Grammar and Logic [Reprint 2019 ed.] 9783111507323, 9783111140193

Table of contents :
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. The Structure of a Sentence and the Structure of a Judgement, Interrogation and Motivation Expressed by It
3. The Logico-Grammatical Level of the Sentence
4. Predicativity and Grammatical Predicativity — Predicativity and Modality — Modality and Mood
5. Members of the Sentence and the Components of a Judgement, Interrogation and Motivation
6. The Grammatical Category of the Voice and the Categories of the Subject (the Bearer) of Action, the Object of Action and Action Proper — The Ergative Construction of the Sentence
7. The Relationship Between the Syntactic and the Logico- Grammatical Levels of the Sentence

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GRAMMAR AND LOGIC

JANUA LINGUARUM STUDIA MEMORIAE NICOLAI VAN WIJK DEDICATA

edenda curai C. H. V A N

SCHOONEVELD

INDIANA

UNIVERSITY

SERIES

MINOR

63

1968

MOUTON THE H A G U E • PARIS

GRAMMAR AND

LOGIC by V. Z. P A N F I L O V

1968

MOUTON THE HAGUE • PARIS

© Copyright 1968 in The Netherlands. Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers. Enlarged edition of: Grammatika i Logika (Grammatideskoe i logiko-grammaticeskoe ¿lenenie prostogo predlozenija) Published by: IfaflaTejibCTBO AxaaeMHH Hayic CCCP — 1963 Moscow-Leningrad Translated by H. A. Vladimirsky

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 68-15535

Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., Printers, The Hague.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction 2. The Structure of a Sentence and the Structure of a Judgement, Interrogation and Motivation Expressed by It . .

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19

3. The Logico-Grammatical Level of the Sentence . . . . * 30 4. Predicativity and Grammatical Predicativity — Predicativity and Modality — Modality and Mood

56

5. Members of the Sentence and the Components of a Judgement, Interrogation and Motivation

83

6. The Grammatical Category of the Voice and the Categories of the Subject (the Bearer) of Action, the Object of Action and Action Proper — The Ergative Construction of the Sentence

91

7. The Relationship Between the Syntactic and the LogicoGrammatical Levels of the Sentence 101

1

INTRODUCTION

Language and thought form a dialectically contradictory entity, where the thought plays the dominant part while the language, being a relatively independent phenomenon, in its turn has a certain counter-influence on the thought. The study of the relationship between the individual levels of language and thought demonstrates that the language units corresponding to each language level are related in different ways to thought, and it also reveals the dialectically complex and contradictory nature of interrelationships between thought and language as a whole. The absolutisation of one of the aspects of this entity is the source of theories identifying language and thought, grammar (the grammatical structure of language) and logic (the logical structure of thinking). The absolutisation of the role played by thought, the exaggeration of its influence on the formation, functioning and development of the language, underlies the logical trend in linguistics. The treatment given to the language-thought problem by the naturalistic trend in linguistics is similar to that followed by the logical trend. A characteristic of the naturalistic trend is vulgar materialistic approach to language as "natural organism which is composed of sounds" (Schleiher), which is an erroneous understanding of the ontological nature of language. In the final analysis, however, language and thought as a result of the absolutisation of the relative independence of language, of the role it plays and of the importance of its counter-influence on thought, are regarded as identical by the representatives of various

8

INTRODUCTION

trends of neo-Humboldtianism (the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, L. Weisgerber and his followers in Germany) and the representatives of those trends of structuralism who regard language as having a certain immanent substance as a system of oppositions, with a character which is independent of that of the individual components of these oppositions (F. de Saussure, O. Hjelmslev and others). The representatives of the latter theories contend that language, besides determining the character and the structure of thought, also determines the very nature of the objective reality which is mirrored. Thus, within the framework of the theories regarding the language-thought relationship developed by the followers of neo-Humboldtianism and of certain trends of structuralism, language is viewed as something determining not only the thought but also the nature of the reality mirrored. Hence, philosophically speaking, these theories may be classified as a sort of "linguistic idealism". The theories which either reject the unity of language and thought outright or reject the existence of any considerable influence of the logical structure of thought on the grammatical structure of language stem from not taking account of the complex nature of the interrelations between language and thought, the grammatical structure of language and the logical structure of thought. The idea of the absence of any considerable influence of the logical structure of thought on the grammatical structure of language has been developed by the representatives of the psychological trend in linguistics, which emerged as a reaction to the logical trend which had predominated for a long time. The criticism to which the representatives of the psychological concept in linguistics subjected the logical trend revealed a series of very substantial points with regard to the characteristic features of the language-thought interrelationships, the grammatical structure of language and the logical structure of thought, in particular; thus, it was shown that: 1) a sentence expresses not only a judgement in the Aristotelian sense, but also an interrogation and a motivation; 2) it is not clear what form of thought is expressed by the

INTRODUCTION

9

impersonal and one-member sentences, since linguistic data tend to question the hypothesis of their subject-predicate structure; 3) the structure of a judgement and the division of a sentence more often than not fail to coincide, firstly, because not only the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate but also the secondary members of a sentence are singled out, whereas a judgement comprises only two members: the logical subject and the logical predicate (if we disregard the controversial issue concerning the independence of the link) and, secondly, because the logical subject is frequently expressed not only by the grammatical subject but also by some other member of the sentence or by a group of members in the same way as the logical predicate may be expressed not only by the grammatical predicate but also by some other member of a sentence or by a group of members, including the grammatical subject; 4) logical and grammatical modality represent different phenomena, inasmuch as languages single out types of mood which do not correspond with those singled out by logic; 5) a notion is expressed not only by a word but also by combinations of words, whereas, on the other hand, certain types of words (interjections, auxiliary words) obviously do not convey any notions; 6) there is no item-by-item correspondence between the categories of an object, action, quality, quantity, etc., and the parts of speech, since the substantive may denote not only the real object but also the quality, action, quantity, etc., and the verb not only action but also the state, quality, etc. The foregoing explains the erroneous definition of a number of principal grammatical concepts by the representatives of the logical concept in linguistics, namely: the definition of a sentence (a judgement expressed in words is a sentence), the definition of a grammatical subject (a grammatical subject is that which is spoken of in a sentence), the definition of a grammatical predicate (a grammatical predicate is that which is said in a sentence), etc., and the statement that language characteristics proper should be taken into consideration in defining these concepts. However, for the representatives of the psychological trend,

10

INTRODUCTION

these observations, which are quite correct in themselves, served as the basis for an equally erroneous interpretation of the problem regarding the interrelationships of the logical structure of thought and grammar and also of thought and language as a whole. Suffice it to mention, in this connection the well-known statement made by G. Steinthal that "linguistic and logical categories are incompatible notions; they are no more related to one another than are the notions of a circle and of red" 1 and a corresponding statement made by A. A. Potebnja, according to whom "linguistics, grammar in particular, is no closer to logic than any other science".2 Apart from the fact that the mentioned observations from the field of language-thought relationships in themselves provide no grounds for such conclusions, it is impossible to agree with these statements by the representatives of the psychological trend because they disregard the problem of the interrelationship of the structure of thought and grammar and of thought and language as a whole.3 However, the criticism of the logical trend in linguistics by the representatives of the psychological concept has revealed not the absence of correlations and dependence between the structure of thought and the grammatical structure of the language but merely the erroneousness of attempts to find in thought a direct and item-by-item correspondence to all language phenomena at different levels, as was the case when the representatives of the logical trend sought to establish such a correspondence between parts of speech and categories of thought, between the sentence and the judgement, between the members of a sentence and the structural components of a judgement, etc. In trying to reduce all grammatical phenomena to logical ones, "logicians" failed to take into consideration the relative in1

I. H. Steinthal, Grammatik, Logik undPsychologie (Berlin, 1855), pp. 221-222. A. A. Potebnja, f f s 3anucoK no pyccKou epaMMamme, 1-2 (Moscow, 1958), p. 70. 3 As M. Sandman correctly comments, "there is no simple parallelism between concept and word, judgement and sentence. This does not prove, however, that language has nothing to do with logic." (M. Sandman, Subject and Predicate: A Contribution to the Theory of Syntax, Edinburgh, 1954, p. 15.) 8

INTRODUCTION

11

dependence of language, which revealed itself, in particular, in the fact that the lower a given level of language was in the hierarchy, the more remote and indirect was the connection of the corresponding language phenomena with the thought and the greater was the degree of independence of the given subsystem of language. In this respect there are essential differences not only between the phonemic level of language, a unit of which is unilateral, and its other levels, in which the units are bilateral, but also between each of these latter levels of language. Suffice it to say that a unit at the morphemic level, i.e. a morpheme without the nominative function, is incapable (in a linear sequence) of expressing notions; i.e. it has no direct relation with any form of thinking, although it possesses its own meaning. Having accepted another fairly widespread point of view to the effect that a morpheme expresses a notion, we are obliged to recognise that a morphologically articulate word in a syntagmatic series conveys several notions simultaneously. The erroneousness of this conclusion is quite obvious, particularly when viewed against the background of the generally accepted idea that in a phraseological sequence of words an isolated word, far from expressing a notion, fails to retain its own lexical meaning. The impossibility of putting any logical stress on a morpheme as a part of a word (it follows that a morpheme cannot act as the vehicle of a logical predicate as one of the notions which, together with the logical subject, is a structural component of a judgement) also proves that it does not convey a notion in the syntagmatic series. A word, or, to be more exact, a notional word, is the smallest language unit with a meaning which has a nominative function and the capability of expressing a notion. 4 Nevertheless while a 4

This property of a word, together with the fact that it is the smallest language unit capable of being the bearer of predication (one-word phrases), makes it the basic language unit directly associated with the existence and functioning of other language units (phoneme, morpheme, patterns of word combinations, patterns of sentences). See, for greater detail, V. Z. Panfilov, "06 onpefleneHHH noHHTM cnoBa", Mop^ojiozmecKan cmpyxmypa CAoea e H3biKax paiAUHHbix munoe (Moscow-Leningrad, 1963).

12

INTRODUCTION

word always retains its meaning in a linear syntagmatic sequence within the confines of free word combinations, it can be without a notion. Indeed, within the structure of a judgement expressed by a simple extended sentence and disregarding the link as a specific member of the judgement, two notions may be singled out: the logical subject, i.e. the notion of the object of the thought, and the logical predicate, i.e. the notion of the characteristic or the characteristics which are ascribed to it in the given act of thinking. Each of these notions may be expressed by two or more words, for instance by the syntactic group of the grammatical subject and the syntactic group of the grammatical predicate, respectively, as in the following sentence: HcnyraHHaa HaMH BopoHa B3JieTejia Ha BbicoKoe aepeBo (The scared by us crow flew up to a high tree). Within the structure of judgements expressed by this type of sentence, none of the words incorporated in the corresponding syntactic groups expresses a notion when taken separately, although it retains its lexical meaning, as a result of which it is distinct from the morpheme, in that it retains the potentiality of expressing notions, this being the case when it receives the logical stress. It should be noted that, in the view of certain logicians and linguists, in cases where the logical subject (or the predicate) is expressed by a group of notional words, it, "being an entity, at the same time clearly represents a combination of a series of notions, each taken separately being distinct from the entire combination taken as a whole ,..". 5 This, according to the said authors, solves one of the antinomies of the problem concerning the unity of language and thought, namely that, unlike a judgement, a sentence may have a more complex structure, since the simple extended sentence singles out not only the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate but also other members of the sentence which have no immediate counterparts in the structure of a judgement. 5 N. M. Goder, "O normecKoft CTpyKType iiohjithh, BbipaxceHHOro cjiobocoHeTamreM", JIoauKo-zpaMMamunecKue onepKU (Moscow, 1961), p. 49. See also r . B. KonmaHCKHfi, K eonpocy o AozuHecnou (fiymifuu emopocmenemux H/ienoe npedAOMcemn (Moscow, 1954).

INTRODUCTION

13

However, this type of solution regarding the correspondence between the structure of a sentence and the structure of a judgement appears invalid from the point of view of the concept of the logical form of thought in general, since it presupposes that the components of a notion as a form of thought are one and the same notions and that the notions are, at the same time, components of another, qualitatively distinct form of thought — viz. judgement. It could be similarly argued, for instance, that a word consists not of morphemes but of words and that, at the same time, words form word combinations whose patterns, in relation to a word, are units of a higher order — viz. a statement, which is clearly erroneous in the light of the theory of language units. The fact that expressions of a logical subject and predicate are verbally divisible in those cases where they are conveyed by sets of words cannot, in our opinion, prove that the corresponding characteristics which are incorporated in the content of a logical subject or predicate and which have an independent verbal expression are found in the structure of the given judgements as individual notions, since in these cases both the logical subject and the logical predicate each reflect one logical object. It is quite apparent, that, regardless of whether the logical subject is denominated by one word (a square) or by a set of words (rectangular, equilateral quadrangle), the object of the thought is one and the same, and the notion of this object of the thought will remain one and the same, by virtue of both its content and its structure.6 Language, or, to be more exact, the verbal divisibility of the expression of the logical subject or predicate, characterises the inner structure of the notion, the mode of its formation and its language denomination in the preceding acts of thinking; i.e. it is a sort of notional etymology. Just as the presence of an inner form in any morphologically divisible words (for instance, Russian words, of the type napoxofl h noflCHeacHHK, etc.) does not mean that the lexical meaning is a compound one and represents a • This is also recognised by some of the proponents of the above-mentioned point of view, N. M. Goder, for instance "O Jionroecrott erpyKType noHJrow, BupaxceHHoro cnoBocoieraHHeM", pp. 49-50.

14

INTRODUCTION

combination of the meanings of the morphological components which comprise it (the semantic integrity also characterises the meaning of the morphologically divisible word),7 so the presence of an inner form in some notion in its given verbal expression does not prove that the notion is a combination of notions. This difference between the morpheme and the word in their relation to thought is associated with the following difference between their roles in the mechanism of language: if the meaning of the word is also actualised in the syntagmatic and paradigmatic sequences, the meaning of the morpheme is actualised in the latter only. Indeed, in the act of speaking, the meaning of a separate morpheme incorporated in the word is not, as a rule, realised by the speaker, since the person who has a fluent command of one language or another uses a word in the act of speech as a certain integral unit and in the given act of speech does not form it from corresponding morphemes. The characteristic feature of free word combinations is precisely that they are formed in accordance with definite patterns of words and that they are not reproduced in the act of speech as ready-made units. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that some particularly popular word combinations in given language media may be reproduced in some or other acts of speech in the form in which they were previously created and used in preceding acts of speech, while certain words may be newly created and not reproduced in a given act of speech, as is the case with the compound words in the German language. Admittedly, in the latter case, we have to ask ourselves whether such types of word strictly belong to the language used as a means of communication by the entire group of speakers. Thus, the use of morphemes in a linear syntagmatic sequence is connected with a sort of reflex and it is this feature and not the degree of generalisation and abstraction which constitutes difference between the lexical and grammatical meanings. The meaning of a morpheme is explicit and the speaker is ' The question of the semantic integrity of a word is discussed in greater detail by V. Z. Panfilov in "Ilpo6jieMa CJioBa H 'HHKopnopHpoBaHHe' B HHBXCKOM H3biKe", Bonp. H3biK03HaHUH, Na 6 (1960), pp. 51-53.

INTRODUCTION

15

conscious of it only when it is singled out and compared with some other morpheme singled out by the speaker, i.e. in the associative paradigmatic series, which, according to F. de Saussure, comprise the mechanism of language together with the syntagmatic linear connections between language units. The meaning of the word is also actualised in the paradigmatic series. It follows that this property is common both to the meaning of the word and to the meaning of the morpheme. One of the main problems with regard to theories recognising the dependence of language on thought and, in particular, on its logical structure is that the thought which is of a universal nature (at any rate, as far as its logical structure and the basic laws governing mental behavior are concerned) is implemented by means of languages of different typologies, which are distinct from one another not only in phonetic but also in grammatical structure and in the character of the linguistic units themselves, as well as in the system of their lexical meanings. The same problem may be formulated as follows: how can one reconcile the thesis about the unity of language and thought with the fact that thought is of a universal character whereas languages are national phenomena? It is known that the opponents of theories recognising the dependence of language upon thought and upon its logical structure, in particular, assert that if language were dependent upon thought, then, owing to the common logical structure of the thinking of contemporary peoples, their languages would have at least a common grammatical structure and would not possess appreciable differences in the meanings of words, etc. This problem is of cardinal importance not only for general linguistics but also for the theory of cognition, and it can be solved only by means of a differentiated approach to varying levels of language from the point of view of the interrelationship with thought. Obviously, the thesis about the dependence of language upon thought does not presuppose a direct and item-by-item dependence of language phenomena at all levels upon thinking and will be valid only if it is proved that the structure of our thought predetermines the structure of the language phenomena

16

INTRODUCTION

at the level of direct participation in the communicative and expressive functions of language. The strictly differentiated approach to different levels of language should be applied to the entire problem of the correlation of extralinguistic and linguistic factors in the formation, functioning and development of language and also to the problems of the languagethought relation and the social content of language as a means of communication. These constitute the central problems in modern linguistics, the main linguistic trends being differentiated according to their approach to this problem. The most characteristic feature of structuralism as a trend is probably that the object of its study and the sphere of application of the methods suggested by it are only those aspects of language which are preconditioned by the linguistic factors (intra-system linguistic connections) and that these aspects of language are frequently taken by structuralists for the entire language (the understanding of a language as a certain immanent substance). Obviously, if this point of view is followed consistently, even the idea of the very formulation of the problem of language being influenced by thought and society as extralinguistic factors would be invalid. It is not fortuitous, therefore, that certain representatives of structuralism set forth as their main methodological principle the so-called "principle of homogeneity". Thus, according to S. K. Saumjan, this precept is the guiding principle for "every scientific theory" and is defined by him in the following way: "Every theory in which one fact is explained by other facts should operate on the basis of only those which are of a homogeneous nature from the point of view of the theory's subject matter. Within the framework of a given theory a scientific explanation cannot be based on facts which are outside the scope of its subject matter." 8 In keeping with this principle, according to S. K. Saumjan, only intralinguistic factors should be used to analyse or interpret the language as a subject of linguistics. "We should not expect", S. K. Saumjan writes, "the immanent ex8

S. K. Saumjan, "O cymHocra CTpyKTypHofi jihhtbhcthkh", Botip.

3HQHUH, X° 5 (1956), p. 44.

H3UKO-

INTRODUCTION

17

planation to indicate the reasons for language changes, since the structure of language is subject to extraneous mental, physical and social influences which cannot be considered here owing to the accidental nature of their relation to the structure of language".9 Furthermore, according to S. K. Saumjan, "the question of the causes of language changes is irrelevant to the science of language".10 The following statements by F. de Saussure have been the source of such methodological views in linguistics: 1. It is not the object studied that determines the point of view of the investigator; on the contrary, it is the point of view that creates the object studied.11 2. The object studied should be homogeneous in character, whereas speech activity (langage) as a whole does not satisfy this

9 S. K. Saumjan, CmpyxmypHcm jiumeucmuKa KOK UMMaHeHmHaH meopua H3biKa (Moscow, 1958), p. 29. The following statement by Saumjan shows that he has now departed from this point of view: "Structural linguistics, in singling out the formal skeleton of language for subsequent interpretation in the light of historical, archaeological and anthropological data, ensures a deep knowledge of all aspects of language." (S. K. Saumjan, "O TeopenwecKHx HccnefloBaHHHX B COBeTCKOM H 3 B I K 0 3 H a i f l f f l " , CmpOUmeAbCmSO KOMMyHUiMa u oSufecmeeHHbie naymi (Moscow, 1962), pp. 273-274.) The departure from the principle of considering language as a particular immanent phenomenon is expressed with still greater clarity in a paper by another representative of structuralism, I. I. Revzin ("CrpyKTypHaa JiHHTBHCTHKa h eflHHCTBO H3faiK03HaHHa", Bonp. H3UK03H0.HUR, M2 3 [1965]). 10 S. K. Saumjan, CmpyKmypnan AumeucmuKa KOK UMMmeHmnan meopun R3biKa, p. 2. Compare, for instance, his statement that "strict application of the principle of homogeneity helps to unravel the truly linguistic, internal causes of changes in a language" (S. K. Saumjan, "O cyiiiaocTH CTpyKTypHofi jihhtbhcthkh", p. 46). 11 F. de Saussure, Kypc oSufeu numeucmuKu (Moscow, 1933), p. 33. F. de Saussure does not make a terminolgical distinction between the object and the subject of science. However, the principle of such a distinction is also very useful for defining the subject of linguistics. We believe that speech activity as a whole may be regarded as the object of linguistics and of a series of other sciences (physiology, psychology, etc.). As for the subject of linguistics, it incorporates only those components of speech activity by means of which we implement the acts of communication and thinking but which are separate from speech activity as a whole. See also the collection of articles on this question O coomHOUiemii cunxpomozo oHamaa u ucmopmecKOZo myHenun n3bmoe (Moscow, 1960), pp. 114-115.

18

INTRODUCTION

requirement, for which reason it cannot be the object of a linguistic study.12 3. Language (langue) has a homogeneous character when regarded as an object composed of nothing but distinctions (distinctions which are established negatively only); seen from this point of view, the real properties of sounds and meanings are not relevant to language, while language as a subject of linguistics is not a substance but a form. 13 4. "Language, taken independently of speech, is the subject of a similarly independent study ... not only can the science of language dispense with the extraneous elements of speech activity, but, in fact, it is in general only possible to study language when these extraneous elements have been separated from it."14 Thus, the methodological principle discussed is based on subjective-idealistic and anti-substantialist relativist views.15 The relative independence of language and, in particular, the role of the system factor are absolutised here, while the requirement, quite legitimate in itself, of making an accurate distinction between the extralinguistic and the genuinely linguistic factors in an analysis of language becomes self-contradictory, as it becomes a negation, in principle, of anything which plays a role in or has an influence upon the structure of language and its development of such extralinguistic factors as a system of thought or mutual communications within a particular society.

12

F. de Saussure, ibid., p. 39. Ibid., pp. 117-120. 14 Ibid., p. 39. Compare similar statements by L. Hjelmslev (L. Hjelmslev, "IIpojieroMeHH k Teopmi H3MKa", Hoaoe e jiumeucmuKe, 1 (Moscow, 1960), p. 269. 15 See the criticism of these views in the article by T. P. Lomtev, in "CoBpeMeHHoe ii3BiK03HaHHe h crpyKTypHaa nHHTBHCTHKa", TeopemwtecKue npoSAeMbi coepeMeHHOzo coeemcKozo R3biK03Hpa3a u npedAOMcemie (1961). It should be noted that in linguistics certain authors also believe that a sentence is a type of phrase. 8 P. V. Kopnin, "npapoaa cyacflemw H (j)opMbi Bupaxcemra ero B H3bnce", MuuiMHue u H3UK, pp. 300-322. It should be borne in mind, at the same time, that a judgement-statement, a judgement-interrogation and a judgementmotivation do not exhaust all the types of utterance which are differentiated according to their functions. Thus no one of the above-mentioned types of utterances can cover the following two-member sentences: A, mu npuium?! 'Ah, you are here?!'; Hy nmo rma nymaeutbcn nod HOZOMU?! 'Now, what are you getting into my way for?!'.

STRUCTURE OF A SENTENCE AND OF A JUDGEMENT

21

follow that they are not reflected at all in the grammatical structure of a sentence. It can be affirmed, a priori, that the structural components of a judgement, interrogation or motivation as a form of thought find their formal expression in language in the formal structure of a sentence, because the establishment (by specific linguistic means) of the opposition existing in the structure of a judgement, interrogation or motivation between the logical subject as a notion of the object of the thought and the logical predicate as the new information communicated about the object of the thought or asked about it is a necessary condition for the fulfilment of the communicative assignment. A. S. Akhmanov quite correctly comments that: "Thought in its entirety, including its structure, is expressed by the linguistic means of speech ... Obviously, as a result of the perception of speech a person is also able to know the form of thoughts communicated in speech. Hence, there should be a linguistic means for expressing the logical forms of thought."4 Logicians and linguists have repeatedly stated5 that the logical (other authors believe it to be the psychological) predicate of the judgement — whenever it is not expressed by a grammatical predicate — is singled out in the sentence by the so-called "logical stress", i.e. by a type of intonation. This fact has not, however, been properly considered in the light of the correlation between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the thought expressed, since intonation has not been traditionally regarded as a formal linguistic means, although, in some cases, certain types of intonation have been considered by grammarians in connection, for instance, with the delimitation of indicative, interrogative and imperative sentences. It is important, therefore, to remember that 4

A. S. Akhmanov, "JIormecKH $OPMI>I H HX BupaxceHHe B aîbnce", p. 181. See for instance Henry Sweet, A New English Grammar opMajn>Hoft jiorHKH", Bonpocw jtoBUKU (1955), pp. 49-50.

38

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

subject of a judgement. There are no grounds for believing that there is a certain inner relation between the development of the forms of a judgement in respect of the character of its structural elements and the emergence of a particular part of speech as the substantive. There is no doubt that, originally, substantives designated only real objects and that the origin of substantives designating qualities, action, etc., i.e. abstract substantives of the type "whiteness", "smoking", etc., is partially due to the fact that at a certain stage in the development of man's thinking, notions of characteristics, actions, etc., began to assume the function of the subjects of a judgement. In other words, the grammatical meaning of the objectification of substantives in modern languages, which is characterised by the fact that these languages have special means for representing as objects not only real objects but also qualities, actions, etc., and which therefore does not coincide with the notion of an object (i.e. it seems at first sight to be independent of the ultimate logical structure of the thought), is found to be preconditioned by this objectification.16 The tendency to establish a correlation between the logical function (in this case the function of the logical subject) and the linguistic form demonstrates itself in a series of other very varied linguistic facts: i.e. in substantiation and conversion, in those cases where the verb as a part of the logical subject is given specific nominal characteristics or where it forms a deverbal, as is the case in the Chinese language17 (compare for instance: Ta kandy shy chjungo pao "That which is read by him are Chinese papers" and Ta kan chjungo pao "He is reading Chinese papers", where dy is the nominal suffix and shy is the link),18 in the existence of special syntactic constructions of the type of the French C'est I'oiseau qui vole "That which is flying is a bird" (compare L'oiseau vole "The bird is flying"), etc. For more on this subject see V. Z. Panfilov, rpaMMamma HUBXCKOZO M3biKa, 1 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1962), pp. 36-38. 17 See A. A. Dragunov, HccjiedoeattuH no epaMMamwe coepeMennoeo KumaucKozo H3biKa (Moscow-Leningrad, 1952), pp. 103-112. 14

18 The examples are borrowed from the above-mentioned work by A, A, Dragunov,

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

39

However, it would be wrong to consider that, owing to the presence of this trend, the logical function in all modern languages is always expressed item-by-item in the language, i.e. that, according to the applicable case, the logical subject is always expressed by the substantive or some other part of speech in the nominative case. The instances mentioned indicate that in one and the same language the logical subject may be designated by different linguistic means, so that, for instance, if we ignore for the moment languages with the ergative construction, a part of speech in the nominative case (the subject) may be regarded as the main, but not the only, form of its expression. Thus, the logical subject may quite frequently be distinguished quite negatively in the structure of a sentence when the logical predicate is established by special linguistic means. Thus, the point of view of A. A. Saxmatov regarding the character of the interrelations between the division of a communication and the division of a sentence does not correspond either to the real nature of different types of communication (judgement, interrogation, motivation) or to the linguistic facts themselves. K. G. Krusel'nickaja, who has written two very informative articles on the question of the actual division of a sentence, while accepting A. A. Saxmatov's view of the nature of a judgement, does not believe it possible to identify the members of the actual division with the logical or psychological subject and predicate, since the former are, in her opinion, "abstractly objective" categories and the latter are "specifically subjective" categories. Moreover, the "given" and "new" "comprise an entity with two aspects, the objective, inasmuch as the categories are determined by real concrete circumstances and by the extent of knowledge possessed by the listener about the communication, and the subjective, since the categories are determined by the way in which these objective factors are perceived by the speaker."19 It has been mentioned already that the objectivity of the structure of a judgement should not be understood as meaning that only the 19

K . G. KruSel'nickaja, X3biKe, pp. 23-24,

CMUCAOOOH

(FIYHKIFUX

nopndKa CJioe e

UEMEIFKOM

40

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

notion of a real object may be the subject of a judgement and that only the notion of the characteristics (qualities, properties, actions, etc.) of this object may be the predicate of the judgement; i.e. one should not reduce the subject-predicate relations within the content of a judgement to the level of the relations between substance and attribute. Nor is the judgement, interrogation or motivation, while constituting an act of cognition, deprived of the subjective aspect, since it invariably reflects the direction of the act of cognition, particularly the way in which objective reality is being perceived. Thus, in this respect, there is no difference in principle between the logical subject and predicate, on the one hand, and the members of the actual division on the other. According to K. G. Krusel'nickaja and some other linguists,20 the view that the actual division of a sentence into the "given" and the "new" reflects the subject-predicate structure of a judgement cannot be accepted either, because the subject and predicate of a judgement are purely logical categories while the singling-out of the "given" and the "new" in the content of a sentence is an operation of a grammatical nature, the "given" and the "new" therefore being linguistic categories. However, the legitimate question arises as to why the structural components of the thought, in this case, the judgement, interrogation or motivation, cannot be distinguished by specific linguistic means and still remain components of thought. This type of argument would most probably have been valid if the logical forms of the thought had a separate existence from the forms of their expression. An interesting and, in many ways, original concept of the correlation between the structure of the sentence and the structure of a logical phrase or the logeme as a combined notion of a judgement, interrogation and motivation is set forth in the mentioned book by P. V. Cesnokov, "JIorHHecKaa (J)pa3a h npeaj i o x e H H e " (The Logical Phrase and Sentence). In this work ,0 See, for instance S. E. Jaxontov, "Huchh npeflJioaceHra b KHTafiCKOM jBMKe", yueubie 3anucKu Jiry, 1958, cepmi BOCTOKOBeflHbix HayK, >6 6, p. 165, Reference I.

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

41

P. V. Cesnokov undertakes to establish a complete correspondence between the division of the sentence at all its levels and the articulation of the logical phrase. According to P. V. Cesnokov, "the articulation of the logical phrase into components may be effected along three lines: its structure, the dynamics of the thought and the relation of the thought to reality (the objectification of the thought).21 The first of these types of articulation implies the division of the logical phrase" into the minimum structurally independent sense components equivalent to the members of the sentence.22 As regards the relation of the thought to reality (the objectification of the thought), the logical phrase is subdivided into two components, the notion of the object of the thought and the notion of this object's characteristic features.23 P. V. Cesnokov applies the term logical subject of the judgement to the first components and the term logical predicate24 to the second. As regards the dynamics of the thought, i.e. the movement of the thought from the old to the new knowledge, the same logical phrase is divided into the "given" and the "new", which the author (following the example of Karl Boost) calls the theme and the rhema, respectively.25 According to P. V. Cesnokov, each of the latter two types of division of the logical phrase also has an item-by-item reflection in the grammatical structure of the sentence in its articulation into two parts. Of the three types of articulation of the logical phrase and of the 21

Ibid., p. 84. See also his comment on the Russian edition of this work, rpaMMamuKa u Jlozma, IfoeecmuH Axadejuuu Hayic CCCP, OmdeAenue

Aumepamypbi u H3UKa, 25, Ns 2 (1966). 22

Ibid. Ibid., pp.40. 24 Ibid., p. 88. 25 Ibid., p. 87. It should be noted, however, that according to Boost the 'rhema' is always expressed by the grammatical predicate or by the grammatical predicate and the related members of the sentence. Therefore, the meaning of the term RHEMA, as used by K. Boost corresponds to the term LOGICAL PREDICATE which P. V. Cesnokov uses to designate a part of a logeme distinguished by the objectification of the thought and always expressed by the grammatical predicate or the grammatical predicate and the related members of the sentence. 28

42

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

three types of division of the sentence, respectively, the first type is static and the latter two are dynamic. This means that one and the same thought and one and the same sentence may be articulated into two parts by different methods. 28 Furthermore, the articulation of a logical phrase by means of the objectification of the thought, may, in principle, fail to coincide with the articulation of the same logical phrase by means of the dynamics of the thought. 27 This is due to the fact that the mobility of logical phrase articulation by means of the objectification of the thought is limited, since, according to P. V. Cesnokov, the logical predicate of the logical phrase is always expressed by the grammatical predicate or the grammatical predicate and the related members of the sentence,28 whereas logical phrase articulation by means of the dynamics of the thought is always absolutely free, since both "rhema" and "theme" may be expressed by any member of the sentence. Because of this, there may be a difference not only between the direction of the process of the objectification of the thought and the dynamics of the same thought but also between the boundaries of the logical phrase articulation in both cases mentioned. For instance, if in the sentence: K MM npuexam apmucmu TypKMemiH "We are visited by actors of Turkmenia" the logical stress is on the word TypKMenuu "Turkmenia", it expresses the "rhema", and the logical predicate will be expressed by the group of the grammatical predicate K MM npuexaAu "We are visited". 29 As a result, this logeme from the point of view of its objectification and from the point of view of the course of the thought will be articulated in the following way: "the given" I 1 K MM npuexa/iu apmucmu I I I the logical predicate < "

>• "the new" 1 I TypKMenuu I. the logical subject

Ibid., pp. 50-51, 74-81. Ibid., p. 78-81. 28 Ibid., pp. 47, 78-81. According to Cesnokov this function in one member sentences is fulfilled by the principal member. 27

2

» Ibid., p. 81.

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

43

This theory of item-by-item correspondence between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the logeme expressed by it has, however, proved to be vulnerable. First of all, P. V. Cesnokov's statement30 that the sense components, each expressed by some member of a sentence, are the smallest structurally independent elements of the logeme as a form of thought is open to question. As we have already noted (see pages 13-14), the smallest structurally independent elements, in a judgement and in the other types of logeme are the logical subject and the logical predicate and it is only their interrelationship which determines the character of the logeme as a form of thought. 31 The members of a sentence, however, are the smallest structural elements of a sentence taken as a grammatical unit of language. Thus, it is hardly possible to agree that the members of a sentence and their corresponding sense components are the syntactic and logical members of the correlative division of the sentence and the logeme, as is suggested by P. V. Cesnokov.32 Similarly doubtful is the validity of distinguishing two independent structural levels of logeme, one of which is related to the objectification of the content of the logeme (which is quite correctly regarded by P. V. Cesnokov as a characteristic which distinguishes it from other types of thought, from the notion, for instance),33 and the other of which is related to the dynamics of thought. To begin with, we can hardly accept that the process of the objectification of thought is something independent from the movement (dynamics) of thought; obviously, the direction of both processes is bound to coincide, since the objectification of the thought is an aspect of the thought's movement or development. It is not accidental, therefore, that the criteria which allow us to judge the character of the articulation of the logeme according to 30

Ibid., p. 74. This is recognised to a certain extent by Cesnokov when he points out that "... the distinguishing of sense components corresponding to members of the sentence is of no particular importance for the logical study proper" {ibid., p. 84). 32 Ibid., pp. 74-75. 83 Ibid., pp. 14. 31

44

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

the objectification and the movement (dynamics) of the thought are one and the same (the logical stress, the word order, etc.),34 for which reason it is impossible to distinguish these two types of articulation. The point of distinction suggested by P. V. Cesnokov — the logical predicate of the logeme is always expressed by the grammatical predicate or by the grammatical predicate and the related members of the sentence — by virtue of which one and the same logeme may have different articulation, viz. according to the objectification or the dynamics of the thought, is a purely grammatical one and cannot be considered relevant for the logical structure proper that is claimed by him to represent the structure of the logeme from the point of view of the objectification of the thought. Indeed, one and the same logeme may, for instance, be expressed by two different sentences, one particular component being expressed by the grammatical predicate in one sentence and by some other member in the other sentence. Thus, compare: 1) Jlemum — nmuifa "The bird is flying" with 2) Heumo jiemnufee ecmb nmuifa "That which is flying is a bird". If we agree that the logical predicate of the logeme, distinguished by the objectification of the thought, is always expressed by the grammatical predicate, then the logical predicate in the first instance is Aemum "is flying" and in the second ecmb nmuifa "is a bird", although one and the same logeme with an identical structure and with the same type of articulation is expressed in both cases. Finally, the analysis of the logical predicative modal relations in a logeme and of the methods of their expression in a sentence does not give sufficient grounds for distinguishing two types of logeme articulation, viz. according to the objectification or movement of the thought. P. V. Cesnokov believes that this type of relationship is peculiar only to the logeme structure determined by the objectification of the thought and not to a structure determined by the movement of the same thought. 35 It is obvious, 34

36

Ibid., pp. 50-51, 55-56, 75-78.

Ibid., pp. 55, 84.

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

45

however, that the movement of the thought, the transition from the old to the new knowledge, is bound to include corresponding predicative-modal characteristics.36 We shall show (see pages 56-82) that the logical predicative-modal relations from an essential component of the logeme structure resulting from its articulation into the "given" and the "new" and expressed in the structure of a sentence. Also distinguished in a sentence are the genuinely grammatical predicative-modal relations, which are always related to the grammatical predicate. The modalpredicative relations ascribed by P. V. Cesnokov to the structure of the logeme, which, according to him are a result of the objectification of the thought, are in actual fact either the logico-predicative relations which describe the structure of the logeme resulting from its articulation into the "given" and the "new" or the genuinely grammatical predicative-modal relations, since P. V. Cesnokov believes that the logical predicate is always expressed by the grammatical predicate or by the grammatical predicate and the related members of the sentence. Finally, the validity of this explanation of the actual division of a sentence according to its correlation with the logical structure of the thought may also be questioned, because two-member sentences are by no means always partitioned into the "given" and the "new". I have in mind such cases as when the sentence as a whole is an answer to the question as to what has happened and, hence, the thought expressed does not comprise something already known by the speaker; i.e. the entire content of the sentence conveys something new for the speaker. Such sentences as IIOIUAU napoxodu "The ships sailed", IIpu/iemeAu zpauu "The rooks came", have 36

See also I. P. Raspopov, AKmyajiwoe t/teHeuue u KOMMymmmueHOcmmaKCutecKiie munu noeecmsoeame/ibHbix npedjioMcenuù e pyccKOM H3biKe

(Moscow, 1964). Raspopov writes the following in this connection: "The actual division is directly related to the sentence constituting the act of predication. The components of this division are at the same time the components of the predicative relation. This very fact (the predicative relation in the abovementioned sense) links the content of the sentence with reality (the object of the thought) from the point of view of the speech interaction between the speaker and the listener." (ibid., p. 8).

46

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

been defined by L. V. S&rba as uni-component phrases as distinct from bi-component phrases of the following type: Tlapoxodbi — noni.ro "The ships — sailed" rpanu — npHJieTe.™ "The rooks — came" the distinction being that in the latter sentences "the component following the dash is always a particular statement concerning that which has been expressed in the component preceding the dash and is in opposition to it," whereas in uni-component phrases "there is no such opposition, all of them being mere matter-of-fact statements, though very complex at times."3' However, if the division of a bi-component phrase into the "given" and the "new" reflects, as L. V. §5erba asserts, the subjectpredicate structure of the thought expressed, it may be asked whether there is any subject-predicate structure in the thought expressed by the uni-component phrase which is not subject to division. A similar question arises with regard to the character of the structure of the thought which is expressed by one-member sentences which cannot be bi-component phrases38 (one-word 3

'

L. V. Scerba, OonemuKa ffipaHify3CKoao H3biKa, pp. 117-118. D. V. Bubrix

emphasises the difference between the division of a sentence into formalgrammatical components of subject and predicate and components of subject and predicate based on the content and he indicates the possibility of divergence between the two types of division (as in the case: Ilaiuem — omeif 'It is the father who is ploughing). He also distinguishes "sentences with an obliterated grammatical subject-predicate opposition where the phrases are bi-componental in form but uni-componental in fact". (D. V. Bubrix "O BO3HHKHOBCHHH noiyieacamHO-CKasyeMOCTHoro npefljioaceima", Becmu. Jiry, JVa 5 (1947), p. 78). Conventionally, in similar cases in sinology, we speak of uni-component one-member sentences with a dependent grammatical subject which, unlike the independent grammatical subject, forms with the verb a single, closed group of the grammatical predicate and is characterised by a series of formal characteristics (it is placed after the verb, carries the strong stress, the suffixes of predication are placed after it and not after the verb, etc.). See A. A. Dragunov, "O saBHCHMbix uieHax npefljio>KeHiM B coBpeMeimoM KMTaflCKOM

H3bixe", Hie. AH CCCP, OJIH, V JVs 6, (1946), p. 118.

88 It should be noted that, contrary to existing opinion, by no means all types of one-member sentences are identical in this respect. Thus, one-member, but no one-word sentences of the type rpadoM nodwto pojtcb 'The wheat is hail-beaten' may also be bi-component phrases no6wio poMCb — rpaaoM 'The hail has beaten the wheat', in which the logical subject and predicate of the

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

47

impersonal and nominative sentences of the following type in the Russian language — Benepeem, 3UMO etc., impersonal sentences with the formal subject of the type Es regnet and Man sagt in German, II pleut in French, It is cold in English, etc.). In our opinion, this question should be settled similarly in both cases, since it seems that the structure of thoughts expressed by twomember sentences which are uni-component phrases may be identified with the structure of thoughts expressed by the abovementioned types of one-member sentence.39 There are two main trends of opinion regarding the structural character of thoughts expressed by the latter types of sentence. According to one view, they convey judgements in which the logical subject of the judgement, although not given separate verbal expression, is, nevertheless, present in the thought proper and is distinguished in it by virtue of the situation, the context, etc.40 According to the other view, we are dealing in such cases with subjectless judgements (M. Vladislavlev, N. N. Lange, M. I. Karinskij and others). notion, each taken separately, are given verbal expression. It would be proper to discuss all types of one-member sentence from this point of view. See also I. P. Raspopov, AKmyatibHoe HAenenue npedjioncenuH (Ufa, 1961).

3 * The similarity of uni-component sentences and one-member sentences is noted by D. V. Bubrix, who offers a number of interesting ideas in this connection. Bubrix firstly points out that the sentences which are uni-componental in content "create the media for the development of highly peculiar phenomena. On the one hand, it becomes possible to omit the component of the grammatical subject if the component of the grammatical predicate indicates it sufficiently clearly, if it is apparent from the general context or if it is so vague semantically that it is possible to do without it. On the other hand, it becomes possible to elaborate certain types of subjectless sentence where the component of the grammatical subject is not even indicated as part of the assignment." (D. V.

Bubrix, " O B03HHKH0BeHHH nojyieacainHO-CKaayeMocTHoro npefljioaceHHH",

p. 78). It is possible to agree with Bubrix also with regard to the point that "the obliteration of the opposition between the components of the grammatical subject and predicate should be regarded not as a manifestation of regression, decay or a return to the pre-subject-predicate past but as the result of the development of the subject-predicate form of a sentence from the sphere in which it was previously necessary into a sphere where, essentially speaking, it is still unnecessary." {ibid.) 40 See, for instance P. V. Kopnin, "IIpHpofla cyacflemw H opMbi Bbipa»eHna e r o B H3kiKe", pp. 331, 340.

48

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

Both points of view are open to considerable reservations. Indeed, if the logical subject of a judgement which is not given verbal expression in the composition of the sentence is distinguished only by virtue of a certain situation or context, then it is hardly possible to consider that it is present in the actual act of the given concrete thought expressed by a corresponding sentence. Besides, this point of view presupposes that one of the components of a judgement, in a certain category of cases, is never given linguistic expression. The proponents of this point of view are, consequently, basing themselves on the understanding that notional thinking may be realised without the use of any form of language (without the use of audible or vocal language, manual or visual language or any other system of signs), which can hardly be accepted as a valid opinion.41 By way of countering this argument, some proponents of the former point of view assert that the topic of a judgement in these cases is directly perceived and that the logical subject of the judgement will be not a notion of the topic of the thought but the image of its perception. However, this statement contradicts the generally accepted understanding of the nature of a judgement to the effect that it is a form of abstract, logical thinking, since it is presupposed that one of its structural components (in a certain category of cases) is a sensory image and, hence, belongs to the sensory stage of cognition; i.e. it belongs to the first rather than to the second signal system. Obviously, this view cannot be corroborated by indications, although they are basically indisputable, that there is no insurmountable boundary between the sensory and the logical stages of cognition, that in the process of cognition the elements of both stages of cognition are in constant interaction, interrelation, etc. Besides, the view mentioned is invalid from the factual viewpoint. Indeed, although it is clear that in most cases the im41

See V. Z. Panfilov, "K Bonpocy o cooTHomeHHH H3bnca h mmuukhhh", Muiujienue u H3bm (1957); G. Revesz, "Denken und Sprechen", Acta Psychologies X, Ni! 1-2 (1957), p. 26.

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

49

personal and other one-member and one-word sentences are uttered about a concrete situation and are accompanied by sensory images of corresponding objects of thought, the presence of a concrete situation and of the corresponding sensory images of the objects of thought is by no means obligatory when such sentences are being uttered. For instance, when uttering or perceiving a sentence like the Russian CeemaAo it is possible to have no sensory image of the corresponding natural phenomenon. On the other hand, if we agree that there is no logical subject in a given thought, the question arises as to whether this thought may be regarded as a judgement. It is quite probable that, if we interpret a form of thought as "a definite type or method of associating elements of a thought or associating thoughts proper"42 then we shall be dealing not with a judgement but with a new form of thought which thus far has not been distinguished and defined by logic. This decision with regard to the question of the character of the thought structure expressed by one-member sentences seems to be accepted, for instance, by the authors of the Grammar of the Russian Language. "Thus", they write, referring to one-member sentences, "the structure of a concrete sentence may be based also on a sole notion or image grammatically related to reality."43 The fact that syllogistic deductive conclusions are based only on judgements which have a subject-predicate structure is another proof that a thought which is characterised by its objectification and which in its contents does not single out a verbally expressed logical subject is not a judgement but some other special form of thought. It follows that both the types of one-member sentences mentioned and the two-member sentences which are devoid of any actual divisioning express some form of thought other than a judgement. Thus, the actual division of a sentence mirrors the subjectpredicate structure of the thought expressed. Furthermore, since 42

A. S. A k h m a n o v , "JIoriroecKHe ( ¡ > o p M b i H H X B b i p a j K e i m e B H 3 H K e " , p . 172. rpaMMamuKa pyccKozo H3bwa, II, part 1 (Moscow, 1954), p . 74. See also V. V. Vinogradov, "HeicoTopMe 3aaaiH cnHTascHca n p o c r o r o npewioaceHHa", Bonp. R3blK03HQHUH, Ms 1 (1954), p. 9. 13

50

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

the actual division of a sentence is not purely semantic or logical, but is rather of a formal-grammatical nature, we inevitably come face to face with the question as to how it is related to the syntactic division of a sentence. In other words, should we, linguistically speaking, regard the actual division of a sentence as being a phenomenon of the same order as the syntactic division. V. Mathesius, K. Boost and some other linguists44 were inclined to regard these two types of sentence division as being in opposition, using their mutual divergence as an argument to justify their viewpoint. Referring in this connection to the English and Czech languages, V. Mathesius also states that the extent of divergence between the actual and the syntactic division of the sentence varies from language to language and that "the English language is much more consistent than the Czech language in striving to bring the grammatical division of a sentence into agreement with the division of the content of a sentence into the 'theme' and the 'rhema'." 45 We should at the same time point out that, as a rule, the divergence between both types of division is much greater in the morphologised (synthetic) languages than in the "isolating" or analytical languages where the morphologisation of the members of a sentence is considerably less pronounced. 46 44

See Karl Boost, Neue Untersuchungen zum Wesen und zur Struktur des deutschen Satzes (Berlin, 1955). In this connection we should note a very valuable monograph by Raspopov (I. P. Raspopov, AKmycuihHoe HAeueme npedaootcenuH, Ufa, 1961). 45 Mathesius, "O funkci podmetu", p. 234. 46 Most interesting views on this point were offered by G. Paul. "In the languages with less developed formal means," he wrote, "the contradiction between the psychological and the grammatical subject or between the psychological and the grammatical predicate is found much less often. The contradictions are the direct result of the presence of developed forms for expressing the different logical relations between the notions. The peculiar and unusual forms of expression in the Dayak language, which are referred to by Steinthal {Typen, pp. 172 and 173), are mainly due to the fact that the psychological subject or the psychological predicate is at the same time the grammatical subject or predicate." (G. Paul, IIpuHifunbi ucmopuu H3viKa, p. 244). We only wish to question here the grounds for distinguishing, in a language, between two series of phenomena, the 'given' and the 'new', on the one hand, and the grammatical subject and predicate, on the other, if they continually coincide in the given language.

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

51

According to another point of view which has been elaborated in particular detail by K. G. Krusel'nickaja, the actual division of a sentence does not exceed the framework of its syntactic division and is a phenomenon of a syntactic nature. K. G. Krusel'nickaja writes the following: "The meanings of the 'given' and the 'new', which depend on the function of speech and are imparted to the members of a sentence in the process of speech, do not obliterate the basic meanings of the members of the sentence expressed by corresponding grammatical forms. The meanings of the 'given' and the 'new' are superimposed on the grammatical meanings of the members of the sentence and constitute an indispensible function of the latter in every concrete act of communication."47 And further: "Thus, the communicative function of the members of the sentence is a component of their meaning and is expressed through the use of specific linguistic means. Therefore, it seems expedient to regard this function as a specific syntactic category."48 According to K. G. Krusel'nickaja, the communicative function of the members of a sentence should be classed with the syntactic category of predicativity. Some other authors also regard the relationship between the "theme" (the "given") and the "rhema" (the "new") as one of the main syntactic relationships.49 However, the mere fact that the communicative function which reveals itself in the actual division of a sentence into the "given" and the "new" may be ascribed to any member of the sentence without altering the latter's quality at the level of the syntactic division of the sentence means that the actual division of a sentence K. G. KruSel'nickaja, "K Bonpocy o cmmcjiobom uieHeHim npeAJioacemw", Bonp. H3biK03HamH, .Ns 5 (1954), p. 58. 18 Ibid., p. 65. " See for instance: O. M. Barsova, "O Tpex cTenemix cjihthocth HMeimoro npefljioxceHHfl", Bonp. H3biK03Hmun, 3 (1961), p. 99. Admoni correctly criticises the theory of the mono-linearity of the verbal chain and indicates the multi-aspect nature and the multi-linearity of the latter; however, he includes the actual division of a sentence into the 'given' and the 'new', with the meanings of time and person, in the grammatical meanings (see V. G. Admoni, "O MHoroacneKTHo-flOMHHaHTHOM noflxofle k rpaMMaTireecKOMy crpoio", Bonp. H3htK03HQHUHy X8 2 (1961), p. 43). 47

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THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

exceeds the framework of its syntactic division. Obviously, the phenomenon with which we are dealing here is, in actual fact, not of the same syntactic sentence level but of a higher level, so that a traditional analysis according to the members of a sentence fails to explain all phenomena associated with the actual division of a sentence. This concerns not only the analysis of the content aspect of the actual division of a sentence, but also its formal-grammatical aspect inasmuch as the syntactic analysis according to the members of the sentence likewise fails to explain the purpose of some of the formal linguistic means (specific morphemes in some languages, the intonation, the word order, etc., see pages 20-29); i.e. it cannot be considered an exhaustive means for understanding the structure of the sentence as a whole. As has been rightly indicated in the abovementioned Grammar of the Russian Language, "the linguistic form of a sentence is not determined wholly and totally by the grammatical composition, by the relation of the grammatical subject and grammatical predicate. In fact, the sentence exists as a certain entity of its content, intonation and word order." 50 Thus, the sentence has in addition to the syntactic level, a special level which is predetermined by the actual division. Inasmuch as at this level of the sentence specific grammatical means are used to express the subject-predicate structure of a given thought, it seems possible to call it, as distinct from the syntactic level, a logico-grammatical level and to call the logical subject and the logical predicate of the thought conveyed the logicogrammatical subject and the logico-grammatical predicate.51 60

rpaMMamwca pyccKoao H3biKa, II, part 1, p. 89. See also V. Z. Panfilov, "K Bonpocy o jionuco-rpaMMaTiraecKOM ypoBHe H3biKa", Zeitschrift fur Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung, 15 (1962). It is most probably due to a misunderstanding that Antal asserts that Panfilov in the article "SKCTpanHHrBHCTHtecKHe h BHyrpHJIHHTBHCTHHeCKHe aKTOpbI B (fiyHKUJIOHHpOBaHHH H pa3BHTHH H3bIKa" suggested that not only the syntactic level but also the logical level of the sentence should be distinguished (see Laszlo Antal, "Word Order and Syntactic Position", Linguistics, 8 (1964), pp. 37 and 41). In actual fact, in the article referred to, just as in another earlier work mentioned above, we have always defined the structure of the sentence which is built over its syntactic structure as the LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL level of the sentence, "since the subject-predicate 51

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

53

At every level, we are dealing with different structural elements, i.e. members of a sentence52 including the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate at the syntactic level and the logicogrammatical subject and the logico-grammatical predicate at the logico-grammatical level. The meanings of the members of the sentence which are included in the logico-grammatical subject and the logico-grammatical predicate at the logico-grammatical level are found there in their "non-operative" form, so that both the logical subject and the logical predicate may be expressed by any member of the sentence or by any group of members. Moreover, the type of relations existing between the members of the actual division may not only differ from that of the syntactic relations between the members of the sentence but even constitute a direct contradiction to them. Thus, in the bi-component phrases OH npuexa/i — Sucrpo "He has come — soon"; OH npuexan — noe3noM "He has come — by train", the words 6bicmpo "soon" and noe3doM "by train" occurring at the level of the syntactic structure of the corresponding thought is expressed at that level of the sentence by specific grammatical means" (V. Z. Panfilov, loc. cit., p. 53). The fact that the subject-predicate structure of the thought expressed is fixed in the sentence by certain formal linguistic means is eventually recognised by Antal too (see p. 40 of the article mentioned). Therefore, the entire argumentation of Antal, which is based on the assertion that this level is a purely logical one and cannot therefore be an object of linguistic investigation, is invalid. Neither can we agree with the following argument set forth by Antal. He says that, since there are sentences without a logical subject and logical predicate, then even when they are found in a sentence they do not belong to it (ibid., p. 37). The logical invalidity of this conclusion is self-evident. Indeed, it is known, that, for instance, by no means all sentences contain the auxiliary and even the principal members of a sentence. If we follow Antal's logic, we are obliged to say that, even in those sentences where they do exist, they do not belong to the sentence, i.e. are not components of its structure. 62 Although the question of the criteria for distinguishing members of a sentence and, in particular, for distinguishing different types of auxiliary members is still a controversial issue, we believe that there are no serious grounds for doubting the validity of the principle of the syntactic division of a sentence, firstly, since it is perfectly clear that in the grammatical structure of a sentence its main members which function as the grammar — shaping centres of the sentence, are in opposition to the auxiliary members, which are grammatically dependent on then and, secondly, that the auxiliary members, in their turn, are in opposition to each other by virtue of their grammatical dependence upon one or other main member of the sentence.

54

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

division as adverbs of manner are syntactically dependent on the verb predicate npuexaji "has come". However, at the level of the actual division of the sentence, the same words expressing the logico-grammatical predicate are in a predicative relation to the other words of the sentence ("he has come") which, while expressing the logico-grammatical subject of the same thought at the level of the syntactic division of the sentence, in their turn are in opposition to one another as the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate. In other words, just as a word, in that it is a unit of a higher level than the morpheme, is not a mere sum of the morphemes, so a member of the actual division is not a mere sum of the syntactic members of the sentence. Since the actual division represents a higher level than the syntactic division, the sentence as a whole also belongs to the logico-grammatical level of language and cannot be defined at the syntactic level. Therefore, it is quite natural that most of the linguistic definitions of the sentence should indicate in one form or another that an essential characteristic of the sentence is that it expresses a relatively complete thought63 and that a sentence is characterised by the objectification of the content which it expresses (predicativity) ; M i.e. these definitions refer to a characteristic which cannot be explained at the syntactic level of the sentence. Therefore, it is not fortuitous that some linguists, such as De Groot, for instance, should feel it necessary to use two terms in the analysis of the sentence, viz. "clause" and "sentence"; the term "clause" most probably represents only that aspect of the "sentence" which could be called (according to the authors of the above-mentioned Grammar of the Russian Language) the grammatical composition of the sentence and does not include as63

Akhmanov states that hence the "grammatical definition of a sentence in its determination of the aspect of the sentence is based on the notion of logical form" and indicates that this gives rise to the question as to "whether the form of the sentence is a logico-grammatical one rather than a purely grammatical one." (A. S. Akhmanov, "JIoraiecKHe (fiopMti H HX BtipaaceHae B jBHxe", p. 200). 64 See pages 56-63 for more details concerning the notion of logical predicativity and the necessity of distinguishing this notion from grammatical predicativity.

THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVEL OF THE SENTENCE

55

pects associated with the actual division of the sentence.55 It follows that, as a whole, a sentence cannot be distinct from a judgement, interrogation or motivation, or from any other logical form of thinking. Owing to the confusion of the syntactic with the logicogrammatical levels of language, many phenomena belonging to either of these two levels have not been given a satisfactory definition up to the present time; the same reason explains why we have not fully overcome the influence of logicism in our approach to certain phenomena at the syntactic level. This is particularly evident in the approach to such questions as the substance of categories of predicativity, modality and mood, the applicability and the extent of applicability of the syntactic division of the sentence to all types of sentence, the criteria for distinguishing the principal members of the sentence, etc. 65

De Groot's point of view regarding this problem was rather vague. He merely indicated that "the judgement contained in a clause is not actualised". Some authors extend the question of the relations between the syntactic and the supersyntactic levels of the sentence to the field of language — speech relations, for instance: B. Trnka, "Morphologicke protiklady", O vldeckem poznAtti soudobych jazyku (Praha, 1958), and "Principles of Morphological Analysis", Philologica Pragensia, IV (1961); and Emile Benveniste, "Les niveaux de l'analyse linguistique", Preprint of papers for the 9th International Congress of Linguists, August 27-31, 1962, Cambridge, Mass. Trnka, in addition to the phonological, morphological and syntactic levels of languages, distinguishes the supersyntactic or the stylistic level. According to Trnka, unlike the syntactic level the unit of which is the sentence with its main component in the form of the grammatical subject-predicate relation, the unit of a supersyntactic level is the utterance based on the 'theme'/'rhema' relation. According to Trnka, the utterance of the type my father is ill is realised by the sentence my father is ill, but, unlike the latter, which may be used to denote many realities, it includes a concrete speaker, a concrete listener and a concrete extralinguistic situation, as a result of which, according to Trnka, Saussure's dichotomic concept of language as 'parole' and 'langue' becomes superfluous (see B. Trnka, "Principles of Morphological Analysis", pp. 130-131). Thus, the views of Trnka are a follow-up of the teaching by Mathesius about the actual division ,of a sentence. Unlike Trnka we regard the logico-grammatical level, as it is distinguished by us, as a language level which includes neither the concrete extralinguistic situation nor the concrete content of the sentence. E. Benveniste, while distinguishing a specific phrasal or categorematic level, also places it beyond the confines of language as a system of signs and considers it to be a property of speech.

4

PREDICATIVITY AND GRAMMATICAL PREDICATIVITY PREDICATIVITY AND MODALITY MODALITY AND MOOD

In many syntactic theories predicativity is recognised as a common property of a sentence which distinguishes it from other language units and the predicative relation is recognised as the main element of its structure. However, the substance of these phenomena still remains, to say the least, a controversial issue, and the theories on the question are highly contradictory. Basically, there are two approaches to a definition of the notion of predicativity and two main points of view on the substance of this phenomenon. The proponents of one point of view, which is outlined most fully in the Grammar of the Russian Language published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, base themselves on the following: "the meaning and the designation of the general category of predicativity which forms the sentence is in the objectification of the content of the sentence"1 and "predicativity may be a property of a sentence as a whole without causing its articulation."2 At the same time predicativity is regarded here as a syntactic category3 and it is asserted that "the correlative members of a sentence connected by predicative relations are the grammatical subject expressed by a substantive in the nominative case or by a pronoun (or also by a substantivised word) and the grammatical predicate expressed by the finite form of a verb, by the short form of the participle, by the adjective or by other morphological means."4 1 2 8 1

rpoMMamma pyccKoeo H3bma, II, part 1 (Moscow, 1954), p. 80. Ibid., p. 87. Ibid., pp. 78-79. Ibid., p. 88.

PREDICATIVITY AND GRAMMATICAL PREDICATIVITY

57

The proponents of the other point of view, which is most consistently presented in works by A. M. Peskovskij and M. I. Steblin-Kamenskij, ascribe predicativity, which they prefer to call "skazujemost" (cm3yeMocmb), to the syntactic division of the sentence and consider it to be the property of the grammatical predicate as a member of the sentence or, in other words, that which makes the grammatical predicate a grammatical predicate. 5 The same authors also indicate that there are two types of "skazujemost" — the formal and the intonational, which, more often than not, do not coincide with one another and do not replace one another 6 and that this predicativity is "a nuance in a word indicating that the word corresponds not only to a notion but to a complete thought." 7 Furthermore, "predicativity or a predicative relation, by virtue of its content, is certainly that which in logic is called the relation between the logical subject and the logical predicate of a judgement." 8 There are certain types of sentence — CaMan upacuean 6bi/ia M/iaduian doub "The youngest daughter was the most beautiful" — in which "instead of the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate ... there are only two principal members neither of which is a grammatical subject or a grammatical predicate, despite the presence of the predicative relation between these two members." 9 It seems that both points of view on the nature of predicativity are contradictory and the above-mentioned properties of predicativity cannot be reconciled with one another in many concrete sentences. Indeed, if predicativity is the objectification of the content of the sentence, then it should be present in sentences which do not contain a grammatical subject or a grammatical predicate (one-member sentences) or either of these members of the sentence. At least, some types of one-member sentence are 6

A. M. Peskovskij, PyccKuu cunmaKcuc e HayuHOM oceeufenuu (Moscow, 1956), pp. 165-166; M. I. Steblin-Kamenskij, "O npeiuncaTHBHoera", BecmuuK Jiry, Ns 20 (1956), pp. 133, 135. 6 A. M. PeSkovskij, ibid., pp. 170-173. 7 A. M. Peskovskij, ibid., p. 165. 8 M. I. Steblin-Kamenskij, ibid., p. 135. * M. I. Steblin-Kamenskij, ibid., p. 136.

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PREDICATIVITY AND GRAMMATICAL PREDICATIVITY

like this as are also some of the two-member sentences of the type: doub; rpyiumtfKiiu — toHKep; CaMdn Kpacuean 6biAa MAadwan Mocxea — cmo/iuifa CCCP "The youngest daughter was the most beautiful; Grusnicky is a cadet; Moscow is the capital of the USSR" and the like, where the grammatical opposition between the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate as the principal members of the sentence, as this exists in other types of sentence, is absent, since, in a way, the opposition between these members of the sentence is neutralised. Furthermore, if predicativity exhibits itself with regard to the logical subject and predicate, then in those cases where the logical subject and the logical predicate are not expressed by the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate, respectively, but are expressed by some other members of the sentence, there can be no predicative relation between the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate. These contradictions in the understanding of the meaning of predicativity merely prove that the notion of predicativity is interpreted to designate language phenomena which differ in principle; in other words, predicativity is viewed as a property of the grammatical predicate and of the sentence as a whole. Similarly, no distinction is made between the predicative relation as the relation of the grammatical subject to the grammatical predicate and the predicative relation as the relation of the logical subject to the logical predicate. V. G. Admoni has come nearer than anyone to appreciating the necessity for distinguishing between phenomena which, in principle, belong to altogether different categories. However, his point of view on this problem, which is founded basically on the corresponding statements of A. M. Peskovskij, remains in many respects contradictory and inconsistent. Thus, on the one hand, V. G. Admoni distinguishes the grammatical predicative connection (the relation between the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate) and the communicative-individual or the communicative-psychological connection (the relation between members of a bi-component phrase as L. V. §£erba understands it) and indicates that the

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59

"individual act of combining might not merely reproduce but also re-emphasise the grammatically predicative act of combining or it may even be at variance with this act, i.e. by combining with other members of an extended sentence." On the other hand, V. G. Admoni maintains that the first type of connection is, "in principle, the same type of combination of two members in the process of speech as is found in the bicomponent phrase", that both types of connection are "one and the same in their origin and the general direction of the phenomena" and that "the act of the predicative combination of two members in a two-member sentence, which takes place in a concrete process of speech, is twice repeated." 10 However, a clearcut distinction between these two phenomena, which are different in principle, is deemed necessary not only owing to the presence of two different sentence levels, the syntactic and the logico-grammatical, of which they are the essential structural elements, but also because each of them, as will be shown later, has its specific expression in a sentence. Bearing this in mind, it is deemed expedient, on the one hand, to distinguish between predicativity as a category which characterises the objectification of the content of the sentence and, for instance, actually reveals itself in the relation between the logical (or, to be more exact, the logico-grammatical) subject and predicate in a judgement sentence and, on the other hand, grammatical predicativity (crcaayeMocmb) as a syntactic category which is a property of the grammatical predicate (cm3yeMoe) as a syntactic member of a sentence and manifests itself in the two-member sentence in the relation between the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate. Thus, grammatical predicativity and predicativity proper are phenomena corresponding to two different sentence levels, namely the syntactic and the logico-grammatical levels, respectively. Grammatical predicativity as a phenomenon of the syntactic 10

V. G. Admoni, "flByHJieHHMe (J>pa3bi b TpaKTOBKe JI. B. IIIep6bi h npo6;ieMa npeflHKaTHBHOCTH", Haymme doK/iadu Buciueu UIKOJIH, g5UAOJIOBUnecKue nayKU, Ma 1 (1960), p. 38.

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level of a sentence is not a property of the sentence as a unit of language and occurs only in those sentences where we find a grammatical predicate as a member of the sentence. Unlike grammatical predicativity, predicativity proper characterises the objectification of the content of the sentence, i.e. it is a category according to which an utterance is perceived as a piece of information about reality.11 Therefore, predicativity is a property of the sentence as a whole and not of some individual member of the sentence including the grammatical predicate. The difference between grammatical predicativity and predicativity proper is a difference of principle of the same order as the difference between the grammatical subject and the logical subject or the difference between the grammatical predicate and the logical predicate. Grammatical predicativity and predicativity proper coincide only in those cases where the individual grammatical subject or the corporate grammatical subject expresses the logical subject, while the individual grammatical predicate or the corporate grammatical predicate expresses the logical predicate. In most cases they coincide, but this does not mean that predicativity proper and grammatical predicativity are phenomena of one and the same order or that grammatical predicativity is an individual type of predicativity; similarly, although the logical subject is most frequently expressed by the individual grammatical subject or by the corporate grammatical subject and the logical predicate by the individual grammatical predicate or by the corporate grammatical predicate, this is no reason to conclude that the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate are a verbally expressed logical subject and predicate. There is no doubt, however, that the genesis of the grammatical predicativity was predetermined by the predicativity proper, since the grammatical predicate and the grammatical subject as members 11

It is indicated in the definition of predicativity that it expresses the attitude of the speaker to reality or the attitude of the communication to reality (see rpaMMamuKa pyccKOzo Ribma, II, part 1, pp. 65-76). These definitions are erroneous. Indeed, the attitude of the speaker to reality may primarily be an emotional one which is certainly not expressed in all types of sentence and, secondly, this attitude cannot be classed as a logico-grammatical phenomenon.

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of a sentence are developed in a language as specific morphologised forms for expressing the logical predicate and the logical subject, which does not preclude the subsequent occurrence of certain divergencies between these two series of phenomena. Neither grammatical predicativity nor the grammatical predicate itself constitutes a characteristic feature of a sentence, since there are a good many of such types of sentence which do not have a grammatical predicate, and, because the presence of one grammatical predicate or the presence of the grammatical predicate within a set of words does not in itself guarantee the objectification of the thought which it expresses, the corresponding construction will not be a sentence, since it does not express a relatively complete thought or, to be more accurate it does not express a relatively complete act of thinking.12 As distinct from this, predicativity is the indispensable property of every sentence. In particular, the presence of predicativity, i.e. the objectification of the content, is the feature which distinguishes a one-word sentence from a word13 which is used as a specific unit of language, within an extended sentence, for instance. It was stated earlier that the question of the structure of the thought expressed by one-word sentences still remains a debatable issue. As we have ventured to show (see pages 46-49), there are hardly any grounds for supposing that the thoughts expressed by these types of sentence have a logical subject-predicate structure. 12 The necessity of this clarification is indicated by Cesnokov, who quite correctly pointed out that "it is necessary to distinguish between the completeness of thought and the completeness of the act of thinking". However, we can hardly agree with him that the act of thinking cannot be completed even when the thought is objectified (see P. V. Cesnokov, JIozunecKciH pa3a u npedAOMceHue, pp. 19-20). ls It may be argued that the property of objectification is characteristic not only of the sentence as a unit of language and of the logeme as a form of thought, but of the word and of the notion, respectively, bearing in mind that they also reflect objective reality. However, this objectification is actualised, and it is only in this form that the utterance about reality is being implemented. "Certainly, every thought (even a false one) is a reflection of reality and in one or other form is related to it. ... However, not every thought reveals how a person relates its contents to objective facts." (P. V. Cesnokov, JIozutecKan

(ppa3a u nped/iOMcenue, p. 15).

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PREDICATIVITY AND GRAMMATICAL PREDICATIVITY

In connection with this, it seems to be expedient to distinguish the notion of predicativity as the property of every sentence from the notion of the predicative relation as a relation between the logicogrammatical subject and the logico-grammatical predicate. Thus, bearing in mind the two-member sentences of a bi-component character, the predicative relation may be defined as an individual case of predicativity where the thoughts expressed by the corresponding sentences have a logical subject-predicate structure.14 Similarly, it is possible to distinguish the grammatical predicative relation as an individual case of grammatical predicativity which takes place only in two-member sentences and which represents the relation between the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate. When predicativity proper and grammatical predicativity do not coincide, the predicative relation proper and the grammatical predicative relation will likewise fail to coincide and will even have an opposite direction. Thus, when in a sentence: H'HByaa n'pbid' "A man has come", where the grammatical subject n'ueyda "man", which has taken on a predicative characteristic -ma ~ -pa ~ -da, expresses the logico-grammatical predicate and the grammatical predicate n'pbid' "has come" is the logico-grammatical subject, we have the following diagram of the relation of predicativity proper and of the relation of grammatical predicativity: the relation of predicativity proper Ï Hmyaa 1

n'pbid' _ J

the relation of grammatical predicativity. The divergence between the relation of predicativity proper and the relation of grammatical predicativity acquires an even more 14 As has been mentioned (see pages 45-46), not all two-member sentences have a subject-predicate structure; for instance, Russian sentences of the type HacmynuA eeiep, ITpuuijta 3uua, and the like. In this type of sentence, consequently, just as in the one-member one-word sentences, there is no predicative relation. On the other hand, one-member but not one-word sentences may express a thought which has a subject-predicate structure (see pages 46-47) and, consequently, there will be a predicative relation in these sentences.

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profound character in those cases where the boundaries of the articulation of a logeme do not coincide with the boundaries of the articulation of the sentence into the syntactic groups of the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate. For instance, in the sentence H'uex rfpud' TbiTOXTa "A man has come to the house" in which the logico-grammatical predicate is expressed by the adverbial modifier mbi$moxma "to the house", which is characterised by the same predicative denominator, and the logico-grammatical subject is expressed by the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate n'uex n'pbid' "a man has come", the diagram of the relation of predicativity proper and of the grammatical predicativity takes the following form: the relation of predicativity proper H'uex

rfpbid'

TM^TOXTa

the relation of grammatical predicativity. In addition to predicativity, there is usually another characteristic which is peculiar to the sentence as a whole, viz. modality. However, there are many differing and contradictory points of view regarding the native of this category and its relation to logical modality. The authors of the Grammar of the Russian Language published by the USSR Academy of Sciences, who regard predicativity as the objectification of the content of a sentence, state that "the general grammatical meaning of the objectification of the main content of a sentence is expressed in the syntactic categories of modality and also of time and person."15 Thus, modality and predicativity are interpreted here as phenomena which are basically of one and the same order (both are cases of the objectification of the content of the sentence), although they are not completely identified with one another, since predicativity, according to the view of the authors of the book in question, is expressed 16

FpaMMamuKa pyccKozo fi3bixa,

II, part 1, p. 80 (Moscow, 1954), p. 80.

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PREDICATIVITY AND GRAMMATICAL PREDICATIVITY

not only in the category of modality but also in the categories of time and person; i.e. the notion of predicativity proves to be a broader one than the notion of modality. The term modality is also used here in a different sense. Thus, a few lines further on, modality is referred to as "the relation of the information contained in the sentence to reality". A little later, an explanation is given of the meaning of the relation of the information to reality: "That which is being reported may be thought by the speaker to be something real existing in the past or in the present, something to be realised in the future, something desirable, something required of somebody, something unreal, etc."16 The question arises as to what is meant by the real or unreal content of the communication. Is the content of an utterance which reports the presence of a certain connection in reality (the affirmative sentence) real or actual (or thought to be such) and is the unreal content of this sentence that which reports the absence of this connection in reality (the negative sentence)? Alternatively, is the real and actual the content of an utterance in which objective reality is adequately reflected (an utterance of this type might be either an affirmative or a negative sentence) and the unreal the content of a sentence in which objective reality is reflected wrongly or inadequately (an utterance of this type might be either a negative or an affirmative sentence)? The interpretation of modality or, to be more exact, of types of modal meaning in the first sense is widespread among linguists. However, it seems that it is not accepted by the authors of the above-mentioned Grammar of the Russian Language and we shall go into this question in more detail later when analysing the corresponding point of view. As regards the second interpretation of modality, it may be compared with one of the two main views on the nature of logical modality, according to which the modality of a judgement expresses the extent of the reliability of the knowledge about reality which is being conveyed in the judgement (see page 72). There is yet another point of view on the nature of the modality "

Ibid., p. 81.

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of the sentence, according to which "modal categories indicate the function of speech, statement, negation, wish, supposition, etc.", while predication or the relation of predicativity is limited to the categories of time and mood, since — and it is impossible not to agree with this — the category of person "may enter the predication, but this is not always necessary (for instance, where the person is not expressed: 3decb — xopotuo "It is good here", TKumb emano jiynuie "Life became better", etc.).17 We consider that the above-mentioned definition of modality is unsatisfactory as an expression of the function of speech for the following reasons. It is indisputable that, although all types of indicative sentence are, for instance, described by one and the same function of speech and, if we accept this definition, should have the same type of modality, in actual fact they possess differing types of modality. For instance, in the Nivkhi language the function of speech remains unchanged regardless of whether the indicative sentences have the verb-grammatical predicate in the indicative, categorical or problematical or in a number of other moods; the same is found in the Russian language — indicative sentences with the verb-grammatical predicate in the indicative or subjunctive mood will not differ from one another in their speech function. Certainly, a difference in modality is seen also in such interrogative sentences as: MoaceT 6bm> OH noüdem? "Won't he possibly come?" KoHewio OH noüdem? "Certainly he will come?" In these sentences the logical predicate is expressed by the grammatical subject OH "he" and the modal words by virtue of their meaning and intonation are related to it, which relation is preserved in writing by ensuring that no comma separates them from the word OH "he". The first of these two sentences is characterised by a modality of problematical reliability and the latter by a modality of categorical reliability. Thus, if we accept the abovementioned definition of modality, we have to recognise that the meanings expressed by the above-mentioned forms of the verb in indicative sentences or the meanings of problematical and cate17

A. A. Reformatsky, Beedeuue e HntKosmHue

(Moscow, 1960), p. 268.

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PREDICATIVITY AND GRAMMATICAL PREDICATIVITY

gorical reliability in the interrogative sentences are either not modal, which is clearly unacceptable, or are distinguished by some feature other than that of the speech function. As regards imperative sentences with a verb-grammatical predicate in the imperative mood, they are not differentiated according to the extent of the reliability of the content conveyed by them. However, although the imperative mood of the verb is ordinarily included in the paradigm of the mood, the validity of this inclusion might be questioned even on purely structural grounds. Indeed, it is known that the forms of the imperative mood of the verb ordinarily occupy a special place among other forms of mood, and this gives rise to the question as to whether they are really members of the paradigm of the mood. 18 For instance, in the Nivkhi language the verb in the imperative mood may change in person, whereas in the other moods there is no personal conjugation of the verb. There is also a connection between one of the forms of the imperative mood (second person singular) and the vocative form of substantives.19 It is also hardly possible to agree with the idea that affirmative and negative sentences differ in their speech function, the more so as even sentences with a clearly differing speech function such as indicative and imperative ones may be either affirmative or negative and, consequently, should be regarded as sentences with a double modality, viz. as affirmative indicative, negative indicative, affirmative imperative and negative imperative, respectively. It follows from all this that the speech function cannot serve as a criterion for singling out different types of modality and that, according to the character of the speech function, we distinguish rather different types of communication (a sentence-statement, a sentence-interrogation, etc.). At any rate, in determining the question as to whether the 18

"The imperative mood," Vinogradov pointed out, "is on the periphery of the verb system. It strives to escape from it, since it is being attracted by interjections" (V. V. Vinogradov, Pyccmu H3biK (1947), p. 590). " See for more details V. Z. Panfilov, RPAMMAMMA HUSXCKOZO H3BWA, I, p. 164. See also V. V. Vinogradov, PyccKuu H3biK, p. 90.

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speech function is a sufficient basis for singling out different types of modality, it has to be borne in mind that identical varieties of sentence are classed as indicative or interrogative sentences according to the extent of reliability of their content. Compare, for instance: 1) He will go; He will certainly go; He will possibly go. 2) Will he go?; Will he certainly go?; Will he possibly go? Thus, the speech function and the extent of reliability of the content of the sentence represent overlapping bases for differentiating sentences and, consequently, if we maintain both bases for differentiating sentences according to the criterion of modality, we are violating the basic principle underlying the logical operation of differentiation.20 With regard to the use of moods as a method of expressing modal meanings, i.e. by means of the verbal form, O. Jespersen considers that this characterises "certain attitudes of the mind of the speaker towards the contents of the sentence."21 Obviously, this definition of moods as a type of modal value is too broad, since the attitudes of the mind of the speaker towards the contents of the sentence may be extremely varied; they might even be emotional, for instance. This type of attitude is also expressed in some languages by special verbal forms, which, according to this definition, should be regarded as forms of mood. Using the above-mentioned definition of modality as a basis, others introduce into it a limiting characteristic specifying the nature of the speaker's attitude towards the contents of the sentence. For instance, V. G. Admoni writes the following on this point: "However, the sentence, just as any other act of thought expressed by the sentence, not only reflects objective reality but also contains a definite attitude towards the objective connections 20

A different view on this matter is held by Cesnokov, who, since he regards the judgement, interrogation and motivation as "the main modal varieties of the logical phrase", considers, for instance, that the degree of reliability of the contents of the sentence is used only to specify more precisely these main types of modal meaning (see his JIozmecKan HH0 nafle» B apraTHBHoft KOHCTpyimHH", IJpo6jieMU cpaeHume/ibHou $u/ioaozuu, C6opuuK e necmh HjtenaKoppecnondenma AH CCCP, B. M. iKupMyncKozo (Moscow-Leningrad, 1964).

7

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SYNTACTIC AND THE LOGICO-GRAMMATICAL LEVELS OF THE SENTENCE

Let us now formulate some conclusions to characterize the grammatical (syntactic) and the logico-grammatical levels of language and their correlation. 1. The logico-grammatical level of the language is constituted on the basis of logical forms of thinking and their structural components are expressed by specific linguistic means and, in this connection, we have considered the logical phrase (the judgement, interrogation, motivation) and its structural components — subject and predicate.1 The sentence — logical phrase (such as the sentence-judgement, the sentence-interrogation, the sentencemotivation) and its components, i.e. the logical or, to be more exact, the logico-grammatical subject and predicate, represent phenomena of the logico-grammatical level of language. In most languages, specific linguistic means exist for establishing only the logico-grammatical predicate, while the logico-grammatical subject, when it does not coincide with the grammatical subject, is distinguished in the sentence-logical phrase structure in a negative manner by virtue of its opposition to the logico-grammatical predicate; i.e. it is characterized by a zero form. 2. The grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate as purely linguistic categories belong to the syntactic level of language and are characterized as the grammatically organising centres of the sentence, in every language their opposition being established 1 The question of other logical forms of thought and their structural components in this connection requires special study.

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by virtue of certain grammatical characteristics, which also include purely morphological ones. 3. The use of one or other member of the sentence in a function which is not peculiar to it at the logico-grammatical level (the grammatical subject in the function of the logical predicate, the grammatical predicate in the function of the grammatical subject, etc.) does not alter the quality of that member at the syntactic level of the sentence and cannot be regarded merely as an additional semantic content occurring at the same syntactic level of the sentence. 4. The components of the syntactic level of language — the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate — are developed within a language as specific forms for expressing the logical categories of the subject and predicate. The occurrence of a special form of the grammatical subject in the ergative case, in addition to the grammatical subject in the nominative or the absolutive case in languages which have the ergative construction of the sentence, is due to the tendency to convert into a grammatical subject that member of the sentence which designates the subject of the action. Thus, in these languages, the formation of the grammatical subject as a member of the sentence is influenced not only by the category of the grammatical subject but also by the category of the subject of the action. Since, owing to the relative independence of the development and functional aspects of language, certain divergencies arise between the logical content of the members of the sentence and their initial and main grammatically established function, specific means have been developed in the course of time for establishing the logical content of the members of the sentence when this content does not correspond to the historically developed linguistic material. 5. The difference between the syntactic and the logico-grammatical levels of the sentence in the synchronic plane manifests itself in: a) the possibility that the grammatical subject and predicate will not coincide with the logico-grammatical subject and predicate in

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those types of sentence which are characterised by both levels; b) the occurrence of sentences which have logico-grammatical (actual) division, but in their composition do not distinguish between the grammatical subject and predicate; on the contrary, in such cases sentences which permit a syntactic division into the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate do not have the logico-grammatical (actual) division into the logical subject and the logical predicate (according to L. V. §5erba's definition of uni-component phrases of the type HacTynnjia ocein>); c) the possibility that predicativity and modality as phenomena of the logico-grammatical level will not coincide with grammatical predicativity and mood as phenomena of the syntactic level of sentences, etc. Hence, the fact that sentences are identical at the syntactic level, i.e. their members have an identical composition in a concrete verbal expression, does not signify that these sentences are identical at the logico-grammatical level. 6. The relationship between the syntactic and the logicogrammatical divisions of the sentence is different in languages of a different typology. In the synthetic languages (in the flexive and, to a lesser extent, in the agglutinating), where are, as a result of the morphologising of the members of the sentences, considerable divergencies between these two types of sentence division. A s regards the "isolating" languages, owing to the absence of any clearly expressed morphologisms of the members of the sentence, the very principle for distinguishing the syntactic members of the sentence remains unclear. The logico-grammatical division of a sentence is surely of considerably greater importance in these languages than in the synthetic languages, in that it is a factor which determines the structure of the sentence as a whole and is in many cases used by the investigators of these languages as the main criterion for distinguishing the syntactic members of the sentence, a procedure which we believe to be wrong in principle. It is clear, at any rate, that in these languages the correspondence between the logico-grammatical and the syntactic divisions of the sentence is much greater than in the synthetic languages. Thus,

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the problem of the relationships between the logico-grammatical and syntactic divisions of the sentence may be a subject for typological examination. 7. The presence of a specific logico-grammatical level in language does not mean that language and thought are identical, since: a) we distinguish in a language such levels as the phonological and morphematic, whose units, i.e. the phoneme and the morpheme, do not have direct equivalents in thought, whereas there are considerable divergencies between the syntactic and logicogrammatical divisions of a sentence (see point 5); b) the concrete content of the sentence, while characterising the content of the thought, does not belong to the logico-grammatical level of language, since, as has been pointed out, the basic function of the logico-grammatical level of the sentence is to express by grammatical means only the structure or form of corresponding thoughts. The divergence between the contents of thought and language is also due to the fact that it is not language but speech that involves the content of the sentences together with the content expressed by free word combinations. 8. As long as we are dealing with linguistic thinking, i.e. with thinking which is implemented by natural language, the logical phrase (the judgement, the interrogation, the motivation) is a component of the logico-grammatical level of language. Only by abstracting the logical structure of the thought from the grammatical means of expressing it can the logical phrase (the judgement, the interrogation, the motivation) be singled out as an object for logical examination. 9. The division of the sentence at the logico-grammatical level is designated by different grammatical means (specific grammatical formants, intonation, word order, etc.) not only in different languages but quite frequently in one and the same language. The method of dividing the sentence at the syntactic level determines the nature of the elements of its structure, i.e. the members of the sentence, since in every language they have certain grammatical characteristics (thus, in the Russian language a noun in the oblique case cannot be a grammatical subject, etc.), as a result of which the

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syntactic structure of the sentence expressing one and the same thought may differ from language to language. The nature of the grammatical means used to distinguish the structural elements of the same sentence at the logico-grammatical level is irrelevant (the logico-grammatical predicate, for instance, will remain as such regardless of whether it is designated by a special formant, by intonation, etc., and also regardless of the part of speech and the word form that was used to express it), as a result of which the sentences expressing one and the same thought at the logicogrammatical level in different languages will have one and the same structure. 10. The fact that the logico-grammatical division of sentences which express one and the same thought in different languages is identical with the possible exception of their syntactic division, confirms the relative independence of language and the dominating part played by thought in the entity which they form. However, this cannot be explained by theories on the language-thought relationship which deny that there can be any dependence of the grammatical structure of language upon the logical structure of thought (the psychological trend), neither can it be explained by theories which contend that the language determines the logical structure of the thought itself and the nature of the reflection of objective reality (the hypothesis of Sapir-Whorf, the school of L. Weisgerber, certain schools of structuralism). When the supporters of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis speak of the limitations imposed on thinking by languages owing to their structural differences and, particularly, owing to the specific nature of their grammatical categories and lexical meanings, they fail to consider that the content expressed in the act of speech is far from being a simple sum of the meanings of the units of language which are used for these purposes. It remains a fact that, despite the considerable differences in the contents of corresponding units in different languages, identical contents may be adequately conveyed by means of any language, and this fact is borne out by the translations from one language into another, including translations from Indo-European languages ("Standard Average

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European" to use B. Whorf's terminology) into, for instance, Indian and Paleo-Siberian languages and vice versa. It is precisely because the content aspect of speech and the units of language used in speech do not coincide that our thoughts can always go beyond the contents of the language units and can influence their emergence and development.

JANUA

LINGUARUM

STUDIA MEMORIAE NICOLAI VAN WIJK DEDICATA Edited by C. H. van Schooneveld SERIES MINOR

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FiNNGEiR m o R T H :

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SAMUEL R. LEVIN:

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PAUL L. GARVIN:

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Syntactic Translation. 1965.162 pp., 58figs.Gld. 21.—

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Mathematical Linguistics in the Soviet Union. 1966. Gld. 22.—

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Generality, Gradience, and the All-or-None. Gld. 5.50

Zur formalen Charakterisierung des Satzes. 1962. Gld. 15.— Linguistic Structures in Poetry. Second printing. Gld. 8.— On Linguistic Method: Selected Papers. 1964. Gld. 14.—

Manual. 1964. 162 pp.

Grammar Discovery Procedure: A Field Gld. 9.—

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165 pp.

Studies in Socio-Linguistics. 1966. 167 pp., 2 tables. Gld. 20.—

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