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Table of contents :
Introduction The Encyclopedia Selected Bibliography Index
Cover
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Historical Encyclopedia of U.S. Presidential Use of Force, 1789–2000
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Historical Encyclopedia of U.S. Presidential Use of Force, 1789–2000 Edited by Karl R. DeRouen, Jr. Joseph Zimmerman, Advisory Editor
GREENWOOD PRESS Westport, Connecticut • London
Page iv Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Historical encyclopedia of U.S. presidential use of force, 1789–2000 / edited by Karl R. DeRouen, Jr. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–313–30732–6 (alk. paper) 1. Presidents—United States—History—Encyclopedias. 2. United States—Foreign relations—Encyclopedias. 3. United States—Foreign relations—Decision making—Encyclopedias. 4. Executive power—United States—History—Encyclopedias. 5. United States—Military policy—Encyclopedias. I. DeRouen, Karl R., 1962– E176.1.H56 2001 327.1'17'097303—dc21 00–020467 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2001 by Karl R. DeRouen, Jr. All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 00–020467 ISBN: 0313307326 First published in 2001 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
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For my son, Pierre
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Contents
Acknowledgments
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Introduction: A Framework for Analysis Karl R. DeRouen, Jr., Steven B. Redd, and Paul Weizer
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The Encyclopedia
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Selected Bibliography
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Index
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About the Contributors
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Acknowledgments Several people were very helpful in the course of this project. Richard Grimmett at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) graciously answered questions about the data set compiled by that agency. Anne DeRouen Jasien helped me to obtain the newest version of the CRS data, which became available in the middle of this project and allowed us to extend our time horizon to 2000. Cindi Hayes and Sue Forrest of the Louisiana State University at Eunice library made my work there more comfortable and enjoyable. The final acknowledgment goes to Curtis Peet, who died suddenly of an acute asthma attack on June 4, 2000 at the age of 43. He is survived by his wife, Susan, and his three sons, Andrew, James, and William. Curtis had just received tenure and promotion to Associate Professor at Bowling Green State University. The following words are those of Curtis’ close friend and colleague, Marc Simon: ‘‘Curtis’ contributions to this volume emerged from his interest in ethics and his work on the liberal/democratic peace. He had a love of research, which emerged from his intense desire to understand the human condition. Curtis was a wonderful friend and colleague who always did more than his share. His insights made those of us who worked with him smarter; his generosity and warmth made us happier. We miss him deeply, and are grateful for having known him.”
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Introduction: A Framework for Analysis Karl R. DeRouen, Jr., Steven B. Redd, and Paul Weizer Use of military force short of war has been a weapon in the arsenal of U.S. presidents for the last 200 years. In the waning years of the 20th century, both the scholarly literature and government officials have recognized the growing relevance of such foreign policy actions. The purpose of this volume is to provide the essential tools for researchers focusing on these critical presidential actions. The use of force is a fertile area for research and theory building. In this chapter we give an overview of the main perspectives from which scholars can approach studies of the use of force: the historical record (including regional analyses, the data sets that focus on the use of force, and ethics), the international level (including democratic peace, multilateralism, and Yugoslavia), domestic politics (including Congress, the media, and public opinion), executivecongressional relations (including political and constitutional issues), and theories of decision making on the use of force. Important contributions to the study of the use of force have come from each of these research agendas. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) defines the term as the use of “military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests.”1 The CRS data set does not include “covert operations, or numerous instances in which U.S. forces have been stationed abroad since World War II in occupation forces or for participation in mutual security organizations, base agreements, or routine military assistance or training operations.” We do not directly consider wars declared by Congress in this volume (War of 1812, Mexican War of 1846, Spanish American War of 1898, World War I, and World War II). The focus of this work is force, short of declared war, undertaken by the president with or without the support
Page 2 of Congress. Grimmett’s data set suits the purposes of this volume and its longterm look at the use of force (see Data Sets on the Use of Force). THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE In the first decades of this country’s history, most presidential uses of force were along the North American continent and in the Caribbean as the nation was consolidating its territorial gains and protecting American lives and property. Presidents were contending with Spanish, Mexican, British, and French troops in places such as Cuba, Hispaniola, New Orleans, Spanish Florida, and Puerto Rico. As the U.S. began to extend its international reach in the first half of the 19th century, presidents began using the Navy and Marines to retaliate in cases where U.S. shipping interests were threatened. Force was applied in faroff locations such as the Barbary Coast, Sumatra, the Fiji Islands, Drummond Island, Johanns Island, and Samoa. By the middle of the 19th century, U.S. presidents had begun turning their attention to the newly independent states of Latin America. Nicaragua, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay were repeatedly targeted by troops protecting U.S. interests. During the remainder of the century the U.S. was consistently using force in Latin America and East Asia. In the latter case, U.S. force was applied to support commercial interests. At around the turn of the century the use of force to quell revolutionary activity became a visible trend. In places as distinct as Chile, Nicaragua, Syria, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Honduras, and China, U.S. troops were drawn into violent insurrections. The U.S. was increasing its global reach as it continued to protect its interests in bolder and more forceful terms. In addition to fighting two world wars in the first half of the 20th century, U.S. troops occupied and repeatedly intervened in Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine held that the U.S. would use force in the Western Hemisphere to protect its interests. This era saw presidents flex their muscles in Latin America when U.S. and European interests were compromised (e.g., the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Cuba). After World War II, U.S. force was typically a response to communism and threats of communism. The seminal uses of force during this era were the Berlin Blockade, the fall of China to communism, and the Korean War. During these years the U.S. repeatedly intervened in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Presidents also used force in the Middle East to control situations in Libya, Lebanon, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf region. With the Cold War over, the 1990s have seen the U.S. intervene in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia in the name of humanitarian assistance. Researchers looking at the historical record can discuss trends and patterns over time. Motivation for the use of force has changed drastically over the decades. Analyses can be broken down by region (see Asia and the Pacific;
Page 3 Europe; Latin America and the Caribbean; Middle East; SubSaharan Africa) or by era (see Congress; Multilateralism). THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE When the U.S. was emerging as a nation, Britain was the hegemon. Other western European nations were following the lead of Britain and trying to carve out their own share of the periphery. The U.S. largely ignored the rush to colonize and instead grew westward on the North American continent. The British Empire began falling apart in the early 20th century, and during the disorder World War I erupted. In the years leading up to the war, the U.S. basically maintained its distance from the European conflicts. Many have termed U.S. policy at this time as isolationist, but this is not entirely accurate. The U.S. had, in fact, used force abroad approximately 133 times prior to World War I. The U.S. was isolated from European conflicts, but not the world. World War II resulted in a bipolar system. The resulting two blocs remained adversarial for almost 45 years. Most of the U.S. uses of force during this era were designed to contain communism. U.S. actions often countered Soviet moves in a region. The last decade of this millennium has seen tremendous international structural flux. Specifically, the USSR dissolved and the bipolar system ceased to exist. There are several reasons one might expect that the end of the Cold War will lead to greater instability and increasing opportunity for presidential uses of force. First, the costs and risks associated with potential Soviet/Russian confrontation are increasingly irrelevant. Throughout the Cold War presidents were constrained from using extreme force in situations where there was a potential for escalation to nuclear exchange, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin Crisis, and Vietnam. The situation is very different today. Although Russia vocally opposed the use of force against Iraq by the U.S. in February 1998, the U.S. scarcely heeded this opposition. Brecher and Wilkenfeld argue that the end of bipolarity will lead to a more unstable system because the time needed to reach a decision is greater. Bipolarity, they say, is the most stable system because it is at this point where the costs of decision making and externalities for nondecisionmaking actors are minimized. There are reasons to believe scholars will have ample opportunity to study the use of force from an international perspective. Now that the bipolar deterrence umbrella has been greatly diminished, states may begin to step up indigenous arms production and imports, thus further exacerbating regional conflicts and generating opportunities for force. Military pullouts by each of the superpowers may bring to a head regional conflicts in the Mediterranean, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean as regional powers fill the voids. Some have argued that Saddam Hussein quickly took advantage of the breakdown of the
Page 4 Cold War to pursue expansionist goals in the Gulf region. Recent Serbian nationalism and ethnic cleansing also reflects an end to the constraints of the Cold War era. Second, the era of proxy states, blocs, and extended deterrence has ended. In the era of liberal internationalism, the U.S. will increasingly intervene to restore human rights or end civil wars. The U.S. actions in the former Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo from 1994 to 1999 are cases in point. The wave of post–Cold War democratization could also herald uses of force to consolidate the rule of new democracies. For example, the U.S. justified intervention in Panama in 1989 to bring about democracy. The end of bipolarity would seemingly give these post– Cold War interventions a higher probability for success and therefore make them more attractive to presidents looking to garner foreign policy victories. A final international factor that must be considered is strategic nuclear weapons. Historically, nations at a nuclear disadvantage were more prone to initiate crises. For example, Khong noted that the instigators of the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the North Korean attack in 1950, and the Quemoy and Matsu crises of 1954, 1955, and 1958 were at a nuclear disadvantage. Since nuclear weapons are thought to make countries more responsible and also more risk averse, the current reduction in the nuclear stockpiles of the two former superpowers could increase the probability of uses of force. Changes in the international system since 1990 have important implications for multilateral uses of force. Multilateralism during the first 45 years of the UN was rare because the U.S. and USSR would veto each other on the Security Council. This veto power was useful to the two world powers during the Cold War in cases such as the USSR’s actions in Afghanistan and U.S. actions in Grenada, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. The veto ability held the UN together during the bipolar decades. Now the UN is able to approach crises from a true multilateral perspective such as during the Iraqi Crisis of 1990–1991. The American public seems ready to accept U.S. activity as part of a wider UN coalition. Recent polls show that most Americans feel that the U.S. should only commit troops under the UN auspices, and that the UN should take the lead during international crises. Taxpayers could be increasingly reluctant to pay the high costs associated with the U.S. acting as the lone global policeman. There are also important ethical considerations surrounding unilateral uses of force. However, the end of the Cold War has made the UN an appealing component of a comprehensive foreign policy (see Data Sets on the Use of Force; Democratic Peace; Ethics; Multilateralism; Yugoslavia). DOMESTIC POLITICS Domestic politics are important to the foreign policy decision calculus. There are substantial political gains associated with the use of force. Lowcost uses of force are an excellent means of diverting attention because they evoke a shortterm boost in public approval known as the “rally ’round the flag” effect. The
Page 5 rally effect can be identified by the greaterthanexpected public support for the executive just after force is used. Frequent public opinion approval polling makes the diversionary use of force an attractive policy choice. Relatedly, George Edwards, among others, suggests that the president’s public approval is correlated with presidential success in Congress. We must consider other domestic factors when we consider incentives for uses of force. For example, the electorate and the media have changed considerably in the past 30 years. Many have observed the changes in U.S. foreign policy as a result of the Vietnam experience, but little has been said about these domestic political changes that began in the 1960s. The electorate began changing when the number of voters participating in the primaries increased and the role of the party bosses diminished. Prior to the vote being extended to women and minorities, voting was a privilege reserved only for a select portion of the population. The partisanship that existed prior to the 1960s began to decline because of the personalizing effect of television, the extended presidential primary season, and the general decline of parties. The decline in partisanship means that there are now more swing voters who can be easily swayed in the general election by uses of force. The media have also changed since the 1960s. The more intensely television covers an issue, such as uses of force, the more important it becomes to the public. Through the agendasetting effect, the media can also influence the public’s perception of the president during a crisis. These factors combine to make domestic political determinants of force even more relevant. Scholars now have a wealth of presidential approval and economic data that can be used to test the effects of domestic politics on the use of force (see Congress; Congressional Responses; Diversionary Theory; Media; Presidential Approval; Public Opinion; Rally ’round the Flag). EXECUTIVECONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS The nexus between the executive and legislative branches presents an abundance of interesting research questions. While most people refer to the American system of government as having a separation of powers, Richard Neustadt referred to this system as one of separate institutions sharing powers. This is particularly accurate in terms of war powers. The Constitution is not altogether clear as to how the use of force is to be handled. As a result, the relationship between Congress and the president in the area of war powers has long been murky. While the president is granted the expressed powers to appoint ambassadors, make treaties, and most importantly, act as commander in chief, the framers reserved to Congress the powers to raise and support an army and navy, to provide for the common defense, and of course to declare war. Exactly what constitutes a war is never defined and has been the source of constant friction between the legislative and executive branches. Both branches were given some power in this area, but neither branch was given exclusive power. The American
Page 6 system has never had its powers divided into neat categories. Both the president and Congress can claim to have implied and enumerated powers concerning the use of force. Both have tried to exercise those powers, resulting in ongoing friction between the branches. The debates of the framers indicate that they intended that Congress would be the body who would decide whether or not the U.S. would be involved in war. They felt that the president should be able to repel sudden attacks, but anything more should be left to the legislature. The president was to be in charge of troops, once committed to battle, but the decision on whether or not to use troops was to be considered by Congress. By dividing war powers between the president and Congress, the framers sought to check potential abuses of this power from either camp. This formula, allowing for both branches to determine whether uses of force should take place, worked well for more than half a century. It was not until President Polk (in 1846) that a president would use troops without first getting congressional approval. From that point, presidential uses of force became more commonplace. President Lincoln took action against the Confederacy prior to getting approval from Congress. President McKinley sent soldiers to China without any legislative action. Since Franklin Roosevelt, every American president has used troops in some capacity without prior congressional approval. After World War II this phenomenon became even more marked. In response to this increase in solely presidential uses of force, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973. The last straw had been the covert bombing of Laos and Cambodia by President Nixon. As U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia grew, Congress felt that it had lost all control of the use of American troops. The purpose of this resolution was to ensure the collective judgment of the Congress as well as the president in using force abroad. The resolution would allow the president the flexibility needed to deal with emergencies and protect American interests, but return Congress to the role of having the final say of whether to take the nation into any sustained military conflict. The main provisions of this joint resolution include: that the president, whenever possible, should consult with Congress before using troops; after sending troops, the president is required to report to Congress within fortyeight hours, and unless Congress approves of the presidential use of force within sixty days, the troops must be removed. The measure was approved over the veto of President Nixon. He argued that the legislative veto provision, permitting Congress to order the removal of troops by concurrent resolution, violated the presentment clause of the Constitution. According to Richard Grimmett, Nixon also argued that the requirement for the removal of troops after the sixtyday window was an unconstitutional check on the president’s powers because through doing so Congress could limit executive action without acting. These claims will be discussed further in the essay on the Constitution. Despite the intentions of this resolution or its legality, the results have not
Page 7 been much different than what existed prior to its passage. No president has ever fully complied with the stipulations of the act and no use of force has ever been cut short under its provisions. While a variety of factors could explain this behavior, many presidential scholars have speculated on the relationship between presidentially driven foreign policies and general legislative success in dealing with the Congress. The most widely used starting point would be Aaron Wildavsky’s “two presidencies’’ theory. His contention is that the modern presidency is not one office, but really two separate entities, one in foreign and the other in domestic affairs. The president has considerable authority to the point of dominance in foreign affairs. Yet, in domestic affairs, the president has been far less successful. While our separation of powers system prevents the president from exercising too much control over domestic policy, the same constraints are not there in foreign affairs, according to Wildavsky. In domestic affairs, the president and Congress are structurally at odds. Since they share power in this area, they are motivated to please their constituents. However, members of Congress and the president are chosen by very different constituencies. Members of the Senate are elected statewide, while the members of the House of Representatives are elected from smaller districts within each state. The president is elected by a national constituency. Thus, despite sharing powers over domestic policies, the groups that each of these people represent may have very different concerns. Ruralbased representatives may have different priorities than urban representatives or senators who represent states which include both. The president has yet another distinct constituency. This political pluralism puts the branches inherently in conflict. In foreign affairs, no such problem exists. When a president seeks to use force, it is as a representative of the nation as a whole. The president does not and cannot use force to favor one congressional district over another. It is the one true national act. Thus, all parties have the same ultimate goal in mind: increased U.S. security. Further, in times of crisis, when the president decides to put American troops in harm’s way, it would not be politically expedient for Congress to try to prevent such actions and be seen as obstructionist or unpatriotic. As Wildavsky argued in his original thesis, In…foreign policy there has not been a single major issue on which presidents…have failed. The list of their victories is impressive: entry into the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Truman Doctrine, the decisions to stay out of Indochina…and to intervene in Vietnam in the 1960s, the test ban treaty, and many more. Serious setbacks to the president in controlling foreign policy are extraordinary and unusual.2
Another factor in separating the two presidencies is the amount of power the president has at his disposal. In domestic policy, the president is only a small part of the process. The president can ask Congress to act, he can appeal to the public to put pressure on the Congress, but he has no direct authority to make
Page 8 laws. That is a power exclusively granted to Congress. On the other hand, the Constitution grants to the foreign policy president far more direct control of the agenda. The power as commander in chief to commit troops belongs to the president alone. He is also given the exclusive power to negotiate treaties and send and receive ambassadors. If Congress were to try and limit these powers, the foreign policy president can still prevail: Presidential discretion in foreign affairs makes it difficult for Congress to restrict their actions. Presidents can use executive agreements instead of treaties, enter into tacit agreements instead of written ones, and otherwise help create de facto situations not easily reversed…. The need for secrecy in some aspects of foreign and defense policy further restricts the ability of others to compete with Presidents.3
Some have argued that Congress can also provide an incentive. Paul Brace and Barbara Hinckley have shown that Congress is a major factor in the president’s calculus in the decision to use force. They contend that a popular president has greater success in Congress when dealing with important legislation. Thus, if a president decides to use force, his popularity is likely to increase, and therefore, his chances in Congress increase with his poll numbers. This theory would provide the president with an incentive to lead Congress toward the use of force while he is riding high in the polls, providing him with someone to share the blame with if the actions do not go as planned. Further, once troops are sent, it is highly unlikely that the Congress would do anything other than support American soldiers while they are in harm’s way. Richard Stoll has referred to this trend as a congressional rally effect. Stoll contends that there is a direct linkage between a U.S. use of force and congressional policy support. He has shown that key bills pertaining to international issues have a greater chance of passage if considered within thirty days of a use of force. Stoll’s theory provides a bridge between the diversionary use of force theories and the “two presidencies” thesis. It contends that presidential success in international affairs is due to the surge in popularity that comes from a military action. Another term used to describe the balance of power in this area is the “imperial presidency.” First used by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in 1973, the idea of an imperial presidency is one where executive power has grown into executive dominance. While the entire system of American government is certainly not dominated by the president, foreign affairs have become increasingly presidential arenas. Schlesinger contends that the imperial presidency: Does not deal with all facets and issues of presidential power…. It deals essentially with the appropriation by the presidency of powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congress. The imperial presidency received its decisive impetus, I believe, from foreign policy; above all, from the capture by the president of the most vital of national decisions, the decision to go to war.4
Page 9 The research mentioned to this point is somewhat dated and timebound. More recent scholarship has undercut the “two presidencies’’ thesis. According to George Edwards, divided government and partisanship have decreased the relevance of two presidencies. Congressional influence in foreign policy has increased with post Vietnam reforms and increases in the size of congressional staff and the congressional bureaucracy (Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, and the General Accounting Office). Subsequently, new research looks beyond legislative success of the president during crises and toward the indirect effects of Congress through agenda setting and public opinion. There are important research questions to be derived from the congressionalexecutive dynamic as it pertains to the use of force. The question of which branch has the upper hand has not been definitively answered (see Congress; Congressional Responses; Constitution). THEORIES OF PRESIDENTIAL USE OF FORCE DECISION MAKING Congress, with all of the expressed powers it possesses, has not proven to be the equal of the president in dealing with the use of force. Therefore, we examine theories of decision making from the perspective of the president. Much of the literature on presidential uses of force focuses on the factors, both endogenous and exogenous, which may or may not contribute to the decision to use force. Most of these factors are either international or domestic in nature. However, many studies have concentrated solely on these factors and their correlation, or absence thereof, with decisions to use force, and have failed to include an analysis of the decision calculus undertaken by the president and/or other participants in the decisionmaking process. There are various theories of decision making as they relate to presidential uses of force. Theories typically focusing on the individual are rational choice theory, cybernetic theory, prospect theory, and the poliheuristic theory of decision making. Broader theories include Allison’s bureaucratic politics theory and organizational process model. Game theory adds in the element of one’s adversary as necessary for explaining decisions to use force. The thinking behind applying decision analyses to presidential decisions to use force abroad stems from the argument that, in the end, the decision to use force has to be made by an individual or group of individuals. The more we know about how these decisions are being made (including the factors which may contribute to the decision to use force and the decision processes themselves), predictions as well as a general understanding of the decision processes behind these decisions about the likelihood that the U.S. will use force short of war in a given situation will likewise increase. Decisionmaking theories such as rational choice (or its variant, expected utility theory), cybernetic, prospect, and poliheuristic models generally focus on
Page 10 the individual as the locus of decision making. The idea is that the manner in which individuals process information will influence their choices. Rational choice theorists assume that individuals will do what is in their own best interest. Expected utility theorists take this notion one step further by making the assumption that decision makers will make the decision that maximizes utility, based on some value function combined with preferences and the probabilities of certain outcomes occurring. The assumption can then be made that if a president uses force, then that decision was in his best interest defined in terms of utility maximization. Presidents have consistent and transitive preferences and are able to combine these with information about the utility of using force and with the probability that force will be successful, to come to a decision about actually employing force. Prospect theory still subscribes to the notion of utility maximization, but argues that the utility function is shaped differently. Without going into too much detail, prospect theory simply says that decision makers are referencedependent (i.e., their decisions depend on deviations from their own reference points). Moreover, decision makers are also susceptible to framing effects. A president deciding whether or not to use force may be influenced by a number of factors including his reference point, framing effects, and whether or not he is in a domain of loss versus a domain of gain. For example, we might expect a president to be more risk acceptant and likely to use force if he were in the domain of loss, and riskaverse and less likely to use force if he were in the domain of gain. Cybernetic theory’s main argument is that individuals do not necessarily maximize utility, but instead satisfice. They look for solutions that are good enough rather than optimizing. Presidents may decide to use force, not because it maximizes utility, but because it is a good enough option for the moment in light of possible personal, structural, and environmental constraints. The theory would posit that presidents have neither the time nor the cognitive abilities necessary to mathematically combine preferences and probabilities to arrive at a utility function for when, and when not, to use force. The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making makes two main assumptions. First, decision makers employ a twostage process en route to choice, resorting to cognitive shortcuts and heuristics in response to cognitive complexities of the choice set and cognitive limitations of the decision maker in the first stage, and resorting to more analytic processes in the second stage. Second, decision makers are flexible in the face of foreign policy scenarios and may employ different decision heuristics as a function of environmental and personal variations. In other words, decision makers do not always maximize utility, but may instead satisfice. Furthermore, the theory posits that decision makers, especially presidents, measure success and failure in terms of political ramifications above all else. Therefore, a president would not initiate the use of force if doing so would damage him politically. Recently, the theory has been expanded to include the presence of advisors and their influence on decisions
Page 11 to use force. While rational choice theories concentrate on outcome validity, the poliheuristic theory strives for process validity as well; the goal is to accurately model foreign policy processes and then to link these processes to choice. The differences in these theories have been at the heart of what is often referred to as the cognitive rational debate. While these theories tend to focus on presidents or small groups around the president in the decision to use force, two other theories incorporate a wider array of actors. Allison proposed two theories to counter rational choice theory in explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962: the bureaucratic politics model and the organizational process model. The bureaucratic politics model basically asserts that policy, or more specifically in this case the use of force, is not some rational calculation made by an individual decision maker. Instead, the decision to use force would be the result of “pulling and hauling,” or bargaining, among various actors arranged hierarchically within the government. For example, it is often argued that the decision to use force in the Teheran Hostage rescue mission in 1980 was the result of bargaining games played out between Brzezinski in the Defense Department, and Vance in the State Department. The bureaucratic politics model has been criticized as being overly deterministic, leaving no room for the preferences of the decision maker, and in lacking a causal mechanism. The organizational process model views foreign policy as organizational output. One of the key concepts of the model is that of standard operating procedures (SOPs). In every government organization there are SOPs which dictate how the actors in the system may behave. Organizations do not attempt to estimate the probability distribution of future outcomes as expected utility theory would state, but instead, they avoid uncertainty by having and resorting to routinized courses of action. The president is part of an overall organization of national security–level decision makers, and the argument is that this group already has SOPs for dealing with various foreign policy crises. The use of force, then, in many situations may simply be the result of resorting to already agreedupon routines or courses of action. All of the theories discussed above help to provide a broader understanding of why decision makers decide to use force in shortofwar situations. However, to one degree or another, they also typically fail to account for adversaries in decisions to use force. Game theory, using rational choice theory as a foundation, includes the adversary in calculating a leader’s utility for pursuing force as a course of action. The belief is that knowing the preferences of one’s adversary will help to determine one’s own course of action by reducing uncertainty. If the president knew, for example, Slobodan Milosevic’s preferences with respect to peace in Kosovo, the president would be able to make the choice that would maximize benefits accruing to the U.S. in the event force were used. There are, of course, many other theories of presidential use of force decision making that cannot be covered here (e.g., groupthink, personality studies, etc.). Those discussed in this section are the most commonly used and accepted in the literature. They have also expanded our knowledge of why the U.S. uses
Page 12 force short of war. Rational choice and expected utility theories perhaps offer the ideal manner in which decisions should be made. Prospect theory is effective in pointing out how and when decision makers deviate from perfect rationality. Cybernetic theory introduces the notion of satisficing and illustrates the constraints under which national security decision makers operate. The poliheuristic theory provides a sort of middle ground, combining cognitive shortcuts in the first stage with maximizing behavior in the second. It also highlights the political importance of decisions to use force. The bureaucratic politics model factors in other actors and institutions in the policymaking process, as well as the observation that policy is often not a conscious choice, but is instead the result of bargaining among many actors. The organizational process model also includes other actors and organizations besides the president, but it refers to organizational routines as the source of foreign policy choices. Finally, game theory helps add a dynamic element to understanding why presidents use force short of war. Each theory provides another piece of the puzzle toward a greater understanding of presidential uses of force short of war. The utilization of decision theories in explaining U.S. uses of force is a step in the direction of moving beyond simple correlations to actual causal factors. By lowering the level of analysis to the individual and the small group and examining how presidents process information, researchers using these theories have developed a clearer picture of how and why presidents use force short of war in foreign policy crises (see Bounded Rationality; Cybernetic Theory; Expected Utility Theory; Foreign Policy Decision Making; Noncompensatory Decision Making; Poliheuristic Theory; Political Psychology; Rational Choice). CONCLUSION In the early days of the Republic the president used force to retaliate and to open the doors for American commerce. During the 19th century, as the nation proclaimed manifest destiny, the presidents largely remained out of the frays of the European powers. World War I brought an end to this pseudoisolationism and forced the U.S. into the European theater. World War II created a bipolar system and presidents were suddenly responsible for Western security. The American public became much more aware of international events as television brought the world into the living room. The American presidency began a metamorphosis, and subsequently presidents had to appear decisive and charismatic on television when staring down Soviet leaders. The bipolar system has ceased to exist and changes within the American political system which began in the 1960s are having an everincreasing influence. At the domestic level, the weakening of party organizations and party identification, and the power of television, combine to heighten the incentives for force. Similarly, opportunities for the use of force have increased at the international level because of the end of bipolarity and the allure of multilater
Page 13 alism. However, the increased role of Congress in foreign policy making will be an important check on arbitrary uses of force. We have discussed several key perspectives in which studies of the use of force can be grounded. Recent findings from each perspective indicate the increasing relevance of the use of force short of war. The time is ripe for new avenues of research so that alternative means of dispute resolution can be found. This chapter was designed to send the reader into the remainder of the book. Some topics merit more detailed attention so there are longer entries on important topics such as the Constitution, Congress, ethics, the media, public opinion, data sets, democratic peace, Yugoslavia, and multilateralism, written by experts on each of these topics. There are also extended entries that describe the patterns, trends, and underlying motivations of U.S. force in each of the major regions of the world. These regional essays on the use of force short of war focus on Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, Asia, the Middle East/North Africa, and SubSaharan Africa. NOTES 1. Richard Grimmett, Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–1999 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report, 1999). 2. Aaron Wildavsky, “The Two Presidencies,” TransAction 4 (1966). 3. Ibid., 10. 4. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), vii.
FOR FURTHER READING Allison, Graham T. 1969. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” American Political Science Review 3:689–718. Blechman, Barry, and Stephen Kaplan. 1978. Force Without War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Bowman, Karlyn, and Everett Ladd. 1993. “Public Opinion and Demographic Report.” The Public Perspective 4:82–104. Brace, Paul, and Barbara Hinckley. 1992. Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents. New York: Basic Books. Brams, Steven J. 1975. Game Theory and Politics. New York: The Free Press. Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1989. Crisis, Conflict and Instability. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. 1990. “Domestic Opposition and Foreign War.’’ American Political Science Review 84:747–65. DeRouen, Karl R., Jr. 1995. “The Indirect Link: Politics, the Economy, and the Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39:671–95. Edwards, George C. III. 1989. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Fordham, Benjamin. 1998. “Political Resource Constraints, Endogenous Threat Perception, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949–1982.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42: 418–39.
Page 14
Gaddis, John. 1992. The U.S. and the End of the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press . Geva, Nehemia, Steven B. Redd, and Alex Mintz. 1996. “Structure and Process in Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Experimental Assessment of Poliheuristic Propositions.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, April 16–20. Grimmett, Richard. 1999. Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–1999. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report. Grossman, Michael, and M. Kumar. 1981. Portraying the President. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Hess, Gregory D., and Athanasios Orphanides. 1995. “War Politics: An Economic, Rational Voter Framework.” American Economic Review 85:828–46. Hibbs, Douglas. 1987. American Political Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hinckley, Ronald. 1992. People, Polls and Policymakers. New York: Lexington Books. Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald Kinder. 1987. News that Matters: Television and American Opinion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. James, Patrick, and John R. Oneal. 1991. “The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President’s Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35:307–32. Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. ‘‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.” Econometrica 47:263–91. Keeter, Scott. 1987. “The Illusion of Intimacy: Television and the Role of Candidate Personal Qualities in Voter Choice.” Public Opinion Quarterly 51:344–58. Khong, Y. 1992. “Vietnam, the Gulf and U.S. Choices: A Comparison.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, August. Levy, Jack S. 1992a. “An Introduction to Prospect Theory.” Political Psychology 13: 171–86. Levy, Jack S. 1992b. “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems.” Political Psychology 13:283–310. Levy, Jack S. 1997. “Prospect Theory and the CognitiveRational Debate.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Marra, Robin, Charles Ostrom, and D. Simon. 1990. “Foreign Policy and Presidential Popularity.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34:588–623. McDermott, Rose. 1998. RiskTaking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Meernik, James. 1994. “Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force.” International Studies Quarterly 38:121–38. Meernik, James, and Peter Waterman. 1996. “The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents.” Political Research Quarterly 49:573–90. Milligan, C. 1991. “Alternatives to the Use of Force and the Role of the United Nations.” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 20:73–89. Mintz, Alex. 1993. “The Decision to Attack Iraq: A NonCompensatory Theory of Decision Making.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:595–618.
Page 15 Mintz, Alex, and Nehemia Geva. 1997. “The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive Rational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Mintz, Alex, Nehemia Geva, and Karl DeRouen, Jr. 1994. “Mathematical Models of Foreign Policy DecisionMaking: Compensatory vs. Noncompensatory.” Synthese 100:441–60. Mintz, Alex, Nehemia Geva, Steven B. Redd, and Amy Carnes. 1997. “The Effect of Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making: An Analysis Using the Decision Board Platform.” American Political Science Review 91:553–66. Monroe, Kristen R. 1991. ‘‘The Theory of Rational Action: What Is It? How Useful Is It for Political Science?” In Political Science: Looking to the Future, Vol. 1, The Theory and Practice of Political Science, ed. William J. Crotty. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Morgan, T. Clifton, and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1992. “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36:25–52. Morrow, James D. 1997. “A Rational Choice Approach to International Conflict.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Neustadt, Richard E. 1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: The Free Press. Nincic, Miroslav. 1997. “Loss Aversion and the Domestic Context of Military Intervention.” Political Research Quarterly 50:97–120. Ostrom, Charles W., Jr., and Brian L. Job. 1986. “The President and the Political Use of Force.” American Political Science Review 80:541–66. Richards, Diana, T. Clifton Morgan, Rick K. Wilson, Valerie L. Schwebach, and Garry D. Young. 1993. “Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Tale of Some NotSoFree Agents.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:504–35. Rivers, Doug, and Nancy Rose. 1985. “Passing the President’s Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress.” American Journal of Political Science 29:183–96. Russett, Bruce M. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. 1973. The Imperial Presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Simon, Herbert A. 1959. “Theories of DecisionMaking in Economics and Behavioral Science.” American Economic Review 49:253–83. Singer, J. David. 1993. “System Structure, Decision Processes, and the Incidence of International War.” In Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Stoll, Richard J. 1984. “The Guns of November: Presidential Reelections and the Use of Force, 1947–82.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28:231–46. Wang, Kevin H. 1996. “Presidential Responses to Foreign Policy Crises: Rational Choice and Domestic Politics.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:68–97. Wildavsky, Aaron. 1966. “The Two Presidencies.” TransAction 4:7–14.
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A Congress; Media. FOR FURTHER READING Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald Kinder. 1987. News that Matters: Television and American Opinion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Page, Benjamin, Robert Shapiro, and Glenn Dempsey. 1987. “What Moves Public Opinion?” American Political Science Review 81:23–43. Jill Glathar Latin America and the Caribbean.
Page 20 FOR FURTHER READING Blasier, Cole. 1976. The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Schoultz, Lars. 1998. Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James Henson ANGE V. BUSH—This 1990 case was heard by a U.S. District Court. It was a challenge of the Iraqi conflict by a soldier. The court ruled that even if the challenge comes from an individual soldier who feels that he has been placed in an unconstitutional war, rather than from a member of Congress, the political question doctrine still holds. The court contended simply that no matter who the plaintiff, there are other avenues of relief available without bringing the courts into the issue of foreign affairs. This court’s refusal to exercise jurisdiction under the separation of powers principles of equitable discretion and in the political question doctrine by no means permits the president to interpret the executive’s powers as he sees fit, nor does it mean that the legislative branch is helpless without the assistance of the judicial branch. Congress possesses ample powers under the Constitution to prevent presidential overreaching, should Congress choose to exercise them. If Congress considers the president’s current deployment of forces in the Persian Gulf to violate the Constitution, or if Congress considers the country to be on the verge of being unconstitutionally brought to war, or if Congress concludes at any time that the president’s actions in the Gulf have usurped Congress’ constitutional role, Congress has many options to check the president. Congress can itself declare war, exercise its appropriations power to prevent further military action in the Persian Gulf, or even impeach the president. The court does not suggest that any of the above options are appropriate or necessary. Nor does the court suggest that any of them would be politically popular for legislators. The court does believe that the Constitution leaves resolution of war powers disputes to the political branches, not the judicial branch. See Constitution; Ethics. FOR FURTHER READING Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990), 198. Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Paul Weizer
ANGOLA—With an estimated population of 10.5 million people and a geographical area of slightly less than twice the size of Texas, Angolans have experienced a turbulent history beginning with Portuguese contact in the latter part of the 15th century. Initial Portuguese trade contacts with the Kongo State eventually developed into the slave trade that saw about 4 million Angolans reach the shores of Brazil between the 16th and mid19th centuries—hence Angola’s appellation, “the mother of Brazil.” In addition to Angola’s human
Page 21 resources, outsiders have also coveted Angola’s rich natural resources, endowed by its tropical location, that enable the production of plantation staples including coffee, sisal, timber, and cotton. Other natural endowments that continue to connect Angola with the global economy include diamonds and petroleum. It is largely as a result of these natural endowments, especially oil, and Angola’s role as a Soviet surrogate during the 1970s and 1980s, that the U.S. has intervened in this troubled country. To be sure, today Angola provides the U.S. with 7 percent of its domestic oil needs, and during the 1970s the U.S. needed to contain Brezhnev’s Soviet designs for the soul of liberation organizations in countries including Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Afghanistan. U.S. intervention in Angolan domestic affairs dates to the African decolonization era of the late 1950s in concert with the Ghanaian independence movement. More specifically, the decolonization struggle to oust the Portuguese from Angola can be dated to the 1956 founding of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) in Luanda. Moreover, the incipient liberation movement crystallized in the National War of Liberation that started in 1961 with an MPLA uprising in Luanda and FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) uprising in northern Angola. The brutal Angolan struggle for independence was not, however, cheap; it came at the expense of about 100,000 Angolan lives on November 11, 1975 and resulted in hostilities among the three liberation movements. UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) was formed in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi, two years after he parted company with the FNLA. Prior to Antonio Salazar’s demise in 1974, his autocratic Portuguese government stubbornly opposed the liquidation of Portugal’s colonies while other colonial powers, led by the British, were removing the shackles of expletive colonialism with increasing speed. It is against this backdrop that the U.S. intervention in Angola is to be understood. Two periods are identified during which U.S. intervention differed in terms of scale and purpose. During the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. intervention in Angola was measured and vacillated from one administration to the next when compared with the determined singlemindedness of the Reagan Doctrine, which sought to eliminate any signs of the “evil empire” in the developing world, including Angola. During the first period, U.S. vacillation in Angola reached its zenith during the early 1970s with the ghost of the Vietnamese War looming over U.S. policy makers. The CIA retained, dating back to the Kennedy administration, Holden Roberto, the leader of the FNLA and a foe of the MarxistMPLA, for $100,000. President Nixon discontinued this contact since it was believed that the Angolan liberation movements were in the doldrums. Portugal’s Salazar was coddled by the U.S. despite the brutal war he was waging against Marxist liberation movements in both Angola (MPLA) and Mozambique (FRELIMO—Front for the Liberation of Mozambique). First, the Portuguese were loyal founding NATO members. Second, U.S. cargo supply aircraft to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War refueled at the Portuguese Azores in the Eastern Atlantic. When the Soviets raised the ante in Angola on the eve of independence, Roberto was
Page 22 brought into the fold again when President Ford, in 1974, approved a $300,000 grant for the FNLA to mobilize politically. By mid1975 with the Sovietbacked MPLA in control of threequarters of Angola’s provinces and gaining strength, President Ford, at the urging of Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko and Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, provided $32 million to support the FNLA and UNITA as well as $16 million in Department of Defense surplus weapons. However, two events, influenced largely by Vietnam, indicated that the U.S. was distancing itself from the Angolan crisis. First, the U.S. Congress voted in December 1975 to ban any use of defense funds for Angola during 1976. Second, in June 1976 the socalled Clark Amendment converted the 1976 ban into a permanent ban on military aid to Angola. With the U.S. on the retreat, the MPLA, in violation of the Alvor Accord and the OAU’s policy of a coalition government in Angola, declared itself the Angolan government in 1975. Moreover, Cuban troop presence in Angola increased from 4,000 (December 1975) to about 12,000 (January 1976), eventually exceeding 50,000 at its zenith. The policy of the Reagan administration toward Angola showed a more determined effort to overtly support moderates like Savimbi, who was also receiving support from the South African Defense Force (SADF), in destroying the MPLA. There was, however, a tension between the Reagan Doctrine and the diplomatic efforts of constructive engagement doggedly pursued by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker. Although Crocker’s diplomatic efforts to link Cuban troop withdrawal with Namibian independence (UN Resolution 435) commenced in the early 1980s, the benchmark event that indicated the U.S. intention to reengage in Angola, albeit in support of Savimbi, was the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985. Its repeal was influenced by the tenor of the Angolan civil war as well as domestic pressure from the CubanAmerican National Foundation through Florida Democratic Representative Claude Pepper. The PepperKemp Bill provided for $27 million of nonlethal support for UNITA that included medicine, clothing, communications gear, and tactical advice. Hereafter, a flood of U.S. support for UNITA was forthcoming on both the military and diplomatic fronts. In December 1985, President Reagan announced a $15million program for UNITA. In July and the fall of 1986, fifty stingers and TOW antitank missiles were dispatched to Angola for UNITA. U.S. military support for UNITA, in conjunction with support from the SADF, resulted in a stalemate proxy war between the MPLA (backed by Cuban troops) and UNITA that had become evident to both the South Africans and Cubans by mid1988. Both sides had suffered losses in three pivotal battles at Mavinga, Cuito Cuanavale, and at the Calueque Dam between an August 1987 and June 1988 protracted struggle. Chester Crocker’s eightyear diplomatic linkage marathon resulted in the governments of Angola (MPLA), South Africa, and Cuba agreeing in December 1988 in New York to Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independence. Although the domestic situation in Angola is still turbulent, since 1991 the U.S. has exerted diplomatic influence to reconcile MPLAUNITA differences through a Jose Eduardo dos Santos–Jonas Savimbi
Page 23 election detail agreement. The election was won by the MPLA. The U.S. has rewarded dos Santos through extension of diplomatic relations and normalizing trade of nonlethal military goods between the two countries in 1993 as well as the sale of six refurbished C130s in 1997. By contrast, the U.S. has pressed other countries to implement UN Security Council Resolution 864, which provides for a moratorium on the sales of war material and petroleum to UNITA because of Savimbi’s failure to implement outstanding aspects of the Lusaka Protocol with dos Santos’s National Unity Government. See LowIntensity Conflict; Proxy War; SubSaharan Africa. FOR FURTHER READING Harding, Jeremy. 1993. The Fate of Africa: Trial by Fire. New York: Simon and Schuster. Krieger, Joel, ed. 1993. The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. New York: Oxford University Press. Ramsay, F. Jeffress. 1998. Global Studies: Africa Annual Editions, 9th ed. Guilford, CT: Dushkin Publishing Group. Rodman, Peter. 1994. More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Darrell P. Kruger
Latin America and the Caribbean. FOR FURTHER READING Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Smith, Peter H. 1996. Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.–Latin American Relations. New York: Oxford University Press. James Henson
Middle East; Yugoslavia.
Page 24 FOR FURTHER READING Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. http://www.acda.gov/initial.html. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. http://www.sipri.se/. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Table 1). Early American military intervention in the region stemmed from the need to protect economic interests, primarily shipping, from attacks by pirates (both those native to the region and European privateers) operating in the open waters of the Pacific and off the coasts of islands and the continental mainland, and from occasional instances of civil unrest among native populations. There was rarely in this early history, however, any genuine attempt by the U.S. to define the Pacific Ocean and areas westward as within the “sphere of influence” that so dominated U.S. policy when it came to the Caribbean and Latin America during the same period of time. Yet, in many ways, 19thcentury military actions in Asia and the Pacific can be traced to a similar underlying policy prerogative: the protection of American lives and property. It was not until the mid20th century that a change in the position of the U.S. toward the Far East would lead to an increasing policy commitment and an ongoing use of military force in the Asia/Pacific arena. This essay explores the uses of military force by the U.S. in the Asia/Pacific region. In doing so, it provides an examination of those instances when force was used as a standard of presidential policy practice, as opposed to instances when a war was actually declared by the Congress of the U.S. against another sovereign nation state. THE 19TH CENTURY: MINIMAL U.S. COMMITMENTS The U.S. entered the greater Asia/Pacific arena as a late player in the game, and hence found itself to be at a disadvantage when compared to its European rivals and their long histories in the region. However, competition with relatively powerful nations over territories on the other side of the world was not of great concern to U.S. policy makers at the time. Most presidents and their advisors during the 19th century were more concerned with expanding and securing the continental holdings of the country in North America than with attempting to influence events in a part of the word of which they knew little. Conventional wisdom in the study of U.S. foreign policy emphasizes the isolationist tendencies of the new nation for the first threequarters of its history, and this assessment is largely correct. Even in the late 19th century, when the U.S. had become one of the dominant industrial nations on the planet, it retained an inward focus to
Page 25 Table 1 Presidential Use of Force in Asia and the Pacific (adapted from Grimmett) YEAR LOCATION DESCRIPTION 1832 Sumatra U.S. naval force storms a fort in Quallah Battoo to punish natives for plundering the U.S. ship Friendship. 1838– Sumatra U.S. naval force lands to punish natives of Quallah 1839 Battoo and Muckie (Mukki) for attacks on American shipping. 1840 Fiji Islands U.S. naval forces land to punish natives for attacking American exploring and surveying parties. 1841 Drummond Island, U.S. naval party lands to punish the natives for the Kingsmill Group murder of a seaman. 1841 Samoa U.S. naval forces land to punish native population for the murder of a U.S. seaman on Upolu Island. 1843 China U.S. sailors and Marines land following a clash between Americans and Chinese at a trading post in Canton. 1853– Japan Commodore Perry and his naval expedition make a 1854 display of force leading to the ‘‘opening” of Japan. 1853– Ryukyu and Bonin Commodore Perry makes three visits prior to his 1854 Islands display in Tokyo harbor and afterward, while waiting for the Japanese reply. He makes a naval display and lands Marines twice in order to secure economic/trade concessions from the natives. 1854 China American and British ships land forces to protect U.S. interests in and around Shanghai to protect against civil strife. 1855 China U.S. forces protect American interests in Shanghai. 1855 Hong Kong U.S. forces fight pirates. 1855 Fiji Islands U.S. naval force lands to seek reparations for attacks on U.S. seaman and residents. 1856 China U.S. forces land to protect American interests at Canton during hostilities between the British and Chinese, and to avenge an assault upon a vessel under the U.S. flag. 1858 Fiji Islands A marine expedition chastises natives for the murder of two American citizens at Wayao 1859 China U.S. naval force lands to protect American interests in Shanghai. 1863 Japan The U.S.S. Wyoming retaliates against a firing on the American vessel Pembroke at Shimonoseki.
Page 26 YEAR 1864
LOCATION Japan
1864
Japan
1866
China
1867
Formosa
1868 1870
Japan (Osaka, Hiolo, Nagasaki, Yokohama, and Negata) Hawaiian Islands
1871
Korea
1874
Hawaiian Islands
1888
Korea
1888– 1889 1889
Samoa
1893
Hawaii
1894– 1895
China
Hawaiian Islands
DESCRIPTION U.S. naval forces protect the U.S. Minister to Japan when he visits Yedo to negotiate concerning American claims against Japan. Naval forces from the U.S., Britain, France, and the Netherlands compel Japan to permit the Straits of Shimoneski to be used for shipping as per signed treaties. U.S. forces punish an assault on the American consul at Newchang. U.S. naval force lands and burns native huts as punishment for the murder of a crew from a wrecked U.S. vessel. U.S. forces land to protect American interests during the civil war in Japan. U.S. forces land to place the American flag at half mast upon the death of Queen Kalama, when the American consul at Honolulu would not do so. U.S. naval force attacks and captures five forts to punish natives for depredations against Americans, especially for murdering the crew of the schooner General Sherman and burning the vessel, and for later firing on smaller American boats in the Salee River. Detachments from U.S. vessels land to preserve order and protect American lives and interests during the coronation of a new king. U.S. naval force is sent ashore to protect American residents in Seoul during unsettled political conditions and possible riots. U.S. forces are landed to protect American citizens and the consulate during a native civil war. U.S. forces protect American interests in Honolulu during a revolution. U.S. Marines land to ostensibly protect American lives and interests, but many believe this action is intended to promote the provisional government of Sanford B. Dole. This action is disavowed by the U.S. U.S. Marines are stationed at Tientsin and move on Peking during the SinoJapanese War.
Page 27 YEAR 1894– 1895
LOCATION China
1894– 1896
Korea
1898– 1899
China
1899
Samoa
1899– 1902
Philippine Islands (SpanishAmerican War and Philippine Insurrection) China (Boxer Rebellion)
1900
1904– 1905
Korea
1911
China
1912
China
1912– 1941
China
1916
China
DESCRIPTION A U.S. naval vessel is beached at Newchwang and used as a fortification for the protection of American nationals. A guard of U.S. Marines is sent to protect the American legation and U.S. lives and interests at Seoul during and after the SinoJapanese War. U.S. forces provide a guard for the legation at Peking and the consulate at Tientsin during a contest between the Dowager Empress and her son. U.S. and British naval forces land to protect national interests and to take part in a bloody contention over the succession to the throne. U.S. forces protect American interests following the war with Spain and conquer the islands by defeating the Filipinos in their war for independence. U.S. troops participate in operations to protect foreign lives during the Boxer Rebellion, especially in Peking. A permanent legation is thereafter maintained at Peking and would be strengthened as trouble threatened. A guard of U.S. Marines is sent to protect the American legation in Seoul during the Russo Japanese War. During the early stages of the nationalist revolution, U.S. forces attempt to rescue missionaries in Wuchang, while a small landing force guards American private property and the consulate at Hankow. U.S. Marines are deployed to guard the cable stations at Shanghai and landing forces are sent to protect U.S. interests throughout the country. U.S. forces protect American interests on Kentucky Island and at Camp Nicholson during revolutionary activity. The disorders beginning with the overthrow of the dynasty during the Kuomintang rebellion in 1912, and which are redirected against the Japanese following the invasion of the latter, lead to U.S. demonstrations and landing parties for the protection of U.S. interests. U.S. forces land to quell a riot taking place on American property in Nanking.
Page 28 YEAR 1917
LOCATION China
1920
China
1920– 1922
Russia, Siberia
1922– 1923 1924
China
1925
China
1926
China
1927
China
1932
China
1934
China
1945
China
1948– 1949
China
1950– 1953
Korean War
China
DESCRIPTION U.S. troops land at Chungking to protect American lives during a political crisis. A U.S. landing force is sent ashore for several hours to protect American lives during a disturbance at Kiukiang. A U.S. Marine guard is sent to protect the American radio station and property on Russian Island, Bay of Vladivostok. U.S. Marines are landed five times to protect Americans during periods of unrest. U.S. Marines land to protect Americans and other foreigners in Shanghai during Chinese factional hostilities. U.S. forces land to protect foreign property and lives due to fighting among Chinese factions, riots, and demonstrations in Shanghai. The Nationalist attack on Hankow brings the landing of American forces to protect U.S. citizens. U.S. naval forces land after Nationalist forces capture Kiukiang. Fighting in Shanghai leads to an increase in U.S. forces. In March, a naval guard is stationed at the Consulate in Nanking. U.S. and British destroyers later use shell fire to protect Americans and other foreign nationals. U.S. forces land to protect American interests during the Japanese occupation of Shanghai. U.S. Marines land at Foochow to protect the American consulate. 50,000 U.S. Marines are sent to North China to bolster the approximately 60,000 U.S. forces remaining in China at the end of World War II. Their intent is to assist in disarming Chinese and Japanese soldiers. U.S. Marines are dispatched to Nanking to protect the American embassy after the city fell to communist troops, and to Shanghai to aid in the protection and evacuation of Americans. Pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions, the U.S. sends troops to aid in the defense of South Korea. Troops eventually number over 300,000 by the last year of the war, with over 36,600 KIA.
Page 29 YEAR 1950– 1955
LOCATION Formosa (Taiwan)
1954– 1955 1962
China
1962– 1975 1964– 1973
Laos
1970
Cambodia
1975
Vietnam Evacuation
1975
Cambodia Evacuation
1975
South Vietnam
1975
Cambodia—The Mayaguez Incident
1976
Korea
1989
Philippines
Thailand
Vietnamese War
DESCRIPTION President Truman orders the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent communist Chinese attacks upon Formosa and Chinese Nationalist operations against mainland China. Naval units evacuate U.S. civilians and military personnel from the Tachen Islands. The 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit lands to support Thailand during the threat of external communist pressure. The U.S. plays an active role in supporting anti communist forces in Laos. U.S. military advisers are increased in number as the position of the South Vietnamese government weakens. After the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964, President Johnson steps up U.S. presence in the country. By April of 1969, 543,000 U.S. troops are present in Vietnam. U.S. troops are sent to Cambodia to clean out communist sanctuaries from which Viet Cong and North Vietnamese fomes are conducting operations. President Ford sends U.S. naval vessels, helicopters, and Marines to assist in the evacuation of refugees and American nationals from Vietnam. President Ford sends U.S. military forces to proceed with a planned evacuation of U.S. citizens from Cambodia. President Ford reports that a force of 70 helicopters and 865 Marines has evacuated about 1,400 U.S. citizens and 5,500 foreign nationals and South Vietnamese from landing zones near the U.S. Embassy and Tan Son Nhut Airfield. President Ford reports that he has ordered military forces to retake the S.S. Mayaguez, a memhant vessel en route from Hong Kong to Thailand when set upon by Cambodian naval forces. Additional forces are sent to Korea after two American personnel were killed while in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. President Bush reports that U.S. fighter planes from Clark Air Base have assisted the Aquino government in repelling a coup attempt. 100 Marines were sent from the U.S. Navy base at Subic Bay to protect the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
Page 30 many of its endeavors. It eschewed extensive contact with the states of Europe whenever possible, except in trade, and sought to establish itself as the dominant authority within the Western Hemisphere, at least to the extent that it would be able to conduct its business without “outside” interference from powers on the other side of the Atlantic. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine served to formalize this isolationist trend in U.S. governmental policy. The British, for their part, were perfectly willing to aid in the cause of American isolationism with the installation of the cordon sanitaire imposed by a Royal Navy still annoyed with the young country’s impudence. U.S. merchants were pushing for an expansion of trade into different areas of the world, including Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The mercantilist practices of other nations, especially Great Britain, created great pressures for the U.S. to do the same. Further, the U.S. intended to protect those interests it had developed, since competition with the economically dominant British was of significant concern. In 1817, President Monroe established a precedent for the use of force in protecting the nation’s interests and punishing foreign powers or populations who had in some fashion run afoul of the U.S. This policy initially took root when Seminole Indian raiding parties penetrated into U.S. territory from Spanish Florida. Monroe ordered thengeneral Andrew Jackson to pursue the raiders back into Spanishheld territory, which the latter subsequently did. This act also had implications not only for U.S. foreign policy, but for presidentialcongressional relations, since Monroe gave his order to Jackson without first notifying Congress of his intentions to invade the sovereign territory of another state. Congress, however, made no adverse response to Monroe’s actions since it was commonly thought that the president possessed the power to act in the immediate defense of the U.S. and its interests. Thus, the reactionary “doctrine of hot pursuit” was born. Ultimately, this doctrine, with its core philosophy of protecting U.S. interests, was to become the cornerstone of the nation’s policy in nearly all cases when American citizens or property were threatened by foreign forces. Andrew Jackson, after becoming president, further legitimized the doctrine by sending a U.S. naval ship to Argentina in order to protect American merchant ships from native raiders in the area. Unlike Monroe, however, Jackson soon after informed Congress of his actions and requested approval. Congress took no steps to disapprove of Jackson’s conduct and thus further embedded the presidential prerogative for the use of military force without a congressional declaration of war. Following these instances, there would be an increasing number of cases where presidents were to authorize the use of force to protect American interests, especially in cases where the U.S. faced a substantially weaker foe and therefore little threat of retaliation. Unlike the U.S. position on Europe at the time, the lack of a formalized policy on Asia and the Pacific during the 19th century left the doctrine of hot pursuit as the only viable guide for presidents and their advisors when the need arose to defend American interests. This position of the U.S. in Asia and the Pacific
Page 31 was laid out formally in 1854 by J. C. Dobbin, then Secretary of the Navy, in a communiqué to the commander of the U.S. Squadron in the Pacific Ocean. Dobbin wrote that the American Navy should protect the rights and the property of Americans all over the globe. In most cases when force was used by the U.S., save for events leading to the opening of Japan and the eventual annexation of Hawaii, the government would follow what amounted to a reactionary foreign policy in regard to this region of the world. Typically, this reaction took the form of either punitive attacks against native populations, such as burning villages, or the use of force to directly protect American interests from actual or potential harm. From 1832 until 1871 there were twelve instances where the U.S. utilized military force in direct retaliation against native populations for attacks on American citizens or property. In most cases this use occurred for depredations against American shipping or citizens living in trading communities throughout the region. Events in Sumatra in 1832 and again in 1838–1839 are typical of these retaliatory cases. In 1832, U.S. naval forces attacked a native fortification in the town of Quallah Battoo in order to punish the indigenous population for plundering the American ship Friendship. In the latter instance, U.S. naval forces once again landed to punish the native population for attacks against American shipping in the area. The last of these clearly punitive attacks took place in 1871 on the Korean Peninsula when an American naval force attacked and captured five fortifications in order to punish native Koreans for depredations against U.S. citizens in the region and, especially, for murdering the crew of the schooner General Sherman and burning their ship. Since the U.S. did not have a regular military presence in the hemisphere, the use of retaliatory strikes was seen as a proper deterrent against future transgressions. This strategy was, of course, problematic since a regular visible presence is usually required in order to assure deterrence. Thus, while the use of force solely to punish native transgressions did drop off, the actual number of incidents between Americans and native populations began to increase, forcing the U.S. to adopt a somewhat more consistent policy of ongoing protection rather than discrete instances of punishment. Within twelve years of the first use of retaliatory force, it became increasingly necessary for the military to be used in a protective capacity, given the problems associated with simple retaliation as a tool of policy in the region. Therefore, from the first instance when force was used protectively in 1843 through 1900, the U.S. utilized military force nineteen times to protect American lives and property in the region, while retaliatory force was used only eight times during the same period. The first clear instance of the U.S. using force in a protective fashion occurred in 1843 with the landing of American sailors and marines in Canton, China following the outbreak of hostilities between U.S. citizens and native Chinese at a trading post. As the level of U.S. trade with Asia began to increase during the 19th century, the number of Americans living and working in the region also rose. Such a buildup in foreign populations inevitably led to contact with an expanding number of native inhabitants, and given the general
Page 32 lack in knowledge of foreign customs and practices among both groups, it was clear that continuing problems would arise. The U.S. was therefore forced to actively protect American citizens and their property, as opposed to simply showing up to punish transgressors following an altercation. It is also worth noting that continued dominance of the European powers in the region placed some restrictions on U.S. contact with the natives and, in fact, most of the notable instances when the U.S. utilized the military in Asia and the Pacific were either constrained to islands of relatively limited value to the European powers or took place in relatively discrete instances. The U.S. did not have any intention of becoming involved in an imbroglio with any European nation over territories in the region, especially since sentiment among most Americans was clearly opposed to anything approaching the traditional imperialism of the British, Dutch, or French. This sentiment tended to prevent U.S. presidents from initiating policies that might have the effect of making them appear as if their administrations held any “European” imperial pretensions. The general feeling of antiimperialism in the U.S. was perhaps a key part of the reason why the country failed to develop a longterm coherent Asia/Pacific foreign policy and would, in fact, shape the course of U.S. involvement in the region well into the 20th century. THE 20TH CENTURY: EXPANDING THE U.S. SPHERE OF INFLUENCE At the end of the Civil War, exports from the U.S. increased dramatically, while tariffs on imports of finished goods remained high. This practice (similar to British mercantilism of the 18th and early 19th centuries), combined with the availability of massive deposits of natural resources and large swaths of arable land, made the U.S. the largest global producer of manufactured goods in the world. The eventual result of U.S. ‘‘hyperproduction” at the start of the 20th century would lead to a fundamental change in foreign and trade policies affecting the entire global distribution of resources. However, at the end of the 19th century the U.S. focused the majority of its trade on Europe and Latin America, while Asia and the Pacific received only a small fraction. As such, while the U.S. retained a significant policy interest in this region of the world, it did not focus the kind of energy that was reserved for the former two regions. In fact, by the time the SpanishAmerican War broke out in 1898, few members of President McKinley’s inner circle of advisors were able to provide knowledgeable policy advice to the president. The beginning of the 20th century also saw a general evolution in American foreign policy and the use of military force. No longer did the U.S. base its policy on the use of simplistic retaliatory strikes, but rather it employed more advanced strategies. The interventions of the new century were infused with more complex policy objectives that, in many cases, went somewhat beyond the situation immediately at hand. This new development involved the beginnings
Page 33 of what would eventually become the growth of a “moralistic” foreign policy unique to the U.S. The isolation of the U.S. for the better part of the 19th century had in significant part led to the development of a certain sense of American ethical, and perhaps racial, supremacy over other cultures and peoples. This, quite naturally, evolved into a notion of a “manifest destiny” for the country and its people which became firmly embedded within U.S. foreign policy by the McKinley and, especially, the Roosevelt administrations. When all of the cases where the U.S. has used force in Asia and the Pacific during the 20th century are examined, one pattern becomes clear. Discounting World War II, military force was used to protect American interests and property, and usually involved rather complex situations where the nation had a clear interest in maintaining both a presence (military and civilian) and some control over the region in question. The first of these instances beyond the example of Hawaii is Samoa in 1899. A small group of islands in the South Pacific, Europeans first made contact with the islands in 1722. In 1872 the U.S. reached an agreement with the native population to use Pago Pago Bay, on the island of Tutuila, as a naval station and shortly thereafter trading rights were established. In 1899 the U.S. and Germany agreed to split the islands, with the U.S. obtaining the major island of Tutuila and several others. In that same year, a combined group of American and British military forces intervened to both protect national interests on the islands and take part in stabilizing the indigenous political situation. In other words, this meant that the U.S. utilized military force to pacify the islands and assert firm control over the territory. In that same year the U.S. used the SpanishAmerican War to establish itself in the Philippine Islands, which had been a traditional Spanish territory. THE POSTWAR PERIOD In a drastic sea change from only a few short years prior to the onset of the Cold War, the use of force by the U.S. in Asia became a tool of one specific policy designed to stop the spread of Soviet, and eventually Chinese, communism. This did not mean, however, that policy makers in the U.S. reached a sudden clear understanding of Asia that had been lacking for the previous 100 years. In fact, it would take another twenty years for the U.S. to begin to develop the experience needed to achieve both a broader and deeper understanding of the region and its people. While in the 20th century the U.S. had resorted to military force for protective reasons, outside of wartime, its application in the postwar period would almost entirely be in the service of the keystone Cold War policy of containment enshrined in the 1947 declaration known as the Truman Doctrine. This declaration, while intended to state an overarching direction for all U.S. foreign policy, would be the first application of a comprehensive American policy in Asia. Further, in a fundamental break with the prewar policies, which had been largely reactionary, the policy of containment would be proactive. It would drive the U.S. to link the use of military force
Page 34 with the effort to reduce the spread of communism and, therefore, the need to support foreign governments whose interests coincided with those of the U.S., and oppose those governments whose interests differed. A proactive foreign policy in Asia would also drive Washington to directly interfere in the internal workings of sovereign states and utilize its military power to prop up a variety of regimes, from democracies (rarely) to military autocracies (more commonly). In the end, the policy of containment meant that the U.S. had at long last taken on a global outlook and the exercise of power politics (although Washington’s actions continued to be couched in moral terms) and rejected isolationism as a way of existence. The first use of American military force in Asia during the postwar period took place in China in 1948, although this was not yet in furtherance of the Truman Doctrine. In this year the brewing communist revolution, instigated and led by Mao Zedong, erupted into open conflict with the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kaishek’s Kuomintang government. At first the communist forces took control of the countryside while the Nationalists retained the cities. But the tide was quickly turning as the Nationalist government was discredited with much of the poor peasant population which fueled Mao’s communist forces. By late 1948 all of the northern territories and Beijing had fallen to Mao and, after a massive battle at Xuzhou in 1949, Chiang Kaishek and his supporters were forced to flee to the island of Taiwan. It was at the time of this revolutionary struggle that the U.S. was compelled to utilize force to protect American citizens from the fighting. During the conflict, Washington lent support to the Nationalist government but, unwilling to remobilize the armed forces so soon after the end of World War II, the fighting was left up to the indigenous troops with the presence of American “military advisors” to aid in directing the hostilities. Even had the U.S. actively engaged in the conflict, the outcome may have remained uncertain. The general consensus among U.S. State Department officials and military officers present in China was that the Nationalist forces were poorly trained, had inadequate leadership, and largely disintegrated during engagements with the communist armies. Regardless of their desire to see a democratic and proAmerican China, the Truman administration was not willing, nor were the American people, to engage in an entirely new conflict that would tax an exhausted nation. Given both the domestic political considerations and the task of rebuilding after the war in Europe and Japan, the U.S. pulled out of China and left Mao to consolidate his hold on the mainland. The most the U.S. would guarantee was ongoing economic and military support to the now exiled Kuomintang in Taiwan and the official recognition of that government as ‘‘China” on the United Nations Security Council. In the years following the World War II, Japan had become a protectorate of the U.S. and military planners considered the island nation as strategically important to U.S. efforts in staving off Soviet communism as they did Western Europe. With the new threat of a Chinese communist state, Japan now served a dual purpose; it would become both a model democratic state in the region
Page 35 and a staging ground and supply base for U.S. forces in Asia. It would be put to good use in this latter role. The first of the “hot wars” that dotted the history of the Cold War started with the Korean conflict of 1950. This was to become the first of the proxy conflicts for which the Cold War was infamous. In these conflicts, one or both of the antagonistic superpowers would engage other nations to do their fighting for them. In this manner the Soviet Union and the U.S. were able to spread their respective influence on a global basis without necessarily coming into direct conflict, the dangers of such contact between the nuclear powers being obvious to most observers. In Korea, the U.S. had engaged the Japanese forces during World War II from the south and worked their way toward the north, while the Soviets had moved in from the north and worked their way southward. The peninsula was eventually divided at the 38th parallel with the Stalinist puppet regime of Kim Il Sung established in the north and the U.S.backed regime of Syngman Rhee in the south, both of which were declared within a month of one another in 1948. The fateful invasion of South Korea by forces from the north instigated a conflict that would last from 1950 through 1953, and bring into play a multinational force largely dominated by the U.S. While the conflict may have had a swift resolution after General Douglas MacArthur had pushed the North Koreans to the Chinese border, the sudden and unexpected intervention of the latter nation in late 1950 extended the war and led to a mere standoff rather than victory for the U.S. The U.S. understood that the surprise invasion from the north could not have taken place without significant Soviet support, and therefore saw the conflict as a test of its ability to contain the spread of communism throughout Asia. Further, if the U.S. did not actively engage in pushing the North Koreans out of the South, the nation’s credibility would be seriously, perhaps fatally, damaged, while at the same time rewarding present and encouraging future Soviet aggression. Such a loss of credibility might even be enough to push other nations in the region, some teetering on the verge of communist revolutions, over the edge. This collection of seemingly logical possibilities eventually became known as the domino theory: if the U.S. were to allow one nation to fall to communism, then others were sure to follow. To further complicate matters in the region during the initial years of the Cold War, the U.S. was forced to maintain a military presence in and around the Kuomintang retreat of Taiwan. From 1950 until 1955 the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet was stationed in Taiwanese waters to diffuse the ongoing military hostilities between the Mainland People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Nationalist government on the island. While this round of overt hostilities eventually ended in 1955, the Taiwanese and the PRC continued to antagonize one another throughout the entirety of the Cold War, making this ongoing conflict a destabilizing flashpoint in the region. In 1953 the U.S. and Taiwan signed a treaty of mutual defense in which Washington pledged to guarantee the security of the island nation. For its part of the bargain, the Nationalist government agreed to restrain itself and not provoke the PRC into aggressive actions. This did not
Page 36 stop the communist regime from acting the provocateur on occasion by shelling Taiwan, but it did ultimately result in a reduction of outright violence between the two parties. It also created a longterm commitment whereby the U.S. would maintain a military presence in the region of Taiwan. INDOCHINA The Asia policy of the U.S. was, at the end of the 1950s, focused primarily on preventing the spread of communism in the region. In July of 1962, U.S. forces were used to support native troops in Thailand following incursions from communist guerrillas into the country and, beginning in that same year, forces were sent to Laos to actively engage in antiguerrilla operations in that country. Many of the conservative local regimes throughout Indochina were suffering from some form of communist insurgency and the U.S. increasingly found itself engaging in what many have described as a creeping war in the region. By 1962, the U.S. military was already flying the nowinfamous defoliation missions into disputed territory in the noman’sland between North and South Vietnam. In 1964 the South Vietnamese government had come under increasing difficulties and Washington was forced to increase the amount of military aid to the country, including upping the number of socalled military advisors that were training the local military, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). At this point the main enemy of concern was the Viet Cong (VC), a guerrilla organization supported by the North Vietnamese government. The VC largely consisted of insurgents, many of whom were peasants who had gone to the north during the earlier conflict, and who were intent on disrupting South Vietnam through any means possible, including political assassination, terrorist actions, and attacks on military units. Direct confrontation between the U.S. and North Vietnam eventually took place in 1964 when the U.S.S. Maddox was attacked by North Vietnamese gunboats. The Maddox, however, was operating in North Vietnamese waters and supporting South Vietnamese operations against the North. As such, it was a legitimate target. However, this attack, and another against the C. Turner Joy convinced President Johnson to openly engage North Vietnam, which he did the following day by ordering U.S. aircraft carrier strikes against naval and other targets in the North. At the end of 1964, U.S. personnel in Vietnam numbered over 23,000, with 147 killed in action and over 1,000 wounded in action. By mid1965 there were over 95,000 U.S. soldiers in the country and more engaged in operations (some legal and some not) in surrounding nations. U.S. troops continued to increase in number and their operations extended throughout the region. By late 1967, American commanders felt they had made progress toward defeating the Viet Cong. However, the infamous Tet Offensive in January 1968 proved them quite wrong. Both the VC and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regular troops dealt a devastating blow to both American and South Vietnamese forces throughout South Vietnam and the war quickly became a politically lethal quagmire for the U.S. Even though the VC were virtually wiped out in the offensive and the NVA had to assume general
Page 37 command of the war, the war had taken on a new cast. The American people now understood that victory would elude them and that Washington had badly underestimated the enemy. It spurred the nascent antiwar effort on to new heights and virtually put an end to President Johnson’s credibility. In retrospect, the Tet Offensive was clearly the Johnson administration’s Dienbienphu. In 1972 the Nixon administration signed the Paris peace accord that called for the removal of U.S. troops from the country and a cessation of hostilities between Washington and North Vietnam. Apart from the treaty, Nixon promised continuing U.S. financial and military aid to South Vietnam, but following his resignation when the final invasion of the NVA pushed southward, the Ford administration failed to lend that support and the South was soon overwhelmed. On April 3, 1975, President Ford authorized the evacuation of the American embassy in Saigon and on April 12 he authorized the evacuation of American citizens in Cambodia, thus putting and end to over fifteen years of direct U.S. intervention in the region. However, the war in Vietnam had a great effect on U.S. policy in Asia, years before the conflict itself ended. President Lyndon Johnson, captivated by the war, lost his policy direction at home and therefore his job, and his replacement, Richard Nixon, took a somewhat different view of the conflict and the region. While Nixon at first escalated the conflict and pushed it further into neighboring nations, he and his key foreign policy advisor, Henry Kissinger, eventually began to rethink the role of military force in the region. Both believed that the goal of containment remained valid and was necessary to prevent the spread of communism, but Kissinger recognized what his predecessors either did not or were unwilling to, that China was perhaps more important as a potential ally than as an antagonist. Further, Kissinger understood that military intervention might be supplanted by concerted policy initiatives designed to stabilize relations between the U.S. and its communist foes. The Nixon administration therefore turned containment into a policy of engagement from one of confrontation, and the era of détente was born. With the end of the Vietnamese War, U.S. policy in Asia had turned a corner. Washington was to use overt military force in Asia on only one occasion following the war. In December of 1989, President Bush dispatched a squadron of U.S. fighter jets to assist the Filipino government in repelling a coup attempt, while a squad of 100 Marines was sent from the Subic Bay military base to protect American lives at the U.S. embassy in Manila. However, at this point the Cold War was drawing to a close and Washington’s policy imperatives were changing. Containment, in any form, was no longer a unifying force for America’s Asia policy and as such the U.S. had to redefine how it would approach this area of the world. THE POST–COLD WAR PERIOD: THE FUTURE OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION During the first term of Clinton’s administration, the president clearly lived up to his campaign rhetoric as he focused most of his attention on domestic
Page 38 policy matters. Some argue that this focus has allowed U.S. commitments in Asia to drift. The U.S. did, however, retain a greater degree of leadership in Asia than some other regions, if for no other reason than the necessity of offsetting the ability of China to bully its regional neighbors and keeping a close watch on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The Clinton administration has yet to take into account the uniqueness of Asia, both in its own right and in terms of American interests. The growing military and economic power of China, in particular, presents numerous difficulties for the U.S., yet both policy advisors and policy makers are unable to derive a coherent and comprehensive framework for dealing with one of the world’s most populous and powerful nations. As one possible solution to a fragmented Asia policy, former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and others have suggested the establishment of an Asian security organization, similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), that would link various nations together with the U.S. in a collective security arrangement in order to halt this policy drift. It is demonstrably clear that, given the growing importance of Asia to the U.S., there is an imperative need for a new and advanced policy to replace that which was lost with the end of the Cold War. While the Clinton administration has developed a more aggressive foreign policy stance in general, it remains unfocused at best and has a tendency to generate hostility among foreign nations at worst. Not surprisingly, China has acted as one of the key critics of American arrogance which, along with U.S. allegations that the PRC has engaged in a number of duplicitous activities within the U.S., including tampering with elections and stealing nuclear secrets, has driven an atmosphere of tension in relations between the two countries. Besides China, the U.S. has also to consider several other pertinent issues, including the ailing Japanese economy, the ascension of India and Pakistan to the nuclear club, and the continuing tensions between North and South Korea. Several of these have the potential for generating conflict, yet it is somewhat difficult to make predictions about when or how the U.S. might choose to utilize military force in order to accomplish its policy goals. In large part this is true because, while the U.S. has begun to take a more aggressive stance in general, it no longer possesses a clear, comprehensive set of policy goals for the region. Washington has not necessarily returned to a purely reactionary policy, yet its present stance certainly has lost the degree of proactiveness common during the Cold War. Perhaps the present situation is best described as one where U.S. Asia policy contains elements of both trends, a proactivereactive policy. Issues with regard to North Korean nuclear technology or the Chinese claim on democratic Taiwan might drive the U.S. to intervene in discrete cases, as it has in the past, yet the benefits of such intervention do not paint a clear longterm picture. Washington has proven that it is willing to stand up to powers in the region, most notably in the case of China and Taiwan, but none of these incidents have resulted in open conflict. Instead the U.S. has made threatening shows of force, similar to the deterrent practices
Page 39 of 150 years ago. However, this kind of an approach can be precarious, especially when one is dealing with a relatively unpredictable adversary such as North Korea. In this case a reactionary policy will not serve to address the longterm issues at stake. Similarly, while economic growth in Asia has been phenomenal, to say the least, recent downturns have led to political troubles in several key nations, especially Indonesia. Such difficulties may spur the U.S. to utilize military power to protect American lives and property, but a more comprehensive policy position might be able to address issues peacefully, before violence breaks out, or at least aid in predicting when it might occur and therefore allow time to safely remove American citizens from harm’s way. More recently there has been debate over the creation of a missile shield that would theoretically prevent nuclear or other missiles from hitting targets either within the continental U.S. or wherever the antimissile system might be located. Those advocating such a system have already suggested establishing the first of these of yet untested shields over the U.S. and its Asian allies, thus highlighting the importance of this region of the world for U.S. policy. Whether the vision of a regional or “trans hemispheric” collective security organization, an AsiaU.S. missile shield, or some other arrangement ever become reality, there is little doubt the U.S. will have to devise a robust and comprehensive replacement for the policy of containment that can serve as a new driving force for U.S. relations with Asia into the 21st century. See China; Hawaii; Japan; Perry, Commodore Matthew C.; Philippines; Russia. FOR FURTHER READING Addleman, William C. 1939. History of the United States Army in Hawaii, 1846–1939. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute. Addleman, William C. 1993. History of the United States Army, rev. ed. Temecola, CA: Reprint Services Corporation. Calleo, David P. 1998. “A New Era of Overstretch? American Policy in Europe and Asia.” World Policy Journal 15:11–25. Center of Military History. 1989. American Military History. Washington, DC: United States Army & U.S. Government Printing Office. Clodfelter, Michael. 1995. Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars, 1772–1991. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company. Dennett, Tyler. 1925. Roosevelt and the RussoJapanese War. New York: Doubleday, Page and Company. Dixon, Joe C., ed. 1980. The American Military and the Far East. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Eckes, Alfred E., Jr. 1995. Opening America’s Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Furber, Holden. 1976. Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600–1800. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Huntington, Samuel. 1999. ‘‘The Lonely Superpower.” Foreign Affairs 78:35–49. Kennedy, Paul. 1987. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Vintage Books, Random House.
Page 40 Meyer, Milton W. Asia: A Concise History. 1997. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Spanier, John, and Steven W. Hook. 1998. American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 14th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. Sutherland, Ian. 1990. Conflict in Indo China. South Melbourne, Australia: Thomas Nelson. Taylor, Paul B. 1938. “America’s Role in the Far Eastern Conflict.” Foreign Policy Reports 13:278–88. Thomas, Ann Van Wynen, and A. J. Thomas, Jr. 1982. WarMaking Powers of the President: Constitutional and International Law Aspects. Dallas, TX: SMU Press. Walker, William O. III. 1991. Opium and Foreign Policy: The AngloAmerican Search for Order in Asia, 1912–1954. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. James Heasley
Media; Public Opinion. FOR FURTHER READING Fiske, Susan, and Shelley Taylor. 1991. Social Cognition, 2d ed. New York: McGrawHill. McGraw, Kathleen, and Milton Lodge. 1995. ‘‘Information Processing Approaches to the Study of Political Judgment.” In Political Judgment: Structure and Process, ed. M. Lodge and K. M. McGraw. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Tyler, Tom. 1982. “Personalization in Attributing Responsibility for National Problems to the President.” Political Behavior 4:379–99. Jill Glathar
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B Middle East. FOR FURTHER READING Cleveland, William L. 1994. A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Lenczowski, George. 1990. American Presidents and the Middle East. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Spiegel, Steven L. 1985. The Other ArabIsraeli Conflict. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ahmed H. Ibrahim
Latin America and the Caribbean. FOR FURTHER READING Hastedt, Glenn. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Langley, Lester D. 1989. America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Page 42 Smith, Peter H. 1996. Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.Latin American Relations. New York: Oxford University Press. James Henson
Multilateralism; Yugoslavia. FOR FURTHER READING Pugh, Michael, ed. 1997. The UN, Peace and Force. Essex, England: Frank Cass. Ruggie, John Gerard. 1996. The United Nations and Collective Use of Force: Whither—or Whether? New York: United Nations Association. United Nations. 1996. The Blue Helmets. New York: United Nations. Weiss, Thomas G., David Forsythe, and Roger Coate. 1997. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Foreign Policy Decision Making; Rational Choice. FOR FURTHER READING Faber, Jan. 1990. “On Bounded Rationality and the Framing of Decisions in International Relations: Towards a Dynamic Network Model of World Politics.” Journal of Peace Research 27:307–19. Geva, Nehemia, and Alex Mintz, eds. 1997. Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Page 43 Kato, Junko. 1996. “Institutions and Rationality in Politics: Three Varieties of Neoinstitutionalists.” British Journal of Political Science 26:553–82. Simon, Herbert. 1957. Models of Man. New York: John Wiley. Singer, Eric, and Valerie Hudson, eds. 1992. Political Psychology and Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. 1990. The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Steven B. Redd
BOXER REBELLION—The Boxer Rebellion occurred in Northern China in 1900. The rebellion was the climactic event in the Chinese movement aimed at halting the spread of the Western and Japanese cultures into the nation during the late 19th century. The movement was begun by the Yihequan (Righteous and Harmonious Fists), a Chinese secret society originally affiliated with the White Locus sect, who opposed China’s Manchu rulers. The society was given its nickname, the Boxers, by Westerners because group members practiced gymnastics and calisthenics. The Boxers began their open condemnation of the spread of Western culture in China during the 1890s. The rebellion began in 1900 when the Boxers started to destroy anything that fostered foreign culture. They burned houses, churches, and schools. They killed over 200 foreigners and missionaries as well as Chinese Christians and anyone who supported foreign ideas. Foreign diplomats in Beijing responded by calling for troops, which caused China’s Manchu government to declare war on those foreign nations. The Boxers later seized foreign legations, or the official residences of the diplomats, and held them from June 21 to August 14, 1900. Finally, an eightnation rescue force, which had come to aid the foreigners and Chinese Christians, ended the rebellion. The Boxer Protocol, signed by the Manchu government and leaders of eleven other nations on September 7, 1901, marked the official settlement of the rebellion. The provisions of the agreement required China to punish or execute a number of officials, destroy numerous forts, and pay approximately $330 million (U.S. funds) in damages. However, several years later, the U.S., Great Britain, and Japan all returned a portion of the money to China, which it used for education. See Asia and the Pacific; China. FOR FURTHER READING Keay, John. 1997. Empire’s End: A History of the Far East from High Colonialism to Hong Kong. New York: Scribner. Meyer, Milton W. 1997. Asia: A Concise History. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Sara Jezewski
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL—The bureaucratic politics model posits that individuals within a decisionmaking group tend to argue for positions in keeping with their bureaucratic predispositions. Furthermore, the resultant
Page 44 policy is more a product of bargaining along these bureaucratic lines than it is the sum of rational, wellreasoned calculations and deliberation. For example, some have argued that the decision to attempt a forceful rescue of the Americans held hostage in Iran in 1979–1980 was the result of the bureaucratic infighting between Brzezinski, who represented the ‘‘hawks” and the defense establishment, and Vance, who represented the “doves” and the State Department. See Foreign Policy Decision Making; Rational Choice. FOR FURTHER READING Allison, Graham. 1969. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” American Political Science Review 63:689–718. Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2d ed. New York: Longman. Halperin, Morton. 1974. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Hilsman, Roger. 1993. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics, 3d ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Holland, Lauren. 1999. “The U.S. Decision to Launch Operation Desert Storm: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis.” Armed Forces and Society 25:219–42. Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith. 1986. “Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making.” British Journal of Political Science 16:269–86. Rhodes, Edward. 1947. “Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the U.S. Navy.” World Politics 47:1–41. Steven B. Redd
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C Middle East. FOR FURTHER READING Carter, Jimmy. 1982. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York: Bantam Books. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Spiegel, Steven L. 1985. The Other ArabIsraeli Conflict. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ahmed H. Ibrahim
CHINA—China was an area where the U.S. wished to gain a foothold for trading purposes during the 19th century. The European presence in China had slowly escalated until the first treaty settlement in 1844 granted extensive trading rights to the British and opened a number of ports for general trade (part of this settlement granted Hong Kong to the British in perpetuity). In the same year the U.S. also signed an agreement with the Chinese that was, if anything, more generous for America than the Japanese treaty several years hence. The Treaty of 1844 allowed Americans in China to acquire rights beyond those that were provided to the general Chinese population and made no provision for reciprocal trade with the U.S. With open trading ports, foreign merchants from several
Page 46 nations significantly increased their presence in the country and established the socalled Open Door to China. Difficulties between American citizens involved in trading and the native Chinese brought interventions from U.S. forces on a number of occasions. However, unlike the rather simplistic retaliatory interventions that characterized the U.S. experience with native populations in other parts of Asia, the U.S. usually brought in its military to act in a protective capacity for American citizens during periods of general unrest. In all but three instances when the U.S. used military force in China, from 1843 until the last in 1954–1955 (see Asia and the Pacific, Table 1), the U.S. would use its troops in a protective capacity. The first of these two exceptions took place in 1856 when American troops were put ashore to protect American interests during hostilities between the British and the Chinese. However, while engaged in the protection of American lives and property, the military took the opportunity to avenge an assault by native Chinese against a vessel flying the U.S. flag. The second retaliatory instance occurred in 1866. The American Consul to the city of Newchang was assaulted by Chinese nationals, and U.S. troops were then sent to punish those responsible. The last instance of reprisal took place in 1867 on the island of Formosa (Taiwan). While the application of force in this instance was not directed at the mainland, the historical links between the island and mainland Chinese—not to mention the current status of the island—make a linkage in this case appropriate. On Formosa a U.S. naval force landed and burned a group of native village huts as a punishment for the murder of seamen from a wrecked American vessel. Yet, while these three cases represent clear instances when force was used in a directly punitive manner, the U.S. certainly did not refrain from using its military as a tool of policy, under the guise of protection, throughout its period of engagement with China. Through the end of the 19th century, the U.S. was to officially use military force in China a total of no less than ten times. However, the number of “unofficial” uses may in actuality have been quite a bit higher during the same period. In the early 20th century, the U.S. used force in China in more instances prior to World War II (fourteen specific recorded instances) than it did in any other country or territory in the region. Complicating matters in Asia at the turn of the century was the SinoJapanese War, which had broken out in 1894 when the two countries fell into conflict over the Korean peninsula. Victory in this struggle handily went to the Japanese who, by this time, possessed modern military forces, including an increasingly formidable naval fleet. However, the Japanese victory over the Chinese and the harsh terms imposed by the victors also made clear that Japan was becoming a power to be reckoned with in the region. In one way the war showcased the amazing technological advances that Japan had made in so few decades, while in another it created a new and more complex situation for the U.S. U.S. policy makers, had they been paying closer attention, might have seen the Japanese advance into Korea as a precursor to a new imperial expansion that would turn the previously isolationist country into one of the great military powers of the early 20th century. The lack of experience
Page 47 in Asia exhibited by the U.S. was telling, however, as other Western powers were quick to take advantage of the weakened Chinese following the SinoJapanese War, and many demanded the cession of additional territory and rights in finance and trade. The U.S., for its part, was concerned for its reciprocal trade agreements couched under the Open Door policy (a historically amorphous approach to China), and requested that the European powers and Japan freeze their spheres of influence in China so as to preserve what little sovereign integrity the Chinese had remaining. The Europeans and the Japanese paid only minor lip service to the American requests and did not fundamentally alter their positions. Ultimately, the constant loss of territory and prestige combined with inept and corrupt leadership could only result in the eventual end of the ruling Manchu dynasty. The virtual collapse of Chinese sovereignty under the weight of the imperial powers by the end of the 19th century led to increasing unrest among the native population. Foreigners became the target of both derision and in some cases violence. In 1900, this popular discontent was given expression in what became known as the Boxer Rebellion. The Boxers, part of an 18thcentury secret society, led the revolt initially against the Manchu leadership; however, their energies were soon turned against the foreign elements largely due to the intervention of the dowager empress Cixi, who had emerged as the de facto ruler of China from the mid1870s until her death in 1908. The dowager empress represented conservative forces among the governing elites, who were largely opposed to the cultural invasion of the various foreign elements in China. The Boxers staged attacks at the Legation Quarter in the capital, killed several diplomats and missionaries, and desecrated foreign cemeteries. The reply of the Western powers was to utilize combined military force to break the Boxer siege of the city. The McKinley administration sent a round of Open Door dispatches (referred to as Open Door Notes) to the Western powers and Japan indicating the U.S. policy of seeking to maintain present Chinese territorial rights and sovereign authority while promoting peaceful trade and the maintenance of treaty rights. However, the administration was also interested in limiting the scope of the conflict and protecting American lives and property. In support of the latter objective, the McKinley administration, for the first time, committed U.S. troops to a multinational action outside of the Western Hemisphere, intended to put an end to a foreign rebellion. Beginning on May 24, 1900, a force of U.S. troops joined allied regiments to put down the Boxer uprising. Direct military action ended on September 28, but a permanent garrison force was thereafter maintained at Peking (Beijing) to protect against future similar scenarios. The aftermath of the conflict resulted in the Boxer Protocol which laid out an extensive group of demands upon the Chinese, including a formal apology for the death of foreign diplomats. The demands also included an attack on the very nature of Chinese Confucian society by suspending the civil service exam for five years in provinces where rebellions took place, the posting of edicts outlawing the harassment of foreigners, a prohibition on the Chinese man
Page 48 ufacture of munitions, and millions in war reparations paid to the allies. The end result of the conflict, then, was the near collapse of Chinese sovereignty. The period following the Boxer Rebellion did not, however, reduce the role of the U.S. or the application of American military force in China. Within ten years the U.S. once again found itself utilizing its military to protect the lives of American citizens in China, this time during the early stages of the perhaps inevitable nationalist revolution that erupted as Manchu leadership became increasingly insular and unresponsive to the people. On October 10, the League of Common Alliances, a militant organization intent on removing the last vestiges of the failing imperial system, instigated an uprising in Wuhan. This soon spread to other territories throughout the country and, before the end of that year, a Nationalist council had been formed which soon thereafter selected a provisional president of the new Republic of China. The Manchu dynasty attempted to regain control, but by early February of 1912 it was clear the situation was hopeless. On February 12, the Imperial Military sided with the revolutionary Nationalists and the Chinese dynastic system, after 4,000 years, came to an abrupt end. The new Republic of China was not in any way more stable than the previous system and, in fact, was perhaps a great deal less so. It was besieged with warring internal factions and external difficulties. In 1912, the future ruling Kuomintang party was founded in the southern provinces as an alternative to the northern Nationalist government, while throughout the outlying provincial regions various warlords commanded localized power with loyalty to none but themselves. The U.S. could no longer rely on dealing with one governing authority, which made the maintenance of a single China policy nearly impossible. From 1912 through the beginning of World War II the use of military force as an instrument of policy became a near constant for many players on the Chinese stage, including the U.S. In fact, it is not particularly useful to break out specific instances when force was used, since the ongoing general chaos led to a fairly regular level of U.S. intervention through the decades leading up to World War II. The U.S., at this point, still did not necessarily have a clear policy agenda in China, or in the entire Asian region for that matter. During the 1930s, the Roosevelt administration was not focused on events in Asia given the turmoil caused by the Great Depression at home. In general, FDR felt that it was imperative to maintain positive relations with both the Japanese and Chinese governments. The most that can be said for FDR’s Asia policy at the time was that it was intent on maintaining U.S. protection for the Philippines, which the president was unwilling to give up to any other power. Yet, in signing the 1934 act granting the Philippines commonwealth status and stating the U.S. intention to grant eventual independence, he had removed direct American dominion over the islands. American interests in the region were further reduced when war broke out between China and Japan in 1937. The U.S., wanting to stay out of a conflict that did not seem clearly related to American interests, adopted a policy of nonintervention. U.S. trade into the region plummeted and
Page 49 American military forces were withdrawn from mainland China. In what would later be seen as a fateful move, Admiral James Richardson, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, moved the bulk of the fleet to Pearl Harbor so that it would be safe from events unfolding in the vicinity. All of this is not to suggest that policy makers were unconcerned with happenings in the Pacific and Asia prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. Japanese aggression in China and surrounding areas was increasingly present in the American press, and Henry Morgenthau, FDR’s Secretary of the Treasury, successfully lobbied to grant the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kaishek $215 million in credits and military aid to defend against the Japanese. U.S. policy makers and military leaders were more concerned about events in Asia than their counterparts during the SpanishAmerican War. The conflagration in Europe led to concerns that the U.S. might by necessity become involved in a twofront war, and military planners were given orders to consider how the country might meet such a challenge. In the end, however, the lack of a broad coherent U.S. Asian policy would not be rectified until after the Japanese defeat in 1945. See Asia and the Pacific; Boxer Rebellion. FOR FURTHER READING Eckes, Alfred E., Jr. 1995. Opening America’s Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Meyer, Milton W. 1997. Asia: A Concise History. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Walker, William O. III. 1991. Opium and Foreign Policy: The AngloAmerican Search for Order in Asia, 1912–1954. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. James Heasley
Angola; Congress; Ethics; SubSaharan Africa. FOR FURTHER READING Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Hastedt, Glenn. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. U.S. 90 Stat 757, sec. 404 (1976). Karl R. DeRouen, Jr.
Eisenhower Doctrine; Kissinger, Henry; Nixon Doctrine; Proxy War; Truman Doctrine.
Page 50 FOR FURTHER READING Calvocoressi, Peter. 1996. World Politics Since 1945. London: AddisonWesley. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Spanier, John, and Steven W. Hook. 1998. American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 14th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Multilateralism. FOR FURTHER READING Bennett, A. Leroy. 1995. International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Cusimano, Maryann. 2000. Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ : PrenticeHall. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Collective Defense; Gulf War; Idealism; Multilateralism; United Nations; Yugoslavia. FOR FURTHER READING Bennett, A. Leroy. 1995. International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Claude, Inis, Jr. 1962. Power and International Relations. New York: Random House. Cusimano, Maryann. 2000. Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s. Pugh, Michael, ed. 1997. The UN, Peace and Force. Essex, England: Frank Cass. Weiss, Thomas G., ed. 1993. Collective Security in a Changing World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
CONFLICT AND PEACE DATA BANK (COPDAB), 1948–1978—The Conflict and Peace Data Bank was originally the work of Edward E. Azar, and
Page 51 is an extraordinary effort at recording daily events from around the world, drawing on numerous journalistic and historical sources. The unique aspect of COPDAB is that it records events involving aspects of both conflict and cooperation at both the international and domestic levels. Although the COPDAB research concludes with 1978, the same coding project is now being conducted by the Global Events Data System (GEDS) under the direction of John L. Davies. The GEDS project has continued the coding work started by COPDAB and has data for the U.S. interactions from 1979 to the mid1990s with Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Libya, and the Soviet Union, plus U.S. interactions with 120 states for the remainder of the 1990s. Although the GEDS data is not presented here, it is available for downloading via the GEDS project at the University of Maryland. See Data Sets on the Use of Force. FOR FURTHER READING Azar, Edward E. 1980. “The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) Project.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24:143–52. Azar, Edward E. 1993. Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948–1978. [Computer file]. 3d release. College Park: University of Maryland, Center for International Development and Conflict Management [Producer]. Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1993. Davies, John, and Chad McDaniel. 1994. “A New Generation of International EventData.” International Interactions 20:55–78. Curtis Peet
CONGRESS—Traditional interpretations of congressional influence in foreign policy find the people’s branch seriously lacking when compared to the president. Congress appears irrelevant, despite a recent congressional resurgence in foreign policy. This is particularly the case when discussing crisis foreign policy, of which uses of force are the most obvious. This essay disputes the argument of congressional irrelevancy as a simplification that distorts our view of foreign policy making. Congress is relevant in both a constitutional and practical sense. Practically, Congress sets boundaries for action for the president, indirectly influencing presidential decisions to use force in much the same way as public opinion. On its face congressional foreign policy lacks relevance today. One needs only to look to the failure of the War Powers Resolution for confirmation. Presidents send troops abroad without effective legislative restraint. However, an examination of the historical context of Congress and the use of force suggests that the deference shown the executive by the legislature following World War II was not the norm prior to 1945. The resurgence of Congress since the Vietnamese War is closer to the norm. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT During the republic’s first 150 years (prior to World War II), Congress dominated policy making, and this dominance carried over to the conduct of foreign
Page 52 policy, even in times of crisis. During World War II and the decades following it, the relationship between the president and Congress can be characterized as consensual, with Congress deferring security responsibility in an uncertain world to the president. The myriad of executive abuses during the Vietnamese War led directly to a resurgence of congressional activism, with contentious politics encroaching on foreign policy and the disappearance of postwar bipartisanship. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991, the unifying threat of communism disappeared. As a result, congressional activism takes on increased relevance today. Prior to World War II Woodrow Wilson labeled American government during the last half of the 19th century “congressional government.’’ Historical accounts clearly indicate an active Congress in foreign policy during this period, often frustrating the president’s conduct of foreign policy. Of the three official declarations of war that occurred during the 19th century, two were unwanted by the president. President Madison was forced into war against the British by northeastern war hawks in 1812. President McKinley was reluctantly pushed into war against the Spanish in 1896. When President Polk maneuvered around a reluctant Congress to get his war with Mexico in 1848, the House of Representatives responded by adopting a resolution of disapproval. Historical anecdotes aside, the Congress’s impact on the conduct of foreign policy was clear when presidents went to the Senate for advice and consent on treaties. Between 1871 and 1898 the Senate defeated every treaty initiated by the president. The treaty to end the SpanishAmerican War broke that string of defeats, by only one vote. The most noticeable defeat on a treaty by a president was Wilson’s defeat on the Treaty of Versailles. In the period since World War II, treaty defeats have become a rarity. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was not without his frustrations in dealing with an isolationist Congress as the U.S. moved toward war with the Axis powers in 1939–1941. Congress seriously limited Roosevelt’s flexibility with the passage of a series of neutrality acts, which limited the president’s ability to respond to the international threat. Congress moved in other ways to limit the president’s capabilities, including prohibiting loans to belligerents and nearly passing the Ludlow amendment that would have left the war decision up to a national referendum. War came despite congressional efforts to the contrary, and the power of the Executive in crisis policy changed dramatically as a result. PostWar Deference (1942–1972) Congressional deference to the president was at an alltime high following World War II. The unifying threat of world communism, made clear with the “fall of China” in 1949, left the president firmly in control, especially during
Page 53 times of crisis. Events surrounding the decision to intervene in Korea in 1950 indicate where the war powers lay in this period. President Truman informed Congress about his decision to send troops to Korea after his decision was already made. Congressional resolve to stop Truman failed to materialize. As James Lindsay noted, when an administration official suggested that Truman ask Congress for a resolution of approval, Senate leaders suggested that such a resolution was unnecessary and would prompt a divisive debate that could weaken the president’s hand. President Eisenhower sought congressional approval to intervene in Taiwan in 1955 and the Middle East in 1957. In both instances, Congress authorized the president’s use of force in very broad terms. Despite Congress’s chance to reassert its war power through debate on these votes, little debate materialized. In fact, senior leaders in both houses of Congress did not think it necessary for the president to even ask for congressional authorization. Again, they feared open debate might weaken the president’s hand diplomatically. Eisenhower’s proclivity for seeking official congressional authority was based more on his own preference for preserving constitutional distinctions than on practical necessity. The president followed up the Middle East resolution by ordering 14,000 troops ashore in Lebanon in 1958. Even with a supportive majority in Congress, President Kennedy felt little need to consult with Congress concerning responses to communist threats in Cuba and Southeast Asia. He ordered the quarantine of Cuba and nearly precipitated nuclear war with the Soviet Union on his own authority as commander in chief, without consultation with Congress. The clearest case of congressional deference was also the last of this era. In passing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing President Johnson to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression,” Congress gave the president a blank check to expand the Vietnamese War. The resolution passed the House unanimously after only forty minutes of discussion, and passed the Senate with only two dissenting votes. The resulting war left an indelible mark on congressionalpresidential relations in foreign policy. Following publication of the Pentagon Papers revealing gross executive abuses in the conduct of the war, Congress strove to reassert its war power and influence presidential decisions regarding the use of force. PostVietnam Resurgence (1973–1992) Following the Vietnamese War, congressional deference to presidential foreign policy making came to an end. Congress, along with the American public and the media, no longer trusted the presidency with unbridled control of the direction of American foreign policy. Congress sought to reassert its war power through procedural legislation, in particular the War Powers Resolution of 1973. The Resolution has proven no more than an inconvenience for the president. Presidents have ignored the reporting, consultation, and authorization require
Page 54 ments with regularity, citing practical and constitutional problems with the Resolution. Despite the failure of the Resolution as an instrument of congressional reassertion of power, it was clear that after the executive’s failure in Vietnam there was disagreement over both the means and ends of American foreign policy. Debate over the direction of foreign policy became heated, and the era of bipartisanship ended. Studies on rollcall voting in Congress have shown that the level of partisanship on foreign policy votes where the president takes a position has increased substantially since 1970. With disagreement on foreign policy widespread in Washington, conflict between Congress and the executive increased. Coinciding with the Vietnamese War and revelations concerning executive abuses was the beginning of the era of split party control of government (known as divided government) that continues today. From 1968 to 2000, the government has been divided twentysix out of thirtytwo years. Only President Carter and President Clinton (during his first two years) experienced a unified government during this period. Presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have all been handicapped in their dealings with Congress because Congress has had its own agenda, even in foreign policy. One line of research suggests that there are “two presidencies.” The argument made by George Edwards and others is that presidents have greater success in Congress on foreign policy votes than in domestic policy. With the era of divided government beginning in 1968, coinciding with greater partisanship in foreign policy, the “two presidencies” appears to be outdated. The two parties also have distinct ideological and policy differences when it comes to foreign policy, and these differences have been exacerbated by the decline of comity in Washington. Add increased polarization of the parties in Congress during the 1980s and 1990s, and presidential leadership of the opposition party becomes more difficult. In addition to increased congressional partisanship, congressional leaders and committee chairs lost their stranglehold on policy making in Congress. The backbench revolt within the Democratic Party in 1973 led to the creation of the ‘‘subcommittee bill of rights,” which resulted in the dispersion of power in Congress. Deference shown to the president in the previous era came largely from the leadership and the chairs of the foreign policy committees. For example, President Ford reflects: Today a President really does not have the kind of clout with Congress he had 30 years ago…. There is not the kind of teamwork that existed in the ’50s, even if the President and the majority of Congress belong to the same party. The main reason for this change is the erosion of the leadership in the Congress. Party leaders have lost the power to tell their troops that something is really significant and to get them to respond accordingly.1
Members of Congress who disputed presidential conduct of foreign policy had more opportunities to influence the policy process in the era following Vietnam, given the increased number of subcommittees dealing with foreign
Page 55 policy. The increase in oversight hearings that followed the explosion of subcommittees meant that Congress would keep an everwatchful eye on the president’s conduct of foreign policy. Such hearings provide members of Congress avenues for voicing dissent and keeping issues on the agenda that the president might prefer to ignore. Barbara Hinckley notes that congressional hearings on the use of force have increased in recent decades. From 1962 to 1972, there were ten hearings, according to her count. From 1973 to 1981, there were sixteen. From 1982 to 1988 there were fiftyfive hearings on uses of force. Subcommittee government has also increased the number of venues available to pressure groups interested in foreign policy, thus enhancing the electoral benefits of foreign policy activism for members of Congress. Partisanship in relation to the president’s decision to use force continued to trend upward during the 1980s and into the 1990s, constraining how presidents Reagan and Bush responded to international threats. Because they could not count on congressional support, Reagan and Bush had to keep an eye toward Congress when deciding whether or not to use force. Although Congress did not successfully interfere with the Republican presidents legislatively, debate on uses of force in Lebanon, Central America, and the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1990–1991 limited the president’s options noticeably. The Persian Gulf War vote that took place in January 1991 provides evidence that Congress can play an important role in the decision to use force. Although many scholars interpret Bush’s statements that he would have used force against Iraq no matter what the outcome of the vote in Congress as evidence of a weak Congress, when compared to the authorizing votes Eisenhower and Johnson received in similar situations, the 1991 vote is much more partisan and limited in scope. The authorization narrowly passed the Senate, splitting mainly along party lines. President Bush’s personal concerns in dealing with Congress on the Gulf War are illustrative. Even when congressional votes of support are unnecessary legally, they become a political necessity when the president is trying to present a unified front to foreign leaders. The closeness of the vote to authorize force prior to the Gulf War worried President Bush considerably. The independent nature of the Congress, even on such a critical issue, made the president very concerned with influencing the debate before Congress. After one meeting with congressional leaders, Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s national security advisor, firmly believed that the balance of support in Congress was no more than 30 percent for using force. This concerned the administration, as it could send the wrong message to Saddam Hussein and to the allied coalition. President Bush expended a great deal of effort lobbying Congress and the American people for support leading up to the Gulf War. The president had daily press conferences at the height of the deployment in August and during the war in January and February. Bush also explained his actions in several highprofile speeches, both to the entire nation and to a variety of smaller groups. Such activity by President Bush was not representative of Bush’s typical conference and speech schedule and represents the great deal of effort Bush ex
Page 56 pended in getting support; effort that Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson did not require. Bush expended similar effort in public relations before and during the invasion of Panama in December 1989. The limited ability presidents seem to have in focusing and sustaining both formal and informal congressional attention is probably a result of circumstances beyond the control of presidents. Members of Congress have their own agendas and are attuned to different goals than the president. They are generally more concerned with reelection and institutional power and prestige than with supporting the president’s foreign policy. The international context influences the level of independence presidents enjoy in relation to Congress and decisions to use force. Until 1992, the unifying threat of communism helped presidents by quieting dissent when dealing with crises indirectly related to SovietU.S. relations. The presence of a bipolar international context provided a powerful rhetorical tool for the need for bipartisan support in crisis situations. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, this tool was lost to presidents, and members of Congress could debate the president’s use of force without concern for some overriding international communist threat. Post–Cold War Resurgence: 1992–Present From 1992 to April 1999, there were fiftysix instances of presidential use of force, easily three times the number for any comparable time frame covered by the Grimmett data set. The threat of communism, often used by presidents to justify uses of force abroad, now no longer exists. Yet, instances of presidential use of force have increased substantially. Many observers suggest that the world is less stable today without the presence of the bipolar relationship (see Introduction). America has become the world’s policeman, or as opponents might argue, the military arm of the UN. New missions for the military include international peacekeeping (especially under UN or NATO auspices) and nationbuilding, missions Congress has not entirely bought into. Thirtytwo of the fiftysix uses of force over the past eight years were multilateral in nature, whereas only twentytwo uses of force were clearly multilateral over the 192 years prior to 1992. This change in the way presidents use force reduces the legitimacy many members of Congress lend to uses of force abroad. In 1995, the House of Representatives passed legislation restricting the president’s ability to place troops under foreign command while on peacekeeping missions for the UN. The vote passed by sixty votes and threatened funding for deployments in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. The Senate failed to consider the measure, but Republicans clearly tried to shift the frame of debate from one of helping democratization to one of U.S. forces acting as the military wing of the UN, and the incompetence of UN military leaders. Today, members of Congress rarely shy from debating the president’s proclivity to use force in the post–Cold War era, and this comes at high political
Page 57 costs for the president. Take recent uses of force in Bosnia as an example. When President Clinton made clear his intention to provide 20,000 U.S. troops to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, congressional reaction was swift and severe. The House of Representatives passed several bills trying to limit the U.S. role in Bosnia. Included was a bill to cut off funding of the mission if Clinton did not get prior approval from Congress. However, the bill was rejected in the Senate. Instead, the Senate offered a nonbinding resolution. The House also approved a resolution expressing opposition to the mission, while at the same time supporting the troops. Clinton issued two highly visible veto threats in relation to congressional policy on Bosnia, killing legislation on prior approval and Senator Dole’s efforts to unilaterally end the arms embargo in former Yugoslavia. In both of these examples, the president prevailed in the end, and forces were deployed or remained deployed. Given this, on its face, presidential use of force appears unconstrained by Congress, because presidents seem to always win. Winning is not without its costs in presidential politics, however. Uses of force in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia lacked public support, and one explanation for this is the degree to which members of Congress were able to frame the debate on the issue of intervention, at the expense of the president’s interpretation. Despite common perception that uses of force provide rallies for presidents both in the polls and in Congress, President Clinton’s public approval remained low throughout 1993–1995, coinciding with widely covered unpopular foreign policy adventures. The degree of effort presidents expend in lobbying for their decisions to use force in recent years shows the concern presidents have for selling their decision to both the public and Congress. If presidents were unconcerned with Congress today, in all likelihood they would expend less effort going over the heads of Congress to the American people for support. Increased debate in Congress and efforts of members to indirectly influence presidential actions in foreign policy through framing and agenda setting suggest that researchers’ focus on the passage of legislation is misplaced when looking for congressional influence. Framing and agenda setting by Congress are more subtle and less intrusive than substantive or procedural legislation designed to force the president to reconsider (or at least consider the Congress’s position) his decision to use force. With increased dissent often coming from the Hill loud and clear, presidents can no longer simply ignore Congress when employing troops abroad. We should be careful not to overstate the influence of the indirect effects Congress has on presidential decisions to use force. Instead, we should broaden our analysis of congressional influence or the influence of the president upon Congress beyond the passage of legislation. Most foreign policy, especially crisis policy, does not require legislative action. Therefore, it is unlikely that the president will pursue legislative solutions to crisis situations or that Congress will, either. Even so, legislative failures are still effective in drawing attention and framing the political debate. Legislative failures are more common than is gen
Page 58 erally perceived and not relegated to the foreign policy realm. The hurdles to successful passage of legislation are many, given bicameralism, the presidential veto, divided government, and other checks like the Senate filibuster. The constraints on the president set by Congress have increased since the end of the Cold War, yet at the same time the use of force appears more viable as an option given its increase and the lack of international constraints (via a bipolar system). This paradox suggests that international constraints are more important than the domestic constraints provided by Congress. Even so, presidents pay a cost in the loss of political capital in their efforts to lead the Congress and the public when they use force abroad. This discussion of congressional constraints on presidential use of force points to the need for systematic study regarding how Congress responds to presidential uses of force. Recognizing that Congress cannot force the president’s hand on the decision, it becomes clear that the response by Congress is the relevant dependent variable worthy of study. See Constitution; Divided Government; Presidential Success; Two Presidencies. NOTE 1. Gerald R. Ford, “Imperiled, Not Imperial,” Time (November 10, 1980): 30.
FOR FURTHER READING Brace, Paul, and Barbara Hinckley. 1992. Follow the Leader. New York: Basic Books. Bond, Jon, and Richard Fleisher. 1990. The President in the Legislative Arena. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Deese, David A., ed. 1994. The New Politics of American Foreign Policy. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Edwards, George C. III. 1989. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Edwards, George C. III, and B. Dan Wood. 1999. “Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media.” American Political Science Review 93:327– 44. Hinckley, Barbara. 1994. Less than Meets the Eye. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lindsay, James. 1994. Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. McCormick, James, and Eugene Wittkopf. 1989. “Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology in CongressionalExecutive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947–88.” Journal of Politics 52:1077–1100. Milkis, Sidney, and Michael Nelson. 1999. The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 3d ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Peterson, Paul. 1994. “The President’s Dominance in Foreign Policy Making.” Political Science Quarterly 109:215–34. Ripley, Randall, and James Lindsay, eds. 1993. Congress Resurgent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. 1973. The Imperial Presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Shull, Stephen A., ed. 1991. The Two Presidencies: A QuarterCentury Assessment. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Page 59 Sundquist, James L. 1981. The Decline and Resurgence of Congress. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Thurber, James A. 1996. Rivals for Power: PresidentialCongressional Relations. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Warburg, Gerald. 1989. Conflict and Consensus: The Struggle between Congress and the President over Foreign Policymaking. New York: Harper and Row. Weissman, Stephen R. 1995. A Culture of Deference. New York: Basic Books. Wood, B. Dan, and Jeffrey S. Peake. 1998. “The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting.’’ American Political Science Review 92:173–84. Jeffrey S. Peake
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT—Oversight is defined as the process of monitoring the bureaucracy and its administration of policy through congressional hearings. Congressional committees play an important role in the legislative process, including special gatekeeping functions and monitoring policy implementation by the Executive branch. Oversight is conducted by authorizing committees and involves policy evaluation and examinations of executive adherence to legislative intent. Oversight select committees have been created in recent years to specifically address foreign policy, including the House and Senate intelligence committees. With the proliferation of subcommittees in the 1970s, and resultant dispersion of power within Congress, oversight has increased substantially, providing a source of conflict between the president and Congress. Paul Aberbach has shown that during the 1980s, oversight hearings made up a quarter of the total substantive committee hearings in Congress, up from around 8 percent in 1970. Today’s Congress is more attuned to presidential management (or mismanagement) of policy. Increased congressional concern carries over to the conduct of foreign policy, even in cases involving the use of force. Barbara Hinckley has shown that oversight hearings on specific uses of force have increased in recent periods. Scholars divide oversight hearings by function. McCubbins and Schwartz labeled two types of oversight: “police patrol” oversight, which focuses on constantly monitoring policy implementation, and “fire alarm” oversight, which monitors policy when a noticeable problem occurs. The latter type is most relevant regarding crisis policies, as most crises cannot be predicted. However, presidents can be certain that members of Congress will monitor their implementation of uses of force abroad, and this monitoring often has policy implications that can lead to conflict between the branches. See Congress; Congressional Responses. FOR FURTHER READING Aberbach, Joel. 1990. Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Hinckley, Barbara. 1994. Less than Meets the Eye. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Over
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Looked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science 28:165–79. West, William F. 1995. Controlling the Bureaucracy. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Jeffrey S. Peake
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES—Decisions to use force generally place Congress on a reactive footing, giving the president distinct advantages. He can order troops into action, and then wait and see how Congress responds. Because of this congressional disadvantage, many observers claim that Congress has no significant impact on the conduct of crisis policy. Binding legislation that effectively limits presidential decisions on the use of force never passes, therefore Congress has no say in crisis policy. However, legislation is not the only method members of Congress can use to influence presidential decision making in crisis policy. Congress responds to presidential uses of force outside of the formal legislative process. Committees hold hearings, floor votes are taken on resolutions of approval or disapproval, and members go on television expressing their views on the crisis at hand, which are often the opposite of the president’s. Even binding legislation that ultimately fails passage can serve to limit the president by impacting the agenda and how an issue is framed in the media, thus affecting public opinion. Given such effects by the modern Congress, it makes sense to broaden our analysis beyond purely legislative effects to less direct influences. The practical relevance of Congress becomes clear when we categorize possible congressional responses to the president’s decision to use force abroad. Examining the responses of Congress (or members of Congress) to presidential uses of force should answer important questions regarding Congress and the use of force. Does Congress systematically respond negatively or positively to certain types of uses of force? What types of force lead to responses from Congress? What international contexts surrounding the use of force influence congressional responses? What domestic factors, such as media coverage and presidential agenda setting, influence how Congress responds? While addressing all of these questions is beyond the scope of this essay, future systematic analysis of congressional responses should give scholars a more complete understanding of congressional policy making in crisis situations. By discarding Congress in the use of force decision calculus, scholars pay scant attention to the branch of government with which the Founders, by most accounts, meant the war power to lie. Scholars should refocus their attention on congressional factors in explaining decisions to use force, much as they have expanded their examination of other domestic explanations, such as public opinion and the media. Below is a discussion of the possible responses by members of Congress to presidential uses of force. Congressional responses range from no noticeable response to a crisis to legislative responses that can make life quite difficult for presidents.
Page 61 LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES Often, when the president uses force or during the buildup toward a use of force, members of Congress attempt to have some say in the process directly through their legislative role. Legislative responses come in two general forms: binding legislation and nonbinding legislation. While bills presidents oppose rarely pass, they do constrain presidents because presidents want to avoid having to expend political capital in order to kill legislation. Nonbinding legislation, if negative, can give a sense that the nation is not unified in its use of force decision, placing the president on shaky ground diplomatically. Legislative responses, if negative, draw unwanted media attention to domestic dissent on a foreign policy issue, and can negatively impact public opinion, as well as world opinion, on the president’s decision to use force. Binding legislation related to the use of force has come in a variety of forms over the past decade; the most limiting for the president are legislative vetoes and appropriations bills. In the case of Bosnia in 1995, the House passed legislation requiring congressional approval before the president could send troops to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords. Legislative vetoes of this type, while attracting a large amount of attention, rarely pass both Houses of Congress, and once they do, a presidential veto is likely. Similar legislation includes resolutions authorizing the president to use force under specific guidelines, such as the Gulf War vote in January 1991. As shown in the Congress essay, President Bush and his advisors were very concerned about the prospects of this vote, and the impact a close or negative vote might have on selling the use of force both at home and abroad. Early in 1997, a close vote in the House failed on legislation that would have forced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia by the end of the year. Congress can also opt to sever or refuse funding for presidential uses of force. The threat is common; however, in practice passage is a rarity. In 1997, the House voted nearly two to one to end funding for the Bosnia mission by the previously imposed deadline of June 30, 1998, a deadline President Clinton continued to extend. In 1994, Congress barred funds for U.S. military participation in or around Rwanda after a specified date. Also, in order to continue an intervention or mission, presidents often must come to Congress with hat in hand asking for increased funding. Such requirements offer members of Congress the opportunity to voice concern for continuing the mission and to try to get the president to decide on an end point for the mission. Once troops are in the field, however, cutting off or reducing funds becomes a nonoption politically. The threat to bar funding legitimizes the role of Congress in the decision to continue an unpopular intervention or deployment of troops. More indirect forms of binding legislation, usually procedural legislation, can constrain the president as well. However, procedural legislation is uncommon in crisis policy, given its encroachment on the president’s clear authority as
Page 62 commander in chief and the failure of the War Powers Resolution. One recent example includes restrictions on the placement of U.S. troops under foreign command in UN and NATO peacekeeping missions. Most procedural legislation comes with an escape clause for the president, whereby if the president certifies that some condition is met he can then ignore the restrictions. Clearly, legislation with such obvious loopholes is weak, at best. Nonbinding legislation, in the form of resolutions of disapproval, increases the appearance of domestic dissent, weakening the president’s position internationally. In 1995, the House voted three to one to pass a nonbinding resolution repudiating Clinton’s pledge to deploy troops in accordance with the Bosnia peace agreement. The Senate followed by passing a resolution imploring the president for advanced congressional approval prior to sending in the troops. In 1994, both houses passed symbolic resolutions chiding Clinton for not seeking congressional approval for using force in Haiti. Nonbinding resolutions have no force of law; however, they attract large amounts of media attention on the conflict between the president and Congress. Increased media attention on an unpopular use of force may constrain the president by forcing him to address issues he might prefer to ignore. Recent research on agenda setting in foreign policy have found that the media play an important role in defining which foreign policy issues the president addresses publicly. Dan Wood and Jeff Peake showed that presidents respond to heightened media coverage of foreign policy issues by adjusting their public foreign policy agendas. QUASILEGISLATIVE RESPONSES Through oversight and investigative hearings, Congress can draw attention to presidential uses of force, and in doing so attempt to frame the issue in a negative way. Hearings on the use of force can come before, during, or after force is used, thus drawing attention to how presidents make decisions and how they implement them. Preemptive hearings or investigations into possible interventions during a buildup primarily discuss the merits of intervening militarily, as opposed to using other means of coercion. Hearings provide a venue where dissenters (or supporters) can apply pressure. Interest groups, including ethnic organizations, can draw attention to dimensions of the issue not considered publicly by the administration. Essentially, by providing another forum for debate on the use of force, congressional hearings serve to expand conflict on decisions to use force beyond the executive. According to Baumgartner and Jones, expanding conflict constrains decision makers by influencing how issues are framed and which issues make the policy agenda. Hearings on the use of force are quite common and have increased substantially in recent years. In most instances, hearings precede legislation. However, hearings can be primarily investigative as well. In 1996, both houses held hearings sharply criticizing the president’s continuation of the Bosnia deployment. After Clinton ordered the missile attack on the Sudan and Afghanistan in August
Page 63 1998, Congress held hearings on international terrorism. Throughout 1996, the House held hearings on the U.S. intervention in Haiti, criticizing political violence by U.S.trained Haitian police. In 1995, hearings in Congress investigated the debacle in Somalia, laying blame at the feet of former Defense Secretary Les Aspin. NONLEGISLATIVE RESPONSES Commonly referred to as grandstanding by detractors, members of Congress rarely miss opportunities to speak out on the president’s use of force, both prior to the introduction of troops and afterward. Debates, both criticizing and supporting the president, rage on the House and Senate floors, often attracting media attention. Members of Congress regularly go on television to voice concern about a prospective use of force, or even to openly criticize a president’s decision. Sometimes, members of Congress even call for the president to use force, possibly placing diplomatic efforts by the president in jeopardy. These forms of nonlegislative responses by Congress can profoundly influence the public’s view on an issue, especially when they call into question the president’s motives for using force. By providing alternative viewpoints to the president’s position, such tactics by members of Congress constrain the president, and force the president to increase his efforts at selling his policy. During the height of the Lewinsky scandal that haunted President Clinton throughout 1998, the president ordered two highprofile uses of force: attacks on Somalia and Afghanistan in August, and the resumption of the air war against Iraq in December. Both uses of force resulted in biting criticism from congressional Republicans, questioning the motives of the president, as well as the wisdom of using force. Media pundits gravitated to the conflict in Washington and openly questioned presidential motives as well. Throughout the crisis in former Yugoslavia, members of Congress were visibly skeptical of presidential decisions, and were not afraid to challenge the president in the media. During the Kosovo bombings in 1999, members of Congress questioned the wisdom of presidential decisions step by step. It is well established in the media literature that the American media, particularly television, are attracted to negative news and conflict in politics. Conflict provides the media with interesting stories which enhance journalistic careers and ratings. Conflict in the media also impacts how the American public views politics and the trust it has in Washington to do the right thing. Nonlegislative expressions of opposition to the president, while of a symbolic nature, increase the negative media coverage a use of force receives, possibly dampening any rally the president receives from the public in the polls. NONRESPONSES Often, there is no visible response by Congress to a presidential use of force. Typically, this occurs when the use of force is minor, does not involve obvious
Page 64 hostilities, and does not attract any media attention. Congress failed to respond visibly to uses of force in Liberia in 1996 and 1998, or in the Central African Republic in 1996. It is difficult to imply any meaning to nonresponses, other than that they probably indicate congressional support for a presidential action that occurred without any noticeable buildup. However, this support remains tacit, as members may be reserving judgment on the wisdom of the president’s chosen course until the intervention draws intense media and public attention. There is little to gain for members of Congress to speak out against uses of force that no one knows about, or in places where there is little concern. Once a use of force becomes more important politically, members of Congress reserving their comments may find it politically expedient to speak out for or against the president. DISCUSSION As noted in the Congress essay, partisanship in Washington has increased substantially in recent decades, in all areas of American politics including foreign policy. No longer do politics stop at the water’s edge, even when the president decides to use force and place troops in harm’s way. With the rise of divided government and the decrease in comity between the executive and legislature, Congress has taken on an important role in decisions to use force. Members of Congress offer alternative political viewpoints on issues surrounding the use of force. Often, these alternative viewpoints clash with administrative policies, creating conflict. This conflict, in turn, attracts heightened media coverage that portrays the decision to use force as controversial. The president must then expend limited political capital in persuading the public and Congress to get behind his foreign policy efforts. Clearly, presidents would prefer to initiate hostilities under more unified circumstances with mostly positive media coverage. With members of the opposite party in Congress (usually of the majority) pursuing their own agendas, presidents become frustrated in their leadership of Congress. By offering an alternative to the president’s policy, members of the opposing party increase conflict and are likely to respond to presidential uses of force in some negative way. Because of this, an increase in negative congressional responses over time in a systematic analysis is likely. The above discussion only touches on the surface of recent congressional responses. Approaching the question in a systematic manner should shed light on presidentialcongressional relations in crisis policy. Traditional analyses of presidentialcongressional relations in foreign policy have focused primarily on purely legislative responses to executive actions in foreign policy. In doing so, this research focuses on presidential success in Congress, or the legal effects of legislation. By focusing only on the legislative process, scholars miss influences Congress may have early in the policy process, during the agendasetting and problemdefinition stages that, as James Anderson and others argue, can profoundly affect the rest of the decisionmaking process.
Page 65 Broadening our analysis to include other quasi or nonlegislative responses may show the weak underside of the “imperial presidency.” Recent systematic analysis of agenda setting in foreign policy has shown that presidents rarely control the media’s agenda. Instead, the media pursue an independent agenda, focusing on foreign policy events and conflict likely to arise in Washington between the president and Congress. The president’s inability to control the media and congressional agenda weakens the president’s efforts at leading the public and gaining support domestically for uses of force abroad. Even so, presidents appear ready to act alone in using force, even when such actions are unpopular. However, given the difficulty in studying nondecisions by the Executive, it is difficult to say whether or not the domestic constraints provided by an opposition Congress have influenced presidential nondecisions. See Congress; Two Presidencies. FOR FURTHER READING Anderson, James E. 1997. Public Policymaking, 3d ed. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Burgin, Eileen. 1997. “Assessing Congress’s Role in the Making of Foreign Policy.” In Congress Reconsidered, 6th ed., ed. Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Openheimer. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Edwards, George C. III, and B. Dan Wood. 1999. ‘‘Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media.” American Political Science Review 93:327–44. Lindsay, James. 1994. Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ripley, Randall, and James Lindsay, eds. 1993. Congress Resurgent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Wood, B. Dan, and Jeffrey S. Peake. 1998. “The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting.” American Political Science Review 92:173–84. Jeffrey S. Peake
CONSTITUTION—The Constitution divides foreign affairs powers between the president and Congress. Among the powers granted to the president are the abilities to make treaties, send and receive ambassadors, and to act as commander in chief of the armed forces. Powers granted to the Congress include the ability to regulate foreign commerce, to raise and support the army and navy, and to declare war. The Senate also carries out the advise and consent function on treaties and appointments. Exactly what the power to declare war means or how far the commander in chief power extends has always been the subject of considerable debate. Formal declarations of war in response to presidential actions have been the exception rather than the rule. The U.S. has officially declared war on only five occasions: during the War of 1812, the Mexican War of 1848, the SpanishAmerican War of 1898, and World Wars I and II. Yet the U.S. has committed military troops abroad on well more than 200 occasions.
Page 66 One of the most striking features of this distribution of war powers is the complete exclusion of the Judiciary. However, as the nation’s history has played out, the courts have performed a very significant role in determining how the balance is determined in the exercise of foreign affairs powers. Commenting in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton wrote of the Judiciary as the least dangerous, least powerful branch of government exercising “merely judgement.” What Hamilton did not foresee was that by exercising this judgment, the Judiciary would help to determine the balance between force and will as exercised by the Executive and Legislature. In no other area is the importance of the courts shown more so than in the exercise of war powers. PRECOURT USES OF FORCE: 1798–1860 During the period extending from the ratifying of the Constitution until approximately the beginnings of the Civil War, the Judiciary did not play a significant role in shaping the distribution of war powers. During this time, the U.S. used armed forces abroad on sixty separate occasions. Nonetheless, there was little occasion for the Supreme Court to exercise its judgment. Presidential uses of force during the first several decades after the Constitutional Convention posed little controversy. The first U.S. instance of armed conflict involved actions against hostile Indian tribes. President Washington set the standard by seeking approval from Congress prior to any military activity. The decision to go to war or to mount offensive action was enacted by the Congress. The two branches cooperated in these decisions, with Congress having the final say in all of them. Although formal declarations of war have been rare, Congress had never been formally excluded from the war powers equation. Throughout this time span, Congress assented to presidential uses of force abroad. Given this cooperation between the branches, it is not surprising that the Judiciary was not actively involved in the war powers debate. Louis Fisher notes that the only notable exception to this was President Polk’s aggressive action against Mexico. The Supreme Court was never called upon to deal with this as it was resolved with a congressional censure of the president. Interestingly, one area in which the president did begin to assert some independent power was in the decision not to use force. According to Michael Nelson, Washington did act without prior congressional approval when he issued a neutrality proclamation concerning the war between France and England in 1793. Ultimately, Congress did pass legislation that supported the president’s decision. However, by acting prior to the Congress in this case, Washington was drawing a distinction between actual war and the other activities surrounding war powers. For the categorical undertaking of war, Congress must first act. However, the ancillary powers, such as a proclamation of neutrality, could be acted upon prior to congressional approval. Congress, through its lawmaking powers, could endorse or disavow these presidential actions. Yet, this did open a loophole that later presidents would exploit in exercising war powers.
Page 67 Washington’s decision caused debate among some members of his own cabinet. Only a few years removed from the ratification of the Constitution, the people were still very sensitive to excessive executive power. In a series of letters, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison debated the constitutionality of this proclamation. Hamilton compared the wording of Article I, stating that “All legislative power herein granted shall be vested in the Congress” with Article II which begins “The executive power shall be vested in the President.” The fact that the wording of these clauses was different was of great significance to Hamilton. Since the opening sentence of Article II does not contain the phrase ‘‘herein granted,” it must mean that there is a difference between the scope of legislative and executive powers. Because congressional powers are only those herein granted by the Constitution, they are limited only to those specifically granted within that document. However, since the executive power granted in the Constitution is not limited by this phrase, it must then mean that the executive power extends beyond those specifically mentioned. Madison, writing as Helvidius, contended that any determination of U.S. uses of force had to come from Congress. Congress was given specific control over raising an armed force as well as declaring war; decisions concerning these subjects were legislative in nature. As Michael Nelson noted, Madison contended that the idea of inherent executive powers was akin to a “royal prerogative.” These debates are quite useful in tracing the source of presidential powers and were called upon in many future instances by both presidents and courts. Following approval by Congress, the actions of Washington were generally accepted. In perhaps the most famous use of the presidential use of the power to determine when a state of war or peace existed, President Monroe followed Washington’s lead. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed. This doctrine, which set forth when U.S. forces would be used, was the basis for American foreign policy for more than a century. Yet despite its significance, there was virtually no debate about whether such a maneuver was within the power of the president. Without any major action by the courts, the president had already won a major victory. COURT INVOLVEMENT IN DETERMINING LEGITIMACY OF USE OF FORCE: 1860–1973 The Supreme Court first became significantly involved in the war powers dispute around the time of the Civil War. President Lincoln, in pursuit of a Union victory, took tremendous liberties with the Constitution. In 1861, while Congress was in recess, Lincoln issued orders calling forth the state militia, suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and blockaded southern ports. It was this last action that brought about an opportunity for the courts to determine the breadth of presidential power regarding use of force. After the initial outbreak of Civil War hostilities, but before Congress had convened to consider a formal
Page 68 declaration of war, President Lincoln ordered a blockade of all confederate ports. During the period between the order of the blockades and the official congressional endorsement of them, several ships were seized and the cargoes confiscated by the Union. While conceding that his actions went beyond those specifically granted in the Constitution, Lincoln nonetheless felt that the Constitution allowed for extraordinary actions under extraordinary circumstances. In The Prize Cases, the Supreme Court held that the actions of the president were justified. The Supreme Court had to decide whether Lincoln had acted prematurely in bringing the nation into war without official congressional approval. The president is the commander in chief, but only Congress can declare war. In interpreting the dilemma as to when a state of war exists, the Court did not hesitate. The Court held that it is not necessary for Congress to declare war in order for a war to exist. It ruled that the Court must be governed by what the president decides. “He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.” It further decided that the president is not only authorized to use force as he sees fit, but he is also obligated to use force as the situation dictates. “If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the president is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority.” Considering the great lengths to which President Lincoln had stretched the Constitution, the Court ruling in his favor certainly tilted the balance of power toward the presidential side of the ledger. What is especially noteworthy about this is the distinction that the Court drew between presidential power in the area of domestic policy and war powers. Clearly, when it came to war powers, the Court was willing to allow President Lincoln to do what he felt was necessary to protect the Union. His actions in calling forth the militia and blockading southern ports without prior congressional approval went far beyond what any president had ever attempted. Certainly, the circumstances Lincoln confronted were far more serious than any ever previously confronted. Yet despite those dangers, when it came to domestic affairs, the Court took a much more restrictive view. When the Supreme Court reviewed President Lincoln’s actions in suspending the writ of habeas corpus and punishing confederate sympathizers by court martial, it used an entirely different line of reasoning. Whereas the Court was willing to allow the president considerable constitutional leeway regarding the use of force, the same did not hold true when dealing with internal affairs. In Ex Parte Milligan, the Supreme Court held that when it came to domestic problems, the Constitution could not bend. “The Constitution of the U.S. is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism.” The Court went so far as to make the claim that even in times of crisis, a country
Page 69 without laws is not one worth fighting for. ‘‘This nation, as experience has proved, cannot always remain at peace, and has no right to expect that it will always have wise and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of the Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln; and if this right is conceded, and the calamities of war again befall us, the dangers to human liberty are frightful to contemplate…. It is insisted that the safety of the country in time of war demands that this broad claim for martial law shall be sustained. If this were true, it could well be said that a country, preserved at the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of preservation.” President Lincoln enacted both the blockades and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as the only methods capable of saving the Union. Both were part of the reasoned judgment of the commander in chief of the armed forces. Yet, when it came to determining their constitutionality, the Supreme Court looked at them in very different ways. In taking military action, the president was not only justified, but also obligated to protect the Union at all costs. In taking internal actions, the Court held that those costs were too high. This is a prevailing theme throughout this area of law. The Supreme Court has been more deferential to the president in regard to foreign and military affairs than in any other area. In comparing The Prize Cases with Ex Parte Milligan, the Supreme Court shows that internal and external affairs will be judged by a different standard. However, it is not until 1936 that the Supreme Court explains the justification of these differing approaches. During the 1930s, the Supreme Court continually frustrated President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his effort to deal with perhaps the greatest economic crisis ever to face the nation. Working together, Congress and the president took many measures to slow the damages of the Great Depression. Despite this grave national crisis, the Supreme Court repeatedly struck down attempts to increase presidential powers. In Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U.S., the Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which allowed the president to enact industrywide codes of competition by executive order. The Court felt that this act unconstitutionally transferred legislative powers to the president. It held that despite the national emergency, the Constitution could not bend. “Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action that lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.” Similar to the Milligan decision, the Supreme Court ruled that even in times of crisis, internal affairs must be governed by the exact letter of the Constitution. However, less than a year after the Schechter decision, the Court had another opportunity to review a congressional delegation to the president in the case of U.S. v. CurtissWright Export Corporation. At issue here was a joint resolution authorizing the president to prohibit the sale of arms to the warring countries of Bolivia and Paraguay if and when
Page 70 he saw fit. Whereas in Schechter the Court found this transfer of legislative authority unconstitutional, in this latter case the Court found no violation. The Supreme Court ruled that in the area of foreign affairs the president was solely charged with determining when action was needed. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, ruled that what is unconstitutional in internal affairs may be upheld in foreign affairs. The Court wrote, “As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States.” It further reasoned that these powers did not depend upon any specific grant of constitutional authority. Having determined that the powers over external affairs that belong to the federal government do not depend upon any specific constitutional guarantee for authority, it is clear that no federal action dealing solely with foreign affairs could be unconstitutional. Therefore, while it would be unconstitutional to delegate certain powers for domestic purposes, such as in Schechter, it would be acceptable when dealing with foreign affairs such as in CurtissWright. This is a very sweeping ruling, but the Supreme Court did not stop there. It further determined that this broad power rests exclusively with the president. “In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems, the president alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation…. The president is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole representative with foreign nations.” Justice Sutherland said the president, “not the Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in times of war…. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular, and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary.” This invests a great deal of inherent authority in the president. Sutherland’s argument is that as a practical matter, the president is better able to deal with foreign affairs. However, he also feels that it is constitutionally grounded. When he listed the number of powers that were transferred directly to the U.S. regardless of specific clauses, Sutherland lists a number of powers that are granted to the president. The Constitution does indeed grant to the president the power to negotiate treaties and maintain diplomatic relations by sending and receiving ambassadors. These are unquestionably presidential prerogatives, whether understood or clearly expressed in the Constitution. However, heading this list in the Sutherland opinion is the power to wage war and conclude peace. This power is not specifically granted to either branch. Yet, by including it in those powers not granted by the Constitution specifically, but rather from other means, it falls squarely within the presidential column. This may not be the most sound logic ever handed down from the bench, but it has never been overruled and has been the source of the justification of many presidents in regard to the use of force. The Court seemed to have said that in domestic affairs the president and Congress are equal partners, strictly constrained by the checks and balances of the
Page 71 Constitution. However, in foreign affairs, the president, as the “sole organ,” is on a level by himself. The Court was willing to allow a different standard for these distinct areas of government involvement. This was also true when dealing with the civil rights of U.S. citizens during times of war. At the time of World War II, President Roosevelt issued an executive order that allowed for all American citizens of Japanese ancestry to be removed from their homes and detained in special military areas. Despite applying the inflexible doctrine of strict scrutiny, the Court allowed the order to stand. In doing so, the Court once again raised the differences in presidential power between foreign and domestic situations. “We uphold the exclusion order as of the time it was made…. In doing so, we are not unmindful of the hardships imposed by it upon a large group of American citizens…. Buthardships are a part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.’’ Justice Frankfurter went on to contend that the outer limits of war powers were up to the president and Congress, not the courts. His logic was simple, “the war power of the government is the power to wage war successfully.” It is clear that when a president’s use of force is based wholly on his foreign affairs powers he will have tremendous discretion from the Supreme Court. However, in instances when both foreign and domestic powers are concerned, the Court is far less deferential. Perhaps the most famous example of this type of situation is Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer. During the Korean War, the U.S. was facing an imminent nationwide steel strike. Since the production of steel was critical in order to continue in this conflict, President Truman issued an executive order seizing the nation’s steel mills. Truman reported his intentions to Congress, which took no action. The president’s contention was that this seizure was necessary in order to successfully carry out the use of force in Korea. In rejecting these actions, the Supreme Court held that while the seizure did impact foreign affairs, they were also a burden upon domestic affairs where the president has much less discretion. Justice Black wrote for the Court, “We cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commanderinchief of the armed forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production.” Ironically, Black, who wrote for the majority in Korematsu allowing wide discretion to the president in uses of force, felt that decisions involving domestic problems must be entrusted to Congress. “The founders of this nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding that this seizure order cannot stand.” In concurrence, Justice Jackson contended that presidential power was not static, but vacillates as circumstances dictate. “While the Constitution diffuses power the better to serve liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
Page 72 separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.” Jackson felt that presidential power in a given circumstance depended upon how it worked with the other branch. He divided presidential power into three categories, giving the president more power when he and Congress cooperated, less when they were at odds, and when Congress failed to act, presidential power was somewhere in the middle. Since there were other congressional statutes dealing with labor disputes and the president acted contrary to them, this was a situation where presidential power was at its lowest. What is striking about this decision is that of the six separate opinions written by justices in the majority, none of them considered the impact on foreign affairs. Each justice, although with different reasons, felt that the president’s actions were domestic in scope. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND BEYOND: 1973–PRESENT Although the framers of the Constitution took great pains to separate the power to declare war from the power to engage in uses of force, the latter part of the 20th century has demonstrated how difficult it has been to achieve this goal. In the period following World War II, the president used troops overseas in two major conflicts, in Korea and Vietnam, as well as seventysix lesser conflicts that involved the use of American soldiers in foreign lands. Eventually, Congress sought to reassert its authority. In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution. The purpose of this Resolution was to ensure the collective judgment of the Congress as well as the president in using force abroad. The Resolution would allow the president the flexibility needed to deal with emergencies and protect American interests, but return Congress to the role of having the final say of whether to take the nation into any sustained military conflict. The main provisions of this joint resolution include: that the president, whenever possible, should consult with Congress before using troops; after sending troops the president is required to report to Congress within fortyeight hours, and unless Congress approves of the presidential use of force within sixty days, the troops must be removed. The measure was approved over the veto of President Nixon. Nixon argued that the legislative veto provision—permitting Congress to order the removal of troops by concurrent resolution—violated the presentment clause of the Constitution. He also argued that the requirement for the removal of troops after the sixtyday window was an unconstitutional check on the president’s powers, because through doing so Congress could limit executive action without acting. Despite the intentions of this Resolution or its legality, the results have not been much different than what existed prior to its passage. No president has ever fully complied with the stipulations of the act and no use of force has ever
Page 73 been cut short under its provisions. The role of the courts has been pivotal in allowing for continuing presidential dominance in this area. Following the War Powers Resolution, the debate about use of force has been conducted outside the court system. Questions presented as to the legality of presidential initiatives have been treated as political questions or as nonjustifiable questions that were not ripe for review. By taking this path, the courts have preserved a system that they helped to create without having to face the new complexities of modern warfare. In 1983, the Supreme Court struck down the legislative veto provision as applied to the Immigration and Nationality Act. Although this case did not deal directly with war powers, the decision did cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of any legislative veto that was not passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the president for his signature. Section 5 (c) of the War Powers Resolution calls for the removal of troops by concurrent resolution. Applying the reasoning of the Supreme Court in dealing with the legislative veto, this provision is suspect since a concurrent resolution does not involve presentment to the president for either a signature or veto. Nonetheless, despite this obvious shortcoming, there has never been a direct Supreme Court ruling on the validity of the War Powers Resolution. There have been numerous challenges in the lower federal courts, but no court has ever reached a decision regarding the War Powers Resolution on the merits of the case at hand. Rather, in numerous examples, the courts have sidestepped the issue. One example is the case of Crockett v. Reagan. In 1982, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia heard a challenge from several members of Congress charging that by sending military forces to El Salvador without either reporting to Congress or receiving congressional approval, President Reagan had violated the War Powers Resolution. While providing an opportunity for review of the Resolution, the court chose to avoid the issue altogether, deciding that this dispute presented a political question. “The question as to the nature and extent of the U.S. presence in El Salvador and whether a report under the War Powers Resolution is mandated because our forces have been subjected to hostile fire or are taking part in the war effort are appropriate for congressional, not judicial, investigation and determination.” While not deciding the issue of whether the Resolution should apply in this instance, the court does decide when the resolution comes into action. Just as in past court rulings, it is the president who determines when actions rise to the level needed to involve the Congress. In 1984, the District Court accepted another congressional challenge of the War Powers Resolution. In Conyers v. Reagan, the court considered the constitutionality of President Reagan’s invasion of Grenada. Once again, the court claimed that this issue presented a political question that would be better solved by the two popularly elected branches of government. In 1987, the District Court once again heard a challenge to the War Powers Resolution. Lowry v. Reagan involved the president’s decision regarding U.S. military escort operations in
Page 74 the Persian Gulf and an attack on an Iranian ship during that mission. This challenge was brought by 110 members of the House of Representatives alleging that the president’s actions had brought about hostilities, and that he had failed to report as required by the War Powers Resolution and have troops removed after sixty days unless approved by Congress. The court, again, refused to rule on the case. It felt that it would violate the separation of powers to involve itself in a political dispute. Further, the question was not ripe for judicial review. The War Powers Resolution gives the president sixty days from the time he reports to Congress. Since the president never reported, the clock never started. As to whether the president had to report, the court chose not to define hostilities, leaving it up to the president as to when hostilities were sufficient to require a report. Since President Reagan felt that no report was required in this situation, the court was powerless to act. In 1990, the court heard a challenge to President Bush’s decision to initiate an offensive attack against Iraq. In Dellums v. Bush, members of Congress challenged the president’s actions as depriving them of their constitutional role of declaring war, as well as their right of consultation under the War Powers Resolution. The court decided that the controversy was not ripe for review and again refused to decide the case on its merits. In an earlier period, the courts were very active in setting the boundaries. Now, it appears that the courts are more comfortable on the sidelines where war powers are concerned. Whether this balance is one of which the framers would have approved no one can know for certain. However, the world is a very different place than it was 200 years ago. The U.S. is now securely in the role of world leader. Since World War II a large American military presence has remained deployed around the world. This military presence, and the advent of the Cold War and its concomitant threat of nuclear war, gave the president options and opportunities as commander in chief never before thought possible. Starting with The Prize Cases, and including other landmark decisions such as CurtissWright and Korematsu, the Supreme Court was instrumental in giving the president the authority necessary to begin to take control over war powers. After that, circumstances took over, giving the president not just the opportunity, but also the means necessary to assert his leadership. Once the president had firmly established his dominance over war powers, the courts, despite congressional attempts to reassert itself into the mix, stood aside. By choosing not to decide cases on grounds of comity or as political questions, the influence of the courts is still felt. By not deciding, the courts still do make a decision. The decision to leave things as they are is every bit as powerful as any the courts could have handed down. Today, the president enjoys far more power than ever before in regard to uses of force. Much of that is a result of presidential assertion, some is due to congressional inaction. However, the presence of the courts, here as in all areas, has been a major factor in determining how far those powers can go. Although the framers viewed the Judiciary as the least dangerous, least powerful branch of government, their impact in shaping the powers of both the
Page 75 Executive and the Legislature is powerful indeed. See Ethics; War Powers Resolution; various court cases. FOR FURTHER READING Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990). Biden, Joseph R., Jr., and John B. Ritch III. 1988. “The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A Joint Decision Solution.” Georgetown Law Journal 77:367–415. Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 323 (D.D.C. 1984). Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (1982). Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). Drachman, Edward R., and Alan Shank. 1997. Presidents and Foreign Policy: Countdown to Ten Controversial Decisions. Albany: State University of New York Press. Edwards, George C., and Steven Shull. 1985. The Presidency and Public Policy Making. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Ely, John Hart. 1988. “Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked.” Columbia Law Review 88:1379–1427. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Glennon, Michael J. 1984. “The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More Politics than Law.” American Journal of International Law 78:571–85. Grimmett, Richard F. 1996. ‘‘The War Powers Resolution: TwentyTwo Years of Experience.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report. Grimmett, Richard F. 1999. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–1999.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Keynes, Edward W. 1982. Undeclared War: Twilight Zones of Constitutional Power. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Lobel, Jules. 1986. “Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 134:1035–1111. Lofgren, Charles A. 1972. “WarMaking Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding.” Yale Law Journal 81:672–700. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (1987). Monaghan, Henry P. 1993. “The Protective Power of the Presidency.” Columbia Law Review 93:1–77. Nelson, Michael. 1998. The Evolving Presidency. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971). The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863). Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Tarr. 1999. American Constitutional Law. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935). U.S. v. CurtissWright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Vance, Cyrus R. 1984 “Striking the Balance: Congress and the President under the War Powers Resolution.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133:79–96.
Page 76 Yoo, John C. 1996 “The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers.” California Law Review 84:167–230. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Paul Weizer
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT—Constructive engagement was a policy designed and pursued by Dr. Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the Reagan administration. The policy culminated in the signing of the Tripartite Agreement, on December 22, 1988 in New York, between the governments of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, bringing about peace in Southern Africa. Constructive engagement was a product of U.S. policy toward the racist apartheid South African government. Crocker believed that bloodshed, the hallmark of political change in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe during the 1970s and 1980s, could be circumvented in South Africa and Namibia through a policy of “linkage.” The apartheid government could be encouraged to move toward majority rule domestically by linking Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to South African implementation of Resolution 435. Resolution 435 was a 1978 UN Security Council Resolution that provided for Namibian sovereignty following South African withdrawal from the mandate territory awarded to South Africa by the League of Nations after World War I and renewed as a Trust Territory by the UN following World War II. The Reagan policy of constructive engagement, like the policies of Nixon and Ford’s “open communication” and Carter’s “human rights” toward the apartheid government, was designed to facilitate evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, political change in South Africa to protect U.S. economic, political, and military interests. Despite UN Security Council Resolution 418 of 1977, which provided for a mandatory embargo on arms sales to South Africa, the U.S. government covertly continued to support South Africa economically, militarily, and politically. See SubSaharan Africa. FOR FURTHER READING Crocker, Chester A. 1980. “South Africa: Strategy for Change.’’ Foreign Affairs 59:323–51. Crocker, Chester A. 1992. High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Rodman, Peter W. 1994. More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Darrell P. Kruger
CONTRAS—Name given to insurgent forces supported by the U.S. in their efforts to overturn the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. U.S. support of the Contras became a controversial issue in the U.S. when it was discovered in 1987 that members of the Reagan administration’s National Security Council staff
Page 77 had supplied the Contras with arms and other material, despite a congressional ban on such actions. See Ethics; Latin America and the Caribbean. FOR FURTHER READING Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. LaFeber, Walter. 1997. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1996, 8th ed. New York: McGrawHill. Schoultz, Lars. 1998. Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. James Henson
Constitution; Ethics; War Powers Resolution. FOR FURTHER READING Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 323 (D.D.C. 1984) 142. Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Paul Weizer
Media; Public Opinion. FOR FURTHER READING Bostdorff, Denise. 1994. The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Jill Glathar
Page 78 Foreign Policy Decision Making; Rational Choice. FOR FURTHER READING James, Patrick, and John R. Oneal. 1991. “The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President’s Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35:307–32. Ostrom, Charles W., Jr., and Brian L. Job. 1986. “The President and the Political Use of Force.” American Political Science Review 80:541–66. Steinbruner, John D. 1974. The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Steven B. Redd
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D DATA SETS ON THE USE OF FORCE—Data sources on interstate conflict have become increasingly more available in recent years. They exist in both electronic and printed forms and can be used for analyzing interstate and intrastate conflict. However, before any conflict data can be systematically gathered, researchers must first provide clear nominal and operational definitions of the type of conflict that they wish to study. Because the definitions of conflict can vary widely, the data gathered can also vary widely. This presents a problem for researchers interested in studying events involving the U.S. uses of force. In spite of some excellent sources of event data on interstate conflict, there are no electronic data sources that focus specifically on the U.S. uses of force since the first Congress in 1789. Furthermore, the few printed sources are often simple lists of events with little or no additional information about the level of force used. Thus, any researcher wishing to systematically study the U.S. uses of force will need to adapt existing data sources and suffer the consequences of questionable validity and missing cases. The researcher may create his/her own data set, but this would be an immensely difficult task, especially if the temporal context predates World War II. This discussion will provide researchers with a template that identifies some of the most reliable data sources, and delineate the types of events that are available (and unavailable) in each source. MAJOR DATA SOURCES To simplify this objective I have selected data sources that meet basic criteria. First, the data sources must include many events involving the U.S. use of force short of war, and cover an extended period of time. Many sources include only a few events (e.g., major conflicts), or cover a relatively narrow span of time.
Page 80 Second, the data set itself, and the primary sources that it relied on, must be readily available to scholars. My discussion will focus on six different data sources. I will also briefly address several others. The six data sets are as follows: Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Services Abroad, 1798–1999, Richard Grimmett, 1999. (Grimmett CRS Report) Militarized Interstate Disputes Data, Stuart A. Bremer, 1996. (MID) International Crisis Behavior Project, 1918–1994: Part 2, Foreign Policy Crises, Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 1996. (ICB2) Conflict and Peace Data Bank, 1948–1978, Edward E. Azar, 1980. (COPDAB) International Military Intervention, 1946–1988, Frederic S. Pearson and Robert A. Baumann, 1992. (IMI) Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, 1978; updated by P. D. Zelikow, 1987, and Benjamin Fordham, 1998. The events presented from these data sets all share the following features. First, they can be adapted to isolate only uses of force by the U.S. military outside the territorial boundaries of the U.S. Thus, domestic uses of force (e.g., the Civil War), and instances of U.S. citizens operating as paramilitary forces (e.g., volunteers in Israel in 1948 or mercenaries in Nicaragua during the 1980s) are generally not included or can be isolated from the analysis. Second, whenever a data set included events that involved the unilateral use of force by other states, or when events were recorded that fall short of the use of force, these cases were filtered from the data in order to create a subset of the data that, as well as possible, isolated events involving only the U.S. use of force. The data sets discussed below either already meet these criteria or were adapted as best as possible to isolate events that meet these criteria. Thus, although many of these data sets provide rich and diverse information, the comparisons are made with respect to the usefulness of each data set for studying the U.S. use of force. The following pages address each of these data sets specifically. Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Services Abroad, 1789–1999 The Grimmett CRS Report is a printed data set compiled by Richard F. Grimmett as a Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. It is composed of approximately 277 separate events with each event accompanied by a brief descriptive text. The report lists uses of military force abroad, but does not include covert operations, post–World War II occupations, and participation in mutual security organizations. The events recorded here are important for the focus of this book for several reasons. First, this report covers all the years of U.S. statehood. Second, of the approximately 277 separate events listed, only five are formal declarations of war. The vast majority of events are lowerlevel uses of force against both state and nonstate actors. However, because the report
Page 81 Table 2 U.S. Use of Force, 1789–1816 (select sample of recorded events unique to each data set) Grimmett CRS Report 1798–1800 Caribbean Recurring naval conflict with French privateers 1801–1805 Triploi First Barbary War 1806–1814 Florida Recurring conflict in Spanish territory and surrounding islands 1812–1815 United War of 1812 Kingdom 1814–1825 Caribbean Response to more than 3,000 pirate attacks
does not include covert operations, it omits such cases as the Bay of Pigs invasion or Operation Mongoose. In spite of these limitations the Grimmett report includes many important events that predate the time frame of the other data sets. Table 2 provides a select sample of some of the U.S. uses of force prior to 1816. Except for the War of 1812, most of these force events were to ensure safe passage of U.S. shipping and to retaliate for violations of territorial integrity. It is noteworthy that the majority of these events were aimed at nonstate or pseudostate actors (pirates) during the early years of the republic. Militarized Interstate Disputes Data (MID) In the years following its 1996 update, Stuart Bremer’s Militarized Interstate Disputes Data has become perhaps the most widely used data set for studying interstate conflict. The data are organized dyadically, that is, pairing the two states engaged in the dispute, and provide information about the conflict and the role of each state in the conflict. Militarized interstate disputes are operationally defined as united historical cases in which the threat, display, or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed toward the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. MID is an immensely valuable resource for researchers interested in interstate conflict. It is an extension of earlier work on the Correlates of War project, and is the product of some of the best scholars in the field. Furthermore, it is publically available to any researcher. Although the MID data focus on the use of force, this focus is contextually specific. MID measures the use of force only between formal members of the interstate system (no nonstate actors) involving regular forces (no covert operations), resulting from an argument between two states. It is possible to confine the MID data to cases involving the use of force by the U.S. This is done by
Page 82 Table 3 U.S. Use of Force, 1816–1918 (select sample of recorded events unique to each data set) Grimrnett CRS Report Small Retaliatory Strikes for Attacks on U.S. Citizens and Military Personnel: Sumatra (1832 and 1838), Fiji Islands (1840), Samoa (1841), China (1843) Military Presence to Protect U.S. Interests and Property during Civil Unrest: Argentina (1833 and 1852), Peru (1835), China (1858 and 1901), Angola (1860), Hawaiian Islands (1870, 1889, and 1893), Korea (1871, 1888, and 18941896) Additional Force Events: 1853–1854 Japan Commodore Perry Opening of Japan 1857 Nicaragua Removal of William Walker 1899–1901 Philippine Defeat of Filipinos in war of independence Islands Militarized Interstate Disputes Data Set 1837 Canada Caroline Affair 1838 Canada Aroostools War 1853 Austro Koszta Affair Hungary 1861 United Trent Affair 1881 & 1882 Haiti Pelletier Case I and II 1903 & 1905 Venezuela Venezuelan and Dominican Debt Crises
filtering the data to include dispute dyads in which the U.S. is either the initiator or target of the dispute, and then filtering the data yet again to include dyads in which the U.S. threatens, displays, or directly uses force. This produces a total of 246 separate events in which the U.S. used force during a militarized dispute with another state from 1816 to 1992. Unfortunately, in spite of the value of the MID data, such a contextually specific definition captures only a minority of cases in which the U.S. has employed military force over this time period. A comparison of the MID data with the Grimmett CRS Report reveals how having different definitions of the use of force can produce very different sets of events. For the time period from 1816 to 1992, the Grimmett CRS Report identifies 212 events involving U.S. use of force, and the MID data identify 246 events. Yet, the two data sets identify only 110 of the same events. Table 3 compares a select sample of events from the Grimmett CRS Report with a select sample of events from the MID data for the years from 1816 to 1918. The events presented for the Grimmett CRS Report are not included in the MID data, and the events presented for the MID section of Table 3 are not included
Page 83 in the Grimmett CRS Report. The events in the Grimmett CRS Report do not appear in the MID data because they do not meet the operational definition of a militarized interstate dispute. Some of the events involve retaliatory strikes for harm done to U.S. citizens or military personnel against entities that were not recognized as sovereign members of the international state system. Other events did involve sovereign state, but force was not used in the context of an interstate dispute. Rather, force was employed to protect U.S. property or interests during a time of political instability. Many of the events are examples of 19thcentury U.S. “gunboat diplomacy” that reveal a great deal about the nature of U.S. foreign policy, but are not formally a militarized interstate dispute. The events unique to the MID data are indeed formal disputes involving borders, shipping, or U.S. citizens, but the level of force used by the U.S. military was not sufficient to be included in the Grimmett CRS Report. International Crisis Behavior: Part 2 (ICB2) Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld have produced a data set of interstate crisis events. The ICB data cover all international crises occurring from 1918 to 1994. The events are presented as two separate data sets. Part 1 contains macrolevel (systemlevel) variables about various dimensions of a crisis. Part 2 contains micro level (statelevel) data about the actors involved in the crisis. Although not all international crises involve the use of force, it is possible to concentrate on Part 2 and retrieve only those international crises in which the U.S. was involved, and used military force. One of the variables in the data set indicates whether or not the U.S. was involved (USINV) in the crisis, and also indicates the level of involvement. Levels 7 and 8 indicate semimilitary and direct military involvement, respectively. It is also possible to use a variable that indicates an actor’s major response (MAJRES) to a crisis. For this variable levels 6 through 9 indicate increasing levels of military involvement. Using these two variables, it is possible to isolate a total of 110 international crisis events between 1918 and 1994 in which the U.S. used military force. The nature of the operational definition of an international crisis makes it possible to record different crisis events that occur within the larger context of a major war. Thus, many of the events unique to the ICB2 data are crises occurring during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnamese War. Table 4 focuses on the 1918 to 1945 period and compares the ICB2 data with the previous two data sets by selecting a sample of events that are unique to each. Again, the Grimmett CRS Report records events that involve the protection of U.S. interests, but not necessarily interstate disputes. The MID data event is a formal dispute that involves a low level of force. The ICB2 data record either international crises in which U.S. marginal involvement led to the use of force, or crises that were watershed events within the context of a major war. Nevertheless, all the events in Table 4 involve the use of military force by the U.S.
Page 84 Table 4 U.S. Use of Force, 1918–1945 (select sample of recorded events unique to each data set) Grimmett CRS Report Military Presence to Protect U.S. Interests and/or Property: China (19121941), Honduras (1919, 1924, and 1925), Turkey (1919 and 1922), British Bases in Newfoundland and the Caribbean (1940), Greenland, Iceland, and Dutch Guiana (1941) Militarized Interstate Disputes Data Set 1926 Alaskan Dagu (Taku) Harbor Territory International Crisis Behavior: Part 2 1920 France Cilician War 1921 Czechoslovakia Karls Remm to Hungary Crisis Events during World War II 1941 Germany/USSR Operation Barbarossa 1942 Germany E1 Alamein 1943 Italy Fall of Italy 1944 Germany DDay Invasion 1945 Japan HiroshimaNagasaki
Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948–1978 Once the time frame of events enters the post–World War II period, more data sets become available and they record a much higher percentage of identical events. The Conflict and Peace Data Bank was originally the work of Edward E. Azar and is an extraordinary effort at recording daily events from around the world, drawing on numerous journalistic and historical sources. The unique aspect of COPDAB is that it records events involving aspects of both conflict and cooperation at both the international and domestic levels. It is possible to isolate international from domestic events, and measure the level of international interaction by means of an International Events Cooperation/Conflict Scale. The scale ranges from 1 to 15 with 1 being the most cooperative and 15 having the most conflict. Based on the coding of the events, any international event with a score of 13 or higher is an event that involved at least a minimal use of military force. It is therefore possible to isolate international conflict events involving the use of force by the U.S. Because COPDAB is so thorough in its recording of daily events, it produces a total of 965 events involving the U.S. use of force over a thirtyyear period. The relatively high number of events is the result of recording daily events. Thus, in most other data sets, large numbers
Page 85 of these events would be collapsed into a single event. Nevertheless, COPDAB offers the researcher a great deal of flexibility in how the data can be employed. Although the COPDAB research concludes with 1978, the same coding project is now being conducted by the Global Events Data System (GEDS) under the direction of John L. Davies. The GEDS project has continued the coding work started by COPDAB and has data for the U.S. interactions from 1979 to the mid 1990s with Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Libya, and the Soviet Union, plus U.S. interactions with 120 states for the remainder of the 1990s. Although the GEDS data are not presented here, they are available for downloading via the GEDS project at the University of Maryland. International Military Intervention (IMI), 1946–1988 Frederic S. Pearson and Robert A. Baumann have compiled a data set that can be adapted to isolate events involving the U.S. use of force. Their data set, entitled International Military Intervention, 1946–1988, identifies politically important actions which interpose a state directly into the conflict patterns occurring in another state, and which conceivably involve a breach of the sovereignty of the target state. Because each event inherently involves the use of force, events involving the U.S. can be easily isolated from the rest of the data set. This provides seventytwo events over the fortytwoyear period. The vast majority of these events can also be found in one or more of the data sets that have already been discussed. Nevertheless, the IMI data do provide some U.S. force events not covered by the other data sets (see Table 5 below). Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument Benjamin Fordham extended earlier data sets with his own research to produce a data set that is specifically designed to record events involving the U.S. use of force from 1949 to 1994. Fordham has emphasized the potential validity problems that can result when attempting to use some of the interstate conflict data sets to study the U.S. use of force. Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan compiled the data from 1949 to 1976, and Phillip Zelikow extended it to 1984. The last ten years of data are supplied by Fordham himself. The result of this effort is a data set that covers the years 1949 through 1994, and provides a total of 358 separate events involving the U.S. use of force. The focus of the study for which this data set was compiled is the attractiveness of force as a policy instrument. Thus, the levels of measurement, rather than being hostility levels, measure the components of force used to create the threat perception. The components are measured on a fivepoint scale ranging from minor components of force, to naval, ground, or air use of strategic or theater nuclear units.
Page 86 Table 5 U.S. Use of Force, 1945–1999 (select sample of recorded events unique to each data set) Grimmett CRS Report 1945 China 110,000 Troops to Disarm Japanese Soldiers 1999 Balkans Air Campaign and Humanitarian Relief in Kosovo/ Yugoslavia Militarized Interstate Disputes Data Set 1979 Cuba Stationing of Soviet Combat Troops 1980 Yugoslavia Soviet Threat after Tito’s Death International Crisis Behavior: Part 2 1964 Ethiopia Ogaden: Repeated in 1977 and 1982 Conflict and Peace Data Bank Feb. 13, 1950 Uganda Bomb Uganda Villages July 5, 1950 North Korea 50 U.S. Casualties July 6, 1950 North Korea Bomb Railroads, Bridges, and Airfields July 8, 1950 North Korea Destroy 40 Tanks 1964–1973 N. & S. Report Instances of Use of Force as Separate Daily Events Vietnam International Military Intervention 1978 Guyana Jonestown Killings 1985 Italy Response to Achille Lauro Hijacking Force Without War: Updated 1954 China British Airliner Shot Down by China 1981 Egypt Sadat Assassination and Security of Sudan 1982 Lebanon/ Response to Israeli Invasion of Lebanon Israel
Data sets that focus on the U.S. use of force are more likely to identify identical cases during the post–World War II era. Nevertheless, no two data sets will be perfectly identical. Table 5 examines the years 1945 through 1999. Although there is a great deal of overlap among these data sets for this time period, each presents cases of the U.S. use of force that are not included in any of the others. Any event not included in a data set should not be interpreted as an oversight on the part of the data collector; rather, it is the result of slightly different operational definitions for the use of force. In fact, any force event unique to a data set is illustrative of the strength of that data set relative to its operational purpose.
Page 87 ADDITIONAL SOURCES In addition to the data sources discussed above, sources exist which, although not as comprehensive in detail and scope, nevertheless are useful for studying the U.S. use of force. These works not only provide partial lists of U.S. force events, but they also offer valuable bibliographic references. Below is a brief description of a select sample of these works. Collins, John M. 1991. America’s Small Wars: Lessons for the Future. Washington, DC: Brassey’s. The focus of this book is to study U.S. involvement in Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs). It was originally published as a Congressional Research Report and examines sixty LICs that range from U.S. forces in the Philippines (1899–1913) to Panama (1987–1990). It provides numerous tables and figures that analyze the conflicts according to various criteria. It concludes with an appendix that presents each event as a twopage case study. Jessup, John E., ed. 1994. Encyclopedia of the American Military: Studies of the History, Traditions, Policies, Institutions, and Roles of the Armed Forces in War and Peace. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. This threevolume set is impressive in its coverage of various topics related to U.S. military history. Each volume is accompanied by an introductory timeline that lists important military events in America, beginning with the expeditions of Christopher Columbus in 1492 and ending with the 1992 election of President Bill Clinton and his policy to lift the ban on homosexuals in the military. Although the timeline is very useful and presents many instances of the U.S. use of force, it includes many important military events that do not involve the use of force in any way. Nevertheless, it is a useful source of U.S. military events, especially during the colonial period. Jessup, John E. 1985. A Chronology of Conflict and Resolution, 1945–1985. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Conflict can be defined in many ways. Because of this, Jessup forgoes a strict operational definition of conflict in favor of a more flexible criterion of whether or not the event caused human misery. Nevertheless, the conflict events recorded here all seem to involve the use of force by one or more parties. Additionally, much of the book chronicles the resolution of conflict. The book is organized such that each year begins a new chapter. Each chapter presents events organized by the month and day of the event. This organization is very useful for identifying events occurring within a defined time frame, but it is more difficult to isolate events for a particular state or region by using an index.
Page 88 Tillema, Herbert K. 1991. International Armed Conflict Since 1945: A Bibliographic Handbook of Wars and Military Interventions. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Tillema presents approximately 269 events on international war and foreign policy intervention. Each chapter presents a geographic region, and then a chronology of events. The strength of this book is that it provides more than a simple list of events. Rather, each event is accompanied by a description that ranges in length from approximately 50 to 300 words. Furthermore, each event is accompanied by numerous bibliographic citations. Although the book is rich in reference information, events involving the U.S. are included along with others. Thus, isolating only U.S. events would require the researcher to filter through the entire book. Wormuth, Francis D., and Edwin B. Firmage. 1989. To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law, 2d ed. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. This book is primarily interested in studying presidential authority to use force and attempts at retraining that authority. In so doing, the book addresses numerous instances of military force used without formal congressional approval. Each case is presented as a legal test of presidential authority which can provide valuable contextual information that affected the use of force. CONCLUSION Even a cursory examination of the various data sources reveals the current difficulties for conducting a systematic longitudinal study of the U.S. use of force. In spite of the high quality of existing data sets on interstate conflict, validity is seriously compromised when these are used to study U.S. use of force. For example, a researcher using the MID data to study the relationship between democracy and the pacifist/bellicose international behavior of the U.S. would omit more than half of the 19th century events in which the U.S. used force to serve its national interest. For those data sets that are more operationally constructed to focus on the U.S. use of force, they are restricted to the post– World War II period, thereby making the temporal context of the research conterminous with the U.S. being a superpower. Researchers must currently decide whether to curtail their research questions to fit the available data, or conduct an extensive data collection effort that recognizes the multifaceted ways that military force is employed and extend the horizon of the collection to include both the 19th and 20th centuries. Clearly, the latter is preferable. But until such data become available to scholars, many fundamental questions about the U.S. use of force will remain systematically and quantitatively untested. See Asia and the Pacific; Europe; Introduction; Latin America and the Caribbean; Middle East; SubSaharan Africa.
Page 89 FOR FURTHER READING Azar, Edward E. 1980. ‘‘The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) Project.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24:143–52. Azar, Edward E. 1993. Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948–1978. [Computer file]. 3d release. College Park: University of Maryland, Center for International Development and Conflict Management [Producer]. Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1993. Blechman, Barry M., and Stephen Kaplan. 1978. Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1996. International Crisis Behavior Project, 1918–1994 [Computer file]. 3d ICPSR version. College Park: Michael Brecher and Johnathan Wilkenfeld, University of Maryland [Producers]. Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1998. Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1997. A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Bremer, Stuart A. 1996. Militarized Interstate Disputes Data. http://pss.la.psu.edu/ MID_DATA.html. Collins, John M. 1991. America’s Small Wars: Lessons for the Future. Washington, DC: Brassey’s. Davies, John, and Chad McDaniel. 1994. “A New Generation of International EventData.” International Interactions 20:55–78. Fordham, Benjamin. 1998. “The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 1949–1994.” International Studies Quarterly 42:567–90. Grimmett, Richard F. 1999. “Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–1999.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report. Jessup, John E. 1985. A Chronology of Conflict and Resolution, 1945–1985. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Jessup, John E., ed. 1994. Encyclopedia of the American Military: Studies of the History, Traditions, Policies, Institutions, and Roles of the Armed Forces in War and Peace. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. 1996. “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 15:163–213. Ostrom, Charles W., Jr., and Brian L. Job. 1986. “The President and the Political Use of Force.” American Political Science Review 80:541–66. Pearson, Frederic S., and Robert A. Baumann. 1992. International Military Intervention, 1946–1988 [Computer file]. St. Louis: University of Missouri–St. Louis, Center for International Studies [Producer]. Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research [Distributor], 1993. Tillema, Herbert K. 1991. International Armed Conflict Since 1945: A Bibliographic Handbook of Wars and Military Interventions. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Wormuth, Francis D., and Edwin B. Firmage. 1989. To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law, 2d ed. Urbana: University of Illinois Press . Zelikow, Phillip D. 1987. “The U.S. and the Use of Force: A Historical Summary.” In
Page 90 Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam, ed. G. K. Osborn et al. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Curtis Peet
Yugoslavia. FOR FURTHER READING Dayton Agreement. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayton.html. United Nations. 1996. The Blue Helmets. New York: United Nations. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Foreign Policy Decision Making. FOR FURTHER READING Allison, Graham T. 1969. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” American Political Science Review 63:689–718. Burke, John P., and Fred I. Greenstein. 1989. How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 & 1965. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Herek, Gregory H., Irving L. Janis, and Paul K. Huth. 1987. ‘‘Decision Making during International Crises: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31:203–26. Janis, Irving L. 1982. Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Neack, Laura, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick J. Haney, eds. 1995. Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. 1990. The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Steven B. Redd
Page 91 Constitution. FOR FURTHER READING Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990) 150. Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Paul Weizer
DEMOCRATIC PEACE—The debate over democratic peace dates back to Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace,” which spoke of perpetual peace and “pacific zones.” For over thirty years, scholars have wrestled with the hypothesis that “democracies rarely fight each other.” They have argued that the absence of war between democratic dyads demonstrates or proves the empirical proposition that democracies are generally at peace with each other. Most recent scholarship has focused on developing alternative theories to explain the lack of conflict between democratic nations. Russett has summarized this disparity: “Scholars … are nearing consensus that democraticallygoverned states rarely go to war with each other … [but] this does not mean that there is anything like consensus on why the phenomenon occurs.’’ The purpose of this essay is to discuss the theory of “democratic peace” and evaluate its relationship to both past and future instances of American use of force. The theory will be examined by considering its principal explanations: cultural/institutional, liberalism, and the political incentive. CULTURAL/INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS One method used to prove the validity of democratic peace involved using a crosscultural, rather than crossnational, point of view. Crosscultural research differs from crossnational research in that the latter compares countries while the former compares societies. Scholars have discussed the difficulties of finding “an adequate isomorphism” involving warfare between the societies under consideration. They explored the possibility of applying the terms “democratic” and “nondemocratic” to the political process in the ethnographic record, yet concluded that this would be too problematic. Therefore, crosscultural research
Page 92 designed to examine democratic peace theory needed to be conducted in absence of these terms. For that reason, the question was amended whether “political units with wider political participation engage in less warfare with one another than do less participatory political units.” The conclusion was that when people develop the ability to agree to disagree and that when they possess some degree of political power, they learn that they can peaceably resolve conflicts with other people with whom they share similar ideas about the political process. Exemplifying this cultural/perceptual explanation of how structures and behaviors are assumed to limit aggression—both internally and externally—is Russett’s notion that people who live within a democracy think of themselves as selfgoverning people who share norms and respect the rights of others to selfdetermination. However, these rules of cultural/perceptual limitations do not apply when the two countries in question are governed according to different norms and at least one is not democratic. Leaders of a nondemocratic nation are seen by members of a democracy as “in a permanent state of aggression against their own people and concomitantly also against foreigners.” The institutional/structural model is a related explanation of democratic peace. It argues that institutions particular to a democracy, such as division of powers or checks and balances, may thwart democratic leaders from initiating or engaging in armed conflict. Democracies, which permit participation from the populace, have a harder time declaring war than would a South American junta or SubSaharan African military dictatorship. Nonetheless, this explanation cannot explain why democracies are about as hawkish as other kinds of states (not toward other democracies, however). Democracies, however, are a special case, for if democratic leaders generally regard other democracies as dovish due to either institutional restraints or a general aversion of the people to war, they will not fear attack from another democracy. As Russett has claimed, “Two democratic states—each constrained from going to war and anticipating the other to be so inhibited—likely will settle their conflicts short of war.” However, it would be wrong to assume that democracies are pacifistic by nature because they tend to peaceably resolve conflicts with other democracies. Scholars generally agree that democracies are not more peaceful than other states in general, and are about as likely to go to war as are other kinds of polities. But international tranquility would logically follow the proliferation of democracy. As former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said a decade ago, ‘‘If we can create a great area of democracy stretching from the west coast of the United States ... to the Far East, that would give us the best guarantee of all for security because democracies don’t go to war with one another.” LIBERALISM Another approach to the democratic peace hypothesis is to evaluate the theory without an examination of cultures or political structures. Instead, one can dis
Page 93 cuss democratic peace in terms of liberalism. Michael Doyle, for example, traced the roots of 20thcentury liberal pacifism to theorist Joseph Schumpeter. He compared Schumpeter with Machiavelli, the 15thcentury classical Republican who is paired with liberal imperialism. Finally, Doyle addressed Immanuel Kant and liberal internationalism. It is here that Doyle discussed “Perpetual Peace” and the separate peace created by, and shared among, liberal states. It is important to understand the doctrines of liberal pacifism and imperialism for the purposes of comparison. Schumpeter cited the interaction of capitalism and democracy as the foundation for liberal pacifism. Furthermore, he believed that democratic capitalism leads to peace, stating that throughout the capitalist world an opposition has arisen to “war, expansion, [and] cabinet diplomacy.” He justified such aversion to war by explaining that only war profiteers and military aristocrats gain from wars, so no democracy would pursue such a minority interest and tolerate the high costs of imperialism. Even before the publication of Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1950), Schumpeter’s pacifist theory was under attack. Nevertheless, he continued to maintain that the capitalist democracy “steadily tells against the use of military force.’’ Machiavelli, the Renaissance philosopher, had taken a much different approach, arguing that republics are not pacifistic, but are instead the best form of government for imperial expansion. Machiavelli’s ideal republic was ancient Rome, characterized by social equality, popular liberty, and political participation. But Rome was no democracy with its consuls serving as kings, the senate as an aristocracy managing the state, and the assembly as a source of power. Other points of conflict include Schumpeter’s explanation of imperialism as “an objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion,” and Machiavelli’s view of imperialism being essential to the continuation and growth of the state. Doyle stated that modern liberalism carries two legacies. The first legacy was the pacification of foreign relations among liberal states. As an example, he mentioned that the U.S. and Great Britain had tense relations until the British Reform Act of 1832 extended the franchise and defined representation as the formal source of Parliamentary sovereignty. After the passage of the Act, the U.S. and Britain negotiated their disputes rather than engaging in subsequent “wars of independence.” Other examples included the AngloFrench entente against illiberal Germany in the years preceding World War I. Also related to the Great War, Italy—the only liberal member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria—refused to fulfill its obligations and instead fought on the side of Britain and France, thereby avoiding a liberalliberal fight. Doyle observed that “When states are forced to decide on which side of an impending world war they will fight, liberal states all wind up on the same side despite the complexity of the paths that take them there.” The second legacy is what David Hume called “international imprudence.” There Doyle argued that peaceful restraint only seems to work in liberals’ re
Page 94 lations with other liberals. It was also there that the relevance of Kantian theory was explained. Kant anticipated the everwidening pacification of a liberal pacific union guided by three “definitive articles” in a metaphorical “treaty” of perpetual peace. The First Definitive Article requires the constitution of the state to declare the state to be republican. By republican, Kant meant a political society that has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order. However, Kant further defined a liberal republic to be one that has preserved the legal equality of citizens on the basis of a representative government with a separation of powers. As Doyle explained, “republican governments are a source of the liberal peace.” The Second Definitive Article states that liberal republics will progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the pacific federation (foedus pacificum). Kant said, in “Perpetual Peace,’’ “If by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which is by nature inclined to seek peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among other states.” This federal association, he continued, will spread further and further by a series of alliances and is likely to prevent war. The Third Definitive Article establishes a cosmopolitan law “limited to conditions of universal hospitality.” Kant theorized that republican representation and separation of powers tame the ambitions of selfish, aggressive individuals by authority derived from representation, general laws, and nondespotic administration. It follows, Kant says, that under a republican constitution where the consent of the citizens is a prerequisite for a declaration of war, the people themselves would have to agree to submit to “all the miseries of war.” These miseries include the cost of actual resources, assuming a great burden of debts that might embitter peace and threaten the outbreak of new wars, and doing the fighting themselves. Furthermore, after aggressive interests are tamed and respect for individual rights is engrained in republican government, wars would appear as disasters to the people’s welfare. POLITICAL INCENTIVE EXPLANATION Some have charged that the democratic peace phenomenon can be better explained in terms of domestic political incentives, rather than cultural/institutional constraints and/or Kantian norms. This explanation assserts that the acceptance of “democratic peace” as a theory must rely upon successful statistical testing, but acknowledges that such testing is inherently difficult. The Kantian position, claim those who argue from this perspective, is also weak since it does not explain why democracies are just as likely as nondemocracies to go or not to go to war. The political incentive explanation states that a perpetual peace exists among democratic nations because their leaders have very few political incentives to fight. Its proponents argued that “leaders of democratic states do not use force
Page 95 against other democracies since such an action is perceived by the public as a failure of foreign policy…. There are only costs to the use of force, no political benefits.” The scholars that offer political explanations advanced that democratic peace exists because democratic leaders have a greater incentive to negotiate rather than escalate disputes, and because the public perceives war with other democracies as a foreign relations failure. In a democracy, such public perception is extremely important. In the U.S., for example, the president’s approval depends upon the quality of social, economic, and international outcomes experienced by the public. When a leader escalates a dispute, his or her risk of liability (or gain) is increased. If the target is a nondemocracy, a leader may receive political dividends, while he or she may lose public support if the target is a democracy. Democratic leaders, according to this explanation, are therefore unlikely to initiate an attack on other democracies. The aforementioned political dividends apply Hollander’s concept of “idiosyncrasy credit.” Hollander asserted that leaders could accrue or lose “credits’’ based on public perception. With enough credits, gained over time, a leader could take certain liberties such as idiosyncratic behavior. Using this concept, a leader’s awareness of his or her credit balance, and conformity to expectations based on that balance, demonstrates accountability to the public. The rarity of war between democratic dyads is therefore explained by the political leader’s need for an extreme amount of credits, which corresponds to an extreme amount of leeway and trust, for the public to tolerate an attack against another democracy. Since war between two democracies is so uncommon, Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz maintained that the only way to test the phenomenon is through experimentation. Each subject was asked to indicate a level of approval for three possible decisions dealing with the aggressor nation: use of force, containment, and isolationism. Some subjects were presented with a scenario in which the aggressor was a democracy, while others received a scenario where the target nation was a police state ruled by a military dictator. The results from this experiment confirmed several elements of the political incentive explanation. The three groups tested were sensitive to the regime of the target nation, and clearly differentiated between the democratic and nondemocratic regimes, verifying that the regime type is significant in public assessment of an international crisis. Additionally, the regime type affected the approval—or lack thereof—of the use of force. Last, the participants noted that the use of force against a democracy was perceived as more of a foreign policy failure than when used against a nondemocratic nation. The conclusion drawn from these experiments is that democratic peace results from a fear of poor approval, because the public treats the use of force against a democracy as a failure of foreign policy. Other experiments determined that negative domestic conditions put the leader metaphorically “in the red,” in terms of idiosyncrasy credits, making the use of
Page 96 force more likely for a simple “rally ’round the flag” effect. In this experiment, subjects who assumed the role of the president during a crisis were more likely to use force against a nondemocratic government than a democratic target due to approval rates. In conclusion, these studies demonstrated that democratic leaders are less likely to use military force against other democracies because leaders have few political incentives to do so and because it is counterproductive from a political standpoint, since it is viewed by the public as a foreign relations failure. WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS Despite the general support from scholars, one may question the validity of the democratic peace hypothesis. It may be true that restraint is exercised by democracies in regard to overt acts of war, but what about covert acts of state terrorism? The U.S., for example, has certainly assisted—and, in some cases, organized—covert forcible actions against elected governments of lessdeveloped countries such as Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1957), Brazil (1961), Chile (1973), and Nicaragua (1981). Can we claim that a democratic peace (1) exists and (2) has significance if the U.S. clandestinely invades or destabilizes a democratically elected government? American political leaders of the past twenty years have made consistent, positive mention of the existence of such a peace. In his 1994 State of the Union address, President Bill Clinton said, “Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other.” And, six years prior, President Ronald Reagan explained that Americans ‘‘believe that the greater the freedoms in other countries the more secure both our own freedoms and peace.” In 1992, only a few months after President George Bush announced the birth of a “new world order,” thenSecretary of State James Baker commented on the prospect of creating “a real and enduring peace: a peace rooted in a shared commitment to democratic government. It’s a peace that makes even the idea of war between the United States and its allies the stuff of fantasy.” Regarding the significance of democratic peace, one only needs to look at examples of U.S. use of force in the forty years after World War II. According to a data set that relies primarily on information released from Congress’s House Committee on International Relations, the U.S. used force in foreign territory about fifty times in nations such as Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, China, Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Lebanon, the Congo, Zaire, Chad, Egypt, Libya, Honduras, El Salvador, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Bolivia. However, at the respective times of intervention, these nations were either autocratic or anocratic, according to codings derived by political scientist Zeev Maoz. As for the attempted or successful overthrow of Mossadegh, Arbenz, Sukarno, Goulart, Allende, and Ortega, Russett cites them as examples of democratically selected leaders who turned away from the ideals of freedom and liberty, and,
Page 97 therefore, writes off these covert actions as skirmishes between the U.S. and illiberal nations. It also cannot be ignored that the American military and intelligence assets involved in these actions were tiny and did not fight in an organized fashion. Indeed, this fortysomeoddyear period of American history demonstrates that the U.S. does engage in militarized conflict often, but not with other democracies. The tenets of the democratic peace theory have been confirmed. Now that the theory has been explored, the question remains as to how it will impact future uses of U.S. force. Without a Soviet Bloc to target, how will future presidents—and Congress—wield American might? Perhaps the events of recent years in regard to foreign relations and policies will shed light on the answer. One distinct possibility is that military force in the future will be used to advance humanitarian objectives. Whereas the U.S. once deployed its troops to promote a free market global economy and to combat communist aggression and oppression, now it will be more likely to intervene in international conflicts on moral grounds. There have been numerous examples of this course of action over the past ten years, ranging from Somalia to Bosnia to Kosovo. American geopolitical and economic interests in these three locales were negligible, but the moral and humanitarian imperatives were perceived as substantial. One reason why the “democracies rarely fight each other” hypothesis has been discussed by scholars for more than thirty years is that there are significant consequences to democratic peace. If history is viewed as a chronicle of war and conquest, then a democratic world might—in a sense—represent “the end of history.” Fukuyama certainly agrees with such a perspective, yet the consequences of democratic peace should be discussed in a different essay. The purpose of this essay is to explore the theory of “democratic peace” and assess its relevance regarding U.S. use of force. Such exploration was conducted by examining the democratic peace hypothesis through the lens of cultural/perceptual and structural/institutional explanations, evaluating the role of Kantian liberalism in modern politics, and explaining pertinence of political incentive. The validity of the proposition was also discussed through interpretation of Russett and the relevance to U.S. history was determined through evaluating the actual and possible role of democratic peace in foreign involvements since World War II. See Ethics; Idealism; Multilateralism. FOR FURTHER READING Babst, Dean. 1972. ‘‘A Force for Peace.” Industrial Research (April):55–58. Baker, James A. “From Cold War to Democratic Peace.” U.S. Department of State Dispatch 26:505. Doyle, Michael. 1983a. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Part 1.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12:205–35. Doyle, Michael. 1983b. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Part 2.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12:323–53.
Page 98 Doyle, Michael. 1986. “Liberalism and World Politics.” American Political Science Review 80:1151–61. Ember, Carol R., Melvin Ember, and Bruce Russett. 1992. “Peace Between Participatory Polities: A CrossCultural Test of the ‘Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other’ Hypothesis.” World Politics 44:573–99. Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “The End of History?” The National Interest 16:3–18. Geva, Nehemia, Karl R. DeRouen, Jr., and Alex Mintz. 1993. “The Political Incentive Explanation of ‘Democratic Peace’: Evidence from Experimental Research.’’ International Interactions 18:215–29. Hollander, E. 1958. ‘‘Conformity, Status, and Idiosyncrasy Credit.’’ Psychological Review 65:117–127. Mintz, Alex, and Nehemia Geva. 1993. “Why Don’t Democracies Fight Each Other? An Experimental Assessment of the ‘Political Incentive’ Explanation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:487–503. Rummel, R. J. 1981. Understanding Conflict and War. Los Angeles: Sage. Rummel, R. J. 1983. “Libertarianism and International Violence.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 27:27–71. Russett, Bruce. 1990. Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Russett, Bruce M. 1992. “Esoteric Evidence on the ‘Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other?’ Phenomenon.” Edmund J. James Lecture, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign. Russett, Bruce M. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wallensteen, Peter. 1973. Structure and War: On International Relations, 1820–1968. Stockholm, Sweden: Raben & Sjogren. Theodore S. Hertzberg
Middle East. FOR FURTHER READING Freedman, Lawrence, and Efraim Karsh. 1995. The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. PBS Frontline Chronology. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/index.html. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Domestic Politics; Presidential Approval; Rally ’round the Flag.
Page 99 FOR FURTHER READING Coser, Lewis. 1956. The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: Free Press. DeRouen, Karl R., Jr. 1995. “The Indirect Link: Politics, the Economy, and the Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39:671–95. James, Patrick, and John R. Oneal. 1991. “The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President’s Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35:307–32. Morgan, T. Clifton, and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1992. “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force.’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 36:25–52. Simmel, Georg. 1956. Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Small, Melvin. 1996. Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Wang, Kevin H. 1996. “Presidential Responses to Foreign Policy Crises: Rational Choice and Domestic Politics.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:68–97. Karl R. DeRouen, Jr.
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT—The common term used in place of split party control of the American government (a president of one party, at least one house of Congress controlled by the other party). Divided government is often considered the major culprit for increased gridlock in American politics and has become very common in Washington. Since 1968, the government has been divided between the two parties twentysix of thirtytwo years. Clearly, divided government is not the sole cause of policy gridlock in Washington. Bicameralism (specifically the requirement that laws must pass both chambers of Congress) and the limited amount of time legislators have to act on legislation heightens gridlock considerably, with splitparty control enhancing gridlock already built into the system. David Mayhew observed that the American government churns out legislation at similar rates under divided government as unified government. Mayhew examined all of the major bills that passed in the period from 1946 to 1991, and found little variation between periods of divided and unified control of government. However, a careful examination of legislation that failed to pass, by Edwards, Barrett, and Peake, shows that more bills fail under divided government and the president is generally the source of gridlock, using vetoes and veto threats to block legislation. It is also important to note that the president’s agendasetting abilities in the legislative process seem to increase when his party controls Congress. Edwards and Barrett found that presidential bills make up nearly half of the major legislation considered by Congress during unified control, but only about a quarter when government is divided. This last point is particularly relevant to presidential use of force. Given the powers majority leaders have in Congress, particularly in the House, when the president’s party controls Congress, the leadership is less likely to challenge a presidential use of force directly through floor action. Challenges to the president
Page 100 may come in other forms, but the proclivity of the president’s party to support his actions serve to keep damaging resolutions from being scheduled. When government is divided, however, congressional leaders have distinct incentives to challenge the president and can do so through the legislative process, where they have the most control. See Congress; Two Presidencies. FOR FURTHER READING Binder, Sarah A. 1999. “The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96.” American Political Science Review 93:519–33. Edwards, George C. III, and Andrew Barrett. 2000. “Presidential Agenda Setting in Congress.” In Congress and the President in a Partisan Era, ed. Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Edwards, George C. III, Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake. 1997. ‘‘The Legislative Impact of Divided Government.” American Journal of Political Science 41:545–64. Mayhew, David R. 1991. Divided We Govern. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Jeffrey S. Peake
Congress; Diversionary Theory; Foreign Policy Decision Making; Public Opinion. FOR FURTHER READING James, Patrick, and John R. Oneal. 1991. “The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President’s Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35:307–32. Maoz, Zeev. 1990. National Choices and International Processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Maoz, Zeev. 1996. Domestic Sources of Global Change. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Morgan, T. Clifton, and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1992. “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36:25–52. Putnam, Robert D. 1993. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of TwoLevel Games.” In DoubleEdged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam. Berkeley: University of California Press. Small, Melvin. 1996. Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on
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U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Wang, Kevin H. 1996. “Presidential Responses to Foreign Policy Crises: Rational Choice and Domestic Politics.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:68–97. Wittkopf, Eugene R., and James M. McCormick, eds. 1999. The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Steven B. Redd
Multilateralism; United Nations. FOR FURTHER READING Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Haass, Richard. 1994. Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post– Cold War World. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Schild, Georg. 1995. Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American Economic and Political Postwar Planning in the Summer of 1944. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Karl R. DeRouen, Jr.
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E Multilateralism; United Nations. FOR FURTHER READING Bennett, A. Leroy. 1995. International Organizations Principles and Issues, 6th ed. Englewood, Cliffs, NJ. PrenticeHall. Luard, Evan. 1989. The United Nations: How It Works and What It Does. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan. United Nations. http://www.un.org/aboutun/. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Cold War; Middle East. FOR FURTHER READING Lenczowski, George. 1990. American Presidents and the Middle East. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Spiegel, Steven L. 1985. The Other ArabIsraeli Conflict. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ahmed H. Ibrahim
Page 104 ELECTORAL CONNECTION—Originally posited by David Mayhew in 1974, the electoral connection refers to the primary goal that influences much of the behavior of members of Congress, whether it be floor voting, joining committees, supporting the president, opposing the president, or championing particular policies. That primary goal is reelection. John Kingdon has further refined the goal to include making policy and institutional prestige and power; however, neither of these is attainable without first getting reelected. The electoral connection offers a parsimonious explanation for congressional behavior; however, many scholars blanch at the cynical nature of the theory. Because of the electoral connection, members of Congress keep an eye toward their constituency when voting, taking positions, or other activities that might influence the foreign policy of the president. James Lindsay suggests that the electoral connection is weakest in foreign policy, because constituencies pay little attention to foreign policies that do not have direct impacts at home. Members have more freedom to behave as trustees as opposed to delegates in foreign policy. However, as Lindsay notes, when constituencies become concerned with the direction of a particular foreign policy, members of Congress respond by adjusting their behavior. When media attention surrounding a presidential use of force is high, constituencies are likely to be attuned to foreign policy, and members of Congress may then behave differently in order to please their constituencies, especially if the use of force is unpopular. Overall, the electoral connection increases the difficulties of presidential leadership in Congress, because Congress and the president do not share the same constituencies. International relations scholars have suggested that presidents behave in a similar manner, with elections impacting presidential decisions to use force abroad. With mixed results thus far in the literature, it is unclear whether or not an electoral connection exists for the presidency in foreign policy. See Diversionary Theory; Presidential Approval. FOR FURTHER READING Arnold, Douglas. 1990. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hess, Gregory D., and Athanasios Orphanides. 1995. “War Politics: An Economic, Rational Voter Framework.” American Economic Review 85:828–47. Kingdon, John R. 1989. Congressmen’s Voting Decisions, 3d ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Lindsay, James. 1994. Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Nincic, Miroslav. 1990. ‘‘U.S. Soviet Policy and the Electoral Connection.” World Politics 42:370–85. Jeffrey S. Peake
Page 105 ETHICS—Ethical considerations provide an important constraint on the U.S. use of force. Ethics enter into all decision makers’ calculus, even if they are not aware of it, through the historical and philosophical traditions that underpin the ideologies which frame political thinking in the U.S. and elsewhere. These ideologies also influence the social norms which, in part, form the individual belief systems of leaders who make the decision to use force. Several strands of ethical thought have influenced the thinking of U.S. leaders over the course of its history. These ethical guidelines are in constant flux, however, since they are themselves affected by events and societal changes. In this essay we will provide an overview of several of the most important ethical viewpoints which have influenced U.S. leaders and their decisions to use force abroad. The tension between these viewpoints is a natural result of the domestic political and social changes within the U.S. and the international system as a whole. The trajectory of change at the domestic and system levels will help us understand which ethical considerations will become dominant in the future. MAJOR ETHICAL TRADITIONS We consider two important ethical traditions which affect the U.S. use of force: Realism and the Just War Doctrine. Each tradition has several variants, but the ethical debate between them focuses on the issue of means versus ends. Let us begin with some philosophical terms which clarify this distinction. The issue of whether “bad” means can be used for “good” ends is an important debate among philosophers of ethics. Our guidelines can be divided into teleological ethics, which emphasizes the results or ends of action, and deontological ethics, which determines the ethics of an action based on adherence to ethical rules or duties. The former, also termed consequentialism, is characteristic of many strands of Realism. An important consequentialist philosophical tradition is utilitarianism, and two major thinkers in this area are Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill. The deontological tradition has important roots in Christian (Roman Catholic) theology; the major secular philosopher in this area is Immanuel Kant. This is the foundation of the Just War Doctrine and its variants. Ethical traditions must deal with a fundamental dilemma regarding the use of force by states. Violence and killing which is normally considered criminal and immoral in the context of domestic society becomes legitimate when carried out by the state. Since the outcome for the victim of violence is the same, we must struggle to identify conditions under which these acts of violence can be considered ethical. This is the function of each of the traditions described below. In each tradition, two questions are central: when is it ethical to start a war (jus ad bellum) and what type of conduct is ethical in carrying out a war (jus in bello)? JUST WAR DOCTRINE These ideas originated in Christian (Catholic) theology and philosophy and were integrated into secular international law on aggression after the develop
Page 106 ment of the modern state system in 1648. St. Augustine was among the earliest and most prominent thinkers to write on this issue. Later, in the 12th century, St. Thomas Aquinas made important contributions. The Just War Doctrine is an example of a rulebased, deontological doctrine, whereby justice can be achieved if the rules are followed. While there is some variation among scholars, the following four ad bellum criteria and two in bello criteria make up the core of the Just War Doctrine. Justice in Starting War Right Authority: Only the highest authority in the country has the right to declare war. No lower authority, group, or individual has this right. Right Intention: (a) States must go to war only for the intention of restoring peace, not for conquest, revenge, economic gain, or other reason. (b) States must have a reasonable chance of success before you commit to war; if the odds against success (restoring peace/justice) are high, you have to use some other means. Last Resort: War must be declared only as a last resort, after all other means of resolving the conflict have been tried and failed. Just Cause: States must have a just cause to go to war. To generalize from international law on aggression, this may include: (a) selfdefense (of territory, citizens); (b) defense of allies who are unjustly attacked; (c) wars to restore “justice” where it had been denied in the past. Justice in War Conduct Discrimination: This is also called noncombatant immunity, which means only the soldiers or militaryrelated targets of the opposing side should be attacked— civilians are off limits. In practice this has meant that civilians cannot be directly targeted, but may nevertheless die indirectly as a result of an attack on a legitimate target. In the jargon of today’s U.S. leaders, this is called ‘‘collateral damage.” Proportionality: In all acts of war, leaders must weigh the good effects of the action (restoring justice/peace, winning the war) against the bad effects of the action (civilian deaths, military deaths, costs of war, likelihood of escalation, etc.). This is also called the doctrine of “double effect,” the good effects must outweigh the bad. Proportionality also applies to the decision to start the war. The potential good effect of the war must outweigh the bad. This is related to the reasonable chance of success criteria above.
Page 107 HISTORICAL ROOTS By the 4th century A.D., the conversion of the Emperor Constantine and the Christianization of Rome gave the Catholic Church a stake in the survival of the state. Thus, in contrast to the pacifist behavior of early Christians, pressures began to emerge for Christian participation in state armies. In City of God, Augustine proposed some of the basic ideas of right intention and just cause to reconcile the violence of war with the teachings of Jesus. Aquinas is credited with refining the just cause criteria. Theologians and scholars like Francisco de Vitoria and Emmerich de Vattel refined the doctrine in the middle ages, and it was integrated into international law by scholars such as Hugo Grotius. U.S. Roots Because the doctrine was based on Christianity and then intertwined with the development of the European state system and nascent international law, these ideas were brought to the new world and became an important strand of American thinking on ethics and the use of force. The ideas of right authority and just cause can be seen in the American desire, beginning with Washington’s farewell address, to avoid “entangling alliances.” Americans wanted to avoid European wars, not just out of self interest, but also because of the sense that wars begun by monarchs whose rule was illegitimate could not be just. That the idea of just cause is relevant in modern times is shown by the name given to the invasion of Panama in 1989: Operation Just Cause. While opponents gave the invasion the nickname “just cause” (as in “we invaded just because we wanted to”), the rhetoric of leaders often makes reference to ideas and criteria from the Just War Doctrine. This is particularly true when the use of force is more controversial. As an example, President Polk started the Mexican War claiming that the Mexicans had attacked first and “shed American blood upon the American soil.’’ This was challenged by Abraham Lincoln, then a congressman, with his “spot” resolutions demanding that Polk identify the exact spot where American blood had been shed on American soil. This example parallels the controversial claims of the Johnson administration that U.S. naval vessels had been attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964, which resulted in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the escalation of the Vietnamese War. The idea of just cause has been especially important in the major U.S. wars, including the Civil War, the two World Wars, Korea, and the Persian Gulf. While the initial act of aggression has sometimes been dubious, the appeal to avenge an injustice—from slavery, to the sinking of the Maine and the Lusitania, to the bombing of Pearl Harbor—has been a potent tool for moblizing public opinion in support of the use of force. Another area where U.S. leaders have appealed to the Just War Doctrine is the “defense of allies” criteria for just cause. Especially since World War II, the
Page 108 U.S. has often gone to great lengths to make sure that its actions are sanctioned by alliances. In addition to the UN actions in Korea and the Persian Gulf, examples include the Grenada invasion in 1983, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the Bosnian and Kosovo interventions in the 1990s. The idea of war as a last resort is also entrenched in the American political discourse. From the late entry into the World Wars to President Johnson’s reluctance to send “American boys to fight an Asian war,” most presidents find popular support for “keeping the U.S. out of war” until all other means have been tried. Recent debates have focused on whether economic sanctions or other less violent means have been given a chance to work (examples include the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Haiti occupation in 1994). Often, leaders will hold last minute negotiations to assure the public that the U.S. has gone the last mile for peace. Noncombatant immunity is an idea important to the U.S. military establishment as well as society. The desire to show that its military upholds this criterion, despite ample evidence to the contrary, is seen in Howard Zinn’s account of President Truman’s claim that Hiroshima, where the first atomic bomb was dropped, was “a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians.’’ In the late 20th century, Americans have invested in the new technology of laserguided “smart” bombs in part to solve the dilemma of noncombatant immunity, which was caused in part by the technological innovations which made massive destruction possible. Pictures in the media of “smart bombs” destroying their targets have been employed from the Persian Gulf War onward in an attempt to verify that indeed the military is doing all it can to safeguard innocent civilians. The issue of right authority is rarely questioned in the modern era, but beginning in the Vietnam era, especially after the passage of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, several uses of force have been challenged by critics on the basis of the failure to follow the Resolution and thus begin the war with “right authority.” This issue is linked to the early reluctance to accept force by nondemocratic regimes as legitimate, and is a key element of another deontological strand of U.S. ethical thought based on the theory of political idealism. IDEALISM The political rhetoric of Woodrow Wilson, who was both a U.S. president and one of the first political scientists in modern times, brought idealist doctrines into the mainstream of U.S. thought. Wilson’s fourteen points, written as a guide for ensuring peace in Europe following World War I, were founded on the Kantian notion that democracies tend to be peaceloving, and that nations which were denied selfdetermination were the victims of injustice. For Wilson, war is caused not by human nature but by bad governments. War can be avoided, according to idealism, if states are governed democratically, adhere to interna
Page 109 tional law, encourage interdependence through free trade, and deter war using collective security. Although in the European context Wilson applied this doctrine evenly, and advocated the League of Nations as a collective security organization based on democratic principles, in the Caribbean and Latin America his idealism was based not on democracy in the abstract but on the need for countries to adopt U.S.style political, and especially economic, institutions. David Cingranelli calls this thinking American “Exceptionalism,” and traces its roots to the idea of Manifest Destiny, the belief that God had shown that the American system is most just and thus the U.S. has an obligation to spread it. This is the ethical basis used to justify many of the interventions and uses of force in the imperialist era from 1898 to World War II; the turn of the 20th century, including events such as the SpanishAmerican War, the Philippine War, the invasions and occupations of Mexico, Haiti, Nicaragua; and others. It is also related to moral arguments used to justify taking land from Native Americans throughout the 19th century; because their culture and politics differed so greatly from the U.S., they could not possibly be considered civilized, and therefore held no moral right to possess their land. In the Cold War, and especially the post–Cold War era, appeals to the promotion of democracy have taken on a greater importance. This is related to the development in political science of a substantial body of research on the democratic peace proposition. This research, based on Kant’s arguments, shows that democracies are more peaceful, especially with each other. The finding that there has never been a war between democracies in the modern era has begun to filter into political rhetoric, and is cited as the basis of U.S. policy in places like Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1993), Kosovo (1998), and East Timor (1999). The U.S. claims to promote democracy not just out of selfinterest, exceptionalism, or justice, but because it will lead to a more peaceful world. Here, both the means and the outcome become important parts of the ethical debate. NONVIOLENCE Another variant of deontological thought that affects U.S. thinking on the use of force is nonviolence. This view assumes that since violence and murder are always immoral, no war is just. Yet, pacifism, or refusal to resist evil and injustice (as the word passive implies), is equally wrong. The nonviolent alternative requires active resistance to aggression and injustice using nonviolent means. Although nonviolence is often advocated by particular religious groups (such as Quakers or Mennonites in the U.S.), its most prominent advocates have not relied solely on religion to persuade people of its merit. Central to the argument of nonviolence is a belief in the connection between means and ends. Martin Luther King, Jr. argued that the ends and means of action are interconnected in process: the end is preexistent in the means, and
Page 110 so, in the long run, immoral and destructive means cannot bring about moral and constructive ends. He often cited the failure of communism as an example. The influence of nonviolence comes from societal forces in the U.S. The tradition of nonviolent protest in the U.S. dates back at least to the Boston Tea Party. Thoreau’s classic On Civil Disobedience, written in response to the Mexican War, has inspired activists in the U.S. ever since. Abolitionism was heavily influenced by nonviolent thinking. In the 20th century, inspired partly by the writings of Gandhi and the Indian revolution, King’s leadership of the civil rights movement brought non violence into the political debate. It influenced the anti–Vietnamese War movement and almost all social movements since. While advocates of nonviolence on the national level have been few, the idea that political conflicts should be solved without resort to violence is a core value of democracy, and is central to Kant’s argument about the peacefulness of democracy. To the extent that the U.S. embraces the promotion of democracy worldwide as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, the ethical debate about the use of force abroad will continue to be influenced by this minority view, which questions not just the ethics but the efficacy of violence for solving international conflicts. The next section examines the realist strand of ethical thought, which has been, perhaps, more important than the Just War Doctrine in influencing American political thought. Although they do not agree that means and ends are connected, realism and its variants share with the deontological theories above the goal of a more secure and prosperous U.S. REALISM Realism is a theory of international politics which deduces from assumptions about human nature and the structure of the international system the requirement that states pursue power and balances of power in order to achieve national security and order in the world. Because human beings are flawed or selfinterested, conflict is inevitable, and violence is likely. Since the international system is anarchic, states must rely on themselves for security. Anarchy makes it difficult to trust other states; cooperation is unlikely unless states share common interests. Since all states have an interest in preserving their sovereignty and independence, they can cooperate at times, especially when they share a common enemy or a common security threat. This leads states to form alliances which naturally check the aspirations of rising powers; if any state begins to get strong enough that others fear domination, alliances are generated to check the powerful state. However, due to human nature and the anarchy of the system, balanceofpower politics will only work for so long. War is inevitable in the long run. States which do not pursue a politics of prudence will eventually become vulnerable. Realism is often called an “amoral” doctrine, because states are called to place moral or ethical concerns at a lower priority than state survival. If governments
Page 111 act on behalf of their citizens, and therefore pursue the common good, it is permissible to pursue almost any means in order to protect the security of the nation. Thus, realism fits into the teleological or consequentialist category of ethical thought; the ends can justify the means. Ethical Roots of Contemporary Political Realism The historical roots of political realism are ancient, dating back 2,500 years to Thucydides and his History of the Peloponnesian War. Other major contributors are Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli, and in more modern times, Reinhold Neibuhr and Hans J. Morgenthau. In the early part of the 20th century, the debate between political realism and idealism took the form of isolationism and interventionism, respectively. For these political realists, isolationism was both a means and an end. From this perspective, U.S. involvement in European wars was bad because it entangled the U.S. in the very social and political problems from which earlier generations of European Americans had escaped. On the other hand, liberal idealists supported intervention based on the belief that humans could realize their social potential if placed in the framework of appropriate institutions, specifically, democracy and the rule of law. After World War II, these schools of thought were reversed with respect to the role of the U.S. use of force. In terms of foreign policy, realists now advocated military involvement in foreign lands while idealists criticized U.S. military involvement in Indochina, Latin America, and nuclear policy toward the Soviet Union. U.S. policy makers now viewed the use of force as an ethical obligation. This new appreciation for the appropriate use of military force was founded on a fundamental shift in the prevailing view of human nature. Earlier idealists believed that human behavior could be shaped through education and positive inducements. In concert, groups of peaceloving nations could cooperate in a manner that would serve both national and universal interests. However, the fragility of the interwar peace and the brutality of World War II seemed to be undeniable evidence that human nature was not variable, but constant. Individually, humans were egocentric to the point of depravity. Organized as groups, their innovation and enthusiasm combined with efficiency and bureaucratic detachment could implement the most horrific acts against humankind. In the U.S., this pessimistic view of human nature meant that power inevitably serves the egocentric interests of the nation wielding the power. The only way to prevent one nation from securing its interests at the expense of another is to check power with power. The ethical use of force was guided by the prudent exercise of power to deter aggression. This version of political realism found support among some theologians and secular academics. Reinhold Niebuhr was the most influential religious influence on U.S. foreign policy during the early decades of the Cold War. Niebuhr had written extensively during the interwar period and during World War II. In contrast to the social idealism that dominated mainline Protestant theology, Niebuhr argued that the depravity of human nature
Page 112 ensured that both absolute power and objective ethical principles could not be harmonized in the same human individual or human organization. The use of force could be justified to the extent that it was prudently deployed to protect one’s nation from being the victim of another nation’s use of military power. Other political realists from academia, such as Hans J. Morgenthau, shared views similar to Niebuhr’s. If human nature is inherently flawed, then even the best intentions of idealists, scientists, and nationalists will result in immoral outcomes when they are given the power to realize their goals. Thus, for Niebuhr and Morgenthau, the ethical use of force did not involve ridding the world of evil or leading other likeminded nations into a brave new world. Rather, force was justifiable only when confronted by a clear and present danger. In this manner, both Niebuhr and Morgenthau could support containing the expansion of the Soviet Union and the development of nuclear weapons. But they also opposed continuing the use of force when the Soviet Union showed interest in detente, and they objected to the Vietnamese War, viewing it as an unethical use of force in pursuit of a U.S. political ideal. This differentiates them from other ostensible political realists whose more hawkish leanings led them to view Soviet rapprochement as an opportunity to gain strategic advantage. Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy Most American presidents have pursued a realist foreign policy which emphasizes “national interest” above all other considerations. This might be termed a “national security’’ ethical doctrine, whereby a state may morally start any war that it deems necessary to protect its security. As for war conduct, moral considerations can be overridden if the action is necessary for national security. Since the Civil War, national survival has rarely been used to justify any use of force. (That is not to say that survival has never been risked. The Cuban Missile Crisis is an important example.) Rather, the prosperity of the nation, and also the safety of its citizens at home and abroad have been used as rationales for many interventions. This is true of many of the wars against Native Americans, as well as the vast majority of U.S. interventions in Latin America, China, and elsewhere in the developing world: the goal is often stated as a desire to protect U.S. lives and property. The national security doctrine also justifies U.S. alliance choices. In World War II, the U.S. aligned with the enemy of Germany’s enemy, the USSR. Especially in the 20th century, balanceofpower guidelines have led U.S. leaders to ally with any country, no matter how distasteful its politics or human rights record, if it serves U.S. interests at the time. This is illustrated by the famous quote attributed to Franklin D. Roosevelt about Anastasio Samoza of Nicaragua, who was installed as dictator with U.S. approval in 1933: “He’s an SOB, but he’s our SOB.” Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. used the danger of the Soviet threat to justify support of almost any anticommunist regime. Today, many
Page 113 argue that the outcomes of World War II and the Cold War are evidence that the ends do justify the means. Two variants of this national security doctrine have been significant in modern debates about the use of force. The first, suggested by Michael Walzer, is the “War Is Hell Doctrine.” Based on the famous dictum by General Sherman, the important ethical issue for both ad bellum and in bello considerations is basically “who started it?” Since the side which breaks the peaceful state of affairs brings on a situation in which normally intolerable actions like mass killing are made necessary, the side which starts that war is morally responsible for all of the death, violence, destruction, and wrongdoing brought about by the war. Thus, the South was morally responsible for Sherman’s burning of Atlanta and march to the sea, as well as all the terror of the Civil War, because the South started the war. Another implicit use of this doctrine was by President Truman, who, in explaining the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan, began his speech to the American people by noting that the U.S. had dropped this bomb on the country which had attacked Pearl Harbor. The second variant of national security is the “No Substitute for Victory Doctrine.” General MacArthur’s famous line from the Korean War has been important in debates about the conditions under which it is moral to begin and end wars. Wars can begin when threats to national security cannot be resolved in such a way that the U.S. is victorious. More important, wars should not be ended until the enemy has been completely crushed, and has accepted unconditional surrender. This doctrine reflects a historical frustration for the U.S. of winning the war and losing the peace. More important, it aptly justifies the American tendency to pursue a total victory. This is seen not only in World War II, but in the ratio of U.S. to enemy dead in most major confrontations in U.S. history. From wars against Native Americans, to the SpanishAmerican, Philippine, Korean, Vietnamese, and Persian Gulf Wars, the U.S. often kills massive numbers of enemy soldiers and civilians while losing only a small percentage of its own. This is often justified by utilitarian logic, as in the atomic bombings, whereby fewer people die if the war is ended quickly. The doctrine also justifies the policy of “decisive force’’ which emerged in reaction to the gradual escalation policy of the Vietnamese War. The idea here is that by threatening massive force, the enemy is likely to back down without a fight, and if force is used, the U.S. will end the conflict quickly and favorably with less loss of life, at least for U.S. soldiers. Since Vietnam, however, policy makers have been especially sensitive to public reluctance to see U.S. troops die in combat. CONCLUSION: THE LONE SUPERPOWER The ethical debate between realism and the just war tradition is likely to continue in the U.S. through the post–Cold War era. Realism has held the upper hand throughout most of the 20th century: though leaders refer to just war ideas
Page 114 in rhetoric, their policies have followed the realist school more often than not. The changes brought about by new technologies and the interconnectedness of the world created by the global economy may influence this debate in years to come. Some scholars argue that these economic and technological changes will affect the basis of state security such that states will no longer be able to use military means to achieve the prosperity they desire. If so, then the ethical debate about the use of force will diminish, because those means will not be often chosen to pursue the ends of U.S. foreign policy. On the other hand, the rise of ethnic conflict and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as the spread of unstable governments making the transition to democracy may make military conflicts more common. In such a world, the ethical debate regarding the use of force will take on greater importance, since the consequences of nuclear war continue to imperil national and perhaps human survival. We begin the new millennium with an evolving expectation about what constitutes the legitimate use of force, both unilaterally by major powers and multilaterally in the form of peacekeeping. It would appear that the ethical use of force by the U.S. is less guided by the prudence of political realism and more influenced by the ideals of human rights and freedom. On several occasions since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has participated in multilateral force operations that have had little direct bearing on U.S. security interests. In Somalia and Kosovo the use of force was judged ethical because of the human suffering that it would alleviate. If these cases are a preview of the future, then the U.S. must ask new questions about the ethical use of force. Can the U.S., either by itself or as part of the UN, be expected or trusted to use military force to prevent violence and ensure justice in all parts of the world? Certainly not. However, can a more limited use of force be applied, if not universally, at least nondiscriminately? This question is, and increasingly will be, at the center of the current debate surrounding ethics and the U.S. use of force. See Constitution; Democratic Peace; Idealism; Power Politics; Realism. FOR FURTHER READING Amstutz, Mark. 1999. International Ethics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Brown, Robert McAfee. 1986. The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected Essays and Addresses. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Cingranelli, David. 1993. Ethics, American Foreign Policy, and the Third World.New York: St. Martin’s Press. Kegley, Charles W., Jr. 1998. “Thinking Ethically About Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.” In Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post– Cold War Conflicts, ed. Tom Woodhouse, Robert Bruce, and Malcolm Dando. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1985. Politics Among Nations, 6th ed. (Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson.) New York: Knopf. Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1932. Moral Man and Immoral Society. New York: Charles Scribner and Sons.
Page 115 Pastor, Robert. 1987. Condemned to Repetition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Russett, Bruce M. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sharp, Gene. 1973. The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Boston: Porter Sargent. Thucydides. 1972. History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Weiner, ed. M. K. Finley. London: Penguin. Walzer, Michael. 1977. Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books. Washington, James M., ed. 1986. A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr. San Francisco: HarperCollins. Zinn, Howard. 1980. A People’s History of the United States. New York: HarperPerennial. Marc V. Simon and Curtis Peet
EUROPE—Despite close historical and cultural ties, the U.S. relationship with Europe has been anything but a smooth one. Soon after the promulgation of the second constitution, the U.S. waged an undeclared naval war on the French, who had only a few years before assisted the beleaguered colonists in their cause for freedom. In 1812 the new nation would once again declare war on Great Britain itself for perceived depredations against American shipping and sailors. The U.S. did not fare well in this conflict and immediately thereafter turned away from more than cursory involvement with Europe until events intervened more than a century later, after which the U.S. would play an increasingly dominant role in the Western world. Historically, military intervention in Europe by the U.S. has gone through several phases (see Table 6). Outside of two instances when the U.S. took on France and Great Britain in open warfare, the first phase consisted largely of naval operations against pirates interfering with American shipping in the Mediterranean Sea. The second phase of military intervention began with the U.S. entrance into World War I, its subsequent withdrawal back into isolationism, and, ultimately, its reemergence and active participation in World War II. The third phase picks up several years following the conclusion of hostilities in Europe and the declaration of the Cold War where the U.S. made the decision to remain not only politically and militarily engaged in Europe, but also assumed a position of leadership with the creation of NATO. Finally, the last phase, which is still in the processes of evolving, finds the U.S. redefining its role as it engages in military activities designed to not only maintain order, but to protect human rights in the besieged arena of the Balkans. PHASE I: THE CENTURY OF AVOIDANCE In order to prevent early European entanglements, President George Washington issued the Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793. It was his intent to avoid becoming involved in the war between France and Great Britain. There was some concern that the president did not have the constitutional authority to issue
Page 116 Table 6 Presidential Use of Force in Europe (adapted from Grimmett) YEAR LOCATION DESCRIPTION 1798– Dominican Republic The U.S. engages in an undeclared naval war with 1800 France, which includes land actions, such as the capture of a French privateer under the guns of the forts by Marines in Puerto Plata, Dominican Republic. 1827 Greece U.S. landing parties hunt pirates on the islands of Argenteire, Miconi, and Androse. 1849 Smyrna U.S. naval force gains the release of an American that had been captured by Austrian officials. 1851 Turkey The U.S. orders its Mediterranean squadron to demonstrate along the Turkish coast following a January massacre of Americans and other foreigners at Jaffa. 1858– Turkey The Secretary of State requests a display of U.S. 1859 naval force in response to the Jaffa massacre. 1912 Turkey U.S. forces guard American legation in Constantinople during a Balkan War. 1918– Soviet Russia Marines land at/near Vladivostok in June and July 1920 1920 to protect the American consulate and other points during fighting between the Czech Army and Bolshevik troops. 1919 Dalmatia (Croatia) U.S. forces land at Trau, at the request of Italian authorities, to police order between Italians and Serbs. 1919 Turkey Marines from the U.S.S. Arizona land to guard the U.S. consulate in Constantinople during Greek occupation. 1922 Turkey With the consent of Turkey and Greece, a U.S. landing force is sent ashore to protect American lives and property following the entrance of Turkish Nationalists into Smyrna (Izmir). 1941 Greenland U.S. takes Greenland under its protection. 1941 Iceland With the consent of Iceland's government, the country is placed under U.S. protection for strategic reasons. 1941 Germany President Roosevelt orders the navy to patrol the ship lanes to Europe. U.S. warships are convoying by July and attacking German submarines by September.
Page 117 YEAR 1946
LOCATION Trieste
1948– 1949
Berlin
1974
Cyprus
1985
Italy
1993
Bosnia
1993
Bosnia
1994
Bosnia
1994
Bosnia
1994
Bosnia
1994
Macedonia
1994
Bosnia
1994
Bosnia
DESCRIPTION After an unarmed U.S. Army transport plane is shot down by Yugoslav forces over Venezia Giulia in northern Italy, President Truman orders the augmentation of U.S. troops along the zonal occupation line and the reinfomement of U.S. air forces in northern Italy. The U.S. airlifts supplies to West Berlin, following the Soviet land blockade of the American, French, and British sectors of the city. The airlift continues until the blockade is lifted in May 1949. U.S. forces evacuate civilians during hostilities between Turkish and Greek Cypriot forces. U.S. Navy pilots intercept an Egyptian airliner carrying members of the PLO who had hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro. U.S. begins an airdrop of supplies to Muslims surrounded by Serbian forces. President Clinton reports that U.S. forces are participating in NATO air action to enforce the UN ban on all unauthorized flights over Bosnia Herzegovina. President Clinton reports that the U.S. has expanded its participation in the UN and NATO conflict resolution efforts in the former Yugoslavia and that 60 U.S. aircraft are available for authorized NATO missions. President Clinton reports that on February 28, U.S. planes, under NATO, shot down 4 SerbianGaleb planes in the nofly zone over the former Yugoslavia. President Clinton reports that U.S. warplanes under NATO fired against Bosnian Serb forces shelling the "safe" city of Gorazde, on April 10 and 11. President Clinton reports the reinforcement of the U.S. contingent in the former Yugoslavian republic of Macedonia by 200 personnel. President Clinton reports an August 5 use of U.S. aircraft under NATO to attack Bosnian Serb heavy weapons in Sarajevo's heavy weapons exclusion zone, at the request of UN protection forces. President Clinton reports a November 21 use of U.S. combat aircraft to attack bases in Binac, Bosnia that were being used by Serbs.
Page 118 YEAR 1994
LOCATION Macedonia
1995
Bosnia
1995
Bosnia
1995
Bosnia
1996
Bosnia
1996
Bosnia
1997
Albania
1997
Bosnia
1997
Bosnia
1998
Bosnia
DESCRIPTION President Clinton reports the continuation of the peacekeeping mission of the U.S. Army contingent in Macedonia. President Clinton reports the continued contribution of U.S. combatequipped fighter and other aircraft to the enforcement of the nofly zone in the airspace over BosniaHerzegovina. The UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) was also active. President Clinton reports the use of U.S. combat and support aircraft beginning August 29. President Clinton notifies Congress of the deployment of 1,500 U.S. military personnel to BosniaHerzegovina and Croatia as part of a NATO "enabling force" that will lay the groundwork for the prompt and safe deployment of the NATOled implementation force (IFOR). President Clinton reports to Congress that 17,000 U.S. forces remain deployed in Bosnia "under NATO operational command and control" as part of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). President Clinton reports to Congress his authorization for 8,500 U.S. troops to participate in an IFOR followon force in Bosnia, known as SFOR, under NATO command. President Clinton reports his March 13 utilization of U.S. military forces to evacuate certain U.S. government employees and private U.S. citizens from Tirana, Albania, and enhance security for the city's U.S. embassy. President Clinton reports to Congress the continued support of U.S. troops to the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and other regional states. President Clinton reports to Congress it was his intention to have the U.S. participate in a security presence in Bosnia for the NATO SFOR withdrawal in summer of 1998. President Clinton reports to Congress the activities of combatequipped U.S. forces in support of NATO's SFOR in Bosnia and other areas of the former Yugoslavia over the past six months.
Page 119 YEAR 1998
LOCATION Albania
1999
Bosnia
1999
Yugoslavia
1999
Albania, Macedonia, and Yugoslavia
DESCRIPTION President Clinton reports to Congress the August 16, 1998 deployment of 200 Marines and 10 Navy SEALS to the U.S. embassy compound in Tirana, Albania, to enhance security following reported threats against U.S. personnel. President Clinton reports to Congress his continued authorization of the use of U.S. combatequipped armed forces in Bosnia and other regional states as participants and supporters of the NATOled Stabilization Force (SFOR). In addition, 350 U.S. military personnel remain in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). President Clinton reports to Congress that on March 24, 1999, at his direction, U.S. military forces, in coalition with NATO allies, commenced air strikes against Yugoslavia in response to the Yugoslavian government's campaign of violence and repression against ethic Albanians in Kosovo. President Clinton reports to Congress that he has ordered additional 2,500 U.S. military forces, rotary wing craft, artillery, and tactical missiles systems to Albania in an effort to enhance NATO's ability to effectively conduct air operations in Yugoslavia.
such a proclamation (the issue was debated by Hamilton and Madison in the popular press) and Congress ultimately passed the Neutrality Act in 1794, so as to give statutory authority to the president’s action. The Act specifically forbade either the government of the U.S. or any of its citizens from exporting any item related to warfare to any other nation. The Act set specific penalties for those breaking the law, including fines and the forfeiture of ships found to be carrying contraband items to foreign ports. Several court cases arising from the Neutrality Act challenged the power of presidents to act outside of statutory authority. In each case, however, the courts argued that the president was bound to follow the lead of Congress in undertaking hostilities against a foreign power. This relationship held true in the first two instances when the U.S. would undertake military action against European powers. In making the Proclamation of Neutrality, President Washington was aware that as a young nation the U.S. could ill afford to engage the European powers— specifically England and France—in hostilities for an extended period of time. Yet, there was also a need for the U.S. to show its teeth on occasion, if for no other reason than to deter the great powers from absentmindedly preying on
Page 120 American interests as they went about their business. The first instance of military force was used against a European power for just such reasons, as was the second, fourteen years later. In the first case, from 1798 until 1800, the U.S. became involved in what has been described as a “quasiwar” against the French. While some scholars have argued that this conflict represents the first time a U.S. president utilized military force against a foreign power without congressional approval, this is not the case. In fact, President John Adams was sure that he did not have the authority to engage in open hostilities with Napoleon’s France without first seeking the consent of Congress, and he thus requested, and was subsequently granted, such permission. Military action against France in 1798 was the culmination of what became known as the XYZ affair. In 1797, President Adams dispatched three representatives to France in order to negotiate a treaty of commerce. However, once the delegation arrived, the French foreign minister, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, refused a meeting with the representatives and in his stead sent three agents later described as X, Y, and Z in American reports to the president. During negotiations, Talleyrand’s agents suggested that before any treaty would be signed, the U.S. would have to make a loan to the French government and pay a bribe to Talleyrand of $250,000. Adams refused to pay and reported the experience of his representatives to Congress. Popular resentment against France markedly increased and relations between the two countries began to decline precipitously. Congress, in 1798, authorized President Adams to block ships entering French ports. Adams, however, ordered naval vessels to both prevent ships from entering French ports and to detain ships leaving ports. This became a problem later when a U.S. naval vessel under the command of Captain George Little seized a Danish ship leaving a French port. Little was sued for his actions and the Supreme Court later ruled that the president did not have the authority to go beyond the specific orders of engagement passed by Congress. The U.S., despite its attempts at remaining politically neutral, was once again drawn into conflict with a European power a little over a decade following its naval actions against the French. Europe was embroiled in war once again in the early 19th century, this time resulting from the ongoing imperial pretensions of the infamous French general and selfproclaimed emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. While Napoleon’s armies swept over the European continent, the British held off the French on the oceans by virtue of naval superiority. However, since the British lacked the wherewithal to effectively fight the larger French army on land, and Napoleon found himself unable to successfully confront the British on the open seas, conflict continued unabated. The U.S., possessing no desire to find itself embroiled in such a wideranging war, assiduously attempted to avoid the entire debacle. However, the U.S. also traded with both France and Great Britain during this period, which placed American ships at risk of collateral damage and intentional acts of aggression by the warring parties. Ultimately, this inevitable clash of interests brought the U.S. into its first declared war. The War of 1812 was the last major military engagement fought by the U.S.
Page 121 against any European great power until the nation’s 1917 entrance into World War I. Neutrality continued to be the core of U.S. foreign policy when it came to relations with the European powers. The Concert of Europe, that political entity created as a product of Napoleon’s war, worked to bring order and stability to relations among the European powers for several decades. Relations between the U.S. and the great powers thus took on a greater degree of stability than had existed prior to the ascendancy of the Concert. While scholars debate exactly when the Concert began its decline into ineffectiveness, the Crimean War (1853–1856) once again brought the continent into conflict, although this time the fighting took place away from the major population centers of Europe. For its part, the U.S. avoided involvement in this or any other military action involving the great powers for the remainder of the 19th century, save for the SpanishAmerican War of 1898, which was confined largely to land and sea battles in the Caribbean and Asia. Lack of a U.S. desire to become involved in European affairs did not, however, prevent the European powers from attempting to meddle in the affairs of the U.S. There are a number of instances when Britain, France, and Spain attempted to cajole the U.S., or even to actively partake in threatening the sovereign integrity of the nation (see Table 6). Fortunately for the U.S., such activities did not have the desired effects. Perhaps the closest the U.S. came to blows with a European power was in the removal of the Hapsburg Emperor Maximilian from the throne of Mexico following the U.S. Civil War. Prior to the beginning of the Civil War, Mexico had fallen into political turmoil as varying political factions contended for power. The U.S. favored the ascendancy of the populist leader of the Liberal Party, General Benito Juárez, who had fought the repressive regime of General Santa Anna. Juárez had taken control of Mexico City in 1861 only to lose it to the forces of the French, who had ostensibly been dispatched, along with British and Spanish troops, to maintain order and assure the protection of their respective nationals. Once the British and Spanish realized that the French, who had arrived prior to the former powers, intended to stay in Mexico, both pulled out, not wanting to run so clearly afoul of the Monroe Doctrine, even during the turmoil of the Civil War. Napoleon III, sensing an opening, installed the Austrian Maximilian and his Dutch wife Carlotta as Emperor and Empress so as to gain control of Mexico for France, but the U.S. would not allow such a flagrant violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Following the Civil War, the U.S. immediately took action to persuade the French to abandon Mexico. While some elements, including General Grant, proposed an immediate invasion of that nation, Secretary of State William Seward suggested and won the implementation of a more diplomatic policy. Instead of an immediate invasion, 50,000 U.S. Cavalry troops were dispatched to the Mexican border in a show of force. The U.S., following the conclusion of the war, was possessed of perhaps the most formidable army of any nation and Napoleon III, who had less than 30,000 legionnaires in Mexico, removed his troops rather than face the U.S. in war. Unfortunately for Maximilian, he was captured and executed by
Page 122 firing squad in Mexico City following the arrival of Juárez. While the situation in Mexico proved to be the closest call the U.S. had to actual confrontation with one of the great powers following the War of 1812, it did become involved in minor hostilities in southern Europe on several occasions during the 19th century. These engagements were fought almost entirely in order to protect U.S. commercial interests in the Mediterranean. Engagements in Greece and Turkey Prior to World War I, the U.S. utilized military force in Europe on five occasions and all took place in the region of Greece and Turkey. Three incidents involve retaliatory actions where American ships were attacked or U.S. seamen were killed by pirates or other foreign forces. One of these instances involved Greece (1827), while the remaining two took place in Turkey (1851 and 1858–1859). In the case of Greece, U.S. naval landing parties were dispatched to hunt down pirates involved in attacks on American shipping. The two cases involving Turkey were qualitatively similar. While the U.S. did not have extensive contacts with the Ottoman Empire, ongoing internal strife and its eventual death throes prior to the beginning of World War I created general instability into which American merchant vessels unwittingly sailed. In fact, the Balkan Wars of the early 20th century, precursors to similar conflicts in the post–Cold War era, are both a consequence of the dissolution of the Ottoman nation and the beginnings of the first major conflict among the great powers of the century. Interestingly, Turkey would emerge as a nexus in U.S. relations with Europe, both prior to and during the Cold War. During much of the 19th century, the U.S. projected its policy of neutrality and noninvolvement with Europe to the states of the Mediterranean as well. Few Americans lived or worked in Ottoman Turkey. Only those who were directly responsible for merchant trade, typically in tobacco and petroleum products, and a very few American missionaries, made Turkey their home. The missionaries had general success in their endeavors to bring new sustenance to the small groups of Christians living throughout the empire, and several quite successful schools and colleges were founded. In the mid19th century, the U.S. even assisted the Turks in improving their naval capacity by sending an important shipbuilder to the Ottoman Sultan, and six consulates were established throughout the empire. However, the political relations between the two nations took on a generally muddled air since most treaties and agreements went through a process of translation that regularly suffered from a lack of clarity. Difficulties therefore arose over a range of issues, including the disposition of American citizens living in Turkey and naturalization. As a result, when American merchant interests were threatened by rogue elements, the U.S. reacted to protect its interests. U.S. European policy did not develop beyond a very general reactionary model, however, until the early 20th century.
Page 123 PHASE II: NECESSARY ENGAGEMENT The beginning of the end of U.S. neutrality in Europe literally arrived with a bang as the nation reluctantly entered World War I. President Woodrow Wilson attempted to avoid involving the U.S. in another war among European powers; however, the country had become too important an actor on the world stage to remain aloof for long. The instrument eventually responsible for eroding U.S. neutrality was the submarine, used effectively for the first time in unlimited naval warfare. Germany used its fleet of Uboats to undermine shipping by destroying merchant and passenger vessels thought to be carrying supplies to the Allies. This included the sinking of ships under the American flag. The fact that many of these ships were indeed carrying war supplies to Great Britain and France did not dampen the ensuing public outrage over such events, especially upon the sinking of passenger liners, most remembered of which was the sinking of the British passenger liner Lusitania in 1915, on which 1,198 people, including American citizens, died. There have been a number of explanations surrounding the actual entrance of the U.S. into the conflict in 1917, from the immediate concern over German violations of U.S. neutrality to a more longterm vision of German domination of Europe and what that would mean for the U.S. While it is difficult to sort out a single, specifically agreedupon rationale, the U.S. entered the conflict with its April 1917 declaration of war on Germany and officially ended its policy of neutrality in the affairs of Europe. The Russian Revolution and Allied Intervention During the final stages of the war in Europe, another area of concern to the U.S. was coming to a head. While all nations involved in the conflict had suffered a great deal, Russia was wracked not only by four years of conflict with Germany and AustriaHungary, but by the brewing internal turmoil that would give rise to the Bolshevik Revolution. In Russia, the growing social and economic costs of the war with Germany, combined with the increasingly inept political leadership of the failing monarchy, led to widespread civil unrest bordering on outright mass rebellion. By March of 1917, with the Russian Army able only to hold, but not push back, the forty German divisions on the Eastern Front, the Czar finally abdicated his throne. On November 8, 1917, the Soviet Union was born. Lenin’s first decrees upon ascendance to power were to first, end the war with Germany and, second, to hand over land to the peasants. The first of these policies, enshrined in the March 1918 Treaty of BrestLitovsk, would anger the Allies, who were already fearful of communism, while the second policy would anger the propertyowning classes who, like the West, were no less fearful of the system Lenin represented. Further, Lenin ignited dissent within and among the various socialist parties that
Page 124 had shared power with the Bolsheviks when he took unilateral control of the new government. Thus, the November coup did not immediately settle affairs. There remained a significant internal opposition to the new government, especially within parts of the military and the upper classes, and a growing international concern among other nations. To further aggravate matters, Lenin sought to solidify his control by establishing a number of ‘‘revolutionary tribunals” charged with keeping order and prosecuting those thought to be acting against the Revolution. Ultimately, these measures forced opposition groups to coalesce and, eventually, take up arms against Lenin, igniting the Russian Civil War. By 1920, the Red Armies had vanquished their foes and consolidated power in Russia for Lenin and the communists. It was into this arena of chaos and revolution that the U.S., Great Britain, France, and Japan deigned to intervene. The rationale behind the Western intervention revolves around several interlocking factors. First, it is not an overexaggeration to say that the Western powers were both shocked and dismayed at the disintegration of the Russian regime, especially at so critical a time in their war with Germany. The Europeans were all fearful of communism, but until this time no Western power had taken the ideologically driven movement as a serious threat to the stability of either their own governments or to that of another major power. Second, the Treaty of BrestLitovsk resulted in the freeing of forty additional German divisions to fight on the Western front, thus escalating the war and further straining the already exhausted Allies. Third, the West, and especially the U.S., had been supplying the Russians with military aid, much of which ended up sitting on shipping docks around the country, since the poorly maintained Russian railroad system operated only intermittently. Fourth, Great Britain and France began to encourage the Japanese to intervene to shore up the Eastern Front, something that the U.S. considered risky. Fifth, somewhat conflicting rumors (later shown to be baseless) reached Washington that 80,000 German prisoners of war (POWs) being held in Siberian camps were escaping and arming themselves, thus threatening regional stability and U.S. weapons and supplies in the area. Yet, it added to the mounting reasons for Allied intervention. Jumping ahead of any move by Wilson, British and French troops landed in Murmansk, and, foretelling the president’s ultimate decision in the matter, the U.S.S. Olympia sailed into Murmansk Harbor the following month. Return to Turkey During the interwar period, the U.S. would only engage in hostilities within the greater European region on three occasions, all of which resulted from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The first of the these incidents occurred in 1919 when U.S. naval forces came ashore in Italiancontrolled Croatia at the request of Italian authorities to lend assistance in a skirmish between Italians and Serbians during an ongoing civil
Page 125 disturbance. The next two instances when the U.S. intervened in European affairs were both protective in circumstance. During the early part of the 20th century, as the Ottoman Empire withered, the Greeks became increasingly bold in their desire to take back what they perceived to be territory that had traditionally belonged to Greece. In two such instances, the first in 1919 and the second in 1922, U.S. troops were called upon by American diplomats for protection. In 1919, when Greece occupied Constantinople, a force of Marines from the U.S.S. Arizona landed to guard the U.S. consulate. In 1922, U.S. naval forces landed, with the consent of both Greece and Turkey, to protect Americans residing in the contested region of Smyrna (Izmir) at the start of the Turkish nationalist occupation. The U.S. would not again utilize direct military force in Europe until the start of World War II. PHASE III: THE END OF NEUTRALITY: WORLD WAR II AND THE COLD WAR World War II signaled the end of American neutrality. The policy of neutrality, which had served the U.S. well during the nation’s formative years in the 19th century, could not bear up under the harsh global realities imposed by the rise of Nazi Germany and the need for an expansion of American power to fill the vacuum left after the end of the last major European war. Roosevelt understood the consequences for the U.S. and the world should Nazi Germany dominate Europe and depose Great Britain. The post–World War II period saw a fundamental change in the way the U.S. viewed its role in Europe. This change did not take place immediately following the war, but required several key catalyzing events to drive it home. These events, primarily the Soviet siege of Berlin, the creation of the Eastern Bloc, and the detonation of the first Soviet nuclear weapon, forced the U.S. to redefine its vision of the American role in world politics. In a world of nuclear weapons, globally expansionist powers, and the continuing emergence of drastically new communication and transportation technologies, isolationism and neutrality were no longer conceivable as a basis for U.S. dealings with either Europe or the Soviet Union. The Berlin Airlift The closure of the highway leading to the American, British, and French sectors of Berlin by the Soviet Army in 1948 signaled the beginning of the first major U.S. Soviet postwar confrontation. This action was taken as a response to the suggestion by Washington that the three zones of West Germany, controlled by the U.S., France, and Great Britain, should be merged in order to speed up the economic recovery of the nation. The Soviets, casting about for a way to respond, latched onto Berlin, itself divided into four sectors, as a prime target for applying pressure to the Western powers. The Soviet Union, like the
Page 126 French, also feared the Germans, who had invaded Eastern Europe and Russia twice in the first part of the 20th century alone. Stalin was going to allow neither the reunification of Germany, nor its remilitarization. Thus, in order to show the West his determination, he cut off access to Berlin by blockading the only highway leading from the West. This action deprived the West Berliners of muchneeded basic supplies such as food and clothing. President Truman had limited options available for dealing with this new threat. The Soviets had simply blockaded Berlin, they had not actually attempted to wrest control of the city from the occupying Western forces. The siege of Berlin was the first of the Cold War crises, and perhaps one of the most important, for it tested U.S. determination to support Great Britain, France, and even Germany against the Soviet Union. While the U.S. had not yet firmly established the range of policies, including containment, that would come to define the Cold War, the Truman administration knew that maintaining confidence in the U.S. was a key prerequisite to developing a successful strategy for countering Soviet designs in the region. Truman did not want to directly confront the Soviets and, even if he were in favor of such a move, he surmised there was little popular support at home for launching what might well become another major war in Europe so soon after the closing of World War II. But he could not stand idly by, either, and let the Soviets erode the position of the U.S. in Europe. So, seeking a middle ground that would both show the Europeans his commitment and the Soviets his resolve, Truman authorized an airlift of supplies to begin on June 21, 1948. What became known as the Berlin Airlift would last a full 324 days and fly from 4,000 to an amazing 13,000 tons of food, fuel, and other materials daily to supply the city. The Soviets eventually capitulated and ended the blockade in May of 1949. Interestingly, the two occasions on which the U.S. later used force in Europe during the Cold War had nothing to do with Cold War. The first of these instances occurred in 1974 during the Turkish and Greek Cypriot War where the U.S. evacuated civilians during hostilities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The second intervention occurred in October of 1985 when U.S. aircraft intercepted an Egyptian airliner carrying the Palestine Liberation Organization hijackers of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro. Yet, while the U.S. did not utilize its military to actively intervene in European affairs during the Cold War, it did maintain a large garrison of troops and equipment within most of the NATO countries. While these forces were and are integrated into a multinational command structure, they remain part and parcel of the U.S. military. No NATO nation maintains a similar garrison of troops within American territory, although joint training exercises do bring both officers and enlisted men from Allied militaries to the U.S. The combination of a joint command structure and the presence of U.S. troops throughout Europe served to link American and European foreign policy throughout the Cold War.
Page 127 PHASE IV: REDEFINING U.S. PRIORITIES AFTER THE COLD WAR The end of the Cold War has left Washington scrambling to redefine its foreign policy priorities with regard to Europe, and perhaps the most pressing area of concern has been over the U.S. and European role in NATO. In a very significant way the Cold War was a boon for American relations with Europe. Unable to retain its 19th century stance of neutrality in the 20th century, and faced with the possibility of being constantly embroiled within the ongoing struggles for power resulting from the practice of traditional power politics, Washington required a third way. The Cold War provided the U.S. with exactly such an option. The Soviet Union became a common enemy that would necessitate an unprecedented level of cooperation among the nations of Europe, as well as allow for a strong American presence. Washington could then credibly tie its own foreign policy into that of Europe and oppose the Soviet Union while eliminating the threat of another fracture within Europe itself; NATO became the institutional expression of that policy. If Washington could not avoid Europe, it would encompass that troubling collection of states within the greater American demesne. With the passing of the Cold War, both the U.S. and Europe faced the problem of defending the existence of a policy and organization that have proven clearly beneficial, yet no longer possess a clear raison d’étre. Few in Washington seriously suggested the disbanding of NATO, but none were quite able to develop a new and purposive mission either for the organization or for what the U.S. ought to focus on in its relations with Europe. U.S. post– Cold War policy in Europe therefore became increasingly one of reaction to discrete events, rather than one of longterm strategy. The Balkans This new nonpolicy of reactionism was tested and found lacking early in the post–Cold War period. The end of Soviet antagonism and the withdrawal of that nation’s stabilizing influence threw parts of the world into chaos. Perhaps the most pronounced of these was in the former Yugoslavia. This nation, never strictly beholden to the Soviet Union, nonetheless became a causality of forces that had been repressed for forty years. Racism, ethnocentricity, declining standards of living, and the pure lust for power among men and women who were willing to use these divisive factors to their own benefit, quickly drove Yugoslavia past the point of viability as a nation state. Unlike countries in other parts of the world facing similar internal difficulties, however, Yugoslavia rested on the edge of Western Europe and therefore posed a threat to the stability of several NATO nations, as well as to the European Union itself. As a collective defense organization, where nations are pledged to assist in defending each other against outside threats, NATO did possess a rationale for taking action in the
Page 128 Balkans, especially as elements of the internal Yugoslav conflict began to spill over into neighboring areas, and refugees increasingly began to wash up on Italian shores. Yet, the U.S. and other NATO nations were not yet ready to take action. NATO stood paralyzed largely because decision makers were unsure of what actions were required to halt the spreading chaos, as well as because Washington and other NATO capitals debated as to whether resources ought to be committed when the American and European citizenry were only just beginning to enjoy the socalled peace dividend reaped by the slashing of massive defense budgets soon after the end of Cold War antagonisms. While NATO member states debated, the situation in the Balkans worsened until all structures of civil integrity had been demolished. The area of Bosnia Herzegovina, where most of the intensive ethnicbased fighting took place early in the conflict, was reduced to a chaos reminiscent of the Thirty Years’ War in Europe, where roving bands of soldiers, paramilitary groups, and armed civilians fought one another while terrorizing and killing civilians who were either caught in the crossfire or mere targets of cruel opportunity. As the media brought the growing number of atrocities into the homes of the West, both the U.S. and Europe began to react. In December of 1992, NATO issued a statement of its intentions to engage in peacekeeping activities, under request of the UN Security Council, beyond its traditional borders. Beginning in 1993, the U.S. used its military to drop supplies to Muslim enclaves in the socalled safe haven cities such as Serajevo. Later that year, the U.S., operating under the aegis of NATO, brought additional military power to bear first by participating in the enforcement of a “nofly” zone over BosniaHerzegovina and then, in 1994, engaging Serbian heavy weapons that were threatening various safe haven regions. Washington continued to supply both logistic support and personnel to the burgeoning crisis in Yugoslavia, and ultimately took responsibility for negotiating the Dayton Accords, which formally ended conflict and installed the NATOled Implementation Force (IFOR) and, later, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the former Yugoslav province. The Dayton Accords and ongoing NATO military presence in the form of SFOR, however, did not prove to be the end of U.S. activities in the Balkans. U.S. forces stood by around the region should new trouble break out, which it did once again in 1998 and 1999. Slobodan Milosovic, the renegade leader of the former Yugoslav province of Serbia who was believed to have instigated much of the conflict in Bosnia, turned his attention southward and increasingly began to pressure ethnic Albanians to leave their homes in the southern Yugoslav province of Kosovo. The Kosovar Albanians, who made up roughly 85 percent of the province’s population, were being forced to leave their homes and trek toward distant Macedonia or Albania while ethnic Serbs were then allowed to take over the “abandoned” property. At first a slow process, Milosovic soon stepped up the pressure and a new round of “ethnic cleansing” began in the region. At first the U.S. and Europe attempted to negotiate with Milosovic, but this eventually proved a futile endeavor. After a series of threats, on March
Page 129 29, 1999, NATO began a U.S.led bombing campaign against Serbia proper and Serbdominated parts of Kosovo. This operation ended on June 10, 1999 and the followon peacekeeping mission, Operation Joint Guardian, began the following day. Throughout the decadelong Yugoslav crisis, the West and NATO have been critiqued for failing to take decisive action at the start of the conflict, which many observers believe may have limited the extent and duration of the war. Further, the fact remains that regardless of the eventual outcome of NATO’s actions in the Balkans, the result has not led to the development of a new, coherent U.S. policy toward Europe. Europe and the U.S. into the 21st Century The relationship between the U.S. and Europe has evolved significantly in the course of 200 years. The early period of avoidance gave way first to hesitant involvement, and then to a significant level of integration in both policy and military endeavors. Political and economic integration within Europe itself, while clearly beneficial to the establishment of longterm peace and prosperity, has left some in the U.S. concerned over the emergence of a “fortress Europe” that would exclude U.S. participation and perhaps even form the kernel of a new competing bloc. Such concerns, however, are at best an unlikely possibility. Rather, with the end of the Cold War and the dawning of a new century it would seem likely that Europe will begin to once again chart its own course in world affairs and this will inevitably lead to a reduced reliance on the U.S. for guidance. The security relationships between the U.S. and its European allies embedded within NATO must also evolve if they are to survive. The benefits of a common defense command and control system that tie the American and European militaries together are obvious, but retaining such a system requires a clear raison d’étre. With the Soviet Union no longer present to provide that rationale, NATO may begin to look somewhat long in the tooth. The problems faced during the Yugoslav crisis highlight such deficiencies. The shift from an organization focused purely on collective defense to one encapsulating a new, forwardlooking mission that includes peacekeeping duties beyond its traditional borders may provide a new beginning, although the success of this approach is difficult to determine so early in the process. Clearly, NATO’s experience in Kosovo was both a poignant and learning one. While the association between the U.S. and the nations of Europe may remain temporarily out of focus, it is equally apparent that a stable and progressive world order requires that such a relationship continue into the 21st century. See Multilateralism; Russia; Yugoslavia. FOR FURTHER READING Addleman, William C. 1993. History of the United States Army, rev. ed. Temecola, CA: Reprint Services Corporation.
Page 130 Boren, David L., and Edward J. Perkins, eds. 1999. Preparing America’s Foreign Policy for the 21st Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Center of Military History. 1989. American Military History. Washington, DC: United States Army & U.S. Government Printing Office. Duke, Simon W., and Wolfgang Krieger. 1993. U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945–1970. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Foglesong, David S. 1995. America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917–1920. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Glenny, Misha. 1995. ‘‘Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans.” Foreign Affairs 74: 98–108. Kennedy, Paul. 1987. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Vintage Books, Random House. Kissinger, Henry A. 1984. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster. Kort, Michael. 1990. The Soviet Colossus: A History of the USSR, 2d ed. London: Routledge. McKenzie, Mary M., and Peter H. Loedel. 1998. The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation: States, Interests, and Institutions. Westport, CT: Praeger. Rhodes, Benjamin D. 1988. The AngloAmerican Winter War with Russia, 1918–1919. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Rostow, Eugene V. 1992. A Breakfast for Bonaparte: U.S. National Security Interests from the Heights of Abraham to the Nuclear Age. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. Spanier, John, and Steven W. Hook. 1998. American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 14th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. White, John Albert. 1950. The Siberian Intervention. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. James Heasley
Constitution. FOR FURTHER READING Bell, Derrick, Jr. 1997. Constitutional Conflicts. Cincinnati: Anderson. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
Page 131 Gunther, Gerald. 1991. Constitutional Law, 12th ed. Westbury, NY: The Foundation Press. Lively, Donald, Phoebe Hadden, Dorothy Roberts, and Russell Weaver. 1996. Constitutional Law: Cases, History, and Dialogues. Cincinnati: Anderson. Nelson, Michael. 1998. The Evolving Presidency. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Tarr. 1999. American Constitutional Law. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Paul Weizer
Foreign Policy Decision Making; Rational Choice. FOR FURTHER READING Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1984. “Forecasting Policy Decisions: An Expected Utility Approach to PostKhomeini Iran.” PS 17:226–36. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1988. “The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18:629–52. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1989. “The Contribution of ExpectedUtility Theory to the Study of International Conflict.’’ In Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Morrow, James D. 1985. “A ContinuousOutcome Expected Utility Theory of War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 29:473–502. Morrow, James D. 1997. “A Rational Choice Approach to International Conflict.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Zinnes, Dina A., and Robert G. Muncaster. 1997. “Prospect Theory Versus Expected Utility Theory: A Dispute Sequence Appraisal.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Steven B. Redd
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F Constitution. FOR FURTHER READING Bell, Derrick, Jr. 1997. Constitutional Conflicts. Cincinnati: Anderson. Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Gunther, Gerald. 1991. Constitutional Law, 12th ed. Westbury, NY: The Foundation Press. Lively, Donald, Phoebe Hadden, Dorothy Roberts, and Russell Weaver. 1996. Constitutional Law: Cases, History, and Dialogues. Cincinnati: Anderson. Nelson, Michael. 1998. The Evolving Presidency. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Page 134 Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Tarr. 1999. American Constitutional Law. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Paul Weizer
Latin America and the Caribbean. FOR FURTHER READING Guevara, Che. 1998. Guerrilla Warfare. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. James Henson
FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING—When scholars, pundits, the public and others attempt to explain decisions to use force, they usually point to many different factors such as election cycles, presidentCongress relations, the state of the economy and, of course, the nature and capabilities of the potential adversary as well as the dyadic relationship between two countries. To a lesser degree, though, studies on the use of force have identified the decisionmaking strategies of leaders as potential causal factors. However, in the U.S., decisions about whether or not to use force ultimately rest with the president. How he gathers and integrates and then uses the plethora of information available (including the factors listed above) from advisors, foreign policy experts, and others may go a long way toward explaining use of force decisions. An examination of foreign policy decision making could include both structural and institutional factors that influence foreign policy decisions, such as organizations, bureaucracies, advisory systems, and so on. Here the focus is on procedural foreign policy decision making as it pertains to the use of force, which examines the process by which decision makers gather and integrate information, and then how they use that information to arrive at a choice. There are several decisionmaking theories that attempt to explain why decision makers make the choices they do. Also discussed are the four most common theories identified in the literature that endeavor to explain why leaders make certain choices in foreign policy crises: rational choice, cybernetic, prospect, and poliheuristic theories. These theories are often associated with the cognitiverational debate; each purports to explain foreign policy decision making to a better degree than the others (however that may be defined). First the general tenets
Page 135 of these theories are discussed and then how each has been applied in studies on the decision to use force short of war is analyzed. The rational actor approach is one of the most frequently used decisionmaking models in general studies of foreign policy. It is essentially based on an actionreaction process (i.e., foreign policy is conceptualized as a calculated response to the actions of other actors). In the rational choice model, leaders maximize gains while minimizing losses. Rational choice theory makes several simplifying assumptions about human behavior in a decision situation. Kristen Monroe identified seven assumptions which form the core of rational choice theory: (1) actors pursue goals; (2) these goals reflect the actor’s perceived selfinterest; (3) behavior results from conscious choice; (4) the individual is the basic unit of analysis; (5) actors have preference orderings that are consistent and stable (transitive); (6) if given options, actors choose the alternative with the highest expected utility; and (7) actors possess extensive information on both the available alternatives and the likely consequences of their choices. The rational choice approach has been successful because of the accurateness of its predictions about foreign policy outcomes. Rational choice’s deductive logic is an attractive feature of the model and enables its users to simplify the decisionmaking process. Of course, it has been criticized for the same reason, that is, it understates the complex processes of foreign policy decision making. Specific applications of rational choice theory to U.S. decisions to use force are quite few, although many of the studies of U.S. uses of force most likely implicitly assume a unitary actor (the president) who is goaloriented, has specific preferences, and maximizes utility. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman use extensive form game theory to examine the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. Specifically, they attempt to ascertain how domestic political opposition affects a nation’s propensity to initiate conflict. Wang includes both domestic and international factors within a rational choice framework in examining decision making in a crisis situation. Both incorporate rational choice assumptions in their respective models; that is, they assume that states are led by individuals who maximize utility while minimizing losses. However, these studies differ with respect to both independent and dependent variables included for examination. Kevin Wang highlights three factors that determine a nation’s utility calculus for conflict escalation: (1) the expected value for war, (2) the reputational costs which leaders anticipate should they back down (capitulate) in a crisis, and (3) the expected political costs for the use of force. Both authors use various domestic indicators such as presidential approval ratings, election cycles, economic performance, and congressional support as measures of the domestic factors which may influence U.S. uses of force. Wang notes that during a crisis situation, there is a concentration of decisionmaking authority around a few critical actors, and that because of the importance of the situation, these actors are less likely to be affected by personal and partisan interests.
Page 136 Diana Richards et al. find that diversionary uses of force are rare but that when they do occur they are more likely to be initiated by “good” executives than by incompetent executives. The authors note that their rational choice model is highly simplified and abstract, that is, the domestic independent variable only includes the state of the economy and agents are only competent or incompetent. Rational choice explanations of U.S. uses of force have been countered by several other theoretical approaches. Perhaps the most wellknown is the cybernetic approach initially put forth by Charles Ostrom and Brian Job and followed by Pat James and John Oneal. Ostrom and Job refer to a decision maker’s tendency to employ decision shortcuts or heuristics. A leader faced with a decision of whether to use force will formulate decision algorithims. Specifically, they argue that presidents monitor a limited number of critical factors and then consider a restricted set of decision options. Ostrom and Job constructed their cybernetic model to account for three factors originally suggested by Herbert Simon: (1) the cognitive structure of the president asdecisionmaker, (2) the content and formulation of his decision premises, and (3) the logic of his inference process (i.e., the decision rule) used to reach a decision. Specifically, with respect to cognitive structure, Ostrom and Job state that decision makers focus on a small and relatively fixed number of environmental factors. They posit that the president forms his decision premises on the basis of his three major functional responsibilities: commander in chief (international dimension), chief executive (domestic dimension), and political leader (political dimension). Finally, they posit that presidents adopt a satisficing decision rule wherein a decision maker attempts to find solutions that are “good enough” rather than those that maximize expected utility. Ostrom and Job and James and Oneal use a variety of international, domestic, and political indicators to represent the president’s environment. Ostrom and Job found that all three of the environments (international, domestic, and political) affect presidential decisions to utilize uses of force, but that the absolute and relative levels of popular support are the most important factors in accounting for U.S. uses of force short of war. James and Oneal modify Ostrom and Job’s international indicators by including a measure of the severity of ongoing international crises. This severity measure turns out to be more influential than Ostrom and Job’s international measures; however, James and Oneal still found that domestic political factors were the most influential on the president’s decision to use force short of war. Overall, Ostrom and Job found extended periods, or eras, in which similar decisions (i.e., uses or nonuses of force) existed. Presidential decisions to use force short of war have also been analyzed and explained using prospect theory. Prospect theory was first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979, and has since become one of the leading alternatives to rational choice as a theory of decision under conditions of risk. Prospect theory posits that individuals evaluate outcomes, not from net asset levels, but instead as a function of deviations from a reference point; that they overweight
Page 137 losses relative to comparable gains; that they are riskacceptant in the domain of loss, but are riskaverse in the domain of gain; that their identification of this reference point is a critical variable; and that they react to probabilities in a nonlinear fashion. The application of prospect theory to U.S. uses of force generally revolves around the notions of riskseeking in the domain of loss and riskaverse behavior in the domain of gain. In contemplating the use of force, U.S. presidents prefer to have the support of the public either before the initiation of force or after, in the form of a rally’roundthe flag effect. DeRouen notes that this decision process is simplified, because of time constraints, uncertainty, and incomplete information, by organizing the decision around a single dimension: domestic politics. DeRouen, using the context of prospect theory, states that when the president’s approval level is high, force is predicted to be less likely because the president is in the domain of gain, and thus is riskaverse. Conversely, if the president’s approval ratings are low, we can expect a greater tendency to resort to uses of force short of war because the president is now in the domain of loss. DeRouen finds evidence of a vicious cycle between force and approval. When the president’s approval is low, force levels increase. In turn, the use of force causes approval ratings to climb. Furthermore, DeRouen notes that approval is a determinant of U.S. uses of force throughout a president’s tenure in office, and not just during election cycles. McDermott uses prospect theory to explain President Carter’s decision to launch a military operation to rescue American hostages in Iran in April 1980. McDermott argues that Carter was in a domain of loss both domestically and internationally and that loss aversion led him to take military risks he otherwise would have been hesitant to undertake in order to secure the release of the hostages. Domestically, Carter was facing pressure both from a looming reelection campaign that was sure to be difficult and from political opponents (chiefly Ronald Reagan) and the public who criticized Carter for being too passive. Internationally, Iran’s taking of American hostages damaged U.S. credibility, power, and prestige in the international arena. McDermott concludes by stating that Carter gambled by trying to win back all of his losses in one shot. Nincic utilizes prospect theory to explain U.S. military interventions by separating this dependent variable into instances of “protective’’ intervention (avoiding the loss of an already acquired geopolitical position) versus “promotive” intervention (securing a net foreign policy gain). Nincic hypothesizes that presidents can expect to gain more public support when the use of military force is intended to preserve or restore a state of affairs that once existed than for the purpose of pursuing a new gain or to create a new outcome. This can be explained in terms of loss aversion, wherein leaders will resort to actions that are riskier, but which offer a greater chance to recoup previous losses. The logical extension is that presidents will then be constrained by the circumstances and nature of the potential situation in which force is being considered. Nincic finds that, indeed, the U.S. public is more willing to reward the president for foreign
Page 138 policy actions (i.e., military intervention) intended to recoup previous losses. Nincic shows how the public is more willing to support a president if the use of force is for reasons of loss aversion. Therefore, the notions of loss aversion are applied more to the public than to the president, as is typically done in most studies. The fourth decision theory examined here is the poliheuristic theory of decision making developed by Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva. The poliheuristic theory of decision making incorporates the conditions surrounding foreign policy decisions, as well as the cognitive processes associated with these surroundings. Basically speaking, the poliheuristic theory proposes that (a) different decision heuristics (cognitive shortcuts) may be employed in response to different decisions as a function of environmental and personal variations, and (b) decision makers use a mixture of decision strategies en route to a single choice. The premise that decision makers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions also implies that these strategies may be suboptimal (i.e., not always the “best”). Another key premise of the poliheuristic theory of decision is its reference to the political aspects of decision making in a foreign policy context. The assumption is that the decision maker measures costs and benefits, risks and rewards, success and failure, and gains and losses in terms of political ramifications above all else. Mintz and Geva note that politicians value gains and losses in political terms and that domestic politics is the essence of decision. Furthermore, politicians are concerned about challenges to their leadership, their prospects of political survival, and their level of support. As Mintz and Geva assert, the political dimension is important because politicians are averse to loss and will reject alternatives that rank poorly on the political dimension. This processing characteristic is often referred to as a non compensatory decision strategy or rule. The noncompensatory principle suggests that a low score on a particular dimension cannot be compensated for by a better score on some other dimension. The noncompensatory principle suggests, then, that decision makers will discard options that are below a threshold level. High scores on other dimensions cannot compensate. After adopting or eliminating, remaining options are evaluated on other dimensions such as the economic, strategic, or diplomatic. Therefore, based on this noncompensatory principle, Mintz hypothesizes that if the decision to use force is unacceptable from a political standpoint, then it will preclude the decision maker from using force even if the “score” emanating from the cost/benefit ratio on the military dimension (or some other substantive dimension) is very high. In his study of the U.S. decision to attack Iraq, Mintz found that President George Bush utilized a noncompensatory decision strategy which eliminated options, such as ‘‘do nothing,” that scored low on the political dimension. Based on these findings, Mintz concludes that leaders seem to “process information” in a different way from that suggested by purely rational models.
Page 139 In several experimental studies, Mintz and Geva, Mintz et al., and Geva, Redd, and Mintz show that decision makers, assuming the role of the president, utilize non compensatory and dimensionbased strategies in processing information dealing with the U.S. use of force short of war. Moreover, Geva, Redd, and Mintz show that the order in which dimensions appear also influences the choice of decision makers in decisions concerning the use of force. Specifically, they found that when the political dimension appeared first and conveyed a negative view of the use of force, decision makers chose to use force only 30 percent of the time, as opposed to when the military dimension appeared first, decision makers chose to use force 42 percent of the time. Again, these results support Mintz’s 1993 finding that the political dimension acts as a noncompensatory device in decisions to use force short of war, and that the processes of information acquisition influence the ultimate decisions made by policy makers. In conclusion, rational choice theories offer deductive, outcome validity– based explanations for why nationstates engage in conflict. The two main points of rational choice theory are that rational choice theories make assumptions about the processes decision makers employ en route to using force (utility maximizing), and the theory focuses on the outcomes of decisions, such as use of force, rather than on the processes. Prospect theory is also based on outcome validity but argues that decision makers aren’t necessarily expected to maximize utility. Instead, a leader may decide to use or not use force because of framing effects and/or because he/she is operating in the domain of loss, and is therefore more riskacceptant in the case of the former, or is in the domain of gain and is riskaverse in the case of the latter. Cybernetic theory argues that decision makers are rational, but only boundedly so. Therefore, decision makers would not decide to use force based on expected utility calculations, but instead would satisfice (i.e., they would choose the option that is good enough). The decision to use or not use force is not an optimizing one, but one that satisfices utility. Finally, the poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making concentrates on the processes of decision making as well as on choices, rather than solely on the outcome. Second, the theory does not assume that decision makers always maximize utility, but that they instead resort to cognitive shortcuts and heuristics to deal with the complexities of foreign policy crises. The decision to use or not use force could depend on the structure of the choice set, the manner in which the choice set is framed, the specific decision strategies employed by the decision maker, as well as other relevant structural and personal characteristics. Further research should concentrate on comparing more directly these theories of foreign policy decision making. However, emphasis should be placed on highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of both, rather than direct comparisons, so that the theories may complement each other. This may entail identifying the conditions under which each theory is most helpful (i.e., offers the best explanations). Further research is also needed in more rigorously testing
Page 140 the various models in a number of different methodological realms. Such steps would enlighten our understanding about presidential uses of force and how decision making theories contribute to this further understanding. See Decision Making; Expected Utility Theory; Rational Choice. FOR FURTHER READING Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. 1990. “Domestic Opposition and Foreign War.” American Political Science Review 84:747–65. DeRouen, Karl R., Jr. 1995. “The Indirect Link: Politics, the Economy, and the Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39:671–95. Ford, J. Kevin, Neal Schmitt, Susan L. Schechtman, Brian M. Hults, and Mary L. Doherty. 1989. ‘‘Process Tracing Methods: Contributions, Problems, and Neglected Research Questions.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 43:75–117. Geva, Nehemia, and Alex Mintz, eds. 1997. Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Geva, Nehemia, Steven B. Redd, and Alex Mintz. 1996. “Structure and Process in Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Experimental Assessment of Poliheuristic Propositions.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, April 16–20. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Hess, Gregory D., and Athanasios Orphanides. 1995. “War Politics: An Economic, Rational Voter Framework.” American Economic Review 85:828–46. James, Patrick, and John R. Oneal. 1991. “The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President’s Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35:307–32. Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.” Econometrica 47:263–91. Levy, Jack S. 1992a. “An Introduction to Prospect Theory.” Political Psychology 13: 171–86. Levy, Jack S. 1992b. “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems.” Political Psychology 13:283–310. Levy, Jack S. 1997. “Prospect Theory and the CognitiveRational Debate.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. McDermott, Rose. 1992. “Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission.” Political Psychology 13:237–63. McDermott, Rose. 1998. RiskTaking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Mintz, Alex. 1993. “The Decision to Attack Iraq: A NonCompensatory Theory of Decision Making.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:595–618. Mintz, Alex, and Nehemia Geva. 1997. “The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision making.” In Decision making on War and Peace: The Cognitive Rational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Mintz, Alex, Nehemia Geva, and Karl DeRouen, Jr. 1994. “Mathematical Models of
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Foreign Policy DecisionMaking: Compensatory vs. Noncompensatory.” Synthese 100:441–60. Mintz, Alex, Nehemia Geva, Steven B. Redd, and Amy Carnes. 1997. “The Effect of Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making: An Analysis Using the Decision Board Platform.” American Political Science Review 91:553–66. Monroe, Kristen R. 1991. “The Theory of Rational Action: What Is It? How Useful Is It for Political Science?’’ In Political Science: Looking to the Future, Vol. 1, The Theory and Practice of Political Science, ed. William J. Crotty. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Morgan, T. Clifton, and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1992. “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36:25–52. Morrow, James D. 1997. “A Rational Choice Approach to International Conflict.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Nincic, Miroslav. 1997. “Loss Aversion and the Domestic Context of Military Intervention.” Political Research Quarterly 50:97–120. Ostrom, Charles W., Jr., and Brian L. Job. 1986. “The President and the Political Use of Force.” American Political Science Review 80:541–66. Richards, Diana, T. Clifton Morgan, Rick K. Wilson, Valerie L. Schwebach, and Garry D. Young . 1993. “Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Tale of Some NotSoFree Agents.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:504–35. Simon, Herbert A. 1959. “Theories of DecisionMaking in Economics and Behavioral Science.” American Economic Review 49:253–83. Singer, J. David. 1993. “System Structure, Decision Processes, and the Incidence of International War.” In Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Wang, Kevin H. 1996. “Presidential Responses to Foreign Policy Crises: Rational Choice and Domestic Politics.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:68–97. Steven B. Redd
FRAMING—Framing occurs when an actor attempts to influence the attitudes and behavior of a targeted decision maker. Framing is an attempt by leaders and other influential actors to introduce organizing themes into the policy debate, or specifically in a group deliberation, that will affect how the public as well as the targets themselves perceive a political issue. For example, both Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski attempted to frame the policy options presented to President Jimmy Carter concerning the discovery of a Soviet brigade in Cuba in 1979. Advisors, the media, and even a president himself, may frame the use of force in a manner that may facilitate greater acceptance from others. Framing can also pertain to the wording and phrasing of events and impact political choices and performance evaluations. A majority of news stories are episodic or eventoriented and report on concrete events. This type of framing generally elicits the attribution of responsibility toward a person. Presidents desire this type of framing when the media cover international crises because the responsibility tends to be attributed to the source of the aggression, not the
Page 142 president who justifiably retaliates. See Foreign Policy Decision Making; Media; Public Opinion. FOR FURTHER READING Allen, Barbara. 1994. “The Media and the Gulf War: Framing, Priming, and the Spiral of Silence.” Polity 27:255–84. Farnham, Barbara. 1992. “Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from Prospect Theory.” Political Psychology 13:205–35. Hoyt, Paul D., and Jean A. Garrison. 1997. “Political Manipulation within the Small Group: Foreign Policy Advisers in the Carter Administration.” In Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policymaking, ed. Paul ‘t Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Iyengar, Shanto. 1991. Is Anyone Responsible? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1987. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. London: Cambridge University Press. Levy, Jack S. 1996. ‘‘Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict.” International Political Science Review 17: 179–95. Maoz, Zeev. 1990. “Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings.” World Politics 43:77–110. Jill Glathar and Steven B. Redd
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G Data Sets on the Use of Force. FOR FURTHER READING Grimmett, Richard F. 1999. “Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–1999.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report. Curtis Peet
Foreign Policy Decision Making; Rational Choice. FOR FURTHER READING Janis, Irving L. 1972. Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of ForeignPolicy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Page 144 Janis, Irving L. 1982. Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Kramer, Roderick M. 1998. “Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam Decisions 25 Years Later: How Well Has the Groupthink Hypothesis Stood the Test of Time?” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 73:236–71. Schafer, Mark. 1996. “Antecedents of Groupthink: A Quantitative Study.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:415–35. Smith, Steve. 1985. “Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission.” British Journal of Political Science 15:117–23. Stern, Eric. 1994. ‘‘The Essence of Groupthink.” International Studies Quarterly 38:101–7. ‘t Hart, Paul. 1991. “Irving L. Janis’ Victims of Groupthink.” Political Psychology 12: 247–78. Steven B. Redd
Middle East. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION—Months before the 1964 election, U.S. ships were allegedly fired on by the North Vietnamese in the Gulf of Tonkin. President Johnson sought bipartisan support for a “blank check” of support in the form of a joint resolution. According to Louis Fisher, the resolution had been prepared prior to the Tonkin incident. The Tonkin episode merely provided a convenient flashpoint. The resolution (which passed 88–2 in the Senate and 417–0 in the House), allowed the president to “take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force.” These events are often considered the beginning of the Vietnamese War. Many scholars also consider the lopsided votes as an indication of the high water mark of bipartisan consensus in foreign policy. See Asia and the Pacific; Congress. FOR FURTHER READING Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. “The Gulf of Tonkin, the 1964 Incidents.” 1968. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 90th Congress, 2nd session. “Southeast Asia Resolution.” 1964. Joint hearing before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 88th Congress, 2nd session. Karl R. DeRouen, Jr.
GULF WAR—In response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. and a broad coalition of other states (although the majority of the military contribution came from the U.S., Britain, and France) deployed 100,000 troops to Saudi
Page 145 Arabia in Operation Desert Shield. This protective deployment and steady buildup of coalition forces (including forces from several Arab states) was buttressed by a carefully engineered campaign within the UN’s Security Council which passed several resolutions and organized a range of comprehensive economic sanctions aimed at convincing Iraq to withdraw its forces. Acting in both multilateral settings within the UN and in a whole series of bilateral discussions, President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker were able to maintain and in some instances strengthen the antiIraq coalition which, despite an occasional wobble, remained remarkably steadfast throughout the whole autumn. One major factor in this respect was the ability of the U.S. and its allies to avoid Soviet intervention in the area. This coalition received UN backing for more aggressive actions with the passage of Resolution 678, authorizing the coalition forces in the Gulf to take any actions deemed necessary to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait if they had not departed by January 15. Two days after this deadline had passed the coalition forces led by the U.S. launched a concerted air attack on both Iraqi forces in Kuwait and upon Iraq itself. The air attacks lasted until February 24 when ground troops were sent on the offensive. These forces were declared victorious just three days later on February 27, when Iraq communicated to the UN its intention of abiding by the battery of UN resolutions which had been passed in the months prior to the coalition attack, demanding that Iraq withdraw, recognize Kuwaiti sovereignty, and decommission its program to develop weapons of mass destruction (of which the coalition forces on the ground were finding increasing evidence). In 1998–1999, U.S. and coalition forces in northern Iraq were involved in several operations against Iraqi air defense batteries, in response to the potential threats these emplacements were seen as posing to coalition aircraft. Policing of the nofly zone in Iraq continues as of early 2000. See IranIraq War; Middle East. FOR FURTHER READING Hiro, Dilip. 1992. Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War. New York: Routledge. Ismail, Tareq Y., and Jacqueline S. Ismail. 1994. The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East. Gainesville: University of Florida Press. United Nations. http://www.un.org/Depts/. United Nations. 1996. The Blue Helmets. New York: United Nations. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY—Popular term that is used to describe the use of military, typically naval, threats to compel Latin American governments to comply with international obligations, typically financial, and U.S. preferences. Generally associated with an implicit critique of U.S. policy in Latin America, over time the term has been commonly used simply as descriptive of U.S. policy in
Page 146 the region in the early decades of the 20th century. See Asia and the Pacific; Latin America and the Caribbean; Monroe Doctrine; Roosevelt Corollary. FOR FURTHER READING Hastedt, Glenn, P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. LaFeber, Walter. 1993. Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 2d ed. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. James Henson
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H HAWAII—Unlike U.S. policy in other areas of Asia or the Pacific, the movement of American citizens and trade to the islands ultimately led to not only the necessity for the use of force against a sovereign nation, but the annexation of that nation. At the start of the 1820s, American missionaries arrived in the Hawaiian Islands to begin the process of Christianizing the native inhabitants. By the 1840s commercial fishing, whaling, and trading vessels had found the islands to be an ideal outpost for their expanding operations in the Pacific and Asia. In 1826 the first U.S. shipofwar, the U.S.S. Dolphin, arrived in Hawaiian waters, while the first contingent of U.S. Army troops arrived in Hawaii in 1849. After this the American military presence grew in fits and starts, although it did not reach significant levels for some time. The commercial and strategic value of Hawaii was not lost on key decision makers in Washington, and thus the policy position of the U.S. government tended to be one of fairly constant interest in the islands. A number of treaties were signed over time that granted economic and political rights to the U.S., although the U.S. continued to recognize the sovereignty of the native monarchy. While there is no recorded incident of direct intervention by the U.S. in Hawaiian affairs until 1874, there was a constant military (usually naval) presence in and near the islands. Given the strategic location of the island chain, the U.S. was not the only power interested in exerting influence over Hawaii. Both the British and the French had shown some concern in the territory and were not beyond making an attempt to bring the islands into their own empires. In 1842, President John Tyler, concerned over such intentions, made it known to both European powers that Hawaii was of particular interest to the U.S. and, specifically, that the U.S. recognized the sovereign integrity of the island nation. This statement of intent by the U.S. did not, however, prevent an unsuccessful attempt by the British in
Page 148 1843 to take possession of the islands. Following this brief fiasco, both Great Britain and France signed an agreement recognizing the sovereign integrity of the native monarchy and forbidding any attempt to draw the islands into their respective imperial portfolios. For its part, the U.S. refrained from subscribing to a similar agreement and, as early as the 1850s, contrary to previously stated concerns for Hawaiian sovereignty espoused by the Tyler administration, serious proposals for annexing the islands were being put forward by both members of the U.S. private sector and the national government. The immediate intent of many of these proposals was likely not to seek the actual integration of the islands, but to aid in forestalling such attempts by other powers and thereby allowing continued open access by the U.S. Actions by France in 1851 had suggested the potential benefit of such a position when this power engaged in a brief dispute with the government of Hawaii. This small conflict, which resulted in damage to Hawaiian government property, oddly enough led the British Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, to suggest that the islands become a protectorate of the U.S. His reasoning, one must assume, was that it was better for the islands to fall under U.S. jurisdiction than that of the French. Having said this, however, when Secretary of State William Marcy attempted to negotiate a treaty of annexation with the Hawaiian leadership in 1854, it was the British who exerted their own influence to slow the process. With the death of the U.S.friendly King Kamehameha III shortly thereafter, chances for a simple annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the U.S. all but withered away. While annexation of the Hawaiian Islands was not in the offing for several decades, regardless of various serious and semiserious attempts, U.S. presence and influence increased steadily. Without a policy promoting the immediate annexation of the islands, the U.S. nonetheless considered it only a matter of time before the interests of the Hawaiians would be bound so tightly to the mainland that there would be almost no question as to the final outcome. Therefore, the immediate tool of choice became trade reciprocity, although an actual treaty along these lines was not promulgated until 1875. As early as 1868, however, in a presidential address, Andrew Johnson made it clear that trade reciprocity with Hawaii would lead to a situation whereby the Hawaiian people would feel so much a part of the U.S. that they would eventually apply for admission into the Union. Further, given the general sentiment among most administrations during this period, the presence of the military on the islands was not surprising. For its part, the military, and the navy in particular, increasingly considered Hawaii a fundamental strategic location for control of the entire Pacific. If the U.S. did not dominate the islands, then some other power eventually would. And, if this latter were to occur, military analysts could only predict the demise of any U.S. ability to control the security of its own Pacific Coast. To be sure, there were also tensions on the islands with respect to the role of the U.S. in the affairs of the indigenous government. The native Hawaiians were divided since economic reciprocity made the islands dependent on the U.S. and
Page 149 there was some feeling that this weakened the position of the government. However, the business community was dominated by foreigners—largely Hawaiianborn Americans—whose interests were in maintaining and enhancing the relationship with the U.S., and who had advanced their political control over the islands by forcing a new constitution on King Kamehameha III in 1852. This constitution reduced the role of the monarchy and granted additional powers to the legislature, which was itself increasingly dominated by these same business interests. Furthermore, the interest of the U.S. military in acquiring Pearl Harbor as a naval base increased tensions. There were those among the native population who were not in favor of any cessation of territory to foreigners. In November of 1873, the Hawaiian government took action on this growing public sentiment and sent a dispatch to Washington stating that it would not cede territory to any foreign power. While public opinion vacillated on this issue, tensions erupted briefly during the coronation of King Kalakaua—who replaced King Lunalilo upon his death—in February of 1874. Lunalilo had died without naming a successor, which brought about a competition between Kalakaua and the nationalistic Queen Emma for the throne. Kalakaua favored the interests of the Americanborn Hawaiians, while Emma was distinctly opposed to the desires of the American community and was, in fact, tied to the British through her active connection to the Anglican Church. These events would, ultimately, culminate in the Hawaiian Revolution of 1893, but at the time they were settled with the overwhelming legislative election of Kalakaua as king and the military intervention of the U.S. Following the election, a revolt among supporters of Queen Emma broke out. The U.S., concerned over the possibility of such an occurrence, had arranged for two U.S. Navy ships to be standing by and, upon receiving their orders, dispatched 150 troops armed with a Gatling gun to put down the insurrection. Eventually, the unrest faded as the new king embarked on a goodwill tour of the U.S. Yet the pressures contained by the U.S. military actions would soon again boil over. The late 1880s and early 1890s once more brought political strife to the Hawaiian Islands, and it was during this period that the move to bring the islands into the U.S. fold would finally bear fruit. This strife came to a head in the Revolution of 1889, which brought U.S. forces once again into direct conflict with the native population. Domestic Hawaiian governance was facing increasing difficulties, especially with regard to mismanagement by the king. Kalakaua proved to be rather reactionary in his rule of the islands and the American business community developed a significant degree of irritation with him. By 1883, King Kalakaua was seriously planning an expansion of Hawaiian dominance into Polynesia with the goal of creating a Pacific empire with Hawaii, and himself, at the pinnacle. Yet, while the king was engaged in grandiose fantasies about foreign empires, the Hawaiian domestic situation was deteriorating. Factions formed opposing Kalakaua, with the most notable among them the planter and merchantdominated Hawaiian League. In 1887, the League took action and demanded that a new constitution be promulgated in order to restrict
Page 150 the powers of the king. The new constitution, appropriately referred to as the “Bayonet Constitution,” severely curtailed the ability of the king to rule and created a new and stronger parliamentary structure. This act, along with the cession of Pearl Harbor, incensed the native population and drove the now untenable situation toward open conflict. Beginning on July 30, 1889, open fighting broke out in the Hawaiian Islands. The fighting was largely instigated by one Robert W. Wilcox who, as an ardent nationalist, wanted to return native Hawaiians to predominance throughout the islands. Wilcox and his men occupied the royal palace while the king fled to safety. Shortly thereafter, a rifle company, composed mainly of American citizens living in the islands, surrounded the rebel position and a pitched battle took place. The U.S. Navy, represented by the vessel Adams, sent men and ammunition to reinforce the local rifle company. By the evening of July 30, the rebels were finally dislodged and Wilcox captured. Following this shortlived revolution, the U.S. established a constant military vigilance over the islands in order to spot and deter similar acts in the future. However, ongoing governmental and societal intrigue continued to plague the Hawaiian Islands. Eventually, by the end of the 1890s, it was clear that the interests favoring annexation had won out and, on July 7, 1898, President William McKinley signed the proclamation annexing Hawaii. The policy of the U.S. government toward Hawaii was clearly different from that of any other country or area in the AsiaPacific region during the 19th century. Early on, various administrations realized that if the U.S. were to become a power in the Pacific and Asia, Hawaii would be a key resource. The military went yet further in its assessment, considering control of the Hawaiian Islands as not only important to the position of the U.S. in the greater Asian arena, but essential for the defense of the entire Western Coast of the nation. Regardless of the specific position taken, Hawaii was clearly seen by policy makers as more significant to U.S. strategy than other countries or territories. Ultimately, the strategic location of the islands, combined with an increasingly dominant American population and an ineffectual native government, created a situation whereby U.S. control was all but assured by the end of the century. See Asia and the Pacific. FOR FURTHER READING Addleman, William. 1939. History of the United States Army in Hawaii, 1846–1939. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute. James Heasley
HELVIDIUS—Pseudonym used by James Madison urging limited presidential power over the use of force. Madison contended that any determination of U.S. uses of force had to come from Congress. Congress was given specific control over raising an armed force as well as declaring war; decisions concerning these
Page 151 subjects were legislative in nature. Further, he contended that the idea of inherent executive powers was akin to a “royal prerogative.” See Constitution. FOR FURTHER READING Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Nelson, Michael. 1998. The Evolving Presidency. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Paul Weizer
HO CHI MINH—Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese nationalist leader and president of North Vietnam from 1954 to 1969, was born Nguyen That Thanh on May 19, 1890 in central Vietnam. He attended school in Hue and taught briefly before leaving Vietnam in 1911 to take up employment as a cook aboard a French liner. He lived in London and the U.S., and moved to France at the end of World War I. While in France, Ho became involved in the nation’s socialist movement and was one of the founding members of the French communist party when it was organized in 1920. He then went to Moscow, where he studied revolutionary tactics before being sent by the Comintern to Guangzhou, China in 1924. In China, Ho organized a group of Vietnamese revolutionaries who had been exiled there and founded the Communist Party of Indochina (ICP), which was later known as the Vietnamese Communist Party. Ho spent much of the 1930s living in Moscow, but returned to China in 1938 to serve as an advisor to the Chinese communist armed forces. He returned to his homeland at the outbreak of World War II, where he organized the Viet Minh, a communist Vietnamese independence movement. Throughout the war, the Viet Minh fought the Japanese, who had invaded Vietnam in 1941. When the Japanese were defeated in August 1945, Ho proclaimed himself president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), an autonomous state of the French Union. However, within a year, fighting broke out between the French and Vietnamese broke out. Hostilities continued until 1954, when the French were finally defeated. See Viet Cong. FOR FURTHER READING Archer, Jules. 1971. Ho Chi Minh: Legend of Hanoi. New York: CrowellCollier Press. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ. PrenticeHall. Sutherland, Ian. 1990. Conflict in Indo China. South Melbourne, Australia: Thomas Nelson. Sara Jezewski
HUGHESRYAN AMENDMENT—This amendment represented an attempt by Congress to maintain oversight of covert operations carried out by U.S. intelligence agencies. Congress demanded that it be kept informed of covert operations. The amendment was a response to CIA involvement in the 1973
Page 152 Chilean coup and covert bombings in Laos and Cambodia. The amendment ordered the president to approve covert operations on a casebycase basis, thus forcing him to accept some level of responsibility. See Angola; Congress; War Powers Resolution. FOR FURTHER READING Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Haass, Richard. 1994. Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post– Cold War World. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. House Report #1471, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. (1974). Karl R. DeRouen, Jr.
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I Ethics; League of Nations; Realism. FOR FURTHER READING Kegley, Charles. 1995. Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Russett, Bruce M. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE V. CHADHA—When Chadha’s student visa expired, he became eligible for deportation under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The Act allowed the attorney general to suspend deportation proceedings, subject to the review of each house of Congress. The House of Representatives, using this legislative veto, overturned the decision of the attorney general and ordered Chadha deported. Upon review, the Supreme Court struck down the legislative veto. The Court held that for any law to be constitutional, it must be passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the president for his signature. This is very important when considering the War Powers Resolution. This allows the Congress to exercise a legislative veto to stop a presidential use of force. Applying the results on
Page 154 Chadha, this would seem to pose serious constitutional problems for the War Powers Resolution. See Constitution. FOR FURTHER READING Bell, Derrick, Jr. 1997. Constitutional Conflicts. Cincinnati: Anderson. Edwards, George C., and Steven Shull. 1985. The Presidency and Public Policy Making. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Gunther, Gerald. 1991. Constitutional Law, 12th ed. Westbury, NY: The Foundation Press. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Kozak, David C., and Kenneth N. Ciboski. 1985. The American Presidency: A Policy Perspective from Readings and Documents . Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Lively, Donald, Phoebe Hadden, Dorothy Roberts, and Russell Weaver. 1996. Constitutional Law: Cases, History, and Dialogues. Cincinnati: Anderson. Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Tarr. 1999. American Constitutional Law. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Paul Weizer
Diversionary Theory; Rally ’round the Flag; ‘‘Us vs. Them” Mentality. FOR FURTHER READING Coser, Lewis A. 1956. The Function of Social Conflict. New York. Free Press. Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1964. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Levy, Jack S. 1989. “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique.” In Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Simmel, Georg. 1956. Conflict, trans. K. H. Woldff. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Stein, Arthur A. 1976. “Conflict and Cohesion.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 20:143–72. Steven B. Redd
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT OF 1991—As a result of the IranContra scandal, in which illegal arms sales were conducted by the Executive without the knowledge or consent of the Legislature, an act of Congress was passed to ensure that the president kept them fully informed about all future covert operations. The major provisions of the act include:
Page 155 a. That the president keep the intelligence committees of both Houses fully informed of all intelligence and covert activities b. That the president only authorize covert operations if necessary to support an “identifiable foreign policy objective” c. That all documents and current information be passed along to the appropriate committees as soon as the president is able. See Angola; Congress; HughesRyan Amendment; War Powers Resolution. FOR FURTHER READING Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River; NJ: PrenticeHall. Intelligence Oversight Act, 105 Stat. 441–445 (1991). Paul Weizer
Multilateralism; United Nations; Yugoslavia. FOR FURTHER READING Bennett, A. Leroy. 1995. International Organizations Principles and Issues, 6th ed. Englewood, Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Luard, Evan. 1989. The United Nations: How It Works and What It Does. Basingstoke, England : Macmillan. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Data Sets on the Use of Force. FOR FURTHER READING Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1996. International Crisis Behavior Project, 1918–1994 [Computer file]. 3d ICPSR version. College Park, MD: Michael
Page 156 Brecher and Johnathan Wilkenfeld, University of Maryland [Producers]. Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1998. Curtis Peet
Data Sets on the Use of Force. FOR FURTHER READING Pearson, Frederic S., and Robert A. Baumann. 1992. International Military Intervention, 1946–1988 [Computer file]. St. Louis, MO: University of Missouri–St. Louis, Center for International Studies [Producer]. Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research [Distributor], 1993. Curtis Peet
IRANIRAQ WAR—The Iranian Islamic revolution that toppled the regime of the Shah of Iran in 1979 was a key cause in the breakout of war between Iran and Iraq in 1980. The new regime in Iran under the leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini was determined to spread its ideology of a militant Shiite vision of Islam to the rest of the region. Tension with Iraq heightened when Iran appealed to Iraq’s Shia population to overthrow the president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein. Adding to this state of tension, Khomeini had already labeled the Iraqi regime as antiIslamic. There was also a personal dislike between these two leaders. Khomeini, who had led the Iranian revolution from his exile in Iraq, was forced to leave this country since his presence there created tension between Iraq and the regime of the late Shah of Iran. As a result, Saddam Hussein ordered Khomeini to leave the country and take refuge in France. Once in power, Khomeini was a threat to the Iraqi regime. Consequently, Iraq declared war on Iran in September 1980. The war continued throughout the following eight years, during which the Soviet Union was Iraq’s main supplier of arms. But given the Soviets’ heavy involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq sought support from Western powers. France and the U.S. provided jet fighters and military intelligence, respectively. The U.S. was eager to punish Iran for its antiWestern stand, and to retaliate for Iran’s takeover in 1979 of Western diplomats as hostages (including sixtysix Americans). Washington pressured its allies not to sell arms to Iran. The U.S. made certain to cripple Iran’s economy when it stopped importing Iranian oil. Further, in 1987 the U.S. challenged Iran’s control of the Persian Gulf when it permitted Kuwait’s oil tankers to fly the American flag to protect them against Iranian gunboat attacks. The war ended on August 20, 1988. Neither Iran nor Iraq achieved any of their objectives. Both Saddam Hussein and Khomeini con
Page 157 tinued their authoritarian grip on power. Furthermore, the cost of the war was so high in both material destruction and human losses, that the only way for either country to recover was through the sale of their huge deposits of oil. As for the U.S., the Gulf region proved vital to American national interests, including security of oil supplies, protection of Israel, and containment of the Soviet Union. The removal of a key ally, the Shah of Iran, from power and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 increased the instability of the Gulf region and caused the U.S. to respond decisively. Even after the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union, Iraq and Iran became the primary targets of U.S. containment effort. The Carter Doctrine was the answer. It replaced the Nixon Doctrine in early 1980. The Doctrine rested on the principle that the U.S. would use all means necessary, including military force, to prevent any outside power from gaining control of the Gulf. But the Carter Doctrine was never implemented, despite the brief attacks on Lebanese and Syrian targets, after the bombing attack of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983. Internally, both enemies and allies of the U.S. in the Middle East resented American military presence in the region throughout the 1980s. Kuwait, for example, refused prepositioning American equipment and arms in the Gulf, fearing that it would increase the tension in a region already complicated by the IranIraq War. Other countries, such as Oman and the United Arab Emirates, wanted a lowlevel American military buildup within their territorial water because they believed that any strong American military presence would create unwanted domestic and regional reaction. See Middle East. FOR FURTHER READING Khaddauri, Majid. 1988. The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the IranIraq Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. Nye, Joseph. 2000. Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 3d ed. New York: Longman. Stoessinger, John. 1998. Why Nations Go to War, 7th ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Ahmed H. Ibrahim
Carter Doctrine; Middle East. FOR FURTHER READING Calvocoressi, Peter. 1996. World Politics Since 1945. London: AddisonWesley. Carter, Jimmy. 1982. Keeping the Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York: Bantam Press.
Page 158 Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
ISOLATIONISM—Isolationism is based upon the belief that a nation should keep itself separate from the affairs of other nations. Isolationist countries tend to limit their involvement internationally and avoid becoming involved in conflict much beyond their own borders. The U.S. practiced isolationism, for the most part, from its founding through World War II. The rationale behind this policy was to keep the nation separate from the nationalistic struggles that occurred among the European nations. The geographic location of the U.S. also encouraged isolationism. The nation was separated from Europe by the vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean, and no neighboring country posed any sort of military threat. The U.S. isolationist foreign policy remained fixed throughout the 19th century. The acquisition of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam following the Spanish American War (1898) forced the U.S. to become more involved in world affairs, but many Americans still held fast to the nation’s traditional isolationist ways. Isolationism was pushed aside when the U.S. entered World War I in 1917, but the ideology reemerged with such strength at the end of the war that it prevented the U.S. from joining the newly organized League of Nations. Despite attempts by traditionalist politicians to keep the isolationist ideology alive, the nation quickly began to abandon its old foreign policy strategy, especially following the outbreak of World War II. Isolationism was all but abandoned by the U.S. in the postwar years, as the nation encouraged international cooperation and the containment of the Soviet and other communist regimes through economic and military aid, and alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although during the 1950s several unsuccessful attempts were made to revive isolationism, it soon became apparent that the current global situation would prevent isolationist policies from ever being feasible for the U.S. again. See Data Sets on the Use of Force; Multilateralism. FOR FURTHER READING Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Kissinger, Henry A. 1984. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster. Nordlinger, Eric A. 1995. Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rossini, Daniela, ed. 1995. From Theodore Roosevelt to FDR: Internationalism and Isolationism in American Foreign Policy. Staffordshire, England: Keele University Press. Viotti, Robert, and Mark V. Kauppi. 1999. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Sara Jezewski
Page 159 Agenda Setting; Foreign Policy Decision Making; Media. FOR FURTHER READING Bostdorff, Denise M. 1991. “The Presidency and Promoted Crisis: Reagan, Grenada, and Issue Management.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 21:737–50. Bostdorff, Denise M. 1994. The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Bostdorff, Denise M., and Daniel J. O’Rourke. 1997. “The Presidency and the Promotion of Domestic Crisis: John Kennedy’s Management of the 1962 Steel Crisis.’’ Presidential Studies Quarterly 27:343–61. Crable, Richard E., and Steven L. Vibbert. 1985. “Managing Issues and Influencing Public Policy.” Public Relations Review 11:3–16. Steven B. Redd
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J JAPAN—The U.S. sent several missions to Japan during the early part of the century in order to establish trading relations. Historically, Asia had interested the European powers primarily for its wealth in spices, silk, and related trade goods. Americans had similar, but also somewhat different interests in mind. Early American contact with the Japanese was due in large part to the U.S. whaling industry. Whaling had become a large and profitable industry by the early part of the century and competition from the Europeans was quite heavy in the Atlantic. With the geographical expansion of the nation to the Pacific Ocean, an entirely new opportunity to exploit this resource became available. With the move to whaling in the Pacific it was only a matter of time before U.S. sailors who had been shipwrecked were washing up on Japanese shores. The Japanese, always an insular people, engaged in limited trade with the Dutch and no other European powers were welcome. U.S. sailors appearing on shore or American trading vessels sailing into Japanese harbors were not a welcome sight and often came in for rough treatment, including being summarily attacked, by the local Japanese warlords. Japan in the early to mid19th century was still a feudal society and, although it had historical contact with Western society—predominantly through Portuguese trade missions during the 16th century and, later, with the Dutch through limited trade agreements—little impact was made on an isolated people who had successfully fought off foreign influences and invasions for most of their recorded history. During the last of the great feudal periods, the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1868) made every attempt to freeze Japanese society and prevent Western influences from infecting traditional Japanese culture. This endeavor proved generally successful and thus Europeans and, later, Americans were not able to make much headway in establishing favorable trade agreements.
Page 162 By the middle of the 19th century, the U.S. was intent on changing this situation substantially. In 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry became the first Westerner to successfully move the Japanese toward establishing open relations with the West. In July of that year, Perry sailed the four ships of his small fleet into Edo Bay and forced the Shogunate to take notice of the U.S. The development of industrialage military technology had provided the U.S. with the ability to back up its policy desires, something lacking in past missions. The Japanese, for their part, had been warned by the Dutch of American intentions, and therefore did not readily welcome the U.S. ships. This intransigence on the part of the Japanese did not prevent Perry from presenting the Shogunate with a letter from President Millard Fillmore stating U.S. intentions to sign a treaty with the Japanese that would open the country to free trade. Perry told the Japanese leadership that he would return in one year to promulgate the treaty, and took his leave. Perry was not idle in other nearby areas either. During the same time frame, from 1853 to 1854, Perry made visits to the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, both before and after his initial display in Edo Bay, in order to gain trading rights from the native populations. In two instances he was not opposed to the use of overwhelming force in achieving his ends, and landed Marines in order to gain trading concessions for the U.S. Upon his return to Japan the following year, Perry signed with the Japanese the Treaty of Kanagawa, which contained the provisions outlined in President Fillmore’s letter: humane treatment for shipwrecked American sailors, trade issues covered by a mostfavorednation clause, and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, including a consular residence. The trade agreements contained in the Treaty, however, were not of the bilateral, reciprocal nature typical of agreements with the European powers of the day. Rather, it provided the U.S. with a clear advantage in export to Japan with little guarantee of allowing Japanese imports into the U.S. Once the Treaty of Kanagawa had been signed, the other major European powers soon promulgated similar agreements with the Japanese leadership. Perry’s mission ultimately had a dramatic and largely unforeseen impact on Japanese society. In reaction to the American intrusion, the Japanese made plans to fundamentally alter their traditional lifestyle and governing institutions. In 1856, Townsend Harris became the first American consul to Japan and, although the Japanese initially isolated him, by 1857 he had concluded additional agreements with the Japanese allowing for the increased presence of Americans in Japan, including the addition of four new trading ports. While U.S.Japanese relations improved following the implementation of the Treaty, the transition of the decentralized Japanese feudal society to the centralized military bureaucracy that held sway through the end of World War II was not entirely smooth. One faction of feudal lords, or Daimyo, resisted change and continued their open hostility toward foreigners. Thus, the U.S. was forced, in July 1863, to retaliate against Japanese cannon fire on the American vessel Pembroke at Shimonseki. This retaliatory action, however, proved insufficient
Page 163 and, the following year, the U.S. felt it necessary to engage in a combined action with the British, French, and Dutch to force the Japanese to allow the Straits of Shimonseki to be used for shipping as per Treaty obligations. Ultimately, these changes, while seeming small at first, were a key force in leading to a fundamental political shift that by 1868 resulted in the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the consolidation of the feudal Daimyo, and the arrival of the forwardlooking Meiji Restoration. The U.S. was not to undertake military hostilities against the Japanese again until 1941, following the bombing of Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands. See Asia and the Pacific. FOR FURTHER READING Dennett, Tyler. 1925. Roosevelt and the RussoJapanese War. New York: Doubleday, Page and Co. Dixon, Joe C., ed. 1980. The American Military and the Far East. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Furber, Holden. 1976. Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600–1800. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Meyer, Milton W. 1997. Asia: A Concise History. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. James Heasley
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K KISSINGER, HENRY—Henry Alfred Kissinger (1923– ), who served as the U.S. Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977, was an influential foreign policy advisor of both President Richard Nixon and President Gerald Ford. Kissinger was born in Furth, Germany, and immigrated to the U.S. in 1938 to escape the Nazis’ persecution of Jews. He served in the U.S. Army during World War II (1939–1945) and became a citizen of the U.S. in 1943. In addition to his position as the Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977, Kissinger served as National Security Advisor from 1969 to 1975. He conducted secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese from 1969 to 1973 in an effort to end the Vietnamese War. The negotiations culminated in a ceasefire agreement, which was signed by the U.S., the Viet Cong, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam in 1973; however, despite the agreement, fighting continued until 1975. For his role in the negotiations process, Kissinger, along with the chief North Vietnamese negotiator, Le Duc Tho, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. Kissinger was also responsible for arranging Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to China and the president’s 1972 meeting with Soviet leaders in Moscow. He has earned three degrees from Harvard University and taught international relations courses at the university. In addition, Kissinger has published numerous writings on foreign policy, as well as two volumes of memoirs. See Cold War; Nixon Doctrine; Viet Cong. FOR FURTHER READING Kissinger, Henry A. 1984. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster. Schulzinger, Robert D. 1989. Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy. New York: Columbia University Press. Sara Jezewski
Page 166 KOREAN WAR—Conflict in the Korean Peninsula, which began when North Korean troops invaded the South in 1950. UN forces, led by the U.S., drove North Korean forces back over the 38th Parallel and deep into North Korea, precipitating massive Chinese intervention for the North. The fighting stabilized around the parallel and a ceasefire was agreed upon in July 1953. The deployment of troops under the UN flag in defense of South Korea was made possible only by the absence of the USSR from the Security Council. The conflict in Korea lasted three years and saw some very bitter fighting between the predominantly U.S.supplied UN forces and those of North Korea and its Chinese ally. Although numerous other countries made military commitments to the UN operation, in particular the U.K. and the British Commonwealth, operational command remained largely with the U.S. After some initial successes, the North Korean forces were driven back over the 38th Parallel by combined South Korean and UN forces. However, the entry of massive numbers of communist Chinese forces, responding to perceived threats to their border along the Yalu River, meant that when fighting finally stabilized it remained around the initial dividing line, the 38th Parallel. In July 1951 truce negotiations began in Kaesong. See Asia and the Pacific; Multilateralism; United Nations. FOR FURTHER READING Calvocoressi, Peter. 1996. World Politics Since 1945. London: AddisonWesley. Fehrenbach, T. R. 1998. This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History. London: Brassey’s. Hastedt, Glenn, P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Constitution. FOR FURTHER READING Bell, Derrick, Jr. 1997. Constitutional Conflicts. Cincinnati: Anderson. Gunther, Gerald. 1991. Constitutional Law, 12th ed. Westbury, NY: The Foundation Press.
Page 167 Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Lively, Donald, Phoebe Hadden, Dorothy Roberts, and Russell Weaver. 1996. Constitutional Law: Cases, History, and Dialogues. Cincinnati: Anderson. Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Tarr. 1999. American Constitutional Law. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Paul Weizer
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L LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN—The quickest of glances at the tables in this volume reveals that the U.S. has intervened militarily most frequently (though not most extensively) in Latin America and the Caribbean. The deployment of U.S. military force in the region historically has generated both diplomatic and cultural friction, with political consequences for the diplomatic relations among the nationstates of the hemisphere as well for social relations within their respective societies. Beneath these straightforward observations lie a range of complex explanatory factors, and of approaches to explaining historical patterns of U.S. use of force in the region. This essay provides an overview of the patterns of continuity and change in the use of military force by the U.S., framed by discussion of elements commonly used to explain those patterns. Particular attention is paid to the play of internal political and economic interests that have influenced presidents’ use of force in the region, as well as to the cultural formations that were intertwined with these interests. There are significant continuities in the willingness of decision makers in the U.S. government to deploy military force in Latin America and the Caribbean (see Table 7). Students of policy making and decision making have done much to illuminate how people, institutions, and specific objectives have shaped decisions to intervene militarily in Latin America. But two basic structural characteristics—the distribution of interests that are filtered through institutions, and prevailing cultural meanings and practices—have in differing constellations been persistent factors shaping the desire and willingness of U.S. policy makers to deploy force in the region. The use of military force by the U.S. in Latin America is an excellent context to examine the links between political economy and culture. The history of interAmerican relations is long and culturally complex. From the founding of the
Page 170 Table 7 Presidential Use of Force in Latin America and the Caribbean (adapted from Grimmett) YEAR LOCATION DESCRIPTION 1806 Mexico (Spanish Brief invasion by one U.S. platoon. territory) 1822 Cuba Naval forces suppress pirates. 1823 Cuba Naval forces suppress pirates. 1824 Cuba Naval forces suppress pirates. 1824 Puerto Rico (Spanish Occupation of town allegedly supporting piracy. territory) 1825 Cuba Naval forces pursuing pirates (joint with Great Britain). 1831– Falkland/Malvinas Protection of U.S. citizens during maritime dispute. 1832 Islands 1833 Argentina Protection of U.S. citizens during social unrest. 1835– Peru Protection of U.S. citizens during social unrest. 1836 1836 Mexico Territory dispute during Texas insurrection. 1842 Mexico Occupation undertaken under mistaken view that war had been declared. 1844 Mexico Border dispute pending U.S. Senate vote on annexation of Texas (failed). 1852– Argentina Protection of U.S. citizens during social unrest. 1853 1853 Nicaragua Protection of U.S. citizens during social unrest. 1859 Mexico Army pursuit of Cortina into Mexico. 1860 Colombia Protection of U.S. citizens during social unrest. 1865 Panama Protection of U.S. citizens during social unrest. 1866 Mexico Protection of American residents during social unrest. 1867 Nicaragua Marine occupation of Managua and Leon. 1868 Uruguay Protection of foreign residents and customhouse during insurrection at Montevideo. 1868 Colombia Protection of passengers and treasure in transit at Aspinwall. 1870 Mexico Destruction of the pirate ship Forward. 1873 Colombia (Bay of Protection of American interests during hostilities Panama) over possession of the govemment of State of Panama.
Page 171 YEAR 1873– 1896 1876 1885
LOCATION Mexico
1888
Haiti
1890
Argentina
1891
Haiti
1891
Chile
1894
Brazil
1894
Nicaragua
1895
Colombia
1896
Nicaragua
1898
Nicaragua
1899
Nicaragua
1901
Colombia (state of Panama) Colombia
1902
Mexico Panama (Colon)
1902
Colombia (state of Panama)
1903 1903
Honduras Dominican Republic
DESCRIPTION U.S. crosses border in pursuit of cattle thieves and other brigands. Temporary policing of the town of Matamoros. Guarding the valuables in transit over the Panama Railroad and the safes and vaults of the company during revolutionary activity. Also helped reestablish freedom of transit during revolutionary activity. Displayed force to persuade Haitian government to give up an American steamer it had seized. Protection of U.S. consulate and legation in Buenos Aires. Protection of American lives and property on Navassa Island. Protection of the American consulate and the women and children who sought refuge in it during revolution in Valparaiso. Protection of American commerce and shipping at Rio de Janeiro during a Brazilian civil war. Protection of American interests at Bluefields following a revolution. Protection of American interests during attack on Bocas del Toro by a bandit chieftain. Protection of American interests in Cofinto during political unrest. Protection of American lives and property at San Juan del Sur. Protection of national interests at San Juan del Norte and Bluefields (joint with British forces). Protection of American property on the Isthmus and kept transit lines open during social unrest. Protected American lives and property at Bocas del Toro during a civil war. Kept the railroad line open on the Isthmus and stationed ships to prevent the landing of Colombian troops. Protection of U.S. interests during social unrest. Protection of U.S. interests during social unrest.
Page 172 YEAR 1903– 1914
LOCATION Panama
1904
Dominican Republic
1904
Panama
1906– 1909
Cuba
1907
Honduras
1910 1911
Nicaragua Honduras
1912
Honduras
1912 1912
Panama Cuba
1912– 1925 1913
Nicaragua
1914
Haiti
1914
Dominican Republic
1914– 1917 1915– 1934 1916– 1917 1916– 1924
Mexico
DESCRIPTION Protection of U.S. interests and lives during and after the revolution for independence from Colombia. Established area in which no fighting would be allowed and protected American interests during social unrest in the cities of Puerto Plata, Sosua, and Santo Domingo (joint with British forces). Protected American lives and property at Ancon during unrest. Sought to restore order, protect foreigners, and establish a stable government after revolutionary activity. Protection of American interests during war between Honduras and Nicaragua. Protection of American interests at Bluefields. Protection of American lives and interests during civil war in Honduras. Prevention of the seizure of an Americanowned railroad by the government of Honduras. Supervision of elections outside the canal zone. Protection of American interests in Province of Ofiente and in Havana. Protection of American interests during social unrest. Aid in the evacuation of American citizens and others from the Yaqui Valley. Protection of American nationals during social unrest. Stopped the bombardment of Puerto Plata and threatened force in order to maintain Santo Domingo’s neutrality during social unrest. U.S. occupation of Veracruz.
Haiti
Maintained order during political instability.
Mexico
Pursuit of bandits/revolutionaries (including Pershing expedition). Maintained order during period of chronic unrest.
Mexico
Dominican Republic
Page 173 YEAR 1917– 1922 1918– 1919 1918– 1920 1919 1920
LOCATION Cuba
DESCRIPTION Protected American interests during social unrest.
Mexico
Pursuit of revolutionaries.
Panama
Policed elections and subsequent unrest.
Honduras Guatemala
1921
Panama/Costa Rica
1924
Honduras
1925 1925
Honduras Panama
1926– 1933 1933 1940
Nicaragua
Maintained order in a neutral zone during unrest. Protection of American Legation and other interests during unrest. Demonstration to prevent war between Panama and Costa Rica over a boundary dispute. Protection of American lives and interests during election hostilities. Protection of foreigners during political unrest. Protection of American interests during social unrest. Protection of American interests during coup d'etat of General Chamorro. Demonstration during political unrest. Protection of air and naval bases obtained by negotiation with Great Britain.
1941 1954 1959– 1960 1962 1965
Cuba Newfoundland, Bermuda, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, Trinidad, British Guiana Netherlands (Dutch Guiana) Guatemala Caribbean Cuba Dominican Republic
1981
E1 Salvador
1983– 1989 1983
Honduras
1986
Bolivia
Grenada
Securing of military bases. Military aid and advising to antiArbenz forces. Protection of U.S. nationals during Cuban crisis. Support to Cuban exiles in Bay of Pigs invasion. Protection of lives and property and opposition to proBosch forces. Assisted in training government forces in counterinsurgency. Military training and maneuvers. Protection of U.S. citizens and helped restore law and order. Assisted in antidrag operations.
Page 174 YEAR 1989
LOCATION Panama
1989 1989
Panama Colombia, Bolivia, Peru Haiti Haiti
1993 1994 1995– 1996
Haiti
DESCRIPTION Protection of American citizens/capture and arrest of General Manuel Noriega. Supplementation of forces already present. Military aid and advising in drug eradication and antitrafficking efforts. Enforcement of UN embargo. Continued enforcement of UN embargo, peacekeeping. Continued military participation of U.S. troops in the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).
U.S., Latin America caught the economic and political attention of U.S. citizens, even as many Latin Americans still remained focused on Europe as the center of gravity in the global systems of culture, economics, and politics. Economic relations within the region predated the North American and South American revolutions, but U.S. trade with Latin America quickened with the precipitous decline of the Spanish in the Americas and the Latin American wars of independence that followed shortly after the North Americans’ successful break with Great Britain. Geopolitical and geoeconomic ambitions toward Latin America percolated relatively narrowly among specific interests in the U.S. through the early 19th century, with the exception of the U.S.Mexican War. But these ambitions reached a boil toward century’s end as a result of two mutually reinforcing developments. First, regions and sectors in the U.S. whose economic interests were implicated in Latin America increasingly advocated an active U.S. role in the hemisphere. The second factor was the quickening of always present, but decreasingly latent, senses of U.S. nationalism that were readily expressed in a frequently racialized sense of cultural superiority visàvis Latin America and the Caribbean. In the early decades of the 20th century, the U.S. pursued a variety of tactics to use its maturing power in the international political economy to make good on the longdeclared, but now more politically enabled intention to secure as much of the region as possible as a U.S. sphere of influence. With the advent of the Cold War, established economic interests were viewed through the lens of Cold War ideology, refocusing not only geopolitical priorities but also the ideological interpretations policy makers used to construe the meanings of events in Latin America. With the end of Cold War competition and the dissolution of the ideological templates peculiar to that geopolitical/ideological competition, the U.S. returned to attempting to play a leadership role in the region, albeit within a new set of historical conditions. Calling attention to the continuity of these broad structural characteristics should not subtract from the variation with these general parameters. The larger
Page 175 part of this essay describes the purposes and characteristics of U.S. uses of force in Latin America, which have varied in readily discernable ways that can be roughly periodized. The first period begins at the founding of the U.S. and reaches the early 1890s, and is characterized by the dual development of U.S. ambitions and capabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean. The second period stretches from the 1890s to the 1940s, during which the U.S. intervened frequently and deeply in Latin American politics as the leadership of the country explored a variety of tactics for implementing a strategy of regional hegemony. The third period covers the Cold War period from the 1940s to the early 1990s, and is dominated by the position of the U.S. as a leading contestant in the Cold War. The fourth period stretches from the denouement of the Cold War to the present, in which U.S. strategy has sought to implement a policy that maintains hegemony in a post–Cold War environment driven once again, at least in Latin America, primarily by economic concerns. THE FOUNDING OF THE U.S. TO THE 1890S By the time the 19th century was over, the U.S. had joined the other firstand secondtier global powers in the imperialist game. By century’s end, U.S. imperial ambitions operated in both Asia and Latin America, most directly as a result of territories and influence won in the SpanishAmerican War (1898). But the proximate effect of the SpanishAmerican War came after a century during which U.S. ambitions in Latin America and (especially) the Caribbean incubated within the context of debates and conflicts of U.S. expansionism. The SpanishAmerican War provides an obvious and interesting watershed in the pattern of the U.S. government’s use of force in Latin America (and the presumptions underlying such deployments). However, the war with Spain capped a century of territorial expansion that prepared the ground for the building of empire both formal and informal. Peter Smith’s discussion of imperialism in the context of U.S.Latin American relations elaborates on ‘‘the conquest and incorporation of territory,” the “subjugation and colonization,” and the creation of spheres of influence. As the 19th century progressed, a “sphere of influence” was established by U.S. presidents, ultimately resulting in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. The characterization of “informal empire” as the general thrust of U.S. strategy in the region through the end of the 19th century is complicated somewhat by the territorial expansion of the U.S. The expansion of U.S. authority across the continent can be considered as part and parcel of the impulse propelling hegemonic ambitions in the hemisphere. Both popular and elite discourse frequently posed the expansion of political authority, either formal or colonial, into the Caribbean and Central America as a logical extension of U.S. expansion across North America. Neither the general political failure of the argument for linking continental expansion to imperialist policies in Latin America, nor the fact that (especially early in the century) U.S. ambitions outstripped capability,
Page 176 negate the importance of such sentiment as a political force when assessing those uses of military force in Latin America that did take place in the 1800s. That is, there was meaningful disagreement and debate over U.S. policy in Latin America during the period, resulting in an uneven application of force in Latin America. This fluctuating pattern makes it difficult to arrive at a simple characterization (e.g., “manifest destiny, linked to imperialist ambitions, resulted in consistent applications of military force in Latin America”). The issue was too contentious for this to be accurate. But for important figures of the time, ideological formations that constructed U.S. nationalism as a dynamic force driven to cross frontiers and expand territorial boundaries provided templates for foreign policy. Early in the century, U.S. policy makers also focused on a more defensive concern: the nationstate’s capabilities in the region relative to the European powers, particularly the British. These geopolitical concerns were centered on commercial affairs in the wider Caribbean basin, encompassing Mexico and Central America. The annexation of Texas provided a buffer to European maneuvering in the Gulf of Mexico, but further compromises had to be made. The prevalence of British investment and commercial interests in Central America led the U.S. to strive for access rather than hegemony for most of the century. In the Caribbean, racialized fears catalyzed by the Haitian revolutions contributed powerfully to support for policies that accommodated European colonialism as necessary to the prevention of future occurrences. Thus, the early U.S. military actions came in response to the circumstances of commercial activity in the Caribbean and South America, particularly competition among European and U.S. interests. The intertwining of trade, smuggling, piracy, European imperial competition, and the complexities of the Caribbean slave economy reached back well before the independence of the U.S. For the young country, this meant that early interventions typically had limited purposes, however much they were accompanied the stirring of broader ambitions. U.S. forces landed in Cuba four times in the 1820s as part of an effort to combat piracy, which, like smuggling contraband, was a widespread practice in the area as Spanish authority declined, and French, British, and U.S. traders sought profit in working around colonial trading regulations. Later interventions as the decade wore on—a partial list of sites would include those in Uruguay, Nicaragua, Argentina, and Peru (see Table 7)—were ostensibly to protect U.S. citizens and/or interests from “social unrest.” This broad category only slightly masks a complex game. Presidents intervened less as a demonstration of U.S. hegemony than to convey that the U.S. was willing and able to maintain a degree of order. U.S. presidents of the period attempted to send the signal that there was no need for European intervention—though such intervention continued as the U.S. remained generally unable to forestall it. The Mexican War, in which the U.S. added greatly to its territory and illustrated both willingness and ability to undertake a major military operation in its sphere of influence, would not only change the shape of relations with its south
Page 177 ern neighbor forever, but also color the view of the U.S. in Latin America as a whole. As the 1800s wore on, increasing U.S. capabilities and a growing range of material interests resulted in uses of military force driven by objectives that were more complex than those of the pre–Civil War actions. These interventions reflect post–Civil War domestic politics in the U.S. When the issue of slavery was detached from the issue of expansion once and for all as a result of the outcome of the Civil War in the U.S., Northern interest in expanding U.S. influence in the Caribbean, Central America, and northern Latin America intensified. Delinked from slavery, the southward expansion of U.S. influence became more clearly focused on the extension of political and economic power. The faltering of British power in the region fueled this dynamic. The pace and frequency of U.S. military intervention quickened in the 1880s and 1890s, with the U.S. carrying out smallscale military interventions in Panama, Argentina, Haiti, Chile, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Colombia—all justified in the name of restoring order and/or protecting U.S. interests. 1890–1940S: EARLY STRATEGIES OF EMPIRE The U.S. demonstrated the ability and the political will to use military power most forcefully during the latter half of the century in the SpanishAmerican War, both capping the earliest period of U.S. policy toward Latin America and, in the process, transforming it. The successful deployment of military force can be understood in part as a sign of the success of domestic interests in the U.S. in pushing policies that increased the ability of the U.S. government to pursue expansionism. In this context, the war was an early showcase for the expanding blue water navy, a pet project of expansionists which, in the early phases, set the stage for the crushing U.S. defeat of Spain. One consequence of this buildup was to strengthen the ability of presidents to deploy military force to the south of the continental U.S. This fed into a larger development: Latin American policy during and after the SpanishAmerican War aligned domestic support, capability, and strategy into a relatively coherent approach to the Caribbean and (to a lesser degree) Latin America, based on a culturally grounded assertion of regional hegemony. The war resulted in the acquisition of Puerto Rico by the U.S. and the transformation of Cuba into a protectorate. These changes were concrete indications of the transformation of North American ambitions and the tactics used to pursue them. Replacing the almost haphazard, defensive intervention of most of the 19th century was a more aggressive, recognizably imperialist strategy. The centerpiece of this strategy was the employment of rhetoric built around a U.S. commitment to promote and protect democracy as it protected material interests in the region. The rhetorical emphasis on democracy obscured U.S. material interests and reposed virulent streams of racialized cultural thought in a language of democracy. Theodore Roosevelt’s embrace of empire is prominent in popular conscious
Page 178 ness as well as historiography, and was reflected in the ‘‘Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, which signaled to leaders both in the hemisphere and outside of it that the U.S. would “exercise … an international police power” in the Western Hemisphere. Roosevelt’s position was graphically illustrated in the military interventions undertaken by his administration in Colombia, what would become Panama, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and, of course, Cuba (where Roosevelt had added to his fame during his military service and where he oversaw a significant U.S. military intervention in 1906). The U.S. was interested in maintaining the diligence of Latin American countries in paying their foreign (at this point, predominantly European) creditors. The more revealing examples of the contradictions inherent in the combination of elements in U.S. policy in the wake of the SpanishAmerican War were provided during the administration of Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921). The Wilson administration’s deployment of military force represented a critical foreshadowing of things to come in U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and the rationales for the use of force that were both discussed by decision makers and offered in public. The historiography of foreign policy makes much of Wilson’s “idealism”—a central theme of this discussion being Wilson’s effort to elevate the role of “spreading democracy” as a key principle in U.S. foreign policy. Wilson’s dedication to “principles” provided part of the rationale for several deployments of military force in the hemisphere, not to mention U.S. military involvement in Europe. Many private and public sector internationalists supported Wilson’s candidacy. In Latin America, this took the form of high visibility deployments of force that yielded questionable results but presaged the mixture of culture imperatives, ideological orientation, and geopolitics that characterized U.S. Cold War policy. The interventions overseen by Wilson in Mexico, for example, were partly haphazard, largely almost tragicomic exercises in hegemonic muscle flexing, and deeply informed by a reflexive cultural superiority on the part of Wilson and other key U.S. actors involved in the U.S. Mexican policy. Yet the former professor’s lessons went badly in Mexico, particularly when the pedagogic technique called for the use of military force. Wilson attempted without longterm success to influence the outcome of the civil wars that constituted the Mexican Revolution, pursuing a policy that was opposed to largescale U.S. military intervention in Mexico but which nonetheless ended up with the U.S. deploying forces within Mexico twice during Wilson’s term. His first effort was to oppose the government of General Victoriano Huerta, who came to power in a coup against the recently elected Francisco Madero. Although opposed to intervention that might lead to fullscale war (in part based on fear in the administration that the U.S. military was unprepared for such an action), Wilson came to oppose Huerta based on the U.S. president’s objection to Huerta having come to power through undemocratic means. Huerta’s regime therefore threatened both stability and business interests. Wilson gained the opportunity to apply military pressure on Huerta’s government when a chance conflict near the Mexican port of Veracruz resulted in the landing of American forces in that
Page 179 city. The intervention began as a minor conflict over the temporary detention of a group of U.S. Navy men by Mexican government forces and the refusal of Mexican officials to offer an apology sufficient to please the officers’ commander. With Wilson’s approval, the conflict escalated into the military occupation of the port city and, as John M. Hart’s research argues, before withdrawing the U.S. exerted influence on the Mexican Civil War by withholding customs duties from the Huerta government and providing forces opposed to Huerta with arms originally intended for the government. In early 1916, U.S. military forces were again in Mexico, this time in the form of the socalled “Punitive Expedition” sent into Mexico to pursue Francisco “Pancho” Villa and his troops after they staged an armed attack on Columbus, New Mexico. Over 5,000 U.S. troops, led by General John Pershing, moved hundreds of miles into Mexican territory, skirmished occasionally with Mexican regulars, but were unable to locate, let alone apprehend, Villa. After nearly a year of fruitless searching for Villa, diplomatic tension with Mexico, and additional “punitive expeditions” triggered by raids on U.S. border towns (and with the war in Europe increasingly occupying the attention of U.S. policy makers), Wilson withdrew the forces early in 1917. Wilson’s willingness to use military force to enforce his visions of good government and order in Mexico and the Caribbean left a longterm mark on U.S. policy in the region that is often underestimated. The immediate effect of Wilson’s approach seems to have encouraged weariness of the activist stance Wilson had taken in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua, and a retrenchment of a more conservative approach by State Department career officers and secretaries of state under presidents in the 1920s. The 1920s were not completely without U.S. military interventions, but the decade clearly marked a transition in the direction of Franklin Roosevelt’s “good neighbor’’ approach, in which the policy makers sought to influence Latin American countries with less frequent recourse to military intervention. And the Good Neighbor Policy itself, its resistance to the crudities of “Gunboat Diplomacy” notwithstanding, may yet be seen as the mature phase of the imperialist orientation earlier identified as providing the basic orientation of U.S. policy. Beset by economic depression and complex global conditions, the president of the U.S. shifted strategies in the 1930s. Yet the tactical shift was more a result of the success in the early decades of the century in establishing U.S. hegemony in the eyes of both European rivals and Latin Americans. And, moreover, the approach would not survive the onset of the Cold War rivalry with Soviets and the ideological struggle that accompanied it. 1945–1989: COLD WAR INTERNATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA As with so many areas of U.S. foreign policy, the vicissitudes of Cold War international politics strained the consistency of policy in Latin America and led presidents to undertake a number of military interventions in the region in which
Page 180 the connections between means and ends were not always apparent. As with policy in other parts of the world (none more so than Southeast Asia), the politics of military intervention in Latin America created polarized political conflict by the 1980s, both within policy making institutions and in the polity at large. Perceptions of the Soviet threat both to democracy and to U.S. economic interests were the fundamental considerations in decisions to apply military force to achieve U.S. ends in Latin America. The variety of tactics employed to intervene in opposition to perceived Soviet influence reflected the construction of the Soviet threat not only as real but also as universal. Particularly after the success of the Cuban revolution and Fidel Castro’s public embrace of communism, policy makers saw the Soviet threat residing not only in direct Soviet political influence, but also in the opportunities social and political instability offered forces allied with or sympathetic to international communism. Any sign of instability could be read as a potential opening for Soviet or Sovietsupported subversion. This association between instability and either aggression or subversion by forces allied with international communism resulted in a sensitivity to social unrest that resulted in both overt military intervention by the U.S. (such as the landing of 20,000 U.S. military personnel in the Dominican Republic, ordered by Lyndon Johnson in 1965) and a long series of policy actions that stopped well short of largescale military intervention but reached well beyond moral support. The U.S. government provided extensive training and support to Cuban exiles for the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, and only a logistical breakdown appears to have prevented the U.S. from providing limited air support using unmarked planes, which was authorized by President John Kennedy at the eleventh hour. In the 1980s, the provision of a mixture of overt and covert military training and support was refined into the modal strategy for projecting U.S. military power in the region without deploying actual forces in combat situations. U.S. military advisors and covert operatives provided extensive support for the militaries of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala as part of the Reagan administration’s determined efforts to combat perceived Soviet and Cuban expansionism in Central America. The administration’s support for these regimes capped years of support for often abusive regimes in Central America and throughout the region. Support for allied regimes in these countries served the end of attempting to maintain stability and, in the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, supporting cooperative governments against leftist insurgencies supported (though often with not much more than verbal encouragement) by the Cuban government and by the Soviets. Military support and training for these governments were also used to support the antigovernment forces in Nicaragua, known collectively as the Contras, whom the Reagan administration supported in their efforts to destabilize the government headed by the Sandinista front (FSLN). In addition to support from leftist parties and governments in Europe, the FSLN government was also strongly supported by Cuba and the USSR,
Page 181 making them a critical test case for the Reagan administration’s more aggressive policy in combating Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere. The centerpiece of the Reagan administration’s policy, the notion of “low intensity conflict,” purposefully blurred the easy definition of a presidential use of military force. Low intensity conflict called for small counterinsurgency forces (native or U.S.) who would, by various means, wear down opponents. This approach in part reflected lessons taken from both Vietnam and counterinsurgency efforts elsewhere in Latin America. It also reflected the recognition that substantial opposition to largescale U.S. military involvement in Central America existed in Congress and among the U.S. populace. The low intensity approach had the virtue of drawing little attention and being relatively costeffective. Nonetheless, opposition to the application of the approach in Nicaragua and (to a lesser extent) El Salvador drove members of the Reagan administration to covertly fund and execute programs supporting the antigovernment in Nicaragua, and in some instances in violation of congressional legislation. The 1980s began with the Reagan administration’s efforts to strengthen opposition to Soviet influence by ratcheting up pressure on Cuba, supporting the Contras with training, material, funds, and covert actions such as the mining of Nicaraguan harbors by U.S. personnel in 1983, and extensive military training and maneuvers in the territories of Nicaragua’s neighbors. Yet as intense as this pressure was, and as central to the Reagan administration’s foreign policy, the approach failed to fundamentally change the situation on the ground in Central America. To the extent that democratic transitions were an objective of U.S. policy in Central America— and one can only surmise that this objective was greatly qualified by the fact that leftist forces had some degree of popular support, particularly in Nicaragua—the transformation and eventual disappearance of the Soviet Union likely did more to bring combating parties to the electoral arena than any tact taken by the Reagan administration. POST–COLD WAR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA The transformation and eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union transformed the logic of U.S. military intervention that had been applied throughout the Cold War, and effectively rendered obsolete the most comprehensible public rationale for justifying and explaining U.S. military intervention in the region. The rationale for the military intervention of almost all types during the Cold War disappeared with the Soviet Union, making any further assessment of the real extent of “Soviet danger to the U.S.” a postmortem assessment. Cuba remained defiant, but the continued U.S. economic embargo coupled with the departure of the Soviets allowed the Castro government to do little more than holler and occasionally send raft loads of refugees to Florida. U.S. presidents and policy makers were left with a configuration of elements
Page 182 in Latin America in some ways similar to that on the eve of the Cold War. As Fidel Castro among others was quick to point out, the departure of the Soviets from Latin America and the transformation of global strategic calculations put the U.S. once again in the position of being a regional power that benefited from a radically asymmetrical balance of power. As others have observed, when the Soviet influence in Latin America was diminished the incentives for force also declined. However, the costs of such intervention also went down. The absence of the Soviet Union also left policy makers without a rationale for military intervention that was both commensurable in public discussion and easily spliced with directly interested reasons for intervention, such as economic stability and the maintenance of regional hegemony. Smith’s interpretation is borne out by the two major military interventions undertaken by the U.S. since the Cold War wound down, the 1989 invasion of Panama, and the 1994 landing of approximately 14,000 U.S. troops in Haiti as part of a peacekeeping force maintaining stability during the seating of the government of Jean Bertrand Aristide. In both cases, the U.S. decision to use military force reflected a heterogeneous array of factors both domestic and international, but immediate security threats (or the perception of them) were not among the apparent reasons. In the Panamanian case, representatives of the Bush administration cited the security of the Panama Canal as a compelling interest as well as the threats posed to the U.S. by drug trafficking in which the Panamanian government was complicitous. But the primary thrust of the invasion ultimately appeared to be the ouster and either death or capture of General Manuel Noriega—who was portrayed as the primary threat in both of the above areas. In the case of Haiti, the expressed goal of supporting democracy was placed front and center in the Clinton administration’s explanation of the U.S. leadership in the UN peacekeeping force that was sent into Haiti, U.S. discomfort with the product of that democracy, deposed President Aristide notwithstanding. Cultural factors also played a subtle role in justification for the policy when administration officials cited the U.S. interest in righting things in Haiti in order to avoid a flow of refugees to the U.S. In justifying the deployment of U.S. troops in Haiti to support the return of the Aristide government, Clinton neatly illustrated the link that could be made between refugee flows and the lack of democracy in Haiti and Cuba. As many observers pointed out at the time, and as Peter Smith argues in his overview of U.S.Latin American relations, support for democratic governments was clearly not sufficient in and of itself to justify military action by the U.S. In the Haitian case, as in the case of Panama, other interests tip the scales in favor of intervention. Yet the general thrust of policy making, shorn of Cold War rationales, seemed more and more to reflect the prewar period of U.S. hegemony, marked as these policies are by a Wilsonian emphasis on the U.S. commitment to democratic order, as conceived by U.S. policy makers and, to a lesser extent, their constituents. This conception of order bears the marks of
Page 183 both contending interests and contending cultural constructs. See Alliance for Progress; Cold War; Focos; Monroe Doctrine. FOR FURTHER READING Blasier, Cole. 1976. The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Castaneda, Jorge G. 1994. Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War. New York: Vintage Books. Cottam, Martha L. 1994. Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Hart, John Mason. 1987. Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press. Joseph, Gilbert M., Catherine C. Legrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds. 1998. Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.Latin American Relations. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. LaFeber, Walter 1993. Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America,2d rev. and exp. ed. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. Langley, Lester D. 1989. America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere. Athens: University of Georgia Press. Lowenthal, Abraham, and Gregory Treverton, eds. 1994. Latin America in a New World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Pastor, Robert A. 1992. Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pike, Frederick B. 1992. The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature. Austin: University of Texas Press. Schoultz, Lars. 1998. Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Smith, Peter H. 1996. Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.–Latin American Relations. New York: Oxford University Press. James Henson
Idealism; United Nations. FOR FURTHER READING Bennett, A. Leroy. 1995. International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Carr, E. H. 1964. The Twenty Years Crisis. New York: Harper and Row. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Page 184 LEGISLATIVE VETO—Congress typically delegates authority to the president, for a variety of practical (saving time) and political (deferring responsibility) reasons. A common practice in such delegation involves the Congress’s ability to override a presidential decision through a vote in one or both houses. The delegation of power comes with strings attached. If the president makes a decision based on this delegated power, then Congress can pass a resolution overturning the president’s decision. Until the Chadha decision in 1984, legislative vetoes were very common, and provided a political safety net and a convenience for congressional policy making. Chadha, however, found legislative vetoes violated the separation of powers inherent in the Constitution. In essence, the veto was a check provided for the Executive on legislative intrusion, not vice versa. Following the decision, delegated powers to the president with strings attached would be in violation of the Constitution. In actuality, legislative vetoes have not been wiped from public law. Congress still delegates authority to the president, and in some cases, attaches some form of legislative veto to that delegated authority. Presidents are loath to challenge the legality of such requirements because they want the convenience and enhanced power stemming from the delegation. The argument goes that if presidents start challenging legislative vetoes, then Congress will stop delegating authority, thus increasing the difficulty presidents have leading policy change. Presidents realize that Congress is more willing to relinquish control when it knows it has a way to rescind it. In foreign policy, the most obvious legislative veto is the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which has yet to be challenged legally. See Congress; Constitution; INS v. Chadha; War Powers Resolution. FOR FURTHER READING Gibson, Martha Lieber. 1992. Weapons of Influence: The Legislative Veto, American Foreign Policy, and the Irony of Reform. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Fisher, Louis. 1991. Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President, 3d ed. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Korn, Jessica. 1996. The Power of Separation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the Legislative Veto. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jeffrey S. Peake
Asia and the Pacific, Table 1; Data Sets on the Use of Force, Tables 2–5; Ethics. FOR FURTHER READING Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Offutt, Milton. 1928. “The Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the
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United States.” Johns Hopkins Area Studies in Historical and Political Science, Serial no. 44. Karl R. DeRouen, Jr.
Proxy War. FOR FURTHER READING Downie, Richard. 1992. “LowIntensity Conflict: Old Wine in a New Bottle?” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 15:53–67. LaFeber, Walter. 1997. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1996, 8th ed. New York: McGrawHill. McMahon, Bernard. 1990. “LowIntensity Conflict: The Pentagon’s Foible.’’ Orbis 34: 3–16. U.S. Army. http://call.army.mil/call/ctc_bull/904/904toc.htm. James Henson
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M MEDIA—The use of military force in reaction to international threats is fairly routine. Presidents frequently rely on this response to achieve official foreign policy objectives: Kennedy blockaded Cuba during the Missile Crisis, Carter used force in an attempt to free hostages in Iran, Reagan bombed Libya in response to terrorism, and Bush invaded Iraq when American economic interests were threatened. The American public is often described as lacking sophisticated knowledge in the foreign policy arena. This absence allows presidents wide latitude in explaining military uses of force. However, as the political scandals increase in number, the media are beginning to attribute a desire for stronger approval rates as the motivation underlying presidential decisions to use force. It is important to understand how the media influence foreign policy formation, specifically decisions to use force. In times of advanced technology, the media have moved beyond simply disseminating elite information to critically evaluating the entire situation, including framing the motivation behind use of force action during times of crisis. Acting as the public’s gatekeeper, scorekeeper, and watchdog has greatly increased the media’s power to impact public perception of foreign policy. Only through exploring the media’s intermediary role to influence the process of assigning motivation can the interaction between the public and the president be fully comprehended. MODELS OF POLICY FORMATION In the development of domestic policy, democratic theory proposes a simple, yet interactive model involving the mass public and elites. The public expresses opinions through political behavior and in response, elites develop policies enacted on the public. As part of a continual and reciprocal cycle, democratic
Page 188 theory assumes that the public is somewhat knowledgeable about political issues, even if their information is selectively based on personal experience. In forming domestic policy, the direct experience of the mass public enables a recursive policy model to function. However, Americans have little or no immediate interaction with other countries and have minimal information upon which to build political attitudes. According to Hurwitz and Peffley, foreign policy preferences in this area tend to be based on the application of democratic and capitalistic values interacting with elite discourse. Given this foundation, individuals are frequently unable to generate attitudes without assistance in understanding the context of the situation and the realm of appropriate responses. Thus, in the realm of foreign policy this model requires an additional, supplementary component. The media play an intermediary role in the construction of foreign policy by providing information, setting the public agenda, and influencing the attribution process in developing foreign policy. As the third actor, the media contribute directly and indirectly to foreign policy decisions concerning use of force during times of international crises. Initially, direct effects include conveying information and agenda setting. During times of national crisis, the president and elites rely on the media to relay facts, current information, and provide a historicalpolitical understanding of the crisis. The media also engage in agenda setting: the power of the media to bring public attention to particular issues and problems. By selectively communicating specific information, the media influence what areas of the world Americans consider significant. More important, the media’s agenda setting influences the importance Americans place on various crises. The primary indirect effect of the media is influencing the framing and attribution process. When a crisis occurs where the president decides to use force, public support is essential to justify military action. To secure this support, the president, through the media, depicts the crisis as a threat to America. Once the media project this scenario, the electorate will attribute responsibility for the crisis to the aggressor country or individuals and support the president. This phenomenon is typically called the “rally’roundtheflag” effect. In recent years, another aspect of the attribution process has begun to emerge in the media. Increasing levels of political cynicism have Americans doubting the actions of many politicians, especially during times of crisis. Knowing the positive influence of the “rally’roundtheflag” effect on presidential popularity, the media have conveyed more doubt about the sincerity of military action during times of recent crisis. For example, while the Gulf War was a military success, several media sources questioned whether President Bush was trying to deflect attention away from the economy and gain enough popularity to win the November election. The Electorate Americans are often depicted as lacking a sophisticated understanding of international relations. Due to this absence of knowledge and information, Charles
Page 189 Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf posit that attitudes about foreign policy are less stable and less predictable than opinions about domestic issues. In the policy making process, the electorate is generally unable to give representatives clear and coherent positions about foreign policy. Lacking a knowledge foundation from which foreign policy attitudes could be constructed, the electorate must rely on alternative sources. Foreign policy attitudes derive from core beliefs central to democratic and capitalistic theory. According to Hurwitz and Peffley, values such as ethnocentrism, morality of warfare, and free market economics are used to develop attitudes concerning international trade, foreign loans, and spending on defense programs. This foundation is sensible given the lack of specific knowledge about international relations. Individuals can respond to crises based on familiar, pivotal ideas in American political thought. However, the combination of minimal knowledge and valuebased attitudes does permit the public to be manipulated by elite rhetoric. By tapping into core beliefs, presidents have influenced public opinion to gain support for military action. The President The malleability of public opinion concerning foreign policy permits the president to use what Neustadt found to be the primary unofficial power of the institution: the power to persuade. In accord with Zaller’s theory of opinion formation, attitudes are influenced the most when individuals have low issue awareness and the message is conveyed with high intensity. This scenario describes a crisis situation. Messages from the president communicate importance, severity, and gravity; they are mainstream ideas consistent with underlying values shared by Americans. For example, when President Bush discussed sending troops to Iran in the fall of 1989, he discussed how such action secured American economic interests. The use of military force is part of the president’s constitutional power, but public support is never guaranteed. As the president represents the entire electorate, he can and must use unofficial powers to ensure approval of military action. Unofficial powers generally consist of the power to persuade where the president must convince the public to support his policy directives. In the case of a crisis situation, the president attempts to persuade the public that the useofforce response is an appropriate, necessary, and defensive measure. The president is in a unique position to achieve this goal because the Executive Branch controls the release of official information and can talk with the public through the media. By being the exclusive voice of explanation, presidents engage in rhetoric to elicit public support. The situation is depicted in a specific way to portray the use of force to protect the American way of life. Presidents use specific language to convey their message and gain public support. The opposing country or actor eliciting the useofforce response is portrayed as advancing against democratic and capitalistic values, generating feelings of fear and uncertainty. Presidents usually represent America as the
Page 190 victim of a violation of morals and accepted norms. Moreover, presidential rhetoric usually depicts this situation in a group dynamic, emphasizing the cohesiveness of American society, the importance of protecting our culture, and the necessity of defending ourselves against the enemy. The use of values and abstract principles dominates this rhetoric to avoid details of action. Presidents from Johnson to Clinton accentuate the “us vs. them’’ mentality in attempting to generate support for military action. Through rhetoric, or the “alchemy of promoted crisis,” Denise Bostdorff finds that presidents have used threatening situations to their political advantage. The Media During a crisis, the electorate depends on the media for information and the president uses the media to generate support for use of force responses. Given this relationship, it should not be surprising that the media play such an important role. As discussed previously, the media have both direct and indirect effects on foreign policy, particularly during times of international crisis. Direct effects include the media’s democratic function (keeping the public informed) and setting the public agenda concerning foreign policy. Direct Effects Informing the public involves the media playing various roles. The primary role is simply as observer; reporters and correspondents gather and present information. During crisis events, information is very limited and comes almost exclusively from the Executive Branch. Acting as a participant is the second role. The media grill the president and other officials for details about the event and may conduct some investigative reporting into the background of international actors involved in the situation. Through the combination of these roles, the media also act as a catalyst by influencing what the public sees and hears about the crisis, thus shaping public opinion. Iyengar and Kinder found that agenda setting occurs when certain problems receiving attention from the national media become publicly perceived as very important to Americans. In the context of international relations, the national media focus more on European and other countries that are economically affluent, politically powerful, and similar to the U.S. This leaves the public with an incredible void concerning crisis. Most conflicts concerning America do not occur with our allies; crises occur with countries or actors receiving little or no media attention. Therefore, the electorate does not carry exclusive responsibility for minimal levels of information; knowledge is difficult to obtain as well. However, the decision to engage in limited use of force sometimes occurs after a situation gradually escalates and this is where agenda setting will influence how salient the electorate perceives the situation to be, according to Iyengar and Simon. For example, the long buildup to military action in the Gulf War was preceded by months of news coverage. By October of 1991, Americans
Page 191 saw the Gulf conflict as equally important to the failing economy, as the result of agenda setting. Indirect Effects Priming and framing are indirect ways the media influence public attitudes toward foreign policy. Unlike the direct effects where the impact is exclusively issuerelated, indirect effects influence the public’s evaluations of the conflict and the political leaders. Priming involves the media setting or influencing the standards by which elites are evaluated. Framing is a phenomenon where the media set the context of a story; the frame of reference provides a background of understanding for the viewer. These combined effects allow the electorate to make attributions of responsibility for the crisis and attributions of elite motivation for selecting limited use of force. Due to limited time or interest, people pay only selective attention to news information. When stories are presented in a similar, repetitious way, the information will saturate into the public’s consciousness and ultimately become familiar. Thus, the media can influence the characteristics, traits, and issues used to evaluate elite by reiterating specific stories. Priming plays a dominant role in the coverage of crisis response. Listening and accepting elite rhetoric originates from news stories conveying the president as communicating relevant, accurate information. The public evaluates the president from standards expressed through the news story: the president’s integrity, ability to lead, and appropriateness of the response. For example, during Reagan’s presidency, his popularity rating remained continuously high until the IranContra scandal. The priming theory suggests that national media coverage of the scandal impacted the electorate’s evaluation of Reagan. Prior to the story breaking, few Americans used foreign policy to evaluate Reagan; after reports continuously ran questioning Reagan’s involvement in the arms sales, Miller and Krosnick found attitudes about American involvement in Central America played a much larger role in presidential evaluation. President Reagan was perceived to be out of touch with the electorate and his popularity ratings on integrity and competence decreased significantly. Ultimately, the negative priming weakened Reagan’s political power in foreign policy, by minimizing his ability to persuade the public. Framing addresses a different aspect of elite evaluation. Depending on the presentation of a story, the public will engage in making attribution judgments concerning responsibility for and motivation underlying action taken. Given that presidential rhetoric typically portrays America as a victim to an outside aggressor, the media’s conveyance of this information frames the issue to where the electorate normally places responsibility on the aggressor. This effect occurs whenever the presidential rhetoric is persuading the public through political rhetoric: John F. Kennedy’s Cuban Missile Crisis, Ronald Reagan’s invasion of Grenada and bombing of Libya, and George Bush’s actions in the Gulf War. Elites must be careful though, about the attribution of responsibility. If a crisis
Page 192 is not resolved quickly, or if the useofforce response is not successful, the media may alter the story’s framing to maintain the public interest. The change in frames is typically critical of elite action and questions elite rhetoric and actions. For example, the initial media frame of President Carter’s attempt to free American hostages was supportive, but polling showed that public opinion changed quickly to include extensive criticism of his foreign policy. The longer a crisis, the greater the likelihood that the media will shift story focus and concentrate on elite motivation for use of force. Presidential rhetoric identifies the motives as defending American values and way of life. Early on, the media readily present this frame. Nevertheless, elites are very aware that the electorate almost always rallies to support the president during an international crisis, temporarily increasing presidential popularity, and power. Elites have arguably used this reaction to deflect attention away from troublesome domestic issues. Politically, the use of force to deflect attention away from domestic issues makes sense. Limited military action has a low cost in human lives and will probably increase presidential popularity. However, the media are also aware of this phenomenon and have become more cynical about elite motivation by framing international crisis in the context of foreign and domestic policy. The initial coverage is usually support of presidential action, but as time goes on and in light of presidential scandal, questioning motivation is another frame to help the public understand governmental action. CONCLUSION The media’s contribution to foreign policy is substantial. In part, this is due to the electorate’s lack of knowledge and interest in conjunction with the presidential need to secure public support for international policies. The media are a source of information, they influence what Americans think is important, and shape public perceptions through presenting stories in specific ways. Thus, the media have both direct and indirect effects on foreign policy. Coverage of crises is often incomplete and sensationalized due to the immediacy and intensity of international conflicts. These are periods of uncertainty where information is presented as comprehensive, though minimal information is typically available. The reliance on elites for facts further blurs the situation as presidential rhetoric is designed to rally support. During a time of crisis, coverage is likely to increase presidential power by generating a rally effect and promoting the necessity of supporting elites. In the short run, and if the use of force is successful, media coverage will temporarily increase presidential power. However, in this day and age of intense political cynicism, the media have increasingly begun to question the motivation underlying military responses to crises. Through framing and priming, the media influence the process of attribution for both responsibility and motivation. Deflecting attention away from domestic problems is a temporary aspect of crisis response, and if the media frame the motivation in this light, presidential power is likely to reduce. The
Page 193 public may not be sophisticated enough to reason through elite motivation, but the media are, and can dramatically influence foreign policy. See Diversionary Theory; Public Opinion; Rally ’round the Flag. FOR FURTHER READING Bostdorff, Denise M. 1994. The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. 1987. “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model.” American Political Science Review 81:1099–1120. Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald Kinder. 1987. News that Matters: Television and American Opinion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Iyengar, Shanto, and Adam Simon. 1996. “Toward Theory Based Research in Political Communication.” Political Science and Politics 29:1–29. Kegley, Charles, and Eugene Wittkopf. 1988. ‘‘The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: An Introduction.’’ In The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, ed. Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Miller, J. M., and J. A. Krosnick. 1996. “News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: A Program of Research on the Priming Hypothesis.’’ In Political Persuasion and Attitude Change, ed. D. Mutz and P. Sniderman. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Neustadt, Richard. 1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: The Free Press. Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press. Jill Glathar
Table 8 ). NORTH AFRICAN PIRATE STATES: 1787–1818 American interests in the Middle East have been developing ever since the beginning of the 19th century. American ties with the Middle East were insignificant at first. Throughout the 19th century, American interaction with and interest in the Middle East were mostly commercial and cultural. For example, American missionaries initiated their activities in locations such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. Their work ranged from evangelism to education, and their efforts brought about the establishment of schools, hospitals, and cultural centers. In 1870, the Egyptian Army recruited a number of American military officers. These Americans were private citizens who, at one point or another, had served as either Confederate or Union officers. Because of their military expe
Page 194 Table 8 Presidential Use of Force in the Middle East (adapted from Grimmett) YEAR LOCATION DESCRIPTION 1801– Tripoli Naval forces with Marines land in Tripoli to free the 1805 crew of the Philadelphia. 1815 Algeria Naval forces attack Algiers, Algeria in the second Barbary war. 1815 Libya Naval forces secure indemnities for offenses during the War of 1812. 1882 Egypt Naval forces land in Alexandria to protect American interests during British invasion of Egypt. 1903 Greater Syria American forces protect the American consulate in Beirut, Greater Syria upon fear of local uprising. 1948 Palestine A Marine consular guard sent to Jerusalem to protect American consul general. 1956 Egypt A Marine battalion evacuates American nationals and others from Alexandria during the Suez crisis. 1958 Lebanon Marines land in Beirut, Lebanon at the invitation of its government to help protect against threatened insurrection. 1976 Lebanon Naval helicopters evacuate American and European nationals in Beirut during the Lebanese civil war. 1980 Iran American transport planes and helicopters unsuccessfully attempt to rescue American hostages being held in Iran. 1981 Libya American naval planes shot down Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra claimed by Libya as territorial waters but considered international water by the U.S. 1982 Egypt Military personnel and equipment deployed to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai according to Americanbrokered EgyptianIsraeli peace treaty. 1982 Lebanon Marines deployed to serve in a temporary multinational force to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty after end of civil war. 1982 Lebanon Marines dispatched to assist with the multinational force in the withdrawal of members of the Palestine Liberation Organization force from Beirut in the wake of Israel's invasion of Lebanon. 1983 Egypt American AWACS electronic surveillance aircraft dispatched to Egypt in response to Libyan hostility in Sudan.
Page 195 YEAR 1984
LOCATION Persian Gulf
1986
Libya
1986
Libya
1987– 1988
Persian Gulf
1989
Libya
1990
Saudi Arabia
1991
Iraq
1991
Iraq
1992
Kuwait
1992
Iraq
1993
Iraq
1993
Iraq
1993
Iraq
DESCRIPTION American AWACS electronic surveillance aircraft assist Saudi jet fighter planes in downing Iranian fighter planes over the Persian Gulf during the Iran Iraq war. Naval missiles attack Libyan targets in the Gulf of Sidra. American air and naval forces conduct bombing strikes on alleged terrorist facilities and military installations in Libya. American naval forces execute a policy of reflagging and escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Persian Gulf during the IranIraq war. American Naval aircraft shoot down Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea in response to Libyandemonstrated hostile intentions~ American armed forces deployed into the Persian Gulf to help defend Saudi Arabia after August 2 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. American armed forces join a coalition of allies in enforcing UN Security Council resolutions to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. American forces deployed into northern Iraq to prevent Iraqi repression of the Kurdish people. American military exercises begin in Kuwait following Iraqi refusal to recognize a new border drawn by the UN and refusal to cooperate with UN inspection teams. American participation in the enforcement of a prohibition against Iraqi flights in a specified nofly zone in southern Iraq along with aerial reconnaissance to monitor Iraqi compliance with UN ceasefire resolution. American aircraft down Iraqi aircraft in the prohibited nofly zone along with joint effort with Gulf coalition partners attacking missile bases in southern Iraq. In addition, an Americandeployed battalion task force is sent to Kuwait to underline American commitment to Kuwaiti independence. American aircraft fire at targets in Iraq in reaction to Iraqi anti aircraft firing at them. American planes fire missiles at Iraqi antiaircraft sites that had tracked American aircraft.
Page 196 YEAR 1993
LOCATION Iraq
1993
Iraq
1998
Afghanistan and Sudan
1998
Iraq
1998– 1999
Iraq
DESCRIPTION American naval forces launch missiles against the Iaqi Intelligence Service’s headquarters in Baghdad in response to an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate former President Bush in Kuwait in April 1993. American aircraft fire a missile at an Iraqi anti aircraft site displaying hostile intent. American planes also bomb an Iraqi missile battery. American airstrikes against camps and installation in Afghanistan and Sudan used by the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization in response to bin Laden’s alleged involvement in the bombing on August 7 of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. American and British air forces conduct a bombing campaign termed Operation Desert Fox against Iraqi industrial facilities deemed capable of producing weapons of mass destruction and against other Iraqi military and security targets. American and coalition forces enforcing the nofly zones over Iraq conduct military operations against the Iraqi air defense system in response to actual or potential threats against aircraft enforcing the nofly zones in northern and southern lraq.
rience, the Egyptian government chose these men to participate in the training and reorganization of the Egyptian Army. The first American military intervention in the region took place between 1801 and 1815, during which the Jefferson (1801–1809) and Madison (1809–1817) administrations authorized the use of naval forces to protect American trade against acts of piracy by the North African states of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli (presentday Libya). It was economically profitable for these states to control the trade routes of the southern Mediterranean with their acts of piracy, since they collected large sums of protection money form many European countries to safeguard their trade in this strategic waterway. For example, Great Britain was rich enough to pay such a fee while dominating trade activities in the Mediterranean. The trouble with these states originated out of the fact that the U.S., after its independence from Great Britain in 1776, had lost protection of its commercial activities by the British Navy, which in turn impacted American trade in the Mediterranean. The U.S. was financially incapable of paying protection money to safeguard its trade. The earlier attempt to protect American trade activities was a treaty with Morocco in 1787, in which the U.S.
Page 197 agreed to pay about $30,000 in presents with no annual tribute. The other North African states were far more difficult to negotiate with. In 1801 the leader of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli, declared war on the U.S., in what was known as the Tripolitan War, after his demands for larger tribute from the U.S. to safeguard American ships in the region were rejected. President Jefferson decided to take up the challenge and sent American naval warships into the Mediterranean Sea. In 1805, a naval force was able to free the crew of the American frigate Philadelphia, which was captured along with its 300 sailors in 1803 in the Tripoli Harbor. In 1805 the war ended with a signed peace treaty. The U.S. agreed to pay $60,000 for the release of the crew of the Philadelphia, and in return Tripoli gave up any right to demand further tribute from the U.S. In 1815, Congress authorized the use of force against Algiers after its leader had resumed the plunder of American shipping during the War of 1812. Insisting that he had not been receiving enough tribute from the U.S., the Algerian leader had declared war on the U.S. The American naval force, under the command of Captain Stephen Decature, defeated the Algerians and threatened to bombard the city. Consequently, in 1815, Algiers signed a treaty in which it agreed to cease hostilities against American ships, to free American prisoners, and to end all demands for future tribute payments from the American government. Also in 1815, Captain Decature forced Tunis to sign a treaty in which it agreed to halt interference with American commercial shipping in the Mediterranean and to cease tribute demand from the American government. Finally, in 1815, Captain Decature forced Tripoli to sign the last treaty to cease hostilities against American ships and end their demands for any further tributes. The American use of force in the case of the North African states of Algiers, Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli underline the extent to which a threat to American economic interest, in this case the ability to trade freely in international water, could justify the use of force. Even though American military intervention was in no way directly influencing the internal conditions of the region, it demonstrated the capacity of the American military to undertake successful operations overseas, even when such operations were considered risky and unlikely to bring about substantial results. PROTECTING AMERICAN DIPLOMATS AND NATIONALS ABROAD: 1882–1948 A survey of American military presence that did not involve combat operations in the Middle East shows that, on several occasions, the U.S. was less interested in the region’s political squabbles than to secure its diplomats and nationals. For example, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 prompted the U.S. to send a naval force to the port of Alexandria to protect American interests there. Such a force did not confront or prevent the British from executing their plan of invasion. In 1903, in the Ottoman province of Greater Syria, local instability prompted the U.S. to deploy a small force to protect the American
Page 198 consulate there. The same scenario was repeated in the case of Jerusalem in 1948, to protect the American consul general after the establishment of the State of Israel and the subsequent clashes between Arabs and Jews. AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES: MILITARY INTERVENTION, 1941–1955 Postwar American policy in the Middle East has been based on the framework of three key interests. The first goal was to prevent the expansion of communism to the south of the Soviet Union; therefore, control over the Middle East was absolutely necessary. The second goal was energy security. The Middle East produces close to 50 percent of Europe’s needs for oil, 75 percent for Japan, and 20 percent for the U.S. The third goal was to help the Jewish Zionist movement to establish a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948. Support of the newly established State of Israel continued thereafter and has become a matter of American commitment to help and protect Israel’s independence. Apart from economic and cultural issues that characterized American ties with the Middle East before World War II, the U.S. government was heavily drawn to one of the region’s longest conflicts: the ArabIsraeli conflict. The dilemma for the U.S. was about how to support Jewish rights to establish a state in Palestine, while avoiding the alienation of key Arab states, particularly the oilproducing ones. It would eventually take several decades for the U.S. to find an evenhanded policy for the ArabIsraeli conflict Up to 1945, the U.S. diplomatic and political involvement in the region took a back seat to European, particularly British and French, activities. Even though American involvement increased gradually between 1900 and 1945, as a result of oil discovery and growing support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the U.S. did not rival nor undermine European dominance. During World War II, American troops were stationed in Iran to handle the supplies to Russia; they were also stationed in Egypt and Palestine to maintain the Americanmade weapons that the allies, particularly the British, used. In addition, the U.S. extended its lendlease law to most of the countries in the region. Increasing American contact with the region was even more obvious when President Roosevelt held discussions with Arab leaders in the Suez Canal zone. Once the war ended, American involvement in the Middle East was linked mostly to issues of oil, SovietAmerican confrontation, and support of Israel. One of the key implications of World War II was that it opened a new era in the history of the Middle East, an era in which the U.S. involvement increased substantially. In fact, the U.S. has become the major foreign participant in Middle Eastern affairs. When the war ended in 1945, British and French control of the region had diminished quickly as they faced the political struggle for selfdetermination and national independence in places such as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine. In addition, the bipolar world order of the postwar
Page 199 era, with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the dominant powers, had further contributed to the region’s new political configuration. Containment of the Soviet Union in the Middle East In 1947, President Truman, before a joint session of Congress, proposed $400 million for economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, to assist them in their recovery from the losses of World War II and to help them in their effort to prevent any Soviet/communist takeover. The proposal became known as “The Truman Doctrine,” and it became a key American policy in the early years of the Cold War. It influenced the realignment of the region in its northern frontier. Further, it represented the first time the U.S. was ready to implement a policy of containing Soviet expansion in the region. The rationale for the Truman administration in asking for aid to Greece and Turkey was based on the principle that Sovietsponsored guerrilla activities to undermine and overthrow the Greek government would have created a domino effect on Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East. Therefore, unless the U.S. intervened, the Soviet Union was likely to gain control of Greece and Turkey. If this were the case, the other states of the Middle East would quickly fall under communist control. The Truman Doctrine, formulated to preemptively prevent this from ever taking place, committed the U.S. to provide military assistance and economic aid to Greece and Turkey and prepare them to beef up their security before any communist threat could undermine them. Consequently, between 1947 and 1960, American aid to Turkey alone totaled around $3 billion. This allowed the Turks to maintain an armed force of 500,000 men as a deterrent to Soviet expansionist effort. The Truman Doctrine was very significant in that it represented, for the first time in American ties with the Middle East, a major American commitment of a semi military nature. It also contributed to ultimately drawing Turkey and Greece into full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and thus protecting the northern tier (the territory of the Middle East bordering on the Soviet Union excluding any Arab state) against any Soviet threats. Like Truman, President Eisenhower believed that Soviet policy in the Middle East was expansionist and that a plan was necessary to contain it. But unlike Truman’s emphasis on economic and military aid, Eisenhower’s plan was centered on the creation of a network of alliances among the states of the region. In 1954, Turkey and Pakistan signed a mutual cooperation treaty, and in 1955, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Great Britain formed the Baghdad Pact. Although the U.S. did not formally participate in these alliances, it had committed to their military and financial support. American Response to the 1956 Suez Crisis A key change in the new political order in the Middle East emerged when the end of British and French colonial rule in the region was met by a gradual
Page 200 increase in American and Soviet involvement. The Suez crisis of 1956 illustrates this change. The crisis was triggered by a conflict between Egypt and Great Britain over Egypt’s decision to nationalize the Britishowned Suez Canal Company. The canal was vital for the flow of Gulf oil to the West. It was also an important base for airfield and personnel facilities. For Egypt, the canal was a reminder of British colonial rule. Furthermore, Egypt wanted to nationalize the canal to help pay for the Aswan High Dam project. A backdrop to the crisis originated late in 1955, when the U.S. agreed to provide Egypt with a $56 million loan for the building of the Aswan High Dam. Great Britain also agreed to contribute to the financing. It was Secretary of State John F. Dulles who, disturbed by Egyptian President Nasser’s close ties with the Soviet Union, announced in July 1956 that the U.S. was withdrawing the loan offer. The World Bank followed the American decision, since the Bank’s offer was contingent on others. In late 1956, Nasser retaliated and announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. He had also accepted a Soviet offer to help construct the dam. As a result, Great Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt in October 1956. The Tripartite aggression, as it was known, was aimed at using force to recover control of the canal and undermine the Nasser regime. Even though the aggression resulted in a humiliating defeat for Egypt, it politically strengthened Nasser. To understand American opposition to the aggression, one must place it in the context of the AngloEgyptian conflict that originated after the 1948 ArabIsraeli War and culminated with the Suez crisis. This conflict presented the U.S. with a serious problem. The Department of State believed that Egypt’s national independence was compromised with British aims and that helping to preserve Egypt’s independence was a reflection of the Wilsonian ideal of selfdetermination, particularly during the heated years of the Cold War. There were two conflicting views on what course of action the Eisenhower administration needed to take. On one hand, some officials in the State Department believed that if the U.S. did not take a stand in opposing the aggression, then Egypt would turn to the Soviet Union, whose assistance and support was readily available. On the other hand, some officials in the Pentagon believed that British absence from Egypt would prevent access to its bases and in turn undermine American national security. Meanwhile, President Eisenhower decided, once the Tripartite aggression had begun, that the use of force would undermine American national security interests. Any support of the British effort would inflame Arab nationalism, would increase Soviet presence in the region in an era of cold war and superpower confrontation, and would halt the steady flow of oil from the Middle East. Accordingly, Eisenhower was forced to oppose the British plan to invade Egypt and, when the attack was carried out on October 29, 1956, Eisenhower insisted on opposing the occupation of Egypt and demanded complete withdrawal of the occupying troops. Under American pressure and threat of Soviet intervention, Great Britain,
Page 201 France, and Israel accepted a ceasefire that went into effect on November 6, 1956. Thereafter, a UN resolution placed a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) as a buffer between Egypt and Israel. A key result of the Suez affair was that it marked the end of AngloFrench hegemony in the Middle East and led eventually to the first American legislated law for the right to militarily intervene in the Middle East. In January 1957, Congress endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine and authorized the use of $200 million in mutual security funds for fiscal year 1957. In addition, it gave President Eisenhower the authority to act in the area by authorizing use of force against any communist aggression. The Doctrine was first tested during the Lebanese crisis of 1958. The Marine Landing in Lebanon in 1958 The Eisenhower Doctrine was first implemented in Lebanon in 1958. The crisis in Lebanon, like that of the Suez crisis, represented a decision by the U.S. to stop the increasing threat by outside forces of extreme Arab nationalists against the proWestern Lebanese government of President Camille Chamoun. In 1957, Egypt and Syria united their nations into one single “United Arab Republic” that lasted only three years. It was the ideology of PanArabism that brought the two nations together. Revolutionary means were employed to turn monarchical and proWestern Arab states, such as Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, into modern authoritarian ones with a common goal: Arab unity. As revolutions continued to change the political landscape of the region, so did the effort to achieve Arab unity. The union between Egypt and Syria was bound to impact other countries in the Middle East. President Chamoun feared that his country’s laissezfaire economic system, its moderate democratic system of government, its international banking system, and its liberal culture of free press and intellectual exchange would not survive the storm of the political upheavals and nationalization laws of Socialist Arab states nearby (such as Egypt and Syria). Furthermore, the Lebanese National Pact of 1943 established the basis of confessional politics of sectarian and communal loyalties and declared Lebanon as an Arab state, but one that would not unite or federate with any other Arab state. Many Lebanese did not agree with this arrangement and eventually their disagreement engulfed the country in civil war and instability. In the summer of 1958, Lebanese cities, such as Sidon and Tripoli, broke away and rebelled against the central government of President Chamoun. Consequently, President Chamoun made an appeal to the U.S. for immediate military and financial support. Eisenhower responded quickly and ordered about 14,000 U.S. Marines from the 6th fleet in the Mediterranean to land in Lebanon. On July 15, 1958, the Marines landed and were fully ready to protect the proWestern government of President Chamoun. Their landing came a day after a
Page 202 military coup in Iraq ousted its regime of King Faisal II, thus heightening tension in the region and putting into question Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad Pact. Eisenhower addressed Congress on July 15 and declared Lebanon’s independence and territorial integrity as “vital to American interests.” He declared that the U.S. was determined to protect the sovereignty of Lebanon against extreme Arab nationalists or communists. The American military intervention to protect the government of President Chamoun signaled a dangerous shift in American interests in the Middle East: that direct use of force would become a tool to protect those interests, even in a region where American experience was limited. ArabIsraeli Conflict After World War II, American Middle East policy changed dramatically. A wellorganized Jewish lobby in Washington amassed enough resources to make a case for the need to support a Jewish state in Palestine. Once the British withdrew from Palestine in 1947, the UN was the only body capable of putting a resolution on the table for both Arabs and Jews to consider. UN Resolution 181, known as the partition resolution, provided the framework of the future of Palestine: the creation of two states, a Jewish one with about 52 percent of the land, and an Arab state with about 42 percent, with Jerusalem under international supervision. The U.S. voted in favor of the Resolution. In May 1948, the U.S. recognized Israel’s declaration of independence and became instrumentally committed to its protection in the decades that followed. To understand the U.S. shift to support of Israel, one must note the relevance of the Cold War. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were determined to pursue their geopolitical rivalry by supporting opposing sides in the ArabIsraeli conflict. Israel was considered a strategic asset for the U.S. in what many American policy makers considered a volatile Middle East. During the 1960s, American policy shifted gradually toward complete support of Israel, particularly under the presidency of Johnson. Unlike Kennedy, who gave more attention to the Arab states, Johnson tilted strongly toward Israel, particularly after the 1967 ArabIsraeli War. Once the ArabIsraeli War ended, Israel emerged with key territories under its control: the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, the Syrian Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank of the Jordan River. American post1967 policy toward the ArabIsraeli conflict shifted drastically in support of Israel. President Johnson committed the U.S. to providing Israel’s military needs that included the sale of fifty Phantom F4 supersonic jet fighterbombers late in December 1968. Soon the U.S. replaced France as Israel’s chief supplier of weapons and has since been its most trusted and constant ally. But the U.S. had to pay a high a price for this shift in policy. Key Arab states, particularly Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Palestine accused the U.S. of assisting Israel during the 1967 War, rejected its unevenhanded policy, and threatened to undermine American national interests in the region. Johnson’s
Page 203 fivepoint plan to achieve peace in the Middle East was considered proIsraeli and did not change the strongly prevailed view among the Arab states that the U.S. was only interested in preserving its national interests on the expense of regional peace and stability. Meanwhile, the superpowers entered into an arms race in the region after 1967. The Soviets were increasingly determined to assist in rearming and rebuilding the Egyptian and Syrian militaries. In fact, the Soviet Union went as far as providing military personnel to assist Egypt against Israeli raids in 1970. However, the superpowers were diplomatically active in searching for a viable political solution that both Arabs and Jews could accept. Next, American policy in the Middle East underwent drastic change during the Nixon years. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was instrumental in configuring the new American policy in the region. He stressed the need not to alienate key Arab states while fully supporting Israel. Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were key to Kissinger’s strategy and had to be courted to the American side to counterattack any Soviet attempt to win them over. In addition, the formulation of the Nixon Doctrine to provide military and economic assistance along with manpower to nations allied with the U.S. if their freedom or security were threatened, was not only applied to Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf but to Israel too. Accordingly, during his first term in office, Nixon’s support of Israel was heavily manifested in increasing arms sales and over $2 billion in grants and loans. The outbreak of the third ArabIsraeli War, in October 1973, created a serious problem for Nixon and Kissinger. The U.S. and other Western powers were made the target of an Arab oil embargo. Unlike the earlier embargo that followed the 1967 war that banned the sale of oil to certain countries, the 1973–1974 embargo was aimed at the U.S. Consequently, it was a key factor in shifting American policy in the Middle East to a more evenhanded one. Eventually, Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy and the mediation of the Carter administration through the Camp David Accords eventually led to the 1979 EgyptianIsraeli peace treaty. The U.S. and the Persian Gulf Explosive Persian Gulf events throughout the 1980s and 1990s contributed to increasing American intervention and use of force. The backdrop to AmericanIraqi confrontations in the 1990s was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The tension between Iraq and Kuwait began with Iraq’s refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the border dividing the two countries. Iraq had refused to recognize the independence of Kuwait since 1963, and official Iraqi policy maintained that Kuwait was a part of the Basra province that lies within Iraq. Immediate economic and strategic considerations also played a role in Saddam Hussein’s decision to annex Kuwait in the summer of 1990. The costly war with Iran during the 1980s left Iraq with an enormous debt of $60 billion of which over $10
Page 204 billion was owed to Kuwait. Iraq was also eager to stop Kuwait’s exploitation of the Rumelila oil fields along their borders. Iraq was largely dependent on oil revenues to finance its postwar recovery efforts, including the rebuilding of the Iraqi military. In addition, the blocking of the Shatt alArab waterway (Iraq’s only access to the Persian Gulf) during the war with Iran left Iraq completely dependent on pipelines through Turkey and Saudi Arabia for its oil export. When the Iraqi leadership decided to invade Kuwait, it had no reason to believe that the U.S. would react at all. In fact, up to the eve of the invasion, the Bush administration provided Iraq with economic assistance. Further, the U.S. did not show interest in punishing Iraq’s human rights abuses or its massive effort to possess nuclear capabilities or weapons of mass destruction. There was, however, the fear of Saddam Hussein’s desire to place oilrich Gulf states under his control. The invasion of Kuwait was followed within days by redeployment of Iraqi troops along the Saudi Arabia–Iraqi border, which raised a major concern in the U.S. and Western Europe. The notion that Saddam Hussein was on his way to controlling around 40 percent of all the world’s oil reserves was a direct threat to American and Western European economic national interests. The Bush administration reacted instantly by utilizing the UN Security Council in obtaining key resolutions seeking full Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and imposing a trade embargo on Iraq. In addition, the early deployment of U.S. troops in what was known as Operation Desert Storm was added to a multinational force to protect Saudi Arabia and evict Iraq from Kuwait. Britain, France, Italy, Canada, and the Netherlands committed forces to the effort, while Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait joined with their troops in what amounted to an international coalition. Even the Soviet Union joined in criticizing Iraq and suspended Soviet arms shipment to the Iraqi regime. In November 1990, American forces in Saudi Arabia had reached close to 400,000 troops. The UN Security Council passed a resolution declaring Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait invalid and authorized the use of force if Iraqi troops did not withdraw by January 15, 1991. By January 1991, American forces had reach over 500,000 and Operation Desert Shield (to defend Saudi Arabia) shifted to become Operation Desert Storm to evict Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Domestically, the Bush administration had also concentrated its efforts to portray Saddam Hussein as another Hitler. Such efforts were aimed at gaining the support of the American people for military intervention. When the UN deadline of January 15, 1991 passed without an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the U.S.led coalition forces were able in a matter of weeks to eject the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm was carried out with overwhelming American air strikes that lasted well after the Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait. The American use of force against Iraq did not end with the liberation of Kuwait. Since then there have been attempts to force Iraq to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors (see Table 8). The most recent massive use of force since the end of the second Gulf War took place in December 1998, when the UN Security Council voted unanimously to condemn Iraq’s refusal to cooperate with
Page 205 the weapons inspectors. When Iraq refused to do so, President Clinton gave the order to launch Operation Desert Fox—an airstrike on Iraq that continued for several days until Iraq agreed to allow weapons inspectors to resume their work in Iraq. CONCLUSION American military intervention in the Middle East has been on the rise since the end of World War II. Prior to that, American use of force in the region was mostly associated with dealing with the North African pirate states of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The key conflict with such states was protection of American trade against acts of piracy. On several occasions, the U.S. had to use force in order to bring each of those states into the signing of treaties, to put an end to their interference with American trade operations in international water. This early American use of force illustrated that the U.S., before becoming a major global power, was already acting like one to defend its national interest of trading freely in international water. The immediate aftermath of the Gulf War coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, it is highly possible that the U.S. will continue to use force in the Middle East for as long as it remains the sole global superpower. One can only hope that if that, over time, the nations of the Middle East will be able to avoid American use of force by adopting policies of regional reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. See Carter Doctrine; Eisenhower Doctrine; IranIraq War; Kissinger, Henry; Nixon Doctrine; Proxy War. FOR FURTHER READING Amirahmadi, Hooshang, ed. 1993. The U.S. and the Middle East: A Search For New Perspectives. Albany: State University of New York Press. Brzeziniski, Zbigniew. 1983. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Carter, Jimmy. 1982. Keeping the Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York: Bantam Books. Epstein, J. 1987. Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Freedman, Lawrence, and Ephraim Karsh. 1993. The Gulf War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Freiberger, Steven. 1992. Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953–1957. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. Gendzier, Irene L. 1997. Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958. New York: Columbia University Press. Hadar, Leon T. 1992. Quagmire: America in the Middle East. Washington, DC: Cato Institute Press. Hiro, Dilip. 1992. Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War. New York: Routledge.
Page 206 Irwin, R. W. 1931. The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776–1816. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Kissinger, Henry. 1979. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Kitzen, Michael L. S. 1993. Tripoli and the United States at War: A History of American Relations with the Barbary States, 1785–1805. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. Lenczowski, George. 1990. American Presidents and the Middle East. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Neff, Donald. 1981. Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America Into the Middle East. New York: Linden Press and Simon and Schuster. Spiegel, Steven L. 1985. The Other ArabIsraeli Conflict. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wright, Louis B., and Julia Macleod. 1945. The First Americans in North Africa; William Eaton’s Struggle for a Vigorous Policy Against the Barbary Pirates, 1799–1805. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ahmed H. Ibrahim
Data Sets on the Use of Force. FOR FURTHER READING Bremer, Stuart A. 1996. Militarized Interstate Disputes Data. http.//pss.la.psu.edu/ MID_DATA.html. Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. 1996. ‘‘Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 15:163–213. Curtis Peet
Latin America and the Caribbean; Roosevelt Corollary.
Page 207 FOR FURTHER READING Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Schoultz, Lars. 1998. Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Smith, Peter H. 1996. Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.–Latin American Relations. New York: Oxford University Press. James Henson
MULTILATERALISM—Multilateralism, as it applies to uses of force, involves the coordinated action of two or more states. Accommodation of interests is thus a crucial component. Differences in capabilities and degrees of commitment must also be weighed and tasks apportioned accordingly. Clarity of ultimate goals, speed and decisiveness of response, all of which have in many circumstances proven to be vital factors in the successful application of force, may well be harder to achieve under such conditions. Nonetheless, multilateralism has significant advantages too, burden sharing being the most obvious of these. Using force entails both economic costs and political risks. Thus, acting in conjunction with others spreads the burden of both. Criticism and moral opprobrium which opponents may seek to attach to actions will be shared and the support of other actors may add significant political weight to legitimacy claims. Multilateral activity often necessitates that numerous issues be coordinated. In part, this is because the competing preference structures of the multiple parties involved require that issues be “bundled” and side payments of various sorts be agreed upon, in return for agreement on central issues. This already difficult situation is made more complex by the fact that multilateral activity is, of necessity, conducted upon multiple levels, with contacts being established up and down the chain of command from the highest policy formulation levels to the lowest practical implementation questions. Although unilateral action can be conducted expediently, without forming a consensus within the international community, unilateralism carries political risks. Generating domestic and international support for use of force is critical to establishing the legitimacy of military actions. In the late 1960s, when public support for the war in Vietnam began to erode and mass demonstrations against U.S. involvement occurred across the nation, the government was forced to confront a loss of credibility with the domestic population and the international community that continues to affect the decisions of foreign policy makers. The arguments between unilateralist and multilateralist orientations in foreign policy positions often center on balancing pursuit of U.S. interests with finite U.S. resources (military and financial); just where that balance lies provides the crux of the conflict. Many of those in the U.S. Congress who seek to limit American involvement in multilateral military action are reluctant to commit U.S. tax dollars, and more importantly, to risk American lives, unless a direct
Page 208 and obvious threat to national security is present. In contrast, many of those in Congress who favor multilateral action believe that a threat to peace anywhere is a threat to peace everywhere, and that the maintenance of global security is vital to the protection of U.S. interests. POSTWAR U.S. USE OF FORCE Between 1945 and 1999, the U.S. unilaterally deployed military personnel on foreign soil on fortyone occasions (see tables below). However, during those same years, the U.S. acted multilaterally sixtyseven times, including eighteen military actions in accordance with UN resolutions and sixteen in partnership with NATO allies. Many of these actions, while being carried out under UN auspices, were controlled operationally by NATO. The use of force by the U.S. can be analyzed as responses to combinations of three primary motivations: systemic (global), strategic,or domestic concerns. Comparing and contrasting the use of unilateral and multilateral force, using the above tools of analysis and examination of the geographical location where they occurred, highlights the possible advantages and disadvantages of each type of action for the U.S., and therefore goes some way toward explaining the choices made. Asia Europe Africa Latin America Africa Asia Europe Latin America
Multilateral Uses of Force Domestic
Strategic 11 1 1 0
Systemic 0 0 0 2
Unilateral Uses of Force Domestic
Strategic 2 7 1 1
Total 12 21 11 8
Systemic 1 3 0 3
23 22 12 10 Total
13 3 4 0
16 13 5 4
Instances of unilateral use of military force by the U.S. fall most heavily in the category of strategic concerns, with the majority occurring on the continent of Asia, followed by Latin America and Africa. Strategic concerns are defined as issues of national security and the search for power. An action is defined as primarily strategic if the dominant motive is determined in terms of direct security concerns, explicit threats to national interest, and the increase of national power. A significant advantage of unilateral response to strategic concerns is the
Page 209 ability of armed forces to act quickly and decisively in times of crisis. For example, in 1986, when U.S. forces stationed in the Gulf of Sidra were “attacked by Libyan missiles” the forces in situ responded immediately in kind. Lack of obvious restriction is not, however, a guarantee of success; in some instances, troops were deployed neither quickly nor decisively. In June of 1993, U.S. forces bombed the Iraqi Intelligence Service in retaliation for an attempted assassination of former President Bush that occurred in Kuwait in April of 1993. Although this incident can be best explained as a response to strategic concerns (explicit threats to national interest), elements of the response can also be described as an attempt by the U.S. to protect its hegemonic position in the world system. A major factor in the unilateral use of force has been the ability of the U.S. to respond to domestic concerns and pressures with international action. These responses have occurred almost exclusively on the continents of Asia and Latin America. Although influences are both economic and political, the central feature of domestic explanations for the use of force is the possibility of enhanced political power for the president. After sponsoring several failed coups the U.S., in December of 1989, invaded Panama, captured its head of state Manuel Noriega, then returned him to the U.S. to stand trial for drugrelated crimes. With the invasion of Panama, President George Bush hoped to strengthen his weakened image, prove his abilities as a world leader, and also to be seen to be fulfilling his campaign promise to continue the “War on Drugs.” Ironically, this ability to respond to domestic concerns can also be a disadvantage. The ability leads to an expectation and perhaps a necessity of responding. The problems this entails were demonstrated in April of 1980, when the U.S. attempted to rescue the American hostages being held in Iran, and failed. For then President Jimmy Carter, this failure resulted in his political annihilation; Carter would never regain the public’s trust, and lost the election in November of 1980. Multilateral use of military force in response to domestic concerns, on the other hand, is a rare occurrence. From 1945 to 1999, U.S. troops were deployed twice, both times on the continent of Latin America. The two incidents can best be described as operations that were attempts by the U.S. government to eliminate the cocaine business in Latin America, precipitated by the U.S. “War on Drugs.” The U.S., in 1986, assisted the Bolivian government’s attempt to eradicate its country’s flourishing cocaine industry, and again assisted Bolivia in 1989, in its collective effort with Columbia and Peru, in order to attack illicit drug producers and traffickers. While these efforts proved to be nominally successful and provided a shortlived publicity coup, they accomplished very little toward eliminating illegal drug use in the U.S., or enhancing the power of the president in the long term. The majority of the examples of multilateral responses to strategic concerns by the U.S. occurred on the continents of Asia and Europe. Asian examples tended to divide into two clusters, around Southeast Asia and the Middle East.
Page 210 In the bipolar Cold War era, the U.S. and the Soviet Union each sought to increase their own national power while decreasing the national power of their opponent. As both countries realized the futility of allout war with one another, these conflicts over national power were played out primarily in Southeast Asia. The Korean and Vietnamese Wars were efforts of the U.S. and its Western allies to contain the spread of communism. Other examples of U.S. military response to Cold War policies include operations in Thailand in May of 1962, Laos from 1962 through 1975, and Cambodia in 1970. In the Middle East, multilateral responses to strategic concerns centered in the Persian Gulf, a region of particular geographical importance to the U.S. and its allies. Large oil reserves and access to the Gulf for shipping that oil were vital to the national interests of the U.S. and other industrialized democracies. During the war between Iraq and Iran in 1987–1988, the U.S. Navy protected Kuwaiti oil tankers navigating through the Persian Gulf, and in 1990, troops were sent to help deter an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia after the August 2 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Protection of national interests was the primary motivating factor behind these examples of military force. Within six months of placing defensive troops in Saudi Arabia, the U.S., in conjunction with a coalition of allies and authorized by UN Security Council resolutions, went on the offensive against Iraq. The motives for this action are complex but obviously include the enhancement of its hegemonic position within the world system, and most importantly, to maintain the stability of that system and the flow of vital oil that it guaranteed. Multilateral responses motivated by systemic concerns overwhelmingly represent the most frequent use of military force by the U.S. These military actions have been carried out on every continent, but the most extensive examples occur in Asia and Europe. As indicated above, in January of 1991, the U.S. and allied forces, with the backing of the UN Security Council, launched a military campaign against Iraq. Although the implicit goal of restoring the flow of oil from the Gulf can be cited as an explanation for the deployment of troops, the allied campaign’s explicit objectives were to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces, to defend other Gulf States from invasion, and to ensure the safety of American citizens in the region. Within six weeks, the U.S. and allied forces achieved these objectives. Systemic stability was again threatened in 1993 when Serbian forces began attacks on Muslims in Bosnia; U.S. military personnel under NATO command were positioned in the Balkans on fourteen occasions between January of 1993 and December of 1995. Acting in conjunction with UN forces, NATO’s military objective was to restore stability to the region. These objectives were accomplished (however temporarily) when the NATOled Implementation Force (IFOR) was used to implement the Bosnian peace agreement after its signing. Serbian aggression, however, would continue to challenge regional stability. The same motivation led to renewed U.S. engagement (alongside NATO allies) in this region in 1998–1999, when U.S.led air forces mounted a sustained air campaign in an attempt to curtail Serbian activities in Kosovo. When the U.S. has chosen to use force unilaterally, the majority of examples
Page 211 can be explained as reactions to threats of security and national interest, or as demonstrations of national power. In many of the examples, the ability of the U.S. military to act quickly and, in some cases, without prior public knowledge, can be a strategic advantage. This strategic advantage can also have the effect of increasing the hegemonic position of the U.S. in the global system. Attempts by the U.S. to act unilaterally in reaction to internal issues have proven less successful. The invasion of Panama did very little to enhance the presidential image, and the Iranian hostage crisis destroyed the American public’s confidence in the Carter administration’s credibility. Ironically, although primarily described as being motivated by systemic concerns, after the Gulf War, public approval ratings of the Bush administration were at an alltime high. Thus, the advantages of multilateral use of force in the context of the Gulf War are apparent in all three categories of analysis: strategic, domestic, and systemic. Judging from the number of examples described as multilateral (sixtyseven) compared with those described as unilateral (fortyone), the advantages to the U.S. when acting in conjunction with other states seem to outweigh the disadvantages. EVOLUTION OF THE UN SYSTEM In the last 200 years of conflicts involving more than two antagonists, technological developments in the realm of both communication and of warfare have combined to make multilateral diplomatic interaction an increasingly common phenomenon (Congress of Vienna, Treaty of Versailles, League of Nations). The UN represents the international communities’ response to the devastation of World War II, the complexity, reach, and destruction of which was on a scale hitherto inconceivable. The advent of atomic, and then thermonuclear weapons gave this response added importance. In fact, unlike previous efforts to construct multilateral systems (post Napoleonic, post–World War I), the UN has its origins in meetings which took place prior to the cessation of hostilities. The League of Nations, established after the end of World War I, was the first formal attempt of liberal states to form cooperative global leadership. Conceived by President Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations’ priorities centered on collective security and prevention of war. Although Germany and the Soviet Union were not invited to join, dozens of nations became members. The U.S. Congress however, swayed by isolationist ideology, refused to ratify the League of Nations Covenant. The League of Nations disintegrated after a long series of disappointments, the last of which was the failure to prevent the outbreak of World War II. In the period between the wars, the U.S. withdrew from European concerns, not rejoining them until the formation of the antiAxis Alliance during World War II. This conflict was one that Wilson had predicted would occur in the absence of collective security measures to promote peace. Woodrow Wilson’s vision for achieving world peace was reborn, albeit in a less idealistic fashion, in 1945, with the creation of the UN. U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt viewed collective security pragmatically, as neces
Page 212 sary to the prevention of war. Based on this conviction, FDR began to lay the groundwork for an international security force during a summit with Great Britain’s Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, held in Teheran in 1943. Discussions of this nature, between the U.S., Great Britain, the USSR, and China continued throughout the war until, on June 26, 1945, China became the first nation to sign the charter ratifying the existence of the UN. Despite the problems that the League of Nations had faced, the UN Charter specified a similar institutional structure of five major bodies: the Security Council, the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat, and the Trusteeship Council. One important addition to the UN organs was the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), whose inclusion indicates recognition on the part of the authors of the charter that these issues were of great significance. Nonetheless, at the heart of the system was a resurrected notion of Collective Security that was embodied in Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The hopes enshrined within the charter very rapidly became prey to the Cold War animosities which emerged rapidly as the wartime allied coalition of the Soviet Union and the U.S. was transformed into mutually hostile blocs. The bipolarity of the Cold War dominated activities within the UN as both superpowers, both members of the Security Council, sought to use the UN as a forum within which to pursue their ideological struggle. Almost no aspect of UN activity escaped the influence of this struggle and it was only with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent dissolution of the Cold War divisions that the UN began to explore areas of activity that previously had been significantly circumscribed by the bipolar division. The ability of the UN to gain recognition as a legitimate actor in international affairs was severely limited during the Cold War. This was hampered by U.S. and Soviet Bloc voting and by the fact that, as members of the Security Council, each possessed a veto. A notable exception to the deadlock occurred in 1950, during a Soviet boycott of the Security Council protesting the failure of the UN to recognize the communist government in China. During the boycott, North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel and invaded South Korea. The UN, led by the U.S., was then afforded its first opportunity to mandate the use of multinational forces in order to enforce international law, in the name of Collective Security. In June of 1950, the Security Council, by a nearly unanimous vote, resolved to defend South Korea from the communist North Korean forces. Although sixteen nations contributed in some fashion, the U.S. along with Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and Turkey provided much of the support for the South Korean military. With the return of the Soviet Union to the Security Council, the UN was once again immobilized by ideological struggle. Activity on the part of the UN increased significantly from the late 1980s onward so that by the mid1990s there were seventeen peacekeeping operations active where previously there had only been five. In the whole period since 1945, the UN has undertaken fortytwo operations in the area of peacekeeping or conflict prevention. Here again
Page 213 the impact of the Cold War was apparent. While thirteen peacerelated operations were conducted between 1945 and 1978, none were started in the decade between 1978 and 1988. Thereafter, as indicated above, there was a significant increase in activity in this area. The number of troops actively involved in these operations increased more than sixfold up to a maximum of 78,000, and the number of countries committing troops and support to these activities had more than doubled, increasing from twentysix to approximately seventysix. While it appeared that the international community was now more prepared to turn toward the UN for a solution, it is less clear that the UN was able to provide the desired response. Although activity increased significantly, unambiguous successes remained elusive. This concern has been exacerbated by the financial difficulties that the UN has encountered. Both of these elements, financial disputes and the ambiguity of outcomes, have been characteristic of the relationship between the U.S. and the UN. Despite the difficulties in the relationship in the past fifteen years, the U.S. has been involved in several UN actions during this period, in addition to those in which it was involved previously. This involvement is detailed below. The U.S. within the UN System The debate within U.S. foreign policy circles over the desirability of multilateral action has been mirrored in the relationship between the U.S. and the UN. This relationship has been distinctly rocky in the past and, despite an increased rhetorical warmness on the part of both the Bush and Clinton administrations, the relationship between the U.S. and the UN remains somewhat tense. The primary factor mitigating this tension (which has its origins primarily within American domestic political opposition to the UN) is the apparent mutual dependence or interdependence that appears to have been created in the post– Cold War period. As the unrivalled superpower, the U.S. is the obvious choice for enforcement actions in the name of the international community. Although when politically expedient within the domestic realm, the U.S. has fulfilled this role, at other times it has been far more reticent. Indeed, the majority of UN peacekeeping troops, historically, have come from the “middle’’ and smaller powers. The current contributions to UN peacekeeping activities continue to reflect this. Ironically, the ending of the superpower rivalry that gave the U.S. its unprecedented position as the dominant global military power has simultaneously created significant burdens. The U.S. relationship with the UN remains ambiguous, both materially and intellectually. Nonetheless, the U.S. has been involved in numerous deployments under the UN banner. CONCLUSION The relationship between the U.S. and the UN with respect to the multilateral deployments of force remains in a state of flux. After initial general enthusiasm
Page 214 in the wake of the successful conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, events in Haiti, Somalia, and to a lesser extent Bosnia and Herzegovina have served to significantly dampen enthusiasm within U.S. policy circles. This has led to a wholescale reevaluation of the position of the U.S. in this respect. The most important issue here is control. Burden sharing necessarily entails some division of planning and overall control and responsibility for operations. It is this (potential rather than actual) loss of control which is the source of considerable domestic opposition to the use of U.S. forces within the context of UN operations. When the U.S. is in de facto control of operations and those operations are successful, as was the case in the Persian Gulf, this is not an issue. However, when situations prove less amenable to resolution and/or the U.S. is unable to dominate the control of a mission, substantial domestic opposition occurs. Multilateral involvement of U.S. military forces will continue to be an unavoidable and important component in any future deployments, although it is likely that this will continue to be only one element, in addition to unilateral actions. The conditions under which the U.S. will choose to “go it alone,” as opposed to acting jointly with other states, are complex but, as our discussion has indicated, are likely to be influenced by several major factors. These factors include proximity and immediateness of threat, degree of domestic support, degree of international support, and the existence of prior commitments in the area. In this final respect the interaction of multiple international organizations (for example, the UN and NATO) is likely to become increasingly important as both organizations continue to seek to establish their post–Cold War identities, positions, and roles. The U.S., as the most powerful state within this context, is likely to have a uniquely important (although not the exclusive) influence upon the direction they adopt. The extent to which the U.S. adopts multilateral approaches to the use of force will be critical. This choice will influence both the nature of military operations in the UN system of the 21st century, and the position of the U.S. within the international system as a whole. See United Nations; Yugoslavia. FOR FURTHER READING Albright, Madeleine K. 1997. U.S. Policy and Reform Agenda on the United Nations. U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 9/19. Bennett, A. Leroy. 1995. International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. BoutrosGhali, Boutros. 1995. An Agenda for Peace. New York: United Nations. Cahill, Kevin, ed. 1996. Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars before They Start.New York: Basic Books. Clinton, William J. 1997. U.S. Participation in the United Nations: A Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1997. Department of State Publication 10558. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Mingst, Karen. 1995. The United Nations in the Post–Cold War Era. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Page 215 Muldoon, James P. et al., eds. 1999. Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today . Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Tessitore, John, and Susan Woolfson, eds. Annual. A Global Agenda: Issues before the General Assembly of the United Nations. New York: W. W. Norton. Weiss, Thomas G., David Forsythe, and Roger Coate. 1997. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
MULTINATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION FORCE (IFOR)—As an Annex to the “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (the “Dayton Agreement” officially signed in Paris on December 14) the Multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), organized by the NATO countries, was created. IFOR was intended as a replacement for the UN peacekeeping forces, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which had been active with varying degrees of success (the very public failure of these forces to protect Srebrnica as a “safe enclave,” for example) since 1992. IFOR was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1031 (1995). IFOR is principally a NATO operation; however, forces, particularly naval forces, from several nonNATO countries are also involved. Thus IFOR, and to some extent UNPROFOR before it, marked an important development in the multilateral use of force, as not only were numerous countries involved, but so were two major transnational organizations, NATO and the UN. This is of great significance, as the U.S. is a major, perhaps dominant, power in both organizations. Initially, NATO airpower was utilized in support of the UN operations. This raised some important operational and control questions, although the general pattern was that the UN would request and authorize operations while NATO remained in operational command. In some situations, however, the UN commander of UNPROFOR specifically ruled out NATO operations because of the consequences a reaction might have brought for his troops and existing humanitarian operations on the ground. The NATO contribution was dominated by U.S. airpower, with some contributions from the U.K. The purpose of these missions was both to suppress Bosnian Serb artillery, which had been shelling the ‘‘safe havens,” and to drop foodstuffs, medicines, and clothing to the encircled Bosnian Muslims. These operations (during 1994 and 1995) were only moderately successful in terms of their military goals. However, they remained politically popular with domestic audiences in the U.S., despite precipitating several hostage situations in which the Serb forces used UN hostages as “human shields” to protect their artillery and ammunition dumps. While the cooperative relationship between NATO and the UN was not unprecedented, these operations did mark the most ambitious cooperation between the two organizations and appeared to lay down some important precedents for future operations. UNPROFOR, and particularly IFOR also marked an important development in the application of force by multilateral peacekeeping forces. All previous operations had restricted the use of force by the peacekeeping contin
Page 216 gent to selfdefense. In effect, this meant the peacekeeping forces could only return fire once fired upon. In the case of UNPROFOR and even more so with IFOR, the forces were authorized to use force proactively in defense of their broader mission goals, rather than solely in response to immediate threats to their personnel. While this was a controversial move, suggestive of implementing peace or “peacemaking” rather than peacekeeping as it had previously been understood, it reflected a concern to address many of the issues raised by U.S. planners involved in preparing the mission. Operation Deliberate Force (the name of the concentrated air strikes) saw primarily U.S. airpower put this revised doctrine into practice by attacking over 300 specific targets. This was done by attacking a coordinated series of targets (agreed with the UN) in an attempt to impose zones around the safe areas, in which there were no heavy weapons capable of attacking population centers in the way in which Serb mortars and artillery had done previously. The prior planning of the missions also meant that UN forces had been removed from the areas and thus were unavailable as potential hostages. In addition to implementing the peace agreement, IFOR was also charged with training and “professionalizing” internal security and police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with training the Bosnian defense forces. The status and likely success of this operation remains difficult to evaluate at this time. See Multilateralism; Yugoslavia. FOR FURTHER READING Albright, Madeleine K. 1997. U.S. Policy and Reform Agenda on the United Nations. U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 9/19. BoutrosGhali, Boutros. 1995. An Agenda for Peace. New York: United Nations. Cahill, Kevin, ed. 1996. Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars before They Start.New York: Basic Books. Clinton, William J. 1997. U.S. Participation in the United Nations: A Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1997. Department of State Publication 10558. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Mingst, Karen. 1995. The United Nations in the Post–Cold War Era. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Muldoon, James P. et al., eds. 1999. Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Tessitore, John, and Susan Woolfson, eds. Annual. A Global Agenda: Issues before the General Assembly of the United Nations. New York: W. W. Norton. Weiss, Thomas G., David Forsythe, and Roger Coate. 1997. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
MULTINATIONAL OBSERVER FORCE (MOF)—The MOF was deployed on the basis of the Camp David Agreement to monitor the border between Egypt and Israel (including the Straits of Tiran). MOF is often championed as being the most successful peacekeeping operation. There is a significant ongoing commitment on the part of the U.S. to this mission.
Page 217 The Multinational Force in the Sinai was set up under the Camp David Agreement negotiated between President Sadat of Egypt and Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin in 1978. The role of the force was (and continues to be) to observe and report on the actions of Israeli and Egyptian forces in the area, to guarantee safe navigation in the Straits of Tiran, and to operate a number of border controls in the area. The U.S., as sponsor of the Camp David Agreement, has had an ongoing commitment to the MFO. The Multinational Observer Force has been one of the most successful peacekeeping operations mounted. See Middle East; Multilateralism. FOR FURTHER READING Department of National Defence to Canadian Forces. http://www.dnd.ca/dcds/missions/ mfo_e.htm. Diehl, Paul. 1993. International Peacekeeping. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
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N Congress; Ethics; Two Presidencies. FOR FURTHER READING Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. ‘‘U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers.” 1967. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 90th Cong., 1st session 3. Karl R. DeRouen, Jr.
Constitution.
Page 220 FOR FURTHER READING Bell, Derrick, Jr. 1997. Constitutional Conflicts. Cincinnati: Anderson. Gunther, Gerald. 1991. Constitutional Law, 12th ed. Westbury, NY: The Foundation Press. New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Tarr. 1999. American Constitutional Law. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Paul Weizer
Kissinger, Henry; Middle East. FOR FURTHER READING Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Kissinger, Henry. 1979. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Lenczowski, George. 1990. American Presidents and the Middle East. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Spiegel, Steven L. 1985. The Other ArabIsraeli Conflict. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ahmed H. Ibrahim
Foreign Policy Decision Making; Rational Choice. FOR FURTHER READING DeRouen, Karl, Jr. 1994. “The Decision Not to Use Force: A Noncompensatory Perspective.” Discussion Paper #21. The Program in Foreign Policy Decision Making, Texas A&M University. Mintz, Alex. 1993. “The Decision to Attack Iraq: A NonCompensatory Theory of Decision Making.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:595–618. Mintz, Alex, Nehemia Geva, and Karl DeRouen, Jr. 1994. “Mathematical Models of
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Foreign Policy DecisionMaking: Compensatory vs. Noncompensatory.” Synthese 100:441–60. Mintz, Alex, Nehemia Geva, Steven B. Redd, and Amy Carnes. 1997. “The Effect of Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making: An Analysis Using the Decision Board Platform.” American Political Science Review 91:553–66. Redd, Steven B. 1999. ‘‘Foreign Policy Decision Making in an Advisory Group Setting: Using Process Tracing Methods in Linking Choice to Decision Processes.” Ph.D. diss., Texas A&M University. Steven B. Redd
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)—Collective defense alliance created in April 1949 by the Western European powers, U.S., and Canada in order to deter a Sovietled attack on Europe. The premise upon which NATO is based is that all countries will treat an attack on a member state as an attack upon themselves and respond accordingly. The primary importance of this stance was the extension of the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” to include the European states. Following the end of the collapse of the Soviet threat and the subsequent end of the Cold War, NATO has engaged in a significant expansion and redefinition of its role, including recent activities in the Balkans. Unlike the Soviet Union’s relationship with Eastern Europe, the U.S. could not exercise authoritarian control over Western Europe, nor did it desire to do so. However, this created a dilemma for Washington, since it required some degree of control over European military affairs in order to counter the Soviet threat. NATO became the means through which to accomplish this end. The U.S. had never before joined, much less suggested leading, a peacetime military alliance. A culmination of factors pushed Washington toward establishing such an alliance. First, it was clear that the Soviets, if left unopposed, intended to expand westward. In February of 1948, the Soviets supported a coup in Prague that brought Czechoslovakia into the communist fold. Then, in June, the Soviets blockaded West Berlin. The Europeans had by this time already taken steps to strengthen their alliance against the Soviet Union. Great Britain and France promulgated the Treaty of Dunkirk in March of 1947 and, the following year, they were joined by Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in a collective defense arrangement under the Brussels Pact. These agreements became the basis for the Western European Union (WEU), a collective defense organization whose members agreed to come to the aid of any other member falling under attack by an outside nation. The U.S. responded to this foundation by proposing and then, in 1949, establishing NATO. The membership of this new organization included the Brussels Pact nations, the U.S., Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal. Its general purpose was to provide a deterrent against Soviet expansionism in Europe. The U.S. took the leadership position within the organization and tied the command structures of the European nations into its own. The most divisive debate within the organization occurred when Washington and Great
Page 222 Britain argued that Germany ought to be rearmed and, eventually, brought into NATO. For their part, the French expressed vehement opposition to the rearmament and inclusion of Germany; however, the U.S. argued that even a rearmed Germany would pose no threat if its military was tied into a common command structure. The need for German participation was based on sound military strategy, as well as political considerations. Germany’s location placed it at the interstice of Western and Eastern Europe. Without its own military, Germany’s defense would be left to other NATO members. The French understood this difficulty and, unable to provide additional troops, acquiesced in German rearmament, and later, to Germany’s admittance into NATO in 1955. Little was done by either side to push for German reunification. Retaining control of East Germany, which became the German Democratic Republic (GDR), was one of Moscow’s key goals and the French were no more willing to see reunification, since they considered a divided Germany to be a less bellicose and, therefore, a safer Germany. Not once during the Cold War did NATO troops engage in hostilities with the Soviet Union or any other actor in the European theater. The alliance served its purpose as a deterrent against Soviet encroachment upon Europe and also as a consolidating force that, combined with economic unification driven by the various stages of European integration, from the European Coal and Steel Community to the European Union, locked the militaries of the U.S. and Europe together. Such an outcome was necessary given the historical nature of America’s relationship with the Europeans. It is doubtful that Washington would have been able to maintain a commitment had each European nation decided to remain on its own. A new postwar balance of power arrangement of shifting alliances, which Washington considered as the cause of many historical European conflicts, was unacceptable. NATO would provide for a permanent and integrative alliance which would prevent the instabilities inherent within the 19th century’s system. Even the 1966 withdrawal of Gaullist France from the alliance’s command structure did not threaten its existence, since the French generally continued to follow NATO’s lead. See Cold War; Europe; Multilateralism; Yugoslavia. FOR FURTHER READING Bennett, A. Leroy. 1995. International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
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O Foreign Policy Decision Making. FOR FURTHER READING Bond, Joseph H. 1994. “Restructuring the Operational Code Construct: A Psychological Assessment of George Bush and Events Leading to the Gulf War.” Ph.D. diss., Purdue University. George, Alexander L. 1969. “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and DecisionMaking.” International Studies Quarterly 13:190–222. George, Alexander L. 1979. “The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and DecisionMaking Behavior: The ‘Operational Code’ Belief System.’’ In Psychological Models of International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Walker, Stephen G. 1983. “The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A Reanalysis of the Operational Code Construct.” International Studies Quarterly 27:179–202.
Page 224 Walker, Stephen J., Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young. 1998. “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter’s Operational Code.” International Studies Quarterly 42:175–89. Young, Michael D., and Mark Schafer. 1998. “Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International Relations.” International Studies Quarterly 42:63–96. Steven B. Redd
Foreign Policy Decision Making. FOR FURTHER READING Allison, Graham T. 1969. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.’’ American Political Science Review 63:689–718. Welch, David A. 1992. “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect.” International Security 17:112–46. Steven B. Redd
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P Constitution. FOR FURTHER READING Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Nelson, Michael. 1998. The Evolving Presidency. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Paul Weizer
PARALLEL PUBLICS—This is a supplemental and additional explanation of how individuallevel attitudes can lack coherence, but aggregated opinions possess the qualities of consistency, stability, and sensibleness. The American population is not homogeneous, but comprised of heterogeneous subgroups based on collective interests. If we are to talk of the “public,” we must first acknowledge these groups and understand how their opinions contribute to the aggregate position. Group interests vary, but their opinions are constrained by the set of
Page 226 democratic and capitalistic values called the American Ethos. While prioritizing different values, group opinions tend to be stable and changing in tandem to one another. The stability of these “parallel publics” allows scholars to speak of aggregated subgroups as the mass public. See Media; Public Opinion. FOR FURTHER READING Page, Benjamin, and Robert Shapiro. 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press. Jill Glathar
Multilateralism; Yugoslavia. FOR FURTHER READING Annan, Kofi. 1996. ‘‘The PeaceKeeping Prescription.” In Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars before They Start, ed. Kevin Cahill. New York: Basic Books. Diehl, Paul. 1993. International Peacekeeping. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Ruggie, John. 1996. The United Nations and Collective Use of Force: Whither—or Whether? New York: United Nations Association. United Nations. http://www.un.org/peace/; http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/. United Nations. 1996. The Blue Helmets. New York: United Nations. Weiss, Thomas G., David Forsythe, and Roger Coate. 1997. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
PERCEPTION/MISPERCEPTION—Perceptions and misperceptions on the part of individuals naturally include the beliefs and images about the world and other actors. Misperceptions, broadly defined, include miscalculations of consequences, inaccurate inferences, and misjudgments about how other actors will respond to one’s policies. Perceptions and misperceptions are often pointed to as the causes for presidents using force abroad. For example, some might point
Page 227 to President George Bush’s experiences and worldview as his reason for using force against Saddam Hussein and portraying Hussein as Hitler. Likewise, many would allude to President Jimmy Carter’s misperceptions about the utility and prospects for success of using force in an attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980. See Foreign Policy Decision Making. FOR FURTHER READING Chan, Steve, and Donald A. Sylvan. 1984. Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence. New York: Praeger. Brands, H. W., Jr. 1987. “Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada.” Political Science Quarterly 102:607–24. Fordham, Benjamin O. 1998. “The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 1949–1994.” International Studies Quarterly 42:567–90. Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kim, Woosang, and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 1995. “How Perceptions Influence the Risk of War.” International Studies Quarterly 39:51–65. Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. 1990. The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Steven B. Redd
PERRY, COMMODORE MATTHEW C.—U.S. Naval Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, who is probably best known for his successful efforts to open Japanese ports to American trade, was born in South Kingstown, Rhode Island in 1794. Perry began his naval career in 1809, serving under his brother, Oliver Hazard Perry, who later commanded the U.S. Naval fleet that defeated the British forces in the Battle of Lake Erie in 1813. Perry also served in the War of 1812, then continued his naval career, achieving the rank of captain in 1837 and of commodore in 1841. As commodore, Perry commanded the African squadron from 1843 to 1844 (which was instrumental in suppressing the slave trade), as well as the Gulf fleet during the Mexican War. In 1852, Perry received the position of commander of the East India fleet and orders to open up trade in Japan, then an isolationist, feudal nation. Perry’s expedition to Japan began in 1853. On July 8 his fleet of four ships entered Tokyo (then Yedo) Bay. He presented his requests for protection of American seamen, the right to purchase coal, and the opening of one or more ports to American trade, to the ruling Tokugawa Shogunate. Perry then left for China, but returned to Japan in February of the next year with a larger fleet. On March 31, 1854, Perry and the Tokugawa signed the Treaty of Kanagawa, which opened two Japanese ports, Shimoda and Hakodate, to American trade. Following his return, Perry helped to compile the Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, which was published in 1856. Perry died in 1858. See Asia and the Pacific.
Page 228 FOR FURTHER READING Wiley, Peter Booth. 1991. Yankees in the Land of the Gods: Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan. New York: Penguin Books. Sara Jezewski
PERRY DOCTRINE—Former Secretary of Defense William Perry articulated his thoughts on the use of force in a 1995 speech. Perry felt that the threats to the U.S. have changed in the post–Cold War era. No longer is the survival of the U.S. threatened, but there are still “complex and very dangerous’’ threats. Perry discussed three cases in which force should be used. Each of the cases involve “political and ethical” questions: 1. “when our vital national interests are threatened” (e.g., Iraq in 1991); 2. “when important, but not vital national interests are threatened” (e.g., Bosnia); 3. “when a situation causes us deep humanitarian concern” (e.g., Rwanda). See Cold War; Ethics. FOR FURTHER READING Daggett, Stephen, and Nina Serafino. 1995. “The Use of Force: Key Statements by Weinberger, Shultz, Aspin, Bush, Powell, Albright, and Perry.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report. Haass, Richard. 1994. Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post– Cold War World. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Karl R. DeRouen, Jr.
Foreign Policy Decision Making. FOR FURTHER READING Barber, James David. 1985. The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House, 3d ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. George, Alexander L. 1964. Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study. New York: Dover.
Page 229 George, Alexander L. 1998. Presidential Personality and Performance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Shepard, Graham H. 1988. “Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1969–84: A Second Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory.” International Studies Quarterly 32:91–123. Snare, Charles E. 1992. “Applying Personality Theory to Foreign Policy Behavior: Evaluating Three Methods of Assessment.” In Political Psychology and Foreign Policy, ed. Eric Singer and Valerie Hudson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Winter, David G. 1992. “Personality and Foreign Policy: Historical Overview of Research.’’ In Political Psychology and Foreign Policy, ed. Eric Singer and Valerie Hudson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Steven B. Redd
PHILIPPINES—The SpanishAmerican War, which broke out in 1898, was the first war fought distinctly in two theaters, the Atlantic/Caribbean and the Pacific, and it brought to light the desire on the part of the U.S. to be taken seriously as a world power. This relatively short war was fought primarily over Spanish dominion in Cuba, which was considered by the U.S. to be a somewhat bothersome thorn in its largely successful attempt to attain ascendance in the Western Hemisphere. Yet, the war was clearly also the result of a much more internationally activist diplomacy on the part of the U.S., where it was willing to utilize force to achieve its political ends on a broader scale than in the past. The Monroe Doctrine had given the U.S. a clear policy direction to follow in its relations with Latin America, and thus its actions to remove the Spanish from Cuba were not surprising. The behavior of the U.S. in the Pacific, however, was rather astonishing, given past experiences where the country would fight generally limited conflicts and attempt to minimize the experience if at all possible, so as to not become involved in a long and drawnout contest. The War of 1898 changed this long standing policy position. With the war against Spain, the McKinley administration had a perfect excuse to formally extend U.S. presence into Asia, and the Philippines, located in the South China Sea, would make a useful far eastern outpost with Hawaii as a bridge to the mainland. After vanquishing the Spanish from the Philippines, the U.S. turned to putting down an indigenous rebellion on the islands that had originally sprung up to resist the Spanish but, when the native islanders understood that the U.S. was not necessarily going to head for home following the war, they turned their attention to the American forces. During the war with the Spanish the U.S. had supported the native revolutionary elements but, when the Treaty of Paris was signed with Spain ending the war, part of the agreement handed over the Philippines to the U.S. for a rather miniscule payment of $20 million. The Filipinos were outraged and almost immediately, in 1899, the socalled Philippine Insurrection broke out. Through 1902, U.S. forces fought to put down the insurrection while managing the protection of American interests in the islands. The U.S. declared victory early in July 1902, but guerrilla actions continued through the
Page 230 following year and required a continuous protective military presence. In the end, four times as many men would serve in the Philippines than in the Caribbean during that phase of the conflict, and, by 1902, the Asiatic fleet was the largest of all such squadrons within the U.S. Navy. Clearly, the actions of the U.S. in the Philippines show how far the country had come toward establishing the capability for a truly global presence. The use of force in the Philippine wars, however, also proved that the U.S. did not yet have a consolidated longterm policy on Asia or the Pacific. Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries the U.S. would simply act in a relatively opportunistic fashion. Only the intentional opening of the Japanese market and the acquisition of Hawaii showed signs that there was some longerterm direction to what the U.S. wanted to accomplish in the region. This lack of policy coordination was exacerbated by American domestic political realities. As was the case with many policy makers, most Americans had little knowledge regarding Asia or the Pacific. While most had heard of Hawaii, few even knew of the Philippines until the wars began. Military activities have a way of bringing public attention to issues and this one was no different; and, with the attention came the inevitable debate over American goals in the conflict. Of course, during the war with Spain the goals were much more obvious: defeat the Spanish and evict them from their former territories so the indigenous peoples would be free of tyranny and oppression—or at least that was the popular line. However, once this had been accomplished, public concern over continuing action in the Philippines (as well as the ongoing role of the U.S. in Cuba) intensified. The U.S. was looking a little too “imperial” for the taste of its citizens, many of whom at the time considered imperialism a “European disease” not to be associated with the moral superiority of the U.S. This popular sentiment was reflected in the administrations of both William McKinley and his successor Teddy Roosevelt. Public concerns and conflict within both administrations prevented a clear picture of U.S. goals in the region from developing. Events in China during the same period further complicated the U.S. policy position. See Asia and the Pacific; Hawaii; Monroe Doctrine. FOR FURTHER READING Dixon, Joe C., ed. 1980. The American Military and the Far East. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Eckes, Alfred E., Jr. 1995. Opening America’s Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. James Heasley
POLIHEURISTIC THEORY—The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making incorporates the conditions surrounding foreign policy decisions, as well as the cognitive processes associated with these surroundings. In other words, it concentrates on the “why” and “how” of decision making which makes the theory relevant to both the contents and the processes of decision making.
Page 231 The term “poliheuristic’’ can be subdivided into the roots poly (many) and heuristic (shortcuts), and refer to the cognitive mechanisms decision makers utilize in attempts to simplify complex decision tasks. In addition to “poli” referring to the use of multiple heuristics in a twostage decision process, the main premise of the poliheuristic theory is its reference to the political aspects of decision making in a foreign policy context. The assumption is that the decision maker measures costs and benefits, risks and rewards, gains and losses, and success and failure in terms of political ramifications above all else. The poliheuristic theory posits that (a) different decision heuristics may be employed in different decisions as a function of environmental and personal variations; and (b) decision makers use a mixture of decision strategies en route to a single choice. The theory proposes a twostage process: in the first stage decision makers employ cognitivebased heuristic strategies. Then, in the second stage, when the decision matrix has been reduced to a more manageable number of alternatives and dimensions, decision makers resort to other rules of choice (e.g., lexicographic, expected utility rules, etc.). As applied to the decision to use force, the theory would state that decision makers would first reduce the alternatives and dimensions available in the choice set down to a manageable size, using cognitive shortcuts. If the use of force option were still viable, then the decision maker would more analytically ascertain the costs and benefits of using force. See Diversionary Theory; Foreign Policy Decision Making; Rational Choice. FOR FURTHER READING Geva, Nehemia, Russell Driggers, and Alex Mintz. 1996. “Effects of Ambiguity on Strategy and Choice in Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Analysis Using Computerized Process Tracing.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Houston, Texas, October 25–27. Mintz, Alex. 1997. “Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: Bridging the Gap between the Cognitive Psychology and Rational Actor ‘Schools.’ ” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Mintz, Alex, and Nehemia Geva. 1997. “The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive Rational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Mintz, Alex, Nehemia Geva, and Steven B. Redd. 1994. “Testing the Poliheuristic Theory of Decision with Evolving Choice Sets.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), UrbanaChampaign, Illinois, November 3–5. Mintz, Alex, Nehemia Geva, Steven B. Redd, and Amy Carnes. 1997. “The Effect of Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making: An Analysis Using the Decision Board Platform.” American Political Science Review 91:553–66. Redd, Steven B. “Foreign Policy Decision Making in an Advisory Group Setting: Using Process Tracing Methods in Linking Choice to Decision Processes.” Ph.D. diss., Texas A&M University, 1999. Steven B. Redd
Page 232 Foreign Policy Decision Making. FOR FURTHER READING de Rivera, Joseph H. 1968. The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy. Columbus, OH: Merrill. Hermann, Margaret. 1986. Political Psychology. San Francisco: JosseyBass. Janis, Irving L. 1982. Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Singer, Eric, and Valerie Hudson, eds. 1992. Political Psychology and Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Stein, Janice Gross, and David A. Welch. 1997. “Rational and Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Conflict: Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. 1990. The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Zey, Mary, ed. 1992. Decision Making: Alternatives to Rational Choice Models. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Steven B. Redd
Cold War; Ethics; Kissinger, Henry; Truman Doctrine. FOR FURTHER READING Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Morgenthau, Hans. 1978. Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. New York: Knopf. Spanier, John, and Steven W. Hook. 1998. American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 14th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
Page 233 Viotti, Robert, and Mark V. Kauppi. 1999. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. James Heasley
Diversionary Theory; Media; Presidential Approval; Public Opinion; Rally ’round the Flag. FOR FURTHER READING Neustadt, Richard E. 1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Free Press. Jill Glathar
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL—Alternatively known as the public’s approval of the president, presidential approval is a measure of the degree of support the president receives from the public, as shown through public opinion polls. In particular, aggregate approval measures are typically drawn from Gallup surveys, which ask respondents whether they approve or disapprove of the current president’s handling of his job as president. Approval is considered important to presidential leadership. If presidential power is the power to persuade, as Neustadt suggests, then approval provides an important resource for presidential leadership. Examinations of trends in public approval have become a cottage industry in the study of the presidency. A variety of studies have shown that the economy, international crises, and presidential success on salient issues, among other factors, influence trends in approval. Public approval is also used as an independent variable in explaining presidential success in Congress (with few significant results) and explaining why presidents might use force abroad. Studies clearly indicate that public approval is an endogenous variable when considering relationships between the president’s approval, success, and decision making in foreign policy. The reciprocity of approval and presidential success is clear. Foreign policy studies relate approval to the concept of the rally event whereby presidents appear to receive a boost in approval following a foreign policy crisis. As such, some scholars suggest that the rally effect may provide an incentive
Page 234 for the president to use force abroad. Results of empirical research on the existence of rally effects are mixed. Despite the uncertainty of the relationship, a consensus exists that presidential approval is an important variable when explaining presidential leadership. See Diversionary Theory; Media; Presidential Approval; Public Opinion; Rally ’round the Flag. FOR FURTHER READING Brace, Paul, and Barbara Hinckley. 1992. Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents. New York: Basic Books. Brody, Richard A. 1991. Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Edwards, George C. III, and George Gallup, Jr. 1990. Presidential Approval. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Neustadt, Richard E. 1990. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: The Free Press. Jeffrey S. Peake
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS—American politics scholars, in particular George Edwards, Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher, and Terry Sullivan, have examined presidential success in Congress as the degree to which presidents win on floor votes where the president takes a stand. Their findings indicate that presidents influence floor voting in Congress only marginally, and presidential influence is tempered by the partisan and ideological makeup of Congress. Specifically, Edwards found that presidents can only count on members of their party for support about twothirds of the time. The findings are rigorous across a variety of legislation and measures of presidential success in Congress, both at the aggregate level and when examining motivations of individual members of Congress. Further, since presidents have very little impact on the partisan and ideological makeup of Congress, they have a very difficult time increasing their overall success in Congress, in both foreign and domestic policy. Even the most skilled of presidents cannot overcome the partisan and electoral forces that drive congressional behavior. The same can be said for the most popular presidents, as presidential approval only marginally affects presidential success in Congress. Scholars have examined differences in presidential success between foreign and defense policy, and find few distinguishable differences. Also, as presidents rarely lose votes in binding legislation dealing with uses of force abroad, it is unclear whether or not the results from these studies apply to the specific type of foreign policy that force implies. The limited success presidents have in their dealings with Congress does suggest, however, that presidents are handicapped by partisan and ideological differences when dealing with individual members of Congress. This reality can frustrate the president’s attempts to lead Congress during crisis situations. See Congress; Two Presidencies. FOR FURTHER READING Bond, Jon, and Richard Fleisher. 1990. The President in the Legislative Arena. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Page 235 Edwards, George C. III. 1989. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Sullivan, Terry. 1991. “The Bank Account Presidency: A New Measure and Evidence on the Temporal Path of Presidential Influence’’ American Journal of Political Science 91:686–723. Jeffrey S. Peake
Agenda Setting; Media; Public Opinion. FOR FURTHER READING Iyengar, Shanto, and Adam Simon. 1994. “News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda Setting, Priming and Framing.” In Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, ed. W. L. Bennett and D. L. Paletz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Miller, J. M., and J. A. Krosnick. 1996. “News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: A Program of Research on the Priming Hypothesis.” In Political Persuasion and Attitude Change, ed. D. Mutz and P. Sniderman. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Jill Glathar
Public Opinion. FOR FURTHER READING Jentleson, Bruce, and Reberra Britton. 1998. “Still Pretty Prudent: Post–Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42:395–418. Jill Glathar
Page 236 Constitution. FOR FURTHER READING Bell, Derrick, Jr. 1997. Constitutional Conflicts. Cincinnati: Anderson. Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Lively, Donald, Phoebe Hadden, Dorothy Roberts, and Russell Weaver. 1996. Constitutional Law: Cases, History, and Dialogues. Cincinnati: Anderson. Nelson, Michael. 1998. The Evolving Presidency. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Tarr. 1999. American Constitutional Law. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Paul Weizer
Diversionary Theory; Foreign Policy Decision Making. FOR FURTHER READING DeRouen, Karl R., Jr. 1995. “The Indirect Link: Politics, the Economy, and the Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39:671–95. Farnham, Barbara. 1992. “Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from Prospect Theory.’’ Political Psychology 13:205–35. Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.” Econometrica 47:263–91. Levy, Jack S. 1992. “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems.” Political Psychology 13:283–310. Levy, Jack S. 1997. “Prospect Theory and the CognitiveRational Debate.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Page 237 McDermott, Rose. 1992. “Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission.” Political Psychology 13:237–63. Nincic, Miroslav. 1997. “Loss Aversion and the Domestic Context of Military Intervention.” Political Research Quarterly 50:97–120. Zinnes, Dina A., and Robert G. Muncaster. 1997. “Prospect Theory Versus Expected Utility Theory: A Dispute Sequence Appraisal.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Steven B. Redd
Angola; Cold War; Latin America and the Caribbean; SubSaharan Africa. FOR FURTHER READING Eayrs, James, and Robert Spencer, eds. 1980. Superpower Diplomacy. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Longman, Timothy. 1998. Proxy Targets: Civilians in the War on Burundi. New York: Human Rights Watch. James Heasley
PUBLIC OPINION—Following John Mueller’s seminal work on presidential use of force and public reaction, scholars began taking a closer look at the relationship between foreign policy and public opinion. Mueller found that presidential approval dramatically increased after force was used in response to an international crisis. This reaction is commonly known as the ‘‘rally’roundtheflag” effect. In studying the effect, scholars found more puzzles than solutions. The relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, especially public reaction to use of force, can be characterized as paradoxical. First, not all uses of force yield rallies. In reaction to some crises presidential approval soars, while
Page 238 other times the response is negligible. Brody reported evidence of rallies, but after studying the rally effect from 1953 to 1980, George Edwards deemed the effect “rare and idiosyncratic.” However, before we can comprehend how the public reacts to presidential use of force, the first step is to understand how the public thinks about and formulates foreign policy preferences. Herein lies another paradox. Page and Shapiro concluded that individual foreign policy attitudes are inconsistent, incoherent, and ignorant, but when aggregated, the attitudes appear rational and prudent. The paradox of individual versus aggregate foreign policy attitudes is this incongruity. One potential resolution is a link connecting the two paradoxes. The link is the content and organization of the belief systems upon which foreign policy attitudes are based. We know that individuals rely on democratic and capitalistic values as the foundation for most political attitudes. Core beliefs such as liberty, equality, and individualism are at the heart of both elite and mass belief systems. As most Americans see all democratic and capitalistic values as important, what varies is which values are most significant to the individual, thus resulting in different opinions. By examining the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy through the lens of valuebased belief systems, similarities and variations in political attitudes toward presidential use of force become less paradoxical and more clearly reflect the rationality of the American public. THE INDIVIDUAL VERSUS AGGREGATE PARADOX OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES Before exploring public reaction to presidential use of force, it is paramount to understand the nature and characteristics of foreign policy attitudes. According to democratic theory, the role of public opinion is to guide elected officials in creating viable policy. Two assumptions are inherent to this relationship. The first assumption is that political attitudes represent wellformulated ideas grounded upon a thorough understanding of political ideas. Building on this foundation, the second assumption posits that representatives consider the public’s views when creating public policy. In the realm of foreign policy, public opinion research suggests that theory is not always reflected in reality. Democratic theory is certainly not upheld when looking at individuallevel foreign policy attitudes. Delli, Carpini, and Keeter show that even with increased media exposure, opinions are largely ignorant and unreliable. The public does not possess basic knowledge of America’s political, historical, and economic relationships with other countries. Foreign policy opinions reveal an inattentive public whose attitudes can be portrayed as deficient in constraint, coherence, and consistency. Given the abysmal state of individuallevel attitudes, it is paradoxical that when aggregated, foreign policy attitudes exhibit qualities that are capable of
Page 239 guiding public policy. Page and Shapiro characterize the electorate to have rational and prudent opinions. When attitudes are examined from the aggregate perspective, the opinions are sensible and stable, constrained by political beliefs and capable of making discerning choices. Moreover, rather than being random or static, the public demonstrates reasonable changes based on available information. Page and Shapiro investigated the incongruity between individual and aggregatelevel attitudes, offering two possible resolutions to this paradox. The first solution is statistical in nature. Theoretically, individuallevel attitudes are like a crosssection sample, where average positions are extremely influenced by outliers. One sample, or “snapshot,” of the population is not necessarily reflective of the population. When the samples are aggregated, a better picture formulates of population opinions, where extremes cancel each other. By summing and combining attitudes, factors like measurement error and varying levels of education or interest that creates inconsistencies disappear to produce a population average of foreign policy positions. In the aggregate, the electorate appears homogeneous, but in reality, the mass public is a heterogeneous population with varying preferences. Aggregating diverse groups may veil underlying distinctions important to understanding foreign policy attitudes. Therefore, Page and Shapiro offer an additional, supplemental theory to account for the heterogeneous nature of the American electorate: parallel publics. These publics incorporate different subgroups within the population, whose group interests produce varying opinions with distinctive patterns. For example, Zaller found opinion leaders and the mass public construct different opinions about American intervention in foreign countries. It is the acknowledgment of these subgroups that assists in explaining the “rally” paradox of varying public reaction to seemingly consistent circumstances of presidents using force. THE “RALLY” PARADOX OF PUBLIC OPINION John Mueller initially studied the ‘‘rally’roundtheflag” effect and defined it as an increase in presidential popularity following an international crisis. The three following criteria are necessary for a rally effect to occur: an international crisis confronts the nation as a whole, the event involves the U.S. and the president directly, and the crisis is specific, dramatic, and sharply focused. The paradox surrounding this effect is that public response to international crisis is not consistent. Brace and Hinckley claim that international crises can potentially improve a president’s ratings. Edwards shows that half of all presidential approval surges are preceded by rally points. These studies are focusing on the consistency and magnitude of the rally effect which appear contradictory. If instead, the question is refocused to center on systematic occurrences rather than the size of the response, public reaction does not appear so arbitrary. Jentleson and Britton address the rally effect through the Principal Policy Objective
Page 240 (PPO) theory. PPO theory advocates that the aspect of international crisis that best explains the corresponding public reaction is the principal policy objective for which the military force is being used. There are limited, systematic reasons why presidents use force. These reasons comprise the explanation provided to the public; the objective of the act is the president’s justification for using force. Policy objectives may include the defense of American interests, humanitarian causes, support of an ally, or containment of an aggressive state, to provide some examples. It is this objective that Jentleson and Britton find to be the primary factor in determining public reaction. The electorate pervasively supports use of force following the loss of American lives or when an aggressive state threatens our economic interests. The response is less comprehensive for humanitarian reasons. Simply knowing that the policy objective will impact the public reaction does not explain why the reaction occurs. For that, we need to return to thinking about the basis for foreign policy attitudes and Page and Shapiro’s theory of parallel publics. From the work of Hurwitz and Peffley, it is wellknown that individuals base foreign policy attitudes on democratic and capitalistic values. Using beliefs about equality, capitalism, ethnocentrism, and warfare, individuals develop attitudes without specific information by simply structuring the opinion around the abstract value. Differences between individuals, and thus between groups, can be accounted for based on what values the individuals hold important within their belief system. Groups are made up of individuals with similar interests. In this case, group distinctions share the organization of values within belief systems. In relation to PPO theory, various policy objectives may trigger or violate the primary values within a group’s belief system. For example, if America were attacked and the president responded with force, the attack would violate the population’s sense of freedom and explain universal public reaction in rallying to support a president. However, when presidents use force to defend American economic interests, this may only resonate with a subset of the population who hold free market capitalism to be very important. Group distinctions particularly relevant to investigation of public reaction to use of force include age, in reaction to the Vietnamese War, and education as it pertains to understanding the complexities of international relations. Russett and Nincic address the periodicity effect related to the Vietnamese War by examining its impact on the relationship between public opinion and the use of force. In relation to belief systems and their organization, the American experience with Vietnam impacted the prioritization of values associated with interventionism and the containment of communism. People growing up in the aftermath of Vietnam undoubtedly give lower priority levels to intervention in foreign crises not directly involving the U.S. Education may also be a dominant factor in the way individuals prioritize belief systems. Those who are educated have increased levels of knowledge, pay more attention to politics, and possess the cognitive skills to understand the
Page 241 complexity of a multipolar world. Page and Shapiro note that the better educated hold certain values at higher levels of importance than the rest of the electorate. Having more formal education is associated with support for military and economic aid for allies, humanitarian intervention, and government initiatives in foreign affairs. CONCLUSION The relationship between public opinion and foreign policy is riddled with paradoxes. The first paradox addressed in this essay focused on the contradiction between individual and aggregate attitudes. The second paradox centered around the idiosyncratic public reaction to presidential use of force during times of international crisis. The explanation explored here suggests that by first addressing how policy preferences are formulated at the individual level, scholars can begin to identify systematic reasons accounting for public response. Individuals use democratic and capitalistic values to construct political attitudes. These values are prioritized within a dynamic belief system based on individual or group interests, leading to varying policy preferences. While the attitudes may appear irrational from an individual level, when aggregated, public opinion appears very discerning. The organization of value priorities is not random throughout the public. Certain properties create similar, prioritized belief systems based on group interests. In this chapter age and educational levels were suggested as possible group factors, but others undeniably exist. This idea of a similar set of beliefs prioritized in different ways contributes to explaining why systematic differences have been found in studies of the rally effect. Almost all Americans prioritize freedom and when threatened, public opinion responds similarly by supporting presidential use of force. However, when the crisis pertains to a different policy objective, such as the protection of economic interests or humanitarian concerns, public opinion will only support the use of force if an associated value is highly prioritized within the belief system. Where does this put our understanding of the relationship between political attitudes and foreign policy, particularly in terms of comprehending public reaction to presidential use of force? Having a better understanding of the systematic trends in the formation of foreign policy attitudes should be an important priority to elected representatives. Many scholars suggest that presidents manipulate international crises to generate a rally effect, thereby increasing their political power. The discussion presented here should indicate that presidents will fail in their attempt. Presidents cannot use any crisis to bolster waning popularity and political power. Rhetoric alone will not convince the public. The crisis must be a blatant attack on American interests to violate the universally prioritized value of freedom. Other foreign policy objectives may generate the response within some groups, but not the aggregate as a whole.
Page 242 Overall, the theory advocated in this essay furthers the perception that the American public is rational and prudent, not just in their opinions. In developing opinion, the electorate is acting on concepts inherent to American democracy with natural variations in what ideas are important. They are reacting to crises in a manner that reflects their priorities, and not necessarily those of elected representatives. This promotes the idea that elected representatives need to be more in touch with their constituents, furthering the democratic nature underlying the relationship between the mass public and elites. See Media; Presidential Approval; Rational Prudent Thesis. FOR FURTHER READING Brace, Paul, and Barbara Hinckley. 1992. Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents. New York, Basic Books. Brody, Richard. 1984. “International Crises: A Rallying Point for the President.” Public Opinion 6:41–43. Delli Carpini, Michael, and Scott Keeter. 1991. “Stability and Change in the U.S. Public’s Knowledge of Politics.” Public Opinion Quarterly 55:583–612. Edwards, George. 1983. The Public Presidency. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. 1987. “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model.” American Political Science Review 81:1099–1120. Jentleson, Bruce, and Reberra Britton. 1998. “Still Pretty Prudent: Post–Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42:395–418. Lian, Bradley, and John Oneal. 1993. ‘‘Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:227–300. Mueller, John. 1970. “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson.” American Political Science Review 64:18–34. Page, Benjamin, and Robert Shapiro. 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Russett, Bruce, and Miroslav Nincic. 1976. “American Opinion on the Use of Military Force Abroad.” Political Science Quarterly 91:411–31. Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press. Jill Glathar
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R Diversionary Theory; Media; Presidential Approval. FOR FURTHER READING Brace, Paul, and Barbara Hinckley. 1992. Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents. New York: Basic Books. Brody, Richard. 1984. “International Crises: A Rallying Point for the President.” Public Opinion. 6:41–43. DeRouen, Karl R., Jr. 1995. “The Indirect Link: Politics, the Economy and the Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39:671–95. Edwards, George. 1983. The Public Presidency. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Jentleson, Bruce, and Reberra Britton. 1998. “Still Pretty Prudent: Post–Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force.’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 42:395–418. Lian, Bradley, and John Oneal. 1993. “Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 37:227–300.
Page 244 Mueller, John. 1970. “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson.” American Political Science Review 64:18–34. Russett, Bruce, and Miroslav Nincic. 1976. “American Opinion on the Use of Military Force Abroad.”Political Science Quarterly 91:411–31. Jill Glathar
Public Opinion. FOR FURTHER READING Hinckley, Ronald. 1992. People, Polls, and Policymakers: American Public Opinion and National Security. New York: Lexington Books. Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. 1987. ‘‘How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model.” American Political Science Review 81:1099–1120. Page, Benjamin, and Robert Shapiro. 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Russett, Bruce. 1990. Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wittkopf, Eugene. 1990. Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Jill Glathar
Expected Utility Theory; Foreign Policy Decision Making. FOR FURTHER READING Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1983. “The Costs of War: A Rational Expectations Approach.” American Political Science Review 77:347–57. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. 1990. “Domestic Opposition and Foreign War.” American Political Science Review 84:747–65. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. 1992. War and Reason. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Page 245 Hess, Gregory D., and Athanasios Orphanides. 1995. “War Politics: An Economic, Rational Voter Framework.” American Economic Review 85:828–46. Morrow, James D. 1997. “A Rational Choice Approach to International Conflict.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Richards, Diana, T. Clifton Morgan, Rick K. Wilson, Valerie L. Schwebach, and Garry D. Young. 1993. “Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Tale of Some NotSoFree Agents.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:504–35. Stein, Janice Gross, and David A. Welch. 1997. ‘‘Rational and Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Conflict: Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses.” In Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The CognitiveRational Debate, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Wang, Kevin H. 1996. “Presidential Responses to Foreign Policy Crises: Rational Choice and Domestic Politics.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40:68–97. Steven B. Redd
Idealism; Kissinger, Henry; Power Politics; Truman Doctrine. FOR FURTHER READING Billington, James H. 1987. “Realism and Vision in American Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs 65:630–52. Callahan, David. 1994. Between Two Worlds: Realism, Idealism, and American Foreign Policy after the Cold War. New York: HarperCollins. Freedman, Lawrence. 1998 “International Security: Changing Targets.” Foreign Policy 10:48–55. James, Patrick, and Athanasios Hristoulas. 1994. “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: Evaluating a Model of Crisis Activity for the U.S.” Journal of Politics 53:27– 48. Kapstein, Ethan B., and Michael Mastanduno. 1999. Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press. Keohane, Robert O. 1986. “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics.” In Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1967. Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Myers, Robert John. 1999. U.S. Foreign Policy in the TwentyFirst Century: The Relevance of Realism. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
Page 246 Russett, Bruce. 1995. “Processes of Dyadic Choice for War and Peace.” World Politics 47:268–82. Wittkopf, Eugene R. 1994. “Faces of Internationalism in a Transitional Environment.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38:376–401. Steven B. Redd
ROOSEVELT COROLLARY—President Theodore Roosevelt expanded the Monroe Doctrine by stating that not only would the U.S. protect its citizens and their property, but also would act to enforce U.S. foreign policy in the hemisphere. The Roosevelt Corollary was first used to justify U.S. intervention in Panama in 1903. Later U.S. interventions in Nicaragua, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and Cuba were also justified using the Roosevelt Corollary. See Latin America and the Caribbean; Monroe Doctrine. FOR FURTHER READING Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Mowry, George. 1958. The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900–1912. New York: Harper. Pike, Frederick B. 1992. The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature. Austin: University of Texas Press. Karl R. DeRouen, Jr.
RUSSIA—Wilson dispatched American forces to two port areas in Russia during the Russian Civil War. The first group of forces landed at Archangel in northern Russia, under the command of F. C. Poole, a British general commanding all Allied forces, and American Ambassador Francis. The second took up residence in Vladivostok on the east coast of Siberia, under the command of U.S. General Graves. Almost immediately the two forces took differing approaches to their mission. In the north, Ambassador Francis and General Poole undertook an aggressive course of action from the start, splitting their troops under different Allied commanders. The largest contingent, acting contrary to Wilson’s policy of nonintervention, undertook an attack against Bolshevik forces to the south. Interestingly, while Ambassador Francis was aware of the President’s aide mémoire, the military commanders present at Archangel were not. Ambassador Francis, however, was staunchly anti communist and thus supportive of General Poole’s plan to attack the Bolsheviks In fact, he hoped that the use of Allied forces to support the antiBolshevik forces might lead to the downfall of Lenin’s regime. He therefore did nothing to prevent the use of American forces in this endeavor. As summer approached, additional Allied forces arrived in Russia, along with a contingent of Japanese troops. Interestingly, once President Wilson became fully aware as to the extent of U.S. activity in northern Russia, he requested that General Poole change his tactics or the
Page 247 U.S. would withdraw its troops from the region. The British reacted to Wilson’s complaint by replacing Poole. Following Poole’s replacement, the Allied forces took up a defensive position, but, having engaged the Bolshevik forces, they were compelled to hold their ground until being removed from Archangel in April of 1919. Unlike the American forces in Archangel, the troops under the command of General Graves in Vladivostok did not actively participate in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Graves received a copy of Wilson’s aide mémoire and thus was aware of the president’s misgivings about becoming involved in the brewing Russian Civil War. Further, being situated roughly 6,000 miles from Ambassador Francis in Archangel, Graves was not subject to his rather aggressive influences. As such the general decided to maintain a position of U.S. noninterference in Russian affairs, and consequently did not commit his forces to supporting one side or the other. Further, the Czech Legion, which Graves was supposed to be waiting to evacuate, was spending the majority of its time fighting the Bolsheviks rather than retreating toward Vladivostok for removal to the Western Front which, interestingly, made his mission ultimately one of guarding stockpiled U.S. supplies. To be sure, American policy in Siberia was not overly clear to those who were present, especially to the diplomatic corps and U.S. Allies. The French pushed Graves to actively support the antiBolshevik forces while various American diplomats, including the ambassador to Japan, complained to Washington that Graves was not actively pursuing U.S. interests in the region. Wilson and the secretary of war supported Graves; however, neither made this support clear, and as a result Graves was constantly barraged with complaints. In the final analysis, the Allied intervention resulted in little political or military gain. It did not in any significant way impact Lenin’s nascent regime, nor did it aid the Allies in their quest to defeat the Germans. It is perhaps most interesting only in that it represents the one time that the U.S. would engage troops of the Soviet Union. At no other time, even during the height of the Cold War, would the U.S. and the Soviet Union actively engage in open hostilities with one another. See Asia and the Pacific; Bolsheviks. FOR FURTHER READING Foglesong, David S. 1995. America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917–1920. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. LaFeber, Walter. 1997 America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1996, 8th ed. New York: McGrawHill. Rhodes, Benjamin D. 1988. The AngloAmerican Winter War with Russia, 1918–1919. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. James Heasley
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S Latin America and the Caribbean. FOR FURTHER READING Castaneda, Jorge G. 1994. Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War. New York: Vintage Books. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. LaFeber, Walter. 1997. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1996, 8th ed. New York: McGrawHill. James Henson
Constitution.
Page 250 FOR FURTHER READING Bell, Derrick, Jr. 1997. Constitutional Conflicts. Cincinnati: Anderson. Gunther, Gerald. 1991. Constitutional Law, 12th ed. Westbury, NY: The Foundation Press. Lively, Donald, Phoebe Hadden, Dorothy Roberts, and Russell Weaver. 1996. Constitutional Law: Cases, History, and Dialogues. Cincinnati: Anderson. Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Tarr. 1999. American Constitutional Law. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Schecter Poultry Corporation v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Paul Weizer
SHULTZ DOCTRINE—George Shultz was secretary of state in the Reagan administration. The Shultz Doctrine was largely a rejoinder to the Weinberger Doctrine. In particular, Shultz opposed Weinberger’s public support criterion. Shultz also felt the U.S. had a moral duty to use force at certain times. In a speech given in December 1984, Shultz said the use of force was legitimate to combat foreign aggression: 1. “when it [foreign aggression] crushes the human spirit and tramples human freedom”; 2. “when it imposes an alien will on an unwilling people”; 3. “when it is applied unsparingly, without care or concern for innocent life.’’ See Cold War; Ethics; Weinberger Doctrine. FOR FURTHER READING Daggett, Stephen, and Nina Serafino. 1995. “The Use of Force: Key Statements by Weinberger, Shultz, Aspin, Bush, Powell, Albright, and Perry.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report. Haass, Richard. 1994. Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post– Cold War World. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Karl R. DeRouen, Jr.
SUBSAHARAN AFRICA—The 45 countries that constitute subSaharan Africa cover an area of approximately eight million square miles and are home to approximately 578 million people. Within this vast and relatively underpopulated geographical area lies a wealth of natural resources. With the exception of petroleum found in West Africa (mainly in Nigeria and Gabon), the greatest concentration of minerals is in Southern Africa. In 1990, countries in subSaharan Africa, in addition to producing about half of the world’s cobalt, platinum, and vanadium, also produced about 25 percent of diamonds, chromium, manganese, and phosphates as well as more than 5 percent of ten other minerals. This mineral wealth in subSaharan Africa coupled with tropical and subtropical climates that are conducive to producing plantation crops ensure that Africa
Page 251 south of the Sahara is an important primary economic producer for the world economy. To a great extent, this is a continuation of what occurred during European colonialism in Africa, in the latter part of the 19th century and into the second half of the 20th century. Despite President Clinton’s 1997 announcement of a Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa, Africa remains on the periphery of the global economy, including trade with the U.S. To be sure, the relative share of U.S. trade with African countries has decreased slightly from what it was a half century ago. Between 1945 and 1965 Africa accounted for less than 5 percent of the total U.S. world trade; in the mid1990s this figure stood at about 2 percent. Considering sub Saharan Africa specifically, U.S. exports to the region only account for close to 7 percent of the market share, whereas Japan and the European Union account for 7 and 30 percent, respectively. Furthermore, U.S. economic links in subSaharan Africa tend to be concentrated in a handful of countries including South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon. African exports to the U.S. are dominated by crude oil that accounts for 70 percent of the total U.S.–subSaharan African trade. Judging from the fact that the U.S. has used covert force on only eighteen occasions in subSaharan Africa since the founding of the country, one might erroneously conclude that the U.S. has had, and continues to have, no national interest in subSaharan Africa. Although U.S. national interests in subSaharan African countries pales in comparison with Latin American countries in particular, U.S. foreign policy has had a significant impact on the lives of Africans during the second half of the 20th century in particular. Humanitarian and economic interests were dominant concerns guiding U.S. foreign policy in subSaharan Africa from the founding of the U.S. until about 1950. From 1950 until 1991 geopolitics dictated U.S. foreign policy in subSaharan Africa, which was aimed at containment of Soviet expansion, especially following Khruschev’s pledge of support for African resistance organizations waging wars of national liberation against colonial masters. In the post–Cold War period, humanitariandemocratic concerns appear to be determining U.S. foreign policy in subSaharan Africa. However, U.S. intentions and actions have not always been noble and altruistic there. For example, before 1958 the U.S. only paid lip service to African selfdetermination because European colonial masters, who opposed decolonization, were NATO Allies opposing Soviet expansionism. The U.S. had to perform a delicate balancing act between practicing its principles and placating its European Allies—the result was qualified U.S. support for African selfdetermination until after 1958. Because of distant relative geographical location to the U.S., subSaharan Africa has been spared the curse of frequent U.S. intervention in countries there (see Table 9). During the 19th century the U.S. resorted to use of force in subSaharan Africa on four occasions, namely, during the period 1820–1823, and in the years 1843, 1851, and 1860. The first two were related to the slave trade, presumably off the coast of West Africa in the first instance, and along the Ivory Coast,
Page 252 Table 9 Presidential Use of Force in SubSaharan Africa (adapted from Grimmett) YEAR LOCATION DESCRIPTION 1820– West Coast of Africa U.S. Navy enforces 1819 Slave Traffic Act of 1823 Congress. 1843 Ivory Coast and West U.S. Navy discourages piracy and slave trade. Coast 1851 Johanns Island Protects U.S. whaling interests. (Comoros Group) 1860 Kissembo in Angola Protects U.S. citizens during civil unrest. 1964 Leopoldville, U.S. provides military support to Congo Stanleyville, and government to oppose CNL (Conseil National de Paulis in Congo Liberation) insurgents. 1967 Katanga in Congo U.S. provides military support to Congo government to oppose gendarme units. 1978 Kolwezi (Shaba U.S. provides military support to Congo region) in Zaire government to oppose FLNC (National Front for the Liberation of Congo) insurgents in Shaba II. 1990 Monrovia in Liberia U.S. troops protect U.S. embassy and evacuate U.S. citizens. 1991 Kinshasa in Zaire U.S. military planes transport Belgian and French troops as well as American citizens and thirdcountry nationals during civil unrest. 1992 Sierra Leone U.S. military planes evacuate citizens following a coup. 1994 Rwanda U.S. military planes evacuate U.S. citizens and third country nationals during civil unrest. 1996 Liberia U.S. military planes evacuate U.S. citizens and third country nationals during civil unrest. 1996 Rwanda and Zaire U.S. personnel and aircraft support UN humanitarian efforts with Rwanda refugees. 1997 Congo and Gabon U.S. military personnel deployed to provide enhanced security for U.S. citizens, employees, and selected thirdcountry nationals in Zaire. 1997 Freetown, Sierra U.S. military personnel deployed to undertake the Leone evacuation of U.S. citizens and employees during civil unrest. 1998 Bissau, GuineaBissau U.S. military personnel deployed to Dakar, Senegal to evacuate U.S. citizens, employees, and selected thirdcountry nationals following an army mutiny in Bissau.
Page 253 YEAR 1998
LOCATION Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
1998
Monrovia, Liberia
DESCRIPTION Joint Task Force of U.S. military personnel deployed to Nairobi following U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Security personnel deployed to Nairobi and Dares Salaam for U.S. embassy and citizen security. Thirty U.S. military personnel deployed to augment security at U.S. embassy and to evacuate U.S. citizens and employees due to political instability and civil unrest.
where in addition to preventing the slave trade, an additional objective was to discourage piracy. The other two instances of using force during the 19th century, both for civilian purposes, occurred during the second half of the century. In August 1851, at Johanns Island on the East Coast of Africa, U.S. forces from the sloop Dale restored the unlawful imprisonment of the captain of an American whaling brig. On March 1, 1860, American residents at Kissembo, in Portuguese Angola, solicited the help, in protecting both their lives and property, of the U.S. and Britain during a rebellion with Africans. For more than a century hereafter, U.S. use of force in sub Saharan Africa was absent. The Congo crisis, which followed in the wake of Belgium hastily conferring independence upon the Congo, ushered in U.S. use of force in subSaharan Africa during the 20th century. Although force would only be used on fourteen occasions during the 20th century, the U.S. intervention in the Congo during 1964 was symptomatic of where the U.S. government would exert its efforts during the Cold War. Again, in 1967, 1978, and 1991, the U.S. intervened in the Congo (renamed Zaire after 1971) in support of Mobutu Sese Seko’s (formerly General JosephDesire Mobutu) kleptocracy that had aligned itself with the West during the Cold War. The remaining ten instances of U.S. intervention in subSaharan Africa during the 20th century occurred in West Africa (1990, 1992, 1996, 1997, 1998), East Africa (1994, 1996, 1998), and Equatorial Africa (1997), respectively. U.S. rationale in all instances was to protect American citizens and occasionally thirdcountry nationals because of political instability and associated civil unrest. U.S. Intervention: Founding of U.S. to 1950 During the 18th and 19th centuries, two major branches of American maritime trade linked the U.S. with Africa and periodically resulted in American intervention to protect both routes as well as its citizens engaged in the trade. The Mediterranean branch of American economic interest in Africa during the 18th century was dwarfed, in terms of value, by the Zanzibar trade, which began as
Page 254 a trickle in the early 19th century but gradually gained momentum culminating in a flood on the eve of the Civil War. As early as 1770, the U. S. Mediterranean trade with the Barbary states was valued at 900,000 pounds sterling and included as many as 100 ships and 1,200 seamen. Despite U.S. diplomatic efforts, beginning in Morocco in June 1876, to protect American trade from piracy, the U.S. Navy had to be called upon to provide stability to trade in the wake of the Barbary Wars. The Zanzibar trade network was far more important to the U.S., measured in terms of value and volume of trade. One measure of the importance of the U.S. participation in the Zanzibar trade is the reference to calico in Swahili as Amerikani or Merikani. American calico was prized for loincloth material within the hinterland of coastal East Africa. During the first half of the 19th century, American merchants played a dominant role in trade between Zanzibar and Salem, Massachusetts. This trade network should not be thought of as a simple linear SalemZanzibar affair. More accurately, American merchants were plying the waters of the Indian Ocean in a trade network that extended from Madagascar in the southern Indian Ocean to Zanzibar Island off the coast of Kenya and extended eastward to India. Despite the involvement of American merchants during the first half of the 19th century, the U.S. government had limited economic and no political interests in Africa. Although the U.S. had entered a trade treaty with Said ibn Sultan of Muscat, the ruler of Zanzibar, on June 30, 1834 (which essentially gave America most favored nation trade status), the secretary of state left the daytoday administration of American interests in East Africa to Captain J. G. Waters, who served as the American consular officer. Moreover, the U.S. government did not pursue the trade treaty of 1834; rather, it was entered into at the prompting of New England merchant Edmund Roberts, who was frustrated with hindrances to profitable trade. In short, the U.S. government was pulled into Africa because of the economic interests of a handful of its citizens on the eastern seaboard. The U.S. responded by signing a trade treaty with the sultan that would be enforced by Waters at the Consular Office. Generally, the U.S. took a handsoff approach and concentrated on protecting its interests in the Western Hemisphere through enforcing the Monroe Doctrine of 1824. There is only one instance of the U.S. government flexing its muscles regarding Indian Ocean trade and whaling activity involving American citizens during the 19th century. In August 1851, at Johanns Island, part of the Comoros Island group, the U.S. used forces from the American warship Dale to free the captain of an American whaling brig who had been unlawfully imprisoned. In addition to these maritime economic interests, the U.S. also developed commercial interests in the African interior during the late 19th century. American attention to the potential commercial opportunities of the populous Congo Free State were first brought to light through the writing of Henry Morton Stanley in the 1870s. This resulted in the New York Chamber of Commerce and other trade groups lobbying the U.S. government to open the Belgian Congo to U.S. traders.
Page 255 U.S. Intervention: 1950 to 1958 Two periods are identifiable in U.S. intervention in subSaharan Africa during the second half of the 20th century. In both periods, containment of the Soviet Union was the primary foreign policy consideration. During the first period, from 1950 to 1958, the U.S. had to grapple with the socalled “colonial question” and second, after 1958, the U.S. had to learn to deal with newly independent African countries. Franklin D. Roosevelt ushered in the most decisive shift in U.S. policy toward intervention in the Western Hemisphere as well as in U.S. colonial policy. During the early 1940s disagreements between the U.S. and Western Europeans arose over the interpretation of the Atlantic Charter, particularly as it related to self determination. Roosevelt opposed colonialism because it represented economic protectionism and would ultimately lead to conflict both within colonies and between colonial powers over demands for selfdetermination and competition for resources. Moreover, Roosevelt was appalled at the abysmal quality of life he observed in British Gambia and French Morocco while on route to the Casablanca Conference early in 1943. Although Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull pursued the anticolonial cause with more vigor than their predecessors, their language on selfdetermination was still peppered with qualifiers. To make matters worse, the image of America, in African eyes, as a defender of European colonialism in the first decade after World War II was lent credence by the language of U.S. public policy statements. For example, while on a visit to eight African capital cities that coincided with Ghana’s independence in 1957, Vice President Richard Nixon did not endear himself to Africans when he spoke of the “battle for men’s minds” which smacked of paternalism. Mason Sears heralded the elimination of these qualified statements for African independence during the 1950s when he served as the U.S. representative on the UN Trusteeship Council for eight years. The flashpoint came following Sears’s inclusion on a fourmember UN Trusteeship Council mission to East Africa in 1954, to determine the viability of timetables for attainment of independence for African states. Previously, in 1952 and 1953, the U.S. had abstained from voting on UN resolutions that had adopted a tenyear timetable for the attainment of independence, and pressured countries who administered UN Trusteeship’s to provide timetables for projected attainment dates. Publicly and in UN resolutions, the U.S. opposed decolonization in Africa because European colonial masters, who opposed setting timetables for African independence, were U.S. partners in the NATO alliance that served as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in Europe. Sears embarrassed the U.S. government when in 1954 he voted in favor of a twenty to twentyfiveyear timetable for RuandaUrundi independence and a shorter timetable for Tanganyika. Sears was instructed by the U.S. to inform the UN Trusteeship Council that his personal view on the attainment question differed from that of the U.S. government. This resulted in a 2–2 vote on the
Page 256 attainment question. Since the Trusteeship Council was divided, the timetable resolution came to naught. Following the independence of Ghana in 1957, the first country in subSaharan Africa to do so, U.S. policy shifted from selfdetermination to ensuring that elite African leaders did not embrace socialism as a remedy for post independent socioeconomic ills. Ghana’s charismatic Kwame Nkrumh’s PanAfricanist vision, peppered with socialist rhetoric, made the U.S. uneasy following Ghana’s independence. The Cold War was shifting to the developing world and to some extent the establishment of a Bureau of African Affairs readied the U.S. to counter Soviet expansion in subSaharan Africa. U.S. Intervention: 1958 to the Present Following his visit to Ghana on March 6, 1957, VicePresident Richard Nixon recommended to President Eisenhower that a separate Bureau of African Affairs be created within the U.S. Department of State. The Bureau was in place on August 20, 1958. Eight years earlier George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, had made the first major American foreign policy statement regarding U.S. interest in Africa. Prior to McGhee’s Oklahoma City speech, the only other major African policy statement was a historical rendition of American relations in Africa by Henry S. Villard, Assistant Chief in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, in August 1943. The creation of an African Bureau was probably also influenced by Nikita Khrushchev’s declaration of Soviet support for wars of national liberation in the developing world in 1950s. In subSaharan Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo is pivotal to understanding U.S. intervention in the region during the 20th century. Aside from the importance of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s relative location, as well as its natural resources already referred to, Wallerstein contended that these were secondary to Zaire’s economic importance to the U.S. within the world economy. In short, the Democratic Republic of Congo is considered the springboard into Southern Africa for U.S. economic benefit. The Democratic Republic of Congo is the linchpin to understanding U.S. intervention in subSaharan Africa during the Cold War. Three of the four U.S. military interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo were motivated by geopolitical Cold War considerations under the Johnson (1964 and 1967) and Carter (1978) administrations. The fourth U.S. intervention was in September 1991 during the Bush administration. Following civil unrest in Kinshasa, U.S. C141s transported 100 Belgian soldiers and equipment to Kinshasa, 300 French soldiers to the Central African Republic, and U.S. citizens and thirdcountry nationals from locations outside of Zaire. This 1991 intervention occurred on the eve of the conclusion of the Cold War, by which time the proWestern Mobutu regime, coddled during the height of the containment years of the Cold War, had become expendable. Zairian rioting and looting in the capital were symptoms of the bankruptcy of his Westernsponsored dictatorship since his
Page 257 1965 coup d’état. Mobutu was marking tenuous time following his thirtyyearplus role as a pawn of the West, which finally expired in May 1997 when Laurent Kabila replaced him as head of state. The Democratic Republic of Congo was the ideal African country for the West to befriend as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism, given its size (about a quarter the size of the U.S.); its relative location in equatorial Africa, sharing borders with nine African countries; its holding the key to the door to Southern Africa, for both economic as well as geopolitical reasons; and its great wealth of strategic mineral resources. Prior to the U.S. overt intervention in 1964, Belgium and the U.S., in concert with the UN, spearheaded by Sovietphobic Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld, had consistently covertly, during the Congo crisis, undermined the legitimate Congolese government of Patrice Lumumba following independence from Belgium in July 1960. Following chaotic social unrest and the secession of copperrich Katanga (Shaba) province, led by Moise Tshombe and aided by the Belgian military’s unilateral intervention, in the southern part of the Congo, Lumumba appealed to the UN to remove Belgian troops from his country. When the UN dragged its feet in July 1960, Lumumba turned to the Soviet Union, who provided logistical support including aircraft, trucks, and supplies. Hammarskjöld and the U.S. interpreted this as Lumumba inviting communism into the heart of Africa. The U.S. was preoccupied with containing Soviet expansion because, starting with the Sovietsponsored invasion of South Korea between 1950 and 1952, the Soviets were shifting their focus from the satellite states of Eastern Europe to other parts of the developing world, including Indochina (1960s and 1970s) and Africa (Congo in 1960s and Angola in mid1970s). The two events that probably propelled the U.S. to become involved in containing Soviet expansion in the Congo were the Berlin crisis (1958 to 1963) and the Soviet Union’s commitment to support wars of national liberation in the developing world during the 1950s and 1960s. Both events were the brainchild of Nikita Khrushchev, who issued two lame ultimatums to the West in the case of Berlin, and in early 1961 described wars of national liberation as sacred. Since Lumumba was regarded as an instrument of Soviet expansion, the West eventually had him removed as prime minister, supported his late1960 arrest and imprisonment, and his execution by authorities of the secessionist Katanga province in January 1961. During the Eisenhower administration the CIA had plotted to kill him by placing cobra venom, prepared by CIA scientist Sidney Gottlied, in his food or toothpaste. Following his arrest by the Congolese military, the West turned a blind eye when Lumumba’s captors transferred him from Thysville (MbanzaNgungu), just south of Kinshasa, to Elisabethville (Lubumbashi), in Katanga (Shaba) province. By June 1964, when the UN troops left the Congo, the U.S., operating from under the UN umbrella, ensured that influential Lumumbists were sidelined from the political scene. Other Lumumbists went into exile in Brazzaville where the insurgent Conseil National de Liberation (CNL) was established as a vehicle for attempting to regain power in
Page 258 the Congo. It is against this backdrop that, in 1964, the first overt U.S. intervention in the Congo is to be understood. Following the departure of the UN, Lumumbists mounted popular insurrections for a ‘‘second independence” centered on Kwilu in the eastern part of the Congo. By August 4, 1964, with aid from China, the CNL occupied Stanleyville, proclaimed a People’s Republic, and was in control of almost half of the Congo’s territory. These developments drew the U.S. and Belgium into the fray in June and November 1964. In June, President Johnson provided U.S. transport planes and paratroopers to assist the ailing Congolese government. Furthermore, the U.S. also provided the proWestern Congolese government at Leopoldville with a small air force operated by the CIA and registered in Lichtenstein as Western International Ground Maintenance Organization (WIGMO). By the end of 1964 the Congolese army and mercenaries who received logistical support from the U.S., Belgium, and Israel had defeated the CNL insurgents. On November 24, 1964, the U.S. sent planes to drop Belgian paratroopers on Stanleyville and Paulis, in the northwestern part of the country, with the goal of rescuing whites from the conflict area. The real purpose, however, was to recapture strongholds from the CNL. The Congo crisis (1960–1965) was brought to closure on November 24, 1965 when Mobutu staged a successful, U.S.supported coup d’état following Tshombe’s inability to end the Congo political crisis. During Mobutu’s regime (1965–1997) the U.S. intervened in Zaire, renamed by Mobutu in 1971, to save Mobutu from Lumumbist nationalists in 1967 and 1978. In 1967 the U.S. sent 3 C130s and support personnel to aid the Zairian army in its successful campaign against mutinied mercenary and former Katanga gendarme units. In the late 1970s, Mobutu was twice threatened by the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FLNC). The FLNC was an insurgent group of a few thousand lightly armed Zairian exiles, operating from Angola, who invaded Katanga (Shaba) in 1977 (Shaba I) and 1978 (Shaba II). President Carter was not prepared to help Zaire during Shaba I, so Mobutu turned to Morocco and France for assistance. When FLNC insurgents invaded from Angola for a second time in May and June 1978, and captured the mining center of Kolwezi, the U.S. intervened in conjunction with France and Belgium. From May 19 through June 1978, the U.S. provided logistical support with military transport aircraft to Belgian paratroopers and French Foreign Legion units who had been landed in Kolwezi. Notwithstanding Zaire, the U.S. has intervened in subSaharan Africa on ten other occasions during the 20th century, namely, in Liberia (1990, 1996, and 1998), Sierra Leone (1992 and 1997), Rwanda (1994 and 1996), Congo and Gabon (1997), GuineaBissau (1998), Kenya (1998–1999) and Tanzania (1998). In the majority of instances, the U.S. used its military to evacuate American citizens following political and/or civil unrest in each country, including a coup in Sierra Leone in May 1992. In the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the U.S. deployed combatequipped military troops to neighboring Burundi in April to assist in the evacuation of both U.S. citizens as well as other thirdcountry
Page 259 nationals. Of these ten interventions, the Rwandan genocide and KenyanTanzanian embassy terrorist bombings have received the lion’s share of the coverage in print as well as television press. In Rwanda, the spark that ignited the conflict that resulted in the death of more than 750,000 people in three months in 1994 was the shooting down of Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana’s airplane. Although there is reason to believe that this act was the work of elements in the Hutu military who opposed Habyarimana’s reformist ideas, the Hutu military went on the offensive against the Tutsis, who constitute about 15 percent of Rwanda’s 7.8 million inhabitants, as well as moderate Hutus. By July 1994, however, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), an insurgent Tutsidominated group in Uganda, had taken control of the capital, Kigali. This caused 2 million Hutus to flee, resulting in 1 million Rwandans being exiled and another 2.5 million having to crowd into “safe zones” in neighboring countries. It should be underscored that what has been labeled the Rwanda genocide was not simply polarized Hutus killing polarized Tutsis—simply ethnic differences. Although the Tutsis bore the brunt of the Hutu military’s wrath, many Hutus who supported Habyarimana’s democratization and reconciliation initiatives were also killed. The most significant effort at reconciliation is the RPF’s creation of a provisional government in Kagili whose leadership includes both Hutus and Tutsis. SubSaharan Africa has never been and probably will never be of national interest to the U.S. Just as the region’s pecking order, in terms of U.S. foreign policy, has waxed and waned during the last 200odd years, so that dynamism appears to be shifting toward the waning part of the continuum during the post– Cold War period. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of integrating Africa into the global economy, U.S. foreign policy toward the region will probably be lukewarm and military intervention limited as Structural Adjustment Programs supersede containment as the West’s highest priority in the developing world. Toward this end, the U.S. will seek to facilitate both democracy and economic reform in its policy toward leaders of African countries. It is expected that the U.S. will not advocate democracy and economic reform in tandem. Rather, the U.S. will likely support leaders of countries like Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings, who, following his ascension to political power through a coup in 1981, has embraced tough economic reforms with the blessing of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Moreover, the West led by the U.S. appears to be retreating from UN peacekeeping operations. In the future it is expected that UN peacekeeping operations will be limited to Europe as a Cold War hangover, while the West will continue to advocate building an African “peacekeeping capacity” through vehicles like the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The U.S. will also, however, continue to unilaterally intervene in Africa in order to protect U.S. employees and citizens, as has been the case in the last five interventions in subSaharan Africa, highlighted by the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. See Angola; Constructive Engagement; Proxy War.
Page 260 FOR FURTHER READING Arkhurst, Frederick S., ed. 1975. U.S. Policy toward Africa. New York: Praeger. Barkan, Joel D., and David F. Gordon. 1998. “Democracy in Africa: No Time to Forsake It.” Foreign Affairs (July/August):107–11. Bender, G. J., J. S. Coleman, and R. L. Sklar, eds. 1985. African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy. Berkeley: University of California Press. Krieger, Joel, ed. 1993. The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. New York: Oxford University Press. McKay, Vernon. 1963. Africa in World Politics. New York: Harper and Row. Rodman, Peter W. 1994. More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Darrell P. Kruger
Agenda Setting; Media; Public Opinion. FOR FURTHER READING Ball, Moya Ann. 1994. “The Phantom of the Oval Office: The John F. Kennedy Assassination’s Symbolic Impact on Lyndon B. Johnson, His Key Advisers, and the Vietnam DecisionMaking Process.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 24:105–19. Bostdorff, Denise M. 1994. The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Bostdorff, Denise M., and Steven R. Goldzwig. 1994. “Idealism and Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy Rhetoric: The Case of John F. Kennedy and Vietnam.’’ Presidential Studies Quarterly 24:515–30. Denton, Robert E., Jr. 1982. The Symbolic Dimensions of the American Presidency: Description and Analysis. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Nimmo, Dan, and James E. Combs. 1980. Subliminal Politics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. 1990. The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Steven B. Redd
SYSTEMATIC MOTIVATIONS—A motivation for a foreign policy action or stance whose primary motivation is the maintenance of global security and the stability of the international system. These motivations are particularly im
Page 261 portant for hegemonic powers that benefit from the preservation of the existing international structure and are therefore willing to expend resources to preserve it. See Power Politics. FOR FURTHER READING Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Eugene Wittkopf. 1985. World Politics: Trend and Transformation. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
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T Ho Chi Minh; Viet Cong. FOR FURTHER READING Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Spanier, John, and Steven W. Hook. 1998. American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 14th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. James Heasley
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Page 264 FOR FURTHER READING Camp, Roderic. 1999. Politics in Mexico: The Decline of Authoritarianism, 3d ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Krauze, Enrique. 1998. Mexico: Biography of Power. A History of Modern Mexico, 1810–1996, trans. Hank Heifetz. New York: HarperPerennial. James Henson
Middle East. FOR FURTHER READING Irwin, R. W. 1931. The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776–1816. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Kitzen, Michael L. S 1993. Tripoli and the United States at War: A History of American Relations with the Barbary States, 1785–1805. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. Wright, Louis B., and Julia MacLeod. 1945. The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton’s Struggle for a Vigorous Policy Against the Barbary Pirates, 1799–1805. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ahmed H. Ibrahim
Cold War; Power Politics. FOR FURTHER READING Jones, Joseph M. 1955. The Fifteen Weeks. New York: Viking Press. Spanier, John, and Steven W. Hook. 1998. American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 14th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. James Heasley
Page 265 TWO PRESIDENCIES—The two presidencies hypothesis states that presidents are more successful in Congress in foreign and defense policy than in domestic policy. The hypothesis is based on diplomatic, military, and informational powers of the president, which are greater than any other American political institution. Aaron Wildavsky, the first to notice this apparent difference in presidential success across policy areas, examined data from the bipartisan era of the 1950s and 1960s, prior to the resurgence of Congress in foreign policy. Using data from the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, Wildavsky found that presidents had greater levels of success in foreign and defense policy. Recent scholarship examining the two presidencies hypothesis questions Wildavsky’s original findings of presidential advantage in foreign policy. Scholars, including Edwards and Fleischer et al., have analyzed the rollcall data and concluded that the two presidencies do not exist after Vietnam, or only exist for Republican presidents. Other analysts have modified Wildavsky’s hypotheses; however, the data do not support the original expectations. Although a consensus exists among most foreign policy scholars that presidents have distinct advantages in foreign policy, observers of the legislative process have not shown a clear link between these advantages and legislative success. Since most decisions surrounding the use of force occur outside of the legislative process, it is unclear how the two presidencies relate to questions of presidential use of force. It is clear, however, that presidents do not dominate the Legislative Branch in foreign policy, an assumption international scholars make again and again. See Congress; Presidential Success. FOR FURTHER READING Edwards, George C. III. 1989. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. Hew Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Fleisher, Richard, Jon R. Bond, Glen S. Krutz, and Stephen Hanna. 2000. “The Demise of the Two Presidencies.” American Politics Quarterly 28: forthcoming. Shull, Steven A., ed. 1991. The Two Presidencies: A QuarterCentury Assessment. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Wildavsky, Aaron. 1966. “The Two Presidencies.” TransAction 4:7–14. Jeffrey S. Peake
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U Ethics; Multilateralism. FOR FURTHER READING Haass, Richard. 1994. Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post– Cold War World. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND ZIMBABWEAN INDEPENDENCE—The Rhodesian Front government of Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesian independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965, after almost two years of pernicious discussions with Britain following the collapse of the Central African Federation. The Federation included Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Rhodesia and later Zimbabwe), and Nyasaland (Malawi). Zambia and Malawi obtained independence in 1964. At the time of the UDI, the U.S. was concerned with the infiltration of communism into subSaharan Africa in general, and Southern Africa in particular. The mineral wealth of Southern Africa and its strategic importance to the U.S. was underscored by a visit to Zaire, Zambia, Rhodesia, and South Africa by the Congressional Committee on Strategic Minerals and Mining who referred to the
Page 268 area as “the Persian Gulf of strategic minerals of our earth,’’ including gold, diamonds, platinum, and chrome. Initially the U.S., with prodding from Britain, supported the oil embargo imposed against Rhodesia by the British Labor government in return for Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s support for the U.S. Vietnam policy. The U.S. also refrained from buying highquality Rhodesian tobacco and by 1968 had cut off the shipment of motor assembly plant supplies as well as transport, tractor, and farming machinery, although France and Japan filled the vacuum in the market. The example of Rhodesian chrome ore illustrates the disadvantage to the U.S. in supporting economic sanctions. Zimbabwe has highquality chrome ore along the Great Dyke between Harare and Bulawayo. In the context of sanctions, an American consortium that owned and mined ore at Selukwe was precluded from making shipments to the U.S. Shipments of Rhodesian chrome ore were traced to the Soviet Union and it was learned that the Russians were selling lowergrade ore to the U.S. at double the price that they were buying it from Rhodesia. So by January 1971, six years after the imposition of Rhodesian sanctions under the new Strategic Materials Act, the U.S. ceased its moratorium on importing Rhodesian chrome. With Mozambican and Angolan independence looming, coupled with the possibility of Marxists taking over the reigns of government, the U.S. continued to exert political influence in Southern Africa. In August 1974, President Ford agreed to support South Africa’s planned incursion into Angola against the Marxist MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and their FAPLA (Armed Forces for the Popular Liberation of Angola) military wing, if South African Prime Minister John Vorster agreed to withdraw South African policemen who were aiding the Rhodesians in their fight against ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) terrorist attacks from bases in neighboring Mozambique and Zambia, respectively. Moreover, during the Ford administration the U.S. overtly aided the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) financially and militarily in 1974 and 1975 against the MPLA. Following the Portuguese military coup in April 1974, which led to Mozambique’s and Angola’s independence, Vorster embarked upon a policy of detente with influential Organization of African Unity (OAU) leaders, namely, Kenneth Kuanda (Zambia) and Julius Nyrere (Tanzania). In order to win recognition for South Africa’s pariah status, Vorster attempted to bring closure to the Rhodesian problem by impressing on Ian Smith the need to move Rhodesia to majority rule. The South African government resorted to withholding badly needed armaments, fuel supplies, and military manpower to Rhodesia if it refused to go to the negotiating table. Following South Africa’s failed efforts, with the connivance of the British and the OAU to reach a negotiated settlement between the ANC (African National Council), ZAPU, ZANU, and the Rhodesian Front Government at the Falls Bridge Conference in Zambia in August 1975, Vorster turned to the U.S. in 1976 for support of his obsession with detente. South Africa used leverage with the U.S., which had pressured the South Africans to withdraw from Angola in February 1976
Page 269 when the South African Defense Force was within a day of taking Luanda. The U.S. was concerned about being seen handinglove with the racist South African government—hence the pressure against South Africa to withdraw from Angola. In September 1976, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger presented the Rhodesian Front with a proposal, the brainchild of the British, the OAU, and South Africans, that would lead to the formation of an interim government, which within two years would agree upon a new constitution for the country. The Geneva Conference where this was to be ratified by all parties failed because ZANU and ZAPU rejected Kissinger’s agreement made with Kuanda and Nyrere and the OAU leadership. This led the Rhodesian Front to negotiate and reach an agreement with the internal Rhodesian black leadership, including the African National Council (Sithole) and the United African National Council (Muzorewa), in March 1978, that was initially supported by the U.S. and Britain. While Muzorewa headed (June 1, 1979) the new Zimbabwe Rhodesia government, the dissatisfied nationalistic leaders of ZAPU (Nkomo) and ZANU (Mugabe) rejected the interim government and continued to use ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army) and ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) through terrorist acts to bring about change in Rhodesia. In early June 1979, the Carter administration indicated its rejection of Muzorewa’s interim government by deciding not to lift U.S. sanctions. Later that month three CIA agents were caught spying in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. While visiting the U.S., Muzorewa was assured by Carter that although U.S. sanctions would be lifted, Carter needed more time to consider implementation. Muzorewa agreed to release the captured CIA spies and that nothing would be made public about their capture. Although U.S. sanctions were never lifted, the U.S. and Britain, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, pressured the interim government to commit to the allparty, onemonth Lancaster House Conference in September 1979. In August, Thatcher was pressured by Nigeria and Australia at the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka not to recognize the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government. The Lancaster Conference paved the way for majority rule in Rhodesia. Governor Lord Soames arrived in Zimbabwe Rhodesia in December 1979 and, following the threeday election in February 1980, Mugabe’s ZANUPF won 57 seats, Nkomo’s ZAPU 20, and Muzorewa’s UANC 3 amidst widespread intimidation. Evidence of intimidation by ZANUPF was ignored by the West despite Foreign Office Secretary Lord Carrington’s assurance that according to the Lancaster Conference agreement, any party guilty of intimidation would be disqualified. When Ian Smith raised the issue with Governor Soames following the election, he was informed that it would be difficult to sell to the rest of the world, especially the OAU. Regrettably, Mugabe’s initial sound government has over the course of the two decades since independence degenerated into a oneparty ZANUPF dictatorship whose fiscal corruption and abject human rights record has been publicly criticized by the World Bank and Amnesty International. See Angola; SubSaharan Africa.
Page 270 FOR FURTHER READING Charlton, Michael. 1990. The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia. Oxford: Blackwell. Kissinger, Henry. 1999. Years of Renewal. New York: Simon and Schuster. Krieger, Joel, ed. 1993. The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. New York: Oxford University Press. Smith, Ian. 1998. The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith. London: Blake. Young, Crawford. 1982. Ideology and Development in Africa. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Darrell P. Kruger
Dumbarton Oaks Conference; Idealism; Multilateralism. FOR FURTHER READING Annan, Kofi. 1998. The Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization. New York: United Nations A/53/1. Bailey, Sydney D. 1995. The United Nations: A Concise Political Guide. Lanham, MD: Barnes and Noble Books. Bennett, A. Leroy. 1995. International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Luard, Evan. 1989. The United Nations: How It Works and What It Does. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan. Maurice, Betrand. 1997. The United Nations: Past, Present and Future. Dordrecht: Nijhoff. Tessitore, John, and Susan Woolfson, eds. Annual. A Global Agenda: Issues before the General Assembly of the United Nations. New York: W. W Norton. United Nations. http://www.un.org/overview/brief.html. Weiss, Thomas G., David Forsythe, and Roger Coate. 1997. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
UN CHARTER CHAPTER VI (PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES)—The founding document of the UN in which the general principles and institutional structure of the organization are set out in the charter. The concept of equal sovereignty is central among these principles. States are guaranteed this right to the extent that they fulfill their duties to the international community, including an undertaking to adhere to the principles of collective security.
Page 271 Chapter VI is the section of the charter that contains procedures for arbitrating disputes among member states. Chapter VI reads in part: The parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. See Ethics; Idealism; Multilateralism.
FOR FURTHER READING Luard, Evan. 1989. The United Nations: How It Works and What It Does. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan. Ruggie, John Gerard. 1996. The United Nations and Collective Use of Force: Whither—or Whether? New York: United Nations Association. United Nations. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/. Weiss, Thomas G., David Forsythe, and Roger Coate. 1997. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
UN CHARTER CHAPTER VII (COERCION)—Chapter VII is the section of the charter that contains specific references to sanctions and enforcement. Chapter VII reads in part: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the UN to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
If such measures prove inadequate, “the Security Council may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” See Multilateralism. FOR FURTHER READING Luard, Evan. 1989. The United Nations: How It Works and What It Does. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan. Ruggie, John Gerard. 1996. The United Nations and Collective Use of Force: Whither—or Whether? New York: United Nations Association. United Nations. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/. Weiss, Thomas G., David Forsythe, and Roger Coate. 1997. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder CO: Westview Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Page 272 Multilateralism. FOR FURTHER READING Bailey, Sydney D. 1995. The United Nations: A Concise Political Guide. Lanham, MD: Barnes and Noble Books. Bennett, A. Leroy. 1995. International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Kaufmann, Johan. 1980. United Nations Decision Making. Rockville, MD: Noordhof. Luard, Evan. 1989. The United Nations: How It Works and What It Does. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Middle East; Multilateralism. FOR FURTHER READING United Nations. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/. United Nations. 1996. The Blue Helmets. New York: United Nations. Weiss, Thomas G., David Forsythe, and Roger Coate. 1997. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
UN MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH)—In September of 1991, President JeanBertrand Aristide, the democratically elected president of Haiti, was deposed by military coup. The UN, in 1993, after receiving increasing reports of corruption and human rights abuses by the military junta, ratified Resolution 867, enacting an oil and arms embargo against Haiti. This embargo was lifted briefly after the Governor’s Island Agreement. As part of the agreement, the UN was to modernize the Haitian military and establish a professional police force. The advance team for the UNMIH attempted to land in PortauPrince but was turned away by General Raoul Cedras’ troops. In response to this action, the Security Council enacted Resolution 940 granting UN members the authority to employ “all necessary means” to remove the military from power and restore the constitutional government. Resolution 970 also increased the role of the UNMIH, expanding its objectives to include maintaining the physical security of Haiti, securing free democratic elections, and providing Interim Public Security. Less than one month after the U.S. led UN troops into Haiti, President Aristide returned from
Page 273 exile and was restored to power. The UNMIH achieved its objectives: the constitutional democracy was restored and a free election held on December 17, 1995; a new professional police force was formed; and civil order returned to Haiti. See Multilateralism. FOR FURTHER READING Weiss, Thomas G., David Forsythe, and Roger Coate. 1997. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England.
UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE IN MACEDONIA (UNDREDEP)—This UN operation was a deterrent force of international observers deployed in areas of particular tension in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in an attempt to prevent the escalations of these tensions into open conflict. After a reorganization of UN forces in the Balkans, UNPROFOR was divided into several different operations. In addition to the deployments in Bosnia, discussed above, the U.S. also made a significant contribution to the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). Part of the purpose of the reorganization was to provide more mission specificity (in terms of what each deployment was being asked to do). In the case of UNPREDEP, the purpose was preventative or deterrent. The purpose of the deployment was, through the positioning of international monitoring forces into sensitive areas, to forestall potential escalation of disputes into conflicts, mirroring the pattern in Bosnia, Croatia, and later Kosovo. In March 1999, the U.S. and NATO launched a concerted air campaign against the Yugoslav (Serb) Republic. This was in response to Serbian paramilitary operations in the predominantly Albanian region of Kosovo, where there was an ongoing conflict between Yugoslav forces and forces of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army). The Serbian operations were causing substantial and apparently deliberate civilian casualties and massive dislocation of population. Subsequent investigations revealed a deliberate campaign of terror and “ethnic cleansing’’ against the Albanian population, for which evidence was presented to the war crimes tribunal in the Hague. Although actual operations were confined to airpower, the U.S. deployed significant numbers of ground troops and helicopter support forces to the region, including reinforcing U.S. units already deployed in Albania and Macedonia. These operations concluded with the negotiated withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and a NATOled multilateral “protective” force being deployed into the region, to ensure the safety of the region’s population and assist in reconstruction. See Europe; Multilateralism; Yugoslavia. FOR FURTHER READING Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall.
Page 274 United Nations. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/. United Nations. 1996. The Blue Helmets. New York: United Nations. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Multilateralism; United Nations. FOR FURTHER READING Kaufmann, Johan. 1980. United Nations Decision Making. Rockville MD: Noordhof. Luard, Evan. 1989. The United Nations: How It Works and What It Does. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan. United Nations. http://www.un.org/aboutun/. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Middle East; Multilateralism. FOR FURTHER READING Schlachter, Oscar. 1991. “United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict.” American Journal of International Law 85:452–73. Weston, Burns H. 1991. “Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy.” American Journal of International Law 85:516–35. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
United Nations; UN Charter Chapter VI; UN Charter Chapter VII. FOR FURTHER READING Bennett, A. Leroy. 1995. International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 6th ed. Englewood NJ: Ciffs, PrenticeHall. Kaufmann, Johan. 1980. United Nations Decision Making. Rockville MD: Noordhof. Luard, Evan. 1989. The United Nations: How It Works and What It Does. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan.
Page 275 Tessitore, John, and Susan Woolfson, eds. Annual. A Global Agenda. Issues before the General Assembly of the United Nations. New York: W. W. Norton. United Nations. http://www.un.org/aboutun/. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
UN TASK FORCE (UNITAF), UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I), AND UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA II (UNOSOM II)—UNITAF was a U.S.led multinational force in Somalia that had been authorized to establish a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance in Mogadishu and its environs. The mission was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 751 (1992). In essence, the mission involved establishing the rule of law. In November and December of 1992, the U.S. deployed troops into Somalia as part of a force whose mission was the protection of UN workers already in the country, who were working to mitigate the effects of drought and food shortages caused primarily by the warfare which had destroyed the country. The cause of this conflict was a struggle between competing “warlords’’ for control of Mogadishu and other major towns. The successful transfer to nonmilitary operations was never achieved. The death toll from the conflict, and the conflictexacerbated shortages of food and water were significant, yet the response from the international community had been minimal. The deployment had the dual objective of guaranteeing Somalia’s ports as a point of entry for muchneeded supplies and, once that was achieved, to seek to establish order in Mogadishu and the surrounding countryside. After meeting with initial success in these goals, the Clinton administration began a gradual withdrawal of forces. In part, this reduction was spurred by the deaths of several U.S. servicemen. In response to attacks of their personnel by forces loyal to General Adid, UNOSOM II undertook the forcible disarming of the factions. They were supported in this by U.S. Rangers and members of the Quick Reaction Force. These U.S. forces remained under American control, although their operations were directly in support of UNOSOM. It was on one of these missions, in October 1993, that two U.S. helicopters were shot down and seventeen U.S. soldiers were killed and seventyfive wounded. The domestic pressure for withdrawal mounted in direct relation to the number of casualties the U.S. forces suffered; the horrific pictures of a dead U.S. Ranger being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by members of one of the warring factions served to utterly demolish support for the mission, which had been so important in initiating the deployment. The Clinton administration both accelerated the withdrawal of troops and began to rethink the whole relationship between the U.S. and UN multilateral activities. The negative response to the Somalia operation on the part of both public opinion and many politicians within the U.S. had considerable knockon effects for the U.S. relationship with the UN. The failure of the operation in Somalia led many to question the UNfocused multilateralism, which had been an increasingly important component both of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. military operations in the 1990s. The New (multilateral) World Order appeared to
Page 276 be in danger due to domestic U.S. opposition to further “entanglement” in “UN” operations. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (May 1994), issued as the administration’s response to Somalia, threw into question any future commitment of U.S. troops to operations of this nature. See Multilateralism. FOR FURTHER READING Bennett, A. Leroy. 1995. International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Crocker, Chester. 1995. “The Lessons of Somalia.” Foreign Affairs 74:2–9. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Ruggie, John. 1996. The United Nations and Collective Uses of Force: Whither—or Whether? New York: United Nations Association. United Nations. www.un.org/aboutun/. Weiss, Thomas G., David Forsythe, and Roger Coate. 1997. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
UN TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL—UN organ charged with the monitoring and oversight of territories under UN mandate (non–selfgoverning territories). The main tools available to the council in administering these territories are set out under Articles 87–88. The Trusteeship Council was particularly important in managing the process of decolonization in the 1960s but currently is almost without responsibilities. See United Nations. FOR FURTHER READING Bailey, Sydney D. 1995. The United Nations: A Concise Political Guide. Lanham, MD: Barnes and Noble Books. Bennett, A. Leroy. 1995. International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. United Nations. http://www.un.org/aboutun/. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
Congress; Constitution.
Page 277 FOR FURTHER READING Bell, Derrick, Jr. 1997. Constitutional Conflicts. Cincinnati: Anderson. Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Lively, Donald, Phoebe Hadden, Dorothy Roberts, and Russell Weaver. 1996. Constitutional Law: Cases, History, and Dialogues. Cincinnati: Anderson. Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Tarr. 1999. American Constitutional Law. New York: St. Martin’s Press. U.S. v. CurtissWright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Paul Weizer
Diversionary Theory; Presidential Approval; Public Opinion; Rally ’round the Flag. FOR FURTHER READING Allport, Gordon. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley. Rothbart, Myron. 1993. ‘‘Intergroup Perception and Social Conflict.” In Conflict between People and Groups, ed. Stephen Worchel and Jeffry Simpson . Chicago: NelsonHall. Jill Glathar
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V Ho Chi Minh; Tet Offensive. FOR FURTHER READING Dixon, Joe C., ed. 1980. The American Military and the Far East. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Spanier, John, and Steven W. Hook. 1998. American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 14th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. Sara Jezewski
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W Latin America and the Caribbean. FOR FURTHER READING Cusimano, Maryann. 2000. Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s. Chris McDonald and Melanie Gregg England
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION—In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution. The purpose of this resolution was to ensure the collective judgment of the Congress as well as the president in using force abroad. The resolution would allow the president the flexibility needed to deal with emergencies and protect American interests, but return Congress to the role of having the final say of whether to take the nation into any sustained military conflict. The main provisions of this joint resolution include: that the president, whenever possible, should consult with Congress before using troops; after sending troops the president is required to report to Congress within fortyeight hours, and unless Con
Page 282 gress approves of the presidential use of force within sixty days, the troops must be removed. Despite the intentions of this resolution or its legality, the results have not been much different than what existed prior to its passage. No president has ever fully complied with the stipulations of the act and no use of force has ever been cut short under its provisions. While a variety of factors could explain this behavior, the role of the courts has been pivotal in allowing for continuing presidential dominance in this area. See Congress; Constitution. FOR FURTHER READING Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Grimmett, Richard F. 1996. “The War Powers Resolution: TwentyTwo Years of Experience.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report. Grimmett, Richard F. 1999. ‘‘Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Paul Weizer
WEINBERGER DOCTRINE—Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger articulated his doctrine on the use of force in a speech made before the National Press Club in 1984. The speech was made in the wake of the deaths of 239 Marines in Lebanon. The overall tone of the speech was to urge caution in the use of force. The Vietnam experience also shaped this doctrine, in which he developed six points: 1. It must be a matter that is “vital to our national interest”; 2. If troops are sent, we should be committed to victory; 3. We should have “clearly defined political and military objectives”; 4. The “relationship between our objectives and the forces … must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary”; 5. Before the U.S. uses force, “there must be some reassurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress”; 6. The commitment of troops to combat “should be a last resort.” The Weinberger Doctrine was controversial and was, at least in part, openly opposed by others such as George Shultz. See Domestic Politics; Public Opinion; Shultz Doctrine. FOR FURTHER READING Daggett, Stephen, and Nina Serafino. 1995. “The Use of Force: Key Statements by Weinberger, Shultz, Aspin, Bush, Powell, Albright, and Perry.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report.
Page 283 Haass, Richard. 1994. Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post– Cold War World. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hastedt, Glenn P. 2000. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. Karl R. DeRouen, Jr.
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Y Constitution. FOR FURTHER READING Bell, Derrick, Jr. 1997. Constitutional Conflicts. Cincinnati: Anderson. Fisher, Louis. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Gunther, Gerald. 1991. Constitutional Law, 12th ed. Westbury, NY: The Foundation Press. Kellerman, Barbara, and Ryan J. Barilleaux. 1991. The President as World Leader.New York: St. Martin’s Press. Keynes, Edward W. 1982. Undeclared War: Twilight Zones of Constitutional Power. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. Kozak, David C., and Kenneth N. Ciboski. 1985. The American Presidency: A Policy Perspective from Readings and Documents. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Lively, Donald, Phoebe Hadden, Dorothy Roberts, and Russell Weaver. 1996. Constitutional Law: Cases, History, and Dialogues. Cincinnati: Anderson.
Page 286 Rossum, Ralph A., and G. Alan Tarr. 1999. American Constitutional Law. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Paul Weizer
YUGOSLAVIA—On March 24, 1999, for the first time in NATO’s history, NATO forces (led by the U.S.) launched offensive air strikes against a sovereign country. The target was Slobodan Milosevic and his Serbian forces in the former Yugoslavia. Since 1989, the Serbs had been undertaking a campaign to rid Yugoslavia of its many ethnic minorities. The stated goal of NATO’s attacks was to stop the “ethnic cleansing’’ of the Albanian ethnic majority in Kosovo, a province of Yugoslavia, by Slobodan Milosevic, the leader of the Serbian government in Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito successfully broke away from the control of the Soviet Union after World War II. Although Yugoslavia consisted of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Albanians, and other ethnic groups, as well as Muslims, Christians, and other religious groups, Tito was able to successfully unify this large and ethnically and religiously diverse population. Although Tito used repressive tactics to keep the various ethnic and religious groups in check, and despite the fact that Yugoslavia in no way retreated from its commitment to Marxism, the U.S. found itself in the uncomfortable position of supporting a communist Yugoslavia in an effort to counter the influence of the Soviet Union. At the time of Tito’s death, Yugoslavia consisted of many republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina, BosniaHerzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro, all of which enjoyed some measure of autonomy, but were still part of Yugoslavia proper. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, the fear of a possible Soviet takeover vanished. Subsequently, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia broke up in January 1990. Naturally, the autonomous regions felt as if they could govern themselves instead of relying on Belgrade to dictate political positions. In January 1991, the communists were ousted in Croatia and Slovenia and the move was on for independence. Croatia and Slovenia subsequently declared independence on June 25, 1991. Serbia, the largest of the six republics and still Marxist, under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, attempted to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia by seeking political, economic, and eventually military control of the country. Milosevic fomented nationalist sentiment and managed to consolidate Serbian power in Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Serbia, which gave him formal control of three of the eight republics, instead of his previous one in Serbia (informally, he could also count on Montenegro, giving him control of four). Of course, the dissolution of the Yugoslav republic was also a cause for great concern in the international community because of the complex issues of sovereignty, borders, ethnicity, diplomatic recognition, and selfdetermination. Relatively speaking, Slovenia rather easily seceded from the Yugoslav republic mainly because there was no significant Serbian minority in Slovenia. The
Page 287 same could not be said about Croatia or BosniaHerzegovina, and the problems in both republics led to the first involvement of U.S. force in the region. Croatia consisted of ethnic Croats and Serbs, and BosniaHerzegovina consisted of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims as well as other ethnic and religious groups. The Serbs, under guidance from Milosevic, and with the cooperation of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), moved to quash the Croatian independence movement in May 1991. The European Union was unable to stop the bloodshed, prompting the UN Security Council to call upon the Secretary General to intervene. The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed in early 1992 to implement the “Vance Plan,” named for former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. In essence, the Vance Plan called for the complete withdrawal of the JNA and other Serbian military forces from Croatia. The Vance Plan was relatively successful in bringing the conflict in Croatia under control; although tensions remained high and incidents of noncompliance were widespread. In Croatia, the Croatian army was quite able to defend itself and its territory and was able to repel Serb advances on many fronts. In contrast, in Bosnia Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serbs and the JNA accelerated the violence against Bosnian Croats and especially against the Bosnian Muslims, and were able to forcibly remove, intimidate, and even kill with impunity in order to create ethnically pure Serb enclaves. Serb forces eventually managed to conquer roughly twothirds of the republic, but failed to force the official leadership in Sarajevo to capitulate to Serbian terms. On April 7, 1992, the U.S. and the European Community (EC) recognized Bosnia, hoping that such action would stabilize the political situation. It did not. UNPROFOR II was created to help assure the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, UNPROFOR’s credibility deteriorated because it tried to provide impartial humanitarian assistance while at the same time adopting a partisan stance in order to provide safe areas for Muslims under attack. Finally, NATO, under U.S. direction, began to directly address the ethnic violence occurring in BosniaHerzegovina in the spring of 1994. The Serbs stopped their bombardment of various sites under threat of NATO air attacks. The CroatMuslim war ended by means of a UNbrokered ceasefire and a U.S.sponsored peace plan. The war in BosniaHerzegovina continued, with the fivenation Contact Group (U.S., Germany, France, Great Britain, and Russia) issuing an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to cease hostilities or face military action. The offer was rejected and throughout the rest of 1994, the Bosnian Serbs continued to violate Bosnia’s safe areas, even at one point abducting UN troops and taking UN hostages. By the end of 1994, Bosnia had been at war for over two and a half years. An estimated 200,000 people had been killed and there were approximately 2 million refugees. Finally, the Clinton administration decided to actually use force against the Bosnian Serbs. According to Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, one of the most important factors influencing the decision to use force was “that the outbreak of fighting in March [1995] … and the apparent certainty that it would escalate raised the very real
Page 288 prospect that United Nations forces would have to be withdrawn from Bosnia.” The U.S. and NATO realized that if UNsponsored forces were to pull out of the region, the U.S. would almost certainly be required to commit substantial ground forces and logistical support in an effort to protect allied forces as they withdrew. Secretary of Defense Perry, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Shalikashvili, and Ambassador Albright all wanted to initiate more forceful action against the Serbs, but Secretary of State Christopher opposed any expansion of U.S. actions, asserting that neither Congress nor the American people would support an escalation of U.S. involvement. Furthermore, the Clinton administration also had to deal with a fractious Congress. Some members supported increased uses of force while others were wary of having the U.S. drawn into another Vietnamstyle conflict. The U.S. and NATO began sustained air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions in the summer of 1995. The feeling was that the U.S. and NATO involvement on the ground was inevitable, and that it was up to the U.S. to ensure that involvement of U.S. troops took place under the most favorable circumstances possible. All of the parties to the conflict were weary of the constant fighting and were ready to cease hostilities under increased threats of continued NATO bombing and even greater NATO military involvement. In November 1995, the U.S. finally forced through the Dayton Peace Accords, which established dual control of BosniaHerzegovina. The most compelling arguments for the use of force were based on moral factors. The term ‘‘humanitarian intervention” was used to distinguish intervening to save the lives of innocents, from more traditional cases of intervention where the goal was more interest and security based. The UN as well as the U.S. and NATO were clearly caught between the notions of peacekeeping (i.e., going in after a diplomatic settlement has been reached to keep the peace) versus peacemaking (i.e., attempting to force adversaries to cease hostilities by intervening in between). Burg and Shoup note an interesting fact about the U.S. decision to use force in BosniaHerzegovina. The force was designed to stop the fighting or reverse Serb gains, but not to resolve the political issues that underscored the fighting in the first place. Perhaps the most important lesson arising from the crisis was that the projection of power without any plan for a political solution to end the war tended to invite the kind of openended intervention in Bosnia that the U.S. wanted to avoid in the first place. Unlike Slovenia, Croatia, and even BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo holds a special place in Serbian history and culture. Warren Zimmerman points out that Kosovo is the “historic heart of Serbia’s glorious medieval kingdom, the religious seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the geographic site of Serbia’s oldest and most beautiful monasteries and churches.” Kosovo is also the site of the epic battle in 1389, in which the Turks defeated the Serbs and controlled Yugoslavia for over five centuries. Therefore, Milosevic and the Serbs believe that they have much more at stake in keeping Kosovo part of Yugoslavia than they did in keeping Slovenia, Croatia, or even BosniaHerzegovina. Although
Page 289 Kosovo had been granted autonomy by the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, in 1989, Milosevic, using a mixture of force and further threats of brutal repression, stripped Kosovo of its autonomy. The Dayton Peace Accords ended the fighting in Bosnia but did not address Kosovo. Although the role of Milosevic and ethnic cleansing is similar in both cases, the differences in the two conflicts are substantial. Besides the historical, cultural, and religious significance of Kosovo already discussed above, the Serbs make up only 10 percent of the population in Kosovo. Moreover, in Bosnia, the Serbs faced organized and powerful Muslim and Croat forces. In contrast, the only organized resistance in Kosovo was from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a rather small guerrilla force comprised of Albanian separatists. Also, in Bosnia, both sides had grown war weary, which was definitely not the case in Kosovo: both the Serbs and Albanians were anxious to renew hostilities. All Bosnians are Slavs and have a common language, whereas Serbs and Albanians are separate ethnic groups and speak different languages. Finally, unlike Bosnia, where the Serbs had no claim to sovereignty, the Serbs do have a somewhat legitimate claim of sovereignty in Kosovo. This is the situation the U.S. and NATO faced in Kosovo only a few short years after the bloodshed in Croatia and Bosnia ceased. The hostilities between the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians began anew in the spring of 1998. Over the next year, the Serbs (and the KLA) continued their campaign of ethnic cleansing to the point that several hundred thousand refugees had fled. The KLA demanded not just a return to autonomy but complete independence from Serbiancontrolled Yugoslavia, while the Serbs were determined not to allow the Kosovar Albanians to secede. The problem for the U.S. and NATO was essentially the same as before: should they stand by and observe while the violence and bloodshed escalated, as they did for so long in Bosnia, or risk their own citizens’ lives and their own political fortunes by becoming involved in somebody else’s war? Bosnia served as a lesson to the Clinton administration and NATO as a whole, and there was a decreased likelihood that the West would wait quite as long to get involved in Kosovo. The Western powers were again somewhat concerned that the violence would spread, this time to the neighboring countries of Albania, Macedonia, and possibly even Bulgaria. In June 1998, NATO leaders threatened the use of force, although most of the threats came from British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and President Clinton to a lesser extent. At the same time, Russia, as part of the Contact Group, was insisting that any NATO action must be authorized by the UN Security Council—where Russia has a veto. There was also initial uncertainty among NATO powers about what the ultimate objective in Kosovo should be: was it a ceasefire, or a general withdrawal of Serb forces? One month later, in July 1998, Pentagon officials played down the chances of NATO taking any action against Slobodan Milosevic and the Serb forces. NATO again changed its mind in October 1998 and more seriously threatened to initiate air strikes against Mil
Page 290 osevic and the Serbs because of their continued repression of the Kosovar Albanians. Only a lastminute diplomatic effort by U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke averted the imminent attack. Once again, Milosevic backed down and agreed to withdraw some of his forces and to allow 2,000 unarmed observers on the ground. However, the deal brokered by Holbrooke did not address the future status of Kosovo. The fighting cooled off during the winter months only to return again in the spring. NATO leaders summoned both the Serbs and the KLA to peace talks in the French town of Rambouillet in February 1999. NATO attempted to force the Serbs to accept a plan to allow a NATOpoliced autonomy for Kosovo. Surprisingly (to the U.S. and NATO), it was the KLA who first rejected the deal. The KLA had argued all along for complete independence and were not about to “settle” for mere autonomy when they believed they could fight their way to freedom. The KLA eventually were pressured into accepting the deal, while the Serbs did not, which led to the NATO air strikes in March. Even then, the primary powers in NATO often waffled about what to do in Kosovo. Albright expressed NATO’s willingness to desert Kosovo under certain circumstances if the situation became too uncomfortable. The French even blocked NATO from having a top representative at the negotiations in Rambouillet. When it came time to seriously consider using force in October 1998, several NATO members hesitated, including Germany, Italy, and Denmark, because they did not want to undertake military action without an explicit UN Security Council mandate. Unlike Bosnia, in the Kosovo situation NATO never really consulted with or asked for assistance from the UN. Perhaps the main reason was that the UN had a specific mandate not to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. Moreover, it was difficult enough for the nineteen members of NATO to agree on specific policy options without also having to factor in the desires and constraints of the UN. Western officials commented that while UN authorization was desirable, it was not necessary or essential. The U.S. knew that it could only carry out its objectives via a NATO vehicle and that, furthermore, NATO would lend instant credibility to any military action. If the U.S. had attempted to use force unilaterally, it would have been castigated as an imperial bully and the world’s policeman. As it was, NATO heard some of these accusations, but it was much harder to make the point when countries such as France, Great Britain, Germany, and other European powers were also involved. Because specific and direct national interest reasons and threats were missing from the decision to intervene in Kosovo, the U.S. knew it had to resort to multilateral means in order to gain legitimacy for the use of force. NATO discovered, though, that it would be quite tricky to use force against the Serbs while simultaneously stopping the Kosovar Albanians from trying to secede. The U.S. opposed the secession of Kosovo because of the precedent it might set for other ethnic groups in Bosnia and Macedonia. An examination of the Grimmett data set on U.S. uses of force shows that
Page 291 multilateral uses of force have increased since the early 1980s, and especially so since the latter part of the Bush administration and into the Clinton administration. What is interesting is that this latest increase coincides with the end of the Cold War. It seems that in the absence of hard and fast rules of national interest in response to communist and Soviet threats of world domination, such as existed during the Cold War, the U.S. has resorted to enlisting the aid of allies in shortofwar situations. The automatic justification of national selfinterest in the name of selfpreservation has more or less disappeared. Without an archenemy, unilateral arguments for the use of force seem to be less compelling and, instead, the U.S. pursues multilateral uses of force in an attempt to convince the world that U.S. objectives are also what’s best for the security of most other nationstates in the international arena. The U.S. decision to use force against the Serbs was also influenced by domestic factors. Specifically, the U.S. Congress, the public, and elections all played a role in U.S. decisions to use force in Kosovo. In the summer of 1998, many members of Congress, especially Republicans, pressured the White House to consider deploying U.S. troops as part of a NATOled force to stop the ethnic violence in Kosovo, while the Clinton administration publicly expressed doubts about getting involved. Again, humanitarian intervention was often cloaked and legitimized under the pretense of Cold War power politics by referring to the potential for the conflict to spread to Albania and Macedonia. One of the main reasons the Clinton administration immediately ruled out the use of ground troops was because they knew that the American public had little appetite for U.S. soldiers coming back in body bags. Somalia taught that lesson well, when graphic images of U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu appeared on television. Use of force from the air is much more palatable to the American public. The Clinton administration, as well as NATO, knew that as long as casualties were kept to a bare minimum (or in this case, zero), public opinion would at the very least not turn against the NATO alliance. Surgical air strikes were the perfect middle course of action between doing nothing and allout war. Two other factors, although more negative in connotation, were thought to influence U.S. decisions to use force. Some members of Congress (e.g., Senate majority leader Trent Lott) accused the Clinton administration of using the threat of force in October 1998 in response to the upcoming elections in November. On the other hand, many have accused the administration of only using air strikes beginning in March 1999, because the Clinton White House did not want to jeopardize Al Gore’s, and other Democratic candidates’, chances in the 2000 elections, because of a protracted ground conflict in Kosovo. On March 24, 1999, President Clinton took his case to the American people in a speech to the nation. In outlining U.S. reasons and objectives for using force against the Serbs in Kosovo, he said “We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war; to defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has ex
Page 292 ploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now we are upholding our values, protecting our interests and advancing the cause of peace.” The reasons for acting are listed in order: (1) humanitarian concerns, (2) containment, and (3) the prestige and credibility of NATO; and the president reiterates and acknowledges as much when he speaks of values, interests, and advancing the cause of peace, in that order. The last ten years have provided the U.S. with some interesting challenges in Yugoslavia. On a grander scale, the U.S. has had to reconcile the notions of self determination with the rights of state sovereignty in deciding when, or if, to intervene in the former Yugoslavia. On a domestic and applied level, the dilemma has been deciding what is and is not in the national interest. Humanitarian concerns seem to play a larger role in U.S. decisions to use force abroad. Perhaps this is the price of being the world’s only dominant power. Moreover, the proper role of the military (e.g., air strikes versus ground troops) has been a point of contention. These issues will surely dominate the U.S. foreign policy agenda in the former Yugoslavia for years to come. There are still many unresolved issues in the Balkan region and more than likely the U.S., and even NATO, may be called on again to help solve these problems. See Europe; Multilateralism; NATO; United Nations. FOR FURTHER READING Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. 1999. The War in BosniaHerzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Clinton, William Jefferson. 1999. ‘‘Statement by the President to the Nation.” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 24. http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/. Cviic, Christopher. 1994. “Yugoslavia: The Unmaking of a Federation.” In The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security after the Cold War, ed. F. Stephen Larrabee. Washington, DC: American University Press. Gutman, Roy. 1999. “The Collapse of Serbia?” World Policy Journal 16:12–18. Larrabee, F. Stephen. 1994. “Balkan Security after the Cold War: New Dimensions, New Challenges.” In The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security after the Cold War, ed. F. Stephen Larrabee. Washington, DC: American University Press. Larrabee, F. Stephen. 1994. Western Strategy Toward the Former Yugoslavia. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. MacInnis, John A. 1998. “Piecemeal Peacekeeping: The United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia.” In The Savage Wars of Peace: Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations, ed. John T. Fishel. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Mandelbaum, Michael. 1999. “A Perfect Failure: NATO’s War against Yugoslavia.” Foreign Affairs 78:2–8. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1999. “Redefining the National Interest.” Foreign Affairs 78:22–35. Rodman, Peter W. 1999. “The Fallout from Kosovo.” Foreign Affairs 78:45–51. Rogel, Carole. 1998. The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Schlesinger, Thomas O. 1991. The United States and the European Neutrals. Vienna, Austria: Braumüller.
Page 293 Steinberg, James B. 1993. “International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict.” In Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, ed. Lori Fisler Damrosch. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Walzer, Michael. 1999. “Kosovo.” Dissent 46:5–7. Zametica, John. 1992. The Yugoslav Conflict. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. Zimmerman, Warren. 1998. “The Demons of Kosovo.” National Interest 52:3–11. Steven B. Redd
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Index Boldface page numbers indicate the location of main entries. Agenda setting, 19, 188 Alliance for Progress, 19 Ange v. Bush, 20 Angola, 20–23, 49, 76 Arias Plan, 23 Arms embargo, 23–24 Asia and the Pacific, 24–40; data, 25–29; post–Cold War period, 37–39; postwar period , 33–36; the 20th century, 32–33 Attribution process, 40 Baghdad Pact, 41 Bay of Pigs, 41–42 Berlin Airlift, 125–126 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 42 Bounded rationality, 42–43 Boxer Rebellion, 43, 47–48 Bureaucratic politics model, 43–44 Bush, President George, 74, 188–189 Carter, President Jimmy, 141, 156–158, 192, 209, 211 Carter Doctrine, 45 Castro, Fidel, 180 China, 43, 45–49. See also Asia Clark Amendment, 49 Cold War, 49–50,52 Collective defense, 50 Collective security, 50 Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948–1978, 50–51, 84–85 Congress, 5–9, 51–59, 99–100, 104, 153–154; post–Cold War, 56–58, 99–100, 234–235; postVietnam resurgence, 53–56; postwar deference, 52–53; pre– World War II, 52 Congressional oversight, 59–60 Congressional Research Service, 1, 80–82 Congressional responses, 60–65; nonresponses, 63–64; quasilegislative responses, 62–63 Constitution, 65–76; issues from 1860–1973, 67–72; 1973–present, 72–76, 133, 150–151; precourt force, 66–67 Constructive engagement, 76 Contras, 76–77 Conyers v. Reagan, 73, 77 Crisis promotion, 77 Cuba, 41, 180 Cybernetic theory, 78 Data sets on the use of force, 79–90; additional sources, 87–88
Page 308 Dayton Agreement/Accords, 61, 90, 215–216 Decision making, 43–44, 78, 90, 220–221, 223–224, 236–237 Dellums v. Bush, 74, 91 Democratic peace, 91–98; cultural/institutional explanations, 91–92; liberalism, 92–94; political incentive explanation, 94–96 Desert Shield/Storm, 98 Diversionary theory, 98–99, 136 Divided government, 99–100 Domestic politics, 4–5, 100–101 Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 101 Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC), 103 Eisenhower, President Dwight, 53, 200–201 Eisenhower Doctrine, 103 Electoral connection, 104 Ethics, 105–115; historical roots, 107–108; just war doctrine, 105–106; realism, 110–113 Europe, 115–130; Balkans, 127–129; data, 116–119; Greece and Turkey, 122; Russian Revolution, 123–124 Ex Parte Milligan, 68, 69, 130–131 Expected utility theory, 131 Federalist No. 78, 133–134 Federalist Papers,66 Focos, 134 Foreign policy decision making, 9–12, 134–141 Framing, 141–142 Grimmett CRS Report, 1, 143 Groupthink, 143–144 Gulf of Sidra, 144 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 144, 219 Gulf War, 50, 98, 144–145, 203–205 Gunboat diplomacy, 145–146 Hawaii, 147–150 Helvidius, 150–151 Ho Chi Minh, 151 HughesRyan Amendment, 151–152 Idealism, 104–115, 153 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 153–154, 184 Indochina, 36–37 Ingroup/outgroup hypothesis, 98–99, 154 Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991, 154–155 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 155 International Crisis Behavior: Part 2 (ICB2), 83–84, 155–156 International Military Intervention (IMI), 1946–1988, 85–86, 156 Iran, 44 IranIraq War, 156–157 Iranian hostage crisis, 157–158 Isolationism, 158 Issue management, 159 Japan, 161–163 Just war doctrine, 105–106 Kissinger, Henry, 37, 165, 202–203 Korean War, 166 Korematsu v. U.S., 71, 74, 166–167 Latin America and the Caribbean, 134, 169–183, 145–146; Cold War internationalism, 179–181; data, 170–174; early strategies of empire, 177–179; the 19th century, 175–177; post–Cold War military intervention, 181–183 League of Nations, 183 Legislative veto, 153–154, 184 Libya, 144, 187, 196–197 Lincoln, President Abraham, 67–68, 130 ‘‘Lives and property,’’ 184–185 Lowintensity conflict, 185 Manifest Destiny, 33, 109 Mayaguez, 29 Media, 65, 187–193; the electorate, 188–189; the president, 189–190 Middle East, 193–206; American diplomatic initiatives, 198–199; ArabIsraeli conflict, 202–203; data, 194–196; Persian Gulf, 203–205; protecting diplomats, 197–198; Suez crisis, 199–200
Page 309 Militarized Interstate Disputes Data (MID), 81–82, 206 Monroe Doctrine, 30, 206–207 Multilateralism, 207–215; evolution of the UN system, 211–213; postwar, 208–211 Multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), 215–216 Multinational Observer Force (MOF), 216–217 National Commitments Resolution, 219 New York Times Company v. U.S., 219–220 Nicaragua, 21, 23, 155, 249 Nixon, President Richard, 72 Nixon Doctrine, 220 Noncompensatory decision making, 220–221 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 50, 127–129, 215–216, 221–222, 286–291 Operational code, 223–224 Organizational process model, 224 Pacificus, 225 Parallel publics, 225–226 Peacekeeping, 226 Perception/misperception, 226–227 Perry, Commodore Matthew C., 162, 227–228 Perry Doctrine, 228 Personality, 228–229 Philippines, 229–230 Poliheuristic theory, 230–231 Political psychology, 232 Power politics (Realpolitik), 110–113, 232–233 Power to persuade, 189, 233 Presidential approval, 233–234 Presidential success, 234–235 Priming, 235 Principal policy objective, 235, 240 The Prize Cases, 68, 69, 74, 236 Proclamation of Neutrality, 115, 119 Prospect theory, 134–141, 236–237 Proxy war, 237 Public opinion, 237–242; individual versus aggregate, 238–239; rallies, 239–241 Rally ’round the flag, 188, 243–244 Rational and prudent thesis, 244 Rational choice, 244–245 Realism, 245–246 Reagan, President Ronald, 76–77, 181, 185, 187 Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 71, 166 Roosevelt Corollary, 2, 246 Russia, 246–247 Sandinistas, 249. See also Nicaragua Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U.S., 69, 70, 249–250 Shultz Doctrine, 250 Soviet Union, 49, 101, 125–127, 237. See also Russia SubSaharan Africa, 250–260; data, 252–253; U.S. intervention to 1950, 253–254; 1950 to 1958, 255–256; 1958 to the present, 256–259 Symbolism, 260 Systematic motivations, 260–261 Tet Offensive, 263 Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, 263–264 Tripolitan War, 264 Truman Doctrine (Policy of Containment), 34, 199, 264 Two presidencies, 265 Unilateral(ism), 267 Unilateral Declaration of Independence and Zimbabwean Independence, 267–270 United Nations (UN), 270. See also other United Nations entries UN Charter Chapter VI (Peace Settlement of Disputes), 270–271 UN Charter Chapter VII (Coercion), 271 UN General Assembly, 272 United Nations IraqKuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), 272 UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), 272–273
Page 310 United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (UNDREDEP), 273–274 UN Resolution, 274 UN Resolution 678, 274 UN Secretariat, 274–275 UN Task Force (UNITAF), UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), and UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), 275–276 UN Trusteeship Council, 276 U.S. v. CurtissWright Export Corporation, 69, 70, 74, 276–277 ‘‘Us vs. them’’ mentality, 277 Viet Cong, 151, 263, 279 Vietnamese War, 53–54, 144, 151–152, 263 War on Drugs, 281 War Powers Resolution, 51, 91, 281–282 Weinberger Doctrine, 282–283 XYZ Affair, 120 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer, 71, 285–286 Yugoslavia, 23, 42, 90, 127–129, 286–293
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About the Contributors KARL R. DEROUEN, JR. is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas. His research interests include use of force, conflict processes, and the political economy of defense. He has recently published in the Journal of Politics, the British Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Peace Research, International Studies Quarterly, International Interactions, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and others. MELANIE GREGG ENGLAND is a student at Lincoln Land Community College, Springfield, Illinois, majoring in political science. She draws on years of experience including travel, political work, and motherhood as a background to her interest in international relations and writing. JILL GLATHAR is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield, Missouri. Her areas of expertise include methodology, voting behavior, and public opinion. She is currently working on adapting conjoint methodology in the study of mass belief systems and analyzing the use of issue ads as a form of controversial campaign ads with the Pew Charitable Trust. JAMES HEASLEY is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Lake Superior State University, Sault Sainte Marie, Ontario, Canada. His areas of interest are international relations theory, international regimes, law and organization, conflict resolution, and transnational movements. He is the author of Organizing Global Governance (forthcoming). JAMES HENSON is Assistant Professor in the Department of History and Government at the University of Louisiana at Monroe. His research interests include
Page 312 the ways in which economic development and racial and ethnic relations affect each other in the United States and Latin America. THEODORE S. HERTZBERG is a student at Amherst College, Amherst, Massachusetts. He was a participant in the 1998 and 1999 Junior Statesmen Foundation summer programs at Yale University. AHMED H. IBRAHIM is Associate Professor of Modern Middle East History at Southwest Missouri State University. His areas of specialization are Modern Middle East Diplomatic History, the ArabIsraeli Conflict, and Islamic Modernism. He has recently published in the International Third World Studies Journal and Review, International Journal of Middle East Studies, The Arab Studies Journal, and others. He is currently writing a monograph on the origin of peace in the Middle East. SARA JEZEWSKI is a political science major at Lake Superior State University. Her interests include international relations theory and U.S. foreign policy. DARRELL P. KRUGER is Assistant Professor at the University of Louisiana at Monroe. He is an urbanhistorical geographer with primary research and teaching interests in South Africa and Louisiana. He has published articles and book reviews in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers, the Journal of Historical Geography, the Journal of Cultural Geography, Historical Geography, and the Louisiana Genealogical Register. A forthcoming chapter entitled “Afrikaner Identity in Late TwentiethCentury South Africa: Struggle, Trek, and Rootedness” will be published in Worldview Flux: Place, Identity, Relation, Value. CHRIS MCDONALD is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lincoln Land Community College. His research focuses on international institutions (especially the European Union) and the role of organized labor in the international system. Additional research interests include radical political philosophies and pedagogical issues in teaching the social sciences. JEFFREY S. PEAKE is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, specializing in the presidency, Congress, and U.S. foreign affairs. His work has appeared recently in the American Political Science Review and the American Journal of Political Science. CURTIS PEET was Assistant Professor of Political Science at Bowling Green State University. His research and teaching focused in the fields of international relations, international political economy, and international organizations. His most recent research examined the relationship between democracy, trade, and international conflict. He was published in International Interactions and the Journal of Peace Research. He passed away on June 4, 2000.
Page 313 STEVEN B. REDD is Tower Fellow at Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. His areas of interest are foreign policy decision making, decision theory, and process tracing and experimental methods. He has published in American Political Science Review and also has authored several book chapters. MARC V. SIMON is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Bowling Green State University. His research focuses on conflict processes, war and political violence, and conflict resolution. He is the author of recent articles in the Journal of Peace Research, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Interactions, and International Studies Quarterly. PAUL WEIZER is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Fitchburg State College, Fitchburg, Massachusetts. Prior to his appointment at Fitchburg State, he taught at Temple University, Rowan University, and Indiana University of Pennsylvania. He teaches courses in American Government and many of the college’s courses in Public Law. He has recently completed a book on civil liberties entitled The Supreme Court and Sexual Harassment (1999) and an article entitled “The New McCarthyism: Sexual Harassment, Due Process, and Free Speech,” published in the journal Public Integrity.