Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar

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Understanding the Rohingya Crisis and the Failure of Human Rights Norm in Myanmar: Possible Policy Responses

Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 1–21 2019 Jadavpur University Reprints and permissions: in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india DOI: 10.1177/0973598419862482 journals.sagepub.com/home/jnr

Md. Shariful Islam1 Abstract How can one understand the genealogy of the Rohingyas? How did the Myanmar state frame the Rohingyas? What factors led to the failure of the human rights norm in the case of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar? How can this crisis be addressed? This article investigates these questions and argues that Rohingyas were living in the Rakhine state of Myanmar throughout centuries. They were dehumanized and systematically excluded by the government of Myanmar over a long time. The article also argues that Myanmar state was not interested in complying with the international norms of human rights in case of Rohingya crisis due to the prevailing domestic structure of the country, lack of political opportunities at the national, regional, and global levels, and the narrowly defined national interests of the major powers. In this context, possibilities need to be created to address the Rohingya crisis. Thus, the role of the international community, including China, India, Russia, the United Nations, and the European Union, becomes critical.

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Department of International Relations, University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh.

Corresponding author: Md. Shariful Islam, Department of International Relations, South Asian University, Akbar Bhawan Campus, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi, Delhi 110021, India. E-mail: [email protected]

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Keywords Rohingya crisis, genocide, Myanmar, human rights, norms

Introduction ‘Rohingya crisis’ or ‘Rohingya genocide’ has become a buzzword to the policy world or academic community or civil society organizations (CSOs) today. The violence against the Rohingyas started in June 2012, and the recent crisis committed by the Myanmar military has been identified as the ‘textbook case of Genocide’ by the United Nations (UN News 2017). On August 28, 2018, in a Security Council meeting on Myanmar, UN Secretary-General António Guterres contends that ‘The massive refugee emergency that began one year ago in Rakhine State, Myanmar, has become one of the world’s worst humanitarian and human rights crises’ (United Nations 2018). According to the Bangladesh foreign minister Abdul Momen, over 24,000 people were killed, 18,000 women raped, and 1,20,000 house destroyed, 1,15,000 houses were burnt in Myanmar Rakhine state (Daily Star 2019b). Approximately 1,000,000 Rohingyas have taken shelter in neighboring Bangladesh. Against the backdrop of such genocide, this article investigates: how can one understand the genealogy of the Rohingyas? How did the government of Myanmar project them? What factors led to the failure of human rights norm in the case of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar? How can this crisis be addressed? Before going to investigate the failure of the human rights norm, it is pertinent to understand the theorization of norms first through looking at scholarly literature. Norm is seen as ‘shared expectations about appropriate behaviours in a given situation’ (cited in Hirsch 2015). Edna UllmannMargalit contends that ‘a social norm is a prescribed guide for conduct or action which is generally complied with by the members of a society’ (Ullmann-Margalit 2015: 12). Ann Florini maintains that ‘Norms govern much state behavior’ (Florini 1996: 367). Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl add that ‘norm means normative, that there are issues of justice and rights of a moral or ethical character’ (1992: 638–639). At the same time, it is also important to unpack human rights. As a human being, everyone is entitled to have certain fundamental and inalienable rights acknowledged by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 by the United Nations. In the case of the Rohingyas, it was their human rights to live, life, food, housing, health care, education, and social insurance, equality

Islam 3 before the law, protection against arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of religion, speech, assembly, political participation, and so on. Though some scholars (i.e., Brooten 2015; Evans 2001) are critical to the discourse of human rights, the article argues that despite criticisms, human rights are important to ensure a better life. Thomas Risse (2000: 5) notes that ‘Human rights norms not only protect citizens from state intervention but also (and increasingly) define a “civilized state” in the modern world’. But in the case of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, this was not the case. Therefore, the study argues that the norm of human rights failed in the case of Rohingya crisis because the state of Myanmar did not comply with the norm and hence did not stop the genocide. The study merits serious attention as Sangmin Bae (2007: 11) notes that ‘the literature shows a tendency to rely on cases in which norms “mattered” and have actually affected state policies. In other words, scholars tend to highlight only successful cases of norm compliance’. Thus, it is also important to look at when some norms do not resonate well. The study is also important because International Relations (IR) as a discipline should not be confined to only state perspective; people’s perspective also matter. In the mainstream IR dominated by the realist paradigm, refugees are hardly studied that should not be the case. Also, if one looks at the practice perspective of IR, the policy world only witnessed the Rohingya genocide days after days while hardly acted to stop it. In this context, the paper becomes critically important because it argues that the identities, protection, and well-being of the Rohingyas need to be taken into account by the international community. The paper is divided into five sections. The first section focuses on the discourse of the Rohingyas. The second section concentrates on the politics of framing and labeling against the Rohingyas. The third section deals with the question of why the norm of human rights has not been resonated in case of Rohingya crisis. The fourth section focuses on possible policy responses to address the crisis. Finally, the paper focuses on the conclusion part.

Genealogy of the Rohingyas Though the term ‘Rohingya’ has become a buzzword, its discourse is under-researched. Thus, the proper genealogy of the term becomes important. In general, the term ‘Rohingya’ is used in the context of minority Muslim Arakanese in Myanmar. Donald M. Seekins notes that

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around 1.4 million Rohingyas were residing in Arakan who ‘have been objects of systematic persecution’ (Seekins 2006: 382). If one looks at the existing literature on the Rohingyas, it was in fact 1799 when Francis Buchanan contends that ‘I shall now add three dialects, spoken in the Burma Empire, but evidently derived from the language of the Hindu nation. The first is that spoken by the Mohammedans, who have long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves Rooinga, or natives of Arakan’ (Buchanan 2003: 55). Michael W. Charney from the School of Oriental and African Studies [SOAS], University of London thinks that ‘the derivation of Rohingya from Roainga is very clear’ (Charney 2005). Andrew Selth writes that ‘at least 4% of Burmese are Muslims, or by most counts well over 2 million people. Some unlikely claims range as high as 20%, or more than 11 million people’ (Selth 2013). So, there is also politics concerning the number of the Muslim population in Myanmar. Moshe Yegar (1972: 2) in his book The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a Minority Group notes that ‘Muslim seamen first reached Burma in the ninth century. Although geographically on the perimeter of the major trade routes, Burma nevertheless enjoyed rather lively shipping activity which brought in its wake the beginnings of a Muslim settlement.’ Yegar traced the ancestors of the Rohingyas to the Arab and Persian traders. To understand the history of the Rohingyas, it is also pertinent to look at the history of Arakan. In this context, Thant Myint-U notes that: The British and the Burmese had already fought two wars, in 1824–6 and 1852–3, both resulting in decisive British victories. Assam, Manipur, Arakan and the Tennasserim were ceded to Calcutta after the first war, and the remainder of the Indian Ocean coastline was taken during the second. But the heartland of the Burmese kingdom, what the British called ‘Ava’ or ‘Upper Burma’, remained in the hands of an enfeebled Burmese monarchy, together with a collection of nearby Shan principalities. (Myint-U 2004: 2)

Bodawpaya ascended the throne of Ava (Upper Burma) in 1782 at the age of 37 and continued his rule until his death in 1817. His first target was annexing Arakan in the Burmese empire. Arakan was a small kingdom along the Bay of Bengal which was separated by a formidable mountain range, the Arakan Yoma, from the Irrawaddy valley. However, the area’s principal role as a centre of Indian Ocean trade and piracy also meant that Arakan was much more exposed to Indian Ocean influences, in particular from Bengal, but also from further afield. The religion was primarily Theravada Buddhist, but with a large Muslim minority and strong Brahmanical influences. (Ibid.: 14)

Islam 5 The Burmese invaded Arakan and occupied its capital at Mrohaung in early 1785 (Ibid.). Thus, the lineage of the Muslim minority or Rohingyas in Arakan was strongly found in earlier Burma which indicates that they are living in the country throughout centuries. Then one can question why the Rohingyas are called ‘illegal immigrants’ today in Myanmar. To understand this, one needs to look at the politics of framing and labeling, which are discussed in the following section.

Politics of the Framing/Labeling of the Rohingyas How are Rohingyas framed or labeled by the Burmese state? The Burmese government claims that Rohingyas descended from Bengali residents of Chittagong District (now in eastern Bangladesh) who migrated into Arakan after the British annexed it in 1824–1826. And therefore, they cannot be considered as a legitimate Burmese ethnic nationality. According to the 1982 Burmese citizenship law, a Rohingya is eligible for citizenship only if s/he provides proof that his/her ancestors have lived in the country before 1823. Indeed, Donald M. Seekins notes that historical scholarship suggests that ‘Muslim communities flourished in the Kingdom of Arakan (Rakhine) for many centuries before the coming of the British’ (Seekins 2006: 383). Here comes the politics of framing. In fact, one needs to look at the 1947 Burmese Constitution to understand the citizenship criteria. According to the 1947 Burmese Constitution: Under s.11 of the constitution, both the blood test and the place of birth test are applied to determine the citizenship of a person. A person both of whose parents belong or belonged to any of the indigenous races of Burma is a natural-born citizen. A person born in Burma, at least one of whose grandparents belong or belonged to the indigenous races, is also a naturalborn citizen. A person born in Burma, both of whose parents are, of if they had lived at the commencement of the constitution would have been, Union citizens, is also a natural born citizen. (Maung 1959: 94)

Concerning religious freedom, the 1947 Burmese constitution mentions that Buddhism is recognized as the faith professed by the great majority of Union citizens. The State also recognizes Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Animism as some of the ‘religions’ existing in the Union at the date of the coming into force of the constitution (Ibid.: 98). Thus, it is clear that in the 1947 constitution of Burma, full rights were enshrined to the Muslims

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even to the Muslim Rohingyas. Gradually, systematic discriminations, persecutions have been perpetrated against the Rohingyas by the state. In this regard, Andrew Selth (2013) observes that: Full rights for Muslims were enshrined in the 1947 constitution, but in 1960 Buddhism was made Burma’s state religion and after the 1962 coup the military regime tended to equate Muslims with colonial rule and the exploitation of Burma by foreigners. Muslims were not permitted to run for public office, join the security forces or work as civil servants. The number of mosques was restricted, some Muslim cemeteries were destroyed and a number of madrassas were closed.

It is also pertinent to note that Rohingyas were systematically excluded by the adoption of discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law. One also needs to look at the politics of labeling and the use of language and its meaning to understand how the Rohingyas were systematically persecuted by the Myanmar state. Indeed, the minority Muslim Rohingyas were labeled as ‘threats’ to Myanmar and the Buddhist religion by Myanmar’s Ma Ba Tha [the Committee for the Protection of Nationality and Religion] monks. They (the monks) also urged to restrict the civil and political rights to the Rohingyas (Fisher 2015; Lee 2016; Mizzima 2015). It is reported that Mandalay monk Ashin Wirathu uses social media to spread often false stories about Muslims, regularly denigrating them in speeches as mad dogs and rapists. Those that dare challenge Wirathu’s view of events quickly become the target of his invective. UN envoy Yanghee Lee was labelled a ‘whore’ when she stood up for the rights of the Muslim Rohingya minority. (Fisher 2015)

The Rohingyas were also labeled as ‘Bengalis’ and ‘propagandaspreading’. In an interview with the Time Magazine in 2013, Ashin Wirathu points out that ‘[Muslims] are breeding so fast, and they are stealing our women, raping them … They would like to occupy our country, but I won’t let them. We must keep Myanmar Buddhist.’ In his interview, he also claims that about 90 per cent of Muslims in Burma is ‘radical, bad people’ (cited in Lee 2016: 199). In fact, protecting the Buddhist religion was/is presented as in the national interests of Myanmar. Nan Da Ba Tha, the state chairman of Ma Ba Tha, or Patriotic Association of Myanmar, claims that ‘propaganda-spreading Bengalis

Islam 7 want to take this [Myanmar] land on a permanent basis for generations to come’ (Mizzima 2015). And thus, Muslim occupation needs to be prevented as argued by Ma Ba Tha Chairman (Ibid.). Rohingya have been labeled as ‘illegal migrants’ by the government and political leaders of Myanmar but the historical record does not support their claim as outlined in the previous sections. Indeed, Rohingyas were framed as the ‘enemy’ of the state of Myanmar due to occupy their lands. In this regard, Seekins rightly notes that ‘in a classic “divide-and-rule” strategy, both military regimes have enlisted Arakanese Buddhists in attacks on Rohingya communities, and, after evicting the Muslims, allowed the Arakanese Buddhists to occupy their lands’ (Seekins 2006: 383). So, one can claim that land is one of the main reasons behind the politics of framing Rohingya as negative elements in society. The next section deals with the failure of human rights norm and the Rohingya crisis.

The Failure of Human Rights Norm Where is norm situated in the major paradigms of IR? Realist theory in IR mainly focuses on the role of the state, power, and the Hobbesian anarchic international system. They emphasize primarily on the material world. They argue that states’ behaviors are primarily determined by the distribution of power and capabilities in the anarchic international system. Since there is no central authority to regulate the behaviors of the states, they are in constant competition for power and position. Realists ‘do not expect international norms to have much of an impact unless they are enforced by powerful states or secure national interests’ (Bae 2007: 7). Realists failed to explain why states comply with certain norms. Here comes the constructivist school of IR. Constructivists contend that norms are important in IR because they constrain the behavior of the states, and they (states) are ‘socialized to norms’ (Price 1998: 615). Sangmin Bae, for instance, maintains that ‘Norms shape and reshape the goals of states, and build their perceptions of state interests’ (Bae 2007: 8). While Gregory A. Raymond finds that ‘international norms can perform a tripwire function. Should a widely accepted rule be violated, attention can be focused on the transgression so that collective response can be more easily mobilized’ (Raymond 1997: 215). In the case of the Rohingya crisis, this did not happen. So the pertinent question

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becomes why has the norm of human rights on the Rohingya crisis failed? To examine this question, it is also important to look at when states comply with a particular norm. In this regard, Bae (2007) mentions some domestic sources of norm compliance, that is, domestic political factors and structures, domestic political culture and political settings, independent civil society, and robust domestic legal institutions. In addition, it is also important to look at the political opportunities that sometimes ‘crystalized as static opportunity structures, sometimes as changing political environment’ (Tarrow 2005: 23). Concerning the Rohingya crisis, the reasons for human rights norm failure are discussed in the following section.

Domestic Structures of Myanmar Domestic structures are very important in the case of norm compliance. It includes the political institutions of the state, societal structures, political culture, state-society relations, and policy networks (Risse-Kappen 2003: 20). Thomas Risse-Kappen also notes that ‘domestic structures are likely to determine both the availability of channels for transnational actors into the political systems and the requirements for “winning coalitions” to change policies’ (Ibid.: 6). A state’s attitudes and receptiveness to a particular norm depends on the political culture and institutions of the country to a great extent (cited in Bae 2007). If one looks at the domestic structure of Myanmar, it is highly state-controlled. And thus CSOs are very weak and get very less space. Indeed, the domestic space of resistance has been reduced drastically in Myanmar. The institutions are not democratic on that sense where the military plays a crucial role. In addition, the political culture of the country is not pluralistic. Norms and values are not respected in society. The media is not strong enough. The transnational activists were not even given access to the location of the Rohingya genocide by the Myanmar military/government. So, they were not successful to ‘win coalitions’ and thus unable to change the Myanmar government’s policy regarding Rohingyan genocide. Moreover, whether a norm will be complied or not also depends on the domestic salience to that particular norm (Cortell and Davis 1996). Myanmar is not salient to the norm of human rights. In fact, the human rights record in the country is very poor. Human rights defenders have been attacked; journalists have been prosecuted, freedom of expression,

Islam 9 religious freedom of the minorities have been strictly curtailed in Myanmar (Human Rights Watch 2018). It is also pertinent to look at the role of the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission which was established in September 2011 by the government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to ensure the fundamental rights of its citizens. No statement has been issued by the National Human Rights Commission to condemn the Myanmar armies attack on the Rohingyas. On contrary, the commission issued a statement to condemn the attack by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army on the vehicle carrying members of the security force with explosive device and small arms from the hillock of North West of Kyein Chaung village in Maung Daw Township, Rakhine State around 10:00 am on January 5, 2018. According to the statement, ‘Such attack may affect the process of stability, security, prevalence of law and order and development in Rakhine State’ (National Human Rights Commission 2018). One can conclude that due to the prevailing state-controlled domestic structure in Myanmar, the absence of a democratic form of government, and the absence of strong political institutions and a pluralist society, the country was not receptive to the norm of human rights.

Absence of Independent Civil Society and Robust Domestic Legal Institutions Independent civil society is also imperative for norm compliance. A vibrant civil society existed in urban areas under the democratic government in Burma between 1948 and 1962 though ‘paramilitary organisations and local politicians tended to repress dissenting views and independent organisations in rural areas’ (International Crisis Group 2001: i). It is also claimed that ‘Since General Ne Win’s military coup in 1962, however, successive regimes have sought to stamp out civil society and permit only state-controlled organisations that further the regime’s interests’ (Ibid.). Military regimes ensured highly restricted access to communication technology to the CSOs, which was not conducive to the active functions of the CSOs in the country. Myanmar Times (2017b) notes that ‘CSOs in Myanmar have yet to join forces to help each other making a strong coalition for common causes’. Legal institutions in Myanmar are highly state-controlled and politicized which makes it

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difficult to ensure justice to the marginalized section in the society like the Rohingyas. Besides, there is more possibility that norms get diffused if there is a strong societal pressure from below which was also absent about the Rohingya crisis.

Role of Public Opinion and Belief System ‘Where international human rights norms resonate with domestic cultural understandings and beliefs, states are more likely to respond to human rights pressures’ (Bae 2007: 15). Indeed, the Myanmar authority constructed and nurtured a negative public opinion against the Rohingyas through creating negative narratives around the Rohingyas. Though 90 per cent of people are Buddhist, Islam is projected as threats to Buddhism through mass publications and popular religious materials. The whole society was polarized. The earlier sections show that they (the Rohingyas) were framed as threats to Myanmar’s national interest. Rohingyas were constructed as ‘othering’ in society. Thus, the belief system of the people in general in Myanmar goes against the cause of Rohingyas. For instance, one noodle seller in Yangon’s Lanmadaw district view that ‘They [Rohingyas] are terrorists to the native population’ while Tin Win, who works for the country’s Inland Water Transport agency believes that Rohingyas are a threat to Myanmar. According to Win, ‘They [Rohingyas] are expanding. They produce so many kids, so many children’ which are a threat to the country (CNN 2017). And consequently, a strong resistance in Myanmar was absent in case of the Rohingya crisis.

Political Opportunities Political opportunities were not conducive to stop the genocide of the Rohingyas. In the name of democracy, the military dominates Myanmar politics. Moreover, the rise of populism in different parts of the world has reduced the resonance toward human rights and humane governance. For instance, the Syrian crisis, the Yemen crisis, and the Myanmar crisis could not shake the world community to take strong actions to stop the crisis. Also, the event of 9/11 has brought the issue of military security and hard power on the board while marginalizing the soft issues like the environment or human rights. At the regional level, China and India are

Islam 11 major investors in Myanmar and maintain warm relations with the regime. So, one can conclude that among many reasons, the Rohingya crisis was not resonated well due to the lack of political opportunities both at the national, regional, and international levels.

Regional and International Dimension of Norm Compliance Richard Price notes that for systemic norm diffusion, the role of hegemonic state powers also become important (Price 1998: 616). In this case, major powers like Russia, China, and India remained silent. Russia and China used veto power in the UN Security Council concerning UN resolution over Myanmar. Even from the very beginning, scholars did not pay serious attention to the question of norms execution on the Rohingya genocide that why the world needs to act decisively to stop the genocide. Emulation was also absent. Myanmar was not interested in emulating the successful human rights practices of other states. So, it was not possible to stop atrocities over the Rohingyas. Bae argues that for the compliance of human rights norms, the role of international or regional human rights regimes is also important. They try to persuade and sometimes pressurize to ratify human rights treaties and execute those treaties. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was quite silent to exert pressure on Myanmar on the Rohingya issue. Even a single word is not found on its website on the issue (ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights [AICHR] 2018). It is also pertinent to mention that ‘The plight of the Rohingya was conveniently forgotten after Burma joined ASEAN’ (Parnini 2013: 289). On the contrary, transnational CSOs were able to generate Rohingya issues through disseminating information. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, for instance, published dozens of reports, news analysis concerning the Rohingya crisis which reached the world community. Additionally, the global media like The New York Times, The Guardian, Al Jazeera, and BBC has published and broadcasted dozens of reports about the atrocities of the Myanmar army over the Rohingya people. People around the world were convinced to the sufferings of the Rohingyas and felt that the genocide needs to be stopped. And thus, they protested to stop the Rohingya genocide. Thus, it can be said that

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transnational CSOs were able to generate the issue. But they failed to win coalitions in Myanmar, which would be imperative to policy change.

Norm Versus Power and Interest One needs to take into consideration the role of power and interest in case of investigating the role of norms in changing or influencing the state’s behavior (Goertz and Diehl: 1992). In fact, the state’s actions are very much defined by national interest as argued by the realist paradigm of IR. In the case of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, the norm of human rights was not resonated well due to the country’s emphasis on narrowly defined national interest, that is, Arakanese land rather than people. Major powers like Russia or China calculated their national interests in the expense of human rights (Islam 2017). Amaia Sánchez-Cacicedo contends that ‘All the external actors involved have been keen to preserve their material interests in Myanmar, be they resource or geostrategicrelated’ (Sánchez-Cacicedo 2014: 176). Human Rights Watch (2018) for instance, notes that China continued to strengthen its ties with Burma, shielding the Burmese government from concerted international action and scrutiny over the Rohingya crisis. Large-scale infrastructure projects ramped up under China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, including an eastern seaport development that offers strategic access to the Indian Ocean.

China shares a 2,200-km (1,360-mile) border with Myanmar and is Myanmar’s largest trading partner crossing US$700 million bilateral trade in 2018. Myanmar has officially permitted the use of the Chinese currency in cross-border payments that would facilitate Myanmar’s trade with China. China is lobbying the Myanmar government for building US$3.6 billion Myitsone hydropower project (Bermingham 2019). Notably, the project was suspended in 2011 over environmental concerns. China and Myanmar also plan to build a US$7.3 billion deep-sea port in Kyaukpyu (Ibid.). China has invested more than US$20 billion in Myanmar in the past three decades. Notably, Myanmar–China enjoys warm relations for a long time. Meaghan Tobin writes that ‘India and China both have infrastructure projects important to their own domestic interests underway in Rakhine’ (Tobin 2018). India is one of the major

Islam 13 investors in Myanmar. Despite ongoing Rohingya crisis, in October 2018, India signed an operational agreement with Myanmar on a port in Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine state. India also signed another agreement on the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project that will allow India to have access to its northeastern states through Rakhine (Ibid.). Tobin (2018) also writes that ‘Having India and especially China as economic partners could also help shield Myanmar from international legal investigation’ concerning Rohingya genocide. Russia maintains strong military relations with Myanmar as part of its pivot to Asia. In 2009–2010, Russia exported a squadron of MiG 29B, MiG 29SE, MiG 29UB fighter jets worth US$511 million (Myanmar Times 2017a). Thus, calculating their interests, China, India, and Russia remained silent toward the Rohingya crisis. In the case of Rohingya genocide, interests and power triumphed over humanity which made the norm of human rights failed.

Possible Policy Responses Possibilities of Repatriation According to the Bangladesh foreign minister, ‘Bangladesh being an overpopulated country has been facing huge challenges to manage the burden of over 10 lakh Rohingyas in its land. There may be developed radicalism and uncertainty may loom in the region that may hinder the regional peace and stability’ (Daily Star 2019b). It is globally recognized that despite limited resources and insufficient international aid, Bangladesh has made considerable efforts to help the Rohingyas from a humanitarian ground. The safe repatriation of the Rohingyas in Myanmar needs to be ensured. In this regard, although in January 2018, Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed to repatriate the Rohingyas, very little progress has been made because the conditions of repatriation hinge on proof of citizenship. Pal Ahluwalia and Miller Toby (2018: 291) writes that ‘As people who have systematically been disenfranchised, it is virtually impossible for these stateless people to authenticate their identity’. This identity crisis will make the repatriation process complex. UN SecretaryGeneral Antonio Guterres expressed his concern defining the repatriation process too slow and frustrating. According to him, ‘I feel an enormous

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frustration with the lack of progress in relation to Myanmar and with the suffering of the people. We insist on the need to create conditions for them to be willing to go back. Things have been too slow’ (South China Morning Post 2019). According to a joint statement of the UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (IOM), ‘We encourage countries in this region and beyond to show solidarity with Bangladesh and to support Myanmar to start creating conditions for voluntary, safe and dignified return of Rohingya refugees’ (Daily Star 2019c). The role of China, India and the member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) are critically important to repatriate the Rohingyas in Myanmar. Major partners of Myanmar, that is, China, India, and Russia need to stop backing the Myanmar regime over the Rohingya refugees considering the humanitarian ground rather than material interest. Bangladesh Foreign Minister AK Abdul Momen views that ‘We want a safe haven for the Rohingya people in Myanmar’s Rakhine state and that haven has to be monitored by India, China and other ASEAN nations’ (Daily Star 2019b). During his visit in New Delhi in February 2019, Momen requested Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his counterpart, Sushma Swaraj for arranging ‘safe haven’ for Rohingyas in Myanmar’s Rakhine state (Ibid.). In return, India has assured to cooperate in the repatriation process (Daily Star 2019a). The role of the European Union, the USA, and the UK also becomes crucial to create a strong international pressure on Myanmar to ensure a safe repatriation for the Rohingyas.

Ensuring Accountability Through a Strong Global Response The accountability of the state of Myanmar to respect the norm of human rights needs to be ensured. The culprits of the genocide need to be brought under the justice system so that such a case is not repeated in the future. In this regard a strong global response becomes crucial. Despite the continuing Rohingya genocide in Myanmar, the role of the United Nations was negligible except adopting few statements condemning the atrocities. In July 2018, UN Secretary-General visited Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh to see the situations of the Rohingyas led to no formal outcome except open briefing of the Council which was held on August 28, 2018. In fact, the UN Security Council could not take actions against

Islam 15 Myanmar as China and Russia used veto power in favor of Myanmar as mentioned earlier. One positive development is that in September 2018, a three-judge panel of the International Criminal Court (ICC) said in a written summary of their decision that The Court has jurisdiction over the crime against humanity of deportation allegedly committed against members of the Rohingya people. The reason is that an element of this crime—the crossing of a border—took place on the territory of a State party (Bangladesh). (Daily Star 2018a)

Charles Santiago, chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Parliamentarians for Human Rights contends that ‘This is a milestone decision and a step forward towards accountability for the alleged atrocity crimes against the Rohingya population’ (Daily Star 2018b). Eva Kusuma Sundari, a member of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights and House of Representatives of Indonesia, claims that ‘The ICC now has the opportunity to initiate a full investigation. This means bringing those responsible for the alleged human rights violations to account and possibly putting an end to the longstanding discrimination and injustices this community has faced in Myanmar’ (Ibid.). Malaysia has expressed its support that the perpetrators of the Rohingya genocide need to be punished. Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah contends that ‘The Malaysian government is openly adhering to the principle that criminals must be punished’ (Daily Star 2019d). Again, support of the major powers especially China, India, and Russia will be a major challenge to ensure accountability of the Myanmar government or militaries. In this regard, Shawlin Chaw, a Singaporebased senior analyst for consultancy Control Risks contends that The Myanmar government does not want the United Nations or International Criminal Court to investigate the issues in Rakhine state at this time. Getting China’s support indirectly means getting Russia’s support, and being sure the United Nations Security Council will not go forward with an investigation is critical. (cited in Tobin 2018)

C. Christine Fair also maintains that ‘Myanmar will essentially be able to abscond from the crimes against humanity it has committed’ due to the support from China, India, and Russia (Fair 2018: 72).

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Building a Pro-refugee International System The existing international system defined by the great power politics and power distributions does not work for the majority of the people in the world including the refugees. Ahluwalia and Toby (2018) write that the Rohingya crisis is ‘another failure of the international system’. While Alexander Betts and Paul Collier (2018: 5) in their seminal work contend that ‘refugees never received the global attention needed for major change’. They define the present refugee system as a ‘broken system’ and suggest to build ‘a new system that works’. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) needs to be strengthened to address the current global refugee crisis. In addition, Gil Loescher contends that ‘only a concerted effort by the United Nations, regional organizations, and governments to deal with the conditions that create refugees holds much prospect of restoring a decent way of life to the victims and of preventing mass buildups of refugees in the future’ (Loescher 1996: 181).

Conclusion The article explored the genealogy of the term ‘Rohingya’ and investigated the factors that best explain the failure of human rights norm in case of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar. One would conclude that Rohingyas were living in the Arakan state of Myanmar throughout centuries. In the 1947 constitution of Burma, full rights were enshrined to the Rohingyas. They were systematically dehumanized and persecuted by the state of Myanmar. In addition, Rohingyas were depicted as an existential threat to the national interest of Myanmar to delegitimize their physical presence in the country. The article also found that Myanmar state was not interested in complying with the international norms of human rights in case of Rohingya crisis due to the prevailing state-controlled domestic structure of the country, lack of political opportunities at the national, regional, and global levels, and the narrowly defined national interests of the major powers. It strongly recommends that the contemporary plight of the Rohingyas needs to be heard and addressed by the international community. Consequently, international community needs to play a

Islam 17 genuine role to ensure the safe repatriation of the Rohingyas in Myanmar. In this context, the role of India, China, and Russia become critically important to ensure accountability of the Myanmar government. Ahluwali and Toby (2018: 291) in their editorial notes that Despite the commitments made in the UN by political leaders, the plight of the Rohingyas is unlikely to change, not least because China and Russia will use their veto in the Security Council to preclude formal condemnation of the Myanmar government or any significant intervention.

The strength of this article is that it will fill the existing knowledge gap on the dimension of human rights norm and Rohingya crisis. One of the major limitations of this research would be not consulting with the scholarship published in Burmese or Rohingya language and not taking interviews. Concerning the future research agenda, one area would be to look at the role of nation-building especially the politics of constitution making in Myanmar and how the process marginalized Rohingyas over time. Acknowledgments The author would like to extend his profound gratitude to the editor and the anonymous reviewers of the journal for their valuable comments and suggestions. He is also grateful to his teacher Dr. Medha Bisht at South Asian University, New Delhi, India, who has patiently read and commented on the first draft of the paper. The author is grateful to his teacher Professor Delwar Hossain at the University of Dhaka; Professor Md. Abul Kashem at the University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh; Dr. Mat Hardy at Deakin University, Burwood, Australia, and Mr. Abdullah al-Modabber at South Asian University, New Delhi, for their supports. Finally, the author is thankful to his wife Jannat Ara Tithy and daughter Eelma Sharif Samata for their infinite support and sacrifice during preparing the manuscript.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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