India and the European Union in a Turbulent World [1st ed.] 9789811539169, 9789811539176

The book examines how the European Union, which in the past had tended to be seen by India as an undervalued partner, is

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India and the European Union in a Turbulent World [1st ed.]
 9789811539169, 9789811539176

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xxv
India, the European Union and the World Order (Pramit Pal Chaudhuri)....Pages 1-25
India, the European Union and the Postwar Liberal Order (Patryk Kugiel)....Pages 27-58
India, the European Union and Global Trade Governance (Anna Wróbel)....Pages 59-73
The European Union and India in Global Financial Governance (Karina Jędrzejowska)....Pages 75-89
Brexit and India-UK Relations (Pramit Pal Chaudhuri)....Pages 91-107
India-EU Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement: Process, Issues, Prospects (Dinkar Khullar)....Pages 109-126
India, the European Union and Counter-Terrorism: Shifting Paradigms, New Cooperation (Bhaswati Mukherjee)....Pages 127-146
India-EU Partnership for Security: Through the Prism of Nuclear Non-proliferation (Manpreet Sethi)....Pages 147-166
India and the European Union: A Dialectical Approach to Human Rights (Bhaswati Mukherjee)....Pages 167-185
India, the European Union and Climate Change: The Paris Agreement and After (Vijeta Rattani)....Pages 187-203
Indian and European Responses to Migration and Refugee Crises (Sheetal Sharma)....Pages 205-217
Back Matter ....Pages 219-230

Citation preview

India and the European Union in a Turbulent World

Edited by Rajendra K. Jain

India and the European Union in a Turbulent World

Rajendra K. Jain Editor

India and the European Union in a Turbulent World

Editor Rajendra K. Jain School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, Delhi, India

ISBN 978-981-15-3916-9    ISBN 978-981-15-3917-6 (eBook) © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To My Parents for always inspiring and supporting me


The world today is in geopolitical flux and in disarray. The 2008 financial crisis and the economic rise of Asia underlined the redistribution and diffusion of power and the emergence of a more multipolar world with the G8 giving way to the more representative G20. The postwar liberal world order established by the West—which was ‘neither liberal nor worldwide nor orderly’ (Haass 2018)—is under unprecedented strain. It has been eroded largely because the political, economic and security fundamentals that undermined it are invalid, and there is no consensus on other global issues (Tharoor and Saran 2020a: xii). The world has entered a period of profound change and uncertainty with the unpredictable behaviour of the Trump Administration, the rise and growing assertiveness of China, Brexit, a divided Europe, a re-emerging Russia, an even more disturbed Middle East, and the backlash against globalization. These developments, according to Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, have had/are likely to have a six-fold impact. Firstly, with the broader distribution of power, the world has become increasingly multipolar with emerging powers demanding a greater voice in world affairs and institutions. Secondly, the rise of nationalism is resulting in greater economic friction as well as a ‘stronger multipolarity with weaker multilateralism’ in many domains. Thirdly, the world is likely to witness a fallback on balance of power as its operating principle which usually produces ‘unstable equilibriums’. The world will also witness ‘a proliferation of frenemies … allies who publicly turn on each other or competitors who are compelled to make common cause on issues’. Fifthly, we are likely to vii



witness the emergence of ‘a more transactional ethos [that] will promote ad hoc groupings of disparate nations who have a shared interest on a particular issue’. Finally, the combination of these developments will encourage ‘more regional and local balances with less global influence on their working’ (Jaishankar 2019). The current world order, the emerging powers argue, needs to reflect current economic and geopolitical realities. It has proven difficult to either change or incrementally reform existing international institutions since they have in-built rules that prevent the dilution of their influence and role. However, emerging powers like India do not seek to overturn the existing international order. They ‘do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it’ (Ikenberry 2011: 57). New Delhi does not seek to replace the existing international governance institutions with new ones, but it seeks admission to increase its influence and protect its interests. Thus, what New Delhi really seeks is a more inclusive multilateralism and a more inclusive world order. In the first chapter, Pramit Pal Chaudhuri examines the reactions and responses of India and the European Union to President Donald Trump’s policies and assesses their impact on India-EU relations. Neither India nor the EU Member States, he argues, were pleased with the Trump Administration’s unilateralism and hostility to the international order’s three primary components: multilateral institutions, the postwar military alliance structure and their legitimizing values. The weakening of the US-Europe relationship and Brexit, he maintains, has meant that India and the EU have come much closer together in recent years on a number of policy issues integral to the international order. The EU’s India Strategy 3.0 (November 2018) was driven by Brussels’ desire for middle power cooperation to compensate for the unilateral actions of the United States and China. It de-emphasizes the Broad-Based Trade and Investment Agreement and lays stress on greater cooperation with like-minded countries like India and Japan in areas like climate change, terrorism, maritime security, and support for multilateral institutions like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. The EU joint communication on China (March 2019) and its mechanisms to screen Chinese FDI and technology acquisition indicate how the European Union is slowly aligning itself with the American approach towards China. However, the EU, Pramit concludes, contributes very little to India’s critical security needs. India continues to struggle to bring



Europe into the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, unlike Europe, only the United States remains a credible partner in attempts to balance against China. India, Pramit maintains, remains much more of ‘a realpolitik practitioner’ than the EU would like to be. New Delhi’s heterogeneity of thought and policy signifies that it requires a lot of attention to be able to work with EU on policy terms. Both Brussels, which lacks a common strategic culture, and New Delhi are reluctant to make such an investment in each other. After tracing the evolution of the postwar ‘liberal order’, Patryk Kugiel argues that the unilateral policy of President Donald Trump, an increasingly assertive China and a resurgent Russia have combined to put the postwar liberal order into crisis. He goes on to critically evaluate the position of the European Union and India on four critical elements of the liberal order—a rules-based order and multilateralism, free trade and globalization, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and non-proliferation. While India and EU have similar approaches towards many global issues, he argues, structural and ideological differences tend to hinder cooperation. Thus, while they may not be ideal partners in preserving the liberal order, they are nevertheless indispensable for its sustenance and reform. In conclusion, Patryk argues that India and the EU apparently have a broad convergence of views on the liberal international order, but there are differences in detail largely because of historical legacies and because they are at different levels of development. While India and the European Union may not be ideal partners in preserving the liberal international order, they are, he concludes, nevertheless, indispensable for its reform. They are, he argues, apparently ‘the best partners to work together towards a new post-Western order, which would still be “rules-based”, but not necessarily “liberal”’. In the next chapter, Anna Wróbel argues that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is confronting an existential crisis, which has considerably weakened its role in global trade governance and accentuated the symptoms of dysfunctionality of the multilateral trading system. The WTO has lost not only its effectiveness in trade negotiations, but could lose its ability to settle trade disputes, especially with the United States having blocked the possibility of processing appeals in trade disputes by not filling the vacancies in the Appellate Body. The chapter seeks to answer the question whether the WTO is still an effective instrument for the realization of trade interests of its members, especially the European Union and India. The chapter examines the negotiating positions of the EU and India towards the Doha Round, evaluates proposals made by the EU and India



to revitalize the multilateral trading system and highlights the elements of convergence and divergence in their proposals for reform of the WTO. It concludes that both the European Union and India have high stakes in the stability and predictability of the rule-based multilateral trading system. However, a WTO reform requires the involvement of all major powers, including the United States. Karina Jędrzejowska argues that the Asian financial crisis (1997–1998) and the global financial meltdown (2007–2009) revealed serious deficiencies in global financial governance. The failure to provide credible crisis prevention and crisis management mechanisms fostered the development of alternative regional and plurilateral financial arrangements as well as the emergence of new global financial actors and arrangements (e.g. the Financial Stability Forum and its successor, the Financial Stability Board). The chapter assesses the role of the European Union—a union of highly developed countries—and a major emerging market (India) in the governance of international financial institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group and the Bank for International Settlements. It examines their compliance with global financial regulations, especially the Basel process as well as the convergence and divergence in their interests in the governance and reform of the global financial system. Global financial governance, she concludes, will have to contend with key challenges including the rise of China, the shift towards unilateral and bilateral governance mechanisms advocated by certain countries and South-South financial governance. Prior to the Brexit referendum (June 2016), Pramit Pal Chaudhuri argues, UK-India trade for nearly two decades was static signifying the lack of supply chain linkages. However, Indian foreign direct investment in the United Kingdom has been greater than the rest of Europe, and the UK has cumulatively been the single largest source of FDI in India. Britain, according to a top Indian foreign diplomat he cites, was of consequence largely because of the size of the Indian diaspora and because it had a veto in the United Nations Security Council. India, Pramit argues, did not support Brexit and viewed it largely as a negative development. Brexit was largely seen as undermining the influence and strength of Europe as a whole, fostering global instability and insofar as it weakened the Westcentric international order; it tended to increase China’s international influence. Brexit, he concludes, has had two key implications for Indian foreign policy. Firstly, it has led to a recognition that New Delhi should adopt a more proactive stance regarding weak trade ties and declining



immigration. Secondly, India has to revisit its policy towards the European Union, strengthen links with France and Germany, and make a serious effort at forging closer ties with secondary European countries, including those of Central Europe. Authored by one of India’s key negotiators of the Broad-Based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), Dinkar Khullar, former Ambassador to the European Union, provides a succinct analysis of the salient aspects as well as the points of convergence/divergence in the negotiations that started in June 2007 and went on till April 2013, when they came to a standstill. The author discusses the mismatch of respective perceptions and ambitions, the different procedural mechanisms of the two sides and how the two sides dealt with the difficult issues like agriculture, automobiles, wines and spirits, services, intellectual property rights, sustainable development and human rights. He examines the reasons behind India’s termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties with many Member States of the EU. He discusses the issue of confidentiality in negotiations, the role of civil society and the impact of Brexit on the BTIA. Khullar is somewhat sceptical about an early conclusion of the BTIA, especially given the strong reservations about FTAs at the higher levels of the Government of India. If and when a free trade agreement with the EU is signed, he concludes, it would be ‘a sui generis one’. He urges the Union to look for a balanced and realistic outcome rather than an overly ambitious one. India and the European Union confront similar challenges of international terrorism, terrorist networks and global Islamic fundamentalism. Bhaswati Mukherjee examines the evolution and the degree of cooperation with the European Union and key Member States in counter-terrorism. She discusses Indian efforts for a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and India-EU cooperation in counter-terrorism since the Lisbon Summit (2000). The October 2017 joint statement on cooperation in combating terrorism, she maintains, was a significant breakthrough. She goes on to examine evolving cooperation through the joint working groups on counter-terrorism with the EU and several Member States. India and the European Union, she argues, have come a long way in bypassing Pakistan as an impediment to cooperation and that India is becoming a key partner for the West in developing a common approach towards combating terrorism. Manpreet Sethi argues that the European Union has been a key proponent of non-proliferation whereas India was an outlier until a decade ago. The divergent views on nuclear issues kept the two sides estranged over



many decades. The India-EU strategic partnership gradually led to a better understanding of each other’s positions on security matters, including non-proliferation. Subsequently, India’s accommodation into the nonproliferation regime was made possible with the support of European countries. The chapter examines the issues that historically had kept them apart and identifies the changed circumstances today. It identifies potential areas of cooperation since the two entities have the clout to make a difference to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. This, the author argues, is doubly important at a time when the United States appears to be withdrawing from global issues, and China seeks to impose its own rules. In Chap. 9, Bhaswati Mukherjee examines the evolution of a multifaceted and multi-dimensional relationship between India and the European Union on human rights. She discusses their contrasting approaches towards UN’s human rights mechanisms, including the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its successor—the Human Rights Council. She assesses the nature and the reasons why India agreed to an informal human rights dialogue. She analyses the role of India, the EU and Pakistan during the 1994 UN Human Rights Council and assesses the impact of the strategic partnership on human rights, the role of civil society, and the linkage between human rights and the Broad-Based Investment and Trade Agreement. In recent years, the human rights debate within the EU underwent a fundamental change with the rise of populism. The schism within Europe is becoming an increasingly toxic debate between sovereignty of the individual in West Europe versus sovereignty of the nation in Eastern Europe. In conclusion, the chapter looks at the EU’s 2018 India Strategy approach towards human rights and trade and suggests a way forward. In the next chapter, Vijeta Rattani argues that the climate agenda of India and European Union is rooted in their own broader foreign policy and developmental priorities. While the former has sought to set benchmarks and strategies for the global community to follow in the form of the European Trading Scheme and the European Climate Change Programme, the latter has slowly but surely arisen as a credible climate change actor. This chapter looks at the approach and the role of India and European Union towards the 2015 Paris Agreement and the Paris Rule Book adopted in Katowice Summit in 2018. It also examines how India and the EU domestically implement and collaborate to meet their international commitments and suggests a roadmap for the future.



In the concluding chapter, Sheetal Sharma seeks to address some of the core issues and the challenges posed by legal and illegal migration as well as the movement of refugees in India and Europe. The author seeks to make a comparison between the scenario, mechanisms and success achieved by India and Europe in coping with the influx of migrants. In spite of economic and infrastructural limitations, India provided shelter to over 10 million East Pakistani refugees during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis. Europe however confronted an unprecedented challenge with the arrival of over a million refugees in 2015. European responses, the author argues, raised fundamental issues about the values and the human rights espoused by Europe, the erection of national barriers, the rise of Islamophobia as well as fears about the socio-cultural threat and the burden on social security systems posed by migrants and refugees. China has emerged as ‘the most prominent normative challenger’ of the existing international order (Tharoor and Saran 2020a: 192, 250). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is seen by many in India as an important instrument in building the Chinese narrative of the inevitability of a Chinese hegemonic order based on political authoritarianism and illiberal values. Thus, the values that India and the European Union share become important in the context of ‘an alternative authoritarian and state-controlled model that President Xi Jinping is propagating today’ (Sibal 2019: 77). Growing convergence between India and the European Union at the October 2017 summit was spurred by eroding European romanticism that greater engagement with and facilitating China’s rise would eventually lead to internal, democratic reform and the gradual acceptance of Western values. From being the lone critic of the Belt and Road Initiative at the time of the BRI summit in Beijing (May 2017), India’s concerns why it disliked the BRI began to be echoed a few months later by others, including Europe, Japan and the United States. The outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) will further exacerbate the drawbacks of the existing world order. The pandemic has highlighted the ‘waning legitimacy’ of international institutions, which suffer from politicization, manipulation, a lack of representation, independent leadership and purpose (Tharoor and Saran 2020b). It signified ‘the unmistakeable demise of Pax Americana’, exposed the social and governance vulnerabilities of the West, and further widened the divide between North and South Europe over economics, and Western and Eastern Europe over values’ (Saran 2020). The coronavirus may have, in fact,



heralded the sudden onset of what Ian Bremmer calls ‘a “G-Zero” world— one that is at once multipolar, leaderless, and likely besieged by renewed geopolitical conflict’ (Bremmer 2011). The pandemic is leading to ‘a smaller, meaner kind of world’ since in all polities, there is already ‘a turning inward, a search for autonomy and control of one’s own fate’ (Menon 2020; Borrell 2020). The European Union, which in the past had tended to be seen by India as an undervalued partner, is now increasingly part of most conversations in fields like the economy, technology, standards, best practices, development, defence and security. The renewed focus on Europe is the result of changing geopolitics, India’s own priorities, Europe’s growing relevance in the post-Brexit era, China’s expanding footprint in the continent, Brexit and the search for alternatives to the loss of the UK as the gateway to Europe. All these developments have compelled India to revisit, re-examine and rethink its own policies towards Europe and search for alternatives to Britain. This realization has been accompanied by a more proactive engagement of Europe—concentration on Germany, France and Spain, the Nordic countries as well as Central and Eastern Europe, which had hitherto received inadequate attention because of limited historical ties, weak people-to-people links and marginal economic cooperation. The US-China geopolitical contest and trade war is taking the world towards a new Cold War. The uncertainties of a more turbulent world have made both India and the European Union look towards each other and towards like-minded partners with similar values, international outlook and adherence to international law to strengthen multilateralism and a rules-based world order.

References Borrell, J. (2020). The Post-Coronavirus World is Already Here. ECFR Policy Brief 320. Retrieved May 30, 2020, from post_coronavirus_world_is_already_here.pdf. Bremmer, I. (2011). A G-Zero World: The New Economic Club will Produce Conflict, Not Cooperation. Foreign Affairs, 90(2), 2–7. Haass, R. (2018, March 21). Liberal World Order, R.I.P. Project Syndicate. Ikenberry, G. J. (2011). The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism after America. Foreign Affairs, 90(3), 56–62, 63–68.



Jaishankar, S. (2019, October 1). Remarks at the Atlantic Council, Washington, DC. Retrieved October 5, 2019, from Council+Washington+DC+on+1+October+2019. Menon, S. (2020, March 20). How the World will Look After the Coronavirus Pandemic. Foreign Retrieved May 25, 2020, from Saran, S. (2020, April 27). Order at the Gates: Globalisation, Techphobia and the World Order. Raisana Debates. Retrieved May 10, 2020, from https://www. Sibal, K. (2019). India and the European Union: Perceptions and Misperceptions. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Changing Indian Images of the European Union: Perception and Misperception (pp. 61–78). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Tharoor, S., & Saran, S. (2020a). The New World Disorder and the Indian Imperative. New Delhi: Aleph Book Company. ———. (2020b, March 28). The New World Disorder. Raisana Debates. Retrieved May 7, 2020, from


1 India, the European Union and the World Order  1 Pramit Pal Chaudhuri 2 India, the European Union and the Postwar Liberal Order 27 Patryk Kugiel 3 India, the European Union and Global Trade Governance 59 Anna Wróbel 4 The European Union and India in Global Financial Governance 75 Karina Jędrzejowska 5 Brexit and India-UK Relations 91 Pramit Pal Chaudhuri 6 India-EU Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement: Process, Issues, Prospects109 Dinkar Khullar 7 India, the European Union and Counter-­Terrorism: Shifting Paradigms, New Cooperation127 Bhaswati Mukherjee




8 India-EU Partnership for Security: Through the Prism of Nuclear Non-proliferation147 Manpreet Sethi 9 India and the European Union: A Dialectical Approach to Human Rights167 Bhaswati Mukherjee 10 India, the European Union and Climate Change: The Paris Agreement and After187 Vijeta Rattani 11 Indian and European Responses to Migration and Refugee Crises205 Sheetal Sharma Index219

Notes on Contributors

Rajendra K. Jain  was formerly Professor and Chairperson at the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has been Director, Europe Area Studies Programme, JNU and the first Jean Monnet Chair in India (2010–2015). He has also been Adjunct Research Professor, Monash European and EU Studies Centre, Monash University, Melbourne (2010–2015). He was formerly Visiting Professor, AsiaEurope Institute, University of Malaya (2010) and Visiting International Fellow, Monash Europe and EU Centre, Melbourne (2009). He was Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Fellow at the University of Constance and Visiting Fellow at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London (1993) and the Foundation for Science and Politics/Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (1995), Ebenhausen, Germany. He has been Visiting Humboldt Foundation Professor at Freiburg, Leipzig and Tuebingen universities and at the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris (2008, 2010, 2013). He has also been visiting professor at the universities of Sofia, Warsaw and UPFM Barcelona. He was Adjunct Professor (Research), Monash University (2010–2015) and Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) Professor of Contemporary India, Leuven University (2015). He is the author/editor of over 30 books and has written 150 articles/chapters in books. He has most recently published Changing Indian Images of the European Union: Perception and Misperception (Palgrave 2019) and India, Europe and Pakistan (Knowledge World, 2018).




Karina Jędrzejowska  is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw. She is a graduate of the University of Manchester (MsC Globalization and Development, 2008), Warsaw School of Economics (M.A. in Finance and Banking, 2007), and an M.A. in International Relations from the Institute of International Relations, Warsaw University (2005). Since April 2017, she is a Governing Board Member and Treasurer of the World International Studies Committee (WISC). She is co-editor of the forthcoming The Future of Global Economic Governance: Challenges and Prospects in an Age of Uncertainty (2020). Dinkar Khullar  studied Economics at St Stephen’s College, New Delhi (1970–1973) and thereafter obtained a Master’s degree from the Delhi School of Economics. Prior to joining the Indian Foreign Service in 1978, he taught Economics at St. Stephen’s College for three years. Between 1978 and 1999, he worked in India’s Embassies in Moscow, Rome and Seoul, interspersed with assignments in India in the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministries of Finance and Commerce and the Office of the Prime Minister. He was the Ambassador of India in Azerbaijan and Bulgaria. He later served as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of India to the UN Offices and International Organizations in Vienna, Austria (2009–2012) and Ambassador of India to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union at Brussels (2012–2013). He occupied the position of Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs, with responsibility for India’s relations with Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Canada and Eurasia (2013–2014). Patryk  Kugiel  is Senior Analyst in the Asia-Pacific Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw. He is a specialist on South Asia and international development cooperation. His research in PISM focuses on the foreign policy of India and Pakistan, the security situation in South Asia, US and EU policies towards the region; implications of India’s rise on the global order as well as the development cooperation policy of Poland and the EU.  He is the co-editor of India-Poland Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Vistas for Future Cooperation (2014) and author of India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy (2017).



Bhaswati Mukherjee  has had a distinguished career of over 38 years in the Indian Foreign Service. She served as First Secretary, Permanent Mission of India to the UN, New York (1986–1989) and Deputy Secretary (United Nations, Political), Ministry of External Affairs, (1984–1989). She was formerly Ambassador to the Netherlands (2010–2013) and Permanent Representative to UNESCO, Paris (2004–2010). She was formerly Chef de Cabinet to the UN Assistant Secretary General for Human Rights and Special Assistant to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Centre for Human Rights, (subsequently renamed as Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights) Geneva (1991–1997). She was Joint Secretary (Europe West, EU and Commonwealth), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi (1999–2004), during which she piloted institutional linkages with the European Union. She helped to shape and chaired from the Indian side several India-EU Working Groups including on Counter Terrorism (three separate working groups with France, UK and EU respectively) and India-EU Joint Working Group on Consular Issues as well as the India-EU Joint Commission. She has recently published India and the EU: An Insider’s View (2018). Pramit  Pal  Chaudhuri  is a Distinguished Fellow and Head, Strategic Affairs at Ananta Aspen Centre and the Foreign Editor of the Hindustan Times. He writes on political, security and economic issues. He was a member of National Security Advisory Board of Government of India from 2011–2015 and is a member of the Asia Society Global Council and the Aspen Institute Italia, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, and the Mont Pelerin Society. Vijeta Rattani  is Technical Expert on the issues of environment, climate change and natural resource management in Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)—the Indo-German Bilateral Cooperation Agency. Earlier, she was heading the climate team at the Centre for Science and Environment. Her work profile includes tracking, analyzing and writing on different aspects of climate change including global climate negotiations, adaptation. She has been a regular contributor to Down to Earth magazine. She obtained her PhD from JNU focussing on climate politics from the European Union perspective. She has been a Visiting Scholar at the Freie University of Berlin, Vrije University Brussels, Bremen International Graduate Institute of Social Sciences, University of Bremen, University of Bonn, and University Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium. She is the recipient of a German Academic Exchange Service fellowship during her PhD research.


Notes on Contributors

Manpreet  Sethi  is Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi where she heads the project on nuclear security. Over the last two decades, she has been researching and writing on nuclear energy, strategy, non-proliferation, disarmament, arms and export controls and ballistic missile defence. She is the recipient of the prestigious K Subrahmanyam award, an honour conferred for excellence in strategic and security studies. She lectures regularly at establishments of Indian Armed Forces, Police and Foreign Services. She has been a Member of the Prime Minister’s Informal Group on Disarmament (2012) and several Track II initiatives. She has been Member of Executive Board of Indian Pugwash Society and is a Consultant with the global Nuclear Abolition Forum and Asia Pacific Leadership Network. Her publications include Code of Conduct for Outer Space: Strategy for India (2015) and editor of Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World (2009), Global Nuclear Challenges (2009) and Nuclear Power: In the Wake of Fukushima (2012). Sheetal  Sharma is Assistant Professor, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She is coordinator of the Jean Monnet Module on Society, Culture, and Social Change in Europe. She was previously lecturer at the Institute of Technology and Management, Gurgaon, India. Her research interests include social and cultural issues in contemporary Europe and India and their historical roots, multiculturalism and diversity, the methodology of the social sciences, and gender issues and the empowerment of women. She has written a number of book chapters and journal articles and is the author of Legal Profession and Women: A Study in Professions and Gender (2006). Anna Wróbel  is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw. She holds a PhD on the policy of liberalization of international trade in services. A Member of the Polish Association of International Studies, she is also the co-editor of The Dragon and the (Evening) Stars: Essays on the Determinants of EU-China Relations (in Polish) (2013) and The Future of Global Economic Governance: Challenges and Prospects in an Age of Uncertainty (2020).



Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Accounting Standards Board Association of Southeast Asian Nations Brazil, South Africa, India and China Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Bank of International Settlements Bilateral Investment Treaty Bharatiya Janata Party Belt and Road Initiative Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism Common European Asylum System Common Foreign and Security Policy Countering the Financing of Terrorism Conference of Parties Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Dispute Settlement Body Doha Development Round Democratic People’s Republic of Korea European Banking Authority European External Action Service European Economic Community European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority European Securities and Markets Authority xxiii



ETS Emission Trading System EU European Union FATF Financial Action Task Force FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty FSB Financial Stability Board FSF Financial Stability Forum FTA Free Trade Agreement GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GCF Green Climate Fund GDP Gross domestic product GI Geographical indication GSP Generalised Scheme of Preferences GWOT Global War on Terrorism HRC Human Rights Council IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors IASB International Accounting Standards Board IB Intelligence Bureau ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights IFI International Financial Institutions IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards IMF International Monetary Fund INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty IOM International Organization for Migration IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPR Intellectual property rights ISI Inter-Services Intelligence ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISSBs International financial institutions and international standardsetting bodies ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation JAP Joint Action Plan JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JeM Jaish-e-Mohammad JS Joint Secretary JSA Jal Shakti Abhiyan JWG Joint Working Group LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba LoC Line of Control MFN Most favoured nation MNRE Ministry of Natural and Renewable Energy


MSMEs Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NAFCC National Adaptation Fund on Climate Change NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NAPCC National Action Plan on Climate Change NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDB New Development Bank NDCs Nationally Determined Contributions NNWS Non-nuclear weapon states NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group NTBs Non-tariff barriers NWS Nuclear weapon states OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development P5 Permanent Five R2P Responsibility to Protect R&AW Research and Analysis Wing RBI Reserve Bank of India RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership RTAs Regional trade agreements SAPCC State Action Plans on Climate Change SCR Security Council Resolution SDT Special and differential treatment SPIPA Strategic Partnership on the Implementation of the Paris Agreement SPS Sanitary and phytosanitary standards TBT Technical barriers to trade TCPO Town and Country Planning Organisation TDI Trade defence instruments TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN United Nations UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNSC United Nations Security Council VDPA Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WTO World Trade Organization



India, the European Union and the World Order Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

The election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States has posed a major challenge to the Atlantic Alliance and the post-World War II international order. A Europe used to the special bonding of an Atlantic Alliance has been buffeted by Trump’s preference for a robust unilateralist foreign and trade policy. India, more distant from the US, has perceived some geopolitical benefits in Trump’s unorthodox ways in regard to China. But the weakening of the US-Europe relationship, along with upheavals like Britain’s vote to leave the European Union, has meant that India and the European Union have come much closer together in the past five years on a number of policy issues integral to the international order. This trend was already evident before either Trump or Brexit, but American external polices have accelerated the coming together of India and the EU.

P. Pal Chaudhuri (*) Distinguished Fellow and Head, Strategic Affairs at Ananta Aspen Centre, New Delhi, India Foreign Editor, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2020 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World,




Views of the World Order Neither India nor the EU Member States were pleased with the Trump Administration’s unilateralism and hostility to the international order’s three primary components: multilateral institutions, the postwar military alliance structure and their legitimizing values (International Institute of Strategic Studies 2018). But they had significant differences over which of the American President’s actions was more objectionable and the reasons why they disliked these actions. New Delhi’s relationship with Washington had far less depth and background than the Atlantic Alliance and there was thus less for Trump to disrupt in terms of bilateral ties. Moreover, common values were seen by the Europeans as the unique element of their bond with the Americans and values were almost completely missing in the US President’s pronouncements and policy. In the India-US relationship, values were largely a rhetorical exercise as far as New Delhi was concerned. That India is less invested in preserving the postwar international order is in large part because it has been a marginal player in that order for most of India’s independent history. It initially rejected key economic elements of that order and broadly saw its own economic and political development best accomplished by minimizing international interaction. While this has changed significantly since the opening up of the economy and the end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991, New Delhi continues to engage with the international system cautiously (Kliman and Fontaine 2012). India is far more sanguine about Trump’s attempts to delegitimize the international system, so long as they do not go beyond a certain point, for two reasons. One, India sees the decision-making bodies of the international system as weighted against its own representation, whether the United Nations Security Council or bodies like the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Trump-style attacks are therefore seen as useful in shaking up the status quo. Two, lndia supports a soft balance of power structure in the Indo-Pacific region as necessary to put limits on Chinese geopolitical assertiveness. The present international order is seen as incapable of doing so, in part because China sits at the high table of most multilateral bodies and there is nothing like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the western Pacific (Rajagopalan 2017; Paul 2018). The European Union is seen as having negligible levers of influence in the Indo-Pacific and no willingness to use the few levers, almost all economic, it has against



China. Trump’s China policy has proven to be remarkably forceful with its sweeping imposition of tariffs and barriers on technology. Two elements of the international order—climate and maritime security—have seen the maximum amount of India-EU cooperation. In the case of climate change, this was greatly enhanced following the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Both in terms of the EU and with individual European countries, there has been considerable cooperation on the climate front (Khandekar 2018). India has also raised existing maritime security cooperation with France and Britain, and has even had its first naval actions with French warships flying the EU flag. However, there has been a minimal degree of overlap on the issue of trade and almost none in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, though both multilateral systems have been deliberately targeted by Trump. New Delhi and Brussels have sought to uphold the sanctity of the World Trade Organization (WTO) against unilateral American trade actions. However, India is a minor player in global trade and among the more protectionist WTO members. Many of Trump’s grouses against India are also shared by the European Union (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2003). New Delhi has been indifferent to the fate of NATO, a key target of Trump’s ire and a major source of concern for the EU. The one overseas military operation that Trump wants to wind up which worries India—the US military action in Afghanistan—is a war most Europeans also believe should come to an end. The nascent military arrangements India has invested in, whether the India-US-Japan trilateral or the Quad, are all about the Indo-Pacific, where India sees the EU is seen as having little or no role. The Trump Administration has remained fully supportive of these efforts, if anything seeing India as the less aggressive participant in all three. New Delhi and Brussels have both opposed the American abrogation of the nuclear agreement with Iran and the subsequent imposition of US sanctions. India lacks the economic wherewithal to defy the United States on the sanctions and so has largely acquiesced, preferring to negotiate temporary exemptions directly with Washington. European attempts to set up parallel financial mechanisms to get around the US sanctions were supported by India but proved abortive. The two sides were on the same side but lacked the capability to do much about the US’s actions (Emmott et al. 2019, 9 May). On Trump’s decision to cancel the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, however, India and the EU were not on the same page. New Delhi saw the INF Treaty through the prism of China and the fact the



treaty had allowed China a near monopoly in missiles of that range in the western Pacific. Brussels saw it in terms of a breakdown of the post-Cold War consensus on non-proliferation and destabilizing to their region. India, a long-standing former sufferer of multilateral nuclear technology sanctions, is generally cynical about the multilateral non-proliferation and arms control regime. Where the EU and India differ the most is the importance they place on the ‘liberal’ prefix that is sometimes attached to ‘international order’. Arguably, nothing distinguishes the Atlantic Alliance from similar arrangements in the world more than the commonality of the United States and the Union when it comes to values. This is a much weaker element even with the five treaty alliances of the United States in the Indo-Pacific. Constitutional democracy is well entrenched in the Indian polity today but India remains ambivalent about liberalism and all that it entails, both at home and abroad. Indian attitudes regarding liberalism are an ever-­ changing landscape though present trendlines show Indians becoming more liberal in their economic views but less tolerant on social issues (Meinardus 2019). Being ambivalent about the universal applications of liberal democracy is one reason India does not support its export. Privately, most Indian commentators will argue democracy is alien to the cultures of both China and the Arab world. Therefore, the question of exporting democracy to elsewhere has never been part of India’s foreign policy. New Delhi prefers to emphasize that the world order should be ‘rules-based’ but not necessarily that it be ‘democratic’ at the nation-state level (Muni 2009; Press Trust of India 2019). While the Union was as enthusiastic about democracy promotion as the United States in the aftermath of the Cold War, that sentiment in Brussels has waned as other issues have assumed priority and interventions in places like Libya have turned sour. Trump’s enthusiasm for dictators and right-wing populists has shocked Europeans but has been treated with indifference by Indians. The international order has many elements and the Trump Administration has wielded at least a verbal axe on most of its foundations. India and the EU agree on the importance of only some of the pillars of that order, but this has been enough to accelerate cooperation between the two. India will seek ‘coalitions of the willing’, say senior Indian diplomats, to rally around specific pillars of the international order.1 Another reason for limited India-EU cooperation is continuing uncertainty by both sides whether Trump’s policy will necessarily remain US policy after



his presidency is over. Even the mercurial US President’s views on the world, as discussed below, have changed over the years.

Campaign Views On the campaign trail through 2016, Trump laid out a worldview that ran counter to the prevailing foreign policy consensus in Washington and the major Western capitals. He made three major overlapping claims that positioned him even outside the mainstream of his own Republican Party. As one of his early political backers explained after Trump’s inaugural address and its America First theme, ‘Trump is repudiating the establishment consensus. He is part of neither its rightwing nor its leftwing’ (Gingrich 2016). Firstly, he expressed a preference for unilateral foreign policy action in the context of an extremely narrow view of the national interest, labelled as ‘America First’. While a belief in unilateralism is widespread among conservative American politicians, in Trump’s case it encompassed a repudiation of almost all US bilateral and multilateral commitments, including those in trade, defence and immigration and even bodies that the United States had itself created. Secondly, Trump claimed that American allies were exploiting the United States by not shouldering their fair share of the costs of the alliance. Unprecedented for a postwar US President, Trump expressed scepticism about the utility of even NATO.  He even remarked that the European Union was created to take advantage of the US. Thirdly, Trump espoused a crude version of mercantilism which saw US trade deficits as signs of America’s wealth leaking out to other countries. He was critical of almost all multilateral trading arrangements as being biased against the United States. Trump’s worldview was a throwback to a nineteenth-century American conservativism and consistent with his own statements going back to the 1980s (The Economist 2016, 9 November; Sanger and Haberman 2016; Wright 2016). In other words, unlike other postwar American presidents, Trump did not believe ‘a world of expanding democracy and free markets’ was in American interests and did not believe that the relatively low costs of the American alliance structure and investments in international institutions constituted a geopolitical ‘bargain’ (Kahl and Brands 2017).



Symbolic Acts During his first year in office, President Trump acted on some of his promises, but in a manner that seemed to indicate he was mostly interested in symbolic victories. The most striking action was on trade policy. Right after his inauguration, Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Four months later, he initiated a review of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Trump maintained an unrelenting criticism, in speeches and on social media, of the trade surpluses of a number of countries, including China and Germany, were running with the United States. None of this caused too much alarm. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was already in limbo because of Congressional opposition and Trump incorporated many of its new elements into the amended NAFTA.  The US leader made only a few passing references to the EU, India and the larger international trading system. He even allowed a joint statement critiquing ‘protectionism’ at the G-20 summit in March (Schneider-Petsinger 2017). On American overseas military commitments, Trump also seemed more bark than bite. In July 2017, in a speech in Warsaw, he declared that a strong Europe was in everyone’s interest. He called upon Europeans to contribute ‘billions’ more because of him (Trump 2017). The following month he publicly committed to sending more troops to Afghanistan though he insisted their primary role would be counterterrorism. There were a number of policy areas where Trump did turn the US ship of state in a different path. The most obvious were in regard to West Asia. In October 2017, the US president refused to certify Iran’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the formal name of the agreement which had been negotiated between the West and Iran over restrictions on the latter’s nuclear programme. But Trump did not impose any actual costs on Iran; he merely called upon the US Congress to consider sanctions. In December 2017, Trump announced the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and promised to move the US Embassy to that city. Most European governments joined the majority in the United Nations to censure the American move. India, which already recognized Palestine but had developed a close relationship with Israel, abstained. On both these issues, Trump was not out of line with mainstream Republican views. Barack Obama had never been able to secure a consensus in favour of his Iranian agreement during his presidency. Again, neither of these decisions fundamentally affected regional stability.



Overall, the early Trump Administration was far from being radical. Earlier Conservative US Presidents like Ronald Reagan or George W. Bush had not shied away from unilateral action. Trade agreements had long had a chequered political history in the United States though it was jarring that a candidate of the Republican Party—the free trade party of America— spoke of tariffs so welcomingly. The Iran nuclear deal had never attracted bipartisan support in Washington. But there were warning signs that as his presidency progressed Trump’s foreign policy would hew closer to the extremism of his campaign speeches.

Climate Shock The biggest shock for the international system was Trump’s decision in June 2017 to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change. While Republicans are the party of climate scepticism and generally opposed to restrictions on US fossil fuel consumption, there had been hope Trump would only demand some renegotiation. In the run up to his decision, he had said he had ‘an open mind’ regarding the Paris Agreement. In practical terms, the announcement in theory had no impact as the American withdrawal would only come into force four years later. Trump’s domestic decisions regarding carbon emissions were more damaging in climate terms. The US decision was particularly traumatic for the EU, which had put climate change front and centre in its external policy (The Economist 2017, 6 July; Shear 2016). The Narendra Modi Government’s response reflected an ongoing debate within the Indian system. While no Indian agency opposed the Paris Agreement, some policy-makers argued that the West as a whole had fulfilled none of its funding promises for the developing world and an Indian threat to follow the United States would give New Delhi leverage at Paris. Reportedly Modi’s personal concern about climate change and fears Paris would unravel altogether led the Indian leader to personally insist New Delhi maintain its support for the Paris Agreement. ‘We earned many brownie points with the Europeans in doing so’, added a senior Indian diplomat afterwards.2 The main European governments rallied around the Paris Agreement and made clear their determination to adhere to if not tighten the Paris Agreement though India and other countries noted this did not find reflection in increased EU funding or assistance to least developed countries.



Personal Biases Arguably what upset Europe the most was Trump’s singular indifference, bordering on hostility, to the Western alliance and disinterest in the special status it held in US foreign and security policy. He treated NATO and the EU not as the bedrock of US foreign and security policy but rather as a millstone and a noose around America’s neck. The US President publicly admitted he could not remember the name of Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, after he rang him to congratulate him on his electoral victory. The US President also saw nothing wrong in commenting on domestic European politics. European governments were horrified at Trump’s open endorsement of the new right-wing populist parties making their mark in the continent. This was most evident in his support for Britain’s withdrawal from the EU, the so-called Brexit vote of June 2016, but also in his embrace of anti-immigrant conservative parties in Central Europe and elsewhere. In an interview, Trump called the European Union ‘basically a vehicle for Germany’ and predicted that other countries would join Britain in leaving (Esch 2017). In contrast, Trump saw Modi and the 2014 landslide victory of his right-wing nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as being an echo of his own election. A number of his ideologues in the White House, notably Steve Bannon, argued that Modi’s victory, the Brexit vote, Trump’s election and the spread of right-wing parties in Europe were all part of a global anti-establishment wave. Bannon said, ‘That centre-right revolt is really a global revolt … I think you’ve already seen it in India’—a questionable claim as Modi was hardly a political outsider. Trump openly endorsed the anti-immigrant fringe parties in France, Germany and Britain, arguing his global revolt was evident in the ‘UK Independence Party and Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom, whether it’s these groups in the Low Countries in Europe, whether it’s in France, there’s a new party in Germany. The theme is all the same’ (Feder 2016; Walt 2018).

Different Ways This resulted in different approaches to Trump as an individual by the political leaders of Europe and India. Modi, recognizing that the US President rightly or wrongly saw him as one of his own, sought to embrace Trump closer. In his first meeting, he invited Trump’s daughter, Ivanka, to represent her father at a conference in India and avoided direct criticism



of any of Trump’s policies, including withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. New Delhi was also struck by the strong sentiments in favour of closer Indo-US strategic relations it encountered from most elements of the Trump Administration, whether ideologues like Bannon or more establishment figures like the Pentagon chief James N. Mattis, Secretary of State Rex W.  Tillerson and the National Security Advisor Herbert R. McMaster3 (Desai 2018). In the European case, the newly elected French President Emmanuel Macron sought to create a working relationship with Trump through flattery. When this failed, Macron began publicly calling for an EU that strengthened itself domestically and militarily—as he did in a speech in September 2017. German Chancellor Angela Merkel did little to hide her personal disdain for Trump and preferred a more direct and confrontational approach, both in private and in public. Trump, it seems, already had a personal bias against Germany to the point that he sometimes denied his own German origins and claimed to be of Swedish descent (Dempsey 2018). He bracketed Germany with China and Japan as the main countries which had used unfair trade practices to impoverish the United States. He came to see the German leader’s policies as almost a challenge to his own and would publicly revel in what he perceived to be her failures. Merkel’s decision to allow one million Syrian refugees to enter Germany in 2015 was derided as a ‘catastrophic mistake’ and apposite to Trump’s decision to impose a travel ban on a handful of Muslim majority countries (Hesch et al. 2017). British Prime Minister Theresa May had the least amount of leeway in her relations with Trump. Hobbled by her commitment to go through with Brexit, her party’s irreconcilable differences over the nature of separation and a belief she needed to maintain a close relationship with the US for her own domestic credibility and to strengthen her negotiating posture with Brussels, May sought only photo opportunities with Trump. It did not help that the US President was open in his praise for the most extreme proponents of Brexit, like Nigel Farage of the UK Independence Party (Wright 2019).

Divided America The European position in the Trump Administration was further compounded by a lack of convergence with many members of the Administration. Establishment figures like Mattis, Tillerson and McMaster



remained committed to the Western alliance, even while sharing the President’s irritation with Germany’s continuing underspending on defence and the general sense of policy drift in Brussels. However, many of the White House ideologues were contemptuous of the mainstream European political leadership and openly supportive of their right-wing populist opponents. The result was often contradictory statements by the Trump Administration on even simple issues like fighting the Islamic State or handling Russia. India benefited from the grand strategies unveiled by the Trump Administration in January 2018—a National Security Strategy and a National Defence Strategy—that spoke of a return of ‘great power rivalry’ to the international system and identified Russia and China as major strategic competitors to the United States. Both documents were cleared by Trump. However, both policies built on the ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy outlined by the Obama Administration in arguing that the US’s primary strategic theatre of concern lay in the growing Chinese footprint in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Both documents made a mention of the Atlantic Alliance and declared that ‘a strong and free Europe is of vital importance to the US’. But in the hierarchy of things, Asia was elevated ahead of Europe. This meant there was a consensus between the ideologues and the moderates in the Trump Administration as to the importance of India. There was less of an agreement on the importance of the Atlantic Alliance (Joshi 2017). All of this was to prove important when Trump began to purge the moderate figures in his Administration from March 2018 onwards. The major European states had been reassured these individuals represented continuity in US foreign policy. These ministers understood that NATO was the bedrock of American security, that the EU was in the American interest and Brexit was not, that India was a nascent strategic relationship that needed to be cultivated and so on. That much of US foreign and security policy was, on the ground, relatively unremarkable in the first 14 months of the Trump Administration was in large part because these three men, with assistance from Trump’s Chief of Staff John Kelly and his daughter Ivanka, tempered the President’s more extreme positions. Much of this was to change after February 2018.



Moderates Purged Fourteen months into his presidency, Trump began refashioning his Administration to reflect his worldview. In March 2018, he dismissed Tillerson as his Secretary of State and, two months later, replaced his National Security Advisor McMaster. There were similar personnel changes on the economic side, notably the departure of White House economic adviser Gary Cohn. Kelly was to hang on until year-end. Trump replaced McMaster with the abrasive neoconservative and fervent unilateralist, John Bolton. The new Secretary of State was a conservative ex-­ Congressman from Kansas, Mike Pompeo, who reinforced Trump’s dislike for the Iranian nuclear deal and opposition to multilateralism in general. The new faces on the economic front did so on the understanding they did not shirk from waging trade wars, supporting the use of tariffs against the likes of China (Olorunnipa and Wadhams 2018). This alarmed European governments as they were comfortable with the moderates in the cabinet and the White House and saw them as the primary constraint on Trump’s more extreme points of view. India was less concerned. Pompeo was a great advocate of the US-India relationship. After some initial doubts, New Delhi was reassured about Bolton’s commitment as well. Bolton developed a strong bond with his Indian counterpart, Ajit Doval. Much of this was driven by the growing US belief that its primary long-term strategic threat lay in the Indo-Pacific arena—a region in which the EU had little or no role to play. But New Delhi was to learn, as did other governments, that Trump kept a strict firewall between his strategic relations and his trade policy. He saw no contradiction in attacking a government for its trade actions even if he believed it important to the US for military and defence reasons.

Tehran and Tariffs In May 2018, a new Trump foreign policy was unveiled: the President began to act on what he had previously only spoken about. The US fully withdrew from the JCPOA and announced two sets of sanctions against Iran that would start in August and November. This was fiercely criticized by the EU and its major Member States. India also opposed the American move but confined its public statements to saying that, on principle, it opposed sanctions not approved by the United Nations. At a meeting in Sofia in May 2018, EU leaders spoke of finding a means to save the JCPOA



by limiting the economic damage to Iran. France and Germany announced plans to create an alternative financial payments system to circumvent American sanctions, which largely depended on the American stranglehold on cross-border payments. The European system was created but because it exempted oil and gas it has so far been ineffective. Iran, after determining that the EU had no real response to the US actions, announced it would breach the terms of the JCPOA as well. India, after receiving assurances on price stability and alternative oil supplies from the United States and its Arab allies, sharply reduced its oil imports from Iran (Farmanfarmaian 2019; Financial Express 2018). Trump also began to widen his unilateral trade policy to encompass almost all of the major trading partners of the US. In late November 2017, when asked who his ‘biggest foe globally right now’ was, Trump said, ‘I think the EU is a foe, what they do to us in trade’ (Glor 2018). In March 2018, the US imposed tariffs on steel and aluminium on a number of countries for unfair trade practices, notably China. After a few months these tariffs were extended to cover India and the EU as well. The Union retaliated by imposing similar duties on the US though it earned itself no points with India by taking the opportunity to impose similar duties on Indian imports. New Delhi, determined to not let its relationship with Washington fray beyond a point, held back from retaliation for a full year. While both sides were unhappy with American actions, there was sufficient trade friction between India and the EU to ensure they did not join a common front against the US. Trump proposed a ‘zero tariff, zero subsidy’ trade agreement at the G-7 summit in June. Next month, Jean-­ Claude Juncker, the EU Commission President, agreed to not impose further tariffs and stated that the two sides should work to a double zero agreement as well as begin talks on reforming the structure of the WTO (Miner 2018). The US President had been critical of India’s protectionist trade policies from the start of his Administration, focussing in particular on tariffs on Harley-Davidson motorcycles. Modi had quietly reduced motorcycle tariffs but this did little to appease Trump, who continued to publicly attack India on this. The US motorcycle firm manufactures in India, a point lost on the US President, but the US Trade Representative’s Office used the opportunity to pick up other long-standing trade disputes with India over price controls, market access and other issues. After two failed rounds in the fall of 2018 and early 2019, the US withdrew special market



access privileges India received under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) just after Modi was re-elected for a second term (Business Line 2019). The US’s trade battles reflected different sets of policy environments. The largest and most bitter trade battle was between the US and China in which tariffs affecting billions of dollars of trade were being imposed. However, Trump was fully supported by all parties in Washington in this struggle because of a larger geopolitical rivalry between the two countries and a sense that China was the most egregious violator of global trade rules. In the case of the EU, the Trump Administration was more agreeable to coming to terms because of the sheer volume of trade involved, the establishment’s continued support for the relationship and the desire to bring the EU on board the long-term US Trade Representative’s plan to reform the paralysed WTO system. India was a much smaller trade relationship—its surplus with the US rarely went beyond $20 billion a year— and there was a desire not to disrupt the strategic relationship. The Modi Government’s own intransigence led the trade dispute to snowball through the latter part of 2018 but there was a strong desire for the US system to get the dispute wrapped up as quickly as possible. But Washington, going by India’s obstructionist policies in most multilateral trading bodies, tended to see New Delhi as an adversary in issues like WTO reform. The EU was arraigned on the US’s side when it came to its problems with drug price controls, e-commerce investment restrictions and electronic tariffs (Business Standard 2019, 12 July).

The European Union: The Foe The Trump Administration elevated its attacks on the EU and its mainstream political leadership through 2018 and 2019. Part of this stemmed from the increasing policy dominance of the President’s right-wing ideologues and Trump’s own instincts. Mattis, the last representative of establishment thinking, left the Administration in December 2018. It also seems to have been a consequence of the Trump team’s belief that this is what his political base desired—and keeping this base on his side was essential if he was to win the Congressional elections of November 2018. But there seems little doubt that the US President’s already parlous personal relationship with the most important European leaders deteriorated even more. Through 2018 and 2019, the Trump Administration took a more aggressive, verbal assault on the EU and liberal internationalism as a whole.



Trump signalled this new phase during the G-7 summit in Canada in June 2018. He assailed Germany, questioned the purpose of NATO asking ‘Why do we need it?’, called for Russia to be re-inducted into the G-7 and then tried to block the summit’s traditionally unanimous communique (The Economist 2018b, 16 June). In December, Pompeo, in a speech in Brussels, strongly attacked the existing postwar international system and its institutions ranging from the United Nations and the World Bank to the European Union. The central question, he said, was ‘whether the system as currently configures, as it exists today, and as the world exists today—does it work?’ Multilateralism had ‘too often become viewed as end unto itself’. While praising NATO and warning against Russia and China, Pompeo called Brexit a ‘political wake-up call’ as to whether the EU was working for its member citizens (Pompeo 2018, 4 December). That same month, the EU envoy to Washington found the US had downgraded his diplomatic status (Emmott 2019, January 8). US Vice-President Mike Pence echoed Pompeo a few months later at the Munich Security Conference, and was met with a stony silence from the European delegates. The Trump Administration continued to withdraw from multilateral agreements and commitments under its America First stance. The US withdrew from the United Nations Human Rights Council and the INF agreement. Trump announced American plans to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and Syria. Washington barely consulted with its closest allies, like those in Europe, on any of these decisions. It was similarly uncommunicative with India and other related governments about Afghanistan, the only one of these issues New Delhi was concerned about. All of this fit into a larger pattern of refusing to support multilateral groupings that did not jibe with US interests and, in the case of conflict zones, a determination by Trump to reduce US overseas military commitments in which the US was shouldering the bulk of the cost (Schieffer 2019). The Trump Administration’s sense is that its policies are largely successful. NAFTA was successfully renegotiated and a number of countries, including the EU and India, have agreed to bilaterally rework their trade policies with the US. The EU, Japan and others have agreed to relook at the WTO’s structure though India continues to resist such moves. It is another thing that these have had no major impact on the trade position of the US as the latter is determined by macroeconomic factors that are largely separate from tariffs and other trade barriers. The US President has had limited success in terms of reducing the American overseas military footprint, with only relatively small operations in Africa so far affected.



What seems to matter most is the perception to his white working-class base that Trump is shaking up a ‘treasonous’ cosmopolitan governing elite (Mead 2017). The US President has steadfastly held on to a 40 per cent approval rating and many commentators believe he has a very good chance of getting re-elected in 2020.

European and Indian Responses Handling Trump Europe and India have both struggled to handle the radical change in the tone and tenor of US foreign policy under President Trump. But given the much closer and longer relationship that exists between the US and its European allies, the US President’s attitude has been much more traumatic for Europe. Indian officials privately praise key elements of Trump’s policies, most notably his hardline on China and commitment to the Indo-Pacific in general. Europe has been bothered both by Trump’s hostility to the multilateral institutions that were jointly created by the West and by his personal hostility to the EU. Trump’s on-and-off praise for Russia and his arguments against the utility of NATO have shaken a Europe that has come to assume their security will be handled by the US.  As European Parliamentarian Guy Verhofstadt admitted, ‘Transatlantic relations have adhered to a perverse, unspoken dynamic, whereby the more active the US has been, the more Europe has dozed off’ (Verhofstadt 2016). Trump’s open support for the new right-wing populist parties led Europeans to ask whether the standard differences over tactics with the US were now being complemented by a more fundamental disagreement over values, a gap that would go right to the heart of the Atlantic Alliance (Newman 2018). India has drifted closer to the US over the past two decades, strategically because of common concerns over China and economically because the US has emerged as the country’s largest partner when investment, remittances, trade and technology are all taken together. New Delhi, however, is conscious that since the Obama Administration there has been a question mark over the US’s commitment to its presence in the western Pacific. Major differences also exist between the two governments over the American belief, which has stretched back to the Obama years and continues under Trump, that Pakistan’s facilitation is needed to ensure a US withdrawal from Afghanistan. India assumes Pakistan’s price for such



assistance will be to the detriment of India and therefore has placed limits on its defence relationship with the US as far as its western frontier goes. European Unity European observers recognize that many of Trump’s complaints about unequal burden-sharing and a trading system that does not deliver are long-standing bipartisan grouses in the United States. Until now they have not had to face a US President prepared to dilute the Atlantic Alliance in his determination to get Europe to take these complaints seriously. Many continue to believe that Trump is a temporary phenomenon and that future US presidents will return to the status quo. Others recognize that Trump’s policies echoed in large part that of Obama before him and reflect changes in the global order. Norbert Rottgen, Chairman of German Parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee, admitted that ‘Mr Trump is not the cause, but a symptom of the tectonic shifts in geopolitics that have led to the return of great power rivalry and centrifugal forces away from multilateralism’ (Erlanger and Bennhold 2019). Many European leaders have argued publicly that the EU should be motivated by Trump’s behaviour to become a more coherent body when it comes to foreign and security policy (Bravo et al. 2018). So far, despite many speeches and op-eds, a more externally oriented EU has not gone very far for three reasons. Firstly, France and Germany have major differences over what this would entail with Paris calling for a more centralized EU and Berlin opposing such moves. Secondly, uncertainty over Brexit makes the idea of a common European defence force questionable. Britain and France are the only European countries with military capability. The German sense of themselves as a civilian power means if Britain leaves a European military would be overwhelmingly French. Noticeably, despite Trump’s exhortations, Germany has reduced its defence spending even further and its military is treated almost as a joke in Western circles. Thirdly, the political rise of the populist right-wing, especially in Central Europe and places like Italy, has meant a coherent European response to Trump is almost impossible. Many of these governments believe in embracing Trump’s views on Islam, immigration and multilateralism. While polls show that anti-Americanism has risen in the major European countries as has support for the EU as a whole, tangible policy responses remain awaited (Buras and Janning 2018; Deutschmann and Minkus 2018). The weakness of the EU’s response, despite many



defiant statements, to the Iranian sanctions and US trade policies has been noticed by other governments (The Economist 2018a, 17 May). India has stayed the course regarding its desire to align closer to the US and preferred to see Trump as a matter of problem-solving rather than a source of despondence. New Delhi has accepted that its trade relations would be much more contentious and Trump can be expected to come up with throwaway statements—like an oft-repeated desire to mediate over the Kashmir dispute. But the former would run on a separate track from its strategic relations while the latter did not necessarily reflect actual US Government policy. It helped that Modi’s political mandate at home also made him more or less impervious to any criticisms of his US policy or his relationship with Trump (Bagchi 2019; Pal Chaudhuri 2019). New Delhi was also less invested in the global status quo. It was not a major trading state and held the view that much of the present system was inherently discriminatory to emerging powers like India. The Modi Government was impressed with the Trump Government’s tough response to Chinese assertiveness, including its intolerance with Beijing’s serial violations of international trading rules and theft of technology. Indian officials, in contrast, were often privately critical of Obama’s failure to stand up to China. While Trump’s tactics were seen as unusual, such as the imposition of tariffs, his general China policy was something India both supported and encouraged. The endorsement of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ by the United States was seen as a sign that Trump and the Washington establishment had aligned on tackling China. India and the EU Even before Trump was elected, New Delhi and Brussels had been in the process of reassessing their bilateral relationship. Both sides acknowledged that relations had become overly focussed on the tortuous negotiation of a free trade agreement (FTA). An earlier phase where the EU harped on human rights issues had also come to a close. There was interest in moving the relationship to other areas. The unilateralist bent of the US today helped accelerate these trends. The two now seek to improve cooperation in climate change and security in part to compensate for the Trump Administration’s erratic views on such issues. The EU also downgraded the importance of the India FTA. Brussels concluded that given the challenge the US was posing to the international trading system it needed to focus on negotiating large numbers of bilateral and plurilateral trading



agreements. The India FTA was seen as a lower priority because of the smaller likelihood of success and European Commission President Jean-­ Claude Juncker, in his meeting with Modi in October 2017, privately said the EU was prepared to put off a final agreement.4 Much of this new thinking was to be found in a new EU policy paper on India—‘Elements for an EU Strategy on India’—issued in November 2018. While its origins predated both Brexit and the election of Trump, the two events gave the document a sense of greater urgency. The paper was driven by the EU’s desire for ‘middle power cooperation’ to compensate for the unilateral actions of US and China. India was seen as a major contributor on climate policy, maritime security, nuclear non-proliferation and support for multilateral institutions like the United Nations and the WTO.  Importantly it argued ‘the EU has an interest in India playing a greater role in a multipolar world, which requires a multipolar Asia’. In other words, supporting India’s ‘sustainable modernization’ was implicitly accepted as in the EU’s strategic interest. In return, India and the EU would work together in places like Africa, West Asia and the Indian Ocean and other areas where their ‘extended neighbourhoods’ overlapped5 (European Commission 2018). Brussels found New Delhi was more open to discussions on these issues as well. India was arguably as much influenced by the imminence of Brexit as it was by Trump. Until 2016, India had tended to see and treat Britain as its gateway to Europe and even its window on the EU. Indian investment in Britain was greater than its investment in the rest of Europe combined, the Indian diaspora there was by far the largest in the continent and, though France was a closer defence partner and Germany a larger trading partner, Indians tended to conflate Europe with Britain. The Brexit vote, however, forced a major rethink in New Delhi about how it would engage with Europe. During a four-nation tour in May 2017, Modi met the newly elected French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. As Indian officials explained, this was partly to start developing a triangle of relationships in preparation for a post-Brexit Europe.6 Italy was kept out of the equation at the time because of an ongoing dispute with India over the detention of some Italian maritime guards and a lack of a functional government in Rome. Rajoy fell from power soon after, but Modi’s visit was still noteworthy as no Indian Prime Minister had visited that country for 29 years. Modi followed this up with a ‘Nordic summit’, where he met the heads of five Nordic countries in a joint summit in Stockholm in April



2018. In other visits, the Indian Prime Minister has gone to Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and Ireland. As an EU diplomat noted, ‘India’s reconnect with Europe is a recognition that even without Britain this is India’s primary source of trade, foreign investment and technology’ (First Post 2017; Hindu Business Line 2018). European countries have belatedly also become more active in strategic issues that matter to India, especially in developing strategies to counter the rising influence of China in the Indian Ocean and Africa. European states were slow to accept India’s thesis that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had dangerous geopolitical overtones but came around to the view by late 2016. France, the only European state with a physical and military presence in the Indian Ocean, was the most active on this front. Germany also announced an ‘Indian Ocean strategy’ in 2017 though it was largely economic in nature, as did Britain though the latter’s had a military facet (Pal Chaudhuri 2017; Pant and Kaura 2019). In other matters, New Delhi does not see a convergence with the Europeans. The latter are supportive of Trump’s initiatives to hold talks with the Taliban and facilitate a US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Europeans are also internally divided over how to handle China’s technology challenge. While the United States, India and Japan are considering working together on developing a 5G alternative to China, EU Member States remain internally divided on the issue even though their fellow European states, Sweden and Finland, have 5G capabilities (Cerulus and Bishop 2019). A more fundamental issue is the latent belief among Europe’s leadership that Modi and his right-wing party represent illiberal and religio-­ nationalist values that are incompatible with those of the EU and Europe’s elite as a whole. Modi’s political rise has seen European public attitudes about India, often negative because of cultural stereotypes, worsen. Europeans may question whether there is a widening gap between themselves and the United States, but they feel there is a yawning chasm between themselves and the India that Modi represents. This is arguably exaggerated—the World Values Survey shows that Indian values are closest to those of East Europeans, notably Poland—but is a perception that inhibits India and the EU from working beyond a certain point (Weizel-­ Inglehart 2015). India remains much more of a realpolitik practitioner than the EU would like to be. This is one reason New Delhi is less alarmed by Trump’s policy than is Brussels. India’s heterogeneity of thought and policy means



it requires a lot of attention to be able to work with it in policy terms. The EU continues to struggle to make such an investment. The same holds true for India. The EU is surrounded by external challenges today. India is wooed by a myriad of foreign governments. As S.  Jaishankar, then a corporate executive but today the Foreign Minister of the Modi Government, said in an interview, Europe needs to recognize that there is an Asia that goes beyond Japan and China. India, he noted, was 60 per cent of the trade of Japan and 80 per cent of its investment as far as Europe was concerned, ‘so Europe needs to give it a little bit more attention’ (Kostaki 2019).

Notes 1. Private conversation with a senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, 6 June 2019. 2. Private conversation with a senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, December 2018. 3. Private conversations with German diplomats, New Delhi, December 2017. 4. Private conversation with a senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, June 2017. 5. Private conversation with a senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, June 2017.

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India, the European Union and the Postwar Liberal Order Patryk Kugiel

Introduction The global liberal order is in an unprecedented and existential crisis (see Colombo and Magri 2019; special edition of International Affairs 2018). Though it has been under strain in the past, challenged by rogue states, rising powers and non-state actors, this time the situation is a whole different. The severity of today’s problem lies in the fact that for the first time in history the system is being attacked from within as the founding father of liberal international order—the United States—seems not interested in its preservation any more (Ikenberry 2018: 7, 23). Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 shocked many as a direct challenge to the post-Cold War order in Europe and a more assertive policy of China since 2013 posed an even greater challenge to the global status quo. The crisis of liberal democracies and the rise of populist, nationalist, xenophobic and authoritarian tendencies around the world aggravated the situation. However, the changes in American foreign policy after Donald

P. Kugiel (*) Asia-Pacific Programme, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World,




Trump took over as the President of the United States made many to question the resilience of the liberal order. His harsh criticism of multilateralism, global institutions and trade system as well as his unilateral actions and protectionist decisions led some observers to conclude that Trump’s ‘war on the liberal international order is still gathering steam, and the costs are mounting’ (Patrick 2019). These fears were most blatantly expressed by Joseph S.  Nye when he observed: ‘I am not worried by the rise of China. I am more worried by the rise of Trump’ (cited in Allison 2018: 124). Leaving aside various assessments of Trump’s policy and debates whether the liberal world order can survive without American leadership at all,1 it is noteworthy to look at the defenders of the status quo. While the United States seems to join hands with China and Russia in the dismantling of the postwar system, are there any other players capable and interested in its protection? Both the European Union and India apparently have shared interests in upholding the postwar liberal order. They regularly declare each other to be ‘natural partners’, major economies and important global players. They consider themselves to be beneficiaries of globalization and supporters of an open trading system, and committed to cooperation to defend multilateralism. Thus, the October 2017 EU-India Summit joint statement stated: India and the EU, as the world’s largest democracies, share a desire to work closely together and with all relevant players to support a rules-based international order that upholds agreed international norms, global peace and stability, and encourages inclusive growth and sustainable development in all parts of the inter-connected and multipolar world. They welcomed the growing convergence on contemporary global issues and agreed to enhance India-EU cooperation in all multilateral fora. They also recognized their common responsibility towards ensuring international peace and security, and an open and inclusive international order. (European Commission 2017: para 7)

This convergence of views led the EU to formulate its first ever Strategy on India in November 2018—‘Elements for an EU Strategy on India’, which stated: The EU and India share the values of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and support the rules-based global order centered on multilateralism[…] This Joint Communication proposes to[…]:‘Join forces to



consolidate the rules-based global order, based on multilateralism with the UN and the WTO at its core’. (European Commission 2018: 1)

Is this declared congruence of views well grounded in their respective polices and visible in greater international cooperation? Can previous cooperation in EU-India strategic partnership lead us to predict prospects of potential for more collaboration in multilateral forums in the future? Can India and the EU be real natural partners in safeguarding the liberal international order? This chapter seeks to answer these questions by looking beyond official rhetoric and examining practical EU-India cooperation in selected areas. The first section seeks to define the ‘liberal international order’. The next section examines EU and Indian official positions relating to the liberal order. The third section assesses the potential of EU-India cooperation regarding the liberal order. The following section focuses on practical cooperation in four key elements of liberal order, namely attitude towards the rules-based order and multilateralism, free trade, promotion of democracy and non-proliferation. The last section makes some concluding observations and suggestions for future collaboration.

Liberal International Order: Definition and Evolution In recent years, the nature and survival of the crisis-ridden ‘liberal order’ has been intensely debated. Yet, the concept of ‘liberal order’ still does not seem to be well defined. In fact, it is difficult to explain what it really signifies since2 it has no single or dominating definition. In fact, there does not seem to be a general agreement as to whether the ‘liberal order’ exists today or that it has ever existed (Allison 2018). Generally speaking, it is a product of the liberal school of thought in International Relations and is rooted in the philosophy of liberalism (John Locke, Emmanuel Kant) as well as economic liberalism (John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith, Richard Cobden) of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Their ideas emphasized individual rights and freedoms. As a theory, liberalism emerged after the First World War but grew in prominence only in the 1960s and 1970s in opposition to both realism and constructivism, when growing interdependence, globalization and growing role of institutions became more evident. The ‘liberal world order’ was promoted by many liberal scholars



of  neoliberal institutionalism (Robert Keohane, Joseph S.  Nye), liberal internationalism (John Ikenberry, Anne Marie Slaughter) or the theory of international regimes (Stephen Krasner, John Ruggie, Robert Keohane). Thus, a liberal order can be defined as a set of norms, rules and institutions of global governance based on liberal values. John Ikenberry, one of the leading authors and promoters of the concept, defines it as ‘open and rules-based international order’ that is ‘enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism’ (Ikenberry 2011: 56). Other scholars stress that it is a system of ‘alliances, institutions and rules’ created and upheld by the United States after the Second World War (Wright 2018). It could therefore be described as a hierarchical system under American hegemonic leadership. Such a system, according to Ikenberry, has five characteristics, namely openness (in trade); a commitment to a loosely rules-based set of relations (multilateralism); a certain degree of security cooperation; an assumption that reform of the international society is possible; and an assumption that it will move countries in a progressive direction—towards liberal democracy (Ikenberry 2018: 11). This would entail, inter alia, free trade, the freedom of navigation, the rule of law, multilateralism, democratic principles and human rights. There are, according to Ikenberry, three stages of the evolution of the liberal order (Ikenberry 2009: 71–87). The first one—Liberal Order 1.0—was short-lived and linked to the idealist vision of the global system promoted by President Woodrow Wilson following the First World War. The second stage—Liberal Order 2.0 (1945–1989)—was not truly international since Western-led institutions and norms were constrained geographically and thematically. The end of bipolarity, defeat of the communist bloc and the new wave of democratization led to a proper liberal international order (version 3.0). With the victory of liberal democracies and declaration of the end of history, this seemed to be the only option (Fukuyama 1992). The liberal order expanded outwards to became almost universal. Realist thinkers regard the Cold War order ‘neither liberal nor international’ (Mearsheimer 2019: 8). Though the post-Cold War system functioned under different names (unipolar world order, American century, etc.), it has generally been regarded as inherently liberal. As a complex, global phenomenon, the liberal order is composed of its many constituent parts—thematic or geographic subsystems. Hans Maull calls them partial orders defined as ‘regional or/functional arrangements of cooperation and competition between states’ which guide the behaviour of actors through ‘principles, norms, rules and organizations’ (Maull



2018: 8–9). Functional partial orders are commonly called international regimes. According to Kundnani, there are three such suborders: the security order, an economic order and a human rights order (Kundnani 2017: 4). Other authors like D. Kliman and R. Fontaine (2013: 94) point at five key elements, namely (1) a trade order, based on commercial reciprocity and non-discrimination; (2) a financial order, aimed at monetary stability; (3) a maritime order, premised on territorial sovereignty and freedom of navigation; (4) a non-proliferation order, constructed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to reduce their testing; and (5) a human rights order, rooted in respect for fundamental liberties and the democratic process. Maull (2018) evaluated the liberal global order by looking at five functional partial orders: international trade, climate change, public health emergencies, international nuclear order and emerging cyberspace order. In this chapter it is proposed to compare the EU’s and India’s policies on four aspects: multilateralism, trade regime, democracy and human rights regime and non-proliferation regime.

European Union and India in the Liberal International Order As allies of the United States, West European countries were co-authors of postwar multilateral institutions and norms. They play a key role in global governance since two European nations are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (France and Britain) and a European is usually elected the head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) while an American usually heads the World Bank. The European Union itself can be seen as an example of a regional liberal order. It has been one of the most active promoters and defenders of the liberal order in its external policies. After becoming independent in 1947, India was born into the emerging world system and had little influence on shaping its rules and institutions. Yet, India was a founding member of the United Nations (though still a British colony in 1945), and Indian diplomats took part in the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 that created IMF and World Bank and played a significant role in drafting the Universal Human Rights Declaration in 1948. In the following years, as the Cold War took shape, India became increasingly critical of bipolarity and played a leading role in forming the non-aligned movement. Its foreign policy has been guided to



a big extent by five principles of peaceful coexistence (Panch-Shila) agreed in a historical agreement with China in 1954, namely mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-­ interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. During the Cold War, post-colonial and anti-imperial India was a staunch critic of the Western-dominated economic and political system. As a socialist and autarkic economy, it had only limited links to global economy through trade and investments. Hence, India can be hardly seen as part of this Western-led liberal order. Only after major geopolitical shifts since 1989 and outward expansion of the liberal order India was pulled into its orbit. Though it continued criticism of some elements of global governance and rules (like nuclear, trade regimes), it accepted basic premises of international relations. After the Cold War India developed more ‘positive attitude toward liberalization, globalization, and multilateral engagement’ (Sidhu et al. 2013: 14). Fast economic growth that followed its major liberalization since 1991 made India a major beneficiary of not only globalization but also existing liberal international order. In this period ‘India has started to reflect a more pragmatic, realpolitik approach to multilateralism and multipolarity—which is evident in its multiple-­ alignment policy’ (Sidhu et al. 2013: 5). This ongoing shift of India from criticism to acceptance, from challenger to a stakeholder in liberal international order, brought it closer to Europe and opened possibility for closer cooperation. In recent years, with a growing rift between the United States and Europe, India’s value as a like-minded partner increased for the EU. Despite Trump’s alleged retreat from the liberal order, the EU declared its commitment to this system in its 2016 Global Strategy: ‘EU is committed to a global order based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter, which ensure peace, human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons’ (EEAS 2016: 39, para 3.5). Though the Strategy does not use the word ‘liberal’ and it rarely occurs in speeches of EU leaders, there is little doubt that the EU’s commitment to ‘promote a rules-­ based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core’ (EEAS 2016: 8, para 1) complies with theoretical understanding of ‘liberal international order’. The European position is somewhat similar to that of India, especially under Prime Minister Narendra Modi since 2014. For some authors, ‘the country’s foreign policy has undergone remarkable transformation in the



short span of five years’ (Pant and Taneja 2019: 5). It now appears to be much closer to liberal democracies and supports the world order more openly. Though Indian leaders also do not explicitly use the term ‘liberal international order’, they often refer to the ‘democratic and rules-based order’, which sounds very synonymous. In June 2018 at the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, Modi stated: We will promote a democratic and rules-based international order, in which all nations, small and large, thrive as equal and sovereign. We will work with others to keep our seas, space and airways free and open; our nations secure from terrorism; and our cyber space free from disruption and conflict. We will keep our economy open and our engagement transparent. We will share our resources, markets and prosperity with our friends and partners. (Modi 2018b, 1 June)

In January 2019, Minister of External Affairs Shushma Swaraj also reaffirmed India’s support for a ‘democratic and rules-based order’ (Swaraj 2019, 9 January). At the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2018, Modi reiterated support for globalization and a rules-based order. He termed protectionism as one of the three biggest threats to global peace along with climate change and terrorism. In these turbulent times, ‘adherence to the international system based on rules,’ he stated, had ‘become more important than ever’ (Modi 2018a, 23 January). India’s democracy’, he added, is ‘the fundamental base of our country’s stability, certainty and sustainable development. For an India which is full of immense variety of religion, culture, language, costumes and food habits, democracy is not just a political system, it is a way of life, it is the philosophy of life’ (Modi 2018a, 23 January). India’s pledge to ‘work closely together and with all relevant players to support a rules-based international order’ is clearly stated in a document signed with the EU in 2017 (European Commission 2017: 1, para. 7). New Delhi’s strong commitment to international law is also incorporated in the India-US Joint Strategic Vision for Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean of January 2015. In a rare yet not explicit criticism of China, it stated: ‘We call on all parties to avoid the threat or use of force and pursue resolution of territorial and maritime disputes through all peaceful means, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (India, Ministry



of External Affairs 2015a, 25 January). This was reiterated again in December 2015 in a joint statement with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, which stated: ‘[The] two Prime Ministers reiterated their unwavering commitment to realize a peaceful, open, equitable, stable and rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond’ (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2015b, 12 December). It was reinforced three years later in another joint statement: ‘India and Japan must endeavour to work together for a rules-based and inclusive world order that fosters trust and confidence by enhancing communication and connectivity to ensure rule of law, unimpeded trade and flow of people, technology and ideas for shared prosperity’ (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2018a, 29 October). Adherence to a rules-based order is also stated to be a key reason for closer cooperation of the four Indo-Pacific powers (Australia, India, Japan and the United States) that formed the Quadrilateral Dialogue or Quad in 2017. At its third meeting (November 2018), the Quad ‘agreed to partner with other countries and forums in the region to promote a free, open, rules-based and inclusive order in the Indo-Pacific that fosters trust and confidence’ (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2018b, 15 November).

The EU and India as Natural Partners in the Liberal Order? Statements by India and the European Union suggest that both share similar perspectives on liberal international order. There is however an ongoing debate whether this is a rhetorical convergence or a genuine convergence of views. A closer examination of the literature on India’s approach to postwar liberal order indicates that there are at least three schools of thought: those who see India as a natural partner of the EU, those who perceive India as a challenge and a threat to liberal order and those who present India as a supporter of some elements of liberal order. The first group stresses India’s strong commitment to uphold the current international system. For instance, Samir Saran argues that India is a leading supporter as well as a crucial pillar of the liberal world order: ‘There is only one legitimate heir to the global liberal order of any consequence: India’ (Saran, Samir 2018: 106). Other Indian analysts such as C. Raja Mohan and Harsh V. Pant concur and present India as a valuable partner of Western democracies (Raja Mohan 2010). Pramit Pal Chaudhuri maintains that though India may seem to be close to other revisionist



powers, there is an important distinction. Unlike China or Russia, India does not want ‘to scrap liberal order, but to reform it’.3 Ian Hall too argues that after the Second World War India became ‘more of a “norm taker” than “norm maker”, accommodating itself (reluctantly) to the new liberal economic order and American hegemony’ (Hall 2017a: 114). The second group of scholars perceives India in the prism of its anti-­ Western heritage and structural differences between rising and established powers. For them, India is seen as a revisionist power and a global challenger of the status quo. It is regarded as a ‘significant challenge to US interests’ not less than China, as ‘many of India’s interests will be closer to China’s than to those of the United States’ (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2013: 125–126. The ‘conception of the world order’, according to a German scholar, ‘which India seeks to assert in global politics is not necessarily congruent with the values and interests of the West … Despite its democracy and the economic opening-up after the end of the Cold War, India is not a natural partner of the West’ (Wojczewski 2016). Some other scholars feel that India’s perspective on world affairs is closer to that of Western countries, but they have reservations about India’s ability to burden sharing and playing any major role. India, according to Richard Hass, is ‘preoccupied with the challenge of economic development and is tied down by its problematic relationship with Pakistan’ (Hass 2017). ‘India’s commitment to the current order’, Deepa Ollapally points out, ‘remains both instrumental and partial: it has not come around to seeing current liberal order constructed by the West as an end in itself, and is unlikely to do so’ as the main reason for this is India’s ‘deep-seated postcolonial identity and near obsession with autonomy’ (Ollapally 2018: 62). The third group of scholars regards India as a valuable partner of the European Union in the preservation of the rules-based order, but under certain conditions and to a certain extent. ‘Socialization and a buy into the current liberal order’, Ummu Salma Bava points out, ‘imply that India will strive to sustain the existing global order since it has benefited from it. Simultaneously, India challenges the rules of the global order by seeking change to the existing status quo in various institutions such as nuclear non-proliferation’ (Bava 2017: 22). Some authors argue that India may join forces with the West on a case-by-case basis and that it is a ‘global swing state’ which would cooperate with the West on some issues where it would serve its interests (Fontaine and Kliman 2013).



Given the divergent opinions on the potential of India-EU cooperation in upholding the liberal order, this chapter seeks to make a comparative study of their approaches towards four crucial elements.

The EU, India and the Rules-Based Order The foregoing discussion reflected a broad congruence of views of the EU and India on rules-based order and multilateralism with the UN in its core. There are however many examples of differences and a few examples of cooperation. Respect for international law and rules and support for multilateralism are part of the DNA of the European Union. They are enshrined in its founding treaties, strategies and declarations and illustrated in speeches of European leaders. Building international system based on ‘effective multilateralism’ was already one of EU strategic objectives in its European Security Strategy of 2003 (Council of the European Union 2003: 36–38). The more recent EU Global Strategy (2016) reaffirmed that European interests ‘are best served in an international system based on rules and on multilateralism’ (European  External  Action  Service 2016: 4). The EU supports the international system and its key institutions like the United Nations and other global institutions (World Trade Organization, the World Bank, etc.) or regional organizations (Association of South East Asian Nations, the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation, etc.). It is an active promoter of multilateralism and is involved in various multilateral efforts to end conflicts or reach international agreements. In recent years, it has played a crucial role in negotiating the nuclear deal with Iran in 2015. It hosted the Brussels Conferences on Syria and formed the International Contact Group on Venezuela. Brussels is also a part of the Quartet for Libya and had organized regional meetings on Afghanistan (see European External Action Service 2019). It was also a driving force in negotiations leading to the Paris climate agreement in 2015, the adoption of Sustainable Development Goals in 2015 or the Global ­ Compact on Migration in 2018. The EU has strongly supported UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres’ reform agenda across the management, peace and security, and development pillars (European External Action Service 2019). As a normative power, the European Union rejects ‘power politics’ and is ready to react to breaches of international law (e.g. in the case of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014). However, the scale of the EU’s responses



is constrained by practical considerations, interests and unanimous system of decision-making process (e.g. its response to Chinese actions in the South China Sea or US intervention in Iraq in 2003). As a postmodern entity, the EU’s focus on individual human rights sometimes puts it at odds with other traditional values like state sovereignty. The EU, unlike the US, now officially supports a multipolar order. As a result of the growing frustration with President Trump and the mounting rift between Europe and America, the EU is more welcoming to accept a more robust role of India, especially as it now perceives Russia and China as major competitors. Thus, the EU’s 2018 India Strategy says that it has ‘an interest in India playing a greater role in multipolar world, which requires a multipolar Asia’ (European Commission 2018: 11). However, the Strategy does not support India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council largely because of lack of unanimity among EU Member States. India’s attitude towards the post-Cold War world order tends to be more ambivalent or even contradictory. For some India has been a ‘hesitant rules shaper’, shifting its position between being a norms-taker, norms-breaker, norms-maker and norms-shaper (Sidhu et al. 2013: 3). Its aspiration to influence international rules and institutions grew as it left ‘universalism of the weak’ practiced in the Cold War to pursue ‘internationalism of the strong’ (Sidhu et al. 2013: 4). As Indian foreign policy has been driven by ‘the desire to achieve major power status’, it created a conflict between India and the major-power system whose sources ‘have been fundamentally systemic’ (Nayar and Paul 2003: 1). This created a ‘status inconsistency’ for India—a discrepancy between its rising aspirations and ascribed status. India’s goals fuelled an ongoing debate on whether rising India is a revisionist or a status quo power and whether it is a ‘responsible power’ (Dormandy 2007). For instance, while India supports the United Nations, it argues that it should better reflect current-day realities rather than those of 1945. To that end, it maintains that UN reform is essential and that India deserves to get a permanent seat in the Security Council. As a rising power, India strived for greater influence and a greater voice in international institutions like the IMF, the WTO and the UN, which would have to happen at the expense of European powers. To that end, it occasionally joined the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) on specific issues or sided with the West when it suited its interests. Given the West’s reluctance to accommodate rising powers in the reform of multilateral institutions like the IMF, India supported the



establishment of BRICS institutions like the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which were sometimes viewed as alternatives to the World Bank and the IMF.  New Delhi is a founding member of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and is its second biggest shareholder, and joined in 2017 the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, led by China and Russia. India’s support for multilateralism and global institutions has been a constant feature of India’s postwar foreign policy. It has been a proponent of strong adherence to international law as well as the central role of the United Nations. It has therefore been a staunch opponent of any sanctions or foreign interventions without a UN mandate. India has also been critical of Western humanitarian interventions or the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Puri 2016). According to Hall (2018: 173): ‘India’s position has not shifted much, if at all, despite major changes in other areas over the past twenty years. India remains skeptical of embracing R2P, especially its so-called “third pillar”.’ At the same time, it has actively supported UN peacekeeping missions, being the second biggest source of military personnel with over 100,000 Indians having served at various UN operations. While India and Europe have similar approaches in upholding international laws (like voting on Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency), they often criticized each other’s stance on crucial international issues. For instance, India was highly critical of European countries which joined the interventions in Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011) without a clear UN mandate. Similarly, the European Union was disappointed by the lack of Indian condemnation of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. As a traditional Westphalian state, India is strongly attached to national sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states; it is strongly opposed to humanitarian intervention. This is despite the fact that India has in the past sent its troops abroad without a UN mandate—to East Pakistan in 1971, Sri Lanka in 1987 and Maldives in 1988. The differences between the views of the EU and India on world affairs are reflected in voting patterns in the UN General Assembly, where as the leader of developing countries, New Delhi has historically presented an anti-Western position and in the post-Cold War era it has kept more distance from the West than Russia (Das 2017: 5). India’s stance on many issues has tended to be closer to European nations than to the United States (Das 2017: 8). Its position more often has been similar to that of other BRICS countries than EU Member States. Generally speaking, India’s anti-Western position is indicative of India’s quest ‘to carve out a



leading position amongst countries, including Russia, that seek to challenge Western dominance of the liberal world order’ (Das 2017: 5). Nevertheless, India has been a beneficiary of the existing multilateral system in recent years; the divergence between the European Union and India on major global issues like climate change and non-proliferation has narrowed down. Both of them support the centrality of the United Nations and the WTO and consider it more important than ever to uphold multilateralism in times of growing nationalist and isolationist sentiments. For instance, in September 2019, India along with about 50 countries joined the Franco-German initiative supported by the EU to form a new initiative called the Alliance for Multilateralism at the UN General Assembly. Such examples of joint initiatives and practical cooperation between India and Europe to strengthen rules-based order are however rare. Thus, while there is generally considerable convergence between India and the European Union on a rules-based order, there are many differences in practice. For instance, the lack of competences of the Union on crucial issues like a seat in the UN Security Council and divergent perspectives on principles of sovereignty versus human rights may also hinder greater cooperation in future.

The EU, India and the Trade Order A free, open and rules-based trade system based on multilateralism with the WTO in its core is seen often as a centrepiece of the liberal order. The EU, which is the largest trading bloc and a customs union in the world, declares strong commitment to such a system. As its Global Strategy 2016 says: ‘A prosperous Union hinges on a strong internal market and an open international economic system. We have an interest in fair and open markets’ (European External Action Service 2016: 14–15). The EU is a relatively open market as export of goods and services accounts for 44.7 per cent of its GDP (World Bank 2019) and it has one of the lowest customs duties and tariffs in the world. The simple average tariff (Most Favoured Nation (MFN) applied) was 5.2 per cent in 2018 (World Trade Organization 2019b). The EU presents itself as a promoter of free trade and liberalization and an opponent of protectionism. At the same time, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are regarded by developing countries as unfair protective measures. The EU’s subsidies for agriculture, though legal under the WTO rules, are also vehemently criticized for



creating distortions in global trade and the overall negative impact on the developing world. As an active member of the WTO, the European Union has been an offensive force during the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations that started in 2001. Once the global negotiations stalled, the EU promoted regional trade agreements (RTAs) with countries in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. By the end of 2018, the Union had over 40 RTAs in force and 12 more under negotiations. In 2018–2019, it had signed FTAs with Mercosur (June 2019), Vietnam (June 2019), Singapore (October 2018) and Japan (July 2018). Brussels is also making progress in negotiations with Mexico, Chile, Australia and New Zealand. Since the inception of the WTO, the EU has been one of the WTO’s most significant users of trade defence instruments (TDI), as it ranks third overall in terms of anti-dumping initiations and second in terms of countervailing duty initiations (WTO 2017, October 17: 60). At the end of 2018, the EU had 135 measures in force, including 93 definitive anti-­ dumping measures (which were extended in 27 cases) and 12 countervailing measures in force (which were extended in 1 case) European Commission 2019b: 6). Two-thirds of all the 135 measures in place concern imports from China. The EU shields 320,000 direct jobs across Europe from unfair foreign competition. Total TDI measures in force, targeting EU exports, amounted to 174  in 2018 (as compared to 162 in 2017). The European Union is the second most active user of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. By mid-2019, Brussels had launched 102 cases as a complainant, was a respondent in 85 instances and was a third country in about  200 cases (World  Trade  Organization 2019c). It was therefore appalled by the US attacks on the WTO and seeks to reform the institution. On 18 September 2018, the EU presented a comprehensive proposal for WTO reform. On 25 October 2018, it joined 12 other partners (excluding India) for a comprehensive WTO reform. On 23 November 2018, the EU joined India and 11 other countries to propose reforms of the WTO Appellate Body. Unlike Trump, the Union is committed to upholding the multilateral trading system. At the same time, it shares many interests with the US like limiting ‘privileges’ of emerging economies. India, on the other hand, does not seem to be an active promoter of globalization. When Prime Minister Narendra Modi criticized protectionism at Davos in early 2018, the international media criticized the inconsistency in his speech (New York Times 2018, 23 January). India has not



embraced globalization with open arms. In fact, India is a relatively closed market and protectionist economy. The 2015 WTO review of India observed that ‘the tariff structure remains complex and the simple average MFN tariff rate increased during the review period’—from 12 per cent in 2010–2011 to 13 per cent in 2014–2015 (World Trade Organization 2015: 8–9). Under Modi’s watch, India’s tariff rates have gone up to 17.1 per cent in 2018 (World  Trade  Organization 2019a). Besides custom duties, there are also problems with non-trade barriers, numerous licenses and fluid tariff system. There is ‘no denying that high bound rates, relatively higher applied rates, greater incidence of nonbinding tariff lines and high binding overhang, are features that point to India being the most protectionist economy among large emerging markets (Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia)’ (Palit and Mukherjee 2019). American scholars also acknowledge that despite strong US pressure to open its market ‘there appears to be neither the vision nor the appetite in New Delhi to liberalize trade’ (Blackwill and Tellis 2019: 181). As a semi-closed economy, trade plays a much lesser role in Indian than in the EU case. The share of exports in goods and services in GDP was 19.7 per cent in 2018. Though this was much higher than the 7 per cent in 1990, it was still lower than the global average (29.35 per cent) and even less than in 2013 (25 per cent) (World Bank 2019). India had also cancelled most of its bilateral investment treaties with about 60 countries, which made it less attractive for international companies. This is despite further economic reforms and liberalization pursued by Modi since 2014. Though India improved its position remarkably in Doing Business ranking from 132 in 2014 to 77 in 2018, it continues to be a difficult market for foreign companies. India has been often described as being defensive at trade negotiations in WTO and one of the main actors responsible for the failure of the Doha Development Round. This was despite early studies showing major possible gains for India in case of its conclusion (Mattoo and Stern 2003). India often presents itself as a representative of the developing world, but it also acts in its own interest. This was evident in 2014 when India stood isolated in blocking Trade Facilitation Agreement coming into force. Though Modi withdrew his veto in coming months, securing its national interests, it has reminded the West of India’s reputation as a destructive force in trade negotiations. India’s position can be understood in terms of its structural and economic constraints that stop its economy from opening up. Its low



manufacturing share in GDP, rising unemployment, lack of capital and new technologies make it unprepared to compete on a free global market. Therefore, the objective of the  flagship programme Make in India is  to transform India into a global manufacturing hub, is to open India more to foreign investments but not to export. With the global trade talks having reached an impasse, India is reluctant to enter meaningful bilateral or regional trade agreements. It has only 15 agreements in force (which are not so ambitious in scope) and has not signed any new FTA since 2012. It is also dragging its feet over signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is likely to be signed soon by 16 Asian countries. India, like the EU, is one of the most active users of WTO dispute settlement mechanism. By mid-2019 it had brought 24 cases as a complainant, was a respondent in 32 cases and acted as a third party in 161 cases. It is also one of the most active users of anti-dumping measures among WTO members; it initiated more than 80 anti-dumping investigations against 23 trading partners between 2010 and 2014 (WTO 2015: 10). The recent rise of trade tensions between the US and India, including the withdrawal of Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) status to India in June 2019, illustrates to some extent growing international frustration with India’s trade practices. Though President Trump calls India as a ‘tariff’s king’ and prefers to address the grievances bilaterally outside the WTO system, India found itself under pressure in the WTO as well. In 2018 India was referred to the WTO by Australia over sugarcane subsidies (17 November 2018) and by the US over cotton subsidies (12 November 2018) and had lost a steel duty case to Japan on 7 November 2018. The EU and 11 other countries backed an US complaint against India’s export subsidies at the WTO on 20 August 2018. Bilateral goods trade amounting to €91.5 billion in 2018 is a founding stone of the cooperation (European Commission 2019a, 3 June). Yet, it is also one of the most contentious areas in relations—both at bilateral and at multilateral levels—with serious risk of further escalation in future. For India, the EU is still the largest trading partner, accounting for 13.3 per cent of its trade. India is the EU’s ninth biggest trading partner with a 2.3 per cent share in total extra-EU trade. This asymmetrical relationship gives the Europeans some leverage in trade negotiations. The mismatch in the level of ambitions led to negotiations on the Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), which started in 2007 but were terminated in 2013. Some of the sticking points include divergent views



on duties on certain categories of products (like automobiles in the EU case and wine and spirits in the Indian case), public procurement, intellectual property rights, and labour and environmental standards. Despite the narrowing of differences in some issues and arguments to sign the deal for economic and strategic reasons (Kumar and Xavier 2019), there is little hope for talks to resume any time soon. Though trade is fairly balanced (the EU recoded a trade deficit of €143 million in 2018) both claim unfair trade practices and limited access to each other’s market. As a result, the EU and India drag each other to the WTO very often. By mid-2019, the EU brought 11 cases against India in the WTO (second only to the US—35 cases) and was sued by India in 7 cases (less only than the US—11 cases) (see Table  2.1) (World  Trade  Organization 2019c). By the end of 2018, India was the target of 3 out of all the 120 EU anti-dumping measures in force, and 4 out of the 12 EU anti-subsidy measures. India is the second biggest user of TDI against the EU, with 21 measures in force (21 in 2017), after the United States (33 measures in force in 2018) followed by China, with 18 measures in force in 2018 (20 in 2017). In terms of new investigations in 2018, the US initiated three, India four and China two new investigations (European Commission 2019b, 27 March: 20). Thus, even though both the EU and India agree on the need for reform of the WTO, they see it rather distinctively (Kugiel 2019). However, they both are committed to reform the Appellate Body. To that end, they jointly issued a reform proposal in 2018. However, on other aspects of the WTO reform, the EU has more similarities with the US than with India. Table 2.1  Trade disputes in the WTO of the EU and India


European Union (formerly EC)

As complainant

As respondent

As third party

24 cases Including 11 cases against the United States, 7 against the EU 102 cases (including 35 cases against the United States, 11 against India, 9 against China)

32 cases (including 11 brought by the EU, 8 by the US) 85 cases (including 20 brought by the United States, 7 by India, 5 by China)

161 cases

Source: (accessed on 30 August 2019).

202 cases



While the EU expects to limit privileges of developing countries, for India ‘trade is not the end in itself’ but must serve larger goals of development and narrowing asymmetries between developing and developed countries. Therefore, in the proposal of the WTO reform prepared by India and supported by eight other developing and least-developed countries in July 2019, it called for the immediate resolution of the impasse at the highest adjudicating body for global trade disputes and asked for ‘development-­ centric’ reforms of the WTO (Kanth 2019). This has been rejected by the United States and may not find much support in the EU either. While most of the EU 2018 Strategy on India is written in a friendly and diplomatic way, the language tends to become more critical when it deals with trade. The EU will seek  ‘to encourage India to open up its economy’ and set as the main objective ‘to work towards a sound, transparent, open, non-discriminatory and predictable regulatory and business environment for European companies trading with or investing in India, including the protection of their investments and the protection and enforcement of intellectual property’ (European Commission 2018, 20 November: 7). Also when it comes to multilateral trade negotiations, the EU seems visibly irritated with the Indian attitude: ‘The EU expects India to play a more constructive role in the WTO in order to identify long-­ lasting solutions, to contribute to addressing the deep causes of existing trade tensions and to help restore balance in the international trading system’ (European Commission 2018, 20 November: 12). New areas of disagreements over digital technology, data localization and so on may add to the challenge. Thus, different approaches and perspectives on the trade regime may prove to be one of the most contentious issues in EU-India relations.

The EU, India and Human Rights and Democracy Adherence to shared values of democracy and human rights is regularly underlined by the EU and India as a solid foundation for their ‘natural’ strategic partnership. However, instead of being a shared interest, it is more often a source of differences. The EU is based on the democratic values as enshrined in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty and it expects Member States and partners to fulfil democratic criteria and high standards on human rights. Though in recent years respect for democracy and rule of law in several EU Member States has become questionable, the EU stays as a liberal democracy.



Since the end of the Cold War, the promotion of democracy and human rights has also become an important part of European external policies. The ‘most important requirement’ for building a liberal order is said to be ‘to spread democracy far and wide’ (Mearsheimer 2019: 31). The EU has thus embarked on this task. It uses a wide variety of instruments to spread these values around the globe, including political, economic and development assistance. The European Union’s third-generation trade agreements include ‘essential clauses’ with certain commitments regarding human rights, good governance, democratic values, and labour or environmental standards. The EU conditions its development assistance to developing countries on progress made in democratic reforms. It actively supports civil society, democratic reform and human rights in developing countries through its special tools like the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) or the European Endowment for Democracy, which was established in 2011 outside official EU structures. Discussions about the situation of human rights and democracy are also part of regular dialogues Brussels holds with many foreign governments. Its policy in this field is generally guided by midterm strategies, like the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015–2019. For India, discussion on democracy and human rights is a sensitive issue. Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue that started in 2004 took place for the last time in 2013 (Jain 2017: 414) and there are little chances of restarting it soon. Due to deficiencies of democracy in India, the country itself has often been criticized by European NGOs and politicians. Especially, the European Parliament has been critical of violations of human rights in Kashmir and elsewhere in many of its resolutions. With the growing pressure on minority groups in India and recent spike in tensions in Kashmir following the abrogation (August 2019) of Article 370 of the Constitution which used to guarantee autonomy to Kashmir, human rights issues may again became an irritant in India-EU relations. The case of democracy promotion shows a big gap between self-­ perceptions of the European reality and how ‘Outsiders’ perceive it (Jain and Pandey 2010; Jain and Pandey 2012). Indian experts point to the selectivity and ‘incoherence’ in the ‘EU’s domestic and external human rights policy’ (Jain 2017: 419). India finds many priorities of EU’s foreign policy to infringe on sovereignty of other states. The European Union—a postmodern entity which is not responsible for the law and order situation in its Member States—fails to understand complexities and economic, societal and cultural challenges of Indian society. Thus, even if India were



to continue human rights dialogue with the EU, human rights will continue ‘to be ranked rather low in New Delhi’s policy agenda and interaction with the EU’ (Jain 2017: 423). The EU’s ‘staunchly upright stance’ on human rights poses problems in its relations with India. The EU would ‘need to develop a new approach, less confrontational and more constructive’, and to leave improvements in human rights implementation ‘to Indians themselves’ (Jain 2017: 424). Though commitment to cooperation on democracy has been included in the first several joint statements from EU-India summits this element disappeared after 2005 (Jain 2016: 63). Only a few examples of cooperation can be mentioned. India cooperated with Europe in establishing the Community of Democracies in 2000 and United Nations Democracy Fund in 2005 to support civil society organizations in developing countries. It joined the Western powers in voting against Sri Lanka in Human Rights Commission in 2012. There has been a limited cooperation between the EU and India in democracy training in South Asia, especially in Nepal (Jain 2009). Most recently, pressure from European countries and India helped to defuse the constitutional crisis in Sri Lanka and the Maldives in 2018. Though both the EU and India would like to see more democratic and stable countries in their respective neighbourhoods, they differ in methods and tools to pursue that goal. There are significant differences between India and the EU in the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad (see Kugiel 2012; Hall 2017b). India’s general stance is that ‘democracy cannot be imposed from abroad’. ‘Societies’, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pointed out, ‘cannot be reordered from outside through military force’ (Singh 2011, September 24). Though India is willing to share its experiences and institutional knowledge on democratic governance with other countries it has not made democracy promotion an important part of its foreign policy. It has provided training to officials from developing countries under its ITEC programme, supported democratic institutions in Afghanistan after 2001 and engaged in democratic process in Nepal in 2005. In this sense, India prefers to practice democracy rather than promote it. India takes a more pragmatic and less ideological approach in this regard—it provides democratic assistance when its suits its interests and engages with dictators when it has no better alternative. This position does not seem to change much under the Modi leadership. As India tries to combine its commitment to liberal values with



realpolitik, its policy on human rights and democracy is a ‘middle path’. As one author explained: Normatively, New Delhi strikes a middle path. India is in principle committed to genocide prevention, R2P, human rights and liberal democracy, but has serious reservations regarding their practical implementation. The commitment is born out of its own national values. The reservations are borne out by its experience too. (Pai 2013: 317)

Unlike the EU which in South Asia ‘preferred a bottom-up approach by essentially concentrating on civil society and non-governmental organization’ (Jain 2016: 70), often despite or even against the governments of the region, India works at the request of and in cooperation with foreign governments. Indian elites have been critical of Western intrusive and offensive promotion of democracy (like support for past ‘colorful revolutions’), which has been viewed as interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. India prefers a ‘defensive’ approach (Jain 2016: 64). The EU has been critical of India’s continued cooperation with military junta in Myanmar and human rights violations in other countries. The European Union is accused of ‘double standards’ when it comes to its profile as a normative power. Europe is often perceived as presenting ‘a normative agenda in a way that seeks to undermine the competitive advantage of developing countries’ (Jain and Pandey 2013: 120 ). Thus, it is perceived as a form ‘of regulatory imperialism’ through ‘unilateral regulatory globalization’ (Bradford 2011, cited in Jain and Pandey 2013: 121). The EU seems to ‘propagate and reflexively impose social, economic and ideological norms as global public goods that have been so successful in Europe at the global level, irrespective of other countries’ stage of development, historical background, and social and cultural peculiarities’ (Jain and Pandey 2013: 121). Indian elites call for more equal treatment. Europe, according to Rajendra Jain, ‘should recognize that it has to listen more and lecture less, for very often most Indians tend to regard Europe as being intrusive and preachy’ (Jain 2014: 20; Jain 2016: 2). The EU normative approach to international affairs may lead to irritants with Indian exceptionalism in future. India has, like Europe, traditionally viewed itself as a ‘moral’ or ‘normative’ power (see Sullivan 2014). The notion of Indian idealism was especially strong in the first years of its independence, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. During the Cold War, India projected itself as a representative of developing countries and



sought the establishment of a new just and fair international system. Though idealism in Indian foreign policy declined by the end of the Cold War, it is again gaining traction in recent years as India develops its own model of ‘soft power’ (Kugiel 2017). This is especially visible under Prime Minister Modi. The manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014 called India ‘vishwa guru’—universal leader, global leader, or a reformer and teacher to the entire world. In other words, it can use its ancient wisdom through its soft power and proactive diplomacy (BJP Election Manifesto 2014 Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, March 2014: 40). India, according to Foreign Secretary Jaishankar, seeks to play a ‘leading’, and not just a ‘balancing’, role in Asia (Jaishankar 2015). Modi is trying to make use of ancient Hindu traditions as a source of Indian exceptionalism (Hall 2017a). Far from subscribing to the European vision of world affairs, India may soon be more vocal in suggesting its own solutions and models of global governance. Some Indian authors propose a ‘New Delhi Consensus’, as distinct from both the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the ‘Beijing Consensus’, as a more legitimate proposal of international system (Saran 2017). After the re-election for a second term in 2019, Prime Minister Modi stated: ‘I see the next five years as crucial and important time not only for Gujarat but also for the entire world. This is an opportunity for another renaissance that will make India a vishwa guru (global leader)’ (Modi 2019). Though India may not at present have the resources and capacities to play that role (Hall 2017), its past traditions and ambitions of current leadership should not be ignored. Therefore, though the clash of European and Indian exceptionalisms is not inevitable, it is still a possibility. Much will depend on a better understanding of Indian proposals and on the willingness of Europeans to respond positively to their ambitions. Finally, it is important to underline that India and the EU differ in their understanding of the very sense of democratization. When Indian leaders speak about a ‘democratic international order’, they mean the democratization of the international system, not the democratization of individual states. The global order, according to New Delhi, lacks legitimacy and is not representative of current-day realities. It should include India, accounting for one-sixth of humanity, in major institutions of global governance like the UN Security Council.



The EU, India and the Non-proliferation Order The EU is a strong supporter of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Two EU Member States, France and Britain, are nuclear states under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1967 and co-founders of the non-proliferation regime. The European Union is keen to promote the existing system. All EU members have signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and strongly support early start and conclusions of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Most of them are also members of four non-proliferation regimes, namely the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group. India, on the other hand, had been for long an outcast and a challenger to the existing non-proliferation regime. It did not sign the NPT and termed the system ‘discriminatory’ and a form of ‘nuclear apartheid’ (Singh 1998). Staying outside the regime, it was developing its own nuclear capabilities and eventually tested nuclear weapons in May 1998. It is also a non-signatory to the CTBT and rejects the FMCT.  Over the decades, New Delhi has stated that it has been a responsible nuclear power, upholding clean records on non-proliferation and slowly but steadily integrating into the non-proliferation regime. In fact, after going nuclear, India has accepted the norms of non-proliferation and has worked ‘to maintain the global nuclear order’ (Nayan 2018: 232). Thanks to the historic Indo-US nuclear deal (2008), it has been recognized as a nuclear power outside the NPT system and partially reintegrated with the non-­ proliferation regime. It has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and joined the West in sanctioning Iran. After years of efforts India has been admitted to MTCR (2016), the Wassenaar Agreement (2017) and the Australia Group (2018). Therefore, India has been transformed from being a ‘pariah nuclear state’ state to a de facto nuclear weapon state (Pant and Biswas 2018: 2240). The nuclear regime is a very interesting case study in EU-India relations, showing how India’s integration with the liberal order removed one of the major irritants in the bilateral relations since the 1990s. In 1998, the EU joined the United States, France, Britain and China in condemning India’s nuclear tests, and restricted cooperation. Yet, in the following years, as India’s reintegration proceeded, non-proliferation ceased to be a problem.



The European Union and India have similar approaches when it comes to Iran or North Korea. India has voted with the European countries against Iran in the IAEA, supported the JCPOA agreement with Iran in 2015 and today, despite US withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, the EU and India continue to support it. The 2018 EU India Strategy proposes to ‘continue the positive engagement with India on non-­ proliferation and disarmament, export control, and nuclear safety and security’ (European Commission 2018: 13) and that the EU would ‘continue to encourage India to participate constructively in international export control regimes and initiatives’, and to join the Arms Trade Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Treaty on the Non-­ Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-­ Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (European Commission 2018: 13). This last statement indicates that possible areas of disagreement are not fully resolved.

Conclusion There seems to be a broad convergence of views of the EU and India on the liberal international order. However, in practice there are many differences between the two. The aforementioned four case studies reveal varied degrees of convergence depending on particular aspects of the liberal order. It appears that the two have considerable agreement regarding a ‘rules-based international order’ and multilateralism. However, while they agree in principle, there are differences in details. Different positions and power within existing global bodies (between established and rising powers), the level of development and historical legacies often put the EU and India on opposite sides in multilateral negotiations and discussions of world’s system. They rarely present a common position at the United Nations General Assembly and do not engage in joint diplomatic initiatives. As the differences are narrowing in recent years along with India’s accommodation within the existing system, the two would still need to translate it in practical cooperation. Joining the Alliance for Multilateralism may be one positive example, but it must still lead to concrete actions. More regular dialogue on multilateral issues and enhanced coordination and cooperation within existing multilateral forums, as suggested in EU Strategy on India (2018), seem to be a step in the right direction.



Similarly, both India and the EU generally support an open and free trade regime, but there continue to be differences in their respective approaches to the multilateral trading system. Trade, which used to be the strongest bond between the EU and India, may transform to be the biggest problem in cooperation. As these differences are often structural— between developed and developing economies—they may be hard to narrow. Nevertheless, the two can still work towards the conclusion of the BTIA and cooperate in the reform of the Appellate Body of the WTO. If a less ambitious BTIA is not feasible, the two should work towards the conclusion of an investment agreement. Surprisingly for many, the  approach to human rights and democracy promotion, both at bilateral relations and towards third countries, is not a solid foundation for closer cooperation. Here is where the different natures of the EU and India—one a postmodern liberal entity and the other a modern, Westphalian state—come into play. The two differ on both the purpose of democracy assistance (whether it can be exported in the first place) and methodology (viz. working with governments or with civil society). While India finds European approach to democracy promotion too offensive, Europe regrets India’s minimalist approach. Luckily, as the EU appears to pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy under its EU Global Strategy and it takes a tougher approach to migration or the fight against terrorism, there are chances for better understanding with India. More mutual understanding would be required also to avoid the looming clash of two exceptionalisms or ease the competition of these two normative powers. With India’s reintegration into the non-proliferation regime, traditional irritants over non-proliferation have faded. With India’s core national interests being accommodated in the current system, it is more willing to uphold the given system. Some researchers reached a similar conclusion regarding the transformation of India’s climate change policy (Mohan 2017; Narlikar 2017). Moreover, as India’s wealth and capabilities grow, it is willing to take more part in burden sharing. As one scholar concludes: ‘Modi’s growth strategy may make India better able to take on new international responsibilities, while his reliance on Indian cultural traditions may make the country more willing to develop new ideas on alternative global public goods, come up with a clear grand strategy, and contribute to the building of a shared vision of global order’ (Narlikar 2017:111).



This chapter provides a realist assessment of the potential for cooperation between India and the European Union in defence of the liberal world order. It supports those opinions that perceive India as an ambivalent partner for the EU in this regard. Apparently, neither will India join liberal Western democracies to preserve the world order nor is it interested in its complete overthrow. Interestingly, on certain issues (like the WTO) it is India which acts as a ‘status quo’ power while the EU (and the US) seems to be a revisionist one. In general, New Delhi will seek to reform the existing liberal order in order to safeguard its interests. Thus, even though India and the EU may not be ideal partners in preserving the liberal international order, they are still indispensable. India is closest to the EU’s position on the world order than other emerging powers like China or Russia. On some aspects, like the promotion of multilateralism and the fight against climate change, the European Union has more common interests with India than with the Trump Administration. The similarities should enable the two to work together to promote the freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Indian Ocean, Europe-Asia connectivity or Sustainable Development Goals—all of which would contribute to a more stable global order. They can jointly fight against climate change, nuclear proliferation or terrorism. Through joint initiatives they can contribute more to regional stabilization in the Middle East, Afghanistan or Myanmar and play a more active role in salvaging the JCPOA. Finally, they can contribute in partnership with others to shape new norms and build nascent regimes—for example, on climate, maritime security, and cyber security or space. The convergence between the EU and India does not seem to be adequate to foster greater cooperation to save international liberal order, but is enough to reform it. There is a growing recognition by International Relations scholars that the liberal international order must not be reinstated, but reformed (Colgan and Keohane 2017). There is greater understanding that the West needs a broader coalition of states willing to cooperate in the reformed liberal global order and that it needs to ‘actively court and co-opt the wider world of developing democracies’ (Ikenberry 2018: 23). In that context, the stance of the world’s largest democracy is of vital importance. If the EU would be willing to push for gradual reform of international rules and institutions, it may find India a valuable and willing partner. If the liberal order is to be replaced by a thin international order and two thick bound realist orders—one led by China and the other by the United States—as foreseen by realists, the EU and India can again



play a role (Mearsheimer 2019: 44). They could be important actors to diffuse a new Cold War. India may use its unique position as a ‘bridging power’—an intermediator between the ‘free world’ and the ‘not free world’, ‘democracies and authoritarian states’, and liberal and illiberal actors. The European Union does acknowledge the need to reform the global system. As the EU Global Strategy (2016) stated, the commitment to a rules-based order ‘translates into an aspiration to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system’ and this commitment ‘must translate in the determination to reform the UN, including the Security Council, and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Resisting change risks triggering the erosion of such institutions and the emergence of alternative groupings to the detriment of all EU Member States’ (European External Action Service 2016: 39). Though not all EU Member States are presently able to agree on supporting India for a seat in the United Nations Security Council, there is an understanding about a growing global role for India. For the EU, India will remain a difficult partner within the liberal international order. As a leading Indian diplomat observed recently, ‘the search for strategic autonomy is a constant theme in Indian foreign policy’ despite the changes introduced by Modi (Saran, Shyam 2018: 2). As a global swing state, it will be willing to cooperate and support Brussels on certain issues but act against the EU interests in others. Nevertheless, India and the EU seem to be the best partners to work together towards a new post-­ Western order, which would still be ‘rules-based’ but not necessarily ‘liberal’.

Notes 1. For a more optimistic assessment, see Deudney and Ikenberry 2018, Duncombe and Dunne 2018. For a more pessimistic account, see Mearsheimer 2019. For Mearsheimer, the liberal international order ‘contained the seeds of its own destruction’ and it can ‘arise only in unipolar systems where the leading state is liberal democracy’. (Mearsheimer 2019: 7). Since the current system is increasingly multipolar, it thus can’t be liberal anymore, in his view. 2. It is interesting to note that the term has not been widely used by politicians and media in the first two decades after the Cold War. For instance, in publications of the New York Times it has not appeared before 2012. 3. Discussion with the author in New Delhi, 8 January 2019.



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India, the European Union and Global Trade Governance Anna Wróbel

Introduction Global trade governance based on the World Trade Organization (WTO) is currently in crisis. This is due to the lack of efficiency of this institution as a result of the fact that some countries favour particular interests over multilateral solutions. The seriousness of the global trade governance crisis is demonstrated by the fact that it is defined as an existential or organic crisis. This crisis significantly weakens the legitimacy of the WTO in the architecture of global economic governance (GEG) (Wróblewski and Stecz 2018: 421). The dysfunctions of the multilateral trading system that have been observed since the establishment of the WTO include more and more functions of the organization. First of all, there is a growing inefficiency in the negotiating function of the organization in the form of a lack of progress in the Doha Development Round (DDR). Nineteen years after the start of negotiations, there is still no prospect of a rapid conclusion. The growing number of members of the organization, consolidation

A. Wróbel (*) Department of Regional and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Warszawa, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World,




of the position of developing countries, changing the balance of power in the world economy, increasing the scope of negotiations in comparison to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, the principle of single undertaking, agricultural protectionism of developed countries and the growth of economic nationalism are some of the reasons that contributed to such a situation (see Basedow 2017: 8–21; Wróbel 2020). One of the most serious problems affecting the lack of effectiveness of the WTO is the fundamental polarization of the positions of developed and developing countries. There are objective, serious differences in approach to many trade issues between the two groups of countries, which are essentially due to different development trajectories and various structural and historical constraints. Therefore, depending on the level of economic development, the economic interests of the members of the organization are different, resulting in deep divisions with regard to the perception of the functioning of the WTO and the negotiation topics undertaken (Wróblewski and Stecz 2018: 422). Another sign of the diminishing operational capacity of the WTO is the threat of paralysis of the dispute settlement system. With US dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) so far and the expiry of the terms of two of its remaining three members on 11 December 2019,  the Appellate Body can no longer meet the quorum requirement of three members to review appeals in trade disputes. In this way, the organization has been deprived of its fundamental mechanism for ensuring compliance with its commitments (McDougall 2018). In addition to the crisis in the WTO negotiating function and the threat of blocking the dispute settlement system, there is also the  adaptability crisis of the WTO, which is manifested by a failure to adapt the organization to major structural changes taking place in the world economy (Elsing 2016: 6). In particular, the organization faces a major challenge related to the process of digitalization in the world economy, which manifests itself in a systematic increase in the importance of e-commerce, the growing scale of business data flow, robotization, the growing importance of artificial intelligence in the operational activities of companies and the development of new business models and consumer interaction based on digitalization (Wróblewski and Stecz 2018: 423). Issues relating to investment facilitation, support for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and the new special and differential treatment (SDT) rules to take account of differences in economic potential within the group of developing countries also require attention. The WTO debate also



underlines the need to develop rules to ensure greater inclusiveness of the multilateral trading system. When creating trade regulations, the WTO should also try to respond to challenges such as climate change and labour standards. The crisis in the multilateral trade system is a major challenge for members of organizations that treat the WTO as an important forum for achieving trade policy goals. Both India and the European Union are examples of this. This chapter seeks to answer the question whether the World Trade Organization is still an effective instrument for the realization of trade interests of its members, especially India and the European Union. The chapter focuses on the negotiating positions of the European Union and India in the Doha Round, with a special focus on areas of convergence and divergence between these two actors since the last WTO Ministerial Conference held in Buenos Aires in December 2017. The chapter also seeks to analyze and evaluate measures taken by the EU and India to revitalize the multilateral trading system and the points of convergence and divergence in their proposals for WTO reform.

India, the European Union and WTO Negotiations The 11th Ministerial Conference (MC11), held in Buenos Aires in December 2017,1 highlights the deepening crisis in the functioning of the WTO as a negotiating forum. The failure of the conference has dispelled any hopes of an early conclusion of the Doha Development Round. After Roberto Azevêdo assumed the position of Director General of the WTO in September 2013, efforts were made to break the logjam in trade negotiations during two consecutive Ministerial Conferences held after his election. However, since then there has not been any meaningful progress. Compared to the Ministerial Conference in Bali (3–7 December 2013) and in Nairobi (15–19 December 2015), the meeting in Buenos Aires (10–13 December 2017) did not conclude with the adoption of a package of commitments. Even in those areas which seemed most promising in terms of achieving concrete outcomes (e.g. public stocks to maintain food security, fisheries subsidies and national support for services), no significant result was achieved (Wróblewski and Stecz 2018: 418). The Member States were not able to agree on the problems in question. The statements of the Indian Minister for Commerce and Industry Suresh Prabhakar Prabhu and the EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia



Malmström at the Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference reflect the different expectations of WTO members. For India, development issues remain a constant priority in the Doha Round. The expansion of world trade, Suresh Prabhu argued, must result in development. He called on Member States to unequivocally confirm the importance of a rule-based multilateral trade system and to reinstate the central importance of development in WTO negotiations without creating new sub-categories of countries. In this context, he stressed the need to maintain a special and differential treatment (WTO 2017i: 1). There was also an expectation that all WTO Members would be involved in taking final decisions in areas where specific mandates were granted in Nairobi (December 2015), including, inter alia, a permanent solution for public stockholding for food security purposes. Regarding the agricultural sector, the Indian Minister also referred to the issue of domestic support and stressed the need for developed countries to reduce the scale of subsidies. He also reiterated India’s interest in negotiating fisheries subsidies and its determination to conclude these talks by the next WTO Ministerial Conference. New Delhi had also expressed its willingness to actively participate in efforts to promote services domestic regulations. India traditionally focused its attention on Mode 4.2 E-commerce, investment facilitation and MSMEs are among the areas of concern for India. New Delhi opposes placing these new issues on the WTO negotiating agenda. It argues that these issues are neither trade-related nor have they been sufficiently addressed (WTO 2017i: 1–2). Unlike India, the European Union attaches considerable importance to the development of regulations on e-commerce at the WTO and support for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Brussels also devotes a great deal of attention to the services sector. Thus, Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström had identified the development of a future pathway for the organization in relation to e-commerce, domestic regulation in services and MSMEs as one of the main priorities of the Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires. She maintained that these areas were of key importance for world trade. Like India, the EU also gives priority to decisions on fisheries subsidies and effective action by the WTO to support development (WTO 2017j: 1–2). Both the EU and India also share a common interest in preserving and strengthening the rules-based multilateral trading system. The Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference resulted in several relatively general decisions concerning the continuation of work regarding fisheries subsidies (WTO 2017b), the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce



(WTO 2017l), the TRIPS Non-Violation and Situation Complaints (WTO 2017k) and the Work Programme on Small Economies (WTO 2017m). Moreover, some Member States have signed four declarations concerning the continuation of work in the areas of services domestic regulations (WTO 2017f), e-commerce (WTO 2017g, h), investment facilitation (WTO 2017e), and MSMEs (WTO 2017c, d). They contain only general support for the work in the areas indicated and are treated as a manifestation of political support for the continuation of talks (Wróbel 2020). Thus, the Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference did not bring about any real progress in the negotiations. The commitment of many members to the multilateral trading system and its rules, as declared at the meeting, did not, therefore, translate into concrete results. WTO Director General Azevêdo expressed his deep disappointment with the outcome of the Conference (WTO 2017a). However, the adopted decisions and declarations defined the directions of the organization’s activities for the period until the next Ministerial Conference. Intensive multilateral negotiations on fisheries subsidies are continuing. A consolidated text is  likely to be considered at the 12th Ministerial Conference in Nur-Sultan in June 2020. Some WTO members have also undertaken activities under joint initiatives initiated at the Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference in the areas of e-commerce (71 members accounting for 77 per cent of trade in this sector), investment facilitation for development (70 countries receiving 66 per cent of the total value of foreign direct investments), and the informal Work Programme for MSMEs (87 members accounting for 78 per cent of world exports) (Wnukowski 2018: 2). These initiatives seek to revitalize WTO talks in these sectors. While the European Union participates in all these initiatives, India is not involved. New Delhi draws attention to the shortcomings of plurilateral solutions. According to India and other developing countries that participated in the informal ministerial meeting held in Delhi in March 2018, ‘all negotiations at the WTO must follow the fundamental principle of multilateralism and that any other approach represents a threat to the multilateral trading system’ (Permanent Mission of India, Geneva 2018, 20 March: 2). The EU and India also have different positions on the Joint Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment adopted in Buenos Aires. Unlike EU Member States, India has not joined the initiative. A different position is also taken in the case of the extension of the Moratorium on Electronic Commerce. Brussels is in favour of extending



the moratorium for another period, or even permanently abolishing customs duties on electronic transmission (EEAS 2019). India, on the other hand, regards such an extension to be unfavourable for developing countries. Given the differences in the development of e-commerce in developing countries, New Delhi asserts that these countries should be able to control such trade by trade policy tools (Permanent Mission of India, Geneva 2019a, 15–16 October). It is difficult to assess whether the announced continued work in the areas covered by the decisions and declarations of the Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference will lead to concrete results by the next WTO Ministerial Conference scheduled to be held in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan, during 8–11 June 2020.

The European Union and the Reform of the WTO In view of the deepening crisis in the multilateral trading system, some WTO members have taken initiatives to restore its effectiveness in trade negotiations as well as monitoring and surveillance mechanisms. Both the European Union and India have been actively involved in this process. At a WTO Ministerial organized by Canada in Geneva, the European Commission published ‘Concept Paper: WTO Modernization, Introduction to Future EU Proposals’ on 20 September 2018. Covering three main areas—namely rule-making, regular work and transparency, and dispute settlement—the concept paper provided the basis for developing concrete proposals for reforming the World Trade Organization (European Commission 2018). In order to implement the WTO modernization programme, the EU has initiated cooperation with other WTO members, including India, which has supported some of the Union’s initiatives. For instance, both entities are cooperating in the reform of the dispute settlement system, especially the crisis created by the non-fulfilment of vacancies of the Appellate Body. In order to overcome the real threat of losing the functionality of the dispute settlement system, the European Union submitted two communications to the WTO General Council on 12 December 2018. The first document was submitted together with India, China, Canada, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Australia, the Republic of Korea, Iceland, Singapore, Mexico, Costa Rica and Montenegro (WTO 2018a, b). The second one contained the proposals formulated by the EU, India, China and Montenegro (WTO 2018c, d).



The proposed amendments sought to break the deadlock on vacancies in the Appellate Body and to strengthen its effectiveness, independence and impartiality. To that end, the proposals sought to amend certain provisions of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). The first proposal includes regulations for outgoing Appellate Body members, which clearly specify when they can continue in office until the end of the pending procedure. In justified cases, the possibility of exceeding 90 days of appeal proceedings is provided for, with the agreement of the parties. The EU’s proposals also address the scope for the interpretation of regulations under investigation and the introduction of annual meetings of WTO Members and the Appellate Body. It was clarified that the legal issues subject to appeal before the Appellate Body did not include the interpretation of domestic legislation. Annual meetings of all members of the organization (within the DSB) with the Appellate Body would provide an additional ‘channel of communication’ to express Member States’ concerns about certain Appellate Body approaches, systemic issues or case law trends (WTO 2018a, b). The proposed amendments to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes submitted to the WTO by the EU, China, India and Montenegro address four issues: namely the independence of the Appellate Body members, the efficiency of the appeal procedure, transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members and the launch of the Appellate Body selection process. In order to increase the independence of the Appellate Body, the need for one single but longer term for its members (from six to eight years) was reported.3 In addition to the changes to the 90-day duration of the procedure described above, the efficiency of the appeal procedure is to be improved by increasing the number of full-time Appellate Body members from seven to nine. The increase in the number of members of the AB body is intended to improve its efficay and contribute to a better geographical balance within since  numerous countries  joined the WTO  since it was established. The proposals sought  to expedite proceedings by actions which do not require changes to the provisions of the DSU. To that end, the proposed amendments sought  to expand the resources of the Secretariat of the Appellate Body and provide administrative and legal support in order to facilitate the rapid circulation of the Appellate Body reports while maintaining their quality (WTO 2018c, d).



The proposed new rules for outgoing members of the Appellate Body stipulate a transitional period until new members take up their duties. The outgoing members would continue to perform their duties until they are filled, but for no longer than two years after the end of their term of office. The selection process for new members should be triggered automatically and should start a few (e.g. six) months before the end of their term of office.4

India and the Reform of the WTO India does not fully endorse all the proposals made by the European Union to modernize the WTO. New Delhi was somewhat cautious about the draft decision of the General Council on Procedural Guidelines for WTO Councils and Committees addressing trade concerns (WTO 2019b). This document was first presented by the EU to the General Council in July 2019. It was then included on the agenda of its meeting in October 2019. In both cases, India welcomed the initiative itself to better organize the work of WTO bodies in order to increase the effectiveness of actions taken. At the same time, a number of objections were raised to individual provisions of the document (Permanent Mission of India, Geneva 2019c, 23–24 July). New Delhi has also expressed concerns, inter alia, about the proposed increase in the role of the WTO Secretariat in resolving trade problems between members largely because it is likely to adversely affect the neutrality of the body. Similar concerns were expressed with regard to proposals relating to chairpersons of other WTO bodies/committees. Any procedural changes concerning the work of WTO bodies, India argued, should take into account ‘limited technical and financial capacity of developing Members’ (Permanent Mission of India, Geneva 2019a, 15–16 October). Given the importance of development issues, India, in cooperation with other developing countries, has proposed that WTO reform initiatives should take into account the needs of these countries. These activities shall focus on strengthening the WTO to promote development and inclusiveness, including maintaining and strengthening existing special and differential treatment arrangements. In 2019, India presented two important documents to foster the interests of developing countries within the framework of the General Council: ‘Strengthening the WTO to Promote Development and Inclusivity’ (WTO 2019e) and ‘Statement on Special and Differential Treatment to Promote Development’ (WTO



2019d). The first document contained proposals from India and other co-­ sponsors in three areas, namely preservation of the core principles of the multilateral trading system, resolution of dispute settlement issues and safeguarding of development concerns, transparency and notifications. These proposals primarily sought to ensure a balance in the on-going discussions on WTO reform by reiterating the importance of its future development. India expressed its commitment to multilateralism as a fundamental value of the WTO. At the same time, New Delhi stressed that plurilateral joint initiatives could not change the fundamental architecture of the WTO. Any reform of the multilateral trading system, it asserted, should be preceded by a solution to the stalemate in the Appellate Body, because without a well-functioning dispute settlement system, Member States have no incentive to negotiate new trade rules, comply with existing ones and make efforts to reform the WTO (2019e). The Indian Statement (23 July 2019) was  a response to unilateral American initiatives to change the status of developing countries in the WTO. The United States argued that many developing countries unjustifiably benefit from the special and differential treatment since their economic development has considerably improved since the establishment of the WTO. Washington is opposed to the continued provision of special and differential treatment in the WTO to those countries that belong to the G20, are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), are recognized by the World Bank as high-­ income countries or have a share of at least 0.5 per cent in global trade (WTO 2019a). India is critical of these proposals. Maintaining the existing special and differential arrangements is a high priority for New Delhi. In fact, special and differential treatment is regarded by India to be ‘a non-­ negotiable, treaty-embedded right for developing Members’ (Permanent Mission of India, Geneva 2019b, 23–24 July: 1). On 14 October 2019, during the WTO General Council meeting, India made an important ‘Statement on Special and Differential Treatment to Promote Development’. India’s statement was supported by more than 50 WTO members, but not the European Union. While Brussels did not support the American criteria to deny Member States the continued use of special and differential treatment, it proposed new regulations should be adopted so that flexibility in this area applied only to those countries that actually needed it and not to developing countries as a whole. New arrangements, the EU maintained, should be tailored to the needs of individual members and their ability to meet their commitments. Thus, like



the United States, the EU too maintained that WTO members who benefit from SDT benefits should be assessed on a case-by-case basis on the basis of evidence. A shift towards greater flexibility in SDT, the EU had proposed, should be initiated within the framework of the current negotiations on fisheries subsidies. Once concluded, this issue should be further developed and taken into account in future agreements (EEAS 2019). India also draws attention to the issue of development disparities amongst WTO members in the discussion on ensuring greater transparency and increasing the effectiveness of its notifications. New Delhi argues that any reforms in this area should take account of the difficulties faced by developing countries in meeting their notification obligations. The provisions of the proposal for Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements under WTO Agreements, which provides for a system of administrative and financial penalties for failure to fulfil these obligations, were found to be erroneous. It is noteworthy that the European Union is a co-sponsor of the draft decision (WTO 2019c). This is therefore another example of the divergence between the approaches of the EU and India in their quest to restore the functionality of the WTO.

Conclusions Both the European Union and India have high stakes in the stability and predictability of the rules-based multilateral trading system. The special place of the World Trade Organization in their trade policies is because of their stakes in world trade and the consequent responsibility for the success of WTO multilateral negotiations. The role of the WTO in the trade policies of India and the EU is evident from the bilateral and regional trade agreements concluded by them as part of a strategy based on the multilateral trading system. The World Trade Organization is an instrument for the liberalization of trade and the creation of a stable trade system, ensuring that entrepreneurs from different countries have equal conditions of competition in the global market. Within the WTO, both India and the EU seek to promote solutions conducive to building prosperity by fostering economic development of countries in various regions of the world. At the WTO, India has repeatedly stressed that trade is not an end in itself. The EU is conscious of the problems of developing countries. In view of the increasing dysfunction of the multilateral trading system, both the EU and India are taking steps to halt the marginalization of the



WTO.  Restoring the functionality of the dispute settlement system has been identified as the most urgent challenge for the WTO members. Both the EU and India seek to break the deadlock in the selection of the Appellate Body members. Moreover, the proposed solutions are intended to prevent a similar crisis from occurring in the future. However, without the support of the United States, which is the real cause of the crisis in the Appellate Body, the efforts being made by India and the EU as well as others will not bear fruit. Apparently, both India and the European Union seek to expedite multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO.  However, they have proposed different solutions. India is a staunch supporter of multilateral negotiations involving all members of the organization. The EU supports them, but it also prefers to conduct plurilateral talks amongst Member States which seek to negotiate solutions in some areas of world trade. The different approaches of India and the EU were evident in the work within the framework of plurilateral joint initiatives initiated in Buenos Aires (e-­ commerce, investment facilitation for development informal Work Programme for MSMEs). As a supporter of multilateral solutions, New Delhi did not join these talks and repeatedly expressed reservations about such talks in various bodies of the WTO. Both India and the European Union also have different positions relating to special and differential treatment. While India is in favour of maintaining the status quo, the EU is in favour of the framing of new and more flexible rules for the use of SDT.  The two entities also have differences relating to the continued moratorium on electronic commerce. Even though India and the European Union have divergent interests owing to the differences in socio-economic development, the structure of economies and trade baskets, both of them seek to ensure that the multilateral trade system becomes more functional in the context of the worsening WTO crisis. This cooperation is extremely important for maintaining and strengthening global trade governance. One cannot however predict whether the measures taken will prove to be effective. WTO reform requires the involvement of all major economic powers, including the United States, whose current trade policy represents an acute challenge for the multilateral trading system.



Notes 1. This was the first WTO Ministerial Conference to be held in South America. It was attended by about 4,500 participants. 2. Mode 4 (the movement of natural persons) is one of the four ways through which services of skilled persons can be supplied internationally. 3. Amendment to Article 17(2) of the DSU. 4. Amendment to Article 17(2) of the DSU.

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The European Union and India in Global Financial Governance Karina Jędrzejowska

Introduction The Asian financial crisis (1997) and the global financial crisis (2008) revealed serious deficiencies in the functioning of international financial institutions (IFIs) and the regulation of global finance. Global financial governance mechanisms failed to provide credible crisis prevention and crisis management mechanisms. Both the crises and subsequent developments gave greater momentum to the long-overdue reform of the governance of the global financial system. They also led to alternative solutions in the form of regional financial arrangements and the emergence of new global financial actors and arrangements (e.g. the Financial Stability Board [FSB]). This chapter seeks to assess the evolving role of the European Union and India in the governance of global finance in recent decades. It examines the steadily declining status of the EU and its Member States in the

K. Jędrzejowska (*) Department of Regional and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Warszawa, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World,




structures of global financial governance and the gradually improving status of India. The impact of emerging markets on global finance continues to be limited in many aspects. However, their participation and actual impact on the governance of international financial institutions and international standard-setting bodies (ISSBs) is on the rise. At the same time, the European Union and its Member States and the United States—traditional key players in the global financial architecture—face greater hurdles to preserve their hegemonic status. Thus, while India seeks to enhance its position, the EU endeavours to avoid being marginalized and to remain at the core of global financial governance (Mukherjee 2017: 216; Adagale 2013: 30). The chapter discusses the divergent attitudes of the European Union and India towards the functioning and reform of international financial institutions and international financial regulation. It argues that despite these differences, they have shared interests in the governance of global finance on a multilateral and multipolar basis, in the strengthening and development of regional financial arrangements and in enhancing global financial regulation. The chapter goes on to situate the analysis within the broader context of global financial governance reform with special reference to the issues of greater inclusion in global financial governance and the preservation of its multilateral character. It examines the evolving role of the EU and India in some international financial bodies. Before making some concluding observations, the chapter evaluates the EU and Indian attitudes towards a few areas of financial regulation.

Global Financial Governance Randall Germain defines global financial governance as the ‘broad fabric of rules and procedures by which internationally active financial institutions are governed’ together with the mechanisms leading to the creation of these rules (Germain 2001: 411). Hence, global financial governance may be described as a network of interdependent international financial institutions and regulatory arrangements supporting the functioning of the global financial market (Jędrzejowska 2020). For the last three decades, institutional and regulatory elements accounting for the intricate network of the global financial system have been undergoing a gradual transformation, facilitating its better adjustment to the challenges of the modern-day financial world. The reform of global financial governance has primarily been undertaken in response to the recurrent financial and economic crises that resulted, inter alia, from a



mismatch between the governance structures of global finance on the one hand and the quickly changing reality of the global financial market on the other. The contemporary system of governance of the global financial system constitutes a unique hybrid of institutions and regulations inherited from the Bretton Woods regime and those established (or reformed) after the financial crises of the last three decades (Jędrzejowska 2020). The Bretton Woods institutions that were created in the aftermath of the Second World War continue to be at the core of global financial governance. The post-­ war international financial order was framed mostly by the United States and, to a lesser extent, by West European countries. In practice, both financial regulation and governance of major IFIs had been shaped according to American and European preferences. Today, however, American hegemony in global financial affairs is on the decline. The impact of the United States on global financial governance has been gradually undermined in the aftermath of the burst of the dot-com bubble (2000), major accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom in 2001 and 2002, and the subprime crunch (2008) (Leblond 2010: 58). Moreover, despite European efforts to increase its impact on global financial governance and enhance regional financial integration, there has been a relative decline in its influence in global financial governance owing to the Eurozone debt crisis and its failure to complete the EU single financial market. The relative weakening of the American and European financial hegemony has been accompanied by the growing influence of major emerging economies in global finance, especially China and India (Webber 2016). Until recently, changes in the balance of power in global finance were reflected only to a limited extent in global financial governance structures (Kumar 2012: 407–408). Since the 1990s, the persistent under-­ representation of developing countries in major financial regulatory bodies has become more apparent. However, it was only on the turn of the twenty-first century that some emerging economies became gradually incorporated in the governance of global finance (Cho 2011: 95–96; Warner and Buckley 2010: 188; Sohn 2005: 487–488). India was amongst the first emerging powers to engage in the reform of global financial governance through its participation in and informal leadership of the Group of 24.1 As a long-time member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, India used these fora to channel its preferences about the functioning of the global financial system (Srinivas 2019; Helleiner 2009:



6). However, it was only in the last two decades that India received greater representation in the global financial governance (inclusion in the G20, the FSB, and the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, to name a few) and became an active player in its reform process, acting as an advocate of developing countries and greater South-South financial cooperation (Chitalkar and Malone 2015: 581). Moreover, by mostly using multilateral fora to present and pursue its proposals India has declared itself to be unequivocally in favour of multilateral solutions in global financial governance and the multilateral financial order (Kirk 2015: 620).

The EU and Global Financial Governance Apparently, the position of some EU Member States, which for decades had been among the most influential players in global financial governance, is radically different from that of India. In practice, the position of India and the European Union regarding major international financial institutions has elements of convergence and divergence. Both India and the EU (together with a majority of its Member States) seek to conform to most international financial standards and codes of conduct. They support the enforcement of international financial regulations. Both of them apparently agree upon and support the changing nature of global financial regulation. The major focus of the international financial institutions and standard-­ setting bodies has previously been primarily on the agreement and adoption of standards governing the international financial system. Nowadays their focus is shifting towards the implementation of these standards and achievement of tangible outcomes. This process appears to be supported by both the EU and India (Helleiner and Pagliari 2011). By channelling their interests through the same multilateral institutions (IMF and G20 above all), the EU and India express their support for multilateralism in global financial governance and the multipolar global financial order (Schaffer 2010; Oehler-Şincai 2011: 36). Moreover it is in multilateral institutions like the G20, the IMF, the FSB, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), or the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) that most cooperation (or collision) between the EU and India with regard to financial affairs takes place (Leblond 2010: 59). The openness and interconnection of European economies influences the EU’s position on global financial governance. The global financial system also conditions the financial governance at the EU level. The EU



therefore cannot allow itself to be excluded from the process of reforming governing global finance (Moloney 2016: 453). In this context, Daniel Mügge points out that barely any aspect of the functioning of European financial markets remains without EU regulation. Over the years the EU has gradually shifted regulatory competences from national authorities to supranational ones. Simultaneously, the pattern in which the European Union regulated its markets has been increasingly influenced by the global developments in the field of financial regulation, for example the implementation of the rules and standards provided by the Basel Committee (Mügge 2014: 2–4). The European Union is, in fact, either directly a member or indirectly through its Member States a member of most international financial institutions such as the IMF, the G20, and the FSB. As a result, European representation remains dispersed. This fragmented external representation may, on the one hand, weaken the effectiveness of the framework of multilateral global financial governance and, on the other hand, aid major emerging powers to gain greater influence (Buti 2017: 12–13; Mügge 2011). The European Union also engages in various activities regarding enhancing regional financial governance. In fact, most adjustments in the institutional governance of the EU financial system were primarily designed to address internal EU challenges in the wake of changes in the global financial governance and foster the development of the EU’s single financial market (Moloney 2017: 144–145). One of the best examples of this type of action is the creation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). Established in 2011, the supranational supervisory framework consists of three institutions—the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the European Banking Authority (EBA), and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). Their primary goal is to ensure consistent and coherent financial supervision in the EU. The establishment of ESAs has had a particular spillover effect in the form of intense activity of EU financial supervisors within international regulatory and standard-setting bodies (Moloney 2016: 453). The ESAs have reshaped the way the Union engages with the global financial governance institutions, inclusive of the FSB, the BCBS, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (Moloney 2017: 138). As a result of sometimes a loose coalition of Member States and sometimes a more cohesive, supranational regional bloc, the European Union has emerged as a significant force both in the Basel Committee and



in the IOSCO with the adoption of new standards for the global financial market (Mügge 2014; Moloney 2017: 148–149). While the EU’s actions within global financial governance structures may appear to primarily serve its internal interests, an examination of Indian efforts reveals that the creation of a more inclusive and equitable multipolar global financial order is a key priority. At the same time, though India seeks to acquire a greater role and presence of emerging economies in global financial bodies, it does not seek to do so by distancing itself from the strategically significant Western world (Ciorciari 2011: 77–78; Wang 2018: 63).

India and Global Financial Governance India seeks to enhance its influence in global financial institutions not only through its membership in major IFIs but also as a member of informal groupings like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China)—all of which seek to foster greater South-South cooperation and work towards reform of the financial institutions (Panda 2012: 175–176). These informal groupings enable India to project itself as a proponent of extended South-South cooperation and an advocate of the Global South in global financial governance (Besada 2019). Among the aforementioned institutions, BRICS is most actively involved in reshaping the mechanisms of global financial governance in accordance with the current balance of power in the global economy. For example, in the 2012 Delhi Declaration, BRICS stressed the need for a ‘more representative international financial architecture, with an increase in the voice and representation of developing countries’ (Panda 2012: 177). All BRICS members support the reform of the IMF as well as the development of new crisis prevention mechanisms (Sinha 2015: 162). By the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) in 2015, BRICS took another step by the creation of a crisis prevention framework alternative to the provisions of the IMF. India’s engagement with the NDB is in keeping with its effort to be involved in the development of regional and plurilateral financial governance structures. Since the emerging financial architecture is more and more centred on Asia, New Delhi’s efforts seem to address the challenge posed by the regional and global rise of China (Nafey 2015: 337).



Institutional Change in Global Finance There seem to be three major institutional changes in global financial governance. Firstly, the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions seeks to grant greater representation to emerging economies. Secondly, we are witnessing the establishment of new global institutions like the G20 or the FSB which deal with issues relating to financial governance. Thirdly, the development of regional financial arrangements is accompanied by the creation of financial institutions ‘parallel’ or alternative to the existing structures. While the institutional reform of the global financial system was set in motion after the 1997 Asian financial crisis it is only since the global financial crisis of 2008 that the G20 replaced the G7 and the G10 as a major decision-making body in global financial governance and the FSB emerged as a kind of an ‘umbrella organization’ for the remaining institutions of global financial governance. Subsequently, several non-Western international financial institutions like the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) were established. They presented themselves as alternatives to the IMF and the World Bank as well as platforms of greater South-South financial cooperation (Zangl and Kruck 2016: 191; Nafey 2015: 347–350; Yang 2016: 772). The engagement of the European Union and India in the process of the reform of global financial governance institutions reflects major differences in their approach and role. Firstly, the reforms advocated by India, along with China and other emerging markets, might weaken the position of EU Member States in Bretton Woods institutions. Secondly, India and the EU differ considerably in their approach towards regional financial institutions. The EU, as stated earlier, perceives regional financial arrangements to be complementary to global arrangements and as mostly conforming to its internal needs. India, on the other hand, regards regional financial governance structures as alternatives to global institutions and as a means to partially restrict rising Chinese financial power (Paradise 2016: 149–150; Hazarika 2018: 999–1000).

Reform of the International Monetary Fund The reform of the IMF is a crucial focus of proposals for the stabilization of the international financial architecture. ‘In a sense,’ Menkhoff and Meyers point out, ‘IMF governance is of paradigmatic importance:



whatever a proposal wants to achieve through the reform of international financial institutions will be reflected in its stance on IMF governance. Accordingly, major interests and contradictory ideas are involved in the debate about IMF governance’ (Menkhoff and Meyer 2010: 171). In the never-ending debate on the reform of the IMF quota system, a recurring theme is the pre-eminent position of the United States in the IMF governance mechanism. Paradoxically, from the perspective of developing countries, the voting power of the EU constitutes a bigger problem. The 28 EU Member States currently have over 30 per cent of votes. Assuming that they can speak in one voice, they constitute the most important power both in the IMF as well as in the World Bank. The over-­ representation of Europe is also reflected in the distribution of seats within the important IMF Executive Board, where 24 executive directors basically agree unanimously on decisions and Europe practically controls one-­ third of the seats (Menkhoff and Meyer 2010: 178). With the 15th general quota review coming to an end in December 2019, EU Member States will continue to maintain most of their privileges in the system. The quota system reform is closely linked to the debate on the appointment of the IMF Director/World Bank President. Emerging powers have consistently challenged the informal rule that the Director of the IMF comes from Europe while an American holds the office of the President of the World Bank. EU Member States naturally support the continuance of the practice. BRICS and the majority of developing countries have supported India’s staunch criticism of the practice (Zangl and Kruck 2016: 191; Feldmann 2017: 474). Another important element of the IMF reform is its surveillance system of the financial stability of its members. IMF surveillance mechanisms were originally shaped by the US in cooperation with West European countries and, to a lesser extent, Japan. Initially, they primarily focused on developing countries and exchange rate issues (Zangl and Kruck 2016: 171). Reform of this discriminatory and unequal nature of the IMF surveillance system had been a longstanding demand of developing countries. It was through the Group of 24 that India initiated early reform efforts. However, the 2008 global financial crisis led China to demand that IMF surveillance practices should be extended to address the risks of financial instability stemming from developed countries, including the European Union and the United States. Even though surveillance reform was mostly led by China, India was a key part of the process (Zangl and Kruck 2016: 191).



G20 and The Financial Stability Board The G20 constitutes a major forum through which reform of the global financial governance and the IMF is being pursued. However, paradoxically, while this grouping is cited as an example of greater inclusion of emerging economies in global financial governance, it continues to be dominated by the developed countries (Kumar 2012: 420). Nevertheless, the role of G20 in the global financial governance transformation extends beyond the rise of emerging markets and the on-going shift in the balance of economic (and financial) power. The G20 provides a necessary framework for strengthening the international financial system and international financial institutions as well as the provision of requisite support to implement new financial standards. It is also a platform for debate about the development aid architecture inclusive of the role of multilateral development banks (Buti 2017: 1). The G20 had also initiated the establishment of the only new institution to emerge from discussions of the international financial architecture, namely the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The FSB replaced the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which was established under the auspices of G7 in 1999. It was meant to serve the role of the coordinator and promoter of the system of international standards (Thirkell-White 2007: 26). The major limitation of FSF and one of the reasons for its subsequent replacement by the FSB was the fact that only four of its members were not G7 countries. Moreover, neither China nor India was included. Today’s FSB is unique in its composition: national authorities of G20 economies, international financial institutions, and standard-setting bodies. Moreover, the FSB has created a number of ad hoc working groups to give recommendations on specific issues, including highly leveraged institutions such as hedge funds, capital flows, offshore financial centres, the implementation of standards, incentives to foster implementation of standards, deposit insurance, and e-finance (Warner and Buckley 2010: 202; Bayne 2008: 2; Sohn: 2005: 493).

International Financial Regulations A substantial part of global financial governance includes regulations of the global financial market aimed, inter alia, at supporting market access, the facilitation of supervisory coordination and the provision of crisis prevention and crisis management mechanisms. They usually represent



different measures adopted by international standard-setting bodies. Today the main international financial regulators are the FSB, the BCBS, and other so-called G10 Committees, the IOSCO, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation, and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). There is also the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which specializes in the prevention of money-­ laundering (Tsingou 2010: 619–620; Vlcek 2018: 249). Moreover, in keeping with the framework adopted by the G20, the regulatory bodies are granted a defining role in transforming the governance of finance at the global, regional, and national levels (Moloney 2016: 452). A major step towards the greater legitimization of the international standard-setters has been an expansion of their traditionally limited membership to incorporate representatives of major developing economies. For instance, in 2008, the Basel Committee opened its membership to large emerging markets with a view to encourage the adoption of a more globally relevant set of standards. Developing countries were to a certain extent able to help shape some rules (Khan 2013: 125). In fact, all ISSBs at present include representatives of both developed and developing countries; both India and the EU are present in all of them. Moreover, representatives of both developed and developing countries generally support financial regulation in order to foster greater financial stability and greater transparency in financial transactions.

The Basel Accords The failure of a bank represents a risk to the stability of a financial system. One bank’s failure can threaten other banks in the system and create a domino effect, which is known as ‘systemic risk’. The most common way to reducing systemic risk is to regulate the amount of capital that banks have. Capital adequacy rules seek to prevent regulated financial institutions from taking excessive risks. Since the late 1980s, an internationally agreed framework for capital adequacy rules for banks has been developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in the form of the successive versions of the Basel Accords (Leblond 2010: 68). Despite possible differences in respective positions towards specific regulatory solutions provided under the current Basel III regulations, the European Union and its Member States as well as India are amongst the proponents of the further development of the Basel rules and subscribe to them (Lee 2013; Boora and Jangra 2019).



From the perspective of developing countries, a key problem of Basel III is that its requirements and the pressure from regulatory authorities may limit the supply of credit provided by commercial banks to borrowers from developing countries. In practice, it might mean less credit for the small and medium enterprises in the developing countries as well as reductions in the availability of trade finance for exporters from the Global South. The latter is one of the examples of lack of coordination between representatives of developed and developing countries in ISSBs. It is also the area of negotiations where the EU and India oppose each other (Auboin and Blengini 2019; Khan 2013: 126; Gottschalk and Sen 2010).

International Financial Reporting Standards Apart from the capital adequacy requirements and rules for banking supervision, another important area of global regulation is the globalization of accounting standards. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are established by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which seeks to bring uniformity in the preparation of the financial statements in order to facilitate a comparison of different companies across the globe (Ramanna 2013: 2). IFRS are meant to ensure easy comparability and comprehensiveness of the financial data around the globe. As such, they are supported, inter alia, by all G20 members and BRICS. However, the EU was the first to accept the adoption of IFRS, in as early as 2002, as a single set of globally accepted accounting standards. This enabled the IFRS to be universally applied within the EU (Athma and Bhavani 2018: 12). India is also perceived as a pioneer of IFRS implementation in the developing world. Since the early 2000s, India’s Accounting Standards Board (ASB) has issued accounting standards that are in conformity with the IFRS (Ramanna 2013: 24).

Conclusion The brief overview of developments in the governance and regulation mechanisms of the global financial system presented in this chapter highlighted the role of two seemingly distinctly different actors in global financial governance, namely the EU and India. The positions of a single developing country and a group of developed economies must, by definition, be different. However, the two entities have common positions on certain issues, which offer scope for potential cooperation, including



support for multilateral mechanisms in global financial governance as well as support for selected international financial standards and regulations. Both the EU and India are engaged in additional global financial governance-­related initiatives and activities, including infrastructure and development financing, the future global reserve currency, and sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. In conclusion, the reform of global financial governance is an on-going process. It remains to be seen how both the European Union and India would adjust to key challenges within the governance of global finance— new areas of potential international regulation, the rise of China, the shift towards unilateral and bilateral governance mechanisms advocated by certain countries, South-South financial cooperation, and the challenges of regional financial governance.

Note 1. The Group of 24 was established in 1971 as a section of the Group of 77. Over the years, it has sought to coordinate the positions of developing countries on international monetary and development finance issues within major financial institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank (Boughton 2014: 14).

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Brexit and India-UK Relations Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

On June 2016, a narrow majority of British citizens voted to end their country’s membership of the European Union, an event that has come to be known as Brexit. Negotiating the exact nature of Brexit between the United Kingdom and the European Union as well as securing a parliamentary majority in favour of the final deal dragged on for over three years. While India did not support Brexit, it took a neutral view of the process and over time came to see possible benefits in terms of the UK’s immigration policy and extracting trade concessions. Perhaps more importantly it forced India and Britain to re-evaluate a relationship that while rich in history had come to be downgraded by both countries in the previous decades.

India and the Brexit Vote The Indian Government saw the British decision to vote to leave the EU as a negative development. New Delhi had been comfortable with the status quo, despite its overall scepticism regarding the EU as a strategic

P. Pal Chaudhuri (*) Distinguished Fellow and Head, Strategic Affairs at Ananta Aspen Centre, New Delhi, India Foreign Editor, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2020 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World,




player and unhappiness with British immigration policies. The potential benefits of Brexit, whether in immigration or trade, were theoretical and far outweighed by the comfortable relationship that already existed. At the economic level, the vote was seen as disastrous. India had become among the largest foreign direct investors in the United Kingdom, especially in the manufacturing sector. Indian companies preferred to use the UK as the gateway to access the larger European market. New Delhi saw the vote as weakening the economies of both the UK and the EU, two of its most important economic partners.1 At the strategic level, Brexit was seen as undermining the influence and strength of Europe as a whole, contributing to already high levels of global instability and, insofar as it weakened the West-centred international order, helping China increase its international clout. A forerunner to the Brexit vote had been the abortive referendum on Scottish independence in 2014. The then Indian Foreign Minister, Sushma Swaraj, when asked about her opinion had expressed surprise and shock, saying ‘God forbid!’ She quickly took the more diplomatic stance that it was a domestic British issue and India had no opinion (NDTV 2014). The official Indian view on Brexit was a similar position of neutrality. It was explicitly stated in a starred question response in the Indian Parliament in January 2019. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated: ‘India took no position on Brexit, for or against. It also made no attempt to influence the referendum or its aftermath in any way.’ It stressed that ‘the Brexit process is essentially an issue that concerns the UK government and the European Union. However, the Government of India is closely following the Brexit process’ (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2019). Whatever evidence that exists indicates the large Indian-origin community in the UK was divided during the Brexit vote. The community, reflecting presumably the many decades of its existence in the UK, largely followed the voting trends of other Britons in their respective classes. Working-class Indians, for example, joined many of their white working-­ class brethren to vote in favour of leaving the EU. Their white-collar compatriots did exactly the opposite. There were a few prominent exceptions to the rule. For ideological reasons, the Conservative Minister Priti Patel and Conservative parliamentarian Rishi Sunak voted in favour of Brexit and became the most high-­ profile Indian-origin voices in favour of Brexit. The Indian Workers’ Association also voted for ‘leave’ as did some less well-off and more recent Indian immigrants because of resentment against official favouritism



granted to EU immigrants (Duttagupta et al. 2016). But there is no evidence that these community viewpoints were in anyway influenced by New Delhi or vice versa.

Bilateral Status Before Brexit In the decades before the Brexit vote, the UK had allowed its historical and cultural relations with India to atrophy. This was a direct consequence of Britain’s joining the EU and a deliberate British shift of interest away from the Commonwealth states towards the rest of Europe. This is particularly evident in the economic relationship. Between 2000 and 2016, trade between the EU and India had grown 300 per cent, while UK-India trade figures had remained largely static. Germany is India’s largest trading partner in Europe, far surpassing the UK. UK-India investment is a more vibrant connection, but much of this is because of Indian corporate preferences and a legacy of the colonial economic relationship. India’s outward investment flows have shown a strong preference for English-speaking destinations—the common Anglo-Saxon legal system may have been as much an attraction as the language. This is most striking in the case of the UK. Indian direct investment in the UK, with the combined Indian firms generating revenues of over $50 billion, is greater than Indian investment in the rest of Europe combined (India, High Commission in UK 2017). The UK is cumulatively the single largest source of FDI into India, though Japan is likely to overtake it in a year or two.2 The discrepancy between the trade and investment relationship indicates India and the UK lack supply chain linkages—a sign that the two economies remain remarkably unintegrated despite a long-shared history (Pal Chaudhuri 2011). Immigration has been a strong bond, but this began declining soon after the UK joined the EU and reduced migration flows from the Commonwealth—the association of largely ex-British colonies. Indians are the second largest migrant population in the UK, but inflows of new full-fledged migrants peaked in 2007 and a few years back were overtaken by Polish migrants in absolute numbers (on Indian migration to the UK, see Romei 2015). While the numbers of Indians being issued UK visas, whether as tourists, students or temporary workers, remained impressive, the paths by which such migrants could become UK citizens were increasingly limited—as was the case with all Commonwealth countries.



Strategic relations in the pre-Brexit years were weak, largely because there was little UK military presence in Asia. In the South Asia region, the primary Western foreign power is the United States and the primary European strategic player France. When the presidents of the European Commission and European Council visited New Delhi in October 2017, India’s senior-most diplomat assured them that the only reason the UK mattered to India was the large size of the Indian diaspora there and the fact that Britain had a veto in the United Nations Security Council.3

Anglosphere Delusion A number of the nativist British politicians and intellectuals who supported Brexit put forward the theory of an ‘Anglosphere’ foreign policy for their country as an alternative to the EU. A smaller number of them incorporated India in this thesis (Davis 2018; Nalapat 2011). The more practical argued for the revival of the Commonwealth or simply a set of free trade agreements with the United States, China, India and other major non-European economic partners. However, there is no evidence that the Indian Government sees any of these culture-based world views as converging with its own strategic interests. Indians’ view of British colonial rule ranges from ambiguous to strongly negative, a sense that does not lend itself to a sense of cultural affiliation with the English-speaking world. Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh summarized what most educated Indians would see as the positive consequences of British rule in a speech at Oxford University in 2005. After noting the economic depredations of colonialism, Singh added that it was now possible for an Indian Prime Minister to assert that India’s experience with Britain had its beneficial consequences too. Our notions of the rule of law, of a constitutional government, of a free press, of a professional civil service, of modern universities and research laboratories have all been fashioned in the crucible where an age old civilization of India met the dominant Empire of the day. … Our judiciary, our legal system, our bureaucracy and our police are all great institutions, derived from British-Indian administration and they have served our country exceedingly well. (Singh 2005)

However, he made no mention of this leading to a common world view or lending itself to a convergence of foreign policies.



As far as the idea of an English-speaking strategic community is concerned, Indian foreign policy has been marked by alignments dictated by its interpretation of Asian geopolitics. It has never shown much concern about cultural, historical and linguistic relationships of the kind that the Anglosphere represents. India has paid almost no attention to whether the countries it moves closer to are influenced by British culture and by Anglo-­ Saxon political practices or have an affinity to the English language. At least two of India’s closest international friends, the Soviet Union in the past and Japan today, are more important to New Delhi’s foreign and security policy than the UK, Canada and Australia. India remained politically close to the UK in the first few years after independence in 1947, largely out of legacy issues in the realm of defence and because New Delhi took a few years to understand the consequences of the Cold War and formulate a more independent foreign policy (Manu 2012). From 1958 to 1965, New Delhi tilted towards Washington because of common concerns regarding Maoist China. Differences with the United States over Pakistan and, subsequently, the US’s closeness to China led India to shift towards the Soviet Union—a country ruled by a dictatorial one-party system with zero cultural affinity to India. The Soviet alignment ran from 1966 to 1989 and left a strong defence relationship that continues to this day (Kux 1994). Since then, India has been moving closer to the United States again, with China and close economic and diaspora relations driving this slow drift. But in the past five years, it is US allies like Japan and Israel which have emerged as India’s primary strategic partners.

Revival Attempt The prospect of the UK leaving the EU increased London’s interest in closer relations with India. Brexit supporters argued the British economy would prosper after severing its umbilical cord with the EU because it would be free to expand its economic relationships with the United States, China, India and other large economies. This was laid out more comprehensively in the then UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s speech to the Conservative Party in October 2016 where she listed India among several other countries with which the UK would seek to sign free trade agreements to compensate for the loss of access to the EU market (May 2016). There have been four elements to this attempt at developing a new post-­ Brexit India-UK relationship.



The first has been in the area of bilateral trade and investment, building on already strong relations. British officials cite studies demonstrating the existence of a ‘Commonwealth advantage’, showing that countries within the Commonwealth experience 19 per cent cheaper trade costs (Commonwealth 2016). But this is an advantage India shares with the United States and other imperial offshoots like Singapore. Prime Minister May visited the US, China and India in 2017 seemingly to signal to Brussels that London had trading partners other than the EU. If so, the message fell flat. India, as with all these countries, made it clear it would not be in a hurry to sign on the dotted line. New Delhi declined to consider a fast-tracked free trade agreement with the UK, preferring to wait for the terms of Brexit to be clarified (Business Standard 2016). New Delhi, in any case, has become increasingly sceptical of the benefits of bilateral trade agreements in general, especially those without a strong service and immigration component. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his officials made it clear that a post-Brexit India-UK agreement would require the UK to open wider the door for Indian immigrants—something which May said was politically impossible for her (Rothwell 2017; Safi 2016). A Joint Working Group set up by both countries to explore a post-­ Brexit economic future has so far foundered on the immigration issues (Khanna 2017). These obstacles, plus India’s reputation for moving slowly on trade agreements, led the UK Government to admit in early 2019 that India was not ‘a first-tier country’ for a post-Brexit trade agreement and ‘a lot more work would be required before Britain can start negotiating such a deal with India’ (Economic Times 2019a). Second, London pressed India to consider investing more time and money in the Commonwealth. A post-Brexit UK’s interest in reviving the Commonwealth is self-evident. However, it is an institution that New Delhi has long treated as largely symbolic, though its expulsion clause against non-democracies is seen as a useful if mild instrument with which to embarrass Pakistan and other South Asian countries regressing into military or one-party rule. There is a small group of Indian officials who argue the Commonwealth may be useful as India begins to expand its influence in Africa and the South Pacific, parts of the globe which take the Commonwealth seriously, but their views are not yet reflected in official policy. Even if they were, this school would argue for India to replace the



UK as the dominant player in the Commonwealth and use the organization for Indian interests rather than have New Delhi supplement any of London’s actions (Sachdeva 2018; Narayanan 2019; Bhala 2018; Pant 2018). Third, the UK’s own primary interest has been to try and sell London as an overseas financial hub for India’s rising need for external investment and capital. The idea, laid out in visits by the then UK Chancellor Philip Hammond, would be for the City of London to de-risk investments by investors like sovereign wealth funds and pension funds which were nervous about putting money for the long term in India. Hammond argued that the UK is ‘perfectly placed to be India’s financial partner of choice, helping it to raise the finance needed for its continued rapid growth’. The slow but steady increase in sales in the London market of rupee-­ denominated masala bonds, of which 80 per cent are raised in the UK, is an indication of what might be (see United Kingdom 2017; Economic Times 2018a; The Hindu Business Line 2018). This idea is helped by the similarity of India’s legal system and financial and corporate regulations to those of Britain. What Britain has struggled to sell is the fourth element: that India can gain any strategic or military advantage from a post-Brexit UK. In New Delhi, Britain continues to be seen as having little or no influence in Asia—India’s main foreign and security policy focus. Despite repeated claims by UK ministers to play up their naval presence in the Persian Gulf and other odd bits of flag-waving, Indian officials are clear that the only European country that is seen as a major player in the region is France because of its territorial and military presence in the Indian Ocean4 (Business Standard 2017; Rahman 2015). In contrast, India’s strategic relations with the United States are on a steady upward trajectory and, somewhat more hesitantly, so are its security relations with Australia. India does not place the UK on the same level. British ministers have made a concerted effort to talk up the Asian role their new aircraft carriers will play and the recent expansion of British naval facilities in the Persian Gulf. The then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson admitted during his New Delhi visit that ‘the deep social links between our societies have not always translated into a shared strategic outlook’ (Johnson 2017). While Johnson’s reference was largely to the Cold War, any discussion with senior Indian officials would seem to indicate this lack of strategic convergence remains largely true even today. Only Canada and New Zealand are treated less seriously as strategic



partners among the English-speaking countries. As an Indian official once privately commented a few years ago, ‘Britain’s army is today smaller than Nepal’s in manpower.’5 As evidence of the UK’s strategic questionability, Indian officials also cite their experience in Afghanistan where London was seen as a vocal supporter of a negotiated settlement with the Taliban at any cost—an anathema to India’s view of the Afghan conflict.6

New Delhi Prepares for Brexit There has been a general sense of equanimity among Indian commentators about the consequences of Brexit for India and the rest of the world. As one observer noted, the Indian Government has published no policy paper on Brexit or even made a technical-legal study as to its consequences for the country. The broad sense is that the adjustments required will be largely on the British side of the fence and, other than a few Indian companies, relations between India and a pre- or post-Brexit UK will be largely the same. The sheer complexity and drawn-out nature of the Brexit debate in the UK has helped dull public interest in India. The primary Indian response was to either joke about it or simply express befuddlement (Sachdeva 2018; Narayanan 2019; Bhala 2018; Pant 2018, 24 November). The Indian Government’s responses to Brexit have revolved around the largely economic issues listed below. The first is managing some of the administrative uncertainty revolving around Brexit. In response to a parliamentary question on the status of India-UK agreements during any transition phase after a formal UK Brexit from the EU, the Foreign Ministry noted that under the India-UK joint statement of April 2018, ‘it was agreed that both sides will ensure continued application of EU-India Agreements to the UK during the transition period, and put in place arrangements to replicate relevant EU-India agreements beyond this period’ (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2019). India and the UK also began working through issues like market access and regulatory controls while the UK was wrestling with Brexit debate to ensure a minimal disruption of trade in the event of an actual withdrawal. On this, the UK High Commissioner Sir Dominic Asquith noted, ‘My team and ministers have been engaging in good conversations with their counterparts in the Indian Commerce Ministry’ (The Hindu Business Line 2019, 26 April).



The second is a mild debate about the trade and investment pros and cons of Brexit for India. Indian corporate concerns about Brexit have been allayed by the nature of the Brexit deal put together by Prime Minister Boris Johnson. At the time of writing, it seems likely the UK will leave the EU but with some form of customs union, the primary desire of Indian firms which have invested in Britain. As a senior executive of the Tata Group said, ‘If that is in place after Brexit, the financial damage will be limited.’7 But this may have been largely a concern for bigger manufacturing concerns like the Tatas or the Mahindra. As a Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) survey in 2016 determined, only 14 per cent of Indian firms that had invested in the UK said they had set up shop there ‘mainly’ for the continental EU.  Almost half said their primary interest was the British market and did not plan to develop separate operations in the EU even after Brexit. The remainder of the firms said they were interested in both markets. But half the respondents said they expected a decline in investment in the UK until the uncertainty surrounding Brexit came to an end (FICCI 2016). On the trade front, though the UK is the market for about 3 per cent and the EU about 17 per cent of India’s exports, there has been a sense that Brexit could in the long term be beneficial for India. While an immediate disruption is universally predicted, most economic and business analysts in India seem to believe that Indian exports can capture some of the space vacated by the EU economies. A recent Reserve Bank of India (RBI) report noted that the ‘the likelihood of Brexit in March 2019 could offer opportunities for Indian exporters if bilateral trade agreements are renegotiated’. However, if the UK and the European Union do negotiate a Brexit that includes a customs union and Brexit is followed by a mild British recession and/or a decline in the value of the pound sterling relative to all currencies, it is unlikely India would benefit in terms of exports (NDTV 2019). There is a universal Indian assumption that a post-Brexit UK would be at a negotiating disadvantage when it came to a free trade agreement with India. A State Bank of India report on this prospect noted that in bilateral negotiations with the UK, India would not have to deal with the more cumbersome EU rules and regulations. In any case, at least one British analysis has argued it would take at least seven years to negotiate a trade agreement with India given the latter’s past record of procrastination in this area (Economic Times 2016, 12 May, 2018b, 3 April; Kumar 2019).



The third is the fact that market forces are making London an external financial centre for India. Despite the reservations of the Reserve Bank of India but thanks to increased flows of foreign capital flow to the Indian economy and some implicit encouragement from the UK Government, London officially overtook India’s financial capital Mumbai to become the top centre for trading the nation’s currency in early 2019. Average daily volumes for rupee trading in the UK soared to $46.8 billion in April 2019—a more than five-fold jump from $8.8 billion in 2016, according to a Bank for International Settlements survey. The comparable figure for Mumbai was $34.5 billion. Most of the trading was in dollar-rupee offshore non-deliverable forwards. Similar patterns of increased rupee trading—including spot, outright forwards, foreign-exchange swaps and other financial products—also jumped in Singapore, Hong Kong and the United States (Economic Times 2019b, 18 September). Indian officials say that the Ministry of External Affairs is enthusiastic, but the Reserve Bank of India remains sceptical. The Ministry has even urged the RBI to consider setting up an office in London to help ease the regulatory concerns of investors. The fourth is the most contentious part of the India-UK relationship in the age of Brexit, namely immigration. The issue of EU migrants was arguably the most important trigger for the entire Brexit debate and immigration of any variety remains a sensitive issue for the dominant UK Conservative Party. Under May’s prime ministership, it seemed a post-Brexit UK would be a more inward-looking Britain with further obstacles to Indian migration. The already difficult path facing Indian migrants desiring to be UK citizens would become even more tortuous and even the temporary visa system for students, resident businessmen and tourists would be made more difficult. The May Government imposed restrictions on Indian students. This policy was partly a consequence of an attempt by London to force New Delhi to take back several thousand illegal immigrations it claimed were from India but who lacked any proper identification (Saroor 2019). However, Prime Minister Johnson took a different tack after he assumed power in 2019. Johnson argued only against the unfettered access that EU citizens had to settle down in the UK and that the country adopt a points-­ based immigration system, similar to the variety that exists in Australia and Canada. He immediately reversed May’s restrictions on foreign students and other types of non-EU migrants. The British High Commission was quick to tout the new rules, saying they would ‘be better for students who will have a longer time after finishing their studies to look for a job in the



UK. It will also be better for workers with a lower skill threshold. And it would result in less bureaucracy for those employees who employ non-EU workers.’ It noted that the number of visas for Indian students and skilled workers had surged as a consequence (The Hindu Business Line 2019, 26 April; Roy 2019; Haidar 2019). Johnson’s shift has been attributed to his personal connections with India and he has touted himself as a ‘friend of India’. But it also reflects the view of even Nigel Farage, the ideological father of the Brexit movement, that immigrants from Commonwealth countries were preferable to those from continental Europe because of cultural affinities (Basu 2019; Mason 2015). The Indian High Commission in the UK also concluded that this would be largely beneficial to Indian immigrants as it would put a premium on English-language skills. ‘When we looked at them, we realized that wherever a points-based system had been introduced, Indians had benefitted,’ said one Indian diplomat.8 Finally, Brexit has led India to take a new look at the European Union and its European policy as a whole. The erratic nature of US foreign policy under the presidency of Donald Trump has also been a contributory element to this shift. New Delhi has recognized that it will need a new partner or partners among the members of the EU. France and Germany have been among the countries the Modi Government has reached out to in this regard. India has also made a concerted attempt to develop relations with secondary European governments. Modi notably held a ‘Nordic summit’ with five countries in 2018 and Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar announced the next year that India would work with Central European countries under the Visegrad format. The EU responded with equal interest. Brussels rolled out a new strategic paper for relations with India that notably looked beyond the long-awaited India-EU free trade agreement (European External Action Service 2018; Iwanek 2019; Raja Mohan 2016). In April 2019, the then EU ambassador to India, Tomasz Kozlowski, publicly reminded that the bloc would continue being India’s largest trading partner despite Brexit and stressed that ‘Brexit will not have any impact on India-EU relations. All agreements between the two will be implemented. We have a lot of plans with India and we will continue’ (Business Standard 2019, 5 April).



Conclusion The UK Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee issued a report in July 2019 saying ‘the UK government needs to adjust its strategy to fit India’s enhanced influence and power: the UK cannot afford to be complacent or rely on historical ties.’ However the UK’s Brexit drama ends, it has forced a re-evaluation of the Indo-UK relationship by both sides. The parliamentary committee report underlines that London has woken up to the fact its traditional profile in India is rapidly being eroded by the arrival of new economic partners like the United States and Japan while the strategic component of the relationship hangs by a thread. India has recognized its relatively passive stance on declining immigration and weak trade ties with the UK needs to be replaced with a more proactive stance. Brexit has provided New Delhi leverage that it should consider using. But Brexit has also made India realize it must look beyond the United Kingdom in its overall relationship with Europe. In the years to come, it is likely that one of the lasting consequences of the Brexit imbroglio will be the evolution of separate policy tracks for India’s relations with the UK and with the EU, even if Britain decides not to leave the Union (Business Standard 2019, 5 April; UK Parliament 2019; Seth 2019).

Notes 1. Private conversations with Indian diplomats at the Indian High Commission to the UK, London, November 2018. 2. On India-UK trade, see Demertzis and Roth (2017). On UK and India investment, see Romei (2015). For a comprehensive survey of the UK-India economic relationship and investment, see Romei (2015) and Heald (2017). 3. Private conversations with Indian and EU diplomats, December 2017. 4. Private conversations with Indian diplomats during 2017–2018. 5. Private conversation with an Indian official, January 2018. 6. For a detailed account of the differences between India and the UK on this issue, see Paliwal (2017: 260–265). 7. Private conversation with a senior executive, May 2018. 8. Private conversation with Indian diplomats, November 2019.



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India-EU Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement: Process, Issues, Prospects Dinkar Khullar

Introduction This chapter discusses some of the salient aspects of India’s negotiations with the European Union with a view to arrive at an understanding of the complex nature of the issues involved in the prospective Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA). It begins by outlining why this process began when it did, and this should answer many questions about how it actually transpired and why it has not materialized so far. It also examines the prospects of reaching an agreement and the constraints that will need to be overcome. In 1962, India established diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community, or the Common Market as it was then known. My predecessors deserve credit for this decision because they had great foresight in how the Community would evolve. However, the problem in the 1960s was that the Indian economy was largely closed behind high tariff barriers. New Delhi did not have a very diversified industrial base and it

D. Khullar (*) Former Indian Ambassador to the European Union and Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2020 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World,




was largely dependent on traditional exports such as agricultural products, raw materials, hides and skins, tea, jute, etc. Value-added exports such as ready-made garments, engineering goods and drug and pharmaceuticals, etc. entered the Indian export basket at a much later stage. Until the 1990s, New Delhi focused on some trade issues, but mostly on technical cooperation and development assistance. The 1990s was the era when the Washington Consensus and globalization became hallmarks of economic policies worldwide and India had to change its own strategies due to a variety of compulsions. This process opened up the economy and was soon followed by the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Community in 1993. This was followed by annual summits since 2000 and an arrangement for a strategic partnership in 2004. Meanwhile, there was a change in the economic momentum with the diversification of the Indian economy. Common interests had developed between India and the European Union. India was a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. It had significantly opened up its economy in many areas. The Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations was not progressing. Consequently, there was a search for alternative arrangements. At the 2005 India-EU summit, it was decided to set up the High-Level Trade Group, and in 2006 at the Helsinki summit India and the EU decided to go ahead with negotiations for a trade agreement.1

Compulsions What were the compulsions for India and the European Union to enter into a trade agreement? With low growth rates in Europe, many EU Member States were increasingly perturbed by the fact that most of their trade was totally concentrated in Europe. For most of the Member States, the elephant in the room was the Federal Republic of Germany. They therefore felt the need to diversify and seek new markets. India appealed to them as it was a growing market with good growth rates at the time. There was also the so-called Indian advantage, by way of a demographic dividend and skilled workers. By the early 2000s, India had considerably diversified its economy and was no longer merely a raw material exporter. The investment advantages for the Europeans had become apparent, especially since markets were becoming increasingly difficult to enter. India represented a market which had enormous potential because it had not hitherto been open. The European Union had considerable interest in a large consumer base that India had, even as the per capita income did not



match that of the Europeans. There were, therefore, advantages for India to seek closer economic links with the EU. Indian exporters were deeply interested in a trade agreement in 2005 because the EU was a market of half a billion with a per capita income of around €24,000–€25,000. Simultaneously, India was graduating out of schemes like the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). There was a complementarity of interests between India and the EU when the Agreement was planned. Both also had their sector-specific interest areas. The Indian agenda was limited. New Delhi was basically interested in the reduction of trade barriers, greater access to the market and the inflow of investment into India. The position of the European Union was a little more postured and sought more ambitious targets on a number of subjects. The Doha Round was slowing down and not much progress was being made on the multilateral front. The Indian preference had always been for multilateralism. Within the Union, India was seen as a major but important obstructive force in multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva. The EU was therefore looking for greater market access to a large market like India. Brussels’ objectives were greater market access for both goods and services, supplemented by public procurement; an investment framework, including investment protection; rules that frame trade, especially intellectual property rights and competition; and finally, because of their own constituency, sustainable development. These represented growth in tandem with environmental as well as social and labour rights. This was broadly the European agenda and this has not basically changed between 2005 and 2017. There was no great change in the Indian stance during this period, which still remained focused on trade and investment. One of the areas that the Europeans used to dwell upon a great deal, and which later became one of the areas of disagreement, was services, which remains one of the major areas of India’s trade with the European Union. The trade in services with the EU was €5.2 billion in 2002; this rose to €24.4 billion in 2014 even though there was no trade agreement. This highlights the importance of this aspect on which India has continued to focus a great deal in trade negotiations. In reality, however, India has a deficit in trade in services with the EU because it is largely concentrated in transport, travel and business services. The EU on the other hand are leaders in professional skills such as financial services, telecommunications, IT and other services not only with India, but worldwide as well. One of the growing items in the Indian case is medical tourism. But with the European Union, IT remains a particularly important aspect of trade in services and is critical to the negotiations.



The Process The process of concluding trade agreements is essentially through governmental institutions. The summit remits the mandate to two principals, viz. the EU Trade Commissioner and the Union Minister of Commerce and Industry. Negotiations are conducted by the designated Chief Negotiators on both sides at the official level. In India this is handled by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and in Brussels by a  senior European Commission official. The negotiations that covered diverse areas began in June 2007, following the Helsinki summit. India originally used the term ‘BTIA’, i.e. Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement, while almost everyone else generally uses the term ‘FTA’, or free trade agreement. A fundamental area of coverage in any trade agreement is market access. In reality, trade in goods and services is the central subject for negotiations and subsequently became one of the major sticking points in the negotiations. As of 1991, Indian tariffs had been reduced to a large extent, but they were still relatively high, whereas European tariff rates were rather low. For instance, any reduction in tariffs, in many products to zero, would imply a much greater advantage for the Europeans than for India. The latter was opening up its market, with average tariffs that were significantly higher; hence, India maintained that there was a case for asymmetry in duty concessions. Our argument in the initial stages of negotiations was that the EU should open up more tariff lines than India. The general intention was that if India were to open up about 90 per cent of tariff lines, the European Union should open up 95 per cent. However, this idea did not find concurrence. Tariff negotiations are the most important aspect of a trade agreement. Both India and the European Union recognized this, although Brussels had a number of other items on its agenda. India was concerned about non-tariff barriers (NTBs), especially what are called sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) as well as technical barriers to trade (TBT). This was a key problem for India because considerable time was spent in trying to cope with such obstacles. Those familiar with India-EU trade are aware that when it is not mangoes, it is grapes; when it is not grapes, it is bitter gourd (karela); when it is not bitter gourd, it is okra (bhindi), which are subject to SPS and TBT from time to time. Both SPS and TBT were therefore extremely important aspects of the negotiations because we needed to get things in order. Drugs and pharmaceuticals represented yet



another arena where India had concerns pertaining to market access being limited by non-tariff measures. Other important aspects of negotiation were trade in services (sectoral coverage and mode of supply), investment (market access and free flow of investment-related capital movements), trade facilitation (which has not been overtaken by multilateral negotiations in Geneva) and, for India, to a lesser degree, public procurement. These were important issues for both EU and India. intellectual property rights and Geographical Indications (GI) were also issues of special concern to the EU, which are elaborated later. It takes considerable time to conclude a trade agreement with the European Union. In fact, Brussels assured the Japanese and the Americans that they would attempt to reach an agreement in one year, which was unrealistic, to say the least. Both India and the EU are democratic structures; any negotiation has therefore to work within these parameters. Obviously, there are a number of stakeholders in any agreement, especially one pertaining to trade, investment and the economy. A strategic partnership agreement, for instance, does not attract the same degree of attention in domestic constituencies. A trade agreement involves hard economic choices where some stand to gain and others feel they are losers. A number of stakeholders therefore have to be necessarily involved in the process. In India, there is a central body, viz. the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which negotiates such agreements. Officials of the Ministry are answerable to the Minister who, in turn, is answerable to the Cabinet. No decision can be taken without consultation with representatives of industry, agriculture and the services sector, apart from domain experts in specialized areas such as intellectual property, international and domestic law, and diplomacy—all of which provide valuable inputs into the process. In the end, the essential point is to find a mutually agreed and acceptable text. If India is able to initial the text of an agreement after negotiations and the Cabinet approves it, we are at the end of the road. This, in fact, is one of the problems in negotiating with the European Union. In the case of the European Union, the mandate for trade negotiations is the responsibility of the European Commission, which greatly values this power. It does not like overt interference by Member States and other interest groups. The European system, however, is different because it is, after all, accountable to 28 governments (which may in the near future become 27). The Commission has to deal with the Council because the latter represents individual governments. In addition, there is the new



institution of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is the counterpart of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. The EEAS exerts influence on any matter relating to foreign affairs. The Commission, however, zealously safeguards its authority and prefers to work independently. Another stakeholder in trade negotiations is the European Parliament. After the Lisbon Treaty (2009), it has powers relating to trade agreements. The European Parliament does not have powers to modify any clause of individual agreements. It cannot say you choose ‘x’ or ‘y’ or add ‘x + 1’ to ‘x + 2’. However, it has the right to approve or reject an agreement. The European Commission is responsible to the European Parliament. Besides, it would not be wise to believe that any European Commission will make decisions without the influence of the larger Member States, i.e. Germany, France and Britain. These big players will always have a say. They may not express this directly, but they do have influence both through senior appointments and bilateral engagements. This is not dissimilar to what happens in India. For instance, the Agriculture Minister has huge influence on trade agreements. As a result, the process becomes convoluted because negotiations are not on a one-to-one basis. When India negotiates with the Japanese and finalizes something with their counterparts, the matter is concluded. However, in the case of the European Union the process is not concluded even if you finalize a trade agreement between the Minister of Commerce and Industry and the EU Trade Commissioner. This is a fundamental problem with the process itself.

The Negotiations Negotiations that started in June 2007 and went on till April 2013 were a virtual continuum. Since then, these have seemingly come to a standstill. Undoubtedly, there were some hiccups between 2007 and 2013. The year 2013 was the deadline—something which I have argued about with many EU officials—not for us, but for them because in 2014 the elections to the European Parliament were to be held. It was known that there was a holdup on negotiations because of the change in both the European ­ Commission and the European Council. The negotiations for a BTIA began with a divergence of perceptions of what we were going to achieve and what our ambitions were. The procedural mechanisms were also quite different. While procedural problems in the EU extended over one year, once India announced that an agreement



had been initialled and signed, negotiations were over. When one partner in such a process does not finalize it for a year or more, the Indian media, the public space and civil society begin to ask questions about why we have gone along with it when the other side has reservations. This is then transformed into a political issue. For India as well as a number of other countries, a quick conclusion is desirable once issues are effectively resolved, else the contentious and sometimes peripheral issues find resonance in Parliament. Therefore, without going into technical details, I would argue that these trade negotiations began with a slightly flawed understanding of each other’s processes and objectives. I was told by European Commission officials, not once but on several occasions, that they required a year after initialling the text in order to complete the procedure. First, they have to translate an agreement into several languages, which takes them about four months. Then, it has to go to the respective governments of the Member States. Meanwhile, any Trade Agreement also goes to the European Parliament, which once asked me what the procedure in India was. I explained to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) that for India it was simple. Once a text has been initialled by the Commerce and Industry Minister, it goes to the Cabinet for approval and this is final. India does not require additional approval by the Parliament for signing trade agreements. There are some elements which are mandatory, which I will discuss shortly. But the procedures of the European Union are very long drawn out and they are aware of this. Commission officials emphasized this a number of times. Confidentiality in Negotiations When one is negotiating, for instance, with countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the developing countries, the general impression is that we can reach a consensual arrangement with them because we have a focus on South-South cooperation. However, when you negotiate a similar arrangement with the European Union, there is a palpably reasonable argument and question on the lines of, ‘why are you giving duty free access to an Economy with a per capita income of €25,000?’ This is not something unique to India. For instance, when the European Union started negotiations with the United States on the Trans-­ Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), there was domestic criticism within Europe that Brussels was giving in to the Americans. A month after the EU started negotiations with the United States, the



French President François Hollande was up in arms that one should stop imports from Hollywood. This is an inevitable sensitivity which is linked to democratic processes. In India there is a tradition of great confidentiality with respect to international negotiations. It is to the credit of the Europeans that they are more transparent than India. But the fear of the media, the Press, and the Parliament is in-built in a system that one will come under severe criticism if one is perceived as making concessions to the developed European Union. When I spoke in the European Parliament on the India-EU trade agreement, I heard expressions of resentment on the absence of information regarding the proposed trade agreement and inability to access it from the EC. This is similar to reservations appearing in the Indian media on the extent of so-called ‘capitulation’ by the Indian side. This is a common problem in democratic societies, but it illustrates the inherent difference between South-South cooperation for India and negotiating a trade agreement with a developed nation.

The Issues Surprisingly, both India and the European Union had achieved a great deal on major issues in the negotiations for a BTIA. I think the original intention was to agree to graduation of duties to 90 per cent concessional market access, to be achieved over seven years. My own impression is that we had come to a broad outline of an agreement—I would not say a final agreement—but a broad agreement on up to 94 per cent of tariff lines. Of course, no agreement is final until it is actually signed. A retreat clause is always available. There was potential to arrive at an agreement on over 90 per cent of tariff lines by around 2012. This was qualified by each side placing the condition: ‘depending on your final package, I will make you an offer’. This should be considered remarkable, given the number and nature of issues involved. Agriculture After six years of negotiations, both India and the European Union had found ways to deal with the difficult issue of agriculture. There was mutual agreement that some agricultural products could not be included in the list because these were sensitive items for both sides. For most other products, the negotiators found mechanisms to overcome difficulties such as



tariff quotas, minimum price requirements and so on. Agriculture, especially rice and sugar, is of great interest to India. There were problems regarding cheese and dairy products too. Since negotiations are confidential, it is inappropriate to discuss the details. But the reality, I believe, is that that we had found our way around agriculture, which I considered to be a rather difficult part of our negotiations. Automobiles During the concluding stage of negotiations, key problems arose pertaining to the trade in goods related to automobiles, auto components and wines and spirits. Eventually, these were the most difficult items for arriving at a conclusion. The EU was keenly interested in market access for automobiles and auto parts in India. New Delhi too had its own domestic interests as India had developed a strong auto industry with a substantial domestic market and major export interests. Wines and Spirits In my view we had a formula for wines, because what the EU basically wanted was to be able to export cheap Italian and French wines to India, while we had developed a domestic wine industry of our own. The Indian strategy was a proposal for a minimum export price above which the EU could export wines. Spirits posed a serious problem. The EU wanted very concessional prices, so the negotiators worked on setting minimum export prices, which in turn became a major issue. Wines and spirits were an actual deal breaker: when Germany raised automobiles and auto components, other EU countries raised concessions for paper products. As new products were successively introduced into the game, inevitable delays in negotiations ensued. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals I do not think that drugs and pharmaceuticals were a problem with the European Union, other than the technical barriers issue referred to earlier. Frankly, intellectual property rights was never a concern with respect to drugs and pharmaceutical exports because India has essentially been supplying bulk drugs and pharmaceuticals to the European Union, rather than generics, which had encountered the challenge of debates on



intellectual property rights. In fact, the bulk of Indian pharma exports of generics are destined for non-EU destinations. While Germany and Switzerland are major buyers of bulk drugs, these represent a positive aspect in the trade agreement. Issues regarding intellectual property rights with the EU are linked to investments in India because the Europeans want to protect their own interests in these, rather than our exports. Services Services is an area in which India was looking for offensive interests, in particular in the IT sector. This posed major difficulties. Basically, there was Mode 1 (trans-border supply) and Mode 4 (movement of natural persons, involving travel to the EU for temporary employment). A lot of problems were encountered regarding both of these. On Mode 1, Brussels raised the bogey of data security; while the EU had found a formula for granting data security to American companies, in the case of India the EU argued that these issues did not fall within the purview of the trade agreement. Mode 4 involved questions of visas, work permits, wage parity and non-recognition of qualifications, on all of which India did not seem to be getting its adequate or legitimate satisfaction. Without satisfaction on Mode 1 and 4, it became difficult for Indian negotiators to argue that the agreement was protecting a key interest area. For India, the main compensation in the FTA was in services. In fact, Indian software exports under Mode 1 had declined from 27 per cent to 20 per cent between 2008 and 2014. Software exports also declined under Mode 4. We were clearly being affected by this. The European Union wanted to leverage the trade agreement to open up services like multi-­ brand retail. Insurance had eventually been opened up by India, permitting foreign investment of up to 49 per cent. This executive decision could have been implemented but for the need for legislative approval that was held up because of disruption of the Indian Parliament. The EU also wanted a change in India’s banking regulations in view of prevalent restrictions that, according to them, posed difficulties to foreign banks. Several EU Member States, especially the United Kingdom, also wanted India to open up accounting and legal services that, in the Indian view, was highly premature and required detailed domestic consideration. On the EU side, the UK was the main obstruction regarding both Mode 1 and Mode 4 for our IT services.



Intellectual Property Rights On intellectual property rights, the EU sought WTO-plus commitments. But India had reservations because of public health considerations, generic drugs and compulsory licensing provisions and was of the view that our policies were in consonance with the multilaterally agreed TRIPS (Trade-­ Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement. During the period of negotiation, consignments of generic drugs en route to Brazil were confiscated at Rotterdam, in violation of international law, in order to impose considerable pressure on India. IPRs would remain a tricky issue, but I am of the view that an acceptable agreed text could have been elaborated. Geographical Indicators was an EU issue. The Indian Mission in Brussels was expected to facilitate the process of registration of GIs along with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Much was administratively done in this regard. Reciprocity, however, remains a concern. Incidentally, this is still an issue on which the Europeans have difficulty with most countries in reaching agreements. The Canadians used to tell me—and they were negotiating at the same time as India—that it was very difficult to deal with the EU on the subject. Caution is called for in this area, on the part of both the government and industry. Sustainable Development and Human Rights Both India and the EU also could have arrived at a mutually acceptable language on sustainable development. While India argued that this was not within the purview of a trade agreement, the issue had to be discussed even at the ministerial level. In April 2013, when negotiations were effectively suspended, it did not represent a make or break point. Human rights have always been a subject of discussion and engagement with the recognition that both are democratic societies and have means to resolve their respective concerns. So, when it came to the trade agreement this did not present itself as a major bottleneck and although it is a very important issue for the EU, it was not prominent in the trade talks. In the past, the Europeans had wanted to renegotiate the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1993. Human rights issues remain important for the EU as well as for the European public, but they are great realists. In the case of the trade agreement, one could cynically argue that they would live with human rights concerns if a good deal was forthcoming.



Bilateral Investment Treaties I believe that some sort of compromise can be struck with the EU on the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)—the model BIT (India, Press and Information Bureau 2015) that we circulated in December 2015. Since this is a post-2013 issue raised by the Narendra Modi government, the chapter on investments in the FTA will have to be defined in a manner so as to somehow override the BIT. This is not going to be easy politically because there is considerable sensitivity especially about legal proceedings in foreign courts and I think this will be a major bottleneck. At the same time, the Modi  Government is very keen to attract investments. The Europeans, too, are potentially large investors; they have many skills which can benefit the Indian economy. Given the major interest in the flagship ‘Make in India’ campaign and the need to attract foreign investment, the Government of India  will have to sort out the situation created by the termination of the BITs with the Europeans in the chapter on investment. There are no signs of willingness to enter the model investment treaty circulated by India because of pre-existing treaties, which New Delhi wanted to supersede. This is a key issue which will not be easy to resolve. The BIT was not an issue in 2013 when negotiations were suspended. If the trade agreement had been concluded then and the Europeans were subsequently presented with the BIT, it would have been an incremental issue. Today, however, it may become a major hurdle in addition to earlier difficulties. This is not going to be resolved in a hurry because we have a major interest in investments. Moreover, for many investors the BIT would be treated as a flawed treaty. The problem is what one reads into the BIT. As an investor, one is not reading the various clauses of the Treaty; what one sees is the intention; what kind of position one would be in if one invests in India and if disputes arise, therefore, being stuck in yet another snag. If the main purpose of a Trade Agreement is to encourage trade and investment, and if it does not come about, then we will be losers.

Role of Civil Society Since both India and the European Union are democratic polities negotiating a trade agreement, their respective civil societies manage to garner information quite speedily. I clearly recall that the authorities were less concerned about problems of tariff rates rather than the negotiations causing permanent damage to the dairy industry. The sensitivity of our



political leadership, regardless of which government is in power, about civil society is much greater. European civil society is very vibrant. When I attended several sessions of the India-EU Round Table during 2007–2009, I noted that virtually every European member of the Round Table proved to be a lobbyist. One Dutch member of the European Parliament came to me and started discussing the India-EU trade agreement and argued that it would hamper Dutch agriculture. As a member of civil society, he was representing the interests of Dutch farmers. I therefore think that civil society of both Europe and India need to find ways to convey their respective interests and concerns to each other. This is also the case with the European Association of Services, whose representatives engaged with the Indian Mission in Brussels on a regular basis. Their President used to come and present papers making the case for greater access of Indian services to the market of the European Union. He argued that this represented the broader interests of the service industry within Europe. I, therefore, think that on both sides civil society must find a way to present its views.

India as a Sui Generis Case India will negotiate a distinct trade agreement with the European Union regardless of how the latter has negotiated agreements with other countries. The reality is that India is too large to negotiate an agreement and cannot be treated on par with any other country, apart from the United States and China. Brussels, it should be noted, has not been able to conclude a trade agreement with either of them. The Europeans are not negotiating a trade agreement with China. They had started negotiations on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United States. The TTIP and its Pacific counterpart, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), were instruments designed to set standards in relatively new areas such as IPR, environmental standards, state-owned enterprises, labour rights, e-commerce and other spheres mentioned earlier. This was a reaction to the inability of securing movement on these subjects in multilateral trade negotiations. The US Administration has also taken a decision to back down on these agreements, as they were negotiated earlier. India would be well served if both the government and industry were to prepare themselves for inevitable discussions on these issues, while adjustments in domestic laws and practices may need attention as well.



India’s agreement with any party, especially the EU, will therefore be sui generis altogether. It will not be similar to any they have signed so far. For instance, the Canadians were negotiating exactly at the same time as we were. I am aware of their frustrations because these are inevitable when dealing with the European Commission. But Brussels recognized that India would be treated separately. In end-2013, I told the EU Trade Director-General that with the new European Commission and a possible change in government in India in 2014, things may well result in beginning de novo on everything. Therefore, the EU should not assume that whatever had been achieved in negotiations in 2013 would comprise the starting point for further discussions in the future. A  new Government would inevitably look at things afresh; they would examine what has been achieved in other such agreements. For example, it is revisiting India’s FTAs with Japan and South Korea.

Brexit and the India-EU FTA The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union is a significant development in India-EU negotiations. Britain is not likely to be part of the single market or party to the latter’s Common External Tariff. Britain will have control on its own laws and will not accept directives from supranational institutions in Brussels or the European Court of Justice. Immigration controls will be put in place and there will be no free movement of people from Europe to the UK.  Furthermore, Britain seeks to negotiate a new free trade agreement with the EU on ‘beneficial’ terms. Meanwhile, it would also open up negotiations for bilateral trade agreements with countries such as the United States, India, China, Australia and New Zealand. During negotiations, there were doubts about the time it would take since the range of subjects to be discussed was large and issues complex. The United Kingdom stopped being a member of the European Union on 31 January 2020. It may be recalled that Greenland is the only country to have left the EU and in that case the negotiation process stretched over three years, from 1982 to 1985. The importance of arriving at an agreement with the EU will be central to British interests in this process. Exports of goods and services from the UK to the EU contribute over 10 per cent to their GDP, while the corresponding figure for the EU is only 3 per cent. Admittedly, EU-27 is significantly larger, but there is an asymmetry and the UK would seek to



conclude such an agreement quickly and at the earliest. However, this is likely to be a contentious issue, with respect to the nature of the agreement, its coverage and pace of implementation. The EU rests on the foundation of free movement of goods and services, capital and labour. Britain has already moved away from the principle of free movement of labour, but they need to recognize that the EU may not offer full and free movement in the other areas. Statements have already emanated from different European countries that the negotiations cannot be a forum for ‘cherry picking’. In addition, trade negotiations with the EU have typically been lengthy and difficult, partly because of the need for internal consultations with Member States. Although the European Commission has the exclusive mandate for trade negotiations, it is inevitable that Member States, especially the large ones, will bring their weight to bear on subjects of economic interest to them. It should be recalled that the EU-Canada FTA negotiations took over eight years. In the case of Britain, there will be the additional political considerations in yielding substantial concessions to a country that has chosen to walk out of the club. Internal politics in Europe will also have a bearing on the nature of the relationship that emerges between the UK and the EU-27. This may manifest itself in some changes in the way Europe functions internally, especially over-centralization in Brussels about which many EU Member States have been concerned. In turn, we may find a situation where Europe’s mode of dealing with the world also undergoes change. And, since the UK is not likely to be in the Union, the EU will have to learn to deal with the latter as an external power and no longer a participant in their decision-­ making process. These developments will undoubtedly affect the status of the UK as a global player with wide-ranging influence. The political and economic outcomes of Brexit are fraught with multiple uncertainties, the impact of which is likely to be more serious for Britain, rather than the EU. A word on the possible implications for India. Many Indian companies have investments in the UK, which are used as a base for operations in Europe. They are likely to be affected, at least in the short term, by these developments. It is fairly apparent that restrictions on labour movement from Europe are unlikely to benefit the movement of Indians to the UK, especially those working in the field of IT.  The reference to a bilateral trade deal with India seems like a long shot. We should not forget that the major difficulties in concluding the Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement with the EU arose out of pressures from the UK for openings in financial, legal and accountancy services and concessions for Scotch



whisky. Meanwhile, they have blocked any progress for facilitating access and movement for our IT sector. Hence, the upshot of Brexit will have ramifications primarily in Europe, with minor consequences in Asia and India.

Prospects Post 2013, there was a setback in political terms (Italian marines case). There also was no summit for four years until March 2016. Several issues had been added on to the earlier ones after 2013. Firstly, negotiations had not taken place effectively. Secondly, there was an  apparent decision to review existing FTAs, which were found to be mainly benefitting the other side. Thirdly, the new model of Bilateral Investment Treaties—that a company had to have recourse to domestic courts for five years before one could take it internationally—caused discomfort to our partners. Also, the ‘Make in India’ focus may have potential for conflict with an FTA. Yes, a trade agreement minus the UK is easier to handle whether in the area of services or goods. Britain will now need an FTA with India more desperately. Brexit therefore makes negotiations with the EU somewhat easier. The EU has apparently  become somewhat  negative in recent years, nothing much has been done. There was no summit for nearly four years— from February 2012 to March 2016. I was somewhat surprised that in the March 2016 summit in Brussels, there was nothing tangible about the trade agreement. Both sides talked about it, but there was no direction. The Prime Minister and the Commerce and Industry Minister will have to take a decision on what we want, what costs are involved and whether these are worth taking. This decision can only be taken at the political level. This was an issue before every summit—what are the deliverables? Today the major deliverable, as perceived on the Indian side, is the trade agreement. It has been hanging fire from 2007 to 2013, and since then there has been no progress. My own anticipation and doubts were confirmed at the outcome of the 2017 Summit. No mandate was given at the ministerial level for resumption of negotiations. The Joint Statement at the summit merely ‘noted the ongoing efforts of both sides to re-engage actively towards timely re-­ launching negotiations for a comprehensive and mutually beneficial India-EU Broad Based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA)’ (European Commission 2017: para 32). This was a very tepid



formulation, illustrating that there is no political mandate for negotiation talks at present.

Conclusion In 2017, India is in a much more difficult situation than in 2013 because of several additional issues that have been added. Would we then be willing to make concessions on tariffs when domestically you have protection issues for new start-ups? I think we will be able to find a way around the bilateral investment treaties. There is no doubt that something like a flawed agreement is worse than ‘no’ agreement. This does not imply that an imperfect agreement is inferior to the absence of an agreement. No trade agreement has only winners; there are losers on both sides. For us, textiles represented a clear advantage; pharma would have worked as well. We therefore have to live with some degree of imperfection. Any trade agreement has clauses on bilateral discussions. What one needs to do in future is seek the best workable option and move forward incrementally for gradual improvement in sensitive areas. In annual discussions spread over 10 years, one can bridge differences. There will have to be give and take necessarily. Room must be left for political discussions. A pragmatic view has to be taken on this. In May 2014, a new government came to power through elections. In 2016, there was no mandate to continue the negotiations. The ideal time was probably 2013 to clinch a trade deal even if we did not get a perfect FTA. It may be recalled that the High-Level Trade Group report had indicated that India would have benefited by 0.6 per cent of GDP and in the medium term by 1.6 per cent of GDP. Now considerable political conviction is required to arrive at a mutually satisfactory deal. I do not see an early trade agreement being concluded. Some strong reservations have been expressed at the higher levels of the government. This did not go down well with the European Union. Even if a mandate were to be given to resume negotiations, this does not imply that the difficulties I have mentioned earlier will go away. In any case, the 2017 summit has not authorized resumption of the negotiations. At best, technical level dialogue on issues of concern will continue at the official level. A political mandate does not imply that a trade agreement would be signed soon. I remember at the Marseille summit in 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Commission President José Manuel Barroso and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, as France had the Presidency at the



time, directed that when they met for the next summit, the trade agreement should be finalized. Politicians probably have to be unduly optimistic. But those of us who observed the proceedings were clear that this was not a realistic expectation. This highlights the difficulties for any current discussions as it is apparent that the political call has not yet been taken. To avail of the advantages of a free trade agreement, one must have the capacity to deliver and benefit. If a trade agreement does not work for you, it should not be attributed to the nature of the agreement or the negotiators. If, as in India, there are supply-side constraints, these should be factored in, in advance in the negotiations. This becomes more imperative in the present scenario if serious negotiations are to take place. New factors have come in to play since 2013. Any trade agreement with the EU should look for a balanced and realistic outcome as it would be difficult to undertake an overly ambitious objective.

Note 1. The summit ‘welcomed the work done by the High Level Trade Group and endorsed the case made for a future broad-based bilateral trade and investment agreement’. (European Commission 2006: para 5).

References European Commission. (2006, October 13). Joint Statement 7th India-EU Summit. Retrieved from sum10_06/eu_india_joint_statement.pdf. ———. (2017, October6). Joint Statement 14th India-EU Summit. Press Release. Retrieved from India, Press Information Bureau. (2015, December 16). Cabinet, ‘Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty’. Retrieved from newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133411.


India, the European Union and Counter-­ Terrorism: Shifting Paradigms, New Cooperation Bhaswati Mukherjee

International Terrorism: Definition and Recognition as Threat to International Peace and Security The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enshrined the principle that human beings are born equal in dignity and rights, principles underlying every culture and civilization, religion and philosophy. Adopted on 10 December 1948 when two-thirds of the world was under colonial rule, it was ominously silent on a definition of both self-­ determination and terrorism as a gross violation of human rights. It took the United Nations 18 years (1966) to define, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to self-­ determination. It too was silent on a definition of terrorism. Article 1 of the ICCPR states: ‘All peoples have the right of self-determination.’ Adopted when South Africa was under apartheid and during a period of

B. Mukherjee (*) Former Joint Secretary (Europe West, EU and Commonwealth), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2020 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World,




decolonization in the rest of Africa, Latin America, Middle East and Asia, Article 1 was routinely used to justify the legitimate right of colonized peoples and countries to fight for self-determination. When colonizers condemned the rise of national liberation movements such as the Palestine Liberation Organization and the African National Congress, labelling them as ‘terrorists and terrorist groups’, developing countries fiercely countered these arguments, citing the absolute right of peoples and countries to self-determination. It used to be said in the corridors of the UN at that time that ‘one country’s terrorist was another country’s freedom fighter’. With the rise of international terrorism, terrorist entities and non-state actors globally as well as in India’s difficult neighbourhood, especially Pakistan, the international community and the UN tried to negotiate an acceptable definition of international terrorism. It took another 27 years, till 1993 in Vienna at the World Conference on Human Rights, to make a breakthrough on this issue. Painstakingly negotiated in a two-year preparatory process, which the author was privileged to witness as Secretary to the Preparatory Committees and the Drafting Committee, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action1 (VDPA) finally achieved a breakthrough. Its paragraph 17 states: The acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as well as linkage in some countries to drug trafficking are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of States and destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments. (United Nations Human Rights Commission 1993)

In order to achieve a consensus, the right to ‘self-determination’ was also reiterated. In Article 2, the VDPA states: ‘All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ (United Nations Human Rights Commission 1993). Since apartheid was still to be eliminated and some peoples and countries were still under colonial rule, a ‘balancing’ second paragraph was added to Article 2 as follows: Taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, the World Conference



on Human Rights recognizes the right of peoples to take any legitimate action, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to realize their inalienable right of self-determination. The World Conference on Human Rights considers the denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of human rights and underlines the importance of the effective realization of this right. (United Nations Human Rights Commission 1993)

Although the UDHR, like the VDPA, is not legally binding, their main principles have acquired the status of customary international law, which States are legally bound to respect. A fundamental change in the international approach to terrorism occurred after 9/11  in the United States. The scale of the devastation, combined with horrifying images of the collapse of the World Trade Center in New York, along with hundreds of innocents jumping off sky-­ scrapers to certain death below, changed perceptions forever. President George W.  Bush on 21 September 2001 appropriately summarized the new thinking: ‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorist.’ These multiple attacks within the United States, followed some years later with India’s own 9/11  in Mumbai and terrorist attacks thereafter in Paris, London and across Europe, were a wakeup call to the developed world including the European Union that no continent or country was immune from this scourge.

Rise of Non-state Actors and International Terrorist Groups: Impact on India and EU We live in challenging times where the world order is being re-shaped, on the  one hand because of the perceived decline of the West and on the other because of the threat posed by international terrorism and non-state actors. The 26/28 November 2008 Mumbai attack, organized by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a jihadi group based in Pakistan, was a case study on how a small group of jihadis could paralyze a major city, attract global attention, and terrorize a continent. In the Mumbai attack, the terrorists used small, well-armed bands of terrorists striking simultaneously and sequentially against multiple soft targets in an urban area. The attacks in Paris and across Europe were a chilling recollection of Mumbai and later attacks, with a similar pattern of a cowardly heinous assault, in the heart of a sophisticated urban centre. The victims were always innocent vulnerable civilians. The attacks on France, a country



considered to be tough on terrorism, exposed the peculiar vulnerability of democratic, open societies including India to international terrorism, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) style. India and the European Union are combating similar challenges in the form of international terrorism, terrorist networks and sleeper cells as well as the threat of global Islamic fundamentalism. Large European cities are the most vulnerable. Inadequately policed earlier, Europeans are slowly and reluctantly introducing security measures across Europe which has permanently changed European lifestyles, ways of living and freedom of travel. India unfortunately had to introduce these curbs, which are a challenge to human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, much earlier. Discussions between India and the EU on building cooperation on terrorism were reflected from the first Summit itself (Lisbon, in June 2000), when both sides acknowledged the need to build a coalition of interests in a unipolar world which had emerged after the Cold War. Held on the eve of 9/11, when the first footprint of international terrorism would soon be imprinted on the shores of a developed country, the language on international terrorism ‘being a major threat to international peace and security and its condemnation in all its forms, wherever it occurs and whatever its motives and origins’, was of great significance. It resulted in a much greater understanding by the EU of India’s principal security concerns in its unstable and volatile neighbourhood. The 14th India-EU Summit (6 October 2017) was held in the shadow of repeated terrorist strikes in a continent which had once prided itself on its liberal democratic values which now seemed under siege. The Joint Statement was complemented by a separate statement entitled ‘Cooperation in Combating Terrorism’ (European Commission, India-EU Joint Statement on Cooperation in Combatting Terrorism, New Delhi, 6 October 2017). Forward movement is clear from the agreement to take decisive action against globally proscribed terrorists and terror entities, including Hafeez Saeed, Dawood Ibrahim, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-­ Mohammad (JeM) and others. This was summarized in the formulation: ‘The European Union and India share a common vision of key global and regional challenges. The leaders addressed a number of pressing situations in the EU’s and India’s immediate neighbourhoods, as well as further afield.’



Evolving International Responses: UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1267 and Status of Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) ‘Nowhere is the delusional streak in policy making more evident than in the manner in which governments deal with the issue of terrorism’ (Puri 2019: 155–160). This includes, according to Hardeep Puri, ‘some enduring myths about terrorism including that it is umbilically linked to abject poverty and that it is largely anchored in a particular religion’. These myths persist till today. In addition, some States are in a denial mode for reasons of political expediency. This has only delayed the adoption of a CCIT. Questions have been raised on the utility of a CCIT, given that the UN Security Council has already adopted SCR 1267. Multilateral experts such as Asoke Mukerji (former Indian Permanent Representative to New York) are of the view2 that the CCIT and SCR 1267 represent different frameworks in terms of international law. UNSC resolutions are the result of political compromises between the members, especially the (Permanent Five) P5. The political nature of such resolutions became clear when SCR 1267 was divided into two separate resolutions in 2011, with SCR 1988 to focus on the Taliban and SCR 1989 to focus on Al-Qaeda. Unfortunately, such texts based on consensus among the P5 usually lack a muscular approach, expected from a body empowered under Article 25 of the UN Charter with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Ambassador Asoke Mukerji (June 2016) notes: ‘The preferred approach of major UNSC resolutions to counter terrorism, whether 1267 and 1989 or 1373 and 1540, has been to condemn terror acts, recall obligations of Member States to fight against terrorism, including the concept of ‘zero tolerance’ of terrorism, offer support for capacity building in Member States to counter terrorism, and introduce sanctions in specific cases’ (Mukerji 2016). The CCIT proposal was the outcome of a lengthy debate in the UN General Assembly. The onus of implementation of such legal obligations under such Conventions, which are in the nature of treaties, is on Member States. International expectations regarding the CCIT are much higher than resolutions of the Security Council.



India had chaired in 1972 the 35-member Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism to flesh out a multilateral legal framework to counter terrorism. Its report included a proposal for the negotiation of an additional international convention, or conventions, based inter alia ‘on the principle of extradition or prosecution to combat acts of international terrorism not yet covered by other similar international conventions’. This principle is totally lacking in resolutions of the Security Council on combating international terrorism. Later India’s Permanent Representative in New York, Hardeep Singh Puri, chaired the Security Council’s Counter-­ Terrorism Committee in 2011–2012. This Committee had been established in pursuance of UNSC Resolution 1373 following 9/11. With international terrorism evolving into new and complex forms, there is growing recognition within the UN that the absence of a comprehensive convention is an impediment to the development of a robust response to the threat of international terrorism. This was clear in the recent debate within the Sixth Committee which deals with legal affairs at the 73rd session of the General Assembly held from October to November 2018. It was increasingly acknowledged that the absence of an acceptable definition was responsible for the lack of progress in the negotiations. The debate also highlighted the role of non-state actors and the absence of an international juridical framework to deal with this new challenge. There was consensus that rise of new terrorist groups as well as social alienation and radicalization needed to be responded to effectively. Of particular interest in the debate was the highlighting by the representative of the EU of the new threat posed by the military operations in Iraq, Syria and Libya against the Islamic State which had resulted in foreign terrorist fighters, nationals of the EU, seeking to return home, thereby transplanting the threat of terrorism directly to the continent of Europe. India’s Representative underlined that South Asia has been particularly impacted by the activities of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba. The growing interlinkages between terrorist groups, cross-border operations—including financing networks and the exploitation of modern technologies—implies that no country can stay aloof from the effects of terrorism. Although Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII, Article 25 of the UN Charter are binding on all Member States of the UN, their outcome or impact is unfortunately limited, due to the veto power of the P5. Decisions to ‘de-list’ terrorist organizations have sometimes been



taken by the P5 for political reasons. For this reason, despite India’s efforts to list individual terrorists like Hafiz Saeed, Masood Azhar and entities like LeT and JeM, all based in Pakistan in total violation of SCR 1267, China has ‘blocked’ their listing for political or technical reasons. The listing of Masood Azhar as a global terrorist by the UN Sanctions Committee on 1 May 2019 was a major vindication of India’s efforts to isolate Pakistan on the issue of international terrorism. India has legitimately argued that enforcement of SCR 1267 under Chapter VII is provided in Article 41 of the UN Charter. This allows the Security Council to take ‘measures not involving the use of armed force’ to give ‘effect to its decisions’. These include sanctions which in the case of UNSCR 1267 have been applied to entities and individuals listed in the 1267 ‘Sanctions List’ in three areas, viz. cutting off finances, restricting travel and imposing an arms embargo. These sanctions would then apply to these entities, individuals and to the country giving refuge, Pakistan.

Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism The first India-EU Summit was held in Lisbon in June 2000, soon after the hijack of IC 814 to Kandahar. In the on-going negotiations to release over 171 hostages, a reluctant Indian Government was forced to release the terrorist leader Masood Azhar to the Taliban in Afghanistan. This represented a huge setback to India’s international credibility and its efforts to combat cross-border terrorism. The result of the release was immediate with the grisly and horrific public execution of French journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi, Pakistan. Shortly thereafter, 9/11 occurred, representing the first footprint of international terrorism within the shores of a developed country. The first India-EU Summit (Lisbon, June 2000) in its Partnership agreement entitled ‘India-EU Partnership in the 21st Century: First Summit’ noted that international terrorism was ‘a major threat to international peace and security and its condemnation in all its forms, wherever it occurs and whatever its motives and origins’. This was of great significance. It demonstrated in a much greater understanding by the EU of India’s principal security concerns in its unstable and volatile neighbourhood. As a consequence, there was greater sensitivity to India’s security concerns caused by cross-border terrorism and terrorist groups freely operating across India’s border and the LoC (Line of Control) with Pakistan. It paved the way for the establishment of specific anti-terrorism



Joint Working Groups (JWGs) with the European Union and bilaterally with several EU Member States. If the first Summit resulted in a shared conviction that terrorism remained a major threat to regional and international peace and security and constituted a serious violation of the rights of innocent individuals and of the integrity of states, the second Summit went further in its Joint Communique. Its language on terrorism was a public acknowledgement for the first time by the EU of India’s concerns. It pledged to fight against terrorism, wherever it occurs and regardless of its motives. In retrospect, 9/11 changed the Western perception of international terrorism forever. The Rubicon was crossed and there was no going back. The growth of terrorist sleeper cells in Europe as a result of flawed EU policies towards Syria and Iraq posed a fundamental challenge to liberal and democratic values enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. The EU had to reluctantly acknowledge that terrorism had finally come to roost from within. Battle-hardened marginalized Muslim jihadis, EU citizens with no stakes in Europe’s values, its culture and civilization, were returning to wage war within Europe’s frontiers. Marginalization of EU’s Muslim minorities is proving to be a serious threat to its internal security as well as to international peace and security. As stated elsewhere: Europe’s inability to acknowledge the utility of controlled migration, along with its failure to absorb and accommodate its many minority groups, whether Muslim, Arab or African, compounded the crisis. … Its minority ghettoes reflect marginalized and socially alienated citizens with no hope in their future and with no stakes in the prosperity of the nation state to which they belong. (Mukherjee 2018: 147)

This is in contrast to India, which has the world’s second largest Muslim population of about 180 million. The democratic Indian state with a constitution based on the recognition of plurality and protection of minorities can serve as a model to an EU struggling with ‘Islamic radicalisation’. This is presently a subject of ongoing cooperation between India and EU within the respective Joint Working Groups. In this context, Gareth Price points out that the 180-million Muslim population has proven to be ‘remarkably resilient to radicalisation’. In contrast to nearly 2,250 Belgian, French and German Muslims joining the



Islamic State by mid-2015, only 25 Indian Muslims had joined ISIS by the end of 2015 (Price 2016: 34). Price went on to identify three broad areas with potential for counter-­ terrorism cooperation between India and the European Union: • ‘dealing with groups that both India and the EU agree are terrorist: for instance, restricting their movement and financing; • sharing best practices in responding to or mitigating different types of terrorist attacks; • understanding the causes of radicalisation in order to introduce successful counter radicalisation strategies and limit the spread of extremism’ (Price 2016: 33). The above does provide a suggested broad agenda for cooperation in the India-EU summits and the Joint Working Groups. Held after a gap of four years, the thirteenth India-EU summit in Brussels in March 2016 took place a few days after the devastating terror attack in the Belgian capital that killed 32 and injured more than 300 people. An India-EU Joint Declaration on the Fight Against Terrorism (30 March 2016) condemned international terrorism and reaffirmed the determination of both sides to jointly combat terrorism. Decisive and united action would be taken against terrorist networks and organizations, including the LeT and JeM. Significantly, both sides agreed to coordinate efforts to prevent violent extremism and expressed concern at the increased radicalization of youth. This was a precursor to sharing of intelligence and inputs on both sides on an open and transparent basis. The 14th India-EU Summit (New Delhi, 6 October 2017) was also held in the shadow of repeated terrorist strikes in a continent which had once prided itself on its liberal democratic values. It was a natural consequence that this cooperation was further strengthened. The President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, at a press conference in New Delhi before the summit, underlined: ‘We are the world’s two largest democracies. Working together with a like-minded partner like India simply makes sense. It is natural.’ A separate statement on combating terrorism entitled India-EU Joint Statement on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism adopted on 6 October 2017 was a significant breakthrough. Forward movement is clear from the agreement to take decisive action against globally proscribed terrorists and terror entities. This was summarized in the formulation in paragraph 8:



‘The leaders agreed to take decisive and concerted actions against globally proscribed terrorists and terror entities including Hafeez Saeed, Zaki-ur-­ Rehman Lakhvi, Dawood Ibrahim, Lashkar-e-Tayibba, Jaish-e-­ Mohammad, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Haqqani Network, Al Qaeda, ISIS (Da’esh) and their affiliates.’ Acknowledging the developing partnership on security, including counter-terrorism, between India and EU, the statement on terrorism expressed satisfaction with progress made at the tenth meeting of the India-EU Counter-Terrorism Dialogue on 6 October 2017 in New Delhi. They welcomed inter alia: ‘The joint commitment to explore opportunities to develop cooperation between the relevant institutions on both sides, to, inter alia, share information, best practices, including on countering the on-line threat of radicalization, and to engage in capacity building activities, such as training and workshops. They welcomed the resolve to deepen cooperation on domestic and international terrorist designation listing proposals through exchange of information’ (Press Information Bureau 2017: para 2).

Joint Working Groups on Counter-Terrorism: Evolving Cooperation Since the development of the Strategic Partnership in 2004, cooperation in countering terrorism and intelligence sharing developed through inter alia several joint working groups on counter-terrorism, including the India-EU, India-UK, Indo-French and the Indo-German, to cite a few. The existence of a plurality of working groups, both bilateral and EU, demonstrate the difficulty of implementation of the Lisbon Treaty on such issues. Intelligence sharing could be regarded as an ‘exclusive’ competency ceded to Brussels, rather than a ‘shared’ competency. It also highlights the contradictions between the EU as an intra-state entity and the bilateral components of its relationship with India while dealing with complex issues such as cooperation on counter-terrorism. Structure The JWGs have a similar structure. Initially the chairperson from the Indian side was the Joint Secretary (JS) (EW [Europe West]), i.e. the Joint Secretary (Director General) dealing with European Union issues. The author chaired these working groups from 2000 to 2004. Participants on the Indian side include the concerned Ministries including the Ministry of



Home Affairs, representatives of Intelligence Agencies and, when held in Delhi, a representative of the Prime Minister’s Office. On the EU side, the meeting would be chaired by the counterpart of JS (EW) in Brussels, the EU Ambassador or the concerned bilateral Ambassador and representatives of their intelligence agencies. The structure with the EU and individual Member States changed over the years as intelligence cooperation became more substantive and discussions became less transparent. Discussions between intelligence agencies were held behind closed doors and parallel to the meeting of the JWG. The JWG meetings also provided for an exchange of additional information on the new and emerging threat perceptions. The role of the Chairs was crucial in ensuring exchange of sensitive intelligence between agencies of EU Member States and India and establishing a modus vivendi of cooperation. Cyber security remained an important agenda item. European intelligence agencies shared their preoccupation with Indian intelligence of the need to safeguard the cyber networks of both sides. In addition, emerging threats were shared and discussed ‘in camera’. The author recalls a suspenseful meeting of the Indo-French Joint Working Group where intelligence inputs had been received about an impending terrorist attack using drones on the Eiffel Tower. Detailed scenarios were worked out regarding possible responses. One agenda item on which our inputs were always ascertained was how to de-radicalize an emerging terrorist or how to balance secular with religious Islamic education disseminated in mosques and madrassas. In this context, Western intelligence agencies remained highly concerned about messages contained in weekly Friday sermons by the imams of different mosques. Approaches suggested were different. In the India-UK group, British intelligence was of the view that some amount of freedom and non-­ interference in the day-to-day affairs of British mosques may be a better method of de-radicalization. The French on the other hand remained convinced that the mosque should be infiltrated by their intelligence and the imam should be well disposed to the Government. In retrospect, given the large numbers of radicalized and marginalized British Muslims who left for Syria and Iraq to join the ISIS, in contrast to much smaller numbers from France, it would appear that the French approach was far more pragmatic, realistic and successful. ‘Jihadi John’ is a constant reminder of the failure of British Intelligence and the State to de-radicalize their Muslim population.



We shared our own perception including the importance of secular education as well as safeguarding rights of minorities of India’s 160 million Muslims. In our view, marginalization and forced cultural assimilation as was the practice in Europe could result in alienation and later radicalization in a mosque or madrassa. Today, India and the EU are cooperating in the development of de-radicalization programmes of benefit to both sides. Over a period of time, the comfort level dramatically increased between the two sides, both with EU and individual Member States. The counter-­ terrorism dialogue facilitated the development of valuable contacts for mutual benefit of the two sides. The support of the Prime Minister’s Office and its counterpart on the EU side was crucial in providing necessary political support to the process. Duration The duration of the Joint Working Group on counter-terrorism, whether with EU or with bilateral Member States, would normally be for two working days on a six monthly basis, rotating between Brussels or the European city concerned and Delhi. The agenda was invariably decided before the dialogue and was mutually agreed upon by both sides. It would open with a discussion on the identified terrorist threat perceptions in the neighbourhoods of both India as well as the European Union. The Indian delegation, for example, would provide a detailed briefing on cross-border terrorism and infiltration into Kashmir. This briefing was led by the Joint Secretary (Pakistan), Ministry of External Affairs and India’s intelligence agencies, including representatives of IB (Intelligence Bureau) and RA&W (Research and Analysis Wing). A response to India’s briefing was provided by the counterpart Intelligence Agency of the respective EU Member State. The meeting would conclude with an agreement on a detailed time table of cooperation, which was presented to the Working Group for approval. This was the usual format of these working groups. Over time, the nomenclature changed and the India-EU Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism evolved into an annual counterterrorism political dialogue. This was considered to be more responsive to the demands of a substantive strategic partnership. At present, the most effective mechanism for cooperation is the India-EU Annual Counter-Terrorism Political Dialogue. Its most recent 11th meeting was held on 12 November 2018  in Brussels. The next India-European Union Counter-Terrorism



Dialogue was to take place in New Delhi in 2019 on a mutually convenient date. The Indian delegation for the 2018 Counter-Terrorism Political Dialogue was led by Mahaveer Singhvi, Joint Secretary for Counter-­ Terrorism at the Ministry of External Affairs of India, while the European Union’s delegation was led by Pawel Herczynski, Director for Security Policy, European External Action Service. The Press Release issued after the meeting noted: Both sides condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and emphasized the need for strengthening international cooperation to combat terrorism in a comprehensive and sustained manner. They reviewed threats posed by terrorist groups worldwide and in their respective regions including cross border terrorism in South Asian region. They exchanged views on current counter terrorism challenges including countering radicalisation and violent extremism, combating financing of terrorism and tackling terrorist use of internet and agreed to strengthen cooperation in dealing with these challenges. (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2018)

There was also agreement to deepen institutional linkages between Indian Agencies and their European counterparts including Europol for closer interaction, cooperation and information sharing in the sphere of counter-terrorism.

The Pakistan Factor The Pakistan factor has always been the elephant in the room! Pramit Pal Chaudhuri argues that the dissonance between India and the European Union on Kashmir between 2000 and 2004 was because EU’s post-­ modernism did not ‘emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs’. On the other hand, India is ‘a post-colonial state’ in an advanced and continuing process of nation building. In fact, while India regards dialogue to be one of several instruments in a broader strategy of handling both domestic insurgency and Pakistan, the EU’s approach has been to see dialogue as a constant factor which cannot be turned on and off, depending on circumstances. Since 2008, the Kashmir issue has never been publicly discussed by the two sides. EU Ambassadors who visit Kashmir annually have distanced themselves from separatist groups. In 2011, the EU Ambassador said of Kashmir: ‘There are some issues which you have to settle by yourselves’ (Pal Chaudhuri 2018: 58).



Rajendra K. Jain highlights the EU’s continuing internal debate on its policy towards Pakistan. Like other aspects of EU foreign policy, its shifting positions towards Pakistan demonstrate the continuing struggle between pragmatists led by the European Commission and ideologues led by the European Parliament. The key problem areas are Islamic extremism and unequal economic development. This is compounded by the retrograde role of Pakistan’s military and the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) in undermining Pakistan’s civilian governments (Jain 2018: 100). Today India and the European Union have come a long way in bypassing Pakistan as an impediment to cooperation. Chinese support to Pakistan on the presence of international jihadi groups and jihadis on its soil is posing a huge challenge to the EU-Pakistan relationship, which is to the benefit of India. The EU has strongly supported India’s pre-emptive strikes on terror camps of the JeM in Balakote,3 deep within Pakistan, as India’s legitimate right of self-defence after the Pulwama attack. Pakistan has been served notice by the EU that it cannot be business as usual.

Terrorist Funding International cooperation to combat financing of terrorism and its related activities came sharply into focus after 9/11 (11 September 2001). As Acharya noted: ‘If radical ideology and extremism are at the heart of terrorism today, finance is its lifeblood.’ (Acharya 2009: 7) The declaration of a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates was followed by a more robust approach to the implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which had been adopted in 1999. The complexity of the issue is compounded by the scope of terrorist financing which is linked to crime and money laundering. In some cases, it is supported by Governments of failing and failed States. Vivek Chadha notes: ‘Finance is a dynamic facet of terrorism, which has evolved with speed and flexibility. While it has been impacted, as a result of the world-­ wide campaign, it continues to sustain violence perpetuated by local non-­ state actors and state sponsored groups’ (Chadha 2015: 117). India was slow to develop the necessary frameworks to combat money laundering and funding for terrorism, including through the hawala4 route. This was despite the fact that the proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir, based on Pakistan’s policy of bleeding India with a thousand cuts, had



been waged for over two decades. This proxy war witnessed limited local funding and was primarily dependent on cross-border proxy funding. Unlike the threats that the United States and Europe confront (mainly from external and non-state actors), India faces a ‘heterogeneity’ of threats, including state sponsorship of terrorism and financing from Pakistan, domestic insurgencies and terrorist groups like the Indian Mujahideen. This makes the formulation of ‘a “one-size-fits-all” national policy difficult’ because of the different characteristics of existing threats and the consequent need to deal with them in keeping with their distinct characteristics (Chadha 2015). The 26/11 attack (26 November 2008) in Mumbai was a watershed in changing India’s approach to developing international cooperation to combat terrorism and terrorist financing. India became a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). It put into place the necessary legal, regulatory and administrative frameworks for combating money laundering and financing of terrorism. These include ‘Prevention of Money Laundering Act’ (amended in 2004) and the establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit. India also has Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with 33 countries including with the EU. Similarly, 9/11 was a wakeup call for the West. The EU strategy emanated from their overall counter-terrorism strategy, which was based on four fundamental pillars: • prevention, which ‘aims to combat radicalization and recruitment of terrorists’, • protection that ‘aims to reduce the vulnerability of targets to attacks’, • pursuit with a dual aim to ‘pursue terrorists across borders’ and ‘put an end to sources of terrorist financing’, and • response to a terrorist strike The EU model is based on transparency and visibility of its policy guidelines. Every effort was made to ensure that every guideline, directive and procedure adopted was made public. As a result, EU has been influential in providing international policy directions on this issue and guiding the proceedings in the Security Council on resolutions related to terrorism and terrorism finance as well as FATF recommendations. EU’s experience provides valuable inputs and guidance to India despite the nature of threats and patterns being differently nuanced. The similarities flow from the procedures adopted and measures put in place to curb



terrorism finance, which essentially remain the same. This is reinforced by the fact that FATF guidelines have become universally accepted and adopted norms across the world. There has been similar incorporation of UN resolutions dealing with both terrorism and terrorism finance. This issue is now an important agenda item on the JWGs between India and EU. India has greatly benefited from EU’s experience including EU’s success in fully implementing international laws, regulations and guidelines on this issue. This is crucial for success and an important reminder to India which is in the process of establishing its own mechanism for developing a successful model for Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). The on-going cooperation between India and EU in the Security Council is testimony to the success of the counterterrorism mechanism established after the first Summit in Lisbon in June 2000.

The Pulwama Attack, February 2019 As an indication of a growing consensus in India’s favour, France, as President of the UN Security Council, along with the United Kingdom and the United States, in March 2019 moved a resolution under the 1267 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee of the UNSC to list Masood Azhar. This move came in the wake of the Pulwama terror attack in which 40 CRPF personnel were killed. JeM had claimed responsibility for the Pulwama attack. Fourteen out of the 15 members of the UN Security Council supported the proposal, but China was the only country which did not go with the move. China ‘put on hold’ the terror listing of Masood Azhar in the Security Council, defying majority P5 opinion in support. One positive indication was that China had only put the proposal ‘on hold’ and did not ‘block’ it, unlike in the past. Subsequently, France imposed sanctions on Azhar, including a freeze on his assets. The French Interior, Finance and Foreign Ministries said in a joint statement in March 2019 that France would discuss with its European partners the matter of putting Azhar on a European Union list of terrorists and terror organizations  (Press Release 2019, 22 March). This was adopted by the EU by end April 2019. It resulted in a total travel ban as well as freezing of his assets in all EU Member States. It has been ascertained from informed sources that since China ‘putting on hold’ Azhar’s terror listing in the Security Council, the European Union had made two formal demarches to China on this issue. The United States has also put pressure on China by moving a resolution, supported



by France and Germany, on this issue in the Security Council. China was isolated. France’s ban, followed by the EU, on Azhar, sent a strong political signal that Pakistan was harbouring a terrorist and helped in further isolating Pakistan on the world stage. Experts noted that the French move sent out several important messages, from expressing solidarity with India to warning China about its ‘blocking tactics’. The Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Raveesh Kumar noted: ‘France has taken up the matter with the EU. We understand that the EU will take its decision once their process of designating a terrorist is complete’ (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2018). International pressure by the United States supported by the EU on China was accompanied by intense bilateral diplomatic discussions between India and China, including a sudden visit by India’s Foreign Secretary Gokhale to Beijing. In a  major diplomatic victory for India, China relented and lifted its technical hold on designating Azhar as a global terrorist. On 1 May 2019, Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country and Chairman of the UN Sanctions Committee, formally designated Azhar as a global terrorist. India’s Permanent Representative in New  York, Syed Akbar-ud-din, tweeted: ‘Big, small, all join together. Masood Azhar designated as a terrorist in UN Sanctions List. Grateful to all for their support.’

The Way Forward India earlier had appeared like a lone warrior in its struggle for international recognition of the threats posed by the scourge of terrorism. In a call to India and to Indians to unite against colonialism (September 1905), Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore5 had said: If they answer not to thy call, walk alone, If they are afraid and cower mutely facing the wall, O thou unlucky one, open thy mind and speak out alone.

India has often taken a lonely but principled path in its foreign policy and been eventually vindicated. This is certainly true in the present Western and EU support for its struggle against cross-border terrorism, supported and nurtured by Pakistan. India and the EU have come a long way in understanding that international terrorism is a threat to democratic states,



rule of law, pluralism and protection of minorities. In this millennium, it poses the most fundamental challenge to international peace and security. India had to successfully overcome the challenge of the Pakistani factor in impeding such cooperation. Negotiating a bitterly contested Brexit and facing divisive forces of nationalism, populism and racism as well as difficult elections to the European Parliament in May 2019, the EU has forged fundamental changes to its foreign policy, vis-a-vis India on this issue. This is evident in EU’s new Joint Communication on ‘Elements for an EU Strategy on India’ announced on 20 November 2018  (European Commission 2018). Launching it, the EU High Representative Mogherini acknowledged: ‘India is a key player in our interconnected world’ (Mogherini 2018). The Council ‘supports increased cooperation with India on common security interests, such as counter-terrorism, radicalisation, cyber security, hybrid threats, maritime security, and non-­proliferation and disarmament. Cooperation on crisis management, including military-­ to-­military relations, should be pursued in order to enhance mutual confidence, joint assessments and responses’ (European Council 2018: para 14). The European Union and India are now cooperating effectively on terrorism and on a strategy for combating radicalization. Timely intelligence inputs from Western agencies regarding potential strikes constitute an important element of our national counterterrorism strategy. In addition, India has considerable experience in counter-radicalization which is an important component of that strategy. India is sharing that expertise with EU. As a result, the European Union is urging India to assume a prominent role regionally and internationally to maintain international peace and security. The India-EU partnership is resulting in India becoming a key partner for the West, not least in developing a common approach to combating terrorism.

Notes 1. On 25 June 1993, representatives of 171 States adopted by consensus ‘The ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ at the World Conference on Human Rights (1993), which created a new watershed in global recognition of a common definition of human rights. All human rights, whether civil and political or economic, social and cultural, are indivisible, interdependent and inter-related.



2. Private correspondence between the author and Asoke Mukerji, former India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations. 3. The Pulwama attack was a terrorist attack by Pakistani jihadis on Indian security forces in Kashmir. Forty jawans of India’s Central Reserve Police Force were killed. India carried out pre-emptive airstrikes against Jaish-e-­ Mohammad terror camps in Balakote, deep within Pakistan, in self-defence. 4. Hawala is an alternative remittance channel that exists outside the traditional banking systems. In India, it has been abused for funding of terrorist activities by utilization of foreign funds intended for charity or education. 5. Rabindranath Tagore was the first non-white Nobel Laureate in November 1913. He was awarded a knighthood by King George V, which he renounced after the 1919 Jallianwala Bagh massacre.

References Acharya, A. (2009). Targeting Terrorism Financing: International Cooperation and New Regimes. New York: Routledge. Chadha, V. (2015). Lifeblood of Terrorism: Countering Terrorism Finance. New Delhi: Bloomsbury Publishing. European Commission. (2018). Elements for an EU Strategy on India A Partnership for Sustainable Modernisation and the Rules-Based Global Order. European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels (2018) 28 final, 20 November 2018. European Council. (2018). EU Strategy on India—Council Conclusions (10 December 2018), Statement 14638/18. Retrieved March 31, 2019, from India, Ministry of External Affairs. (2018, November 14). Press Release on 11th India-European Union Counter Terrorism Dialogue. Retrieved March 30, 2019 from diaEuropean+Union+Counter+Terrorism+Dialogue Jain, R. K. (2018). The European Union and Democracy Building in Pakistan. In R.  K. Jain (Ed.), India, Europe and Pakistan (pp.  85–109). New Delhi: Knowledge World Publishers. Mogherini, F. (2018, November 20). In European Commission Press Release IP/18/6481. EU Shapes Its Ambitious Strategy on India. Retrieved March 30, 2019, from Mukerji, A. (2016, June 4). Extradite or Prosecute: Why the Counter-Terrorist Principle India Is Pushing Is So Crucial. The Wire. Retrieved March 30, 2019, from



Mukherjee, B. (2018). An Insider’s View: India and EU. New Delhi: Vij Books. Pal Chaudhuri, P. (2018). Decline of Kashmir in India-EU Relations. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), India, Europe and Pakistan (pp. 58–66). New Delhi: Knowledge World Publishers. Press Information Bureau. (2017). India-EU Joint Statement on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism, 6 October, Retrieved on March 30, 2019, from: Press Release. (2019, March 22). France Working with EU for Listing of Masood Azhar as a Global Terrorist: MEA. India Today. Retrieved March 30, 2019, from Price, G. (2016), ‘Counter-Terrorism and Radicalization’ in Observer Research Foundation, Prospects for EU-India Security Cooperation, New Delhi, pp. 33–40. Puri, H. S. (2019). Delusional Politics. Gurgaon: Penguin Random House. United Nations Human Rights Commission. (1993, June 25). Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Retrieved March 30, 2019, from https://www.


India-EU Partnership for Security: Through the Prism of Nuclear Non-proliferation Manpreet Sethi

Introduction India-European Union summits have been held with a fair regularity since 2000. Joint statements, issued after each Indo-EU summit, have recognized both players as ‘natural partners’ based on their ‘shared principles and values of democracy, freedom, rule of law and respect for human rights and territorial integrity of States’ (see, e.g., Ministry of External Affairs 2017). Both sides have also recognized each other’s political and economic worth. Indeed, the 28-member European regional grouping is the world’s second largest economic entity; India has the world’s second largest population and is slated to emerge as the third largest global economy in the coming decades. The pull of the two towards each other should be a natural phenomenon. So, in 2016, the EU was India’s largest trading partner with 13.5 per cent of its overall trade with the world going to EU countries, and India was the EU’s ninth trading partner. From the above one can gauge the economic dimension of the strategic partnership. But, the two don’t essentially figure in each other’s foreign

M. Sethi (*) Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2020 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World,




policy and security conversations. In general public perception in India, the EU is not a particularly prominent player with much political weight and influence. Interestingly, a survey done in 2005 to assess the external image of the EU had found a huge information deficit about the EU in India even as India too was under-reported in all EU capitals (Fioramonti 2012: 150). In the security dimension too, the two players have primarily remained preoccupied within their own orbits. However, the situation may be ripe for change in the coming years owing to changes in the EU, India and the global circumstances. In 2018, the EU had decided to outline an India Strategy to signal the importance it seeks to attach to the country and maximize the opportunities that the EU’s evolving relationship with India can offer. The European Commission’s Working Programme for 2018 had proposed to put together a new EU strategy on India to ‘further develop the EU-India Strategic Partnership, and contribute to the realization of its full potential… to increase EU participation in the process of India’s modernization, and invigorate the engagement of both the EU and India towards a common response to global environmental, economic, and security challenges’ (European Commission 2018b, 20 November: 1). Prime Minister Narendra Modi too has reached out to individual European capitals as well as to the EU collectively. It is encouraging that the two have expanded the scope of their cooperation from traditional areas of economy, energy, education and climate change to include cyberspace, urbanization, water management, maritime security, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Syria and the Middle East Peace process to connectivity, non-proliferation and disarmament, and terrorism. This expansion of areas of cooperation is happening at a time when the Trump Administration apparently seems to be stepping backwards from global concerns it has traditionally led. American cajoling of Europe to take more responsibility of its own security is also pushing Europe to look for like-minded partners. India fits the bill and both sides are discovering several areas of natural convergence. This provides room for the two to work together. Surprisingly, one of these areas is that of nuclear non-­proliferation and disarmament, a field which in the past actually kept them apart. India and the EU have been strong supporters of the principle of nuclear non-proliferation. Unchecked spread of nuclear weapons has been denounced by both for its adverse impact on international security. And yet, ironically enough, despite their support for the principle, the two have been on the opposite sides of the fence as far as the application of nuclear



non-proliferation is concerned. The EU has been, so to say, inside the tent of the non-proliferation regime while India was an outlier, at least until a decade ago. This difference of view and status on nuclear issues kept the two sides estranged over many decades from the 1950s to the mid-2000s. It was only in 2004 that a strategic partnership was signed between the two, which paved the way for sharing a better understanding of each other’s positions on security matters, including non-proliferation. Subsequently, the conclusion of the Indo-US agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation facilitated India’s accommodation into the non-proliferation regime, which was made possible with the support of the European nations. The two sides have since been attempting to forge a new relationship over the last decade or so. Is it time now for take-off? The aim of this chapter is to understand the India-EU relationship through the prism of nuclear non-proliferation. Historically, which issues have kept the two apart despite the fact that India was one of the first few countries to establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community in the 1960s? What has changed in recent times; and why? On which areas do they today have convergent positions? The purpose of the exercise is to identify potential areas of cooperation since the two political entities have the clout to make a difference to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation for the promotion of international peace and security. This is doubly important at a time when the US appears to be withdrawing from global issues, and China is seeking to impose its own rules at the cost of those that have long governed the international order. The chapter offers some recommendations on how the two important players in Asia and Europe could partner for the sustenance of an international security order that fosters respect for nuclear non-proliferation and generates movement towards nuclear disarmament. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first one explains the historical dimension of how the nuclear issue kept the EU and India apart for nearly six decades. The second section explores the factors that have facilitated changed positions since 2005. The next section identifies areas of convergence and offers some suggestions for both to collectively and meaningfully support the cause of nuclear non-proliferation in a cooperative partnership for international security. The conclusion finally sums up the relationship on the parameter of non-proliferation and provides pointers to what could make or mar the partnership.



‘Natural Partners’, But Not on Nuclear Issues: 1950s to 1990s Amongst the many reasons that constrained the India-EU relationship from blossoming in the security dimension in the period 1950–1990, one important factor was the disparate India and EU position on matters of nuclear non-proliferation. In fact, it may be recalled that nuclear non-­ proliferation was not the topmost priority for Europe in this period. In 1957 when the European Economic Community (EEC) was founded by the Treaty of Rome, matters related to foreign policy and security were left to individual nations. The EEC preferred to concentrate on its internal political and economic consolidation issues, and it pretty much left the concerns of nuclear non-proliferation to the United States. Its own nuclear-related security concerns were in any case largely from the Soviet Union. And, the general perception was that the United States/the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would handle this threat through military measures and political engagement with the Soviet Union. Also, even amongst the European states there was no unitary approach to the risks from nuclear weapons or proliferation. While some countries were happily accepted the extended nuclear deterrence offered by US/NATO nuclear forces and the protection this brought them against conventional hostilities, others had reservations about hosting American non-strategic nuclear weapons in the European theatre. Fearing the possibility of a nuclear conflagration that would affect them directly, these countries supported the goal of a nuclear-free Europe. Similarly, on the issue of export of sensitive technologies, some countries paid little heed to the potential of such transfers for military applications compared to others. As expressed by a French strategist Bruno Tertrais while reflecting on this period, ‘non-­ proliferation was near the bottom of European Council’s list of concerns for a long time’ (Tertrais 2005: 47). Caught in addressing their own nuclear challenges and contradictions, Asia, or India, figured even lesser in the European consciousness. Meanwhile, several thousands of kilometres away, nuclear non-­ proliferation was a major concern for India which was grappling with the growing nuclear and missile proliferation from China to Pakistan. Transfers of nuclear material, technology, engineering designs and even nuclear test data from Beijing to Islamabad from the 1970s to the 1990s is well documented in several books based on archival research (Burr 2013). China had already tested its nuclear weapon in 1964 and established itself as a



‘legitimate’ nuclear weapon state (NWS) under the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). The treaty had designated an arbitrary date of 1 January 1967 as the cut-off date for a country to have conducted its first nuclear test and hence to be accepted as a NWS. By that measure, only five states became NWS and all the others were described as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and urged to pledge to remain so under the NPT. India decided not to become party to the treaty and even though several European nations too were not very quick to join,1 they eventually did so and became active and ardent supporters of the NPT. In fact, over the years, the EU’s championship of non-proliferation has been anchored by its belief that treaty instruments of the regime, such as the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), are its inviolable pillars that must be universalized. This, however, has been anathema to India. A vociferous critic of the NPT, India has denounced the treaty for the manner in which it perpetuates a built-in discrimination by designating nations as nuclear and non-­ nuclear with an unfair distribution of the share of responsibilities to be borne by the NNWS and privileges to be enjoyed by NWS. Its perfunctory support for nuclear disarmament has also disheartened India’s hopes that the universal elimination of nuclear weapons would help address its security challenge from China’s nuclear arsenal. Rather, through the 1970s and the 1980s, India witnessed the proliferation of nuclear capability to Pakistan, even as the United States and Europe turned a blind eye to the developments. Meanwhile, India was subjected to technology denials that started with the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1974, after the conduct of a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) by India. This was perceived by the Western powers as a blow to the non-proliferation regime even though the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had at that time an active programme on PNEs for activities designated legitimate, such as changing the course of rivers or deep geological mining. Anyway, positions of the United States and Europe hardened as a result of this episode, which made them cut off India from all types of nuclear trade. Consequently, the two sides became even more estranged through the 1980s and the 1990s. Little effort was made to build any bridges by either side since both were primarily preoccupied with their respective immediate regional concerns. In 1993, the EU was formed with the conclusion of the Maastricht treaty. Internal issues of consolidation and institution building did not allow much scope for non-proliferation to emerge as a priority issue for the group, at least not immediately. However, a couple of years down the



line, in the run up to the review and extension conference of the NPT in 1995, EU Member States came up with a joint action plan. This involved an extensive diplomatic campaign to forge a general consensus on the need to get an unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT. One year later, the CTBT came into focus and given the EU’s penchant for multilateral treaty-based non-proliferation mechanisms, its support for this instrument was natural. It bears recalling that multilateralism has been the cornerstone of the EU strategy on non-proliferation. Accordingly, it has emphasized commitment to a system of international treaties that provide a legal and normative basis to nuclear non-proliferation. However, neither of these treaties found favour with India. New Delhi had denounced the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT as the surrender by NNWS of their leverage that could have pushed NWS towards disarmament. India perceived the grant of indefinite extension to the NPT as indefinitely perpetuating the discrimination inherent in the treaty. As regards the CTBT, whose idea India had initially supported, New Delhi felt let down by the final outcome which, in its view, ended up making the treaty more an instrument of non-proliferation than disarmament, contrary to what India had envisaged and desired. The manner in which the CTBT was passed through the UN when its chances were blocked in the Conference on Disarmament where it was actually negotiated, and the identification by the treaty of 44 countries who were mandatorily asked to sign up, further antagonized India besides placing it in a difficult position. Facing up to the non-proliferation pressures mounted by the NPT and CTBT, India felt compelled to demonstrate its nuclear weapons capability through the conduct of five nuclear tests in 1998. India perceived its nuclear situation as quite unfavourable to its security interests, which the international community’s exclusive emphasis on non-proliferation measures minus any hope of disarmament, had failed to address, or even acknowledge. The tests, not unexpectedly, resulted in immediate criticism and sanctions. At the time, the European Union as a bloc displayed little empathy for India’s security concerns and compulsions, though, of course, there were exceptions. France, for instance, showed greater understanding of India’s actions. But the EU itself was critical of India for the harm it felt that New Delhi had caused to the norm against nuclear testing that the CTBT was hoping to legalize by 1999. A further wedge had been driven between the India-EU relations and the differences in their approach to



non-proliferation were starkly evident by the end of the last decade of the millennium.

Signs of Change in India-EU Relations: The 2000s to the Present The dawn of the twenty-first century brought along a spate of developments that were to herald a change in the relationship between India and the EU. First of all, the tragic incident of 9/11 in 2001 awakened the EU to the threat of terrorism and the possibilities of its linkage with nuclear proliferation. The European Council meeting in October 2001 reflected on the possible connections and this eventually led to EU’s adoption of a transformed approach to strategic issues. Evolution of EU Non-Proliferation Policy It may be recalled that tentative moves towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) of the EU had emerged in the mid-1990s. This included the adoption, in 1995, of a Joint Action on EU’s participation in the NPT Review Conference; in 1997, a Joint Action on transparency of nuclear export controls; in 1998, a common position on nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia after the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan; and in 1999, on the early entry into force of the CTBT. A further step towards evolution of EU’s non-proliferation policy was taken in 2003 with the formal adoption of a new EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD. This strategy recognized WMD and missile proliferation as a distinct challenge that ‘puts at risk the security of our states, our peoples and our interests around the world’ (European Council 2003b: 2). The main goal of the policy included ‘strengthening the international system of non-proliferation, pursuing universalisation of multilateral agreements, and reinforcing strict implementation and compliance with these agreements’ (European Council 2003b: 9). The broad approach identified political and diplomatic preventative measures such as multilateral treaties and export control regimes as also the international organizations such as the IAEA as forming ‘the first line of defence’ (European Council 2003a, 10 June: 5). To further deal with these new challenges, the EU Council adopted a European Security Strategy that recognized the importance of a



multi-faceted approach based on ‘simultaneous use of inter-related policies that address not only the existence of WMD per se, but also the causes that may lead state and non-state actors to proliferate and make use of them’ (Pardo 2012: 10). In this context, the idea of strategic engagement with nations was implemented. Only four countries (the United States, Canada, Japan, and the Russian Federation) figured in this to start with in 2003. But it was subsequently expanded to six others, which included India. Consequently, in 2004, the India-EU relationship was upgraded to a ‘strategic partnership’, reflecting a more explicit political dimension to what had been until then a lukewarm economic association. The strategic partnership was also designed to include non-proliferation, which opened a bilateral channel to share views on promotion of non-proliferation besides ways to address specific cases of proliferation, such as Iran or North Korea. The conclusion of the strategic partnership with India was followed up with the formulation of a Joint Action Plan (JAP) in 2005. This was a significant document since it expressed a shared interest in working towards achieving ‘the goals and objectives of universal disarmament and non-proliferation… [and both expressed] resolve to enhance collective action to fight the proliferation of WMD as well as their means of delivery.’ The JAP emphasized ‘strengthened multilateral consultations and the pooling of all efforts and resources’ (European Council 2005: 6) in its paragraph on Disarmament and Non-proliferation of WMD and Security Dialogue. The platform also helped address misunderstandings and opened up the possibilities of exchange of views and expertise on non-­ proliferation to foster cooperation on nuclear safety and security. The JAP has been described as an ‘ambitious instrument’ and lauded for its ability to introduce ‘multidimensional cooperation, a political dialogue at the highest level and greater democratic visibility through parliamentary exchanges and a round table to which civil society is invited’ (Sautenet 2012: 126). Interestingly, this thawing of India-EU nuclear relations happened about the same time as the US was warming up to India. In fact, it may not be wrong to state that the EU felt comfortable taking the US lead. Even European scholars admit that ‘most Europeans look to Washington first as a point of reference when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation, either to follow the US lead or to distance themselves from the US policies’ (Tertrais 2005: 47). Obviously, the lucrative Indian market was also one of the drivers for the developments. Since the EU too had expanded



its membership from 15 to 25 countries and its economy was looking for new outlets, India held an appeal for Europe. Other arguments made by Western proponents of an engagement with India have included the utility of India as a counter balance to China and the need to help India fulfil its huge electricity demand in an environmentally friendly way so as to minimize the harmful effects on climate change from an unchecked fossil fuel burning. With Europe being sensitive to both issues, the outreach to India made sense. However, transforming the nature of the nuclear engagement with India also posed a dilemma for the EU.  On the one hand, the Bush Administration’s aggressive engagement with India provided endorsement for EU’s own initiatives with New Delhi. But, on the other hand, US efforts aimed at India’s accommodation into the non-proliferation regime, which included seeking an NSG waiver and the conclusion of an India-specific IAEA safeguards agreement despite its non-membership of the NPT, was not particularly welcomed by some EU members. They were critical of what in their view was India’s defiance of the NPT and felt that making an exception for New Delhi could end up putting the entire regime in jeopardy. Therefore, the remodelling of the non-proliferation rules for India came to be seen as a test case for EU’s own commitment to non-proliferation and created a divide within the group. While UK and France were empathetic towards India and more keen to follow the United States, others like Austria, Sweden and Ireland took a more principled approach and objected to the exception being made for India. Two developments then may have saved the day for India. One was its own proactive outreach to the EU as a whole and to its individual members bilaterally. This enabled a better explaining of the Indian position on non-proliferation and how it had supported the principle even if it was not a member of the NPT. The second development which could have helped was one that had already taken place in 2003. This related to the revelation of the A.Q. Khan network of nuclear proliferation run from Pakistan and in which many European countries were found inadvertently involved owing to a laxity in the implementation of their own export controls. This expose brought about a heightened sensitivity to issues of proliferation and the need for taking measures to ensure that countries would play by the rules of the game. The contrast between the nuclear behaviour of India and Pakistan was also clearly obvious and this may have influenced some of the countries to soften their position towards India’s accommodation. As it turned out at the all-important Nuclear Suppliers Group



meeting in 2008, an exception was made to allow India to participate in nuclear trade with the world. Since then, India has signed several nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of countries. With EU too, possible areas of nuclear cooperation have been explored. It is significant that India and EU have established, in 2013, a dialogue on non-proliferation and disarmament, which reflects a sense of their common understanding on the broader security dynamics of nuclear issues. India, the EU and Dual-Use Goods The EU itself, as stated earlier, became serious about the implementation of stringent export controls only at the turn of the millennium. It was on 22 June 2000 that the Council issued Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 ( 3A32000R1334) to set up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-­use items and technology. This identified the significance of applying an effective system of export controls on dual-use items, including software and technology, when they were exported from the EU countries to anywhere outside. Meanwhile, a common control system with a harmonized list of items was envisaged as a pre-requisite for enabling free movement of such goods within the EU community. Over time, the EU dual-use goods regulations have seen several revised iterations. For instance, in 2009 Regulation (EC) No 428/20092 was issued to include • common export control rules, including a common set of assessment criteria and common types of authorizations (individual, global and general authorizations), • a common EU list of dual-use items, • a ‘catch-all clause’ for non-listed items which could be used e.g. in connection with a WMD programme, • controls on brokering dual-use items and their transit through the EU, • specific control measures to be introduced by exporters, such as record-keeping and registers, and • provisions setting up a network of competent authorities supporting the exchange of information and the consistent implementation and enforcement of controls throughout the EU.



India’s own growing sensitivity to export controls too roughly coincided with that of the EU. By the mid-2000s, as the Indo-US nuclear deal was beginning to take shape, India was well aware that it should harmonize its own long-standing national export control measures with the larger non-proliferation regime in order to ensure the safety and security of dual-use imports to India, as also ascertain that these were not re-­ exported to illegal destinations for unintended purposes. Assurances with regard to this were given through political commitments. Since then India has worked towards the harmonization of its existing export controls system with international standards and to take necessary measures to facilitate their effective administration (see Sethi 2007).

Issues of Convergence and Possibilities of Nuclear Cooperation between India and the EU Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is a stated shared goal of India and the EU even if they have maintained different approaches to achieving these objectives. With India’s inclusion into the non-proliferation regime in 2008 and its more recent membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group and the Wassenaar Agreement, the EU and India have been able to find more common ground on matters nuclear. These areas also offer possibilities of cooperation as highlighted in the paragraphs below. The Iranian Imbroglio The European Union played a major role as a convener-in-chief and mediator between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) P5 (Permanent Five) (plus Germany) and the Iranian regime in resolving a long-standing nuclear issue. The conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 was not a minor achievement for the EU. Its participation in the non-proliferation diplomacy actually started out as a triadic effort when the foreign ministers of France, Germany and UK visited Tehran in 2003 and managed to get Iran to promise a suspension of its enrichment programme. But thereafter, the EU Representative became fully involved in the talks. EU positions on Iran were crafted after intense debates within the European Council and this carried collective weight that helped in the negotiations with Iran. In fact, it may be said that EU’s



success in sealing the agreement after many turnarounds made the group far more conscious of its potential in nuclear diplomacy. This awakening is coincidentally timed with the retreat of President Trump from major global issues, and with India’s entry into the non-proliferation regime as a more ‘legitimate’ player. On the Iranian deal, India and the EU find themselves on the same side. Both look at the JCPOA as an effective and useful tool for handling Iran’s suspected nuclear ambitions. India had lauded the EU for its efforts during the long-drawn negotiations. It also welcomed the agreement as a much-needed opening to mainstream Iran and thereby reduce its threat perceptions that were likely to push it towards nuclear weapons. Once the JCPOA had come into play, India and the EU supported its full and effective implementation by all sides. Both were opposed to President Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement. In fact, India and the EU believed that this step would only push Iran towards greater hardening of its nuclear position. The India-EU joint statement of 2017 accordingly reads ‘India and the EU reaffirmed their support for the continued full implementation of the JCPOA regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. They recognized confirmation by the IAEA that Iran is complying with its nuclear-related JCPOA commitments. India and the EU called for the full and effective implementation of the deal, which has been endorsed by the UN Security Council and is a crucial contribution to the non-proliferation framework and international peace, stability and security’ (para 17 of Ministry of External Affairs, at htm?dtl/29011/India++EU+Joint+Statement+during+14th+IndiaEU+S ummit+New+Delhi+October+06+2017). This remains their position to date even after President Trump has jettisoned the JCPOA and cautioned others to respect the sanctions that the United States has begun imposing on Iran. As a result, the EU and India find themselves in a difficult position. For India, Iran is not only an important provider of oil, but also a strategic location through the Chabahar port that allows connectivity with Afghanistan, Central Asia and upwards to Europe. In fact, this link has been seen as being beneficial to Europe too (Kugiel 2018). Given that India and the EU have fairly good relations with both the United States and Iran, it may be worthwhile for them to look for ways to resolve the current imbroglio. Pushing Iran to the wall and compelling it to develop a nuclear weapons capability is not a situation that appeals to



either India or the EU. Therefore, there is a common interest to protect non-­proliferation from being jolted by the possibility of an Iranian nuclear test, a development that might appear threatening to others in West Asia and lead to a larger international security conundrum. The Knotty North Korean Issue North Korea’s nuclear and missile programme poses little direct threat to either the EU or India. But both do look upon it as a grave nuclear challenge to non-proliferation and therefore seek its sensible resolution. Both had explicitly expressed their keenness on the primacy of diplomacy in resolving the problem when tempers of President Trump and President Kim Jong-un were being ratcheted up by irresponsible statements bordering on nuclear brinksmanship from the leaders in the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Both sides condemned the nuclear test conducted by DPRK on 3 September 2017, as a violation of its international commitments, as also its continued pursuit of ballistic missiles as posing a threat to international peace and security. India and the EU in their joint statements have called for the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In case this is not achieved, India is particularly concerned over the possibility of nuclear proliferation from DPRK to state or non-state actors. Such activity has happened in the past between North Korea and Pakistan and this is a natural cause of worry for India. The risk of DPRK selling its nuclear weapons material or technology or even weapons for money to terrorist organizations should, in fact, be a matter of concern for the entire international community. It is not surprising that India has insisted on the inclusion of a mention of those that have been responsible for providing support to DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes though China has been leery of shouldering any blame for the present situation having come to pass. The US-North Korea summit in June 2018 has brought down the temperatures for now but no real resolution to the problem is yet in sight. It can only be emphasized that unity of the international community is necessary in addressing this challenge. The fact that India and the EU share a similar approach helps create an opportunity to maximize pressure towards achieving a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue.



Nuclear Export Controls Interestingly, till not very long ago, export controls were dubbed as technology denials by India and it felt wrongly victimized by the ad hoc groupings that had been created in the name of non-proliferation. Even as India faced the brunt of this regime, it found other players in its neighbourhood indulging in blatant nuclear and missile transfers and the export control groups and their Western creators were unable to do anything about it. Owing to this, India and the EU were on the opposite sides of the issue of export controls. The situation only changed with India’s accommodation into the non-proliferation regime. As part of this process, India undertook to harmonize its own export control lists and this has eventually enabled its inclusion into the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar agreement. The NSG membership is still pending but that is because of China’s political objections to India’s inclusion. Meanwhile, India’s membership of the other groups enables better cooperation between the two on bilateral trade on dual-use items without the risk potential of disruption in any future defence or nuclear cooperation. Today, India and EU share common concerns over the threat of nuclear terrorism. While India has its worries from the neighbourhood given that a nuclear Pakistan has been a supporter of terrorism against India, the EU too has woken up to the risks of terrorism and the possibility of their taking a nuclear dimension. Both sides, therefore, have a common stake in the effective and universal implementation of strict export controls and other nuclear security instruments that mandate national control over Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and delivery system materials and technologies. Their common positions on full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and other nuclear security treaties such as the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and its Amendment, etc. provide a common platform for the promotion of measures to mitigate the risks. Both are also active members of the IAEA nuclear security efforts, including having contributed to the Nuclear Security Fund to finance measures not accounted for under the IAEA budget. Having been a part of the Nuclear Security Summit process that generated an awareness on nuclear security and a momentum on national efforts, it is in the interest of the EU and India to keep the focus on this subject and not let national efforts flag. There is scope for both to craft initiatives that keep the issue alive.



Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy India has long maintained that nuclear energy is an important part of its electricity mix given the huge demand for electricity in the country and the inadequacy of other sources (see Sethi 2017). However, not all EU Member States are supporters of nuclear energy, even though as members of the NSG, they do have a bearing on India’s nuclear power programme. As is well known, India has ambitious nuclear plans that are not only aimed at increasing the share of nuclear electricity but to also graduate to fast breeder reactors and then on to the thorium cycle. In the approach to the newer nuclear fuel cycles, there is scope for cooperation with countries that might be interested, though there are few such nations in the EU today with the exception of France. Nevertheless, India and the EU do have a common interest in the development of fusion energy and have in place a Euratom-India Cooperation Agreement on Fusion Energy research. Also, EU technological edge and Indian manufacturing costs could help make India a viable hub in the global nuclear supply chain. At the India-EU Summit in 2017, the leaders encouraged Euratom and the Department of Atomic Energy to conclude the agreement for research and development cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including in non-power technologies such as water, health care and medicine, environment, etc. Nuclear cooperation could also encompass fields of nuclear safety through sharing of technological and HR best practices. This could be particularly enabled by cooperation between the Centres of Excellence of both sides. Given that India’s Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership has five schools dedicated to different kinds of nuclear and material studies, there is scope for undertaking joint R&D on many dimensions to promote multi-dimensional peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Scope for India-EU cooperation in this dimension is immense, especially with India’s accommodation into the non-­proliferation regime. Nuclear Disarmament The EU does not have a joint position on nuclear disarmament. This is hardly surprising given the disparate nature of the states that constitute the EU.  Two of them are nuclear weapon states who have shown little interest in giving up their nuclear arsenals. Twenty are members of NATO and under the umbrella of extended nuclear deterrence. Four of them host



nuclear weapons on their own territories. Owing to these differences, each tends to approach the issue of nuclear disarmament with a distinct attitude and conviction. However, irrespective of their individual positions, the EU official statements have expressed a readiness to support nuclear disarmament through an incremental step-by-step process. On this, the Indian position is close to that of the EU. India too supports the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world (NWFW) by working towards creating necessary conditions rather than following a radical agenda. It is also for this reason that both have not supported the Nuclear Ban Treaty that was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 7 July 2017, even though five non-NATO, EU members (Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Sweden) voted in its favour at the UN General Assembly. Austria and Ireland have also signed it. However, there is no agreed EU position on the ban treaty though the grouping is generally in favour of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. India and the EU can find common ground to support movement towards the goal that both have expressed an interest in. One such idea could be to work jointly on verification technologies that can establish the technical viability of nuclear disarmament.

Conclusion Throughout the last decade, the EU has taken steps to raise its game on non-proliferation by becoming more active globally and by improving its internal coordination. The EU’s role in the Iranian negotiations is a case in point. Having said that, however, it is also a fact that non-proliferation is of relatively recent vintage in EU security priorities. Two challenges can be seen to have constrained the development of a united and coordinated EU non-proliferation strategy. The first of these relates to the disparate nature of the states within the EU.  The co-existence of two nuclear weapon states with 26 NNWS has generated varied attitudes to non-­ proliferation, its prioritization and focus on implementation strategies. As put by an analyst, ‘The EU is still punching below its weight in the international arena… its objective potentials still limited by different foreign policy traditions and cultures, and by diverging interests defined predominantly in the national framework’ (Emmanouilidis 2012: 94). Indeed, EU Member States have often opted for nationally driven positions and policies that have weakened a common EU position. The second challenge has arisen from the rather bureaucratic nature of the EU architecture. The silo-based functioning of the institutions tasked



with international security and non-proliferation has not proved to be the most efficient way of dealing with the issue and rather led to a sense of the EU not being a coherent and meaningful player in the field of non-­ proliferation. However, in an effort to resolve the issue, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European External Action Service centralized many non-proliferation policies (see Renard 2013). While this has led to better coordination with international bodies like the IAEA, internal divisions over issues such as how to approach nuclear disarmament, redeployment of non-strategic nuclear missiles in Europe and also the Indo-US nuclear deal still persist. In a sense, despite efforts at arriving at a common position on many issues, non-proliferation remains first and foremost a national preserve. This makes the emergence of the EU as a single, strategic actor quite complicated. Looking at Europe from India, it does not appear yet as a major power centre on security issues, including non-proliferation. Of course, its role in the conclusion of the JCPOA has somewhat changed this perception. Certainly, the EU’s self-image is that of a ‘qualitatively distinct actor in world politics’ that places emphasis on ‘multilateralism and a rule-based international order as opposed to traditional power politics, realpolitik and other narrow national interests’ (Fioramonti 2012: 147–148). In this formulation, the EU distinguishes itself from US pursuit of unilateralism. India is today re-engaging with Europe along new pathways. This is significant as the world appears to be entering a period of profound changes. The UK’s exit from the EU created uncertainty. Meanwhile in the United States, President Donald Trump seems to be upending an international order with his unpredictability and a blatantly America First attitude. Closer home to India, the rise of China as an unapologetically aggressive expansionist power brings challenges for India’s own interests and growth trajectory. In this panoply of developments, the EU and India, both of whom have expressed keenness for multilateralism and a multi-­ polar world order, could find support from each other. Political and economic circumstances have brought them to a pass where their paths could cross to create a win-win for both sides. But, it is equally important that the two respect the differences that still persist in some of their non-proliferation positions. For instance, the EU’s insistence on the universalization of the NPT will always come up against India’s non-acceptance of treaty membership as a NNWS and the treaty’s inability to accept it as a NWS. Similarly, on CTBT too, the EU is keen to



have it enter into force. But India has refused to accept anything more than a unilateral moratorium on testing. Some Europeans have argued that grant of NSG membership to India must be linked to New Delhi’s acceptance of the CTBT.  As one strategic analyst writes, India’s acceptance of the CTBT ‘should be the ultimate price that it has to pay for reaping the benefits of further integration’ (Kienzle 2015: 13). However, India is unlikely to appreciate such insistence on what it considers is a matter of strategic autonomy and certainly not unless other major holdouts like United States and China were to move in the direction of ratification of the CTBT. Cooperation on matters of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament between India and the EU will first of all require a consistent dialogue wherein misperceptions and misunderstandings of the past can be patiently dispelled. India’s unique approach to nuclear weapons underpinned by the ideas of credible minimum deterrence and no first use is not well understood. This then gives rise to misgivings about its intentions. New Delhi must make the effort to engage with the EU to explain its positions and generate a level of trust. Similarly, Brussels too must try to overcome its old habits of technology denials to enter into meaningful cooperation in high-end technologies. It will be interesting to see how the issue of nuclear non-proliferation that traditionally kept India and the EU estranged for so long could become the anchor for forging a new security partnership. The potential certainly exists as has been highlighted in the previous section. It remains to be seen whether it will be realized.

Notes 1. Germany and Italy ratified the NPT in 1975 and France joined it only in 1992. 2. dual-use-controls/, p. 1. Accessed on 30 October 2019.

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Emmanouilidis, J. A. (2012). Europe’s Role in the 21st Century. In T. Renard & S. Biscop (Eds.), The European Union and Emerging Powers in the 21st Century: How Europe Can Shape a New Global Order (pp. 83–104). Surrey: Ashgate. European Commission. (2009). Dual Use Trade Controls. Retrieved September 29, 2018, from ———. (2018a). Joint Communication on Elements for an EU Strategy for India. Retrieved September 28, 2018, from ———. (2018b). An EU Strategy on India. Retrieved October 30, 2019, from European Council. (2003a, June 10). Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 10352/03. Brussels. Retrieved September 29, 2018, from ———. (2003b, December 10). EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Retrieved September 29, 2018, from ———. (2005, September 7). The India-EU Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan. 11984/05. Brussels. Retrieved September 29, 2018, from http://www. Fioramonti, L. (2012). Is the EU a “Better” Global Player: An Analysis of Emerging Powers’ Perceptions. In T. Renard & S. Biscop (Eds.), The European Union and Emerging Powers in the 21st Century: How Europe Can Shape a New Global Order (pp. 147–163). Surrey: Ashgate. Kienzle, B. (2015, February). Integrating Without Quite Breaking the Rules: The EU and India’s Acceptance Within the Non-Proliferation Regime. Non-­ Proliferation Papers, No. 43. Kugiel, P. (2018, October 5). Enhancing India-EU Connectivity: Towards New Spice Routes. PISM Analysis, No. 135. Ministry of External Affairs. (2017, October 6). India-EU Joint Statement of 14th India-EU Summit. New Delhi. Retrieved September 29, 2018, from https:// oint%2BStatement%2Bduring%2B14th%2BIndiaEU%2BSummit%2BNew%2B Delhi%2BOctober%2B06%2B2017. Pardo, R.  P. (2012). Normal Power Europe: Non-Proliferation and the Normalization of EU’s Foreign Policy. European Integration, 34(1), 1–18. Renard, T. (2013, October). Partnering for a Nuclear-Safe World: The EU, Its Strategic Partners and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. ESPO Working Paper, No. 3. Sautenet, A. (2012). The EU’s Strategic Partnership with Emerging Powers: Institutional, Legal, Economic and Political Perspectives. In T.  Renard &



S. Biscop (Eds.), The European Union and Emerging Powers in the 21st Century: How Europe can Shape a New Global Order (pp. 123–146). Surrey: Ashgate. Sethi, M. (2007). Export Controls in India: Essential CBMs for Trade and Security. South Asian Survey, 14(2), 231–249. ———. (2017, July–December). A Strong Case for Expanding the Role of Nuclear Energy. Liberal Studies, 2(2), 143–150. Tertrais, B. (2005). The EU and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Does Soft Power Work? The International Spectator, 40(3), 47–57.


India and the European Union: A Dialectical Approach to Human Rights Bhaswati Mukherjee

Contrasting Approaches to UN Human Rights Mechanisms India is an original signatory to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Widely accepted as the basis of international human rights law, it enshrines the principle that human beings are born equal in dignity and rights, principles underlying every culture and civilization, religion and philosophy from ancient times till today. Hence, these rights are referred to as universal rights. Historically, these rights emanated from Plato’s Republic as well as the Arthashastra of Chanakya, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 and the American Bill of Rights in 1791. It was, however, only after the elaboration of the Charter of the United Nations signed on 26 June 1945 that the concept of universal respect for human rights was accepted as a fundamental right. The United Nations, the Charter states, was established ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to reaffirm faith in fundamental

B. Mukherjee (*) Former Joint Secretary (Europe West, EU and Commonwealth), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2020 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World,




human rights, in the dignity and worth of human person and in the equal rights of men and women’. Post 1947, the developing countries led by India, had insisted that all rights including economic, social and cultural as well as civil and political rights have the same status and should be respected equally. The ‘Right to Development’, according to developing countries, was of primary importance so as to fully enjoy rights including civil and political rights. In the 1970s, this perspective, given the political and ideological divisions of the Cold War, was strongly opposed by the West. Fortunately, with the end of the Cold War, the principle of respect, the promotion and protection of all human rights on the same footing and with similar emphasis gained universal recognition. As Secretary to the Preparatory Committees leading up to the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, and as Secretary to the Drafting Committee of the World Conference, under the wise leadership of Ambassador Gilberto Vergne Saboia of Brazil, who chaired the Drafting Committee, the author was privileged to witness the intricate negotiations that led to the adoption in 1993 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, which ‘reaffirmed the principle of indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights’. The ideological pillars of the human rights system within the United Nations had made a dramatic shift and would never be coloured by Cold War politics again. They would, however, be influenced by new challenges, including terrorism and non-state actors to cite a few, as well as the shifting Western approach towards human rights as a mechanism to establish political and economic control especially over emerging markets. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), like the Vienna Declaration1 (1993), is not legally binding, their main principles have acquired the status of customary international law, which States are legally bound to respect. Some States have tried to argue that it was negotiated at a time when two thirds of the world was under colonial rule and should take into account different social and legal systems in the new universal global community. There remain few takers for this approach. Both India and the EU have always underlined that the Universal Declaration is the basis of international human rights law. The different human rights instruments, including the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, respectively, are legally binding treaties for States Parties whose human rights records are scrutinized periodically by different Committees. The Human Rights Committee, which periodically examines the reports



of States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, consists of 18 independent experts nominated and elected by States Parties and who serve in their personal capacity. Other important human rights instruments which have similar reporting obligations include the Convention against Torture, the Convention of the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

The Human Rights Council The Human Rights Council (HRC)—a successor body to the Commission on Human Rights—is an important intergovernmental body within the UN system responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights globally and for addressing situations of human rights violations and making recommendations on them. It can discuss all thematic human rights issues and situations that require its attention throughout the year. Composed of 47 Member States, it replaced the former United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). Created by the United Nations General Assembly on 15 March 2006 by a resolution 60–251, its first session took place on 19–30 June 2006. India is a founding member of the Council and has served three terms from 2006–2007, 2007–2010 and 2011 to 2014. As an indication of the growing recognition of its status globally, India was recently elected to the Human Rights Council2 for a three-year term beginning 1 January 2019. Among 18 candidates, India secured the highest number of votes—188— which is almost the entire membership of the UN.  India’s Permanent Representative Syed Akbaruddin thanked Member States for this phenomenal victory and noted: ‘India will continue a balanced and moderate approach in protecting human rights.’ India is highly respected in the HRC. Its approach is based on certain fundamental principles including respect for democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as respect for minorities and rights of women. India firmly believes that the promotion and protection of human rights are fundamental freedoms which can be best pursued through dialogue and cooperation. India has consistently and successfully pleaded for preserving the inter-governmental nature of the Council’s mechanism and encouraged the strengthening of national efforts to realize human rights. India has always upheld respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs



of the States, impartiality, non-selectivity and transparency. At the same time, depending upon the complexities of the issues, India has invariably taken a principled stand on gross human rights violations in any particular region of the world. India has usually abstained on one-sided or unbalanced resolutions on country-specific situations. India is of the view that ‘finger pointing’ is not an elegant or effective solution to a difficult problem. During the erstwhile Human Rights Commission in the early 1980s, India courageously moved a ‘No Action Motion’ on a country-specific resolution moved by Western countries against Cuba. The motion carried with one vote and the resolution on Cuba was rejected. In the author’s view, it marked the high point of India’s policy of being guided by the principle of dialogue and cooperation and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It was a courageous but difficult decision to take, given India’s difficult economic situation at that time. As a country emerging from 190 years of colonial rule, India’s approach to human rights is based on its Constitution and in particular Article 19, which guarantees all human rights and fundamental freedoms as conceptualized in the Universal Declaration. India recognizes certain unalienable rights that are inherent to the concept of the dignity of the human person. At the same time, human rights are not limited to the protective aspect. It includes the notion that a human must have the space and the means to achieve freedom. Both democracy and development contribute to human rights in that they promote freedom of thought, action and existence. For developing countries, there is no contradiction between the individual and the social good and natural rights and development. These values are rooted in their multicultural and multi-ethnic civilizational heritage. Emerging from the Cold War and faced with a challenging economic situation at home, India was frequently critical of the so-called Western agenda on human rights. Within the Human Rights Commission which preceded the Council, India regretted the inherent contradictions in the Western approach to human rights. These included, inter alia, the lack of a balanced historical perspective of gross human rights violations by Western powers including those committed during the colonial period, denial of violations of human rights within Western societies and the refusal by the West to accept that the continuing marginalization and exclusion of, and discrimination against, large sections of their own societies was a violation of the Universal Declaration. Such recognition could put both Western human rights records and the human rights records of the developing world in a better perspective. These violations include



racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, double standards and marginalization of large minority populations. India has consistently advocated a balanced and comprehensive promotion of human rights through the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law, the pursuit of development, the promotion of tolerance and respect for pluralism and diversity and a morally anchored respect for life. New Delhi maintains that democracy, tolerance, and pluralism are the best guarantees for the full realization of human rights. It is through democracy that both individual and collective rights are best reconciled. At the same time, it must be recognized that while democracy provides the best political framework to safeguard human rights, efforts to ensure the social and economic rights of people are also essential to enable people to live a life of dignity. Development is imperative in order to achieve the fullest democratization. The right to food, shelter and clothing is as important as political rights, including the right to vote. At the core of India’s approach is the conviction that development may not be a sufficient condition for the full enjoyment of human rights but it is an enabling condition. India maintains that the international human rights discourse has often been marred by ‘false contradictions between the universal and the particular, between the individual and the state, and between the natural and developmental concepts of human rights by both those who violate and those who protect human rights’. New Delhi is therefore of the view that as long as human rights are used in conjunction with political power, the perception that human rights are being used as ‘instruments of pressure, domination, or assertion of superiority of one kind or the other’ will tend to persist (Shah 1997: 41–42). This is a complex issue. It may be pertinent to recall the observation of a great UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold3: ‘The conflict between different approaches to the liberty of man and mind or between different views of human dignity and right of the individual is continuous. The deciding line goes within us, within our own peoples, and also with other nations. It does not coincide with any political or geographical boundaries. The ultimate fight is one between the human and the sub-human.’

Can India Be a Human Rights Leader? Many believe that India can provide an alternative to the dominant discourse on rights. ‘Can India be an international human rights leader?’ asks Meenakshi Ganguly, arguing: ‘India should have a strong foreign policy



that promotes human rights abroad’ (Ganguly 2013). In this context, Aseem Prakash argues that India should not seek to be a global human rights leader. For him, the moot question is whether India, as an emerging power from the global South, can offer any alternative approach to human rights that can benefit other states. Can it offer an alternative perspective on human rights beyond the individual-centred negative rights paradigm that currently dominates the global discourse? (Prakash 2013). Much has changed in India within the last decade. India has developed a robust rights-based approach to development issues within its Parliament. Hence, through the legal recognition of socio-economic rights, both the judiciary and the legislature in India are moving beyond the negative conception of human rights and including positive rights as enforceable entitlements. In many ways, it blurs traditional boundaries in international jurisprudence, drawn between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights as enshrined in UN Conventions. What is also exceptional about India’s new rights regime is that these are not social security schemes which operate as per the expediency of the Government of the day. Rather, these are rights based on statutory law that enforces legal accountability by providing concrete mechanisms for its realization.

India, Pakistan and the EU at the 1994 Human Rights Council Differences between India and EU over Kashmir ‘reached their peak’ between 2000 and 2004 but have now largely disappeared as an issue of dissonance between the two strategic partners’ (Pal Chaudhuri 2017: 58). At the height of the militancy and cross border infiltration by armed terrorists in Kashmir in the 1990s, orchestrated and fomented by Pakistan, the Indian State was in the process of eliminating militancy so as to start a political process in Jammu and Kashmir. At that time, to divert international attention from their role in cross-border terrorism, Pakistan decided to sponsor a resolution condemning human rights violations by Indian Armed Forces in Kashmir in the erstwhile Human Rights Commission. During this period, India intensively consulted EU Member States, members of the Commission, who were largely sympathetic to the difficulties posed by armed militancy to a vibrant democracy. At the same time, mindful of the pressures posed by Western civil society groups and the human rights activists within the European Parliament, many EU Member States



could only promise an abstention on the resolution if it came to a vote. While India was ultimately able to prevail within the Commission, the refusal of many EU Member States, particularly the Nordic countries, to vote against the resolution cast a long shadow on the relationship at that time.

The Strategic Partnership and Human Rights An analysis of the India-EU Strategic Partnership and the 14 summits held so far from 2000 to 2018 reveal an evolving approach to human rights. This was partly due to a different world-view of the two strategic partners, emanating from a different historical and developmental narrative. The quest for a multipolar world led by the European Union, Mukherjee points out, ‘impacted by the profound political changes and tectonic shifts at the end of the 20th century, towards this partnership. India had a different vision of the world order after the end of the Cold War.’ She notes that as  an important area of discord, India underlined that  the issue of human rights is ‘solely within the national domain’ and that the EU should ‘avoid a prescriptive approach’ (Mukherjee 2018: 96). Informed sources noted that the discussions demonstrated a lack of trust, diffidence about their role in the emerging global order and anxiety on their ability to effectively project power in their region and beyond. Through negotiations, the Joint Action Plan (JAP) of 2005—a fundamental pillar of the strategic partnership—identified areas of cooperation, including multilateral cooperation in the area of conflict prevention, anti-­ terrorism, non-proliferation, the promotion of democracy and the defence of human rights. The background leading to the JAP reveals complex negotiations and discord on key issues including human rights. Mukherjee points out: A voluminous paper elaborating the EU’s ideas for the corresponding institutional architecture, their incorporation and streamlining into existing dialogue formats was presented to the Indian side. These were based on the EU’s existing dialogue mechanisms and made no attempt to accommodate the institutional architecture familiar to the Indian side. The approach, unfortunately, was heavy handed and non-transparent. The negotiations could hardly be considered to have been conducted on the basis of sovereign equality. (Mukherjee 2018: 103)



The Indian Foreign Office and its Embassy in Brussels were of the view that a comprehensive response was required from India’s side. Accordingly, a strategy paper, which was far more pragmatic and realistic as well as ‘India-centric’, was prepared by the Indian Embassy in Brussels in close consultation with the Europe West Division of the Ministry of External Affairs headed at that time by the author. The Indian draft stressed the bilateral nature of the document. Facing terrorism on its western border as well as from within, directed and organized by a hostile Pakistan which had already become the epicentre of terrorism, the Indian proposal underlined the need to upgrade the existing counterterrorism dialogue to a broader working group on security cooperation, which would include representatives from intelligence agencies on both sides with sharing of classified information, including on cyber security. It was a difficult negotiation! India resented and rejected the insistence on the European side to enter into a human rights dialogue. Such a dialogue, if agreed to, would be totally one sided. It would avoid any discussion of social deficits on the European side such as racism, xenophobia and treatment of their minorities, including Muslims. It would exclusively focus on the EU’s predetermined perceptions of India’s so-called social evils, including the caste system, treatment of women and child labour. An analysis of the JAP reveals an over-ambitious agenda and inadequate machinery for implementation, leading to an oft-repeated comparison of the partnership resembling a loveless Indian arranged marriage! From the perspective of 2016, a fundamental flaw in the JAP and its review was that both sides had differing definitions of a strategic partnership which were never fully reconciled. The EU naïvely felt that India, coming out of international isolation after its nuclear tests at Pokhran and facing increasing threats from a nuclear armed Pakistan, would readily agree to the Union’s initial proposal of June 2004. Naturally, this did not happen! Senior Indian officials insisted that the strategic partnership should be based upon a relationship of sovereign equality based on comparative advantage and a mutuality of interests and benefits. Keeping in mind the then tendency of the EU to equate India with Pakistan, which was termed ‘hyphenation’, India insisted in its Response (August 2004) to the Commission’s 2004 Communication on a Strategic Partnership that the partnership should be kept ‘immune from the vicissitudes of either side’s relationship with a third party’.



The Right to Protect The Indian establishment’s foreign policy thinking in 2004 reflected India’s hesitation to embrace new Western thinking including the Right to Protect (R2P).4 India was wary of the evangelical zeal of the West to intervene across borders to promote democracy, pluralism, human rights and the rule of law. The Indian leadership also tried to sensitize their EU counterparts that India was hardly in a position to join the European Union in pointing fingers at the human rights records of the developing countries when its own record, like that of Europe, was far from perfect. The Joint Action Plan was thus based on ideological pillars that were diametrically opposed to each other. Analyzing this difference in approach, Muenchow-Pohl points out: ‘The EU’s approach to bringing its relationship with India to a “strategic” level rested on two premises—that India, as a like-minded democracy and emerging global power, would share the same notion of responsibility for global security, and that it would accept the EU as a true strategic player’ (Muenchow-Pohl 2012: 16). The European Union urged India to actively join not just peacekeeping and peace-building but also peace enforcement along with the Union and become an effective new pole in a unipolar world dominated by United States. The EU generally supported the existing order as providing an equitable framework capable of balancing and settling conflicting interests. Brussels’ thinking was somewhat naïve. It also reflected its conviction that with the end of the East-West divide and the emergence of a united Europe, international politics would be characterized by a new era of a broad multilateral consensus. European thinking was not in sync with the then Indian perspective. The European comfort level with the new international order was not reflected in the thinking of the Indian negotiators. ‘Effective multilateralism’—an important EU foreign policy doctrine to create strategic coherence and legitimacy for its international actions—was perceived by New Delhi to be an euphemism for intervention. Its tautology was suspect and was reflected in the ambiguity of the actual document. While the basic issues were never fully addressed, the Political Declaration of September 2005 unsuccessfully attempted to verbally bridge this perception gap. While the EU succeeded in inserting mutual commitment to its ‘effective multilateralism’ creed, the text tied multilateralism not only to the broader objectives of international peace and security, but also to ‘the economic



and social advancement of all people’, which was inserted by India as a precondition for acceptance of the text on multilateralism. In fact, multipolarity as a European concept was ‘neither fully understood nor appreciated’ by India’s strategic community and the Foreign Office at that time. Differing perspectives on deliverables would explain the ambiguity in the language which sought to cover up the only partial overlap of what both sides hope to get out of this partnership (Mukherjee 2018: 59–62).

The Human Rights Dialogue: A Non-Starter? From the 1990s onwards, the European Union urged India to engage in an active human rights dialogue with India. Brussels repeatedly pointed out that China had never objected to such a dialogue, provided that the Dalai Lama was not mentioned! In an emerging post-Cold War scenario and with new and enthusiastic East European partners, the EU was eager to proselytize others about the benefits of democracy and human rights. Refusing to acknowledge that a JAP with the world’s largest democracy hardly required a HRD of the kind that the EU conducted with authoritarian States, Brussels continued to insist during the negotiations that such a dialogue was a central part of its mission. Many explanations have been given for the EU’s insistence on a human rights dialogue with India as well as the continuation of a peace process between India and Pakistan. The dichotomy in the two approaches has been underlined by Pramit Pal Chaudhuri: India sees dialogue, whether with representatives of Kashmiri separatism or Pakistan, as one among several instruments in a broader strategy of handling both domestic insurgency and Pakistan. And in addition, an instrument that can be turned on and off, depending on circumstances, and that can be used in tandem with force and the threat of military power. European Union officials, on the other hand, see dialogue as a constant that must never be removed from any conflict-resolution equation, with coercion being the variable in the equation and one best avoided. (Pal Chaudhuri 2017: 59)

This provides an excellent interpretation of the European Union’s reasons to engage in a human rights dialogue with India. This approach continued till 2004.



With the holding of the first Summit in June 2000, the EU initially pressed India to commence a human rights dialogue. As the world’s largest democracy based on respect for human rights and the rule of law, India argued that an external HRD with a strategic partner was not relevant. New Delhi, however, remained open to discuss specific issues of relevance to both sides, both informally and on a case-by-case basis. At one point, at the Athens-India-EU Troika ministerial meeting (17 January 2003), India acknowledged that an ad hoc human rights dialogue could be considered at the level of senior officials, viz. at the level of Joint Secretary (Europe West) and the EU counterpart. One such dialogue (chaired on the Indian side by the author) resulted in a general discussion on human rights issues globally as well as regionally. The Indian establishment was of the view that such a dialogue, if conducted on the basis of sovereign equality, would enable a better understanding of the challenges being faced by India because of its hostile and nuclear armed neighbour. The consultations were informal and conducted in a friendly and open manner. A detailed background briefing was provided on cross-border terrorism and militancy. It was underlined that India was determined to restore the democratic process in Jammu and Kashmir. Since India insisted that the discussions would include human rights violations within the EU, including racism, intolerance for minority rights, and the rise of xenophobia and denial of mobility and free travel for Indians and not be a one-­ sided monologue by the EU, it never took off in an institutionalized manner. There was no meeting of minds either on the ideology or on an agreed agenda. India’s position on a human rights dialogue, which was never articulated publicly, was therefore interpreted differently by scholars. Rajendra K. Jain argues that India demonstrated greater flexibility on beginning a human rights dialogue with the West since it came under increasing international pressure after the Pakistan-inspired insurgency in Kashmir. Firstly, it adopted ‘a policy of greater openness’ in terms of permitting more NGOs, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit Kashmir. Secondly, New Delhi in 1993 established the National Human Rights Commission to investigate human rights violations. Thirdly, India initiated a policy of regular visits of Delhi-based Ambassadors, including those from the European Union, to Kashmir to speak to various stakeholders and ‘see ground realities at first hand’ (Jain 2017: 412). A more nuanced interpretation of the official Indian position is that India never succumbed to such Western pressure. Once India started a



political process in Jammu and Kashmir for an elected State Assembly and a representative State Government, the West, including the EU became more receptive to India’s arguments that it was Pakistan that was undermining the democratic process in Kashmir and trying to destabilize Kashmir. The annual visit of the EU Troika Ambassadors to Jammu and Kashmir has become an established mechanism to enable the Union to better appreciate the challenges to this process as well as to meet the main stakeholders. On such visits, EU Ambassadors have avoided meeting separatist groups and have underlined that EU holds Kashmir to be ‘an integral part of India’ (Pal Chaudhuri 2017: 84).

Civil Society and Human Rights Civil society dialogue became an important element in re-establishing confidence and providing a new dynamism to India-EU relations. It had been established early in the summit process, during the first summit itself in 2000, through the setting up of the India-EU Round Table on civil society dialogue (Mukherjee 2018: 158). It tried to bring about a better understanding of contentious human rights issues through carefully chosen themes which helped to take this process forward. This was certainly the case when N.N. Vohra—the Indian Co-Chair of the Round Table— obtained Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s approval to take the members to Srinagar in June 2004. The author was the Secretary of the Round Table. The Indian Prime Minister supported the view that the EU would come to appreciate New Delhi’s genuine desire for the restoration of the democratic process in Kashmir and recognize the destructive agenda of Pakistan-supported separatists through such a visit. Soon after the visit, Vohra became the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir. Members of the Round Table ‘freely met’ with representatives of the media, civil society and dissidents apart from meetings with the then Chief Minister Muhammad Mufti, the then Governor (late General Srinivas Kumar Sinha), academicians, dissidents and lawyers (Mukherjee 2018: 159). It is ironical and unfortunate that the ‘soft’ power elements of the partnership, including a civil society dialogue under the aegis of the India-EU Round Table, cultural exchanges and think tank interactions had become marginal or non-existent by 2018. The normative means that the EU established through the first summit to expand the partnership, including through the Round Table, were not reciprocated by India. Both sides



failed to address the question whether the normative elements insisted by the EU were relevant for the strategic partnership.

Terrorism and Human Rights A counter-terrorism dialogue established by the India-EU summit, through a working group chaired on the Indian side by the author, viz. the Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, has become an institutionalized mechanism for exchange of intelligence on terrorism, money laundering and hawala, safe havens for terrorists, etc. The Joint Declaration adopted at the first India-EU summit (28 June 2000) acknowledged the need to build ‘a coalition of interests’ in a unipolar world. Looked at from a human rights context, the United Nations has long accepted that international terrorism poses a grave threat to human rights as well as to international peace and security. This was underlined in paragraph 7 of the Joint Declaration. It thus seemed that by mid-2000 the European Union had a greater understanding of India’s principal security concerns in its unstable and volatile neighbourhood. After 9/11, the West, including the EU, developed a better understanding of the threats posed by international terrorism to democratic societies based on the rule of law and human rights. Once terrorism came to roost within the shores of Europe, the Union’s position changed even more dramatically, particularly on the issue of accommodating the human rights demands of their religious minorities, especially Muslims.

EU Strategy on India (2018) and a Pragmatic Approach to Human Rights and Trade Since June 2000, the EU’s position on human rights has moved dramatically. An ambitious Agenda for Action 2020 was adopted jointly at the 2016 EU-India Summit. At the October 2017 summit, the two sides agreed on a common vision of global governance, shared values and principles. A major and positive development is the new Joint Communication on Elements for an EU Strategy on India which was made public on 20 November 2018 and adopted by the Council on 10 December 2018. It marks a significant step forward in the India-EU partnership. There is, therefore, a positive momentum for the EU to recalibrate its engagement



towards India. Instead of an adversarial or patronizing approach, the 2018 EU Strategy underlined: The European Union and India entered into a strategic partnership in 2004. Over the years, their commonalities have grown. In a challenging regional and international environment, the EU and India share the values of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and support the rules-based global order centered on multilateralism. Both represent ‘unions of diversity’ and have important stakes in each other’s prosperity and sustainable development. (European Commission 2018a: 2)

It acknowledges: ‘A strong partnership with India is key for a balanced EU policy towards Asia as a whole. A strong partnership with India is desirable to jointly contribute to preserve peace and stability, promote prosperity and sustainable development, and strengthen the rules-based order’ (European Commission 2018a: 2). From a human rights context, the EU’s India Strategy (2018) underlined ‘a common responsibility with India to promote peace, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including at the multilateral level and at the UN’. Of greater significance, it is suggested that both parties should continue regular exchanges of best practices on the protection of human rights at home and around the world, focusing on gender equality and women’s empowerment, the political, economic and social inclusion of young people and persons belonging to minorities, the rights of the child, elimination of any form of discrimination, the fight against trafficking in human beings, and freedom of religion and belief (European Commission 2018a: 11). The 2018 EU Strategy suggests that an EU-India partnership on humanitarian assistance would be ‘a strong asset’ for ensuring joint vision and action within the international community. The EU has invited India to work with them in third countries to help consolidate democratic processes and support transitioning regimes through capacity building for electoral and parliamentary institutions (European Commission 2018a: 11, 2.2). Here again, there is a shift from the earlier R2P, which India had opposed as possible interference in the internal affairs of States, to a more realistic assessment of what India would be willing to do with the EU particularly in its neighbourhood but also in Africa. EU High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini also regarded India to be ‘a key player in our interconnected world. The EU and India are



committed to seize opportunities to support and promote effective multilateralism and solutions whenever peace and stability are in danger’ (European Commission 2018b). A careful analysis of the Communication reveals that though crafted as a document by EU for EU and its institutions, including the European Parliament, there are many sections where a more positive approach to India can be ascertained. It demonstrates a significant shift in the EU approach to India. The EU is a normative foreign policy actor and this had shaped its approach to India. Now a more strategic approach is evolving and this is a welcome development. There is clearly an effort to skate lightly over India’s sensibilities, whether on trade or data protection or human rights. The language is opaque or ambiguous. Clearly the desire is not to offend. This is quite similar to the EU’s approach to China where the Dalai Lama and other sensitive issues are neither discussed publicly nor raised in negotiations.

Human Rights and the BTIA The earlier efforts by EU and the European Commission to link trade negotiations with human rights, including in respect of a Broad Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), cast a long shadow on the discussions and an impasse which is yet to be surmounted. Though negotiations were launched in July 2007, it has not yet been finalized despite sixteen rounds of negotiations. In fact, there have been no negotiations since 2013 though now reportedly there are talks about talks! In this context, Rajendra K.  Jain remarks that Brussels did not initially raise non-trade issues like human rights when negotiations for the BTIA began in June 2007. However, subsequently when the EU sought to include issues like weapons of mass destruction, child labour, environment, human rights and democracy, New Delhi asserted their inclusion was unacceptable since FTA negotiations were ‘not the appropriate place to discuss these issues and there was “no possibility” of such references being accepted’ (Jain 2017: 415). The debate was further complicated by the insistence of the European Parliament on the inclusion not only of ‘legally binding clauses on human rights’, but also of ‘social and environmental standards and their enforcement, with measures in the event of infringement’ (European Parliament 2011: para 29).



The then Commerce Secretary of India, Rahul Khullar, insisted that India would not allow ‘backdoor entry’ of non-trade-related issues in the FTA.  He said: ‘Whether these issues go under the guise of sustainable development or whether they come in the form of labour or environmental standards our answer is a simple “no”’ (Khullar 2010). These apprehensions on the Indian side persist even today. It has been informally ascertained from very senior officials at India’s Ministry of Commerce that India apprehends that the many legally binding clauses on human rights, social and environment as well as labour standards would be a huge burden, which India cannot comply with as a developing country for a long time. The shift in the EU’s strategic approach is clear from the absence of a direct reference to the BTIA in the 2018 EU India Strategy. Instead it notes that the EU will continue to work towards ‘comprehensive and balanced agreements with India with sufficient level of ambition to respond to each side’s key interests in trade and investment’ and support ‘a rules-­ based multilateral trading system’ (European Commission 2018a: 8, 11). The EU will use ‘all available channels and fora to ensure fair market access and predictable investment conditions’ in order to enhance trade and investment and unlock the potential of the two economies (European Commission 2018a: 7, 12). Clearly, the EU and the European Commission wish to move towards a multi-faceted relationship with India, which would not be held hostage to the continuing impasse on the BTIA or on their divergent approach to linking trade with human rights. Brussels appears to be adopting a more collegial approach with a greater understanding of the complexities of India’s problems and its strategic priorities in its increasingly difficult and dangerous neighbourhood.

The Way Forward In a dialectical context, the evolution of a multi-faceted and multi-­ dimensional relationship has not been easy. Both Europe and India are similar as well as dissimilar. While both faced many challenges after the end of World War II, both continued to have different approaches based on differing perceptions of the world order and their place in the global community. Both had to rethink their place in the world and to re-examine their relationships with new and emerging global players. In this context, C.  Raja Mohan highlights an important ideological paradox and the nuanced complexity of the issues. ‘In essence’, he points out, ‘the EU



relationship with India is that of a status quo power, in contrast to the US relationship which is that of a revisionist power, rewriting the rules in India’s favour, a reference to the civil nuclear energy agreement’ (Raja Mohan 2006). At the crossroads after World War II, Europe had hoped to develop into a Western superpower that relied on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms with rights guaranteed to minorities, which would become an example to an emerging world order. The emphasis was on normative instruments rather than military ones, a superpower whose foreign policy tools were built on cooperation rather on coercion. Based on idealism and liberal values, the reality in the post-Cold War era was however quite different. History demonstrates that the use of persuasion when exercised by strong states towards weak ones is often a mixture of persuasion and coercion. It does not lead to the development of strategic partnerships on the basis of equality. This became increasingly clear in the context of a dialogue on human rights based on equality. In the recent past, the human rights debate within the European Union underwent a fundamental change with the rise of populism. A bitter conflict between the EU’s western flank, which remains overwhelmingly liberal and progressive, and Eastern Europe, which is rejecting modernity, liberal values and challenging the principles enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, translated into a different approach towards a human rights dialogue with India. The conflict within Europe is becoming an increasingly toxic debate between the sovereignty of the individual in West Europe versus the sovereignty of the nation in its East. On 10 December 1948, the UN General Assembly met at the magnificent Palais de Chaillot in Paris and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Free from the shackles of colonialism, India actively participated on an equal basis to the debate. Both Europe and India shared the same perspective on human rights. This is beautifully demonstrated by two philosophers and poets writing in Delhi and in Paris: Mirza Ghalib (1797–1869) in Delhi said: ‘I asked my soul: What is Delhi? She replied: The world is the body and Delhi its life.’ Emile Zola (1840–1902) in Paris wrote: ‘Paris flared—Paris, which the divine sun had sown with light, and where in glory waved the great future harvest of Truth and of Justice.’



Today, Europe remains divided on dignity, justice and equality, principles at the heart of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Lisbon Treaty and India’s Constitution. To ensure that these rights remain at the centre of the debate, India and the EU must come closer in a relationship based on the same principles of dignity, justice and equality. Destiny will ensure that it is India, a once unequal partner, that will play an increasingly dominant role in ensuring the centrality of human rights in an increasingly unequal and divided world. The European Union must support and work with India on this great project. There is no other way.

Notes 1. On 25 June 1993, representatives of 171 States adopted by consensus the ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ at the World Conference on Human Rights (1993). The Convention was a new watershed in the global recognition of a common definition of human rights. For the first time, it was agreed that all human rights, whether civil and political or economic, social and cultural, are indivisible, interdependent and inter-related. It also recognized the Right to Development. 2. Swedish UN Secretary-General who was elected to office in April 1953 dedicated to reconciliation and peace in an emerging Cold War. 3. A Western doctrine enshrining the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ when human rights are deemed to be in danger, intervening across national frontiers. It was later used by the West to bring about regime change in Libya. 4. Headed by senior officials on both sides, the JWG on Counter-Terrorism was a very useful and practical mechanism for intelligence cooperation and sharing.

References European Commission. (2018a). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for an EU Strategy on India. Adopted by the Council at Its 3662nd Meeting Held on 10 December 2018. ———. (2018b, November 20). EU Shapes Its Ambitious Strategy on India. Press Release. Retrieved February 7, 2019, from European Parliament. (2011, May 11). Resolution on the State of Play in the EU-India Free Trade Negotiations. Retrieved January 14, 2019, from http://



Ganguly, M. (2013, June 21). Can India Be an International Human Rights Leader? Open Democracy. Retrieved January 24, 2019, from https://www. Jain, R.  K. (2017). India, the European Union and Human Rights. India Quarterly, 73(4), 411–429. Khullar, R. (2010, March 12), cited in S. Arun, ‘India Rejects EU Demand on Social Clauses in Trade Pact’. The Hindu Business Line. Retrieved January 14, 2019, from Muenchow-Pohl, B. von (2012, May). India and Europe in a Multipolar World. The Carnegie Papers. Mukherjee, B. (2018). India and the EU: An Insider’s View. New Delhi: Vij Books. Pal Chaudhuri, P. (2017). Decline of Kashmir in India-EU Relations. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), India, Europe and Pakistan (pp. 58–66). New Delhi: Knowledge World Publishers. Prakash, A. (2013, July 9). Misplaced Priorities? Global Leadership and India’s Domestic Neglect of Human Rights. Open Democracy. Retrieved January 25, 2019, from Raja Mohan, C. (2006). India and the Balance of Power. Foreign Affairs, 85(4), 17–32. Shah, P. (1997). International Human Rights: A Perspective from India. Fordham International Law Journal, 21(1), 24–44.


India, the European Union and Climate Change: The Paris Agreement and After Vijeta Rattani

Introduction The issue of climate change has emerged as one of the biggest global challenges of the twenty-first century. Research indicates that climate change will cause 200 million people to migrate in the near future. Already 124 million people from 51 countries face crises from extreme events arising due to climate change (International Organization for Migration 2019: 11). Scientific evidence further suggests that by 2030, greenhouse gases must be cut by 45 per cent to restrict temperatures to liveable limits (IPCC 2018: 12). The awareness of climate-induced impacts on humankind has grown in recent years. The recent forest fires in the Amazon have caught the world’s attention as it is home to large biodiversity, home to indigenous peoples and has a significant role in stabilizing rainfall cycles in South America (National Geographic 2019). Similarly, Europe suffered its worst heat-wave in the summer of 2019 with temperatures in Germany soaring to 42 degree C, the highest in recorded history (Deutsche Welle 2019). While the impact of climate

V. Rattani (*) Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)—the Indo-German Bilateral Cooperation Agency, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2020 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World,




change is felt globally, the impact is greater for developing countries like India owing to their greater dependence on natural resources for livelihood and limited capacities to cope with exposure to climate change. Each year, India faces worsening climate impacts in the form of unseasonal rain, droughts, floods, heatwaves, hailstorms, etc. which adversely affect livelihoods and development. Climate change makes agriculture riskier across much of the developing world. As a result, subsistence-holding farmers with meagre incomes and meagre access to technology tend to be more exposed to such extreme weather events and disasters (Mall et al. 2006). This chapter looks at the role of the European Union and India in the climate regime. It also explores domestic actions and bilateral cooperation in the field of climate change between the two entities. It concludes with some suggestions for potential areas of cooperation.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change The global nature of the climate change issue necessitates global responses. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was signed in 1992 and came into effect in 1994, is the global climate framework to address climate change through a series of annual summits referred to as the Conference of Parties (COP)—the supreme decision-making body under the UNFCCC (Gupta and Grubb 2000). With near-universal membership, the UNFCCC is one of the outcomes of the Rio Summit held in 1992, the other being on biodiversity and desertification (UNFCCC 2019). The framework rests on the core principles of equity and differentiated responsibility (UNFCCC 1992). The differentiated responsibility posits that although every country must contribute to addressing climate change, the rich, developed countries must contribute more while also supporting developing countries in their efforts to address climate change, considering their historical role in creating the current carbon stock in the atmosphere through unregulated industrial processes for their development (Rajamani 2002: 120). Within the UNFCCC, there are two basic agreements: the Kyoto Protocol specifies quantified emission reductions for developed countries for first commitment period from 2008 to 2012 and the Paris Agreement



(adopted in 2015 and ratified in 2016) is scheduled to be operational in 2020. However, it has no quantified targets. It is primarily a bottom-up regime where countries are free to make voluntary climate targets in accordance with their domestic requirements and circumstances (Rajamani 2016: 346–350). The Paris Agreement has the primary goal of limiting greenhouse gases within 2 degree C by the end of century and as an aspirational goal has set up a target of 1.5 degree C.

India’s Role in Climate Change India’s role has steadfastly grown over the years in the climate regime. One of the signatories of the FCCC, it has been a champion of equity and differentiated responsibility in the regime. To that end, India played a pioneering role in expanding the narrative of common responsibilities to common but differentiated responsibilities, thereby underscoring the importance of allocated responsibilities of the developed countries towards addressing climate change. India also played an instrumental role in pushing for allocation of financial support and the creation of separate financial mechanisms for the same (Dubash 2013: 192). New Delhi’s role in climate change has transformed over the years from being a diplomatic issue to an economic one. It has taken time and understanding for the issue to filter into the scientific, businesses, political and academic circles as well as the larger civil society. For the corporate sector, the carbon market facilitated direct engagement with the issue of domestic climate agenda as India became one of the largest beneficiaries of carbon markets (Pulver 2011: 259). As long as the international narrative centred on equity focusing on developed countries, one can generally argue that climate change was not regarded as an issue of national importance by Indian policy makers or researchers. The early 2000s saw the urgency of protecting the integrity of the Kyoto Protocol after the United States pulled out. India hosted the 2002 COP in New Delhi, which assumed strategic importance against the backdrop of the American announcement. The subsequent period can be termed as the policy formation phase when New Delhi began to prepare a national response to climate change against growing international pressure and acceptance of the severe impact of climate change on the Indian economy (Atteridge et al. 2012: 70–71). In June 2008, India launched its National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) comprising its climate plans and targets within the realms of its eight missions related to solar, energy efficiency, water,



agriculture, greening, strategic knowledge and Himalayan ecosystem (see Rattani 2018). The national missions translated into a decentralized climate action in the form of State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCC). Till date, 32 states have prepared and implemented their SAPCC with funds from designated agencies and the National Adaptation Fund on Climate Change (NAFCC) (Kumar 2018). At the international level, India as part of the G-77 and China as part of the developing Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC) group pushed for equity and the means of implementation in the form of finance, technology transfer and capacity building from the developed countries. New Delhi has opposed any international scrutiny of its climate efforts largely because of sovereignty concerns. In the years leading to the Paris Agreement, India pushed against legally binding commitments for all nations, including developing countries. New Delhi also fought hard for the inclusion of the principle of equity and differentiated responsibility and exhorting developed countries to fulfil the mandate of the UNFCCC to be reflected in the Agreement. India, along with other developing countries, pushed for the provision of an implementation mechanism in the form of finance, technology and capacity building by the developed countries to help developing countries’ efforts in addressing climate change. These efforts included a major push for enhancing financial contributions for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Adaptation Fund. India also sided with the island group of nations for inclusion of the 1.5 degree temperature goal in the Paris Agreement (Rattani 2019a: 184). In the Paris rulebook, India succeeded in reaching a balance of issues in the rulebook text. It could secure policy goals on the ex ante provision of financial information for developed countries and a process to start increasing financial commitments for the Green Climate Fund. It however expressed dissatisfaction over the treatment of equity in the issue of Global Stocktake (Hindustan Times 2018). India has also shown interest in devising the rules of carbon markets. However, so far it has failed to create a consensual narrative and the requisite coalitions for joint collaboration in the issue (Rattani 2019a: 188–189). With increasing vulnerability to the impact of climate change, India has in recent years stepped up its efforts to mitigate its effects. According to a German think tank, India is the sixth most vulnerable country in the world to climate impacts (German Watch 2019).To address climate change in



India, NAPCC and SAPCCs are the umbrella policy documents for national and state level responses to climate change. Under the Paris Agreement, India has also submitted its Nationally Determined Contributions and pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emission intensity of its GDP by 33–35 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030, 40 per cent of installed renewable capacity by 2030 and the creation of an additional ‘carbon sink’ of 2.5–3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent through additional forest and tree cover by 2030 (UNFCCC 2015a: 29). With regard to solar energy, India has made giant strides. Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the Indian Government announced an ambitious renewable energy target of 227 GW by 2022, which includes 100 GW of solar power. Between 2014 and 2018, India increased its solar-­ generation capacity eight times from 2650  MW to over 20  GW (Rathi 2018, 5 December). In order to deal with its water crises, India has launched a separate campaign called the Jal Shakti Abhiyan (JSA) under the newly established Ministry of Jal Shakti in order to conserve water and formulate a long-­ term strategy water conservation. The JSA is a countrywide effort to enhance water security, especially in water-stressed districts. In the past months, the JSA has delivered over 500,000 local water conservation structures in 256 districts. Out of these, 273,000 are water conservation and rain water harvesting measures, over 44,000 relate to the rejuvenation of traditional water bodies, about 150,000 are reuse and recharge structures and 123,000 are watershed development projects. An estimated 37 million people have already participated in the Abhiyan, making it a people’s movement, and about 120.3 million saplings have been planted as afforestation intervention (Ministry of Jal Shakti 2019). Prior to the 14th UN Conference on Combating Desertification (Conference of Parties (COP 14) (New Delhi, 2–14 September 2019), which was attended by more than 5,000 delegates from all over the world, India pledged to restore 5 million hectares of degraded land by 2030 (MOEFCC 2019). Such initiatives also contribute to addressing climate change by focusing on resilience and enhancing adaptive capacity. Urban Greening Guidelines were introduced in 2014 by the then Ministry of Urban Development focusing on greening of pavements which is currently witnessing unregulated concretization. In 2000, the Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment had published Guidelines for Greening of Urban Areas and Landscaping. Prior to this, in 1980, Town



and Country Planning Organization (TCPO) had published the Guide on Plant Materials for Landscaping in India (Ministry of Urban Development 2014). The Smart City Initiative promotes development of urban green spaces which can be coupled with strategic landscaping to optimize benefits of greening programmes (Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs 2019). Thus, at the national level there are several initiatives towards forest management and environmental protection in general. However, more de-centralized city-specific solutions to urban greening are required, which at present do not receive the required importance. One possible way could be to devise locally suitable specific solutions to climate change and sustainable development.

The EU’s Role in the Global Climate Regime The European Union is reckoned as a leading player in the climate regime since the UNFCCC and has been at the forefront of international efforts to fight climate change (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007: 26). The issue of climate change has been an area that enhanced the visibility of the European Union on the international stage and highlighted its capacity to enlarge the climate agenda based on its own experience in dealing with environmental issues (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007: 26). In most international summits, the EU always advocates that the challenge of climate change is a challenge that we confront now and not in the future. Brussels feels that it can play a critical role in pushing the climate agenda through diplomatic efforts. To that end, it introduced unilateral carbon emissions cuts and other innovative policies and proposals to address climate change. In this way, the EU has sought to ‘decrease the credibility gap between its international climate stance and domestic implementation’ (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007: 27). The EU played a role in the formulation of the Kyoto Protocol (1997) in terms of establishing benchmarks and standards and urging other players to do the same. The American pull-out led to other countries also opting out of the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol highlighted the European Union’s leadership in climate regime since without its diplomatic efforts, it would not have been possible to secure the requisite ratification of other countries (Wurzel and Connelly 2010: 6).



However, at the Copenhagen Summit (2009), which had the mandate to produce a new agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol (scheduled to expire in 2012) the European Union was marginalized (Bodansky 2010: 234). This is largely ascribed to the economic crises, the rise of populism and the eastward enlargement of EU (Oberthür 2011: 2). On the negotiating side, its weakened diplomatic capabilities and inflexible and cumbersome decision-making processes were primarily responsible for the weak policy outcomes (Jordan et al. 2012: 43–46). Having recovered from the Copenhagen jolt, the EU played a significant role in the adoption of the Paris Agreement. It pushed the other countries to raise their ambitions in coping with climate-induced impacts. To that end, it submitted its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) or its climate plans ahead of the Paris Summit, which was deemed as relatively more ambitious than most other countries. Under the NDC, the EU pledged to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 40 per cent by 2030 against 1990 levels. All the main legislations required for implementing the targets were adopted by 2018 (UNFCCC 2015b: 3). During the negotiations for the Paris Agreement, Brussels worked with the French Presidency for a balanced and ambitious agreement. It acted as a bridge-builder between island and least developed countries on issues like loss and damage on the one hand and developed countries on the other so that consensus could be achieved as far as the difference in stances were concerned. The Union helped build a broad coalition of developed and developing countries in favour of high ambition that led to the successful outcome of the Paris conference. It was also successful in pushing for an international treaty, a five-year review cycle, mitigation commitments for all countries and a rule-based system ensuring transparency and accountability through reporting on and review of countries’ climate action (Oberthür and Groen 2018: 712). Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the European Union has sought to translate pledged commitments into legally binding national country-wise targets. The EU is presently is the largest wind energy producer in the world and is making significant investments in the green batteries as well as storage. With a view to increasing renewable capacity in other regions, Brussels is investing in Africa for greater access to sustainable and affordable clean energy. In 2017, the EU announced the launch of 19 new renewable energy projects with total potential investment of €4.8 billion (European Commission 2017). Likewise, it has taken measures for the promotion of e-mobility, sustainable transport and smart



cities. For its agenda of clean energy and sustainability, EU has internally aspired to increase its commitments, on the need to do so by other players too. Ahead of the Marrakech Summit (2016), which was held against Donald Trump being elected as a climate sceptic President of the United States—historically the biggest polluter—the European Parliament adopted a resolution on COP 22 on 6 October 2016. The resolution reiterated the Union’s continued efforts regarding climate agenda regardless of global developments. It underscored the inadequacy of the current NDCs in meeting the ambitious objectives of the Paris Agreement and urged developed countries to increase their commitments (European Parliament 2016, 6 October). EU’s unfinished long-term agenda of increasing climate action has continued in successive negotiations. The Katowice Summit (December 2018) to finalize the rulebook for the implementation of the Paris Agreement assumed greater importance since in September the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had released its landmark Special Report of Global Warming of 1.5 degree C. The Report underscored that the earth had already warmed by 1 degree C and that it would breach the 1.5 degree C mark in 12 years (IPCC 2018). The UNEP Emission Gap Report released on 5 November 2018 ahead of COP urged a five-fold increase of climate actions in order to remain within the 1.5 degree C mark. The evidence presented as per the scientific reports led the European Council to highlight the need for an ambitious and robust rulebook and for enhancing climate protection (Europa 2018b, 6 November). On 28 November 2018, the EU released its 2050 Strategy for a Carbon Neutral Europe by 2050 (Europa 2018e, Press Release, 28 November) and announced €10 million in pledges to the Adaptation Fund under the UNFCCC (Europa 2018c, 11 November). Together with the European Investment Bank, the EU was the largest donor of climate finance in 2017, providing €20.4 billion in public climate finance for developing countries (Europa 2018d). During the Katowice climate summit held at Poland in December 2018, the EU was successful in working with the Polish Presidency in driving the negotiations forward to secure a rulebook. It was successful in brokering common transparency rules for climate reporting in cooperation with developed countries and determining procedures for conducting global stocktake for assessing collective global efforts on climate change. It however failed in further enhancing ambitious climate mitigation goals



and did not emerge as a bridge builder on issues of adaptation as well as loss and damage. On finance, the Union agreed to provide indicative information on financial sources. It was successful in inserting stronger language of achieving the temperature goal of 1.5 degree C in the Talanoa Dialogue, which was an inclusive platform for a call to stronger action. However, the fact that it failed to live up to the expectations of science in raising its own commitments and also in garnering adequate treatment to the IPCC’s Report whose text was diluted in the final outcome text by the use of weaker language welcoming the report in the wake of resistance of oil producing nations like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia and Kuwait (Droege and Rattani 2019: 4). The Union welcomed the results of the Katowice climate summit as balanced and expressed appreciation for the efforts of the Polish presidency in being able to secure the rulebook. The European Union was relatively more influential and result-oriented in the formulation of the Paris Agreement. However, the Union’s role has considerably weakened since its adoption in 2015. With an uncertain and regressive America, one could perhaps argue that the EU could have played a more decisive role in having a more ambitious rulebook. The final rulebook has equity watered down in global stocktake, loss and damage merely sprinkled as part of reporting requirement and adaption issues restricted mostly to reporting. The rules on carbon markets have not yet been formulated;  they are likely to be  finalized in the future (Rattani 2019b, 2 January).

EU Domestic Actions in Climate Change Domestically, the European Union has made active efforts for climate actions which have fostered similar initiatives worldwide apart from many other co-benefits and synergies. From the EU’s perspective, decarbonizing energy and transport is closely associated with improved air quality and health outcomes, especially in urban areas. Similarly, promoting a circular economy, including the smarter use of materials such as plastics, can reduce emissions while also contributing to cleaner natural systems such as land, water and oceans. Greater energy efficiency has multiple benefits. For instance, it can reduce water demand from the energy sector while increasing its availability for certain other uses. On the supply side, some low carbon energy systems (e.g. bio-energy systems) could use water more intensively than the system they replace. More efficient transport systems



with upgraded standards for cars and other vehicles has a direct impact on the overall air quality (Gupta  and Grubb 2000). Under climate action, one of the priority areas has been the introduction of energy efficiency measures. To that end, the EU is the global leader in the adoption of renewables. Brussels has also taken steps for a smarter, interconnected and more efficient electricity market. In its Council document of 2007, the EU pledged to a  20 per cent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, an  increase by 20 per cent of renewable energy and an increase by 20 percent of energy efficiency by 2020. Studies claim that EU is already on the way to achieving its 2020 targets (Council of the European Union 2007). As a binding requirement under the Paris Agreement, the European Union submitted its Nationally Determined Contributions in 2015. It pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 40 per cent by 2030, increase renewable energy and energy efficiency to 32 per cent and 32.5 per cent, respectively, by 2030 (as compared to 1990 levels). Although Green groups and governments urged the Union to propose even more ambitious targets, in comparison to other developed countries, the EU’s NDC targets can be termed as fairly ambitious. The EU Emission Trading System (ETS), which was established in 2005, covers 45 per cent of total EU’s emissions. In comparison to 2005, it aims to reduce emissions by 43 per cent by 2030 (Europa 2019a). However, 55 per cent of the emissions are still not covered under ETS, viz. housing, agriculture, waste and transport (excluding aviation), etc. (Europa 2019a). With a view towards decentralized climate action and the promotion of compliance, the EU has initiated several Regulations. It has set up CO2 standards for cars, vans and heavy-duty vehicles. It has in place an Energy Directive Initiative and a separate energy performance directive for buildings. There are also directives for renewable energy, eco-design and electricity. In order to achieve these energy and climate goals by 2030, about €180 billion in additional annual funding will be needed. To that end,  it has earmarked 25 per cent of its expenditure towards climate finance. The European Commission has proposed to dedicate over €45 billion annually for climate mainstreaming from 2021 to 2027. Moreover, it has proposed the ‘Invest EU’ programme, which will provide an additional €150 billion during 2021–2027 for sustainable infrastructure investments. Brussels realizes that these financial allocations are not adequate and that the



financial sector would need to play a greater role in meeting climate and energy goals. To overcome this challenge and leverage more investments, the EU has tabled three pieces of legislation in May 2018 intended to boost private sector investment into sustainable development (Europa 2018a). Accordingly, the first legislation sought to determine if an environmental activity was environmentally sustainable, the second dealt with the duty of asset managers and institutional investors to take sustainability into account while the third was related to establishing low-carbon benchmarks (Europa 2018a). As a European strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral economy, EU launched its strategy for 2050 entitled ‘Clean Planet for All’. The vision document talks about 60 per cent reductions in 2050 from the current 2030 policies. A major focus of the document is regarding energy consumption. The Strategy seeks to increase the use of renewables by 2050 by 80 per cent. In this context, it mentions smart electricity and data/information grids, hydrogen pipelines and increased synergy between transport and energy systems. With focus on business improvement and enhancing investments, the document focuses on increased recovery and recycling of raw materials (including critical materials), new materials and business concept. Regarding capturing of carbon and its storage, the document highlights the importance of biomass and natural carbon sinks. Likewise, upgradation of transport system, carbon-free power, cheaper efficient batteries, electric trains, digitalization and smart cities are planned to be the focal areas (Europa 2019b, 9 April). Despite such ambitious goals and commitments, the ‘Clean Planet for All’ strategy is not consistent with the Paris Agreement’s goals of restricting temperatures to 2 degree C and strive for 1.5 degree C by the end of the century. Even though radical transformations are required to meet climate targets, feasible solutions apparently exist from the technological, economic and social perspective. To that end, the EU has devised an enabling framework which relies on an effective taxation system, making viable commercial rules for energy, building and mobility, rolling out of key infrastructure technologies, value chains and circularity, creating a single digital market and working towards a global level playing field. Not only within their domestic apparatus, both India and the EU are also committed to cooperation in the field of climate change and clean energy as explained in the next section.



Joint Cooperation on Climate Change Both India and the European Union share a keen interest on the issues of climate change and sustainable development. They have signed a Clean Energy and Climate Partnership (Europa 2017, 10 October). During the 2017 India-EU summit, a Joint Statement on Clean Energy and Climate Change was signed (Europa 2019d, 8 February). According to the statement, EU is promoting clean and low-cost energy transition to India, which faces huge energy demand with growth rates and an increasing population. Brussels is also keen to support clean, affordable and reliable energy. In this context, renewable energy with a focus on solar and off-­ shore wind is acquiring prime importance. Additionally, buildings and sustainable finance are two other significant areas of cooperation (Europa 2019d, 8 February). In order to foster the adoption of an energy-efficient building code, the EU is funding an Adoption, Compliance and Enforcement for Energy Efficiency (European Union 2019) project funded by the European Union. Called the ACE:E2 project, it focuses on buildings and especially on the adoption, enforcement and compliance of the ECBC (Energy Conservation Building Code) in India through facilitating the transfer of knowledge and technological know-how from the EU experience in the sector and its adaptability to the Indian context as well as through the involvement of European companies in the energy technologies sector and by fostering their cooperation with Indian counterparts. With the Paris Agreement ready to be operational by 2020, implementation of commitments as laid out in the Nationally Determined Contributions would be a priority for nations. In this regard, domestic actions facilitated by cooperation and support would determine the meeting of global commitments.

EU-India Technical Cooperation Project India seeks to install 40,000 MWs of PV rooftop solar systems by 2022. To that end, the MNRE and the European Union formed the PV Rooftop Cell under the ‘Technical Cooperation for Energy and Environment in India’. The Cell started its operations in July 2016 under the leadership of the then Joint Secretary Santosh Vaidya and has been assisting the MNRE in its constant endeavour to promote and implement Grid Connected and Small Power Plant Programme in India. The PV Rooftop Cell developed the only comprehensive information guide available on PV Rooftop



Programme of the Government of India, which was launched by the MNRE Secretary in January 2017. The cell is in charge of several activities, which include promotion of PV Rooftop Programme at various platforms, data segregation and analysis, development of Model and standard documents, training and webinars for various stakeholders, representing MNRE at national platforms, development of model and standard documents, market analysis and studies (MNRE 2019). Under its Asia Investment Facility Programme, the EU has allocated (€31.07 million) for the years 2016–2020 on projects on green housing, smart cities, urban mobility and nursing school. EU is collaborating with sub-national actors for its development efforts, some of which have a climate bearing. Accordingly, it has allocated €4.6 million for the period 2012–2023  in its partnership with Local Authorities for Development (Europa 2019e). Under this, seven projects are earmarked for water, sanitation and solid waste management, capacity building and awareness raising with the purpose of building resilience and adaptive capacity of communities (Europa 2019b). Apart from India as a partner, on a broader note, the EU engages with other partners under G-20 within the ambit of the project on Strategic Partnership on the Implementation of the Paris Agreement (SPIPA) with an emphasis on the exchange of best practices on climate change, fostering greater awareness on climate issues and enhancing cooperation in pursuits of climate goals (Europa 2019c, 22 May).

Conclusion and the Way Ahead Both the European Union and India have been crucial players pushing forward the climate agenda. In meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement and the rulebook, their role assumes greater significance. Since the Paris Agreement and its rulebook are largely in place and set to be operational from 2020 onwards, the onus principally lies on domestic actions backed by cooperation and means of implementation to achieve ambitious climate action targets. The EU is therefore expected to lead by example by enhancing both short-term and long-term targets and providing political and financial support to other countries. Its support would be vital for poor, developing and island countries to implement the Paris rulebook. Moreover, in order to maintain the global momentum towards raising awareness about climate change and its integration with other policy fields, the European Union must focus on deepening cooperation with underdeveloped and developing economies.



Enhancing EU-India partnership and cooperation in climate change is important not only in existing areas but in other emerging areas as well. One important area for strengthening cooperation could be in the field of carbon markets and transparency mechanisms owing to the EU’s experience and expertise in these areas. Another potential area of cooperation could be nature-based solutions in addressing climate change with a focus on ecosystem services, afforestation, carbon capture and storage. Sustainable lifestyles and consumption centred on behavioural patterns are issues that are less discussed in policy circles. This is one area where EU’s sustainable living experiences could benefit its partner countries. The window of opportunity, as the IPCC points out, is small, the urgency to step up action and cooperation acquires greater significance (IPCC 2018: 22–23).

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Indian and European Responses to Migration and Refugee Crises Sheetal Sharma

Introduction The movement of people from one place to another for economic, social, political, cultural and other reasons is a universal phenomenon. The nature and extent of migration in contemporary times has acquired varied dimensions as both the causes and consequences of migration have many dimensions. Cross-border migration has become an issue of considerable controversy with economic, political, social, religious, linguistic, cultural and emotional consequences. Diverse social, cultural and emotional issues have been an intrinsic part of the movement of people across boundaries. These issues, along with the domestic, political and economic problems of the host countries, become a source of bitter conflict, stereotyping and ‘otherization’. Both India and Europe are currently facing challenges posed by migration and relentless influx of refugees. Both have confronted challenges of managing migrants and refugees. However, today, the influx poses challenges to the governments in power due to several social and

S. Sharma (*) Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2020 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World,




political factors. Illegal migration and its associated socio-cultural, political and economic dimensions and consequences have generated a lot of debate, opposition, contradictory standpoints and protest in the host countries, with often polarized positions over the issue. This chapter seeks to address some of the core issues pertaining to the nature and causes of legal as well as illegal migration and the consequences of the movement of refugees in India and Europe. It discusses the issues and challenges faced by India and Europe, respectively, due to influx of people. The last section will attempt to draw a comparison between the scenario, approaches and mechanisms adopted by India and Europe in coping with the crisis and assess the extent to which they have been successful in managing the crisis.

The Scale of Migration As per the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an unprecedented 70.8 million people around the world have been forced from home. Among them are nearly 41.3 million Internally Displaced People, 3.5 million asylum-seekers and 25.9 million refugees, over half of whom are under the age of 18. About 80 per cent of the total number of refugees live in countries neighbouring their countries of origin (UNHCR 2019). Compared to any point of time in history, in the last decade, a large number of people have been forced to flee their homes and seek refuge elsewhere due to wars, conflict and persecution, according to the UN Refugee Agency. UNHCR statistics indicate that by the end of 2018 there were 75.9 million persons who had been displaced because of war, conflict or persecution compared to 42.5 million a decade ago (UNHCR 2019). This rise has been due to the unending/ongoing or reigniting of social and political conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Asia. More than two thirds (67 per cent) of all refugees worldwide came from just five countries, viz. Syrian Arab Republic (6.7 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), South Sudan (2.3 million), Myanmar (1.1 million) and Somalia (0.9 million). For the fifth consecutive year, Turkey hosted the largest number of refugees worldwide, with 3.7 million people. The main countries of asylum for refugees were Turkey (3.7 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), Uganda (1.2 million), Sudan (1.1 million) and Germany (1.1 million) (UNHCR 2019).



Refugees, Migration and Displacement in India India has been  both a leading source and destination for the world’s migrants.1 According to a  study by the Pew Research Centre, in  2015, about 5.2 million immigrants were reported to be living in India, making it the twelfth largest immigrant population in the world (Connor 2017). There are currently 110,000 Tibetans and 102,000 Sri Lankan Tamils living in India officially as refugees. Thousands of others, from Afghanistan to Sudan, can be found across India. In Delhi, there is an ethnic Chin community of at least 5000 from Myanmar. Many Christians have fled the brutal discrimination in Buddhist-majority Myanmar (Chowdhury 2017). Apart from the international migrations, the internal migration too, in a country of continental proportions has social and demographic implications. The magnitude of inter-state migration, as estimated by the Economic Survey of India 2017, was close to 9 million annually between 2011 and 2016, while Census 2011 pegs the total number of internal migrants in the country (accounting for inter- and intra-state movement) at a staggering 139 million. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are the biggest source states, followed closely by Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, Jammu and Kashmir and West Bengal; the major destination states are Delhi, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala (Krishnavatar 2017). An estimated 14 million people moved to either side of the border within four years of the Partition. An estimated 2 million people lost their lives in the process (Bharadwaj and Mirza 2018). According to the 1951 Census, about 7.5 million persons had moved into India in search of permanent homes, 4.9 million from West Pakistan and about 2.6 million from East Pakistan (India, Planning Commission 1951). An estimated 10 million people sought refuge in India from East Pakistan escaping atrocities of the Pakistani Army in 1971. This was, according to a UNHCR report, the single largest displacement of refugees in the second half of the twentieth century (Mukherji 1974). Covering long distance on foot, starving, holding minimum belongings, the refugees from East Pakistan were living in streets everywhere in cities and towns in the neighbouring state of West Bengal.2 These refugees were extended hospitality and temporary relief ‘only until such time as they were able to go back to their country of permanent residence with dignity’ (Mukherji 1974: 402; Chimni 1994; Jahan 1995). Right from the beginning, it was clear that India did not intend to rehabilitate, integrate or



absorb the refugees (Murshid 2011). Their existence in India was to be temporary and their status was to remain as foreign nationals (Mukherji 1974; Chimni 1994: 393). Beginning in December of 1971, millions of refugees who had arrived months ago started returning to a newly carved independent nation-state called as Bangladesh. Their return was said to be  one of the largest repatriation operations in modern history (Grbac 2014). Over the past decade, the Rohingyas3 have been trickling into India, fleeing army excesses in Myanmar, where the one million minority Rohingya population, mostly in Rakhine, have faced discrimination for generations and have been denied citizenship rights as they are seen as Bengali settlers rather than Myanmese. The Indian Government claims there are an estimated 40,000 Rohingyas in India (Chowdhury 2017). The Indian Government is determined to deport Rohingyas as they are perceived as posing ‘serious national security ramifications and threat’. Some of them are said to have links with Pakistan-based terror groups and the Islamic State. New Delhi also maintains that the principle of non-­ refoulement that prohibits countries from sending back refugees to a country where they might be persecuted does not apply to India since it is not a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention (Chowdhury 2017). India has long maintained a general policy of not internationalizing refugee problems and thus not seeking assistance from the international community. Despite not being a signatory of the 1951 International Convention on Refugees, India has been willing and has accepted refugees. New Delhi also does not discriminate between refugees on the basis of their country of origin. Refugees have, like all aliens, free access to the courts to protect their ‘life and liberty’. India does not discriminate between refugees on the basis of race or religion. As a secular state, it accords to refugees the complete freedom to practice their religion (Chimni 1994: 394).

Refugees, Migration and Displacement in Europe Europe has always attracted people, but in recent years millions of people have fled to Europe fearing conflict, terror and persecution in their own countries. From the summer of 2015, thousands of refugees have been coming through various routes either illegally or by seeking asylum to Europe in order to save their lives from the conflict-ridden regions of Syria, North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Balkans.4 By



mid-2015, thousands of people, risking their lives, were undertaking dangerous journeys by rail, road or sea to reach Greece, Hungary or Italy and then from their move on to either Germany or Sweden or other European countries. Hundreds of them lost their lives while attempting to cross borders; many drowned in overloaded boats or rafts while attempting to reach Europe through sea (Sharma 2016: 4). According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): Despite indicators that the numbers of people arriving were increasing, the extent to which they escalated caught many countries in Europe unprepared, and chaos prevailed. The capacity of EU Member States and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was severely tested during the period. Some countries, such as Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Sweden, were more affected than others. Fragmented responses emerged amongst EU Member States. Some took measures to restrict access of refugees and migrants to their territories and to shift the responsibility to neighbouring countries. Although several made efforts to welcome refugees, the lack of a common EU response led to seemingly intractable policy dilemmas. This resulted in serious operational difficulties, exacerbating the already precarious circumstances under which refugees5 and migrants arrived in the EU. (UNHCR 2016: 2)

Indian and European Responses to Migration: A Comparison The causes and consequences of the influx of refugees and migration have been different in the case of India and Europe. Living up to its cultural ethos and philosophy of helping others in need, India provided shelter to more than 10 million refugees during the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis, in spite of its economic and infrastructural limitations. With no international support and little external assistance, India managed reasonably well to provide basic necessities, food and shelter to refugees from Bangladesh. Though Europe has been confronting a refugee crisis over the past decade, there are several differences in the two situations. Firstly, unlike India, the EU Member States or European countries are certainly better placed in terms of all parameters to extend help and offer shelter to a one-tenth of the refugees that India took in 1971. The arrival of over a million refugees did pose an unprecedented challenge to Europe.



However, the magnitude of the migration crisis in Europe (2014–2015) was much less poignant than the one confronted by India in 1971, especially in terms of the number of refugees, the amount of external assistance, the complicated international milieu, and the preparedness of the economy of the country to pose with the sudden influx. Secondly, the difference  between Indian and European responses towards the refugee crisis and acceptance of migrants raises fundamental issues about their commitment to the very values (human rights), exposing their double standards between the values that they claimed to uphold and what they propagate. Despite better support systems, the general response of European countries was inadequate. They lacked the political will to accept refugees in significant numbers, with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany. Other countries fell short of such exemplary standards. Thirdly, European responses towards the migration crisis highlighted the differences amongst the EU Member States, which adopted different strategies to cope with the crisis. It was only under considerable international pressure that Prime Minister David Cameron declared that Britain would accept 20,000 refugees over the next five years. France recently created an emergency fund as well as an aid programme for refugee camps in the Middle East, and announced that it would be willing to accept up to 24,000 refugees (Ganguly and Miliate 2015). Extreme right-wing parties across the European continent, particularly in Hungary, Estonia, Austria, Italy, France, expressed their strong opposition to the influx of refugees. These responses have exposed the hollowness of Europe’s tall claims and commitment to human values, humanitarian causes and human rights. A 2017 poll conducted by Chatham House in ten European countries revealed that 71 per cent in Poland, 65 per cent in Austria, 53 per cent in Germany and 51 per cent in Italy supported a ban on all migration from Muslim-majority countries. An average of only 20 per cent were opposed to such a ban (Lang 2019). There were differences amongst European countries over quotas or numbers to be accepted, border barriers, patrolling, passage to the refugees and finding a sustainable solution to the issue. Fourthly, another difference between Indian and European responses is related to the geographic and cultural dimension of the crisis. India had a porous, largely permeable border with East Pakistan. There was thus little chance of stopping millions of refugees from crossing over (Ganguly and Miliate 2015). The Muslim population of East Pakistan was



Bengali-speaking, with similar cultural traits to those of the state of West Bengal in India. As a result, refugees from Bangladesh were not seen as ‘others’ culturally, or absolute strangers/aliens. The cultural similarity did not foster a sense of fear, distance or repulsion. In the case of Europe, Syrian and other refugees from the Middle East and North Africa were seen as culturally ‘others’, from a distant land attempting to enter Europe. Fifthly, the problem of the influx of East Pakistani refugees persisted for a short span of time whereas the refugee crisis in Europe has stretched for almost a decade now—in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (2011)—witnessing its peak during 2014–2016, but it is far from over. Sixthly, while India took decisive and concerted action in 1971 in spite of the lack of international support, Europe has tended to focus more on its internal and border security rather than the protection of people fleeing for safety. The entire European discourse tends to largely focus on the issue of Fortress Europe, and the erection of barriers rather than devising sustainable strategies to deal with vulnerable refugees. There is also some similarity in Indian and European concerns about the influx of refugees. Like India in 1971, the Europeans too fear absorbing refugees, especially from largely Muslim countries. In this context, the Europeans are apprehensive of an increase in the Muslim population leading to Islamophobia; that refugees are likely to become an economic burden on the state; that greater Muslim presence of refugees and immigrants would tend to result in cultural and religious tensions and clashes; and that refugees are a potential security threat to host and neighbouring countries since they are likely to become easy targets of radicalization and a fertile ground for breeding terrorism. Moreover, there are concerns about the management of short-, medium- and long-term logistics for the settlement of refugees. Some of these concerns are related to housing, engagement in the economic activities, the provision of health and educational facilities and designing policies for their social integration. The absorption of a substantial number of people from different cultural backgrounds requires a harmonious multicultural framework to avoid cultural frictions in culturally diverse societies. These concerns have led to the rise of far right parties, which tend to foster a sense of panic and fear among people by portraying refugees as an existential threat. For instance, Austria’s Sebastian Kurz even called for ‘an axis of willing against illegal migration’ between Italy, Germany and his own country (Trilling 2018a). In this process, one does not make any distinction between a legal migrant, a refugee, an economic migrant, or



even the diaspora at times. The Others’ irrespective of the difference in their legal status are seen as absolute ‘Others’ in a cultural sense. Thus, migrants in general and refugees in particular are marginalized and/or excluded claiming that these are the ‘people with another mentality and religion, and a large number of them cannot adopt the European values and model of behaviour and cannot possibly integrate in the European community. The danger of the spread of Islamism in Europe rises’ (Kyuchukov 2016). In the midst of the migration crisis, ‘European values’ have been invoked both in support of and against the refugees. On the one hand, if anti-immigrant groups have ‘positioned themselves as defenders of a Christian European civilization, enacting anti-migrant policies to protect Europe from being overrun by Muslim hordes. On the other, humanitarians have frequently appealed to a vision of Europe ‘as a community of nations that has overcome war and fought totalitarianism, and stand(ing) by those who are in pursuit of peace and human dignity’ (Trilling 2018b). However, Trilling identifies problems in both the positions. The anti-­ immigrant perspective attempts to erase the fact that Europe is and has been a culturally diverse continent for centuries. It rather seeks to present Europe as mono-cultural. On the other hand, Trilling argues that the pro-­ immigrant position tends to ‘present Europe as a beacon of hope for rest of the world’. Europeans have undoubtedly been able to overcome their belligerent past and establish peace, but the principles of foundation of peace and mutual prosperity is to avoid future conflict only among them. It does not change their fundamental idea of European racial supremacy, and colonial and imperial legacy continues to influence their present. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize the persistence of European racism if one is to understand the refugee crisis and European responses thereto. In fact, thousands of people from former European colonies, whose grandparents were treated as less than human by their European rulers, ‘have drowned in the Mediterranean in the past two decades, yet this only became a “crisis” when the scale of the disaster was impossible for Europeans to ignore’ (Trilling 2018a). Migrants and refugees have transformed the demographic character of European society as Europe has become culturally more diverse. India has always been culturally diverse. In recent years, it too is facing issues of cultural contestation and friction. In the Indian context, however, social tensions involving migrants rather than cultural differences are mainly a product of economic distress in the regions of migration. Migrants, mostly



from rural areas and who work as labourers, are generally characterized as docile, less resistant, more productive; they can be paid less, treated discriminately and are vulnerable to exploitation compared to locals. For these reasons, employers tend to prefer migrant workers (Deshingkar 2005). However, conflicts primarily emerging from economic reasons are generalized into socio-cultural spheres and migrants as a group becomes ‘them’ with a distinct set of characteristics as against ‘us’. In Europe, however, migrants and refugees are seen as a social, cultural, security and an economic threat/burden on the social security system. There is ample evidence to attest to the fact that refugees and immigrants face disadvantages in everyday life, particularly on the key indexes of social integration, legal rights, education, employment, criminal justice, health, housing, living conditions and civic participation. The public resentment of migrants, and fear of ‘cultural’ difference, leads to discrimination, marginalization, the exclusion of migrants, community tensions and may even at times lead to violence. The growing support for extreme far-right political parties is both a cause and consequence of the exploitation of people’s fears and resentment of migrants and refugees.

Conclusion Despite differences in the nature and dynamics of the refugee crisis in India and the European Union, issues relating to the rights of refugees, asylum seekers, human rights, social harmony and humanitarian concerns arise. In both cases, millions of people are crossing borders or had crossed borders, seeking refuge to save their lives while escaping civil wars and political instability in their home country. However, the difference between the two cases lies in their respective response in managing the crisis (Chowdhury 2017). Both India and Europe are increasingly becoming culturally diverse owing to either internal or external migration and the influx of refugees. Though the cultural plurality may be politically recognized in liberal democratic countries, and equality among culturally diverse groups may be constitutionally guaranteed, nevertheless the day-to-day experience of cultural interaction between individuals and communities having different cultural affiliations has not been so harmonious (Sharma 2016: 13). Even though there is no coherent policy to deal with the massive influx of refugees and migrants into Europe, the emerging consensus is that European countries manage migration best when they work with the



migrant’s country of origin on everything from border control to development issues; they have well-advertised, easy-to-understand schemes for skilled migration; they provide a clear and fair route to citizenship for newcomers; and they use the right mixture of sticks and carrots to get illegal immigrants to leave. However, efforts to advance these aims at the EU level are still in their infancy (Brady 2008: 3). One can identify three obstacles in the road to securing agreement on a substantive, EU-wide social integration strategy. First, the fear of public resistance to migrants, and to EU involvement in their conditions of stay. Second, the key levers for integration (such as employment policy and family reunification) fall under the authority of different Directorates-­ General at the European Commission, different committees in the European Parliament and different ministries at the national level—with the usual barriers thus created to developing a coordinated strategy. Third, views differ across Europe on the goal(s) of social integration and mechanisms to achieve it (Spencer 2009). The movement of people, either as a result of globalization or the fear of persecution, is unstoppable. The movement of people in any form either as migrant or refugee is not just simply an issue of human mobility. Instead, it is the cause and consequence of a complex set of socio-­economic processes and phenomena that influence human societies both at the source and the destination. A ‘comprehensive’ understanding of a variety of issues related to the movement or displacement of people is therefore required. In a world where the meaning and limits of territories is fast reducing, a world where an unprecedented 75.8 million people have been forced from their homes, migration/displacement of people can no longer be understood merely by the application of analytical terms such as ‘push-­ pull’ factors. Perhaps new conceptual categories, typologies of migrant types, theoretical approaches, policies, practices and methodologies are required to equip researchers to comprehend the complex social, economic, political and cultural realities of migration. Since this movement at global level is unfolding a wide variety of socio-cultural consequences, there is a need to have in-depth understanding of cultural differences among communities, and the adoption of policies which are more inclusive and harmonious. If such measures cannot restrict forceful displacement, they can at least offer a conducive environment for displaced persons to live with minimum dignity.



Notes 1. India is a leading  source of international migrants, with one in twenty migrants worldwide born in India. In 2015, 15.6 million people born in India were living in other countries. India has been among the world’s top origin countries of migrants since the United Nations started tracking migrant origins in 1990. The number of international Indian migrants has more than doubled over the past 25 years, growing about twice as fast as the world’s total migrant population (Connor 2017). 2. Writing from the town of Barasat, a city located in the outskirts of Calcutta, West Bengal, Sydney Schanberg, a journalist with the New York Times, describes the town as a ‘swarm’ with refugees ‘so thick in the streets that cars can only inch through’. The refugees seemed to be everywhere—sitting in the streets, crouching in doorsteps, sleeping on porches, occupying empty buildings and cooking in the fields. They attempted to build lean-tos only to have the monsoon rains rip them apart’. The refugees, Schanberg adds, appeared ‘anxious and troubled … look[ing] for someone to answer their questions … ‘Do they know we are coming?”’ (Schanberg 1971, 17 June). 3. The Rohingya are a stateless Muslim minority in Myanmar. The latest exodus began on 25 August 2017, when violence broke out in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, driving more than 723,000 to seek refuge in Bangladesh. Most arrived in the first three months of the crisis. An estimated 12,000 reached Bangladesh during the first half of 2018. The vast majority reaching Bangladesh are women and children, and more than 40 per cent are under age 12 (UNHCR 2019). 4. Of the 1.2 million first-time applications for asylum in the EU in 2016, over a quarter came from war-torn Syria, with Afghanistan and Iraq in second and third place, respectively. In all these countries, civilians face threats from extremist insurgent groups (European Parliament 2017). 5. In 2018, there were 634,700 applications for international protection in the EU plus Norway and Switzerland. This compares with 728,470 applications in 2017 and almost 1.3 million in 2016. In 2018, EU Member States granted protection to almost 333,400 asylum seekers, down by almost 40 per cent on 2017. Almost one in three (29 per cent) of these were from Syria while Afghanistan (16 per cent) and Iraq (7 per cent) rounded up the top three. Of the 96,100 Syrian citizens granted international protection in the EU, almost 70 per cent received it in Germany (European Parliament 2017).



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Abe, Shinzo, 34 ACE: E2 Project, 198 Afghanistan, 3, 6, 14–15, 19, 36, 46, 52, 98, 133, 148, 158, 206–207, 215 n. 4, 215 n. 5 Africa, 14, 18–19, 40, 96, 128, 180, 193, 206 African National Congress, 128 Akbaruddin, Syed, 143, 169 Al–Qaeda, 131–132, 136, 140 Alliance for Multilateralism, 39, 50 America First, 5, 14, 163 Andhra Pradesh, 207 Anglosphere, 94–95 apartheid, 49, 127 Arab Spring, 211 Arthashastra, 167 Article 370, 45

Asia, 48, 52, 80, 94–95, 97, 124, 128, 149–150, 180, 206 Asia Investment Facility Programme, 199 Asian financial crisis, 75, 81 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 38, 81 Asquith, Sir Dominic, 98 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 36, 115 Athens India–EU Troika ministerial meeting, 177 Atlantic Alliance, 1–2, 4, 10 Australia, 34, 40, 42, 64, 95, 97, 100, 122 Australia Group, 49, 157, 160 Austria, 155, 162, 209–211 Azevêdo, Roberto, 61 Azhar, Masood, 133, 142–143 Balakote, 140 balance of power, 2, 60, 77, 80 Balkans, 208 Bangladesh, 208–209, 211, 215 n. 3

© The Author(s) 2020 R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent World,




Bangladesh Crisis (1971), 209 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 78, 100 Bannon, Steve, 8–9 Barroso, José Manuel, 125 Basel Accords, 84 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 78–79, 84 Basel III regulations, 84–85 BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China), 80, 190 Beijing Consensus, 48 Belgium, 19 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 19 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 8, 48 Bihar, 207 Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41, 120, 124–125 biodiversity, 187–188 Bolton, John, 11 Brazil, 37, 41, 80, 119, 168, 190 Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (BASIC), 190 Bretton Woods Conference (1944), 31 Brexit, 1, 8–10, 14, 16, 18, 102, 123–124, 144 and Anglosphere delusion, 94–95 and India, 91–98 and India–EU FTA, 122–124 Indian preparations for Brexit, 98–101 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), 37–38, 80, 82, 85 Broad–based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), 42, 51, 109, 112, 114, 116, 124, 181–182 a sui generis case, 121–122 agriculture, 116–117 and Bilateral Investment Treaties, 120 and Brexit, 122–124 automobiles, 43, 117 civil society, role of, 120–121

confidentiality in negotiations, 115–116 drugs and pharmaceuticals, 112, 117–118 EU compulsions, 110–111 Indian compulsions, 110–111 insurance, 118 intellectual property rights, 43, 111, 113, 117–119 issues, 116–119 labour and environmental standards, 43 negotiations, 114–115 process, 112–114 prospects, 124–125 public procurement, 43, 111, 113 services, 118 sustainable development and human rights, 119 wine and spirits, 41, 117 Brussels conference on Syria, 36 Bush, George W., 7, 129, 155 Cameron, David, 210 Canada, 14, 64, 95, 97, 100, 123, 154 Central Asia, 158, 208 Central Europe, 8, 16 Chabhahar, 158 Chadha, Vivek, 140 Chanakya, 167 Chatham House, 210 Chile, 40 Chin community, 207 China, 1–3, 6, 9–15, 17–20, 27–28, 32–33, 35, 37–38, 40, 43, 49, 52, 64–65, 77, 80–83, 86, 92, 94–96, 121–122, 133, 142–143, 149–151, 155, 159–161, 163–164, 176, 181, 199 and Indian NSG membership, 160 and INF, 3–4 and Pakistan, 150 technological challenge, 19


climate change, 188–197 Cobden, Richard, 29 Cohn, Gary, 11 Cold War, 2, 4, 27, 30–32, 35, 37–38, 45, 47–48, 53, 95, 97, 130, 168, 170, 173, 176, 183 Common European Asylum System (CEAS), 209 Common Foreign and Security Policy, 153 Commonwealth of Nations, 93–94, 96–97, 101 Community of Democracies (2000), 46 Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT), 131 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 49, 151–153, 163–164 Conference on Disarmament, 152 connectivity, 34, 52, 148, 158 Contingent Reserve Arrangement, 38 Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), 160 Convention against Torture, 169 Convention of the Rights of the Child, 169 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 169 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti–Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 50 Copenhagen summit (2009), 193 Costa Rica, 64 Crimea, 27, 36, 38 cross–border terrorism, 133 Cuba, 170 cyber security, 52, 137, 174 Cyprus, 162 Dalai Lama, 176 data security, 118


Dawood, Ibrahim, 130 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 167 de–radicalization, 137–138 Doha Development Round, 40–41, 59, 61–62, 110–111 dot–com bubble, 77 Doval, Ajit, 11 East Europe, 19, 176, 183, 206 East Pakistan, 38, 207, 210–211 e–commerce, 13, 60, 62–64, 69, 121 Economic Survey of India 2017, 207 Energy Conservation Building Code (ECBC), 198 Enron, 77 Estonia, 210 Euratom, 161 Euratom–India Cooperation Agreement on Fusion Research, 161 Europe, 32, 163 European Association of Services, 121 European Banking Authority (EBA), 79 European Commission, 18, 64, 94, 112–115, 122–123, 135, 140, 148, 181–182, 196, 214 European Council, 8, 94, 114, 150, 153, 157, 194 European Court of Justice, 122 European Economic Community, 109, 149–150 European Endowment for Democracy, 45 European External Action Service, 114, 139, 163 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), 45 European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), 79 European Investment Bank, 194



European Parliament, 15, 45, 114–116, 121, 140, 144, 172, 181, 194, 214 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), 79 European Security Strategy, 36, 153 European Union, 1–3, 5, 8, 13–14, 28, 31, 34–36, 39–40, 45, 47, 49–50, 52–53, 62–63, 75–76, 79–81, 147, 173, 175–179, 188, 192, 195–196, 198–199, 213 Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015–2019, 45 Adoption, Compliance and Enforcement for Energy Efficiency, 198 agricultural subsidies, 39 and climate change, 192–195 and global financial governance, 76–78 and Iran nuclear deal, 3, 11 and liberal order, 31–34 and non–proliferation, 49–50, 150–153 and Pakistan, 139–140 and trade order, 39–44 and Trump, 15–16 and WTO reform, 13, 40, 43, 64–66 anti–dumping initiatives, 40 asylum applications, 215 n. 4 Clean Planet for All 2050, 197 Common Position on nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia, 153 domestic actions in climate change, 195–197 Emission Trading System (ETS), 196 Global Strategy (2016), 32, 36, 39, 51, 53 India Strategy (2018), 18, 28, 37, 43, 50, 148, 180, 182

Joint Action on transparency of nuclear export controls, 153 non–proliferation policy, evolution of, 153–156 normative approach, 47 Strategy against Proliferation of WMD, 153 Strategy for a Carbon Neutral Europe 2050, 194 Eurozone debt crisis, 77 Farage, Nigel, 8–9, 101 Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), 99 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 84, 141–142 financial crisis (2008), 75, 81 Financial Stability Forum (FSF), 83 Financial Stability Board (FSB), 75, 78–79, 81, 83–84 Finland, 19 Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), 49 Fontaine, R., 31 France, 3, 8, 12, 16, 18–19, 31, 49, 94, 97, 101, 114, 125, 129, 137, 142–143, 152, 155, 157, 161, 210 and Indian Ocean, 19, 97 G–7, 12, 14, 83 G–10, 81, 84 G–20, 6, 67, 78–79, 81, 83–85 G–77, 190 Ganguly, Meenakshi, 171 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 60 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 13, 42, 111 Geographical Indication (GI), 113, 119 Germain, Randall, 76


Germany, 6, 8–10, 12, 14, 16, 18–19, 93, 101, 110, 114, 117–118, 143, 157, 164 n. 1, 187, 206, 209–211, 215 n. 5 and Indian Ocean, 19 Global Compact on Migration (2018), 36 globalization, 28–29, 32–33, 40–41, 47, 110, 214 Gokhale, Vijay K., 143 Greece, 209 Green Climate Fund (GCF), 190 Greenland, 122 Grid Connected and Small Power Plant Programme in India, 198 Guide on Plant Materials for Landscaping in India, 191–192 Gujarat, 48, 207 Guterres, Antonio, 36 Haass, Richard, 35 Hall, Ian, 35 Hammarskjold, Dag, 171 Hammond, Philip, 97 Haqqani Network, 136 Harley–Davidson motorcycle, 12 hawala, 140 Herczynski, Pawel, 139 Hizb–ul–Mujahideen, 136 Hollande, François, 116 Hong Kong, 100 human rights, 17, 28, 30–32, 37–39, 44–47, 51, 127–130 and BTIA, 181–182 and civil society, 178–179 and sustainable development, 119 and terrorism, 179 humanitarian intervention, 38 Hungary, 209–210 Ibrahim, Dawood, 130 IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), 80 IC 814, 133


Iceland, 64 Ikenberry, John, 30 India Accounting Standards Board (ASB), 85 and Afghanistan, 3, 14–15, 98 and Brexit, 98–101 and climate change, 189–192 and INF, 3–4 and Iran nuclear deal, 3, 11, 50 and liberal order, 31–34 and non–proliferation, 49–50 and Paris agreement, 7 and Special and Differential Treatment, 62 and trade order, 39–44 and Trump, 15–16 and UN Human Rights Commission, 46, 170, 172, 177 and Human Rights Council, 169–171 and UN peacekeeping operations, 38, 175 and UN Security Council membership, 37, 39, 53 and WTO reform, 13, 40, 44, 66–67 anti–dumping investigations, 41 Department of Atomic Energy, 161 Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, 161 Intelligence Bureau, 138 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 112–113, 119, 182 Ministry of External Affairs, 92, 100, 138–139, 143, 147, 174 Ministry of Jal Shakti, 191 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, 141 National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), 189, 191 Nordic summit (2018), 18, 101 NSG membership, 157, 160 nuclear tests (1998), 49, 152–153, 174



India (cont.) Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 141 soft power, 48 tariff structure, 41 Trade Facilitation Agreement, 41 India and European Union Agenda for Action, 179 and disarmament, 161–162 and dual–use goods, 156–157 and human rights, 173–174 and human rights and democracy, 44–48 and Iran imbroglio, 157–159 and non–proliferation, 49–50 and North Korea, 159 and nuclear export controls, 160 and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 161 and rules–based order, 36–39 and trade order, 39–44 and WTO negotiations, 61–64 and WTO reform, 66–68 as natural partners, 34–36 Bilateral Investment Treaties, 120 Clean Energy and Climate Partnership, 198 counter–terrorism cooperation, 133–136 Cooperation in Combating Terrorism, Statement (2017), 130, 135 Counter–Terrorism Dialogue (2017), 136 democracy promotion, 45–46 High–Level Trade Group, 110, 125 Joint Action Plan (2005), 154, 173, 175 Joint Declaration on the Fight against Terrorism (2016), 135 Joint Working Group on Counter– Terrorism, 136–139, 179, 184 n. 4 natural partners in liberal order, 34–36

Pakistan factor, 139–140 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1993), 110, 119 potential, 143–144 role of non–state actors, 129–130 Round Table, 121, 178 strategic partnership, 29, 44, 110, 113, 136, 138, 147–149, 154, 173–174, 179–180, 199 summits: 2000, 130, 133–134, 142, 177–179; 2005, 110; 2006, 110, 112, 126 n. 1; 2008, 125; 2016, 124, 135; 2017, 28, 124–125, 130, 135, 161, 179, 198 trade disputes, 43 terrorist funding, 140–142 India and EU, human rights, 44–48 and BTIA, 181–182 and EU 2018 India Strategy, 179–181 and Kashmir at the Human Rights Council (1994), 172–173 and Right to Protect, 175–176 and strategic partnership, 174–175 contrasting approaches to UN human rights mechanisms, 167–169 human rights dialogue, 176–178 India as a human rights leader, 171–172 India and United Kingdom Anglosphere delusion, 94–95 Brexit, impact of, 98–101 perceptions of Brexit vote, 91–93 relations before Brexit, 93–94 revival of ties, 95–98 India and United States agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, 49, 157, 163 Joint Strategic Vision for Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean (2015), 33 nuclear deal, 49, 146, 157, 163


Indian Mujahideen, 141 Indian Ocean, 10, 18–19, 33, 52, 97 Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), 46 Indonesia, 41, 143 Indo–Pacific, 2–4, 11, 15, 17, 34 intellectual property rights, 43, 111, 113, 117–119 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 187, 194, 200 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF), 3, 14 International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 85 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), 84 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 38, 49, 151, 153, 155, 158, 160, 163 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 177 International Contact Group on Venezuela, 36 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 140 International Convention on Refugees (1951), 208 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 127, 169 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 168 International Financial Institutions, 53, 75–76, 78–79, 81–83 International financial regulations, 76, 78, 83–84 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 84 International Monetary Fund, 31, 37–38, 77–83


International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 79–80, 84 international terrorism, definition of, 127–129 Inter–Services Intelligence (ISI), 140 Invest EU Programme, 196 Iran, 3, 6–7, 11–12, 17, 36, 38, 49–50, 154, 157–159, 162, 195 Iraq, 37–38, 130, 132, 134, 215 n. 4, 215 n. 5 Ireland, 19, 155, 162 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 10, 130, 132, 135–137, 208 Islamophobia, 211 Israel, 6, 95 Italian marines, 18, 124 Italy, 16, 18–19, 209–211 Jain, Rajendra K., 47, 140, 177, 181 Jaishankar, S., 20, 48, 101 Jaish–e–Mohammad (JeM), 130, 132, 136, 145 n. 3 Jal Shakti Abhiyan (JSA), 191 Japan, 3, 9, 14, 19, 20, 34, 40–42, 82, 93, 95, 102, 113–114, 122, 154 Jerusalem, 6 ‘Jihadi John,’ 137 Johnson, Boris, 97, 99 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 6, 11–12, 50, 52, 157–158, 163 Juncker, Jean–Claude, 12, 18, 135 Kandahar, 133 Kansas, 11 Kant, Emmanuel, 30 Kashmir, 17, 45, 138–140, 172, 176–178, 207 Katowice summit (2018), 194–195 Kazakhstan, 64 Kelly, John, 10 Keohane, Robert, 30



Kerala, 207 Khan, A.Q., 155 Khullar, Rahul, 182 Kim Jong–un, 159 Kliman, D., 31 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of, 50, 154, 159 Korea, Republic of, 64, 122 Kozlowski, Tomasz, 101 Krasner, Stephen, 30 Kumar, Raveesh, 143 Kundnani, H., 31 Kurz, Sebastian, 211 Kuwait, 195 Kyoto Protocol, 188–189, 192–193 Lakhvi, Zaki–ur–Rehman, 136 Lashkar–e–Taiba (LeT), 129, 133, 135 Latin America, 128 liberal world order, 28–29, 34, 39, 52 and Europe, 34–36 and India, 34–36 definition, 29–31 Libya, 36, 38, 132 Lisbon Treaty, 44, 114, 134, 136, 163, 183–184 Locke, John, 29 London, as financial hub, 97, 100 Low Countries, 8 Maastricht Treaty, 151 Macron, Emmanuel, 9, 18 Madhya Pradesh, 207 Maharashtra, 207 Make in India, 42, 120, 124 Maldives, 38, 46 Malmström, Cecilia, 61–62 Mahindra group, 99 Malta, 162 Mao Zedong, 95 maritime security, 3, 18, 52, 144, 148 Marrakech Summit (2016), 194

Mattis, James N., 9 Maull, Hans W., 30–31 May, Theresa, 9, 95 McMaster, Herbert R., 9, 11 Menkhoff, I., 81 Mercosur, 40 Merkel, Angela, 9, 18 Mexico, 40–41, 64 Middle East, 52, 128, 148, 206, 208, 210–211 middle power cooperation, 18 migration and refugee crisis, 205–206 and Europe, 208–209 and India, 207–208 comparison of India and European responses, 209–213 Mill, John Stuart, 29 missile proliferation, 150, 153 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 49, 157 Mode 1, 118 Mode 4, 62, 118 Modi, Narendra, 7–8, 12–13, 17–20, 32–33, 40–41, 46, 48, 51, 53, 96, 101, 120, 148 Mogherini, Federica, 144, 180 Montenegro, 64–65 Most–Favoured Nation treatment, 39 Mufti, Muhammad, 178 Mügge, Daniel, 79 Mukerji, Asoke, 131 multilateralism, 11, 14, 16, 28–32, 36, 38–39, 50, 52, 63, 67, 78, 111, 152, 163, 175–176, 180–181 multipolar Asia, 18, 37 multipolarity, 32, 176 Mumbai attack (2008), 129 Munich Security Conference, 14 Myanmar, 47, 52, 148, 206–208, 215 n. 3


Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), 193–194 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 47 neoliberal institutionalism, 29 Nepal, 46, 98 Netherlands, 19 ‘New Delhi Consensus,’ 48 New Development Bank, 38, 80–81 New Zealand, 40, 64, 97, 122 non–aligned movement, 31 non–proliferation, 3–4, 18, 29, 31, 35, 39, 49–51, 144, 148–164 Non–Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), 151–152, 162–163 Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 49, 151–153, 155, 163 non–tariff barriers, 39, 112 Nordic summit (2018), 18, 101 North Africa, 208, 211 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 6, 14 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2–3, 5, 8, 10, 14–15, 150, 161–162 Norway, 64, 215 n. 5 NPT Review Conference, 153 Nuclear Ban Treaty (2017), 162 Nuclear Security Fund, 160 Nuclear Security Summit, 160 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 2, 49, 151, 155, 160–161, 164 Nye, Joseph S., 27, 30 Obama, Barack, 6, 15–16 Ollapally, Deepa, 35 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 67 Oxford University, 94


Pacific Ocean, 10 Pakistan,15, 35, 38, 95–96, 128–129, 133, 138–141, 143–145, 150–151, 153, 155, 159–160, 172, 174, 176–178, 206–208 Pal Chaudhuri, Pramit, 34, 139, 176 Palestine, 6 Palestine Liberation Organization, 128 Panch–Shila, 32 Pant, Harsh V., 34 Paris climate change agreement (2015), 2–3, 7, 9, 36, 187–191, 193–199 Paris terror attacks, 129 Patel, Priti, 92 Pearl, Daniel, 133 Pence, Mike, 14 Persian Gulf, 97 Pivot to Asia, 10 Plato, 167 Poland, 19, 93, 194, 210 Pompeo, Mike, 11, 14 Portugal, 19 Prabhu, Suresh, 62 Prakash, Aseem, 172 Price, Gareth, 134 Pulwama attack (2019), 140, 142, 145 n. 3 Punjab, 207 Puri, Hardeep Singh, 131–132 PV Rooftop Cell, 198 Quad, 3, 34 Quartet for Libya, 36 Raja Mohan, C., 34, 101, 182 Rajasthan, 207 Rajoy, Mariano, 18 Rakhine, 208, 215 n. 11 Reagan, Ronald, 7 realism, 30 refugee crisis, 9



Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 42 Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs), 40 regulatory imperialism, 47 Research and Analysis Wing (RA&W), 138 Reserve Bank of India (RBI), 99–100 Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 38, 47, 175, 180 right–wing populism, 4, 8, 10, 15–16, 19, 144, 183, 193, 210 Rohingyas, 208, 215 n. 3 Rottgen, Norbert, 16 Ruggie, John, 30 rules–based order, 29, 36–39 Russia, 10, 14–15, 27–28, 35–39, 52, 80, 154, 195 Saboia, Gilberto Vergne, 168 Saeed, Hafeez, 130, 133, 136 sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS), 112 Saran, Samir, 34 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 125 Saudi Arabia, 195 SCR 1267, 131, 133 self–determination, 127–129 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 38 Shangri La Dialogue, 33 Singapore, 33, 40, 64, 96, 100 Singh, Manmohan, 46, 94, 125 Singhvi, Mahaveer, 139 Sinha, Srinivas Kumar, 178 Slaughter, Anne Marie, 30 Smart Cities, 197, 199 Smith, Adam, 29 Somalia, 206 South Africa, 37, 41, 80, 127, 190 South America, 187

South Asia, 46–47, 94, 96, 132, 139, 153 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 36 South China Sea, 37 South–South cooperation, 80, 115–116 South–South financial cooperation, 78, 81, 86 special and differential treatment, 60, 62, 66–67, 69 Sri Lanka, 38, 46, 207 State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCC), 190–191 Sudan, 206–207 Sunak, Rishi, 92 Sustainable Development Goals, 36, 52 Swaraj, Sushma, 33 Sweden, 19, 155, 162, 209 Switzerland, 19, 64, 118, 215 n. 5 Syria, 9, 14, 36, 130, 132, 134, 137, 148, 206, 211, 215 n. 4, 215 n. 5 Tagore, Rabindranath, 143 Talanoa Dialogue, 195 Taliban, 19, 98, 131, 133 Tamil Nadu, 207 Tatas, 99 Technical barriers to trade (TBT), 112 Tertrais, Bruno, 150 Tibet, 207 Tillerson, Rex W., 9, 11 Town and Country Planning Organization (TCPO), 192 Trade–Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 63, 119 Trans–Atlantic and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 115, 121 Trans–Pacific Partnership, 6, 121 Treaty of Rome, 150 Trilling, D., 212


Trump, Donald, 1–2, 4, 6–7, 10–13, 15–16, 18, 27–28, 32, 37, 40, 42, 52, 101, 148, 158–159, 163, 194 and European Union, 8, 12–15 and European unity, 8, 16–17 and Iran, 11–12 and Paris agreement, 9 and right–wing populism, 8, 15 and US trade deficits, 9 campaign views, 5 China policy, 3 personal biases, 8 Trump, Ivanka, 8, 10 Turkey, 206 Tusk, Donald, 8 Uganda, 206 United Kingdom, 8–9, 91–102, 118, 122, 142, 157 Conservative Party, 95, 100 EU immigrants, 93 immigration policy, 91 Independence Party, 8–9 Indian diaspora, 94 Indian Workers’ Association, 92 Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, 102 United Nations, 2, 6, 11, 14, 18, 30–32, 36–39, 46, 50, 53, 127, 167–168, 179 Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 132 Charter, 32, 129, 131–133 Conference on Combating Desertification (2019), 188, 191 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), 188, 190, 192, 194 General Assembly, 38–39, 50, 131–132, 162, 169, 183 Refugee Convention, 208 Sanctions Committee, 132, 143


Security Council, 2, 31, 37, 39, 48, 53, 94, 131–133, 141–143, 157–158 Sixth Committee, 132 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), 128, 168–170, 172 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 33 United Nations Democracy Fund (2000), 46 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 206–207, 209 United Nations Human Rights Council, 14, 169, 172 United States, 1, 4–5, 7, 16–17, 19, 27–28, 30, 32, 34–35, 38, 43–44, 49, 52, 67–69, 76–77, 82, 94–97, 100, 102, 115, 121–122, 129, 141–143, 150–151, 154–155, 158–159, 163–164, 175, 189, 194 and EU, 5 and Iran nuclear deal, 6–7, 11–12, 48 National Security Strategy (2018), 10 North Korea summit (2018), 159 Republican Party, 5, 7 tariffs on China, 11 trade deficit, 5 Trade Representative, 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 31, 127, 129, 167–168, 170, 183–184 UNSC Resolution 1540, 131, 160 Uruguay Round, 110 Uttar Pradesh, 207 Uttarakhand, 207 Vaidya, Santosh, 198 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 178



Venezuela, 36 Verhofstadt, Guy, 15 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA), 128, 144 n. 1, 168, 184 n.1 Vietnam, 40 vishwa guru, 48 Vohra, N.N., 178 von Muenchow–Pohl, Bernd, 175 Washington Consensus, 48, 110 Wassenaar Arrangement, 49, 157, 160 West Asia, 6, 18 West Bengal, 207, 211, 215 n. 2 Wilson, Woodrow, 30 World Bank, 14, 31, 36, 38, 67, 77, 81–82 World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna), 128–129, 168, 184 n.1 World Economic Forum, Davos (2018), 33 World Trade Center, 129

World Trade Organization (WTO), 3, 12–14, 18, 29, 37, 39–44, 51–52, 59–65, 67, 110 Appellate Body, 40, 43, 51, 60, 64–67, 69 Dispute Settlement Body, 60 dispute settlement mechanism, 40, 42, 60, 64, 67, 69 Ministerial Conference: Buenos Aires (2017), 61–64, 69; Bali (2013), 61; Nairobi (2015), 61–62 reform, 13, 40, 43–44, 61, 66–67, 69 Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, 62 Work Programme on Small Economies, 63 World Values Survey, 19 World War I, 29–30 World War II, 1, 9, 30, 35, 77, 182 WorldCom, 77 Zola, Emile, 183