Genocide and Geopolitics of the Rohingya Crisis 1536182583, 9781536182583

Table of contents :
Dedication
Contents
List of Figures
Foreword • Sadequl Islam
Preface
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
1 Introduction
2 Organization of the Book
3 Background History of the Rohingyas in Arakan: From the Kingdom of Arakan to the Colonial Era
4 Relevant Burmese Modern History and Its Pitfalls
5 To Define the Rohingya Problem
6 Strategic Significance of the Area
7 Turning Events in Myanmar History: Enacting the 1974 Constitution and the 1982 Citizenship Law
8 Role of the Monks
9 What Genocide/Crime against Humanity/Ethnic Cleansing Entails?
10 Can the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecute the Perpetrators?
11 Geopolitics Involved
12 Possibility of Local Insurgency Getting Entrenched
13 Possibility of Rohingyas Going Back to Myanmar this Time Round
14 Plight of Bangladesh in Sheltering the Rohingyas
15 Scenario Development
16 Suggestions and Few Doable
References
About the Author
Index

Citation preview

HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES.

GENOCIDE AND GEOPOLITICS OF THE ROHINGYA CRISIS

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HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES. Additional books and e-books in this series can be found on Nova’s website under the Series tab.

HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES.

GENOCIDE AND GEOPOLITICS OF THE ROHINGYA CRISIS

MOHD AMINUL KARIM

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NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers’ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works. Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the Publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Karim, Mohammad Aminul, author. Title: Genocide and Geopolitics of the Rohingya Crisis / Mohd Aminul Karim, (Author), Dean & Professor, School of Business, Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB), Dhaka, Bangladesh. Description: New York : NOVA Science Publishers, [2020] | Series: Human rights: contemporary issues and perspectives | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2020029149 (print) | LCCN 2020029150 (ebook) | ISBN 9781536182583 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781536183153 (adobe pdf) Subjects: LCSH: Rohingya (Burmese people)--Violence against. | Rohingya (Burmese people)--Crimes against--Burma. | Rohingya (Burmese people)--Social conditions. | Genocide--Burma. | Burma--Ethnic relations. Classification: LCC DS528.2.R64 K375 2020 (print) | LCC DS528.2.R64 (ebook) | DDC 959.1--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020029149 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020029150

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

Dedicated to Sakina and Zahra, my two granddaughters born to my only son Rommel and his wife Sadia, and my only daughter Fatima and her husband Sharif My son Rommel lives in Liverpool, the UK and my daughter Fatima lives in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada I and my wife Neelufar live in Dhaka, Bangladesh

True Globalization at the costs of our physical and psychological separation?

CONTENTS List of Figures

ix

Foreword

xi Sadequl Islam

Preface

xiii

Acknowledgments

xvii

List of Abbreviations

xix

Chapter 1

Introduction

Chapter 2

Organization of the Book

13

Chapter 3

Background History of the Rohingyas in Arakan: From the Kingdom of Arakan to the Colonial Era

17

Chapter 4

Relevant Burmese Modern History and Its Pitfalls

27

Chapter 5

To Define the Rohingya Problem

33

Chapter 6

Strategic Significance of the Area

41

Chapter 7

Turning Events in Myanmar History: Enacting the 1974 Constitution and the 1982 Citizenship Law

51

Role of the Monks

59

Chapter 8

1

viii Chapter 9 Chapter 10

Contents What Genocide/ Crime against Humanity/Ethnic Cleansing Entails?

67

Can the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecute the Perpetrators?

93

Chapter 11

Geopolitics Involved

101

Chapter 12

Possibility of Local Insurgency Getting Entrenched

129

Chapter 13

Possibility of Rohingyas Going Back to Myanmar this Time Round

137

Chapter 14

Plight of Bangladesh in Sheltering the Rohingyas

153

Chapter 15

Scenario Development

163

Chapter 16

Suggestions and Few Doable

173

References

179

About the Author

199

Index

201

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Offshore and onshore oil/gas fields in the Rakhine region (Kanthan 2017)

43

Figure 2. Myanmar-China Oil and Gas pipeline (Kanthan 2017)

44

Figure 3. Myanmar’s common border with Bangladesh, Northeast India, and China (Lintner 2020)

46

Figure 4. Location map of oil and gas field in Sedimentary Basins of Myanmar (ADB 2016)

47

Figure 5. Myanmar Army Structures in Rakhine State (Security-Force-Monitor 2018)

48

Figure 6. List of Violent Acts Experienced (Siddiqui 2018)

75

Figure 7. Map of Rakhine state in Myanmar/the refugee camps are in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh (Bepler 2018)

104

Figure 8. A google map view of Northeast India and Myanmar

106

Figure 9. Seven Sisters Corridor

110

Figure 10. Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project

114

Figure 11. India – Myanmar – Thailand Trilateral Highway (Friendship Highway)

115

x

List of Figures

Figure 12. Strait of Malacca

117

Figure 13. China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (Htwe 2019)

117

Figure 14. Rohingya population map in Bangladesh

155

FOREWORD Dr. Aminul Karim, the author, is known to me for about 53 years since our days at Rajshahi Cadet College in Bangladesh. He embodies in himself a remarkable and a diverse set of expertise and experience: a distinguished military career as a General in the Bangladesh Army, an established scholar with a Ph.D in political science, and now the Dean of Business School of a leading Private university. Genocide and Geopolitics of the Rohingya Crisis is a well-timed and comprehensive book about the Rohingyas- the most persecuted group in the world. Forced displacement of more than one million Rohingyas by Myanmar to Bangladesh has created a catastrophic humanitarian, social, economic, and political crisis in the region – a crisis which continues to cry for an urgent solution. The book covers several broad dimensions of the crisis: social, religious, political origins of the crisis; genocidal crimes committed by the Myanmar State against the Rohingyas; the dynamics of political and economic interests of the dominant powers in the region; and different scenarios of resolution of the crisis. It adroitly connects the political, economic, social, historical, and religious dots in Myanmar that endogenously generated the crisis. Based on his scholarly expertise on political and security issues, his experience as a senior military officer, and his direct observations from visits

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to Rohingya refugee camps, the author, presents a remarkable book on relevant issues concerning the Rohingya crisis. The author is at his best in integrating perspectives from military and regional conflicts, politics, economics, ethnic and religious divides. The book is a tour de force and is a must read for scholars, policy makers, international agencies, and students of regional conflicts. Dr. Sadequl Islam Professor & Chair of Economics Laurentian University, Canada 26 May 2020

PREFACE I have a profound interest in the subjects like geopolitics and geoeconomics that encapsulate civilizational and regional flashpoints, insurgency, genocide, national security, and overall South/East Asian geopolitics. My Ph.D. dissertation Power Politics in the Asia-Pacific: The Case of Chinese Modernization and one of the previously published papers China’s Power Politics and Modernization: Implications for Taiwan and the South China Sea serve as testimonies of my interest and lay the groundwork for the current book. It is important to note, one of the other reasons for my being interested in the pressing subject matter goes back to my military roots. My long-standing military career, especially during my service at Bandarban that borders Myanmar, where I was commanding a battalion and a brigade, helped me gain hands-on experience and prognostication knowledge on the subject. My book 21st century high politics in the Indo-pacific and the Bay of Bengal (published in 2017 by NOVA) attempted to make forecast that the issue was soon going to turn into a civilizational or regional flashpoint; interestingly that has come true today which has further prompted me to write the current book. Civilizational aspects of life when intermingled with geopolitics tend to take a tangential turn with unimaginable consequences waiting. Ultra-nationalism in Myanmar has raised its ugly heads with implications beyond its borders. Not much work has been done on the

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existing or future regional flashpoints -- except probably Kashmir-- in this part of the world although there exist many. The importance of the Bay of Bengal---its waves touch the shores of both the countries and is linked to the issue and determines the economic sustainability of Bangladesh in the longrun-- has been generally sidelined. This provided me with a wider scope for this much-needed work. This book predominantly investigates the genocidal and geopolitical aspects of the Rohingya crisis. It starts by examining the displacement of the Rohingyas considering its historical and contemporary contexts. It then goes onto exploring Myanmar’s various horrifying approaches of deporting the Rohingyas and attempts to understand whether it is incentivized by the State or home-grown or a combination of both. The book then looks into the geopolitical agendas of stakeholder countries behind discounting the genocidal or humanitarian aspects of the crisis, the plausible role of United Nations in taking punitive actions against the parties involved, whether Rohingyas can go back to their ancestral home through negotiation and diplomacy and whether a third party such as China, India and USA needs to intervene to put an end to the crisis. Lastly, the book attempts to understand how long this stalemate will last and the social, economic, and environmental degradation impacts the 1.1 million Rohingya refugees that may take a toll on the Bangladeshi people and its ecology. The book warns there is a strong possibility that the Rohingya crisis will manifest into a civilizational and regional flashpoint of inconceivable magnitudes much to the deliberate foot-dragging by the world community. In the process, Bangladesh has turned out to be the worst victim as it must shelter 1.1 million-strong refugees for decades that put heavy pressure on its developing economy. More so, Bangladesh is already overcrowded space, probably the highest in the world. Regrettably, there is no straightforward military solution to bring the crisis under control. As it happens to be deep-seated and extremely complicated, it demands the incorporation of multifaceted steps and strategies. The book offers solutions ranging from high-level inclusive political dialogue to interfaith dialogue at grass-root and mid-level facilitated by the UN and other important players like China, Russia, and the

Preface

xv

United States. It also recommends comprehensive training for the security forces on human rights and the laws of war, activating fact-finding missions, speedy and justified repatriation, greater involvement of the UN and other international bodies, restoration of citizenship for the Rohingyas, ensuring more autonomy to the constituent units or federalism in the Myanmar Statestructure. I understand the book will be of good use to the policy planners, foreign policy, and military professionals, to international organizations, academics, researchers, and general readers, etc. I always welcome any comments and suggestions for improving its quality or veracity so that I can correct those in its next edition. I am deeply indebted to almighty Allah because on 1st November I suffered a stroke and was hospitalized but I have not failed my deadline to my esteemed publisher. Professor Mohd Aminul Karim, PhD Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB) Dhaka, Bangladesh 27 May 2020

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book is based on genocidal and geopolitics aspects of the current Rohingya crisis. Without supports from The Almighty, my family members, colleagues, and institutions, it would have been difficult to complete this book. First and foremost, praises and thanks to almighty Allah for providing me protection and ability for work. I am grateful to Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB) and a number of colleagues from there, especially Dr. Ziaul Haq Adnan, Mr. Mohammad Naveed Adnan Siddique, Ms. Seeratus Sabah, Ms. Jessica Tartila Suma, Ms. Afnan Ashfaque, Ms. Kashfia Ameen, Mr. James Clinton Baroi, and Ms. Sumaiya Tahmin Bushra, for encouraging me to start writing and completing the book. Their honesty and criticism helped me refine my ideas and approach throughout writing this book. This book is richer for their contributions. Writing a book is a continuous process of learning and creating new knowledge that cannot be possible without the assistance and moral support from the people and institutions of society as well as the family. I am also grateful to Professor Sadequl Islam, a world-class scholar, for writing a fascinating foreword for my book and providing very useful advice to enrich my book. I am grateful to NOVA Science Publishers, Inc. for providing me space, their suggestion, guideline, and finally for their intention to publish the book. As things turn out, NOVA is increasingly becoming a world-class publisher

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with reach in every nook and corner of the world. I follow my last books published by NOVA are sponsored by all the important vendors especially in the United States, Europe, Australia, and Asia. Finally, I would like to acknowledge with gratitude, the support, and love of the members of my family. They all kept me going and without them, this book would not have been possible. They had to endure much of my absence and negligence. I will appreciate all of you mentioned here to take gratitude and bring support, enthusiasm, and encouragement for the future publication and learning together.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ASEAN: ARIF: ARNO: ARSA: BRI: CAA: CEDAW: CFR: CIL: CMEC: CNPC: CNOOC: CNPC: CRC: EU: GDP: ICC: ICJ: ICSI: IEDs:

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front Arakan Rohingya National Organization Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army Belt and Road Initiative Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 Convention on the elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women Council on Foreign Relations Customary International Law China-Myanmar Economic Corridor China National Petroleum Corporation China National Offshore Oil Corporation China National Petroleum Corporation Convention on the Rights of the Child European Union Gross domestic product International Criminal Court International Court of Justice International State Crime Initiative Improvised Explosive Weapons

xx

Abbreviations IIGS: IRO: IONS: MLP: MOGE: NATO: NLD: NVC: OIC: ONGC: PRI: RLP: RNA: RPF: RSO: SEZ: SLORC: SPDC: UN: UNICEF: UNSC: UNGA: UNHCR: UNHRC: UNDP: ULA: USAID: UWSA: VHP: WTO: WFP: YMCA: YMBA:

Indian Insurgent Groups International Refugee Organization Indian Ocean Naval Symposium Magh Liberation Party Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise North Atlantic Treaty Organization National League for Democracy National Verification Card Organization of Islamic countries The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Policy Research Institute Rohingya Liberation Party Rohingya National Army Rohingya Patriotic Party Rohingya Solidarity Organization Special Economic Zone State Law and Order Restoration Council State Peace and Development Council United Nations United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Security Council United Nations General Assembly United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Human Rights Council United Nations Development Programme United League of Arakan United States Agency for International Development United Wa State Army Vishwa Hindu Parishad World Trade Organization World Food Program Young Men’s Christian Association Young Men’s Buddhist Association

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION Myanmar – formerly known as Burma – draws world attention today because of its unique strategic location, its rich and abundant natural resources and above all for earning the wrath of the world community for committing a ghastly genocide to its minority Rohingy citizens especially in 2017. Myanmar being dubbed as the “last Asian frontier”, mining corporations and oil/gas companies from all over the world moved into Myanmar and commissioned plenty of natural resources projects.1 This invigorated Myanmar’s GDP to quadruple in the last ten years. That said, these extractions always have huge social and environmental costs for people living there for centuries. The Rakhine state of Myanmar is no exception. There is reportedly massive exploitation of laborers, destruction of the environment, and mass eviction of people from their ancestral homes. Myanmar had been under military rule for a prolonged period since 1962 – practically the Military still calls the shot on security matters – and then gradually started opening its economy in the 1990s. This is the time when 1

In late-2012, Myanmar Parliament passed a new foreign investment law that opened overseas ownership of business ventures and offered tax breaks. Its net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), as the World Bank estimates, increased from USD 900 million in 2010 to USD 2.3 billion in 2013. No wonder, as its government announced the FDI hit more than USD 8 billion. These reforms attracted countries such as the United States, European Union, Australia, and Japan to drop some economic sanctions, and thus multinational companies began investing in the country. (Xu and Albert 2016)

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the Indian economy opened, and it started booming so is Myanmar’s. Myanmar economy underwent huge reforms in 2006, after which foreign investments rise precipitously as indicated. Myanmar is located close to the strategically critical oil route that covers the constricted Malacca Straits. It borders India, China, Thailand, Bangladesh, and the Bay of Bengal on different sides that enable the formation of geopolitical ripples across the region. With shepherding towards limited democracy in the recent past as spearheaded by the United States, Myanmar is gradually coming out of its isolationist foreign policy. That said, its Military still has substantial clout as mentioned – even in its elected Parliament – that tends to make the elected civilian government rather helpless – at times – when it comes to national security issues. Important ministries such as defense, home, border matters are under the Military’s control. The Military tends to, in partnership with the chauvinistic Buddhist majority, especially its monks, pitch this country towards deeper political and diplomatic crisis, which is otherwise a beleaguered at least diplomatically. The stature of Myanmar is now abysmally low in the comity of nations. Having said so, “Rohingyas” are primarily the residents of Arakan, which is today called Rakhine state. Myanmar is one of the most diverse – ethnically and religion-wise – societies in the world today. 135 ethnic nationalities, with numerous subgroups, are officially recognized by the State of Burma. The list does not include ‘Rohingyas’. That said, in the first – 1947 – Constitution of Myanmar all people at that time were living even in “Frontier Areas” and those who intended to stay permanently were considered citizens and accepted as citizens of the country. When General Ne Win came to power in 1962, the Rohingyas were not considered citizens as Rohingyas were deemed not companionable with other ethnic groups in Burma. Other Muslims, not belonging to the Rohingyas, are, however, granted citizenship. The Government of Myanmar circumvents the term Rohingya and terms them as “Bengalis’’ who understandably immigrated illegally – as alleged – from neighboring Bangladesh. Rakhine is one of the poorest states of Myanmar despite it being rich in natural resources as mentioned (Bepler 2018).

Introduction

3

Mercy Corps gives its perspective on Rohingya Issue: People from Bengal (now Bangladesh) have traded with Myanmar (Rakhine State) for hundreds of years. These traders settled and established themselves in the country. During the British colonial period in the 1800s, many people from India and Bangladesh were brought to Myanmar to work in the British led administration, doubling the community in 50 years. This decision was resented by the local Myanmar people and forms one of the root causes of the animosity. World War II exacerbated this animosity. The Muslims supported the British while many Buddhists supported the Japanese. After Myanmar gained independence in 1948, the Muslims fought for equal rights but were defeated, further solidifying the divide in their community. (Mercy Corps 2019)

Rohingya Muslim’s vulnerability is glaring as they live in its peripheral areas – implying bordering areas – where minorities – in totality – have greater numbers. There are approximately 925,939 Rohingya Muslims who reside predominantly in Rakhine State. Rohingyas constitute 1.7 percent of Myanmar’s total population of 55, 123, 814. Buddhists are the religious majority, as indicated, accounting for 87.9 percent of the total population. In Rakhine State, however, the religious and ethnic lines are drawn rather tightly thus infuriating religious tensions than in the rest of the country. The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census show that 52.2 percent of Rakhine State are Buddhists and 42.7 percent Muslims. The 1982 Citizenship Act denied the Rohingyas of their citizenship and were categorized as “nonnationals”. It is an irony that even in this 21st century, nearly 1 million Rohingya Muslims live within Myanmar’s borders as stateless and endure the constant threat of ‘detention camps, deportation, and forced labor, including sex trafficking.’ (Sanderson and Markusen 2017) Details are covered in the subsequent chapters. That said, the country is also beleaguered by national disintegration problems leading to prolonged insurgencies that sweep mostly its frontier border areas that meet China, India, Bangladesh, and Thailand. On top of that, today it faces the wrath of the international community for its gross

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human rights violations and genocidal intent predominantly in Muslim Rakhine State. Details are covered in later chapters. Despite such scathing criticism, it looks like Myanmar remains undaunted because of support it directly receives from China, India, and Russia. Sandwiched between the two great powers i.e., China and India and being proximate to Thailand, Bangladesh, and China, its wide-ranging indigenous minorities tend to roll over into these countries. Its former Prime Minister U Nu once said, “We are hemmed in like a tender gourd among the cactus.” Historically, the internal Chinese and Indian population – those coming from the Subcontinent – have been economically influential thus creating tensions and antagonisms with the majority Burmans. (Steinberg 2010) Both these states around Myanmar tend to influence it – at the cost of each other – for geopolitical reasons and to get control of its natural resources, especially oil and gas. Even the United States and Japan are set to influence this country to carve out their part of the pie where power political rivalry is also rife. Ultimately history suggests it is ultimately politics that rules the roost. Those states around Myanmar have “the burden of proximity” and those further afield have the ‘luxury of distance’ (Steinberg 2010). Frankly speaking, this country suffers from the ‘tyranny of geography’ ultimately. Among many other issues, the Rohingya issue is a long-festering problem that the world must grapple with today and even tomorrow. The crisis that beset the Rohingyas is the culmination-as it looks today – of a civil war that started in 1948. Many of the problems of the world today are the result of maps drawn by former colonial masters rather whimsically. In the post-independence period, many ethnic groups in Burma asked for a federal structure of the state, while the Rohingyas called for unification with the then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. (The Duran 2017) The conflict between the Muslim Rohingyas and the Buddhists in the Rakhine state continued for quite some time – the first biggest exodus happened in 1977 from Arakan to Bangladesh – but it aggravated drastically in 2012, 2015, and 2017.2 So far, the 2017 atrocities carried out dreadfully 2

Bangladesh treated the refugees with sympathy and compassion being both the peoples were Muslims. Thirteen makeshift camps were set up along the border of River Naff to the sides

Introduction

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by the Myanmar security forces are the worst. Its parallels are seemingly rare both in modern and ancient history. The 2017 incident was the follow up of the ultra-nationalist Buddhist majority reprisals against the Rohingyas who resorted to an old-fashioned limited guerilla war against the security forces (The Duran 2017). In 2012, many were driven out of their places of residence so over 100,000 Rohingyas moved to resettlement camps while many were forced on dangerous maritime trips towards countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia (Karim 2017). The majority of the world see the of the Cox’s Bazar – Teknaf highway. They were supported with food and temporary shelters. Right at the outset of the exodus, Bangladesh made it very clear that it was a temporary arrangement, and that refugees must leave as soon as the situation became normal for them in Arakan. Bangladesh’s then foreign minister Shamsul Huq made it loud and clear during a press conference in July 1979, “the Government of Bangladesh’s stand on the refugee problem was that they should be repatriated in the interest of good neighborliness and in the interest of border peace” (Huq 1993). Both the countries’ delegation held a discussion in Dhaka during 7 to 9 July 1978, and consequently signed an agreement called – Agreed Minutes Signed between the Government of Burma (Myanmar) and the Government of Bangladesh on Repatriation of the Burmese Refugees, 1978. The document identified the refugees as “the lawful residents of Burma”, though not as “Rohingyas”. In the first phase, Burma agreed to repatriate “the lawful residents of Burma” who could produce their Burmese National Registration Cards along with their family group pictures. In the second phase of repatriation, Myanmar agreed to take those back who were “able to present their documents issued in Burma with indication of their residence in Burma, along with the members of their families,… who will be able to furnish evidence of their residence in Burma, such as address or any other particulars” (“Agreed Minutes Signed between the Government of Burma (Myanmar) and the Government of Bangladesh on Repatriation of the Burmese Refugees” 1978). By the end of January 1979, “according to Rangoon Radio, 60,803 returnees had taken part in the program since 31 August 1978. By December 1979, a total of 187,197 refugees had been repatriated (Reid 1994). This successful repatriation process establishes at least two important facts. One, since the refugees were originally from Myanmar, they agreed to take back their “the lawful residents of Burma”. Second, the view of the Bangladesh Government proved to be correct in that they were from the other side of the border and “the lawful residents of Burma”. There is nothing imaginary here. Sad enough within a decade, another much bigger diaspora entered Bangladesh, after 1990 Myanmar’s election. In April 1992, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the two governments, setting terms of reference for repatriation. Towards the end of 1992, the Government of Bangladesh repatriated the Rohingyas without UNHCR involvement. As will be discerned clearly later in the book that it was a diplomatic blunder for Bangladesh for which space for negotiation has got restricted even today. Myanmar is getting a leverage thenceforth. . This time round also the Myanmar authorities were rigid in classifying the nationality status of the Rohingyas. The April 1992 MoU – later, however, both the parties signed separate MoUs with UNHCR – accepted the repatriation proposals but declined to call the Rohingyas as citizens but as “temporary residents of Arakan”. Interestingly during 1997 repatriation, Rohingyas were “the lawful residents of Burma” but during 1992 repatriation it got degraded to “temporary residents of Arakan”. (Farzana 2017, 68 – 69)

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Rohingyas as the worst persecuted minority on Earth, while the majority of the Buddhist insiders in Myanmar view them as Muslim separatists – foreigners – who are foreign-funded presumably to create instability in the country. (Calamur 2017) To see it from another perspective: It is essentially a case of ethnic cleansing; this can also be dubbed as a conflict over resources like oil and gas. In 2004, a huge natural field namely Shwe – so named to honor the longtime military leader Shwe – was discovered off the coast of Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal. In 2008, The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) secured the rights to natural resource extraction. The construction began on two 1,200 km overland pipelines that connect Myanmar Rakhine state – home of the Rohingyas – to the Yunnan province of China. The gas pipeline was kicking in 2014 – a good recipe to use as a pretext by the insurgents. The Rakhine state plays a significant strategic role for Myanmar’s neighbors that interests China. China’s gigantic geostrategic mega project called ‘Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)’ has the vision to connect the west of China with the Bay of Bengal with pipelines and a highway. China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) that aims to connect Asia with Africa is another mega project of connectivity. China is disparagingly dependent on Myanmar for both energy and connectivity. The BRI will bring about substantial advantages like bypassing the security bottleneck in the Strait of Malacca. (Bepler 2018) Details are covered in the latter part of the book. The Myanmar Government and larger parts of the society do not recognize Rohingyas as one of the “national races” as mentioned. So, most of the Muslims living in Rakhine for centuries are made stateless by only changing its laws, without any consent or consultation with the aggrieved community, with a far-reaching ulterior objective. The problem dates to the colonial era or even beyond. Although Myanmar is tending to move towards a wave of – a kind of – democracy it is getting stigmatized because of this festering Rohingya problem that badly batters this not-so-integrated statenation. It is trying to transform itself into modernity and trying to make its mark on the international stage. It has even become a member of the WTO and doing good business with China, India, and EU countries. It is gradually

Introduction

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coming out of isolationism but again is getting dwarfed by ethnic problems especially the Rohingyas. The Rohingyas are so persecuted constantly especially since 1977 that a mass exodus to the neighboring countries – especially Bangladesh, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, etc. – has become a routine still today. Bangladesh must bear the maximum brunt of this horrendous crisis due to the factors of its proximity, ethnicity, and religion. Its implications are analyzed in subsequent chapters. Through bilateral diplomacy and with the assistance of the United Nations, especially through UNHCR, many of the “illegal refugees’ – the term used by both Bangladesh and Myanmar – were repatriated back to their country of origin but much to their chagrin. Those leftovers i.e., who could not be repatriated back either moved to Saudi Arabia, Malaysia or got mingled with the local Bangladeshi population mostly because of ethnicity and religious affinity. Kristof, in his Opinion “I saw a Genocide in Slow Motion”, captures a devastating picture of the genocide perpetrated in 2017 by Myanmar’s security forces and the fanatic Buddhist zealots. Entering Myanmar on a tourist visa, I was able to slip undetected into five Rohingya villages. What I saw was a slow-motion genocide. The massacres and machete attacks of last August are over for now, but Rohingya remain confined to their villages – and a huge concentration camp – and are systematically denied most education and medical care. (Kristof 2018)

He further adds: Myanmar and its Nobel Peace Prize-winning leader, Aung San Suu Kyi are trying to make the Rohingya’s lives unlivable while keeping out witnesses. Some 700,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh in recent months, but the fate of those left behind has been less clear, for Myanmar mostly bans foreigners from Rohingya areas. The government fired a warning flare when it arrested two Reuter’s journalists for reporting on an army massacre of Rohingya; the reporters face up to 14 years in prison for committing superb journalism. (Kristof 2018)

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The research titled, “Forced Migration of Rohingya: The Untold Experience”, published by Ontario International Development Agency, Canada on July 18, 2018, estimated in January 2018 that during the genocide, the military and the local Rakhine Buddhists killed at least 24,000 Rohingya people. According to the UN reports of September 2018, it was over 700,000 Rohingya people, although according to the local NGOs the figure is almost 1,200,000, had fled or had been driven out of Rakhine state. (Habib et al. 2018)3 Scholars at Yale University and the U.S. Holocaust Museum terms this as genocide as the then United Nations Human Rights Chief, Zeid Ra’ad alHussain does. He put it this way: “The devastating cruelty to which these Rakhine children have been subjected is unbearable.” He noted a case in which a soldier “stab(bed) a baby crying out for mother’s milk” as his mother was gang-raped “by the very security forces who should be protecting her.” (Blank and Culbertson 2018) The uniqueness of this genocide is that sometimes it consists of violent attacks, but now mostly of denying food or medical care. This refers to the massacres perpetrated on the Rohingyas in August 2017. However, this is generally the trend and tactics followed by the authorities and their cohorts. Details are covered later in the book. “These tactics are right out of the genocidaires’ playbook,” opines Mathew Smith of Fortify Rights, a human rights group specializing in Myanmar. “Underfeeding and systematically weakening a population has been characteristic of other genocides.” (Kristof 2018) UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres calls this violence as ethnic cleansing and the humanitarian situation as catastrophic. The UN further

3

According to another research, more than 24,000 Rohingya Muslims have been killed by Myanmar security forces since August 2017. An estimate said more than 40,000 Rohingyas suffered bullet wounds while in situ and during exodus. More than 34,000 people were thrown into fire and more than 114,000 others were brutally beaten. A research estimated number of murdered Rohingyas up to 23,962 (±881) from previously provided figure of 9,400 by the Doctors Without Borders. More than 34,000 people were thrown into fire and more than 114,000 others were beaten. It also mentions 17,718(±) Rohingya women and girls were raped, even gang-rapes, since Myanmar Army and Police deliberately targeted the world’s most distressed group. The research also mentioned more than 115, 000 Rohingya houses were burnt and 113,000 others were vandalized. (Agency 2018)

Introduction

9

qualifies it as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” Many UN leaders think it is an act of genocide. Then U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley was candid – – during an emergency meeting at the UN Security Council – when she brands the violence a “brutal, sustained campaign to cleanse the country of an ethnic minority,” and she urged the members to suspend weapons provisions to the Myanmar Military. (Albert and Maizland 2020) She released a statement declaring: The United States supports democracy for the Burmese people, and we condemn attacks by militant groups in Rakhine State. However, as Burmese security forces act to prevent violence, they have a responsibility to adhere to international humanitarian law, which includes refraining from attacking innocent civilians and humanitarian workers and ensuring assistance reaches those in need. We call on all members of the Security Council to support the Burmese government in ensuring the rights and dignity of all communities in Rakhine State and throughout Burma. (Sanderson and Markusen 2017)

Iyengar gives his perspective little differently: The Rohingya Muslim community of the military-dominated Southeast, Asian nation, which is now officially known as Myanmar, has been systematically persecuted and expunged from national narrative – often at the behest of powerful extremist groups from the country’s majority population and government authorities – to the point where complete extermination is a possibility, according to a damning new study by the International State Crime Initiative (ISCI) at the Queen Mary University of London… . The Rohingya face the final stages of genocide. (Iyengar 2015)

All organs, forces agencies, and religious zealots of the State from top to bottom got involved in the genocide of Rohingyas in Myanmar. It can be termed as a supra national project of the State. It also ensured mass exodus of a million of them mostly to neighboring Bangladesh. More Rohingyas now live outside their ancestral home in Myanmar than in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. (Siddiqui 2019a; 2019b)

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‘Ultra-racist intellectuals like Aye Chan, Aye Kyaw, and Khin Maung Saw worked as catalysts like that of Julius Streicher who contributed to the ‘Jewish Solution’ – leading to massive Jewish exodus – in Hitler’s Germany. These intellectuals branded the Rohingyas as infiltrators or intruders and the ‘enemies within’ coming from neighboring Bangladesh. They thought they needed to be killed or wiped out. Such a suggestion was reinforced by the dogmatic monks – religious zealots – like Wirathu who provided religious motivation that Buddhist motherland needs to be cleansed from the minority Muslims. He considered Muslims as a threat to Buddhism. (Siddiqui 2019a; 2019b) Given this backdrop tinged with complexities, ulterior motives, and regional geopolitics, this book attempts to address the following questions in an eclectic manner that would encapsulate genocide and geopolitics only:  









Firstly, what are the historical and contemporary contexts of the Rohingya displacement crisis? Secondly, is Myanmar resorting to genocide, ethnic cleansing, and religious persecution to deport the Rohingyas once for all? Is it a state-sponsored project? Or is it home-grown? Or is it teamwork of the two? Thirdly, is geopolitics of such countries like China, India, Russia and Japan driving these countries to overlook the genocidal or humanitarian aspects of this crisis? Fourthly, is the international community, especially the United Nations Security Council, going to take punitive actions against the perpetrators for such atrocities committed in 2017? Fifthly, are Rohingya refugees going to go back to their ancestral home soon through dialogue and negotiations? Is the intervention – mostly diplomatic – by a third party – like China, India, and the United States – necessary to put an end to this crisis? Sixthly, is the homegrown insurgency – if initiated by the Rohingya Muslims or already initiated – going to prolong?

Introduction 

11

Seventhly, are 1.1 million refugees – being sheltered in Bangladesh – impacting social, environmental, and economic life of bordering people of Bangladesh?

As the book tries to address these questions it will attempt to make a perspective scenario development that is likely to unfold in the days to come. The book will also suggest a few alternative options that may contribute to calming the conflagration that is raging the body-politics of Myanmar and its neighbors, especially Bangladesh. Suffice it to say, this inferno carries the potential to turn into a regional or civilization flashpoint with unimaginable consequences. The book would primarily analyze the genocidal and geopolitical aspects of the crisis as highlighted in the questions. The book follows the literature survey, interviews, observation methods, etc. The book attempts to study the literature originating both in the east and west. The author, however, has the inherent limitation of getting first-hand knowledge from actors originating inside Myanmar. That said, the author has operated in this area during his military career has some inherent advantage of having a better look at the problem. The book should be a useful read for the researchers, academics, foreign policy and international relations experts, politicians, military professionals, media, international institutions executives, and general readers. There is a huge scope to do further detailed research on different facets of this festering crisis. That would, however, need the collaboration of Myanmar authorities which is so far not forthcoming even to the United Nations.

Chapter 2

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK Chapter 1 introduces the setting, context, and genesis for the book. It sets the tone and tenor of the book and raises the research questions that the book attempts to address. Research questions are all related to the genocide that was perpetrated by the Myanmar security forces, and geopolitics of the nations around that dwarfs the horrific brutalities and human rights violations. Chapter 2 describes the organization of the book. A brief description of each chapter is provided here. Chapter 3 gives a background history of the Rohingyas in Arakan and how it got overturned by the Burmese Kings. There were ups and downs of different dynasties during this period. Islam and Buddhism started coming at odds from this time. Chapter 4 introduces Burmese modern history to the readers. Modern Burma studies started following the British model to the land during the sixteenth century --and more precisely during the nineteenth century-- with the formal colonization of the country in three phases. Four major events in history brought about definitive changes in Burmese modern history. These are the start of British colonization, political independence in 1948, military take-over of state power in 1962, and the 1988 suppression of prodemocracy movements. Many contributors of the study maintain the thesis

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that the formation of ethnic identity and its related complexities are relatively modern, and those have emerged within the milieu of colonial rule and the drive for national identity by the Burmese formal and informal state authorities. Such studies mostly remained confined to the major known ethnic groups such as Karen, Karenni, Chin, Shan, Mon, and Kachin. Chapter 5 defines the Rohingya problem. The treatment of Rohingyas is now a burning humanitarian issue. An absence of accountability in the system makes the unfettered violence justifiable. This Chapter summarizes how since 1978, the Myanmar Army has carried out indiscriminate killings and rapes of the Rohingyas, forcing them to migrate in thousands to Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia. Chapter 6 focuses on the strategic importance of the area. Myanmar is abundantly rich in oil and gas and other natural resources. And it is in a strategically important point like at the epicenter of South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Malacca Strait, the Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean, and Northeast India. This is drawing the major powers in this imbroglio mostly for geopolitical – geo-economics comes in as a natural course – reasons. Chapter 7 concentrates on the 1974 Constitution as a turning political event in Myanmar history. General Ne Win – who took over state power in a military coup in 1962 – wanted to formalize his military rule. To do that, he introduced the new 1974 Constitution. The 1974 Constitution followed an Eastern European model, retitling Burma as the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. It would be a single-party state run by BSPP. Therefore, Burma turned out to be a socialist authoritarian – not communist per se – State. With the change of federal structure to unitary accompanied the specter of disintegration. Ethnic insurrections raised their ugly heads across the border (peripheral) areas. However, all state control coercive mechanisms over minorities remained in force. This Chapter also introduces the citizenship fiasco by promulgating the 1982 Citizenship Act, 1982 where Rohingyas were declared stateless by not according citizenship status to the Rohingyas of any stature. The citizens were divided into three groups; Rohingyas were denied of any one of the groups.

Organization of the Book

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Chapter 8 discusses the role of the monks in the politics and nationality issue of Myanmar. It also discusses the plight of religions of Christianity and Islam. Chapter 9 describes/compares the terms genocide/ Crime against Humanity/Ethnic Cleansing. The author concludes in this Chapter the crime of genocide prevails in the long run especially after the 2017 full-scale pogroms perpetrated on the unarmed Rohingya population. There is a debate in defining the crime, but the author is emphatic to show that it is a clear case of genocide. The Chapter also introduces the subject if the Rohingyas should be declared Refugees or foreigners. All relevant international documents including the UN Charter make it clear they are refugees. But even the Bangladesh Government tends to deny them this status. The Chapter discusses its implications. Chapter 10 raises the questions as to whether the Burmese perpetrators can be tried in the International Criminal Court (ICC) since Myanmar is not a signatory to it. The Chapter also examines various aspects of other different laws and concludes that the perpetrators as individuals can be tried. Already primary inquiry has been ordered by the pre-trial judges against some of the top brasses of the Military. Another important aspect of this book i.e., geopolitics is handled in Chapter 11. Geopolitics, important to all stakeholders like China, India, United States, is discussed in a cross-cutting manner. Most of it relates to geo-economics and connectivity to the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia. Connectivity is in full gear in the Rakhine state which is abundantly rich in precious natural resources. China has an especial interest because it wants to bypass the Malacca strait to get energy from the Middle East which is so critical to its economy and development. China, India, and Japan are investing hugely in this part of Myanmar. Aim of American geopolitics is basically to keep the controlled democracy functional apart from control over the country and competition with China. The rise of local insurgency that can be called an offshoot of broader geopolitics is covered in Chapter 12. The Chapter concludes that the possibility of local Muslim insurgency surging is huge which might destabilize the region in the long run.

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Chapter 13 investigates the issue as to whether the Rohingya refugees will go back to Myanmar without full assurance this time round. Few attempts have already been made but those have backfired. Things, as it stands out today, are stalled. Chapter 14 highlights the plight of Bangladesh, being a small country, in sheltering the Rohingya refugees. It is a huge burden on its economy. However, donor agencies are coming forward to support Bangladesh. The Chapter concludes that much of Bangladesh’s environment, market stability, and tensions with the local community are bad omen in the long run. Chapter 15 concludes the book by drawing a scenario development. How things are going to shape up, in the long run, is projected in this Chapter. The last Chapter 16 provides certain suggestions to the stakeholders for restraint and cultivating trust and confidense to come to the resolution of the problem in the long run. The book ultimately concludes it is almost a mission impossible, at least in the near future.

Chapter 3

BACKGROUND HISTORY OF THE ROHINGYAS IN ARAKAN: FROM THE KINGDOM OF ARAKAN TO THE COLONIAL ERA ABSTRACT The Arakan Kingdom, now Rakhine state spanned from Western Burma to parts of Bangladesh. The Buddhist majority Rakhine arriving from central Burma around 1000 A.D overshadowed Rohingyas’ dominance. In the 15th century, thousands of Muslims settled here. Many followed suits during the 19th and early 20th centuries. During the MraukU Dynasty --between the 13th and 17th centuries-- Islam turned out to be the main religion among the Rohingyas, while the Rakhine retained their Buddhist identity. In 1784, the Burmese King conquered Arakan resulting in a mass exodus to the English colony of Bengal - now divided into Bangladesh and India. During the British period from 1824 to 1826, authorities moved large numbers of people from Bengal and other parts of India creating demographic shifts. Following the Second World War the Bengali Mujahideen, generally called Rohingyas demanded liberation for North Rakhine state and its incorporation into then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Other ethnic groups took up arms against the regime too. The Burmese Military defeated the mujahideen and others, staged a coup and took over state power that lasted until 2011.

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Arakan was formally independent of Burma up to the end of the eighteenth century while it started to interact with the kingdoms of central Burma from the eleventh century onwards. To put it in perspective, the Rakhine state of Burma was originally the Arakan Kingdom that traversed from Western Burma to parts of Chittagong, now the main port city of Bangladesh. In the 8th century most of the Rakhine people converted to Islam. Its culture was thus predominant in the region from the 15th to the 18th century when the Muslim Mrauk U Dynasty ruled Arakan (Al-Mahmood 2016). That said, Rohingyas’ dominance started declining with the arrival of the largely Buddhist Rakhine from central Burma around 1000 A.D. (Gutman 2001). As a matter of fact, in 1785 the Burmese kingdom conquered Arakan and thus the fall of the Mrauk U Dynasty. Arakan, after the arrival of the Rakhine, maintained close links with the kingdoms of central Burma during the peak of Pagan power. When this power fragmented, Arakan regained its independence but got embroiled in six centuries of war, dispute, and trade with its neighbors in both Burma and Bengal. From the thirteenth to the end of the seventeenth centuries there were bouts – alternating – of Burmese dominance. Arakanese independence and even brief periods when the regional kings conquered portions of modern-day Bangladesh. During this period, the Mrauk-U Dynasty ruled Arakan as mentioned. The Dynasty ruled a population of a multi-ethnic mix of Mru, Sak, Kumi, the Rohingyas, and Rakhine, and a mix of multireligious mix of Hindu, Muslim, and Buddhist faiths. (Ibrahim 2016)4 Having outlined and set thus, about 90% of the population in Myanmar today is oriental and most of them believe in the religion of Buddhism. In Western Myanmar lies the state of Rakhine which borders Bangladesh and India. Buddhism and Islam are the two predominant religions in this subarea. To be more precise, there are more than one million people who are Muslims and their roots lie in Bangladesh and India. During the British 4

Buchanan mentioned in 1799 that there were two main communities then settled in Arakan. One was the Mohammedans who had long settled in Arakan and called themselves Rooinga, or natives of Arakan. The other is the Rakhing who adhere to the tenets of Buddhism. This concludes the fact that after the arrival of the Rakhine in Arakan around 1000 AD the ethnic mix remained static with hardly any communication with the outside world. (Buchanan 1799).

Background History of the Rohingyas in Arakan

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period, the authorities moved large numbers of people from Bengal and other parts of India. This was necessary because there was a demand for them in the tea and rubber plantations and civil service. It was an issue of supply and demand. There were a good number of Indians mostly from Kolkata and Gujrat were moved to Myanmar Rakhine state as small-scale entrepreneurs. Immediately after the Second World War the Bengali Mujahideen, mostly coming from then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) – they are generally called Rohingyas – waged a low-intensity conflict against the Burmese authorities to liberate North Rakhine state and incorporate it into then East Pakistan. When Burma gained independence in 1948, the Burmese Government accused the mujahideen – and by implication the Pakistani Government – of illegal immigration of thousands of Bengalis from East Bengal into Rakhine state with an ulterior motive to annexing it. The Burmese Military successfully defeated the Bengali mujahideen thus forced many to find their way back into the then East Bengal. In 1962, during the turmoil of insurgencies that also pushed for the federalization of Myanmar – details are covered in the latter part of the book – the Burmese Military took over state power that lasted until 2011. (Quinn 2017) To appreciate the history a little deeper, Arakan and Persian merchants settled in Southern Burma and the then independent Buddhist Kingdom of Arakan from the 9th century.5 This region remained isolated because geographically it is separated by the Yoma-Mountain Range and the Naaf River. In the 12th century, the Arakan Muslim population developed a close 5

Between the ninth and twelfth centuries, the Arab Muslim merchants set up trade colonies along the coastal regions of South and Southeast Asia. While making their base in Bengal, they continued trading with Burma, and other cities like Malabar, Ceylon, and Malacca. Yegar argued that the Muslims had a visible presence in northern Arakan since the twelfth century (Yegar 1972). The Muslim influence was so overwhelming that “the Arakanese kings though Buddhist in religion, became somewhat Mahomedanised in their ideas” (Bhattacharya 1927). The Arakanese kings adopted Muslim names in addition to their original names during the period of more than 200 years (1430 – 1638) (Jilani 1999; Phayre 1883). In 1459, Chittagong was conquered by the Arakan Kingdom, and the rule continued till the Mughals occupied it in 1666. Bhattacharya observes: “In history … the Arakanese King Basapyn occupied Chittagong in 1459 and we know that since then it was ordinarily in Arakanese hands till 1666. The influence of Bengal is, however, apparent till 1638 from the Mahomedan names and Persian and Nagri characters on their coins.” (Bhattacharya 1927)

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relationship with the Bengal King. There was then a surge in Islamization till the 17th century as mentioned. That said, peaceful coexistence prevailed between the religious communities. Arakan’s pre-colonial background signposts that Arakan was not always a part of Myanmar Taking advantage of the weakness of the Bengali Kingdom of the Konbaung Dynasty, in 1784 the central Burmese Kingdom entered Arakan. The objectives of the initiative were to ensure the Buddhist purity of Arakan and to cut to size its dangerous ties to the Islamic world to the west (Pearn 1944). This led to massacres and forced labor. Its effect resulted in a mass exodus to the English colony of Bengal - now divided between Bangladesh and India. The British colonized Burma from 1824 to 1886. The British created artificial ethnic and administrative units thus kept the ethnic minorities separated. The political and social conditions were ripe for indigenous liberation movements. The much talked about British policy of ‘divide and rule’ was a key trigger to generate ethnic tensions. The ethnic and religious groups that collaborated with the British were given preference in recruitment in the army and senior government positions. Until 1937 - when the famous Indian Independence Act, 1937 was promulgated – Burma remained a province of colonial India following which it became an independent colony. There were huge intraregional labor migrations from India to Arakan for their use in plantations and ports as mentioned. During the Second World War, an indigenous liberation movement grew under the leadership of Aung San that sided with the Japanese when the Japanese conquered Burma defeating the British. Most minorities remained loyal to the British Empire during this time. At the conclusion of the War, Burma got integrated into the British colonial empire (Bepler 2018). The British annexed Burma – may be called an extension of Indian colonization – in three phases as mentioned. Burma got independence in 1948. Aung San earned support from the ethnic groups for a federal type of State. However, the scenario changed once Aung San was assassinated. The minorities felt deprived and their identity was under strain within the union, as policy tilted towards Burmese dominance and unitary form of State. Conflicting legislation led to unequal treatment of ethnic minorities. In the late 1950s, almost all ethnic groups

Background History of the Rohingyas in Arakan

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took up arms against the regime. The Military of Burma took advantage of this chaotic situation and General Ne Win staged a coup to take over state power in 1962. Since then the Rohingyas were considered enemies and nonnationals of Myanmar because they had earlier collaborated with the British (Bepler 2018). The Rohingyas trace their origins in the region in the fifteenth century when thousands of Muslims settled in the former Arakan Kingdom as indicated. Many followed suits during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when Rakhine was under British rule. Such claims have been refuted by the authorities and the majority Buddhists since Myanmar’s independence in 1948. Myanmar authority even denies the recognition of Rohingya as one of the country’s 135 official ethnic groups. Sadly, they are even branded as “illegal immigrants” from Bangladesh. Neither the Myanmar Central Government nor Rakhine’s dominant ethnic Buddhist group, known as the Rakhine, recognize the tag “Rohingya”. This, however, gives the group a collective political identity. This gives them a world-wide identity that draws its attention, if not something more tangible. Come what may: This identity cannot be put under the rugs. To put it in perspective, all the UN agencies are directly involved in the affairs of the Rohingyas. This ethnic Muslim group claims its ties to the land that was once part of the Arakan Kingdom. Chris Lewa, director of the Arakan Project, a Thailandbased advocacy group also substantiates such a thesis. (Albert and Maizland 2020) Just like the claim of Jerusalem as to who were the first inhabitants, there is a similar debate as to who first settled in Arakan or Rakhine as is presently known. Burmese nationalists claim that Rakhine lived there, in Arakan, since 3000 BCE. Be that as it may, it is pertinent to mention here that Indian influence is glaring in Southeast Asia. Indian culture, traditions, and religion are visible in the area, as it took its roots since the fourth century. The Chandra dynasty of the Samatata region of Bengal, growing as the stronghold of Mahayana stream of Buddhism spreading its message in Southeast Asia, ruled northern Arakan between the tenth and eleventh centuries. Islam reached the shores of Arakan during the late eighth century

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with Arab traders and missionaries. Rakhine began migrating from upper Burma to Arakan in the ninth century. (S. Ahmed 2019) At this point in history, there are an estimated 3.5 million Rohingyas dispersed worldwide. As can be discerned, before 2017, the majority of the estimated one million Rohingyas in Myanmar lived in Rakhine State. They accounted for nearly a third of the population. They are different from Myanmar’s domestic Buddhist group ethnically, linguistically, and religiously (Albert and Maizland 2020). Here lies the root cause of the problem, primarily triggered by discrimination, deprivation and persecution, which has now wheeled into unmanageable proportion with regional and international implications. The festering fault line lies here. Myanmar authorities have, so far, not made any serious move to correct this fault line except resorting to a military solution. History attests resorting to military means only cannot bring any resolution to a festering problem like the Rakhine state of Myanmar. A pertinent point as analyzed by Habib Siddique may be raised here to understand the demographic pattern of various races in Rakhine over the centuries. He refers to a pattern developed by Ne Oo, a Myanmar Government source. He further claims that it was purely a propaganda attempt to marginalize the Rohingyas. His description may be quoted here. Oo has mostly relied on the data provided by Reverend Comstock who was on a mission to Arakan between 1834 and 1844. The Christian missionary was on a mission as mentioned but Oo quoted him as a reliable source: The population of Arakan at present (1842) is estimated at 250,000. Of these about 167,000 are Mugs, 40,000 Burmese, 20,000 are Mussulmans ( Muslims), 10,000 are Kyens, 5,000 are Bengalese, 3,000 Tungmroos, 2,000 are Kemees, 1,250 are Karens and the remainder is of various races. (Siddiqui 2019a; 2019b)

These figures, interestingly, do not match with the ones provided by Mr. Paton who was the first administrator of Arakan right after the East India Company conquered the area in the first Anglo-Burma War. Mr. Paton reported the total population did not exceed 100,000 of which 60,000 were Maghs (Arakanese Buddhists) and 30,000 (Rohingya) Muslims. The rest

Background History of the Rohingyas in Arakan

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could be the settlers from outside Arakan. Even if one takes Comstock’s figures as reliable, it does not stand to logic when we see the total population had grown by 2.5 times within only 16 years without inward migration. Next logical question that comes to mind: how could a Magh (Mug) population grow 2.78 times – from 60,000 to 167,000 – within such a short period when during that time rate of growth of population was generally minimal? The last logical question that comes to mind: Why the size of the Muslim population in Arakan got reduced to 20,000, a reduction by 33 percent, while the Buddhist Mug population grew by 178 percent and the Burmese Buddhist population quadrupled? (Siddiqui 2019a; 2019b) Thus pointed out, in 1406 after having lost to the rival claimants, Arakan King Naramekhla Min Saw Mon took shelter in the Durbar of Bengal Sultan. He was overthrown by the kingdoms of Ava and Pegu who tried to establish cultural hegemony over the Indo-Aryan Kingdom of Rakhine. That said, after 23 years, in 1430, later with the support of the Sultan of Bengal – the Sultan taught him war tactics and provided a Muslim army – he reconquered the Kingdom as mentioned. Since then Arakan continued to remain independent until the eighteenth century. At its pinnacle, he controlled most of the southwestern part of present Bangladesh. In 1430 the regenerated Rakhine ruler ousted the foreigner, Bamar, and Mon invaders and established a religiously hybrid court, a Sultanate from one perspective, a Buddhist from another. It is discerned that there are lots of evidence to show that Buddhists and Muslims got along quite well then. It was widely believed that Muslims and the Muslim World were the savior and protector, not the enemy of Rakhine (Charney 2019). In continuation, Chamey makes very pertinent and interesting observations: In a population poor area, the court tried to build up its labor pool by raiding Bengal and bringing back to Rakhine thousands of Bengali Muslims and Bengali soon-to-be Muslims captive every year. Many of these people were planted in villages along with the Kaladan River areas close to the concentrations of Muslims in Rakhine we see today, or up until a year and a half ago, where they grew rice and engaged in other kinds of primary agricultural produce cultivation. By the mid-18th century, observers claimed that 75 percent of the population of Rakhine south of the

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Mohd Aminul Karim Naf, because the Mughals had taken the rest of the region in the 1660s, was of Bengali origin. (Charney 2019)

Another source describes the incident in a rather similar fashion. It so mentioned that: a historical incident brought Arakan and neighboring Muslim Bengal into close contact. An Arakanese ruler named Meng Soamwun was defeated by a foreign invasion. He then took shelter with the Bengal Sultan Ghiasuddin Azam Shah in 1406 CE. The king remained in exile for many years after which Soamwun was able to retake his throne in 1430 CE with the help of a Bengal army led by Sultan Jalaluddin Muhammad Shah. (Farzana 2017, 42 – 43)

One historian Serajuddin describes the aftermath thus: On his (Arakanese Soamwun) homeward journey he was accompanied by a host of Bengali adventurers, fortune-hunters and admirers. While the king molded his court on Bengal’s model, his Muslim followers built the Sandi-khan mosque at Mrohaung. The expatriate Bengalis found employment in the King’s civil and military establishments. (Serajuddin 1986)

It ultimately lost to the Mughals in 1766 after a series of land and naval battles. Buddhism spread to Arakan and beyond during the Chandra Dynasty as the Buddhist scholars argue while they maintain Islam arrived much later. That said, Myanmar conquered Rakhine in 1784-85 as mentioned and tried to impose Irrawaddy civilization as part of its empire-building mission. (Bashar 2019) Myanmar Buddhism was introduced, court literature and local Buddha images were taken to the Irrawaddy valley along with tens and thousands of Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists. (Charney 2019) This happened during the British Colonial rule when Muslims mainly from Chittagong started settling there. The Japanese, after conquering Burma during the World-War-II, handed over areas of Burma’s Shan State to Thailand which, however, was returned

Background History of the Rohingyas in Arakan

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after the War. The Burmese view with deep suspicion the Thai and American annual joint military exercises called Cobra Gold, which many Burmese apprehend is a prelude to armed intervention. On its western front, Burma also invaded Manipur and East Bengal, leading to the first of three AngloBurmese Wars (1824-1826, 1852, 1885). During the first Burmese-British War in 1826, the British conquered Arakan followed by the rest of Burma in a series of wars. The cycle was completed in 1885. Thus, British colonialists incorporated it into the British Empire as a province of India until 1937. Burma declared its independence on January 4, 1948, following the partition of the Sub-continent. The independence brought in its trail Central Government’s tenuous control over Burma’s border regions. This has compounded – mostly because of varied ethnicity and religion – the national integration problem of Burma. Burma exhibits many of the problems facing a multicultural state and raises a basic question: How might societies with disparate ethnic and linguistic groups achieve national integration without destroying local cultures – creating nations and not just states? (Steinberg 2010) This has been an arduous task in the aftermath of a colonial setting as such Southeast Asian nations have suffered prolonged insurgencies. Thus, they took a long time to strengthen their national integration. To come back to Burma, the crack in the society was wide open when the Japanese forces conquered Burma in 1942. The Bamars sided with the Japanese, and the Indians sided with the British. In 1942, large-scale war witnessed a large massacre that affected both sides. In 1946, the Arakanese Muslims approached Pakistan’s founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah to join Pakistan, but it was declined. They even approached the Burmese leaders to cede two townships for Pakistan but to no avail. (S. Ahmed 2019) From the 1950s, there was a growing movement for secession and restoration of Arakan Independence. In 1974, the socialist Government under Ne Win, to appease secessionist forces with Rakhine nationalist agenda that includes self-determination, safeguarding Rakhine Buddhist identity and cultural heritage and development of the state, allowed the formation of ‘Rakhine State’ by transforming the Arakan administrative Division. These are now being spearheaded by Arakan Army – with its

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political wing the United League of Arakan (ULA). The group is fighting for greater autonomy of the Rakhine Buddhist people. (Bashar 2019) Its details are covered in a later chapter of the book. Burma after its freedom from the British witnessed a different ballgame startingto unfold. Independence, in its wake, brought military rule, under the tight control of the Bamars. The country gradually slid to isolationism from the rest of the world. They resorted to a policy of discrimination against the Indians, especially the Muslims, culminating in declaring them non-citizens in 1982 by an Act which was simply preposterous by any norms and definition. The military regime politicized Buddhism to such an extent that it gave rise to militant Buddhism, a concept which was far different from the original teachings of Buddha. (S. Ahmed 2019) Even Tibetan Buddhist leader, Dalai Lama, now exiled in India, has not endorsed such a tendency. More details on this will be covered later in the book.

Chapter 4

RELEVANT BURMESE MODERN HISTORY AND ITS PITFALLS ABSTRACT The officially recognized 135 ethnic groups along with unofficial ones make Myanmar one of the most diverse countries in the world. There are four historic turning points in Burmese modern history - the beginning of British colonization, political independence in 1948, military take-over of state power in 1962, and the 1988 crush of pro-democracy movements. Forced national integration by the state which constitutionally and structurally adopts exclusionist policies has unsurprisingly led to more chaotic disintegration time and again. The country’s ethnic insecurity resulted in two rival groups: Japanese-patronized Burmese and Britishpatronized ethnic groups. Later, the defeat of the British threatened the status and rights of ethnic groups in the new state of Burma. Attempts at an agreement among the Burmese, Kachin, Chin, and others failed too. Later on after 1962, a forced unitary assimilation policy was implemented which a political blunder was leaving the country with crippled bodypolitics.

The officially recognized 135 distinctive “ethnic nationalities” are characterized by many varied subgroups with different dialects. This resulted in creating a complex social mosaic. This book cannot even cover the tip of the iceberg of the study of such diversities in ethnic people and

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their identities and attempts by the State to formulate a common national identity and thereby better national integration. Sad to say this is not working out well in Myanmar. Here multiculturalism is deeply ingrained which probably the State could not handle competently so it is a mess to handle the Rohingya case. Or it could be a deliberate attempt to formulate an exclusionist policy for the Rohingyas. It has been deliberated enough later in the book. To come to the moot point: Modern Burma started maintaining the European contacts. These contacts got a boost in the nineteenth century with the formal colonization of the country. Four historic turning points brought about sea changes in Burmese modern history. These are: the beginning of British colonization, political independence in 1948, military take-over of state power in 1962, and the 1988 crush of pro-democracy movements as mentioned. Many contributors of the study maintain the thesis that the formation of ethnic identity and its related complexities are relatively modern, and those have emerged within the context of colonial rule and the craving for national identity by the Burmese formal and informal state authorities. Such intrusions mostly remained confined to the major known ethnic groups such as Karen, Karenni, Chin, Shan, Mon, and Kachin. The State underscores “ethnic cleansing” that only demonstrates the State’s prejudiced policy towards certain ethnic groups. The result is ethnic resistance has become part of routine political life, while the State authorities are tending to become intolerant and oppressive. With the revival of democracy, limited though, there was an expectation that such an exclusionist policy will be eventually fixed. But there are still no such signs yet. (Farzana 2017, 14 – 17) However, why it is not happening that way is a puzzle by itself that one needs to study separately. That goes beyond the scope of this book. Myanmar’s ethnic policy, which goes back to the 1947 Panglong Agreement signed between Aung San and major ethnic groups before independence in 1948, is seemingly at the root of much of the ills or security concerns that the State confronts today. Before independence, the Government structure created two types of political groups. One was the administrative divisions of Ministerial Burma, controlled by British and

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Indian officials, and the other Frontier Area, controlled by the traditional leaders similar to tribal leaders. The first British minority policy of gradual exclusion started by excluding the Burmese from the armed forces. The process was eventually completed and was replaced in 1925 by Chin, Kachin, and Karen. This created a sense of ethnic insecurity among the Burmese, who saw it as a potential instrument of oppression and control by other ethnic minorities. This activated the Burmese to collaborate with the imperial Japanese occupation forces against the British counterpart. This created a clear division between the Burmese and the British-patronized ethnic groups thus institutionalizing the ethnic rivalry. As the luck would have it, the defeat of the British by the Japanese forces shifted the ethnic balance completely in favor of the Burmese. This development frightened those British-allied ethnic groups about their status and rights in the new State of Burma. (Farzana 2017, 15 – 17) In the words of Walton: “the most pressing question at this time was whether or not the Frontier Areas would be associated with Ministerial Burma and if so, in what way” (Walton 2008). During negotiation that followed between Aung Sun and leader of the Burmese, the British authority and minority groups raised the apprehension that Ministerial Burma would dominate the political landscape of independent Burma while at the same time the British continued a policy of consultation and consent of the Frontier Areas about their choice. The position taken by Aung San was loud and clear and liberal: “As for the people of Frontier Areas, they must decide their future. If they wish to come with us, we will welcome them on equal terms” (Walton 2008). The majority Burmese leader Aung Sun promised other ethnic groups on the foundational principle of the states federating with Burma. An agreement was thus signed by Burmese, Chin, Kachin, and Shan, which included the internal autonomy, the desire for a Kachin state, and the right to secession. Aung further reiterated fair treatment and equal rights that “if Burma gets one kyat, then you get one kyat.” That said, Aung ignored the non-signatories such as the Karen ethnic group as he refused to consider such demands as its option for a future Karen State. (Farzana 2017, 18) Thomson took three fundamental positions on ethnicity and minority policy of Burma. First, the notions of ethnicity and nation are alien to the

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people of Burma. So, the policies drawn along the lines of ethnicity failed to satisfy the people of Burma. He argues, Nationalism was really a concept among the lowland peoples, but the much for diverse hill peoples, whose descendants include the Kachins, Chins, Shans, and some Karens, the colonial state was a remote and largely irrelevant as the pre-colonial state had been, and no concept of nation existed. (Thomson 1995)

Second, power disparities existed among the people due mainly to inherent instability and ethnic differences. This made them compete for control over territories. This resulted in looking for a diversity identity and discouraged people from developing a unified identity. So right after independence, the Government mostly followed the federal state structure by allowing the ethnic groups to enjoy their local identity and culture yet remain part of greater single nation. But the policy could not take its root and failed to work, because, Groups such as the Kachin, Karren, and Shan, which had never been directly subjugated by the former Burman kings, found themselves in a new State under the influence of a Government that was relentless in its attempt to Burmanize them … . They challenged the validity of an independent nation-state in whose definition they did not fit. (Thomson 1995)

Despite these daunting challenges, the Burmese Government mostly followed a unitary assimilation policy after 1962. This policy was found to be counterproductive in the long run. This was a great strategic political blunder done by its Military. Forced assimilation was uncalled for. There was not enough political space available to the ethnic groups, especially the dominant ones, to play their cards well in a give-and-take setting. So all-out insurgencies, in a way, that prolonged for centuries have crippled the bodypolitics of this state-nation. There has not been much change to such a concept to date.

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Despite coming to the modern age and trying to effervesce in modernity, the identity question of the Rohingyas is still a quintessential issue that is much ignored both by the international community and the stakeholders. Powerful ideologies like nationalism and socialism have propelled the identity issue more towards the political approach. Liberalism is considered as the champion of solving the identity question but the State institutions and the theories that the State propagate have failed to address the identity question of the displaced Rohingya refugees. Burmese nationalism has deliberately ignored the identity of the Rohingyas. Burma has heterogeneity in the society that puts at loggerheads the State and people’s identity (Farzana 2017, chap. 2). Heterogeneity brings forth differences of taste, preferences, attitude, lifestyle, and internal system. This may give rise to a centripetal tendency in a seemingly well-knit ethnic community when it relates to their internal specific heritage, customs, culture, history, religion, etc. This then brings liberalism into conflict with diversities. Then the concept of equality or egalitarianism comes to the fore when it is doled out to any marginalized group such as the Rohingyas in a rather weak form. Here is the basis of all the evils that permeate the Burmese society. The peripheral ethnic or religious groups have been almost totally sidelined. From federalism which was a better option for State integration, they suddenly moved to a unitary system and that brought almost perennial cracks in its State structure. This resulted in a sudden upsurge of ethno nationalism which again gave rise to secessionist movements seemingly from its opposite side almost all along with its peripheral areas. That said, the greatest enigma is the Rohingya issue being singled out rather too nakedly. Modern Burma is trying to throw its age-old problem to the outside world that tends to make the problem more chaotic, and unnecessarily draw diplomatic wrath almost from the whole world.

Chapter 5

TO DEFINE THE ROHINGYA PROBLEM ABSTRACT The Rohingyas have been stripped of their rights in the most abhorrent and inhuman manner. Rise of ethnicity and religion based Burmese nationalism made their identity a contested one and exclusionist policies of “Burmanization” have further deepened it. They have been denied citizenship rights and patented as a distinct group and thus gradually marginalized in all aspects of state and societal activities and values. Myanmar authorities wrongly but purposely regard the Rohingya Muslims as immigrants from Bangladesh. “Muslims from Rakhine State” is also a misleading and generalized version of label used against them. Such discriminations make violence and violations justifiable. It can be surmised that religion-based ethno nationalism triggers this whole scale persecution. The Military tries to gain validation of the majority at the cost of meting out discrimination and vulnerability to the minorities.

The Rohingya problem is now a burning issue that at the least rattles the world humanity although that may not shake humanity enough to take punitive action, in the form of humanitarian intervention as was done in Siberia and Kosovo in former Yugoslavia by the NATO forces led by the United States. It had the mandate of the United Nations under the UN Charter. The matter was confined to aerial bombings only that destroyed the fabric and infrastructure of that country so ultimately, they had to give in. It

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resulted in creating an autonomous region called ‘Croatia’ under the care of the United Nations. This action, being mandated by the United Nations demonstrated the fact that humanitarian intervention was an instrument that can justify a felt need for war. This, however, did not happen in respect of Rwanda as the genocide occurred between two intra-country tribes. Their main objective was to create division between Hutu and Tutsis - two warring tribes. It was well planned, and it started with the propaganda and rumor-spread to stigmatize the Tutsis by the colonial Belgian ruler. The children were taught that Tutsis had ruled and dominated the Hutu for 400 years. Belgians would call the Hutu the servants of Tutsis. Hutu performed manual labor free of cost and more degrading was they carried hotpots on their heads. The Hutu tribe was not even allowed to attend schools. (Jessee 2017) At the beginning of 1990 following the civil wars in Rwanda, the international community urged President Habyarimana of Rwanda to find a democratic solution to the conflict but it backfired. President Habyarimana increasingly alienated an increasingly powerful ‘Hutu’ power cohort within the regime who took up arms as early as 1993 to defend their nation against the Tutsis. (Jessee 2017) It was a gruesome genocide overlooked by all and sundry, but no punitive action followed against the perpetrators of genocide and ethnic cleansing. However, the whole world, by and large, expressed remorse for the butchering of hundreds and thousands of Hutu tribesmen who took shelter in the neighboring country. Humanitarian action was justified by the standard the world had set for Serbia. But it did not happen for whatever reason. This book will not delve into the nitty-gritty of the case. But the case finds semblance to the Rohingya case. Now the next logical question arises: If humanitarian action is justified for the Rohingya genocide in the Rakhine state of Myanmar? Now to define or to identify this festering problem, three distinct but related areas of law and fact deserve scrutiny. Firstly, nationality and discrimination which implicates Myanmar exclusively. It is by all counts an internal problem of Myanmar. Secondly, statelessness and displacement which implicate or entangle its neighbors as well. This is hugely ominous. Thirdly, the Doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, like humanitarian intervention, which

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bestows the responsibility on the entire international community. (Zawacki 2013) It is a puzzling question: What should be the modus operandi for the international community to contain this genocidal or near-genocidal problem? It is to be noted, many do not agree to this term but generally agree to call it ethnic cleansing or genocidal intent. Characteristics of genocide or near-genocidal or ethnic cleansing will be discussed later in the book. The point of contention here is: A minority identity has been constructed for Rohingyas in Myanmar. First, the rise of Burmese nationalism, based on both ethnicity and religion, has made the Rohingyas identity a contested one. Second, Rohingyas’ identity has been politicized by not recognizing the group’s distinct identity and by the exclusionist policies of “Burmanization”. Third, Myanmar’s decision to deny the Rohingyas of their citizenship rights, a historical fallacy at the height of chauvinistic nationalism. Lastly, the Rohingyas have been branded as a distinct group as mentioned and gradually marginalized in all aspects of State and societal activities and values. Wirth defines the ‘minority’ as “a group of people, who because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in their society.” (Alam 2018) This definition fits well for the Rohingyas in Myanmar. The term “Rohingya” is contested within Myanmar as mentioned, because this ethnic status is contested by most Rakhine Buddhists, indeed most people in Myanmar. They are regarded as immigrants from Bangladesh, and whom they prefer to call them as “Bengali”. The Government of Myanmar has asked its officials and the international community to refrain from using either of the terms. Such terms as “Muslims from Rakhine State” are less precise: Several Muslim communities in the state do not identify as “Rohingya”, including – but not only – the Kaman, a recognized indigenous Muslim group. It is Muslims in the northern parts of Rakhine state most strongly identify themselves as Rohingyas; those in the diaspora who so identify are overwhelmingly from this area, rather than central or southern parts of the state. (International Crisis Group 2016) So identity case is clear here without a shade of ambiguity. To examine the nationality and discrimination problem of the violent events of 2017, along with those of 1978, 1992, 2001, 2009, and 2012, can

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be attributed to systematic all-out discrimination against the Rohingyas in Myanmar. The political, social, and economic systems of Myanmar as manifested in its law, policy, and practice lead one to conclude that such direct violence against the Rohingyas is far more likely even in the days to come. As there is a huge lack of accountability in the systems, discriminations seemingly make the violence and violations a routine. This very fact hits at the root of the Rohingya problem. As part of 1978’s ‘Dragon King’ operation, the Myanmar Army carried out indiscriminate killings and rapes of the Rohingyas along with the destruction of mosques and other religious persecution. These triggered a mass exodus of an estimated 200,000 Rohingyas to a small neighbor Bangladesh. (Zawacki 2013) The avowed aim of this operation was to get rid of all the foreigners before the national census. Being helpless they streamed into neighboring Bangladesh for shelter. Bangladesh sheltered them but itself being a war-torn newly born country could do little except to go for diplomatic protests. But it did, however, succeed in repatriating most of the refugees. It is an intractable problem imposed on a small, poor neighbor. Another fact that pushes the Rohingyas to Bangladesh is that Bangladesh is a Muslim majority country. Common ethnicity could be another factor. Other countries that are, at least to some extent, bearing the brunt of this huge human refugee crisis are Malaysia and Saudi Arabia and to some extent Indonesia. They are providing them reasonable shelter without any guarantee of a secured job despite the Rohingyas reach there after crossing a long distance with many hurdles or trials and tribulations. Its details are covered in the latter part of the book. Another campaign of forced labor, summary executions, torture, and rape in 19926 triggered a similar number of Rohingyas – 250,000 – fleeing 6

As a prelude to that, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) was frequently clashing with Myanmar security forces and the ultra- buddhist Rakhines. So, the Myanmar security forces launched a massive operation code-named Pyi Thya to drive out the RSO insurgents. In the process of a kind of war hysteria in December 1991, the Myanmar Military forces crossed the international border and launched an attack against a Bangladeshi border outpost, killing and injuring the members of the para-military forces of Bangladesh knows as Bangladesh Rifles. Bangladesh Military forces were mobilized and deployed. It was ready for a limited attack, but political masters did not give green signal for whatever reasons. The author was then

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the country. In a similar vein in February 2001, the communal violence between the Muslims and Buddhists in Sittwe (a border town near Bangladesh-Myanmar international border) resulted in an unknown number of people killed and Muslim property destroyed by violent Buddhists who were directly supported by the state security forces and local thugs. (Amnesty International 2004) Sad to mention Myanmar’s southern neighbor Thailand, in late 2008 and early 2009, in contravention to human compassion, pushed back onto the high seas several boats – lacking adequate food, water, and fuel – carrying several thousand fleeing Rohingyas in the Andaman Sea. (Mathieson 2009) Another such incident as narrated by an Australian researcher reads thus: On April 19 of this year (2016), a packed boat carrying more than 60 Rohingya Muslim men, women, and children capsized off Sittwe in Burma. At least 21 people, including nine children, died, with many still unaccounted for. These Rohingyas are among the 1500 residents of Sin Tet Maw camp for the internally displaced. Denied land travel, they are forced to seek special authorization to travel by dangerous sea route to Sittwe to purchase essential food and medicines. More than 140,000 Rohingyas are being held in apartheid-like camps since being forced from their homes in waves of violence in 2012. Janet Jackson, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Myanmar (20 April 2016) reported: this accident serves as a tragic reminder of the vulnerability that many communities and families face in this area of Rakhine where their only option is to use this mode of travel to access markets, livelihoods, and other basic services that are essential for a dignified life. (Hudson-Rodd 2016)

On top of all, the system got thoroughly distorted by enacting a draconian 1982 Citizenship Law – its implications are discussed separately in the book – that was introduced by the Military junta that seized power in 1962. This black Law, both in its design and implementation, denies any citizenship to a Rohingya. Rohingyas had been able to register as temporary

serving in the Bangladesh Army as a mid-level officer and he had detailed discussion with the local Brigade Commander responsible to launch the attack. It had then dampened the morale of the officers of Bangladesh Military.

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residents with identification cards (white cards), which the Military junta began issuing to many Muslims, both Rohingyas, and non-Rohingyas in the 1990s. It did provide limited rights but ran short of citizenship. In 2014, the Government conducted an UN-backed census, its first in thirty years. They were initially identified as Rohingyas, but it was strongly opposed by the Buddhist nationalists. Under such pressure, the Government gave in but permitted Rohingyas could only register as Bengali. (Albert and Maizland 2020) In continuation of such similar pressure like Buddhist nationalist’s opposition to Rohingya’s right to vote in a 2015 constitutional referendum, then-President Thein Sein canceled the temporary identity cards in February 2015. This effectively revoked Rohingya’s right to vote. It is worth mentioning here white card holders could vote in Myanmar’s 2008 constitutional referendum and 2010 general election. In 2015, no parliamentary candidate was of the Muslim faith. International Crisis Group observes, “Country-wide anti-Muslim sentiment makes it politically difficult for the Government to take steps seen as supportive of Muslim rights.” (Albert and Maizland 2020) Rohingyas are discriminated through the restrictions on marriage, family planning, employment, education, religious choice, and freedom of movement. Rohingya couples intending to marry in northern towns of Maungdaw and Buthidaung can have only two children. They need permission to marry in which case they must bribe authorities and provide photographs of the bride without a headscarf and the groom with a cleanshaven face. These practices go against the religious practices of a Muslim. (Albert and Maizland 2020) They even need government approval when they move to a new home or travel outside their townships. These are clear violations of human rights and grossly discriminatory. Sad enough, these are state-sponsored measures in the 21st century when in many countries of Southeast Asia itself living together in harmony in a multicultural society is greatly encouraged. Multiculturalism, if it does not mesh well in a society, is a great threat in national integrity in Southeast Asia, but its nation-states are putting in concerted efforts to combat this menace. And they have been

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mostly successful, but it seemingly goes to the deaf ears of Myanmar generals. It can be surmised that religion-based ethno nationalism triggers this whole scale persecution. Religious-based ethno nationalism is a kind of mindset instilled by successive military dictators in Myanmar. The Military tried to gain legitimacy by keeping the majority in good humor at the cost of meting out discrimination and vulnerability to the minorities. The Military dictators resorted to the ‘divide and rule’ strategy. Thein Sein’s Government utilized it to foster anti-Muslim sentiment and institutionalize the persecution of Muslims. This anti-Muslim sentiment has been re-inforced by inflammatory anti-Muslim rhetoric. For example, a popular claim in Myanmar is that Buddhism is threatened by a densely populated Muslim Bangladesh whose population has the propensity to overwhelm Myanmar. Religious ethno nationalism is also seen as a move to remove the physical, legal, and historical existence of the Rohingyas from Myanmar.7 Systemic and institutionalized persecution has been used to achieve this. Such as these persecution have been deliberately fashioned to drive out individuals from their ancestral land. (WIN 2015) This deliberate annihilation process is substantiated by an Australian researcher Dr. Nancy Hudson-Rodd (the researcher is cited above) thus: In March 2015, researchers discovered that the Rohingyas are subjected to dehumanization through rampant hate speech, the denial of citizenship, and restrictions on freedom of movement, in addition to a host of other human rights violations that put this population at grave risk of additional mass atrocities and even genocide. The research team was deeply concerned that many preconditions for genocide were in place. They reported that there was still time to prevent genocide if urgent action was taken. The Simon-Skjodt Centre for the prevention of Genocide,

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‘In countries such as Myanmar and Sri Lanka, we observe Buddhist (more precisely Theravada Buddhist) supremacist violence being perpetrated against the minority Muslims, Hindus and Christians. The rationale for such violence follows the usual rhetoric that Buddhism and its culture are under existential threat in these countries and therefore, the Buddhist majority (i.e., Sinhalese in Sri Lanka and Burman or Bamar people in Burma) must eliminate any potential threat that may later emanate from the targeted minorities who are perceived as outsiders or invaders. (Siddiqui 2019c)

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Mohd Aminul Karim created with Romeo D’ Allaire the first early warning system to predict impending genocide. The system has identified the top 10 countries most at risk of mass killings. Burma is number one. Moreover, Genocide Watch has issued a genocide alert on the continued plight of Rohingya on World Refugee Day, the group spoke of Rohingya as ‘oppressed, victimized, terrorized, and forcefully expelled from their homelands by both government authorities and extremist Rakhine people’. (Hudson-Rodd 2016)

Chapter 6

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AREA ABSTRACT History suggests mass eviction of people from their ancestral homes is a common practice under two circumstances. One, when there is strong economic motivation and two, when the “people” are a less empowered minority group. This Chapter sheds light on how the strategically important location of the Rakhine state along with economic motivation may have incentivized the Rohingya genocide. This lends support to the book’s claim that this genocide has been systematic. Myanmar’s oil fields are sprawling in the Rakhine state where Rohingya Muslims live. The Myanmar Government controls all the oil fields through an enterprise led by generals and other military officers linked to Tatmadaw bearing a reputation of land grabbing and intimidating local farmers. The Rakhine state’s geographical position, totalitarian control concentrated in the hands of the ruling Government, and somewhat new accessibility to vast untapped natural resources by world major powers and big corporations as a result of Myanmar’s opening up present a complex labyrinth of power, motivation, and exploitation. Myanmar is strategically located ---critical to the interests of the major powers—is highlighted in the Chapter

Historian Phayre claims Arakan used to be an independent Kingdom until it was annexed by Burma in 1784 AD (Phayre 1883; Siddiqui 2020). Some Arakanese scholars argue that Aryans from the west first came to

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Arakan for settlement but this was refuted by most of the scholars. They opine Kanyan tribe of Tibeto-Burman group first came to Arakan. (Maung 1989) Arakan has the longest of the ruling of dynasties that dates to 2666 BC. Given this brief background, Rakhine state – also known as Arakan state until 1989 – that covers an area of 36778 square kilometers is in the western part of Myanmar. It has an estimated population of 3.3 million – before the forced displacement of Rohingya people as mentioned – of which Rakhine Buddhists are the majority. The state holds a unique geographical position which connects South Asia to Southeast Asia. It boasts of 360 miles of strategic coast, which provides passage to the Indian Ocean that starts with the Bay of Bengal. It also provides a political and economic corridor to Myanmar thus ensuring connectivity with the countries of Africa, the Middle East, and India. (Myanmar Investment Commission 2019) This facilitates China’s mega connectivity project like BRI. The state is rich in gas, oil, and other natural resources especially precious stones such as jade, ruby, rice, timber, etc. The state is closely linked to the Bay of Bengal which is growing in geopolitical importance because of rivalry between the major powers and it also links the strategically vital Malacca Strait. Many companies coming from Asia and Europe have invested hugely in onshore projects and are involved in exploration. The different States are also interested in the mining of uranium deposits. It is a strategic supply route for the USA as it connects the US Military bases of the Pacific and the Middle East. For the USA, sustained unrest in Myanmar and pressure from the outside world could delay or break off the negotiations with China and may divert its attention more to the West. The conflict may get murkier due to rumors about insurgent connections to international drug trafficking. (Bepler 2018) Dubbing Myanmar the “last frontier”, mining corporations and oil and gas companies from all over the world rushed to Myanmar and discovered plenty of untapped natural resources. Myanmar’s GDP quadrupled over the last decade. It received huge revenues from natural gas, tin, forestry, rubber, gold, precious metals (jade), and more. (Kanthan 2017)

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Figure 1. Offshore and onshore oil/gas fields in the Rakhine region. (Kanthan 2017)

According to the US Energy Information Administration, Myanmar has an estimated 10 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves and an estimated 50 million barrels of proven oil reserves. (UK Trade & Investment 2015) Myanmar has a total of 105 oil and gas fields out of which in the region of Rakhine state there are 25 fields, 23 offshore and two onshore. (Myanmar Investment Commission 2019) The Shwe gas project, located in Rakhine state, is considered as one of the four offshore projects that earn huge export revenue to Myanmar. The daily production capacity of the Shwe gas field is 500 million cubic feet. (EUROCHAM Myanmar 2018) Besides these resources, there are opportunities for potential investors to invest in areas like fisheries and livestock, agriculture, manufacturing, energy, and so on. The Government controls all the gas and oil fields under the brand name Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), an enterprise under the Ministry of Electricity and Energy. Interestingly the high-ups in the MOGE are former and current generals and other military officers linked to Tatmadaw. MOGE is responsible for the exploration, production, and sale of natural resources. MOGE is blamed for land grabbing and intimidating the farmer involved in the Myanmar-China oil and gas pipeline projects. Interestingly Tatmadaw (military) officers, under the Ministry of Defense, play a pivotal

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role in the extraction of resources and in the process receive non-bonafide benefits. Military forces have been involved in the land grabbing from the smallholders since the 1990s. (Motaher 2019) Myanmar’s oil fields are sprawling in the Rakhine state where Rohingya Muslims live. In the map below one can decipher that this area is surrounded by offshore and onshore oil/ gas fields. Shwe project, one of Myanmar’s largest offshore gas production project is adjacent to the red region on the map. Shwe is owned by Chinese and South Korean corporations. Chinese project called Kyauk Pyu deep seaport is located close to this project. China’s oil and gas pipelines that extend from this very region to China are shown in the map below. (Kanthan 2017)

Figure 2. Myanmar-China Oil and Gas pipeline. (Kanthan 2017)

Myanmar is located at the junction point of East, South, and Southeast Asia and can potentially function as a land bridge to Southeast Asia and East

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Asia if adequate infrastructure are developed. These are, in fact, already, underway. Myanmar is the second-largest neighbor to India and its largest on the eastern flank. These two countries share a land border of 1,640 kilometers, mostly unfenced and mountainous. India’s Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram states border Myanmar’s Kachin, Sagain, and Chin states. Many insurgent groups operate in these states of India and they operate, understandably, from bases inside Myanmar. Myanmar is a key player in the Bay of Bengal littoral region and shares a common maritime boundary with India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh is gradually turning out to be a key player in the Bay of Bengal region which India calls it ‘India Lake’. This Bay is critically important for the sustenance of its people in the long run. India is militarily strong in the Bay of Bengal, especially in having its only joint operational command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands that oversee the western tunnel of the Malacca Strait and Chinese hobnobbing in the area. Myanmar shares a common border of 270 kilometers with Bangladesh in its southeastern flank. This small flank makes the route of escape for the Rohingyas from the atrocities of the Myanmar Military. Myanmar shares a common border of 2,185 kilometers with China. Arunachal Pradesh is a disputed territory between India and China. China claims sovereignty over this disputed state of India. India and China fought a bitter war over this territory in 1962. That bitter memory still haunts the national psyche of India. Indian forces were simply routed. This is called ‘Himalayan Blunder’. India may have an urge to take reprisal to that total defeat. And as mentioned Arunachal Pradesh shares a common border with Myanmar. Myanmar is reportedly having the tenth-largest gas reserves in the world, estimated at 90 trillion cubic feet. (Ramachandran 2009) The Bay of Bengal is now drawing our attention for its emerging strategic importance. Myanmar also adds value to its importance in the recent past. K. Yhome describes thus: The opening of Myanmar has added a new strategic value to the Bay. Isolated for decades, Myanmar is actively engaging the world’s major

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Mohd Aminul Karim players in redefining its geopolitical identity today. This has further encouraged naval exchanges, exploration of energy resources, and development of connectivity infrastructure in a vital littoral of the Bay… . Among other developments, four factors have been transforming the strategic and economic geography of the Bay of Bengal – the growing Chinese southward orientation; Myanmar’s opening up; the rich natural resources particularly oil and gas; and the increasing regional connectivity networks in and around the littorals of the Bay. Other emerging issues that are changing the perception of the Bay are the growing non-traditional security threats including environmental threats, piracy, and terrorism. (Yhome 2014)

Figure 3. Myanmar’s common border with Bangladesh, Northeast India, and China. (Lintner 2020)

The last decade has witnessed growing naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal involving littoral and non-littoral states. The multilateral Milan exercises focus on maritime terrorism, piracy, and search-and-rescue operations. The Myanmar Navy has participated in the exercises hosted by India. Myanmar has also joined the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the 35-member group comprising all the Indian Ocean littorals that aims to promote maritime cooperation among the Indian Ocean littorals. (Yhome 2014)

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Figure 4. Location map of oil and gas field in Sedimentary Basins of Myanmar. (ADB 2016)

Figure 5. Myanmar Army Formations in Rakhine State. (Security-Force-Monitor 2018)F

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Another key and sensitive area in the Bay of Bengal is energy resources. The discovery of oil and gas in Myanmar’s offshore blocks since the 1980s and subsequent findings have redefined the strategic importance of the Bay of Bengal. There is now a huge demand for energy in the region as there is a stellar growth of economies in the region. This has triggered the players to exploit the Bay’s energy resources. Since the discoveries of natural gas reserves in the Martaban fields, Total of France, Chevron of the U.S., and PTTEP of Thailand have got involved in the Yadana project. A natural gas pipeline runs from the Yadana and Yetagun gas fields in the Gulf of Martaban to Ratchaburi near Bangkok supplying natural gas worth USD 2 billion. About 20 percent of Thailand’s electricity is dependent on Burmese natural gas. There are discoveries of hydrocarbons in Myanmar’s offshore Rakhine basin in the early 2000s which have attracted global gas and oil companies in the exploration and production of such resources. Major regional state-owned corporations such as ONGC Videsh Ltd and GAIL of India, CNOOC and CNPC of China, and PTTEP of Thailand are involved in such explorations. The crux of the discussion is Myanmar has emerged as an important energy exporting country. (Yhome 2014) There is a thesis that whenever there is an abundance or deficiency of energy resources in an area, geopolitics/geo-economics follows suit as a natural course. Energy provides a new-found impetus to Myanmar’s economy. There is also a hypothesis that a strong economy generally pushes a country to go for more militarization. This is so true with respect to China, to cite a glaring example. This is gradually getting true for Myanmar also.

Chapter 7

TURNING EVENTS IN MYANMAR HISTORY: ENACTING THE 1974 CONSTITUTION AND THE 1982 CITIZENSHIP LAW ABSTRACT This Chapter examines how Myanmar’s Constitution and citizenship law have deliberately marginalized the Muslim Rohingya population. Myanmar is a socialist authoritarian State. Their Constitution dissects the country into 14 regions based on ethnic differences. It is an innately faulty system that draws on the unjust and prejudicial distinction. Consequently, an alarming disintegration is underway over several stages. The 1974 Constitution that transformed the State from federalism to unitary has done enough damage to the integration process of the State of Burma. The 1982 citizenship law methodically excluded the Rohingyas from the country’s body politics. The citizenship law entails three categories of citizens – full citizen, associate citizen, and naturalized citizen. The range of rights and privileges citizens can access varies from one category to another. While the categories are not all-inclusive, they allow their citizens to exercise their rights in some measure. However, the indigenous Muslim Rohingyas, living near the Bangladesh border are not considered for any category of above-mentioned citizenship leading them to suffer an acute deprivation.

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THE 1974 CONSTITUTION General Ne Win, who took over the state power in a military coup in 1962, wanted to formalize his military rule and thus set up a committee in 1969 to suggest a new constitution as the 1947 Constitution was suspended in 1962. The 1974 Constitution followed an Eastern European model thus Burma was renamed as the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. It would be a single-party State run by the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) . No other party was allowed under the new dispensation. It had a unicameral legislature with a tiered series of elections from the local level to a State-Council of twenty-eight. Its Chair became the President. The Government could nominate candidates for the legislature and no opposition was allowed. Various rights were stipulated but these were subject to control by law and State. The courts were placed under the legislature. In sum, Burma turned out to be a socialist authoritarian state, not communist per se. With the change of federal structure, ethnic insurrections raised their ugly heads across the border areas. The author feels this was a great political blunder for a beleaguered country like Burma. Military dictators usually make such blunders because they put more emphasis on regime survival than national cohesion. They do not look at the horizon but at the bottom. However, all State control mechanisms over minorities remained in force as mentioned. (Steinberg 2010, 69 – 70) The Constitution adopted an apparent ethno-unitary structure – with some characteristics of federalism – dividing the country into 14 regions, based on ethnic lines. Seven union republics were formed representing Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon, and Shan ethnic sub-nations. Another seven regions were created for the Burmese ethnic majority. Those were Rangoon, Irrawaddy, Tenasserim, Pegu, Magwe, Mandalay, and Sagain. These divisions look like ethno-federalism, but these divisions, especially the ethnic ones, did not contribute much to the national integration efforts as they were deprived of basic characteristics of ethno-federalism such as autonomy and a high degree of control over their resources. This system was meant to contribute to a greater central administration with a basic faulty assumption of “a territorial policy that treats the great variety as

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a single assimilable (sic) entity.” (Thomson 1995) Such a dispensation cannot contribute much to a better national integration for a state-nation such as Burma where diversity – where no palpable efforts were put in for integration – is so glaring. There is a thesis that unity in diversity can be a strength of a nation, but Burma is walking in the opposite direction where it is rather contributing to widening the fault-line rather than unifying the nation if taken as one whole. Myanmar is a State composed of many several sub-nations though not fully intellectualized and appreciated by the ethnic groups themselves as mentioned. By nation generally, we mean a group of people with a shared history, language, religion, ethnic identity, and culture who live in a defined territory for decades together. That said, at the end of the day, a nation-state does not come to a concrete shape unless most of the population express their desire explicitly to live together as a separate entity. All the people therein exercise sovereignty. There is a thesis that the nation-state dilemma is like a daily plebiscite. This has not been happening in Burma both during and after the colonial period. It is, therefore, difficult to call Burma a good case of a nation-state. It is rather superimposed from the top especially by the military dictators. Truly speaking it is difficult to call it a nation-state. Some of these sub-nations in Burma, as opposed to the majority dominant Buddhist group called Bamars, include the Shan, Karen, Rakhine, Rohingya, Kachin, Chin, Karenni, Mon, Wa, and Kokan Chinese as mentioned. Interestingly each of these groups generally shares a defined geographical area, generally on the outskirts, in the bordering areas, of the country as mentioned. Many of the ethnic groups practice traditional religions or Christianity, while majorities are the Buddhists as obvious. Thus, Myanmar turns out to be a state with many sub-nations with different religions and ethnicity. It, in effect, opened the Pandora’s box. Multiplicity or diversity can be a blessing for a State or a curse depending on what are the measures that a State takes for national integration. Seemingly, the Myanmar authorities have not done enough for integration rather the measures taken so far have contributed to disintegration. Many of the ethnic groups have their armed cadres fighting the Central Government, while some have ceasefire agreements. Most Rohingyas are Muslims, while a few

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are Hindus. Rohingyas in Myanmar are called Rohingya “Bengalis” and are considered as not originating from Myanmar. (Ty 2019b) Myanmar’s ambassador to Bangladesh Mr. Phae Thann Oo, in an exclusive interview with the Dhaka Courier, announced his government’s stand on the Rohingya issue. He clearly said, “The Rohingyas are an unfortunate issue between the two countries. The so-called “Rohingyas’ for you, of course, not for us. For us, they are Bengali Muslims.” (E. Khan and Khan 2009)8

8

One may question the branding of Rohingyas as “Bengali Muslims”. Does it imply that Bengali Muslims cannot be Myanmar citizens? They have been living in this country for generations, as good as any other multiethnic civic countries. This is where the root cause of this teething and festering problem lies. Myanmar is rather oblivious, seemingly deliberately, to address this history-linked root cause of the problem. In the ambassador’s statement two assertions clearly stand out. Number one is: Myanmar government does not recognize the term “Rohingya” as used elsewhere like advocacy groups, international institutions and other national governments, media, and NGOs. Second, it is primarily, rather exclusively, the responsibility of the Myanmar Government to address this complex issue of political identity of Arakanese and other ethnicities in general. By calling them ‘Bengali Muslims’, Myanmar is trying to externalize the issue which was kicking well before the creation of the modern State called Myanmar. It is seemingly not following the peaceful method of settling complex issues through dialogue and negotiations. In doing so Myanmar should adhere to international norms and ethics. (Farzana 2017, 60) As the areas of Chittagong and Arakan are connected by land, and the combined area thereof was under the British rule, many Bengalis migrated to Arakan. Apart from that, “the government brought in laborers from South India, including convicts, and encouraged the migration of Chinese from the west coast of Malaya. Both Tenasserim and Arakan soon took on the character of international trading centers and settlements. ... The port of Rangoon was the busiest in terms of immigration in the world after 1924. … It is estimated that between 200,000 and 350,000 of the over one million Indians in Burma entered or left the country every year in the 1930s.” (Taylor 2009, 147 & 156) Myanmar tends to view this body of its population, now displaced from Arakan, as outsiders, coming from South India, as immigrant laborers brought by the colonial masters for a limited purpose. But the dilemma arises as these people have lived in the country for generations, and who, seemingly, rightly claims their citizenship which is being denied by the state of Myanmar. Another related fundamental issue is that the ethnic national groups, such as the Mon and the Karen, are legally recognized based on historical agreements, while the Arakanese Muslims are denied such rights . (Taylor 2009, 159). It is no different in case of Karen organizations as they also fought alongside the British frontier forces during World War II. So, the issues of “(dis)loyalty are not purely related to groups in Arakan, but to numerous others living in other parts of the country’s extensive border-lands where Britain employed ‘divide and rule’ strategies”. (Smith 1999, chaps. 3&4). The Tatmadaw tends to deny the fact that the Rohingyas have existed historically in the area. Yegar (1972) has refuted such an assertion, arguing that there is no difference between the Arakanese Muslims who had been there for centuries, even before the British’s arrival, and the migrant Muslims who came in the later part of Myanmar’s colonial history. (Yegar 1972)

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This resulted in the isolation of the majority from the rest of the world whereas the minorities like Karen, Mon, Shan, Chin, Kachin, and the Rohingya developed a kind of relationship with their transborder brethren and thus with the outside world. Some of these groups, with the support of Christian states, got involved in the break-up of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. Federal troops, assigned to the periphery, where most of the minorities lived, often felt they were operating in a foreign land and culture. Minorities felt they were being maltreated by an occupying force. (Steinberg 2010, 70) As such national integration continues to be under severe strain. Among the majority, monks started playing a domineering role in the control of State matters. Religious and coercive forces are in league to realize the State’s despicable objectives.

CITIZENSHIP FIASCO: THE BURMA CITIZENSHIP LAW, 1982 Much of the Rohingya problem has emanated basically from the citizenship fiasco. The 1947 Constitution was generally accepted across the board. In this Constitution, all people living at that time in ‘Frontier Areas’ and who intended to stay permanently were considered citizens and accepted as ‘The People of Burma’. But the Military muddled it up by making the Rohingya not eligible for citizenship (Bepler 2018). It was a great paradigm shift with an ulterior motive. This had compounded the problem leading to the exclusion of Rohingyas from the body-politics of Myanmar. Under the BSPP, the Military excluded the Chinese and Indian foreigners from assuming the official power. The Rohingyas were deprived of Burmese nationality by the promulgation of the 1974 Emergency Immigration Act. Thus, they became foreigners in their ancestral homes. On top of that, on October 15, 1982, the Military passed the infamous citizenship act establishing a three-tiered system of citizenship. 135 “ethnic nationalities” with numerous subgroups are officially recognized in the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, but it is sad enough that therein the ethnic Rohingyas were

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not included. Other Muslims, who do not belong to the Rohingyas, have Myanmar nationalism. (Bepler 2018) General Ne Win and his regime promulgated the Burma Citizenship Law, 1982 that codified ethnic exclusion of Rohingyas. It was a defining moment for the Rohingyas as it made them stateless in the land of their ‘fathers, grandfathers, and ancestors’. The Law created for them a stateless society and undermined the Arakanese community identity.9 Burman or a member of one of the indigenous ethnic/linguistic groups or those who were descendants of residents who had lived in that area in 1823 (i.e., before the start of the first Anglo-Burmese War, 1824-1826) were eligible to be full citizens. Full citizens could contest the election and assume government posts. The Law describes those as ‘citizens’ who belong to one of the national ‘races’ of the country i.e., Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), Karen, Chin, Burmese, Mon, Rakhine, Shan, Kaman, and Zerbadee, or those whose ancestors had settled in the country before 1823, the beginning of British occupation of the Arakan state.10 However, they would lose their citizenship even if they married a foreigner. (Farzana 2017, 50 – 51) The second category, called associate citizenship such as Indians and Chinese, were those who were born in Burma after 1824. If a person could 9

Despite being stripped of citizenship by the 1982 Citizenship Law, Rohingyas were given a kind of recognition – as temporary residents – as they were issued with identification cards known as the white cards. The military junta issued this to many Muslims – Rohingyas or nonRohingyas – in the 1990’s. It allowed them a temporary stay. The UN-backed census in 2014 – it was the first in 30 years – initially allowed the Muslim minorities to identify themselves as Rohingyas. It was, however, strongly resisted by the ultra-nationalist Buddhists. Under such a threat the Government had to back down to change the policy. The Rohingyas could only register themselves as Bengali. In 2015, President Thein Sein Government decided to allow the temporary card holders to participate in the constitutional referendum. This was again protested by the Buddhist nationalists. The pressure was so intense that the Government had to cancel the temporary cards once and for all in February 2015. This had effectively revoked their right to vote. They were, however, allowed to vote during the 2008 constitutional referendum and the 2010 general election. This gave a big advantage to the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). As a big departure, none of the parties gave nomination to any Muslim candidate during the 2015 general election which was considered largely free and fair. It was discernible that no political party wanted to be supporting the Muslim rights at a time when anti-Muslim sentiment was ravaging the entire country. (Albert and Maizland 2020) 10 The Burma Citizenship Law, 1982 (Chapter II – Citizenship) mentions thus, “Nationals such as the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhine, or Shan and ethnic groups as have settled in any of the territories included within the State as their home from a period anterior to 1185 B.E., 1823 A.D. are Burma citizens”.

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not provide evidence that his or her ancestor, or at least one grandparent, had settled in Burma before 1823, then he/she shall be accepted as an ‘associate citizen’. The third category was called naturalized citizens. They are those who can provide ‘conclusive evidence’ that they or their parents had entered and resided in Burma before independence on January 4, 1948. Additionally, persons whose parents hold one of the categories of Burmese citizenships are also eligible. That said, the person must be at least 18 years of age, be able to speak one of the national languages, be of good character, and a sound mind. (Farzana 2017, 50 – 51) No dual citizenship was accepted. Interestingly, associate citizenship could be revoked if someone was found disloyal to the state ‘by act or speech or otherwise’ or because of moral turpitude or disclosure of the State secret. So, it can be inferred that there are enough latitude or flexibility in the hand of the Government to play on the fate of citizenship of two lesser categories. Those in the two lesser categories could not be given any bureaucratic or military posts as indicated, they were not eligible to vote and were denied higher education. Worst of all, the indigenous Muslim Rohingyas, living near the Bangladesh border, was never considered for any category of citizenship. Thus, their sense of deprivation was most acute. It is widely hypothesized that the root cause of any insurgency is the sense of deprivation being felt by a community. After the military coup of 1962, the Military expelled some 200,000 Indians back to the region only with their movable baggage. It only manifested the highest form of xenophobia. (Steinberg 2010) The 1982 Citizenship Law has a serious consequential impact. The main impact is that Rohingyas have been simply rendered stateless. They are unable to avail themselves of the protection of the State and, as has been the case for decades, are subject to policies and practices that amount to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These include restrictions on movement, forced labor, land confiscation, forced eviction, destruction of houses; extortion and arbitrary taxation; and restrictions on marriage, employment, health care, and education as mentioned clearly. (“Amnesty International Supra Note 1,” n.d.; The Equal Rights Trust 2012;

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Human Rights Watch 2012). Such restrictions are generally imposed on the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine. They are not imposed in the same manner and to the same degree on Buddhists, or other Muslims in Rakhine state, or any other ethnic minorities. As a member of the UN body, Myanmar is honor-bound to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion,” as stipulated in Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, though not a binding document, mentions in Article 15 that “everyone has a right to a nationality.” Article 2 holds that “everyone is entitled to all rights in the Declaration without distinction of any kind such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” These antidiscrimination languages are almost universal such that these can be found in five more different international human rights documents, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)11 and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 12. Myanmar has ratified both the documents thus become binding on her. According to Amnesty International Supra Note 1, it is a violation “to be deprived of one’s rights because of a characteristic that one cannot change, such as one’s race or ethnic origin, or because of a characteristic that is so central to one’s being that one should not be forced to change it, such as religion.” Moreover, Article 7 of the CRC provides for the right of a child to a nationality, where the child would otherwise be stateless. It turns out that Myanmar, as a State Party to this Treaty, violates its international legal obligations pertaining to the right of Rohingya children to a nationality. Thus said, Myanmar should substantially amend the 1982 Citizenship Law or repeal and redraft it, such that the Rohingyas are indisputably made citizens. Rohingyas born in Myanmar who would otherwise be stateless should be granted citizenship, as those who are not born there but claim effective and genuine link to the country. (Zawacki 2013)

11 12

Myanmar ratified CRC on July 15, 1991. Myanmar ratified CEDAW on July 22, 1997.

Chapter 8

ROLE OF THE MONKS13 ABSTRACT Politics and religion have always been deeply intertwined in the country. Although religious establishments such as the Sangha was deemed indispensable in order to fortify the regime’s power and legitimacy, it had also proven to be detrimental. Therefore, the Myanmar Government implemented measures to contain the limits of autonomy of Sangha in 1980s. But the monks continued to be a powerful and volatile force. Subsequently, the British tried to downplay Buddhism by devising alternative modes of education and removing formal structure undermining the position of Buddhism, but new Buddhist organizations sprang up charged with political agendas leading to ultra-nationalist movements. They eventually started going against migrant Muslims in the form of open 13

90 percent of Myanmar’s population is Buddhist and an estimated 600,000 people are practicing monkhood. The monks generally enjoy a visibly better quality of life than most of the followers. In their meditation center their life is strictly regulated and, in the Buddhists, academic centers the monks specialize in Pali language and Tipitaka. That said, wherever they live they enjoy the highest respect from the society. Monks, generally the younger generation, are now more aware of their moral responsibility towards the country. In Myanmar most of independent activities are ruthlessly suppressed by the State. On the contrary, the monkhood enjoys a high degree of immunity and freedom. The recent events indicate their role in the society is not limited to the preservation of religion and rituals only. The Saffron revolution can be a case in point. The recent events like the “Saffron Revolution” in 2007 and cyclone Nargis in 2008 brought the Myanmar monks into limelight. In 1988 they took to the streets along with other citizens asking for more democratic and economic reforms of the country. In a similar vein, in 2007 monks took part in nation-wide protests against rising fuel and commodity prices. (Gil 2008)

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Mohd Aminul Karim demonstrations, hate speech, and boycotts. These riots were fueled by the belief that Muslims were converting Burman women, as a case in point, and causing insults to Buddhism in many ways. However, these riots may have been orchestrated by the Military to divert resentment away from the Government. Buddhism is known to be a religion of peace and harmony. Yet contradictorily the ultra-nationalist Buddhists, including Buddhist monks, openly support and maintain strong alliance with the intimidating Military.

THE ‘SANGHA’14 The Sangha, an institution run by the monks, is a critical social and nationalist force. Any regime, like the kings, U Nu, and the Military, tried to control the Sangha both for religious purposes and to ensure the regime’s power and legitimacy. There is ample precedence in modern history that the military juntas try to use religion as a tool to woo its electorates to give legitimacy to the regimes. Nevertheless, its long-term effects are generally counterproductive. It does great damage to the values of society and national integration when centrifugal forces are at work. The monk leaders today look back to the relationship they had with the kings before the British rule.15 14

According to Khin Maung Nyunt, Sangha, traditionally, had a sort of constitutional check on the ruler. They were forbidden to get involved in secular matters and politics. They could, however, act as advisers. The head of the hierarchy appointed by the king, the Thathanabaing or other distinguished teachers could even admonish the king, ask for pardon for a condemned person, and help the subjects in times of natural disasters. At times, the Sangha was entrusted with political and diplomatic missions. In the case of Mongol invasion and occupation of the country in the 14th century, they helped settle the scores peacefully. Generally, the kings and Sangha were cooperating and balancing each other. (Gil 2008) 15 The Pagan Kingdom and its successors had fused religion and state and they generally followed the Theravada strand of Buddhism. They were, however, tolerant of ethnic minorities and non-Buddhist religious group. The key characteristic of the Theravada sasana (teaching) is linking religion with state power. According to this strand, tolerance of any non-Buddhist religion tantamount to harm both the religion and state. The Theravada Buddhists approve the actions of a Buddhist king in Sri Lanka who defeated a Tamil invasion. The defense of sasana is an active phenomenon. This was the pretext used to invade Arakan in 1784, since the Kingdom was not sufficiently Buddhist although the Kingdom had a huge Rakhine ethnic group representing substantial Buddhist group. The large Muslim population in Arakan was considered a threat to Buddhist traditions. So, the invasion in 1784 was carried out in phases as there were huge population then in Arakan. This contradicts the thesis propounded by both the regime and the Buddhists extremists that there were small number of Muslims in Arakan before the British conquest in 1826. The Rohingyas only arrived in the province during the colonial period. (Ibrahim 2016, 80 – 81)

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Mathew Walton argues, “Buddhism and nationalism have become almost inseparably intertwined (in Myanmar).” Walton is candid when he argues Buddhist ideas have influenced political thinking, and as a sequel, political actions in Myanmar. The central argument he developed is that ‘politics in Myanmar’ cannot be thought of without Buddhism. This may be called a ‘moral universe’ when the term ‘political’ implies what forms political authority and participation might take. It is worth mentioning that the Theravada strand of Buddhism, overwhelmingly followed by the Buddhists, is also followed by a significant number of non-Burman ethnic populations. So, this is the precise rationale, a common thread that makes it convenient to find a common basis for having citizenship in the country. U Nu recognized that the unstructured autonomy of the Sangha gave rise to various dangers to the society. A criminal could shave off his head, put on a saffron robe, and be considered sacred. A communist insurgent could do the same. Monasteries could become sanctuaries for the rebels. The Myanmar Military always wanted to control the Sangha, given the monks’ anti-government activity during the colonial period. More so the Sangha was the only national organization of both size and influence that could challenge the authority of the Military. In 1980, the State finally placed the sangha under its control. In 1979, the Military established the Sangha Maha Nayaka, the centralized Supreme Council of 33 monks, and a group of 1,219 monk representatives of the Sangha as a whole. The hierarchy of monkhood was established. All monks were registered with the State by 1980. Educational activities of the Sangha were even controlled and monitored by the State. Since 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) andState Peace and Development Council (SPDC) further tightened their control over the Sangha and its various sects.16 Despite such control, the volatility of the Sangha got exposed when the Saffron Revolution of 2007 hit the fabric of the state? (Steinberg 2010, 71 – 72)

16

After the Military takeover in 1988 SLORC established several new military garrisons in Rakhine in the North where the Muslims are a majority. The Muslims were not given any compensation. The SLORC distributed the surplus lands to Rakhine convicts and retired army personnel on attractive terms in order to change the ethno-demographic pattern of the area. (Razzaq and Haque 1995, 15 – 18)

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Mohd Aminul Karim As the saying goes, To be Burman is to be Buddhist. During the colonial period, intrinsically it continues till date, Buddhism was the primordial value of Burman society. A monk is known as an hpoungyi – “great glory” – was related to the Sangha. The sangha was controlled by an administrative hierarchy with the thathanabaing – supreme patriarch – at the apex. Education was monastically fostered at the village level. Every male Burman, at some point in time, had become a novice or monk. The British abolished this formal structure and undermined the position of Buddhism. They even abolished the position of thathanabaing thus the Sangha lost administrative cohesion. They introduced modern secular education in both Burmese and English thus curtailing one of the important monastic functions. The monastery was still the cornerstone of village life. The monk had great prestige. Common people offered gifts to the members of the Sangha. (Steinberg 2010, 32 – 34)

With the end of the monarchy in 1885, there was a period of intense, though scattered, rebellion in much of upper Burma. The British had brutally subdued it that lasted for ten years. The British gradually downplayed Buddhism, as mentioned, through the elimination of its formal structure and development of alternative modes of education. That said, early Buddhist leaders felt the need to emulate Christian activity. On the model of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), the Burmese established the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) in 1906. It was, in fact, both a religious and political organization. Later other Buddhist organizations sprang up such as the General Council of Buddhist (Burmese) Associations in 1920 with political objectives in focus. The link was thus established between nationalism and Buddhism. That link lingers on till today though the issues may be different. It may be mentioned Buddhist monks were also active in the ultra-nationalist movements. (Steinberg 2010, 34 – 35)

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Economic deprivation, as a fallout of the Great Depression of 1929, coupled with the educational marginalization of Buddhism, resulted in agitation in the streets. Interestingly, monks were leading demonstrations against Muslims, most of whom had migrated from the Indian subcontinent, because of their perceived insults against Buddhism. Monarchy and religion are intertwined in Burmese politics. During the British rule, some of the rebellions who tried to reestablish the monarchy had a religious tint. The most important one was the Saya San (Hsaya San) rebellion of the early 1930s that was finally defeated by the British with extra troops brought from India. Saya (teacher) San was a monk who was later captured, tried, and executed. He advocated combining traditional Buddhist, magical, and astrological teachings. The rebellion was a primitive reaction to conquest exacerbated by the Great Depression of 1929 as mentioned. Saya San is considered a nationalist hero, and his portrait is visible on the Burmese currency. The Second World War effectively brought an end to British colonial rule. It left in its trail few young leaders who championed the cause of nationalist movement in the late 1930s. They eventually became the leaders of the independence movement and the government in the offing. They included Aung San, Ne Win, U Nu, and others who have left lasting impressions in contemporary Burma. (Steinberg 2010, 35 – 37) This book does not intend to go into the details of hundreds of events that changed the Burmese course of history for good or bad. Such impressions also impacted substantially to the continuation of the Rohingya crisis.

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PLIGHT OF THE RELIGIONS 17 OF CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM Minority religions have both negative and positive influences in society. In Myanmar, group dynamics work better between peoples on the periphery, especially among non-Buddhists groups. This is evident as deep-seated deprivations are overwhelming with the minorities along the periphery. Some minority groups are prone to Christian conversions. Conversions mostly take place among the animist populations. The most Christianized groups are the Chin and Kachin. The 1983 census shows that among the Chin in western Myanmar along the Indian border about 70 percent of the population are Christians. It could even go up to 90 percent. There is a strong belief that perhaps 90-95 percent of the Kachin in northern Myanmar are now Christians. The Karen have substantial converts to Christianity, and it started since the early nineteenth century when the American Baptist Mission went into Burma. It is believed one-third of the Karen people are Christians, one-third Buddhists, and one-third animists. There have been allegations of the burning of churches, and oppression, especially in the east, where Karen insurgents, many of whom are Christians, operate. The Chin State also is a scene of harassment and forced labor to build Buddhist pagodas. Muslims are subjected to more severe brutalities. (Steinberg 2010, 106 – 7) 17

To trace the history little deeper, the Arakanese were primarily animists, but over the centuries, Brahmanism, Buddhism and Islam extended their religious beliefs, as they did over the Burmans (Hall 1981). Islam was first introduced in Arakan by the Arab merchants. So, one school of historian suggests that Rohingyas are descendants of Moorish, Arab, and Persian traders, including Mughal, Turk, Pathan and Bengali soldiers cum migrants, who settled in this area between the ninth and fifteenth centuries. (Imtiaz Ahmed 2004). The other school argues ethnically, culturally, and linguistically the Rohingyas are intimately related to the Bengalis, particularly the people of Chittagong areas. The Muslim population of the Rakhine state is the descendant of Bengali migrants from Bengal – now Bangladesh, with some Indians – mostly from Gujrat – during the British period. (D. Hossain 2010). It is believed most of them speak Bengali, so they are regarded as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. The Government of Myanmar and its majority Burman – Buddhist population believe in this conception. (Imtiaz Ahmed 2004) The Myanmar Military does not accept the term “Rohingya” and tends to call them instead “Bengali intruders”. To the Military regime, cause of Rohingyas finds little support within, and their claim of an earlier historical tie to Burma is insupportable. (Chan 2005)

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Mosques are allowed a free hand in the major cities but there are unembellished preconceptions that provoke riots. Muslim-Buddhist riots are irregular but not uncommon in various cities. These are triggered by a perceived insult by a Muslim to Buddhism or a Burman woman. There are allegations that these riots are orchestrated by the Military to divert antagonism away from the Government to helpless scapegoats. There is a widespread belief that Muslims’ attempt to convert Burman women and in case this is successful, Islamic organizations provide rewards depending upon the social status of the converted person. (Steinberg 2010, 107 – 8) The problem is not about the religion per se but the political use of it. The political use of religion is giving rise to political tensions and even terrorism. This is now a world-encompassing phenomenon that is disturbing the fabric of a society or a State. This is an inexorable move. This is an extremely bad omen for human civilizations. This author feels there is going to be no let-up from this menace any time soon. In Myanmar, ultranationalist Buddhists, including Buddhist monks, to say metaphorically, sleep with the Military (Zaw 2017). Buddhism is known as a religion of compassion, mercy, harmony, peace, serenity, and calmness, while the Military and the Police are seen to be coercive forces who resort to physical violence during any operation. But it is heart-breaking to note that thousands of ultranationalists Buddhists attend mass rallies, among others, in downtown Yangon, the Karen state, the Mon state, and the Mandalay Region to drum up their support to the Military for the atrocities perpetrated to the Rohingyas in Rakhine state. They form such groups as Tatmadaw (military) Admirer Group (TAG). It even goes to the extent of criticizing – by the Buddhist monks – foreign governments, and international media for castigating the Military for its excessive use of force against the minority Rohingyas. Buddhist monk U Wirathu wrote, “Monks and people are the ones who will take care of the helpless army like their sons. Sitagu Sayadaw, a prominent Buddhist monk, stated that “taking the life of a human being is acceptable as long as that person is not a Buddhist.” (Ty 2019b) When a communal riot broke out in 2012 in the Rakhine state, prominent ultra-nationalist Buddhist monks resorted to anti-Muslim hate speech, brought home the point that Islamic fundamentalism is an evil, called for

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boycotting Muslim businesses, and spread the narrative that the Muslim Rohingyas are a threat to the security of the Myanmar State. (Ty 2019b) The Bamar Buddhist supremacy has become synonymous with Myanmarism, a term coined by Dr. Shwe Lu Maung, who has authored several books on Myanmar. Here the dominant Burman (Bamar) race is recognized as the ‘super race’. The Rohingyas are the worst victims of Myanmarism in the hands of Bamar and Rakhine Buddhist supremacists. In continuation, the Shan, Karens, Chins, and other minority communities also undergo persecution for just being different ethnically, and religiously. They are so chauvinistic that even the Rakhine Buddhists, considered second class in this supremacist pyramid of nationalities, are fighting guerilla wars against the Government of Myanmar that Bamar majority controls in its entirety. Theravada Buddhist monks like Wirathu, was called the ‘The Face of Buddhist Terror’ by Time Magazine on 20 June 2013, and his 969 fascist movement tends to incite Islamophobia and justify genocidal acts against Muslims. That said, Myanmar has all the signatures of disintegration but interestingly it remains intact so far with, however, brute physical force. The reason contributing to its continuity is the pursuit of blind racist nationalism, ‘national reconsolidation’ meaning forced assimilation utilizing Burmanization and Buddization and preventing ‘disintegration of the Union’ implying if the Tatmadaw fails then a kind of chaos would befall the State. They have perfected the art of Myanmarism since the days of General Saw Maung who took over state power in 1988. (Siddiqui 2019c)

Chapter 9

WHAT GENOCIDE/ CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY/ETHNIC CLEANSING ENTAILS? ABSTRACT This Chapter addresses the predicament of intergovernmental organizations and other relevant bodies in categorizing the atrocities meted out to the Rohingyas appropriately. Should it be classified as a genocide or a crime against humanity or ethnic cleansing is a question of paramount implication? All three terms have several features in common. And yet they are different. As a result, the degree of urgency varies. The Chapter draws on various accounts and definitions and explains why the Rohingya crisis is tantamount to genocide. Not only were there strategic and systematic one-sided mass killings but also other atrocious crimes have been committed. There are fundamentally two problems that stand in the way of the discussion being more inclusive. Firstly, international tribunals and other bodies limit the definitional scope of genocide. Secondly, the discussion has not yet incorporated the grim crimes of 2017 when one million Rohingyas had been made refugees and stateless. Bangladesh does not grant Rohingyas the refugee status primarily because of legal limitations. Acknowledging Rohingyas as refugees would ease foreign aid flow. But it seems to be a double-edged sword as it is likely to validate Myanmar’s claim that the Rohingyas are originally non-Burmese. It could also lead to a conflict of interest between the Bangladeshi Government and

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The term ‘genocide’ was first coined by a Polish jurist, Raphel Lemkin, who was moved by witnessing the devastation and massacre in Rwanda and subsequently mobilized the world to recognize genocide as a crime under international law. He defined it as “the destruction of a nation or an ethnic group.” He further identified that “Genocide has two phases: one, the destruction of the national identity of the oppressed group, the other, the imposition of the national identity of the oppressor.” (Lemkin, Schabas, and Power 2008) The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260 (III) (A) of the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 which was notably ratified by the State of Myanmar in 1956, codified the notion of genocide. This was later accepted by the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998. Thus said, Article 6 of Rome Statute defines ‘genocide’ as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, such as: “a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part ; d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” (Imtiaz Ahmed 2010, 124) Of the five practices mentioned above, three are applicable to the Rohingya population in the form of “a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” (Imtiaz Ahmed 2010, 125; “The Hidden Genocide” 2013)

What Genocide/ Crime against Humanity/Ethnic Cleansing Entails? 69 Chalk and Jonassohn define genocide as ‘a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group and membership in it as defined by preparator’ (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). Curtin argues these definitions certainly fit to what is occurring to the Rohingyas today. He again rightly cites the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein: one, in late 2017 the atrocities committed against the Rohingyas were tantamount to the degree of genocide. He even stated he would not be surprised if Aung San Suu Kyi were implicated in the crime of genocide. (Curtin 2018) The most credible use of the term ‘genocide’ in relation to Myanmar came from Professor William Schabas, who was a member of the International Association of Genocide Scholars during 2009-2011. In an AlJazeera document titled “The Hidden Genocide” that was first aired on December 9, 2012, he stated: In the case of the Rohingya we’re moving into a zone where the word can be used. When you see measures preventing births, trying to deny the identity of a people, hoping to see that they really are eventually – that they no longer exist denying their history, denying the legitimacy of their right to live where they live, these are all warning signs that mean that it’s not frivolous to envisage the use of the term genocide. (“The Hidden Genocide” 2013)

Schabas, in his 2010 report titled Crimes against Humanity in Western Burma: The Situation of Rohingyas concluded that international tribunals and other bodies have been unwilling to interpret the scope of genocide beyond ‘the intentional physical destruction of a group’, and so clearly implied that such intentional physical destruction of the Rohingyas as a group was not taking place. His Al-Jazeera report seems consistent with the 2010 report. Most of what he notes is not necessarily aimed at physically destroying the Rohingyas as a group, and even the communal violence of 2012 and the Government’s response, which he did not address, do not connect such an expansive definition of genocide. He concludes that it was a crime against humanity. A crime against humanity is defined in the Rome Statute of the ICC as “any of the following acts when committed as part of

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a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” Schabas added that it is necessary that the perpetrator act pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy.18 Of the eleven acts listed in the Rome Statute, nine are of varying relevance to the Rohingyas in Myanmar: ‘murder; forcible deportation or transfer of a population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, or religious grounds; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; and other inhuman acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury’.19 The 1945 London Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal), Article 6(C) is candid to define the crime against humanity as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against civilian populations, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in the execution of or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.” Again the United Nations Commission of Experts who investigated the violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia described ethnic cleansing as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terrorinspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas." These statements speak volumes that Myanmar Army has been committing international crimes against the Rohingya people for decades, and that monstrosity has already killed 10 thousand Rohingyas and added to that, displacing more than 1 million Rohingya population. Now a note on the question of whether the issue is genocidal, or it comes under the purview of crimes against humanity is relevant here. It is a debatable issue. As discussed so far, the international community has not 18 19

Irish Center for Human Rights, supra note 31, at 31-32. Rome Statute supra note 34.

What Genocide/ Crime against Humanity/Ethnic Cleansing Entails? 71 taken into consideration the grisly crimes of 2017 in that perspective, it deserves further scrutiny. The crimes committed in 2017 are much more severe in nature and scope as this time round one million Rohingyas have been displaced to take shelter in Bangladesh. Many of the scholars and institutions tend to call it genocide or genocidal act as mentioned. There is a much wider outcry in the international community, like the UN and the UN Human Rights Council, showing sympathies and asking for punitive actions for the persons responsible for the crimes against humanity and genocide meted out to the Rohingya people in Myanmar in 2017. These crimes are much deeper and wider in scope. Its impacts are much more comprehensive like it is causing a huge drain on the economy of Bangladesh. International aid agencies are getting tired of supporting the huge relief and rehabilitation efforts. It is giving rise to huge human and child trafficking, drug, child, and women prostitution. Bangladesh’s environment – especially its small forest lands – because of sheltering these refugees in a small constricted land of Cox’s Bazar in southeastern Bangladesh – is under extinction. Its post-conflict management is exhaustive, expensive, and complicated. There is a tangible rise of the localized insurgency in Arakan and the possibility of a conventional war breaking out cannot be ruled out unless the international community takes the case seriously – that looks like waning as the days pass by – to give it a lasting solution. Details are discussed in subsequent chapters. However, it is heartening to see the ICC is moving to haul up Myanmar’s generals responsible for these crimes against humanities or genocide or by whatever name you may call it (Ejaz 2019). It seems the issue tends to go more towards genocide if we see the implication of the policy articulated by President Thein Sein. The President himself set the tone in July 2012 thus: Rohingyas could not and should not be accepted as either citizens or residents of Myanmar. He asked the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to consider placing them in camps outside of the country and resettling them to others. (Sein 2012) He thus wanted them removed from Myanmar. It is widely believed that more Rohingyas live outside Myanmar than the estimated 800,000 who live inside the country. (“Myanmar Fact Sheet” 2019; The Equal Rights Trust 2010) This was the state before the

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worst possible – so far- carnage that was meted out to the Rohingyas in 2017. Outside Myanmar, these people are not simply refugees but stateless persons outside their territory of habitual and historical residence. So how should one define this case: genocidal or otherwise? UNICEF report on Rohingya carnage gives a short, vivid and candid picture as to how horrifying and deep it was: (Unicef 2020) “I’d rather die in Bangladesh than be forced to return to Myanmar,” says Aisha, 19, who was raped by soldiers during an attack on her village in Myanmar. Soldiers killed her oldest child, a seven-year-old boy, as the family was trying to flee the violence. “They threw my son in the air and cut him with a machete. Then they threw petrol bombs and burned down our houses. The Rohingya refugees in Southern Bangladesh brought with them horrifying accounts of what triggered their chaotic flight from Myanmar. Tales of savage violence and cruelty, of homes and communities razed to the ground, of children murdered in cold blood, and of women brutally raped. Independent confirmation of these accounts was hard to come by. But satellite images and the telltale smoke were seen rising from many border villages left little room for doubt. When hundreds of thousands of terrified refugees began flooding onto the beaches and paddy fields of Southern Bangladesh in August 2017, it was the children – who made up nearly 60 percent of their number –that drew many people’s attention. Today around 400,000 children who have arrived since August 2017 need humanitarian assistance and protection – and looking to the outside world for help. “This is a crisis without a quick fix that could take years to resolve unless there is a concerted effort to address the root causes,” said Manuel Fontaine, UNICEF Director of Emergency Programs.

The 440-page report of the fact-finding mission presented to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is more revealing. The investigators and their staff spent 15 months examining the conduct of Myanmar’s Military and other armed groups in the states of Rakhine, Shan, and Kachin. They were not allowed access to Myanmar but interviewed 875 witnesses who fled the country. When they were six months into their mission, in August

What Genocide/ Crime against Humanity/Ethnic Cleansing Entails? 73 2017 the Rohingya militants attacked a series of Burmese police outposts with knives and small bombs as mentioned. That triggered reprisal from Myanmar Army in the name of “clearance operations” that forced more than 700,000 members of the Muslim minority group to take shelter after a strenuous journey into neighboring Bangladesh. The report gave a conservative estimate that at least 10,000 Rohingya people had been killed in the two months after the Army crackdown that began in August 2017. At least 750 people were killed in the village of Min Gyi, known to the Rohingya as Tula Toli. Satellite imagery attached to the report showed nearly 400 villages were wiped off the map. The report further mentions: Accounts of women tied by their hair or hands to trees and then raped; young children trying to flee burning villages but forced back inside; widespread use of torture with bamboo sticks, cigarettes and hot wax; and landmines placed at the escape routes from villages, killing people as they fled army crackdowns. Rape and violence were a ‘particularly egregious and recurrent feature’ of the Tatmadaw’s conduct. Citing eye-witness accounts of Rohingya people who reported that they had seen naked women and girls running through forests “in visible distress” and villages littered with dead bodies with ‘large amounts of blood … visible between their legs’. (Safi 2018)

The panel observed the Tatmadaw had developed a “toxic command climate” in which human rights abuses had become the norm. It called for senior military commanders, including the commander-in-chief, Min Aung Hlaing, to be prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. “Any engagement in any form with the Tatmadaw, its current leadership, and its businesses is indefensible.” (Safi 2018) The UN Convention and Raphael Lemkin identify distinctive features of genocide where the perpetrators tend to destroy a group rather than individuals. This way they aim to destroy a group’s identity. Myanmar has been precisely resorting to such practices intermittently since 1977 in waves after waves. Myanmar, as its State policy, has already made them stateless and denied them citizenship in their birthplace where they have been living for centuries. History is witness to it. They are uprooting them from their

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ancestral homes in phases and converting those homes into military garrisons or housing for the Rakhine who works as collaborators of the Military. This is brutality in deliberate form and is of the highest magnitude. There have been serious abuses of human rights in the form of forced displacement, forced labor, restricting freedom of movement and confinement in the concentration camps, committing rape and other sexual crimes – looks like being used as a weapon of war – extra judicial killings, arson, extortion, police harassment, land confiscation, arbitrary taxation, inequitable marriage regulations, exclusion of Human Rights and also denying access to jobs, education, healthcare, etc. They are limited to restricted move between dusk to dawn that reminds one of the apartheid eras of South Africa. (I Ahmed 2019, 124 – 25) The International State Crime Initiative (ISCI) at the Queen Mary University of London Report clearly articulates the Rohingya Muslim Community is being systematically persecuted and expunged from the national narrative at the behest of the combined unethical forces of powerful extremist Buddhist groups and the security forces in a way where complete extermination is irrefutably concluded. The ISCI confirms that “The Rohingyas face the final stages of genocide” (Iyengar 2015). ISCI uses notes of genocide expert Daniel Feierstein’s framework of six stages of genocide as outlined in his book Genocide as Social Practice (Shaw 2016). Rohingyas have already gone through the first five stages of genocide i.e., stigmatization and dehumanization; harassment; violence and terror; isolation and segregation; systematic weakening and are on the verge of “mass annihilation”. The sixth stage, which is directed at ‘removal of the victim group from collective history’ is underway rather in a naked way. Again, people tend not to differentiate between ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘genocide’ based on the number of innocent unarmed people killed. Mathew Smith, the founder and executive director of Bangkok-based Fortify Rights reported to TIME Magazine, “the abuses the Rohingyas are experiencing are at a level and scale that we have not seen elsewhere in Southeast Asia’. The abuses meted out to the Rohingyas can also be encapsulated under the definition of Crimes against Humanity under Rome Statute whose Article 7 mentions crime against humanity as:

What Genocide/ Crime against Humanity/Ethnic Cleansing Entails? 75

Figure 6. List of Violent Acts Experienced. (Siddiqui 2018)

any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:” (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of

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Mohd Aminul Karim sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”

SYSTEMATIC AND WIDESPREAD PERSECUTION OF ROHINGYAS It looks like there are common threads in the definitions of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. That said, this time around this has reached the highest level of intensity and magnitude of brutalities and displacement reminiscent of Rwanda and Hitlerite Germany cases. So, this only goes to the ICJ – although the highest Court of the UN – whose mandate will not result in any coercive action. The world is rather helpless against Corona Virus so also against the perpetrators of gruesome genocide inside Myanmar whose spill-over effect is crippling – socially, economically, and environmentally – it’s neighbor Bangladesh. (I Ahmed 2019, 131) Such an assertion is corroborated by Professor Sadequl Islam: In recent years, many scholars and legal experts have contributed to a growing literature on the concepts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In the context of the Rohingya refugee crisis, a relevant question is whether Myanmar is committing genocide or other forms of state-sponsored crimes. In my opinion, the evidence clearly indicates that Myanmar is committing all the above crimes led by the neo-fascist state in conjunction with “radical Buddhists… . The accumulated evidence gathered by many

What Genocide/ Crime against Humanity/Ethnic Cleansing Entails? 77 organizations clearly suggests that Myanmar is committing genocide which is the core of crimes against humanity… A report by the Yale University Law School finds strong evidence that the abuses against the Rohingya satisfy the three elements of genocide: that Rohingyas are a group as contemplated by the Genocide Convention; that genocidal acts have been committed against Rohingyas; and that such acts have been committed with the intent to destroy the Rohingyas, in whole or in part …, the International Association of Genocide Scholars recognizes the crimes committed against the Rohingyas in 2017 in Myanmar as Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity ... calls upon the International Court of Justice to issue a finding in favor of Gambia’s allegations against Myanmar of violations of the UN Genocide Convention; and calls upon the international community to impose/extend the arms embargo and to freeze the assets of those who are responsible.20

Yanghee Lee, the Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar provides marks of genocide in Myanmar, “I am becoming more convinced that the crimes committed following 9 October 2016 and 25 August 2017 bear the hallmarks of genocide and call in the strongest terms for accountability.” Lee suggested a body to be set up at Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh where most of the Rohingyas have been given shelter to compile evidence of human rights abuses. She said, “it would aim to facilitate impartial, fair, and independent international criminal proceedings in national or international courts or tribunals.” (Wilkinson 2018) Hundreds of people, mainly Muslims, were slaughtered in two waves of violence in June and October 2015. It was painted as a spontaneous outbreak of religious acrimony following the reported rape of a Buddhist woman as mentioned. This is, again, contradicted by the ISCI who reports compelling evidence that the attacks were premeditated which were probably orchestrated by local authorities. Interviews with some of the perpetrators reveal they were abused in the capital city Sittwe from the nearby villages and were provided two free meals a day and were instructed it was their “duty as Rakhine to participate in an attack on the Muslim Population.” 20

Professor Sadiqul Islam, Department of Economics, Laurentian University, Canada; Interviewed by the author on 19 May 2020.

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There are clear indications that the Government not only gave free hand to conduct the violence unabated for almost a week but also allowed the Police, Military, and other state security forces to participate in it. Since then, close to 140,000 Rohingya have been sequestered in make-shift camps, outside the state’s capital. They are heavily guarded and are not allowed free movement. A huge number of Rohingyas, numbering 800,000 are spread out across two townships in northern Rakhine state fully blocked off from the outside world by the Military. (Iyengar 2015) Rohingya refugees, interviewed by young Bangladeshi researcher, reported problems of their inability to sleep at night, suffering from constant trauma due to violent experiences in Myanmar, deep-seated fear of compulsion of leaving the house, stressful and distressful times over and over again due to losses of their near and dear ones and discriminations on all accounts including religious. He interviewed a Rohingya Imam (Muslim Religious Leader): In Myanmar, we were not allowed to lead prayers or teach at madrassas. The construction of mosques and madrassas was prohibited. I was unable to offer Jumma prayers (Friday weekly prayer) for 4-5 years. Religious people were beaten up the most. Their beards were forcefully shaven, and their religious clothes were forcefully removed by the security forces. Marriage registrations were prohibited for bearded men. They could not submit photographs with beards for identity cards. Rohingyas with religious attires had to pay double the amount to marry than that of other Rohingya men and women. All these caused great suffering and pain for me as I could not practice my religion freely. (Hussain 2018)

The young researcher also interviewed a UNDP officer based in Bangladesh. The officer was sharing his experiences of talking to the refugees immediately after their arrival in September 2017. He narrated there was virtually a complete lack of human emotions among those who fled the gruesome atrocities inside Myanmar:

What Genocide/ Crime against Humanity/Ethnic Cleansing Entails? 79 I spoke to a man who was bleeding due to serious injuries that he had sustained in Myanmar. He showed no signs that he was having pain or physical distress. I also spoke to a woman who narrated she had lost her child while escaping the carnage in Myanmar. The woman did not exhibit any emotions of sorrow or sadness that is normal to a person undergoing such an ordeal. They were so badly persecuted that they could only think of how not to die. (Hussain 2018)

At the beginning of 2018, ICC’s chief prosecutor launched an investigation into alleged war crimes perpetrated against the Rohingyas. Added to it, in September 2018 the UN’s fact-finding panel recommended Myanmar’s Army leaders be referred to the ICC and urged the UN Security Council to impose arms embargoes and sanctions. (Albert and Maizland 2020) As background, in December 2016 President Obama lifted sanctions against Myanmar assuming human rights conditions had improved when, in fact, the crackdown on Rohingyas was on. The move was criticized as premature so a year later new U.S sanctions were imposed against a Myanmar General for his alleged role in the massacre in Rakhine. It is heartening to note that the U.S. had continued to widen its sanctions regime on Myanmar military commanders in 2018. (Albert and Maizland 2020) It is understandable it continues so far. However, the question remains: how far? That said, so far nothing substantial has been done to punish these perpetrators. In fact, given the geopolitical realities obtainable in the region this is a mission almost impossible. The complex question that comes to the fore: Will China and Russia allow the perpetrators to be handed over to the ICC? Sudanese President Bashir … remains beyond the reach of the ICC although a warrant arrest has been issued against him. UN rhetoric sounds good but, its efficacy is doubtful although there are few instances – when all the veto-wielding powers agreed to do so – where the perpetrators were put on trial. That may not be applicable in Myanmar now.

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The US House of Representatives has approved the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act that can impose sanctions on Myanmar military officials responsible for ethnic cleansing (K. U. Ahmed 2018). Thus said, there is a silver lining as the US sanctions have been imposed on Myanmar’s Military Commander-in-Chief Min Aung HIaing and other leaders who were responsible for the extrajudicial killings of Rohingya Muslims. They have been barred from entering the United States. The sanctions also cover Min Aung HIaing’s deputy, Soe Win, and two other senior commanders and their families. It identifies the two others: they are Brigadier Generals Than Oo and Aung Aung. These are, so far, the strongest, measures, the United States has undertaken in response to ghastly massacres of minority Rohingyas in Myanmar. (W. Reuters 2019)

LATEST ATROCITIES: ATTACK AND DISPROPORTIONATE COUNTERATTACKS LEADING TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS On August 25, 2017, just after the Kofi Annan Commission publicly announced its recommendations about the situation in the Rakhine State, which Aung Sung Suu Kyi accepted, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army ( ARSA), using knives and home-made bombs, carried out its attacks on about twenty to thirty police outposts in the northern Rakhine state. About 150 militants were involved in the attacks killing a soldier, one immigration officer, ten policemen, fifty-nine militants (BBC 2017). This resulted in disproportionate reprisals from the security forces on the Rohingya population in general, which is, indeed, a violation of international humanitarian law. This triggered a whole chain of mass exodus for haven outside the length and breadth of Myanmar.

What Genocide/ Crime against Humanity/Ethnic Cleansing Entails? 81 Stirring a bloodbath, more than half a million to one million Rohingyas were displaced due to military operations conducted by the Myanmar Military and ultra-nationalist Buddhists. (Ty 2019a) Reprisals on the ARSA is justified, as both sides are combatants where laws of war apply. But the international humanitarian law stipulates on the one hand reprisals against civilian populations and their properties are forbidden and on the other military actions on both sides must be proportionate. Article 3 common to the 4 Geneva Conventions and Protocol II additional to these Conventions state that “(1) there should always be a distinction between the armed forces and civilians; all persons not involved in combat, including the wounded and sick, must be treated humanely; (3) the only legitimate objective is to weaken the enemy’s armed might; (4) and civilian population, including women and children, as well as civilian homes, property and cultural objects must be protected, as they are not military objects.” One can well imagine the extent of gruesome genocide that was inflicted on the innocent civilian Rohingya population like what the erstwhile Pakistan Army did to the innocent unarmed people of the then East Pakistan in 1971. After the Rohingyas left their homes their houses and properties were bulldozed (Pitman and Htusan 2018; Human Rights Watch 2018). At least 55 Rohingya villages were ravaged to erase the evidence (BBC 2018). About half a million Rohingyas remain at large in the Rakhine State. Pope Francis was deeply concerned about the massacre of Muslims in Myanmar. He lamented: “I see Jesus again in the children I met during my recent visit to Burma and Bangladesh, and it is my hope that the international community will not cease to work to ensure that the dignity of the minority groups present in the region is adequately protected.” (Democracy Now 2017)

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The UN Secretary General expressed his position loud and clear: “I have no doubt that the Rohingya people have always been one of, if not the, most discriminated people in the world, without any recognition of the most basic rights starting by the recognition of the right of citizenship by their own country – Myanmar.” (Secretary-General 2018) The worst sufferers are the Muslim Rohingyas along the Bangladesh border. They are, otherwise, stateless. They are not recognized by the Government – and have not been so since the Panglong Agreement in 1947 – as a minority group or a national “race”. The Government brands them as Bengalis. They do not have any rights and cannot even legally leave their area in the townships along the border. Some tens and thousands have fled to Malaysia, understandably a friendly Muslim country but their status has been ambiguous. In 1978, a reported atrocity by the Burmese police and army prompted more than 200,000 Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh. Most of them were, however, repatriated back to Myanmar under the UN auspices. A similar exodus occurred after gruesome brutalities were perpetrated on the Rohingyas in 1991-92 and again good sense prevailed when they were repatriated back – some 10,000 – 15,000 remain in exile – under the UN repatriation program. In January 2009, Myanmar’s Government again denied they were one of the national “races”. The Military claims these people are illegal immigrants, and therefore they have no right to citizenship. The migrations to Burma/Myanmar, mostly from adjoining Chittagong in Bangladesh, and other parts of India, from the early nineteenth century onward is rather a complex issue, getting compounded as the days pass by. In 2008, the Myanmar Government did, however, announce it would issue identity cards to some 37,000 Rohingyas as the first stage in their registration. That is again questionable if that would at all give them better status at social, political, citizenship level. (Steinberg 2010)

What Genocide/ Crime against Humanity/Ethnic Cleansing Entails? 83

ARE THE ROHINGYAS REFUGEES?21 The question of ‘refugee’ first drew the attention of the international community at the League of Nations after the First World War. After the Second World War, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was formed in 1947, to deal with the crisis of refugees in Europe. As an extension, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted a statute of the UNHCR on December 14, 1950, which replaced the IRO. As a follow-up, in 1951, the International Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees provided a universally accepted definition of ‘refugees’. The Statute of UNHCR and the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees did not mention ‘refugee’ as a displaced person, thus narrowing the term. Article 1.A. (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention reads thus: A refugee is a person who, (o)wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his formal habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

African Convention that focuses on refugees as a sequel to foreign aggression, formulated by the Organization of African Unity in 1969, mentions:

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Rohingyas have fled to different countries, most prominent of which is Bangladesh. While Bangladesh bears the highest brunt of refugee concentration, they have also spread out across Asia mostly by water, risking death, hunger, and diseases along the way. In 1978, the first flight of refugees began, as mentioned, forcing many to cross the sea and ocean water by boat to mostly Southeast Asia. Apart from Bangladesh they are spread out to Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, The Gambia, Saudi Arabia, India and the United States. (Mercy Corps 2019)

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Thus said, it can be inferred the Rohingya case fulfills every criterion of a refugee that is outlined in the above two definitions. They are being persistently persecuted as a distinct religious and ethnic group. It is a deliberate and sustained strategic vision of Myanmar to get rid of Muslims from the state of Rakhine. And above all, they have been expelled en masse from their ancestral homes and forced to move to Bangladesh and other destinations in the region. It is sad to observe even the host country Bangladesh tends not to call them refugees – it keeps on telling the world it is an internal problem of Myanmar although the Government of Bangladesh admits it’s linguistic, cultural, and religious proximity to the Muslim Bengalis in Chittagong. A recognition of the Rohingyas – as a refugee class – is likely to legitimize Myanmar’s logic that they are originally non-Burmese and that may justify their further expulsion and escape. Such an acceptance could also lead to conflicts with the local population and influence elections in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Government, therefore, avoids responsibility by identifying the Rohingya as “Forcibly Displaced Myanmar National (FDMN)” and not as “Rohingya” or “Refugees”. (Bepler 2018) In Bangladesh different old rules and laws are inadequate to meet the needs of the Rohingya refugees (U. K. Das 2005). This is substantiated by Bangladesh’s refusal to be a party to the UN Convention Relating to the Status of the Refugees, 1951 or its 1967 protocol. That said, in 1991 Bangladesh recognized 258,000 Rohingyas as ‘refugees’ by an executive order. The remaining 200,000 Myanmar nationals – including Rohingyas – not registered as ‘refugees’ were considered ‘illegal foreigners’ or ‘economic migrants’ by the Government of Bangladesh. As mentioned earlier there are inadequacies in its internal laws and rules to accommodate the Rohingya Refugees; nonetheless, Bangladesh is a

What Genocide/ Crime against Humanity/Ethnic Cleansing Entails? 85 signatory to various international legal documents such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and signatory to the UN Charter, which obligates Bangladesh – as part of State responsibilities – to take care of the refugees. Therefore, the country is committed to the principle of non-refoulement by becoming a party when these documents are considered. The Constitution of the country also guarantees the rights of the refugees and responsibilities of the State as it is primarily applicable to citizens living inside Bangladesh (U. K. Das 2004). All said and done, there is a problem of coordination between different departments regarding treatment towards refugees. Human Rights Watch criticizes Bangladesh for its role in the Rohingya Refugee problem. Brad Adams Asia Director at Human Rights Watch thus says, “The Bangladeshi Government is ignoring its obligations to protect Rohingya refugees and permit international relief agencies to assist with the humanitarian needs of Rohingya refugees.” (Human Rights Watch 2007) This may not be true in today’s situation as this author visited the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar and relief and rehabilitation system of the Bangladesh Government right after the refugees were given shelter in different camps. Bangladesh Army was given the responsibility for relief distribution in coordination with the UNHCR and other agencies. This author along with former Bangladesh Army Chief General Harun n and others carried winter clothes and handed those over to the local Army camp on behalf of Rotary Club of Dhaka Central (RCDC). And those were sent to different camps for distribution in coordination with the local civil administration. The team also visited some of the camps and distributed winter clothes to the Rohingya refugees. Having mentioned so, voluntary repatriation is sine qua non in resolving the refugee crisis. The 1951 Convention is silent on the question of voluntariness. The UNHCR Handbook on voluntariness mentions that “the principle of voluntariness is the cornerstone of international protection with respect to the return of refugees….A person with a well-founded fear of

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persecution is a refugee, and cannot be compelled to repatriate” (UNHCR 1996, 10). A Memorandum of Understanding signed between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 1993 stipulates that the UNHCR may provide protection to refugees from Myanmar and cooperate with Bangladesh to ensure their safe and voluntary repatriation. The sad part is, as reported in the UNHCR report, the Government of Bangladesh has expressed its reluctance to recognize the Rohingya refugees in the country for the fear of a large refugee population (UNHCR 2007). The compulsion for Bangladesh is obvious as it is an overpopulated country with a developing and struggling economy. The present coronavirus crisis has made the situation more deplorable as its GDP growth is likely to take a nosedive in the days to come.

EVIDENCES OF ATROCITES

Image Courtesy: (Siddiqui 2018)

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Image Courtesy: (Siddiqui 2018)

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PICTURE GALLERY OF THE ROHINGYA CAMPS

Escaping from atrocities.

Arrived at the destination after crossing the river.

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Waiting for the camp allocation.

A child walking across the muddy land.

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A long queue for the relief.

Vulnerable infrastructure at the camp.

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Expressing gratitude for the biometric identity card at the camp.

A child’s hope.

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BEYOND SURVIVAL

A Safe Space for Rohingya Women and Girls.

A mix of spaces for counseling, workshops, management meetings, etc. [Courtesy: Architect Rizvi Hassan, UN, BRAC, Charity UNICEF (Hassan 2020)]

Chapter 10

CAN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) PROSECUTE THE PERPETRATORS? ABSTRACT Myanmar is not a signatory Party to the Rome Statute. It limits the jurisdiction of ICC over crimes committed within the territorial boundary of the country. Security Council can refer such a case to the ICC, but that is likely to be turned down by China and Russia over geopolitical interests. However, the crimes have their ripple effects on Bangladesh, a State party to the Rome Statute. The cross-border activity could provide the basis for territorial jurisdiction. Territoriality, which is the Court’s only feasible option comes with statutory ambiguity. In this case, objective territoriality may be useful as it refers to the location (i.e., Bangladesh) where a crime has its wide and deep implications. The ICC Prosecution as an independent body has the authority to probe into the crimes without any referral. Thus, a preliminary investigation of the case had started in 2018. However, there will be attempts to weaken the case by highlighting the non-member status of Myanmar and the inherent difficulty in reaching a unanimous decision in the UNSC.

By a simple logic the perpetrators, mostly coming from the security forces of Myanmar, one may conclude that the ICC has the jurisdiction to

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try the perpetrators but looking deeper into it, it remains conspicuously absent from the Court’s docket. The reason the ICC prosecutor has taken such a long time to order for an investigation is simple: Myanmar is not a signatory to the Rome Statute thus limiting the jurisdiction of the Court over crimes committed within the territorial boundary of Myanmar. It is the UN Security Council that can refer such a case concerning a non-state party to the ICC, but that would likely be vetoed by China and Russia repeatedly unless there is a sea change in the geopolitical landscape. Here again the issue of geopolitics that will prevail and not the humanitarian values and ethics. That said, the crimes have been carried over into the territory of a State party to the Rome Statute: Bangladesh. It can be argued that the crossborder activity could provide the basis for territorial jurisdiction, which could be different had the crimes/conflicts, in its entirety, taken place within countries that are not members of the Court. A UN investigation into the crime events reveals: credible information… that the Myanmar security forces purposely destroyed the property of the Rohingyas, scorched their dwellings and entire villages in northern Rakhine State, not only to drive the population out in droves but also to prevent … (them) from returning to their homes … (Tatmadaw used megaphones) to announce: ‘to go to Bangladesh. If you do not leave, we will torch your houses and kill you. (Curfman 2018)

If the UN Security Council does not refer the matter to the prosecutor, Article 12 (2) of the Rome Statute provides that the Court may exercise jurisdiction in two situations: “1) the State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred’ is a party to the Statute, or, ‘if the crime was committed on board the vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft:’ or 2) ‘the State of which the person accused of the war crime is a national.” Since the Security Council has not referred the matter to the ICC and no State party national appears to be complicit, territoriality is the Court’s only viable option of jurisdiction. That said, the Statute does not seem to answer the question: whether the ‘territory’ on which “the conduct in question occurred “covers the territory of multiple states in which the crimes occur, some of which may not be State parties? It is to be noted

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that no ICC case has, so far, addressed such an issue – like that of recent genocidal acts in Myanmar – before. So, an element of ambiguity exists here. Here is an open question of whether the Court could claim territorial jurisdiction over unlawful deportation – after having inflicted gruesome atrocities on the unarmed civilians from Muslim Rohingyas in northern Rakhine State – from Myanmar into Bangladesh. The act of deportation implies crossing a state border. Deportation is inherently a cross-border action that is dependent on – and is not complete until the deportees enter – another state. Thus, using the lexicon of the Rome Statute, one could argue that deportation is a “conduct” that necessarily occurs in the territories of both states. Drawing an analogy from this perspective, when Myanmar deports Rohingya civilians, after inflicting a ruthless massacre, the conduct occurs in both the states. (Curfman 2018) To think of expanding the definition of ‘deportation crime’, we may consider the concept of territorial jurisdiction. It implies the State where direct effects of the crimes are felt – in case of Bangladesh it is sheltering more than a million brutalized and traumatized population for a prolonged period with no light at the end of the tunnel – no matter whether any element of crimes occurred in that State. The traditional concept of territoriality refers to the location where the underlying actions of a crime occur, while on the other, objective territoriality refers to the location where a crime has its wide and deep implications. Here it can be argued that the ICC could assert objective territorial jurisdiction over the situation in Myanmar given the reality that the main effects of the crime have occurred to a State party. (Curfman 2018) It is likely to give rise to controversies as the ICC has not done so before and the Rome Statute does not specify whether “conduct in question” includes the impact of a crime. To make it credible, such a claim of territorial jurisdiction needs to be firmly grounded in the sources of law. Article 21 of Rome Statute suggests consultation in case there is statutory ambiguity: It can be the text of the Statute itself; the ICC Elements; “applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law; and, in “failing that, general principles of law” derived from national legal systems, including the laws of “States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime.” There is a

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window of opportunity that the word “conduct” may imply differently in different contexts within the Rome Statute. In the jurisdictional clause, Article 12(2) (a), the “conduct in question” over which the Court has jurisdiction refers to a crime, which includes both fundamental actions and effects. The same Article gives the ICC jurisdiction over the relevant crimes, as mentioned, if they are committed in “the State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft.” The wording of this clause suggests that “conduct in question” and “crime” are synonymous. This raises the question: if you permit territorial jurisdiction over sea-and air-based crimes, then why not over the crimes carried out on land? (Curfman 2018) Such an analogy seems convincing. Although there may be a kind of ambiguity in the Rome Statute in clarifying whether the term “conduct” encompasses the effects of the crime, the principles, and rules of international law are clearer. In the Lotus case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded that Turkey could assert jurisdiction over the criminal actions that led a French ship to collide with a Turkish ship because the effects of crime were perceived to be occurring on Turkish territory, even though actions occurred in French territory. It may also be noted that states view territorial jurisdiction as encompassing both subjective and objective territoriality as a matter of customary international law (CIL). As a case in point, Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Foreign Relations Law Section 402, which the United States views reflecting CIL, claims that a state has jurisdiction over external conduct that has effects within the state’s territoriality. (Curfman 2018) All said and done, there appears to be a silver lining on the horizon. On 9 April 2018, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC filed a petition with the ICC to rule whether the Prosecution has the power to initiate an investigation into the en mass cross-border deportations of Rohingya Muslims. The petition is now under review by a pre-trial judge of the ICC. Myanmar has refuted such a claim. Now the logical question that comes to the fore is: Does forced deportation constitute an international crime under the ICC Statute? As

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shown in the earlier paras those can be categorized falling under the Statute in a round-about way. Is the case good enough to prosecute by straight application of the Statute? ICC Article 7(d) enlists ‘deportation or forcible transfer of population’ as a constituent element of crimes against humanity, in addition to rapes and sexual violence (Article 7g) and other inhuman acts causing great suffering (Article 7K). There are many examples – the world over – that recognize these offenses as crimes against humanity. Some of such examples are: the Nuremberg Charter Article 6c ( deportation); Tokyo Charter Article 5c ( deportation); Yugoslav( ICTY) Statute Articles 5d ( deportation), 5g( rape), 5h ( persecution), 5i ( other inhuman acts); and Sierra Leone Special Court Statute Articles 2d ( deportation), 2g ( rape), 2h ( persecution), 2i ( other inhuman acts). The Yale Law School International Human Rights Clinic Study – published in October 2015 – established tangible evidence of genocide in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. All these offenses – committed in Rakhine- fall squarely within the purview of crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the ICC Statute. (Islam 2018) Now the next logical question that comes to the fore: Does the ICC Prosecutor has jurisdiction to probe into the crimes that are purported to ‘intentionally deport unarmed civilians across the international border into Bangladesh?’ ICC Prosecution is an independent body with authority, among others, to launch investigation proprio motu (on own impulse or accord) in an alleged commission of the ICC crimes based on its sources without any referral by any ICC member or the UN Security Council (Articles 13, 14). This is thus called the automatic trigger mechanism of the ICC Prosecution under which it initiated a proprio motu investigation in November 2009 into the reported commission of crimes against humanity during the post-2007 election violence in Kenya. As forced deportation and other associated crimes in Myanmar – mostly committed by its security forces – are the crimes that fall within the purview of its Statute, there appears to be no legal bar for the ICC Prosecution to start a proprio motu probe. Ample pieces of evidence are testifying brutal atrocities committed by Myanmar’s security forces against unarmed Muslim civilians in Rakhine state. Even the Myanmar authority itself has implicated seven of its soldiers – for their alleged extra-judicial killings of ten Rohingya Muslims – and

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sentencing them ten years of rigorous imprisonment. The UN, EU, and some other countries – such as Turkey, the Philippines, and few Arab States – termed the Rohingya crisis as ethnic cleansing and genocide. (Islam 2018) Thus said, preliminary investigation of the case started in September 2018, following the judges’ ruling in response to the request that confirmed that the Court may assert jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12(2) of the Statute: “if at least one element of a crime within the jurisdiction of the court or part of such a crime is committed on the territory of a state party to the statue.” The Prosecutor has determined that there is a reasonable basis to believe that at least 700,000 Rohingyas were deported from Myanmar to Bangladesh through a series of coercive acts and that great suffering or serious injuries have been inflicted on the Rohingyas by violating their right to return to their State of origin. (Opu 2019) Thus said, the daunting challenges would be the attempt to dilute the case by highlighting the ICC non-member status of Myanmar and the inherent difficulty in reaching a unanimity decision at the UNSC. As a normal and expected practice in respect of the Myanmar atrocities the matter can be referred to the ICC under Articles 13 (b) and 87(7) of the ICC Statute. The UNSC, acting under the UN Charter Chapter VII, is mandated to make a referral to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation. Since Chapter VII is mandatorily applicable to all UN members, such referral enables the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over non-ICC members such as Myanmar. The first such referral was the Sudanese Darfur case in 2005, followed by the Libyan case in 2011. Both Sudan and Libya are not ICC parties like Myanmar. (Islam 2018) Thinking optimistically and logically – may be in an implied way – on 14 November 2019, the ICC judges of the pre-trial Chamber III authorized the prosecutor to start an investigation into the “situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar.” The Chamber concluded, as the prosecutor welcomed, “the alleged deportation of civilians across the Myanmar/Bangladesh borders, which involved victims crossing that border, clearly establishes a territorial link based on the actus reus of this crime i.e., “the crossing into Bangladesh by the victims. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over crimes when part of the criminal conduct takes place on the territory of a State Party.” The judges even observed, “that there is a

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reasonable basis to believe that there may have been a state policy (in Myanmar) to attack the Rohingya population.” (The Daily Star 2019j) That said, the UNSC may not get a unanimity decision to refer the Myanmar matter to the ICC because geopolitics would constrain the inherent jurisdiction of the highest multilateral – most potent with legal enforcement authority – institution of the world.22 As the signals suggest this is not going to happen anytime soon.23 However, there is another silver lining on the horizon as the ICJ has recently approved emergency provisional measures directing ‘Myanmar to stop the persecution of the Rohingyas in all its dimensions namely killing, raping, and destroying houses and villages.’ Some more details of this momentous ruling, though not that potent legally, gives Bangladesh and the world, by and large, a sigh of relief. A moral victory, in the long run, has also great indirect influence on collective decision making.

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The UNSC was rather quick to refer the matter of Sudanese President Omar Al Bashar and Libyan Leader Muammar al-Gaddafi and Saif al-Islam to the ICC prosecutor. From the time of referral to open investigation, the Prosecutor took only three weeks for Sudan and less than a week for Libya. UNSC has not yet made such referral of the unabated commission of crimes in Syria and Yemen. It is ostensibly a double standard due to overriding national interests of the permanent members, majority of whom are not ICC members. It looks like Myanmar situation will face similar fait accompli. (Islam 2018) The UK’s All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) has called upon the UK, as penholder on Myanmar at the Security Council to lead a Chapter VII UN Security Council Resolution, stating the present scenario and the need for referral to the ICC. Referring Myanmar’s case to the ICC is the best way forward. The entirety of crimes that have been committed would come under the ICC jurisdiction. That said, while the ICC has started a pre-examination, as mentioned, of crimes related to deportation of the Rohingya sheltered in Bangladesh, the work would be limited in scope and likely fail to address the full range of violations and atrocities, AAPG report observed. However, raising the issue at the Security Council could disturb Myanmar Government’s political calculations as well as isolate and raise the political cost on China, Russia, and other countries that would prefer the status quo of Council’s inaction on the issue. (The Daily Star 2019e)

Chapter 11

GEOPOLITICS INVOLVED ABSTRACT Powers like China and India are directly involved in the geopolitics of the sub-region and deeply interested to connect their land-locked eastern regions to the Bay of Bengal and fast-growing Southeast Asia. India is going strong in cohort with the west in South Asian regional politics to create a geopolitical space and create hurdles to Chinese initiatives in South Asia to counterbalance the Pakistan-China axis and most importantly, implement its ‘Act East Policy’. China’s BRI perspective is an upshot of its domineering strategy – creating its central place in world politics as it enjoyed in 1820 – that is pulsating the geopolitical waves of Asia-Pacific/ Indo-Pacific and thus it places Myanmar strategically important to China. The BRI project is likely to provide – for China – an overland facility to the Indian Ocean, more specifically to the Bay of Bengal. Proximity to the Malacca Strait enables China to export its goods directly through Myanmar’s territory especially the import of natural gas from Myanmar. This may be called a ‘bypass’ strategy. The U.S grand strategy in the Indo-pacific and the Japanese interests are also likely to shape the future geopolitics of this region.

This is a peculiar case where geopolitics has got intermingled with genocide. It is difficult to separate geopolitics from genocide tinged with religion in Myanmar at least for now. There is a simmering distrust between the religions of Islam and Buddhism which is deeply entrenched as already

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covered in the book. Geopolitics also played a determining role in the destiny of the region say between the British Empire and the Japanese during the Second World War. But presumably, religion did not have much to do when ethnicity did play its part during the British regime. Now again both ethnicity and religion have got intertwined. Over and above that geopolitics per se between the powers – having high stakes in the location and resources of Myanmar – is taking this to an intricate level. It looks non-redeemable. It looks like it is not solvable. A higher form of geopolitics is cascading the internal long-simmering animosities between, one can always say, two civilizations as Huntington has classified. To put it straight-forward, both the United States, China, and India are competing to create their sphere of influence. A scholar puts the competition in a kind of poetic manner: “They were like three men on their knees proposing to one damsel. They would not mind that she has reddened her lips by sucking the blood of Rohingyas and darkened her eyebrows with charred remnants of Rohingya wooden huts.” (Izzadeen 2017) This, however, applies to the Muslim Rohingyas in Myanmar. The fact that Myanmar refuses to acknowledge Rohingyas as an ethnic minority, let alone citizens, should not be evaluated that straightforward. It is not merely semantics. To see it differently, it is related to territory and sovereignty. In case Rohingyas are accepted as a legitimate Burmese ethnic group they will have autonomy in Rakhine as they are the majority there, which is spelt out in the 1982 Citizenship Law. Myanmar, being a predominantly Buddhist country, apprehends three non-integrative scenarios. One, it might give rise to a deeper alliance between the Rohingyas and Bengalis. Interestingly both the ethnic groups are Muslims. This might distort the national integration fabric of the seemingly chauvinistic Buddhist nation in the long run. Second, this alliance may ultimately ask for the right to self-determination. Third, though ARSA’s entrenchment in Rakhine is overstated by Myanmar it is not misplaced. There are indications ARSA may grow stronger as the days pass by since Rohingyas are discriminated against and persecuted seamlessly. There will be no shortage of funding and recruitment for ARSA. That said, as a note of caution, Myanmar is undertaking a short-sighted strategy of persecution that badly tarnishes its

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image to the international community. This strategy has serious regional security implications as well. Myanmar should also appreciate it’s a weak post-colonial State which is suffering from a myriad of problems such as almost country-wide insurgencies, corruption, poverty, civil-military imbalances, and so on. (S. Khan 2017) Powers like China and India are directly involved in the geopolitics of the sub-region. The United States and Japan are also involved in this great game of geopolitics. UN, ASEAN, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh are drawn in the fray by default. For Bangladesh, it is imposed geopolitics that is too heavy for it to bear. For Bangladesh, it is a humanitarian crisis that as a responsible nation-state it just cannot afford to avoid. Even it wants it just cannot wriggle out of this crisis that carries serious geopolitical baggage. Bangladesh is already a victim of about fiftyyear long insurgency where Myanmar is at least indirectly involved. India is directly involved. Non-state actors are active in the intersecting territories between India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. There are hundreds of examples in history where non-traditional security has turned into traditional. More so humanitarian crises can trigger the international community to intervene either through very stringent sanctions or direct military action as it happened in Serbia. However, it did not happen in the case of Rwanda. There is every possibility this crisis may replicate the Rwandan case where the international community as a whole – with the UN mandate – will intervene to stop the genocide. In 1971 India could mobilize the whole world except the governments of the United States and China to support its efforts to wriggle out of huge exodus of refugees coming from across the then East Pakistan, now called Bangladesh. And Bangladesh is slowly but surely sliding towards this trap. This is quite ominous. Even Turkey has shown its active interest in the geopolitics of the subregion. For Saudi Arabia, it is at least a fait accompli. Malaysia and Indonesia may also get involved by default.

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A part of this festering problem has been imposed on them as well. They are the rising powers at least in the Southeast Asian context. So, they cannot absolve themselves from this geopolitical quagmire.

Figure 7. Map of Rakhine state in Myanmar/the refugee camps are in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. (Bepler 2018)

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GEOPOLITICAL PLAYGROUND BETWEEN DELHI AND BEIJING Strangely though, both India and China are desperately trying for more strategic influence over Myanmar. Apparently, they are the two major players who seemingly should contribute to nudging Myanmar to stop such persecution – some call it genocide, some call it ethnic cleansing – but as the events suggest they are not doing enough to diffuse the imbroglio and restore peace along the international border between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Other powers involved here and who have high stakes – may not be as high as China and India – are the United States and Japan. ASEAN, as a group, has some stakes in terms of human rights violations and democracy, could not make much headway to discipline Myanmar. To me, ASEAN is a nonentity as far nudging Myanmar towards sanity. Especially ASEAN Charter is a big bottleneck for them to come to a consensus. For China, the Rohingya crisis is a unique opportunity to pull back the country to its orbit. This may not be that easy given the United States has its interests intertwined especially after the new democratic government has taken over the reins of the country. Both China and India have deep interests to connect their land-locked eastern regions to the Bay of Bengal and fastgrowing Southeast Asia as mentioned. The Kaladan Multi-modal Project is designed to provide a sea-river-land link to India’s northeast region through Sittwe port thus also connecting Sittwe with Kolkata. This would not just connect India with Southeast Asia but also India’s northeast with India’s mainland. This will be discussed in greater detail subsequently. As it stands today, India’s northeast can only be accessed through the Siliguri Corridor, a constricted 22-kilometer strip of Indian land, bordering Bangladesh and Bhutan, euphemistically called “chicken’s neck.” This causes significant delays in transportation and increased cost overheads thus making trade with northeast India difficult and expensive. Its supply chain is thus badly strained. Northeast India is plagued by underdevelopment, corruption, drug trafficking, and insurgency, with as many as 50 Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs) still active in the area. Given that the border is

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porous and that transnational nature of insurgency, India seemingly must depend on Myanmar, which shares 1,600 km border with four northeast states, to fight insurgencies in the region. India, therefore, seems apprehensive that any criticism of Myanmar’s maltreatment of Rohingyas might affect the budding security relationship between the two countries. (Kamdar 2018) Binod Mishra, a foreign policy analyst of India, puts it in this way: “Both India and China engage the Burmese Military as much as the civilian Government because the country is key to India’s ‘Act Asia Policy’ and China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’.” (K. U. Ahmed 2018)

Figure 8. A google map view of Northeast India and Myanmar.

INDIAN BLUEPRINT Former foreign Secretary of India Shyam Saran provides a clear picture of India’s regional neighborhood policy:

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Proximity is the most difficult and testing among (the) diplomatic challenges a country faces. We have, therefore, committed ourselves to giving the highest priority to closer political, economic, and other ties with our neighbors in South Asia…..Geography imparts a unique position to India in the geopolitics of the Asian continent, with our footprint reaching well beyond South Asia and our interests straddling across different subcategories of Asia – be it East Asia, West Asia, Central Asia or South-East Asia. (Saran 2003, 115)

India’s ‘Act East Policy’ is targeted at opening connectivity and markets in Southeast Asia for which cooperation with Myanmar is critical for India. Bangladesh is considered a recalcitrant partner in its efforts, so it further raised the importance of Myanmar as a geopolitical and geo-economics partner. Without this paradigm shift in policy, development in several of India’s northeastern states would get stalled by the attendant risk of fueling ongoing insurgencies. (Hariharan 2008; Kumar 2005) It looks like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is moving aggressively in a cohort with the west in South Asian regional politics. Many analysts believe Modi is likely to pursue RSS envisioned “Hindu-Buddhist Peace Zone” in South Asia to counterbalance the Pakistan-China axis. It seems old (British) world order is in focus and sadly, India is acting as the Anglo-Saxon pawn in the great game in the Bay of Bengal. India is rather exposed as the regional mastermind of an Anglo-Saxon atrocious plot to create genocide and thereby fuelling a huge refugee crisis in the Bay of Bengal region. Seemingly there is a strong hunch the recent Rohingya crisis may reshape the map of South Asia if the present sectarian conflict spreads and two regional powers i.e., India and China clash with each other using their proxies. To counter Chinese influence in Myanmar, Prime Minister Modi visited Myanmar in September 2017 right after the massacre when he eulogized Myanmar’s development efforts. It is the geopolitics that deterred India not to condemn Myanmar’s atrocities in Myanmar. Human rights violations were of no concern to Modi. He sought cooperation on intelligence sharing amid politically motivated claims that linked Rohingya rebels with ISIS terrorists.

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BJP, the party that has come to power in India, the second time in a row in a landslide victory with the slogan of Hinduvta that gives rise to ultranationalistic – Hindu-fundamentalist – fervor of making India totally Hinducentric. It is xenophobic fervor per se. Its apathy toward Muslims is well known. Such a trend in a neighboring powerful country is going to impact the fate of the Rohingya Muslims. It is exemplified by the fact that it threatened to drive out 40,000 Rohingya refugees when it took shelter in India drawing sharp criticism from the United States. Indian Ministry of Home has branded the displaced Rohingyas as “illegal Immigrants”, accused them as a “threat to national security,” and prayed for their deportation in an affidavit submitted to the Supreme Court. The affidavit also mentioned that India does not have to adhere to nonrefoulement as India is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. In response, the Supreme Court has asked the Indian administration to “strike a balance between human rights and national security interests” but had not stayed the deportation plans. As per the UN records, there are nearly 200 Rohingyas presently detained in India on charges of illegal entry. Their future along with 40,000 other Rohingyas, as mentioned, who reside in India is fraught with risks. India has no option but to keep the Myanmar authorities in good humor, both for geopolitical and anti-Muslim stance. There is a general trend – during the last election campaign the slogan of discrimination was pronounced loud and clear – under the Modi Government of hostile citizenship policy towards the Muslim “other,” as reflected in the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) that recognizes only non-Muslims minorities fleeing persecution in neighboring South Asian states as Indian Citizens. In a similar vein in August 2018, India’s National Register of Citizens did not include 4 million Assamese, who are predominantly Bengali Muslims thus stripping them of their nationality. Days are not far when they are likely to be declared stateless. This is reminiscent of Rohingya stateless people in the Rakhine state in Myanmar. Meenakshi Ganguli, South Asian Director at Human Rights Watch, observes that India views the Rohingyas “from a single prism – that they are Muslim.” (Kamdar 2018)

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This anti-Muslim stance comes under the rubric of geopolitics. Even many Indian analysts opine that Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) just passed by the Indian Parliament, as moved by the BJP and being idealized by its mother organization RSS, is directed ultimately to make India a Hindu ( cultural nationalism called Hindutva) State as opposed to secularist State as enshrined in its Constitution. Thus said, there is a clear-cut difference between Hindutva and Hinduism as Dr. Shashi Tharoor tends to argue, a Congress leader and once a former Minister of State for external affairs in the federal cabinet. It is beyond the scope of this book to go further into this controversial issue. Thus said, India has heavily invested in the coastal belts around Sittwe to get more foothold in the northeastern states of India, a heavily insurgencyinfested region of India. Having a better foothold in Sittwe will give India better sway over the southern Bay of Bengal. (Hasan 2019) This then gets linked with India’s only joint-forces garrison i.e., the Andaman Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal as mentioned. India tends to call, as mentioned, the Bay of Bengal as India’s lake. China is also slowly intruding into the Bay of Bengal. So, the free space available in Rakhine cannot be made available to one’s use – rather critical – by antagonizing the Myanmar Military or its civilian authorities. India and Myanmar are on its way to build a 1640 km highway that connects India with Myanmar and Thailand. India calls it its gateway to Southeast Asia and its response to China’s One-BeltOne – Road (BRI) Initiative. (Izzadeen 2017) India provided over USD 1.75 billion to Myanmar in grants and credits as of mid-2017. It built the Sittwe power station in the Rakhine state. India is also implementing the 109-km road project that links Palewa river-terminal to Zorinpui on the Mizoram border in Myanmar, and as mentioned, it is part of USD 484 million Kaladan Multimodal project. (K. U. Ahmed 2018) India and Myanmar have recently opened two land-border crossings at Tamu/Moreh in the state of Manipur and Rihkhawdar – Zowkhawtar in Manipur. This is likely to bring these two countries closer together. A statement issued by the Indian Embassy in Myanmar mentions, “the landmark Land Border Crossing Agreement between India and Myanmar, signed on May 11, 2018, has been brought into effect with the simultaneous

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opening of international entry-exit checkpoints at the Tamu-Moreh and the Rihkawdar-Zowkhawtar border between Myanmar and India.”

Figure 9. Seven Sisters Corridor.

India has been given the right to build, operate, and use an offshore hub for utilization of Myanmar gas. The link is to be established between Mizoram in India and Sittwe in Myanmar, and completion of the project is expected within five years. It facilitates the northeastern Indian states to get direct access to international trade. This will also boost bilateral trade. India lost out to China in purchasing Myanmar’s offshore gas resources in Rakhine state. (Kuppuswamy 2008) The initial pipeline project that was planned with Bangladesh was shelved because of unreasonable demands on the part of Bangladesh. (Kumar 2005) India continues to eye the bountiful energy resources in Myanmar. The latest proposal on the table is to transport gas through a 1,574-kilometer Sittwe – Guahati-Siliguri – Gaya pipeline. In the meantime, India plans to transport the gas by pipeline as liquefied natural gas. The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL) hold a 30 percent stake in the exploration and

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production from the offshore natural gas fields near Sittwe. (The Economic Times 2006) Thus said, it is sad to see how this geopolitics is overshadowing a deeply festering religio-ethnic issue. Humanity is sacrificed at the altar of geopolitics or geo-economics as clearly discerned in the Rohingya crisis. That said, Zhao Gancheng, director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies observed no matter how fiercely India and China fight with each other to wield for more influence in Myanmar, Myanmar will take advantage of this by playing neutrality to derive maximum dividends. It will resort to a great game of balancing: Myanmar plays a vital role in India’s ‘Act East Policy’ as its closest Southeast Asian neighbor. Bordering Myanmar, India’s northeast region has long suffered from chaos and an underdeveloped economy. More importantly, India sees the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between Beijing and Nay Phi Taw as a threat… . It hence feels the urge to take the offensive by cozying up to Myanmar in order to gain more influence in the country as leverage to counterbalance China. (The Economic Times 2018)

Zhao further argues even though China was of great geopolitical and geo-economics importance to Myanmar: Nay Pyi Taw will not put all its eggs in one basket. Despite India having an upper hand in Myanmar, its economic might was “limited” and the economic and trade volume between China and Myanmar as well as Chinese investment in Myanmar have long left India far behind… . Situated on either side of Myanmar, China and India will keep competing for more influence in the country. Such a reality will long last. (The Economic Times 2018)

As part of this influencing a neighboring country, albeit strategically critical, India seems to have also made many inroads in the Myanmar Navy. The exchange of high-level naval officers is an important part of these ties. Myanmar seeks Indian help in building offshore patrol vessels and supplies of naval sensors and other military equipment. (Bipindra 2013) Indian Navy has been regularly training the Myanmar naval officers in India and has

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provided military equipment including Islander maritime patrol aircraft, naval gunboats, electronic equipment, and radar. In March 2013, the two navies conducted their joint exercise in the Bay of Bengal. (Yhome 2014) India has also leased a helicopter squadron to the Myanmar Military sand offered to help maintain its existing Russian equipment. Since 2003, joint naval maneuvers and several port calls have been conducted. (Ministry Of Defense, Government of India 2004) India’s Assam Rifles, a paramilitary force, has the dual role of maintaining internal security in the northeastern states and guarding the Indo – Myanmar border. (Ministry of Defense, Government of India 2004) Of great interest is the transfer of two Indian Kilo-class submarines to Myanmar. This transfer is facilitated through a line of credit offered by India to upgrade its strategic and military relations – it signals a new strategic height – with Myanmar. It unfolds or heightens the tug-of-war that has been going on for some time. India views Myanmar as a steppingstone to execute its ‘Act East Policy’ that also aims to counter Chinese creeping forward to the Bay of Bengal. India is trying to embody security in its relations with Southeast Asian nations through Milan Exercise and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. In fact, the initiative would be helpful for India to root its military influence in the blue sphere of the Bay of Bengal. Furthermore, this also mirrors the dedicated embrace of the maritime geostrategic significance of the Bay of Bengal by India. (M. R. Rahman 2019) The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reveals that during 2014-2018, China was the main supplier of military hardware to Myanmar. It is unlikely that there would be a sudden receding tide in Chinese military influence on Myanmar. It can be argued that India’s submarine transfer decision may backfire and there is a possibility of technological up gradation of the refurbished Kilo-class submarine may get divulged to China through Myanmar. (M. R. Rahman 2019) Of prime significance on matters of strategic importance is the counterinsurgency operations cooperation with Myanmar. People living in the northeastern provinces of India have their kiths and kins living in the adjoining states of Myanmar like the case of Nagas of Nagaland (Borah

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2018). India needs Myanmar’s cooperation to contain Naga insurgency (Bhaumik 2017). The insurgents operating in the northeastern Indian states have ethnic bondage with people on the Myanmar side of the border as indicated. This has triggered terrorism, initiated by these groups, who claim to represent the tribal people on both sides of the border, have been on the rise since the 1990s. Joint counterinsurgency operations have been conducted for quite some time. In April-May 1995, the Indian and Myanmar armies conducted a successful joint military operation, codenamed Operation Golden Bird, against northeastern insurgent groups including the United Liberation Front of Assam, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, and the People’s Liberation Army (Manipur). (Thawnghmung and Myoe 2008) In November 2001, the Myanmar Army raided several Manipuri rebel-bases, rounded up almost 200 rebels, and recovered 1,500 guns. Tatmadaw conducted further operations in 2005, 2006, and 2007 as well. (Ministry of Defence and Government of India 2009; Zee News 2007) In 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding on Intelligence Cooperation was signed that enables both the countries to share real-time “actionable” intelligence to fight the insurgents more effectively in the border region. (Ministry of Defence, Government of India 2009) In terms of investments in Myanmar – it may not be comparable to that of China – it has done considerable investments like from 1988/89 to 2018 it stands to USD 763.567 million. Additionally, Indian companies are holding stakes in the Shwe gas field. Indian companies are also extracting oil and gas from four offshore blocks YEB, M-17, M-18, M-4, and three onshore blocks PSC-1, EP-3, PSC-B2. (EUROCHAM Myanmar 2018) According to the International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, India is also one of the top arms suppliers to Myanmar. They sell military aircraft, artillery, naval vessels, and many other types of military equipment to the military forces of Myanmar. (Choudhury 2019) Now an observation on India’s ‘Act East Policy’ that focuses on both economic and security interests as different from ‘Look East Policy’ which focused on economic interests only in Southeast Asia – may be pertinent here. With this Policy India wants to create close relationships with the

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ASEAN countries as well as other Asia-Pacific countries. It also plans to integrate the North Eastern Region of India. Thus said, Myanmar is at the center of the current Indian government’s ‘Act East’ trade policy and so it maintains an essential geostrategic linkage with ASEAN states. To fulfill such an objective, India has developed many projects such as the Kaladan Multimodal Transport Project, India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, Rhi-Tiddim, and Rhi-Falan Roads. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project is strategically important for both Myanmar and India. This Project entails shipping, inland water, and road transport. India is funding this project as mentioned. It connects the port of Kolkata and the port of Sittwe in Rakhine. Again, from Sittwe it will connect Mizoram, India by road. (Sajjanhar 2016) The objective of this project – for India – is to establish connectivity between India’s littoral and landlocked northeast region through Myanmar. India is also constructing/ improving the India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway and Rhi-Tiddim trilateral highway that connects the Tamu-KalewaKalemyo Road which is otherwise known as ‘Friendship Road’. Its approximate length is 1400 kilometers. It will link the Northeast region of India with South-east Asia through Myanmar and Thailand. This project is going to greatly contribute to trade and commerce in the ASEAN-India FreeTrade Area. India is also constructing and upgrading the Rhi-Tiddim and Rhi-Falam roads in Myanmar which will connect the insurgency-infested Mizoram state with Rih (Rihkahwdar) in Myanmar. (Sajjanhar 2016; Ziipao 2018)

Figure 10. Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project.

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Figure 11. India – Myanmar – Thailand Trilateral Highway. (Friendship Highway)

CHINA’S GEOPOLITICS An apparently poor country such as Myanmar has not been seen on the radar of global geopolitics for decades and it is now increasingly becoming strategically important when it is considered from China’s BRI perspective. Now that any country that becomes important to China automatically becomes an object of extraordinary interest to the United States. (Kanthan 2017) Myanmar is strategically important to China. Implementation of BRI projects is likely to provide – for China – an overland facility to the Indian Ocean, more specifically to the Bay of Bengal. Proximity to the Malacca Strait enables China to export its goods directly through Myanmar’s territory. (Kaya and Kiliç 2017) China has primarily two goals as regards to deep-sea ports and pipelines linking Myanmar. The first one is obviously to import natural gas from Myanmar. China is an energy-starved country.

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China will run into social disorder if its huge energy supply is not ensured uninterrupted. The second goal is a little complex but flows out from its first goal. China wants to create a shorter route for oil tankers and cargo ships that originate in the Middle East and beyond. These vessels can drop off the merchandise in Myanmar rather than going through the constricted and militarily critical chokepoint Malacca Strait and detour around South East Asia. This saves 2000 miles or roughly two weeks of travel. (Kanthan 2017) China’s investment in Myanmar reached USD 18.53 billion in January 2017 (K. U. Ahmed 2018). From 1988/89 to 2018, 297 Chinese enterprises invested around USD 20, 353.528 million, which is 26.92% of the total FDI received by Myanmar. In Kyaukpyu – a coastal town in Rakhine state – China has built a deep- seaport, a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), and Oil and Gas Pipelines, etc. There are other upcoming projects in the pipeline such as the ChinaMyanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), Kunming-Kyaukpyu railway project (Blanchard 2018) Among other numerous developmental projects, a transnational pipeline built by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) that connects Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine, to Kunming, started its operation in September 2013. China has also built twelve mega oil storage tanks in Kyaukpyu to store the oil that will be brought from the Middle East and Africa (ENAC Burma 2017). It is discernible that efforts are on to take Myanmar’s oil and gas from the Shwe gas field to Guangzhou, China. The daily production rate of the Shwe gas field is 500 million cubic feet (EUROCHAM Myanmar 2018). A parallel pipeline is also expected to carry Middle Eastern oil from the Kyaukphyu port to China. The gas pipeline became operational in 2014 and it carries more than 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year to China. On the other hand, the oil pipeline allows China easier access to oil coming from the Middle East and Africa and reduces the transport time of such oil by as much as 30 percent. Production sharing agreements were signed between the Chinese Offshore Oil Company and the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise between October 2004 and January 2005. (Van Gelder and Law 2009)

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Figure 12. Strait of Malacca [source: Wikipedia].

Figure 13. China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. (Htwe 2019)

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Above all, the Shwe oil pipeline is of critical strategic importance to Chinese geopolitical interests. Eighty percent of China’s imported oil passes through the constricted Malacca Strait and the disputed South China Sea which could be blockaded by the U.S. Navy, should hostilities break out between the two militaries?SThe two pipelines are critically important to China for these not only diversify energy supply for China but also act as an alternative – bypassing – to using the constricted, strategically critical Malacca Strait and the South China Sea as mentioned. The oil pipeline can transport 22 million tons of oil, and natural gas pipeline can transport 12 billion cubic meter gas annually. (Beining 2017) That said, in 2005 a message was conveyed to China that the U.S. Japanese, Australian, and Singaporean navies that participated in the ‘Talisman Sabre’ naval exercise simulated the blockade of much-trumpeted Strait. (Pannett 2019) Ever since the construction of the pipelines started there were protests in Rakhine state and other areas of Myanmar. There were complaints lodged to the Government and CNPC over the issue of polluted rivers, destruction of private property, and decimation of the livelihood of local fishermen. Also, CNPC did not compensate enough for many of the owners of properties confiscated for the project thus infuriating anti-pipeline demonstrations and unrest. Protesters have also repeatedly called for CNPC to supply the surrounding area with electricity, a basic utility still lacking there. (Webb 2017) In a nutshell, these pipelines give rise to local tensions related to land seizures, insufficient compensation for damages, environmental degradation, and an influx of foreign workers rather than increased local employment opportunities. As a reaction, the neutral advisory commission on Rakhine state has urged the Myanmar Government to carry out a comprehensive impact assessment. Coastal areas of Rakhine State are clearly of strategic interest to both China and India. So, Myanmar has a vested interest in clearing land for more development projects. All these maneuverings take place within the broader canvass of geopolitics. (Forino, Meding, and Johnson 2017) The Myanmar Government is a major stakeholder in the pipelines as it owns a major stake in the Shwe field’s

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production of natural gas and is set to earn USD 7 million per year in annual right-of-way fees for both the pipelines. Because of local resistance Myanmar had to suspend China’s Myitstone Dam project in Kachin state in 2011. The Government is fully aware that unchecked local resistance to the pipelines could potentially deprive it of millions of dollars as revenue per year. Such a development comes in harm’s way for both China and Myanmar. This compulsion has also presumably triggered the Myanmar Military to persecute the Rohingyas, although it tends to show the rationale of periodic attacks by the local insurgent groups such as ARSA for their atrocities. (Webb 2017) Now a note on the Bay of Bengal and its strategic significance to China. China is not a littoral state in this part, but its southward orientation and interests in the Indian Ocean tend to brand it as an emerging player in the Bay of Bengal. According to Voon Phin Keong, the director of the center of Malaysian Chinese Studies in Kuala Lumpur, Myanmar is “an outlet…..would enable China to overcome its ‘single-ocean strategy’ and to realize what would constitute a highly significant plan for a ‘two-ocean strategy’.” China has launched its national “bridgehead” to turn Yunnan into a strategic corridor and a bridgehead for China’s engagement in the Indian Ocean. It is thus going for ‘two-ocean strategy’ to move into the Indian Ocean lock, stock and barrel (Sun 2012). There is a growing hypothesis that the Chinese southward orientation is triggered by its huge economic interests. Its strategic and political interests are still not clear. China’s and India’s naval rivalry is still at its nascent stage. (Samaranayake 2012) But given the indications and trends, there exists a huge potential of further surge as the time pass by. Now, a flotilla of the Chinese Navy is anchored near the Maldives ostensibly over Maldives’ internal political problem that also draws India directly. That said, China, over the years, has been increasing its naval cooperation with Myanmar. It has been supplying weapons and military equipment including missiles, fighter planes, radar, and warships, and trained Myanmar’s air and naval officers (Chenyang and Fook 2009; Li and Hofmeister 2010, 186). China has provided military equipment worth USD 2 billion, using a barter system. China has also extended support to Myanmar

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to modernize its naval bases at Hanggyi, the Coco Islands, Akyab, and Margui. China has made a huge contribution to making the Myanmar Army the second largest in Southeast Asia after Vietnam’s. It has expanded from 180,000 to 450,000 personnel in just a few years. (Ramachandran 2009) China helped Myanmar in the construction of the Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) facility in the Bay of Bengal. The Myanmar-controlled Coco Islands have significant geopolitical importance for the Chinese Navy. By the year 2050 when China acquires world-class blue-water naval status, China expects that Myanmar-controlled islands will provide China with direct access to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In such an eventuality, China may not need to cross the Strait of Malacca to reach the Bay of Bengal. Thus the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PLAN) would be able to shorten the distance by 3,000 km thus shortening the journey by five to six days. China established a modern reconnaissance and electronic intelligence system on the Coco Islands in 2003 to monitor India’s military movements, including missile testing in the Indian Ocean. (Kaya and Kiliç 2017) Although strength-wise Myanmar has a large military force composed of varieties of arms and services its efficacy in terms of conventional warfare may not be comparable to its neighboring armies like Thailand, Malaysia, and even Bangladesh. It does not have the history of fighting a prolonged modern conventional war so fighting such a war inside another country may be problematic. Its logistics outfits are mostly based on “live off the land” concept, and training doctrine – including joint-services training – has seemingly more baggage of counterinsurgency operations, as this author appreciates.24 Since mid-1980’s Chinese warships started – it has, of late, started anchoring flotillas in the Indian Ocean even as a show of force near the waters of Maldives as mentioned – unannounced calls were made occasionally. (Garver 2011)

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The author had the rare privilege of visiting some of their military institutions in Myanmar in 2003 while leading a military delegation there.

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US GRAND STRATEGY Rohingya issue fits well into America’s grand strategy. It is not immune and isolated from the US grand strategy of ‘War on Terror’ or ‘peace through strength’. Its objective is to contain the proposed new world order floated by China and Russia. Interestingly Bamar-Buddhist terrorism is already in place and over and above that the globalists have been creating fertile ground for Islamic terrorism – it is still in its budding state, however – by provoking ethno-religious hatred amongst the people of South/ South East Asia. US grand strategy seems to have successfully infiltrated into the alternative multipolar BRICS block through Modi-Doval’s India. Doklam standoff, North Korean crisis, and the recent Rohingya crisis are seemingly interlaced to distort or delay the China-led infrastructural and maritime projects – such as BRI/ MSR – as planned for the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean region. Thawing ties with Washington, coupled with the Obama administration’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, aims to disrupt Myanmar’s long-standing strategic and economic relationship with Beijing. Beijing is Myanmar’s largest investor. But there is growing resistance within Myanmar against China’s overriding infrastructure investment. Myanmar expert Bertil Lintner wrote for Politico: China was taking over Myanmar economically and exploiting the country’s natural resources – creating a ‘national emergency’ that threatens the country’s independence. This – more than any high-minded ideological epiphany – appears to be what led Myanmar to reach out to the West, and, especially, China’s main critic in the international community, the United States. (Xu and Albert 2016)

Thus said, the Rohingya crisis – that has drawn the attention of the world community in general and the UN in particular – seemingly had the potential to derail the Shwe oil pipeline to China. It was set to begin functioning in the later part of 1917. Preventing the building of this pipeline would profoundly benefit the United States. While Chinese tacit support to Myanmar’s response to the Rohingya crisis was understandable for economic and

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strategic interests, some quarters expressed surprise that the US – being the defender of human rights and rule of law values anywhere in the world – is wary of getting involved in the conflict despite the outrage expressed – loud and clear – by the UN and international including the US media. The US is presumably concerned that its involvement to restore human rights could “undermine the Asian country’s democratic leader” Aung San Suu Kyi who is a product of Western funding. In 2003, a document titled “Burma: Time for Change” by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) noted that the NLD and its leader “cannot survive in Burma (Myanmar) without the help of the United States and the international community.” Between 2012 and 2014, the U.S. provided USD 375 million to Myanmar to cultivate “democratic institutions” and spur “economic development” that would ease the way for a new form of government in Myanmar. Furthermore, in 2015, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)25 was the “leading donor” in Myanmar’s 2015 election, which saw Su Kyi and her party earned decisive victories. The USAID spent over USD 18 million to help create Myanmar’s entire voter database that year and the use of all related technology. (Webb 2017) Also, many non-governmental organizations, often funded by controversial U.S.-Hungarian billionaire George Soros, have been involved in Myanmar “Democracy Promotion.” Two such examples are the Londonbased Prospect Burma and the CFR umbrella group known as the Burma Task Force, which has taken up the Rohingya’s plight as its flagship issue since 2013. Soros’ Open Society Foundations have also got involved in Myanmar, especially in attempting to pressure Indian shareholders to abandon the Shwe natural gas pipeline project. There is a change of

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In 2009, President Obama ushered in a new approach to U.S. – Myanmar relations. Washington maintained sanctions but indicated its willingness to open high-level dialogue. In 2011, the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Myanmar and agreed to boost humanitarian aid and announced the United States would not block assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In 2012, the relations reached a new height for cooperation like reestablishment of a USAID mission and easing the bans on export of U.S. financial services and new investment. The United States also named its ambassador to Myanmar in twentytwo years. The relations earned further height with landmark visits by both President Obama to Yangon in 2012 and President Thein Sein to Washington in May 2013. (Xu and Albert 2016)

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Myanmar policy now – in opening its foreign investment – after Su Kyi was elected as the country’s leader. Her predecessors favored investment from China and South Korea primarily. Her installation has seen U.S. investment increasing quickly in Myanmar and is expected to double its 2017 level by 2020. As of late 2017, U.S companies had invested USD 250 million in Myanmar following Su Kyi’s assumption of power. The U.S. oil and gas companies could invest in Myanmar despite U.S. sanctions since 2012. Su Kyi’s rise to power brought more lucrative contracts for the U.S and Western companies, particularly Shell Oil and ConocoPhillips. (Webb 2017) Geopolitics is the raison d’être as to why United States’ condemnation – mostly from its administration – is not commensurate with the “genocide” – or at least “ethnic cleansing” – perpetrated against 1.3 million Rohingyas. Myanmar followed an equidistance policy vis-à-vis China, the United States, and India during the latter part of military strongman Than Shwe’s (1992-2011) rule. Before that, it was under China’s economic protection for decades. The visit of American President Barack Obama to Myanmar the relation between the two countries has reached a new height where human rights abuses were largely ignored. Since then America has increased – following Myanmar’s transition to limited democracy – its economic aid to Myanmar. It, however, tends to still call itself a fledgling democracy. It is sad to see the United States is not exercising the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Myanmar although it has a rich legacy of doing so elsewhere in the world, even in the recent past. (Izzadeen 2017) Bosnia is a glaring example – protecting the distressed humanity – here during President Clinton’s administration as mentioned. In respect of the Rohingya crisis, the U.S. is playing both sides of the coin. On the one hand, its close ally Saudi Arabia is funding and fomenting insurgency while the U.S. corporate media brands this insurgency as “freedom fighters”. On the other hand, the U.S. is extending deeper military cooperation to Myanmar to help combat the very insurgency it has helped to create. There is a possibility if the situation worsens, the Su Kyi Government may request the U.S. Military support to combat “terrorism” or call it “insurgency”. This will allow America to gain another military foothold in another Chinese neighboring nation and secure Myanmar’s oil and gas fields

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for its use. Apart from controlling Myanmar’s oil and gas fields, the U.S. motivation lies in wresting influence from the Chinese. It is critical for America as part of its regional “China containment Strategy”. This goal was articulated by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2013: “We are going to ring China with missile defense. We are going to put more of our fleet in the area.” This strategy has been put into practice as part of Obama’s 2011 “Pivot to Asia” policy resulting in a massive increase in sales of U.S. weapons to the nations neighboring China as well as the proliferation of Saudi-backed insurgents in nations that have the propensity to foster closer ties with Beijing namely the Philippines and Myanmar. America should be restless as with the opening of the Shwe oil pipeline to China it would result in permanently removing the U.S capacity to impose a blockade on eighty percent of China’s oil supply. (Webb 2017) With the new administration, there may appear a shift in that policy but when we analyze the potency of the U.S. Pacific Command, it is simply overwhelming even compared to the growing Chinese military prowess. The United States’ latest defense policy/doctrine is now geared to competition with China than fighting terrorism the world over. It is always a practice in international politics to create as many hurdles to the rivals as possible. This rivalry is quite tangible/ visible in East Asia or the wider Asia-Pacific. Things may take a different shape in the post coronavirus world especially tensions may spiral between China and America especially over trade issues. Of significant importance is the Bay of Bengal, as mentioned, where America is getting closely involved. There is a perception that the U.S should welcome the expanded naval engagements in the region “as it is a vital part of building strategic trust among governments and maintaining regional stability.” Both India and the U.S. have been conducting joint bilateral – at times trilateral by including Japan – Malabar Exercise in the Bay. The U.S. Military has also engaged with the armed forces of Myanmar by participating in the annual Thai-U. S. Cobra Gold exercise for the first time in 2013 as an observer. This, however, raises the apprehension that deeper the military engagements grow between the two militaries, this may “raise further Chinese fears of encirclement.” As Myanmar reengages the

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international community, focus on supposed competition between China and India may get diluted. Attention is then diverted to Myanmar’s improving relations with the West, particularly the U.S. and its implications for China and India. (Steinberg 2013) Reportedly, both the Japanese and Russian warships have visited Myanmar’s port on several occasions.

JAPAN’S GEOPOLITICS Teppei Kasai writes: In Omelas, a fictional town envisioned by the science fiction author Ursula K. Guin, everyone is happy, but they embrace a paradox; the prosperity of the town is sustained at the expense of the misery of a little girl who is locked underground. The diplomatic approach of the Rohingya crisis by Japan, one of the world’s most prosperous liberal democracies, closely resembles the devil’s bargain of Omelas. As the new “leader of the liberal order in Asia,” Japan has a responsibility to promote human rights in its foreign policy. (Kasai 2019)

Japan is an ideal brand name in Asia mostly for its developmental and humanitarian assistance programs. Its humane face is deeply ingrained in the hungry faces of impoverished Asia. It is famously known for its soft-power skills. So, it should have a stand on the human rights of the people or its violation by the perpetrators. May be through quiet diplomacy it is propagating its ideals of human rights. But perception and visibility also matter. Should Japan keep quiet when in 2018, the United States Human Rights Council – through an investigation by an independent fact-finding mission – found that the violence – inflicted on the Rohingya Muslims who has lived for centuries in Rakhine State- by the Myanmar military “rise(s) to the level of both war crimes and crimes against humanity”? In October 2018, the Head of the fact-finding mission said that the situation amounted to “an ongoing genocide”. The Japanese Government has been largely indifferent to the plight of the Rohingyas. Japan has been largely abstaining – it does

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not speak good of this country that many countries in Asia emulate for its non-violent approach to its foreign relations – from all Myanmar-related resolutions at the UN in recent years, even refusing to call them “Rohingya”. Japan prefers to call them “Muslims in Rakhine State,” which is, as it thinks, much more neutral. (Kasai 2019) Japan, as it looks like, is seemingly biased. It could be attributed to religious reasons also. Civilizational card probably is being played here as well. Japan just cannot ignore the fact that Amnesty International has implicated specific military units in atrocities. They include the 33rd and 99th Light Infantry Division (LID), the combat formations that were deployed in northern Rakhine state in mid-August 2017. These formations are responsible for executing hundreds of Rohingyas in the villages of Chut Pyin and Min Gui in the latter part of August 2017. These formations are infamously known for committing war crimes in Kachin and northern Shan State in late 2016 and early 2017. Based on its extensive research and evidence gathered, including in Rakhine state and the refugee camps in southern Bangladesh, Amnesty International identified 13 individuals who should be criminally investigated for crimes against humanity. Among them is Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s Army Commander. Despite evidence of Myanmar Military’s crimes rising and senior UN officials denouncing it as ethnic cleansing, it is sad to mention Japan’s Government did not join the global outcry or attempt to distance itself from Myanmar’s Military leadership. In a meeting with Min Aung HIaing in Naypyitaw in November 2017, Japan’s State Minister for foreign affairs Kazuyuki Nakane did mention “alleged…. human rights abuses” in northern Rakhine state but did not denounce the Myanmar Military’s atrocities and excess use of force. He had rather reaffirmed two country’s strong military ties. Beyond its military-to-military cooperation, in January 2018, the Government announced an additional USD 20 million in humanitarian aid and development assistance for Rakhine State. As a major donor, Japan has a responsibility to ensure that it does not contribute to the ongoing commission of crimes as described under international law, including crimes against humanity and war crimes committed within its territory. Then Japan also abstained, with nine other states, from voting, when the UN Human Rights

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Council adopted a resolution in March 2018 to “strongly condemn the reported widespread, systemic and gross rights violations and abuses committed in Rakhine state.” Unless Japan ends its silence about the appalling crimes in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine state, Japan will be left on the wrong side of history. (Tassi 2018) In early 2019, Japan and Myanmar co-organized the Rakhine state investment fair while overlooking the ghastly massacres inflicted on the civilian Rohingyas, the human rights abuses, and the massive displacement of people of this state. Ichiro Maruyama, the Japanese Ambassador to Myanmar, justified the investment fair by emphasizing that “if there is economic development… there will be no conflict.” In late May 2019, the ambassador bucked global condemnation of the Myanmar Military’s most inhuman atrocities in Rakhine state. He was candid: Japan “cannot agree to the international community applying pressure or taking action against Myanmar concerning the Rakhine issue. Things will get more complicated.” (Kasai 2019) Japan is probably working within the framework of its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” with the altruistic objective of bringing stability and growth in Asia and Africa. Japan is also hugely investing in neighboring Bangladesh and Thailand. I always thought these were meant to checkmate Chinese influence. So, these powers are investing to curve out their sphere influence in Myanmar by sacrificing human values, rights, and institutions. Such a trend may ultimately make global governance weaker further.

Chapter 12

POSSIBILITY OF LOCAL INSURGENCY GETTING ENTRENCHED ABSTRACT The Rohingya Muslims have been victims of abominable repression, marginalization, and violation for a century. This has inevitably led to deep grievances and incitation of a widespread revolt. Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the well-organized leading group of the ongoing insurgency, infamous for their traditional guerilla and terrorist tactics, is allegedly funded by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The group is likely to attract many recruits as Saudi Arabia is spending heftily to build as many as 560 Wahhabi mosques near Bangladesh where the exiled Rohingyas have taken refuge. Almost half of whom are potential young men. Therefore, the refugees are feared to be a breeding ground for radicalization. The world is apprehensive of Myanmar attracting regional insurgencies with links to international terrorist organizations such as the Islamic States, Jihadi-Salafi, Tehreek-e-Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Taiba as thousands of battle-hardened fighters are seeking new missions. There are other interested terror groups in neighboring countries such as Thailand and the Philippines too. The ARSA has support and sympathy from Islamic political parties in Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. All this combined makes the region a strong case of a budding transnational and civilizational flashpoint.

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The Rohingya insurgency is in the media that prognoses that localized insurgency is making its inroads. The insurgency, so far, is spearheaded by the group known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), formerly known as Harakah al-Yakin. This insurgency spawns out of the grievances and deprivations of Rohingya Muslims. The Myanmar Government calls this organization terrorist. Its leader is Ataullah Abu Ammar Junjuni, a Pakistani national who worked as a Wahabi Imam in Saudi Arabia before coming to Myanmar. A Reuter report suggests the group is receiving financial aids both from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Its activities are overseen by a “committee of 20 senior Rohingya émigrés” and it is based in Mecca. ARSA is supposedly responsible for its attack on military installations and bases that precipitated the Military’s violent response in 1917 as mentioned. ARSA also targets Buddhist civilians in Rakhine state thus fomenting resentment among extremist Buddhists elsewhere in the country. This then greatly invites a brutal response from Myanmar security forces. ARSA is likely to have no shortage of recruits as Saudi Arabia is spending over a billion dollars to construct 560 Wahhabi mosques in nearby Bangladesh where the Rohingya refugees have taken shelter. (Webb 2017) When the political demands of the Rakhine Muslims – such as Arakan to be integrated with the then East Pakistan as mentioned – fell to deaf ears of both Pakistan and Burma in 1946 it gave rise to the formation of a local Mujahedeen group led by Mr. Mir Qasem. He started a strong movement that compelled a good number of Rakhine Buddhists to flee to East Pakistan. With the imposition of martial law in 1948, Burmese security forces took control of the region by June 1949. This pushed the Mujahedeen to take shelter in the jungles near the then East Bengal border areas. In the early 1950s both Burma and Pakistan came to an understanding of supporting each other on border security operations that ensured the arrest of Mr. Mir Qasem and the surrender of many of his followers. By 1961 most of the Mujahedeen surrendered to the Burmese security forces but the Muslim Rohingyas who migrated from the Indian subcontinent during the British period or after the independence of Burma were not accepted by the Burmese. In 1972, Mujahedeen leader Zafar Kawal established the Rohingya Liberation Party (RLP). Abdul Latif and Muhammad Jafar Habib were other important

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leaders of his party. By mid-1974 the active posture of Burmese security forces compelled Zafar Kawal and many of his activists to take shelter in inaccessible jungles in the bordering area. In the same year, Muhammad Jafar Habib launched another party called the Rohingya Patriotic Party (RPF). In 1978, the Burmese security forces conducted ‘Operation King Dragon’ that forced the common Rohingyas to cross over to the other side of the border in Bangladesh. This was, in fact, the first account of this insurgency at the inter-state level. There was a huge uproar about this mass exodus between Bangladesh and Burma. Over here the UN got involved in the repatriation process. This repatriation was done generally to the satisfaction of the host country. There is no let-up to this process since then with, however, certain interruptions. Such interruptions are normal in any protracted insurgency. (Haider 2019) Thus said, even after the ‘Operation King Dragon’ RPF remained intact up to 1982. But it got divided and came up with a new name the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus. In 1986, another party named the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) was launched under the leadership of Nurul Islam. Of these parties, RSO remained active both militarily and coordinating with like-minded parties of Pakistan, India, and Malaysia. In April 1994, RSO-planted bombs causing damage to a few buildings at Maungdaw town in Arakan. In 1998, both ARIF and RSO got merged to form a new party called Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO). It maintained a separate armed wing named the Rohingya National Army (RNA).In 2012, another party named Harakah al-Yaqin was formed under the leadership of Ata-Ullah Abu Ammar Jununi – popularly known as Ata Ullah as mentioned – to protest Myanmar security forces torture as a reprisal to a rape of a Buddhist woman by some Rohingya people. There were communal clashes – as a sequel to the rape incident – between Rohingyas and Rakhine Buddhists. Later, Harakah al-Yaqin was renamed in English as Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). (Haider 2019) ARSA may be called a game-changer:

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Mohd Aminul Karim The emergence of this well-organized, apparently well-funded group is a game-changer in the Myanmar Government’s efforts to address the complex challenges in Rakhine State, which include longstanding discrimination against its Muslim population, denial of rights and lack of citizenship. The current use of disproportionate military force in response to the attacks, which fails to adequately distinguish militants from civilians, together with the denial of humanitarian assistance to an extremely vulnerable population and the lack of an overarching political strategy that would offer them some hope for the future, is unlikely to dislodge the group and risks generating a spiral of violence and potential mass displacement. (International Crisis Group 2016)

There were reports that RSO had in possession various types of automatic weapons but ARSA mainly used bladed weapons and improvised explosive weapons (IEDs). From 2016 to January 2018, ARSA projected its strength as can be gleaned from several incidents. In October 2016 at least 40 people were killed due to clashes between ARSA and Myanmar security forces in the northern part of Rakhine. On May 4, 2017, an accidental detonation of an IED caused the death of seven ARSA activists including one instructor at Kyaung Taung village tract – north of Buthidaung – during their training on IEDs. There is a rumor that there were instructors from Pakistan. Myanmar security forces investigated the May 4, 2017 incident and it found traces of training materials related to IED. They also found five dead bodies including two foreigners. That said, ARSA leader Mr. Ata Ullah in a video message – in August 2017 – conveyed that his group had no connection with any of the terrorists – either regional or global – groups and they never intended to target the Rakhine civilians. That, however, does not preclude the possibility of ARSA resorting to terrorist activities soon. This is plausible when seen in historical context the activities – of more than half a century – of various insurgency groups in northern Rakhine who finds their actions justified by the overkill mentality or overuse of forces by Myanmar security forces. They were also fed up with the vindictive and xenophobic approach of Rakhine Buddhists. (Haider 2019) ARSA’s parallels are operating – ethno-religious-nationalist insurgencies in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines. There is,

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therefore, a legitimate concern that the violence meted out to the Muslimminority Rohingyas will attract the regional insurgencies with links to international terrorist organizations. Now that thousands of battle-hardened, ISIS-affiliated foreign fighters are seeking new missions – beyond a shrinking Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. This opportunity given on a platter to protect Muslim interests are likely to attract them. Though there is no fair comparison between the ISIS-affiliated Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and any of the groups in Myanmar, there is a huge potential for ISIS to direct fighters and other resources to Myanmar – whether invited or not. The larger issue of marginalization of Muslims in Myanmar has attracted the interest of transnational terror groups including Islamic State, Tehreek-e-Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. This is accentuated by the fact that with the marginalized Muslim youth making up 45 percent of the Rohingya population, there is a strong possibility of radicalization. (Sanderson and Markusen 2017) To make matters worse, as Japan Times reported the religious insurgents operating against Myanmar authorities are “threatening to deepen sectarian tensions across the region… as Muslim communities … grow increasingly angry over the treatment of Muslim Rohingyas by Buddhist Rakhine.” (Devnath, Koutsoukis, and Marlow 2017) Islamic political parties in Muslim majority countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan share provocative statements thus raising the specter of religious conflict in the region. Al-Qaeda has appealed to all Muslim populations in the region to support the Rohingya people wholeheartedly. It retorted thus: “The savage treatment meted out to our Muslim brothers…. shall not pass without punishment. The Government of Myanmar shall be made to test what our Muslim brothers have tested.” (Devnath, Koutsoukis, and Marlow 2017) The Government of Bangladesh has communicated to the Government of India about the possible threats emanating from the Rohingya refugee crisis. The Bangladesh High Commission in Delhi has conveyed that due to the huge influx of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh, the current security situation is of grave concern as the Islamist groups are looking for new enrollment from Rohingyas. It is observed that: “you can argue for security to say that this has an impact on India’s security. So, what is happening there

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(in Bangladesh) will spill over into India.” (Mitra 2017) It is reportedly known that a good number of Rohingya refugees have entered the Northeast and Kashmir areas in India. Indian Express published a report that approximately 5700 Rohingyas were settling in slum areas of Jammu. As a response, the right-wing Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) has urged the Government of India to deport Rohingyas from Jammu, otherwise, it may destabilize the security dynamics of India. (D. M. I. A. Khan 2017) To make matters more complicated and to look at it from another perspective, the Arakan Army, as mentioned, in clashes with Tatmadaw, in the first half of 2019, was seen using both traditional guerilla and terrorist tactics. On June 22, the group had conducted a rocket attack on a Myanmar tugboat in Sittwe, killing two security personnel and injuring another. This was the first attack of its kind on a naval ship in the coastal state. The group espouses “the way of Rakhita,” rallying cry among Rakhine nationalists that rekindles the memories of the once-powerful Arakan Kingdom that was defeated by the Bamar Konbaung Dynasty in 1784 as mentioned (Bashar 2019). This alludes to both civilizational and geopolitical connotations. It is difficult to conclude the outcome of two opposite insurgencies operating in the same state with different agendas. It will be interesting to see how the Myanmar authorities handle such a complex scenario brewing. One relies on Buddhist nationalism and the other primarily on Muslim nationalism. But these are going to be messy which Tatmadaw may find difficult to confront in the long run. Rakhine is one of Myanmar’s poorest states with 78 percent of the population who live below the poverty lines. Locals do not derive any benefit from foreign investments. Former UN Chief Kofi Annan – heading a government-backed Commission on Rohingya troubles – raised alarms about who was benefitting from the investment thus stated, “Profit tends to be shared between Naypyidaw and foreign companies, and as a consequence, local communities often perceive the Government as exploitative.” This exclusion in the socio-economic development of the state gives rise to grievances. (Bashar 2019) Such grievances always make a convincing rationale for breeding insurgency. This trend seems is universally applicable.

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The Arakan Army currently has a strength of 7,000 to 10,000 cadres. Many of the troops are drawn from ethnic Rakhine workers in Kachin State. It has an alliance relationship with other ethnic armed organizations, collectively known as the Northern Alliance. The Alliance brings support to the Arakan Army in terms of arms, ammunition, training, and sanctuary. The alliance members have a standing agreement to help each other when under attack. Since January 2019, the Arakan Army has been fighting the Tatmadaw all by itself as other members are cautious about engaging in Rakhine State. That said, many of the weapons used by the Arakan Army are manufactured by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) or of Chinese origin. The Army uses heavy weapons, IEDs, and landmines. It is concluded the Arakan Army will continue to remain a formidable threat to Myanmar in the short-to-medium-term with its continued dependence on the Northern Alliance’s supply of finances, weapons, and sanctuaries. (Bashar 2019) Myanmar Government believes that the Arakan Army plans to build a sizeable force in the Rakhine state to emulate the autonomy enjoyed by the UWSA in Wa areas near the Myanmar-China border. There is another worrying side of it. There are reports the Arakan Army often uses Bangladesh territory. They also take advantage of kinship ties with the Rakhine population-based in the southeastern districts of Bandarban and Rangamati in Bangladesh. There are reports that the Arakan Army had created a shadowy platform named Magh Liberation Party (MLP) in 2010 to recruit Rakhines based in Bangladesh. This insurgency is, therefore, taking a transnational character.

Chapter 13

POSSIBILITY OF ROHINGYAS GOING BACK TO MYANMAR THIS TIME ROUND ABSTRACT The negotiation and still-to-be implemented repatriation of Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar have been nothing but a deplorable charade. Dhaka and Rangoon signed a bilateral agreement in 2017 followed by finalization of the “Physical Arrangement” in 2018 to carry out the repatriation within two years despite Myanmar Military commander’s unapologetically antagonistic statements casting doubts on the legitimacy of their intentions. The Bangladesh Government placed a list of 8,032 displaced persons of which only 878 got clearance and none has been repatriated so far. Myanmar is now forcing them to accept identity cards that categorize them as foreign nationals, essentially squelching all future possibilities of becoming a citizen. Myanmar is holding insurgent suspects incommunicado which possibly involves torture, ill-treatment, and deaths in custody. Villages that were once home to Rohingyas have been bulldozed to the ground and transformed into military garrisons and housing estates. Rights groups suspect another wave of genocide likely to be recurring against the remaining 600,000 Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. The refugees are unwilling to return without an infallible guarantee of safety under current perilous circumstances.

The genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 moved the world community to say, “Never again”. The same pledge was also repeated after

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the 1992-95 ethnic cleansing campaign in the former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia and Serbia, and another one between 2003 and 2010 in the Darfur region of Sudan and more than a million Rohingyas are waiting in the makeshift camps in southern Bangladesh for repatriation and the world is watching it rather helplessly. The United States could help this process if it could put its full weight for it to happen. This statement looks like one-sided as today only Russian and Chinese weightage have to be factored in. Observers suggest a multipronged pragmatic approach. It involves brokering a political solution, creating conditions in Myanmar conducive to resettle the Rohingyas in their ancestral homes. And third could be: Assist Bangladesh to cope with the presence in what is likely to be a new long-term population. The world could simultaneously help Bangladesh integrate hundreds and thousands who may never be able to return to Myanmar. (Blank and Culbertson 2018) Bangladesh has brushed aside such a proposition. But the reality may turn out to be different. In fact, such transformation is already underway. The Chinese and Russian vetoes in the Security Council have dwarfed the international attempt to make any reckonable progress. Dhaka and Rangoon signed a bilateral agreement in November 2017, presumably at the behest of China – considered friendly to both – to repatriate the Rohingya refugees – if you may call them so – back to Myanmar. On January 16, 2018, both the parties finalized “Physical Arrangement” to help repatriation of the Rohingyas within two years. The Bangladesh Government had already handed over a list of 8,032 displaced persons. Myanmar has given clearance to only 878 persons. But none could be repatriated yet. (K. U. Ahmed 2018) There is a serious bone of contention here: Myanmar has agreed to take back Rohingyas who have identity cards or citizen certificates. As mentioned, Rohingyas have no evidence of their citizenship as the certificates had been denied to them by the 1982 Act. They cannot go back home as they do not have papers to claim their citizenship. (M. A. Hossain 2018) However, here the diplomacy must be forceful with potent international clout supporting it to find a way out. The UN should get actively involved in the process. But the UN also seems rather helpless which got reflected in the words of the UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner Kelly T Clements

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while briefing the media in Dhaka, “It’s extremely difficult to set a timeline (for repatriation). There are too many factors” (United News of Bangladesh 2019c). That said, to the surprise of the international community – what to talk about citizenship certificate – Myanmar authorities are now forcing the Rohingya Muslim minorities to accept identity cards that categorize them as foreign nationals. It practically denies them any possibility of becoming a citizen ever. The report by the group Rights Fortify on the campaign to force the Rohingyas to accept National Verification Card (NVC) may further compound the crisis. “The Government is trying to destroy the Rohingya people through an administrative process that effectively strips them of basic rights,” observes Mathew Smith, the group’s chief executive officer. Over and above this, Myanmar is holding insurgent suspects incommunicado – usually incommunicado implies torture – in a practice that may be covering torture, as observed by three UN experts like Yanghee Lee, Agnes Callamard and Nils Melzer. They have grave concerns about the Army’s use of incommunicado detention in the recent conflict, as well as allegations of torture, ill-treatment, and deaths in custody. (Naing 2019) Apart from such complexities, the move was, however, considered, dangerously premature by the rights groups. Lee, the special UN rapporteur, banned from visiting Myanmar, claimed she had evidence that Myanmar’s military was continuing to target Rohingyas including razing their villages. She was emphatic, “There is an increasing amount of evidence, including satellite images, which indicates that whole villages that were once home to Rohingyas have been bulldozed to the ground.” This, therefore, casts doubt on the sincerity of Myanmar authorities to repatriate the Rohingyas. (Wilkinson 2018) Nathan Ruser, one of the researchers at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) International Cyber Policy Center, mentions in a statement: The continued destruction of residential areas across 2018 and 2019 – clearly identifiable through our longitudinal satellite analysis – raises serious questions about the willingness of the Myanmar Government to facilitate a safe and dignified repatriation process.

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A Reuter’s investigation in December 2018 found authorities have built houses for Buddhists in former Rohingya areas. There is another interesting side of the story: a resettlement map produced by the Government revealed that refugees, rather than returning to their original villages, are likely to be herded into Rohingya-only settlements. (Y. Reuters 2019) Added to that, the report from the fact-finding mission, presented to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHCR) as mentioned, observed Myanmar’s Military had committed “the gravest crimes under international law.” The report casts doubt about the repatriation of Rohingyas. It clearly said repatriation in the current circumstances is out of the question. It continues, “The security forces who perpetrated gross human rights violations, with impunity, would be responsible.” Human Rights Watch’s Asia director has this to say on physical evidence of Myanmar’s reluctance to repatriate the Rohingya refugees back to their ancestral homes: The satellite imagery and eyewitness interviews point the finger at the Military for setting these buildings ablaze... it is difficult to believe that militants burned down over 300 buildings in Wa Peik over a month while Burmese security forces stood there and watched.

The International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar listed Tatmadaw officers who were responsible for the atrocities committed during the socalled 2017 ‘clearance operation’. From October 2016 to August 2016, the HRW identified 1500 buildings destroyed. (Motaher 2019; Human Rights Watch 2016; OHCHR 2019) Amnesty International published a report showing satellite images that exposed the fact that the state – that was once home to the majority of Rohingyas – is being militarized at an alarming pace. Security forces bases were being stretched to the Rohingya villages that were destroyed. Tirana Hassan, Amnesty International Crisis Response Director, makes it loud and clear, “What we are seeing in Rakhine state is a land grab by the Military on a dramatic scale. New bases are being erected to house the very same security forces that have committed crimes against humanity in Rohingya.” (Wilkinson 2018)

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According to a report – published in March 2017 – titled Remaking State by Amnesty International that describes the Military is building new installations and roads on top of those in the same villages that were earlier bulldozed by the same Military. Myanmar is constructing make-shift camps to rehabilitate the Rohingyas returning but the UN apprehends those camps may be used to intern the Rohingyas on a long-term basis. Such practice is already in place in the Rakhine state. If history is any indication, the UN’s apprehension is well-founded. (S. Khan 2017) BBC correspondent Jonathan Head saw four locations in Rakhine where secure facilities have been built on what – satellite images confirmed – were once Rohingya settlements. One such location includes HIa Poe Kaung transit camp which, according to Myanmar Government, can house 25,000 returnees. It has been built on the site of two Rohingya villages, Haw Ri Tu Lar and Thar Zay Kone, demolished after the 2017 carnage, as the BBC reported. Another Rohingya village called Myar Zin was bulldozed to clear the area for the camps. Speaking off-camera, officials there confirmed to BBC of the demolition. (The Daily Star 2019e) As a kind of response – as deduced – in November 2018, Amnesty International stripped Suu Kyi of the Ambassador of Conscience Award it had once conferred on her during her fifteen-year long internment. A Bangladeshi diplomat, who served in both Delhi and Yangon, Mahmood Hasan provides rather a convincing rationale for the Rohingyas not returning to their ancestral homes in Rakhine: Regarding the repatriation process of Rohingyas, Myanmar has been stalling continuously. Given the fact that majority of Rohingyas are Muslims, whose language is related to Chittagonian and who share similar features with Bengalis, with time these people will eventually be assimilated into the local Bangladeshi population. It appears both Aung San Suu Kyi and her Army Chief Min Aung Hlaing are in a cozy situation now that this ethnic community has been driven out of Myanmar. For them, there is practically no scope for these people to return to Rakhine.

He continues emphatically,

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Mohd Aminul Karim Understandably, the diplomatic demarche that Myanmar has undertaken to thwart the return of Rohingyas is quite well known. The three big countries that have given support to Myanmar against the return of Rohingyas is quite well-known. The three big countries that have given support to Myanmar against repatriation of Rohingyas have two arguments: religious antagonism and that Rohingyas are part of overpopulated Bangladesh. Sandwiched between Hindu-majority India and Buddhist-majority Myanmar, Muslim-majority Bangladesh is in an unenviable situation as far its population is concerned. Both India and Myanmar look upon Muslims of Bangladesh with a great deal of suspicion. (Hasan 2019)

The diplomat goes on to show another perspective of the conundrum: Myanmar has launched non-military aggression against Bangladesh to destabilize the country socially, economically, environmentally, and politically. The only way this aggression can be tackled is to get stringent UN Security Council sanctions against Myanmar. For that to happen, Bangladesh will have to get all the five permanent members of the Security Council on its side. But China and Russia have repeatedly blocked any statement from the UN Security Council. Fourth Joint Working Group meeting between Bangladesh and Myanmar was held in Naypyidaw on May 3, 2019, but no concrete movement on repatriation was seen. (Hasan 2019)

There is a war of words between the two governments over the repatriation process – an agreement to this effect already signed as mentioned. Myanmar has very recently complained that Bangladesh was delaying the repatriation process. This was refuted by the Bangladesh Government as its foreign minister had to retort thus: “In recent times, the media published reports of a Myanmar Minister saying that Bangladesh was responsible for the delay in Rohingya repatriation. Bangladesh is not cooperating. Such a statement is blatantly false.” He was referring to a statement by Kyaw Tint Swe, Minister for the office of the State Councilor, Myanmar, said Bangladesh was not cooperating with Myanmar in its

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repatriation efforts and not proving residence cards among all refugees who had fled Myanmar’s western region. (The Daily Star 2019a) There were some misgivings about the figure of refugees who have taken shelter in Bangladesh. The Emergency Response and Assessment Team from ASEAN mentioned in its report only 500,000 Rohingyas had fled the violence in Myanmar. Bangladeshi Foreign Minister categorically refuted it: “This figure is totally wrong. Since August 2017, more than 740,000 Rohingyas had fled to Bangladesh. In total, there are 1.1 million Rohingyas living here…. Myanmar has not kept its pledge.” (The Daily Star 2019a) Such misgivings or mistrust does not bode well for the quick repatriation of the Rohingyas. This, therefore, remains an enigma. At the end of the day, you do not see any light at the end of the tunnel. Such sentiment is echoed by a UNHCR Goodwill Ambassador Jung Woo- Sung who visited the Kutupalong camp inside Bangladesh a couple of times. He has this to say on the plight and the prospect of repatriation: They (the Rohingyas) have been persecuted for many decades. More than 34,000 refugees in Kutupalong have lived there since the 1990s. Many refugees have been here their whole life, and do not know their homeland or a life outside the refugee camp. I was relieved to see that many refugees were striving to rebuild their lives in an environment that has visibly improved since 2017, but my heart remained heavy at the thought of their future. No matter how well-structured or safe life at a refugee camp maybe, a refugee is only a guest in the country of his or her asylum. When a guest’s visit becomes protracted the hospitality will inevitably begin to wane. Unfortunately, a permanent solution for the Rohingya refugees appears something to be expected only in the distant future. (Woo-sung 2019)

There is hardly any hope of refugees returning to their homeland – even after two years of their forced deportation – as expressed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet during the opening statement at the 42nd session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva on 9 September 2019. He narrates the Rakhine state is now experiencing another wave of conflict, human rights violations, and displacement making it harder

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for the Rohingyas to return to Myanmar. Such a bleak picture comes at a time when two earlier attempts – once on November 15, 2018, and another on August 22, 2019 – failed to repatriate the refugees as they declined to return as the conditions to return to Rakhine are not secured and the right of citizenship is not guaranteed. Bachelet even reminded that the recent escalation of clashes in Shan state and the long-standing conflicts in the Kachin state also cause displacement and human suffering and thus undermine the overall peace process. The final report of the UN FactFinding Mission, which has given the world a clear picture of the intensity and scale of the violations and atrocities committed across Myanmar. This Independent Investigative Mechanism was established by the Council and was declared operational by the Secretary-General in August 2019. But Myanmar seems ‘could not care less’ about such mechanism and allegations of genocide and ethnic cleansing. (The Daily Star 2019d) The UN Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar narrated in a statement on August 22, 2019, Soldiers routinely and systematically employed rape, gang rape and other violent and forced sexual acts against women, girls, boys, men, and transgender people in blatant violations of international law… many of these acts amount to crimes under international law, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide.

Radhikha Coomaraswamy, who took part in the UN Fact-Finding Mission said, “Conditions were not favorable for a safe repatriation…. People will not return to their villages unless the silence is broken surrounding cases of sexual violence against men, boys, and transgender people.” The Mission had interviewed hundreds of survivors and witnesses of sexual abuse in Kachin and Shan state in the north and Rakhine state in western Myanmar. (The New Age 2019) UN investigators said on September 16, 2009, of the Rohingya Muslims remaining inside Myanmar nearly 130,000 Rohingyas were trapped in ‘open-air-prisons” in central Rakhine. The investigators observed in their final report on Myanmar.

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Myanmar continues to harbor genocidal intent and the Rohingyas remain under serious risk of genocide… . The country is denying wrongdoing, destroying evidence, refusing to conduct effective investigations and clearing, razing, confiscating, and building on land from which it displaced Rohingyas.

The UN Mission reiterated calls for the UN Security Council to refer the Myanmar case to the ICC or set up a tribunal like for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It claimed it had a confidential list of more than 100 names, including officials, suspected of being involved in genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, in addition to the six generals named publicly last year. The report warned the repatriation of a million already driven from the country by the Army remains impossible. (The Daily Star 2019f) The trial of the case in the UN’s highest Court International Court of Justice (ICJ), spearheaded by a small African Muslim country Gambia, on behalf of the Organization of Islamic countries (OIC), is a great initiative but that also may not help much as mentioned. Now to narrate the chronology of events for repatriation that have been taking place between the two governments with or without the support of China and the UN agencies. It depicts a dismal picture. On November 23, 2017, the two governments signed an agreement for the return of the Rohingya refugees as mentioned. It proposed that a joint working group would be set up and the repatriation would start in two months. This optimistic mood coming from both the civilian governments was overshadowed when the Myanmar Military commander Senior General Min Aung HIaing said at that time the return of Rohingyas should be acceptable to both the Rakhine local people – he referred to them as the “real Myanmar citizens” and the Rohingyas – he referred to them as ‘Bengalis’. He further qualified the returnees would be “scrutinized and re-accepted under the 1982 Citizenship Law and the 1992 Myanmar – Bangladesh bilateral agreement.” (Aung and Lee 2017) It is discernible things are complicated to come to a conceivable solution acceptable to both the parties. The officials from two governments met again on 15 January 2018 to discuss the modalities of repatriation as agreed in the deal signed two months ago. Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh Shahidul Haque said the refugees

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without valid documents would be asked to identify streets, villages, and other landmarks as evidence of their right to return. The permanent secretary at Myanmar’s Ministry of Labor, Immigration, and Population, Myint Kyaing, said Myanmar would be ready to start processing at least 150 people a day through each of the two “repatriation and assessment camps” by January 23, 2018. (K. N. Das, Quadir, and Lewis 2018) To this, however, the UN high officials were highly skeptical about the outcome. The UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres emphasized the need for the involvement of the UN refugee agency. He said, A huge effort of reconciliation is needed to allow it to take place properly, and the worst would be to move these people from camps in Bangladesh to camps in Myanmar, keeping an artificial situation for a long time and not allowing for them to regain their normal lives. (Paul and Lee 2018)

Myanmar agreed to accept – according to the bilateral agreement – up to 1500 Rohingyas each week to bring back over 740,000 people who had taken shelter in Bangladesh following the October 2016 atrocities. It also stipulated that the repatriation would be voluntary. It also envisioned once the eligible refugees go back to Myanmar, they will be issued with national verification cards which will facilitate them to apply for citizenship. There is no guarantee implicit in it that all refugees will automatically be entitled to citizenship. It may be mentioned that most of the stakeholders – other than the aggrieved refugees – fail to appreciate the simmering tensions between the local Rakhine Buddhists and the Rohingya Muslims. This fact had prompted the Myanmar Military commander Senior General Min Aung HIaing to say on 15 November 2017 – during his meeting with the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson – that the Muslims will be welcomed back only if the local Rakhine Buddhist population were willing to accept them (BBC News 2018). This was simply undiplomatic and audacious. This statement added to the concerns that were already lingering. No wonder the Rohingya refugees had demanded as preconditions for repatriation that the

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Myanmar Government made a public statement that they would be recognized as one of the ethnic groups and citizens of Myanmar. That said, on October 30, 2018, Myanmar and Bangladesh reached yet another agreement to begin the repatriation. Following a bilateral meeting in Dhaka, Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Shahidul Haque was optimistic to say, “We are looking forward to starting the repatriation by mid-November,” which the permanent Secretary of Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Myint Thu, called a “very concrete result on the commencement of the repatriation.” But the UNHCR was not that optimistic. Its representative Andrej Mahecic commented that the conditions in Rakhine state were “not yet conducive for returns” and “it is critical that returns are not rushed or premature.” The plan was to send back in batches of 150 per day beginning November 15. But this did not work out as the refugees were not willing to go back. To this Bangladesh’s Refugee, Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Mohammad Abul Kalam, lamented his team had completed all necessary preparations to start the repatriation but was forced to accept the fait accompli as the refugees “are not willing to go back now.” He did, however, categorically mention, “We will not force anyone to go back to Myanmar against his or her will… and Bangladesh was “totally committed to the principle of non-refoulment and voluntary repatriation.” (Kipgen 2019) There was yet another trilateral agreement signed between Bangladesh, Myanmar, and China at the UN Headquarters in late 2019 for the smooth repatriation. No wonder Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Li Jimming clearly articulated China stands ready to “mediate and Promote” Rohingyas’ repatriation in an “active manner” to find a logical resolution. He even went to the extent of saying, “As a Chinese saying goes, neighbors are just like family members who stand by each other. If the two neighbors and friends need help, China would not shy away from it.” (United News of Bangladesh 2019b) There is again a recent development of Rohingya refugees getting organized inside Bangladesh. The Rohingyas gathered to mark the recent exodus of refugees to Bangladesh. They attended a rally where they called August 25 as “Genocide Day” and placed a few (Molla 2019) demands such

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as their safety, citizenship, and punishment to those involved in causing genocide to a targeted (Muslim) unarmed minority civilian population. To date, there has been no response from the Myanmar Government, not to mention meeting any of their demands. Such a development puts the repatriation process in great jeopardy. All said and done, the intriguing question that comes to the fore: Why are the Bangladesh and Myanmar authorities rushing though the repatriation when the UN refugee agency was against the move? It is now clearly discernible that both countries are under different pressure to quicken the process. Myanmar is under severe international scrutiny, especially after the UN fact-finding mission report in August 2018 was emphatic to ask for the investigation and prosecution of Myanmar’s military leaders for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The report also concluded 1991 Nobel peace laureate and the country’s civilian leader Aung Suu Kyi “has not used her de facto position as Head of Government, nor her moral authority, to stem or prevent the unfolding events, or seek alternative avenues to meet a responsibility to protect the civilian population.” Myanmar felt even greater pressure following the ICJ decision to begin a preliminary investigation on the massive displacement of Rohingyas. It resulted in the deprivation of basic human rights, killing, sexual violence, enforced disappearance, destruction, and looting. (Kipgen 2019) As the days pass by people are raising their voice if the noble laureate On Sun Kyi could be implicated in this genocidal act. This drew greater attention as she participated in the proceedings of the ICJ, to defend his country and Military. She, however, acknowledged her Military was involved in the crimes against the Rohingya Muslim unarmed civilians. She proposed the defaulters could be tried by the law of the land. To this Christopher Sidoti, a member of the fact-finding mission makes an oblique observation, “it is clear that the civilian side of the government does not control the military side of the government.” That said, “The civilian side of the government has very constitutional responsibilities.” He ultimately surmises, “The longer this goes on, the more impossible it is for the civilian side of the government to escape international criminal responsibilities for the human rights situation in Myanmar.” (AFP 2019)

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Bangladesh’s pressure is of a different kind. It is relatively a small resource-starved country as mentioned. It finds it extremely difficult to accommodate more than a million people as covered in Chapter 14. in greater detail. More so international assistance is gradually declining. The present ruling party was feeling the pressure from the voters in December 2018. The ruling Government wanted to send an unambiguous message to the electorate that the Government was only providing temporary shelter. The Prime Minister in September 2018 said, “I already have 160 million people in my country” and therefore “I can’t take any other burden. I can’t take it. My country cannot bear.” Bangladesh’s Government was frustrated with the response from the Myanmar Government. So, when Myanmar appeared willing to take back the refugees, Bangladesh was happy to jump on-board despite the criticism by the UN agencies and other human rights groups. (Kipgen 2019) Bangladesh has only been fooled by the smart dirty game played by Myanmar. Bangladesh’s timing of signing the first bilateral agreement was seemingly premature. Enough pressure was not built up by that time. The pressure was building gradually but it was not enough. The pressure got thwarted after signing the first bilateral agreement. More groundwork was necessary. After all, Myanmar is playing hide-and-seek game and they have the strategic objective of driving out the Muslim Rohingyas in a predominantly Buddhist country once and for all. Myanmar is turning this festering in-house ethnic and human-rights issue into a civilizational flashpoint, apart from the fact that it is already a regional flashpoint. (Karim 2017) All these moves that go against any sane human civilization values are drawing the geopolitical partners both in its neighborhood and beyond. Things are getting complicated, much beyond Myanmar to handle alone. As mentioned, things are taking a very complicated – what else could be more heinous and tormenting when the nation-state system is still working under a kind of global political and economic governance – turn as aptly articulated by John Quinley III, a human rights specialist at Fortify Rights: Myanmar has denied Rohingya Muslims citizenship for decades, and unsurprisingly, Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh who fled genocidal

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Mohd Aminul Karim violence in Myanmar in 2016 and 2017 say they will not return to their homeland in Rakhine state without restored citizenship… . Genocidal regimes often use legal and administrative tools to facilitate the destruction of a targeted group ‘in whole or in part’, and that is the situation my colleagues and I at Fortify Rights have documented about Myanmar’s National Verification Card (NVC) process…..our latest report shows how the Myanmar Government is trying to use the NVC to erase Rohingya identity and rights by requiring Rohingyas to identify as “foreigners”, effectively stripping them of access to full citizenship rights in their own country… . Our new report not only documents restrictions on the right to nationality but also how Myanmar authorities have threatened, beaten, and even forced Rohingyas to accept NVCs at gunpoint… . Our findings confirm conclusions reached last month by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on Myanmar.

As summarized by Marzuki Darusman, the Chair of the FFM, “The threat of genocide continues for the remaining Rohingyas.” Our findings parallel those of the UN and FFM – that “the process is an integral part of the Government’s protracted attempts to deny the Rohingyas their identity and citizenship.” (Quinely III 2019) Most worryingly, as Marzuki Darusman told the General Assembly’s Human Rights Committee that “there is a serious risk of genocide recurring” against the estimated 600,000 members of the Rohingya Muslim minority still living inside Myanmar … if anything, the situation of the Rohingyas in Rakhine state has worsened “as a consequence of continued discrimination, segregation, restricted movement, insecurity, and a lack of access to land, jobs, education and health care.” He continues to add on genocide, “Myanmar is failing in its obligations under the Genocide Convention to prevent genocide, to investigate genocide and enact effective legislation criminalizing and punishing genocide”.

He urged the Assembly to also take measures such as the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal like the UN did for crimes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Yanghee Lee, the UN’s independent investigator on Myanmar,

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told the Assembly, “there is no discernible improvement” in the human rights condition in Myanmar….. “Discrimination against religious minorities continues unabated. I am informed of 27 villages which describe themselves as ‘Muslim free’ banning Muslims from entry.” We can, therefore, conclude that the repatriation of Rohingyas is not going to start anytime soon.

Chapter 14

PLIGHT OF BANGLADESH IN SHELTERING THE ROHINGYAS ABSTRACT Bangladesh is a resource starved overpopulated country that finds it difficult to provide shelter to such many refugees. More so overseas assistance is declining. The lingering Rohingya crisis puts enormous political, economic, social, environmental, and security burden on the country. Poverty has increased by three percent in the local neighborhood of the refugee camps. NGOs prefer cheap Rohingya labor force over the locals leading to discontent amongst the latter. Nearly a million refugees now occupying two hill districts which were previously used for agriculture has taken a huge toll on food production that may thwart the country’s achievement of sustainable development goals. The refugee influx is destroying millions of dollars’ worth of forest reserves and biodiversity, affecting the local tourism industry, giving rise to crimes and is turning into a potential breeding ground of insurgency and terrorism. It takes huge money just to feed the refugees for a day. The local people are becoming disgruntled because of the prolonged presence of refugees as they are fighting for portions of the same small pie. Furthermore, half a million Rohingya children languishing in the refugee camps have no access to education which will inexorably jeopardize their future and magnify the existing challenges.

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In the first three weeks of the refugee – coming from Myanmar – influx in August 2017, Bangladesh received more refugees than all of Europe did in 2016 at the height of the Syrian crisis. Bangladesh has less than .31 percent of the global population but hosts 4.7 percent of the world’s total refugees. The arrival of Rohingya refugees started – subsequently in three other waves – in 1978 to start with as mentioned. The latest wave was in 2017 – largest so far – and refugee population is now estimated at 882,676 or 203, 137 families. Children make up more than fifty percent of the population. More war babies are in the process of being born. Some estimate says it could be sixty thousand or even more. Sad to mention, the political process for their repatriation has been dragging on for the last three years without any visible – tangible – outcome. (Hashim 2019a) Only diplomatic hustle and bustle are going on with two bilateral agreements and one trilateral agreement, with China included in the last one, signed – so far – for the repatriation as discussed earlier. Looks like Myanmar is cool to take any tangible action to take back their most-suffering citizens. And the world community is seemingly giving tacit approval to the response of Myanmar. Again, it looks like Bangladesh diplomacy is playing without many spanks – originating both inside and outside – supporting it. So, the Bangladesh Government is under serious strain to shelter such a huge influx of refugees in a narrow-constricted land channel – on its one side is the Bay of Bengal and the other side is hilly forest region – in the southeastern part of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is understandably the densest populated country in the world. It is struggling hard – of late its economy is, however, picking up – to formally reach to the level of a mid-level-income country. It might get stunted if it is troubled with such a huge burden time and again. Its GDP size is increasing, and its social safety nets are also expanding. It is doing remarkably well in human development – social indicators – index, at least in South Asia. That said, it must go a long way to come out of a middle-income trap if it gets so trapped. It has huge challenges in infrastructure development, debt burden, narrow export basket, much dependence on volatile foreign markets for remittances, limited foreign investments, and not-so-good governance. Added to these, the catastrophic after-effect of Corona-virus pandemics may put a huge strain on its

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economy, as both its RMG export and remittances earnings – two of its four main pillars of economy – may take a serious downturn as a consequence to this pandemic. Its GDP growth is likely to take a nose dive as mentioned. However, that applies to most of the developing and even European economies.

Figure 14. Rohingya population map in Bangladesh.

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Bangladesh is still somehow managing this rather an almost insurmountable problem, as the international community has come forward to assist Bangladesh in tackling this challenge. In case such support slows down – there are already such indications – Bangladesh’s economy may encounter serious setbacks. This additional burden may make the local population hostile – as there are already such indications – to the Rohingyas. It may then transcend the boundary of ethnic and religious bondage. Bangladesh’s Government is already thinking to relocate them – a portion of them – on an offshore island in the Bay of Bengal. The Government has already built the necessary infrastructure there to relocate them – not all of them put together. There is opposition from the Rohingyas and the international community, especially the UN, so the Government is giving it a second thought. The Cox’s Bazar district which is sheltering the refugees is already facing a serious environmental threat, along with human, child, and drug trafficking crimes. As the days pass by it is taking an upsetting shape. It is already turning into a potential catchment area for recruiting insurgents: The Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar District are fertile grounds for recruitment by Islamic militants. With little love for Myanmar, and alienated from Bangladesh, the stateless Rohingyas are vulnerable and desperate, and likely to become militant to uphold their interests. (U. Rahman 2010)

This area has been the route for movement of different insurgent groups for last about five decades. Shantibahini, the insurgent group that has been operating from across the border had almost severed the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) from mainland Bangladesh. A ceasefire is now underway between the Bangladesh Army and the Shantibahini. Things might take an oblique turn if the Muslim Rohingya insurgents become active in this part of Bangladesh. As it looks like things might get even more compounded when donor’s interest to feed and shelter the Rohingya refugees starts waning – significantly – over the years. This is – factually – articulated by Syed Mansur Hashim:

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The humanitarian response to the Rohingyas living in various camps in Cox’s Bazar is on the decline. The implication of this trend is surely not lost upon the Government of Bangladesh. According to ICSG, a global platform of volunteer agencies working in the camps, as of August 24, 2019, Bangladesh has received only USD 330 million out of USD 920 million (36 percent) required to last the remaining months of 2019. So, where does that leave Bangladesh? If we look at the situation at the corresponding timeline when the crisis began in 2017, it was 73 percent, and in 2018 it was 71 percent. So, over one year, donor commitment has declined significantly. (Hashim 2019b)

The findings of such threats and implications may be tabulated in the following manner: a. Rohingya refuges put huge demographic pressure on a densely populated, resources starved country such as Bangladesh. b. Poverty has increased by three percent in the local neighborhood of the refugee camps. Rohingya refugees supply cheap labor in the local market, as they were rooted out from their ancestral homes and they have no recourse but to depend on the measured relief items from the donor agencies. NGOs prefer the Rohingya labor force rather than the locals. There is a ban on fishing in the Naf River leading to unemployment of 35,000 local fishermen. This creates socio-economic inequalities thus making distortions to the market system. (The Daily Star 2019h) c. The price of rice has increased significantly because rice is also the staple food for the Rohingyas. Survey data shows that the mean wages of all laborers declined from Tk. 417 pre-influx to Tk. 357 post-influx, or a decline of 14 percent in Teknaf (in Ukhiya it was 6 percent). The agricultural wage in Ukhiya has fallen at a much higher rate. These figures tell us that there is now an abundant pool of agro-laborers and they are mostly coming from the refugee population. (Hashim 2019a) d. The impact of nearly a million new people now living in the two hill districts has taken a huge toll on agricultural production.

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Mohd Aminul Karim Department of Agriculture Extension data shows that between August 2017 and March 2018, at least 100 hectares (ha) of cropland in the Teknaf/ Ukhiya area was damaged due to refugee presence. An additional 76 ha of arable land has been occupied by refugee settlements and humanitarian agencies. Around 5,000 acres of land have been rendered useless because of sandy oil flowing down from the mountain slopes, which are being used for refugee housing purposes. (Hashim 2019a) Speakers at a roundtable discussion in Dhaka concluded thus: The large number of Rohingyas have created a crisis that may hinder the achievement of sustainable development goals (SDG) for Bangladesh by 2030. (United News of Bangladesh 2019a) e. They are reportedly damaging the local forests thus disturbing the ecological balance of the area. The refugees are exploiting the forest resources for their daily sustenance. According to the Forest Department data (Cox’s Bazar) the refugee influx has destroyed approximately 4,818 acres of forest reserve worth about USD 555 million. (Hashim 2019a) Another report, with data updated on October 7, 2019, shows Rohingya settlements have severely damaged biodiversity and depleted over 8,000 acres of reserved forests in Cox’s Bazar. In forests, planted trees worth around Tk. 1980 million and naturally growing trees worth around Tk 4560 million have disappeared. The damage is equivalent to Tk. 2, 4200 million (equivalent to approximately USD 285 million).26 f. Cox’s Bazar is the largest tourist spot in Bangladesh. The business is badly disturbed as the area is getting cluttered by hundreds and thousands of refugees who are damaging the natural and scenic environment of the area in the largest natural beach of the world that meets the Bay of Bengal.

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The, Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change of the Government of Bangladesh originates this report. It also mentions: Biodiversity in Cox’s Bazar is severely damaged, Houses are built on 6,164 acres of reserved forests, 1,837 acres of forest land razed due to firewood collection, and elephants have stopped coming to the area. (R. Hasan 2019)

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g. Above all, such as giving rise to crimes like international and national syndicates are active in trafficking women and children in different parts of the country or even abroad. This area is drug-prone – it is called the entry point of drugs for Bangladesh as drugs pour in from Myanmar – so there is still a brisk business of drugtrafficking after the arrival of thousands of Rohingya refugees. The local people of Cox’s Bazar are becoming disgruntled because of the prolonged presence of refugees. All these are giving rise to tensions. There are alarming reports of some Rohingya refugees – a normal negative consequence – forming criminal gangs, connecting with local gangs, and getting embroiled in crimes such as murder, human trafficking, and drug smuggling as mentioned. (Molla 2019) h. There is a trend that the Rohingyas are getting radicalized. This is a humanitarian issue, but it also needs to be seen from an insurgency perspective. This trend has serious implications for regional security as mentioned in Chapter Twelve. i. World Food Program (WFP) informs that it takes around USD 800,000 just to feed over a million refugees a day. This is just one aspect of the burden that Bangladesh is increasingly undertaking daily. “If the crisis lasts long, donors at one stage may lose interest in providing funds for the Rohingyas as several human catastrophes are emerging across the globe.” (Hashim 2019b) The latest pandemics may take the world’s political-economic scenario towards recession/depression. A new world order may emerge that may also encapsulate the Rohingya issue. j. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in association with Policy Research Institute (PRI) of Bangladesh and the local administration of Bangladesh in Cox’s Bazar, revealed the findings of a joint impact assessment study on July 25, 2019. The report called “Impacts of the Rohingya Refugee Influx on Host Communities” provides the following (shown here in brief): The immediate effect of Bangladesh hosting about a million people on its soil is that prices of daily essentials have risen by

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Mohd Aminul Karim about 50 percent, wages of day laborers have decreased, some 2,500 households fell below the poverty line, about 1,500 acres of reserve forests have been decimated and 1,500 hectares of wildlife habitat destroyed. Poverty has increased by nearly three percent in the host community…. About 75,000 people in the host community have become more vulnerable in poverty terms due to the refugee crisis. Day laborers are bearing the brunt of the refugee influx since cheap labor is available from the Rohingya community and a ban on fishing on the Naf River along Bangladesh-Myanmar border is causing hardship and threatening livelihoods of some 35,000 fishermen and their dependents. These fisher folks each, had, according to the study, an annual income of around TK. 70,000 – equivalent to approximately USD 900 – per annum which has now all but dried up. Five thousand acres of land have been rendered non-useable due to deforestation of hills. This may further deteriorate by the fact that the groundwater levels around refugee camp areas are reported to have fallen by between 5-9 meters. Even irrigation walls are slowly drying up. The road infrastructure has sustained damage to the tune of about USD 200 million. The repatriation costs that are estimated are astronomical: USD 2.2 billion will be necessary for refugees to return to their home country under the best-case scenario and if 600 refugees are returning per day, the process will take five years to complete. In case the number of returnees drops to 200 people per day, the cost will escalate to USD 11.6 billion and the number of years necessary to complete the entire repatriation will be thirteen years. (Hashim 2019a)27

These are localized problems that are battering the areas in Cox’s Bazar district now. Things may take a divergent turn – may go beyond the economy of Bangladesh to sustain anymore thus pushing the host nation and community to the brink. When the problem persists over a prolonged period, we will see its macro impacts. “Fiscal burden will multiply, environmental 27

The study (Hashim 2019a) used a mix of primary survey data, secondary data from traditional sources and occasionally perceptions based on the researchers’ understanding. The researchers used both quantitative and qualitative tools to gather data and information on community perceptions.

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damage will be long-lasting, tourist inflow will dry out and we will start counting the damage and burden in national terms’, observes a Bangladeshi security expert Professor Abdur Rob Khan. (Tithi 2019) He further adds, There is missing macro-micro linkage. The problem is now localized in the districts of Coax’s Bazar and Bandarban of Bangladesh. We are uncertain about its impact on the national economy. Repatriation is yet to start. And even it starts today it will take time to complete. So, huge costs will pile up. We need continuous monitoring of these costs which will impact the macro-level ultimately. (The Daily Star 2019h)

All said and done, apart from the problems already highlighted in the preceding paras, it is quite disconcerting to note that half a million Rohingya children languishing in the refugee camps have no access to education. What is most discouraging for us to appreciate is the “consequence of a generation growing up without an education, a generation that will not be able to speak up for themselves, speak out against the violations of their rights, enjoy the benefits of an active and enlightened mind, or lift themselves out of their difficult situations.” (Hammadi 2020; Bashar 2019)

Chapter 15

SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT ABSTRACT Myanmar’s mockery of repatriation efforts will most likely continue with China and India on its side. Unfortunately, the UNSC has only been a hamstrung spectator. Sanctions against responsible individuals of Myanmar Military is still an option with the help of America and the EU but it may not resolve the bigger problems. Myanmar receiving military cooperation from powerful nations further complicates the situation. If Myanmar refuses to engage in negotiations, Bangladesh may be able to involve international coffers and Myanmar may face some level of sanctions. However, without military modernization Bangladesh’s diplomacy will not be effective. The exceedingly risky environment prevailing in refugee camps may – someday – call for humanitarian military intervention. Bangladesh must make concerted efforts to divert some attention of China and India towards itself and leverage the remarkable contributions it has made to UN’s peace missions. If jihadist groups used by western intelligence agencies secure a foothold here a war between Myanmar and other Muslim majority countries with far-reaching consequences may break out engulfing South and Southeast Asia and disturb the overall regional security equilibrium. There is already internal tension between Myanmar’s Military and the newly elected Government. It seems like it is after all the rich powers that are going to determine the fate of the Bangladeshi Government and the helpless hungry and persecuted millions.

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A significant portion of Rohingyas, who had experienced the traumatic events of pogrom, atrocities, rape, genocide, ethnic cleansing – call it by any name – may decline to go back to their country of origin unless foolproof assurance is given for their safe return or their human security is assured along with economic and education security. Forced repatriation goes against international norms as discussed in the book. As it appears today Myanmar is playing dawdle tactics. Such tactics would continue if China and India keep on backing the Myanmar stand even in case ICJ’s final verdict goes against Myanmar. That said, this may tone down their genocidal intent somewhat. Here humanitarian issues or human rights violations are turning out to be immaterial as their economic and geopolitical issues come to the fore. Here the UNSC plays an onlooker’s role except at times issuing seemingly strongly-worded statements at the most. The UNSC is already handicapped, as it stands today, as both China and Russia have used their veto power to stifle a resolution that called for condemnation of Myanmar’s atrocities/ genocide committed in the Rakhine state of Myanmar against the Muslim Rohingyas. Possibility of comprehensive international sanctions, imposed by a UN mandate, is most unlikely. However, the sanctions imposed by President Obama by executive order may be revisited. These can be done by the President himself and others with the cooperation of the Congress. Sanctions against individuals like the generals responsible for the genocide are a possibility as the United States Government has already imposed sanctions recently against some of the top brasses of Myanmar Military as mentioned. There is a possibility that the EU might follow suit. Few more countries have also imposed such sanctions on the individuals. That said, such sanctions may not carry much clout to nudge Myanmar towards negotiating table for a permanent resolution of the problem. The United States is not a supplier of military hardware, but it can prevail on its allies – that includes Israel, India, France, and Germany, all of them have supplied arms to Myanmar – to stall such cooperation. This again would not be that threatening as this void could easily be filled by China and Russia. Here again, human rights issues are dashed to the ground. (Blank and Culbertson 2018) In all probability blanket sanctions on arms transfer by these countries to

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Myanmar are quite unlikely. Even North Korea supplied arms to Myanmar under cover when all-encompassing sanctions were in place. Let us look at the game theory application which a scholar from Bangladesh suggests. Number one scenario could be: if Bangladesh resorts to aggressive diplomacy, Myanmar may react by either taking a conciliatory approach or refuse to engage in any meaningful negotiations and seek assistance from its friends. Again, Bangladesh may play hardball: Stop any further negotiations and mobilize the international community to put pressure on Myanmar. In response, Myanmar may decide to refuse again to engage in any meaningful negotiations and ignore the rest of the world. In this hypothetical scenario, if Bangladesh adopts aggressive diplomacy, and Myanmar refuses to engage in any meaningful negotiations, Bangladesh may get the assistance of international coffers for the refugees while Myanmar may face some kind of – not that strong – international sanctions. In any scenario, Bangladesh’s assessment must factor in Myanmar’s abandonment of Rohingyas, endless delays, acting in bad faith, and denial of citizenship and equal rights to the Rohingyas. (Shibli 2019) Suggesting in a similar vein, a Bangladeshi diplomat working earlier as the Director of UNHCR, Dr. Shamsul Bari highlights three strategies that Bangladesh may adopt: first, hand over the leadership to the UN both for assistance and durable solutions for the refugees; secondly, involve other important agencies – like it has gone to the OIC, ICJ/ICC – to pursue accountability. Such a path may even lead to a limited war and third, to undertake bilateral/ trilateral approach of diplomacy. Persuasion and cooperation with Myanmar to hasten the repartition process is necessary now but difficult. For Bangladesh, the path to resolving the crisis is not that smooth. It is going to be a long-drawn-out process. Having said so, there are all logical and plausible options that Bangladesh may undertake. I would tend to think all the options can go in tandem. To get any kind of results, Bangladesh will have to display perseverance, alliance/ alignment building, modernization of its military including ramping up its joint-forces operability, quiet, military and public diplomacy, etc. Bangladesh must make concerted efforts to divert some portion of the attention of both China and India towards Bangladesh. Bangladesh alone cannot make much

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headway. To emphasize again it must take recourse to the UN system, whatever may be the outcome. (The Daily Star 2019c) As mentioned, Bangladesh has the leverage of supporting the UN efforts in peace missions in different parts of the world, especially Africa. To start with, diplomatically this may be exploited. The international community is failing here again as it failed – under the UN mandate – to react at the first signs of the troubles in Rwanda. One million minority Tutsis would not have been massacred by the Hutu dominated regime in Rwanda from April 7 to mid-July 1994. It was also true in case of Bosnia where 8,000 Bosnian men and boys would not have been executed by Ratco Mladic’s army just a year later, and in case of Darfur where more than 300,000 people would not have perished during 2003 to 2010. (Izzadeen 2017) The teeth of the international community did not move to take coercive action against the perpetrators of the ghastly massacres – it is a clear case of genocide as argued in the book – unto the unarmed minorities in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. There were and still are ample signs of such massacres that visibly started in 1977-78 and continued almost unabated – with interruptions, however – till date.28 The space that was occupied for centuries together by the Rohingyas would continue to be transformed into military garrisons or housing estates for the Rakhine people who work as collaborators to the Military. No amount of satellite imagery provided by the developed militaries would put a damper on such unlawful, sinister activities. No amount of diplomacy or outcry from the civil societies or the relevant UN agencies did much or will do much to dampen the genocidal urge of the Burmese majorities or its generals or its monks. There may be a temporary halt to the process now. There is the faintest possibility of UN-mandated coercive action against the perpetrators. Even ICJ’s recent interim order to Myanmar to take preventive and other measures against the genocide 28

As a matter of fact, this refugee crisis has its roots in the 1940’s. Some Muslims then living in Myanmar fled across the border – now Bangladesh – as early as 1942 following communal riots in Myanmar. The flow of movement was insignificant till 1975 when 3,500 refugees arrived from Myanmar to Bangladesh. There was no letup in the exodus when in just over two months – from May to June in 1978 – over 200,000 refugees from Myanmar crossed over to Bangladesh. (Kipgen 2019b, 157)

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perpetrated against Myanmar, and directed Myanmar to report it to ICJ every month will not substantially change the scenario as ultimately it is the UNSC that has the clout to impose such directives. However, Bangladesh gets a moral victory over the issue so its diplomacy may get an impetus. That said, geopolitics is not going to let that happen that smoothly. From the Bangladesh side, its diplomacy is failing or is not meeting the expectation level. It is failing because – as the famous saying makes it clear: no diplomacy is workable unless it is backed by commensurate military prowess that supports it – it is still relatively a not-so-strong State militarily. This does not, however, preclude the possibility of a limited conventional war breaking out between these two neighbors over the Rohingya issue in the not-so-distant future. There is also a strong possibility of an all-out insurgency breaking out as the genesis of the issue asks for it, and ground realities are very fertile for such insurgencies to fester. The issue may ultimately turn into a regional or civilizational flashpoint. Its consequences may be far-reaching and may engulf both South and Southeast Asia. In the process even Southeast Asia may get divided along the civilizational line. That said, Professor Delwar Hossain of Dhaka University strongly refutes the possibility of any such limited war:29 It is highly unlikely to see a military confrontation between Bangladesh and Myanmar on the issue of the Rohingyas. The fundamental stance of Bangladesh is against any attempt to use force particularly when the issue is a global or regional one. If there is a limited war or military intervention, then it must be by the UN or international coalition.

If in case, the Jihadist groups can gain a foothold in Myanmar, few other South Asian – even Southeast Asian nations – may get attracted. This may contribute to driving a wedge between Myanmar and other Muslim-majority nations like Indonesia and Malaysia. Countries in the greater region may get polarized to give it a cloak of civilizational conflict as mentioned. Internally,

29

Professor Delwar Hossain of the Department of International Relations of Dhaka University; interviewed by the author in Dhaka on 15 May 2020. He is the co-author of an edited book The Plight of the Stateless Rohingyas.

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Myanmar is already jostling for such a conflict as argued in the book. Thus said, the insurgency is going to rip the vitality of this – Myanmar – otherwise a beleaguered nation. This nation has been either pursuing isolationist policy or trying to maintain equidistance policy – especially with China and India – may have to go for a paradigm shift either for peace or conflict. Former Malaysian Prime Minister, a world-class statesman and seemingly a spokesperson of Islamic Ummah has asked for the constitutional rights for the Rohingyas or else provides them a separate homeland. The US congressman Bradly Sherman, who is the Chairman of the sub-committee on the Asia-Pacific Region has suggested integrating Rakhine with Bangladesh though this has been brushed aside by the Bangladesh Prime Minister. All these pronouncements and activities do not bode well for the emerging regional security order and peace. These are going to greatly affect the economic prosperity and national integration of both Myanmar and Bangladesh. Myanmar is likely to suffer most, as the country is afflicted by seventy years of civil war – a prolonged insurgency – that can even further fragment this otherwise fragile state. Its newly acquired democracy – not a good wave yet as Huntington had expected – may once again come under threat. There is already a tug of war between the Military and new – democratically elected – leadership in the Parliament over sharing of powers or control of powers. In Cox’s Bazar of Bangladesh, where most of the Rohingya refugees live in overcrowded camps, facing a heightened risk of domestic and sexual violence, communicable diseases, community tensions, fires, and landslides. Human Rights Watch found the camps lack of any sort of effective evacuation plan in case of a natural disaster in this typhoon-prone region. In case of any serious disaster hitting the camps, it will add fuel to fire. The latest report suggests these crowded camps are already afflicted by coronavirus pandemic. It may go beyond the capabilities of the Bangladesh Government to handle such a catastrophe. Human tragedy may reach its highest tip when the international community may come forward to support the distressed humanity. There may then be a call for humanitarian military intervention. No wonder this may facilitate some process to realize their

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geopolitical objectives under the cover of humanitarian assistance. The UNSC will have no control over the situation. As a case of scenario building, though hypothetical yet carries a huge possibility, under cover of a genuine humanitarian crisis, conflict in north Rakhine may take a turn of a regional flashpoint as mentioned that can disturb the regional security equilibrium. In such an eventuality there remains a possibility of threatening the Chinese pipelines. China has also several future planned projects apart from the pipeline including USD 10 billion Kyak Pyu Special Economic Zone. The Zone is likely to create 100,000 jobs in one of Myanmar’s poorest regions. Instability in this region may disturb the normal functioning of China’s BRI project. (Quinn 2017) BCIM project, part of China’s BRI mega-project has already taken a nosedive, though that is mainly because of non-cooperation from India. This then may turn out to be China’s core issue in which case China is likely to marshal all its resources including military power. All these factors may appear to act as a catalyst to the U.S. Government’s “pivot” to Asia policy. Overtly the United States is planning to station sixty percent of its naval and air assets in the Southeast Asian/ Asia-Pacific region. This also implies a developing network of military alliances and partnerships – including covert U.S. support for Jihadist mercenaries – as was done in Syria or Afghanistan during its occupation by the Soviet Union – that may be necessary to fight against China. (Quinn 2017) America’s objective of competitiveness towards China will not be allowed to go unchallenged when it disturbs China’s core issues that straddle its neighborhood. This is accentuated by the national interests of countries such as China, Russia, the USA, Japan, etc. (Quinn 2017) It looks like these countries – they are essentially countries who can call the shots at least regionally – are going to determine the dynamics of this imbroglio. The smaller states in both South and Southeast Asia will continue to be onlookers of this protracted holocaust. Bangladesh, so far, is the worst sufferer. Except for providing food, basic medicine, and make-shift shelters, occasional rhetoric, etc. these powers are not expected to take a tough stand against the perpetrators. As the days pass by rhetoric is also getting muted. However,

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these rich powers are going to determine the fate of the Bangladeshi Government and the helpless hungry and persecuted millions, if at all. All said and done, what stands out clearly: the Rohingya People are ethnic Bengalis, but they do not belong to Bangladesh? All these are the outcome of Western meddling in, and mismanagement of, South East Asian region over the last hundred years. The plight of the Rohingyas is likely to be exploited by international Jihadist groups who are seemingly used by Western intelligence agencies. There is, in fact, no concern among Western politicians or their media about its impending security implications. The regional security environment may get destabilized if this imbroglio is not settled soon. It will drag many powers in the region. There is already power political polarization in the region. As Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad makes a short of provocative statement on the plight of the Rohingyas during an exclusive interview to the Anadolu Agency where he said Rohingyas “should either be treated as nationals, or they should be given their territory to form their own state” as mentioned. Myanmar has expressed its deep anger by maintaining “Malaysian leader’s statement was not constructive and described it as a breach of principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter.” (The Daily Star 2019b) Myanmar may remind the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another member country as ASEAN Charter demands. But here humanitarian intervention mandated by UNSC may fall under the lexicon of internal interference. Mahathir also talks about the ASEAN process. ASEAN process could not nudge Myanmar towards democracy unless the United States came forward to mean business. So, ASEAN can hardly do anything tangible to activate repatriation unless there is a united UNSC mandate. Such a mandate is not feasible any time soon. Thus said, Myanmar being in a strategic geographical location it is unlikely that it will fully shift towards China nor lurch towards India. It is likely to continue with its balancing act towards both the neighbors and thereby derive maximum benefits from both. Despite such an analysis, China will always have an upper hand in the affairs of Myanmar because of its robust economy, almost five times the size of India’s.

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A former foreign secretary of Bangladesh Mr. Touhid Hossain who was directly involved with Myanmar’s authorities to come to a negotiated settlement is rather blunt and disillusioned in his observation. Bangladesh must find means, foul or fair, to export this festering problem to the country where it got originated. The Rohingya problem will be long drawn, will have unforeseen ramifications – political, social, economic and security. There is no instance in history of such issues being settled peacefully, without the defeat of the perpetrators. In Bangladesh, the Pakistan army was defeated, in Rwanda, the Tutsis, with the help of Uganda, defeated the genocidal Hutu regime, in the Balkans the Serbians were forced to retreat, before the issues could be resolved. In both latter cases the perpetrators were also tried and punished. Maybe, years from now, the ICJ will find Myanmar guilty of genocide (or maybe not), or the ICC indict some of the generals. These will not, however, ensure return of the Rohingyas with rights and dignity. Ten years from now, the camps will have a few hundred thousand able bodied young men who will not relish the camp life even if all necessities are provided? They will create problems that would include violence. If we cannot divert the violence towards the culprits who have caused them this ignominy, the violence will consume the relative peace of our society. Some experts are of the opinion that the Rohingya problem will become a regional security issue. I would humbly disagree with them. It will become a regional security issue only if Bangladesh can make it so. We (the Bangladeshis) should start 10 years plan today as to how to export the problem to where it belongs, the Rakhine state of Myanmar. 30

There is no doubt that the crisis will drag on for years henceforth as, I understand, is clearly articulated in the book. This is somewhat substantiated by another expert in the form a concluding remark: I do not think China will change its position of exercising veto in favor of Myanmar in near future. There is no short cut mechanism in diplomacy. We know the examples of Cambodia crisis, Vietnam crisis and several 30

Mr. Touhid Hossain, former Foreign Secretary, Government of Bangladesh; Interviewed by the author in Dhaka on 7 May 2020.

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international issues where diplomacy took years, if not decades, to deliver results. The Rohingyas are the victims of utter negligence of international community.31 Again, on the contrary, another expert feels Bangladesh has a right to wage a limited war as Myanmar has already waged a war against Bangladesh: I think forced displacement of Rohingyas from Myanmar to Bangladesh is an act of war by Myanmar on Bangladesh. In my opinion, Bangladesh has a right to wage a limited war against Myanmar as a last resort to establish basic conditions for repatriation of Rohingyas. The UN in the aftermath of a war can create a buffer zone. It is unlikely however, that Bangladesh is actively considering a military solution. 32

31

Professor Delwar Hossain of the Department of International Relations of Dhaka University; interviewed by the author in Dhaka on 15 May 2020. He is the co-author of an edited book The Plight of the Stateless Rohingyas. 32 Professor Sadiqul Islam, Department of Economics, Laurentian University, Canada; Interviewed by the author on 19 May 2020.

Chapter 16

SUGGESTIONS AND FEW DOABLE ABSTRACT The Chapter offers solutions ranging from high-level inclusive political dialogue to interfaith dialogue at grass-root and mid-level facilitated by the UN and other important players like China, Russia, and the United States. It also recommends comprehensive training for the security forces on human rights and the laws of war, activating fact-finding missions, speedy and justified repatriation, greater involvement of the UN and other international bodies, restoration of citizenship for the Rohingyas, ensuring more autonomy to the constituent units or federalism in the Myanmar State-structure. These may sound tall-talks but we have to start somewhere at least through some confidense-building measures.

There is no quick and readily available fix for this protracted and complicated conundrum – artificially but deliberately created by the State apparatus and ultra-nationalist Buddhists of Myanmar. There is no military solution to this problem as well. Fighting a traditional war between Bangladesh and Myanmar – may be a limited one – is mere speculation – although there are many precedence in history that such complicated refugee crisis ends with war such as it happened between India and Pakistan in 1971 or the German case of slaughtering the Jews. Even if it happens that way it will entangle other neighboring powers such as China, India, the United States, or even Japan and Russia. Some of the calls and recommendations –

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in short, medium and long-term – include a mix of different options: ceasefire, high-level dialogue, and negotiations, more flow of relief materials both within and without, stop once and for all ethnic cleansing and genocide as a kind of State instrument to stifle a community or even to erase it once for all from its territory, imparting comprehensive training for the security forces on human rights and the laws of war by the Myanmar Government, conduct interfaith dialogue at the grass root and middle-level, sponsor reputable humanitarian organizations, activate more fact-finding missions, speedy and justified repatriation acceptable to all parties especially to the refugees, more active involvement of the UN and other international bodies, restoration of citizenship for the Rohingyas, rethinking of more autonomy or federalism – thus revisiting their infamous 1974 Constitution – in the Myanmar State-structure. Unitary State structure has seemingly contributed much to this appalling national disintegration process. The repatriation can genuinely start if the Myanmar authorities show commitment – not an ‘eyewash’ – by inviting the representatives of Bangladesh Government, the international community especially the UN, the ASEAN, the Rohingya refugee community – who are now better organized inside Bangladesh to voice their concerns – to visit the facilities that they claim to have built for the returning Rohingyas. This will help improve communication and trust between the Rohingyas and the Myanmar authorities. (Molla 2019) A heavy-handed response by the Myanmar security forces violates fundamental principles of proportionality and distinction thus defies the international norm. This is going to be counterproductive in the long run. It will create further animosity and despair. So, any aggressive military planning should be rooted within a broader policy framework so there is a check on their unbridled misuse of power. Security response should be subordinated to a well-crafted, overarching and humane political policy. Myanmar should have a policy that can foster more positive relations between Muslim communities and the Myanmar State. It should also cultivate better relations with the neighbors and go for intimate intelligence sharing. (International Crisis Group 2016)

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The four-point proposals given by the Bangladeshi Prime Minister at the UNGA in September 2019 is worth mentioning, though its implementation is problematic as the Myanmar representative had just brushed aside such proposals at the same venue right after the Bangladesh proposals were put on the table. Point one concerns a clear expression of political will on the part of Myanmar manifested by concrete actions. Point two talks about building trust and a sense of safety and security by the Rohingyas through ‘go and see’ visits to Rakhine. Points three and four are interesting as these points seek the involvement of the international community in monitoring and investigating the genocidal acts perpetrated by Myanmar security forces. (Tithi 2019) There is a suggestion of mixing both the bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to address these points. Bangladesh needs to continue to actively pursue diplomatic efforts both bilateral and multilateral and press Myanmar to solve this problem that archaeologically belongs to them and got created in its territory centuries back. The international community must appreciate this is Myanmar’s internal problem: Conceived, crafted, and operationalized by them so why at all keep it pending for others to handle their core internal security matter? This goes to support the UN’s lofty objectives of its creation. Beyond that, an international conference can be convened under the initiative of the UN with all the stakeholders, including the Rohingyas from across the world, with the affirmed task of preparing a roadmap for Myanmar’s recognition of the ‘Rohingya identity’ and the resolution of the crisis. (Imtiaz Ahmed 2020) Resolution is a long-drawn-out problem but process to that end can always start. The sticky question remains if it would have any impact on the identity issue unless the UNSC comes together on board to tackle the crisis upfront. However, to raise universal awareness such a conference can have some impact. As a soft approach and as part of confidence-building measures, Myanmar and Bangladesh may work together in fields ranging from harnessing oceanic resources to activating more people-to-people contacts or cultural exchanges. Academic and research collaboration would facilitate opportunities for the Myanmar people to know Bangladeshis and vice versa. (Imtiaz Ahmed 2020)

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To suggest trade and investment sanctions on Myanmar Professor Sadequl’s suggestions seem doable provided Bangladesh diplomacy can make it work well: According to the data of the WTO, in 2018, China accounts for 33.3 % of Myanmar’s exports and 32.2% of Myanmar’s imports. Although China is the main trading partner of Myanmar, Myanmar depends on other countries for about two-thirds of its trade. For example, in 2018, the European Union accounted for 16% of Myanmar’s exports. The shares of Thailand and Japan in Myanmar’s exports in 2018, were 18.3% and 8.3%, respectively. Furthermore, the shares of Singapore, Thailand, and India in Myanmar’s imports were 19.1%, 13.4%, and 5.1% respectively. Furthermore, foreign investment inflows to Myanmar increased from USD584 million in 2013 to USD4.3 billion in 2017 and then declined somewhat to USD3.6 billion in 2018. It appears that strong trade and investment sanctions by countries other than China will significantly hurt the economy of Myanmar and may force Myanmar to change its policy toward Rohingyas.33

Bangladesh Prime Minister has appealed to the world community during the 18th Summit of Non-aligned Movement to come forward to find a lasting solution to this festering problem: We’re currently hosting over 1.1 million Rohingyas. It has the potential to destabilize our country and beyond. We’re constrained to seek support from the international community in resolving the crisis. Voluntary return of the Rohingyas to their homes in the Rakhine state in safety, security, and dignity is the only solution to the crisis… . Rohingya crisis is a political one deeply rooted in Myanmar. Thus, its solution must be found inside Myanmar. (The Daily Star 2019i)

Having thus triggered, and to put it more concretely, Bangladesh may pursue fast-track diplomacy for repatriation by involving important stakeholders such as the UN, the ASEAN, the USA, China, India, the EU 33

Professor Sadiqul Islam, Department of Economics, Laurentian University, Canada; Interviewed by the author on 19 May 2020.

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and other international organizations such as the UNHCR as mentioned. Bangladesh just cannot afford to go ‘business as usual’. The international community has a solemn – they are otherwise doing it – responsibility to provide more funds for the reconstruction of accommodation, and educational infrastructure, better health services both inside make-shift camps inside Bangladesh and in the ancestral lands of the refugees under the aegis of the United Nations. If the international statute or convention permits it, Myanmar may be asked to pay compensation/penalty for all such dislocations, destructions, genocide, etc. right away or over a period. An editorial of the Daily Star, a reputable Daily in the sub-continent, makes the point more succinct and pointed under the title “Myanmar’s Misleading Hyperbole at UNGA”: Myanmar must substantiate its claims by allowing international observers to visit the sites it is supposed to have developed for the accommodation of the Rohingya refugees, and accepting all their demands immediately, including the prosecution of the perpetrators of crimes against the Rohingyas and acknowledging their citizenship by issuing citizenship cards – to facilitate their return to their homeland. (The Daily Star 2019g)

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Professor Mohd. Aminul Karim, PhD Dean & Professor, School of Business & Entrepreneurship, Independent University, Dhaka, Bangladesh

Mohd. Aminul Karim, Lt General (ret.) is now a Professor and Dean at the School of Business & Entrepreneurship at Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB). Previously, he was a Visiting Professor at China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, and a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. He is now a Senior Fellow (non-resident) at the International Institute for NonProliferation Studies, USA. He worked as Chief of both National Defense College and Defense Services Command and Staff College of Bangladesh. He was a Visiting Scholar at the Mershon Centre for International Security Studies, Ohio State University, USA; a Professor at BRAC University, Dhaka; and an Adjunct Professor at University of Malaya. He is a prolific writer and published research papers on various subjects such as leadership and management, geopolitics, international relations, and politics in journals such as Cambridge, Elsevier, Springer, Tylor and Francis, Routledge, SAGE, Wiley, BIISS, etc. He has also published a good number of books and contributed chapters in many books. His latest book

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References

Geopolitics of the South China Sea in the Coming Decades published by Nova Science Publishers in September 2018 has been highly acclaimed world-wide.

INDEX A Africa, 6, 42, 74, 116, 127, 166 aggrieved community, 6 Agreed Minutes, 5, 179 agreement, 5, 27, 28, 29, 82, 109, 135, 137, 138, 142, 145, 146, 147, 149, 154 allegations, 64, 77, 139, 144 ambiguity, 35, 93, 95, 96, 182 American Baptist Mission, 64 Amnesty International, 37, 57, 58, 126, 140, 141, 180 Anglo-Burmese War, 25, 56, 190 antagonisms, 4 Arakan, vii, xix, xx, 2, 4, 5, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 41, 42, 52, 54, 56, 60, 63, 71, 80, 129, 130, 131, 134, 135, 181, 182, 184, 186, 187, 190, 192, 197 Arakanese community, 56 arrested, 7 Arunachal Pradesh, 45 Asia, xiii, 18, 6, 14, 21, 38, 42, 44, 83, 85, 101, 105, 106, 107, 111, 114, 116, 121, 124, 125, 127, 140, 154, 167, 168, 169, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 191, 192, 199 assimilation, 27, 30, 66

atrocities, 4, 10, 39, 45, 65, 67, 69, 78, 80, 88, 95, 97, 98, 99, 107, 119, 126, 127, 140, 144, 146, 164, 192 attacks, 7, 8, 9, 77, 80, 119, 132 Aung Sun, 29, 80

B Bangladesh, v, viii, ix, x, xi, xiv, xv, 17, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39, 45, 46, 51, 54, 57, 63, 67, 71, 72, 73, 76, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 120, 126, 127,129, 130, 131, 133, 135, 137, 138, 139, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 179, 180, 181, 183, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 195, 196, 199 Bay of Bengal, xiii, 2, 6, 14, 15, 42, 45, 46, 49, 101, 105, 107, 109, 112, 115, 119, 120, 121, 124, 154, 156, 158, 187, 190, 191, 197

202

Index

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), xix, 6, 42, 101, 106, 109, 115, 121, 169 Bengal, xiv, 3, 6, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 42, 45, 49, 63, 101, 107, 109, 112, 119, 130, 181 bilateral, 7, 110, 124, 137, 138, 145, 146, 147, 149, 154, 165, 175, 195 border, ix, 2, 3, 4, 5, 14, 25, 36, 37, 45, 46, 51, 52, 54, 57, 64, 72, 82, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 105, 109, 112, 113, 130, 131, 135, 156, 160, 166, 182 bottleneck, 6, 105 bribe, 38 British, 3, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 54, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 102, 107, 130, 190, 195, 196 brutalities, 13, 64, 76, 82 BSPP, 14, 52, 55 Buddhism, 10, 13, 18, 21, 24, 26, 39, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 101 Buddhists, 3, 4, 8, 21, 22, 23, 24, 35, 37, 42, 53, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 76, 81, 130, 131, 132, 140, 146, 173 burden, 4, 16, 149, 153, 154, 156, 159, 160 bureaucratic, 57 Burma, 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 37, 39, 40, 41, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 63, 64, 69, 81, 82, 116, 122, 130, 131, 179, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197

C carve, 4 census, 3, 36, 38, 56, 64 Chandra Dynasty, 24 child trafficking, 71 China, ix, x, xiii, xiv, xix, 2, 3, 6, 10, 15, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 79, 93, 94, 99, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111,

112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 135, 138, 142, 145, 147, 154, 163, 164, 165, 168, 169, 170, 171, 173,176, 181, 182, 184, 189, 191, 193, 194, 196, 199 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), xix, 6, 49, 116, 118 China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), x, xix, 116, 117 Chittagong, 18, 19, 24, 54, 63, 82, 84, 156 citizens, 1, 2, 5, 14, 26, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 68, 71, 85, 102, 108, 145, 147, 154 citizenship, vii, xv, xix, 2, 3, 14, 33, 35, 37, 39, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 73, 82, 102, 108, 109, 132, 138, 139, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 165, 173, 174, 177, 187, 189, 193 Citizenship Act, 3, 14 civil war, 4, 34, 168 clearance operations, 73 Cobra Gold, 25, 124 colonial, vii, 3, 4, 6, 14, 17, 20, 24, 25, 28, 30, 34, 53, 54, 60, 61, 62, 63, 103 colonial rule, 24 communal riot, 65, 166 communal violence, 37, 69 confiscating, 145 conflict, 4, 6, 19, 31, 34, 42, 67, 71, 107, 122, 127, 133, 139, 143, 167, 169, 179, 181, 189, 194, 196 consent, 6, 29 constitution, vii, 2, 14, 51, 52, 55, 85, 109, 174 construction, 6, 78, 118, 120 consultation, 6, 29, 95 Corona-virus, 154 court, xix, 23, 24, 76, 77, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 108, 145 crisis, xi, xii, xiv, 17, 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 36, 63, 67, 72, 76, 80, 83, 85, 86, 98, 103, 105, 107, 111, 121, 123, 125, 133, 139, 140,

Index 153, 154, 157, 158, 159, 160, 165, 166, 169, 171, 173, 175, 176, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 193, 194, 195, 196 criticism, 17, 4, 106, 108, 149 Croatia, 34

D dangerous, 5, 20, 37 decade, 5, 42, 46 declaration, 58, 85 defense, 2, 43, 60, 80, 112, 124, 199 delegation, 5, 120 democracy, xx, 2, 6, 9, 15, 28, 81, 105, 122, 123, 168, 170, 183, 192 deportation, 3, 70, 75, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 108, 143 deprivation, 22, 51, 57, 62, 70, 75, 148 destruction, 1, 36, 57, 68, 69, 118, 139, 148, 150 diplomacy, xiv, 7, 125, 138, 154, 163, 165, 166, 167, 171, 175, 176, 189 diplomatic, 2, 5, 10, 31, 36, 60, 107, 125, 142, 154, 175 discovered, 6, 39, 42 discrimination, xix, 22, 26, 33, 34, 35, 39, 58, 108, 132, 150, 151, 195 disparities, 30 displacement, xi, xiv, 10, 34, 42, 74, 76, 127, 132, 143, 148, 172 disputed territory, 45 drug, 42, 71, 105, 156, 159

E East Pakistan, 4, 17, 19, 81, 103, 130 economic migrants, 84 election, 5, 38, 56, 97, 108, 122 energy, 6, 15, 43, 46, 49, 110, 115, 118, 179, 183, 191, 194

203 enforced, 70, 75, 148 enslavement, 70, 75 environmental threats, 46 ethnic, viii, xii, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 67, 68, 70, 74, 76, 80, 84, 98, 102, 105, 111, 113, 123, 126, 135, 138, 141, 144, 147, 149, 156, 164, 170, 174, 185, 191 ethnic groups, 2, 4, 14, 17, 20, 21, 27, 28, 29, 30, 53, 56, 102, 147 ethnically, 2, 22, 63, 65 ethno-federalism, 52 evidence, 5, 23, 57, 76, 77, 81, 97, 126, 138, 139, 140, 145, 146, 181, 192 exodus, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17, 20, 36, 80, 82, 103, 131, 147, 166 exploitation, 1, 41 extermination, 9, 70, 74, 75 extortion, 57, 74

F federal, 4, 14, 20, 30, 52, 55, 109 federalism, xv, 31, 51, 52, 173, 174 forced, xi, 3, 5, 8, 19, 20, 27, 30, 36, 37, 42, 57, 58, 64, 66, 72, 73, 74, 75, 84, 96, 97, 131, 143, 144, 147, 150, 164, 171, 172, 184 foreign investments, 2, 134, 154 foreign policy, xv, 2, 11, 106, 125 foreigners, 6, 7, 15, 36, 55, 84, 132, 150 foreign-funded, 6 fundamental, 29, 54, 57, 58, 70, 75, 96, 167, 174, 180

G gas pipeline, ix, 6, 43, 44, 49, 116, 118, 122 GDP, xix, 1, 42, 86, 154

204

Index

genocide, 1, iii, viii, xi, xiii, 1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 34, 39, 41, 67, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 81, 97, 98, 101, 103, 105, 107, 123, 125, 137, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150, 164, 166, 171, 174, 177, 179, 180, 182, 185, 186, 187, 188, 192, 194, 195, 196 geo-economics, xiii, 14, 15, 49, 107, 111 geography, 4, 46, 107 geopolitics, 1, iii, viii, xi, xiii, 17, 10, 13, 15, 49, 94, 99, 101, 102, 103, 107, 109, 111, 115, 118, 123, 125, 167, 181, 185, 186, 187, 196, 197, 199 geostrategic mega project, 6 governance, 127, 149, 154, 183 Government of Myanmar, 2, 35, 63, 65, 133 guerilla war, 5, 65

H highway, ix, 5, 6, 109, 114, 115 history, vii, 4, 5, 13, 14, 17, 19, 22, 27, 28, 31, 41, 51, 53, 54, 60, 63, 69, 73, 74, 103, 120, 127, 141, 171, 173, 180, 182, 184, 187, 190, 192, 196 honor, 6, 58 human rights, 1, ii, iii, xx, 8, 58, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 81, 85, 97, 108, 125, 126, 140, 143, 150, 168, 183, 186, 188, 189, 191, 195, 197 human trafficking, 159 humanitarian, xi, xiv, 8, 9, 10, 14, 33, 34, 37, 70, 72, 80, 81, 85, 94, 103, 122, 125, 126, 132, 157, 158, 159, 163, 164, 168, 169, 170, 174 humanity, viii, 15, 33, 67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 77, 97, 111, 123, 125, 126, 140, 144, 145, 148, 168, 187, 194

I ideologies, 31

illegal immigrants, 108 immigrants, 21, 33, 35, 63, 82 immigration, 19, 54, 55, 80, 146 imprisonment, 70, 75, 98 independence, 3, 4, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 57, 63, 121, 130 independent, iv, xv, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 29, 30, 41, 59, 72, 77, 93, 97, 125, 144, 150, 189, 199 India, ix, xiv, 2, 3, 6, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, 42, 45, 46, 49, 54, 63, 82, 83, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 131, 133, 142, 163, 164, 165, 168, 169, 170, 173, 176, 181, 182, 188, 189, 190, 191, 194, 197 Indian Independence Act, 20 Indian Navy, 111, 189 Indonesia, 5, 7, 36, 83, 103, 129, 133, 167 influence, 4, 19, 21, 30, 61, 84, 99, 102, 105, 107, 111, 112, 124, 127, 181, 192 instability, 6, 30, 169 insurgents, 6, 36, 64, 113, 124, 133, 156 international, viii, xii, xv, xix, xx, 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 15, 22, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 42, 54, 58, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 77, 80, 81, 83, 85, 93, 95, 96, 97, 103, 105, 110, 111, 112, 113, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 132, 133, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144, 145, 148, 149, 150, 156, 159, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 180, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199 international community, 3, 10, 31, 34, 35, 70, 71, 77, 81, 83, 103, 121, 122, 125, 127, 139, 156, 165, 166, 168, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177 International Criminal Court (ICC), viii, xix, 15, 68, 69, 71, 79, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 145, 165, 171, 182, 186, 189, 194

Index International Crisis Group, 35, 38, 132, 174, 186 International State Crime Initiative (ISCI), xix, 9, 74, 77 international tribunals, 67, 69 intolerant, 28 investigation, 79, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 125, 140, 148 Irrawaddy, 24, 52, 189, 197 isolationism, 7, 26

J Japan, 1, 4, 10, 15, 103, 105, 124, 125, 126, 127, 133, 169, 173, 176, 187, 193 Japanese, 3, 20, 24, 25, 27, 29, 101, 102, 118, 125, 127 Jewish Solution, 10 journalism, 7 jurisdiction, 76, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 182

K killings, 14, 36, 40, 67, 74, 80, 97 Konbaung Dynasty, 20, 134

L labor, 3, 20, 23, 34, 36, 57, 64, 74, 146, 153, 157, 160, 192 landscape, 29, 94 last frontier, 42 lawful residents, 5 legal, 39, 58, 67, 76, 85, 95, 97, 99, 150, 183 legislature, 52 legitimacy, 39, 59, 60, 69, 137 leverage, 5, 111, 163, 166 liberal, 29, 125

205 liberation movements, 20 linguistically, 22, 63 literature, 11, 24, 76 livelihoods, 37, 160 luxury, 4

M Magwe, 52 majority, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 17, 21, 22, 29, 33, 36, 39, 42, 52, 53, 55, 61, 63, 65, 99, 102, 133, 140, 141, 142, 163, 167 Malacca strait, 15 Malaysia, 5, 7, 14, 36, 82, 83, 103, 120, 129, 131, 133, 167 maltreatment, 106 Mandalay, 52, 65 Manipur, 25, 45, 109, 113 maps, 4 maritime cooperation, 46 Maritime Silk Road (MSR), 6, 121, 182 maritime trips, 5 markets, 37, 107, 154 massacre, 7, 25, 68, 79, 81, 95, 107, 186 Memorandum of Understanding, 5, 86, 113 Middle East, 15, 42, 116 migration, 23, 54, 192 military, 1, 2, 9, 15, 17, 19, 21, 30, 33, 36, 37, 39, 42, 44, 45, 52, 55, 57, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 70, 72, 74, 78, 80, 81, 82, 106, 109, 112, 119, 123, 124, 126, 127, 130, 137, 140, 141, 145, 146, 148, 163, 164, 166, 168, 186, 190, 192 military rule, 1, 14, 26, 52 mining, 1, 42 minority, 1, 9, 10, 29, 35, 39, 41, 64, 65, 73, 80, 81, 82, 102, 133, 148, 150, 166, 180, 187, 191, 195, 197 monarchy, 62 monks, vii, 2, 10, 15, 55, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 166

206

Index

mosques, 36, 64, 78, 129, 130 movement, 20, 25, 38, 39, 57, 63, 65, 74, 78, 130, 142, 150, 156, 166, 176 Mrauk-U Dynasty, 17, 18 Mughals, 19, 24 Mujahideen, 17, 19 multiculturalism, 28, 38 murder, 75 Muslim, 3, 4, 9, 15, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 51, 56, 57, 60, 63, 64, 65, 73, 74, 77, 78, 82, 84, 95, 97, 102, 108, 109, 130, 132, 133, 134, 139, 142, 145, 148, 149, 150, 151, 156, 163, 164, 167, 174, 182, 186, 187, 191, 192 Myanmar Army, ix, 8, 14, 36, 48, 70, 73, 113, 120, 179, 191, 192, 197

N Naaf River, 19 national races, 6 national security, xiii, 2, 108 nationalism, xiii, 30, 31, 33, 35, 39, 56, 61, 62, 66, 109, 134, 188 nationalist, 5, 25, 38, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 81, 132, 173 nationality, 5, 15, 34, 35, 55, 58, 83, 84, 108, 150 natural, xx, 1, 2, 4, 6, 14, 15, 41, 42, 43, 46, 49, 60, 101, 110, 115, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 158, 168, 183 natural resources, 1, 2, 4, 14, 15, 41, 42, 43, 46, 121 negotiation, xiv, 5, 29, 137 North Korea, 121, 165

O offshore, ix, xix, 43, 44, 49, 110, 111, 113, 116, 156 Oil and Gas Pipelines, 116

Ontario International Development Agency, 8, 184 oppressive, 28

P pagan, 18, 60 pakistan, 19, 25, 81, 101, 107, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 171, 173 paradigm shift, 55, 107, 168 parliament, 1, 2, 109, 168 pegu, 23, 52, 190 persecuted minority, 6 persecution, 10, 22, 33, 36, 39, 65, 70, 76, 86, 97, 99, 102, 105, 108, 186, 196 petition, 96 photographs, 38, 78 pipelines, 6, 115, 118, 119, 169 piracy, 46 politics, xii, xiii, 4, 11, 15, 27, 30, 51, 55, 59, 60, 61, 62, 101, 107, 124, 179, 180, 183, 186, 187, 188, 193, 199 population, x, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 15, 18, 19, 22, 23, 39, 42, 51, 53, 54, 59, 60, 63, 64, 68, 70, 75, 77, 80, 81, 84, 86, 94, 95, 97, 99, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, 141, 142, 146, 148, 154, 155, 156, 157, 186 power, xiii, 2, 4, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 27, 28, 30, 34, 37, 41, 52, 55, 59, 60, 66, 68, 96, 108, 109, 123, 125, 164, 169, 170, 174, 188 powerful, 9, 31, 34, 59, 74, 108, 134, 163, 195 prevention, 39, 68, 192 pro-democracy movements, 13, 27, 28 propaganda, 22, 34 proposals, 5, 175, 188 prosecutor, 79, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99 province of China, 6 punishment, 68, 133, 148

Index R racist, 10, 66 Rakhine state, ix, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43, 44, 58, 63, 65, 78, 80, 97, 104, 108, 109, 110, 116, 118, 126, 127, 130, 135, 140, 141, 143, 144, 147, 150, 164, 166, 171, 176 Rangoon, 5, 52, 54, 137, 138 rapes, 8, 14, 36, 97 razing, 139, 145 recognition, 21, 56, 82, 84, 175 reconciliation, 146 refugees, xiv, xx, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 15, 16, 31, 36, 67, 71, 72, 78, 83, 84, 85, 86, 103, 108, 129, 130, 133, 137, 138, 140, 143, 145, 146, 147, 149, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 165, 166, 168, 174, 177, 179, 183, 184, 186, 191, 196 regional geopolitics, 10 rehabilitation, 71, 85, 147 relief, 71, 85, 90, 99, 147, 157, 174 religion, 2, 7, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 31, 33, 35, 39, 53, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 78, 83, 101, 102, 184 repatriation, xv, 5, 82, 85, 86, 131, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 154, 160, 161, 163, 164, 170, 172, 173, 174, 176, 179, 181, 183, 189, 191, 196 research, xx, 8, 11, 13, 39, 112, 113, 126, 159, 175, 182, 184, 187, 191, 192, 199 resettlement camps, 5 residence, 5, 72, 83, 84, 143 resources, 1, 6, 43, 44, 46, 49, 52, 102, 110, 133, 157, 158, 169, 175, 183, 189 restoration, xv, xx, 25, 61, 173, 174 Rohingyas, vii, viii, xi, xiv, xv, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 28, 31, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 45, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 63, 65, 67, 69, 70,

207 71, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 94, 95, 98, 99, 102, 106, 108, 119, 123, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 133, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 156, 157, 158, 159, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 184, 185, 186, 187, 191, 194, 195, 196 Rome Statute, 68, 69, 70, 74, 93, 94, 95, 96 rules, 4, 70, 75, 84, 95, 96 rumor, 34, 132 Russia, xiv, 4, 10, 79, 93, 94, 99, 121, 142, 164, 169, 173

S Sagain, 45, 52 Sangha, 59, 60, 61, 62 Saudi Arabia, 7, 14, 36, 83, 103, 123, 129, 130 scrutiny, 34, 71, 148 secession, 25, 29 Second World War, 17, 19, 20, 63, 83, 102 Security Council, xx, 9, 10, 93, 94, 99, 138, 142 security forces, xv, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 36, 37, 74, 78, 80, 93, 94, 97, 130, 131, 132, 140, 173, 174, 175 self-determination, 25, 102 Shwe, 6, 43, 44, 65, 113, 116, 118, 121, 122, 123, 124, 188 single-ocean strategy, 119 socialism, 31 socialist authoritarian, 14, 51, 52 Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 14, 52, 55 Southeast Asia, xix, 14, 15, 19, 21, 25, 38, 42, 44, 74, 83, 101, 104, 105, 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 120, 163, 167, 169, 182, 190, 193

208

Index

sovereignty, 45, 53, 102 Special Economic Zone (SEZ), xx, 116, 169 stateless, 3, 6, 14, 56, 57, 58, 67, 72, 73, 82, 108, 156 Stateless, 167, 172, 180, 185, 195 statelessness, 34, 179 statute, 68, 70, 83, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 177 sterilization, 70, 75 Strait of Malacca, x, 6, 117, 120 strategically, 2, 14, 41, 42, 101, 111, 114, 115, 118 subcontinent, 4, 62, 130 submarine, 112 sustainable development goals (SDG), 153, 158

T Tenasserim, 52, 54, 190 terrorism, 46, 64, 113, 121, 123, 124, 153, 187 Thailand, ix, 2, 3, 21, 24, 37, 49, 83, 103, 109, 114, 115, 120, 127, 129, 132, 176 torture, 36, 70, 73, 75, 131, 137, 139 transform, 6 transgender people, 144 transnational, 106, 116, 129, 133, 135 Turkey, 96, 98, 103

United League of Arakan (ULA)., xx, 26 United Nations, xiv, xx, 7, 8, 10, 11, 33, 68, 70, 83, 159, 177, 180, 183, 189 United States, xv, 18, xx, 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 15, 33, 80, 83, 96, 102, 103, 105, 108, 115, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 138, 164, 169, 170, 173

V victims, 65, 98, 129, 172 violations, 4, 13, 33, 36, 38, 39, 57, 70, 77, 99, 105, 107, 127, 140, 143, 144, 161, 164 violence, 8, 9, 14, 33, 36, 37, 39, 65, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 97, 125, 132, 133, 143, 144, 148, 150, 168, 171, 179, 181, 185, 186, 195, 196 vision, 6, 84 voluntariness, 85 vulnerability, 3, 33, 37, 39

W war, xv, 3, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 34, 36, 45, 54, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 79, 81, 83, 94, 112, 120, 121, 125, 126, 142, 144, 145, 148, 154, 163, 165, 167, 168, 172, 173, 188, 190 World-War-II, 24

U UN Charter, 15, 33, 58, 85, 98 UN Security Council, 9, 79, 94, 97, 99, 142, 145 UNHCR, xx, 5, 7, 71, 83, 85, 86, 138, 140, 143, 147, 165, 177, 189, 196

Y Yunnan, 6, 119