Canadian Military History Professionalism Under Fire: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement, Croatia 1993

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Professionalism Under Fire: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement, Croatia 1993
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Canadian Military History Volume 9

Issue 3

Article 3

2000

Professionalism Under Fire: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement, Croatia 1993 Lee A. Windsor University of New Brunswick, [email protected]

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons

Recommended Citation Windsor, Lee A. "Professionalism Under Fire: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement, Croatia 1993." Canadian Military History 9, 3 (2000)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Windsor: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement

Professionalism Under Fire Canadian Im plem entation of the Medak Pocket Agreement, Croatia 1993 Lee Windsor

F

or m an y C a n a d ia n s , th e S o m a lia Affair b ecam e a sym bol of th e ir a rm e d forces in the 1990s. In te n se m edia coverage of a Som ali te e n ’s m u rd e r by C a n a d ia n p a ra tro o p e rs, its co ver-up by se n io r b u re a u c ra ts a n d officers a t N ational Defence H e a d q u a rte rs a n d a series of s u b s e q u e n t sc a n d a ls sh o o k pu b lic confidence in th e n a tio n ’s m ilitary in stitu tio n s. Negative coverage particularly in the first half of the 1990s c re a te d a n im age of m ilitary incom petence a n d unprofessionalism , vividly c a p tu red in letters to th e e d ito r to m a jo r n e w s p a p e rs a c ro s s th e country. In recent years th a t image w as balanced w ith m ore positive o n es of C a n a d ia n Forces p e rso n n e l p ro tectin g th e peace in th e F orm er Yugoslavia, Africa, a n d E a st Timor. Nevertheless, th e sp e ctre of Som alia still lingers in th e m inds of m an y b o th in a n d o u t of uniform .

S o m a lia ) “s y s t e m s b r o k e d o w n a n d org an izatio n al discipline c ru m b led ” w ith in the C a n a d ia n A irb o rn e B a ttle g ro u p , a n d t h a t “planning, training, a n d overall prep aratio n s fell far s h o rt of w h a t w as required....W e c a n only ho p e th a t S om alia re p re s e n ts th e n a d ir of the fo rtu n e s of th e C a n a d ia n Forces. T here seem s to be little room to slide low er.”1 The rep o rt im plies th a t C a n a d a ’s m ilitary p e rso n n e l were p o o rly t r a i n e d , in c o m p e te n tly le d , b a d ly equipped, a n d q u ite often rac ist. D ishonoured Legacy is especially influ en tial a s a n histo rical tex t sin ce it p a s s e s criticism of th e S om alia operation to all of C a n a d a ’s m ilitary in stitu tio n s b a sed on a n adm ittedly incom plete investigation of crim in al activity a n d cover-up d u rin g the m is s io n of o n e b a tt le g r o u p on a fo re ig n deploym ent.

T he s tro n g p r e s e n c e of S o m a lia in th e n a tio n a l collective m em ory is p e rh a p s p a rtly a resu lt of the Report of the C om m ission of Inquiry into th e C a n a d ia n deploym ent to E a s t Africa, rev e a lin g ly title d D ish o n o u red L egacy: The L e sso n s o f the Som alia Affair. T his re p o rt is o n e of th e few p u b lic ly a c c e s s ib le , q u a s i ­ s c h o la rly a c c o u n ts of a C a n a d ia n m ilita ry o p e ra tio n in th e la s t decade w hich is b a s e d on a n allegedly full appreciation of prim ary sources. E ssentially, th e rep o rt re p re se n ts a first draft of C a n a d ia n m ilitary h isto ry since th e en d of the Cold War.

In fact, O peration D eliverance w as only one of dozens of m issio n s c arried o u t by C a n a d ian soldiers, sailors, a n d aircrew d u rin g th e p a s t d e c a d e . Before a c c e p tin g th e c o m m is s io n ’s c o n d e m n a tio n of th e p r o fe s s io n a lis m a n d lead ersh ip of th e a rm ed forces, a n d of th e arm y in p a rticu la r, it w ould be u sefu l to scru tin ize o th e r m ilitary activity d u rin g th e sam e period. T he B a lk a n s are a good place to s ta rt. Indeed, C a n a d ia n experience in th e F orm er Yugoslavia is m ore rep re sen ta tiv e of the n a tio n ’s m ilitary experience in the 1990s th a n the ra th e r u n u s u a l case of Som alia.

C om posed by a com m ission of two ju ris ts a n d a senior jo u rn alist, the report lent credibility to public percep tio n s th a t th e C a n a d ian Forces in th e 1990s w ere deficient a n d in d a n g e r of c o lla p se . T he c o m m is s io n e rs c la im e d t h a t d u rin g O p eratio n D eliverance (the m issio n to

S ince 1992, te n s of th o u s a n d s of C a n a d ian m ilitary a n d naval perso n n el have endeavoured to restore peace to th e B alkans. They have acted a s p eacek eep ers, negotiators, aid w orkers, an d q u i te o f te n a s c o m b a t s o l d i e r s . I n it ia l exam ination of a n u m b e r of C an ad ian m issions

© C a n a d ia n M ilitary H istory, Volume 9, N um ber 3, S u m m er 2000, p p .23-35.

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Windsor: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement

to th e region in 1992-94, in clu d in g th o se a t Sarajevo, S re b rn ic a, a n d the M edak Pocket, seem to co n trast w ith the Som alia C om m ission’s findings a b o u t poor lea d e rsh ip a n d training. W hat follows is a closer investigation of C anadian e f f o r ts to im p le m e n t th e M e d a k P o c k e t A greem ent in 1993 to d eterm in e if th e n a tio n ’s a rm e d forces w ere tru ly a t th e ir “n a d ir ” d u rin g th e fateful year of th e S om alia scan d al. In m id -S e p te m b e r 1993 U n ited N atio n s Protection Force (UNPROFOR) soldiers from 2nd B attalion, P rin cess P a tric ia ’s C a n a d ia n Light In fan try (2 PPCLI) ad v an ced into th e d isp u te d M edak Pocket in s o u th e rn C roatian w ith orders to im p le m e n t th e la te s t c e ase -fire b e tw e e n C roatian Army troops a n d Serb irregular forces. 2 PPCLI were reinforced w ith two m ech an ized co m p an ies of F re n ch troops. The C a n a d ian s, w e ll s c h o o le d in th e d e li c a t e a r t of “p e a ce k e e p in g ”, discovered th e ir n eg o tiatio n s k i l l s a n d s t r i c t i m p a r t i a l i t y w e re n o t im m ediately required the M edak Pocket. Instead they found them selves calling up o n their prim ary w ar-fighting skills w h en C ro a tia n A rm y u n its opened fire w ith m ac h in e-g u n s, m o rta rs a n d a rtille ry in a n effort to s to p th e C a n a d ia n advance. To com plete their assigned m ission the P a tric ia ’s wTere re q u ire d to th re a te n th e u s e of, an d ultim ately use, deadly force against Croatian u n i t s . H ow ever, th e t r u e t e s t of m ilita ry pro fessio n alism a n d discipline cam e after the sm oke cleared, the C roatians b ack ed dow n an d the C anadians im m ediately reverted to th eir role as im partial peacekeepers in th eir dealings with in d iv id u a ls w ho only m o m e n ts b efo re h a d a tte m p te d to kill them . R esolute C a n a d ian a n d F rench action cam e a t a tim e w hen the UN rep u tatio n in C roatia was a t a low ebb d u e to rep e a te d failu res to secu re th e in fam o u s U nited N ations P ro tected A reas (UNPAs). Colonel George O ehring, co m m an d er of UN PRO FO R S e c to r S o u th , c la im e d th e P rin c e ss P a trc ia ’s “w on for th e w hole m ission a c re d ib ility a n d r e s p e c t t h a t w ill b e lo n g rem em bered by th e opposing p a rties a n d m u ch facilitate o u r fu tu re efforts h e re .”2 For th eir efforts, 2 PPCLI w as aw ard ed a U nited N ations F o rc e C o m m a n d e r ’s C o m m e n d a tio n from F re n ch G eneral Cot, th e first of its k in d of one of only th ree aw ard ed in UNPROFOR’s history. Of course, th e C a n a d ian s originally w ent to th e F orm er R epublic of Yugoslavia to p ro te c t a

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fragile tru c e , n o t to im pose peace on w arrin g factions locked in a bloody civil war. U ntil the early 1990s Y ugoslavia w as a fed eratio n of six republics including Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, all q u ite sim ilar in language, c u ltu re a n d custom . D e s p ite th e p r e s e n c e of u l t r a - n a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n ts in e a c h re p u b lic , th e Y ugoslav f e d e r a tio n e x is te d h a r m o n io u s ly e a r n in g international acclaim a n d the privilege of hosting th e w orld a t th e 1984 W inter Olym pics. T he c o lla p se of c e n tra liz e d c o m m u n is t a u th o rity in Y ugoslavia d u rin g th e late 1980s b r o u g h t n a tio n a lis ts in e a c h re p u b lic in to m a in s tr e a m p o litic s . In S e rb ia , S lo b o d a n M ilosevic a n d in C ro atia F ranjo T u d jm an , rose to power by destroying the carefully constructed Yugoslav identity in favour of a new n ationhood b a s e d on blood a n d religion. In th e process, S e rb ia , m o st pow erful of th e six re p u b lic s, a tte m p te d to tak e control over th e cru m bling fe d e ra tio n . T h is did n o t a p p e a l to grow ing n a tio n a list m ovem ents in C roatia a n d Slovenia re su ltin g in d e c la ra tio n s of in d ep e n d e n c e in 1991, followed closely by a sim ila r move in B osnia. C ro atia a n d B o sn ia c o n ta in e d large n u m b e rs of e th n ic S erb s, hostile to th e federal b r e a k u p . C ro a tia n a n d B o s n ia n S e rb s e sta b lish e d p a ra m ilita ry forces to re s is t th eir re sp e c tiv e new g o v e rn m e n ts le a d in g to two d istinctly s e p a ra te civil w ars. D u rin g th e opening m o n th s of th e se w ars, th e Yugoslav N ational Arm y (JNA), on o rders from Belgrade, openly intervened to prevent the b re a k u p of th e fed eratio n . JNA involvem ent u su a lly m ea n t assistin g S erb m ilitias in C roatia a n d B osnia. However, th e reg u la r a rm y w as a m irro r of th e old fed eratio n a n d th u s suffered from th e sam e p ro b lem s of divided loyalties. N on-Serb officers a n d sen io r NCOs left th e JNA to jo in th e new n a tio n a l arm ies of th e ir hom e rep u b lics. This ex o d u s of n o n -S e rb s destroyed co hesion in th e JNA, th u s elim inating th e only m odern professional m ilitary force in Yugoslavia. W ith no arm y left to im plem ent its goals a n d an e c o n o m y o n th e v erg e of c o lla p s e , S e rb ia gradually w ithdrew from conflicts in C roatia and B osnia, leaving Serb m inorities th ere to fend for th em selv es a g a in st th e newly c re a te d B osnian a n d C ro a tia n arm ies. S erb m ilitias acq u ired w eapons, vehicles, a n d even volunteers from the JNA as it withdrew, while newly created C roatian a n d B o sn ian forces received e q u ip m e n t from

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Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 3 A r ifle m a n fro m th e 2 n d B a tta lio n , P rin cess P atricia's C a n a d ia n L ig h t In fa n try n e a r M e d a k , e q u ip p e d w ith th e C-7 a u to m a tic rifle.

C ro atian gov ern m en t in Zagreb a n d m inority S erb s w ho so u g h t in d ep e n d e n c e from th e new s ta te . T he p e a c e a g re e m e n t in c lu d e d e s ta b lis h m e n t of a UN patro lled buffer zone in u n d e r C h a p te r VI of th e UN C h a rte r.4 B oth p a rtie s w elcom ed th e cease fire, w hen in fact it held, a s a n o p p o rtu n ity to b u ild th e ir m ilitary capabilities u n til s u c h tim e a s victory could be a s su re d . T his w as th e en v iro n m en t faced by C a n a d ia n so ld iers m a k in g u p UNPROFOR’s C a n a d ian B attalion N um ber 1 in 1993.

o u tsid e so u rc e s like G erm any a n d th e U nited States. However, equipm ent alone does n o t build a n arm y. It w ould tak e y ears before th e various m ilitias a n d arm ed g an g s w ould coalesce into p rofessional m ilitary forces. For m ost of the period betw een 1992-95, the Yugoslav w ars of s u c c e s s io n were w aged by a m a teu rs. W hen the JNA w as rem oved from the equation, they took w ith th em th e norm al codes of co n d u ct held by m odern professional m ilitary officers. Rival m ilitia s fired w e a p o n s in th e vicinity of opposing troops, m ore often th a n not, in te n t on killing civilians. The re s u lt w as to c re a te a p a tt e r n of c o m b a t w h e re m ilita ry c a su a ltie s were few. The new arm ies knew how to kill, b u t n o t how to wage w a r a g a in st o th e r soldiers properly. U n p ro tected civilians w ere a different m atter. And so, th e objective in th ese w ars w as n o t to defeat th e o p p o n e n t’s co m b at pow er b u t to consolidate new eth n ic n a tio n ­ s ta te s by killing or driving o u t th o se w ho did n o t fit.3 T h e U n ite d N a tio n s P r o te c tio n F o rc e (UNPROFOR) e n te red th is sto rm in 1992, first in C ro atia a n d la te r in B osnia. In C roatia, th e UN b ro k e re d a c e ase -fire b e tw e en th e n ew

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The second rotation of CANBAT 1 w as b ased on th e “reg u la r force” 2 n d B attalion of P rincess P a tric ia ’s C a n a d ian Light Infantry. However, of the 875 soldiers m aking u p the battlegroup, only 375 actually cam e from th a t u n it. One h u n d re d an d sixty five cam e from other regular force u n its a n d a ssig n m e n ts. The re m a in d e r c o n sisted of 385 reserve soldiers who h a d volu n teered from m ilitia u n its ac ro ss th e C an ad a. D ue to th e req u irem e n t for highly skilled a n d experienced reg u la r soldiers in s u p p o rt a n d tech n ical tra d e positions w ithin the battleg ro u p a n d the overall s h o rta g e of co m b a t in fa n try so ld ie rs in th e C an ad ian Army, the m ajority of those reservists served in th e rifle co m p an ies. In fact, reserve soldiers m ad e u p 70 p e rc e n t of rifle com pany strength d uring the m ission. This includes seven o u t of th e 12 p lato o n co m m an d ers w ho cam e from m ilitia battalio n s as Reserve E ntry Schem e Officers (RESO).5 R eserve a u g m e n ta tio n w as n o t new in th e C a n a d ia n Army. For d ecades, u n d e r-s tre n g th regular b attalio n s h a d their ra n k s filled o u t w ith rese rv ists before deploying to C yprus. Indeed, after m u c h d e b a te in th e C a n a d ia n defence comm unity, providing regular u n it augm entation w ith in d ividual soldiers becam e a p rim a ry role fo r r e s e r v e r e g i m e n t s in th e 1 9 9 0 s . A ugm entation w as p a rticu la rly vital d u rin g the tim e of im m e d ia te p o s t-C o ld W ar c o n flic t p ro life ra tio n , a c o rre s p o n d in g sp ik e in th e n u m b e r a n d intensity of peacekeeping m issions com bined w ith s h rin k in g p erso n n el pools a n d b udgets. This w as especially tru e in 1993 w hen the arm y, now know n as Land Forces Com m and, w a s s t r e t c h e d n e a r ly b e y o n d its m e a n s ; p ro v id in g tw o b a ttle g r o u p s to th e F o rm e r Yugoslavia (the o th er in Bosnia), one to Som alia a n d a n u m b e r of o th er u n its , d e ta c h m e n ts a n d

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Windsor: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement L ie u ten a n t-C o lo n el J a m e s Calvin, c o m m a n d e r o j th e 2 PPCLI B a ttleg ro u p

in d iv id u a l so ld ie rs to a m y ria d of m issio n s a ro u n d th e world. N evertheless th e 2 PPCLI B attleg ro u p in C ro atia c o n tain ed th e h ig h e st c o n c e n t r a t i o n of r e s e r v e s o ld i e r s o n a n o p eratio n al m issio n to date. The s ta n d a r d of M ilitia perform ance in a te n se a n d d em an d in g th e a tre like C roatia, rem ain ed to be seen. The 2 PPCLI B attlegroup sp en t the first three m o n th s of 1993 conducting p reparation training f ir s t in W in n ip e g , a n d l a te r in F o rt O rd, California. M uch of th is time w as sp e n t working the large reserve com plim ent u p to basic regular force s ta n d a rd s for sectio n a n d p lato o n b a ttle drills. T here w as no tim e to properly exercise c o m p a n ie s , le t a lo n e th e w hole b a tta lio n .6 B e s id e s , s e c tio n a n d p la to o n s k ills w ere generally all th a t is required of soldiers m anning observation p o sts on UN p eacekeeping duty. No one could know th a t the 2 PPCLI platoons would be called u p o n to gel together a n d go into action a s a full battalion. 2 PPCLI m oved to C ro atia a t th e en d of M arch 1993, rep lacin g 3 PPCLI on w h a t Land F o rc e s C o m m a n d re fe rre d to a s O p e ra tio n H arm ony. At th a t tim e, UNPROFOR’s CANBAT 1 w as resp o n sib le for a UN P rotected Area in S e c to r W est, in th e n o rth w e s te rn c o rn e r of C roatia. It w as th ere th a t L ieutenant-C olonel J a m e s C a lv in , c o m m a n d in g th e 2 PPCLI B a ttle g r o u p , a n d h is tro o p s d e v e lo p e d a re p u ta tio n am ong the w arring p a rties a n d their fellow UN con tin g en ts for being fair, b u t tough. U nlike u n its from m o st o th e r in te rn a tio n a l contingents, C an ad ian battalio n s o p erated with its full com plim ent of w ar-fighting w eaponry and eq uipm ent. Rifle com panies travelled in M -l 13 A rm oured Personnel C arriers (APCs) configured in a n A m erican a rm o u re d cavalry fash io n w ith a n a rm o u re d cu p o la offering som e pro tectio n for crew m en m anning the powerful Browning .50 c a lib re m a c h in e -g u n . T he c o m p a n ie s also c arried along w ith th em C-6 m edium m achineg u n s a n d 84 m m C arl G u stav a n ti-ta n k rocket lau n ch ers to add to platoon w eaponry consisting of C-7 a u to m a tic rifles a n d C-9 light m achineguns. Rifle com pany firepow er w as am plified by th e h e a v y w e a p o n s of S u p p o r t C o m p a n y in c lu d in g 8 1 m m m o rta rs a n d TOW (Tube-

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lau n ch ed , O ptically-tracked, W ire-guided) a n ti­ a rm o u r g u ided m issiles m o u n te d in a rm o u red tu rre ts aboard purpose-built APCs.7 C anad a was am ong th e first m em ber n a tio n s to deploy blueh elm eted soldiers w ith th is k in d of firepow er w h e n UNPROFOR first deployed to C roatia in 1992. T his s o rt of sta n c e w as n o t initially well received in UN H eadquarters in New York, where th e tra d itio n a l n o tio n of lightly a rm e d blueb e re te d p e a ce k e e p ers prevailed.8 However, by 1993, th e value of w ell-arm ed forces in th e F o rm er Yugoslavia, w here th e c o n se n t of the w a rrin g p a rtie s w as n o t alw ays a p p a re n t, w as well u n d e rsto o d . O nce on th e g ro u n d , 2 PPCLI e a rn e d th eir tough rep u ta tio n no t only w ith th eir equipm ent, b u t by th eir d e m o n stra te d w illingness to u s e it. N ot lo n g a fte r th e ir a rriv a l, th e b a tta lio n c o n d u c te d a m ajor defensive exercise in th e sector. The exercise w as in te n d e d p a rtially to complete the battlegroup’s collective training and im prove force cohesion, b u t also to d em onstrate to the Croats th a t an attack into the UN Protected Area in Sector W est w ould a n d could be resisted by th e UN.

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Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 3

The P a tric ia ’s vigorously enforced w eapons b a n s in th eir a re a of operations, seizing c o n tra ­ b a n d a rm s of all ty p e s from b o th w a rrin g fa c tio n s . C olonel C a lv in a lso , on h is ow n initiative, developed a pro ce d u re to d e te r C roat a n d S e rb p a tro llin g a n d ra id in g w ith in th e P rotected Area. Previously, belligerent soldiers detained by the UN after engaging in su ch activity w ould be re tu rn e d to th e ir own a u th o ritie s for p u n ish m e n t. Calvin b eg an releasin g d e ta in e e ’s to the opposing forces w ith UN civilian police keeping a close eye to e n s u re p u n is h m e n t w as n o t “te rm in a l.”9 A fter five m o n th s of in -th e a tre tra in in g coupled w ith h a n d s on practice, the 2 PPCLI Battlegroup becam e one of the m ost effective and resp e c te d u n its in all of UNPROFOR. It w as for th a t re a so n th a t th e new Force C om m ander, French Army General Cot, selected them to move to S ecto r S o u th to u n d e rta k e one of th e m ore d if f ic u lt a s s i g n m e n t s in U n ite d N a tio n s peacekeeping history. Unlike 2 PPCLI’s relatively tra n q u il form er a re a of responsibility, S ecto r S o u th w as still a w ar zone. It w as here th a t C ro a tia n S erb s m ost fiercely r e s is te d th e n o tio n of living u n d e r Z a g r e b ’s r u le . C r o a tia n a n d S e rb tr o o p s ro u tin ely exchanged sm all a rm s, m o rta r a n d a rtille ry fire all over th e a re a . T h is s te a d y exchange of fire w as p u n c tu a te d in 1993 by several m ajo r C ro a tia n offensives, in clu d in g “O peration M aslencia” in Ja n u a ry . At M aslencia, F re n ch tro o p s g u a rd in g th e UN P rotected Area were forced to a b a n d o n th e ir po sitio n s w h en faced w ith heavy C ro a tia n fire. The F re n c h w ithdraw al allowed advancing C roatian u n its to occupy th e su p p o sed ly d e-m ilitarized b uffer zone. T his event destroyed S erb confidence in the force m andated to protect them . It also taught the C roatians th a t a few well directed bullets an d sh ells w ould se n d th e b lu e-h e lm e ts p a c k in g anytim e they w ished to remove prying UN eyes.10 N onetheless, by su m m e r of 1993 b o th sides h a d b e e n p r e s s u r e d b y th e i n te r n a t io n a l com m unity into a new ceasefire in Sector S o u th know n as the E rd u t Agreement. U nder the term s of th is a g re e m e n t, C r o a tia n fo rc e s w o u ld w ithdraw from m any of th e territories gained in th e M a s l e n c ia o f fe n s iv e . T h e C a n a d i a n b a ttle g ro u p , reinforced w ith two m echanized F re n ch com panies b ro u g h t in from B osnia a n d

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n o rth e rn C roatia, w as ord ered to e n su re th a t C roatia followed th ro u g h w ith th e agreem ent. G eneral Cot anticipated th a t Croatian troops would be relu c ta n t to w ithdraw from th eir h ard won gains. T his is why he chose the well arm ed an d highly effective CANBAT 1 to im plem ent the ag reem en t a n d resto re UN p resen ce in S ector S outh. Cot expected a n d even hoped for trouble as he w as looking for an opportunity to win back UN credibility lost in J a n u a r y ." He w ould get h is wish. While Cot expected trouble, he m ay not have been aw are of the extent to which Croatian forces u s e d th e E r d u t n e g o t i a t i o n s to s h ie l d p re p a ra tio n s for a renew ed offensive in S ector S o u th . On 9 S eptem ber, a s lead UN elem ents m oved into th e village of M edak, th e C ro atian 9 th “Lika W olves” G u a rd s B rigade com m enced its a s s a u lt on th e salien t section of front know n as th e M edak Pocket. Intelligence a s se s s m e n ts la te r in d ic a te d th e C ro a ts w ere m o st likely a tte m p tin g to p u s h b a c k th e frontline so th a t th eir operational zone h e a d q u a rte rs in the town of Gospic would be out range from Serb g u n n e rs located in th e long narrow M edak sa lie n t.12They m ay also h ave in te n d e d to drive a corridor to th e D a lm a tia n coast, or draw a tte n tio n aw ay from dom estic political controversies b a c k in Zagreb. The Lika Wolves G u a rd s Brigade were well su p p o rte d w ith ta n k s a n d artillery, in clu d in g a s q u a d ro n of form er E a s t G erm an Arm y T -7 2 s as well a s older m odel W arsaw Pact arm o u r. However, while th e C roat force contained all the tra p p in g s of a m o d ern m ech an ized arm y, it applied its c o m b at pow er in very ru d im e n ta ry fashion. Artillery w as u se d to lay down a sim ple creeping b arrag e while the infantry an d a rm o u r ad v an ced w ith o u t an y degree of co-ordination. As C roat a rm o u r p u s h e d dow n th e m ain road along th e valley betw een G ospic a n d G racac, a C ro a t lig h t in fa n try force o p e ra tin g in th e m o u n ta in s to th e s o u th m oved to close off th e M edak Pocket from th e opposite direction. The even m ore poorly organized a n d equipped Serb defence collapsed u n d e r th e crude, b u t effective C roat o n sla u g h t.13 T he C ro a t p re lim in a ry b a rra g e on S e rb defences in th e M edak Pocket com m enced as lead elem ents of 2 PPCLI were m oving u p to the

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CF Photo Unit RE96-CD -049 Photo 20

Windsor: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement

front, thro u g h the Serb rea r area, in preparation to im plem ent the E rd u t agreem ent. The outbreak of heavy fighting req u ired a rap id a n d dram atic a d ju stm e n t to C an ad ian plans. T rained to react quickly to u n e x p e cte d developm ents on a fastmoving battlefield, the P atricia’s easily m anaged th e a d ju stm e n t. Forw ard p latoons im m ediately co m m en ced c o n s tru c tio n of fo rtificatio n s to p ro te c t a g a in st th e b o m b ard m en t. The welldrilled P a tric ia ’s took adv an tag e of every lull in th e b a rr a g e to f u r th e r s a n d b a g a n d re v e t p o sitio n s. Over 500 m ortar, field a n d m edium sh ells fell in a n a re a th e size of P a rlia m e n t Hill a ro u n d L ie u te n a n t Tyrone G reen’s 9 P latoon from C harlie C om pany w ith in th e village of M edak itself. T his did n o t d e te r G reen a n d his m en from carrying out their newly assigned task s of gathering intelligence on the developing battle a n d recording cease-fire violations. It is a tribute to th e ir h ig h -in te n s ity w a r fig h tin g sk ills, including a th o ro u g h a pp reciatio n of th e effects of artillery , t h a t only fo u r C a n a d ia n s w ere w o u n d e d d u rin g th e sh e llin g .14 If th e C roats expected th e ir b a rra g e on S erb defences w ould also drive off th e UN, th ey were w rong. Serb reinforcem ents p o u red into th e M edak Pocket from all over Yugoslavia a n d in two days m anaged to stop the C roatian advance cold, b u t n o t before th e te n k ilo m e tre lo n g a n d five kilom etre wide salient h a d been pinched o u t and the front line straightened, roughly 3000 m etres northw est of Medak. Fighting raged on in a bitter

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sta le m a te for two m ore days u n til Serb artillery opened fire on th e C roatian city of Karlovac, and th e n lau n c h e d a FROG long range m issile into a Zagreb s u b u rb . S erb reta lia tio n coupled w ith g ro w in g p r e s s u r e fro m th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l co m m u n ity w as en o u g h to convince P re sid e n t T udjm an to a b a n d o n the offensive an d w ithdraw h is forces to th e ir p re- 9 S ep tem b er s ta rtlin e .15 A verbal agreem ent to th a t effect w as signed into the “M edak Pocket Agreem ent” on 13 Septem ber. It w o u ld be u p to th e re in fo rc e d C a n a d ia n b a ttle g ro u p to e n s u re all p a rtie s com plied w ith th e new term s. Up to th is point, 2 PPCLI h a d j u s t been p assiv e - if d irect - p a rtic ip a n ts in th e M edak P ocket action. However, th a t soon changed. At 1630 on 14 Septem ber, 1993 Lieutenant-Colonel Calvin held a n O rd ers G roup (“O” G roup) w ith h is s u b o rd in a te officers a n d NCOs to review p la n s for th e c o m in g o p e ra tio n . T h e new w ith d raw al a g reem en t w as to be im plem ented in fo u r p h a s e s . T he first s te p of occu p y in g S e rb ia n frontline p o sitions w ould be m ade by 2 PPCLI’s C h a rlie C o m p a n y a n d one F re n c h com pany on 15 S eptem ber. P h ase 2 w ould see Charlie Company, u n d e r the w atchful eyes of the a n ti-a rm o u r platoon, e sta b lish a crossing point in th e n o -m a n ’s -la n d b etw een th e opposing a rm ies on th e m ain paved ro ad ru n n in g the le n g th of th e valley floor. In p h a s e 3, D elta Com pany an d the second French C om pany from FREBAT 3 w ould move along th e road, th ro u g h

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Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 3

S e rg e a n t R o d D e a rin g ’s se c tio n o f 7 p la to o n , p o s in g in fr o n t o f th eir tre n c h e s th e m o rn in g a fte r their fir e fig h t w ith e le m e n ts o f th e 9 th C roatian G u a rd s. D ea rin g is se c o n d fr o m th e right, w ith h is h e lm e n t rem oved. F ive o f D e a rin g ’s riflem en w e re re se rv ists.

the se c u re cro ssin g p o in t a n d on to occupy th e f o r w a r d C r o a ti a n p o s i t i o n s . 2 P P C L I’s R e c o n n a is s a n c e P la to o n a n d th e b a tta lio n ta c tic a l h e a d q u a r t e r s w o u ld follow D e lta com pany into th e pocket. The la s t ste p w ould be to oversee th e C ro a tia n w ith d raw al to th e ir p re-9 S e p tem b e r po sitio n s th ere b y com pleting th e s e p a ra tio n of forces a n d e sta b lish in g a new dem ilitarized zone. The P a tric ia ’s A lpha a n d Bravo C om panies, w hich only j u s t arrived in the a r e a fro m S e c to r W est, w o u ld s e c u r e th e r e m a i n d e r o f th e CANBAT 1 ’s a r e a of r e s p o n s ib ility d u rin g th e o p e ra tio n . U nfo rtu n ately th e C a n a d ia n s w ould have to do w ith o u t its 81 m m m o rta r platoon. S ince the u n it w as due to rotate hom e in only a few w eeks, th e tu b e s h a d a lre ad y b e e n sh ip p e d b a c k to C a n a d a .16 In th e h o u rs p rio r to th e o p eratio n G eneral Cot p erso n ally flew into th e a re a to sp e a k to C o lo n el C a lv in , e s s e n tia lly ta k in g o v e ra ll co m m an d of th e o p eratio n a n d elim inating th e link to Sector S o u th H e a d q u a rte rs in Knin. Too m u c h w as rid in g on th e com ing events to have a n y d e la y in th e r e p o r t in g c h a in o r a n y m is u n d e rs ta n d in g a b o u t w h a t w as to h a p p e n . The Force co m m an d er rem in d ed Calvin of how vital it w as th a t h is battlegroup succeed in order to resto re UN credibility. Cot also indicated th a t

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r e q q -c d -049

Photo 49

details of th e M edak Pocket A greem ent h a d n o t likely m ade it from Zagreb dow n to the frontline C r o a t i a n s o ld i e r s t h a t w o u ld b e s o o n en co u n tered . G eneral Cot strongly im plied th a t force m ay h av e to be u s e d to e n s u re th e ir com pliance w ith the ag reem ent. He rem in d ed Calvin th a t th e UN ru les of engagem ent allowed to blu e h elm eted C a n a d ia n a n d F re n ch troops to r e tu r n fire in k in d if they or th e ir m a n d a te were th re a te n e d .17 The m issio n w as clear a n d the stage set. T he M -l 13 A rm oured P ersonnel C arriers of C h a r lie C o m p a n y r o lle d f o r w a r d o n 15 S e p tem b e r on sch ed u le. Not long after se ttin g off, L ie u te n a n t G reen ’s 9 P latoon cam e u n d e r sm all a rm s a n d m a c h in e g u n fire from th e C roatian lines. At first it ap p e are d th a t G eneral Cot w as right a b o u t the C roat frontline u n its n ot being advised th a t the C a n a d ian s were coming. The so lu tio n to th is problem seem ed obvious. Get th e w hite p a in te d a rm o u red vehicles o u t in the open w here th ere w ould be no m istak e th a t it was UNPROFOR advancing, ra th e r th a n a Serb counterattack. Large b lu e UN flags w ere fixed to rad io a n te n n a a n d th e c a rrie rs driven o u t of a tree line into th e open. This b ro u g h t a n in cre ase in C roat fire, including heavy m achine gun, rocket

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Windsor: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement

p ropelled g ren a d e s a n d 20 m m a n ti-a irc ra ft gunfire. It w as now obvious th a t th e C ro atian s h a d n o in te n tio n of le ttin g th e C a n a d ia n s advance. All along th e C harlie a n d FREBAT 1 C o m p an y front, th e b lu e h e lm e ts h a lte d in w h atev er defensive p o sitio n s th ey could find, roughly along the form er Serb line. For th e next 15 h o u r s , th e C r o a tia n s s h o t it o u t w ith C a n a d ia n a n d F re n ch tro o p s .18 In terestin g ly en o u g h , of all th e w eap o n s u s e d a g a in st the ad v an cin g UN troops, th e deadly T -7 2 s know n to be in th e a re a did n o t m ake a n a p p e ara n ce . P erhaps C roat officers were aware of the potency of th e TOW a n t i - a r m o u r m is s ile s y s te m , especially w hen m anned by C anadian crews, and w ere u n w illin g to r is k th e ir p r e c io u s new vehicles. It w as not exactly a battle, a t least n o t by the sta n d a rd s of w estern arm ies where positions are a tta c k e d w ith fire a n d m ovem ent. T here were no infantry a s sa u lts or sweeping ta n k th ru s ts to seize g ro u n d held by th e UN. T h a t is n o t how w ar is waged in th e B alkans. G round com bat in th e F orm er Y ugoslavia co n sisted of b o th sides a t t e m p t i n g to m a k e o p p o s in g p o s it i o n s u n te n a b le by brin g in g m axim um fire to bear. C onversely, as soon a s a po sitio n b ecam e too d an gerous due to ac cu ra te an d su sta in e d fire, it w as a b a n d o n ed . Any m ovem ent th a t involved placing troops in the open was avoided. W eapons w ere p le n tif u l in th e re g io n b u t s o ld ie rs , especially of th e tra in e d variety, were not. This way of w ar m ay also be a vestige of Tito’s guerilla m ilitary doctrine th a t form ed th e b a s is of the old Yugoslav N ational Army in w hich m an y of th e officers a n d NCOs on b o th sides h a d served. T he a r g u m e n t t h e n is t h a t b y B a lk a n definition, the C roat firefight w ith C an ad ian a n d

F re n ch soldiers w as in d eed a b a ttle . It su rely se em e d th a t w ay to S e rg ea n t Rod D earin g ’s s e c tio n of 2 PPC LI’s 7 P la to o n on C h a rlie C om pany’s left n e a r th e village of Licki Citluck. It w as th ere th a t som e of th e heaviest firing took place, often a t ranges of 150 m etres. At one point in th e e v e n in g C ro a t m o rta rs a n d 20 m m a u to c a n n o n s w en t to w ork on th e C a n a d ia n tre n c h line. C roat in fa n try tried rep eated ly to flank D earing’s section, b u t each tim e they were driven off by C a n a d ia n rifle a n d m ac h in e-g u n fire directed by a S tarlight telescopic night vision sig h t.19 In the early h o u rs of 16 Septem ber, w hen C roat troops m ade one la s t a tte m p t to p u s h out th e P atricia’s, Private S cott LeBlanc leap t o u t of h is tre n c h blazing aw ay a t the a tta ck e rs w ith his b e lt-fe d C -9 lig h t m a c h in e - g u n . L e b la n c ’s audacious act w as apparently enough to convince th e C roats th a t th ese C an ad ian s were n o t ab out to give ground a n d th a t it w as time to pull back.20 R egardless of how th is action com pares to other larg er b a ttle s in C a n a d ia n m ilitary h istory, for the riflem en of Charlie Com pany, it w as war. Five of D e a rin g ’s m en w ere re se rv ists, in clu d in g LeBlanc. Over on th e UNPROFOR right, th e F ren ch C om pany w as h aving b e tte r luck. E a c h of th eir m ech an ized p lato o n s w as equipped w ith one VAB infantry fighting vehicle m o unting a 20m m a u to can n o n in an arm oured turret. W hen hostile fire w as retu rn ed with this powerful a n d accurate w eapon, C roat troops were less inclined to offer resiste n c e.21 The firefights la s te d all n ig h t a n d early into th e n e x t m orning. D u rin g th e n ig h t Colonel J.O.M . “Mike” M aisonneuve, UNPROFOR’s Chief O p e ra tio n s Officer, arrived from Z agreb in an effort to talk dow n th e C ro atian s. E ventually, CF Photo Unit RE96-CD-049 Photo 43

F re n c h A r m y p la to o n s u n d e r C a n a d ia n c o m m a n d a t M e d a k ro d e in VAB A rm oured P erso n n el Carriers. O ne in e a c h p la to o n w a s a r m e d w ith a 2 0 mm a u to c a n n o n (sh o w n above). T h e s e w e re u s e d w ith g r e a t e ffe c t a g a in s t C ro a t a tta c k e r s .

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9

Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 3

M aisonneuve, L ieutenant-C olonel Calvin, a n d a sen io r UN M ilitary O bserver drove dow n th e m a in r o a d to m e e t w ith th e lo c a l C r o a t c o m m a n d er. O p e ra tio n a l Zone C o m m a n d e r G eneral Ademi, ro u g h eq u iv alen t to a NATO corps com m ander, agreed to th e m eeting a n d let th e C a n a d ia n s delegation p a s s th ro u g h th e lines to h is h e a d q u a rte rs in Gospic. After m u ch h e a te d d isc u s s io n , A dem i ag reed n o t re s is t p h ase 2 a n d th a t the C a n a d ian s could estab lish th e c ro ssin g poin t th a t n ig h t w ith o u t C ro a tia n interference. P hase 3 w ould com m ence a t 1200 th e following day w hen D elta C om pany w ould p a s s th ro u g h th e c ro ssin g p o in t to move into th e C ro atian tre n c h lin e.22 D uring th e night, M ajor D a n D rew a n d h is D e lta C o m p a n y H eadquarters moved u p th e road to the crossing point. The rem ain d er of th e com pany would join him in th e m orn in g for th e ir 1200 d e p a rtu re time.

they r a n in to a C ro a tia n roadblock. To th e left of th e ro ad s a t a very m o d ern a n d very deadly T -72 m ain b attle tank, a gift from G erm any. On th e rig h t side of th e road, two towed a n ti-ta n k g u n s a n d a b a n k of Sagger m issiles were aim ed a t the C an ad ian colum n. A com pany of C roatian in fa n try p ro te c te d by a h a stily laid m ine field th a t com pleted the obstacle.

The P a tric ia ’s rose to a horrifying sig h t on the m o rn in g of 16 S eptem ber. Sm oke could be seen rising from several villages behind C roatian lines. E xplosions a n d a n o ccasional b u r s t of a u to m a tic rifle fire c o u ld a lso be h e a rd . It s u d d e n ly b e c a m e c le a r w hy th e C ro a tia n s resiste d th e C a n a d ia n advance. Those villages were in h a b ite d p red o m in an tly by S e rb s a n d C ro a tia n Special Police were n o t yet finished ethnically cleansing them .

D urin g th e ten sio n , Colonel Calvin arrived on th e sc e n e . He a rg u e d h e a te d ly w ith th e ran k in g C roat officer, Brigadier G eneral Mezic.24 Mezic w as G eneral Ademi’s senior liaison officer. His p rese n c e a t th e road block in d ic a te d th a t th e O p e ra tio n a l Z one C o m m a n d e r h a d no in tention of keeping his word. In fact, Mezic w as stallin g to give C ro atian Special Police th e tim e th e y n e e d e d to d e s tro y e v id en ce of e th n ic cleansing.

Colonel Calvin c lam o u red for a c tio n a n d im m ediately recalled Colonel M aisonneuve to m eet a gain with G eneral Ademi. U nfortunately, w ith only four widely se p a ra te d com panies a n d no su p p o rtin g ta n k s or artillery, C alvin’s force h a d no c h a n ce in a fro n tal a tta c k a g a in s t th e entire C roatian 9 th Brigade w hich h a d ta n k s a n d heavy g u n s. Even if th e C a n a d ian s did have the s tre n g th , it w ould be far beyond the scope of UNPROFOR’s m a n d a te to deliver a full a tta c k . R e tu r n in g a im e d fire w a s o n e is s u e , b u t la u n c h in g a n a s s a u lt w as an o th er. T here w as little th e C a n a d ia n s could do b u t sit b a c k w ait for the 1200 timing. As they w aited they listened h elplessly to th e explosions a n d sh o o tin g a n d im a g in e d w h a t w as h a p p e n in g to th e S e rb civilians to th e ir front.

S h o rtly after 1300, Calvin took a gam ble to b re a k th e deadlock a n d avoid a bloody p ointb la n k s h o o to u t in the m iddle of th e road. Som e 20 in te rn a tio n a l jo u rn a lis ts h a d acco m p an ied D elta C om pany, all seeking to cover the story of th e C ro a tia ’s la te s t in v a sio n of th e S e rb ia n K rajina. It w as tim e to b rin g th em into action. Calvin called th e m edia crew s to the front of the colum n a n d held a p re s s conference, com plete w ith c am eras, in front of th e roadblock. He told th e re p o rte rs w h a t C ro a tia n policem en were doing on the o th er side of the b arricade a n d h a d th e c a m e r a ’s film th e C r o a ti a n ’s o b v io u s interference w ith the UN’s effort to m ake peace.

D elta C om pany rolled a h e a d on sch ed u le at noon m ounted in their M -l 13s a n d accom panied by several TOW a n ti-a rm o u r vehicles. They no sooner s ta rte d dow n th e ro ad in colum n before

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The se n io r C roatian officer on th e b a rrie r refused M ajor Drew’s dem an d th a t his com pany be allowed to p a ss. W eapons on both sides were m ad e re a d y for actio n . T h is te n s e M exican sta n d o ff la ste d over a n h our. T h ro u g h o u t th e standoff, th e well train ed a n d highly disciplined C a n a d ia n riflem en m a in ta in e d th e ir cool while the C roats grew increasingly uneasy. Essentially th e reso lu te a n d ste rn -fa c ed C a n a d ia n s b eg an to s ta r e do w n th e C r o a tia n s m a n n in g th e ro ad b lo ck .23

The c a m e ra s broke th e increasingly sh a k y C roat resolve. By 1330, D elta C om pany w as on the move. C alvin’s im aginative ploy w as too late to sto p th e e th n ic clean sin g of S erb villages in th e M edak Pocket, b u t it did allow th e blueh e lm e ts to re a c h m o st of th e villages before all tra c e s of C ro a tia n atro cities could be e ra s e d .25

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Windsor: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement

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CF Photo Unit RE96-CD -049

Photo 49 A

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A b o v e 81 le ft: S o ld ie rs f r o m 2 PPCLI s u r v e y b a ttle - d a m a g e d b u i l d i n g s a lo n g t h e lin e o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n in t h e M e d a k P ocket.

U nfortunately, th e battlegroup w as also held up late r in the afternoon by senior UN officials who in sis te d th a t they stic k to a rigid tim e tab le for ad v ancing into th e pocket, a tim etab le th a t did n o t ta k e into a c c o u n t th a t w ith every w a sted m inute, m ore evidence w as destroyed. It w as not u n til 17 S ep tem b er th a t UNPROFOR soldiers occupied the whole area. The next few days were the m o st difficult for C an ad ian soldiers involved in th e M edak Pocket operation. T heir job w as now, along w ith civilian

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police officers a n d UN m edical officers, to sweep th e a re a for sig n s of e th n ic cleansing. The ta s k w as en o rm o u s. E a c h a n d every b u ild in g in the M edak Pocket h a d b e e n levelled to th e ground. T ru c k loads of firewood h a d b e e n b ro u g h t to s ta r t in ten se fires am ong the w ooden buildings. B rick a n d concrete b u ild in g s w ere blow a p a rt w ith ex p lo siv e s a n d a n ti - ta n k m in e s . T he C ro a tia n s com pleted th e ir ta s k by killing m o st of th e livestock in th e area. T h a t w as th e sm alla rm s firing h e a rd on 16 Septem ber. In addition, oil or dead a n im a ls w ere d u m p ed into wells to

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Photo supplied b y author, courtesy Col. Oehring.

Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 3

C a n a d ia n C olonel G eorge O ehring took c o m m a n d o f UNPROFOR S ecto r S o u th s u b s e q u e n t to M ed a k. O ehring rep o rted a s ig n ific a n t im p ro v e m e n t to UN cred ib ility a m o n g th e w a rrin g fa c tio n s fo llo w in g th e operation. H ere O ehring (centre) ta k e s th e n Vice C h ie f o f th e D efen ce S ta ff, V ice-A dm iral L a rry M u rra y (seco n d fr o m right) o n tou r in S ecto r H e a d q u a rte rs in K nin.

m ake th em u n u sa b le for S erbs en tertain in g any th o u g h t of re tu rn . 26 Only 16 S erb bodies w ere found s c a tte re d in h id d e n lo c a tio n s. T he o p e n g ro u n d w as littered w ith ru b b e r su rg ical gloves. Calvin a n d h is m en believed the gloves indicated th a t m o st S erb d ead laying in th e op en w ere tra n s p o rte d elsew here a n d only th o se h id d e n in b a s e m e n ts or in th e woods h a d b een left beh in d in h a ste . A m ass grave containing over fifty bodies w as later located in th e vicinity. The bodies recovered in clu d ed th o se of two you n g w om en fo u n d in a b a se m e n t. They h a d a p p a re n tly b een tied up, shot an d th en doused with gasoline an d burned. W hen found, th e bodies were still h o t enough to m elt p lastic body bags. At a n o th e r location, a n elderly S erb w om an h a d b e e n found s h o t four tim es in th e h ead , execution style.27 While the job of gathering evidence m ay have b e e n th e m o st difficu lt for th e C a n a d ia n s , h a u n tin g m any of the young soldiers to th is day, it w as of critical im portance. The M edak Pocket provided th e w orld w ith th e first h a rd evidence th a t Serbia, alth o u g h probably th e largest, w as n o t th e sole p e rp e tra to r of e th n ic clean sin g in th e B a lk a n s. Also, th e m etic u lo u s C a n a d ia n p ro ce d u re s u s e d to sw eep a n d record evidence in the area becam e standardized in UNPROFOR, p e rh a p s providing som e degree of d eterren ce to th o se who m ay fear being called before a w ar crim es trib u n al. C anadian action a t M edak earned back some of th e re sp e c t for th e U nited N ations lo st a t M aslencia. T hat sam e m onth, a C anadian officer, C o lo n e l G e o rg e O e h r in g , to o k o v e r a s

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co m m an d er of S ector S o u th . O ehring w as in a b e tte r po sitio n th a t anyone to feel th e effects of M edak. M edak re s to re d UNPROFOR’s cred ib ility resulting in renewed dialogue leading to a local informal cease-fire in November, a more formal and wider one at Christm as, and a “bilateral”, universal cease-fire signed in Zagreb on 29 March, 1994. Everybody hated us in September 1993. I was stoned and threatened during my first trip to Zadar to meet the Croat commander there. Medak changed all this. The Serbs, right u p to my d e p a rtu re a y e a r later, w ould spontaneously mention the resolute fairness of the C anadians at Medak, while the Croats, although grudgingly at first, came to respect the C anadians in Sector South.28

U nfortunately M edak did n o t go far enough in w iping aw ay the m em ory of M aslencia. The C a n a d ia n s m ay have d o c u m e n ted C roat w ar crim es, b u t they could n o t sto p them , adding to th e s e n s e of in s e c u rity a m o n g th e S e r b s .29 However, J im Calvin a n d h is m en c a n tak e c o m fo rt in th e k n o w le d g e t h a t th e y d id everything w ith in th e ir m e a n s to keep o rd er in C r o a tia . T h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e k e e p in g co m m unity w as n o t yet rea d y in 1993 to tak e th e k in d of re so lu te s te p s se e n la s t y e a r in Kosovo. It w ould tak e several, m u c h larg e r m assacres aro u n d the world before international political will could be m u ste re d to intervene a n d stop ethnic cleansing. T he jo in t C a n a d ia n -F re n c h o p e ra tio n a t M e d a k r e p r e s e n t s a w a t e r s h e d in th e developm ent of international conflict resolution. It will be m an y years before scholars will be able to fully explain th e ongoing tra n sfo rm a tio n in

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Windsor: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement

th e n a tu re of m o d ern m ilitary peace s u p p o rt operations. Sources are not yet available a n d not enough distance h a s been established to present a clear, a c cu ra te h istorical picture. The M edak Pocket O peration also occu rred a t the b eginning of th e tra n s itio n period. The C a n a d ia n b a ttle g ro u p p o sse sse d a high degree of com bat power an d a dem onstrated willingness to u se it. However, m o st o th er c o n tin g e n ts in UNPROFOR were totally u n p re p a re d in regards to equipm ent, training an d political will to engage in th e ty p e s of a c tio n c a rr ie d o u t by th e C a n a d ian s a t M edak. Analysis of activities engaged in by C anadian troops a t M edak offers a n alternative view to the c o n clu sio n s of th e S om alia R eport. O p erations in UNPROFOR’s Sector S o u th dem anded the full range of capabilities p o sse sse d by C a n a d ian s o ld ie r s , fro m f o r tif ic a tio n c o n s tr u c ti o n , m ark sm an sh ip , a n d m echanized mobile com bat to negotiation and basic investigation techniques. In all th e s e c a te g o rie s , C a n a d ia n m ilita ry le a d e rs h ip a n d tra in in g w as of th e h ig h e s t stan d ard . Contrary to the findings of the Som alia Inquiry, the C a n a d ia n Army in 1993 c o n tain ed d e d ic a te d , s k ille d , a n d w e l l- d i s c i p li n e d pro fessio n al soldiers. T hese troops w ere led by com petent, educated, a n d highly capable officers a n d senior NCOs. M edak a n d S om alia were obviously n o t the only two C anadian m ilitary operations in tire last decade. A great deal m ore rese a rc h is n ecessary before a final verdict can be p a sse d on C anadian F orces effectiveness in th e 1990s. O ne th in g is c le a r, h o w ev er. An i n s t i t u t i o n c a p a b le of producing soldiers who could perform effectively in the difficult an d constantly evolving conditions a t M edak w as pro b ab ly n o t a s close to collapse a s som e m ay th ink. *1

4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

N otes T h is a rtic le is b a s e d on re s e a r c h c o n d u c te d for th e C onference of D efence A ssociations In stitu te. 1.

2.

3.

Comm ission of Inquiry into the Deployment of C anadian Forces to S om alia, D ishonoured Legacy: T he L e sso n s o f the Som alia Affair. (O ttaw a: 1997) p. xxix M em o ra n d u m . C olonel G. O e h rin g to UNPROFOR D e p u ty F o rc e C o m m a n d e r M a jo r - G e n e r a l J.A . M acG innis, 1 O ctober 1993. Overview of Y ugoslav b re a k -u p b a se d on UN R eports an d print m edia analysis conducted while a u th o r served a s CF o p e ra tio n s a n a ly s t for C o nference of Defence

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A ssociations In stitu te , 1996-98. For m ore inform ation on th e topic see: S u sa n L. Woodward, B a lka n Tragedy: Chaos a n d D issolution a fter the Cold War. (W ashington: B rookings In s titu tio n , 1995); a n d T he U nited N ations a n d the Situation in the Form er Yugoslavia. (New York: UN D ept, of Public Inform ation, 1995) T ro o p s d ep lo y ed u n d e r C h a p te r VI of th e U nited N ations C harter are m a n d a te d to im p artially su p p o rt p eacefu l re so lu tio n of d is p u te s b etw een p a rtie s, as opposed to deploym ents u n d e r C hapter VII w hich allows th e u se of force to re sto re in te rn a tio n a l peace an d security. Interview w ith now C olonel J . Calvin, K ingston 1997. R eserve c o m b at a rm s officers en ro lled in th e RESO p ro g ra m receive v irtu ally id en tical tra in in g a s th eir r e g u la r force c o u n te r p a r t s u p to p la t o o n /t r o o p co m m an d level. Interview w ith Calvin. W ar Diary [WD], 2 PPCLI, O peration H arm ony R otation 3, M ar-O ct, 1993. Lewis M acKenzie, P eacekeeper: T he R o a d to Sarajevo (Vancouver: D ouglas & M cIntyre, 1993). M a jo r D a w n M. H e w itt, USAF, F rom O tta w a to S a ra jevo : C a n a d ia n P e a c e k e e p e rs in th e B a lk a n s (Kingston: 1998) pp. 55-57. Interview w ith Colonel G. O eh rin g (Retired), K ingston 1997. Interview w ith Calvin; M edak Pocket H earing, S tanding Committee on Defence an d Veterans Affairs [SCONDVA], 1998. U NPROFOR In te llig e n c e S u m m a ry , WD 2 PPCLI, S ep tem b er 1993. Interview w ith Calvin. SCONDVA H earing. C olonel J.O . M ichel M aisonneuve, “U nity of A ction in ex-Yugoslavia,” D efence A ssociations National N etw ork N ew s (Winter 1995/96). WD 2 PPCLI, M edak P o ck et After A ction R eport, 1993 S ection 5. SCONDVA H earing. WD 2 PPCLI, M edak R eport. H ew itt. From O tta w a to Sarajevo p.64. SCONDVA H earing. Interview w ith C alvin. Interview w ith Calvin. Interview w ith Calvin. WD 2 PPCLI M edak R eport. SCONDVA H earing. WD 2 PPCLI. M edak R eport. Interview w ith Calvin. L etter from Colonel G. O ehring to M in ister of N ational Defence. D ecem ber 1996. “It w as im possible to h ave any m eeting or n egotiations w ith th e S e rb s w ith o u t having ‘22 J a n u a r y , 1993' (Op M aslencia) d is c u sse d a d n a u s e a m .” WD 1 PPCLI, E nd T o u r R eport Op H arm ony, R o tation 4, O ctober 1994.

Lee W in d s o r is c u r r e n t l y a d o c to r a l candidate in C anadian m ilitary history a t the University of New Brunsw ick. He holds a BA from A cadia U niversity a n d a n MA from Wilfrid Laurier. He is a form er m em b er of th e C a n a d ia n F orces Reserve. From 1996­ 98 he w orked a s a re se a rc h e r a n d a s s is ta n t c o o rd in ato r for th e C onference of Defence A ssociations Institute.

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Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 3

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