Goal Systems Theory: Psychological Processes and Applications 0197687466, 9780197687468

Table of contents :
Cover
Goal Systems Theory
Copyright
Contents
Contributors
Introduction: The Principles of Goal Systems Theory
1. New Developments in Goal Systems Theory
2. A Goal Systems Approach to Risk Behavior
3. The Means–​Ends Fusion Model of Intrinsic Motivation
4. The Structure of Immersive and Engaging Activities: Insights from a Computational Model of Flow
5. The Temporal Dynamics of Goal Systems: How Goal Progress Changes the Drivers of Motivation
6. Paying for Goals and Means
7. Variety among Means: Advancing Understanding of Equifinality in Goal Systems
8. A Goal Systematic Approach to Persuasion: Influencing Attitudes and Behavior
9. Needs Find a Way: Means-​Shifts, Domain Jumps, and Leaps of Faith
10. Problem Solving from a Goal-​Systems Perspective
11. Extremism and the Extreme Personality
12. Political Behavior from the Perspective of the Goal Systems Theory
13. The Interplay between Goal Systems and Identities
Index

Citation preview

G OA L SYS T E M S T H E O RY “This book is a celebration of over 20 years of theoretical and empirical work studying Goal Systems Theory. It is well worth celebrating. The initial ambitious vision for this theory was to revise the study of motivation, and, impressively, it has done just that. It is extremely rare for a theory to have the breadth and depth displayed here. We used to call such theories ‘Grand’, and the research and ideas discussed in this book are grand indeed. And inspiring. This is a milestone that is must reading for anyone interested in motivation science.” —E. Tory Higgins, Professor of Psychology, Columbia University, Author of Beyond Pleasure and Pain: How Motivation Works “Do you have more than one goal? Then this book is for you! Like the stars in the sky, goals wax and wane, harmonize, conflict, or live next to each other. Diving into this volume summarizing the unique research on goal systems, will give you access to a new universe of discovery and surprise, of guidance and practical advice. A uniquely fruitful collaboration of world-leading scientists over the past two decades will lead you through their research journey into the sky of goal systems.” —Gabriele Oettingen, Professor of Psychology, New York University, Author of Rethinking Positive Thinking: Inside the New Science of Motivation “Pursuing goals is one of the most universal and basic human activities. In this exceptional book, leading experts summarize their contributions to Goal Systems Theory, grappling with diverse and fascinating aspects of how people think about, select, desire, manage, and achieve (or fail to achieve) their goals. This book covers the latest and most creative work in the field. It is an indispensable resource for anyone interested in human goal pursuit—which is to say, anyone interested in human motivation.” —Roy F. Baumeister, Professor of Psychology University of Queensland “Goal psychology is emerging as a hub of many areas of scholarship in the behavioral and social sciences. Goal Systems Theory has ushered a paradigmatic reorientation of this field by uncovering the means-end architecture of the systems of individuals’ goals. This timely book presents a comprehensive and integrative review of the important lessons learned over the last two decades from research inspired by Goal Systems Theory. The diverse programs of research by the contributors to this book, renowned motivation science scholars, attest to the explanatory power of Goal Systems Theory and its rich implications for the betterment of individual

and societal functioning. I recommend this authoritative book as a valuable resource for advanced undergraduate students, graduate students, as well as researchers and practitioners in psychology and the social sciences.” —Yaacov Trope, Professor of Psychology, New York University “Goal Systems Theory has been an especially generative model of motivation for the field of psychology in general and for me in particular. Commemorating two decades of research, this volume stands as testament to this theory’s breadth of influence as well as a harbinger of advances to come. Required reading for anyone who wants to know why and how people pursue the goals they do.” —Angela Duckworth, Professor of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Author of Grit “Goal Systems Theory is a marvelous compilation of essays that will help readers better understand, navigate, and achieve their multiple goals. Whether you’re a scholar of motivation interested in the latest research or a curious novice ready to learn about goal systems from the world’s experts, this book is for you.” —Katy Milkman, Professor of Business at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and author of How to Change “Goal Systems Theory is the most important advance in decades in our understanding of human motivation. It revolutionizes classic ideas such as intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, how people juggle multiple goals, and the relation between means and goal outcomes. This volume presents novel directions and the latest research on goal systems, explaining political extremism, risk taking, flow, problem solving, and identity. It is simply a must-read for all social and behavioral scientists as well as anyone interested in why people do what they do. I can’t overstate the significance of this book.” —Wendy Wood, Professor of Psychology and Business, University of Southern California, Author of Good Habits, Bad Habits: The Science of Making Positive Changes that Stick “Goal Systems Theory is among the towering achievements of twenty-first-century motivation science. Its power was readily apparent upon publication of the landmark 2002 paper introducing the theory, and yet its influence has grown in ways that were hard to fathom at the time. This essential book captures the power and scope of the theory across domains ranging from attitudes to problem-solving, from risky behavior to extremism. These chapters are required reading for anybody seeking to understand the nature of goals, motivation, or self-regulation.” —Eli Finkel, Professor at Northwestern University and author of The All-Or-Nothing Marriage

Goal Systems Theory Psychological Processes and Applications Edited by

A R I E W. K RU G L A N SK I AY E L E T F I SH BAC H C ATA L I NA KO P E T Z

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2023 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kruglanski, Arie W., editor. | Fishbach, Ayelet, editor. | Kopetz, Catalina E., editor. Title: Goal systems theory : psychological processes and applications / [edited by] Arie W. Kruglanski, Ayelet Fishbach, and Catalina Kopetz. Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2022] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022060618 (print) | LCCN 2022060619 (ebook) | ISBN 9780197687468 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197687482 (epub) | ISBN 9780197687499 (online) Subjects: LCSH: Goal (Psychology) | Motivation (Psychology) | Cognition. | Decision making. Classification: LCC BF 505 . G 6 G 64 2022 (print) | LCC BF 505 . G 6 (ebook) | DDC 158.1—dc23/eng/20230222 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022060618 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022060619 DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197687468.001.0001 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

Contents Contributors 

Introduction: The Principles of Goal Systems Theory  Ayelet Fishbach, Catalina Kopetz, and Arie W. Kruglanski

vii

1

1. New Developments in Goal Systems Theory  Arie W. Kruglanski

9

2. A Goal Systems Approach to Risk Behavior  Catalina Kopetz and Wesley Starnes

25

3. The Means–​Ends Fusion Model of Intrinsic Motivation  Kaitlin Woolley and Ayelet Fishbach

55

4. The Structure of Immersive and Engaging Activities: Insights from a Computational Model of Flow  David Melnikoff, Ryan Carlson, and Paul Stillman 5. The Temporal Dynamics of Goal Systems: How Goal Progress Changes the Drivers of Motivation  Szu-​chi Huang 6. Paying for Goals and Means  Franklin Shaddy

77

103 130

7. Variety among Means: Advancing Understanding of Equifinality in Goal Systems  Jordan Etkin

150

8. A Goal Systematic Approach to Persuasion: Influencing Attitudes and Behavior  Birga Mareen Schumpe

173

9. Needs Find a Way: Means-​Shifts, Domain Jumps, and Leaps of Faith  L. Maxim Laurijssen and N. Pontus Leander

190

10. Problem Solving from a Goal-​Systems Perspective  Benjamin A. Converse

211

11. Extremism and the Extreme Personality  Ewa Szumowska, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Catalina Kopetz

239

vi Contents

12. Political Behavior from the Perspective of the Goal Systems Theory  Katarzyna Jaśko

257

13. The Interplay between Goal Systems and Identities  Maferima Touré-​Tillery and Jessica Gamlin

280

Index 

307

Contributors Ryan Carlson Yale University

N. Pontus Leander Wayne State University

Benjamin A. Converse University of Virginia

David Melnikoff Northeastern University

Jordan Etkin Duke University

Birga Mareen Schumpe University of Amsterdam

Ayelet Fishbach University of Chicago

Franklin Shaddy University of California, Los Angeles

Jessica Gamlin University of Oregon

Wesley Starnes Wayne State University

Szu-​chi Huang Stanford University

Paul Stillman Yale University

Katarzyna Jaśko Jagiellonian University

Ewa Szumowska Jagiellonian University

Catalina Kopetz Wayne State University

Maferima Touré-​Tillery Northwestern University

Arie W. Kruglanski University of Maryland

Kaitlin Woolley Cornell University

L. Maxim Laurijssen University of Groningen

Introduction The Principles of Goal Systems Theory Ayelet Fishbach, Catalina Kopetz, and Arie W. Kruglanski

In the fall of 2021, between two waves of the COVID pandemic and university closures, a group of people who study goal systems theory (GST) met at the University of Chicago to discuss ongoing research and exchange ideas on where to go next with the research. The story of this group started more than 20 years before the Chicago meeting. In the fall of 2000, Arie met Ayelet at the University of Maryland in College Park. He was an established professor and a world expert on research on motivation and cognition. She was a postdoc who wrote her dissertation on self-​control. In their first meeting, Arie expressed his vision that their group would revise the study of motivation. Ayelet thought it would be nice if they published a paper. They started working on what they initially referred to as “goal networks.” In just a few months, the group, which included Arie, Ayelet, James Shah, Ron Friedman, Woo Young Chun, and David Sleeth-​Keppler, published a paper titled “A Theory of Goal Systems.” It came out in 2002, and for many of us, it marked the beginning of long and productive research programs that supported, expanded, and applied the original GST (Kruglanski et al., 2002). The following year, a new graduate student arrived at the lab. Arie handed Cata the GST paper and invited her to work on multifinality (a concept that, as an international student, she could barely pronounce). Cata found the group’s enthusiasm about the new theory contagious, and she soon became a true believer in GST and an enthusiastic researcher of multifinality. Our team was intrigued by what we found, curious about what we have yet to find, and generally busy uncovering the relationships between goals and means and the implications of these structures for motivation. None of us could have predicted the breadth of discoveries that GST would inspire in the 20 years that followed. We were clueless about the relevance of our work and the number of questions that were inspired by it and that would still

Ayelet Fishbach, Catalina Kopetz, and Arie W. Kruglanski, Introduction In: Goal Systems Theory. Edited by: Arie W. Kruglanski, Ayelet Fishbach, and Catalina Kopetz, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197687468.003.0001

2  Goal Systems Theory occupy the field of motivation more than 20 years later. This book is a celebration of the work in motivation science that was and is inspired by GST.

GST A theory offers a set of general principles that explain some empirical observations or phenomena. At times, the phenomenon begs an explanation. Humans asked about the origins of diseases thousands of years before Louis Pasteur offered an answer articulated in his work on germ theory. Other times, the theory informs us what phenomena might exist and what to watch for. Because we have heard of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), we expect people who supported a political candidate to feel more (and not less) committed when this elected politician’s performance fails to meet the general expectations of a person who holds a public office. GST was originated to explain why people pursue the goals they pursue the way they pursue them. Why, for example, does one person find personal meaning in planting a garden while their neighbor travels the world for that same purpose? And why do some choose political extremism while others do not even bother to vote in a democratic election? Beyond goal selection, what guides people’s choice of means, that is, the activities or objects they choose to facilitate their goals? Why, for example, do some health-​conscious individuals eliminate junk food from their diet while others sign up for the gym? When there are multiple goals, research on GST asked when do people prioritize one goal over others, and when do they seek a compromise between goals? When there are different means to achieve a goal, GST research asked how people prioritize these means. When will pursuing one means substitute for another? For example, when will healthy eating substitute for exercising? In contrast, when will means complement each other such that pursuing one makes pursuing another means more likely? To address these questions, GST offers several principles and goal configurations.

The Principles of GST An efficient motivational system operates to maximize goal attainment. The first principle of GST is: People want to pursue actions, choose objects, and relate to others who help them achieve more goals without compromising any of these goals. For example, people prefer healthy food that is tasty and cheap and a job that is interesting and supports them financially. Yet, at times people choose the means that achieve less. They might prefer a pen that is just a pen instead of one that is also a laser pointer (Zhang et al., 2007).

Introduction  3 They might even choose a means that undermines other goals. People sometimes choose a risky activity (e.g., substance abuse) to promote their social status because, rather than despite, the fact that it undermines their physical health (Kopetz et al., 2019). People behave as if they do not always prefer the means that maximize goal attainment. The reason for these observed anomalies is the second principle of GST: The number of goals that a given means serves and the number of means that are connected to a given goal are negatively related to the strength of a given means–​ goals link. For example, if biking serves both commuting and exercising, it will be less strongly connected and, hence, appear less instrumental for either commuting or exercising. By the principle of maximizing attainment, a person may spend hours on the exercise bike at the gym and yet commute to work by car. Even more so, most gym-​goers choose to park their car closer to the entrance to minimize the walk. This second principle implies that the configuration of a goal system—​ the number of means that serve a goal and the number of goals served by a means—​will determine activity selection. Specifically, GST offers four basic goal configurations.

Equifinality Equifinal means all serve the same goal and can therefore substitute for each other. This structure is best captured in the idiom “all roads lead to Rome.” Equifinal means often seem redundant. Why would a traveler need more than one way to get to Rome? Yet, equifinal means form a backup plan. When people are presented with several equifinal means to a goal, they feel more confident that they can reach the goal. Hence, the mere presence of these means increases the goal commitment. On the downside, the presence of equifinal means dilutes the cognitive association between the activity and the goal it serves, resulting in less transfer of properties such as commitment and positive experience from achieving the goal to pursuing the means (Fishbach et al., 2004). Ultimately, when several activities serve the same goal, we should expect lower intrinsic motivation to engage in any of these activities (Kruglanski et al., 2018).

Multifinality Multifinal means achieve more than one goal. This is best captured in the (less famous, more animal-​friendly) idiom “feeding two birds with one scone.” Multifinal means maximize attainment, and therefore they should be superior.

4  Goal Systems Theory In principle, getting more for the same unit of effort should always be the dominant choice. Even if a person does not care for the additional benefits (e.g., they only wanted to feed one bird), they should not oppose it either. Take the example of kosher food. If a person learns that some food is kosher, they should either see it as a benefit (i.e., if they observe the Jewish tradition) or not; but this information should not undermine their interest in that food. And yet it does. In a classic demonstration (Simonson et al., 1993), presenting information on the status of an ice cream as kosher reduced consumers’ interest in it. They concluded that it was less flavorful. Indeed, people often prefer means that achieve fewer goals. The children in Lepper et al.’s (1973) studies on overjustification were less interested in expressing themselves through drawing after they learned that drawing is not only a means for self-​expression but can also win them a reward. And children as young as 3 years inferred that food that was said to make them strong cannot be delicious, so they had little of it (Maimaran & Fishbach, 2014).

Unifinality Unifinal means achieve only one goal. If only a single road led to Rome, it would have been unifinal. Unifinal means are less efficient but offer one advantage—​ they are strongly associated with the single goal that they help achieve. As a result, people are often highly intrinsically motivated to pursue their unifinal means. In this way, the disadvantage of equifinal means is the advantage of unifinal means.

Counterfinality Counterfinal means achieve some goals while undermining others. For example, a homemade lunch may be healthier than dining out, but it undermines a person’s goal to socialize with colleagues over lunch at a restaurant. Counterfinal means are often non-​optimal. Instead of maximizing, they minimize attainment. They are the opposite of multifinal means. Yet counterfinal means may seem more instrumental for the goal that they facilitate exactly because they inhibit another goal. When a Canadian pharmaceutical company advertised its cough syrup as “it tastes awful and it works,” the message was that because this cough medicine undermined the taste goal, it was more instrumental for the goal of getting rid of the cough. Indeed, people often prefer counterfinal means, and those who have high need for cognitive closure are even more likely to display this preference (Kramer et al., 2012).

Introduction  5

Research Inspired by GST The principles and configurations of goal systems helped us explain many of the anomalies we observed in activity selection. Moreover, they inspired us to make new predictions for phenomena we did not know existed. One of the earlier examples comes from research on self-​control. We predicted that temptations might be cognitively associated with the goals that override them. For example, to watch their weight, people should abstain from high-​calorie foods. So, we predicted and found that dieters associate “chocolate” and “cake” with “dieting” (Fishbach et al., 2003). It was Arie and Ayelet’s first empirical publication, coauthored with Ron Friedman. In another paper, Cata, Ayelet, and Arie found that people who watched their weight chose healthier foods mainly when no other goals (e.g., food enjoyment, alleviating hunger) were salient and important. However, when alternative goals become relatively more salient and important (e.g., people were hungry), the weight-​watching goal lost its pull so that people ate less healthy food (Köpetz et al., 2011). The chapters in this book describe research that the principles and configurations of GST inspired. These chapters illustrate how having a theoretical framework helped to predict phenomena we did not know existed as well as explain what we often observed but were not sure why.

A Peek into the Discoveries in This Book The essays included in this book cover part of the recent research in GST. They connect research in motivation to the basic topics of psychological research, including identity, persuasion, problem-​solving, and political extremism, among others. They further advance motivation theory by addressing topics such as intrinsic motivation, resource allocation, and means choice. In Chapter 1, Kruglanski explores several new directions in goal systems research, including identifying that political (and other) extremism stems from motivational imbalance, a state in which a given need dominates other basic concerns, and that intrinsic motivation stems from a psychological fusion between a goal and a means. Importantly, Kruglanski argues that one basic need—​ the need for social significance—​underlies many of the goals that people pursue (from finding romance to political extremism). In Chapter 2, Kopetz and Starnes explore risk behavior. They argue that risk-​ taking is not irrational; neither does it represent self-​regulatory failure. Instead, risk behavior is a means to a goal. For example, the appeal of substance abuse for adolescents (prior to addiction) comes from the perception that certain

6  Goal Systems Theory substances signal high social status and belonging to the group. By their analysis, risk behavior often results in focusing on one goal and the inhibition of alternative considerations for health or safety. In Chapter 3, Woolley and Fishbach return to intrinsic motivation and explore the means-​ends fusion model of intrinsic motivation. According to this model, intrinsic motivation results from the strong association between an activity (means) and its end goal; it occurs when the means and the ends collide. They explore the antecedents of means–​ends fusion and its consequences for adherence to work, health, and academic goals. In a related line of research, Melnikoff, Carlson, and Stillman explore flow in Chapter 4. This chapter provides a goal systems analysis of psychological flow. Building on the notion of means–​end fusion, the authors offer an information theory of flow, according to which learning tasks that induce the strongest goal–​means association are more effective at generating flow and, consequently, learning. Goals are not static, and neither is the process of pursuing them. In Chapter 5, Huang explores the temporal dynamics of goal pursuit. Her temporally dynamic goal pursuit model explains how various factors (e.g., the number of equifinal means) influence motivation at the beginning versus middle versus toward the end of a goal. Motivation is a function of expectancy and value, yet expectancy matters more at the beginning of goal pursuit, while value matters more once expectancy has been established. It follows, for example, that having multiple means matters more at the beginning of goal pursuit, when people are less confident they can do it, than later, when their confidence and commitment are established. In Chapter 6, Shaddy explores resource allocation in goal systems. He argues against the common perception that people invest resources only in means to a goal. Instead, he documents instances where people can invest both indirectly in the means and directly in the goal and that people prefer to invest in goals. He then explores how the architecture of goal systems and the characteristics of the individuals involved both influence resource investment. Chapter 7 explores variety among means. Etkin describes the relationship between equifinal means to a goal, asking how actual and perceived variations among means to a goal influence motivation. She further explores means variety as an end in itself. Goal systems have important implications for attitude research and persuasion, which are topics Schumpe explores in Chapter 8. She explains how GST helped develop persuasion techniques. For example, the principle of counterfinality (e.g., presenting a mouthwash that causes burning sensation) inspires persuasion appeals that emphasize rather than hide the fact that a product that facilitates one goal also inhibits others. Similarly, multifinality

Introduction  7 (adding a goal), equifinality (adding a means), and contrafinality (adding a means that undermines the goal) offer distinct persuasion techniques. In Chapter 9, Laurijssen and Leander explore means substitution. When goals are disrupted, we should expect people to switch to a different means or goal. Unlike Etkin’s analysis of choosing between equifinal means, this chapter is about finding a route after the original one was frustrated. The authors present a shifts–​jumps–​leaps perspective of means substitution, which distinguishes between three qualitatively distinct types of shifts: shifts between means within a current goal domain, jumps to other domains, and leaps of faith into unexpected or new directions. They next explore implications for the frustration-​aggression phenomena and how shifts can produce aggressive responding. Chapter 10 discusses implications of GST to problem-​solving. Converse analyzes what theory on problem-​solving can gain by incorporating motivation theory to its analysis. He highlights a key difference between a goal and a problem, which is that a problem lacks a representation of the appropriate means and their relationship to overriding goals. A problem arises when the goal system is incomplete. Converse specifically addresses how viewing problem-​solving through a goal systems lens sheds new light on elements—​the components of problem-​solving—​and processes—​the generic problem-​solving cycle. Chapter 11 explores extremism. Szumowska, Kruglanski, and Kopetz propose that motivational imbalance, in which one need dominates over the others, releases pursuit of activities that would not be considered if the person was considering their entire set of goals. They use this principle to explain both violent extremism and devoted humanism. They argue that similar principles also explain self-​harming behaviors. In Chapter 12, Jaśko focuses on political engagement. She identifies how the principles of goal systems explain people’s decision to engage in all sorts of political actions, from signing a petition to risking one’s life for a political cause. Finally, Chapter 13 applies GST to the study of identity. In exploring the interplay between these related but distinct areas of research, Touré-​Tillery and Gamlin note that both goals and identities are stored in memory in an interconnected, hierarchical structure. The cognitive structures that support goals and identities are further intricately linked. Goal pursuit shapes identities, and identities influence which goals are being pursued and which means are selected in pursuing these goals. These authors’ work specifically demonstrates how goal systems shape identities and how identities shape goal systems.

References Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press.

8  Goal Systems Theory Fishbach, A., Friedman, R. S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2003). Leading us not into temptation: Momentary allurements elicit overriding goal activation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(2), 296–​309. Fishbach, A., Shah, J. Y., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2004). Emotional transfer in goal systems. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40(6), 723–​738. Köpetz, C., Faber, T., Fishbach, A., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2011). The multifinality constraints effect: How goal multiplicity narrows the means set to a focal end. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(5), 810–​826. Kopetz, C. E., Woerner, J. I., Starnes, W., & Dedvukaj, J. (2019). It’s risky, therefore I do it: Counterfinality as a source of perceived instrumentality of risk behavior as means to goals. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 81, 39–​52. Kramer, T., Irmak, C., Block, L. G., & Ilyuk, V. (2012). The effect of a no-​pain, no-​gain lay theory on product efficacy perceptions. Marketing Letters, 23(3), 517–​529. Kruglanski, A. W., Fishbach, A., Woolley, K., Bélanger, J. J., Chernikova, M., Molinario, E., & Pierro, A. (2018). A structural model of intrinsic motivation: On the psychology of means–​ends fusion. Psychological Review, 125(2), 165–​182. Kruglanski, A. W., Shah, J. Y., Fishbach, A., Friedman, R., Chun, W. Y., & Sleeth-​Keppler, D. (2002). A theory of goal systems. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 34, pp. 331–​378). Academic Press. Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1973). Undermining children’s intrinsic interest with extrinsic reward: A test of the “overjustification” hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28(1), 129–​137. Maimaran, M., & Fishbach, A. (2014). If it’s useful and you know it, do you eat? Preschoolers refrain from instrumental food. Journal of Consumer Research, 41(3), 642–​655. Simonson, I., Nowlis, S. M., & Simonson, Y. (1993). The effect of irrelevant preference arguments on consumer choice. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 2(3), 287–​306. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S1057-​7408(08)80018-​6 Zhang, Y., Fishbach, A., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2007). The dilution model: How additional goals undermine the perceived instrumentality of a shared path. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(3), 389–​401.

1

New Developments in Goal Systems Theory Arie W. Kruglanski

The year 2022 marks a 20-​year anniversary of goal-​systems theory (GST), which made its debut in a 2002 paper at the Advances in Experimental Social Psychology volume (Kruglanski et al., 2002). At a recent conference at the University of Chicago dedicated to this event, colleagues whose work was inspired by the theory presented exciting papers on a wide range of topics attesting to the theory’s usefulness and breadth. These presentations in their complete form constitute the various chapters of this volume. In the present chapter my aim is to review several theoretical and empirical developments in the goal systemic framework that informed the research in my own lab over these last decades. These include further exploration of the constructs of equi-​and multifinality, as well as the introduction of a new structural construct, counterfinality, and examination of its implications. They also include a new model of intrinsic motivation based on the structural properties of the GST. Both the structural and allocational properties of the GST are drawn upon in a model of extremism that we have recently presented (Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al., 2021); it identifies a common psychological dynamic that underlies such different types of “extremism” as terrorism, engagement in extreme sports, embarking on extreme diets, extreme love crushes, and extreme humanism. Finally, I tie the concept of goal systems to the fundamental notion of basic human needs and show how this conjunction can be used to understand and modify a wide range of behaviors, including the aggressive response to frustration and romantic love.

The Architecture of Goal Systems: Equifinality, Multifinality, and Counterfinality The relations between goals and means can be mentally represented via several different configurations, each with important psychological implications. Three

Arie W. Kruglanski, New Developments in Goal Systems Theory In: Goal Systems Theory. Edited by: Arie W. Kruglanski, Ayelet Fishbach, and Catalina Kopetz, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197687468.003.0002

10  Goal Systems Theory (a)

(b)

Goal 1

Means 1

Means 2

Goal 1

Goal 2

Means 1

(c)

Goal 1

Goal 2

Means 1

Figure 1.1  (a) Equifinality configuration. (b) Multifinality configuration. (c) Counterfinality configuration.

such forms, equifinality, multifinality, and counterfinality, were addressed by work in our lab. Equifinality (see Figure 1.1a) refers to the case wherein several means are attached to a given goal such that each of the means can on its own accomplish (is sufficient condition for) goal attainment. Multifinality (see Figure 1.1b) represents the case wherein the same means simultaneously serves several goals. Counterfinality (Figure 1.1c). Studies addressing these configurations were reviewed at some length in a paper published by Kruglanski et al. (2015). Here, I offer a thumbnail discussion of this work.

New Developments in Goal Systems Theory  11

Equifinality A major implication of the equifinality configuration is the possibility of substituting one means for another. This basic motivational concept, immanent already in Freud’s (1920) notion of symptom substitution and Lewin’s (1935) work on task substitution, was touched upon in several research domains including work on different routes to dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957), different routes to persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and different methods of self-​esteem maintenance (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983; Tesser, 2000), among others. Substitutability work carried out in our lab examined the effects of multiple means to a goal on commitment to the goal and to the means. This research found that having alternative means to the goal increases goal commitment, while at the same time reducing commitment to each of the separate means (Kruglanski et al., 2011). The reduced commitment to the equifinal means is attributable in part to the dilution effect—​the reduced association strength of a given means to the goal in the presence of alternative such means. Evidence for the dilution effect in the context of the equifinality configuration was obtained in a series of studies by Bélanger et al. (2015) and a research program (Dugas & Kruglanski, 2013) about commitment to groups viewed as means to social identity. A series of studies by Etkin and Ratner (2012) hypothesized and found that individuals who perceive themselves as having made little goal progress prefer a set of equifinal means that is high in variety as such means carry greater assurance of goal attainment than a homogeneous means set. Finally, Milyavsky et al. (2022) found that personal agency and social assistance can be viewed as alternative means of goal attainment such that reliance on one reduces reliance on the other, with important downstream consequences for people’s social attitudes.

Multifinality The simultaneous presence of several salient goals can lead to goal conflict and require a choice as to which goal to prioritize. But often a means can be found that accomplishes all those goals at once. One may find a job that is interesting, offers good working conditions, and provides an opportunity to serve society. One may cook a dish that is nutritious, tasty, and easy to prepare. On first glance, finding a way to accomplish several goals at once may seem all good and to afford greater value than the pursuit of each goal individually. But there is a downside to this story in that the greater the number of goals connected to a given means, the weaker the connection. In other words, the number of connections to a given entity (goal or means) in a goal system dilutes the strength of the connections. Further, because connection strength is typically construed as instrumentality of

12  Goal Systems Theory the means with respect to the goal, the greater the number of goals that a given means serves, the lower its perceived efficacy in serving those goals. This dilution effect, mentioned earlier in reference to the equifinality configuration, was first discovered in a series of experiments by Zhang et al. (2007). For instance, in a scenario, a means (e.g., eating tomatoes) was related with one goal (e.g., preventing heart cancer or preventing eye disease) versus two goals (e.g., preventing heart cancer and preventing eye disease), which in turn affected the means’ perceived instrumentality to the goal(s): A means said to serve one goal was seen as more instrumental to that goal than a means said to serve two goals. This effect was replicated in several studies that varied in the contents of the goals as well as in the manner in which those goals were presented (self-​generated vs. described by the experimenter). Zhang et al. (2007) also varied the similarity (vs. distinctiveness) of the goals to each other and the degree of association of each of the goals to the focal means. The dilution effect was more pronounced when two goals were distinct rather than similar, presumably because similar goals activated each other. Too, the greater the manipulated association between the means and one of the goals, the lesser was the perceived association between the means and the remaining goal. Zhang et al.’s (2007) experimental paradigm was used in a series of studies by Orehek et al. (2012), who found evidence for moderation of the preference for unifinal versus multifinal means. Specifically, individuals high on the locomotion tendency (the self-​regulatory orientation that constitutes a desire for movement and change) prefer unifinal means, whereas those high on the assessment tendency (the self-​regulatory orientation that involves a desire to critically evaluate alternatives) prefer multifinal means. This supported the authors’ hypothesis that high locomotors are particularly affected by the expectancy component of motivation that affords quick progress toward the goal, whereas high assessors are particularly sensitive to the value component that they strive to maximize. Catalina Kopetz’s doctoral dissertation explored another facet of the multifinality configuration, thus discovering the multifinality constraint effect (Kopetz, 2007; Kopetz et al., 2011). It has to do with the fact that the simultaneous presence of several active goals exercises constraints on means to those goals such that means that serve some of those goals while undermining others will tend to be avoided. Consider the co-​active goals of satisfying one’s hunger, satisfying one’s taste, and taking care of one’s health. This creates a situation in which the selected foods will be those that, while nutritious, are also tasteful and healthy, whereas unhealthy and tasteless foods would be avoided. Kopetz et al. (2011) also investigated the case in which one of the active goals becomes dominant. According to the allocational principle of finite mental resources, this should result in the concomitant withdrawal of resources from the

New Developments in Goal Systems Theory  13 alternative goals, thus weakening the constraints they would normally exercise on means to the dominant goal. In consequence, the consideration set of means to the dominant goal now expands, producing a situation in which nearly “anything goes” that serves the dominant goal, including means that normally would undermine (some of) the alternative goals. I revisit that point at a later juncture when reviewing the GST-​inspired work on the psychology of extremism (Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al., 2021).

Counterfinality Those latter means, ones that undermine some goals while serving others, are therefore labeled as counterfinal. Often, those means are avoided, especially when the goals they undermine are salient; but occasionally they are even preferred over other means to a goal. Specifically, when one goal becomes dominant and other goals are crowded, the counterfinal means that serve the dominant goal (while undermining other goals) can be particularly attractive. Counterfinality has intriguing psychological properties that “irrationally” enhance its appeal: Such means often are alluring precisely because they are counterfinal. That may be the case because the counterfinal means is perceived as uniquely, and hence particularly strongly, attached to the focal goal (Kruglanski, 1996; Zhang et al., 2007) and because it brings to mind the “cost heuristic” whereby costs are seen as a proof of efficacy, along the lines of the “no pain no gain” slogan that portrays pain (or cost) as the necessary condition of goal attainment (see Kruger et al., 2004; Labroo & Kim, 2009). Along these lines, a set of studies by Freund and Hennecke (2015) demonstrated that less enjoyable means (and in that sense counterfinal to the goal of enjoyment) were viewed as more instrumental to the goals they were assumed to serve. Another example of this phenomenon is the so-​called martyrdom effect whereby people believe that someone who suffers while helping is actually more helpful (Olivola & Shafir, 2009). Schumpe et al. (2018) demonstrated the counterfinality effect in five studies. For instance, the more pain people experienced when getting tattooed, the more they perceived getting tattooed as instrumental to the goals of being unique and showing off. And the more counterfinal a consumer product was considered to be (i.e., a “burning oral rinse”), the greater was its perceived effectiveness (in fighting germs). Other studies in the Schumpe et al. (2018) series showed that counterfinality resulted in a more positive attitude toward the means and that a simultaneous commitment to both the focal and the alternative goals reduced the preference for the counterfinal means. Research by Catalina Kopetz (see Chapter 2 in this volume) also demonstrates that risk behavior is perceived as more instrumental to one’s goals, particularly when it is seen as counterfinal.

14  Goal Systems Theory Because counterfinal means are perceived as particularly instrumental to goal attainment, their attractiveness is more pronounced when the general expectancy of goal attainment is low. In this vein, Bélanger et al. (2015) found that individuals high on depression or anxiety who are generally pessimistic about their likelihood (expectancy) of goal attainment exhibit a strong preference for a counterfinal means. Klein (2013) found that a goal that was portrayed as difficult to attain (curing severe illness) led participants to prefer a counterfinal (expensive) means more so than a goal that was easier to attain (curing a common cold). The appeal of counterfinal means may in some cases promote dependency and addiction. Thus, Connor et al. (2011) found that individuals who felt that smoking cannabis has negative consequences (e.g., makes them feel insecure) are more dependent on the drug. Similarly, Li and Dingle (2012) found on the basis of survey data that beliefs about the negative consequences of alcohol consumption (e.g., being hungover) were positively related to risky alcohol consumption such as binge drinking.

The Psychology of Extremism An important feature of the GST is its breadth and scope. In this way, it affords a prism on a wide variety of phenomena, all of which are governed by the same basic cognitive and motivational principles. A recent example of a GST-​derived insight into an important social phenomenon is the application of work on counterfinality and the multifinality constraint effect to the psychology of extremism. In popular parlance, the term extremism has come to signify specifically political violence and terrorism. Yet there are numerous other types of behaviors generally regarded as extreme: extreme diets, extreme sports, extreme (exceptional) humanitarianism, extreme substance or behavioral addictions, etc. A goal systemic perspective allows a common understanding of all those extreme behaviors (for extensive discussion, see Kruglanski, Kopetz, & Szumowska, 2021; Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al., 2021). That approach views extremism as based on a motivational imbalance in which a given need dominates other basic concerns. A motivational balance exists where all of the person’s basic needs are in their region of satisfaction. Such well-​rounded care for all one’s basic needs defines the state of moderation. A state of motivational imbalance, which gives rise to extremism, occurs where one of the basic needs gains dominance and crowds out other basic concerns. As noted earlier, this liberates the means to the dominant need from constraints exercised by those alternative (and now faded) concerns. The resulting expansion of the consideration set of means to the dominant goal comes to include now counterfinal means, ones that effectively undermine or sacrifice the alternative concerns. As most people attempt to maintain a

New Developments in Goal Systems Theory  15 motivational balance, they refrain from carrying out counterfinal behaviors that sacrifice some of their needs. As a consequence, counterfinal behaviors are typically rare, consistent with their labeling as extreme. Extensive empirical evidence for the proposed motivational imbalance model of extremism is reviewed by Kruglanski, Kopetz, & Szumowska (2021) and Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al. (2021). It includes studies attesting to the negative relation between the motivation to pursue dominant versus alternative needs as well as research examining cognitive, behavioral, affective, and social consequences of motivational imbalance. The cognitive consequences included studies of selective attention, inhibition, rumination, projection, and choice expansion (in considered means to the focal goal). Behavioral consequences included increased tendency to choose the counterfinal means when under motivational imbalance and a decreased tendency for such a choice prompted by the restoration of balance. Affective consequences included studies of considerable emotional volatility when under a state of motivational imbalance, the alternation between the proverbial “agony” and “ecstasy.” Finally, the social consequences of motivational imbalance were attested to by the relative infrequency of protracted tendencies to perform counterfinal behaviors and by the status of social deviants accorded to individuals who exhibit such tendencies. The GST-​based work on the psychology of extremism has resulted so far in two conferences on this topic that brought together scholars with diverse interests (from neuroscience to culture) yet sharing in common the focus on extreme behavior and in an edited volume on the psychology of extremism whose chapters describe the varied extremisms and their underlying dynamics (Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al., 2021).

The Means–​Ends Fusion Model of Intrinsic Motivation Another important application of the GST is to the phenomenon of intrinsic motivation. According to the theory, the links that connect means to goals can vary in strength. And the greater the links’ strength, the more the means brings to mind the goal and vice versa. In fact, when the association between the means and the goal is very high, the two are nearly indistinguishable, or cognitively “fused” with each other. In other words, under such fusion, performance of the activity (the means) is experienced as attainment of the goal, and the activity is perceived as intrinsically motivated, that is, as an end in itself. Based on this logic, Kruglanski et al. (2018) defined an intrinsicality continuum that reflects the degree to which the means–​end fusion (MEF) is experienced. The MEF theory assumes that fusion is affected by four major factors: (1) repeated pairing of the activity and the goal, (2) uniqueness of the activity–​goal connection,

16  Goal Systems Theory (3) perceived similarity between the activity and its goal, and (4) temporal immediacy of goal attainment following the activity. Kruglanski et al. (2018) offer evidence for each of the foregoing determinants of intrinsic motivation. The idea that repeated pairing of a stimulus and a reward results in association between the two has been the mainstay of classical conditioning theory, one of the most robust and well-​documented theories in the history of psychology (for review of the relevant evidence, see, e.g., Hilgard & Bower, 1966). As a result of classical conditioning, the neutral stimulus acquires motivational value and comes to serve as a secondary reinforcer (e.g., see discussion by Robinson & Berridge, 1993), that is, a goal that the animal or the human would then strive to attain. Kruglanski et al. (2018) reasoned that a continuum of intrinsicality reflects the degree to which the activity (the means) is seen as likely to result in goal attainment, the upper bound of which is where the activity is itself perceived as constituting goal attainment. To address this implication of the MEF theory, Zhang et al. (2007, Study 4) repeatedly (and subliminally) flashed words related to the goal of strengthening muscles (e.g., muscle) concomitantly with a (supraliminal) presentation of a specific means to that goal (i.e., jogging). This procedure significantly increased the perceived instrumentality of the means to the goal while concomitantly decreasing the perceived instrumentality of the same means to an alternative goal (increasing blood oxygen). These findings were conceptually replicated in research by Bélanger et al. (2015, Study 4). Strengthening the means–​end connection increases the perceived instrumentality of the means to the goal and, in this sense, increases intrinsicality. On the other hand, establishing alternative links between the means and alternative goals or between the goal and alternative means dilutes the strength of a given means–​end connection, and hence reduces the means’ perceived intrinsicality. Work reviewed earlier on the dilution effect, in both the multifinality and the equifinality contexts (cf. Bélanger et al., 2015; Kruglanski et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2007), yields findings supportive of this theoretical implication. Goal attainment results in positive affect. Therefore, increasing the fusion between the activity and the goal should result in that positive feeling seeping into the activity as well. This prediction of the MEF theory was supported in research by Fishbach et al. (2004, Study 1), where participants reported more positive affect toward the activity (means) in a condition where they generated a single versus two means to the goal, the latter known to dilute the means–​end connection, and hence to reduce the MEF (Zhang et al., 2007). Other research supportive of the MEF theory is work by Woolley and Fishbach (2018; see also Chapter 3 in this volume), showing that the immediacy with which the goal follows the means increases the degree of the MEF and, hence, the means’ instrumentality/​intrinsicality to the goal. Specifically, it was found that

New Developments in Goal Systems Theory  17 receiving the immediate (vs. delayed) reward for performing the experimental task increased experienced enjoyment, interest, and intention to pursue the experimental task in the future—​typical effects of intrinsic motivation to an activity (e.g., Deci et al., 1999). Similarly, research by Fishbach et al. (2004) supported the theoretical implication of the MEF model whereby the magnitude of affect toward the fused activity should be correlated with the magnitude of affect that the goal attainment itself engenders. Specifically, Fishbach et al. (2004) found that the affect felt toward the means corresponded more to the affect toward the goal when the two were strongly versus only weakly associated. Studies also found support for the mediating role of fusion in effects of immediacy on means instrumentality (Woolley & Fishbach, 2018) and for the implication that for the fused means to be endowed with qualities that characterize goal attainment, the goal needs to be active in the first place. In short, the MEF model of intrinsic motivation is based on extensive and wide-​ranging research concerning its varied implications. In so far as intrinsic motivation toward activities is of considerable importance in multiple domains of human endeavor (e.g., in work, sports, and education), the novel insights that this model provides could prove to be of considerable practical utility.

Applying the GST to Real-​World Phenomena: Current and Future Research Directions On the Origins of Goal Systems. The Origin Question: Where Do Goals Come From? A fundamental assumption of the GST is that goal systems are hierarchical; that is, all goals actually are means that serve a supreme goal at the apex of the hierarchy. That supreme goal is nothing but a basic psychological need. Psychological theorists from Freud onward (including Deci & Ryan, 2000; Fiske, 2010; Higgins, 2012; Maslow, 1943; McDougall, 1908) assume the existence of basic biological and psychogenic needs, and from the GST perspective each goal system is “crowned” by a basic need. This suggests that all our goals, at the end of the day, are geared to serve basic needs. The basic needs are the “dogs that wag the tails” of all that we ever do. We assume them to be universal and fixed, part and parcel of “human nature,” the structure of our psyche if you will. In contrast, the goal systems that serve those needs are fluid and highly variable. They are culture-​specific, context-​specific, and socially constructed. They are tied to the satisfaction of the basic needs via narratives that are validated by one’s in-​group or social network. The need, the narrative, and the network define our 3Ns model of behavior that we believe to be quite general (see Kruglanski,

18  Goal Systems Theory Belanger, & Gunaratna, 2019). In other words, any behavior whatsoever is in service of some need or need combination (the need component of the 3Ns); the satisfaction of that need factor is guided by a narrative that specifies what goals, subgoals, etc. would, in a given situation, serve the need(s) in question; in turn, that narrative is socially validated by a network of significant others, members of one’s in-​group. This gives it credibility, and hence the power to guide behavior. Different goal systems can be constructed to satisfy any basic need out of beliefs shared within a network or a community of meaning. This is important because it affords substitution of a given goal system regarded as problematic or undesirable in some sense by another goal system that is more desirable. According to this analysis, a goal systemic understanding of any behavior should start with identifying the basic need that ultimately drives it. This is the departure point from which one can explore the goal systems that have been or can be constructed to gratify that basic need. So you can always ask what basic need does a given behavior serve? And are there other means that serve the same basic need and that can be substituted for the current behavioral means? In the past decade or so, my colleagues and I were interested in one such basic need, the need for social significance and worth (arguably, the single most important social need), and examined it empirically in a series of papers in which Pontus Leander, Kasia Jaśko, and other friends have participated, including our comprehensive statement of significance quest theory, now published online in the Perspectives on Psychological Science.

Terrorism We have been studying this need in several contexts starting with the context of terrorism. In the terrorism literature a major question has been that of terrorist motivation: Why in the world do they do it? And terrorism researchers have identified a variety of motivations (the perks of paradise, vengeance, adoration of the leader, feminism). They concluded, therefore, that terrorism is multiply determined. But there is a different, and potentially more useful and parsimonious, way to think about it, namely that these are all means to the same end, satisfaction of the same basic motive, the quest for significance. Take vengeance, for example. Vengeance comes in response to a humiliation or a loss of significance, and by avenging one’s humiliation one regains significance and shows that one too matters and has the power to punish the original offender. Other causes, like the perks of paradise or earning the leader’s appreciation, reflect an opportunity for significance gain. In multiple studies, we obtained evidence that manipulating the quest for significance or measuring it in various ways promotes behaviors seen as significance-​enhancing often through violence. So, in one paper we estimated suicide bombers’ quest for significance by gleaning from open-​source data

New Developments in Goal Systems Theory  19 evidence for their loss of significance or ambition for significance gain and found that the stronger the quest, the greater number of people these suicide bombers killed or wounded (Webber et al., 2017); and in another study, with members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, one of the most cruel and determined terrorist organizations in history, we found that the greater the significance gain they experienced from a deradicalization program, including vocational and language courses and other activities allowing them to reintegrate into Sri Lankan society, the greater was their degree of deradicalization, illustrating the substitution of vocational preparation for terrorism as a means to significance gain (Webber et al., 2018).

Frustration–​Aggression Whereas we have ample published data (see, e.g., Kruglanski, Belanger, & Gunaratna, 2019; Kruglanski, Webber, & Koehler, 2019) attesting to the role that the quest for significance plays in violent extremism, our lab is currently pursuing two new topics from the significance quest perspective for which we do not yet have sufficient data: the frustration–​aggression hypothesis and romantic love. Our novel analysis of both these issues is firmly grounded in the GST perspective. With respect to the frustration–​aggression hypothesis, the question is what logic moved Dollard et al. (1939) to come up with the hypothesis that frustration leads to aggression? What basic need does aggression serve? What is the end to which aggression is a means? Why aggression, of all things, in response to frustration? In response, we surmise that aggression is a primitive, primordial means to dominance and that dominance or power is a form of significance or social worth. This framing suggests several hypotheses: One is that, depending on the narrative, and the network, frustration can lead to other significance-​affording responses. In a study that Pontus Leander and his colleagues published recently (Leander et al., 2020) we manipulated frustration through failure on an anagram task and then manipulated the norm presumably endorsed by college graduates of whether the United States should intervene militarily in Syria. We found that the frustrated participants more so than the controls tended to go more with the narrative endorsed by the network, whether aggressive or non-​aggressive. A second hypothesis that follows from our analysis is that frustration will elicit an aggressive reaction to the extent that the goal serves the significance quest. Molly Ellenberg, of our lab, recently analyzed the survey responses of a sample of 272 incels (involuntary celibates), men who feel unfairly rejected and mistreated by women. She found support for a mediational model (see Figure 1.2) in which an index of significance loss (agreement with items such as “were you ostracized,” “did you have trouble with sports,” “did you face rejection from girls”) predicted an aggressive response toward women, namely agreement with the statements “I sometimes entertain thoughts of violence” and “I would rape if

20  Goal Systems Theory “I admire Elliot Rodger for his Santa Barbara attack.”

a = 0.1694*

Number of Significance Loss Items (Ostracism, Rejection from girls, Trouble with sports, Bullying)

b = 0.45926***

“I would rape if I could get away with it.”

c’ = 0.13471 c = 0.2135*

Figure 1.2  Readiness to commit rape as a function of Significance Loss and approval of Rodger Manifesto.

I could get away with it.” This was mediated by agreement with the statement “I admire Elliot Rodger for his Santa Barbara attack.” Notably, Elliot Rodger carried out a misogynistic terror attack in Isla Vista California, in which he killed six people, as well as himself. Gabriele di Cico of our lab recently carried out a different project in which he performed a linguistic analysis on 33,484 posts on the incels.co web forum. Words indicating honor loss had a direct effect on words related to death (indicating aggressive intentions), and the relationship was also mediated by the number of words indicating anger (see Figure 1.3). A third hypothesis is that this frustration–​aggression relationship will be moderated by the individual’s personal degree of significance quest. Finally, we predict that the frustration–​aggression relationship will be moderated by the degree that the culture subscribes to the narrative that violence restores or brings about significance (e.g., an honor culture), that is, the narrative that violence is the means to the end of significance. Research bearing on this hypothesis is presently under way in our lab. Mediation Estimates

Anger

Effect Indirect Direct Total ‘Honor Loss’

Estimate 0.00 0.15 0.15

SE

Z

p

0.00 0.00 0.00

3.32 56.37 56.98