India Migration Report 2019: Diaspora in Europe [1 ed.] 9781138602113, 9780429425752

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Notes on contributors
Preface
Acknowledgements
1 Skilled Indians in Switzerland: mobility paths and transnational connections
2 Crossing past and present: heritage and identity among Hindu-Gujarati diaspora in Portugal
3 Indian community in the United Kingdom: settlement, achievements and challenges
4 The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom: an overview of characteristics and contributions to India
5 Pathways of integration in Italy: Indian immigrants in Emilia Romagna
6 International migration and place-based inequalities: the case of high-skilled migration and student mobility to eastern Germany
7 The abstract concept of an ‘Indian community’: perceptions of high-skilled migrants and international students from India in Germany
8 Skilled Indian migrants and their differential engagement with the Dutch society
9 Transnational emotion work: the Punjabi diaspora in Europe
10 Creating communities within a community: understanding the Indian diaspora in Europe
11 The effect of economic capital and Swedish cultural capital on bonding and bridging ties: a study of first-generation Malayalees in Sweden
12 Transforming homelands: Punjabi diaspora and capital flows
13 Diasporic ageing and home-making practices of Hindustani Surinamese older adults in the Netherlands
14 From Kerala to Switzerland: India’s forgotten diaspora
15 Changing demographics and intimate relation patterns among Indian diaspora in Denmark
16 Economic impacts of migration on UK labour markets: the case study of Indians in Britain
17 The impact of the Trump administration on immigration
18 Impact of demographic transition in Kerala on migration and labour force
19 Panel data analysis in Kerala Migration Surveys, 1998–2013
20 Migration and income inequality: evidence from rural Uttar Pradesh
Index

Citation preview

India Migration Report 2019

India Migration Report 2019 examines the issues of identity related to integration in European societies. It examines the multifarious nature of social, economic and political engagements of the Indian diaspora with their host societies in Europe. This volume: • assesses the historical trends in migration to Europe, mobility paths and transnational networks of skilled Indian migrants, as well as recent tendencies in movements of migrants; • explores the roles of Indian migrants in transforming host societies with their skills and capabilities; • highlights their contribution towards the development of their homeland through knowledge transfer, philanthropy, capital flows, remittances and investment; • takes stock of the impact of recent events, especially Brexit and anti-immigrant positioning of some political parties; • uses mixed research methods including ethnography, key informant interviews and in-depth case studies. The volume will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of development studies, economics, demography, sociology and social anthropology, and migration and diaspora studies. S. Irudaya Rajan is Professor at the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India. With more than three decades of research experience in Kerala, he has coordinated seven major migration surveys (1998, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2014 and 2016) in Kerala (with Professor K.C. Zachariah), led the migration surveys in Goa (2008) and Tamil Nadu (2015) and provided technical support to the Gujarat Migration Survey (2010) and Punjab Migration Survey

(2011). He has published extensively in national and international journals on demographic, social, economic, political and psychological implications of international migration. Professor Rajan is currently engaged in several projects on international migration with the New York University, UAE Exchange Centre, India Centre for Migration of the Ministry of External Affairs and International Labour Migration. He worked closely with the erstwhile Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India, Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs (NORKA), Government of Kerala and Kerala State Planning Board. He is currently co-chairing the working group on NORKA for the thirteenth five-year plan (2017–2022) of Kerala State Planning Board, Government of Kerala, and is initiating the Kerala Migration Survey 2018, funded by the Department of NORKA, Government of Kerala. He is editor of the two Routledge series India Migration Report (annual) since 2010 and South Asia Migration Report (biennial) and is the founder and editor-in-chief of the journal Migration and Development.

India Migration Report Editor: S. Irudaya Rajan

Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India

This annual series strives to bring together international networks of migration scholars and policy makers to document and discuss research on various facets of migration. It encourages interdisciplinary commentaries on diverse aspects of the migration experience and continues to focus on the economic, social, cultural, ethical, security and policy ramifications of international movements of people. India Migration Report 2013 Social Costs of Migration India Migration Report 2014 Diaspora and Development India Migration Report 2015 Gender and Migration India Migration Report 2016 Gulf Migration India Migration Report 2017 Forced Migration India Migration Report 2018 Migrants in Europe India Migration Report 2019 Diaspora in Europe For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge.com

India Migration Report 2019 Diaspora in Europe Edited by S. Irudaya Rajan

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 selection and editorial matter, S. Irudaya Rajan; individual chapters, the contributors The right of S. Irudaya Rajan to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-60211-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-42575-2 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Dedicated to the memory of my teachers at International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai Professor K.B. Pathak Professor S. Mukerji

Contents

List of figuresxii List of tablesxiv Notes on contributorsxvi Prefacexviii Acknowledgementsxxv   1 Skilled Indians in Switzerland: mobility paths and transnational connections

1

GABRIELA TEJADA

  2 Crossing past and present: heritage and identity among Hindu-Gujarati diaspora in Portugal

28

INÊS LOURENÇO

  3 Indian community in the United Kingdom: settlement, achievements and challenges

41

SHINDER S. THANDI

  4 The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom: an overview of characteristics and contributions to India

60

RUPA CHANDA

  5 Pathways of integration in Italy: Indian immigrants in Emilia Romagna MEENAKSHI THAPAN

81

x  Contents   6 International migration and place-based inequalities: the case of high-skilled migration and student mobility to eastern Germany

106

MUSTAFA AKSAKAL

  7 The abstract concept of an ‘Indian community’: perceptions of high-skilled migrants and international students from India in Germany

123

KERSTIN SCHMIDT

  8 Skilled Indian migrants and their differential engagement with the Dutch society

137

AJAY BAILEY

  9 Transnational emotion work: the Punjabi diaspora in Europe

154

STEVE TAYLOR

10 Creating communities within a community: understanding the Indian diaspora in Europe

171

PRIYA VIJAYKUMAR POOJARY

11 The effect of economic capital and Swedish cultural capital on bonding and bridging ties: a study of first-generation Malayalees in Sweden

183

RENU VINOD

12 Transforming homelands: Punjabi diaspora and capital flows

200

ROSY HASTIR

13 Diasporic ageing and home-making practices of Hindustani Surinamese older adults in the Netherlands

213

MARLEEN FLUIT, AJAY BAILEY AND RUBEN BOUWMAN

14 From Kerala to Switzerland: India’s forgotten diaspora SANTHY IYYAKKUNNEL

234

Contents xi 15 Changing demographics and intimate relation patterns among Indian diaspora in Denmark

249

RASHMI SINGLA AND AMBIKA VARMA

16 Economic impacts of migration on UK labour markets: the case study of Indians in Britain

274

YASIN KEREM GÜMÜŞ AND RAKESH RANJAN

17 The impact of the Trump administration on immigration

289

S. IRUDAYA RAJAN AND NIKHIL PANICKER

18 Impact of demographic transition in Kerala on migration and labour force

316

S. IRUDAYA RAJAN, BENOY PETER, UDAYA S. MISHRA AND VISHNU NARENDRAN

19 Panel data analysis in Kerala Migration Surveys, 1998–2013

330

S. IRUDAYA RAJAN AND K.C. ZACHARIAH

20 Migration and income inequality: evidence from rural Uttar Pradesh

344

RUCHI SINGH

Index364

Figures

3.1

Indians in England and Wales by birth and settlement period 44 3.2 Representation of religious groups in higher managerial, administrative or professional occupations in England and Wales, 2011 50 6.1 Indian migrant flows in Germany, 1960–2014 109 6.2 In- and outflows of Indian students and professionals to and from Germany, 2010, 2012, 2014 109 15.1 Indian diaspora in Denmark, 2008–2017 251 16.1 Net migration, UK, 1964–2015 275 16.2 Population in UK by country of birth 275 16.3 India-born population (,000) in the United Kingdom 283 17.1 Immigrants as a percentage of US population, 1850–2015291 17.2 US GDP growth rate (%), 1945–2016 292 17.3 Immigration to the US by continent, 1999–2015 293 17.4 Top 6 immigrant-sending countries, 1999–2015 293 17.5 Immigrants in civilian labour force, 1980–2015 297 17.6 Number and share of Mexican immigrants, 1850–2016301 17.7 Refugees from seven Muslim countries, 2006–2015 302 17.8 H-1B visas, 2007–2017 308 17.9 H-1B visas by country, 2016 308 17.10 Occupation and H-1B visas, 2015 309 18.1 Annual exponential growth rate and rate of natural increase of Kerala population, 1961–2011 318 18.2 Population in Kerala by sex and census year, 1961–2011318 18.3 Population distribution: Kerala, 1961 319

Figures xiii 18.4 Population distribution: Kerala, 2011 18.5 Estimates of migrants from Kerala: 1998–2016 18.6 Inter-state migrants to Kerala by place of birth data, census 1971–2001 19.1 Age cohort of head of the households, 1998–2013 19.2 Households by religion

320 322 323 335 336

Tables

3.1 Growth of Indian community in Britain, 1951–2011 44 3.2 Religious population in England and Wales showing changes between 2001 and 2011 45 3.3 Major religious groups among Indians in England and Wales, 2011 45 3.4 Immigration acts and race relations legislation in Britain since 1962 47 4.1 Estimated size of different overseas Indian communities61 11.1 India-born persons and persons born in Sweden with one or both parents from India, as of 31 December 2014 186 14.1 Overview of the interviewed Keralite migrant families in Switzerland, 2015 237 15.1 Indian population in Denmark, 2008–2017 251 15.2 Indian employment, 2015 252 15.3 Indian crime rates, 2000–2016 253 15.4 Marriages in Denmark 254 16.1 Concentration of foreign-born workers employed in the UK 281 16.2 Latest changes in international migration to the UK, year ending March 2016 and year ending March 2017 283 16.3 Latest changes in net migration by citizenship in the UK, year ending March 2016 and year ending March 2017 284 17.1 Immigrant share of total US population, 1970–2015 291 17.2 Share of foreign and native-born workers in occupation, 2015 296 19.1 KMS panels, 1998–2013 331 19.2 KMS old and new panels, 1998–2018 332

Tables xv 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.7 19.8 19.9 19.10 19A.1 19A.2 19A.3 20.1 20.2a 20.2b 20.3a 20.3b 20.4a 20.4b 20.5a 20.5b

Change in household population, 1998–2013 333 Percent of households according to HH size, 1998–2013333 Cross-tabulation of HH sizes, 1998–2013 334 Sex of head of the household, 1998–2013 334 Changes in the migration status of households (distribution)336 Changes in the migration status of households (cross-tabulation 1998–2013) 337 Changes in the quality of houses with migration status, 1998, 2013 338 Standard of Living Index by household type, 1998–2003–2008–2013338 Changes in the quality of house according to migration status, 2013, 2008 341 Changes in the quality of house according to migration status, 2003, 1998 341 Comparison of consumption pattern among household types 342 Distribution of migrant and non-migrant households in selected sample villages in Jaunpur district (in percentage) 349 Demographic profile of sample migrant households of surveyed villages in Jaunpur district 350 Demographic profile of sample migrant households of surveyed villages in Jaunpur district according to 351 their social group Occupational and income details of sample migrant households in surveyed villages of Jaunpur district 353 Occupational and income details of sample migrant households in surveyed villages of Jaunpur district according to social group 354 Income, occupational and expenditure details of migrant and non-migrant households of surveyed villages in Jaunpur district 355 Social group-wise income, occupational and expenditure details of migrants and non-migrant households of surveyed villages in Jaunpur district 356 Gini coefficient with and without remittances for sample villages 358 Gini coefficient across various social groups in sample households of Jaunpur district 358

Contributors

Mustafa Aksakal is post-doctoral researcher at Bielefeld University, Germany. Ajay Bailey is Assistant Professor, Department of Human Geography and Spatial Planning, Utrecht University, the Netherlands and Dr. T.M.A. Pai Endowed Chair in Qualitative Methods, Manipal University, Manipal, India. Ruben Bouwman is with Faculty of Spatial Sciences, University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Rupa Chanda is Reserve Bank of India Chair Professor in Economics at Indian Institute of Management, Bengaluru, India. Marleen Fluit is with Faculty of Spatial Sciences, University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Yasin Kerem Gümüş is Assistant Professor at Sakarya University, Turkey. Rosy Hastir is independent researcher who obtained a doctorate from University of Delhi, India. S Irudaya Rajan is Professor at Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, India. Santhy Iyyakkunnel is researcher with the Graduate Institute in Geneva and lives in Switzerland. Inês Lourenço is an integrated researcher at Center in Research Network in Anthropology, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, and associate researcher at Center for International Studies of the University Institute of Lisbon, Portugal.

Contributors xvii Udaya S. Mishra is Professor at the Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum, India. Vishnu Narendran is Director of Program at Centre for Migration and Inclusive Development, Kochi, India. Nikhil Panicker is Researcher at the Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum, India. Benoy Peter is Executive Director, Centre for Migration and Inclusive Development, Kochi, India. Priya Vijaykumar Poojary is researcher on European studies at Department of European Studies, Manipal University, Karnataka. She was a visiting student at Metropolitan University Prague, Czech Republic. Rakesh Ranjan is Doctoral Fellow at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. Kerstin Schmidt is Faculty of Sociology, Bielefeld University, Germany. Ruchi Singh is Assistant Professor in Rural Management (Emerging Economies) at Prin. L.N. Welingkar Institute of Management Development & Research, Mumbai, India. Rashmi Singla is Associate Professor at Department of People and Technology, Roskilde University, Denmark. Steve Taylor is Professor of Sociology, Department of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Design and Social Sciences, Northumbria University, United Kingdom. Gabriela Tejada is a scientist with Cooperation and Development Center, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland. Shinder S. Thandi is Professor at the Department of Global Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, United States of America. Meenakshi Thapan is Professor of Sociology, Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, India. Ambika Varma is associated with Roskilde University, Denmark. Renu Vinod is independent sociologist and lives in Pune, India. K.C. Zachariah is Honorary Professor at the Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum, India.

Preface

It is my pleasure to introduce the tenth edition of the India Migration Report (IMR), which concentrates on diaspora in Europe. In the current geopolitical climate, the rise in fragmentation of groups is, in part, due to an inadequacy in the understanding of identities and cultures of diaspora around the world. Better knowledge of fellow human beings from a different cultural lineage will make it easier to cross some of these fault lines in society that are being deliberately widened by a few. Based on studies in Europe and India, the current volume examines pathways of settlement of migrants, connectivity and achievement of diaspora communities and challenges faced in successful integration into the larger society. In this framework, the Report emphasises the need to recondition ideals of multiculturalism and union to create a less disintegrated world. Before we consider the contents of this volume, I would like to recapitulate the ideas discussed in previous ones. The inaugural volume, India Migration Report 2010, researched labour management and governance issues on international labour migration. The Report assessed the flow and characteristics of different types of migrant workers to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to make a comparison with historical phases. Along with factoring the gender dimensions of migration, the Report scrutinised prevailing labour laws that lead to human rights violations at the destination and the unscrupulous practices of recruitment at the source. The need for a national migration policy for India was emphasised especially considering the fact that other labour-exporting nations such as the Philippines have implemented such a policy, making their migration practices more just. The second volume, India Migration Report 2011, investigated identity, conflict and violence in the context of internal migration within India. The Report focused on the implications of internal migration, livelihood strategies, recruitment processes, and development and

Preface xix policy concerns to critically review the existing institutional framework. This volume also analysed the various facets of migration, focusing on employment networks, gender dimensions and linkages between migration and development, to provide concrete policy suggestions to improve the living and working conditions of vulnerable migrant workers who are a lifeline to the growth of the Indian economy. The India Migration Report 2012 studied dimensions of the global financial crisis and its economic and social impact on governance, emigration, remittances, return migration and re-integration. The Report, through rigorous quantitative and qualitative analyses and fieldwork in both the Gulf region and South Asia, concluded that, contrary to popular predictions, both emigration and remittances were more resilient than expected. The fourth volume, India Migration Report 2013, was an empirical assessment of an often-neglected space in migration research – the social, psychological and human costs for both migrants and the families they leave behind. Based on qualitative and quantitative research, the Report addressed concerns such as children’s negotiation of parental migration, coping mechanisms adopted by women left behind, utilisation of social networks by the elderly, along with broader impacts of migration on the family and the demographic implications on society. In addition, the Report also included articles dealing with skilled mobility such as nurses’ migration and critical assessments of bilateral mobility agreements among nations to protect Indian workers. In the fifth volume, India Migration Report 2014, results from one of the first series of systematic studies on contribution of diasporas in development, both in countries of origin as well as destination, were presented. Based on case studies on Indian diaspora in the Gulf region and the United Kingdom, the Report probed how diasporas’ human and financial resources could be utilised for economic growth and sustainable development, especially in education and health. Moreover, the Report offered critical insights on migrant experiences, transnationalism, philanthropic networks, and indigenisation and diaspora policies. The India Migration Report 2015 explored migration and its crucial linkages with gender. While documenting the experiences of migrants from across India, the Report highlighted the relationship between economics and changing gender dynamics brought about by migration, by studying important issues such as irregular migration, marriage migration and domestic labour migration, and the interconnections of migration, gender and caste.

xx  Preface The seventh volume, India Migration Report 2016, was exclusively on migration to the Persian Gulf region. Bringing together the latest field data on migrants across states in India, this volume looked at contemporary labour recruitment and policy, both in India and in the GCC countries. Furthermore, the Report also considered gender dimensions of India–Gulf migration corridor to understand the increasing vulnerability of female migrants. In the eighth volume, India Migration Report 2017, attention was drawn to forced migration caused by political conflicts, climate change, natural as well as man-made disasters and development projects. Apart from conflicts and disasters, development projects, including urban redevelopment and beautification, often justified as serving the interests of the people, have caused massive displacements in different parts of the country that have disrupted the lives and livelihoods of millions of people. Combining a rich mix of research methods and in-depth case studies, this Report examined the brunt of forced migration on diverse groups such as peasants, the poor, religious and ethnic minorities, and women that lead to their exclusion and marginalisation. The struggles and protests movements of displaced groups across regions and their outcomes were also assessed in this volume. And finally, the previous volume, India Migration Report 2018, was on migration to Europe. This Report, with an emphasis on recent international events such as the European Refugee Crisis and Brexit, researched various issues faced by migrants in Europe such as social security benefits, work permit schemes, policy changes in terms of visa requirements for health, information, technology professionals and linguistic and gender norms within transnational communities. The India Migration Report 2019 features the life and history of Indian diaspora in Europe. According to the United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), with over 15.5 million living outside the country in 2015, India’s diaspora population is one of the largest in the world. Since 2005, when Indians formed the world’s third-largest diaspora at 9.5 million, their numbers have risen by a staggering 60 percent. Additionally, the total number of international migrants grew by over 41 percent since 2000 to 244 million, or about 3.3 percent of the world population. The host society with the largest number of international migrants is Europe, with 76 million immigrants. Moreover, of the twenty countries with the largest number of international migrants living abroad, six are in Europe. Migration, being one of the defining features of the twenty-first century, significantly contributes to economic and social development everywhere. As such, migration will be key to achieving the Sustainable

Preface xxi Development Goals (SDGs). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognises for the first time the contribution of migration to sustainable development. Migration is a cross-cutting issue and is relevant to all of the SDGs. Particularly, SDG 16 calls on states to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’. However, in spite of these agreements, legal and social protection coverage of migrants remains low. Furthermore, established diaspora are increasingly being alienated, and in many cases even subjugated, by populist regimes. This volume is an inter-disciplinary work of twenty chapters that explore these issues and more. In the opening chapter, based on evidence collected through in-depth interviews, Gabriela Tejada looks at the mobility paths and experiences of Indian students and skilled professionals in Switzerland and examines the transnational contacts, knowledge, skills and social capital they accumulate that shape the type of connection they have with India. The second chapter narrates how the process of building places of worship is akin to territorialising immigrant presence that creates new symbolic universes. Inês Lourenço, with intensive ethnographic research focuses on the process of identity consolidation around material culture and temple construction of a Hindu community in the Great Lisbon Area. The choices of tangible and intangible heritage made by individuals to represent themselves, their community and their diverse backgrounds are also analysed in this chapter. In the third chapter, Shinder S. Thandi provides both a historical overview on migration patterns as well as recent trends in Indian migration to the UK and assesses the socio-economic condition of contemporary Indian diaspora in the UK. India’s long migratory relationship with the UK, which deepened during the colonial period and expanded afterwards, has led to the emergence of an economically and politically successful Indian community in the UK. This has had important implications for both the inner dynamics of the Indian diaspora in the UK as well as on Indo-British economic and diplomatic relations. Finally, this chapter discusses some of the current challenges facing the community. The fourth chapter, by Rupa Chanda, focuses on the Punjabi diaspora community in the UK and their contributions to the home state of Punjab. Based on in-depth discussions with Punjabis settled in the UK as well as migration and diaspora experts on the contributions made by this diaspora to their home state, the author emphasises the importance of creating a business-friendly environment in the state of

xxii  Preface Punjab to incentivise successful diaspora to participate in the developmental process. In the fifth chapter, Meenakshi Thapan takes a look at the diverse ways in which citizens and immigrants in northern Italy are engaged in the processes of integration across cultures, faiths and linguistic barriers. Cosmopolitan sociability and its construction through networks of interconnection and locally based activities have been imperative in blurring racial lines in Italy, which is popularly known as a strongly nationalistic society. Indian migration to Germany is momentous. In 2016, India represented the most important non-EU country of origin for high-skilled migrants and the second-most-significant sending country for international students. Although there is strength in numbers, Mustafa Aksakal in Chapter 6 talks about territorial inequalities that have an influence on integration and subsequently affect personal goal achievement among Indian migrants. The author demonstrates that due to low exposure to diversity among the native population, institutions and companies, Indians living in the eastern states of Germany experience discrimination and exclusion. The seventh chapter by Kerstin Schmidt seeks to understand the abstract concept of ‘Indian community’. Using a mixed research method, this chapter unfolds the concept as a social group arising out of a desire to belong and as a means to be distant from other migrants, especially humanitarian migrants. The eighth chapter by Ajay Bailey is a qualitative study based on narratives of skilled Indian migrants in the Netherlands. This chapter gives deeper insights on how they perceive their role in the Dutch society and what they recognise to be their contributions. These contributions are mediated through a range of intersectional identities such as gender, skills, religion, caste and class, making the experiences of migrants diverse. This lack of common space for bonding is an impediment in creating meaningful relationships with civil society and the government. Steve Taylor, in Chapter 9, contributes to a vastly growing literature on transnational ‘emotion work’. Emotion work refers to the management of feeling in order to create a publicly observable display. This outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others, and which is part of a search for identity, is explored deeply within an Indian Punjabi transnational community in Europe. In the tenth chapter, Priya Vijaykumar Poojary dives deep to understand the serious question – what exactly is the Indian diaspora? This chapter is the result of ten interviews of Indians living in different parts

Preface xxiii of Europe to understand the idea of ‘Indianness’. The similarities and differences between people who retain and shed certain aspects of this idea are advanced to discern if Indians abroad constitute a uniting diaspora. Renu Vinod, in the eleventh chapter, links empirical evidence with theoretical literature on the inter-disciplinary concept of social capital to demonstrate the selectivity that first-generation Malayalees in Sweden exhibit in building intimate bonding capital within social groups. This chapter suggests that contrary to popular belief, shared ethnic identity does not invariably lead to the creation of strong bonding capital. Chapter 12 by Rosy Hastir looks at various transnational links migrants maintain with their homeland. These links are shown to be imperative in the development and transformation of their native communities in the homeland. This chapter is the consequence of a study of Punjabi Sikh migrants in Italy, the second largest Sikh population in Europe after the United Kingdom. In Chapter 13, Marleen Fluit, Ajay Bailey and Ruben Bouwman examine the topic of older migrants in Europe by investigating the home-making practices of older Hindustani Surinamese living in the Netherlands that contribute to their well-being. The sharing of rituals in schemas provides a sense of community and safety that are highly valued by most in old age. The fourteenth chapter, by Santhy Iyyakkunnel, stresses the importance of diaspora engagement by the source societies. Switzerland and the Indian state of Kerala, on which this chapter is based, is a classic example on the untapped and under-utilised potential of diaspora. The author reminds us not to ignore smaller diaspora populations in favour of larger ones. In Chapter 15, Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma skilfully diverge from the much discussed social and economic context of Indian diaspora to focus on psychosocial aspects of transnationalism and the formation of intimate relationships. Empirically, they study the formation of ‘mixed couples’ consisting of Indians in ethnically heterogamous relationships with Danish spouses and the transformation of these relationship patterns over the decades, thus touching on notions of belonging and identity. Chapter 16 studies the management of labour migration during times of financial and political crises. Using data from the United Kingdom, Yasin Kerem Gümüş and Rakesh Ranjan explore the negative impact on the strength and agility of labour markets due to economic crises and conceive ways to navigate following periods of recovery.

xxiv  Preface Chapters 17 to 20 investigate other topics on migration. In Chapter 17, S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker scrutinise the influence of the presidency of Donald Trump on migration. They also deliberate on the politics and attitudes about immigration that led to his election. Besides, the rationale behind and repercussions of Trump’s policies on immigration are developed in detail. S. Irudaya Rajan, Benoy Peter, Udaya S. Mishra and Vishnu Narendran, in Chapter 18, delve into the demographic transition in the Indian state of Kerala, a state set apart from the rest of the country in human development. This chapter summarises the changes in mortality and fertility in Kerala since its formation and the impact of these changes on the migration scenario of the state. Implications of such a scenario for the state’s economy, which is heavily dependent on remittances, are also analysed. Chapter 19 is on the results from a panel data analysis of four rounds of Kerala Migration Surveys (KMSs) between 1998 and 2013. The research spanning fifteen years effectively answers questions on the nature of transformation of migrant households. KMS 2018 will improve the scope of this panel study, and it will be the first migration study in the world to understand the lives of migrants over a span of twenty years. The final chapter is on the complicated and less understood relation between migration and income inequality. Here, Ruchi Singh inquires into this critical relationship as proposed by the new economics of labour migration (NELM) through empirical research in rural Uttar Pradesh – a region currently witnessing a high growth rate in migration. The future volumes of the India Migration Report are in the process. IMR 2020 will concentrate on refugees in India while the focus of the 2021 volume will be the health of migrants. S. Irudaya Rajan

Acknowledgements

The India Migration Reports (IMR), since their inception a decade ago, have drawn great support and global recognition from readers that include development practitioners, policy makers, researchers as well as activists and have emerged as influential reference works in the field. I express my sincere gratitude to all contributors who have helped make every volume in this series a must-read. In particular, I thank all the contributors who have made IMR 2019 an appealing and thought-provoking collection of articles on diaspora in Europe. The series, which was conceived in 2008, after the erstwhile Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) established the Research Unit on International Migration (RUIM) at the Centre for Development Studies in 2006, has successfully brought out ten volumes. I take this opportunity to thank all the secretaries at the MOIA, in particular S. Krishna Kumar, K. Mohandas and Dr. A. Didar Singh, for their backing and guidance throughout the life of RUIM at CDS between 2006 and 2016. At CDS, I thank K.M. Chandrasekhar, Chairman; Sunil Mani, Director; Suresh Kumar, Registrar; V. Sriram, Librarian; and S. Suresh, Finance Officer, along with my colleagues, students, administrative and library staff for their encouragement and wishes in all my academic endeavours. Over the last ten years, earlier directors at CDS, K.N. Nair, Pulapre Balakrishnan and Amit Shovon Ray; and Chairpersons N.R. Madhava Menon and Bimal Jalan have provided all the necessary backing to make the series a success. I also appreciate my own research team members – S. Sunitha, K.S. Sreeja, Nikhil Panicker, Sidharth Rony, Sayed Migdad and Sreelakshmi R. – who were fundamental in putting this report together.

xxvi  Acknowledgements Besides, I am indebted to my wife Hema and our three children – Rahul, Rohit and Mary Catharine – for their emotional support, patience and understanding throughout the years. Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge the hard work of the editorial and sales teams at Routledge in bringing this report out on time. S. Irudaya Rajan

1 Skilled Indians in Switzerland Mobility paths and transnational connections Gabriela Tejada 1.1 Introduction Global transformations and technological advances have helped generate communication and information systems and transport networks that have facilitated connections between people and their mobility. The intensification of international migration, which involves increased movements of skilled persons to countries other than their own, has led to concerns about the effects that it has on developing countries (Castles and Miller 2009). Although we are now witnessing a type of human mobility, especially in the case of skilled professionals, that is of a more temporary and flexible nature than that of previous decades, the social capital accumulated by these people and their transnational connections has taken on a particular relevance. The studies that examine the power of Western countries to attract talent mention the demand for skilled professionals in innovative production sectors, the internationalisation of higher education, the prestige of academic and research institutions, the proliferation of post-graduate scholarships and migratory policies. These elements, combined with others of an emotional and personal nature, play a decisive role in mobility-related decisions and about whether migrants remain in the host country or return to their country of origin. India is a very interesting case to study for several reasons. Until the last decade, the vast majority of skilled Indians saw the United States as their main destination for work or study, but in more recent times, the countries of continental Europe have become alternative destinations, especially within the academic, research and engineering sectors. As India has developed into one of the countries of origin with the largest numbers of skilled personnel and international students, it has been increasingly considered as a priority country in public higher-education and labour-market strategies. Its growing global importance in terms

2  Gabriela Tejada of science, technology and innovation has also seen it become an essential partner for scientific cooperation and research. In addition, more and more skilled Indians are seen as being capable of generating social transformations in India, with recent studies confirming their role in the development of knowledge-intensive activities there and their active involvement in the country’s integration into the global market (Kapur 2004; Saxenian 2006). This has reinforced the image of the Indian diaspora as having an important role to play as an active and creative mediator that is generating change in India (Leclerc and Meyer 2007; Siddiqui and Tejada 2014). While the mobility of skilled Indians to Europe has attracted plenty of attention, we still know very little about the Indian skilled professionals and students in these destination countries and their employment or study situation in the local contexts. There is also scant evidence about their transnational contacts and the social capital they have accumulated through their mobility paths and the effects that these have on their mobility decisions and their type of connections with the home country. This chapter illustrates a case study of skilled Indians in Switzerland, who are mostly temporary stayers, ready to leave the country in the short-term horizon. According to the Swiss Federal Statistics Office, almost half of all Indians with a tertiary education remain in Switzerland for less than five years.1 They stay in Switzerland in the expectation of continuing their migratory journey elsewhere, to new destinations that arise according to available opportunities and personal interests. The social capital they accumulate during their career itineraries plays a decisive role in their migration preferences and decisions. Even though the value attached to social capital depends on time and place, the new spatial forms created by international migrants reveal the power of transnational contacts as valuable assets for their local and transnational-based practices. Based on evidence collected through in-depth interviews, this chapter focuses on the mobility paths and experiences of Indian students and skilled professionals in the Swiss local context, and it examines the transnational contacts, knowledge, skills and further social capital they accumulate in different spaces and places, which influence their subsequent mobility decisions and shape the type of connection they have with India.

1.2 Mobility, social capital and transnational connections In reviewing the literature that examines the mobility paths and experiences of skilled human resources and the conditions for

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 3 socio-economic and technological progress, the studies that stand out allow us to assess the manner in which these elements are interrelated and the effects that are generated for the countries. For the most part, the literature represents two fields of study. The first of these focuses on the links between science, technology and society, and it looks at the international mobility of skilled human resources from the perspective of the internationalisation of higher education and the globalisation of science. Within the current context of accelerated globalisation, which in its broadest concept involves an increase in world connectivity and the expansion of a global conscience (Robertson 2016), we see how developed countries compete with each other to attract talent from the global offer of human capital, while the mobility of skilled personnel in search of opportunities outside their borders increases. Recognising the value of knowledge in terms of strengthening the systems of innovation and progress, this mobility has considerable potential for the destination countries, which benefit from the contributions of skilled individuals, but it also has potential for the countries of origin, especially the less developed ones (Vinck 2013). Recent case studies have set out strategies to absorb human capital by using retention or return mechanisms, the transfer of knowledge and skills through institutional-linkage networks and the establishment of knowledge diasporas (Kuznetsov 2006; Tejada 2012; Meyer 2015). The second field focuses on the links between migration and development, where the growing transnational nature of migration – so relevant in contemporary migration – has become more prominent over the past two decades (Vertovec 2004; Bauböck and Faist 2010; Faist et al. 2011). Recent research analyses the capacity of migrants to get involved simultaneously in multiple locations through various kinds of links, and this research incorporates observations of the circulation of ideas, symbols and knowledge into the study of the movement of persons (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004; Vertovec 2004; Faist 2010). The interest in the transnational actions carried out by migrants, whether individually or as members of diasporas, translates into an academic discussion that sees them as agents who are capable of generating positive effects for the countries of origin (Kapur 2004; Faist et al. 2011; Kuznetsov 2013). Within the two fields of study, we can see a special analytical focus on aspects related to the circulation of knowledge and other resources that skilled migrants acquire and accumulate through their international academic or professional experiences and the actions that link them to their country of origin. Empirical evidence has allowed us to analyse the profiles of emigrated students and skilled professionals,

4  Gabriela Tejada their international mobility paths, the elements that influence their mobility decisions, and the types of resources and links that they accumulate during their career itineraries. The reflection includes recommendations on mechanisms and strategies that allow the countries of origin to absorb these resources through physical return or by capitalising on skills and resources from a distance (CODEV-EPFL et al. 2013). Some assumptions and analytical elements from the literature on international migration, whilst not sufficiently addressing the study of skilled migration, are useful in terms of understanding it better. In an analytical framework based on social capital and social remittances, it is interesting to observe the forms of social capital that skilled migrants acquire during their academic paths and professional experiences and the effect that these have on their mobility decisions and the establishment of transnational links. They usually accumulate contacts, knowledge, skills, ideas and other social capital during their migratory paths. The transfer of this accumulated social capital to the country of origin is known as social remittances (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). Bourdieu (1986) defines social capital as the cumulative actual and potential resources that are interconnected to the possession of a durable network of established relationships of mutual recognition. For Putnam (2000), social capital denotes the nature and degree of one’s social relations and associated norms of reciprocity. According to Portes (1998), social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures. For Bruggeman (2008) social capital represents the benefits of the interpersonal contacts of social networks, where social cohesion as well as structural and contextual elements are crucial for their creation. Such considerations denote social capital as an individual’s duties and prospects in the form of resources or capital invested in someone for future use. It is therefore a resource that is capitalised upon and turned into concrete assets by the recipients. Social capital is closely related to individual mobility decisions. According to Faist (2000), the decisions that potential migrants make about whether to remain or to leave must be considered within the context of their connections. Van Mol (2017) shows that transnational social capital acquired by international students through their overseas experiences and contacts leads to increased aspirations to repeat migration. Following Nowicka and Serbedzija (2016), when we study social remittances, we need to look beyond the types of resources that are being sent and incorporate the result of the transactions that impact social relations, cultural values and rules and the economic conditions

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 5 of the actors involved into the focus. The interest in the effects of these transfers is evident, and empirical research shows us that the process of social transformation has taken on a relevant role as a conceptual framework that allows us to understand the link between human mobility and global change (De Haas 2008; Glick Schiller and Faist 2009; Castles 2012; Nowicka and Serbedzija 2016). This discussion highlights the fact that the assets linked to social remittances can generate positive or negative effects, for example by contributing to rising or declining income inequality (Glick Schiller and Faist 2009). While Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011) point out that migrants can be agents who change their societies of origin and contribute to a restructuring of social inequalities through social remittances, Lacroix et al. (2016) highlight the determining role that available material resources play in ensuring an effective circulation of ideas and practices whilst warning of the relationship between the transfer of social remittances and social disparities. Another relevant angle for our study is the analysis of space and place with the upsurge of transnational social spaces (Faist 2000, Vertovec 2001; Van Riemsdijk and Wang 2017). Recognising the power of social networks and transnational contacts that extend beyond national borders as a necessary element for understanding international mobility, the literature examines how these contacts and networks facilitate social action and help people to easily reach their objectives, and it shows that contemporary migrants have developed the skill of building new spatial forms. The value attached to a migrant’s skills, competences and other social capital depends on time and place, as well as the person and the socio-cultural and political context that they find themselves in (Kuvik 2012; Van Riemsdijk 2013). Notwithstanding the wealth of contributions from the perspective of space and place, these have not sufficiently explained the process of the accumulation of social capital by skilled migrants along their mobility trajectories and their local and transnational place-based practices.

1.3 Indian students and skilled professionals in Western Europe India has been a significant source country of international labour for many years. Overseas Indians constitute one of the world’s largest diasporas, which was estimated to be about 30 million strong in 2016.2 Indian labour migrants can be found in multiple regions around the world. While the Middle East is a common destination for low-skilled Indians, the highly skilled are mainly found in North America and

6  Gabriela Tejada Europe (especially the United Kingdom; Khadria 2007). Over the last decade, Indians comprised the fourth-largest group of new immigrants in the OECD space (after China, Romania and Poland), with a yearly average of 236,000 Indians migrating to these countries between 2005 and 2015. In 2015, Indians represented 3.9 percent of all new OECD immigrant inflows. In addition, within the OECD group of countries, India is the top source of skilled migrants from non-industrialised countries (UN-UNDESA and OECD 2013). Over the past two decades and more, we have been able to observe a systematic increase in the flows of skilled professionals from India to new destinations in continental Europe, which have emerged as a consequence of their transformation into knowledge-based economies and their policy strategies to attract skilled personnel (Buga and Meyer 2012; Mosneaga 2014; OECD 2017). Current Indian skilled migration to Europe comprises mainly persons involved in research and academia, engineers and professionals in the ICTs, finance and management, and the pharmaceutical sector (CODEV-EPFL et al. 2013). Indian international students are also an important component here, as they are a significant constituent of skilled migrants and represent the fastest-growing group among all migrant groups (OECD 2017). The role of international students as knowledge migrants who have the capacity to become mediators in shaping the structure, power and sustainability of academic knowledge has gained relevance with the increased number of international students over the last few decades (Findlay 2010; Raghuram 2013; King and Raghuram 2013; Riaño and Piguet 2016). Also, the study-to-work transition of international students, as a significant dimension of the transitional character of this category of migrants, has gained attention in recent research (Kuptsch 2006; Findlay et al. 2012; Mosneaga 2014). The increase in Indian international student mobility of recent years is relevant. The UNESCO Institute for Statistics Database (UNESCO – UIS 2015) shows that international students from India increased almost threefold between 2000 and 2013, rising from 62,342 to 181,872. After China, Indian students make up the second largest number of international students enrolled in OECD countries, with Indians totalling 186,000 in 2014. In contrast to the 7 percent drop in the number of Chinese student enrolments in OECD countries between 2013 and 2014, Indian enrolments increased by 13 percent (OECD 2017). There are several factors to explain this growth. On the one hand, overseas experience is highly valued in India given the prevalent view that a foreign degree ensures better employment and better career prospects. Besides, more and more Indians are motivated

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 7 to pursue higher education and further specialisation out of their country as part of their career paths. This is related to a recognition of the benefits involved such as having access to study provisions and higher-quality research conditions (Martin-Rovet 2003; Findlay et al. 2012), as well as personal self-realisation associated with travel and experiencing another culture (King 2002; Ackers and Gill 2008). The rising Indian middle class that can afford foreign education is another influential factor (Kumar et al. 2009; Mukherjee and Chanda 2012), and this points to the transformation of the geographies of middleclass decision making in education as a result of the rise of the international education market (Waters 2006). On the other hand, the internationalisation of higher education and competition for foreign talent among academic institutions stimulates a stronger demand for international students and active promoting strategies (Tremblay 2005; Mosneaga 2014; Hercog and Van de Laar 2017). This is backed by targeted immigration policies in destination countries, which facilitate the recruitment of people who are considered to offer the highest economic payback. This trend of pushing student migration as a forerunner of labour migration (Kuptsch 2006; Ackers and Gill 2008; Findlay et al. 2012) is implemented in the praxis by allowing students who have been awarded degrees in their country to stay on after their studies and by giving them special treatment when they apply for residence permits. Some countries in continental Europe are following this path. For example, the Netherlands and Germany allow foreign students to stay and seek employment for up to twelve and eighteen months, respectively, after they have completed their studies, while stays of up to six months are allowed in France and Switzerland. The Netherlands has recently moved to allow international students to come to study for more than 90 days by abolishing the requirement to apply for a temporary residence permit. The Netherlands and France have recently introduced targeted entry schemes for international innovative start-up entrepreneurs, which will potentially prompt those Indians who are willing to pursue the entrepreneurial path (including international students) to consider moving to these countries to develop their business ideas. Despite these new policies, these countries are still not attractive enough as prospective work destinations to entice international students after graduation. As Hercog and Van de Laar (2016) have shown, even though continental European countries are attracting more and more Indian students for education purposes, they are still failing to absorb them into the local labour market or offer them interesting long-term career prospects. Failing to provide a smoother transition from studying to the labour

8  Gabriela Tejada market means that these countries remain short-term destinations, and this limits the relevance of the policies they have adopted to target skilled individuals (De Grip et al. 2009; Boeri et al. 2012; Hercog and Van de Laar 2016).

1.4 The Swiss context Whereas in previous decades the prevalent strategy in Switzerland focussed on attracting foreign human capital as an economic buffer, this has evolved in recent years towards a more liberal option. Today, together with a favourable labour and academic environment, immigration policies aimed at attracting skilled foreign personnel who can bring a critical mass that is valuable for the economic interests of the country are complementary factors that have influenced the evolution of skilled migration from India to Switzerland, including the reception of international students (Becker et al. 2008; Pecoraro and Fibbi 2010; Mosneaga 2014). As international student recruitment is increasingly becoming a central part of the Swiss bilateral strategy for academic and scientific cooperation with specific countries, higher education and research policies are being restructured across the cantons to secure quality, competitiveness and growth (Becker and Kolster 2012). According to data from the OECD (2017), Switzerland registered a total of 50,000 enrolments of international students in 2014. There was a particularly high share of international students at PhD level, accounting for 53 percent of all PhD enrolments in the country (against an average of 22 percent registered in OECD countries). During the latter part of the last century, migration from India to Switzerland was the result of a modest flow of skilled persons. At that time, the Indian community in Switzerland was made up of a small group with diverse ethnic and linguistic characteristics, distributed geographically across the country. During this period associations were established, and these allowed students, and people from India in general, to meet and hold cultural and entertainment events with their fellow citizens. This geography has been recently transformed as a result of the rapid increase in the migration of skilled professionals, students and scientists from India, especially in the areas of engineering, finance and management and biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry. According to data from the Swiss Federal Office for Statistics (SFOS),3 the total number of Swiss-based individuals with Indian citizenship was estimated to be 2,353 and 3,864 in 1980 and 1990, respectively, whereas by the years 2000 and 2010 these estimated totals had reached 5,864 and 10,391, respectively. In 2015, the

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 9 total estimated number of people with Indian citizenship in Switzerland was 13,589, which represents an increase of 231 percent since the turn of the millennium. This population, made up of 9,150 men and 4,439 women, is composed for the most part of recent young immigrants (between the ages of 25 and 45) who have a high level of education (80 percent of them have third-level education), and they live mainly in the cantons of Zurich, Basel, Geneva and Vaud, which are representative due to the importance of their universities and research centres, as well as their multinational companies and industry. If we examine the determining factors that facilitate or limit the incorporation and integration of skilled professionals and students from India in Switzerland, we can observe that the particular characteristics of the context and the social environment to which they are exposed play a significant role (Liebig et al. 2012; Hercog and Tejada 2013). Several elements such as the scientific and educational excellence of Swiss academic and research institutions, which are at the vanguard of technological progress and innovation, the high quality of life, security, as well as the favourable employment conditions offered by transnational companies all add up to provide a welcoming context that favours skilled migrants. Liebig et al. (2012) highlight the favourable conditions that the Swiss labour market offers emigrant workers, and they base their findings on the fact that three out of every four persons of the total number of foreign workers are in employment, placing Switzerland as the leading country among the OECD countries. These elements, together with the internationalisation of higher education and the professions, have resulted in the prevalence of a favourable situation for skilled migrants from India in Switzerland. At the same time, they possess valuable social capital, as they have a high educational level, work in jobs that are professionally recognised and have international experience. However, on occasion, several elements of a personal nature as well as others related to local structures may possibly make it difficult for them to integrate into Swiss society outside the academic or professional environment. The temporary nature of their residence in Switzerland may also be determinant (Hercog and Tejada 2013). 1.4.1 In-depth interviews with skilled Indians in Switzerland The following sections provide a qualitative analysis intended to help understand the mobility paths of skilled Indians in Switzerland and their experiences in the local context, with a particular focus on their

10  Gabriela Tejada transnational contacts and social capital accumulated, which influence their onward mobility decisions and shape their connections with India. A series of 30 semi-structured interviews was held with Indian students, researchers and skilled professionals living in Switzerland with a view to advancing our knowledge of these issues. The study also benefits from observations made by the author while participating in conferences and workshops on Indian international mobility as well as her attendance at social and cultural gatherings organised by the Indian community. The chapter draws on results from a broader research project on skilled Indians in selected European countries and returnees in India, which explored opportunities to leverage their potential in home country development, including the return option. The study was completed as part of the international project Migration, scientific diasporas and development. Impact of skilled returned migration on development in India4 (CODEV-EPFL et al. 2013; Tejada et al. 2014). The interviews were conducted with thirty individuals living in Switzerland who gave detailed explanations of their mobility trajectories and experiences, the motives that brought them to Switzerland, their study and/or working situation and experiences in the Swiss context, their connections involving India and the factors influencing further mobility plans. The interviews were conducted in several Swiss cities at two different times: a first round of twenty interviews was held in the period between July 2011 and June 2012, and these were complemented by ten additional interviews conducted between May and August 2017. Together, the interviews represent a sample of Indian students and researchers from several disciplines in main Swiss universities and professionals in the sectors of engineering and ICTs, finance, banking and the pharmaceutical and food industries. Ten of the interviewees were women and twenty were men, and they represent a variety of trajectories, resident status and lengths of stay. Each interview lasted about one to two hours and they were recorded and transcribed. The following sections present some observations of the testimonies given by the interviewed persons in relation to these topics. 1.4.2 Mobility motives and trajectories Better possibilities for professional advancement in the more developed countries is one of the most frequently cited aspects among the motivations for moving and remaining abroad. The benefits that result from good working conditions and a competitive income level, career opportunities and academic training opportunities at prestigious institutions,

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 11 as well as quality public services, also have an influence on mobility decisions (Gibson and McKenzie 2009). Despite the existing differences between academic disciplines and professional sectors, the internationalisation of the professions and higher education enables people to be more susceptible to mobility and more flexible when choosing their destinations, and this confirms the current multi-directionality and elasticity of skilled mobility (Meyer 2003; Bruneau 2010). Prior experience of living abroad, whether it be for education, work or personal reasons, is an indicator of the mobility of a person and their familiarity with the cost of migration (Grundel and Peters 2008). Getting educated abroad increases the probability of an individual working in a foreign country (Parey and Waldinger 2008; De Grip et al. 2009). The elements of space and place are also determining factors in mobility decisions, as shown in a recent study that examines whether the migratory paths of the skilled Indians are planned and carried out according to those advance plans or whether, on the contrary, their experiences in the host country make them change their plans and stay away for longer or move on sooner to another destination (Hercog and Siddiqui 2014). The study shows that perceptions of the quality of the institutions and conditions regarding the context and migratory policies in the host country affect immediate and future decisions. The time of stay in the destination country is also a factor of influence, as a longer stay in a host country allows a person to adjust better to the local society, rules and culture and in general to be less inclined to move on to another country or return to the country of origin. After examining the migratory paths of the skilled Indians that we spoke to, we can see that, in general terms, there is no single reason behind their mobility decisions, but rather they have multiple reasons which are often interrelated. The most common reasons are a desire to access opportunities for academic advancement and professional growth and also, albeit to a lesser extent, to accompany a partner or reunite a family. Various elements influence Indians’ mobility decisions depending on their main activity: skilled professionals working in the private sector on the one hand and students, researchers and professionals working in research and/or academia on the other, although the limits between the two categories are often not very clear. Skilled professionals move to Switzerland to pursue career development opportunities and accumulate experience in multinational or Swiss firms. Their mobility is mainly industry-driven and arranged by recruitment and relocation agencies and facilitated by their professional networks and

12  Gabriela Tejada organisational channels. In contrast, for students, researchers and professionals in the academic and research sector, migration is mainly driven by individual motivation and facilitated by their personal contacts and networks as they search for opportunities to expand their careers. In their case, scholarship programes and academic exchanges and scientific collaborations are formal vehicles of mobility. The international professional and scientific setting together with Switzerland’s academic and scientific excellence are regarded as valuable assets by skilled Indians as they seek to develop their careers. They mostly move in search of opportunities at the best institutions and companies, and geographic location does not play a crucial part in their choices. They generally stay in Switzerland on a temporary basis. This is especially true in the case of recently arrived Indians, as they see this move as another step in their ongoing movement to other destinations. Their narratives correspond to those usually depicted by nondomiciled transmigrants or globetrotters (Mahroum 2000), who are always ready to move from country to country, guided by the opportunities with their corporations. A male professional in management who works for an international company in Geneva said that he first moved from Mumbai to London to study and from there to Geneva for work, where he has spent six months. He plans to stay a further two years and then move to Asia or the US: The opportunity, the potential for growth and salary made me decide to come to Switzerland. I had three other offers, two in India and one in the UK. I had interned here over the summer and I liked it; that is why I joined. Quality of life is high and working conditions are excellent. (However) I am not interested in staying in Switzerland. I am hungry for opportunities and growth, and right now these are not in Europe. A female PhD student at the University of Lausanne said that a mix of scientific excellence and financial benefits was behind her decision to come to Switzerland rather than go to the UK: I applied for PhD opportunities in the UK and Europe. I wanted to be in Europe because the US is far away. I was accepted by a very good lab in Oxford but funding for international students at that time was cut. So I accepted the offer from the University of Lausanne, which is renowned for its biological science research. I liked the place and the lab and the professors are great. At a PhD level, you get employee status and are paid, which is a big advantage.

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 13 The accumulation of transnational contacts of skilled Indians is noteworthy within the context of their migratory paths. Their mobility, which often involves different destinations before they arrive in Switzerland, reveals multi-site paths that enable them to accumulate transnational contacts, experiences and different types of skills (professional, technical and social) that come into play simultaneously in Switzerland and in India. These connections are favourable in terms of furthering mobility and advancing their professional careers. Accordingly, we can say that the mobility trajectories and plans are influenced by the social relations and the professional and academic contacts that skilled migrants establish during their experiences abroad. We see that, in defining spaces through mobility and interaction, transnational contacts link skilled Indians to specific places of origin and destination, offering them an array of social capital that extends the limits of the spaces where they move and thereby opening up new opportunities (Mahroum 2000; Van Mol 2017). A female PhD student at the University of Zurich explained that a friend in Germany had been a key contact for her move. I knew a lot about studying in Switzerland before I came, as a friend I met in Bremen instructed me about visa procedures and students’ associations here. I also got to know my supervisor through her. This was of great help. We have observed that families often shape mobility decisions. Like in the findings of Hercog and Van de Laar (2017), we observed that a family’s social capital not only acts as an enabler of mobility, supported by social networks, but it can also deter mobility when private responsibilities or constraints impede new undertakings. The testimonies of the skilled Indians reveal their confrontation with the strong expectations of international adaptation from their families, colleagues and other people around them, and the consequent mobility, for their academic and professional development. We can say therefore that their decisions are the result of a complex continuum of coercion and free-will’ (King 2002). As one male master’s student at the EPFL in Lausanne said, ‘I am the first in my family to study abroad. I actually wanted to stay in India but it was actually my mom who pushed me. She said, ‘No, it is a good opportunity for you to study abroad’’. A Basel-based female professional in the pharma industry explained the importance of having her family in India nearby to help her raise her children while she fulfilled her professional obligations; this seemed to influence her plans to return: ‘I definitely want to head

14  Gabriela Tejada back to India in the near future. I want my children to be with their grandparents. Also, I could count on them to help me raise them if I have to travel a lot’. A male post-doc researcher at the Biotech Campus in Geneva sees the decision about moving as an issue involving his partner. ‘I would like to stay longer but this also depends on my wife. If she gets a work permit then we will stay. Otherwise, we will move to the US or India’. Contacts with family and friends in the country of origin also usually facilitate mobility, and they are constitutive in forming spatial aspirations. A female PhD student at the University of Geneva explained how acquaintances of her parents motivated her to study abroad and provided her with some contacts. ‘They put me in touch with a member of their family, a UK-based professor, who told me about scholarships opportunities in Europe and Canada. It seemed like a great idea, so I just looked it up’. Regarding future mobility plans, we can see differences between the perspectives of students and those of established professionals. Whether a student plans an academic career or to look for work in private industry depends on the career that they assume they will undertake in the near future (Ackers and Gill 2008; Hercog and Siddiqui 2014; Hercog and Van de Laar 2017). We can observe that students are more uncertain about their short-term future plans than academics and professionals in remunerated employment are. This is probably the case because they are younger, without any family responsibilities, and their situation is less stable, which causes them to be more open to opportunities. The discussion of our observations indicates that Indian students in Switzerland do not limit their mobility plans to time limits or specific places, but rather they follow strategies in which their options are kept deliberately open. The intentional uncertainty of the migrants is significant when they are not sure about the possibilities that the future is going to offer them. As mentioned by Mosneaga (2014), the status transition of international students, as a transitional and transnational stage, is framed by diverse sets of challenges and opportunities and includes various geographical locations, as the factors that shape their transition experiences often range beyond their host or home contexts. Consequently, we could conclude that the mobility decisions of international students depend on the opportunities available and their perceptions of environments in the possible locations. Moreover, as Van Mol (2017) indicates in his study of Erasmus students, we can see that students are more likely to move in their future careers, which is in line with other studies which suggest

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 15 that once migrants have moved, they are more inclined to move again. One male master’s student at ETH Zurich stated, Once I finish my Master’s I will start looking for jobs and PhD positions in different places. Regarding jobs, I do not have any location preference; any country will be OK. For the PhD, it should be in an equally reputable university. If I get that in ETHZ or Imperial London or someplace like that, then yes. The UK would be fine and the rest of Europe is fine, but not the US as I actually feel that it’s a bit far away and it doesn’t really appeal to me. Regarding future mobility plans, a possible return to the country of origin comes to the fore in the testimonies of the Indians that we spoke to. The common aspiration to return and accomplish their migration project back in India arose as a response to a positive assessment of the economic and professional opportunities that India has to offer, as well as a reply to questions about family ties. Some Indians are motivated by the idea of deploying their foreign earned experience and knowledge in the Indian context. As in the findings of Carling et al. (2016), we see that skilled Indians rely on relatives and acquaintances, social media and networks for information about the situation back in the home country, and this impacts their intention to return. As shown by Biswas (2014), migrants’ intentions are largely based on the career and business prospects they believe that India has to offer, and their families and professional networks facilitate their possible move. A male management professional working for an international company in Geneva said, ‘I have an aspiration to go back home. India is growing fast; I see good opportunities there’. A female PhD student at the University of Zurich mentioned her intentions to use the knowledge and expertise she had accumulated overseas within the Indian academic field, and she also wanted to be close to her family. Her collaboration with a scholar there may help her move: I definitely would like to return to India in the near future. I do not see myself staying away for long. [. . .] I plan to apply for an academic position in Delhi, where my family lives. I am working with a professor there in my current research and this will help me re-establish contacts. She mentioned policies that India is implementing to attract its talented people based abroad. ‘I heard about a programme supporting

16  Gabriela Tejada young researchers to return and pursue an academic career back there and I plan to apply’. The Indian case shows that doctoral graduates are highly mobile and looking for the best opportunities worldwide. As they represent a valuable human resource for research and innovation, their mobility is gaining importance in an increasingly competitive global market. As pointed out by Auriol (2010), the mobility of doctorate holders is seen as a significant vehicle of knowledge flow by the governments and backed by policy measures aiming at gaining them as part of their labour force. 1.4.3 Experiences in Switzerland and transnational connections Skilled Indians spoke positively of the international atmosphere at the place where they study or work, which they are happy with because it creates an environment in which they can establish connections and feel welcome. We can see that the perception of their experiences in the Swiss context varies according to whether they are referring to the highly international and open environments of the institutions in which they study and the companies in which they work or whether they are referring to their exchanges with the local community in the places where they live. Culturally speaking, Indians are openly disposed and inclined to engage with local people, although this is not always easy for them. We see a contrast between the perceptions of those who live in the more cosmopolitan cities such as Geneva, Zürich or Basel and the few who live in the Swiss countryside where the internationality in the setting is less palpable and connecting with the local community is more difficult. While they do have a positive perception of the local environment, especially with regard to employment and career opportunities, income level, level of scientific research and academic institutions and the living environment, they cite language barriers, Swiss people (who they see as ‘reserved’ and ‘difficult to access’), and problems renewing or obtaining working permits, as some of the obstacles that they face in the Swiss setting. Accordingly, as Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004) have indicated, we can see how the idea of place, where skilled Indians are located in the same relational space or shared belonging, is detached from the space in which one lives, indicating a disassociation between their professional or academic activity and their ties with the peculiarities of the host-country setting. Exposure to a highly international context as in the cities of Geneva or Basel, which host international organisations and multinational companies, provides an opportunity to adapt as well as personal

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 17 experiences which are accumulated in the form of greater social capital. Moreover, the experience of working abroad and of multiple mobility helps people to form a global perspective, which is a valuable and even essential asset in terms of being competitive in highly international academic and professional environments. A female professional in the pharma industry based in Basel said, ‘Living and working here has given me massive exposure; it is good for my career and for learning’. The high consideration for the international environment is also based on their appreciation of the possibility to communicate in English. As English is the common language in the international environment in which they work or study, most of them do not need to learn the local language to a professional level, and therefore they do not see the language as a barrier from a professional point or view, and hence they do not make much of an effort to learn any of the local languages, which becomes a real obstacle to a long-term stay. A male professional in management working for an international company in Geneva said, ‘Although English is the language in my company, I see my opportunities for career advancement in Switzerland restricted because I do not know the local languages’. The life and professional experiences of skilled Indians in the Swiss context will be influenced by their perspectives and mobility plans in the short-term horizon (Raghuram 2013; Van Riemsdijk and Wang 2017). Since their stay is essentially a temporary one, their efforts to integrate into Swiss society depend on their construction of a sense of belonging to the local community or to the community in the country of origin, following the imaginary geography of their future (Hercog and Tejada 2013). Hence, skilled Indians decide to establish links in a particular territory according to the notion of how they imagine the future and the strategies that they believe to be necessary to make it become a reality. The organisation and collective action of migrant groups are significant as they offer access to significant social capital through their operations that result from contacts, social and professional links and any institutional relations that are established (Tejada 2012). We are interested in knowing about the experiences of skilled Indians regarding their participation in formal associations, including those that bring their co-nationals together. Since this involves a relatively small and scattered population, meaning that opportunities to have contact with other Indian co-nationals in Switzerland are limited, community association activities are of particular importance. We can see that their active participation in the cultural associations that unite the Indian community in Switzerland is not obvious, and this partly

18  Gabriela Tejada explains their interest to interact more with the local community or with colleagues from their academic or professional environment. As the findings of Jain (2011) show, recent Indian migrants do not generally meet in networks or associations, and they are immersed in their own particular process, which involves a constant negotiation of their cultural belonging to both Switzerland and India. As Putnam (2000) points out, when they choose to participate in different activities with others as they pursue their professional, academic, leisure, family interests or those of another kind, the social capital shows its relational nature insofar as it is the property of the individuals, but only by virtue of the fact that they belong to a group. For the Indians, their sense of belonging to a group is established by the perception that they have of their identity linked to their educational or professional activity at a specific institution. This is what motivates them to participate in association activities that operate on the basis of reciprocal commitments on the part of their members and which represent a significant asset in the accumulation of social capital. For students, we can see how associations such as the Indian Students Association Zurich (InSAZ) and Indian Students Associations Lausanne (YUVA) organise a wide range of activities and offer possibilities for contacts and facilitate their arrival and integration in Switzerland. A male master’s student at the ETHZ said, ‘I am in touch with people from the association because they have excellent groups and provide advice on what you need to do when you come here’. They also function as a platform where Indians can get together and meet other communities and celebrate cultural, social and sports events, such as cricket and badminton tournaments, yoga courses and Diwali or Holi festivities and movie nights. He continues with an explanation of the main objective of InSAZ: It is basically for Indian students who are living here not to feel unwelcome in the city because when they come here they do not really have a lot of friends, so they can get together with other fellow Indians and have fun. A female student at the University of Lausanne talked about her active participation in YUVA: I initiated this with a friend of mine. We are planning a career day that companies will attend, with some workshops for job interviews, CV writing and visits to companies. We have a Facebook page where we post our activities.

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 19 As Putnam (2000) mentions, we can see how social capital allows individuals to access resources, ideas and information and to have precise expectations about the behaviour of others thanks to their participation in relations that are the result of networks and associations. The testimonies show the significant role played by the organisations that support associative activities by providing contacts with actors linked to academia or industry, which may result in opportunities with a long-term impact. We are interested in seeing how the transnational contacts, skills and further social capital that skilled Indians accumulate in different spaces and places shape the type of connections they have with India. The literature on transnationalism in migration shows that the greater the number of transnational connections, the greater the effect on migrants, on the persons closest to them and on their community in the country of origin. We can see that the transnational contacts of skilled Indians often create a transnational social space that is made up of a series of relations formed by more or less structured interactions and exchanges of practices and information. Even though the transnational connections of migrants are generally considered to be the equivalent of positive social capital, various empirical research studies have shown that these connections can also have a negative effect (Tabar and Maalouf 2016) in the form of the exclusion of other communities, excessive claims on group members or restrictions on individual liberties (Portes 1998). On this point, some studies show how the transnational connections of the diaspora can replicate attitudes of social exclusion that exacerbate the structural inequalities or racial tensions that have operated in certain societies (Kwankam 2010). Other cases highlight elements that characterise the lack of a strong and cohesive national identity, which limits the collective actions of the diasporas, their transnational actions and possible benefits for the country of origin (Tejada 2012). We observed how Indians imagine themselves generating change in India through their own subjective opinions of the contributions they make from abroad. Skilled Indians think that Indian society can benefit from their accumulated resources, their contact networks and their scientific and professional knowledge, both through their transnational connections that promote the transfer of knowledge through various forms of cooperation and interaction from a distance and through a physical return to their country. As one male researcher based at the CERN said, ‘I have exchanges with researchers and entrepreneurs in India; we want to develop a new technology for efficient waste management’. Their transnational ties with India in the form of

20  Gabriela Tejada social remittances follow several patterns and comprise diverse types of knowledge circulation practices (Tejada 2016). Their aspirations to make a social contribution to their community and contribute intellectually or professionally through their work are linked to the plans that many have to return to India at some time in the future, which would allow these aspirations to materialise if the return actually occurs. One male post-doc researcher at EPFL mentioned, ‘Once I get back to India, I will educate and train younger generations through my research work. That will be my contribution. I am preparing my return by using my networks and the help of my colleagues back home’. However, the evidence shows that several barriers must be overcome if the accumulated social capital is to be transferred effectively to the local context. As the findings of Siddiqui and Tejada (2014) have shown, resistance to a change in the work culture, the lack of an adequate infrastructure, long bureaucratic processes and resistance from the society are some of the elements that affect the appropriation of new practices and knowledge that are transferred transnationally.

1.5 Conclusions This study allows us to observe the knowledge, skills, contacts and other forms of social capital that skilled Indians accumulate during their academic paths and professional experiences abroad and the influence these have on mobility decisions and the establishment of transnational links. The most common reasons behind mobility decisions of skilled Indians are an aspiration to access opportunities for academic advancement and professional growth. This confirms that professional advancement is the main stimulus behind decisions related to international skilled mobility. The international professional setting together with the academic and scientific excellence offered by Switzerland are valuable assets that skilled Indians consider as they seek to develop their careers. They mostly arrive in Switzerland to pursue opportunities in specific academic institutions and companies, and geographical place is not an essential element in their decisions. In general, Indian students and young researchers do not specifically seek to come to Switzerland, but rather they are attracted by educational and doctoral programmes at institutions with a reputation for academic and scientific quality. The same happens in the case of professionals whose mobility is mainly industry driven and arranged by recruitment and relocation agencies. Their mobility, which often involves different destinations before they arrive in Switzerland, reveals multi-site paths that enable them to

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 21 accumulate transnational contacts, experiences and different types of skills that come into play simultaneously in Switzerland and in India. The experiences of skilled Indians show that their mobility trajectories and plans are influenced by the social relations and the professional and academic contacts that they create during their experiences abroad. This social capital helps to further their mobility and exposure and advance their professional careers. Moreover, the family often shapes mobility decisions, and it can be involved in forming spatial aspirations. Through multi-site mobility and interaction, skilled Indians define the spaces that they remained linked to through the transnational contacts they establish in various locations, and this offers them a set of social capital elements that open up new opportunities and broaden the limits of the spaces that they move in. Furthermore, international experience facilitates their adaptation to the new contexts. They usually come to the countries of destination with an advanced education and professional skills, which ease their transnational linkages and make their mobility patterns more flexible. Skilled Indians generally stay in Switzerland on a temporary basis. This is especially true in the case of recently arrived Indians who see this move as another step in their ongoing journey to other destinations. Indians have a positive perception of the local setting in Switzerland, particularly with regard to employment and career opportunities, income level, level of scientific research and academic institutions and the living environment, while they mention language barriers, the reserved character of Swiss people and problems when renewing or obtaining working permits as some of the obstacles they face. Their lives and professional experiences in the Swiss context are influenced by their perspectives and their mobility plans in the short-term horizon. This shows that the decisions of migrants to establish links in a certain territory have to do with the notion of how they imagine the future and the strategies that they believe to be necessary to make this become a reality. Their decisions regarding further mobility depend on the available opportunities and their perceptions of contexts in possible locations, whether in Switzerland, India or elsewhere. Here, the element of space and place is a determining factor in the subsequent mobility decisions, since the migrants’ perceptions regarding the quality of the institutions, the conditions of context and migratory policies in the host country affect their immediate and future decisions about whether to move on again or not. A return to the country of origin is a possible option in the future mobility plans of skilled Indians. The common aspiration to return and accomplish their migration project back in India arises as a response

22  Gabriela Tejada to a positive assessment of the economic and professional opportunities that they see India offering, as well as a reaction related to family ties. As they think that Indian society can benefit from the contact networks, skills and knowledge they have accumulated, their future plans include the idea of deploying them in the Indian context and making social contributions to the community, either by their physical return or through transnational connections using various forms of cooperation and interaction from a distance. This study shows that by increasing their social capital during the course of their career itineraries, skilled Indians develop local and transnational contacts based on specific places, which are maintained when they move to a new destination. Even though the value attached to social capital as a result of the impact of the social relations depends on time and place, this study shows that the new spatial forms created by international migrants reveal the power that transnational contacts have as valuable assets for their local and transnational-based practices, and these are determining factors in their further mobility decisions and the connections they maintain with the home country. Establishing transnational connections has to be seen as a dynamic process that embodies individual life plans, social expectations and professional opportunities, as well as contextual issues from the countries concerned. It is an individual process which people experience in different ways, and it is linked to the construction of a sense of belonging to a specific place, and the individual agency to produce this depends mainly on their future plans.

Notes 1 Swiss Federal Statistics Office, STAT-LAB, accessed 21 August 2017. 2 According to data from the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India http://mea.gov.in. 3 Data from the Swiss Federal Office for Statistics (SFOS) (www.bfs.admin.ch/ bfs/en/home/services/recherche/stat-tab-online-data-search.html) accessed 21 August 2017. 4 The project was carried out by the Cooperation and Development Center of the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (CODEV – EPFL), in collaboration with the Institute of Development Studies Kolkata (IDSK), the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and the International Labour Office (ILO), with financial support of the Swiss Network for International Studies (SNIS).

References Ackers, L. and Gill, B. (2008). Moving people and knowledge: Scientific mobility in an enlarging European Union. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 23 Auriol, L. (2010). “Careers of doctorate holders: Employment and mobility patterns”. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 2010/04. Paris: OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kmh8phxvvf5-en (accessed 3 March 2017). Bauböck, R. and Faist, T. (2010). Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Becker, R. and Kolster, R. (2012). International student recruitment: Policies and developments in selected countries. Nuffic: Netherlands Association for International Cooperation in Higher Education. Becker, L., Liebig, Th., and Sousa-Poza, A. (2008). “Migration policy and industrial structure: The case of Switzerland”. International Migration, 46(2), 81–107. Biswas, R. (2014). “Reverse migrant entrepreneurs in India: Motivations, trajectories and realities”; in Tejada, G., Bhattacharya, U., Khadria, B. and Kuptsch, Ch. (eds.) Indian skilled migration and development: To Europe and back. New Delhi: Springer; pp. 285–307. Boeri, T., Brücker, H., Docquier, F., and Rapaport, H. (2012). Brain drain and brain gain: The global competition to attract high-skilled migrants. A Report for the Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti (Milan). New York: Oxford University Press. Bourdieu, P. (1986). “The forms of capital”; in Richardson, J.-G. (ed.) Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education. New York: Greenwood Press; pp. 241–258. Bruggeman, J. (2008). Social networks: An introduction. New York: Routledge. Bruneau, M. (2010). “Diasporas, transnational spaces and communities”; in Bauböck, R. and Faist, T. (eds.) Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; pp. 39–45. Buga, N. and Meyer, J.-B. (2012). Indian human resources mobility: Brain drain versus brain gain. CARIM-India Research Report. San Domenico di Fiesole: RSCAE/EUI. Carling, J., Bolognani, M., Bivand Erdal, M., Tordhol Ezzati, R., Oeppen, C., Paasche, E., Vatne Pettersen, S., and Heggli Sagmo, T. (2016). Possibilities and realities of return migration. Oslo: PRIO. Castles, S. (2012). “Migration and social transformation”; in Martinello, M. and Rath, J. (eds.) An introduction to international migration studies: European perspectives. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. (2009). The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. CODEV-EPFL, IDSK, JNU, and ILO (2013). Migration, scientific diasporas and development: Impact of skilled return migration on development in India. Final Research Report. Lausanne: CODEV-EPFL. De Grip, A., Fourage, D., and Sauermann, J. (2009). “What affects international migration of European science and engineering graduates?” IZA Discussion Paper, 4268. Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics.

24  Gabriela Tejada De Haas, H. (2008). Migration and development: A theoretical perspective. Working Paper 9. Oxford: University of Oxford, International Migration Institute. Faist, Th. (2000). The volume and dynamics of international migration and transnational social spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Faist, T. (2010). “Diaspora and transnationalism. What kind of dance partners?”; in Bauböck, R. and Faist, T. (eds.) Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; pp. 9–34. Faist, T., Fauser, M., and Kivisto, P. (2011). The migration and development nexus: A transnational perspective. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Findlay, A. (2010). “An assessment of supply and demand-side theorizations of international students’ migration”. International Migration, 49(2), 162–190. Findlay, A., King, R., Smith, F., Geddes, A., and Skeldon, R. (2012). “World class? An investigation of globalisation, difference and international student mobility”. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 37(1), 118–131. Gibson, J. and McKenzie, D. (2009). “The microeconomic determinants of emigration and return migration of the best and brightest”. Working Paper No. 173. Center for Global Development. Glick Schiller, N. and Faist, Th. (2009). “Introduction: Migration, development and social transformation”. Social Analysis, 53(3), 1–13. Grundel, S. and Peters, H. (2008). “What determines the duration of stay of immigrants in Germany? Evidence from a longitudinal duration analysis”. SOEP Papers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research, Vol. 79. Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. Hercog, M. and Siddiqui, Z. (2014). “Experiences in the host countries and return plans. The case study of highly skilled Indians in Europe”; in Tejada, G., Bhattacharya, U., Khadria, B. and Kuptsch, Ch. (eds.) Indian skilled migration and development: To Europe and back. New Delhi: Springer; pp. 213–235. Hercog, M. and Tejada, G. (2013). “Incorporation of skilled migrants in a host country: Insights from the study of skilled Indians in Switzerland”. IMDS Project Working Papers Series, WP 58. New Delhi: IMDS JNU; pp. 1–15. Hercog, M. and Van de Laar, M. (2016). “Europe as unlikely immigrant destination: Location choice for international mobile students in India”. European Journal of Higher Education, 6(4), 356–371. Hercog, M. and Van de Laar, M. (2017). “Motivations and constraints of moving abroad for Indian students”. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 18(3), 749–770. Jain, R. (2011). “Negotiating assimilation, exotiscm, and global Indian modernity: Transnational subject-making of second generation Indians in Switzerland”. Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques, LXV(4), 1001–1027. Kapur, D. (2004). “Ideas and economic reform in India: The role of international migration and the Indian diaspora”. India Review, 3(4), 364–384.

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 25 Khadria, B. (2007). “India: Skilled migration to developed countries, labour migration to the Gulf”; in Castles, S. and Delgado Wise, R. (eds.) Migration and development: Perspectives from the South. Geneva: IOM; pp. 79–112. King, R. (2002). “Towards a new map of European migration”. International Journal of Population Geography, 8(2), 89–106. King, R. and Raghuram, P. (2013). “International student migration: Mapping the field and new research agenda”. Population, Space and Place, 19(2), 127–137. Kumar, P., Sarkar, S., and Sharma, R. (2009). “Migration and diaspora formation: Mobility of Indian students to the developed world”. IMDS Project Working Papers Series, WP 8. New Delhi: IMDS JNU; pp. 29–45. Kuptsch, C. (2006). “Students and talent flow, the case of Europe: From castle to harbour?”; in Kuptsch, C. and Fong, P.E. (eds.) Competing for global talent. Geneva: IILS/ILO. Kuvik, A. (2012). “Skilled migration in Europe and beyond: Recent developments and theoretical considerations”; in Martinello, M. and Rath, J. (eds.) An introduction to international migration studies: European perspectives. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; pp. 211–235. Kuznetsov, Y. (2006). Diaspora networks and the international migration of skills: How countries can draw on their talent abroad. WBI Development Studies. Washington, DC: World Bank. Kuznetsov, Y. (ed.) (2013). How can talent abroad induce development at home? Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Kwankam, F. (2010). “The South African scientific diaspora in Switzerland”; in Tejada, G. and Bolay, J.-C. (eds.) Scientific diasporas as development partners. Skilled migrants from Colombia, India and South Africa in Switzerland: Empirical evidence and policy responses. Bern: Peter Lang; pp. 411–486. Lacroix, Thomas, Levitt, P., and Vari-Lavoisier, Ilka (2016). “Social remittances and the changing transnational political landscape”. Comparative Migration Studies, 4(16). Leclerc, E. and Meyer, J.-B. (2007). “Knowledge diasporas for development. A shrinking space for scepticism”. Asian Population Studies, 3(2), 153–168. Levitt, P. and Glick-Schiller, N. (2004). “Conceptualizing simultaneity: A transnational social field perspective on society”. International Migration Review, 38(3), 1002–1039. Levitt, P. and Lamba-Nieves, D. (2011). “Social remittances revisited”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31(1), 1–22. Liebig, T., Kohls, S., and Krause, K. (2012). “The labour market integration of immigrants and their children in Switzerland”. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers. Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. Mahroum, S. (2000). “Highly skilled globetrotters: Mapping the international migration of human capital”. R&D Management, 30(1), 23–32. Martin-Rovet, D. (2003). Opportunities for outstanding young scientists in Europe to create an independent research team. Strasbourg: European Science Foundation.

26  Gabriela Tejada Meyer, J.-B. (2003). “Policy implications of the brain drain’s changing face”; in Science and development network. www.scidev.net/en/policy-briefs/policyimplications-of-the-brain-drain-s-changing-html (accessed 3 March 2017). Meyer, J.-B. (coord.) (2015). Diasporas: Towards the new frontier. Marseille: IRD; Montevideo: Universidad de la Republica. Mosneaga, A. (2014). “Student migration at the global trijuncture of higher education, competition for talent and migration management”; in Tejada, G., Bhattacharya, U., Khadria, B. and Kuptsch, Ch. (eds.) Indian skilled migration and development: To Europe and back. New Delhi: Springer; pp. 87–111. Mukherjee, S. and Chanda, R. (2012). “Indian student mobility to selected European countries: An overview”. Working Paper 365. Bangalore: Indian Institute of Management. Nowicka, M. and Serbedzija, V. (2016). “Migration and remittances in a global Europe”; in Nowicka, M. and Serbedzija, V. (eds.) Migration and social remittances in a global Europe. Series Europe in a Global Context. London: Palgrave Macmillan; pp. 1–20. OECD. (2017). 2017 international migration outlook. Paris: OECD. Parey, M. and Waldinger, F. (2008). “Studying abroad and the effect on international labour market mobility: Evidence from the introduction of ERASUS”. Discussion Paper Series, IZA DP No. 3430. Bonn: IZA. Pecoraro, M. and Fibbi, R. (2010). “Highly skilled migrants in the Swiss labour market, with a special focus on migrants from developing countries”; in Tejada, G. and Bolay, J.-C. (eds.) Scientific diasporas as development partners. Skilled migrants from Colombia, India and South Africa in Switzerland: Empirical evidence and policy responses. Bern: Peter Lang; pp. 179–195. Portes, A. (1998). “Social capital. Its origins and applications in modern sociology”. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1–24. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon and Schuster. Raghuram, P. (2013). “Theorizing the spaces of students migration”. Population, Space and Place, 19(2), 138–154. Riaño, Y. and Piguet, E. (2016). “International student migration”; in Oxford bibliographies. Oxford: Oxford University Press; pp. 1–24. Robertson, R. (2016). “Global culture and consciousness”; in Roberston, R. and Buhari-Gulmez, D. (eds.) Global culture: Consciousness and connectivity. Farnham: Ashgate; pp. 5–21. Saxenian, A. (2006). The new argonauts: Regional advantage in a global economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Siddiqui, Z. and Tejada, G. (2014). “Development and highly skilled migrants: Perspectives from the Indian diaspora and returnees”. International Development Policy, 6(1). Tabar, P. and Maalouf, W. (2016). “The emergence of a diasporic political field: A case for political remittances”; in Nowicka, M. and Serbedzija, V.

Skilled Indians in Switzerland 27 (eds.) Migration and social remittances in a global Europe. Series Europe in a Global Context. London: Palgrave Macmillan; pp. 99–120. Tejada, G. (2012). “Mobility, knowledge and cooperation: Scientific diasporas as agents of development”. Migration and Development, 10(18), 59–92. Tejada, G. (2016). “Skilled Indians in Europe: knowledge transfer and social impact”; in Nowicka, M. and Serbedzija, V. (eds.) Migration and social remittances in a global Europe. Series Europe in a Global Context. London: Palgrave Macmillan; pp. 281–301. Tejada, G., Bhattacharya, U., Khadria, B., and Kuptsch, Ch. (eds.) (2014). Indian skilled migration and development: To Europe and back. New Delhi: Springer. Tremblay, K. (2005). “Academic mobility and immigration”. Journal of Studies in International Education, 9(3), 196–228. UN-DESA and OECD (2013). World migration in figures. www.oecd.org/els/ mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf (accessed 3 March 2017). UNESCO – UIS (2015). Education: Outbound internationally mobile students by host region. UNESCO Institute for Statistics Database. http://data.uis. unesco.org/ (accessed 20 August 2017). Van Mol, Ch. (2017). “European mobile students. (Trans.) National social networks and their (inter) national career perspectives”, in Van Riemsdijk, M. and Wang, Q. (eds.) Rethinking highly skilled migration. New York: Routledge; pp. 54–74. Van Riemsdijk, M. (2013). “Everyday geopolitics and the valuation of labor: International migration and socio-political hierarchies of skill”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 39(3), 373–390. Van Riemsdijk, M. and Wang, Q. (eds.) (2017). Rethinking international skilled migration. New York: Routledge. Vertovec, S. (2001). “Transnationalism and identity”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27(4), 573–582. Vertovec, S. (2004). “Migrant transnationalism and modes of transformation”. International Migration Review, 38(3), 970–1001. Vinck, D. (2013). “Formation des chercheurs et mobilité internationale: utilité pour le pays d’origine”; in Glassey, O., Leresche, J.P. and Moeschler, O. (eds.) Penser la valeur d’usage des sciences. Paris: Editions des Archives Contemporaines; pp. 77–91. Waters, J.-L. (2006). “Geographies of capital: Education, international migration and family strategies between Hong Kong and Canada”. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 31, 179–192.

2 Crossing past and present Heritage and identity among Hindu-Gujarati diaspora in Portugal Inês Lourenço 2.1 Introduction Indian origin population started to massively settle in Portugal after the decolonisation of Portuguese colonies in Africa, where Indian communities had invested in life projects for several generations. They came mainly from the Gujarat, belonging to the small colonies of Daman and Diu to the Portuguese empire, and consisted of a majority of Hindus and Muslims; from Goa came a majority of Catholics, with deep ties to the Portuguese colonial past. After the end of the Portuguese State of India in 1961, some Goan families had begun to settle in Portugal, but it was in the late 1970s, after the independence of the Portuguese colonies in Africa in 1975, that a mass migration of population originating in India – but with an already long migratory tradition – towards Portugal was triggered. The set of population of Indian origin in Portugal is very diversified and complex, although they are seen by the broader society as a homogeneous group, whose distinct internal characteristics are ignored and amalgamated by the common citizen in Portugal. The presence of Indian origin communities in Portugal is diverse in its composition and in its duration and has already been explored (Lourenço, 2013). According to the High Level Committee Report on the Indian Diaspora (Singhvi et al., 2001) they constitute 0.7 percent of the Portuguese population. They are 70,000 (65,000 PIOs and 5,000 NRIs) and are divided according to their socio-religious specificities. Thus, there are Hindus (33,000), Muslims (Sunnis) (12,000), Ismailis (5,000), Sikhs (8,000) and Goans (mainly Catholics) (15,000); roughly speaking, Catholics from Goa arrived right through the twentieth century, while Hindus and Muslims came in the early 1980s; Sikhs and some Hindus and Muslims from other states in India arrived in the late 1990s. The division by religious communities is related to the way the different groups have been organised according to their identity

Crossing past and present 29 priorities. Thus, temples, mosques or gurudwaras were first built on a provisional basis and took different forms over the years. The process of building places of worship has been territorialising the immigrant presence and religious diversity in a country where despite the weight of the Catholic tradition as one of the structural elements of Portuguese culture, the recent diversity in the religious sphere, largely driven by new migratory flows, has influenced the process of creating different worldviews and new symbolic universes (Vilaça, 2006). According to Vilaça ‘lack of theoretical and empirical studies on religion as a macro-societal phenomenon [. . .] lays bare the handicap of sociology of religion that is made in Portugal’ (Vilaça, 2006: 122). Indeed, the difficulty in finding statistical information on the minority religious groups in the Portuguese society – such as the case of Hindus – reveals an under-investment at both institutional and scientific level. This chapter will focus on the process of identity consolidation around material culture and temple construction of a Hindu community of the Great Lisbon Area. Centred on an inclusive project that studies the heritage of the Portuguese Hindu diaspora, I intend to analyse the choices of tangible and intangible heritage made by individuals to represent themselves, their community and their diverse backgrounds. Although the project is extended to the different groups of Indian background, this text will concentrate on the Hindu community belonging to Shiva Temple Association (located in Loures, Lisbon District) and its strategies of visibility and agency. The basis of this paper is ethnographic intensive research carried out in this community by the author between 2000 and 2008 with the maintenance of contact during the subsequent years, reactivated since 2016 in the scope of the current research project. Empirical data was collected on the basis of informal interviews among women belonging to various social backgrounds and different ages. The so-called satsang group was the priority focus of my PhD research, and emphasis was also placed on a heterogeneous group of young women. Participation in female devotional moments, as well as in public ritual performance, together with my presence during day-to-day domestic activities, was the main source of information. Current data are currently being collected among the community in general. In total, this research is part of fieldwork undertaken in Portugal and complemented by research periods in India and in the UK. The methodology used had the particularity of being partially done together with another anthropologist, Rita Cachado. We both developed fieldwork with participant observation on different subjects but in the same places and with the same populations in our academic

30  Inês Lourenço course, from master through PhD and even in the beginning of the post-doctoral research. It is therefore a situation that is not analysed in the literature, a research that is not teamwork but which welcomes the same advantages of teamwork. This prolonged experience of collaborative ethnography (e.g. May and Patillo-MacCoy, 2000) allowed a permanent reflexivity – on the one hand, on the adopted methodologies themselves and, on the other hand, on the field and the pertinence of the topics dealt with in relation to the field data (Cachado and Lourenço, 2016).

2.1 Consolidating identity and negotiating heritage around Shiva temple Religious identity is a particular form of approaching difference. According to Werbner (2009) religious identity is a discourse on boundaries, relatedness, otherness and, simultaneously, of encompassment and inclusiveness (Werbner, 2009: 233). As the expression ‘Hindu community’ itself indicates, religion is one of the key defining features of this community. Cohen (1997), who maintains that it is not possible to claim the existence of strictly religious diasporas, does assents the notion that the consolidation of a diasporic consciousness is comprised of a few essential elements, among which religion may be particularly salient. The author’s position is particularly bound with the fact that he considers religions to concentrate on a variety of cultural contexts while at the same time finding that most universal religions, except Judaism and Sikhism, do not mythologise and idealise their origin. We must also point out that even though Cohen does not acknowledge the existence of religious diasporas, he states that ‘religions can provide additional cement to bind a diasporic consciousness’ (1997: 189). Vertovec (2000), however, adds Hinduism to the two religions that Cohen has identified as possible exceptions. Unlike Christianity or Islam, Hinduism assumes a strong association with a national territory, in the sense that virtually all Hindus are Indians. The feeling of a bond with India in the form of spiritual reverence, of the great sacredness attributed to religious locations and the geography itself, is enough to demonstrate the significance of India’s civilisational heritage in the consolidation of this diaspora. In DeshPardesh, Roger Ballard (1994) considers religion an essential element in the consolidation of South Asian diasporas in the UK. Martin Baumann speaks of the establishment of ‘Little Indias’ beyond the subcontinent, where Hinduism is not simply maintained but

Crossing past and present 31 transformed through reinterpretations of this religion and its reification (cf. Baumann, 1998). Appadurai (1996) and Hannerz (1996) endowed the concept of globalisation with features of mobility and of mutual influences; these involve identity negotiation processes, resulting from a global flow of cultural objects, images and meanings. Transnational activity, for example, illustrates the logic of a return engagement of people and goods (Schiller et al., 1994)1 that cross-cultural boundaries and policies, maintaining multiple relationships that lead to involvement with two or more societies. Socially involved in more than one nation-state, they are ‘people with feet in two societies’ (Chaney, 1979: 209). The culturally essentialising models of multiculturalism, rooted in homogeneous cultural and territorial ideas of nation (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2006: 24), overshadowed for a long time the possibility of deterritorialisation of national identity, progressively replaced by multiple citizenships. This proves the ability of states to manage diversity and allow free expression by ensuring the degree of social cohesion enough to ensure the legitimacy of the state and its institutions (Cohen, 1997: 32). In Portugal the Hindu population is concentrated in the two major Portuguese cities: Porto and Lisbon. In the capital, Lisbon, some families of high socio-economic status live in prestigious areas of the country’s capital. The remaining Hindu population is divided into three core residential, and less attractive, areas. Some years ago several relocation processes transferred Hindu populations from shantytowns to resettlement neighbourhoods. These were the people from Quinta da Holandesa (Vale do Areeiro, Lisbon), relocated in the 1990s to the areas of Chelas and Moscavide, and those from Portela Sacavém (Loures), rehoused in 2002 in flats adjacent to the old neighbourhood.2 In shantytowns, before their transfer to vertical housing, they lived in single-storey houses with entry courtyards dividing the domestic space according to the Hindu special logics (see Bastos, 1990). In Santo António dos Cavaleiros (outskirts of Lisbon, Loures municipality) a more diversified community, of a medium socioeconomic level, lives in its blocks of buildings. Although Gujarati, this community is divided according to two different areas in the same state: Diu and the central area of Gujarat. This division also corresponds to different religious affiliations and caste belongings, whereas the first are mostly belonging to Shudra varna and the second to the Vaishya varna. Comprised by several neighbourhoods, Santo António dos Cavaleiros spreads up the hill, towards Cidade Nova and also and further

32  Inês Lourenço to Torres da Bela Vista, which is separated from the previous neighbourhoods by a vast plateau. The municipality of Santo António dos Cavaleiros dates from the second half of the 1960s, when construction companies started a building process of bands and towers that combined public and private quarters. The first installations of residents occurred in 1967, at the base of the slope. If we consider that the occupation of this area occurred prior to the decolonisation of African Portuguese colonies we can see why it has the highest ethnic homogeneity of the urban set, once Portugal had at the time turned into a large receiver of migrants. With regard to Cidade Nova, this is part of a more recent construction project, which started in 1978. It has about 10,000 dwellings with a higher volume and higher-density towers. Here, the number of Hindu residents is much higher. The period in which these dwellings were placed on the market and their reduced prices may have been factors attracting the large Indian community, which had come in large numbers from Mozambique. These individuals did not leave the former Portuguese colony immediately after decolonisation. It was only around the late 1970s and early 1980s that this population established itself in Portugal. Further up are the Torres da Bela Vista, an even more recent set of buildings, in which the number of those of Indian origin is lower than that of those who reside in the Cidade Nova. It is in this area that Shiva Temple is located. The decolonisation of former Portuguese colonies led to this area housing a population of well-diversified geographical and cultural origins, and it remains a striking characteristic. Although some Hindus chose the area because of its sacred character, others eschewed the foundation of a new myth. Their decision to reside in this place was based on the affordability of the dwellings. As the Hindu population was setting up home in Santo António dos Cavaleiros, other people kept coming from Mozambique, thus forming a cohesive and spatially aggregated community. The Hindu community in Santo António dos Cavaleiros comprises about 2,000 individuals, scattered through the district but concentrated mostly in the area of Cidade Nova. Composed of people originally from the state of Gujarat, this community is, as already mentioned, divided at two related levels: (1) the diversity of geographical origins within Gujarat: Diu on the one hand and mainland Gujarat on the other, i.e., areas of Gujarat marked by British and Portuguese colonial occupation and (2) consequently, a multiplicity expressed by a socioreligious distinction between those originating from Diu (divesha) and those originating from the rest of the Gujarat state (non-divesha).3

Crossing past and present 33 Such distinctions are the sources of a network of intrinsic antagonisms, enhancers of internal conflicts. For instance, the distinction between castes from different varna leads to a discourse of superiority/inferiority based on vegetarianism as the central argument, which extends to the distinction between non-divesha and divesha Hindus as well. Although all individuals belong geographically to Gujarat, Diu, along with Daman, has an independent administration, expressed in their description as union territories. Moreover, differentiation between individuals genealogically linked to Diu and those to the rest of Gujarat is therefore justifiable. According to the interlocutors themselves, Diu lies outside the historical framework of the administrative state of Gujarat, a distinction which implies different colonial backgrounds and therefore different socio-cultural references. Community organisation, however, allows the management of internal conflicts through religious services – domestic and community – at the same time ensuring cosmic order and allowing the maintenance of the community’s unity, which is supported by a strategy of spatial cohesion and by contact networks with the society of origin. Different socio-cultural backgrounds are not much evident at professional level, since the group is much more uniform, most of these Hindus being traders from wholesale to retail catering activities and itinerant sales. Liberal professions, with a strong prevalence for engineering, proliferate within this group, and many workers are employed in construction. The heterogeneity of this group results, as we have seen, from its inner diversity. The distinction between the aforementioned divesha and non-divesha also implies religious variations, expressed in the relevance given to specific types of worship. Non-divesha Hindus are predominantly vaishnava. Centred on the worship of Vishnu and his avatars (divine ‘incarnations’), especially Krishna and Rama, they focus their religiosity on an aspect of devotional Hinduism, the bhakti.4 On the other hand, divesha Hindus are devotees of Shiva and of the Mother Goddess. Electing Shiva and the Goddess, his female manifestation, as their main deity, these Hindus adopt the centrality of the divine pair associated with power that is simultaneously destructive and renewing, the balance between good and evil, the nature of eternal creation. This distinction is not linear, however. Although these devotional rites are associated with geographically distinct traditions, both are part of the religious practices of most of the devotees, who usually attend assiduously to both types of worship. In fact, this community is constituted by multiple identities which generate various references

34  Inês Lourenço that also overlap. Thus, plurality in the form of a cohesive community is engendered. Although it may seem paradoxical, the Hindu community of Santo António dos Cavaleiros encompasses the various singularities, through a unitary of identity that is required to culturally affirm towards the surrounding society (see Lourenço, 2015). Therefore, social, economic and religious differences are managed in order to establish a harmonious relationship within the community and ensure its common identity. In a universe of permanent contradictions the management of tensions is pivotal. Thus, a unitary community imposes itself, despite the variety of internal references, ensuring the construction of a solid identity. Women’s work also contributed to this consolidation process since they are responsible for organising religious events within this community (the satsang group) and have a special status that is conferred not just by age but also through the religious knowledge accumulated along the years. Thus, it is not possible to analyse the topic of religion in this community without taking into account the issue of gender. Actually, religion and gender are intertwined, and the cultural and religious reproduction of the group directly depends on their women (see Lourenço, 2010, 2011).

2.3 Material culture and migrant heritage Before focusing on the heritage selection process I will briefly contextualise the history of the construction of Shiva Temple. The Shiva Temple Social Solidarity Association was formed in 1984 and became a formal association in 1991; its goal was to build a temple for the local Hindu community. In 2001, after Swami Satyamitran and had blessed the land (bhumipujan), the building of a provisional pavilion began, pending until now the future construction of a temple with the traditional architectural features of the northern Indian temples. On that occasion, the mayor of Loures attended the ceremonies and expressed his solidarity and support for the Hindu community of Santo António dos Cavaleiros. This was understood by the Hindu community to be an act of religious pluralism. However, the definitive project did not materialise. In 2016 new plans were made for the definitive construction of the temple, in a moment after the economic crisis in Portugal and identity crisis within this Hindu community. On 30 August 2017 a new bhumipujan was performed, with the presence of distinguished guests, among them Sri Giri Bapu and Mrs. K. Nandini Singla, the Indian ambassador in Portugal, engaging a new construction process, taking advantage of the growing visibility situation of this community, resulting from a trust-building effort not only with the partner institutions, but also the neighbouring surrounding society.

Crossing past and present 35 The issue of visibility is central here, and my current research closely follows this phenomenon. In addition to public performances (weddings, ritual processions etc.) the presence of a real temple – rather than a temporary construction – would be a central element of spatial and material affirmation in the public space. The sacralisation of public space integrates the strategy of passing from (in)visibility to visibility, a concept widely discussed by Kim Knott, according to which these tactics are developed by the groups themselves as they encounter ‘renewed vigour to practice and share their beliefs in private [. . .] until it again it becomes safe to emerge and deploy the tactics of visibility’ (idem: 64). Thus, the project of direct participation of the community in the conceptualisation of an exhibition that will reflect in the way it represents itself was enthusiastically welcomed by the group. It will be on this collaborative feature that I will concentrate below. 2.3.1 Travelling heritage This research project called ‘From India to Portugal. Postcolonial Perspectives on Museums, Heritage and Circulation of Culture’ departed from the idea that museums can challenge their own universalism and fixed ideas on nation and contextualise themselves in a society increasingly marked by migrants and populations in mobility. Thus, it emphasises their contribution to challenge the idea of nation, allowing, simultaneously, the renegotiation of the role of objects (Poehls, 2011: 346). Giving voice to the agents of immigrant and portable heritage is to include minorities in the heritage studies and in the processes of exploring ‘practices and forms of knowledge that are strongly tied to a sense of identity, to place and to memory’ (Naguib, 2013: 2181). Aiming to contribute to the collaboration between academic work and museums in the field of anthropology, and in order to understand the different logics that govern institutionalised and informal patrimonialisation processes, it analyses of the migrating heritage (Whitehead et al., 2015) of communities of Indian origin in Portugal through an ethnographic collection of these communities’ heritage. It intends to give visibility to the different Indian diasporas that compose the Portuguese society through the collection and exhibition of objects and practices selected by their members, in the National Museum of Ethnology (Museu Nacional de Etnologia), in Lisbon, through the organisation of an exhibition on the immaterial and material heritage of the Indian diasporas in Portugal, and the production of ethnographic film in the scope of the exhibition. Thus, this project intends to include populations in movement in the discourse of heritage while thinking of diasporas as groups that

36  Inês Lourenço seek integrity and authenticity while accommodating transformations (Naguib, 2013: 2182). After all, heritage is an activation of the past in the light of the interests, powers and intelligibility of the present, expressions of contemporary social, political and economic contexts, as the case of the adoption of Our Lady of Fatima by the polytheistic cult of the Portuguese Hindus can show. The selection was made on the basis of personal interests of the individuals involved in the process of representing themselves as Portuguese Hindus – a category that implies a multiplicity of identity references – and as a living and active cultural and religious community in contemporary Portuguese society. Thus, their participation in the exhibition works in different ways: those who choose elements of intangible heritage (religious practices, songs or performances) have agreed to participate in the video recording of these practices such as those who choose to donate or lend personal objects such as a domestic temple or a stone millstone (ghanti). The choice of contemporary objects (such as the domestic temple) or the ancient ones (ghanti) demonstrates the need to bring together the past, associated with traditional and artisanal practices such as grinding cereals and the present of religious practices in the diaspora, kept alive by people born outside India for one or several generations. Therefore, the analysis of the material culture of groups of individuals reveals the relationship between people and things and the ability of people to appropriate objects in order to produce meanings and construct identity dimensions (Rosales, 2009), demonstrating the relevance of materiality in processes mobility (Basu and Coleman, 2008, Burrell, 2008; Frykman, 2009; Rosales, 2009). Centred on film as a methodology this ethnographic and methodological case intends to demonstrate how this resource gives agency to the individuals and to their own processes of representation and how film can make the museum more inclusive by adding critical and reflexive voices as part of the exhibition. My previous ethnographic experience had shown me the difficulty of accessing relevant information to my analytical goals. Obviously, my continuity – albeit non-permanent – relationship with the community has facilitated the approach, overcoming the initial impasses of expected gaining confidence on the field. Nevertheless, in addition to this advantage, the feeling of direct participation in this project was revealed by a willingness on the part of individuals to take an active part in their own representation process. Incorporating the film as a strategy to support the conceptualisation of the exhibition evidences the relevance of visual methods of research

Crossing past and present 37 and representation as playing a ‘fuller role in ethnography as a whole’ (Pink, 2004, 2001; Banks, 2001). In addition, video is yet another vehicle that can contribute to a deeper understanding of the viewpoints of the interlocutors. Contrary to the reaction they had when previously asked for interviews – informal, not recorded or filmed – in this project people were very receptive and agreed to participate soon. Thus, so far some moments of collecting images and video recording have been performed in the temple, such as the interview with the temple priest, Chandresh Sevak, and records of religious and cultural moments elapsed in the temple. Furthermore, the choice of objects to be used in the future exhibition was made with such enthusiasm by the interlocutors, manifested in the readiness to choose objects and making them available to lend them to be temporarily exposed in the museum, being this collaboration interpreted as a form of agency and direct participation in the representation of their own group.

2.4 Final remarks Inspired by experiments on exhibitions on migration in Europe, particularly developed by MeLa Project (MeLa* – European Museums in an Age of Migrations, 2011) on the link between museums and migration, this exhibition intends to reflect on the daily lives of immigrants and their descendants, their contributions to their new establishment places, more than to their routes, arrivals or departures (Innocenti, 2014), more in a migrating heritage than in a heritage immigration (Whitehead et al., 2015), and strengthen cultural dialogue and exchange as tools for creating social inclusion. The use of the visual in this research arose on the one hand from the desire to make a documentary that integrated the exhibition and, on the other, as a way of recording the intangible heritage identified by the interlocutors, since this exhibition will be constructed with the active and direct participation of people belonging to the community. Taking advantage of the use of visuals in anthropology, explored since the years 2000 (Pink, 2001; Banks, 2001), this project is particularly reflexive, collaborative and participatory. By integrating the visual representations in anthropology it is possible to access the way the interlocutors represent themselves – it is a collaborative form: ‘not simply as a matter of anthropologists analysing their informants’ drawings but tone of learning through their images about how they feel, see and experience the world’ (Pink, 2004: 7). It was in this sense that we used the film as a resource to access the way the interlocutors present themselves, individually and as a

38  Inês Lourenço community, through the reflection on their own heritage. Using video allows us to have a ‘skilled vision’ as a way to ethnographic knowledge that provides a deeper understanding of the informants’ points of view. Thus, film and video are both research methods in themselves (Pink, 2004: 5) while attributing to the agency to interlocutors in the process of conceptualising the exhibition and, as a final product, making the exhibition and the museum an inclusive place. Museums can function as contact zones (Pratt, 19912; Clifford, 1997) for a cultural encounter for the audiences and reflection for immigrants and diasporas on the meaning and value of their own heritage (Naguib, 2013: 2184). They allow researchers to go beyond territorial heritage associations, facilitating the articulation with the public sphere (Barrett, 2011) and promoting the participation of the communities themselves in the discourse on their own heritage, bringing the margins to the centre (Hall, 1990). The Hindu community organised around Shiva Temple is overcoming invisibility that lasted about three decades. In a moment of posteconomic crisis in Portugal, it takes advantage of the opening of the surrounding society, becoming locally visible and assuming a specific identity, investing in the construction of a temple. I intended to analyse how the present collaborative exhibition project demonstrates the overcoming of the identity crisis of the community, through a strategy of visibility associated with their increasing agency and active participation and interaction with the surrounding society. The construction of a migratory heritage is a process that brings together past and present, resulting in a crossing between homeland and country of establishment, demonstrating that the study of heritage, rather than just representing the past, allows us to reflect on the past and imagine the future (Harrison, 2013: 7). Past, present and future are temporal realities that clearly intersect in the way this community represents itself as Portuguese Hindus.

Notes 1 Nina Glick Schiller, along with Ayse Çaglar, added the approach of mobility between cities to the debate on transnational mobility (Schiller and Çaglar, 2009), which disaggregates the national referent as the single referent to the concept of transnationalism, adding the usefulness of urban referents to diaspora populations. 2 Both resettlement processes were studied by Portuguese anthropologists (Bastos, 1990; Cachado, 2008). 3 These names are based on those used by the Hindus and the literature produced on the subject (see Bastos and Bastos, 2001). 4 The tradition of bhakti is defined by a religious devotion that aims to promote intimacy with the deity, transmitted by the god Krishna and registered in the sacred book Bhagvad Gita.

Crossing past and present 39

References Appadurai, A. 1996. Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Ballard, R. 1994. DeshPardesh: The South Asian presence in Britain. London: Hurst. Banks, M. 2001. Visual methods in social research. London: Sage. Barrett, Jennifer. 2011. Museums and the public sphere. Chichester: WileyBlackwell Publishing. Bastos, S.T.P. 1990. A comunidade hindu da Quinta da Holandesa. Um estudo antropológico a sobre organização sócio-espacial da casa. Lisbon: LNEC. Bastos, Susana and José, Bastos. 2001. De Moçambique a Portugal – Reinterpretações Identitárias do Hinduismo em Viagem. Lisboa: Orientália. Basu, Paul and Simon Coleman. 2008. ‘Introduction: Migrant worlds, material cultures’, Mobilities, 3(3): 313–333. DOI: 10.1080/17450100802376753. Baumann, Martin. 1998. ‘Sustaining ‘Little Indias’: The Hindu Diasporas in Europe’, in Gerrie ter Haar (ed.), Strangers and sojourners: Religious communities in the diaspora, 1st edn, pp. 95–132. Uitgeverij Peeters. Burrell, Kathy. 2008. ‘Managing, learning and sending: The material lives and journeys of polish women in Britain’, Journal of Material Culture, 13(1): 63–83. DOI: 10.1177/1359183507086219. Cachado, Rita. 2008. Hindus da Quinta da Vitória em Processo de Realojamento. Uma etnografia na cidade alargada. Lisbon: ISCTE, PhD dissertation. Cachado, Rita and Inês Lourenço. 2016. ‘Aparentemente no mesmo terreno. Notas sobre trabalho de campo colaborativo’, in Humberto Martins and Paulo Medes (eds.), Trabalho de Campo: envolvimento e experiências em antropologia. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. Chaney, Elsa M. 1979. The world economy and contemporary migration. The International Migration Review, 13(2): 204–212. Clifford, James. 1997. ‘Museums as contact zones’, in James Clifford (ed.), Routes: Travel and translation in the late twentieth Century, pp. 188–219. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cohen, Robin. 1997. Global diasporas: An introduction. London: UCL Press. Frykman, Maya. 2009. ‘Material aspects of transnational social fields: An introduction’, Two Homelands, 29: 105–113. Hall, Stuart. 1990. ‘Cultural identity and diaspora’ in Jonathan Rutherford (ed.), Identity: community, culture, difference. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Hannerz, U. 1996. Transnational connections. London: Routledge. Harrison, Rodney. 2013. Heritage: Critical approaches. London and New York: Routledge. Innocenti, Perla (ed.). 2014. Migrating heritage: Experiences of cultural networks and cultural dialogue in Europe. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. Lourenço, Inês. 2010. ‘Anthropological perspectives on female identity: The Hindu diaspora in Portugal’, The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, 5: 143–150.

40  Inês Lourenço Lourenço, Inês. 2011. ‘Religion and gender: The Hindu diaspora in Portugal’, South Asian Diaspora, 3(1): 37–51. DOI: 10.1080/19438192.2010.539033. Lourenço, Inês. 2013. From Goans to Gujaratis: A study of the Indian community in Portugal. Research Report, CARIM-India. San Domenico di Fiesole: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. Lourenço, Inês. 2015. ‘Constructing hindu worlds in Portugal: A case study from Lisbon’, in Pratap Kumar (ed.), Indian diaspora: Socio-cultural and religious worlds, pp. 91–118. Leiden: Brill. DOI: 10.1163/9789004288065_007. May, Reuben, A. Buford, and Mary Patillo-MacCoy. 2000. ‘Do you see what I see? Examining a collaborative ethnography’, Qualitative Enquiry, 6(1): 65–87. Naguib, Saphinaz-Amal. 2013. ‘Museums, diasporas and the sustainability of intangible cultural heritage’, Sustainability, 5: 2178–2190. DOI: 10.3390/ su5052178. Pink, Sarah. 2001. Doing visual ethnography: Images, media and representations in research. London: Sage. Pink, Sarah. 2004. ‘Introduction. Situating visual research’, in Sarah Pink, L. Kurti and A.I. Afonso (eds.), Working images. Visual representation in ethnography. London and New York: Routledge. Poehls, Kerstin. 2011. ‘Europe, blurred: Migration, margins and the museum’, Culture Unbound, 3: 337–353. Pratt, Mary Louise. 1991. ‘Arts of the contact zone’, Profession, 1: 33–40. Rosales, Marta Vilar. 2009 ‘Objects, scents and tastes from a distant home: Goan life experiences in Africa’, Two Homelands, 26: 153–166. Schiller, Nina G., Basch, Linda and Blanc, Cristina Szanton. 1995. ‘Immigrant to transmigrant: Theorizing transnational migration’. Anthropological Quarterly, 68(1): 48–63. Schiller, Nina G. and Caglar, Ayse. 2009. Towards a comparative theory of locality in migration studies: migrant incorporation and city scale. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35(2): 177–202. Routledge. Singhvi, L. et al. (eds.) 2001. Report of the high level committee on the Indian diaspora. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs. Vertovec, Steven. 2000. The Hindu diaspora: Comparative patterns. London: Routledge. Vertovec, Steven and Wessendorf, Susanne. 2006. Cultural, religious and linguistic diversity in europe: an overview of issues and trends. The dynamics of international migration and settlement in Europe: A state of the art. Amsterdam University Press. Vilaça, Helena. 2006. Da Torre de Babel às Terras Prometidas. Pluralismo Religioso em Portugal. Porto: Afrontamento. Werbner, Pnina. 2009. ‘Religious identity’, in M. Wetherell and C. Talpade (eds.), The sage book of identities. London: Sage. Whitehead, Christopher, Katharine Lloyd, Susannah Eckersley, and Rhiannon Mason (eds.). 2015. Museums, migration and identity in Europe. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.

3 Indian community in the United Kingdom Settlement, achievements and challenges Shinder S. Thandi 3.1 Introduction It is well understood that India has a long migratory relationship with the UK which dates back several centuries but which expanded and deepened during the British colonial period (Visram, 2002; Fisher, Lahiri and Thandi, 2007). But the overall numbers remained small. There is also considerable literature which discusses the settlement pattern and evolution of the Indian communities in the UK which, according to the 2011 census, number nearly 1.45 million (Ballard, 2004; Ali et al., 2006; Peach and Gale, 2003). Due to important historical reasons two Indian ethnic groups dominated Indian immigration up to the 1980s – Punjabis and Gujaratis, with the former migrating largely directly from the Indian state of Punjab and the latter mostly indirectly, as ‘twice migrants’ from Uganda and Kenya in East Africa, originally hailing from Gujarat, after Africanisation began to take root there. Continuous tightening of immigration rules on unskilled immigrants, which began in the early 1960s – coupled with changes in the global and British labour markets which largely favoured high-skilled workers such as doctors, engineers and IT professionals, Indian immigrants from other Indian states, especially central and southern states, are now also represented in significant numbers in Britain, increasing diversity of backgrounds among British Indians (Business in the Community, 2014). This chapter both provides a historical overview on migration patterns and recent trends in Indian migration to the UK and assesses the socio-economic condition of the contemporary Indian diaspora in the UK. The paper argues that not only has the Indian community in UK become economically and culturally more diverse and representative of India, it has also emerged as a successful community, relatively well integrated, engaged in diversified activities ranging from self-employment at one end to the highest level of public

42  Shinder S. Thandi service at the other. The British Indian community’s growing economic clout is not lost on Indian and British governments, which have both intensified their engagement with it. This in turn has important implications for the inner dynamics of the Indian diaspora in the UK as well as on Indo-British economic and diplomatic relations. This chapter is divided into three further sections. The second section provides an overview on settlement of the Indian community over several phases. The third section provides a socio-economic profile of the contemporary Indian community, highlighting major achievements as well as discussing current challenges facing the community. The fourth and final section summarises the chapter with concluding remarks.

3.2 History and patterns of Indian migration to UK 3.2.1 Early decades 1950s to 1980s In the four decades following the ending of the Second World War, migration from the Indian sub-continent to Britain surpassed anything that had occurred in the previous 400 years. The make-up of migrants arriving in the UK was different too, with a higher proportion being unskilled, poorly educated manual workers compared with earlier migrants who were members of the Indian elite and students. The lascars who were associated with shipping companies were transient and largely hidden in port cities (Visram, 2002). Increased demand for labour to reconstruct Britain after the devastation caused by the Second World War and dislocation of millions of people caused by the partition of India acted as critical factors leading to many Indians migrating to Britain, seeking a better life in greener pastures. Although aware of the prospects of a better standard of living in Britain, nevertheless the 1950s and 1960s were decades of struggle, uncertainty and high anxiety for many of the new migrants still unsure of their long-term plans (Fisher, Lahiri and Thandi, 2007). Seeing government attempts to impose restrictions on further immigration, many decided to make Britain their home and asked their wives and children to join them. Thereafter, settlement expanded rapidly, through family reunions and natural increase, and this was given a further boost by fresh immigration from East African Indians in the late 1960s and early 1970s. East African Indians, largely Gujaratis, were forced to leave Uganda, and others in Kenya and Tanzania, fearing the same fate, also began to move. Although largely unwanted by the British state, East African ‘twice migrants’ comprising Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims had a significant impact on both the socio-economic composition and

Indian community in the United Kingdom 43 future evolution of the British Indian community and on providing an important new impetus to an emergent Indian business sector. Thus starting as a small community at the beginning of the 1950s, through both direct and indirect immigration, we see the emergence of a sizable and visible Indian community in the major metropolitan areas of Britain – predominantly England. From the 1980s onwards, due to restrictions on immigration the number of ‘fresh’ immigrants began to decline, and the only categories of immigrants allowed in were wives and children or dependents of immigrants already living in Britain, spouses of newly married or to be married and controlled numbers of immigrants from some professional categories such as doctors, scientists and engineers because of acute skill shortages in Britain. Migration of eligible East African Indians also continued on a phased basis, with some having to spend some time in India before getting entry to Britain. This has largely remained the pattern since then except from the beginning of this century, when emergence of skill shortages in critical areas allowed further immigration. This is specifically the case among IT/software engineers and research or teaching professionals because equivalent workers could not be found among the British population. It is also worth noting that there are other ‘twice migrant’ Indians coming to settle in Britain from various Commonwealth countries such as Fiji, Malaysia, South Africa and Trinidad and also many entering on business visas with relaxed immigration and financial rules in both India and Britain. Thus the size of the community continues to increase due to different categories of Indians entering Britain, categories that are very different from the earlier phase. However, a major reason for increase in the Indian population is the growth in British-born Indian population. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 show both the growth in the size of the Indian community in Britain and the distribution among British-born and foreign-born Indians and more importantly how entry of new immigrants has added to the foreign-born category. Presently only 42 percent of British Indians were born in UK with 58 percent born outside. The UK-born number would be higher had there not been constant immigration of categories discussed above, especially of highskilled immigrants. For instance, according to government statistics for 2016, Indian nationals accounted for 57 percent of total skilled work visas granted (53,575 out of 93,244). One of the largest sectors sponsoring skilled work visas (known as Tier 2 visas) has been the information technology sector, which alone made 42 percent of skilled work visa applications, followed by professional, scientific and technical activities (19 percent) and financial and insurance activities (ONS,

44  Shinder S. Thandi Table 3.1  Growth of Indian community in Britain, 1951–2011 Year

Total Indians

% of population

1931 (est.) 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011

7,100 31,000 81,000 375,000 675,000 840,000 1,053,400 1,451,800

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.8 2.3

Source: Taken from ONC Census data for various years

Total 1.4 million Born in the UK 606,000 21% arrived 2007-11 21% arrived 2001-06 Born outside the UK 807,000

20% arrived 1981-2000 38% arrived before 1981

Figure 3.1  Indians in England and Wales by birth and settlement period Source: ONS, Census 2011

2011).1 However, UK government’s determined attempt to reduce overall immigration into the UK is also likely to restrict the number of high-skilled work visas issued in future years, much to the annoyance of the IT industry which suffers from skill shortages. As a result of the changing composition of Indian immigrants, both the areas of origin as well as religious affiliations have changed. Britain has emerged as a multi-religious country, but immigrants from South Asia are still dominated by Hindus and Sikhs. Table 3.2 shows major religious groups in Britain showing changes between 2001 and 2011. Table 3.3 also shows major religious groups but shows their

Indian community in the United Kingdom 45 Table 3.2  Religious population in England and Wales showing changes between 2001 and 2011 Thousand, percent Religion

2001

2011

 

Number Percent Number Percent Number Percentage point

Christian No religion Muslim Hindu Sikh Jewish Buddhist Other religion Religion not stated

37,338 7,709 1,547 552 329 260 144 151 4,011

71.7 14.8 3.0 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 7.7

33,243 14,097 2,706 817 423 263 248 241 4,038

Change

59.3 25.1 4.8 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 7.2

−4,095 6,388 1,159 264 94 3 103 90 27

−12.4 10.3 1.8 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 −0.5

Source: Office for National Statistics, 2011

Table 3.3  Major religious groups among Indians in England and Wales, 2011 Religion

% of total Indian population

% of total population

Hinduism Sikhism Islam Christianity Buddhism Judaism Other religions Religion not stated No religion Total

44.02 22.15 13.95 9.62 0.26 0.06 2.34 4.47 3.13 100.0

1.5 0.8 4.8 59.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 7.2 25.1 100.0

Source: ONS, 2011 Census

relative share in the Indian population as well as their percentage share of the total British population. 3.2.2 Settlement, challenges and struggles Considering the first four decades of immigration as a whole, four broad features stand out. First, the distinctive settlement pattern – the concentration of different Indian migrants in specific localities of

46  Shinder S. Thandi Britain. The two predominant communities – Punjabis and Gujaratis – settled largely in west London (especially the borough of Ealing which includes Southall) and the West Midlands (especially Birmingham and Wolverhampton) and north-west London (especially in the borough of Brent, which includes Wembley) and East Midlands (especially Leicester), respectively (Thandi, 2015). This early settlement pattern was reinforced further by continuous immigration of Punjabis and Gujaratis to these same areas, and this more or less continues today. Second, the dramatic life-changing experiences for these new migrants (often originating from small villages in Punjab or small townships in east Africa), who are now living in new urban and cold industrial environments. It is well documented that first and many second-generation Indians lived in run down, overcrowded, relatively small Victorian terraced houses without the luxury of constant hot water or bathroom facilities inside the house. Only with the second generation entering employment were many families able to acquire housing in more desirable neighbourhoods. This upward housing mobility was also indicative of the general improvement in lifestyles of most Indian families. Thirdly, their reception in the localities they settled in was not particularly welcoming. Along with the arrival of immigrants from the Caribbean islands or other South Asian countries, Indians faced hostility on a number of fronts. Apart from the difficulties in getting access to good-paying jobs and to decent housing, racist harassment and abuse was common and sometimes boiled over. The Conservative MP Enoch Powell’s infamous ‘rivers of blood’ in 1968 inflamed racial tensions further and focused the government’s mind in enacting legislation to improve race and community relations (Hansen, 2000). At the national level, politics of race and immigration pre-occupied the minds of legislators, in a way reflecting both the new anxieties among the host British society, especially in metropolitan areas where minority ethnic groups were settling, and electoral calculations. Table 3.4 shows the close correlation, with a short period lag, between legislation to restrict immigration and promoting racial harmony, the latter giving rise to the ‘race industry’ operating through local and national councils. Restrictions on immigration continue to be defined in terms of maintaining good community relations, as immigrants are always seen as the problem, as seen in recent discourse before and after the Brexit referendum. Fourthly, given the challenge of multiple deprivation and discrimination, the Indian community undertook struggles to secure their cultural, religious and human rights. As previously intimated, early settlers faced discrimination in a number of areas: in access to housing, whether for rental or ownership, access to better-paid jobs

Indian community in the United Kingdom 47 Table 3.4  Immigration acts and race relations legislation in Britain since 1962 Year

Acts of parliament

1962 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1976 1981 1993

Commonwealth Immigration Act

Commonwealth Immigration Act Immigration Appeals Act Immigration Act British Nationality Act

1996 1998 1999 2000 2002

Immigration and Asylum Act

2004 2006 2007 2009 2010

British Nationality Act Asylum and Immigration (Appeals) Act Asylum and Immigration Act

Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act Asylum and Immigration Act Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act UK Borders Act Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act

Law on race relations Race Relations Act Local Government Act Race Relations Act

Race Relations Act

Human Rights Act Race Relations (Amendment) Act

Equality Act

Human Rights Act, Equality Act

Source: Author’s compilation

despite having appropriate qualifications and in getting permits to build places of worship and community centres, but legislation to curb racial discrimination and uphold equal opportunities helped the community to progress. However, it was not as smooth as it may appear – for example, it took years for Sikhs to get their turban recognised as a religious symbol, to get planning permission to convert buildings into places of worship, to be allowed to hold public processions at important religious or cultural festivals, to allow faith-based funeral facilities and to get permission to set up state-funded religious schools on the same basis as Church of England, Catholic or Jewish schools. The tolerance for cultural and religious difference only really started with the full acceptance of multi-culturalism as underpinning public policy. However, this was not to last long, and a backlash against

48  Shinder S. Thandi multi-culturalism began during the first decade of this century and was built upon the premise that the policy was pandering to minority ethnic groups, creating unnecessary divides, difference and separatism among minority ethnic groups themselves as well as from the mainstream British community. Deteriorating race relations and periodic race riots among some minority ethnic groups, especially the youth, were seen as a direct outcome of multicultural policies. Although the target group may have been the Muslim community, who were alleged to be leading ‘parallel lives’ in parallel communities, the negative discourse impacted all minority ethnic communities. Rather than focusing on economic deprivation and disadvantage associated with entrenched racism, the problem appeared to be multiculturalism. Not surprisingly, therefore, the policy response was to introduce initiatives to promote community cohesion and social integration by re-asserting core cultural values of ‘Britishness’. Advocates of this approach tended to have in mind a notion of a homogenous British citizenship, which raised concerns among the minority communities. In reality the new initiatives meant greater insistence on learning and use of the English language, curtailing or not publicly promoting or funding ethnic cultural and religious symbols and stricter citizenship tests which included questions on British history. But these initiatives seemed to be inconsistent with other public and educational policies such as now allowing all religious groups to set up their own state-funded faith schools, which are seen by many as sowing seeds of separatism. Needless to say, Hindus. Sikhs and Muslims have taken advantages of these policy changes by setting up their own faith schools in the past decade.2 3.2.3 Rise of second generation, multiculturalism and celebration of difference A British-born second generation of young Indians only came into public notice in the 1970s. This new generation imbibed values taken from their parental culture as well as those of the dominant British society. Academics and policy makers of the day, describing this generation as ‘between two cultures’, predicted inter-generational conflict and their rapid assimilation into ‘British’ society (Watson, 1977). In fact, as this generation grew in size and became more confident of transplanting roots in Britain, they began to support their firstgeneration parents in various campaigns to secure economic, political, cultural and religious rights, given the high levels of discrimination faced by them. Over time, however, Indians were able to win important victories and were grateful for growth in understanding and tolerance

Indian community in the United Kingdom 49 of cultural diversity and equal-opportunity laws. Thus, by the end of the 1980s, the foundations of a vibrant, urban, multi-cultural, multireligious and multi-racial Britain were fully laid which allowed Indians to thrive. The Indian community thrived under multi-culturalism, as this created a cultural space for them to celebrate their distinct cuisine, religious and cultural festivals, fashion, art and literature, cinema and music without fearing a backlash. Along with the rise and success of self-employment among Indians, with many rags-to-riches stories, and the emergence of a wealthy British Indian business and entrepreneurial community and the appearance of annual Asian Rich Lists which boasted incredible wealth,3 the community grew in confidence and gained the widespread perception that it was a hard-working, aspirational, tolerant and well-integrated community, almost a model minority (Thandi, 2006). Some even described the Indians as the new Jews – a complement not paid to other minority ethnic communities acknowledging their high level of integration and wealth.

3.3 Indian community: achievements and challenges Indian immigrant success and upward socio-economic mobility are built on two important pillars: business enterprise largely through self-employment and education. Indians are employed in all types of occupations and have the highest labour market participation rate at 80 percent for men and 63 percent for women (overall rate at 72 percent) among all South Asians.4 It is worth underscoring the point about the high labour force participation among Indian women because not only does this provide access to additional income from employment, a crucial factor in upward social mobility, but also because labour market experience allows females to become eligible for higher-paying job opportunities. Occupations taken up by Indians include skilled as well as unskilled (about 40 percent of total), but one type of employment which has always attracted Indians is self-employment (about 20 percent of total), whether as owners of grocery shops, restaurants, post offices or travel or insurance agencies.5 Following a detailed analysis of labour market experiences drawn from the ONS 2011 census data, Indians emerge as the most successful minority ethnic group with 15.4 percent (17.8 percent if students are excluded) engaged in eight occupational groups classified as class 1, namely higher managerial, administrative roles as well as professions like doctors and lawyers. This is almost double the figure compared with the British white ethnic group. Those who have successfully undertaken professional training

50  Shinder S. Thandi now own medical centres, dental surgeries, pharmacies and law and accountancy firms, offering their services to the South Asian community as well as to the mainstream community. In fact, like in the United States, the community has emerged as a critical component of the British healthcare sector, providing a whole range of professional services as consultants, GPs, dentists and nurses and also as administrators and cleaners. According to the British Medical Council, there are 34,287 (12.2 percent of the total) registered Indian doctors in Britain in 2016, with 24,000 who gained their qualification in India. Figure 3.2 shows the connection, rarely made, between religious groups and higher-level occupations and confirms that Hindus are only marginally behind the Jews, usually the benchmark minority ethnic community, whilst Sikhs are at average for all religious groups but still much higher than other South Asian religious groups. Indian business success and enterprise is now well documented as discussed earlier, and some individuals have seen their contribution to Britain rewarded with life peerages and sit in the House of Lords. The most popular names among these include Lord Paul, Lord Dholakia and Lord Bilimoria among several others, and they often also play an ambassadorial role in strengthening IndoBritish business and trade ties.

20

15

10

5

0

Figure 3.2 Representation of religious groups in higher managerial, administrative or professional occupations in England and Wales, 2011 Source: Chart from Reynolds and Birdswell (2015)

Indian community in the United Kingdom 51 The British public education system is known for its high standard of education in schools and universities, and it would be an understatement to state that the Indian community has made the best use of it. Indian parents, given their immigrant status as well as social and economic expectations and aspirations, which place a high value on education, encouraged, strategised and cajoled their children to gain the highest qualifications possible, especially which would enable them entry to highly regarded and recognised professions. As a consequence, Indian children have emerged as one of the most successful ethnic groups in achieving higher grades at GCE and Advanced Level qualifications. These give many of them guaranteed access to elite higher education institutions. Thus, beginning with the second generation, Indian students have taken full advantage of the opportunities available to them. They have been assisted in their endeavours by government policies which have expanded access to higher education. Thus it is not surprising that almost 90 percent of Indian children leaving school enter higher education, with most graduating with an honours degree, placing them at an advantage in the labour market. Access to higher education has emerged as a crucial factor in the upward social mobility of the British Indian community. 3.3.1 Institution building As the community settled and expanded in many large metropolitan areas, there was a continuous process of institution building. Thus Indian political, cultural, religious, educational and business organisations started coming into being. These were important for building community solidarity in the initial period and for mobilising community members to resist racism and fight for immigration and other cultural and political rights. However, given the diversity in the areas of origin, diversity in religious traditions followed and languages spoken, Indians tended to build institutions along their distinct affiliations rather than at pan-Indian level. This pattern has continued to be perpetuated, and nowadays, each Indian sub-community – Gujaratis, Sikh and Hindu Punjabis, Bengalis, Tamils, Indian Muslims etc. – have their own separate organisations, pursuing their own specific agendas, and only coming together on issues which affect all Indians. For example, the Sikh community organisations have in the past undertaken campaigns to get recognition for their religious symbols and more recently have mobilised against injustices inflicted on Sikhs during Operation Blue Star (June 1984) and anti-Sikh violence in Delhi in November 1984.

52  Shinder S. Thandi One common form of institution building which all diaspora communities engage in is the establishment of places of worship and other religious institutions, not only to meet the community’s social and spiritual needs but also to transmit their religious tradition and heritage to newer generations. Starting at an early stage, all Indian communities have built their separate places of worship. The most prominent among these are Hindu Mandirs, representing the varied Hindu traditions which number around 150, and around 300 Sikh gurdwaras despite the Sikh community’s smaller size. Again, in addition to mainstream Singh Sabha gurdwaras, which derive their religious authority from Darbar Sahib at Amritsar, smaller traditions affiliated with Sikhism – Nanaksar, Namdhari, Ravidassia – are also represented. Some of these places of worship are quite ostentatious, designed along traditional architectural style, using specially imported materials and sometimes even importing artisans from India. Many of them have cost tens of millions of pounds to construct. Further, some sections of the Indian Dalit community, perceiving social exclusion and discriminatory practices, have also built their own places of worship. So the religious landscape amongst the British Indian community is quite dynamic and vibrant but also highly differentiated along religious and sectarian lines. There is little evidence of inter-faith dialogue just among the Indian communities, and the only occasion when they tend to mobilise collectively is when a particular issue is relevant to all Indian communities, even though there may be much disagreement and discord between them. One particular issue which provides a good example of this is the joint mobilisation among Hindus (led by its umbrella organisations such as Hindu Council, UK and Hindu Forum) and Sikhs (spearheaded by the Sikh Council, UK), to oppose attempts by Dalit groups to have caste included as a form of discriminatory practice, just like race, in the amended Equality Act of 2010. It remains to be seen whether the increasingly assertive Dalit community will be successful in this venture given the vociferous opposition mounted by Hindu organisations, many with alleged links to the Sangh Parivar, and Sikhs. The caste issue laid bare the growing difference and animosity among British Indian communities and demonstrated how identity politics are increasingly invoked by them. 3.3.2 Political participation and representation Economic and business success coupled with upward social mobility made the community more confident in participating in civic and political organisations. Although in the early years Indians had formed

Indian community in the United Kingdom 53 their own version of labour and political organisations – Indian workers associations – over time they also began to join mainstream trade unions and political parties, usually Labour and Conservatives, and started contesting in local elections to serve as councillors, with many becoming mayors of their city or borough. Over time, and having gained political experience in their local council, some even attempted to gain nomination to stand for election to be Members of Parliament. Although there had been Indian Members of Parliament during the colonial period, in fact as long ago as 1892 with the election of Dadabhai Naoroji, it was not until the early part of this century that we see a breakthrough with sizable Indian representation in British Parliament. Of course, the situation has continued to improve, with MPs of Indian heritage also becoming Cabinet Ministers. In the 2015 general election, a record number of ten Indian-origin MPs were elected to the House of Commons, out of the fifty-nine who contested. This number rose to twelve after the snap general election called by Theresa May in 2017. Unfortunately, at the time of writing a second Indian-origin MP, the highly ambitious Cabinet Minister and International Development Secretary Priti Patel (MP for Witham), got caught in having unofficial meetings with Israeli government ministers and was forced to resign. This follows the earlier fall from grace of a long-serving MP and exminister Keith Vaz (MP for Leicester East), who was allegedly involved in a sex scandal involving young male prostitutes. Representation of Indian-origin peers in the House of Lords has increased markedly in recent years under the Labour and Conservative government. There are currently dozens of Indian-origin peers in the House of Lords, although some of them were also found to be embroiled in falsely claiming expenses and cash-for-peerages scandal. Overall though we need to remember that the continuing success of Indian-origin politicians is beginning to correct their historical under-representation in British Parliament. Prognosis for the future looks good given the growing participation of new generations of Indians in British politics at all levels. At the level of culture and cultural transmission of heritage, there have also been some radical changes. The earlier Indian visual culture associated with visiting the cinema or watching VHS videos as a family at home has given way to watching numerous Indian satellite channels, usually replicating channels available in India, and listening to national and local digital radio stations which play different genres of music to serve all tastes 24/7. The continued popularity of Bollywood is supplemented by regular visiting artists and musical troupes from India, who play to packed audiences at spectacular venues such as

54  Shinder S. Thandi the Wembley Arena, LG Arena in Birmingham or De Montfort Hall in Leicester. These visitors add to the large number of British artistes and musical bands that tour the UK, perform at wedding parties and appear on TV channels such as BritAsia. It is worth underscoring that cultural exchanges between India and Britain have become truly circular, and sometimes it becomes difficult to understand the permanent domicile of artistes. The rise of British Indian cultural and creative industries which extend into different domains – religious, wedding services, cuisine, fashion and jewellery, music, drama and cinema – has been truly remarkable and has popularised Indian culture among a large section of the British population, over-evoking at times the nostalgic colonial relationship. 3.3.3 Homeward orientation Indian immigrants in Britain never really broke their links with their friends and families at home. Although physical return remained limited due to prohibitive air travel costs, many kept contact through letters, since telephone calls were still relatively expensive. Over time especially with falling costs of travel and easy access to digital technologies, linkages between British Indians and their Indian contacts have strengthened greatly with social media becoming the preferred form of communication in two-way and circular communications. Whether undertaking financial, cultural or religious exchanges, the two geographical spaces have got closely connected, and air traffic between Britain and India continues to thrive and break records. In addition to strong familial connections, one of the reasons for strengthening of British Indian and Indian ties has been the changes in Indian government policies towards its diaspora communities after the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, chaired by L.M. Singhvi, submitted its report with a long list of recommendations in 2002. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Indian Prime Minster at the time, initiated a plethora of policies and institutions at both national and state levels to connect with its long-neglected diaspora, especially the ‘old diaspora’ which emerged under the indentured labour system under British rule. The annual or nowadays bi-annual Pravasi Bhartiya Divas plays a pivotal role in building diaspora connections and trust. British Indians have also welcomed these initiatives and have used platforms to raise their concerns regarding their personal problems when visiting India, in seeking voting rights and easier immigration and visa rules. Many British Indians take advantage of the Overseas Citizen of India

Indian community in the United Kingdom 55 visa, which effectively gives them dual nationality and greater protection when visiting India. 3.3.4 Challenges facing the Indian community It would be misleading to leave an impression that all Indians in Britain are doing well in all spheres of economic and social life. Whilst economic and business success can be explained by high aspirations, work ethic and spirit of enterprise within an immigrant community, especially when considered along with the length of settlement of the community, other factors need to be considered to explain why a significant proportion of the community still lives in deprived neighbourhoods and are stranded in low-paying unskilled occupations, and especially women workers continue to experience high rates of unemployment in some localities and survive of state benefits. The Rowntree Trust estimated that in 2004/2005, although the Indian community may be doing better than other South Asian communities, household income poverty among Indians was around 25 percent (Rowntree Trust, 2005). This means that 25 percent of Indian households had incomes of less than 60 percent of the current median income of British households. Given the implementation of severe austerity measures after the fiscal crisis of 2007/08 in Britain, with their impact on supressing the real value of welfare benefits and wages, it is highly unlikely that income poverty level will have improved significantly and in fact may have actually worsened given trends in the country as a whole. At the society level there are also other challenges which the community is struggling to accommodate, and two in particular are worth discussing: family break-ups and state of health. Firstly, the concept of the traditional extended family has undergone a fundamental change with most British-born children preferring to live in their own homes. Whilst this may be perceived positively and as an inevitable tradeoff of living in a modern urban economy, it does raise the possibility that elderly parents may feel isolated and even abandoned and left to depend on social services for their care and well-being. Indian community leaders have responded to this hidden but unfolding crisis by making a case for further funding for more Indian community centres or day care centres. In fact many of the larger gurdwaras have started offering these facilities, but many still remain isolated. Some enterprising individuals, seeing a gap in the market, have opened up private care

56  Shinder S. Thandi homes specifically catering for elderly Asians, but such facilities are nowhere near sufficient or of adequate standard and quality to provide care for all those who need it. Apart from the elderly care issue, there are other family-based issues which often involve dependence on local social services. These include increasing cases of domestic abuse and paedophilia, alcoholism and drug-related family tensions and breakups, forced marriages and a significant rise in marriage failures. These issues are discussed regularly within the walls of social services departments in many metropolitan areas and by women’s groups. Southall Black Sisters among others have tried to raise awareness about them nationally. However, they still remain taboo subjects, best swept under the carpet (Thandi, 2017a). Secondly, the Indian community suffers from many health issues which are partly genetic and partly related to sedentary lifestyles and poor dietary intake and nutritional education. It is well acknowledged that Indians are more prone to suffer heart attacks, strokes and diabetes and are least likely to participate in sporting or other exercise activities which would contribute to leading healthy lifestyles. Two important consequences follow from this. Firstly, a person’s proneness to frequent illness places greater caring demands on family members, causing unnecessary tensions. Secondly it implies taking a lot of time off work, negatively affecting career prospects, perhaps losing a job or inability to find a job. All these have an impact on family income and ability to climb up the socio-economic ladder. Whilst the Indian community has developed greater awareness about consuming a healthy and more nutritious diet and including exercise into their daily lifestyle, these have not significantly improved health issues, and serious challenges remain. There are of course other challenges offered by the wider society such as racism which have persisted since the first arrivals, but the community seemed to have learnt to live with that and have developed mobilisation strategies to counter them. Race relations and equalopportunities legislation has been relatively successful in preventing overt forms of racism and discrimination, such as in job applications and promotions, but covert forms of prejudice still remain, as evidenced in employment tribunal case reports, which regularly uphold allegations of discrimination.

3.4 Some conclusions This chapter has provided an overview of the Indian presence in Britain, which increased markedly from the 1950s onward. Decades of

Indian community in the United Kingdom 57 settlement have culminated in the emergence of a vibrant, wealthy and relatively well integrated 1.45 million-strong community, which has entrenched itself in many critical sectors of the economy and thereby make a significant contribution to Britain’s gross domestic product. Indians have warmly embraced British values of freedom, fairness and tolerance but at the same time have not shed the cultural baggage which sometimes can conflict with them. Further, given the great diversity among British Indians, each sub-community sets their own priorities, have developed their own networks of communication both with British society and their homeland national and state governments. Evidence on whether this diversity acts as a positive or negative force in a diaspora context is inconclusive. Despite this, most Indians continue to demonstrate great patriotism when forced to make a choice regarding their loyalties. It has always been a mystery to white Britishers why British-born and -bred Indian youth should support the Indian cricket team rather than England. The clue to this perhaps lies in the absence of a British cricket team, since most would identify themselves as British rather than English. The Indian ability to straddle both worlds – the Indian and the British – gives them the flexibility to adapt to different situations and feel at home and yet be abroad. The chapter has also highlighted many of the achievements by firstgeneration pioneers, their second- and third-generation children, but new arrivals, whether for family reunions, as marriage partners or on highly skilled or business visas, had added to the vibrancy and dynamism of the community. So not unlike India, which seems to live in several overlapping centuries all at once, Indians in Britain nowadays also comprise the full range of generations. New entrants sometimes pose challenges for long-settled families, who both fear competition from new immigrants and also offend their British sensibilities because they are perceived as uncouth ‘freshies’. This does lead to tensions, and it is not surprising therefore that many Indians oppose further immigration whether from mainland Europe or India and many voted for Brexit. There are also some anti-India elements which try to embarrass India under one pretext or other, but they do not represent the vast majority of British Indians who continue to cherish and celebrate their Indian heritage.

Notes 1 For detailed analysis of immigration rules regarding skilled migration to the UK and extent of skilled occupations among Indians in Britain see Zucotti (2013).

58  Shinder S. Thandi 2 There are now around eight Hindu and ten Sikh publicly funded faith schools in Britain catering for both primary and secondary schools. 3 The Asian Rich List 2017, released earlier this year, stated that the total wealth of the richest Asians in Britain, mostly Indians, was estimated at £69.9 billion, rising by £15 billion over the year. Shailesh Solanki, executive editor of Asia Media and Marketing Group, which produces this annual list, is quoted as saying, ‘The achievement of the entrepreneurs on the Asian Rich List is truly inspiring and humbling. Many came to the UK with very little and worked extremely hard to make their fortunes. They have been great for Britain and Britain has welcomed and nurtured them – they are tremendous examples of what immigrants can do for a country if they are free to live and work as they please. They bring new ideas, a studious work ethic and determination and are not afraid of taking risks’. See Eastern Eye, ‘Wealth Rises by £15 billion in Asian Rich List 2017’, March 16, 2017. 4 Employment rate for men was 80 percent and 63 percent for women, an overall employment rate of 72 percent. This compares with 63 percent (men) and 30 percent (women) for Pakistanis (overall 50 percent) and 79 percent (men) and 28 percent (women) with 55 percent overall for Bangladeshis, the two other main Asian groups. It is also worth adding that the unemployment rate among Indians is only 6 percent compared with Pakistanis at 17 percent and Bangladeshis at 13 percent. Figures taken from Business in the Community (2001). 5 According to the 2011 UK Census, Indians accounted for 21 percent of those employed in the wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle businesses. See ONS (2011) publication ‘2011Census analysis: Ethnicity and the Labour Market, England and Wales’.

References Ali, N., Kalra, V.S. and Sayyid, S. (2006) A Postcolonial People: South Asians in Britain (London: C. Hurst & Co.). Ballard, R. (ed.) (1994) 2004 Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain (London: Hurst). For a most recent survey, see Ali, N., Kalra, V.S. and Sayyid, S. (2006) A Postcolonial People: South Asians in Britain (London: C. Hurst & Co.). Business in the Community (2014) ‘Fact File – UK Labour Market Status by Ethnicity (April–June 2014)’. Available online at https://race.bitc.org.uk/ Leadingchange/Factfile/Ethnicitylabourmarket. Accessed 10/11/2017. Fisher, Michael, Lahiri, Shompa and Thandi, Shinder S. (2007) A South Asian History of Britain: Four Centuries of Peoples from the Indian Sub-Continent (London: Greenwood Press). Hansen, R. (2000) Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Office of National Statistics (2011) 2011 Census Analysis: Ethnicity and the Labour Market, England and Wales (London: ONS). Peach, C. and Gale, R. (2003) ‘Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs in the New Religious Landscape of England’. The Geographical Review, 93(4): 469–490.

Indian community in the United Kingdom 59 Thandi, Shinder S. (2006) ‘Labouring Enterprise and South Asians’ In Ali, N., Sayyid, B. and Kalra, V. (eds.), Post-Colonial People: South Asian Experience in Britain (London: Hurst). Thandi, Shinder S. (2015) ‘Punjabi Migration, Settlement and Experience in the UK’ In Irudaya Rajan, S., Varghese, V.J. and Nanda, Aswini Kumar (eds.), Migrations, Mobility and Multiple Affiliations: Punjabis in a Transnational World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 105–129. Thandi, Shinder S. (2017a) ‘Diversities, Continuities and Discontinuities of Tradition in the Contemporary Sikh Diaspora: Gender and Social Dimensions’ In Pande, Amba (ed.), Women in the Indian Diaspora: Historical Narratives and Contemporary Challenges (New Delhi: Springer). Thandi, Shinder S. (2017b) ‘Educated Millennial Sikhs: Higher Education, Social Mobility and Identity Formation among British Sikh Youth’ In Dusenbery, Van, Singh, Pashaura and Townsend, Charles (eds.), Living and Making Sikhi in the Diaspora: The Millennial Generation Comes of Age (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Visram, R. (2002) Asians in Britain: 400 Years of History (London: Pluto Press). Watson, J.L. (ed.) (1977) Between Two Cultures: Migrants and Minorities in Britain (Oxford: Blackwell). Zucotti, Carolina V. (2013) ‘Highly-Skilled Indian Migrants in the United Kingdom’, CARIM-India RR 2013/34 (San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute).

4 The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom An overview of characteristics and contributions to India Rupa Chanda 4.1 Introduction The word ‘diaspora’ comes from the Greek word diaspeirein (dia means about/across and speirein means to scatter). The term refers to the dispersion of people with a common root, who forge some sort of community network with each other and maintain a relationship (real or otherwise) with their homeland while living far away from home. Diaspora contribute to their home country through financial, social and human capital and their soft power and thus can play an important role in the development of their home countries as well as source regions and communities. Such contributions have facilitated a shift in attitude and thinking regarding migration, from brain drain to ‘brain bank’, ‘brain gain’, ‘brain trust’ and ‘brain circulation’. The manifold contribution of the Indian diaspora through their remittances, expertise and networks has led to a similar change in perspective among Indian policy makers and academics towards the Indian diaspora. As India is a diverse nation, its diaspora consists of many ethnic subgroups. Amongst the various Indian communities settled outside, the Punjabi, Gujarati and Keralite diaspora are large in number and also contribute significantly to the development of their native places. According to the sixty-fourth round of National Sample Survey data (2007–2009), Punjab figures among those states with the most out-migrants from India at an estimated 386,423 persons. Among host markets, the UK has always been an important destination market for Indian emigrants and has a sizeable Indian diaspora community, including people born in the UK of Indian descent and Indian-born people who have migrated to the UK. People of Indian origin (PIO) make the largest ethnic minority in Britain estimated at nearly 2 million or 2.73 percent of the UK’s population in 2011.

The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom 61 Within this community, Punjabis and Sikhs constitute a sizeable immigrant group, accounting for 45 percent of all Indians living in the UK at over 450,000 as per official UK statistics.1 This chapter focuses on the Punjabi diaspora community in the UK and their contributions to their home state of Punjab. Section 4.2 provides a brief overview of the Punjabi diaspora in the UK, including the drivers of migration from Punjab to the UK and their caste and community characteristics. Section 4.3 presents evidence based on indepth discussions with Punjabis settled in the UK as well as migration and diaspora experts on the contributions made by this diaspora to their home state. Section 4.4 concludes with the main insights and some policy recommendations.

4.2 Overview of the Punjabi diaspora in the UK Punjabis constitute an important Indian diaspora community not only in the UK but in many other parts of the world. They constitute 33 percent of the Indian emigrants to Gulf countries and account for 20 percent and 11 percent of Indian emigrants in Canada and the US, respectively. The UK accounts for 0.6 percent of all Punjabis living around the world.2 Within the Punjabi community in the UK, Sikhs constitute an important group. The largest Sikh community outside India is based in the UK, at around 300,000 or 2 percent of the 19.2 million Indian Sikh population and 65 percent of all Indian Punjabis living in the UK.3 Table 4.1 highlights the significance of the Punjabis and the Sikhs as an immigrant group in the UK. Table 4.1  Estimated size of different overseas Indian communities  

All people

Hindu

Muslim

Sikh

Others

All people in 52,041,916 552,421 1,546,626 329,358 49,613,511 England and Wales Asian 2,273,737 533,397 1,139,065 316,763 284,512 Indian 1,036,807 466,597 131,662 301,295 137,253 Indian Punjabi 466,5631         Pakistani 714,826 547 657,680 346 56,253 Bangladeshi 280,830 1,693 259,710 113 19,314 Other Asian 241,274 64,560 90,013 15,009 71,692 Source: Office of National Statistics (2012). 1

Data for Punjabis is estimated based on the share of Punjabis in total Indian migrants to the UK from the High Level Committee Report on the Indian Diaspora

62  Rupa Chanda 4.2.1 Drivers of Punjabi migration to the UK There have been several waves of migration from Punjab to the UK. The first wave was prior to independence, when there was direct migration from Punjab to the UK by Indian princes, elites and servants of the British. Punjab was also a key region for recruitment into the British Indian army, with some of these recruits going to the UK on overseas postings and eventually settling there after retirement.4 The second wave was post-independence when a large number of Punjabis who had migrated from India to the British East African colonies of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (Kaur 2007a) during the colonial period to work on developmental projects or as recruits in the British army were forced to leave these countries following political turmoil and Africanisation.5 Most of them moved to the UK as twice migrants in the 1960s and 1970s. More recently, in the 1990s, there was another secondary wave of Punjabi migration to the UK (and other developed countries) from Afghanistan by Sikhs who had settled as businessmen and traders in that country and were forced to leave following the political turmoil in Afghanistan.6 A third wave of migration has been driven by socio-economic factors in the post-independence period. Direct migration of Punjabis to the UK reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s, when many Punjabi males migrated in response to the demand for low-skilled workers in Britain’s industrial sector after World War II.7 The UK’s Commonwealth immigration policy facilitated such flows, as it allowed any citizen of a Commonwealth country to live, work, vote and hold public office in the UK (Koikkalainen 2011), though the 1962 immigration reform brought an end to this privilege. Many male Sikhs migrated under this liberal policy. There was also migration (primarily male) from Punjab to the UK during the 1960s and 1970s in search of better employment, educational facilities and other benefits which were not available in Punjab. In part, such flows were triggered by a change in mindset and aspirations for a better standard of living among Punjabi villagers following the Green Revolution in Punjab. This initial maledominated migration of workers from Punjab was followed by spouse and family migration to the UK. In the post-independence period, marriage-related migration has emerged as a major contributor to the growth of the Punjabi diaspora community in the UK, with spouses forming the largest single category of migrant settlement in the UK.8 Irregular migration has also contributed to the sizeable Punjabi diaspora community in the UK. According to a report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, every year nearly 0.02 million Punjabi youths

The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom 63 try to illegally migrate to European Union (EU) countries in pursuit of greener pastures.9 A majority of these irregular migrants from Punjab go to Britain. 4.2.2 Caste and community characteristics10 There is considerable heterogeneity in the Punjabi community in the UK. The majority of the Sikh diaspora in the UK is from the Jat caste, who were traditionally landed peasant farmers. Sikhs from the Jat caste migrated from the Jullundur Doaba region to the UK, starting in the early 1950s. In addition, a section of the Sikh diaspora in the UK belongs to the Bhatra and Ramgarhia castes. They were mostly landless workers. The Bhatras like the Jats migrated to the UK directly from India, initially between the two world wars, when they settled in Britain’s seaports and later after independence. The Ramgarhia Sikhs on the other hand were mostly secondary migrants from the countries of East Africa. Within the Sikh diaspora community in the UK, two important subgroups are the Ravidasi and Valmiki communities. These are considered lower zat among the Sikhs. There are separate community centres and sabhas which help these subgroups to establish their identities. The sabhas bring together the community members. They are usually the venues for marriages, which tend to be intracommunity in nature as there is generally no intermarriage between the different Dalit zats (lower castes). In addition to the sabhas, both the Valmiki and Ravidassia communities also establish their sub-group identities through distinctive rituals and practices, by celebrating festivals and events and by establishing separate places of worship. Membership of many Gurdwaras is caste based, with the presence of separate Jat, Bhatra and Ramgharia Gurdwaras. These communities have also established their own charitable trusts. The fragmentation of this diaspora community has ramifications for the manner in which these different subgroups engage with and contribute back to their place of origin.

4.3 Economic contributions of the Punjabi diaspora in the UK The economic contributions of the diaspora can be divided into ‘direct economic returns’ and ‘indirect economic returns’.11 Direct economic returns from the diaspora communities consist of financial flows through remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI), imports of technology and transfer of technical know-how. Indirect economic

64  Rupa Chanda returns arise from diaspora networks which help in building and enhancing the reputation of institutions in less developed countries.12 Overseas diaspora networks can potentially act as strong ‘intermediaries’ who facilitate employment of others from the country of origin in overseas markets. 4.3.1 Findings from secondary sources13 Secondary evidence indicates that both direct and indirect contributions have been made by the Punjabi diaspora to their home state. Punjab ranks among the top few Indian states for inward remittances.14 These financial flows have enabled infrastructure development in rural Punjab, raised household incomes and consumption, enhanced the availability of healthcare services and education, provided resources for agricultural activities and facilitated the Green revolution.15Although Punjab has not been a major recipient of diaspora FDI,16 there are instances of Punjabi entrepreneurs who have made significant investments in Punjab. For instance, Lord Swaraj Paul, entrepreneur of Caparo Group, UK acquired 100 acres of land in Haryana for the development of six new engineering plants to support the growth of automotive companies. The project involved investment of around $100 million and employment for over 2,000 people. Another important channel for UK-based Punjabi diaspora contribution has been through ‘social capital’. Punjabi disapora networks and associations in the UK have contributed towards development work in Punjab. For example, the Guru Ravidass Educational Assistance Trust, an educational charity organisation established in 2005 by the Ravidassia community members of the Punjabi diaspora and based in Birmingham, provides education to poor students back in India, particularly in the states of Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. It supports poor children by providing textbooks and scholarships for paying school and college fees and provides education for deprived children and youth, irrespective of religion and caste. Likewise, the Kamaleshwar Valmiki Education Trust, which enjoys heavy patronage from UK-based Punjabi members of the Valmiki community, aims to provide literacy to disadvantaged groups like women, scheduled castes and tribes and backward classes. The Trust has built a school of international standards at Daburji village in Punjab. There are also many cases of individual diaspora philanthropy in sectors such as education, healthcare and rural development by UK-based Punjabis. This includes setting up of colleges, hospitals and places of

The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom 65 worship, renovation of schools, funding orphanages, creating sports and recreational facilities, running training programmes for women’s empowerment, and various other initiatives in the source communities and region (Government of India 2001; Singh and Singh, 2007). 4.3.2 Findings from in-depth discussions In order to get a qualitatively richer understanding of the nature and modalities of the contributions made by the Punjabi diaspora in the UK, in-depth discussions were carried out with Punjabi Non-Resident Indians residing in the UK, persons involved with implementing diaspora projects back in Punjab, and with researchers working on the Punjabi diaspora. These discussions were carried out during the September 2011 through February 2012 period over the telephone. The questions covered issues such as the preferred areas and forms of contribution by the diaspora, impact, problems encountered in engaging with their home state and country and views regarding government policies. Three important issues were highlighted by these discussions as shaping the nature and extent of the contributions made by this diaspora community. The first was the concentration of the UK-based Punjabis from the districts of Hoshiarpur, Nanasheher, Jullundur, Kapurtala, Moga (a newer NRI district), mainly Doaba districts, and thus the greater degree of engagement by this diaspora community with these source regions of Punjab. The second was the fact that the UK-based Punjabis have a longer history than those based in Canada or the US, as noted earlier. Hence, the first generation is very old and may no longer be alive. Subsequent generations have maintained contact with their villages and towns/districts, but these ties have tended to weaken over time, especially since many have sold off their agricultural land and are no longer involved in supporting agricultural activities back home. In contrast, the Punjabi diaspora in Canada is relatively younger, and thus their connection is much more alive with their source regions. The third issue is the fragmentation within the Punjabi diaspora community in the UK, with different religious organisations and sub-group identities, as noted earlier, which affects the nature of their engagement with Punjab. Selected examples of diaspora engagement The discussions indicated that the diaspora primarily contributes to health, education and religious purposes and that most of this

66  Rupa Chanda contribution is aimed at their source regions and districts within their home state. Several interesting examples were highlighted for diaspora activity by UK-based Punjabis in their home state. HEALTH SECTOR

The health sector emerged as one of the most preferred areas of contribution by the UK-based Punjabi diaspora. Several respondents noted the capital and current expenditures made by these NRIs for setting up and running state-of-the-art hospitals in Jullundur, Ludhiana, Amritsar and the Doaba area. One such example cited by several respondents was the charitable 100 bedded Bilga General hospital at Bilga which was set up by an UK-based Punjabi NRI with an initial investment of $3.59 million for establishment costs. The land for the hospital was donated by the village. The hospital has a staff of ten doctors which includes surgeons (general and specialised), gynaecologists, deontologists, physiotherapists, orthopaedists, eye specialists, and lab technicians. It operates on nominal charges with a mere entry card fee of $0.20 cents or Rs. 10 which covers all costs for the patient. The latter can meet all the doctors and specialists with this one payment. The hospital provides a 24-hour ambulance and emergency service and also provides medical facilities at the primary and secondary levels. It also provides free services at the mortuary where the dead body can be kept for three to four days till the NRI relative can come for the last rites. The hospital is run by the Bilga General Hospital Charitable Trust. Many UK-based Punjabis as well as some villagers are members of this trust. Hundreds of thousands of pounds have been donated by the Punjabis in the UK for the running of this hospital, with some single individuals contributing more than $100,000. The trust uses innovative ways to raise money for the running of the hospital, including holding annual fundraisers where NRIs are invited. The respondents in the above case, including persons managing the aforementioned hospital as well as some UK-based Punjabis who are members of the trust running this hospital, were asked about the latter’s operating model and in what capacity the diaspora were involved in its functioning. The responses indicated that although Bilga Hospital had been running for five years at that time, it was still not selfsustaining. Its running expenses were in the range of $10,000 to $20,000 per month, mostly for costs pertaining to electricity, water, maintenance and staff, which continued to be paid by the Punjabi NRIs from the UK. The latter were sending around 8 to 9 thousand

The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom 67 dollars per month to cover the losses. Moreover, some consultants and doctors in the UK have over the years raised around 600 to 800 thousand dollars in the UK to help sustain this hospital. This example highlighted the fact that although the diaspora have contributed to establishing and running hospitals in their home state, these often remain as charitable ventures and may not be viable without continued support from the diaspora community. Another case that was highlighted in the discussions was that of the Gur Nanak Dev Hospital in Pasla. This is a 40-bed hospital which has been in operation for over ten years now. This hospital has been entirely funded by the NRIs and is located on 4 acres of land donated by the diaspora. Around five or six persons settled in Birmingham and London, all of them from this village, set up a charitable trust and raised money to fund the establishment of this hospital. The hospital has very good infrastructure, including an operation theatre, scanners and specialists in gynaecology, dentistry, cardiology, a surgeon, a general practitioner and several support staff. The UK-based Sikhs continue to provide funds for running the hospital. They raise funds through dinners, local advertisements, and general appeals for donations. In this manner, around GBP 2.5 million has been raised by the Sikh community in the UK. Contributions have also been raised from persons in India. The hospital receives an estimated amount of Rs. 50,000 from the NRIs in the UK every month. Often the expenses for purchase of costly equipment are covered by the NRIs. Discussions with a doctor based in India who runs this hospital indicated the dependence on competent and ethical local professionals to operate these diaspora-funded establishments. This professional, who is also a partner at another hospital in Jullundur, has been running the Pasla hospital on a contract basis for several years. Local doctors provide the services and no NRI doctors. There are strict conditions for running this hospital. No more than Rs. 10 can be charged per patient, and the maximum fee for operations is Rs 5,000, with an average charge of less than Rs. 100 per operation (whereas the charge in other similar hospitals could be as high as Rs. 20,000 for the same operation). However, due to such restrictions on pricing, which limit the scope for profiteering, it was pointed out that such diaspora ventures which insist on transparent, ethical practices in accounting and operations face a challenge in finding persons to manage their establishments. Very dedicated and honest persons are needed to successfully run such ventures. These two cases of UK-based Punjabi diaspora–funded hospitals provide useful insights. The first concerns the importance of local

68  Rupa Chanda presence and competent management of diaspora initiatives, and the second relates to the likely differences in standards and codes of conduct between diaspora ventures and those present locally. Discussions highlighted the need for support from local officials and Panchayats in raising funds and implementing such schemes given difficulties in operating such institutions remotely and in rural areas. They also highlighted the importance of having reliable local partners to run these establishments. In some cases, difficulties faced by doctors in making money in some of these charitable hospitals have led to problems of work effort and management. However, respondents noted that politics and bureaucracy are largely kept out of the day-to-day running of these social service ventures, as the primary interest is in running them well, raising funds and ensuring the welfare of the persons they are meant to serve.17 The discussions also indicated that UK-based Punjabis are involved in outreach and extension programmes to provide health services in rural areas. Several of those interviewed mentioned the health camps that are organised over fifteen to twenty days each year by UK-based Punjabi doctors. Groups of doctors, most of them from the UK, come to provide free services and to hold seminars on themes such as cancer, orthopaedics and eyes. About twenty-two top surgeons have been brought by these NRI Punjabis from the UK to India. These surgeons are from different backgrounds, and they conduct camps over four to five days in places like Jullundur and Ludhiana. Some 150 lenses are provided free of cost, out-patient department services are provided to around 700 to 800 persons and around five to six operations are performed each year at these camps. The UK-based Punjabi community bears the costs while affiliated hospitals contribute towards the purchase of equipment. Around Rs. 500,000 to 600,000 are donated by the Punjabis in the UK each year for conducting these camps. These funds are raised by them in various ways. The latter hire halls and put advertisements in local newspapers and establishments and in local cash-and-carry stores in the UK. They invite business persons to an evening banquet and charge an amount of around $800 per table. They raise additional funds by appealing to people to donate money. In this manner, they have been able to raise around $4 million over the years. The Punjabi NRIs from the UK also help spread general awareness on health issues through their outreach activities and provide family services. For example, one NGO, Jandiala Lok Bhalai Manch, funded by the Punjabis in the UK and operational for over a decade, was the first to set up a mortuary for dead persons. Thus, the discussions

The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom 69 revealed numerous forms of diaspora engagement in health-related activities. EDUCATION SECTOR

The UK-based Punjabi diaspora support primary and secondary schools and colleges in both general and vocational education. They provide books, school equipment and uniforms and sponsor the education of children in villages. One person gave Rs. 2 million for setting up a school, while many others have given large sums of money. One such institution is the Guru Nanak Khalsa Women’s College in Banga Sangdesia. This college provides nursing and paramedical training on a charitable basis. Over the years, it has provided a lot of help to young girls in this area, many of whom have even gone abroad for further studies. The college also provides postgraduation degrees in political science, history and economics. Several respondents noted that this college not only provides good quality of education but also provides good job opportunities. The NRIs continue to provide financial support for running this college. SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Punjabi NRIs in the UK also contribute towards the development of social infrastructure in rural areas. In Phagwara, they helped put in place a sewerage system and a solar heating system. They have funded a potable water project worth $190,000. A Punjabi NRI from the UK has invested his own money along with a supplementary grant from the government to set up a plant in Ludhiana for cleaning sewage water. This project came into operation in October 2011 at a total cost of $400,000. It aims at improving the quality of rural life. There are also Punjabi welfare societies and associations in the UK which work towards the upliftment of selected villages by upgrading hospitals, building libraries, running schools, constructing and paving roads, greening projects and so forth. Several interviewees noted that the UK-based Punjabis have been making such social contributions for a long time. Earlier, the Gadar Party members would fund villages in Punjab to which the famous shaheeds of the independence movement belonged in order to keep the name of the shaheeds alive. The party financed development work such as building pucca houses, financing cars, schools, hospitals, community centres, cremation grounds and mortuaries, though this was not really done in an organised manner and was mostly at an

70  Rupa Chanda individual or family level. The Gadar Party has also built a Martyr’s Memorial on 4 acres of land in Punjab. There is a library which contains the documents regarding the martyrs, with photos of the heroes. A Shaheed Divas is also celebrated to remember their ideology and what they fought for. There is a four-day festival from 29 October to 1 November in their honour. Many NRIs come for this event and provide financial support as well. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

The UK-based Punjabi diaspora has also provided support for developing the agricultural sector. Ludhiana National Agricultural University and the government received money from this community in support of the Green Revolution. In the Doaba area between the Beas and Sutlej rivers, NRI Punjabis from the UK have helped people back in their villages to procure agricultural implements like tractors, trolleys, machines and harvesting combines and to pay off family debt and provided bank collateral for loans. Some have funded investments in tube wells and irrigation pump sets and also provided financial support to the provision of agricultural education. In recent years, however, their contribution (and for that matter contributions of all Punjabi NRIs) to the agricultural sector has declined, while funding for health and educational causes has been on the rise as much of agricultural land has been sold off by the younger generations and as ties between the new diaspora generations with their home regions have weakened. OVERALL RURAL ECONOMY

Several respondents also highlighted the multiplier effect of the NRI Punjabis, including UK-based Punjabis, on the local economy through increased demand, sales and economic activity. According to the president of the Jandiala Shopkeepers’ Association, although a large part of the traders’ business in these districts depends on the spending of farmers, their main business depends on the spending of the NRIs. The latter come and shop for wedding items like clothing, jewellery and gifts when they visit India, typically in the months of November to March. In his view, more than 50 percent of the traders’ earnings come from the NRIs, and if the latter did not come, many of the businesses would fold up. According to one study, about 75 percent of the local economy thrives on the NRIs during these months.18 In Phagwara and Jullundur, which are on the Grand Trunk road, the diaspora have invested in wedding halls, banquets and event

The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom 71 halls, with state-of-the-art infrastructure that is rented out for anywhere between $4,000 and $8,000 per day. The potential for economic impact through NRI tourism is also evident from the seven flights operating per week between Birmingham and Punjab or London and Punjab, thus indicating the extent of travel between the two and related business and activity. The banks in the Doaba region also benefit from NRIs’ spending on property and houses as well as their remittances. However, respondents did not cite any examples of any large businesses or entrepreneurial ventures by the UK-based Punjabis, noting that most business ventures are in the form of trade and real estate activities rather than investment in actual manufacturing and industrial units. 4.3.3 Problems faced Although the Punjabi diaspora in the UK would like to contribute to their home state, they face a plethora of problems, both as individuals and as diaspora associations. These include problems of corruption, lack of support from the state government and the absence of a business-friendly environment. Hence, several respondents noted that they are unable to make contributions in the way they would like to, such as through setting up large commercial establishments and industrial units, and instead choose to make small-scale contributions at the family level and charitable contributions at the local village level, as the latter are subject to fewer implementation constraints. Some cases were highlighted which revealed how governance and administrative problems faced by the diaspora and the lack of a proactive diaspora engagement policy at the ground level have limited the possibilities for large-scale diaspora contributions from the UK-based Punjabi community (and the Punjabi diaspora more generally). One case was that of a UK-based Punjabi businessman who had wanted to set up a distillery project in his home district. He had to give up his plan, as one of the local politicians demanded a 25 percent share in this project without contributing anything towards it. The NRI abandoned the project and sold the land. In another case, a UK-based Punjabi investor who took over a Sikh spinning mill near Ludhiana and spent $6 million to modernise it faced many difficulties to get it operational. He did not have 24-hour electricity supply. He made a representation to the chief minister but got no help from state officials. Finally, he installed a direct power line. But as he continued to face problems on different issues and as going through proper channels did not seem to work, he was forced to finally close the mill. Another case cited was

72  Rupa Chanda that of an industrial unit that was set up by a Punjabi businessman based in the UK, on Chandigarh Road about 35 km from Ludhiana, at Saurala. The unit consisted of a 14-acre shed for making aeroplane parts, as this businessman owned a factory for manufacturing such parts in the UK and had prior experience in this business. He also set up two offices in Chandigarh and engaged employees to run this industrial unit. But he could not start his production due to problems he encountered at various stages with government officials. Hence, this NRI could not get his industry to take off in India even though he was a seasoned businessman who was exporting his products to China and Japan. Another example of corruption was that of a Punjabi NRI in the UK who used to import clothes from India for sale in the UK. He finally discontinued this trade, as the inspector in India wanted a share of his profits. He also had problems with the suppliers, as he was shown something but the consignment that would arrive would not be of good quality. He then switched to sourcing from China. Overall, it is evident that while many Punjabi NRIs do want to enter into business ventures, they are deterred from doing so by of corruption, an inefficient bureaucracy, problems with purchase of property and lack of streamlined procedures for NRI investors. There is corruption at all levels, and as the NRIs are used to good and transparent systems, they decide not to invest. Hence, their engagements tend to take the form of small-scale investments in hotels, shops, banquet halls and properties and small tailoring and sports goods units apart from funding community-based projects and sending remittances to their households. Several respondents also noted that although politicians and bureaucrats from Punjab do go abroad and seek NRI investment in sectors such as agriculture, industry, education and healthcare, on the ground they offer little help to NRIs. Many NRIs have thought of launching large environmental projects in the areas of water supply, sanitation and rural infrastructure, but they are unable to put these initiatives into effect due to administrative and bureaucratic difficulties. There is no special window to facilitate NRI investments. The government officials often take more money from NRIs to give clearances for their ventures. It was pointed out, however, that the Punjabis from Canada have been more successful in undertaking larger business initiatives than the UK-based Punjabis. Moreover, the NRI Punjabis in North America are more professionally educated than their counterparts in the UK, and there are also more instances of leading individuals within the Punjabi community in North America than in the UK. These differences in profile, leadership and organisation affect the nature and extent of the

The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom 73 diaspora’s contribution to Punjab. Canadian Punjabis were cited by some respondents as being more entrepreneurial, more successful and better organised and thus more visible across all types of contributions, charitable or commercial, compared to the UK-based Punjabis. The fragmentation within the Punjabi community in terms of caste and sub-caste divides highlighted earlier and the lack of appeal of any one political party across the spectrum of Punjabi NRIs in the UK were also seen as other reasons for the lack of large-scale engagement. Some respondents also noted differences across state governments in India with regard to diaspora engagement. Several stated that compared to Punjab, Haryana is more proactive. They also gave the example of Himachal Pradesh, which has started giving incentives to NRIs, and the fact that some Punjabi NRIs are choosing to close their manufacturing units and shifting from Punjab to Himachal Pradesh. According to one respondent who is well placed in the Punjabi community in the UK and has been residing there for a long time, the lack of interest on the part of the Punjab state government is evident from the fact that no minister or high-ranking official from Punjab has visited the Punjabi diaspora community in the UK or made presentations to attract investment from them thus far. In contrast, there have been regular visits by delegations from Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu to attract investments from these diaspora communities in the UK back to their home states. On this issue of state-level differences, an interesting point was made by a leading researcher on the Punjabi diaspora. This respondent noted that the lack of diaspora engagement in Punjab through industrial ventures and large-scale business units is symptomatic of a larger problem which afflicts Punjab. The state does not receive much public- or private-sector investment even within India. It is relatively under industrialised compared to its level of per capita income. It does not have large factories or manufacturing units. Even the multinational corporations investing in India are hardly present in Punjab. This researcher also pointed out that even at the all-India level, there is a ‘mantra of NRI investment’, which is a myth, as NRIs account for less than 5 percent of total FDI in India. Within this, Punjab attracts less than 1 percent of total NRI investment as per data provided by the NRI Sabha in contrast to states such as Gujarat and Maharashtra, which account for most of the NRI investment in India. Hence, if other investors are not present in Punjab, why should one expect the NRI Punjabis to invest there? In this respondent’s view, there is a myth of lots of Punjabi entrepreneurs who are willing to invest in Punjab, and it is unrealistic to expect this to happen. The NRI Punjabis are more

74  Rupa Chanda likely to invest where they will find it easier and where their returns will be higher. There is no reason to expect NRI Punjabi businessmen to have any specific loyalty towards India. This respondent also pointed out that the ties between many Punjabi NRIs and India had been affected adversely by the 1984 Delhi riots, which had alienated the Sikh community from Punjab and from India. Hence, for many, the affinity today is at the household and individual level rather than to the state or the nation, further compounded by problems of corruption and governance. Another problem cited by several UK-based Punjabis pertained to visas and passports. A former President of the Indian Workers’ Association based in the UK pointed out that the diaspora has repeatedly raised issues of unsystematic visa and documentation procedures, corruption, failure to provide updated information, lack of transparency and poor treatment of applicants at the high commissions and consulates of the government of India. Some raised concerns about having to surrender their original Indian passports to the high commission in order to get a longer-term visa or an Overseas Citizens of India card. Frustrated by the lack of support and incentives to facilitate their contributions back to Punjab, several of those interviewed suggested that the Indian government and individual state governments need to address these ground-level problems if they wish to attract large-scale diaspora investments. Most of them recommended that the central and state governments set up a single-window, one-stop investment clearance facility so as to overcome the problems faced by NRI investors due to multiple levels of clearances such as with state electricity boards, environment ministries and planning boards. Some also suggested that the overseas consulates and embassies improve their functioning in terms of providing correct and timely information regarding visas and provide a smoother interface for the diaspora community. 4.3.4 Negative impact of diaspora The discussions also highlighted the negative effects of diaspora involvement and presence in Punjab due to the impact of NRI funding on the local economy and politics and due to the diaspora influence on the mindset and culture of local people. Several interviewees noted that there is considerable NRI financing and influence in Punjab’s politics by the UK-based diaspora. All the big parties such as Congress and Akali Dal have their overseas branches, cultural organisations and NRI funding links (though the quantum of such financing is not known) in the UK. When the state government officials visit the UK to

The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom 75 seek investment from the NRIs, they seek members from their affiliated parties, as the funding networks are highly politicised. The case was cited of one politician who had gone to the UK to raise funds. Most of these funds were spent on election campaigning rather than for the welfare of the people. Such financing leads to potential political interference in that the diaspora provide support to their own parties and candidates for causes which may not always be in the interest of the local people. It also leads to a lot of circulation of money and misuse of funds by politicians in the local economy. A case in point is the Khalistan movement.19 Much of the financial support for this movement came from the Sikh diaspora in the UK, Canada and the US. Activists abroad were able to take advantage of the gatherings at gurdwaras to rally the diaspora Sikh population to collect funds for the cause. The World Sikh Organization and the Council for Khalistan promoted the cause of Khalistan through public-awareness and education campaigns.20 On February 2008, BBC Radio 4 reported that the chief of the Punjab police had alleged that militant groups were receiving money from the British Sikh community. Thus, there are occasions when the Punjabi diaspora in the UK may have had a destabilising effect on Punjab. In the context of inter-country political relations too, some respondents expressed the view that the Punjabi diaspora in the UK may play a negative role. In some constituencies in the UK (e.g. Wolverhampton, Birmingham, West London), MPs have to listen to the Punjabi population, who constitute an important segment of the voting population. The Sikh community in these areas has for instance lobbied the MPs for introducing different kinds of policies towards Punjab and insisted on justice for the Sikh victims of the Delhi 1984 riots. The stance of the Punjabi community in the UK or Canada has been largely anti-Punjab government and in some ways anti-Indian. There has been less focus by this community on promoting trade and investment ties between India and the UK and more on promoting religious and ideological causes through local politicians in the UK. Hence, to what extent this community may have played a communal role as opposed to a positive socio-economic and pluralistic role can be questioned. On the social front, several concerns were voiced. For example, there is a negative demonstration effect of the diaspora on the local population’s incentives to study and work hard. Given the large sums of money remitted by the diaspora and their superior spending power, as evident from their purchases in the local economy, many Punjabi youth perceive settling abroad as the only way to social and economic mobility. In districts where migration has been prevalent in the past

76  Rupa Chanda and which contribute to a large number of diaspora, there is a higher incidence of Punjabi youth who migrate. Many get their passports made much in advance so as to go abroad. Young males do not want to study. The money that is remitted by their diaspora relatives is often spent by the youth on purchasing expensive mobiles and other gadgets and to engage in bad habits such as liquor and drugs. There are also women who are thirty-five or forty years old but are not willing to marry unless they get an NRI spouse, as they are desperate to go abroad. There are cases of NRIs coming and marrying young girls in the villages and towns, although they are already married abroad or have no intention to take the bride back with them, thus resulting in the problem of abandoned brides in some districts of Punjab. As expressed by one academic, this peer culture of getting one’s daughter married to an NRI has so permeated society in some parts of Punjab that parents are willing to ‘pawn’ their daughter’s future in order to secure a better future for their sons or themselves, as marriage is seen as a means of migrating and getting employment abroad. It is interesting to note that most of these comments regarding the negative consequences of diaspora engagement with Punjab came from those diaspora individuals who spend long periods of time in Punjab or those who are local residents but involved with the management of diaspora projects. This suggests that there may be a disconnect between many diaspora individuals and the local population unless the former spend a sufficient amount of time in India to understand the ramifications of their presence on the local society and economy.

4.5 Concluding thoughts It is evident that the Punjabi diaspora in the UK remains connected to its place of origin through individual and organisational initiatives. It is a diaspora that is the result of several waves of migration from India, pre- and post-independence, direct and indirect, and which is characterised by interesting caste and sub-caste dimensions and intracommunity dynamics. The UK-based Punjabi diaspora’s engagement with India and its home state of Punjab is mainly through householdlevel remittances and village-/district-level social and charitable projects, primarily in the health and education sectors. There is little engagement through industrial ventures and larger commercial initiatives. Discussions with the community reveal the need for greater emphasis, especially at the state level, to facilitate the Punjabi diaspora’s engagement with India and with their home regions and state. Many initiatives remain on paper. Many organisations and institutional frameworks have not been effective on the ground. A wide range of issues

The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom 77 need to be addressed to encourage the Punjabi diaspora’s engagement with Punjab and to derive greater benefit from this involvement. These include streamlining procedures, improving governance, reducing corruption, ensuring continuity in administration and taking an apolitical approach to the diaspora community, among others. However, issues of community fragmentation and profile which affect the extent and nature of engagement and to what extent these could be overcome by more pro-active diaspora policies remains an open question. But the most important issue that emerges is whether there really is as much potential to engage the Punjabi or Sikh diaspora in a big way as one believes and whether there is a myth that has been created about a Sikh or Punjabi entrepreneurial class which can significantly contribute to Punjab’s development. As one respondent put it, ‘Is this a search for the holy Grail?’ The discussions indicate that possibilities for large developmental impact through diaspora activities do not depend only on diaspora-specific policies and initiatives. They ultimately depend on the overall business environment and the state and national governments’ overall policies towards investors. Thus the larger context of creating a business-friendly investment environment in Punjab and at the national level is critical. In the absence of such an environment, the Punjabi diaspora’s contributions, whether from the UK or elsewhere, are likely to be limited in reach and impact.

Notes 1 Office of National Statistics data www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html (accessed April 19, 2012) and http://ukinindia.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/workingwith-india/india-uk-relations/ (accessed April 18, 2012). 2 Kullar and Toor (2009). 3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikh (accessed February 17, 2012). 4 When Punjab was annexed by the British in 1848 and taxes were imposed on agriculture, Punjabis started to emigrate. They first went to the UK (and only later to Canada and the US). Some made money in the UK and then returned to India to fight in the independence struggle. 5 R. Kaur (2007) and Kuepper et al. (1975). 6 Khadria (2006). 7 Hill et al. (2004). After independence, many Punjabi families fell into debt. In order to release their lands back home, many migrated to the UK in the 1950s and 1960s and worked hard to pay off their loans. As their children grew up, they brought their families over to the UK. 8 Charsley et al. (2012) 9 Saha (2012) and UNODC (2009). 10 This section is based on information obtained about overseas Punjabis and their diaspora organisations (links to the Global Punjabi Society, the Ravidassia Community, United Ravidassia Community) and Takhar (2008). 11 Sanyal (2009).

78  Rupa Chanda 12 Kapur (2010). 13 Secondary findings discussed in this section are obtained from a variety of online sources for trusts and organisations (Guru Ravidass Educational Assistance Trust, Kamleshwar Valmiki Education Trust, Sikh Missionary Society, Sewa UK) and newspaper articles (Ahuja 2008; Chaudhry 2011; Dhaliwal 2008; Kaur 2007; Indian Realty News 2011). Also, see Chana (2009). 14 Tumbe (2011). 15 Thandi (2006), Kullar and Toor (2009), G. Singh and S. Singh (2007). 16 Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (accessed April 19, 2012). 17 Examples of other charitable hospitals funded or set up entirely by NRIs were also highlighted in the discussions. These are mainly in the Jullundur area, such as the Sant Pritam Das Charitable Hospital in Jaura, which is on the Jullundur and Pathankot highway. 18 Tatla (2009). 19 The Khalistan movement refers to a global political secessionist movement which seeks to create a separate Sikh state. 20 After the infamous Operation Blue Star, the diaspora community acted primarily out of compassion and sympathy for the victims of the violence in Punjab and mobilised themselves to help their brethren and not for supporting separatism. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, the president of National Council of Khalistan, travelled to London in May 1980 and announced the formation of Khalistan. He reportedly raised a fund of millions of dollars from the Sikh diaspora in the United States. See Tatla (1999): 43, Dhillon (2007) and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalistan_movement#Support_ from_outside_India (accessed March 29, 2012).

References Ahuja, C. 2008. ‘Industrial corridor paves the way for FDI inflow to Punjab’, The Financial Express, 19 January. www.financialexpress.com/news/indus trial-corridor-paves-the-way-for-fdi-inflow-to-punjab/263233/0ws/indus trial-corridor-paves-the-way-for-fdi-inflow-to-punjab/263233/0 (accessed 21 February 2012). Chana, S. 2009. ‘NRI Investment in Social Development Projects: Findings from Two Sample Surveys in Doaba, Punjab’, Chapter 4 in Dusenbery, V.A. and Tatla, D.S. (eds), Sikh Diaspora Philanthropy in Punjab Global Giving for Local Good, pp. 107–119. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Charsley, K., Storer-Church, B., Benson, M., and Van Hear, N. 2012. ‘MarriageRelated Migration to the UK’. International Migration Review, 46(4): 861–890. Chaudhry, R. 2008. ‘UK NRI entrepreneur, Raj Loomba receives CBE’, 12 December. www.nriinternet.com/NRIcharity/UK/A_Z/L/Raj_Loomba/2_Award_ CBE.htm (accessed 12 December 2011). Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. http://dipp.nic.in/English/ Publications/FDI_Statistics/2011/india_FDI_November2011.pdf (accessed 21 February 2012). Dhaliwal, B. 2008. ‘UK NRI Raj Loomba, donate Rs. 50 lakh (Rs 5 mn) for his native village School in Punjab’, 12 December. nriinternet.com/NRIchar ity/UK/A_Z/L/Raj_Loomba/index.htm (accessed 12 December 2011).

The Punjabi diaspora in the United Kingdom 79 Dhillon, S. 2007. ‘The Sikh Diaspora and the Quest for Khalistan: A Search for Statehood or for Self-Preservation?’, December. IPCS Research Papers. New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Government of India. 2001. Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, Chapter 11: Other Countries of Europe and Chapter 34: Philanthropy. New Delhi: The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. http:// moia.gov.in/ (accessed 30 April 2017). Hill, K., Seltzer, W., Leaning, J., Malik, S.J., Russell, S.S., and Makinson, C. 2003. ‘A Demographic Case Study of Forced Migration: The 1947 Partition of India’. Conference of South Asia Initiative of the Harvard University Asia Centre, September. http://paa2004.princeton.edu/download. asp?submissionId=41274 (accessed 30 April 2017); http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Sikh (accessed 17 February 2012); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khal istan_movement#Support_from_outside_India (accessed 29 March 2012). Indian Realty News. 2011. ‘NRI’s seek better policies for more FDI inflow in Punjab’, 19 January. www.indianrealtynews.com/real-estate-india/delhi/ nri%E2%80%99s-seek-better-policies-for-more-fdi-inflow-in-punjab.html (accessed 21 February 2012). Kapur, D. 2010. Diaspora, Democracy and Development: The Impact of International Migration from India on India. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kaur, R. 2007a. ‘NRI brothers donated Rs. 5 million to set up the school in Punjab village’, 12 May. http://nriinternet.com/NRIschool/India/2007/6_ NRI_village_school.htm (accessed 12 December 2011). Kaur, R. 2007b. ‘The Second Migration: Displacement and Refugees from Rawalpindi During partition’. Journal of Punjab Studies, 14(1): 89–120. Khadria, B. 2006. ‘Migration Between India and UK’. Public Policy Research, 13(3), September–November: 172–184. Koikkalainen, S. 2011. Free Movement in Europe: Past and Present. Migration Information Source. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute. https:// www.migrationpolicy.org/article/free-movement-europe-past-and-present (accessed on 30 August 2017). Kuepper, W.G., Lackey, G.L., and Swinerton E.N. 1975. Ugandan Asians in Great Britain, Forced Migration and Social Absorption. London: Croom Helm Ltd. Kullar, I. K. and Toor, M. S. 2009. ‘The Use of Foreign Remittances by Central Punjab Farm Families’, Chapter 5 in Dusenbery, V.A. and Tatla, D.S. (eds), Sikh Diaspora Philanthropy in Punjab Global Giving for Local Good, pp. 120–136. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Office of National Statistics. 2012. www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html (accessed 19 April 2012). Saha, K. C. 2012. ‘Irregular Migration from India to the EU: Punjab and Haryana Case Study’. CARIM-India Research Report 2012/28. Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. Sanyal, A. 2009. ‘Emigration Data: We Need a Change of Focus’. Working Paper No. 10. IMDS Working Paper Series, July.

80  Rupa Chanda Singh, G. and Singh, S. 2007. ‘Diaspora Philanthropy in Action: An Evaluation of Modernization in Punjab Villages’. Journal of Punjab Studies, 14(2): 225–248. Takhar, O. K. 2008. ‘Issues of Identity Among the Valmikis and Ravidasis in Britain: egalitarian hermeneutics from the Guru Granth Sahib’. International Conference in Sikhism in Global Context, University of California, 4–6 December. Tatla, D. S. 1999. The Sikh Diaspora: The Search for Statehood. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Tatla, D. S. 2009. ‘Sikh Diaspora Philanthropy in Punjab: Origins, Growth, and Contemporary Trends’, Chapter 2 in Dusenbery, V.A. and Tatla, D.S. (eds), Sikh Diaspora Philanthropy in Punjab Global Giving For Local Good, pp. 30–77. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Thandi, S. S. 2006. ‘Punjabi Diaspora and Homeland Relations’. India SeminarWeb Edition. www.indiaseminar.com/2006/567/567_shinder_s_thandi.htm (accessed 30 April 2017). Tumbe, C. 2011. ‘Remittances in India: Facts and Issues’. Indian Institute Management Bangalore Working Paper No. 331, 1 March. http://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1780289 (accessed 30 April 2017). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Report. 2009. ‘Smuggling of Migrants: from India to Europe in Particular to UK’. Project XSA/S78. New Delhi: Regional Office for South Asia. www.unodc.org/ documents/human-trafficking/Smuggling_of_Migrants_from_India.pdf (accessed 30 April 2017).

Websites for various Punjabi diaspora associations Global Punjabi Society. www.sikhphilosophy.net/punjab-punjabi-punjabiyat/ 29156-global-punjabi-society-launched.html (accessed 15 February 2012). Guru Ravidass Educational Assistance Trust. www.great4education.co.uk/ (accessed 15 February 2012). Kamaleshwar Valmiki Educational Trust. www.bhagwanvalmiki.com/kvetpics.html (accessed 15 February 2012). Sewa UK. www.sewauk.org (accessed 24 February 2012). Sikh Missionary Society (UK). www.sikhmissionarysociety.org/sms/smspubli cations/ (accessed 3 March 2012). The Ravidassia Community. http://ravidassiacommunity.com/ (accessed 22 February 2012). United Ravidassia Community. www.gururavidassguruji.com/ (accessed 22 February 2012).

5 Pathways of integration in Italy Indian immigrants in Emilia Romagna1 Meenakshi Thapan 5.1 Introduction It has been argued that Italy is a ‘post-racial society’ where ‘widespread racism permeates the political discourse, the societal behaviour, and popular culture, yet race is often unnamed and ultimately silenced’ (Lombardi-Diop 2012: 175). This view suggests that Italy is an extremely racist society with perhaps few explicit expressions and several undertones present in policy and political rhetoric as well as in social interactions. Italy has also been described as a deeply nationalist society especially in the last 150 years. This has no doubt resulted in what one scholar refers to as deeply rooted ‘nationalist repertoires’ (Maritano 2004: 64) that generate exclusionary practices and policies vis-à-vis migrants and others in the public sphere. There are several illustrations of such nationalism and the racism that prevails in everyday life.2 It also results in the view that multiculturalism has failed or that there is no real effort for the integration of immigrants in Italy and indeed in Europe. Although such a view offers a critique of government initiatives, legal outcomes and political will, I point instead to the diverse ways in which citizens and immigrants in northern Italy are engaged in the processes of integration across cultures, faiths and linguistic barriers. The emphasis is on ‘cosmopolitan sociability’ and its construction through ‘networks of interconnection and locally based activities’ (Glick Schiller, Darieva and Gruner-Domic 2011: 400).3 The idea of ‘sociability practices’ moves beyond multiculturalism and mere tolerance of difference to an understanding of ‘when and where people use their diverse cultural or religious backgrounds to build relationships and identities of openness’ (Ibid.: 410). While ‘cosmopolitan sociability’ is a deeply enabling concept that allows us to examine the multiculturalism prevalent in Italy through the prism of integration, it also brings to the forefront issues of ethnicity and identity that are simultaneously present in such considerations.

82  Meenakshi Thapan Social relationships are complex and based on ties that may be located across social groups, class, regional, linguistic and ethnic identities. Such ties or connections are particularly strong amongst migrant groups in host societies who seek out ethnic conclaves in which they may assert their identities, such as through their religious affiliations and festivals, social and cultural events of different kinds and family gatherings. These ties are grounded in strong links to the home society and a rooted ethnic identity that seeks affirmation through continuous engagement with similar others in multiple situations and contexts. At the same time, migrants continuously seek to belong to the host society, and this is evident best in the public domain where they are located in their work-space. This affective urge to belong and be accepted as a citizen pushes the migrant to engage with others, primarily their employers, through acts that may be viewed as aspects of an instrumental integration. Both cosmopolitan sociability and ethnic identity come together in this search for integration for different purposes and to attain varying immediate and long-term goals.

5.2 Pathways of integration In this chapter, I examine the relationship between people, institutions and the efforts to build an integrated society based on individual and collective strategies of civic engagement.4 The people involve migrants and their Italian hosts and several others who are engaged in the process of ‘integration’ and accomplish this through different kinds of activities within the legal framework of the legal framework of the workplace. 5.2.1 Local municipalities and governments There are no necessarily shared or common goals or sensibilities in place in this endeavour that in fact stays alive through a multiplicity and diversity of views and practices. The initiative, drive and commitment of local citizens, immigrants and religious institutions is one reason why their efforts are successful and result in the formation of cross-cultural friendships and networks. Whether or not integration is achieved is another question and is not the focus of this chapter. The point is to examine the different pathways of integration as they emerge and evolve in everyday life in social contexts that are fragmented by dichotomies between political intent and economic necessity, between national laws and local policies, between the desire to open up the possibilities for interaction and integration and the will

Pathways of integration in Italy 83 and commitment to follow this through at the governmental level and through the work of the people involved. Pathways of integration as processes include forms of civic engagement that are expressed at diverse levels of everyday life. Like Caroline Brettell, I seek to understand ‘immigrant agency and . . . diverse pathways to civic engagement’ (2012: 130). In this process, I focus on the individual and collective strategies of civic engagement for forms of integration that seek to move out of ‘subordinate integration’ (Ambrosini 2001) to more assertive acts of engagement that promise gain, acceptance and recognition in one way or another.5 In this, I argue against Ambrosini’s idea of ‘subordinate integration’, which limits agency in many ways. I prefer the more useful and enabling idea of ‘instrumental integration’ that takes into account the migrants’ abilities to take decisions regarding ‘fitting in’, even submitting to normative expectations for instrumental gain. Immigrants themselves are therefore engaged in processes of becoming citizens, in a social and affective sense, and make an effort to seek out engagement and involvement with others in the public sphere. The themes of participatory citizenship and civic engagement bring in this element of an expanded understanding of both individual goals and a collective spirit. The ‘we-feeling’ that both migrants and citizens experience is conducive to building an ethos of mutual respect, trust and cohabitation through both the person and individual as well as the impersonal, larger, urban network in which migrants live. I also seek to understand the initiatives by local citizenry in the process of integration and the mutual recognition and acceptance of diversity. The motivations behind efforts at integration lie in the emotional need for the recognition of one another as equal and participatory citizens in the public sphere. The impetus for such integration is evident in the local citizenry, especially those who have a history of activism and engagement with causes that seek to eradicate injustice, social inequalities, exclusion and marginalisation. This act of working for the rights of migrants through pro-migrant mobilisation has been referred to by some scholars as ‘altruistic mobilisation’ (Passy 2001). By taking on the mantle of building pathways of integration with immigrants, they seek to articulate their suffering, search for their resolutions, emphasise their rights, offer assistance in different ways and seek to integrate immigrants into Italian society. Their ultimate goal is to build a just, humane society, based on the well-being of all members.6 These ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin 2008) seek to constitute citizens not as mere subjects but as active citizens who seek transformation and change.

84  Meenakshi Thapan Through ‘acts of citizenship’, immigrants assert themselves for their right to regular status and equality in employment opportunities. Oliveri refers to this engagement by migrants in Italy through strikes and other forms of resistance as indications of their ‘developing an autonomous political subjectivity’ (Oliveri 2015: 496, emphasis in the original). This results in an attempt to take on new forms of citizenship activity, as their actions are producing new actors who did not earlier exist. He further adds that in their struggles for regularisation of their status, immigrants may be viewed as ‘enacting themselves as rights-bearing subjects and thus acting as citizens, even if they are not expected or authorized to do so’ (Oliveri 2015: 497).7 Such an analysis emphasises that migrants are active agents in the process of integration that they seek, from their point of view, not only in the forms that the state or local citizenry require them to so. We may on the one hand view that the trend of opening out towards others, in an inclusive and expansive approach, points to integration as a form of cosmopolitanism. This consideration of social reality in terms of ‘people’s experiences, identities, solidarities and values’ provides the basis for a ‘new conception of immanent transcendence’ (Delanty 2012: 41). Citing Piet Strydon, Delanty argues that the ‘core of the cosmopolitan imagination’ is a way of viewing the social world that is concerned with the possibilities it opens up for self-transformation which can only be realised by ‘taking the cosmopolitan perspective of the Other as well as global principles of justice’ (ibid.). In contexts relevant to our discussion, cosmopolitanism therefore takes us beyond seeking to engage with the other in everyday forms of civic engagement or through understandings of one another’s cultures by forms of cultural interaction that surpass borders and barriers to such interaction. These could be first steps in understanding the other and engaging with the other in everyday life. Activities and engagements range from the most banal acts of finding housing, employment and schools for migrants to participation in social activities and events that hold the promise of acceptance and change for them as they do for their hosts, who seek their integration in one way or another. Cosmopolitanism is at the same time rooted in the struggles of migrants to find equality of status and employment opportunities. In this sense, cosmopolitanism is not merely about opening out to one another but indicative of the struggle and combative efforts as a form of active or participatory citizenship. Acts of cosmopolitan sociability through convivial behaviour and relationships as well as acts of participatory citizenship through migrant struggles for their rights are both integral to our understanding of migrants in Europe.

Pathways of integration in Italy 85

5.3 The context As citizens of the European Union (EU) freely move about the EU in search of economic opportunities, the playing field in the labour market sends out different messages to citizens from outside the EU. There are limited mobility opportunities for them, and they ‘may enter on the basis of economic migration (managed migration), family reunion and on humanitarian grounds’ (Biffl 2012: 1). However, highly skilled migrants are actively sought out from these countries to fulfil the ‘needs of an increasingly knowledge driven economy’, but at the same time, restrictive policy measures are in place to control and even stop immigration from third countries because of ‘concerns about integration costs in the face of rising budgetary restrictions’ (Biffl 2012: 1). Costs of integration include such special measures for integration as in schools and the labour market (for example, education and training) and in already pressurised areas such as housing, healthcare and welfare services (Biffl 2012: 1). As a consequence of such policies and the over-emphasis on high-skilled immigration most low-skilled migrants seek to enter the informal economy through insertion into the lowest segments of the economy. Migration policy in these countries has therefore tended to be more open to this category of migrants due to the demand for them in sectors of the economy that are hard pressed for native workers. It has in fact been pointed out that since the 1980s, the principle of the ‘economic legitimation of immigration’, which views immigrants primarily as ‘economic factors with relatively little regard for social and humanitarian considerations’ has been followed in Italy (Caponio and Graziano 2011: 106). In 2016, foreign workers in Italy appear to have had higher chances of employment at 74.3 percent compared with 67.9 percent of Italian nationals between the age group of twenty to sixty-four years (Merelli 2016).8 The figure is higher for immigrant workers from non-EU countries. Although the entry of labour migrants has largely been unauthorised, in most cases, they fill in job shortages in large numbers. It is an undisputed fact that immigrants are essential to the survival of the Italian economy primarily due to the low birth rates and the apprehensions about meeting the social security demands of a rapidly ageing population (Calavita 2005: 48). As a result, Italy has sought immigration in the past and there are now 5.3 million immigrants, including more than 500,000 foreign residents who are in an irregular position (Fondazione ISMU 2011, as cited by Ambrosini 2012: 4). Most immigrants to Italy are concentrated in the northern and central regions of the country, with the majority of

86  Meenakshi Thapan the immigrant population coming from outside the European Union, especially Africa, followed by eastern and central Europe. The second largest Asian communities in the EU are in Italy with the Indians at 169, 394 as of 1 January, 2016 (Dossier, 2012). There is thus an enormous presence of migrants in Italy, who are viewed by the local population as being essential in certain sectors of the labour market, such as agriculture, but also as causing grave ‘security’ risks through their infringement on the welfare benefits such as housing, healthcare and education. These aspects of the migrants’ presence in their midst are fuelled by politicians and their agents, who seek to maximise their political gains through a focus on ‘security’ issues which are fictions created for public consumption. For example, the Northern League, the right-wing political party active in northern Italy, has from the beginning articulated defence against the surging immigration presence in its political agenda (Ambrosini 2012).9 As a consequence of efforts to control the inflow of immigration, the BossiFini Law was promulgated in 2002. It is a severely anti-immigrant law that seeks to police and control immigration, with a very negative view of most immigrants (especially irregular immigrants) as criminals and an unnecessary part of Italian society.10 In addition, Italians appear to be haunted by fears of losing ‘Italianness’ as a result of the efforts of the media, demographers and politicians, who all emphasise for example the nation’s low birth-rate record (Stanley 2008: 43). The repeated emphasis in the popular media serves to increase these fears that the Italian ‘race’ itself is under threat and, along with European culture, may soon be overcome by large and increasing numbers of migrants in Italy and indeed in Europe as a whole (Ibid: 44). Viewing the links between religion and ostracism in Italy, Bertolani and Perocco (2013) point to the work of some intellectuals who have asserted that ‘Islamic religion constitutes an insuperable obstacle to social inclusion’. As a result of several such outcomes, ‘a policy of exclusion and of segregation of the immigrants’ has been developed that is ‘designed to keep them from taking social roots or rising above subordinate status’ (Bertolani and Perocco 2013, emphasis in the original). All the resultant antagonism in society is particularly directed at the non-European immigrant, who is increasingly visible in the labour market and in social spaces such as educational institutions, and towards whom the energy and work time of the social service and other welfare officers appears to be directed. The social rejection of migrants, as a consequence of political and media efforts, results in the creation and sustenance of feelings of insecurity, suspicion and distrust of migrants among the Italian people, which has consequences for the integration of migrants. At the same time, due to economic necessity,

Pathways of integration in Italy 87 there have been several regularisation programmes, six in twenty-two years, with the most recent one in 2009 (Ambrosini 2012: 4). There is no doubt a conflict between the political aims of some political parties and the economic needs of the labour market that appears to have resilience and adaptation in the absorption of immigrants especially at the lower ends. This dual approach to immigrants does not augur well for immigrants who are both considered useful in certain slots of the labour market and yet are not welcome in the social and collective spaces that are inhabited by migrants and others. At the same time, there is no homogeneous outlook towards immigrants in Italy, and there are differences in the reception of immigrants in northern and southern Italy. While the south has traditionally been considered somewhat ‘peasant-like’ and ‘backward’ compared to the more politically progressive and economically vibrant north, sharp differences have been noted in the response of people towards immigrants. Cole suggests that although anti-immigrant violence occurs throughout the country, ‘brutality takes the form of intimidating foreign workers in the south and exemplary beatings by neo-Nazis and skinheads in the north’ (Cole 1997: 101).11 It is also significant that all the work supportive of immigrants, their initial reception, and their rights associated with work, health and security benefits and their integration into Italian society has been addressed by individuals and organisations more in the north than in the southern parts of Italy. A very vocal and active Catholic Church, its wing CARITAS,12 local associations, immigrant associations, as well as politicians have been much more supportive in the traditionally left-wing northern regions of the country than in the south. The Church along with other organisations has played a critical role in the work of the integration of immigrants in northern Italy. No doubt the socialist traditions of northern Italy, especially of the Emilia Romagna region, have a role to play in this supportive and enabling attitude towards immigrants, but the culture of charity, pastoral care, expressions of solidarity and volunteering associated with the church cannot be undermined. It is also noteworthy that all these different associations are working together, across individual ideological and faith commitments, for a cause that is viewed as common. 5.3.1 Relations between employers and immigrant employees Livelihood opportunities and employment lie at the heart of the migrant’s quest for a new life and are therefore critical to his or her experience of integration. Among the community under study, it is

88  Meenakshi Thapan the men who are mainly engaged in work in the agriculture sector, while women tend to stay at home, although there are a few working women. Most Indian immigrant employees follow a pattern of instrumental integration by choosing to be quiet instead of answering back, are respectful, obedient and subservient to their employers in order to avoid losing their jobs. At the same time, there is resentment against the employer who discriminates among them, favouring the Italian or Romanian over the Indian, or who exploits their labour in different ways. They do not, however, seek to redress the situation, and continue to work with mixed emotions of simmering discontent (‘I experience exploitation and there is nothing I can do about it’) mixed with contentment (‘At least I have a job’) for the well-being of their family and the future of their children. Italian employers vary, with most appreciating the Indian community for being quiet, good workers who make little trouble for them and are therefore the best workers for them to hire and the seek them out through kin and community networks. There are other Italian employers who seek to engage with their employees in vastly different ways, thus forging links that go beyond an instrumental relationship. Such employers have a higher educational background from the others and belong to the upper social class of Italian society. Fabio is an educated, well-read and politically aware dairy farmer near Fidenza. The farm has been in the family for generations. In 1997, he decided to hire Sunil, an Indian worker from Rajasthan, a state in north-western India, who was already in Italy but had no skills in working with animals. Soon, Sunil brought his wife over to live with him, and their children joined them only a few years ago. Fabio taught him all the work from scratch and is appreciative that Sunil now works very well and with great precision: ‘He has a mind oriented towards precision, he respects schedule, the hours, the process he has to control. In all aspects of his life, he is precise’. The employer is also very happy with other aspects of Sunil’s personality, that he ‘respects others’ and thinks he is different from other workers who are from the Punjab. He concludes, ‘he is a very special person’. Although Fabio insists he has no personal relationship with him, he is completely involved with Sunil and his family. He helped to obtain the necessary documents for Sunil’s children and get them admission into a school. Whenever Sunil has a medical problem, Fabio takes him to the doctor or the hospital; he observes that Sunil and his sons are model Italian citizens because they respect administrative rules and Italian law and says with admiration, ‘he is the best!’

Pathways of integration in Italy 89 At the same time, the economic project of the migrant is so essential to his survival, Fabio asserts, that Sunil seeks not to have any ‘human feelings’ and is focused only on earning money, following all the rules, and he is certain that when Sunil’s economic project is over, he will leave Italy. Sunil’s wife, Rajni, is a cheerful woman and is well liked by Fabio’s wife, who invites her for tea to their home. She would like a more engaging relationship with Rajni, who she thinks is reserved and keeps her distance from her husband’s employers. On her part, Rajni is deeply appreciative of Fabio and his wife, Maria, an activist and volunteer in an intercultural organisation, and their joint efforts to help them integrate into Italian society and achieve their goals. She particularly values their efforts in helping her sons to gain admission to good schools and other activities in Fidenza. Although she tells me she has been invited to their home several times, she is a little embarrassed by their efforts to treat them as equals and is awkward while making conversation in their living room, drinking tea with her hosts as an equal.13 Fabio’s engagement with Sunil, his economic project, which Fabio acknowledges is closely linked to his own, and in turn deeply connects the two men, is rare and rests on Fabio’s world view, which is open and seeks to encompass the other to whom he is connected through work, which they often do together, into his own life and project. At the same time, Fabio is clear that due to Sunil’s lack of engagement with his surroundings, with the world around them, he and his family can never attain an Italian identity. Sunil and his family are a closed unit, not only with Italians but with other Indians as well. This restricts their abilities to be truly integrated, as their project is an economic project, not one of integration, and once that ceases, they will return to India.14 Fabio’s relationship with the immigrant as an employee, based on equality and trust, is perhaps unique but nonetheless, as an individual strategy, opens up a pathway of integration for the ways in which employer seek to engage with their employees. Antonio is a cheese maker who hires six Indian men (out of his total workforce of ten) and says, ‘Indians work well, they adapt to the work necessity which sometimes is seven days a week. In the beginning, they were ready to do overtime. Now, they have stabilised and do only the hours . . . They are very docile, work properly . . . are punctual, precise, responsible and adaptable to the necessity of the job. This is not like a normal factory job. It needs more attention and they have the patience to do that. They help each other a lot and have good integration with Italian workers’. The fact that docility, submissiveness and adaptability are so well appreciated is indicative of the high value that is placed on keeping the worker in his or her place, outside the realm

90  Meenakshi Thapan of critical engagement or any further involvement with workers as citizens. Unlike Fabio, this employer is not interested in the personal life of his employees and seeks their maximum output, although he makes sure he follows all the legal requirements. This is a form of instrumental integration for the employer and restricts the world of the immigrant, who is viewed purely in terms of his performance and production. In general, there is a deep satisfaction with Indian workers, whose only problem, according to Stefano, the owner of a slaughterhouse, is that they go to India for two months or more on vacation and sometimes do not even return! Stefano exclaims, ‘We are waiting for them to return!’ He finds them ready to do all kinds of work and work for eight or nine hours in a day. ‘The most difficult work, which Italian workers refuse to do, is done by them. Earlier (about ten years ago), Italians used to come looking for work here in their summer holidays. But now they don’t come here, they work in an office. This is hard work, not clean, there is the blood; you have to cut the meat. So, ten years ago, we started hiring European persons from Albania, Romania, Eastern Europe. After that, we noticed that the contractor hired for cleaning the slaughterhouse brings Indian people just for cleaning. So we became interested in these people because we see ‘good’ persons, they are quiet, they come with family so they work better, they don’t speak a lot, have a good education, they don’t drink’. There are several stereotypes and a paternalistic attitude in this judgement about Indians in the slaughterhouse, but their work merits deep praise from the owner. Stefano is at pains to emphasise that he seeks out only Indian workers for employment, as they are such good workers, and wants to give them more and more responsibility. He concludes, ‘I trust in them and in their honesty. In the future, when they will learn the Italian language, they can be partners in the work, not merely workers’. While Stefano displays an open confidence and trust in Indians, the work at the slaughterhouse is the most difficult and results in most Indians turning to alcohol addiction and depression. Indian workers are reticent about their work, but other Italian workers inform me that they integrate well with other workers, develop good ‘joking relationships’ with them and make an effort to be fluent in the Italian language. There have also been agitations and forms of protest by migrant collectives which need to be unpacked for understanding forms of civic engagement in society. Such forms of protest, an outcome of routine forms of exploitation by gangmasters from within the community as well as from outside, has resulted in establishing new forms of political

Pathways of integration in Italy 91 mobilisation, still in the nascent stage, among migrants and indicates new forms of engagement with the society in which they are located.15 Migrants are primarily dependent on these agents for their employment and cannot risk dissent at this stage to save their position in the labour market and their precarious social position in Italian society. They are caught in a bind and therefore rather seek safety and security within their community, the celebrations, festivals and rituals of collective life, rather than seek out acceptance and greater security in the workplace or into Italian society. In any case, they have access to trade union organisations in the country such as the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), the Italian General Confederation for Labour, a leading union with which Indians and other immigrants are affiliated. Although Indian immigrants complain of exploitation not only by Italian employers but also increasingly by members of their own community, and this has been emphasised by the CGIL trade union in Fidenza as well, they do not seek to organise and make collective protests. The CGIL in Fidenza has 75,000 workers on its rolls that includes Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Filipino, Sri Lankan, Indian and a few Chinese.16 According to the CGIL administration, there are very few illegal Indian workers, as they are ‘very good workers’, well liked by the Italians, who ask them to work on the dairy farms with the animals and help in their regularisation. Provision of the necessary documents by employers helps in the employment and continuity of the immigrant in the workplace. At the same time, this becomes the means through which employers are in control of immigrants and their working lives in one way or another and gives them authority and enormous power over the lives of immigrants. As one CGIL official said, ‘immigrants are slaves to employers’, as they cannot displease them in any way or they will lose their jobs and thereby their permits for staying in Italy. Italian employers in the agriculture sector are quite rude to the employees, the CGIL asserts, as they are not very well educated themselves, and Indian employees in particular tend to remain silent for fear of losing employment. Relationships between employers and employees and with trade unions remain fraught and yet point to the possibilities opened up for integration through the efforts of CGIL officials to address the migrants’ problems or in the efforts of employers to work together with migrant employees on their joint economic projects. Such pathways perhaps exist all across the country and are the resources through which integration is possible. However, the restrictions imposed by the community itself, which seeks to hide behind its apparent ignorance or

92  Meenakshi Thapan shield itself from exploitation or oppression by the employer, are constraining factors which limit the extent to which integration is actually possible under the circumstances. 5.3.2 Building cosmopolitan sociability through religious institutions Religious institutions and their inter-relationships have been the focus of study across the world especially in the context of the reproduction of traditional forms of belonging and of cultural values embedded in religion among migrants. This is, however, only one aspect of the role of the religious institution in the migrant’s life. Religion also serves to connect migrants to the municipality, the local government and citizenry and, over time, may acquire some kind of status in the host community, as it has in some places in the UK.17 It may also develop what Ester Gallo refers to as a ‘new geography of belonging’, connecting displaced immigrants with the lost homeland and the new community (Gallo 2012). One aspect of focusing on religious institutions and their role as a pathway of integration is by seeking to understand the informal aspects of civic engagement as they emerge through immigrants’ religious institutions and cultural associations that also focus on religious content to a large extent. This is essential to our understanding of informal aspects of civic engagement. Considering religious institutions as spaces for civic engagement, this section focuses on participatory citizenship that is informal and is grounded in the domain of affect, belief and commitment to a particular faith that transcends legalese if necessary. In the transnational context, spaces for religious worship such as temples and gurdwaras are places for the development of civic ideals and skills among immigrants and their children (Bertolani and Singh 2012). Brettell and Reed-Danahay argue that ‘the identities and moral values associated with particular forms of ethno-religious expression shape both formal and informal citizenship practices’ (2012: 78). This interaction and the building of such practices take place in the everyday life of institutions where immigrants and their children not only gather together for purposes of worship and faith but to reproduce conventional and new ways of belonging to a community and service to others. This, however, is not the only way we may view these institutions that also take on different avatars to build civic networks and establish meaningful connections with the local government and people.

Pathways of integration in Italy 93 Near Fidenza, the local Hindu temple was inaugurated on 21 July 2007, when local Hindu migrants received space from the municipality to have their own association. Fourteen local community members set about meeting and interacting with one another in each other’s homes, but now they meet in the temple every Sunday. On any particular evening, every single member of the congregation takes turns to perform the aarti (ritual worship). It is a temple dedicated to a mother goddess (maatakamandir); they worship the goddess and seek her protection. The leader, not a pujari (priest) but a local Indian, does a lot of cleaning, serving the food, the langar (serving of free food) and the Prasad (ritual food). As one grandmother told me, ‘I wait for Sunday and keep thinking when will it come, so that I can meet everyone again’. And she said it feels good to come to the temple every Sunday, as she has status and respect from others, who seek her blessing as an elder in the community. It brings together generations and families in a common return to the homeland through daily and weekly ritual worship. At the same time, it serves as a space for the socialisation of children and youth into cultural values and traditions and simultaneously establishes links with members of the host society, who often visit the temple as curious citizens or as seekers of new religions. The Sikh temple (gurdwara) has been the subject of study in different European regional contexts such as the UK, Finland, Sweden, Poland and increasingly in northern Italy as well.18 Apart from the recitation of the holy book and the music (kirtan) associated with the Sikh temple, an important part of its culture is linked to the development of the notion of service (sewa) among the congregation. In Britain, as a result of the close links between the Labour Party and minority ethnic religious institutions, gurdwaras have gained access to public services, benefits and political patronage (Singh 2006: 158). This has resulted in a great diversity in the services they now offer, ‘and they now act as advice and learning centres, provide care for the elderly, serve as ‘one stop shops’ for local agencies, and are centres of community development’ (Singh 2006: 158). Community development is linked to the idea of sewa (service) and has always been a critical component of the gurdwara culture. It is a well-known fact that in India Sikhs will do anything to propagate this culture among not just the congregation but especially the novitiate, youth and members of the general public. It is therefore not surprising that the Sikh community in the region of my study has tied up with the local health department for conducting a training camp within the gurdwara at Novellara near Reggio Emilia for mutual benefit.19

94  Meenakshi Thapan The fact that the camp took place with the cooperation of the immigrant community within its own religious institution is indicative of the strength of the linkages between the communities. It also points to the adaptability of the community to extend its religious space for social activities that are as important for them as they are for the Italian health dept. The director of the health department who conducted this training emphasised how they felt completely welcome and included in the life of the temple. The women of the community cooked lunch for everyone, and it was served, as it normally is, to all health dept. personnel and community members sitting on the floor together. The pragmatic use of the Sikh temple for training purposes may appear as another form of instrumental integration, but it has not resulted in the exoticisation of either the temple or the faith and is perceived as useful to the immigrant community for its integration into the local community including the municipality.20 Religious and social activities become essential to the life of the institution over time, especially in diasporic contexts. The Catholic Church in Italy plays a significant role in building an interactive relationship with migrants through informal ways of civic engagement in everyday life. In this chapter, I consider the role of CARITAS in northern Italy, vis-à-vis immigrants and others in contemporary times. I would like to emphasise that I am well aware of the position of the Church vis-à-vis Islam, which it has in the past sought to distance itself from.21At the same time, I seek to understand that aspect of the work of CARITAS that is directed to the well-being of all immigrants, regardless of their religion, ethnic backgrounds or socioeconomic status. In 1967, Pope Paul VI wrote a letter to all his bishops, priests, the religious and the faithful in the whole Catholic world and included also ‘all men of good will’ among his addressees.22 Known as the Populorum Progressio (the progressive development of peoples), it sets out to examine the role of the Church in the context of global dilemmas such as ‘of those peoples who are trying to escape the ravages of hunger, poverty, endemic disease and ignorance; of those who are seeking a larger share in the benefits of civilisation and a more active improvement of their human qualities; of those who are consciously striving for fuller growth’ (source: www.vatican.va). In this elaborate document, the Pope draws our attention to the global phenomena of suffering and argues for the need for a ‘new humanism’ that will address some of the complex problems that plague society. There was now a shift from the heavyhandedness of the church and unquestioned traditions to a more open spirit that encourages ‘individual conscience

Pathways of integration in Italy 95 and agency’. Although Vatican II therefore was an effort to respond to the challenges of contemporary times and to renew the church in many ways, it has been critiqued on the grounds that it seeks to build a new kind of Catholicism through middle-class values in the forms of religious practices advocated (Pratt 1996). An interview with the Bishop of Fidenza reveals that the work of CARITAS rests on the vision/inspiration they receive from the Bible (in formal terms) and from the document, Vatican II. The bishop argues that one important characteristic of the Catholic people is to receive foreign people, to be in human touch, not in an official, bureaucratic sense: ‘All people are human, all are brothers in God. The second point is that the human is not in Christ himself but in the human family: all people are one brotherhood. All people are my brother’. This wisdom is derived directly through the document Populorum Progressio and from Vatican II. ‘The motto is: Ogniuomoe miofratello (each man is my brother) . . . Now, the immigrant phenomenon is a new thing, so the church must play a role in the new phenomenon. Everyone who comes from everywhere must be welcome. Before this, the church was working with the poor, unemployed, etc. In the end of the eighteenth century, Italians started emigrating from Italy, so the church formed an organisation for taking care of the immigrants who were going out. It was the UCEI Ufficio Catholico Emigrazione Italiano run by the national Catholic church which has offices in different places. It was for the Italian emigrants’. In present times, the work is now with immigrants coming into Italy. Every local church has been made a local centre for receiving immigrants. The bishop adds, ‘The work of the local church includes receiving immigrants, answering their questions about housing, food, clothes, all that is required for survival, teach the Italian language and culture, Italian law, traditions, customs, lifestyle, help in the search for jobs and occupation and to enable a kind of ‘tentative integration’. To meet, to know the difference’. The bishop is very emphatic: ‘We must accept the difference. We must recognise the difference between me and the other people but we must meet one another. Identity must be very clear, my identity and the other person’s identity. We must meet. Respect is real only if I know that you are different and I accept this diversity. We don’t become one. There is no fusion (i.e. no imposition of identity). We must accept diversity and live in the same place together with our diversity, respecting one another’. A few significant points stand out in this narrative: the emphasis on the efforts of the church to inculcate a humanistic approach to the problems that beset contemporary society, the fact that earlier the

96  Meenakshi Thapan church took care of its own fold in other cultures. but now, the church has resolved to take care of others within its fold, not a religious but a territorial fold, as it were, and finally, in enabling a kind of tentative integration, as the Bishop put it. To further this effort, the Bishop, who arrived in Fidenza in 2010, initiated the Festadei Poppoli (the coming together of different communities and nationalities). The festival is organised by the government of Fidenza and several other associations. It first started four years ago and is the culmination of work that goes on throughout the year such as the workshops about different kinds of food – Italian, African, South American – about art, dance; ‘everyone can do something for expressing themselves’. In 2011, the theme of the festival was hope. It is the first time there was a theme. A volunteer elaborates: ‘In the earlier years, the theme was merely the meeting of different countries, acknowledging other countries; the workshop on art is dedicated to an expression of hope. There are sessions on body massage and karate. Workshops are held in many places in the town. No expert or any teacher is present in the workshop which is made up of the people who are participating in it . . . The spirit is ‘doing something together and meeting other people doing something’. The perspective is a ‘project of the community of the people’’. Italian social workers in Fidenza assert that while the Church no doubt plays a very significant role in the integration of immigrants in Italy, its intervention in this space is a way ‘to establish its own power in the lives of Italian people’.23 They argue that the church seeks to establish itself as a do-gooder and therefore to inculcate religious ideas in more and more people. In this manner, the authority of the church increases, and the people become more and more encompassed in this web of faith-based initiatives that seek to inculcate the faith as much as the social and pastoral practices they undertake. At the same time, the work of CARITAS appears to be located at a social level and is not viewed as a religious activity, as pointed out by several young people working as volunteers at the festa as well as, for example, by people in a position of governmental authority, such as the mayor of Busetto. The local Minister for Immigration and Social Services in Fidenza is emphatic that the Church is reaching out to people, both the natives and the immigrants, and therefore has a very important role in society. It is ‘fundamental’ because of the services it provides for the immigrants but also for cultural purposes. Through its parish priests, it enters into the lives of every family in the parish. In Busetto, I observed that the Indian Catholic priest visits non-Christian Hindu and Sikh families, who may seek his help for intervention with the mayor to establish a temple in the region and visit the church to

Pathways of integration in Italy 97 express their solidarity with him and his religion. Such interaction suggests ways of engagement that are present at multiple levels, that of formal participation as Christian members of a community seeking to help others, of non-denominational members seeking to relate to one another, intermingling in an expression of solidarity.24 This culminates in the festa de poppoli in which people participate regardless of their religion, nationalities or cultural differences. The curious presence of the bishop at all events in the heart of a right-wing local government is prefaced by the minister stating in a very matter-of-act way, ‘the Bishop is very important in local civil society, he is always invited to all events and public meetings including those of the municipality’. It is this close link with the government at local levels that makes the work of CARITAS much more effective and results in its vast outreach. This culture of service extends itself to the well-being of the poor, the unemployed and the homeless.25 The festival is only aspect of the work of the church in the community in Fidenza. CARITAS runs health clinics, shelters, food kitchens and other activities with the help of volunteers. The range of activities depicts the engagement with activities that cater to the well-being of the immigrant apart from the pastoral care and efforts at integration. In Reggio Emilia, the municipality runs a family health centre (centro salute famigilia) that is solely a facility for irregular immigrants. It provides basic care but for consultation with medical specialists, it collaborates with CARITAS who has a full-fledged health centre at its premises in Reggio Emilia. These well-established networks facilitate and enable the positive integration of immigrants who may otherwise lack access to healthcare and cross-cultural interaction. There is also willingness and openness among the agents of the Church to connect to hugely different faith-based organisations in order to achieve their aims and realise their goals of service to the people through the culture of charity, solidarity and volunteering that prevails within it. The connections between public institutions, non-governmental agencies, CARITAS, immigrant associations and faith organisations, by crossing different kinds of intersecting borders, points to the development of new forms of civic engagement in the public sphere.

5.4 Concluding comments My focus in an earlier paper (Thapan 2013a) on Indian migrants in northern Italy has emphasised their lived experience through the lens of exclusion, marginalisation and silence in the face of racism. This essay has sought to look at the possibilities for integration as these are

98  Meenakshi Thapan opened up through practices of cosmopolitan sociability among people belonging to different cultures, faiths and linguistic backgrounds.26 The pathways of integration opened up by such interventions prevail at different levels of individual and collective strategies that are evolved by different groups, collectives and organisations of people. The church and its agencies welcome immigrants through their reception and listening centres, shelters, food kitchens, healthcare, counselling and even monetary loans or donations for specific needs. The labour unions and other labour associations provide information and services related to the immigrants’ rights in the context of employment, wages and benefits. Cultural and immigrant associations help in organising workshops and annual events for the benefit of the social integration of immigrants. Their efforts are based on their commitment to solidarity, but their views also reflect the differences that may exist for example between union officials and the workers on the ground. Some Italian employers seek to engage in joint economic projects with their Indian employees, whose work ethics and practices they value and extoll. There is however a somewhat patronising attitude in the expression of seeking joint economic projects with good but nonetheless quiet workers who may not themselves be interested in such common projects. Immigrant workers, especially from India, are rather circumspect precisely because they want to quietly do their work, earn some money and stay out of trouble without getting too involved or engaged in anything else. All Indian immigrants assert this as their only goal in Europe, an aim that has been well internalised by the second generation, especially young men, who choose also not to speak out against the racism they may encounter for fear of spoiling their chances for higher education or employment in Italy. There are ambiguities and uncertainties therefore in these strategies which seek an openness towards others but are not without their share of pitfalls and complexities, especially in how the other is defined and constructed. Building cosmopolitan sociability is therefore crucial to the process of integration but, at the same time, perhaps engenders ambivalent outcomes. There is no doubt that certain elements of difference prevail even in the efforts by immigrants and local citizenry to bridge gaps and cross barriers. In fact, there is a combination of ethnically shared perspectives and religious affiliations and an openness towards others. It is not always possible therefore to have completely similar perspectives, representations or religious identifications. Identity remains vexed in migrant contexts. Migrants seek acceptance and belonging but often shun the social company of their hosts in informal settings. These are

Pathways of integration in Italy 99 some of the limitations to developing a cosmopolitan perspective in transnational contexts. In addition, there is a power dimension in such forms of cosmopolitan sociability that is shaped by gender, religion, race and ethnicity, as well as legal status, and these need to be fully understood when we examine cosmopolitanism and forms of engagement. Indian immigrant women forge their own individual strategies out of domestic spaces into which they are locked and isolated.27 Young Indian girls and boys in high school seek to build connections and frame subjectivities in different ways from the dual worlds of exclusion they are encapsulated in.28 Men seek to forge working relationships that protect their self-interests and simultaneously engage them in other worlds in a hugely unequal and complex world. What emerges from these complex behavioural, social and affective conditions is that migrants and their others remain committed to a joint project that serves to bring them together for different purposes. Their acts of engaging with each other with full knowledge and intent, and directed towards fruitful engagement and change, indicate their commitment to the project of integration and therefore constitute ‘acts of citizenship’. At the same time, their embeddedness in the field of power urges us to pose further questions in seeking to understand such acts. Perhaps the ideal of cosmopolitanism as one of ‘immanent self-transcendence’ is not yet realised and we need to explore pathways of integration as the first step towards transcending difference and finding mutually constructive means of individual and collective participation in the public sphere.

Notes 1 An earlier version of this chapter was brought out as a working paper: Pathways of Integration: Individual and collective strategies in northern Italy, CARIM-India RR 2013/28, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013. 2 See for example Favero (2010). 3 ‘Cosmopolitan sociability’ has been defined as ‘consisting of forms of competence and communication skills that are based on the human capacity to create social relations of inclusiveness and openness to the world’ (Glick Schiller, Darieva and Gruner-Domic 2011: 402). 4 Immigrants of Indian origin around Fidenza and Parma in northern Italy were selected for this study (conducted in 2010–11). Those with very little formal education are employed in the agriculture sector, primarily dairy farms, slaughterhouses and small factories in the largely rural and small towns of Emilia Romagna. They have lived in Europe for between fifteen and twenty-five years depending on the trajectories for migration undertaken by them. I met and interviewed thirty men between the ages of thirty-five

100  Meenakshi Thapan and sixty. Interviews and focus group discussions were also conducted with fifty school-going young adults (aged fifteen–eighteen years) and other youth (eighteen–twenty-one years). I met several women as well: some were engaged in factories or in laundries or working in small boutiques or shops. Most were homemakers and unemployed. I made several visits to the region of a week to two or three weeks each time, spending every day meeting a crosssection of the Indian farm worker community, NGOs working with immigrant populations, immigrant associations, employers, schoolteachers and administrators, students of Indian origin) both boys and girls) and women at home, in the Sikh gurudwara and Hindu temples. I also interviewed a young Indian woman in Vicenza who runs the only non-formal organisation I encountered for the welfare of Indian women. In addition, I met and interviewed more than forty Italian people including social workers, teachers, doctors, employers, trade union officials, police officials, members of local governments, church functionaries, translators, cultural mediators, NGOs of different kinds and others. Interviews with Indian immigrants were conducted in Punjabi and Hindi and with Italians in English, using an interpreter each time. The collected material is part of Work Package 3 on Migrants and Borders in the EU FP7 Euro Broad Map project 2009–2012 funded by the European Union. I am grateful to this project and to the European Studies Programme (2010–2011), University of Delhi, funded by the European Union, that enabled me to engage in fieldwork in Europe in 2011. 5 See Brettell and Reed-Danahay (2012) for a discussion of informal aspects of civic engagement and definitions of citizenship that go beyond the formal constructions of the same. 6 I am well aware that this is not necessarily true for all Italian participants and that there have been racist attacks on immigrants by local Italians across Italy. See, for example, Calavita (2005), Cole (1997), Favero (2010), Maher (1996). 7 See Oliveri (2015) for a detailed account of the strike by immigrants (including Indians) seeking regularisation of status in Brescia, a city in Lombardy in northern Italy. 8 Source: https://qz.com/710468/foreign-workers-in-italy-are-more-likelyto-be-employed-than-italians-are/. 9 For a review of the Northern League and the anti-immigrant xenophobia it supports and advocates, see Avanza (2010). 10 Calavita notes that ‘hundreds of priests mobilised against Bossi-Fini which they said “violates the principles of solidarity and human rights” ’ and creates ‘problems of conscience’. Significantly, they asked the Catholic church to engage in ‘civil disobedience’ (2005: 36). 11 Cole is specifically referring to the anti-immigrant violence in Florence in the 1990s. See Cole (1997: 100ff). 12 CARITAS (literally, charity) is an organisation of the Catholic Church worldwide that provides relief, welfare and social services for the poor and oppressed regardless of religious affiliation or nationality. 13 This is partly an outcome of the class and caste distinctions that are so well ingrained in Indian society and incorporated into the habitus of most Indians. 14 Two years later, Sunil did leave Fabio’s employment to return to his village, where he has built a house for himself. With Fabio’s help, he obtained

Pathways of integration in Italy 101 pension from the Italian government, and his sons now live and work in Italy, but Sunil and his wife have retired to India. After his relationship and experience with Sunil, whom he values a great deal, Fabio could not bring himself to hire another Indian and has two Egyptian workers now. 15 Federico Oliveri has asserted that migrants in Italy are now engaged in active processes of developing new forms of class consciousness and seeking to develop ‘global citizenship from below’ (Oliveri 2012, n.d.). In work that focuses on the strikes by migrant farm workers in Rosarno in the southern region of Calabria in 2010 and in Nardo, a small town in Apulia in southern Italy in 2011, Oliveri argues that realising their oppression by the gangmasters or the caporali who control their recruitment and their wages, migrants are on a warpath to make change. One important outcome is a change in the law recognising gangmastering not merely as an ‘administrative violation’ but now as a ‘penal crime’ punishable with up to twelve years in prison and with a fine of 1,000 to 2,000 euros per illegally hired worker (Oliveri n.d.: 6). 16 For the agriculture or food industry including the slaughter industry, there is another organisation: FLAI or FederazioneLavoratori Agro Industria (Federation for agro-industry workers), and most Indians (300–400) are members of this organisation in Parma and the surrounding regions in Emilia Romagna. 17 See for example Knott’s discussion, among many others, of the links between the Hindu temple and the host society in Leeds (Knott 2009). 18 See for example the work of Singh (2006), Singh and Tatla (2006), Jacobsen (2012), Jacobsen and Myrvold (2011). Bertolani and Singh (2012) and Gallo (2012) are the pioneers in developing this field in Italian studies. 19 The regional health service of Emilia Romagna conducted training around health and hygiene issues for migrants and their employers in the premises of the gurdwara. Entitled ‘To protect health and security in work place’, the local Department of Public Health organised a two-day event in December 2011 in which the focus was on the lack of hygiene and training of workers at the workplace (primarily the dairy farms) where most of the Indians are employed. 20 Gallo (2012) points to the one-way dialogue between the Catholic Church and the Sikh temple in Terni, where Catholic representatives are invited to the gurdwara as well as the acceptance of the Sikh community for their children to be given a Catholic education in Italian schools, but there is a complete lack of a similar interest among Catholic representatives to learn more about Sikhism or its faith community 21 In this context, see Garau (2010) and Bertolani and Perocco (2013). 22 There was an important meting known as the Concilio Vaticano II held between 1962–1965 of bishops from all over the Catholic world. This meeting/conclave was very important for changing the mentality of believing in the Church and in the Church in front of other religions. The emphasis now was to be on non-competitive spirit, non-hostility, nonproselytising, and instead dialogue, discussion, peace building, brotherhood, helping others. For example, earlier the Mass used to be only in Latin. After this important meeting, the Mass can now be in the language of the place where it is being conducted; this makes the church more accessible to the common people, who can now participate more readily in the

102  Meenakshi Thapan activities of the church. This meeting changed the role of the church. After some time, all the popes continued this policy, and it became the basic foundation of the Catholic Church. 23 The bishop refutes this by saying, ‘There is a negative view of church by some people but the church helps, every person is my brother, man comes before the law. So if anyone needs anything, the church answers. In one text, Christ said, what you do for one person, you have done for me. For Christian people, in every man, woman or child, there is Christ inside. The level of religious motivation is in the New Testament, this belief that Christ is everywhere’. 24 This kind of close interaction across faiths is markedly visible in small towns in Emilia Romagna where I conducted fieldwork and may very well not be the case even in other bigger towns in Emilia Romagna and in the rest of the country. 25 The church does experience some difficulties in harnessing the support of all Italians towards the immigrant population, as the Lega Nord is active in building a negative image about immigrants and their access to welfare benefits through the media and other sources (interview with the bishop). 26 Only some aspects of such interaction have been examined here, and the work of organisations that work for youth and children in educational institutions is not addressed in this chapter. 27 See Thapan (2013b) for an analysis of Indian women’s lives in the community under study. 28 See Thapan (2015) for a nuanced understanding about this aspect of young people’s immigrant lives in Italy.

References Ambrosini, M. 2001. La faticad’ integrarsi. Immigrazione e lavoro in Italia (The Effort to Integrate: Immigration and Work in Italy). Bologna, Il Mulino. ———. 2012. ‘We are against a multi-ethnic society’: Policies of exclusion at the urban level in Italy. Ethnic and Racial Studies: 1–20. Avanza, Martina. 2010. The Northern league and its ‘innocuous’ xenophobia. In Andrea Mammone and Giuseppe A. Veltri (eds.) Italy Today the Sick Man of Europe. London, New York, Routledge, Taylor and Francis: 131–142. Biffl, Gudrun. 2012. Labour market integration of low skilled migrants to Europe: Economic impact. Paper presented to the conference on managing migration and integration: Europe and the US, 9 March 2012, University of California, Berkeley. Bertolani, Barbara and Fabio Perocco. 2013. Religious belonging and new ways of being “Italian” in the self-perception of second-generation immigrants in Italy. In Ruy Blanes and José Mapril (eds.) Sites and Politics of Religious Diversity in Southern Europe. Leiden, Brill. Bertolani, Barbara and Iqbal Singh. 2012. The journey of Guru Granth Sahib to Italian Sikhs: Defining national leadership in transnational mass media. In Knut A. Jacobsen and Kristina Myrvold (eds.) Sikhs Across

Pathways of integration in Italy 103 Borders: Transnational Practices of European Sikhs. London, New York, Bloomsbury: 211–231. Brettell, Caroline B. 2012. Deciding to jump: Immigration, gender, and civic engagement. In Kavita R. Khory (ed.) Global Migration: Challenges in the Twenty-First Century. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 129–153. Brettell, Caroline B. and Deborah Reed-Danahay. 2012. Civic Engagements: The Citizenship Practices of Indian and Vietnamese Immigrants. Stanford, Stanford University Press. Calavita, Kitty. 2005. Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race and Exclusion in Southern Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Caponio, Tiziana and Paolo R. Graziano. 2011. Towards a security-oriented migration policy model? Evidence from the Italian case. In Emma Carmel, Alfio Cerami and Theodoros Papadopoulos (eds.) Migration and Welfare in New Europe: Social Protection and the Challenges of Integration. Bristol, The Policy Press: 105–120. Cole, Jeffrey. 1997. The New Racism in Europe: A Sicilian Ethnography. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Delanty, Gerard. 2012. The idea of critical cosmopolitanism. In Gerard Delanty (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitan Studies. London, New York, Routledge, Taylor and Francis. Dossier, Caritas. 2012. Dossier Statistico Immigrazione. Rome, Caritas/ Migrantes. Gallo, Ester. 2012. Creating Gurdwaras, narrating histories. Perspectives on the Sikh diaspora in Italy. South Asia Multidisciplinary Journal, 6(2012): 1–16. Garau, Eva. 2010. The Catholic church, universal truth, and the debate on national identity and immigration. In Andrea Mammone and Giuseppe A. Veltri (eds.) Italy Today: The Sick Man of Europe. London, New York, Routledge, Taylor and Francis: 158–169. Glick-Schiller, Nina, Tsypylma Darieva and Sandra Gruner-Domic. 2011. Defining cosmopolitan sociability in a transnational age. An introduction. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34(3): 399–418. Isin, F. Engin. 2008. Theorizing acts of citizenship. In F. EnginIsin and Greg M. Nielsen (eds.) Acts of Citizenship. London, New York, Zed Books: 16–43. Jacobsen, Knut A. 2012. Tuning identity in European “houses of the guru”: The importance of Gurdwaras and Kirtan among Sikhs in Europe. In Knut A. Jacobsen and Kristina Myrvold (eds.) Sikhs Across Borders: Transnational Practices of European Sikhs. London, New York, Bloomsbury: 105–118. Jacobsen, Knut A. and Kristina Myrvold (eds.). 2011. Sikhs in Europe: Migrations, Identities and Representations. Farnham, Ashgate. Knott, Kim. 2009. Becoming a faith community: British Hindus, identity and the politics of representation. Journal of Religion of Europe, 2: 85–114. Lombardi-Diop, Cristina. 2012. Postracial/postcolonial Italy. In Cristina Lombardi-Diop and Caterina Romeo (eds.) Postcolonial Italy: Challenging National Homogeneity. New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 175–190.

104  Meenakshi Thapan Maher, Vanessa. 1996. Immigration and social identities. In David Forgacs and Robert Lumley (eds.) Italian Cultural Studies: An Introduction. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press: 160–177. Maritano, Laura. 2004. Immigration, nationalism and exclusionary understandings of place in Turin. In Robert Lumley and John Foot (eds.) Italian Cityscapes: Culture and Urban Change in Contemporary Italy. Exeter, University of Exeter Press: 61–74. Merelli, Annalisa. 2016, 22 June. Foreign workers in Italy are more likely to be employed than Italians are. Quartz. https://qz.com/710468/foreign-workersin-italy-are-more-likely-to-be-employed-than-italians-are/ (Accessed on 13 October 2017). Oliveri, Federico. 2012. Migrants as activist citizens in Italy: Understanding the new cycle of struggles. Citizenship Studies, 16(5–6): 793–806. ———. 2015. Subverting neoliberal citizenship. Migrant struggles for the right to stay in contemporary Italy. ACME. Published Under Creative CommonsLicence: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works. www.academia. edu/4440865/Subverting_neoliberal_citizenship._Migrant_struggles_for_ the_right_to_stay_in_contemporary_Italy (Accessed on 13 August 2017). ———. n.d. Enacting rights from below. Migrant farm workers’ struggles in Nardo, Southern Italy. www.academia.edu/4441087/Enacting_Rights_ from_Below._Migrant_Farmworkers_struggles_in_Nard%C3%B2_Southern_Italy (Accessed on 30 October 2017). Paolo, Favero. 2010. Italians, the “good people”: Reflections on national selfrepresentation. Journal of Critical Practice, 12(2): 138–153. Passy, Florence. 2001. Political altruism and the solidarity movement. An introduction. In Marco Giugni and Florence Passy (eds.) Solidarity Movements in International Perspective. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield. Pratt, Jeff. 1996. Catholic culture. In David Forgacs and Robert Lumley (eds.) Italian Cultural Studies: An Introduction. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press: 129–143. Singh, Gurharpal. 2006. Gurdwaras and community building among British Sikhs. Contemporary South Asia, 15(2): 147–164. Singh, Gurharpal and Darshan Singh Tatla. 2006. Sikhs in Britain: The Making of a Community. London, Zed Books. Stanley, Flavia. 2008. On belonging in/to Italy and Europe. Citizenship, race and the “immigration problem”. In Deborah Reed-Danahay and Caroline B. Brettell (eds.) Citizenship, Political Engagement and Belonging: Immigrants in Europe and the United States. New Brunswick, New Jersey, London, Rutgers University Press. Thapan, Meenakshi. 2013a. Imagined and social landscapes. Potential immigrants and the experience of migration in northern Italy. Economic and Political Weekly, XLVIII(38): 55–64.

Pathways of integration in Italy 105 ———. 2013b. Isolation, uncertainty and Change: Indian immigrant women and the family in northern Italy. CARIM-India RR2013/09. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. ———. 2015. Punjabi youth in Northern Italy: The family, belonging and freedom. In Knut A. Jacobsen and Kristina Myrvold (eds.) Young Sikhs in a Global World: Negotiating Traditions, Identities and Authorities. Farnham, Ashgate: 59–70.

6 International migration and place-based inequalities The case of high-skilled migration and student mobility to eastern Germany Mustafa Aksakal 6.1 Introduction In response to demographic and macroeconomic trends linked to labour shortages, Germany gradually engaged in creating legal channels for the attraction of qualified labour migrants and in parts international students. One of the first political measures to recruit foreign professionals, particularly IT experts, was the introduction of the Green Card in 2000 (Westerhoff, 2007). This initiative was formalised with the implementation of the New Foreigner Law in 2005 (Chanda & Mukherjee, 2014), allowing the preferential entrance of migrants with certain professional backgrounds. The legal framework for the recruitment was again strengthened by the implementation of the EU Blue Card into the National Residence Act in 2012 (Hanganu & Heß, 2016). Thereby, it was especially intended to increase efficiency in recruitments by reducing bureaucratic barriers (Wogart & Schüller, 2011). These trends in migration policies were also accompanied by several amendments after 2005. In short, the legal framework in Germany has adapted over the last few years to accommodate to ongoing societal conditions, which led to more tolerant but yet selective migration policies (Beine et al., 2016), as well as to the formulation of integration measures for arriving migrants. Propelled by these noted developments, high-skilled and student mobility from Asia (Kreienbrink & Mayer, 2014) and particularly from India to Germany (Schulze-Palstring, 2015) gain in importance. The significance of Indian migration to Germany is currently also reflected in terms of numbers; in 2016 India represented the most important non-EU country of origin for high-skilled migrants (BAMF, 2017) and the second most significant sending country for international students (Burkhart

Place-based inequalities 107 et al., 2017). With the increasing relevance of Indians in Germany, also the number of studies on Indian migration has augmented. Studies have, for instance, focused on general characteristics of Indian migrants in Germany (Gottschlich, 2012), on the integration conditions (Goel et al., 2012), on diasporic links to India (Butsch, 2017) and on the motivations to choose European countries, including Germany, as a country of destination (Chanda, 2015). With few exceptions, such as the study of Faist et al. (2017), little attention has been paid to the perceptions of Indian migrants in Germany. Moreover, there is a knowledge gap with respect to the particular challenges that Indian migrants confront in the country, potentially (re)producing social inequalities in diverse ways. Inequalities can be understood as social dynamics leading to advantageous or disadvantageous conditions among people in society (Grabb, 2006) and can be analysed in different dimensions. The objective of this chapter is to address place-based inequalities, meaning the territorial effects (Lamont et al., 2014) that might have an influence on the integration and subsequently affect personal goal achievement among migrants. This means to ask about the ways spatial social conditions in regions with a low exposure to diversity are leading to drawbacks in the living conditions and career prospects. Drawing on two research projects on Indian migrants, 40 expert and 35 migrant interviews with foreign-born Indians students and high-skilled labour migrants were conducted between 2015 and 2016. Our findings show that due to the low exposure to diversity among the native population, institutions and companies, Indians living in Eastern states of Germany can experience additional detriments. It is highlighted that especially certain social dynamics, such as discrimination and exclusion, for instance, expressed in xenophobia in this region, can cause social isolation, leading in some cases to cumulative disadvantages among mobile people from India. The chapter is organised as follows: the second section is devoted to the current trends in the migration from India and Germany. The third section includes a literature review, and the fourth discusses research results linked to Indian migration and place-based inequalities. The concluding section summarises the findings and discusses these theoretically in relation to the relationship between migration and social inequality.

6.2 Current migration from India to Germany Indian migration to Germany is not a recent phenomenon but rather began shortly after World War II; while during the 1950s Indian students (Gottschlich, 2012), high-skilled migrants and entrepreneurs

108  Mustafa Aksakal arrived (Singh & Rajan, 2016), in the 1960s, particularly Indian nurses immigrated (Goel, 2002), in the early 1980s humanitarian migrants came (Khadria, 2014) and after 2000 Indian migration was again mainly characterised by high-skilled migration and student mobility (Faist et al., 2017). Differently formulated, the Indian diasporic community in Germany is historically characterised by a heterogeneous group with regard to motivations, regions of origin within India as well as ethnic and religious compositions (Butsch, 2017; Goel et al., 2012; Goel, 2007). Currently, Germany represents in Europe one of the countries with the largest number of Indian immigrants after the UK and Italy. Indian migrant stocks in Germany increased between 1990 and 2015 by more than 114 percent (UN DESA, 2015). According to the 2016 German Micro Census, the total population of Indians amounted to 115,000, whereby around 83 percent (95,000) were Indian-born migrants. Around 64 percent of this population was in the age group of 20 to 40 years, only 38 percent were represented by female migrants, and 60 percent of all foreign-born Indians were married. In terms of the educational level, 18 percent are still involved in education, 24 percent are low skilled, and 55 percent (the broad majority) is represented by qualified migrants. Finally, regarding the geographic distribution of the foreign-born Indians, the statistical data shows that North Rhine Westphalia, Baden Wurttemberg, Bavaria and Berlin are the most important states of destination for Indian migrants. Only around 13 percent of this Indian population, corresponding to 12,350 people, reside in Eastern states (Federal Statistical Office, 2017). As Figure 6.1 on the (in and outward) flows shows, Indian migration to Germany is a historical dynamic. The migration flow data shows that 20,462 people immigrated and 11,938 emigrated in 2014. Figure 6.2 provides information on the temporality in the Indian high-skilled and student mobility to Germany by reflecting the numbers of those of the same population who left the country in the two subsequent years after arrival. Moreover, it illustrates the changes in Indian migration patterns over time. According to this data, the outflow of Indian students in the subsequent two years represented 18 percent between 2014 and 2016, signifying a decrease by 11 percent in comparison to the period of 2010 and 2012. Temporary migration (a duration up to two years) is far more significant among high-skilled migrants than among students, represented by 57 percent of all immigrants who entered the country in 2014. However, similarly to the previous case, in comparison to the

Place-based inequalities 109 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0

inward outward 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014

Figure 6.1  Indian migrant flows in Germany, 1960–2014 Source: Federal Statistical Office (2016)

5000

6000 5000

Professionals (inward)

4000 3000 2000

Professionals (outward within 2 years after arrival)

1000 0 2010

2012

2014

Students (inward)

4000 3000

Students (outward within 2 years after arrival)

2000 1000 0 2010

2012

2014

Figure 6.2 In- and outflows of Indian students and professionals to and from Germany, 2010, 2012, 2014 Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2016)

period 2010–2012, the share of Indian professionals who entered in 2014 and left the country over the following two years diminished by 12 percent (from 69 to 57 percent). In sum, the previously noted statistical information indicates that more recently arrived Indians are mainly characterised by young, male, married, skilled mobile people. More than the half of the skilled Indian migrants and almost a fifth part of the students represent temporary migrants, who stay in Germany up to two years. It remains an open question why there is a relatively high rate of out-migration

110  Mustafa Aksakal among Indian migrants, especially among high-skilled migrants. This chapter discusses the spatial conditions in the Eastern parts and rural areas related to social isolation leading to drawbacks among some Indian migrants. Although only a few foreign-born Indians are living in the Eastern parts of Germany, revealing the link between Indian migration and place-based inequalities can offer one explanation about the factors that influence migrants’ intentions and patterns of current Indians in Germany.

6.3 Migration and place-based inequalities In general terms, it might be argued that most European research on migration from India to Europe represents case studies, in which the general characteristics, integration conditions, diasporic links as well as migration policies and public perceptions in destination countries are considered. These aspects are, for instance, studied in the context of Indian migrants in the UK (Castles, 2009), the Netherlands (Bal, 2012), Italy (Lum, 2012) or Germany (Gottschlich, 2012). Next to these descriptions of the status quo, some other studies address particularly migration and related territorial outcomes in India, whereby some indirectly consider questions that can be related to territorial inequalities as an outcome of international migration. Saxenian (2005) observes Indian high-skilled migrants who studied in the US and were able to successfully build (transnational) start-ups in India upon return. These returnees engage in knowledge transfers that the scholar dubs ‘brain circulation’. In these dynamics might be however only a few migrants from selected regions involved, potentially leading to different territorial outcomes in India. In line with this consideration, Khadria (2014) discusses critically the dichotomy in political discourses in India regarding the development potentials of unskilled and skilled labour migrants. He argues that discourses have addressed the territorial development potentials of returning high-skilled migrants but that the real regional outcomes are often underexplored, and some evidence would indicate that they are often moderate and varying. In line with this reflection, it has been noted that subjective perceptions, limited stays in places of destination and varying ‘technology, delivery mechanisms or resistance to change [. . .] in India’ (Kumar et al., 2014: 282) would often dampen these opportunities for development, showing the role of temporality as a factor influencing territorial outcomes. Other studies emphasised territorial outcomes in European destination countries, including in Germany. For instance, Chanda and Mukherjee (2014) focus on Indian high-skilled labour migration in the context of

Place-based inequalities 111 bilateral investment flows and find that these movements especially aim to ‘address skill shortages in the EU countries and to facilitate the offshoring of client processes to India’ (Chanda & Mukherjee, 2014: 66–67), whereby outcomes for India and Indian professionals would not be fully exhausted. Another body of literature focuses differently on the link between migration and spatial inequalities. In these approaches, it is assumed in general terms that high-skilled migrants engage in spatial mobility and move toward certain regions because of expected career and educational prospects (Gibson and McKenzie, 2009; Favell et al., 2007) and thereby to reduce the inequality gaps they perceive previously to their current migration. From this vantage point, the conditions in destination countries are often addressed, and it is analysed how these circumstances affect migrants’ personal development as well as intentions. For example, Chanda (2015) addresses socio-economic and cultural rationales of Indian international students to select EU countries as destinations for study as well as the challenges they experience in the university-to-work transition in Europe. She observes that missing internship positions in certain European places can lead to limited exposure to the local labour market and might reduce the opportunities to obtain an adequate job after graduation and increase the possibilities for unfavourable career prospects. Also, incoming qualified migrants might have difficulties to integrate into the labour market due to existing territorial differences between the previous country of residence and Germany. In this fashion, Oberkircher (2006) finds that there is a discrepancy between the expectations that high-skilled Indians who arrived in the Green card initiative after 2000 have about their immigration to Germany and the real (often adverse) integration experiences. This would often include labour market incorporation and would frequently shape initial intentions of this mobile population. A more recent study analyses decision-making processes of Indian high-skilled migrants and international students regarding the duration of stay in relation to experienced challenges in Germany and responsibilities back home (Faist et al., 2017). The scholars conclude that often very different political, cultural and socio-economic influencing factors have an interlinked effect on migrant intentions after moving to Germany, which can have a significant impact on migrants’ integration. In short, these kinds of studies focus on the territorial characteristics and conditions of destination countries that provide in some cases more and in others fewer opportunities for the incorporation of migrants in different societal realms, such as everyday life, labour market and within companies.

112  Mustafa Aksakal Lastly, few studies focus on regional characteristics within countries that can have an effect on migrants’ career development. For example, Fielding (1992) describes the role of particular ‘escalator regions’ on migrants’ intra-generational mobility. He observes that these regions offer temporary migrants accelerated career development opportunities due to a dynamic and open labour market for high-skilled migrants. On a European level, Favell (2008) argues that certain ‘Eurocities’ represent spaces where a transnational middle class emerges, namely ‘Eurostars’, and obtain favourable conditions for career development, such as opportunities to gain formal skills or achieve good wages. However, a transnational living as a Eurostar also includes disadvantages such as the exclusion from formal welfare benefits in the city of residence or the lack of social capital that could provide access to adequate housing. Finally, King et al. (2017) observe that international movements from the Baltic States to London can involve escalator effects for migrants. They reveal that the city provides mobile people socio-economic and career as well as lifestyle and personal-development-related opportunities. They conclude that many interviewed migrants indeed perceive economic or career-related aspects as paramount but that these considerations were often interlinked with non-material personal factors, for example to rationales related to self-realisation and quality of life in big cities. In summation, studies on migration in general, and on Indian migration in particular, have often focused rather indirectly on the link between migration and territorial dynamics, leading to inequalities among migrants. As the previous review shows, on the one hand, some studies focus on development in India and sometimes in countries of destination but do not explicitly consider the involved detriments in particular regions within countries. Other contributions emphasise economic and career outcomes for mobile persons resulting from migration to certain places and lose sight of non-career and nonmaterial aspects, as observed by King et al. (2017). It is uncontested that territorial conditions influence migration patterns and social practices (Faist, 2010; Lyons, 2006), yet only a few studies focus on the particular connection between migrants’ trajectories in relation to the effects of spatial social conditions. This also implies a knowledge gap in the understanding of the creation of cumulative disadvantages due to spatial circumstances. Therefore, the next section addresses, from an inequality perspective, how certain social features in Eastern Germany can enter consecutive social dynamics, affecting through integration issues, personal

Place-based inequalities 113 goals achievements among those Indian migrants living in this region. Social inequalities are usually defined as social dynamics leading to advantageous or disadvantageous conditions among people in society (Grabb, 2006). The place-based dimension of inequality ‘interrogates the social processes of neighbourhood and cities [or other types of entities] taking the social-ecological environment, rather than the individual social actor, as its starting point’ (Lamont et al., 2014: 578). In migration studies, many of these place-based inequality studies have focused on the effects of segregation for migrants. For instance, it has been observed that the persistence of segregation and related factors among first- and second-generation migrants can lead to social deprivation adverse integration in certain areas of metropolitan cities in the United States, which is identified as proof of an unfavourable neighbourhood effect (Sampson, 2012; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). The following section focuses differently on migration and place-based inequalities. We address the ways Indian high-skilled migrants and students are affected by spatial conditions leading through processes like social discrimination and isolation to drawbacks among those who live in these areas in Germany.

6.4 Discussion of findings The effects that certain spatial conditions have on migrants might be expressed in very distinct ways in different destination countries; while for instance in some countries, ethnic segregation triggering disadvantageous outcomes might be of particular relevance, in others, mechanisms of place-based inequality might be linked to the low exposure to diversity and might be expressed in the unpreparedness of policies, institutions, economy and people. Migration studies in the global North have overwhelmingly addressed segregation in cities as a detriment-producing process with varying unfavourable outcomes for migrants often connected to stigmatisation (Massey, 2007), educational inequalities (Wodtke et al., 2011) or poverty and unemployment (Sampson, 2012). Also in Germany, ethnic segregation in some cities and among certain migrant categories represents a significant topic (Schönwälder et al., 2007). Whilst segregation represents an important mechanism for social inequalities in Germany, other migrants living in geographies less exposed to diversity, migrants might be exposed to other kinds of barriers, related to a low degree of exposure to diversity that can hamper personal development through integration. In general terms, the concept of diversity points to existing differences or social differentiation

114  Mustafa Aksakal processes (Vertovec, 2015; Koenig, 2009). These heterogeneities can be related to a variety of social features (Zifonun, 2015), such as physiological abilities, education, gender, religious background, social class, nationality, ethnicity or culture (Vertovec, 2012). Immigration, including the recent movement of Indian professionals and international students, is, first of all, a concrete reflection of ethnic and cultural diversity in Germany. However, migrants are not equally distributed in the country. Especially the Eastern states are less exposed to diversity than other regions. This is also reflected in the fact that only around 13 percent of the foreign-born Indians live in the Eastern part of the country. Low levels of exposure to diversity can have different reasons and effects on migrants’ integration and consequently on personal goal achievements. As argued by several interviewed experts, the low levels of exposure to diversity can be linked to the fact that among the native population, in institutions, as well as in small and middle-scale enterprises, certain dismissive attitudes towards migrants are more conspicuous than in other regions with a high exposure to ethnic and cultural diversity. Elias and Scotson (1993) revealed many years ago that relational aspects in place-based inequalities are of particular importance. The scholars observed that due to power differences that are based on a longer duration of residence, involving a higher degree of social cohesion, ‘the established’ were able to develop behaviours to exclude ‘the outsiders’ in everyday life. These dynamics had several advantageous results for the established and apparently disadvantageous outcomes for the outsiders, for instance, related to integration barriers. From a socio-psychological inequality perspective, it has been observed that human beings are often ‘wired cognitively to construct general categories about the world [. . .] and then to use them to classify and evaluate the stimuli [they] encounter’ (Massey, 2007: 9). This means that social actors rely on cognitive structures or schemas that are used for assessing other individuals and social groups and interacting with them (Fiske, 2004). As observed by Lamont et al. (2014: 579–580), this can mean that human beings engage in categorisation and hierarchisation by associating in-group actors mainly with positive and out-group persons with negative characteristics, such as incompetence or dishonesty. In the case of Indian migrants living in Eastern parts of Germany this means that the low degree of exposure to diversity can be related to the ways people, institutions or companies perceive and evaluate foreigners as well as interact with them (Fiske et al., 2002), which leads to stereotyping (Fiske, 1998), discrimination and social exclusion (Massey, 2007). As discussed by some interviewees from academia and

Place-based inequalities 115 civil society, xenophobia as a public expression of discrimination and social exclusion by parts of the native population can be reflected in the emergence, persistence and increasing support of right-wing movements (e.g. PEGIDA) and right-wing parties (e.g. AFD) as well as in more radical ways in the strong increase of violence against migrants living in East Germany. Discrimination and violent assaults against Indian migrants in this region were reported by several interviewed experts and migrants alike. For instance, a student association leader from Berlin stated that two Indian students were ‘brutally attacked’ by some locals in Thüringen, slightly before the interview was to be carried out. In another case, an Indian high-skilled migrant, living at the time of interview in a community in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, narrated that he was chased while driving and also experienced other forms of abuse in everyday life several times. As the next consideration shows, migrants with family are also concerned about the treatment of their family members, such as shown in the following statement regarding the treatment of the child by school peers: My daughter is also a little bit colored like me. And she really had problems in the school because [. . .] it was really disturbing because the children used to harass her [. . .] because they [children] are very open, the children don’t have to hide anything [. . .] they talk just the same about what their parents are telling at home. So I’m a little bit afraid, because of this situation. (Khaan, high-skilled migrant, 34) The statement shows that discrimination and exclusion of family members of migrants can have a similar effect as direct experiences of discrimination and exclusion. Moreover, it shows that these kinds of social dynamics can be also taking place within institutions, such as among schoolmates in schools. Moreover, clerks in public institutions, as well as employees and managers in medium and small-scale companies, can engage in these discriminative and exclusive attitudes toward migrants or tolerate hostile behaviours. For instance, related to the latter aspect, due to the low exposure to diversity, teachers are less sensitive toward discriminative practices in schools due to missing experiences. Furthermore, as Roscigno and Yavorsky argue, discrimination and exclusion can be reflected in more latent processes, such as in workplace discrimination through certain ‘organizational practices and interpersonal relations’ (2015: 275). That these organisational practices can mean drawbacks for Indian migrants are also reflected in expert as well as in migrant interviews. Some experts argued that

116  Mustafa Aksakal companies with low levels of exposure to foreign workers have not sufficiently developed intercultural competencies, such as expressed in the refusal to contract non–German-speaking workers or once contracted to be tolerant to alternative ideas or different solution-finding strategies. In short, the above discussion shows that the native population, as well as institutions and companies in regions with low levels of exposure to diversity, tend to perceive, evaluate and interact differently with Indian migrants than in the opposite case. The low exposure of East Germany does not only influence the perception of the native population, institutions and companies but can also have an influence on Indian students and professional migrants’ living conditions through social isolation. A civil society activist working on the topic of migration and refuge in Saxony-Anhalt considered that ongoing public perceptions and right-wing dynamics are not only contradictory to the current demographic and macroeconomic needs in the state but also unfavourable for migrants’ career and integration prospects: [Immigration] is actually a huge opportunity, because there is a population loss, demographic aging and a shortage of skilled workers, which unfortunately is only recognised by some [. . .] Right-wing movements in Saxony-Anhalt [like PEGIDA] provoke that immigrants simply do to feel welcomed here [. . .]. Many migrants told me that they feel completely insecure and that they are afraid. In conjunction with this, they also see little prospects for themselves here, so few opportunities to find a promising job, or to build relationships [. . .] although the state is demographically suffering under labour shortages. That’s a bad basis to really integrate or to stay here in long term. (Hanna, civil society activist) In line with this statement, two Indian high-skilled migrants stated that public expressions of xenophobia, discrimination and exclusion not only strengthen the feelings of insecurity and to be not welcomed but also feelings of loneliness in everyday life and in the workplace. It has been contended that these experiences interviewed migrants have had were leading to lowering self-esteem and motivation. In turn, this was expressed in their reluctance to engage in building relationships in everyday and professional life as well as to innovatively engage in work. Regarding the influence of isolation on social mobility, it has been considered by one Indian professional living in Thüringen that feelings of uncertainty represented barriers for his career development

Place-based inequalities 117 because he felt that he needed first integrate into society and the company, meaning to ‘engage in learning the language and cultural settings’. This means that in this period, he was not able to fully perform expected tasks and to focus on career goals. The previously discussed aspects empirically show how spatial social conditions related to the degree of exposure to diversity in certain regions can have, through discrimination, an exclusionary and isolating influence on Indian students’ and professionals’ integration and social mobility. The findings show that place-based inequalities discussed in the case of Indians in Eastern Germany have a strong relational character. Evidently, detrimental spatial conditions can not only be traced in East German states but also in rural areas, including in Western Germany. The empirically based considerations on Indians in East Germany are, however, clearly indicating that certain relational social processes linked to dynamics in the Eastern region (expression of discrimination and exclusion) and to Indian migrants’ behaviours (uncertainty and social isolation) lead to place-based inequalities among migrants. Indian migrants living in the Eastern regions can be, in comparison to those migrants who moved to metropolitan cities, especially in Western states, more exposed to social dynamics leading to detriments. This seems to be especially true when considering that additionally, they don’t have immediate access to social capital through ethnic networks in these places (Lin, 2000). It becomes clear that different social processes are working, and outcomes are proceeding in sequential ways, leading to an accumulation of disadvantages. From this vantage point, local actors’ attitudes are affecting migrants’ behaviours, leading to integration barriers. This, in turn, enters in some cases to the limitation of personal goal achievements among Indian students and professionals.

6.5 Conclusion This chapter addressed international migration from India and placebased inequalities in Germany. This has been discussed on the basis of findings from qualitative expert and migrant interviews. It is illustrated that low levels of exposure to diversity can be linked, from a sociopsychological viewpoint, to discrimination and exclusion by parts of the native population, institutions and companies. Moreover, our findings emphasise that this can lead to the social isolation of Indian migrants; this underlines on the one hand that relational aspects in place-based inequalities (Elias & Scotson, 1993) are of particular importance. On the other hand, it illustrates that diverse consecutive social mechanisms

118  Mustafa Aksakal can be at play, expressed in the fact that migrants react to discrimination and exclusion to themselves or to their family members through distancing. In turn, this type of interaction can hamper integration and consequently affect personal development goals of migrants and potentially their families. From this vantage point, the results also underpin that integration processes and achievement of migrants’ and family members’ personal goals (e.g. career development) can be interlinked and influence each other. It is worth noting that the role of personal goals beyond career and economic aspects are important to consider. The demographic characteristics of Indian migrants in Germany discussed above show that more than half of the foreign-born Indian population in Germany are in the age group 20 to 40. Many of these migrants in this age are skilled-labour migrants and international students. A study on temporary migration from Asia to Germany revealed that especially young and educated movers often consider non-material achievements, such as gaining independence from parents or acquiring informal intercultural competencies, as important as career and economic development (Aksakal & Schmidt, 2017). In line with this observation, King et al. (2017) observe that likewise meeting lifestyle goals and gaining self-confidence in places of destination can help to accelerate the youth-to-adult transition and that therefore places can also include escalator effects for the easier achievement of non-career and non-economic goals. Our findings, discussed in this chapter, suggest, however, that adverse experiences related to discrimination and subsequently isolation have the opposite (downward) effect on young Indian migrants, namely the inability to engage in the lifestyle they envisaged previous to their arrival and sometimes the decrease of selfconfidence. Finally, the discussion on discrimination, exclusion and isolation illustrates that different subsequent mechanisms co-exist. Moreover, it also indicates that the often adverse outcomes for Indian migrants living in Eastern regions of Germany are potentially cumulative in nature. This means, for instance, that they can experience detriments in integration and subsequently in the fulfilment of personal or family goals. Additionally, since few Indian and other migrants live in the Eastern areas, they cannot immediately make use of social capital based on migrant networks (e.g. support from Indian student associations in the case of international students). Migration and (relational) place-based inequalities, exemplified in this chapter in relation to the low exposure to diversity and migrants’ reactions, can represent in some migrant trajectories an appropriated explanation for processes of de-skilling, perceived low quality of life as well as changing migrant intentions, such as reflected in the previously

Place-based inequalities 119 noted high rates of outgoing international migrants, including those from India. In the light of increasing migration on the basis of labour, education, and asylum, these kinds of analyses seem not only in relation to Eastern regions but also in connection to other areas with low exposure to diversity, such as rural ambits, of increasing relevance in Germany.

References Aksakal, M., & Schmidt, K. 2017. Temporary migrants’ experiences, perceptions, and motivations in Asian-German transnational spaces. In P. Pitkänen, M. Korpela, M. Aksakal, & K. Schmidt (Eds.), Characteristics of temporary migration in European-Asian transnational social spaces (pp. 198–206). Dordrecht: Springer. Bal, E. 2012. Country report: Indian migration to the Netherlands. CARIMIndia Research Report 2012/07. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. BAMF - Bundesamtfür Migration und Flüchtlinge (www.bamf.de). In English, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. 2017. Annual Court Statistics 2017. Germany: BAMF. Beine, M., Boucher, A., Burgoon, B., Crock, M., Gest, J., Hiscox, M., & Thielemann, E. 2016. Comparing immigration policies: An overview from the IMPALA database. International Migration Review, 50(4), 827–863. Burkhart, S., Chehab-van den Assem, N., Essig, K., Grützmacher, J., Heublein, U., Jechel, L., Kammüller, S., & Kercher, J. 2017. Wissenschaft weltoffen. Daten und Fakten zurInternationalität von Studium und Forschung in Deutschland. Bielefeld. Butsch, C. 2017. The ‘Indian diaspora’ in Germany – Emerging networks and new homes. Diaspora Studies, 1(1), 1–22. Castles, S. 2009. Indians in Britain. IMDS Working Paper Series No. 11., July, New Delhi: International Migration and Diaspora Studies Project, Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Chanda, R. 2015. Exploring India – EU student mobility. In R. Chanda & P. Gupta (Eds.), India-EU people mobility: Historical, economic and regulatory dimensions (pp. 183–219). New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. Chanda, R., & Mukherjee, D. 2014. Investment and skilled mobility linkages between India and the EU. In G. Tejada, U. Bhattacharya, B. Khadria, & C. Kuptsch (Eds.), Indian skilled migration and development: To Europe and back (pp. 47–70). New Delhi: Springer. Deutscher Bundestag. 2016. Antwort der Bundesregierung. Ausländerfeindliche und rechtsextremistische Straftaten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im September 2016. Berlin. Retrieved from http://dip21.bundestag.de/ dip21/btd/18/102/1810261.pdf (accessed 8 September 2017). Elias, N., & Scotson, J. 1993. Etablierte und Außenseiter. Baden Baden: Suhrkamp Tachenbuch Verlag.

120  Mustafa Aksakal Faist, T. 2010. Diaspora and transnationalism: What kind of dance partners? In R. Bauböck & T. Faist (Eds.), Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods (pp. 9–34). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Faist, T., Aksakal, M., & Schmidt, K. 2017. Indian high-skilled-migrants and international students in Germany: Migrations behaviours, intentions and development effects. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Favell, A. 2008. Eurostars and eurocities: Free movement and mobility in an integrating Europe. Maldon: Blackwell. Favell, A., Feldblum, M., & Smith, M. P. 2007. The human face of global mobility: A research agenda. Society, 44(2), 15–25. Federal Ministry of the Interior. 2016. Politisch Motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2016. Berlin. Retrieved from www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/down loads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/2017/pmk-2016.html. Fielding, A. J. 1992. Migration and social mobility – South East England as an escalator region. Regional Studies, 26(1), 1–15. Findlay, A., King, R., Smith, F. M., Geddes, A., & Skeldon, R. 2012. World class? An investigation of globalisation, difference and international student mobility. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 37(1), 118–131. Fiske, Susan T. 1998. Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. In D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology, 4th ed., vol. 1. New York: McGraw-Hill. Fiske, S. 2004. Social beings: Core motives in social psychology. New York: Wiley. Fiske, S., Cuddy, A., Glick, P., & Xu, J. 2002. A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(6), 878–902. Gibson, J., & McKenzie, D. 2009. The microeconomic determinants of emigration and return migration of the best and the brightest: Evidence from the Pacific. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3926. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). Goel, U. 2002. Indische Engel in Deutschland. Südasien, 22(2), 61–63. Goel, U. 2007. Indians in Germany. The imagination of a community. Journal of the UNE Asia Centre, 20, 1–8. Goel, U., Punnamparambil, J., & Punnamparambil-Wolf, N. 2012. Inder Kinder. Über das Aufwachsen und Leben in Deutschland. Heidelberg: Draupadi Verlag. Gottschlich, P. 2012. German case study. CARIM-India Research Report 2012/3. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. Grabb, E. G. 2006. Theories of social inequality. Toronto: Nelson Canada. Grzegorczyk, A. 2013. Social and ethnic segregation in the Paris metropolitan area at the beginning of the 21st century. Miscellanea GeographicaRegional Studies on Development, 17(2), 20–29. Gsir, S. 2009. Housing and segregation of migrants, study: Antwerp, Belgium. Retrieved from http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/bitstream/2268/35134/1/2009%20 Housing%20Eurofound.pdf (accessed15 August 2017).

Place-based inequalities 121 Hanganu, E., & Heß, B. 2016. Die Blaue Karte EU in Deutschland. Kontext und Ergebnisse der BAMF-Befragung, Forschungsbericht No. 27. Nürnberg: Bundesamtfür Migration und Flüchtlinge. Khadria, B. 2014. The dichotomy of the skilled and unskilled among nonresident Indians and persons of Indian origin: Bane or boon for development in India? In G. Tejada, U. Bhattacharya, B. Khadria, & C. Kuptsch (Eds.), Indian skilled migration and development: To Europe and back (pp. 29–45). New Delhi: Springer. King, R., Lulle, A., Parutus, V., & Saar, M. 2017. From peripheral region to escalator region in Europe: Young Baltic graduates in London (Sussex Research Online). New Delhi: Sage Publications. Koenig, M. 2009. Diversity interview. MPI MMG. Retrieved from www. mmg.mpg.de/diversity-interviews/koenig/ (accessed 8 September 2017). Kreienbrink, A., & Mayer, M. M. 2014. Einführung – Migration aus Ost-und Südostasien. In A. Kreienbrink (Ed.), Migration of skilled labour from Asia to Germany. Nuremberg: BAMF. Kumar, P., Bhattacharya, U., & Nayek, J. 2014. Return migration and development: Evidence from India’s skilled professionals. In G. Tejada, U. Bhattacharya, & C. Kuptsch (Eds.), Indian skilled migration and development: To Europe and back (pp. 263–284). New Delhi: Springer. Lamont, M., Beljean, S., & Clair, M. 2014. What is missing? Cultural processes and causal pathways to inequality. Socio-Economic Review, 12, 573–608. Lin, N. 2000. Inequality in social capital. Contemporary Sociology, 29(6), 785–795. Lum, K. 2012. Indian diversities in Italy: Italian case dtudy. CARIM-India Research Report 2012/02. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. Lyons, T. 2006. Diasporas and homeland conflict. In M. Kahler & B. Walter (Eds.), Territoriality and conflict in an era of globalization (pp. 111–132). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Massey, D. S. 2007. Categorically unequal: The American stratification system. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Oberkircher, V. 2006. Die deutsche Greencard aus der Sicht indischer ITExperten. In C. Brosiusand & U. Goel (Eds.), Menschen aus Südasien in Deutschland (pp. 161–188). Heidelberg: Draupadi Verlag. Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. G. 2001. Legacies: The story of the immigrant second generation. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Roscigno, V., & Yavorsky, J. 2015. Discrimination, diversity, and work. In Vertovec, S. (Ed.), Routledge international handbook of diversity studies (pp. 274–283). Oxon: Routledge. Sampson, R. 2012. Great American city: Chicago and the enduring neighborhood effect. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Saxenian, A. L. 2005. From brain drain to brain circulation: Transnational communities and regional upgrading in India and China. Comparative International Development, 40(2), 35–61.

122  Mustafa Aksakal Schönwälder, K., & Söhn, J. 2007. MigrantInnen in deutschen Städten: Siedlungskonzentration und deren Relevanz für Integrationsprozesse. Migration und Soziale Arbeit, 3(4), 173–179. Schulze-Palstring, V. 2015. Das Potenzial der Migration aus Indien – Entwicklungen im Herkunftsland, internationale Migrationsbewegungen und Migration nach Deutschland, Forschungsbericht No. 26. Nuremberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. Singh, A. D., & Rajan, S. I. 2016. Politics of migration: Indian emigration in a globalised world. Oxon: Routledge. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). 2015. International migration stock: The 2015 revision. Retrieved from www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/ estimates15.shtml (accessed 8 September 2017). Vertovec, S. 2012. Diversity and the social imaginary. European Journal of Sociology, 53(3), 287–312. Vertovec, S. (Ed.) 2015. Routledge international handbook of diversity studies. Oxon: Routledge. Westerhoff, H.-D. 2007. Die Greencard. Zur Wirtschaftspolitik der rotgrünen Bundesregierung. Working Paper No. 161. Retrieved from www. wiwi.uni-due.de/fileadmin/fileupload/WIWI/pdf/161.pdf (accessed 10 November 2017). Wodtke, G. T., Harding, D. J., & Elwert, F. 2011. Neighborhood effects in temporal perspective the impact of long-term exposure to concentrated disadvantage on high school graduation. American Sociological Review, 76, 713–736. Wogart, J. P., & Schüller, M. 2011. The EU’s BlueCard: Will it attract Asia’s highly skilled? Retrieved from www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/ Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233& lng=en&id=132587 (accessed 10 November 2017). Zifonun, D. 2015. The diversity of milieu in diversity studies. In Vertovec, S. (Ed.), Routledge international handbook of diversity studies (pp. 98–105). Oxon: Routledge.

7 The abstract concept of an ‘Indian community’ Perceptions of high-skilled migrants and international students from India in Germany Kerstin Schmidt 7.1 Introduction This chapter is concerned with different forms of perceptions of an ‘Indian community’ in the highly heterogeneous population of people of Indian origin (PIOs) in Germany. With a migrant stock of 68,291 people in 2015 – according to UN data – Germany has not been among the most important destination countries of Indian migrants in the past. The volume of Indian migrants living in Germany is even far from the number of migrant stock in the major countries of destination, the UAE (3,499,337), Pakistan (2,000,908), the United States (1,969,286), the UK (776,603) and Australia (389,992) (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015). However, from the perspective of Germany as a destination country, migration from India has gained importance over the past years. This is particularly the case in the context of public discourses about the need to attract high-skilled migrants to fill labour market shortages and to counter future demographic problems caused by a decreasing birth rate and an ageing society (Faist et al., 2017; Kreienbrink and Mayer, 2014). In recent years, India has become the most important country of origin of high-skilled migrants in Germany in terms of numbers, despite a slight decrease in the number of residence titles granted from 5,036 in 2014 to 4,897 in 2015.1 In addition, with 13,537 enrolments and a share of 5.1 percent of university entrants among the total of international students in Germany in the winter term 2015/16, India also remains the second most important origin country of migration to Germany for the purpose of higher education after China (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2016). It has previously been argued that the discursive construction of an ‘Indian community’ in Germany does not do justice to the diverse

124  Kerstin Schmidt population of PIOs in Germany (Goel, 2007). The present contribution follows this argument, particularly considering the fact that the diversity of PIOs in Germany has even increased over the past decade as a result of the immigration of Indian professionals and international students. The analysis in the remainder of this text is therefore guided by the idea that empirical research into perceptions of belonging to a community and processes of boundary making should avoid falling into the trap of ‘methodological nationalism’. As Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) pointed out referring to this term, diaspora and community studies often assumed homogeneity and cohesiveness among ‘ethnic groups’ (and a resulting social distance to what is often the majority population). They further argued that these studies tend to neglect internal heterogeneities and interactions between different communities and ignored those cases in which no communities were formed or existing ones disintegrated. In this vein, I refrain from basing my analysis on the premise that feelings of belonging to some kind of ‘Indian community’ necessarily shape the interaction between settled and recently arrived migrants of Indian origin in Germany. Instead, I intend to grasp how recently arrived highly educated migrants from India refer to other migrant groups (including but not exclusively from India) and with whom they socially interact or would like to socialise with. The analysis draws on fifteen qualitative interviews with high-skilled professionals and international students from India who had lived in Germany between three months and five years during the time of the interviews. The information is complemented by data derived from qualitative interviews with a religious leader and a student counsellor, both of Indian origin, who have lived in Germany for several decades. These two ‘key informants’ (Payne and Payne, 2004) on the one hand acted as gatekeepers, facilitating access to the interviewed high-skilled migrants and international students from India. On the other hand, they also contributed insights about the topic of interest based on observations during their daily interactions with PIOs of different backgrounds in Germany. The interviews were conducted in different German cities between the spring of 2015 and the summer of 2016, transcribed and analysed using content analysis.2 The empirical results will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. Before doing so, I provide a brief overview of the history and current situation of immigration from India to Germany, which is followed by a critical discussion of the concept of ‘Indian community’, which is often referred to as a diaspora, and the way it has been framed in the extant literature. In the subsequent empirical section,

The abstract concept of an ‘Indian community’ 125 I analyse the social interactions and processes of boundary making between diverse migrants of Indian origin living in Germany. This section highlights three contexts in which the interviewees referred to the Indian diaspora in Germany. First, the importance of personal contacts to other people of Indian origin to overcome feelings of isolation and non-acceptance in the mainstream German society was addressed. Related to this, the second part of this section is concerned with the interviewees’ perceived importance of strong networks of other PIOs for social support and feelings of belonging. The noted lack of these networks in Germany – due to the relatively small number of PIOs living in Germany – turns out to be an important element in decisions about the length of stay in Germany and a preference for moving on to other countries (e.g. the United States or the UK) when considering long-term settlement outside of India. As a third point I analyse the way in which some of the recently arrived interviewees distanced themselves from other migrants by stressing their high level of education and their economic contribution to the German society. The final section briefly concludes.

7.2 History of migration from India to Germany Migration from India to Germany dates back to the early twentieth century, when predominantly fighters for independence from the British colonial rule sought refuge as well as support for their struggles from the German government. Until the 1950s, the reputation of Germany’s tertiary education attracted students from India, particularly technicians and engineers. Many of them stayed and integrated into the educated middle class of the Federal Republic of Germany (Gottschlich, 2012), together with professionals and entrepreneurs who arrived in Germany from the 1950s on (Singh and Rajan, 2016). In addition to this predominantly male immigration of students and high-skilled migrants, female skilled-labour migrants from India also started to arrive in Germany after the Second World War. In order to address shortages in the labour market, the German government had actively sought to attract female caregivers from Asia, predominantly through agreements with Korea and the Philippines. In order to respond to the persisting labour demand in the care sector, the German Catholic Church also recruited young Christian women from the South Indian state of Kerala to work as nurses in their denominational German hospitals and retirement homes. While some of them married German men, others brought their Indian husbands who were also granted residency but were not allowed to work in Germany (Goel, 2002). From the early 1980s until

126  Kerstin Schmidt the second half of the 1990s, several thousand Indian nationals sought asylum in Germany. It is likely that many of these predominantly male immigrants belong to the religious group of the Sikh, who fled the violent conflicts in the Indian state of Punjab, which broke out in 1984. While they generally did not obtain refugee status, many were granted temporary protection in Germany (Tatla, 1999). From the beginning of the twenty-first century on, immigration from India to Germany became more homogeneous, mainly consisting of high-skilled migrants and international students. Between 2000 and 2004, the German government aimed to attract foreign professionals to fill labour market shortages, particularly in the IT sector, through its Green Card initiative. In the context of this recruitment scheme, highskilled migrants could obtain a residence and work permit in Germany for up to five years, provided they had a job offer by a German company. Their spouses were also allowed to work after one year of residence in Germany (Kolb, 2005). Yet due to a stagnation of the German IT sector shortly after the introduction of the recruitment scheme, and because of the high administrative burden for companies, only about 85 percent of the quota of 20,000 professionals that the German government had aimed to attract was exploited (Westerhoff, 2007). India was the most important country of origin of German Green Card holders with a share of 26.4 percent of the total number issued. While in German public debates the Green Card was often considered a failure, its relevance as a step towards more open migration policies for highskilled migrants has also been acknowledged (Kolb, 2005). Important milestones in this process were marked by the establishment of the New Foreigner Law in 2005 and the German implementation of the EU-wide work permit (Blue Card) Council Directive 2009/50/EC in 2012. Partly in response to this policy, India has for several years been an important country of origin of high-skilled migrants and international students in Germany. Similar to previous forms of migration, the recent immigration of high-skilled migrants from India to Germany is highly gendered. Between 2010 and 2014, the share of Indian women who entered Germany with a high-skilled visa remained continuously low at 15 to 17 percent of the total of high-skilled visas issued to Indian nationals (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2016).

7.3 Constructions of an ‘Indian community’ in Germany This section juxtaposes the different understandings of the notion of an ‘Indian diaspora’ or ‘Indian community’ in academia and policy. It shows how the importance of diasporas for development has been

The abstract concept of an ‘Indian community’ 127 stressed by policy makers in migrant origin countries in general, and in the particular case of India, before discussing the conceptual shortcomings of the term. The term ‘diaspora’ originally referred to dispersed groups of people living away from a real or imagined ‘homeland’, including the Jews, but also Africans, Armenians, Palestinians and the Irish. Later on it was used to demark different groups of migrants and displaced people, often referring to ethnic or religious minorities (Cohen, 2008). Resting on the latter conception of the term, diasporas have also been understood as forms of transnational communities, in which solidarity is based on ‘some sort of collective identity’ (Faist et al., 2013: 57). This ‘collective identity’ is expressed in the form of shared ideas, beliefs, values and symbols, and it is often founded on a common religion, nationality or ethnicity (ibid.). This meaning of a diaspora hints at the important role that membership in this transnational community plays for the identification of the group and of the individuals it is formed of. From a policy perspective, the potential engagement of diasporas as collective agents of international development has led to an increasingly positive perception of transnational communities. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century international development agencies have promoted migrant networks and organisations as collective providers of financial, social and political remittances for the benefit of the countries of origin (Faist, 2008). In line with this discourse, some national governments of migrants’ countries of origin officially recognised the diverse economic, social and political potential of diasporas and accordingly strengthened the ties to their citizens and former citizens living abroad, as well as to their descendants (Chen et al., 2015). In this vein, the Indian government established the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs in 2004 – which in 2016 became part of the Ministry of External Affairs. Yet also after this administrative restructuring, the Indian government continues to promote diaspora engagement, for instance by granting particular rights to overseas citizens of India (OCIs) and by creating the Indian Community Welfare Fund, which provides support to non-resident Indians (NRIs) abroad in need (Government of India, 2017). However, as (Varadarajan, 2010) argued, the Indian government also benefits from fostering connections to Indians living abroad, who contribute to economic development in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), access to foreign markets, the creation of business networks and as a source of foreign currency in the form of remittances. As recent World Bank data show, in 2015 India was with 72.2 billion USD the most important receiving country of remittances, which were mainly sent from the United Arab Emirates and the United States (World Bank, 2016). One reason for the high amount of

128  Kerstin Schmidt remittances is the large number of PIOs living abroad. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs there were more than 15.5 million Indians living abroad in 2015, particularly in the Gulf region, Southeast Asia, North America and Europe (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015). The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs estimated the total size of the Indian diaspora, consisting of NRIs and PIOs – with the latter category not necessarily being Indian nationals (anymore) – at almost 22 million people (Dwivedi, 2014). While on the one hand the potential of diasporas or transnational communities for development has been increasingly celebrated by diverse policy actors, on the other hand its academic meaning has been contested. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, constructions of collective identities in communities are often dominated by ideas of ‘groupism’, which according to Brubaker (2006) is the tendency in academic, policy and public discourses to treat (ethnic) groups as homogeneous entities. Referring to this terminology – in the context of the study of transnational migration and transnational communities – Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003: 218) labelled methodological nationalism a form of ‘groupist thinking’. Therefore, the concept of an ‘Indian diaspora’, which is based on the assumption of a collective ‘Indian identity’, raises questions about the way this heterogeneous group of people of Indian origin living in different parts of the world can be understood. For instance, Khadria (2014) distinguishes between a skilled and an unskilled Indian diaspora, the former term referring to highly educated and skilled knowledge workers or ‘global Indian citizens’ living in the US, Canada, Europe, Australia and New Zealand and the latter referring to Indian labour migrants in the Gulf States. According to this division, the unskilled diaspora sends the bulk of the financial remittances. The skilled diaspora, after considerations of brain drain and loss of human capital in the 1960s and 1970s, has more recently been acknowledged as beneficial for the transfer of knowledge and skills as well as investment in India, independent of whether professionals and students return to India or continue their careers elsewhere (Tejada and Bhattacharya, 2014).

7.4 The significance of an ‘Indian diaspora’ for people of Indian origin in Germany As this brief literature review about the history of migration from India to Germany, the contemporary diversity of Indians living abroad, as well as the theoretical critique of the concept showed, it seems to be

The abstract concept of an ‘Indian community’ 129 problematic to speak of an ‘Indian diaspora’ or an ‘Indian community’ as such. In the case of Germany, PIOs living in Germany are highly heterogeneous with regard to their motivations for migration, the length of their stay in Germany, the region in India where they were born and – often related to their geographic origin – their ethnic and religious backgrounds. In addition, there is a difference between those who migrated themselves and those whose parents or grandparents had moved to Germany before they were born or when they were children. This diverse panorama of different aspects of Indian migration to Germany also leads to differences regarding the legal status in Germany, for instance with respect to citizenship or the right to longterm residency. Given this high diversity of PIOs in India, the anthropologist Urmila Goel, already in 2007, called the Indian diaspora in Germany an ‘imagined community’, which incorporates the assumption of a shared origin in India, the conviction to be different from others, and the basis for collective action (Goel, 2007: 3). With the growing importance of Germany as a destination country for Indian IT specialists, engineers, other highly qualified professionals and international students, the diversity of PIOs living in Germany has even increased over the last decade. This is also related to the different experiences, perceptions and resulting needs of those who only intend to stay in Germany on a temporary basis and those of others who aim to settle on a long-term basis (Faist et al., 2017), irrespective of the actual future outcomes of these plans. Against this background, the remainder of this chapter is concerned with an analysis of interviewees’ perceptions of and ideas regarding the meaning of an ‘Indian diaspora’ in Germany. Based on the empirical data, it is divided into three sections addressing the following aspects that arose in the interviews: (1) the construction of an Indian community to overcome feelings of exclusion from the German mainstream society; (2) the conviction that life is better in countries with stronger networks of people of Indian origin, and related future plans to leave Germany and settle elsewhere; (3) the reference to skills and competences to stress the ‘value’ of Indian migration for German society in comparison to other migrant groups. 7.4.1 Perceptions of exclusion and the meaning of an Indian community in Germany As Hartung et al. (2015) showed for the example of international students in Germany, a perceived lack of social inclusion into society can have serious effects on people’s health and general well-being.

130  Kerstin Schmidt As I argued elsewhere (Aksakal and Schmidt, 2017), migrants, particularly newcomers in the German society, often benefit from social support provided by people who share similar life and/or migration experiences in order to overcome perceptions of isolation. While this is important for most people who live away from their families and friends, it is of particular relevance for many of those who are used to being engaged in a closely knit network of family members and/ or friends. One of the interviewees expressed her frustration after she moved from a large to a medium-sized city within Germany. I never had a problem in [XY] because we’ve always had a big group of friends, and we used to have get-togethers and party and all that. But here, this winter was like . . . most horrible because I was sitting all alone, new place, no friends, and you sit idle in the dark. And for a person like us who’ve always been surrounded by somebody, it’s like . . . too difficult. (female, born in 1982, high skilled) As this and other similar quotes demonstrate, feelings of isolation and/ or exclusion prevailed. Some respondents said that they stand out of German mainstream society for their physical characteristics, their lack of German language skills and/or their habits. Consequently, because they did not feel accepted as members of society, many of them actively sought to socialise exclusively with other Indians. In this vein, the term ‘Indian community’ was used to refer to an undefined group of people. This is expressed in the quote of a male high-skilled migrant, who had shared some thoughts about his efforts of getting to know more people through an online platform. He regretted the fact that in the city he lived in, he did not find any active members of the platform he could contact. He concluded, ‘there could be lots of Indians living here, but we don’t know’ (male, born in 1979, high skilled). In this vein, the interviews showed that in the context of strong perceptions of exclusion from society in the destination country, ‘Indian’ identity turned out to be of high importance. As Kumar (2015) had already argued, particularly for the case of Indians in South Africa, the meaning of belonging to a particular caste seems to become less and less relevant. This idea also became evident in some of the interviews conducted in Germany. Sharing the same ‘community, caste and religion’ (female, born in 1982, high skilled) did not seem to matter with respect to the question if social interaction was desirable at all but rather represented an additional asset because of the shared language and customs.

The abstract concept of an ‘Indian community’ 131 7.4.2 Rationalising the wish to leave Germany and to settle elsewhere To some extent related to the previous argument about the lack of social contacts in Germany, some of the respondents stressed the importance of an ‘Indian community’ by referring to its absence in Germany. They said that settling down in Germany was difficult because their family members were far away and they therefore did not have access to local kinship support networks. It was further argued that, as opposed to other countries, such as the UK or the United States, there were no strong networks of Indian migrants to compensate for the absence of these networks. This is related to the smaller number of PIOs living in Germany in comparison to other destination countries. In addition, as previous research results show, for Indian high-skilled migrants, other Asian countries, the Gulf States, or English-speaking countries are often more attractive destinations than (continental) Europe (Chaloff, 2014). Particularly Germany was sometimes considered a stepping stone to enhance one’s knowledge and skills by studying and gaining some work experience before moving on (Faist et al., 2017). This was also the case for this PhD student: I am definitely not planning to stay here after graduation. Well, maybe two or three years of work experience if I can find a job quickly. Later, I want to move to the US, or maybe to Singapore – because it is closer to India – to work and to have a family. This is difficult here, we do not speak the language and there is no Indian community where we live. (male, born in 1988, student) As this quote illustrates, some of the respondents referred to the term ‘Indian community’ to stress their desire of forming part of a network of people who can rely on each other’s support with regard to the issues they face in everyday life. It further shows that the presence of a large number of co-nationals in the country in which they live provides them with feelings of belonging to these support networks. The fact that these structures are much stronger elsewhere than they are in Germany is explicitly put forward as one reason for moving on after having spent some time in Germany. 7.4.3 Creating boundaries towards other groups of migrants It has been shown that migrants create boundaries towards other migrants based on various characteristics other than nationality. For

132  Kerstin Schmidt instance, Pérez and Stallaert (2015) argued that gender stereotypes tend to be reinforced for Latin American women and men engaged in domestic work in Brussels. Based on empirical fieldwork among Vietnamese migrants in Berlin, Hüwelmeier (2013) demonstrated that Pentecostalism, while reducing social, ethnic and political boundaries, generates religious boundaries. Likewise, among Turkish high-skilled migrants in Amsterdam, Barcelona and London, strategies of personal re-positioning (Wimmer, 2008) with respect to human capital/education and secularism are used. These are employed to mark boundaries to established or second-generation Turks and to overcome the allocation into the categories ‘Middle Eastern migrants’ or ‘Muslims’, which tend to rank low in public perceptions of ethnic hierarchies (Yanasmayan, 2016). The interviews with migrants from India demonstrated that some of the professionals and international students aimed to distance themselves from humanitarian migrants. One argument that was expressed in several interviews was that humanitarian migrants would not contribute financially to the German economy, while the interviewees themselves belonged to the categories of migrants that should be desired by the German government and society because they contributed in the form of taxes and/or with the knowledge and skills they brought to the country. This view resulted among some of the respondents in frustrations about the perceived lower level of state support they received in the form of language courses and other support measures for societal integration. One interviewee put it: You know, there are many refugees here and they get everything for free, German classes, a place to live and there are many people who welcome them. Of course, they had a horrible time and they are poor people who need support. But nobody gives us anything and most Indians are here to work and not to beg. (male, born in 1969, high skilled) Apart from those perceptions of injustice, Indian professionals and international students also dissociated from humanitarian migrants to improve their perceptions about their own status in the German society. Several respondents said that they felt insulted by the fact that people had stared at them on the street for their physical characteristics. For instance, one international student from India shared an incident at a bus stop. I was sitting there and waiting and someone kept on looking at me. Suddenly he asked me ‘are you a refugee from Syria?’ I told

The abstract concept of an ‘Indian community’ 133 him that I was from India and that I was studying at the university. So he relaxed and smiled. (female, born in 1991, student) This statement shows the respondent’s perception of being frowned at in public because of her physical characteristics yet being appreciated for her status as a student from India. This is particularly intriguing if one considers that it is unknown if the person that addressed her disapproved of the presence of refugees, was interested in learning more from someone he thought was a refugee or just tried to start a conversation, admittedly in a somewhat awkward way.

7.5 Conclusion As the preceding analysis of qualitative interviews with high-skilled migrants and international students from India in Germany showed, there are different contexts in which the concept of an ‘Indian community’ seems to be of relevance. On the one hand, it is used to express a desire of belonging to a social group, which is not fulfilled in the German mainstream society. This wish in some cases also leads to plans of leaving Germany in order to settle in a country where more PIOs live and where support networks are therefore expected to be stronger. On the other hand, the importance of belonging to an ‘Indian community’ was also expressed in situations in which respondents aimed to distance themselves from other migrants, particularly humanitarian migrants. In both cases, it is striking that respondents did not elucidate what an ‘Indian community’ concretely meant for them but referred to the concept in an abstract way. The ‘Indian community’ served as a reference group, to which the respondents aimed to belong in order to receive social support or to gain social status while living away from their home country. In light of ongoing academic debates, which rightfully doubt the meaningfulness of the social construction of communities based on nationality or ethnicity, these research results raise new questions. For instance, future empirical research might need to address how highskilled migrants and international students from India, who have recently arrived in growing numbers in Germany, precisely perceive of an ‘Indian community’ in Germany. One likely conclusion might be that the concept is constructed as a way of creating feelings of belonging to a group and to overcome perceptions of non-inclusion in German mainstream society.

134  Kerstin Schmidt

Notes 1 There are two schemes through which high-skilled labour migrants can obtain temporary residence and a work permit in Germany: (1) §18 AufenthG (Gesetzüber den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von AusländernimBundesgebiet); (2) §19a AufenthG (EU Blue Card). The figures show the sum of the successful applications of Indian citizens in both schemes. 2 The empirical data that this chapter draws on were collected in the context of two research projects: (1) ‘Transnational Migration in Transition: Transformative Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of People (EURANET)’ received funding from the European Unions‘ Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development and Demonstration under grant agreement 612921 (www.uta.fi/edu/en/research/projects/ eura-net/index.html); (2) ‘Indian high-skilled migrants and international students in Germany: Migration behaviors, intentions and development effects’ was a study commissioned by the German Bertelsmann Stiftung (www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePub likationen/Indianhigh-skMigrants_2017_final__002_.pdf).

References Aksakal, Mustafa and Kerstin Schmidt. 2017. ‘Temporary Migrants’ Experiences, Perceptions and Motivations in Asian-German Transnational Spaces’, in Pirkko Pitkänen, Mari Korpela, Mustafa Aksakal, and Kerstin Schmidt (eds.), Characteristics of temporary migration in European-Asian transnational social spaces, pp. 177–192. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Brubaker, Rogers. 2006. Ethnicity without groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chaloff, Jonathan. 2014. ‘The Role of Asia in International Migration: Skilled Migration to Europe’, in Axel Kreienbrink (ed.), Beiträgezu migration und integration, Band 5. Immigration of skilled labour from Asia to Germany and Europe, pp. 24–39. Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Chen, Yu-Wen, Emilie Racine and Neil Collins. 2015. ‘Gone but not forgotten: The (re)making of diaspora strategies’, Asian Ethnicity, 16(3): 371–379. Cohen, Robin. 2008. Global diasporas: An introduction (2nd ed.). London, New York: Routledge. Dwivedi, Om Prakash. 2014. Tracing the new Indian diaspora. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi. Faist, Thomas. 2008. ‘Migrants as transnational development agents: An inquiry into the newest round of the migration – Development nexus’, Population, Space and Place, 14(1): 21–42. Faist, Thomas, Mustafa Aksakal and Kerstin Schmidt. 2017. ‘Migration von indischen Hochqualifizierten und Studierenden nach Deutschland: Auswahlkriterien, Bleibeintentionen und Entwicklungseffekte’, in Matthias Mayer and Bertelsmann Stiftung (eds.), Faire Fachkräftezuwanderungnach

The abstract concept of an ‘Indian community’ 135 Deutschland Grundlagen und Handlungsbedarfim Kontexteines Einwanderungsgesetzes, pp. 149–166. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung. Faist, Thomas, Margit Fauser and Eveline Reisenauer. 2013. Transnational migration. Immigration and Society Series. Cambridge: Polity. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. 2016. Migrationsbericht 2015. Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Goel, Urmila. 2002. ‘Indische Engel in Deutschland’, Südasien, 22(2): 61–63. Goel, Urmila. 2007. ‘Indians in Germany. The imagination of a community’, Journal of the UNE Asia Centre, 20: 1–8. Gottschlich, Pierre. 2012. ‘The Indian Diaspora in Germany’, in Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Laxmi Narayan Kadekar (eds.), Global Indian diaspora: History, culture, and identity, pp. 157–175. Jaipur: Rawat Publishing. Government of India. 2017. Website of India’s foreign affairs. https://india. gov.in/topics/foreign-affairs (accessed 20 November 2017). Hartung, Freda-Marie, Gudrun Sproesser and Britta Renner. 2015. ‘Being and feeling liked by others: How social inclusion impacts health’, Psychology & Health, 30(9): 1103–1115. Hüwelmeier, Gertrud. 2013. ‘Creating and refining boundaries – Church splitting among Pentecostal Vietnamese migrants in Berlin’, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 47(2): 220–230. Khadria, Binod. 2014. ‘The Dichotomy of the Skilled and Unskilled Among Non-resident Indians and Persons of Indian Origin: Bane or Boon for Development in India?’, in Gabriela Tejada, Uttam Bhattacharya, Binod Khadria, and Christiane Kuptsch (eds.), Indian skilled migration and development: To Europe and back, pp. 29–46. New York: Springer. Kolb, Holger. 2005. The German Green Card. www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/ migration/kurzdossiers/58174/the-german-green-card (accessed 20 November 2017). Kreienbrink, Axel and Matthias Mayer. 2014. ‘Einführung – Migration aus Ost-und Südostasien’, in Axel Kreienbrink (ed.), Immigration of skilled labour from Asia to Germany and Europe, pp. 7–22. Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Kumar, Pratap. 2015. ‘Introduction: Socio-Religious and Cultural World of the Indian Diaspora’, in Pratap Kumar (ed.), Indian diaspora: Socio-cultural and religious worlds, pp. 1–18. Leiden: Brill. Payne, Geoff and Judy Payne. 2004. Key concepts in social research. London: Sage. Pérez, Ines and Christiana Stallaert. 2015. ‘Gendered boundaries among Latin American migrants in Brussels’, ERLACS, 98: 69–86. Singh, A. Didar and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2016. Politics of migration: Indian emigration in a globalised world. Abingdon, Oxon, New York, NY: Routledge. Tatla, Darsham Singh. 1999. The Sikh diaspora: The search for statehood. London: UCL Press. Tejada, Gabriela and Uttam Bhattacharya. 2014. ‘Indian Skilled Migration and Development: An Introduction’, in Gabriela Tejada, Uttam Bhattacharya,

136  Kerstin Schmidt Binod Khadria, and Christiane Kuptsch (eds.), Indian skilled migration and development: To Europe and back, pp. 3–26. New York: Springer. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2015. ‘Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin’, in United Nations Database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015. Varadarajan, Latha. 2010. The domestic abroad: Diasporas in international relations. New York: Oxford University Press. Westerhoff, Horst-Dieter. 2007. ‘Die Greencard. Zur Wirtschaftspolitik der rot-grünen Bundesregierung’, Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universität Duisburg-Essen, Standort Essen, Working Paper No. 161. Wimmer, Andreas. 2008. ‘The making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries: A multilevel process theory’, American Journal of Sociology, 113(4): 970–1022. Wimmer, Andreas and Nina Glick Schiller. 2003. ‘Methodological nationalism, the social sciences, and the study of migration: An essay in historical epistemology’, International Migration Review, 37(3): 576–610. World Bank. 2016. Migration and remittances factbook 2016 (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: World Bank. Yanasmayan, Zeynep. 2016. ‘Does education ‘trump’ nationality? Boundarydrawing practices among highly educated migrants from Turkey’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1–19. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/10.1080/0 1419870.2015.1131315 (accessed 3 March 2017).

8 Skilled Indian migrants and their differential engagement with the Dutch society Ajay Bailey 8.1 Introduction The growth and globalisation in banking, finance and professional services has meant more highly skilled people are mobile (Beaverstock, 2012) and move across countries, some even without changing employers. Hopkins and Levy (2012) observe that the success and growth of the knowledge economy depends on the companies getting the right skills at the right time and at the right price. Years of recession and population decline have meant that if EU countries need to stay globally competitive they need to hire skilled professionals from outside the EU and often from developing countries. The migration of skilled personnel for some developing countries has led to brain drain. A certain percentage of movement of the skilled personnel is needed for the developing countries to enter the global market (Lowell & Findlay, 2001). Optimists about the skilled migration from developing countries propose brain gain or even brain circulation (Harvey, 2008; Saxenian, 2002) as a way to keep the global economic machinery functioning. A good example of brain circulation is the work of Saxenian (2007), who examined how skilled migrants were responsible for technology transfer to their home countries. The value of skilled migrants to the host society has been largely studied from an economic perspective. This value or impact is measured in terms of the improved productivity, higher innovation potential and wider range of skill sets. Recognising this value, many national governments started highly skilled migrant programmes to both attract and retain talent. The pioneer was the United States of America, followed by Canada, Australia, United Kingdom and the Netherlands (Cerna, 2011; Shachar, 2006). The European Union introduced the ‘Blue Card’ to further improve mobility and transferability of skills across its member states. It did not realise that the member countries were also competing for the

138  Ajay Bailey same talent from non-EU countries. Each member country has its own requirements for entry and stay for the skilled migrants and their families. Compared to other immigrant groups, the highly skilled migrants (HSMs) have easier entry both for themselves and their linked movers. The ability of spouses to work, long-term visas, tax reductions and no imposition of integration rules has led to specific corridors for swift mobility of professionals.

8.2 Skilled migrants in the Netherlands In the Netherlands the Kennismigrant visa (highly skilled migrant visa) was introduced at the end of 2004. According to this scheme the Kennismigrant visa can be granted to ‘labour migrants with nationally or internationally scarce expertise; generally highly educated and earning an above average wage; employed in sectors of great economic or social importance’ (ACVZ, 2004). Recent reports show that India, the United States and Japan where the top three countries, with Indians applying for the most visas from 2005 onwards (Bal, 2012). Statistics Netherlands projects that the inflow of labour migrants from Asian countries, and India and China in particular, will continue and increase, as India and China will remain the largest pools of highly skilled migrants in the world (Nicolaas, 2009). In an effort to retain talent the Dutch government allowed recent graduates to spend a year to find jobs by providing a zoekjaar visa. Though the Netherlands does manage to attract and retain talent it still faces large-scale shortages in industries such as IT services. In 2014 there were 34,000 vacancies in the IT sector, but only a few hundred were graduating in the discipline (Dutchnews, 2015). The increasing competition for talent and increasing costs have meant companies are now looking to move their development centres abroad. The recent move of Phillips and Shell to set up global development centres in Bangalore, India, is an indication that in addition to production even R&D is being outsourced (Crabtree, 2013). With a favourable start-up climate the Netherlands still attracts many foreign companies to set up bases in the country. The move of Indian multinational companies to the Netherlands and the takeover of the Dutch companies have meant there is further growth of HSM mobility in terms of intra-company transfers. The ‘Orange Carpet facility’ (BUZA, 2015) and Netherlands Foreign Investment Agencies (NFIA, 2015) are also instruments to attract investments and companies to the Netherlands. The role of HSMs in development has been seen from the perspective of what they give back to their country of origin (Agrawal, Kapur, McHale, & Oettl, 2011; Singh, 2011). There has been considerable

Migrants’ engagement with Dutch society 139 interest in the role of skilled migrants in the political and economic development in country of origin (Kapur, 2004; Khadria, 2014). Siddiqui and Tejada (2014) argue that familiarity with the Indian situation and disadvantaged identities drive skilled migrants to engage with development in their home countries. In this chapter the focus is much more on how the skilled migrants are contributing to the host society in the countries of the global North. The common thread that emerges from the small amount of literature is that skilled migrants are seen as temporary stayers; those living in expat bubbles and transient lives hence are not seen to be an integral part of the host society (Findlay, 1988; Kofman, 2000; Robertson, 2011; Walsh, 2014). Their arrival is sometimes viewed with contempt (Meijering & van Hoven, 2003; Robertson, 2011) as migrants in general are seen to take jobs away from the host population. However, for some jobs the skilled migrants are not perceived to be encroaching the local labour market. Robinson and Carey (2000) note how the presence of the ‘Indian doctor’ is generally accepted by the British people; conversely their German compatriots went on strikes to oppose the arrival of Indian IT professionals. Some studies also question if immigration is the answer to shortages in the labour market and population ageing (Saczuk, 2013). As the HSMs have a skill set that can be easily transferable in the global market, there are possibilities for either onward or return migration (Kõu & Bailey, 2014), with an exception of those who stay for the long term by taking on a new citizenship. Immaterial if the HSM stay for the short-term or the long term they are part of the Dutch society and contribute to the welfare system. The aims of this chapter are therefore to examine how skilled migrants perceive their contribution to the Dutch society and how these reflexive narratives highlight the positioning of the migrant in the host society. 8.2.1 Reflexivity and positionality Reflexivity1 is one of the key strengths of qualitative research. Much of the literature that deals with this concept informs the researcher to be aware of the subjectivity that shapes the research in terms of norms, values and positionalities. Alcoff (1988) acknowledges that people have multiple overlapping identities. Thus, people make meaning from various aspects of their identity such as social class or professional identity. Positionality assumes that power relations can change. Social categories are fluid and dynamic; affected by historical and social changes. Therefore, researchers and scholars within this tradition use the term ‘constructing beliefs’; reality is not fixed but constructed. Positionality as concept has been extensively discussed by

140  Ajay Bailey critical geographers (Hopkins & Noble, 2009; Hopkins, 2007; Rose, 1997; Sheppard, 2002) who emphasise the existence of unequal power relations between the researcher and the researched and being attentive to the manner in which knowledge is produced. Reflexivity need not be the sole responsibility of the researcher or go down the lane of overanalysing and making the research more researcher centric (Gemignani, 2011; Pillow, 2003). This chapter shifts the focus back on the participant and examines how he/she uses this reflexive space to position and evaluate his/her contribution to the Dutch society. Participant reflexivity is the ability of self-reflection and the imagination of the self by the participant in the research process (Pink & Leder Mackley, 2014; Yang, 2015). With migration this adds a new layer to the reflexivity, as the immigrant uses this space to link the self with the host society, and the construction of the self maybe at times in opposition to the host society. Understanding such positionings gives us a deeper view into the migrant-host society relations and the migrant’s societal involvement/participation.

8.3 Data and methods 8.3.1 Participant recruitment Participants in this study were purposively selected to include a broad range of occupations and durations of stay. The two main groups included were migrants from the states of Kerala and Karnataka in India. These groups were chosen because they have many fellow migrants to create regional diasporic organisations. Kerala has a rich history of migration and is one of the front runners in skilled and semi-skilled emigration. Karnataka and specifically Bangalore is the hub for Information Technology, and most migration takes place from this region. The participants were recruited from Groningen, Amsterdam, Amstelveen, Enschede, Eindhoven, The Hague, Rotterdam and Maastricht. Participant recruiting strategies included snowball sampling, advertisements on Facebook sites and through events of the diasporic organisations. Participant recruitment continued up to saturation, and in total thirty interviews were conducted between June and December 2014. 8.3.2 Interviews The interviews were conducted in English, Kannada and Malayalam. The participants from Karnataka started to speak in Kannada and

Migrants’ engagement with Dutch society 141 then when it came to their work switched to English and then when it came to their personal lives they switched back to Kannada. Only one interview was conducted in Malayalam to check if there was any difference in the data gathered when interviews were conducted in English or the native language. The interviews ranged from 40 to 90 minutes. Most interviews were conducted face to face and a few through Skype. The semi-structured interview guide included topics on personal background, family, remittances to India, remittances from India, non-economic remittances in the form of norms, values and practices, and the final part included questions on perceived contribution to the Dutch and Indian society. In this chapter I focus specifically on reflexive narratives on contribution to the Dutch society. 8.3.2 Data analysis All the interviews were transcribed and translated (where required) to English. The interviews were coded using the Atlas-ti software. A narrative coding technique (Saldana, 2009) was applied. Each reflexive narrative was first read for the structure and then for the content. The structure coding included codes on the migrant’s presentation of the self, then the manner in which the self is embedded in the context/ background, then the activities which the migrant considers important to his/her positioning in the host society and then the final summation of the contribution. The structure and the content of these reflexive narratives highlight the processes of sense making for both the researcher and the participant as they co-construct this knowledge. 8.3.4 Ethical clearance The fieldwork was given clearance by the Ethics Review committee for the Faculty of Spatial Sciences. All interviewees gave their consent for the interviews. In the face-to-face interviews a consent form was signed. In the Skype interviews the consent form was read out to the participants. Most identifying information has been removed from the quotes presented in the paper.

8.4 Results The reflexive narratives are grouped under four themes. Each theme is illustrated with a narrative, which will be discussed based on the structure of the self, context, activities and the summarised contribution. Where relevant I also discuss cases which did not fit the pattern.

142  Ajay Bailey 8.4.1 Unique skills and ready-made workers Participants reflected on the unique skills that they bring to their jobs. Many of them have been educated in some of the top institutes in India and abroad. They reflected that they brought not only skills but also experiences that they have gained working in other countries. The following narrative is of Ravi,2 who is from Karnataka and has studied and lived in Germany and Japan before moving to work at one of the top labs in the Netherlands. In his narrative he first presents himself with the marker of ‘unique skills’ and then validates the marker by providing contextual information and how his knowledge is the ‘need’ of the hour, with the intention of linking it to the urgent needs of the society for this knowledge to be developed. Towards the end of this reflexive narrative he shows how his knowledge and research activities would contribute to making lives of people better. The reflexive space is dominated by his skills that he links to real-life issues. I:  Okay,

ya, ya last question as a skilled Indian migrant what do you think is your contribution to the Dutch society? P:  As I previously mentioned, I have this unique skill that I can really combine different disciplines which enormously helps in quickening the experiment or analysis. Previously lot of biology studies have been done to find genes and once I came here, I really could show how all these genes are connected and then influencing particular pathway which clearly showed a target for designing therapeutic interventions against that gene. So it is (this knowledge) not just confined to one country or one population. It’s worldwide and also in Netherlands it’s a problem. Unfortunately the incidence rate is increasing, so I think that these are just specific examples that I am giving. I think this is the research line I am focusing I am sure I will contribute towards making people’s life much healthier. The other narratives on unique skills show how the participants first position themselves as skilled and then situate the context in which their skills are relevant after which the activities they are undertaking to validate the reason they are in the Netherlands, which they then finally link to the societal contribution. In these narratives the linkage they try to make is between skills and society and not to the economy per se, whereas most literature that discusses the impact or value of skilled migration does so in terms of benefit to the economy and the welfare system.

Migrants’ engagement with Dutch society 143 Participants also took a step back to reflect on the cost of their training, which the Dutch government did not pay for. Many of the participants commented that the Dutch government or their employees had not paid for their expensive education but had received the HSMs as ‘ready-made workers’. Kumar, who has studied in the United States and Bangalore, in his reflexive space first positions himself as a readymade worker who is a boon to the Dutch economy, Though he is now supported by a doctoral grant he reasons that the only reason he was selected was because no one was interested to work in his specialised field. He then provides ways by which he contributes to raising the research profile of the country and has further intentions to stay and work. His last sentence on citizenship shows how he evaluates his earned Dutch citizenship. This is one of few reflexive narratives that sees citizenship as an end point in the migrant journey. I: Ya,

one last question. As a skilled Indian migrant, what do you think is your contribution to the Dutch society? P:  Oh, I think that is quite huge, in the sense like I become an immediate tax vending machine as such. They don’t have to spend, they didn’t have to spend on my healthcare, and they didn’t have to spend on my education, basic education at least. Even my Masters, yes they are paying me to do my PhD now. That is because no one wanted in their society to do it, because, the way they hired me. They first have to internally advertise it, they have to then externally advertise it, and when there is no one who wants to do it, only then they are allowed to hire me. So that way my contribution is huge, I am also raising their profile as a research community because, the conferences where I go and submit the papers, present the research is I think it is valuable in raising Dutch research profile as such. And ya, once I am done with my research, I am willing to stay here either at the university or any company who is willing to hire me as such. That way I think it is huge, I think and also if at all I become a Dutch citizen, I have earned it, I haven’t inherited it I think . . . This positioning that the Dutch are not interested in science or technology has come from other narratives as well. Participants also reflected on how their extensive technological education and grounding in mathematics and sciences made them stand apart compared to their Dutch contemporaries. Through these differentiating mechanisms the migrants are trying to ‘place’ themselves in the host society. It was

144  Ajay Bailey not only what they brought to the Netherlands but narratives also focussed on how they have improved their skills on the job. One of the few narratives that deal with growth and competition comes from Gopal. He works for a large Multinational company and manages innovation in the marketing department. Gopal comes from Karnataka and has been educated in one of the top business schools in India. Gopal and his wife, also a skilled migrant, after living apart and having a commuting relationship, decided finally to make Amsterdam their home. In his reflexive space he gives credit to all knowledge workers in contributing to Dutch companies. P:  Skilled

migrant what is my contribution to Dutch society in general [pause] I would say I am not the only one who is doing this. A lot of people who are these knowledge migrants who are coming to the country, by the fact that they are working here; they are either improving the companies that they are working here. So let’s say I mean in that sense if it’s not me its someone else if I would replace individual with knowledge migrant who is coming from some other country who is working here is bringing that element of competitiveness, his knowledge of rest of the world and hence making the company which are based out of Netherlands globally competitive. So I would say if I mean I won’t take names but if some of these Dutch companies let’s say Philips or shell or KLM if they continue to strive or continue to excel globally that’s because of the contribution coming from the global citizens called these knowledge migrants. They bring in their wealth of experience they do their part. Of course there are other opportunities where you can engage with someone of the NGO activities teaching someone something. Or even participating in let’s say research opportunities like this I don’t mean just this one, if university is researching on marketing or consumer behaviour or psychology of consumer in that sense I would love to be part of them contribute.

In contrast to other narratives on unique skills he does not single himself out but takes a collective approach where he positions himself as part of the group of ‘global citizens’ who aid in the growth of the Dutch industry. He then makes the link to societal contribution by participating in NGO activities as a way to give back to the society. Interestingly Gopal used the fact that he was participating in the interview as a way to give back to the society. Similar to the narrative of Ravi, Gopal also sees teaching as a contribution to the society.

Migrants’ engagement with Dutch society 145 8.4.2 Diversity and image of India I present here a case study of Sheena and her multiple positioning of the self in her narratives. Sheena is from Kerala and works as a manager at a large financial company in the Netherlands. She lives with her husband and children. Her reflexive space is dominated by the discussion on ‘how it was before’ and ‘how it is now for Indians’. Her positioning between a manager, a skilled migrant, woman in a men’s world and a Keralite give different dimensions to understanding her contribution to the Dutch society. In her narrative she first positions herself as one of the few female managers in her organisation, which she terms a contribution to diversity at her workplace. Diversity I would say. Diversity in the office and also being a woman also diversity with the male, female population I would say because especially not many women are in the managerial (position), which is changing at least. Not necessarily me being a Indian but it’s a kind of recognition also to be you know from India, to be in that role also. In the quote her use of the term ‘not necessarily’ shows the first contribution to be that of bringing about gender diversity and then her ethnicity. In her interview she further explains how she coaches other Indian women professionals to be more vocal and take credit for their work But within my team especially for the Indians usually my advice is always be visible, be communicative enough which often can undermine their capabilities. So That’s the thing, I try to give . . . Visible in the sense ya being social and speaking out rather than their own team like for example I have an Indian lady in my team she, I used to be her team leader the test leader. Everybody within the project, within the team had high opinion about her. She was doing things so quickly and asking and for more and more work . . . but nobody outside knows her. The only reason why she is appreciated is mainly because everybody wants her in their team because of her knowledge and skills . . . not many people know her. People who are directly associated with her know her for her capabilities but because she is not outspoken person it’s not visible. So as a manger if I have to defend her so . . . Here in this country if you want to get recognition and stuff you need to brand yourself or sell yourself not bluffing, but you need to brand yourself.

146  Ajay Bailey Her multiple positioning and her activities to enable other women to be visible are her manner of bringing about diversity at workplace in the Dutch society. A related dimension of bringing about diversity or experiences of diversity was seen in the narratives where participants spoke about changing the image of India. The common grievance across all interviews was that the Dutch saw India only as a land of poverty and filth. Developments in India in the last two years on gender abuse and violence also figured in the reflexive accounts. Jose, a migrant from Kerala, works as a financial consultant at a multinational company and has been living in the Netherlands for a long period of time. His positioning of the self is on the role of information sharing as a mechanism of connecting with the Dutch population. The examples he uses of child marriage and child labour are issues the Dutch neighbours brought to him. Without being defensive of his culture he discusses that things have changed. His contribution is presented as better informing the people about his country. Towards the end he brings in the topic of paying taxes as a way to contribute to the welfare system. Having lived in the Netherlands for many years and having learnt the language and customs of the host society, in the interview Jose prefers to identify with him being an Indian and more specifically a Keralite. Organising church services in Malayalam and connecting with other Syrian Orthodox Christian groups is another way of contributing to the society. P:  Ya

there are both ways actually. You see, my contribution to Dutch society I can say that they have, at that time they didn’t have much people from abroad they used to ask me lot of questions about India and Kerala, where it is in India, the child marriage is there, child labour is there. then those kinds of things I used to explain to them saying that okay there are issues, things have improved. so, people around me I could say they had a better information about India at that time since I came. For the social and economic side I don’t know may be the tax which I am paying government is using that, not much.

Other narratives on linkages with the Dutch colleagues and neighbours included celebrating common festivals together, inviting them for Indian events or speaking at schools about the diversity of India. Thus, bringing about diversity ranged from the workplace to the neighbourhood with gender, religion and power as cross-cutting themes in these cross-cultural narratives.

Migrants’ engagement with Dutch society 147 8.4.3 Paying tax and helping people? Some of the participants’ first reaction when asked about the contribution to Dutch society was to mention the payment of higher taxes compared to India. The payment of taxes came up as a prominent issue in the reflection. What was interesting in these cases was that the primary reaction on the tax was followed by a reflective account on how their jobs or work contributed to the society. Rajendara also brings up payment of taxes and other linked issues. He is from Karnataka and has worked extensively in the banking sector and has lived in many European countries before moving to Amsterdam with his wife. His positioning starts with work and the services he has offered his clients in the past years. He then doubts his societal contribution before reflecting further that he has been a good citizen by paying taxes. His comment about ‘cried and moaned about it’ shows the reluctance to believe in the welfare system. Later he reassures that the government would be using this money to aid the less privileged. The latter highlight his class position and meanings he brings to the concept of aid. P:  I would

be lying if I say anything otherwise. I have done a lot to myself, as a skilled migrant. I have done my best and offered my best services to my client and the company. Society probably I have done nothing. I have been a Good citizen of the country I have paid taxes even though I have cried about it, moaned about it   [Laughter]   I pay my taxes, and if that kind of helps the society in some way, okay. After my 30% ruling went off, I have out paid 52% so probably the taxes helped the society in some way. The more the less privileged people probably government uses the taxes to do something. So If you have more people, but you have a 30% ruling so I don’t know what percent actually, actually goes to the government and how they help the local people with that, but once you completely now ingrained completely into the society, I think ya, we try to be one among them of course. Other than that, although I would, really wouldn’t know. It would sound too clichéd if I give out miss world version ahhh of course [Laughter].

In addition to paying taxes consumption and paying of high rents came up as issues in the narratives. Participants who had bought homes and had made substantial investments saw these as their contributions to

148  Ajay Bailey the Dutch society. Some participants argued that as there are fewer people in the Netherlands, their consumption patterns helped keep the economy alive. These issues they contrasted by saying that they do not send more money home but use it for consumption and investments in the Netherlands. 8.4.4 Nothing special . . . just a number A few of the participants did not see themselves as contributing to the Dutch society. They thought their work was not special and could be done by anyone with the right skills. They thought that if it wasn’t them, there would be someone else from India in their place. The first narrative is of Savitha, who works for an IT company and has lived in The Netherlands for almost a decade. She comes from Karnataka and lives here with her husband and son. The company she works for and the city she lives in have many Indians. She starts her positioning by evaluating herself as not being ‘extraordinary’, and this she extends to other Indian HSMs. Her reasoning is that other Indian IT engineers can easily replace the skill set. As the narrative progresses she starts to position herself as different from her colleagues who work in India. The context she provides where she brings her contribution to the fore is highlighting the problems in communication between her Dutch colleagues and her colleagues in India. Though compared to other reflexive narratives presented in this paper she does not position herself as unique or that she values her technical contribution to be important, she however finds the role of interpreter between two work cultures to be one of her main strengths. Earlier in her interview she explained how she had to inform and convince people on both sides to keep the team together. The example she gave was that of educating her Indian team to say ‘no’ when things were not possible and on the other hand informing the Dutch counterparts that ‘Yes’ could have potential delays. To negotiate and interpret between two work and national cultures is her contribution. This can also be seen as adding another dimension to bringing diversity to the workplace. P: I don’t

see as, I am not extraordinary or those who are Indians those who are coming, we are coming here are extraordinary. We are just a number. but I think we are I am quite sure what I am telling now, they have seen the difference compared to they can see two varieties of India. The people those who are living here, people they are working away from here that that is Bangalore. they can two version of Indians.

Migrants’ engagement with Dutch society 149 I: Okay P:  And because of us they try to understand Indians those who are work-

ing from Bangalore or something like that. May be its IT company version I don’t know. but many times in Meetings or something like that when we have a call like, they are trying to struggle out what trying to understand the other party is saying from Bangalore. for me it is very easy to pick up what they are saying and all. So I used to translate them Even though English to English.   Laughter P:  For me this is very easy to translate and I can understand what they trying to tell. So in that way I can contribute being a Indian. So they can see me as an interpreter or key contact person like that. So in that way most of the years I worked as a key contact person back to Bangalore actually. They see that is more advantageous because the communication lines are quicker. In stark contrast to all narratives Aarvan, from Kerala, does not feel the need to contribute to the Dutch society. Aarvan has had a difficult reception and stay in the Netherlands. First he was employed by a Dutch company and then asked to leave his position within a few months. He then came to the Netherlands as a linked mover, as his wife had found employment. His difficult experience with the former Dutch colleagues and the whole of experience of being fired has left him questioning his role in the society. P:  So

I don’t want to serve the people. I just want to earn from the people. Of course it’s my bread; I never changed my bread. At least for saying itself I just want to say my things. I never going to do that but I just want to say that. Now it’s completely business. No, there is no humanity or anything its purely business. If you give money I will give service that’s it. I am not the person to promote the Dutch community. I am not Martin Luther king or Nelson Mandela. I don’t want to be that. I do not want to be shot by some bloody idiot. I want to be with my family and friend circle.

He does not see his role to be that of a person to promote or work towards societal contribution but rather he sees it as a transaction. He then draws boundaries on how far he is going to go and whose wellbeing is of prime importance for him. The negative experience makes him withdraw from participating in the society, but his entrepreneurial attitude brings him back in contact with the Dutch society but then on his own terms.

150  Ajay Bailey

8.5 Conclusion The reflexive narratives of skilled Indian migrants presented in this chapter give us deeper insights on how they perceive their role in the Dutch society and what they recognise to be their contribution. This contribution is mediated through a range of intersectional identities and positionalities. The multiple positionalities of gender, skills, religion, caste and class highlight the need to understand the diversity of experiences of skilled migrants in the Netherlands. The reflexive space in all these narratives is largely dominated by skills and work-related contributions. When we examine a deeper layer to these narratives we see a lack of linkage to the civil society. This lack of bond to the society and participation in various civic initiatives highlights the limited agency of skilled Indian migrants in the host society. The existence of the expat bubble and closer affinity towards co-ethnics leads to less meaningful contact with the host population. The closer affinity to co-ethnics among both Karnataka and Kerala migrant groups creates smaller networks. If the Dutch government wants to have a more meaningful relations with the skilled Indian migrants, then it should encourage them to participate in civic initiatives where they can bring their skills and link better to the society. This linking will further embed them in the society and reduce return migration. Integration programmes are designed to see how immigrants can become active members of the society. However, they are not always successful, as they require the immigrant to adhere to the host society’s idea of integration. Using an immigrant reflexivity approach, we can try to see the diverse ways by which skilled migrants currently do contribute and can be activated to further contribute to a multicultural society in the Netherlands.

Acknowledgements This work is part of the research project ‘The Migrant Suitcase: examining the flow of norms, practices, identities and social capital between India and The Netherlands (W 07.04.103)’ funded as part of the research programme Migration, Development and Conflict, which is financed by the WOTRO Science for Global DevelopmentNetherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). I would like to thank all participants for sharing their experiences and life stories with me. My gratitude also to P.N.N. Nikhil and Dr. Ambuja Kowlgi for the research support. This work was carried out during my

Migrants’ engagement with Dutch society 151 tenure at the Population Research Centre, University of Groningen, the Netherlands.

Notes 1 Different disciplines use other terms such as ‘intersectionality’, ‘multiple subjectivities’ and ‘relational reflexivity’. In this chapter I use ‘reflexivity’ to understand participants’ self-reflection and positionality/positioning as way to documents the manner in which migrants related themselves to the host society. 2 All names used in the article are pseudonyms.

References Agrawal, A., Kapur, D., McHale, J., & Oettl, A. (2011). Brain drain or brain bank? The impact of skilled emigration on poor-country innovation. Journal of Urban Economics, 69(1). doi:10.1016/j.jue.2010.06.003. ACVZ (2004). Werkprogramma 2004. The Hague, Netherlands: Advisory committee for Immigration. Retrieved from https://acvz.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/07/WP_2004_NL.pdf. Accessed on 3 March 2017. Alcoff, L. (1988). Cultural feminism versus post-structuralism: The identity crisis in feminist theory. Signs, 405–436. Beaverstock, J. (2012). Highly Skilled International Labour Migration and World Cities: Expatriates, Executives and Entrepreneurs. In International Handbook of Globalization and World Cities (p. 584). United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing. BUZA, M. van B. Z. (2015). Orange Carpet Visa Facilitation | Embassy, ConsulateGeneral, Consulates and NBSO’s, India. Retrieved March 19, 2015, from http://india.nlembassy.org/services/visa/orange-carpet-visa-facilitation.html. Cerna, L. (2011). Selecting-Best-and-Brightest, Policy Primer. Retrieved March 15, 2015, from www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/policy-primers/ selecting-best-and-brightest. Crabtree, J. (2013). Companies turn to India to boost their business – FT.com. Financial Times. Retrieved from www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ca58b216-bcaa-11e29519-00144feab7de.html#axzz3UoWCTKr4. Accessed on 3 March 2016. Dutchnews. (2015). The Netherlands has a shortage of IT workers. Dutchnews.nl. Retrieved from www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2012/09/it_ sector_hit_by_job_losses_an/. Accessed on 3 March 2016. Ellen, B. (2012). ‘Indian Migration to the Netherlands’. CARIM-India Research Report 2012/07. The Netherlands: European University Institute. Findlay, A. M. (1988). From settlers to skilled transients: The changing structure of British international migration. Geoforum; Journal of Physical, Human, and Regional Geosciences, 19, 401–410. doi:10.1016/S0016– 7185(88)80012–5.

152  Ajay Bailey Gemignani, M. (2011). Between researcher and researched: An introduction to countertransference in qualitative inquiry. Qualitative Inquiry, 17(8), 701–708. doi:10.1177/1077800411415501. George, A., Lalani, M., Mason, G., Rolfe, H., & RosazzaBondibene, C. (2012). ‘Skilled immigration and strategically important skills in the UK economy’, Final Report to the Migration Advisory Committee. www.niesr. ac.uk/pdf/290212_151752.pdf. Accessed on 31 March 2016. Harvey, W. S. (2008). Brain circulation? Asian Population Studies, 4(3), 293– 309. doi:10.1080/17441730802496516. Hopkins, P. (2007). Positionalities and knowledge: Negotiating ethics in practice. ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 6(3), 386–394. Hopkins, L., & Levy, C. (2012) Simply the Best? Highly-Skilled Migrants and the UK’s Knowledge Economy. The Work Foundation. Retrieved from www.workfoundation.com/DownloadPublication/Report/315_Simply%20 the%20Best%20TWF%20format.pdf. Hopkins, P., & Noble, G. (2009). Masculinities in place: Situated identities, relations and intersectionality. Social & Cultural Geography, 10(8), 811–819. Retrieved from www.informaworld.com/10.1080/14649360903305817. Accessed on 8 September 2017. Kapur, D. (2004). Ideas and economic reforms in India: The role of international migration and the Indian diaspora. India Review, 3(4), 364–384. doi:10.1080/14736480490895723. Khadria, B. (2014). The Dichotomy of the Skilled and Unskilled Among Nonresident Indians and Persons of Indian Origin: Bane or Boon for Development in India? In G. Tejada, U. Bhattacharya, B. Khadria, & C. Kuptsch (Eds.), Indian Skilled Migration and Development Dynamics of Asian Development. New Delhi, India: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-81-322-1810-4. Kofman, E. (2000). The invisibility of skilled female migrants and gender relations in studies of skilled migration in Europe. International Journal of Population Geography, 6, 45–59. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-1220 (200001/02)6:13.0.CO;2-B. Kõu, A., & Bailey, A. (2014). “Movement is a constant feature in my life”: Contextualising migration processes of highly skilled Indians. Geoforum, 52, 113–122. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.01.002. Lowell, B. L., & Findlay, A. (2001). Migration of highly skilled persons from developing countries: Impact and policy responses. International Migration Papers, 44. Meijering, L., & van Hoven, B. (2003). Imagining difference: The experiences of “transnational” Indian IT professionals in Germany. Area, 35(2), 174–182. NFIA. (2015). Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency. Retrieved March 19, 2015, from www.nfia-india.com. Nicolaas, H. (2009). Bevolkingsprognose 2008–2050: Veronderstellingen over immigratie. Bevolkingstrends, 57(1), 23–33.

Migrants’ engagement with Dutch society 153 Pillow, W. (2003). Confession, catharsis, or cure? Rethinking the uses of reflexivity as methodological power in qualitative research. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 16(2), 175–196. doi:10.1080/ 0951839032000060635. Pink, S., & Leder Mackley, K. (2014). Re-enactment methodologies for everyday life research: Art therapy insights for video ethnography. Visual Studies, 29(2), 146–154. doi:10.1080/1472586X.2014.887266. Robertson, S. (2011). Cash cows, backdoor migrants, or activist citizens? International students, citizenship, and rights in Australia. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34, 2192–2211. doi:10.1080/01419870.2011.558590. Robinson, V., & Carey, M. (2000). Peopling skilled international migration: Indian doctors in the UK. International Migration, 38, 89–108. doi:10.1111/1468–2435.00100. Rose, G. (1997). Situating knowledges: Positionality, reflexivities and other tactics. Progress in Human Geography, 3, 305–320. doi:10.1191/030913 297673302122. Saczuk, K. (2013). Development and Critique of the Concept of Replacement Migration. In M. Kupiszewski (Ed.), International Migration and the Future of Populations and Labour in Europe. Springer. Saldana, J. (2009). The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (p. 223). New Delhi: Sage Publications. doi:10.1109/TEST.2002.1041893. Saxenian, A. (2002). Brian circulation. The Brookings Review, 20. Saxenian, A. (2007). The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Shachar, A. (2006). The race for talent: Highly skilled migrants and competitive immigration regimes. New York University Law Review, 81, 148–206. Retrieved from ://000237068200007. Sheppard, E. (2002). The spaces and times of globalization: Place, scale, networks, and positionality. Economic Geography, 78, 307–330. doi:10.2307/4140812. Siddiqui, Z., & Tejada, G. (2014). Development and highly skilled migrants: Perspectives from the Indian diaspora and returnees. Revue Internationale de Politique de Développement, 5(2). doi:10.4000/poldev.1720. Singh, N. (2011). Diaspora, development, and democracy: The domestic impact of international migration from India. Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4). Walsh, K. (2014). Placing transnational migrants through comparative research: British migrant belonging in five GCC cities. Population, Space and Place, 20(1), 1–17. doi:10.1002/psp.1798. Yang, K.-H. (2015). Participant reflexivity in community-based participatory research: Insights from reflexive interview, dialogical narrative analysis, and video ethnography. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 5, 447–458. doi:10.1002/casp.2227.

9 Transnational emotion work The Punjabi diaspora in Europe Steve Taylor 9.1 Introduction This chapter examines ‘emotion work’ within an Indian Punjabi transnational community and, in doing so, is informed by ten years of original, ethnographic, transnational research within Europe and India. Our particular focus is upon the small, predominantly rural and Sikhmajority north-west Indian state of East Punjab. East Punjab (hereafter Punjab/Punjabi) is widely recognised as a major outsource of South Asian migration to Europe over the past century. In fact, there is a long and continuing history, and deeply embedded cultural tradition, of significant overseas Punjabi emigration and inter-diasporic migration. In a study of Sikhs in Britain, Singh and Tatla (2006: 41–42) argue that Punjabi Sikhs ‘are, in many ways, the premier migrants of South Asia’ and that the culture of migration is becoming Punjabis’ ‘only culture’ (original emphasis). It is a cliché, but also factual, to assert that Punjabis can now be found all over Europe. Indian Punjabis, originating particularly from the predominantly rural Doaba region of Punjab, some of whom migrated to Europe via East Africa due to British colonialism there as well as in India and others who arrived in Europe through a multitude of circuitous international migration routes as well as through direct migration, now constitute a significant proportion of the substantial South Asian population of Europe and a particularly economically successful part of that population. The economic and occupational success, within the metropolitan centres of Europe, of a group of people who were often originally small-scale peasant farmers has been remarkable. From the second half of the twentieth century onwards, we have also witnessed the birth of second-, third- and fourth-generation European-born Punjabis. Nevertheless, all existing studies of the global Indian Punjabi village diaspora emphasise the strength of continuing links between

Transnational emotion work 155 this group, including those born and raised away from India, and the people and places of Punjab, particularly through kinship ties. The Punjabi European diaspora can be seen as part of a wider ‘transnational community’. the territory and people of contemporary Punjab are embedded within multiple transnational relations. This chapter argues that emotion work has been and is central to both the foundation and continued reproduction of Punjabi transnationalism and the associated caste and identity relations therein. I cannot hope to provide a comprehensive account and analysis of all aspects of transnational Punjabi emotion work within the space available here, so, drawing upon our empirical data, I provide two illustrations of this phenomenon – transnational emotion work for the avoidance of shame and the assertion of high (caste) status and identity and transnational emotion work through publicly observable consumer display – in order to highlight its significance for analyses of the Punjabi transnational community. This chapter contributes to a vastly growing literature on transnational emotion work but is unique within the existing body of work on South Asian transnational emotion work, given the specific focus upon Punjab and its analysis of the relationship between emotion work, caste relations and identity within an Indian transnational community.

9.2 Transnational emotion work and identity Hochschild (1979, 1983) originally conceived of and distinguished between ‘emotion work’ and ‘emotional labour’ within social life whilst also arguing that these phenomena have significance for selfidentity within contemporary society. Both refer to ‘the management of feeling in order to create a publicly observable . . . display . . . Emotional labour is sold for a wage and therefore has exchange-value . . . emotion work . . . refer(s) to these same acts done in a private context where they have use-value’ (Hochschild 1983: 7, emphasis in original). Hochschild’s work has inspired a voluminous body of research and literature on emotion work both inside and outside of employment organisations and employment relations. While recognising some of the now widely noted flaws within aspects of Hochschild’s overall thesis, not least her suggestion that emotion work is fundamentally guided by individual and cultural autonomy as opposed to the forces of commercialisation and gendered power which are seen as propelling emotional labour, this chapter retains Hochschild’s (1983: 7) pioneering concept of emotion work, as feeling management with the aim of sustaining ‘an outward countenance that produces the proper state

156  Steve Taylor of mind in others’ and which is part of a search for identity, in order to inform our analysis of contemporary European Punjabi transnationalism and identity.

9.3 Punjabi caste, izzat and identity Central to any examination of emotion work and identity within the Punjabi transnational community are the connected issues of Punjabi caste and izzat (honour/prestige). As a social system of differentiation and inequality, caste within India and Punjab has been and still is related to the most extreme forms of human exploitation, humiliation and poverty. Within rural Doaba, Sikhs constitute between 70 and 90 percent of the population (Ram 2012). Despite a clear opposition to caste differentiation within the scriptures and spiritual teaching of Sikhism, it has been widely established that caste-based hierarchies and social exclusion on the basis of caste are significant aspects of cultural practice and lived experience within contemporary, Sikh-majority Punjab (Judge and Bal 2009; Jodhka 2014; Bahadur 2015; Ram 2016). There is a strong correlation between caste and class within Punjabi Jat. Sikhs, estimated at 60 percent of the Punjabi Sikh population (Ram 2012), are the ‘dominant caste’ (Jodhka 2014; Ram 2016) of Punjab (numerically, economically, politically and socially), but the state also has a large proportion of Scheduled Castes (SCs) or Dalits (the lowest social castes), spread across different religions. At over 30 percent of the Punjabi population, Dalits are greater in number, but their share of land ownership (three percent) is lower than in any other Indian state. Jats and Dalits ‘live in extreme contrast of affluence and deprivation’ (Ram 2007: 4068). Whilst Punjab as a whole is being urbanised, the SC population is growing in rural areas, and Dalits are particularly concentrated within the Doaba region, with their population constituting 50 percent or more of some Doaba villages and with Chamars and Ad Dharmis Ravidassi Sikhs (titles which are often used interchangeably to refer to the same people), as well as Chuhras, Valmikis, Mazabi Sikhs (labels which are also interchangeable) being the most numerous amongst them. Despite the overall maintenance of relative economic inequalities between Jats and Dalits in Punjab (Judge and Bal 2009; Jodhka 2014; Ram 2016), some Punjabi SCs (especially Chamars and Ravidassi Sikhs) have experienced rising economic prosperity in absolute terms during the post-Green Revolution era of the past forty years, particularly enabled by occupational diversification and access to reservations, educational opportunities and the very overseas migration that is discussed in this chapter.

Transnational emotion work 157 Existing studies (Ballard 2003; Singh and Tatla 2006; Taylor 2014a) demonstrate that it is Doaban Jat Sikhs who have dominated transnational Punjab-UK (and European) migration and that this dominance has been enabled primarily by superior access to material resources, transnational intra-caste migration networks and intra-caste endogamy. However, it is also estimated that a significant number of UK Punjabis, as many as 10 percent, belonged originally to Scheduled Castes, with a large proportion of these from the Chamar and Ravidassi communities of Doaba (Singh and Tatla 2006; Hardtmann 2009; Ghuman 2011; Taylor 2014b). The long tradition of international emigration from Doaba has, to some extent, spread throughout the caste structure – enabled partly by the material and educational advancement of particular caste groups (Chamars/Ravidassis/Ad Dharmis) within the Punjabi SC category. Our empirical research on transnational emotion work within the Punjabi UK Dalit, as well as Jat Sikh, diaspora contributes to a body of research which has only just very recently (Dhanda 2009; Lum 2010, 2016; Ghuman 2011; Singh 2012, 2013) got beyond considering Jat Sikhs alone as entirely representative of the European Punjabi diaspora. The concept and cultural practice of izzat lies at the core of caste relations and the pursuit of identity within Punjabi culture and society. High izzat is accorded to particular individuals, kinship groups and castes, and their occupations and cultural practices, at particular points in time. Thus, Jat Sikhs have an historical reputation and identity as expert farmers and indomitable peasant proprietors, with their ownership and cultivation of agricultural land and produce through ‘hard’ manual labour being markers of high izzat, attracting high economic returns and ensuring their caste dominance, the latter also being consolidated by the (still continuing) Punjabi cultural practice of intracaste endogamy, for much of the twentieth century. However, it is also important to note that despite overall stability in the reproduction of Punjabi caste inequities and izzat differentiation over time, the Punjabi caste order is relatively fluid when compared to other Indian regions. High izzat and caste dominance has to be maintained and can be lost (‘de-izzat’) through the work, labour, behaviour and cultural practice of individuals, kinship groups and castes (Helweg 1979). Thus, some Punjabi caste groups, for example Ramgarhia Sikhs (Bhachu 1985) and Mahtons (Verma 2002), have increased their izzat and caste position through overseas migration. It has been previously argued (Singh and Tatla 2006; Taylor 2014a) that overseas migration, which as we have seen has been dominated by Doaban Jat Sikhs, has more recently grown in importance, displacing agricultural prowess, as the indicator

158  Steve Taylor of high izzat and caste dominance within Punjabi culture and society. Here, I will be arguing that transnational emotion work is central to the maintenance of Punjabi high izzat and caste superiority. In doing so, it is insufficient to draw upon empirical data from the UK Punjabi diaspora, both Jat Sikh and (largely Chamar/Ravidassi) Dalit, alone. Izzat, identity and caste dominance are asserted by these groups within the Punjabi transnational community and via emotion work but we must also consider the reception and success of such attempts in order to fully understand the nature of contemporary, transnational, European Punjabi caste, identity and izzat relations, hence our ethnographic research with a sample of respondents representing all castes and nonmigrant as well as migrant families within rural Doaba in addition to the work with the cross-caste UK diaspora. This chapter draws upon over ten years of ethnographic research, primarily semi-structured interviewing and non-participant observation. Over 150 interviews were conducted within the Jat Sikh and Punjabi Dalit (largely Chamar/ Ravidassi, reflecting the constitution of this UK group) communities of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, Wolverhampton and Southall, UK, and over 150 interviews were undertaken within rural villages of the Doaba region of Punjab, India, between 2002 and 2015.

9.4 Transnational emotion work: avoiding shame and pursuing izzat and identity It has been established elsewhere (Ballard 2003; Singh and Tatla 2006; Taylor 2014a) that the overseas Punjabi migration process and the behaviour of the Punjabi diaspora both within Europe and India are most often motivated by the cultural desire to secure high izzat for the individual migrant and the kinship and caste group to which they belong, which, as we have seen, is in turn connected to the pursuit of identity and caste dominance within the Punjabi transnational community. However, the emotional dynamics and consequences, and for our purposes specifically the emotion work, involved in these processes have yet to be articulated. One way in which Punjabi transnational emotion work, in the pursuit of izzat and identity, can be illustrated is through feeling management to avoid shame (de-izzat). Thus, the majority of first-generation UK Jat Sikh migrants in our study arrived in the UK during the 1950s and 1960s, with a perception that their migration would maintain or increase the izzat of the immediate family and simultaneously the izzat of the wider kinship and Jat Sikh caste group. Initially, the aim was to utilise money earned in the UK to buy land and increase family

Transnational emotion work 159 holdings in Punjab. For example, many respondents recounted how partition meant giving up the ownership of land in West Punjab to move to the East and work as a farmer on someone else’s land, something which was viewed as of low status in Punjab, resulting in deizzat. ‘It was a shame on me and for my family that I was forced to work on someone else’s land . . . but we didn’t have any land or any money . . . we came here (UK) to improve our prospects and to avoid the shame of poverty in India, it wouldn’t have been good for our family or our community . . . it has worked’ (UK Jat Sikh, male, 71). Reflecting a common story across our UK first-generation migrants, there were families within this man’s kinship group where males had moved to the UK and told of the opportunities of very high and stable earnings. He decided that migration to the UK (in 1956) ‘would be a better way to find security and stability for my family’. In using the initial proceeds of their UK migration for investment in agricultural land and produce within Punjab (which attracted high izzat), these pioneering Punjabi migrants were managing feeling of themselves and their families by inducing feelings of high status and izzat while also producing an outward countenance in order to produce the appropriate state of mind in others, the local Punjabi population who continued to regard Jat Sikhs as indomitable peasant proprietors and of high izzat. Our research conducted in UK during October–December 2015 revealed that this transnational European Jat Sikh emotion work also frequently involved what Hochschild (1983: 33) referred to as ‘surface acting’, a particular form of emotion work wherein ‘we deceive others about what we really feel, but we do not deceive ourselves’. All of our first-generation UK migrant respondents reported the deep emotional difficulties associated with leaving family (and in many cases originally immediate family, wives, husbands and children) in Punjab when first migrating to the UK. Huge difficulties in the Punjabi migrant experiences of working, educational, family and cultural life in the UK were also widely reported across our research samples. However, the presentation of success and contentment via overseas migration, and the concealment of difficulties and contradictions, was universal across our Punjabi migrant respondents, regardless of age, caste or gender. Such surface acting, facilitated by the connections between overseas migration, high izzat and caste dominance and identity, continues across the contemporary Punjabi diaspora: I still miss India, even now when I left thirty years ago . . . that warmth of family and community, we don’t really have it in the UK . . . life here (in the UK) is hard . . . it’s all work, all time

160  Steve Taylor is spent working, not around family, the weather makes it hard also . . . but we can’t tell our family there, they think things are paved with gold here and they all want to come . . . we can’t tell them what it is all like . . . they depend on us for support and help. (UK Jat Sikh, female, 55) I was born here (UK) but I have visited Punjab many times . . . we get great respect there . . . our families when we visit, they can’t do enough for us . . . I think they think we live like Kings in UK . . . we do ok here (UK) but they don’t know how tough it is, how hard it has been for my parents and grandparents to build all of this up . . . years of struggle and racism and all that . . . I guess it suits us not to tell the whole story to people in India . . . they kind of respect us because they think we have done it because of who we are, we are enterprising, hard workers and will succeed anywhere. (UK Jat Sikh, male, 24) Such surface acting and emotional management, driven by the intense pressure to attain and/or maintain high izzat via the particularly Punjabi marker of overseas migration, has also been noted by other scholars (e.g. Varghese and Rajan 2015), who describe the phenomenon of attempting to conceal and impression manage any ‘failed’ migration attempts, often a consequence of illegal Punjabi migration strategies and routes which are reported to be rapidly increasing. Permanent return migration to Punjab without symbols of success to display (see below) can result in shame, de-izzat for the family, kinship and caste group. Some groups within our UK Punjabi Dalit samples have religiously converted away from Sikhism or Hinduism to Buddhism or Christianity, most often post-migration to the UK, an act which is articulated as an attempt to escape caste discrimination and caste-based social exclusion. Many of these religiously converted Punjabi Dalits are following the ideas and arguments of B.R. Ambedkar, a leader of the oppressed in India, opponent of Gandhi and author of the Constitution of independent India, who advocated Dalit religious conversion away from Hinduism and Sikhism to Buddhism, on the basis that the latter does not recognise caste distinctions and following Ambedkar’s belief that his neo-Buddhism would enable the development of an egalitarian social order in India devoid of caste hierarchies and the evil of untouchability. Thus, for Ambedkar, religious conversion to neo-Buddhism (in his case from Hinduism) was a clear expression of resistance to caste differentiation, caste oppression and untouchability. Similarly, the religiously converted Punjabi Dalits in our sample

Transnational emotion work 161 frequently spoke of escaping (managing) feelings of caste-based humiliation and shame (emotion work) through conversion, and the feelings of greater ‘strength’ and ‘respect’, alongside a transformed identity, which their new religion gave them. For example: It was at school when I first became aware. I was about 11 years old. I will always remember it. There were a lot of Jat Sikh boys and girls. I knew I was low caste to them but I didn’t really know about caste or Ambedkar. We were playing and one of them called me by my caste name and I didn’t know how he knew . . . after that a group of lads used to taunt me about it for years . . . it made me miserable but I couldn’t really talk to anyone at home about it . . . my new religion though gives me something to be proud of, people in India and here really respect the Buddhist religion . . . we are probably more respected than Jat Sikhs in many ways . . . Buddhists are seen as more educated. (UK Punjabi Dalit Buddhist, female, 47) One of the major ways in which the search for identity, respect and status manifests itself amongst our UK Punjabi religiously converted respondents is through the denial of rituals associated with their former Sikh religion. This was unanimously seen as the crucial expression of religious conversion and something that had to be complete but that also involved significant emotion work and management. ‘One thing we have to do is completely reject our former religion . . . all of the rituals . . . it can be really difficult, so easy to lapse back when your family are asking, pleading . . . we feel we want to because of our family ties but we can’t because we have taken this commitment to our new religion’ (UK Punjabi Dalit Buddhist, male, 56). The religiously converted UK Punjabi Dalits participants within our research project and their Indian kin who, for the most part, had not converted frequently described the emotional distress and divisions which conversion and resistance to former Sikh religious rituals has facilitated. An example of this was narrated by a UK Punjabi Christian convert (42, male) who described (while in tears) the reaction of his sister to his refusal to partake in the Indian Hindu and Sikh ceremony of Rakhi, where siblings express their love for each other on a particular day of the year, and his resulting emotion work and feeling management: She is shattered . . . cos we give up all our rituals and that and traditions. One of the traditions is the brother and sister act, we go and tie the Rakhi (band) on the wrist of our sisters and every

162  Steve Taylor Rakhi day I would go and take a present to my sister . . . it’s like a festival and she would tie the one for me, for brotherly love, and since I’ve become Christian all these traditions have to go . . . it’s a bold decision but you have to be, and she was crying. She was pleading with me and crying to others. But I always have that special day in my heart but not in presents, presents in other ways but not in Indian traditions. Such examples clearly demonstrate the intense pressures within the Punjabi transnational community to engage in emotion work for the production and maintenance of identity and izzat.

9.5 Consumer displays and emotion work within Punjab There is still a strong commitment to owning land in Punjab amongst the UK Jat Sikhs studied, with the vast majority of our research participants maintaining/purchasing further holdings since the migration of themselves or previous generations, thus illustrating the enduring social, symbolic and emotional importance of Punjabi land ownership for the pursuit of izzat, identity and the maintenance of caste dominance. However, the diaspora-owned land is no longer primarily used for traditional Jat agriculture but most often to build very large, palatial Indian family homes, a phenomenon which Erdal (2012) demonstrates is also present within West (Pakistani) Punjab. The landscape of rural Punjab is now punctuated, and in some areas of Doaba dominated, by huge brick- and often marble-built NRI (nonresident Indian) houses. Many of the NRI houses within rural Doaba are built on the site of an original or existing family farm, others on newly purchased land. However, the ownership and control of agricultural production and the presentation of agricultural prowess is no longer the priority for Jat Sikhs in terms of asserting identity, izzat and their dominant caste position, particularly as the material value of Punjabi agricultural produce has markedly declined in recent years. Consumer display within Punjab, which inherently and simultaneously involves emotion work as these are publicly observable displays, outward countenances aiming to produce particular states of mind in others, is now the primary means through which Jat Sikh diasporic identity, high izzat and caste dominance are asserted and maintained within the contemporary Punjabi transnational community. The NRI houses within Punjab illustrate an enduring emotional attachment to people and places in India, as our Jat Sikh diasporic

Transnational emotion work 163 respondents universally spoke of the importance of retaining a home within Punjab and that this land should never be sold. Very few of our second- and third-generation UK Jat Sikhs expressed any intention to dispense with family land or buildings in India. In fact, the majority stressed the importance of maintaining a tangible connection with the people and places of Punjab, their Indian ‘roots’, for the benefit of their own children and grandchildren. Drawing upon Tolia-Kelly’s (2004) analysis of material cultures within British Asian UK houses, we see here how material possessions (Punjabi land and buildings) signify enfranchisement to a particular heritage, home and identity (Indian Jat Sikh Punjabi). Certainly, there was a widespread recognition – part of a ‘collective, visual vocabulary’ (Tolia-Kelly 2004: 319) – amongst our entire sample (NRI and Indian) that a physical and most often very ostentatious home in Punjab is crucial for migrants to (symbolically and publicly) illustrate their continuing emotional commitment to their Punjabi heritage, as well as publicly expressing the continuing dominance of the Jat Sikh caste within Doaba (Taylor, 2014b). Thus, one of our SC Punjabi respondents argued that NRI Jat Sikh consumer displays, outward countenances, in Punjab (e.g. the building of large, ostentatious houses) are ‘what makes them Jats . . . we are so far away from them . . . everyone wants what they’ve got but we can never get it, we never travel away from Punjab’ (Scheduled Caste Punjabi, 32, male). However, we want to simultaneously argue that the building of large Doaban family houses by our UK Jat Sikh sample, the physical, symbolic and emotionally driven reconstitution of space within Punjab, also publicly asserts the distinctive identity and high izzat of specifically NRI Jat Sikhs, relative to the resident Doaba population and including among them Doaban Jat Sikhs. The pursuit of high izzat and identity in the context of migration, through the publicly observable, symbolic and emotional reconstitution of space by building NRI houses within Punjab, exacerbates and produces boundaries of social exclusion as well as inclusion. These processes simultaneously involve emotion work. Some of the Jat Sikh NRI houses have as many as sixteen bedrooms and a matching number of bathrooms, and they are often surrounded by large gold-tipped metal fences. There is usually a gold-lettered sign on the gate entrance with the names and country of residence of the owners. The majority of these houses have their own water tanks at the very top which are frequently shaped in the image of a particular symbol to indicate that the owner is an NRI. Such symbols include aeroplanes, eagles and footballs. Both the outside and interior of the UK Jat Sikh NRI houses which we visited in Punjab are decorated in

164  Steve Taylor a luxurious, Western style, with furniture and decorations, such as leather sofas, very large flat-screen televisions and framed pictures of Western cities and views often imported from the UK. Many of these products and brands are widely available in Punjab and India, but our UK and Indian respondents continually emphasised the importance of the European origin of those displayed within the NRI homes we visited. Guests to these NRI houses were often served popular Western snacks and drinks, such as biscuits from the famous UK department store Marks and Spencer and brands of Scottish whisky. We can suggest a reversal of the process described by Tolia-Kelly (2004) where she examines possessions and artefacts in the British Asian home as publicly observable signifiers of belonging, geographically, socially and emotionally, to a particular (e.g. East African Asian) community and of opposition to exclusion within wider British society. Interestingly, the UK homes of the majority of NRIs in our study were decorated (an outward countenance) to publicly display more strongly their belonging to Sikh, Punjabi and Indian communities, as opposed to their NRI status. The artefacts and possessions on display in these homes, such as carpets, rugs, pictures, crockery, ornaments and religious symbols, were much more likely to assert the Sikh, Punjabi and Indian identity of our respondents. The pursuit of identity via migration and associated emotion work, in this case publicly observable outward countenances that aim to produce a particular state of mind in others, occurs transnationally, both ‘here’ and ‘there’. The NRI houses described above are publicly observable signifiers of an emotional attachment and belonging to, and inclusion within, not only Punjab as a region and India as a nation but also the NRI community in Punjab/India and the global Punjabi village diaspora/transnational community. Despite the fact that the non-migrant family and kin of our diaspora are often asked to oversee and care for the Jat Sikh NRI houses under scrutiny here, it is common for these buildings to stand empty for the majority of the year, only in full use when the owners visit. They are an omnipresent, publicly observable symbol and reminder to Indian residents of NRI distinctiveness and wealth, the former being effectively excluded from a world in which the latter are included. We have also recently witnessed the development of some similar forms of publicly observable consumer display (e.g. the building of large, ostentatious houses) amongst non-migrants and amongst some non Jats within Punjab. Thus, the UK Punjabi Dalit diaspora we researched are also increasingly involved in such emotion work. Even those who have religiously converted away from Sikhism in an attempt to escape caste differentiation and discrimination then re-engage with

Transnational emotion work 165 the caste structure, demonstrating the strength of the Punjabi ‘feeling rules’ (Hochschild 1983) connecting feelings of respect and status (izzat) with consumer display in Punjab. Thus, the Dalit diaspora studied suggested that publicly observable consumer display (house building) was a way of asserting their social mobility, respect, identity and status within Punjab which had been achieved post-migration from the state, and (as they saw it) enabled by both their overseas migration and religious conversion. As one of our UK Punjabi Dalit Ambedkarite Buddhists (male, 62) explained, in a way which was actually representative of all our UK Dalits: I feel very proud when I look at the house we have built back in our village . . . and when others see it over there . . . we stay there when we go (to Punjab) . . . when we were growing up we could never have thought we could have achieved such a thing, it’s a huge thing to us . . . people over there, poor people look at it and realise what can be achieved by our Buddhism, our religion, this is what has given us the strength to achieve so much . . . without coming abroad, and without our religion which gives us so much strength and power . . . the feeling we can achieve anything . . . people over there (Punjab) would still see us as shoemakers (Chamars, working with leather), even though my father and his father before him had never even touched a pair of shoes. The building of these large Punjabi Dalit family homes within villages of origin, buildings which often stand empty for the majority of the year and are only in use when the Dalit diaspora (re)visit Doaba, was certainly perceived by the permanent Dalit residents of rural Punjab (all of those that we interviewed) as a status-seeking activity: Dalit NRIs are now building large family houses and palaces in Punjab in the way that Jats have done for years . . . they are copying them . . . it’s all for show . . . to show us here how much they have over there (UK) and how much they are above the rest of us stuck here (Punjab). (Punjabi Sikh Dalit, female, 44) Our data revealed that similar non-migrant consumer displays (e.g. house building in Punjab) have been met by NRI attempts to further publicly distinguish themselves from the resident Doaban population. As one Punjabi resident Jat Sikh put it, ‘many richer people here (in Punjab) have started to build same type large houses . . . with their

166  Steve Taylor own water tanks on the top . . . and big televisions and American-style fridges and things . . . the NRIs don’t like it if there is some of these next to them in their village . . . they then build a bigger one with even more things in it . . . they are always trying to show us what they have achieved over there . . . we are becoming further and further divided as a community’ (42-year-old male). Our resident Punjabi respondents, and some within our UK sample, also suggested that there was intra-NRI competition for status, izzat and distinctive identity through publicly observable conspicuous consumption, ongoing attempts to ‘outdo’ each other through the development of ever-more-ostentatious houses in Punjab. We encountered intense criticism from virtually all of our Indian respondents of the NRI (Jat Sikh and Chamar/Ravidassi) buildings within their midst. ‘We are annoyed by the NRI houses . . . they are an insult, people in the same village do not have enough sanitation’ (resident Jat Sikh Punjabi, 42, male) was a representative view. Our Indian participants also described other ways in which NRIs (again both Jat Sikh and Chamar/Ravidassi) ‘flouted’ their wealth which was, from their (Indian) perception, an attempt to publicly emphasise a distinctive identity and superior izzat from the permanent residents of Doaba, and thus an outward countenance to produce a particular state of mind in others: They (NRIs) hire big cars and have very nice clothes and mobile phones and computers . . . here we see the wealth, they show us it, of course we want it. We are very poor here and live in unhygienic homes, lots of flies, lots of poverty, of course especially the young people they want to move to the UK and live a rich life . . . they buy many things in India to take home because they are cheaper to them. Large amounts of clothes that we could never dream to buy. It is a sign of their wealth. We see this. (Jat Sikh Punjabi, 19, male) They (NRIs) look down on the village when they come back . . . speaking frankly, there is jealousy, and even hatred, on both sides. They (NRIs) cause great disruption to local life and we are belittled by their presence. (resident SC Punjabi, 39, male) These strongly held views and feelings in relation to NRI consumer displays within Punjab are inherent to and manifestations of an increasing and widespread resentment of Punjabi NRIs amongst

Transnational emotion work 167 the permanent residents of the Doaban villages we studied, something which has developed over a number of years. Our older Indian respondents reported that in the 1960s and 1970s, original, firstgeneration returning foreign migrants to Punjab were often seen by local villagers as returning ‘heroes’ whose overseas labour was celebrated as enhancing the prosperity of the entire village. However, this image and treatment has gradually eroded. Nevertheless, the above reported publicly observable consumer displays, emotion work, have played a part, alongside the declining value and attractiveness of agricultural prowess as a route to high izzat and the general intrusion of global consumer culture within Punjabi culture and society, in producing a particular state of mind amongst the resident Punjabi population who participated in our study. We found the desire for Western migration to be widespread amongst our cross-caste Doaban sample. Despite the local resentment of NRI consumer displays within Punjab, Western migration has certainly simultaneously displaced the ownership of agricultural land and agricultural prowess within India as the route to high izzat, which we can suggest is the aim of the publicly observable emotion work being engaged in by both our Jat Sikh and Punjabi Dalit (Chamar/Ravidassi) diasporic respondents – this is the appropriate state of mind in others. As one of our respondents (a resident Punjabi Jat Sikh, 39, male) explains, ‘all of our younger generation want to go, it makes it very difficult for us to manage our lives, to be parents to our children and to manage their dreams and aspirations realistically, and to maintain traditions and family life here. Everyone wants to go . . . given a chance, we would all go’. In common with Walton-Roberts (2004) and Mooney (2006), we found that the nurturing, maintenance and development of NRI connections and communications was a priority above all other ambitions, and certainly above the nurturing of agricultural land, for the resident Indian families researched. The priority of all our parental Jat Sikh and Chamar/Ravidassi respondents within Doaba was to arrange the marriage of their children to NRI families, thereby apparently ensuring high izzat for the family. The UK Jat Sikhs and Chamars/Ravidassis in our sample are seen by Indian Jat and non-Jat residents and see themselves as a distinct and privileged social group with high izzat, a distinctive identity and caste dominance resulting from their migration overseas. Other studies of South Asian migration, for example from Bangladesh (Gardner 1995), Pakistan (Erdal 2012) and Indian Gujarat (Ramji 2006) to the UK, and from Kerala, South India to the Middle Wast (Osella and Osella 2000), reveal similar attempts to assert diasporic wealth, superiority and identity through consumption practices within South

168  Steve Taylor Asia. However, it is being additionally argued here that these processes inherently also involve emotion work. Such work is crucial for the maintenance and (re)production of the izzat, identity and caste relations being studied in this chapter. Jat Sikhs are maintaining and consolidating their dominant caste position through the transnational emotion work involved in the consumer displays described above, whilst similar emotion work amongst Chamar and Ravidassi Punjabi Dalit overseas migrants has been an important part of the recent rise of these groups up the Punjabi izzat and caste order.

9.6 Conclusions Drawing upon original empirical data from both European, UK, Punjabi communities and the Doaba region of Punjab, India, this chapter demonstrates the significance of emotion work within the contemporary Punjabi transnational community. This has been achieved by providing two examples of transnational emotion work. Firstly, the avoidance of shame/de-izzat through emotion work, including presenting the migratory experience as an overwhelming success story and concealing the emotional difficulties therein (surface acting) and managing the emotional consequences of religious conversion amongst the Punjabi Dalit Diaspora, with the aim of asserting identity, izzat and ultimately caste dominance within Punjab – in Hochschild’s terms, an outward countenance to produce a state of mind in others. Our second illustration of transnational Punjabi emotion work focusses upon diasporic consumer display in Punjab. Again drawing upon Hochschild, a form of emotion work, in particular the use of a publicly observable display to produce a particular state of mind in others (local Punjabi residents confirming the high izzat and caste superiority of Jat Sikhs and Chamars/Ravidassis in Punjab), which is also central to the (re)production of izzat, identity and caste relations within the Punjabi transnational community. While there is an emerging literature on transnational emotion work, there has been no previous analysis of emotion work within Punjabi, or indeed Indian, transnationalism, nor has there been any previous attempt to link emotion work to the transnational (re)production of caste relations and inequalities within a South Asian context, as is undertaken here. The links between overseas migration, emotion work (for example, consumer display) and status in the original ‘homeland’ have been noted throughout the world. However, the centrality of izzat and caste relations to Punjabi culture and society, and the importance of contemporary transnational emotion work to both of these

Transnational emotion work 169 phenomena and the pursuit of identity, perhaps intensify the force of the feeling rules which dictate the need to present the overwhelming success of the Punjabi overseas migrant back in the ‘homeland’ in this particular context. All of this said, I have only been able to provide two brief illustrations of transnational Punjabi emotion work and its connection to Punjabi caste and identity. There is much more work to be done in this respect. In particular, the role of wider social-structural forces in propelling the feeling rules and emotion work under discussion, most notably the declining value and attraction of Punjabi agricultural prowess as a route to izzat, identity and caste dominance within contemporary Punjab, in turn partly precipitated by capitalist globalisation, has only been implicit within our analysis. Nevertheless, this chapter does demonstrate that contemporary Punjabi izzat, identity and caste relations, issues which are central to any understanding of Punjabi culture and society, are only (re)produced through continual human work and labour, and transnational emotion work is an important part of this process.

References Bahadur, B. 2015. Mapping occupational changes and social mobility among the Dalits: A sociological study of a village of Malwa region of Punjab. Political Economy Journal of India, 24(1): 42–48. Ballard, R. 2003. ‘The South Asian Presence in Britain and Its Transnational Connections’. In Parekh, B., Singh, G. and Vertovec, S. (eds) Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora. London: Routledge, 197–222. Bhachu, P. 1985. Twice Migrants: East African Sikh Settlers in Britain. London: Tavistock. Dhanda, M. 2009. Punjabi Dalit youth: Social dynamics of transitions in identity. Contemporary South Asia, 17(1): 47–63. Erdal, M. 2012. “Place to stay in Pakistan”: Why migrants build houses in their place of origin. Population, Space and Place, 18(5): 629–641. Gardner, K. 1995. Global Migrants, Local Lives: Travel and Transformation in Rural Bangladesh. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ghuman, P. 2011. British Untouchables: A Study of Dalit Identity and Education. Farnham: Ashgate. Hardtmann, E. 2009. The Dalit Movement in India: Local Practices, Global Connections. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Helweg, A. W. 1979. Sikhs in England: The Development of a Migrant Community. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Hochschild, A. R. 1979. Emotion work, feeling rules and social structure. American Journal of Sociology, 85(3): 551–575. Hochschild, A. R. 1983. The Managed Heart: The Commercialisation of Human Feeling. Berkeley: University of California Press.

170  Steve Taylor Jodhka, S. S. 2014. Caste in Contemporary India. New Delhi: Routledge. Judge, P. S. and Bal, G. 2009. Mapping Dalits: Contemporary Reality and Future Prospects in Punjab. New Delhi: Rawat. Lum, K. 2010. ‘Caste, Religion and Community Assertion: A Case Study of Ravidasias in Spain’. In Jacobsen, K. A. and Myrvold, K. (eds) Sikhs in Europe: Migration, Identities and Representations. Farnham: Ashgate, 179–201. Lum, K. 2016. Casted masculinities in the Punjabi diaspora in Spain. South Asian Diaspora, 8(1): 31–48. Mooney, N. 2006. Aspiration, reunification and gender transformation in Jat Sikh marriages from India to Canada. Global Networks, 6(4): 389–403. Osella, F. and Osella, C. 2000. Social Mobility in Kerala: Modernity and Identity in Conflict. London: Pluto. Ram, R. 2007. Social exclusion, resistance and Deras in Punjab: Exploring the myth of casteless Sikh society in Punjab. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(40): 4066–4074. Ram, R. 2012. Beyond conversion and sankritisation: Articulating an alternative Dalit agenda in East Punjab. Modern Asian Studies, 46(3): 639–702. Ram, R. 2016. Structures of social exclusion, Dera culture and Dalit social mobility in contemporary East Punjab. Contemporary Voice of Dalit, 8(2): 186–195. Ramji, H. 2006. British Indians “returning home”: An exploration of transnational belongings. Sociology, 40(4): 645–662. Singh, G. 2012. Religious transnationalism, Ravidasi identity and the Dera Sant SarwanDass, Ballan. Sikh Formations, 8(1): 21–36. Singh, G. 2013. Religious transnationalism, development and the construction of religious boundaries: The case of the DeraSachkhand Ballan and the RavidassDharm. Global Networks, 13(2): 183–199. Singh, G. and Tatla, D. S. 2006. Sikhs in Britain: The Making of a Community. London: Zed Books. Taylor, S. 2014a. The diasporic pursuit of home and identity: Dynamic Punjabi transnationalism. The Sociological Review, 62(2): 276–294. Taylor, S. 2014b. Religious conversion and Dalit assertion amongst a Punjabi Dalit diaspora. Sociological Bulletin, 63(2): 224–226. Tolia-Kelly, D. P. 2004. Locating processes of identification: Studying the precipitates of re-memory through artifacts in the British Asian home. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 29(3): 314–329. Varghese, V. J. and Rajan, S. I. 2015. ‘Migration as a Transnational Enterprise: Migrations from Eastern Punjab and the Question of Social Licitness.’ In Rajan, S. I., Varghese, V. J. and Nanda, A. K. (eds) Migration, Mobility and Multiple Affiliations: Punjabis in a Transnational World. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. Verma, A. B. 2002. The Making of Little Punjab in Canada: Patterns of Immigration. New Delhi: Sage. Walton-Roberts, M. 2004. Transnational migration theory in population geography: Gendered practices in networks linking Canada and India. Population, Space and Place, 10.

10 Creating communities within a community Understanding the Indian diaspora in Europe Priya Vijaykumar Poojary Wherever goes an Indian, there will always be a little bit of India in him/her.

10.1 Introduction Over the past few years diasporic studies have gained significant importance, especially in understanding migratory trends. Indians in particular constitute essential elements of the global migration pattern. What exactly is the Indian diaspora? Butalia states that Indian diaspora refers to, ‘those millions of Indians who now live outside the subcontinent’ (Butalia 2003). A more debated definition of Indian diaspora includes persons of Indian origin living outside India yet retaining certain elements of ‘Indianness’. This definition leads us to certain important questions such as what about those Indians who have shed their ‘Indianness’ to assimilate within the host society? Would they not constitute a part of the Indian Diaspora? Furthermore, how do you conceptualise ‘Indianness’? The main focus of the chapter is to see whether Indians abroad do constitute a uniting diaspora or something uniquely different. For this purpose, ten interviews of Indians living in different parts of Europe were conducted in the month of August 2017. Indian residents residing in different parts of Europe were interviewed. It all began with an ‘Indian Merchant Diaspora’ (Levi 2002) when most Indians who went abroad were mainly the people belonging to the business class or the Vaishya community. In a country where Indian identity has always been transposed by either an ethnic or a cultural or a linguistic identity or a regional identity, any Indian is first a Hindu, or a Malwani or a Keralite or a Tamilian or a Gujarati or a Rajasthani, and the list would just go on endlessly. An Indian is everything else except an Indian. Identity of course has always been a

172  Priya Vijaykumar Poojary very picky subject. For us, all other identity has been followed by our national identity. It is quite understandable, given our history where the people have always been ruled by kings and they never saw the nation as an entity. In fact, thanks to the British, the entire nation united as one to free themselves from the atrocities of their colonial lords. It was during the freedom struggle that the idea of India as a nation-state emerged. Before that, it was more a state-nation rather than a nation-state. Now it is very interesting to understand how Indians portray themselves when they are in another country. Do they unite as one, giving up on their multiple identities marred by ethnicity, culture, language and religion? If so, what has caused this? How did they come to account for a strong diasporic identity? Assimilation may happen when his/her group is small. Research has shown that Indians in European countries follow the integrationist model where they maintain their own culture but at the same time also interact with their host (M. Gautam 2013). But is this pattern common across all European nations? There are some European countries like Germany, France, United Kingdom and the Netherlands that host the majority of Indians. These countries gained popularity among Indians owing to the employment opportunities, visa ease, non-language barriers, social-welfare systems and educational systems. Indians here began formulating their own communities, and they did not feel any need to assimilate with the host society. They stuck together as one. Being a visible and a distinct community, it is bound to call for some sort of discrimination. This discrimination could be on a social level or an economic level (M. K. Gautam 2011). It has been no different for Indians in Europe. Most times they have been ridiculed for their dark skin or for their accent or for their social status. To ensure their security against this discrimination, immigrants begin to institutionalise themselves (M. Gautam 2013). Cultural associations are established where people come together to celebrate festivals and rituals, cook together or may be just have a conversation or two. Apart from this they also share their worries on finding suitable jobs, extend their stay permits or sort out accommodation problems. They gather a ‘circle of friends’ (Desai 1963; Kramer 1979). This leads us to question what would the same Indians do when they are few in number? This is the case when Indians move to countries with lesser visibility of the Indian diaspora such as Hungary, Czechia or Poland, Spain, Portugal or any of the Nordic countries. India like most countries follows a policy of cultural pluralism. Rational choice theory states that members of a particular ethnic

Creating communities within a community 173 group trade in goods and services among themselves, yet they continue to maintain their relations with the host society (Banton 1983). They set the boundaries on how much they interact with the host society. The idea is to maintain a healthy relation with the host. By doing so, they actually create the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dialogue (Barth 1969). They see themselves as distinct from the host community.

10.2 Exploring diaspora The diasporic space [is] the quintessential late 20th-century space, a space in which the terms of modern immigration, exile, loss, nation, subject, and citizen are negotiated and reinvented for various use. (Enwezor 1997)

We often hear the words ‘diaspora’, ‘diasporic communities’, ‘diasporic consciousness’; but the question settles on what does diaspora mean? What exactly constitutes a diaspora? Analysing the discourse on diaspora reveals that there is huge ambiguity when it comes to operationalising the meaning of the word ‘diaspora’. Some scholars would agree on a definition of diaspora as a mere scattering or dispersion of people, while scholars such as Robin Cohen (2008) refer to diaspora as colonial settlements. Recent studies argue for a more traumatic origin for the word ‘diaspora’ wherein it involves a forced expulsion of people from their homeland. Here two things gain precedence; a forced dispersion and homeland. One of the key elements that essentialises any diaspora is the word ‘home’. Home, the nurturing ground for every human. In diasporic studies home ceases to be just a psychological feeling and rather attaches a number of political, cultural and economic elements (Anderson 1991). Even diasporic writers face the difficulty of conceptualising ‘home’. Salman Rushdie says that our physical alienation from India almost inevitably means that we will not be capable of reclaiming precisely the thing that was lost; that we will in short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but invisible ones, imaginary homelands, Indias of the mind. (Rushdie 1991) There is a feeling of nostalgia created by Rushdie whenever he is reminded about home. Interestingly, for Rushdie home appears to be the place that one always dreams of. Despite it being imaginary, there is a deep sense of belongingness associated with India.

174  Priya Vijaykumar Poojary Judith Shuval defines diaspora as a social construct founded on feeling, consciousness, memory, mythology, history, meaningful narratives, group identity, longings, dreams, allegorical and virtual elements all of which play an important role in establishing a diaspora reality. At a given moment in time, the sense of connection to a homeland must be strong enough to resist forgetting, assimilating or distancing. (Shuval 2000) Shuval here makes a very important distinction, that of non-assimilation. She points out that what clearly distinguishes a diaspora is the ability of the diasporic people to maintain their distinct identity, which they do by clinging on to their customs and traditions, thereby preventing any form of assimilation. Again here like any other diasporic scholar Shuval states that diasporic people are constantly reminded of their homeland. They are constantly psychologically linked. William Safran (1991) has made a key contribution to the entire debate on the use of the word diaspora. For quiet sometime diaspora was not associated with migration or identity studies. The earliest works on diaspora were rooted to the concept of homeland, and the reference goes back to the ‘Jewish diaspora’. It was only later that George Shepperson (1996) began discussing the African diaspora. In this sense the concept of diaspora began to be extended to other ethnic groups. Clifford says that we should be able to recognise the strong entailment of Jewish history on the language of diaspora without making that history a definitive model. Jewish (and Greek and Armenian) diasporas can be taken as non-normative starting points for a discourse that is travelling or hybridizing in new global conditions. (Clifford 1994) Which group of emigrants can be actually considered as constituting diasporas? To overcome this problem of groupism . . . we should think of diaspora not in substantialist terms as a bounded entity, but rather as a stance, a claim. We should think of diaspora in the first instance as a category of practice, and only then ask whether, and how, it can fruitfully be used as a category of analysis. (Brubaker 2005)

Creating communities within a community 175 Anderson in fact makes a very distinct category of groups of those emigrants that despite being away are actively involved in the politics of their home country (Anderson 1998). The Kurds, Irish, Hindus, Pakistanis, Kashmiris and Tamils are considered belonging to this category (Sheffer 2003). Then there are also those diaspora (the Francophones and Anglophones) who have ceased to be called diasporas merely because they have assimilated in the host society (Baumann 1996). The most popular category of course remains that of the country-specific diaspora. The term is expanding to include various domains such as the refugees, the exile community, expatriates, labourers (Tololyan 1991). Rogers Brubaker has identified three elements that actually constitute a diaspora: •

Dispersion in space – when people cross boundaries. This element is widely criticised because it is not necessary that they have to cross state borders. It could also mean crossing intrastate boundaries (Brubaker 2005). • Orientation to the homeland, real or imagined. Here, homeland becomes a part of their identity, their values and virtues. Homeland here is figurative. (Safran 1991) has allotted four specific categories for associating homeland. He states that homeland could be an assortment of collective memory or myth. Secondly, homeland for some may mean the place where everyone must return. Thirdly, it may for some be preserving the place and restoring it to its true state, and finally, for some it may mean a personal connection that moulds one’s identity. This specific element has come under widespread scrutiny, as many would not argue that it is necessary for people to be connected to a certain set of cultural values • Maintenance of the boundary, metaphorically meaning that communities cling to their primordial identity rather than assimilating. Rogers considers this the most important feature, as it enables us to draw distinctions, to speak of diaspora as distinct groups. Clinging to your identity is a very important distinction. That is what constitutes mainly as diasporas (Brubaker 2005). When groups are assimilated, it results in boundary erosion. What of future generations? Most times, the second and third generations tend to assimilate with the host society. Then do they no longer constitute diasporas (Brubaker 2005)?

176  Priya Vijaykumar Poojary Diasporic identities are said to be complex and heterogeneous. Bhabha claims that, ‘hybridity displays . . . the displacement of all sites of discrimination and domination’ (Bhabha 1994). He explains about the creation of the third space which is categorised for the immigrants or the diasporic people. This is the place where identities are marred by hybridity. Stuart Hall also makes similar claims, stating that ‘the construction of identities involves recognition of a necessary heterogeneity, diversity and hybridity’ (Hall 1996). Most people are struggling between their ethnic identity and their new hybrid identity, which is not fixed.

10.3 Indian diaspora in Europe: an imagined diaspora? Migration cannot be considered as an isolated act. Especially when it comes to Indian migration, there may be many lives linked. Family members play a very important role in determining the decision of an individual migrant. Migrants’ lives are linked to their parents. Parents get their respective positions from all the cultural values and traditions. Parents play a key role in deciding what their children will study. Children are expected to follow their advice. Parents as well as extended family members direct the life trajectories of the migrant children. They influence their decisions by means of education choices and providing assistance in terms of money. In case of married couples, the system of child care lies at the centre of their lives, as child care is not institutionalised in the Indian society. A recent study also suggests that the Indian social norms among the Indian migrants are changing since they are now exposed to the Western ways of more individualistic life with less involvement of the parents (Kou, Mulder and Bailey 2017). The Indian diaspora in Europe finds itself divided on regional and cultural lines. They form regional diasporas such as the Tamil diaspora, Bengali diaspora, Punjabi diaspora or they even form on a larger picture, religious diaspora, such as the Hindu diaspora or the Jain diaspora. However, they still feel connected to their identity as an Indian (Gautam 1999). But then we need to ask the questions as to what contributes to their feeling of being an Indian. Is it just the fact that they all come from the same land? The answer to this question will be explored further in what follows. Given the disparity, what then characterises the so-called Indian diaspora? Given the nature of diversity of the ‘Indian’ identity, is it possible label the Indians worldwide as one? What is the role of the media in depicting the image of the Indians residing abroad? Bhatia asks the questions whether Indian diaspora does act like any other diaspora?

Creating communities within a community 177 For example, the Jews share unified grounds in terms of religion; the Africans are from a distinct common race, while the Chinese have a common language among them. Indians on the other hand come from a diverse multicultural background where every Indian is different from his fellow Indians in terms of religion, language and ethnicity and so on. Bhatia comments on the role of Bollywood in promoting the Indian identity. Bollywood has always focussed on depicting the Indian morals and values, which helps to a certain extent in reviving the Indianness among the Indians abroad. He classifies the markers of Indianness among diasporic Indians as films, language, food, literature, politics, history, rituals and music/dance (Bhatia 2001). When we speak of diaspora, we immediately associate it with ethnicity. Gilroy states that nations use ethnic differences to create a feeling of togetherness. The objective here is to create a homogenous entity comprised of the same ethnic group (Gilroy 1993). While this ethnic differentiation divides various ethnic groups and protects the interests of the ruling authority, it also creates a sense of feeling that other ethnic groups do not belong here. That their homeland is elsewhere. Today we see a drastic shift, as most people refuse to believe in the homeland myth and the fact that ethnicity constitutes a nation. The interviews conducted revealed the following when interviewees asked about how well they related to their fellow Indians abroad, whether the connection (if at all) was due to common ethnicity or common cultural markers. Surprisingly, most of the interviewees responded to ethnicity as the main thing that fostered a sense of belonging with their fellow Indians. INTERVIEWEE:  I

think it is just a simple connection of ethnically one, that we were born INDIANS. Honestly I did not relate to them much when I was in India also. INTERVIEWEE:  I think the sufficient reason to feel connection to any fellow Indian is being Indian. Rest all factors like language, food, behaviour, rituals, traditions don’t matter at all. It’s the feeling of being from same land is the one which makes us feel a ‘connection’ or a feeling of been connected to them. INTERVIEWEE:  The only relation I see is the aspect of common language and the craving of Indian food which again is not the case always. Most of the Indians tend to believe that travelling abroad makes them different from what they are and they tend to become pseudo Westerners. This tends to kill the common connection that traces back to India. The only common connection left behind is probably with respect to the ethnicity.

178  Priya Vijaykumar Poojary Negating all the factors, most of them were convinced that their common ethnic identity was the only element that fostered a diasporic connection. However, ethnic identity just like other identity is not just given. It is socially constructed through social interactions between individuals. Indian identity as an ethnic identity too developed through categorisations as Indians by others. It is this sense of a common ethnicity that binds most Indians together. Analysing the social construct of ethnicity through the lenses of racism brings us to the point that the entire notion of being ethnically different was created by a certain group of people to maintain their hegemonic rule. As stated above that ethnicity is not merely given; it is sufficed to say that it is arbitrarily constructed to feed the interests of certain people. Therefore, is it appropriate to call a group of people one diaspora just on the basis of ethnicity? Common ethnicity fosters a common ‘origin’. It becomes an immediate association. This has led to the creation of ‘Indian communities’ in various countries in Europe. I would say that like ethnicity, community is not just given. It is created through various levels of interactions between individuals. Being social constructed, a community cannot exist out of this construction. While creating this so-called Indian communities, it is based on the assumption of a common origin: ‘India’. Commonality breeds a sense of homogeneity barring all distinctions in language, religion, culture, traditions. The concept of community nullifies all differences and ceases to exist. It also ignores the fact that the Indians living in various parts of Europe come from different parts of India, speak different languages, practice different religions and follow different customs and traditions. Homeland myths are based on this common origin; that is the place where one must ultimately return. It forms a very key element in characterising any diaspora. When the interviewees were asked if they ever wished to return to their country, I received mixed responses. INTERVIEWEE:  I

am not sure if I will live in Europe for the rest of my life in Europe. I may move to different country except India. I want my daughter to get best facility in education, exposure to big universities, new technology which comes/originates in other countries and not in India. I want her to have equal opportunities in the area of sports. I just don’t want her to study and get married and stay at home . . . which is the fate of most of women in India. INTERVIEWEE:  I would prefer to stay in Europe, since living conditions are better here than in India. Also factors like over population and reservation make India a non-favourable place for most people to relocate.

Creating communities within a community 179 This was the most common response received. They did not wish to return to their country for reasons such as better comforts, better education. Interestingly, one of the participants stated that he would return to India because he knew he was an outsider and would never belong to Europe. INTERVIEWEE:  After

completing my studies, I probably plan to take a work experience in Europe for maybe a couple of years and then for sure return to my country. This is because of the sole reason that despite being comfortable in a European country I would always be someone who would be seen as outsider. However, home is where life is.

Safran’s model refuses to explain various heterogeneity that is involved in diasporic communities. It is not necessary that a community identify themselves with a single homeland. Hall in his essay ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’ says that identities are always changing and dynamic in nature. He considers it displaced. Identities always work in narratives which are expressed in complex relations (Gabriel 1999). Hall states that It [cultural identity] belongs to the future as much as to the past. It is not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture. Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But, like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power. Far from being grounded in mere ‘recovery’ of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past. (Hall 1990) The creation of an Indian identity developed as an antithesis to the Colonial discourse. Chatterjee says that Indian domesticity was divided into two different spaces. In terms of a nationalist discourse, the social sphere was distinguished into ‘ghar’ and ‘bahir’, meaning home and outside (Chatterjee 1993). Here ‘bahir’ symbolises the West, while ‘ghar’ is the feminine figure of India. The message spread here is that though Indian space has been colonised by the British, their spiritual space remains to be theirs. The home is just not reduced to

180  Priya Vijaykumar Poojary an infrastructure, rather it is a place inhabiting numerous memories (Nandy 1999). It is a movable concept and particularly true when it comes to diasporic people for whom ‘home’ has always been subject to change (Barley 2007). Interestingly, Anderson considers the Indian diaspora as an imagined diaspora (Anderson 1983), which is ‘an imagined cultural and structural boundary of ethnic contestation where the community is seen as a transnational homogenous group’ (Anderson 1991). For the generations of Indians who have lived away from India, born or raised abroad, India stands as an imagined homeland- a place about which they have heard millions of stories from their parents or grandparents. Them being Indian then becomes a much-imagined idea, and all significant feeling of Indianness also succumbs to an imaginary feeling.

10.4 Conclusion Identity is vital for a diasporic consciousness. Diaspora need not just be an ethnic consciousness, nor does it have to be a reflection of the homeland myth, which even to this day constitutes immensely to diasporic research. The homeland myth is constantly been used for political mobilisation. Modern-day diasporas span borders and territories to become a part of the larger transnational community. India and the functionaries of the societies have always been a paradigm of great intrigue. The diversity it harbours in its landscape gives it a very secular colour. Ethnicity and origin constitute the base for the Indian diasporic formation. As defined earlier, diaspora is socially constructed. In the same manner, when we talk about an Indian diaspora, there is a sense of being part of it without actually them not knowing each other, individually or acting collectively.

References Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities. London: Verso. ———. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. ———. 1998. The Spectre of Comparison: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World. London: Verso. Banton, M. 1983. Racial and Ethnic Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Barley, Alexandra Fiona. 2007. At Home in India: Geographies of Home in Contemporary Indian Novels. Durham: Durham University. Barth, F. 1969. Ethnic Groups & Boundaries. Oslo: Jhansen & Nielson.

Creating communities within a community 181 Baumann, Gerd. 1996. Contesting Culture: Discourses of Identity in MultiEthnic London. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bhabha, Homi. 1994. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge. Bhatia, Tej K. 2001. ‘Media, Identity and Diaspora: Indians Abroad’, Diaspora, Identity, and Language Communities, 31(1): 269–287. Brubaker, Rogers. 2005. ‘The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(1): 1–19. Butalia, Urvashi. 2003. ‘An Indian by Any Other Name’, New Internationalist: 354. Chatterjee, P. 1993. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Clifford, James. 1994. ‘Diasporas’, Cultural Anthropology, 9(3): 302–338. Cohen, Robin. 2008. Global diasporas: An introduction (2nd ed.). London, New York: Routledge. Desai, R. 1963. Indian Immigrants in Britain. London: Oxford University Press. Enwezor, Okwui. 1997. ‘A Question of Place: Revisions, Reassessments, Diaspora’, In Mora Beaucham Byrd and M. Franklin Sirmans (eds), Transforming the Crown: African, Asian, and Caribbean Artists in Britain, pp. 80–88. New York: Caribbean Cultural Centre. Gabriel, Sharmani Patricia. 1999. Constructions of Home and Nation in the Literature of the Indian Diaspora, with Particular Reference to Selected Works of Bharati Mukherjee, Salman Rushdie, Amitav Ghosh and Rohinton Mistry. Leeds: University of Leeds. Gautam, M. K. 1999. ‘The Construction of the Indian Image in Surinam: Deconstructing Colonial Derogatory Notions and Reconstructing Indian Identity’, In Mahine Gosine and Dhanpaul Narine (eds), Sojourners to Settlers: Indian Immigrants in the Caribbean and the Americas. New York: Windsor Press. Gautam, M. K. 2011. ‘Indian and the Dutch Media’, In R. Lakhima and B. Madan (eds), Sixty Years of the Netherlands-India Association in the Netherlands. The Hague, Netherlands: Embassy of India. Gautam, M. K. 2013. Indian Diaspora: Ethnicity and Diasporic Identity. Leiden: CARIM-India. Gilroy, Paul. 1993. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousnes. London: Verso. Hall, Stuart. 1990. ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’, Framework: 222–237. Hall, Stuart. 1996. ‘Minimal Selves’, In Houston A. Baker, Manthia Diawara and Ruth H. Lindeborg (eds), Black British Cultural Studies: A Reader, p. 118. London: University of Chicago Press. Kou, Anu, Clara H. Mulder, and Ajay Bailey. 2017. ‘ “For the Sake of the Family and Future”: The Linked Lives of Highly Skilled Indian Migrants’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies: 1–18.

182  Priya Vijaykumar Poojary Kramer, J. Y. 1979. ‘Ethnicity and Community: Indian Migrants in a Norwegian Town’, In Mark Gaborieau and Alice Turner (eds), South Asia: Traditions and Continuity, pp. 661–668. Paris: C.N.R.S. Levi, Scott C. 2002. The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and Its Trade. Leiden: Brill. Nandy, A. 1999. ‘The Invisible Holocaust and the Journey as Exodus: The Poisoned Village and the Stranger City’, Postcolonial Studies: 305–329. Rushdie, Salman. 1991. Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism. London: Granta. Safran, William. 1991. ‘Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return’, Diaspora, 1(1): 83–99. Sen, Amartya. 1989. ‘Development as Capability Expansion’. S. FukudaYParr and AK Shiva Kumar. eds. Readings in Human Development. Oxford University Press, New York ———. 1992. Inequality Re-examined. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 2009. The Idea of Justice. London: Allen Lane. Sheffer, Gabriel. 2003. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shepperson, George. 1966. The African diaspora or the African abroad. African Forum, 1(2) : 76–93. Shuval, Judith. 2000. ‘Diaspora Migration: Definitional Ambiguities and a Theoretical Paradigm’, International Migration: 41–56. Tololyan, Khachig. 1991. ‘The Nation-State and Its Others: In lieu of a Preface’, Diaspora, 5(1): 3–36.

11 The effect of economic capital and Swedish cultural capital on bonding and bridging ties A study of first-generation Malayalees in Sweden Renu Vinod 11.1 Introduction The relevance of social capital as an inter-disciplinary theoretical concept has been researched deeply in sociological literature. The usefulness of social capital has been demonstrated in an array of fields including mobility (Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2000; Grootaert et.al, 2004), development and public policy (Fukuyama, 2001; Krishna, 2002; Muir, 2011), unequal access to social, cultural and economic capital (Jarness, 2017), migrant groups (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Zhou, and Bankston, 1994; Zhou and Lin, 2005; Portes and Manning, 2008; Dhingra, 2008; Ryan, Sales, Tilki and Siara, 2008; Thapar-Bjokert and Sanghera, 2010; Portes and Vickstrom, 2011; Barwick, 2017), ethnic diversity (Putnam, 2007; Cox and Orman, 2010; Stolle, Petermann, Schmid, Schönwälder, Hewstone, Vertovec, Schmitt, and Heywood, 2013; Laurence, 2016), ethnic capital (Shah, Dwyer and Modood, 2010), preparedness and response to emergencies (Andrew and Carr, 2013) and conflict societies (Leonard, 2016). Social capital theorists generally concede that one of its common features is its embeddedness in the ‘structure of social organisations, patterns of social relations, or processes of interactions between individuals and organizations’ (Zhou and Lin, 2005: 262), rather than in the individual agent. Definitions of social capital tend to place it within two broad frameworks, namely, microsociological and macrosociological (Oorschot, Arts and Gelissen, 2006). The instrumental perspective (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998; Lin, 1999), which falls within the microsociological paradigm, views social capital as the product of material or symbolic exchanges characteristic

184  Renu Vinod of social relations among members of a collectivity (Bourdieu, 1986). On the other hand, the associational framework (Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000; Flora, 1998; Stolle and Rochon, 1998; Fukuyama, 2001; Krishna, 2002; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004; Muir, 2011; Andrew and Carr, 2013; Laurence, 2016), which falls within the macrosociological framework of social capital, emphasises its nature as a public good. Using the case of Malayalee immigrants to Sweden, I present three inter-related ideas to frame my argument. The first idea is that Swedish cultural capital, which indicates cultural competences such as ease with Swedish values and norms and economic capital, which I refer to as security of tenure in one’s profession in Sweden, are not uniform across the respondents. The variations in possession of both Swedish cultural capital and economic capital are key determinants of membership within intimate cliques, especially in Stockholm, which has more first-generation Malayalees than any other city in Sweden. The second inter-related idea deals with the existence of a social universe, which infuses the context within which first-generation Malayalees bond, and shapes the discourses within cliques. I refer to the social universe as a set of elements that underlies intragroup cohesion creating a common ground for intimate bonding within cliques. The elements characteristic of the social universe are year of arrival in Sweden, geographic location of group members, age of members, age group and common interests of children and common wavelength, as noted recurrently by the respondents themselves. These intragroup commonalities are not always inflexible as informal – albeit less frequent – socialising can cut across these on certain occasions. The third inter-related idea relates to the fact that first-generation Malayalees, unlike refugees or economically vulnerable migrants, are predominantly white-collar labour migrants who possess considerable human and economic capital at the time of arrival in Sweden. They work either in Swedish or multinational firms or in research or academic institutes, which equips them with the intellectual, financial and cultural wherewithal to absorb the elements of Swedish cultural capital almost immediately. First-generation Malayalees who have permanent jobs in Sweden have more economic capital than those who have contractual positions, and they tend to live in Swedish neighbourhoods.1 They prefer not to converge within a predominantly Indian neighbourhood and, consequently, are residentially dispersed in multi-ethnic or Swedish neighbourhoods. The chapter is structured in the following manner. The first section delineates the research methodology used to gather data from the respondents. The second section reviews social capital literature, especially the Putnamian framework, and prepares the theoretical ground

Economic and Swedish cultural capital 185 that links the Bourdieusian framework to the forms of bonding and bridging capital that first-generation Malayalees engage in. The third section links the empirical findings with some of the theoretical ideas raised in the previous sections to demonstrate the selectivity that firstgeneration Malayalees exhibit in building intimate bonding capital within the social group. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main points on the patterns of bonding and bridging capital engaged in by these white-collar labour migrants.

11.2 Research methodology The end of 2008 saw Sweden implement some widespread reforms in its labour immigration policy to allow the entry of both high- and low-skilled workers from non–European Union countries to meet the pressing demands of the Swedish labour market. The new labour immigration policy placed no ceiling on the number of workers that could enter Sweden from a single country for a period of two years, with a subsequent extension possible. Additionally, at the end of a four-year stay, they could apply for permanent residence and also apply to the Swedish Migration Board to bring their families into the country. In 2008, immigrants from India were the second-highest group of labour migrants (2,393) to receive residence permits to stay in Sweden (Migrationsverket, 2016). While in 2007 there were 1,447 Indian migrants who obtained residence permits, by 2014, this number had become 3,443, which is an almost 140 percent jump, in seven years. In 2014, Indians accounted for 0.34 percent of the Swedish population.2 Since the turn of the millennium, a total of 24,409 labour migrants from India have been granted residence permits to work in Sweden, making Indians the second-highest Asian cohort to be granted residence permits to live and work in Sweden. Indian migrants in Sweden come from a variety of backgrounds. These include the ‘Gujarati and Punjabi refugees and labour migrants from East Africa’ (Myrvold, 2012: 9), the Afghan Hindu and Sikh asylum seekers fleeing Afghanistan, and most recently, students and highly skilled white-collar labour migrants from India, who have either temporary or permanent resident status in Sweden. Given the heterogeneous nature of Indian immigration into Sweden and the variations in social and cultural value systems that typically characterise different Indian sub-communities, this chapter looks only at one Indian sub-community, i.e. first-generation Malayalees. The first-generation Malayalee respondents in this study are whitecollar labour migrants from Kerala, in southern India, where the predominant language spoken is Malayalam. The respondents are mainly husband–wife pairs or one of the spouses, who agreed to provide

186  Renu Vinod information for this study. One of the husbands is from the neighbouring state of Karnataka in southern India, and another is a Swede (who was not interviewed for this project). In most cases, the husband arrived in Sweden as a white-collar labour migrant, to work on a temporary information technology (IT) project or with a job offer in the financial, pharmaceutical, engineering or research sectors, and the wife – usually qualified in India – joined him subsequently. In such cases, the wife, after arriving in Sweden, either stayed at home or, as in the case of most respondents in this study, upgraded their own skills, learnt Swedish and joined the workforce, either as part-time, full-time or self-employed workers. Since Swedish government policy prevents the ethnic profiling of its population, there is no data on the exact number of first-generation Malayalees residing in Sweden. The only data available is on the number of persons born in India, but not the specific Indian state to which they belong. However, rough estimates by community members place the population of first-generation Malayalees between 350 and 600. These include not just permanent residents and Swedish citizens but also temporary residence holders. The main criterion for inclusion of respondents in the sample was that they had to be permanent residents or Swedish citizens, as that was perceived to be an important factor for the respondents to decide whether to build their economic and Swedish cultural capital in the host country. Consequently, a purposive snowball sample3 was undertaken to select the respondents, out of whom the first husband–wife respondents were referred to the author by a contact in Kerala, India.

Table 11.1 India-born persons and persons born in Sweden with one or both parents from India, as of 31 December 2014 Country Born in Born in India Sweden with both parents born in India

Indianborn Father when both parents have different countries of birth

Indianborn Mother when both parents have different countries of birth

Indianborn father and Swedish mother

Indian- Total born mother and Swedish father

India

855

864

2,600

4,557

21,929 2,668

Source: Statistics Sweden (2016)4

33,473

Economic and Swedish cultural capital 187 There were more respondents from Stockholm, as it has the largest concentration of first-generation Malayalees in Sweden. According to the husband–wife duo from Sandviken, theirs is the only firstgeneration Malayalee family in that municipality. All the respondents from Uppsala and two from Stockholm were interviewed personally, whereas the rest of the interviews were conducted on Skype and by telephone. The project used a two-stage process between February and May 2016 to obtain information from the respondents. First, an e-questionnaire was sent out, questions which were based on the World Bank’s Questionnaire on Social Capital. These included queries on extent of exclusive socialising among the social group members, degree of trust among members and in institutions in the host society and extent of integration into Sweden. These questions were asked to obtain primary data on respondents’ socialising. Subsequently, semi-structured, qualitative interviews were conducted to delineate in a more in-depth manner the nature of social capital formation among first-generation Malayalees. Seventeen (husband–wife) respondents answered the e-questionnaire, out of which fifteen agreed to be interviewed for the study. The youngest respondent (female) was thirty-three years old and the oldest (male), sixty-one years. Among the respondents were a substitute preschool teacher, a molecular biologist, a doctor, a retired senior accountant, academic researchers, a system developer, a software architect, a national trade union president, a few self-employed professionals and two stay-athome mothers. Eight respondents were from Stockholm, six from Uppsala and one from Sandviken. As this study focuses on a limited number of first-generation Malayalees, the sample is not representative of all Malayalees in Sweden. Thus the study attempts to explore some of the microdynamics related to social capital formation among white-collar immigrants rather than to make generalisations about immigrant social capital formation.

11.3 Social capital: a brief review of literature Putnam (2000; Field, 2003) identifies two main forms of social capital, evident in the manner in which people interact, as bonding capital (engaging within the group) and bridging capital (engaging between groups). While bonding social capital strengthens identities based on class, race, ethnicity, caste, region and language within the group, bridging social capital strengthens ties across such social cleavages. However, Putnam’s assumption that these social cleavages can alienate people and, in the short run, lead to a ‘hunkering down’ (2007) from

188  Renu Vinod in-group as well as out-group engagement has been criticised (Portes and Vickstrom, 2011; Stolle, Petermann, Schmid, Schönwälder, Hewstone, Vertovec, Schmitt, and Heywood, 2013). Stolle, Petermann, Schmid, Schönwälder, Hewstone, Vertovec, Schmitt, and Heywood (2013) note that the American experience of the effect of ethnic diversity on social capital, particularly on trust, cannot be transposed to European contexts, as the contextual and historical trajectories of migration in Europe are different. Portes and Vickstrom (2011: 463) note that contrary to Putnam’s (2007) findings of strong negative relation between diversity and trust, other studies have emerged with mixed results that rely on ‘various individual and contextual factors’ rather than on diversity alone. Leonard (2004) privileges the work of Bourdieu, according to whom economic capital is the most important type of capital, as it helps individuals gain access to other types of capital, particularly social and cultural. According to Erel (2010: 643), skilled migrants ‘exercise agency’ in the formation of ‘migration-specific’ (Erel, 2010: 644) embodied and institutionalised cultural capital in the host country. Laurence (2016) points out in his study of data across Great Britain and within London that the level of trust in an ethnically diverse neighbourhood is not merely dependent on the degree of diversity but on the degree of integration or segregation in the ‘wider community’. This is especially true of the Swedish social landscape. Sweden presents a unique social context in terms of its inclusive approach towards immigrants (Joppke, 2007; Eastmond, 2011; Wiesbrock, 2011; Borevi, 2015). Within Europe, in the Netherlands, France and Germany, immigrant integration is subject to clearing mandatory citizenship tests and attending integration courses (Meer, Mouritsen, Faas and de Witte, 2015). The Swedish attitude towards immigrants is more liberal, informed as it is by a universal welfare state model or the Social Democratic welfare state regime, which according to Borevi (2015: 497) provides ‘comprehensive, generous, and redistributive benefits and welfare services’ universally. To understand the operation of economic capital, Swedish cultural capital and the social universe and the ways in which they influence the creation of intragroup cliques among first-generation Malayalees and their integration into the host society, I use Bourdieu’s (1984, 1989) analysis of the social construction of collective space and symbolic power to create networks based on differentiation. According to Bourdieu (1986), exchanges of social capital are never completely independent of the economic and cultural capital owned by an individual or group. In fact, members possess more or less similar

Economic and Swedish cultural capital 189 volumes of capital, which has a multiplier effect on the social capital that an individual possesses. The benefits gained from membership in a social group make solidarity within that group possible. Social networks are not a ‘natural given’ or a one-step process. Rather, the creation of long-lasting networks requires the investment of time and effort by its members, who, by following certain rules of conduct, help to re-establish the relationships within the group and, consequently, the group itself. Bourdieu (1989) argues that social classes operate in social space. One’s position within social space is determined by the total weight of the economic and cultural capital that one possesses. Interactions between people within a social class, i.e. the tangible, perceivable actions, are a product of the invisible structures that create and determine interpersonal interactions. Social classes imply social distance with people who belong to similar social classes exhibiting similar behaviours and interests, i.e. their habitus. While those who belong to a higher social class tend to ‘maintain their rank’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 17), those who belong to a lower social class are expected to ‘keep their distance’. Both the dispositions/interests and the ‘strategies’ that lead people to develop a ‘sense of one’s place’ can be ‘unconscious’ behaviour, according to Bourdieu (1989). In addition to these, even the reality that one forms, can be determined by one’s ‘position in objective social space’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 18).

11.4 First-generation Malayalees’ bonding and bridging behaviour in the host society 11.4.1 Bonding capital among first-generation Malayalees: the role of economic and Swedish cultural capital Two elements play a decisive role in affirming clique membership among respondents. One is Swedish cultural capital, which is cultural competence marked by familiarity with and openness towards Swedish norms and values and a reasonable degree of fluency in the Swedish language. In addition to Swedish cultural capital, the social universe also plays a deciding role in the affirmation of clique membership. The social universe includes the time-period of arrival as a determinant of degree of possession of Swedish cultural capital and, consequently, integration into the host society; geographic location, which makes it practical to socially engage more frequently with those sharing physical proximity, the exception being two families who originally worked in Stockholm and subsequently shifted to Uppsala but are members

190  Renu Vinod of a Stockholm-based intragroup clique; and common wavelength, which reveals a degree of similarity in worldviews and life experiences among group members that render them more at ease within their respective cliques. Other equally supportive characteristics include age group of members and age group and common interests of their children. Common wavelength is an outcome of similar upbringing and background of clique members in the homeland, i.e. their habitus, resulting in shared viewpoints on various social and political issues and similar career and life experiences in the host society. First-generation Malayalee respondents arrived in Sweden in three clusters. The first cluster comprised students and professionals who came from the late 1970s onwards. The second cluster arrived from the late 1990s and comprised predominantly IT professionals on short- and long-term projects, which were extended recurrently. The third cluster came from 2009 onwards, many of them on IT projects undergoing project extensions. Two of the respondents in this study have started their own consultancies. All female respondents except two are employed either part-time or full-time in various fields. The respondents of this study chose to stay back in Sweden due to the good quality of life in the host country and the availability of firstrate and free healthcare and education for their children. Owing to the economic capital that they possessed as a result of their professional backgrounds, they were able to afford housing in predominantly Swedish, middle- and upper-middle-class neighbourhoods. Having lived in Sweden for many decades with lesser numbers of co-ethnics to intermingle with, this first cluster of Malayalees is more accustomed to the Swedish way of life and more integrated into Swedish society. Very few first-generation Malayalees belonging to the second and third clusters know members of the first cluster intimately. According to Sebastian,5 who arrived in Stockholm in 1978: There was inadequate contact with other Malayalees when we arrived simply because of our limited numbers in Sweden. However, a group of seven to eight families that arrived around the same time got together socially and stayed in touch. First-generation Malayalees grew in number by the end of the 1990s, when there was a young generation of workers from the IT sector that came here. Being more in number, they interacted more, though not necessarily only with other first-generation Malayalees. We did not build a close relationship with these newcomers because they live in another time and space. Besides we do not have the time to mingle with everyone. There are however, some common occasions

Economic and Swedish cultural capital 191 for which Malayalees get together, such as Onam, Vishu or the screening of a Malayalam film in Stockholm. Rajni, a second-cluster first-generation Malayalee, who arrived in Stockholm in 2006 with her husband, points to the personal value generated by membership within her intimate clique, We are closer to our core group because we think alike. For instance, if we take a political issue, there isn’t much difference in the way we respond. We can agree with each other, because we are from the same background. So, I think, we have the same upbringing. We also have children of the same age, who are close to each other. There are very few differences of opinion among us. There are many other Malayalees who have arrived after 2009, but we do not feel like getting very close to them; we cannot relate to their philosophy, attitude or style. We meet them only at larger get-togethers, which are less frequent, such as movie screenings or Onam celebrations. Not only do we not know them very well, but they also tend to mingle within their own circle. Since they arrived into the host country as white-collar labour migrants possessing human and economic capital, and not as asylum seekers or economically vulnerable immigrants, first-generation Malayalees perceive themselves to be in a superior position relative to other immigrants and refugees. The fungibility of their human and economic capital into useful cultural and social capital has created among members a high sense of self-worth. Moreover, respondents see themselves as contributing meaningfully to Swedish society economically, by paying taxes, and socially, by contributing as doctors, nurses, preschool teachers and volunteering in the church. At the same time, the perception of the Swedish state as tolerant and granting them equal rights (though equal opportunities are not always accessible), and of locals as progressive and inclusive, is seen as a complementary reason not to band together parochially. 11.4.2 Bridging capital in the host society: the advantage of pre-existent human and cultural capital First-generation Malayalees who intend to settle down in Sweden attempt to increase the volume of Swedish cultural capital they possess by ensuring that one or both spouses learn Swedish, sending their children to Swedish Dagis or crèches so that the second generation

192  Renu Vinod gets a sound foundation in the language which can convert to valuable cultural and social capital in the long term, and purchasing residential property in predominantly Swedish middle- and upper-middle-class neighbourhoods. Those who possess economic capital choose to stay in predominantly Swedish neighbourhoods as they assume that those are better in terms of access to a better quality of life, such as good neighbourhood schools. They display distaste for the idea of living in ethnically segregated neighbourhoods, as it is indicative of a lack of sufficient economic, social capital and Swedish cultural capital. Some first-generation Malayalees who own economic capital prioritise socialising with co-ethnics and build just sufficient Swedish cultural capital to get ahead in the host society. Bipin and Meena, from the second cluster, work in the same Swedish IT firm. Their economic capital has helped them purchase a home in a Swedish neighbourhood, and their son goes to an international school, where he learns Swedish. Nevertheless, they prefer to bond within their own first-generation Malayalee clique. They limit their interaction with Swedes to their immediate neighbourhood, their workplace and their son’s friends’ parents, We both speak very little Swedish. Though my wife speaks more Swedish, I interact more with the Swedes. Our Swedish friends are mainly our colleagues and the parents of our child’s friends. We have not made a conscious effort to engage with Swedes outside of these circles. We interact with our neighbours in English and that does make us feel like outsiders sometimes. The only time we wish we knew more Swedish is during fika (coffee break) sessions in office, when we occasionally fail to understand Swedish humour. The patterns of bridging capital engaged in by first-generation Malayalees point towards Laurence’s (2016) analysis that the levels of trust in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods are contingent upon the degree of integration/segregation in the wider society within which they are nested. Therefore, ethnic minority integration into the wider society, or bridging capital, irrespective of class status, can be impeded or facilitated by the attitude of the host society. First-generation Malayalees in Sweden with a secure job and good Swedish cultural capital have conveyed that they do not feel like outsiders in Sweden, that there is at least an overt acceptance of foreigners. Peter, who arrived in Uppsala in 2002, alludes to this aspect of the Swedish social setting, specifically its open and supportive society and state, to back his argument on why first-generation Malayalees do not need to bond exclusively with other co-ethnics and why they do not need a pan-ethnic association to look after their interests.

Economic and Swedish cultural capital 193 In Sweden, we get equal rights, and once we are hired, we get equal pay as well. We may need a Swedish surname to get a job, yes that is a bias. But, there is more bias in India than there is in Sweden. Sweden is generally very open and liberal. That is one reason why we feel we don’t need to have an association. If the surroundings are conducive to our interests, then what is the need to have strong formal bonding ties with our co-ethnics? We are educated and do not need support of that kind. While the degree of integration already existent in the host society is a crucial determinant of bridging capital, so is the possession of economic and Swedish cultural capital among the immigrant community. When lack of Swedish cultural capital is combined with insecurity in career or insufficient economic capital, there is a tendency to perceive oneself as an immigrant first and seek the company of others who share similar outsider traits. Nitya, who arrived in Uppsala in 2006 to join her husband Rithik, then a PhD candidate, and subsequently pursued her own PhD, explains the systemic inequality that exists within the Swedish academic setting. According to her, the Swedish academic sector is overtly progressive but covertly discriminatory, as they show a bias towards Swedes in the provision of grants and permanent positions. Both she and her husband work in contractual post-doctoral positions, and neither speaks Swedish. They claim that their relationship with the locals is complicated, as they lack knowledge of Swedish, they have unstable careers and they cannot relate to Swedish norms and values. They send their son to an English Dagis as they are not certain of their long-term future in Sweden. First-generation Malayalees attribute their success in the host society to two factors: first, their hitherto-possessed economic capital, with the assistance of which they acquired Swedish cultural capital and attained a middle-class status in Swedish society, and second, to their embrace of certain Swedish values and norms, such as respect for others irrespective of class or status, progressive attitude towards women and gender roles, which have made their integration into local society a relatively undisturbed process.

11.5 Conclusion This chapter has studied patterns of bonding and bridging capital among first-generation Malayalees in Stockholm and Uppsala to understand whether status markers such as ethnicity, race and language are sufficient to reinforce intragroup ties in an alien setting. It has critically engaged with two theoretical paradigms, the Putnamian

194  Renu Vinod and the Bourdeausian, to throw light on social capital formation within a group of first-generation Malayalees whose socialising patterns demonstrate the interplay of economic and Swedish cultural capital within a social universe, in shaping bonding (intragroup) and bridging (intergroup) capital. The study suggests that shared ethnic identity does not invariably lead to the creation of strong bonding capital. In fact, the findings indicate that social engagements within the group are far from mediated by a fixed group identity, such as, in this case, a shared Malayalee ethnic identity. First-generation Malayalees value their economic and Swedish cultural capital and consequently pay attention to whether other community members possess similar characteristics. At the same time, Swedish multiculturalism provides a unique social landscape within which bonding and bridging capital is to be understood. Integration promoted in the wider Swedish community promotes an inclusive Swedish identity while recognising fundamental cultural and religious differences of minorities that encourages their integration into the host society. Having Swedish friends increases one’s status within the firstgeneration Malayalee community. It points to the increased worth of one’s Swedish cultural capital. First-generation Malayalees who belong to the first cluster have more diverse groups, as there were very few Malayalees in Sweden in the beginning. Therefore, their higher Swedish cultural capital has created a symbolic boundary between them and more recent arrivals who have relatively lesser Swedish cultural capital. Some second-cluster Malayalees are keen to engage in intimate bonding with first-cluster members, but not everyone succeeds in making inroads. The second-cluster respondents who have more co-ethnics to bond with make a conscious effort to network with Swedes by living in predominantly Swedish neighbourhoods, getting their children enrolled in local hobby or sports groups and interacting socially with their Swedish co-workers and with the parents of their children’s friends. Bridging capital is possible only up to a point, while more intimate socialising is possible only with one’s co-ethnics. For first-generation Malayalees in the second cluster, the lack of sufficient bonding ties with locals is attributed to having very little in common with them, at least beyond superficial ties of work, neighbourhood and school. Nevertheless, even within intimate bonding circles, one comes across selective intimate socialising, based upon the social universe and varying levels of economic and Swedish cultural capital. Additionally, among some of the second-cluster respondents, there is a deliberate choice to not upgrade their Swedish cultural capital – by

Economic and Swedish cultural capital 195 choosing not to learn Swedish, for example – simply because they have reached a comfort zone comprising, on the one hand, a permanent job in a multinational firm and on the other, membership in an intimate intra–ethnic group clique based on common social universe and similar levels of economic and Swedish cultural capital. Internally, ethnic group members gauge similarities with others based on these factors and decide to invest time and resources in choosing their intimate bonding partners from among those who share similar traits, rather than make the effort to create bonding ties with locals or other middle- to upper-middle-class immigrants. Finally, my own positionality amongst the respondents had its impact on the research process. Though an insider in regard to my Malayalee ethnicity, I was an outsider to the specific social context within which the dynamics of first-generation Malayalee collective behaviour played out. The awareness of my status as an outsider, i.e., as a guest researcher in a foreign locale, became more acute as I realised the challenges in making inroads among the respondents, who were my co-ethnics but also members of intimate cliques, which took precedence over our common ethnic identity.

Notes 1 The Stockholm-based respondents in this study are from Älvsjö, Bromma, Gröndal, Järfälla, Spånga and Stuvsta. The Uppsala-based respondents are from Årsta, Nyby, Slavsta and Stenhagen. 2 Personal conversation via e-mail with R. Gard, Statistics Sweden, on 16 February 2016. 3 Though Kerala has more Muslims than Hindus, the purposive snowball sampling for this study yielded only Hindu and Christian respondents, but no Muslim respondents. As per Census 2011, retrieved from www.census 2011.co.in/data/religion/state/32-kerala.html, on 28 September 2016, Hindus form 54.73 percent, Muslims, 26.56 percent and Christians, 18.38 percent of Kerala’s population. 4 Personal conversation via e-mail with R. Gard, Statistics Sweden, on 16 February 2016. 5 The names of all respondents have been changed to protect their privacy.

References Andrew, Simon A. and Jered B. Carr. 2013. ‘Mitigating Uncertainty and Risk in Planning for Regional Preparedness: The Role of Bonding and Bridging Relationships’, Urban Studies, 50(4): 709–724. http://usj.sagepub.com/con tent/50/4/709.full.pdf+html (accessed 21 September 2016). Barwick, Christine. 2017. ‘Are Immigrants Really Lacking Social Networking Skills? The Crucial Role of Reciprocity in Building Ethnically Diverse

196  Renu Vinod Networks’, Sociology, 51(2): 410–428. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ pdf/10.1177/0038038515596896 (accessed 26 March 2017). Borevi, Karin. 2013. ‘Understanding Swedish Multiculturalism’, in Peter Kivisto and Östen Wahlbeck (eds), Debating Multiculturalism in the Nordic Welfare States, pp. 140–169. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Borevi, Karin. 2015. ‘Family Migration Policies and Politics: Understanding the Swedish Exception’, Journal of Family Issues, 36(11): 1490–1508. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinctions: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Trans. R. Nice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1986. ‘The Forms of Capital’, in John G. Richardson (ed), Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, pp. 241– 258. New York: Greenwood Press. http://faculty.georgetown.edu/irvinem/ theory/Bourdieu-Forms-of-Capital.pdf (accessed 14 December 2015). Bourdieu, Pierre. 1989. ‘Social Space and Symbolic Power’, Sociological Theory, 7(1): 14–25. www.soc.ucsb.edu/ct/pages/JWM/Syllabi/Bourdieu/SocS paceSPowr.pdf (accessed 11 April 2016). Coleman, James S. 1988. ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital’, American Journal of Sociology, Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis of Social Structure, 94: S95–S120. http://courseweb.lis.illinois.edu/~katewill/forchina/readings/coleman%201988%20social%20capital.pdf (accessed 11 December 2015). Cox, James and Wafa H. Orman. 2010. Immigrant Assimilation, Trust and Social Capital. Discussion Paper No. 5063. Bonn: IZA Institute for Labor Economics. http://ftp.iza.org/dp5063.pdf (accessed 14 December 2015). Dhingra, Pawan. 2008. ‘Committed to Ethnicity, Committed to America: How Second-Generation Indian Americans’ Ethnic Boundaries Further Their Americanisation’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 29(1): 41–63. Eastmond, Marita. 1998. ‘Nationalist Discourses and the Construction of Difference: Bosnian Muslim Refugees in Sweden’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 11(2): 161–181. Eastmond, Marita. 2011. ‘Egalitarian Ambitions, Constructions of Difference: The Paradoxes of Refugee Integration in Sweden’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37(2): 277–295. Erel, Umut. 2010. ‘Migrating Cultural Capital: Bourdieu in Migration Studies’, Sociology, 4(4): 642–660. http://soc.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/44/4/642 (accessed 25 September 2016). Field, John. 2003. Social Capital. London, New York: Routledge. Flora, Jan L. 1998. ‘Social Capital and Communities of Place’, Rural Sociology, 63(4): 481–506. Fukuyama, Francis. 2001. ‘Social Capital, Civil Society and Development’, Third World Quarterly, 22(1): 7–20. Geys, Benny and Zuzana Murdoch. 2010. ‘Measuring the ‘Bridging’ Versus ‘Bonding’ Nature of Social Networks: A Proposal for Integrating Existing Measures’, Sociology, 44(3): 523–540. www.wzb.eu/sites/

Economic and Swedish cultural capital 197 default/files/personen/geys.benny.328/sociology_44_3.pdf (accessed 14 December 2015). Grootaert, Christiaan, Deepa Narayan, Veronica N. Jones, and Michael Woolcock. 2004. Measuring Social Capital: An Integrated Questionnaire. World Bank Working Paper No. 18. Washington, DC: The World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15033/ 281100PAPER0Measuring0social0capital.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 11 December 2015). Jarness, Vegard. 2017. ‘Cultural vs Economic Capital: Symbolic Boundaries Within the Middle Class’, Sociology, 51(2): 357–373. http://journals.sage pub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0038038515596909 (accessed 11 April 2017). Joppke, Christian. 2007. ‘Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe’, West European Politics, 30(1): 1–22. Krishna, Anirudh. 2002. Active Social Capital: Tracing the Roots of Development and Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press. Laurence, James. 2016. ‘Wider-Community Segregation and the Effect of Neighbourhood Ethnic Diversity on Social Capital: An Investigation into Intra-Neighbourhood Trust in Great Britain and London’, Sociology, 51(5): 1011–1033.http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0038038516641867 (accessed 25 September 2016). Leonard, Madeleine. 2004. ‘Bonding and Bridging Social Capital: Reflections from Belfast’, Sociology, 38(5): 927–944. http://soc.sagepub.com/con tent/38/5/927.full.pdf+html (accessed 21 September 2016). Lin, Nan. 1999. ‘Building a Network Theory of Social Capital, INSNA’, Connections, 22(1): 28–51. www.insna.org/PDF/Keynote/1999.pdf (accessed 19 December 2015). Lin, Nan. 2000. ‘Inequality in Social Capital’, Contemporary Sociology, 29(6): 785–795. Meer, Nasar, Per Mouritsen, Daniel Faas, and Nynke de Witte. 2015. ‘Examining ‘Postmulticultural’ and Civic Turns in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, and Denmark’, American Behavioral Scientist, 59(6): 702–726. Muir, Jenny. 2011. ‘Bridging and Linking in a Divided Society: A Social Capital Case Study from Northern Ireland’, Urban Studies, 48(5): 959– 976. http://usj.sagepub.com/content/48/5/959.full.pdf+html (accessed 20 September 2016). Myrvold, Kristina. 2012. Swedish Case Study: Indian Migration and Population in Sweden. CARIM-India Research Report 2012/06. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. www.indiaeu-migration.eu/media/CARIM-India-2012%20-%2006.pdf (accessed 15 January 2016). Parusel, Bernd. 2009. ‘Sweden: Country Profile No. 18’, Focus Migration. http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/typo3_upload/groups/3/focus_Migration_ Publikationen/Laenderprofile/CP_18_Sweden.pdf (accessed 16 April 2016). Portes, Alejandro. 1998. ‘Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology’, Annual Review of Sociology, 24: 1–24. www.rect.muni.

198  Renu Vinod cz/summerschool/New_Europe/Module_3/Session%206/6_Portes_Social_ Capital.pdf (accessed 5 December 2015). Portes, Alejandro and Robert D. Manning. 2008. The Immigrant Enclave: Theory and Empirical Examples. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University. www.nyu.edu/classes/jackson/analysis.of.inequality/Readings/Portes%20 -%20Immigrant%20Enclave-Theory%20and%20Empirical%20Exam ples%20-%2086.pdf (accessed 7 February 2016). Portes, Alejandro and Erik Vickstrom. 2011. ‘Diversity, Social Capital, and Cohesion’, The Annual Review of Sociology, 37: 461–479. Portes, Alejandro and Min Zhou. 1993. ‘The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 530: 74–96. Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. New York: Simon and Schuster. Putnam, Robert D. 1995. ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital’, Journal of Democracy, 6(1): 65–78. http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/ detoc/assoc/bowling.html (accessed 11 December 2015). Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. Putnam, Robert D. 2007. ‘E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century, The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 30(2): 137–174. Ryan, Louise, Rosemary Sales, Mary Tilki, and Bernadetta Siara. 2008. ‘Social Networks, Social Support and Social Capital: The Experiences of Recent Polish Migrants in London’, Sociology, 42(4): 672–690. Shah, Bindi, Claire Dwyer, and Tariq Modood. 2010. ‘Explaining Educational Achievement and Career Aspirations Among Young British Pakistanis: Mobilizing “Ethnic Capital”?’ Sociology, 44(6): 1109–1127. http:// journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0038038510381606 (accessed 22 September 2016). Stolle, Dietlind and Marc Hooghe. 2004. ‘Review Article: Inaccurate, Exceptional, One-Sided or Irrelevant? The Debate about the Alleged Decline of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in Western Societies’, British Journal of Political Science, 35: 149–167. Stolle, Dietlind, Sören Petermann, Katharina Schmid, Karen Schönwälder, Miles Hewstone, Steven Vertovec, Thomas Schmitt, and Joe Heywood. 2013. ‘Immigration-Related Diversity and Trust in German Cities: The Role of Intergroup Contact’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 23(3): 279–298. Stolle, Dietlind, and Thomas R. Rochon. 1998. ‘Are All Associations Alike? Member Diversity, Associational Type, and the Creation of Social Capital’, American Behavioral Scientist, 42(1): 47–65. Swedish Migration Agency, Ministry of Justice. 2016. ‘Residence Permits Granted to Close Relatives by Citizenship 1986–2014’. www.migration sverket.se/download/18.36084ac214622cf65991382/1426062977129/

Economic and Swedish cultural capital 199 Tab+4+-+Residence+permits+granted+1986-2014+-+family+reunification. pdf (accessed 25 February 2016). Swedish Migration Agency, Ministry of Justice. 2016. ‘Residence Permits Granted for Labor Market Reasons by Citizenship 2000–2014’. www.migra tionsverket.se/download/18.36084ac214622cf65991384/1426062978502/ Tab+5+-+Temporary+permits+2000-2014-labour+market.pdf (accessed 25 February 2016). Thapar-Bjokert, Suruchi and Gurchathen S. Sanghera. 2010. ‘Social Capital, Educational Aspirations and Young Pakistani Muslim Men and Women in Bradford, West Yorkshire’, The Sociological Review, 58(2): 244–264. Van Oorschot, Wim, Wil A. Arts, and John Gelissen. 2006. ‘Social Capital in Europe: Measurement and Social and Regional Distribution of a Multifaceted Phenomenon’, Acta Sociologica, 49(2): 149–167. Wiesbrock, Anja. 2011. ‘The Integration of Immigrants in Sweden: A Model for the European Union?’, International Migration, 49(4): 48–66. http:// archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/72-immigration-wiesbreck.pdf (accessed 16 January 2016). Zhou, Min and Carl L. Bankston III. 1994. ‘Social Capital and the Adaptation of the Second Generation: The Case of Vietnamese Youth in New Orleans’, International Migration Review, 28(4): 821–845. Zhou, Min and Mingang Lin. 2005. ‘Community Transformation and the Formation of Ethnic Capital: Immigrant Chinese Communities in the United States’, Journal of Chinese Overseas, 1(2): 260–284. www.sscnet. ucla.edu/soc/faculty/zhou/pubs/Zhou_Lin_Ethnic_capital.pdf (accessed 11 December 2015).

12 Transforming homelands Punjabi diaspora and capital flows Rosy Hastir

12.1 Introduction The term ‘migration’ is very broad in its meaning. People change their place of residence for various reasons like employment, education, better lifestyle and also for security reasons. Therefore, socio-economic and political factors are the major cause of migration. Migration of people across borders has become a global phenomenon. There is no doubt that large numbers of people live outside their country of origin, and many more are continuously on the move to various developed countries for greater opportunities. Increased demand for labour and global production of world economies has become the boon for further migration. Thus, these migrations which are originating from different places are reshaping and transforming societies around the world (Barsan and Bolaria, 2003). The Sikh community is scattered around the world while at the same time retaining strong ties with their homeland. ‘Sikhs have become a paradigmatic transnational community charting what Arjun Appadurai has called ‘a new, post-national cartography’’ (Dusenbery and Tatla, 2009: 3). The kind of vital links these diasporic Sikhs maintain with their homeland further channel the resources, information and values between the host and home countries (Barrier, 2007). Tatla (1999: 6) argues that the diasporic Sikh community maintains strong links with their homeland through memories and religious connections. Initially, they were small in numbers in the Indian or Punjabi diaspora, but with the passage of time their numbers became significant in the vast Indian diaspora. There are numerous features like social values, religion, linguistic bonds and ethnic identity which make them a distinct community in the Indian diaspora. He further adds that majority of the Sikh migrants voluntarily migrated while others were pushed to migrate due to political circumstances to escape state

Transforming homelands 201 violence. Broadly there are three countries where this community has significant population – Canada, Britain and the United States. The period of decolonisation also witnessed the remigration of Sikhs from East Africa and the Far East to various Western countries. Emigration of single male migrants largely occurred in the colonial period, while in the post-colonial period they started settling with their families. According to Dusenbery and Tatla (2009: 3) the Punjabi community is the leading transnational community who are pioneers in sending back remittances to their families settled in the homeland. In a globalised world India ranked as top recipient of remittances sending by their people settled in Western countries and Punjab in particular, where the flow of capital is immense. They also contributed significantly to the development of their ancestral villages. When Diaspora philanthropists give projects in their ancestral homeland, they do not just make capital indiscriminately available for local use; rather they fund particular kinds of activities that they consider necessary and valuable. There is no doubt, only those NRIs are involved in philanthropic activities for their homeland who are well-established and accumulate wealth in the host country. The act of giving back to their ancestral villages provides them a sense of gratification. Constructing a village gate with their names inscribed on it gives them popularity in the village. After landing in foreign countries, their prime purpose is to send remittance to their family members in their village homeland. Once settled in the host country migrants start sponsoring their family members and fellow-kin members to migrate. When the migrant’s family unites abroad in the country of immigration, then their next target is to contribute their share of wealth for the development of the village community. They are usually aware of the existing problems in their ancestral villages, whether it is drainage, sewerage, shortage of schools and hospitals or disorganised cultural activities and sports tournaments and so on. According to Thandi (2008) although there have been wealthy individuals who undertook philanthropic work on their own and in their own way, most of the community remittances currently being mobilised are through the development of hometown or village welfare associations. In the entire process of circular migration remittances largely play a vital role in connecting the individuals back to their homeland. Social remittances are the other significant factors through which there is an exchange of ideas, values and belief in the host as well as home country. In an earlier work Thandi (2006) noted the range of philanthropic activities by migrants in terms of charity which

202  Rosy Hastir includes gurdwara donations, clothes and computers. As far as infrastructure is concerned, it includes hospitals, nursing colleges, parks, sports complexes, street paving and lighting, mortuaries, sewerage and water. He has also talked about human development like scholarships, libraries, IT and health infrastructure as well as recreational things like sports facilities and sports tournaments. In case of investment it includes various programmes for the improvement of village community life such as waste and water recycling. Scholars of migration, some of whose work I have discussed above, have shown that historically and in the contemporary period, migration shapes the lives of people both in the places of origin and in places of destination. Migrant communities must therefore be studied as ‘transnational’ because they cross different kinds of boundaries, in terms of movements of goods, people, ideas and cultures, creating and transforming spaces across the globe. It is this framework of the ‘transnational’ nature of migrants that I hope to study through my work on Punjabi migrants and the diverse links they maintain across national/ transnational boundaries. Taking the issue of migrants crossing different boundaries as well as the ideas raised by studies of migrants in places of origin and in places of destination, I decided to conduct fieldwork in one village of Punjab and two settlements of Sikh migrants in Italy to study the processes of immigration. In Punjab, I selected Kharoudi village because of its transnational movements and the connections which migrants maintain with this village. In Italy, my field sites were two significant regions of Sikh settlement – Bergamo and Reggio Emilia. In both cases I have focused on the socio-economic background of Punjabis, impact on their families left behind, links they maintain across borders, remittances, philanthropic activities in their homeland and integration with the host society. It was interesting to study the transnational movement of Punjabis in the global diaspora and the links they maintained with their country of origin. The main reason I have done multi-sited fieldwork was to look at the transnational links migrants maintain with their homeland. While the sets of people I met and interviewed in village Kharoudi and migrants settled in Bergamo and Reggio Emilia in Italy are not related to each other, nevertheless the patterns of remittances, philanthropic activities, visits to the village for marriages, attending functions, and religious shrines seemed to suggest that the village and the transnational settlement reflected broader patterns that migrants maintain between their place of residence and their villages of origin. Thus these two different field sites are not connected in any way, as no one from Kharoudi migrated to Bergamo and Reggio Emilia, and no migrants

Transforming homelands 203 from Bergamo and Reggio Emilia were from Kharoudi whom I met. Punjabi migrants in Italy originated from the different places in Punjab like TarnTarn, Jalandhar, Kapurthala, Hoshiarpur, Nawanshar, Barnala, Phagwara, Moga, Jalandhar, Ludhiana, Patiala and Amritsar. They are from small villages of these districts, and some of them also belong to Ludhiana, Patiala and Amritsar cities. Among them a majority emigrated from Jalandhar and Hoshiarpur districts of Punjab.

12.2 Pattern of migration: Kharoudi village My choice of village Kharoudi as a field site was inspired by the video on YouTube called ‘Modern Village Kharoudi’, which features the prominent returned migrant Baldev Singh, a retired engineer from Abu Dhabi. In the YouTube video, Baldev Singh introduces the viewers to the conspicuous signs of transnational migration that are evident in the public spaces of the village as well as his own domestic space. For example, we, the viewers, are shown a water tank in the shape of an airplane, solar light panels and motorable roads. One is also shown a board which reads ‘Village Kharoudi Lifestyle Improvement Project, A Co-operative effort of Kharoudi NRIs and local villagers with the support of government of Punjab’. During the Gram Pushkar Awards ceremony in New Delhi held on 24 February 2005, the president of India, APJ Abdul Kalam, referred to this village as ‘The Model Village’ in Hoshiarpur. Kharoudi therefore is a well-known village across Punjab not only in terms of its long-established transnational connections but also its infrastructural development like family theatre, primary schools with computer facilities, sewerage system, two children’s parks, solar heater systems and solar street lighting. Dusenbery and Tatla (2009) in their discussion of diaspora philanthropy in Punjab have discussed in detail the contribution of transnational migrants to the infrastructural transformations of Punjabi villages. In their work, especially the first section of the volume highlights Sikh diaspora philanthropy in the contexts of giving. They introduced NRIs as the new VIPs of Punjab. Global dispersion of Sikhs and the strong links which they maintained with their ancestral and spiritual homeland Punjab encourage them to share some part of their income in different kinds of projects in Punjab, which ranges from family consumption to political and religious agendas. Remittances for community development, social investment and charitable or philanthropic work are also recognised. Dusenbery and Tatla have analysed this philanthropy as ‘private giving for local good’ in the ancestral homeland.

204  Rosy Hastir The patterns of links maintained by migrants with their places of origin are like patterns observed elsewhere and are replicated in Kharoudi. The village is therefore a good example of migrants and their links to home. One such crucial pattern of links is evident in remittances. Remittance is the money or other capital goods which migrants usually send back to their home or country of origin. Remittance is characteristic of internal and international migration. During my fieldwork in 2011–2012 there were 137 households, and the total population of the village was 644 currently resident in the village, excluding the 5 locked households. I interviewed one person from each household; which means the total number of interviewees was 137. The total population of currently resident villagers (644) also includes short-term NRI visitors even though they don’t usually live there. Out of the 137 households in the village, 93 households are those where at least one member or more than one member has emigrated overseas. Among the 137 households covered during the period of my research, my respondents, namely the ‘household reference persons’, varied from returned migrants, to short-term NRIs visitors, migrants currently abroad, servants and caretakers of NRI homes. Respondents were from all caste groups, though the predominant two groups were Ad-Dharmi and Jat. Migration from the village was to diverse countries across the globe including Canada, the United States, UK and European countries and various Middle Eastern countries; the majority seemed to be going to Dubai. Men outnumbered women migrants, and migration without family rather than with family was the predominant pattern. It is clear that migration was not homogeneous across caste or class. Richer, high-caste landholders had a different pattern of migration, connections and linkages to the Kharoudi in comparison to poorer, lower-caste, landless migrants. For example, landless lower castes migrated primarily to Gulf countries. Most of them were employed as labourers in Dubai, Lebanon, Oman and Abu Dhabi. Few people from among the lower caste migrated to Italy and England. The fieldwork of Kharoudi has given me insights into the present scenario of migration and its future implications. In particular the fieldwork of migration patterns in Kharoudi gives me insights into the migrations of two major caste groups of villagers – the Jats (uppercaste) and Ad-Dharmi (lower-caste) migrants. An analysis of the migration patterns reveals the complex picture that migration as a process presents in the life of the village itself and how the different categories of migrants affect the life of the village as a whole. I have categorised

Transforming homelands 205 them as big fish and small fish. Big fish are the main transformers of Kharoudi village. The majority of the migrants that contributed to the gurdwara in the village were from upper-/dominant-caste households; however, the Schedule Caste contribution to the gurdwara is also significant. Overall village development which includes village infrastructure, school, health club and cremation centre was an important focus of contribution for upper/dominant caste households; almost an equal number from among them donated for village improvement as well as toward the gurdwara; Scheduled Caste contributions seem to be towards religious institutions. Today, Kharoudi village is known as a modern or model village. The transnational villagers of Kharoudi keep on moving between their two homes, and sometimes more than two homes. One is the country of emigration and another in the country of immigration. The notion of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ is more precise for the first-generation migrants who are born and brought up in the village because second-generation and third-generation migrants seem to consider only one home where they were born and brought up and usually get married with the spouses there. However, even in their negative feelings towards village homes of Punjab, there is a relationship they acknowledge of their ‘roots’. This acknowledgement translates through music, fashion, names and often religious or ritual practices, through which an idea of ‘home’ is formed and maintained. It shows that attachment with the roots or with the ancestral village, though diminishing from generation to generation, is ultimately not totally absent. However, it does affect the contribution for village development and active involvement in philanthropic activities in homeland. So it would be interesting to study the future prospect of many transnational villages like Kharoudi after another two decades to see the effects of the subsequent generations and their links with village life in Kharoudi.

12.3 Punjabi migrants in Italy Italy has the second-largest Sikh population in Europe after the United Kingdom. They number more than 70, 000 (about 0.12 percent of total Italian population). There are about twenty-two gurdwaras across the country, though some sources put the number of gurdwaras at about fifteen (en.wikipedia.org). In Italy’s central Emilia-Romagna region, home to the famous cheese; cattle herds that produce milk for parmesan are managed by Indians, mainly from the 30,000 strong Sikh communities. ‘If

206  Rosy Hastir Sikh workers go on strike, Italy will not produce parmesan, not a chance’, said by Italian. (www.sikhphilosophy.com) According to Bertolani (2011) the vast settlement of Sikhs in the Emilia-Romagna region encouraged them to open their first gurdwara in Italy. Early migrants were mostly employed in the circus to earn their livelihood, which also became enablers for their friends’ and relatives’ migration. Bertolani, Ferraris and Perocco (2011: 139) also analyse the significant numbers of Indian migrants in Italy who have developed a remarkable relation with local Italian people. More than 50,000 of Punjabis, mostly Sikhs are spread across towns such as Reggio Emilia, Casina, Bergamo and Brescia, a far cry from Kapurthala, Hoshiarpur or Ludhiana, labouring with quiet determination and doing jobs the Italians is unavailable for or unwilling to do. (www.sikhchic.com) The establishment of metal-mechanical factories and various food industries especially the production of famous Parmesan cheese in Reggio Emilia region has led to the vast settlement of Indian migrants. Authors further mentioned that cow-milking was another prominent field of work in Emilia which provided employment to many migrants. This field required hard work but it also offered good salary and accommodation within the farm, which enabled migrants to continue the system of family reunification. This job was also protected from economic crisis because of the organised milk quotas. The idea held by most Italian employers that Indians treated the cow as a holy animal further opened the gate of work opportunities for Indians and Sikhs. Thus, the province of Reggio Emilia has become a dense settlement of migrants and facilitated the system of family reunification (Bertolani et al., 2011). The scattered population of the Sikh community in Italy shows that their settlements in different areas are not alike. In some places they are well settled with their families where their wives are also working and children studying in Italian schools. On the other side they are still struggling hard to acquire jobs with good salary and saving every penny to send back to their families in India. Another finding shows that the Sikh community in Lazio and Sabaudia areas is not well settled especially due to linguistic barriers, which undoubtedly are a major problem for migrants (Bertolani, Ferraris and Perocco,

Transforming homelands 207 2011). In case of my research many respondents have told me that they encountered language problems when they were working under Italians, but when they have other Sikh workers then it was convenient for them to speak in their own language, and they helped each other to communicate with their Italian owner. Gradually they started speaking Italian, although they still feel that their children who are studying in Italian schools speak better Italian and sometimes correct them. Punjabis settled in Italy, a destination that has emerged over the last couple of decades unlike the older destinations of the UK and Canada, which have a longer history of migration and settlements. Initially a majority of the migrants I met and interviewed migrated illegally to Italy, but eventually some of them were granted legal status as residents. Others, however, are still struggling with their illegal/unsettled/ undocumented status. For the field research I selected two very important places of Sikh settlement in Italy, Bergamo and Reggio Emilia. During my research I observed that the Sikh community was not residing in cities but in very small villages of these regions. The reason for this was that workplaces like factories, agricultural fields and dairy farming were all situated near villages, so it was quite convenient for them to settle in the village. I also decided to visit the gurdwaras located in these two regions and interviewed many people there. This is another interesting fact that wherever there is a large number of Sikhs there is at least one gurdwara. In the region of Reggio Emilia the gurdwara was located at Novellara village. As far as Bergamo region is concerned the gurdwara is located in Cortenuova village. These two Sikh shrines prove to be a better place to meet the respondents, because on weekends from many small villages they visit their nearby gurdwara with families. Before arriving in the field I decided to conduct six case studies: three from Bergamo and another three from Reggio Emilia. But during fieldwork I met lots of Punjabi families in the gurdwara, so besides these six case studies I also conducted twenty-four interviews. Respondents for my study were both male and female. On one side male respondents were able to reveal their history of migration, their job experiences and the problems they faced in the host country. On the other side female respondents of whom a majority were housewives provided significant information about their social and cultural experiences in Italy. Respondents of my research belonged to both the upper/dominant caste which includes (Jat, Brahmin and Khatri) and Schedule Caste which includes the Ravidasis. In terms of occupation migrants are largely engaged in manual labour like working in agricultural fields and metal factories. Some of them are self-employed. A majority who are

208  Rosy Hastir largely engaged with manual labour usually earn 1,000–2,000 euros per month. Those who are self-employed manage to earn/save 2,000– 3,000 euros per month. Very few of them earn less than 1,000 euros per month, and they are mostly single migrants who lack permanent jobs in Italy. Many Sikh migrants who have established their own transport, restaurant and agency businesses in Italy become renowned figures in their local newspaper and magazines. They have their own visiting cards in Italian, English and Punjabi which they give to the local people. Sometimes they also sponsor their business work during sports tournaments of their community and cultural programmes in Italy. Punjabi migrants mostly fall in the age group of 36–45 years. Some are in the age group of 25–35, and a few are 46–55 years old. Only very few of them belong to the age group of 56–65 years old. As far as their education level is concerned, most of them studied up to high school level followed by primary education and university undergraduates. Only one respondent reached up to post-graduate level. Migrants mostly migrated with their families. Only four of them were single male migrants. Nuclear family household was the most prominent family structure among them, rather than the joint family household which was the structure in their village homes. Respondents’ wives were mostly housewives rather than working outside of their home. Those who were working outside were largely employed in factories. It was interesting to note that most migrated in the years of 1991–2000. Some migrants arrived in the decade of 1980–1990, and others arrived between the years of 2001–2010, demonstrating the recent migration to Italy. If I look at the type of permit they had at the time of migration, it’s clear that a majority of them illegally migrated to Italy, but they got legal permission of residence and work permits later on. A few of them arrived on a tourist visa. Very few of the migrants were sponsored or managed to travel with a work permit visa. When I asked the respondents their initial country of migration, a majority of them said they first arrived in other European countries like Greece, Holland, England and so on. Ten respondents said they arrived directly to Italy, their first country of migration. Very few of them stated Middle East and Asian countries as their initial country of migration. Respondents gave different reasons to choose Italy as their country of immigration and settlement. Most of them said that it’s easy to get work permits in Italy, while others said that the family reunification system of Italy was the reason to choose this as their country of immigration. Requirement of cheap labour in factories, agricultural farms and dairy farms provides occupation to unskilled migrants, which further

Transforming homelands 209 led them to get work permits in Italy. According to the respondents when one gets permanent work in Italy documents are obtained from the employer which ensure work permits in Italy. An Italian work permit is usually sponsored by Italian employers. Migrants have to renew their work permit every two years. Very few of them said that it was easy to get a tourist visa for Italy or to get married to Italian women to enable migration as compared to other countries. It was also very interesting to look at the relation of remittances and philanthropic activities to their homeland. A majority of migrants are not very active in sending remittances back home due to the reason that their wives and children are staying with them in Italy. A majority of them revealed that they are not very active in philanthropic projects in their homeland. However, when we look at the issue of philanthropy from the perspective of the village, then the example of Kharoudi shows us that philanthropic activity is prevalent in the village, and Punjabi villages benefit greatly from such NRI investment. From the perspective of the migrants they speak of their involvement in village development as a way of ‘improving’ homes, drawing attention to the links and networks that philanthropy creates between migrants and village. One migrant (Ranjit Singh) whom I interviewed in Italy was active in both remittances and philanthropic activity in his village in Punjab. Every year he organises a free health camp for his villagers in Punjab. He collaborates on this health camp with his brother who is settled in England. During the health camp I personally visited him in his ancestral village. The organisation of the health camp shows Ranjit’s attachment to his roots. From a religious perspective, he considered this activity as vandshaknna or sharing the prosperity and wealth with others through charity. He told me that when you do something good for others it gives you satisfaction, and your wealth also increases when you share some part of it with other people. His life story depicts the transnational life of a migrant who maintained links back with his homeland. His constant movements are not only between India and Europe but also to other European and Western countries, which represents the continuing global movement of migrants. The most significant part of his biography was his movement not only between the country of immigration (Italy) and emigration (Punjab) but also to other European and Western countries for sustenance. He frequently visited other countries for work and to earn more money. He strongly holds the notion that Canada is more prosperous and developed than Italy. Therefore he keeps on travelling there, looking for permanent settlement for his family.

210  Rosy Hastir Of all European countries, Italy is understood as another homeland for Sikh migrants. Their increasing population and the number of gurdwaras are the prime expression of their settlement and their desire to create community. For most of the migrants, Italy was never their first choice as destination country; most of them wanted to settle down in England or Germany. But Italy has provided more opportunities to find work whether it be in circus, agricultural, dairy farming or factory work. This particular country was also more lenient towards migrants from different nations, providing work permits and permissions to bring families. After some years when they realise their working lives, their income, their well-settled families here and especially the difference of the lifestyle between India and Italy, are desirable in all respects then Italy becomes their desirable country for immigration. Irrespective of all their responses and various perceptions it cannot be denied that Italy has the second-largest population of Sikhs in Europe after England. Whether they still want to move with their families to other Western countries or different countries in Europe is still an issue; but Italy has provided them work, shelter and a better life for their families. That is the reason all migrants blessed Italy and consider it as their own homeland. They have adapted to the extent that they never want to leave their new home – that is, Europe – and feel like strangers in their own homeland.

12.4 Conclusion In the present age of global movement, migrants no longer inhabit an enclosed space as their daily practices draw simultaneously from both sending and receiving communities/countries. Now they can be conceived as ‘transmigrants’, which means those migrants whose mundane lives depend on multiple and constant interconnection across transnational borders and whose public identities are recognised by more than one nation state. After migration, they have been called by different names in Punjab like NRIs, OPs (overseas Punjabis), Pravasi and new VIPs (very important persons), the last term used by Tatla (2009) to characterise a new status of migrant in Punjab. The pattern of migration not only influenced the migrant but also influenced the families left behind. The notion of transforming the village or giving back to the home depends on multiple factors like ownership of land in the village, history of migration, country of immigration and status of the migrant abroad – in other words, on the nature of transnational links that migrants maintain and foster. The migration of upper-caste Jatis has

Transforming homelands 211 been mostly to the United States, Canada and European countries, though my fieldwork in Italy established the strong presence of Jat migrants there as well. On the other hand, Ad-Dharmi migrants mostly migrated on work permits or illegally with the help of agents to Europe and the Middle East. In case of Jat migrants they migrated with their families, whereas, Ad-Dharmi migrants mostly migrated without families. The temporary migration of Gulf migrants is also because of citizenship/nationality/permit policies in the Gulf countries. Irregular/illegal migration from Kharoudi was mostly to Western/ European countries rather than gulf countries. Migrants going to gulf countries were on work permit visas. Gulf migration nevertheless is temporary migration, so it cannot be considered the migrant’s country of destination. The ‘Village Kharoudi Lifestyle Improvement Project’, a co-operative effort of Kharoudi NRIs and local villagers with support of Government of Punjab, distinguished this village from other villages in Hoshiarpur district. It was an effort undertaken primarily by uppercaste migrants and particularly those who were permanent migrants or return migrants. Scheduled Caste migrants were relatively recent migrants, and they had not earned enough to be able to contribute to large and expensive infrastructural projects. Their ‘contributions’ to the village were primarily to religious institutions in the form of ‘offerings’ or charava. My fieldwork in Italy reveals that the capital flows and philanthropic activities by migrants are not as significant as that of the Kharoudi NRIs. There is only one respondent I met who is active in maintaining strong ties with his homeland in terms of remittances and philanthropic activities. In my study I have looked at the two different sides of migration – from country of origin to country of destination. My extensive fieldwork in one village of Punjab and other fieldwork in two significant regions in Italy where Punjabi – mainly Sikh – migrants has settled, have broadened my understanding of migration as a kind of travel between these multiple zones. The phenomenon of migration wraps the migrant in its own complexities, dynamic changes and multiple experiences which migrants encounter before and after migration. On one hand it provides opportunities for economic development but on the other hand it creates the complex milieu of socio-cultural setting for the migrant. My study highlighted the fact that migration proved to be a boon for some migrants while it is a bane for others. The constant flux of the migrant in search of better life empowers them to encounter the changes and challenges in the destination countries and at the same time to remain active and connected with their roots.

212  Rosy Hastir Thus, in this contemporary pattern of diaspora movements, migrants are not alienated and dislocated from their roots. It is not about breaking emotional ties and complete separation from their homeland. In fact it is an amalgamation of opportunities and obstacles, aspirations and alienation, ambitions and depression which is expressed in the figure of the migrant.

References Barsan, Gurcharn S. and B. Singh Bolaria. 2003. The Sikhs in Canada: Migration, Race, Class, and Gender. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Barrier, N. Gerald. 2007. “Sikh emigrants and their homelands: The transmission of information resources and values in the early twentieth century” in Ajaya K. Sahoo and Brij Maharaj (eds) Sociology of Diaspora: A Reader, vol. 2, pp. 663–689. New Delhi: Rawat Publications. Bertolani, Barbara. 2011. The Sikhs in Italy: A growing heterogeneous and plural presence. Religion and Social Order, 23: 75–93. Bertolani, B., F. Ferraris, and F. Perocco. 2011. “Mirror games: A fresco of Sikh settlement among Italian local societies” in Knut A. Jacobsen and Kristina Myrvold (eds) Sikhs in Europe: Migration, Identities and Representations, pp. 133–161. Farnham: Ashgate. Dusenbery, Verne A. and Darshan S. Tatla. 2009. “Introduction: NRIs are the new VIPs” in Verne A. Dusenbery and Darshan S. Tatla (eds) Sikh Diaspora Philanthropy in Punjab: Global Giving for Local Good, pp. 2–30. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Tatla, Darshan S. 1999. The Sikh Diaspora: The Search for Statehood. London, UK: UCL Press. Thandi, Shinder S. “Punjabi Diaspora and Homeland Relations”. www.indiaseminar.com//2006/567/shinder-s-thandi.htm* (accessed 30 April 2017). Thandi, Shinder S. 2008. “Evaluating the potential contribution of the Punjabi diaspora to rural development” in Autar S. Dhesi and Gurmail Singh (eds) Rural Development in Punjab: A Success Story Going Astray, pp. 446–459. New Delhi: Routledge. Tatla, Darshan S. 2009. “Sikh diaspora philanthropy: Direction, incentives and impact on Punjab” in Verne A. Dusenbery and Darshan S. Tatla (eds) Sikh Diaspora Philanthropy in Punjab: Global Giving for Local Good, pp. 236–270. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Internet sources Sirohi, Seema. ‘Sikhs in Italy’. www.sikhchic.com//sikhs_in_Italy (accessed 14 August 2012).

13 Diasporic ageing and home-making practices of Hindustani Surinamese older adults in the Netherlands Marleen Fluit, Ajay Bailey and Ruben Bouwman 13.1 Introduction Post-war migrants in Europe are now ageing in the country of destination (White, 2006). Within the Netherlands the four largest groups of non-Western migrants are from Morocco, Turkey, Suriname and the Antilles (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2016). The share of older non-Western migrants within the Dutch population is increasing (den Draak & de Klerk, 2011). Although the topic of older migrants has gained more attention during the last decade, it has not been explored to a great extent within migration studies and gerontology (Ciobanu et al., 2017; King et al., 2017). In addition, several studies (Bilecen, 2017; Buffel, 2015; Palmberger, 2017) have focused predominantly on guest workers from Turkey. Therefore, in an attempt to address this gap, this study focuses on older Surinamese migrants living in the Netherlands. On 1 January 2017, 349,978 Surinamese, including the first (place of birth Suriname) and the second generation (place of birth the Netherlands), were living in the Netherlands, and 30,483 of the first generation were aged 65 and older (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2017). Considering the ethnic diversity of Surinamese migrants, this paper focuses on Hindustani Surinamese who form, together with the Creoles, the largest group of Surinamese living in the Netherlands (Choenni, 2013). The majority of the Surinamese population in the Netherlands are concentrated in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. In particular, Hindustanis and Creoles are largely clustered in the cities, and other ethnic groups are more spatially distributed (Oudhof et al., 2011). Hindustanis form a religious diverse group consisting of Hindus, Muslims and Christians (Choenni, 2013). Choenni (2013) argues that overall older Hindustani

214  Marleen Fluit, Ajay Bailey and Ruben Bouwman Surinamese adults feel satisfied in the Netherlands and have integrated within the Dutch society. Being able to adapt to the Dutch lifestyle and the ability to still retain many of their cultural traditions and maintain their unique cultural identity were perceived to be important factors for feeling satisfied about living in the Netherlands (Choenni, 2013). The home-making process of migrants is examined in multiple ethnographic studies (Mazumdar & Mazumdar, 2009; Rosales, 2010; Boccagni, 2014). For migrants the process of home-making is a transnational process. Migrants reconstruct connections with the country of origin by practicing old routines within a new context and by putting certain objects in the house that are part of their cultural values and family history and have strong linkages with the country or family they have left behind (Blunt & Dowling, 2006). Home and domestic space becomes central to the lives of the older adults as with age their geographies of mobility get limited. With ill health or disability this becomes even more exacerbated. Hence the home becomes a source of refuge where the older adults can still retain many of their memories and have a greater control on the changes taking place around them. This process is largely referred to as ageing in place (Rubinstein & Parmelee, 1992; Wiles, 2005).The focus of this article is on the homemaking practices that contribute to the well-being of older Hindustani Surinamese living in the Netherlands. The aim of this chapter is to examine the home-making practices of older Hindustani Surinamese living in the Netherlands. In order to examine this the following research question is formulated: ‘How do older Hindustani Surinamese living in the Netherlands create and sustain a sense of home?’

13.2 Home-making Blunt and Dowling (2006) state that the definition of home consists of multiple elements that are inter-related to each other. The physical space, tangible and intangible objects, meanings and feelings of belonging are embedded within the home and these elements relate to each other. Moreover, the home can be seen as a place where identities are formed. These identities can be produced by power relations such as the division of labour according to certain gender roles within the household. In a similar way, Boccagni (2014) and Rosales (2010) discuss that home-making can be seen as an ongoing process whereby meaningful tangible and intangible objects and relations are transferred into a home. This process is negotiated by members of the household. Through home-making individuals create their meaning of

Hindustani Surinamese in the Netherlands 215 home within foreign and impersonal spaces (Blunt & Dowling, 2006). According to Blunt and Dowling (2006) the meaning of home exceeds the physical space of the home and therefore the home-making process can involve the neighbourhood and the community. This is in line with Wiles et al. (2009), who explain that the individual perception of the neighbourhood and how the amenities are perceived is believed to influence well-being. Altman and Low (1992) describe that a space embedded with meaning assigned by individuals or a group becomes a place. This is in line with Rubinstein and Parmelee (1992), who argue that the time spent, personal experiences and social relations are related to assigning meaning to a place. Hidalgo and Hernández (2001) refer to place attachment as an affective connection that an individual or a group has with a particular place. Rubinstein and Parmelee (1992) argue that the attachment to places of older people is influenced by past experiences and identity. Place attachment is related to the life course. Older people might have feelings that are associated with experiences that occurred in a particular place. These feelings help older people to remember certain past experiences. In this way, older people create a sense of continuity. The present connections to places are important to the feeling of autonomy of older people. The connection to places can change over time and can be influenced by events within the life course. As people age they can create new connections to places (Rubinstein & Parmelee, 1992). Similarly, Wiles et al. (2009) describe that the attachment to places of older people is linked to familiarity, family living close by and the location of the home. The meaning older people give to personal objects and the way the objects are displayed create a place. Within the home older people can make their own decisions and in this way feel autonomous. Other important aspects of the home are security, memories and the home as a meeting place (Dahlin-Ivanoff et al., 2007). In order to age in place, some older people have to make adjustments to their homes or relocate and in this way have to remake place (Rowles & Watkins, 2003). Rowles and Watkins (2003) discuss that through memories and the rearranging of objects and furniture older people remake their place. Rosales (2010) argues that home-making is a cultural process for migrants whereby they adjust and adapt their past routines to the new environment. For migrants the home is a place where they deal with feelings from the place they left behind, and the home is a place where new feelings of belonging are created. In her study Buffel (2015) found that for migrants a sense of home was linked to transnationalism. Some migrants have connections with both their homeland and

216  Marleen Fluit, Ajay Bailey and Ruben Bouwman the environment they currently live in and are emotionally attached to both places. Moreover, family and social ties with other people in the neighbourhood are important to create a sense of home. In addition, Lager et al. (2012) discuss that older migrants were attached to places in the new environment that resemble the country of origin and to places that involve social interaction. In a similar way, Ehrkamp (2005) argues that for some migrants a sense of belonging to the neighbourhood is enhanced by the expression of the cultural identity within the neighbourhood. For example, the presence of churches or mosques and other facilities related to the country of origin can foster attachments to the neighbourhood. These facilities symbolise the country of origin (Ehrkamp, 2005). According to Rosales (2010) it is important for migrants to express their culture and identity within the home. Meijering and Lager (2014) discuss that objects of the country of origin remind migrants of their home. Additionally, Bilecen (2017) argues that by placing such objects in the home, migrants create a sense of home within the host country. The objects often symbolise the homeland and by placing these objects in the home, migrants feel connected to their homeland. Another aspect of culture that can be expressed through the home is religion. Religion can be expressed through rituals, objects and art within the home. Through religious artefacts and performing rituals, migrants can create feelings of belonging within the new environment (Mazumdar & Mazumdar, 2009).

13.3 Research context The study is based on interviews conducted in four co-housing communities for older Hindustani Surinamese adults in Amsterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. The largest population of Hindustanis are living within these cities (see Oudhof et al., 2011) and therefore the decision was made to conduct the study in Amsterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. The four co-housing communities are Jaffar Autar, Dama Ramautar, Apna Ghar and Ratan Kalloe.1 The co-housing communities in this study are especially built for Hindustani Surinamese adults aged fifty and above. Each co-housing community consists of twenty-five to thirty dwellings.

13.4 Study design The interpretative paradigm is the underlying approach of this study, and an explanatory study has been conducted. Flick (2015) describes that the interpretative paradigm is often used in qualitative research.

Hindustani Surinamese in the Netherlands 217 The experiences and interpretations of participants are central within this paradigm (Flick, 2015). In line with Flick (2015), Hennink et al. (2011) discuss that the interpretative paradigm involves an emic perspective. An emic perspective can be referred to as the inside perspective or the perspective of the participant. Within the interpretative paradigm the experiences and the interpretations of a person are understood from the perspective of that person. Moreover, it acknowledges that both the researcher and the participants are subjective and therefore the background of the researcher influences the data (Hennink et al., 2011).

13.5 Method data collection Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted. Hennink et al. (2011) describe that in an in-depth interview particular themes are discussed in depth. This method allows for a better understanding of certain themes from the point of view of the participant or the emic perspective. In-depth interviews enable to listen to the experiences, stories, feelings and interpretations of an individual. A semi-structured interview guide was developed with open questions regarding the main topics such as home-making, place attachment, material culture, use of objects for cultural life and living arrangements. Interviews enabled the participant to share his or her experiences.

13.6 Recruitment method participants At each study site the participants were recruited in slightly different ways. In Dama Ramautar a presentation was given, and residents could fill out their names on a list if they wanted to participate. Other participants were recruited through assistance of the chairman and snowballing method. This method allows the recruitment of participants with specific characteristics. After an interview the participant is asked whether they know someone else who would like to participate in the study. Participants trust the person who referred them to the researcher, and therefore they are more likely to participate. However, it is important that multiple starting points are used in order to prevent that the participants are all from the same social network and share similar thoughts (Hennink et al., 2011). In Apna Ghar, participants are recruited through the gatekeepers method. Through this method participants are recruited by the coordinator, who is respected within the community. The gatekeeper is a person who has knowledge about the community and often knows who would be willing to

218  Marleen Fluit, Ajay Bailey and Ruben Bouwman participate. In this way, it can be easier to recruit participants, because the participants trust the gatekeepers and are therefore more willing to participate. Participation in the research is voluntary, and participants should not be forced to participate by the gatekeepers (Hennink et al., 2011). The participants in Ratan Kalloe are recruited by a stakeholder from a foundation that organises activities in order to bring people from different cultural backgrounds together. In Jaffar Autar, a younger resident helped with the recruitment of participants. A total of twenty interviews were conducted including an interview with the key informant. The interviews were conducted within the home of the participants. In addition to the interviews photographs were taken by the interviewer.

13.7 Participant profile Some of the participants in this study are younger than sixty-five. These participants are included in the study, because they live in a cohousing community for older adults, have experienced migration and have engaged in the process of home-making, and their experiences are relevant for the study. The participants in this study are from Hindustani Surinamese origin. The majority of the participants are Hindu. Some participants are Muslim, and a few participants are Christian. The participants have migrated to the Netherlands for various reasons. The four main motivations are education, the political situation in Suriname, family reunification and healthcare. Some participants had the opportunity to study in the Netherlands, and this was their main motivation for migration. Other people in this study migrated during the 1970s as a result of the political situation in Suriname. During this time schools were closed, and participants wanted to give their children a better future by migrating to the Netherlands. Other men and women in this study were afraid of what the situation would be after Suriname gained independence and fled to The Netherlands. Another reason for migration is family reunification. Some participants already had siblings or children living in the Netherlands and wanted to be reunited with them. Also, the healthcare system in the Netherlands is perceived to be better compared to the healthcare system in Suriname. This was a reason for migration for participants with health problems or for those who had family with health problems. Only a few participants had the opportunity to study at a university. Whereas, other people in this study completed vocational training. Some participants did not have the opportunity to finish high school, as they were expected to work, get married or take care of their parents.

Hindustani Surinamese in the Netherlands 219 Some participants had low-paid jobs in the Netherlands and had to do more physical work. As a result, they got health problems and had to retire early. Others migrated later to the Netherlands and have not worked for a long period, and therefore their pension is low. A few participants are more highly educated and had better paid jobs. Their financial situation is on average better compared with participants who had low-paid jobs. Almost all the participants have children and grandchildren. Most of the children and grandchildren are living in the Netherlands. Some people in this study have children and grandchildren living in Suriname. The participants have close relationships with their children and grandchildren, and they have regular contact. Also, some participants have siblings and other relatives living in the Netherlands with whom they have regular contact.

13.8 Data analysis For the data analysis both the content and thematic approach are used. The content analysis enables the use of theories based on the conceptual model, and the thematic analysis allows for looking for themes and patterns within the data. In this way, both deductive and inductive coding methods are used for analysing the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Flick, 2015).

13.9 Data management The data is analysed using the software program Atlas.ti. The first coding cycle included methods which are the first steps in coding the data (Saldaña, 2013). The following coding methods were applied within the first cycle of coding: attribute coding, descriptive coding, In Vivo coding, process coding, emotion coding, values coding and deductive coding. Attribute coding is used to code information related to the data – for example the interview setting and demographic characteristics of the participants such as gender, age, marital status etc. (Saldaña, 2013). Based on this background information a profile of the participants was created. Through descriptive coding, paragraphs in the transcript are coded by topic. In this way, it is clear what the topic of the paragraph is and what is happening in the data (Saldaña, 2013). In Vivo coding uses words and phrases from participants as codes. This way of coding can be applied to see how participants express particular things and to understand their perceptions (Saldaña, 2013). This coding method is used, because this study is interested in

220  Marleen Fluit, Ajay Bailey and Ruben Bouwman examining the experiences and perceptions of older Hindustani Surinamese adults living in the Netherlands. The participants might use particular words or phrases to express something, and this is coded as an In Vivo code. Process coding is a way of coding action by using gerunds (-ing words). This method can be applied to studies that are interested in the behaviour of people as a reaction to particular situations (Saldaña, 2013). Another method that is used for coding the data is emotion coding. Through emotion coding the emotions and feelings of participants are coded. This method is useful for examining experiences and perspectives of participants (Saldaña, 2013). Through value coding, the beliefs, values and perceptions of the participants are coded. This method is especially suitable for studies that are interested in cultural values (Saldaña, 2013). In addition to coding the data, the photographs were analysed in order to make sense of the data. The photographs gave an insight into what the co-housing communities and the homes of the participants look like. These photographs were used to understand the context. Second-cycle coding methods were applied for reorganising the data after first-cycle coding and to reduce the number of categories and themes in order to gain a better insight into the data (Saldaña, 2013). The process of merging codes was based on similar themes or concepts. Codes that stood out were used to develop categories. This process of reorganising the data can be referred to as focused coding, which is a second-cycle coding method (Saldaña, 2013). After merging the codes were categorised into code families based on similar themes or concepts. Because of the richness of the data set and the varying topics, not all code families could be analysed, as this would be beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, only the code families that are important for this study were analysed. The output of each code family was analysed by categorising what was said by which participants. In this way particular patterns within the data, major themes and overlapping and different experiences could be identified. There were some ethical considerations that were taken into account during the process of analysing the data and in reporting the results. The characteristics of the participants were anonymised, and pseudonyms were used to prevent the possibility of identifying participants (Dowling, 2016). After analysing the data and writing the results, the results were discussed with R. Bouwman, who conducted the interviews. Discussing the results with the interviewer was important for validating the results of the study. The interviewer provided more background information and could tell whether the results were interpreted in the correct way. Issues that were interpreted in a different way compared to the interpretation of the interviewer were checked again and

Hindustani Surinamese in the Netherlands 221 adapted. For example, the importance of nature was first linked to the childhood of the participants. After discussing the results and checking the output of the data again, it became evident that the importance of nature is linked to the connection Hindustanis have with the earth and not so much to their childhood.

13.10 Results 13.10.1 Home-making A sense of home is associated with feelings of happiness, comfort, autonomy, satisfaction and the importance of having a place for oneself. Also, the findings show that both men and women engage in the process of home-making. There are some similarities, but also differences in how female and male participants create a sense of home. In regard to the process of home-making, women refer more often to how they remodelled and decorated the home in order to create their own place, whereas men refer more often to the co-housing community or the proximity of facilities instead of the home itself. The first theme is sense of home. The second theme is creating a home and the third theme is about important possessions. 13.10.2 Sense of home Almost all the participants express that they feel a sense of home within the co-housing community. The exception was one participant expressed that he does not feel a sense of home in the co-housing community or in any other place. The reason for this is not having meaningful social relations. There are two main themes that appear from the findings which are having a place for oneself and the emergence of a sense of place from multiple places. Having a place for oneself Autonomy and the importance of having a place for oneself are significant aspects in the process of creating a sense of home. Female participants express more often that their sense of home is related to a feeling of being in control and having a place for themselves. Look this is my house. I am the boss. I pay the rent on time . . . I can do whatever I want. (Mira, 65–70, F)

222  Marleen Fluit, Ajay Bailey and Ruben Bouwman For some people in this study their sense of home is extended beyond the physical space of the home. The co-housing community and the proximity of facilities within the neighbourhood are an important part in the process of creating a sense of home. This is related to social contact with fellow residents and activities organised within the cohousing community. Also, the co-housing community provides a sense of safety, because of the social control between the residents. I do not want to leave this place and everyone who lives here does not want to leave. Because you experience so much joy with all the activities . . . daily activities etc. I forgot to mention that every two weeks we have bingo. A lot of people from outside [co-housing community] come and that gives a good feeling. (Ritesh, 75–80, M) Specific places within the neighbourhood such as the mandir, the mosque and the market play an important role in the process of creating a sense of home for some of the participants. For instance, Samir likes to walk through the neighbourhood and to talk with other people at the square. His sense of home is related to the proximity of facilities within the neighbourhood, as he explains: The market is nearby. Some shops, supermarkets all are nearby. They have made a nice square . . . If you sit there, a lot of Surinamese and Hindustanis are sitting there. You can talk with them, you can sit down. Throughout the whole environment you feel your own community . . . not only the community, but also the facilities are important for me. I have everything here. (Samir, 65–70, M) A sense of home is associated with having a place for oneself and being independent. Moreover, for some a sense of home is related to the cohousing community and particular places within the neighbourhood. In a similar way, the presence of people from the same origin is important for creating a sense of home. 13.10.3 There are more places that feel like home A sense of home can emerge from multiple places. For instance, some participants are longing to return to Suriname, because they want to be with their children who are living in Suriname. This is the place of origin. Some participants describe that they feel at home in multiple

Hindustani Surinamese in the Netherlands 223 places. As their sense of home is connected to their life stages and the time they spent at different locations or countries, the early socialisation and existence of strong cultural roots play a significant role in their imagination of their homes. . . . Maybe because I always lived there [house in Suriname] . . . I feel at home. When I am in Suriname I feel it there and when I am in the Netherlands then I feel it in my home. (Indra, 60–65, F) From the findings of the study it also becomes clear that a sense of home is linked to previous dwellings. This is illustrated by the following quote: I feel a sense of home in the Netherlands. Where my parents lived in Suriname, where we used to live . . . I cherish that. Yes, my parents are not here anymore, so . . . But I only cherish the places where we have lived, but I feel a sense of home in the Netherlands. I also long for India, it is so beautiful there. I find it so beautiful. (Saroja, 65–70, F) This quote also shows the connection the participant has with India. This connection with India was apparent for more people in this study. Some participants feel connected to India because of their roots, and they feel a sense of belonging. This is also expressed in a way that some participants are longing to live in India. They feel a sense of home in India. As Sunaina explains: I visited India and I felt a sense of home there. Because I was one of them . . . the people did not see me, because I was wearing the same clothes. They asked me where I lived I said: I am not from here; [reply] No that is not possible. Because I can speak Hindi they did not believe me . . . no you are not from here . . . It gives you a sense of home I am one of them . . . So to be honest, I told my son if it was up to me I would live in a village in India. (Sunaina, 70–75, F) The findings indicate that a sense of home can change over the life course. This is illustrated by the following quote: When I lived in Suriname I felt more at home there. I did not know the Netherlands. But now I do not feel Surinamese,

224  Marleen Fluit, Ajay Bailey and Ruben Bouwman because where I live I feel at home. If I could get a job here, I would have worked and help to build the country. This is my country now. (Arjan, 70–75, M) The narratives show that a sense of home is not restricted to one place. Some participants express that they feel a sense of home in multiple places, and this is inter-related with their housing history, Suriname and their cultural roots.

13.11 Creating a home In addition to older adults’ perception of home we also need to examine what efforts they make to recreate the sense of home in the co-housing living arrangement. Data from interviews indicate that women talk more specifically about how they have created a home. In contrast, men often mention that they feel at home in relation to the co-housing community and specific places within the neighbourhood but often do not give details on the home-making process. With regard to the home-making process, some female participants explain how they remodelled their house in order to create a home. This was believed to be very important, because the participants wanted to create their own place. For some female participants this was the first time they were living without their families. Moving to a co-housing unit was a way for them to start a new independent life. They did everything, my grandson did the floor and painted everything. One thing I said: I want you to paint the whole house . . . make it new. This is the first time I will live on my own. (Mira, 65–70, F) The findings indicate that another important aspect in the creation of a sense of home is culture. Some participants who believe in Hinduism have created a place within the home where they can practise their religion. This place is a small mandir that consists of religious artefacts and flowers. Look here is the room where we pray. Most Hindus have this . . . some even have bigger [talks about room] with artefacts and stuff . . . if there is more space. Mine is small, but you can pray here quietly . . . I put flowers, but not on the other days, only on Thursday and Friday. (Asha, 60–65, F)

Hindustani Surinamese in the Netherlands 225 Another way culture plays a role within the home-making process is by creating familiarity within the home. The following quote illustrates how Saroja created a sense of home: I got more television channels so I can watch Hindu soap operas . . . I find this important, it is my own language . . . I grew up with this . . . feeling at home . . . I belief that you have to create a sense of home yourself, you cannot expect others to do this. (Saroja, 65–70, F) Familiarity within the home is also created by placing objects that are taken from previous dwellings into the new home. A majority of the participants took furniture and kitchen supplies from their previous home. Other participants took meaningful possessions and pictures with them. Some residents created a sense of home by placing family pictures in the home. The findings illustrate how the participants have created their own home in various ways. Remodelling the home, expressing culture and creating familiarity within the home were believed to be important aspects in the process of creating a home. Another aspect of homemaking is placing meaningful objects within the home.

13.12 Important possessions So far it is discussed how the people in this study have created a sense of home. This section discusses possessions that are important for the participants. A majority of the participants could identify a possession that has a special meaning. However, a few participants could not mention a possession that is important to them. In addition, some of the participants who could not identify an important possession did not specifically describe how they have created a home. Also, the sense of home for these participants was to a greater extent associated with the co-housing community and the environment and to a lesser extent with the home itself. The findings are presented through photographs taken by the interviewer. The men and women in this study have many important possessions but most often mentioned possessions that are related to memories, religion and preventing loneliness. Each photograph represents one of these categories. 13.12.1 Possessions which tell a story Important possessions can have a special meaning for the participants. These possessions could for instance bring up memories and can be a

226  Marleen Fluit, Ajay Bailey and Ruben Bouwman reminder of Suriname, and the possessions can be a reminder of people who have passed away. An example of an object that is a reminder of Suriname is the painting of a wooden house which belongs to Rahul. This object symbolises and reminds the participant about his past life in Suriname. A certain value is attached to the painting and this is what makes it special. Rahul explains why this painting reminds him of Suriname: These are the type of houses people used to have. A wooden house on pillars. Usually not painted . . . and I took this picture myself. It gave me a feeling of: this is the house we used to live in. Everybody loves that picture. (Rahul, 75–80, M) Other important possessions that are mentioned by the participants are family pictures. The findings indicate that only women mention pictures as important possessions. Only one male participant mentions family pictures as important, but this was after the interviewer asked whether family pictures are an important possession for the participant. The following quote illustrates the relation between possessions and memories: I have some pictures of my husband and children and these are important to me. I do not really have possessions that I own . . . and some things that belonged to my parents which are important to me. Those are my memories . . . it is a reminder of the past . . . when the children were young. That is important. (Asha, 60–65, F) In addition, this quote shows that belongings from people who have passed away have a special meaning. Pictures and possessions can serve as a memory of loved ones. Also, the belongings are often the only tangible possession participants have of the person who has passed away. The majority of the participants identify possessions that symbolise connections with their homeland and family as important. Each of these possessions tells a different story and has a special meaning for the participants. 13.12.2 Expressing religion within the home Narratives from participants show that expressing religion through artefacts within the home is something particularly done by Hindus.

Hindustani Surinamese in the Netherlands 227 Participants who are Muslim do not specifically mention that they have religious artefacts within the home. Religion is expressed within particular spaces in the home. For instance, a mandir is an important place for practising religion. The quote below illustrates how older adults still maintain religious rules on purity and pollution. We call this a Mandir . . . it is very important to me and I do not let anyone touch it. Maybe that person ate meat. I say: do not touch it. And if family is visiting and I cooked meat or something else, then I do not let them come nearby. I will tell them to eat in the kitchen. (Rosita, 60–65, F) Religious artefacts are also important in the praying ritual, and they symbolise the roots of the participants. Religious artefacts are for instance part of the mandir. Not all Hindus express their religion through artefacts in the home. According to some participants there are two movements within Hinduism the Arya Samaj and the Sanatan Dharma. Followers of the Sanatan Dharma often use artefacts or have red and yellow flags, whereas followers of the Arya Samaj do not have artefacts. Some Christian participants explain that they have a connection with Hinduism because they have family members who are Hindu. In addition, some participants who are raised as Christians have read about Hinduism and view Hinduism as the first religion from which other religions originate. One Christian participant has religious artefacts within the home that are symbols of Hinduism: We have a Buddha, Shiva . . . If I look at the Shiva, dancing, it says a lot to me, the hand with all the attributes and the movements. That is huge. (Dilip, 70–75, M) The mandir and the religious artefacts are important for expressing religion within the home. For many participants expressing religion within the home is part of the home-making process.

13.13 Possessions that make you feel less lonely Thus far important possessions such as family pictures, belongings of loved ones who have passed away, possessions that are a reminder of Suriname and religious artefacts are discussed. Some participants

228  Marleen Fluit, Ajay Bailey and Ruben Bouwman identify objects such as the television, radio and music instruments as important possessions. Participants who play a music instrument often mention this as one of their most important possessions. Playing instruments is for some participants a way to keep busy. Also, the music instrument is a memory of their past life. The importance of music instruments was only mentioned by men and not by women in this study. Ritesh explains why he considers his music instruments to be important: Well it is very important in our lives. If you have nothing to do and if you sit behind it you can be busy for hours. And if you are doing it right, you will get a good feeling . . . I believe it also keeps me young . . . I also have memories from when I was younger . . . I always performed on the radio and in the theatres. (Ritesh, 75–80, M) Other possessions that were mentioned that help participants to feel less alone are the TV and the radio. Ramesh describes that when he is not singing or visiting his children he likes to watch television or to listen to the radio: Very important for me are the TV and the radio. If I am alone and I feel lonely: radio on. Then I hear songs . . . and if I don’t do this, it is so quiet . . . [About the TV] then I don’t feel alone, because I always have something to watch. (Ramesh, 75–80, M) Music instruments, the television and the radio are examples of possessions mentioned by participants that make them feel less alone. This paragraph described the possessions that are important to the participants. The majority of the participants identify possessions that are related to memories, to religion and to preventing loneliness as important. Overall, we have tried to describe how older Hindustani Surinamese in this study create their home. Creating a sense of home through home-making activities such as expressing culture and placing objects within the home is important in the home-making process.

13.14 Discussion and conclusions This study was conducted in order to gain an understanding of how older Hindustani Surinamese adults create a sense of home within the

Hindustani Surinamese in the Netherlands 229 context of a co-housing community in the Netherlands. In contrast with studies focussing on guest workers and retirement migrants this study has focused on post-colonial migrants who are now ageing in the country of destination. This chapter has provided an insight into how older migrants manage to remake their home within a co-housing community, live independently and what it means to live in a co-housing community. The context of this chapter is different compared to most studies focusing on individual dwellings or the neighbourhood. Our empirical material showed that a co-housing community provides a sense of community and a sense of safety and enables residents to live independently. It was believed to be important to live with other Hindustani Surinamese, as the residents share the same rituals and schemas. In order to age in place the older Hindustani Surinamese adults in this study have made the decision to move to the co-housing community and had to remake their place (Rowles & Watkins, 2003). A sense of home is created through remodelling the house, placing meaningful objects, expressing culture and religion within the home and creating familiarity. Familiarity is created by rearranging furniture from previous dwellings in the new dwelling and by placing religious artefacts and other meaningful possessions within the home. Through expressing religion within the home a sense of belonging can be created (Mazumdar & Mazumdar, 2009). The findings of this study indicate that the expression of religion within the home is an important aspect within the home-making process and especially for Hindus. Within Hinduism praying rituals include offering water and flowers. This praying ritual should be performed within a garden as the connection with the earth is believed to be important. Due to the absence of a garden, a mandir is created within the home where praying and offering rituals can take place. The mandir is an important place within the home, and this is also visible as the mandir has a prominent place within the home. Home-making is a cultural process (Rosales, 2010), and through adapting past routines such as performing praying rituals within a garden to the new environment by creating a place within the home for performing religious rituals, the older Hindustani Surinamese adults in this study have created their home. The importance of nature, which is rooted in the culture of Hindus, is also visible within the home, through plants and flowers in and outside the home. Another way older Hindustani Surinamese have created a sense of home is through placing objects from Suriname within the home. These possessions are a reminder of the country of origin and connect older Hindustani Surinamese with Suriname. Other important

230  Marleen Fluit, Ajay Bailey and Ruben Bouwman possessions within the home are family photographs and belongings of loved ones who have passed away. It is not necessarily the possession itself, but what it represents and the memory that is attached to it is what makes it special. The findings of this study indicate that it is important to have possessions such as music instruments, a television and a radio within the house for distraction and preventing loneliness. As is argued by Dahlin-Ivanoff et al. (2007) and Rubinstein and Parmelee (1992) the home becomes an important place for older people as they age, and this is influenced by decreasing mobility. Also, the home is a place where older people are in control and can make their own decisions (Dahlin-Ivanoff et al., 2007). In a similar way, a sense of home for older Hindustani Surinamese is related to having a place for oneself and being in control. This feeling of being in control gives older adults more autonomy even though their mobility is declining. Another way the home is an important place in old age is that it provides a sense of safety (Dahlin-Ivanoff et al., 2007). Within the cohousing communities the residents feel more secure, because there is more social control as compared to normal apartment buildings. The co-housing community provides the opportunity to live independently within a community. The residents have managed to create a sense of home and show great resilience towards living independently. Being pro-active enables the participants to live independently, and the home provides an environment where they can be in control. The process of creating a home within the co-housing community and the proximity of other Hindustani Surinamese have created a place where the residents want to age in place. This study substantiated other studies (e.g. Buffel, 2015) that discuss how older migrants can feel a sense of home in both the country of origin and the country of destination. In addition, the findings of this study indicate that a sense of home is not restricted to one place and emerges from multiple places such as the current dwelling, the country of origin, previous dwellings and the places that symbolises the roots of migrants. For instance, some older Hindustani Surinamese adults in this study feel a sense of home in India although they have never lived here. This feeling of belonging arises from the recognition of their roots within the environment and from a longing for India. Future research is needed to examine how the provision of care for older adults could be facilitated within the context of a co-housing community. The number of older migrants is increasing, and there is a preference to live with people from the same origin. It is therefore important for further studies to focus on home-making in relation to ageing in place in the setting of a co-housing community for various groups of older migrants.

Hindustani Surinamese in the Netherlands 231

Acknowledgements We would like to thank the participants of the project, older men and women, for their time and for sharing their views living in co-housing communities. This paper was written within the Indian-European research networking grant: Ageing and well-being in a globalising world (NWO 465–11–009), funded by NWO-ESRC-ICSSR. The funding for the fieldwork came from the project. The participating institutions include Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore; Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum; Population Research Centre, University of Groningen, the Netherlands, and the University of Southampton, United Kingdom.

Note 1 For confidentiality reasons the names of the co-housing communities are pseudonyms.

References Altman, I. & Low, S. M. (1992). Place attachment. New York: Plenum Press. Bilecen, B. (2017). Home-making practices and social protection across borders: An example of Turkish migrants living in Germany. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 32(1), 77–90. Blunt, A. & Dowling, R. (2006). Home. London: Routledge. Boccagni, P. (2014). What’s in a (migrant) house? Changing domestic spaces, the negotiation of belonging and home-making in Ecuadorian migration. Housing, Theory and Society, 31(3), 277–293. Braun, V. & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101. Buffel, T. (2015). Ageing migrants and the creation of home: Mobility and the maintenance of transnational ties. Population, Space and Place, 23(5), 75–87. Online first. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2016). Jaarrapport integratie 2016. The Hague: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. Retrieved on July 23, 2017 from file:///C:/Users/Gebruiker/Downloads/2016B5_Jaarrapport_Integra tie_2016_web%20(1)pdf. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2017). Statline. The Hague/Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. Choenni, C. E. S. (2013). ‘Happy in Holland’: The Hindostani elders in The Netherlands. Sociological Bulletin, 62(1), 40–58. Ciobanu, R. O., Fokkema, T., & Nedelcu, M. (2017). Ageing as a migrant: Vulnerabilities, agency and policy implications. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(2), 164–181. Dahlin-Ivanoff, S., Haak, M., Fänge, A., & Iwarsson, S. (2007). The multiple meaning of home as experienced by very old Swedish people. Scandinavian Journal of Occupational Therapy, 14(1), 25–32.

232  Marleen Fluit, Ajay Bailey and Ruben Bouwman Dowling, R. (2016). Power, subjectivity, and ethics in qualitative research. In Hay, I. (Ed.), Qualitative research methods in human geography (pp. 29–44), 4th Edition. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. Draak, M. den & Klerk, M. de (2011). Oudere migranten: Kennis en kennislacunes. 2011–35. The Hague: The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP). Ehrkamp, P. (2005). Placing identities: Transnational practices and local attachments of Turkish immigrants in Germany. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31(2), 345–364. Flick, U. (2015). Introducing research methodology: A beginner’s guide to doing a research project, 2nd Edition. London: Sage. Hennink, M., Hutter, I., & Bailey, A. (2011). Qualitative research methods. Los Angeles: Sage. Hidalgo, M. C. & Hernández, B. (2001). Place attachment: Conceptual and empirical questions. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 21(3), 273–281. King, R., Lulle, A., Sampaio, D., & Vullnetari, J. (2017). Unpacking the ageing – Migration nexus and challenging the vulnerability trope. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(2), 182–198. Lager, D., Van Hoven, B., & Meijering, L. (2012). Places that matter: Place attachment and wellbeing of older Antillean migrants in the Netherlands. European Spatial Research and Policy, 19(1), 81–94. Mazumdar, S. & Mazumdar, S. (2009). Religion, immigration, and home making in diaspora: Hindu space in southern California. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 29(2), 256–266. Meijering, L. & Lager, D. (2014). Home-making of older Antillean migrants in the Netherlands. Ageing & Society, 34(5), 859–875. Oudhof, K., Harmsen, C., Loozen, S., & Choenni, C. (2011). Omvang en spreiding van Surinaamse bevolkingsgroepen in Nederland. Bevolkingstrends, 2e kwartaal 2011 (pp. 97–104). The Hague/Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. Palmberger, M. (2017). Social ties and embeddedness in old age: Older Turkish labour migrants in Vienna. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(2), 235–249. Rosales, M. V. (2010). The domestic work of consumption: Materiality, migration and home-making. Etnográfica, 14(3), 507–525. Rowles, G. D. & Watkins, J. F. (2003). History, habit, heart and hearth: on making spaces into places. In Warner, S. K., Wahl, H. W., Mollenkopf, H., & Oswald, F. (Eds.), Aging independently: Living arrangements and mobility (pp. 77–96). New York: Springer. Rubinstein, R. L. & Parmelee, P. A. (1992). Attachment to place and the representation of the life course by the elderly. In Altman, I. & Low, S. M. (Eds.), Place attachment (pp. 139–163). New York: Plenum Press. Saldaña, J. (2013). The coding manual for qualitative researchers, 2nd Edition. London: Sage.

Hindustani Surinamese in the Netherlands 233 White, P. (2006). Migrant populations approaching old age: Prospects in Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32(8), 1283–1300. Wiles, J. L. (2005). Conceptualizing place in the care of older people: The contributions of geographical gerontology. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 14, 100–108. Wiles, J. L., Allen, R. E. S., Palmer, A. J., Hayman, K. J., Keeling, S., & Kerse, N. (2009). Older people and their social spaces: A study of well-being and attachment to place in Aotearoa New Zealand. Social Science & Medicine, 68(4), 664–671.

14 From Kerala to Switzerland India’s forgotten diaspora Santhy Iyyakkunnel

We are a lost generation. —Davis Kunju, 2015

14.1 Introduction Across the globe, diasporas have been identified as significant actors in the development of their home countries. Davis Kunju is one of the many international migrants in today’s world who left his home for a foreign country. These migrants have increasingly greater ways to maintain ties with their home country through transnational linkages. ‘Transnational migrants’ are immigrants whose daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are shaped by relationships to more than one nation-state (Glick Schiller et al. 1995: 48). Continuous transnational transactions across borders allow the migrant to have a stake in his or her country of origin. This can happen at the economic, social and political level. Being simultaneously embedded in more than one society equips the migrant with essential resources for socio-economic development in the country of origin, given that development is understood as an improvement of people’s well-being where their social constraints are diminished and personal circumstances improved. In the South Indian state of Kerala, migration is so deeply ingrained in society that scholars even speak of migration as being a part of the Keralite culture (Percot and Nair 2011: 195). In fact, every extended family in Kerala has at least one relative working outside of India (Zachariah 2007: 2). An ever-increasing number of people continuously desire to emigrate from Kerala in the hopes of better economic returns abroad. These migrants send a sum of their earnings, called ‘remittances’, back to their families in their home countries, which

From Kerala to Switzerland 235 serves as a source of income for them (Pelletier 2011: 378–380). This is the most well-known contribution towards development (Ajanovic 2014: 101). The state of Kerala is very dependent on the transfer of migrants’ money back to the state (Pelletier 2011: 378). With a flow of remittances of more than Rs 70,000 crores in 2014, its importance is undeniable (Zachariah and Rajan 2015: 251). Studies suggest that the longer migrants stay abroad, the less they remit to their country of origin (Grieco 2004: 244). Likewise, remittances are particularly based on familial ties to the home country (Cai 2003: 473). Furthermore, scholars argue that ties of the secondgeneration to their parents’ home country vanish over time (Fouron and Glick-Schiller cited in Faist et al. 2013: 102). This is directly related to the decrease of remittances to the country of origin. Therefore, the focus on diaspora engagement needs to move beyond remittances. Governments at both ends of the migration cycle recognise the value of migrants’ engagements for their country’s socio-economic development and are looking for ways to cooperate with them (Agunias and Newland 2012: 13). According to Gamlen (2006: 6), the capacity of the source country to implement diaspora engagement policies is dependent firstly on the imagined existence of a cohesive transnational community, based on a common, national identity, towards which policies can be directed, and secondly, it depends on the existence of a corresponding government system within the source country. Yet migration impacts are evidently heterogeneous and highly dependent on the context (De Haas 2010: 227). The Keralite diaspora in the West seem to be forgotten by the Keralite government. However, they uphold significant transnational ties to their home country, which is of essential importance for effective diaspora engagement. This chapter aims to illustrate that due to their close ties with Kerala, they are an untapped resource with great potential for diaspora engagement.

14.2 Keralite diaspora in Switzerland In the early 1980s, several Keralites found their way to Europe. Due to the shortage of nurses in many Western countries, vacancy rates in the profession were high, which seems to have been solely remedied through international migration (Walton-Roberts 2010: 196). Switzerland has placed nurses on a preferred list within immigration processes because of the critical shortages in their labour market (Kingma 2007: 1285). Thus, many nurses from Kerala decided that their migration

236  Santhy Iyyakkunnel could create a livelihood for their entire family, and many migrated to Switzerland. Switzerland is a small country located at the heart of Europe, yet it is not a member of the European Union. Switzerland, like other European countries, is known to be restrictive when it comes to immigration policies. In particular, the admission of citizens from non-EU/ EFTA countries, such as India, remains very limited (State Secretariat for Migration 2017: 9). Each year, the Swiss Federal Council establishes quotas for workers from non-EU/EFTA member states who wish to work long-term in Switzerland. In the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) index on human development, Switzerland ranked second out of 188 countries in 2015 (UNDP 2016). Its HDI (Human Development Index) value was 0.939 in 2015, which falls under the category of very high human development (UNDP 2016). On the other hand, India ranked 131st in the Human Development Index (UNDP 2016). Inter-state comparisons in India revealed that Kerala’s achievement in human development has been remarkable, with an HDI valued at 0.790 in 2008 (Government of India 2011). Although the statistics are not up to date, evidence shows that Kerala has been continuously ranked first in India in terms of its human development indices (Ravi Raman 2010: 3). However, the development experience in Kerala has been quite unique in its pattern, with high social achievements on a weak economic basis. Kerala’s very moderate economic performance has compelled many Keralites to look for better work opportunities across borders (Drèze and Sen 2002: 198). In this context, Kerala has generated labour migrants, who often move to seek employment in more developed places (Skeldon 1997: 144). One such developed place is Switzerland. Today, most permits are issued only to highly qualified persons, where Indians compose the largest group of migrants within non-EU/EFTA countries (State Secretariat for Migration 2017: 17). Although there are a remarkable number of Indian specialists across the country migrating to Switzerland, this chapter solely focuses on the Keralite diaspora in Switzerland which resulted from the nurses’ migration in the 1980s. The following discussion is based on qualitative semi-structured interviews which were conducted with eight Keralite migrant families, consisting of the first and the second generations, during February to March 2015 in Switzerland. In fact, the research context was very familiar to me. Growing up as a second-generation Keralite migrant in Switzerland meant tackling transnational migration in my early years. By giving the Keralite diaspora in Switzerland a voice, long-held assumptions are challenged and more effective policies promoted.

From Kerala to Switzerland 237

14.3 From Kerala to Switzerland 14.3.1 Socio-economic background of Keralite migrants in Switzerland The most relevant aspects of each family are presented in Table 14.1. Each family is divided into first and second generation. In both categories, the profession of the respondents is indicated. The year of migration to Switzerland of the first-generation category is also included. All names were replaced in order to ensure respondents’ confidentiality. Table 14.1 Overview of the Interviewed Keralite migrant families in Switzerland, 2015 Migrant families

1st Year of Profession 2nd Profession generation Migration to generation Switzerland

1 Adikkal Jose

1989

Jolie Balu

1980 1980

Beena

1974

2 Chako

Machine Jimmy Operator Nurse Insurance Bintu Clerk Nurse Bimal Binod

3 Kunju

Davis

Banker Accountant Assistant Psychologist Financial Accountant Scientific Associate Physics

1986

Storeman

Dilip

1981 1981

Nurse Mechanic

Anand

Asha Manoj

1974 2000

Nurse Nurse

Electric Engineer

Manu

Meena 6 Palatty George

2000 1986

Nurse Clerical Girish Assistant

Computer Science student

1982

Nurse

1987 1982 1985 1980

Taxi Driver Ria Nurse Storeman Tina Nurse

Deepa 4 Menon Anthony 5 Nayar

Gita 7 Thampi Rajesh Rina 8 Vypil Thomas Tessy

Source: Interviews conducted by the author

Gowri

Human Resource Management student Structural Engineer Law student Medical student

238  Santhy Iyyakkunnel Most of these families migrated to Switzerland in the 1980s. Every female within the first-generation is a nurse, with the exception of one male nurse. All the nurses from this sample come from a rural, lower-middle-class background, where their parents had rather traditional roles. Percot and Nair (2011: 198) found that nurses from Kerala belong to a rather homogeneous group with similar social backgrounds, where the nurses are clearly the first generation within their family to receive higher education. Thus, the nurses entered a state where they were able to live their parents’ aspiration of a better standard of life by pursuing migration. However, the particularity of nurse migration from Kerala is explained elsewhere (Walton-Roberts 2010; Percot and Nair 2011; Percot and Rajan, 2007). The Keralite migrants became naturalised Swiss citizens, renouncing their Indian citizenship, as India doesn’t allow dual citizenship. Furthermore, they have settled in family houses after years of saving. Their residences are mostly located in rural areas amongst the Swiss middle class. Yet the first generation still visits Kerala every year, and while in Switzerland, they mainly mingle with members of their own community. Even on a daily basis, Keralite newspapers are being read and Keralite movies watched. The second generation, on the contrary, is more integrated into Swiss society. The majority of them were born in Switzerland or immigrated in their early years. They are fluent in the local language and well integrated into the Swiss labour market as well as the educational system. Visits to India are also regular within the second-generation, and many chose to marry a fellow Keralite in Switzerland. At the time of research, the second generation’s ages ranged between twenty and thirty years. All are within highly skilled occupations, ranging from a banker to a medical student. These characteristics are important considering diaspora engagement. In order to understand the diaspora’s views and actions towards their country of origin, transnational ties need to be unravelled first.

14.4 Unravelling transnationalism within the Keralite migrants in Switzerland With increasing mobility and, in particular, the improvements in communication technologies, the lives of migrant families are permeated with transnationalism. Given the strong influence of kinship, Keralite migrants continued to stay connected with Kerala. The interviews reveal that even loose ties to the country of origin present a central incentive to be engaged with the home country.

From Kerala to Switzerland 239 14.4.1 Transnational ties within the first generation Notably from Table 14.1, the migrant families have been living in Switzerland for more than twenty years but still share a strong feeling of collectiveness and unity across borders. My siblings and also my mother are still alive. This is a big connection. I don’t know, if I had such a desire to go to India, if my sisters or my mum would not be alive anymore. That means a lot to me. I want to go. I call them every week. TessyVypil, first generation, 2015 The interviews reveal that transnational familial ties are sustained through various social practices, such as regular visits to Kerala, long-distance phone calls and remittances. The above statement shows that the transnationalism among the sample is predominantly family based. Providing financial support to their family back home is a significant way of keeping family ties across borders. In Indian kinship systems, familial obligations are of high value. The idea that children should support their parents financially and practically is widespread among the Indian population and does not seem to fade with distance (Singh and Cabraal 2014: 223). On the one hand, this support displays a sense of continuous belonging to the family, and on the other hand the support sets up reciprocal obligations within the family (Singh and Cabraal 2014: 224). Therefore, the first-generation put emphasis on a transnational upbringing for their children. I wish that they will stay in touch with their cousins in Kerala and also maintain the culture and tradition we passed on to them. Also that they would go back regularly to Kerala, even if we are not around anymore. But they like to go to Kerala. [. . .] They are fluent in Malayalam, we focused on that a lot. We also went every year to Kerala, even though it was expensive, but it was worth it. So that they were able to maintain the relation to Kerala. [. . .] I hope they will go regularly. Jolie Adikkal, first generation, 2015 Hence, the second generation have been growing up in intensely transnational households.

240  Santhy Iyyakkunnel 14.4.2 Transnational ties within the second generation The second generation grew up in a completely different environment than their parents. Outside the walls of their own home, nothing was remotely Indian. Many critics within academia claim that transnational ties are only relevant for the first generation and will over time vanish with further generations (Faist et al. 2013: 102). Nevertheless, the majority of the second generation claims that they are used to visit their relatives in Kerala. Kerala is not completely estranged to them. On the contrary, many of them feel connected to Kerala, although they never lived there for longer periods. I feel at home in Kerala. Girish Palatty, second generation, 2015 I realised that this (Kerala) is part of my roots and it is partly ‘home’. [. . .] The close family accept, that you didn’t grow up there (in Kerala), but you still belong to the family. That’s the reason, why I like going there. Dilip Kunju, second generation, 2015 Incontestably, there is a sense of belonging to Kerala within the second-generation. Transnational ties to the country of origin need to be treated on a very individual basis. While various transnational identity issues are not part of this chapter, it is important to note that a transnational connectivity to Kerala exists in varying degrees within the second generation. The patterns and reproduction of intergenerational transnational ties remain largely unexplored (Vertovec 2010; Faist et al. 2013). Yet they are indeed transnational actors. These transnational ties to Kerala are significant conditions for diaspora engagement.

14.5 The actual and potential role of the Keralite diaspora in Switzerland towards socio-economic efforts in Kerala – intergenerational disparities Diaspora engagement can range from remittances over entrepreneurship to philanthropy. During the interviews, the members of the Keralite migrant families explained why they engage with Kerala, what hinders them from engaging with Kerala and, finally, what they hope for the future. Due to a similar socio-economic background of the Keralite migrant families in Switzerland, their stories shared many

From Kerala to Switzerland 241 similarities. Everyone within the first generation supports their kinship on a financial basis in Kerala. We supported them (family in Kerala) very well financially. Monthly money transfers and also in case once a year, if there are medical expenses or study fees to be covered, we even give additional support. We supported our nephew and niece with their school fees and also helped our nephew to go to Canada. That was an investment. Or special occasions in the family, like the funeral of the grandmother. Manoj Nayar, first generation, 2015 All of the interviewees sent remittances to their family in Kerala, where most of them send financial support only as required. The diaspora contributed positively towards social development, then the flows of capital across borders not only diminished the vulnerability of the poor families but have also greatly facilitated access to education, health and entrepreneurship in Kerala (Ratha and Plaza 2014: 9). Clearly, this has positive spill-over effects on Kerala’s socio-economic development and poverty alleviation (Pelletier 2011). However, remittances often induce tensions. They (non-migrants in Kerala) don’t think, where and how we get the money from. In Kerala, they don’t work as hard as we do. They work very comfortably and more relaxing, we on the other hand bear the brunt from 7 a.m. till 4 p.m. [. . .] But they only want the money from us. When they got to know, that we are coming from abroad, they only want money. It’s like they think, that we only shake a tree, where money falls off. Deepa Kunju, first generation, 2015 Hence, we the second generation ask ourselves how will we deal with it (financial support)? Will we simply give money? To whom? Are we actually that close to them? Bintu Chako, second generation, 2015 Many respondents expressed frustrations when it came to remittances and associated familial support with familial conflicts. The second generation’s transnational support is not based on reciprocity as they don’t expect anything in return from their relatives in Kerala. Therefore, the approach for the second generation’s diaspora engagement needs to go beyond remittances.

242  Santhy Iyyakkunnel Joint ventures and business start-ups have been identified as one potential area for diaspora engagement. This area can be very promising for the future, as there is an acute scarcity of qualified workers in Kerala (Kumar and Rajan 2014: 4). Considering the high-skilled degrees and professions of the second generation, international tie-ups between Switzerland and Kerala can be mutually beneficial. Let’s say maybe within the framework of an European company, who transfers people, I can imagine it (skill transfer). Anand Menon, second generation, 2015 At the most I would invest in stocks in India or Kerala. [. . .] I mean if I would have a project there (Kerala), maybe even with a friend. I don’t know much about business in India, but I could imagine doing it. Binod Chako, second generation, 2015 The statements echo the speculation of the ideas. Yet the interest and, in particular, the willingness to invest are crucial indicators for actual diaspora engagement. According to the Global Forum on Migration and Development (cited in Pande 2014: 36, 37), engaging diasporas for development is primarily based on their attitude, which involves recognising that their double belonging can be enriching for both source and host countries. The majority of the second generation have definitely shown interest during the interviews to be engaged with Kerala in the future. However, most of them seemed to be helpless when it comes to taking this forward, as they have never heard of concrete initiatives regarding diaspora engagement. Some governmental agencies and private firms in several countries are actually approaching their diasporas about possible trade and business facilities with the countries they have emigrated to (Ratha and Plaza 2014: 13). Involvement of the diasporas in the host countries can take several forms, such as employment opportunities in the country of origin after relevant work experience in the host country. This way diaspora engagement can represent a form of ‘brain circulation’ where knowledge and skills are transnationally transferred (Rahman 2013: 219). Most of the forms of diaspora involvement require facilitation from the source country’s government. This is, however, rather problematic in the case of Kerala, because of obstacles such as the poor infrastructure and unfavourable policies (Pande 2014: 40).

From Kerala to Switzerland 243

14.6 Perceived barriers for diaspora engagement by the Keralite diaspora in Switzerland According to the respondents, Keralite politics seem to be the most difficult problem to overcome. Political processes in Kerala have greatly enhanced social achievements. However, persisting bureaucratic authoritarianism and corruption present immense obstacles for diaspora engagement. If I could change something, I would change the politics. The politics is totally wrong. It’s not serving people, it’s more a business. Its serving themselves. If we have to change that, we have to change it totally. Rajesh Thambi, first generation, 2015 You can’t change anything from the bottom, the change needs to come from the top. Meaning each person has a brain and the brain from the society is the government. There is government and governance. The entire problem is within the governance. In case a part of the brain is damaged, a part of the body will be paralyzed. If the entire brain is damaged, the entire body is paralyzed. This is the main problem (in Kerala), that there is no governance. Anthony Menon, first generation, 2015 Statements above reveal the discontentment towards politics in Kerala. There is no trust towards the Keralite government from the first-generation migrants. Without genuine trust built up between the diaspora and the government, all endeavours for effective diaspora engagement are set to fail. The universally known fact of corruption often came up as another obstacle during the interviews. Within this context, corruption will be understood as abuse of power by public servants for their own benefit. Corruption is prevalent all over India, where paying bribes to public officials is still a norm (Corbridge 2013: 223). Migration allowed the diaspora to experience a different everyday life not penetrated by corruption. Due to these experiences, minds were opened and customs rethought. In Switzerland you can live without corruption. I live here since 12 years and never had to pay anyone a bribe to achieve something. In India corruption already begins by birth, to get a birth certificate. Manoj Nayar, first generation, 2015

244  Santhy Iyyakkunnel The first generation is very familiar with corruption on an everyday basis in Kerala. They claimed realistically that they wouldn’t survive staying in Kerala unless they ‘become part of the system’. Even some of the second-generation members recognised corruption as a main problem. Since all of them grew up in Switzerland, they felt highly overwhelmed when dealing with corruption during their visits to Kerala. This makes the second generation quite powerless in the Keralite context, which is not an ideal ground for effective diaspora engagement. Effective diaspora engagement can only be subject to certain conditions, and it’s the state’s role to attract the diaspora’s participation for equitable outcomes.

14.7 Kerala’s government initiatives to strengthen their diaspora Migrants can only be a source of rich potential to the country of origin if they have the means and, most importantly, are willing to invest in their home country (Kapur 2010: 186). Diaspora engagement policies in this research refer to state incentives and practices that address members of that state who reside outside its borders. It is not solely based on a legal membership of the source country but applies to persons with roots in the source country. As aforementioned, the Keralite diaspora of this sample have all been nationalised in Switzerland. Although they all resigned Indian citizenship, they still consider Kerala to be home. Citizenship is one of the basic institutions of present policies and implies political rights and responsibilities within a community (Faist et al. 2013: 110–112). Furthermore, each diaspora is comparatively unique, shaped by historical experiences and present realities of its countries of origin and destination (Agunias and Newland 2012: 25). These complexities need to be considered by policy makers. Nonetheless, according to Agunias and Newland (2012: 25–29), a few fundamental elements should almost always be included in policies for diaspora engagement. First, governments and institutions need to know their diaspora in order to understand what it has to offer, what it is willing to offer and what it expects in return from the government. Secondly, goals and capacities for the source country must be identified. If the country seeks to reduce poverty, its diaspora policy may focus on business investments and education facilitation. A third element is to build genuine trust between the diaspora members and the governments. The state of Kerala has recognised the resources of its diaspora and, therefore, aims to create an environment for effective contribution

From Kerala to Switzerland 245 towards development (Government of Kerala: 758–759). For this reason, the government of Kerala set up the Department of Non-Resident Keralites Affairs (NORKA) in 1996, and a field agency called NORKA Roots in 2002 in order to strengthen the relationship of NRKs and the government of Kerala (Rajan 2012: 7). NRKs are referred to as ‘Keralites who are holding a valid Indian passport and are employed or residing for livelihood abroad with the Visa of the foreign country’ (Non-Resident Keralite’s Welfare Act 2008). At that point in time, the creation of NORKA was the first initiative to address diaspora matters within all of India (Rajan 2012: 7). Due to the resignation of Indian citizenship, the members of the Keralite diaspora in Switzerland are not entitled to any services provided by NORKA. NORKA Roots only focuses on the Keralite migrants in the Gulf region, and there is no institution alike which targets diaspora members holding another citizenship (Rajan 2012: 11). With its assets and drawbacks, NORKA Roots is an innovative attempt by the government of Kerala. Many developing countries are equipped with institutions with rich ambitions, but hardly able to implement their vision (Agunias and Newland 2012: 90). The Government of Kerala agrees that NORKA Roots needs to be strengthened with a clear mandate and a well-defined and legally binding policy framework (Government of Kerala 2015). Besides the Keralite diaspora in Switzerland, the evaluation by the Centre for Development Studies has also shown that many Keralites are not aware of the existence of NORKA Roots (Rajan 2012: 11). In order to act as an effective institution for the needs of its diaspora, people need to know about the establishment and the provision of services by NORKA Roots. Furthermore, NORKA Roots might be more effective if it would also include diasporas residing in the West into their focus. Knowing this sample’s barriers for diaspora engagement, an effective cooperation with the Keralite diaspora in Switzerland with NORKA Roots might be heavily biased. Therefore, annual meetings with the Keralite associations in Switzerland might be a good starting point in order to discuss diaspora issues, engagement potential and the way forward.

14.8 Conclusion So far, development strategy is strongly family based in Kerala. The Keralite diaspora is transnationally operating on an independent basis with powerful impacts on development. Indeed, in many areas it involves less government intervention and more provision of the

246  Santhy Iyyakkunnel necessary infrastructure to facilitate transnational flows of various kinds (Gamlen 2008). The illustration of transnationalism of the Keralite diaspora residing in Switzerland and their double belonging present a rich potential for diaspora engagement. However, potential ideas for diaspora engagement have been discussed on a highly hypothetical level. Real intentions are therefore hard to identify. Due to the home bias, diaspora members might be willing to take more risks and aim for a social impact in their home country. Eventually, more potential might be harnessed from the diaspora if the state would offer more possibilities for the diaspora to be involved with their homeland. This requires a better atmosphere and a system where trust can be built between the diaspora and the state. This chapter has been an attempt to place policy perspectives from Kerala in the context of the potential for socio-economic development by their forgotten diaspora in Europe, so that Davis Kunju and many other diaspora members can be told that they are not a lost generation but are unique in their transnational resources.

References Agunias, Dovelyn Rannveid and Newland, Kathleen. 2012. Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development – A Handbook for Policy Makers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries. International Organisation for Migration, Migration Policy Institute. Geneva, Washington. Ajanovic, Edma. 2014. ‘Remittances – More Than Money? Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zum Verständnis von Rücküberweisungen von Migrant-innen in ihre Sendeländer’. In: Migration und Entwicklung – Neue Perspektiven. Promedia, Südwind. Wien, Österreich. Cai, Q. 2003. ‘Migrant Remittances and Family Ties: A Case Study in China’. International Journal of Population Geography. 471–483. Corbridge, Stuart. 2013. ‘Corruption in India’. In: Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. Routledge. Abingdon, UK. 222–229. De Haas, Hein. 2010. ‘Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective’. International Migration Review. Vol. 44. No. 1. 227–264. Drèze, Jean and Sen, Amartya. 2002. India – Economic Development and Social Opportunity. Oxford University Press. New York, USA. Faist, Thomas, Fauser, Margit, and Reisenauer, Eveline. 2013. Transnational Migration. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK. Gamlen, Alan. 2006. ‘Diaspora Engagement Policies: What Are They, and What Kinds of States Use Them? In: Compas Centre on Migration, Policy and Society. Working Paper No. 32. University of Oxford. Oxford. Gamlen, Alan. 2008. ‘Why Engage Diasporas?’ In: ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society. Working Paper No. 63. University of Oxford. Oxford.

From Kerala to Switzerland 247 Glick Schiller, Nina, Basch, Linda, and Szanton, Cristina. 1995. ‘From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration’. Anthropological Quarterly. Vol. 68. No. 1. 48–63. Government of India. 2015. India Human Development Report 2011 – Towards Inclusion. Institute of Applied Manpower Research. www.iam rindia.gov.in/media_coverage_compilation/IHDR_Summary.pdf. Accessed 14 May 2015. Government of Kerala. 2015. ‘Diaspora and Migration Policy’, Chapter 20. http://kerala.gov.in/docs/reports/vision2030/20.pdf. Accessed 05 May 2015. Grieco, Elizabeth. 2004. ‘Will Migrant Remittances Continue Through Time? A New Answer to an Old Question’. International Journal on Multicultural Societies. Vol. 6. No. 2. 243–252. Kapur, Devesh. 2010. Diaspora, Development and Democracy – The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India. Princeton University Press. Princeton, NJ, USA. Kingma, M. 2007. ‘Nurses on the Move: A Global Overview’. Health Services Research. Vol. 42. No. 3. 1281–1298. Kumar, Krishna S. and Rajan, S. Irudaya. 2014. ‘Introduction’. In: Emigration in 21st-Century India. Routledge. New Delhi, India. 1–11. Non-Resident Keralite’s Welfare Act. 2008. www.old.kerala.gov.in/dept_ norka/act_10_2009.pdf. Accessed 07 May 2015. Pande, Amba. 2014. ‘Diaspora and Development: Theoretical Perspectives’. In: India Migration Report 2014 – Diaspora and Development. Routledge. New Delhi, India. 36–46. Pelletier, Adeline. 2011. ‘Household Remittances, Inequality and Poverty: Evidence from the State of Kerala’. In: Dynamics of Indian Migration – Historical and Current Perspectives. Routledge. New Delhi, India. 378–417. Percot, M. and Nair, S. 2011. ‘Transcending Boundaries: Indian Nurses in Internal and International Migration’. In: Dynamics of Indian Migration – Historical and Current Perspectives. Routledge. New Delhi, India. 195–223. Percot, Marie and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2007. Female Emigration from India: Case Study of Nurses. Economic and Political Weekly. 42(4): 318–25. Rahman, Taiabur. 2013. ‘From Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Leveraging the Academic Diaspora for Development in Bangladesh’. In: Diaspora Engagement and Development in South Asia. Palgrave Macmillan. Hampshire, UK. 124–144. Rajan, S. Irudaya. 2012. Assessment of NORKA-ROOTS (An Implementing Agency of the Department of NORKA – Non-resident Keralites Affairs of the Government of Kerala) and the Applicability of a Similar Organisation to Other States in India. Migrant Forum in Asia. Quezon City, Philippines. Ratha, D. and Plaza, S. 2014. ‘Diaspora and Development – Critical Issues’. In: India Migration Report 2014 – Diaspora and Development. Routledge. New Delhi, India. 1–20. Ravi Raman, K. 2010. ‘The Kerala Model – Situating the Critique’. In: Development, Democracy and the State. Routledge. New York, USA. 1–21.

248  Santhy Iyyakkunnel Singh, Supriya and Cabraal, Anuja. 2014. ‘ “Boomerang Remittances” and the Circulation of Care: A Study of Indian Transnational Families in Australia’. In: Transnational Families, Migration and the Circulation of Care – Understanding Mobility and Absence in Family Life. Routledge. New York, USA. 220–234. Skeldon, Ronald. 1997. Migration and Development: A Global Perspective. Longman Limited. Essex, England. State Secretariat for Migration (SEM). 2017. Migration Report 2016. www. sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/publiservice/berichte/migration/migrations bericht-2016-e.pdf. Accessed 15 July 2017. United Nations Development Programme. 2016. Human Development Report 2016. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_develop ment_report.pdf. Accessed 20 July 2017. Vertovec, S. 2010. ‘Transnnationalism and Identity’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Vol. 27. No. 4. 573–582. Walton-Roberts, Margaret. 2010. ‘Student Nurses and their Migration Plans: A Kerala Case Study’. In: Governance and Labour Migration – India Migration Report 2010. Routledge. New Delhi, India. 196–216. Zachariah, K. C. and Rajan, S. Irudaya. 2007. Migration, Remittances and Employment – Short-Term Trends and Long-Term Implications. Working Paper 395. Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum. Zachariah, K. C. and Rajan, S. Irudaya. 2015. ‘Emigration and Remittances: Results from the sixth Kerala Migration Survey’. In: India Migration Report 2016 – Gulf Migration. Routledge. New Delhi, India. 238–254.

15 Changing demographics and intimate relation patterns among Indian diaspora in Denmark Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma 15.1 Introduction Indians, mostly skilled, have been invited to fill gaps in the Danish labour market, as has been witnessed in the last decade, changing the demographics and dynamics of the Indian diaspora. The paper diverges from the much discussed social and economic context of the Indian diaspora to focus on the psychosocial aspects of transnationalism and intimate relationship formation. The theoretical framework combines a life course perspective, processes of interconnectedness and inclusion/ exclusion studies of Indian and ‘mixed couples’ consisting of Indians in ethnically heterogamous relationships with Danish spouses, which form the empirical part of this chapter. In doing so, it attempts to demystify the stereotypical notions of belongings to the country of origin and highlights the multiple affiliations and identities Indians hold.1 An understanding of the socio-economic transformations of the Indian diaspora in Denmark requires putting into context the Danish setting in relation both to European migration and to India. The first section provides this backdrop. This is followed by an analysis of the socioeconomic and demographic status of the Indians living in Denmark. The third section looks more closely at the intimate relationship formations of Indians and the transformation of these patterns over the decades, thus touching the notions of belongings and identities. The article ends with discussions on the research done in Denmark and presents perspectives for policy change to improve the conditions for Indians in Denmark and for those in homogamous and heterogamous relationships.

15.2 European migration: setting the context Europe is home to an estimated 78 million international migrants, making it the second-largest host in 2017 after Asia (80 million) (UN

250  Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma DESA 2017). Germany (12.2 million) leads the European countries in terms of absolute numbers as well as percentage in relation to the population, followed by the Russian Federation (11.7 million) and the United Kingdom (8.8 million). In comparison, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark (657 thousand), Norway (799 thousand) and Sweden (1.7 million) host only a small fraction of the total migrants in Europe as well as the world. The majority of migration flow is within the region i.e. among European countries, boosted by the free movement agreements for European Union citizens. However, in recent years people from nonEuropean and non-Western countries have been moving to Europe. This has partly been facilitated by the European countries themselves to fill the labour force deficit created by an ageing population and because of inflow of asylum seekers from countries in crisis such as Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Afghanistan among others (IOM 2017). The negative perception of the large influx of refugees into the European countries since 2015 has resulted in deterrent policies such as the temporary closure of borders, introduction of border control between countries previously having open borders and stricter immigration rules. The referendum for Brexit held in 2016 and the subsequent decision by Britain to leave the European Union is also seen as an outcome of the recent inflow of refugees to Europe. The popular rhetoric of non-Europeans being a burden on the welfare system and the fear of Islamisation and terror have fed this negative perception among the public (Tølbøll 2016).

15.3 Indian diaspora in Denmark Globally, the Indian diaspora is deemed the largest with about 16.6 million Indians living outside the country in 2017. The largest Indian population outside of India was in the United Arab Emirates (UAE 3.2 million) and the United States of America (USA, 2.3 million). As of 2017, about 1,307,007 Indians live in Europe. UK is a preferred destination country in Europe with Indians being the largest diaspora (836,524). The other two European countries with a huge Indian population are Italy (138,802) and Germany (68,521) (UN DESA 2017). About 56,937 Indians reside in the three Scandinavian countries, with the majority living in Sweden (25,719) and Norway (20,018) and a relatively smaller number in Denmark (11,200) (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2017). The Danish colonisation of India (Tanqebar, Serempore and Nicobar Islands) from 1620 to 1845

Indian diaspora in Denmark 251 has not made a significant impression on the collective consciousness of either the Indians or the Danes, as much of the colonial history of India is dominated by the British, Portuguese and Dutch colonisation. This may be one of the reasons why despite the Denmark–India links going back to the seventeenth century, Denmark has not been a country Indians have naturally been drawn to, unlike the UK. In addition, the language barriers and the cold climate may have acted as deterrents (Venkatasubramanian 2010). Nevertheless, there has been a steady growth in the Indian diaspora in Denmark (see Table 15.1/Figure 15.1). Historically too, many Indian men arrived in the late 1960s and early 1970s as labour migrants just before the ‘immigration stop’ was implemented in 1972. Paradoxically this was followed by family reunification with the spouses. In 2017,

Table 15.1  Indian population in Denmark, 2008–2017 Years

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Age/Sex Girls 434 463 475 523 584 622 670 769 900 1,068 (0–17) Boys 501 542 555 582 637 708 756 854 981 1,160 (0–17) Women 1,730 1,935 2,066 2,266 2,429 2,552 2,704 2,922 3,315 3,752 Men 2,913 3,256 3,286 3,508 3,707 3,729 3,996 4,374 5,002 5,647 Total 5,578 6,196 6,382 6,879 7,357 7,611 8,126 8,919 10,198 11,627 Source: Statistics Denmark 2017

25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0

2008

2009

2010

Girls

2011 Boys

2012

2013

Women

2014 Men

Figure 15.1  Indian diaspora in Denmark, 2008–2017 Source: Statistics Denmark 2017

2015 Total

2016

2017

252  Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma the Indian population in Denmark (immigrants and descendants) was 11,627, comprising a mere fraction (0.20 percent) of the Danish immigrant population dominated mainly by Turks, Poles and more recently Syrians (Statistics Denmark 2017a). A number of factors have been instrumental in the increase in the Indian diaspora in Denmark. These include the increased bilateral agreements and trade relations between the countries; introduction of policies such as the Green Card Scheme (discontinued as of 16 June 2016), Positive List, Pay Limit scheme and the issuance of work permits based on Danish labour market needs; and programmes such as Work in Denmark; and setting up offices of Indian and Indo-Danish companies in Denmark. Moreover, the Danish work environment is attractive with high salaries, decent work culture and long leaves (six weeks), leading to a positive ‘work–life balance’ (Venkatasubramanian 2010). In addition, free healthcare for all and free education for children are major pull-factors for coming to Denmark. In 2016, the average income of Indians before tax was DKK 389,300 (USD 62,887), which was the highest among the non-Western immigrants and significantly higher than Sri Lankans, who had the second-highest income of DKK 300,000 (USD 48,461) (Statistics Denmark – Indvandrere 2017a: 69). Similarly, among the non-Western immigrants, Indians were found to have the highest average pension assets worth DKK 1.2 million (USD 193,847), with average net individual pensions being DKK 400,000 (USD 64.616) in 2015 (ibid: 79). However, women have a raw deal with regard to income in general in Denmark, where they earn less than men, which has a spill-over effect on Indian women’s income as well (ibid: 70). Criminal offences are relatively low among Indians. As of 2016 (see Table 15.3), total crimes committed by Indians were 179, most of which were minor offences comprising fines for breaking traffic laws. Since Indians are mainly economic immigrants and have come to Denmark to work they either arrive here with a job or, if they come on schemes such as Green Card, are urged to find work in order to be granted extension of residence permit. These requirements include the obligation to earn a minimum annual income of DKK 50,000 in the Table 15.2  Indian employment, 2015 Men

Women

Total

Total % men

Total % women

Total %

3118

1919

5037

75

49

65

Source: Statistics Denmark 2017

89 18 107

76 15 91

2002

118 17 135

2004

Source: Statistics Denmark 2017

Men Women Total

2000

134 31 165

2005

Table 15.3  Indian crime rates, 2000–2016

139 34 173

2006 114 23 137

2007 115 17 132

2008 137 26 163

2009 150 24 174

2010 138 18 156

2011 130 37 167

2012

138 34 172

2013

152 32 184

2014

157 40 197

2015

147 32 179

2016

254  Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma first year, procuring full health insurance prior to coming to Denmark (in order to cover the period of unemployment or until one is eligible for government health insurance), and does not grant the right to work as a self-employed person. Family reunification is not allowed until one has found a job and a place to live. With the pressure of finding work quickly both to fulfil the residency permit requirements as well as to meet the high cost of living in Denmark, Indians often take up work outside their area of expertise (education and work experience). Therefore, Indians as a group are perceived as being socially adjusted, largely employed (61 percent as of 2015, Statistics Denmark, 2017b), with high average income, and low dependency on the social welfare system. Community formation among the Indian diaspora tends to be based on ethnic, language and religious identities. This can be seen by the many associations registered with the Indian Embassy. These associations are formed mainly to preserve cultural identities and to celebrate religious festivals. The other reasons for Indians coming to Denmark are higher education and marriage. An informal assessment done by the Indian Embassy a few years back found that there were around 350 Indian students in Denmark’s various educational institutions, mainly (200) listed for PhD or post-doctoral research studies (Indian Embassy, Denmark 2017). While the number of transnational marriages between Danes and Indians may look insignificant (see Table 15.4) since 2009, their numbers are on the rise. With the many changes in the immigration laws over the last few years it has become increasingly difficult for Indians and foreign spouses to come to Denmark on family reunification. The next section reflects some of these parameters in exploring the intimate relationship formation among the Indians in Denmark and adds nuances to the phenomenon. Table 15.4  Marriages in Denmark Marriages

2000

2010

2016

Total (men and women) Indian men & Indian women Indian men & Danish women Indian women & Danish men Total heterogamous

38,388 19 9 8 17

27,140 49 5 14 19

30,389 54 11 14 25

Source: Statistics Denmark 2017

Indian diaspora in Denmark 255

15.4 Intimate relationship formation: myths and facts Global discourse on intimate relationships among the Indian diaspora has been dominated by violence against women, trauma, desertion of wives and divorces (Jopson 2018).2 With the rise in reported grievances to the Indian government, the Ministry of External Affairs, under services provided to overseas Indians, initiated a programme to extend legal and financial support to women who suffered such marital abuse (MEA, GoI 2017). A report by Jopson (2017) substantiates further that a sum of USD 3,000 is provided to deserted wives in Western countries for legal assistance. However, such partial or ‘selective scanning and amplification’ of studies on Indian diaspora, as pointed out by Rajan and Joseph (2015) in their study of migrant domestic workers in Saudi Arabia, obfuscate positive stories of successful, joyous intimate relationships experienced by Indians abroad. This chapter attempts to presents a more nuanced facet of intimate relationships among Indians in Denmark with a focus on motivations for couple formation, their experiences of inclusion and exclusion in the Danish society as well as their continued connectedness to India. It does not however negate or overlook the problematic aspects of intimate relationships but notes that it is only a part of the story of a vibrant and complex Indian diaspora in Denmark. The formation of intimate partnership among native Danes and persons originating from different countries is relatively under-researched with limited data, leaving much scope for the proliferation of myths. An article in a Danish national newspaper (Sommerand and Mortensen 2017) titled ‘Love Without Borders: Danish Men Find Wives in Asia – Women Find Love in Europe’3 highlights the differential preference of Danish men and women when it comes to choosing a non-Danish partner. Further reading reveals that the wives are primarily from Thailand and the Philippines in Asia, while the husbands are mainly from Britain, Germany, Norway and Sweden. Denmark has a highly systematic mechanism for gathering statistics about its population including intimate relationship formation and dissolution. This is facilitated by the relatively small population of about 5.7 million and a high degree of digitalisation process of service provision to its citizens enabled by the central personal register number (CPR number). However, only the marriages registered in Denmark are included in the statistics, leaving potentially ‘grey areas’ related to marriages, including mixed marriages, taking place outside the country, as is the case with Indians (Olsen 2018). Many Indians migrating to Denmark, especially those with higher education and

256  Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma taking up jobs with high positions, are already married hence don’t get counted in the statistics. Therefore, quantitative data is combined here with qualitative studies to fill gaps in data. Homogamous marriages are those that take place between men and women from the same country of origin, as in this case between two Indians. On the other hand, social scientists define marriage between couples from different country backgrounds as heterogamous. While investigating the overall extent of homogamous couples and ethnically mixed/heterogamous couples in Denmark, there is an increase in the past decades from four percent in 1990 to six percent in 2010 (Singla 2015: 31). A look at the data for three points (2000, 2010 and 2016) indicates a reduction in total number of marriages despite an increase in the total population. However, if only the homogamous and heterogamous couples are considered, a significant increase in homogamous marriages (Indians with Indians) among the Indians is seen. This can be attributed to the changes in demography resulting from an increase in the number of Indian descendants and the arrival of new Indians over the years, thereby having more Indians to choose from, thus increasing the scope for homogamy. Similarly, numbers of ethnically heterogamous couples (intermarriages between persons of Indian origin and Danish origin) show an increase, despite the small numbers, from 17 in the year 2000 to 25 in the year 2016 (see Table 15.4). The focus here is on two major patterns in the intimate relationship formation among the Indian diaspora group in Denmark based on the empirical qualitative studies: Ethnically homogamous relationships – marriages among co-ethnics, both ‘transnational’ marriages (one partner/spouse grew up in India or a third country) and ‘national’ marriages both spouses grew up in Denmark. • Ethnically heterogamous relationships/intermarriage/mixed marriage – one spouse has an Indian origin while the other spouse has a Danish origin. •

15.5 Empirical studies on intimate relations formation patterns Two studies conducted by the first author attempt to shed light on the phenomenon of intimate relationship formation among Indians in Denmark. Due to the relatively limited scope of the first study (2008), the second study (2015) is discussed more extensively here.

Indian diaspora in Denmark 257

15.6 Theoretical framework The conceptual framework of inclusion and exclusion was used to understand the Indians in Denmark in the first empirical study. Humans, as social beings, seek inclusion and belongingness, while exclusion in social life is often used to maintain power and social control. However, these boundaries are often challenged and even crossed (Abrams, Hogg and Marques 2005). One form of exclusion, which may range from relatively abstract to relatively specific, is the process of categorisation – positioning people into different social categories in terms of assumed sharedness of their characteristics with others of the same category. Essentially connected with both inclusion and exclusion is the concept of ‘belonging’ defined as an ‘experience of being part of the social fabric’ (Anthias 2006: 21). Belonging is about connectivity, values and practices, about feeling accepted and being safe (ibid). The framework also includes diaspora, the transnationalism phenomenon as a concept, practice and consciousness. According to Kalra et al. diaspora is both a positive espousal of transnational affiliations as well as defensive positions communities take ‘in the face of a hostile host saying you do not belong’ (2005: 14). The integrative theoretical framework of the second study about intermarriage and mixed parenting (Singla 2015) is based on a sociocultural and psychological approach, in which as Valsiner and Rosa clarify human beings are social, historical as well as uniquely personal – subjective, affective and individually goal oriented (Valsiner and Rosa 2007: 2). This approach also implies significance of the life course periods and transitions especially related to generational variations. Intersectionality (Singla 2006; Phoenix 2011) provides an ontological framework, which establishes that social existence is never singular and that everybody belongs simultaneously to multiple categories not only by ethnicity, gender and class or socio-economic position, considered the ‘Big Three’, but also includes categories such as age, nation and locality that mutually constitute each other (Moodley 2011). Lastly the framework includes the phenomenological theory, in which sexual desire is perceived as an existential need with its origin in our gendered human condition, determined by neither ‘biology nor cultural prescriptions’, though constrained by both (Giles 2006: 237; Panty 1940: 7). In theorising the changing patterns of mate selection in relation to social development, Tepperman et al. (2006) emphasise the increased personal choice and further notes ‘development promotes a romantic

258  Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma and erotic conception of mate selection’. People in the ‘developed countries’ by this theory are likely to marry for ‘love’ – that is, for reasons of intimacy, companionship and sexual attraction. Whatever the real reasons, few these days will admit to marrying for money alone, where intimacy, friendship and attraction are noticeably lacking (ibid: 46). Furthermore, the phenomena of love and gender are inextricably entangled together and are constantly changing, making them fluid, thus making it difficult to fix them to specific categories.

15.7 Methodology The first study, conducted in the mid-nineties and followed-up in 2006 (Singla 2004, 2008, 2011), consisted of qualitative in-depth interviews wherein fourteen South Asian and Danish youths (equal numbers) living in Copenhagen were selected. The participants were between twenty-six and thirty-two years old at the time of the follow-up. The study aimed at understanding the young people’s experiences including their intimate partnership formations. While in the second study six intermarried couples, (one partner Danish and the other South Asian – Indian or Pakistani origin) between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-one were interviewed in 2015. The interviews covered themes of intimate relationships, parenting and transnationalism (Singla 2015).4 The analysis strategies used were to develop categories grounded on in-depth readings of the narratives, combined with the condensation and interpretation of them.

15.8 Major findings The narratives in the first study pointed to experiences of racial discrimination at both the societal and personal levels, which varied from exclusion and harsh and differential treatment in the labour market thereby reflecting higher levels of unemployment, along with inclusion in education evident from their high levels of education among these groups in comparison to other ethnic minorities and even the Danes (Singla 2008). One of the reasons for the higher levels of education among the Indian youths was seen as a result of the welfare regime, which enables individuals to complete their education, including taking on higher education without incurring overwhelming financial burden either for themselves or their families, as has been found in other studies (Hellevik 2004). The findings from the second study, on the other hand, showed, which is corroborated by recent data from 2016, that the average income and labour market participation of

Indian diaspora in Denmark 259 Indians living in Denmark had risen. These reflect changes in the overall socio-economic situation of Indians in Denmark over the last two decades. However, as has been mentioned earlier, gender differentials in income exits in labour force participation as well as in incomes (see Table 15.2). There are diverse motivations and dynamics involved in intimate relationship formation among the Indian diaspora, which are presented below, through the ‘close-up’, in-depth narratives of the participants in the empirical studies. These narratives add nuances to the understanding of the phenomenon. 15.8.1 Diverse intimate partner formation in Denmark Homogamous couples (Indian–Indian) The dominating pattern of marriage among Indians in Denmark is homogamy. Indians either marry between Indians born and raised in Denmark or marry transnationally i.e. an Indian from India or from a third country. In the first study, Mita, a young woman aged twenty-eight, met her husband in the UK where both were doing their Masters. Her husband is from Andhra Pradesh in southeast India, while she comes from Punjab, Northwest India. He was different from the stereotypical image of an Indian man she had, and thus they became friends, started dating and eventually married after a year. The common denominator became their academic education and intellectual compatibility, and the fact that they came from different communities and cultures and spoke different languages became secondary concerns. I met him in masters . . . it was in Liverpool . . . he came from India and I came from Denmark . . . we came in the same class . . . I did not speak much to him . . . I thought that all Indian men are macho – they do not respect women because I have experiences from our culture . . . once you start studying together then you see good sides of each other . . . then I came back to Denmark and realized that he was the one . . . it took me more than a year to realize that. Mita’s and her husband’s parents accepted their decision to marry without any conflict, and they were married with three different ceremonies, respecting the different traditions as well as the elders’ wish to keep the sanctity of Indian traditions regarding marriage rituals, reflecting the significance of the diaspora consciousness.

260  Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma Experiences of inclusion/exclusion in the Danish society and transnationalism/interconnections with India Mita was connected with India, her ancestral home country, partly being an Indian descendant and partly because of her marriage to an Indian man and their business relations in India (Singla 2008). Mita reflects about her positive feelings and connection to both the countries Denmark is my country because I am born here . . . But what I gained in Denmark is simply my settlement for life. Got my education here came back and the first future and everything I need for progress in life, I got it here . . . I do belong to Denmark. But I love India as well. Love for India, which I did not have before [the original study] because I have not been to India for that long. Mita experienced exclusion in high school as well as in the society to some extent. She notes that Danes are not open to foreign cultures. Mita’s narrative reveals that her social contacts between here and the many in India (there) are at several levels, as she has frequented and varied contact with the ancestral country through her husband’s family and business connections and with the UK, where she got her higher education. While on the other hand, based on anecdotal evidence, it is seen that for a number of Indian homogamous couples, where both spouses are born and raised in Denmark, there is relatively less transnational connections and practices, as is also shown by Hole (2005) among Indians in Sweden. Prieur (2004) argues that the young people form a ‘third way’, live separately from the parents, which implies decreased direct contact with the extended family in the country of origin, especially if both spouses have grown up in a Scandinavian country. However, because of lack of substantive research it is too simplistic to arrive at any conclusive pattern in affiliation and interconnectedness. Heterogamous/ethnically mixed couple (Indian-Dane) Another pattern regarding intimate relationship formation, in which there has been a numerical increase in the past two decades, is marriage between persons of Indian origin and Danish origin. In line with Trask and Koivunen (2007: 93), it is important to note that heterogamy or intermarriage is dependent on the availability factor, including the availability of potential spouses, regionality, location, age and

Indian diaspora in Denmark 261 education. For example, the higher the educational level of the partners, the greater the potential for intermarriage. Two types of cases of heterogamous couples are presented here. One is the case of Sabita, twenty-one years, and Sam, thirty-six years, who were born and raised in Denmark and married Danes. On the other hand Raaka’s, forty-two years, and Rajiv’s, thirty-five years, case are transnational marriage i.e. marriage migration as they are married to Danish partners they met in India and thereafter migrated to Denmark. Sabita is the only child of highly educated and well-placed parents from India, who migrated to Denmark twenty-five years ago. She met her Danish spouse during her bachelor studies in the United States, which led to first being attracted to her husband including sexual desire and ‘falling in love’. And hmm . . . , it was about 2 years ago, we met sort of at a ‘Danskeraften’ [Danish Evening] . . . It went quickly from that, because we had a lot in common. We had both grown up in Denmark, but had sort of similar mind-sets that we kind of wanted to go out and you know try to get some of the best, get a very good education and try to get into a very good institute. Sam was born and raised in Denmark by Indian parents, who moved to Denmark four decades ago and had a middle-level education and employment. Sam met his partner Cecilia at their workplace. Cecilia in her narration of her story says: Yes, we fell in love, and then we took it one-step at a time . . . I think it was more difficult for Sam than for me, because they have other traditions than in my home, if I had a boyfriend I could bring him home, even if it was, you know I had known him for a week. But in Sam’s culture, you would expect not to bring a person home until you were quite sure that this was the right person for you . . . So I guess there is a big difference, so I did not meet his family for quite a long time, which for me was a little bit difficult to understand, like ‘why?’ But, that, I know now. The marriage migrant Rajiv, grew up in a metropolis in north India, had a well-placed father and homemaker mother. Rajiv’s reason for coming to Denmark was Katja, whom he met through a musician friend in an Indian metropol. The narrative below documents their reciprocal attraction based on common interests and values as cosmopolitans

262  Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma and maintaining contact via digital communication/internet, also discussed in Constable (2004) regarding transnational couples. And finally, we ended up meeting and we really liked each other . . . It was so nice . . . And then she was travelling around, and then she came back . . . we were already together in the first trip and we spend the last 12 days together and then she left but we were always in touch. Raaka grew up in a city in South India and has a master’s-level education. She met her Danish spouse Klaus at the workplace in India, where they were colleagues, at the same level. However, we met in India . . . In India it would be almost impossible to imagine that you can have your daughter or son marrying someone from outside your religion, country and caste . . . when you marry, you marry within your own caste . . . So, I imagined a lot that it would be a problem, but it turned out that it wasn’t a problem . . . .my mother had problems . . . but my siblings did not have. Commonality of education and career/work has been a major factor in their intimate relationship formation as for number of other heterogamous couples. Experiences of inclusion/exclusion in the Danish society and transnationalism/Indian interconnections with India One of the basic foci of the study was the observable aspects of physical differences (Sengstock 2009) including colour of the skin, in the mixed couples, a product of the cultural racism which still influences the Danish public discourse. Many researchers argue that a form of cultural racism as related to the earlier-mentioned colonisation and post-colonial responses has substituted earlier prejudices and stereotypes about ‘race’ (Andreassen and Henningsen 2011). Sam’s wife Cecilia and Raaka show an awareness of the discrimination processes in the Danish society illustrating that ‘race does matter’, while Sabita’s and Rajiv’s attitude towards racial discrimination is seen as indifference entailing ‘race does not matter’ discourse as is also validated by other studies (Killian 2013). Sam’s wife Cecilia expresses her concern for her phenotypically mixed daughters. Cecilia is worried about socialising her children in an environment of exclusion groups of population. The historical

Indian diaspora in Denmark 263 experiences of exclusion and stigmatisation of the ‘other’ (Andreassen and Henningsen 2011) affect these understandings to some extent. I think that the biggest concern is for the girls, I mean if it continues to go down this road, it could be difficult for them. Hmm . . . maybe if they find a future husband from a different country . . . respect for other human beings until you know that person. That is something that I miss in society today. Similarly, Raaka emphasises the job-related exclusion for ethnic minorities in Denmark through her own experience: I wanted to go back to work, after two years, but then I could not find a job in Denmark. It was very difficult to get a job in Denmark . . . if there is a foreigner coming in, and this is only if it is a necessity, if there is a position where they cannot find a Dane. Then okay, cheap labour or whatever. On the other hand, Rajiv seems to be hardly affected by the immigration process or the process of moving to Denmark, but he did express his first impressions of the large supermarket in the very first phase of arriving to Denmark. He states: For me it was not even a big move, because it was not a cultural shock. In the beginning yeah, yes I mean, I remember the first time in Føtex (supermarket’s name), I thought wow, this is paradise. He is aware of some difficulties at the macro/structural level related to the compulsion of learning the Danish language, getting appointments with the medical specialists and so on. However, he recognises that the support, appreciation and acceptance from his wife Katja at the personal/micro level is a major contributor to his subjective perception of the immigration process as unproblematic and smooth. He is also appreciative of the structural functioning and the openness and ‘spaciousness’ of Danish society. In addition, he expresses his appreciation of the relative economic equality in Denmark and criticises the corruption in India, his country of origin. However, I love the fact that systems work and have a basic sense of respect for each other. The space and that is good. . . . Nobody is hungry, nobody here has ever experienced hunger in their entire life. The homeless people are not even hungry. So that is a big

264  Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma thing. Denmark is the least corrupt country in the world. Did you know that? Number one. India is number 83. Sabita does not mention exclusion processes in the Danish society. However, she has close and frequent transnational contact with her extended family in South India, whom she visited every summer vacation. Sabita and her husband Robert’s focus on filial piety towards grandparents (Trask and Koivunen 2007) is a significant aspect of their transnationalism as well as a common value for both of them. I speak to my grandparents on both sides once a week, at least. Sometimes a little bit more and sometimes a little less. There is always a lot of dialogue . . . I think that now, I will be travelling more with Robert. Rajiv also maintains frequent contact with India through both travelling and Internet technologies such as Skype. This maintaining of interconnectivity with India corresponds with the conclusions of the study on Indian online transnationalism, where members of the Indian diaspora connect with one another and ‘life at home’ and where technology functions as both a catalyst and an indicator of contemporary sociocultural change (Sahoo and deKruijf 2014). He communicates not only with his family in India but also to others in other countries. His narrative illustrates the diverse objectives of his trips to India such as to give concrete financial advice to his father, to further develop competences in his profession as a health promotion practitioner and for recreation. On the other hand, Sam has almost no contact with his country of origin, as his Indian parents, first generation of immigrants, chose not to maintain links with India. However, he has visited his extended family members in the UK and Canada. His infrequent contact with India may be related to his Danish spouse Cecilia not having visited India and being connected with a sister-in-law in Canada. Sam’s lack of transnational practices may be related to the nature of his family’s relative lack of transnational involvement and relationships with the ancestral country of origin. The marriage migrant Raaka is not nostalgic about India or the lack of Indian contacts in Denmark, contrary to theories of enhanced involvement with the country of origin especially for relatively newly arrived migrants (Sam and Berry 2010). I am not the person who calls too much and talks to people. I write mails, even if I keep in contact I don’t have that craving.

Indian diaspora in Denmark 265 I keep in touch sort of. The last six months I have been calling my sister, because she lost her husband. Raaka’s narrative indicates interdependence towards extended family members. Raaka is aware of her responsibilities towards them and fulfils her duties when her parents and siblings are in need, especially at the time when they had issues with housing. To sum up, these narratives of both homogamous and heterogamous couples demystify and challenge stereotypical and simplistic understanding of intimate and transnational relationships and present a more complex pattern of intimate relationship formation, inclusion/ exclusion in both the countries.

15.9 Discussion The findings highlight the need to move beyond simplistic understanding of Indian diaspora with regards holding on to identity affiliations to India, the country they left behind, which they previously would not have given a second thought. No generalisation about the nature of transnational contacts on the basis of structural categories such as type of migration, gender or socio-economic belonging can be made, as they are subjective and intersect with factors such as the nature of relationships, and the agency of the persons involved. The empirical cases illustrate a wide mix – from frequent visits to India for Mita, Sabita and Rajiv to the cases of Raaka with limited visits and Sam with no visit in the past two decades. We could look at transnationalism in relation to the quality of the contact, especially with the extended family in terms of involvement in critical decisions and how it affects their everyday life. Thus, transnationalism needs to be seen as a dynamic, changing process depending on many factors including the particular period in life course entailing generational variations. Further, transnationalism focuses on the double feelings of belonging, as many immigrants display a form of loyalty to more than one nation, which does not imply conflicts (Nyberg Sørensen 2005). Most Indians nurture ties with their country of origin along with becoming a part of the host society, despite increasing polarisation in the society. Our findings can form a point of departure for a nuanced understanding of these phenomena. Within the metaphorical framework of pull and push for the diasporic relations, we could consider factors such as transnational marriage accompanied by cordial, close relations with the partner’s family, presence of extended family with warm ties or business

266  Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma relations as factors which pull the diaspora towards the country of origin. One of the stressors for women is concern about the extended family in the country of origin e.g. parents who are ill and need help, relatives in need of economic support. Similarly, in a study conducted in the US, Guzder and Krishna (2005) note that Indian women are seen as being more concerned and psychologically connected with their extended families in India. This is however seen as a generational issue, relatively more relevant to the first-generation migrants, not so much to their descendants. On the other hand, complex societal factors like uncertain political situation, extended family conflicts about the issue of marriage and property and death in the family are push factors for Indian diasporic population for leaving the ancestral country. Similarly, there are pull-factors related to migration in Denmark, which have been discussed earlier in the chapter. The experiences of exclusion, especially the gendered ones in the labour market (see Table 15.2: men 75 percent, women 49 percent) and in the social sphere can be considered ‘push factors’. A study by Machura (n.d.) in which twenty-three out of forty-one Indians interviewed think that it is difficult to make friends with Danes. The reasons elucidated were that Danes are shy in general, often have a small group of friends they hold on to and do not easily let new people into this group of very good friends. They have special ‘safe zones’ and don’t mix ‘work life’ with private life. Similar views were formulated by an Indian anthropologist who studied Danish rural life in the 1990s (Reddy 1991, 1998). Another push factor to Denmark or feelings of exclusion is the perception of migrants, especially the visually ethnically different (non-Western), can be seen as a result of the residual racial impact of colonial history. The national pride of their democratic heritage has led to their rejection of the ideas of Nordic colonial atrocities. The most prevalent view held by Scandinavians of their colonial past is that of ‘benign and gentle’ and that the interactions with the colonised people in Africa, Asia and America were based on collaboration rather than extortion and subjugation (Lehtola 2015). As has also been mentioned earlier in this chapter, European immigration policies have been largely influenced by the influx of immigrants (via both family reunification and conflict). Rache and Singer (2016) note that fear of being wiped out by the other races, especially for those coming from Islamic countries, has raised anti-Islamic and anti-Semitic sentiments. Through a Junganian optic, Skogemann (2016) points to a strong cultural complex in Denmark for at least a

Indian diaspora in Denmark 267 thousand years, based on an image of a royal shield-maiden protecting the Danes: . . . not only borders, but also, especially in later times, spiritual, cultural, and emotional values as well as language . . . strong emotions around the issues involved show that the cultural complex is still quite active. (ibid: 272) The above quote also illuminates concerns over the Danish language and the reason why all migrants are forced to learn language. There are also changes in interconnections to country of origin with regards to generations. Based on a doctoral study of the Indian Gujrati diaspora in Sweden and UK, Hole (2005) notes the relative decrease in connection with India for the young generation in comparison with the parental generation, especially due to demise of the older generation members. One of the results of the new restrictive immigration policies in Denmark is that it has made transnational marriages difficult if not impossible. This is contrary to the democratic values of choice particularly in the case of intimate relationship formation. The transnational marriages have been perceived by some as a way to re-invest in social relations and maintain a link to the place and the people that the migrants left behind (Rytter 2007, 2013; Singla 2006).

15.10 Perspectives for policy change This chapter about the demographics and the intimate partnership formation among Indians in Denmark directs our attention to the transformations as well as the continuities and has implications for the policies in Denmark and India. It is important to note that our focus is on persons from the world’s largest democracy to one of the world’s oldest democracies. Although socioeconomically Indians in Denmark are relatively well placed among the non-Western immigrants, the restrictive immigration rules also affect Indians’ employment opportunities, especially for the women, as is reflected in the statistics. The overall negative discourses about migrants in the Danish society also affect the Indians. One recommendation with regards to employment would be to have a more human and realistic job policy that is inclusive of all genders and nationalities to fulfil the international promises, so the migrants

268  Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma and/or their spouses are able to use their skills and education not just work within the unskilled sector. One of the most concerning features of the Danish immigration policy is the tightening of rules over the years, especially with regards to family reunification. These include living in the country continuously for over eight years, both couples being over twenty-four years, having a full-time permanent job, passing the Danish language exams, and the citizenship exams (Family Reunification Information Site 2017). A recent survey shows that only 36 percent of the immigrants – both Western and non-Western – are able to fully meet the Danish citizenship requirements, which is criticised as one of the toughest in Europe (Thieden 2018). In addition, Indian spouses do not benefit from financial support (apart from the free medical services and education for children, which every person living in Denmark enjoys), such as unemployment allowance or help with finding work. The Danish citizen/ spouse is seen as being responsible for their partner. These requirements have great negative implications on people in mixed marriages, limiting the personal choices for intimate relationship formation for the Indians in Denmark. In a democratic country, the citizens should have real, personal choices (Tepperman et al. 2006), and thus the restrictive policies should be revised and duly implemented. On the policy changes from the Indian side, the introduction of the Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) in 2005 (MEA, GOI 2017), while a positive step, does not fully help non-Indian spouses of Indians especially with travel to India. Ethnic Danish spouses of Indians still have to fulfil the visa requirements to enter the country, making travel to India difficult. At the international level, there are inspiring examples in countries such as China, Mexico and Philippines, which will benefit both the Indian diaspora as well as the Indian nation (Portes and Rumbaut 2014). The Ministry of Overseas Indians Affairs (MOIA) and the Indian Embassy in an effort to strengthen ties of the Indian diaspora in Denmark to their motherland India and to increase interactions among the diaspora organise cultural events and celebrate significant national days together including the International Yoga Day. However, many people of Indian origin, including those in heterogamous relationships, are either not informed or aware of these events and hence remain excluded. A recommendation would be to put in place mechanisms to ensure inclusion of diverse groups of Indians, as suggested by Gautam in 2013, in countries such as Germany and Holland. Lastly a more realistic understanding of Indian in Denmark considering the continued ‘emotional citizenship’ (Ho 2009), not an

Indian diaspora in Denmark 269 idealised, glamorous image, with considerations for return migration or simultaneous work relation to both countries, will contribute positively to the Indian diaspora globally as well as in Denmark. A comprehensive scientific study of Indians is recommended in order to map the unique dynamics in the Danish context covering the diverse generations as well as the multiple socio-economic groups. Additionally, there is a need for embassies of India around the world and especially in Denmark to make greater efforts firstly to put in place a systematic registration system inviting Indians arriving in Denmark to register. Indians in heterogamous relationships also need to be included. This enables a better integration process, developing a better understanding of the needs of the Indian diaspora in Denmark, thus facilitating better policy framing and implementation and helping Indians in Denmark to feel at home. Consideration and implementation of the policy recommendations by the Danish and the Indian governments will benefit not only the Indians in Denmark but also Danes and Indians in India.

Notes 1 Both authors are Indians with master’s degrees from India as well as Denmark (first author) and India and the UK (second author) and are currently residing in Denmark. The first author is in a homogamous relationship (Indian–Indian), while the second author is in a heterogamous relationship (Indian–Dane). 2 In Jopson (2017) Dr Chandrika Subramanian, leader, Sydney Tamil community, believes that extreme abuse such as ‘bride-burning’ and other oppressions women in the Hindu and Sikh communities face derives from Manu Smriti (ancient scripture) and hence often is seen as culturally acceptable for both victims and perpetrators. 3 Original title: ‘Kærlighed uden grænser- Danske mænd finder kærligheden i Asien – kvinderne finder den i Europa’ 4 The first author conducted the interviews in the first study, while in the second study a young researcher, herself in a heterogamous relationship (Swedish– Danish), conducted the interviews (see Dunger 2010).

References Abrams, Dominic, Hogg, Michael A., and Marques, Jose M. 2005. The Social Psychology of Inclusion and Exclusion. New York: Psychology Press. Andreassen, Rikke and Anne Falke, Henningsen. 2011. Menneske Udstilling: Fremvisninger af Eksotiske Mennesker i Zoologiske Have og Tivoli. København: Tiderne Skifter. Anthias, Floya. 2006. ‘Belongings in a Globalising and Unequal World: Rethinking Translocations’ in Yuval-Davis, N., Kannabiran, K., & Vieten,

270  Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma U. (eds.), The Situated Politics of Belonging. Sidmouth: Pluto Press, pp. 18–31. Constable, Nicole. 2004. Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia. Pennsylvania, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Dunger, Frida. 2010. Making Sense of Intermarried Identities. Unpublished Master’s Degree Project Report, International Development Studies, Roskilde University. Family Reunification, Residence Permits and Danish Citizenship. http://nem familiesammenfoering.dk/. Accessed 22 November 2017. Giles, James. 2004. The Nature of Sexual Desire. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger/Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Giles, James. 2006. ‘Social Constructionism and Sexual Desire’, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36(3): 225–238. Guzder, Jaswant and Krishna, Meenakshi. 2005. ‘Mind the Gap: Diaspora Issues of Indian Origin Women in Psychotherapy’, Psychology and Developing Society 17(2): 121–138. Hellevik, Tale. 2004. ‘The Transition to Adulthood from a Welfare Regime Perspective’, Norwegian Social Research Paper presented at the Second European Society on Family Research Congress, University of Fribourg Switzerland, 30 October 2004. Ho, Elaine. 2009. ‘Constituting Citizenship Through the Emotions: Singaporean Transmigrants in London’, Journal Annals of the Association of American Geographers 99: 788–804. Hole, Elizabeth Åsa. 2005. Neither Here- Nor There – An Anthropological Study of Gujarati Hindu Women in The Diaspora. Uppsala: Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, Uppsala University. Indian Embassy, Denmark. 2017. Email Communication with Ashok Polur, Commercial & Marketing Officer on 12 December 2017. Irudaya Rajan, S. and Joseph, Jolin. 2015. ‘Migrant Women at the Discourse – Policy Nexus: Indian Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia’, Chapter 2, in Irudaya Rajan, S. (ed.), India Migration Report 2015: Gender & Migration. New Delhi: Routledge, pp. 9–25. Jopson, Debra. 2017. ‘The Secret Scourge of Family Violence and Murder in Australian Hindu and Sikh Communities’. ABC News. www.abc.net. au/news/2017-12-18/scourge-family-violence-in-hindu-and-sikh-communi ties/9257724. Accessed 17 December 2017. Kalra, Virinder, Kaur, Raminder, and Hutnyk, John. 2005. Diaspora & Hybridity. New Delhi: Sage. Killian. Kyle D. 2013. Interracial Couples, Intimacy, and Therapy: Crossing Racial Borders. New York: Columbia University Press. Lehtola, Veli-Pekka. 2015. ‘Sámi Histories, Colonialism, and Finland’, Arctic Anthropology 52(2): 22–36. Machura, Aleksandra. n.d. Indians in Denmark: Living and Problems. Report for Contemporary India Study Centre Aarhus. http://cisca.au.dk/fileadmin/ www.cisca.au.dk/attachments/Aleksandra_Machura_report.pdf. Accessed 25 December 2017.

Indian diaspora in Denmark 271 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. ‘Marital Issues of Indian Nationals Married to Overseas Indians’. www.mea.gov.in/MIINMOI.htm. Accessed 22 December 2017. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Population of Overseas Indians. http://mea.gov.in/images/attach/NRIs-and-PIOs_1.pdf. Accessed 22 December 2017. Misra, Mrutyuanjai. 2017a. ‘Decolonizing Culture and History’, Mind the Gap. Times of India Blog, 1 June 2017. https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/mind-the-gap/decolonizing-culture-and-history/. Accessed 25 December 2017. Misra, Mrutyuanjai. 2017b. ‘Why Are Western Men Marrying Asian Women?’ Mind the Gap. Times of India Blog, 29 October 2016. https:// blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/mind-the-gap/why-are-western-menmarrying-asian-women/. Accessed 25 December 2017. Moodley, Roy. 2011. Outside the Sentence: Readings in Critical Multicultural Counselling and Psychotherapy. Toronto: Centre for Diversity in Counselling and Psychotherapy, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. Nath, Sayathika. 2015. ‘What Does It Feel Like to be an Indian in Denmark?’ Quora, 13 December 2015. www.quora.com/What-does-it-feel-like-to-bean-Indian-in-Denmark. Accessed 25 December 2017. Nyberg Sørensen, Ninna. 2005. ‘Den Globale Familie: Opløsning Eller Transnationalisering af Familien?’, Dansk Sociologi 16(1): 72–89. Olsen, Anne Mette. 2018. Email Communication with Senior Adviser Population and Education, Statistics Denmark. Panty, L. 2013/1940. Marriage and Our Society (िववाह और हमारा समाज). (Trans. from Hindi by Meenakshi Nayar). Jaipur: Jaipur Printers. Phoenix, Ann. 2011. ‘Psychosocial Intersections: Contextualizing the Accounts of Adults Who Grew Up in Visibly Ethnically Different Households’, in Lutz, Helma, Vivar, Maria Teresa Herrera, & Supik, Linda (eds.), Framing Intersectionality: Debates on a Multi-Faceted Concept in Gender Studies. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, pp. 137–152. Portes, Alejandro and Rumbaut, Ruben G. 2014. Immigrant America: A Portrait, Updated, and Expanded. Berkeley: University of California Press. Prieur, Annick. 2004. Balansekunstnere: BetydningenavInnvandrerbakgrunni Norge. Oslo: PaxForlag. Rasche, Joerg and Singer, Thomas (eds.). 2016. Europe’s Many Souls, Exploring Cultural Complexes and Identities. Louisiana, LA: Spring Journal. Reddy, Prakash G. 1991. Sådan er Danskerne! En Indisk Antropologs Perspektiv på Det Danske Samfund. Mørke: Grevas. Reddy, Prakash G. 1998. Danske Dilemmaer. Mørke: Grevas. Rytter, Mikkel. 2007. ‘Partnervalgets Grænse: Dansk-Pakistanske Ægteskabsmigranter’, Sverige Dansk Sociologi 18(3): 25–45. Rytter, Mikkel. 2013. Family Upheaval Generation, Mobility and Relatedness Among Pakistani Migrants in Denmark. EASA Series 21. New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books.

272  Rashmi Singla and Ambika Varma Sahoo, Ajaya Kumar and de Kruijf, Johannes G. (eds.). 2014. Indian Transnationalism Online: New Perspectives on Diaspora. Farnham: Ashgate. Sam, David L. and Berry, John W. 2010. ‘Acculturation: When Individuals and Groups of Different Cultural Backgrounds Meet’, Perspectives on Psychological Science 5(4): 472–481. Sengstock, Mary C. 2009. Voices of Diversity: Multi-Culturalism in America. New York: Springer. Singla, Rashmi. 2004. Youth Relationships, Ethnicity and Psychosocial Intervention. New Delhi: Books Plus. Singla, Rashmi. 2005. ‘South Asian Diaspora in Scandinavia: Youth, Interethnic and Intergenerational Relations’, Journal of Psychology and Developing Societies 17(2): 215–23. Singla, Rashmi. 2006. Den Eneste Ene: Hvordan Etniske Minoritetsunge i Danmark Danner Par, Konflikt og Intervention. København: Akademia.dk. Singla, Rashmi. 2008. Now and Then – Life Trajectories, Family Relationships and Diasporic Identities: A Follow-Up Study of Young Adults. Copenhagen: The Copenhagen Studies in Bilingualism. Singla, Rashmi. 2011. ‘Plugged in Youth: Technology and Transnationalism Among South Asian Diaspora in Scandinavia’, in German, Myna & Banerjee, Padmini (ed.), Migration, Technology and Transculturation: A Global Perspective. St. Charles, MO: Lindenwood University Press, pp. 141–164. Singla, Rashmi. 2015. Intermarriage and Mixed Parenting, Promoting Mental Health and Wellbeing: Crossover Love. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Singla, Rashmi. 2017. ‘Intermarried Couples Negotiating Mixedness in Everyday Life in Denmark: Lessons for Psychologists’, Chapter 17, in Thomas, Alexander (ed.), Culture and Ethnic Diversity: How European Psychologists Can Meet the Challenges. Gottingen: Hogrefe Publishing, pp. 159–167. Singla, Rashmi and Sriram, Sujata. 2016. ‘Indian Danish Intermarriage: Motivational Dynamics in Context of Modernity’, Paper presented at the Conference on Modern Matters: Negotiating the Future in Everyday Life in South Asia, 20–22 September 2016. Lund: The Swedish South Asian Studies Network (SASNET), Lund University. Skogemann, Pia. 2016. ‘Mother Denmark’, Chapter 10, in Singer, Thomas and Rasche, Joerg (eds.), Europe’s Many Souls, Exploring Cultural Complexes and Identities. Louisiana, LA: Spring Journal, pp. 257–274. Sommerand, Malthe and Mortensen, Mikkel Walentin. 2017. ‘KærlighedUden Grænser: Mænd Finder Konen i Asien, Kvinder finder kærligheden i Europa’, Berlingske, 26 July. Statistics Denmark. 2017a. Indvandrere 2017. www.dst.dk. Accessed 22 December 2017. Statistics Denmark. 2017b. www.dst.dk. Accessed 22 December 2017. Tepperman, Lorne, Lin, Ailieen, Mehran, Weeda, and Yi, Chin-Chun. 2006. ‘Changing Patterns of Mate Selection in Taiwan’, Chapter 1, in Gomes, Cristian (ed.), Social Development and Family Changes. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, pp. 44–69.

Indian diaspora in Denmark 273 Thieden, Amalie. 2018. ‘Danmark er et af de sværeste lande at blive statsborger i: nu vil DF gøre det endnu sværere’, Berlingske, 5 January 2017. Thoning, Lars. 2017. ‘What Do the Danes Think of Indians Especially the Indians in Denmark’, Quora, 12 February 2016. www.quora.com/What-dothe-Danes-think-of-Indians-Especially-the-Indians-in-Denmark. Accessed 25 December 2017. Tølbøll, Lene. 2016. ‘Migration Policies: Denmark 2016’, Population Europe Resource Finder and Archive (PERFA). www.perfar.eu/policy/migration/ denmark. Accessed 26 December 2017. Trask, Bahira Sherif and Koivunen, Julie M. 2007. ‘Trends in Marriage and Cohabitation’, Chapter 5, in Trask, Bhira Sherif and Hamon, Raeann R. (eds.), Cultural Diversity and Families: Expanding Perspectives. New Delhi: Sage, pp. 80–99. Valsiner, Jaan and Rosa, Alberto. 2007. The Cambridge Handbook of Sociocultural Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Venkatasubramanian, K. V. 2010. ‘Indians Discover There’s More to Denmark than Dairies’, Nordic Labour Journal, 10 May 2010. www. nordiclabourjournal.org/i-fokus/in-focus-2010/theme-joint-nordic-drivefor-more-foreign-labour/indians-discover-theres-more-to-denmark-thandairies. Accessed 25 December 2017. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (UN DESA). 2017. International Migration Report 2017: Highlights. New York: UN DESA. United Nations International Organisation for Migration (IOM). 2017. World Migration Report 2018. Geneva: IOM.

16 Economic impacts of migration on UK labour markets The case study of Indians in Britain Yasin Kerem Gümüş and Rakesh Ranjan 16.1 Introduction There is today the question of how (if at all) the recent financial and political crisis has impacted the policies associated with the management of labour migration and what forthcoming future research agenda might look like given the dramatic changes wrought by the recent EU crisis, which started in 2008 and is still continuing. In this chapter, we consider general EU migration policy (Koufmann, 2008) as well as the framework of migration labour supply (MLS) as argued by Pastore (2014) to investigate data from United Kingdom and its impact on Indian migrants. To keep the research tractable, we focus narrowly on labour migration statistics from the UK’s Labour Statistics Survey, the source of which is the UK Migration Observatory’s Report (Rienzo, 2014), recognised as one of the UK’s most authoritative sources of migration labour data (see Figures 16.1 and 16.2). It is largely accepted that the financial and political crisis has had a negative impact on the strength and agility of the labour markets, and as such there has been a large body of research in the area of labour migration and how it can be used to the benefit of the EU countries in navigating this period of recovery. It is noted throughout this analysis that there are likely to be certain effects of the economic crisis which will not be known for many years, if ever, and therefore the analysis here looks at the data available and the perceived issues that have arisen. This chapter will look at the management of migration during economic crisis. The UK migration policy before the ongoing financial and political crisis will be discussed, as well as how the crisis has influenced UK labour markets and UK policy reactions to the crisis.

Impact of migration on UK labour markets 275 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 –100 1960 –200

1970

1980 Immigraon

1990

2000

Emigraon

2010

2020

Net Migraon

Figure 16.1  Net migration, UK, 1964–2015 Source: Migration Watch, UK

6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0

2012

2013 EU

2014 Non-EU

2015

2016

India

Figure 16.2  Population in UK by country of birth Source: Office for National Statistics, Government of UK

16.2 EU-level labour migration policy: research agenda before crisis Initially, it is important to understand the general principle of immigration and the ways in which it was being controlled and managed prior to the economic crisis. In order to appreciate why or how a specific course of action can impact labour migration, it is first necessary to understand what was happening before the economic crisis took

276  Yasin Kerem Gümüş and Rakesh Ranjan place. Research in this area has recognised that there are many different forms of migration, and this in itself can go a long way towards explaining how EU migration policies will deal with labour migration (Koufmann, 2008). It is noted that individuals will migrate for many different reasons, not only in pursuit of work, although this will ultimately still have an impact on the labour market, even if migrants are moving for other purposes such as asylum. On the whole, however, the focus here is on those who migrate for the purpose of gaining employment. Even where the individual moves from one country to another to seek work, there are going to be different impacts on the situation, depending on where the economic migrant has come from and for what reason. The migrant profile itself will also have a direct bearing on the willingness of an individual to move and to look towards opportunities in other regions (Tilly, 2013). There is also an additional difficulty in that an economic crisis may for a short period of time create unusual movement, particularly if there is a real shortage of work in one region that will encourage individuals to seek employment or choose to move from country to country, rather than to return home, due to the social protection that is being offered. The economy itself will become much more informal in nature, as well, with some people seeking employment in different industries or looking for ad hoc work that may not be on the formal register and will not be part of the statistics (Galgoczi and Leschke, 2013). The first aspect to look at when it comes to the impact of the economic crisis on migration is to consider what the impact has been during the immediate period of the crisis and the changes that have emerged. Prior to the economic crisis, the population across the EU had grown by a total 9.5 million in the years between 2001 and 2008, with the majority of migrants within the EU coming from countries outside of the EU. This indicates that although there is certainly movement across the EU member states, the trend prior to the crisis was to encourage individuals from outside of the EU into the EU. This was however already in a declining position, with 66 percent of foreign migrants coming from outside of the EU in 2001, down to 63 percent in 2008. Prior to the economic crisis, the countries that saw the greatest influx of foreign individuals were Spain, Ireland and Cyprus, although this could be largely attributed to movement from other nations within the EU and cannot be attributed solely to the influx of foreign groups (Balan and Uzlau, 2010: 85). One particular difficulty is that there is likely to be some time lag between an economic slowdown and changes in migrant flows; therefore, the subsequent changes in policy are unlikely to take place

Impact of migration on UK labour markets 277 immediately, thus making it hard to ascertain the exact impact of the economic crisis on migrant flows and the subsequent need for changes in EU-level policy. At this point, the overall policy had not changed, but there was still a shift in the desirability of the individuals to move from one region to another. Similarly, the net migration figure for the UK, which is the surplus of people who were immigrating in excess of the people emigrating, was 44 percent lower in 2008 than it was in the previous year and the lowest it had been since the accession to the EU in 2004 (Koehler, 2010: 14). This again is a clear indication that there has been a direct change of behaviours without the policy itself changing at all. This needs to be borne in mind due to the need to ascertain whether the policy change will be required to adapt to the underlying economic changes or whether it is necessary for the policy to shift to mitigate the effects of the changes that the market is making of its own accord. Certain sectors and regions remain in a position where they are recruiting, although it is clear that the general recruitment pattern is changing and, in most cases, slowing down. This will naturally have an impact on the ability and desirability of moving from region to region and the approach that the policy makers need to take to mitigate the effects and lay down the foundations for economic recovery. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the economic crisis has created irregular migration, even if it is not necessarily a complete stop of migration or a complete change of factors that has an impact on migration. For example, by looking at the issue of illegal border crossing, this point relating to irregular migration can be considered fully. The area of temporary employment permits offers a real opportunity to understand the cause and effect of the economic crisis, indicating that the policy itself may not be the main driver of change but rather the actual market forces themselves. Furthermore, temporary workers will have to readjust their position regularly, and whilst the policy may impact their decision-making processes, it is not the sole driver and may even be a reaction to the position rather than the cause of the change in the first place. One of the main indicators of illegal residences is in the number of forced removals, with figures indicating that this number has dropped substantially between 2008 and 2009, showing that there was seemingly a reduction in the amount of migration, both legal and illegal, and a willingness of those on temporary contracts to leave the country in which they were resident on return home. Essentially, this suggests that as the economic crisis emerged, there was an immediate change in policy, yet the changes in behaviours were dramatic, even in the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis (Dobson et al., 2009).

278  Yasin Kerem Gümüş and Rakesh Ranjan Bearing this in mind, the next part of the analysis shall consider the theoretical changes that the economic crisis has had on labour migration and how this then needs to be tackled from the EU level policy makers in this area.

16.3 What has the economic crisis changed in the EU labour markets? Economic crises also affect different sectors of the economy differently. It has been shown that both the high-end as well as non-profit sectors tend to suffer shortfalls in times of economic crisis. For instance, the care sector can be hard hit by cutbacks or new local or federal constraints (see Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). From the beginning of the economic crisis in mid 2008 and two years later in 2010, four million jobs were lost across the total of the EU (for all types of workers, both migrants and local workers; ECB, 2012: 7). It is noted when looking at the number of jobs lost that this is somewhat smaller than the expected losses, based on the reduction of GDP, indicating a muted reaction from the labour markets (ECB, 2012: 39). The other distinction that seemed to emerge in the postcrisis trend was the speed of recovery, with some countries recovering quickly and others having a much longer recovery period. The evidence also suggests that there were large divergences in terms of the worker groups themselves, with the level of unemployment being very much focussed on certain industries such as construction and manufacturing, with those who are in the younger age category being worst hit during the economic crisis. This could largely be seen as recognition of how the institutions themselves have reformed and handled their key employment policies. This concept will be explored further, as if the companies themselves have changed their employment policies to focus on certain groups and to make others redundant, it would seem that this will then naturally lead to a different migration policy from the EU as a whole. For example, if the economic crisis has hit those within the age category of sixteen to twenty-four years old, then it would be expected that the EU-level policies would support those within the age category in order to reverse this trend. Several trends have emerged and are relevant in this discussion; each will be looked at in turn. Labour hoarding refers to the trend towards reducing hours of work rather than reducing headcount. This means that employers are recognising that they wish to retain staff members, particularly those with specific expertise, and therefore do not want to release these individuals into the labour market but instead want to reduce the wage bill. This trend of labour hoarding and placing staff onto part-time

Impact of migration on UK labour markets 279 contracts has both positive and negative consequences. Theoretically, therefore, those countries that encourage labour hoarding and part-time contracts in this way will, on paper, seem to be managing the economic crisis in a better way, with a lesser number of jobs being lost. Secondly, certain industries and sectors have suffered quite a bit more, but again, this could be seen to be a reaction to the previous boom within the housing sector, and as the bubble burst on the housing industry, this had an immediate impact on the construction sector, with some countries in the EU then also having a more direct impact on the statistics, depending on their reliance on the construction industry. The framework proposed by Pastore (2014) of ‘migrant labour supply’ (MLS) policies is relevant here. Pastore argues that states and regions seek to exercise agency and control in times of economic crisis by determining and constantly adjusting the composition of MLS through various policy mixes. Interestingly enough, MLS policies can be, according to Pastore (2014: 385), a fundamental expression of states’ ‘country-specific attempts’ to control the incentives, flow and overall effects of migrant labour supply; this is an important form of agency in the field of labour migration, especially in times of major economic fluctuations. We also contend that such national MLS policy mixes can be explained as country-specific attempts to find and constantly adapt ‘paths of least resistance’ meant to maximise fulfilment of labour immigration demands while minimising resistances to it (ibid, 385). In other words, the European crisis can be clarified through a framework that allows, firstly, for periods of ‘actual regulation of transition periods’ in recognition of the right to full freedom of movement between workers in acceding countries of the European Union and also giving recognition to ‘indirect’ labour migration policies that are ‘aimed at granting, facilitating or boosting access to domestic labour markets to immigrants originally admitted for reasons other than work (humanitarian, family, study, etc.)’ (ibid, 387). UK being a part of EU has been a centre for attraction for the English-speaking population. Since nearly four decades Indians have preferred UK on other European countries because of linguistic familiarity. This trend has seen some slight changes since the last decade, with increasing migration to other European countries, but the significance of UK has remained unquestioned. However, after recent policy changes especially after Brexit, in contrast to possible restriction on border movement, the flow of Indian migration to EU and UK needs to be analysed more carefully. Although the economic crisis can be seen to have been impacting all countries across the EU, there have been some notable areas that are worse hit, such as the countries of Ireland, Spain and Estonia, all

280  Yasin Kerem Gümüş and Rakesh Ranjan of which had different labour dynamics prior to the economic crisis but which are now seemingly suffering a more dramatic and more sustained period of decline. With this in mind, the discussion here now moves on to look at the policy measures that have been adopted to tackle the issue, both in EU and from a more regional basis.

16.4 What are the UK-level policy reactions to the crisis? Before discussing the reaction to the crisis, it is helpful to look at the institutions and structural issues that had been put in place prior to the crisis. For example, tax wedges and the reduction of benefits for unemployed individuals by ensuring that the benefits offered to those who are unemployed are not as financially viable as gaining employment would be. This means that individuals would be less inclined to remain on benefits and would actively seek employment. Whilst this may have been effective for those who are actively avoiding employment, it does not offer a solution where individuals are actually seeking employment, but the jobs do not exist. Migration policies themselves will clearly have a direct and real impact on the migrant flows. National governments will naturally look towards applying policies in such a way that their own recovery is as quick and efficient as it can be. The immediate reaction in most cases across the EU is that of the need to restrict the number of third-party nationals who enter into their country by tightening the border controls, particularly in terms of the unskilled labour that is susceptible to the downturn, at a greater rate than the highly skilled individuals. For example, in the UK, a migrant approach that involves points is used to ensure that only those with a skill that is in short demand are able to enter the country on a labour or working basis. Direct migrant policies are however somewhat reactive in nature and will not necessarily look towards the long-term demographic changes. Instead, the migration policies will consider the security of the country and will look to protect the position of the country rather than seeking long-term growth and development.

16.5 Economic crisis and policy changes: Brexit According to Rienzo (2014: 3), ‘the number of foreign-born people of working age in the UK increased from 2.9 million in 1993 to more than 6 million in 2013’. The recession saw only a slight decrease in numbers of migrants coming to the UK to seek work (e.g. 2007, 2009

Impact of migration on UK labour markets 281 and 2010). As expected, there was a significant jump in the number of foreign-born workers in the UK during 2006, which coincides with the opening of UK labour markets to workers from the A8 countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) in mid-2004 (ibid). As Table 16.1 shows, the greatest concentration of foreign-born workers employed in the UK is in the manufacturing industry (industry Table 16.1  Concentration of foreign-born workers employed in the UK Top 10 by % Occupation Top 10 by % Occupation workforce share, share (%) workforce share, share (%) all migrants recent migrants (1) 1 Elementary process plant occupation 2 Process operatives 3 Cleaning and housekeeping manager 4 Elementary cleaning occupations 5 Food Preparation and Hospitality 6 Textiles and garments trades 7 Health professionals 8 Elementary storage occupations 9 IT and telecomms professionals 10 Assemblers and routine operatives

(2) (3)

(4)

42 0.8

Elementary 19 0.8 process plant occupation Process 12 0.9 operatives Elementary 11 2.4 cleaning occupations Cleaning and 9 0.2 housekeeping manager Elementary 9 1.4 storage occupations Other elementary 9 3.4 service occupation Assemblers 8 0.9 and routine operatives Elementary 8 0.6 construction occupation 7 0.3 Elementary agricultural occupation Mobile machine 7 0.5 drivers & operations

36 0.9 35 0.2 31 2.4 30 1.6 28 0.1 26 1.7 26 1.4 25 3.1 25 0.9

(5) (6)

Note: Occupation share indicates the share of total employment represented by the occupation. Source: Labour Force Survey 2015, Q1–Q4

282  Yasin Kerem Gümüş and Rakesh Ranjan cleaning, canning, filling etc.) or manual trades (agriculture). Clearly, then, labour supply correlates closely to demand. Migrants take jobs that local citizens are either unwilling or unable to fill. Since 2004, the key increase in labour migration from new EU member states has come from Eastern Europe and especially Poland, with migrant concentrations in agricultural areas which have traditionally been areas of emigration unused to inflows except on a seasonal basis. Evidence of the impact of the economic crisis of 2008–2009 in the UK lies in the policies of the 2010 Conservative-Liberal coalition, who have attempted to cut immigration and welfare programmes. As a result, labour inflows have declined, and many immigrants returned home due to rising unemployment in Britain and increased opportunities in their countries of origin. Maerdi (2012) point to the construction industry in the UK as demonstrating a clear link between economic downturn and migration. They point to increases in immigration in preceding years especially from Poland, Slovakia and the Baltic States accounting for an estimated 10 percent of employment in the sector. In 2009, immediately following the financial crisis, employment in construction fell 4 percent as against 2.1 percent for the whole economy (Choudhry et al., 2012).

16.6 Impact of Brexit on Indian immigrant population in the UK Indian migration to the UK is not a new phenomenon. Broadly three waves of Indian immigration has been noted, first; colonial skill mobility to the UK, second; post-Independence high skill mobility and migration of distress colonial plantation workers from Uganda, Kenya and other countries. India is the second-highest migrant-sending country for the UK after Poland. As per estimate of Office for National Statistics, Government of UK, the Indian-born population in the UK is 833,000. Figure 16.3 provides the details of yearly increase in the number India-born population in the UK. As per the figure, Indian population in the UK has seen nearly 15 percent of increase within five years. Figure 16.3 presents the trend of Indian immigration in the UK. As per the trend reflected in the figure, Indian emigration to the UK has not seen any decline in the last five years. Ironically, this five-year period includes an era of economic crisis and Brexit debate. Contrary to the immigration pattern of India, overall immigration to the UK has seen a significant decline. As reflected in Table 16.2, net migration to the UK has declined by nearly 81,000. During the period of

Impact of migration on UK labour markets 283 833

840 820 800 780 760

793

795

2014

2015

760

752

740 720 700 2012

2013

2016

Figure 16.3  India-born population (,000) in the United Kingdom Source: Office for National Statistics

Table 16.2 Latest changes in international migration to the UK, year ending March 2016 and year ending March 2017 Thousands  

YE Mar 2016

95% CI

YE Mar 2017

95% CI

Difference

Net migration Immigration Emigration

+327 638 311

+/−39 +/−33 +/−21

+246 588 342

+/−42 +/−35 +/−23

−81* −50* 31*

Source: Office for National Statistics, Long-Term International Migration Notes: 1 The estimates given are the sum of the EU, non-EU and British citizenship groupings. 2 2016 and 2017 estimates are provisional. 3 Figures are rounded to the nearest thousand. Figures may not sum due to rounding. 4 CI is confidence interval. Further information on confidence intervals can be found in the Migration Statistics Quarterly Report Information for Users. 5 YE is year ending. 6 Statistically significant change at the 5 percent level is indicated by an asterisk.

March 2016 to March 2017, immigration has seen a decline of nearly 25 percent. A closer look on the labour migration trends reflected in Table 16.3 provides a clearer picture of the regions of decline. As reflected in Table 16.3, immigration from EU 8 countries has seen the highest

284  Yasin Kerem Gümüş and Rakesh Ranjan Table 16.3 Latest changes in net migration by citizenship in the UK, year ending March 2016 and year ending March 2017 Thousands  

YE Mar 2016

95% CI

YE Mar 2017

95% CI

Difference

Total British EU (of which) EU15 (of which) EU8 (of which) EU2 Non-EU (of which) Asia (of which) rest of world

+327 −43 +178 +76 +39 +61 +193 +120 +60

+/−39 +/−19 +/−28 +/−18 +/−14 +/−15 +/−21 +/−16 +/−12

+246 −60 +127 +74 +7 +43 +179 +110 +57

+/−42 +/−20 +/−29 +/−20 +/−14 +/−14 +/−23 +/−17 +/−15

−81* −17 −51* −2 −32* −18 −14 −10 −3

Source: Office for National Statistics, Long-Term International Migration Notes: 1 EU other and Other Europe citizenship groupings are not included as separate groups in the table but are included under the EU and non-EU totals. 2 2016 and 2017 estimates are provisional. 3 Figures are rounded to the nearest thousand. Figures may not sum due to rounding. 4 CI is confidence interval. Further information on confidence intervals can be found in the Migration Statistics Quarterly Report Information for Users. 5 YE is year ending.

decrease. These countries include Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Non-EU countries seem to be less affected by the economic crisis or Brexit. Compared to the UK immigration decline from EU, which is 51 percent, non-EU has shown a decline of 7 percent. Within this percentage, Asian countries have shown a decline of approximately 10,000. This decline can be the result of multiple issues, which include changing political and social landscape in Asian countries and rise of other economies. Although the data presented in Table 16.3 is provisional and represent timeperiod of March 2016 to March 2017 only, the statistics significantly reflect the fear among other EU emigrants.

16.7 Assessment of migration policies in the times of economic crisis: crisis is an opportunity? The broader European Economic Recovery Plan is central to the overall approach taken by the EC to the economic recovery of the region. This does not specifically look at migration or even employment but

Impact of migration on UK labour markets 285 can arguably be seen to underlie the overall agenda pursued in this specific area of policy generation. For example, the EC states fully that it expects any policies implemented by the national states to be mindful of the long-term agenda for recovery. In particular, the EU agenda aims to look at the building of long-term skills, something which has been central to the approach in Germany, for a relatively long period of time (and in any event, long before the financial crisis came forward). The EU policy recognises that there is an ongoing concern about the skills mismatch and that there is a need for mobility amongst the workforce of the EU to facilitate these gaps. The need for more highly skilled individuals remains constant, and countries are amending their migrant policies to allow for this flow of skilled individuals to take place while at the same time restricting the migration of low-skilled individuals. There are exceptions to this: for example, certain countries have a high seasonal demand for certain workers, such as those involved in tourism. With this in mind, the main policy change is towards the up-skilling and training of people who seem to be central to the long-term policy approach which has been adopted across the EU (Hijzen and Venn, 2011). Certain countries have embraced this with a greater sense of urgency than others; however, the main factor which is relevant to the discussion here is that migration is only being restricted in so far as it is necessary to ensure long-term buoyancy within a country, thus ensuring that individuals who are low skilled or unemployed are not encouraged to enter an area or country in order to make use of social benefits. This indicates a need to review social policies rather than necessarily looking at migrant policies to change the parameters (as is already the case in Germany) so that people simply do not go welfare shopping and will only migrate to a country when it is for a specific job or in order to fill a specific skill gap. For the purposes of comparison, the Migrant Integration Policy Index is an assessment tool provided by the EU using 148 policy indicators to benchmark current laws and policies against the highest standards regularly monitoring forty countries and expanding its influence well beyond Europe. The UK government, fourteenth in the index, was unprepared for the number of EU Citizens from 2004 accession countries. The migration debate in the UK is seen in terms of real costs versus benefits, community cohesion versus British jobs for British workers. Since the economic crisis, Migrant Integration Policy Index has found conditions slightly less favourable to integration with UK policies for nonEU workers and their families only half-way favourable compared to other countries in the index.

286  Yasin Kerem Gümüş and Rakesh Ranjan In some areas then, an economic crisis can be seen to have a positive impact on migration policies particularly where the crisis is seen as an opportunity. The European Union has seen it as an opportunity to strengthen integration and anti-discrimination law and to standardise regulations for residence and family reunion as well as attempting to obtain relocation and citizenship rights for asylum seekers and refugees. Globalisation has encouraged competitiveness and market flexibility, emphasising liberalisation, democratisation and deregulation. One outcome has been to stem the flow of migration through outsourcing in countries of origin with a reverse flow of capital, both human and financial, technology and skills. Flexibility is key to the positive perception of migration in the UK, Italy and Spain, as is the diverging role of the state and the expectations of the welfare state (Düll, 2003: s. 4). In the UK, in a strategic ad hoc response to the unpredictability of demand and staff shortages in sectors with highly competitive product markets and fluctuating labour costs, greater flexibility has been achieved through temporary contracts and as a method of overcoming the crisis. In the first place, it is flexible and gives companies the ability to react quickly to changing labour conditions. Secondly, higher unemployment vulnerability of migrants has political advantages for the host government electorally and financially in terms of less expenditure than high unemployment among voters.

16.8 Conclusions Immigrants have been an important factor within the economic sectors of the UK, whether it is in the pre-Brexit period or post-Brexit period. The Brexit may have a huge impact on trade and investment sectors of the UK and EU, but its impact on immigrants is still unseen. The statistics published by the government of the UK present both positive and negative trends. The major sending countries like Poland and India has not seen any major statistical changes. The UK has been an entry point for the Indian workers. Health care migration is a significant example. Further, it is assumed that Brexit will be responsible for the possible skilled worker shortage in UK. The impact is an expected outcome of restricted border movement between the EU and the UK. This brings some positive perspectives for Indian workers. The gap will enhance the opportunities for the skilled workers coming from non-EU countries, which include India. However, these expected outcomes are blur possibilities and need appropriate

Impact of migration on UK labour markets 287 time-series data for verification. In this context, the impact of the UK economic crisis and Brexit on Indian immigrants has not shown any negative impact till now. The actual outcome of Brexit is a subject for future analysis.

References Balan, M. and Uzlau, C. (2010) Migration in the Context of Current Economic and Financial Crisis: Comparative Analysis. Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting, 83–99. Choudhry, M.T., Marelli, E. and Signorelli, M. (2010) Financial crises and labour market performance, International Atlantic Economic Conference, Prague, 24–27 March 2010. \ https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/228736773_The_Impact_of_Financial_Crises_on_Youth_ Unemployment_Rate (accessed 16 August 2017). Dobson, J., Latham, A., and Salt, J. (2009) On the move? Labour migration in times of recession. What can we learn from the past. Policy Network Paper No. 1, July, London. Düll, N. (2003) Is precarious employment shaping European labour markets? Assessing and accounting for precarious employment in five European countries. The 15th Annual Meeting of the Society of Advanced Economics in Aix-en-Provenceno 1. European Central Bank. (2012) Euro area labour markets and the crisis. Occasional Paper Series No. 138, October, Frankfurt. Finotelli, C. and Sciortino, G. (2009) The Importance of Being Southern: The Making of Policies of Immigration Control in Italy. European Journal of Migration and Law, 11(2), 119–138. Galgóczi, B. and Leschke, J. (2013) EU Labour Migration in Troubled Times. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 51(4), 832–834. Hijzen, A. and Venn, D. (2011) The role of short-time work schemes during the 2008–09 recession. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 115, January, France. Kaufmann, V. (2008) Les Paradoxes de la Mobilité. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes. Koehler, J., Laczko, F., Aghazarm, C., and Schad, J. (2010) Migration and the Economic Crisis in the European Union: Implications for Policy. Brussels: International Organization for Migration. Retrieved from http://publica tions.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_and_the_economic_crisis.pdf Meardi, Guglielmo. 2012. Social Failures of EU Enlargement: A Case of Workers Voting with their Feet. Routledge, New York. Office for National Statistics. (n.d.) International immigration and the labour market, UK: regional data – Office for National Statistics. Retrieved November 3, 2017, from www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommu nity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/international immigrationandthelabourmarketukregionaldata

288  Yasin Kerem Gümüş and Rakesh Ranjan Pastore, F. (2014) The Governance of Migrant Labour Supply in Europe, Before and During the Crisis: An Introduction. Comparative Migration Studies, 2(4), 385–415. Rienzo, C. (2014) Migrants in the UK labour market: An overview. Migration Observatory Report, November, Oxford. Tilly, C. (2013) The Impact of the Economic Crisis on International Migration: A Review. Work Employment & Society, 25(4), 675–692.

17 The impact of the Trump administration on immigration S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker

17.1 Introduction On 8 November 8 2016, the United States of America elected Donald J. Trump to lead the nation. Such an end to a tumultuous campaign was a ray of hope for some while it was devastating for others. But they were all in agreement about one thing – the result was surprising, and it was going to have a monumental impact not just in the United States but across the world. With his rallying call ‘Make America Great Again’ and subsequent emphasis on ‘America First’, he made migration the most important issue, albeit giving it devilish characteristics. His emotional outbursts and violent appeals proved one thing – that issues of migration had a dominating control on the innermost and unconscious lives of the people. Immigration to the United States is often the subject of significant public and political debate, with questions about the size of inflows, the role of immigrants in the labour market, enforcement and humanitarian admission policies and benefits and costs. Presently, around 43 million migrants live in the US, who account for 13 percent of the total population. Since 2013, the foreign-born population increased by a million a year, or 2.5 percent. The sub-prime crisis and following years of slow economic growth persuaded American citizens to adopt an antagonistic attitude towards immigrants. While all candidates in the election process realised the importance of migration and formulated fairly inclusive policies on how to secure borders and retain jobs, Trump’s strategy was two-pronged – to divide the electorate and then cater to the majority. Since this strategy involved little convincing the voters, Trump spoke more about problems than solutions. Consequently, the effect on migration during the Trump presidency is more open to question than Brexit.

290  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker Trump claims that migrants play an active role in crime and violence. His indignation towards unlawful (mostly Hispanic) and Muslim immigrants could drive a policy where these communities are discriminated against. Currently, 46 percent of immigrants are reported to have Hispanic or Latino origins. Besides, Muslim refugees accounted for 46 percent of the refugees in 2016. It is certain that there will be a decrease in the flow of Hispanic and Muslim migrants to the US in the coming years. In addition, Trump has also vowed to deport almost 3 million illegal immigrants soon. Trump aims to establish new immigration controls to boost wages and to ensure that open jobs are offered to American workers first. He plans to impose tighter controls on the H-1B visa program where skilled professionals from all over the world migrate to the US. Estimates show that roughly 600,000 migrants hold this visa, valid or expired. Although he wants immigrant graduates fresh out of American universities to stay and contribute to the economy, the poor educational level of middle-class America coupled with the fear of losing jobs to better-educated immigrants could lead to a curb on foreign students as well. Thus, it is clear that the impact of the Trump policy on immigration will permeate all sections of the economy, from trade and commerce to education and tourism. The United States of America could lose its position as the most appealing country to migrate to. Such a trend is evident from the surge in visa requests to the neighbouring country of Canada.

17.2 Immigration to the USA: a brief history The current population of the United States of America is 323 million, of which 43.3 million are immigrants. This corresponds to 13.5 percent of the total population. Data on the nativity of the US population were first collected in 1850. That year, there were 2.2 million immigrants in the United States, representing nearly 10 percent of the population. Between 1860 and 1920, the immigrant shares of the overall population fluctuated between 13 percent and nearly 15 percent, peaking at 14.8 percent in 1890, mainly due to high levels of immigration from Europe (see Figure 17.1). Restrictive immigration legislation in 1921 and 1924, coupled with the Great Depression and World War II, led to a sharp drop in new arrivals. As a result, the foreign-born share steadily declined between the 1930s and 1970s, reaching a record low of approximately 5 percent in 1970 (9.6 million; see Table 17.1). Since 1970, the share and

Impact of Trump on immigration 291 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

70 18 80 18 90 19 00 19 10 19 20 19 30 19 40 19 50 19 60 19 70 19 80 19 90 20 00 20 10 20 20

60

18

18

18

50

13.5

Immigrants as a percentage of US populaon

Figure 17.1  Immigrants as a percentage of US population, 1850–2015 Source: US Department of State

Table 17.1  Immigrant share of total US population, 1970–2015 Year

Size of immigrant population (millions)

Immigrant share of total US population (%)

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2015

9.6 14.1 19.8 31.1 40 43.3

4.7 6.2 7.9 11.1 12.9 13.5

Source: US Census Bureau and American Community Surveys

number of immigrants have increased rapidly, mainly as a result of large-scale immigration from Latin America and Asia made possible by the abolishment of national-origin admission quotas by Congress in 1965. Since 1970, the number of US immigrants more than quadrupled, rising from 9.6 million then to 43.3 million in 2015. Between 2014 and 2015, the foreign-born population increased by 899,000, or 2.1 percent, a slower growth rate compared to 2.5 percent between 2013 and 2014. According to the 2016 Current Population Survey (CPS), immigrants and their US-born children now number approximately 84.3 million people, or 27 percent of the overall US population. In 2015, 1.38 million foreign-born individuals moved to the United States, a 2 percent increase from 1.36 million in 2014. India was the leading country of origin for recent immigrants, with 179,800 arriving

292  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00%

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

0.00% –5.00%

Figure 17.2  US GDP growth rate (%), 1945–2016 Source: The World Bank

in 2015, followed by 143,200 from China, 139,400 from Mexico, 47,500 from the Philippines and 46,800 from Canada (Deportations in Mexico Up 79% in First Four Months of 2015, The Guardian, 2015). In 2013, India and China overtook Mexico as the top origin countries for recent arrivals. While most of these new arrivals are immigrants new to the country, some are naturalised citizens, lawful permanent residents and others who might have lived in the United States for some time prior to returning in 2015. It is clear from the two charts above that immigration to the US increases during longer periods of stable growth of the economy. Shorter and intermittent periods of high growth are not favourable to immigration (see Figures 17.1 and 17.2). Since the 1970s, immigration to the US has been on the rise. The detrimental effects of the 2008 financial crisis were too short-lived to affect immigration in a major way.

17.3 An overview of immigration to the US: types, processes and future prospects A typical alien enters the US through one of the three routes: 1 I-94 relates to all admissions such as business professionals, students, tourists etc. All visas are under this including the H-1B visa. 2 Border Crossing Card is for Mexican nationals and is given for a period of 72 hours. 3 Visa Waiver Program allows citizens of specific countries to stay up to 90 days without having to obtain a visa.

Impact of Trump on immigration 293

Millions

The next step is to apply for Lawful Permanent Residency Status. This is commonly known as the green card. This is based on a lottery system. A green card holder of five years (just three years if married to an American citizen) is eligible for citizenship. However, on average, it takes between seven and ten years. In the modern world, the United States is the most preferred destination for potential migrants from almost every country in the world. Every year, the United States attracts immigrants from all corners of the globe. The largest immigrant population in the last 15 years was from Asia and North America and the Caribbean (see Figure 17.3). The major immigrant sending countries in Asia are China, India and Philippines. In the Americas, the major countries are Mexico, Cuba and Dominican Republic. During this period, Mexico accounted for a quarter of immigrants (see Figure 17.4).

3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 All countries (total)

Africa

Americas

Asia

Europe

Oceania

Figure 17.3  Immigration to the US by continent, 1999–2015

Thousands

Source: Department of Homeland Security

600 500 400 300 200 100 0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Mexico

China (excluding Hong Kong)

India

Philippines

Cuba

Dominican Republic

Figure 17.4  Top 6 immigrant-sending countries, 1999–2015 Source: Department of Homeland Security

294  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker In 2015, Mexicans accounted for approximately 27 percent of immigrants in the United States, making them by far the largest foreign-born group in the country. India was the next-largest country of origin, with close to 6 percent of all immigrants, followed by China (including Hong Kong but not Taiwan) and the Philippines, at close to 5 percent each. El Salvador, Vietnam and Cuba (about 3 percent each), as well as the Dominican Republic, Korea and Guatemala (2 percent each), rounded out the top ten. Together, immigrants from these ten countries represented 58 percent of the US immigrant population in 2015. The predominance of Latin American and Asian immigration in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries starkly contrasts with the trend in 1960 when immigrants largely originated from Europe. In the 1960s no single country accounted for more than 15 percent of the total immigrant population. Italians were the top immigrant-origin group, making up 13 percent of the foreign-born population in 1960, followed by Germans and Canadians (about 10 percent each). Since immigrants on visas enter and leave multiple times during the period of validity of their visas, only annual net migration is a reliable figure. For example, in 2015, the net migration was half a million. 1.05 million people were granted Lawful Permanent Residency (LPR) status. The top countries of origin of these green card recipients were Mexico (15.6 percent), China (7.3 percent), India (6.3 percent), Philippines (5.6 percent) and Cuba (5.4 percent). The top US states where legal permanent residents live are California (19.9 percent), New York (12.4 percent), Florida (11.3 percent), Texas (9.5 percent) and New Jersey (4.7 percent). New legal permanent residents are younger on average than native-born residents, more likely to be female and more likely to be married. In 2015, a total of 730,259 people became naturalised US citizens. Residents becoming naturalised citizens in 2014 had spent a median of seven years in LPR status. Immigrants born in Asia and Africa had the shortest wait time, six years, while those from North America had the longest wait time, ten years.

17.4 Demographic, educational and linguistic characteristics of immigrants 17.4.1 Demographic characteristics The demographic composition of the foreign-born labour force differs from that of the native-born labour force. In 2016, men accounted

Impact of Trump on immigration 295 for 57.9 percent of the foreign-born labour force, compared with 52.3 percent of the native-born labour force. By age, the proportion of the foreign-born labour force made up of twenty- to fifty-fouryear-olds (73.4 percent) was higher than for the native-born labour force (62.4 percent). Labour force participation is typically highest among persons in that age bracket. In 2016, nearly half (48.3 percent) of the foreign-born labour force was Hispanic, and one-quarter (25.0 percent) was Asian, compared with 10.4 percent and 1.9 percent, respectively, of the native-born labour force. About 16.2 percent of the foreign-born labour force was White and 9.3 percent was Black, compared with 73.0 percent and 12.1 percent, respectively, of the native-born labour force. In 2016, 22.4 percent of the foreign-born labour force age 25 and over had not completed high school, compared with 4.5 percent of the native-born labour force. The foreign born were less likely than the native born to have some college or an associate degree – 17.0 percent versus 29.8 percent. The proportions for foreign-born and native-born persons were more similar for those with a bachelor’s degree or higher (35.9 percent and 39.6 percent, respectively) and for high school graduates, no college (24.7 percent and 26.1 percent, respectively). 17.4.2 Labour force The share of the US civilian labour force that was foreign born increased to 16.9 percent in 2016 from 16.7 percent in 2015; it was 13.3 percent in 2000. In 2016, the labour force participation rate of the foreign born was 65.2 percent, unchanged from the prior year. The participation rate for the native born was 62.3 percent in 2016, little different from 2015. The participation rate of foreign-born men was 77.8 percent in 2016, higher than the rate of 67.5 percent for native-born men. In contrast, 53.4 percent of foreign-born women were labour force participants, lower than the rate of 57.5 percent for native-born women. Among the major race and ethnicity groups in 2016, labour force participation rates for foreign-born Whites (59.0 percent), Blacks (70.1 percent), Asians (63.1 percent) and Hispanics (67.9 percent) were little different from the prior year. The participation rates for native-born Whites (62.4 percent), Blacks (60.1 percent), Asians (62.6 percent), and Hispanics (64.0 percent) also showed little change from 2015 to 2016. In 2016, foreign-born mothers with children under eighteen years old were less likely to be labour force participants than were native-born mothers – 58.9 percent versus 73.9 percent. Labour force participation differences between foreign-born and native-born mothers were greater among those with younger children than among those

296  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker with older children. The labour force participation rate of foreignborn mothers with children under age six was 49.5 percent in 2016, much lower than that for native-born mothers with children under age six, at 69.0 percent. Among women with children under age three, the participation rate for the foreign born (44.3 percent) was 22.1 percentage points below that for native-born mothers (66.4 percent). The labour force participation rates of foreign-born and nativeborn fathers with children under age eighteen were more similar, at 93.5 percent and 92.6 percent, respectively. By region, the foreign born made up a larger share of the labour force in the West (24.1 percent) and the Northeast (19.5 percent) than for the nation as a whole (16.9 percent) in 2016. In contrast, the foreign born made up a smaller share of the labour force than for the nation as a whole in the South (16.1 percent) and the Midwest (8.6 percent). 17.4.3 Workforce characteristics Immigrants accounted for nearly 17 percent (26.7 million) of the 160.6 million workers in the civilian labour force in 2015. Between 1970 and 2015, the percentage of foreign-born workers in the labour force more than tripled, from 5 percent to 17 percent. Over the same period, the foreign-born share of the total population grew from almost 5 percent to 13.5 percent (see Figure 17.5). Of the 25.7 million employed foreign-born workers ages 16 and older in 2015, the largest share, or 31 percent, worked in management, professional, and related occupations (see Table 17.2). Table 17.2  Share of foreign and native-born workers in occupation, 2015 Occupation

Share of ForeignBorn Workers in Occupation (%)

Share of NativeBorn Workers in Occupation (%)

Management, Business, Science and Arts Service Sales and Office Natural Resources, Construction and Maintenance Production, Transportation and Material Moving

31.0

38.4

24.0 16.9 13.1

16.7 25.0 8.2

15.0

11.8

Source: American Community Survey

Impact of Trump on immigration 297 18.00% 16.00% 14.00% 12.00% 10.00% 8.00% 6.00% 4.00% 2.00% 0.00% 1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Foreign born as a share of civilian labour force Foreign born as a share of total populaon

Figure 17.5  Immigrants in civilian labour force, 1980–2015 Source: American Community Surveys, US Census Bureau

17.4.4 Unemployment From 2015 to 2016, the unemployment rate of the foreign born declined from 4.9 percent to 4.3 percent, and the jobless rate for the native born fell from 5.4 percent to 5.0 percent. The over-theyear decrease in the unemployment rates of the foreign born and the native born reflected decreases in the rates for both men and women. The unemployment rate for foreign-born men fell from 4.5 percent to 3.8 percent, and the rate for foreign-born women was down from 5.6 percent to 5.1 percent. Among the native born, the rate for men fell from 5.6 percent to 5.2 percent, while the rate for women was down from 5.1 percent to 4.7 percent. For both the foreign born and the native born, joblessness rates vary considerably by race and ethnicity. Among the foreign born, Blacks had the highest unemployment rate (6.1 percent) in 2016. The unemployment rates were 4.7 percent for Hispanics, 3.7 percent for Whites and 3.4 percent for Asians. Among the native born, Blacks also had the highest jobless rate (8.8 percent),

298  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker followed by Hispanics (6.8 percent). The unemployment rates were 4.2 percent for Asians and 4.0 percent for Whites. 17.4.5 Occupation In 2016, foreign-born workers were more likely than native-born workers to be employed in service occupations (23.5 percent versus 16.5 percent); in production, transportation and material moving occupations (14.8 percent versus 11.1 percent); and in natural resources, construction and maintenance occupations (13.6 percent versus 8.3 percent). Native-born workers were more likely than foreign-born workers to be employed in management, professional and related occupations (40.7 percent versus 32.2 percent) and in sales and office occupations (23.4 percent versus 15.9 percent). Among the employed, foreignborn men were more likely than native-born men to work in natural resources, construction and maintenance occupations; in production, transportation and material moving occupations; and in service occupations. Compared with employed native-born women, employed foreign-born women were more likely to be in service occupations; in production, transportation and material moving occupations; and in natural resources, construction and maintenance occupations. The disparity was especially great in service occupations – 32.5 percent of employed foreign-born women worked in service occupations in 2016, compared with 19.4 percent of employed native-born women. In contrast, employed native-born men and women were more likely than their foreign-born counterparts to be in management, professional and related occupations and in sales and office occupations. 17.4.6 Earnings In 2016, the median usual weekly earnings of foreign-born full-time wage and salary workers ($715) were 83.1 percent of the earnings of their native-born counterparts ($860). Among men, median weekly earnings for the foreign born ($751) were 79.0 percent of the earnings of the native born ($951). Median earnings for foreign-born women ($655) were 86.0 percent of the earnings of their native-born counterparts ($762). Differences in earnings reflect a variety of factors, including variations in the distributions of foreign-born and nativeborn workers by educational attainment, occupation, industry and geographic region. Among the major race and ethnicity groups, Hispanic foreign-born full-time wage and salary workers earned 83.5 percent as much as

Impact of Trump on immigration 299 their native-born counterparts in 2016. For Black workers, earnings for the foreign born and the native born were relatively close. For White and Asian workers, earnings for the foreign born were slightly higher than for the native born. The earnings of both foreign-born and native-born workers increase with education. In 2016, foreign-born workers age 25 and over with less than a high school education earned $489 per week, while those with a bachelor’s degree and higher earned about 2.7 times as much – $1,311 per week. Among the native born, those with a bachelor’s degree and higher earned about 2.4 times as much as those with less than a high school education – $1,253 versus $525 per week. Native-born workers earn more than foreign-born workers at most educational attainment levels. Among foreign-born full-time workers, those with less than a high school diploma earned 93.1 percent as much as their native-born counterparts, compared with 85.8 percent for high school graduates, no college and 90.0 percent for those with some college or an associate’s degree. The gap between the earnings of foreign-born and native-born workers closes at higher levels of education; among those with a bachelor’s degree and higher, the earnings of foreign-born workers ($1,311) were not much different from the earnings of native-born workers ($1,253). The uncertainty surrounding immigration policies and global opportunities following the presidential election is not dampening the outlook of employers when it comes to hiring and mobilising their global workforce. During the next year, 55 percent of employers expect their foreign national headcount to increase – up from 34 percent in the 2016 report. Fifty-nine percent of employers expect their demand for work authorisation in jurisdictions outside the United States to increase. The majority of employers believe that acquiring and developing global talent is a key building block of their talent management strategy. Sixty-three percent of employers say sourcing foreign national employees is extremely or very important to their companies’ talent acquisition strategy, up significantly from 42 percent last year. Eighty-three percent of employers invest in acquiring and retaining this key talent pool with immigration-related perks. A large majority of employers (92 percent) spends an average of $6,000 or more on immigration-related perks for each individual, while a slight majority (54 percent) spends between $6,000 and $15,999. Thirty-eight percent spend $16,000 or more. HR is the primary department responsible for managing both inbound and outbound immigration. Seventy percent of employers have a global mobility department. Global mobility and global immigration typically report to the HR function of the organisation. Almost half of employers (46 percent) say nine or more people

300  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker handle the majority of the responsibilities surrounding immigration and/or global mobility. Four in five employers (83 percent) believe the US immigration system has an impact on their companies’ hiring and retention strategies. Many of the major implications are negative and affect both time and money, such as increasing budgets to address the challenges of the immigration system and engaging in advocacy efforts to propose solutions that would positively impact hiring and retention strategies (Envoy Immigration Trends Report, 2017). 17.4.6 Undocumented immigrants The Department of Homeland Security estimates that there are over 11 million unauthorised immigrants living in the US (Carl et.al, 2016). The top countries of origin are Mexico (59 percent), El Salvador (6 percent), Guatemala (5 percent), Honduras (3 percent) and Philippines (3 percent). The top US states where unauthorised immigrants settle are California (25 percent), Texas (16 percent), Florida (6 percent), New York (5 percent) and Illinois (5 percent). Unauthorised immigrants to the United States tend to be young (61 percent between ages twenty-five and forty-four) and male (53 percent). However, 57 percent of unauthorised immigrants over the age of forty-five are female. In 2015, 462,388 unauthorised immigrants were apprehended and 333,341 deported. Most of them were from Mexico.

17.5 The case of Mexico: undocumented immigrants, crime and the wall Since 1980, immigrants from Mexico have been the largest nationalorigin group in the United States (see Figure 17.6). Mexican immigrants are primarily concentrated in the West and Southwest, and more than half live in California or Texas. In 2015, the top five states of residence for Mexican immigrants were California (37 percent of all Mexican immigrants), Texas (22 percent), Illinois (6 percent), Arizona (4 percent) and Florida (2 percent). In 2015, Mexican immigrants accounted for more than half of the foreign-born population in New Mexico (71 percent), Arizona (57 percent) and Texas (55 percent). By contrast, Mexicans accounted for less than 2 percent of all immigrants in Rhode Island (1.8 percent), Massachusetts (1.5 percent) and New Hampshire (1.2 percent). About 69 percent of the 11.2 million immigrants from Mexico ages sixteen and older were in the civilian labour force in 2015. This represents a slightly higher labour force participation than for the

Impact of Trump on immigration 301 14000000

35.00%

12000000

30.00%

10000000

25.00%

8000000

20.00%

6000000

15.00%

4000000

10.00%

2000000

5.00%

0 1840

1860

1880

1900

Mexican born

1920

1940

1960

1980

2000

2020

0.00% 2040

Mexican born as a share of all immigrants

Figure 17.6  Number and share of Mexican immigrants, 1850–2016 Source: American Community Surveys, US Census Bureau

overall foreign-born population ages sixteen and older (66 percent of 41.4 million) and the native-born population ages sixteen and older (62 percent of 214.8 million). According to Mexico’s National Survey of Occupations and Employment (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo, or ENOE), the emigration rate from Mexico (refers to emigrants leaving Mexico regardless of their destination, although most head to the United States) has remained steadily low in recent years, after experiencing a drop following the 2007–2009 US recession. From 2008 to 2012, the emigration rate dropped from 6.4 migrants per 1,000 residents to 3.3 migrants. It picked up slightly in 2015 to 3.6 migrants per 1,000 residents. The immigration rate to Mexico (overwhelmingly comprised of return migrants) has also dropped, from 4.4 migrants per 1,000 residents in 2008 to 1.4 per 1,000 in 2015. With about 43 million foreign-born people living in the country and about 11 million of them here illegally, immigrants are a large slice of the population. About 1.9 million non-citizens living in the United States, whether legally or illegally, have been convicted of criminal offences. And 820,000 of these people are in the country illegally, including 300,000 with felony convictions (Walter, Martínez and Rumbaut, 2015). However, only 5 percent of inmates in state and federal prisons are non-citizens. Analyses of census data from 1980 through

302  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker 2010 show that among men ages eighteen to forty-nine, immigrants were one-half to one-fifth as likely to be incarcerated as those born in the United States (Carl, Tan and Lin, 2016). For instance, in 2010, 1.6 percent of immigrant males age eighteen to forty-nine were incarcerated, compared to 3.3 percent of the native born. In federal prisons, a much higher share of inmates, 22 percent, are non-citizens. But federal prisons hold a small fraction of the nation’s inmates, and in many ways, it is an unusual population. About one-third of non-citizen federal inmates are serving time for immigration offences – usually re-entering the country illegally after being deported – that are not covered by state law (Ginger and Cohen, 2014).

17.6 The travel ban on seven Muslim-majority countries

Thousands

President Trump’s first order banned all entries (including visa and green card holders) from seven Muslim-majority countries for a period of 90 days (Amy, 2017). These countries were Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen (see Figure 17.7). He also suspended entry to the US for all refugees for 120 days and indefinitely for those from Syria. Later, an order removed Iraq from the list. All the orders regarding these travel bans were rejected by the various courts. As has been shown already, the proportions of immigrants from these countries are low. It is estimated that up to half a million legal

120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2006

2007 Total

2008

2009

Iran

Iraq

2010

2011

Somalia

2012 Sudan

2013 Syria

Figure 17.7  Refugees from seven Muslim countries, 2006–2015 Source: US Department of State

2014 Yemen

2015

Impact of Trump on immigration 303 permanent residents are from these countries. Roughly another 280,000 US residents born in these countries are on various visas. Cumulatively, they account for just 2 percent of all immigrants. The largest share of these immigrants is from Iran (370,000), followed by Iraq (170,000). Immigrants from the region mainly work in business ownership (22 percent), management (11 percent), healthcare (11 percent) or education (8 percent), and only 1 percent were unemployed as of 2012. Immigrants from the region are highly educated. Over 50 percent have a bachelor’s degree or more compared to the national average of 28 percent. Iranian Americans, the largest in this group, particularly stand out. They are among the top immigrant groups in business ownership, with the total business income generated estimated at USD 2.56 billion. Moreover, more than one in for Iranian Americans hold a master’s or doctoral degree, the highest rate among all ethnic groups. However, these countries do account for a large proportion of refugees entering the US. From 2013–2015, 44 percent of all refugees immigrated from these countries. Another 23 percent immigrated from Burma, which is not on the list. The reasons for the ban are simple: Islamophobia or, put simply, assumed involvement in terrorism. But reality couldn’t be farther from public perception. Muslims make up a small proportion of immigrants and an even smaller proportion of the population. Approximately only 10 percent of all legal immigrants arriving to the US are Muslim. There are only 3.3 million people who practice Islam. Interestingly, the number of Americans who convert to Islam is about equal to the number of Muslim-Americans who convert to another faith or no longer identify with Islam. When it comes to terrorism, only seventeen people from these countries have been convicted of attempting or participating in terror attacks on US soil over the last forty years (Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2017). Zero refugees from these countries have killed anyone in terrorist attacks on American soil. While nine people have been killed a year, on average, by Muslim extremists in the US since 9/11, close to 13,000 people are killed by guns, on average. This excludes suicides by firearm, which is more than 20,000 per year.

17.7 Muslims in America Muslims are the fastest-growing religious group in the world. The growth and regional migration of Muslims, combined with the ongoing impact of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) and other

304  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker extremist groups that commit acts of violence in the name of Islam, have brought Muslims and the Islamic faith to the forefront of the political debate in many countries. Yet many facts about Muslims are not well known in some of these places, and most Americans – who live in a country with a relatively small Muslim population – have said they know little or nothing about Islam. There were 1.8 billion Muslims in the world as of 2015 – roughly 24 percent of the global population – according to a Pew Research Center estimate (www.pewresearch.org). But while Islam is currently the world’s second-largest religion (after Christianity), it is the fastestgrowing major religion. Indeed, if current demographic trends continue, the number of Muslims is expected to exceed the number of Christians by the end of this century. Muslim Americans are a diverse and growing population, currently estimated at 3.45 million people of all ages, including 2.15 million adults. The US Muslim community is made up heavily of immigrants and the children of immigrants from around the world. On average, Muslim Americans are considerably younger than the overall US population. In their educational attainment levels, Muslims closely resemble the general public. About three in ten (31 percent) US Muslims are college graduates, including 11 percent who have a post-graduate degree. On average, Muslim immigrants are more highly educated than US-born Muslims. Financially, Muslims are about as likely as Americans in general to have a household income over $100,000. At the same time, they are more likely than Americans in general to have an income under $30,000. The survey also finds that Muslims are three times as likely as other Americans to be without a job and looking for work. Although many countries in the Middle East-North Africa region, where the religion originated in the seventh century, are heavily Muslim, the region is home to only about 20 percent of the world’s Muslims. A majority of the Muslims globally (62 percent) live in the Asia-Pacific region, including large populations in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Turkey. Indonesia is currently the country with the world’s largest Muslim population, but Pew Research Center projects that India will have that distinction by the year 2050 (while remaining a Hindu-majority country), with more than 300 million Muslims. The Muslim population in Europe also is growing; we project 10 percent of all Europeans will be Muslims by 2050. Nearly six in ten US Muslim adults (58 percent) are first-generation Americans, having been born in another country. An additional

Impact of Trump on immigration 305 18 percent are second-generation Americans – people who were born in the US and who have at least one parent who was an immigrant. About a quarter (24 percent) of US Muslims are US natives with USborn parents (i.e. they are from families who have been in the US for three generations or longer), which is the case for nearly three-quarters of US adults overall (73 percent). Among US Muslim adults who were born abroad, more come from South Asia (35 percent) than any other region. An additional 23 percent were born in other parts of the Asia-Pacific region (such as Iran, Indonesia etc.); 25 percent come from the Middle East-North Africa region, 9 percent come from sub-Saharan Africa, 4 percent were born in Europe and 4 percent come from elsewhere in the Americas. No single country accounts for more than 15 percent of adult Muslim immigrants to the United States (15 percent are from Pakistan). The countries with the next-highest totals are Iran (11 percent of Muslim immigrants), India (7 percent), Afghanistan (6 percent), Bangladesh (6 percent), Iraq (5 percent), Kuwait (3 percent), Syria (3 percent) and Egypt (3 percent). Three in ten Muslim immigrants have arrived in the US since 2010. An additional 26 percent arrived between 2000 and 2009, and roughly one in five (19 percent) Muslim immigrants arrived in the 1990s. One in ten immigrated in the 1980s, 6 percent arrived in the 1970s and just 2 percent of Muslim immigrants say they arrived in the US before 1970. The survey also finds that the vast majority of Muslims living in the US (82 percent) are American citizens, including 42 percent who were born in the US and 40 percent who were born abroad but who have naturalised. The remainder are not US citizens (18 percent). Looked at another way, 69 percent of all foreign-born US Muslim adults have become naturalised US citizens. No racial or ethnic group makes up a majority of Muslim American adults. A plurality (41 percent) are White, a category that includes those who describe their race as Arab, Middle Eastern, Persian/Iranian or in a variety of other ways. About three in ten are Asian (28 percent), including those from South Asia, and one-fifth are Black (20 percent). Fewer are Hispanic (8 percent), and an additional 3 percent identify with another race or with multiple races. Muslim immigrants are much more likely than US-born Muslims to describe their race as Asian (41 percent vs. 10 percent). And US-born Muslims are more likely than immigrant Muslims to be Black (32 percent vs. 11 percent). In fact, fully half of Muslims whose families have been in the US for at least three generations are Black (51 percent). The American Muslim adult population is considerably younger than

306  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker the overall US adult population. About a third (35 percent) of Muslim American adults are between eighteen and twenty-nine years old, which is a far higher percentage than the share of the general population that falls in that age bracket (21 percent). Similarly, adults ages eighteen to thirty-nine make up 60 percent of the Muslim American adult population, compared with 38 percent of the US adult population as a whole. Meanwhile, at the other end of the age spectrum, adults ages fifty-five and over make up just 14 percent of Muslim Americans, while people in this older age bracket comprise 36 percent of the overall US adult population. Another way to compare how old or young a group is within a broader population is to calculate its median age, which for Muslim adults in the US is thirty-five. In the US population as a whole, the median age of adults is forty-seven. Roughly half (53 percent) of Muslim adults in the US are married. A third (33 percent) have never been married, while 8 percent are divorced or separated, 4 percent are unmarried but living with a partner and 1 percent are widowed. Foreign-born Muslims are much more likely to be married than are Muslims who were born in the US (70 percent vs. 29 percent). The vast majority of US Muslims who are married have a spouse who is also Muslim. The share of Muslim American adults who are married is identical to the share of US adults overall who are married (53 percent), even though Muslims are younger than the US general public. Among adults ages forty to fifty-nin, Muslim Americans report having an average of 2.4 children over the course of their lives. Americans overall average 2.1 children. This is in line with the fact that Muslims have higher fertility rates than any other major religious group in the world. About three in ten US Muslims (31 percent) have college or postgraduate degrees, equivalent to the share among US adults as a whole (31 percent). Foreign-born Muslims are more likely to have at least a college degree (38 percent) than are Muslims born in the US (21 percent), perhaps reflecting immigration policies that give preference to highly educated immigrants. Similarly, US Muslims are about as likely as Americans overall to report household incomes of $100,000 or higher (24 percent of Muslims and 23 percent of Americans in general). But they also are more likely to be at the other end of the income scale: 40 percent of Muslim Americans report household incomes under $30,000, compared with 32 percent of the US population as a whole. Muslims are also less likely than the general public to fall into the middle range, between $30,000 and $99,999 – 35 percent of Muslims report household income in this range, compared with 45 percent of all Americans.

Impact of Trump on immigration 307 Fewer than half of Muslim adults say they are employed full time (44 percent). Overall, 29 percent of Muslims are underemployed, in that they are either employed part time but would prefer full-time work (10 percent) or they are not employed but they are looking for work (18 percent). By comparison, 12 percent of US adults overall are underemployed in these ways. Still, Muslims are about as satisfied with their finances as are US adults as a whole. Asked to rate their personal financial situation, 43 percent of Muslims say they are in either ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ financial shape, while 56 percent say they are in ‘only fair’ or ‘poor’ shape financially. Among the general public, 46 percent rate their financial situation as good or excellent, while 53 percent say it is only fair or poor. The most common living situation among Muslim Americans – especially immigrants – is a multi-person household in which everyone is Muslim. More than half of Muslims (57 percent) live this way. An additional 18 percent of Muslims live in a home with non-Muslims (such as a non-Muslim spouse), while 23 percent live alone. Half of Muslim Americans live in a household with minor children, and usually those children are Muslim. But 6 percent of all US Muslims live in households with children who are not Muslim.

17.8 H-1B visas and the Indian dream The US State Department defines an H-1B visa holder as an alien admitted to the United States temporarily to perform services in a ‘specialty occupation’. When the H-1B category was enacted in 1990, Congress set a maximum of 65,000 aliens who could be issued H-1B visas or otherwise provided H-1B status during each fiscal year (see Figure 17.8). This turned out to be the most sought-after visa by Indian professionals, especially the ones working in the information technology sector. China and India received 82 percent of all H-1B visas issued in 2016, according to data from the US Department of State. The percentage is up slightly from 2015, when India and China made up 80 percent of the total, and underscores the relationship between tech companies and foreign labour (see Figure 17.9). Having a high share of these visas means that India and China are most at jeopardy as the Trump administration seeks to constrict the program. Uncertainty surrounding the visa program has driven down stock prices at Indian tech companies. The new Trump administration in the United States has disrupted the existing broad immigration reforms, including H-1B and L1 visas, used largely by the global knowledge workforce and more so by the Indian IT services industry. In August 2016, Indians held 72 percent

308  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker 450000 400000 350000 300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Receipts

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Approvals

Figure 17.8  H-1B visas, 2007–2017 Source: US Department of State

India China Mexico South Korea Great Britain France Philippines Thailand Brazil Germany Japan 0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

Figure 17.9  H-1B visas by country, 2016 Source: US Department of State

of the total H-1B visas issued worldwide. While the executive order does affect other nations – China, Britain and South Korea corner the highest number of H-1B visas after India – the Indian IT industry would be the hardest hit. Understandably, this has caused concern and confusion in the Indian IT community, which has been leveraging the

Impact of Trump on immigration 309 Computer Systems Design & Related Services Management, Scienfic & Technical Consulng Services Colleges, Universies and Professional Schools Architectural, Engineering & Related Services So‡ware Publishers Accounng, Tax Preparaon, Bookkeeping & Payroll… Scienfic Research and Development Services Semiconductor & Other Electronic Component… General Medical and Surgical Hospitals Securies & Commodity Contracts Intermediaon &… 0

100000

200000

300000

400000

Figure 17.10  Occupation and H-1B visas, 2015 Source: Department of Homeland Security

H-1B visa to relocate IT consultants for delivering onshore technology services to US corporations. There is concern because the Indian IT industry will have to modify its approach and align it with the new requirements. The H-1B visa requirements were created for two reasons: first, to bring in the talent required to make the US a technological powerhouse using talent it did not have; second, to accelerate the competitiveness of US businesses across the world. Both these goals have been served well by the H-1B programme (see Figure 17.10). For Indian IT companies, it is a wait-and -watch time. The executive order will remain in force for ninety days from the day it is issued. Within those ninety days, the secretary of homeland security needs to review regulations that allow foreign nationals to work in the US and provide an opinion on the regulations that violate immigration laws or are not in the interests of America. There are other hoops through which an executive order must pass: the Supreme Court can overturn an executive order, as it has done several times in the past, on the grounds that the order exceeds the president’s constitutional powers; and finally, while Congress cannot actually block the order, it can rewrite or amend the law or provide greater detail on how the executive must act. Of course, the president has the power to veto what Congress recommends. It’s all a bit complex and, for the moment, Indian IT companies must hold their anxiety at bay, and be prepared to ride through. For the last twenty-eight years, the Indian IT sector has benefited hugely from the programme. In 1989, the minimum wage of $60,000

310  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker was established by the programme, and it has remained unchanged since, until now. It has now been raised to $130,000. We may choose to debate the quantum of increase in minimum wages, but the fact that the raise was overdue could be justified. And the problem is not as simple as that. First, the US needs to have the talent with the right education and experience that is needed to deliver these services and in the numbers that is required. And often, the onshore engineers work in tandem with the offshore engineers to deliver integrated service to customers. The combined expertise and solutions that get delivered add value to US corporations, making them more competitive and also saves time. The Indian IT industry delivers services in combination of ‘technology, process and people’ and of late has been integrating this with ‘automation and analytics’. This will not be easy to replace in the near term simply by changing the visa rules. Hence, in the near term, new solutions will be designed with a higher offshore content that now would be more acceptable to US customers and thereby not increase their costs. This in turn will be good for India as it would also increase employment in India. Indian companies have already been hiring more US nationals, including hiring from US colleges, and that pace will now increase. The costs of outsourcing for US customers will increase, as some jobs need to be delivered onshore, and the skills needed for this do not exist in the numbers that are required in America. Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, who introduced the High Skilled Integrity and Fairness Act 2017, said that her legislation refocuses the H-1B programme to its original intent – ‘to seek out and find the best and brightest from around the world, and to supplement the US workforce with talented, highly paid, and highly skilled workers who help create jobs here in America, not replace them’. She further said that the new law ‘offers a market-based solution that gives priority to those companies willing to pay the most’. This ensures that American employers have access to the talent they need, while removing incentives for companies to undercut American wages and outsource jobs. This is the type of goal that every government should ideally have. But there are practical considerations as well. Hiring local talent is possible only if the required skill levels exist. At the moment, the US may not have an adequate number of appropriately skilled people. There is a need for the US to put in place larger investments in its education system and refocus a part of it to produce the required skills as quickly as possible. In the meantime, companies that cannot do without the skills made available through the H-1B visa will have no choice but to pay more (200 percent increase in costs related to H-1B talent). For India, this could be a good wakeup call

Impact of Trump on immigration 311 as well. It provides the right impetus to create talent with a higher capability set, increase the IT pool and create deeper innovation that allows an increased number of services to be rendered from offshore locations. As much as President Donald Trump’s executive order will affect Indian IT, one cannot resist thinking of how it will actually benefit the nation in the long term. We will be spurred to produce brighter and better talent because that is what the market demands. In fact, if we bring focus to this task quickly, we may end up with a greater than 72 percent share of H-1B visas.

17.9 How Americans view immigrants and immigration While immigration has been at the forefront of a national political debate, the US public holds a range of views about immigrants living in the country. Overall, a majority of Americans have positive views about immigrants. Six in ten Americans (63 percent) say immigrants strengthen the country ‘because of their hard work and talents’, while just over a quarter (27 percent) say immigrants burden the country by taking jobs, housing and healthcare. Yet these views vary starkly by political affiliation. Among Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents, 82 percent think immigrants strengthen the country with their hard work and talents, and just 13 percent say they are a burden. Among Republicans and Republicanleaning independents, roughly as many (44 percent) say immigrants are a burden as say immigrants strengthen the country because of their hard work and talents (39 percent). Americans also hold more positive views of some immigrant groups than others, according to a 2015 Pew Research Center immigration report. More than four in ten Americans expressed mostly positive views of Asian (47 percent) and European immigrants (44 percent), yet only a quarter expressed such views of African and Latin American immigrants (26 percent each). Roughly half of the US public said immigrants are making things better through food, music and the arts (49 percent), but almost equal shares said immigrants are making crime and the economy worse (50 percent each). Americans were divided on future levels of immigration. Nearly half said immigration to the US should be decreased (49 percent), while one-third (34 percent) said immigration should be kept at its present level and just 15 percent said immigration should be increased. Americans continue to express mixed views of both Muslims and Islam. But on some measures, opinions about Muslims and Islam

312  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker have become more positive in recent years. More Americans express ‘warmer’ feelings toward Muslims on a thermometer scale than they have in the past, while there has been a decline in the share who say Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence among its followers. In addition, most say there is little or no support for extremism among US Muslims. And a large – and growing – majority of the public says that Muslims in the United States face a lot of discrimination, while roughly half of US adults say media coverage of Muslims is unfair. Still, overall opinion on many questions about Muslims remains divided – and deeply fractured along partisan lines. Indeed, Americans – especially Republicans and those who lean toward the GOP – view Muslims far less positively than they view members of most other major religious groups. Half of US adults say Islam is not part of mainstream American society. And the US public is split over whether there is a ‘natural conflict’ between Islam and democracy. Views about the link between Islam and violence have fluctuated in the last 15 years. In March of 2002, just six months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 51 percent of Americans said Islam does not encourage violence more than other faiths, while 25 percent said it does. Responses to this question have become substantially more divided along partisan lines. When it was first asked in 2002, just 11 points separated Republicans and Democrats. By December 2016, the partisan gap had grown to 44 points: 70 percent of Republicans say Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence, compared with 26 percent of Democrats who say the same. Meanwhile, the share of US adults who think there is little or no support for extremism among US Muslims has increased by 9 points since 2011 (from 45 percent to 54 percent). The public was evenly divided on this question in 2011 (with 45 percent saying that, among Muslims, there was ‘not too much’ support for extremism or ‘none at all’, while 40 percent said there was a ‘great deal’ or a ‘fair amount’ of support for extremism). Today, those who believe there is little or no support for extremism in the Muslim American community outnumber those who say there are a substantial number of Muslims who support extremism in the US (54 percent vs. 35 percent). Despite these changes in views on Muslims and Islam, there are clear indications that many Americans have reservations about the role of Islam in society. For example, a January 2016 Pew Research Center survey found that one-quarter of US adults (25 percent) think half or more of Muslims in the US are ‘anti-American’, while an additional 24 percent say they think ‘some’ Muslims are anti-American. More recently,

Impact of Trump on immigration 313 an April 2017 poll finds that more Americans say Islam is not a part of ‘mainstream American society’ (50 percent) than say that it is (43 percent). And about as many think there is a natural conflict between Islam and democracy (44 percent) as say there is no such conflict (46 percent). Still others (8 percent of those who see a conflict) say Islam’s teachings about gender and sexuality are inconsistent with democracy. However, in spite of all this general apprehension towards Islam, half of US adults think coverage of Islam and Muslims by American news organisations is generally unfair (53 percent), compared with 39 percent who think the media is fair to Muslims and Islam. And just one-third of Americans (36 percent) think that the overall public is generally friendly toward Muslim Americans; 32 percent say the American people are generally unfriendly toward Muslims, while 29 percent say the public is neutral.

17.10 Conclusion it is clear that the inimical attitude of the Trump administration on immigration will permeate all sections of the economy, from trade and commerce to education and tourism. The United States of America could lose its position as the most appealing country to migrate to. Such a trend is evident from the surge in visa requests to the neighbouring country of Canada. However, President Trump has not got it all wrong. He will face immense pressure on the deportation of illegal migrants and on the travel ban on several Muslim-majority nations, as these are sensitive racial or religious issues (Annotated Border Immigration Enforcement Executive Order, National Immigrant Justice Center, 2017). However, the curb on the H-1B visa program may be beneficial to the United States, as many of these jobs are bound to be taken over by machine learning and artificial intelligence. Although it is true that H-1B workers contribute substantially to the American economy through consumption, the choice to replace them with even more skilled and creative professionals cannot be questioned. More importantly, this is the perfect time for ambitious and growing nations to attract talent that would have once migrated to the US. China has been attracting US-educated Chinese Americans to invest and lead the technology sector in China. India is also in a fine position to do this, as Indian Americans have risen to the top of the world in technology, medicine, education and business. The government needs to think long term and utilise the expertise of these immigrant Indians to build capacity in both public and private institutions in India.

314  S. Irudaya Rajan and Nikhil Panicker

Data Sources 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

US Department of State Department of Homeland Security (DHS) International Labor Organization (ILO) American Community Surveys (2010–2015) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Pew Research Centre Surveys Migration Policy

References Amy Wang, Trump Asked for a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani Says – and Ordered a Commission to Do It “Legally,” Washington Post (January 29, 2017), www. washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-amus lim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally/?utm_ term=.e8dc130824f1. See also Abby Phillip & Abigail Hauslohner, Trump on the Future of Proposed Muslim Ban, Registry: “You Know My Plans,” Washington Post (December 22, 2016), www.washingtonpost.com/news/ post-politics/wp/2016/12/21/trump-onthe-future-of-proposed-muslim-banregistry-you-know-my-plans/?utm_term=.e98a13585623; Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration, Donald J. Trump (December 7, 2015), www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-state ment-on-preventingmuslim-immigration. Last date of access February 27, 2018. Annotated Border Immigration Enforcement Executive Order, National Immigrant Justice Center, § 2(b) (January 27, 2017), https://immigrantjustice. org/research-items/annotated-border-immigration-enforcement-executiveorder. Last date of access February 27, 2018. Carl Takei, Michael Tan, & Joanne Lin, Shutting Down the Profiteers: Why and How the Department of Homeland Security Should Stop Using Private Prisons, American Civil Liberties Union, 22 (2016), www.aclu.org/sites/ default/files/field_document/white_paper_09-30-16_released_for_web-v1opt.pdf. Last date of access February 27, 2018. Deportations in Mexico Up 79% in First Four Months of 2015, The Guardian (June 11, 2015), www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/11/deportationsmexico-central-america. Last date of access February 27, 2018. Envoy Global, Immigration Trends Report, 2017. https://www.envoyglobal. com/resources/PDF/Envoy-Immigration-Trends-Report-2017.pdf. Last date of access February 27, 2018. Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Records Show, New York Times (April 6, 2014), www.nytimes. com/2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows. html. 66 American Civil Liberties Union, DHS Secretary Johnson Discontinues Secure Communities “As We Know It,” 1 (2014), www.aclu.org/

Impact of Trump on immigration 315 files/assets/2014_12_18_-._aclu_summary_of_dhs_scomm_and_detainer_ reforms_final.pdf. Last date of access February 27, 2018. Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (February 2, 2017), www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states. Last date of access February 20, 2018. Walter Ewing, Daniel Martínez, & Rubén Rumbaut, The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States (July 13, 2015), www.americanimmigra tioncouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_criminalization_of_immigra tion_in_the_united_states.pdf. Last date of access February 27, 2018. www.pewresearch.org. Last date of access February 27, 2018.

18 Impact of demographic transition in Kerala on migration and labour force S. Irudaya Rajan, Benoy Peter, Udaya S. Mishra and Vishnu Narendran 18.1 Introduction The state of Kerala on the south-western coast of the Indian peninsula has been well ahead of the rest of Indian states in social development. Formed in 1956 as part of the linguistic reorganisation of Indian states, the state has achieved human development comparable to that of developed economies although without significant economic advancement. A host of favourable factors, ranging from settlement pattern to high level of female literacy, are attributed to this achievement. Pioneer among the Indian states undergoing the demographic changes, the state is currently experiencing advanced demographic transition while most of the other Indian states are way behind and India is heading towards being the most populous country in the world (United Nations, 2017). Changes in mortality, fertility and migration and the resultant age structure by and large explain the demographic changes in a region. In the case of Kerala, both mortality and fertility levels have touched near saturation bottom levels and migration plays a critical role in shaping the future demographic scenario. Migration has played a pivotal role in Kerala’s development and economy (Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan, 2001a, 2001b, 2003). The state even has a Department for Non-Keralite Affairs signifying the important role that migration plays in its economy. Although a narrow strip of land with 1.2 percent of India’s total area and 2.8 percent of population, Kerala continues to be one of the major sending states in India in the case of international migration. This chapter summarises the changes in mortality and fertility in Kerala since its formation, the impact of these changes on the migration scenario of the state and implications of such a scenario for the state’s economy given that migration is increasingly at the centre of global politics.

Demographic transition in Kerala 317

18.2 Mortality and fertility transitions in Kerala From a high fertility-high mortality scenario where the population is stationary, through various stages, the population transitions to a low fertility-low mortality scenario wherein the population becomes stationary or it tends to decline. Mortality rates start declining first, followed by fertility rates, resulting in a natural increase of the population while migration accentuates or inhibits the population growth depending on the direction and volume of migration. A significant component of mortality is the deaths with in the first year of birth (infant mortality). Kerala is the first Indian state to achieve an infant mortality rate (IMR) below 25, in 1989 (Bhat and Rajan, 1990). While the state further reduced the IMR to 10 in 2016, with an IMR of 34 in 2016 India has a long way to go (Registrar General of India, 2017). Significant strides were also made by the state in improving the life expectancy at birth. During 1951–60, the male and female life expectancy at birth for Kerala was 44.2 years and 48.1 years respectively which has advanced to 72.2 years and 78.2 years during 2011–2015 (Bhat and Rajan, 1990; Thomas and James, 2014). At the same time, life expectancy at birth for India during 2011–2015 was 66.9 years and 70 years respectively for male and female (RGI, ibid). To summarise the mortality transition in Kerala, the state has attained a stage that, barring those above sixty years, most age groups have reached their limit of mortality reduction (Irudaya Rajan and Mishra, 2018). With the significant fall in levels of mortality, the fertility levels also have come down considerably. Kerala has been the first Indian state to achieve below-replacement-level fertility, that too three decades ago in 1987 (Zachariah and Rajan, 1997). India is yet to achieve replacement-level fertility even during 2015–2016 while Kerala’s total fertility rate (TFR) further declined to 1.6 (IIPS, 2017).

18.3 Trajectory of population growth in Kerala The combined effect of the reduction in mortality and fertility rates in Kerala has been a decline in the natural growth rate of the population. However, the population of Kerala has doubled from 16.9 million in 1961 to 33.4 million in 2011 given its momentum (see Figure 18.1). An analysis of the male and female population in Kerala reveals that, while both populations have doubled over the past five decades, the increase of female population over male population has grown by 7.5 times (see Figure 18.2). This is a cumulative impact of the higher life expectancy of females compared to males and outward migration of

318  S. Irudaya Rajan et al. 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 1961

1971

1981

1991

Annual Exponenal Growth Rate

2001

2011

Natural Increase

Figure 18.1 Annual exponential growth rate and rate of natural increase of Kerala population, 1961–2011 Source: Calculated from Various Censuses 1961–2011, Registrar General of India

40 35

Millions

30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1961

1971 Male

1981

1991 Female

2001

2011

Total

Figure 18.2  Population in Kerala by sex and census year, 1961–2011 Source: Calculated from Various Censuses 1961–2011, Registrar General of India

Keralite men. While the overall sex ratio in Kerala has been historically favourable to females, examining the age-specific sex ratios, it is evident that, at younger ages, the sex ratios have been favourable to males. Male out-migration evidently plays a significant role in the feminisation of sex ratios in Kerala during the working ages whereas at later ages, the differential longevity plays a key role. While the transition to

Demographic transition in Kerala 319 a sex ratio favourable to females occurred at the age of nineteen years during 1961, from 2001 this has moved up to above twenty-four years (Irudaya Rajan and Mishra, 2018). The movement of the tipping point of the sex ratio from nineteen years to twenty-four years during the last two decades is perhaps the result of the spurt in growth of migration of single male migrants from other states to Kerala.

18.4 Age structure changes in Kerala population In the past six decades since the formation of the state, the agespecific growth rates too have significantly declined in line with the overall population growth rates, with an exception of population sixty years and above (Irudaya Rajan and Mishra, 2018). Negative growth rates are observed in the case of young population (zero to fourteen years) during the past three decades and its impact is evident in the age groups fifteen to twenty years and twenty to twenty-nine years also. In the case of men, negative growth is registered in the thirty-to-thirty-nine-years age group too. The age-sex distributions for 1961 and 2011 for Kerala indicate that the base of the population has narrowed with its share shifting from 15 percent to less than half of it (see Figures 18.3 and 18.4). At the same time, narrowing of the 80+ 75-79 70-74 65-69 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 0-4

20

10

0 Female

10 Male

Figure 18.3  Population distribution: Kerala, 1961

20

320  S. Irudaya Rajan et al. 80+ 75-79 70-74 65-69 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 0-4

20

10

0 Female

10

20

Male

Figure 18.4  Population distribution: Kerala, 2011 Source: Calculated from Various Censuses 1961–2011, Registrar General of India

base of the population pyramid continues till the age of twenty-nine years depicting a consistent decline in fertility during the last three decades, while survivors of the births prior to thirty years contribute to the broadening of the pyramid towards the top. Thus, the shape of the population distribution has gradually transitioned to that of a bottle over the period from its original pyramid shape in 1961. The ageing of the population is clearly evident in this transition as the median age of the population moved from nineteen years in 1961 to thirty-one years in 2011. While as demographic dividend, the working population has significantly bulged in Kerala, among the major states in the country, the state has the highest unemployment rate during 2015–2016, more than double the national average (GOI, 2016). According to Census 2011, 13 percent of the Kerala population is above sixty years of age. Migration to the state may also have contributed to the shift in the median age as well as the changes in the age structure. However, the census is unlikely to capture significantly the seasonal circular migration to the state from the rest of India.

Demographic transition in Kerala 321

18.5 Impact of mortality and fertility changes on migration Migration has been and continues to be a significant catalyst in the development of Kerala. The spectrum of migration relevant to Kerala can be broadly classified into two; migration from Kerala and migration to Kerala.1Outward migration from Kerala is constituted by migration to destinations in other Indian states as well as to international destinations. This migration is complemented by migration to the state from the rest of India and also from other countries. The mortality and fertility changes accompanied by a host of social determinants facilitated this inward and outward migration. Migration, both internal and international, together with the advances made with regard to demographic transition, have undoubtedly been the distinct features of the state of Kerala (Mishra and Irudaya Rajan, 2018). The demographic advantage Kerala had over India has been leveraged by Keralites even before mortality and fertility declined considerably. The demographic expansion, unprecedented boost in education and fewer opportunities outside agriculture within the state were the major contributing factors for Keralites migrating out of the state (Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan, 2003). As a result of the demographic transition, there has been a universalisation of nuclear families. One of the major investments of these nuclear families has been in the education of the children. This, coupled with universal access to education in Kerala, resulted in better educational attainment among the younger populations over time. Given the limited opportunities for the educated workforce in Kerala, unemployment peaked among the educated, and migration became an inevitable coping strategy. From an estimated diaspora of the size of two million in 1998, migration from Kerala peaked during 2008 with an estimated 3.1 million Keralites outside the state and then gradually declined to 2.9 million in 2016 (see also Figure 18.5) (Irudaya Rajan and Zachariah, 2017).

18.6 International migration from Kerala International migration from Kerala was initially directed towards a few South Asian countries. By 1960, Keralites had found a place in the British colonies such as Malaysia and Singapore and countries in the African region and had also moved to developed countries in North America and Western Europe (Irudaya Rajan and Zachariah, 2018). The oil boom in the Gulf region triggered heavy migration from Kerala to countries in this region, surpassing the quantum of people who

322  S. Irudaya Rajan et al. 3.5 3

Millions

2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 1998

2003 Inter-state

2008 Internaonal

2013

2016 Total

Figure 18.5  Estimates of migrants from Kerala: 1998–2016 Source: Kerala Migration Survey, Various Waves

moved from Kerala to other Indian states. By the middle of the seventies, Indian workers in the Gulf region were estimated to be 0.15 million, and the majority of them belonged to Kerala (GOI, 2008). The number of international migrants from Kerala rose to 1 million in 1996, crossed 2 million in 2008 and peaked during 2013 with 2.4 million migrants from Kerala living outside the country (GOI, 2008; Irudaya Rajan and Zachariah, 2018). However, the recent estimates reveal that it declined to 2.2 million in 2016 (Irudaya Rajan and Zachariah, 2017). Almost nine in ten international migrants from Kerala moved to the Gulf region, whereas the rest moved predominantly to the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. While during the seventies unskilled workers constituted the majority of the international migrants from Kerala, the proportion of skilled workers has increased considerably over time. Among those who move to Europe and North America, the proportion of females is much higher compared to the proportion of males.

18.7 Inter-state migration from Kerala Keralites also moved to destinations in other Indian states. During 1961–1981, most of the migrants from Kerala moved within India; there was a significant outflow of persons from Kerala to Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Delhi and other states of India (Zachariah, Mathew

Demographic transition in Kerala 323

Thousands

500 400 300 200 100 0 1971 Total

1981 Andhra Pradesh

1991 Karnataka

Tamil Nadu

2001 Rest of India

Figure 18.6  Inter-state migrants to Kerala by place of birth data, census 1971–2001 Source: Census Data Various rounds

and Rajan, 2003). Neighbouring states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka continued to be the major destination states for migrants from Kerala even during 2013 (Mishra and Irudaya Rajan, 2018). Nearly twothirds of the migrants from Kerala who moved to other states moved to Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Maharashtra during 2013, whereas the share of these states during 2001 was 70 percent during 1991 (see Figure 18.6). Economic factors dominated as the major reasons for men for their migration to other Indian states, whereas for women other reasons continue to dominate. According to the Kerala Migration Survey (KMS), migration from Kerala to other states declined from 1.1 million in 2003 to 0.9 million in 2008 and further declined to 0.65 million in 2016 (Irudaya Rajan and Zachariah, 2017).

18.8 Migration to Kerala While Kerala experienced high levels of educated unemployment with the demographic changes in the state, there also emerged an acute shortage in the labour force that catered to low-skilled, lowvalued jobs that demanded arduous physical labour. Since its formation, Kerala has been witnessing increasing in-migration, particularly from the neighbouring states. A majority of these migrants had come from Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. During the period from 1961 to 1991, workers from Tamil Nadu and Karnataka complemented the native workers in filling up the requirement of the blue-collar labour force (Peter and Narendran, 2017). There were specific sectors where migrant labourers were largely absorbed. The plantations, the brick

324  S. Irudaya Rajan et al. kilns and work requiring digging up earth predominantly depended on migrant labour. Almost half of the male migrants of various durations of residence and approximately 10 percent of the female migrants to Kerala during 1991–2001came seeking employment (Office of the Registrar General of India, 2007). Tamil migrants played a key role in the construction sector in Kerala from the mid-1970s. The spurt of construction activity that arose due to the high inflow of remittances from Keralites working in the Middle East had triggered this migration (Anand, 1986). The significant difference in wages and the sustained demand in the construction sector resulted in heavy migration from Tamil Nadu (Anand, 1986; Surabhi and Kumar, 2007). Migration from Karnataka has been largely restricted to districts adjacent to Karnataka. Labour migration from beyond southern India started significantly with the arrival of migrants from Odisha during the early nineties and later from Assam and West Bengal to work in the timber industry. The emergence of Kanjikode in Palakkad during the nineties as a hub of iron and steel industry led to sourcing of workers from Bihar (Peter and Narendran, 2017). Gradually, except the traditional sectors such as coir, handloom and bidi, most sectors across all districts in Kerala depended on migrant workers. Workers from Nepal and Bangladesh also work in Kerala. In 2013, 2.5 million migrant workers from other states were estimated to be present in Kerala (Narayana, Venkiteswaran and Joseph, 2013). Given the growth patterns estimated by this study and accounting for the migration from neighbouring states which the study did not cover, 3.5–4 million workers from other states are estimated in 2017 (Peter and Narendran, 2017). However, demonetisation and the introduction of Goods and Values Tax (GST) and the resulted economic stagnation have adversely affected this flow in the recent past.

18.9 Impact of migration on Kerala economy Migration has become an all-pervasive phenomenon in the economic and social spheres of the state influencing every facet of life (GOK, 2018). Every household is directly or indirectly affected by migration; it has impacted female education, infrastructure, prices, wages, transportation and status of women in Kerala. Migration has been a key factor that sizeably reduced the unemployment rates in Kerala (Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan, 2003). The influence of migration is also significantly prominent even in the art and culture. Historically, migration of Keralites has not only played a pivotal role in the Kerala economy but also impacted the country. International migration from

Demographic transition in Kerala 325 Kerala accounted for about half of the annual outflow of emigrants from India and the bulk of external remittances which helped India tide over serious foreign exchange crises after the mid-1970s (Kamble, 1983; Nair, 1998). The Kerala workforce abroad in 1998 was equal to the organised-sector workforce within the state (Kannan, 2005). In the last quarter of the twentieth century, migration was one of the most prominent factors that influenced the development scenario of Kerala (Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan, 2003). In 2016, remittances constituted 36.3 percent of Kerala’s net state domestic product and were also capable of wiping out 60 percent of the state’s public debt (Irudaya Rajan and Zachariah, 2017). In June 2017, the NRI deposits in banks in Kerala were to the tune of ₹1542.5billion (GOK, 2018). Such significance of migration in the state’s economy has prompted the government of Kerala to establish a Department of Non-resident Keralites Affairs (NORKA) in 1996. The state in 2017 has also set up Loka Kerala Sabha – a platform where members of the State Legislative Assembly and representatives of the Kerala diaspora come together to deliberate upon the concerns of the Kerala diaspora and also contribute towards policy formulation. With the changes in the age structure of the population, migrant workers from outside Kerala have become an important and integral part of the Kerala economy. The government of Kerala has acknowledged them as the backbone of the state’s economy. Their presence is very evident from the agriculture sector to service sector and from urban centres of the state to remote corners. Except for certain traditional sectors, most of the industries depend on migrant workers. Construction, mining and quarrying, plywood, iron and steel, marine fishing and fish processing, textile and apparel, hospitality, furniture, footwear and plantation are some of them (Peter and Narendran, 2017). Many labour contract societies in Kerala now engage migrant workers significantly. The informalisation of work has resulted in even public-sector undertakings in Kerala engaging migrant workers. Besides fuelling the industrial growth in the state, these workers also spend nearly onethird of their earnings in Kerala, which could range around ₹100billion in 2017. There are even government-funded schools in Kerala that survive because of the sole presence of children of migrant workers.

18.10 Evolving trends in migration and its implications for the state’s development With the advancements in connectivity, sources and destinations have become significantly closer. However, more and more barriers

326  S. Irudaya Rajan et al. complicate transnational movement of people. Increasingly, migration is at the centre of global politics. A combined outcome of these will be a further decline in the international migration from Kerala to the traditional destinations. The ageing of the population and decline in the number of people in the migration-prone age groups in Kerala are also likely to contribute to a decline in the volume of international migration from Kerala. The nationalisation schemes and similar measures in the Gulf region are likely to bring down migration of Keralites to the Middle East region, to which more than four-fifths of the international migrants from Kerala move. Introduction of Nitaqat and expatriate dependent fee in Saudi Arabia can not only reduce migration to Saudi Arabia but also accentuate the already increasing return migration. As more and more countries in the region adopt similar regimes, more Keralites will be forced to either return to Kerala or opt for alternate destinations. This is likely to result in reduction of remittances, adversely affecting the economy. While NORKA has formulated schemes to rehabilitate and reintegrate the return migrants, operationalising them is not going to be easy. The issues Kerala will be grappling with would range from reintegration of returnee migrants to the job market in Kerala to heightened mental health crises. However, it is also likely that the African region may emerge as a prominent destination for migrant workers from Kerala. The inter-state migration from Kerala also has been decreasing as evident from various waves of the Kerala Migration Survey. Attempts of states such as Karnataka to reserve a significant proportion of the jobs even in the private sector for the natives can also reduce the prospects of Keralites in other states. However, as avenues outside India too are not promising in the near future, Keralites will have to vigorously tap the opportunities within the country as urban India expands. Migrant workers from other states fill in an important vacuum and play an indispensable role in the Kerala labour market. In fact, while these migrants have the choice of other destinations in the country, the state’s economy is to a large extent dependent on the migrant workforce in the emerging demographic context. Given the very high wage rates in Kerala compared to the rest of India, sustained livelihood opportunities and relatively better treatment of migrant workers, the state has emerged as one of the most promising destinations for migrant workers from major Indian states known for out-migration. This migration is likely to grow once the current industrial stagnation due to the cumulative impact of demonetisation as well as introduction of GST is over.

Demographic transition in Kerala 327

18.11 Way forward The rate of growth of Kerala’s native population will turn negative within a decade or so. The fertility and mortality of the native population have already reached near-saturation levels. Migration is the only component among the demographic parameters that can significantly alter the emerging population scenario in Kerala. Both international migration and migration to the other states from Kerala have registered downward trends in terms of volume, which is obvious given the population scenario. However, due to the high levels of educational attainment and the limited scope of employment within the state, the migration propensity of Keralites is likely to increase. This calls for rigorous and gender-sensitive investments by the state and other relevant actors towards making the native population job ready for the international labour market. Simultaneously, efforts are needed to facilitate creation of employment opportunities within the state that cater to the requirements of the unemployed Keralites. Addressing the challenges related to ageing of the population and reintegrating the return migrants as well as their families are two other major areas of interventions in the case of the native population. The available estimates indicate that migration to Kerala from other states has surpassed or is on the verge of overtaking the quantum of migration from Kerala. While young single male migrants from socially and economically backward communities of rural India dominate among the migrants to the state, there are also significant numbers of single women and girls and senior citizens as well as families with children among them. The future of human development in Kerala is also dependent on how fast this migrant population catches up with the current level of development in the state. Given the saturation of most of the human development indicators, migrants’ access or lack of access to products and services is likely to influence the overall achievements. Kerala needs to realise that the state needs the migrant workers more than they need the state. Creating this awareness among key stakeholders is fundamental in developing migrant inclusive policies. It is also important to expand the scope of the NORKA to a Department of Migrant Affairs to also manage the heavy in-migration to the state. Kerala now has the opportunity to diffuse its muchacclaimed social development to some of the most deprived regions of India while these workers help Kerala tide over the worsening human resource crisis.

328  S. Irudaya Rajan et al.

Note 1 Migration within the state, which is a third component, is not included in this discussion.

References Anand, S. 1986. Migrant Construction Workers in Kerala: A Case Study of Tamil Workers in Kerala. Thesis (M. Phil). Jawaharlal Nehru University. Bhat, P. N. M. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 1990. Demographic Transition in Kerala Revisited. Economic and Political Weekly, XXV(35 & 36), September 1–8: 1957–1980. Government of India. 2008. Kerala Development Report. Planning Commission, New Delhi. Government of India. 2016. Report of the Fifth Employment Unemployment Survey 2015–16, Vol. 1. Labour Bureau, Chandigarh. Available at http:// labourbureaunew.gov.in/UserContent/EUS_5th_1.pdf. Last accessed on June 25, 2018. Government of Kerala. 2018. Economic Review 2017. State Planning Board, Thiruvananthapuram. Available at www.spb.kerala.gov.in/images/pdf/ whats_new/ER17_ENG_1.pdf. Last accessed on February 26, 2018. International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and ICF. 2017. National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4), 2015–16. IIPS, Mumbai, India. Irudaya Rajan, S. and U. S. Mishra. 2018. Demographic Dynamics and Labour Force. Centre for Development Studies, Kerala. Irudaya Rajan, S. and K. C. Zachariah. 2017. Kerala Migration Survey 2016: New Evidences, Chapter 18, in Irudaya Rajan, S. (ed.) India Migration Report 2017: Forced Migration. Routledge, 286–302. Irudaya Rajan, S. and K. C. Zachariah. 2018. International Migration. Centre for Development Studies, Kerala. Kamble, N. D. 1983. Labour Migration in Indian States. Ashgate Publishing House, New Delhi. Kannan, K. P. 2005. Kerala’s Turnaround in Growth: Role of Social Development, Remittances and Reform. Economic and Political Weekly, 40(6): 548–554. Mishra, U. S. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2018. Internal Migration. Centre for Development Studies, Kerala. Nair, P. R. G. 1998. Dynamics of Emigration from Kerala: Factors, Trends, Patterns and Politics, in Appleyard, Reginald (ed.) Emigration Dynamics in Developed Countries Volume II: South Asia. Ashgate Publishing, Vermount, 257–291. Narayana, D., C. S. Venkiteswaran, and M. P. Joseph. 2013. Domestic Migrant Labour in Kerala. Gulati Institute of Finance and Taxation, Thiruvananthapuram, India. Available at www.lc.kerala.gov.in/images/Current/ ismstudy.pdf. Last accessed on May 1, 2013.

Demographic transition in Kerala 329 Office of the Registrar General India. 2007. Migration Census 2001 [CD ROM]. Office of the Registrar General of India. Peter, Benoy and Vishnu Narendran. 2017. God’s Own Workforce: Unravelling Labour Migration to Kerala. Centre for Migration and Inclusive Development, Perumbavoor, Kerala. Registrar General of India. (2017). S.R.S Bulletin, 51(1), New Delhi. Surabhi, K. S. and N. Ajith Kumar. 2007. Labour Migration to Kerala: A Study of Tamil Migrant Labourers in Kochi. Centre for Socioeconomic and Environmental Studies, Kochi, India. Available at http://csesindia.org/admin/ modules/cms/docs/publication/16.pdf. Last accessed on June 25, 2018. Thomas, M. B. and K. S. James. 2014. Changes in Mortality and Human Longevity in Kerala: Are They Leading to the Advanced Stage? Glob Health Action 2014, 7: 22938. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/gha. v7.22938. Last accessed on September 8, 2017. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2017. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables. Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP/248. UNDESA. Available at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFind ings.pdf. Last accessed on June 25, 2018. Zachariah, K. C and S. Irudaya Rajan. 1997. Kerala’s Demographic Transition: Determinants and Consequences. Sage Publications, New Delhi. Zachariah, K. C., K. P. Kannan, and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2002. Kerala’s Gulf Connection: CDS Studies on International Migrant Labour Migration from Kerala State in India. Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. Zachariah, K. C., E. T. Mathew, and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2001a. Impact of Migration on Kerala’s Economy and Society. International Migration, 39(1): 63–88. Zachariah, K. C., E. T. Mathew, and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2001b. Social, Economic and Demographic Consequences of Migration in Kerala. International Migration, 39(2): 43–72. Zachariah, K. C., E. T. Mathew, and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2003. Dynamics of Migration in Kerala: Determinants, Differentials and Consequences. Orient Longman Private Limited.

19 Panel data analysis in Kerala Migration Surveys, 1998–2013 S. Irudaya Rajan and K.C. Zachariah

19.1 Introduction Migration has always been of great significance in shaping the economic and political processes along with paving the way for social change especially, with the new beginnings of the global village. Theoretical and empirical analysis of human mobility with regard to both internal and international migration is central to both academic and policy work. The need to acquire an understanding of the complex and varied nature of migration and its centrality to global, regional and national processes has led to different studies on the phenomenon. Panel data, due to its multi-dimensional nature consisting of researchers’ observations collected over several time periods for the same group of units or entities, helps us to track the status of the same individuals or households over time. There are two distinct forms of analysis which can be performed using cross-sectional time series data. The cross-sectional component of the data set reflects the differences observed between the individual subjects or entities, whereas the time series component reflects the differences observed for one subject over time. It has been used by scholars across the globe to do cause–effect analysis. Du et al. (2005) analyses two complementary data sets from China to answer whether the poor migrates and if they migrate, how it affects their economic conditions. One of the data sets used are from China Poverty Monitoring Survey (CPMS) from 1997 to 2001, which is a panel household survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The second data set was obtained from the China Rural Poverty Survey (CRPS) conducted during 1997–2000. Balderas and Greenwood (2010) uses panel data to account for the variables correlated with unobservable quantities and focus on both the supply and the demand sides of migration patterns. The paper

Kerala Migration Surveys, 1998–2013 331 studies European migration to Argentina, Brazil and the United States as separate destinations, i.e., by treating migration to Argentina and Brazil as alternative destinations. To allow more comparability they study each country of destination with the same model, using annual panel data for the period 1870–1910. Mayda (2010) explores the economic, geographic, cultural and demographic roots of bilateral international migration. The study uses the data on immigrant inflows in fourteen OECD countries from 1980 to 1995. This is the first paper to use OECD data on international migration. The paper also addresses some of the econometric questions that is encountered during panel data analysis like endogeneity and reverse causality. Kim and Cohen (2010) uses panel data analysis to quantify the determinates of international migratory inflows to seventeen Western countries and outflows from thirteen of these countries. The study uses the demographic variables (life expectancy, mortality rate), which change slowly over time, compared to economic variables as predictors of international migration. Chiswick et al. (2004) studies the waves of immigration and its impact on immigrants’ English language skills in Australia. In India, panel data to analyse migration status exist only at the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs Research Unit on International Migration at the Centre of Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram (Zachariah, Mathew, & Rajan, 2003; Zachariah & Rajan, 2009; 2011; 2012; 2014; Zachariah, Kannan, & Rajan, 2002; Zachariah, Nair, & Rajan, 2006). The first Kerala Migration Survey was conducted in 1998, and it has been executed every five years since then, thus creating a huge collection of panel data which can be used for various analyses (Table 19.1) Table 19.1  KMS panels, 1998–2013 Panel no.

KMS years

Linked households

1 2 3 4 5 6

1998–2003–2008–2013 2003–2008–2013 1998–2008–2013 2008–2013 2003–2013 1998–2013

358 526 263 1228 504 276

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

332  S. Irudaya Rajan and K.C. Zachariah The current chapter seeks to analyse the panel data spanning fifteen years and covering four Kerala Migration Surveys. This study will be focusing on the household-level data to comprehend the impact of migration on the household dynamics in Kerala. We attempt to respond to the following core questions underlying migration and its extent of influence on the socio-cultural and economic processes in the state: 1 How have household composition and dynamics evolved over the years with regard to the patterns of mobility over a decade and a half? 2 Is there any empirical evidence to substantiate transformation of household type? 3 Have the households undergone changes in the standard/quality of living or in the possession of consumer durables (assets)? 4 It also tries to analyse the improvements (or lack thereof) in these households over the chosen period of time. Moreover, the ongoing Kerala Migration Survey 2018 will further increase the scope of research on migration using panel data. This will be the first migration study in the world which has looked at the lives of the same migrants over a period of twenty years. This will increase the number of panels to ten, with 7830 households (Table 19.2).

Table 19.2  KMS old and new panels, 1998–2018 Old panel

 No. of HH

1998–2003–2008–2013–2018 1998–2008–2013–2018 1998–2013–2018 2003–2008–2013–2018 2003–2013–2018 2008–2013–2018 Total New Panel 1998–2018 2003–2018 2008–2018 2013–2018 Total households

953 476 550 623 696 1282 4580 500 750 750 1250 7830

Panel no. 1 2 3 4 5 6

  7 8 9 10

 

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

Kerala Migration Surveys, 1998–2013 333

19.2 Household characteristics We have included 358 households in the panel which have been resurveyed over the years. Each of these rounds had varying numbers of individuals in each household, which is clear from the data. While marriage and birth act as agents of addition, the panel has clear evidence in support of net attrition, which indicates the stronger presence of migration and mortality (Table 19.3). The panel data concurs with the low fertility rate (1.7), but the simultaneous existence of low death rate (6.6) in the state directs attention to migration as one of the main reasons for the resulting net attrition.1 Family size helps us comprehend the changes in household structures and dynamics. As evident from Table 19.4, all the family sizes have undergone changes over time with the exception of singlemember households during the first two rounds (1998–2003), which demonstrates the volatility of the household sizes. While the one- and two-member families have the highest positive percent rates of change (154.5 percent and 72.6 percent, respectively), indicating bias towards smaller family sizes, on the other hand, households with eight members Table 19.3  Change in household population, 1998–2013

No. of households No. of persons Net attrition

KMS 1998

KMS 2003

KMS 2008

KMS 2013

358 1854

358 1819 35

358 1743 76

358 1654 89

-

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

Table 19.4  Percent of households according to HH size, 1998–2013 HH Size

2013

2008

2003

1998

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+ Total

2.8 12.6 14.2 23.5 18.7 14.2 6.4 7.5 100.0

1.7 10.9 14.5 23.5 16.8 12.8 7.3 12.6 100.0

1.1 8.9 12.6 24.3 17.0 16.5 7.5 12.0 100.0

1.1 7.3 11.7 23.2 20.1 15.9 8.1 12.6 100.0

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

334  S. Irudaya Rajan and K.C. Zachariah or above show a negative trend over the years, with 40.4 percent negative rate of change. Another point of interest is the four-member household, which holds the lowest rate of change at 1.29 percent. The household sizes are shrinking, pointing towards preference for smaller family sizes, along with an evident decline in the percentage of households with size of more than four members. From Table 19.5, we can track the change in the households’ position in terms of family size at two points of the surveys (1998 and 2013). The diagonal figures show unchanged number of households in a particular household size over time. Out of the total number of households (358), 19.8 percent2 of households maintained their familysize position in 1998 and 2013, while the remaining 80.2 percent moved to other family sizes. The same trends discussed above can be substantiated using this table. There has been a steady but slow increase in the number of femaleheaded households in the sample (Table 19.6). Female-headed households showed an increase of 11.4 percentage points3 at the cost of Table 19.5  Cross-tabulation of HH sizes, 1998–2013 HH size (2013)

HH size (1998) 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8+

Total

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+ Total

1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 4

5 7 2 6 3 3 0 0 26

1 10 4 7 11 8 0 1 42

1 11 14 22 20 8 5 2 83

2 9 10 15 14 13 4 5 72

0 5 11 13 11 9 5 3 57

0 0 5 6 4 4 4 6 29

0 2 4 14 4 6 5 10 45

10 45 51 84 67 51 23 27 358

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

Table 19.6  Sex of head of the household, 1998–2013  

2013

2008

2003

1998

Male Female Total

72.9 27.1 100.0

72.3 27.7 100.0

78.4 21.6 100.0

75.6 24.4 100.0

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

Kerala Migration Surveys, 1998–2013 335 160 140 120 100

2013

80

2008

60

2003

40

1998

20 0 Below 25 to 29 30 to 34 35 to 39 40 to 44 45 to 49 50 to 54 55 to 59 60 to 64 65 24 &above

Figure 19.1  Age cohort of head of the households, 1998–2013 Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

male-headed households, indicating sustained migration excluding other factors (such as widowhood or divorce). Figure 19.1 helps us understand the age composition among the heads of the households over the period of time. As it is evident, the upper-age cohorts are much more concentrated, which concurs with the social concept of eldest male/female being considered the head of the household. It also reflects the higher life expectancy of individuals, as there is a decline in the middle-age cohorts (40–55), while the older age groups are adding members, so it shows the transition of heads of the households to older cohorts. The panel consists of 55 percent Hindus, 21 percent Christians and 24 percent Muslims. The highest proportion of households among Hindus hail from Nair and Ezhava background, while among Christians and Muslims, it is Orthodox Syrian followed closely by Roman Catholic and Sunni communities, respectively (Figure 19.2).

19.3 Migration status Over a decade and half, the percentage of non-migrant households declined from 63.9 percent to 59.7 percent (Table 19.7). This is reflected in the 5.9 percent increase in emigrant households during the same period – 13.6 percent in 1998 to 19.5 percent in 2013. We can also observe the higher proportion of EMI households in the years 2008 and 2003 compared to 1998 followed by a decline in the proportion in 2013, showing gradual decline in the number of EMI households. The reverse trend is witnessed in terms of non-migrant and REM households, with an increasing proportion of households

336  S. Irudaya Rajan and K.C. Zachariah

0%

24% 55% 21%

Hindu

Chrisan

Muslim

Others

Figure 19.2  Households by religion Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

Table 19.7  Changes in the migration status of households (distribution) Type/Year

2013

2008

2003

1998

Non-Migrant EMI REM OMI Return out-migrants Total

59.7 19.5 13.6 5.02 1.9 100.0

51.9 25.6 10.6 5.3 6.4 100.0

56.7 20.6 8.4 3.9 10.3 100.0

63.9 13.6 6.7 7.2 8.3 100.0

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

especially after 2008. In 2008, an estimated 6 million Indian workers were working in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. About 60 percent of those worked in the construction field, which is contract based. International economic slowdowns and recessions, resulting in delay in execution of projects, have contributed to the increase in return migration along with lower rates of international migration.

Kerala Migration Surveys, 1998–2013 337 Table 19.8 Changes in the migration status of households (cross-tabulation 1998–2013) Type 2013

Non-migrant EMI REM OMI ROM Total

Type 1998

Total

Nonmigrant

EMI

REM

OMI

ROM

76.6 47.1 38.7 55.5 42.8 63.9

6.07 30.0 28.5 0.0 14.2 13.6

2.8 7.1 22.4 5.5 14.2 6.7

3.2 7.1 10.2 38.8 28.5 7.26

11.2 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

There is a clear shift in the attrition of the non-migrant households. The patterns in which these changes have occurred over the period have been presented in Table 19.8. About 47.1 percent of the nonmigrant households became EMI households. Among the EMI households, 28.5 percent became REM households in 2013. Interestingly, 7.1 percent of return migrants became EMI households, indicating reemigration among the return migrants, which is lower in proportion compared to 32 percent in a study (Zachariah & Rajan, 2012). In addition, 5.5 percent of return migrant households have become OMI households, and 8.5 percent of ROM households changed their status to EMI households in 2013.

19.4 Quality of life There was a steady increase of emigrants living in luxurious houses4 from 4.1 percent in 1998 to 21.4 in 2013. As you can observe from Table 19.9, there has been negative change in terms of households occupying good houses, which is mirrored in the positive growth of households in both very good and poor houses, echoing growing equality between the households. Following EMI households, REM and OMI households seem to cluster in type I and II (see Endnote 6 also Appendix Tables 19A.1 and 19A.2). Another remarkable phenomenon is the change in the quality of houses among return out-migrants. They seem to have been relegated to poor households (39.6) and show a negative growth in type I (−7.7). The return out-migrants were unable to maintain their earlier quality of life. Simultaneously, the percentage of ROM households

338  S. Irudaya Rajan and K.C. Zachariah Table 19.9 Changes in the quality of houses with migration status, 1998, 2013 1998–2013 Type

Luxury

Very good

Good

Poor

Kutcha

Total

Non-migrant EMI REM OMI ROM Total

2.3 17.3 6.0 3.4 −7.7 4.3

15.2 8.7 18.0 6.8 1.9 13.4

−20.6 −39.8 −19.6 −15.4 −27.1 −22.0

9.8 13.7 −6.5 5.2 39.6 8.9

−6.9 0.0 2.0 0.0 −6.7 −4.8

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

Table 19.10  Standard of Living Index by household type, 1998–2003– 2008–2013 SLI Index 2003

2003

2013

Low

Medium

High

Low

Medium

High

Non-Migrant EMI REM OMI ROM Total

13 3 0 7 3 8

73 70 80 71 76 73

14 27 20 21 22 18

25 13 12 0 43 20

61 70 61 61 43 62

14 17 27 39 14 18

SLI Index 1998

1998

Non-migrant EMI REM OMI ROM Total

2008

Low

Medium

High

Low

Medium

High

13 0 0 8 23 11

74 78 79 73 57 73

13 22 21 19 20 16

18 8 8 11 0 13

72 71 74 84 78 73

10 22 18 5 22 15

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

has also gone down (1.95) drastically in 2013 from 2003 (10.3). Nonmigrant households seem to maintain steady growth in terms of quality of households, excluding the general downward trend in type III. In order to comprehend the quality of life led by the household, a standard-of-living index was formulated using chosen indicators5

Kerala Migration Surveys, 1998–2013 339 consisting of possession of consumer durables, type of house, ownership of house and type of cooking fuel. The index was constructed by giving weights to the respective indicators with regard to necessity and popularity. The standard-of-living index shows a slowly stagnating but increasing trend in favour of high-ranked households over the study period (see also Appendix Table 19A.3). There seems to be a concentration of households in the medium ranks, while an increasing percent of households are moving to the lower rank (0 percent in 1998 to 13 percent in 2013 for EMI type). On analysing the SLI by household type, the upper hand EMI households held over non-migrant as well as other households in terms of quality of life seems to be slowly disappearing along with non-migrants being successful in converging to the higher standard of living. The decreases in higher rankings have been more visible after 2008 and might be pointing towards a financial crunch. Another point of interest is the rise of OMI houses into high-ranked groups especially after 2008. This might be indicating higher salary or savings from internal migration (Table 19.10). In the above analysis, we discussed the changes that occurred over fifteen years and the role of migration in changing the characteristics of a household and its other related features. Panel data analysis of individuals would yield further insights into the same and will be analysed in later studies of Kerala Migration Surveys.

Notes 1 Sum of all the diagonal frequencies divided by the total of all frequencies – (358). 2 It has been calculated on the basis of 1998 and 2013 data. 3 Classification of households are as follows 4 1 Luxurious 2 Very Good (2 bedrooms with attached bathrooms, concrete roof, Mosaic floor) 3 Good (1 bed room, brick and cement walls, concrete or tiled roof) 4 Poor (Brick walls, cement floor, tin or asbestos roof) 5 Kutcha (Mud walls, Mud floor & Thatched roof) All the tables for respective rounds would be given in Appendix (Table A1.1 and A1.2) 5 Indicators are given below: I Possession of 1 Motor Car 2 Taxi/Truck/Lorry 3 Motorcycle/Scooter

340  S. Irudaya Rajan and K.C. Zachariah 4 Telephone 5 Television 6 Refrigerator II Type of cooking fuel III Ownership of house (currently occupying) IV Type of Household (Quality of house – Type I to V)

Bibliography Balderas, J. U. & Greenwood, M. J. 2010. From Europe to the Americas: A Comparative Panel-Data Analysis of Migration to Argentina, Brazil, and the United States. Journal of Population Economics, 23, pp. 1301–1318. Chiswick, B. R., Lee, Y. L., & Miller, P. W. 2004. Immigrants’ Language Skills: The Australian Experience in a Longitudinal Survey. International Migration Review, 38(2), pp. 611–654. Du, Y., Park, A., & Wang, S. 2005. Migration and Rural Poverty in China. Journal of Comparative Economics, 33(4), pp. 688–709. Kim, K. & Cohen, J. E. 2010. Determinants of International Migration Flows to and from Industrialized Countries: A Panel Data Approach Beyond Gravity. International Migration Review, 44(4), pp. 899–932. Mayda, A. M. 2010. International Migration: A Panel Data Analysis of the Determinants of Bilateral Flows. Journal of Population Economics, 23, pp. 1249–1274. Zachariah, K. C., Gopinathan Nair, P. R., & Irudaya Rajan, S. 2006. Return Emigrants in Kerala: Welfare, Rehabilitation and Development. Manohar Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi. Zachariah, K. C. & Irudaya Rajan, S. 2009. Migration and Development: The Kerala Experience. Daanish Publishers, New Delhi. Zachariah, K. C. & Irudaya Rajan, S. 2011. Economic and Social Dynamics of Migration in Kerala, 1998–2003: Analysis of Panel Data. Chapter 12, pp. 361–377 in S Irudaya Rajan and Marie Percot (eds): Dynamics of Indian Migration: Historical and Current Perspectives. Routledge, New Delhi. Zachariah, K. C. & Irudaya Rajan, S. 2012. A Decade of Kerala’s Gulf Connection. Orient Blackswan. Zachariah, K. C. & Irudaya Rajan, S. 2014. Researching International Migration: Lessons from the Kerala Experience. Routledge, New Delhi. Zachariah, K. C., Kannan, K. P., & Irudaya Rajan, S. (eds). 2002. Kerala’s Gulf Connection: CDS Studies on International Labour Migration from Kerala State in India. CDS Monograph Series. Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. Zachariah, K. C., Mathew, E. T., & Irudaya Rajan, S. 2003. Dynamics of Migration in Kerala: Determinants, Differentials and Consequences. Orient Longman Private Limited, New Delhi.

Appendix

Table 19A.1 Changes in the quality of house according to migration status, 2013, 2008 2013

Luxury

Very good

Good

Poor

Kutcha

Total

Non-migrant EMI REM OMI ROM Total 2008 Non-migrant EMI REM OMI ROM Total

9.3 21.4 10.2 11.1 0.0 11.7

25.7 27.1 34.7 22.2 28.6 27.1

39.7 35.7 42.9 50.0 28.6 39.7

23.8 15.7 10.2 16.7 42.9 20.4

1.4 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.1

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

2.7 5.4 7.9 0.0 4.3 3.9

22.7 40.9 39.5 15.8 26.1 29.1

57.3 46.2 50.0 73.7 65.2 55.0

15.7 6.5 2.6 10.5 4.3 10.9

1.6 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

Table 19A.2 Changes in the quality of house according to migration status, 2003, 1998 2003

Luxury

Very good

Good

Poor

Kutcha

Total

Non-Mmigrant EMI REM OMI ROM Total

4.9 9.5 3.3 0.0 5.4 5.6

13.3 31.1 16.7 21.4 21.6 18.4

65.5 54.1 76.7 71.4 70.3 64.8

12.8 5.4 3.3 7.1 2.7 9.2

3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 (Continued)

Table 19A.2 (Continued) 2003

Luxury

Very good

Good

Poor

Kutcha

Total

1998 Non-migrant EMI REM OMI ROM Total

7.0 4.1 4.2 7.7 7.7 7.3

10.5 18.4 16.7 15.4 26.7 13.7

60.3 75.5 62.5 65.4 55.7 61.7

14.0 2.0 16.7 11.5 3.3 11.5

8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 5.9

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

Table 19A.3  Comparison of consumption pattern among household types Non-migrant 1998 Motor car 8 Taxi/Truck/Lorry 8 Motorcycle/ 18 Scooter Telephone 33 Television 72 Refrigerator 36 2003 Motor car 16 Taxi/Truck/Lorry 10 Motorcycle/ 27 Scooter Telephone 78 Television 116 Refrigerator 47 2008 Motor car 14 Taxi/Truck/Lorry 2 Motorcycle/ 47 Scooter Telephone 118 Television 153 Refrigerator 53

EMI REM OMI ROM Total 3 0 5

1 3 4

0 0 1

0 2 2

12 13 30

11 23 18 10 4 14

3 11 8 3 1 5

3 15 10 1 0 2

4 11 6 4 3 7

54 132 78 34 18 55

53 53 30 11 4 27

18 18 12 3 1 15

9 12 5 1 0 7

21 22 14 5 0 9

179 221 108 34 7 105

75 81 62

28 34 24

17 16 8

19 23 9

257 307 156

Kerala Migration Surveys, 1998–2013 343 Non-Migrant EMI REM OMI ROM total 2013 Motor car 45 Taxi/Truck/Lorry 20 Motorcycle/ 77 Scooter Telephone 96 Television 184 Refrigerator 105

21 3 34

14 7 27

10 0 9

1 0 3

91 30 150

37 60 48

22 44 33

11 18 17

2 7 6

168 313 209

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the Kerala Migration Surveys conducted by the authors during 1998–2018

20 Migration and income inequality Evidence from rural Uttar Pradesh Ruchi Singh 20.1 Introduction Migration has become an integral feature of rural households in developing economies. Exodus of rural males is an outcome of various factors such as lack of employment opportunities, fragmentation of land as a result of huge population pressure, stagnant agriculture, poor irrigation status, climatic conditions, level of development etc. Along with the above-mentioned reasons, rural male exodus can also be due to existing income inequality, lack of credit facilities, relative deprivation etc. (Stark, 1985). Most of the studies have either focused on causes of relationship or the role of migration in poverty alleviation (Gupta, Pattillo, and Wagh, 2009). Relatively less attention has been paid to the relationship between migration and income inequality. This chapter deals with analysing the relationship between migration and income inequality as proposed by the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) approach with special references to rural Uttar Pradesh (Taylor, 1999). The relationship between migration and income inequality is not straightforward. Rather, literature shows mixed views on the same. Although few attempts have been made to understand the linkages between migration and inequality in developing countries, the studies on the relationship between the two is negligible in rural Uttar Pradesh. Few studies have been done to understand characteristics, patterns and determinants of male out-migration from Uttar Pradesh (Khan, 1986; Singh et al., 1980; Singh, 2013; Singh, 2014), but there is a dearth of studies on linkages between migration and income inequality in Uttar Pradesh. The current study will fill this void and will contribute in developing a preliminary understanding of relationship of income inequality and migration in rural areas.

Migration and income inequality 345 Uttar Pradesh is a state with a huge population and a high share of male out-migration from rural areas. The chapter proceeds with the proposition of the NELM approach that migration is an outcome of income inequality in reference groups (Black, Claudia and Skinner, 2005). This approach has shifted the focus of migration research from individual independence to mutual interdependence. The main argument of this approach is that the individual does not make migration decisions alone. Rather, households and families as a whole undertake migration decisions. This approach opines that unlike neo-classical and push-and-pull frameworks, migration decisions are influenced by a comprehensive set of factors, not only profit maximisation intentions alone. Migration is perceived as a risk, insurance and income diversification strategy by poor households.1 The NELM approach challenges some of the postulations of the earlier existing thoughts such as push and pull (Ravenstein, 1885; Lee, 1966; Harris Todaro (1970) and other neo-classical propositions (Lewis, 1954) and offers different sets of explanations for migration behaviour such as role of income inequality, market imperfections etc. Migration and income inequality, i.e. the Gini coefficient, are positively related to migration, which is another major proposition of the NELM approach. In a field survey, it was found that, in villages of Uttar Pradesh settlement pattern are often based on caste/social groups, i.e. members of the same caste or social affiliation tend to live in proximity to each other. Though things have changed over time because of huge population pressure on land, caste- and social affiliation–based settlements are still prominently visible in rural UP. Thus to have a better understanding of the linkages between migration and income inequality, social group-wise analysis has been done as well. The chapter is divided into four parts. Part one will be dealing with introduction, objectives and data and methodology adopted, literature and limitation of the study. Part two is brief profiling of socioeconomic characteristics of sample migrant households. Part three deals with the relationship between migration and inequality and part four is concluding remarks (Taylor, 1999).

20.2 Objectives 1 Brief profiling of socio-economic characteristic of migrant households in sample rural villages in Uttar Pradesh 2 To study the relationship between migration and income inequality in rural Uttar Pradesh

346  Ruchi Singh

20.3 Data sources and methodology The study is primarily based on a field survey. To meet the objective, the study undertakes a primary survey of 370 households in six villages of Jaunpur district, namely Chitkon, Jarasi, Rampur Soiri, Asbaranpur, Manecha and Yonouspur in three blocks: Dhobi, Jalalpur and Shahganj. Jaunpur has been selected because it is in the top five districts with the highest rural male out-migration among all 75 districts from rural Uttar Pradesh as per National Sample Survey Organization (Government of India, 2010). Simple random sampling technique has been used for selection of sample villages and households. Fifteen percent of the total number of households has been selected for the survey in each village. To analyse the relationship empirically, the Gini coefficient has been used along with simple statistical techniques. The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of distribution. The Gini coefficient for the current study has been estimated as proposed by Jann (2016).2

20.4 Limitations and future direction The study is a preliminary attempt to analyse the relationship between migration and income inequality via remittances and open the area for further research on same in rural India. Total income with and without remittances has been considered to analyse income inequality in surveyed households. In the no-migration-scenario, it is difficult to measure total income as it is cumbersome to measure various forms of income such as agricultural income, income in kind, etc. Moreover, the migration duration of migrants in sample households is fifteen to twenty years. Thus measuring money migrants could have earned at the time of leaving home is entirely different from what they could have earned today.

20.5 Studies on migration and income inequality linkages This section deals with existing studies that unravel the relationship between migration and income inequality. The relationship between income inequality and migration is of mixed type. Various studies show that impact of migration is negative on income of migrant households (Adams et al., 2008; Barham & Boucher, 1998; Koechlin & Leon, 2007; Lipton, 1980; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2007; Portes & Rumbaut, 1990; Rozelle et al., 1999; Stark et al., 2009; Stark et al.,

Migration and income inequality 347 1986), whereas other literature reveals that migration reduces income inequality and increases well-being of the migrant households (Acosta et al., 2008; Awumbila et al., 2015; Ebeke & Le Goff, 2011; Garip, 2014; Semyonov & Gorodzeisky, 2008). A study by Tanja (2013) shows that migration also reproduces unequal structures of caste, gender and class. Stark (2006) provides a behavioural and analytical explanation for the positive relationship between income inequality and Gini coefficient, holding the population’s income constant. In rural areas of developing economies in the presence of imperfect capital markets, migration via remittances is an understood contract between the migrant and the household. Migration via remittances helps households in smoothing consumption despite volatility in income in rural areas. Some studies have analysed the distributional impacts of remittances by comparing income distributions including and excluding remittances (Barham & Boucher, 1998; Knowles & Anker, 1981; Oberai & Singh, 1980) or by using income-source decompositions of inequality measures (Adams, 1989, 1991; Adams and Alderman, 1992; Stark et al., 1986, 1988). Studies also show that migration leads to real estate bubbles and rising food prices in the country (Marat, 2009). Datta (2016) in her study found that remittances play an important role in livelihoods of households at origin, and households in the lower quintiles (castes and classes) are disproportionately more dependent on remittances than those in the better-off social groups. The study by Kuddusov (2004) shows that migration is a result of inequality in the distribution of resources and lack of diversified sources of income. It is perceived as the barometer of changing socio-economic and political circumstances at the national and international levels (Razi, 2014). Migration acts as the only choice for sustenance of livelihood for landless and marginal farmers, who are in a constant debt trap (Deshingkar & Akter, 2009). Study shows that rural households will not opt for migration if they are offered a sustainable livelihood in rural areas (Kumar, 2005).

20.6 Profiling of socio-economic characteristics of sample households History of emigration from UP can be traced back to the 1800s. In 1820, a large number of artisans and cultivators moved to different British colonies like Guyana, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius, Fiji, Sri Lanka, Reunion Island etc. as bonded and indentured labourers on sugar and tea plantations (Lal, 1998). This section

348  Ruchi Singh outlines the socio-economic characteristics of sample households in selected villages in rural Uttar Pradesh. 20.6.1 Socio-economic characteristics of sample migrant households in rural Uttar Pradesh Table 20.1 shows distribution of migrant and non-migrant households in selected sample villages. It can be seen that out-migration rate is highest for Asbaranpur: 56 males out of 100 migrate out, followed by Jarasi, where 53 males out of 100 males migrate out of the village. Manecha, Chitkon and Yonouspur have the lowest percentage shares of migrant households. The out-migration rate for male aged between fifteen and fifty years is high at 46 males per 100 males in comparison to 17 males per 100 aged fifty and above. Migration is selective and often undertaken by the young males of the family. 20.6.2 Demographic profile of sample migrant households of surveyed villages in Jaunpur district This section highlights the demographic profile of migrant households. Table 20.2a shows socio-demographic characteristics of sample migrant households surveyed in six villages. Household size is an important variable in determining male out-migration in rural families. Average household size of migrant households is eight. Large household size plays a facilitating role in out-migration. Women left behind look after agriculture and homesteads, and males migrate out to diversify sources of income and risks associated with agriculture at place of origin. About 85.8 percent of migrant households are Hindu and 14.2 percent of total sample migrant households are Muslim. Chitkon and Rampur Soiri reported 100 percent Hindu in migrant households. Manecha and Yonouspur have a high percentage share of Muslim migrant households at 57.9 percent and 38.5 percent, respectively. Social group is another very crucial factor in undertaking migration decisions. SC households have the lowest percentage share on total migrant households at only 18.6 percent. Percentage share of OBC and Others is very high in total migrant households at 41.7 percent and 39.7 percent, respectively. In sample migrant households, there is no household that belongs to the ST category. Educational attainment of the head of the household is very important in influencing educational attainment of other members of the household. If the head of the household is educated, he/she will be able to understand information on their interests and preferences to make

38 (10.3) 65 (17.6) 95 (25.7) 66 (17.8) 74 (20.0) 32 (8.7) 370 (100.0)

Note: Figures in parentheses represent percent to total.

Source: Field survey 2016

12 (9.8) 25 (20.3) 16 (13.0) 22 (17.9) 35 (28.5) 13 (10.6) 123 (100)

Migrant HH Non-migrant Total HH HH number

Chitkon 26 (10.5) Jarasi 40 (16.2) Asbaranpur 79 (32.0) Rampur Soiri 44 (17.8) Manecha 39 (15.8) Yonouspur 19 (7.7) Total 247 (100.0)

Village name

96 149 247 128 159 50 829

43 79 139 61 43 17 382

44.8 53.0 56.3 47.7 27.0 34 46.1

24 33 53 37 12 2 161

0 2 13 10 1 2 28

0 6.06 24.52 27.03 8.33 100 17.4

Total male Total male OutTotal Male Male Out- Rate of (15–50) Out-mig migration pver 50 mig Outrate pver 50 migration**

Table 20.1 Distribution of migrant and non-migrant households in selected sample villages in Jaunpur district (in percentage)

26 (100.0) 0 (0.0)

6 (23.1) 0 (0.0) 13 (50.0) 7 (26.9)

Religion Hindu Muslim

Social group SC ST OBC Others

13 (32.5) 0 (0.0) 11 (27.5) 16 (40.0)

35 (87.5) 5 (12.5)

39 (97.5) 1 (2.5) 9.9

Jarasi

Note: *Figures in parenthesis represent percent to total.

Source: Field survey 2016

Educational attainment of head of household Illiterate 3 (11.5) 0 (0.00) Primary 13 (50.0) 7 (17.5) Matriculation 2 (7.7) 8 (20.0) Intermediate 1 (3.8) 13 (32.5) Graduate 7 (26.9) 7 (17.5) PG and above 0 (0.0) 5 (12.5) Average Land 1.8 1.7 Holding Size Total 26 (100) 40 (100)

15 (57.7) 11 (42.3) 8.0

Chitkon

Name of village

Head of the HH Male Female Average HH size

Name of variables

16 (36.4) 11 (25.0) 10 (22.7) 7 (15.9) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0.7 44 (100)

79 (100)

13 (29.5) 0 (0.0) 17 (38.6) 14 (31.8)

44 (100.0) 0 (0.0)

34 (77.3) 10 (22.7) 8.8

Rampur Soiri

14 (17.7) 5 (6.3) 17 (21.5) 12 (15.2) 31 (39.2) 0 (0.0) 0.8

5 (6.3) 0 (0.0) 31 (39.2) 43 (54.4)

75 (94.9) 4 (5.1)

70 (88.6) 9 (11.4) 8.9

Asbaranpur

39 (100)

16 (41.0) 0 (0) 20 (51.3) 0 (0.0) 3 (7.7) 0 (0.0) 0.4

5 (12.8) 0 (0.0) 21 (53.8) 13 (33.3)

24 (61.5) 15 (38.5)

37 (94.9) 2 (5.1) 6.8

Manecha

Table 20.2a Demographic profile of sample migrant households of surveyed villages in Jaunpur district

19 (100)

4 (21.1) 2 (10.5) 12 (63.2) 1 (5.3) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0.5

4 (21.1) 0 (0.0) 10 (52.6) 5 (26.3)

8 (42.1) 11 (57.9)

17 (89.5) 2 (10.5) 6.3

Yonouspur

247 (100.0)

53 (21.5) 38 (15.4) 69 (27.9) 34 (13.8) 48 (19.4) 5 (2.0) 0.93

46 (18.6) 0 (0.0) 103 (41.7) 98 (39.7)

212 (85.8) 35 (14.2)

212 (85.8) 35 (14.2) 8.4

Total

Migration and income inequality 351 better decisions related to migration. About 21.5 percent of migrant household heads are illiterate; 15.4 percent of migrant households reported that the head of the household has educational attainment up to primary level. Only 2.0 percent of migrant households reported that the head of household has educational attainment up to postgraduation level and above. Village-wise, it can be seen that Jarasi, Asbaranpur and Chitkon are far better than other villages in terms of educational attainment. Table 20.2b shows various demographic profiles of migrant households according to their social group. In all social groups, percentage share of male-headed households is high in comparison to femaleheaded households at 85.8 percent and 14.2 percent, respectively. In Others, the percentage share of female-headed household is high in comparison to the other two social groups. The average household size is the highest in the OBC category. Heads of the household of Table 20.2b Demographic profile of sample migrant households of surveyed villages in Jaunpur district according to their social group Name of variables

Social group SC

OBC

Head of the HH of sample migrant households Male 45 (97.8) 90 (87.4) Female 1 (2.2) 13 (12.6) Average 8.0 9.1 household size Religion Hindu Muslim

46 (100.0) 0 (0.0)

86 (83.5) 17 (16.5)

Educational status of head of household Illiterate 20 (43.5) 29 (28.2) Primary 14 (30.4) 17 (16.5) Matriculation 5 (10.9) 44 (42.7) Intermediate 7 (15.2) 9 (8.7) Graduate 0 4 (3.9) PG and above 0 0 Average Land .3 .3 (in hectares) Total 46 (18.6) 103 (41.7) Source: Field survey 2016 Note: *Figures in parenthesis represent percent to total.

Others

Total

77 (78.6) 21 (21.4) 8.0

212 (85.8) 35 (14.2) 8.4

80 (81.6) 18 (18.4)

212 (85.8) 35 (14.2)

4 (4.1) 7 (7.1) 20 (20.4) 18 (18.4) 44 (44.9) 5 (5.1) 1.8

53 (21.4) 38 (15.4) 69 (27.9) 34 (13.8) 48 (19.4) 5 (2.0) 0.9

98 (39.7)

247 (100.0)

352  Ruchi Singh migrant households in the upper caste have educational attainment than in SC and OBC migrant households. There is huge difference in educational attainment between Others and other social groups. The highest educational attainment of the head of the household of Others migrant households is postgraduate degree and above. A study done by Singh and Tripathi (1995) also found that educational attainment of socially better-off sections is comparatively higher than OBC and SC households. 20.6.3 Occupational and income details of sample migrant households in surveyed villages of Jaunpur district and across villages Table 20.3a shows income and occupational details of migrant households in sample villages. In Table 20.3a it can be observed that the primary source of income of migrant households in most of the villages is remittances. Primary source of income from cultivation is very high in Chitkon, Asbaranpur and Rampur Soiri. Village-wise, distribution of average monthly income shows that Jarasi, Asbaranpur and Chitkon with Rs. 61, 625, Rs. 47,696.2 and Rs. 32,500, respectively, are comparatively better off in terms of income in comparison to Yonouspur, Rampur Soiri and Manecha with Rs. 23,368.42, Rs. 19,738.6 and Rs.18, 300, respectively. It can be observed that migrant households show huge income inequality. Table 20.3b shows income and occupational details of migrant households across various social groups. The highest percentage share of primary source of income in migrant household is remittances for all groups except Others. In both the SC and OBC categories, remittances have the highest percentage share as primary income at 68.9 percent and 82.6 percent, respectively, but for Others, the share is only 32.7 percent. Others migrant households reported cultivation as their main source of income. From the previous table, it can be noted that Others are also comparatively better off in terms of land attainment than the other two groups. Percentage share of cultivation in SC and OBC migrant households is very small at 8.7 percent and 16.5 percent, respectively. Average monthly income is very high in Others at Rs.56, 908.2, followed by OBC at Rs.28, 932, and is very low in SC migrant households at Rs.12, 380.4. There is huge inequality in monthly income across various social groups. A study by Kumar (2013) also shows

11 (27.5) 0 (0.00) 5 (12.5) 21 (52.5) 3 (7.5) 61,625.00 40

26

Jarasi

16 (61.5) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.0) 10 (38.5) 0 (0.0) 32,500.00

Chitkon

Name of village

Note: *Figures in parenthesis represent percent to total.

Source: Field survey 2016

Primary source of income Cultivation Non-Agriculture Enterprises Wage/Salaried Remittances Others Average Monthly Income in Rs.(including remittances) Total

Name of variables

79

32 (40.5) 0 (0.00) 9 (11.4) 26 (32.9) 12 (15.2) 47,696.2

Asbaranpur

44

10 (22.7) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.0) 29 (65.9) 5 (11.4) 19,738.64

Rampur Soiri

39

3 (7.7) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.0) 36 (92.3) 0 (0.0) 18,871.00

Manecha

19

0 (0.0) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.0) 19 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 23,368.42

Yonouspur

Table 20.3a  Occupational and income details of sample migrant households in surveyed villages of Jaunpur district

247

72 (29.1) 0 (0.00) 14 (5.7) 141 (5.7) 20 (57.1) 36,949.4

Total

354  Ruchi Singh Table 20.3b Occupational and income details of sample migrant households in surveyed villages of Jaunpur district according to social group Name of variables

Social group SC

Primary source of income Cultivation 4 (8.7) Non-agriculture 0 (0.0) enterprises Wage/salaried employee 1 (2.2) Remittances 38 (82.6) Others 3 (6.5) Average monthly 12,380.4 Income in Rs. (including remittances) Total 46

OBC

Others

17 (16.5) 0 (0.0)

51 (52.0) 0 (0.0)

72 (29.1) 0 (0.0)

5 (4.9) 71 (68.9) 10 (9.7) 28,932.0

8 (8.2) 32 (32.7) 7 (7.1) 56,908.2

14 (5.7) 141 (57.1) 20 (8.1) 36,949.4

103

98

Total

247

Source: Field survey 2016 Note: *Figures in parenthesis represent percent to total.

that it is not the poorest that migrate. Instead, people from lowermiddle-income and middle-income households are sending male members out for economic reasons.

20.7 Migration and income inequality This section develops an understanding of linkages between migration and income inequality. 20.7.1 Income and occupational details of migrant and non-migrant households of surveyed villages in Jaunpur district Table 20.4a shows income and occupational details of sample households according to their migration status. It can be observed that the major occupation of non-migrant households is wage/salaried jobs. It can be inferred that households which have their primary occupation as wage and salaried jobs have less propensity to out-migrate, as they have a source of livelihood at their origin do not rely solely on agriculture. The primary source of income of migrant households is remittances. Migrant households lack diversified sources of income at origin, and migration thus is also a result of lack of diversified income

Migration and income inequality 355 Table 20.4a Income, occupational and expenditure details of migrant and non-migrant households of surveyed villages in Jaunpur district Variables Primary source of income Cultivation Non-agriculture enterprises Wage/salaried employee Remittances Others Average monthly income with remittances (in Rs.) Average monthly income without remittances (in Rs.) Average MPCI with remittances (in Rs.) Average MPCI without remittances (in Rs.) Total no. of households

Migrant households

Non-migrant households

Total

72 (29.1) 0 (0.00)

28 (22.8) 18 (14.6)

100 (27.0) 18 (4.9)

14 (5.7) 141 (57.1) 20 (8.1) 36,949.4

62 (50.4) 0 (0.0) 15 (12.2) 12,304.8

76 (20.5) 141 (38.1) 35 (9.5) 28,756.0

27,565.4

12,304.8

22,434.2

4,957.4

2,016.5

3979.8

3,680.1

2,016.5

3117.4

247

123

370

Source: Field survey 2016 Note: Figures in parenthesis represent percent to total.

sources at origin. Income is one of the important determinants of migration decisions. Literature also shows that income is one of the major determinants of undertaking migration decisions by households in rural areas. Migration is associated with the financial cost of moving out and thus is not undertaken by the poorest households. If, in the case they migrate out, they move internally and go short distances (Geest, 2011). The average monthly income of migrant households including and excluding remittances is comparatively higher than non-migrant households. It can be said that migrant households are better off in terms of average income. The monthly average income of non-migrant households is Rs. 12,304.8, while that of migrant households including remittances is Rs. 36,949.4 and excluding remittances is Rs. 27,565.4. To have a better understanding of the average income of migrant and non-migrant households, income analyses across various social groups have been done in Table 20.4b. Comparing migrant households’ income with and without remittances, it can be seen that migration is beneficial for migrant households. Households’ incomes have increased by including remittances and reduce significantly when we exclude remittances, indicating migration has increased the income of

19,205.3 3,159.6 1,898.0 103

9,660.7 1,723.4 1,723.4 56

32

1,311.6

1,311.6

7,765.6

7 (21.9) 7 (21.9) 17 (53.1) 0 (0.00) 1 (3.1) 7,765.6

NM HH

98

6,879.4

8,399.0

46,260.2

51 (52.0) 0 (0.0) 8 (8.2) 32 (32.7) 7 (7.1) 56,908.2

M HH

Others

35

3,130.0

3,130.0

1,8371.4

21 (60.0) 4 (11.4) 4 (11.4) 0 (0.0) 8 (22.8) 18,371.4

NM HH

Notes: Figures in parenthesis represent percent to total. (M HH-Migrant Household, NM HH-Non-Migrant Household, MPCI-Monthly Per Capita Income)

Source: Field survey 2016

17 (16.5) 0 (0.0) 5 (4.9) 71 (68.9) 10 (9.7) 28,932.0

0 (0.0) 7 (12.5) 41 (73.2) 0 (0.00) 8 (14.3) 9,660.7

M HH

M HH

NM HH

OBC

SC

Primary occupation/primary source of income Cultivation 4 (8.7) Non-agriculture enterprises 0 (0.0) Wage/salaried employee 1 (2.2) Remittances 38 (82.6) Others 3 (6.5) Average monthly income with 12,380.4 remittances (in Rs.) Average monthly income without 6,456.5 remittances (in Rs.) Average MPCI with remittances 1,650.9 (in Rs.) Average MPCI without remittances 854.9 (in Rs.) Total no. of households 46

Variable

Table 20.4b Social group-wise income, occupational and expenditure details of migrants and non-migrant households of surveyed villages in Jaunpur district

Migration and income inequality 357 the households. While doing this survey, it was found that the majority of households reported their household income has increased post-migration. From Table 20.4b, it can be seen that cultivation as the major source of primary income is the highest in Others followed by OBC. None of the non-migrant households in the SC category reported cultivation as their primary source of income. Cultivation as the primary source of income is highest in Others in both migrant and non-migrant households. In SC, migrant households’ major source of income is remittances, and in non-migrant households it is wage/salaried jobs. In the field survey, it was found that SC households are often engaged in many casual and Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) jobs in the village itself and thus do not undertake migration. The remaining SC population is too poor to afford the cost of migration. By observing monthly income and per-capita income, it can be inferred that there is a huge difference between average income of migrant and non-migrant households across various social groups. It can be seen that the difference between average income of migrant and non-migrant households is highest in the OBC category.

20.8 Empirical analysis Existing studies do not provide the straightforward relationship between migration and income inequality. As per the NELM approach, migration via remittances reduces income inequality. Descriptive analysis of income details of migrant and non-migrant households in the previous section shows that migration reduces income inequality via remittances. The Gini coefficient calculated across villages in Table 20.6a depicts a similar result. Income inequality has been reduced in Gini with remittances except in Asbaranpur and Yonouspur, where there is more income equality excluding remittances. In Asbaranpur and Yonouspur, migration via remittances have increased income inequality in sample households. From Table 20.5a it can be seen that the Gini coefficient for all villages is 0.57302 and inequality is very high among sample villages. Village-wise analysis shows that the Gini coefficient is highest in Manecha at 0.60968 followed, by Chitkon at 0.56656, and is lowest for Yonouspur, and these villages are showing high inequality. The analysis has been done on total income without remittances to have a better understanding of role of migration. From Table 20.1, it can be seen that rate of male out-migration is highest in Asbaranpur

0.45840

0.56656

0.41707

0.39568

Asbaranpur

0.51769

0.44540

Rampur Soiri

0.60968

0.57289

Manecha

0.45260 0.52113

With remittances Without remittances

Source: Field survey 2016

SC

Gini coefficient 0.50411 0.57518

OBC

0.38924 0.42815

Others

Table 20.5b  Gini coefficient across various social groups in sample households of Jaunpur district

Source: Field survey 2016 (own work)

0.42211

0.47565

With remittances Without remittances

Jarasi

Chitkon

Gini coefficient

Table 20.5a  Gini coefficient with and without remittances for sample villages

0.20688

0.41400

Yonouspur

0.51991 0.57302

Total

0.57302

0.51991

Total

Migration and income inequality 359 followed by Jarasi and Rampur Soiri with 56, 53 and 47 persons per 100 persons. Rate of out-migration is lowest for Manecha followed by Yonouspur with 27 and 34 persons per 100 persons. Thus migration is positively related to Gini coefficient, as income inequality of all sample households in Jaunpur district is reduced when we include share of remittances in total monthly income of the households, but the relationship varies across villages. Table 20.5b shows the Gini coefficient with and without remittances across various social groups It can be observed that migration has reduced income inequality in all social groups. Income inequality is highest for the OBC group and is lowest for Others. From descriptive analysis as well, it was found that the rate of migration is highest in OBC households, and the Gini coefficient also shows that the highest income inequality is in OBC households.

20.9 Concluding remarks Migration and income inequality do not have a straightforward relationship and depend on various factors. The descriptive analysis part of the study shows that village-wise Jarasi, Asbaranpur and Chitkon are better off than other villages in terms of land and educational attainment. As far as income is concerned, it can be interpreted that migration is highly beneficial to OBC households, as average monthly income with and without remittances is almost double in migrant households in comparison to non-migrant households. Average income with and without remittances is almost double in migrant households in OBC and SC households. It can be observed that migrant households show huge income inequality. It is not only poor households which are migrating. Instead, households with high monthly income also send male members abroad. Intra-household income disparity is one of the major reasons for migration as per the NELM approach, and our descriptive and empirical analysis reveals the same. There is huge inequality in monthly income across various social groups. The study found migration via remittances reduces income inequality in Jaunpur district, but when we consider all the villages, this doesn’t hold true. Migration doesn’t reduce income inequality in all villages whereas when Gini coefficient of income with and without remittances across social groups is considered, the relationship is positive. Therefore across various social groups, higher the Gini coefficient, higher is the rate of out-migration. Income inequality is highest in OBC

360  Ruchi Singh households, and so is the rate of out-migration. As a policy implication, an effort shall be made to establish smooth transfer of remittances, as most of the households in rural Uttar Pradesh except the upper-caste ones remit to support consumption and daily needs. Moreover, more non-farm opportunities shall be encouraged to reduce huge inequalities among various social groups and thus enhancing equal access to resources, be it land, education or income. Migration is contributing to a great extent to improving well-being of the rural households in Uttar Pradesh, and therefore more skills and training shall be imparted to enhance the quality of migrants moving out.

Notes 1 See Arango (2000), De Brauw et al. (2011), De Haan (2000), De Weerdt and Hirvonen (2013), Ellis (2003), Geisbert (2007), Ghobadi et al. (2005), Lindstrom et al. (2012), Paulson (2003), Stark and Levhari (1982), Waddington and Sabates (2003). 2 Jann, B. (2016). Estimating Lorenz and concentration curves in STATA. Tech. rep., University of Bern, Department of Social Sciences.

References Acosta, Pablo, Cesar Calderon, Pablo Fajnzylber, and Humberto Lopez. 2008. What Is the Impact of International Remittances on Poverty and Inequality in Latin America? World Development, 36(1): 89–114. Adams Jr, Richard H. 1989. Worker Remittances and Inequality in Rural Egypt. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 38(1): 47–71. Adams, R. H. (1991). The effects of international remittances on poverty, inequality, and development in rural Egypt. International Food Policy Research Institute Report No. 86. Adams, Richard H., and Harold Alderman. 1992. Sources of Inequality in Rural Pakistan: A Decomposition Analysis. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 54(4): 591–608. Adams, R. H., A. Lopez-Feldman, Jorge Mora, J. E. Taylor, J. DeWind, and J. Holdaway. 2008. Remittances, Inequality and Poverty: Evidence from Rural Mexico. In Migration and Development Within and Across Borders: Research and Policy Perspectives on Internal and International Migration, 101–130. Hammersmith Press. Arango, Joaquin. 2000. Explaining Migration: A Critical View. International Social Science Journal, 52(165): 283–296. Awumbila, Mariama, Joseph Kofi Teye, Julie Litchfield, Louis BoakyeYiadom, Priya Deshingkar, and Peter Quartey. 2015. Are Migrant Households Better Off Than Non-Migrant Households? Evidence from Ghana. Barham, Bradford, and Stephen Boucher. 1998. Migration, Remittances, and Inequality: Estimating the Net Effects of Migration on Income Distribution. Journal of Development Economics, 55(2): 307–331.

Migration and income inequality 361 Bastia, Tanja (ed.). 2013. Migration and Inequality (No. 100). London: Routledge. Black, Richard, Claudia Natali, and Jessica Skinner. 2005. Migration and Inequality. Washington, DC: World Bank. Datta, Amrita. 2016. Migration, Remittances and Changing Sources of Income in Rural Bihar (1999–2011). Economic & Political Weekly, 51(31): 85. de Brauw, Alan, Valerie Mueller, and Tassew Woldehanna. 2011. Insurance Motives to Remit: Evidence from a Matched Sample of Ethiopian Internal Migrants (No. 1090). Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). De Haan, Arjan. 2000. Migrants, Livelihoods, and Rights: The Relevance of Migration in Development Policies. Social Development Working Paper No. 4. De Haan, Arjaan. 2010. Migration and Livelihoods in Historical Perspective: A Case Study of Bihar, India. The Journal of Development Studies, 38(5): 115–142. De Weerdt, Joachim, and Kalle Hirvonen. 2013. Risk Sharing and Internal Migration. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 65(1): 63–86. Deshingkar, Priya, and Shaheen Akter. 2009. Migration and Human Development in India. Human Development Research Paper 299/13. New York: UNDP. Ebeke, Christian Hubert, and Maëlan Le Goff. 2011. Why Migrants’ Remittances Reduce Income Inequality in some Countries and Not in Others? Working Papers halshs-00554277, HAL. Ellis, Frank. 2003. A Livelihoods Approach to Migration and Poverty Reduction. Norwich, UK: ODG/DEV. Paper Commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID). Garip, Filiz. 2014. The Impact of Migration and Remittances on Wealth Accumulation and Distribution in Rural Thailand. Demography, 51(2): 673–698. Geisbert, Lena. 2007. Seeking Opportunities: Migration as an Income Diversification Strategy of Households in Kakamega District of Kenya. Working Paper No. 58. German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Geest, K. 2011. The Dagara Farmer at Home and Away: Migration, Environment and Development in Ghana. Leiden: African Studies Centre. Ghobadi, Negar, Johannes Koettl, and Renos Vakis. 2005. Moving Out of Poverty: Migration Insights from Rural Afghanistan. Kabul, Afghanistan: World Bank, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation. Government of India. 2010. Migration in India, NSSO 64th Round (2007– 08). Report No. 533. New Delhi: National Sample Survey Office, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. Gupta, Sanjeev, Catherine A. Pattillo, and Smita Wagh. 2009. Effect of Remittances on Poverty and Financial Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. World development, 37(1): 104–115. Harris, John R., and Michael P. Todaro. 1970. Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis. The American Economic Review, 60(1): 126–142.

362  Ruchi Singh Jann, Ben. 2016. Estimating Lorenz and Concentration Curves. Stata Journal, 16(4): 837–866. Khan, Nazma. 1986. Pattern of Rural Out-Migration (A Micro Level Study). New Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation. Kumar, R. R. (2013). Remittances and economic growth: A study of Guyana. Economic Systems, 37(3), 462–72. Knowles, James C., and Richard Anker. 1981. Analysis of Income Transfers in a Developing Country: The Case of Kenya. Journal of Development Economics, 8(2): 205–226. Koechlin, Valerie, and Gianmarco Leon. 2007. International Remittances and Income Inequality: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 10(2): 123–141. Kuddusov, Jamshed. 2004. Migration Problems in Tajikistan. Central Asia and Caucasus Journal, 3(27): 2004. Kumar, Sarvottam. 2005. Rural Male Out-Migration. Vista International Publishing House. Lal, Brij V. 1998. Understanding the Indian Indenture Experience. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 21(s1): 215–237. Lee, Eveerett S. 1966. A Theory of Migration. Demography, 3(1): 47–57. Lewis, W. Arthur. 1954. Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour. Manchester School, 22(2): 139–191. Lindstrom, D. P., C. Hadley, and T. Belachew. 2012. The Role of Migration and Income Diversification in Protecting Households from Food Insecurity in Southwest Ethiopia. 2012 Annual meeting of the Population Association of America. Lipton, Michael. 1980. Migration from Rural Areas of Poor Countries: The Impact on Rural Productivity and Income Distribution. World Development, 8(1): 1–24. Marat, Erica. 2009. Shrinking Remittances Increase Labor Migration from Central Asia. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, 2. McKenzie, David, and Hillel Rapoport. 2007. Network Effects and the Dynamics of Migration and Inequality: Theory and Evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development Economics, 84(1): 1–24. Oberai, Amarjit S., and H. K. Singh. 1980. Migration, Remittances and Rural Development: Findings of a Case Study in the Indian Punjab. International Labor Review, 119: 229–241. Paulson, Anna L. 2003. Insurance Motives for Migration: Evidence from Thailand. Working Paper. Evanston, IL, USA: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 1990. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ravenstein, Ernst Georg. 1885. The Laws of Migration. Journal of the Statistical Society of London, 48(2): 167–235. Razi, S. 2014. Rural and Distress Migration. Kuruhkshetra, Ministry of Rural Development, 62(11): 52.

Migration and income inequality 363 Rivera, Jose Jorge Mora, and José Jorge. 2005. The Impact of Migration and Remittances on Distribution and Sources Income: The Mexican Rural Case. Meeting of the United Nations Expert Group on International Migration and Development, July (pp. 6–8). Rozelle, Scott, J. Edward Taylor, and Alan DeBrauw. 1999. Migration, Remittances, and Agricultural Productivity in China. The American Economic Review, 89(2): 287–291. Semyonov, Moshe, and Anastasia Gorodzeisky. 2008. Labor Migration, Remittances and Economic Well-Being of Households in the Philippines. Population Research and Policy Review, 27(5): 619. Singh, Ajit Kumar. 2013. Income and Livelihood Issues of Farmers: A Field Study in Uttar Pradesh. Agricultural Economics Research Review, 26(2013). Singh, Ruchi. 2014. The Role of Social Networks in Migration: A Case Study of Out-Migration from Uttar Pradesh to Mumbai. Journal of Studies in Dynamics and Change, 1(3): 137–144. Singh, D. K., and S. P. Tripathi. 1995. Factors Affecting Shift of Occupations from Agriculture to Non-Agriculture at Farm Level (A Case Study in Allahabad District). Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 50(3). Singh, S. N., R. C. Yadava, L. Sharma, and H. L. Sharma. 1980. Outmigration from Varanasi (Rural): Some Results on Differentials. Demography India, 9(1–2): 28–34. Stark, Oded. 2006. Inequality and Migration: A Behavioral Link. Economics Letters, 91(1): 146–152. Stark, Oded, and David E. Bloom. 1985. The New Economics of Labor Migration. American Economic Review, 75(2): 173–178. Stark, O., and David Levhari. 1982. On Migration and Risk in LDCs. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 31(1): 191–196. Stark, Oded, J. Edward Taylor, and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 1986. Remittances and Inequality. The Economic Journal, 96(383): 722–740. Stark, O., M. Micevska, and J. Mycielski. 2009. Relative Poverty as a Determinant of Migration: Evidence from Poland. Economics Letters, 103(3): 119–122. Taylor, Edward J. 1999. The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in Migration Process. International Migration, 37(1): 63–88. Waddington, H., and R. Sabates-Wheeler. 2003. How Does Poverty Affect Migration Choice? A Review of Literature. Working Paper T3. Sussex: Institute of Development Studies.

Index

Page numbers in italics indicate figures and in bold indicate tables on the corresponding pages. §18 AufenthG 134n1 §19a AufenthG 134n1 aarti (ritual worship) 93 abolishment of national-origin admission quotas 292 acts of citizenship 84 Ad-Dharmi migrants 211 Ad Dharmis Ravidassi Sikhs 156 Afghan Hindus 185 African diaspora 174 Africanisation 62 age structure changes in Kerala population 319 – 320 agricultural sector, UK-based Punjabi diaspora in 70 Akali Dal 74 Alcoff, L. 139 Altman, I. 215 altruistic mobilisation 83 Ambedkar, B.R. 160 Ambrosini, M. 83 ‘America First’ 289 Americans view immigrants and immigration 311 – 313 Anderson, Benedict 175, 180 anti-immigrant violence 87 anti-Punjab government 75 anti-Sikh violence in Delhi 51 Appadurai, Arjun 31 Asian Rich List 2017 58n3 assimilation 172 Asylum and Immigration Act 47 asylum seekers 250

Atlas-ti software 141 attribute coding 219 Auriol, L. 16 bahir 179 Ballard, Roger 30 Bapu, Giri 34 Baumann, Martin 30 belongingness 257 Bengali diaspora 176 Bergamo 207 Bertolani, Barbara 101n21, 206 Bhagvad Gita 38n4 bhakti 33, 38n4 Bhatra caste 63 bhumipujan 34 Bilecen, B. 216 Bilga General Hospital Charitable Trust 66 Bilimoria, Lord Karan 50 Biswas, R. 15 Blue Card 106, 126, 134n1, 137 Blunt, A. 214, 215 Boccagni, P. 214 bonding capital 187 Border Crossing Card 292 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 47 Bossi-Fini Law 86 boundary making between diverse migrants 125 Bourdieu, Pierre 4, 188, 189 Bourdieusian framework 185 Bouwman, R. 220

Index  365 brain bank 60 brain circulation 60, 110, 137, 242 brain drain 137 brain gain 60 brain trust 60 Brettell, Caroline B. 83, 92, 100n5 Brexit 46, 250, 280 – 282, 286; on Indian immigrant population in the UK 282 – 284 bride-burning 269n2 bridging capital 187 British-born Indian population 43 British-born second generation Indians 48 British East African colonies 62 British Indian army 62 British Indian community 42, 43 British Indians 41 British labour markets 41 British Medical Council 50 British Nationality Act 47 ‘Britishness’ 48 Brubaker, Rogers 174, 175 Bruggeman, J. 4 Buffel, T. 215 Butalia, Urvashi 171 Cachado, Rita 29 Çaglar, Ayse 38n1 Calavita, Kitty 100n6, 100n10 Canadian Punjabis 72 – 73 Caparo Group, UK 64 Carey, M. 139 CARITAS 87, 94, 95, 97, 100n12 Carling, J 15 caste-based social exclusion 160 caste discrimination 160 central personal register number (CPR number) 255 Chamars 156 Chanda, Rupa 110, 111 Charsley, K. 77n8 Chatterjee, P. 179 Chelas 31 China Poverty Monitoring Survey (CPMS) 330 China Rural Poverty Survey (CRPS) 330 Chiswick, B. R. 331 Chuhras 156 Cidade Nova 31, 32

circle of friends 172 circular migration 201 citizenship 244 civic engagement 83 class 1 occupational groups 49 Clifford, James 174 Cohen, J. E. 331 Cohen, Robin 30, 173 cohesive community 34 co-housing communities 216, 221 – 222 Cole, Jeffrey 87, 100n11 collective identity 127 Commonwealth Immigration Act 47 Commonwealth immigration policy 62 community formation 254 community organisation 33 Concilio Vaticano II 101n22 Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) 91 conflict societies 183 Congress 74 consent form 141 Conservative-Liberal coalition 282 Constable, Nicole 262 constructing beliefs 139 consumption pattern among household types 342 – 343 contemporary migration 3 content analysis 124 contribution towards development 235 corruption 71 cosmopolitanism 84 cosmopolitan sociability 81, 98, 99n3 Council Directive 2009/50/EC 126 Council for Khalistan 75 couple formation 255 criminal offences 252 cross-caste UK diaspora 158 cross-cultural friendships 82 cultural and immigrant associations 98 cultural associations 172 cultural identity 179 cultural pluralism 172 Dahlin-Ivanoff, S. 230 Dalit diaspora 165 Dalits see Scheduled Castes (SCs)

366 Index Dalit zats 63 Daman and Diu 28 Dama Ramautar 217 Danish colonisation of India 250 Danish labour market 249 Darbar Sahib at Amritsar 52 decolonisation of Portuguese colonies 32 deductive coding 219 degree of integration/segregation 192 de-izzat 157 – 159 Delanty, Gerard 84 demographic transition in Kerala 316; age structure changes in Kerala population 319 – 320; evolving trends in migration 325 – 326; impact of migration on Kerala economy 324 – 325; international migration from Kerala 322; inter-state migration from Kerala 322 – 323; migration to Kerala 323 – 324; mortality and fertility changes on migration 321 – 322; mortality and fertility transitions 317; population distribution 319, 320; trajectory of population growth 317 – 319 Denmark, Indian diaspora in 250 – 254; findings 258 – 259; heterogamous/ethnically mixed couple (Indian-Dane) 260 – 265; homogamous couples (Indian–Indian) 259 – 260; Indian population in 251, 251; intimate relationship formation 255 – 256; methodology 258; policy change 267 – 269; socioeconomic transformations 249; theoretical framework 257 – 258 Department for Non-Keralite Affairs 316 Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion 78n16 Department of Migrant Affairs 327 descriptive coding 219 DeshPardesh 30 deterritorialisation of national identity 31 detriment-producing process 113 devotional rites 33

Dholakia, Lord Navnit 50 diaspora 124; defined 60, 127, 173 – 174; elements 175; potential engagement 127 see also specific diaspora diasporic consciousness 173 – 180 diasporic identities 176 diasporic Sikh community 200 direct economic returns 63 discrimination 114, 115, 172; caste 160; racial 258; social 113; workplace 115 dispersion in space 175 diverse intimate partner formation in Denmark: heterogamous/ ethnically mixed couple (IndianDane) 260 – 265; homogamous couples (Indian–Indian) 259 – 260 diversity 145 divesha 32, 33 Doaban Jat Sikhs 157 dominant caste 156 Dowling, R. 214, 215 Dusenbery, Verne A. 203 Dutch society, skilled migrants in see The Netherlands, skilled migrants in earnings 298 – 300 East African Indians 42, 43 economic buffer 8 economic crisis 276, 278 – 280; migration management 274; migration policies in times of 284 – 286 economic immigrants 252 economic legitimation of immigration 85 economic migration 85 education sector, UK-based Punjabi diaspora in 69 Ehrkamp, P. 216 Elias, N. 114 Emilia Romagna 87, 99n4, 102n24 emotional citizenship 268 emotional management 160 emotion coding 219, 220 emotion work 154 – 155; avoiding shame and pursuing izzat and identity 158 – 162; identity

Index  367 155 – 156; izzat 156 – 158; within Punjab 162 – 168; Punjabi caste 156 – 158 employment rate 58n4 England and Wales, religious groups representation 50 English language 16 Equality Act 47 Erel, Umut 188 ethical clearance 141 Ethics Review committee 141 ethnically heterogamous relationships 256 ethnically homogamous relationships 256 ethnic capital 183 ethnic diversity 183 ethnic groups 124 ethnic identity 178 ethnicity 177 ethno-religious expression 92 EU Blue Card 106 EU-level labour migration policy 275 – 278 EU migration policy 274 EURANET 134n2 Eurocities 112 Europe, Indian diaspora in 171 – 173; diasporic consciousness 173 – 180; Punjabi diaspora in 154 – 168; South Asian migration to 154 European-born Punjabis 154 European Economic Recovery Plan 284 – 285 European migration 249 – 250 Eurostars 112 face-to-face interviews 141 Faist, T. 4 familiarity 229 family reunification 85, 251, 254 Federation for agro-industry workers 101n16 FederazioneLavoratori Agro Industria 101n16 female devotional moments 29 female migrants 108 Ferraris, F. 206 fertility-low mortality 317 Festadei Poppoli 95

first-generation Malayalees in Sweden 183 – 193 Flick, U. 217 foreign-born Indians 107 – 108, 114 foreign-born labour force 295 foreign-born workers employed in the UK 281 foreign direct investment (FDI) 63, 73 ‘From India to Portugal’ 35 Gadar Party 69 – 70 Gallo, Ester 101n18, 101n20 Garau, Eva 101n21 gatekeeper 217 gender: differentials in income 259; diversity 145 German Catholic Church 125 Germany: female skilled-labour migrants 125; Green Card 106; Green Card initiative 126; high-skilled migrants 125 – 126; Indian community in 123 – 125, 126 – 128; ‘Indian diaspora’ 128 – 133; Kerala, Christian women from 125 – 126; male immigration of students 125; migration from India, history of 125 – 126; New Foreigner Law, 2005 106; Sikhs 126; social contacts, lack of 131; tertiary education 125 Germany, migration from India 106 – 110; in- and outflows of Indian students and professionals 109; place-based inequalities 110 – 117 ghanti 36 ghar 179 Gilroy, Paul 177 Gini coefficient 345 Glick Schiller, Nina 16, 124, 128 global citizens 144 Global Forum on Migration and Development 242 global Indian citizens 128 globalisation 286 globalisation of science 3 global migration pattern 171 global Punjabi village diaspora 164

368 Index Goel, Urmila 129 Goods and Values Tax (GST) 324 government-funded schools in Kerala 325 Gram Pushkar Awards ceremony 203 Great Depression 290 Great Lisbon Area 29 Green Card 252, 293; initiative 126; Scheme 252 Green Revolution 62, 70 groupism 128 groupist thinking 128 Gujaratis 46; in Portugal 28, 31, 32 gurdwaras 92 Gurdwaras 63 Guru Nanak Dev Hospital, Pasla 67 Guru Nanak Khalsa Women’s College 69 Guru Ravidass Educational Assistance Trust 64 H-1B visas and India 290, 307 – 311 Hall, Stuart 176, 179 Hannerz, U. 31 healthcare migration 286 health sector, UK-based Punjabi diaspora in 66 – 69 Hennink, M. 217 heterogamous/ethnically mixed couple (Indian-Dane) 260 – 265 heterogamous marriages 256 Hewstone, Miles 188 Heywood, Joe 188 High Level Committee Report on the Indian Diaspora 28 highly skilled migrants (HSMs) 138, 185 high-skilled immigration 85 high-skilled Indians 5 – 6 high-skilled migrants 106, 111 high-skilled visas 126 Hill, K. 77n7 Hindu community 30 Hindu Council, UK 52 Hindu diaspora 176 Hinduism 30 Hindu Mandirs 52 Hindus in Portugal 28, 29, 31 Hindustani Surinamese in The Netherlands 213 – 214; creating

a home 224 – 225; data analysis 219; data management 219 – 221; ethnic diversity 213; home-making 214 – 216; method data collection 217; participant profile 218 – 219; possessions 225 – 228; recruitment method participants 217 – 218; research context 216; results 221 – 224; study design 216 – 217 hitherto-possessed economic capital 193 Hochschild, A. R. 155, 159 home-making process of migrants 214 – 216, 221 Homeward orientation 54 – 55 homogamous couples (Indian–Indian) 259 – 260 homogamous marriages 256 honour/prestige (izzat) 156 – 162 Hopkins, L. 137 House of Commons 53 human capital/education 132 Human Development Index (HDI) 236 human exploitation 156 humanistic approach 95 humanitarian grounds 85 humanitarian migrants 132 human mobility 1, 5 Human Rights Act 47 humiliation 156 hunkering down 187 Hüwelmeier, Gertrud 132 hybridity displays 176 I-94 292 identity affiliations to India 265 identity negotiation 31, 33 imagined community 129 immanent self-transcendence 99 immanent transcendence 84 immigration 116; legislation 290; to USA 290 – 293, 293 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 47 Immigration Act 47 immigration acts and race relations legislation in Britain 47 Immigration and Asylum Act 47 Immigration Appeals Act 47

Index  369 income inequality 5, 344 – 345; data sources and methodology 346; empirical analysis 358 – 359; income and occupational details 344 – 357; limitations and future direction 346; socio-economic characteristics 347 – 354; studies 346 – 347 India-born population in the United Kingdom 283 Indian-born migrants 108 Indian communities 178 Indian community in Britain: challenges faced by 55 – 56; growth 44, 44 Indian community in Germany 123 – 133; in academia and policy 126 – 127; discursive construction 123 – 124; undefined group of people 130 Indian Community Welfare Fund 127 Indian crime rates 253 Indian Dalit community 52 see also Scheduled Castes (SCs) Indian diaspora 128, 171; in Europe 176 – 180 Indian diaspora in Denmark 250 – 254; findings 258 – 259; heterogamous/ethnically mixed couple (Indian-Dane) 260 – 265; homogamous couples (Indian– Indian) 259 – 260; Indian population in 251, 251; intimate relationship formation 255 – 256; methodology 258; policy change 267 – 269; socio-economic transformations 249; theoretical framework 257 – 258 Indian doctors in Britain 50 Indian employment in Denmark 252 Indian high-skilled labour migration 110 Indian international mobility 10 Indian international students 6 Indian labour migrants 5; in Gulf 128 Indian Members of Parliament 53 Indian Merchant Diaspora 171 Indian multinational companies 138 Indianness 171, 177

Indian Punjabis 154 Indian Students Associations Lausanne (YUVA) 18 Indian Students Association Zurich (InSAZ) 18 Indian workers associations 53 indirect economic returns 63 – 64 infant mortality rate (IMR) 317 injustice 83 institutional-linkage networks 3 institution building 51 – 52 instrumental integration 82, 83, 94 integrationist model 172 interconnectedness 249 intermarriage 257 internationalisation of higher education 1, 3, 7 international migrants 3 international migration 4, 110; from Kerala 322; to the UK 283 international mobility of skilled human resources 3, 4 international professional 12 International Yoga Day 268 intersectionality 151n1, 257 inter-state migration from Kerala 322 – 323 intimate relationship formation 255 – 256 intra-caste endogamy 157 intra-caste migration networks 157 intra-company transfers 138 intra–ethnic group clique 195 intragroup commonalities 184 intra-NRI competition 166 In Vivo coding 219 inward remittances 64 irregular migration 62 – 63 Islamic State 303 – 304 Islamisation 250 Italian General Confederation for Labour 91 Italy, integration in 81 – 82, 85  – 8 7; cosmopolitan sociability through religious institutions 92 –  97; employers and immigrant employees 87  – 9 2; local municipalities and governments 82 – 85; multiculturalism 81

370 Index Italy, Punjabi migrants in 205 – 210 izzat 156 – 162 Jaffar Autar 218 Jain, R. 18 Jain diaspora 176 Jann, Benn 346 Jat caste 63 Jat Sikhs 157; NRI houses 164 Jaunpur district 346, 348 – 350, 352 – 354, 359 Jewish diaspora 174 job-related exclusion 263 joint ventures 242 Jopson, Debra 255, 269 Kamaleshwar Valmiki Education Trust 64 Kapur, D. 78n12 Karnataka: migrants to Netherlands 140 Kaur, R. 77n5 Kennismigrant visa 138 Kerala, demographic transition in 316; age structure changes in Kerala population 319 – 320; evolving trends in migration 325 – 326; impact of migration on Kerala economy 324 – 325; international migration from Kerala 322; inter-state migration from Kerala 322 – 323; migration to Kerala 323 – 324; mortality and fertility changes on migration 321 – 322; mortality and fertility transitions 317; population distribution 319, 320; trajectory of population growth 317 – 319 Kerala Migration Surveys, 1998 – 2013 326, 330 – 332; household characteristics 333 – 335; migration status 335 – 337; panel data 330; Quality of life 337 – 339 Khadria, B. 77n6 Khadria, Binod 128 Khalistan movement 75, 78n19 Kharoudi village 202 – 205 Kim, K. 331 Knott, Kim 35 Knott’s discussion 101n17

knowledge-based economies 6 knowledge-intensive activities 2 knowledge migrants 6 Koivunen, Julie M. 260 Kuddusov, Jamshed 347 Kuepper, W.G. 77n5 Kullar, I. K. 77n2 Kunju, Davis 234 labour force 295 – 296 Labour hoarding 278 labour immigration policy 185 labour market 87 labour market incorporation 111 Lacroix, Thomas 5 Lager, D. 216 Lamba-Nieves, D. 5 Lamont, M. 114 langar 93 Laurence, James 188, 192 Lawful Permanent Residency (LPR) status 293, 294 Lega Nord 102n25 Leonard, Madeleine 188 Levitt, P. 5, 16 Levy, C. 137 liberal professions 33 Liebig, T. 9 linguistic identity 171 Lisbon 31 Local Government Act 47 long-term buoyancy 285 Low, S. M. 215 low-skilled Indians 5 low-skilled migrants 85 Ludhiana National Agricultural University 70 maatakamandir 93 macro-societal phenomenon 29 Mahtons 157 maintenance of boundary 175 ‘Make America Great Again’ 289 Malayalees: in Netherlands 140; in Sweden 183 – 193 see also Kerala, demographic transition in manual workers 42 marginalisation 83, 97 marital abuse 255 marriages in Denmark 254

Index  371 material culture and migrant heritage 34 – 35; travelling heritage 35 – 37 mate selection 257 – 258 Mayda, A. M. 331 Mazabi Sikhs 156 Meijering, L. 216 MeLa Project 37 metal-mechanical factories 206 methodological nationalism 124, 128 Mexico 300 – 302 Mexico, immigrants from 300 – 302 Middle Eastern migrants 132 migrant-host society relations 140 Migrant Integration Policy Index 285 migrant labour supply (MLS) policies 279 migrants: communities 202; constant flux 211; home-making process 214; reconstruct connections 214; social rejection 86; workers 326 migration 118, 200; acts 347; contemporary 3; and development 3; evolving trends in 325 – 326; Italy, Punjabi migrants in 205 – 210; from Karnataka 323; to Kerala 323 – 324; from Punjab to the UK 62 – 63; upper-caste Jatis 210; via remittances 347 migration and income inequality 344 – 345; data sources and methodology 346; empirical analysis 358 – 359; income and occupational details 344 – 357; limitations and future direction 346; socio-economic characteristics 347 – 354; studies 346 – 347 migration labour supply (MLS) 274 migration policies 85, 280; in times of economic crisis 284 – 286 migratory trends 171 Ministry of Overseas Indians Affairs (MOIA) 127, 128, 268 mixed couples 249 mixed marriages 255 mixed parenting 257 mobility: Indian international student 6, 10 – 16; of skilled Indians to Europe 2

Modern Village Kharoudi (YouTube video) 203 Mooney, N. 167 mortality and fertility changes on migration 321 – 322 mortality and fertility transitions 317 Moscavide 31 Mosneaga, A. 14 Mukherjee, D. 110 multiculturalism 31, 47 – 48, 49, 81 multiple subjectivities 151n1 multi-site mobility 21 music (kirtan) 93 Muslim Americans 304 Muslim community 48 Muslim-majority nations 313 Muslims 132; in America 303 – 307; immigrants 290 Nair, S. 237 Namdhari 52 Nanaksar 52 National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 330 national identity 171 national identity, deterritorialisation of 31 nationalist repertoires 81 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 47 National Museum of Ethnology, Lisbon 35 National Residence Act (2012) 106 National Sample Survey data 60 National Sample Survey Organization 346 neighbourhood 215, 216 neo-Buddhism 160 The Netherlands, Hindustani Surinamese in 213 – 214; creating a home 224 – 225; data analysis 219; data management 219 – 221; ethnic diversity 213; home-making 214 – 216; method data collection 217; participant profile 218 – 219; possessions 225 – 228; recruitment method participants 217 – 218; research context 216; results 221 – 224; study design 216 – 217

372 Index The Netherlands, skilled migrants in 7, 137 – 138; contribution to society 142 – 149; data analysis 141; diversity and image of India 145 – 146; ethical clearance 141; interviews 140 – 141; participant recruitment 140; positionality 139 – 140; reflexive narratives 140 – 149; reflexivity 139 – 140; taxes, paying 147 – 148; unique skills and ready-made workers 142 – 144 Netherlands Foreign Investment Agencies 138 Newcastle-Upon-Tyne 158 New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) approach 344, 345 New Foreigner Law 126 Nitaqat 326 no-migration-scenario 346 non-assimilation 174 non-divesha 32, 33 nondomiciled transmigrants 12, 161 – 162 non-EU/EFTA countries 236 non–European Union countries 185 non–German-speaking workers 116 non-migrant family 164 non-resident Indians (NRIs) 127, 162, 210; houses of 163 – 164 non-resident Keralites Affairs (NORKA) 245, 327 non-Western migrants to the Netherlands 213 see also The Netherlands, Hindustani Surinamese in Nordic countries 172 NORKA Roots 245 Northern League 86 Nowicka, M. 4 NRI see non-resident Indians (NRIs) NRI Punjabis 73 – 74 NRI spouse 76 nuclear family household 208 Oberkircher, V. 111 occupation 298 Office of National Statistics data 77n1

Ogniuomoe miofratello 95 Oliveri, Federico 84, 100n7, 101n15 Operation Blue Star 51, 78n20 Orange Carpet facility 138 orientation to homeland 175 overseas citizens of India (OCIs) 127, 268 overseas Punjabis (OP) 210 ‘parallel lives’ 48 Parmelee, P. A. 215, 230 partition of India 42 Pastore, F. 274, 278, 279 Patel, Priti 53 patrimonialisation processes 35 Paul, Lord Swaraj 50, 64 Pay Limit scheme 252 PEGIDA 115 Pentecostalism 132 People of Indian origin (PIO) 60; in Germany 123 – 133 perceptions of exclusion 129 – 130 Percot, M. 237 Pérez, Ines 132 period of decolonisation 201 Perocco, Fabio 101n21, 206 personal contacts 125 personal-development-related opportunities 112 personal self-realisation 7 Petermann, Sören 188 Pew Research Center estimate 304 place-based inequalities 107, 110 – 117, 118 political turmoil 62 Populorum Progressio 94, 95 Portela Sacavém 31 Portes, Alejandro 4, 188 Porto 31 Portugal: from Goa 28; from Gujarat 28, 31, 32; Hindu community, identity consolidation 29; Hindu population 31; population of Indian origin in 28, 35 Portuguese colonies, decolonisation in Africa 28 Portuguese Hindu diaspora 29 Portuguese Hindus 36 positionality 139 – 140

Index  373 Positive List 252 post-national cartography 200 post-racial society 81 post-war migrants in Europe 213 poverty 156 poverty alleviation 241 Powell, Enoch 46 Prasad 93 Pravasi 210 Pravasi Bhartiya Divas 54 process coding 219, 220 pujari 93 Punjabi diaspora 176; in Europe 154 – 168 Punjabi diaspora in United Kingdom 60 – 61, 61; agricultural sector 70; caste and community characteristics 63; drivers of 62 – 63; economic contributions 63 – 64; education sector 69; health sector 66 – 69; negative impact 74 – 76; problems faced 71 – 74; rural economy 70 – 71; secondary sources 64 – 65; social infrastructure 69 – 70 Punjabis 46; Dalit Diaspora 168; entrepreneurs 64; migrants in Italy 205 – 210; Non-Resident Indians in UK 65; SCs 156; Sikhs 154; transnational community 158, 168 Putnam, Robert D. 4, 18, 19, 187 Putnamian framework 184 quality of house according to migration status 341 Quinta da Holandesa 31 race industry 46 Race Relations Act 47 Race Relations (Amendment) Act 47 racial discrimination 258 racism 178 Ramgarhia Sikhs 63, 157 Ratan Kalloe 218 rational choice theory 172 Ravidasi 63, 207 Ravidassia 52 ready-made workers 142 – 144 Reed-Danahay, Deborah 92, 100n5

reflexive narrative 141 reflexivity 139 – 140, 151n1 refugees, influx of 250 Reggio Emilia 97, 206, 207 regional identity 171 relational reflexivity 151n1 religion: defined 216; and gender 34 religious conversion: to Christianity 161 – 162; to neo-Buddhism 160 religious diasporas 30 religious identity 30 religious pluralism 34 religious population in England and Wales 45; Indians in 45 remittances 234, 237, 239 retention/ return mechanisms 3 return migration 139 Rienzo, C. 280 right-wing parties 115 ‘rivers of blood’ 46 Robinson, V. 139 Romagna, Emilia 101n19 Rosa, Alberto 257 Rosales, Marta Vilar 214, 215, 216 Roscigno, V. 115 Rowntree Trust 55 Rubinstein, R. L. 215, 230 Rushdie, Salman 173 Safran, William 174, 179 Safran’s model 179 Saha, K. 77n9 Santo António dos Cavaleiros 31; Hindu community in 32, 34 Sant Pritam Das Charitable Hospital, Jaura 78n17 Sanyal, A. 77n11 satsang group 29, 34 Saxenian, A. 110, 137 Saxony-Anhalt 116 Scheduled Castes (SCs) 156; migrants 211 Schiller, Nina Glick 38n1 Schmid, Katharina 188 Schmitt, Thomas 188 Schönwälder, Karen 188 Scotson, J. 114 second-cycle coding methods 220 second-generation Indians 46 second-generation Turks 132

374 Index self-realisation 112 self-transformation 84 semi-structured interviews 217 sense of home 221 Serbedzija, V. 4 service (sewa) 93 Sevak, Chandresh 37 sewerage system and solar heating system in Phagwara 69 Shaheed Divas 70 Shepperson, George 174 Shiva temples 34 – 35, 38 Shiva Temple Social Solidarity Association 29, 34 short-term horizon 3 Shudra varna 31 Shuval, Judith 174 Siddiqui, Z. 20, 139 Sikh Council, UK 52 Sikhs: caste-based hierarchies 156; community organisations 51; diaspora 63; social exclusion 156; temporary protection in Germany 126; victims of Delhi 1984 riots 75 see also anti-Sikh violence in Delhi Singh, Baldev 203 Singh, G. 154 Singh Sabha gurdwaras 52 Singhvi, L.M. 54 Singla, K. Nandini 34 skilled Indians in Switzerland 2; in-depth interviews 9 – 10; Indian students and skilled professionals in 5 – 9; mobility, social capital and transnational connections 2 – 5; mobility motives and trajectories 10 – 16; temporary basis stay 21 skilled-labour migrants 118 skilled migrants 138; exercise agency 188 skilled migration 4 skilled professionals in innovative production sectors 1 Skype interviews 141 small-scale contributions 71 sociability practices 81 social capital 2, 4, 64, 183, 187 social contribution 69 social discrimination 113

social-ecological environment 113 social exclusion 114 social groups 348 social inclusion 129 – 130 social inequalities 83, 113 social infrastructure, UK-based Punjai diaspora in 69 – 70 social interactions 125 social networks 5 social remittances 4, 5, 201 social transformations 1, 2, 5 societal contribution 144 socio-cultural setting 211 socio-economic development 234 socio-economic mobility 49 socio-economic transformations 249 socio-psychological inequality 114 solution-finding strategies 116 Southall, UK 158 South Asian migration 167; to Europe 154 spaciousness 263 Stallaert, Christiana 132 Stark, Oded 347 start-up entrepreneurs 7 Statistics Sweden 195n2 stigmatisation 113 Stockholm-based intragroup clique 189 Stockholm-based respondents 195n1 Stolle, Dietlind 188 structure coding 141 student migration 7 study-to-work transition 6 subordinate integration 83 Subramanian, Chandrika 269n2 surface acting 159 Swami Satyamitran 34 Sweden, Malayalee immigrants 183 – 185; first-generation Malayalees’ bonding 189 – 193; India-born persons 186; labour immigration policy 185; research methodology 185 – 187; social capital 187 – 189 Swedish cultural capital 189 Swedish labour market 185 Swedish Migration Board 185 Swiss Federal Office for Statistics (SFOS) 8

Index  375 Swiss Federal Statistics Office 2 Switzerland, Keralite diaspora 234 – 236; barriers for diaspora engagement 243 – 244; interviewed Keralite migrant families 237; Kerala’s government initiatives 244 – 245; role of Keralite 240 – 242; socioeconomic background 237 – 238; transnational ties within the first generation 239; transnational ties within the second generation 240; unravelling transnationalism 238 Switzerland, skilled Indians in 2; in-depth interviews 9 – 10; Indian students and skilled professionals in 5 – 9; mobility, social capital and transnational connections 2 – 5; mobility motives and trajectories 10 – 16; temporary basis stay 21 Tamil diaspora 176 Tamil migrants 323 Tatla, Darshan S. 78n18, 154, 200, 203 tax wedges 280 Tejada, Gabriela 1, 20, 139 temporary migration 108 tentative integration 95, 96 territorial effects 107 Thandi, Shinder S. 78n15, 201 Thapan, Meenakshi 102n27 The Hague 213 Tier 2 visas 43 Tolia-Kelly, D. P. 164 Toor, M. S. 77n2 Torres da Bela Vista 32 trajectory of population growth 317 – 319 transforming homelands 200 – 203; pattern of migration 203 – 205; Punjabi migrants in Italy 205 – 210 transmigrants 210 transnational activity 31 transnational-based practices 2, 22 transnational communities 127, 128 transnational contacts 22 transnational emotion work 154 – 155; avoiding shame and pursuing izzat and identity

158 – 162; identity 155 – 156; izzat 156 – 158; within Punjab 162 – 168; Punjabi caste 156 – 158 transnationalism 38n1 transnationalism in migration 19 transnational marriages 254, 267 transnational migrants 234 transnational migration 128 transnational mobility 38n1 transnational transactions 234 Trask, Bahira Sherif 260 travel ban on seven Muslim-majority countries 302 – 303 Trump, Donald J. 289 Trump administration on immigration 289 – 290; Americans view immigrants and immigration 311 – 313; demographic characteristics 294 – 295; earnings 298 – 300; H-1B visas and India 307 – 311; immigration to the USA 290 – 293; labour force 295 – 296; Mexico 300 – 302; Muslims in America 303 – 307; occupation 298; travel ban on seven Muslim-majority countries 302 – 303; undocumented immigrants 300; unemployment 297 – 298; workforce characteristics 296 – 297 Tumbe, C. 78n14 Turkish high-skilled migrants 132 twice migrants 41, 42, 43, 62 Ufficio Catholico Emigrazione Italiano 95 UK-based Punjabi diaspora–funded hospitals 67 – 68 UK Borders Act 47 UK-level policy reactions 280 UK Migration Observatory’s Report 274 undocumented immigrants 300 unemployment 297 – 298 unique skills and ready-made workers 142 – 144 United Kingdom, Indian community in 41 – 42, 282; 1950s to 1980s 42 – 45; achievements and challenges 49 – 51; challenges

376 Index 55 – 56; homeward orientation 54 – 55; institution building 51 – 52; migration pattern 42 – 49; political participation 52 – 54; second generation 48 – 49; settlement, challenges and struggles 45 – 48 United Kingdom, Punjabi diaspora in 60 – 61, 61; agricultural sector 70; caste and community characteristics 63; drivers of 62 – 63; economic contributions 63 – 64; education sector 69; health sector 66 – 69; negative impact 74 – 76; problems faced 71 – 74; rural economy 70 – 71; secondary sources 64 – 65; social infrastructure 69 – 70 United Kingdom labour markets, impact of migration 274; Brexit 280 – 282; Brexit on Indian immigrant population in the UK 282 – 284; economic crisis 278 – 280; EU-level labour migration policy 275 – 278; migration policies in times of economic crisis 284 – 286; net migration 275; UK-level policy reactions 280 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 128 United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) index 236 university-to-work transition in Europe 111 Uppsala 189 use-value 155 US population, immigrants in 291 Utrecht 213 Uttar Pradesh 344 – 359; demographic profile 348 – 352; male out-migration from 344; socio-economic characteristics of migrant households 348

vaishnava 33 Vaishya community 171 Vaishya varna 31 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 54 Valmiki 63 Valmikis 156 Valsiner, Jaan 257 values coding 219, 220 Van de Laar, M. 7, 13 vandshaknna 209 Van Mol, Ch. 4, 14 Vaz, Keith 53 Vertovec, Steven 30, 188 Vickstrom, Erik 188 Vilaça, Helena 29 Village Kharoudi Lifestyle Improvement Project 203, 211 violence against migrants 115 Visa Waiver Program 292 Walton-Roberts, Margaret 167 Watkins, J. F 215 Werbner, Pnina 30 Western Europe, Indian students and skilled professionals in 5 – 8; in Switzerland 8 – 9 white-collar labour migrants see highly skilled migrants (HSMs) Wiles, J. L. 215 Wimmer, Andreas 124 Wolverhampton 158 workforce characteristics 296 – 297 work–life balance 252 workplace discrimination 115 World Sikh Organization 75 World War II 290 xenophobia 107, 115, 116 Yavorsky, J. 115 zoekjaar visa 138