Globalization on the Margins: Education and Post-Socialist Transformations in Central Asia [2 ed.] 9781641138826, 9781641138833, 9781641138840

Table of contents :
Cover
Globalization on the Margins
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Contents
Acknowledgments
INTRODUCTION--Education and Post-Socialist Transformations in Central Asia
PART I: COMPLICATING THE MARGINS: INTERNATIONALIZATION AND HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS
CHAPTER 1: Higher Education in the Former Soviet Union
CHAPTER 2: Internationalization of Higher Education in Central Asia
CHAPTER 3: Accreditation as a Means of Quality Assurance System in Higher Education in Kazakhstan
CHAPTER 4: The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013
CHAPTER 5: Higher Education Admissions Regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
CHAPTER 6: Developing a Common Admissions System for Institutions of Higher Education
CHAPTER 7: The Changing Status of Faculty Work and Life in the Universities of Tajikistan
CHAPTER 8: Central Asian Higher Education on the Margins of the European (Dis)Integration
PART II: RE-ENGAGING THE MARGINS: GLOBALIZATION AND NEW EDUCATION INEQUITIES
CHAPTER 9: Language, Globalization, and Education in Central Asia
CHAPTER 10: Including Children With Disabilities in Tajikistan’s Education System
CHAPTER 11: Efforts to Overcome Barriers to Girls’ Secondary Schooling in Rural Tajikistan
CHAPTER 12: Transition From Higher Education to Employment in Central Asia
CHAPTER 13: Examining Education Change in Urban Kazakhstan
CHAPTER 14: Parents’ Perspectives on the Educational Market in Central Asia
PART III: REFORMING FROM THE MARGINS: THE CENTRALITY OF THE TEACHING PROFESSION
CHAPTER 15: Ten-Plus-One Ways of Coping With Teacher Shortage in Kyrgyzstan
CHAPTER 16: Teaching as a Profession in the Kyrgyz Republic
CHAPTER 17: Blaming the Context Not the Culprit
CHAPTER 18: Teachers’ Continuing Commitment in Kyrgyzstan
PART IV: REDEFINING THE MARGINS: INTERNATIONAL AID, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, AND LOCAL RESPONSES
CHAPTER 19: Researching Internationalization and Educational Reform in Kazakhstan
CHAPTER 20: Middleman in the Global Education Marketplace
CHAPTER 21: Moving Between Soviet and Post-Soviet Educations in Tajikistan
CHAPTER 22: Pedagogy and Power in Turkmenistan
PART V: CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 23: Moving Central Asia From the Soviet Margins to the Global Center
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS
INDEX

Citation preview

Globalization on the Margins

Globalization on the Margins Education and Post-Socialist Transformations in Central Asia

edited by

Iveta Silova Arizona State University

Sarfaroz Niyozov University of Toronto

INFORMATION AGE PUBLISHING, INC. Charlotte, NC • www.infoagepub.com

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data   A CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress   http://www.loc.gov ISBN: 978-1-64113-882-6 (Paperback) 978-1-64113-883-3 (Hardcover) 978-1-64113-884-0 (eBook)

Copyright © 2020 Information Age Publishing Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the publisher. Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments................................................................................. ix Introduction: Education and Post-Socialist Transformations in Central Asia: Exploring Margins and Marginalities...................... xi

PA RT I COMPLICATING THE MARGINS: INTERNATIONALIZATION AND HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS 1 Higher Education in the Former Soviet Union: Recommendations for Reform in 1990—Were They Right?.............. 3 Stephen P. Heyneman 2 Internationalization of Higher Education in Central Asia: Implications Beyond the Intended...................................................... 15 Martha C. Merrill 3 Accreditation as a Means of Quality Assurance System in Higher Education in Kazakhstan: Developments and Challenges..................................................................................... 41 Sulushash Kerimkulova 4 The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013: A Bibliometric View............................................. 69 Aliya Kuzhabekova 

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5 Higher Education Admissions Regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: Difference Makes a Difference........................................ 95 Todd Drummond 6 Developing a Common Admissions System for Institutions of Higher Education: Contexts and Considerations........................ 125 Nazarkhudo Dastambuev, George Bethell, and Algirdas Zabulionis 7 The Changing Status of Faculty Work and Life in the Universities of Tajikistan.................................................................... 147 Zumrad Kataeva and Alan J. DeYoung 8 Central Asian Higher Education on the Margins of the European (Dis)Integration................................................................ 167 Voldemar Tomusk

PA RT I I RE-ENGAGING THE MARGINS: GLOBALIZATION AND NEW EDUCATION INEQUITIES 9 Language, Globalization, and Education in Central Asia.............. 191 Stephen A. Bahry 10 Including Children With Disabilities in Tajikistan’s Education System: Global Ideas, Local Tensions............................................... 207 Kate Lapham 11 Efforts to Overcome Barriers to Girls’ Secondary Schooling in Rural Tajikistan: The Importance of Experiential Activities..... 229 Kara Janigan 12 Transition From Higher Education to Employment in Central Asia: Graduate Experiences in Post-Soviet Tajikistan..................... 249 Dilrabo Jonbekova 13 Examining Education Change in Urban Kazakhstan: A Short Spatial Story........................................................................................ 273 Elise S. Ahn and Juldyz Smagulova 14 Parents’ Perspectives on the Educational Market in Central Asia....293 Christopher Whitsel

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PA RT I I I REFORMING FROM THE MARGINS: THE CENTRALITY OF THE TEACHING PROFESSION 15 Ten-Plus-One Ways of Coping With Teacher Shortage in Kyrgyzstan: Before and After 2011.................................................... 315 Gita Steiner-Khamsi and Nurbek Teleshaliyev 16 Teaching as a Profession in the Kyrgyz Republic: The Quest for (Re)Building the Knowledge Base.............................................. 351 Alan J. DeYoung and Rakhat Zholdoshalieva 17 Blaming the Context Not the Culprit: Limitations on Student Control of Teacher Corruption in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.............. 375 Eric M. Johnson 18 Teachers’ Continuing Commitment in Kyrgyzstan......................... 401 Nurbek Teleshaliyev

PA RT I V REDEFINING THE MARGINS: INTERNATIONAL AID, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, AND LOCAL RESPONSES 19 Researching Internationalization and Educational Reform in Kazakhstan..................................................................................... 431 David Frost and Assel Kambatyrova 20 Middleman in the Global Education Marketplace: The Role of South Korea in Uzbekistan’s Education Transformations.......... 455 Byoung-Gyu Gong 21 Moving Between Soviet and Post-Soviet Educations in Tajikistan: Institute of Professional Development as Response to Globalization........................................................................................... 475 Sarfaroz Niyozov and Juma Bulbulov 22 Pedagogy and Power in Turkmenistan............................................. 505 Victoria Clement

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PA RT V CONCLUSION 23 Moving Central Asia From the Soviet Margins to the Global Center: Educational Implications and Conclusions........................ 527 Sarfaroz Niyozov, Izza Tahir, and Iveta Silova About the Contributors...................................................................... 555 Index................................................................................................... 565

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The production and publication of the 2nd edition of this book came as a result of multiple requests for updating the 1st edition to reflect the dynamic development of research and scholarly exchange in the education field, both internationally and in Central Asia. As a reminder, the 1st edition of the book emerged as an outcome of a two-day conference, The Challenges of Education Reform: Central Asia in a Global Context, which was organized by the Harriman Institute, Columbia University in 2009. Since then, many changes have naturally occurred. While the theoretical purpose of the edited volume reflects the original goals of the conference and the first edition, this book is different in many ways. First and foremost, its authorship has significantly broadened to include more diverse voices, especially from Central Asia. Second, the latest edition of the book has broadened the scope of the book thematically, covering new topics (e.g., inclusive education, gender equity, language diversity), new geographic areas (e.g., Uzbekistan), and new methodologies (e.g., spatial analysis). A few of the original chapters have been significantly updated to reflect the latest developments, while several new chapters have been added reflecting new research trends. In addition, the volume’s introduction was revised along these conceptual, methodological, and representational lines. Notably, this volume also has a conclusion chapter, which pulls together key insights from the chapters, connects them to the broader literature on postsocialism and comparative education, and raises deep questions for new research, policy decisions, and further engagement with education and society in Central Asia. A key thread connecting the first and second editions is its collaborative nature,

Globalization on the Margins, pages ix–x Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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reflecting close collaboration between Central Asian scholars and their international colleagues in both the production of the chapters and the external reviews. As a result, this new edition represents expanded in size, too. We are deeply grateful to all the contributors to this book who worked patiently and enthusiastically across multiple continents to make this publication a reality. Special thanks go to OISE graduate student Izza Tahir for helping us finalize this volume and co-authoring its concluding chapter. Thank you also to graduate students from Lehigh University and Arizona State University for all the hours invested in editing, organizing, and proofing the manuscript.

INTRODUCTION

EDUCATION AND POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA Exploring Margins and Marginalities

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, many Western academics and commentators rushed to celebrate the long-awaited victory of liberal democracy and capitalism on the global scale. Following the logic of the “third wave” of democratization1 (Huntington, 1993), the expectation was that the Soviet system would ultimately be replaced by Western political, economic, and social institutions. The former Soviet Union was thus pronounced “a new frontier for the propagation of the western way” (MacFarlane, 1999, p. 1). Indeed, most of the countries in the former socialist bloc appeared to move towards the projected goals as they revised their constitutions, laws, and policies to reflect the principles of market economy, democratic pluralism, and human rights. In education, policy rhetoric became remarkably similar across the region, signaling a move from socialist education policies to more Western-oriented ones. As Birzea (1994) observed, all post-socialist countries have adopted, at least in official rhetoric, “one or another of the

Globalization on the Margins, pages xi–xxxix Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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western ideologies” (p. 55). From the post-socialist countries of Central Europe to the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, the catchwords of the new education reforms were “democratization,” “decentralization,” “liberalization,” “pluralism,” and “humanization of learning” (Silova, 2009). Almost three decades later, this triumphalist discourse remains strong among many observers, although some cracks are beginning to emerge as a result of the return of national-populist, right-wing neo-conservative movements in the West, of which Brexit and Donald Trump are just a few examples. This new national-populist rightist challenge is exacerbated by the revival of new pro-socialist discourses in the West, the rise of China, and Islamist-driven resurgence on a global scale, as well as the “comeback” of Russia to the post-Soviet landscape. Nevertheless, as Gilbert, Greenberg, Helms, and Jansen noted in 2008, some policy makers, scholars, and funding agencies have in fact “declared Eastern Europe to be fully ‘transitioned,’ socialism dead and gone, and liberal democracy a cure-all for the difficulties of global economic and political transformations” (p. 10). In particular, some studies proposed that the accession of the former socialist countries into the European Union (EU) should be viewed as one of the key indicators marking the end of post-socialist transitions (Birzea, as quoted in Phillips & Oancea, 2005). Commenting on the political, economic, and social developments in Central Asia, some commentators argued that the region was also “at the end of the transition,” although at an entirely different “end”: The transition period has come to an end in the sense that the states of Central Asia have largely completed the process of systemic transformation. The social and political structures in the Central Asian countries have acquired a stable and (in terms of basic characteristics) a broadly similar character. The countries have also fixed the shape of their basic features. They have established regimes, with varying degrees of authoritarianism, behind a formal quasi (or pseudo) democratic facade. These regimes range from what is a relatively moderate regime (by regional standards) in Kyrgyzstan to the fullblown despotism that prevails in Turkmenistan. (Rumer, 2005, p. 3)

While some of the newly independent countries of former Soviet Central Asia have indeed adopted the rhetoric of democracy and market economy, the modern triumphalism over the “end of socialism” has been clearly misleading. Unlike most of the countries in Central/Southeast Europe and the Baltic states, where the discursive debates about “the end of the transition” have only recently entered the public space (Vedres & Csigo, 2002),2 Central Asian political, economic, and social transformations have led to distinctly different trajectories. While the Kyrgyz Republic attempted to rapidly adopt democratic and market reforms, the rest of the Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—have maintained a certain degree of authoritarianism and state involvement in

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political, economic, and social life (Karatnycky, 2000; McGlinchey, 2011). Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have in fact settled into repressive autocracies, with little or no space for opposition political groupings and independent civic activism (Freedom House, 2005). Yet ruptures are taking place, as the two countries’ new leadership is breaking up with the very rigid governance practices inherited from their predecessors at home and opening their countries to ideas and relationships with the outside world. Moreover, while the four Central Asian republics have maintained internal stability throughout the transition period, Tajikistan has experienced a civil war (1993–1995), followed by a prolonged period of civil unrest, which ended with the signing of the peace accords in 1997. Leading to rapid socioeconomic growth and stability, as well as the inflow of foreign investments, the signing of the peace accords has also been marred by political uncertainties such as the attack on foreign tourists in the South, localized conflicts in Gorno-Badakhshan, and a prison riot in the north of the country. In Kyrgyzstan, the peaceful “tulip revolution” of 2005 turned “blood red” in the spring of 2010 as demonstrators stormed government buildings in Talas and across the country’s north in an attempt to overthrow the increasingly authoritarian regime (Horton, 2010). Following two violent revolutions in 2017, the first peaceful democratic transfer of prudential power took place in the country later in the same year. The new president hails from southern Osh region and there is hope that he may bring stability and balance to the south-north and the inter-ethnic and interclan relationships in Kyrgyzstan. In the area of education, the record of “transition” has been similarly mixed. Most governments in Central Asia have adopted features of the “post-socialist education reform package” (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008, p. 1), a set of policy reforms symbolizing the adoption of Western education values, including such “traveling policies” as student-centered learning, introduction of curriculum standards, decentralization of educational finance and governance, privatization of higher education, standardization of student assessment, and liberalization of textbook publishing, among others. Additional changes include the internationalization of higher education, such as aligning university curricula with the Bologna Process and other international policies and standards, establishing international, or joint universities and schools, setting up testing centers, sending students to Western universities and receiving those from the region, and accepting Western graduate credentials. In some cases, the post-socialist education reform package was imposed through the structural adjustment policies introduced by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and other agencies. In other cases, however, it was voluntarily borrowed or introduced out of fear of “falling behind” internationally (Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006, p. 189). While Central Asian education discourses have become increasingly similar to those of the rest of the world, education practices have not

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substantially changed (Silova, 2005), leading to the perception that the more things change, the more they remain the same. “Traveling policies” have often clashed with the strong desire of education policy makers in the region to maintain Soviet education legacies and, in some cases, revive pre-Soviet traditions. While some countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and to some extent Tajikistan, for example) have experimented with the adoption of “traveling policies” quite actively, other countries (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) often used the rhetoric of Western education reforms to simultaneously transform and reproduce, that is, legitimize the maintenance of their authoritarian regimes, including ideological indoctrination in schools and scrupulous control and management of the communities (Dailey & Silova, 2008; Silova, 2005). Almost 30 years later, an examination of the complex trajectories of “traveling policies” in Central Asia still raises more questions than it brings answers. In particular, why did some countries quickly move towards Western education models, while others went initially backwards, followed entirely new trajectories, or moved back and forth? Why did some elements of the “old” system remain so surprisingly functional? How have Western education discourses been hybridized in the encounter with collectivist and centralist cultures within post-socialist environments? Why did some elements of the “post-socialist education reform package” create new and unanticipated distortions? More importantly, were Western educational policies and practices borrowed directly or via south-south collaboration, and did they help improve quality, access and equity, while removing corruption and nepotism? This book responds to these and other questions by bringing together essays that reflect on the continuities and changes in educational development in Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The authors represent a broad range of individual and collaborative scholarship, reflecting geographic, and institutional diversity. Rather than viewing post-Soviet transformations in isolation, the authors place their analyses within the global context by reflecting on how Soviet legacies interact with global pressures to reform education in the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The book attempts to go beyond the common story of transnational projects that arrive in the region to change and influence former socialist countries. Instead of portraying the transition process as the influx of Western ideas into the region, the chapters in this book provide new lenses to critically examine the multidirectional flow of ideas, concepts, and reform models within the former Soviet countries of Central Asia. The authors critically and constructively engage both local and international practices, policies, contexts, and traditions in order to show new possibilities to build upon and the new challenges to reckon with. By highlighting the political nature

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of the transformation processes and the uniqueness of historical, political, social, and cultural contexts of each particular country, this book portrays post-socialist education transformations as complex, multidimensional, uncertain, and increasingly unpredictable. The title of this book, Globalization on the Margins, highlights the multiple connotations and interpretations of the concepts of “margins” and “marginalities” surrounding the scholarship on post-socialist transformations in Central Asia. For example, one may immediately picture the region as positioned on the margins of the world economy and dependent on global financial and economic institutions (e.g., the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank) to facilitate economic restructuring. One may also think of the margins of democracy, in which case the emphasis is on Central Asia’s maintenance of authoritarian political regime structures. Additionally, one may focus on social margins, in which case the emphasis is on populations that have been economically, socially, or politically marginalized—both externally and internally. Another perspective is the margins of knowledge, especially its focus on the uncertainty of post-socialist transitions. In the context of globalization, this is uncertainty in the degree of change projected by competing global discourses, uncertainty in regional differences in education change, and unpredictability in education implications of post-socialist transitions. This perspective from the margins of knowledge is vital as it shows how Central Asia may differently move into new global margins, from the Soviet to the late-neoliberal capitalist world order. This perspective also captures issues related to the colonization of the mind and the transformation of Central Asia into a market and testing site for the borrowed “best” ideas and practices in all spheres of human life rather than a context where collaborative research is supported and relevant and empowering ideas are produced. In sum, this book will explore these different notions of “margins” and “marginalities” and will examine where, why, and how they intersect in redefining Central Asia’s education spaces. GEOPOLITICS ON THE MARGINS: THE DISPLACED CENTRALITY OF CENTRAL ASIA Located at a strategically important intersection between the two continents, Central Asia has a centuries-old tradition of bridging Europe and Asia. Yet, despite its geographic and geopolitical centrality, Central Asia has been consistently displaced from early modern history. In fact, the Cambridge History of Islam (Holt, Lambton, & Lewis, 1970) largely dismisses the history of Central Asia between 1400 and 1800, arguing the region was isolated and therefore “led an existence at the margin of world history” (p. 471). While

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many would passionately disagree with such glaring marginalization and suggest that Central Asia was not entirely marginal and peripheral (Nanji & Niyozov, 2002; Starr, 2013), the unfortunate narrative is that the region has historically “fallen through the cracks, created by the segmentation of Western academia” and, as a result, inspired little interest beyond the realm of specialized Western and modern Russian historians (Erturk, 1999, p. 1). In fact, Frank (1992) argues that the “centrality of Central Asia” has been not only overly neglected but also outrightly denied by Eurocentric scholarship. The disintegration of the Soviet Union brought renewed attention to the region. Central Asia’s promising oil and natural gas reserves, combined with its strategic geographic location between the “East” and “West,” put the region back on the map as a central site of the new “Great Game” among rival nations for hegemony in the region.3 The situation became further complicated by the events of September 11, 2001, after which security concerns began to overshadow political, economic, and cultural rivalries, making Central Asia “the epicenter of geopolitical shocks on a global scale” (Rumer, 2002, p. x). In more simplistic terms, Russia, China, and the West were trying to pull Central Asia away from the Islamic world, while “its Muslim neighbors were determined to build a greater economic and political consensus with the Central Asian states” (Rashid, 1994, p. 250). However, a more nuanced approach reveals much more complex rivalries, stretching beyond the East/West dichotomy. For example, Sandole (2007) highlights the multidimensional nature of the “Great Game” which includes not only the traditional East–West dynamics, but also East–East and West–West rivalries. The East–East dimension includes regional power struggles between Russia and China who have competing interests in energy, yet converge politically in trying to limit the influence of NATO and the United States in the region. The West–West dimension highlights the power dynamics between NATO’s International Security Assistance Force and other allies involved in military and reconstruction activities in neighboring Afghanistan (Sandole, 2007). Other state “players” include Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and India, all of which have their own specific interests in Central Asia. Furthermore, the region hosts a whole range of multilateral and bilateral agencies involved in international development in the region, including the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), among others. In addition, international private foundations, philanthropies, and development agencies (such as the Open Society Foundations, the Aga Khan Development Network, Save the Children, and CARE) have firmly established themselves in the region. Finally, the Central Asian states have themselves

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emerged as active players in world politics, further complicating the power dynamics in the region. Not surprisingly then, Central Asia has become a site of “colliding trajectories” (Rumer, 2005, p. 39), with each international agency having its own “donor logic” or country assistance strategy. More often than not, what these international organizations fund reflects their own interests rather than local needs, leading to ongoing controversies, complexities, and misunderstandings (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008).4 Of particular interest is how these «colliding trajectories» play out on the ground, how the local elites receive, reshape, and represent them to their populations, and what becomes accepted as a norm for action in charting post-Soviet education reforms locally. Notably, the local elites are no longer perceived as naïve receivers of Western wisdom, but are rather viewed as confident negotiators with sound knowledge of the lenders’ vulnerabilities and hidden agendas, as well as of their own geostrategic advantages, and strategies for managing the locals. In this context, the notion of “controversies” is especially helpful. Instead of trying to understand which educational “logic” is most appropriate in Central Asian contexts, the concept of “controversies” allows us to critically examine how knowledge is produced within “an amalgam of an immense world of institutions, authority relations, stories, resemblances, memories, and fantasies” (Lindblad & Popkewitz, 2004, p. ix). As Lindblad and Popkewitz (2004) suggest, examining “controversies” allows us to understand “the roles and standards of reasons that order, differentiate, and distinguish the process of [education] restructuring across different contexts” (p. ix). Given the presence of virtually all the world’s global actors in the region and the ongoing controversies among them over the future direction of post-Soviet education reforms, the issues originally raised in Andre Gunder Frank’s (1992) Centrality of Central Asia, deserve further examination. In particular, what does Central Asia’s complex geopolitics reveal about knowledge production in the context of globalization? What place and role should Central Asian scholars have in this knowledge production equation? How can the study of Central Asia assist us in theorizing the world’s shifting geopolitical “margins” and constantly shifting and multiplying “cores”? And what does Central Asia’s complex geopolitical space tell us about globally circulating education policies and practices, which order and differentiate post-Soviet education reforms and thus inevitably produce new meanings about what constitutes “good” education and “good” society? In other words, if we understand how the controversies and contradictions embedded in global imaginaries are being played out on the world’s geopolitical margins, we should be able to learn more about the global norms as such, and not just about their Central Asian versions.

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GLOBALIZATION ON THE MARGINS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF “CRISIS” AND “SALVATION” IN CENTRAL ASIA’S EDUCATION REFORMS Notwithstanding increasing attempts among academics and policy-makers to redefine Central Asia’s “centrality,” the region continues to thrive on the margins of globalization. Located within the narratives of “progress,” “economic development,” and “equality” in dominating academic literature and policy reports, Central Asia is often portrayed as a region constantly defying global pressures and predictions, and haunted by the legacies of socialist, Islamic, and other ethno-nationalist traditions, all of which are viewed as regretful obstacles to the region’s development towards freedom and prosperity. Central Asia is also presented as a region inevitably falling behind in a global race towards democracy and market economy, which are viewed as markers of happy humanity and successful society. From OECD’s educational achievement rankings to Freedom House’s democratic development scores and to Transparency International’s corruption perception index, most Central Asian countries receive a low score or ranking by these organizations, making them appear as far too distant from modernity’s promise of democracy and economic development. Central Asia’s perpetual location on globalization’s margins is further intensified by the narratives of “decline,” “danger,” and “crisis,” which circulate widely in the scholarship on political, economic, and social development in the region. In fact, Central Asian Survey devoted an entire special issue of the journal to examining “the discourses of danger,” pointing to the tendency of “the researchers, the development agencies, the experts” of Central Asia to socially construct the region as rife with conflict and danger (Thompson & Heathershaw, 2005, p. 1). While Frank (1999) correctly points to the historical roots of this rhetoric dating back to the Soviet period,5 the social construction of Central Asia’s “crisis” has become especially pronounced since the breakdown of the former Soviet Union in 1991. Commenting on post-Soviet scholarship, Erturk (1999) argued that recent literature is dominated by three main themes, including (a) the danger of ethnic conflicts within and among the Central Asian states (and their Middle Eastern neighbors), (b) the rivalry for influence in the region between secular Turkey and fundamentalist Iran, and (c) the nuclear threat posed to the West (p. 2). While not all publications on Central Asia are alarmist and crisis-oriented (e.g., see Starr, 2013; Pomfrett, 2019, for positive view), a significant number of the edited volumes, books, and reports highlights different angles and intensities of this impending “crisis.” The theme of “crisis” has also penetrated the area of education, firmly dominating all genres of education literature, including policy reports, education sector reviews, ethnographies, qualitative case-studies, and

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quantitative cross-national comparisons. International academics, experts, and agencies have insisted almost unanimously that education systems in the region were approaching a “crisis situation,” highlighting the urgency of the problem in their panic-stricken reports with titles such as A Generation at Risk: Children in the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Khan, 1998), Youth in Central Asia: Losing the New Generation (International Crisis Group, 2003c), and Public Spending on Education in the CIS-7 Countries: The Hidden Crisis (World Bank, 2003). Since the early 1990s, education sector reviews rushed to point out the alarming indicators of crisis, including falling expenditures, declining literacy rates, decreasing enrollment, rising student dropout, deteriorating capital infrastructure, outdated textbooks, stagnated curricula, and a lack of qualified teachers (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008; Silova, Johnson, & Heyneman, 2007). Many studies concluded that educational systems had become less equitable and more corrupt (Hallak & Poisson, 2007; Heyneman, Anderson, & Nuraliyeva, 2008; Johnson, 2008). Finally, some argued that Central Asia’s public school systems could soon reach “a tipping point”—a point at which institutional and professional capacity drain away so that education systems are no longer capable of regenerating themselves (Heyneman & De Young, 2004; Johnson, 2004). What the emerging rhetoric of “crisis” suggests is that Central Asia’s education systems need to be normalized—redefined, recuperated, and reformed—usually (but not exclusively) against the prevailing Western models. In a post-Soviet context, policy-makers and funding agencies have systematically used certain norms as a powerful strategy for both a critique of existing practices (“this is not normal”) and a legitimization of external influences (“this will make you normal”). For example, Perry’s (2009) analysis of scholarly publications examining education change in the former socialist countries highlights the use of “normalizing” discourses, which emerge from the construction of conceptual dichotomies between education in the “West” and “East.” Based on the analysis of documents written by American academics involved in education assistance during the post-socialist transformation (i.e., documents published between 1989 and 2001), Perry (2009) highlights the dichotomies, which portray “the West as tolerant, efficient, active, developed, organized, and democratic, and the East as intolerant, corrupt, passive, underdeveloped, chaotic, and undemocratic” (Perry, 2009, p. 177). In her analysis of 65 documents dealing with education change in Eastern Europe, Perry (2009) concludes that the majority of texts (89%) discuss education change in post-socialist countries negatively. For example, these texts project that “the typical teacher in a post-communist country is traditional, outmoded, unprogressive, authoritarian, unable or unwilling to change, unprofessional, and ineffective” (p. 179). More specifically, these studies explain that

xx    Education and Post-Socialist Transformations in Central Asia [post-socialist] teachers focus too much on memorization and facts and not enough on application, problem-solving, reasoning, analysis, and “critical thinking”; teachers are too controlling and authoritative, classrooms should be centered more around the student than the teacher; and teachers are passive, inflexible, and unable to adapt or take initiative. (p. 178)

By constructing a negative image of education in post-socialist contexts, Eastern Europe (and by extension Central Asia) is presented as “backward and inferior,” thus reinforcing the superiority of the West (Perry, 2009, p. 184). More importantly, alternatives are presented through the familiar narratives of “progress,” “hope,” and “salvation.” When seen from such deficit perspectives, educational consultants and reformers, even those who claim to be progressive, do not see hopeful insights and practices at the local level, often rebranding “global” practices as local or connect[ing] them with local traditions to make them legitimate (Niyozov, 2018). As Lindblad and Popkewitz (2004) note, these modern narratives are meant “to bring progress to society and redeem the individual” by invoking our “social obligation to rescue those who have fallen outside the narratives of progress” (pp. xx–xxi). Further elaborating on the notions of deviance and normality, Lindblad and Popkewitz (2004) explain how some global reforms become internalized as legitimate through the narratives of “progress”: Educational attainment and child development become tales about “finding a better life,” fulfilling one’s own and national destiny, and joining of the progress and development of the individual with collective hopes and desires of the nation. Progress is told as change in the curriculum and teaching that ensures the future of democracy in the new global, informational world. The mechanisms of inclusion are access to differential integration into labor markets, inclusive cultural representation in the curriculum, and democracy promoted by decentralizing decisions and improving all children’s achievement and performance. (p. 71)

In other words, the social construction of Central Asia has been generally built around the unquestioned assumption that development, progress, and modernity are not only neutral but also universally desired concepts. Yet, the uniqueness of the Central Asian education case is that it hosts a wide range of alternatives, which may not necessarily enter Western development narratives as viable discourses. At the same time, however, these alternative discourses affect local configurations of education reforms in meaningful ways. As most of the chapters in this book illustrate, the multifaceted nature of the post-Soviet education reform trajectories in Central Asia effectively disrupts the linearity of the transition from socialism to capitalism. When projected onto post-Soviet education spaces, the assumed homogeneity of the world culture is inevitably questioned, offering

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new opportunities to think about education reforms in more nuanced and unexpected ways. CONTESTING MARGINS AND MARGINALITIES Reflecting on the period of nearly 30 years of post-Soviet transformations, the essays in this book examine complexities, contradictions, and controversies of Central Asian education reforms in a global context. Collectively, they aim to highlight the continuities and discontinuities of post-Soviet education transformations and they do so by using a variety of analytical, theoretical, and methodological approaches and speaking from a variety of geographical and institutional contexts. This diversity adds unique value to understanding the dynamics of globalization and post-Soviet transformations in education. Rather than observing post-Soviet transformations from a single epistemological viewpoint, the chapters in this book attempt to grasp the diversity of post-Soviet education reform processes and the multiplicity of outcomes emerging from new political, economic, and social constellations. As Rabikowsa (2009) noted, “generalizing diverse historical and social entanglements in one pot of homogeneous experience results in a reductionist view of the past and the abstraction of the present” (p. 166). Thus, a combination of diverse analytical perspectives allows us to reflect on post-Soviet transformations with a new conceptual openness. Whether reflecting on higher education reforms or examining the changing status of the teaching profession in Central Asia, multiple theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches allow us to challenge the notions of “margins” and “marginalities” embedded in traditional conceptual dichotomies, while also complicating our understanding of globalization processes in meaningful ways. The book is structurally divided into four interconnected thematic parts that together create an integrated story of the evolving education transformations in the region. The first part focuses on the internationalization of higher education reforms in Central Asia, highlighting a dynamic interaction among state and non-state actors and examining competing agendas advanced by these actors in the Central Asian higher education space. The second section examines education inequities which have been intensified in the context of globalization, ranging from linguistic and socioeconomic inequities to gender and disability-related inequities. The third part of the book brings together research on the central role of teachers during postSoviet education reforms. Finally, the fourth part of the book problematizes international aid and development assistance in Central Asia, focusing on the global/local dynamics and highlighting paradoxes inherent in

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post-Soviet education reforms. The rest of this chapter offers brief summaries of each section of the book. Complicating the Margins: Internationalization and Higher Education Reforms The first part of the book brings together essays on higher education, which collectively examine higher education reforms against the background of the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape of Central Asia. While Central Asia’s “centrality” remains an elusive concept, it is important to explore it in relation to the power dynamics and politics operating at the national, regional, and global levels. Most of the chapters in this section attempt to do just that by highlighting the multiplicity of state and non-state actors involved, examining the variety of competing agendas circulating in the Central Asian higher education space, and discussing the unpredictable outcomes emerging from these new educational constellations. Stephen P. Heyneman begins the discussion with a short commentary on structural changes in Central Asia’s higher education systems by noting the similarity of post-Soviet education reforms in Central Asia. In particular, he suggests that at the time of their independence, the structure, curriculum content, governance, and admissions procedures of higher education institutions were more or less identical across Central Asia as well as the fifteen republics of the former Soviet Union. While independence brought multiple changes, they have been quite similar in nature. For example, Heyneman observes that there has been a move toward standardized testing as a criterion for admissions, a restructuring away from sector ministerial control, a diversification of the provision of education, as well as a decentralization of governance, salary, and tuition structures. The chapter engages readers in thinking about the reasons for these apparent similarities: Is it because globalization is so powerful and the local institutions on the periphery so weak? Is it because of the irresistible pressures from international financial institutions such as the World Bank? Or are the requirements for excellence in higher education in a market economy sufficiently similar to make changes inevitable? Based on his observations of post-Soviet education reforms, Heyneman supports the latter argument and suggests that the changes in higher education have been inevitable and that future changes are predictable. In his view, the Central Asian states are moving along a predetermined trajectory towards Western standards in higher education reforms. Heyneman suggests that while trajectory, end points, and key strategies are all clear (i.e., Western) the process of their workability depends on the local actors, who should actively participate in

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the processes of debating the relevance of the global ideas, and their finetuning implementation in particular contexts. While Heyneman’s chapter discusses the inevitability and predictability of post-Soviet transitions, processes, and outcomes, most of the remaining chapters irrevocably complicate his argument. For example, Martha C. Merrill argues that having similar pasts and facing a similar set of problems do not necessarily mean that higher education institutions in Central Asia have pursued the same reforms. In “Internationalization of Higher Education in Central Asia: Implications Beyond the Intended,” Merrill discusses the emergence of new actors in higher education institutions across Central Asia—ranging from the EU’s programs, Confucius Institutes, international accrediting agencies, the Open Society Foundations and other donors to students returning from international exchanges—and their influence on the trajectories of higher education reforms in the Central Asian republics. She argues that these new actors have significantly diversified the scope of internationalization within Central Asian universities, influencing institutional norms and structures in multiple ways. They have also diversified— oftentimes unintentionally—the traditional powers of centralized authority, such as Ministries of Education, thus further contributing to multiple reform trajectories and diverse governance structures in higher education institutions across the region. Zooming in on university research in Kazakhstan, Sulushash Kerimkulova illustrates the shifting powers of higher education authority. In her article “Accreditation as a Means of Quality Assurance System in Higher Education in Kazakhstan: Developments and Challenges,” Kerimkulova explores the policies and developments in the accreditation journey of higher education in Kazakhstan with a specific focus on the establishment of a national model of accreditation as a means of assuring quality of higher education, its impact on educational improvements in higher education, and the challenges that it generates for the higher education institutions. In particular, Kerimkulova’s study documents the evolution of the accreditation infrastructure in Kazakhstan, reflecting its progressive movement from being completely controlled by the government to one dominated by independent accrediting agencies. Echoing Merrill’s findings, she illustrates how the processes of developing the quality assurance system in higher education have been strongly influenced by policies and developments at the EU level, while at the same time being driven by the “best practices” borrowed from North American and Asian institutions and informed by Kazakhstan’s own experience. In other words, the development of Kazakhstan’s higher education quality assurance system has not necessarily followed one (Western) blueprint, but was rather developed out of an amalgam of diverse global, regional, and local practices. Yet, while a few positive impacts of the accreditation system on Kazakhstan’s higher

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education institutions have been documented, practically nothing is known about whether the new accreditation infrastructure has led to excellence in education and improvements in quality, including curriculum content, teaching activities, and students’ learning outcomes. Continuing the discussion of the complex nature of higher education reforms in Kazakhstan, Aliya Kuzhabekova focuses on the effects of Soviet institutional legacies on post-Soviet aspirations to join the Western higher education space. In her chapter “The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan during 1991–2013: A Bibliometric View,” Kuzhabekova argues that despite efforts to “modernize” and “Westernize” its national research and innovation system, which has been reflected in a deliberate policy shift from a post-Soviet to a Western European and American sphere of influence, Kazakhstan’s higher education infrastructure remains heavily dependent on Soviet legacies. Similar to the Soviet period, research activity in post-Soviet Kazakhstan remains primarily concentrated in the former and new capital cities, Almaty and Astana, and the industrial centers; the most productive research institutions are those which have inherited a history and capacity for research from the Soviet period; the largest number of publications is produced in the fields of physics, chemistry, mathematics, and related fields, all of which were well-supported in the Soviet era; and, the impact of the research output remains concentrated on the area of influence of the former Soviet Union, with the majority of research being published in Russian journals. Overall, this study concludes that Kazakhstan remains largely isolated from the international research community, despite its intensive efforts to internationalize during the last three decades, and that this isolation is primarily caused by the persistence of Soviet institutional legacies both in Kazakhstan and the broader postSoviet education space. While an understanding of the increasingly complex power dynamics is key, the role of local politics in reform implementation is equally important. In “Higher Education Admissions Regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: Difference Makes a Difference,” Todd Drummond attempts to disentangle the motives of different competing parties and local politics involved in higher education admissions reforms in order to understand the actual impact of these reforms on educational systems and the individuals who constitute them. He argues that the ultimate question is not whether testing has been introduced but whether or not it has served its purpose in promoting fairness. While these reforms appear to align the new regimes with norms in university admissions in many western countries, in practice they appear to adhere loosely (and primarily rhetorically) to any international norms. By examining such localized issues as language politics, corruption, and institutional ownership, Drummond argues that the new admissions regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan differ both from each other and from

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Western countries in significant ways. Furthermore, he suggests that the sustainability of the newly introduced reforms remains uncertain and will be determined by local politics and power struggles. This theme is further detailed by Nazarkhudo Dastambuev, George Bethell, and Algirdas Zabulionis in their chapter “Developing a Common Admissions System for Institutions of Higher Education: Contexts and Considerations.” The chapter discusses how the global practices of standardized exams and common admission systems (CAS) have taken different shapes and forms in the various post-Soviet countries and how these variations are affected by local priorities, politics, and cultural contexts. The authors look at the various models of CAS in Georgia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, suggesting general principles for Tajikistan to take into consideration as it designs and implements its own common admissions system. The authors contend that the common reasons behind the adoption of these systems and unified examinations can be grouped according to the requirements of the key groups of stakeholders: society at large, students (and their supporters), and the institutions of higher education. The old, Soviet-era systems of admission selection were under the purview of individual institutions of higher education and were believed to be particularly prone to corruption, especially by virtue of being complex and opaque in nature. A common system under a publicly accountable centralised authority, on the other hand, should be able to ensure transparency, accountability, as well as avenues for appeals against the procedures and decisions of the system. It should be able to minimize the potential for corruption by maintaining integrity and fairness of assessments. The authors argue that centralized systems are thus able to better uphold the rights of students. Yet, the introduction of new centralized models of higher education examination and admission systems are also highly contested as those in power may attempt to influence the development of these centers in a particular direction, while higher education institutions themselves may be resisting the reforms. Tajikistan’s recent adoption of this global “best practice” will be a test case of the viability of the reform beyond its rhetoric and initial euphoria. Undoubtedly, all of these reform dynamics have serious implications for professional lives and personal well-being of higher education faculty. In “The Changing Status of Faculty Work and Life in the Universities of Tajikistan,” Zumrad Kataeva and Alan J. DeYoung draw on in-depth interviews with 23 faculty members in four universities in Dushanbe to reflect on changes in the lives of higher education faculty from the Soviet to the post-Soviet eras. They reveal that amidst the ambitious higher education reforms, the working conditions and job satisfaction in the academic profession has significantly declined since the early 1990s. While education was highly valued during the Soviet era for its moral as well as political uses

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and was funded accordingly, in the post-Soviet era the sector has seen a significant decrease in government funding. Expected to actively participate in higher education reforms, faculty members are inadequately compensated and struggle to make ends meet as the higher education sector as a whole suffers from inadequate financial, infrastructural, and human resources. Furthermore, higher education faculty face challenges related to state control over curricula and assessment processes, have little or no opportunities for professional development, and lack opportunities to access supranational professional associations. At times, they have to take on additional employment to supplement their incomes, leading to a fractured professional identity and career trajectory. Needless to say, the declining status of university faculty members irrevocably complicates higher education reform trajectories in Tajikistan and perhaps Central Asia more broadly, affecting not only occupational choices of individual faculty members but also possible development options of the entire higher education sector in the future (for further discussion about the effects of post-Soviet transformations on university faculty in Central Asia see CohenMiller & Kuzhabekova, 2018). Finally, the last chapter in this section zooms out to bring back the discussion of Central Asian higher education into the broader European geopolitical space. In “Central Asian Higher Education in the Margins of the European (Dis)Integration,” Voldemar Tomusk examines the implications of the Bologna Process—EU project aimed at the integration of higher education structures across the European education space—for both Central Asian republics and the EU itself. He argues that political disagreements, legal needs, and various competing interests among the EU member states and beyond, have resulted in the loss of the Bologna Process’ reforming power and thereby its integrating capacities. Tomusk notes that Kazakhstan’s accession to the Bologna Process in 2010 has not only failed to make any significant contributions to solving the problems of country’s higher education, but also signaled to other Central Asian states that all that is required to bring higher education to the level of European standards is skillful politics and lots of connections. From this perspective, Kazakhstan’s accession to the Bologna Process demonstrated the internal weaknesses of the EU integration process itself, while further contributing to its demise. While trying to reposition themselves from the margins to the center of the European education space, Central Asian higher education institutions instead found themselves in the middle of a disintegrating European education space. What is fascinating about Central Asia is that it embodies a multiplicity of actors and institutions involved in redefining Central Asia’s geopolitical space. And it encompasses the multidirectional flow of ideas and imaginaries about the future world order. Moreover, it questions the legitimacy of the traditional East/West divide by suggesting that we may in fact be

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witnessing the emergence of a new multi-polar (Grevi, 2009) or, according to some authors, non-polar, world (Haas, 2008). In particular, Grevi (2009) suggests that the world is becoming increasingly “multi-polar” as a result of the post-Cold War processes, which have entailed a shift from Western cultural, political, and economic predominance towards a more diverse and heterogeneous international “cacophony” wherein “emerging and reemerging players not only assert their individual interests but also promote their distinctive worldviews” (p. 7). While these processes are clearly unpredictable and uncertain by their very nature, it is precisely this uncertainty that deserves further examination. Re-Engaging the Margins: Globalization and New Education Inequities The second part of the volume brings to readers’ attention the various manifestations of the marginality and inequity within Central Asia, or what one might metaphorically call the “marginalities in the global margins.” Notably, the chapters in this section also illustrate that global traveling policies might be helping with both better articulation and sustainable resolution of some equity issues, especially when many of these issues have been disregarded by the neoliberal discourses of meritocracy, resilience, and choice, or by religious and cultural discourses of predestination, luck, and fate. The authors problematize these discourses and assumptions, suggesting that equity-inequity occurrences are sociocultural structural and systemic constructs, and are defined and worked through power, politics, and interests. They should be acknowledged, debated, and addressed in policy and practice. Stephen Bahry’s chapter “Language, Globalization, and Education in Central Asia” looks at how specific languages are diffused in post-Soviet Central Asia by means of societal multilingualism and personal plurilingualism, which are prerequisites for cross-border interchange between people and, therefore, global change. Taking a “skeptical” approach towards globalization, Bahry argues that globalization research, especially in post-Soviet Central Asia, has largely focused on debates about language policy and has neglected to problematize the role language plays in the process. Not only can individual languages be diffused by globalizing forces but language capacities may also be globalized through the diffusion of bilingualism or multilingualism. Multilingualism and plurilingualism are not obstacles, but assets to making globalization work better for all. Bahry maps out different international influences on language policy development, including Western actors (e.g., Germany, France, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom), regional influences (e.g., Turkey, Iran, South Korea, China, and Russia), as well as international agencies (e.g., UN, OSCE, and others). Yet,

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many policy innovations may privilege certain languages according to the perceived value of investment in those languages. Thus, the chapter raises a larger question with regard to the fate of the national minority languages in the context of competing discourses of indigenisation and globalization. Despite changing language policies and proclamations, the minority and small languages and their carriers find themselves increasingly marginalized and disenfranchised in the neoconservative and neoliberal Central Asia. It is not only the minority language speakers who are feeling the heat. Kate Lapham’s chapter “Including Children with Disabilities in Tajikistan’s Education System: Global Ideas, Local Tensions” critically discusses the cases of, and solutions to, the issue of children with disabilities in Tajikistan. Lapham’s robust examination of the tensions that arise between the increasing foregrounding of Western-defined “inclusivity” in global education discourses, on the one hand, and a local, Tajik understanding of the concept, on the other, is simply fascinating. Through the use of two vignettes, she suggests that in order to make Tajik education more inclusive, the reformers must adopt creative ways of working with, and within, the constraints and realities of the local context. These vignettes illustrate how civil society organizations have successfully navigated the Tajik legal and policy architecture governing inclusive education and surmounted two of the biggest barriers to inclusive education: the lack of financial resources and teachers’ lack of confidence and training in working with children with disabilities. Kara Janigan examines girls’ secondary education in Tajikistan in her ethnography-based chapter “Efforts to Overcome Barriers to Girls’ Secondary Schooling in Rural Tajikistan: The Importance of Experiential Activities.” She looks at the UNICEF-funded Girls Education Project (GEP) implemented from 2006 to 2008. The research was conducted in six rural schools, three of which implemented the GEP and the other three did not. Janigan develops a complex theoretical framework by drawing concepts from Bourdieu’s social reproduction theory, “empowerment” theories, and theories of education for girls’ and women’s empowerment within the field of international development, which prove successful, but raise questions about whether the application of a Western theoretical framework in a Tajik context was sufficient for a deeper understanding and resolution of the girls’ education challenge. Marginalization affects not only girls, but also youth more broadly. Dilrabo Jonbekova’s “Transition from Higher Education to Employment in Central Asia: Graduate Experiences in Post-Soviet Tajikistan” details the experiences of disenfranchisement of the post-Soviet Tajikistan’s university graduates as they navigate their transition from university to employment. The author argues that this transition has become more difficult for students in the post-Soviet era due to continuing challenges in the education system, a struggling and stagnant economy, poor labor market opportunities, a lack

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of transparency and corruption in the recruitment process and the differential treatment of local versus expatriate employees in the international organizations. Using a mixed-methods research design, the author interviewed recent graduates from various disciplines, geographical locations, and universities as well as employers in order to look at the disconnect between skills and the labour market in Tajikistan. As a testimony to the argument that inequalities are structural and systemic, Elise S. Ahn and Juldyz Smagulova use spatial analysis to capture the effects of education reform policies, especially as they play out “on the ground” and affect the lived experiences of students. In “Examining Education Change in Urban Kazakhstan: A Short Spatial Story,” the authors reveal a pattern of unequal access and stratification in education based on school type and location in Almaty. They document how the distribution of secondary schools reflects the pattern of urbanization in the city, with students in the newer, peripheral districts having less access to different types of schooling and diversity of language of instruction, even though they have newer schools. These findings suggest that achievement gaps are not only a result of school-related factors but rather stem from structural-systemic inequalities such as the location-dependent learning opportunities which are differentially available to privileged and disadvantaged students. The authors conclude that the differing economic strengths of the older and newer districts will continue to put the latter at a disadvantage. Christopher Whitsel’s chapter, “Parents’ Perspectives on the Educational Market in Central Asia,” extends the study of education inequities both conceptually, methodologically, and geographically. Through a mixedmethods study conducted in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, Whitsel explores the perspectives of parents on school choice. School choice has greatly increased in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet era, both as a result of explicit policies of decentralization, privatization, and the establishment of market economies, as well as the rise of informal mechanisms to mitigate the effects of economic crises which have seen a significant reduction in government spending on education. The study finds that while parents do tend to actively exercise choice in selecting schools appropriate to their children’s needs and abilities in both countries, they do not tend to associate this with a market-type activity. The findings suggest that the majority of parents do not perceive market resemblance because first, they do not directly associate prices with schooling as many do not pay for school at all, second, very few consider school cost a factor in selecting a school, and third, because many parents do not have a direct way of assessing the true price of schooling due to the informal nature of the majority of the costs they do experience. Combined, the chapters in this part of the book suggest that contrary to the aforementioned promises of the post-Soviet education reform package,

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questions of equity and marginality persist and, in some cases, have even been exacerbated. The resolution of the issues of equity, access, and quality requires going beyond discourses of meritocracy, choice, decentralization, and diversification—going beyond policy proclamations and charity/empathy/ mercy-based actions. The resolutions may rather require cultural and structural changes such as providing material, financial, and human resources, and critically and constructively engaging local and international practices and voices in terms of their ethics, agendas, and practical implications. Reforming from the Margins: The Centrality of the Teaching Profession The third section of the book examines how post-Soviet transformations have affected the professional status and morale of schoolteachers in Central Asia and how schools themselves have been affected by these changes. The chapters in this section of the book look beyond the rhetoric of “crisis” and “salvation,” while attempting to disentangle the complex array of education policies and practices which define boundaries and set limits to post-Soviet transformation processes. In “Ten-Plus-One Ways of Coping with Teacher Shortage in Kyrgyzstan: Before and After 2011,” Gita Steiner-Khamsi and Nurbek Teleshaliyev focus on teacher shortage in Kyrgyzstan and investigate how schools are coping with teacher shortage on a daily basis. Rather than blaming schools for resorting to various (often problematic) hiring practices, the authors examine why the system faces enormous difficulties with hiring young teachers and retaining older teachers in the profession. While traditionally baseline studies have focused on one indicator of teacher shortage (i.e., subjects and lessons with vacancies in danger of cancelation), this research suggests that it is more accurate to measure teacher shortage with the “ten plus one” indicators. These ten indicators reveal the full scope of teacher shortage in schools, and help us understand why the quality of education is so low in the Kyrgyz educational system. It also provides a sense of urgency for developing a comprehensive teacher attraction and retention strategy at the policy level that is able to bring more teacher education graduates into the profession and keep them working in schools. In “Teaching as a Profession in the Kyrgyz Republic: The Quest for (Re) Building the Knowledge Base,” Alan J. DeYoung and Rakhat Zholdoshalieva use ethnographic methods to explore changes in the social status of teachers and the teaching profession in Kyrgyzstan since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Following the discussion of the teaching profession during the Soviet period, the chapter examines external challenges to the profession brought about by economic and demographic shifts in the country

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since the 1990s. DeYoung and Zholdoshalieva argue that despite multiple reform efforts to date, the majority of Kyrgyz teachers remain disempowered and disenfranchised in a top-down system which imposes policies heavily influenced by global agendas rather than developed in response to the local needs and context. In this context, the teaching profession and its knowledge base cannot be rebuilt until the teachers themselves are given active ownership of, and participation in, the reform agenda. The authors recommend granting practicing teachers a seat at the policy making table, alongside the government and international stakeholders, in order to enable teachers to become an active force in reform and regain the social value of the profession. Next, Eric M. Johnson places the discussion of the changing nature of teacher professionalism in the context of increasing teacher corruption in Central Asia. In “Blaming the Context not the Culprit: Limitations on Student Control of Teacher Corruption in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan,” Johnson describes reported teacher corruption by students and teachers, assesses factors that explain differences in student reporting of it, and probes stakeholder interpretations of its impact. Using data collected from students and teachers in Kyrgyzstan over a 7-month period, this chapter reveals that teacher corruption is neither widespread nor extreme in Kyrgyzstan. Overall, only one third of teachers are reported to be engaging in corruption and most of these teachers do so at a very low-level. While some schoolteachers extort bribes from students, steal money from schools, and force students to pay them for unwanted private tutoring lessons, students generally do not seem to associate teacher corruption with teacher professionalism. Instead, the study suggests that corruption victims—that is to say, students—are generally sympathetic toward teachers, tolerant of their behavior, and generous in how it impacts their perception of the teacher as a professional. In Kyrgyzstan, they blame and mistrust systemic actors like the economy and the government rather than teachers themselves for such corruption. In particular, stakeholders either deny corruption is a problem or excuse it due to low pay and poor teacher support. Finally, the concept of teacher professionalism is further discussed in Nurbek Teleshaliyev’s chapter “Teachers’ Continuing Commitment in Kyrgyzstan.” Despite the severe effects of the decline in the teaching profession, which has been documented in previous chapters, there are teachers who continue to inspire students and other teachers through their undiminished commitment to and enthusiasm for teaching across the region. Such teachers are often referred to as c Uchitelya s bolshoi bukvy (Teachers with a capital “T”). Teleshaliyev argues that these teachers are different from other teachers by virtue of their being exemplary teachers who are well-regarded by their colleagues and respected by students and parents for demonstrating continuous commitment to the profession. This chapter draws

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on current research into the professional lives and practices of eight experienced, long-serving, and exemplary teachers in four schools in Kyrgyzstan. It identifies and explores the various personal and contextual factors that have influenced their decisions and asks how these might be important for other teachers more broadly. The contribution of these teachers is largely underutilised and, in many ways, undervalued. This chapter explains what and how they, and other teachers like them, may contribute to education reform in relation to strengthening the teaching profession in Kyrgyzstan and the Central Asian region more broadly. In sum, the chapters above highlight the centrality of teachers in ensuring the quality of education in Central Asia and suggest that the increasing demands on teachers cannot be met without rapid enhancement of teachers’ life and work conditions, including their professional status and position as engaged partners in educational and societal reforms. Demanding that teachers care for students, communities, and nations without themselves being cared for as humans, citizens, and as committed and dedicated knowledge workers is not a sustainable proposition. Redefining the Margins: International Aid, Global Solutions, and Local Responses Education-related aid is pouring into Central Asia from all sides: East and West, North and South. Bilateral and multilateral donors and agencies, charities and individuals are providing financial, material, and academic support to both public and private education systems in the region. Both the investors as well as the receivers of international aid equally understand that aid alone, and especially that provided in monetary terms without developing local institutional and human capacities as well as infrastructures and systems, will not lead to sustainable and culturally-relevant development. This final part of the volume problematizes these assumptions, by first depicting the fate of the global education practices and then suggesting how such capacities, structures, systems, and solutions might be approached differently. David Frost and Assel Kambatyrova’s chapter “Researching Internationalization and Educational Reform in Kazakhstan” presents a reflexive account of the authors’ collaborative research experiences in Kazakhstan in 2013, which involved a direct collaboration between researchers from the United Kingdom and Kazakhstan. In the last decade, Kazakhstan has adopted an explicit policy of internationalization vis-à-vis its education sector, with the aim of adopting international best practices in the hope that this will lead to the rapid modernization of the sector. This policy has been realized in the form of the establishment of scholarship programs to facilitate

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overseas study and of experimental schools and universities, the hiring of foreign teachers, and the establishment of a large-scale training program designed by the University of Cambridge Faculty of Education. The authors question how an explicit policy commitment to internationalization affects the national education system and national identity. Reflecting on their own experiences of engaging in an international partnership, the authors discuss such issues as the nature and dynamics of multi-national research collaboration as a dimension of internationalization, their own assumptions and perspectives, and the ideas of school leadership and change derived predominantly from Western research and organizational theory that informed their work. The authors highlight the tensions between the forces and values of globalization, on the one hand, and Kazakhstan’s own centralized, bureaucratic system and values, on the other, which cause education reform efforts to go on a circuitous path. This chapter is uniquely valuable for its authors’ honesty in questioning the validity of the very projects in which they, their institutions, and their countries are invested in and have high stakes in to claim its success. Analogically reflexive is the chapter by Byoung-Guy Gong, “Middleman in the Global Education Marketplace: The Role of South Korea in Uzbekistan’s Education Transformations.” Gong questions whether this example of inter-Asian cooperation results in the creation of a localized model of education as an alternative to the hegemonic Western capitalist one. By looking at two cases of South Korean educational assistance in Uzbekistan’s education sector, he concludes otherwise, and argues that South Korea essentially acts as a “middleman,” transmitting neoliberal education values by means of its international development assistance and thus perpetuating the hegemonic model. The author argues that South Korea’s “donor logic” is defined by two key factors. First, South Korea’s national strategy aims to increase and cement its share in the regional higher education market, in keeping with the global trend of the increasing marketization of education. Second, Uzbekistan and South Korea have an increasingly strong bilateral relationship, especially in the industrial and economic sectors, and investment in the tertiary sector to create a skilled Uzbek workforce is a means of further strengthening this relationship of mutual economic interest. The author concludes that the ambitions of both countries to strengthen their regional footprint and position in the global educational market merely resulted in the perpetuation of the neoliberal model, with South Korea acting as the medium of transfer of the imported education policies and models to Uzbekistan. The next chapter discusses how this vicious cycle may be broken, and how South–South cooperation or regional multilateralism may be more effectively used to develop alternative ways of imagining educational change. How can global best practices be engaged to produce local insights and

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models of education reform? Why can’t international networks empower local bodies to critically engage global practices and synthesise them with local ones? Niyozov and Bulbulov’s chapter, “Moving Between Soviet and Post-Soviet Educations in Tajikistan: Institute of Professional Development (IPD) as Response to Globalization,” is an attempt to respond to these critical questions. The authors trace the history of a local agency called the Institute of Professional Development (IPD) in the Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan from the Soviet to the present era, and highlight its unique position as a successful public–private partnership and a center of excellence in teacher development in particular and of educational development in general. In particular, the IPD’s critical partnership with the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) and its subsidiaries enabled the institute to develop its unique and educative local-global response to the advent of neoliberal globalization into Tajikistan. The chapter highlights the challenges that the institute continues to face and which it must overcome in order to continue to preserve and consolidate its strategic position as a model of response and innovation. Reflecting on their extensive personal and professional experiences in Tajikistan, the authors conclude that the three key factors behind the IPD’s success were: (a) its ability to find its footing outside the public versus private and East versus West dichotomies; (b) positioning itself as a constructive force for adapting innovations and recovering local, including Soviet, traditions; and (c) its affiliation with the Aga Khan Foundation. The chapter thus offers a success story of international partnership, illustrating a possibility of how sustainable development depends on constructive engagement with local educators, conditions, realities, structures, and indigenous knowledges in order to enable local entities to gradually move toward knowledge production and away from being a mere implementer of Western ideas. Lastly, Victoria Clement’s chapter “Pedagogy and Power in Turkmenistan” describes the reforms undertaken in the education sector first by President Saparmurat Niyazov (1990–2006), followed by President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov (2007–present). She argues that Turkmenistan is a “sultanistic regime,” where political power is vested directly in the person of the president, and the reforms introduced by both presidents have been ultimately aimed at strengthening their respective regimes rather than the education sector. Clement frames her argument using the concept of a “sultanistic regime” as coined by political scientists Chehabi and Linz (1998) to describe regimes characterized by personal rulership, widespread corruption, a cult of personality centered on the leader, and a pseudo-ideology delineated in much-revered books. The leader uses a mixture of fear and rewards to control society and encourages “passive submission” of the masses through mechanisms such as the politicized manipulation of the education system. Clement argues that Turkmenistan is such regime, as evidenced

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by the series of reforms undertaken by its first two presidents aimed at allowing only state-approved topics in teaching/learning materials, using presidential texts as part of the formal curriculum and using education for nation-building in a way that excludes minority groups. Even though the main thrust of President Niyazov’s reforms was regressive and they were more explicitly aimed at promoting his cult of personality, President Berdimuhamedov’s more modernizing reforms arguably have the same end goal, as education remains deeply politicized in the country. To summarize, the chapters in this part of the book reveal the complexity of post-socialist transformation processes, as well as the interactions between the local and global forces. While these interactions often serve local needs, mostly the needs of the elites and in some cases of the local people too, the chapters suggest that there are no “comprehensive blueprints” to facilitate an all-encompassing process of institutional and cultural change from socialism to democracy (Durrschmidt & Taylor, 2007, p. 51). Wholesale borrowing of education policies and practices—whether from the West or the East—does not necessarily result in their appropriation and implementation locally. What it does reveal is that post-socialist transformations may take uncertain trajectories and lead to open-ended and often unpredictable outcomes. Within this framework, Central Asia remains a veritable laboratory wherein new visions of “good” schooling and “just” society become possible. TOWARD A CONCLUSION The chapters included in this book highlight the many fascinating issues surrounding the post-Soviet transformation processes in Central Asia while challenging the existing notions of “margins” and “marginalities” throughout the volume. A few authors have readily embraced the opportunity to analyze Central Asian education reforms against a set of Western norms, thus implicitly re-inscribing the region’s location into the margins of globalization and geopolitics. Many others, however, have resisted that temptation. Instead, they have attempted to highlight the gap between the perceived Western “norms” and the actual education practices in order to look beyond the mainstream rhetoric of failure, resistance, or corruption. Furthermore, some authors have challenged the legitimacy of the new (usually Western) “norms” outright, pointing to the multiplicity of ideas and imaginaries circulating in Central Asia’s education space. In this way, they contest the notions of “margins” and “marginalities” as such, pointing to constantly shifting political, economic, and cultural configurations. Notwithstanding the variety of theoretical perspectives, methodological approaches, conceptual lenses, and institutional-country representations, the chapters included in this book have one thing in common. Both

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individually and collectively, they reveal the plurality, complexity, and uncertainty of the post-Soviet transformation processes. To varying degrees, they recognize uncertainty and unpredictability as “a state of dynamic being” inherent in post-socialist transformation processes (Buyandelgeriyn, 2008, p. 235). In this context, uncertainty and unpredictability are viewed as “a complex conceptual space that offers further opportunities to step away from the evolutionary mode of thinking and to develop theories of multiple ways of being” (Buyandelgeriyn, 2008, p. 235). These concepts thus help us revisit our preconceived notions, goals, and directions of education reforms, and open our eyes, minds, and hearts to new understandings of the post-socialist education transformation discourses, policies, and practices in more nuanced and unexpected ways. The power of this unprecedented uncertainty is exactly what could constitute Central Asia’s new “centrality,” thus ultimately challenging the usual evolutionary trajectory of thought and questioning the foundational concepts of Western modernity. —Iveta Silova Sarfaroz Niyozov NOTES 1. Huntington (1993) argued that the current era of democratic transitions constitutes the third wave of democratization in the history of the modern world. The first wave of democratization began in the 1820s and lasted until 1926, bringing into being 29 democracies. After the coming to power of Mussolini in Italy in 1922, however, the number of democratic states was reduced to 12, thus marking the first “reverse wave.” The second wave of democratization coincided with the triumph of the Allies in World War II, and increased the number of democratically governed countries to 36, only to be followed by a second “reverse wave” (when was this second wave?) that brought the number of democracies back down to 30 (Huntington, 1993, p. 3). 2. For example, Vedres and Csigo (2002) note that there are many studies documenting the starting points of the transition, while “the question of how transition ends, is a question practically left unasked” (p. 1). Using the case study of Hungary, the authors theorize that the ending events of the transitions from socialism are also debates that imply “discursive events” (p. 1). While recognizing that the transition process is not over, the authors document one of the first discursive attempts to bring it to an end. 3. “The Great Game” is a term used for the strategic rivalry between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for supremacy in Central Asia from 1813–1907. While the term “the Great Game” is usually attributed to the British intelligence officer Arthur Conolly (1807–1842), it became mainstream through Rudyard Kipling’s novel Kim (1901). For more information see Meyer and Brysac (1999).

Education and Post-Socialist Transformations in Central Asia    xxxvii 4. In How NGOs React (Silova and Steiner-Khamsi, 2008), the authors discuss this idea in greater detail by highlighting the complex interplay between different policy actors as they advance their own missions in post-Soviet education environments of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia. 5. For example, Frank (1999) describes that to legitimize Soviet power in Central Asia, it was first convenient to contrast it with tsarist contributions to the “decline of Central Asia” (p. 26).

REFERENCES Birzea, C. (1994). Educational policies of the countries in transition. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe Press. Buyandelgeriyn, M. (2008). Post-post-transition theories: Walking on multiple paths. Annual Review of Anthropology, 37, 235–250. Chehabi, H. E., & Linz, J. (1998). Sultanistic regimes. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. CohenMiller, S. A., & Kuzhabekova, A. (2018). Quarter-century of reforms in postSoviet education: The effects on university faculty. European Education, 50(3), i–iv. Dailey, E., & Silova, I. (2008). Invisible and surrogate education: Filling educational gaps in Turkmenistan. In I. Silova & G. Steiner-Khamsi (Eds.), How NGOs react: Globalization and education reform in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia (pp. 211–230). Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Durrschmidt, J., & Taylor, G. (2007). Globalization, modernity and social change: Hotspots of transition. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan. Erturk, K. A. (1999). Introduction. In K. A. Erturk (Ed.), Rethinking Central Asia: Non-Eurocentric studies in history, social structure and identity (pp. 1—10). Reading, England: Garnet. Frank, A. G. (1992). The centrality of Central Asia. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: University of Amsterdam. Frank, A. G. (1999). Re-Orient: From the centrality of Central Asia to China’s middle kingdom. In K. A. Erturk (Ed.), Rethinking Central Asia: Non-Eurocentric studies in history, social structure and identity (pp. 11–38). Reading, England: Garnet. Freedom House. (2005). Nations in transit 2005. Retrieved from http://www. freedomhouse.org Freedom House. (2017). Freedom in the world. Populists and autocrats: The dual threat to democracy. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom -world/freedom-world-2017 Gilbert, A., Greenberg, J., Helms, E., & Jansen, S. (2008, November). Reconsidering post-socialism from the margins of Europe: Hope, time and normalcy in postYugoslav societies. Anthropology News, 10–11. Grevi, G. (2009). The Inter-polar world: A new scenario (EUISS Occasional Papers No. 79). Paris, France: EU Institute for Security Studies. Haas, R. N. (2008, May–June). The age of non-polarity: What will follow U.S. dominance? Foreign Affairs, 87(3), 44–56.

xxxviii    Education and Post-Socialist Transformations in Central Asia Hallak, J., & Poisson, M. (2007). Corrupt schools, corrupt universities: What can be done? Paris, France: IIEP/UNESCO. Heyneman, P. S., & DeYoung, A. J. (2004). The challenge of eEducation in Central Asia. Greenwich, CT: Information Age. Heyneman, S., Anderson, K., & Nuraliyeva, N. (2008). The cost of corruption in higher education. Comparative Education Review, 52(1), 1–25. Holt, P. M., Lambton, A. K. S., & Lewis, B. (1970). Cambridge history of Islam. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Horton, S. (2010). In Kyrgyzstan the tulips turn blood red. Retrieved from http://www. harpers.org/archive/2010/04/hbc-90006837 Huntington, S. (1993). Democracy’s third wave. In L. Diamond & M. Plattner (Eds.), The global resurgence of democracy (pp. 3–26). Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press. Johnson, M. (2004). Trends in secular educational development in Azerbaijan and Central Asia: Implications for social stability and regional security. National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis, 15(4), 7–58. Johnson, V. (2008). Corruption in education: A global legal challenge. Santa Clara Law Review, 48(1), 1–77. Karatnycky, A. (2000). From post-revolutionary stasis to incremental progress. In Nations in transit 1999–2000 (pp. 9–18). Retrieved from http://www.freedom house.org Khan, S. M. (1998). A generation at risk: Children in the Central Asia republics of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan: by Armin Bauer, Nina Boschmann, David Green, and Kathleen Kuehnast. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Journal of Asian Economics, 9(4), 671–677. Lindblad, S., & Popkewitz, T. S. (2004). Educational restructuring: International perspectives on traveling policies. Greenwich, CT: Information Age. MacFarlane, N. B. (1999). Western engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia. London, England: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. McGlinchey, E. (2011). Chaos, violence, dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Meyer, K. E., & Brysac, S. B. (1999). Tournament of shadows: The great game and the race for empire in Central Asia. New York, NY: Basic Books. Nanji, A., & Niyozov, S. (2002). The Silk Road: Crossroads and encounters of faiths. In C. Borden (Ed.), The Silk Road: Connecting cultures, creating trust (pp. 37, 39–41). Washington, DC: The Smithsonian Institution. Niyozov, S. (2018). Engaging the global to create local models of education reform. In T. Ali & S. Niyozov (Eds.), Lessons from the implementation of educational reform in Pakistan: Implications for policy and practice (pp. 433–462). Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press. Perry, L. (2009). American academics and education for democracy in post-communist Europe. In N. Sobe (Ed.), American post-conflict educational reform: From the Spanish War to Iraq (pp. 169–188). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Pomfret, R. (2019). The Central Asian economies in the twenty-first century: Paving a new Silk Road. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Phillips, D., & Oancea, A. (2005). Fifteen years on: Educational transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. Directions for educational research and policy in the post-communist

Education and Post-Socialist Transformations in Central Asia    xxxix EU accession and candidate countries. [Scientific Report of the ESF SCSS Exploratory Workshop, Oxford, England, 8–10 July 2005.] Rabikowska, M. (2009). The ghosts of the past: 20 years after the fall of communism in Europe. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 42(2), 165–179. Rashid, A. (1994). The resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or nationalism? London, England: Oxford University Press. Rumer, B. (2002). Central Asia: A gathering storm? Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Rumer, B. (2005). Central Asia: At the end of transition. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Sandole, D. J. D. (2007). Central Asia: Managing the delicate balance between the “discourse of danger,” the “great game,” and regional problem-solving. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40(2), 257–267. Silova, I. (2005). Traveling policies: Hijacked in Central Asia. European Educational Research Journal, 4(1), 50–59. Silova, I. (2009). Varieties of educational transformation: The post-socialist states of Central/Southeastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In R. Cowen & A. Kazamias (Eds.), International handbook of comparative education (pp. 295– 320). The Netherlands: Springer. Silova, I., Johnson, M., & Heyneman, S. (2007). Education and the crisis of social cohesion in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Comparative Education Review, 51(2), 159–180. Silova, I., & Steiner-Khamsi, G. (Eds.). (2008). How NGOs react: Globalization and education reform in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Starr, S. F. (2013). Lost enlightenment: Central Asia›s Golden Age from the Arab conquest to Tamerlane. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Steiner-Khamsi, G., & Stolpe, I. (2006). Educational import in Mongolia: Local encounters with global forces. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Thompson, C. D., & Heathershaw, J. (2005). Introduction: Discourses of danger in Central Asia. Central Asian Survey, 25(1), 1–4. Vedres, B., & Csigo, P. (2002). Negotiating the end of transition: A network analysis approach to political discourse dynamics, Hungary 1997 [Working paper 02–06]. New York, NY: Columbia University, Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy. World Bank. (2003). Public spending on education in CIS-7 Countries: The hidden crisis [Report by Nicholas Burnett and Rodica Cnobloch]. Retrieved from http:// web.worldbank.org/archive/website00504/WEB/PDF/BURNET-2.PDF

PART I COMPLICATING THE MARGINS: INTERNATIONALIZATION AND HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS

CHAPTER 1

HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION Recommendations for Reform in 1990— Were They Right? Stephen P. Heyneman Vanderbilt University

At the time of independence, the structure of higher education, curriculum content, governance, and admissions procedures were identical across the 15 republics of the former Soviet Union. Since independence there have been multiple changes, but often these have been quite similar in nature. There has been a move toward standardized testing as a criterion for admissions. There has been a restructuring away from sector ministerial control. There has been a diversification of provision and of sources of finance. There has been a decentralization of governance, salary, and tuition structures. Why have the changes to higher education been so similar? Is it because globalization is so powerful and the local institutions on the periphery are so weak? Is it because of the irresistible pressures from international agencies such as the World Bank? Or are the requirements for excellence in higher education

Globalization on the Margins, pages 3–14 Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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in a market economy sufficiently similar to make these changes inevitable anywhere? This chapter will support the latter argument. BACKGROUND The Soviet Union is widely credited as having invested heavily in education. School attendance through secondary education and adult literacy were universal. Though differences remained across specializations, gender parity had been achieved in higher education. And there were widely acknowledged achievements in science, art, and the humanities. Less widely known, however, is that public investment had been on the decline for decades. The Russian Federation devoted 7% of its GDP to education in 1970, but this had declined to 4.4% in 1994. Prior to the transition in 1990, physical infrastructure was beginning to crack, maintenance was spotty, and equipment was antiquated (Heyneman, 1998; World Bank, 1995). In 1970, the average teacher in the Russian Federation was paid 81% of the average industrial wage but by 1980 that had fallen to 73%, by 1989 to 67% and by 1994 to 66%. The salary of an assistant professor fell from 123% of the average industrial wage in 1960, to 70% in 1980, 54% in 1991, and 37% in 1993 (Heyneman, 1997a). Not only had the value of teacher salaries declined by comparison to other professions, but they had become erratic, varying month to month, and delayed in delivery. In August of 1993, teacher salaries were 44% of the industrial wage and by June of 1994, they constituted 90% of the industrial wage. Teacher strikes were common. In 1991, there were 58,000 Russian teachers on strike at 1,177 locations. In 1992, the number of teachers on strike had increased to 222,100 at 4,929 locations. By contrast, only 15, 900 industrial workers were on strike at 324 locations. Teacher strikes accounted for 62% of all individuals and two thirds of all strike days lost in 1992 (Heyneman, 1997a; World Bank, 1995). Between 1991 and 1992, per student financing in the Russian Federation declined by 35% in preschools, 29% in compulsory education, 17% in vocational education, and 9% in higher education. Declines in finance affected student demand. Between 1991 and 1993, student enrollment declined by 9% in the technikums and 7% in vocational education (Heyneman, 1997c). Since the demand for products and services from state-owned enterprises were dropping precipitously, declines in student demand were particularly clear in the specializations. Student demand fell in machine building and electronics by 28%, in automation by 26%, in radio technologies by 31%, and in food processing training institutes by 34%. Demand for entry into extension programs for mid-career professionals fell by 32% between 1980 and 1993. Higher education enrollment declined by 14% and applications declined by 11% between 1990 and 1994 (Heyneman, 1998, 2000).

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Many categories of budgetary expenditure ceased being funded or were off-loaded to become a responsibility of the local regional authority which did not have authority to tax. This was characteristic of textbooks, official travel, pedagogical equipment teacher upgrading, student health, clothing for needy students, capital investments, as well as maintenance and repairs. In effect, real expenditures per student declined from $804 per student in 1990 to $27 per student in 1995. By 1995, recurrent expenditures in education were about 5% of what they were in 1990. Declines in quality were evident in all fields—equipment, reading materials, consumable supplies, and building maintenance. The purchasing power of teacher salaries in 1995 (about $10 per month) was insufficient to cover the rapidly rising cost of public transportation to and from work (Heyneman, 1998). In the wider environment, GDP declines were precipitous throughout the former Soviet Union but were particularly problematic in Kyrgyzstan (–5%), Latvia (–7%), Lithuania (–12%), and Moldova (–18%; Heyneman, 1994, p. 11).The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the 15 republics precipitated a series of unprecedented changes in government, the economy, and social affairs. Crisis was experienced in every sector. The population was elderly, but the value of pensions collapsed; rates of poverty immediately spiked. Nuclear power plants were in danger of leakage. Coal mines were bankrupt. Even petroleum and gold mines were unprofitable. Above the arctic circle the mines and petroleum fields were opened in conjunction with artificial cities for the workers instead (as in OECD countries) of flying workers in and out from residences further south. Because of declines in public finance, state-owned industries began to collapse. Since they were now expected to make a profit, state-owned industries immediately off-loaded social responsibilities—health care, worker housing, and kindergartens. Land was privatized. Collective farms were abandoned. Traditional trade relationships across boundaries were severed. Cotton from Uzbekistan could no longer be imported for textile mills in Ukraine; the price of petroleum from Russia and Kazakhstan in Belarus began to reflect a world price. People whose ethnic group was listed in their identity card had to decide whether they were to be a Lativan citizen of Russian ethnicity or a Russian citizen returning “home.” Migration across national boundaries rose. Ethnic Russian outmigration was particularly heavy from Turkmenistan to other parts of Central Asia, but outmigration was common to many ethnic groups. Economic prospects were draconian. Due in part to past educational accomplishments and in part due to the compelling demands from other sectors, common across all 15 republics was the decision to place education last on the list of priorities to address. While ministers of education in 1990 were quick to acknowledge the need for budgetary support, they were largely skeptical that their systems needed improvements. This was the situation in 1990.

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When the Berlin Wall came down, I was the division chief in the World Bank, responsible for education and health in the Middle East and North Africa region. Without warning, 26 new countries applied to become members of the World Bank. I was given a choice: remain where I was or transfer to this new region. I chose the latter. It was an unprecedented opportunity. On the other hand, I had had no academic preparation, spoke none of the regional languages, and had no background in the nature of the challenges faced. I, and many others, were newcomers, novices. I was privileged to lead the first education sector work on the Russian Federation during this era, and this constituted the first time that Russian education had been analyzed without control by the Communist Party. My first impression may be worthy of mention. In the discussions with ministers of education I was not the only novice. Few of the ministers had travelled outside of the Soviet Union or had seen an education system anywhere else. What they knew of how education was financed and managed in France, Britain, Germany, Japan, or the United States was superficial. What they knew of how skills were provided, how standards were maintained, how institutions were governed, how curriculum was designed, how educational institutions adjust to changes in the labor market was determined by stereotype and naiveté. Newcomers were on both sides of the table (Heyneman, 2016). RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM IN 1990 The first task was to open a discussion of what to do about education in the transition (Heyneman, 1991). For national authorities, the highest priorities consisted of macroeconomic management, the financial sector, public sector management, protection against nuclear power leakages, nuclear disarmament, unemployment compensation, the collapse of pension systems, environment, and public health. Education was considered to be of low priority both within the countries and within the World Bank. As a result, there were no resources to finance education discussions. However, with generous assistance of the government of the Netherlands each minister of education and a representative of each ministry of finance was invited to a meeting in the Netherlands to discuss education reform. Each nation had declared they wished to have a market economy and wanted to know the educational requirements. I had 2 weeks to prepare for the meeting. There was no time for research and no opportunity to gather data. The speech was limited to 30 minutes and translated into Russian. Since that meeting in 1991, that address has been republished (Heyneman, 1995) and later formed the essence of regional education strategy. But it should be emphasized that it was the product entirely of intuitive guess work and without the slightest local experience. On the other hand, it was based on

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2 decades of professional experience in other parts of the world. And it was guided by the professional dicta—one never advanced an idea from one’s own country. Instead, so far as one is able, one raises ideas based on global experience. Was it a “Western orientation”? Of course, but then it was the product of experience drawn from all regions of the world except the one under discussion. The question was what about higher education in the former Soviet Union would have to change given that each of the 15 republics wished to shift away from a planned to a market economy? Four elements were highlighted. The first was structure. Higher education in the former Soviet Union was organized by sector ministry. This was unique to a planned economy and we guessed would be deeply problematic if the structure of higher education were to continue while the economy had shifted. The entire economy had been administered by a bureaucracy without consideration either to demand or prices. Labor markets were separately controlled within each sector. Educational institutions, faculties, and curricula were governed within each sector. Goods and services were manufactured within sectors. The education sector, for instance, was responsible for the manufacture of pencils, blackboards, desks, and education/farms were responsible for the production of food for students. Students were assigned to jobs according to the sector of their particular school. Thus, the first suggestion was to place universities under a single ministry and allow them to provide the training in highest demand without the constraint of a sector ministry. What we foresaw was the inefficiency generated when a university, identifying local demand for skills, was prevented from responding to that demand by the sector ministry which “owned” it. Second was the system of university entrance examinations. Examinations are an important instrument to help insure an equality of opportunity. Since WWII the technology of designing and administering examinations had substantially changed in OECD countries. They were graded by computer, given identically in multiple sites often with frequency, inexpensive to manage, and relatively free of corruption. In the Soviet Union examinations were predominantly oral and administered independently by each department in each university. In the Russian Federation, for instance, each of the ten faculties within the universities offered an exam; hence, there were over 5,000 examinations used for university entry. Exams were given orally even in physics, chemistry, history, and foreign languages and in written form in mathematics and Russian language. The entrance examinations were unfair because they penalized those who could not travel to the test site. They discriminated against those without sufficient information to know when an exam was to be given. They were inefficient because students had to take a new examination for each faculty to which they applied and, because institutions were situated in widely dispersed areas across multiple time zones, candidates unable to sit for a particular exam in one location had to wait

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for a year or two for another opportunity. This raised the opportunity cost of higher education admissions and provided significant advantages for students from family backgrounds where testing information was common knowledge. Because exams were oral, bribery was an additional risk. While it is true that computer graded standardized entrance examinations do not eliminate all of these problems, it is the case that they lessen them and it is also the case that no modern higher education system outside of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) fails to employ them. So our second suggestion was to modernize university entrance examinations. Third was the diversification of income. In the USSR, higher education was available free of private cost. It was considered a public good and, like all public goods, it was entirely financed by government. Its availability was treated as a human right, as was housing, health, and public transportation. However, across large parts of the world, universities, both public and private, generate income from multiple sources. This tendency has two potential rationales. One is based on philosophy of the argument that it is right to ask wealthy families to help pay for post compulsory education and because it is more efficient when universities have access to their own income. The other rationale is based on necessity, because university survival and certainly prosperity, requires it. We chose the latter of the two arguments as our principle rationale. Universities in 1990 were starved of public resources and because of the demand from other priorities, universities were unlikely to achieve their ambitions for quality improvement without access to their own resources. The sources which were discussed were eclectic. They included: rental or sale of land, income from research or consulting services, investments in the equity or bond markets, and of course from tuition. But income derived from savings were also considered important, and saving could be obtained through many mechanisms considered radical at that time. They included the rationalization of specializations and the inter-institutional coordination of facilities such as libraries, dormitories, and administrative services with other universities. Fourth was the ownership of land. In the USSR, all land belonged to the state. With the privatization of agriculture and industry however, private ownership of land was becoming the norm. But who owned university land? The municipality? The region? The national government? And which sectoral ministry? Our recommendation was that all public universities should be given clear ownership of their own land for fiscal reasons. Universities, we reasoned, cannot compete in quality without a strategic plan. But it is not feasible for a plan to rely on public financing alone. Most sources of financing, such as tuitions are insufficient to cover large capital expenditures. These can be covered by borrowing, but banks will not loan without sufficient collateral. Land is sufficient as collateral. Thus we reasoned, universities which did not own land could not borrow, and universities which

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could not borrow, could not develop, hence land ownership is necessary for university development. These four issues constituted our primary recommendations. Of course we discussed other issues but did not lay emphasis on them because it was obvious that the university sector was undergoing a revolution in that direction anyway. Private universities were opening almost daily and in no country did the government any more have a monopoly on the provision of higher education. Our concerns were how to legally distinguish between for profit and nonprofit universities and how to tax the former but not the latter. We discussed curriculum, but it was obvious that none of the republics had any intention of maintaining Marxism and Leninism requirements and all were busily adding business and economics, and the long neglected social sciences of sociology, political science, and professional training in law, public policy, and journalism. Rather than how to inaugurate new subjects in line with universities in other parts of the world, our concerns centered on how to eliminate the lengthy list of professional “specializations” which would have no place in a future economy and for which there were vested interests of teaching personnel with little hope of being retrained to teach subjects in higher demand. DISCUSSION These were the problems as foreseen in the early 1990s. What has happened in the interim? Each of the issues as outlined 15 years ago has proven to be prescient. Standardized examinations, in one form or another, have been widely introduced. And although in no country is higher education financing adequate, a diversity in the sources of finance is the norm. In many countries universities have been given title to the land which they own, but few universities have yet to use land as collateral. Many countries have restructured their universities so that they are less frequently managed by sectoral ministries. On the other hand, some sector ministries have allowed universities under their purview to expand curricular offerings beyond their particular sector. The effect of this latter strategy may well accomplish the same goal of being able to quickly respond to changes in the labor market without sectoral restriction. As a result, the long list of outdated specializations has typically been replaced by modern academic disciplines and programs of professional training. Two issues have taken us by surprise. First has been the character of private education. As McLendon (2004) points out, private education has little resemblance to the private education known in North America. Kainar, a for-profit university in Kazakhstan, is not Stanford. With the exception of those institutions owned and managed by international foundations such

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as the Soros/Open Society Foundations, most private institutions are really proprietary schools. These are family owned and operated for profit. They concentrate on teaching and ignore research. They utilize underpaid faculty from public institutions who seek extra income. They concentrate curricular offerings where there is immediate vocational demand (business, accounting, and English language) and ignore others. Given the inadequacy of the public sector in terms of size and flexibility, these proprietary schools serve a needed function. But in terms of quality they are a problem. Moreover, they sometimes help spread a counter-productive ethos. They offer a degree to students who can pay, but student responsibility to perform may be under-emphasized. Students are sometimes led to believe that if they pay enough the higher education institution should be required to offer them a degree. This attitude adversely affects the reputation of the entire sector. Corruption was anticipated in many public services and functions, but the spread of corruption in the education sector has been a shock. No one in 1991 anticipated the depth to which this disease would take over or the impact which it would have on the reputation of the higher education systems. This is particularly true in Central Asia. Payment for grades, bribery for entry, corruption in accreditation and licensing now threaten the social cohesion of several Central Asia nations (Anderson & Heyneman, 2005; Silova, Johnson, & Heyneman, 2007). Education corruption has been found to raise the cost of hiring, it has been found to lower graduate salaries, and it has reduced the economic returns expected to higher education investments (Heyneman, 2004b, 2004c, 2013; Heyneman, Anderson, & Nuraliyeva, 2008; Heyneman & Skinner, 2014), and may in fact bring the Bologna process to a halt (Heyneman, 2009). But there has been another surprising trend as well, and this has been the resistance to corruption demonstrated by individual faculty with strong professional standards (Heyneman, Kraince, Lesko, & Bastedo, 2007; Heyneman, 2007a; 2009). These leaders exist even in the most austere and debilitating of environments. Some lead by virtue of moral principle. Others rise to the occasion and lead on the basis of practical assessment. Regardless of the source of their strength, given this commonality, there is a universal standard of the professorate. The standard is parallel to the characteristics as identified by Braxton and Bayer (1999). It includes the promise to treat all students with fairness and impartiality. And it includes selecting a common hierarchy among differing moral principles. In particular, it requires that faculty choose the principle of fairness (to students and colleagues) over the principle of loyalty to family and friends. In this small but important way, certain faculty in Central Asia and the Caucasus may be leading the way for other local organizations in government, business, and the not-for-profit sector. These “quiet heroes” of the university classroom, those who stand up for their principles without legal or administrative support,

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in their own way are upholding the principles associated with development and freedom. They do this without the promise of reward; on the contrary, they do this in spite of making enemies and enduring the criticism of their corrupt administrative superiors. They do this for one reason: That it is the right thing to do. Debates over the origins and directions of change. It is popular to argue that education reform should be based on local priorities. Klees (2008) suggests that reforms proposed by the World Bank or other international organizations are loaded with neoliberal assumptions and should not be trusted. The flaws in this view have already been noted and need not be repeated here (Heyneman & Anderson, 2008). Others point to the need for local ownership of reform away from the vicissitudes of global trends and perspectives (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004; Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006). This latter point of view is credible and should be taken seriously. But one thing needs to be clarified and that is the distinction between the direction of reform and the method or mechanism for achieving that direction. A country may agree with an international organization to try a payfor-performance scheme to augment the efficiency of teachers. A similar scheme currently operates in Britain. But the mechanism for such a scheme need not mirror that of Britain; it may instead be operated by local social groups more sensitive to local standards of performance than a centrallyadministered standardized test. As important as pay-for-performance may be, it is only one of many possible methods to raise teacher efficiency. And there may be a dozen additional ways which could be identified locally which have no international precedent. The key point with respect to the relations between local and international institutions is to agree on the importance and priority of raising efficiency. It is not necessary to agree on the mechanism for bringing it about. Staff members of international organizations are sometimes thought to know more than they actually do. In some cases they may be insufficiently modest about what they know (Heyneman, 2004a). In the final analysis, no staff member in international organization knows how to reform (Heyneman, 2012). They may present ideas and experiences on how others have tried to manage analogous problems, and these experiences may be helpful. But as to their experience in, for instance, how to manage this new transition now required in Turkmenistan they are without knowledge. Here is where local experience is required. International organizations are good for one thing, and that is helping to suggest the direction of reform. It is the why but not the how. The “why” does not include sequence. No one knows which changes should come first and which second. How changes should come about and the sequence of change are all under the purview of local experience. Thus this debate should not be between two opposite sides—local as opposed to international ideas for reform. Rather it

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should be a discussion of appropriate roles, one of the directions of reform and the other of the many divergent and legitimate methods of achieving that direction. It is true that policy borrowing is delicate and can be counter-productive. But it is also true that no nation, including an OECD nation, is immune from the need to improve and to study how other nations address similar problems. For instance, recent evidence suggests that countries with higher education systems with more diverse sources of finance may have greater equity (Heyneman, 2008). This suggests that over time one can assess the general credibility of the suggestions made long ago. I would conclude that if a country has decided on the direction of change, such as a market economy, then these four educational changes suggested in 1991—institutional structure, university entrance examinations, diversification of income, and ownership of land—have turned out to be helpful. REFERENCES Anderson, K. H., & Heyneman, S. P. (2005). Education and social policy in Central Asia: The next stage of the transition. Journal of Social Policy and Administration, 39(4), 361–380. Braxton, J. M., & Bayer, J. M. (1999). Faculty misconduct in collegiate teaching Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press. Heyneman, S. P. (1991). Revolution in the East: The educational lessons. In K. Alexander & V. Williams (Eds.), Reforming education in a changing world: International perspectives (pp. 35–47). Oxford, England: Oxford International Roundtable on Educational Policy. Heyneman, S. P. (1994). Issues of education finance and management in ECA and OECD countries (Human Resources Development and Operations Policy Working Paper No. 26). Washington DC: World Bank. Heyneman, S. P. (1995). Education in the Europe and Central Asia Region: Policies of adjustment and excellence. In W. Mertons (Ed.), Reflections. Washington, DC: World Bank, Office of the Vice President, Europe and Central Asia Region, #IPD-145. Heyneman, S. P. (1997a). Education and social stabilization in Russia. Compare, 27(1), 5–18. Heyneman, S. P. (1997b). Educational choice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: A review essay. Education Economics, 5(3), 333–339. Heyneman, S. P. (1997c). Russian vocational and technical education in the transition: Tradition, adaptation, unresolved problems. Institute for the Study of Russian Education Newsletter, (May), 22–34. Heyneman, S. P. (1998). Transition from party/state to open democracy: The role of education. International Journal of Educational Development, 18(1), 21–40.

Higher Education in the Former Soviet Union    13 Heyneman, S. P. (2000). From the party/state to multi-ethnic democracy: Education and social cohesion in the Europe and Central Asia Region. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 21(4), 173–191. Heyneman, S. P. (2004a). The history and problems in the making of education policy at the World Bank: 1960–2000. International Journal of Education Development, 23, 315–337. Heyneman, S. P. (2004b). Corruption in education—Is it a problem of education or society as a whole? School Director (Moscow), 3, 3–11. (in Russian) Heyneman, S. P. (2004c). One step back, two steps forward: The first stage of the transition in Central Asia. In S. P. Heyneman & A. J. DeYoung (Eds.), The challenge of education in Central Asia (pp. 3–11). Greenwich, CT: Information Age. Heyneman, S. P. (2007a). Buying your way into heaven: The corruption of education systems in global perspectives. Perspectives on Global Issues (New York University), 2(1), 1–8. Heyneman, S. P. (2007b). Three universities in Georgia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: The struggle against corruption and for social cohesion. UNESCO Prospects, 3(September), 305–318. Heyneman, S. P. (2008). Review of Stratification in Higher Education: A Comparative Study edited by Yossi Shavit, Richard Arum, and Adam Gamoran. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Review of Higher Education, 31(3), 366–367. Heyneman, S. P. (2009). Moral standards and the professor: A study of faculty at universities in Georgia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In S. P. Heyneman (Ed), Buying your way into heaven: Education and corruption in international perspective (pp. 79–108). Netherlands: Sense. Heyneman, S. P. (2010). A comment on the changes in higher education in the former Soviet Union. European Education, 42(1), 76–87. Heyneman, S. P. (2012). Education policy and the World Bank: When models become monopolies. In A. Wiseman & C. Collins (Eds.), Education strategy in the developing world: Understanding the World Bank’s education policy revision (pp. 43– 62). Bingley, England: Emerald. Heyneman, S. P. (2013). Higher education institutions: Why they matter and why corruption puts them at risk. Global Corruption Report: Education (pp. 101– 107). New York, NY: Transparency International. Heyneman, S. P. (2016). The first work on post-Soviet education: How it started. Hungarian Education Research Journal, 6(3), 32–42. Heyneman, S. P., & Anderson, K. H. (2008). A quarter century of getting it right in education: World wide successes and continuing challenges. Globalization, Societies and Education, 6(4), 355–369. Heyneman, S. P., Anderson, K. H., & Nuraliyeva, N. (2008). The cost of corruption in higher education. Comparative Education Review, 51(2), 1–25. Heyneman, S. P., Kraince, R., Lesko, N., & Bastedo, M. (2007). Higher education and social cohesion: A comparative perspective. In P. Altbach & P. McGill Peterson (Eds.), Higher education in the new century: Global challenges and innovative ideas (pp. 55–79). Rotterdam, Netherlands: Sense (in conjunction with UNESCO).

14    S. P. HEYNEMAN Heyneman, S. P., & Skinner, B. (2014). The Bologna process in the countries of the former Soviet Union: An outsider’s perspective. Journal of European Higher Education Area: Policy, Practice, and Institutional Engagement, 1, 55–73. Klees, S. (2008). A quarter-century of neo-liberal thinking in education: Misleading analyses and failed policies. Globalization, Societies and Education, 6(4), 311–349. McLendon, M. (2004). Straddling market and state: Higher education governance and financial reform in Kazakhstan. In S. P. Heyneman & A. J. DeYoung (Eds.), The challenge of education in Central Asia (pp. 275–295). Greenwich, CT: Information Age. Silova, I., Johnson, M., & Heyneman, S. P. (2007). Education and the crisis of social cohesion in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Comparative Education Review, 51(2), 159–180. Steiner-Khamsi, G. (Ed.). (2004). The global politics of educational borrowing and lending. New York, NY: Teachers College Press. Steiner-Khamsi, G., & Stolpe, I. (2006). Educational import: Local encounters with global forces in Mongolia. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. World Bank. (1995). Russia: Education in the transition. Washington, DC: The World Bank, Europe, and Central Asia Country Department III.

CHAPTER 2

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN CENTRAL ASIA Implications Beyond the Intended Martha C. Merrill Kent State University

The internationalization of higher education in Central Asia has introduced new actors into all five nations. Some of these new actors have authority that slowly and subtly is undercutting the authority of some of the traditional higher education actors, such as Ministries of Education. This is more clearly the case in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan than in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. To support this idea, first, I will explain some of the current concepts and trends in higher education in general and in internationalization in particular. Second, I will describe selected—by no means all—of the internationalization activities currently taking place in Central Asia. Third, drawing on the work of Dakowska and Harmsen (2015), I will suggest that new actors may influence new structures and help

Globalization on the Margins, pages 15–40 Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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to create new norms, thereby slowly adding diversity into the lines of authority in higher education governance. The internationalization of higher education institutions and systems in Central Asia is a response both to global economic and higher education trends and to local political, economic, and demographic issues, as well as to local educational needs. Not only are policy makers reacting to a broader range of issues coming from a broader range of sources than they were in the Soviet era, but also, in the last decade, new actors have entered the higher education field. The independence-era issues that policy makers are reacting to have moved from the surface and rhetoric of educational operations, such as changing program names, to, in some contexts and cases, the core of educational purposes: student learning, and the evaluation of quality. The multiplicity of issues, actors, funders, ideas, and evaluators make it difficult, particularly in the more actively reforming countries, for the traditional sources of authority, such as Ministries of Education and Academies of Education, to maintain complete control over all of the functions that used to be in their purview. Dakowska and Harmsen (2015) argue that educational actors, norms, and structures have become diversified in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. To some extent, similar claims could be made for Central Asia, although with different players and different levels of intensity in the different nations. Froumin and Smolentseva (2014) note that having similar pasts and facing a similar set of problems do not mean that nations will address higher education issues in the same way. Certainly this is true in Central Asia, where the contrasts between nations are so stark that even on a project designed to create a Central Asian Higher Education Area (Tuning CAHEA, n.d.), some educators in Uzbekistan refused to send students to Kyrgyzstan on the program’s 2-month exchanges (TuCAHEA Pilot, n.d.), citing fears about political instability, with an implied subtext of worries about students becoming infected with liberal ideas from Kyrgyzstan (personal conversations with three Kyrgyzstani university administrators participating in Tuning CAHEA, March 2015). Nevertheless, throughout the region, the independence era has brought in new actors, with new ideas of the norms and purposes of education. Slowly, and likely, in many cases unintentionally on the part of traditional governing authorities, new actors are beginning to suggest new and more diverse higher education structures, not only programmatic, but also institutional and even systemic. More slowly, diversity in terms of authority is beginning to appear in Central Asian higher education. DEFINITIONS Of the three terms that Dakowska and Harmsen (2015) use to discuss higher education change in Central and Eastern Europe—actors, norms, and

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structures—they define only norms, using Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998, p. 891) consolidation of the work of several authors: A norm is “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.” Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) problematize this notion, asking, for example, what proportion of a group of actors has to consider a behavior appropriate before it becomes a norm. Researchers also need to think about the differing levels of authority and power among a group of actors; much of Central Asia operates on a high power distance model (Hofstede, 2001), in which hierarchies are respected and superiors are deferred to. Nevertheless, amorphous as it may be, the concept of norms may be a useful one for analyzing changes in higher education. Such analysis, however, demands deep and long-term immersion in the host academic culture, so that a researcher can both observe norms and see changes in them. This researcher can claim such in-depth immersion only for Kyrgyzstan. Actors include both organizations and other collectives, as well as individuals, although attempts will be made to name and assign agency to the most discrete actor or unit possible. The actors in Central Asian higher education have increased in number, changed, and diversified in the last 2 decades. Players ranging from the European Union’s TEMPUS program (now part of ERASMUS+) to Confucius Institutes to universities with Fethullah Gulen connections to international accrediting agencies like ABET (Accrediting Board for Engineering Technologies) to the Open Society Institution and other donors to students returning from international exchanges have entered higher education systems and discourses and, eventually, some practices have changed. Again, national distinctions must be made, as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have been the most open to external influences in higher education and Turkmenistan the least open, with Uzbekistan a close second. In Uzbekistan, for example, graduates whose tuition has been paid by the state must work for the state for 3 years before they are allowed to travel abroad (in Uzbekistan, 2015). Yet even the more closed nations need to deal with outside forces. Turkmenistan has to interact with the outside world to sell its gas; its students need not only technical engineering skills, but also competencies in languages, accounting, and international negotiations. The mobility of people and access to information may be limited by government decrees, but the huge deposits of natural gas have value only due to international interactions. Similarly, although it can be argued that Tajikistan is becoming more repressive rather than less, as suggested by the case of Alexander Sodiqov, a Tajik citizen pursuing a PhD at the University of Toronto who was arrested in Khorog while talking to a representative of a local NGO, isolation is less possible than it once was. Petitions, editorials, statements by international scholarly groups, and articles in international publications revealed an internationalized scholarly community (see ASEEES, 2014; Clibbon, 2014;

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Karram, 2014; Kumkova, 2014; Schatz, 2014), and one can argue that it was, at least in part, the pressures of that community that led to Sodiqov’s release. Sodiqov’s case was unusual in that he was a student in Toronto working for a university in the United Kingdom, with a devoted and active dissertation chair, yet his case makes the point that academe is an international enterprise, and that because it is, the loci of power, however slowly and however quietly, are beginning to become multi-vectored. Overall, the new actors that are internationalizing Central Asian higher education include outgoing, incoming, and returning international students; partners abroad for universities; the Bologna Process and its norms and structures; branch campuses of universities from other countries and new universities established in partnership with other nations; international scholars such as Fulbrights; international accrediting agencies; international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); donors; international agencies such as the United Nations (UN); and national and international assessment tests. These new actors, including the donors, are initiating new structures, or persuading institutions and governments to do so: bachelor’s and master’s degrees, credit hours, joint degree programs, national tests for secondary school exit and/or university entrance, processes for independent and international accreditation, systems for international student exchange, and partnerships for joint decisions on graduates’ competences (see Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008, for a discussion of donor-driven reforms common across the region, at the elementary and secondary, as well as higher education levels; see Froumin & Smolentseva, 2014, for a discussion of new issues universities in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, and the Yugoslav successor states are facing). The resulting new norms are beginning to permeate discourse and, to a lesser but not insignificant extent, practice, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Among the new sources of authority are Bologna Process standards, international accreditors, international partners and funders, and universities whose diplomas are recognized in non-Central Asian countries. Ministries of Education, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, no longer are the only sources of legitimate power. This multitude of players also means that a scholar studying higher education in Central Asia can no longer focus on one department or one institution; a researcher needs to use what Bartlett and Vavrus (2009) call a “vertical case study”—that is, examining not only the department and institution, but also partners who may be influencing curricula or working with faculty on research, political figures who see value in strategic alliances with one nation or another and make decisions about whether or not international institutions from those nations are allowed to operate, NGOs that are involving the institution and its faculty in various projects, and so forth. In effect, the researcher needs to take a 360-degree view, looking at the “cloud” of influences surrounding a department or program (Schoeberlein,

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personal communication, October 24, 2014; Spector, personal communication, October 24, 2014). More importantly, the Ministries of Education now also need to think about external players. For example, the Ministry of Kyrgyzstan has one high-ranking individual whose work focuses on interacting with international donors (personal observation, 2014). Educational structures are not only entities that are built or created, according to the choices of actors, but also are entities that have interlinking parts. Therefore, what might seem to be an isolated change—one university in one country achieving international accreditation for one program, for example—can have cascading effects on related elements of educational structures. Structural change often comes after norms have changed, but can be ordered from above, as was the case with the imposition of bachelor’s and master’s degrees and the use of credit hours in Kyrgyzstan (see Merrill & Ryskulova, 2012). Global or International? Although some commentators use the terms interchangeably, “global” and “international” have different meanings (Altbach & Knight, 2007). Global is an adjective describing processes that do not respect national borders; environmental scientists thus speak of global climate change; network specialists discuss global information flows; and some musicians have global reputations. International, on the other hand, refers to processes in which nations take a major role: international treaties, international trade, international borders. Philip Altbach (2004) maintains that internationalization is the process by which higher education institutions respond to global forces: Internationalisation includes specific policies and programmes under-taken by governments, academic systems and institutions, and even individual departments or institutions to cope with or exploit globalisation. (p. 6)

Others, such as Cantwell and Maldonado-Maldonado (2009) problematize this concept, suggesting that globalization is not a force that is “out there,” uninfluenced by actors, and that universities and educational systems do not respond in unified, coherent ways. Yet discourses of “entering the world educational space” remain potent in post-socialist Central Asia. RELEVANT MACRO-LEVEL TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION A major trend in contemporary higher education is massification. Martin Trow (1972), the preeminent writer on the subject who coined the term,

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explained that massification means not simply larger enrollments coming into an existing system, but rather, in addition, a greater diversity of students that thus demand a greater diversity of higher education institutions. For example, as the United States moved from elite to mass to universal enrollment in higher education (defined by Trow [2005] as less than 15% of the relevant age group, 15% to 50%, and more than 50%), the U.S. system moved first from being composed primarily of small private institutions for young White men preparing for law and the ministry, to including public land grant institutions focused on pragmatic skills for an industrializing nation, colleges for women, and institutions founded to serve African Americans; and then, after World War II, in the era of “universal” enrollment, to community colleges serving adults with multiple life roles as well as recent high school graduates, colleges for Native Americans, colleges that grew into serving Hispanic students as the surrounding population changed, institutions emphasizing distance education, and, most recently, those awarding degrees on the basis of the achievement of competencies, rather than credit hours and “seat time.” As the fourth edition of the European Standards and Guidelines (European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education et al., 2015) indicates, nations in the European Higher Education Area (48, with the addition of Belarus at the 2015 Yerevan Conference of Ministers) also see the extension of higher education to a broader and more diverse student population as requiring systemic changes. The ESG (2015), agreed to by seven prominent higher education associations, plus the Ministers responsible for higher education in the EHEA, recognize that responding to diversity and growing expectations for higher education requires a fundamental shift in its provision; it requires a more student-centered approach to learning and teaching, embracing flexible learning paths and recognizing competences gained outside of formal curricula. Higher education institutions themselves also become more diverse in their missions, mode of educational provision and cooperation, including the growth of internationalization, digital learning, and new forms of delivery. The role of quality assurance is crucial in supporting higher education systems and institutions in responding to these changes while insuring the qualifications achieved by students and their experience of higher education remain at the forefront of institutional missions. (p. 4)

In Austria, for example, Danube University Krems, which offers only master’s degrees, only in a hybrid (part in person and part online) format, and only in professional fields, would be an example of a new kind of institution to meet new student (and economic) needs. Founded in 1995, it bills itself as “the university for continuing education” for students from across Europe and beyond (Danube University, n.d.).

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Nations throughout Central Asia, while attempting to change their economic and (in positive and negative ways) their political systems, as they develop post-Soviet societies, are massifying higher education enrollments (Brunner & Tillett, 2007; DeYoung, 2011; Merrill & Dukenbaev, 2011; Wilmoth, c. 2011). At the same time, in one way or another, to a greater (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) or lesser (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) extent, from economic necessity or a desire to enter “the world educational space,” these nations are internationalizing higher education: being admitted to the European Higher Education Area (Kazakhstan); adopting Bologna Process reforms without being admitted to the EHEA (Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser extent, Tajikistan and the other countries); engaging (at least nominally) in the Tuning Project (Tuning CAHEA, n.d.) to define jointly-agreed to disciplinary competencies (all five nations); permitting jointly-sponsored institutions or those that award foreign degrees; hosting campuses of the University of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), which is sponsored by the Aga Khan Development Network and established by international treaties with the relevant nations (University of Central Asia, n.d.); creating programs to send students and young professionals abroad (Kazakhstan; JSC Center, 2013); and engaging in EUfunded TEMPUS projects (now ERASMUS+; all five) or accepting Chinesesupported Confucius Institutes (all except Turkmenistan; University of Nebraska—Lincoln, 2015); or taking funding for projects sponsored by other nations or international donors. (See also Wilmoth, c. 2011, who compares student mobility in and out of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.) What may not have been clear to the governments of the Central Asian countries as they massified enrollments and internationalized their systems in various ways was that massification and internationalization lead to diversity—diversity, as Dakowska and Harmsen (2015) argue, in terms of actors, norms, and structures. Massification and internationalization, in other words, undermine unitary state control of higher education. Although the focus of this chapter will be on internationalization, some authors see massification itself is a response to global forces (Altbach, Reisberg, & Rumbley, 2009). Entering “the world economic space” requires a labor force with world-level academic credentials, not just among the elites. But even the education of “world-class” elites, as Altbach et al. (2009) point out, requires world-level faculty, and, as Salmi (2009) underscores, worldlevel access to resources, both financial and academic, and world-class academic freedom—the ability to pursue an idea or invention wherever it leads, regardless of the political implications. Froumin and Smolentseva (2014) suggest that the Soviet-era separation of research from teaching, of Academies of Science from universities, of knowledge production from knowledge transmission, is a fundamental structural difference between Humboldtian universities in Europe and universities throughout the

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post-socialist region. This issue remains little addressed by international donors. Partially as a result of this history, PhD education is developing, slowly, in Kazakhstan, and to a modest extent, in Kyrgyzstan. RATIONALES FOR INTERNATIONALIZING HIGHER EDUCATION Countries, types of institutions, individual institutions, and even individual players within those institutions may differ in the rationales they have for internationalizing education. The differences in rationales, however, can lead to different planned outcomes and to different evaluations of the results achieved, even for the same activity. The four categories of rationales that van der Wende (1997, as cited in de Wit, 2002) originally proposes, and de Wit (2002) elaborates on, are political, economic, cultural, and educational. In the category of political rationales, de Wit (2002) incorporates foreign policy, national security, technical assistance, peace and mutual understanding, national identity, and regional identity. Certainly political issues enter into national choices to host institutions that offer degrees jointly with Russia or Turkey, or branch campuses of, for example, the Management Development Institute of Singapore—Tashkent (MDIS Tashkent, 2015). In addition, the countries Bolashak students from Kazakhstan study in (Sagintayeva & Jumakulov, 2015) or the willingness of a nation to let students go on U.S. government sponsored programs would be connected to political motivations for internationalization on the part of government actors. Economic rationales are much in the ascendancy these days in both the United States and in Europe—indeed, a major initial impetus for the Bologna Process, which as of the 2015 Ministerial meeting in Yerevan involves 48 countries, including Russia and Kazakhstan, was labor mobility (de Wit, 2002), the idea that Europe would be more economically powerful and more able to compete against the United States if, for example, a pharmacist educated in Sweden could practice in Spain. That, of course, requires synchronization of professional qualifications between the countries, which in turn requires the so-called “harmonization” of educational systems and learning outcomes. But labor mobility is only one of the economic rationales for international education. Other economic rationales include economic growth and competitiveness, as mobile students learn about both potential economic partners and consumers, and about technology or innovations not used at home. Economic rationales for international education also may involve using the educational infrastructure of other countries instead of constructing one’s own, and international entrepreneurial activities devised by the university itself (de Wit, 2002). The economic rationale for

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internationalization is clear in the cases of the medical schools of Osh State University and the International University in Kyrgyzstan, both of which offer medical education in English, and have agents in South Asia (Medical Faculty, n.d.; International School of Medicine, 2012). Jenish (2012) bases his analysis of the internationalization of higher education in Kyrgyzstan (defined primarily in terms of inbound and outbound student mobility) on the economic rationale. He writes that in 2008, students from India contributed $430,000 to Kyrgyzstan’s economy and those from Pakistan contributed $1.1 million (p. 11). Nations that are rapidly changing their economic base may find it more cost effective to send students abroad, at least temporarily, until the needed infrastructure can be built at home. This happened, for example, in the 1980s when Nigeria began to develop its oil industry. Lacking a system of technical education sufficient to train workers in all the skills that were needed on short notice, Nigeria sent thousands of students to community colleges in the United States. A few years later, when a contingent had been trained and institutions were developed at home, the flood of Nigerians to the United States ceased. The changes in purposes and participants in the Bolashak program (Sagintayeva & Jumakulov, 2015) may reflect similar changes in the educational structures and the actors available in Kazakhstan. Cultural rationales can be seen as import- or export-focused. Nineteenthcentury upper-class Russians who did “the grand tour” and spoke French at home imported culture from Europe; today, the European Union’s active presence in Central Asia is an attempt to export its culture and values (as well as, economically, to diversify its sources of gas and other resources; see Council of the European Union, 2007). Such cultural imports and exports may, at times, be seen as the “soft side” of political rationales. Certainly the Soviet Union’s funding of international students from Asia and Africa to study at Lumumba University and other universities in the country sprang from political as well as cultural rationales. A related rationale—the social development of the individual—is perhaps more of a focus in the United States than elsewhere. A quotation with multiple attributions, which this author heard used by Madeleine Albright when Albright visited the American University in Central Asia, states that the United States is the only country in the world with a friendly neighbor to the north, a friendly neighbor to the south, a huge ocean to the east, and a huge ocean to the west. Therefore, students in the United States, at least traditionally, before the advent of 21st century communication technologies and globalization, were more isolated from other cultures and more insular than were the students in many other countries. A student in the Ferghana Valley in Central Asia would not be so isolated from other nations and cultures. Thus, as Savicki and his co-authors point out in Developing Intercultural Competence and Transformation: Theory, Research, and Application

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in International Education (2008), for U.S. students, a primary rationale for international education is what students refer to as “getting outside one’s comfort zone” and having the experience of being challenged by what Emmanuel Levinas (Peperzak, Critchley, & Bernasconi, 1996) and other contemporary philosophers have called “the Other.” Elsewhere in the world, “the Other” is not so far away and need not be sought out. Nevertheless, social development in terms of accepting and valuing the other and considering the conditions under which one’s received “truth” may or may not apply, may be a result, if not a rationale, for the internationalization of higher education in Central Asia. Fourth, van der Wende (1997, as cited by de Wit, 2002) suggests the rationale that might seem most obvious to those in the academy—the academic or educational rationale. This rationale, too, has multiple dimensions (see de Wit, 2002). First, of course, is simply stimulating new and critical thought, challenges to what is “conventional wisdom” in one society, but what may be perceived differently in another society. Global warming and rising oceans look different to a student who stands on the delta of Bangladesh than to one who sits in Ames, Iowa. An educator used to a credithour model must rethink a number of assumptions when confronted with a contact hour model. Additionally, as de Wit asks (2002), “Can one learn something at the foreign institution one cannot learn at the home institution?” (p. 97). The creation of government-sponsored education abroad programs, such as Kazakhstan’s Bolashak (JSC, 2013) fall into this category of providing learning for mobile students and professionals that cannot be accessed at home, although, as noted, what cannot be learned at home is changing rapidly. Nazarbayev University (Nazarbayev University, 2014), with its multiple U.S. and British partners, international faculty, and generous funding, and the Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools (Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools, 2015), although not without their critics (Koch, 2014; Koch, 2015; Kucera, 2011) have changed the landscape of what can be learned at home, as has the American University of Central Asia (American University of Central Asia, n.d.). Closely tied to these notions of diversity and difference are the ways in which researchers from different nations and cultures can bring new ideas to a project, creating synergies that would not exist in homogenous research groups, and linked to all of this is the sense that more ideas, and different ideas, lead to higher quality thinking and thus to higher quality institutions. Nevertheless, Knight (2009), worries about institutions that internationalize not for reasons of intellectual advancement, but rather purely because internationalization is equated with prestige and is necessary for moving up in academic rankings. She also suggests adding a dozen additional or newly nuanced rationales (not all of which she approves of, but which she recognizes as existing) to van der Wende and de Wit’s traditional list, one

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of the more prominent now being international trade. Education is listed as a tradable service in the General Agreement on Trade in Services, or GATS, by the World Trade Organization (Knight, 2004), which Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are observers in (World Trade Organization, 2015). This rationale for internationalizing education, which moves outside the sphere of education altogether, is something that is flying under the radar screen of many educators. Under GATS, for example, Country A could agree to admit Country B’s insurance providers if Country B agrees to admit Country A’s tutoring services. The possible rationales for internationalizing education are diverse, but no country or institution needs to pursue only one to the exclusion of others. Higher education has multiple stakeholders with multiple interests and multiple ways of evaluating quality. Not all internationalization activities, of course, can address a variety of goals among multiple stakeholders. On the other hand, if not all stakeholders are aware of all the options for internationalization, stakeholders with different rationales for internationalizing may unnecessarily seem to be in conflict with each other. Central Asian Rationales As I have argued elsewhere with specific reference to Kyrgyzstan (Merrill, 2013), Central Asian nations have their own specific reasons for internationalizing, as well as circumstances that make internationalizing, in one form or another, inevitable. One is simply geographic location. With Russia to the north, China to the east, and Afghanistan and Iran to the south, Central Asians have neighbors whose power, histories, economies, and conflicts cannot be ignored. A second is the history of Central Asia—centuries of contact with tsarist and then Soviet Russia—and its heritage of Islam. Both provide reasons for continuing links with other countries in ways that affect curricula and, in the case of the Soviet Union, languages of instruction. In addition to these issues and other remnants of a common Soviet higher education heritage, four of the five Central Asian countries have a Turkic heritage. Thus, it is not surprising that one form of internationalization that took place in those Central Asian countries was the creation of universities, either jointly sponsored by the governments in question—the International Ahmet Yesevi Kazakh-Turk University (Ahmet Yesevi University, n.d.) and the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University (Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University, n.d.)—or privately supported by organizations with links to the Fethullah Gulen Movement, and, on the secondary school level, the development of Turkish lyceés. Since the Erdogan government in Turkey blamed the 2016 coup attempt on Gulen, a number of the schools and the Gulen-linked International Turkmen-Turkish University have closed (Gaynor, 2017; Owen,

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2016). These closings involve political considerations as the then prime minister, now president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, closed the Gulen schools there in 2014 (Tol, 2014; Turkey to close, 2014) and has pressured Central Asian governments to close them as well. Given the strength of commercial and political relations between most of the Central Asian countries and Turkey, as well worries about Islamization and brain drain to Turkey (Samanchina & Elebaeva, 2015) closing the Gulen schools in Central Asia likely is a response to multiple factors. The universities which remain include, in Kazakhstan, Suleyman Demirel University (Suleyman Demirel University, n.d.) and in Kyrgyzstan, the International Ala-Too University (previously known as the International Ataturk Ala-Too University; International AlaToo University, 2016; On the universities, see Aypay, 2004; Ashurov, 2015; Balci, 2014c; Sahin, 2015; Samanchina & Elebaeva, 2015; “Tajikistan Closes,” 2015; “Tajikistan. Education Without Alternatives,” 2015; On the lyceés and Gulen schools more generally, see Balci, 2003; Balci, 2014a; Balci, 2014b; Clement 2011; Dailey & Silova, 2008; and Demir, Balci, & Akkok, 2000). All five countries have a heritage in Islam. The role of Islam in education in all of the Central Asian countries is a subject of much debate, as controversies over headscarves in schools (Bakhtiyor, 2014; Urnaliev & Najibullah, 2017) and the president of Tajikistan’s decision to ask students studying at madrassahs in Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to return home (Ergasheva, 2010) would indicate. Nevertheless, as Bacon (1980) points out, Islam has had different meaning for the traditionally settled peoples of Central Asia than it has had for the traditionally nomadic peoples. The traditionally settled peoples have the heritage of the madrassas of the Bukharan Emirate and the reform movements of the Jadids (see, inter alia, Allworth, 1990; Becker 1968; d’Encausse 1966/trans. 1988; Khalid 1998; Roi 2001; Silova, Johnson, & Heyneman, 2007). The nomadic peoples, on the other hand, generally followed a more syncretic religion, supplemented by Sufism and oral traditions (Bacon, 1980; Roi, 2000; Silova et al., 2007). The degree of influence these differing traditions have had on contemporary educational practices in the more open nations of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, contrasted with the more closed societies of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, is debatable; particularly since the Turkmen, like the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, traditionally were nomadic. Although a full study of the growth of Islamic higher education within Central Asia, and the enrollment of students from the region in Islamic institutions abroad, such as Al-Azhar, is beyond the bounds of this chapter, it is clear that an uneasy tension exists in several Central Asian countries regarding the appropriate role of Islam. In addition to the role of Islamic, Soviet, Turkic (and for Tajikistan, Persian) heritages in internationalization, the countries with small populations—Kyrgyzstan, 5.6 million (Kyrgyzstan, 2014) and Tajikistan, 8 million (Tajikistan, 2014)—cannot offer every subject needed, particularly at the

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graduate level. Related to this is the lack of teaching and research materials in local languages for specialized technical fields. Students studying in such fields almost inevitably will need to go abroad to access departments and professors with the relevant specializations, or, at a minimum, to use texts imported from elsewhere. An additional factor, particularly affecting Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the two poorest of the former Soviet countries, and not affecting Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, with their oil and gas wealth, is the need for reliance on donors to fund reforms. As Silova and Steiner-Khamsi (2008) point out, donors have their own agendas and preferred strategies. This may lead to the implementing of reforms that are funded, rather than the reforms that are most needed, and to an incoherent non-system as a country accepts funding for a variety of projects that do not really fit together (see Merrill, 2011, for how this played out in Kyrgyzstan). One colleague in Kyrgyzstan told this author, “Why do you think we are interested in European accreditation? They give us money. If the United States gave us money, we’d be interested in U.S. accreditation” (personal communication, April, 2015). Poverty also leads to labor migration. Anecdotal as well as some source material suggests that at least in urban areas, some students in Kyrgyzstan are choosing to study in Russian-medium and, to a lesser extent, Turkish-medium schools and universities in order to enhance future employment prospects and the option of working abroad (see Wilmoth, c. 2011, Table 2.4). In Kyrgyzstan, the demand for places in Russian-medium schools outstrips the availability (Kyrgyzstan’s Russian-language, 2014). Another alternative is for students from Central Asia to study in Russian universities (Najibullah, 2014). A newer trend influencing internationalization of Central Asian higher education institutions is the application of uniform criteria to university evaluation. Quality assessment measures range from researched and considered (the European Standards and Guidelines [European Association, 2015] and some of the more prestigious international accreditations) to commercial, whatever-can-be-counted calculations. Whether or not the criteria are valid and the methodology sound (and, in many rankings, they are not; see Rauhvargers, 2011), such universalized measures have an effect. On the secondary level, after Kyrgyzstan twice participated in PISA (the Programme for International Student Assessment of OECD) and twice came in last in the world, the myth that “we inherited the Soviet system and therefore our education must be good” was broken (see Shamatov & Sainazarov, 2006). Kazakhstan participated in PISA in 2015, with a cohort heavily favoring the Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools (Press Center, 2015). At the higher education level, throughout the region, some institutions and agencies are considering requiring faculty and programs to write learning outcomes. These are mandated by the adoption of international accreditation, be it European accreditation based on the European Standards and

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Guidelines (European Association, 2015); or program-based accreditation from agencies located in Europe and registered with EQAR, the European Quality Assurance Register (EQAR, n.d.), which permits them to operate outside their home countries; or program accrediting agencies based in the United States, such as ABET (Accreditation Board for Engineering Technologies, n.d.) or ACBSP (Accreditation Council for Business Schools and Programs, 2013). Additionally, 32 universities and the Ministries of Education in all five nations currently are participating in the TEMPUS (now ERASMUS +) funded Central Asian Tuning Project (TuCAHEA Partners, n.d.; six universities in Kazakhstan; ten in Kyrgyzstan, plus the NGO EdNet; six in Tajikistan; two in Turkmenistan, plus the National Institute of Education; and eight in Uzbekistan). The Tuning Project requires agreement on both generic and discipline-specific competences by program faculty from a number of institutions. The methodology, as designed in Europe, involved participation by program alumni and employers as well (Tuning Educational Structures in Europe, n.d.). Higher education institutions in Kazakhstan are the most active in pursuing international accreditation. This is not surprising, as the State Program of Education Development in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011–2020 (State Program, 2010) states: “The national higher educational institutions will have to undergo an international specialized accreditation together with the national one” (p. 47). A number of universities already have been through the process. According to its website, Zhetysu State University named after I. Zhansugurova received accreditation for six programs from the German agency ACQUIN in 2010 and, in March 2015, another 16 programs were accredited (Zhetysu State University, 2015). KIMEP University has 15 programs accredited by AFBE, the Asian Forum on Business Education (AFBE, n.d.); AQ Austria, the Agency for Quality Assurance and Accreditation Austria (AQ Austria, n.d.); and FIBAA, the Foundation for International Business Administration Accreditation (FIBAA, 2015; KIMEP, 2015). The German technology-focused accrediting agency, ASIIN, has accredited 14 programs at East Kazakhstan State University named after S. Amanzholov, 13 at D. Serikbayev East Kazakhstan State Technical University, and three at North Kazakhstan State University (ASIIN, 2015). The Kazakh-American Free University has nine programs accredited by the business accreditor ACBSP (ACBSP Search, 2013). ABET has accredited three programs at the Kazakh British Technical University and one at the Kazakh Technical University (ABET Accredited Program Search, 2014). Kazakhstan also has an independent agency that accredits and ranks institutions and programs, both at the higher education level and at the vocational/technical level (IQAA, 2014). As the European Standards and Guidelines (European Association, 2015, Standard 3.3) state, accreditation agencies should be independent, and thus Kazakhstan, as a Bologna Process member, needs to have an

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independent accreditation agency. So internally and externally, new actors are achieving authority in the assessment of higher education quality in Kazakhstan. In addition, in Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz-German Informatika program at the Kyrgyz State University for Construction, Transport and Architecture (KGUSTA) which, with DAAD funding, has many exchanges and shared curricula with the Westsächsische Hochschule Zwickau in Germany (Geifes, 2013, slides 24–25), was accredited by ASIIN in March 2015 (interview with A. A. Abdumayev, dean of the Kyrgyz-German Faculty of Informatics, March 27, 2015; ASIIN Akkreditierte Studiengänge, 2015). Business programs at least two universities in Bishkek are pursuing ACBSP accreditation (personal communications and e-mails, April and May, 2015). In September 2016, Kyrgyzstan replaced state attestation with independent program accreditation, using criteria based on the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance (EdNet, 2017; Ryskulova, 2018). International accreditation does not yet seem to be operating in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, although Uzbekistan now houses ten international branch campuses—two Korean, one from Singapore, one from the United Kingdom, one Italian, one United States (Webster University, with ten other campuses worldwide, is scheduled to open a campus in Tashkent in Fall 2018), plus four from Russia (in Tashkent, 2018). In Turkmenistan, according to a 2017 report by the European Commission’s Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, a variety of bilateral agreements have been signed, mainly for student exchanges, but quality assurance operations remain in the hands of the state (Educational, Audiovisual, 2017). INTERNATIONALIZATION EFFECTS These examples of internationalization in Central Asia reveal some of the new actors in higher education, and underscore Dakowska and Harmsen’s (2015) assertion that Europeanization and internationalization can change the structures, norms, and actors, although, as Sobe (2015), Silova (2005), Steiner Khamsi (2000, 2006, 2010), Ochs and Philips (2004), and Vukasovic (2015) remind us, educational policy transfer is not simple duplication of a policy in a new location but rather a translation (Sobe, 2015) of some kind, depending on the levels of duress involved in the policy transfer (Ochs & Philips, 2004) or whether the adoption has been made because of the economic strings attached (Steiner Khamsi, 2006), or if a particular framing of a policy is useful to a politician or other local actor (Silova, 2005). For example, in the case of Kyrgyzstan, it is quite clear that the structures of new degrees (bachelor’s and master’s) were borrowed without the accompanying norms, funding, supports for faculty and students, and research

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infrastructure found in Europe (Merrill & Ryskulova, 2012). One element of an integrated structure was changed, while others were left untouched. The cascading effects still are being felt. Whether or not the norms that accompany accreditation structures in their original iterations move along with them may be questionable. Dakowska and Harmsen (2015), citing Börzel and Risse (2012), speak of “norm diffusion” via the Bologna Process into Central and Eastern European countries, most of which are now members of the European Union and the European Higher Education Area, but such norm diffusion is less clear in the case of Central Asian countries, where there is very limited academic freedom and institutional autonomy, as well as, for most, a tilt toward Russia. In addition, although European norms may be developing influence in some areas of higher education, those norms do not permeate all of society. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, although higher education institutions have been required to use credit hours to measure student progress since the Fall of 2012, the Ministry of Labor still counts full-time employment for professors using contact hour criteria. Therefore, professors hold classes called “independent study with professor” so that they can get enough hours to be full-time and thus eligible for state benefits (Ryskulova, personal communication, 2014). The actors in higher education are not always the same as actors in other spheres. For example, Alexander Cooley (2012), in his widely-cited book, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia, focuses on the United States, Russia, and China as major players in the “new great game” in Central Asia. His focus, however, is politics. In higher education, the major player is Europe (Merrill & Dukenbaev, 2011), even though its 2007 “strategy for a new partnership” (Council of the European Union, 2007) may not be as well thought through as some might wish, and may falter in implementation (Jones, 2010). Jos Boonstra (2015) of the European think tank FRIDE, which focuses on the EU’s global connections, is critical of what he considers the EU’s limited involvement in higher education and its implications: Over the last eight years, no member state has been willing to take on the education initiative. This is disappointing, as it is this sector that deserves most attention – though not necessarily on a regional basis. If the EU wants to contribute to the development of Central Asia, become more visible, act strategically over the long-term, and counter Russian influence, it should invest heavily in higher education (and where funds allow, also in technical vocational and secondary education). However, such an investment (largely consisting of Central Asian students having the opportunity to study in Europe) will only be useful if programmes are able to tackle or circumvent the risk of brain-drain and unequal access (of the elites) to higher education. (p. 3)

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Gast (2014) maintains that the EU is moving away from “soft” issues such as education and toward a focus on security. However, as described above, even when Central Asian nations such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are joining the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, for international accreditation, they are turning to Europe and the United States. International actors are more diverse when international universities in Central Asia are considered. The degree to which these “international” universities bring changed norms and structures, however, varies, as does their degree of influence, even when the norms and structures are different. As noted above, Uzbekistan has ten international universities, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan are home to Turkish universities. Kazakhstan hosts the Kazakh British Technical University (Kazakh British, 2016) and the Kazakh German University (Deutsch-Kasachische, 2014). Kyrgyzstan has a Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University named after Yeltsin that gives degrees recognized in Russia as well as Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Russian Slavic University, 2011) and Tajikistan has a Russian-Tajik Slavic University that similarly gives degrees recognized in both countries (Russian-Tajik, no date). However, two departments of RTSU did not pass Russian accreditation in the spring of 2015 (Federal Service, 2015). Interestingly, however, the deputy head of the Office of Interdepartmental Cooperation in Education and the head of the International Relations Office at the Kyrgyz Russian Slavic University told this author that KRSU now was having trouble getting its degrees recognized in Russia, because, like all universities in Kyrgyzstan, starting in the Fall of 2012, KRSU has shifted from the Soviet-era 5-year diplom to a 4-year bachelor’s degree, whereas many universities in Russia still give the diplom, despite the fact that Russia officially joined the Bologna Process in 2003 (T. M. Lapochkina & K. Shambetalieva, interviews with the author, April 2, 2015). INTERNATIONALIZED LEARNING OUTCOMES Green and Olsen (2003), in their classic work, Internationalizing the Campus: A User’s Guide, maintain that internationalization takes two forms. One is the inventory of activities described above—students going abroad, changes in degree structures, international accreditation, donor projects, and more. The other is learning. What are the actual results of all those activities? How have the lives—and the minds—of students changed? The plethora of demands from accreditation agencies and international organizations for the assessment of learning outcomes will not provide answers unless those learning outcomes themselves require internationalized learning as an objective. In a sense, the study of internationalization of higher education in Central Asia is following the trajectory of accreditation standards in the United

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States. At first, accreditors considered inputs—”How many books in the library?”; “How many faculty with PhDs?”; “How many computer labs”; with the assumption that inputs would produce good learning. Eventually, however, the evaluators recognized that a library could have thousands of books, but that they would do little good if no one read them. So accreditors turned to outputs: “How many students graduate in 6 years?”; “What percent land jobs in their fields?” Yet outputs, too, do not reveal what students have learned. Thus educators have begun to focus on learning outcomes. Similarly with internationalization in Central Asia: The inputs, or activities, and the actors are clear. The outputs, both numerical results and individual cases, are beginning to show up, in terms of international accreditations, or cases such the new Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to the United States, Kadyr Toktogulov, being a graduate of the American University in Central Asia (Kadyr M. Toktogulov, n.d.) or the last two Ministers of Education of Kazakhstan, Aslan Sarinzhipov and Yerlan Sagadiyev, holding graduate degrees from U.S. universities (Dossier, 2019; Minister, 2015). But what are the outcomes, the learning for students? What are the norms in the classrooms? These are more difficult to know. Actors and structures are visible; norms are less so. CONCLUSION In the years since the nations of Central Asia became independent, new actors have entered the higher education arena, as a response to both global and local issues. However, as Froumin and Smolentseva (2014) note, similar histories do not mandate similar responses to current pressures. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan thus have been more receptive to new ideas than have Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, although likely for different reasons, with Kazakhstan trying to position itself as a leading nation and Kyrgyzstan often responding to donor priorities. The new actors have, in some cases, created or assisted with the creation of new structures, such as new degrees, the articulation of competences and learning outcomes, and the pursuit of independent or international accreditation. These new structures, in turn, may be leading to new norms among local higher education actors (see Dakowska & Harmsen, 2015). The diversity of actors, additionally, may be undercutting the authority of some of the traditional actors in higher education, although more research is needed on both of these last two points. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author is grateful to IREX for a Short-Term Travel Grant that allowed me to conduct 18 interviews on independent accreditation in Kyrgyzstan

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in March and April 2015 and to the Fulbright Commission for a specialist grant that permitted me to learn about contemporary conditions in Kyrgyzstan from university faculty at a series of workshops I conducted in December 2013 and May 2014. I am also indebted to Chynarkul Ryskulova for research assistance, and to William Fierman for alerting me to numerous relevant articles. REFERENCES ABET Accreditation. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.abet.org/accreditation/ ABET Accredited Program Search. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://main.abet.org/ aps/Accreditedprogramsearch.aspx Accreditation Council for Business Schools and Programs. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.acbsp.org Accreditation Council for Business Schools and Programs Search. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://acbspsearch.org/Home/Details?instId=Inst3127 AFBE. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.afbe.biz/main/ Ahmet Yesevi University. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.yesevi.edu.tr/eng/ Allworth, E. A. (1990). The modern Uzbeks: From the fourteenth century to the present: A cultural history. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Altbach, P. (2004). Globalisation and the university: Myths and realities in an unequal world. Tertiary Education and Management, 10, 3–25. Altbach, P., & Knight, J. (2007). The internationalization of higher education: Motivations and realities. Journal of Studies in International Education, 11(3), 290–305. Altbach, P., Reisberg, L., & Rumbley, L. (2009). Trends in global higher education: Tracking an academic revolution. Chestnut Hill, MA: Boston College. American University of Central Asia. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.auca.kg AQ Austria. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.aq.ac.at/en/ Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. (2014). Statement of concern for A. Sodiqov, researcher arrested in Tajikistan. Retrieved from http://www.aseees.org/advocacy/statement-concern-sodiqov Ashurov, A. (2015, January 3). Schto budet s turetskimi liceeyami v Tadjikistane? [What will happen to the Turkish lyceés in Tajikistan?] Retrieved from https://centrasia .org/newsA.php?st=1420182540 ASIIN. (2015). Akkreditierte Studiengänge [Accredited degree programs]. Retrieved from http://www.asiin-ev.de/pages/de/asiin/akkreditierung-studiengaenge/ akkreditierte-studiengaenge.php Aypay, A. (2004). Turkish higher education initiatives in Central Asia. In S. P. Heyneman & A. J. DeYoung (Eds.), The challenge of education in Central Asia. (pp. 81–96). Greenwich, CT: Information Age. Bacon, E. E. (1980). Central Asians under Russian rule: A study in culture change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

34    M. C. MERRILL Bakhtiyor, H. (2014, May 19). Islamic dress as bar to female education in Tajikistan. Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Retrieved from http://iwpr.net/ report-news/islamic-dress-bar-female-education-tajikistan Balci, B. (2003). Fethullah Gülen’s missionary schools in Central Asia and their role in the spreading of Turkism and Islam. Religion, State and Society, 31(2), 151–177. Balci, B. (2014a, March). Turkey’s religious outreach in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In H. Fradkin, H. Haqqani, E. Brown, & H. Mneimneh (Eds.), Current trends in Islamist ideology (Vol. 16). Washington, DC: Hudson Institute. Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World. Retrieved from http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1393/ ct_16_posting.pdf Balci, B. (2014b, April). The AKP/Gülen crisis in Turkey: Consequences for Central Asia and the Caucasus. Central Asia Policy Brief No. 16. Washington, DC: The Elliott School for International Affairs, George Washington University. Balci, B. (2014c, July 2). What future for the Fethullah Gülen movement in Central Asia and the Caucasus? Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. Retrieved from http:// www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13006-what-future-for-the-fethullah-gülen-movement-in-central-asia-and-the-caucasus?.html Bartlett, L., & Vavrus, F. (2009). Introduction: Knowing, comparatively. In F. Vavrus & L. Bartlett (Eds.), Critical approaches to comparative education: Vertical case studies from Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas (pp. 1–18). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Becker, S. (1968). Russia’s protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Boonstra, J. (2015, February). Reviewing the EU’s approach to Central Asia (EUCAM Policy Brief #34). Retrieved from https://eucentralasia.eu/2015/02/ reviewing-the-eus-approach-to-central-asia/ Börzel, T., & Risse, T. (2012). From europeanization to diffusion: Introduction. West European Politics 35(1), 1–19. Brunner, J. J., & Tillett, A. (2007). Higher education in Central Asia: The challenge of Modernization. Washington, DC: World Bank and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Cantwell, B., & Maldonado-Maldonado, A. (2009). Four stories: Confronting contemporary ideas about globalization and internationalisation in higher education Globalisation, Societies and Education, 7(3), 289–306. Clement, V. (2011). Faith-based schools in post-Soviet Turkmenistan. European Education, 43(1), 76–92. Clibbon, J. (2014, September 23). How Alexander Sodiqov was freed following espionage charges. CBC News. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ how-alexander-sodiqov-was-freed-following-espionage-charges-1.2772191 Cooley, A. (2012). Great games, local rules: The new great power contest in Central Asia. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Council of the European Union. (2007). The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a new partnership. Retrieved from http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010113%202007%20INIT

Internationalization of Higher Education in Central Asia    35 Dailey, E., & Silova, I. (2008). Invisible and surrogate education: Filling educational gaps in Turkmenistan. In I. Silova & G. Steiner-Khamsi (Eds.), How NGOs react: Globalization and education reform in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia (pp. 211–230). Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Dakowska, D., & Harmsen, R. (2015). Laboratories of reform? The Europeanization and internationalization of higher education in Central and Eastern Europe. European Journal of Higher Education, 5(1), 4–17. Danube University Krems. (n.d.) From pilot project to leading university of continuing education. Retrieved May 29, 2015, from http://www.donau-uni.ac.at/ en/universitaet/ueberuns/20-jahre-donau-uni/22306/index.php Demir, C. E., Balci, A., & Akkok, F. (2000). The role of Turkish schools in the educational system and social transformation of Central Asian countries: The case of Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Central Asian Survey, 19(1), 141–155. d’Encausse, H. C. (1966). Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and revolution in Central Asia (Q. Hoare, Trans.). Berkeley: University of California Press. Deutsch-Kasachische Universität. (2014). Retrieved from http://dku.kz/en/ de Wit, H. (2002). Internationalization of higher education in the United States of America and Europe: A historical, comparative, and conceptual analysis. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. DeYoung, A. (2011). Lost in transition: Redefining students and universities in the contemporary Kyrgyz Republic. Charlotte, NC: Information Age. Dossier: Sagadiev Erlan Kenzhegalievich. (2019). [Досье: Сагадиев Ерлан Кенжегалиевич] Retrieved from https://inbusiness.kz/ru/appointment/ dose-sagadiev-erlan-kenzhegalievich EdNet Agency for Quality Assurance in Education. (2017). Retrieved from http:// www.accreditation.kg/index.php/en/ Education, Audiovisual, and Culture Executive Agency of the European Commission. (2017, February). Overview of the higher education system: Turkmenistan. Retrieved from https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/sites/eacea-site/files/countryfiche _turkmenistan_2017.pdf EHEA Ministerial Conference—Bucharest 2012. (2012). Making the most of our potential: Consolidating the European Higher Education Area: Bucharest Communiqué. https://www.eurashe.eu/library/modernising-phe/EHEA_2012_Bucharest -Communique.pdf European Quality Assurance Register. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.eqar.eu Ergasheva, Z. (2010, November 24). Tajikistan: Islamic students told to come home. Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Retrieved from https://iwpr.net/ global-voices/tajikistan-islamic-students-told-come-home European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education, et al. (2015). Standards and guidelines for quality assurance in the European Higher Education Area. Retrieved from https://enqa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ ESG_2015.pdf European University Association. (2008). European universities’ charter on lifelong learning. Brussels, Belgium: EUA https://eua.eu/downloads/publications/ european%20universities%20charter%20on%20lifelong%20learning%20 2008.pdf

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Internationalization of Higher Education in Central Asia    37 Jones, P. (2010, February). The EU-Central Asia Education Initiative. EUCAM Working Paper #9. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers .cfm?abstract_id=1604444 Kadyr M. Toktogulov. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://old.kgembassy.org/docs/Kadyr -M_Toktogulov.pdf Karram, G. (2014, August 15). Lessons from the arrest of Alexander Sodiqov. University World News, Global Edition Issue, 330. Retrieved from http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20140814094918877 Kazakh British Technical University. (2016) Retrieved from http://www.kbtu.kz/en Khalid, A. (1998) The politics of Muslim cultural reform: Jadidism in Central Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press. KIMEP Rankings and Accreditation. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.kimep.kz/ discover/en/kimep-rankings-accreditation/ Koch, N. (2014). The shifting geopolitics of higher education: Inter/nationalizing elite universities in Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and beyond. Geoforum 56, 46–54. Koch, N. (2015). Domesticating elite education: Raising patriots and educating Kazakhstan’s future. In M. Ayoob & M. Ismayilov (Eds.), Identity and politics in Central Asia and the Caucasus (pp. 82–100). New York, NY: Routledge. Knight, J. (2004). Internationalization remodeled: Definition, approaches, and rationales. Journal of Studies in International Education, 8(1), 5–31. Knight, J. (2009). New developments and unintended consequences: Whither thou goest, internationalization? In R. Bhandari & S. Laughlin (Eds.), Higher education on the move: New developments in global mobility (pp. 113–123). New York, NY: Institute on International Education. Kucera, J. (2011, August 3). Kazakhstan rising. Slate. Retrieved from http://www. slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/dispatches/features/2011/kazakhstan_rising/nazarbayev_u.html Kumkova, K. (2014, July 23). Sodiqov charges spur worries about academic freedom. EurasiaNet. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69176 Kyrgyzstan. (2014, July). CIA World Factbook. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kg.html Kyrgyzstan’s Russian Language Teaching Getting Squeezed Out. (2014, December 15). EurasiaNet. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71376 Kyrgyz Russian Slavic University. (2011). General information. Retrieved from http://www.krsu.edu.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id =1074&Itemid=568&lang=en Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University. (n.d.) Retrieved May 29, 2015 from http://manas. edu.kg MDIS Tashkent. (2015a). Retrieved from http://www.mdis.uz Medical Faculty, Osh State University. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://oshmed.com Merrill, M. C. (2011). Kasha and quality in Kyrgyzstan: Donors, diversity, and disIntegration in higher education. European Education, 43(4), 5–25. Merrill, M. C. (2013). Higher education in Kyrgyzstan: The inevitability of international actors. In P. Akçali & C. Engin-Demir (Eds.), Politics, identity, and education in Central Asia: Post Soviet Kyrgyzstan (pp. 190–220). London, England: Routledge.

38    M. C. MERRILL Merrill, M. C., & Dukenbaev, A. (2011). Youth and higher education. In A. Warkotsch (Ed.), The European Union and Central Asia (pp. 114–131). London, England: Routledge. Merrill, M. C., & Ryskulova, Ch. Sh. (2012). Kyrgyzstan plans BA-MA system, with credit hours. International Higher Education, 68(Summer), 18–20. Minister of Education and Science Aslan Sarinzhipov. (2015). 23rd CEEMAN annual conference. Retrieved from http://www.ceeman.org/docs/default-source/ cac-2015/aslan-sarinzhipov_23cac.pdf?sfvrsn=0 Najibullah, F. (2014, March 12). Russia mulls fast-track citizenship, sparking braindrain concerns elsewhere. RFE/RL. Retrieved from http://www.rferl.org/ articleprintview/25294443.html Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools. (2015). Retrieved from http://nis.edu.kz/en/ Nazarbayev University. (2014). Retrieved from http://nu.edu.kz/ Ochs, K., & Phillips, D. (2004). Processes of educational policy borrowing in historical context. In D. Phillips & K. Ochs (Eds.), Educational policy borrowing: Historical perspectives (pp. 7–23). Oxford, England: Symposium Books. Owen, E. (2016, September 12). Turkey: Effort to force closure of Gülen Schools falling flat in Eurasia. Retrieved from https://eurasianet.org/turkey-effort-force -closure-gulen-schools-falling-flat-eurasia Peperzak, A. T., Critchley, S., & Bernasconi, R. (Eds.). (1996). Emmanuel Levinas: Basic philosophical writings. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Press Center, Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools. (2015). The investigation the quality of education in Kazakhstan. Retrieved from http://www.nis.edu.kz/en/ press-center/news/?id=3922 Rauhvargers, A. (2011). Global university rankings and their impact. Brussels, Belgium: European University Association. Retrieved from http://www.eua.be/pubs/ Global_University_Rankings_and_Their_Impact.pdf Roi, Y. (2000). Islam in the Soviet Union: From the Second World War to Gorbachev. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Roi, Y. (2001). Islam in the CIS: A threat to stability? London, England: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Russian-Tajik Slavic University. (n.d.). Rossiisko—Tadjikskii (slavianskii) universitet. Istoriia: Stanovlenie I Razvitie Rossiisko—Tadjikskogo (slavianskogo) universiteta [History: Establishment and Growth of the Russian-Tajik (Slavic) University]. Retrieved from http://www.rtsu.tj/ru/univercity/about/istoriya/ Ryskulova, C. (2018). Faculty perspective on independent accreditation of pedagogical programs in Kyrgyzstan (Unpublished doctoral dissertation proposal). Kent, OH: Kent State University. Sagintayeva, A., & Jumakulov, Z. (2015). Kazakhstan’s Bolashak Scholarship Program. International Higher Education, 79(Winter), 21–23. Sahin, A. (2015). Tajikistan to discontinue Gülen schools, citing “shadowy mission” Daily Sabah. Retrieved from http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/ 2015/01/07/tajikistan-to-shut-down-gulenist-schools Salmi, J. (2009). The challenge of establishing world-class universities. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Samanchina, Z., & Elebaeva, A. (2015) The prospects for educational migration from Kyrgyzstan to Turkey. Central Asia and the Caucasus, 16(1), 135–148.

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40    M. C. MERRILL Trow, M. A. (2005). Reflections on the transition from elite to mass to universal access: Forms and phases of higher education in modern societies since WWII. University of California Working Papers Series. Berkeley: University of California. Retrieved from http://escholarship.org/uc/item/96p3s213 Tuning CAHEA. (n. d.) Retrieved from http://www.tucahea.org TuCAHEA Partners. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.tucahea.org/partners.html TuCAHEA Pilot Student Mobility. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.tucahea.org/ news/pilotstudent.html Tuning Educational Structures in Europe. (n.d.). Tuning Methodology. Retrieved from http://www.unideusto.org/tuningeu/tuning-methodology.html Turkey to Close Down Gulen Schools. (2014, March 1). BBC. Retrieved from http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26397755 University of Central Asia. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.ucentralasia.org/index .asp University of Nebraska–Lincoln. (2015). Confucius Institutes Around the Globe. Retrieved from http://confuciusinstitute.unl.edu/institutes.shtml Urnaliev, S., & Najibullah, F. (2017, November 19). Hijab vs. education: Kazakh schoolgirls face dilemma over head-scarf ban. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-schools-head-scarf -ban/28862676.html Vukasovic, M. (2015). Concluding comments: When international, European and domestic influences collide. European Journal of Higher Education, 5(1), 96–106. Wilmoth, G. D. (c. 2011). Central Asia’s future role in international higher education. Retrieved from http://www.wilmoth.com.au/publications/WilmothNaz UnivPaper.pdf World Trade Organization. (2015). Members and observers. Retrieved from https:// www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm Zhetysu State University named after I. Zhansugurova. (2015). Mejdunarodnaya spetsializirovannaya akkreditatsia ACQUIN [International Specialized Accreditation ACQUIN]. Retrieved from http://zhgu.edu.kz/index.php?newsid=158

CHAPTER 3

ACCREDITATION AS A MEANS OF QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN KAZAKHSTAN Developments and Challenges Sulushash Kerimkulova Nazarbayev University

Driven by an ambitious goal to enter the 50 most developed countries (Nazarbayev, 1997) and the need to train highly qualified and competitive specialists to meet the needs of the world market and contribute to the development of the country economy, Kazakhstan has made its top priority to invest in education, paying significant attention to integration of its higher education system into the world educational sphere. Improvement of education quality has been proclaimed as one of the priority directions in strengthening the competitiveness of education and developing human capital in Kazakhstan. In compliance with these goals, and driven by the standards and guidelines of the Bologna Process, which Kazakhstan has

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officially joined in 2010, the country has made a number of important changes in its quality assurance system. The establishment of the Institute of Accreditation is one of these important steps (Law of the RK “On Education,” 2007). Emphasizing the significance of accreditation of higher education institutions for their competitiveness in the world arena, President Nazarbayev (2007) in his annual address to the nation proclaimed that, in order to become competitive in the world arena, “We have to achieve provision of high quality educational services throughout the country at the level of world standards . . . to establish effective system of accreditation and attestation of higher educational institutions at the level of international standards” (para. 6). The idea of accreditation is not new to the global educational world. It has become one of the most widely spread and popular means for external quality assurance (Collins, 2015; Stensaker, 2011). While being an innovative and challenging experience for Kazakhstan, accreditation has become an “imperative of a high priority” within the last decade, resulting in the creation of a national model of accreditation, which includes national and international accreditation elements and is based on the best international practices and Kazakhstan’s higher education experiences (Bishimbayev & Nurasheva, 2011; Kalanova, 2013; Kerimkulova, 2014; Shakhanova, 2009). As stated by Bishimbayev and Nurasheva (2011), accreditation is recognized as “the most important factor in improving the quality of education in Kazakhstan” (p. 1). Its development has gone through a number of stages with the first being a total failure to subsequently more successful steps. It has also moved from being totally controlled by the state to becoming a more independent quality assurance instrument in higher education. The aim of this chapter is to explore the policies and developments in the accreditation journey of higher education in Kazakhstan with a specific focus on the establishment of a national model of accreditation as a means of assuring quality of higher education, its impact on educational improvements in higher education, and challenges that it generates for the higher education institutions. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the higher education system in the country, followed by the description of the national quality assurance system framework in order to provide the background for this chapter. This is followed by the analysis of stages that the accreditation process has passed through as it developed into a national structure. A special attention is given to the exploration of the role of international organizations in the development of accreditation model, the impact of accreditation on higher education development and performance, as well as the challenges that higher education institutions have faced as a result of the introduction of accreditation as a new means of assuring quality.

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HIGHER EDUCATION IN KAZAKHSTAN During the past 24 years of independence, the education system of Kazakhstan has undergone a number of reforms designed to create a model of education that will support achievements of the national goals and meet international standards. In March 2010, Kazakhstan became the 47th state to join the Bologna Process. Over the last few years the country has been rapidly modernizing its higher education system and enhancing its quality and relevance by applying the main principles of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) framework, including the three cycle degree system, credit transfer and accumulation system, academic mobility, and quality of higher education. The national reform strategies, which are aimed at the implementation of Bologna standards and raising the quality of education, have required significant revision and renewal of the national educational legislation. As a result of the reforms, it is expected that degrees offered in the country will be comparable with European degrees. Higher education in Kazakhstan has a variety of higher education institutions according to the new classification: national research universities, national higher educational institutions, research universities, research and teaching universities, academies, and institutes (Ministry of Education and Science [MoES], 2010). New classification is aimed at improving the quality of higher education and creating a competitive environment by differentiating higher education institutions by educational programs and scope of research activities. Besides, it gives the applicants the possibility of choosing higher education programs in compliance with their career goals. After an unprecedented proliferation of private higher education institutions (from 0 in 1991 to 126 in 2001) and the overall growth in the number of higher education institutions (from 61 in 1991 to 185 in 2001), their number in the country has significantly decreased in the last decade (Ministry of National Economy Committee on Statistics, 1990–2014) and is currently at 130 (IAC, 2018). In line with the governmental policy of optimization in higher education, some higher education institutions were closed, while many merged. The policy was aimed at enhancing the quality of educational provision through more rigorous quality standards and quality control measures. Kazakhstan’s higher education system is regulated by the national government. The principal authority regulating higher education system and responsible for the evaluation of higher education institutions and programs is the MoES. It defines the general policy and strategy and has established a number of government agencies and government-based committees to monitor and improve the quality of the higher education system. Both public and private higher education institutions are obliged to implement State Compulsory Education Standards (SCES), regulating the content and structure of education, as well as the examination and graduation requirements

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and the external quality assurance procedures. Recently, however, as part of the Bologna Process, such content control has decreased and universities enjoy more academic freedom under the increased percentage of the optional component (electives) up to 55% at undergraduate level, 70% at master’s and up to 90% at the PhD level (MoES, 2014b, p. 14). Although the governance of public higher education institutions is still being determined by the MoES, new principles of university management such as corporate management, strategic planning, quality management, and institutional autonomy are being currently shaped. At the same time, the legal basis for granting autonomy to higher education institutions is also under development. During the years of independence, the national quality assurance system has been established and certain progress in ensuring the quality of higher education has been achieved. This progress is notably recognized in the reports of international organizations (OECD & WB, 2007; Tempus, 2010; Tempus, 2012) and national documents (Abdiyev, 2014; Irsaliyev, 2013; MoES, 2010). NATIONAL QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM FRAMEWORK To better understand accreditation as a major means of quality assurance, one needs to have an overall picture of the national quality assurance system and the developments that took place since its establishment. In particular, this section describes the evolution of the quality assurance system from a highly governmentally-centralized towards a more decentralized approach, as well as summarizes the corresponding structure of the system. Quality has not always been the main item on the educational reform agenda in Kazakhstan. In the early years of independence, when all postSoviet states were hit by the economic crisis, the government was more concerned with preventing the educational system from the total collapse due to a lack of public finances and ideological disorientation, resulting from the abandonment of the communist system of economic relations and values. Later on, the government was more preoccupied with reshaping the basic organizational structure of the educational system to align with the structures of Western educational systems. Recently, however, the government has become more concerned with the efficiency and output of the education system. Quality has evolved into one of the key issues on the educational reform agenda. A substantial part of reforms is driven nowadays by the concern for quality of education, which is viewed as essential in the larger national pursuit of international competitiveness. As a result of reforms, the national quality assurance system has been established with the main purpose to conduct the overall assessment of education at all levels.

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The early approach to quality control in higher education in Kazakhstan was highly centralized and governmentally controlled. Like many other post-Soviet countries, Kazakhstan faced a challenge of historical legacy, which subsequently influenced the development of its national quality assurance model. As stated by McLendon (2004), the strict policy and rigid control of the Ministry of Education has continued as one of the legacies of Soviet education, resulting in formalization and standardization in Kazakhstani higher education policy (p. 279). The prescriptive system caused the necessity for all the universities to operate under strict regulations and common rules set up by the MoES and receive its approval. The main impact of this centralized approach is that it produced the culture of compliance mentality, and did not create any incentives for universities to develop internal quality assurance systems, “their own quality targets and to assess their own strengths and weaknesses to improve themselves” (OECD & World Bank, 2007, p. 113). Such incentive was created by the market competition rather than by the government. A number of challenges facing higher education policy makers in the early period affected greatly the quality of education: proliferation of higher education institutions as a result of liberalization reform and dramatic expansion of private universities mostly driven by profit incentive (OECD & WB, 2007, p. 111); confusion and lack of understanding in adapting curriculum and instructional approaches to new realities following the recommendations of multiple international donors (Merril, 2011); high degree of corruption that pervaded the society and the educational system in particular (Heyneman, 2007) and contaminated every cell of the educational system in the conditions of limited funding; and multiple threats to societal cohesion, brought about as a result of emergence of ideological vacuum. Given all these challenges, educational quality in the early years was a very elusive concept in Kazakhstan and, ultimately, was not on the educational reform agenda since policy makers were more concerned with bringing the educational system to the Western standards in its form and process rather than in the final product. In addition, the government needed a high degree of control over the whole array of educational reforms to better align them with reforms in other sectors at the stage when the overall country’s development strategy was still not particularly clear and policy makers lacked experience and policy analysis and evaluation capacity. As a result of the challenges experienced by the educational reformers at the early stage of independence and the growth of negative tendencies affecting quality of higher education services, there was a strong need for the introduction of the system to assure the quality of higher education institutions and control their work (Tempus, 2012, p. 4). In response to this need, the government developed the legal framework and adopted a number of strategic documents, starting from 1999, which defined the main principles,

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goals, and mechanisms of staged realization of state policy in education and creation of a national system of education quality assessment. Among them were the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Education” (1999), the State Program on Education (2000), Strategic Plan for the Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2001), State Program of Education Development in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2005–2010 (2004). Especially important was the latter document, which shaped the course of quality assurance development in the country by identifying three main directions of quality assurance development in Kazakhstan: (a) the development of a national system of quality assessment, (b) the implementation of the system of quality management, and (c) institutional evaluation and accreditation (MoES, 2004). These documents laid the foundations for the development of a national system of quality assessment in the early stages of its development, which were further strengthened by more recent strategic documents, including the Strategy for Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan Until the Year 2020 (Strategy, 2010), State Program of Education and Science Development in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2016–2019 (Ministry of Education and Science, 2016), and renewed legal framework based on amendments to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Education” in 2007, 2011, and 2015. According to these documents, improving the quality of education was proclaimed as one of the priority directions in strengthening the competitiveness of Kazakhstani education and developing human capital. In compliance with these policy documents, the infrastructure and mechanisms to support the implementation of the quality assurance system have been developed. But it should be noted that the system has been developed in the direction of quality control and state regulation with the MoES being the main authority in higher education of the country responsible for the evaluation of higher education institutions and programs and retaining control at the central level. At the national level, this control is realized by a number of government agencies and government-based committees created by MoES to monitor and improve the quality of the higher education system, including the National Centre for Educational Standards and Assessment, National Centre for Educational Quality Assessment, the National Accreditation Centre, the Committee for Supervision and Attestation in Education and Science, National Centre of State Standards for Education and Tests, and Centre for Certification, Quality Management, and Consulting. This list has been changing throughout the time, reflecting new or renamed bodies such as Committee for Control in Education and Science, National Testing Centre, National Centre for Educational Statistics and Assessment, Centre for Bologna Process and Academic Mobility, and the Altynsarin National Academy of Education. The creation of numerous quality related bodies, though helpful in developing the quality assurance framework and infrastructure was nevertheless criticized for the

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work duplication and for the creation of an unnecessary burden for higher education institutions, leading to the formation of the compliance mentality with little focus on institutions’ self-evaluation and improvement (OECD & WB, 2007; Tempus, 2012; Raza, 2009). The control over quality is conducted via the system of external assessment procedures such as licensing, attestation, accreditation, ranking, and external assessment of students’ academic performance. The most basic type of quality control system is licensing—an obligatory quality control procedure aimed at determining whether institutions meet the minimum requirements stated by the government for delivering particular study programs. The licencing is conducted by the Committee for Control in Education and Science, which issues a license, allowing an organization to provide educational services (Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan [RK], 2007a). The requirements are predominantly focused on evaluation of inputs such as faculty–student ratio, type and amount of facilities, library resources, and initial capital. It should be noted that redundancy of numerous licensing permission requirements created bureaucracy, administrative barriers, and corruption. To avoid these negative influences, MoES has taken steps towards simplifying and optimizing licensing procedures in 2012 by cancelling 9 out of 27 (33%) licensing documents and providing transparency for all the stages of licensing starting by its transfer into e-format and by placing decisions on the website (Government of the RK, 2013; Irsaliyev, 2013). Licensing was followed by state attestation up to 2017 when it finally was replaced by accreditation. Unlike licensing, attestation was more comprehensive and assessed inputs, outputs, and the actual mechanics of the educational process. The attestation process consisted of two stages: (a) selfassessment by the higher education institutions (internal assessment) and its analysis and (b) the site visit by the Attestation Committee, which submits a report to MoES, including either recommendation for revoking the license from the educational organization, a decision to renew the license if the organization meets all the expectations, or a decision to temporarily discontinue the license until requested changes are made if the organization fails to meet some of the expectations of the Attestation Committee. Based on the institutional self-assessment reports and findings of the attestation commission, MoES makes the attestation decisions of “attested” or “not attested.” Being centrally controlled and conducted by MoES, attestation continues to be “a bureaucratic and formalized procedure with the limited level of effectiveness” aimed at “establishment of minimum compliance of educational organizations to the state requirements” (Irsaliyev, 2013, para. 16). In 2012, attempts were made to decentralize control management in order to raise the efficiency and quality of the education system by transferring authorities and responsibilities “down” to regional departments

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for control, which represent lower levels of management. But such decentralization demonstrated its inefficiency because of the existing “conflict of interests”: those who governed the organization of educational services also monitored their quality themselves (Irsaliyev, 2013). Besides, the decentralization led to other negative consequences such as general decrease of quality of education, growth of regional differentiation, absence of feedback, and impossibility of studying the problems at the national level. This situation led to the necessity of keeping state control and attestation until 2015 when it was planned to be conducted only in the form of licensing check (Irsaliyev, 2013). The next type of quality control is accreditation, which is quite a new practice for Kazakhstan. It was added to the existing system based on licensing and attestation as an outcome of Kazakhstan’s aspiration to become a member-state of the Bologna process and as a result of interaction with accrediting agencies in the West, where independent accreditation was viewed as the main mechanism of external quality assurance. Being initially very similar to a mandatory state attestation and conducted under the control of MoES for ensuring compliance of higher education institutions with the “standards of accrediting bodies” (Government of RK, 2007c, p. 1), accreditation has recently turned out to be an independent and voluntary mechanism for quality assurance aiming at defining “perspectives for educational organizations development” (Irsaliyev, 2013, para. 16). As this type of quality assurance is the main focus of this chapter, it will be discussed further in a separate section. Simultaneously to accreditation practices, another important element of the national system of quality assurance has been developed: higher education institutions’ ranking with the first ranking being conducted in Kazakhstan in 2006. Rankings were launched to assist the government with the determination of funding and grant allocation priorities, help students and parents to choose higher education institutions and programs, and for use by other stakeholders. In parallel with national rankings, some leading Kazakhstani higher education institutions have recently started to participate in the international rankings: Quacquarelli Symonds World University Rankings (QS WUR), Webometrics Ranking of World Universities (Webometrics), and Times Higher Education World University Rankings (THE). The MoES statistics reveal recent improvements in positioning of Kazakhstan’s universities in international rankings in comparison with the past indicators. For example, If in 2011 only two national universities entered the top 500–550 in the QS ranking, the number of universities in 2018–2019 reached 10 with most of them improving their positions from year to year. But the stable leading

Accreditation as a Means of Quality Assurance System    49 position is hold by the Kazakh National University (KazNU) having broken through to the 220 position in 2018–2019 from 390, rising by 170 positions as compared with 2012 and by 16 positions as compared with the previous 2017–2018 academic year. (Information and Analytical Center, 2017, p. 340; 2019, p. 215)

International and national rankings promote competition between universities, stimulate quality assurance of Kazakhstani higher education, and motivate Kazakhstan’s universities to improve their performance on specific indicators, which can be regarded as a positive influence. However, as the president of the national IQAA accreditation agency Sholpan Kalanova (2008) states, it is important to understand that working on specific indicators does not reflect full quality of higher education and that participation in international and national rankings should be combined with other quality assurance methods, such as accreditation and benchmarking for “continuous improvement of HEIs” (pp. 309–310). In addition to accreditation and university rankings, MoES Committee for Control in Education and Science conducts external students’ performance assessment. Initially it was conducted by Interim State Control (ISC), which being criticized was replaced by the External Assessment of Educational Achievements (EAEA) in 2012 in response to the adoption of the State Program of Education Development for 2011–2020 (MoES, 2010). The EALA was established as a form of independent monitoring of the quality of education with the aim to assess the quality of education services and the level of students’ mastery of curricula at the end of higher education in specific subject areas. On a positive side, this type of governmental control allowed forming minimum requirements for quality, reducing corruption and low quality of learning. The results of the tests are used to monitor student performance, evaluate educational process efficiency, and conduct comparative analysis of educational services of educational institutions (Abdiyev, 2014). However, ISC was criticized by the World Bank experts as ineffective instrument for serving as a key measure of quality in higher education as it significantly reduced academic autonomy of students and faculty and imposed uniform requirements to preparation programs (World Bank, 2005). As it is not clear, whether there is qualitative methodological difference between these two testing instruments ISC and EAEA, this critique of ISC can be applicable to EAEA. Such practice of testing students also diminishes the quality of creativity and innovation, preparing students for tests instead of training them towards market requirements to meet the goals of increasing national competitiveness and international recognition. Another external students’ performance assessment instrument and element of quality assurance system is Unified National Test (UNT)—a standardized assessment used as a secondary school graduation and a

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university entrance examination. Being suggested by international experts as a key solution in addressing the problem of corruption, it allowed to solve some strategic issues of quality assurance by providing independent assessment of students’ learning results while reducing the factor of subjectivity. But UNT has a number of systemic problems connected with combination of two measurements different by their educational goals: final attestation at school level and competitive selection at higher education level. As stated by Serik Irsaliyev (2013), chair of the Committee for Control in Education and Science, UNT carries out too many social loads: “from assessment of school education to realization of the right for higher education” (p. 3). UNT has also been criticized by the World Bank and OECD experts as inadequate means of monitoring and assessing quality. Though they praised Kazakhstan for making “a quick and concrete step” towards creation of the system of monitoring quality, they noted that this system was “unable to effectively use the data on the results of exams for assessment of education quality” (World Bank, 2005, p. 33–34) and that testing practice “push[es] students to become more concerned about the test than about their wider learning,” making institutions become “trapped” by the expected outcomes of the test (OECD & World Bank, 2007, pp. 120–121). Though efforts to reform the UNT and improve its quality in accordance with international standards are ongoing since its introduction in 2004, it is still subject to criticism by different stakeholders for the “inadequate quality and validity of the test items” and inefficiency in “allowing fair and transparent entrance to higher education institutions” (World Bank, 2012, p. 7–8). As a result of these reforms, the national quality assurance system has been established. It evolved from quality of education being an insignificant item on the educational reform agenda at the early stages of the country’s independence to currently one of the key priorities. Furthermore, it evolved from its initial highly centralized and governmentally controlled approach to a more decentralized (though still highly regulated) approach more recently, resulting in the development of a comprehensive legal framework and the creation of a variety of public institutions, government agencies, and government based committees and mechanisms for higher education quality control and assessment. Recent positive changes in various aspects of quality assurance system have become possible thanks to “a strong political will and specific plans of the Government to moving towards international best practice in quality assurance, governance and research” (Tempus, 2010, p. 11). Under the new regime, the recently introduced accreditation has become an “imperative of a high priority” and the core mechanism of external quality assurance.

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INTRODUCING ACCREDITATION IN KAZAKHSTAN The emergence of accreditation system as a new kind of higher education quality management tool in Kazakhstan has been motivated by a number of rationales including the following: • effective integration of the higher education system of Kazakhstan into European Higher Education Area under the Bologna Process through the required presence of the accreditation of HEIs; • protection of Kazakhstani citizens’ rights for education abroad and at the international labor market; • cooperation with the international networks for education quality for information exchange and development of comparable criteria and procedures; • increase of credibility of Kazakhstani higher education institutions; recognition of diplomas for graduates of the accredited institutions in accordance with the agreements between the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) countries; • stimulation of academic mobility of students and faculty, attraction of foreign specialists and students; and • raising quality of education in the interests of stakeholders’ satisfaction by the educational services and for assuring international competitiveness of the national education system (Bishimbayev & Nurasheva, 2011; Zakirova, 2010). Having introduced accreditation into its quality assurance system, Kazakhstan has made considerable efforts within a relatively short time towards development of a national model of accreditation based on international standards and experiences. The formation of this national model went through a complex period of probation and search for the most optimal model. First basic provisions on the accreditation of universities in Kazakhstan had been introduced in 1999, when the state accreditation was proclaimed a mandatory procedure (Law of the RK “On Education,” 1999). However, the actual accreditation has first occurred in 2001 in the form of state accreditation of higher education institutions by the MoES on the basis of 27 quantitative performance indicators. The whole procedure of that accreditation was a “total failure” and was sharply criticized by different stakeholders for two reasons (Kalanova, 2013). First, the government did not consider the international requirements in the process of quality assessment and controlled the whole procedure of accreditation; second, the performance of educational institutions was measured on the basis of only quantitative indicators in the form of statistics. As a result, this attempt

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to introduce accreditation turned to be just a “duplicate for process of attestation” (Kalabayev, 2008, p. 12). It was understood later that “making conceptual conclusions based exclusively on statistical data was inadmissible” (Kalanova, 2013, para. 6). While this first unsuccessful experience held back further development of accreditation for a number of years, the lesson learned was the necessity of studying different procedural methodologies of accreditation and learning from rich international experience before launching a national accreditation procedure. The next step towards accreditation development was the creation of the National Accreditation Centre (NAC) under the MoES in 2005 with the aim of conducting institutional accreditation of higher education institutions and educational programs and developing criteria for harmonizing procedures of quality evaluation with the Bologna Process. It was the first agency that started to conduct national accreditation in Kazakhstan. Between 2005 and 2009, NAC made important contributions towards the formation of the national model of accreditation. State standards for institutional accreditation were developed, data for training experts in quality assessments was collected, seminars and trainings for preparation of representatives of higher education institutions to conduct self-assessment process were conducted, the budget program “assuring quality of education” was developed which provided funding for 5 national universities for accreditation of their 10 educational programs (two from each university) by different international accrediting agencies. As stated by the NAC Director Nurilya Shakhanova (2009), this program can serve as an evidence of government support and as “an unprecedented care of the government for assuring quality of higher education” (para. 12). Higher education institutions were also oriented to apply for international accreditation at their own expense and for institutional accreditation by the national accrediting agencies. The amendments in the Law of the RK “On Education,” of 2007 provided the legal basis for accreditation. The state attestation was still required once in 5 years unless the university has institutional and program accreditations. The law introduced the Institute of Accreditation, outlined the forms of accreditation (institutional and specialized), as well as the right of higher education institutions to choose accrediting international agencies among the agencies having international recognition. Accreditation was recognized as a voluntary procedure and it was stated that the government of Kazakhstan should not interfere in the process of accreditation, as it was no longer its “burden” but the responsibility of institutions in their choice of accrediting agency (Law of the RK “On Education, 2007, Item 58). Besides, to assure proper regulations of accreditation procedures, the following policy documents were approved: Regulations for accreditation of educational organizations (Government of RK, 2007c) and Instructions for organization and conducting accreditation of educational organizations (MoES, 2008).

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To provide support, NAC began to publish a journal titled Higher Education in the Republic of Kazakhstan: Accreditation and Nostrification in 2008 aiming to discuss the issues of national and international accreditation and the experiences of the first Kazakhstani universities that gained international accreditation of their programs. A series of accreditation supporting literature (such as “Rector’s library”) was issued, including materials on the legal provision of accreditation procedures and recognition, world practices of institutional and specialized accreditation, overview of international accrediting agencies, accreditation standards and criteria, issues of the Bologna Process and English–Russian–Kazakh glossary of basic educational terms. This series was a good supporting instrument for university administration in their understanding of and preparation for accreditation. During these years, NAC became an associate member of such international quality assurance networks as European Network for Quality Assurance (ENQA) in Higher Education, Asia-Pacific Quality Network (APQN), and Eurasian Association for Education Quality Assessment (EAEQA). The OECD (2007) claims that NAC achieved several great results: First, it generated its own accreditation criteria based on the experiences of the most successful European and U.S. agencies; second, it provided valuable recommendations and supervision on the process of quality assurance and preparation for self-assessment to several Kazakhstani universities; and third, it conducted trainings for Kazakhstani experts in accreditation. Though this body did not exist for long and was reorganized in 2012 into the Centre of Bologna Process and academic mobility, its activities created a stable ground for conducting independent national accreditation in Kazakhstan (Kalabayev, 2008; OECD, 2007). The most distinguishing aspect of this stage was the transfer of accreditation from the sphere of state control into public-and-professional, competitive sphere (Shakhanova, 2009). Furthermore, NAC was applying the concepts of motivating institutions to undergo the process of accreditation, which was quite new in Kazakhstan, and which was subsequently stated in the amendments to the Law (Law of the RK “On Education,” 2011). These steps revealed an understanding of the importance of quality issues by universities and the government of Kazakhstan, promoting further development of a national model of accreditation. A huge step towards the establishment of the external accreditation was made after joining the Bologna Process in 2010 (OECD, 2007, p. 143). As the authorized member of the European Higher Education Area, Kazakhstan has been required to follow the determined criteria common for all countries within the Bologna framework with one of them being education quality assurance by means of accreditation. So Kazakhstan had to scrutinize the existing methods of accreditation to gain a stable interaction between the system of higher education in Kazakhstan and the global market of educational service (Zakirova, 2010). In response to this requirement

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and to increase the transparency and credibility of its education, the government empowered the external accrediting agencies with the right to evaluate the quality of services given by Kazakhstani institutions. External international accreditation in Kazakhstan was considered not only as a way to audit the functioning of universities, but also as a solution to improve the quality of education and increase the status of our universities on the world educational arena. New approaches towards formation of a national model of accreditation, including university accreditation by independent agencies in compliance with the European standards, and recommendations for quality assurance were reflected in a number of strategic documents: the amended Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Education” (2011), The Strategic Plan of the Development of Kazakhstan up to 2020 (2010), and State Program of the Education Development for 2011–2020 (2010). In all these documents, the role of accreditation in the provision of quality education was raised to a new level with the focus on its independent character. The conceptual “core changes,” fixed in these legislative and normative documents, are defined as follows: • the transfer of the part of government authority to non-governmental sector to decrease its controlling functions, and • the development of public-private partnership in education in different forms and at different levels (Kalanova, 2013, p. 63). A very important step in improving the quality assurance system involved a shift from “compliance mentality” and “control” to the idea of improvement that universities should do upon the completion of accreditation, and by doing so, build capacity to assure quality for themselves (Law of the RK “On Education,” 2011; OECD & WB, 2007, p. 121). In accordance with these policy documents, starting from 2012, accreditation has been carried out by non-commercial, nongovernmental organizations thus having moved to a competitive environment. The amended Law of the RK “On Education” (2011) defines accreditation of educational organization as “the procedure of recognition by the accrediting agency of the compliance of educational services to the established requirements and standards with the aim of provision of objective information of their quality and proof of the presence of effective mechanisms for their improvement” (Item 16). The structure of accreditation is divided into institutional, specialized/programmatic, national, and international elements and is based on qualitative criteria and indicators. Given that accreditation is voluntary, the government uses different mechanisms to stimulate and encourage universities to seek it. Once accredited, universities will be given the right to issue diplomas of their own model, recognized by the government starting from 2021, and will no longer

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be required to go through the state attestation process, which, starting from January 2017, was completely replaced by accreditation. Public funding is provided only to the accredited higher education institutions, which are obliged to have at least one accredited program in order to enroll publicly funded students. They are also free to adapt the state standards to their own more flexible institutional requirements: Bachelor’s programs may be modified by 50%, master’s by 70% and PhD programs by up to 90–95% (Nazarbayev University Graduate School of Education, 2014, pp. 96–97). These mechanisms create strong incentives to universities to undergo this process in order to prove that they provide high quality services. Next serious step towards progressive development of accreditation model in Kazakhstan, from totally controlled by the MoES to the one conducted by independent accrediting agencies, is connected with the creation of a National Accreditation Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2012 and development of a National Register of Accreditation Agencies. Though the government transfers a part of its authority to nongovernmental sector, it still regulates the accrediting agencies by their recognition and inclusion into the National Register. The number of agencies listed in this National Register has increased from six in 2012 to 10 in 2015, and currently includes two national independent agencies having the right to conduct accreditation at the institutional and program levels and eight international agencies (three from Germany, two from Austria, three from the United States, and one from the United Kingdom (MoES, 2014b, p. 15): 1. Independent Quality Assurance Agency (IQAA), created in 2008, Kazakhstan. Associate membership in ENQA; a full status in International Network for Quality Assurance Agencies in Higher Education (INQAAHE). 2. Independent Agency for Accreditation and Ranking (IAAR), created in 2011, Kazakhstan, Associate membership in European Network for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA); a full status in INQAAHE. 3. Accreditation Agency for Degree Programs in Engineering, Informatics, the Natural Sciences and Mathematics (ASIIN), Germany. 4. Accreditation, Certification and Quality Assurance Institute (ACQUIN), Germany. 5. Austrian Agency on Quality Assurance (AQA), Austria. 6. Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET), United States. 7. Fund for International Business Administration Accreditation (FIBAA), Switzerland. 8. Accreditation Council for Business Schools and Programs (ACBSP), United States.

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9. Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools—Commissions on Elementary and Secondary schools (MSA–CESS), United States. 10. Institution of Marine Engineering, Science and Technology (IMaREST), United Kingdom. One of the important requirements for inclusion into the National Register is the recognition of the international agency in the national register of its country or membership in the European Quality Assurance Register (EQAR) for Higher Education. From this point of view, all these international agencies are the members of the leading quality assurance international networks and associations. Another important innovative requirement is that international agencies have to include Kazakhstani experts in the accreditation review teams, while national agencies in their turn should include international experts in their teams (Kalanova, 2013). It should be noted that both national accrediting agencies IARR and IQAA developed their accreditation standards and procedures on the basis of the European standards and guidelines (ESGs) for quality assurance and are based on the principles of voluntarism, independence, objectivity, openness, and transparency which are the main indicators of the European education area. Rich experience of the United States in accreditation as well as proposals from Kazakhstani universities were also taken into account. Including leading European and American accrediting agencies into the National Register and compliance of the national accreditation agencies standards with ESGs for quality assurance has had a positive impact on the process of national accreditation model development allowing to involve all stakeholders including employers into the process of improving education quality (Bishimbayev & Nurasheva, 2011; Kalanova, 2013). The work on the development of the Institute of Independent Accreditation is currently a high priority. It has come in place of attestation and accreditation is expected to become a major form of quality assurance in the future (MoES, 2010; OECD & World Bank, 2007). It is expected that the percentage of higher education institutions, passing the independent accreditation, will increase 50% in 2015 and by 65% in 2020, while 30% will pass independent national program accreditation according to international standards by 2020 (MoES, 2010). Based on the analysis of accreditation development the following key features of the national model can be summarized. The model includes national and international accreditation drawing on the best international practices and Kazakhstani higher education institutions’ experiences. Its structure is comprised of the National Accreditation Council that develops National Register of Accreditation Agencies by recognizing accrediting agencies and including them into the Register. This Register currently includes eight international and two national independent accrediting

Accreditation as a Means of Quality Assurance System    57

agencies IQAA and IAAR each with its own Accreditation Council that makes decision on institutional and specialized/programmatic accreditation of the universities that apply to them. Both national accrediting agencies are independent of the state and have developed their accreditation standards and procedures on the basis of the ESGs for quality assurance, rich experience of the U.S. accreditation as well as proposals from Kazakhstani universities. The procedures of accreditation are conducted by national accrediting agencies in accordance with the best international practices of external evaluation (university self-evaluation/site visit by the team of experts/report on external evaluation followed by the decision of the accrediting council/publication of the report). National accreditation model is supported legally by the Law of the RK “On Education,” which recognizes accreditation as an independent and voluntary quality assurance mechanism, proclaims the right of higher education institutions to choose accrediting international agencies, and defines its structural forms as institutional, specialized/programmatic, national, and international. Along with these features, which comply with international practices, national accreditation model has some specific features that make it somehow different from European and U.S. models. The main specific feature is connected with the consequences of accreditation failure by higher education institution. While in Europe the universities or programs that fail accreditation are subject to closure, in Kazakhstan universities in such a case stop getting state funding. Another national feature is that accreditation goes along with licensing and until recently co-existed with state attestation which has recently been eliminated. Though introduced recently into the quality assurance system of Kazakhstan, the accreditation institution has currently become a core means for external quality assurance. In its aspiration to enter EHEA as a memberstate of the Bologna Process, the country has made considerable efforts towards development of a national model of accreditation based on international standards and experiences. The formation of this national model went through a complex period of probation towards progressive development of accreditation model in Kazakhstan, moving from a process of total control by the MoES to a more decentralized involvement of independent accrediting agencies. Different stakeholders contributed to its development, including international organizations. ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Starting from the first decade of its independence, Kazakhstan consulted and actively collaborated with different international organizations in developing its national system of education. In the 1990s, implementation of

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the Asian Development Bank’s recommendations resulted in the introduction of new subjects, specializations and electives; provision of more freedom to universities and faculty in the choice of what to teach and how to teach by replacing a universal curriculum and textbooks with more flexible state education standards; promotion of greater student independence and student-centered learning; as well as cultivation of critical thinking skills (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008). Though at that time these reforms were not directly focused on quality, in the long run their implementation contributed to raising the quality of educational services. The development of quality assurance system also benefited from such international organizations as Central Asian Foundation of Management Development (CAMAN), Corporation CARANA and Education Network EdNet (USA), Association of Business & Economic Education (USAID), European Commission with its TEMPUS and TACIS programs (Bishimbayev & Nurasheva, 2011; Shakhanova, 2009). For example, CAMAN was the first non-governmental corporation in Central Asian that brought public professional accreditation practices in 2005, proposed the standards and criteria in the area of economic and business education, and created regional accreditation system CAMEQ (Shakhanova, 2009). These first experiences are implemented currently in Kazakhstan through creation of independent accreditation agencies which generated their own accreditation criteria on the basis of the most successful European and U.S. accrediting agencies’ experiences. In addition, studies conducted later by OECD and World Bank also comprise the whole set of recommendations, including internationalization of curriculum, decentralization of existing quality control mechanisms, and entrusting quality assurance to independent accrediting agencies, provision of incentive measures to encourage institutions for passing accreditation, phasing out attestation with the establishment of accreditation, development of national quality assurance system and national model of accreditation in compliance with international standards, to name some. Kazakhstan increasingly cooperates with international quality assuring networks for exchange of information and development of comparable criteria and procedures for accreditation purposes, including International Network for Quality Assurance Agencies in Higher Education (INQAAHE), European Network for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA), the Network of Central and Eastern European Quality Assurance Agencies in Higher Education (CEE Network), Asia-Pacific Quality Network (APQN), Eurasian Association for Education Quality Assessment (EAEQA). The latter association EAEQA was created following the example of the similar successful supranational worldwide professional organizations. It unites accrediting agencies that carry out external quality evaluation of higher education on the national and/or regional level in the following post-Soviet countries: Russia, Belorussia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Estonia, and

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Kazakhstan. Active participation in such EAEQA events as jointly organized annual international conferences on the issues of quality in education, realization of cross-country research in the sphere of quality assessment, development of compatible methodologies of national quality assurance systems, and dissemination of good practice via publications in its journal “Quality of Education in Eurasia” are beneficial for Kazakhstan as it provides a joint regional professional platform for discussion, exchange of opinions, and constructive dialogue (http://eaoko.org/ru). As a result of the interaction with international organizations and networks, Kazakhstan included eight leading European and American accrediting agencies into its National Register and brought national accreditation agencies standards in compliance with the ESGs for quality assurance. Active collaboration of the country with international organizations, quality assurance networks, and agencies was beneficial for internationalizing the quality assurance system. Gurevich (2011) claims that it is evident that Kazakhstan is not afraid to borrow the most current and advanced international decisions of educational problems and is leading by the speed of educational reforms including the quality assurance among other postSoviet countries. However, he also warns that the country should be careful in its collaboration with international organizations, avoid blind copying and situations when “superior clapping over the shoulder by the western hand is accepted as the highest and peremptory ascertaining of achievements” (Gurevich, 2011, n.p.). IMPACT OF ACCREDITATION ON EDUCATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION The impact of accreditation on quality and educational improvements is somewhat contested in international literature. Some scholars raise negative issues with regard to accreditation arguing that it does not encourage excellence and rapid improvements in quality by focusing on the achievement of minimum standards set by the accrediting bodies (Harvey, 2002). Others suggest that the compliance with the set of standards promotes conformity rather than the production of high quality outcomes (Engerbretsen, Heggen, & Eilertsen, 2012). Yet others note positive and lasting effect of accreditation on quality when a self-study period by the institution is required by the accrediting bodies against a set of standards, which “act as a benchmark or quality threshold, however ill-defined that notion might be” (Collins, 2015, p. 142). As for the impact of accreditation on quality and educational improvements in higher education in Kazakhstan, the impact is not yet clear enough. But the results of the initial experiences reveal positive impact

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of international accreditation on the development of the national system of higher education (Bishimbayev & Nurasheva, 2011; Danilevskiy, 2016; Kerimkulova, 2014; Myrkalykov & Yefimova, 2013; Zhetpisbayeva, Arinova, & Asylbekkyzy, 2012). As Myrkalykov and Yefimova (2013) note, as a result of accreditation of educational programs by international agencies, universities acquired invaluable experience in formation of internal quality assurance systems and development of educational programs, which allowed universities to more actively integrate into the world educational sphere. In addition, participation in preparation for accreditation and going through the accreditation procedures developed the whole cohort of specialists in the sphere of education quality provision, most of whom later played an important role in the development of a national model of accreditation (Myrkalykov & Yefimova, 2013). According to Danilevskiy (2016) universities recognize that international accreditation helps “to attract attention of foreign specialists and students, raise qualification of universities’ staff, simplify academic and research exchange organization, and expand collective experience of each university” (para. 15). International recognition of quality of educational services has become an important indicator for the institutional level of education quality management. The assumption is that the highest effectiveness of accreditation is reached when it is conducted by independent public organizations. Higher education institutions have also come to an understanding of the positive influence of accreditation on the quality of all their activities, as well as its influence on their image and competitiveness (Myrkalykov & Yefimova, 2013; Zhetpisbayeva et al., 2012). One of the positive impacts of accreditation in Kazakhstan is the growing interest in accreditation among universities for their reputation and image, leading to the constant increase in the number of accredited universities and their programs. By 2016, the share of accredited institutions and their programs has become comparatively significant (see Table 3.1). While there has been an increase in the percentage of universities that gained national institutional accreditation, more significant is the growth TABLE 3.1  The Percentage of Universities That Gained Institutional and Specialized Accreditation Percentage of HEIs That Gained Specialized/ Programmatic Accreditation

Year

Percentage of HEIs That Gained National Institutional Accreditation

2013

40.4%

7.6%

5.3%

2014

57.0%

38.0%

19.0%

2015

64.3%

49.0%

25.0%

National Accreditation

Source: Information and Analytical Center, 2015, pp. 185–186.

International Accreditation

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of accredited programs: more than 6 times increase of programs accredited by national accrediting bodies (from 7.6% in 2013 to 49% in 2015) and nearly 5 times increase by international accrediting agencies (from 5.3% in 2013 to 25% in 2015). The more recent data shows an increase in the number of universities that gain acreditation. Thus 101 out of 112 civil universities (90%) in 2017 gained international accreditation for 3,040 educational programs that comprise 63% of all the programs offered by the universities (Information and Analytical Center, 2017, p. 166). The geography of the accredited universities covers all parts of Kazakhstan—central, north, south, east, and west—with accredited programs covering all three levels (bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD). Most universities use the practice of acquiring program accreditation from several international agencies. The most popular international agencies that accredited the majority of Kazakhstani programs are German agencies ASIIN and AQUIN, followed by the Austrian agency AQA. National and state universities have more accredited programs in comparison with other institutions, especially the private ones. This can partially be explained by the financial support that was provided by the government to national universities within the budget program mentioned above. It is worth to note that there is a number of state and private universities which also succeeded in gaining international accreditation without such a financial support at their own expense. The significant factor of the growing interest of accreditation among higher education institutions is their access to state funding and an increasing competition between the universities in terms of quality as defined by employability of students and students’ satisfaction with educational experiences. While a few positive impacts of the accreditation system on higher education institutions have been documented, practically nothing is known about whether accreditation processes really lead to excellence in education and rapid improvements in quality, whether they impact the quality of curriculum content, teaching activities, and students’ learning outcomes. Further research exploring these aspects is necessary to better understand its impact on educational improvements and quality of education. CHALLENGES OF ACCREDITATION The experience of accreditation revealed a number of challenges that universities in Kazakhstan have faced. The main challenges include (a) methodological provision of international accreditation; (b) reliance on quantitative approaches; (c) superficiality and misconception about selfevaluation process; (d) lack of positive, supportive, and constructive approaches among national accreditation agencies; and (e) high costs.

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The main challenge is connected with methodological provision of international accreditation. Universities that passed international accreditation revealed different methodological approaches to the interpretation of requirements and standards of international accrediting agencies (Zhetpisbayeva et al., 2012). The standards of different international accrediting agencies differ from each other, creating confusion for Kazakhstan universities applying to different agencies. This challenge is further complicated by the second challenge of the lack of national experts in the database of international accrediting agencies, absence of special centers and specialized programs for training national experts in the sphere of quality assurance and accreditation that could have helped universities in proper understanding of the standards and procedures of accreditation and preparation for accreditation. NAC trained a number of experts in accreditation during its existence but with its closure no other body continues this work. The third challenge for accreditation is reliance on quantitative approaches. A comparative analysis of accreditation systems in Western countries and the established practices in Kazakhstan shows that the national accreditation standards and indicators still reflect more quantitative approaches. As Gurevish (2011) notes, there is a “desire to measure everything” accompanied by “input-oriented” and indicators-based quality measurements such as academic qualifications and spending per student (Nazarbayev University Graduate School of Education, 2014, p. 98). On the other hand, the degree of development, progress of reforms, innovation in the work of higher education institutions, as well as the dynamics of moving forward are insufficiently captured by accreditation mechanisms (Bishimbayev & Nurasheva, 2011, p. 5). Closely linked to the previous challenge is the fourth challenge of superficiality and misconception about self-evaluation among universities applying for accreditation. Because of the “compliance mentality” caused by the centralized approach, universities usually take formalized and superficial approach to self-evaluation. They are not used to looking critically at the results of their performance, and therefore focus more on finding and then hiding flaws in their work, rather than critically considering the problems they face with further improvement in mind. As stated by the international project team working on the development of the strategic directions for education reform in Kazakhstan for 2015–2020, “In spite of the mobility frameworks and institutional accreditation procedures . . . there remains an emphasis on centralized quality control and on compliance rather than on a culture of quality assurance and self-evaluation at the institutional level” (Nazarbayev University Graduate School of Education, 2014, p. 98). Kazakhstani universities tend to have “overstated self-assessment”; “the indicators do not reflect the real picture” that might help in self- improvement; instead of applying a “self-critical approach,” the universities tend to do a

Accreditation as a Means of Quality Assurance System    63

“self-promotion” (Bishimbayev & Nurasheva, 2011) and persuade the observers in the ultimate quality of their programs and teaching workforce rather than reflect the “real picture” that will help in their self-improvement (Naizabekov & Chalaya, 2012). This tendency can also be explained by the previous “tradition” of quality control bodies to focus on negative aspects in the work of a university, when universities used to be penalized by the government without receiving advice on how to solve their problems. Considering such an impact, Zakirova (2010) points out that not all higher education institutions in the country have “units dealing with assessment and analysis” and professional organizations are too weak to serve as experts in the sphere of external accreditation (p. 33). The fifth challenge is connected with lack of positive, supportive, and constructive approaches that universities endure on the side of national accreditation agencies which are used to making difficult conclusions, undertaking decisive actions to close programs, while not providing constructive feedback or offering different solutions to specific problems (Bishimbayev & Nurasheva, 2011, p. 4). Such an approach demotivates institutions. According to OECD and World Bank (2007) recommendations, the process of accreditation should be “positive and supportive”: . . . the agency should evaluate universities and give them feedback in the form of a consultation about a better functioning of these organizations; it has to be an ongoing process of visiting and revisiting until the institutions will be confident that they have achieved desirable results and are ready to be accredited. (p. 23)

The final challenge is connected with the high cost of accreditation procedures that leads to monopoly in accreditation. As stated by Kehm (2010), accreditation has sometimes been characterized as being “a successful money-generating machine” (p. 238). A number of universities, especially the private ones, endure financial challenges with international accreditation of their programs and may possibly not be able to acquire accreditation only because of the financial problems. There is still a challenging task for national accreditation agencies to join the world nets, in particular EQAR and gain full membership in ENQA because this requires significant financial support on the side of the Kazakhstani government and constant training of experts in the area of quality provision. CONCLUSION The review of the accreditation practices in Kazakhstan shows that in spite of its relatively recent history, the accreditation process is developing very fast and has currently become a high priority and a core part of the quality

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assurance system in higher education. The development of accreditation as a means of assuring quality went through a number of stages, reflecting its progressive movement from totally controlled by the government to the one conducted by independent accrediting agencies. Its recent developments have been strongly influenced by policies and developments at the European Union level. New directions in the state policies and government support in provision of education quality promoted the development of a national model of accreditation based on the best international practices and Kazakhstani experience. While Kazakhstani universities face a number of challenges, their experience reveals the importance of the accreditation for the development of a national system of higher education, improvement of the quality of educational services, and the creation of conditions for entering the worldwide education sphere. The national system of accreditation has become one of the most important elements of the national system of education, which demonstrates the aspiration of Kazakhstan to reach the highest standards of quality as an important dimension of the country’s human capital and competitiveness strategy. REFERENCES Abdiyev, K. (2014). National quality assessment system in education in the Republic of Kazakhstan: Description of infrastructure and ongoing assessing activities. Quality of Education in Eurasia, 2, 59–69. Bishimbayev, V., & Nurasheva, K. (2011). Accreditation process in Kazakhstan: State regulation, procedures, and prospects. Retrieved from http://www.parlam.kz/kk/ blogs/Bishimbayev/Details/4/8377 Collins, I. (2015). Using international accreditation in higher education to effect changes in organizational culture: A case study from a Turkish university. Journal of Research in International Education, 14(2), 141–154. Danilevskiy, D. (2016, April 26). International accreditation or the crush of higher education? Flash. Retrieved from http://flashpress.kz/blog/flash/160207.html Engebretsen, E., Heggen, K., & Eilertsen, H. A. (2012). Accreditation and power: A discourse analysis of a new regime of governance in higher education. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 56(4), 401–417. Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2007a). Regulations for licensing qualification requirements for educational organizations 2007 (Bylaw No. 452). Retrieved from https://pavlodar.com/zakon/?dok=03695&all=all Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2007b). Regulations for state attestation of educational organizations (Bylaw No. 1270). Retrieved from http://skocontrol .gov.kz/files/11%20rus.htm Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2007c). Regulations for accreditation of educational organizations (Bylaw No.1385). Retrieved from http://tengrinews

Accreditation as a Means of Quality Assurance System    65 .kz/zakon/pravitelstvo_respubliki_kazahstan_premer_ministr_rk/obpazovanie/ id-P070001385_/ Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2010, February). Strategic plan of the development of the Republic of Kazakhstan up to 2020. Decree of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, No 922. Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2013). Some issues of licensing of educational activities (Bylaw No.195 with amendments and additions as of 27.05.2014 No. 549). Retrieved from http://online.zakon.kz/ Document/?doc_id=31343907 Gurevich, L. (2011). The lie that raises us up. Expert Kazakhstan, 37(10). Retrieved from http://expert.ru/kazakhstan/2011/37/nas-vozvyishayuschij-obman/ Harvey, L. (2002). Evaluation for what? Teaching in Higher Education, 7(3), 245–263. Heyneman, S. P. (2007). Thee universities in Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan: The struggle against corruption and for social cohesion. Prospects, 37, 305–318. Information and Analytical Center. (2015). National report on the condition and development of education system in Republic of Kazakhstan (on the results of the year 2014). Astana, Kazakhstan: Author. Retrieved from http://iac.kz/en/analytics/ national-report-state-and-development-educational-system-republic -kazakhstan-2014 Information and Analytical Center. (2017). National report on the state and development of education system in the Republic of Kazakhstan (for the years of Independence). Astana, Kazakhstan: Author. Retrieved from http://iac.kz/sites/default/files/ nacdok-2017_ot_kgk_final_09.08.2017_10.00-ilovepdf-compressed.pdf Information and Analytical Center. (2018). The annual national compendium “Education system statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan” for the 2017–2018 academic year. Astana, Kazakhstan: Author. Retrieved from http://iac.kz/sites/default/ files/nacionalnyy_sbornik_2017-2018.pdf Information and Analytical Center. (2019). National report on the state and development of education system in Republic of Kazakhstan (on the results of the 2018 year). Astana, Kazakhstan: Author. Retrieved from http://iac.kz/sites/default/files/ 0_nacionalnyy_doklad_za_2018_god_final_s_oblozhkami_na_sayt_ compressed_0.pdf Irsaliyev, S. A. (2013). The conquest of knowledge society heights. Accreditation in Education. Retrieved from http://www.akvobr.ru/kazahstan_sistema_ocenki _kachestva.html Kalabayev, N. B. (2008). Accreditation and state control in the system of higher education of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In Reports of the international scientificmethodic seminar “Role of accreditation in improvement of higher education quality” (pp. 11–26). Almaty, Kazakhstan: KazNTU. Kalanova, Sh. M. (2008). The methodology of ranking higher education institutions in Kazakhstan. Higher Education in Europe, 33(2/3), 303–310. Kalanova, Sh. M. (2013, April 5). The future of independent accreditation in Kazakhstan. Accreditation in Kazakhstan. Retrieved from https://akvobr.ru/ nezavisimaja_akkreditacia_v_kazahstane.html

66    S. KERIMKULOVA Kehm, B. M. (2010). The German system of accreditation. In D. D. Dill & M. Beerkens (Eds), Public policy for academic quality: Analyses of innovative policy instruments (pp. 227–248). New York, NY: Springer. Kerimkulova, S. I. (2014). Accreditation of higher education in Kazakhstan: Current trends and policies. In L. G. Chova, A. L. Martínez, & I. C. Torres (Eds.), Education and new learning technologies (pp. 69–79) Barcelona, Spain: Proceedings of IATED Academy International Conference EDULEARN14 . Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Education.” (1999). No. 389-I. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Education.” (2007). No. 319-III (with amendments and additions as of 2007). Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Education.” (2011). No. 487-IV (with amendments and additions as of 2011). Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Education.” (2015). No. 398-V (with amendments and additions as of 2015). McLendon, M. K. (2004). Straddling market and state: Higher education governance and finance reform in Kazakhstan. In S. Heyneman & A. De Young (Eds.), The challenges for education in Central Asia (pp. 275–293). Charlotte, NC: Information Age. Merril, M. (2011). Kasha and quality in Kyrgyzstan. European Education, 43(4), 5–25. Ministry of Education and Science. (2004). State program of education development in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2005–2010. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, December 2004. Astana: Author. Ministry of Education and Science. (2008). Instructions for organization and conducting accreditation of educational organizations. Order of the Minister of Education and Science, No. 109. Astana: Author. Ministry of Education and Science. (2016). State program of education and science development in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2016–2019. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, March 2016, No. 205. Astana: Author. Ministry of Education and Science. (2014a). Report on the dynamics of Kazakh National University and Eurasian National University in QS academic ranking of world universities. Astana: Author. Ministry of Education and Science. (2014b). Strategic Plan for 2014–2018. Order of the Minister of Education and Science, No. 520. Astana: Author. Ministry of National Economy Committee on Statistics. (1990–2014). Dynamic tables: Higher education institutions. Retrieved from: http://www.stat.gov.kz/faces/ wcnav_externalId/homeNumbersEducation?_afrLoop=37023474219783769 #%40%3F_afrLoop%3D37023474219783769%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D19yry heult_83 Myrkalykov, Zh. U., & Yefimova, I. Y. (2013, August 23). National model of accreditation in Kazakhstan. For HEIs of the country accreditation has become the stimulus for maintaining high quality of training specialists. Accreditation in Education. Retrieved from https://akvobr.ru/model_akkreditacii_kazakhstana .html Nayzabekov, A. B., & Chalaya, O. B. (2012). The quality assessment of higher education. Vestnik KarGU, 2(66), 15–19.

Accreditation as a Means of Quality Assurance System    67 Nazarbayev University Graduate School of Education. (2014). Development of strategic directions for education reforms in Kazakhstan for 2015–2020, diagnostic report. Astana, Kazakhstan: Indigo print. Nazarbayev, N. A. (1997). Strategy Kazakhstan 2030: Prosperity, security and ever growing welfare of all the Kazakhstanis. Retrieved from http://prokuror.gov .kz/eng/state/acts-president/strategy-kazakhstan-2030 Nazarbayev, N. A. (2007, February 28). The address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the peoples of Kazakhstan. Retrieved from http://www.akorda.kz/ru/ page/page_poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-n-nazarbaeva-narodu -kazakhstana-28-fevralya-2007-g_1343986887 OECD & World Bank. (2007). Reviews of national policies for education: Higher education in Kazakhstan. Paris, France: OECD. Raza, R. (2009). Examining autonomy and accountability in public and private tertiary institutions. Human Development Network: World Bank. Retrieved from http://documents.vsemirnyjbank.org/curated/ru/267671468158063464/ pdf/526540WP0Auton145574B01PUBLIC110pdf.pdf Shakhanova, N. Zh. (2009). National model of accreditation: Experience of Kazakhstan. Retrieved from http://www.akvobr.ru/nacionalnaja_model_akkreditacii_opyt _kazahstana.html Silova, I., & Steiner-Khamsi, G. (Eds.). (2008). How NGOs react: Globalization and education reform in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Stensaker, B. (2011). Accreditation of higher education in Europe—Moving towards the US model? Journal of Education Policy, 26(6), 757–769. Tempus. (2010). Higher education in Kazakhstan. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, EACEA. Tempus. (2012). Higher education in Kazakhstan. Brussels Belgium: European Commission, EACEA. World Bank. (2005). Modernization of the system of quality assurance assessment in the Republic of Kazakhstan: analytical report. Astana, Kazakhstan: MoES RK. World Bank. (2012). Kazakhstan. Student assessment: SABER country report. Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/education/saber Zakirova, G. D. (2010). Internationalization of accreditation processes in the system of higher education of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In Integration of higher education of Kazakhstan into international education sphere: achievements, problems, perspectives for development (pp. 28–37). Almaty, Kazakhstan: National office of the Tempus program. Zhetpisbayeva, B. A., Arinova, O. T., Asylbekuly, D. A. (2012). On the experience of International accreditation of educational programs of KarGU named after Buketov. Vestnik KarGU, No.  4. Retrieved from http://articlekz.com/ node/1412

CHAPTER 4

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH IN KAZAKHSTAN DURING 1991–2013 A Bibliometric View Aliya Kuzhabekova Nazarbayev University

Since 1991, the government of Kazakhstan has taken many measures to transform the national research and innovation system. These efforts were aimed at reorienting the system from serving the needs of the centrally planned economy to the needs of the market economy, as well as helping the system recuperate from the losses induced by the economic decline following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. There was a simultaneous and at times implicit shift from post-Soviet to Western European and American sphere of influence. While the government’s science and technology policy has been framed by strategic plans, it has not necessarily been supported by a comprehensive

Globalization on the Margins, pages 69–93 Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

69

70    A. KUZHABEKOVA

data-driven analysis of the existing situation. There is a deficit of empirical evidence-based studies on the state of research capacity in the country and there is a lack of government capacity to use such evidence in policy formulation. Meanwhile, it is important for research policy to be empirically grounded for policy makers to avoid blind copying of “best practices” from other countries, and, instead, to base their decisions on sound understanding of the state of the research system to be able to address the deficits and to capitalize on prior achievement. To promote the development of empirical research on the state of the national innovation system that could inform policy, as well as to raise local analytical capacity in the use of empirical evidence to guide policy making, the government has established the National Center for Science and Technology Information (NCSTI) in 2011. This center is responsible for science and technology policy evaluation with scientometric indicators, which are quantitative measures collected from citation and patent databases, which are used to characterize different parameters of a research system. The newly established NCSTI remains the only local producer of empirical research on the state of the research system in Kazakhstan and there is still a gap in empirically-based understanding of challenges and opportunities it faces, as well as strengths and weaknesses it possesses. While a number of measures have been taken to modernize the research and innovation system of modern Kazakhstan, at present, there is not much understanding of what changes have taken place and what the current condition of the research and innovation system is. The purpose of the chapter is to address the gap by providing a longitudinal analysis of the changes with the help of bibliometric methods. Given that universities are viewed as one of the key actors in the national research and innovation systems, the analysis has focused on the changes in university research, addressing the following research questions: “How has research productivity of Kazakhstani universities measured in terms of quality and quantity of publications over the period between 1991 and 2013?”; “Who are the main players (regions, organizations, individuals, journals) in Kazakhstani research?”; “What are some trends in the contribution of Kazakhstani researchers to different disciplines?”; and “How have patterns of institutions, regional, international, and individual collaboration transformed over time?” INFLUENCES ON THE RESEARCH SYSTEM To provide a context for the study, the chapter starts with a short summary of the influences that shape the development of the research system in contemporary Kazakhstan and of the prior scientometric and bibliometric analyses of the system. The development of the research system in

The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013     71

independent Kazakhstan has been affected by three factors: (a) the Soviet legacy, (b) the consequences of the economic crisis of the 1990s, and (c) the government’s initiatives in education and science and technology policy. Several characteristics of the Soviet research and innovation system are particularly relevant to our study and are worth discussing in some detail. While the Soviet government put much effort in the development of the local capacities of the republics, the dominant role was still played by the central research universities and research institutes located in the center of the Soviet Union, also the capital of Russia. Hence, much of the existing research infrastructure and human resources that exist in contemporary Kazakhstan is the direct outcome of the Soviet government’s efforts at raising local research capacity to service the needs of industrialization and agricultural development. At the same time, the current lack of research capacity is the consequence of a high level of dependence of the research system in Soviet Kazakhstan on the support from Russia, especially, in terms of advanced training of researchers since, due to the nature of organization of the Soviet research training, most of the Candidate and Doctor of Science degrees were pursued and defended in Russian research centers. The structure of the research system within Soviet Kazakhstan was also unbalanced. Capacity was concentrated in the former capital city of Almaty and in the largest industrial centers, notably in the coal industry center around Karaganda and in the metallurgy-specializing Eastern Kazakhstan. The capital and the regions had the highest concentration of universities, a network of industry-serving research centers, as well as branches and laboratories of the Academy of Sciences. They were able to accumulate a wellqualified cadre of researchers and strong collaborative ties with industry and research centers within Kazakhstan and with the key Russian research organizations. Another legacy of the Soviet times is the high concentration of research activity in public research agencies. Most of the research capacity of present-day Kazakhstan exists in the centers, which were inherited from the Soviet times; and private research centers continue to play a minor role in scientific production of the country. In addition to that, due to ideological control and orientation of research to the needs of industrialization and the military, the Soviet Union has accumulated research capacity predominantly in natural sciences, while social sciences were not given a priority in funding and support. One can anticipate that the geographic and disciplinary distribution of research capacity in contemporary Kazakhstan should reflect the disproportions inherited from the Soviet Union. Another important feature of the Soviet research and innovation system was the centralized, planned, and strategically determined funding and administration of research. Research activity in the Soviet Union was planned like other aspects of social and economic life. Strategic directions were

72    A. KUZHABEKOVA

determined by the sector Ministries and the Academy of Sciences based on the needs of the planned economy with funding being disseminated in accordance with the strategic needs. The Academy of Sciences with its system of research centers, institutes, and labs play an important role in determining the directions of research, implementation of the key initiatives, and monitoring of the overall performance of the system. It also produced the largest share of research publications. Finally, one of the characteristics of the Soviet research and innovation system, which continues to exert influence today, was a regionally isolated system of research results dissemination. The Iron Curtain prevented not only physical movement from and to the Soviet Union, but it also interfered in exchange of ideas and somewhat isolated the intellectuals of the Soviet Union from their colleagues outside. The results of research were rarely published outside the Soviet block. Rather they were published in a set of Soviet journals, which varied in quality and prestige, with the key role being played by journals published in Russia. These journals used review and editorial procedures, which were different from the Western standards. They were also run by editorial teams that very rarely included international experts. Similarly, Soviet scholars were not included on editorial boards of journals outside the Soviet Union. Other influences on the research system of contemporary Kazakhstan originate from the devastating 1990s, when the country was in economic and administrative disarray. During that period many talented researchers left either the country or the profession in search of better opportunities. The career of a researcher became unattractive and the quality of researchers’ training deteriorated. Severe underfunding contributed to the aging of the research facilities and equipment. The dissolution of the centralized system of research administration and the emergence of differentiated approaches to research policy in the post-Soviet space led to a dissipation of previously established research ties. Finally, the transfer of ownership from the public to the private domain has left many research organizations without links to business or industrial sector, as well as without much awareness of the need to be oriented to market needs or skills in attracting private research funding. A decade after independence, Kazakhstan’s economy recovered and the government started to take more active measures at refurbishing the research and innovation system, viewing it as essential for the economic growth. Some of the measures that have exerted influence on the state of research in Kazakhstan were the following: 1. reform of post-graduate education within the frameworks of the Bologna Process, which led to the introduction of master’s and PhD degrees in compliance with the Western degree structure;

The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013     73

2. expansion of the presidential Bolashak1 scholarship to include PhD training and research internships; 3. focused effort to build the capacity in key research universities, which culminated most recently in the establishment of the worldclass status-aspiring Nazarbayev University; 4. creation of technoparks to promote university–industry collaboration and innovation; 5. adoption of the new intellectual property legislation; 6. development of mechanisms for venture financing, that is, financing of high-risk research-based innovative projects with unpredictable profit prospects; 7. introduction of the competitive and strategically targeted grant financing of research and development; 8. modernization of research facilities and equipment by creating laboratories of shared use; 9. attempts to integrate Kazakhstani researchers into the international research dissemination systems (e.g., national subscription to library databases); 10. establishment of the national research centers of strategic importance (National Nanotechnology Center, National Biotechnology Center, National Space Agency, etc.); and 11. transformation of the National Academy into a nonprofit organization in the effort to optimize the research system and to increase the role of universities in research. Notwithstanding the implementation of these measures, at present, there is not much understanding of what changes have taken place and what the current condition of the research and innovation system is. The purpose of the chapter is to address the gap by providing a longitudinal analysis of the changes with the help of bibliometric methods. THE USE OF BIBLIOMETRIC METHODS IN EVALUATION OF RESEARCH ACTIVITY IN KAZAKHSTAN A conventional method for studying research activity in a country is bibliometric analysis. Bibliometric analysis is a quantitative approach to analyzing the quantity and the quality or impact of research output of an individual scholar, a research organization, a research community, or a country, using data from citation and patent databases. Bibliometric methods fall under the family of scientometric methods (methods used to quantitatively analyze research and innovation activity) and are increasingly used nowadays in science and technology studies, in business research, and in information science.

74    A. KUZHABEKOVA

There is a range of specialized tools and software available for data processing and analysis. However, the methods are not yet commonly used in education research with some exceptions (examples of recent studies include Horta & Jung, 2014; Kosmützky & Krücken, 2014; Kuzhabekova, Hendel, & Chapman, 2015; Kuzhabekova, 2011; Tight, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014). The use of bibliometric methods in the analysis of research activity in the former Soviet Union presents some complexities. As has been mentioned previously, the former Soviet Union used to have a regionally isolated system of research communication. Present-day post-Soviet researchers remain cut off from the global research community due to poor knowledge of English and the divergent interests and methods that emerged in the Soviet Union as a result of isolation. Hence they publish in local journals, very few of which find their way to international citation databases. As a result, the databases conventionally used to create bibliometric samples, such as Web of Science and Scopus, are not very representative of research activity in the post-Soviet region. Meanwhile, the newly emerging Russian and other local databases capture most of the articles published in local languages, but they do not yet provide summary information in a way, which is compatible with a software-assisted bibliometric analysis. In case of Kazakhstan, the ideal approach for creating a representative database of publications would be to combine data from (a) several international databases, which contain only a limited number of high quality papers from Kazakhstan; (b) a Russian database, which contains publications by Kazakhstani researchers in Russian and some Kazakhstani journals, which are included in the databases; as well as (c) Kazakhstani databases, which contain all publications in Kazakhstani journals or all publications by Kazakhstani authors. However, the Kazakhstani and the Russian databases do not yet allow software-enabled retrieval of extended bibliographic records and do not permit dataset combinations, which would lead to sufficiently informative set of variables. Hence, the existing studies tend to be built on only one of the available databases. Suleimenov, Frolova, Khasenova, and Rog (2007) implemented scientometric analysis of research activity in Kazakhstan using the data from the National Science Indicators database (Thomson Reuters), which covers publications from 180 countries over the period from 1981 till 2005. Their study revealed that over the period 2001–2005 the number of publications in Kazakhstan has increased from 867 to 1,044, while the number of citations has increased from 688 to 1,044 with a 3 times increase in the average number of citations per article. The study also found that Kazakhstan occupies 87th place in the world in terms of the number of publications and the number of citations, contributing only 0.021% share to the total number of publications in the world during the period of analysis with only 40% of the articles being cited. Finally, the study found that the most productive

The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013     75

disciplines in Kazakhstan are chemistry, physics, engineering, earth sciences, material science, and mathematics. Suleimenov Ponomareva, Dzhumabekov, Kubieva, and Kozbagarova (2011) conducted a similar analysis using data from the Scopus database (Elsevier). For the analyzed period from 1996 to 2008, the database contained 18,796,397 publications in all areas of life sciences, social sciences, and humanities, originating from 233 countries of the world. The Kazakhstani dataset included 3,298 papers. The study found that in terms of number of publications Kazakhstan occupied 90th place in the world and 7th place among the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States with its share of 0.018% out of all the publications in Scopus. In terms of quality of publications, Kazakhstan occupies the sixth place in the Commonwealth of Independent States with its relative citation index2 of 0.32. The authors also explored the relative performance of such disciplines as chemistry, physics, material science, earth sciences, mathematics, agrarian, and biological sciences in the dataset compared with other countries of the CIS and the world. Karamourzov (2012) assessed some very general trends in the development of science in the whole CIS regions by using a set of simple scientometric indicators, including bibliometric ones. Combining data from the National Statistic Agencies, Thomson Reuters Science (SCI) and Social Science Citation Indices (SSCI), and the World Intellectual Property Organization, he compared relative input (the value of R&D performed in terms of GDP and number of researchers) and output indicators (number of publications and number of patents) for different countries of the region over the period from 1990 till 2009. He found that in Kazakhstan the average number of articles per 1,000 scientists was 11, positioning the country in the sixth place in the former Soviet Union. The annual number of patents per 1,000 of researchers was 57, also positioning Kazakhstan in the sixth place in the former Soviet Union. Importantly for our study, Karamourzov noted one methodological issue with the use of Thomson Reuters data in bibliometric analysis. He observed that SSCI and SCI are biased in favor of natural sciences in representation of the Russian journals. He indicated that at the time of analysis the database included 157 journals from Russia, of which only six represented social sciences. The explanation he provided was that researchers in social sciences tend to concentrate on locally relevant and culturally determined issues and are more likely to publish in the national languages and journals. Frolova et al. (2008) implemented scientometric analysis of Abstract Journal Database, which is currently being developed in Kazakhstan by the National Center for Scientific and Technological Information (NC STI). The assumptions of the authors of the articles indicate that they equate the properties of the database with the properties of research activity in

76    A. KUZHABEKOVA

Kazakhstan. The NC STI team, who conducted the analysis, claims that the database, which is not yet publicly available and fully completed, contains abstracts of all articles published by Kazakhstani authors in Kazakhstani, Russian, and international journals over the period of 1996–2007. The database contains 45,593 publications. The analysis revealed that the number of publications from Kazakhstani journals is 43,518, while the number of publications in Russian-language journals is 44,112. Importantly for our study, the most represented publications in the database were from the fields of chemistry, physics, materials science, mathematics, ecology, agricultural science, and biology. An overview of the prior research reveals that most of the studies conducted international comparisons of Kazakhstani research and are methodologically limited to the use of very basic indicators, including publication/ patent and citation counts. None of the studies have conducted an in-depth analysis of the patterns of publication and citation within Kazakhstan, or have done a comparison among organizational types, regions, or individuals. In addition to that, there is a basic understanding regarding the types of journals, where Kazakhstani articles are published and the extent and the kind of domestic and international collaborations that are pursued by researchers in Kazakhstan. In addition to that, none of the studies explored the dynamics of publication over the whole period of Kazakhstani independence. Finally, none of the studies paid special attention to the development of university research. This study attempted to fill the gap by conducting a comprehensive longitudinal analysis of a dataset of all publications from independent Kazakhstan from one of the international databases with special attention to research conducted by universities. DATA AND METHODS To construct our dataset, we used data from bibliographic records on scholarly articles published by Kazakhstani authors, which are included in Thomson Reuters Web of Science database (WoS). WoS covers over 12,000 high-impact journals in a variety of disciplines (Reuters, 2012). While the database has been criticized for a bias towards publications in the English language and Anglo-American science, it continues to be the largest and the most complete collection of records on scholarly publications in various fields of inquiry encompassing publications from many countries of the world (Observatoire des Sciences et des Techniques, 2009). The use of the database has become acceptable for the majority of bibliometric studies despite its limitations. As has been mentioned before, one of the limitations of the WoS in representing research activity in Kazakhstan is that it contains only articles

The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013     77

published in international journals, predominantly in the Western Englishspeaking countries with a small number of internationally recognized Russian journals. Due to the existing pressure on the Kazakhstani faculty to publish internationally, we assume that the internationally published articles are of better quality than the articles published in local journals, which are the second choice venues. Hence, our sample should represent well the most important research activity in Kazakhstan. To create the dataset representing research activity in Kazakhstan during the period of independence from 1991 till 2013, all records with at least one author being from Kazakhstan were extracted from the Web of Science using advanced search option. The search was limited to journal articles and excluded any books and conference presentations. After cleaning and removal of duplicates, the dataset contained 4,612 records. The data were analyzed with the Vantage Point software using an approach originally described in Kuzhabekova et al. (2015). A summary of the description is provided further for the convenience of the reader. The Vantage Point software allows importing the results of searches in the Web of Science, cleaning the data, and generating three types of data analysis: ordered frequency lists, tables (matrices), and graphs based on the data from the tables. Ordered frequency lists provided simple counts of items of interest, such as counts of articles per author/institution/country and, upon request, presented the lists in the ordered format. We used the frequency lists with counts to create graphs and tables in Excel to make the results more interpretable. Three types of matrices were generated for this analysis. Co-occurrence matrices provided counts of articles in the database, where both items of interest were co-occurring, thus assessing the extent of collaboration. For example, it presented the number of records in which two given authors were listed, or the number of records in which two institutions were cooccurring. Auto-correlation matrices provided correlation among items in the same list (authors with other authors, organizations with other organizations, countries with other countries, etc.) as another measure of collaboration. In some sense, auto-correlation shows exclusivity of a collaborative relationship. An auto-correlation value of 1 for two authors means that the two authors published exclusively with each other. An auto-correlation value of 0 means that they never collaborated. A value close to 1 means that they collaborated a lot, but not exclusively with each other. A value close to 0 means that they did not collaborate much and did not collaborate exclusively with each other. Cross-correlation matrices provided correlations among items in one list based on the items in another list, thus assessing the extent of similarity. For example, such matrices listed correlation among authors based on the keywords they use in their articles, which assessed the extent to which the two authors were interested in the same topics. While we are

78    A. KUZHABEKOVA

not presenting any of the complete matrices in the results section due to their large size, we used them to make more sense out of the maps. Maps provided a visual representation of the information from the autoand cross-correlation matrices. The nodes in the maps represented the items of interest (authors, institutions, countries), while the links of different breadth represented the presence and the strength of ties among the items based upon the auto- or cross-correlations. The distinction between the two types of maps is similar to the distinction between the corresponding types of matrices. Autocorrelation maps show the extent of collaboration among items regardless of various characteristics of interaction. Cross-correlation maps show the extent of collaboration conditional on some characteristics, such as topics of interest (keywords), and institutional affiliation. Results This section presents the results of the bibliometric analysis of research activity in independent Kazakhstan. We organized the results of the study in this section according to research questions. The summary of the results is followed by a discussion in the subsequent section of the chapter. Changes in Research Productivity of Kazakhstani Universities Measured in Terms of Quality and Quantity of Publications Over the Period Between 1991 and 2013 One of the main findings of our study is that research capacity has increased in Kazakhstan during years of independence defined in terms of both quantity and quality. The total number of publications by Kazakhstani authors in the dataset is 4,612. Over the period of time between 1991 and 2013, the increase in the number of international publication has been tenfold from 37 publications during the first year of independence to 378 publications in 2013 (see Figure 4.1). The total number of citations to the

Figure 4.1.  Distribution of articles in terms of number of publications per year.

The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013     79

Figure 4.2  Distribution of articles in terms of number of citations per year.

articles in the dataset is 24,455 (without self-citation—20,669). The number of citations per year has increased from one citation in the first year of the analyzed period to 2,886 in 2013. It should be noted that the majority of articles produced by Kazakhstani authors are low in impact. The average citation per item is 4.72; however, the measure of central tendency is misleading since only a small set of high quality articles generates a substantial number of citations. In other words, the distribution of articles in terms of citations is skewed and the mean number of citations per item should be interpreted with caution. The Main Players (Regions, Organizations, Journals) in Kazakhstani Research The analysis of geographic distribution of publications revealed that much research activity is still being conducted in the former capital Almaty (city of regional importance), the new capital Astana (city of regional importance), as well as in industrial centers of Kazakhstan. Fifty-eight percent of publications in Kazakhstan were produced by authors affiliated with organizations located in Almaty, compared with only 12.7% of publications produced by researchers from Astana. Highly industrialized Karagandy oblast accounts for 13.5% of publications, thus superseding the city of Astana. Another industrialized region of the Eastern Kazakhstan is the second non-capital region in terms of research productivity with the contribution to the total pool of the nation’s publication of slightly above 5% of articles. The lowest research productivity is demonstrated by the North-Kazakhstan, Kzylorda, and Almaty regions of the country. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the results of analysis of distribution of publications by type of research organization. Using Internet, we assigned each organization of affiliation in the dataset to one of the following types: (a) government research centers, (b) universities, and (c) private research centers. Our analysis shows that the number of publications by universities has

80    A. KUZHABEKOVA

Figure 4.3  Distribution of publications by type of organization.

been steadily increasing over the period of analysis, with a rapid increase occurring over the last 3 years. The number of publications by government centers has also been increasing, but at a slower pace and it has been at relatively steady levels over the past 7 years. Private research has not picked up over the period of independence. Table 4.1 lists the Top 20 organizations in Kazakhstan in terms of number of publications. As should be clear from the table, all top research organizations in Kazakhstan are either government laboratories or universities. None of the private research centers has become a leader in terms of research. Interestingly, at the very top of the list is a national university rather than an Academy of Science-affiliated center. Most top organizations in Kazakhstan are located in Almaty, followed by Astana, Karaganda, and Eastern Kazakhstan. Finally, based on the data, the Ministry of Education and Science and the National Academy of Science continue to play an important role in research. Table 4.2 lists the Top 20 universities in Kazakhstan based on the number of publications. A quick look through the table would reveal that most productive institutions are the ones that have a history of success and research capacity inherited from the Soviet Union, and which are located mostly in Almaty and the industrial centers. Given the leading status of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University in the former Soviet Union, there is no surprise in that the university continues to demonstrate high research activity benefitting from the Soviet legacy and continuing support from the government. In a similar fashion, Satpayev Kazakh National Technical University, Almaty University of Power and Engineering, Abai State National Pedagogical University, Kazakh State Academy of Architecture and Construction, and Turar Ryskulov Kazakh Economic University were the key higher educational institutions in Soviet Kazakhstan. Buketov Karaganda State University (Karagandy), Auezov South-Kazakhstan State University (Shymkent), and Serikbayev East-Kazakhstan Technical University (Oskemen) are examples of the key regional universities

The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013     81 TABLE 4.1  Top Twenty Research Organizations in Kazakhstan by Number of Publications Rank Organization

Number Type of of Records Organization

Location

1

Al Farabi Kazakh National University

567

University

Almaty

2

Ministry of Education and Science

543

Government

Nationally

3

National Academy of Sciences

429

Government

Almaty

4

Gumilyov Eurasian National University

254

University

Astana

5

Institute of Physics & Technology

218

Government

Almaty

6

National Nuclear Center

212

Government

Nationally

7

Buketov Karaganda State University

168

University

Karaganda

8

Satpayev Kazakh National Technical University

101

University

Almaty

9

Institute of Organic Synthesis & Coal Chemistry

84

Government

Karaganda

10

KBTU Kazakh-British Technical University

73

University

Almaty

11

Nazarbayev University

55

University

Astana

11

National Space Agency

55

Government

Nationally

12

Auezov South Kazakhstan State University

48

University

Shymkent

13

Serikbayev East Kazakhstan Technical University

40

University

UstKamenogorsk

14

Institute of Polymer Materials & Technology

39

Government

Almaty

14

National Biotechnology Center

39

Government

Nationally

15

Semipalatinsk State Medical Academy

37

University

Semipalatinsk

16

Asfendiyarov State Medical University

33

University

Almaty

16

Institute of Mathematics

33

Government

Almaty

17

Karaganda Medical Academy

32

University

Karaganda

18

National Museum

31

Government

Almaty

19

Sokolskii Organic Catalysis & Electrochem. Inst.

30

Government

Almaty

20

Fitokhimiya Scientific & Production Center

30

Government

Karaganda

established in the Soviet Union with the intention to support the industrial development of the regions. These universities also continue to benefit from the Soviet legacy and from the sustained support from the government of independent Kazakhstan, which explains their success in terms of research output.

82    A. KUZHABEKOVA TABLE 4.2  Top Twenty Kazakhstani Universities by Number of Publications Rank

University

Number of Publications

1

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty

567

2

Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Astana

254

3

Buketov Karaganda State University, Karagandy

168

4

Satpayev Kazakh National Technical University, Almaty

101

5

Kazakh-British Technical University, Almaty

73

6

Nazarbayev University, Astana

55

7

Auezov South-Kazakhstan State University, Shymkent

48

8

Serikbayev East-Kazakhstan Technical University, Oskemen

40

9

Semipalatinsk State Medical Academy, Semey

37

10

Asfendiyarov State Medical University, Almaty

33

11

Karaganda Medical Academy, Karagandy

32

12

Almaty University of Power and Engineering, Almaty

29

13

Abai State National Pedagogical University, Almaty

24

13

Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics, & Strategic Research, Almaty

24

14

Kazakh-American University, Almaty

22

14

Yasawi International Kazakh-Turkish University, Turkestan

22

15

Aktyubinsk State University, Aktobe

20

16

Pavlodar State University, Pavlodar

19

17

Suleyman Demirel University, Almaty

14

18

Amanzholov East-Kazakhstan State University, Oskemen

13

18

Kazakh State Academy of Architecture and Construction, Almaty

13

19

Korkyt-Ata Kzylorda State University, Kzylorda

10

19

Turar Ryskulov Kazakh Economic University, Almaty

10

19

Ualikhanov Kokshetau State University, Kokshetau

10

20

Semei State University, Semey

9

In addition to the old players, the list of top universities also includes several universities that were established during the period of independence. One such example is Gumilyov Eurasian National University, which was the first higher educational institution established in the new capital of Astana. Two other examples include the highly subsidized private Kazakh-British Technical University, which was established to serve the needs of the booming oil sector, and the recently established Nazarbayev University, which is envisioned as the first world-class university in Kazakhstan. The presence of the Nazarbayev University in the table is particularly impressive given that it

The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013     83

has existed for less than a decade. Even more interestingly, the list includes four newly established private universities, which do not receive government support, such as Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics, and Strategic Research (Almaty), Kazakh-American University (Almaty), Yasawi International Kazakh-Turkish University (Turkestan), and Suleyman Demirel University (Almaty). One possible explanation for the appearance of these universities in the list is the fact that our dataset was constructed from a database, which is heavily biased towards English-language publications and towards Western journals. Given that each of the private universities draws on international partnerships and a large proportion of international faculty (compared with other universities), the high rank of the universities in the particular dataset is not surprising. The English speaking researchers at the universities tend to publish in international rather than local and foreign journals as in the case of other universities. Several interesting observations can be made about changes in the number of publications among top six universities. First, since around 2008, all universities have experienced a rapid increase in publications. Second, this growth has been the fastest for the Gumilyov Kazakh National University, which in 2012 has contributed more articles than the all-time national leader—the Al-Farabi National University. Rapid growth has also been demonstrated by the newly created Nazarbayev University. Finally, contrary to expectations, the rapid increase has not been demonstrated by the KazakhBritish Technical University, which used to exercise much government support prior to the establishment of the Nazarbayev University and which might have lost some of its funding and research staff to the newly established rival. When analyzing the dynamics of publications for the top five government research centers. We observed a decrease in the importance of the contribution of the National Academy of Sciences since 1998, when the Academy started to receive less support from the government (Note: It has eventually lost its status as a specialized government affiliate). There was also a decrease in research output by the Ministry of Education and Science starting from 2009. Finally, one can notice a gradual growth in output of specialized government research centers, most visible in the example of the National Nuclear Center, which might demonstrate change in funding mechanisms (more strategic program driven allocations). Table 4.3 is the ranked list of the Top 20 research publication venues, where Kazakhstani researchers publish their work. The main conclusion from the table is that most of Kazakhstani research published in peer-reviewed journals of international importance is actually published in Russian journals, which are included in the Web of Science, including journals, which publish in Russian. In addition to that, most of the Russian journals in the list have a low impact factor. Given that the Russian journals remain largely invisible to researchers from outside the country, Kazakhstani researchers’ impact

84    A. KUZHABEKOVA TABLE 4.3  Ranked List of Top Twenty Publication Venues Rank

Journal

Publications

Country

Impact Factor 2012

1

Russian Journal of Applied Chemistry

165

Russia

0.235

2

Chemistry of Natural Compounds

119

Russia

0.599

3

Russian Journal of General Chemistry

97

Russia

0.432

4

Physics of Atomic Nuclei

82

Russia

0.539

5

Zhurnal Obshei Khimii

79

Russia

0.432

6

Physics Letters, B

69

Other

4.569

7

Differential Equations

68

Russia

0.420

8

European Physical Journal C

60

Other

5.247

9

Actual Problems of Economics

56

Ukraine

0.024

10

Petroleum Chemistry

55

Russia

0.451

10

Zhurnal Neorganicheskoi Khimii

55

Russia

0.417

11

Khimiya Prirodnikh Soedinenii

49

Russia

0.599

11

Zoological Journals

49

Russia

0.250

12

Russian Journal of Inorganic Chemistry

48

Russia

0.417

13

Journal Fizicheskoi Khimii

46

Russia

0.386

14

Mathematics Notes of the Russian Journal of Physics Chemistry,

42

Russia

0.239

15

Russian Journal of Physical Chemistry A

35

Russia

0.386

16

Kinetics and Catalysis

34

Russia

0.543

17

Doklady po Mathematike

33

Russia

0.376

17

Izvestiya Akademii Nauk, Physical Series

33

Russia

0.277

17

Russian Journal of Physical Chemistry

33

Russia

0.386

18

Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya

32

Russia

0.271

19

Physics Review D

31

Other

4.691

19

Russian Physics Journal

31

Russia

0.408

20

Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research

27

Other

1.266

stays limited to the area of the former Soviet Union, where the journals are popular. Another implication is that most Kazakhstani research is of poor quality and is not sufficiently competitive in the larger international arena to be accepted to non-Russian journals. Some possible explanations for this are that (a) studies conducted by Kazakhstani researchers are not of interest to

The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013     85

researchers in the larger international research community; and (b) Russia and Kazakhstan may specialize in some specific areas of interest or use methods, which are not of particular interest in the West. According to the data for the analyzed period, the greatest number of publications is produced by researchers representing chemistry, physics, and related fields, which were well developed in Soviet Kazakhstan. However, even the most productive researchers in Kazakhstan produce research of low impact. For most of the researchers an article is cited on the average only several times and the Hirsh index is below five (i.e., only five articles are cited five or more times). Trends in Contribution of Kazakhstani Researchers to Different Disciplines One of the important results of the analysis is the list of key disciplines, which are developed in Kazakhstan. As should be clear from Table 4.4, the TABLE 4.4  Ranked List of Top Twenty Research Areas by the Number of Publications Rank

Research Area

Number of Publications

1

Chemistry

2

Physics

1220 990

3

Mathematics

398 239

4

Engineering

5

Materials Science

217

6

Astronomy & Astrophysics

181

7

Pharmacology & Pharmacy

164

8

Environmental Sciences & Ecology

149

9

Metallurgy & Metallurgical Engineering

136

Polymer Science

136

9 10

Nuclear Science & Technology

131

11

Energy & Fuels

120 104

12

Science & Technology—Other Topics

13

Geology

93

14

Zoology

88

15

Business & Economics

86

16

Geochemistry & Geophysics

85

17

Instruments & Instrumentation

84 69

18

Spectroscopy

19

Plant Sciences

67

20

Biochemistry & Molecular Biology

65

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top three fields of inquiry in Kazakhstan are chemistry, physics, and mathematics. These spheres were strongly developed in the Soviet Union and continue to benefit from the capacity created during the time. Astronomy and astrophysics, as well as nuclear research also continue to be strong as in the times of the Soviet Union. Notably, these areas have been identified as areas of strategic importance and they are well supported in Kazakhstan. Ecology is also in the list of the most productive disciplines despite the fact that area is not in the list of government supported strategic initiatives. One potential explanation is that the area attracts much interest of international researchers working in collaboration with Kazakhstanis, who are employed by international projects aimed at elimination of environmental consequences of nuclear testing and biological weapons testing, which were conducted in Kazakhstan during the Soviet times. Finally, polymer science and energy and fuels research can be developing due to the flourishing oil sector, as well as the fact that Kazakhstan is one of the leading producers of different kinds of energy. The field of education research occupies 70th place in the ranking of subject areas in the database. Only nine publications in the dataset were represented by this subject area. The low rank of the subject area in terms of research productivity is not surprising given the overall low rank of Kazakhstan-produced research in social sciences in terms of number of publications included in the Web of Science. Several reasons may explain the low presence of educational research in the database. First, Kazakhstani researchers in education may have lower skills in research methods and the English language, necessary for publication in non-Russian international journals than researchers in the sciences and mathematics have. They may also have less funding opportunities to attend international conferences and to establish international collaborations that would allow them to improve the skills. Also, education is not a prestigious occupation in Kazakhstan and it does not attract high quality of students, who would be willing to continue with a research career later on. The quality of research training in education may be lower than the quality of such training in sciences. In addition to that, researchers in education might be focusing and receiving funding to conduct research on topics of domestic importance, which might not be attractive for international readership, publishers, or journal editors. Changes in the Patterns of Institutions, Regional, International, and Individual Collaboration Over Time Figure 4.4 reveals that the average proportion of collaborative articles relative to single-authored articles has not shown any notable change over the years. Most of the articles in Kazakhstan are co-authored and they comprise on average 85% of total publications per year. At the same time, the percentage of internationally co-authored papers in the total number of

The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013     87

Figure 4.4  Change in collaboration: Percentage of collaborative and non-collaborative research over time.

co-authored papers has increased over time from 17% in 1991 to 70%in 2011. The average annual percentage of internationally co-authored papers comprised 48% out of the total number of co-authored articles. The main collaborator of Kazakhstan as a country is Russia, which was indicated as a country of origin for collaborators a quarter of co-authored articles. The United States is second in importance participating in 14% of co-authored articles, while Germany and the United Kingdom, were each mentioned in about 9% of co-authored articles and they are the most important partners in Western Europe. In terms of regional distribution of collaborators, the most active collaborators of Kazakhstan are the post-Soviet block and Europe (27% of coauthored articles), followed by Asia (19%) and North America (18%). A social network map (autocorrelation map) of international collaborations, which was generated as a part of this study, shows that as a country, Kazakhstan remains very isolated from the international research community. Compared with other countries in the dataset it has a much lower number of co-authorships with international researchers. As a part of the study, a social-network analysis of domestic collaboration among the top research organizations was implemented. The results show that domestic collaboration is not very active in Kazakhstan and that the existing ties are not long term. Even the four most productive organizations (Ministry of Education and Science, National Academy, the Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, and the Gumilyov Eurasian National University) are not involved in collaborative research among one another and with other research-intensive organizations. One possibility is that for the four organizations their high success in research might be more related to collaboration with external organizations in other countries and to government funding availability. At the same time, research centers responsible for research in physics, astrophysics, nuclear research, and space-related

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research collaborate with each other more intensively than organizations specializing in other disciplines. Same applies to research in chemistry. The highly productive fields with a history in the Soviet Union can be successful due to the collaborative ties established in the Soviet times. In terms of regional distribution, there is much collaboration in Eastern Kazakhstan and Karaganda, the regions, which are very productive in research. These results imply that research productivity may be somehow connected to regional collaboration networks. At the international scale, Kazakhstan remains relatively isolated from the international research community. Compared with other countries in the dataset it has much fewer numbers of co-authorships with international researchers. However, a closer look at cross-border research collaboration with Russia at the organizational level (Figure 4.5) shows that some interaction of Kazakhstani organizations with their Russian counterparts does take place. Interestingly, Kazakhstani Ministry of Education and Science, which does not collaborate domestically, belongs to a strongly collaborating group of Russian institutions involved in physics research. On a similar note, the Gumilyov Eurasian National University is also collaborating more with Russian institutions than with domestic ones. Another notable observation is that with the exception of the Moscow State University, all the long-term collaborators with Kazakhstani organizations are Russian government research centers. Also, collaborations are stronger with central Russian institutions and the ones located in the bordering regions. In addition, more collaboration occurs between Russian organizations and research organizations from Eastern Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Almaty, and Astana. Hence, research productivity may be related to collaboration with Russia and may be enhanced for nearby and central cities/regions (i.e., geographic proximity and central location matter). Finally, most collaboration with Russian institutions occurs in highly productive disciplines of physics, chemistry, or math, which suggests a link between international collaboration (with Russia in particular) and high research productivity in a particular discipline. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION The results of the study clearly demonstrate that, based on the data from the Web of Science, the research capacity in Kazakhstan seems to be improving, as demonstrated by the dynamics of quantitative indicators. An increasing number of Kazakhstani researchers publish their scholarly papers in internationally recognized journals. This increase in the quantity of publications has not been accompanied by a consistent growth in the quality of articles. In fact, the majority of Kazakhstani articles in the Web of Science have been published in Russian journals with a relatively low impact factor and a small

Figure 4.5  Social-network map of collaborations with Russia at the organizational level.

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number of researchers have produced highly cited publications, while most of the articles have never been cited. Modern Kazakhstani research continues to draw on the Soviet legacy. It is strongest in fields, institutions, and regions promoted in the past. There is much path dependency in the persistent success of researchers in physics, mathematics, and chemistry; and of the key national and regional universities and research centers located in the former capital Almaty, and the most industrialized East-Kazakhstan and Karagandy regions. The fields, organizations, and regions might be benefitting from access to better human resources, better equipped labs and facilities, from historically preferential treatment in government funding and from closer ties with industry and international partners. At the same time, the government’s focused effort at supporting research in strategically important fields and at newly established “Western-style” institutions and national research centers seem to be somewhat effective as evidence by our data. The Nazarbayev University, the Kazakh-British University, as well as the laboratories of the National Nuclear Center seem to be quickly gaining the capacity to generate research publications. The problem with the focused effort of the government, however, is that the success of the few occurs at the expense of the many. The number of publications in the dataset by Kazakhstanis in social sciences, history, or humanities is very limited. Whether this is due to a low level of capacity in the disciplines remains a question since prior research indicated that the Web of Science is biased against journals in the areas of research. The output of the majority of public and private universities in all but very few areas of Kazakhstan remains unimpressive both in terms of quality and quantity of publications. While for the first decades of independence the focused effort to preserve the historically successful research teams and to stimulate the development of strategically important research directions might have been acceptable, it is high time to modify the strategy and start paying greater attention to the balanced development of research capacity across disciplines, types of universities, and regions. With research function of higher education being closely linked to teaching, it is essential for all higher educational institutions to be able to conduct research of the acceptable quality for the sake of training innovative human resources and future research workforce for the country. In addition to that, the government should provide greater support to humanities and social sciences as fields essential for the maintenance of social cohesion and for development and promotion of the national ideology and culture. An important finding of this study is a high prevalence of research collaboration in Kazakhstan. The study was not designed to answer whether this prevalence is the result of the government’s efforts to promote collaboration, of the effectiveness of collaboration in increasing research

The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013     91

productivity by pulling together intellectual and material resources, or of the particular arrangement in research administration, whereby research supervisors or support staff have to be included as co-authors. Most likely it is a combination of the potential explanations. One thing, which is clear from the study, is that more collaboration occurs internationally than domestically and that Russia is the most important of international collaborators. There is also a pattern, whereby most successful fields of research are accompanied with developed networks of research centers in Russia and Kazakhstan. So, there might be a positive relationship between collaboration and success in research, which should be tested in future studies. While the persistence of ties with Russia is definitely beneficial for research in Kazakhstan, it is important not to lock down on Russia and to put greater effort in linking successful research centers in Kazakhstan with partner organizations in other countries. The establishment of the Nazarbayev University, in which each of the colleges have been built in collaboration with a successful international partner, and the introduction of the international mobility program at the national level are promising steps in this direction. In general, it seems that an effective use of collaboration in retaining, maintaining, and promoting research capacity of higher education institutions consists in pursuing/promoting diverse collaboration portfolio, which draws on regional clustering, larger domestic ties, old ties with Russian partners in neighboring regions and fields, and new international endeavors. Finally, the results of this analysis show that based on the data from the Web of Science, Kazakhstan seriously lacks capacity in educational research or, at least, the produced research remains isolated from global inquiry in this field and remains invisible for international readership. This finding is alarming given the fact that Kazakhstan is engaged in a number of educational reform initiatives, which are guided by recommendations from international organizations or are conducted within the framework of the Bologna Process and other international initiatives. Kazakhstani reformers could benefit from empirically based studies on educational initiatives in Kazakhstan, which are enriched with ideas of researchers from other countries. At the same time, the lack of locally produced research on education may imply that much of the international advice is based on a one-sided interpretation of educational issues, whereby the voices of local researchers remain largely unheard for a non-Russian speaking expert community. The need for greater support for raising educational research capacity in the country from both the government and international donors is evident.

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NOTES 1. Bolashak scholarship is a very prestigious scholarship, which was established in 1993 by the president of Kazakhstan to finance education of talented Kazakhstani youth abroad. While in the past, the scholarship covered expenses connected with pursuing undergraduate and graduate degrees in top universities around the world, nowadays, it also covers expenses associated with internship and professional development courses undertaken outside the country. 2. Ratio of the average citation per publication from a given country to the corresponding world indicator, which is taken as 1.

REFERENCES Frolova, V. A., Karabaev, Zh. A., Khasenova, S. K., Kubieva, T. Sh., Myrzakhmetov, T. M., Lazareva E. A., & Semiletova, I. A. (2008). The scientometric analysis of the “Abstract Journal” database. The Scientific and Technical Information Processing, 35(3), 143–152. Horta, H., & Jung, J. (2014). Higher education research in Asia: An archipelago, two continents or merely atomization? Higher Education, 68(1), 117–134. Karamourzov, R. (2012). The development trends of science in the CIS countries on the basis of some scientometric indicators. Scientometrics, 91(1), 1–14. Kosmützky, A., & Krücken, G. (2014). Growth or steady state? A bibliometric focus on international comparative higher education research.  Higher Education, 67(4), 457–472. Kuzhabekova, A. (2011).  Impact of co-authorship strategies on research productivity: A social-network analysis of publications in Russian cardiology (Doctoral dissertation). University of Minnesota. Retrieved from https://conservancy.umn .edu/handle/11299/108109 Kuzhabekova, A., Hendel, D. D., & Chapman, D. W. (2015). Mapping global research on international higher education. Research in Higher Education, 56(8), 861–882. Observatoire des Sciences et de Techniques. (2009). Methodological note: Bibliometrics as a tool for the analysis of the scientific production of a country. ESTIME. Retrieved from http://www.estime.ird.fr/article268.html Suleimenov, E. Z., Frolova, V. A., Khasenova, S. K., & Rog, O. A. (2007). Kazakhstan in the national science indicators database: Scientometric analysis (2001– 2005). Informatsionnye Resursy Rossii, 4, 17–20. Suleimenov, E. Z., Ponomareva, N. I., Dzhumabekov, A. K., Kubieva, T. S., & Kozbagarova, G. A.  (2011). An assessment of the contributions of Kazakhstan and other CIS countries to global science: The Scopus database. Scientific and Technical Information Processing, 38(3), 159–165. Thomson Reuters. (2012.). Web of science. Retrieved from http://thomsonreuters. com/products_services/science/science_products/a-z/web_of_science/ Tight, M. (2012a). Higher education research 2000–2010: Changing journal publication patterns. Higher Education Research & Development 31(5), 723–740.

The Development of University Research in Kazakhstan During 1991–2013     93 Tight, M. (2012b). Levels of analysis in higher education research. Tertiary Education and Management, 18(3), 271–288. Tight, M. (2013). Discipline and methodology in higher education research. Higher Education Research & Development, 32(1), 136–151. Tight, M. (2014). Working in separate silos? What citation patterns reveal about higher education research internationally. Higher Education, 68(3), 379–395.

CHAPTER 5

HIGHER EDUCATION ADMISSIONS REGIMES IN KAZAKHSTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN Difference Makes a Difference Todd Drummond American Institutes for Research

Throughout Eurasia, nation states once part of the Soviet Union are redesigning their higher education admissions regimes. In the last 14 years, Kyrgyzstan (2002), Kazakhstan (2004), Georgia (2005), Russia (2008), Ukraine (2008), and Tajikistan (2012) have all replaced oral examinations administered by individual higher education institutions with externally administered, standardized testing (Drummond & Gabrscek, 2012).1 In addition to changes in the type and format of admissions assessment, new selection norms and enrollment procedures have also been introduced. Higher education institutions in some Eurasian countries have even lost all discretionary power to select their own students. The rationale for the reforms in the

Globalization on the Margins, pages 95–124 Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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six countries noted above has been to overcome corrupt practices that have plagued Eurasian admissions regimes since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Drummond & Gabrscek, 2012; Heyneman, Anderson, & Nuralieva, 2008; Osipian, 2007). These selection reforms merit scholarly attention for several reasons. First, admissions regimes have important distributive effects as they allocate the valuable resource of higher education. Second, high stakes testing for tertiary admissions can impact secondary schooling as administrators, teachers, and students adjust to new incentives created by what is tested (Yeh, 2005). Third, the reforms serve as a litmus test for the extent to which authoritarian political regimes in the region are serious about taking on corruption in access to higher education: Scholars of educational governance will find the high stakes politics in admissions reform informative. Finally, analysis of the reform implementation processes allows us to refine theoretical understanding of how educational institutions in different countries change, diverge or converge with each other over time; that is, we can analyze these reforms in light of world cultural theory, a perspective employed by some scholars to explain educational phenomena in the world system (Baker & LeTendre, 2005; Dale, 2000; Meyer & Ramirez, 2000). While the primary purpose of this chapter is to describe and compare, I also address the utility of world cultural theory in helping us understand the admissions regime reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. At a distance, the reforms appear to align the new regimes with worldwide norms in university admissions and thus provide credibility to the hypothesis of increasing convergence of educational institutions worldwide. In fact, the new admissions regimes in these two countries differ both from each other and from non-Eurasian countries in significant ways. As will be argued in this chapter, these differences matter, especially to scholars of Eurasia. Structural theories that rely too heavily on similarity of declared intentions, macro structures, and surface phenomena miss important differences such as variation in the extent of impact the new regimes on education systems and differences in the legitimacy of the reforms in the eyes of stakeholders, just to name a few (Stambach, 2003). Further, structural theories assume an aura of inevitability about change that in the case of these reforms appears tenuous. After a brief historical overview, I compare the admissions reforms that were implemented in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic from 1999 through 2015, highlighting key differences between the new regimes. I then provide a brief account of the political dynamics that evolved during their implementation. In the analysis section I argue that few outcomes were predetermined or shaped significantly by outside forces. In fact, despite the sustainability of the new regimes in both countries to date, the significant alteration or abolition of the new admissions regimes and a return to the previous regimes remains possible. In the conclusion I make

Higher Education Admissions Regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan    97

the case that the best way to understand the evolution of the new regimes and their impact on the education systems is to focus on local politics and the nuances of the differences in what was implemented, not the alleged convergence of norms in what was introduced. EXAMINING ADMISSION REGIMES: KEY TERMS AND METHODS In this chapter I employ the term admissions “regime,” a word commonly used in the political science literature. Regimes can be broadly defined as “social institutions governing the actions of those involved in specifiable sets of activities” (Young, 1989, p. 12). In regard to admissions practices, key activities are those related to the process of applying for and enrolling in higher education. The social institutions which govern these activities are embodied in the authority and obligations of higher education institutions, ministries of education, and presidential administrations in regard to university selection. An “admissions regime” refers broadly to the laws, decrees, and norms which elaborate and frame the governing arrangements of the newly created assessment agencies, new admissions requirements, rules and procedures for aspiring students, timelines and costs of applying, institutional discretion in how test results are utilized (or not utilized), and the type, format and content of assessments that students must sit for. While perhaps a bit cumbersome, this broad conceptualization of an admissions regime is warranted by the fact that throughout Eurasia, the contested policy issues related to the new regimes are about much more than a debate over the appropriateness of replacing traditional oral examinations with standardized testing. Standardized testing itself has even been somewhat peripheral to more fundamental political questions related to the alteration of power structures such as who has the final discretion to admit students to higher education institutions.2 In this chapter I distinguish narrow “testing issues” from broader “regime issues” when appropriate. Another term utilized throughout is abiturent—which denotes someone seeking higher education entry, not yet enrolled in tertiary education but no longer a student at a secondary or vocational school. The data from Kyrgyzstan was collected from direct participation in the development of the new admissions regime from 2001 to 2005, through the study of relevant laws, decrees, documents, press, and testing materials from 2005 to the winter of 2010, and from continued monitoring and study since 2010. From 2002 to 2005, I served as the director of the “National Scholarship Testing Initiative” in Kyrgyzstan, a USAID-funded project charged with implementing the admissions regime reform, including the establishment of a non-governmental assessment center. In this capacity I

98    T. DRUMMOND

participated in key meetings, decisions, and events surrounding the reform and was responsible for overseeing test development and administration from 2002 to 2004. I also assisted with the development of procedures to enroll students in higher education institutions based on test results.3 I gathered data in Kazakhstan from March 1 to May 25, 2006. Methods utilized included unstructured interviews and document analysis. I have also followed events in Kazakhstan through a review of ministerial and presidential decrees and orders from 2000 to the present, press review, and an examination of test materials and relevant information available on the ministerial website. A valuable resource was Galina Valyaeva’s (2006) unpublished study of the reform in Kazakhstan presented at the Central Eurasian Studies Society Conference at the University of Michigan in September of 2006. Despite the subjectivity inherent in my analysis of historical processes in which I was a direct participant, in this chapter I make no normative claims about the value, relevance, or performance of either of the new admissions regimes. I seek to describe major aspects of these reforms in two neighboring countries, note important differences between them, and highlight the complex nature of the power struggles that accompanied the implementation of the reforms. I do not argue that the admissions reforms were necessary or implemented effectively. I do not argue that the reforms have resolved the corruption problem in higher education institutions access or that the new regimes will be sustained in the future. Information about the new regimes is freely available and their impact and effectiveness can be evaluated by other scholars.4 ADMISSIONS REGIMES IN THE SOVIET AND PRE-REFORM ERAS Located with contiguous borders in Central Eurasia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan share a historical and cultural legacy that predates the Soviet period. They have common political, social and economic institutions, religion(s) as well as many shared traditions, customs, and ways of life. Russian speaking minorities remain in both countries and opportunities to receive an education through the Russian language medium exist at both the secondary and tertiary levels. In 2006, 58% of higher education students in Kazakhstan and 67% in Kyrgyzstan received their tertiary educations through the Russian language medium (Bruner & Tillet, 2007, p. 24). The two countries also share a common history in the evolution of most aspects of their educational systems and face similar challenges to those systems today (Bauer, Boschmann, Green, & Kuehnast,1998; Bruner & Tillet, 2007; DeYoung, 2004; Johnson, 2004).

Higher Education Admissions Regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan    99

With independence in 1991 both nations inherited a tradition of strong, centralized authority in educational governance and their current administrative systems reflect the characteristics of the previous command model (Bruner & Tillet, 2007; Johnson, 2004). Historically, as the educational systems in both republics were tightly integrated into the Soviet administrative bureaucracy, the higher education admissions regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were basically the same. Today, the ministries of education still formally determine overall admissions policy for all state higher education institutions in both countries and can alter these regimes by decree (Drummond & Gabrscek, 2012). Though overall admissions policy was made at the ministerial level in the Soviet period, each university did select their own students with internally created and administered examinations. Exam scores served as the single criterion for selection for the majority of abiturents.5 Higher education institutions administered oral exams in subjects deemed necessary for a particular course of study plus a written essay in the abiturents’ native or Russian language for humanities majors. Mathematics also required a written exam in addition to an oral exam (Clark, 2005). Abiturents prepared for admissions exams by studying many “topics,” or questions about a particular content area. For both written and oral examinations, students would come before an examination committee and randomly select these topics, turned face down, on small cards or strips of paper. After abiturents demonstrated their knowledge of the selected topic (usually by telling what they knew about the topic), admissions committees composed of specialists in the subject area being assessed asked the abiturents relevant questions. Examiners assigned marks on a scale of 2 to 5, 5 being the highest mark, as an estimation of abiturents’ knowledge. After the completion of exams, the admissions committees forwarded their lists of recommended abiturents up the appropriate higher education institution chain of command for official approval and eventual enrollment (Bereday, 1960; Drummond & DeYoung, 2004).6 After the breakup of the Soviet Union, some universities continued to select students through these traditional procedures. However, with the loosening of bureaucratic controls in the early 1990s, many higher education institutions throughout Eurasia began to introduce written, multiple choice admissions tests. Representatives of some universities believed that multiple choice testing was more efficient in handling the increasing numbers of higher education applicants.7 Using multiple choice tests, higher education institutions could screen larger numbers of abiturents than they could with the more time consuming individual based, oral exams (Drummond & DeYoung, 2004). The new written tests were not standardized in the sense that one test was utilized to assess all abiturents throughout the country; each higher

100    T. DRUMMOND

education institution required abiturents to sit for their own examinations (RIA News, 2007). Critics pointed out that the multiple-choice tests administered by the universities were of low quality and could be easily manipulated by test administrators for abiturents willing to pay for the service (Clark, 2005; Koroliuk & Kovalchuk, 2012). In the era of social instability and economic crisis that followed the Soviet collapse, throughout Eurasia evidence that higher education institutions began to abuse their power in the admissions process mounted (Heyneman et al., 2008; International Crisis Group, 2003; Orkodashvili, 2012; Osipian, 2007). By 1999, ministerial bureaucrats and even some university officials in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and other Eurasian countries began to propose major changes to their admissions regimes (Drummond & DeYoung, 2004; Osipian, 2007; Valkova, 2001; Valyaeva, 2006). While the timetable for reform was different in each country, the focus on corruption was a common rationale for change. According to a report by the Russian Ministry of Education and Science and the Moscow School of Economics, abiturents in Russia were allegedly frequently paying the equivalent of several years of tuition in illicit payments to enter higher education institutions (Clark, 2005). At a September 19, 2006 address to participants at The Black Sea Conference on University Admissions and Examinations, the Minister of Education of the Georgian Republic, Alexander Lomaia (2006), claimed: Some studies have shown that as many as 80% of students admitted to Georgian higher education institutions in late 90s, were enrolled for non-academic reasons. Some 5 years ago, the amount of bribes given and taken during admission exams in the same period, according to different studies, varied from USD 6 to 20 million annually. (Conference Program, p. 3)

Fighting corruption thus emerged as the primary rationale for admissions regime reform throughout the region and remains a rationale for their maintenance today in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (Shamatov, 2011). Despite this common rationale, a close examination of what was actually implemented in each of these countries demonstrates significant variation in approach, politics, and ultimately what was introduced.8 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan serve as useful case studies for demonstrating these differences. ADMISSIONS REGIME REFORM IN KAZAKHSTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN (1999–2015) In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan new presidential and ministerial decrees initiated the reform process. New assessment institutions had to be created for the development and administration of the new higher education selection tests. Equipment and physical plant had to be procured

Higher Education Admissions Regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan    101

and personnel had to be identified and trained to run the new assessment agencies. While the introduction of new higher education admissions tests was prioritized in both countries, reformers envisioned the development of educational assessment capacity that would ultimately be able to develop other types of assessments—sample-based assessments of educational quality, summative and formative assessments, evaluations of teacher quality, and various diagnostic tools (Presidential Decree No. 91, 2002; Valyaeva, 2006). In Kazakhstan the new admissions regime based on a standardized test, known as The Unified National Test (UNT), was first piloted in 1999. By 2004 it had become the official admissions test, required for all abiturents. It was developed by the newly established Center of National Standards in Education and Testing (CNSET) which reported to the Ministry of Education and Science. As in Russia and Georgia, the director of the CNSET at that time, Tahir Balykbayev, emphasized that the introduction of standardized testing was a necessary anti-corruption measure (Valyaeva, 2006). Four subtests are required on the UNT: Mathematics, native language (Kazakh or Russian), Russian or Kazakh as a second language, and History of Kazakhstan. One additional optional subject test (World History, Foreign Language, Biology, Geography, Chemistry, Physics or Literature) is available for abiturents enrolling in faculties requiring these tests (Turlanbekova, 2015). In Kyrgyzstan, President Askar Akaev issued his first decree in support of admissions reform on April 18, 2002. The decree called for the introduction of the National Scholarship Test (NST) in June of that same year.9 The decree explicitly eliminated higher education institutions’ discretion in selection of abiturents with internal examinations and called for scholarships (state “budget” places) to be allocated according to NST results (Presidential Decree No. 91, 2002). The presidential decree also called for public observation of the enrollment process, similar to the kind of monitoring that accompanies major political elections. In Kyrgyzstan, the Minister of Education, Camilla Sharshekeeva, also emphasized that overcoming corruption was the primary purpose of the admissions reform (Drummond & DeYoung, 2004).10 Despite the similar goals of policy makers and the common origins of reform in executive decrees, the substance of the decrees reveal significant differences in approach to reform. For example, the institutionalization of CNSET in Kazakhstan was funded by the national government and its operations overseen by the Ministry of Education and Science. In Kyrgyzstan, Minister Sharshekeeva procured outside funding for the establishment of a non-governmental, fully independent assessment organization. While the ministry still determined admissions policies, the new assessment center in Kyrgyzstan would not be subordinate to government authority but instead be overseen by a board of trustees. In the long term, fees were to be collected to sustain the center through the provision of assessment services

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(Shamatov, 2011).11 To date, the Center for Educational Assessment and Teaching Methods (CEATM) has remained a financially and politically sustainable organization and has consistently won the right to conduct the NST through competitive procurement processes. In addition to differences in the institutional arrangements in assessment center governance, the purpose and form of the admissions tests differed in the two countries. The Kazakh UNT served both as a school-leaving and university entrance exam. The Kyrgyz NST was designed for higher education selection purposes only. In Kazakhstan, each abiturent was required to take the core tests (listed above) as well as one additional subject test related to the intended area of study (Valyaeva, 2006).12 The Kyrgyz NST was a scholastic aptitude test intended to assess readiness for higher education and had two primary sections, mathematical reasoning and verbal skills. Additional subject tests were required only for certain disciplines such as medicine and foreign languages (Drummond & DeYoung, 2004). Table 5.1 highlights the main differences between the regimes in the two countries. For educational researchers interested in the effect of high stakes testing on schooling, curricula, and classroom practice, the differences between the UNT native language test and the NST verbal skills test are important to highlight. Since inception in 2004, the Kazakh UNT has relied on subject tests which seek to measure “knowledge-based” competencies. According to the UNT specifications, the original goal of the native language section was to assess knowledge of parts of speech and grammar rules, or aspects of language (MOES, 2007). Knowledge of these areas was elicited through one test item per competency in the language domain (25 total items per test).13 In contrast, the Kyrgyz NST relied on a verbal skills (словеснологический) test that assessed readiness for advanced academic study and consisted of four sections: Reading Comprehension (24 items, 3–4 texts), Analogies (10 items), Sentence Completion (10 items), and Grammar Use (20 items; Valkova, 2004). Table 5.2 highlights these key differences. Today there are other significant differences between the UNT and NST. As of 2012, the CNSET in Kazakhstan claimed that each of the core tests has at least 800 computer-generated test variations of equal equivalency TABLE 5.1  Differences in Admissions Regimes Through 2014 Country

Institutional Form

Oversight

Test Purpose

Test Forms

Outside Funding

Kazakhstan 2004

State agency

Ministry of Education

School Certification, Subject Based Higher Education Achievement Selection

No

Kyrgyzstan 2002

Nongovernmental organization

Board of Trustees

Higher Education Selection

Yes

Scholastic Aptitude

Higher Education Admissions Regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan    103 TABLE 5.2  UNT Native Language and NST Verbal Skills Tests (2004) Country

# of Versions

Total Items

Kazakhstan Grammar Knowledge (Native Language) of Native Language

Domains

Criterion referenced

Several hundred

25

Kyrgyzstan (Verbal Skills)

Norm referenced

5

64

Reading Comprehension, Analytical Thinking, Grammar Use

Scoring

(Clark, 2005). The CNSET makes test items publicly available in advance and encourages abiturents to memorize as many test items as possible. The CEATM in Kyrgyzstan utilizes five closed versions of the NST and encourages the use of study guides that contain similar type items, not exact test items found on actual tests. The CNSET in Kazakhstan continues to maintain almost immediate turn around on test scoring (Valyaeva, 2006). In Kyrgyzstan, it takes 3 weeks to process the results and abiturents receive score certificates at school graduation (CEATM, 2015). Finally, in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan today, only abiturents who attain certain cut scores are eligible to compete for university budget (scholarship) places. However, in Kyrgyzstan in the early years, only in 2004 were all applicants (for budget and contract places) required to sit for the test. In previous and subsequent years until 2012, the NST was only required for those abiturents seeking budget (state funded) places. In Kazakhstan, the UNT has been required for all students seeking higher education since reform inception. Other key differences between the regimes include registration and administration procedures, fees for testing, and ultimately how higher education institutions enroll abiturents in their courses of study. In general, small changes have been made to the admissions regimes each year but in the interests of space I describe only the main aspects of the regimes. At the time of writing in 2015, Kazakhstan is considering major reforms to the UNT which include providing separate tests for those seeking higher education and those not seeking higher education (Turlanbekova, 2015). In the next section I provide a description of the politics surrounding the implementation of the reforms in both countries. LOCAL POLITICS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR REFORM In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the introduction of new admissions regimes has been marked by controversy. In Kazakhstan, public battles have played out over questions of interpretation of historical events, language politics, and test security issues (Dosybiev, 2007; Valyaeva, 2006). In Kyrgyzstan, acrimonious struggles over which institutions should have the

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authority to actually conduct the NST have accompanied the reform (DeYoung, 2004; Shamatov, 2011). In this section, I describe these struggles in order to emphasize their localized nature and the inherent volatility of the new admissions regimes. Kazakhstan History of Kazakhstan has been a required UNT subject for all abiturents since reform inception. According to Valyaeva’s (2006) study of UNT implementation, the development of this test posed political challenges.14 Valyaeva argues that the lack of coherent and widely agreed upon approaches, materials and standards in the teaching of history led to conflict between the educators responsible for developing the tests (Valyaeva 2006). For example, some textbooks still in use interpreted history through a Leninist perspective, via the lens of class struggle.15 The history of relationships between the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union and Kazakhstan was also an acute challenge. Valyaeva notes that initial attempts to “de-politicize” history in post-Soviet Kazakhstan failed, and politics, more than objective history, colored how “the correct answers” on the UNT were determined. In the Spring of 2006, Valyaeva’s respondents also reported that there were widespread rumors that the History of Kazakhstan test would be administered in the Kazakh language regardless of abiturents’ language of instruction at school. This caused consternation in the non-Kazakh speaking community. According to Valyaeva’s respondents, the ministry did little to squelch the rumors, leaving the decision on test language “for a later date.” Thus, UNT development was accompanied by debates on sensitive issues that spread beyond closed-door test item development sessions (Valyaeva, 2006). Historical interpretation and language politics have not been the only issues of contention surrounding the UNT. According to a report by Anton Dosybiev (2007) of the of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, money making schemes based on selling answers to the UNT have allegedly plagued the new admissions regime. On June 12, 2007, the National Security Committee arrested the alleged organizer of a criminal gang in Almaty for distributing answers to test questions (Dosybiev, 2007). Dosboyiev noted that according to investigators, answer codes for the UNT were being offered for around $10,000. Police found large sums of money said to be collected for assistance in passing the UNT, approximately $25,000. Lists of graduates names as well as their test identification numbers were also reportedly confiscated in the raid (Dosybiev, 2007). By June of 2008, debate over the future of the UNT had reached the floor of Parliament. According to one news report, some Parliamentary

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deputies officially requested that the prime minister eliminate the UNT in 2009 (Konovalov, 2008). Apparently, some deputies believed that the controversy over the UNT would lead to social destabilization and “even an outbreak of suicide amongst the youth.” Senator Gani Kasimov noted “. . . the UNT has not taken hold, there have been sales of correct answers, and in general I am categorically against the assessment of knowledge of students in the current form of the UNT, as it is currently administered” (Konovalov, 2008). In the end, the prime minister’s office rejected this appeal by Parliamentarians and the UNT went forward in 2009. Despite strong opposition from Kasimov and others, the UNT continued without major alteration of the admissions regime over the next few years. Things changed in 2012 when the Parliamentarian and daughter of President Nazarbaev, Dariga Nazarbaeva, criticized the UNT on the floor of Parliament for causing serious psychological harm to the youth of Kazakhstan. She argued that in 2009 and 2010 that there were 209 and 237 teenage suicides respectively that could be attributed to the stressful UNT regime (Lee, 2013). Interestingly, she noted that the very tight security regime of the assessment—such as frisking abiturents for electronic devices— was a key contributing factor to that stress. Resistance to the UNT clearly remained in other quarters, bolstered by occasional scandals involving students disqualified for cheating, a perception of high overall failure rates, technical glitches such as the disqualification of high scorers that occurred in the Dzhambul Oblast in 2013, and criticism that the test contains arbitrarily selected test questions (Lee, 2013; Urazova, 2014). In the Fall of 2013 major change was announced; it was not to be, however, a return to the pre-reform days when higher education institutions selected their own students. Instead, the main adaptation would be the elimination of the dual purpose of the UNT as an attestation and selection exam. According to Deputy Minister of Education, Murat Abenov, starting in 2015 there were to be two different examinations—one for admissions for those students who sought access to higher education, and one to serve as a high school leavers’ exam called Complex Testing (CT). The rationale for this change was the realization that combining several goals in one assessment is challenging; the need to assess school content coverage for all while providing an admissions test that would discriminate finely amongst the higher education seeking population in one test is sometimes a difficult task. Constant media focus on “the number of UNT failures” (low scorers, often around 25% of the cohort) kept attention on the increasingly apparent need for a separate assessment for the non-college bound proportion of school leavers (Urazova, 2014). This change in regime represents convergence towards the regime in place in neighboring Kyrgyzstan where the NST always had the singular purpose of university selection.

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Because the UNT has now existed as the formal admissions test since 2004, some studies on student perception of the UNT are now available. For example, according to a 2015 study of student perception of the UNT by Turlanbekova, approximately half of the students sampled in focus groups believed that the UNT was an effective higher education admissions test (n = 88). Turlanbenkova interviewed both high school students who had yet to sit for the UNT and college students who had taken it. Primary criticisms were that the items demanded mostly memorization and that the test was very stressful. Opinions about the UNT were notably more favorable for those pupils who had yet to take the UNT. Sixty-eight percent of students who sat for the UNT believed that “the UNT was not an effective entrance test to university” (Urazova, 2014, p. 417). Kyrgyzstan The introduction of the NST in Kyrgyzstan was also controversial from the outset. While initial resistance of higher education institutions to the reform in 2002 was overcome, by 2004 the admissions regime faced a new challenge. Minister of Education Ishengul Boljurova, who replaced Camilla Sharshekeeva in June of 2002, initially supported reform (Boljurova, 2003; Drummond & DeYoung, 2004; Mambetaliev, 2003; Shamatov, 2011). However, at a White House presentation for university rectors on November 24, 2003, the new minister articulated a new vision for the admissions regime starting in 2004. That new plan entailed the Ministry of Education owning the rights to the student testing databases, ministerial oversight of test scoring, and the ministerial production of test score certificates.16 By winter 2004, a bitter battle between the ministry and a presidential advisor, Gaisha Ibragimova, raged over the fate of the admissions regime. The White House supported the development of an independent assessment agency and sought to protect the admissions regime from what presidential advisors perceived to be the threat of state (ministerial) encroachment on an independent agency. After a protracted struggle, the ministerial attempt to alter the original institutional arrangements failed (Novechkin, 2004). The newly-created Center for Educational Assessment and Teaching Methods (CEATM) was given the mandate by President Askar Akaev to administer the NST in both 2004 and 2005, without being required to turn over test databases to the Ministry of Education or have the ministry produce test score certificates (Presidential Decree No. 114, 2004). In late March of 2004, Minister Boljurova was removed from her post and the next minister, Mustafa Kidibaev (March 2004 to March 2005), supported CEATM and the existing admissions regime (Kalchaeva, 2004;

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Pozharski, 2004). The two ministers who followed the political “revolution” which literally chased President Askar Akaev from office in March, 2005, Dosbul Nur Uulu (April 2005 to February 2007), and Kanybek Osmonaliev (February 2007 to November 2007) both supported the admissions regime without major changes. The regime was maintained from 2005 up to 2007 and the NST results continued to be used as the single criterion for all HEI scholarship places. On November 27, 2007, however, former Minister of Education Boljurova returned to the ministry (Kabar News, 2007). In February 2008, she announced plans to change the university admissions regime through the introduction of state-run testing based on the Russian, Unified State Exam model (Kutaeva, 2008a; Yuldasheva, 2008). Articles appeared in the press which criticized CEATM and the status quo in admissions (Kozhemyakin, 2008a; Kozhemyakin, 2008b; Kutaeva, 2008b; Timirbaeva, 2008). It appeared for a second time that the admissions regime would undergo a major transformation. Yet, Minister Boljurova was again removed from her post before any changes could be made. The NST was carried out once again by CEATM in 2008 and 2009 (Benilyan, 2009) and since that time the regime has remained relatively stable till the present day. Yet, there were some changes of note between 2009 and the present day. In 2010, all abiturents were required to sit for at least one subject test in addition to the core tests of mathematical reasoning and verbal skills. In this same year, the additional subject tests of physics and history were added to previous selection of biology, chemistry, and English. In 2010, the ministry also required that at least 50% of all “contract places” (places filled by fee paying students) must be filled with students who sat for the NST. In 2011, a ministerial decree brought the admissions regime into full alignment with Article 40 of the law on education by mandating that all abiturents seeking higher education (paying or scholarship) were required to sit for the NST. Also in 2011, the option of German as a foreign language was discontinued due to low student demand. In 2012, the ministry took the step of requiring the NST not just for all state higher education institutions but mandated its use as the single admissions criteria for private institutions of higher education and distance learning degree programs as well (CEATM, 2015). Another significant change occurred in 2013 when the dates for the NST were synchronized so that all abiturents throughout the country sat for the NST at the exact same date and time. In previous years, testing was conducted over a 2 to 3 week period, using different test forms in various locations. As in Kazakhstan, however, the use of sophisticated technology by abiturents to cheat on exams remains a challenge in Kyrgyzstan and CEATM and the MOE took this step to ensure test booklet integrity.

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ANALYSIS AND PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY OF THE NEW ADMISSIONS REGIMES Some parliamentary deputies have called for the elimination of the UNT in Kazakhstan. A Minister of Education serving in two different, non-consecutive, periods has called for the introduction of a new admissions regime, based on the Russian state-led model, in Kyrgyzstan. Yet, so far, the regimes in both countries have been resistant to major changes since their inception. In both countries there appear to be strong forces both for and against the new admissions regimes and interpreting the reasons for sustainability as well as the veracity of claim and counter claim is difficult in such a high stakes environment. In the context of Kazakhstan, for example, it is difficult to judge the extent to which the visible, public struggles over interpretation of history, linguistic issues, and the UNT security problems are core or peripheral political issues. Certainly, they are important issues in their own right. Yet, these are also issues that can be exploited by parties with vested interests in altering the status quo for other reasons; that is, problems can be exaggerated to create support for change on the part of oppositional forces. For example, it is not clear whether the parliamentary debates in Kazakhstan reflect genuine widespread concern over the new regime. According to a 2007 OECD report, Higher Education in Kazakhstan, interviews with parents and abiturents revealed “widespread acceptance that the UNT is a better instrument than the former system and criticisms are in the minority” (pp. 61–67). Further, the OECD report notes that it is primarily higher education representatives, those who lost the most with the introduction of the UNT, who are the most vocal in criticizing alleged flaws of the new regime. Without the benefit of direct participant observation in key political decisions, interpretation of the various perspectives on the UNT is highly speculative and risks relying on a tenuous “statements reflect motives” interpretation of events. In the initial iteration of this article from 2011, the prospects for sustainability were less certain than they are today, however. The fact that the UNT has survived (though is now changing in format) after direct attacks from a member of the Nazarbaev family would appear to indicate that whatever the limitations of the UNT and highly public criticisms, a return “to the old days of HEI-run admissions” seems unlikely at this point. In some ways, the UNT regime might be perceived as “the lesser of two evils.” For Kyrgyzstan, direct participant observation over a long period of time has allowed me to focus on the interactions between officials at MOE, rectors of higher education institutions, and the executive level of government. This has enabled a clearer assessment of the extent to which both regime proponents’ and opponents’ words and actions diverged or coalesced. Throughout, public discourse often centered on whether or not standardized testing was an “American intervention” due to USAID

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support for the reform. Since the publication of the 2011 article, it is fair to say that a “revival” in anti-Americanism since the Ukrainian crisis is evident in the region. Yet, the core actors—ministerial functionaries, presidential advisors, project implementers, and higher education representatives—all appear to continue to accept the notion that the new admissions regime system rightfully replaced oral examinations and higher education selection autonomy in Kyrgyzstan. The two most contentious questions for core policymakers from 2001 to 2009 were: (a) “Would higher education institutions be able to require their own, additional forms of assessment (in addition to the NST) or was their discretion in admissions to be completely curtailed by the new regime (2001–2002)?”;17 and later, (b) “Were essential functions such as test scoring and score certificate production best carried out by an independent organization or by a state agency (2003–2004, 2007–2008)?” In other words, “Who would have the final authority to officially ‘finalize’ test scores received by abiturents, the test center or the state?” While external (foreign) actors were occasionally involved in high level discussions over these questions in Kyrgyzstan, day to day admissions politics involved primarily local actors and activities, meetings, events, and working groups in which external actors took little or no part.18 With the exception of Sharshekeeva, most of the core actors in the initial days cared little about outside support of testing, how Western countries selected abiturents in general, or even that the U.S. government was supporting this particular initiative. What mattered was the impact of the new regime on the discretion of higher education institutions to select their own students. Key actors believed that only presidential power—through decree or by new law—could curb or uphold the discretionary power that higher education institutions had enjoyed for decades. Thus, the 2001–2002 fight between the president’s office and reform opponents (primarily higher education institutions) was over the minutia of the presidential decrees which articulated the university role in the admissions process. “Success” in these struggles depended on acquiring allies in the small working groups that drafted the decrees and the ability of Minister Sharshekeeva to gain influence with powerful actors in the president’s administration. Participating parties believed that those who left their mark on the last draft version of the presidential decree before it went to the president for signature would see their vision implemented. Ultimately, those arguing for complete elimination of university discretion in admissions—led by Sharshekeeva—were able to influence the president and see their vision of admissions regime reform implemented. The later conflicts (2003–2004 and 2007–2008) between proponents of independent testing and the two different Boljureva administrations— which proposed state-controlled assessment—were marked by a similar arena of conflict, the battle over the contents of a new presidential decree.

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One side argued for the need for strong state oversight while the other maintained that independence in assessment was essential. Two sides struggled to get “their version of reality” institutionalized through a new presidential decree that would shape the form and substance of the admissions regime and articulate which institutions would ultimately control the test scoring process and, indirectly, wield considerable power to influence abiturents’ access to higher education. Margaret Archer (1979) reminds us that educational policy is not a natural response to evolving “societal needs,” but rather the expression of the will of actors with the power and ability to influence policy and institutionalize their version of reform. Because societal needs are not always the driving force when political actors with their own perceived interests push agendas—be it for status-quo or dramatic change—determining actors’ rationales and motives and interpreting behavior is not always a straightforward task. By all accounts, higher education institutions in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan stood to lose considerable power and resources with the introduction of admissions regimes that called for external assessment of abiturents; yet, rectors never argued openly that this was a reason for their resistance. Archer’s perspective is useful for interpreting the local politics around admissions reform in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as it warns us about the danger of relying exclusively on stated rationales for actions and agendas and overly simplistic interpretations of events. The acrimonious nature of the admissions regime debates reflects the high stakes nature of their introduction and maintenance. Clashing vested interests in conditions of political uncertainty should caution us to draw firm conclusions about the future of the regimes in both countries. External, standardized testing and the new admissions regimes will continue to appeal to many as a sound policy option as long as newly created assessment agencies work relatively transparently and effectively. Post-2011, it appears that the question of “returning” to university-led admissions regimes is no longer a question that generates serious discussion. I still contend, however, that despite sustainability to date, the regimes are still potentially susceptible to change or even complete abolition in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. High stakes testing remains high stakes politics. New debates will likely center on more subtle nuances, not necessarily on the governing arrangements of assessment centers as they stand now in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, the question is no longer “Should an independent organization conduct admissions testing?” but rather “Which independent organization should conduct admissions testing?” In Kazakhstan, after all the parliamentary debate, there is now focus on improving the quality of the assessments, not on going back to the previous admissions regime. On the other hand, under the existing authoritarian governments in both these countries, there is not necessarily a connection between what is popularly

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appealing with what gets implemented. And, there are still vocal opponents of the admissions regimes in both countries. The admissions regimes reforms in both these countries were implemented from the top-down without public input and they could still be discarded without public input just as easily even though both regimes have now survived over a decade. Just as before 2011, unfortunately ministries of education, presidential administrations, and even non-governmental organizations still inspire little more public confidence than the HEIs themselves. A 2008 study showed that the Ministry of Education in Kyrgyzstan is perceived to be the second most corrupt government institution in the nation (Kutueva, 2008c). Many skeptics in Eurasia have argued, perhaps correctly in some cases, that the current alteration of admissions regimes simply represents a change in who “controls the goodies,” not necessarily an improvement (for abiturents) in the way “those goodies are distributed.” The failure of any new institutional arrangements to make headway against admissions corruption could still stimulate new reform proposals or calls for a return to other forms of admissions regimes. In the context of authoritarian governance, political sustainability does not necessarily indicate public legitimacy of a new regime just as a regimes’ abolition does not necessarily indicate a lack of public support. In both of these countries, for the admissions regimes to remain sustainable—a key prerequisite that remains is continued support from the executive (presidential) levels. Since the 2011 iteration of this research, this fact has not changed. There are several reasons for this. First, executive power is still paramount in both countries. Ministers of education are only free to make sweeping changes to the status quo to the extent executive power enables and supports such change.19 Second, and related to the first point, while formally ministries dictate higher education selection policy, in reality ministerial power in relation to higher education institutions has eroded significantly since independence; enforcing MOE policy has become difficult and executive power is necessary to leverage any ministerial systems and agendas.20 It is important to remember that in the 1990s when higher education institutions were allegedly “the most corrupt,” ministries of education formally oversaw and monitored the actions of their university colleagues during higher education admissions (Blau, 2004). The failure of MOEs to do so to the publics’ satisfaction is primarily a function of this underlying power shift in the last 25 years and a corresponding evolution of mutually beneficial admissions norms (i.e., forms of collusion) between higher education institutions and ministries of education. The first cause of this power shift has been the dramatic decrease in state funding transfers to higher education institutions since the collapse (Caboni, 2004; Mertaugh, 2004). Ministerial power is also undermined by the relative low pay of ministerial bureaucrats charged with overseeing higher education compliance to state

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policy. At the same time state subsidies to higher education institutions were declining in the 1990s, universities were able to increasingly generate more income through student fees—thus empowering higher education institutions relative to the ministries; hardly a scenario likely to ensure that ministerial officials would be in a strong position to provide oversight of the lucrative admissions process. Funds generated from admissions—both legitimate and illegitimate—are one of the few reliable sources of income in the education sector. It should be noted however, that due to state resources, Kazakhstan has been relatively more successful in reducing incentives for corruption through pay increases in the education sector. Second, high cabinet turnover rates negatively impact the ability of a ministry to implement and sustain new policies that appear to run counter to rectors’ personal or institutional interests. Longtime rectors of prestigious higher education institutions, who often remain in their positions for many years, often resent intrusive reform policies that strike at major revenue generating activities. They argue that a state which provides little financial support should not have a strong role in the oversight of their institutions. One way to avoid compliance is simply to “wait out” the minister until he/she is removed in the next cabinet shuffle (DeYoung, 2004). This remains as true today as it was 5 or 10 years ago. However, in regard to the admissions regimes, in some sense they are perceived as more legitimate now as they have survived the initial inception phases in both countries. Thus, while counter reform initiatives are still possible, rector influence is somewhat weaker now than it was 5 years ago. Thus, when analyzing prospects for admissions regime sustainability over the next ten years, it is important to recognize the potential limits of actual ministerial power to maintain meaningful change in practice. Anecdotal evidence suggests that collusion with higher education institutions (sharing admissions dividends), not vigorous enforcement of ministerial policies, is still possible under the current circumstances. Any such collusion between universities and ministries—or ministries and other external testing centers for that matter—could further undermine public support for the admissions reforms. While political support from the presidential level certainly won’t guarantee success in legitimizing the new admissions regimes, without it, the probability that ministries can bring about and sustain popularly supported admissions regimes seems less likely indeed. CONCLUSIONS: WORLD CULTURAL THEORY AND ADMISSIONS REGIME REFORM Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are just two of the many Eurasian countries that have introduced admissions regimes relying on standardized testing:

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Tajikistan is also now in the process of major reform in this area. World cultural theorists argue that institutional convergence worldwide results from the evolution of a common value system, one that is becoming increasingly shared over time. These evolving educational norms help to shape educational structures, institutions, and policy options (Baker & Le Tendre, 2005; Meyer & Ramirez, 2000).21 At a time when assessment and accountability issues still seem to dominate Western educational agendas, it would be tempting to explain the regime changes in Eurasia through neo-institutional, or world cultural theory perspectives, or even critical theories emphasizing the role of hegemonic neoliberal forces in promoting change. The equalization of social opportunities through fair access to higher education is indeed a widely accepted norm and an area where the rhetoric surrounding educational agendas has converged in recent decades (Ramirez & Boli, 1987). Few, if any, Eurasian policy makers would dispute the idea that “fair access to higher education for all” through transparent admissions regimes is a good thing. During the implementation of reforms in both countries there was much discussion about the need to overcome corrupt practices. As Baker and Le Tendre (2005) argue, it would be hard to take any country seriously that was indifferent to blatant corruption and injustices—at least in terms of what is proclaimed publicly.22 During implementation in Kazakhstan, there was some public discussion of the convergence of the admissions regime in Kazakhstan with Western countries. According to Valyaeva (2006), some reformers in Kazakhstan assumed that what was Western (standardized testing) was somehow better and therefore the reform represented an opportunity to improve or “modernize” the existing system. Valyaeva argues that many interpreted Minister Kulekeyev’s support for the UNT as indicating a “turn towards the West.” Minister Kulekeyev, in turn, defended the admissions reform, arguing that standardized testing for selection was utilized in 58 countries and that the ministry was not “inventing anything new” (Valyaeva, 2006, p. 9). In Kyrgyzstan, Minister Sharshekeeva surrounded herself with foreign advisors and pushed hard for the implementation of reform that could feasibly be described as “Western looking” (DeYoung, 2004). At a broad level of abstraction then, world culture theory seems to provide some explanatory power for understanding the push for change in both of these countries, at least in terms of what was publicly stated. It is also true that the move from oral examinations to standardized, written testing has brought these two countries closer to what is perceived as common admissions practice in many western countries. Yet, despite similarities in history, cultural context, goals, timing, and public rhetoric, as highlighted above, the regimes implemented in both of these Eurasian countries in fact look very different when examined up close; and attention only to

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commonality at the broadest level of analysis distracts us from the important underlying variation evident in these new regimes (Stambach, 2003). There are specific reasons why focusing on difference is essential for a complete understanding of the new regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. First, in regard to standardized testing in particular, many scholars believe that high stakes testing impacts schooling, for better or worse, perhaps more than other educational phenomena (Corbett & Wilson, 1991; Firestone, Shore, & Monfils, 2004; Yeh, 2005). If this holds for these two countries, educators could respond to what is assessed by adjusting instruction and hence the reform could impact learning outcomes in important ways.23 Significant changes could include what is covered (or not covered) by the secondary curricula, changes in opportunities to learn, and even changes in teaching practice, whether encouraged or not. Students could devote more time to test preparation in or out of class at the expense of other important studies. These changes, in turn, could promote or constrict future trends and policy options as the new incentive structure continues to shape what is taught and learned in the future (Yeh, 2005). Ultimately, the differences in what content is tested could promote more divergence than convergence in educational practices between these two countries over the long run. In that regard, it may be no small matter that the Kyrgyz NST breaks with Soviet tradition by assessing verbal skills, a domain not previously assessed in the republic by any large scale examination or test. In Kazakhstan, despite popular rhetoric about Western-style reforms, the UNT native language test has kept clearly within the tradition of assessing important knowledge of language. Ultimately, these different approaches to assessing content could result in differences in how the practice of teaching native language, literature, reading, writing, and reasoning skills is conceptualized and practiced. Of course it remains to be seen exactly how, if at all, the UNT and NST have impacted instruction and schooling at this time.24 Differences between the regimes in the way assessment institutions are governed also matters. How might institutional structures affect their capacity to develop as effective assessment organizations over the long term? How might institutional governance impact the quality of educational assessments? What challenges does a state-funded center confront as it tries to maintain independence in assessment of individuals and educational institutions? The test center in Kazakhstan might enjoy both financial support and government protection but find growth in capacity difficult due to political interference in professional assessment matters, low government salaries of test center staff, and high turnover at MOE which could negatively impact personnel appointments at the test center. The independent Kyrgyz test center might enjoy political and academic autonomy but struggle to generate income to support assessment services and thus find sustainability challenging over the long term. The two new assessment centers could

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follow different growth and development trajectories over time which in turn has implications for their potential impact on the education systems in both countries. The most significant question that world cultural theory cannot address, however, is the question of most importance for abiturents and their parents: Surface changes in the status quo aside, do the new admissions regimes actually meet the aims their implementers sought to achieve in terms of fairness in access to higher education (Dale, 2000)?25 If two countries rely on standardized testing but in only one of those countries the public trusts the results, this is a profound difference. It is far from a forgone conclusion that the reforms will actually foster real change in access to higher education and garner the public’s trust over the long term. While the evidence to date suggests that serious progress in confronting corrupt admissions practices has been made in both countries, long term sustainability is far from certain (Shamatov, 2011). Getting beyond the declarations and basic structures is essential, then, to understanding how these reforms are impacting individual students and institutions. It is worth emphasizing that the legitimacy of the new admissions regimes can not be inferred from their sustainability. The admissions regimes will be legitimate in the eyes of citizens only to the extent that they reduce illegitimate barriers to access to higher education on a consistent basis. In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan however, democratic institutions are weak and unpopular regimes can be maintained regardless of whether or not they are effective or fair (Drummond & DeYoung, 2004). Thus, only knowing that relatively similar admissions regimes exist in neighboring Eurasian countries leaves the most important questions unanswered: That is the weakness of world cultural theory in explaining what is important in the Eurasian reform context. When seen from afar, the reforms in these two countries seem to indicate worldwide convergence around “norms of fairness” and the use of standardized testing as an admissions tool. Some would argue that the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan simply demonstrate the local “mediation” of worldwide trends and forces that are here to stay. However, when the stakes are high for local actors, the connection between the acquisition of international status and permanence of the admissions regimes remains tenuous. I contend that the evolution of the new regimes in these countries is at best only loosely connected with adherence to any such international norms, primarily at the level of public rhetoric. As the descriptions of what was implemented demonstrate, admissions regime reforms, even in countries evolving from a common education system, are ultimately products of local politics and pressures which can result in very different types of regimes. If the regimes are maintained, it will not be because of outside pressures or the general acceptance of world-wide norms. It will be because

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a coalescence and alignment of strong local forces within the nation is able to mobilize support for the maintenance of the regimes. Only through the study of the local politics surrounding the reforms can we understand how the new regimes evolved and how they might ultimately impact the educational systems and the individuals who constitute them. Only by attempting to disentangle the motives and actions of key competing parties and studying such localized issues as language politics, corruption, and institutional power and ownership, will any accurate prognosis for the future be possible. Prediction remains, however, speculative in a context marked by arbitrary rule, concentrated power, and high levels of turnover in governance. This volatility and the very high stakes nature of admissions regime reforms would seem to indicate that little is certain about the future of the admissions reforms at this time. Since the first iteration of this publication in 2011, there is now more evidence to assert that the new regimes have attained a certain level of legitimacy. The long-term prospects however, remain somewhat uncertain. I have left important evaluative questions to other scholars: How do stakeholders experience these new regimes? Are the regimes strengthening state oppression and corruption or reducing it? How might the two different admissions regimes promote difference and divergence between two countries that were once the same country over the long run? The admissions regime reforms throughout Eurasia provide a myriad of further research opportunities for scholars of the region, as I hope the cases of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have demonstrated. NOTES 1. Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine initiated pilot testing of their new admissions regimes earlier—Kazakhstan (1999), Russia (2001), Ukraine (2004). These dates refer to the time when admissions testing became mandatory for all those seeking higher education. 2. For example, almost a decade after pilot testing was initiated in Russia, leading universities still opposed the Unified State Exam (USE). In 2007, Rector Sadovnichy of Moscow State University claimed that his higher education institutions had no intention of honoring USE results (RIA News, 02/05/2007). In Ukraine, proponents of reform maintained that test results would be required for all abiturents to enter HEIs by 2008. However, the December 2007 ministerial decree only partially reflected this intent as HEIs still had many avenues to select their own students. In effect, they could ignore test scores for up to 40% of their enrollees as allowed by “point fifteen” in the decree (Ministry of Education Decree No. 1172, 2007). In contrast, the Republic of Georgia has dramatically limited university discretion in selection. The new assessment center assigns abiturents to a university based on their test scores and preferences, completely by-passing higher education institutions

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in the process (National Assessment and Examination Center, 2005). Many of these political struggles continue to the present day as will be demonstrated through the Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan case studies. 3. The Center for Educational Assessment and Teaching Methods (CEATM) was officially chartered by the American Councils for International Education in the Spring of 2004 (www.testing.kg). From 2002–2004, American Councils served as the proxy test organization until CEATM could be established. The views expressed in this article do not reflect the opinion of the CEATM, American Councils for International Education or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 4. See, for example Shamatov (2011). For detailed information about the selection reforms see: Kyrgyzstan—www.testing.kg, Kazakhstan—http://www .edu.gov.kz/ru/ent/. Over the years, in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, dozens of newspaper articles, TV shows, and other forms of information have been produced and published in support of or against these reforms. Every effort has been made here to include a balanced sampling of the various positions as well as to highlight materials that were published by third parties, that is, independent newspapers, reviews, and commentaries. Still, as scholars of Eurasian politics know, the practice of “zakaznoi press” (in which competing interests hire journalists to print material representing their positions) makes interpretation difficult. Therefore, a healthy dose of skepticism and careful triangulation of sources is recommended when trying to make sense of the available material. For examples of the “call and response” type of public debate that characterizes the politics around the admissions regime in Kyrgyzstan, see Tokombaev (04/11/03), Pozharski (05/26/04), Maripov (03/24/05), and Maya Stolitsya (09/07/05). 5. With the exception of special conditions for “gold medal winners” (perfect marks throughout the school career), winners of academic “Olympiads” and quotas for disabled, orphaned, or other special categories of students who were granted special admissions privileges. 6. MOE approval was somewhat of a formality and necessary in order to enable state funding for the HEI-selected abiturents. 7. According to the World Bank’s 2007 analysis, the increases in HEI enrollment in the 19–24 year old cohort went from 15% to 45% in Kazakhstan between 1996 and 2004 and from 15% to 36% in Kyrgyzstan during this same period (Bruner & Tillet 2007, pp. 30–33). 8. A common assumption in all the post-Soviet countries was that in the new admissions systems, the single selection criterion would be test results. In a sense, this was not a new approach as HEI examinations had always been high stakes. The crucial distinction was that under the new systems, the new tests or exams would be developed, administered and scored by external agencies, not by the HEIs themselves. 9. In the Russian language, the NST is known as “Общереспубликанское тестирование” which translates literally as “General Republican Testing.” I use the name “National Scholarship Testing” as it captures the idea that results were used for HEI scholarship allocation (originally). Since 2012, results have been used not just for scholarship distribution but as the criteria

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10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16. 17.

for admissions decisions for those seeking contract (fee paying) places as well (CEATM 2015). Determining whether presidential and ministerial decrees are actually followed in practice is an important empirical question that needs to be addressed in each country. Further, it should not be assumed that the decrees themselves ultimately articulated “the rules of the selection game” as the reformers themselves initially intended (as the case of Ukraine, noted above, demonstrates; Ministry of Education of Ukraine, Decree No. 1172, December 25, 2007). Decrees reflect the outcomes of contested negotiations and as will be argued later in this chapter, the core political battles were fought over their content. A significant difference between the two regimes is how independence in assessment is conceptualized. In official documents (MOES website 2009), the UNT in Kazakhstan is referred to as an independent assessment. Because the UNT is also a school leavers’ exam, independence is understood as being external to schools, or teachers, who have traditionally administered school attestation exams. In Kyrgyzstan, where the NST is only a selection test, independence in assessment is understood to mean independence in assessment governance, that is, the administration of testing by a non-governmental organization (NGO), as opposed to a state agency. This was the requirement in 2004. Today abiturents from Kazak language schools are required to also sit for Russian language and arbiturents from Russian language schools are required to sit for Kazak language in addition to the core tests (Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2009). Otherwise, test content in both countries today is similar to what it was in 2004 though Kazakhstan in currently in the process of considering major changes to the admissions regime such as having separate exams for attestation and admissions. In earlier years there were more questions, but with the addition of another language (Kazak or Russian) test in 2008, there are now no more than 25 items per test on any of the test sections (MOES website 2015). Overall, four sections are mandatory but scores on the second language test do not count towards total score (Turlanbekova 2015). Valyaeva interviewed over 50 teachers and students in one region of Kazakhstan. She also conducted a detailed content analysis of the UNT’s history exam. Valyaeva notes . . . “Several questions that I have studied . . . presents the Marxist point of view. This trend can be traced, particularly, regarding the questions about revolutions and labor movements in modern history (in the 17th– 19th centuries). Describing several conflicts of the time, the textbook lesson about English revolution of the 17th century, for example, underscores—in accordance with the Marxist theory of revolution—that the main reason for the revolution was a conflict between feudalism and the needs of the rising capitalism” (p. 26). Minister Boljurova’s power point presentation at the White House meeting. For a deeper description of the early political struggles from 2001–2002, see DeYoung (2004) and Drummond and DeYoung (2004).

Higher Education Admissions Regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan    119 18. Representatives of USAID, the State Department, and American Councils did take political positions on the reform and expressed their views at both the presidential and ministerial levels in Kyrgyzstan. They supported Sharshekeeva’s initial vision for the reforms and pushed back against Minister Boljurova when they perceived her position to diverge from the original agreement to support independent rather than state managed testing. However, I contend that for the most part they were peripheral not primary actors. 19. I mean here actual change—not simply a change in rules and procedures but a change in the way things are done in practice. 20. Bruner and Tillet (2007) note that HEIs are weak in relation to other actors in the education sector due to their dependence on state financing (p. 38). However, they also note that in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, student fees (paying students) generate over 75% of all HEI financing (p. 46). As HEIs control the collection of these fees, I contend that they in fact they have considerable power. The power of an HEI relative to that of the MOE is a function of the prestige of the particular HEI in question. Popular HEIs generate significant income on their own, considerably more from paying students than they can receive through MOE financing for budget students. Less prestigious HEIs are more dependent on state financing. Considering the fact that it is leading HEIs that often “set the tone” on relations with the MOE, I argue that actual MOE control over HEIs is somewhat tenuous. In fact, in many leading Eurasian HEIs, rectors have been openly lobbying for independence from the government, even though they would lose some state support (a very small percentage of their overall budget) from the state financing of budget students. 21. Critical theorists argue that it is capitalist forces and hegemonic power—not “value convergence”—that ensure the imitation of western systems while world cultural theorists claim that the acceptance of common formal and informal institutions is, while western in origin, voluntary (Dale 2000). I do not consider critical theories here. While the story of admissions reform in Eurasia is first and foremost one of high stakes politics and power relations, in general, I contend that the core power struggles are local. Kazakhstan utilized no foreign assistance in their admissions reform and USAID’s initial investment over the first 3 years in Kyrgyzstan’s NST reform effort was 1.3 million USD—all of it in technical assistance. For critical perspectives, however, see Burbules and Torres (2000). 22. I am not suggesting that these values emerged only in post-Soviet Eurasia. Whatever the prior practice, the Soviet Constitution specified that everyone should have a fair chance to compete for higher education. The post-Soviet constitutions of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also reflect the values that educational opportunity for all is important and should be protected (Valyaeva, 2006). 23. Protesters of the Unified State Exam (USE) in Russia have recently argued that “study in the 11th class in any Russian school has become a mass preparation for the USE” (O’Flynn, 06/29/09). 24. See Shamatov (2012) for a study on the impact of the NST in Kyrgyzstan. In the North American context, see Firestone et al. (2004) for a comprehensive study of the issue.

120    T. DRUMMOND 25. While this is perhaps the most important question to be answered about the admissions regime reforms, as I noted at the outset, I leave the evaluation of the impact of these reforms to other scholars.

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Higher Education Admissions Regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan    121 DeYoung, A. (2002). West meets east in Central Asia: Competing discourses on secondary education reform in the Kyrgyz Republic. International Journal of Educational Research, Policy, and Practice, 3(3), 1–45. DeYoung, A. (2004). The demise of the action plan. In S. Heyneman & A. DeYoung (Eds.), Challenges for education in Central Asia (pp. 199–224), Greenwich, CT: Information Age. Dosybiev, A. (2007, July 16). Kazak Exam Scammers Outwit Officials. Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Retrieved from https://iwpr.net/global-voices/ kazak-exam-scammers-outwit-officials Drummond, T. (2011). Higher education admissions regimes in kazakhstan and kyrgyzstan: Difference makes a difference. In I. Silova (Ed.), Globalization on the Margins: Education and Post-Socialist Transformations in Central Asia (pp. 117–144). Charlotte, NC: Information Age. Drummond, T., & DeYoung, A. (2004). Perspectives and problems in education reform in Kyrgyzstan: The case of national scholarship testing 2002. In S. Heyneman & A. DeYoung (Eds.), Challenges for education in Central Asia (pp. 225–242). Greenwich, CT: Information Age. Drummond, T., & Gabrscek, S. (2012). Understanding higher education admissions reforms in the eurasian context. In T. Drummond & A. DeYoung (Guest Eds.), European education: Issues and studies, special edition entitled The New Educational Assessment Regimes in Eurasia: Impacts, issues, and implications, 44(1), 7–26. Firestone, W., Schorr, R., & Monfils, L. (2004). The ambiguity of teaching to the test: Standards, assessment, and educational reform. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Heyneman, S., Anderson, K., & Nuralieva, N. (2008). The cost of corruption in higher education. Comparative Education Review, 52(1), 1–25. International Crisis Group. (2003). Youth in Central Asia: Losing the new generation. Asia Report No. 66. Osh, Kyrgyzstan: Author. Johnson, M. (2004). The legacy of russian and soviet education. In S. Heyneman & A. DeYoung (Eds.), Challenges for education in Central Asia (pp. 21–36). Greenwich, CT: Information Age. Kabar News Agency. (2007, November 27). Ishenkul’ Boldzhurova naznachena i.o. ministra obrazovaniya i nauki Kyrgyzstana [Ishengul Boljurova appointed acting minister of education and science of Kyrgyzstan]. Retrieved from http:// www.kabar.kg/ Kalchaeva, B. (2004, February 17). Pered testom vse ravny [All have equal chances on the test]. Rossiskaya Gazetta, 30(3407), 6. Konovalov, A. (2008, June 16). Dvojka ministru. Proval “edinogo naztestirovaniya” v Kazakhstane [“2” for the Minister: the failure of national testing in Kazakhstan]. Время. Retrieved from https://centrasia.org/newsA.php?st=1213594200 Koroliuk, S., & Kovalchuk, S. (2012). The introduction of standardized external testing in Ukraine: Challenges and successes. In T. Drummond & A. DeYoung (Guest Eds.), European Education: Issues and Studies, special edition entitled, The New Educational Assessment Regimes in Eurasia: Impacts, Issues and Implications. 44(1), 46–70. Kozhemyakin, S. (2008a, April 7). Bolezn’ bez lecheniya [Sickness with no cure]. Retrieved from http://parus.kg

122    T. DRUMMOND Kozhemyakin, S. (2008b, May 21). Za gody nezavisimosti sistema obrazovaniya v Kyrgyzstane okazalas’ v glubokom krizise [During the years of independence the educational system in Kyrgyzstan has fallen into a major crisis]. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Information Agency 24.KG Retrieved from https://24.kg/archive/ru/ community/35776/ Kutueva, A. (2008a, February 5). V Kyrgyzstane v 2009 godu planiruetsya perejti na sdachu edinogo gosudarstvennogo ehkzamena [In 2009 Kyrgyzstan plans to move to a unified government exam system]. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Information Agency 24.KG. Retrieved from https://24.kg/archive/ru/community/35077 Kutueva, A. (2008b, February 5). Zhangoroz Kanimetov: V obrazovatel’nuyu sistemu Kyrgyzstana neobhodimo vvodit’ edinyj obshcherespublikanskij ehkzamen dlya vypusknikov [Jangorooz Kanimetov: It is necessary for Kyrgyzstan to move to a unified exam for abiturents]. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Information Agency 24.KG. Retrieved from https://24.kg/archive/ru/community/35795-2008/05/22/85241.html Kutueva, A. (2008c, May 22). Po dannym antikorrupcionnogo komiteta za 2007 god, Ministerstvo obrazovaniya i nauki Kyrgyzstana stoit na vtorom meste po urovnyu korrupcii [According to data from the anti-corruption committee in 2007, the ministry of education and science is in second place for highest levels of corruption]. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Information Agency 24.KG. Retrieved from https://24 .kg/archive/ru/community/35795-2008/05/22/85241.html Lee, D. (2013). United national testing to be replaced by two different tests by 2015. Retrieved from http://astanatimes.com/2013/09/united-national-test-to-be -replaced-by-two-different-tests-by-2015/ Mambetaliev, R. (2003, September 11). Nasha zadacha—dostup i kachestvo obrazovaniya [Our task—access and quality of education]. Obshestveni Rating, No. 35(157). Maripov, A. M. (2005, March 24). Obshcherespublikanskoe testirovanie—zerkalo urovnya obrazovaniya v Kyrgyzstane [National scholarship testing—Mirror of the educational level in Kyrgyzstan]. Maya Stolitsya, 11(233), 5. Maya Stolitsya. (2005, September 7). Nuzhen konstruktivnyj dialog [Constructive dialog is needed], 103, 10. Meyer, J., & Ramirez, F. (2000). The world institutionalization of education. In J. Schriewer (Ed.), Discourse formation in comparative education (pp. 111–132). New York, NY: Peter Lang. Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2009). System of higher education in Kazakhstan: Achievements and perspectives on development. Country Report. Astana, Kazakhstan: Author. Retrieved from https://wayback .archive-it.org/10611/20160122023903/http:/portal.unesco.org/geography/ es/files/10898/12353680055Kazakhstan.pdf/Kazakhstan.pdf Ministry of Education of Ukraine, Decree no. #1172, December 25, 2007. Conditions for Enrollment to Higher Education Institutions in Ukraine. National Assessment and Examination Center. (2005). Unified national university entry examinations: Report. Retrieved from http://www.naec.ge Novechkin, V. (2004, May 19). Na predstoyashchem konkurse v vuzy roditeli mogli by sehkonomit’ 150 mln somov [On the upcoming enrollment to HEIs, parents could have saved 150 million soms]. Delo No. 3–4. OECD, World Bank. (2007). Higher education in Kazakhstan. Retrieved from http:// hdl.voced.edu.au/10707/137527

Higher Education Admissions Regimes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan    123 O’Flynn, K. (2009, June 24). Exams are over, the problem remains. Retrieved from http://www.rferl.org/content/Russias_New_Standardized_Exams_Fail_ The_Public_Test/1761799.html Orkodashvili, M. (2012). The changing faces of corruption in Georgian higher education: Access through times and tests. In T. Drummond & A. DeYoung (Guest Eds.), European Education: Issues and Studies, special edition entitled The New Educational Assessment Regimes in Eurasia: Impacts, Issues and Implications, 44(1), 27–45. Osipian, A. (2007, February). Corruption in higher education: Conceptual approaches and measurement techniques. Paper presented at the meeting of the Comparative and International Education Society, Baltimore, MD. Presidential Decree No. 91. (2002, April 18). O dal’nejshih merah po obespecheniyu kachestva obrazovaniya i sovershenstvovaniyu upravleniya obrazovatel’nymi processami v Kyrgyzskoj Respublike [About further measures for ensuring quality education and improving the administration of educational processes in the Kyrgyz Republic]. Retrieved from http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/3720 Presidential Decree No. 114. (2004, March 30). O dal’nejshem sovershenstvovanii procedur prisuzhdeniya gosudarstvennyh obrazovatel’nyh grantov, provedeniya obshcherespublikanskogo testirovaniya abiturientov i ih konkursnogo zachisleniya v vysshie uchebnye zavedeniya Kyrgyzskoj Respubliki [About the further measures for improving the selection procedure for government scholarships, administering the national scholarship test, and their enrollment in higher education institutions through competition in the Kyrgyz Republic]. Retrieved from http:// cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/4109 Ramirez, F., & Boli, J. (1987). The political construction of mass schooling: European origins and worldwide institutionalization. Sociology of Education, 60, 2–17. RIA News, Moscow. (2007, February 5). Vvedenie v Rossii Edinogo gosudarstvennogo ehkzamena (EGEH) yavlyaetsya oshibkoj, ubezhden spiker Soveta Federacii Sergej Mironov [Speaker of Federal Soviet Thinks the USE is a Systematic Mistake] Retrieved from http://www.spravedlivo.ru/news/section_385/738.smx Shamatov, D. (2011). The impact of standardized testing on university entrance issues in Kyrgyzstan. In T. Drummond & A. DeYoung (Guest Eds.), European Education: Issues and Studies, special edition entitled The New Educational Assessment Regimes in Eurasia: Impacts, Issues and Implications, 44(1), 71–92. Stambach, A. (2003). World cultural and anthropological interpretations of “choice programming” in Tanzania. In K. Anderson-Levit (Ed.), Local meanings: Global schooling, anthropology and world culture theory (pp. 141–160). New York, NY: Palgrave. Tests for UNT Kazakhstan. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://testcenter.kz/en/entrants/ ent Timirbaeva, N. (2008, March 4). Vsyo-taki testirovanie, no v poslednij raz [There will be testing after all, but for the last time]. Maya Stolitzya. Retrieved from http:// www.msn.kg/ru/news/22034/ Turlanbekova, Z. (2015). Applicants’ or students’ perceptions of Kazakhstani universities admissions tests or exams. Sociology and Anthropology, 3(8), 414–423.

124    T. DRUMMOND Urazova, D. (2014, July 13). Quarter of high school students fail national testing in Kazakhstan. Retrieved from http://en.tengrinews.kz/edu/Quarter-of-high-school -students-fail-National-Testing-in-253960/ Valkova, I. (2001). My symphony: Interview with the minister of education of the Kyrgyz Republic, Camilla Sharshekeeva. Thinking Classrooms, October(6). Vilnius, Lithuania: International Reading Association. Valkova, I. (2004). Getting ready for the national scholarship test: Study guide for arbiturents. Bishkek, Kazakhstan: CEATM. Valyaeva, G. (2006, September). Standardized testing for university admissions in Kazakhstan: A step in the right direction? Paper presented at the Central Eurasians Studies Conference, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. Yeh, S. S. (2005). Limiting the unintended consequences of high-stakes testing. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 13(43), 1–23. Young, O. (1989). International cooperation: Building regimes for natural resources and the environment. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Yuldasheva, N. (2008, February 15). Ministerstvo obrazovaniya i nauki Kyrgyzstana rassmatrivaet vozmozhnost’ zameny obshcherespublikanskogo testirovaniya novymi vidami vstupitel’nyh ehkzamenov v vuzy strany [Ministry of Education and Science considers replacing republican scholarship testing with a new form of admissions exams]. Bishkek, Kazakhstan: Information Agency 24 KG. Retrieved from http://www.24.kg/parliament/2008/02/15/76817.html

CHAPTER 6

DEVELOPING A COMMON ADMISSIONS SYSTEM FOR INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION Contexts and Considerations Nazarkhudo Dastambuev Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation in Tajikistan George Bethell Anglia Assessment, UK Algirdas Zabulionis Anglia Assessment, UK

This chapter describes the context in which a common admissions system1 (CAS) for universities was designed and implemented in Tajikistan in 2014. It also sets out the general principles that underpin the selection and admission of the students to institutions of higher education (HEIs). Several

Globalization on the Margins, pages 125–146 Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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examples are given as to how other countries in the post-Soviet region have addressed the issue of admissions to HEIs and have introduced methods and systems specifically designed to take their own perceived needs, traditions, and resources into account. This chapter relates to centralized examinations and CASs. Centralized examinations are set, controlled, and scored centrally, usually by a specialist organization such as the National Testing Centre in Tajikistan, and are beyond the direct influence of schools or HEIs. Such examinations produce results (scores) that can be used in a variety of ways for a number of different purposes, including the certification of graduation from secondary school (the so-called Matura exams, called Atestat in Russian and Nomai Kamol in Tajik) and the selection of applicants to the institutions of higher further education. Centralized examinations may, or they may not, be used as part of a CAS. A CAS is one in which all applicants for all eligible study programs at all participating HEIs are processed centrally under the same scheme. The details of the scheme may vary from country to country, but the principle remains the same: It is a system in which the preliminary allocation of places is centralized and not devolved to individual universities. In some countries, such as Russia, Ukraine, and Armenia, a “lighter” form of common admission is used whereby the formal admission process is left up to individual HEIs, but the institutions are prohibited from running their own entrance exams. For the selection of the applicants, they are required to use, in some way, the information generated from the centralized examinations. Readers should note that in order to operate a CAS a centralized examination system is a condicio sine qua non. However, centralized examinations on their own are not sufficient because additional elements such as centralized information systems/databases and agreed selection “algorithms” are needed for them to achieve their goals in effective and ethical ways. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CAS Numerus Clausus Where the number of available places at a university or in a specific study program is limited, the principle of numerus clausus (Latin “closed number”) applies. In this case, the main function of the university admissions system is to limit the number of entrants to the number of available places. Where the number of applicants for a particular study program exceeds the number of places, the admissions system must include a method of selection and, hence, rejection.

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Selection on the Basis of Merit In theory, university applicants may be selected on the basis of a range of characteristics. In the past, student quotas have, in some cases, been set on the basis of ethnicity, religious affiliation, or even gender. However, such quotas are, by definition, discriminatory and are now generally viewed as being unacceptable, if not illegal. Therefore, as a matter of principle, admission systems should select applicants solely on the basis of merit. Although some have critiqued this approach, saying that merits are usually defined by those who want to benefit from it, or that achieving merits requires providing equitable and equal opportunities, conditions and resources which do not exist in many societies due to socioeconomic inequities. Ignoring this critique, considering the contextual conditions, and not providing the needed opportunities may imply that those in power and those who possess wealth and social capital benefit from defined merits such as knowledge of English. In practice, governments may seek to address, through the admissions system, social concerns such as the need to encourage students from rural and/or disadvantaged groups to study at a higher level so that they can become, for example, teachers in their communities. This is usually achieved by applying a bonus to the students’ exam scores. Such compensation appears to be acceptable to the public if: (a) the bonuses are relatively small, and (b) the scheme is transparent and announced well in advance of the examinations and admissions procedures. Desirable Characteristics The principles above may be incorporated in a university admissions system in many different ways. However, there are other desirable characteristics that should be considered when designing such a system. These include fairness, transparency, and “educational value.” A fair system is one in which all applicants are treated in the same way, that is, where no applicant has an advantage due to, for example, wealth or political connections. In order for a system to be fair, it must be accessible to all and the methods used must be equitable. For example, accessibility is enhanced by the use of local examination centers rather than requiring all students to travel to a few major urban centers. Similarly, equity is enhanced by the use of common, centralized examinations rather than multiple university selection exams or non-standardized school marks. In theory, it is possible for an admissions system to be fair but hidden from society at large. Such secrecy creates suspicion that the authorities have something to hide. Therefore, it is highly desirable that the university admissions system should not only be fair, but also be seen to be fair. Transparency means that the selection instruments, the scoring processes, and ultimately, the results should be freely available for scrutiny. Transparency is

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a prerequisite for an effective appeals system through which a student may challenge her/his result. In many post-Socialist countries, the introduction of a CAS system was primarily seen as an expensive but necessary tool to fight corruption (see Karklin, 2005; Niyozov & Bulbulov, this volume). As a result, all the security issues surrounding the administration of the system were viewed to be of paramount importance. Usually, the wider society relates this issue directly with the secrecy of the exam papers, that is, the risk that confidential material would be “leaked” in advance of the test. In practice, leakage may occur at any stage from the drafting or compilation of question papers, through the printing process, to the distribution of materials and their receipt at testing centers.2 To this end, in the context of high-stake assessments, the concepts of transparency and secrecy are opposite sides of the same coin: both are critical for a healthy and sustainable centralized examination system. Fairness and transparency protect the rights of applicants. However, the selection system, and in particular any examinations, should also promote better teaching and learning in secondary schools. In other words, the content and approach used in the assessment should reflect curricular aims and hence have a positive effect on classroom practice. At the very least, the examinations should not divert the teaching/learning process away from the main objectives of the curriculum. To illustrate the dangers of introducing a serious mismatch between examinations and the curriculum, consider the hypothetical example below. In a particular country, the Ministry of Education decides to select university applicants using the results of just one test in an artificial language called “Gibberish.” This decision is announced in September so nobody knows this in advance of the start of the final school year. The Ministry, or a selected commercial publisher, produces dictionaries and grammar books for this hitherto unknown language and so all students wishing to enter university in the following year start to learn “Gibberish.” On the face of it, this looks ridiculous but, in fact, the system incorporates the main principles of admission by merit. It is “fair and transparent,” because all applicants have the same information about the examination, have the same access to learning materials, and are assessed using common instruments under the same conditions. It also has some validity in that students who learn this (useless) language successfully have demonstrated their ability to learn under pressure and have shown high levels of motivation. The system is also highly efficient in that just one examination is required. However, the critical problem is that throughout the last year of schooling, all students will be learning “Gibberish” and neglecting all other school subjects. Here the admission system is damaging normal school processes that are planned in

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the national curricula. Whilst this example looks ridiculous, some parallels can, unfortunately, be found in the admission rules of some universities. REASONS FOR INTRODUCING A COMMON ADMISSIONS SYSTEM In order to understand the reasons behind the decision of several former Soviet republics to introduce centralized examinations as part of a CAS, one needs to be aware of the context in which such decisions were made. Firstly, with the disappearance of the certainties offered to school graduates under the planned economy model, the stakes associated with the examinations used for controlling access to higher education increased significantly. Success could bring not only a place on a desirable university study program but also, in many cases, financial support from the state. On the other hand, failure was more likely to damage a young person’s life chances, leading to, for example, unemployment. The example below exemplifies this. Perhaps the starkest example of . . . an examination with truly high stakes comes from the unified school graduation and university selection examinations of Armenia . . . In these examinations, a student who gets a very high score gains a place on the university course of their choice together with full state funding. A student who passes with a lower score may secure a university place but without any financial support from the state. Finally, a male student who does badly will not be given a place at university and, as a consequence, will be inducted into military service where it is likely he will spend some time in a combat zone. It is hard to conceive of a situation where the stakes for examination candidates, and their families, are higher. (Bethell and Zabulionis, 2011)

Secondly, societies throughout the region fear that all official processes, including university admission systems, are corrupt.3 It may be that much of this fear is ungrounded, but the perception of corruption is strong as shown in Table 6.1. Given the increasing pressure on school graduates to gain a place in HEIs, and the widely held belief that the old systems of selection were prone to corruption, a number of transition countries have taken the opportunity to make the admissions process fairer and more effective. While each such country has its own priorities for reform, we can still see some common reasons behind adopting unified exams and common admissions procedures. These relate, in different measures, to

130    N. DASTAMBUEV, G. BETHELL, and A. ZABULIONIS TABLE 6.1  Corruption Perceptions Index Scores for Post-Soviet States Country

CPI 2009 Score

Rank (Out of 180)

Estonia

6.6

27

Lithuania

4.9

52

Latvia

4.5

56

Georgia

4.1

66

Moldova

3.3

89

Armenia

2.7

120

Kazakhstan

2.7

120

Belarus

2.4

139

Azerbaijan

2.3

143

Russia

2.2

146

Ukraine

2.2

146

Tajikistan

2.0

158

Kyrgyzstan

1.9

162

Turkmenistan

1.8

168

Uzbekistan

1.7

174

Average (former SSRs)

3.0

Average (180 countries)

4.0

Average (OECD)

7.0

Note: The CPI scale ranges from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Data Source: Transparency International, 2009.

the requirements of three key stakeholders: society at large, students (and their supporters), and HEIs. For many countries in the region, corruption is seen as a menace that damages all aspects of the society. Fighting corruption at all levels has become a priority. The educational sphere is no exception and the “traditional” university selection procedures have been viewed as corrupt (Heyneman, 2007). Hard evidence of corruption is difficult to come by as criminal prosecutions are few and far between. However, anecdotal evidence of malpractice on the part of tutors and examiners (these two often being one and the same), university professors, and even officials of Ministries of Education is almost universal. In the face of this apparent unfairness, those lower down in the system—students, parents, grandparents, and so forth—feel powerless. The systems were complex, opaque, and run by powerful autonomous institutions. As a result, “ordinary” members of society could not challenge the procedures or the outcomes.

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While anti-corruption is clearly an important factor, other changes have also made a CAS much more attractive from the students’ point of view. For example, a competitive market has developed in the higher education sector with an expansion in the number of HEIs offering a much more diverse selection of courses. A student wishing to study commerce may now find suitable courses at many HEIs rather than just one or two, as in the past. This applicant would like to apply for her/his chosen course at several universities through a single “door,” something which is impossible if each HEI sets its own entrance exams. In sum, centralized examinations and a CAS move authority to a central agency which, at least in theory, is responsible to the society it serves. Centralized systems can be designed to be more transparent and to include rights for candidates and others to appeal against procedures and decisions. In contrast to society’s broad concerns, students (and their parents and other supporters) have specific concerns. Each candidate’s priority is to gain a place in the university course/program that they feel best meets their needs. Typically, they wish to study the subject/specialty of their choosing at the institution of their choosing. However, the aspirants also want the mechanism by which they win their university place to be fair and efficient. For example, under the traditional system, whereby each university ran its own admission exams, a student would have to prepare for multiple, different examinations. As a consequence, a student wishing to study economics would have to travel to several universities on different days to take different examinations in the same subject, say, mathematics. This was undoubtedly stressful, inconvenient, and expensive. It was also inequitable as shown in the extract below. (In) the case of Karelia (Russia), it is easy enough for a student who lives in the capital city to present him/herself at several of the city’s universities to sit their entrance exams. But a student who lives in a remote village will find it difficult to travel to Petrozavodsk and stay there for a few days to take the same entrance examinations. The system is also inequitable because students require private tuition for each entrance test, which is beyond the means of poorer students. (Gvozdeva, 2009)

In other words, the centralized examinations and a CAS replace the multiple pathways to higher education which were characteristic of the old system. This increases fairness and efficiency, reducing the burden on students and their families and increasing equitable access. Universities and other HEIs have some reason to resist the move towards centralized exams and a common admissions procedure. As a matter of principle, they are unlikely to welcome the diminution of their autonomy when it comes to the selection process. At a more pragmatic level, the

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institutions and their academic staff may resent the loss of a lucrative source of income—albeit a “grey” one. However, if this can be overcome, for example, by increasing budgetary funding to increase the salaries of teaching staff, then there are reasons why universities would welcome reforms to the admissions process. The priority of a university and its faculties is to attract and admit the best students. Here “best” means those who are both highly motivated to study in a particular program and those with the greatest academic potential. Centralized examinations can provide universities with a reliable, national “rank order” of students by ability. This gives them the information they need to fill their available places with the highest performing school graduates. Coupled with this, the CAS will consider the students’ preferences, which can be taken as a proxy for motivation. In short, if a university can fill all available places with “first-choice” candidates from the top of the merit lists, then it will have achieved a key objective. To summarize, different stakeholders have different reasons and needs for supporting the introduction of centralized exams and CASs. A welldesigned system can address these diverse needs. It can: help in the fight against corruption by increasing transparency, security, and accountability; meet the needs of students by increasing fairness and reducing the psychological and financial burdens on them; and help students to gain places on courses that meets their wishes. Equally important, such a system can provide universities with the information they need to fill their courses with the “right” students. Finally, in countries where centralized examinations serve the twin functions of certification and selection, investment in more sophisticated, and hence more expensive, examinations can support government initiatives to improve the quality of education in schools. In other words, centralized examination and admission systems can play a diagnostic role, leading to reforming the whole education system (Shamatov & Sainazarov, 2010). OVERVIEW OF THE TRADITIONAL ADMISSION SYSTEM The pending4 traditional system for admission to universities is quite simple: A student decides where and what he/she wants to study and applies directly to that study program through a university entrance commission. The university concerned may set some requirements for applicants; for instance, it may set some entrance exams and/or ask for some information about the student’s academic achievement at school, or even ask for some work experience. Based on this information, all students applying to this study program are ranked and the ordered list is released. All students are now able to check the fairness of the admission process. The top students,

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as many as there are places available in this study program, are asked to come on the specific day to a special committee meeting and to sign a “contract for studies.” The student might predict, to some extent, how well he/ she fits the admission requirements (e.g., to forecast their results on the entrance tests) and to compare this information with what happened in previous years under similar conditions. However, the applicant takes some risks; if he/she is not admitted, there are very few possibilities for entering another study program in the same year even in the same HEI as the new program may ask for another combination of entrance exams. In order to overcome these high stakes, the ministries of education in some countries arranged the admission process by grouping all HEIs into several groups. All HEIs within a group had to have the meeting of the special admission committee on the same day. There was then a gap before the meeting for the next group of HEIs. In this case, a student not admitted into a study program from the first group of HEIs, had, at least in theory, a chance to apply to HEIs in the second group. Figure 6.1 shows this process graphically. To summarize Figure 6.1: • A student was applying for a single study program in a chosen HEI. • Each study program in HEIs had the right to set its own admission requirements with or without special entrance examinations, specifically designed for that study program or a small group of similar programs. • Different HEIs did not share information about the applicants. There was no tradition of accepting results from entrance examinations taken at another HEI. • The student was responsible for all the risks associated with failing to enter into their chosen study program. That is, even a very bright student could be left out of HEI in that particular year if his/ her choice was too ambitious since there was no time for a second attempt. • It was difficult to analyze such a diverse admission process in general; the public trust of the system varied from HEI to HEI.

Figure 6.1  The model of traditional admission system.

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OVERVIEW OF A COMMON ADMISSION SYSTEM The main idea behind the Common Admission System (CAS) is the use of a single “entrance door” to all HEIs of the country. Through this door, the applicant can apply to any HEI and study program, as well as to multiple programs at a number of universities. The first assumption under which such a CAS might operate is the establishment of a unified information system about all applicants, that is, information that is acceptable for all HEIs and study programs. This “universal information” about student achievements could come from secondary schools (e.g., subject “year-marks” as included in the Matura/graduation diploma). However, as school-level information is generally regarded as unreliable, it is better if the centralized examinations are administered for all applicants. These centralized examinations might be run by HEIs (as in Armenia5 in early 1990s), or by an external institution such as a national examination center. The second condition for success of a CAS is the establishment of a centralized database where information from HEIs and applicants is stored, including the number of places available and admission rules for each study program; ranked lists of students’ wishes according to which HEI and study program they would like to apply to; mode of study (full time, part time); type of funding (state-paid place, self-paid place), and so forth. The database may be administered by the National Examination Centre (as in Georgia) or by a university or group of HEIs (as in Lithuania by the Association of HEIs of Lithuania). Figure 6.2 illustrates the process of the “classical” CAS.

Figure 6.2  Model of “classical” unified admission system.

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Figure 6.3  Model of partially unified admission system.

The CAS might also function in a “partial mode”: the HEI itself is responsible for all admission processes, but without the right to re-examine applicants in subjects where the centralized examination has been administered. In this case, the students would apply to their chosen study programs, but their exam results are valid for all HEIs in the country. Similar “partial” CAS functions in Ukraine and Russia. It should be mentioned that in this case, the role of HEIs in the admission process would be much more substantial, but mostly restricted to “bureaucratic” processing of ranked lists of applicants based on external information (i.e., the room for corruption is limited). Figure 6.3 shows the process of admission as it operates in a “partially unified” admission system. EXAMPLES FROM THE POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES ON HOW THEIR NEWLY ESTABLISHED CAS OPERATE Georgia This country runs the most centralized CAS. Georgia’s CAS was developed under the auspices of President Saakashvili in 2005, who delegated the task to the National Assessment and Examination Centre (NAEC), founded a few years earlier. Each July, the NAEC runs subject-based centralized admission examinations (i.e., for students who have already graduated from secondary schools) in main school subjects and one General Ability Test (GAT). The admission of a student into an HEI depends solely on the student’s results on NAEC’s examinations. The GAT, as a compulsory test for all applicants, is also used to distribute financial vouchers for studies in HEIs. The most successful students on the GAT get a 100% voucher. Partial

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vouchers (75%, 50%, 30%, or 0%) are paid to less successful students depending on their GAT scores. NAEC holds the national register of all study programs. These study programs are grouped, and, for each group, the common admission requirements are defined. This means that, for example, the admission requirements for economics are exactly the same in all HEIs throughout the country. Each student registers with NAEC his/her ranked “wish list” of different study programs and different HEIs. Based on this list, he/ she receives a list of examinations to be taken.6 As the numbers of statefinanced places in HEIs are controlled by the Ministry of Education, the role of a single HEI in the admission process is very limited. Each institution receives, around mid-August, a list of students that should be invited to study in each program. It is then up to the student to come in a few days in order to sign an agreement with HEI. A few days later the NAEC collects back information from all HEIs about this first round of admission and announces how many places are left (if any) in each study program/ HEI. Students who have not succeeded in the first round have the right to participate in the second round. They should present to NAEC their new ranked wish lists for studies and the CAS is run once again, using the information from the same centralized examinations. As the flow of all information about students, examinations, and admission processes can be tracked in the NAEC’s website, the CAS is quite transparent and fair. It is generally well-accepted by the wider society. Lithuania Each June, the National Examination Centre (NEC) administers centralized Matura examinations. The results of these exams are used for certification of a student’s graduation from secondary school, that is, for obtaining the Matura Certificate. At the same time, the results are used for admission to HEIs. The admission process is administered by the Association of HEI of Lithuania, but without reexamining the student in the subjects where NEC information on centralized examinations is available. Only some special creative competitions (in art, music, or test of physical condition of the applicant, if needed) can be arranged by HEIs. The students/applicants present their ranked wish lists for studies in different HEIs to any HEI (e.g., to the nearest) and wait for an invitation to sign a contract for studies in the highest available places from their wish lists according to their examination results. Around a week is given to complete the first round of admission. Thereafter, information about unfilled places in HEIs is collected back into the system and the second CAS round is announced for students who were not successful in the first round.

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The role of individual universities in the process is not very significant. However, because the system is run by the Association of HEIs, universities do not appear to feel that they are marginalized. For example, it is up to the association to group similar study programs and agree on common admission requirements, that is, number of exams, weighted mean of exam results, any additional criteria for admission, such as participation of the students in the national competitions. This means that the two parts of CAS in Lithuania are separated: The NEC produces trustworthy unified information on student achievement, and another institution (the Association of HEIs) administers the CAS using that information. Russia and Ukraine These two countries have similar admission systems, which start from external examinations. In Russia these EGE (Ediniy Gosudarstvenniy Examen) exams also serve to certify students’ graduation from secondary school (i.e., performs as a Matura examination). In Ukraine, the external ZNO (Zentr Nacionalnoi Ocenivanii) exams initially served a similar dual function, internal and external, but later were postponed in time and are not associated with the secondary school leaving any longer. Nevertheless, the general idea in both countries is the same: HEIs should not re-examine applicants in the subjects where an external exam is administered. In both countries the autonomy of universities is highly respected, so, formally these HEIs are managing student admission using students’ results on external examinations, but they are free to use some additional information in their selection of the applicants. This “additional information” can be controversial. For example, in Ukraine the applicant will get a substantial bonus if they have attended—and paid for—a special preparatory course arranged by the HEI to which the student is applying. In Russia, special bonuses are awarded for a student’s success in various school contests and competitions. Azerbaijan This country, together with Kazakhstan, has a unified admission system, which is conspicuous in being based on a single, multi-subject test. This test focuses on the individual subjects taught in the school, but several subjects are combined into one test paper. This approach was chosen to address the problems faced by the institution responsible in administering multiple high-stake tests, and the difficulties faced by students in having to take multiple tests at different times. The test paper does not integrate subjects at the item level; it is compiled from several single-subject sub-tests. The main

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advantage of this assessment model is that one test paper gives the student’s final score to be used for admission. All study programs offered by all HEIs in the country are grouped into four groups. Group I consists of mathematics, physics, engineering, chemical technologies, architecture, and design specialties. Group II comprises economics, management, sociology, and geography specialties. Group III consists of humanities, arts, and music specialties. Group IV includes medicine, chemistry, biology, psychology, and sport specialties. For each group, a single admission test is prepared, combining several school subjects that are considered to fit most closely the demands of the group’s study programs. Admission tests are arranged on Saturdays and a student has the right to participate in one session only, that is, the student can apply for different study programs, but from within the same group only. This somewhat restricts the possibilities of students in that they cannot apply for programs in different fields, but overall this approach makes the admission process simpler, more transparent, and more efficient. Kazakhstan The structure of the test papers in the Kazakh centralized examination system is quite similar to that in Azerbaijan in that a multi-subject test is used. In this country, however, the applicant gets one test booklet containing 13 subject subtests. Of these, four are compulsory: Mother Tongue (Kazakh or Russian), History of Kazakhstan, Mathematics, and Russian or Kazakh Language (i.e., a different language from that chosen as Mother Tongue). In addition, the applicants choose one other subject, depending on the selected study programs at the HEI. The list of elective subjects is quite large, making the test booklet “impressive”—Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Geography, World History, Literature, English, German, or French. The number of items in each subtest is 25 and the correct answer for each item is scored with one point. The exams are administered in about 150 local sites (1/3 of which are at HEIs and the others in secondary schools) in seven sessions, each on a different day. The number of students taking an exam at one time/place is limited to about 800. This is necessary as the results of this complex testing must be released by the local state commission on the same day as the exam was taken. A minimal benchmark of 50 points (55 for medicine) is required in order to participate in the admission process which follows the exams. For example, in 2011, around 9.6% of students (from a cohort of 126.168) failed in this exam. Admission is arranged by the HEIs themselves, using a student’s combined scores on this centralized examination. For some study programs,

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special “creative” tests are allowed which are administered by the HEI instead of the optional part of the centralized test. FUNCTION OF EXAMS In all countries that use centralized examinations, the most important assessments take place at the interface between (higher) secondary schools and HEIs. At this point, examinations typically serve one or two major functions. Firstly, the results can be used to certify the successful completion of the secondary phase of education (“school graduation”). In many countries across Central and Eastern Europe, success in these exams, together with school grades, is taken as a proxy for maturity, hence, such exams are sometimes labeled Matura. Secondly, results from centralized exams can be used for admission to HEIs. As shown below, some countries use examination results solely for the purpose of admission, while others use the results for both purposes: • Admission only: Ukraine, Georgia, Belorussia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey; and • Matura and admission: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovakia, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Armenia. TYPES OF CENTRALIZED EXAMINATION PAPERS When it comes to the design of the centralized examinations, each country has its own political and educational priorities, context and traditions, and technological and financial resources (see Drummond, Chapter 5, this volume). As a result, different countries have adopted different models for constructing and processing their examinations. The lists below categorize countries according to two criteria: (a) whether the subjects of the curriculum are assessed independently or in groups (i.e., combinations of subjects); and (b) whether student responses are marked automatically via optical scanning, or whether some part of the responses are marked by humans. • Single-subject based, including open-ended items requiring human marking: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovakia, Russia, Byelorussia, Georgia, and Ukraine (language examinations only); • Single-subject based, processed by optical scanning without human marking: Armenia and Ukraine (for non-language subjects, e.g., maths, history, sciences, etc.); and

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• Multiple-subject combinations of several (4–5) subjects into one exam “paper”: Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. Notably, the current work in Tajikistan assumes that the common admissions procedure will be based on centralized exams of multiple subjects (in combinations of “3 subjects in 1” and/or “4 subjects in 1”) and that all students’ responses will be marked automatically as in the Turkish model. THE ROLE OF HEI IN THE COMMON ADMISSION SYSTEM According to Stanislavsky,7 “Theatre begins with the cloakroom.” By analogy, we can say “University starts with admission exams,” since admission exams allow a university to identify a pool of prospective students who have met some prior requirements as to their knowledge and skills in relevant areas. By selecting from this pool, a university can be more confident in that it has enlisted the “best” candidates for further studies. This is a rational approach to selection, but unfortunately, in societies where there is corruption, there is often a darker side to the process. This “darker side” may take different forms, starting from members of the examination committee offering expensive “special tuition” for entrance exams to the admission of well-connected applicants for favour or money. In short, some HEIs and their senior staff are likely to see the admission process as an opportunity to make money and, hence, they will be resistant to the introduction of a “clean” CAS. The role of the HEI in the admission process should be understood from the angle of “anti-corruption” measures. Firstly, removing the rights of HEIs to set their own entrance examinations and delegating the responsibility for the centralized exams to an external examination center resolves much of the corruption problem. In fact, this has some positive aspects for the HEI themselves since they do not have to worry about setting examination on their own vision of a syllabus, which may or may not be related to curricula and teaching practice in schools. The burden is removed from universities and, at the same time, the exams support and enhance educational values of the national secondary education. The exams are also more transparent and fairer for students. However, in special cases, the HEI should be allowed to administer some special tests or contests for study programs where particular creative and performance skills are needed. These special tests may contribute only a part of the overall admission score since the rest should be compiled from the centralized exams’ results. Another place where an HEI might have a right to impose its own admissions policy would be in the use of a “weighted score” for the selection of applicants.

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Consider a student applying to a study program where he is required to take three examinations—Language/Mother Tongue (L), Mathematics (M), and History (H). The student’s total score to be used for admission can be calculated in several ways:8’ 1. a simple sum = L + M + H; 2. a weighted sum = w1 × L + w2 × M + w3 × H. If all three weights w1, w2, and w3 are equal, then these two sums are equivalent in that they give the same ranked list of the applicants. However, changing these weights according to the priorities of the study program may change the order of the students in the weighted list. For example, the use of mother tongue in all subjects might be an educational policy decision, and it may be decided that a student’s skills in maths are very important for a particular program, but that knowledge of history is less important for this program. Here, the HEI might set the weights as w1 = 0.3, w2 = 0.6, and w3 = 0.1. This means that the Maths score carries the greatest weight; the Language score carries medium weight; and the History score is considered—but only with a small weight. In this way, the HEI gets a tool to form the “face” or profile of applicants whom they would like to see studying this program. It is important to point out that the use of weights does not destroy the system of common admission, but leaves enough room for a single HEI to be responsible for its own prospective students. Of course, it is desirable that different HEIs use the same approach (i.e., the same list of exam subjects for the same study programs), but the weights could be slightly different with little significant impact on students. CAS FROM A TECHNICAL ANGLE: MANAGEMENT OF DATABASES AND THE NEED FOR A SECOND ROUND Technically, a unified admission means the management of a relational database, that is, a collection of data items organized as a set of formallydescribed tables from which data can be accessed or reassembled in many different ways without having to reorganize the database tables. At least, three large “tables” should be used: • Table 1: Database of the students’ wishes to study in HEIs on various programs; • Table 2: Database of the students’ results on different admission tests and other information used to judge students (e.g., marks from school, participation in contests and Olympiads, other background information); and

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• Table 3: Database of the study programs and places available in these study programs and the requirements for applying for these study programs. Once all three above-mentioned databases have been filled and “frozen” for processing, the system will generate an invitation to each student to study in some study program. This study program comes from each particular student’s wish list and is the highest rank available according to the student’s results on the tests and other background information. For some students, the outcome is a letter of rejection, informing the unlucky applicant that “your wishes were much higher than your achievement shown on the admission tests, so you cannot be invited this year to study in an HEI.” In case of success, however, the next step is up to a student: to present the invitation to the HEI concerned and to sign a formal contract for studies. In theory, the number of the invited students in a study program should exactly match the number of places declared to be available in that study program as entered into the admission database. In reality, not all students accept the invitations. Therefore, at the end, some study programs will not be full. The simplest way to fill the vacant spaces would be to allow HEIs to arrange their own small “additional” admission processes. However, this would be outside of the public control. In 2011, a sad example of the consequences of such additional admission opportunity came from Russia. A highly prestigious medical university in Moscow artificially put some “dead souls” with very high scores in the applicants’ list. Most of these dummy applicants were students who graduated from school in previous years and were already studying in other universities. Therefore, after the first round of unified admission, around 2/3 of the places at the medical university were not filled, because the “invited” students didn’t come to sign contracts. These places were sold in an “admission black market” (see Lenta, 2011). It can be seen that there is a need for a second centralized admission round, based on the same applicants’ achievements and background information, but by letting the students present a new “wish list” for the available study places. This second round usually puts a lot of pressure on the institutions running CAS as it should be done in a short time and requires some new information to be entered into the databases (e.g., information from the universities about the available places in particular study programs; information from the students about their updated wish lists). Unfortunately, if one of the declared goals of the CAS is to reduce the level of corruption on the bridge between secondary school and HEI, then this second round is essential. ON THE “CORRECTNESS” OF ORDERED LISTS A CAS is a highly computerized system where outcomes are derived from the interaction of several large databases. Therefore, the inner workings of

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the CAS are, to a great extent, hidden from the end-users. The CAS is effectively a “black box” which students and their supporters and university faculties are invited to trust. In a good system, this trust will be reinforced by including steps which “prove” the correctness of the ultimate result, like why a particular applicant was placed on a particular study program in a particular HEI. Just as importantly, there may be a need to demonstrate why an applicant was not invited to study in his/her preferred HEI, or study program. The need to be transparent and demonstrate “correctness” can conflict with the need to protect the personal information of the applicants. In fact, in most countries, the final list of the invited students cannot be published in the public domain. In some countries, the correctness of the final list of students, invited to a study program, can be checked by the very applicant, who expressed a wish to study in that program. Everybody gets his/her score (which was used to rank applicants to that study program) together with information about the lowest score which was accepted for the entry. Therefore, each student can check why he/she was not accepted into a program higher up in their list of preferences. However, this requires a great deal of extra work on the part of the institutions running the CAS, as each applicant should receive not only an invitation for studies, but also special information about all their other, unsuccessful wishes. The complexity of the CAS system, and the difficulty of defining “correctness,” can be illustrated by a further example. For simplicity, this example assumes a “minimal situation” with just two universities and two applicants. The reader can extend the principles to more realistic situations: So, two students, Nazar and Gulchehra (pseudonyms), both applied to two universities: “modern” and “old.” Nazar’s first wish was to study at the modern university, whilst Gulchehra’s preference is the old university. They both took centralized examinations and, in accordance with the admissions criteria, the universities used different weights to calculate their total scores. These weighted scores were presented in Table 6.2. As the CAS issues the results, Nazar gets invited to the modern university, while Gulchehra is invited to the old university. They both are happy as they got invitations matching their first wishes. They feel that they can trust this TABLE 6.2  Hypothetical Example of Student Score Outcomes Using Differential Weighting Applicant/University

Modern University

Old University

Nazar

1st wish Score 61

2nd wish Score 58

Gulchehra

2nd wish Score 69

1st wish Score 52

144    N. DASTAMBUEV, G. BETHELL, and A. ZABULIONIS computerized system. However, the computer could issue different results, inviting Nazar to the old university and Gulchehra to the modern. In this case, they might both be a little unhappy as they both missed their first wishes. But, once again, they can trust the computer, because it shows why these first wishes were denied: Nazar’s 1st wish was the modern university, but Gulchehra’s score for this university was higher (69 > 61), so she deserved this place more. Nazar can not complain. Gulchehra’s 1st wish was the old university, but her scores for this university were lower than Nazar’s (52  .05) and no differences by wealth. During my in-depth interviews with parents in Dushanbe, Tajikistan I asked about their view of the market and received mixed responses, which may shed light on responses from the survey in Kazkhstan. A few parents did TABLE 14.5  Mean of Responses About “Choice” and “Market” by Number of Children and School Attendance, Kazakhstan 2015 Full Sample

Siblings Same School

Parents Make Choices

3.69

3.78

Siblings Different School 3.57

 SD

0.92

0.98

0.99

Resembles Market

2.76

2.84

2.77

 SD

1.29

1.39

1.15

 N

301

73

22

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agree with the concept of school choice resembling markets. These parents mostly referred to a positive relationship between the cost of the school and quality. Others disagreed about education being a market, citing the fact that even expensive schools could offer a poor education. I observed that the parents who disagreed with education being a market seemed to be the ones which put higher emphasis on the importance of teachers and noted that even more expensive schools had poor teachers. The quotation below summarizes the mixed viewpoints described above. The parent both recognizes changes in quality related to cost, but in the end places responsibility for learning on parents no matter the type of school. Interviewer: Is there a connection between the price and the quality? Respondent: There is a connection, the more expensive schools try to have better conditions . . . But I think that many things depend on the parents. Some parents think I gave a lot of money, no other work is needed . . . In the regular schools there is also the possibility to have good education if parents pay attention. (Parent 7, Tajikistan) Parents in both Tajikistan and Kazakhstan also tended to associate market activities with corruption, bribes, or informal payments. When asked about a market in education, several parents immediately began sharing about various bribes, entrance fees, and sponsorship requirements. The quotation below is an excellent example of those types of responses: Interviewer: Is the schooling system like a market? Parent: It is like a market. Our school director got caught taking a bribe by the “financial police” they decide to punish her. The rate for entrance fee increased every year. Last time she asked for 2,000 dollars. (Parent 8, Kazakhstan) Another reason why parents may not associate school choice with a market is because few of them directly associate prices with schooling. In Kazakhstan, 30% of parents in all types of public schools, including gymnasiums and lyceums, responded that they did not pay any funds at all, as seen in the table above which presented the types of payments parents make. While the number may be over reported as parents may have been cautious about discussing school payments over the phone, such a high number would indicate there are definitely some percentage of parents that have access to a variety of schools without any cost. If costs are not directly related to schools, perhaps this influences their low rating of school choice as functioning like a market.

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Further supporting the argument that costs are disassociated with school choice, very few parents in the survey or interviews indicated school cost as a factor they considered when choosing schools. In the countrywide survey in Kazakhstan, fewer than 5% of parents mentioned that they research schools costs and fewer than 5% considered cost when choosing schools. In interviews with parents in Dushanbe, costs also seemed to be in the background of parents’ decisions. Parents first mentioned considering aspects of school quality, location, and so forth. School costs were mentioned, but only as an excuse for not sending their children on to higher quality schools (Whitsel, 2014). I argue that this is because many of the specific costs of schooling are informal. Parents do not have a direct way of assessing the true price of the school to judge it like a market product. Often parents are confronted with costs only after schooling begins during the first parent–teacher meeting. Thus parents choose schools safely within their budget without a specific eye to the direct cost. Additionally, in the survey in Kazakhstan I asked parents what problems and benefits result from school choice and the results are displayed in Figure 14.2 and Figure 14.3 by respondents’ ratings of school as a market. The totals are above 100% because participants could choose multiple answers. Across the various market viewpoints, a majority of parents associated school choice with an increase in educational quality. Parents perceptions of variety

Figure 14.2  Parent’s viewpoints of the benefits of school choice in Kazakhstan, January 2015.

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Figure 14.3  Parent’s viewpoints of the drawbacks of school choice in Kazakhstan, January 2015.

and flexibility differ based on agreement that school choice resembled a market, but seemingly only at extremes. Parents who rated market resemblance the lowest, mentioned the benefit of variety of schools more than flexibility for the family, while a higher percentage of parents who rated market resemblance the highest, reported flexibility as a benefit than variety of schools. The greatest concerns related to school choice across parents’ views of the market includes high costs of schooling, social inequality, and nonstandardized curriculum. Concerning high cost, there are few differences across categories of market perception. Again, there appears to be a difference at the extremes in the view of inequality and non-standard curriculum. For parents who do not believe that the school choice resembles a market (Category 1) there is a much larger concern for nonstandard curriculum than for social inequality, and the opposite is true for parents who felt school choice did resemble a market. CONCLUSIONS In the 25 years since independence, a variety of schools have arisen in urban settings of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The development is due both to policy changes and economic crises. The policy changes were pursued as a

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part of the initial drive towards democratization and establishing a market economy, which included private provision of education. The economic crises reduced public funding for education and increased reliance on the informal system by school directors to maintain their schools. Despite the disparate socioeconomic status, the findings from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are highly similar. Both survey data from Kazakhstan and interview data from Tajikistan showed that parents were active in choosing among schools. Over 60% of parents in Kazakhstan reported conducting research prior to sending their children to school. While the majority of parents in Kazakhstan sent their children to neighborhood public schools, close to 30% of parents across all wealth categories sent their children to gymnasiums or lyceums. A larger percentage of parents in the upper wealth categories placed their children in private schools, but not more than 10%. Middle-class families preferred gymnasiums and lyceums. Many parents were also making individualized choices for their children as 25% of families with multiple school children placed their children in separate schools. Interview data from parents in Tajikistan demonstrate that they are also active in choosing schools, placing their children in neighborhood public schools, higher quality public schools outside their region, and in private schools. It was common that the eldest child moved between multiple schools as parents searched for the best school and that younger children simply attended the school that parents settled on for the eldest. However, many of the parents in Tajikistan had placed their children in separate schools based on personal aptitude and/or gender. Parents were placing their boys in higher quality schools to be better prepared for careers, while girls were placed in lower quality neighborhood schools as they were thought to simply be housewives in the future. Although parents are active in choosing schools they did not consider it a market type activity. When directly asked in a survey whether school resembled a market, parents in Kazakhstan did not fully agree that it did. Perhaps this is because they do not associate costs directly with schools as less than 5% of parents reported researching school costs and less than 5% reported considering school costs as a factor in school choice. Also, high numbers of parents in Kazakhstan did not report paying anything for multiple types of public schools. In Tajikistan parents only mentioned school costs indirectly in relation to choosing schools. I believe this is because the informal system blurs the total actual costs of schooling from parents. Often parents would only find out about the specific costs in the first parents meetings after the school year began, which is too late to change schools. Finally, many parents were more likely to associate informal activities (as well as bribes and corruption) to the market and perhaps not all parents view their payments for school as market activity. Further research to specifically

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explore reasons why parents do not associate the market with school choice could be conducted. I investigated this topic as part of a broader interest in learning how parents navigate the newly available choices and learning what factors were important for their choice. In addition, better comparable data for Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and for the entire region could be gathered. While the data in this chapter were complimentary, both countrywide survey work in Tajikistan is needed as well as in-depth interviews in Kazakhstan. Countrywide survey data in Tajikistan would allow us to understand how widespread the trends are that were discussed in interviews. In-depth interviews in Kazakhstan would provide direct insight into reasons for the various observed patterns. Further research in neighboring countries is needed as well to better understand regional trends. More data would help immensely in understanding trends in inequality of educational quality in the region since independence. This study demonstrated that within public schools parents perceive differences in educational quality, particularly in Tajikistan, which they take advantage of. More alarming is the fact that parents gain access to the better quality public schools through money, thus the poor are not able to access quality education even within public schools. Previous research found mixed reports about the treatment of the poor in Dushanbe. Some parents reported that poor students were sent to the back of the classroom or asked to leave the class on days when they did not bring payment, while other parents reported that discounts on school or class funds existed for poor families (Whitsel, 2014). Thus more information on both the differences among schools in countries in the region and how they are accessed may improve equality of access to quality schooling. Further studies on the informal system which leads to inequality of educational access and quality may bring about a positive change in educational policy as well. Currently the focus is simply on enrollment numbers, not on various measures of quality in Tajikistan. This is justified as the efforts of international organizations were focused on providing education for all and working with the ministry to increase enrollment. As we learn more about the poor quality of schools, the informal system of support, and the types of groups which are disadvantaged then better policies focusing on increasing educational quality for all can be created. Kazakhstan has focused much attention on quality, especially in creating opportunities for gifted children, but it is still important to learn about the inequalities and who is able to access these opportunities generated by the informal system. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Tajik research was supported by funds from the Research Scholar Program supported by the United States Department of State, Program for Research

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and Training for Eastern Europe and the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (Title VIII), administered by American Councils for International Education. I also want to thank Tuychi Rashidov for his research assistance while in Tajikistan. Data from Kazakhstan was collected with support from the faculty seed grant program at Nazarbayev University. Meiirzhan Baitas, Zhamilya Riztayeva, and Olga Mun were research assistants for preliminary interviews in Kazakhstan and helped to create the national survey. Torgyn Shokanbaeva, Gulzira Khamidulliyeva, and Aldiyar Auezbek helped with analysis of data from Kazakhstan. REFERENCES Anderson, B. A., & Silver, B. D. (1984). Equality, efficiency, and politics in Soviet bilingual education policy, 1934–1980. American Political Science Review, 78(04), 1019–1039. Bazidova, Z. (2007). Tajikistan: Informal payments in formal secondary education. Public foundation “Panorama.” Retrieved from http://www.edupolicy.net/ portfolio-posts/tajikistan-informal-payments-in-formal-secondary-education Charmaz, K. (2014). Constructing grounded theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Davlatov, I. D., & Mulloev, S. M. (2000). Educational financing and budgeting in Tajikistan. Retrieved from http://hdl.voced.edu.au/10707/16258 Humphrey, C. (2002). The unmaking of Soviet life: Everyday economies after socialism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ledeneva, A. V. (1998). Russia’s economy of favours: Blat, networking and informal exchange (Vol. 102). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Mynbayeva, A., & Pogosian, V. (2014). Kazakhstani school education development from the 1930s: History and current trends. Retrieved from http://www.ijse. eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/2014_2_7.pdf Niyozov, S. (2001). Education in Tajikistan: A window to understanding change through continuity (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Canada. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2014). Reviews of national policies for education reviews of national policies for education: Secondary education in Kazakhstan. Paris, France: Author. Silova, I. (2005). Traveling policies: Hijacked in Central Asia. European Educational Research Journal, 4(1), 50–59. Whitsel, C. (2009a). Family resources, sitting at home and democratic choice: Investigating determinants of educational attainment in post-Soviet Tajikistan. Central Asian Survey, 28(1), 29–41. Whitsel, C. (2009b). Growing inequality: Post-Soviet transition and educational participation in Tajikistan (Doctoral dissertation). Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Retrieved from https://iucat.iu.edu/catalog/9028254 Whitsel, C. (2011). Counting the costs. Problems of Post-Communism, 58(3), 28–38. Whitsel, C. (2014). Parental choices in the primary and secondary school market in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. European Education, 46(2), 53–73.

312    C. WHITSEL World Bank. (2015). DATA. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SE.SEC.PRIV.ZS Yakavets, N. (2014). Educational reform in Kazakhstan: The first decade of independence. In D. Bridges (Ed.), Education reform and internationalization: The case of school reform in Kazakhstan (pp. 1–27). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

PART III REFORMING FROM THE MARGINS: THE CENTRALITY OF THE TEACHING PROFESSION

CHAPTER 15

TEN-PLUS-ONE WAYS OF COPING WITH TEACHER SHORTAGE IN KYRGYZSTAN Before and After 2011 Gita Steiner-Khamsi Teachers College, Columbia University Nurbek Teleshaliyev Open Society Foundations, UK

This chapter examines how schools in Kyrgyzstan cope with the low salary of teachers. It focuses on the situation of teachers in 2009 and, in the postscript, sketches the major changes that took place as a result of the fundamental salary reform of 2011.1 We draw on two important situation analyses of teachers that UNICEF Kyrgyzstan supported. The first study was carried out in 2009 and the second in 2014 (UNICEF Kyrgyzstan, 2009, 2014).2 In 2009, teacher shortage was a major concern. The teacher workforce was over-aged and the shortage was especially felt in rural areas. After the Second Kyrgyz Revolution of April 2010, political tensions were high and Globalization on the Margins, pages 315–350 Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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masses of public servants took to the street. The three most vocal groups were military, medication, and education workers. In the Fall of 2010, teachers in Issykul took their protests publicly, soon followed by teachers in other parts of the country. The Ministry of Education and Science solicited advice from national and international experts on how to lift the salary of teachers given the severe financial constraints in the public sector. Finally, in 2011, the government of Kyrgyzstan launched in January 2011 an ambitious salary reform to end the “crisis” in the teaching profession and improve the quality of instruction as follows: remedy teacher shortage, reduce the teaching load of teachers, reward high-performing teachers, and attract young specialists to the profession. Clearly, the salary reform was issued in a state of emergency and under great public and political pressure, making it necessary to subsequently modify and specify the details of the reform. There was a real increase of teacher salaries above and beyond inflation due to the 2011 reform. In 2012, the teacher salary was on average KGS 7,999 (about $170 USD), that is, more than double of what teachers earned prior to the reform. However, equally important is the fact that despite the considerable salary increase in 2011, the salary in the education sector remained below the national wage average. In 2012, the salary in education was only three-quarter (74.6%) of what other professionals in Kyrgyzstan earned on average. Only the salaries in the agriculture sector were lower than salaries in the education sector. The relative low teacher salary is to this day the cause for the dissatisfaction of teachers who tend to view the profession as a second choice, that is, if employment fails in other more lucrative sectors. As a result, the Ministry of Education and Science reconvened a working group in 2014 to explore ways on how to increase the salary of teachers. The issue of low salary of teachers also remains a potential political battleground for various political party representatives in light of upcoming parliamentary elections in 2015. The 2009 study showed that schools used ten different coping strategies to deal with teacher shortage. The most common strategy was to assign extra hours to teachers for which teachers were paid additionally. This coping strategy fulfilled a dual purpose: To fill the vacancies but also, given the uneven distribution of additional teaching hours, to retain select teachers in the workforce by paying them more. Naturally, teachers used to be eager, and still continue to do so, to take on additional teaching hours. Which teachers benefit from the distribution of vacant hours, and which teachers do not, is an issue of great importance that the second UNICEF Kyrgyzstan study tried to raise. Who are typically selected for taking on additional hours: more experienced teachers, more effective teachers, or teachers that are in good standing with the school director? As this chapter will show, redistributing vacant teaching hours is only one of ten coping strategies. There are nine other ways of how schools fill vacancies and/or

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lift the salary of teachers. What follows is a presentation of the 2009 study. In the postscript, written in the last section of this chapter, we discuss what has changed over the period 2009–2014. TEACHER SHORTAGE: GLOBALLY AND IN COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION Teacher shortage is a global phenomenon. Four million teachers had to be recruited by 2015 around the world to achieve universal primary education. Demand for teachers globally by 2030 would be 27.3 million to provide all children with basic education, out of which 3.4 million teachers would be needed for new posts and 23.9 million teachers to compensate for attrition (UNESCO, 2014). Arguably, the reasons for the shortage vary widely by region. In many regions, there simply does not exist a sufficient number of graduates from general education to enter teacher education programs. As a consequence, there is an under-supply of teacher education graduates because teacher education institutions do not “produce” a sufficient number of teachers. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa would need to create 2.3 million new teaching positions by 2030 to achieve universal primary education, and about 3.9 million teachers to fill vacant positions due to attrition, while South and West Asia would need 153 thousand new teaching positions and 4 million teachers to compensate teacher attrition (UNESCO, 2014). In these regions, the shortfall of teachers is caused by the low educational attainment; more specifically, the lack of graduates both in general education and in teacher education. The situation in the Kyrgyz Republic and other post-Soviet republics, however, is diametrically opposed. Central Asia would need 57,000 new teaching positions by 2030 and 326,000 teachers to compensate for attrition (UNESCO, 2014). Kyrgyzstan had to recruit 2.8 thousand teachers by 2015 and would need to recruit 23.7 thousand teachers by 2030; and 17.7 thousand teachers to be replaced by 2030 (UNESCO, 2014). Enrollment in secondary schools is nearly universal and enrollment in tertiary education, including in teacher education programs, is very high. In fact, there was an oversupply of teacher education graduates in Kyrgyzstan in 2009. That is, the universities produced too many teachers. However, only 15% of those that graduate from pre-service teacher education entered the teaching profession (Ministry of Education and Science, 2009; Steiner-Khamsi, 2009). Also, a percentage of trained teachers recruited in Kyrgyzstan is less than 75% (UNESCO, 2014). The difficulty to attract young teachers and to retain teachers of all ages in schools of Kyrgyzstan has been sufficiently studied. Strikingly, the same repertoire of policy options has been tried for decades. Some of the policy

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options, notably the ones that deal either with punishment or with reward, were strongly supported by the international donors present in the Kyrgyz Republic. At one end of the policy spectrum were punitive measures for those teacher education graduates that studied with a government scholarship. The suggestion was made periodically to systematically enforce the 3-year service requirement for those that studied with the financial support of the government. At the other end of policy options were incentive schemes in the form of salary supplements for those that agree to work in unattractive locations (remote villages, mountainous areas) or to teach subjects that were either high in demand but low in supply (foreign languages) or were considered a health hazard (chemistry, computer science/IT). The pilot Young Specialist Deposit Scheme, funded by the World Bank, also counted on a salutary effect of incentives to lure university graduates into the teaching profession. A sizeable salary supplement was deposited in a bank account and made available to the young teacher if she/he worked at the school for 3 years. The repertoire of policies that combat teacher shortage either by stick or by carrot resembled very much the one applied during the Soviet period. There was a third package of strategies in place that attempted to increase the supply of teachers more directly. Many of these measures were introduced in a state of emergency to fix the problem on a short term and were not meant to last forever. Given that the other two packages—the one driven by punishment and the other based on rewards, bonuses, or salary supplements—did not succeed to combat teacher shortage, the third supply-focused approach gained popularity among policy makers. This third package included a series of measures that enlisted anyone as a teacher who was slightly interested in finding a secure albeit underpaid job.3 The supply-oriented policy measures ranged from lowering the entrance requirement for pedagogical degree programs and providing a greater number of government scholarships in teacher education programs to establishing short certification programs or crash courses for those currently working as non-qualified teachers at schools. In some countries of the post-Soviet region (but not in Kyrgyzstan), teachers were imported from neighboring countries to resolve the supply issue.4 These three “packages” should be considered, along with other comprehensive reforms such as the periodical salary raises or the decreases of the normative teaching load for teachers, respectively, as well-intended attempts to address the perpetual “crisis of the pedagogical cadre” that has plagued the educational system for the past 20 years or so. With no clear solutions in sight, schools in Kyrgyzstan have become skillful with coping, year after year, with the lack of teachers. The first empirical study in 2009 investigated these coping strategies and analyzed the impact of these strategies on the quality of teaching. Ten school-level strategies of coping with teacher shortage were discovered. The 11th strategy—canceling the lessons—was only considered if all other options failed. Curiously, this 11th or

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the “plus-one” strategy was commonly viewed as indicative of teacher shortage. We propose in this chapter that the other ten, very common strategies such as, for example, having teachers take on additional hours in subjects for which they were never trained or having teachers take on two or more teaching loads should be interpreted as indicators of teacher shortage. As we demonstrate in this chapter, these coping strategies at school level unintentionally masked the real extent of teacher shortage in Kyrgyzstan. THE 2009 UNICEF KYRGYZSTAN STUDY: A FEW METHODOLOGICAL NOTES The 2009 study drew on qualitative and quantitative data gathered in ten schools of the Batken and Jalal-Abat provinces of the Kyrgyz Republic. Teacher shortage, in Kyrgyzstan commonly referred to as “the crisis of the pedagogical cadre,” is nowadays recognized as one of the biggest barriers for extending schooling from 11 to 12 years and for improving the quality of education in Kyrgyzstan. Several donors in the region funded studies that helped to understand the scope, reasons, and manifestations of teacher shortage. UNICEF, in particular, funded a school-level analysis of teacher shortage, presented in this text. It constituted a follow-up research project to an important study on teacher retention that was completed by Creative Associates as part of the USAID Quality Learning Project (USAID QLP, 2009). Our study complemented the USAID study in important ways in that it focused on actual or latent teacher shortage, actual annual instructional hours, actual teacher qualification, common hiring practices and retention of teachers as reported at school level. Three other studies served as important background information for this research project: the preparatory analytical work for the Education Development Strategy 2011–2020 of the Kyrgyz Republic (especially Steiner-Khamsi, Kumenova, & Taliev, 2008; see also Steiner-Khamsi, 2009), the background paper for the 2009 Global Monitoring Report on teacher salary reform in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia (Steiner-Khamsi, Harris-van Keuren, Silova, & Chachkhiani, 2009), and an unpublished study on the stavka system in Tajikistan (Steiner-Khamsi, 2007). Selection of Provinces In the 2009 study we selected two provinces in the Kyrgyz Republic that were closest to the national average for teacher shortage: The number of schools that reported vacancies (teacher shortage) in the Batken and Jalal-Abat provinces were slightly above the national average. According to the study of the USAID QLP (2009), 56.6% of schools nationwide reported teacher shortage, as shown

320    G. STEINER-KHAMSI and N. TELESHALIYEV TABLE 15.1  Schools With Teacher Shortage by Province/Oblast in 2009

Province Talas

Total Number of Schools in the Province 116

Osh City

Number of Schools With Teacher Shortage

Percentage of Schools With Teacher Shortage

Rank

86

74.1

1

56

40

71.4

2

Bishkek City

123

81

65.8

3

Chui Oblast

325

212

65.2

4

Jalal-Abat

470

295

62.7

5

Batken

225

141

62.6

6

Issyk-Kul

196

95

48.4

7

Osh oblast

521

242

46.4

8

Naryn

136

37

27.2

9

2,168

1,229

56.6

10

Kyrgyz Republic

in Table 15.1. The proportion of schools with teacher shortage was 62.6% of schools in the Batken province and 62.7% of schools in the Jalal-Abat province. Thus, the selected two provinces represented typical cases for teacher shortage. In each of the two provinces (oblast) we selected three districts (rayon). The following districts were selected based on their distance to the province center (purposefully a combination of far and close districts were selected): Batken province (including Batken, Leilek, & Kadamjai districts) and Jalal-Abat province (including Suzak, Bazar-Korgon, & Nooken districts). Selection of Schools In the second sampling selection step, we selected schools in the six districts of Batken and Jalal-Abat that reflected a maximum variation with regard to school size, distance from the province/district center, language of instruction, and the number of officially reported vacancies. Thus, the second step in our purposeful sampling technique ensured a great diversity of schools. The selection criteria for the provinces, districts, and schools were discussed with the Ministry of Education and Science to ensure their support for a study that was likely to have policy implications. Table 15.2 provides an overview of the sample characteristics. To ensure anonymity of the informants, we referred in this chapter to the five selected schools in the Batken province as Batken 1 (BK1), Batken 2 (BK2), and so on, and analogously to the five selected schools in Jalal-Abat as Jalal-Abat 1 (JA1) to Jalal-Abat 5 (JA5), respectively.

67

23

30

23

33

16

25

40

52

11

32

BK2

BK3

BK4

BK5

JA1

JA2

JA3

JA4

JA5

Average

Number of Teachers

BK1

School

3.2

2

4

4

3

2

4

3

3

3

4

Number of Administrators

702.5

142

1,408

1,118

439

376

830

412

318

504

1,478

Number of Students

Kyrgyz

Russian/Kyrgyz/Uzbek

Russian

Uzbek

Kyrgyz

Kyrgyz

Kyrgyz

Kyrgyz/Uzbek

Tajik

Kyrgyz

Language of Instruction

TABLE 15.2  Sample Characteristics of the Ten Selected Schools

81.9

80

50

70

20

64

60

75

250

150

0

Distance to Province Center (km)

42.2

45

20

20

20

75

90

70

70

12

0

Distance to District Center (km)

9.4

6

25

13

4

9

4.5

10

6

6

10.5

Number of Reported Vacancies (Number of Teachers)

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322    G. STEINER-KHAMSI and N. TELESHALIYEV

According to the tariff tables (tarifikatsiya), retrieved from the principals of the schools, the ten schools in our sample lacked on average in total 94 teachers or 9.4 teachers on average in 2009. This amounted to a teacher shortage rate of 23%. Put differently: The ten schools were supposed to be staffed with 414 teachers, but, because of a 23% shortage, only 320 teachers were employed. Rather than referring to the shortage ratio of 23%, we could also indicate the “availability rate,” a measure that was commonly used by the Ministry of Education and Science and the National Statistics Committee: The teacher availability rate in the Batken and Jalal-Abat provinces was, according to our study, 77%. Selection of Informants We interviewed officials in local government offices (village authorities and municipalities), province government offices as well as in District Department of Education offices (rayonos). The interviews were scheduled with the directors and, if not available, with the deputy directors of these offices. At the school level we interviewed all available principals and deputy directors (zavuch). We were able to interview all teachers in smaller schools, either individually or in focus groups. In large schools we interviewed those teachers that were available. Similarly, we had to use convenience sampling for the selection of students, that is, we scheduled individual or group interviews with students that were on the school premises during our visit. The list of interviewed individuals, both in government offices as well as in the ten selected schools, are presented in Table 15.3. In sum, we interviewed 382 individuals at school level and 11 individuals in government offices in 2009. Most teacher and student interviews were conducted as pair or group interviews. In addition to these interviews, the study drew on a comprehensive review of decrees, reports, as well as statistical information. For each school, we either received a copy of the tariff classification (tarifikatsiya) or we copied these pay breakdown tables by hand. In half of the schools we also copied the tabeel—best translated as “time sheet” or the attendance record—which the deputy directors were supposed to keep up to date. The size of our research team enabled us to split into three teams and conduct the interviews with the principals/deputy principals, teachers, and students simultaneously, ensuring that teachers could speak freely, that is, without administrators being present in the room. Similarly, students were able to speak to us openly without teachers or administrators being present in the room. The interviews with government officials purposefully took place after the interviews at the school level and took on the form of meetings in which we clarified information that we received at the school level. During the meetings with government officials, we also solicited reports, statistical information, and important decrees that related to the topic of the study.

Ten-Plus-One Ways of Coping With Teacher Shortage in Kyrgyzstan     323 TABLE 15.3  List of Interviewees and Sample Size Number of Individual Interviews

Number of Group Interviews

  Province Government (a total of 2)

2

0

2

 District Department of Education Officials (a total of 6 districts)

4

2

7

 Local Government (municipality or ail okmotu)

2

0

2

  Subtotal Government Level

8

3

11

Sample Sizea

Interviews in Government Offices:

Interviews in 10 Schools:

a

  School Principals and Deputy Principals

16

1

17

 Teachers (44 individual interviews, 113 participated in focus group interviews)

44

7

157

 Students (3 individual interviews, 205 participated in pair/group interviews)

3

28

208

  Subtotal School Level

63

35

382

Total at the Government and School Level

70

38

393

Individuals interviewed both in individual and group interviews.

Naturally, the greatest strength of this study—in-depth qualitative analysis of a few cases (many variables and small N)—had also its limitation: The limitation of this study was the small sample size: ten schools in two provinces. The sample size did not allow us to quantify the scope of real teacher shortage. Nevertheless, the value of developing a methodology for analyzing the mechanisms that schools used to cope with teacher shortage was not to be underestimated. This study made it possible to list for the first time the various strategies that schools used to deal with teacher shortage. It also discussed why some strategies were worse than others and negatively impacted the quality of education. This was no small feat given the current preoccupation with teacher quality as the main driver for student outcomes (see McKinsey, 2007). Finally, this study also provided a general assessment of how common the various strategies were. It is feasible to gather, in a follow-up study, detailed statistical information on real teacher shortage, that is, to quantify the frequency of the various strategies at national scale, discussed in the current study. OFFICIALLY REPORTED TEACHER SHORTAGE The 2006 PISA study mentioned the shortage of qualified teachers in Kyrgyzstan explicitly and attributed the low student outcomes in science to the lack of qualified science teachers: In Kyrgyzstan, 62% of all schools reported

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vacancies in science. Almost all of these schools (59% countrywide) coped with this shortage by filling their vacancies with teachers that took on additional lessons in science or by assigning non-qualified teachers (i.e., teachers qualified in other subjects but with no training in science) to teach science (OECD, 2007; CEATM, 2008). Redistribution of vacant hours was the most common strategy used at the school-level to cope with teacher shortage. Despite the common practice of redistribution, there was sufficient evidence to suggest that many schools were not able to offer the full range of subjects prescribed by the curriculum. According to the PISA 2006 study, in Kyrgyzstan approximately 25% of students studied in schools in which at least one vacancy in the natural sciences was not filled. This figure was very high from an international comparative perspective. In comparison, in OECD countries 3% of students were enrolled in schools where they had one or more vacancies. It was also high in comparison with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States where, on average, 7% of all students were in schools that were not able to offer the full curriculum in science because of teacher shortage (UNICEF, 2009). We found a great gap between officially reported and empirically found vacancies at school level. Even though the absolute numbers were similar, the relative numbers for teacher shortage (the number of vacancies as a percentage of the total number of needed teachers at school level) as reported at central level (National Statistics Committee, MoES), district level (District Department of Education), and at school level differed considerably. The vast differences might be explained with the different figures used for the total number of teachers. The teacher shortage rates (or relative numbers) were reportedly much lower at the district and central level, because they assumed a much higher number of teachers that were actually employed at the school level. Officially, the supply of teachers nationwide was 95.8%, that is, only 4.2% of the teaching force was non-available. We found a much lower availability rate, projected based on figures retrieved from two provinces with an average teacher shortage rate: We found an availability rate of 77%, that is, a teacher shortage of 23%. It was cause for alarm that the officially reported rate for teacher shortage was so much lower than what empirical studies had found (OECD, 2007; CEATM, 2008; UNICEF, 2009). An even greater cause for concern is the currently used definition of teacher shortage. In this study we advocated for a more comprehensive definition of teacher shortage. The officially reported vacancies refer to the number of nonavailable teachers (listed by subjects) that schools report periodically to the District Education Departments. The District Education Departments, in turn, forward these figures to the Ministry of Education and Science. What are not included in these figures are subjects that are taught by nonqualified teachers or substitute

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teachers: correspondence students (zaochniki 5) from universities, professionals without a pedagogical specialization, or teachers that do not have a specialization in the subject they teach. Since these subjects are actually taught, albeit by non-qualified staff, the government offices do not count them as “vacancies.” In other words, “availability” of teachers (which is the inverse of teacher shortage) measures the availability of qualified and nonqualified teaching staff. The officially used definition for teacher shortage is problematic as it only focuses on vacancies, that is, the number of teachers needed to avoid the cancellation of subjects and lessons. In this study, we have broadened the definition in such a way that it includes the number of teachers employed at a school that have either a very short teacher education or no pedagogical training at all. This more comprehensive definition of teacher shortage acknowledged that the employment of nonqualified teachers in schools of Kyrgyzstan masked real teacher shortage. Thus, the real teacher shortage is much higher than 4.2% (officially reported) or 23% (empirically found in two provinces), respectively, if one counts the numerous individuals that schools have hired because of the severe shortage of teachers. COPING WITH TEACHER SHORTAGE AT SCHOOL LEVEL The following two examples provided a glimpse into how schools cope with teacher shortage. The first example was from a school in Jalal-Abat that uses Kyrgyz, Russian, and Uzbek as languages of instruction. The school employed 48 teachers and has officially reported 25 vacancies and, per official records, did not offer physics in the Grades 7–11 because of teacher shortage. Asked how the school copes with teacher shortage, the principal replied: First of all, we don’t divide the classes in Kyrgyz, English, and Russian into two groups even though we would be entitled to do so. This is bad for the quality of teaching in these classes, but we do not have any other choice. Second, we invited four teachers from the surrounding schools to teach at our school. Third, we begged our own retired teachers to come back and teach for us. Seven of our teachers are at retirement age, but are still working. Finally, we received permission from the District Department of Education to assign a double teaching load for our teachers. Twenty teachers at our school teach more than two stavkas/teaching loads (more than 32–38 hours). Many of them teach subjects for which they never received any training. The highest teaching load/week at our school is 50 hours. Teaching so many hours is inhuman for teachers, but there is no choice.

As a follow-up question, we asked: “How many of your teachers that took on additional hours teach subjects for which they weren’t trained?” The principal answered:

326    G. STEINER-KHAMSI and N. TELESHALIYEV It is easier to answer which teachers only teach subjects for which they have a specialist diploma, a degree, or a certificate! Most of our teachers end up taking on additional hours in subjects for which they never took preparatory courses . . . [Deputy principal goes through the list of teachers, listed in the tarifikatsiya]. From the 48 teachers in our school, 22 teachers teach subjects other than the ones they have been trained to teach.

The second example of “survival strategies” at school level was from a rural school in Batken province with Kyrgyz as the medium of instruction: The teacher shortage is massive at our school: Only patriots teach here. Officially, we have: one vacancy in primary school, nine vacancies in secondary school; that is, the school lacks nine teachers for specific subjects.

The principal, reading from the tariff table (tarifikatsiya) and the staffing plan (tabeel), qualified his previous comment as follows: Physics: nonexistent; we don’t teach physics in any of our classes now. The physics teacher we had became head of the local government this May and left his teaching post. Math: Two correspondence student teach math; both of them took on two stavkas to fulfill the need for math instruction. Chemistry: We haven’t taught chemistry for the past 5 years. English: Four years ago we had one English teacher joined our school who stayed with us for 2 years, but then she left with her husband for Russia; now we don’t have any English teacher for the past 2 years. Geography: We don’t have any geography teacher. For the past 5 years the Kyrgyz language teacher taught the geography hours. Music: We are only entitled to 0.75 stavkas for music. It is very unattractive/impossible to be a professional music teacher at our school. We haven’t taught music for the past 4 years. I used the 0.75 stavkas and redistributed them among the existing teachers and they use it to sing during the extra-curricular hours; but I wouldn’t call this music education. We used to have a music teacher. In fact, my son—now 30 years old—was our music teacher. But he only earned KGS 1,500 ($32 USD) for the 0.75 stavka in music. My son eventually quit the post and took on a job in construction in Batken center and is now earning KGS 6,000 ($128 USD). This way, he can support his own family. Arts and technical drawing: Five years ago, the arts and technical drawing teacher left for Russia and we haven’t had a teacher for the past 5 years. I redistributed the teaching hours and gave them to the labor teacher but this labor teacher retired in May/last month.

Ten-Plus-One Ways of Coping With Teacher Shortage in Kyrgyzstan     327

History: I (principal) am the only history teacher. I gave the Kyrgyz language teacher one stavka of history classes and I teach the other stavka in history. I had to write for permission to teach this additional stavka, because principals are only allowed to work for a maximum 1.5 stavkas (one stavka is for administration). I only teach in the upper classes, that is, in Grades 10 and 11. Math: See above. Currently taught by two correspondence teachers, each with two stavkas. We used to have three math teachers with a higher education diploma specializing in math, but one left for Russia, one left school to work in the post office, and one sits at home and does nothing (she receives money from her husband who is in Russia). Primary school: We lack one primary school teacher and this is how I resolved it: One primary school teacher teaches two stavkas, that is, two primary school classes. In an attempt to categorize the various coping strategies that schools used to avoid having more vacancies than they already have or to fill the officially reported vacancies, we identified three types of strategies: 1. Hours taught by para-teachers, that is, nonqualified teachers or individuals without a pedagogical qualification in a particular subject. 2. Hours taught by qualified teachers who teach either beyond the retirement age, beyond the permissible teaching load of 24–27 hours, or beyond the maximum group or class size. 3. Hours not fully taught or not taught at all reflecting a discrepancy between prescribed and actual curriculum, or between the hours taught on paper but not in practice. There were many possible causes for the discrepancy, ranging from teacher absences or teacher absenteeism to having instructional hours shortened or canceled. These three manifestations of teacher shortage served as the foundation to formulate indicators of real teacher shortage. The last indicator (cancelled subjects and lessons) corresponded to the officially reported teacher shortage and represented, from the school’s perspective, the last and least desirable option and was only applied when all other coping strategies failed. The other ten strategies or indicators mirrored our more comprehensive definition of teacher shortage which paid attention to the quality of teaching. Table 15.4 is a summary of the eleven indicators grouped into the three categories mentioned above.

Number of teachers teaching at the same school with more than 24–27 teaching hours/week.

Number of teachers who do not split the class into groups despite the entitlement to do so.

7

Number of teachers hired from another school.

6

5

Number of teachers at retirement age.

4

B. Qualified teachers who teach beyond the permissible or advised retirement age, teaching load, or class/group size.

Number of university students who teach at a school.

3

Number of professionals (without pedagogical training) who teach at a school.

Indicators

Number of pedagogical specialists who teach subjects for which they were not trained.

A. Para-teachers (nonqualified teachers).

2

1

(continued)

In a few subjects (foreign language courses, IT, etc.), schools are permitted to split the class into two groups to allow for more effective learning. Schools with teacher shortage typically do not split the classes in groups to avoid an increase of teacher shortage.

Schools need to request permission from the district education department if their teachers teach more than 1.5 teaching loads. Some districts officially lifted the ceiling for the maximum amount of teaching hours from 1.5 to 2 teaching loads (stavka).

To circumvent the regulation on the maximum teaching load (24–27 hours per school), teachers are hired from another school to teach at the school. At times these teachers are also hired because the school lacks teachers with the needed qualifications.

Teachers who continue to teach or are brought back to the school to fill vacancies; the retirement age is 63 years for men, and 58 years for women.

This includes both part-time correspondence students (zaochnik) as well as fulltime university students (ochnik) who teach at the school.

For example, Kyrgyz language and literature teacher (with a pedagogical specialist degree) who teaches biology or subjects other than Kyrgyz language and literature.

For example, electrician who teaches physics, accountant who teaches math, etc. (professionals without pedagogical training).

Measurement/Examples

TABLE 15.4  Eleven or Ten-Plus-One Indicators of Real Teacher Shortage

328    G. STEINER-KHAMSI and N. TELESHALIYEV

Cancelled subjects and lessons.

11

Number of teachers who teach for a shorter duration than officially prescribed.

Number of teachers with prolonged absences or absenteeism.

Indicators

Number of teachers that are listed in the lesson plan without holding the actual lessons.

C. Mismatch between what is taught on paper and what is taught in practice.

10

9

8

Measures those subjects that were reported as having a vacancy (or lessons within a subject that had a vacancy) that were not taught in the past school year.

This indicator includes teachers that are kept on the payroll but who have recently or a long time ago quit the job and moved to another location.

The duration of the instructional hours is shortened regularly to save on human resources (that is lacking). The reduction in instructional time applies both to lessons (35 minutes instead of 45 minutes) as well as to the school year (shorter school year than prescribed).

The absences can be seasonal or permanent and can be related to other nonschool related economic activities/work (harvesting, trade, etc.) or other schoolrelated obligations (e.g., principals or deputy-principals in charge of teaching classes, but because of other obligations neglect their teaching commitment).

Measurement/Examples

TABLE 15.4  Eleven or Ten-Plus-One Indicators of Real Teacher Shortage (continued)

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330    G. STEINER-KHAMSI and N. TELESHALIYEV

Professionals Without Pedagogical Training Who Work as Teachers One of the common strategies of coping with teacher shortage was to hire professionals who did not possess a pedagogical degree. That strategy was frequently applied for subjects with little instructional time (e.g., economics, information technologies/computer science). This group of noneducators was grateful for finding employment in schools either because there were no jobs in their own field available or because they took on a few hours in school in addition to their regular job in the private sector. A few of these professionals completed a crash course in teacher training—a 3-month certificate program—but the majority of them worked in schools without any pedagogical preparation. In a few cases, the professionals that taught a particular subject matter were content specialists: For example, an unemployed economists with a higher education diploma taught economics, or an unemployed informatics specialist taught computer science/IT, but very often there was no correspondence between the educational background and the subject taught in schools. We encountered the following examples for poor matches between educational background and subject taught in schools: An electrician with a technical-vocational educational background from an institution in Russia who taught Russian language and literature, a correspondence university student in electronics who taught ethics and physical culture, a tailor with a technical-vocational educational background who taught labor classes, environmental studies, and music. This group of nonqualified teachers should be considered “covert nonqualified teachers” because the Kyrgyz salary system does not differentiate the educational background of teachers with regard to specialization. Thus, someone with a higher education diploma in economics who teaches at a school earns the same as someone with a higher education diploma in education. In fact, the principals and the deputy principals, interviewed in this study, did not quite understand why we distinguished between teachers with a pedagogical background/teacher certification and those with a non-pedagogical training background. This applied especially for professionals who had been working for many years at a school. They were very much respected as teachers even though most of them never completed a pedagogical degree. The tariff table did not document the specialization but only the educational level of employees (secondary school, vocationaltechnical education, incomplete higher education, higher education). We were therefore not in a position to identify how many of those that were, for example, listed as having a higher education diploma obtained such a diploma in a pedagogical specialization or whether they were specialists in another field/profession. Similarly, we were not able to assess how many

Ten-Plus-One Ways of Coping With Teacher Shortage in Kyrgyzstan     331

professionals with vocational-technical education had a degree in education (ped uchilishe) or in another vocational-technical field. Pedagogical Specialists Who Teach Subjects for Which They Were Not Trained All of the ten examined schools assigned vacant teaching hours to teachers who already worked at the school. As a result, teachers taught more than one normative teaching load of 16/18 hours per week. This second indicator measured how many of the additional hours were in a subject other than the one for which the teacher was trained. We excluded those teachers who, by training, were entitled to teach two subjects (e.g., math/physics, biology/ chemistry, etc.) and only focused on those teachers who, because of teacher shortage, were requested to teach subjects for which they lacked the knowledge, competence, and certification. Examples included a biology teacher, who, besides biology, was required to teach chemistry, society and human being, economy, and geography, a history teacher who besides history also taught music, or the geography teacher who also taught physical training; only to list a few examples of qualified teachers who ended up teaching additional hours in subjects about which they knew very little. We found that 19% of all teachers teach at least an additional subject for which they did not receive any training. From these 60 teachers who taught in areas they knew very little about, 45 of them were assigned to one additional subject, 14 taught two subjects, and one teacher had taken on three subjects. The practice of assigning vacant hours to other teachers at the school, regardless of the specialization of the teacher, was very common and had a devastating effect on the quality of education. This study showed that every fifth teacher in the Kyrgyz educational system taught a subject without adequate preparation and knowledge. Especially subjects with low instructional hours were likely to be taught by non-specialists, such as music, labor, economics, man and society, astronomy, drawing and creative work, etc. Especially older students—such as the ones presented in the following— commented frequently on the lack of teacher competence in their schools: Our chemistry teacher teaches a number of other subjects as well: biology, man and society, and economics. This affects the quality of our classes. It would be better if other teachers could teach the other subjects . . .  (10th grade students)

Students were not the only ones that were dissatisfied with the situation. The teachers themselves did not feel comfortable teaching subjects for which they did not receive training:

332    G. STEINER-KHAMSI and N. TELESHALIYEV Since I had some computer skills I was requested to teach informatics. At the very beginning during the first two chetverts (quarters) I taught the theory of informatics only. I had to learn IT together with my students. I had to read a lot about computers . . . I admit that some students had a better understanding of computers than me, since they spend a lot of time in computer club. Together with informatics I was given environmental studies to teach because the previous informatics teacher taught this subject as well. I didn’t want to take it on but I had no other choice. The school permanently lacks biology teachers. Even though I know very little about the subject, I am sure I cannot pass on my biology lessons to other teachers because all have their own hours. In general, biology teachers do not stay long. For instance, this year they had several biology teachers but each one of them only stayed for a few weeks . . . My teaching schedule during the 2008/2009 academic year changed very often due to quick turn-over of teachers. Some teachers worked for 1 month only . . . Many left because of the salary.

University Students Working as Teachers There are two types of university students who work as teachers: correspondence students (zaochnik) and full-time university students. We collected district-level statistical information on how many university students were employed as teachers. In one of the districts the breakdown was as follows: Fifty-one full-time university students to 309 correspondence students, that is, a ratio of 1:6. Typically, District Education Departments make agreements with universities in the province or region to have university students fill the vacant positions. Part of the agreement is, for example, that 4th and 5th year university students are permitted to skip their classes at the university if they teach at a school. This applies to all degree programs and not to university students in pedagogical specializations alone. According to the agreement, only well-performing 4th and 5th year university students are supposed to work as teachers and earn the entry-level salary of a full-time teacher. After all, they miss all their classes for 2 years and only show up at the university for exams. In reality, however, any university student is able to join this university-school collaboration program. Similarly, there is a huge gap that yawns between theory and practice of correspondence studies. In theory and per agreement, correspondence teachers should (a) only start teaching towards the end of the second year of the correspondence studies, and (b) should quit teaching twice a year for a few weeks to attend classes in teacher education (fall and spring). In practice, however, most correspondence students were former students from the school who start teaching right away after they completed Grade 11 at the school. Students of 10th and 11th grade classes reported how former friends of them who used to be one or two grades ahead of them

Ten-Plus-One Ways of Coping With Teacher Shortage in Kyrgyzstan     333

started to work as teachers at the school. To make things worse, most correspondence students did not leave their teaching post twice a year to take classes in pre-service teacher education because the school depended on them and also because the correspondence student could afford to lose the income during the study period. The transition from being a Grade 11 student in one year and then a young correspondence teacher in the following was naturally filled with anxiety. The younger correspondence teachers elaborated on their insecurities with teaching and a few of them explicitly mentioned the problem of earning the respect of Grade 10 and grade 11 students. Most schools paired experienced with inexperienced teachers, but in practice the experienced teachers had such a high teaching load themselves that they were not in a position to sufficiently train and mentor the inexperienced young teachers. Whereas the majority of zaochniks corresponds to the prototype of alumni that continue at the school in the role of a teacher, there also exist older correspondence students who enroll in part-time studies to acquire the required higher education specialist diploma. Table 15.5 shows the educational background of the teachers at the selected ten schools. In the tariff tables, the university students (both the full-time university students and the correspondence students) were listed as having “incomplete higher education.” We inserted the ratio of teachers with incomplete higher education as a percentage of the entire teaching force at the school. The correspondence and full-time students accounted for 9%–30% of the teaching force in the ten visited schools. On the average, every seventh teacher or 13% of all teachers in the ten schools were teachers with incomplete higher education. This group of young teachers was not to be underestimated. In Kadamjay rayon, a district in Batken province with the highest TABLE 15.5  Qualification and Educational Background of Teachers Educational Background Higher Education Specialist Diploma Incomplete Higher Education (including university students)

BK1 BK2 BK3 BK4 BK5 JA1 JA2 JA3 JA4 JA5 51

17

18

7 4 10 10% 17% 30%

23

16

10

21

31

3 9%

2 9%

2 13%

2 8%

3 8%

34

4

7 2 14% 15%

Total 225 69% 42 13%

Vocational-Technical Education (including pedagogical colleges)

7

2

3

6

5

4

2

5

10

6

50 15%

General Secondary School

2

0

2

3

0

0

0

1

1

1

10 3%

Total Number of Teachers

67

23

33

35

23

16

25

40

52

13

327 100%

334    G. STEINER-KHAMSI and N. TELESHALIYEV

teacher shortage rate in the province, 16% of the employed teachers were correspondence students. This figure was double of what the National Statistics Committee reports. According to the National Statistics Committee, the national average for teachers with incomplete higher education in school year 2009/2010 was 6.9%, that is, every 13th teacher employed in a school in Kyrgyzstan was a university student. Similarly, the number of teachers with a higher education specialist diploma differed from the information of the National Statistics Committee: Our proportion was 69% whereas the official statistics assumed that 81% of all teachers had a higher education specialist diploma. The differences had to do with the different methods used to categorize the data. In our calculation we excluded the school administrators (1–3 individuals) in the teacher statistics. Most of the school administrators (principal and 1–2 deputy principals) of the ten schools had a higher education specialist diploma. Despite their lack of pedagogical knowledge and experience, the young correspondence students were popular because they had a sense of loyalty towards the school. As one principal expressed in an interview: We did try to hire young teachers. We keep hiring them and then they leave. Last year alone, five young teachers left for Russia. The ones with a higher education diploma only last a few weeks and then leave. The correspondence students are much better: They stay.

Typically, alumni of the school, the correspondence students are from the village and have family and other social bonds in the community. They are likely to stay and work as teachers unless they end up marrying a man from another location. In that case, they are expected to move and work in the hometown or village of the husband. Finally, a less known fact: They are also beloved because so many of the regular teachers are former correspondence students (zaochniki) themselves. When we scratched at the surface of the group that had, according to the National Statistics Committee, a higher education specialist diploma (81% of the teaching force nationwide), we found that many of them earned their specialist diplomas by means of correspondence studies. In the ten visited schools, one-third to half of the teachers with a higher education specialist diploma consisted of former correspondence students (or, former teacher with incomplete higher education). This meant that many of the regular teachers with a university degree did not complete a full course of pedagogical studies and most of them learned being a teacher at the school. This applied, especially to the middle-aged teachers who completed their studies in the 1990s and afterwards. These teachers completed their higher education diploma as correspondence students (zaochniki). In

Ten-Plus-One Ways of Coping With Teacher Shortage in Kyrgyzstan     335

contrast, the older teacher (known for having better teaching skills) studied as full-time students during Soviet times. Even though the former correspondence students ended up having the same degree (Higher Education Specialist Diploma), the principals distinguished between teachers who completed their studies full time or as a correspondence teacher. One principal, for example, explained that she did not assign 10th and 11th grade classes to teachers who were former correspondence students. Another principal insisted that she did not select former correspondence students as mentors for young teachers regardless of how experienced and skillful the former correspondence student had become over the years. Clearly, teachers completed their teacher education in the form of correspondence studies have the reputation of being second-class teachers. Let us keep in mind, for now, that many of those that were listed in the official statistics as having “higher education specialist diploma” were, at closer examination, former correspondence students. Teachers at Retirement Age In the ten examined schools, the ratio of retired teachers as a percentage of the entire teaching force at a school ranged from 0%–30% (see Table 15.6). Typically, there were one or two teachers at retirement age that “were brought” back to school to teach by invitation of the principal or even the District Education Department. Most of them did not want to resume work, but they felt obliged to come back and help out. TABLE 15.6  Teachers at Retirement Age in the Sample Schools

Teachers (Total)

Retired Teachers

Percentage of Retired Teachers (%)

BK1

67

7

10.4

BK2

23

1

4.3

BK3

30

2

6.7

BK4

33

1

3.0

BK5

23

7

30.4

JA1

16

2

12.5

JA2

25

2

8.0

JA3

40

4

10.0

JA4

52

7

13.5

JA5

13

0

0.0

School

336    G. STEINER-KHAMSI and N. TELESHALIYEV

As the following excerpt from an interview in the Batken province documents, principals realized how dependent they were on the goodwill of retired teachers: We have many teachers that officially are already retired as well as teachers that approach retirement age. This worries me a lot because there is no replacement for these very committed and experienced teachers. This is the list of 10 retired teachers or teachers at retirement age that left or will leave the teaching post over the next few years: –– –– –– –– –– –– ––

one says he will retire in September; third left, yesterday was his goodbye party; fourth leaves in 2 years; fifth one leaves in 4 years; sixth one leaves in 2 years; seventh already left over the course of this school year; eighth is 65 year old and is 5 years above retirement age, he could leave any moment now; –– ninth is a 64 year old primary school teacher and has 43 years of teaching experience; she might also leave at any moment now; and –– the tenth teacher is entitled to leave the school for retirement in 2 years. What shall I do as a principal, if these teachers really quit the job and retire? Close down the school?

The over-aging of the teaching force is a heatedly discussed topic in the Kyrgyz Republic. But typically, the talk centers on the inability to attract a sufficient number of young teachers to the profession. What is less discussed is the high percentage of retired teachers working in schools. According to the National Statistics Committee, 5% of all teachers nationwide are over the age of 59 years. The district-level data that we collected from District Departments of Education suggested a higher ratio. According to that information, teachers at retirement age accounted for 5%–10% of all teachers of the selected districts of this study. With extremely few young specialists interested to start a career as a teacher, the system is extremely vulnerable to teachers at retirement age or shortly before retirement that may decide, from one month to the other, to cease working. Teachers Hired From Surrounding Schools Being hired simultaneously by two or more schools was very common in urban and semi-urban schools where other schools were within walking distance. The practice of hiring teachers that “belonged” to another school enabled principals to circumvent government regulations regarding the maximum amount of teaching loads. The statutory teaching load

Ten-Plus-One Ways of Coping With Teacher Shortage in Kyrgyzstan     337

in Kyrgyzstan was 16 hours for primary school teachers and 18 hours for the teachers in Grades 5–11. Thus, one teaching load (Russian: stavka) was 16–18 hours. Typically, teachers that were hired from another school taught in total more than 1.5 or 2 statutory teaching loads and were marginalized as the “teacher from the other school.” They complained in the interviews that the second school or the host school treated them poorly. The teachers at the host school were considered only part-time teachers even if they had to work for one full teaching load at the second school. Three of the schools in our study were in a town and all of them had a substantial number of teachers who worked simultaneously at 2 or 3 schools. In one of the semi-urban schools of our study, the teaching force consisted of 40 teachers: Twenty-nine teachers had their professional home base at the school and the other 11 were hired from surrounding schools. In another school, 10 of 67 teachers were part-time teachers that the school hired from surrounding schools. In the third municipal school of our study, finally, four of the 52 teachers had their professional home base at another school. Teachers With Multiple Teaching Loads This indicator measured the proportion of teachers at a school with a teaching load that was above the legally permissible or the advised teaching load. Strikingly, there was a great deal of confusion and legal insecurity as to what the ceiling was with regard to the permissible teaching load. The responses that we received included 1.5 teaching loads in total (24–27 hours), 1.5 teaching loads per school (32–36 hours) with no upper limit for all the teaching loads combined, 2 teaching loads in total (32–36 hours), or even 40 hours as prescribed in the Labor Code. The answers varied depending on whether we asked teachers, principals, or government officials, and the responses also varied by district and province. The fact remained, however, that distributing the vacant hours to teachers from the school was a standard practice in Kyrgyz schools. We gathered information on teachers’ base salary for one teaching load (stavka rate), the number of weekly teaching hours, and noted the salary supplements and salary deductions in the ten examined schools. In addition, we received from all the ten principals the tariff tables that, besides the salary information for each employed teacher, also listed the following characteristics of the teacher: age, work experience, teaching experience, educational background, salary category and salary step, subject specialty, weekly teaching load, and additional pedagogical functions. Based on these two different sources of information—teachers and administrators—we were able to provide reliable information both on the teaching load as well as the salaries of teachers in the ten examined schools. Table 15.7 provides

338    G. STEINER-KHAMSI and N. TELESHALIYEV TABLE 15.7  Lowest and Highest Teaching Loads Lowest Teaching Load per Week

Highest Teaching Load per Week

BK1

12

36

BK2

9

35

School

BK3

10

38

BK4

15

43

BK5

17

36

JA1

23

37

JA2

10

36

JA3

8

46

JA4

12

50

JA5

7

35

an overview of the lowest and highest teaching loads held by teachers at the ten selected schools. On the average, teachers in the ten schools taught 27 hours per week, which was slightly higher than 1.5 statutory or normative teaching loads. It was common for language, math, and science teachers to teach 35–40 hours/week. In two of the districts the teaching shortage was so acute that the District Education Departments only demanded from principals to submit special requests if teachers were assigned to more than two teaching loads. They did not need to seek special approval if the teacher was assigned to teach 1.5 to 2 teaching loads. Even though a high teaching commitment implied less time for preparing lessons and reviewing student work, teaching loads of 1.5 stavkas and above were very popular among those teachers that did not have other sources of income. In fact, we found that only teachers with more than 1.5 teaching loads had a professional identity as a teacher. They were the only ones that were able to live on their teacher’s salary. The ones with one or less teaching loads spent more time as farmers, merchants, or workers than as teachers. Teaching was for them a part-time job and they did so to have a pension plan and a safety net in case they would encounter difficulties with the other, better paid full-time job. A cursory analysis of the tariff tables revealed that older teachers tended to have a bigger teaching load than young teachers. Based on that observation, we wondered whether teachers fight over securing more teaching hours. Nine of the ten principals confirmed that they tended to assign the vacant teaching hours to older, more experienced teachers. One of the principals explicitly addressed the issue and made the point that young teachers already were “punished” by their very low starting salary and that

Ten-Plus-One Ways of Coping With Teacher Shortage in Kyrgyzstan     339

he therefore assigned vacant teaching hours to younger and middle-aged teachers that have children to raise. Teachers Working in Undivided Classes and Groups In a few subjects (foreign languages, informatics), teachers were entitled to split the class into two or three groups to allow for more student-centered learning. One of the common but highly unpopular strategies to cope with teacher shortage was not to divide classes but rather keep the students in the big group of 25 students and more. We were not able to determine how this strategy for coping with teacher shortage affected the teacher’s compensation, that is, whether she/he was paid double the amount for teaching an undivided class. Teachers With Prolonged Absences and Absenteeism Naturally, prolonged absences and teacher absenteeism were delicate issues and tended to be under-reported by principals and teachers. Therefore, in addition to interviewing principals and teachers, we also asked students to comment on classes or lessons not held. We identified two main reasons for prolonged absences and absenteeism: (a) seasonal absences during planting season (spring) and harvesting season (fall), and (b) chronic teacher absenteeism because of work overload at the school. First, the interviewees spoke openly about teacher absences that result from work in agriculture. Only in a few schools did principals and teachers deny the occurrence of seasonal absences. In the same schools, the students reported that neither teachers nor students show up during the laborintensive months in agriculture. In most schools, principals regulated the absences by temporarily reducing, for example, the number of shifts from two shifts to one shift and thereby allowing teachers to work part time in agriculture. The annual instructional time was significantly shortened in rural areas because of seasonal absences of teachers. In general, principals and government officials at the District Department of Education turned a blind eye on teachers that missed school because of seasonal work commitments in agriculture. The decision not to sanction teachers for their prolonged absences was directly related with the low salary of teachers, but also with the realization that the school could not afford to upset or lose teachers in these times of severe teacher shortage. In the words of a Teacher Union representative at one of the examined schools:

340    G. STEINER-KHAMSI and N. TELESHALIYEV If a teacher misses classes, we call for a meeting with the teacher and the principal. Reasons for absences are often seasonal work/harvesting in the months of September/October and May. The schools pays the substitute teacher hourly, because the teacher usually only misses half of the day during planting and harvesting season. In general, we count on the “morale” of the teacher—[trying to convince them to miss as few days as possible]. But in general we fully understand that a teacher needs to have other sources of income: A teacher earns KGS 100,000–200,000 ($2,128–$4,255 USD) per year from selling carrots and potatoes. This is approximately the double or more of what a teacher makes at school. A teacher’s salary is at best KGS 5,000 per month ($106 USD) or KGS 60,000 ($1,277 USD) per year. However, the produce from one harvest sells on the average for KGS 100,000–200,000 on the market. To make that much money, the teacher needs to work in the field and in the market only for a few days a year. It is natural that teachers prefer working in the field than working in the school during planting and harvesting season.

Second, students complained about teachers, especially those with more than two teaching loads/stavkas, who often came late or missed classes. They either had their class merge with another class or put a student (class president) in charge of “keeping the class quiet.” Principals and deputy principals deserved special mention here. Their administrative workload was considered equivalent to one normative teaching load. Similar to teachers who were not able to live on one teaching load, school administrators took on additional work—in the form of teaching hours—to boost their salaries. Schools, in turn, depended on school administrators’ interest and willingness to take on teaching hours. All the examined schools had their school administration (2–3 individuals) participate in teaching to minimize teacher shortage. Principals and deputy principals were, however, notorious for canceling lessons or asking teachers to fill in for them whenever urgent administrative work arose. Cutting Instructional Time Kyrgyzstan experienced an electricity crisis during the winter 2008/2009 and schools with a central heating system had the permission to shorten their instructional time over the winter months if they prolonged the school year in other ways. It was recommended to cancel the fall and spring school breaks and to extend the school year beyond the end of May. In the ten schools that we visited nine of the ten schools were hit by the energy crisis. Only one of the schools was exempt from the energy crisis because it had a traditional metal oven (burzhuika) which relied on coal and wood rather than on electricity. The crisis-induced winter break in the nine visited schools lasted for the entire month of January and the first week of February. In one of the nine

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schools the instructional time for all lessons was reduced from 45 minutes to 25 minutes during the winter months. The other eight schools had to close down the school for the entire month of January and the first few days of February 2009. Approximately half of the schools cancelled the spring and fall school breaks (2 weeks in total) and held classes during those two weeks to make up for the lost instructional time. But, against all official recommendations, none of them extended the school year into the month of June to make up for the missed classes. All of the schools that we visited finished classes on May 24 and only had students come in for standardized exams in the month of June. The inability to extend the school into the summer months in times of an unexpected energy crisis had many causes. Teachers were neither willing nor able to work a few weeks more at school because they had other work commitments over the summer months. As a consequence, students in these ten schools missed 2–4 weeks of instructional time in school year 2008/2009. Ghost Lessons and Teachers In their struggle to keep the school functioning under conditions of severe teacher shortage, some principals resorted to practices that were problematic. There was a great fluctuation of teachers, especially among younger teachers, who quit their job on short notice. Rather than notifying the District Department of Education about a new vacancy, the principals sometimes kept the teacher and the lessons “on the books” and pretended that the lessons were being held as usual. They even arranged that students receive grades even though they had not have lessons in the subject. We suggested that this phenomenon was labeled “ghost lessons.” The following interview provides examples of ghost lessons for which students received grades (group interview with students): We didn’t get grades for physics this year; it was completely withdrawn from our lesson plan. Since biology and chemistry were not taught during the first chetvert [first term] we had to go through the curriculum very quickly (3–4 topics per one lesson), mostly in the form of lectures. Physical training was not withdrawn from the lesson plan though even though we didn’t have physical training for about two months. Instead we had other subjects or had “windows,” that is, had no lesson at all and had a free hour. Question: Did you receive grades for all of these subjects? Answer: Yes, of course; including for physical training even though we didn’t have lessons for the first 2 months of the term.

The phenomenon of ghost teachers was related but not identical with the previously discussed ghost lessons. Ghost teachers implied that the

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principal purposefully kept the name of a teacher on the tariff table (tarifikatsiya) and time sheet (tabeel) to enable the teacher to accumulate years of pedagogical service despite her/his absence from the school. The hope of the principal was that the (ghost) teacher would return to the school and resume his/her teaching post. The hours of the ghost teacher were typically redistributed among the other teachers of the school and the lessons were in most cases actually taught. This was how we proposed that the two ghost phenomena were differentiated: In the case of ghost lessons, the lessons were not taught and the students did not learn anything in the subject but nevertheless received grades. From the perspective of educational quality, ghost lessons were a problem but not ghost teachers. From an economic perspective (wastage of pension/social fund), however, ghost teachers were problematic, and ghost lessons were a nonissue. The focus of this study was on ghost lessons and not on ghost teachers. Canceled Subjects and Lessons Throughout the year, principals attempted to minimize the number of vacancies by redistributing the vacant teaching hours among the existing staff of the school, by hiring university students to teach at the school, or by a host of other coping mechanisms listed above as indicators of real teacher shortage. When all attempts to fill the vacancies or redistribute the vacant hours failed, the subject with a reported vacancy was cancelled. The interviews with the principals and deputy principals in the schools of this study revealed the complexity of the situation and showed how schools tried very hard to find solutions so that they could avoid canceling subjects or lessons. In eight of the ten schools, at least one of the subjects was either not taught at all or only taught in selected classes and grades over school year 2008/2009. English, physics, and Russian were the three subjects for which principals seemed to have the greatest difficulty to find substitute teachers. For example, in Jalal-Abat, English was not taught at all in four of the five visited schools. The difference between official curriculum and actual curriculum was graver in some schools than in others. One school in Batken province, for example, reported: Informatics: We haven’t taught informatics for 5 years now. Russian: We couldn’t teach Russian language and literature for the past 3–4 years. Math: Our 7th and 8th graders haven’t had math. This has been going on for the past 3 years.

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The principals, deputy principals, teachers, and students openly spoke about subjects that were not taught or canceled over the last few school years. However, in some schools students named more subjects that were canceled than what principals/deputy principals or teachers reported. This implied the existence of ghost subjects/lessons where subjects/lessons were officially listed, but not taught in practice. It would be wrong to assume that each vacancy led to a canceled subject (throughout the school year) or to canceled lessons (for part of the school year). More frequently than not, principals did find solutions. Several coping strategies, described in the previous ten sections, however, posed a serious threat to the quality of education. CONCLUSIONS In an attempt to understand how schools redistributed the vacant teaching hours, we scrutinized in this study the composition of the teaching force at ten schools in two provinces. In a first step, we disaggregated the group of “qualified teachers” (those with a higher education diploma) and in a second step the group of all teachers, that is, with and without the required teacher qualification. If we were to exclusively rely on the qualification profile and use the educational background of teachers as the only indicator for the quality of teachers, the Kyrgyz educational system would come across as one with an impressively high quality of teachers: Eighty-one percent of all teachers have a university diploma. However, once we disaggregated—in a first step—the group of teachers with a higher education specialist diploma, we discovered at least three groups of teachers that were subsumed under this category. First, quite a few of them, listed as “teachers with higher education diploma,” had a diploma outside the field of education and thus worked as professionals in schools (economists with a higher education diploma, IT/computer specialists with a higher education diploma, etc.). Second, one-fifth of them (19%) taught additional subjects for which they did not have any pedagogical training. Finally, one-third to one-half of them were former correspondence students, that is, obtained their higher education specialist diploma with minimal training input. Thus, the term “teachers with a higher education diploma” erroneously provoked the association that teachers in this category (81% of the teaching workforce) were all qualified to teach the subjects to which they were assigned. Rather than blaming schools for resorting to all kinds of problematic hiring practices, we should therefore investigate why the system faces enormous difficulties with hiring young teachers and retaining older teachers in the profession. We have started to explore these issues in other publications

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(Steiner-Khamsi et al., 2009; Steiner-Khamsi, Moldokmatova, & Sheripkanova-MacLeod, 2009) in greater detail. The 2009 UNICEF-funded study and the other studies drew from an earlier study that explicitly dealt with the stavka system and identified the low and fragmented teacher salary as one of the main reasons for why the teaching profession has become so unattractive (Steiner-Khamsi, 2007). Since the stavka system was based on the normative or statutory teaching load rather than the weekly workload, the base salary (for 1 teaching load) was extremely low and the salary was unpredictable and non-transparent. The more conventional baseline studies on teacher shortage focused on the “plus 1” indicator (subjects and lessons with vacancies in danger of cancelation) rather than on the full scope of teacher shortage. It is more accurate to measure teacher shortage with the ten plus one indicators outlined in this study: ten coping strategies at school-level plus one; the latter reflecting failed attempts and resulting in cancelled subjects and lessons. The ten coping strategies are at closer examination survival strategies: They are undesirable in the long run as they have brought to schools masses of individuals that serve either as unqualified or as overworked teachers. Coming to grips with the ten coping strategies is therefore a prerequisite for understanding why the quality of education is so low in the Kyrgyz educational system. It also provides a sense of urgency for developing a comprehensive teacher attraction and retention strategy at policy level that is able to lure more teacher education graduates into the profession and keep them working in schools. POSTSCRIPT: A COMPARISON WITH THE SITUATION OF TEACHERS IN 2009 As mentioned in the introductory section, the average salary of teachers more than doubled (above and beyond inflation) over the period 2009– 2014. The question therefore becomes: “Have schools discontinued the ten different coping strategies, in particular, including the widespread practice of assigning additional hours to teachers?” As presented above, the excessive teaching loads have a negative impact both on the wellbeing of teachers and on the learning of students. Unsurprisingly, teacher shortage receded significantly over the 5-year period but what proliferated is a new phenomenon that the research team of the 2014 study labeled: “strategic vacancies”: Schools purposefully keep a few positions vacant (mostly in subjects with low weekly instructional hours) so that the existing teaching workforce at the school is enabled to take on additional hours and thereby boost their monthly income. Even though school administrators are explicitly requested to fill vacancies before the start of the new school year,6 some principals prefer to keep

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a number of positions vacant so that they can split the vacant hours and redistribute them among the existing teaching workforce of the school. As a result of this redistribution practice, the average teaching load and the average salary of teachers is higher than projected at the beginning of the school year. The research team of the 2014 UNICEF Kyrgyzstan study therefore proposed to label such unfilled positions “strategic vacancies” and consider them to be a cause of great concern. This practice is common in urban and semi-urban areas where schools are large and teachers may easily take on additional hours if the appropriate funds, saved from unfilled positions, are made available. Even though this practice is considered illegal, there is evidence from the comparison of tariff tables (that shows vacancies) and salary disbursement forms (vacancies disappear or rather the vacant hours are distributed among teachers) to suggest that such a practice does exist. The mere fact that so many schools in Bishkek and in other urban areas claim to be unable to fill vacant positions should be cause for suspicion and further exploration. These are locations where the supply of young specialists is high and where most and many of them remain unemployed. Upon further questioning during interviews, one of the school principals explained: After the reform we did hire young teachers, but they left after a few months. Now we would rather leave the vacancies vacant and distribute the hours among the older teachers that stay. It is also a way for us to keep good teachers in the profession.

In seven of the ten schools of the 2014 study, there were vacancies reported that could be considered “strategic vacancies,” that is, positions that were on purpose left unfilled. In effect, these schools are purposefully understaffed. The teaching hours of the unfilled positions were then distributed among the teachers of the school enabling them to boost their salaries by taking on additional teaching hours. To be fair, some of these strategic vacancies are in subjects where the instructional hours/week are very low (e.g., music, physical education, labor classes) and where it would be difficult to employ a full-time teacher. Another remarkable finding is that school directors find older teachers to be more responsible and professional in their work. Whether this merely reflects a prejudice towards inexperienced novice teachers or whether the older generation of teachers, raised and trained during the Soviet era, are indeed instilled with a greater sense of moral purpose and commitment deserves further scrutiny. Nevertheless, the common practice of school directors to register vacancies as a placeholder for a teaching position that they later up divide up and distribute among the school’s teaching workforce, or so-called “strategic

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vacancies,” is a fascinating phenomenon that unexpectedly surfaced in the 2014 UNICEF Kyrgyzstan study. There is additional data that substantiates the phenomenon of “strategic vacancies.” The fluctuation of vacancies over the course of the school year may be observed nationwide. The Human Resource Department of MoES records monthly the number of vacant positions. It is therefore possible to compare the reported vacancies in September (beginning of school year) and in January (in mid-school year) of every year. Table 15.8 presents a comparison over the past 5 years. Table 15.8 illustrates three developments. First, for the past 5 school years, the number of vacancies is consistently higher in the month of September as compared to the month of January. Second, overall vacancies dropped considerably since the introduction of the salary reform in 2011. As the table above shows, there were 3,556 vacancies reported before the introduction of the salary reform (September 2010). The number decreased significantly with the introduction of the reform. One year after the reform (September 2012), the number was with 1,478 reported vacancies almost 60% less. For the past 2 years, the number of vacancies reached a historical low of approximately 1,500 vacancies at the beginning of the school year. Less than one-third of the vacancies are filled by mid-school year (January) and the rest of the vacancies are broken up in vacant teaching hours and redistributed among teachers in the school. For example, in school year 2013/2014, 1,553 vacancies were reported nationwide in September 2013. By January 2014, 412 of them were filled (27%) and the remaining 1,141 (73%) were redistributed among other teachers at the school. Finally, the table demonstrates a third noteworthy trend: The considerable decrease of vacancies was especially pronounced in rural schools. They managed to hire new teachers as a result of the reform thereby reducing their vacancies by two-thirds over the period September 2010–September 2012. The number of vacancies dropped during that period from 2,634 to 976 vacancies. TABLE 15.8  Reported Vacancies by Month and Location of School Urban/Semi-Urban Schools

Total

Rural Schools

Year

September

January

September

January

September

2009/10

3,130

2,138

676

354

2,454

January 1,784

2010/11

3,556

1,893

922

473

2,634

1,420

2011/12

2,428

1,958

840

370

1,588

1,269

2012/13

1,478

1,146

502

314

976

832

2013/14

1,553

1,141

461

309

1,092

832

Source: MoES, Department of Human Resources, 2014; see UNICEF Kyrgyzstan, 2014.

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Urban and semi-urban schools also experienced a drop in vacancies but the decrease was not as large. This practice is also inscribed in policies that were periodically adjusted to raise the ceiling of permissible teaching loads. Table 15.9 demonstrates the changes in the legal framework that the Ministry of Education and Science had to issue under pressure from the municipalities (led by Bishkek City) that complained about the low salary of teachers for the high cost of living in cities and as compared to other professions. Setting a ceiling for the maximum permissible teaching load was commendable from a pedagogical perspective but, from the onset, was unpopular among practitioners because it resulted in a low teacher salary. Starting with the salary reform of 2011, the unit of remuneration was no longer a stavka (16 or 18 hours of teaching per week) but rather a teaching hour. As with the stavka system, the hourly rate was linked to the actual work that was performed in terms of teaching hours as well as non-teaching hours. The reliance on actual teaching and non-teaching hours only exacerbates the following negative practices in schools of Kyrgyzstan: The professionally humiliating tendency to micromanage teachers and the inefficient TABLE 15.9  The Increase of Permissible Teaching Hours, 2011–2013 Teachers

Directors & School Administrators General Schools With a Teacher Shortage

Exceptions for Schools in Rural Areas With a Teacher Shortage

Maximum Teaching Load per Week

Total

Decree #18, January 19, 2011

20 hours

32 hours

6 hours

9 hours for directors and deputy-directors

Decree #270, May 31, 2011

25 hours

36 hours

6 for directors, 12 deputydirectors

9 for directors, 12 deputy-directors

Directive of MoES #04-7/4451, September 1, 2011

27 hours

41 hours

Administrators with an administrative stavka of 0.75 stavka are permitted to teach 15 hours; those with 0.5 stavka, 19 hours; and those with 0.25 stavka, 23 hours.

Decree #373 June 24, 2013

31 hours

49 hours

12 hours for both directors & deputydirectors Administrators with an administrative stavka of 0.75 are permitted to teach 17 hours; those with 0.5 stavka, 22 hours; and those with 0.25 administrative stavka, 26 hours.

Source: UNICEF Kyrgyzstan (2014).

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requirement of over-reporting. Today, deputy-directors spend much more time with recording how many hours teachers actually teach and how many hours they carry out other non-teaching activities. The non-teaching hours are differentiated between (a) preparatory, curricular work (lesson planning, grading of student notebooks, other preparatory work); and (b) extracurricular work and professional development (class management, mentoring of other teachers, working with circles, other extra-curricular work), and deputy directors are expected to meticulously record every hour a teacher spends on teaching or other work. The excessive reporting to deputy directors at the school and to education authorities in the district disrupts the collaboration among teachers. It generates a culture of denunciation and prevents mutual trust among teachers. In addition, the pressure to report measurable outcomes exacerbates all kind of pedagogical nonsense such as, for example, measuring the quality of teaching by the number of booklets or teaching material that a teacher produced or measuring the quality of student evaluation by the number of comments that teachers provided in students’ notebooks. In such a culture of excessive reporting and compliance, professional activities such as, for example, advising students or collaborating with colleagues fall through the cracks simply because they are difficult to quantify and measure. The teacher salary reform of 2011 faced difficulties with implementation for the following three reasons: First, the new hourly remuneration rate was higher than before 2011, but still too low to allow teachers to make a living from teaching the regular workload. The problematic practice of taking on additional hours and teaching excessively kept creeping back into the new structure of the teacher salary in the Summer of 2011, even before the next school year had started. Second, the reform benefited primarily young teachers and teachers in rural as well as in mountainous areas. This made the large group of experienced teachers in large urban and semiurban schools, which happen to be the most vocal and politically influential group, feel neglected. As with the earlier study of 2009, the follow-up study of 2014 highlighted a few problems in the structure or composition of the teacher’s salary. The problems that were identified were not necessarily new to the politicians, policy makers, and professionals in the Kyrgyz Republic. However, the studies provided a “scientific rationality” (Luhmann, 1990; Schriewer, 1990) or served as a “stamp of approval” to document the need for immediate action. Therefore, the 2014 UNICEF Kyrgyzstan study, referenced in this section of the chapter, made valuable suggestions on how to improve the salary of teachers in Kyrgyzstan given the financial constraints of the education budget. These suggestions are currently discussed in the working group of the Ministry of Education and Science leading most likely to the next salary reform, implemented in 2015 or 2016.

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NOTES 1. An earlier version of this chapter exclusively focused on the 2009 UNICEF Kyrgyzstan study on teachers. It was written by G.  Steiner-Khamsi, N. Teleshaliyev, G. Sheripkanova-MacLeod, and A. Moldokmatova  for the first edition of this book (published in 2011) and was entitled “Ten-Plus-One Ways of Coping with Teacher Shortage: A School-Level Analysis of Teacher Shortage in Kyrgyzstan.” This version has been vastly expanded and also includes a reflection on the 2011 teacher salary reform in Kyrgyzstan. 2. Both authors participated in the 2009 study, along with Gulzhamal Sheriphkanova-MacLeod and Ainura Moldokmatova. Nurbek Teleshaliyev was working for UNICEF Kyrgyzstan at the time of the 2009 study. In addition, Gita Steiner-Khamsi directed the research team for the 2014 study which included Raisa Belyavina and Farida Ryskulueva as well as Chynara  Kumenova who represented UNICEF Kyrgyzstan on the research team. 3. There is a proliferation of research literature on “contract teachers,” hired in developing countries on an annual basis, normally for lower salaries than regular teachers and with no additional social benefits. In many developing countries, contract teachers (also referred to as para-teachers, volunteers, community teachers) have fewer qualifications than regular teachers and were initially recruited to combat teacher shortage in remote rural areas. Different from contract teachers, however, the substitute teachers and other, non-qualified teachers in Kyrgyzstan—examined in this study—were not part of a national strategy but a school-level response to massive teacher shortage. For more information see the overview by Duthilleul (2005) and the most recent empirical study on contract teachers by Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2012). 4. Kyrgyzstan, however, has been an exporter rather than an importer of teachers. Teachers from Kyrgyzstan migrate to Kazakhstan and Russia, in particular, to work in factories or in any other job that pays a decent income. 5. A zaochnik is a part-time student at a higher education institution or a university who is enrolled in a department of correspondence studies. Students in these departments typically work full-time and only visit their education institution twice a year to take exams; they are expected to be self-directed and study textbooks by themselves. 6. See Government decree no. 270 entitled “Approval of the procedure for the calculation of wages for employees of educational institutions,” 31 May 2011.

REFERENCES CEATM. (2008). We study for life. The results of the international comparative study of functional literacy of 15-year old pupils, PISA-2006. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Author. Duflo, E., Dupas, P., & Kremer, M. (2012). School governance, teacher incentives, and pupil–teacher ratios: Experimental ecidence from Kenyan primary schools. NBER Working Paper No. 17939. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Duthilleul, Y. (2005). Lessons learnt in the use of “contract” teachers. Paris, France: UNESCO IIEP.

350    G. STEINER-KHAMSI and N. TELESHALIYEV Luhmann, N. (1990). Essays on self-reference. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. McKinsey Report. (2007). How the world’s best-performing school systems come out on top. London, England: McKinsey. Ministry of Education and Science, Department of Analytical and Strategic Work. (2009). Education development strategy, 2011–2020. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Author. National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic. (2014). Education and science in the Kyrgyz Republic for 2009–2013. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Author. Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development. (2007). PISA 2006. Science competencies for tomorrow’s world (volumes 1 and 2). Paris, France: Author. Schriewer, J. (1990). The method of comparison and the need for externalization: Methodological criteria and sociological concepts. In J. Schriewer, in cooperation with B. Holmes (Eds.), Theories and methods in comparative education (pp. 25–83). New York, NY: Lang. Steiner-Khamsi, G. (2007). The stavka system in Tajikistan: Background, challenges, and recommendations for teacher salary reform. Dushanbe, Tajikistan: Ministry of Education of the Republic of Tajikistan and Education Modernization Project. Steiner-Khamsi, G. (2009). Access and quality in basic education [Background Paper for USAID]. Washington, DC: USAID. Steiner-Khamsi, G., Kumenova, C., & Taliev, N. (2008). Teacher attraction and retention strategy: Background paper for the education development strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic 2011–2020. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Ministry of Education and Science, Department of Strategic and Analytic Work. Steiner-Khamsi, G., Harris-van Keuren, C., Silova, I., & Chachkhiani, K. (2009). Decentralization and recentralization reforms: Their impact on teacher salaries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia [Background paper for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2009]. Paris, France: UNESCO GMR. Steiner-Khamsi, G., Moldokmatova, A., & Sheripkanova-MacLeod, G. (2009). Real teacher shortage in the Kyrgyz Republic: A focus on teacher quality. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: UNICEF. UNESCO. (2009). Overcoming inequality: Why governance matters. Paris, France: UNESCO Global Monitoring Report. UNESCO. (2014). Policy Paper 15/Fact sheet 30: Wanted: Trained teachers to ensure every child’s right to primary education. Montreal, Canada: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. UNICEF. (2009). Learning achievement in the CEE/CIS Region: A comparative analysis of the results from the 2006 PISA study. Geneva, Switzerland: Author. UNICEF Kyrgyzstan. (2014). Situation analysis of teachers in Kyrgyzstan: Salary, teaching hours and quality of instruction. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Author. USAID QLP. (2009). USAID quality learning project in the Kyrgyz Republic. Report on research “New Teacher Retention in the Kyrgyz Republic.” Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Creative Associates.

CHAPTER 16

TEACHING AS A PROFESSION IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC The Quest for (Re)Building the Knowledge Base Alan J. DeYoung University of Kentucky Rakhat Zholdoshalieva UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning

Education and knowledge have historically been highly valued in societies like Kyrgyzstan that were once part of the Tsarist Russia and then the Soviet Union. The formal education system(s), which emerged within them during the 20th century, were universally acknowledged as one of its most significant achievements. Since national independence and its transition to a globalization and marketization, education in the Kyrgyz Republic has remained a rhetorical cornerstone for meeting the learning needs of a market-based economy and a space in which the cultural and social changes in society can be legitimized (Amsler, 2009; DeYoung, 2010). Tellingly,

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dramatic education reform ambitions have been voiced by all of Kyrgyzstan’s presidents: Education was argued to be a “resource for social transition” by Akayev (2003), “the most important element” of the “strategy to renewing the country” by Bakiyev (2009), and a critical “investment in the future” by Atambayev (2011). Since the 1990s, the education system has been subjected to a wide range of reforms including re-standardizing the curriculum, overcoming the “capacity gap” in school management, and better linking schooling to occupations emerging in the private sector. One of the most important components of these reforms has been improving the talent and strength of teachers, under the rubric of improving their “professionalism.” We take issue with this construct, suggesting that improving teacher professionalism would systematically and centrally involve teachers themselves in the process, which as we will argue is usually not the current case in Kyrgyzstan. In the following chapter we analyze teaching as a profession in Kyrgyzstan by first considering characteristics of teaching as a profession from the sociology of occupations and the evolution of teaching in the former Soviet Union. We then outline the general developments in education in the Kyrgyz Republic from about 1990 to 2010 that impacted the material and professional conditions of its teachers. As part of this latter development, we argue that the collapse of the ideological and material conditions under-girding the teaching profession in Kyrgyzstan seriously eroded the knowledge previously supporting the professional status of teachers. We conclude by considering if and how substantial national and international education reform efforts have for the most part undercut teaching as a profession in Kyrgyzstan. Data for this analysis come from several different sources: documents related to Soviet education policy as well as Kyrgyz and regional (Central Asian) media accounts about recent educational issues and problems in the country. These are coupled with fieldwork and interviews collected during two rounds of research between 2003 and 2011 with teachers, school administrators, and university instructors. These observations are also supplemented by project evaluations of several recent school reform initiatives. CHARACTERISTICS OF A PROFESSION AND THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE Strong professional groups are typified by a number of characteristics, including the possession of important or “esoteric” scientific knowledge ethically dedicated to the needs of clients (rather than the market/economy). Professionals normally undergo extensive training and continuous retraining, since their knowledge base is argued to grow and change over time.

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Entries into the profession as well as standards of practice are monitored by licensure boards (Corwin, 1965; Etzioni, 1969; Shulman, 1987). In most nations, teaching is interpreted to be a semi-profession, since teachers usually do not control many of the factors that would allow them primary control of the teaching–learning processes and directions of their work. Without such control, their economic and social status suffers (Ingersoll, 2004; Lortie, 1975). In previous generations school administrators have emerged in most development countries to assume control of education workspaces; more recently, teacher autonomy has more seriously been threatened in the West as waves of school “accountability” protocols were introduced from the 1980s. Under these, policies rewarding increased, efficiency and standardized testing have been championed at the expense of teacher professionalism, and efforts to engender “teacher proof” education resulted in deskilling teachers and subjecting them to further external control (Apple, 1993). The focus became curricular standardization and test performance, often contracted to external companies and corporations in the private sector (Apple, 1988). In general, secondary school teachers almost everywhere have claimed to be both subject matter specialists and pedagogues or methodologists trained in the science of child development. Teachers usually graduate from 4- or 5-year certifications programs and are required to keep abreast of new developments in learning and teaching in their fields in regularly attended in-service training programs. Yet they typically exercise only limited control over their training and are employed by local or regional or state governing boards, and often supervised by even more powerful educational bureaucrats in service to state agendas. A specific problem for teachers striving to enhance their status within local communities is that they are highly visible to all other “status-conferring groups,” that is that, unlike some professionals, who have more limited lifetime contact opportunities with “clients,” (e.g., physicians), virtually every individual in modern societies has had significant and long-term interactions with teachers. The status of teachers and their professional autonomy is thus often challenged by lay and administrative bodies that have critical attitudes and perspectives on teacher knowledge and expertise, which contest the idea that teachers have so much esoteric and specialized knowledge that they should unilaterally control what happens in schools (Macdonald, 1995; Stub, 1975). Teaching as a profession is arguably stronger in nations with decentralized educational governance where trained educators may or have become more powerful in defining what the student needs and how to provide instruction related to these needs. Another factor which likely affects teacher status is how widely knowledge and higher education are valued within one society compared to another (Robb, 2006; Stub, 1975). In the former U.S.S.R., the rise of teaching as a recognized and valued profession actually depended initially upon the state’s mandate to create a literate population even with

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teachers who often had not completed their formal secondary education. The professional status of teaching in this case grew from announced state needs rather than the collective action of teachers. Later, however, their status was bolstered by a population that valued learning and also recognized that teachers and schools were key to upward social mobility. In the U.S.S.R., higher education opportunities grew slowly. In the (then) Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic, there was only one university and a handful of professional institutes even in the 1980s. Future teachers were among approximately 10% of secondary school graduates who were admitted to a higher education institution for a state subsidized professional training. Although the curriculum and teaching methods remained highly specified and state prescribed, to be a teacher was considered important and prestigious (Holmes, Reed, & Voskresenskaya, 1995); partly because teachers would have the luxury of working with ideas rather than with their hands, and they would receive comparatively higher salaries. By the time of Perestroika, however, the professional allure of teaching had begun to erode, as cynicism about the rhetorical march toward world socialism was growing. It was during this period when reform movements in various social and economic sectors—including education—became visible. Soviet educational reformers believed they could remove bureaucratic regulation from the school; decentralize educational administration; bring about innovative teaching techniques, and enhance the involvement of classroom teachers in school renewal (Dneprov, 1993; Eklof & Dneprov, 1993; Froumin, 2005; Kerr, 2005). Dneprov, who became the first education minister of the Russian Federation, placed most of the blame for a moribund and inefficient education system at the feet of school bureaucrats in the central and regional education centers. He proclaimed that the way forward lay with the energy and talent of professional teachers once unleashed from the bonds of bureaucracy and harassment from above (Dneprov, 1993). Froumin (2005) likewise championed the democratic and professional interests of Soviet teachers and teacher collectives in the late 1980s. According to him, the drive to professionalize Soviet schools in this era involved calls for students and teachers to be at the center of most or all innovations. Alternative school and instructional models were to be enabled and experimented with which would facilitate both students and teachers to become more interactive and innovative. Thus, during Perestroika, many Soviet teachers and intellectuals believed they were on the threshold of real professional opportunities and increased power to be innovative and creative in the service of instruction (Kerr, 2005). Unfortunately, teachers were never fully “freed from the bewildering stream of instructions” that previously emanated from former Soviet bureaucracy, and have not been able to “collaborate with society, science and the children to restructure and renew the school”—neither in Kyrgyzstan

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or Central Asia, nor Russia itself (Johnson, 1997). Most of these hopes and expectations were constrained as it became clear that reforming and improving schools and decentralizing education authority had real economic and organizational costs, which few educators within the post-socialist states, including Kyrgyzstan, had anticipated. POST-INDEPENDENCE EDUCATIONAL TRENDS IN KYRGYZSTAN Schools in Kyrgyzstan (as in Russia) were hit hard by the economic and financial crises in the early transition years of the 1990s; and they have never fully recovered (Mertaugh, 2004; Shagdar, 2006; UNDP, 2005). One of problematic trends in post-independent education system has been that the changing responsibility for fixing the problems has been passed from one level of government to the next, and finally to parents who have trouble paying even the modest school fees. Another problematic trend related to educational reform in Kyrgyzstan—as in Russia—was the inadequate and insufficient legal basis that theoretically supports reformed public education. There have been many proclamations and edicts guaranteeing education access and quality, but little ability to hold the state accountable for what is not done. Russian academician Alexander Abramov, criticizing educational laws adopted in Russia as “controversial,” “false,” or “raw,” attributed this situation to several factors—which also hold true for Kyrgyzstan: Arrogance of power. Public discussion of education issues and reports by the ministry are a thing of the past. Dissenting views are ignored. New ideas are rejected. Decisions are made by a handful of officials. The second reason involves the weakness of particular civil structures. There are no professional communities able to uphold the cause for education reform . . . Third, invasive commercialism. The education system is viewed as a market of education services and products—hence the priority that is being given to the institution of market mechanisms. Fourth, Western models (or rather pseudo models) are being imposed, which have limited, if any, application to the Russian reality. (Abramov, 2008)

Kyrgyzstan has also encountered an important additional liability related to its education sector: What some term a “capacity gap.” There was little here in the way of professional educational leadership; no national research related to education policy, and no policy initiatives targeting the exodus of quality teachers from the system (Heyneman, 1998; UNDP, 2006). In Soviet times, virtually every economic and social sector policy decision came from Moscow, and virtually everyone trained to make such decisions lived and worked there as well (Gleason, 1997; Roy, 2000). From the 1930s, contests

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over control of Soviet education policy were actually held between different ministries and departments of the Communist Party Central Committee, and almost nothing was left to chance for either republican education ministries or individual schools to decide (Holmes, 2005). As a consequence, the lack of training at the (then) local level in program evaluation, policy setting and design led after the collapse to very little experience in how to systemically intervene and improve social services in most ministries, including education. The Kyrgyz educational ministry had almost no training or experience in such areas as education finance, curriculum theory and alignment, or measuring learning outcomes, even today. Those professionals with potential for such an expertise left—like the teachers—for more lucrative private sector opportunities. By the early 2000s, international donors began serious efforts to upgrade capacity building in Kyrgyzstan; likely at the expense of restoring teacher professionalism—as we discuss later (World Bank, 2004). Kyrgyz policy makers and local educators are reluctant to pursue policy and practice matters on their own, still looking for Russian models to borrow from (DeYoung, 2008). As one expert commentator summarized, A factor that contributed to the eventual failure of a once-progressive educational system is the lack of strategic vision and the absence of a single (indigenous) strategy for education reform. After the break-up of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet school system could not be sustained, nor was it relevant to contemporary social and economic needs. The consequent reform attempts (were) piecemeal, inconsistent and half-hearted. Moreover, programmatic papers drafted by education specialists were often left unimplemented. Frequent ministerial reshuffles also contributed: With an average education minister in office for slightly more than a year, consistency talk is totally irrelevant. (Rahmetov, 2009, para. 6)

Beyond resource scarcity and lack of policy experience at regional and national levels, the third type of capacity gap in Kyrgyz education is to be found at the level of classroom instruction. The teaching profession in Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian republics became an occupation of last resort for any students entering the university after 1990, and qualified teachers are still leaving the profession, There (was) a shortage of 2,863 teachers in the schools (in 2003). This problem is especially acute in rural areas . . . There are cases when people without proper qualification have been teaching some subjects. As a result, the quality of secondary education is suffering greatly. Part of the reason is that because of low salaries, many teachers and graduates of higher educational institutions with pedagogical degrees do not work based on their specialization but are engaged in private business or work in bazaars (markets). Some, especial-

Teaching as a Profession in the Kyrgyz Republic    357 ly teachers of English and Russian, have left for Kazakhstan and Russia, where the situation is believed to be comparatively better. (Karim, 2003, para. 2)

Regional media sources reported what most parents and citizens had already come to believe by 2010: Kyrgyz school education is in a catastrophic situation. The reading skills of 74% of fifteen-year old Kyrgyzstanis are below basic (“pass”) level. Math and sciences results are even worse—failing students constitute 84% and 82% respectively . . . (I)n 2006, Kyrgyzstan recorded the lowest score among the 57 countries that participated in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) . . . Petty corruption (these days) includes both school corruption with children or their parents bribing teachers in exchange for good grades, as well as corruption in college admissions, which demotivate vigorous knowledge acquisition, since high school students know they can buy their way into college. (Rahmetov, 2009, para. 4–5)

A 2007 public opinion poll conducted about secondary education further flavor of the public unhappiness with the education system about the same time. Of 573 individuals who participated, approximately 70% were “deeply dissatisfied: 37% said that “secondary education is unsatisfactory,” 12% replied that “this is not an education,” and 11% called it “disgusting.” Another 17% of the respondents took a milder approach; suggesting secondary education is of only secondary quality, while 7% responded that secondary education is “still acceptable” (Lymar, 2008). All of the above clearly underscores the public belief that education is a huge national problem and that teachers are part of the problem, not part of the solution. POST-SOCIALIST TEACHERS AS THE WORKING POOR Much of the scorn laid upon the feet of teachers in Kyrgyzstan today focuses on the lack of scientific credibility and skills parents believe teachers have in an era where they are poorly trained and scientific knowledge is suspect. This in turn seems linked to the demise of their moral and civic reputations. Teachers are often portrayed in the media not only as corrupt and immoral, but also as members of criminal groups too. As we have suggested, teacher knowledge is challenged by the public as they know that scientific socialism is no longer the way forward, and that the training programs teachers used to graduate from are weak and corrupt as well. Since education was a primary undertaking of the state before and since the state has little money now, teaching is no longer a viable way to stay alive; and what monies are left in the education sector are going to the pockets or

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others in the system, not the teachers’ themselves. And there is substantial duplication within the education ministries which do very little. Low GDP in Kyrgyzstan, as throughout the developing countries, corresponds with low status of teaching as a profession. Despite the fact that nearly 60% of the total expenditure on education is spent on teachers’ salaries, the material conditions of teachers in contemporary Kyrgyzstan remain impoverished. Teachers here are in fact considered to be within the category of the working poor. In December 2010, a nationwide strike of teachers pushed the government to take serious actions toward increasing average teacher salaries from $75 USD to $150–185 USD (Teleshaliyev, 2013). Yet, the geo-political instability throughout the region generated by the Russian–-Ukrainian border problem and the drop in oil prices and value of the Russian ruble also undercut the purchasing power of the Kyrgyz som. The previous salary boost from 2011 was thus negated by the international context; and inflation now stands at about 10% (in 2015). Teachers of Kyrgyzstan routinely threaten to go on a nationwide strike if their salary is not increased. Kyrgyz parliamentarians began to politicize the plight of teachers in elections since 2014: Dismal pay, combined with low social status, is driving younger teachers to leave the profession. In addition, some older teachers who were trained during the Soviet era are retiring, and they are not being replaced. As they go, the quality of public education is plunging—especially outside of Bishkek— leaving a generation of Kyrgyz graduates lacking the skills needed to find wellpaying jobs . . . Lawmaker, Kanybek Osmonaliev, chairman of parliament’s education, science, culture, and sports committee, says there are 80,000 schoolteachers in the country, a shortage of at least 2,500. “The main reason for the shortage of teachers is the low salaries,” Osmonaliev, a former physics teacher, told EurasiaNet.org. “Nowadays teachers get on average 5,500 soms ($99) per month. We need to raise their salaries by at least 30%.” (EurasiaNet. org, 2014, para. 3–5)

The most recently appointed Minister of Education and Sciences, Elmira Sarieva, was assigned to resolve the issue of teacher salaries by the end of Summer 2014, so opposition candidates could not use the education situation in the country as an issue. However, even if the government raises teacher salaries by 30% in 2015—which would cost approximately 3.5 billion soms ($63million USD)—this increase would not seriously improve the material conditions of teachers’ households and their need to work in the shadow economy to survive. Teachers in Kyrgyzstan have typically had to supplement their income through informal transactions and earnings, including reselling consumer goods in local markets or extorting bribery from parents and students (Niyozov & Shamatov, 2010; Silova, 2010). The negative public

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perceptions of teachers as market dwellers, corrupt professionals, and unethical tutors has dominated since the 1990s (DeYoung, 2008). Although school teachers are drawn from the country to the city, their situation can be even more difficult than those in rural places. Rural teachers often supplement their salaries by raising livestock or vegetables for the market; urban teachers usually cannot supplement this way. This dynamic is suggested in the plight of Janarbek, as reported in the education blog Central Eurasian Studies Media Initiative: Janarbek is a history teacher in a rural area of northern Kyrgyzstan. He has been teaching at school for over 27 years. He lives in a rented house with his wife and three teenage children after migrating to this northern village from his previous home in the mountainous Chong-Alai region (in the south of the country). He migrated in search of better living conditions. But now he spends more than half of his salary for the rent. He is at his school every day teaching from 7 a.m. until 6 p.m. to earn money by teaching as many lessons as possible. Nevertheless, his salary is not even enough to buy the daily bread for his family. Therefore, he buys bread on credit from one of his own pupils who help out his parents in a small village kiosk. When Janarbek receives his monthly salary he pays off his debt to the pupil and from the next day starts accumulating this debt again, until he receives his next salary. (Umetbaeva, 2012, para. 4)

If some teachers like Janarbek live off of credit, most urban teachers have to sell their knowledge in the shadow education markets (Silova, 2010). Education here has become a commodity that can be bought and sold. Buying and selling papers and grades seriously undermines the value of good teaching or investing in professional development to become a better one. As Niyozov and Shamatov (2010) explain, teachers who succumb to bribes undercut their moral authority, “Children do not only listen to what we tell them. They also learn from how we look and live. They compare us with others, like the Mafia and business people (kommersants)” (p. 137). PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE BASE: TEACHING THE EXACT, NATURAL, AND HUMANITARIAN SCIENCES The general secondary education curriculum of the former U.S.S.R. and now Kyrgyzstan remains conceptually organized into exact, natural, and humanitarian “sciences.” The primary claim to rigor and strength in the Soviet secondary school was invariably in the exact and natural sciences: math, physics, chemistry, biology, and so forth; while humanities and social sciences curricula are now understood as previously very dogmatic (Amsler, 2007; Holmes et al., 1995). Under optimal financial and political

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circumstances, strategies for school renewal and rebuilding in Kyrgyzstan as they relate to higher academic standards and building a knowledge-based economy would concentrate on all of the sciences. Unfortunately, instilling academic rigor and adding new scientific content to the curriculum here has taken a back seat to addressing corruption and bribery. And, dreams of entering a knowledge-based economy have diminished as increasing numbers of children are now forced into agriculture or out-migrating to Russian and Kazakhstan to find work. Some in the government even argue that schools should be concentrating now on skills that out-migrants can use if and when they travel outside the country to work in construction, agriculture, and retail services. Science and math teachers were arguably the first to leave the secondary schools of Kyrgyzstan during the 1990s, and their ranks have remained depleted. In addition to poor salaries, laboratory equipment is no longer provided in the state budget. Save for some elite schools in the capital city, operational computers and computer teachers are only rarely to be found, since computer-savvy professionals have much greater employment opportunities elsewhere than in secondary schools. The son of a schoolteacher in one of the best rural secondary schools in his oblast (Naryn) casually described what passed for instruction in computer science (informatika) at his school in 2006. “Informatika” was one class taught every year in the gymnasium, but for lack of qualified teachers in several subject areas, all of the “deeper learning” courses were dropped: We studied computers until 9th grade. And then in 10th and 11th grade, our class did not study computers any more . . . at present we have “kabinet informatiki” (a computer class room), but we do not have computers there now. We used to have five computers, but they were used computers and quickly broke down. Students (still) study the parts of the computer—the keyboard, for example—and they are told about the computer. They fulfill the learning tasks: for example, what button to push. But everything is from a text (book); there is no practice. (DeYoung, personal communication, April, 6, 2005)

Meanwhile, the Associate Principal (Zavuch) for Instruction and math teacher at the same prestigious school complained that her instructional materials remained from Soviet times and needed updating to be more relevant. But, she did not see any curriculum changes coming her way soon: We study math in accordance with the old program, Moscow program, as we say now. This program—I cannot say that it is very complicated; it is intended for an average student. Of course, there are some topics that could be shortened. Math should be more connected to real life, and there are some tasks (in our program) that are far away from reality. There should be more taken

Teaching as a Profession in the Kyrgyz Republic    361 from life, more things necessary for the future. (DeYoung, personal communication, April, 7, 2005)

This Zavuch, an ethnic Kyrgyz, argued that her math teachers who themselves had studied in Russian language schools as students became better math teachers later, since teaching math in most schools relied on Russian language texts. The problem for her was that few incoming teachers were now fluent in Russian, which she claimed compromised their teaching. Our teachers who graduated from the Russian school, it is easy for them to teach math, especially at the high school level. Those teachers who at their time finished in Kyrgyz language schools—and then studied at the university before they came here—it is sort of difficult for them. There is still a difference in terms and differences in speech. They have difficulties (in talking), and it is difficult for them to bring their knowledge to kids. Also (unfortunately) we have only a few Russian-speaking teachers (left) in the elementary school, and parents are trying to get their kids into those classes. We have only two Russian teachers. (DeYoung, personal communication, April, 7, 2005)

The Associate Principal also claimed that many instructional resources previously used to help teach math and the sciences were no longer available, which was becoming a problem for her: Earlier, when it was the Soviet Union, we used to have these publications, like the journal “Teaching Math at School,” and the same for every other subject “Russian,” “Biology at School,” and so on. There are none now. We have not had any since 1992. (These) were a huge help. Subscriptions were compulsory, and (these journals) are still published in Russia. But we cannot obtain them (ne dokhodyat). We used to subscribe, and the journals were delivered. It would be great to get them. Everybody; every teacher used to subscribe to them. Now it would be great to have at least one copy (just) for the school in the library. (DeYoung, personal communication, April, 7, 2005)

Problems of teaching other exact sciences by incoming teachers not fluent in Russian and who have fewer instructional aids are also the same problems to be found in the teaching of chemistry, biology, and physics, arguably the strongest curricular components of Soviet and Kyrgyz secondary schools. Every one of the four high-performing rural secondary schools had problems finding and retaining teachers in all of these subject areas, and often used teachers who were not trained in one or more of the subjects they were called upon to teach (DeYoung, Reeves, & Valyayeva, 2006). More recently, Elysey Sin (2015a), professor and the head of the natural and mathematics education at the Kyrgyz Academy of Education, noted that in the teaching of math today, a large percent of educators do not use the curriculum that has now been rewritten in the competency-based

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approach as suggested by western educators. He also nostalgically recalled that previous math teachers and teacher educators presided over reforms; authored new texts; and organized mathematics Olympiads; that is, they were active in the creation and organization of instruction. Sin cautions, the uncritical borrowing of foreign reform ideas without due consideration and analysis to the historical contexts of the Kyrgyz and Soviet contexts could even be “destructive”: It is easy as well as fashionable for our education policy makers to adopt reforms from other countries. By doing so, they forget the historical contexts of education reforms, their educational philosophy, culture, and traditions are distinct from our contexts. At times, these reforms may not simply be contradictory but also destructive to our education system. (Sin, 2015b, para. 13)

In any event, few in the government or the private sector now believe that the math and science taught today in national schools are as good as they were 25 years ago; and no one believes that schoolteachers in the exact sciences (as a group) are as talented as they once were. This is hardly the reputation needed to convince the public that teaching exact sciences is supported by teacher mastery of a strong knowledge base. With the collapse of “scientific socialism” as the guide to social and moral development, teachers of “humanitarian” sciences throughout the postSoviet world are in even worse professional situations than their comrades in the physical or “exact” sciences. Consider the situation of history teaching in Kyrgyzstan today, a central curricular component in every student’s program (Shamatov, 2010). In fact, all Central Asian republics have problems of teaching national history (Kaplan, 2005; Niyozov & Dastambuev, 2009). Teaching history 20 years ago had Marxism-Leninism as its theoretical and methodological foundation. Teachers focused on certain topics and facts and the “correct” interpretation of them (revolutions, class struggle; socialism; communism as the highest point of social development; and the Soviet power and Soviet politics as a generally positive achievement; etc.). Teaching history now means eliminating Marxism-Leninism. Almost all of what used to be considered the knowledge base—previously heavily politicized—is claimed to be wrong. Virtually everything that was pictured as positive in Soviet textbooks is now interpreted at best as negative; and at worst, not acknowledged at all. Was Kyrgyzstan (and the other Central Asia republics) a vital and equal part of the former U.S.S.R., or was it really only a Russian colony? Without reliable written records of the Kyrgyz prior to Russian colonization, significant debate exists about who, what and where the history of the country—which by the way is ethnically only 65% Kyrgyz—ought to be taught in the school. Oliver Roy (2000) succinctly expressed challenges to state building and the knowledge base problem for teaching history in Kyrgyzstan, suggesting

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it is even more problematic here than in most of the rest of the former U.S.S.R.: The problem of the newly independent states of Central Asia is at once simple and insoluble. As we have seen, they were born during the Soviet period. But their independence was created in opposition to that period. One cannot imagine Kyrgyzstan making Stalin the father of its nation. Furthermore, they are not able to refer back to the period preceding Sovietisation or Russian colonization in the way that can be done among the Georgians or in the Baltic countries, because what existed in that period—the emirates and the tribal confederations—does not fit with the ethnic-national legitimacy which they are building today. (p. 161)

How then to incorporate the other peoples in the country into the history of Kyrgyzstan so that it represents the experiences of their ancestors in a way that can build social cohesion and social identity? Ismailova (2004) argues that the indigenization of history curriculum in Kyrgyzstan after national independence in the 1990s brings a number of visible contradictions. For instance, the epic poem Manas used to be found in the literature curriculum of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic; but today it is located in the social science curriculum. Here it is used to intensify a sense of belonging, achieve ideological unity and loyalty, and promote new patterns of behaviour. However, adopting the Manas epic as the cornerstone of a new nation marginalizes non-indigenous communities, and negatively influences contemporary inter-ethnic relations. Islmailova (2004) argues: New history textbooks treat Russians as colonizers who seized Kyrgyz lands and oppressed the Kyrgyz people . . . (This) revised history glorifies the heroic past of the Kyrgyz people and demonizes Russians, significantly contributing to the mass outmigration of Russians. (p. 259)

Foreign languages, always considered important among the humanitarian sciences, remain compulsory in Kyrgyz schools. Which ones to teach and why, though, are clearly logistical and political questions rather than based on any scientific principal. The teaching of German has suffered greatly since the ethnic Germans who constituted most of the teachers migrated out of the country in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the fortunes of English and English teaching have greatly improved—although the material base for teaching English has suffered for lack of state produced materials. In the capital, though, international donors and for-profit companies are quite active and work with many Bishkek teachers. The knowledge base for teaching English has in many ways been improved, but since school salaries are low and better teachers can find work in international companies and

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organizations, this does not automatically translate to learner success in the secondary schools themselves. Difficulties in elevating the knowledge base of teaching are probably most contentious when it comes to debates about and competency within the two primary instructional languages of Kyrgyzstan. Russian had been the primary instructional language here, particularly for those who wanted to pursue higher education, where Russian was the typical instructional language also. No one could join the intellectual or political elite without speaking Russian fluently, which of course enhanced the status of Russian language (and literature) teachers. National independence and interests in establishing Kyrgyz identity restored the Kyrgyz language to prominence in much of the country, and certainly outside of the major cities (Korth, 2005). Parents are now legally entitled to have their children learn in the instructional language of their choice, which could also include Uzbek or another minority language. Learning Kyrgyz, though, remains compulsory as a second language for those who do not study in Kyrgyz; while those who study in Kyrgyz have to study Russian as well. The problem with studying Russian is that many teachers of Russian—particularly Russian nationals—exited from school systems at the same time as Russian instructional materials came to be in short supply. Where Kyrgyz is the language of instruction, there remain limited teaching materials, and the national financial situation has prevented the government from developing and publishing adequate Kyrgyz language texts. Even creating a comprehensive Kyrgyz dictionary has taken decades to complete. Kyrgyz language teachers are usually fluent, but have few manuals and have had little pedagogical training in how to teach the language. News agency 24.kg discussed the implications of insufficient Kyrgyz language materials in schools several years back: “Only 57% of Kyrgyz schools are supplied with textbooks,” Damira Kudaibergenova, chief of the school and preschool education department has told in an interview. One simple calculation shows that school children have one textbook for two. The books are old and out of date. “Kyrgyzstan is in urgent need of new school books. Usually schoolbooks are brought from Russia introducing beautiful Russian state symbols into the children’s lives. But what about Kyrgyz symbols? Where did our patriotism go?” (Kolbaev, 2009, para. 1)

The most senior Kyrgyz language teacher in a large rural secondary school DeYoung interviewed in 2005 wistfully complained that she had no equivalent to the new teaching manuals her English teacher colleagues had been freely provided by international organizations. She also noted that the Russian Federation donated many materials to their school for use in Russian language classrooms. Yet she and her colleagues could only try to

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borrow some ideas from both these sets of resources and adapt them for their own use. She did not object to this, but her problem was time. In order to make ends meet, she earned more money as a seamstress and growing sugar-beets with her husband than she did as a teacher. She also complained about the “experts” contracted by the Kyrgyz education ministry to create Kyrgyz teaching materials. These people, she opined, were from the university and with no actual school teaching experience, and what they produced was of little use to her. In other words, the methodological base of her language teaching efforts was almost non-existent: The texts we have are very difficult, and they also do not have materials adapted for kids. There are only texts; no suggestions or questions how to work with them, and I myself, sitting at home, do all the preparatory work on how to help a student to understand the language. (DeYoung, personal communication, March 20, 2005)

THE KNOWLEDGE BASE ISSUE FOR VOSPITANIYE Beyond obrazovaniye—the teaching of academic knowledge—the other function of the secondary school in Soviet and now Kyrgyz society is vospitaniye (social upbringing). Virtually every teacher in Kyrgyzstan today has a formal responsibility to connect moral and social values of the culture to the particular curricular area. As well, most teachers serve as klasniye rukovoditeli (cohort leaders for students). Their mission is to create a collective identity among the group; to teach students values related to becoming good citizens; and to dedicate themselves to patriotic needs of Kyrgyzstan. In vospitaniye, the knowledge base for teaching has been severely affected during the past 20 years. Soviet and now Kyrgyz teachers were/are intentionally and formally expected to be the purveyors and models of morality in the school. Previously their claims to creating social cohesion were based on Marxist “science,” a science that no longer holds. But building morality and national character—an explicit and mandated goal of the Soviet and the Kyrgyz school—has become an almost impossible job when there are continuing debates about the focus of either of them (DeYoung, 2007). In the current era, schools and teachers have lost their claim to knowing what is right and what is wrong and how students should behave. Most students think they know better—and the respect for and the status of teachers have thus become compromised. A former secondary school director within one Kyrgyz pedagogical faculty explained the goals of vospitaniye in an interview completed in 2006. As suggested earlier, the seven “behests” of the heroic Kyrgyz epic figure Manas were being proclaimed as the moral values upon which the new

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nation could be built. They predictably called for such values as patriotism, bravery, community, and perseverance. The former school director argued, however, that most of the students she worked with saw through these behests, making life difficult for teachers: The main (problem), I think, is that our government officials—who are watched by people—behave in another way; they show other principles, different from those of Manas . . . (And) it is too difficult for a teacher to bring up the students according to these principles when (students) respond that “real life is different; you are not teaching us the truth; because in real life we don’t need these principles.” (DeYoung, personal communication, April 11, 2006)

The director argued, for example, that it was no longer possible to demand or expect the parents of many students to aid teachers in their requests for serious study. Her students, she claimed, spent long hours in the disco instead of school, relying on their parents’ money and personal connections to enter the university and move up in society. Nowadays in Kyrgyz society it’s possible to enter the university (without benefit of serious study) because if you pay money, you can be a (university) student even if you don’t pass the (entrance) examinations. Instead, your parents may speak to rector, or some relatives (to) get you in. The main reason we have such cases is because the moral principles (shared within) the Kyrgyz family don’t spread to the society. It will work only in the family . . . We (appear) to have two standards of living, but it’s too difficult for a kid to decide whom to follow, his parent or the teacher. (Unfortunately), it is the opinion concerning teachers that they are poorly paid people, and that is why (some parents) cannot allow their children to be (influenced) by us, because they have high positions and so (they feel) they know about life more than a poor teacher . . . But I think only teachers are left true and fair in our society. (DeYoung, personal communication, April 11, 2006)

Today vospitaniye also includes moral education, which has become a highly contested space. While the state does not formally recognize Islamic pedagogy in the national curriculum, moral education, including Islamic norms, is to be found within aspects of Iyman (faith). Often community members with religious education, or literature teachers with no prior specialized training, teach aspects of Iyman informally that promote a deep and profound connection to Kyrgyz traditions, as a form of ethnic particularism and nationalism (Misco & Hamot, 2007). Yet due to criticisms over some Iyman content, a more secularized Adep (ethics) came to replace it, and this is allowed to be taught in schools by those with pedagogical qualifications. Adep promotes . . . an explicitly national idiom . . . constant evocation of how the (ethnic) Kyrgyz “should” behave, and references to the specifically Kyrgyz national

Teaching as a Profession in the Kyrgyz Republic    367 hero, Manas . . . Rather than appealing to some presumed moral universals, the values . . . explicitly rooted in indigenous categories of tradition (salt) and customary law (ürp-adat) that are seen to exist apart from, and prior to the more mutable, negotiated law of parliament (zakon). Not the language of urban national intelligentsia . . . It is simply the language of one who, in a context of strong ethnic boundary maintenance and deference towards moral precepts presumed to derive from the deep past of one’s ancestors, sees it as self-evident that those precepts will be different for different ethnic groups. (DeYoung et al., 2006, p. 181)

So, there remains a fierce competition over the moral direction of education today in Kyrgyzstan, which did not exist during Soviet times. This has led to the rise of community actors outside of the school who compete to influence young people in Kyrgyzstan. For instance, there are as many (or more) mosques in Kyrgyzstan today as there are comprehensive public schools. Although not all the mosques have youth or children’s wings for teaching Islamic way of life, this number alone helps to realize that Islam and other religious centers actively compete now with secular systems. And, they can and do claim a superior moral position to schools and educators exposed for corruption, nepotism, favoritism, and failing to live up to the societal ideals of excellence in academic learning and upright moral behavior. TEACHER PREPARATION AND RETRAINING AS PROFESSIONAL CHALLENGES Under normal conditions, professional preparation could and should come from both professional (university) training, and continuous retraining or in-service training programs where ever improving new teaching and learning strategies can be introduced. Sadly, in both instances the Kyrgyz situation is currently problematic. As discussed earlier, teaching as a profession is no longer highly sought, and teacher trainers have also left if and when they find better opportunities. Steiner-Khamsi, Teleshaliyev, SheripkanovaMacLeod, and Moldokmatova (2011) note that the low status of teaching nowadays often attracts applicants who cannot pass entrance examination scores for more prestigious programs. Silova (2009), meanwhile, finds that students with the lowest scores in the centralized university admission tests usually enter the “budget” groups in universities, which are less prestigious than professional programs for high demand specializations like law, economics, foreign languages, and so forth. This is especially pronounced in the case of regional universities, which allowed new entrants with scores bordering the minimum pass level to enter universities. Despite the Kyrgyz government’s efforts to attract more students to the teaching profession, the highest achieving students still prefer privately funding their education

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in higher status programs in the prestigious metropolitan universities than enrolling in government paid for regional universities to become educators (Silova, 2009). In a 2008 survey, administered to various student cohorts in what is still the primary Kyrgyz pedagogical university, only 21 students out of 43 stated that they would even consider actually working as a teacher once their studies were complete (DeYoung, 2010). Steiner-Khamsi et al. (2011) remind that most teacher-education graduates make their decision where and whether they want to work as teachers, where earlier the state placed teachers. The result today is that there is a mismatch between teacher supply and demand. For those who must teach for 2 years to satisfy terms of their previous government sponsorship, the exodus to the private sector in language, science, or technology fields after 2 teaching years is dramatic. As each of the above referenced studies argue, in-service teacher professional programs remain as a patchwork of seminars and workshops operated by different actors promoting at times conflicting ideologies; the government has no coherent professional development program that it requires teachers to undergo; the state does not reimburse teachers for trainings they are required to undertake; and services provided to teachers in such instances are often sponsored by international agencies with their own agendas (Joldoshalieva, 2007; Steiner-Khamsi et al., 2011). Teachers Joldoshalieva surveyed (2007) about national retraining priorities and opportunities were invariably negative about the state organized retraining activities. In her survey, they not only complained about outdated and too theoretical information but also about retraining activities being often provided by specialists who had rarely spent time in the classroom. A big problem with professional workshops and trainings, sponsored by international donors in Kyrgyzstan, is that these are frequently considered alien interventions and therefore never become systemic at the national level. Many, if not most of such trainings, are not monitored, supported, or sustained, once the international training team heads back to Bishkek. Given the top–down nature of the education system, Kyrgyz officials would prefer to orchestrate both the mechanics and the funding of internationally suggested programs—which usually defeats any effort to de-centralize the larger system (DeYoung, 2004). The fact that teachers no longer receive a stipend to attend summer retraining away from home is a particular issue for teachers from rural areas, who have to find and pay for accommodation in the oblast centers or the capital city. Niyozov and Dastambuev (2009) report very similar dynamics in Tajikistan. Traveling even to an oblast center for a rural teacher earning around the poverty wage is hardly feasible, and thus many teachers claim particular reasons why they should be exempted from participating. Since many teachers cannot afford to go and many others have low expectations that they will gain useful knowledge or techniques from in-service training

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these days, many teachers try to avoid such occasions to increase their knowledge base; from which they likely could benefit from greatly. Open Society Institute (OSI) described the situation in these terms; noting what they thought should be the knowledge base for Kyrgyz teachers today: In-service training institutions have not changed much since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In many cases, they provide outdated training by focusing on “new” factual information, instead of preparing teachers for working in a “new” environment through introducing child-centered, interactive teaching/learning methods. Training opportunities in teaching critical thinking skills, problem solving skills, curriculum planning, and assessment of students are badly lacking. Although the Ministers of Education in (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) have publicly indicated their willingness to mobilize local resources, these are mostly foreign investments (e.g., the Asian Development Bank, Soros Foundation, etc.) that address the alarming situation of in-service teacher training. (OSI, 2002, p. 17)

Teachers are quite aware about their marginal professional status these days in Kyrgyzstan, and that reforms are often formulated elsewhere and targeted at them—without considering their experiences and expertise. Teleshaliyev’s (2013) study of survival strategies of contemporary classroom teachers in four schools reveals that there are various disempowering and deprofessionalization factors in play, primarily orchestrated by top–down management policies. So, teachers had to carefully navigate their ways to assert their autonomy in and outside their workplaces. Often teachers secretly adapted the centralized curriculum of their subjects to suit the needs of their own students. Teachers also maintained local professional learning communities; and sometimes successfully influenced policies at local school levels. However, the careers of these teachers underscored remaining issues of the weak organization of teachers and the lack of collective self-advocacy among them—which remain an impediment of enhanced teacher professional status in Kyrgyzstan (Teleshaliyev, 2013). DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: IF YOU WANT A STRONG TEACHING PROFESSION . . . While it might be argued that schooling in Kyrgyzstan today is marginally better than it has been early this century, it’s hard to imagine the emergence of a strong teacher profession in Kyrgyzstan anytime soon. There was a brief period when teachers might have become more powerful in directing and improving schools. But the lack of leadership and intellectual capacity among teachers, coupled with a disastrous decline in the resource base and continuance of a strong and top–down—but directionless

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governance, have all managed to place teachers in a powerless and pitiful situation in the country (Joldoshalieva, 2007; Shamatov, 2005; Teleshaliyev, 2013). Empowering teachers to be active players in educational reform and improvement here could happen if teachers somehow could be freed-up to participate in the policy and practice discourses of the country, rather than having to experience a re-emerged bureaucratic tyranny (Dneprov, 2013); and/or if globalization and “traveling educational policies” uncritically promulgated by international donors to the country were not so powerful (Silova & Brehm, 2013; Silova & Steiner-Khamsi; 2008). Recent externally driven efforts to reform education under the guise of improving the system in the end deskill, disempower and de-professionalize Kyrgyz teachers here as in the other globalized education systems (Silova & Brehm, 2013; Teleshaliyev, 2013). Teachers in Kyrgyzstan could and should have routine access to the emerging knowledge base for teaching subjects which are international and where information is available electronically. Cadres of teachers themselves would and should be primary players in curricular development committees to share and plan on how to organize and use this information and possible techniques. And the government should create organizational structures where representatives of practicing teachers could actually sit at the table with other education policy makers as well as international stakeholders: As equal participants in the process of reform. In addition to the political will required to support a strong teaching profession, the resource base for schooling would also have to move salaries to be more competitive; and would pay stipends to teachers in their efforts to develop new curricular content as well as to design ever-improving pedagogical tools. In Kyrgyzstan, currently, international NGOs often have developed protocols and strategies for involving teachers in hands-on and interactive teaching styles. Such groups could be helpful in sharing and advising a new generation of teachers who at the same time should be able to professionally judge themselves which techniques and strategies are most appropriate for their national schools and unique needs of their learners. Were teachers to have the time and the support to become part of the decision-making structure and to implement what they have learned, their increased value to the nation and to building the nation would become more obvious to parents and the larger community. Could any of these things happen in Kyrgyzstan? It is our hope, as well as the hope of the many teachers we have worked with here. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We would like to thank IREX and ACCELS for their roles in facilitating the fieldwork portions of this work, as funded under Title VIII from the

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U.S. Department of State. We also want to express our gratitude to the many teachers, faculty, students, parents, and other educators in Kyrgyzstan whose voices are reflected in these pages. Thanks also to Todd Drummond and Galina Valyayeva for comments and critique related to the final version of the chapter. REFERENCES Abramov, A. (2008). Education reform: School of hard knocks. Moscow News Weekly. Retrieved from http://www.mnweekly.ru/national/20080117/55303866-print .html Akayev, A. (2003). Education for All—A resource for social transition in Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Innovation Center ARCHI. Amsler, S. (2007) The politics of knowledge in Central Asia: Science between Marx and the market. London, England: Routledge. Amsler, S. (2009). Promising futures? Education as a resource of hope in Kyrgyzstan. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(7), 1189–1206. Apple, M. (1993). The politics of official knowledge: Does a national curriculum make sense? Teachers College Record, 95(2), 222–241. Apple, M. (1988). Teachers and texts: A political economy of class and gender relations in education. New York, NY: Routledge. Atambayev, A. (2011, August 12). The government is ready to invest in education as an investment for the future [Russian]. Retrieved from http://www.baldar.kg/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1472:2011-08-15-06-28-59 &catid=38:2009-12-24-19-17-51&Itemid=140 Bakiyev, K. (2009). The course to update the country. Retrieved from http://www.google .com/search?hl=en&client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla%3Aen-US%3Aofficial &hs=XNt&q=static.akipress.org%2Fdocs%2Fkurs_presidenta.doc&btnG= Search&aq=f&oq=&aqi= Corwin, R. G. (1965). A sociology of education: Emerging patterns of class, status, and power in the public schools. New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts. DeYoung, A. (2004). On the demise of the “Action Plan” for Kyrgyz education reform: A case study. In S. Heyneman & A. DeYoung (Eds.), The challenge of education in Central Asia (pp. 199–224). Greenwich, CT: Information Age. DeYoung, A. (2007). The erosion of vospitanye (social upbringing) in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40(2), 239–256. DeYoung, A. (2008), Conceptualizing paradoxes of post-socialist education in Kyrgyzstan. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 36(4), 641–657. DeYoung, A. (2010). Redefining students and universities in the Kyrgyz Republic. In P. Akcali & C. Engin Demir (Eds.), Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: Political and social challenges (pp. 158–189). London, England: Routledge. DeYoung, A., Reeves, M., & Valyayeva, G. (2006). Surviving the transition? Schools and schooling in the Kyrgyz Republic since independence. Greenwich, CT: Information Age.

372    A. J. DeYOUNG and R. ZHOLDOSHALIEVA Dneprov, E. (1993). Faith in the teacher: The energy of Renewal for the School. In B. Eklof & E. Dneprov (Eds.), Democracy in the Russian school: The reform movement in education since 1984 (pp. 42–46). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Eklof, B., & Dneprov, E. (1993). Democracy in the Russian school: The reform movement in education since 1984. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Eklof, B., & Seregny, S. (2005). Teachers in Russia: State, community and profession. In B. Eklof, L. Holmes, & V. Kaplan (Eds.), Educational reform in postSoviet Russia (pp. 197–220). London, England: Frank Cass. Etzioni, A. (1969). The semiprofessions and organizations: Teachers, nurses, and social workers. New York, NY: Free Press. Eurasia.Net.org. (2014, October 28). Kyrgyzstan: Teachers are quitting to take better paying, unskilled jobs. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/ node/70636 Froumin, I. (2005). Democratization and the Russian school: Achievements and setbacks. In B. Eklof, L. Holmes, & V. Kaplan (Eds.), Educational reform in postSoviet Russia (pp. 129–152). London, England: Frank Cass. Gleason, G. (1997). The Central Asian states. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Heyneman, S. (1998). The transition from party/state to open democracy: The role of education. International Journal of Educational Development, 1, 21–40. Holmes, L. (2005). School and schooling under Stalin: 1931–1953. In B. Eklof, L. Holmes, & V. Kaplan (Eds.), Educational reform in post-Soviet Russia (pp. 56– 101). London, England: Frank Cass. Holmes, B., Reed, G., & Voskresenskaya, N. (1995). Russian education: Tradition and transition. New York, NY: Garland. Ingersoll, R. (2004). The status of teaching as a profession. In J. Ballantine & J. Spade (Eds.), Schools and society (2nd Edition.) (pp. 102–118). Belmont CA: Wadsworth. Ismailova, B. (2004). Curriculum reform in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: Indigenization of the history curriculum. Curriculum Journal, 15(3), 247–264. Johnson, M. (1997). Visionary hopes and technocratic fallacies in Russian education. Comparative Education Review, 41(2), 219–225. Joldoshalieva, R. (2007). Continuing teacher professional development in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. Journal of In-Service Education, 33(3), 287–300. Kaplan, V. (2005). History teaching in post-Soviet Russia: Coping with antithetical traditions. In B. Eklof, L. Holmes, & V. Kaplan (Eds.), Educational reform in post-Soviet Russia (pp. 247–271). London, England: Frank Cass. Karim, G. (2003, February 26). Problems of secondary school education in Kyrgyzstan. Central Asia-Caucuses Analyst. Retrieved from http://www.cacianalyst.org/ ?q=node/344 Kerr, S. (2005). The experimental tradition in Russian education. In B. Eklof, L. Holmes, & V. Kaplan (Eds.), Educational reform in post-Soviet Russia (pp. 102– 128). London, England: Frank Cass. Kolbaev, B. (2009, September 23). Kyrgyz education: One Russian schoolbook for two. News Agency “24.kg.” Retrieved from http://eng.24.kg/viewpoints/ 2009/09/23/9106.html Korth, B. (2005). Language attitudes towards Kyrgyz and Russian discourse, education and policy in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. Berne, Switzerland: Lang.

Teaching as a Profession in the Kyrgyz Republic    373 Lymar, A. (2008, February 9). Most readers of news agency “24.kg” assess Kyrgyz secondary education as unsatisfactory. News Agency “24.kg.” Retrieved from http://eng.24.kg/community/2008/09/02/5962.html Lortie, D. (1975). Schoolteacher: A sociological study. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Macdonald, K. (1995). Sociology of the professions. London, England: SAGE. Mertaugh, M. (2004). Education in Central Asia with particular reference to the Kyrgyz Republic. In S. Heyneman & A. DeYoung (Eds.), The challenge of education in Central Asia (pp. 153–180). Greenwich, CT: Information Age. Niyozov, S., & Dastambuev, N. (2009). In-service teacher training in post-Soviet Tajikistan: Challenges and prospects. In A. Karras, P. Calogiannakis, & C. Wolhuter (Eds.), International handbook on teacher education. Nicosia, Greece: University of Nicosia Press. Open Society Institute—Education Support Program. (2002). Education development in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: Challenges and ways forward. Retrieved from http://www.soros.org/initiatives/esp/articles_publications/publications/ development_20020401/education_development.pdf Rahmetov, A. (2009, April 22). Scary statistics: The state of schools in Kyrgyzstan. Central Asia—Caucuses analyst. Retrieved from http://www.cacianalyst.org/ ?q=node/5087 Robb, K. (2006). An uncertain position: Examining the status of teaching as a profession. Essays in Education, 18(Fall). Retrieved from openriver.w/inona.edu/ iei/vol18/issi/15/ Roy, O. (2000). The new Central Asia. New York: New York University Press. Shamatov, D. (2010). Everyday realities of a young teacher in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: A case of a history teacher from a rural school. In P. Akcali & C. Engin Demir (Eds.), Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: Political and social challenges (pp. 133–158). London, England: Routledge. Shagdar, B. (2006). Human capital in Central Asia: Trends and challenges in education. Central Asian Survey, 25(4), 515–532. Shulman, L. (1987). Knowledge and teaching: Foundations of the new reform. Harvard Educational Review, 57(1), 1–22, 351, 846. Silova, I. (2009). The crisis of the post-Soviet teaching profession in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Research in Comparative and International Education, 4(4), 366–383. Silova, I. (2010). Private tutoring in Central Asia: New burdens and opportunities. Paris, France: IIEP, UNESCO. Silova, I., & Brehm, W. (2013). The shifting boundaries of teacher professionalism: Education privatization(s) in the post-socialist education space. In T. Seddon, J. Ozga, & J. Levin (Eds.), Educators, professionalism and politics: Global transitions, national spaces, and professional projects (pp. 55–74). New York, NY: Routledge. Sin, E. (2015a, March 20). Na puti reformirovania matematicheskogo obrazovania stoyat ser’yoznyie problemy [Critical issues for reforming mathematics education]. Kutbilim. Retrieved from http://kutbilim.journalist.kg/2015/02/21/elisey-sin -na-puti-reformirovaniya-matematicheskogo-obrazovaniya-stoyat-sereznyie -problemyi/

374    A. J. DeYOUNG and R. ZHOLDOSHALIEVA Sin, E. (2015b, March 20). Dlya optimizatsii matematiki v shkole nuzhen kompleksnyi podhod [Need for a complex approach for improving mathematics education in schools]. Kutbilim. Retrieved from http://kutbilim.journalist.kg/2015/ 03/18/elisey-sin-dlya-optimizatsii-matematiki-v-shkole-nuzhen-kompleksnyiy -podhod/ Steiner-Khamsi, G., Teleshaliyev, N., Sheripkanova-MacLeod, G., & Moldokmatova, A. (2011). Ten-plus-one ways of coping with teacher shortage. In I. Silova (Ed.), Globalization on the margins: Education and postsocialist transformations in Central Asia (pp. 203–233). Charlotte, NC: Information Age. Stub, H. (1975). The professional prestige of classroom teachers: A consequence of organizational and community status. In H. Stub (Ed.), The sociology of education: A sourcebook (pp. 349–366). Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press. Teleshaliyev, N. (2013), Leave me alone—Simply let me teach. An exploration of teacher professionalism in Kyrgyzstan. European Education, 45(2), 51–74. Umetbaeva, D. (2012, December 3). Rural teachers in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. Central Eurasian Studies Media Initiative. Retrieved from http://cesmi.info/wp/ ?p=489 UNDP. (2005). Influence of civil society on the human development process in Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/sites/ default/files/kyrgyzstan_2005_en.pdf UNDP. (2006). Capacity development and the MDGs. Bangkok: UNDP Regional Development Centre. Retrieved from http://www.undppc.org.fj/resources/ article/files/19.pdf UNESCO. (1999). Status of teacher education in the Asia Pacific region. Retrieved from http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/412_35a.pdf UNICEF. (2006). CEE/CIS: Sub-regional formative evaluation of the global education project (2002–2005) in the CARK region. Retrieved from http://www .unicef.org/evaldatabase/index37911.html USAID. (2011). Improving teachers’ pay, investing in the future. Retrieved from http://blog.usaid.gov/2011/11/improvingteachers%E2%80%99-pay -investing-in-the-future/ Webber, S. (2001). The culture of the Russian school and the teaching profession: Prospects for change. In S. Weber & I. Liikanen (Eds.), Education and civic culture in post-communist countries (pp. 215–230). London, England: Palgrave. World Bank. (2004). Rural education project overview. Retrieved from http://web .worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64312881&piPK=6430284 8&theSitePK=40941&Projectid=P078976

CHAPTER 17

BLAMING THE CONTEXT NOT THE CULPRIT Limitations on Student Control of Teacher Corruption in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan Eric M. Johnson RTI International

“Teacher corruption would not exist if wages were higher. No one is guilty, this is life.” “Teachers are not guilty: low salary and instability creates conditions for corruption.” “If the economy were good, teachers wouldn’t be corrupt.” —Quotes from students in Kyrgyzstan

Corruption, while certainly not new, has recently captured development studies. The rise in attention paid to the topic has been called a “corruption eruption,” and the flow of publications on the topic a “raging torrent” (Williams, 2000). Commonly defined as the abuse of public position for private

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gain (Nye, 1967), the perceived dangers of corruption include decreased trust in public institutions, pronounced social inequality, reduced governmental capacity, and costly economic inefficiencies (Bardhan, 1997).1 Emblematic of the recent attention paid to the matter, the slogan of the leading anti-corruption advocate, Transparency International, implores: “Corruption ruins lives. Take action. Fight back.” However, the simplicity of this dictum belies the lack of consensus about how best to combat corruption. Who should take action? What form should the fight take? In the expansive literature on corruption control, some have outlined distinct roles for both state and non-state actors (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), and others have suggested a list of corruption control “best practices” (Miller, Grodeland, & and Koshechkina, 2001). Yet, these approaches have yielded little success (Karklins, 2005). Pointing to the disappointing results, Svensson (2005) claims that the study of corruption faces three problems: (a) there is little evidence of what works in corruption control, (b) there is inadequate knowledge about how the context and type of corruption matter, and (c) there is a general mismatch between macro-theory and micro-evidence. One emergent response to these problems, Svensson suggests, is to consider the impact of particular accountability mechanisms on a specific type of corruption in a narrow context (see Di Tella & Schargrodsky, 2003; Olken, 2004; Reinikka & Svensson, 2005). This chapter aims to do that. An accountability mechanism of particular interest to many, and of central concern to this chapter, is a reliance on civil society to “blow the whistle” on the corruption they witness and/or experience. This is a particularly popular approach for combating street-level corruption such as that committed by police, customs officials, health care workers, and teachers, for example. The civil society approach to corruption reduction is facilitated by an active and independent media, institutional transparency, forums for citizen participation, and safe and effective avenues for corruption reporting. More than anything, this approach requires that the victims of corruption be motivated to report the culprit. This chapter explores the possibility of using the closest observers of corruption—its victims—to report street-level corruption. Specifically, I investigate the potential efficacy of relying on students to report teacher corruption in the Post-Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan. To do this I first explore the prevalence of teacher corruption in Kyrgyzstan. Do students recognize it to be occurring? If so, where and how? Second, I explore the impact of teacher corruption on students? How is it interpreted by them? Might students be counted on to report it? Based on data collected over seven months in 2007, I find that students in Kyrgyzstan recognize corruption to be occurring but blame the context within which teachers work (i.e., low pay, run-down schools, rampant higher-level corruption) for such behavior, rather than the teachers themselves.

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This finding, I argue, suggests that students are poor candidates for “whistle blowing,” even if provided with safe and effective avenues for doing so. TEACHER CORRUPTION Education, at first blush, might not seem like a sector rife with corruption. After all, educators are thought to be professionals concerned with the welfare of children, and educational goods are thought to be accessible to all willing to work for them. However, in many ways, education is the public sector’s most well-suited for corruption. In most countries, education is the largest component of the state, consuming between 20% and 30% of total public budgets, employing the largest number of civil servants, and occupying the energies of a large portion of the general population. The size of the education sector intersects with its typically chronic underfunding, high stakes results, and disgruntled educators to create the perfect corruption storm (Hallak & Poisson, 2007). Corruption watchers, academics, and policy makers have devoted increasing attention to the topic of educational corruption over the past decade. The recent meta-study by Hallak and Poisson (2007) summarizes expansive research on educational corruption and the growing efforts at combating it. Heyneman (2009) presents a volume on education corruption, with examples from Africa, Asia, and Europe. Both works situate teacher corruption within the larger field of education corruption, which includes corruption in the supply of education goods and services and corruption in the use of public educational property for profit making purposes (Heyneman, 2009). Coming out of this research, the following forms of teacher corruption have been identified (Chapman, 2002). The first form is the misuse of discretionary funds and teaching materials. Discretionary funds are typically parental or community contributions to the school. The misuse of materials includes the selling of supplies on the local market and the forcing of students to buy educational materials profitable to the teacher. Extortion and/or bribery for grade or exam manipulation, constitutes the second form of teacher corruption. Extortion occurs when a teacher requests the payment of money or gifts in a quid pro quo for admissions assistance, favorable grading, or exam fixing. Teacher bribery occurs when students or their parents (in some cases relatives or other go-betweens) offer money or gifts for these services. The third form includes induced private tutoring. When demanded by a student and supplied by someone other than his or her teacher, private tutoring is not generally regarded as corruption (Bray, 2003). However, in cases where a student’s own teacher is providing paid tutoring to the student after school hours, the question of demand becomes

378    E. M. JOHNSON

paramount. If students are induced to take private tutoring by a teacher who has created artificial demand by truncating the curriculum taught during the school day or by making clear that high grades and fair treatment are only for their private tuition students, it can be considered corruption (Bray, 2003; Chapman, 2002). The final form of teacher corruption relates to chronic absenteeism to support other income producing work. Teacher absenteeism is a major problem in many developing countries. A World Bank study found between 13% (Peru) and 58% (India) teacher absenteeism in a study of thousands of primary schools in seven countries (Meier, 2004). It is likely that many teachers miss some classes because of outside work, whether education related or other forms of labor like farming and selling products in the market to supplement their meager salaries.2 As these and other types of education corruption have gained attention, so to have energies put into combating them. Though, as is the case with corruption in general, controlling teacher corruption is not easy. CORRUPTION CONTROL Attempts at controlling corruption are likely as old as corruption itself (Riley, 1998). In ancient China, officials were allocated a special “corruption-preventing” allowance in an attempt to buy their honesty. The 4th century BC Indian political analyst, Kautilya, developed a list of 40 ways public officials could be corrupt and a corresponding system of spot-checks, rewards, and penalties (Riley, 1998). In medieval times, Dante sent bribers to the deepest parts of hell, and the late 18th century framers of the U.S. Constitution made bribery one of two crimes that could justify impeachment, treason being the other. Much of the recent academic scholarship on corruption control has theorized about the impact of raising wages, balancing power, reducing discretion, and increasing accountability on corruption (Becker & Stigler, 1974; Klitgaard, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Williams & Doig, 2000), while others have attempted to test these theories (Di Tella & Schargrodsky, 2003; Reinikka & Svensson, 2004; Olken, 2004). International organizations like the World Bank and Transparency International have added to the growing set of recommendations for controlling corruption (see Hutchinson, 2005). The study of corruption control is perhaps most interesting because of how unsuccessful it has been. With Sweden’s move from being one of the most corrupt countries in the 18th century to one of the least corrupt countries in the world today and Singapore and Hong Kong’s more recent successful corruption clean ups as three commonly cited examples, models of successful corruption control are severely lacking. Williams and Doig (2000) caution that even good models suffer from problems of transferability, sustainability, cost-effectiveness, sequencing, and intent. Despite a

Blaming the Context Not the Culprit    379

general lack of success and a paucity of transferable models, a group of “best practices” has emerged in the development community and are increasingly present in anti-corruption programs. These best practices include: (a) imposing tighter control and stricter penalties, (b) encouraging officials through salary incentives, (c) improving administrative efficiency through better training and red-tape cutting, (d) empowering citizens through improved knowledge of rights and responsibilities and better appeal and complaint procedures, and (e) improving openness and transparency through increased public reporting (Miller et al., 2001, p. 304). The final two, more broadly called “political” accountability mechanisms, are the focus of this chapter. They have become popular responses to corruption control and are seen by many as a panacea of sorts. The research on their effectiveness, however, is mixed. Kaufman and Sachs (1998) and Gurgur and Shah (1999) found that more citizen participation in public administration leads to less corruption. Paul (1995) found a positive relationship between public opinion surveys and the reduction of corruption in public works projects in India. Brunetti and Weder (2003) established that a free press is associated with lower corruption and in experimental research, Reinikka and Svensson (2004) showed that increased media coverage and citizen information leads to lower corruption. However, Olken (2004), also using a randomized experimental design, demonstrated that citizen involvement in public works in Indonesia did not significantly reduce corruption. Further, Khan (1998) gives examples of how community involvement might increase corruption through patron-client networks. Lastly, both Miller et al. (2001) and Karklins (2005) concluded that officials are more likely to be corrupt when the community is more corrupt. This study adds to these literatures—that of education corruption and corruption control—by examining student perceptions of teacher corruption and investigating their potential as “political” controls to such corruption. STUDY CONTEXT The data and analysis presented stem from my recent dissertation (Johnson, 2008). Data collection for the dissertation was conducted in Kyrgyzstan over a 7-month period in 2007 with support from the Fulbright Foundation. For a full detailing of the study context and data collection and analysis, please refer to the full dissertation. Kyrgyzstan has a number of characteristics that make it an illuminating context for studying teacher corruption and its control. First, emerging from 70 years of state socialism, Kyrgyzstan shares characteristics with other post-socialist countries undergoing large-scale institutional transformation (Karklins, 2005), making findings comparable with other studies on

380    E. M. JOHNSON

corruption in post-socialist space (see Miller et al., 2001). Second, Kyrgyzstan, like many other developing countries, is highly poor and heavily dependent on external aid. With an average teacher salary of about $35 USD a month,3 some teachers in Kyrgyzstan have an acute material motivation for corruption. Third, corruption, and specifically education corruption, appears to be high in Kyrgyzstan. On Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Kyrgyzstan ranked 166th out of 180 countries (Transparency International, 2008). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) suggests that teacher corruption is widespread in Kyrgyzstan (USAID, 2005) and an expose done by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) claims that, “corruption in education is a serious problem” in Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian Republics and that bribes of clothing, electronics, and cash are given to teachers to buy high grades and pass exams (RFE/RL, 2004). Education is one of the primary institutions undergoing change as a part of the post-socialist transition in Kyrgyzstan. The Soviet education system, operating in Kyrgyzstan from the 1920s to the early 1990s, made school attendance mandatory, built thousands of schools, and raised literacy from 5% in 1926 to 97% by the 1980s (Benfield, 2002). Charged with the “upbringing” (vospitaniye) of proper Soviet citizens, schools and teachers were highly valued. Viewed as high professionals, teachers were specialists in their subject areas after years of education, special training, practicum, and certification. With the respect of the students, parents, community, and state, the stereotypical view of the Soviet teacher was of a serious, strict professional (DeYoung, Reeves, & Valyayeva, 2006). Upon Soviet collapse, independent Kyrgyzstan inherited this school system, but struggled to maintain it. Educational spending as a percentage of GDP dropped from 7.4% of GDP in 1990 to 3.9% of a GDP less than half the size in 2003. Participation in education, both by students and teachers, also went down, with secondary enrollment rates dropping from nearly 100% in the Soviet era to 79% in the early part of this decade and annual teacher shortages currently running around 1,000 teachers a year (Benfield, 2002; DeYoung et al., 2006). With 80% of the population residing in rural areas, a vast majority of the country’s one million students, 70,000 teachers, and 2,000 schools are dispersed across sparsely populated mountainous areas (Mertaugh, 2004). Beyond these material challenges, the ideological changes that have come with transition have required teachers to be retrained in new methodologies, new subject areas, and new expectations. Teachers in Kyrgyzstan are low-paid by any measure. New teachers, teaching one teaching load (18 hours a week) make around $20 USD a month in base salary, depending on their subject matter, training, and location. Teaching a double load would double their salary. More experienced and specialized teachers (English in some areas, sciences, and math in others) can earn

Blaming the Context Not the Culprit    381

an additional $20 USD per teaching load (DeYoung et al., 2006). Many, if not most teachers, however, legally supplement their income through additional work and duties like being a class (home room) teacher, taking on administrative duties, offering sanctioned supplementary educational services after school, or by agreeing to work in high-need rural areas. While precise numbers are not available, it is likely that the average teacher in Kyrgyzstan makes roughly $75 USD a month, with some making as much as $200 USD or more when supplements to the base salary are considered (DeYoung et al., 2006). This is compared to the government-set living wage of $60 USD a month and the nominal national average wage of $50 USD a month in 2005 (ILO, 2006). The teaching situation in Kyrgyzstan has driven many good teachers out of the profession and made the attraction of new teachers difficult. It has not, however, significantly lowered a general feeling among teachers and the public that teachers are professionals. A close reading of the ethnography done by DeYoung et al. (2006) in four diverse schools and regions of Kyrgyzstan reveals a general continuation of the Soviet tradition of treating teachers as professionals. This finding is corroborated by a 2006 International Republican Institute poll that found that 86% of the public in Kyrgyzstan has confidence in teachers (IRI, 2006). In some ways, the conditions are perfectly set for teacher corruption in Kyrgyzstan: system instability, low pay, and high overall corruption. Indeed, some previous reports indicate that teacher corruption is a real problem in Kyrgyzstan and that induced private tutoring, bribery, and materials/funds misusage are likely the most common forms (USAID, 2005). Regarding private tutoring, Todd Drummond the former director of an education NGO in Bishkek and a 15-year observer of Kyrgyz education reports, “Private tutoring here is a real issue and one that needs researching. The link to corruption is especially frightening as it is alleged in many schools that teachers have simply stopped working for the students who don’t pay for extra tutoring. In other words, private tutoring has in effect become the only education in some cases” (personal communication, October 13, 2006). Regarding bribery, a student from the region claims, “To be honest I don’t know the subjects well. You have to bribe, so I worked a while and got some money together . . . I paid $40 to the teacher . . . and I got a 4 (B)” (REF/RL, 2004). The implications of such a system for trust, merit, and the quality of human capital are significant. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS As this research sought to describe, explain, and gain interpretations of teacher corruption, a mixed-methods design was used. A quantitative phase gathered multi-student reports of their teachers’ corruption and a follow-up qualitative phase sought their interpretation and reaction to such corruption.

382    E. M. JOHNSON

Quantitative Phase Data collection was limited to three oblasts (regions) of Kyrgyzstan: Chui (north), Naryn (central), and Osh (south). This narrowing of the data collection area within Kyrgyzstan still allowed for the study of teacher corruption in roughly half the land mass and from districts serving 60% of the population. The northern oblast of Chui contains the capital city of Bishkek and its more than one million inhabitants. The southern oblast of Osh is larger in area, but more rural, with its largest city, Osh City, containing a population of 280,000. The central mountainous oblast of Naryn is the largest and most sparsely populated oblast in Kyrgyzstan, with a population density of six people per square kilometer. The population sampled for the quantitative portion of the research was recently graduated high school students.4 As cohorts of students go through the school system together in Kyrgyzstan they become very close, some claiming the relationship to be like that of siblings. After graduation, these students (usually numbering about 25 in a cohort) generally stay in contact, getting together periodically or staying in touch by phone. Having had the exact same teachers in secondary school, these clusters of former classmates allowed for the collection of multiple observations of corruption related behavior for the same teacher without knowing the names of the students or teachers. On university campuses in the capital cities of each oblast (Bishkek, Naryn City, and Osh City), I recruited volunteers to participate in this research. Once recruited, these “cohort heads,” facilitated the recruitment of as many of their former high school cohort classmates as possible. Working with two research assistants, I met with the cohort heads and had them take the student survey. I then asked them to convene their former high school classmates for a second meeting. This usually netted another 5–10 students per class cohort. As seen in Figure 17.1, each student reported on five teachers (math, English, biology, history, and Kyrgyz language). In doing so the 65 cohorts of students (totally 461 students) produced data on 393 teachers. Please see Table 17.1 for data on student respondents and Table 17.2 for data on the teachers on whom the students reported. Given this non-probability based sampling approach, it is important to understand how the samples that were produced compare to the overall populations. There are two samples to consider: (a) the students who were sampled, and (b) the teachers on whom they reported. Qualitative Phase The qualitative data collection component of this research encompasses from two district case studies conducted after the quantitative data collection phase. Upon preliminary analysis of the quantitative data, Sokuluk, a relatively well-off suburban district just outside of the capital in the Chui

Blaming the Context Not the Culprit    383

Figure 17.1  Student sample structure.

Oblast, and Kochkor, a poor, mountainous district in the Naryn Oblast, were determined to have the lowest and highest levels of reported teacher corruption respectively. Within those case studies I conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with nine students from the two districts.5 Due to the sensitivity of the topic, I attempted to get to know interview subjects, locate myself in their world through past experience, and included a variety of questions about teachers and education, not just corruption. At no point did I ask about anyone’s personal involvement in corruption, but rather I asked for their interpretation of general trends in teacher corruption across individuals, schools, and districts. As anticipated, many answers were of the “some people might . . .” form, similar to the type of responses obtained by Ledeneva (1998) in her study of social network connections

384    E. M. JOHNSON TABLE 17.1  Surveyed Students Sample (n = 461) Frequency

Sample Percentage

National Percentage

 Male

159

34.5

47.3

 Female

302

65.5

52.7

 Kyrgyz

371

80.5

68.4

 Russian

40

8.7

10.8

 Uzbek

19

4.1

14.3

 Other

31

6.7

6.5

Variable Gender

Ethnicity

Current Activity  Non-University

40

9.9

59.0

 University

360

90.1

41.0

Variable

Min

Max

Mean

SD

 SES

0.0

7.5

4.55

1.81

 GPA

3.0

5.0

4.43

0.47

Source: National Statistical Committee, 2006.

TABLE 17.2  Teachers Reported on by Students (n = 393) Variable

Frequency

Percentage

National Percentage

Gender  Male

69

17.6

28.0

324

82.4

72.0

 Kyrgyz

307

78.1

68.4

 Russian

56

14.2

10.8

 Uzbek

20

5.1

14.3

 Other

10

2.6

3.9

  Head Teacher

57

14.5

8.2

  Class Teacher

278

70.7

NA

 Female Ethnicity

Administrative Duties

Source: National Statistical Committee, 2007.

in Russia. As was done by Ledeneva, all attempts were made to probe overly general responses and seek specific interpretations. The result of the qualitative data collection phase was nine transcribed interviews ranging in length from four to ten single spaced pages. The data speak to student interpretation of teacher corruption, its causes, and its possible control.

Blaming the Context Not the Culprit    385

Data Analysis The quantitative data were analyzed first using a variety of descriptive and interpretive techniques. The qualitative data were then analyzed using content analysis techniques. I measure teacher corruption from self-reported student experience with the main forms of teacher corruption behavior identified in the literature: (a) accepting money or gifts for grade changes, (b) accepting money or gifts for exam manipulation, (c) misusing supplemental school funds, (d) forcing students to purchase books or materials profitable to the teacher and unnecessary for the academic process, (e) suggesting a student take paid private tutoring from the teacher, and (f) suggesting a group of students take paid supplemental lessons from the teacher.6 To use all six forms of reported teacher corruption as separate dependent variables was unwieldy and unnecessary. Instead, I reduced the number of variables by looking for underlying constructs using principal components factor analysis.7 Two distinct teacher corruption factors emerged. The first, “financial corruption,” captures one-off corruption exchanges involving money. It includes: (a) grade extortion, (b) exam extortion, (c) funds misuse, and (d) forced purchasing. The second factor, “academic corruption,” captures teacher corruption carried out through longer-run academic interactions between the teacher and student outside of the school day. It includes: (a) induced private tutoring, and (b) induced group lessons. These two scales were constructed using the factor loadings for each form, and have Cronbach Alpha’s of .79 and .73, respectively. The scales have a bivariate correlation of .30, indicating that they are related but that they are not measuring the exact same types of reported corruption. The relationships between these dependent variables and independent variables (student, teacher, school, and district variables) were analyzed using single-level multinomial logistic regression.8 Given the extremely skewed distribution of reported teacher corruption towards the low end, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was determined to be inappropriate. By collapsing the teacher corruption variables (financial and academic) into categorical variables, they can be analyzed using logistic regression. This transformation was performed by categorizing the teachers by their reported corruption scale scores: “not corrupt” meaning the minimum score for the scale (equal to no reported corruption), “moderately corrupt” a score between the minimum and the mean, and “highly corrupt” a score equal to or greater than the mean. To increase reliability and clarity of findings, I compare only “highly corrupt” teachers to “not corrupt” teachers.9 The qualitative data used to answer the question of perception or impact included student reports of who they blame and mis-trust as a result of teacher corruption they experienced. Content analysis was used to analyze

386    E. M. JOHNSON

the qualitative responses of students. I coded the qualitative data produced by the student survey responses and individual interviews using the following categories: • • • • • • • • •

Experience: teacher corruption is a problem in Kyrgyzstan Experience: teacher corruption is not a problem in Kyrgyzstan. Blame: reasons for teacher corruption individual centered Blame: reasons for teacher corruption system, economy, or society centered Impact: limited to education Impact: broader than just education Suggested Remedy: tighter control and better sanctions Suggested Remedy: teacher encouragement and support Suggested Remedy: client empowerment and greater transparency10 FINDINGS

The data collected for this research produced a rich set of findings. They reveal that students do report teacher corruption to occur—though not at the rate some might expect—but also suggest that students might not be good candidates for helping control teacher corruption. Reported Prevalence of Teacher Corruption For each form of teacher corruption considered (financial and academic) roughly two-thirds of the teachers had an average score of 0, or “no reported corruption,” meaning not one of their former students reported them engaging in that behavior.11 Across the forms, another one quarter of the teachers had a score between 0 and the mean or “moderate reported corruption.” Finally, approximately 10% of the teachers had scores greater than or equal to the mean, placing them in the “high reported corruption” group for that form of teacher corruption. The percentage of teachers reported to engage in either moderate or high reported corruption suggests that these forms of teacher corruption exist in Kyrgyzstan and are not likely an artifact of the sample taken. Table 17.3 gives the reported teacher corruption by form of corruption and Table 17.4 classifies the reported teacher corruption on financial and academic scales. How prevalent is teacher corruption in Kyrgyzstan? It depends on your perspective. On the one hand, 39% and 57% of the teachers had absolutely no reported corruption on the two scales. Yet, roughly 33% are categorized as “highly corrupt.” It appears that many teachers resist corruption

Blaming the Context Not the Culprit    387 TABLE 17.3  Categorization of Teacher Corruption Forms (Teacher N = 393) Variable

a b c

No Reported Corruptiona

Moderate Reported Corruptionb

High Reported Corruptionc

Grade Extortion

253 (64%)

85 (22%)



55 (14%)

Exam/Graduation Extortion

246 (62.6)

96 (24%)



51 (13%)

Funds Misuse

244 (62.1)

105 (27%)



44 (11%)

Forced Purchasing

260 (66.2)

104 (26%)

29 (7%)

Induced Tutoring

277 (70.5)

93 (24%)

23 (6%)

Induced Group Lessons

257 (65.4)

106 (27%)

30 (8%)

Teacher had no (0) reported corruption by their former students Teacher had reported corruption between 0 and the coding midpoint Teacher had reported corruption between the coding midpoint and the coding maximum

TABLE 17.4  Teacher Corruption Prevalence, Student Reported (Teacher N = 393) Variable

Not Corrupt

Moderately Corrupt

Highly Corrupt

Financial Corruption Scale

153 (39%)

108 (27%)

132 (34%)

Academic Corruption Scale

224 (57%)

51 (13%)

118 (30%)

altogether, and a second smaller group engage in it at a very low level. A final group, the “highly corrupt,” is reported by multiple former students to be engaging in multiple forms of suspect behavior. Impact of Teacher Corruption on Students Table 17.5 reports the bivariate correlations between student ratings of a teacher’s professionalism (which was a question on the student survey) and four independent variables: (a) average teacher professionalism at that school, (b) average teacher corruption at that school, (c) the teacher’s financial corruption score, and (d) the teacher’s academic corruption score. An individual teacher’s professionalism rating is correlated with the average teacher professionalism rating at that school (r = .41).12 Also as might be expected, a teacher’s professionalism rating is negatively correlated with their financial corruption rating and the average teacher corruption rating for that school (based on 5 teachers from each school). This does not hold, however, for academic corruption, which has a small but positive correlation (.09) with teacher professionalism. This might suggest that students who take private lessons from a teacher, even if the arrangement is “induced,” are more likely to view that teacher as more professional.

388    E. M. JOHNSON

Academic Corruption

Average Teacher Corruption

Average Teacher Professionalism

Financial Corruption

Teacher Professionalism

Average Teacher Professionalism

Variable

Teacher Professionalism

TABLE 17.5  Correlation Between Teacher Professionalism and Corruption (N = 2,285)

—

.41**

–.27**

.09**

–.14**

—

–.18

.01

–.35**

—

.16**

.44**

—

.22**

**

Financial Corruption Academic Corruption Average Teacher Corruption

—

p < .01 Note: The N for these regressions is 2,285, as I report each of the 461 students’ relationship with each of the five teachers. **

These variables were included in a series of OLS regressions to further probe relationships and control for other factors. Regression results are reported in Table 17.6. Model 1 represents the core model. Model 2 introduces the student reports of teacher financial corruption and Model 3 student reports of academic corruption. Given the Soviet legacy of Russian teachers and Russian language instruction being perceived as higher quality, it is not surprising that a teacher being of Kyrgyz ethnicity is negatively associated with perceptions of teacher professionalism. It also seems logical that being an older teacher, a head teacher, and/or a class teacher is positively associated with perceptions of professionalism, given the reverence for the elderly and those in positions of authority. School and district level variables do not explain much TABLE 17.6  Determinants of Reported Teacher Professionalism Model 1 Core

Model 2 Financial

Model 3 Academic

Female

–.02

–.03

–.01

Kyrgyz

–.17

–.17

–.16**

.02

.02

.02***

Head Teacherd

.11*

.11*

.12*

Class Teacher

e

.09

.11

.08*

Math Teacher

.08

.12

.05

–.05

–.05

–.05

Variables b

**

Age

c

***

f

Kyrgyz Teacherf

*

** ***

** *

(continued)

Blaming the Context Not the Culprit    389 TABLE 17.6  Determinants of Reported Teacher Professionalism (Continued) Model 1 Core

Model 2 Financial

Model 3 Academic

Biology Teacherf

–.04

–.02

–.06

English Teacherf

–.07

–.06

–.09

Student SESg

.01

.01

.01

Student GPA

.01

.02

.01

Specialized Schooli

.03

–.002

.04

Urban Schoolj

.03

.00

.04

–.12

.00

–.11*

District Infant Mortality Rate

.00

.00

.00

District Unemployment Rate

.00

.00

.00

–.07

–.15

–.06

Variables

h

Multi-Ethnic School

k

*

l

District Ethnic Fragmentation

m

Average Reported Teacher Professionalismn Average Student Reported Corruptiono

.87***

.87***

.85***

–.06***

.04*

–.08***

Teacher Financial Corruption

–.21

p

***

Teacher Academic Corruptionq Model F R 

2

.08*** 33.78

40.12

.22

.26

***

33.55***

***

.23

Method: OLS. Dependent variable: perceived teacher professionalism (n = 2,285) Notes: The N for these regressions is 2,285, as I report each of the 461 students’ relationship with each of the five teachers. a

p