Getting under the skin: the Bougainville copper agreement and the creation of the Panguna mine 9780522848779

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
Introduction (page 1)
1 Bougainville Before CRA (page 7)
2 Australia's Mandate (page 30)
3 Mining Before Panguna (page 45)
4 Prospecting (page 61)
5 Negotiating (page 80)
6 Rorovana Incidents (page 100)
7 Temporary Resolution (page 125)
8 Creating the Mine (page 146)
9 Consequences (page 161)
10 Judges and Judgements (page 182)
Appendix Douglas Oliver's Report to CRA (page 204)
Notes (page 231)
Bibliography (page 248)
Index (page 257)

Citation preview

Getting Under the Skin

Getting Under the Skin The Bougainville Copper Agreement

and the Creation of the Panguna Mine

DONALD DENOON

MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY PRESS

MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY PRESS PO Box 278, Carlton South, Victoria 3053, Australia [email protected]

www.mup.com.au ,

First published 2000 | Text © Donald Denoon 2000 |

Design and typography © Melbourne University Press 2000 This book is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 and subsequent amendments, no part may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means whatsoever without the

prior written permission of the publisher.

Designed and typeset by Jan Schmoeger in 91/2 point Giovanni Book

Printed in Australia by Ligare Pty Ltd, Riverwood, NSW National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

Denoon, Donald. ,

Bibliography. Includes index. , _ , , ISBN 0 522 84877 X. | ,

Getting under the skin: the Bougainville copper agreement and the creation of the Panguna mine.

1. Australia. Dept. of Territories (1951-1968). 2. Australia. Dept. of

External Territories. 3. Papua New Guinea. Administration. : 4. Bougainville Copper Pty Limited. 5. Copper mines and mining— Papua New Guinea—Bougainville Island—History—20th century. 6. Papua New Guinea—Politics and government. 7. Bougainville Island (Papua New Guinea)—Politics and government. I. Title.

995.304 , Oo ees

Contents

Introduction | / 1 1 Bougainville Before CRA 7

2 Australia’s Mandate 30

3 Mining Before Panguna . AR

4 Prospecting | 61

5 Negotiating | | | 80 |

6 Rorovana Incidents ~ 100 7 Temporary Resolution 125

8 Creating the Mine 146

9 Consequences | 161

10 Judges and Judgements 182

Appendix Douglas Oliver's Report to CRA | 204

Notes | | | oe 231 Bibliography | oe | | 248 Index | 7 — 257

Maps prepared by Neville Minch

The Territory of Papua New Guinea in the 1960s facing 24 The Morobe goldfields in the 1930s

_ from the Official Handbook of New Guinea, 1943 | 25

in the 1960s , —6©=56 The Panguna mining complex in the 1970s 57 Bougainville District, Territory of Papua New Guinea,

troduction — Introduction

The creation of the giant Panguna copper mine in Bougainville shadowed the birth of an independent Papua New Guinea. Exploration began in 1964, when Bougainville was a remote district of the Australian Territory of Papua New Guinea. An Agreement was reached, and enacted

by the Territory's House of Assembly in 1967. Production began in 1972, when a self-governing Papua New Guinea was preparing for full

independence, and the Agreement was renegotiated in 1974 by a novice | government anxious to avert Bougainville’s secession. The closure of the mine, and the onset of civil war in 1989, became a Papua New Guinea

crisis as well as a Bougainville tragedy. In 1997 the national government invited a mercenary force to intervene, but the Defence Force arrested the mercenaries, provoking another national political crisis and very __

nearly a constitutional impasse.! BS _ These were critical events in several contexts. The landowners of Bougainville believed that they owned the sub-surface ores as well as

the ‘skin’ of the soil. For many of them Panguna was a social, economic

and environmental disaster beyond compensation, and a spur to militant protest. Many people in Bougainville already differentiated themselves from the rest of Papua New Guinea, taking pride in their | distinctive glossy black skins in contrast to the ‘redskins’ from the rest of the Territory. Meanwhile Australian administrators saw sub-surface

2 = GETTING UNDER THE SKIN ores as the inheritance of the whole country, and looked to mining revenue as the salvation of a dependent colonial economy, the base on

which to build a viable independent state. | | The mine mobilised the largest investment in any Australian territory

at the time, and proved to be the first of many Papua New Guinea resource projects. It required colossal loans from leading banks, contracts with overseas smelters, and a breach of Australia’s preference for ‘white’ labour. As production got under way, the Papua New Guinea

government had to move swiftly to contain Bougainville separatism, triggered in part by the mine. Panguna was operated by Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd (BCL), with the technical resources of the giant Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ) and its Australian subsidiary, Conzinc Riotinto Australia (CRA): for these companies, the project was a gamble for huge

stakes. Panguna was therefore pivotal to Australian decolonisation, Papua New Guinea’s independence, the mineral boom that was to transform much of Melanesia, and the erosion of relations between national and provincial governments and landowner groups. |

Two incidents in 1969 put Bougainville on the front pages of Australian newspapers, transforming the difficulties of this remote district into an Australian as well as a Territorial issue. Panguna needed land on a grand scale. When villagers refused to sell, the government

expropriated their land and flew in riot police to clear the way for surveyors. Women and men then confronted bulldozers and police in a well-disciplined campaign of passive resistance. These confrontations were not unusual: what was different was the presence of journalists

_ whose reports—and photographs—touched tender Australian nerves. Reports of clashes between police and villagers ‘hit the Australian Press

like a baton charge’? One paper mourned ‘Australia’s Shame, this is how the world will see us’; another condemned ‘Australia’s Bullies’ in

the Territory as ‘Bloody Thugs. , This reportage came to symbolise the villagers’ grievances. Consider this statement by three young Bougainvillean men:

The events surrounding the resumption of land for the project—a woman grappling with police, the tear-gassing of the people, police poised above the ground to watch the survey pegs—will always be poignant reminders of the true character of the so-called negotiations

| INTRODUCTION & 3 between the people and the Administration. For it must be stressed .. .

that the responsibility for what happened lies primarily with the Administration and not with the copper company.?

Land, they continued, meant much more to the people of Bougainville

than to Australians: ‘land is our physical life—food and sustenance.

our only world: |

Land is our social life; it is marriage; it is status; it is politics; in fact, it is

All three would play important roles in the coming events on

Bougainville. John Dove became Bougainville’s Works Coordinator, and

Mel Togolo the Provincial Planner and Provincial Secretary and an alternate director of the mining company. Theodore Miriung rose

through the provincial bureaucracy to an acting position on the National Court. Civil war disrupted all their careers. Miriung was trying

to bring about peace as Premier of the Bougainville Transitional Government in 1996 when he was murdered, possibly by the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and certainly with their connivance. The Panguna copper mine was the largest enterprise in Papua New

Guinea, and larger than any mining project in Australia. It cost more than $400 million, two-thirds of which was borrowed internationally and the balance raised in equity, including 20 per cent subscribed by the host government. At full production, the pit yielded 90 000 tons daily. The driving force to initiate Panguna was CRA, and BCL was its |

purpose-built operator, within the framework of the Bougainville Copper Agreement of 1967. The Agreement gained legal force as an

Ordinance of the Territory’s House of Assembly, committing the Administration and BCL to terms concerning taxation, royalties, environmental management, employment and infrastructure. _ | By the industry standards of the time, the Agreement was both broad-ranging and generous to the host government, but no sooner had the ink dried than it came under attack. Some critics insisted that

the taxation and royalties provisions treated the host government shabbily. Acquisition of land had already inflamed tempers, igniting a | separatist movement that threatened Papua New Guinea’s integrity. Michael Somare’s coalition government, formed in 1972, had immediately to defuse two explosive issues. They renegotiated the Agreement comprehensively in 1974, winning much more revenue and

4 » GETTING UNDER THE SKIN | | from an earlier date. They also developed a decentralised system of provincial government, mainly to accommodate Bougainville.

| The consequences of the Agreement were therefore profound and diffuse. It triggered landowner protest and island-wide separatism, yet became the baseline for later mining agreements. It attracted massive criticism during its brief life but little attention since. The Papua New Guinea government took justified pride in the amended Agreement, which seemed for the moment to resolve all disputes; BCL managers were soon reconciled to it; and the agencies who had drawn the critics’

fire dispersed after independence. The revision reconciled the national government and the company, but did little to please the provincial

government and nothing to propitiate the Nasioi landowners of -_ Bougainville. In the late 1980s a New Panguna Landowners’ Association sponsored a physical assault on the mine. Even the closure of the mine in 1989 did not end the strife, but sparked nine years of civil war. The _ formal protagonists were the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and the

| Bougainville Interim Government, pitted against the national government and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force; on the ground, many other wounds were opened, and remain to be healed. - The happy prospects of peace now make it appropriate to see what | lessons may be learned from Papua New Guinea's first modern resource

project. The three young men who denounced the appropriation of villagers’ land placed the blame squarely on the government. That judgement was near-universal in the 1970s. Criticism of the company increased after independence and reached its peak on the eve of the

civil war. Australian government archives now make it possible to reconstruct the values and mind-set of the officials who negotiated the Agreement; to ask how they understood and discounted criticisms; to _ observe the adjustments they made; and to set the renegotiation in the

context of decolonisation. oe | , 7 Tt is not my purpose to denounce or defend the Agreement, but to ask how it came about. The archival material, and discussions with participants and colleagues, suggest that some issues could have been managed better—but that participants mostly acted out their prescribed roles, often more conscientiously than required. Villagers, their leaders, BCL personnel, Administration officers and missionaries often collided,

7 | INTRODUCTION =& 5

were in conflict. , | | | not as a result of individual failings, but because whole value systems

This monograph is set in the last years of Australian rule. The ~ chronicles of these years, collected and edited by Clive Moore, form an invaluable research resource.* Ian Downs has published a comprehensive account,? making excellent use of his privileged access to archives and people. James Griffin’s commentaries from the 1960s offer

precious insights into Bougainville politics, while Sean Dorney’s reportage on national politics and his book on the mercenary crisis are in a class of their own.° Douglas Oliver's role as adviser to the mining __ company is well described in his books,’ and in a major report to CRA, parts of which are reproduced here. Bougainville was the first of many

resource projects to shake Papua New Guinea. They have attracted superior scholarship, which throws retrospective light on Papua New Guinea’s first and most vexed adventure in resource management. Many

studies allude to the Department of Territories, which offered policy advice to Ministers and exercised control over the territorial Adminis- tration; but the role of this agency has been understated. Research into the Department's records constitutes this monograph’s main claim to

originality. _ on |

This study is largely shaped by the concerns of the Department, and

therefore says little about the people of Bougainville (or indeed other Papua New Guineans) who rarely made contact with the Department, and were commonly represented as natives to govern or problems to

address. The Department did not rule, but ensured that its Adminis- , tration carried out the Minister's policies. It follows that most of the | Department's correspondence was with the Administration in the Port Moresby suburb of Konedobu: the next most popular address was CRA headquarters in Melbourne. The archive allows insight mainly into the

formation and development of policy by an unusual Australian government department as it wrestled with exceptional problems. | I have needed and received much guidance. I am particularly indebted to Moira Smythe and Michael Wilson in accessing and understanding archival material; to Sir Frank Espie, Don Vernon, Jim © Byth and Mike Bell of BCL; to Bill Brown, former District Commissioner _ at Panguna; to Don Mentz and Tim Besley of the Department; to my

6 © = GETTING UNDER THE SKIN wise colleagues Hank Nelson, Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, James Griffin, | Glenn Banks, Chris Ballard, Gerry Ward and Anthony Regan; and to the distinguished anthropologists Douglas Oliver and Eugene Ogan. Each has shared freely a unique body of knowledge and expertise.

This text has been greatly improved by Jenny Lee’s editing, and - illuminated by Neville Minch’s maps. Only the obscurities are mine.

Chapter 1 | Bougainville Before CRA

In 1971 Father John Momis, a Bougainville priest, and the American anthropologist Eugene Ogan were goaded to insist that Bougainville

had its own histories—it had not been ‘discovered’ by the mining company whose exploration, land hunger and construction work had

so unsettled the people.! That illusion arose from the fact that indigenous views and voices were muted in the local media, in the administrative centre in Port Moresby, and especially in Canberra, the Australian capital. It may be‘ helpful to cite some of the representations © that so angered Father Momis and Professor Ogan. First, a view of the

main island recorded in 1936 by N. H. Fisher, an Australian geologist

who had been sent to assess the resources for gold mining around

Kupei, in the rugged high country in the south of the island: | Mountains rise to... 10,000 feet and in general the country consists of streams occupying steep-sided gorges between mountain ridges ... The mountainous country is bordered by a coastal flat usually a few miles wide on the north-east side of the island, while on the south-west, at

of country... | | | ;

Empress Augusta Bay, the coastal flat comprises an extremely large tract

Water throughout the district is generally plentiful, with the streams

falling rapidly in their upper portions... |

8 = GETTING UNDER THE SKIN_ , It is apparent that the greater portion of [the coastal fall] has been used ... for native gardens and the trees have not since had time to regain their normal stature. Near the top of the range, however, and on most of the western fall, virgin forest is found, with a plentiful supply of

trees of all sizes.? , This portrait does justice to the dominance of the Crown Prince Range

and the weather patterns in this island of tropical forest. Fisher's | indifference to the people, their farming and fishing, is a consequence

of his mission, but nevertheless arresting, | | | If Fisher focused on geography and geology, Australian officials (kiaps) were interested in population numbers, agriculture, mechanisms of government—and loyalty. A report of 1968 describes Bougainville

district as the kiaps saw it on patrol, or from their District Headquarters at Kieta and the sub-district centres at Buka in the north, Kieta in the centre and Buin in the south: Geographically, Bougainville and Buka do not belong to the New Guinea

| grouping, but form the northern part of the Solomon Archipelago.

| | The total indigenous population is approximately 73,000. The annual natural increase is approximately 3.9%. The people are ... noticeably blacker in colour than other New Guinea people; they are ~ strongly colour conscious and regard their skin colour as setting them apart from all other races to the extent that they refer collectively to others as ‘redskins ... [T]here is a strong anti-white feeling which is not

| - directed specifically at the Administration, planter, trader or mission.

communities, but generally against the white-skin .. . oe The affinities of the people on the main island .. . lie more with the British Solomons than with the communities of Papua and New Guinea.

The island’s rich volcanic soil sustained copra and cocoa, but economic

| development was inhibited by | ,

| the extreme reluctance of the indigenous communities to release land or even allow temporary occupation ... [A] parochial and subsistence | mentality, and suspicion of the motivation behind land alienation ... is | more pronounced in the southern sector, particularly around Kieta and

- Buin, [where] there is a definite fear of exploitation.? | |

, 1 BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE CRA & 9

SOCIETIES ee | | | Like the other Solomon Islands, Bougainville has been inhabited for at _ least ten and probably twenty thousand years. The diversity of languages

now spoken reflects the island’s colonisation by several peoples at different times, though all came via New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago. About three thousand years ago Bougainville was also

touched by the development and dispersal of the Lapita cultural complex, which brought farming and residential styles from South-east Asia.* By the nineteenth century most of the islanders’ external contacts

were with the southerly islands of the Solomons archipelago, rather

than the Bismarcks or more remote New Guinea. |

_ Although the island was settled early and often, its population was sparse. In the late nineteenth century there were perhaps 45 000 souls, according to the anthropologist Douglas Oliver. As was common when

European whalers and traders brought new diseases and social disruption, numbers declined over the next fifty years: a German official reported a ‘shocking decline’ in villages near Kieta.> This disastrous

trend was reversed in the 1930s, but probably resumed during the Pacific War. At any rate the population reached 71 761 by the 1966 census and about 108 000 in 1980. Almost half were under sixteen. So | swift was the growth that some officials worried about the land’s

Calrying capacity.© Oo | |

This was no homogeneous population but descendants of a plethora

of colonising groups over several millennia. Oliver counted sixteen

languages in Bougainville (excluding Buka) and noted that coastal | languages (Rorovana, Banoni, Hahon) differed from interior languages

(Nasioi, Nagovisi) ‘as much, perhaps, as English differs from Arabic. Later studies raised the total to twenty-one, half of them being Austro-

nesian (loosely related to the Polynesian languages) and the others non-Austronesian, and radically different from each other. Sean Dorney suggests there are a further thirty-five dialects? =»s-—

_ Language was not the only expression of difference. A language group was not a ‘tribe’: even after decades of colonial attempts to cluster people into villages, scattered hamlets reflected the autonomy enjoyed _ by each group of households. Jill Nash and Eugene Ogan doubt whether

10 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN the pre-colonial people of south-eastern Bougainville thought in tribal terms at all, though they might occasionally describe themselves as

Nasioi.® If there was no pre-colonial ‘tribal’ solidarity, there was naturally no pan-Bougainville identity. With secession in 1989, a leader

proposed the name Mekamui (‘sacred land’ in Nasioi), but the term proved to be obscene in another language.’

Communities differed also, depending on whether they lived in coastal or inland sites, whether they were long resident (like the Nasioi,

who may have been the earliest settlers) or (like the Rorovana on the east coast) arrived from the south within remembered time. The extent of contacts varied between inland communities (with few opportunities) and coastal peoples (who interacted often).'° Despite these differences, there were many common features in daily living. As late as the 1950s,

each household produced most of its food, and relied on exchange ~ relations to supplement its products. In most communities descent was reckoned matrilineally, and after marriage a husband usually lived in his wife’s community. Pigs were the main domesticated animal and taro

the dominant crop until the 1940s, when taro blight devastated the islands. Everyone practised gift-exchange, whereby ‘a person presented an object or performed a service for another as if it were a pure “gift”,

but... sooner or later, some equivalent return would have to be made. | These exchanges mainly consolidated support, but they could also be used pugnaciously, to place an enemy under an intolerable obligation."

There were similarities too, in the kinds of authority wielded by hereditary chiefs and wealthy men who consolidated power by gift-

giving and feasting. Oliver concluded that | until quite recently, the political units (i.e. effective fighting units, under

unified leadership) ... were small and relatively unstable—probably averaging no more than about 200-300 people ... In such mini-states leadership was based partly on heredity (normatively matrilineal, but occasionally patrilineal) and partly in proven ability as military mobilizer.

Then, as fighting came to be outlawed by Europeans, heredity continued

to play some role in leader selection, but military-type leaders were superceded by those who were able to win supporters and outdo rivals by means of accumulating and dispensing property—largely through - ceremonious gift-exchanges of shell money, pigs and other foodstuffs. !

1 BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE CRA | 1] The community that hosted the Panguna mine and would bear the weight of the mining revolution was the Nasioi, one of the largest language groups, occupying a broad swathe of southern Bougainville. Ogan deduced that pre-colonial Nasioi had ample land and lived in hamlets of up to a dozen households. Cross-cousin marriages were favoured and land rights were inherited through one’s mother, so that most Nasioi lived and died within a limited space. That pattern did not inhibit marriage, trade and exchange with nearby Buin and Nagovisi,

and even with more distant Austronesian speakers. Typically for Bougainville, ‘little big men’ achieved influence rather than power (unlike more autocratic ‘big men’ in other parts of Melanesia), and a leader's authority was limited to a few issues and a handful of people.

Ogan described the outcome as ‘political atomism‘!? | | Sixty years of erratic contact with Europeans had a less than © revolutionary effect on social values. Ogan mentions that 1960s Nasioi believed invisible beings helped them to achieve their everyday goals.

More to the present point, rights to use land were little affected by colonial or commercial concepts. Land rights were not absolute, but |

forest. , |

better conceived as a hierarchy: ns

¢ ‘Primary rights’ were normally established by a man clearing primary —

e ‘Subsidiary rights’ conferred the right to ask for a plot, or its reversion

after the primary holder's death. Such rights were held only by maternal kin, or by clansmen living in the same location. e ‘Derivative rights’ existed, to some of the product of the land, or to. its reversion. These might be held by individuals who were remote, _

whether geographically or genealogically. | |

claims. '4 | |

These norms were, of course, evolving rapidly as population growth and cash cropping disrupted the old and fluid system of competing

GOVERNMENTS By the 1950s Bougainville had endured eight foreign governments in |

seven decades. In 1884 Germany chartered a company—the New

12 & GETTING UNDER THE SKIN Guinea Kompagnie—to govern north-eastern New Guinea. The Kompagnie, failing to turn a profit, surrendered its charter in 1899 toa more orthodox colonial regime.!> In 1914 the Great War began seven years of Australian military rule, until the baton passed to Australian civilians

mandated by the League of Nations. Bougainville was the site of ferocious battles during the Pacific War, when Japanese occupation was brought to a bloody end by American and Australian campaigns. As the

Allies secured territory, they passed control to the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU), which exercised authority until the Territory of Papua and New Guinea came into being in 1947. Even then there was an interval of Provisional Administration until 1949.

These events bore unevenly. Buka island was the earliest and most drastically affected by labour traders and missionaries in the 1880s,

- while some Kongara Nasioi in the south-eastern highlands did not meet foreign rulers until 1930.!° A few even managed to keep out of harm’s way until the 1940s. The natural harbour at Kieta on the east coast prompted the creation of a German government station there in 1905 to increase the flow of labourers to plantations, but seven battles were fought before Nasioi consented to provide men for public works. Australian military occupation involved further ‘punitive expeditions,

the violence of which was not tempered by understanding of the societies who were its victims.'’ This succession of overlords did nothing

to endear them to their subjects. Apart from the crises of war, and outside a few centres of intense contact, colonial officials had limited impact on daily life. As Firth reminds us, most Pacific colonies were ‘run on a shoestring’:

, Until World War II people in much of Melanesia experienced colonial rule as intermittent and sometimes mysterious demands made on , occasional visits by kiaps, native police and [labour] recruiters ... In many places the outside world was embodied not in government but in the mission station with its plantations, workshops, schools and gardens,

and with missionaries who came to stay, and learned the language of

their congregations. '® |

German administrators bought or expropriated land mainly in New Ireland and New Britain.!? In Bougainville, plantations were few and

1 BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE CRA | 13 restricted to safe anchorages. By 1950 there were 32 plantations, cropping 10 000 acres (see below). This alienation might be vexatious, but it was never enough to destroy the viability of land-holding communities.

The post-war Administration was better funded but, spread thin across the whole Territory and bringing government for the first time to

the Highlands, was poorly informed about social dynamics or political | sentiment. Kiaps could see and count the external features of life, but anything needing a common language eluded them. They spoke English with planters, missionaries and a few Western-educated Bougainvilleans,

or spoke in tok pisin, the villagers’ third or fourth language. Patrol Posts

were often understaffed, and junior officers often exercised powers beyond their training.2? When Eugene Ogan arrived in Kietain 1962 he _ found Assistant District Commissioner Max Denehy supported by a _ cadet and a novice Patrol Officer. With access to a doctor and an agricultural extension officer or didiman, Denehy was better supported | than many ADCs. Between them they personified government most of the time; the District Commissioners at Sohano (on Buka passage) left Kieta to its own devices.*! Bougainville was not convenient for the interwar Mandate administration in Rabaul: after the Pacific War the island | was even more remote from the capital in Port Moresby. Depending on weather, it might take a week to fly from Moresby via Lae, Rabaul and

Sohano to Kieta.2? | | ; |

One role of government was to introduce Local Government | Councils. These worked poorly in Bougainville, whose people mis- | trusted any government initiative, and most of whose leaders could not give orders even in their own villages. By the late 1960s three-quarters of the people were brought under seven LGCs with 193 Councillors.

The Councils’ combined spending was only $60 000 per annum, so they had minimal economic impact. The exercise nevertheless absorbed _ much of the officials’ time and energy.*? Max Denehy, for example, did

lead patrols but he was often anchored to his office, where he ‘reluctantly had to get the people to come and see him rather than go | out and see them’?4 The result was an unsure grasp of events. As one kiap conceded when it was too late to remedy, ‘the Guava, Musinau and | Kokorei [village] groups have been very quiet ... We do not know what

they are thinking:*° | oe *

14 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN The DC chaired a District Advisory Council, which mostly consisted of missionaries or planters and exercised little influence. Kiaps could

consult long-resident missionaries who spoke local languages. In Bougainville, where the dominant mission was the Marist Catholic order, relations between Church and State were less cordial than elsewhere. In any case the Church was mistrusted by some villagers. The -kiaps might have read anthropological studies, but these were difficult sources for young men whose higher education was usually limited to a

few months in Sydney at the Australian School of Pacific Administration. In any case, German ethnographies were inaccessible and studies in English were few. Douglas Oliver pioneered fieldwork in 1938-39 in the Siwai language group in Buin, south of Panguna. His student Eugene Ogan worked in the Aropa Valley of the Kieta district from 1962 to 1964, and Jill Nash and Donald Mitchell worked with the Nagovisi of Buin in 1969-73.2° Recognising the urgent need for such research, the mining company CRA commissioned the Fijian Rusiate Nayacakalou to spend three months in 1968 doing fieldwork, including some investigation of North Nasioi land tenure.?’ Despite the high calibre of this research, it provided no basis for ‘decisions on a resource development as large and as intrusive as Panguna’.?® Even when research

was available, it was rarely consulted. The Administrator conceded that

his officers did not seek expert advice, and asserted (as if this were equivalent) that ‘the Department of District Administration has been

constantly studying these social implications.?? _ a The post-war Administration was mandated to foster economic development and political participation through structures such as cooperative societies and councils, a policy that frustrated villagers who expected radical change. Rash statements by ANGAU officers may have

| encouraged their optimism, but in any event they increasingly needed cash for head taxes and school fees for the baby boom. After the war, most men concentrated on their cash crops and declined to work away

from home. The district was ill served by technical departments.

Education was left to the missions, and there was no full-time agricultural extension officer (didiman) until 1958.°° Oliver noted that the post-war Administration had begun to compensate for past neglect, but these belated efforts did not erase colonial history:

| 1 BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE CRA = 15 For the 40 or 50 years preceding World War II, [Bougainvilleans were]

becoming wholly subordinated to the incoming Europeans: their physical actions restricted by superior force-of-arms, their religious values and many of their social institutions devalued by Mission pressure __

and their desires for European objects stimulated by—but largely frustrated by—European commerce. Unless one denies the fundamental humanity of these people, one cannot help but ponder what effects such events must have had upon their views about themselves and about the aliens they deem responsible for their plight.*!

One indication of their views came in 1962, when a thousand Nasioi asked a United Nations Visiting Mission to transfer the mandate from

Australia to the United States: , The accusation was made that the Australians treated the Nasioi like dogs, that they had failed to improve the villagers’ lot. These charges

were made not only by Nasioi regarded by the Administration as irresponsible trouble-makers, but also by local Administration employees, villagers active in economic development, and those who had been decorated for service with the Allies in World War II.?? |

PLANTATIONS AND SMALLHOLDERS | Germans began planting at Aropa in 1908. Their Australian successors _ continued to grow coconuts, then inter-planted cocoa in the 1950s. Plantation labour was never popular. Buka islanders—hardened in the nineteenth-century labour trade to Queensland, Fiji and Samoa—were

quickly disenchanted. More commonly they worked for colonial regimes as police, overseers or domestic servants, if they left home at all.23 Other Bougainvilleans followed the same trajectory. During the Pacific War, local villagers withdrew their labour. They were replaced by men from the mainland and especially the Highlands. In 1967 perhaps

6700 people were earning wages, of whom 4000 originated outside the _

district.** Though villagers planted more and more tree crops, planta-

tions still dominated production, as can be seen from table 1.1. Smallholders increased production more swiftly, from a much lower

16 § GETTING UNDER THE SKIN ,

to 1974/75. | ' Oo

| Table 1.1: Plantation Production, Bougainville, Selected Years 1950/51

"3051 —32~SC10303: 7755S

| 1953/5451 11439 11019 30 na.

1958/59 63 11 783 12 705 232 3281 ~ 1960/61 81 13.415 13028 903 3595 1964/65 84 14 828 14 402 3845 4032 1968/69 ~— 81 15911 15 612 5324. 5034

1973/74 «8 15691 12709 5502 «4405 Source: PNG Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries statistics for 1969 and 1970; M. L. Treadgold, The Regional Economy of Bougainville. ,

base. Between 1962/63 and 1972/73, smallholders’ copra output rose

from 2398 to 8696 tonnes, and cocoa from 94 to 2030 tonnes. Whereas most plantation income was expatriated or used to buy imported goods, smallholders spent their money locally. In 1968-69, - transactions in trade stores and co-operatives amounted to $321 000, with the 12 co-operative stores accounting for $203 400 and 299 trade

| stores for $117 800. Compared to production and cash incomes elsewhere, Bougainville statistics were impressive. Only in East New Britain and New Ireland did cash croppers produce more copra, and only in East New Britain did they produce more cocoa.2> As a former kiap argued, despite criticisms by missionaries and others: The district was undergoing a period of rapid indigenous agricultural growth, which placed Bougainvilleans among the wealthiest indigenous people in the Territory, and which was laying the basis of a prosperous

future, with or without copper.26 | a | : Even so, the per capita cash income was only $4.42 per annum. This

helps to explain the exasperation of villagers keen to live like Australians. According to M.L. Treadgold’s estimate, in 1966 only 10748 people were in the money-earning work-force (itself an elastic category). Of these, 70 per cent were in primary production, and many

1 BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE CRA & = 17

of those had come from outside the district. The census of that year counted 755 people in Kieta, 877 at Sohano and 345 in Buin. Only in Sohano was there a private telephone. That was the extent of urbanisa-

tion.” In the mid-1960s Oliver was impressed by | a marked increase in the kinds and quantities of things [which people now] wanted—from better clothes and lamps to refrigerators and trucks,

and from more ‘education’ ... to ‘independence’ .. . (one of the things that struck me most forcibly on my return visit to Sivai was this great increase in expectations; thirty years ago it would have occurred to no Sivai that he could ever obtain, say, a motorised vehicle; and even the

notion of self-rule would not have entered his mind.) | | [Some expectations] can be labelled literally ‘fantastic’, including — those involved in cargo-cultism, and some natives’ firm belief that ‘come

their own.*® |

independence’ they themselves will be able to mine copper quite on

The ambitions and frustrations were summed up by a villagerin 1967: The Japanese war came in—it was not our war ... [but] I stepped in willingly ... After the war the government said that because you in your way participated in the Japanese war, from now on I'll treat you as equal to myself but from that time no change took place and since then I have

not been brought up these forty three years. , , - / ae How do you mean not brought up? oe 7 : I do not progress in the standards of living.*? _ :

RELIGION AND POLITICS The Catholic Marists were the first missionaries in the district. By 1914.

they had four stations on Bougainville and another on Buka. Their _ reception was seldom warm: the Marists who ‘bought’ Nasioi land at _ Kieta had to call in gunboats to enforce their title.*° But from then on the mission flourished, and in 1939 Oliver counted 65 missionaries — shepherding 30 000 souls, or two out of three Bougainvilleans. Neither

18 8% GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

the Seventh Day Adventists nor the Methodists, who arrived later and deployed fewer staff, could rival them.*! While white officials and many

civilians fled before the Japanese, missionaries remained, proving (again) more durable than any regime: a few were Fijian Methodists,

but most were Catholic. |

Villagers could not predict the defeat of the Japanese. Some therefore

co-operated with them; others aided Australian coast-watchers behind Japanese lines; many served both.** During 1944 and 1945 many fought as guerillas against the Japanese, but most hedged their bets. Rightly or

wrongly (but in any event simplistically) post-war kiaps believed that _ Methodists and Seventh Day Adventists had been more ‘loyal’ than

Catholics.47 _ |

1426 people: | |

In 1968 officials counted 57 243 Catholics, with a priest for every

, The forty priests, 442 catechists, 96 sisters, 50 brothers, 58 seminarians, 39 catechist trainees, 17 lay missionaries, 386 certified teachers give the

Catholic Mission in Bougainville contact in depth with the people, which the Administration cannot match. _

By then there were 10000 United Church members, served by three expatriate ministers and several ‘native pastors’ and lay workers: they ‘tend to align themselves with Administration aims and objectives’. The 3000 Seventh Day Adventists, with an expatriate pastor, a few ‘native pastors and an expatriate teacher, were an even smaller minority, whose ‘loyalty to the Administration is undoubted’. They usually aligned with

the United Church but ‘neither independently nor combined do they

exert the same degree of influence as the Catholic community’.“ Missions offered almost all the schooling. Even in 1967, when the Administration had opened its own schools (teaching the Australian

curriculum to expatriate children and the Territory curriculum to everyone else), they enrolled only 2105 pupils compared with the missions’ 14 979.4? The Catholic mission monopolised higher edu-

cation; virtually all prominent men in the 1960s and 1970s were products of the seminary system. Until the 1960s, the Marists were notably pietist, with little interest

in the material well-being of their flocks,4° but they became more

1 BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE CRA =~ 19

development-minded in response to their parishioners’ protests. Two priests on the north-west coast, for example, raised loans, built cocoa fermentaries, and bought farming equipment and vehicles. Receiving little help from the didimen, they were resentful of the Administration’s

pretensions and critical of its efforts.*” Missions had seemingly responded to the villagers’ economic aspirations in ways that the Administration had not—and probably could not. David Elder showed that levels of education, health and income compared favourably with

the rest of the Territory, and wondered why popular opinion was

impervious to statistics: | | |

In the villages of Bougainville there is little recognition of the overall role of the central government in creating such things as the framework of arrangements under which Bougainville exists, has relations with the

| public services... :

rest of the Territory and the rest of the world, and enjoys the basic _ Part of the explanation of the ineffectiveness of the Administration

... lies in the fact that overall policy was to leave Bougainvilleans to their own, and the Missions’, devices ... The key requirements were _ roads, bridges, wharves, and airfields, and the officer on the spot could

do little to produce these.48 ,

Elder also remarked that ‘the exceptional officer needed to force solutions’ seldom found his way to Bougainville. For some officers a

Bougainville posting signalled the end of a career. | The separation of Church and State was intensified by the fact that

the Marists had no other stations in Papua New Guinea: their links were to the British Solomons, which was also the headquarters of Methodist evangelists, many of whom were New Zealanders. All three —

missions sent students and teachers to the Solomons routinely, while the Methodists and Seventh Day Adventists ran regular shipping across the border: they had no such links to the rest of Papua New Guinea.*” The most powerful influences for change were doing little to integrate

Bougainville with the rest of the Territory. 7 A dichotomy between Christians and ‘pagans’ does not account

for all systems of belief on Bougainville.°? Throughout Melanesia, | colonialism, Christianity and commerce required ideological as well as

20 & GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

| material adjustment. Many thinkers co-opted European customs, and some revived their own. These innovations were branded ‘cargo cults’, a

term for a host of movements that relied on ritual action and supernatural appeal. They were most often observed after the war, when the phrase ‘cargo cult’ was coined. One of the best-known was Maasina Rule in the British Solomons, which created new structures to resist the

post-war reimposition of European rule. The term has been used so loosely that the Rimoldis*! and other scholars now consider it vacuous. ~ It was always applied to activities that officials deplored, and authorities went to great lengths to discredit cult leaders and ideas. Elder suggests

_ that a prime reason for Administration disapproval was that the | movements ‘were indigenous and sought solutions to real problems

outside accepted administration forms’>2 __ oe a - In an influential book of 1957, Peter Worsley represented mil-_ lenarian movements as proto-nationalist responses to colonialism, forerunners of modern political institutions.>? Their adherents desired Western goods and harmony among themselves and in their relations with Europeans. Other scholars argue that cults were not transitional

but normal Melanesian cultural forms—not desperate reactions of harassed people but creative enterprises. Lamont Lindstrom observes that Melanesians commonly seek economic advantage through ritual ~ action and presume that knowledge is usually the product of revelation.

| Social activists must therefore be (and be seen as) prophets.>* . _ Worsley was barred from Papua New Guinea because of his radical

politics, so his work was based on secondary sources. He devoted a _ chapter to Buka, and more recently the Rimoldis have researched and described Buka events in detail.55 They found that German officials removed two cult leaders from Buka as early as 1913. Despite (or perhaps because of ) opposition from missionaries and kiaps, millenarian beliefs continued to circulate until the Pacific War, when some leaders welcomed the Japanese as saviourts. Relations quickly soured, and several

_ leaders were tortured and executed. The arrival of Americans, and the

promises of development and equality given by (or imputed to) Australians gave new focus to millennial hopes long after the war. The best-known expression of Buka millenarianism was the Hahalis Welfare Society, which arose from a split in Anton Kearei’s East Coast

| 1 BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE CRA |= 21 Buka Society. In 1956 the Administration proposed to establish Local

Government Councils for Buka. When the people resisted, the | Administration imposed a tax on adult men, whether they joined Councils or not. After Kearei led a protest delegation against this imposition, the officials tried to co-opt him. He was flown to a Cooperative Society congress in Port Moresby, appointed to the District Advisory Council, and employed as a government clerk. He understood from these gestures that he would soon replace the kiaps, and the East Coast Buka Society, which embodied his ideas, embarked on agricultural production, house building and general modernisation. But eventually

Administration. | ,

Kearei’s authority was compromised by his association with the The Hahalis Welfare Society seceded from Kearei’s Society in 1960:

John Teosin and Francis Hagai left school to help transform their communities, along with several other young men. The Society engaged

in cash-cropping and established a work collective, but it shunned the | LGCs and co-operatives, which were pursuing similar goals. Its ethic of | self-help and hard work lifted production, allowed some capital | formation, and raised consumption; but kiaps and missionaries found |

other grounds for disapproval: | |

The Society of approximately 700 members was formed in February 1960 [to advance] the interests of the Hahalis, Ielelina and Hanahan | villagers. The activities of the Society soon degenerated into a cargo cult |

in which there was no longer any semblance of individual ownership; | one result of this being sexual promiscuity, practised through the establishment of ‘baby gardens’. Believing in their own self-sufficiency, | they totally rejected the Mission and the Administration and refused to | conform to any Local Government Council requirements, including the |

payment of tax.°° | | | 7 |

The Marists excommunicated some leaders, who founded their own | congregation.>” In 1962 the government stepped in when Society leaders |

advised their followers not to pay the head tax, on the (credible) grounds that they received no commensurate benefit. Characteristically, the Administration sent in two indigenous Members of the Legislative Council to persuade Society members to pay the tax. When that appeal

22 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN failed, a detachment of police marched in—and was forced to retreat. Order was only restored after 400 more police were flown in and more than 400 protesters arrested.°® In the longer term, the consequences were deeply ambivalent. Kiaps were confirmed in their preference for co-operatives and councils as against local initiatives—yet they built roads, clinics and schools, which assisted Society members and Council _ adherents alike. Similarly, missionaries condemned the Society's social (and sexual) practices—and spent thousands of dollars in development

projects.°? | | | | | Kiaps were impressed when the Tsuman (traditional leaders)

admitted John Teosin to their ranks, but dismayed when Francis Hagai spent time in Australia at Tranby (a co-operative college for Aboriginal Australians) and with left-wing unions. One kiap remarked that Hagai's natural air of command’ verged on arrogance. The Society operated

_ trade stores and held a liquor licence, which provoked no trouble (to the kiaps’ surprise). Over time the Society seemed to be converging with

‘orthodox’ institutions. By 1968 members were co-operating with the

kiaps, and there was even a rapprochement with the Council. Only sexuality continued to divide the Society from its rulers and neighbours. Members took pride in its autonomy, but there seemed to be a general

(and to the kiap, most welcome) ‘desire to be respectable and to be accepted on an equal footing with the Council’ The kiaps’ anxiety was

- Jargely assuaged.

Ideas that flourished on Buka to the north and in the Solomons to _ the south were sure to resonate in Bougainville itself. Oliver noticed few such movements before the war, but many afterwards, especially among Nasioi. This was ‘almost inevitable, in view of the natives’ greatly

increased expectations and their consequently deeper frustrations’ Compared with Hahalis, however, the movements among the Nasioi speakers of the Guava area were ‘pathetic little affairs . . . largely religious

| in nature’.°! In the Koromira area, cults had flourished almost continuously since 1949, according to an investigator in 1968. He

gathered that they hoped for a period of no Government, with no police force or army, when people can live as they do now, with their same worldly goods, with no internal strife and in universal brotherhood. The majority of people (excluding

1 BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE CRA |= 23 the SDA minority) are distrustful of the Administration, and prefer to have as little contact with it as possible ... The Marist Mission is in a similar position to the Administration and has had difficulties with both school and church attendance.°* ,

One of these cults, founded by Damien Damen and centred near Panguna, became known as the Bauring Society. Oliver judged it socially and culturally ultra-conservative, but it posed serious problems for kiap

Mike Bell: he found Damien Damen charming, but his henchmen inspired such fear in the villagers that Bell could never have them convicted for the crimes he thought they committed. When the American anthropologist Eugene Ogan began fieldwork

among the Nasioi in 1962, he was disconcerted to find that many villagers treated him as an emissary who was preparing the way for the

return of American government. He judged that ‘cargo’ beliefs— blending traditional and Catholic ideas—were endemic, but observed | no organised cult.°* There was no charismatic leader, and kiap Max Denehy was keen to jail suspects. Nasioi enthusiasm then found a focus _ in Paul Lapun, a Catholic Banoni-speaker from Buin, former seminarian and teacher, and budding politician. A ‘new’ cargoism also developed in the Koromira area south of Kieta, more anti-white and militant than its predecessors. And among Guava, inland from Kieta, an ‘old’ form of cargoism developed, focusing on the imminent end of the world (whose signal would be the 1968 election) and centred upon a Marist lay brother. Religious and cultural innovation alarmed missionaries and kiaps

alike, but other issues divided them. The Australian Father Wally _ Fingleton recalled the Forestry Department negotiating for timber around Tonolei Harbour in 1960. They sought a 40-year lease, a road — and 200 acres of harbour frontage; and offered £30 000 for 500 million — super feet of timber. When the owners offered to lease the land but declined to sell, they were expropriated.© In a dispute over road metal, — Fingleton gave information to the owners, who then demanded more than the Administration would pay. These episodes made Fingleton

complain of: | | an entrenched bureaucracy, approaching an autocracy. What we would regard as legitimate criticism and even constructive criticism is... taken

24 = GETTING UNDER THE SKIN almost as a personal affront. [By speaking out,] I have come to be re_ garded, I think, as a radical and extreme and I do not think this is fair.®°

_ The DC was less diplomatic, telling James Griffin that ‘Your Father Bloody Fingleton has deprived the people of economic progress’.°”

Kiaps who spent any time in Bougainville grasped the range of opinions held by individual missionaries; but nuances dissolved when tensions rose. In 1968, for example, the Territory Intelligence Committee

described the missions in anxious terms as: an American Order predominantly staffed by Americans, some of whom have come from poverty-stricken mining areas in the United States of ~ America. [It] has been singularly critical of Administration policy in the political, educational, social and economic fields. Some Mission priests _ have adopted a more forceful and extremist attitude to CRA activities by

| attempting to discredit Local Government Councils, the House of | “Assembly and the Administration, and by channelling the people's thought towards an independent Bougainville ... They have blamed the Administration, alleging neglect in developing Bougainville in relation

| to other parts of the Territory.® | | |

That analysis was far too blunt. The Methodist Bishop Jack Sharp enjoyed only kindly relations with the Marists; kiap Bell never met one

who opposed the mining project; and the DC knew very well how individuals varied.© If some missionaries intervened in specific issues,

_ there was no uniform view. | The kiaps’ reports through their superior officers suggest something of the flavour of relations between government, missions and people.

The strengths and limitations of this network are well illustrated in W. T. Brown's ‘progress report on the CRA situation’, of 15 October 1966. In a detailed account of local events, Brown commented on two _ broadcasts by the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC), com| plaining that ‘editorial pruning and highlighting gave undue emphasis’

to the dashing of Bougainvilleans’ hopes for amended legislation. Judging by items and opinions in the Catholic News, ‘the Church is now

_ popularly accepted to be aligned with the people against the Government. Denehy’s covering letter was much less complex: the Deputy DC

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Lm” ——“YCSCr*SCiésaéazC;C,,sCrsCtsCcrascj O.CLCrC.CCdCsCd«Cisatsés#t#*tsCirtsC;”;”CO”tC;C;C...C the damage was done.'* Miners probably made ad hoc arrangements — with some landowners. More often they (and the Wardens) treated

them as security threats. , .

Bulolo gold prompted prospecting elsewhere. In 1929 two Australians found gold in thick forest at Kupei on Bougainville. Further finds were made near by at Moroni and in the Pumkuna (now Panguna)

50 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN valley. Production peaked in 1937 at 598 ounces of gold and 30 of silver, but shrank by more than half in 1940, the last full year of operation. Most expatriates considered the venture ‘a pathetic pipe-dream’!5 but the Administration gave some assistance: for two weeks in 1936 the geologists N. H. Fisher and L. C. Noakes inspected Kupei, Pumkuna and ~ Moroni.'® Fisher noted that all transport relied on native labour, and ‘pieces of machinery weighing up to 3.25 tons have been brought in by

this means, after months of arduous work’. From Arawa Bay (an anchorage with no wharf ), a motor road was being built almost halfway to Kupei. From there to Kupei village, the track was suitable for mules; but from the village onwards it was merely a footpath. Fisher advocated

mule transport, since ‘it is practically impossible to get boys to carry cargo from the beach ... to Kupei for less than 2/-, or about 1/2d per pound, and carrying by indentured labourers is little, if any, cheaper’.

By 1936 there were ten mining tenements, six at Pumkuna and

three at Kupei. Seven were owned by the Bougainville Syndicate, financed by that notable builder of churches, Archbishop Duhig of Brisbane.!’ Extraction used more human labour than engine power. At Kupei, ore was railed a short distance from the lode, then tipped down a bank to a dump. From the dump it was carried to a shed, broken with sledgehammers and fed into the stamps. Fisher reported plans to replace _ the two-head battery (processing six tons per day), by a five-head battery (putting through twenty-five to thirty tons). Pumkuna had water power, and the lode was more accessible and higher-grade, but the ore had to be raised to the surface, so it was expensive to exploit. Moroni was even

less promising.

When war was declared, the Bulolo and Wau operations were dynamited. By then Papua had produced 856 377 ounces of gold, valued at £2 670 607, and half a million pounds worth of copper. New Guinea had produced two million ounces, worth £18 578 052.'® Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh notes that gold royalties, even at only 5 per cent, were

| the largest item of New Guinea revenue after customs duties.!? Since mining supplies also added to customs receipts, gold made a huge contribution to revenue. The Administration, however, mainly used the revenue to employ more officials and pay them more. Some funds went to health (including services for New Guineans) but none to education.

3 MINING BEFORE PANGUNA §& 51]

Table:3.2: New Guinea Administration, sources of revenue, selected years 1925/26 to 1939/40.

“Year Gol royalty (&) Other mine revenue (£) Import duties (6) 1025/8 =Ssté«sStstC The Guava people were firmly opposed, and close to violence. Though invited to the court at Barapinang, neither they nor the villagers of Musinau or Kokorei attended. Instead, Anthony Ampei proposed a hearing at Guava village. Brown judged that they were absent

‘because the latest spokesman [Damien] Damen . . . was absent holding | anti-CRA and anti-mining legislation meetings in the Kieta coastal area‘

Two old men who did attend stated that they would have to be killed before CRA could expand its operations. Matters were little better on the coast. Kieta LGC meetings were poorly attended, probably due to ‘dissatisfaction with the royalty provisions’ and a ‘cargo-cult’ in Koromira. Brown's

analysis of Daratui was equally discouraging. The Catholics were all opposed. Everyone except the.SDA attacked the mining laws, the Administration, the ruin of Nauru, and the House of Assembly's pretension. These proceedings were reviewed by the Mining Advisory Board,"

which agreed that the objections must be addressed, but added: Most represented disagreement with the law. This could not be accepted as a valid ground for objection. Other objections were concerned with

future lack of land ... The Board considered that such an objection might have force in the future, if a destructive mining operation were to eventuate, but in respect of short-term prospecting titles, not involving

full scale mining production or occupation of the land, the objection

could not be supported. | Accordingly they recommended a two-year extension over an area of 110 square miles, and imposed only three conditions: $100 000 must

be spent on prospecting, $200 must be deposited as security, and

68 == GETTING UNDER THE SKIN prospecting must begin within three months. It must have been difficult

to keep a straight face as they spelt out these trivial conditions. The Board applied principles that made sense in Australia but allowed no leverage for the villagers’ rationale. When the Administrator read the _ evidence, he reached the same conclusion.” - Further conflict was certain, and was discussed anxiously in monthly

Joint Committee meetings between BCL and the Administration. In May 1968 BCL proposed to expand its surveys beyond Panguna, and to investigate road building, tailings disposal and a pipeline. Brown was

| sure that expansion would shatter the comparative calm: it was now necessary to bring in more police, and to phase in explorations so that kiaps could explain them to the people. Tension between BCLs timetable and the kiaps’ caution was now explicit. A new airstrip was needed, for

example: BCL’s Managing Director protested that this had been foreseen _ and agreed, but the Administration wanted to minimise land acquisitions ‘from resisting native people. No one was surprised when several

field parties were thwarted during the next few months.'!®° | What should have alarmed the Administration was the fact that neither the project’s supporters nor its opponents drew a distinction between CRA, the Australian government and the territorial Adminis-

tration. Opponents differed in the breadth of their vision. At one | extreme were references to the environmental catastrophe of Nauru, which implied a Pacific regional awareness. (The company then ceased

to charter ships with Nauruan crews.)!” Narrower in scope was the assertion that Australian miners should confine themselves to Papua, or to Australia; and both were at odds with the notion that CRA might do whatever it wished at Panguna, so long as they left ‘our own valley’ inviolate. Whether a critique was Pacific-wide or valley-bound, witnesses

_ gave little evidence of pan-Bougainville sentiment. Nor was their opposition couched in ‘national’ terms. The SDA supporter of the project was the only villager who even mentioned Papua New Guinea. Opposition was as much familial as national: as Ererio Moena put it,

| stating what everyone knew, women’s judgements were crucial. Even supporters of the project knew that the Administration's claim to dispose of land was mere pretension. Real authority lay with those— women in particular—who could ‘fasten’ the land and lock up the ore.

4 PROSPECTING ¢& 69 The depth and breadth of opposition might have been anticipated. Four months after Phillips began work, fifty people visited him and

questioned his right to prospect. (Later he realised that this was a — delegation of leaders from throughout the Guava Division.) The discussion persuaded him that his visitors agreed to his work, but the contrast between Edward Teori’s and Phillips’s recollections of their | meeting at Kupei suggests that Phillips was inclined to read villagers’

courtesy as consent. 7 |

Equally problematic was Phillips's judgement that Oni—his host and patron in Moroni village—was a ‘very major force in the Guava’ and ‘spoke with the strength of support from his society, Paul Lapun,

Douglas Oliver and Eugene Ogan all described Oni as only one © landowner among many.'® In Lapun’s view: It was all very well for Oni and the big men to agree but their land was not involved. The people whose land was involved ... did not want ~ compensation. They wanted land for hunting and gardens. They did not know where else they could go. Moreover they liked their land.9 In such an atomised society, it was never easy for geologists or kiaps to

find representatives with whom they could confidently negotiate. In any case, even Oni wavered: in July 1964 he told Phillips abruptly that — he was ‘tired of all the talk by the people about our activities (of which

we knew nothing) and he wanted us to leave the area’ | Nor was Oni's ambivalence the only clue. Reporting on the first few

weeks, Neville Robinson commented that: | 7 | The attitude of the people towards the company activities varied from the isolated case of complete co-operation to open and direct antagonism. It frequently happened that after long discussions, the people

would leave fully convinced of the desirability for supporting the _ Company activities in the area only to return next morning with quite _

contrary ideas. ; ae | |

The Moroni and Pakia people had immediately barred entry to their land; and when he left the CRAE party Robinson was prevented from entering the Pinei Valley by people who assumed that he was still part

of the CRA enterprise.7° - , |

70 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN Robinson and CRAE brought their concerns to the kiaps, observing

that ‘complete native co-operation was a basic necessity for the mining development’. It was agreed that Clancy would convene a meeting at Kieta ‘where the whole situation would be explained and clarified’; but

he and Denehy rejected Robinson's idea ‘that an experienced Patrol Officer should join a Mines patrol and visit all the villages to talk and counter any resentment on the spot.*'

THE MEN ON THE SPOT oe Ken Phillips's recollections are the fullest account of the first months of

exploration, but his was the limited view of a man on the spot. He admired other field officers, including Ivo Wood of the Mines Division.

- Wood and his wardens—Stephens and McKenzie—argued that land-

| owners should not only be compensated for losses, but also paid through royalties. Phillips also admired particular kiaps: a I have often said that if Clancy and Denehy had been left in charge ... none of the turmoil that developed from 1966 on would have taken place—they were both men of compromise, not confrontation.

O’'Faircheallaigh echoes that judgement: , | Denehy and Phillips were in favour of compromise, of patient endeavour to fully inform people of developments and hopefully to win their approval. They opposed the use of force... The Administration rejected this

- approach and pushed for vigorous action, meeting resistance with co, ercion, a strategy implemented under Denehy’s successor, Bill Brown.”

That judgement seems debatable. Brown would dispute it, and Robinson’s views offer little support. In Phillips’s account, for example, Robinson asked for a ‘show of force’ when he was thwarted in the Pinei

valley. Denehy refused, and instead summoned the Guava leaders and

explained the law and CRAE's operations: _ 7 We said we would employ Guavas’ at Panguna and Kupeis at Kupei and

- we all went off quite happy. Our work then continued without incident for several months during which time our relations were cordial, we

4 PROSPECTING = 71 began to pay out more and more money for timber, produce, etc. and of course wages ... An area of ground was cleared at the Moroni people's suggestion at the junction of Barapinang Creek and the Kawerong and a substantial house was built in July/August 1964. We had agreed to pay

not only for the materials used in the building but also for the trees

felled to clear the ground for the building ... a On this view, landowners could be reconciled by jobs and compen-

sation for specific damage. Phillips also negotiated directly to regain : access to Moroni and Pakia land, ‘and by promising a water supply etc.

to Moroni village they agreed to let us onto their land’ a This combination of explanation (not negotiation) and ad hoc | payments did offer benefits. Phillips was relieved, for example, that there was no overt opposition to his pegging the corners of the Exclusive Prospecting Licences in December 1964:

- One of the corners fell in the middle of Musinau village and one can imagine the trepidation with which we approached this task. I explained

at great length that it was nothing to do with land as such but that we were asking the Administration for the right to carry on looking for copper and they required that we place these pegs round the country. _ Astonishingly none of these pegs were removed for some weeks or

months. , , | a

But that approach side-stepped the policy issues.

Phillips's account of the deterioration of relations between prospectors and landowners emphasises specific turning points. For him, the Minister's visit in February 1966 was ‘the major milestone in the rapid deterioration of relationships’ He claims Barnes had no local briefing before he told his Kieta audience that ‘there was nothing in it [Panguna] for them but the development would be for the benefit of PNG as a whole’. The next day Barnes met Guava villagers at Panguna:

When old Oni asked plaintively if there was not a silver shilling in it | somewhere for them and the Minister said no—nothing (in spite of the fact that he knew of the impending changes in the Ordinance), | knew ©

that we had troubles ahead ... It was not long before Itambu signs

_ sprang up like mushrooms. | :

72% GETTING UNDER THE SKIN | Phillips and Denehy were ‘thunderstruck’: Barnes had undercut their hints that new laws would address landowners’ anxiety and compensate their losses. At the same time, in his desire to secure compliance, Phillips

may have overstated the benefits that landowners might expect from the new Ordinance. That was not the only incident. Already in July 1965 Phillips's temporary replacement had sent a party into Mainoki village without

consulting them. The party was expelled and villagers refused to readmit CRAE. Even when caution was shown, the complexity of indigenous rights sometimes eluded geologists. CRAE did consult Kupei

and Guava people before working over their land, but a hunting party from Musinau (who held hunting rights over the same ground) came across the camp and pulled it down. The police arrested several men, _ whereupon villagers began warning off trespassers.*? This incident was

not a result of structural conflict, Phillips wrote, but ‘confused communications”. Such misunderstandings were commonplace, and ‘often we did not get to hear of it until long after the event. At Guava village the arrival of Anthony Ampei, who claimed to own some of the orebody and accosted the prospectors, prompted a suspension of work. Phillips dismissed Ampei as unbalanced, and said it was ‘curious in a way that the people allowed him to become their chief protagonist for a time, although a fair degree of mysticism still existed and cults were

still rife’. oo | | |

Phillips correctly observed that those who made the first exploration were ‘normally more vitally, almost emotionally involved in everything

that is going on, whereas the next stage ... brings in people who ... don’t have this involvement’, but his account relies rather too much on

personalities. Individual human error cannot account for so many | misunderstandings, and the villagers’ acceptance of advice from Anthony Ampei is more than merely ‘curious. Again, Barnes's intervention may have been ill-timed and clumsy, but it did express the considered view of the Australian government and the Administration.

| Between the politics of rural Bougainville and the policy-makers of Canberra and Port Moresby lay an abyss of conflicting interests and incomprehension. The rationale of a mining corporation and that of

landowners made no sense to each other. | |

| 4 PROSPECTING §& 73 Exploration simply had to continue, despite every threat and interruption. Ad hoc compensation kept the operation running, though many people began to refuse payments from 1966. When one site was) ‘fastened’, prospectors explored another, yielding tactically but never strategically. The Department's instructions in early 1967 were very clear:

after explanation and persuasion ‘operations should then proceed with police support’?* Shortly afterwards, kiaps reported general opposition: _ Pakia villagers intended to help their neighbours by lining the bank of the Kawerong River to protect cultivated Moroni land. The authorities

argued that further delay would only aggravate the situation—and _ doubled the police strength to thirty.25 The Administration saw no reason to rein in the prospectors. If prospecting ceased, the people would ‘interpret this as a sign of weakness and would be encouraged to

press their other demands more strongly, particularly that all prospecting cease until after Independence’*° Once prospecting became a test of will, responses escalated. Three more kiaps were brought in ‘to explain the CRA operations’, and the police strength around Kieta was

built up to sixty. With the wisdom of Solomon, Phillips and Denehy , could not have reconciled villagers to the juggernaut of prospecting. _

Until the scale and location of mining were decided, it seemed impolitic to alarm villagers by describing all possibilities. Once the project was defined, the kiaps must expect resistance, but it would be localised and (they hoped) limited.?” Meanwhile tactics were dictated | partly by a legal anomaly. When police powers were analysed, the Secretary for Law, W. W. Watkins, found that if a breach of the peace occurred, ‘landowners retain the right “to defend their possession even against a person entitled to enter”. Conversely, ‘persons entitled to enter, who enter “in a manner likely to cause a breach of the peace” are guilty of a misdemeanour’ It followed that ‘CRA employees should aim either | to gain prior possession, or. . . to ensure their actions do not result in a breach of the peace’ Police could properly arrest people who attacked the employees after a peaceful entry. Administrator Hay spelt out the

operational implications where resistance was expected: Police should endeavour to secure occupation in the first place. This could be done by helicopter or by encircling movement. It would have

74 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN the effect from a legal point of view that persons in lawful occupation of a piece of ground for prospecting purposes were being protected

from disturbance by local people. | |

Watkins thought that the only resolution was to add penal sanctions and power of arrest to the Mining Ordinance, a course of action that would be provocative before the House of Assembly debated the

agreement with CRA.?8 | |

In June 1967 Pakia villagers smashed cement survey markers.”° Officials were duly sent from Rabaul ‘to advise the people that change is inevitable’. District Officer Dow reported that Gregory Kopa—the first person to speak to them—demanded: : ‘Who the hell are you? Not another Government officer come to grease [bribe] us?’ When I explained my presence Gregory informed me that

this had happened many times—people came and talked to them, listened to their side of the story and then did absolutely nothing.

Dow assured him that everything the people said would be conveyed to Port Moresby, and thus gained sufficient breathing space to hold village

meetings, in which a host of grievances were put forward. Nothing could compensate villagers for the loss of land. Money and roads and scholarships were mere ‘grease’. They were outraged by the high-handed

actions of the kiaps and police, and mortified by CRAE personnel looking for women. As matters turned out, ‘absolutely nothing’ did follow from this meeting.2° Within a week, CRA and Administration

_ officers recommended more police and reported that ‘hardening resistance must be expected’! _ Typical of these incidents was one that focused on stream sampling. The kiap spent five days talking with villagers, to no avail, and returned on 8 July 1968 with a police officer, twenty members of the riot squad, three CRAE geologists and two assistants. They arrived on foot, at noon,

and forty people barred their entry, demanding more talk. The kiap agreed to listen to any new points of view, but refused to hear old arguments. Deploying police on the river bank and CRAE men in midstream, he recited his authority—paragraph 5 of Instruction 2 of J. 1-58 _ —and told the geologists to get on with it. In response to shouting, he reminded protesters of the House of Assembly’s endorsement of the

| 4 PROSPECTING | 75 project, and invoked a recent UN mission—‘even an African member’ , of that mission supported the mining laws and CRA’s venture. All in vain: the people (now described as a ‘mob’) pushed through the cordon

and scuffles broke out. Sampling was completed, and a man was arrested. To the kiap’s palpable relief (and perhaps surprise) he required

‘NO MEDICAL TREATMENT WHATSOEVER‘? | ~ In the face of these incidents, the Administration tried to manoeuvre

Paul Lapun into the conflict. Having resisted his campaign for land- | owner royalties, they relented and conceded a 5 per cent royalty. They

then pondered how best to use his political capital. Brown foresaw

problems on several fronts: | -

1 A hardening of opposition as the magnitude of damage and physical

change to the countryside becomes more obvious .. . | 2 A rejection of the 5% royalty amendment but an uninformed rejection as nobody knows what amount is involved. | 3 A closer alignment between the opposing groups of Kokorei, Guava and Moroni [villagers] as each becomes more and more affected by ©

Company activity, and consequent increased resentment.to the

Company and the Administration. oo Like his superiors, he would countenance no wavering. Yet every CRA activity might provoke an incident, so that even a phased programme

might not avert trouble. Therefore: _ | |

I strongly recommend that the Member be given the opportunity to explain his amendment to the people before further Company activity, and Administration support of this activity, can be used as an excuse for rejection by the people of the amendment.

Like many of his colleagues, Brown mistrusted Lapun: If the people meet the Member he can equivocate but he can do so just as efficiently from his own village. His presence in the area can not

materially make the situation worse than it currently is. [Furthermore, , he] will need the support of some other Members of the House otherwise he will probably succumb to the opposition, similarly we need other Members to be present to ensure that the House is reliably

informed ... But until the position is clarified any rejection can be

76 =& ~=GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

attributed to the ‘Administration’s premature actions’ and their failure

Situation. | | ,

, to allow the Member to put his case before they ‘jeopardised’ the Accordingly he advised CRA to defer new projects and drilling until

Lapun had visited.33 __ | oe ,

_ POLITICAL PROSPECTS Responding to a demand for legal advice, the Administration despatched

| the lawyer N.N. Pratt from Rabaul to meet Moroni villagers at Barapinang in April 1967.°* Severinus Ampaoi interpreted for the thirty

_or forty people present. When Pratt described his (explanatory) role, a ‘Gregory’ made him concede that he was not an arbiter: ‘You are on the government side rather than the people's side’. Damien Danie [perhaps

Damen] then expounded his position. The people had welcomed _ German intervention to suppress land disputes, so that ‘one person would not take the other person's land’; but the present government _ had ‘brought in CRA without warning or without telling the landowners

what was coming on’, allowing the company to ‘take the land away _ from us. Responding to Pratt's account of the legislative process, he explained that ‘the law is made not only by the experts, some laws are made almost according to the natives’, Under this law, landowners owned both the surface and anything underneath. For three years they _had protested in vain, and they still wanted CRA to leave. Later, they | might admit a company that accepted their laws. Pratt's references to the House of Assembly cut no ice. When he asked if the people would share the wealth with (for example) the rest

of Bougainville, they told him: oe | |

We would be willing to share ... but not immediately as nowadays... we are not able to govern ourselves and this company has come at a

time when we are still unable to do anything for ourselves, that is before self-government... Bly the time we are granted self-government our Own government will not be able to have any wealth because the

- mineral copper will be dug out. | | ose -

| - 4 PROSPECTING §& 77

honoured: Je | Edward Teori maintained that Phillips’s promises had not been Mr Phillips said ‘If the copper can be worked, then you and us and the judge will all get together to decide whether a drilling machine would be set up. A big sum in compensation will be given ... ‘ From that time to this there has been no compensation paid out until Mr McKenzie started a little while ago. The people are not happy about the amount of compensation ... The amount is decided by Mr McKenzie but we want

it decided by the land owners. | - | Another elder, Taratoro, had often heard the kiaps explain that _ the land laws follow native custom ... The government has given us a fairly good idea of land, and its importance, and what we can do with

it, but now it wants to take it away from us ... The government is

turning us and our customs upside down. =. , Another villager asked what response they might expect from this meeting, and from their protests to the Warden's Court. Pratt admitted that there was no reason to expect either a reply or a change of policy— a reply that provoked the threat to take the matter to the United Nations. The people, Pratt concluded, were ‘quite adamant’ that the company |

should not move into their land. Further: | | the question of mineral ownership has now become inextricably mixed up with self-government and a somewhat veiled threat of separation . . . I feel that one of the root causes of the present stubbornness is a general | lack of understanding on [sic] the nature of government, and a possible

belief that a government of indigenes will respect above all else ~ customary land law. Were it not for the fact that Mr Brown and other officers have already sat down in the villages and endeavoured to discuss

- the issues ... I would have suggested ... a crash programme of

_ elementary government and economics. |

Pratt was not alone. Two months earlier, in February 1967, Phillips revisited the island and was appalled. ‘The majority of the expatriate __ staff had lost all contact with the Bougainvilleans and were contained in a vacuum almost by the Administration’ Eighteen months later

78 * GETTING UNDER THE SKIN Douglas Oliver judged that ‘the people in the Guava census division are in some respects already a “lost cause” ... Anti-CRA sentiment in this area is probably about as strong as it can ever expect to be, and no - further research is needed to trace the sources of it’.*> By the end of 1968, CRA and Administration officers agreed that landowners were

firmly opposed, and that ‘apparent or real weakening of overt opposition does not imply increasing support’.*° Villagers and geologists and kiaps spoke past each other. The Mining Ordinance violated all Nasioi ideas about land, and they greeted it with incredulity. When prospecting authorities were reissued, the Director of Lands added a cautionary letter. The mining laws ‘could be regarded by primitive land owners as an appearance of legalised trespass. [Therefore] holders of prospecting authorities should . . . take particular precautions

to ensure that the appearance of trespass is kept at a minimum’. The ‘precautions suggested seem bizarre: ‘Where daily opportunity for exchange of greetings is available, it is thought that daily observance of the courtesy would be highly desirable’°?’ Officials could not grasp Nasioi arguments or treated them as the irrational views of primitives, and often dismissed their objections as obtuseness.

Realising that the project must proceed even in the teeth of opposition, Administration officers sought grounds for optimism. First, they reckoned that only about 1200 people were directly affected by fear of loss of land.38 The Intelligence Committee report of September 1968 took a similar line3° Nevertheless many landowners still refused to acknowledge the mining law and feared a future as ‘despised landless vagrants. They were not interested in royalties or compensation; and

they warned that mining could proceed only over their dead bodies. The report summarised their objections, as put by Anthony Ampéei:

e denial of mining legislation, , e denial of House of Assembly right to make laws unacceptable to the people, e Bougainville does not belong to New Guinea,

_ © disbelief that the Company is only prospecting—sampling is

a stealing,

© land ownership is permanent (claims it is confirmed by tradition

and by the Administration), |

, 4 PROSPECTING § 79 e tax collected in Bougainville is not spent there, | e pride in the fact that he stopped drilling operations on his own land and has been the agency through which other drilling operations

have been stopped, e the people do not want royalties, e the people do not want occupation fees, and e the people do not want financial rewards—only that CRA retire

from the area. |

Tensions were high in the area due to be mined. Yet villagers outside the mining area had ‘vacillated’ In periods of calm, they favoured the project because of its incidental benefits. According to the Intelligence Committee, while the Catholic mission was largely hostile, ‘Seventh Day Adventist and Methodist Missions favour the mining development. Senior officers also took comfort in the belief that by 1968, after three

years of protest, people had become ‘more resigned to the mining operations of CRA, particularly those in the immediate areas’. To be sure, CRA’s proposals to extend their surveys, and to develop town and

tailings sites, were provoking more opposition, but it was hoped that other areas of resistance might also exhaust themselves.

Administration officials and company managers acknowledged differences among themselves. As one explained archly, ‘cultural differences were immense: all the kiaps were from Queensland or New South Wales, whereas we in CRA were from Melbourne!’ This subtlety was lost

on villagers, who lumped together CRA, the Administration and Australia. To kiaps and geologists, this was proof of ignorance, but in

hindsight the strategic agreement between these parties was more important than their tactical differences. The Administration had hitched its wagon to CRA’s star.

Chapter 5 Negotiating

When Panguna ore looked promising, CRA devised a corporate structure

| to manage further investment and development—Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd (BCPL, later BCL), incorporated in Papua New Guinea in 1969. Until then, exploration capital was raised by CRA (two-thirds) and its

| corporate ally New Broken Hill Consolidated (NBHC).! NBHC soon dropped out of the picture, and CRA and BCL became synonymous in

| the public mind. When CRA resolved to proceed with mining, the corporate structure became more elaborate, but there was always a clear chain of command. The Board of BCL answered to CRA in Melbourne, which answered in turn to its dominant shareholder, RTZ.

In Australia, these relationships provoked suspicion during the 1970s, when economic nationalism was common, but CRA’s Chairman, Sir Maurice Mawby, represented his company to the Prime

Minister as both Australian and patriotic: | [A Bougainville mine] will result in a decrease in the Commonwealth

eo funds necessary for the maintenance of Australian administration . . . and we would hope [to] do much to train the natives and guide them into a peaceful acceptance of independence compatible with our Australian hopes. In this field we have learnt much from contacts in

80 :

Zambia, Rhodesia, and the Congo, and naturally we hope to avoid the extremes of dissension which arise with the growth of nationhood.

, | 5 NEGOTIATING | 81 I believe a great contribution can be made through Cabinet understanding of Industry's desire not, as so many believe, to make profits and bolster share prices, but through company developments to |

strengthen Australia as a Nation? |

‘CRA enjoyed the pick of Australian specialists. For in-house legal advice,

they retained Philip Opas QC, who had quit the bar after defending the © last man hanged in Australia. When a case went to the High Court, CRA

engaged Ninian Stephen QC, later Chief Justice and Governor-General. | _ Mawby chose Frank Espie to head the project in 1966. Born in Burma, where his father managed a mine, Espie had studied mining engineering in Adelaide. After war service in Greece and New Guinea, he worked as an engineer until he moved into management. A preparatory tour of African mines persuaded him that BCL needed anthropologists’ advice on how to behave in Bougainville. (He was steered in that direction by his friend Peter Hastings, who covered the Pacific Islands for the Australian.) The Board was astonished, but acquiesced. _ | Espie’s charm and intelligence opened many doors. Many academics were reflexively hostile to the private sector in general and to mining © companies in particular, but Espie’s friendship with the vice-chancellors _ of the Australian National University and the University of Papua New Guinea put him on the trail of anthropological advisers. The Fijian Dr Rusiate N ayacakalou was engaged to research land ownership and land | usage, and Espie also approached Professor Douglas Oliver, who had

studied in South Bougainville before the war. About to retire from — Harvard, Oliver was delighted to renew his fieldwork. He visited often and supervised research by Eugene Ogan in the Saropa Valley, and by Jill Nash and Donald Mitchell among the Nagovisi.* Espie judged Oliver _

to be the project's saviour.” | | | , Espie’s interests extended beyond anthropology. In Oliver’s words: Espie travelled intellectually as well, attempting to secure advice and experience from sociologists, anthropologists, geographers. In the world

mining industry of the 1960s this was a decidedly unusual priority ... _ Equally unusual was his willingness to enter the open forum, whether _ at the Waigani seminars of the infant University of Papua New Guinea

or in local liaison .. . | |

82 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN , [CRAE’s area manager Colin Bishop] would retell with relish the

blank disbelief of local villagers when his large sweating Chairman appeared among them in shorts and boots, and was introduced as

who: | ‘nambawan bilong kampani’ (top man in the company).°®

Espie made his priorities clear when he set out the criteria for an appointment to Port Moresby in 1967. He was looking for someone understands company policy towards the local people (which he will

have helped to frame), , Oo

administrators, | | | :

knows and is sympathetic to the newly independent politicians and is in touch with the advanced thinkers (at say the university), _

| has a good knowledge of the racial history and political moves (and reasons for them) in a wide range of newly independent states in Africa and elsewhere, _

| can advise our company at a responsible level on the course it should

: chart in the areas above.’ |

~ No immediate appointment was made, but later he lured Jim Byth from Melbourne University Press to fill this position. Since most of : Espie’s time was spent in Panguna and Melbourne, he was seldom in - Port Moresby; BCL's low profile in the capital was at first accidental, and later a matter of debate, but in either case unconventional.® _ Espie was also adventurous in his choice of senior managers. In July

| 1969 he recruited 43-year-old Ray Ballmer from the American corporation, Kennecott, to become Director of Operations, responsible for the design, construction and commissioning of the mine. Don Vernon, a chemical engineer from CRA‘s Melbourne office, became Assistant General Manager at forty. Paul Quodling, a 42-year-old accountant, was Manager of Administration, having worked in RTZ’s Palabora mine in South Africa. John Trezise, aged forty-four, was recruited from NBHC as

Concentration Manager, responsible for metallurgy. Colin Bishop worked first as CRAE’s Area Manager, in charge of land and compensation.” These men—like Haddon King, Director of CRAE—were at the peak of their ability and energy. Nor were they narrowly technical.

| Espie insisted they travel to Africa, the Americas and Europe to keep in

| 5 NEGOTIATING =| ~~ 83 touch with developments in other mining communities. At least two senior managers were sent to study at the Institute of Development

Studies at Sussex University. !° |

CRA’s strengths were not merely financial (though its credit- | worthiness was unimpeachable). Its Chairman had the ear of the Prime Minister. By contrast, Papua New Guinea's Administrator dealt with a Minister who was not even in Cabinet. CRA’s intellectual resources could also be stretched almost infinitely. It remained to be seen whether these

resources could reconcile landowners to the transformation of their

land—and their lives. | To make the Panguna project a reality, negotiations occurred on several levels and at various degrees of formality. CRA negotiated loans from a consortium of banks on mutually satisfactory terms. CRA and the Department then negotiated an Agreement that gave some certainty

to both parties. Endorsement of this Agreement by the House of Assembly was pro forma (unlike the full-dress debate seven years later

when the House was a real parliament). Meanwhile, villagers dealt informally with kiaps and prospectors, and these ‘men on the spot’ tried

in vain to mediate between villagers, CRAE and the Administration. Field officers often discussed the project with villagers, but, as James

Griffin put it: | | |

The people were not consulted as to whether they wanted the mine or not; but at least after a time it was explained to them what was involved ... As [DC Ashton] said to this writer: ‘Explain to them! Why we've explained it to them till we’re blue in the face’. The difference between talking at and talking to people seems to be caught here.!!

These meetings achieved neither certainty nor satisfaction. | The men on the spot tried to mediate. Having discussed develop-

ments with McKenzie and Wood of the Mines Division, Phillips and | Denehy grew dismayed by villagers’ opposition and the likelihood that government and company responses would be inadequate. In mid-1965,

they prepared a submission for Haddon King to take to the Adminis- |

trator, suggesting: ,

1) that the people had to get something monetarily in the way of compensation for minerals etc. and that whatever was granted now

84 4 GETTING UNDER THE SKIN must be sufficiently generous so that there would be no grounds for

complaint in the future, 2) that the Government and/or the Company establish a Bougainville

: Development Fund—which had already been mooted by people like Paul Lapun but which we had also thought of independently. !2

| Phillips thought that Haddon pursued only the first point; but neither

hit its mark. | | an

Phillips and Denehy also hoped that exposure to bigger pictures

would close the knowledge gap and allow real communication. To this

end, in 1965 Denehy and a CRAE geologist escorted a party of Bougainvilleans to Australia to judge the impact of large-scale mining.3

AN AUSTRALIAN ENCOUNTER The party comprised five Bougainvilleans: Severinus Ampaoi of Dapera,

President of the Kieta LGC, the only English-speaker; Ionau Neto of Bakawari, a Councillor in the Kieta LGC, President of the Savings and Loans Society and a substantial farmer; Mirintoro Taninara of Guava, who was employed as a drilling assistant; Moikui Kuavo of Komai, a Councillor of the Buin LGC and a veteran of the 1960 Tonolei timber dispute; and Genanai Auria of Beretemba in Buin, ‘the leader of a group which is deeply suspicious of any move which may lead to exploitation of natural assets by Europeans’. The tour took them through Queensland

and the Northern Territory. They saw dredges at Stradbroke Island, a shipyard, a cannery, a meat works—and Mount Morgan mine: _ Having gazed awestruck at this tremendous hole for several minutes the party asked the CRA Officer accompanying (Mr C. L. Knight) if the hole

; at Panguna (Guava) would be anywhere near as large. Mr Knight's

answer was quite succinct—’Bigger. , | A later account explains that Mirintoro was ‘terrified and required reassurance’ when he imagined Mount Morgan transposed to Guava village, the epicentre of the proposed mine.'* Despite this trauma, -Denehy was pleased with the effect of these visits, especially in _ dispelling ‘cargo cult notions’ The visitors were awed at the sight of a

| a — -§ NEGOTIATING #& 85

machines. | | | | |

hundred women trimming fruit for the cannery, working ‘just like If their gender assumptions were shaken, so were some of their

ideas about race. Some believed that ‘large scale European development

is synonymous with exploitation’, and wanted to meet Aboriginal victims. But when they did meet, they concluded that Aborigines

had neglected or refused the opportunities given them to better themselves. This impression is in no small measure due to the unfailing courtesy and genuine interest in the party by Australians [sic] every-—

where—by a complete absence of discrimination and the absolute |

absence of condescension. | |

The Bougainvilleans ended their tour in Canberra, where they met the

Minister briefly and held two hours of talks with his officers. The Department had been debating what (if any) share of royalties should go to landowners, and the need to channel profits to local projects, so they grasped the chance to sound out opinion—but not to negotiate.

Phillips understood from Denehy that | |

the villagers asked the Minister for some consideration for direct _” financial benefits accruing to Bougainvilleans. The Minister did not — answer or directly reject this which the Bougainvilleans took as tacit

approval of their request.1° oe | ,

That account compresses the two meetings. Since the meeting with officials became a subject of disagreement, it is worth citing a con-

temporary record.'°® | | , | |

Bougainville Leaders—Discussions in Department of Territories 7

on 28th September 1965 — , — Discussions were held with the leaders through their interpreter Mr

Denehy by Mr Gutman in association with Messrs Wood, Ahrens, Lattin,

Gleeson, Grigor and Wilson. Mr Gutman and some of the officers were

not present for the full period... , : The leaders were concerned primarily with the effect which the devel- , opment of the mineral (copper) and timber resources of Bougainville would be on their communities. The main points which they made were:

86 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN e The owners of the land containing minerals and timber stands should share in the royalties received by the Administration from the companies developing such resources. e The development companies should allocate a proportion of their

profits to a local development fund from which the local com| munities could draw to provide modern facilities such as roads,

| the past. housing, etc. A figure of 25% of profits was mentioned.

e The Administration should spend a more reasonable proportion of available funds on developments at Bougainville than it has done in

According to Denehy’s more discursive report, Severinus insisted that the Administration had always recognised indigenous ownership of land, so how could a law be just ‘which claims that the Government owns everything beneath the land’? This Australian convention could not apply in the Territory. He was adamant that Bougainville had been neglected, and proposed that revenue generated in Bougainville should not be used merely to develop services and facilities elsewhere. These points appeared to be well received by the Territories Officers and the group feels that their requests have been acceded to in principle. It

, was at this stage that Moikui of Buin and Genanai of the Nagovisi appeared to come ‘on side’... | [In conclusion] four members of the party accept the urgent need to develop the natural resources of the District with the firm proviso that a

proportion of the revenue and/or profits ... be turned back into the development of the District. I am uncertain of the attitude of the fifth man, Mirintoro of Guava ... however initial reports since his return

home have been very encouraging. If Denehy was optimistic, Administrator Cleland was shocked to learn that the Minister and the Department ‘appear to support in principle [the Bougainvilleans’] attitude in regard to sharing royalties and other matters’, and demanded clarification.!’ Two months after the event,

Lattin recalled that: |

| the discussion was fairly free and generally sympathetic to the point of view being put forward by the Bougainville delegates—namely that...

5 NEGOTIATING §& 87 the local people should get some direct share in the profits and some

compensation for any land taken particularly if the land was of

commercial value for farming. | Although the discussion was fairly free it was made clear by myself and other departmental speakers that neither the Australian Government

discussion. | | |

nor the Administration ... could in any sense be committed by the |

When the Bougainvilleans raised the idea of using royalties to establish

a Bougainville Development Fund, officers had pointed to its ‘impracticability’. They explained that landowners were entitled to compensation for loss and damage, but not to royalties, nor to profits. The payment of royalties into a fund was therefore ‘possible but contrary to the usual practice’, and payment of company profits into such a fund

would be far beyond any legal obligation: | | | | but if a contract is prepared to grant rights to the deposits or if rights are granted by an Ordinance or Commonwealth Act some such provision

might be included. A payment of 25% of the profits is obviously unreasonable but a payment of up to 2% of profits or possibly a flat amount ... could be accepted.

Lattin felt that rental payments to individuals would be less desirable than payment to the whole community, because he understood that the land was ‘community owned’ On the subject of Administration funds, he observed (to his readers, but not to the delegation) that residents ‘should receive some community benefits from the proposed mine if political trouble is to be avoided’, and canvassed appropriate kinds of

support: | | In summary: | | oe 1 A promise has been given in general terms. |

2 There is no legal obligation for payments to the indigenous people

3 A case can be made for an ex gratia or extra legal payment ... for what amount to political reasons but it would be preferable for the | provision to be made through the normal programme of public

works ... , ,

88 |= GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

the form of: ,

If a Special Development Fund were considered, payment could take

| e acontribution ... from the royalties... - ® a payment from the mining company ... This is a matter for the | mining company but is not considered impractical if the amount is not too large, e.g. £10 000 per annum or up to 2% of profits . . . ¢ a payment of royalties or profits to individual landowners. This is

| not favoured as it would create an undesirable precedent. _ |

e additional Administration funds ..._ | | Required to justify his reference to a promise, Lattin was more circumspect. He had not seen the final typescript ‘and would not have agreed entirely with the use of the term “promise” which you have

queried’. He did not deny the substance of the original record, but pointed out that ‘The promise of sympathetic consideration of the proposal for local landowners obtaining a share of the royalty . . . seems

to be in conflict however with the Mining Ordinance which reserves mineral rights and royalties to the Administration. Any company contribution was clearly a matter for CRA, but Lattin did cite a precedent (at Groote Eylandt), and suggested that CRA might also be asked to _ share facilities such as its water supply. Since the project would require an expanded works programme, there would surely be local benefits even if no funds were earmarked. His draft response to Cleland therefore

stressed that the discussions did not decide policy, nor commit the Department or Administration to ‘any particular course of action’ [T]he views expressed by departmental officers were sympathetic and the delegation ... seems to have assumed, of course quite wrongly, that

this sympathetic view was tantamount to a promise that [their]

proposals would be accepted."® | These records explain why the delegation believed that its ambit claim had been accepted, four months before the Minister flew to Kieta to

- dash their hopes and declare that all benefits should flow to ‘Papua

New Guinea asawholeD |

_ Barnes's early career predisposed him to this quintessentially Australian position.!? When he was still at school, the Queensland

, ne | 5 NEGOTIATING | 89 government resumed half of the family farm by compulsory acquisition. The Barnes family used the proceeds to buy an excellent stud farm, and

never looked back. During the 1930s depression, young Barnes considered prospecting in New Guinea, but chose to make a living in © mining and air transport in North Queensland. He probably had better first-hand knowledge of 1930s mining than any other parliamentarian. — Years later, he explained his firm opposition to Bougainville landowners’

claims. Australia’s mining laws derived from Britain, where: an The idea that the aristocracy could go on owning so much inherited —

land could be reasonable if they were taxed; but for them to own mineral wealth under the ground was a bit too much. The principle was established in Australia that what was under the ground should belong

to the people as a whole—not just a few fortunate individuals. The

same principle had to apply in New Guinea.?? __ |

promise.”! |

While Barnes was championing the rights of the nation against a

phantom aristocracy, his audience could only hear him breaking a , Phillips assumed that the delegation must have misunderstood the

Minister and his officers. Oliver's report to CRA also emphasised the |

perils of cross-cultural conversations: , When a CRA employer says ‘maybe’, the native listener usually concludes

‘will’ In other words, remembering the reliance that these basically illiterate people place on verbal assertion|,] ... it behooves CRA to scrupulously avoid giving any impression that it may do something _

which it may eventually not do.** ) | |

confusion. :

No doubt. But these false hopes arose from comprehension, not There were several moments when Papua New Guineans (and |

especially Bougainvilleans) might have been briefed on the state of

negotiations between CRA, the Administration and the Australian — | government. In reality there was no notion that the Bougainvillean delegation be involved; nor were Members of the House of Assembly | informed when they met Barnes in March and raised the issue. Zure Zurecnuoc asked if the law could be amended along ‘American’ lines

90 & GETTING UNDER THE SKIN (conferring ownership of ores on landowners). Barnes said he hoped the House would do no such thing, but made no reference to ongoing

negotiations. In April the Assistant Secretary met several MHAs, including Paul Lapun: again, no reference was made to negotiations.

THE BOUGAINVILLE AGREEMENT In February 1967 Sir Maurice Mawby formally initiated negotiations _ with the Department by describing the concessions that CRA sought, in the framework of a Special Mining Lease.23 Since Papua New Guinea

would be self-governing (if not independent) before the company repaid its loans, lenders would be ‘influenced by the rather unfortunate history of many African and Asian countries. Their anxiety would be allayed only by the promise of cash flows and hard currency. Concessions were accordingly ‘vital’ if the project were to proceed.

Mawby sought concessions under broad headings. oO e ‘To improve economic feasibility and increase the cash flow’, he asked for a 3-year tax holiday, the deduction of capital expenditure from taxable income, and retention of the 20 per cent exemption on income from copper ores (as prevailed in Australia); e ‘To safeguard availability of world currencies’, he wanted to retain _ foreign currency from loans and sales, for loan repayments, dividend

payments and similar obligations; and 7 e ‘To aid long term stability’, he proposed that the Administration take up 20 per cent of equity, and outlined a taxation formula that would take CRA quickly to 50 per cent of taxable income—once

they began paying tax. | |

Several lesser concessions were mentioned, of which the most significant

was a tax ceiling, so that other imposts could not be added to the income tax that BCL was willing to pay. These issues were already being negotiated between the Department

and CRA.** G.O. Gutman, who led the departmental team, was a European refugee who had entered the Department at the bottom and

worked his way to the top by determination and intelligence. He

5 NEGOTIATING & 9] handled much of the discussion one-to-one with Frank Espie, and may have taken a harder line with CRA than Warwick Smith approved: it is possible that CRA appealed to Warwick Smith over Gutman’s head.?° Gutman was isolated also by the Department’s determination to exclude Treasury from negotiations, to their great annoyance. While Gutman had to negotiate in a vacuum, Espie could call on RTZ's global memory. In particular, his African contacts identified errors and useful approaches: | Following this advice we have given a considerable amount of thought — to the steps we must take in ensure that any investment we make... has a higher degree of security than this would have in some other newlyindependent states in Africa and elsewhere. Our objective is to establish these operations in a manner which will ensure that the rulers of the newly independent nation will want us to continue to operate.?° | Nevertheless, Espie was accountable to the boards of CRA and RTZ, so his room for manoeuvre was narrow. It was also limited by the fact that

the lender—the Bank of America syndicate—had already laid down conditions that CRA had to ensure. There is no information in the Department's records about the lenders or the conditions they imposed: what follows is based on information from Sir Frank Espie and other CRA personnel. In Espie’s clear view, ‘the key question was (and must always be) “will the lender be protected?”” BCL was borrowing on a

heroic scale. In the end, the project cost about $A423 million. Shareholders invested $130 million, and borrowings amounted to $334 million, of which the twenty-seven banks in the Bank of America syndicate found $110 million.?’” Their leverage was self-evident, and

they were exceedingly fussy about the institutions and countries to

which they would lend capital. Oo | The points of contention between the company and the Department (as Espie recalls them) were levels of taxation, rather than the structure

of the agreement. A departmental summary described the fate of Mawby’s requests and bears out Espie’s recollection: These were refused:

e entitlement to retain some foreign earnings overseas;

92 == GETTING UNDER THE SKIN | ¢ certain taxes on dividends and royalties falling within the company’s

tax ceiling; |

e¢ government guarantees or insurance against expropriation; and

e a slower rate of annual tax increase.”° oe | These were granted: | e the term of the mining lease to be 84 years; royalty and rent to be renegotiated after 42 and 63 years; and all terms and conditions to

| | be renegotiated after the 84 years; -

es a three year tax holiday; , | oe | | , e broad write-off provisions, making initial capital expenditure eligible

| for accelerated depreciation treatment; _ | |

‘income tax; |

_ @ payment over and above normal imposts to be called supplementary

— e@ exemption from major stamp duties and certain import duties (e.g.

mine machinery); — |

| ¢ a guarantee that the (standard Australian) deduction of 20 per cent of income from copper mining continue to apply for 84 years; and

, e a tax ceiling. ,

Mawby proposed one of the most original elements—the Administration’s equity—in order to commit the government to the project. He was pushing against an open door: Barnes readily agreed, and

adopted it as his own idea.3 | |

Before the draft Agreement went to Cabinet, it was reviewed by other departments. Treasury officials, marginalised until then, objected

to the tax holiday, the broad capital write-off provision, and the description of additional payments as ‘supplementary income tax. Trade and Industry suggested that BCL’s freedom to export should be ‘subject to national interest’, and thought the initial 42-year lease too long (and

therefore too generous). The Crown Solicitor’s Office proposed to ‘Narrow the application of arbitration. External Affairs warned that the United Nations would like a stronger commitment to train Papua New Guineans and might criticise the tax holiday and capital write-off.3! On reflection they thought that UN criticism could be countered by the fact that the cost of concessions to BCL fell on Australia, while the benefits

of increased revenue later would fall to Papua New Guinea.32 .

5 NEGOTIATING =| 93 The decisive voice was the Prime Minister's Department, whose

officers judged that: | | | | _@ the company should be pressed to undertake firmer commitments

on training and employment for indigenes. - a e the venture is important to the Territory's development and tax concessions to assist the early cash flow should be made _ Oo e possibly a decision on the grant of concessions on capital deductions could be withheld until an Australian decision is reached [after a

review of Australian taxes] oe | |

e it may be questionable whether CRA could not be pressed further but it would be better to try to exact more tax in the later period than to refuse concessions important to the successful establishment

of the enterprise. a :

[Regarding UN opinion] the choice may be between criticism for

concessions or criticism for inadequate Territory development— | _ development should therefore be encouraged even if it results in some

unfavourable UN reactions.*? a | | |

The Papua New Guinea Administration also commented, though they focused on peripheral issues. They proposed to treat duties on oil and petrol as outside the tax ceiling, supported BCL’s argument that the tax ceiling should rise only if the general rate of company tax also rose, and

wanted the question of smelting to be treated in a letter of understanding, outside the formal Agreement.** They were content with their

projected income. Depending upon the distribution of dividends: — | total revenue received by 1973-74 could be as high as $16,000,000 per annum. It is expected that the company will commence to pay company tax by 1981-82. A conservative estimate indicated ... revenue ... of

year. | Se OO

about $30,000,000 but ... this could be as high as $50,000,000 per :

The Cabinet submission went through nine drafts.3° The outcome was — an agreement that—in Espie’s view as well as Gutman’s—suited both

Parties. Critics later judged that CRA was treated too generously. At the | time, the only technical analysis was that of the Bureau of Mineral Resources, who judged that the viability of the project hinged on copper

94 % GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

prices. At $610 per ton (the early 1960s price), the prospect could probably not be developed. At $870 per ton (the prevailing price from January to August 1966), it might break even. At $1150 per ton, however (the current price, which had held for five months), ‘substantial profits

would be expected’?’ If BMR’s assessors were correct, Panguna did

involve risk for CRA in 1967. | Cabinet twice considered submissions towards the Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Ordinance. On 29 March 1967, Submission 187

sought policy directions and described the Bougainville political context. We have seen that information from Bougainville was often read more optimistically in Canberra than the writers may have intended. That was even more true when analyses were summarised for Cabinet. Officials may have been reassured in February 1966, when the

Director of Lands blamed Catholic missionaries for indigenous opposition—otherwise the ‘general native attitude [was] favourable. A

month later Denehy argued that a formal proposition from the Administration and CRA was ‘a prerequisite to progress with the natives’,

as a basis for discussion.?® That, too, implied that the problems were

resolvable, and that was the opinion presented to Cabinet. The Department welcomed Lapun’s attempts to overcome opposition and asserted that ‘the Kieta Local Government Council and other native people in the area are in favour of the proposed mining development

continuing under the present law’. By emphasising the role of missionaries, the submission implied that grass-roots opposition could be contained by appealing to church authorities. In any event Panguna was the largest venture ever imagined for the Territory, so it was ‘essential

that the project be brought to fruition’ It had been endorsed by the | House of Assembly, so the Administration would merely be ‘upholding the law as passed by the House’, whereas withdrawal would ruin any

hope of ‘industrial development’ and erode the Administration’s

order’.9 |

prestige: its abandonment might be seen as ‘a victory over authority and could have serious implications for the maintenance of law and

~ On 18 April, Cabinet's Decision 258 approved the terms of the Agreement. The mining leases should be taken out by 31 December 1971, for forty-two years in the first instance. Royalty should be paid at

5 NEGOTIATING | 95 1.25 per cent of the f.o.b. (free on board) value of the minerals. Copper concentrate exports should begin within five years of the issue of the

lease. There would be no formal undertaking on smelting, but the company must ‘pursue objectively a feasibility study into the establish-

ment of smelting and refining’ | .

The company would receive a three-year tax holiday, and could write _

off capital in line with the current income tax ordinance. A profitsharing scheme was envisaged, whereby BCL's payments would rise over

four years to 50 per cent of taxable income. On one hand the Administration would enjoy a minimum annual payment to revenues; and on | the other BCL would gain a tax ceiling. That ceiling would not shelter BCL from royalties or municipal rates, and the ceiling itself would rise each year ‘by a small percentage (no more than 1%) after 25 years up to a level not exceeding 66%’. The prevailing 20 per cent tax deduction on copper mining income was reasserted; and any additional payments above normal tax rates should be designated as ‘special additional tax. Equally important was Cabinet's agreement to give favourable consideration to BCL's offer of 20 per cent of the equity, at par. Cabinet's endorsement was qualified only in three marginal matters:

e the write-off of capital expenditure should accord with the current interpretation of the Income Tax Ordinance, | e the extra revenue payable in later years should not be termed income _ tax, but a special additional tax or a special supplementary tax or

some other term, and | |

e the decision about a smelter would be left to BCL, ‘on the | understanding that there is a moral obligation on the Company to

pursue the question ... objectively’.2° | The Agreement also committed BCL to provide education and health facilities to a specified standard; but the document did not cover all

issues. Several other ‘matters upon which understanding has been

reached’ were spelt out in an exchange of letters: | | e the rate of royalty (1.25 per cent) ‘has in fact been accepted by the Administration as a proper rate for the initial terms of the special

mining lease; |

96 & GETTING UNDER THE SKIN e BCL would confine its activities to those described in the Agreement. If BCL's shareholders engaged in other businesses, they would form - another company. BCL also undertook not to defer the incurring of

costs in selling its products as a device to increase allowable deductions; and 7

e if changes to the Income Tax Ordinance reduced the scope of capital

| - deductions, BCL would request amendments and these ‘would

receive close consideration. , | So The timing of the Administration's purchase of shares was critical. BCL

would give as much information as early as possible; and if it was necessary for the purchase to be spread over two financial years, BCL

would co-operate, though the timing could be determined by the _ lenders. Further, BCL was comfortable with the Administration's notion

of selling some shares to Territory residents, provided that: | the Administration will at all times retain management and control over the shares involved and retain an interest in them . . . which will not fall - below 51%, and that the benefits arising from the shares from time to time will be applied for the benefit of the Territory and its people. *"

The Administration left smelting to the judgement of BCL, which | acknowledged ‘a moral obligation to the Administration to pursue the

matter objectively”. | : | a

In one significant respect the negotiations were unsoundly based. CRA initially expected to process 30 000 tons per day, and the capital cost was thought to be about $145 million. In May 1968 BCL told the Administration that daily production was likely to involve 80 000 tons,

| at a capital cost of about $300 million.42 That revision followed the advice of a feasibility study, that 30 000 tons per day—the output of - comparable African mines—would not be enough: profitability required

90 000. (The study implied annual production of 165000 tons of copper, 500 000 oz of gold, and 1000 000 oz of silver—twice as much as Gutman imagined while negotiating.)** Every social, environmental,

political—and financial—impact would be proportionally greater. Infrastructure costs would rise, and the Administration would have to pay $20 million for its equity instead of $9 million.

| - -§ NEGOTIATING | 97 LEGISLATION IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY | Analysis in Port Moresby was far less searching. Before the Agreement was placed before the House of Assembly, Administrator Hay discussed |

it with his Executive Council. Councillors raised questions about taxation, BCL’s and the Administration's responsibilities for facilities in» | the new towns, opportunities for individuals, clans and Councils to invest, environmental questions and training prospects. These were quickly addressed, and Hay was sure of Councillors’ support when the — bill came before the House. ‘Indeed members showed great interest in the means of making the Agreement well known to other Members of the House before the session starts’4* Since Under Secretaries were also _ briefed beforehand, the Administration was sure of a positive reception.

_ The second-reading speech on the Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Bill explained why an Ordinance was necessary for large projects, and why this one was especially desirable. A full year of negotiations had been held between ‘senior officers of the Admin- | istration and high officials of CRA’, with help from (unspecified) | Commonwealth departments; the final document had been approved | by the Australian Cabinet and discussed by the Administrator's Executive

Council. The speech rehearsed the familiar arguments concerning the benefits to the Territory as a whole. On the benefits for Bougainville it

was less specific, and moved smoothly past the awkward fact that revenue would come mainly from taxation and dividends rather than royalties. (The landowners’ 5 per cent of royalties would therefore be based on only 1.25 per cent of the value of the ore.) More emphasis

was placed on indirect benefits: | ae |

Education, health and community services would be stimulated, and | _ there would be great opportunities for employment ... [which] could be as high as 1,400 [with] a strong training scheme for Papuans and New Guineans ... People from Bougainville, and particularly those in the Panguna area, would be well placed to make the most of these | opportunities. There would also be a large and steady market for the |

sale of local garden produce [although] local people have not taken |

advantage of it yet. : , |

98 = =| GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

A modern town would grow, with a school, a hospital and the full range of urban services. The House quickly passed the Ordinance: those who spoke (including Lapun) expressed general approval. The Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Ordinance 1967 secured the GovernorGeneral's assent on 30 November 1967.

The full implications of the Agreement and the commitments flowing from it were not immediately clear to all officials. In April 1969, for example, Espie pointed to conflicting opinions on several sections of the Agreement, and set out BCL’s views on them.*? BCL

believed that they were not required to pay an occupation fee, an application fee for a Special Mining Lease, nor rent of more than two

dollars per acre per annum. The rule of thumb for compensating landowners seemed to BCL—and Assistant Administrator Henderson , agreed—to produce crazy anomalies, and the time had come for a more coherent approach. Espie could not understand why the Administration

wanted BCL to apply for leases under the Land Ordinance rather than under the Agreement. And there were questions of the adequacy of the

| land area allowed for the town, the structure of town government, the provision of electricity, and responsibility for water and sewage.

_ When Administration officers prepared for the next conference with BCL (whose team would include Opas as legal adviser) they were unsure how to respond.*° Worse still, a host of policy issues arising from the resettlement of villagers had yet to be determined. Who was responsible for resettlement costs? When would resettlement be necessary? Could people be resettled within the mining lease, or must they move beyond it? There was an urgent need for clarity, so as to ‘confront the people with the need to resettle, and to outline the alternatives of compulsory

acquisition for a public purpose or voluntary resettlement with occupation fees, royalty, and ultimate return of the land for occupation by the owners’ The officers also sought clarification on liability for the

cost of the new road from Kieta to Tunuru, the construction authority for the new town, and several questions concerning land leases. The Administration must have recognised that its managerial and financial resources were overstretched, even before BCL listed the ‘critical

_ activities’ they must perform and gave a timetable for completing them.*’ These included an upgraded Aropa airstrip (by January 1970),

| , 5 NEGOTIATING = 99 upgrading the Kieta~Tunuru road (by May 1970), upgrading the AropaKieta road (by December 1969), building a temporary hospital at once, —

and completing the hospital at Arawa by October 1971, building six schools by the end of 1970, and installing a communications system by June 1970. Thirty leases had been applied for, and must be surveyed and issued within seven months. The middle of 1969 was rather late to

make the policies. | | a

begin so many tasks to meet the company’s deadline—and even later to

The differences between these encounters reflected the unequal distribution of power. At the apex were the lenders and the company, © who negotiated the credit and loan agreement. Since the Department and the Administration did not seek access to these dealings, the terms

and conditions were not challenged, and formed the basis of negotiations between BCL and the Department. At this second level, detailed

negotiating generated an Agreement that, once ratified by the House, | bound BCL and the Administration to specific and enforceable rights and obligations. If the cost and other implications of this Agreement emerged only slowly, they were still binding. At another level, ad hoc discussions gave landowners (and the ‘men on the spot’) the illusion of commitments, but these carried only as much weight as officials chose to allow them. If landowners persisted in opposing the Administration’s policies and BCL's practices, they would be acting outside the law.

Chapter 6 Rorovana Incidents —

_ EXPROPRIATING “NATIVE OWNERS’ Early in 1969, with credit and loan negotiations proceeding smoothly,

| BCL managers intensified their interest in title to land, which was one

of the preconditions for the loan. Land was only one of several connected issues worrying the Administrator. The Administration was beginning to grasp its colossal commitments to infrastructure, which had severe financial implications—on top of the need to pay for equity.

It was impossible to find labour within the Territory, it would be difficult to recruit artisans in Australia, and to breach the white Australia

policy by recruiting in Asia would create a fuss that did not bear thinking about. These issues must be resolved, and the work done, within a taut timetable. BCL hoped to complete preparatory work by _ 1971 for production in 1972. This would have been a testing agenda in | a political vacuum, and Bougainville was anything but that. Hay was anxious about his government's capacity to manage public opinion and

contain resistance to land acquisition. A court challenge to the ; legislation might delay the project or even derail it. Furthermore, some Bougainvilleans were proposing a referendum on secession. Hay expected them to exploit news of the expanded plans and their impact

on landowners, and probably enjoy some success.! ; oe

| 6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS = 101 He was in no mood for tactical advice, but (assuming that Panguna | would be the first of several large projects) the Department suggested _ that he test general methods for heading off resistance. These methods |

would add up to a comprehensive programme of propaganda and publicity: more radio broadcasts and vernacular pamphlets, talks to Councils, the use of kiaps to prepare the way for prospectors and give villagers advance warning of prospecting, and the inclusion in the prospecting parties of people with road-building or first-aid skills. Hay retorted tersely that this programme almost exactly described what was

being done already.’ | | The public-relations programme was indeed comprehensive. In |

August 1969 Deputy DC Brown listed some of the coastal patrols in | Bougainville: a (failed) attempt to persuade the Rorovana to yield land for an airstrip in 1967; and at least one visit by a kiap every month since | April 1968. Brown himself had visited Rorovana four times in four

months oO |

and the people from Rorovana have visited Kieta twelve times in the past five months for discussions. There have been frequent discussions

with the Councillor of Rorovana and the Council President ... There _ have also been visits to the Rorovana area by Members of the House of

Assembly and by the District Commissioner? ee To critics who claimed that the Administration had failed to consult,

Hay retorted that his officers had been fully involved in informing people, in the field and over the radio. The problems were more fundamental: ‘the native people of Bougainville generally are pre- _ disposed to resist the European Administration's efforts to change their traditional habits and beliefs. He also hinted darkly of ‘forces affecting _

Administration’ : _ | a | Bougainville public opinion which are directly opposed to the

The search for agitators was a persistent feature of senior officers’ reports, whether or not it was supported by local evidence. Opposition | in Wakunai, for example, was credibly attributed to the influence of Eivo villagers, whose land adjoined the Guava census division, the projected centre of mining.> In another place a Catholic missionary who criticised the people for removing survey markers was roundly

102 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN abused by Anthony Ampei and advised to leave.° Incidents such as this did not dent the senior officers’ belief that Catholic missionaries were

ranked against them. Blaming agitators diverted attention from the abrasive quality of some of the kiaps’ interactions with villagers. |

As David Elder reminds us, colonial power relations shaped all discussion. For example, the law did not require geologists to seek landowners’ permission to enter their land. (Denehy and McKenzie did involve villagers in the licensing hearings, but as a matter of courtesy and politics.) Further, when talks did occur, people would not reject a

kiap’s proposal outright: . When they are tired, or the hour is late, they will simply agree in order to terminate the interview and get home. The next day they may be again opposed to it. Thus people intractably opposed to a proposal may

| appear to periodically agree with it. [This practice] cannot be taken solely as a result of a lack of understanding of the issues on the part of the people, or inadequate explanation by the officers concerned.’

Elder denies that kiaps were responsible for the impasse: ‘If the policy makers were completely insensitive to local problems, there was not

much [kiaps] could do about this’ From the Minister down, policy decreed that landowners should receive no special benefit. It followed

that Bill Brown was constantly frustrated by the trivial sums he could disburse, for fear of breaching Territory-wide standards.® These constraints left the kiaps no role except ‘explaining’ decisions taken elsewhere. Angry incidents were common. In October 1968, for example, sixty-

eight men, women and children confronted a party surveying options for tailings disposal into the Kawerong River. They gave the surveyors an

ultimatum to quit, and even offered to carry out their kit. The survey party (six Europeans, sixty local labourers, the District Officer and three

_ police), were ordered to stay in camp, but not to withdraw. The DC, concerned lest wavering encourage protests, sent a police officer and ten more police ‘to ensure preservation [of] law and order. Group violence

not anticipated provided people aware that withdrawal not con_ templated and patience exercised by sitting out operation’’ Rather belatedly, more kiaps were drafted to the mining lease to explain and conciliate. One of them was Mike Bell, a patrol officer in

6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS | 103 the Highlands, who was transferred to Bougainville in 1969 and spent most of the next two years under canvas near Panguna.?° Bell had strict

instructions to avoid confrontation. He was to explain what would happen if the mine went ahead (though his superiors knew that this was Now certain). He camped at the junction of the Kawerong and Jaba

rivers to explain the effects of a pumping station for tailings. The villagers did not threaten him, but shook their fists as they passed, inveighing against the Administration and refusing to talk. Over several | months, however, their stance softened: they began to ask difficult questions, and eventually engaged in conversation. The limited impact of even such sustained personal contact suggests how ineffective were

the earlier, swift-moving patrols. | Bell was also mapping land ownership, clambering up and down

ridges, plotting areas on a map drawn from air photographs. This exercise was badly overdue: the overburden was already being hosed down, and land might disappear before its owners were listed. (The professional survey was undertaken afterwards.) Not only were Bell and his colleagues hampered by their lack of surveying skills, but they knew nothing about the land rights research undertaken by Nayacakalou or Ogan—a defect that could easily have been repaired, since senior officers were fully aware of these studies."

The scale of land acquisition was without precedent, and exceeded 57 000 acres (see table 6.1). The port and coastal town required 5100 acres, all native land except a mission lease at Tunuru and 200 acres at

Loloho, which BCL had already bought. BCL’s needs were nonnegotiable if Panguna was to operate as planned, so the Administration

was crushed between mining logistics and village politics. Few landowners would be directly affected: about 3000 in the Kieta area, including 475 at the port (Rorovana), 400 at the industrial site, and 170 at Arawa town site. The inland villages varied in size from 80 at Moroni

to 230 at Dapera, totalling about 1200.'* In acquisition and resettlement, the kiaps hoped for support (or at least consent) only from

Methodists and Seventh Day Adventists.!° | Land acquisition and resettlement were political exercises: livelihoods, ways of life, perhaps life itself, turned on the selection of land for the mine. Particularly potent was the choice between white-owned

104 |= GETTING UNDER THE SKIN Table 6.1: Land Acquisitions to August 196914

/ Land already bought by BCL

Loloho Plantation __ 200 , ,

~ Tunuru Mission 55 , ,

| Leases granted, applied for and anticipated Special Mining Lease, 9316 — Includes Moroni and Dapera land.

Panguna ‘Owners generally satisfied.’ , |

, Gravel Lease, 193 ‘Owners’ original acceptance of position —

Pinei River has changed and attitude now cool.

| Considered could be problem area. |

| a Marking of land discontinued when | , , Rorovana situation worsened.’ -- Stage 1, East Coast _ 358 The area was highly cultivated, and the

Road, from Loloho — owners wanted compensation of $5 per plantation to 8 miles | economic tree. Marking of land was

south/west _ discontinued when the Rorovana situation . worsened; could be a problem area.

, Port & Industrial Lease, _ 173 Leases applied for but not yet granted;

Rorovana oe | aborted. ,

Special Mining Lease, | 3840 The application was designed to prevent

-Panguna (in three | competitors from entering an area that

, , areas) might contain further mineral deposits.

Pk. _ Application deferred for 12 months and - Situation to be reviewed annually ‘in light

i of political situation’. No prospecting a ; taking place; not considered sensitive.

Stage(to 2, the East Coast, 150 ' , Road Special _ Mining Lease) | a

Town site _ ,

a) Arawa Native Land 640 Attempts at negotiations have failed; the

| last offer being $105 per acre plus $2 per

, ; economic tree; considered a problem area. b) Arawa Plantation — 998

a Leases expected to be applied for - Industrial area, Willy's Nob) | a) 7 49 Already leased by the Administration as a , , _ Business Lease under the Land Ordinance for 42 years, at $120 per acre. ,

| | 6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS §& 105 Table 6.1: Land Acquisitions to August 196914 (continued) a |

Name andjor purpose == Area = Comments b) 550 Might be subject to separate applications, _

, all deferred until Administration leases or ,

| , purchases land, and might not proceed if : , _ the Administration develops the areato ,

, the Company’s standards. a

Power lines Possibly Lease for Mining Purposes under the

, 100 Mining Ordinance. _ , , ,

Construction Camp, 30 Only required for three years, and already ,

Willy's Nob area so oo | East Coast Road, occupied under prospecting authority. ,

Tailings Disposal, _ Up to ‘Uninhabited swamp land’, not considered

West Coast ~ 40000 a problem area.

(Loloho Nob Plantation, Willy's area) ,| ,, |Gravel Lease 150 —_— Not considered sensitive.

Town Refuse Disposal, == Upto Special Purposes Lease under the Land , North/West Rorovana 150 Ordinance. Size variable, depending on

Village , | - willingness of owners to sell. Swamp | land, could be a problem area. —

Foreshore Reserve, 10 Lease under the Land Ordinance, already

Loloho Plantation = _ Administration land. , ,

mark to reef) — , ,

Wharf and Installations, _ Lease under Mining (Bougainville Copper |

Anewa Bay (high water Agreement) Ordinance. . , Industrial Area 2.5 for BCL Oil storage on part of 22 acres already | (south of Loloho 2.5 for Shell | purchased by Administration. $75 per |

a acre; but price to be reviewed in light of a |Plantation) - ~ Rorovana/Arawa offer. — eo Industrial Area _ — 100 Residential Lease under the Land

(adjoining Loloho Plantation) Ordinance. Not considered sensitive. == Kieta Wharf—Anewa Not Arawa and Rorovana land, a problem

Bay Wharf Road known area. a , | , Airstrip—Aropa Not known An exchange of land only, and not sensitive. 7

Water Storage , a ee | | : . a a) Bovo Valley 5 To be leased under the Water Resources

, Ordinance. , ,

b) Jaba/Kawerong 100 Lease for Mining Purposes under the | ,

River Junction Mining Ordinance. | — ,

c) Location not yet Lease for Mining Purposes under the

available Mining Ordinance. | | ,

106 % GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

plantations and native-owned land. On BCL's plans, for example, the Administration would have to resettle 600 villagers, provoking hostility from members of the Kieta Local Government Council. The worst-case scenario would involve appropriating ‘all the land owned by native

groups bordering Arawa plantation ... leaving this plantation land intact’ Referring obliquely to the political implications of such a move,

scene. | | |

the Administration insisted that ‘due cognizance must be taken of the

impact of such acquisitions on both the local and national political Again, BCL asked to include ‘satellite areas’ in the mining lease. The

Administration resisted, since the move was not essential and would infuriate landowners, but its room for manoeuvre was limited. It was obliged to grant the area applied for by BCL ‘and has no power to intervene in respect of the proposed lease boundaries. Only a little juggling was possible. The lease would include Moroni, Guava and Dapera villages, but Guava villagers had been assured that they would be excluded, so the Administration asked for that area to be deleted

from the application, at least for the moment. , | Hay’s memorandum to the Department on 10 July 1968 gave a survey of the state of play. Relations with Moroni village were complex. Most villagers had evidently moved to Pakia after the war. Only a dozen

or so people were living there when Phillips arrived, but many had since returned to express their opposition, raising the population to eighty. All would have to be resettled, probably to Pakia, though ‘the older, conservative core of the population will be difficult to move’. The 230 Dapera villagers would also have to make way for the waste dump, despite ‘strong reluctance, if not outright opposition’. There would be

political advantage in resettling them on already-alienated land. This could be achieved by appropriating 1000 acres of Aropa plantation. Several other villages would be affected less drastically. Kokorei village

would lose half its land. If the Administration’s suggestion were adopted, Guava villagers would lose little gardening land and ‘there

would be grudging acceptance of what already they have become resigned to as inevitable’. Full alienation, however, would probably provoke ‘outright opposition and hostility—probably physical confron-

tation—not only on the part of the Guavas, but by all groups in the

, 6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS =& 107 area. Musinau, Kupei and Pakia need not move, but Peruri Catholic

mission and school would have to. | The 38 000-acre tailings area was the largest block. It was used mainly for hunting and food-gathering but its acquisition posed serious

problems, since the people had never had reason to define their overlapping rights. A water lease, a limestone lease and leases for roads,

power and pipelines would also require land, though no ‘serious’ problems were expected. BCL had also applied for a lease covering the

waters of the port, although it was not certain that such a lease was really required. Hay concluded his survey percipiently by suggesting that coastal land ‘may be the key to the whole operation’ That matter

had implications for both local and Territorial politics: | To date all demands have fallen on native land and property owners. The opportunity now arises where some of the burden can be shared by

acceptable. oe :

| expatriate land holders. Failure to insist on this is politically un-

Land acquisition was decided largely on technical grounds, but politics also carried weight. To mention one instance, the Administration had discouraged BCL from choosing Pakia village land for its —

mining town, since it was heavily cultivated: | , | The villagers have said in no uncertain terms that they will resist. There

is no immediate possibility of field staff persuading them either to accept compensation or alternative land elsewhere (even if such land

were available).!> | -

Conversely, it was politic to purchase some land mainly because it was offered: ‘for political reasons it was desirable to take at least some of the

land of the Tunuru Mission’! When Espie sought another tract, however, Henderson objected that some of this land was occupied by ‘pro-government’ people—and the politically pivotal president of the

Kieta LGC was ‘one of the principal landholders’! | The mining work-force was expected to be about 1600 (1000 in the

town and 600 at the mine). Together with about 400 ‘grass cutters etc’, | some domestic servants and the wives of perhaps 80 per cent of the men, the mine-related population might total 4600 and the whole

108 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN complex 8000 to 9000. These estimates suggested the amount of land

needed, and Espie reminded the officials that they were obliged to | satisfy BCL's ‘reasonable needs’—a quantum that Henderson reckoned

as about 3400 acres. Another 250 acres would be required for an

Administration town. aan | |

ARAWA PLANTATION | 7 | A departmental minute spelt out the political and racial issues involved in locating the town. BCL wanted 5100 acres—all but 255 acres owned

_ by villagers. That was extremely impolitic, and the Administration suggested that Arawa plantation (998 acres) be acquired instead of some

- native-owned land: | |

| The Administration's proposals would reduce the amount of native land , required and would involve the acquisition of a proportion of expatriate land which the Administration regards as desirable politically ... | | [I]nclusion of Arawa Plantation is essential if there is to be any hope , of achieving cooperation by the native people in the purchase of other

~ land requirements. — | , |

Acquiring Arawa plantation would dispossess an enterprise owned by about twenty people, instead of nearly five hundred villagers for whom

land had ‘social as well as economic importance,!8 The owners of Arawa plantation did not see matters in quite the same light. The plantation was created in the German era, expropriated

| after the Great War and sold by the Expropriation Board in 1927 for $19 800. It changed hands again after the Pacific War for $46 000.’ Its _ Capital structure was complex, but Bovo Company was a part-owner, and ER. McKillop, Bovo's principal shareholder, represented all the

owners. An ex-serviceman, he lived on the plantation and was well regarded by villagers, for whom the plantation provided valued services.

His investment was emotional as well as financial. Arawa plantation

| contained a great orchid collection, and was the headquarters of the New Guinea Biological Foundation.?° McKillop reckoned that the Administration could and should use undeveloped land elsewhere, and

| | 6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS & 109 (despite official denials) he was certain that the resumption was a

political device to sweeten the acquisition of native land. | In March 1969 McKillop received Notice to Treat. (An amended notice was served a month later.) On appeal, he won the Administrator's consent to gazette no compulsory acquisition until 23 June. Meanwhile

a Planters’ Association delegation came with him to meet the Administrator. The Association enjoyed less leverage than it expected. The Highland Farmers and Settlers Association, which boasted of ‘more advanced views’ than the (coastal) Planters’ Association, advised the _ Administrator to be ‘very firm’?! The Planters proposed a meeting of planters, missions, CRA and Local Government Councillors. When that was refused, McKillop observed that the Administration had not gauged

the people’s true feelings for their land. Hay snapped back that these feelings had been provoked by McKillop’s employee, Barry Middlemiss,

an accusation McKillop loyally denied.” ee | Middlemiss, ‘an intense, earnest young man in his late 20s’ according

to Peter Hastings, ‘desperately identified with what he believed to be | the essential interests of the Bougainvilleans, and earnestly worked for —

the preservation of their culture’?3 Suspicion of Middlemiss ran wide , and deep. Tom Leahy (a highland planter and member of the AEC) accused him of ‘stirring native landowners in opposition to Administration and talking wildly about forcible resistance’ He warned McKillop, expecting (wrongly) that Middlemiss would be called off.24 McKillop did give such an undertaking in June, but by that time Middlemiss had

the bit between his teeth.2° Despite his promise, McKillop evidently attended a meeting of the Nasioi-Navitu Association, a new forum for indigenous landowners, at which he moved (and Middlemiss seconded) | | a motion ‘that Arawa Plantation be included under the control of the — Nasioi-Navitu Association’.*° The plantation enjoyed stronger support | from villagers than from fellow planters. The student activist Leo Hannett denounced the plantation acquisition as ‘blatant unfairness’?”? and landowners generally saw the acquisition of the plantation as an

element of the assault on their own land. | | Despite this political gambit, McKillop initiated negotiations through his Sydney solicitors, Allen, Allen and Hemsley.?® On 24 June _ Allens named his price: $1.5 million. By July the areas of dispute had

110 © GETTING UNDER THE SKIN , narrowed to three: the capitalisation period (the number of years by which the property’s annual income would be multiplied to assess its

| value); the plantation’s yield and price projections; and estimates of

future cocoa prices.” | While draft agreements were exchanged,*” the Department's legal

officer suggested that securing Arawa voluntarily rather than by compulsion would ‘encourage the native owners of adjoining lands also to sell their land and avoid any possible hostility. Purchase also allowed better legal control, before the land was leased to BCL. On the other hand, the risk of purchase was a higher sale price, which would

inflate prices throughout the Territory. Again, the Administration might seem to pay less for native than for plantation land. Overall, the legal officer predicted blithely that ‘as with the Plantation, after notice of compulsory acquisition has been served [on landowners] the Administration’s intention will become clear and they will negotiate a

purchase’?! |

That was the mood of the Department in late July 1969. Kiaps’

reports perhaps captured the breadth and depth of Bougainville anger,

but senior officers in Port Moresby put a positive spin on those accounts, and the summaries that reached Canberra were blander than the narratives on which they rested. Then on two days in August landowners ruptured the silence and brought their grievances into every _ Australian household. The events were little different from many other

context.

scuffles that interrupted the surveys, but journalists reported and reframed them, giving the events meaning in an Australian political

TENSION MOUNTS © In 1968 Douglas Oliver heard a tape recording of women near Panguna singing a song that he thought caught the mood of the landowners:

Panguna| |

| The machinery thunders and echoes at Pankiranku, [a hill behind The Company gets police to defend it. Police! You can kill me with your batons,

| 6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS | 111 CRA! You have taken Panguna for your homeland, Australia,

I am the real owner—my ancestors gave me this land, | You did not think of me, you stole my hunting grounds, > When you did this, you thought I was a fool who knew nothing, But do you know what I think of you? I think you are a thief. I think you stole my land.**

One landowner told an ABC reporter: | If the Government brings in the police to try and take their ground, well, they will just have to shoot them, they will just have to kill them

to get their ground... a ,

, It will be just passive resistance because they have not got anything |

to fight with. ) |

Paul Lapun quoted people saying that they would be ‘shot down for their land’, but the Minister reassured the reporter that the landowners

would change their minds when they grasped the extent of compensation. Asked if he expected bloodshed, Barnes said simply: ‘It will surprise me very much indeed’? Off screen he was less confident, but the Administrator insisted that resistance was temporary and the kiaps | would eventually persuade landowners to accept the project. Had they not done it before? ‘In spite of acute tensions since 1966 at the mine

site and adjacent areas, there have been remarkably few incidents | involving violence or requiring the laying of charges’. On that showing,

coastal landowners would also yield after a time.** 7 | Yet Hay was anxious enough to seek tactical advice from Brigadier Ted Campbell of the Social Change Advisory Committee, an ad hoc group of consultants. Campbell proposed that the Administrator make a ‘nation-wide’ broadcast. The overt purposes of the broadcast would be:

e to publicise United Nations’ approval of the CRA operation... © to emphasise the national character of the operation 1.e. benefit to

the whole territory | , |

¢ to inform of the House of Assembly’s approval of the CRA operation. |

Its covert objectives would be: | |

112 © GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

| taken |

© to forestall (or at least minimise) external criticism of any actions ¢ to achieve some transfer of ‘responsibility’ from the Administration

| to the House of Assembly | |

| e to place the dissident at a disadvantage by making it clear that the action has the support of the House of Assembly and hence in

general terms the whole of the Territory.°° | , The quotation marks around the House’s ‘responsibility’ are revealing. It was not uncommon for officials to treat the House and its members as ciphers. At the end of July Lapun and Donatus Mola (MHAs for South and North Bougainville) endured similar disdain when they , emphasised the seriousness of the situation.>° Tension would abate only

‘when the majority of the people ... can recognise that the Project is good for Bougainville’ They agreed that some benefits would flow, but ‘present arrangements certainly are not fair and just’. They appealed for

all-party talks and a moratorium on land acquisitions. | Within the Administration a ‘Bougainville Group’ included Assistant

Administrator Tony Newman and Tom Ellis, the head of the kiaps’ department. On their behalf Newman explained that BCL could claim damages in the event of delay, so even a brief moratorium could not be

| entertained. He then rebutted the Lapun/Mola statement in detail,

denouncing it as the expression of _ - | a philosophy which could only have been enunciated by the Labour [sic] Party and we suspect, therefore, that it is the work of Mr Travers [a

| Melbourne lawyer] who is known to have been in the Bougainville area

; consulting with the two signatories. | _ Hay met Lapun and recited Newman’s argument. Confident that the matter was now closed, he despatched the statement and the rebuttal to

Canberra on 1 August 1969. |

- That day brought the first of two incidents that elevated landowner grievances to an Australian political issue. The timing was determined

by BCLs needs. With supply contracts in Japan and Germany, and

borrowings of $US330 million, BCL felt that they could delay operations no longer. The Administration shared the sense of urgency.

, , | 6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS =~ 113 Newman listed the infrastructure work for the House of Assembly: BCL

had estimated that if all preparations were carried out efficiently,

production could begin in 1972. Therefore: The Administration has a threefold financial interest in securing the early achievement of export production—as a taxing authority, as a potential shareholder in the enterprise, and for balance of payment

reasons. | ae

_ The Administration has the responsibility to ensure that the various - ‘mining and land leases required are granted without delay . . . [especially

for] Arawa town and the industrial land required near the Loloho port.’ | |

The events that transpired at Rorovana belonged squarely ina tradition of symbolic, often strenuous physical opposition to surveyors. There were two Rorovana villages: Rorovana No. 1 had a Council and

was thought to be willing to sell; No. 2 respected no Council and refused to sell.7® This division shrank in the confrontation with the Administration. By July the DC described the mood of the Arawa and Rorovana people as ‘much firmer’ and the risk of violence greater as a result of ‘continual visits by politicians, government officers etc. He reported morosely that ‘people consider their case presented on each ~ and every occasion ignored and tempers now strained’3? Conferring in — | Canberra, the company, the Department and the Administration heard | that the Rorovana were threatening action to defend their land. Barnes had to reassure the Prime Minister that ample police were available, that any trouble would be petty, and that the Prime Minister would be

kept informed.*° The situation demanded delicacy: | fo Action by the Administration to acquire land in the port, industrial, and |

town areas will have to be well planned and executed to ensure minimum physical opposition by the land owners and [prevent] the

spread of such opposition to surrounding areas. __ | ; BCL wanted to begin surveying and clearing on 14 July, but agreed to _ defer entry to Arawa land until the last quarter of 1969 and to Rorovana

land until the end of July.*! oo | ; |

The Administrator laid careful plans for the denouement. He would broadcast his intention to proceed with Arawa and Loloho operations.

114 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

| Police would move in during the week preceding 1 August. A mission of officials and Members of the House would travel to Bougainville on

| 23 July. And on 1 August Arawa villagers would receive notice to treat for the freehold of their land, while (on the same day) ‘operation

Rorovana would begin‘** | Brigadier Campbell advised against ‘a frontal attack, i.e. a settlement in one fell swoop’: ‘better to defeat the situation by attacking in detail’. There could also be advantage in ‘lining up 3 Bougainville members [of the House] telling them of the firm intention to go ahead and seeking

their cooperation ... by asking them to take action with their own people’.43 The officials’ mood is suggested in a telephone conversation _ between the Department and Newman, the Assistant Administrator, on 12 July. Newman thought that a recent visit by the Labor Party frontbencher Gordon Bryant had done little harm; Middlemiss was ‘by far

the greatest trouble maker’, aided (Newman suspected) by McKillop.

He doubted the value of trying to ‘stiffen up’ the Bougainville

members.*4 |

Meanwhile officials were briefed on the numbers of landholders in likely sites of resistance, and the numbers of able-bodied men. They were assured that many overtures to villagers had been rebuffed. Arawa and Rorovana people had ample land without the lease areas, or could be compensated with land elsewhere; they knew the value of the offers;

and they knew why acquisition was essential. And they understood _ how many police would be available, and where. The officials were also

told that the AEC and ‘certain ministerial members’ were firmly in favour of the programme: a minority even advocated ‘rather firmer

action’.*° - - |

On schedule, Newman came to Bougainville with five officials and seven members of the House—Sinake Giregire, Toua Kapena, Brere

Awol, Julius Chan and the three Bougainville members. On Radio Bougainville, his message was blunt. He had been sent to explain, yet again, ‘why we must have some of your land for a new town site and a port and industrial site. The House had debated the issue exhaustively and enacted appropriate laws; the United Nations endorsed the policy; and ‘the majority of the people on Bougainville have said that they want CRA to go ahead’. Rorovana and Arawa lands were clearly the best

6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS = 115 sites, and a modern town would be a source of pride. In any event the land would be resumed on 1 August. Newman’s only concession was

procedural: people could choose a lawyer to explain the law, at Administration expense. But ‘a very big force of police will protect people who clear the land ... If anyone breaks the law they will be

quickly arrested’*° , | |

Administrator Hay flew to Bougainville on 26 July , held discussions

with DC Ashton, Brown and the ranking policeman, and visited Loloho. | He learnt that five Rorovana wanted to sell, but that others would contest their right to do so.4” The operation would begin at Loloho, the furthest point from Rorovana, with a full complement of police. Deputy Crown Solicitor Pratt joined these talks. It was decided that the police would act under section 18(5) of the Survey Ordinance, which made it a criminal offence to impede surveyors.

Hay was told that McKillop was spreading a rumour that 6000 people would oppose the survey. Another rumour had it that 4000 people would resist, hoping that the police would kill someone and provoke the intervention of 10000 villagers. Yet another held that Middlemiss intended to supply shotguns, and that Guava people would

come down from the hills to assist the Rorovana. (When the police visited them, McKillop and Middlemiss were relieved, with no fuss, of

unregistered and elderly firearms.) Yet another rumour had it that Travers, the Melbourne lawyer, was advising Bougainville leaders to create some small incident with surveyors to publicise their cause.*®

When Friday 1 August dawned, the Administrator addressed all — police at Loloho, stressing discipline and the need to avoid violence. The police left Loloho at 7.15 a.m. What happened next was narrated

by DC Ashton.*? oe oe

_ Tape of the proceedings on the morning when women uprooted —

__ the survey peg and discarded it -

: Helicopter Ashton on the ground at Loloho at 6.50. | Upon landing with Deputy Commissioner [Brian] Holloway, 70 riot

_ squad marched off at 7.10. |

116 & GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

: [7.25] Chopper. Ashton preparing to take-off with DC Holloway

and Neil Grant... _ | |

[7.41] The first party of natives which proceeded towards the east

- : have apparently met the police. They are now returning. | : [7.43] I am now standing on the edge of the beach ... There are ___ several hundred people gathering . . . | — I now spot Middlemiss about 75 yards up the beach at 7.44— __ Middlemiss with a group of people. Most of the people have now turned

_ around and several hundred are now passing back from where I am

cannot see them. | oe : | [7.45] The police are now inside the coconut trees. | -

: located, presumably following the police who are in the bush and I

| : _ (Ashton was then approached by natives who apparently wished to hold talks. _ He told them in Pidgin that he had not come today to talk again with them about the law. He had finished talking about the law as had Mr Newman the previous week. They had also been clearly told of things on Bougainville Radio.

| They had come today to cut up the land, the police were there to protect the surveyors who were going to go ahead with the work.)

, [7.52] ... we are closely surrounded by a group of approximately : _ fifty people which includes Middlemiss. There are several hundred

_ natives on the ground ahead of us. | |

[7.56] The Deputy Commissioner is giving Inspector Daniel Gire charge of an unarmed squad to escort surveyors to the starting point. _ Note that the escort party with the exception of Gire are armed with

: _ batons only. | oo | 7 |

: _ [7.58] The Deputy Commissioner, Mr Holloway, in the lead, two | surveyors followed by myself—we are marching through a large group of very sullen people. I suggest we wait for the rest of the party. We've _ got people between ourselves and the escort—till the riot squad comes : up behind us. We're standing now with Inspector Gire’s group—two

: surveyors and the line with the survey pegs. There are two or three

| hundred natives gathered around us. | |

We now continue to advance. The Riot squad is coming up behind : us at about 75 to 100 yards. There are several hundred natives here this

morning. We are now walking out to the beach. ; : We have just arrived on the beach. I must say I prefer this beach : business, Brian [Inspector Holloway], to the bush. : I am now with Holloway and the OIC of the Riot Squad who advises : that if he advances any further his flank will be surrounded by groups on the beach.

— | 6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS & 117 : I think our blokes—if we can keep them here, because there is a _ light wind and this will keep them—if we use gas our people will be |

_ clear of it on the beach. ae | : We have now moved back on to the beach. It is four minutes past —

/ eight. And we'll be moving along the beach. | ; | : | Were just pausing while the Riot Squad comes up on to the beach. ___ It's now five past eight. Middlemiss with a group is right up here with

: the forward party headquarters survey group. a : Riot squad now appearing on the beach 75 yards behind us. | At this stage no one has made any open act of aggression or has

_ made any attempt to prevent our entry other than verbal. _ | | : _ Moving forward again at 7 minutes past 8. We're now coming to a _ : group including women—quite a few women and several children. There are the first that I have seen this morning. Nat (?) has just pointed out the commencement of the survey. It was : approximately 250 to 300 yards from our present position at 9 minutes

of the survey. | | , |

: We are now paused at about 150 yards east from the commencement

: interesting. :

: We have a glorious dog fight with four dogs mixing it. This is most

: (Name indistinguishable) just stated that Middlemiss advised that : there are 200 or 300 armed with bows and arrows but he persuaded e them not to bring them and they left them in Rorovana village. _ |

Number One Riot Squad now passing. Number one unit under |

__ Inspector Fowler has just gone through. ey | _ The other one—the number one Riot Squad—has formed up across : the beach into the bush at 13 minutes past 8, approximately 100 yards © : to the east of the commencement of the survey. At 8.15 exactly, approx. On the survey site and Jim Barnett and the __ other surveyors are taking compass bearings to establish the point of

operation. _ | | | —

: ‘We're at the point of commencement. The survey party is sur- _ _ rounded. One riot squad lined up on the beach astern of us. There is no

_ sight of a second. — oo | | | (Mr Ashton then addressed the crowd in Pidgin, telling them that the time for talking has passed and the survey was about to commence. He warned them __ that the police were watching and that any attempt to interfere with the survey

; would be stopped by the police.) | , _ At 8.20 Jim Barnett is spudding in the first survey mark... There are _

_... something like 30 or 40 women here right up close to the

118 & GETTING UNDER THE SKIN _ commencement of the survey. Some quite young girls and it's a great __ shame to see that these young girls have been brought into this because _ I consider that they are going to offer some sort of resistance, although

: no one is armed. |

: (At this point Mr Ashton talked in Pidgin with a single native. After : ascertaining his name he told him he was sorry but the time for talking was : over and the Company was going ahead with marking the ground which no : longer belonged to him but to CRA. The ground was not being taken for / — nothing. It had been paid for and no longer belonged to the natives.

: After a pause Mr Ashton then warned that if the survey marker was pulled : out there would be trouble. The people could watch what was going on but : must not upset anything. The ground marked out now belonged to CRA. : Mr Ashton continually spoke to individual male natives who were protesting.

/ He repeated that the time for talking was over. The law which had been : approved by the House of Assembly had to be obeyed. He repeatedly reminded

: them not to interfere, often addressing individual natives by name and : reminding them of the words of their Member, Paul Lapun.) —

: The first survey peg has been put in and bearings have been taken for , : the next mark and a number of people have been discussing with me : the activities and are still saying they do not want this to proceed and : they will pull up survey marks. It is now 8.24.

| :: I|amGood morning luluai ... | now talking to the luluai of Rorovana number two, who is now : expressing his .. . (unfinished) |

_ We walked away from the first cement. There's a group of ... all women down here attempting to pull out the survey marker . . . They're : being pulled back gently ... We are ... (excited women’s voices several

: seconds) ... { am still standing on the survey peg. There are a lot of : women shouting and jostling around here. (Excited voices as before)

: -... It is now just on half past eight. The survey line has proceeded. I : see the commencement of survey party about 150 yards south. They _ have put in one, two .. . I can see three markers apart from the concrete

: peg of the first marker on which I am now standing. : | : It is quite certain that the moment we leave this mark the people will pull out the peg. Brian, we've got to make a decision whether we'll

: advance and let them pull this damn thing out of ... How concerned : are you blokes [surveyors] if they do pull it out? Or do you have to have

: that there for a survey? ... The surveyor has just explained that it is : necessary to set up these points with a theodolite and he has about half : an hour's work to do this with his theodolite on this first peg and then as we go—this is to take correct bearings on the second mark; once this

6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS = 119

: importance. | |

__ has been done the fact that the peg is removed will not be of such major

: Middlemiss, the great stirrer, is here with the women. I hope he’s |

: very proud of his effort today. __ |

: 25 to 8 [sic]. We're still waiting for a theodolite to be brought up. A : group of unarmed constables is standing around and guarding the first : peg to keep the women away from removing the peg. 22 minutes to 9. There is now another attempt by women to pull up

: the survey marker but the unarmed police are pulling the women out. __ This time the frenzy is much more of a trouble. The women just about

sure to succeed in removing the first peg. : (Pandemonium of female voices continues for about a minute. Ashton can be

___ heard appealing to them to call it off.) |

_ Those women are really fighting the men now .. . | : (Pandemonium continues for several minutes during which time Ashton can —

again be heard calling on them to go home.) |

Come on girls! Come back! Don’t try and get at that peg again . . . There : are quite a lot of young women here, I would say quite young schoolgirls

: to really old women and at the moment they are the only ones making : any serious attempt to disrupt the survey . . . There would be 100 people

: on the beach; I don’t know how many there would be in the bush.

_ We're waiting for that theodolite to come up. _ |

: Two survey cements have been taken away during the scuffle on the : beach while everyone’s attention has been put to the first one...

: removed? , | , : Surveyor asks: Any objections to cutting marks on a couple of coconut trees close to the line .. . knowing that the survey pegs are going to be

: Ashton: Not at this stage, there is no objection whatsoever. You are

: _ carrying out a legal survey and you're entitled to do that if it is necessary

_ to do that to make a survey. _ | | The surveyor posted the theodolite beside the peg and the exact

_ bearing of the next fixed mark is taken and if they remove it later the : location can be found and it can be replaced. : 10 to 9 and there is another fairly determined assault on the survey : peg by a group of about 20 women and some of them are getting quite

: emotional about this. , |

: The luluai of Tarare has stated that he has been endeavouring to stop the people from ... Thank you, luluai ... the women are getting a little bit more violent now . . . the survey peg has been removed ...

120 & GETTING UNDER THE SKIN . 5 to 9 now and a couple of hundred people having removed the ___ survey peg which has now been replanted have gone up the beach and I __ think they have now made their point by actually taking away a survey ___ marker. I am told that this is probably the end of our major problem

_ today ... Thank you, luluai. Thank you for helping me today. Thank

_ you very much. Goodbye. |

= Well, that last fellow was the luluai from a place called Tarara. | don't know whether or not he’s in the Council but he’s come up today

_ to try and talk sense into these people. |

: The helicopter is coming back on to the beach just in front of the

survey marker now. 3 minutes to 9. |

, (In Air) Now arriving at number one survey mark. 9.14... — It is now 9.35 and the survey work on the first mark has been __ completed. In the helicopter returning to Kieta. Returned to Kieta HQ at

= approx. 10.25. , wo ,

The removal of a peg did not delay the survey, but it was a symbolic victory. Ashton was unduly sanguine when he judged that ‘this is probably the end of our major problem today. Further passive resistance

on Tuesday 5 August drove home the lessons of the first day. Again ~ officials expected resistance and recorded proceedings. A meeting of Rorovana people the previous night was attended by Lapun and Raphael

Bele, and the officials expected some people to try to lie down in front

| of the bulldozers. None of the officials’ speeches made the least

_ impression on the assembled people. | | _ The secretary who transcribed the tape for the Administration prefaced the transcript with the following note: , The tape here transcribed is in many places difficult and sometimes impossible to follow because of the sounds of bulldozers, yelling people _and high level noises of various kinds. It is further complicated in places

by Ashton’s speaking with a gas respirator on. |

- Rorovana 5/8/69 - | Ashton in helicopter: ... having been alerted that the Rorovana are going to lay down under bulldozers etc., after a quiet day yesterday ... : I have just passed over a police riot squad walking through the bush.

6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS = 121 : I see a second riot squad back on the boundary between Loloho and _ the former Rorovana land. This is where the operation was yesterday

: and am going to land there. | , |

: It is 8.18 and I have just touched down on a clearing at the start of / the plantation boundary with Rorovana and there are a group of about : _ 12 or 14 people here from Rorovana including Raphael Bele. (Then follows a long discussion between Ashton and Bele in which Ashton _ denies emphatically any intention of killing anyone and points out that Bele’s

people came from the Solomon Islands only 80 years ago and took the land by

force, etc.) | -

: ... I hear bulldozers coming through the bush now. A group of seven _ women with one child have just recently arrived. One child is rather : ominous and I| have thoroughly alerted the police and Holloway as to _ what is likely to happen here today. The child could quite likely be sacrificed under a bulldozer and the police are aware of this. A number of the male natives have bush knives and I have spoken to them and

: advised them that the police will let no one be run over. We are not : planning to permit them to sacrifice themselves. : As the bulldozer now just comes in sight about 75 yards behind me, _ I'm standing about 20 yards in front of the native people, they are all | standing up ... some of them are taking their shirts off, rolled their __ sleeves up and looking quite business-like although I can see none what__ soever with any weapons. They are now moving up to take up positions

_ right in front of me here. The bulldozer is just behind. I have just __ ordered the bulldozer to stop as these people cross over the road .. . |

(He then warned the natives in Pidgin) oe : Now 8.25 ... All the bulldozer operators have been alerted as to the : possibility of people throwing themselves under the bulldozers and the possibility of the women throwing a child under and they have been

: told to be particularly alert and cautious. _ | |

: At the first sign of anyone approaching the bulldozer too closely

_ they are to stop immediately. | |

7 One baton group of the riot squad are moving forward. They are being confronted by the people who are sitting down and refusing to _ move. There's going to be a yike here. The riot squad are trying to force

: the people back. The riot squad are making no impression. The people © : haven't budged an inch. It is quite obvious that it will be impossible . . . _ without using sufficient force to hurt someone ... The police are now _

: putting their gas masks on and gas will be used to disperse the crowd. I

will talk to the people again. | - |

122 & GETTING UNDER THE SKIN One gas bomb has been dropped . . . Some people have formed up : again in face of the gas . . . They're wearing laplaps around their eyes... : Some of them are now running away. I don’t know what effect they've had from the gas ... Two more . .. grenades have been thrown in. The : people have dispersed but a lot of them have gone away to the right . . . _ Brian! I think one over there. These people are probably sneaking behind

: us ... Throw one over there'd be a bloody good idea. __

Brian: I can’t see ‘em. ,

_ from the gas. | |

Ashton: Oh Christ, there’s plenty over there. 30. They're completely free

_ There is now a fairly heavy pall of gas and we have dispersed the : people from the northernmost area. The bulldozer operator cannot now : advance because none of the operators are fitted with respirators. As far as I can see we have a bit of a stalemate here. We can't advance

: because the bulldozer operators are not equipped with helmets. Rather : : an extraordinary resistance ... Come on, Raphael... Come on, Raphael, more better you clear. No good yupela yu better go no ken idai ... yu : no ken idai... yupela yu better go longsait yu not go bagerap. Bulldozer

_ mas igo through. | / Mr Holloway! ... Well now ... Inspector Clarke (2) In getting rid of : the people, he has clearly instructed that no one be hurt but the few stragglers remaining are to be driven back. With this action I heartily | concur. There are more of the people coming back. . . It is quite obvious _ that more force will have to be used. There are about ten natives resisting

: the police, including Raphael Bele. The police are going in with their : _ batons, then they are not using them ... the people are showing an

: extraordinary tolerance to the gas ... and an extraordinarily (virile) | : sense of their position. They are all unarmed. They have absolutely no weapons. Numerous individual struggles taking place, people being led

: out by the police but they are sneaking back in again. The gas had | : extraordinarily little effect on some of them. _ The consequence is, of course, that the bulldozer operators cannot : drive through it again ... there was frequent reference to the people : wanting to die. The people say they want to die. : There are still 20 people here with us resisting the front line of the riot : squad who have lined up. The police have been very restrained so far in | : their action but I must pay credit to the extremely stubborn resistance of : the people themselves and I thank the little effect exhibited by the gas. : There are about 40 males and about 15 females. We find that we are going to have to arrest each and every one of these persons. The gas at present in use is useless—quite useless ... Most of the people have run

| | 6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS | 123

: them into safe custody. | | _ away and the police have been despatched to apprehend them and take

: _ The gas has now blown back down to the bulldozers and the

: operators have now walked away. My respirator is not keeping it out and I am having difficulty seeing myself.

: ...is now calling up all reserves and it is quite obvious the operation : is not going to proceed the way we are today unless we have more : police [to deal with] the people who keep coming in and barring the

paths of the police... | : It is now planned to arrest everybody and take them into safe custody so the operation can proceed ... | | oo

: , 7 minutes to 9 and a yellow flare has been fired to recall the police ___ who have moved out of the area looking for stragglers and the recall has

: just been... : The bulldozers have just been started up and will advance a little. .. | (noise from bulldozers). The police have had a particularly difficult task

: today as the people have just stood up and refused to be moved back. : They have not resisted or attacked the police; they have just (silently

__ resisted). |

: They are now advancing very (ably) through the bulldozer tracks of : yesterday and about 100 yards away from the (scene) of resistance a __ while ago ... and through the clearing about 100 yards away where : another group of people who would appear to me to be women ... : As I get closer now I can see ... there is a considerably larger group of women this time ... approx. 25 women some of whom are holding

: laplaps over their eyes and nose... | | |

: Ah, you can see that they're not going to bloody well move around

___ (Argument in Pidgin) | | Oe _ Holloway has just spoken to a group of people who have just run back

: along the track I think for the purpose of getting reinforcements. __ : There is the first gas bomb going off. A beautiful shot. Right in the

: middle of this group... | a | : A group of about 30 men, including Raphael Bele, have got between

the police and the (stake) and are just standing passively on the road. . . Inspector (Clarke) has just ordered a charge and instructions have

: been issued that it’s better to hit them around the legs. _

: Batons are to be used around the legs only. | | : Number one platoon is in the process and again they are meeting __ with this extremely stubborn resistance and they are just standing up

and refusing to move...

124 % GETTING UNDER THE SKIN , / : Graham! Graham! What about those stragglers being taken back | ___ and held in custody at the back rather than putting them back with the __ mob again.

~ Voice: All right. We'll see what happens. I can’t fucking well see for this

_ [Ashton]: These people are extremely tough ... a really tough passive

_ resistance here... ~ | | (Sustained Noises of Conflict) | oe |

| / ... One man has an (injured) ankle and they claim blood has been

_ spilled and they will now retreat. |

oe All right! ... Get those bulldozers up. Tell the top road bulldozers

_ tocomeup... a One male native has an extremely small scratch or abrasion on his __ shin and they claim that blood has been spilled .. . they are retreating _ and they are hurrying back down the track. __... They've just come into a patch of gas ... We are now advancing : at a regular fast walk along the track with the people in rout. They feel __ that honour has been satisfied but I must alert the bulldozer drivers to

ensure that no one takes a risk in the way of the dozer...

Ashton’s language tells us more than he perhaps intended. Over two days, girls became women and natives became people, though they

| tended to relapse into their colonial status. The luluais—the Administration’s eyes and ears—were marginal on the first day and absent on the second. Local politicians—Bele and Lapun—displaced everyone

else as arbiters of legitimacy. The Administrator's summary concedes that the people ignored the officials, but obeyed Bele. At that point the __ thirty Rorovanas ‘suddenly shouted that they had had enough and that

they were retreating because blood had been shed’ In a literal sense _ Ashton and the Administrator were right. Neither Rorovana victory had much material effect. But, as other reports make clear, and as the longterm consequences reaffirmed, Rorovana had a better sense of theatre than the kiaps and police. The field officers could neither contain the protests nor resolve the impasse: politicians would have to negotiate a

settlement. Oo a |

Chapter 7 - | Temporary Resolution

The District Commissioner's sang froid was not shared by the journalists who splashed stories and photographs across Australia’s front pages. As

James Griffin described it: | |

[The Sydney Sun] carried on the front page a picture of a helmeted policeman with a truncheon lifting aside a bare-breasted woman ... The Sydney Daily Mirror was more strident and referred to ‘Bloody Thugs’

and ‘Australia’s Bullies in New Guinea’, and asked, ‘Where the hell are

we heading?’ There was also a companion photograph of riot squad police wearing gas masks, carrying batons and looking very intimidating.

| | These two pictures excited comment around the world.) _

The ABC's analyst reported that the story ‘hit the Australian Press like a.

baton charge’? Five morning papers led with it, and it made the front

pages of four others. Only the Hobart Mercury found fauna more exciting (‘Rise in Devil Population in Tasmania’). In the afternoon, both Sydney papers placed their editorials on the front page. The ABC analyst was struck by the fact that the press blamed the Administration, |

often explicitly exempting CRA. A lecture tour of Australia by the Bougainvillean activist Leo Hannett helped focus attention.? During a August there were eighteen editorials on Papua New Guinea issues, all

but one on Bougainville. oo | |

| #125

126 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN A few business-oriented publications supported the government. Predictably, the Australian Miner dismissed public protests against CRA.

The editor used as ammunition Leo Hannett’s remark that the rest of Papua New Guinea, brainwashed by the Administration, believed Bougainvilleans to be greedy. For the Australian Miner, ‘the upset feelings

of the handful of natives directly affected by the mining operations are ... surely of little importance beside this project which will return great sums of money to the whole Territory’* The Financial Review ran a similar line. The mine offered the only chance to reduce Papua New - Guinea’s financial dependence on Australia. It followed that the ‘simple

, slogan-like stance of the anti-Bougainville copper movement thus becomes a barrier to the development of a viable independence; the radical pose has the reactionary effect. The Financial Review did lay some blame on Barnes, whom it trivialised as ‘a successful animal

breeder doing his best for the Country Party's cause’.° | The most coherent support was developed in a letter to the Sydney Morning Herald by Dr Malcolm MacKay MP, chair of the government members’ Mining Committee. Bougainvilleans, he said, were ‘about to

_ be precipitated into an opulence and rate of development which is beyond their ability to comprehend’, and the only honourable course was to allow the landowners to come to terms with the company, while retaining the power to acquire land for other civil purposes. Not only would Australian taxpayers save tens of millions of dollars in subsidies, but ‘the peoples of Papua New Guinea as a whole not only want it, but are clamouring for similar developments in their own districts’. They should not be frustrated by ‘a tiny group of ignorant or self-interested

people’® |

_ Such arguments had no impact on editors. The quality dailies were almost as critical as the tabloids. The Canberra Times described the events as a disaster.’ After Barnes announced that force would continue

to be used to maintain law and order, the Melbourne Age sniped:

If Mr Barnes had more tact, understanding and skill, The Age might suggest that he travel to the island and attempt to settle the dispute in talks with the Bougainvilleans. But his past performances suggest that _ he would be better advised to stay in Canberra.®

7 TEMPORARY RESOLUTION §& 127

Most severe was the Australian, informed by Peter Hastings. (The cartoonist Petty drew Barnes in a gas mask, declaring ‘They’ve got to learn that when we talk about progress, we mean business’) On the morning of the first protest, the paper warned: ‘The ineptitude of the Administration in preparing for such a vast and valuable development _

opined: :

project ... is a matter of the deepest concern’. Six days later the Australian

The basis of the trouble on Bougainville is to be found in Canberra...

Even now, incredibly, the implications of what is happening on Bougainville do not seem to have seeped through to the Australian

Government... ,

The law is obviously on the side of established authority; it could hardly be otherwise. But the law appears to have been used ruthlessly on Bougainville as the easy way out of the situation where conciliation and persuasion were rendered useless by rigid paternalism.

There is no real choice on Bougainville but to begin now the processes of explanation and consultation . . . Starting again must mean suspending the mining development ... The mining company’s losses

can be compensated. The damage being done by present methods,

however, is irreparable.?: |

Several editorials feared the story would have an adverse effect on international opinion, but when the ABC's analyst surveyed overseas coverage, he found ‘hardly a ripple’. A few London papers mentioned it,

but only in the financial pages; and a German women’s magazine requested photographs of the women. Agency reporters had sent the story, but it was always ‘spiked’. One explained that ‘the violence itself

was quite a good little spot news story but the real story about background and motives is too complicated for overseas readers, it

would take too long to explain’'° | | By comparison with the media furore, public protests were lame. In Canberra Hannett addressed a meeting of ninety people—including an informant who spotted the Professor of Pacific History and other ANU

academics in the audience. Hannett described Bougainville’s past neglect, its current infestation by kiaps, the people’s yearning for ‘meaningful participation not fringe benefits’, and the need to replace

128 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN Barnes. Not all the questions were critical of the Administration or the Minister.'' The next day Hannett met Tim Besley, a senior analyst in the Department, and there was a demonstration by thirty ANU students, whose two delegates also exchanged views with Besley. On the same _ day, students briefly occupied the Department's offices in Sydney and

Melbourne, and were forestalled by police in Brisbane (where the Revolutionary Socialist Students Alliance printed a fiery pamphlet by

the Trobriand Island student and poet John Kasaipwalova). Later demonstrations by left-wing unions and students linked Bougainville with broader anti-colonial issues.'2 None involved large numbers: it was not the public but the press that disturbed the Minister's peace. An opportunity arose for putting the Department's point of view through ABC television’s current affairs programme, Four Corners. The snag was the ABC's independence. A year earlier, when Four Corners covered secession movements in New Guinea, the Department's instinct

was to dissuade them if possible, otherwise ‘we should consider _ withholding [entry] permits’. Barnes had more political sense: he suggested potential interviewees and offered ‘constructive assistance’ before the programme went to air. Alas, a Barnes interview was not a sufficient inducement. The ABC’s tactic was not to object in principle, but to list technical difficulties. As an officer of the Department put it

was: |

waspishly, the ABC offered ‘every assistance short of actual help!’ None

| of Barnes's nominees appeared on the programme—and Father Wally Fingleton did. The acting Administrator fulminated that the programme

| a clever piece of propaganda aimed at undermining the Australian public’s confidence in the Government and its Papua New Guinea policy. The ABC’s handling of the subject can only add to a growing mistrust of the ABC and its purposes among many senior officers . . .

A complaint was sent, but it was decided that ‘in view of the tone of the

ABC's letter, it would be useless to take the matter further’!> When Barnes agreed to appear once again on Four Corners, his mood must

have been bleak, and he was obliged to debate the Labor Party - spokesman, Bill Hayden.!* In Canberra as well as Kieta, politicians and media managers were running the Bougainville crisis.

| 7 TEMPORARY RESOLUTION =| 129

AN IMPASSE As it happened, on the day of the second incident, BCL managers were - a conferring with their official counterparts. They were fully aware of the build-up of police; yet the tenor of discussions was placid.!5 They judged

that ‘the political situation in the mine area has improved over the last

month’. The most important factor was ‘payment of the Moroni compensation claim’, while Guava villagers had begun to mark their land boundaries, so that an end to that dispute seemed likely. To be sure, Rorovana and Arawa resistance was increasing, but the report

suggests no anxiety: | | | The Rorovana and Arawa people are still unwilling to sell or lease their

land and have threatened violence if the land is taken from them. Despite such threats the Administration has gazetted 175 acres of the Rorovana land as a Lease for Mining Purposes and intends to proceed with the acquisition of the 640 acres of indigenous land north of the

Bovo River... , ae

; | Commencement of the Arawa acquisition procedure will be subject | to the outcome of the entry by the Company onto the Rorovana land. _ | Disregarding the Arawa and Rorovana land, the major political land problem areas will be the Kieta-Tunuru Road area, and East Coast Road ;

and a small area at Kupei. . | oe Philip Opas warned that ‘a Mr Travers may endeavour to challenge the validity of the Rorovana lease’. This manoeuvre was likely to fail, but would probably generate more ‘unwanted publicity’ _It was some time before the implications of Rorovana intransigence

dawned. A full week later, BCL and the Administration took comfort | from the news that the people in the area subject to the mining lease

had lent no support to the protesters: even Guava villagers were | ‘outwardly, at least, not exhibiting opposition’!® At the head of the kiaps’ department, on the other hand, Tom Ellis feared that friends were wavering and enemies massing: the President of Kieta LGC might have defected. He expected the next hot spot to be Arawa village, where any

immediate attempt to resume land ‘could lead to bloodshed as both McKillop and Middlemiss are heavily involved with Paul Lapun MHA

130 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN and are actually promoting such a reaction’, and even perhaps courting the support of the Hahalis Welfare Society.

I believe that the native people of the area have been informed that McKillop will not leave his property, that they very possibly believe this

and that they very likely believe that the only land which the Administration will ultimately acquire will be native land. The main leader of the anti-group is undoubtedly Paul Lapun MHA, ably abetted by [McKillop and Middlemiss]. Lapun’s main objective at _ the present time is not primarily to kill the whole operation as such, but to obtain a much higher level of compensation by royalty etc. than he

achieved in the past. - , , :

Ellis recognised the role of the media, and recommended a first class

Publicity Agent’, to ‘promote favourable publicity, both for the | Administration and CRA. He added: ‘There is only one prime target being attacked in Bougainville at the present moment by anyone and this is the Administration’'’ The tide of opinion was running against the Administration. When the Public Solicitor met 800 villagers from Kieta, they were ‘highly emotional’ and ‘spoiling for a fight’.!® All land negotiations were suspended (except at Rorovana) and CRA withdrew an application for further prospecting. Nor was the problem confined to Bougainville. A ‘complete review’ of Territory land negotiations had been commissioned,!° and it was obvious that any resolution would have to involve the deeply suspect Napidakoe Navitu. This association originated in April

196979 when Lapun, Middlemiss and representatives of twenty-five villages asked the Administrator to desist from resuming Arawa land and

sought a conference. These requests were rebuffed, and on 6 July Napidakoe (an anagram of the initials of Kieta ethnic groups) Navitu was formed. According to Middlemiss, Napidakoe Navitu's objects were:

e to encourage and foster economic, social and political development on the island of Bougainville and to unite the Bougainville people as one economic, social and political community.

° to restore, maintain, foster and encourage among the people of Bougainville an understanding an|d] appreciation of their traditional

culture and customs. a |

7 TEMPORARY RESOLUTION §& 131 ¢ to maintain a respect and appreciation for marriage and family ties and to encourage respect for and obedience to traditional customary

matriage laws... | e to create and endow scholarships .. . | , a

© to nominate candidates for election to the House of Assembly .. . © to unite all racial groups and political and religious bodies on the

_ island of Bougainville. a : ,

-@ to... seek early domestic internal self-government for the Territory

of Papua and New Guinea while depending upon Australia for financial assistance and guidance and control for external affairs. |

Lapun was elected President, Bele Treasurer and Middlemiss Secretary.

By August, it claimed 72 villages and 4000 members. | _ Meanwhile in Canberra, Warwick Smith asked for an analysis from | an officer who had not been directly involved. That officer diagnosed the problem as political rather than financial. He thought that it would

be expensive but not prohibitive to acquire alternative tracts of land for | a port and a town. It was more difficult to identify machinery for reconsidering the land issue, though clearly ‘the situation needs reexamination’. A House of Assembly Select Committee might confront

the Bougainvilleans and provoke the secession movement. A Joint Committee of the Administration, the Department and BCL would seem | to marginalise the native owners. A Special Commissioner would

probably be acceptable to Australian public opinion and treat landowners on an equal footing. A variant—an Executive Commissioner to take charge of operations—might involve too great a burden for one person. Although there was some prospect of a resolution, any initiative

could be construed as evidence of past weakness, and the Administration would lose face.2! These were not promising options. —

LAPUN AND BELE TO THE RESCUE oo Salvation arrived from a surprising quarter. As soon as the Rorovana dust settled, Lapun and Raphael Bele flew to Australia as representatives

of Napidakoe Navitu, ostensibly to seek High Court intervention.** Visiting Papua New Guineans had always been organised and escorted

132 % GETTING UNDER THE SKIN. | by Australians, but this delegation travelled alone. Equally important was their political agenda. After a brief meeting with Barnes on 19 August, they flew to Melbourne to meet Sir Maurice Mawby. By the time

they met Barnes and the Prime Minister, John Gorton, in Canberra on 21 August they were armed with the stick of litigation—and the carrot

| of negotiation. | ,

The Department prepared for this encounter by reciting the mantra.

The Agreement could not be renegotiated, it had been endorsed by the House of Assembly, it was vital to the Territory economy, and its terms

favoured both the Territory and landowners. It was logistically impossible to resume only expatriate land and swamps. If more compensation were demanded, the door was open—it was the people

who had refused to enter. Their desired outcome was to concede nothing, and yet extract a commitment that the Rorovana would accept

a court decision.” Yet, if the court endorsed the Administration's position, this scenario would surely require further police action, and

CRA knew that further police action would attract public criticism without achieving finality. CRA could readily calculate the high costs of

delay and the affordable price of compromise. The solidarity of

_and Barnes. ; a ,

| | company and Department collapsed before the delegation met Gorton

I have found no record of that meeting. Barnes's briefing notes

. suggested ‘some possibility of negotiated settlement’, but warned that the Administration believed Lapun to be ‘almost certainly the leader of

| organised opposition’, who would not abide by a ‘gentleman's 7 agreement.24 Some light is thrown on that meeting by the minutes of a - second meeting, later that day, when Lapun and Bele held talks with Barnes and his officials. Lapun reaffirmed his preference for a negotiated

| solution rather than High Court action. He was critical of the kiaps, but greatly impressed by Mawby and by CRA's offer ‘to plant up equivalent areas of Rorovana owned land so that the land holders . . . would have

a continuing source of income’. | a | The heart of the matter was that Lapun offered Gorton an alternative _to his Minister's strategy, and one that seemed acceptable to CRA. Barnes

| counter-attacked. It had been suggested that land north of the Pinei River would make a better town site than Arawa: he denied that it was

, 7 TEMPORARY RESOLUTION §|~ 133 suitable, and anyway its owners would not sell. Lapun ‘seemed to agree’ that there was no alternative to Rorovana land, and insisted that he did

not wish the project to be abandoned. He and Bele stressed the inadequacy of the kiaps’ explanations and the people's fears of social

upheaval from a new town. For that reason the people ‘had pressed - | McKillop to resist acquisition. They were also dismayed at the prospect

of losing the plantation’s processing facilities. Lapun again asked for direct negotiations with CRA over land. Predictably, Gorton ‘reacted — favourably’ to this notion, and this became the basis for future policy. It seems that Lapun and Bele endorsed the parliamentary statement

that Barnes had to make that night. Its main points were: | e if the people would negotiate, the Government would welcome and

facilitate such a move;

landowners; | |

e BCL would participate in discussions and direct negotiations with e the discussion could range widely, into ‘social and other factors’? —

However uncomfortable Barnes’s new position, it appeased the press. |

The Melbourne Herald of 22 August welcomed this ‘wiser and more . responsive approach’ and reminded readers that the landowners were

‘entitled to be shown, with patient sympathy and understanding of their customs and anxieties, that no disadvantages will come, either, with the white man’s bulldozers. The Daily Telegraph was equally condescending on 27 August—‘a little sanity’ had returned to ‘the lucky

island of Bougainville. = , oe

The novelty of the new position was that the Administration had lost its monopoly over land dealings, and with full publicity: the Prime © Minister ‘held strongly’ that CRA must not only negotiate but be seen to do so. While conceding this point, the Department continued to insist

that the outcome be ‘outright purchase’. The agreement might include |

cash, an exchange of land, copra and cocoa processing plant, tree | planting and social facilities; but the bottom line was that ‘the land is | essential to CRA requirements and must be resumed in the event of |

failure to negotiate a purchase’.*° | | ee Administrator Hay made suggestions for the Minister, citing Douglas Oliver's confidential report: the people were bound to the land by

134 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

sentiment as well as economics, and could not be satisfied ‘simply by resettlement on what Europeans would consider to be “just as good” land elsewhere’. A long history of poor race relations had created profound incomprehension, compounded by ‘general distrust of the veracity of the European’. Hay deduced that it might never have been possible fully to explain the project and its implications. According to Oliver again, the communication problem transcended language, since ~ ‘no native’s experience ... would have rendered such an explanation comprehensible’. Oliver had predicted hard-core opposition among those directly affected and suggested that ‘this be recognised as an

insoluble problem and hence not even worth trying to solve’. He thought that organised opposition might even increase in the first years

of mining. To this analysis Hay added his recurrent complaint that ‘certain individuals’ had ‘set out to obstruct the CRA operation’ and were attracting undue publicity.2” On the other hand he reiterated his senior Officials’ optimistic line, that Guava, Moroni and Dapera people were now reconciled. His sub-text—that opposition was inevitable, with or without concessions—reinforced the hard line on negotiating for freehold. Lapun and Bele had won a victory, but the Department and the Administration were not ready to yield. _ It was time to tidy up side issues. Agreement on the sale of Arawa plantation was well within reach, as the points of dispute had narrowed to two: an agreed minimum cocoa price, which could later be adjusted

higher but not lower; and no ceiling on the upward valuation.® - Negotiations concluded in Sydney on 18 August. The urgency of the matter became clear when a senior official, Don Mentz, ‘stiffened up’ the Department's negotiator: entry to the plantation on 1 September

could not be compromised. An agreement must be reached by _ midnight, and ‘a breakdown in the negotiations might be the best way out if a suitable excuse were available’ In the face of this tough stance,

settlement was reached.*? Hastings reported that the agreement's convolutions reflected the Administration's anxiety about ‘the political

problems of offering a European $900 an acre and adjacent native owners $105 an acre’? The first plantation palms were cut down two days after the sale. The final purchase had to wait upon the deter- mination of cocoa prices, so discussion continued into the next year. As a political issue, however, Arawa plantation was concluded.*!

7 TEMPORARY RESOLUTION §& 135

NEGOTIATIONS ON SITE It had been agreed that Lapun and Bele would seek the Rorovana people’s permission to negotiate on their behalf, co-opting two men , and two women from larger villages, and one of each from smaller. The

Department advised that Administration officers should accompany Lapun to sustain momentum—and guard against back-sliding. The negotiating team should include a CRA man, two from the Department and someone from the Administration who ‘could not be regarded as a kiap’. The timetable was wildly optimistic: entry to Rorovana land ‘by say Monday week without any impediment even though discussions

may still be going on’? |

En route to Bougainville, Mentz described his purpose as the purchase of freehold title. Although Public Solicitor Lalor advised that ‘any pressure to sell could make the task of Lapun and Bele impossible’, the Minister was reluctant to relax that pressure until he was sure that freehold was unattainable. Regarding compensation, the Department endorsed the principles hammered out for Arawa plantation, but they did not want to pay ‘excessively high’ prices. The outcome should be ‘a final offer of compensation which can be shown to be generous but not excessive. They must also be justifiable publicly in comparison with

Arawa plantation’*> | , | |

Either the Department did not recognise the extent to which it had lost the initiative or it believed that it could regain the upper hand. In the last resort officials still believed that police could enforce a court order. Although CRA clearly saw this as unacceptable, the Department merely suggested devising ‘a more passive method for police to deal with passive resistance’ than that employed at Rorovana. In such a _ crisis, the House of Assembly should express an opinion, since ‘it would be difficult to explain why the House was not consulted although it had | been sitting’?4 (Again the ancillary role of the House is apparent.) Only when Mentz reached Bougainville did he recognise that police action

offered no solution.*° |

Negotiations in Kieta went for three days (Friday 29 to Sunday 31 August). The Department was represented by Mentz and Granger, and the Administration team was led by W.L. Conroy, the Director of Agriculture. BCL’s team was Ballmer, Bishop and Opas; and the

136 = GETTING UNDER THE SKIN Rorovanas’ advisers were Lapun, Lalor and Lovering (from the Public

Solicitor’s Office), MacKay (a Sydney solicitor), Tidex (a Sydney accountant) and Jim Coulter (of Moral Rearmament).°° There was no mistaking the significance of the new meetings, the authority of the official negotiators (none of whom was a kiap), the substantive agenda addressed, and the amounts of compensation permissible. The talks _ were swift and successful. An offer was then made to the Rorovana on

1 September, with ‘unqualified support’ from Lapun and the other advisers; and it was ‘favourably received’. In exchange for leasehold over 140 acres, BCL would pay an annual occupation fee of $7000 ($50 per

acre), plus $30 000 to compensate for damage and an option to buy 7000 shares at par. The company would rebuild copra driers and houses

situated on the contested land, and there would be monthly consul- tation for twelve months between BCL, the Administration and the people.

_ These were not the terms that the Department first envisaged, but

| Mentz rejoiced that MacKay -

has achieved excellent results in gaining confidence of people and is considered by all concerned to have been completely principled in his approach. Had Administration representatives refused to make $7000

offer negotiations undoubtedly would have broken down and [the] assessment [of] Conroy [and] Mentz is that alternatives would have

_ proven unacceptable. , Oe , Some differences of opinion persisted among Rorovana, but success

| was now almost assured. The Department therefore digressed to seek pretexts for having conceded so much. It would never do to admit that Rorovana resistance had forced the issue. Instead: A critical factor in negotiations was publication [of the] tender details

_ telating to Saint Michael’s urban land. These facts affecting valuation were not available to Administration valuers when [the] original offer

| position?” | |

[was] made by Newman and this gives at least some justification to new

| A week later, Mentz listed what the Administration needed to do to

consolidate these gains: | |

7 TEMPORARY RESOLUTION = 137

bourhood; | | ee

e immediately adjust the prices paid for other land in the neighe launch a ‘peaceful penetration’ exercise by Conroy and the DC, to

finish by the end of October; and , ¢ conduct extension activity among those most affected by the project, and aim at an ‘overall settlement’ including social and industrial

issues.38 So oe ,

In effect the kiaps were displaced temporarily by Conroy's didimen.

; Departmental correspondence throws little light on Moral Rearmament’s role. When MRA’s Jim Coulter proposed to visit Rabaul, Warwick Smith commented that, ‘in light of very helpful attitude of Coulter on Rorovana’ he ‘would see no difficulty in some contact being made between MRA and leaders of Mataungan Association’, so long as these meetings were unofficial. The Minister agreed; and when he met Coulter,

he chose to have no departmental officer present.°? | Although negotiations occupied much more than the few days that

the Department expected, they were soon reconciled to the pace, and to | the outcome, and even to the individuals involved. A month after insisting that freehold title must be achieved immediately, and if needs

be by coercion, Mentz reported cheerfully: | | | | Lapun is showing up in an increasingly favourable light. He makes no

secret of desire for power and leadership of people but seems comparatively principled. Bele is getting a reputation as extremist, anti-

European, anti-Administration and an undesirable influence in both

social and political spheres.*° | oo ne Equally surprising to the Department was the conciliatory role of Middlemiss. At one stage, with Lapun in hospital and Bele intransigent, Middlemiss was carrying on alone, ‘strongly supporting acceptance’ of > the setthement. When Lapun made an ‘extremely well prepared’ radio statement in favour of the settlement, an official assumed (implausibly) that Middlemiss had drafted it! As if to confirm their new status in official eyes, Lapun and Middlemiss called on Conroy in late September | and opened negotiations over the Arawa land. Conroy soon concluded

that ‘there is every advantage to us in allowing the Napidakoe

138 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN Association to make the running’, because ‘there is no evidence that the Association is using tactics to which we could object’*! Hastings and other commentators were intrigued that Napidakoe Navitu had been

reclassified from ‘something between a possible cargo cult and a dangerous secret society’ to ‘a highly respected native political organisation, fully recognised by the Administration’*? In November and December MacKay revisited Rorovana, where all

factions had signed the agreement. Trustees had been nominated, _ namely D. N. Brown (Rural Development Officer, for the Administration),

Raphael Bele (Rorovana No. 2) and Michael Binavata (Rorovana No. 1).*° Arawa villagers too adopted the Rorovana approach, having -Napidakoe Navitu represent them and using MacKay as their counsel.*# Nevertheless Arawa negotiations dragged on. As Hastings understood it, the Arawa would lose their 640 acres entirely, so they would scarcely accept a lower unit price than the Rorovanas, who would repossess their 140 acres after 42 years.4° Since Arawa land was the site of a town, the Administration had a particular interest in the precise title. A further reason for delay was to concentrate on completing the Rorovana agreement. Again, Lapun would be the ‘key figure’, and he was in hospital. And in any event some weeks must be allowed for Conroy's ‘peaceful penetration team’ to bring about co-operation among Arawa villagers.*°

The implications of the new approach to land also had to be digested. Barnes recognised the need for a review of land valuation

principles and practices throughout the Territory, and appointed A. J. MacIntyre of the Reserve Bank to conduct it. MacIntyre advised that

land should be valued according to its ‘highest and best use’, taking | account of its potential value. In South Bougainville, the old practice was to value land according to ‘existing use’, but this had lapsed during

| negotiations over Rorovana land and Arawa plantation. Pre-CRA valuations should therefore be reappraised in South Bougainville. Applying this principle to Arawa land, an appropriate valuation might be at least $1000, and perhaps $2000 per acre. At this point the Department consulted the New South Wales Valuer-

General, who agreed with MaclIntyre’s main points. Reassured, the Department recommended that MaclIntyre’s principles be adopted in dealings for Arawa land, and authorised the Administration to negotiate

7 TEMPORARY RESOLUTION = 139 to purchase freehold on the 640 acres in question, up to $1000 per acre. If that offer failed, they should seek further instructions, and meanwhile they might offer commercial opportunities to Arawa landowners.*’ Negotiations were also protracted because the Arawa people wanted _ to retain high ground where their ancestors were buried, and as a refuge in case of another tidal wave like that of 1956.48 More worrying was

their refusal to sell freehold title, which would complicate the subsequent titles to urban land. Some in the Department suspected

East New Britain: | | | _

there was a wider conspiracy embracing the Mataungan Association in It seemed a reasonable presumption that the hardening of attitude on the Napidakoe had some relation to the Tolai approach to land, and if we gave in altogether in Bougainville it could make our position in the Gazelle and elsewhere in the Territory much weaker politically if not

legally. | |

If the Administration agreed to build government offices on leasehold land at Arawa, for example, it would be difficult to resist similar claims ,

by the Mataungans.°° | By August 1970, another impasse loomed. The Department judged that a lease—even for ninety-nine years—was not acceptable unless it

contained options for renewal, and satisfactory rent and reappraisal provisions. There was also the Territory-wide context. Accepting leasehold ‘would not only establish a precedent which could prove difficult but would virtually negate what was recently stated ... to the House of Assembly about the need for the Government to have freehold tenure’. The alternative avenue of compulsory acquisition might have political repercussions locally, but ‘it may also pay the Administration

to show that it is not prepared to jeopardise the country’s future by

giving way on an important matter like this’! | | Happily, the stand-off ended the next day. The latest negotiations envisaged a resolution, if the Administration could accept a long lease

instead of its cherished freehold and make separate six-monthly payments for land (to agents) and improvements (direct to the owners | of gardens). The new Administrator, Les Johnson, recommended

acceptance of these conditions. |

140 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN Aware of the Territory-wide implications, the Department wondered

whether they could remove the Administration from the equation by

| inviting CRA to negotiate directly with the Arawa landowners for a leasehold. This suggestion was rejected by Johnson, who explained that ‘political factors are of over-riding importance [and] failure to conclude these lengthy negotiations now would represent a major loss of political

initiative. So the next day the Department telephoned Espie, who explained that it would be immensely expensive to re-plan Arawa town.

BCL would therefore be content with a 99-year lease. In these

circumstances Barnes at last agreed. __ a : Finally, on 17 August, Johnson secured a 99-year lease covering 372.75 acres. Rent of $25 per acre was payable every six months to | agents of the landowners collectively, and the rate would be reviewed every seven years. An additional $40 000 would be paid directly to the owners of improvements. The deal was sweetened by concessions over the supply of power and water, and an access road. The Administration would lease back two acres to the landowners, while the landowners covenanted not to use another 200 acres west of the lease except for gardens.>4 To supplement this land, the Seventh Day Adventists offered

210 acres at Rumba, in exchange for 100 acres near Wakunai for a school, $150 000, and road access, water and power for the mission headquarters on the remaining ten acres at Rumba. This worked out at

$750 per acre.>? | | oe |

These encounters dragged officers of the Department—and the

Administration—up a steep learning curve. Such land dealings had been unthinkable a year earlier. Not only was the Administration’s monopoly

_ lost, but there was no freehold title, even for urban land, and the leases

were hedged by complex (and for Australians quaint) conditions. Another awkward consequence was soon apparent: the increased land prices threw doubt on earlier transactions. The Administration had, for example, bought land at its own valuation on Anewa Bay and around

_ Aropa air strip, industrial land near Arawa, and mission land at St | Michaels and on the Tunuru peninsula. These parcels had been sold willingly, but now, with the obvious disparity in prices, ‘people will not

negotiate land sales with Administration representatives and will not believe statements that they make as regards to land’. Villagers judged

, | 7 TEMPORARY RESOLUTION «= 141 that those who co-operated had been robbed, and protesters had been bought off. They concluded, reasonably enough, that ‘it pays to object’.

premium.”° | | | | |

There was no choice but to reassess these purchases and pay the _ By May 1970 the heat had gone out of Rorovana and Arawa. The ~ Department's acceptance of these untidy arrangements speaks volumes for the urgency of land acquisition—and for the officers’ learning skills. Significantly, in resolving these difficulties, politicians and professional

been eclipsed. m | | ,

advisers had been central: the older authorities—kiaps and luluais—had

THE LEGAL CHALLENGE | Even before these deals were hammered out in Bougainville, the Panguna project was also under threat in the courts, which would test

basic questions: | | ee the validity of the enabling legislation. The Department identified three _ Under native custom in the Territory does ownership of land include

ownership of minerals? - a title to mineral rights? | oo In the legislation of the Territory does the Administration have a clear .

If the answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the second question is no, can the Administration under the Australian Constitution acquire minerals without payment of just terms to the legal owners?>”

Philip Opas, for CRA, wanted the Mining Ordinance amended to remove all doubt. The Department was concerned that his proposal | would safeguard the company’s ownership of the minerals, but expose _ the Administration to claims for compensation from landowners. Opas explained to the Solicitor-General, Sir Anthony Mason, that a writ could

be damaging to CRA, because capital would dry up and share value | would fall. If CRA’s proposal to amend the laws were not accepted, — Mawby would wish to see the Prime Minister. Mason acknowledged the

difficulty of passing such an amendment through the House of

142 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN : Assembly, but recognised the legal force of Opas’s proposal, and judged

that an approach to the Prime Minister would be a ‘reasonable

precaution’. | |

Faced with the choice between legislating and litigating, the Department preferred the courts. The legislative route would provoke the House of Assembly and strengthen the company’s position while weakening the Administration’s.°? A week later, in the VIP Lounge at Sydney airport, Warwick Smith discussed the mechanism of a writ with Opas and Mason, who were ‘95% sure’ that an argument disputing the just terms of the legislation would fail in the High Court. They were even more certain that an injunction would fail. As a fail-safe, however, they might have to fall back on German law and Nauru precedents.°° On 8 August 1969, in the midst of the Rorovana crisis, Papua New Guinea's Public Solicitor, Peter Lalor, intervened. A former kiap who

had qualified as a lawyer during a long leave for illness, Lalor was a constant thorn in the side of authority. His independence was clear in his most inconvenient argument that the previous week’s police action was illegal.°? Now he filed a writ in the Papua New Guinea Supreme Court on behalf of Teori Tau, representing Pakia landowners, challenging the validity of the mining legislation. (Their conferences began in jail, where Teori Tau languished on a separate issue.) The writ sought a declaration that the Mining Ordinance (or part of it) was invalid, and

asked the Court to declare: |

I) that the Mining Ordinance 1922-28 of the Territory of New Guinea

| is invalid and void, :

II) or alternatively that section 157 ... was invalid and void,

lil) that the Mining Ordinance 1928-1966 ... is invalid and void, IV) or alternatively that [specified] sections in so far as they relate to minerals other than gold and silver is invalid and void. _ Lalor would refrain from seeking an injunction if discussions with BCL or the Administration were conducted ‘without prejudice’. Administrator Hay felt that he must accept these terms.°! |

Three days later, the Department’s John Ballard met Opas and ~ officers of the Crown Solicitor to plan their defence when the action reached the High Court of Australia.°2 Opas was indignant that Lalor

7 TEMPORARY RESOLUTION =~ 143

had been advising Rorovana landowners that CRA could not take the

land without a court order, a view with which Opas ‘hotly disagreed’ He guessed that the delay was costing CRA $30 000 a day.®° Using that

leverage, Lalor asked if CRA would negotiate for 5 per cent of the unimproved value of the land ‘valued at industrial land values instead of agricultural’—which would greatly increase the quantum. He also asked CRA not to enter the land without a court order or the owners’

consent. The company said it was :

perfectly prepared to pay a higher rate of occupation fee. The amount involved is in any case ‘peanuts’ by comparison with the present loss,

but they would not want to do this without the concurrence of the Administration and the Department. |

But on the question of entry, they would give no undertaking. They were sure that the people would not identify the owners of the land, proceedings could be protracted, and even then the people might not comply with a court order.

Disconcerting legal opinions were surfacing. The Department consulted the new Solicitor General, Robert Ellicott, and others, and | formed the suspicion that the lease to CRA in respect of Rorovana land was ‘probably defective’, and ‘the application submitted to CRA for this lease is similarly defective’®* Ballard was disposed to compromise, and

dismayed that: | | the Administration are letting their concern about implications for the rest of the territory over-ride other considerations so that we have never really put to the Rorovana people an offer which takes account of the

whole... , | ae ,

value that this land is going to have to CRA and the Territory as a He wondered whether Lalor might now act as intermediary.

The Department and the Administration seemed to have dug themselves into a legal pit. BCL argued that the Administrator was obliged to put them into possession, if necessary using police. Hay could see only three unattractive options: compulsory acquisition; special legislation to enable the police to remove villagers; or an

‘attempt by CRA to enter land ... (possibly at night) with police

144 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

| standing by’ He was rescued from this dilemma when the Com- monwealth Crown Solicitor advised against the company view, and | suggested that he act under section 88 of the Mining Ordinance, or get : a Supreme Court injunction. Either way, BCL had to take the initiative. _ An order under section 88 could be directed at all Rorovana, without

having to identify landowners.°’ a

Assuming that the company would be a co-defendant, Opas retained

| Ninian Stephen, with John Griffin, to represent CRA before the High Court. It was decided that BCL would take out a demurrer ‘immediately upon delivery of the Statement of Claim’—that is, the company would object to the relevance of the claimants’ point of view, thereby staying

the action until relevance was settled. This device offered , | a convenient method of speedily resolving constitutional challenges in the High Court. We are anxious to have this matter disposed of as soon

as possible and certainly before Christmas ... this writ is most - embarrassing to the Company in its negotiations with banks.°*

The Statement of Claim arrived on 20 October. The Solicitor-General was unhappy about the demurrer procedure, and suggested asking the

Chief Justice for a single justice to hear the whole case.°? Espie - confirmed that timing was critical because of credit negotiations. The Company must give sixty days notice to the lenders of its intention

, _ to draw down on the loans in June 1970, and 1st April 1970 has been set as the deadline for giving this notice. [So] ... the legal challenge

| must be resolved by 1st April 1970. The question was evidently discussed at an even higher level:

The decision to proceed to the High Court was taken after Sir Maurice Mawby had spoken to the Minister and the Minister had discussed the

situation with the Attorney-General. It was a decision of the Minister

and the Attorney-General. | a Ellicott changed his mind after Mawby’s representations, and saw the Chief Justice, who arranged a hearing for early December.”

7 TEMPORARY RESOLUTION §& 145

The question for the High Court was: | Are Territory Ordinances made under the New Guinea Act 1920, the New Guinea Act 1920-26 and the Papua and New Guinea Act 1949-64, | | providing for compulsory acquisition of property invalid if they fail to _ provide just terms for such acquisition.

As the day approached, Espie and his Administration Manager, Paul —

Quodling, asked anxiously what would happen if the Court ruled | against them, and received evasive answers. The Department judged that even if they lost the constitutional point, the case would continue

on the basis of German law, requiring a long delay but not a total

loss—except, of course, to the company.” | The High Court hearing on 9 December 1969 was an anticlimax. It

heard no argument from the Commonwealth or CRA. After the plaintiffs argument, the Court adjourned for ninety minutes, then put the litigants out of their misery: they upheld the validity of the laws.”* _

Chapter 8

Creating the Mine

The impact of Panguna on Bougainville’s physical and social landscape is hard to exaggerate: the impact of Bougainville circumstances on the

mine community is less obvious but equally significant. Immense infrastructure works were needed to create the mine. Even a bald list suggests their dramatic impact on the environment, on the Territory

budget—and on labour.'! BCL had to construct: | | -

1970),

© a town at Arawa (construction to begin in October 1969); ¢ a port at Loloho (construction to begin in September 1969); ¢ a major powerhouse near the port (construction to begin in January © amajor road from the port to the mine (completion by August 1970); e a minor road to the tailings dump on the west coast (in progress in early 1969);

e the concentrator plant; -@ a town at the mine site; e adam on the Jaba River to supply water to the mine and concentrator;

e a water supply for Arawa town; and |

e a limestone quarry. | |

The company also had to prepare the pit site by removing 30 million

146 3 -

tons of overburden, establish a dump for waste rock, organise the

8 CREATING THE MINE & 147 disposal of tailings in swamp land near the west coast, and procure equipment to break and transport ore and waste rock. | The Administration had complementary obligations: e the prompt granting of land leases; ¢ improvements to Aropa airstrip (required by January 1970); _ e primary, technical and high schools for Arawa, and a base hospital

(construction to begin in October 1969); | ¢ improvements to the Aropa-Kieta road (in progress by early 1969);

e construction of a major road from Kieta to Arawa and Loloho (required by May 1970); and e a telecommunication system for 24-hour, world-wide access (needed

by June 1970).

In January 1970, when the Department asked Cabinet—nervously—for $20 million, they priced the Administration’s commitments arising from Panguna at over $40 million. The town alone would cost $27.5 million.” They hoped to finance these projects by raising the Commonwealth’s

contribution from $2 million in 1969/70 to $12 million in 1970/71 and $6 million the following year. Over the same period, the Administration’s contribution would rise from $4.4 million to $9.8 million in 1970/71 and $9.3 million in 1971/72. These sums were inflated by the

expansion of the project, and their impact was intensified by the accelerated timetable between the resolution of the High Court challenge (December 1969) and the mine coming into production (early 1972). These circumstances placed immense and unexpected

strain on the Territory's budget.

‘ASIAN Labour’ : Construction on this scale required more labour than any project since the Pacific War, and much more skilled labour than the Territory could deploy. At a time of full employment in Australia, the obvious sources

of artisans were in East and South-east Asia, but Australia still discriminated against ‘non-European’ migrants and workers. Papua New Guinea was governed by these restrictions, but BCL was not disposed to

148 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN | accept them: it would accept a ceiling of 2000 expatriates but would not reserve these jobs for Australians. Espie realised that Japanese

| contractors might want to employ Japanese artisans, just as American | companies might prefer Americans. Australian companies might win road-building and architectural contracts, but Australian manufacturers were not competitive. Espie also expected foreign labour to be cheaper and more efficient, and felt Japanese workers would create fewer social

problems than Australians. | |

_ Breaking the issue cautiously, BCL sought entry permits for seventeen

Japanese for four months to build houses. Neither the Administrator

nor the Minister had authority to admit them, so the Department consulted relevant Commonwealth departments. Immigration thought that a favourable decision would cause little stir, although trade union _ sensitivity had already been noted. Other departments simply accepted

| the proposal. Predictably, the Prime Minister's office was the most sensitive: it accepted the proposal but warned that further developments could involve ‘important political issues for us’, and advised Barnes to

bring a submission to Cabinet as soon as possible. As if to underline the ambivalence of Australia’s relations with Japan, Espie was rejoicing

decision.* | Fe 7 ae |

ina low-interest Japanese loan of $30 million when he learnt of this

| The draft submissions circulated by the Department assumed that Asian firms would mainly be sub-contractors to Australian principals,

but that Australian firms themselves might want to employ Asian

, labour.> The draft also set a ceiling of 1600 Asian workers. The Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors—a well-organised pressure

_ group—was concerned lest Japanese contractors gain a toe-hold in the Territory: they threatened to lobby the Prime Minister, until they learnt of the limitations on Asian employment. The Department of Labour was sensitive to the needs of Australian employers, but in the end made

only minor suggestions.° _ The Department of Immigration took a quite different view. It brooded about ‘intermarriage or cohabitation with local women which

may produce requests from workers for resident status and a new community of people of mixed-descent, possibly requiring resettlement later if not absorbed. To avert that outcome, they suggested firmer time

8 CREATING THE MINE & 149 limits. While Immigration wanted the social implications spelt out, Treasury wanted them deleted.” The most serious objections came from

the protectionist-minded Department of Trade and Industry, who believed that the proposal would favour Japanese contractors. They were

relieved to learn that BCL'’s policy was to use Australian prime contractors—until Espie denied any such policy, insisting on open tendering. The powerful Minister for Trade and Industry, Jack McEwen,

would oppose the submission in Cabinet.® Territories was wedged between Australian pressure groups and the free market. Faced with this

delay, Espie threatened to complain to the Prime Minister, and his | colleague the managing director of Hamersley Iron (a member of the Immigration Advisory Council) arranged an interview with the Minister for Immigration.? The submission finally reached Cabinet in August.

There would be a ceiling of 1600, provided that the Administration determined that local labour was not available. BCL was to achieve

‘maximum indigenisation’ through its training programme and

guarantee arrangements for repatriation.© a TRAINING A WORK-FORCE 7 Company training schemes for Papua New Guineans were therefore a |

matter of great moment, to cut the Australian political costs of employing Asian workers. The Department's representative on a working

group was given instructions to that effect, and did justice to his brief:

‘the Company has now come to our way almost entirely, with a> substantial increase in the total training programme, and a much greater

accent on management areas’! a | BCL may have needed pushing on management training, but was not averse to technical instruction. One lesson Espie learnt from Africa was the need for real localisation.!* The country’s long neglect of

education in general and especially technical training made this particularly difficult. Nevertheless the first drivers of the immense trucks

were Papua New Guineans, who trained on a simulator before they | | mounted the real behemoths. Before long, other Papua New Guineans were operating the giant shovels. Managers were surprised and delighted

150 & GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

when pre-training often enabled Papua New Guineans to outperform Australians. Nor did BCL stint on other forms of training. By 1973 they had 330 apprentices, and 100 trainees were preparing for supervisory

appointments. A thousand semi-skilled operators and repairmen qualified during the year, while fifty scholarship holders were engaged _ in professional education. In the short term, however, expatriates dominated the skilled work.

BCL entrusted the construction of the mine to the trans-national Bechtel-Western Knapp Engineering, which was also creating Freeport mine in Irian Jaya, and Bechtel engaged and supervised contractors.!°

While BCL built its labour force slowly and offered long-term employment, the construction firms brought in contract labour on a

grand scale. The combined work-force peaked at more than ten thousand, few of whom had social links to Panguna. Almost all the artisans were foreign, and two-thirds of the labourers came from other parts of the Territory. In the Papua New Guinean work-force at its 1971 peak, 14 per cent came from the Western Highlands, 11 per cent from Morobe, and 27 per cent from Bougainville. At BCL itself, Bougainvilleans made up 42.5 per cent of the indigenous work-force,!4 but

contractors simply employed all comers—provoking planters to | complain that their ‘Tedskin’ labourers were deserting. (BCL could not distinguish deserters from other applicants, but they ‘did return deserters when it became aware of them’. To this extent at least, BCL bowed to

planters’ demand for cheap labour.)!° , The demographic impact of this influx was already clear in 1971.'°

~ Roughly 10 000 men (and less than 900 women) from the rest of the Territory had been drawn to the plantations or to Panguna, while only 1771 men and 755 women from Bougainville were living abroad. Table 8.1: Population and Work-force Participation, Bougainville, 1971

Population group = Male Female Total “Indiwnous population Gl PNG). '51430°°~C«‘aA Ss) aes

Born in Bougainville 41434 — 38073 79 507

Of whom, aged over 16 28 902 18568 47470 In the paid work-force 21 358 3570 24 928

Source: PNG Population Census, 1971.

| | 8 CREATING THE MINE §& 151

1970-72 mo

Table 8.2: Expatriate and PNG Employment by Company, Bougainville,

EC yc re

Expat PNG Expat PNG Expat PNG Expat PNG July 1970 152 408 | 463 606 2558 3825 2710 4233 ,

Jan. 1971 253 720 54] 573. 2527 4248 2780 4968 July 1971 426 1139 842 1014 3671 5236 4097 6375 Jan. 1972 757. 2230 492 405 «1524 2699 2281 4929 Source: Philip Daniel, “Wages and Employment in Colonial Papua New Guinea’.

Expatriate workers came from a host of countries, generating serious problems of wage determination, but the sharpest income differentials were those between expatriates and Papua New Guineans. The former

were recruited in a global market, while Papua New Guinean wages were limited by a stunted education system and the Administration’s

insistence on protecting Territory labour markets from upward pressure. !7 Low wage rates had malign consequences. During Phillips's

very first survey, carriers struck work for better pay, but Phillips felt bound by wage rates for government work, so there was no room for negotiation and the carriers quit.!8 As Espie recognised, it was in BCL's

short-term interests to offer much higher wages, but the cost would include ‘destructively distorting effects on the whole manpower and economy’! Miners’ incomes were therefore constrained by the needs of — plantations and the public service—the basis for the statutory minimum

wages. Pay scales differed within each job category, and the cleavage was deepened by the concentration of Papua New Guineans in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. Managers were alert to the risk of racial conflict,

and addressed it through ‘the rule of instant dismissal (and removal from Bougainville) of all parties involved in any incident of inter-racial |

violence’.”° | ee |

_ Every Saturday pay night, the Police Inspector required reinforcements. Saturday 18 April 1970 was especially tense. The expatriate workers were on strike, the communication system had been sabotaged,

and there were rumours of conflict between Bougainvilleans and

Highlanders. At 1.30 on Sunday morning: |

152. | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN , a disturbance developed in Camp 7 amongst indigenous occupants ... It is emphasised that no expatriate employees were involved. [Tear gas was

| used] to ensure that no physical damage was caused to any Company | ‘property by the antagonists whose activities were confined to fist fights and rock and bottle throwing. Such activities amongst the occupants of

, Camp 7 are not unduly unusual on Saturday pay nights [and] there is no indication that the disturbance was of an inter-racial nature. The reports indicate that Bougainvilleans and Tolais were involved.

According to the kiaps, Europeans had sabotaged communications, while

- Papua New Guineans had disconnected the water supply in protest against a ban on alcohol. Kiaps concentrated on pacifying the 700 Highlanders and 1000 Bougainvilleans, hoping also to discover if any

were armed. Fortuitously, two Highland Members of the House of Assembly were visiting, and were invited to calm their constituents.”! If scuffles were common, formal industrial action was relatively rare.

In 1971, there were 95 disputes involving expatriates, costing 91175 _work hours, and only 19 involving Papua New Guineans, costing 12 416

- hours. One strike involved both groups. This was anarchy in the repressive context of Papua New Guinea's plantations, but modest by Australian standards. Even the 18 900 man-hours of the longest strike

equated to less than half a day lost. a | a

Philip Daniel suggests that three of the strikes by expatriates during 1971 ‘could be construed as having overtones of racial antagonism’. The longest strike was provoked by an alleged assault on an expatriate by a Papua New Guinean policeman, prompting some workers to demand separate canteens. Two other strikes concerned ‘issues of “security” for

expatriates. Racial tension may have been endemic, but it was not — universal. Twice in 1971 striking expatriates expressed solidarity or

sympathy with Papua New Guineans. |

At first there was little overt conflict over the differential wage rates. Daniel suggests that conflict was contained by the conditions of the construction phase, when employees averaged sixty hours work a week,

earning regular overtime. As single men they had little chance to manifest different consumption patterns. Differentials became divisive only with ‘normality’, when overtime shrank and families arrived.

8 CREATING THE MINE ¢& 153 Union representation evolved in surprising ways. Expatriates’ wages | were based on Australian rates, supplemented by overseas allowances.

Recognising the salience of Australian models, BCL approached the . Australian Congress of Trade Unions (ACTU) in Melbourne, seeking an agreement acceptable to Australian unions. The resulting agreement was administered by the ACTU, while BCL controlled expatriates’ wages in

the contracting firms through an arrangement with Bechtel. | Some other structure was required to manage Papua New Guineans’ _

industrial issues, and there was no trade union tradition. An early attempt at industrial action by plantation and domestic workers in _ Rabaul in 1929 had been fiercely suppressed.*? As we have seen in chapter 3, the authorities were still apprehensive of collective action by New Guineans in the 1930s. This policy was reversed only in the 1960s, when Australia’s complex industrial relations legislation was imported. Because the system rested on tripartite negotiations, trade unions had to be created and propped up by a Bureau of Industrial Organisations.

The first unions , 7 |

had difficulty in establishing permanent membership, stable leadership and financial viability. Few had any sort of rank and file organisation and most relied on individual leaders . . . [whose loyalties] were divided by the many political, business and career opportunities opening up for | educated and ambitious Papua New Guineans.?3

In this artificial environment the first indigenous mining union was initiated by the company, in the belief that—according to the Personnel

Manager—’a strong responsible union to represent the national workforce was a pre-requisite to industrial stability, Working with the Territory Labour Department, BCL sponsored the Bougainville Mining Workers’ Union,?4 which was registered in November 1969 and aspired __ to represent workers of all nationalities. This ambition soon evaporated, leaving the union as a vehicle for Papua New Guineans. Even in this constituency, BMWU had little initial appeal. Some dismissed it as a creature of management; most of its officials came from staff grades;

and agreements between BCL and the Administration left little room for manoeuvre. Nominal membership reached 1500 in 1971, but fell to.

154. % GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

800 in June 1973—a quarter of BCL’s Papua New Guinean employees, and only a fifth of the total.*° The discrepancy reflected the fact that the union was geared to longterm BCL workers rather than short-term construction workers. In May

1970 the latter formed the Bougainville General and Construction Workers’ Union. They reached an accord with BCL, enforceable on all employers; but BGCWU also lacked long-term members and industrial

experience. These frail institutions were marginalised by another mechanism, whereby representatives chosen on a district basis liaised

with managers. Daniel judged that this mechanism was ‘extremely successful’ in ‘tesolv[ing] irritations before they became a problem’ and ‘played a major part in minimising differences between ethnic groups

which were prone to occur at that stage’. | | Ethnic solidarities repeatedly cut across work-place relations. In July 1970, for example, 600 Bougainvillean workers—and villagers—asked BCL to repatriate ‘trouble-makers’, and to employ only Bougainvilleans in particular categories of work. BCL evidently complied.*’ Bougainvillean

concerns also informed the Panguna Mungkas Association, formed in April 1973, which functioned as a community association embracing all Bougainvilleans living in and around Panguna and Kieta. Its leaders were

all BCL employees, but its concerns ranged far beyond industrial relations.7® As well as the predictable division between expatriate and indigenous workers, the construction phase generated and sustained a deep cleavage between Bougainvilleans and other Papua New Guineans. During the construction phase, low wages were balanced by the fact that all workers received food, accommodation and return passage, and the normal working week of sixty hours included twenty hours overtime. (By 1975 the working week had shrunk to thirty-six hours basic and twelve hours overtime.) The remoteness of the mine made it something of an enclave where the employer provided most of the workers’ daily needs. BCL housed and fed employees, who worked for seven days, then had two or three days off. So attractive was mine work that the Administration waged a media campaign to dissuade job-seekers

from travelling to Panguna. Yet the work-force was notable for its mobility. Few of the construction workers transferred to BCL, and over GO per cent of BCL’s Papua New Guinean employees in 1973 claimed

8 CREATING THE MINE & 155

no previous urban employment.2? The novel working conditions intensified the alienation of many workers. These circumstances made for a very inexperienced work-force, and great difficulties in localisation.

An early BCL notion was to create two ‘integrated’ towns near — Panguna and the port, and an ‘indigenous’ town near the mine.*° One of Douglas Oliver's concerns*! was the size and site of the main town.

He proposed that it be on high ground near the mine, with distinct ‘Tesidential neighbourhoods of multiple-unit composition’ This would limit land acquisition, and its isolation would minimise uncontrolled contact between CRA personnel and villagers, since off-duty personnel

would remain within the company’s jurisdiction. A unified town of | several thousand might be expected to break down on ethnic lines, whereas smaller aggregations would foster integration. The same idea led Oliver to favour multiple-unit dwellings. | As matters turned out, two-thirds of the single accommodation was at Panguna, the rest at Loloho and on the access road, and none in Arawa. Three-quarters of the Papua New Guinean workers lived in single quarters,

in an urban area where men outnumbered women by 4.6 to 1.37 This masculine concentration was exacerbated by ‘a shortage of land... asa

result of political sensitivity to Bougainvillean separatism’.*? os On the coast, Arawa town would be shared by BCL and the Administration; but the integration of functions was threatened by different living standards. BCL sought to attract staff by offering Australian standards of services, housing, town functions and subsidies, while the Administration—strapped for funds as usual—preferred to make Arawa consistent with the lower standards of the Territory.*+ The

obvious alternative—to make Arawa a company town and to house

Administration personnel five miles away in Kieta—would create the damaging impression that BCL was ‘a State within a State, with the | social and political difficulties which this could raise’. The compromise

was to build Arawa as a normal Territory town catering for Admin- — istration, company and other interests, with BCL as the construction

authority but building in line with Territory standards.*° | | To anticipate BCL's labour requirements, the Administration and BCL formed a working group in 1969, which projected a work-force of 1683 (1045 being Papua New Guineans).*° In reality this number was _

156 & GETTING UNDER THE SKIN , reached six months before production began, and by 1975 the total exploded to 4115. Overmanning was partly an artifact of BCL's training programme: there was a ‘localisation lag’, with expatriates being retained

to provide temporary supervision and training. Training had to compensate for a weak education system (even in 1974, BCL's output of 56 tradesmen comprised 13.9 per cent of all the Territory's apprentices).

To meet localisation targets, therefore, BCL probably recruited underqualified students. The other tactic was to fragment the tasks, so that a

| novice worker undertook a fraction of the skilled worker's task,

| consistent with his abilities.7” | |

Overmanning also reflected a very high turnover—BCL workers were

| ‘essentially a migrant labour force’ Workers’ commitment to their home communities may help to explain this phenomenon, and the quality of

their housing may have contributed, but wage rates were probably critical. With self-government, wages rose sharply—the urban minimum wage leapt from $6 to $25.80 in 1975. Although BCL's wage agreement

_ with the BMWU was revised every two years, wages could not keep pace. Again, every adjustment to meet the urban minimum wage tended to raise minimum wages—and compress the differentials. In 1970 there were seventeen wage groups: they shrank to ten in 1974 and seven in

| 1975. Even so, the cost of living outstripped wages.?° | | Enclave circumstances may help to explain why disputes were explosive when they did erupt. The election of a new BMWU executive in March 1974 initiated a very difficult period. There was a company-

wide strike later that year, and bloody riots on 12 and 13 May 1975. - According to Ann Harding in the Australian,?°> a BMWU official was dismissed on a charge of striking a canteen attendant. While arbitration was proceeding, the union rallied a thousand members with a log of

claims and marched on the mine offices. They were intercepted by | police; stones were thrown at police cars; police fired tear gas; and a | thousand men were gaoled. Pita Lus (the new Minister for Police) reported to Chief Minister Somare that the incident resulted from bad communications, and on Somare’s orders the workers were released

and charges dropped. - ; ,

| | Alexander Mamak and Richard Bedford emphasise the racial overtones of the incident and the workers’ response to it.*° Its

| , | 8 CREATING THE MINE §& 157 immediate causes included workers’ industrial inexperience, poor

communication with management, and the union’s inadequacy; but beneath these problems loomed the stratification of the work-force. Until 1972, expatriate and indigenous workers had the same base pay rate, with expatriates receiving supplements. After a 1972 revision, the © all-purpose expatriate supplement was $15 plus an overseas supplement | of $30: these rates related to wages in Australia. Indigenous wages,

meanwhile, were pegged to Papua New Guinea standards. The effect was clear: expatriate tradesmen, for example, earned an average of $144.60 weekly, Papua New Guineans $33.35. Papua New Guineans in staff categories earned about 27 per cent of expatriate incomes. Most of —

the Papua New Guinean wage-earners were migrants, earning the urban minimum wage, merely 15 per cent of expatriates’ incomes.*!

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT To reach the ore body, 220 hectares of rainforest was cleared by poisoning trees and spraying the undergrowth with herbicide. The overburden of volcanic ash and weathered rock was then removed by

high-pressure hoses, generating eighteen million cubic metres of

sediment.’2 The obvious way to dispose of the overburden was to channel it into the Kawerong River, whose headwaters ran close by. The | Kawerong fed the Jaba, which flowed west to Empress Augusta Bay.

Cutting the road from Loloho port produced another eleven million cubic metres, which fed into the east-flowing Pinei River. Serious river : pollution was inevitable.43 It was also dangerous. In January 1970 men _

workers. *4 co struck work after a landslide—of 30000 cubic yards—killed eight

The largest engineering problem once the mine came into operation | was to dispose of the daily 150 000 tonnes of rock waste and tailings. Rock could be dumped in the Kawerong, but tailings presented a more | intricate problem. Bechtel listed five possibilities. First, the tailings could —

be discharged into the Kawerong-Jaba system, some finding its way to Empress Augusta Bay, the rest onto the swampy lowlands near the Jaba

mouth. Second, they could be discharged into the smaller Mariropa

158 © GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

River, which would leave more tailings on land. Third, they could be

| piped to the lowlands to reclaim swamp between the Jaba and the Mariropa. Fourth, they could be piped directly into Empress Augusta

Bay, at a guesstimated cost of $100 million. Finally, conventional holding dams could be used—were it not for high rainfall and frequent seismic activity. Not surprisingly, BCL preferred the first option. _ On 16 September 1969 Bechtel submitted its proposal to the BCLAdministration Joint Committee. The Agreement stipulated a response in two months, but Warwick Smith proposed to answer in five weeks.*° That was wildly optimistic in the absence of expert analysts. There was no such expertise in Papua New Guinea, and not much in Australia. Mining was a State responsibility, and the Commonwealth had little involvement, but the scale and location of Panguna made it unlikely that even State governments could have mustered appropriate experts.

In practice they were not consulted, and the (Commonwealth) Department of National Development replied—after two days study— that the project seemed ‘soundly based and seems well planned’, basing

day.*° |

its opinion mainly on another report, by the Bureau of Mineral Resources. BMR offered little advice, except that Bechtel was optimistic

in expecting the slurry pipeline to operate indefinitely for 22 hours a The Snowy Mountains Authority (responsible for the Commonwealth’s greatest engineering project) did have expertise. Their first reaction to the tailings proposal was very critical,4’ but they agreed to second a technical adviser. Between 10 and 19 October Niel Warner

visited CRA in Melbourne, consulted the Administration in Port Moresby, inspected Panguna, and formed a favourable opinion, which | he took to the Joint Committee. The Committee met on 21 October, _ and devoted a day to his interim report. It took three weeks for his full report to reach the Department. Meanwhile the Administration drafted

a reply to the interim report and sent it to Canberra for comment on

28 November. The vanity of Warwick Smith's schedule became increasingly evident: it was 21 January before BCL replied to the _ Administration’s draft. BCL and the Department held discussions throughout the next three months, and the formal response to Espie was submitted only on 27 April.

8 CREATING THE MINE §& 159 The agreement to allow BCL to discharge tailings into the Kawerong-—

Jaba was hedged by conditions, but these were hardly onerous. The river system must be monitored and evaluated regularly. The tailings lease included the whole Kawerong-Jaba system, but excluded the Mariropa River to the north and Morotana mission to the south. The only heavy metal considered was copper, and the maximum copper content was not precisely defined—it must be low enough to allow solubility in natural water and prevent damage to flora and fauna. The geographer M. J. EF Brown offered two criticisms of the arrangement: no account was taken of the impact on Empress Augusta Bay, nor was any limit specified for chemical pollution in the rivers.*®

The physical impact was quickly evident. By March 1973, tailings had spread over 1690 hectares on either side of the Jaba, and the river itself had risen. In the lower Kawerong the river bed had risen by eight metres; in the Jaba below Mokopolo it rose by five metres. Upstream from Mananau, in the steeper section of the Jaba, and in the swampy

lowlands, deposition had raised the river bed by only about 30 centimetres. In consequence, a few hundred people had to be resettled. Reviewing the impact in 1975, BCL’s environmental manager began

with the 26-kilometre port access road.*? When cutting through the Crown Prince Range, the only affordable choice was ‘to sidecast material

into the Upper Pinei Valley and cut back to stable rock’, Sediment on

this scale eliminated fish from the river and led to compensation payments of $20 000 annually until 1975, when sediments returned to

normal and fish returned to the river. By 1975 the mining rate was 155 000 tonnes per day, of which 70 000 tonnes was waste, discarded into the Kawerong Valley. (An alternative was being developed when

the mine closed, diverting the Kawerong around the build-up of material.) The remaining 85 000 tonnes was processed, yielding 1650

tonnes of concentrate, while 83 350 tonnes of tailings left the concentrator as a slurry of about 40 per cent solids. Paul Quodling calculated that 1.25 billion tonnes had been removed

to recover 10 million tonnes of concentrate. The pit eventually covered | 400 hectares, which land was lost forever. Half of the material removed was solid waste, which was stacked near by, destroying the agricultural

potential of 300 hectares of land. The balance was tailings, whose

160 = GETTING UNDER THE SKIN | impact was ‘monumental’, The earlier expectation was that 80 per cent of the tailings would move to the mouth of the Jaba. In practice only

| 60 per cent did, the rest forming a thousand-hectare delta. Tailings dams were ruled out, because they would eliminate more garden land and would not be stable anyway. After ten years of operation, BCL decided to build a pipeline to carry tailings to the west coast (an option previously ruled out for technical and financial reasons). This approach

would ‘remove the physical management of tailings as a potential constraint on an extended utilisation of the Panguna resource’, and allow rehabilitation of the tailings deposits.°°

There is no calculus to weigh environmental damage against social dislocation; nor can we set either against economic costs and benefits. Clearly, neither the Department nor the Administration took environmental issues seriously—in 1970 environmentalism was in its political infancy in Australia. The response to Bechtel’s tailings proposal was perfunctory at best. BCL had no need to chivvy officials for a favourable outcome, since the figures spoke so loudly for themselves. Nor does the official correspondence provide evidence of sustained environmental concern by villagers. Yet the physical impact of the mine was over_ whelming. At every turn it must have reminded people of their social,

cultural and political dislocations. —— | | Officials devoted infinitely more attention to industrial relations, and to the social and political impact of an industrial enclave. These shaped, and were shaped by, chronic tension over land, confining the mine and its housing to narrower limits than the managers wanted, and keeping the lid on resentments until they burst out in physical violence. The Bougainville context also shaped employment, with the company

raising the proportion of Bougainvilleans in an anxious endeavour to allay animosity. The wider Papua New Guinea context also left its mark,

on standards of housing, on the rate and extent of localisation, on the limited skills of the work-force, and ultimately in BCL’s overmanning.

No amount of planning could negate half a century's plantation production and its malign effects on the economies, the societies and

the polities of Bougainville in 1970. | |

Chapter 9 i

Consequences

CAPITAL AND EQUITY — Panguna was exceptionally expensive, especially once the daily treatment rate rose to 90 000 tons. BCL had to borrow unprecedented _ sums. The Bank of America, marshalling a consortium of twenty-seven banks, wanted to commit Australian lenders, because their absence

would make other investors suspicious.’ This was a portent that the © lenders’ interests would impinge on every aspect of the project. Australian involvement was accomplished by lending funds to the | (Australian) Commonwealth Bank, which lent directly to BCL and also | co-ordinated funds from other Australian institutions. The Commonwealth Savings Bank also lent $A12.5 million to build Arawa town. | Of the projected cost of $A423 million (including exploration and — feasibility studies), shareholders subscribed $A130 million. Borrowings

totalled US$334 million, broken down as follows: -

e Bank of America syndicate, $US110 million; — , | ¢ Commonwealth Trading Bank syndicate, $US67.4 million; _

e Japanese cash and equipment loans, $US60 million; o | e US Export-Import Bank equipment loan, $US56.8 million; , e equipment loans from Australian suppliers, $A25 million; and ¢ Commonwealth Savings Bank housing loan, $A12.5 million.

162 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN The company structure was also refined, again partly to satisfy lenders.°

e BCL was 80 per cent owned by Bougainville Mining Ltd and 20 per

| cent by the Administration. _ | e Bougainville Mining was a wholly owned subsidiary of Capital Mines Pty Ltd, registered in Canberra, the vehicle for the public

| share issue. e Capital Mines shares were held by CRA (two-thirds) and NBHC (one-third).

Once shares were issued, Capital retained an 87 per cent interest in - Bougainville Mining, the balance being held by the public (10 per cent), and lending banks (3 per cent).* To complicate matters, under the credit agreement all the issue capital was pledged to the Bank of America.

The credit and loan agreement was due for signature on 28 July, allowing two months for the Administration to exercise its 20 per cent option. The Department's Cabinet submission predicted a large capital gain, or a substantial income, or both.° To raise the $25 million, three

options were put to Cabinet: a loan from the International Bank of

Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), a loan raised by the Administration, or Commonwealth funding (by grant or by loan). Cabinet was predictably cool when asked for funds. In any case a pending general election made it improper to commit the Government,°

| so talks began with brokers. The first instalment of $12.5m was due by

February 1970, but there was |

a strong case for advancing a portion (say $5m) of the first $12.5m in October or November, if the Administration is to pull its weight ... At this stage [there are] no specific problems but the timing is tight.

Timing was tight indeed. Treasury had not yet approved a grant or even

a loan—which would need approval from the Commonwealth Loan Council, involving a further week’s delay. To provide an immediate $5 million, the Administration was allowed an overdraft.” Rather too late, funds were also sought from IBRD. This seemed appropriate because the loan would liquidate itself without adding to the Territory's dependence on Australia, and IBRD allowed a grace period, which

, | 9 CONSEQUENCES =| 163 would cover the period between paying the equity and beginning to

earn the income from it. Further, |

borrowings from the Bank of America are repayable by 1976, and all shares in Bougainville Copper are pledged to the Bank of America until 1976. Japanese borrowings are repayable by 1980, and the issued shares

will be pledged to them until 1980.° | The Department's application—channelled through Treasury—was not

presented with total coherence, and IBRD demurred. Negotiations , therefore resumed with brokers—but the Administration joined a queue of semi-government borrowers, and loans to Papua New Guinea (unlike Australian borrowings) were not privileged trustee securities.? Payment was due on 27 February, and with two days to go, brokers were invited

to place a loan for $12.5 million at par, with a special interest rate of 6.75 per cent, above the prevailing rate of 6.4 per cent.!° When the brokers were still unable to place the loan, Treasury agreed to an even higher rate, hoping to raise funds at 7.75 per cent.” BCLs patience must have been stretched taut, since delays in this contribution placed

added strain on the other shareholders. = | To maximise the political effect of this equity, CRA suggested a unit trust to enable Papua New Guineans to participate directly, and yield ‘a big payoff in public relations. A managing company would buy BCL shares, sell small parcels to residents, and distribute dividends. Having

no clear view on structures, the Department asked CRA to make a proposal.'* Essentially, one of three institutions could hold the shares. The Administration itself could hold them, but the Development Bank | or an investment institution would be better equipped. If the Development Bank held the shares, its policies on participation might not coincide with the Administration’s. These objections might be overcome by using an investment institution, which could be required to hand over a proportion of its profits: its brief would be to ‘facilitate arrangements for local participation’, reducing the risk of conflict between

political and commercial agendas.!? “ |

By September 1969, a special share issue seemed more attractive.'* A special issue would avoid perpetual fund management, and the need to

involve Territory individuals and institutions could be met by limiting |

164 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN | each holding and restricting transfer. The Development Bank would underwrite and manage the issue, and advance credit for purchases. By October, the near-silence of the Department was embarrassing Don

: Mentz, who reckoned that the company’s approach had always been

straightforward: | a

They wish to make a gesture on direct equity and with [this] in principle,

I think we must agree. Up to date we have not been able to be very

| helpful to the Company in achieving this objective because of lack of , finality in Our own plans. I have gone to some trouble to explain to _ Espie, Vernon and others the reasons for our attitude and that there is no intention of obstructing or opposing their primary objective. I think they have accepted this point but it must be wearing a little thin as the

months go by.}5 | |

November passed, and company opinion remained divided. London felt that the 20 per cent equity was a sufficient gesture, while Melbourne wanted to place some shares into the hands of the local people ‘directly

from the Company’.'® , , -

| Meanwhile the Department crystallised the definition of ‘bona fide Territory resident’, to comprise individuals who were (or had been) resident for twenty-one years, charitable institutions, statutory authorities, local government councils, savings and loans societies, co| operatives and missions. Holdings would be limited to 1000 shares and | restricted to owners within the Territory.!” In the end it was determined to establish a statutory corporation. The November session of the House

| of Assembly duly enacted the Loan (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Ordinance (94 of 1969), allowing the Administration to borrow funds

to buy these shares. CRA was informed, so that BCL’s and the Administration’s shares could be issued at the same time. _ In these manoeuvres the Department came to consider itself CRA’s ally. An (undated) Cabinet submission listed ‘the objectives of local

equity holdings’: an

to give Papuans and New Guineans a sense of participation in ownership

| of Territory enterprises and avoid resentment and hostility against | overseas investment;

| | | 9 CONSEQUENCES =| 165 to enable Papuans and New Guineans to share in the profits made by

- enterprises from the use of Territory resources; oe | to assist the Territory's balance of payments by retaining in the Territory

some of the profits that would otherwise flow out; | ; to provide a local voice in Territory enterprises so that the companies

concerned are informed about local attitudes and interests. _ CRA’s aims were almost identical. Just as the Administration's responsi-

bility for infrastructure drew it closer to BCL, in Australia the Department shared CRA’s purposes. In each case the ultimate purpose was to

fulfil the lenders’ requirements. The bonds firmed again, as the | Administration and BCL addressed the social and political impacts of

Panguna. |

SOCIAL IMPACT © oe The project's impacts were manifest by late 1969. Peter Hastings was dismayed that the beautiful backwater of Kieta had become ‘a cross between a massive war-time invasion beachhead and a South Pacific | slum’. If this transformation was (as he believed) inevitable, it was still |

appalling: ee |

_A thin tide of empty beer cans floats along Kieta’s waterfront beach on a | Sunday. Drunken natives sleep under palms and in the shade of several

massive rain trees. - a |

Piles of Besser bricks, pipes and machinery litter the sides of the narrow roadways. New Administration housing has crept on to the

beachfronts. | | a | oe

Perhaps 200 Europeans and New Guineans sit drinking in a pub a

_ while heavy trucks interminably pound by on the long haul up the hot,

dusty road to the mine site at Panguna . . - —— 7 _ Already younger men are being drained away from the villages to

work for CRA, as house boys, laundry boys, drivers and plant operators |

—for a relatively generous $10.84 a week. | | -

166 =& GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

They were attracted partly, he thought, by ‘freedom from traditional

village sanctions and obligations’ , | ~ However, this is causing older village people considerable dismay, as

7 they see what they regard as monstrous and unbelievably rapid destruction of their village life taking place before their very eyes.

In South Bougainville, fearful of the spread of prostitution, villagers had closed eighteen Catholic schools because of ‘immoral’ letters between boys and girls. The elders were even more anxious lest girls

consort with Europeans. ‘There is no doubt in the minds of many villagers that CRA’s activities will increase the rate of social change to an

unmanageable pace’. '° | Oo

A Bougainville Joint Committee did address these problems. One meeting, for example, heard BCL restate its dismay over ‘long term social and urban problems leading to squatter type development’ and insist that the Administration take (unspecified) action. With no idea how to proceed, the meeting sent a welfare officer to Kieta to assess its problems.”° These issues were also referred to the Department's Social Change Advisory Committee, which agreed that ‘fringe-dwellers’ were inevitably drawn to Arawa, and village life was sure to be disrupted when young people gained schooling and jobs. If those trends were irreversible, perhaps something could be done to prevent expatriate workers from encroaching on the lives of villagers and fringe-dwellers. These Australians were interested (the Committee assumed) only in | gambling, grog and women. Gambling seemed not to create a problem for the host society, and sexual relations would be too hard to control, but alcohol might be brought under control if BCL banned hard liquor in Arawa, as it did at Panguna. The Committee also advised BCL to sack

_ disruptive employees immediately. Some welfare measures were needed for ‘older people who could not cope with cultural change’, but these were best left to the missions and (unspecified) welfare groups.*! In brief, each party hoped that someone else would take the initiative. A town planner, Nigel Oram, also made suggestions on the basis of his East African experience. He too expected a ‘septic fringe’ to grow around Arawa, and proposed that planning controls be broadened. He _ also suggested that domestic servants be housed apart from the residential

- 9 CONSEQUENCES = 167 area. The Territory Department of Social Development and Home Affairs agreed that squatter-settlements would become a ‘septic fringe’ unless the plan provided low-covenant housing with essential services. _

Early in 1970 a Bougainville Social Development Committee (of Territory public servants) considered Oram’s ideas, and advised the Department that policy decisions were needed in seven areas.** Four of the committee’s recommendations were accepted, or had already been —

implemented: a higher proportion of housing for married people; the repatriation of workers from other districts; the screening of expatriate workers before recruitment; and regular consultation with area committees by the town administration. On a fifth proposal, for the extension of planning controls to Loloho and Aropa, which would soon become urban, informal arrangements seemed to be working, which might obviate formal action. On the recommendation that it establish

‘low covenant areas with minimal services and minimal standard housing’, with a proportion of houses available at very low rent, the Department agreed, but could not proceed until land was acquired. Curiously, the recommendation that a proportion of (mainly high-

income) housing must have servants’ quarters was the one that generated the most passion: the Department was ‘strongly opposed’ to building quarters just for the convenience of high-covenant lessees, and

the Assistant Administrator opposed it on the grounds of ‘general policy’.*?. Eventually the deadlock was broken by Les Johnson, who decided to allow servants’ quarters—within the guidelines if possible,

but outside them if necessary.”4 -

A (joint) Unemployment Committee was also told in 1971 that the

work-force was due to fall from 6204 to 2111 over two years, so unemployment must increase and repatriation would become an issue.*? These were serious concerns for earnest people, but they merely addressed the urban consequences of rural crises, as Douglas Oliver was

advising BCL. His first report was general, but a later report made | suggestions to improve BCL's relations with both workers and villagers. He insisted that BCL had too little information on current events, and

none at all on general trends such as population growth, population

movement, health, economic conditions and social values. That ! omission could be remedied only by a programme of research fanning

168 = GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

- out from Panguna. Meanwhile, he advised that Bougainvillean employees should be able to retain access to land, to avoid the development of a landless labour force and slums. To improve welfare, efficiency

and attitudes to the company, BCL should provide English language instruction and a course on the politics and economics of independence.

| They should not lump all indigenes together in one camp, but create -_- more recreational facilities, and try to reduce beer consumption.*° BCL tried to become good corporate citizens. Services were devised to help small businesses, and to provide agricultural extension. BCL canteens were good markets for growers, and local contractors moved into transport, security and building. Much of this extension work was organised by the Bougainville Copper Foundation (BCF), which had a

mandate: _ |

| e to make grants and donations in Papua New Guinea for charitable, public, scientific, educational and artistic purposes;

¢ to assist and promote participation by Papua New Guineans in

commerce, services and industry; |

e to provide medical, educational and welfare services for people in

| Papua New Guinea and |

-@ to provide and assist in the provision for people in Papua New Guinea of training in professional, commercial, agricultural and

industrial skills. A grant from BCL gave the Foundation a financial base, and 3.6 million BCL shares and other investments provided revenue. One of its projects

~was a North Solomons Medical Foundation. Another was a retailwholesale complex, Arawa Enterprises. In the event the share issues were undersubscribed, and BCF continued to operate the complex as its a major shareholder, limiting its effect in promoting local entrepreneurs.*’ Despite these efforts, there was no escaping the impacts of instant | industrialisation. Popular expectations of services rose exponentially—

precisely when their delivery declined. In 1971, Momis and Ogan reported that alcohol, prostitution, vagrancy and truancy had grown dramatically among Nasioi and there was ‘a noticeable decline in social control’ and other indices of well-being.?® The impact of Panguna was highly uneven. BCL employed 241 Nasioi, about 40 per cent of them as

| a 9 CONSEQUENCES §& 169 labourers at $6 per week. On the other hand Nasioi accounted for — about 45 per cent of all apprentices, and 50 per cent of the best paid > Papua New Guineans. Compensation was perpetually under negotiation, and by April 1970 over $1 million had been paid or was in process.

This too was disbursed unevenly. More enduring benefits probably flowed from the sale of produce (over $80 000 in 1970). Many Nasioi _ earned more from primary produce than their colleagues did from

formal employment. There were more medical staff, but they worked only in Kieta. Most disconcertingly, while the numbers of school-age

children rose by more than 20 per cent, enrolment fell by the same proportion. So, apart from Maternal and Child Health nurses, Nasioi were receiving fewer health services and less schooling, relative to their

numbers, than they had six years earlier. These perverse and damaging effects are too complex to address in this context. One element, though, was the poor management of landowners’ compensation. Politically it was crucial for BCL and the Admin- | istration to distribute compensation, and promptly. There was therefore

more haste than planning when distribution began. There was, for | example, an agreed scale for crops and trees, but counting could be haphazard. At Loloho, kiap Bell performed the count clinging to the superstructure of a D8 bulldozer driven by a gun driver, who ‘knew to

an inch how far you could tip one before it rolled’ It was impossible to | be precise while clutching to a vehicle tilting at 45 degrees.2° The view from Canberra overlooked such difficulties. The Department rejoiced at

the public relations potential of the news that occupation fees and royalties would total between $82 and $100 per person per annum. — ‘Perhaps the news ought to be broadcast far and wide and reiterated ad nauseam’. This delight eclipsed any anxiety about creating ‘a preferred pocket of 1,000 people’—and obscured the sobering calculation that the |

compensation was less than half the rural wage.*° a Even so, there were no precedents for compensation of this kind, on

this scale, anywhere in Melanesia. The 1966 legislation set out a

schedule covering: , — —

omic trees); ne | |

e damage to surface and improvements (including crops and econ-

¢ loss of surface rights and access; __ |

170 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN

e consequential damage; _@ procedures for complaints through the Mining Warden; and e occupation fees of 5 per cent of unimproved value for private land

| and mining tenements. Private land entered under prospecting authority required $1 per acre and that under a mining tenement

required $2. , In 1968 the rate was $1 per cocoa tree and $2 per coconut tree. The inadequacy of these sums was highlighted by Hector McKenzie when, as Mining Warden, he determined compensation for eleven dispossessed

- Moroni families. ‘In Australia the Government can buy a man’s farm and he can go and buy another farm. But in Papua New Guinea land is everything to the people’ Landowners were not only suffering specific losses but changing their whole way of life. In this case he awarded each

family $21 000 in cash, and permanent houses, a pig yard, a water

supply, a church, and rations all round until their new gardens produced.*! The cash equivalent was easy to compute (BCL reckoned it

at $40 000),32 but awards of this kind achieved neither coherence nor finality. The rates for cocoa trees and coconut palms were raised to $13.50 and $15 when the Public Solicitor intervened. Nor was the distribution always above reproach. The men who distributed the funds were sometimes unsympathetic. Claimants who walked for hours to the distribution point might be kept waiting to suit officials’ convenience.*3 The complexity of N asioi land ownership and usage led to multiple titles. In the Special Mining Lease there were 510 land blocks amounting

to 3671 hectares; the Tailings Disposal Area had 234 blocks totalling 9119 hectares, and the land required for the Port Mine Access Road had 62 titles over 257 hectares. In sum, there were 806 titles over 13 047 hectares of land.34 The resultant claims soon clogged the Warden’s Court, and in 1969 BCL established a village relations section to handle them. By 1973 compensation and occupation fees had accumulated to $1 613 000, and $400 000 would be paid annually to the 2000 residents of the leased areas.2° BCL envisaged more than ad hoc disbursements. _ Schools, hospitals, and even the Panguna supermarket were all part of a

comprehensive package of benefits. OO |

| In time BCL lost focus on the landowners, until 1979 when they united to form a Panguna Landowners’ Association and list their

| 9 CONSEQUENCES = 171 accumulated grievances. When BCL was slow to respond, several members looted Panguna supermarket, attracting management's attention and initiating a coherent and comprehensive compensation programme. Under that regime, payments averaged a million kina a year, rising to two million in 1989, when it was due for revision.°° By then, however, landowner solidarity had collapsed. A new generation had formed the New Panguna Landowners’ Association, with Francis Ona and Perpetua Serero at the helm. The New PLA overthrew the first

generation of beneficiaries, and made demands that the national government would not and BCL could not negotiate. Violence broke

out, the mine closed, and eight years of civil war began. - , In retrospect Paul Quodling could see flaws in the system.°’ Nasioi society had no ‘structural political organisation’ with which to negotiate.

Finality was impossible, especially as cash compensation provoked conflict within and between kin groups. Irritation was compounded by letting two villages be relocated close to the mine, leading to severe social and environmental problems. The communities within the special | mining lease—Dapera, Moroni and Guava—bore most of the social

cost. In hindsight (again) Quodling thought that BCL should have

insisted on relocation outside the lease. :

Other criticisms could also be made. O’Faircheallaigh suggests that —

if compensation had begun: more generously, there might have been fewer demands for revision.*® The scale and scope of payments were perpetually under angry review,*? and even two million kina did not go

far among hundreds of recipients—only far enough to ignite feuds. Should it flow to all 20000 Nasioi, or only to those in the mining lease? Should it be distributed per capita or by matrilineage; equally Or in proportion to specific damage; to absentees or only to those present? When these choices could not be resolved, Nasioi society erupted in

internal violence before its resentment was directed at BCL. a

SEPARATISM | ae As the Administration drew closer to BCL (and the Department to CRA)

all became estranged from villagers, whose leaders began to question Bougainville’s political status. The issue was raised in the House by Paul

172 % GETTING UNDER THE SKIN |

- - paper: | |

Lapun as early as 1967, when he placed these questions on the notice

, _ As Bougainville is part of the British Solomon Islands can he explain how it became part of the Mandated Territory of New Guinea. | Should the Bougainville people decide to join with the people of the British Solomon Islands, what would be their obligations to the

Australian Government. | : Anxious officials agreed that the first question could be answered simply

- by referring to historical records, and the second was merely hypothetical.*° Departmental research showed that an Anglo-German | agreement of 1886 had allocated Buka and Bougainville (together with Ysabel and Choiseul) to Germany; that Bougainville and Buka (but not Ysabel and Choiseul) had been confirmed as German possessions in a _ further agreement of 1898; and that the islands had been parts of New

| Guinea ever since. The researcher pointedly added that the Solomon Islands laws were much the same as New Guinea’s, vesting minerals in

the Crown, and its government was vigorously pursuing mineral

| exploitation.” | |

_ Bougainville separatism was launched on the Territorial stage in September 1968, in a well-publicised meeting of Port Moresby-based Bougainvilleans. The Administrator expected the meeting to agitate for

more local authority and access to funds. In order to head off the argument for a Bougainville Development Fund, he tried to publicise | the ‘considerable economic development funds which are already being channelled into the Island’4? Nevertheless Lapun, Mola and a score of

others met in Port Moresby on 8 September. (Joseph Lue, the third Bougainville member of the House, was conveniently unable to attend. _ As an Assistant Ministerial Member, he would have been hard pressed to avoid an awkward commitment.) In the capital, and especially in the -_ _University, educated Bougainvilleans were meeting Mungkas Association

students and politicians from the British Solomons, and discussing options, including the possibility of a united Solomon Islands and a separately independent Bougainville.43 A press release described their

major resolutions. While they disavowed villagers’ violent protests

against CRA personnel, they urged that:

, : 9 CONSEQUENCES =| 173 The Bougainville members ... should ask in the House that the Administration carry out a referendum in Bougainville in one or two years time to ascertain whether the people there wish either to remain

on with Papua and New Guinea or be an independence state, or else join up with the British Solomon Islands Protectorate . . . (T]here is an | increasingly growing feeling amongst Bougainvilleans...to be ontheir _ own as a people of a separate nation. In that way they hope to be ~ master of their own destiny and retain their own identity as a people, as

well as having a direct hand in seeking partial solution to their many nagging problems and having full control over their own affairs.

One of the main topics discussed a [was] a Bougainville landownership association . . . [to] advise and control the people concerned

in selling or leasing of their land to anyone ... [T]his body would be

totally independent of any Administration control.*# a Activists did press the case for an official referendum on the question of secession; and when that was refused, some did organise an informal

referendum. The Administration was more immediately worried by mention of a Landowners’ Association, which prompted an official inquiry.*> The investigation reported that in 1967 Anthony Ampei (of Guava) and Damien Damen (of Irang) were collecting money for the ‘Pangu-Bougainville Development Party. Their purpose was evidently to

remove CRA by employing a lawyer or making a donation to a UN

mission, and to create an independent government. Damen was | supported by a Committee (the Association of Landowners) and intended to collect funds annually. Some villagers had already withheld 7 their Council tax, leading the Kieta LGC to complain that Damen was |

‘spoiling the people’ Its President added that many Councillors were | members of Damen’s committee, and another Councillor complained that all areas were under Damen’s influence. That influence seemed not _

to stretch beyond South Bougainville, unless (as the investigator suspected) he had links with the Koromira cult, and with Hahalis. There

were no evident links south to the Solomons, nor to the House of

Assembly, nor among Bougainvillean soldiers or police. | The investigator noted that the missionaries did not support —> secession, Father Fingleton had explicitly invoked the spectre of the Katanga disaster in the Congo. There were now a few indigenous priests,

174 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN who (the investigator supposed) shared their parishioners’ hostility to

BCL, but had no public stance on separatism. The Church's earlier criticism of BCL had seemingly been muted. The Methodist minority were ‘virtually inactive’ in politics but would probably line up with the Administration and against separation. Only the Seventh Day Adventists openly supported both the project and the Administration. ~The investigator found ordinary Nagovisi ‘hostile to the Adminis| tration and its officers’ and ‘generally antipathetic to Europeans —much as Oliver observed thirty years earlier, but aggravated by the Admin-

istration’s failure to build a promised road. a a The independence movement has given the Nagovisi a set political objective and they would overwhelmingly support their leader Paul

| _Lapun. With this political cause and what they consider to be the , continuing failure of the Administration to develop their area, there is a

hardening of anti-Administration attitudes. The Siwai, he thought, were divided: younger people were impatient with the pace of development, while their elders—represented by Joseph _ _Lue—were more content. The same seemed true in Buin, where the pro-

Administration President of the LGC felt his authority slipping to younger men with better education. In the Kieta region, relations had worsened since CRA’s entry, and both North and South Nasioi felt that Europeans were repressing them. The demand for a Development Fund persisted, even if many people accepted the inevitability of the mine. ‘The anti-mining faction who have continually argued . . . that minerals should not be exploited until after independence, have received a fillip from [the] referendum gambit. The Administration was in better odour further north. Teop-Tinputz people remained most pro-Administration; and in Buka, Hahalis and the LGC were co-operating with Administration programmes, and neither exhibited anti-European sentiments. This perceived contrast between southern separatists and northern - federalists did not correlate with the stances of their House of Assembly

| representatives. The researcher merely fortified the Administration's _ suspicion that Lapun was the instigator of the moves to hold a referendum (and of separatism), supported by Donatus Mola (despite

9 CONSEQUENCES §=&— 175

his northern constituency), with Joseph Lue’s stance less clear (despite _ his southern seat). Among other actors, the President of the Kieta LGC

dismissed the referendum as the work of students, and insisted that Bougainville should stay in Papua New Guinea. He deplored the risk of

something like the Nigerian civil war. | | Lapun and Mola duly brought the referendum issue to the House, which duly declined to proceed; but a month later the referendum provoked passionate debate at a Bougainville Combined Councils meeting. Mola—the only MHA present—was asked why he and Lapun had not consulted the Councillors before going public. Though Mola assured them that the proposal had been aired merely to allow people

to think about it, several speakers were uneasy: | The people were afraid when they heard the news. Most of the Councillors at the meeting were against the separation of Bougainville from New Guinea or felt that the conference was not qualified to discuss

the subject as it lacked basic knowledge... , _ A strong minority suggested Bougainville separate from New Guinea

but retain Australian administration. ,

Kieta and Buin councillors favoured separation; those against came from Teop-Tinputz, Siwai, Buka and Wakunai. Others declined to decide on

resolution.*° | OS ee

the basis of one day’s debate, and the matter was adjourned without Faced with evidence of separatism, the Administrator explored its causes with his Ministerial and Assistant Ministerial Members. First was

the people's sense that the island had been neglected: against that background, current benefits seemed like bribery. Next were the high- _ handed methods of kiaps and police, protecting CRA staff and jailing

protesters. In general the Administration’s law was ‘not the law of the | people’, but separatism was fuelled specifically by the denial of a separate development fund. Again, landowners’ royalties were too low.

Joseph Lue believed that a majority would approve the holding of a referendum, and estimated support at 60 per cent of Nagovisi, 40 per cent of Siwai and 70 per cent in Buin (all in his South Bougainville seat). They would not wish to join the backward Solomon Islands. He

176 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN _ also reckoned that the people would accept a decision not to hold such a referendum if they gained compensation instead (which Hay took to

be a reference to a Bougainville Development Fund). | Typically, the meeting probed possible sources of ‘outside influence’ on the students. Some suspected Solomon Island students; and Hay wondered about the role of Jim Davidson, Professor of Pacific History at ANU; but Lue was sure that external influence was minor. Rather than confront separatism through a delegation of Ministerial Members, the meeting proposed a low-key campaign. Tei Abal insisted that the

unity argument be put diplomatically: — | ‘Ol man bilong Bougainville bel bilong em I hot liklik. Orait yumi ken fixim. Yumi ken pinisim woty bilong ol’ [‘The Bougainville people are a

_ bit steamed up. We can deal with that—we can relieve their anxiety: |

| The way to do this was to emphasise the respect in which the people of Bougainville were held throughout the Territory ... that they and the people of the rest of the Territory were truly friends and that it would be a tragedy if the Territory were broken apart.

Lue endorsed this approach and doubted that the Administration could

, handle the issue: ‘the Administration officers tended to wear ties and

never got down to the level of the village people’ | | _ The Administrator was pleased with the meeting, but still anxious about the referendum—and not only in relation to Bougainville. — | If Bougainville has the resources to go it alone, the lesson will not be

| lost on the almost equally wealthy Tolais [of East New Britain] ... In advance of any expression of opinion from the House of Assembly, the

~ Administration ought to be taking every step possible (with due

| discretion) to promote the idea of the unity of the Territory.” The search for agitators persisted. Solomon Islanders were obvious suspects and so was the Rabaul-based Melanesia Independence Front, - though Catholic missionaries continued to attract the closest suspicion.*® Piecing together such items, Brigadier Campbell offered this analysis: separatist movements were ‘normal and predictable results of

political education and growing sophistication’. They were best

9 CONSEQUENCES §& 177 understood in the psychological terms spelt out in a 1964 report (on |

the Mental Health of the Indigenes): coe

Any administrative authority attempting to implement a process of _

cultural change in an immature pre-literate social group in the unenviable position of a parent attempting to guide a family of not very

cooperative adolescents towards adulthood. | 7 , | The parental figure could exercise authority in an authoritarian, a

paternalist, or a mature adult fashion. , ,

[The Administration] faces the dilemma of deciding to what degree it can relax its paternalistic control and encourage permissive risk taking ... The only solution to this problem appears to be the application of a masked and subtle form of directiveness which will give the native

people greater control and responsibility. . What specific action this implied was unclear, although religious, cultural, generational and personal cleavages might offer leverage for manipulation by field officers. Better explanation of Administration

programmes would help, along with a clear account of the ways in which the Administration funded mission programmes. Bougainville — was ‘Teady-made for the application of a psychological operation aimed

at manipulating public attitudes in the Administration's favour’.*? : Campbell judged that BCL operations were the trigger rather than the cause of dissent. He noted parallels between the Hahalis Welfare —

Society and the ‘Amei [Ampei]-Damien secession move’, interpreting , both as the kind of millenarian movement described by Worsley as ‘passing into an orthodox political movement. While Hahalis was localised, the separatist movement was ‘conducted at a higher level of | sophistication and because of the pressure of CRA—for higher stakes’

Secession could attract world-wide interest unless handled ‘with — discretion and with apparent justice to the wishes of the people. The | greatest difference between the two was that the Catholic mission was

‘undoubtedly’ encouraging separatism. A propaganda campaign must | be mounted, nominally as political education but covertly and actually ‘to counter anti-Administration face-to-face propaganda by Lapun,

Amei, Damien et al’>° _ , |

178 & GETTING UNDER THE SKIN _ The formation of Napidakoe Navitu in 1969 introduced a new factor

into the equation. Navitu’s Treasurer/Secretary, Barry Middlemiss, aspired to make it more than a peak body to represent landowners: his ambition was to build it into a pan-Bougainville political movement. It was Napidakoe Navitu that conducted the referendum on independence

in early 1970, distributing about 40 000 ballot papers. The ballot

offered these options: | | I want Bougainville to remain with Papua and New Guinea

(if you vote No above you must answer one of the questions underneath)

_ I want Bougainville to become a separate country (independent) 7

| I want Bougainville to join up with the British Solomons ~ | want Bougainville to join with the other New Guinea Islands | Voters were then asked to write their names and villages. When the Minister met Navitu's leaders in March 1970, Middlemiss and Raphael Bele denounced Joseph Lue and asked for DC Ashton’‘s removal.°* Separatism was now so topical that an ABC television crew accompanied Barnes and asked him to speculate on further police action

if landowners refused to sell. Barnes retorted that ‘this was a smooth operation. Now, as soon as we got stirrers into the operation to make _ trouble, to confuse people, to build their suspicions, we had trouble: Pressed to name the stirrers, he would say only that ‘a lot of people have a vested interest in chaos, not only here but in Australia too’ On the issue of secession, he would add nothing: it was a question for the

House of Assembly, though he would be disappointed if Bougainville

or East New Britain broke away.> _ The regular conference of Bougainville Councils in June 1970 gave DC Ashton some insight into the range of opinion. He identified four

factions. South Bougainville (Buin) delegates thought it might be necessary to secede later, but any referendum should involve the whole Territory. North Bougainville (Buka and Tinputz) delegates strongly

opposed both referendum and secession, perhaps because they _ depended on cash crops, mainland labour and technical assistance from the Administration. Central East Coast (Wakunai) delegates favoured an official committee to inform people, but had ‘no particular views on

9 CONSEQUENCES §& 179 secession. Kieta’s delegates were divided. Some favoured a referendum (but not Navitu’s ballot), and ‘tended towards ultimate secession’, while Navitu naturally favoured their own referendum. According to Middlemiss, the Minister had told him that ‘if Bougainville secedes it must do

so whilst Australia is still in charge. Challenged on Bougainville’s _ vulnerability, he cited Nauru’s independence, and explained that nations like the USA, England and Japan who had interests in CRA would prevent outside interference’. The conference reached no conclusion except that Bougainville’s MHAs should form a committee

to consider the issue further.>** The February 1971 conference, at Wakunai, was much weightier.*> In

the interval, Papua New Guinea had become de facto self-governing, with Somare as Chief Minister and Lapun as Minister for Mines. The DC's entourage represented the old regime, and the new was embodied by Leo Hannett (Somare’s adviser), Moses Havini (Father Momis’s

private secretary), Henry Moses, John Teosin (of Hahalis), Barry © Middlemiss (for the Australian Broadcasting Commission), and K. S. McKenzie of BCL. The agenda was wider than usual and some observers wanted an expression of opinion on secession. = Even the normal agenda had unusual resonance. Ten of the items were demands for public works. Whenever the Public Works Engineer explained that there were no funds, delegates ‘turned on BCP’ with the ‘cry that BCP is making a lot of money and should help Bougainville. McKenzie replied that a great deal of revenue flowed to the government, which allocated funds. He questioned the propriety of BCL’s managing

public works: ‘Did they really want BCP to take on government responsibilities?’ Under this pressure, delegates agreed to rank their demands, and gave first priority to a north-south trunk road from Buka | via Kieta to Buin. McKenzie also encouraged them to rank their requests

to the company. These debates suggested to him that BCL should | reconsider their donation strategy, since ‘requests made by the Combined Conference in a responsible way should not be ignored. _ After schools, local taxes and medical matters, delegates turned to the issue of renegotiating the Agreement. Lapun’s speech struck McKenzie as ‘responsible, factual and largely unemotional’, and there was evidently

another speech by Momis. McKenzie made five points in response: -

180 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN ; The Minister for Mines [Lapun] and the Regional Member [Momis] had

they had said. | Oo

made good speeches and the Company had no real ‘cross’ with what

/ The Company had a clear duty to obey the laws of Papua New Guinea. | The Agreement was of great significance to the country as a whole

Or anger... | ; oe

and to the Company. Any discussion ... should be devoid of emotion The government was to be applauded for its decision to seek outside

| expert advice. However it must be careful not to rely on young, hotblooded economists. They needed mature men with a real under-

- standing of mining. | oe ee - JT agreed with Father John Momis that eventual renegotiation was a two-sided affair not a matter for dictation by the Government or by the

Company. | |

The Mungkas Association held a meeting one evening during the conference. McKenzie gathered that Hannett and Moses dominated the meeting, marshalling opinion for the secession debate. White observers were barred (except Middlemiss, who was effectively muzzled). Later, when McKenzie disputed remarks that Middlemiss intended to attribute to him, he was pleased to be supported by both Lapun and Momis. It

seemed that Middlemiss’s influence was waning. | | | The debate on the secession issue was the climax of the conference. _ Henry Moses began by proposing a committee ‘to guide Bougainville

towards secession’. Andrew Komoro (from Buin) argued that they should secede at once. Anthony Anugu from Siwai also favoured secession and supported a committee. After two other speakers, Sam Kariup from Buka spoke against secession. He was incensed by an incident at Buka: when Somare visited, there were demonstrations for secession and Kariup and other Big Men ‘had been pushed aside and told to “shut up” by vacationing university students. His substantial objections were the difficulty of finding jobs for Bougainvilleans; lack ~ of finance; and sanctions that the outside world would impose. Henry Moses accused Kariup of being manipulated by the planter Jock Lee, to which Kariup retorted that if the conference voted for secession, North | Bougainville would secede from Bougainville. Other northern delegates supported him, while the Wakunai chairman did not state a position.

9 CONSEQUENCES §& 181 McKenzie—like many other outsiders in such encounters—was | baffled by the way in which disputes were handled: delegates reached a ‘confused Melanesian compromise’, and created a bipartisan committee

to educate the people on their options. The Constitutional Planning Committee had already appointed a sub-committee to do precisely this, — so the delegates decided to ask the Chief Minister to disband that sub-

committee and transfer its powers and funds to their own committee. _ Lapun and Momis assured them that the Chief Minister would agree,

and ‘everyone then seemed happy’. | | | ; The Administration and the Department were now marginal. The DC played only a decorative role—as did the kiaps in day-to-day governance—so BCL and the councillors dealt with each other directly.

The Department learned about these proceedings only because BCL

chose to tell them. From BCL's perspective, the conference was encouraging. Delegates proposed projects on behalf of all areas, and treated BCL as ‘part of the long term life of Bougainville. The delegates

have shown preparedness to come to terms with the Company to our mutual benefit. We have made some very firm friends’ And McKenzie | could not imagine how secession could succeed without the support of

North Bougainville: | , |

By forcing the South Bougainvilleans to look deeply at the mechanics and consequences of secession the North Bougainvilleans may well

dampen the ardour of the Southerners. Time and administrative difficulties are on the side of the Northerners. | Separatist sentiment might be strong, but support seemed to be growing

for Panguna, if only to fund projects. And if the Agreement did have to

be amended, it would be negotiated with the central government, .

without the intervention of local politicians. | | |

Chapter 10 Judges and Judgements

- Sooner than anyone expected, Papua New Guinea had its own government. In April 1972, just as Panguna came on stream, elections were

held for a new House of Assembly. The Highlands-based United Party | formed the largest bloc, but Michael Somare built all the other parties | and factions into a coalition centred on his Pangu Pati and Julius Chan’s People’s Progress Party. Together they had a slender majority. Somare became Chief Minister, and Chan Finance Minister; Pangu took six of the remaining ministries and PPP three (one going to Donatus Mola). Disconcertingly for BCL, Paul Lapun (Pangu and Napidakoe Navitu)

took Mines. | |

Honouring his promise to treat a workable majority as a de facto government, Andrew Peacock began to delegate powers.' In December the Australian Labor Party won government and set a maximum of three years for Papua New Guinea's independence, so the new coalition in Port Moresby had to address a critical agenda in great haste—a

constitution, public service localisation, separatisms and regional anxieties, and Australian aid. Father John Momis became de facto chair

of a Constitutional Planning Committee, which proposed to decentralise many powers to district—now provincial—governments. The CPC's radical agenda provoked annoyance in the cabinet, but the country celebrated independence in September 1975 with a constitution, a public service, and an income. —

10 JUDGES AND JUDGEMENTS =| 183 Government involved much crisis management. At Christmas 1972, for example, two Bougainville public servants driving in the Eastern — Highlands accidentally killed a child, whose relatives paid them back by lynching them. When Somare visited Bougainville three weeks later,

he was abused and threatened.” He then appointed the Bougainville priest Dr Alexis Sarei as DC, and (briefly) Leo Hannett as adviser. Such personal approaches neglected structural difficulties. The agreement to create provincial governments faltered when national public servants contested every decision and balked at providing resources. Under this

provocation, the Bougainville provincial assembly lost patience and declared itself independent a fortnight before Papua New Guinea. While Lapun remained in cabinet, Momis led the secessionists to the United Nations. After the UN rebuffed them, the dispute was patched up, and

Bougainville (renamed the North Solomons) remained in the fold. It was in this feverish context that the government turned its attention to .

the mining agreements. | a a

Ox TED! | |

The change of government allows us to compare two approaches to the negotiation of resource projects. In negotiations over Ok Tedi, the first

phase was handled by the Department and the later stages by Papua New Guinea. We may then go on to contrast the Department's handling

negotiation. oe | a |

of the Bougainville Agreement with the Somare government's reEvents at Panguna were followed closely by Kennecott, the American |

Corporation with an interest in the ore body that became Ok Tedi. Like the Department, Kennecott drew interesting inferences from Bougainville affairs. At first, in 1966, Kennecott’s concern was financial: they

offered 25 per cent of equity to Australian or Territory institutions—if the latter would raise 25 per cent of loan capital. Predictably, they _ endorsed the North American practice of levying no royalties. They had

tolerated 70 per cent tax in Chile, but argued that such a swingeing regime could only be sustained in old mines that had already repaid their investment.? After the Rorovana incidents and the High Court

184 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN appeal, Kennecott’s concern shifted to ‘native opposition’. The Department addressed this concern by summarising what little was known of the Star Mountains. The land did have owners, but only 800 lived in

that high, wet region. Relations with government were ‘extremely favourable. None of the Bougainville difficulties [are] apparent. | Reassured, Kennecott agreed to explore ‘a Bougainville-type agreement.’

than BCL: |

| | The ‘lessons’ of Panguna were implicit in the Department's hopes

that, as a ‘Second Starter’, Kennecott should expect less favourable terms

e land purchases might be considered a Company responsibility;

¢ the main town might be a Company town rather than an ‘open’

- town as at Arawa; | | | |

e the Company might be required to meet most or all of the infrastructure costs for the town and associated works;

© benefits... from royalties, taxation, equity participation [etc.] might

, ; be designed to maximise contributions from Company profits over

the life of the project... [and] | e the advice of consultants [should] be sought on these matters.°

To get the ball rolling, the Department invited Kennecott to make a proposal in July 1971.6 Kennecott suggested an open-cut mine and

concentrator near Fubilan, extracting 25 000 tons per day for the eighteen-year life of the mine. A road to Kiunga (100 miles costing $40 million) would deliver concentrate to barges, to carry it to ships at the mouth of the Fly River. Naturally, Kennecott described the project

as marginal and angled for subsidies for transport and power. The

| International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation might

also be asked for help. - | - |

_ Officials wondered how to handle the negotiations. A standard | mining ordinance would be inflexible, and it would not be available in time. An agreement negotiated by a government team could later be denounced as not ‘the best possible deal’. An agreement negotiated by

consultants might be no more generous, but it would deflect flak from the Department; the only difficulty would be financing the consultants’

fees. So the officials proposed that consultants should advise a

, 10 JUDGES AND JUDGEMENTS §& 185 government team—but comprising which players? From Canberra, the

team should include Treasury. By now it was clear that Papua New Guineans must take part (or at least appear to), but the Ministerial Member for Mines, as an expatriate, was ‘not suitable for our purposes’,

and the leading Papua New Guinean public servant, Paulias Matane,

might not be available.’ | a

_ By the time responsibility passed to the Administration headquarters in Konedobu, the Department had said enough to reveal that it had at least learnt one lesson from the Panguna negotiations. It knew better now than to exclude Treasury, with its expertise and contacts. But in other respects things were much the same as before. Papua New Guineans

played no part in negotiating Panguna, and little more in the hypothetical Ok Tedi case. Landowners were finessed on the grounds that their involvement would jeopardise the national good (in other words, the Territory budget). The Department construed negotiating as a purely technical exercise, intended to secure the golden eggs without killing the goose. It followed that politicians were irrelevant, if not subversive. __ The exercise must be done by public servants. ‘Politics’ meant problems.

To defuse irrational ‘resentment and hostility against overseas investment’, people must gain ‘a sense of participation’ This was tokenism. _ The landowners of Ok Tedi could never buy substantial equity in— much less ownership of—the behemoth that would swallow their land. © The Department's orientation is surprising in another way. In the 1990s, critics have noted that the Papua New Guinea state has vanished from mining areas, leaving resource companies to deliver hospitals,

schools and roads. Whether the state is withering away or brokenbacked, it is a conspicuous absentee.® For such critics of the limp

independent state, it is salutary to note that in 1971 the Department would have required Kennecott to buy its own land, build its own town © and create its own infrastructure. The Papua New Guinea state began

wilting before independence. i | _ When it came to Ok Tedi, the amateurism of the old Department compared poorly with the professionalism of the new Papua New Guinea government. As Richard Jackson has shown, the new negotiators

did their homework thoroughly. Ministers recruited consultants in a_ world market. An American lawyer, Steven Zorn, became Lapun’s

186 = GETTING UNDER THE SKIN © ~ adviser. The Canadian David Beatty became director of a new National Planning Office, while Julius Chan, as Finance Minister, coaxed the economists Ross Garnaut and Anthony Clunies-Ross into devising a new way to tax mining. With their expertise, their contacts and their

commitment to Papua New Guinea, these consultants placed the government in a much stronger position than the Department, whose information and expertise were limited by Public Service rules and

sensitivities. Rather than waiting for a company proposal, they researched the global market for capital and for rival companies. Kennecott eventually presented its terms as an ultimatum; and in

, March 1975, to universal amazement, Papua New Guinea’s negotiators rejected them. The company quit, and the government managed the prospect until BHP took over. In Richard Jackson’s account, Goliath is slain by the Papua New Guinean David—though he does concede that the agreement with BHP may have been less favourable than Kennecott's

terms.” | |

RENEGOTIATING BOUGAINVILLE _ Even before the 1972 election, a member of the House asked pointedly _ whether, in negotiating the Bougainville Agreement, the Administration and the Australian government had taken ‘advice from acknowledged

experts in relevant fields’: |

If so, what are the names of the experts? If not, then in view of the undoubted expertise C.R.A. had available to it, what reason has the -House of Assembly to feel confident that the Territory has had the best

deal possible? | |

In far-off Canberra, G.O. Gutman drafted an evasive reply, citing technical advice from the Bureau of Mineral Resources, legal advice from various lawyers, financial advice from the Administration, the

Department itself—and Treasury! we

| Assisted by such expert advice negotiations were conducted by senior _ Officers of the Administration and the Department of External Territories

10 JUDGES AND JUDGEMENTS | 187 with wide experience in high level commercial and international

negotiations...

The House of Assembly therefore can have every confidence that the

best possible deal was secured.'© | |

The new House of Assembly was not convinced. Momis introduced a motion in favour of renegotiation, which was debated in and out of the

House for weeks, and passed in November. | Politicians were not the only critics. A UN Development Program team, which had been consulted on economic strategies, found serious fault with the Agreement. It found that the project had ‘transformed the country’s economy and disturbed its political unity’, and suggested that the Agreement was so heavily weighted in BCL's favour that it

should be renegotiated.!! Sir John Crawford, Australia’s foremost

economic strategist, deplored these ‘cheap comments’: __ a I do not understand why so many academic people forget the standards

of their profession and find it so easy to make completely nonsubstantiated statements. But, alas, this was characteristic of the entire |

draft report as I read it.!? Oo

A World Bank paper asserted that ‘in the circumstances at the time’ the Agreement had achieved ‘a balance of advantages that was satisfactory to both parties’ Yet by early 1972 the economist M. L. Treadgold, who

had initially welcomed the project's contributions to income, was beginning to suspect that Panguna ‘could turn out to be an example of how lack of detailed knowledge weakens the bargaining position of a

host country’!3 | | | -

- Gutman, who had now left the public service, took issue with his.

critics in the Melbourne Age: a

The intelligent way of ensuring that Papua New Guinea benefits from _ future mineral price increases is to have a local share of the project equity plus profit sharing arrangements. The Bougainville deal provides

for both these and other benefits ... a OO The Bougainville agreement ... gives greater net benefits to Papua | New Guinea than Australia derives from the major iron ore projects in

188 = GETTING UNDER THE SKIN Western Australia, or than Irian [Jaya] derives from the Ertsburg [sic]

ss Copper project... |

Papua New Guinea's share of the equity .. . has now a market value

, of about $160 million. A capital gain of over 500% in two years on - investment financed by concessional loans . .. does not look like a bad

bargain, especially when that capital gain represents only a fraction of

the total benefits accruing. | 7 | 7 |

Gutman extended his defence of the agreement at the 1973 Waigani Seminar at the University of Papua New Guinea.!> There he argued that Panguna might prove a ‘lead sector’, promoting ancillary investment and interest in Papua New Guinea as a mineral producer and processor. Conversely, CRA depended heavily on loans, so that the project: a depended on the investors’ capacity to convince major lenders that the _ project was viable, even if historically low prices of copper should occur,

and that the contractual arrangements with the host country would

ensure a cash flow sufficient to service and repay a large debt. The company was therefore ready in return for arrangements which would _ enable it to generate an early cash flow, to make concessions which would give an increasingly large share of the project’s revenue to the

weremet. | ae | -

host government once the initial requirements of the project company

In short, ‘the requirements of the two parties were not competitive, but

~ complementary’. | , | Gutman was on firmer ground when analysing the impact of the 1966 legislation. Under the old laws BCL could have obtained a mining _ lease on request, and would have paid company tax of merely 20 per

cent. As a pioneer venture, it might also have earned a five-year tax exemption. The 1966 legislation imposed greater obligations. BCL was only allowed a three-year tax holiday, and the write-off provisions were

| already available under the tax law. The corporate tax rate—set low to attract capital—would not apply to BCL. Gutman quarantined economic from political issues. He regretted the emotion aroused by Panguna, and sought answers in ‘the patient

examination of facts, their dispassionate analysis and ... rational

| 10 JUDGES AND JUDGEMENTS §& 189 judgment. His own analysis, however, was neither dispassionate nor _

faultless. As Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh points out, circumstances had overtaken Gutman’s vision of Panguna’s role. With independence imminent and Australian aid no longer assured, the government was | anxious to generate revenue quickly. Somare’s coalition saw Panguna as |

an enclave that produced few indirect benefits: it was only justified if it | yielded revenue ‘at an early date’!© By the time Gutman spoke, the

Agreement was doomed. |

~Panguna was due to open in October 1972. By May, a worried Frank Espie had decided that the formal opening by the Chief Minister would be low-key. Even so, it would be tense. A face-saving solution was found:

BCL cancelled the ceremony and donated the money to an appeal for | the drought-stricken Highlands.’’ Pressure was building from another direction as well. Espie was pushed ‘particularly from London’ to resist renegotiation. He should make ‘strong representations’ to the Minister

for Territories and seek ‘direct and detailed discussions with the Chief | Minister. Don Mentz warned (and Espie agreed) that it would be unwise

to be seen to lobby Somare or the Minister for Territories.!8 - Foreign Affairs was listening to the debates in Port Moresby, and advised that even in ‘responsible circles’ the Agreement was regarded as | too favourable to BCL. Benefits would flow only after 1977, and meanwhile the equity payment and the infrastructure programme would impose a heavy financial strain. The political situation was ‘extremely delicate’; BCL’s contribution to the Highlands famine fund had been accepted by Somare ‘only after prolonged discussion with the Bougain-

villean members’! so - | | _ BCL managers embarked on an African safari to see Panguna’s future,

and returned depressed. In Dar es Salaam an Australian diplomat sug- _ gested that Zambia, where mines had been nationalised, was a pointer to Papua New Guinea’s future. Business consultants who met Don —

Vernon and John Trezise ‘did not think an immediate wholesale

nationalisation would be advisable for fear of discouraging other | investors ... but could well foresee a gradual “tightening of the screws” until Bougainville Copper was completely in PNG hands. For Vernon and Tresize, the visit helped to crystallise their feeling that renegotiation __ was inevitable, but total nationalisation was unlikely. Don Mentz of the

190 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN Department agreed,”° but he and BCL were both in the dark about the scope of the renegotiation, both fearing a degree of nationalisation. The Papua New Guinea government was not the only cloud on CRA's horizon. The new Labor government in Australia gave voice to economic

- nationalism and suspicion of transnational corporations. Espie was on the back foot when he met the new Minister, W. L. Morrison: he had to deny that CRA had withheld information, and to insist that CRA was genuinely uncertain of Panguna’s viability. Again he explained that BCL must satisfy lenders: ‘availability of the loan funds was very much the key

to whether the project could proceed’. a _ , ‘But BCL’s immediate problem was in Konedobu, where Lapun proposed a mechanism for renegotiation.** He compared ownership and

taxation regimes in countries that had nationalised mines, and found that Chile, Peru, Zaire and Zambia commonly held 51 per cent interest in

copper mines and levied taxes at rates between 25 and 73 per cent. He would invite BCL and the Australian government to explore changes to the Agreement; meanwhile he would create a staff support group and call in consultants. If BCL balked, the government ‘would have to consider other possible courses of action’ Renegotiation was a popular option. To neutralise any criticism from business and the opposition: _ We should emphasise that we want foreign investment ... At the same time we should make it clear that Bougainville is a special case—because

it was negotiated by the Australian government—and that the Papua New Guinea government intends to honour in full all agreements that it

negotiates for itself. | | |

_ [Further] in view of renewed secessionist activity on Bougainville, it

is imperative that the people of Bougainville see the National Coalition government as a positive force, doing something to improve their lives.

The Department was not convinced. Most of the overseas mines listed had more than repaid their investment; nationalisation had unhappy consequences; and the UN team’s report was not based on mineral expertise. But the Department was keen to avoid entanglement. Any Australian participation ‘would open the way for further renegotia-

tion of the agreement at a later stage on the grounds that it was not a wholly independent PNG Government agreement’, and in any event

10 JUDGES AND JUDGEMENTS + 191 ‘responsibility for mining projects is likely to transfer to PNG before the

discussions are completed’73 The issue became critical in 1974 after BCL announced 1973 profits

of $A158.4 million, an astounding return on $400 million invested. The government received $A29 million for this first year of production, mostly as dividends, and was goaded into renegotiations. BCL attributed

the result to exceptional metal prices. They had a strong case in economics but a poor one politically. Copper soared from £450 per tonne at the end of 1972 to a record £1135 a year later (see table 10.2).*4 The boom was also brief. Prices slumped to £529 by the end of 1974, but that was too late to avert renegotiation. |

O'Faircheallaigh provides the fullest account of these talks, and — Jackson the most dramatic.*? BCL could only guess at Papua New Guinea's goals, and their anxiety was sharpened in February 1974 when

Momis and John Kaputin (Minister for Justice) demanded broad nationalisation. The coalition, however, was by no means of one mind, let alone a nationalising mind. Garnaut and Clunies-Ross had devised a

Resource Rent Tax.*° Its opponents (especially those who paid it) described it as an additional profits tax, but by any name it was the

centrepiece of the government strategy. _ | Discussions began in early 1974. BCL’s team was captained by Ray Ballmer; Papua New Guinea's by the public servant Mekere Morauta, who resigned from the BCL Board to take this position, but the effective leader was Steven Zorn, a declared critic of transnationals. Renegotiation involved theatre, quite foreign to Australian public service traditions,

and directed by David Beatty. When little headway was made, Albert Maori Kiki (Deputy Chief Minister) stated that the government's terms must be accepted or they would be enforced by legislation. This crisis

prompted a visit by the head of RTZ, Sir Val Duncan. | But what happened when Sir Val’s private jet taxied to a halt on the steaming tarmac of [Port Moresby’s] Jackson’s Airport? Precisely nothing.

There was no red carpet, no police band, not even a minister at the

airport, simply BCL’s own cars. | oe - |

After he had cooled his heels for some hours, his staff reached Maori Kiki, who cheerfully explained that Somare had a prior appointment—

192 | GETTING UNDER THE SKIN | | | on the golf course. Jackson believes that this rebuff disoriented Duncan

, so much he ‘agreed where some of his own negotiators might not have

... with the government's position ... and with the concept of additional profits taxation’*’ On any reading, Duncan’s visit vindicated Mentz’s and Espie’s scepticism about personal approaches to politicians.

The government's purpose was not nationalisation, nor to share in management. It did want more revenue, and sooner. The tax exemption on 20 per cent of profits was annulled, the tax holiday was cancelled, accelerated depreciation allowances were withdrawn, corporation tax was imposed at the standard 33 per cent, and Additional Profits were taxed. BCL’s only success was to defer the end of tax exemption by six months.?° But in retrospect BCL was lucky: the government's coup gave it a sense of ownership of the project. The new agreement, combined with community relations initiatives, secured a generation of production. Direct comparisons are not entirely fair. The lenders, and then CRA,

set the terms for the original Agreement, but the government held the aces in renegotiating. It was a fortuitous price surge that exposed the

| inequity of the original deal and enabled Papua New Guinea to force CRA to renegotiate. The original was based on projections, the latter on data. Arguably (and Treasury did so argue) CRA might have been denied its long tax holiday or its generous write-down provisions in the original agreement—but only if the lenders had accepted these modifications.

| An earlier approach to IBRD or ADB might have avoided the need to go to Treasury, Cabinet or the market; but the short interval between CRA’s

commitment to the project and the calls on capital made that approach nearly impossible. But even with these caveats, the Papua New Guinea

government made the Department look dilettantish. |

JUDGEMENTS ; - oe | For fifteen years Panguna was an engineering and investment triumph.

Its capacity grew from 90000 tonnes to 130000, with annual production of 550 000 tonnes of concentrate, 170 000 tonnes of copper, — 15.000 kg of gold and 50 000 kg of silver. The K425 million investment - was augmented by K350 million from profits. The estimated size of the

, | 10 JUDGES AND JUDGEMENTS = 193

—

emporium, etc., for most of east central Bougainville. | II. Factors Concerning Internal Relations High versus Low Elevation. Climatic conditions alone seem to me to

recommend siting the CRA town on higher ground. - , Fragmented versus Unified Town. In a unified residential town comprising __ some 7,000-8,000 persons it would be next to impossible to accomplish the kind of ‘integration’ desired by CRA, especially in view of the ethnic — variation involved. A great deal of sociological study indicates that any population aggregate containing more than about 1,500-1,700 persons will

inevitably split up into smaller separate units, either ‘vertically’ or ‘horizontally’, By vertical fragmentation I mean stratification on some basis _ or other: race, religion, occupation, income, education, etc. By horizontal |

parishes, etc. ,

mean fragmentation on a spatial basis, such as neighbourhoods, precincts, | |

Now some vertical stratification (probably based on race and income) is | going to develop in CRA’s town regardless of distance between dwellings, in spite of anything done to discourage it; but it can be minimised by, say, five

geographically separate neighbourhoods each comprising some 1,600

persons of all ethnic and income categories. _ oe Geography alone should encourage a sense of ‘community’ in each

neighbourhood, but the Company could assist this process by fostering neighbourhood competition between athletic teams, choral societies, _ dressmaking clubs, etc. If rivalries are going to develop, which they undoubtedly will do, how much better that it be between whole neighbour-

hoods consisting of all races, etc., than between, say, Europeans and

indigenes, or Black Skins and Red Skins. Be | As neighbourhoods develop into communities they are also going to develop internal social structures. And in view of the Company's commit-

230 8 APPENDIX ment to integration and ethnic replacement some encouragement will probably have to be applied to ensure that leadership in local neighbour_ hood affairs does not accumulate, by default, in European hands. Melanesians in general, and Bougainville natives in particular, differ radically from Europeans in the structure of their residences and in the use they make of them. Few either cook, eat or socialise inside their houses. Indeed, in many areas none but the closest of relatives are welcome inside a

| house—the place where people sleep. In planning houses for indigenes, - provision should be made for occupants to do part of their living outdoors. Another problem in planning dwellings for indigenous families is ‘The Problem of Permanent Visitors’. There are few things more certain than that

many houses will be more or less permanently crowded by ‘visiting’ relatives. If CRA wishes to avoid this situation (and I suggest that it should), rules governing house occupancy ought to be promulgated at the start.

Finally I draw attention to the housing situation among Tolai in and around Rabaul. There may be useful pointers from a study of their living arrangements, since of all the indigenes in Melanesia the Tolai have moved

farthest in the direction of western-type economy and style of living. The

ANU. _ | | |

ground work for such a study is available in publications and field notes of Drs. A. L. and S. Epstein, attached to the Research School of Pacific Studies,

The proximity of the Epsteins, and of Mr. Oram, leads me to recommend that CRA engage these 3 to consult with CRA’s engineering services to work

residential units. , |

out architectural plans for the indigenous and expatriate-indigenous

Notes a INTRODUCTION | |

1 Sean Dorney, The Sandline Affair. |

2 Press Summary by John Temple, text in Australian Archives, Department of Territories, 68/5448. 3 John Dove, Theodore Miriung and Mel Togolo, ‘Mining Bitterness’ in Peter

Sack (ed.), Problem of Choice, pp. 181-2. os

4 Clive Moore and Mary Kooyman (eds), A Papua New Guinea Political Chronicle

1998. ,

1967-1991. a

> The Australian Trusteeship: Papua New Guinea 1945-1975.

6 James Griffin’s contributions, listed in the bibliography, are too numerous to - mention here. Sean Dorney’s reportage earned him the Walkley award for ” Douglas Oliver, A Solomon Island Society: Kinship and Leadership among the Sivai

of Bougainville; Bougainville: A Personal History; Black Islanders: a Personal Perspective of Bougainville, 1937-1991.

CHAPTER 1 BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE CRA | ' J. Momis and E. Ogan, ‘Bougainville '71. Not discovered by CRA’ +N. H. Fisher's Report, 1936, reprinted in H. H. Stephenson (ed.), Bougainville—

The Establishment of a Copper Mine.

3 68/4999, Territory Intelligence Committee Paper 3/68, 12 September 1968.

* Matthew Spriggs summarises the general situation in ‘The Holocene’, in D. Denoon et al. (eds), The Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders, and the Bougainville situation in The Island Melanesians.

> Stewart Firth, New Guinea under the Germans, p. 127.

» 231

232 = NOTES (CHAPTER 1) ° Douglas Oliver, Black Islanders and A Solomon Island Society; 69/2217, Undated report on the impact of the copper project on wages; Max Rimoldi and Eleanor ~ Rimoldi, Hahalis and the Labour of Love: a Social Movement on Buka Island,

chapter 2.

_ ” Oliver, ‘Some Social-Relational Aspects of CRA Copper-Mining on Bougainville’,

unpublished report for CRA, 1968; J. Allen and C. Hurd, “Languages of Bougainville District’, cited in Eugene Ogan, ‘The cultural background to the Bougainville crisis’; Dorney, The Sandline Affair, p. 39. 8 Jill Nash and Eugene Ogan, ‘The Red and the Black: Bougainvillean Perceptions of other Papua New Guineans’

” Dorney, The Sandline Affair, p. 39. .

Melanesians. ,

10 Ogan, ‘The cultural background to the Bougainville crisis’; Spriggs, Island 1! Oliver, ‘Some Social-Relational Aspects’

12 Oliver, ‘Some Social-Relational Aspects’ , 13” Ogan ‘The cultural background to the Bougainville crisis’

14 Ogan, ‘Nasioi land tenure. -

, 15 Firth, New Guinea Under the Germans. , , 16 John Momis and Eugene Ogan, ‘Development Experience: the view from Bougainville’, in fifth Waigani seminar proceedings, 1971. '? Firth, New Guinea under the Germans, p. 86; Peter Hastings, New Guinea Problems

and Prospects, p. 72. ,

'8 Stewart Firth, ‘Colonial Administration and the Invention of the Native’, in Denoon et al., Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders.

— -'1) Firth, New Guinea Under the Germans. 20 Mike Bell, interviewed in Melbourne, January 1998. _ 7! Eugene Ogan, interviewed in Honolulu, November 1997; Bill Brown, interviewed in Sydney, August 1998. _. #2" Personal communication, Jim Byth, December 1998. 23 68/4999, Territory Intelligence Committee Paper 3/68, 12 September 1968;

and 69/2217, undated report on the impact of the copper project on wages. Interview with Eugene Ogan, Honolulu, November 1997. The District Head-

quarters returned to Kieta from Sohano in 1968. ,

24 K. M. Phillips, ‘Notes on Contact with Bougainvilleans in the Early Exploration

Phase, 1964-66’, appendix 1 in Richard Bedford and Alexander Mamak, Compensating for Development: the Bougainville Case, p. 11.

*° 69/4676, Administrator to Department, 23 September 1969, enclosing A. M.

, Bottrill’s report, 4 September 1969. 26 Oliver, A Solomon Island Society; Eugene Ogan, Business and Cargo, and ‘Nasioi

_ land tenure: an extended case study’; D. D. Mitchell, Land and Agriculture in

of South Bougainville. — ,

Nagovisi, Papua New Guinea; Jill Nash, Matriliny and modernisation: the Nagovisi *? 69/2158, BCL’s six-monthly report to the Administration for the first half of 1968. 28 John Burton, ‘The Land Tenure System of the Nasioi People’.

29 69/3092, Administrator to Department, 1 May 1969. 30 James Griffin, ‘Bougainville is a Special Case’, in R. J. May and M. Spriggs (ed),

The Bougainville Crisis, quoting Pacific Islands Monthly, May 1949. : 31 Douglas Oliver, ‘Some Social-Relational Aspects’. 32, Momis and Ogan, ‘Bougainville: Not Discovered by CRA’ 33° David Elder, ‘Bougainville Background’.

NOTES (CHAPTER 1) =& 233 34 69/2217, Undated report on the impact of the copper project on wages. °° 69/2217, Undated report on the impact of the copper project on wages.

wages. te ,

3° Elder, ‘Bougainville Background’ Oo

37 Commentary by John Connell, ‘Bougainville is legitimate again’. For telephone services, see 69/2217, undated report on the impact of the copper project on

38 Oliver, ‘Some Social-Relational Aspects’ Ce °° 67/3861, Administrator to Department, enclosing N. N. Pratt's account of a

meeting at Barapina, 4 April 1967. ,

40 Hugh Laracy, Marists and Melanesians: A History of the Catholic Missions in the Solomon Islands; James Griffin, “‘Buka and Arawa: some black thoughts on a white history of Bougainville’; Elder, ‘Bougainville Background’.

41 Oliver, Black Islanders, p.58. — | , | oe

42 Gavin Long, The Six Years War: a Concise History of Australia in the 1939-1945

- War; James Griffin, ‘Paul Mason’ ,

43 James Griffin, ‘Bougainville—Secession or Just Sentiment?’

44 68/4999, ‘Bougainville Situation’, 2 October 1968. | 49 69/2217, undated report on the impact of Bougainville copper on wages. 46 Laracy, Marists and Melanesians; Griffin, ‘Buka and Arawa’.

47 68/4999, ‘Bougainville Situation’, 2 October 1968. |

48 Elder, ‘Bougainville Background’. | Oo

Islanders. , _

49 Laracy, Marists and Melanesians; 68/4999, ‘Bougainville Situation’, 2 October 1968. _ °° Lindstrom, ‘Custom Remade’, in Denoon et al., Cambridge History of the Pacific —

>! Max and Eleanor Rimoldi, Hahalis and the Labour of Love. ,

°2 Elder, ‘Bougainville Background’. _ , Oo

53 Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound: a Study of ‘Cargo’ Cults in Melanesia. Worsley’s

monograph became a classic, and was republished in 1968 and 1970. , 4 Lindstrom, ‘Custom Remade’; and Peter Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo: a study of ,

Love. , , ,

the cargo movement in the southern Madang district, p. 31. ,

55 Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound, chapter 6; Rimoldis, Hahalis and the Labour of

°6 68/4999, Territory Intelligence Committee Paper 3/68, 12 September 1968. _ >’ Griffin, ‘Bougainville—Secession or Just Sentiment?’ 58 Oliver, Bougainville: a Personal History, pp. 150-3; Alexander Mamakand Ahmed

Ali (eds), Race, Class and Rebellion in the South Pacific. ,

°° Rimoldis, Hahalis and the Labour of Love; Oliver, Bougainville: a Personal History, —

chapter 8; Elder, ‘Bougainville Background’. , 61 Oliver, ‘Some Social-Relational Aspects’

6° 67/3861, Assistant District Commissioner's report to his Director, 18 October 1968.

62 68/4999, Territory Intelligence Committee Paper 3/68, 12 September 1968.

°S Interview with Mike Bell, Melbourne, 29 January 1998. — | | | 64 Interview with Eugene Ogan, Honolulu, November 1997; and Ogan, ‘Cargoism.

and Politics in Bougainville’ 6° W. Fingleton, ‘Bougainville: a Chronicle of Just Grievances’.

66 68/5448, text of ABC Four Corners television programme, 30 November 1968. a

67 Griffin, ‘Bougainville—secession or just sentiment?’ | 68 68/4999, Territory Intelligence Committee Paper 3/68, 12 September 1968. 69 Interviews with Jack Sharp, June 1998; Mike Bell, January 1998; Bill Brown, August 1998.

234 = NOTES (CHAPTER 1-2) 66/5311, Deputy DC Denehy to Director, District Administration, 19 October 1966, enclosing Assistant DC Brown’s report of 15 October 1966.

7 67/3861, T. E. Daw to Director, Department of District Administration,

10 August 1967. _

‘2 Eugene Ogan, ‘Some Historical Background to the 1989 unrest in Bougainville’ “ James Griffin, ‘Mistakes and Misconception: Some Background (1964-76) to

, the North Solomons Impasse’ See also Griffin, ‘Bougainville’; ‘Bougainville: secession or just sentiment’, ‘Buka and Arawa’; ‘Kivung Bougainville’; ‘Bougain-

ville—occultus sed not ignotus’; and ‘Local government councils as an

instrument of political mobilisation in Bougainville’ 74 Nash and Ogan, ‘The Red and the Black’, referring also to the planter, Paul Mason, ‘What has become of the “Buka Boy”?’, Pacific Islands Monthly,

September 1951. , 75 Hank Nelson, ‘Bougainville Breakaway’. , © Colin Filer, in D. Denoon et al. (eds), The Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders.

’’ Griffin, ‘Bougainville—Secession or just Sentiment’. 78 Nash and Ogan, ‘The Red and the Black’; and interview with Eugene Ogan,

Honolulu, November 1997. , ,

” Bougainville News, vol. 1, no. 1, July 1970.

| 8° Oliver, Bougainville: a Personal History, 156; Ogan, ‘Cargoism and Politics’

CHAPTER 2 AUSTRALIA'S MANDATE | ' International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.

* Hank Nelson, Black, White and Gold: Gold Mining in Papua New Guinea, 1878-1930. 3 James Griffin, Hank Nelson and Stewart Firth, Papua New Guinea: a Political History.

_* A Research Paper summarised the Department's understanding: 68/5430, undated, March 1967. See also Judith Bennett, Wealth of the Solomons: A History of a Pacific Archipelago, 1800-1978; and Stewart Firth, New Guinea under the Germans. At no time was Bougainville part of the British Solomon Islands.

> Patricia Hopper, Kicking Out the Hun. , , ° Dudley McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area—First Year. Kokoda to Wau, Australia in the War of 1939-1945 and David Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, Australia in

the War of 1939-1945. .

| “ Tan Downs, The Australian Trusteeship: Papua New Guinea 1945-1975. | 8 Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, pp. 11-13 > Denoon, ‘Capitalism in Papua New Guinea’; Downs, The Australian Trusteeship,

pp. 82-3.

_'° For convenience, the term ‘Department of Territories’ is used throughout this

study, although at different times it had other names, most often the

Department of External Territories. oe

1 Paul Hasluck, A Time for Building: Australian Administration in Papua and New

a Guinea 1951-1963, p. 6. ,

'2 Downs, The Australian Trusteeship; B. Jinks, Papua New Guinea 1942-1952. Couve de Murville described Hasluck as his own inspector-general (A Time for

Building, p. 407).

'5 Murray Groves, ‘The Reign of Mr Hasluck’, Nation, 5 May 1962, cited in Downs, The Australian Trusteeship.

NOTES (CHAPTER 2-3) | 235

Colony’ | ,

14 These are tabulated in Denoon, ‘Capitalism in Papua New Guinea’. 'S A 452, 62/3210, Minister's minute, 27 January 1956. Hank Nelson, ‘Never a ‘6 Hank Nelson, ‘The Talk and the Timing’

'7 Hasluck, A Time for Building, pp. 86, 239. '8_E. P. Wolfers, ‘January-April 1967’, in Moore and Kooyman (eds), A Papua New Guinea Political Chronicle, 1967-1991. , 9 Loraine Nott, CEB: exploits of an uncommon man, p. 62. 20 Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, p. 284.

1 Interview with Don Mentz, Canberra, 7 August 1998. |

22 House of Representatives, 31 March 1966, pp. 805-6; and 2 May 1968, p. 1059;

Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, pp. 368-76. 23. Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, p. 274. |

4 Interview with Don Mentz, Canberra, 7 August 1998. |

2° Interview with Sir Frank Espie, Adelaide, 11 February 1998. |

26 69/2217, Minute of (indecipherable), April 1969. — , 2? Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, p. 481; interview with Andrew Peacock, — Washington, July 1998. 28 60/374, Minister's minute of 28 January 1960. 22 Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, p. 240.

30 Barnes was acutely aware of Katanga—a stallion which sired many of his best

racehorses. Loraine Nott, Studmaster of Canning Downs. ,

3! Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, p. 555. 32 Hasluck, A Time for Building, p. 14. 33. Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, p. 286. 34 Oliver, ‘Some Social-Relational Aspects’ - , 35 Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, p. 287.

3° Catherine Snowden, ‘Cooperatives’, in Denoon and Snowden (eds), A Time to Plant and a Time to Uproot.

3? Sinclair Dinnen, Challenges of Order in a Weak State. a 38 68/5563, part II, Administrator to Department, 2 June 1969. Downs, a former

kiap and then highland settler, was an able observer who later wrote the

invaluable The Australian Trusteeship. | , ae

39 Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, pp. 287, 395-6. a

40 Griffin, Nelson and Firth, Papua New Guinea. , CHAPTER 3. MINING BEFORE PANGUNA — | | ' The leading source is Hank Nelson, Black, White and Gold. The following para-

graphs lean heavily on Nelson’s expertise. * Bill Gammage, The Sky Travellers: Journeys in New Guinea 1938-1939. 3 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, Mining in the Papua New Guinea Economy, 1880-1980,

and ‘Mining, Development and the Colonial State: New Guinea 1926-1940°

4 Bill Gammage, ‘The Rabaul Strike, 1929’. , a a > ‘Warden's Monthly Report, January 1927’, Rabaul Times, 1 April 1927.

° Alan Healey, Bulolo: A history of the Development of the Bulolo Region, New Guinea.

” Healey (Bulolo) deals with Guinea Gold, Placer and Bulolo Gold Dredging. 8 AV 834/2. Note on file, 12 December 1935. > AV 834/2. Note on file, 12 December 1935. Interview at Salamaua, 15 November 1935: MacNicoll, District Officer E. Taylor, Warden E. Feldt, Inspector of

236 | NOTES (CHAPTER 3) , Mines Fry; Messrs Blaikie-Webster and De Latour (NGG); Messrs Davis, Hodge and Pope, Engine Drivers. For MacNicoll’s reference to trouble, see Gammage, ‘The Rabaul Strike, 1929" 10 J. Blaikie-Webster to Administrator, 4 December 1935, copy in Administrator

| to Prime Minister, 10 January 1936, AV 834/2, Part 1. _ ,

1 Note on file, 4 May 1936, AV 834/2.

12 Healey, Bulolo. AV834/2, part two; petitions from trade unions, and debate on

, 20 June 1941. O’Faircheallaigh, ‘Mining, Development and the Colonial State’ 13 Healey, Bulolo; and A518/1, Z834/2, precis of Mr B. Dunstan's report of his investigations, 17 July 1931; T834/2, note of 19 July 1928. _ 14 Tam deeply indebted to Hank Nelson for this startling information.

'> Oliver, Bougainville: a Personal History, p. 157. a , 16 N. H. Fisher’s Report, published in the Rabaul Times, reproduced in H. H. Stephenson (ed.), Bougainville—The Establishment of a Copper Mine.

17 Duhig patronised the arts and built churches. Had the Syndicate prospered,

_ Placing Queensland Art. , | 18 4518/1, AM834/1. | : Brisbane might have had a bigger cathedral. G. R. Cooke (ed.), Art Off Centre:

19 O'Faircheallaigh, ‘Mining, Development and the Colonial State’; A518/1, BS834/2, ‘Revenue from Royalty on Gold’, 7 April 1948.

20 A518/1, BV834/2, part one, Halligan’s minute, 27 October 1949. 1 J. E. Thompson’s report of 1962, in Stephenson, Bougainville—The Establishment of a Copper Mine; A518/1, $815/1/1, Administrator's return, 15 May 1956. 22 59/2248, ‘Mining Development Policy—Review March 1959’.

23 59/2248, Secretary's minute, 4 October 1961. _

24 IBRD, The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, p. 222.

25 60/5163, Administration Press Statement, 29 November 1962.

~ #8 Donald Denoon, Settler Capitalism 7 27 Wray Vamplew (ed.), Australians: Historical Statistics.

| 8 62/3332, Hasluck to S. S. Ellis, 5 July 1962. | 29 62/3332, Note for file by E. J. Wood, 30 July 1963. oo

3° 70/2960, Confidential summary of policy development, 10 August 1970. 7} 70/2960, Confidential summary of policy development, 10 August 1970. 32 67/3290, discussions, 6 April 1967. Australian Financial Review, 20 March and

6 April 1967. - oo 2 .

33 68/4411, draft pamphlet; Prime Minister's Department response, 12 December 1967; External Affairs response, 20 December 1967; draft Minister's Foreword,

5 December 1967. 7

34 Richard Pape, Department of Information & Extension Services, Port Moresby,

‘Papua and New Guinea’, Investors Chronicle, 30 August 1968. , , 3° 70/2960, Confidential summary of policy development, 10 August 1970.

36 69/1138, minute of 26 February 1969. Co ,

37 69/1138, Meeting of Department and Administration, Canberra, 5 February

1969; minute of 30 January 1969. — 38 69/2160, minute of 18 June 1968, reporting a meeting between BCL and the

Administration, 15 May 1968. , , 39 61/6123. ee Lo

, 40 62/1667, Administrator to Secretary, 27 April 1962, and Departmental minutes.

41 66/5311, unsigned Departmental analysis. | 42 67/3861, Administrator to Department, 11 September 1968.

| | NOTES (CHAPTER 4) | 237 CHAPTER 4 PROSPECTING | - | |

topic. , | _! J. E. Thompson’s report, 1962, and his covering letter to the editor, in Stephenson (ed.), Bougainville—The Establishment of a Copper Mine. 2 Douglas Oliver, Black Islanders, chapter 8, is a clear introduction to this > Mining Journal, 14 February 1969. 4K. M. Phillips, ‘Notes on Contact with Bougainvilleans in the Early Exploration Phase, 1964-66’, in Richard Bedford and Alexander Mamak (eds), Compensating for Development: the Bougainville Case. Much of this chapter is based on Phillips’s

account. , a oo

> 67/3861, Administrator to Department, enclosing N. N. Pratt’s record (10 April 1967) of a meeting at Barapina on 4 April. Pratt assumed that Robinson had

been the interpreter. | |

© Mike Bell, interviewed in Melbourne, January 1998. | 7 Pacific Islands Monthly, ‘Discovery’, in Stephenson, Bougainville—The Establishment of a Copper Mine. Overall cost in 67/1347, Cabinet Submission, 13 January

27 August 1970. i ,

1967; and 67/6401, BCL to Department of Territories, six-monthly report, —

8 67/3861, Administrator to Department, 23 June 1967. ? OFaircheallaigh, The Role of Foreign Investment in Mineral Development. 10 Interview with Bill Brown, Sydney, August 1998.

1967. . , ,

'l Oliver, ‘Some Social-Relational Aspects’. oo ,

'2 67/1648. Warden's Court records. os | Se

13 W. T. Brown to Director, Department of District Administration, 19 January

4 W. T. Brown to Director, Department of District Administration, 19 January | 1967. Minutes of Mining Advisory Board Meeting 6 of 1966/67, enclosed in — -Hay to Department, 1 February 1967. Members were D. S. Grove (chair), I. A.

Wood, H. A. Trestrail, A. Renwick. - , , .

'S 67/347, Administrator to Department, 1 February 1967. -

16 August 1968. | ae ee |

16 69/2160. Minutes of conferences with CRA, Port Moresby, 15 May and ©

"7 69/3848. Minute of 27 August 1969, concerning M. V. Yiegomaya. |

ville’ . a

18 Robinson shared Phillips's view of Oni: N. C. Robinson, ‘Report on Visit to Bougainville Island, 14th April-26th June, 1964’, copy in the possession of 'W.T. Brown. 67/347, E S. Evatt’s chronology; Oliver, ‘Some Social-Relational Aspects’; Momis and Ogan, ‘Development Experience: the view from Bougain-

'9 67/347, Administrator to Department, 16 March 1967. | , 20 N. C. Robinson, ‘Report on Visit to Bougainville Island’

1 N. C. Robinson, ‘Report on Visit to Bougainville Island’ , a 22 O’Faircheallaigh, The Role of Foreign Investment, pp. 401-6. a

23 67/347, E. S. Evatt’s chronology. : Oc 24 67/347, Warwick Smith to Hay, 2 February 1967 © , ——

25 67/3861, Administrator to Department, 30 March 1967. 26 67/3861, minutes of Public Relations Advisory Committee, 22 August 1967.

2? 67/3861, Administrator to Department, 1 July 1968. | 7

28 67/3861, Administrator to Department, 23 June 1967. | 29 67/3861, Administrator to Department, 9 June 1967. ,

238 = NOTES (CHAPTER 4-5) 3° 67/3861, District Officer Dow to Director, District Administration, 15 June 1967.

31 67/3861, Minutes of meeting in Konedobu, 19 June 1967. | 32 67/3861, ADO Warrilow to Deputy DC Kieta, 9 August 1968. 33, 66/5311, W. T. Brown to Denehy, 3 December 1966, forwarded to Canberra. 34 67/3861, Administrator to Department, enclosing N. N. Pratt's record (10 April

1967) of a meeting at Barapina on 4 April.

35 Douglas Oliver, ‘Some Social-Relational Aspects’. (The survey was conducted

between June and August.) Oe

36 69/2158, conference, 12 November 1968, between BCL and the Administration. 3? 68/426, Administrator to CRA, 28 December 1967, enclosing draft letter.

38 69/3092, folio 143. .

3° 68/4999, Territory Intelligence Committee Paper 3/68, 12 September 1968.

CHAPTER 5 NEGOTIATING a | 1 CRA owned 32 per cent of NBHC: Bulletin, 22 February 1969, ‘Investment’ section. 2 See for example Jenny Hocking, Lionel Murphy, a Political Biography. In an ABC TV Monday Conference, CRA’s Managing Director, Rod Carnegie, was pressed

to show that CRA was really Australian. Transcript of programme telecast on 11 December 1972. 3 69/2158, Prime Minister’s Department to Territories, 2 October 1968, enclosing

extract from Mawby to Prime Minister. : 4 Eugene Ogan, Business and Cargo and ‘Nasioi land tenure: an extended case study’; D. D. Mitchell, Land and Agriculture in Nagovisi, Papua New Guinea; Jill Nash, Matriliny and modernisation: the Nagovisi of South Bougainville. > Interview with Sir Frank Espie, Adelaide, February 1998. | © Oliver, Black Islanders, p. 156.

unnamed recipient. , ,

“ Nation, 1 April 1972, quoting Espie’s letter of 14 September 1967 to an

, managers.. | 8 Jim Byth, personal communication, December 1998. ,

? 69/3848, BCL Press Statement, 27 August 1969; interviews with former BCL

'0 Jim Byth, personal communication, December 1998.

1 Griffin, ‘Bougainville’ 12 Phillips, ‘Notes on Contact with Bougainvilleans’

13 66/458, Denehy to DDC Sohano, 7 October 1965, copied to Department. 14 68/4999, Territory Intelligence Committee Paper 3/68 of 12 September 1968. 13 68/4999, Territory Intelligence Committee Paper 3/68 of 12 September 1968.

16 66/458, Ahrens’s note dated 30 September 1965. 17 66/458, Cleland to Department, 26 October 1965. 18 66/458, Lattin’s minute and draft response, 10 February 1966.

‘9 Loraine Nott, CEB: exploits of an uncommon man. _

20 Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, p. 274. ,

“1 68/4999, Territory Intelligence Committee Paper 3/68 of 12 September 1968.

Barnes visited Kieta in February 1966. a ,

2 Oliver, ‘Some Social-Relational Aspects’. , 23 67/1104, part 2, Mawby to Barnes, 24 February 1967. 24 Interview with Sir Frank Espie, Adelaide, 11 February 1998. This paragraph and the next draw also on interviews with former employees of BCL during January

1998 in Melbourne. — a

NOTES (CHAPTER 5-6) =& 239 2°. Interview with Don Mentz, Canberra, August 1998. 26 Nation, 1 April 1972, quoting Espie’s letter of 14 September 1967. 27 69/2158, note for file, 5 February 1969; C. R. Wilshire, ‘Financing the Project’,

in Stephenson (ed.), Bougainville—The Establishment of a Copper Mine. , 28 67/1104, part 2, ‘Papua and New Guinea—Bougainville Copper Deposits—

Conditions for Draft Agreement’. a 22 CRA had proposed that, twenty-five years after the commencement of deductions, the company’s tax ceiling should rise only by 0.5 per cent for each 1 per cent of any increase in company income tax rates above 40 per cent. 30 Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, 283.

23 March 1967. .

3! 67/1104, part 2, Draft summary to accompany the cabinet submission, 32 67/1104, part 2, Note for file recording telephone conversation on 11 April 1967.

33 67/1104, part 2, Note for file recording telephone conversation, date inde-

cipherable.

cipherable. ,

34 67/1104, part 2, Note for file recording telephone conversation, date inde35 69/2443, ‘Statement delivered by the acting Assistant Administrator (Economic

Affairs), Mr A. P. J. Newman, M.H.A! 36 67/1104, part 2.

— (part Il). , same date. | 15 May. | | ,

3” 67/1104, part 2, BMR’s assessment, February 1967. |

38 Proposed Agreement on Mining Copper ... Confidential File 67/1104

39 67/1347, Cabinet Submission, 13 January 1967.

40 67/1104, part 2, Bunting to Department, 20 April 1967. | -

41 69/4118, Espie to Administrator, 6 June 1967, and Espie’s confirmation of the 42 69/2160, minute of 18 June 1968, concerning a conference in Port Moresby on

43 O’Faircheallaigh, The Role of Foreign Investment, p. 430. 7 44 67/1104, part 2, Administrator to Department, 15 May 1967. 45 69/2217, Espie to Assistant Administrator Henderson, 3 April 1969. 46 69/2217, record of pre-conference meeting, 14 April 1969. 47 69/2217, Quodling to Territories, 2 May 1969.

CHAPTER 6 ROROVANA INCIDENTS | |

1968. , , 8 August. ,

| 69/2160, Administrator Hay to Department, 16 February 1969. 2 68/426, Department to Administrator, 28 February 1968, and reply, 29 March

3 69/3092, DDC Brown’s report, 6 August 1969, forwarded by Administrator,

* 69/3092, Administrator to Department, 1 May 1969. | , | > 67/3861, Administrator to Department, 2 June 1967. , ° 67/3861, Administrator to Department, 9 June 1967. ” David Elder, ‘Bougainville Background’

8 Interview with Bill Brown, Sydney, August 1998. , , > 67/3861, Administrator to Department, 4 October 1968.

10 Mike Bell, interviewed in Melbourne, 29 January 1998. ,

240 % NOTES (CHAPTER 6G) | '' 69/2160. Minutes of meetings between BCL and the Administration, 1968. 12 69/3092, folio 143. 13 68/4999, Territory Intelligence Committee Paper 3/68, 12 September 1968. 14 69/4123, Departmental compilation, August 1969. 15 69/2160, Administrator to Department, 19 July 1968.

16 69/2160, note dated 21 February 1969. 17 69/2160, minutes of meetings held on 24 and 25 February 1969. 18 69/2160, minute approved by the Minister on 26 February 1969; quotation from the statement to the House of Assembly by A. P. J. Newman, text in 69/2443. 19 FE S. Evatt’s minute of 11 March 1969. 20 Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, pp. 335-6. 41 68/5563, part II, Administrator to Department, 2 June 1969.

22 69/3092, Administrator's telex to Department, 20 May 1969. ,

23 Australian, 5 December 1969, p. 6. ,

24 69/3092, Administrator's telex to Department, 29 April 1969.

25 69/3092, Notes of a conference in the Department, 2 June 1969. |

26 70/1623, report on ‘unrest—Bougainville’, p. 10. :

7 Post Courier, 4 July 1969. ,

28 69/3092, Allen, Allen & Hemsley to Barnes, 10 June 1969. 29 69/4122, notes on file, March 1970 and 3 July 1969.

3° 69/3092, The owners’ solicitors tendered a draft which the Administration disputed, on about 14 July. A draft was sent to the Department, and queried by the legal section on1969. 1 August. : 3! 69/3092, 31 July | 32 Douglas Oliver, ‘Some Social-Relational Aspects’ 33 Transcript of Four Corners programme, undated (June or July 1969), in 69/3026.

| — 3* 68/5563, part II, Administrator’s draft instruction to DC, and commentary,

15 to 17 July 1969.

3° 69/3026, Department to Administrator, 16 July 1969. 3° 69/3026, Hay to Department, 1 August 1969. Lapun’s and Bele’s statement

~undated; Newman’s reply, 1 August. , >” 69/2443, ‘Statement delivered by the acting Administrator (Economic Affairs)

| Mr A. P. J. Newman, M.H.A! | a | 38 69/2217, conference between the Department, the Administration and CRA,

Port Moresby, 15 April 1969. — | 3? 69/3026, Administrator to Department, 7 July 1969. — 40 69/3092, Mentz’s note for file, 30 July 1969. 41 69/3026, Conference, BCL, Territories and Administrator, Port Moresby, 8 July 1969.

—- 16 July. ,

42 69/3092, Minute for Minister, July 1969. Amended, this plan was endorsed on 43° 69/3092, Department to Administrator, 16 July 1969. Note for file, 11 July 1969.

44 69/3092, Minute of 14 July 1969. 45 69/3092, Department to Administrator (5292) and reply (6760). 46 69/3921, Text of Newman’s statement for delivery 25 July 1969. *” 69/3921, Administrator to Department, undated telex received 12 August 1969. 48 70/1623, report on ‘unrest—Bougainville’, September 1969, p. 10.

, *° 69/3921. Parts of the narrative are in Downs’s Australian Trusteeship. Downs describes his source as ‘personally transcribed, typed and photocopied from an obviously authentic tape record’ (chapter 11, n. 52). °° 68/5563, part II, Administrator to Department, 6 August 1968.

, NOTES (CHAPTER 7) | 241

CHAPTER 7 ‘TEMPORARY RESOLUTION 7 :

‘Bougainville’ ,, 2' Griffin, Text in 68/5448. |a

> 69/3671, record of Hannett’s public address, Canberra, 5 August 1969.

4 Australian Miner, 11 August 1969.

> Australian Financial Review, 8 August 1969. |

6 Sydney Morning Herald, 8 August 1969. | | :

8 Age, 7 August 1969. | ln ? Australian, 1 and 7 August 1969. 7 , ” Canberra Times, 7 August 1969.

10 Text in 68/5448. ,

1 69/3671, record of Hannett’s public address, Canberra, 5 August 1969. ?

12 69/3671, record of demonstrations; see also 70/1623. | ae 13 68/5448, Minutes of 22, 23, 30 and 31 October; Department to ABC, 28 October; Administrator to Department, 16 January 1969; and (undated) reply. 14 69/3921, Mentz, 8 August 1969. 15 69/3848, Minutes of conference, 5 August 1969. 16 69/3848, Minutes of BCL-Administration conference, Port Moresby, 16 Septem-

ber 1969. ,

17 69/4123, Ellis’s notes for the Administrator, 9 August 1969.

18 69/3687, Bougainville Situation Report, 13 August 1969. > | 12 69/3687, Bougainville Situation Report, 13 August 1969. 20 ‘The Origins of Napidakoe Navitu’, Bougainville News, vol. 1, no. 1, 6 July 1970.

41 69/3687, minute of 14 August 1969. or 3 |

2 Post Courier, 11 August 1969.

23° 69/3092, interview with Lapun and Belle [sic], possible approaches by Lapun

and suggested reaction, 7 August 1969. , ,

24 69/3687, ‘Notes for Prime Minister and Minister . . ', 20 August 1969. ,

2° 69/4453, record of discussions, 2 p.m., Thursday 21 August 1969. , 26 69/4453, FAS note for file, 22 August 1969, and appendices. __ 7 27 69/4453, FAS note for file, 22 August 1969, and appendices, enclosed in Hay

to Secretary, 8 August 1969. | oa 28 69/3092, 4, 6 and 13 August 1969. , , 29 69/4122, Mentz, undated note for file. The Department informed Allens’ senior , partner that the ultimatum was genuine, lest the solicitor in charge harboured

any doubts: 69/3092, 18 August 1969, FAS (CS) note for file. a

30 Australian, 21 August 1969. , |

31 69/4122. FAS (GL), note for file, March 1970. 7

32, 69/4122. Department to Administrator, telex, 22 August 1969. | |

note (after 23 August). | ,

1969. | | |

33 69/4123, conversation with Mentz in Townsville, 25 August 1969, and undated

34 69/4123, Department to Administrator, telex, 26? August 1969 and 28 August

35 69/4123, J. B. Gregory note for file, 28 August 1969.

°° 69/4123, unsigned, undated minutes. > a |

37 69/4123, Mentz to Warwick Smith via Administrator, telex, 3 September 1969. 38 69/4123, Mentz to First Assistant Secretary (EA), 5 September 1969. , 39 69/4123, Warwick Smith to Hay, 11 September 1969, and note for file, same date.

40 69/4453, confidential note, 18 September 1969. ,

242 = NOTES (CHAPTER 7-8) 41 69/4104, Administrator to Department, 4 and 8 September 1969; 69/4453, 26 September 1969, 29 September 1969, telephone conversation with Conroy. 42 Australian, 5 December 1969, p. 6. 43° 69/4453, Johnson to Department, undated. 44 69/4453, Administrator to Department, telex, 5 November 1969.

45 Australian, 5 December 1969, p. 6.

46 69/4123, Mentz to Warwick Smith via Administrator, telex, 3 September 1969. 47 69/4453, Submission approved by Barnes, 25 November 1969. 48 69/4453, Minister approved Assistant Secretary's report, 28 November 1969. 49 69/4453, First Assistant Secretary to Secretary, 10 August 1970. °° 69/4453, Ballard to Newman, 8 August 1970. |

51 69/4453, REV, 10 August 1970. | | 52 69/4453, Johnson to Hay, telex, 11 August 1970. |

°3- 69/4453, Ballard to Newman, 8 August 1970; Department to Administrator, 12 August, and Johnson's reply, same day; Assistant Secretary (MP) to Secretary,

13 August 1970. — , °4 69/4453, Administrator to Department ‘for Richardson’, telex, 17 August 1970. °° 69/4453, Barnes approves, 28 May 1970. 56 69/3848, draft submission to Social Change Advisory Committee, 29 October 1969.

>? 69/2160. Undated draft, February 1969. a 58 69/2160. Unsigned, undated minute, probably by J. O. Ballard, attached to his

minute of 21 February 1969. , >? 69/3767. Warwick Smith to Administrator, 26 February 1969. 60 69/3767, Hay to Besley, 8 August 1969. 61 69/3767, Administrator to Department, 8 August 1969. 62 69/3767, Ballard, 11 August 1969. © 68/5563 part II, A. G. Kerr's note for file, 15 August 1969.

64 69/3767, Note for file, 20 August 1969.

© 69/3767, Ballard to Secretary, 12 August 1969. 6° 69/3767, Administrator to Department, 27 August 1969, message 6851. 6” 69/3767, Department to Administrator, undated, replying to 6851.

°8 69/3767, Opas to Ballard, 18 September 1969. a © 69/3767, Department to Administrator, for Clay, 20 October; notes for file,

21 October and 23 October. |

- % 69/3767, minute of 17 November 1969, and A. C. H. Campbell, note for file,

4 November 1969.

“ 69/3767, notes for file, 27 and 28 November 1969. :

| “ 69/3767, acting Asst Sec., note dated 10 December 1969. CHAPTER 8 CREATING THE MINE ©

1 69/2443, House of Assembly proceedings, ‘Statement delivered by the acting Assistant Administrator (Economic Affairs) Mr A. P. J. Newman, M.H.A’

* 69/5222, draft cabinet submission, 28 January 1970. > 69/2160, minutes of meetings between BCL, Administration and Department,

- Canberra, February 1969. |

28 May.

* 69/2443, replies to the Department's letter of 15 May 1969, and note on file,

| | NOTES (CHAPTER 8) | 243 > 67/1104, part 1, minute of 25 July [1967]. ,

‘Service. | , mental comments, 4 July. |

° 67/1104, part 1, notes for file, 28 and 29 July 1969, telephone conversation,

July 1969, and undated precis of negotiations with Labour and National

“ 67/1104, part 1, Immigration to Territories, 1 July 1969, summary of depart-

Industry, 7 July 1969. |

8 67/1104, part 1, note for file, 5 August 1969, and discussions with Trade and 9 67/1104, part 1, note for file, 28 July 1969. 10 67/1104, part 1, Cabinet submission approved by Minister, 3 July 1969. 4 67/1104, part 1, minute on Cabinet Submission, 27 June 1969. '2 Interview with Mr Don Vernon, Rio Tinto, Melbourne, 28 January 1998.

period’ / 1969. |

13 Stephenson (ed.), Bougainville: the Establishment of a Copper Mine.

14 Philip Daniel, ‘Labour in the Bougainville Copper Project: the Construction 'S 69/3848, minutes of BCL-Administration conference, Port Moresby, 21 October

‘© PNG Population Census, 1971. ,

17 Philip Daniel, ‘Wages and Employment in Colonial Papua New Guinea. 18 Phillips, ‘Notes on Contact with Bougainvilleans’. 1) Espie quoted in Oliver, Black Islanders, p. 150. 20 Daniel, ‘Labour in the Bougainville Copper Project’. 21 69/4104, Area Manager Bishop to DC Vernon, 20 April 1970, copied to the

Administration; and cable to Department, 21 April. 22 Gammage, ‘The Rabaul Strike’. 23 Michael Hess, Unions Under Economic Development: Private Sector Unions in Papua

New Guinea, p. 77. | |

in Papua New Guinea’ -

74 P. W. Quodling, ‘Management Policies and Attitudes on Industrial Democracy 25 Daniel, ‘Labour in the Bougainville Copper Project’, based this statement on an interview with a former BMWU President, FE Kaona, interviewed in October 1975.

*6 Daniel, ‘Labour in the Bougainville Copper Project’, p. 56. *? Mamak and Bedford, Bougainvillean Nationalism. ,

28 Mamak and Bedford, Bougainvillean Nationalism.

ber 1968. oe

29 Daniel, ‘Labour in the Bougainville Copper Project’. _ |

39 69/2158, Minutes of BCL-Administration conference, Port Moresby, 12 Novem-

31 Oliver, ‘Some Social—Relational Aspects’. , 32 Citing G. Harris, ‘1973/74 Urban Household Survey: the Bougainville Towns’.

33. Daniel, ‘Labour in the Bougainville Copper Project’ 34 69/3848, Attachment to Mentz’s minute of 18 September 1969; 69/5222, draft

cabinet submission, 28 January 1970. — -

35 69/3848. Bougainville Progress Report for September to November 1969. 36 Report of the Labour and Manpower Working Group on the Bougainville Copper

Project, Port Moresby, 4 July 1969. — 7 ,

37 Daniel, ‘Labour in the Bougainville Copper Project. __

38 Daniel, ‘Labour in the Bougainville Copper Project’. oe

39 Australian, 20 May 1975. , , 40 Mamak and Bedford, ‘Race, Class and Ethnicity: Industrial Relations in the South Pacific with Special Reference to Fiji and Bougainville’

244 = NOTES (CHAPTER 8-9) |

some implications. |

41 Mamak and Bedford, ‘Inequality in the Bougainville Copper Mining Industry:

| Copper’ ; | ber 1968. ,

42, M. J. E Brown, ‘A Development Consequence—Disposal of Mining Waste on Bougainville’. Brown refers to Bechtel-W.K.E., Proposal for Tailings Disposal: — Bougainville Copper Project, 1969. See also M. J. E Brown, ‘Bougainville Pays in 43 69/2158, minutes of BCL-Administration conference, Port Moresby, 12 Novem-

44 70/1623, Intelligence report. a |

- ber 1969. LO

4 69/4502, Warwick Smith to Department of National Development, 23 Septem-

, 25 September 1969. | - | | |

46 69/4118, Department of National Development to Department of Territories,

47 69/4502, Snowy Mountains Authority to Department, 29 September 1969.

48 Brown, ‘A Development Consequence’ , . Limited’, 1975 Waigani Seminar. | |

49 P. J. Gilles, ‘Environmental Development and Planning at Bougainville Copper

°° Paul Quodling, Bougainville: the Mine and the People, pp. 29ff.

CHAPTER 9 CONSEQUENCES | :

! 69/2158, note for file, 5 February 1969. ? Wilshire, ‘Financing the Project’, in Stephenson, Bougainville—The Establishment of a Copper Mine. Australian and US dollars were almost equal in value.

3 69/3026, conference in Port Moresby, between BCL, Department, and Admin-

istration, 8 July 1969. 4 69/3026, memorandum by J.B.G. and G.O.G., 26 August 1969.

1969. ,

5 69/5222, cabinet submission, 19 September 1969. | |

° 69/4118, Mentz’s note for file, 17 October 1969. ,

| ” 69/5688, record of discussions between Treasury and Territories, 8 October 1969. 8 69/5688, cable from Treasury to Australian Embassy, Washington, 4 November

| 9 69/5688, L. Temby’s note, 2 December 1969. ,

1969). | |

10 69/5688, L. Temby’s note, 25 February 1970.

1! 69/5688, Treasury to Territories, 9 April 1970. 12 69/2801, Mentz’s commentary (9 June) on a meeting in Port Moresby (6 June

3 69/2801, undated memorandum, probably June or July 1969. ‘4 69/2801, Vernon to Mentz, 30 September 1969, enclosing Vincent's draft

proposals. ce

15 69/2801, Mentz’s Minute, 16 October 1969. |

16 69/2801, Warwick Smith’s note for file, 25 November 1969. |

'7 69/2801, undated minute, late 1969. a

18 69/2801, FAS (EA) minute, [25] February 1970. , 19 Australian, 5 December 1969, p. 6. | 20 69/4921, Bougainville Joint Committee meeting, Konedobu, 10 February 1970.

21 69/4921, record of discussions, 13 February 1970. ,

_ #2 69/4921, Administrator Hay to Department, 9 May 1970.

23 69/4921, Fenbury (SD&HA) to Chair, Bougainville Copper Project Joint , Committee, 1 May 1970; and Assistant Secretary (MID) notes, 5 August 1971.

| , | NOTES (CHAPTER 9-10) & 245

5 October 1970. 24 69/4921, Hennessy to Gregory, 12 June 1970, and Johnson to Secretary,

25 69/4921, Asst Sec (MID) 5 August 1971. | |

26 69/4921, Dowling, 2 November 1970. ,

7 Paul Quodling, Bougainville: the Mine and the People, pp. 41-5. — _ 28 John Momis and Eugene Ogan, ‘Development Experience: the view from

draft. a a 1969. oO -

Bougainville’ — a oe , 29 Mike Bell, interviewed in Melbourne, 29 January 1998. | 39 69/3092, Warwick Smith’s telex to Hay, 23 May 1969, and comments on the >

31 69/3092, Administrator's telex to Department, 31 July 1969. ,

32 69/3848, Minutes of BCL-Administration conference, Port Moresby, 5 August

33 Mike Bell, interviewed in Melbourne, 29 January 1998. | —

34 Quodling, Bougainville: the Mine and the People = 3° BCL Annual Reports. — , oe 36 Oliver, Black Islanders, pp. 152-3; Connell, ‘Compensation and Conflict:

37 Quodling, Bougainville: the Mine and the People. | a 38 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, ‘Uranium royalties and Aboriginal economic development’, in D. Wade-Marshall and P. Loveday (eds), Northern Australia: Progress and Prospects, pp. 155-81; and ‘Resource Exploitation and Indigenous People: |

towards a general analytical framework’, unpublished, 1990. _ ,

39 Connell, ‘Compensation and Conflict’ a | 40 68/5430, Deputy Secretary's minute for the Minister, 9 March 1967.

41 68/5430, Research Paper, undated [March 1967]. _ , 42 67/3861, Administrator to Secretary, 11 September 1968. ! )

43 Hank Nelson, ‘Bougainville Breakaway’, Nation, 12 October 1968.

44 68/5430, text of ABC press release. © , OO 45 68/4999, ‘Webb Report’, 2 October 1968. - ,

46 68/5430, Administrator to Department, 18 October 1968. |

47 68/5430, Administrator to Minister, 7 October 1968. 48 68/5430, minute, 14 November 1968; Australian Commission, Suva, to

Department, 16 October 1968. ne

but 1968. - Movements in Melanesia‘ :

49 68/5430, ‘Confidential Notes on the Bougainville situation’, unsigned, undated, °° 68/5430, Campbell’s notes, 8 October 1968, citing P. M. Worsley, “Millenarian

1970. a - ce a |

51 70/1623, security report; and minute dated 27 April 1970. 52 70/1623, Notes of Meeting with Napidakoe Navitu in Bougainville, 1 April —

53 Text of This Day Tonight, 24 March 1970, in 70/1623. _ ,

54 70/1623, Minute of 11 June 1970. |

K. S. McKenzie. , a , -

55 68/5430, Defence Department report, 18 March 1973, enclosing an account by

CHAPTER 10 JUDGES AND JUDGEMENTS _ ! Michael Somare, Sana. a 2 Somare, Sana, chapter 9; and interview with Bill Brown, Sydney, August 1998.

3 NT 65/6510, minute of 11 August 1966. | | |

246 |= NOTES (CHAPTER 10) * 69/1645, Note by Assistant Secretary (PA), 22 September 1969; note for file,

28 October 1969; Record of discussions, 30 July 1971. |

— ° 69/1645, 28 July 1970, and telex of 30 July. ° 71/2788, Assistant Sec (MID), 28 July 1971. “ 71/2788, Kennecott—Preparation for Negotiations, August 1971. 8 E.g. Colin Filer, Rolf Gerritsen and Richard Jackson in Denoon et al. (eds), Mining and Mineral Resource Policy Issues in Asia-Pacific.

? Jackson, Ok Tedi, pp. 82-3. , 10 71/2788, 12 March [1972].

1 Somare, Sana, chapter 8. ,

2 69/5655, copy of Crawford to Gutman, 14 September 1972.

'3 69/5655, Asst Sec, (MID), 31 July 1972. : 14 Age, 6 September 1972. —

15 G. O. Gutman, ‘Objectives, Strategy and Tactics in Mining Projects with

reference to Bougainville Copper’. ,

——p. 448. | | | 25 October.

16 O’Faircheallaigh, The Role of Foreign Investment in Mineral Development,

|,

'7 69/5655. Ray Ballmer told A. W. Richardson about the cancellation on

18 69/5655, Don Mentz, 23 October 1972, reporting a phone call from Espie. '9 69/5655, Information paper 71/807 to AEC, 18 October 1972, and undated

memo by Ross Burns. |

20 69/5655, Foreign Affairs to Territories, 30 November 1972; personal communi-

cation, Mr Don Vernon. , |

1 69/5655, report prepared by D. Mentz, 2 February 1973.

22 69/5655, Lapun to Hay, 17 January 1973. a 23. 69/5655, memo dated 23 January 1973. *4 The average price for 1973 was £728, against £428 in 1972. The gold price was $US97.30 per ounce in 1973, compared with $US61.80 in 1972. Silver fetched $US2.50 per ounce in 1973 against $US1.70 in 1972. 25 O’Faircheallaigh, The Role of Foreign Investment in Mineral Development;

Jackson, Ok Tedi, pp. 55-61. | ,

26 O’Faircheallaigh, The Role of Foreign Investment in Mineral Development.

, 2” Jackson, Ok Tedi, pp. 60-1; interview with Don Vernon, Melbourne, January 1998.

28 O'Faircheallaigh, The Role of Foreign Investment in Mineral Development, p. 458. The Additional Profits Tax would yield 70 per cent on annual profits

, once BCL had earned 15 per cent on its capital. . 29 Quodling, Bougainville: the Mine and the People, pp. 5ff. and 35. ,

30 Reproduced in Quodling, Bougainville: the Mine and the People. 3! Interview with Griffin, Weekend Australian, 9-10 June 1990. 32 Moses Havini, ‘A Bougainvillean Perspective on the Crisis’, p. 165. 33. Terence Wesley-Smith, ‘The Non-Review of the Bougainville Copper Agree-

ment’, pp. 92-111; Quodling, Bougainville: the Mine and the People, pp. 9-20. 34 Colin Filer, ‘The Bougainville rebellion, the mining industry and the process of

- social disintegration in Papua New Guinea’, and ‘The Escalation of Disintegration and the Reinvention of Authority’.

3° James Griffin, ‘Bougainville is a Special Case’, in May and Spriggs, The

Bougainville Crisis, pp. 1-15.

36 Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, 287.

NOTES (CHAPTER 10) | 247 3” Bill Brown, interview, Sydney, August 1998

38 67/1104, part 2, BMR’s five-page assessment, February 1967. , 39 Gutman, ‘Objectives, Strategy and Tactics in Mining Projects’, 7th Waigani Seminar.

40 Firth, ‘Colonialism and the Invention of the Native’, in Denoon et al. (eds),

Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders. ,

41 For example interviews with Bill Brown, Sydney, August 1998, and with Mike Bell, Melbourne.

42 66/5311, correspondence between Administrator and Department, and en-

closures, August 1966 to February 1967. closures, August 1966 to February 1967. ,

43 66/5311, correspondence between Administrator and Department, and en- _

New Guinea‘ :

44 Letter in the Times of Papua New Guinea, 26 October 1988, cited by John ~ Connell, ‘Compensation and Conflict: the Bougainville Copper Mine, Papua 45 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, ‘The Local Politics of Resource Development in the

p. 424. |

South Pacific’, in S. Henningham and R. May (eds), Resources, Development and

Politics in the Pacific Islands, p. 262.

1990. |

46 O’Faircheallaigh, The Role of Foreign Investment in Mineral Development,

47 69/2160, undated minute by A. G. Martin.

48 Letter to the author, 1997. 4° Don Carruthers, Interview with James Griffin, Weekend Australian, 9-10 June 50 Interview with Andrew Peacock, Washington, July 1998. |

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Administrator's Executive Council, 43, | Asian investment, policy on, 54-60

97, 109, 114, 197 , Auria, Genanai, of Beretemba, 84-90

African parallels, 38, 48, 81, 90, 91,96, Australia, government departments:

166, 218 Bureau of Mineral Resources, 93-4,

agitators, the search for, 101, 114, 158, 186, 198; Commonwealth Loans

175-6, 178, 196, 199 — Council, 162; Crown Solicitor, 92,

agriculture, 8, 15-17, 21 141-4; External Affairs, 92, 189;

Ahrens (public servant), 85-90 Immigration, 148-9; Labour, 148;

alcohol, 165-6, 168 National Development, 158; Prime

Allen, Allen and Hemsley, 109-10 Minister, 93, 148; Territories, 5,

American dimension, 89-90, 179, — 32-44, 54-6, 68, 73, 83, 85-90, 99,

183-6, 200 101, 106, 110, 128, 134, 135-40,

Ampaoi, Severinus, of Dapera (President 141, 148-9, 167, 183-92, 197-203,

of Kieta LGC), 76, 84-90 (Social Change Advisory Committee)

Ampei, Anthony (activist), 72, 78, 102, 111, 166, 201; Trade and Industry, _

173, 177 , 149; Treasury, 35, 56, 91, 92, 149, | Anewa Bay, 105, 140 162, 185, 186, 192

, | » 257

258 |= INDEX | , Australian (newspaper), 81, 127, 156 Bougainville Copper Pty Limited (BCPL,

Australian Broadcasting Corporation later BCL), passim; equity in, 90-9,

(ABC), 24-5, 29, 111, 125, 127, 128, 161-5, 183, 201 ,

179, 210 , Bougainville Development Fund, 84-90, Australian Labor Party, 33, 37, 112, 114, 97,172,175 128, 182, 190, 199 Bougainville District Advisory Council,

Australian National University (ANU), 14, 21 81, 127, 128, 176, 221, 223, 230 Bougainville Initiative, 195-6

Australian Naval and Military Expedi- Bougainville Interim Government, 4,

tionary Force, 31-2 196

Australian New Guinea Administrative | Bougainville Landowners’ Association,

Unit (ANGAU), 12, 14, 32 177

Australian School of Pacific Admin- Bougainville Mining Company, 162

istration, 14 , Bougainville Revolutionary Army, 4, 197 Austronesian languages, 9 Bougainville Syndicate, 50 ,

Awol, Brere (politician), 114 Bougainville Transitional Government, 3

‘baby gardens’, see Hahalis Welfare —Bovo valley, 105, 129, 224 —

Society , Bovo Syndicate, 108

Ballard, John (public servant), 142-3 British New Guinea, see Papua Ballmer, Ray (BCL), 82, 135, 191 Broken Hill Proprietary Company (BHP),

Bank of America syndicate, 91, 161, 162, 186 , 163, 197-8 Brown, D. N. (public servant), 138

Banoni, (language), 9, 23, 205 Brown, M. J. F. (academic), 159

Barapina/Barapinang, 71 , Brown, W. T. (Bill), District CommisBariunz, Moiari, of Karudu, 66 sioner, 24, 25, 64-5, 67, 68, 70, 75, Barnes, C. E., Minister, 35-7, 38, 39, 101, 102, 115, 197, 199 71-2, 85, 88-9, 92, 111, 126-8, 144, Bryant, Gordon (politician), 114

178, 199, 203 — Buin (sub-district), 14, 17, 23, 84, 174,

Barnett, Jim (surveyor), 117-18 175, 178, 179, 212, 214

Limited 180, 211, 214

BCL/BCPL, see Bougainville Copper Pty Buka (sub-district), 8, 15, 20, 175, 178,

191-2 , Bulolo, 46-50

Beatty, David (public servant), 186, bulldozers, 120-4, 169

Bechtel-Western Knapp Engineering Bulolo Gold Dredging Pty, 46-7, 51~2

(Bechtel-WKE), 150-60 Byth, James (BCL), 82 |

Bedford, Richard (academic), 156-7

Bele, Raphael (politician), 120-4, 131-5, | Callick, Rowan (journalist), 194

178 Calwell, Arthur (politician), 33

Belgian Congo, see Zaire Campbell, Brigadier E. (consultant), Bell, Michael (kiap and BCL), 23, 24, 111, 114, 176-7, 200 |

102-3, 169 Canberra, Bougainvilleans’ visit to,

Besley, Tim (public servant), 128 _ 84-90

Binavata, Michael, 138 Capital Mines, 162 Bishop, Colin (BCL), 65, 82, 135, 205 cargo cultism, see religion and politics

Black, John (kiap), 45 , Chan, Julius (politician), 114, 182, 186

Blaikie-Webster (mine manager), 47-8 Chile, 183, 190

Botswana, 188 Clancy, Deputy District Commissioner Bougainville (now North Solomons at Sohano, 64, 70

Province): physical description, 7-8; | Clarke (police inspector), 120-4

secession, 1, 27-9, 39, 77, 100, Cleland, Sir Donald, Administrator, 39, 171-81, 183, 190, 196-7; sentiment 86-7, 199 in, 1, 8, 9-10, 15, 25-6, 27-9, 62 Clunies-Ross, Anthony (academic), 186,

Bougainville Combined Councils, 191

| 175-6, 178 : cocoa, 15~17, 110, 134, 210, 219, 224 Bougainville Copper Foundation, 168 -coconut/copra, 15-17

INDEX # 259 colonialism: Australian, 11-15, 30-44, | Elder, David (public servant and acad-

207-8; German, 9, 11-12, 15-17, emic), 14, 20, 102, 197 , 31, 108, 145, 172, 207 Ellicott, Robert, Solicitor-General, 142-4

Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 161 Ellis, Tom (public servant), 42, 112,

Commonwealth Savings Bank, 161-2 129-30

compensation, 70-4, 77, 83-8, 97-8, — enclave projects, 156, 160, 195-6 ©

136-9, 169-71 environmental issues, 68, 146-60, 195, Congo, see Zaire 200 Conroy, W. L., Director of Agriculture, | Epstein, A. L. and T. S. (academics), 230

135-9 Erenaru, Andrew, of Daratui,66

Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA), 2, Ertsberg, see Freeport mine

24, 60, 61, 64, 68, 73, 74, 75, 78,79, | Espie, Sir Frank (BCL), 81-2, 91-8,

80-3, 84, 88, 94, 111, 125, 126, — 107-8, 145, 148-9, 151, 164, 189,

131-4, 140, 141-5, 161-2, 186-92, 190, 192, 201, 204 !

205-30 Expropriation Board (New Guinea), 108

Conzinc Riotinto of Australia Explor- - , ation (CRAE), 61-79, 82, 83, 84,109 — Faber, Professor Michael, 187-90 co-operative societies, 16, 21, 25, 41 Fiji, 15 Coulter, Jim (Moral Rearmament), Filer, Colin (academic), 196-7 | 136-7 , Fingleton, Father Wally, 23-4, 128, 173

CRA, see Conzinc Riotinto of Australia Firth, Stewart (academic), 12, 198 | Craestar (prospecting vessel), 65 Fisher, N. H. (geologist), 7-8, 50

Crawford, Sir John (academic), 187,223 Fly River, 184 | Crown Prince Range, 7-8, 64, 159 Foot, Sir Hugh, 38, 41

| , foreign exchange, 90-9, 193

173, 177, 211, 215, 218 ,

Damen, Damien (visionary), 23, 67,76, | Freeport mine, 188 — ,

Daniel, Philip (academic), 150-2 Garnaut, Ross (economist), 186, 191 Dapera village, 67, 84, 103, 106, 134, _ gift exchanges, 205-6, 207, 216-17

171 Gire, Inspector Daniel, 116-24

Dapoi, Oritano (villager), 67 = Giregire, Sinake (politician), 114

Daratui village, 65,66 | Gleeson (public servant), 85-90

Davidson, Professor Jim, 127,176 © gold-mining, 45-53, 62,96 | Denehy, Max, Assistant District Com- Gorton, John G., Prime Minister, 113,

missioner, 13, 23, 24, 62-3, 64, 65, 132-3, 141, 149 | 70, 72, 73, 83-8, 94,102,199 Granger (public servant), 135

dependency theory, 188 Grant, Neil, 116-24 oe

Derham, Professor David, 41 Griffin, James (academic), 5, 24, 27, 83,

didiman (Territory, agricultural extension 125, 196-7 ,

officer), 13, 14, 19, 41, 137 | Griffin, John (lawyer), 144 ,

Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs | Grigor (public servant), 85-90 ,

(Australian Army), 33 Groote Eylandt, 88 ,

Dorney, Sean (journalist), 5, 9 Groves, Murray (anthropologist), 34 Dove, John (public servant), 3 Groves, Dr William (educationist), 39

Dow, District Officer, 74 Guava village, 13, 22, 23, 64, 67, 69, 70, Downs, Ian (public servant and acad- 71, 72, 75, 84-90, 101, 106, 129, 134,

emic), 5, 41, 42-3, 197 171, 173, 199, 211, 214, 215, 222

Duffy, Father, of Koromira, 64 Guinea Gold NL, 46-7

Duhig, Archbishop of Brisbane, 50 - Gunther, Dr John (public servant and

Duncan, Sir Val (RTZ), 61, 191~2 Vice Chancellor), 39, 42, 81, 221 ,

| , , Gutman, G. O. (public servant), 85-90, Edie Creek, gold in, 45, 47 90-8, 186-9, 198

education and training, 14, 17, 18, 22, a

25-6, 30, 50, 149-52, 168, 208, 209, _—_ Hagai, Francis (visionary), 21-2

214, 224, 227-8 | Hahalis Welfare Society, 20-2, 130, 173, _

Eivo village, 101, 222 177, 179, 211, 214, 215

260 | INDEX | Hannett, Leo (activist), 109, 125, 126, | Kapena, Toua (politician), 114

— -128,179,180,183 | Kaputin, John (politician), 191

Harding, Ann (journalist), 156 | Kariup, Sam (politician), 180

Hasluck, Sir Paul, Minister, 33-5, 38,39, | Kasaipwalova, John (poet), 128 ,

41, 198, 203 Katanga, province of Zaire, 38, 173

: Hastings, Peter (journalist), 81, 109, | Kawerong River, 73, 102, 103, 105, 157,

| (127, 134, 138, 165 | 159 | | -Havini, Moses (activist), 179, 196 Kearei, Anton (activist), 20-1

Hay, David, Administrator, 39, 42, Kennecott, 82, 183-6 : 43, 73, 97, 100-1, 106, 108, 111, — kiaps (Administration field officers), 8,

133-4 © _ 12, 13, 14, 22, 24-5, 27, 28, 29, 40,

| Hayden, Bill (politician), 128 41, 43, 62, 65, 74, 79, 83, 101, 102, Henderson, Frank (public servant), 42, 103, 110, 135, 137, 175, 181, 197,

107-8 - 198, 202-3, 207, 211-12, 213, 216,

High Court of Australia, 131, 141-5, 220, 222, 228 , 147,183-4 Kieta, 9, 12, 13, 14, 17, 23, 51, 62, 63,

Highland Farmers and Settlers Associa- 65, 67, 70, 71, 73, 98-9, 101, 103,

tion, 109 3 105, 120, 128, 129, 130, 147, 154,

_ Highlands of Papua New Guinea, 13, 165, 175, 179, 197, 207, 219; Kieta ~ 62, 103, 183; drought-famine, 189; LGC, 25, 29, 67, 84, 94, 106, 107,

gold in, 45, 62; Highlanders, 15, 42, 129, 173, 175, 179, 199 -

150, 151; Highland Labour Scheme, __ King, Haddon (CRA), 61, 82, 83-4 15, 27 ! oo Kiunga, 184 © Holloway, Brian (policeman), 115-24 Kokorei village, 13,67, 75,106

, House of Assembly, 1-2, 27, 41-4, Kolei, Arowai, of Paiuoro, 66 , 56-7, 58, 67, 74, 76, 78, 83, 90,94, | Komoro, Andrew (activist), 180

— 97-9, 101, 111-12, 113, 131, 135, Kona, Duparawai, of Dirimai, 66 __

— 139, 142, 164, 173, 176 , 178, 182, Kopa, Gregory (activist), 74 186-7, 197, 199, 211; elections, 29, | Koranga, gold in, 45, 47

42, 131, 200; members, 29, 42, |Koroma, of Daratui, 65

97-9, 104, 173; ministerial members, | Kuavo, Moikui, of Komai, 84-90

hunting, 69 , 72, 107, 129

42,114, 172, 175, 185 Kupei village, 7, 49, 50, 62-3, 69, 70,

India, 48 re labour trade, nineteenth century, 15, 30

— 147-9, 153-7 194

industrial colour bar, 48-9, 53, 54-6, Lafitte, Gabriel (adviser to Father Momis), industrial relations, 2, 15-17, 46, 47-9, Lalor, Peter, Public Solicitor, 40, 135-6,

— 50, 100, 146, 149-60, 194, 205 142-3, 144 ,

infrastructure, physical, 146-60 Lambert, C. R. (public servant), 33

International Bank of Reconstruction land, 2-3, 11, 17, 64-74, 77, 78, 86-90,

and Development, see World Bank 98, 131-4, 184-5, 194-203, 210, International Finance Corporation, 184 213-16, 217, 227; compulsory acqui-

Irian Jaya, 187 - , sition, 2-3, 98, 100-24, 129, 228-9;

, 4 land rights, 11, 14, 49, 53, 58-60,

| Jaba River, 105, 146, 157-60, 228 62-3, 64-7, 77, 86, 206-7

192, 195-6 , 209

_. Jackson, Richard (academic), 185-6, languages, 9, 13, 14, 28, 29, 62, 205, Japanese dimensions, 18, 31, 32, 54-60, —_ Lapita Cultural Complex, 9 .

148-9, 161,163,179 Lapun, Paul (politician), 23, 26, 29,

Japanese Mining Industry Association, 59-60, 69, 75-6, 90, 94, 98, 111,

55 7 Oo 112, 118, 120, 124, 129, 130,

_ Johnson, Leslie, Administrator, 42, 43, 131-5, 135-6, 172, 174-5, 177, 179,

139, 167 7 181, 182, 183-6, 190-2, 199, 200,

_ Joint Committees of BCL and Adminis- 202, 211, 215, 220 tration, 68, 129, 131, 158, 166, 167 Lattin (public servant), 85-90

| INDEX = 261 Lawrence, Peter (anthropologist), 20 Middlemiss, Barry (activist), 108, 114, League of Nations, mandate, 32, 48 — 115, 116-19, 129, 130, 131, 137-8, |

Leahy, Tom, 43, 109 , 178, 179, 180, 199 7

Lee, Jock (planter), 180 _ millenarianism, see religion and politics 7

Lemay, Bishop of Bougainville, 199-200 Mining Agreements, 58-9, 183-6; reLGC, see Local Government Councils - negotiation, 1-4, 83, 179, 186-92,

Lihir island, 28 , 200 Bn

Lindstrom, Lamont (anthropologist), | mining: before Panguna, 45-53; legis- _

6 ? a , lation, 49, 57-60, 74, 75, 78, 88,

litigation, 141-5 © 102, 141-5, 188; technology, 46-9,

Loan (Bougainville Copper Agreement) 58-9, 61, 62, 63,195 Ordinance (94 of 1969), 164 Mining (Bougainville Copper AgreeLocal Government Councils, 13, 21-2, ment) Ordinance, 90-9, 141-5, 183,

24, 26, 28, 41, 109, 211 186-92, 197 oe |

localisation, 149-52 _ Mining Wardens, 46, 49, 64, 70 167, 169 a Miriung, Theodore (public servant and

Loloho, 103-24, 146, 147, 155, 157, | Mining Warden’s Court, 64-7, 77,170 |

Lovering (Public Solicitor’s Office), 136 - activist), 3 , , Lue, Joseph (politician), 172, 174, 175, | Misima, gold mining in, 45 176,178 | , - _ missions and missionaries, 4, 12, 14, 30, luluais, 28, 118-24 109, 207, 212, 219, 224; Methodist Lus, Pita (politician), 156 — , (United Church), 18, 24, 79, 103,

_ 174, 207; Roman Catholic, 14,

McArthur, General Douglas, 32 | 17-26, 64, 67, 79, 94, 101-2, 166, McEwen, Jack, Minister, 35, 149 | 173-4, 176, 177, 199-200, 207;

McGregor, Sir William, Administrator, | Seventh Day Adventist, 18, 23, 65,

45 - 67, 68, 79, 103, 140,174, 207

Macintyre, A. J. (Australian Reserve Mitchell, Donald (academic), 14, 81 |

Bank), 138-9 Mitsubishi Metal Mining, 54 ,

MacKay (Sydney solicitor), 136, 138 Moena, Ererio, of Daratui, 66,68 _

MacKay, Dr Malcolm (politician), 126 Mola, Donatus (politician), 112, 172,

McKenzie, Hector (mining warden), — 174-5, 182, 215 7

64-7, 70, 77, 83-4, 102, 170 Momis, Father John (politician), 7, 180,

McKenzie, K. S. (BCL), 179-81 181, 182, 183, 191, 193-6 | McKillop, F. R. (planter), 108-10, Moore, Clive (academic), 5

114-15, 129, 130, 133, 199 Moral Rearmament, 136-7 | a

McNicoll, Sir W. R., Administrator, 48 Morauta, Mekere (public servant), 191

Maia, Keni, of Idobua, 66 _ Morgan, Michael (miner), 61

Mainoki village, 72 Moroni village, 49-50, 63, 69, 71, 73, Mamak, Alexander (academic), 156-7 75, 76, 106, 129, 134, 170, 171 Maori Kiki, Albert (politician), 191-2 Morotana village and mission, 159

mapping, 6,103. Morrison, Bill, Minister, 190 oe

Mariropa River, 157-8, 159,228 Moses, Henry (BCL and activist), 179,

Mason, Sir Anthony, Solicitor-General of 180, 199

Australia, 141-2. Mount Fubilan, 184 >

Matane, Paulias, 185 | Mount Morgan mine, 84 Mataungan Association, 139 Mungkas Association, 27, 180

Mawby, Sir Maurice (CRA), 80, 83, 90, Murray, Hubert, Lieutenant-Governor,

92, 132, 141, 144 31 Melanesian societies, 210-30 Musinau village, 13, 67, 71, 72, 107 Melbourne University Press, 82 . , , Mentz, Don (public servant), 5, 36, Nagovisi, 9, 11, 14, 81, 86, 174, 175,

Melanesia Independence Front, 176 _ Murray, Colonel J. K., Administrator,39 >

134-7, 164, 189,192 , 205, 208, 212, 213, 214, 220, 222

Menzies, Sir Robert, Prime Minister, 33, Napidakoe Navitu Association, 109,

54 , | | 130-1, 137-8, 139, 178, 179,182,199

262 4 INDEX Nash, Jill (academic), 9,14, 81 Pakia village, 63, 65, 69, 71, 73, 74, 106, Nasioi, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 22, 107, 142-5, 228 23, 26, 29, 109, 168-9, 170, 171, Palabora mine, South Africa, 82 _ 174, 196, 198, 201, 202, 205, Pangu Pati, see Papua and New Guinea

206-7, 208, 211, 214, 222 | Union Pati , 217 | 49-50, 59, 63, 67, 68, 70, 71, 81-3,

native, concept of, 48-9, 198-9, 209, | Panguna community and mine, 1, 2, 3,

Native miners, 52-3, 57-8 | 94,97, 101, 103, 104, 110, 111, 146,

Nauru, 14, 66, 67, 68 154, 155, 158-60, 161, 165-6, 168, Nayacakalou, Dr Rusiate (academic), 81, 181, 182, 202, 224, 228-9

103, 205, 206, 219, 222 Panguna Landowners Association, 170-1

NBHC, see New Broken Hill Consoli- Papua, Territory of, 31, 32, 45-6, 50, 68

dated oe : Papua New Guinea: Constitutional Plan-

negotiating, 80-99, 131-41, 183-6 ning Committee, 181, 182; courts,

Nelson, Hank (academic), 27-8, 34 41; Defence Force, 1, 3, 4; economic

Neto, Ionau, of Bakawari, 84-90 and financial situation, 2, 21, 30, 37, Neu Guinea Kompagnie, 11-12 50-1, 53, 54-60, 126, 132, 146-7, New Broken Hill Consolidated (NBHC), 192-4, 198; independence, 1, 34, 35,

80, 82, 162 39, 77, 80, 90, 131, 182, 209, 214,

New Guinea, Territory of, 31, 32, 45, 216, 218; Legislative Council, 21, 41;

172 , : Oo relationship with Australia, 30-7, ~ 108-9 , withering away of the state, 185, 196

New Guinea Biological Foundation, 182, 202-3; Supreme Court, 142;

New Guinea Goldfields, 46 Papua New Guinea, government de-

New Panguna Landowners’ Association, partments: Agriculture, Stock and

4,171, 196-7 Fisheries, 13, 39, 208; Bureau of

New Zealand, 35 , Industrial Organisations, 153; Co-

_ Newman, Anthony (public servant), operatives, 39, 41; District Admin-

112-15,116,136 | istration and Native Affairs, 1, 40, 41,

newspaper coverage, 125-7, 133 220; Education, 14, 18, 39, 97, 169,

Nigeria, 38, 175 208, 209; Forests, 23; Information

Noakes, L. C. (geologist), 50 and Extension Services, 220; IntelliNorth Solomons Medical Foundation, gence Committee, 78-9, 220; Labour,

168 © | . 153; Lands, 94 (Mines, Division of), , oe 61, 70, 83; Law, 40; Mining Advisory

O’Faircheallaigh, Ciaran (academic), 50, Board, 67; National Planning Office,

70, 171, 189, 200-1 , 186; Police (Royal Papua New Guinea

Ogan, Eugene (academic), 7, 9, 13, 14, Constabulary), 21-2, 73, 110-24, 23, 26, 29, 69, 81, 103, 206-7, 222 125, 129, 151, 173, 175, 220, 224;

Ok Tedi, 183-6 Public Health, 39, 97, 169, 208, 219;

Oliver, Professor Douglas, 5, 9, 10, 14, Public Solicitor, 40, 130, 135, 136, 17, 22, 23, 27, 40, 65, 69, 78, 81, 89, 142, 170; Social Development and 110, 133-4, 155, 167, 174, 201-2; Home Affairs, 167, 208 report to CRA in 1968, 204-30 Papua and New Guinea Union (Pangu)

Oma, Daino, of Kokardi, 66 © Pati, 42-3, 182 :

Ona, Francis (visionary), 171 Passive resistance, 116-24 ,

Oni of Moroni village,69 > Peacock, Andrew, Minister, 182, 189, 203

141-4 a Peru, 190

Opas, Philip, QC, 81, 98, 129, 135, | Peoples’ Progress Party, 182

opposition to prospecting and mining, Peruri Catholic mission, 107 64-79, 99, 101, 102-24, 129-31, Phillips, Ken (CRA), 62-79, 83-4, 106,

213-18, 224; in Australia, 112 151 | Oram, Nigel (academic), 166-7, 230 Pinei valley, 69, 104, 132, 159 , Placer Development Ltd, 46

Pacific War, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, _ planters/plantations, 12-13, 15-17, 27,

26, 32, 39, 53, 81, 108, 207-8 31-2, 45, 104, 105, 106, 153, 160,

INDEX & 263 212, 219; influence on wage struc- Solomon Islands, British protectorate,

ture, 150, 151 19, 20, 22, 27, 31, 172-3, 175

Planters’ Association, 109 Solomon Islands archipelago, 8, 9, 19, _

population, 8, 9, 150, 167, 219; de- 27,31 | , ,

population, 9 Somare, Michael Thomas (politician), 3, Porgera, gold in, 51-3,62 43, 156, 179, 181, 182, 183, 189,

port development, 103, 146, 155, 157, 191-2, 197 |

170 South Africa, 48, 82, 213 oo

Pratt, N. N. (public servant), 76-7, 115 South Pacific Commission, 31 ,

production rates, 192-4, 195 Star Mountains, 184-6

prospecting, 31, 49, 58, 61-79, 101 Stephen, Sir Ninian, QC, 81, 144

prostitution, 168 7 Stradbroke Island, 84 Pumkuna, see Panguna Sussex University, Institute of Development Studies, 83 :

Queensland, 15, 31, 35, 40, 45, 49, 79, ,

84, 88-9 tailings and overburden disposal, 102,

171, 193-4 228 . Taninara, Mirintoro, of Guava, 84-90

Quodling, Paul (BCL), 82, 145, 159, 103, 105, 146-7, 157-60, 170, 200,

Rabaul, 13, 25, 32, 45, 74, 76, 153, 176, Tanzania, 189-90

203, 230 Taratoro, 77

Radio Bougainville, 224,226 | Tau, Teori (villager), 142-5

referendum, 172-7 Tauweau, Atu, of Daratui, 65 , religion and politics, 17, 26, 65-7, 209, _—_ taxation (mining), 90-9, 183-4, 188,

210-11, 218 190-2, 193

resettlement, 98, 103 Taylor, James (public servant), 45

Reward Prospecting Claim, 50 tear gas, 116-24 , Rhodesia, 48, 80 Teop-Tinputz, 174, 175, 178

Rimoldis (anthropologists), 20 Teori, Edward (villager), 62-3, 69, 77 Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), 2, 61, 80, 82,91, Teosin, John (visionary), 20, 21, 179

191 , Thermo-Con, Tokyo, 54 62-79 tidal wave (1956), 139 Rorovana, 9, 10, 100-24, 129, 130-8, Tidex (Sydney accountant), 136

Robinson, Neville (public servant), 53, | Thompson, Jack (geologist), 61 | 142, 143, 183, 199, 200, 202, 205 timber, rights to, 23, 84, 85

Rowley, C. D. (academic), 221 Togolo, Melchior (public servant), 3 Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, tok pisin, 28, 62, 205 see Papua New Guinea, government __ Tolais, 139, 176, 178, 203, 230

departments, Police | Tonolei, 23, 63, 64, 84

royalties, 86-90, 175, 184, 193 © Torokina, 63 a RTZ, see Rio Tinto Zinc trade stores, 16, 22, 212, 227

‘rule of instant dismissal’, 151-2 _ trade unions, 22, 128, 153-60, 218;

Rumba village, 140 Australian Congress of Trade Unions

(ACTU), 153; Bougainville General

Samoa, 15 and Construction Workers’ Union Sarei, Revd Dr Alexis, 183, 202 (BGCWU), 154; Bougainville Mine

Selebi-Pikwe, 188 , Workers’ Union (BMWU), 153-4, Serero, Perpetua (activist), 171 - 156-7; Panguna Mungkas Associa-

Sharp, Bishop Jack, 24 tion, 154

Sivai, Siwai, 14, 174, 175, 180, 207, 208, | Travers (Melbourne lawyer), 112, 115,

209, 210, 212,214,216 ~~ 129, 199

smelters/smelting, 3, 5, 91-6 — Treadgold, M. L. (economist), 16, 187 Snowy Mountains Authority, 158 Trezise, John (BCL), 82, 189-90 social impact, 165-71, 196-7, 202, tultuls, 28

204-30 Tunuru village and mission, 98-9, 103,

Sohano, district headquarters, 17, 64 104, 107, 129, 140

264 5 INDEX , Unemployment Committee, 167-8 Watkins, W. W. (public servant), 73-4

Union Minieére, 38 Wau, 46 , , United Nations, 15, 32, 37-9, 41, 43, | Wesley-Smith, Terence (academic), 196 77, 92, 111, 114, 183; Decolonis- ‘White Australia’, 31, 49, 53-4, 100, ation Committee (the Committee of 147-9 24), 38-9; Development Program, Whitlam, Edward Gough, Prime Min-

187, 190; Visiting Missions, 15, 75 ister, 37 ,

United Party, 43 Wiley, Father, 199 ©

University of Papua New Guinea, 27,38, | Wilson (public servant), 85-90

81; Waigani seminars, 81, 188-9 women, roles of, 67-9, 116-24, 213-

urbanisation, 98, 103, 146-7, 155-7, 14, 216 , 166-7, 184, 204, 228-30 Wood, Ivo (mining warden), 70

World Bank, 30, 36, 53, 162-3, 184,

Vernon, Don (BCL), 82, 164, 189-90 187, 192; report on Papua New

- Guinea, 30, 31-2, 36 ©

wage determination/wage differentials, | World War I, 12, 26, 108

48-9, 53, 54-6, 147-9, 153-7 World War II, see Pacific War

Wakunai, 101, 140, 175, 178-9, 180, | Worsley, Peter (anthropologist), 20, 201 214

Ward, Eddie, Minister, 33, 39 Zaire, 38, 80, 190 Warner, Neil (consultant), 158 Zambia, 80, 189, 190 Warwick Smith, George (public servant), | Zorn, Stephen (public servant), 185, 191

35-7, 39-40, 91, 131, 142, 158 Zurecnuoc, Zure (politician), 89-90