For the Honour of My House: The Contribution of the Indian Princely States to the First World War 1912390876, 9781912390878

Citation preview

The contribution of the Indian Army to the First World War has been, until recently, at best forgotten, and at worst ignored. This is especially so of those military units provided by the semi-autonomous Indian Princely States whose contribution, even in the Official Histories, barely merits a mention. This book corrects that imbalance. Drawing on a wide range of regimental and Army Headquarters war diaries, few of which have been cited in other publica­ tions, as well as political records held exclusively at the National Archive of India, the book explores why the State rulers volunteered their services and those of their armies. It looks at the deployment of those armies in Europe, Egypt and Palestine, Mesopotamia, East Africa, the Dardanelles and within British India. It draws atten­ tion to problems encountered in their deployment, but also highlights successes such as the capture of Haifa and Aleppo by State cavalry units, and the outstanding role of some State infantry units in East Africa. One appendix records over 1,600 State soldiers who died - killed in action, died of wounds or as prisoners of war, or died of disease, while other appendices tecor hattie honours and rewards for gallantry or meritorious service. Problems identified during the war were addressed in its aftermath and the book concludes by looking at the recommendations which led to the transformation of the Imperial Service Troops scheme into the Indian State Forces scheme.

Tony served in the British Army, is a graduate of Lancaster University, a former crown servant and commercial risk management consultant. Now retired, he lives with his wife in Cambridgeshire. Tony’s keen interest in Indian military history spans almost 50 years and has seen him until very recently as Secretary/Editor/Treasurer of the Indian Military Historical Society. His Indian Princely Medals (Delhi: Lancer, 1996) documented the orders, decorations and medals given by the Maharajas to their State subjects. He co-authored with the late Richard Head 'lhe Maharajas Pallans - a History of' the Indian State Forces 1888-1948 (Delhi: USII/Manohar, January 2013) which docu­ mented the development of the Imperial Service Troops/Indian State Forces. He has contributed chapters to other books and has published articles in the Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, the Bulletin of the Military Historical Society, the Journal of the Orders and Medals Research Society and Durbar, the journal of the Indian Military Historical Society. In recent years he has presented at a wide range of conferences on the Indian contribution to the First World War in Delhi, London, Pondicherry, British Columbia and Nottingham.

FOR THE HONOUR OF MY HOUSE

War and Military Culture in South Asia, 1757—1947 www.hclion.co.uk/warandmilitarycu It urcinsouthasia

Series Editors Professor Emeritus Raymond Callahan, University of Delaware Alan Jeffreys, Imperial War Museum Professor Daniel Marston, Australian National University Editorial Advisory Board Squadron Leader (Retired) Rana Chhina, Centre of Armed Forces Historical Research, United Service Institution of India Dr Anirudh Deshpande, University of Delhi Professor Ashley Jackson, King’s College London Dr Robert Johnson, Oxford University Lieutenant Commander Dr Kalesh Mohanan, Naval History Division, Ministry of Defence, India Dr Tim Morcman George Morton-Jack Dr David Omissi, University of Hull Professor Peter Stanley, University of New South Wales, Canberra Dr Erica Wald, Goldsmiths, University of London

Submissions The publishers would be pleased to receive submissions for this scries. Please contact us via email ([email protected]), or in writing to Helion & Company Limited, Unit 8 Amherst Business Centre, Budbrooke Road, Warwick, CV34 5WE Titles

No 1 Swords Trembling In Their Scabbards'. The Changing Status ofIndian Officers in the Indian Army 1757-1947 Michael Creese (ISBN 978-1-909982-81-9) No 2 Discipline, System and Style'. The Sixteenth Lancers and British Soldiering in India 1822/mjohn IL Rumsby (ISBN 978-1-909982-91-8) No 3 Die in Battle, Do not Despair. The Indians on Gallipoli, 1915 Peter Stanley (ISBN 978-1-910294-67-3)

No 4 Brave as a Lion. The Life and Times ofField Marshal Hugh Gough, 1st Viscount Gough Christopher Brice (ISBN 978-1-910294-61-1) No 5 Approach to Battle. Training the Indian Army during the Second World War Alan Jeffreys (ISBN 978-1-911096-51-1) No 6 The Indian Army in The First World War: New Perspectives Edited by Alan Jeffreys (ISBN 978-1-911512-78-3) No I War without Pity in the South Indian Peninsula 1798-1813: The Letter Book ofLieutenantColonel Valentine Blacker Edited and with introductory notes by David Howell (ISBN 978-1-912390-86-1) No 8 Op Islands, Ports and Sea Lanes: Africa and the Indian Ocean in the Second World War Ashleyjackson (ISBN 978-1-912390-74-8) No 9 Ceylon at War 1939-45 Ashleyjackson (ISBN 978-1-912390-65-6) No 10 For The Honour op My House: The Contribution ofthe Indian Princely States to the First World War Tony McClenaghan (ISBN 978-1-912390-87-8)

For The Honour of My House The Contribution ofthe Indian Princely States to the First World War

War and Military Culture in South Asia, 1757-1947 No. 10

Tony McClenaghan

Helion & Company

United Service Institution of India

Helion & Company Limited Unit 8 Amherst Business Centre Budbrooke Road Warwick CV34 5WE England Tel. 01926 499 619 Fax 0121 711 4075 Email: info(®helion.co.uk Website: www.helion.co.uk Twitter: (®helionbooks Visit our blog http://blog.helion.co.uk/ Published by Helion St Company 2019 Designed and typeset by Mach 3 Solutions Ltd (www.mach3solutions.co.uk ) Cover designed by Paul Hewitt, Battlefield Design (www.battlefield-design.co.uk) Printed by Lightning Source Limited, Milton Keynes, Buckinghamshire Text © Tony McClenaghan 2018 Illustrations © as individually credited Maps © as individually credited

Every reasonable effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permission for the use of copyright material. The author and publisher apologize for any errors or omissions in this work, and would be grateful if notified of any corrections that should be incorporated in future reprints or editions of this book.

ISBN 978-1-912390-87-8 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the express written consent of Helion & Company Limited. For details of other military history titles published by Helion &. Company Limited contact the above address, or visit our website: http://www.helion.co.uk

We always welcome receiving book proposals from prospective authors.

In memory of Richard Head, friend, collaborator and co-author of TJie Maharajas’ Paltans —A History ofthe Indian State Forces 1888-1948. He would have enjoyed this journey of discovery.

Contents

List of Illustrations List of Maps Series Editor’s Preface Foreword Preface Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

A Historical Perspective Stepping Up Following the Lead France and Flanders East Africa Gallipoli Middle East (Egypt and Palestine) Mesopotamia Other Theatres Honours, Rewards and Commemoration Aftermath

x xii xiii xv xvi xix xxi

25 37 72 89 103 156 164 222 248 266 294

Appendices I Battle Honours Awarded for the First World War II Roll of Honour III Honours and Awards Granted in Recognition of the First World War IV Deployments at a Glance V Caste Returns

305 313 314 315 321

Bibliography Index

335 342

ix

List of Illustrations

John Latham Rose, 1 GR, as a young Lieutenant 1895. (Gurkha Museum) 35 Rana of Barwani and his ambulances in France. (British Library, London, UK copyright of British Library Board/Bridgeman Images: BL3308308) 41 King Albert of the Belgians with King George V on the Market Square of Fumes. (Archives of the Royal Palace, Brussels) 43 H.S. Loyalty. (M. Rafiullah, Gwalior's Part in the Great War, p. 96.) 48 Half Anna postage stamp featuring H.S. Madras. (Rana Chhina) 49 ‘Some Statesmen of the Great War’ by Sir James Guthrie. Maharaja Ganga Singh can be seen standing extreme left. (National Portrait Gallery) 69 Muhammad Ali Murza, Commanding Hyderabad Lancers. (NAM 195605) 85 H H Sir Pratap Singh, General Rimington and H H The Maharaja of Ratlam. (British Library, London, UK copyright of British Library Board/ Bridgeman Images: BL3308297) 91 A group image of the Jodhpur Lancers in France, 28th July 1915. (British Library, London, UK copyright of British Library Board/Girdwood Collection/Bridgeman Images: BL 3311745 ) 94 Officers of the 39th Garhwalis [Estaires La Bassa Road, France], 4 August 1915. (British Library, London, UK copyright of British Library Board/ Girdwood Collection/Bridgeman Images: BL 3311815) 99 Sepoys Bal Bahadur Chetti and Dal Bahadur Thapa, 2nd Kashmir Rifles, attempting to reach Jasin. (USI-CAFHR) 116 Officers and men of the Kapurthala I.S. Infantry with Bakshi Pooran Singh (centre), on active service in East Africa, 1915. (Brigadier Sukhjit Singh MVC) ■ 121 Lieutenant Colonel Sarc/arNand Singh, OBI, lOM, Faridkot Sappers. (Imperial War Museum: HU 58655) 124 Colonel Kishan Singh, Sardar Bahadur, OBI, and Sub Assistant Surgeon Sampuran Singh. (Imperial War Museum: Q_L3665) 162 Mysore Imperial Service Lancers and a regiment of Bengal Lancers with the Bikaner Camel Corps (Ganga Risala) in the Sinai Desert, 1915. (Imperial War Museum: Q1/568") 182 Indian lancers ride through the port of Haifa, taken by the 15th Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade on 23rd September 1918. (USI-CAFHR) 214

List of Illustrations

xi

1st Kashmir Infantry in action in Palestine using Lewis machine guns. (Imperial War Museum: HU 58836) 218 Hukum Singh’s three MID certificates. (Jitendra Singh Bhati of Jaipur) 238 Monastir Road cemetery, Salonika, and the headstone for Major Lutf Ali Khan, Indore Transport. (Parveen Sodhi) 253 Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Afzal Khan, Bahawalpur Mounted Rifles. (NAM 195453) 257 1914-15 Star to Jemadar Mohammad Ahmad, Gwalior Army, attached H.S. Loyalty. (Rana Chhina) 276 Original Bahawalpur Great War Star 1914-18/Replacement issue of Bahawalpur Great War Star 1914-18 (USI-CAFHR/Sushil Talwar). (Author) 279 Two versions of Bhavnagar War Hospital Medal, obverse and reverse. (Author and Sushil Talwar) 279 The group awarded to 2922 Sepoy Ghulam Mohd., 93 Burma Infy. Including the Bhavnagar War Hospital Medal. (USI-CAFHR/Sushil Talwar) 280 Gwalior Medal. (USI-CAFHR/Sushil Talwar) 280 Jammu and Kashmir War Medal 1914-1918. (Author) 281 Patiala Great War Medal 1914-18. (Author) 282 Haritan memorial, Aleppo. (Brigadier M S Jodha) 288 Captain Jhaggar Singh War Memorial, Kapurthala. (Author) 290 Hyderabad Cavalry Memorial, Mohammedia Lines, near Golconda Fort, Hyderabad. (Mrs Anuradha Reddy) 290 Sachin Memorial. (Anuradha Reddy) 291 Headstone to Driver Inayat Khan of the Indore Transport Corps, Brookwood Cemetery, England. (Author) 292 Cavalry Memorial, Hyde Park London, showing the main statue with the bronze plaque behind on which are named the cavalry regiments of the Empire. (Author) 293

List of Maps

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

xii

General key India. German East Africa 1914-18. East Africa. Gallipoli. Suez Canal. Haifa. Mesopotamia.

i ii iii iv V

vi vii viii

War and Military Culture in South Asia, 1757-1947 Series Editor’s Preface

The aim of this academic historical series is to produce well-researched monographs on the wars and armed forces of South Asia, concentrating mainly on the East India Company and the Indian armed forces from 1757 until 1947. Books in the series will examine the military history of the period as well as social, cultural, political and economic factors, although inevitably the armies of the East India Company and the Indian Army will dominate the series. In addition, edited volumes of conference papers, memoirs and campaign histories will also be published. It is hoped this series will be of interest to both serious historians and the general military history reader. The resurgence of interest in the history of warfare in South Asia has been very apparent in the growing historiography of the colonial period, particularly in the era of the World Wars. For example in the field of Second World War studies and the period until Partition, Daniel Marston and Tim Moreman have spearheaded this historical research with their volumes: the prize-winning Phoenix from the Ashes: The Indian Army in the Burma Campaign (2003), The Indian Army and the End of the Raj (2014) and The Jungle, the Japanese and the Commonwealth Armies at War (2005) respec­ tively. These are complemented by Raymond Callahan’s Churchill and His Generals (2007), a seminal work published in the United States that deserves better atten­ tion in the United Kingdom, and Steven Wilkinson’s Army and Nation: Ihe Military and Indian Democracy since Independence (2015). In addition, are the important wider studies of Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies: The Fall oj British Asia, 1941-1945 (2004) and Ashley Jackson on The British Empire and the Second World War (2006). The most recent publications include Approach to Battle: Training the Indian Army during the Second World War (2017) published in this series, as well as Tarak Barkawi’s Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World War II (2017) and Raymond Callahan’s Triumph at ImphaTKohima: How the Indian Army Finally Stopped the Japanese Juggernaut {fZQYI). Furthermore the Indian home front has been covered in Yasmin Khan’s social history of the period entitled The Raj at War: A Peoples History ofIndia's Second World War (2015). The aforementioned rise in interest has been mirrored in India as eight volumes of the official histories of the Indian Armed Forces during the Second World War were reprinted in India in 2012 and another four in 2014 (they were originally published

xiii

xiv

For The Honour of My House

between 1954 and 1960). As Squadron Leader Rana Chhina stated at the launch of the reprints: ‘As a resurgent India seeks to be a major player on the world stage, it behoves it to discard its narrow post-colonial world view to step up to reclaim the role that its armed forces played out on a global scale’ during the Second World War. This resurgence is amply demonstrated by the publication of Srinath Raghavan’s excellent overview India’s H'ars ; The Making of Modern South Asia (2016), alongside Kaushik Roy’s India and WorldII: War, Armed Forces, and Society, 1939-45 (2016) and Anirudh Deshpande’s Hope and Despair: Mutiny, Rebellion and Death in India, 1946 (2016), However, even in this crowded arena, there is still much research and work to be published on both war and military culture in South Asia during the Second World War. The series editors, members of the editorial advisory board and our publisher, Duncan Rogers of Helion, are all delighted to be involved in this series, most of the volumes of which are also being published in India under the Primus imprint. We hope it will be of interest in the UK, India but also globally. Alan Jeffreys

Foreword

Field Marshal Sir John Chapple, GCB, CBE, DL (London, February 2018)

This is yet another valuable history of the contribution made by the Indian Princely States. Tony McClenaghan, together with the late Richard Head, has already written and published A History ofthe Indian State Forces 1888-1948 (The Maharajas' Paltans). This book records both the Service as well as the Sacrifice made by the units of the Princely States in the First World War. Of the 50 or so units which were deployed, all were volunteers, and almost all were paid for by their rulers. They were therefore valued as well as a valuable addition to our Armed Forces. Their service has long been forgotten, often omitted from the major histories. It contains much detail not easily found elsewhere. This book puts their service on record. It will be an essential addition to the history of the Indian Armed Forces.

Preface

My interest in the military history of pre-Independence India, what we now know as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar (Burma), goes back over 40 years and began with a medal named to a Sowar in the RIS Lancers. It was several months before I identified IS as meaning Imperial Service, one of the units maintained by an Indian Princely State, and several years before I identified ‘R’ as the family name of the regiment (Patiala Rajindra Lancers) rather than the initial of the State. Over the succeeding years my involvement with the Indian Military Historical Society served to emphasise how small was the circle of people taking an active interest in the subject. The level of general ignorance about India’s involvement in the First World War, and other regions such as China and Africa, was really brought home as we approached the centenary anniversary of the start of that conflict. Since then much has changed thanks to a series of conferences and public awareness events. In India these were led by the United Service Institution of India - Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (USI-CAFHR) in conjunction with the Government of India’s Ministry of External Affairs. In the UK they were largely led by a number of universities coming together under the heading of‘Gateways to the First World War and, for me, the programmes put on by Kent and Nottingham Universities have been particularly relevant. Elsewhere conferences were arranged in Pondicherry, the University of Fraser Valley, British Columbia, and the High Commission for India in London. I also acknowledge the efforts of The Big Ideas Company and Dr Virginia Crompton and have greatly enjoyed my involvement with some of their events. If the role of the Indian Army has largely been forgotten, it had at least been recorded in some contemporary books and accounts, though the Official Histories tend to make light of its contribution. By comparison the contribution of the former Indian Princely States was hardly recorded or acknowledged in the first place, and the few accounts that did appear were either light on detail, or derisory in the attitude adopted by the authors towards their contribution. One result is that, even within the boundaries of the former Princely States, there is almost total ignorance of the fact that they played any part at all in the war. Having taken a keen interest in this niche corner of the study of Indian military history I was delighted to be asked to help set the record straight by compiling this account of the States’ contribution. The task turned out to be much bigger than I had imagined. I thought I had a fair idea of how they had contributed, but in getting into xvi

Preface

xvii

the detail in surviving records I soon came to realise that my knowledge had many gaps, so I have attempted to address those in this account. There are areas that I have not touched upon, such as the financial impact of the States’ involvement back at home, or the impact on the families of the soldiers, though my decision not to explore these areas in no way diminishes the very real hardships that the war occasioned back in the home regions. While I have covered to a certain degree the personal services of many of the rulers, and have included details of some but not all British officers who were attached to the State units, the primary focus of this work is on the contribu­ tion made by the officers and men of the Princely States who served in the Imperial Service Troops. Many of the units demonstrated more than admirably their fighting qualities and, as Brigadier General Rose noted, more than justified their existence. Those employed on Line of Communication or garrison duties also deserve to have their contributions acknowledged since, if nothing else, they at least released more experienced units for front line service, though in fact their service counted for more than this. On the outbreak of war there was an immediate and spontaneous offering of State resources towards the war effort, including the deployment of Imperial Service Troops. It is true that in the early stages of the war many of the units lacked adequate training, equipment or material to fulfil adequately the roles allotted to them. As time went on, however, these failings were largely addressed. By 1917 the total strength of State troops deployed was 12,260, and by the end of the war this figure had risen to close on 22,000 all ranks, of which some 18,440 eventually served overseas. Throughout the four years of the war these troops were maintained in the field at the expense of their rulers and State durbars. Casualties were replaced by drafts, either recruited from their own territories or drawn from other units of their own forces. For a number of States the size of their units was too small to be used as a single entity and so they readily agreed to deploy detachments as reinforcements for other State units or for units of the Indian Army. In all, the Imperial Service Troops lost just over 1,600 killed in action, died of wounds, died as prisoners of war or died of disease. They deserve to be remembered with gratitude for their sacrifice. The State units won a total of 689 decorations for gallantry or meritorious service and a total of 132 Battle Honours between them. In addition to their own military forces. States provided recruits for the Indian Armed Forces, as combatants, non-combatants and labourers for Labour Corps. Again, accurate statistics are difficult to come by. One source gives a figure of 115,891 from those states directly associated with the Foreign and Political Department ot the Government of India, but makes the point that figures for other states were ‘unfor­ tunately included in Provincial tables’, so a final total for such recruits is likely to be considerably more than the quoted figure.'

1

Anon., India's Contribution to the Great War, (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1923), p. 200.

xviii

For The Honour of My House

Given how woefully unprepared the British Army was at the outbreak of the war, the contribution of the Indian Army, including the Imperial Service Troops, deserves to be acknowledged and celebrated as a timely game changer. Until the other Dominions and Colonies were able to field fighting units, the Indian contribution stood alone in its significance and the enduring debt of gratitude for their service and sacrifice must never be forgotten.

...there is hardly an Imperial Service unit, including the Transport Corps, that has not distinguished itself at some time or another and it is nonsense for anyone to suggest that they have not justified their existence - they have been and are a very considerable asset to the Empire in this war...^

2

National Archives of India (NAI): F&P Proceedings Internal 1919: F&P-Intl-Fcb-l 85186-Part B: Brigadier General John Rose, Inspector General Imperial Service Troops to R h. Holland dated 23 September 1918.

Acknowledgements

I acknowledge with gratitude the permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to quote from material held in the Royal Archives. I also acknowledge with gratitude the permission of the Archives of the Royal Palace, Brussels, to use the photograph of King Albert of the Belgians with King George V on the Market Square of Fumes December 1914. With one or two exceptions I have not been able to speak to descendants of those who served, but where I could engage with them I have been accorded a warm welcome and a willingness to share their stories. I did meet former State Forces officers through the good offices of Maharana Arvind Singh of Mewar (Udaipur) and Brigadier Bhawani Singh ofJaipur, but of course none of these had seen service in the First World War, though some were able to talk of their fathers who had served in that conflict. To them all I am extremely grateful for their time and hospitality. I am indebted to Thakur Bhawani Singh of Palawala who carefully preserved the papers and artefacts of his late grandfather. Major Hukum Singh, and to his son Jitendra Pratap Singh Bhati of Jaipur who shared that material with me. To Squadron Leader (Retd.) Rana T S Chhina MBE and his staff at USI-CAFHR, Delhi, especially Bhanushali Gahlot, I owe an enormous debt of gratitude for all the help I have been given throughout the three and a half years of research. I have had considerable help in accessing records and gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the staff of the British Library, India Office Library and Records, and particularly Mr Dudley Sutton and Dr Antonia Moon who at various times smoothed the path to some of the more obscure areas of the archive. My thanks to the staff of the Imperial War Museum, London, for suggesting sources of images, and to the National Army Museum, and especially Jasdeep Singh, who readily identified two images in which I was particularly interested. I am grateful to the staff of the National Archives of India for their assistance in accessing Foreign and Political Internal Part B papers, which only exist in Delhi. Rob Clarke helped enormously with access to the National Archives at Kew and did much of the footwork there on my behalf. He also gener­ ously shared notes based on his own research into casualty figures. 1 am grateful to Ellen Head for permission to use the unpublished part of her late husband Richard’s details of caste returns. Gavin Edgerley-Harris, Director, The Gurkha Museum, and his team searched for the picture of John Latham Rose, Inspector General Imperial Service Troops throughout the period of the war. Parveen Sodhi kindly shared her xix

XX

For The Honour of My House

pictures of the Monastir Road cemetery and of the headstone of Major Lutf Ali Khan of Indore while Rana China shared images ot Indian Princely State medals from his own archive. Many friends in India have given generously of their time and resources to assist me and I am grateful to Brigadier M S Jodha, whose own book on the Jodhpur Lancers is eagerly awaited and who readily agreed to my use of his illustration of the memorial at Haritan, Aleppo; Mrs Anuradha Reddy, Convenor INTACH Hyderabad, who readily shared her pictures of the 2 Hyderabad Lancers memorial and of that at Sachin State; Sushil Talwar for sharing his information on the Military Cross awards and for allowing photography of some of his Indian Princely State medals; Cliff Parrett and Rana Chhina for sharing their information on lOM awards; Adil Rana Chhina for his research in Delhi on those many occasions when I could not be there in person, and Brigadier Sukhjit Singh MVC of Kapurthala for his continuing support and encouragement and for his generous access to his photo­ graphic archive of Kapurthala. To Barbara Taylor my thanks for her superb maps and to the editorial team at Helion my grateful thanks for their unfailing courtesy and support. My warmest thanks to Anjum Kazimi Chhina for her generous hospitality and care during my several research visits to India, and to my wife, Linda, for her enduring patience, encouragement and support, especially at those moments when all was not necessarily going to plan. Any errors or omissions are my responsibility.

I

List of Abbreviations

AA&QMG ADC AHQ_ Appx. AQMG ASC ASSO ATC att. AWM BL/IOLR CIGS CIH C in C CO CWGC FF F&P

GOC GR HEIC HS HT lA lARO IFF IGIST INTACH IO[s] IOR[s] 1ST IWM

Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General Aide-de-Camp Army Headquarters Appendix Assistant Quarter Master General Army Service Corps Assistant Special Service Officer Animal Transport Corps attached [to another unit] Australian War Memorial [Canberra] British Library, India Office Library and Records Chief of the Imperial General Staff Central India Horse Commander in Chief Commanding Officer Commonwealth War Graves Commission Frontier Force Foreign &. Political Department, Government of India (responsible for relations with the Indian Princely States) General Officer Commanding Gurkha Rifles Honourable East India Company Hospital Ship [followed by ship's name] Hired Transport [followed by ship’s name] Indian Army Indian Army Reserve of Officers Indian Expeditionary Force Inspector General Imperial Service Troops Indian National Trust for Archaeological and Cultural Heritage Indian Officer[s] Indian other rank[s] (non-commissioned ranks) Imperial Service Troops Imperial War Aluseum [London] XXI

xxii

For The Honour of My House

KAR LofC

MLE MO NAI NAM NWFF OC OR[s] ORBAT POW R&F RE Rs SAA SS

sso TNA USI-CAFHR

WE

King’s African Rifles Lines of Communication (the rear support echelon of a fighting formation) Magazine Lee Enfield [also RSMLE, Rifle, Short, Magazine Lee Enfield] Medical Officer National Archives of India [Delhi] National Army Museum [London] North West Frontier Force Officer Commanding other rank[s] (non-commissioned ranks) Order of Battle Prisoner of War rank and file (non-commissioned ranks) Royal Engineers Rupees small arms ammunition Steam ship [followed by ship's name] Special Service Officer The National Archives [Kew, London] United Service Institution of India — Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research [Delhi] War Establishment

Honours and Awards

VC

Victoria Cross

The Most Honourable Order of the Bath KCB Knight Commander

CB

Companion

The Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St George

CMC

Companion

The Most Exalted Order of the Star of India GCSI Knight Grand Commander KCSI Knight Commander CSI Companion

The Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire GCTE Knight Grand Commander KCIE Knight Commander CIE Companion

List of Abbreviations

xxiii

The Royal Victorian Order Knight Grand Cross GCVO

KCVO CVO MVO

Knight Commander Commander Member

The Most Excellent Order of the British Empire Knight Grand Cross GBE

KBE CBE OBE MBE BEM DSO lOM MC OBI IDSM IMSM MID

Knight Commander Commander Officer Member Medal of the Order of the British Empire Companion of the Distinguished Service Order Indian Order of Merit Military Cross Order of British India (either 1st or 2nd Class) Indian Distinguished Service Medal Indian Meritorious Service Medal Mention in Despatches

Non-English words

helium bund dhoti firman/farman

jehad/jihad kala pani khamsin

kharita lakh maund sanad

Schutztruppe tarbush

A local river craft used, amongst other things, for creating floating pontoons for bridges [in Mesopotamia] embankment, causeway loin cloth a formal order issued by a ruler of a Princely State small coracle [Mesopotamia] holy war Hindi for black waters an oppressive, hot, dry and dusty south or south-east wind occur­ ring in N. Africa, around the E Mediterranean and the Arabian Peninsula intermittently in late winter and early summer, but most frequently between April and June leading to sandstorms formal letter to the Viceroy one hundred thousand unit of weight measurement which varied around India, but the standard conversion was 82 2/7 pounds avoirdupois a title deed or Charter granted to the ruling princes confirming them in their states, in return for their allegiance German colonial defence force East Africa cap, also known as fez

1

A Historical Perspective

During the period of the British Raj in India, the country fell into two separate camps for internal and administrative purposes; British India, governed initially hy the Governor-General and latterly hy the Viceroy with the full machinery of central, provincial and district administrations; and the Indian States, each responsible for its own internal administration, though under British ‘supervision’ to one degree or another through Residents or Political Agents. States varied in size from Kashmir, with a geographical area larger than France and a population in 1931 of 6 16 million, or the slightly smaller Hyderabad but with a 1931 population of 16 16 million and a revenue which rivalled that of Belgium, to estates such as Varnol Nandi covering an area of one square mile with a population of 87 (there were two shareholders) where the powers of the chief were virtually non-existent. Between them the States accounted for two-fifths of the area of then undivided India, excluding Burma, and one third of the population. Financial revenues varied depending on natural resources and the quality of the land. The foundation of the Mughal Empire had been laid in 1526 at the Battle of Panipat when Babur defeated the last Muslim Sultan of Delhi. These same Muslim rulers had in turn defeated and subjugated earlier Hindu kingdoms, exercising suzerainty over them in exactly the same way that, before them, more powerful Hindu kings had exercised suzerainty over, and intervention in the internal affairs of, less powerful but no less divine sovereigns. All of these systems worked on the principle that the lesser rulers offered allegiance to the more powerful one; subordinated their foreign policy to his diplomatic moves; usually served him in war and offered him tribute; but in other respects maintained their own sovereignty. Like the Sultans before them, who now recognized the paramountcy of the Mughals, the new rulers retained the system of subordinate rulers. Babur’s grandson, Akbar, asserted his authority over the Muhammadan kingdoms in the manner of succession and retained for himself the power to depose any ruler for disloyalty. Control was maintained by governors who ruled on behalf of the Emperor, with viceroys ruling over the more distant provinces but without any sovereign rights of their own.

25

26

For The Honour of My House

It was Akbar’s great-grandson, Aurangzeb, who weakened the Mughal Empire by his attempts to conquer the Muslim kingdoms of Bijapur and Golconda, and tn subjugate the Mahrattas. Furthermore, Aurangzeb was a bigoted Muslim, unlike his two predecessors, and it was his religious intolerance which alienated the allegiance of the Mahratta Hindus. Within 20 years of Aurangzeb’s death the Mughal Empire had collapsed. Mahratta and Rajput chieftains consolidated their positions, the former by establishing new states, the latter by reasserting their sovereignty and independence which had been inherent in the land for centuries. At the same time the Viceroys of Bengal and the Deccan had been establishing hereditary rights in their provinces, whilst in the Punjab the Sikhs began to form several states. It was into this arena that the British and other Europeans were to bring their own conflicts, mirroring their rivalries in Europe. The British expansion into the Indian sub-continent began as a trading venture without any plan to take over territory, or to subject people to its rule. The early merchants, later to become the Honourable East India Company (HEIC), arrived without military forces and were only interested in making profits by a two-way trade in goods. Three main centres sprang up in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta; factories were built and agreements reached with the local Indian officials and rulers. The British, however, were not alone in trying to exploit the sub-continent’s potential. The Dutch, Portuguese and French were also on the scene and set up rival trading organisations, though eventually the British gained the upper hand. The earliest treaty signed was with Sawantwari on 12 January 1730, but this and subsequent early treaties were aimed at no more than the maintenance of the Company’s privileged position of trade against its rivals. Nevertheless, such treaties aimed at protecting the commercial stake in the country actually laid the foundations of the British Empire in India. It was Richard, Marquess of Wellesley and Earl of Mornington, who came to India as Governor-General in 1798, who was convinced that the British had to become the one paramount power in the country. The military achievements of Wellesley and of his brother Colonel Arthur Wellesley, later the Duke of Wellington, play no part in this narrative though it is worth pointing out, of course, that the numerous battles fought over the next 50 years in India were largely against the armies of the native rulers. The Charter Act of 1833 abolished the HEIC’s trading activities and allowed it to assume the functions of the government of India. Territories were annexed, often on allegations of maladministration or malpractice, the rulers deposed and their followers dispossessed. Most states entered into a treaty with the British which usually confirmed the state’s boundaries, identified any tribute to be paid, set out the details of help to be provided by the parties in time of war and forbade the state entering into discussions or agreements with any other Indian state or foreign power. Apart from his military achievements Wellesley’s greatest contribution was the introduction of a policy of subsidiary alliances with the rulers. These alliances, started by Wellesley and completed by Lord Hastings, allowed the stationing of Subsidiary' Forces in or near States. Composed of troops of the Indian Army drawn from Madras, Bengal and Oudh but officered by the British, they were paid for by the States, usually

A Historical Perspective

27

by the cession of lands but occasionally by monetary payment. Ostensibly these Subsidiary Forces were raised for the purpose of protecting the governments of the States concerned against both external and internal enemies, but in fact they were also intended to be used by the British Government for the coercion of the Native State itself if necessary. Localities chosen for Subsidiary forces were important because they were distant from the centres of British power but allowed the British presence to be felt. Subsidiary forces were stationed in or near Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda, Gwalior, Indore, Travancore, Cochin and Cutch. The system was not without its faults. Generally, the Ruling Princes were deemed to have lost prestige under this British surveillance, and in later years the British were to deny the use of the Subsidiary Force for suppressing disturbances, suggesting in one case that the ruler form his own yeomanry for such duties. Separate from the Subsidiary forces were Contingent forces which, as originally defined, represented the reformed troops of the Native States themselves, kept ready to preserve internal order and to act with British troops if the need arose. In later years the British sought to confuse the issue by using the terms Subsidiary and Contingent alternately to refer to a British force established in a Princely State. Contingents were maintained by Baroda, Bhopal, Bundelkhand, Gwalior, Hyderabad, Jodhpur and Kotah, with a United Malwa Contingent paid for by Indore, Jaora and Dewas. Generally, they proved to be neither efficient nor reliable. It was not unusual for a ruling family to be unconnected with its people, either by religion, race or caste. The Maharaja of Kashmir was a Hindu Dogra whilst the bulk of his people were Muslims. The Nizam of Hyderabad was a Muslim whilst his people were mainly Hindus and the Maharajas of Gwalior were Mahrattas of a totally different caste to their subjects. The situation was aggravated by the rulers importing people of their caste to hold most of the senior posts within the state, thus leading to communal discord. A prince could have an importance greater than the size or wealth of his state by virtue of his caste or his religion. The Maharana of Mewar was the leader of the most important Rajput clan and, by virtue of the state’s great history, was the most influential Rajput in all India. The Maharaja of Bharatpur was the most important Jat prince and commanded the respect of all Jats. The Maharaja of Patiala was the foremost Sikh in India after the collapse of the Sikh Empire in 1849. The Nizam of Hyderabad was not only the most important Muslim prince, but was also seen by the British as the premier prince within India. Some important families and rulers held very high-profile roles at the time of entering into treaties with the British, but their actual land holding was very small. The rulers of Dhar, Dewas and Rampur, for instance, were famous generals and warriors who had great influence on the history of India but whose material power in terms of land, wealth, population and resources were insignificant when the British formalized the situation. Many of these rulers gained respect from their campaigns against the Mughals and the British. Subsequently, further honour was gained by them as they fought as allies of the British.

28

For The Honour of My House

The events of 1857 identified the main problem with the Contingents in that they tended not to be recruited from the population of the State whose name they bore. They were not motivated by personal loyalty to their chief, but were largely drawn from what had become a universal recruiting ground, Oudh and Behar. When the Mutiny, or Great Revolt, of 1857 broke out the Contingent troops followed the example of the Bengal Army and not that of their rulers, and joined the Mutiny. For the rulers, many of whom remained loyal to the British authority, it was a sad betrayal to witness the acts of their Contingent forces. There were, of course, exceptions but the ending of the Mutiny saw the majority of the Contingent forces either disbanded or formed into other types of unit. The end of the 1857 Mutiny also saw the responsibility for government pass from the Honourable East India Company to the British Crown, with the Governor General becoming the monarch’s Viceroy. Treaties between ruling princes and the Company were transferred to the Crown and exercised through the Government in London, the Crown acting for each State in its dealings with foreign powers and with other Indian States. Queen Victoria’s proclamation of 1858 announced that the British were seeking no extension of present territorial possessions and maintained that We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native Princes a.s our own. ’ As Copland has observed, this ensured “that in an undefined but substantial way, the fate of 600 royal houses in India became bound up with the reputation of another in England.’’* The States were administered by the Indian Government through Residents and Political Agents working under the Political Department of the Government of India. The most important states, Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda, Kashmir, Mewar, Jaipur and Gwalior had Residents and were in immediate political relations with the Government of India. The remaining states had either Agents to the Governor-General or Political Agents. The formation of Subsidiary and Contingent forces had not led to the disbandment of the remainder of the State Ruler’s private armies. The large size of some of these armies was the cause of some anxiety, as much for the unnecessary drain on resources of the State as for their possible danger in the event of disturbance, since their disci­ pline was never perceived to be entirely satisfactory. “They, however, represented an outward and visible sign of power ... to their rulers and as such were naturally dear to them.’’’ Once the Contingent forces had been disbanded following the Mutiny the States no longer actively contributed to the defence of the Empire, although discussion had

1

2 3

V.P. Menon, The Story ofthe Integration ofthe Indian States (New York: MacMillan, 1956, as reprinted by Arno Press, New York, 1972 for World Affairs, National and International Viewpoints), p. 9. Ian Copland, The Princes ofIndia in the Endgame ofEmpire 1917-194'7 (Cambridge: University Press, 1997), p. 17. Major G. F. MacMunn and Major A. C. Lovett, The Armies ofIndia (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1911), p. 193.

A Historical Perspective

29

often taken place as to what a fair contribution might be of the States towards the expense of the protection under which they, or at least their rulers, flourished. Some argued that the States owed some assistance to the government; others were not so certain. In 1873 Major Owen T. Burne CSI' prepared a report on the State armies, drawing on a paper by the Foreign Secretary of Calcutta of July 1871, and from later docu­ ments. Burne noted that:

There is a certain difference of opinion as to whether it would be better to exer­ cise a control over the armies of the Native States by appointing our own Officers to them and rendering them an efficient and useful auxiliary in time of trouble, or whether it would be more advisable to leave them alone. Past experience and present public opinion in India incline to the latter view, with the recollection that our local Native Contingents almost to a man deserted us in the military rebellion of 1857-58, and became our most formidable opponents. Our present policy would seem to be to content ourselves with keeping a watch over gun foundries such as are said to exist at Indore, Cashmere, and in some parts of Bundelcund, for the manufacture of ordnance or rifles of a superior kind; to control the military aspirations of Chiefs like Scindia who are unable to ensure the fidelity of the disciplined armies they create, and to keep alive a good mili­ tary feeling between ourselves and our Native feudatories by the employment of their troops whenever we may see a chance, either in camps of instruction, or in real expeditions within reach of their States, even if it be only for escorts or baggage guards."

This view was echoed five years later following renewed discussion on the use of the native armies. The Governor-General in Council considered the matter but admitted “... the impracticability, under present conditions, of working out a scheme for asso­ ciating the troops of the Native States with the Imperial Army. Since, therefore, the armies of Native States cannot be utilized along with the Imperial forces for the defence of the Empire, it follows that, if they are in excess of internal requirements, they ought to be reduced.”'’ He went on to call for a return, by 31 December each year, of the strengths, arma­ ments and organization of the native armies. lie Times newspaper saw the State armies as a potential danger.

4 5

6

Owen Tudor Burne, later Major General GCIE, KCSl British Library, India Office Library and Records (BL/IOLR): BL/lOLR/L/MIL/17/6/74: Major Owen Burne, Memorandum - Native States and Armies, 4 April 1873. BL/IOLR/R/2 (1/17): Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner of Mysore, Fort William, 15 January 1878.

30

For The Honour of My House

[They] might have been tolerated if they had not acquired increased efficiency, improved arms, and a greater perception of the advantages of union ... Whether they are considered from the point of view of a political danger to ourselves, of the waste of vast sums of Indian treasure, or as distracting the attention of their rulers to vain dreams of pomp and ambition from necessary duties of adminis­ tration and provident legislation, there can be but one verdict, that they have no right to continued existence.'

It was the dangers of a large war, so forcibly brought home to the authorities in India by the Panjdeh incident in 1885, that changed the perceptions of both the Government and the rulers of the States towards their role in the military sphere." Following tbe end of the Second Afghan War in 1880, and having established what it considered to be a buffer zone between the Indian Empire and the expanding Tsarist Empire through the establishment of a pro-British Amir in Afghanistan, Britain becante increasingly alarmed at the steady Russian advance towards Merv, close to the Afghan border. This the Russians occupied in February 1884, much to the consternation Qf London. A joint Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission was scheduled to meet in order to attempt a resolution of the dispute, but this was delayed by the Russians as further moves took place towards the Panjdeh oasis which they seized on 31 March 1885. As the retreating Afghan troops moved to Herat the Government of India was instructed to mobilize an army to move to the Afghans assistance should the Russians attack the Herat fortress and make war inevitable. Sensing that the British were serious the Russians withdrew from Panjdeh and the Boundary Commission resumed its task, finally agreeing to the boundary. The incident impressed upon the rulers the necessity for them to stand with the government. With half the army in India on the move in 1885, and with the immense sums of money being spent on preparing for a war that seemed inevitable, the Nizam of Hyderabad offered a large sum from his revenues to the government in aid of the war chest, an example which was promptly followed by others. The government, however, did not feel that a contribution to the war chest was as desirable as an entry into some share of the Empire by the maintenance of a portion of the troops required for its defence. Gradually the idea began to gain ground that some scheme for utilizing the military resources of the rulers ought to be worked out. Principal proponent of this idea was Colonel George Chesney who, having witnessed the Punjab Contingent at the Rawalpindi Camp, proposed that they be trained and brought up to first line standards so that, if called upon for assistance, they need not remain in the lines of communication where they would soon tire of playing a secondary role. He observed:

7 8

BL/lOLR/L/MIL/17/6/72: The Times, ‘The Armies of the Native States of India’ (reprinted London: Chapman & Hall Ltd, 1884), p. 167. J. M. Brereton, ‘ Ihe Panjdeh Crisis, 1885’, History Today, 29:1 (1979), pp. 46-52.

A Historical Perspective

31

Although these troops are good, they are not quite good enough. The material is excellent, but it has not been worked into the right shape; ... each Native State should be invited and encouraged to place a part of its troops on a more complete and efficient footing ... [to be] brought up to the standard of one of our own native regiments in respect of drill, musketry, equipment ... it should be supplied with breech-loaders, and some assistance ... either in the form of a European Adjutant ... or in the way of an inspector ..

He went on to suggest that certain Native State Officers be offered commissions as officers of the Indian Army. He suggested that the State would defray the cost of the regiment, retaining the unit at the disposal of the ruling Prince in peace time but releasing it to become an integral part of the Indian Army if called for active service. He also saw a political advantage in utilizing the troops for, while the Princes were unlikely to combine together against the British, for a variety of reasons, participation would unite them in the military system. At the same time he saw the native armies as a source of weakness to the British, tying up large numbers of troops to watch over them. He observed, “We must trust the Princes of India if we are to hold the country” and felt that his proposal would demonstrate a degree of trust.’" He suggested that the idea should be tried slowly “... and a beginning might be very well made with the excellent troops of these Punjab Chiefs, because we know that the material of these is good.”” A couple of years later Major Melliss of the Bombay Staff Corps was selected to visit the States and study the actual condition and probable future capabilities of their armies.'^ He concluded that a portion of the troops belonging to the States could be equipped and trained for active service and by January 1888 a variety of offers had been received from the rulers. Details were forwarded to London while, in India, a committee consisting of Sir Frederick Roberts, C in C, George Chesney, principal architect of the scheme. Foreign Secretary Sir Mortimer Durand, and Sir James Lyall'" met to consider the proposals, reporting on 26 September. Without waiting for clearance from London the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, set out his proposals at a durbar held on 17 November 1888 to celebrate the marriage of the

BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/6/76: Colonel G. Chesney, Memorandum - Employment of Armies of Native States, 29 April 1885. [George Tomkyns Chesney, later Lieutenant General Sir, KCB CSI CIE 1830-95, Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department 1880-86, Military Member of the Supreme Council of the Government of India 1886-91]. 10 Chesney, Memorandum. 11 Chesney, Memorandum. 12 Howard Melliss, later Colonel Sir, KCSI 1847-1921, Inspector General, Imperial Service Troops 1889-1900. 13 Sir James Broadwood Lyall GCIE KCSI 1838-1916, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab 1887-92.

9

32

For The Honour of My House

Maharaja of Patiala. He referred to the offers of assistance made at the time of th^ Panjdeh incident and repeated in 1897 on the occasion of Queen Victoria’s jubilee. He continued:

The Government of India does not think it necessary, or in all respects desirable, to accept from the Native States of India the pecuniary assistance which they have so freely tendered. But in one very important particular we wish to enlist their cooperation. The armies of the Native States are strong in numbers but at present of various degrees of efficiency. Among many of them there exist warlike traditions, and fine soldierly material, while some already contain regiments well worthy to share in any active operations which Her Majesty s troops may be called upon to undertake. What we propose, in a few words, that we should ask those Chiefs who have specially good fighting material in their armies, to raise a portion of those armies to such a pitch of good efficiency as will make them fit to go into action side by side with the Imperial troops. For this purpose some extra exertions will be necessary ... But we shall in no case ask a Native State to maintain a larger force for this description than it can well afford to support ... To help these Chiefs in setting on foot and maintaining the troops selected for service a few English officers will be appointed as advisers and inspectors. Capable Native Drill Instructors will also be lent to the Native States from our own regiments. The selected troops will be armed with breech-loading weapons presented to the several States by the British Government. These will be carbines for the cavalry and Snider rifles for the infantry. It is hoped that in this way each force will remain a purely State force recruited in the territories ot its Chief, and serving with them, the troops composing it will gradually be made so efficient as to enable the Imperial Government to use them as part of its available resources to meet any external danger.''*

A slightly more jaundiced view was contained in a Government of India letter of March 1889, presumably addressed to the Secretary ot State, though this is not clear from the surviving document:

The armies of the Native States cannot be abolished, because they serve a variety of useful purposes. They form in many cases the only police of the State, and act as jail and treasury guards and the like. In other cases they are necessary to control unruly chieftains and tribes and maintain the authority of the recognised ruler. Moreover, we do not regard them as a source of danger to English rule. They are ill organised and ill armed, and have little in common with each other.

14

Brigadier General Stuart Beatson, CB, A History ofthe Imperial Service Troops ofNative States (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 1903), pp. iv-viii.

A Historical Perspective

33

The Native States are, we believe, among the most loyal portions of Her Majesty’s Empire; but even if they were not so, any general combination among them against the central power would be an impossibility. They are very numerous, and formed from a variety of distinct and once hostile races, and the mutual jealousies of their Chiefs are strong. Nevertheless it must be admitted that many Native States maintain armed forces in excess of their real requirements, and in any time of general excitement and disturbance it is possible that here and there these forces might become a source of anxiety both to us and to their own chiefs. Bodies of armed men poorly and irregularly paid, and with little discipline, are likely under such circumstances to prove unmanageable. To this limited extent there is truth in the contention that the armies of Native States are larger than they should be. It is also true, on the other hand, that they form a valuable reserve of power. Though many of them are worthless from a military point of view, and must always remain so, because of the material from which they are formed, others, as we have said, are raised from warlike races and are capable of becoming efficient troops. They have more than once done good service to the English Government, notably during the sepoy mutiny and the last Afghan war. It seems unfortunate that this reserve of strength should be neglected, and that for ant of organisation and arms what might be a valuable body of auxiliary troops should be lost to us.” Despite such negative opinions about the material at hand, the scheme was launched and eagerly accepted by the rulers. The units detailed to participate became known as Imperial Service Troops (1ST). By 1889 the movement had made a start with regi­ ments of cavalry, battalions of infantry, companies of sappers, the Camel Corps of Bikaner, and units of mule and pony draught transport being formed. From the outset the primary objective was to organize units trained and equipped to Indian Army standards and capable of taking part in campaigns alongside the Indian and British armies. It was essential, therefore, that the levels of training and equipment were monitored on a regular basis and that experienced officers of the Indian Army should be made available for this role. The officers were seconded for fixed tours and were usually experts in their arm of service. When the Indian State Forces Scheme was introduced after the First World War the same objectives were maintained. The officers, usually majors and captains, were designated initially as Inspecting Officers and Assistant Inspecting Officers but these titles were later changed to Military Adviser and Assistant Military Adviser, a much more sensitive naming. In time of war the Inspectors/Military Advisers often went with the units with

15

BL/IOLR/L/P&S/10/894, file 3263/1920: Indian States 1920-1930, including reorganisation of Imperial Service Troops/Indian State Forces. Extract of paragraph 4 of Government of India Secret letter No. 18 dated 13 March 1889.

34

For The Honour of My House

which they had been working, either as Special Service Officers or occasionally commanding officers. At the head of this organization was an Inspector-General, later known as Milit^j-y Adviser-in-Chief, who was either a Major-General or Brigadier-General. He h^d overall responsibility for all matters dealing with the troops for whom he was respon­ sible. The duties included preparing annual reports on each unit covering all aspe^js of its state and readiness for its war role such as strength, morale, quality of offic^j-s and men and level of training. He also had the authority to recommend that units |,e allowed to join the scheme or that they be removed from it. The role obviously called for an element of diplomacy as Ruling Princes could be very sensitive to criticisjn in matters affecting their dignity, especially when the troops were commanded and officered by Indian gentlemen, many of them members of the Princely families, and maintained entirely at the expense of the rulers and Durbars of the States concerned. Nor were rulers likely to take kindly to allegations that their administration might not be fulfilling its obligations. The States were grouped into Inspection Circles with an Inspecting Officer and Assistant Inspecting Officer (later Military Adviser/Assistant Military Adviser) presiding over each Circle, and visiting each State in turn. The scheme was not without its opponents in London, principally because it w^s feared that the ratio of Indian to European forces, so carefully guarded since tfie Mutiny, was being altered to a dangerous degree. The arguments were countered trorn India and the scheme progressed, in many cases better than had been anticipated. Within a few years of its inauguration Imperial Service Troops were taking part in many operations, the most notable being the Hunza Nagar campaign of 1891-92, tfie Chitral operation of 1895, and the Mohmand and Tirah campaigns of 1897. The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries witnessed a significant development in the concept of the Imperial Service Troops. When the idea of using them was first mooted it was fully intended that they would be used for the defence of India. Barely 12 years after their formation there was a departure from this. The Boxer rebellion in China in 1900, the Boer War in South Africa 1898-1902 and the Somaliland expedition of November 1902 to July 1903 all saw the deployment in one form or another of some Imperial Service Troops, whether it was fighting troops to China and Somaliland or replacement horses and equipment to South Africa. None of the treaty obligations between the States and the Government of India required them to support the British outside of India, and yet they not only chose to do so but clamoured to be allowed to do so. Apart from the Imperial Service Troops the States continued to maintain their ‘regular troops’, numbering collectively 16,000 cavalry, 7,000 artillery, 70,000 infantry - 93,000 in all. They were generally of little military value although those of Gwalior, Hyderabad and Kashmir were fairly good and those of the Sikh and Rajputana States very good. The cost of maintaining the Imperial Service Troops was, however, quite high and the States therefore reduced their regular troops in order to meet that cost. The regular troops had the arms and equipment, and often the clothing of the early

A Historical Perspective

35

John Latham Rose, 1 GR, as a young Lieutenant 1895. He is in a group of 2/lGR riflemen, the winners of a Lahore Assault at Arms competition. Rose started the war as a Lieutenant Colonel, Assistant Inspector-General to Brigadier General H D Watson. When the latter was given a Brigade Rose assumed the appointment of Inspector-General and remained in that position throughout the war, ending as a Brigadier General and CIE. (Gurkha Museum)

Victorian or Georgian period. The Imperial Service Troops wore the regulation khaki and plain accoutrements for manoeuvres hut their full dress was often more elaborate than either the regular British or Indian armies. As the following chapters will show, the contribution of the States to the First World War was substantial, not only in terms of military forces but also in financial and material support. Several units distinguished themselves but certain defects in the organization and system of the Imperial Service Troops movement came to light both at the outbreak of and during the war. The armament of the 1ST was unsatisfactory. Their rifles, provided by the government in 1889, had become worn out and practically useless. They were not in possession of machine guns, nor were their officers armed with revolvers. Their ‘establishments’ were not up to date and varied in almost every

36

For The Honour of My House

unit so that mobilization of these units based on Indian Army establishments creafgel some difficulty. It is now an established fact, of course, that a change in the spend priorities of the Government of India at this time, had, at least in the near-te^jyi precluded any aspects of military modernization in India that would have incurygj significant cost. If that was so of the Indian Army then it can hardly be surprising t^^t it also permeated down to the Imperial Service Troops. But it meant that there some serious catching up to do at the beginning of the war.

2

Stepping Up

The Indian rulers were well aware of storm clouds gathering over Europe and would have noted the rising tensions in such incidents as Germany s failed attempt to gain a colonial foothold in Morocco in 1910, the clash between Turkey and Italy in 1911-12 for control of Ottoman Libya, and the expansion of some of the Balkan states in the aftermath of that episode. They would, of course, have noted the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, and were well aware of the deteriorating situation as Vienna planned punitive action to end Serbian expansion once and for all. They would also have noted Germany s guarantee of support for any action the Austro-Hungarian Empire might take, including the decision to prepare a pre-emptive invasion of France through Belgium on the assumption that an existing Franco-Russian alliance would make war inevitable. Britain wavered indecisively at this point but, once Belgium had been invaded on 4 August 1914, took the decision that France must not be allowed to fall. Once the government in London had declared war in the name of the King-Emperor the whole of the Empire was also automatically at war and this included India and the Princely States. Even before war had been formally declared some of the princes were making known their willingness to support whatever effort might be deemed necessary. Maharaja Sir Ganga Singh of Bikaner was one of the first off the mark with an offer to place the whole resources of his State, including his Imperial Service Troops, at the disposal of the Government, as well as requesting that he might be given the opportu­ nity for personal military service. He was assured that Should war break out there is little doubt the Government of India would gladly take advantage of Your Highness s patriotic offer.”'

1

BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/2421: Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol. 1, Jul-Aug 1914 (Diary 466),Tel S-484 4.8.14, F&P to Agent to Governor General Rajputana, Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, India, 1917. 37

.38

For The Honour of My House

Once war had been declared many of the rulers made immediate and spontaneous offers of all resources of their States to be placed at the disposal of the King-Emperor. This not only included the services of their Imperial Service units, where such units were supported by the State, but also other manpower for the Indian Army and for civil labour units, as well as financial and other resources. Within two days of war being declared the Government of India reported that Fervently loyal messages have been received from the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Maharajas of Indore, Bikaner and Kapurthala”^ leading the King to observe ■.. nothing has moved me more than the passionate devotion to My Throne expressed both by My Indian subjects, and by the Feudatory Princes and Ruling Chiefs of India, ^d their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the Realm, ^eir one-voiced demand to be foremost in the conflict has touched my heart ere were many more responses of loyal support as a result of this message being promulgated. In the weeks and months following the outbreak of war, and indeed throughout t e our year period of the war, offers and contributions continued to be made. Not a could be accepted, but of those that were they can be broken down into a number or main headings;

Personal Services

wanted to play a direct role in the war and the Viceroy made it clear the^Irn^ Ip it very desirable that certain Ruling Chiefs and most of for a possessed commissions should be given an opportunity Mahar ' intervened with the Commander in Chief to ensure that the Ext)edit' ° ^nd Gwalior should be invited to join the staff of an to 7th iM \ from India - Sir Ganga Singh of Bikaner was appointed staff ofa" Dwision with lEF ‘A’ in France, Bhupendra Singh of Patiala to the chanl uT ; Africa, though this was Division of Gwalior to 3rd (Lahore) tion for health France, though he had to drop out before embarkaRatlam SirS v made it known that, if possible, the Raja of his proposed d attached to a cavalry brigade headquarters, though P P ■ eployment met with some opposition from his own Rani - he went to 2 .3

HcpartmMtl^to 1: Vol l,Jul-Aug 1914 (Diary 499), Viceroy (Army BT/I( S/Sy v XV (no number) dated 6 August 1914. 8 SeXZ Proceedings, Internal A, Pro 74, No 1936-I.-A., Message dated

4

Bh/IOLR/L/MlL/17/5/2422: Army Department (General Service Branch)

lT874’memo 17?; A C f' ’& p" r (Diary 1285) dated T memo 113-I.A. C, Foreign & Political Department to Army Department.

Stepping Up

39

General Rimington’s staff in France where his ADC, Captain Thakur Raghunath Singh, died of disease on 15 July 1915, just three months after his arrival in theatre. Sir Sajjan Singh stayed on in France until May 1918, being promoted from Major to Honorary Lieutenant Colonel in June 1916 and Honorary Colonel in January 1918. Sir Madan Singh of Kishangar also served in France - he joined Sir Ganga Singh of Bikaner on the staff of 7th (Meerut) Division with lEF ‘A where he served from 29 August 1914 to 22 February 1915. Maharaja Hitendra of Cooch Behar went to 19th (Dehra Dun) Infantry Brigade, also with IFF A’ in France while Maharawal Ranjitsinhji Mansinhji, the Raja of Baria, went to 7th (Meerut) Cavalry Brigade in France. Nawab Abdul Majid Khan of Savanur was appointed an extra ADC to the GOC 6th (Poona) Division and served in Mesopotamia while the Jam of Nawanagar was appointed initially as an additional member of staff to Major General George Cookson commanding the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division in France in the rank of Major. ’ He later served as an ADC to the C in C Field Army, Field Marshal Sir John French and was promoted Honorary Lieutenant Colonel in January 1918 in recogni­ tion of his war service. Others not already holding honorary rank in the Army on first deployment were gazetted, ranging from Patiala as a Lieutenant Colonel to a number of the younger officers as Lieutenants.'’ The Raja of Akalkot was in England when war was declared and, on offering his services, was commissioned into the British Army and attached to 9th Reserve Regiment of Cavalry, affiliated to both 3rd and 7th Hussars. He was initially employed as a training officer at Shorncliffe in Kent, before going to a cavalry divi­ sion France. Ill-health forced his return to India in October 1915. Similarly, the Sar Desai of Sawantwadi was undergoing education in England when war was declared. His application to join the army was initially blocked on political grounds but on 24 June 1917 he was commissioned as a temporary Second Lieutenant and attached to 116th Mahrattas, then serving in Mesopotamia, where he remained until February 1919. The young Maharaja of Mayurbhanj (Orissa) was gazetted a temporary Second Lieutenant in the Royal Artillery and served in France.' Not all appointments were as fulfilling as their incumbents or the authorities might have hoped for. Sidi Ibrahim Aluhammad Yakub Khan of Sachin was appointed initially to the staff of Brigadier General Harry Watson in Egypt, though he ended up in East Africa and had to be invalided home from Mombasa in February 1915. Major Nawab Nasrulla Khan (Heir Apparent Bhopal) embarked with his Indian Army regi­ ment, 9th Bhopal Infantry, with the aim of serving with 3rd (Lahore) Division with

5

6 7

BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/2436: Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol 16, Oct-Dec 1914 (Diary 8228) dated 27.11.1914, Viceroy (Army Department) to Secretary of State for India. London Gazette (LG): Fourth Supplement 28939 dated 15 October 1914 to London Gazette dated 13 October 1914. His service was recognised after the war with the grant of Honorary Lieutenant rank Supplement to the London Gazette dated 29 July 1921.

For The Honour of My House

40

lEF ‘A’ in France, but he was invalided en route and left in Aden from where, on medical advice, he returned to India. The Begum’s second son, Nawab Mohammad Obaidulla Khan, offered his services but no opportunity arose for him to be deployed. Lieutenant Nawabzada Muhammad Khan of Palanpur had been appointed as ADC to Major General MacBean, commanding 21st (Bareilly) Infantry Brigade with lEF A in France but prior to embarkation was found to be medically unfit to serve. His place was taken by Lieutenant Kunwar Hira Singh of Panna, though in April 1916 he returned to India on 4 months’ sick leave and was determined by a medical board to be physically unfit to return to field duty. By February 1917, however, he had recov­ ered sufficiently to be appointed ADC to Major General Edward May, GOC Sth (Lucknow) Division, which was serving on internal security duties in India. Nawab Muhammad Iftikhar Ali of Jaora was destined to join 3rd (Lahore) Division with IFF A in France. At the moment of his planned departure for Karachi his son and eir apparent was taken seriously ill and subsequently died so the appointment was cancelled. There were occasions in which rulers came together to make a single offer. One such sample was that of the Rajas of Dhar, Jhabua and Alirajpur and the Rana of Barwani ering to provide and maintain at the front an inter-communication corps of two troops designed to relieve divisional cavalry of routine duties. Alternative schemes iscussed were for the provision of a bearer corps, a tonga service, a motor service or a mounted corps for special service. Whichever was chosen, the Rana of Barwani expressed a wish to be sent in charge of the unit." The provision of an ambulance the selected and Rana Ranjit Singh of Barwani was appointed to command 'TF

offi commission Indian rulers were not universally popular among senior possffi? reflecting a professional opinion about military efficiency, but equally whol 1^ reflecting an element of bias against the personalities involved or even the wer°e h Princely structure. While the initial objections from the Rani of Ratlam Sinn t "Managed by the Agent to the Governor General in Central India, discus­ sion turned to who else might be available:

c Raja of Raghogarh] is a small Chiefwho does not carry weight in Central ’ rir I do not see why he should not do so with Indian soldiers in Europe. I imagme that their ideas are vague as to the relative importance of Chiefs, except e iggest or those from their own part of the world, and that inside that circle ajas are just Rajas to them and all much alike. ' J

V’7^5/2427: Army Department (General Service Branch) Tel 3n W 7 a c®7, Aug-Sep 1914 (Diarv 3627), tcre Governor General Central India to otcretary Government I &P. AventT' nflnffia (NAI): F&P Proceedings Internal 1915; Inti-Apr-818-822-Pt B gent to the Governor General Central India, Indore, to J B Wood dated 14 November 1914.

Stepping Up

41

Rana of Barwani and his ambulances in France. The caption refers to Maharaja but this is inaccurate. (British Library, London, UK copyright of British Library Board/Bridgeman Images: BL33O8.3O8)

Even from the Commander in Chief, General Sir Beauchamp Duff: “These Chiefs are, of course, of no real use to us at the front. With tew exceptions they are a mere nuisance which has to be borne, from the military point of view, in order to meet the Political opinion as to prospective advantages and from J B Wood, Political Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, on finding a replacement for the invalided Maharaja of Patiala, “With so many Sikhs at war it is a pity we haven’t a good one [Sikh Ruler] to send.”" By March 1915 it had been decided that no more offers of personal services would be accepted for duty at the front,and those who returned to India, such as Patiala in April 1915, would not be replaced. This was not as clear cut as it might seem, however. In October 1915 the Nawab of Loharu was appointed to the staff of Sir

NAI: F&P Proceedings Internal 1915: Inti-Apr-818-822-Pt B, Minute signed by C in C, T E Scott and B Holloway to F & P Department dated 24 December 1914. 11 NAI: F&P Proceedings Internal 1915: Intl-818-822-Pt B, DO letter,] B Wood to Lieutenant Colonel F A Maxwell VC CIE DSO, Military Secretary to the Viceroy. 12 NAI: F&P Proceedings Internal 1915: Intl-Mar-8-12-Part B.

10

42

For The Honour of My House

Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer in Mesopotamia, though he lasted less than t\vo months before being returned to India on medical advice, and in the same month the Chief of Jamkhandi was granted the temporary rank of Captain while at the front in charge of an ambulance unit.” In November 1915 Colonel Nawab Sir Afzar-ul-Mulk of Hyderabad was transferred from Egypt to France to join the staff of Major General Michael Rimington commanding 1st Indian Cavalry Division.” In March 1916 the government accepted the personal services of Amarsinhji Banesinhji, Maharana R^ja Sahib ofWankaner, Kumar Shri Krishnachandra Kalubha of Bhavnagar and Kurrtar Shri Shivsinghji of Wankaner to join the Kathiawar Motor Ambulance Fleet in France and all three, as well as the Maharana Raja Sahib’s private secretary, Gajanan Jivabha Mahinentra, were granted temporary honorary rank in the army.'' In June 1916 Raja Malojirao Venkatrao of Mudhol was appointed to the staff of the GOC 32 (Imperial Service) Infantry Brigade in Egypt. Possibly one of the most iconic, and certainly most photographed, of Indian rulers was Colonel H.H. Maharaja Sir Pratap Singh,”’ at the time serving as Regent of Jodhpur. He, along with his charge, Maharaja Sumer Singh of Jodhpur, then a 16 year old, sailed with their own regiment, the Jodhpur Lancers (Sardar Risala), initially or gypt but then on to Europe when the regiment was diverted at Suez. Maharaja umer Singh was initially deemed to be too young and Sir Pratap Singh too old to though such objections were brushed aside at a very early stage. Although both t e regiment and Sir Pratap Singh were to stay in France until early 1918, Maharaja umer Singh did not, returning to his State in May 1915. He was replaced on General imingtons staff by Raja Sir Sajjan Singh of Ratlam. He and Sir Pratap Singh were c ose y involved with each other throughout the deployment in France. Sir Pratap ti>ng returned briefly to India during the cold weather of 1915-16 in connection with l^aharaja Sumer Singh, but was then back at the front again where, ® Sajjan Singh, he remained until the Indian cavalry was withdrawn Sin h h^ **’ early 1918. This lengthy stay at the front, during which Sir Pratap 1917 same hardships as the troops, caused the King to query in December Sir s’ ®‘discussing the 1918 New Year Honours List, why neither Sir Pratap nor JJ n ad received the Legion of Honour “considering that nearly every officer

NAIInternal 1915; Intl-Oct-323-360-Part B. thrcem A I Internal 1915: Intl-Nov-144-Part B. On his return to Egypt just Cavalr "c lieutenant General Rimington, Commanding the Indian services ''“‘I ‘’f “I desire to represent my high appreciation of this officer’s Qiiestm'.'" helpful in giving me the benefit of great experience in all Inti I concerned.” NAI F&P Proceedings Internal 1916 15 MAY“!‘®~N‘’«-^4-467-PartB. his arriv^’’ Proceedings Internal 1916: Intl-Mar-l-40-Part B.Tbe Earl of Carnwath dates 16 A , Prance as November 1915. S*’’ 'Where named as such in official citations the ■P Ung IS given as Pertab, but otherwise Pratap is used. 14

Stepping Up

43

King Albert of the Belgians with King George V on the Market Square ot I'urnes being accompanied by Sir Pertab Singh of Jodhpur (centre) and Maharaja Ganga Singh ot Bikaner (extreme right), 4 December 1914. (Archives of the Royal Palace, Brussels)

of note at GHQ_and at the War Office wear the French and Belgian decorations ... His Majesty feels that the manner in which Sir Pertab and Ratlam have stuck to the Indian Cavalry in France is most creditable.”’' Despite holding honorary rank in the Indian Army, a number of rulers such as the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Maharaja of Mysore, the Maharao of Kotah and the Maharaja of Jaipur were not recommended for field service, though no reasons were given. Others who had offered their own services in whatever capacity might be useful included the Nawab of Amb, Mir Ghulam Ali Khan, the son of the Mir of Khairpur,'” Maharaja Kishan Singh of Bharatpur,'*' Sahibzada Nasir Ali Khan of Rampur, the Mehtar of Chitral and others of the Khyber Agency, the chiefs of Mari, Bugli, Dombki and others of Baluchistan, including the Jam of Las Bela. There were

17

18 19

BL/IOLR/L/P&S/15/37, folio 168, Sir Clive Wigram to Lord Islington, 25 December 1917. Both were to receive the decoration in April 1918, Sir Pratap as Grand Officier and Sir Sajjan as Croix d’Officier, Legion d’Honneur (France) - see Appendix III. He served in France from February 1915 to April 1916. He was not allowed to serve directly because of his youth but his infantry and transport units served with distinction.

44

For The Honour of My House

still others, such as Dholpur, and the Heir Apparent of Palanpur who were prevented from leaving their States, either for health reasons or, occasionally, by Government concerns about the effective running of their States during their absences. The Maharaj-Rana ofjhalawar offered his services in the field of first aid and nursing but no opportunity arose for the offer to be accepted. Perhaps recognizing that some of the rulers would think that if they were going to war then they would need a retinue to accompany them, the Commander in Chief made it clear to all from the outset that they were to be limited to no more than three followers and two horses. The Maharaja of Idar, for example, stated that his minimum requirement would be for “at least 2 ADCs with 2 horses for each, one servant, one cook, 2 horses for myself with syce for each horse (the 6 syces would not be menials but Rajputs) and 6 mules for luggage.”^” He was quickly disabused of his ideas. Patiala tried to get around the restriction by nominating three companions. Sirdar Bahadur General Gurnam Singh, Confidential Secretary, Sirdar Bahadur General Bakshish Singh, Military Secretary, and Captain Sirdar Kishan Singh. The Commander in Chief’s response was quite blunt: The term followers may have misled Your Highness. Follower is a military term which means servants and does not include Staff Officers. Accommodation in ships is limited and this is one reason why HE the Viceroy directed that the number of followers accompanying each Chief should not exceed three. Maharaja Bikaner and other ruling Chiefs are not taking Staff Officers. I hope therefore that Your Highness will be able to make similar arrangements. With limited ship and mess accommodation it would not be possible for General Aitken to arrange as you ask and in view of HE Viceroy’s orders I regret I cannot make any changes.-'’

Patiala persisted for a while until informed that his three nominees could go as that'^h'^^^^ officers over and above the war establishment of the Patiala Infantry, but offi ^"'otild have to understand that they went in that capacity and not as staff whcr '”''' Patiala Infantry was destined for Egypt rather than East Africa, re It Was initially intended to deploy the Maharaja, the idea was dropped.

21

'RfL/MIL/17/5/2427: Army Department (General Service Branch) wespondcnee relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol 7, Aug-Sep 1914 (Diary ,3915) 18.9.14, Maharaja Idar to Chief of the General Staff. LR/L/MIL/17/5/2423: Army Department (General Service Branch) 1 relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol ,3, Aug 1914 (Diary 1945) Tel ‘ ^12-219 dated 22.8.14, C in C to H.H. Patiala.

Stepping Up

45

Financial Contributions

As one semi-official publication was to note in 1923 of the financial contributions from the States, “The bare list of those donations would fill a closely printed book of large dimensions and their total value, in money alone, can hardly be less than £.5 million sterling or seven and a half crore of rupees (out of a total net Indian contribu­ tion by 1919-1920 of £160 million).”^^- There were a number of principal headings under which the contributions and donations were divided: • •

•

State expenditure for the maintenance of Imperial Service Troops in the field, frequently covering everything from pay, to uniforms, to fodder for livestock. General expenditure in connection with the war effort. For example, the Maharaja of Mysore had placed 50 lakhs of rupees at the disposal of the Government imme­ diately on the outbreak of war, with another 10 lakhs in March 1917; others such as Bahawalpur, Baroda, Dewas Senior, Dewas Junior, Dhrangadhra, Indore, Jind, Kapurthala, Kashmir, Kotah, Shapura and Tonk made occasional payments of up to one lakh'., while others set up regular monthly payments ranging from the Gaekwar of Baroda - in his case Rsl2,000 in addition to his occasional dona­ tions, to the Feudatory Chief of Sonpur (Rs700), and the Maharana of Danta (Rs200). Specific donations towards the maintenance of Indian Army units in the field. For example, the Nizam of Hyderabad covered all costs for the maintenance of 20th Deccan Horse for the duration of the war, a regiment of which he was Colonel. The Rao of Cutch similarly provided all running costs on an annual basis for ‘the maintenance of an Indian Infantry Regiment at the front for [another] year or until the war is ended, whichever is sooner,’^'* while the Maharaja of Mysore provided money for ambulance carts and ponies lor 26th Light Cavalry, of which he was Honorary Colonel. The Maharao of Kotah provided money for the comforts of men of 42nd Deoli Regiment while the Maharaja of Datia met all expenses of fifty men supplied by his State to serve in 35th Indian Labour Corps.

Anon. India’s Contribution to the Great War - Published by Authority of the Government of India. (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1923), p. 167 and p. 228. 23 It should be noted that the Indian numbering system uses separators differently from the Arabic system used in western countries. Besides the three least significant digits of the integer part, a comma divides every two rather than every three digits, thus 100,000 (one hundred thousand) in the Arabic system would be expressed as 1,00,000 (one lakh) in the Indian System. 10 lakh equalled one million and ten million equalled one crore. Since 1898 the Indian rupee had been pegged to the pound sterling through a gold exchange standard whereby a rupee was worth l/4d (one shilling and four pence), so 15 rupees to the pound. However, the value of silver against gold had been falling almost continuously in the last years of the nineteenth century putting India into serious financial deficit. 24 NAI: F&.P Proceedings Internal 1916: Intl-Apr-94-lOO-Part B. 22

46

•

26

For The Honour of My House

Money for the provision of specific war materiel, though neither the following list of items nor the list of donors is exhaustive: 1. Aeroplanes - the Punjab alone (including that part falling within British India) subscribed to a total of 51 aircraft, of which Bahawalpur, Jind, Nabha and Faridkot provided two each while Kashmir provided four?' Rajputana Chiefs subscribed to a fund which supplied 15 aircraft. These contribu­ tions were not insignificant. The British Government set aside an initial expenditure of £40,000 and £25,000 recurring annually to organise a flight of aircraft for Mesopotamia but was able to note “We estimate that the initial expenditure will be reduced by approx. £6,400 as HH Maharaja Scindia has generously offered to defray the cost of four aeroplanes Rewa provided five planes - of which one operating in Egypt was described as ‘the best we have’*'. It crashed during bad weather but he picked up the total bill for its repair. Others included Baroda (five lakhs towards purchase), Benares (in conjunction with the Bhuinar Brahmin community of India), Bhopal, Bikaner (eight aircraft), Junagadh (three aircraft), Khairpur, the Ruling Chiefs and Talukdars of Mahi Kantha, Manipur, Mayurbhanj and Rajpipla. 2. Motor Ambulances - a combined gift of seven provided by Ali Rajpur, Dhar, Barwani and Jhabua; Maharaja of Chhatarpur; Maharao Raja of Bundi; Chief of Danta; Tana of Deoli; Maharwal of Dungapur; Faridkot (two); Chief of Jamkhandi; Kalsia Darbar, Kathiawar Agency - the first four classes of Chiefs in the region, the Sardars, Inamdars and Ryots of Kolhapur (four), Maier Kotla, Raja of Manipur (four). Raja of Poonch, Raja of Rajpipla (two lakli}, Raja of Raghugarh and the Chief of Sangli (four). 2- Mechanical transport - Datia, Dhar, Dholpur, Scindia of Gwalior, Idar, Holkar of Indore, Jind, Maharaja of Patiala (13 vehicles), Rajkot, Sailana and the Raja of Sitamau. Machine guns and other weapons - Maharaja of Jaipur, Jaora, Chief of Sonpur. A number of States offered the services of their workshops to manu­ facture munitions and explosive ordnance, including Bikaner and Jodhpur who offered a joint workshop, Bhopal, Gwalior, Kashmir, the Chief ofMiraj (Senior) and the Thakur Sahib of Morvi, but eventually a decision was taken

M S Leigh. The Punjab and the War, Lahore: Superintendent of Government Printing, R?7"‘’(’922),pp 63-64 - OLR/ L/MIL/17/5/3231: War Diary Army Headquarters [AHQj India,Indian tTp m‘D’(Mesopotamia), Vol. 9,1-30 April 1915, (Appx. 463, Diary 8844), India "''*554 29 Apr 1915 Viceroy (Army Department) to Secretary of State for

S^4’F?J'^L/M1L/1 7/5/3898: War Diary AHQ.India, Indian Expeditionary Force ‘E’/’E’ ■ J SLPb Vol. 6, March 1915, (Appx. 57, Diary 6329), General Maxwell to C in C India dated 26 March 1915.

Stepping Up

47

that only Hyderabad should be allowed to manufacture the finished shells, the quality of which was later commented upon favourably?’ 5. Anti-Submarine measures - Hyderabad contributed £100,000 towards a special anti-submarine vessel called Hyderabad for patrolling the seas around India’s coastline. 6. Miscellaneous - some of the other more unusual but equally welcome dona­ tions included 1,000 pounds of tea from Sirmoor for Sappers & Miners units on active service, 1,111 maunds^’ of rice for troops in Europe from the Maharaja of Sonepur, 4,124 maunds of hay from Nawab Nasrulla Khan of Bhopal, 10 maunds of Ghi from the Chief Seraikela, 200 palans or camel pack saddles from Jind, and 200 dhoties’" from the Chief of Bamra. The building or opening of hospitals and the maintenance of other buildings as convalescent homes. These not only included facilities in India, such as at Hyderabad, Jaipur, Bhavnagar, Baria, Benares, Mount Abu (the Maharao of Sirohi), Simla (Maharaja of Patiala), Datia, Indore (Maharaja of Ratlam), Naini Tai (Nawab of Rampur) Kasauli (Raja of Faridkot) and Ratlam, but also overseas such as Scindia of Gwalior’s convalescent home in Nairobi which remained open until May 1918, and Patiala’s convalescent home in Staines, England. Two of the more innovative and most welcome contributions came from collabo­ rative efforts among States and involved the provision of Hospital Ships. Led by Scindia of Gwalior and Begum Bhopal, 31 rulers" combined to hire initially, and then purchase outright, the Canadian Pacific Railway Company’s passenger and mail vessel. Empress of India, for conversion to a hospital ship, re-named H.S. Loyalty. The cost of buying and fitting out the ship as a 300-bed hospital amounted to some £120,000 and the cost of maintaining her for the four years of the war was £360,000, so almost half a million pounds sterling at World War I rates.The vessel was operated by the Royal Indian Marine. Some of the medical staff came on loan from the Government of India but the majority were supplied

NAl: F&P Proceedings Internal 1916: lntl-Jan-136-138-Part B, and NAI: F&P Proceedings Internal 1917: Intl-Feb-205-207-Part B. 29 The equivalent value of the maund varied around India but the standard conversion was 82 in pounds avoirdupois - Colonel H Yule and A C Burnell. Hobson-Jobson - a glossary of Anglo-Indian words and phrases. (Calcutta: Rupa & Co, 1989), p. 564. 30 Loin cloth. 31 Including Hyderabad, Jodhpur, Ali Rajpur, Rewa, Datia, Dhar, Sitamau, jhabua and Sailana, though a proposal to allow the Amir of Afghanistan to participate was blocked on the grounds that the Government needed to ensure the reputation of his neutrality. Nabha became a late contributor in May 1918. 32 NAI: F&P Proceedings Internal 1917: Intl-Feb-292-295-Part B. Scindia never wanted his co-subscribers to pay out more than they desired or could conveniently afford and so he undertook to underwrite any balance due at the end of the war, slightly helped by the fact that departmental charges were waived and only stock book rates charged on medical, clothing, ordnance stores and coal.

28

;

ifj ,,

, !

I

48

For The Honour of My House

H.S. Loyalty. (M. Rafiullah, Gwalior’s Part in the Great War, p. 96.)

by Gwalior, Indore, Dhar and Bharatpur. The ship was based in Bombay and operated between Egypt, Mesopotamia and India except for three months in 1915 when she operated in the Mediterranean in support of the Dardanelles campaign and was based in Southampton. In the south of the country the Madras War Fund made a substantial contribupon towards the purchase of another vessel, fitted out as H.S. Madras, and this und received many large donations from the Maharaja of Travancore, the Rajas o izianagram, Venkatagiri, Pudukottai and Cochin among others. As with the oya/Zy so the Madras operated between Egypt, Mesopotamia and India. e Maharaja of Nabha was among those who funded the provision of motor unches and other shallow draught vessels to be used as ambulances/hospital Euphrates and Tigris rivers in Mesopotamia. His was named TZ’c « while others included the Oudh and Punjab provided by the Maharaja of ^turdee provided by Travancore, a fleet of 13 boats provided bv Ci aharaja of Patiala at a cost of one lakh, and other vessels provided by the am of Dhar, Maharaja of Charkhari, Major Nawab Nasrulla Khan of Bhopal and the Raja ofJubbal, Contributions towards the maintenance of religious facilities for the various faith ~ Bhopal, Hyderabad and Tonk towards a mosque for soldiers in Basra; aridkot and the Kalsia Darbar towards a Gurdwara, also to be built in Basra, ontributions to various relief funds including the Imperial Indian Relief Fund, e rince of Wales’ Relief Fund, Viceroy’s Gift Fund, St John’s Ambulance tigade, and the Countess of Landsdowne’s Fund. Gifts and comforts for servicemen in the trenches Animals - horses, camels and mules, and occasionally the manpower needed to look after them. A large number of rulers, including Holkar of Indore, the

Stepping Up

49

Halt Anna postage stamp featuring U.S. Madras. (Rana Chhina)

Nizam of Hyderabad, the Jam of Nawanagar, the Chiefs ot Baroda, Bhopal, Dhar, Jodhpur, Mysore, Patiala and Rewa had offered all horses from their States that the Government might find convenient to accept, Ot the first Baroda offer, for example, it was subsequently reported that Captain Gordon, Army Remount Officer, had purchased 70 horses from the State Cavalry at a total cost Rs 24,825 but that the Gaekwar had made clear that all 150 horses which he had hoped would be accepted were without charge, so no payment was expected. This offer was accepted by the Government.” As the war went on yet more offers were made, or financial contributions given towards the purchase of horses. Some States, such as Alwar, Faridkot, Gwalior, Jind,Junagadh, Jodhpur, Patiala, Rampur and Udaipur, took untrained horses from the Government of India in exchange for trained horses from the States, and then broke and trained the new animals at their own expense before exchanging them for fresh new horses. Others, such as Bhavnagar and Indore, deployed troops to the Remount Depot at Basra to break and train horses in Mesopotamia. The Nawabs of Loharu and Dujana provided camels and drivers to 71st Mule Corps, Ferozepur, while Loharu also provided camels and men to No. 6 Camel Corps at Bhiwani. Kapurthala provided 50 equipped camels and 16 sarwans for service and Jind provided 140 camels as late as June 1918, the costs being met by the Chiefs and Sirdars of these States.

3.3

BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/2434: Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914. Vol 14, Oct-Nov 1914 (Diary 7183),Tel. 1012 W-14 dated 31 October 1914, Officiating Resident Baroda to Political Secretary Government of India F&P Department.

50

For The Honour of My House

Military Contributions

On the military front, there was a limited initial acceptance of offers of service and the decision not to accept all offers of Imperial Service Troops immediately led to some dissatisfaction among those rulers whose troops were not being sent overseas. The Government responded:

It is the desire of the Government of India that if possible all States, whose Imperial Service Troops are fit for active service, should be represented in some way in the forces which are going from India to fight for the Empire, and it is regarded as most probable that opportunities will arise during the course of the war for the employment on service of all ... Owing, however, to the probability of it being found necessary to meet future demands in the way of reinforcements, the Government of India have decided that it will not be expedient to expend all their resources at once and that it will be desirable to retain certain units in hand for later use when their employment will be just as effective as, if not more than, at present. In view of these considerations it will be clear that the units reserved for later use are not to be regarded as in any way inferior to those already selected for service.

In his history of 14th Bn The Punjab Regiment (Nabha Akai Infantry) Narain Singh claimed that the Maharaja of Nabha was out of favour with the British because he had insisted that his troops must not be asked to serve beyond the Frontier of India in accordance with the treaty terms between the Government and state. ” In fact this is not true: Nabha was one of the first to offer assistance on 8 August 1914. Although not immediately taken up, the Nabha Infantry eventually served in Mesopotamia towards the end of the war. By 1917 all 27 states maintaining Imperial Service Troops had seen contingents accepted for service, either in the actual theatres of war, which will be covered in greater detail in succeeding chapters, or to assist in securing India’s frontier territories, or in providing remount training or replacement units for internal garrison duties within British India so that regular units of the Indian Army could be released for front line service. It had become the accepted practice since the start of the 1ST scheme that states would only pay nominal charges when their troops were actively employed by the Imperial Government, but the Nizam of Hyderabad insisted upon paying all charges in connection with his troops and others were to follow his example. Several

34

'

BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/2428: Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol 8, Aug-Sep 1914 (Diarv 4451) memo 2081 I.A. dated 25 September 1914, Foreign & Political to Army Department. ""5* History 14th Bn The Punjab Revt (Nabha AkaiInjantry) (Dharmasala: Imperial Printing Press, 1953), pp. 11-12.

Stepping Up

51

states increased the establishment of their 1ST units following the outbreak of the war to meet additional demands. Bikaner, for example, raised another three companies of the Ganga Risala (Camel Corps) while Sirmoor raised another company of Sappers and Miners when the original company was taken captive at Kut al Amara. The total strength of 1ST employed by 1917 was:

Cavalry Camel Corps Infantry Sappers Artillery Transport Signallers Total

3,350 840 6,100 480 120 1,270 100 12,260

By the end of the war this figure had risen to close on 22,000 all ranks of which some 18,440 eventually served overseas. Throughout the four years of the war these troops were maintained in the field at the expense of their rulers and state durbars. Casualties were replaced by drafts, either recruited from their own territories or drawn from other units of their own forces. For a number of states the size of their units was too small to be used as a single entity and so they readily agreed to deploy detachments as reinforcements for other state units or for units of the Indian Army. The Baroda Durbar, tor example, opened the ranks of the Baroda Army for recruitment to the Indian Army. Although the move was broadly welcomed and led to the immediate volunteering by 613 or 618 soldiers,’" nevertheless the Secretary of State noted that the Gaekwar had held himself aloof from the Imperial Service Troops scheme and that his army deserved no special recognition. ’’^ The subsequent terms and conditions made clear that previous service in the Baroda Army would not count towards pension. In 1917 the Raja of Suket offered a contingent of 50 men under the command of his uncle, Mian Ganga Singh, for service. They were attached to l/21st Punjabis for initial training and on the departure of that unit on active service the contingent was attached to 2/54th Sikhs. They served as part of 2 Rawalpindi Division and were only returned to the

.36

37

38

BL/lOLR/L/MIL/17/5/2394: Memorandum on the military assistance given by the Ruling Chiefs of India in the prosecution of the war, dated 22 March 1917. BL/IOLR/17/5/2433: Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol 13, Oct-Nov 1914 (Diary 6856), letter 11111 dated 24 October 1914, Resident Baroda to Political Secretary to the Government of India. [The letter itself is uncertain of the exact number of volunteers]. BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/2435: Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol 15, Oct-Nov 1914 (Diary 7654), telegram P, Secretary of State to Viceroy (Army Department) dated 17 November 1914.

For The Honour of My House

52

State in February 1919.” The Maharaja of Manipur raised a Double Company of 266 men which was sent in December 1917 to Mesopotamia as reinforcements for 104th Wellesley’s Rifles, returning to the State in May 1919. As the war progressed, both the British and Indian Armies entered into a period of massive expansion. By the autumn of 1916 it had become official policy to exchange British divisions in secondary theatres for Indian formations, thus releasing British units for the Western Front. By 1918 it had become apparent that the traditional recruiting areas were overdrawn, war-weariness was setting in, and the British were compelled to look for alternative ways and means of improving manpower. In March 1918, following news of the great and almost successful German attack in France, the British, through the Viceroy of India, appealed to India and the Indian states to make an even greater contribution to the war effort. Two approaches were consid­ ered regarding the contribution of the Princely States. The first was to encourage the princes to raise Indian Army units from within their states which would bear their name: ■ to be comprised as far as possible of subjects of the State concerned but officered and equipped by the Government of India, it is intended that the contingents so formed will bear the name of the State in which they are raised, and the Ruler of the State will be the Honorary Colonel (or Colonel in Chief) while members of the Ruler’s family or other State notables will, at the discre­ tion of the King Emperor, be given honorary rank (of Captain or Major) on the nomination of the Ruler concerned Tk ■

nis process culminated in a number of battalions being raised by the time the war ended. It can be assumed that the contribution would have been greater had the war not ended when it did. As part of this process some Imperial Service units were inte­ grated into the Indian Army. T^e units raised were: Cavalry

46th (1st Alwar) Lancers - Towards the end of 1918 the Alwar Imperial Service Lancers (Mangal Lancers) was absorbed into the Indian Army and desig­ nated 46th (1st Alwar) Lancers. This arrangement did not last long, however, as the end of the war occurred before it could be put into effect in other than a nominal way, and it reverted to its previous role in 1919.

Infantry 3rd (Kolhapur) Battalion, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry

39

NAI: I8tP Proceedings Internal 1919: F&P-Intl-Feb-Nos. 307-309-Part B. NAI: F&P Proceedings Internal 1918: F&P-Intl-Dec-Nos. 355-366-Part B.

1

Stepping Up

1st Battalion, 1st Battalion, 1st Battalion, 1st Battalion, 1st Battalion, 1st Battalion,

53

140th Patiala Infantry 141st Bikanir Infantry 142nd Jodhpur Infantry 143rd Narsingh (Dholpur) Infantry 144th Bharatpur Infantry 145th Alwar (Jai Paltan) Infantry)

Kathiawar Company, 125th Napier’s Rifles - an interesting example raised from the Kathiawar states, estates and zamindaris, for the majority of which it was their only contribution to Imperial defence. The unit was attached to 125th Napier’s Rifles and later to the Depot, 2nd Battalion, 125th Napier’s Rifles before being disbanded at the end of the war. The largest contributor of men to this unit was Rajkot, followed by Nawanagar and Limbdi and then another 10 smaller states to make up the balance.

Signals 15th Kathiawar Signal Troop"" Transport Sth (Patiala) Camel Corps, Transport Corps 51st (Patiala) Mule Corps, Transport Corps 72nd (Patiala) Hired Camel Corps, Transport Corps

Mandi State provided recruits for the Signal Section, 2nd Battalion, 41st Dogras. All specially raised units were disbanded soon after the First World War except the Alwar Lancers and Infantry and the Bharatpur Infantry which reverted to being Imperial Service Troops. The second approach, which came about at the end of 1917/beginning of 1918, recognised that some States had deployed units of half battalion strength only, espe­ cially in East Africa,'’^ and even then had experienced some difficulty in providing sufficient reserves to maintain these units from within their own resources. It coin­ cided with an initiative from Egypt that 1ST regiments serving in that theatre should conform to the new establishments of regular Indian Army regiments serving there, with a field service strength of 930 plus a 15 per cent reinforcement, making a total of 1,070 all ranks. In a bid to raise new battalions, a proposal was tabled in late 1918 to form composite battalions by drawing on existing half-battalion State units and

41 42

This is the only unit of this kind to be referred to in subsequent chapters. The others, although forming a contribution from the States, were essentially Indian Army units and therefore fall outside the scope of this book. See Chapter 5. Size wasn’t necessarily everything when it came to effectiveness, and some of these half battalion units performed well, but providing reinforcements and replacements for casualties did prove difficult for some.

54

For The Honour of My House

combining the two State companies of those half battalions with two companies from a regular Indian Army unit. The new battalions would bear the name of the State providing the half battalion, but the battalion as a whole would be commanded by a British officer of the Indian Army with the Adjutant, Quartermaster, two company commanders and two company officers also drawn from the Indian Army. The 1ST element would have its own State officers plus two SSOs. Four definite proposals Were tabled**’ comprising: •

•

•

•

•

Nabha Infantry with its two companies of Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims and Punjabi Hindus combining with a special Punjabi Muslim company attached to ISth Sikhs and a special Jat company attached to 35th Sikhs: Jind Infantry with its two companies of Sikhs and Muslims combining with a special company of Punjabi Muslims attached to T124th Infantry and a special company of Sainis attached to 26th Punjabis; Kapurthala Infantry with its two companies of Punjabi Muslims and Sikhs combining with two special companies of Hindus, Muslims and Meos attached to Depot 13th Rajputs; and Bharatpur Infantry with its two companies ofjats, Gujars and Muslims combining with one company of Mahratta Brahmans attached to 116th Mahrattas and one company of Bhandaris attached to 114th Mahrattas. A possible fifth battalion was muted combining one company from Rampur Infantry and one company from Bhopal Infantry with two companies of TlSth Infantry in Hong Kong, but the difficulties of determining which State name should be used meant that the idea was quickly dropped.

Although the Nabha Infantry had yet to be deployed at the time of these proposals, the other three regiments had only just returned from East Africa and needed six months to refit so would not be ready until June 1918 at the earliest. It was also recog­ nised that all men of the composite battalions would have to be paid at the same Indian Army rate, with the Government meeting the additional costs for the State soldiers. As It transpired, the Nabha Infantry was sent to Mesopotamia, but on its own as a half battalion and without the proposed attachments from 15th and 35th Sikhs?'' The war ended before the other proposed composite battalions could be formed. Although not regarded as Indian princes, the Dalai Lama had offered 1,000 Tibetan troops while the Aga Khan had offered to serve as a private soldier in any regiment of the Indian Expeditionary Force. The tribes of Kurram and Swat Valley, along with the Sam Ranizai, were ready to raise a corps of Frontier Tribesmen if desired while offers had also been received from Amb, Bhutan and the Aden Hinterland.

43 44

NAl: F&P Proceedings Internal 1918: F&P-Intl-Oct-Nos.51-55-Part B. See Chapter 8.

Stepping Up

55

Some states had little to offer of immediate significance but still wanted to show their support. For example, the Nawab of Pataudi wrote to the Commissioner of Ambala District saying,

My State has no military force but 1 place at the service of the Government my treasury, supply of grain and fodder. Unfortunately I have no skilled labour in my State, but I can arrange if required to supply a considerable number of men for ordinary work of labour and camping. I know this is a very humble offer, but I am anxious to show my zeal and sincerity. Ready to present myself for any services required from me personally.'*'

In August 1914 the Nawab of Loharu wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Harry Watson, at that time officiating Inspector General Imperial Service Troops, before he was promoted and headed for Egypt: “... I am Chief of such a petty State that I have no Imperial Service Troops. But I have in my small State strong camels and can provide them easily ... the camels and mules are very useful in every country, Egypt or Europe. Transport is required everywhere.”*'' He was told that camels were not required at present, and that it would be diffi­ cult to ship them from India, though he was asked to keep his offer open in case it could be used later. In fact his offer was never taken up, though other states such as Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Kalat and Las Bela also offered camels and their offers were accepted and used with varying degrees of success in East Africa and Mesopotamia, as well as within India and the North West Frontier area.*' Sachin maintained no Imperial Service Troops but, being a coastal state within the Surat Agency of the Bombay Presidency, it provided manpower to serve on board transport ships. Numbers lost at sea, either in action or through other causes, have not been determined but the State raised an attractive memorial to their memory in 1928 (see chapter 10).

The Political Dimension So much for an overview of the contributions by the states. Why did they do it and what, if anything, were they looking to get out of it? There were those who saw the

45

46 47

BL/lOLR/L/MIL/17/5/2429: Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol 9, Sep-Oct 1914 (Diary 4650), letter 3763-S-Pol 26.9.14 Chief Secretary Government of Punjab to Secretary Government of India Foreign & Political. NAl; F&P Proceedings Internal 1915: F&.P-Intl-June-Nos.47T505-Part B. See Chapters 5, 8 and 9.

56

For The Honour of My House

war as “Essentially a white man’s war ... in Europe.Such a distinction might well be borne out by early titles of the AHQ_Delhi War Diaries - Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, - but within a very short time it had become a world war with the Indian Army carrying a heavy burden in the Middle East and Africa in particular. As already mentioned in chapter one, none of the treaty obligations between the states and the Government of India required them to support the British outside of India, and yet at the turn of the 20th century they had not only chosen to do so but clamoured to be allowed to do so. As shown in these pages, the same was true on the outbreak ol the war. So why? This is not an easy question but it needs to be approached in the context of time and place to give any meaning to a possible answer. The development of the states and their relations with the British has been briefly discussed in chapter one, but space does not allow a detailed examination of the many and varied factors contrib­ uting to such a complex relationship. In a speech to the English-Speaking Union at Dartmouth in January 1929, Sir Walter Lawrence''^ said:

The first two decades of the 20th century had been singularly good ones for the Indian princes. In 1900 the darbars had been isolated from one another and from British India, firmly under the bureaucratic thumb of the political department, a butt for Curzon’s paternalistic rhetoric; by 1921 they had emerged from the shadows into the sunlight as acknowledged partners of the British raj, no longer scorned but lauded as repositories of tradition and loyalty and political wisdom. Mere onlookers twenty years before, they had become the ‘steady goal-keepers in the great Indian game.’’" Such a journey had not been an easy one and there were many disagreements along

e way, not only between the British and the princes, and among the princes themse ves, but also between whichever political party. Conservative or Liberal, was in power in London at the time. For the British, the Mutiny of 1857 had brought home to them the iniquity of their of annexing supposedly ‘failing’ states and bringing them into British n la. Ihey therefore determined after the uprising to adopt a more inclusive approach towards the princes. Queen Victoria’s proclamation of 1858, announcing the British

Major Sarbans Singh, Battle Honours ofthe Indian Army 1757-1971 (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1993), p. 150. 49 Sir Walter Roper Lawrence Bart., GCIE, GCVO, CB - Indian Civil Service to 1896, rrivate Secretary to Viceroy Lord Curzon 1899-1903, Member of the Council of India, various missions under Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener in WWl, Major General Indian Air Force 1918, British Mission to Syria and Palestine 1919. 0 Copland, The Princes ofIndia, p.44 quoting Times ofIndia, 29 January 1929.

48

Stepping Up

57

attitude to the rights, dignity and honour of the princes,” set the tone for the new relationship, though it did not mean that the princes were to be treated as equals. New ‘Adoption Sanads were introduced, recognizing the prerogative of the rulers to adopt successors where natural heirs were not forthcoming. But these measures still did not prevent the British from stepping in where they perceived bad governance in a state, with possible sanctions including the suspension or deposition of a ruler. Where that happened, or where a natural successor was still a minor, the British imposed ‘minority’ administration, meaning that either a Council of Regency, or a single British official, would be appointed to administer the state until such time as it was deemed ‘safe’ to hand it back to princely rule. A sticking point in future negotiations was the question of whether an incoming ruler had the authority to overturn decisions made during a minority administration and this was to loom large in discussions between the princes and British authorities in the early days of the First World War. Lord Lytton’2 had attempted to look at cooperation between the princes and the Paramount Power. Lord Curzon'’ did the same, though in general he had a fairly low opinion of the calibre of the princes and, despite introducing schemes such as the Imperial Cadet Corps, which he intended would divert the attention of the princes away from glittering baubles and luxurious palaces, actually proposed far more inter­ ference in the governance of the states. "... he thought of paramountcy as complete sovereignty ... To rulers he spoke, not of their rights, but always of their obligations, avoiding all mention of the Treaties which lie near their hearts ... in his manner he evinced a shade of patronage or domineering which sometimes marred the wisdom of his counsels.”'’ If introduced, Curzon’s proposals for further interference in the states would have had the effect of reducing the dignity of the princes in the eyes of their own subjects. The India Office in London, as well as a number of influential individuals in India, objected to Curzon’s proposals but his resignation in 1905 meant they were not put into effect and alternative approaches could be considered. Lord Minto, who succeeded Curzon as Viceroy, was highly critical of Curzon’s interfer­ ence in the affairs of the states. His views were largely shared by his Secretary of State in London, Lord John Morley,” who held a view that the Political Officers of the Foreign Department, who were charged with day to day dealings with the states, lacked the sensitivity necessary to be competent in their field. He said, ‘‘The only chance is to do our best to make English rulers friends with Indian leaders and at the same time to do our best to train them in habits of political responsibility.””’ It seems

51 52 53 54 55 56

See Chapter 1, f/n 1. Viceroy 1876 to 1880. Viceroy 1899-1905. A P Nicholson, Scraps ofPaper: India's Broken Treaties, Her Princes, and the Problem (London: Ernest Benn, 1930), pp. 210-211. 1905-1910 and again in 1911. Philip Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India: The Guardians (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954), p. 208.

58

For The Honour of My House

as if it may have been difficult to influence or change entrenched attitudes because a few years later a successor Secretary of State, Edwin Montagu,’' like Morley a Liberal, utterly despised the pompous and overbearing manner of many political officers and held them primarily responsible for the princes’ complaints.”'” Morley and Minto were responsible for introducing a significant piece of legislation, the Indian Councils Act of 1909 (known as the Morley-Minto Reforms). Although not meeting the Indian National Congress demands of self-government, neverthe' less the reforms did herald, albeit in a limited way, the election of Indians to various legislative councils in India. However, a concession was made to pro-British MusliiU leaders for separate electorates whereby only Muslims should vote for candidates for the Muslim seats, a concession that was to remain a source of conflict and irritation right up to 1947.”’ Meanwhile some of the larger and more progressive states had already started to introduce their own reforms, including the introduction of representative institutions, and the British came to realise that they needed the support of such educated and influ­ ential leaders who were generally held in high regard by their subjects. Recognizing that their support could not be taken for granted, Minto and his Political Secretary, Sir Harcourt Butler, determined that the spirit of the Morley-Minto Reforms should be translated to the States - a policy that was to become known as laissez-faire. Launched in November 1909, it included a new code of practice for political officers enshrined in the Political Department Manual of 1910, in effect exhorting them to adopt a more hands-off approach towards existing state administrative systems. Minto wanted to go a stage further with the introduction of princely advisory councils but was deterred y Morley who thought it a step too far. Minto’s successor. Lord Charles Hardinge'" proposed calling a conference of rulers at Delhi in 1913 to seek views on issues ot common interest, but neither it nor a follow-up conference in January 1914 achieved much. Following the January conference Maharaja Ganga Singh of Bikaner proposed at ... when any question arises in the Governor-General’s Legislative Council a ecting even remotely the interests of the States...His Excellency to direct that, e ore a decision is finally arrived at, the matter should be referred for consideration an advice to the Ruling Chiefs whom he would assemble for the purpose,”' ' anikkar claims that Hardinge was sympathetic to the idea and in his address to t e Chiefs College Conference in Delhi in March 1914 alluded to the eagerness

57 1917-1922. 58 SR Ashton, British Policy Towards the Indian States 1905-1939 (London: Curzon Press Ltd., 1982), p. 53. 59 Ihis piece of legislation, probably more than any other, can be seen as the introduction ot ari explicit recognition of separate politico/religious identities which, some would argue, led to the eventual partition of the sub-continent W) 1910-1916. b 1 K.M. Panikkar, His Highness The Maharaja ofBikaner: A Biography (London; Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 144.

Stepping Up

59

of the princes “To share with me and my Government the burden of Imperial rule” and concluded with a desire to treat “Your Highnesses as my trusted colleagues and to seek your collective opinion whenever possible on matters affecting the interests of your Order.”^^ Copland, on the other hand, notes that the viceroy dismissed the maharaja’s proposal as so much ‘rubbish’. Like his political secretary, John Wood, Hardinge doubted that the princes would ever become part of the ‘regular machinery of government’.*’ ’ Pressure continued to build for some sort of consultative body and for a redress of their grievances over the minorities issue. In December 1915 Scindia of Gwalior made the point that they had affected the ‘ties of personal loyalty and obedience between the subjects and their prince,’*’’’ and earned a sympathetic ear from Hardinge who decided to order a study of British policy towards the states. There was a broad recognition that, given the support for the war effort so far demonstrated by the rulers, it would not be politic to ignore their concerns.*” By this time Lord Chelmsford had replaced Hardinge as Viceroy but he nevertheless continued with the Hardinge proposal. Sir John Wood*’*’ recommended setting up a Council of Princes, to be of an advisory char­ acter and to focus on affairs concerning the princely states. Others at the Executive level of Government felt there would be insufficient matters to discuss and suggested that the Council ‘should be more closely co-ordinated with other constitutional and political developments then under consideration for British India’.*' Chelmsford decided that it would not be possible to institute such a Council until British aims in India had been clarified. Meanwhile, and again with consideration of the rulers’ war efforts, it was decided to proceed with a watered-down version of the Wood proposal by hosting a Conference of Princes at Delhi on 30 October 1916. There were voices in London who objected to the idea of defining the principles of Britain’s policy towards the states, preferring that a more opaque approach allowed for greater flex­ ibility in ever-changing conditions. There were others, however, and particularly Sir Thomas Holderness, Under Secretary of State, who were more sympathetic towards the Government of India’s approach. The Conference proceeded as planned with 41 representatives from the Bombay states, Punjab, Central India, Rajputana (including Ganga Singh of Bikaner), the Maharajas of Kashmir, Cochin, Cooch-Behar and

62 63

64 65

66 67

Panikkar, H I!. Bikaner, p. 146. Copland, The Prinee.': ofIndia, p. 32 quoting exchanges between Hardinge and Wood on 19 and 21 January 1914. Yet Hardinge writes in glowing terms of Ganga Singh’s achievements in his Foreword to Panikkar’s biography of the Maharaja - Panikkar, H.H. Bikaner, pp. v-vii. Ashton, British Policy, p. 48. Ashton, British Policy, p. 49 quoting NAI F&P, Secret Inti., July 1916,29, Minute by J B Wood dated 27 May 1916. Political Secretary to Viceroy Hardinge (and later Chelmsford). Ashton, British Policy, p. 49.

60

For The Honour of My House

Benares as well as the Gaekwar of Baroda. Hyderabad, Mysore and Udaim ri-j attend. Apart from discussions on whether the meetings should remain a Confe or become a Council, there were two important areas for consideration The'^fi^*'t concerned the minorities issue. As already discussed, for a number of rulers J sticking point in their relationship with the British Government was the imposit' of a ‘minority’ administration, either following the suspension or deposition of a rul or during a period when a natural successor was still a minor. An underlying cau e of their concern was the question of how paramountcy should be defined hold' out that it should accord with the principles of non-interference. In February 1916 Lord Hardinge convened an informal sub-committee chaired by Sir John Wood and comprising, among others, Scindia of Gwalior, Ganga Singh of Bikaner and the Begum of Bhopal. They proposed that a ruler, on taking control of his State from a minority administration should, if necessary or desirable, be empowered to rescind a measure introduced during such a minority administration. While recognising that for many rulers the question of paramountcy was the most objectionable feature ot their relationship with the Raj, and that their definition and that of the Government of India were essentially conflicting viewpoints, he nevertheless set the British Government’s position clearly for all to see: In the scrupulous maintenance of our treaty obligations nothing less than the honour of the Sovereign is involved, and no Government could ever seek to belittle them. The relations of the Government with the Chiefs are, however necessarily subject to variation, and the literal fulfilment of an obligation may become impossible, either through change in essential circumstances, or by the mere passage of time. Again, many of the treaties were concluded before the Crown stood forth in Lord Canning’s phrase - the unquestioned Ruler and Paramount Power in all India; and since that event considerations of the general good of the Indian body politic have necessarily become a new factor in the interpretation. While they remain unrepealed in the letter and binding in the spirit, a constant development of constitutional doctrine is in process... But of t at process the superintendence, direction and control must remain in the hands of the Paramount Power.' " t ough the 1916 Conference had approved the sub-committee proposal on minority administration, Chamberlain’s position forced an amendment over the ensuing year and the ability of a ruler to rescind a minority administration decision was removed. The government’s revised policy was laid out in Resolution No 1894-1. A

Ashton, British Policy, p.51 quoting Secret letter No. 15 to the Governor General in Council, 27 April 1917.

Stepping Up

61

and was adopted at the 1917 Conference held over three days in early November/’’ The second main topic of discussion at the 1916 Conference concerned the recognition of successions in the Princely States, and of the ceremonial to be observed at installa­ tions and investitures. The results of these deliberations were similarly presented in the papers of the 1917 Conference.’” Meanwhile, in July 1917, criticism of the handling of the Mesopotamia campaign led to Chamberlain’s resignation and his replacement in August as Secretary of State by Edwin Montagu, who adopted a line that British policy for India included “The progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part ot the British Empire.”” Such a policy promise was not lost on the state rulers who held a second session of the Conference of Ruling Princes at Delhi on 5-6 November 1917, this time attended by 46 princes and chiefs. Of the seven agenda items of this later conference two stand out as being of interest; horse-breeding operations in Indian States, and the question of precedence for purely social purposes of princes and chiefs belonging to different provinces or administrations. This last agenda item emphasises the importance of status among the rulers and is further discussed below. The more important discussion was about horse breeding. As the following pages illustrate, many of the States offered horses for the war effort. In addressing the November conference. Brigadier General Cyril Templet, Army Remount Department, high­ lighted the disadvantage under which India operated in regard to horses, given its dependence on overseas-bred animals, particularly from Australia. The large demand on sea freight occasioned by the war had practically prohibited the importation into India of all animals other than those for army purposes, and he urged the rulers to do more to encourage breeding within their States. For some the geographical reality of their circumstances prevented this, but others were quick to take up the call. ’ The ruling princes certainly had their supporters in England. Sir William Wedderburn noted in 1915: No one can doubt that if India had turned against us in the world crisis through which we are passing, the great fabric of the British Empire would have been strained, even to the breaking point. Indeed, the position would have been serious if the response from India had been doubtful, or half-hearted: it there had been hesitation on the part of the Indian princes, who command the heredi­ tary allegiance of the masses, or of the educated class, who control advanced public opinion. Happily there has been no hesitation either among the thinkers

69 70 71 72

BL/IOLR/R/1/1/605, Proceedings ofthe Conference ofRuling Princes and Chiefs 1917 (F&P Sccrct-I, Proceedings, March 1918, Nos. 6-11), Appendix, p. 117. BL/IOLR/R/1/1/605, Proceedings, Appendix, p. 123. BL/IOLR/V/27/261/8 1918, Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918, Cmd. 9109, 1918, para 6 (Montford Report). The Conference of Princes eventually gave way to the Chamber of Princes, inaugurated on 8 February 1921 - see Chapter 11 for further analysis.

62

For The Honour of My House

or the fighters: and India has shown ‘a serious and unswerving loyalty’, placing personal service and her vast resources at the disposal of the King-Emperor, If we ask why the princes and people of India are eager to stand by England in this time of storm and stress, we find that it is because they believe that whatever its shortcomings may be - the British Empire stands, on the whole, for freedom, toleration and progress. But it would be fatal to assume that India is satisfied with her political condition, and that, as regards reform, the time has come to rest and be thankful. The blighting influence of official distrust must be put away forever: we must boldly carry to its logical conclusion the doctrine of trust in the people; and India must be welcomed to an equal partnership in a free Empire.” It may seem that one or two names continually crop up in the discussion of the princes response but as Copland observed, ‘policy and strategy decisions about, and on behalf of the princely order were taken by a relatively small number of darbars'"' while others fell into line with whatever the influential States were recommending. This highlights a key factor in any discussion of the subject - the rulers were not an homogenous entity. Differences in size and revenue have already been touched on in chapter one; revenue in particular determining what a state could spend on infrastructure and services, the resultant inequalities in development and modernisa­ tion becoming apparent in the early part of the twentieth century. The rulers were also separated by race, religion, caste and ideology and, given the proud and ancient heritage of some, there was obviously a pecking order based on status which made open cooperation between them almost impossible to achieve. The question of status was not only important in determining relationships among t e rulers, it was also important in determining the relationship between the rulers and the British. The British contributed to the debate by creating a number of chiv^rous Orders - The Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, The Most Eminent r er of the Indian Empire, and The Imperial Order of the Crown of India — as vvell as enabling rulers to be admitted to some of the British Orders such as The Royal ictorian Order and The Most Excellent Order of the British Empire. All of these were divided into grades or classes, the highest being Knights Grand Cross for the tar of India (GCSI), or Knights Grand Commander for the Indian Empire (GCIE), raging down through Knights Commanders (KCSI or KCIE) to Companions It was exceedingly rare for anyone to be directly appointed to one of t e rders at the highest level and so appointments would be made at one of the ower levels with the prospect of‘promotion’ within the Order held out for ‘good’ or eserving behaviour. As Canadine observed, these awards were given partly’ to

7.3

Kusoom Vadgama. INDIA. British-Indian campaigns in Britain for Indian reforms, justice ‘’"‘^fi^'^dom 1831-1947, (London: Banyan Tree Publishing, 1997), p. 125. Copland, The Princes ofIndia, p. 11.

Stepping Up

63

unite them with the British, partly because it was believed they cared very greatly for honour and recognition ... since the ruling princes were fiercely competitive in any matters to do with status, they vied with each other to obtain the recognition they deemed appropriate to their station.”'’ Quoting Sir William Lee-Warner,''’ “The Crown is the Fountain of Honour, and those who accept its decorations or privileges owe, and admit their liability for, something in return,” Canadine went on to observe of the rulers that . the acceptance of an honour ... put them formally in a direct, and subordinate, relation to the monarch.”'^ That point had been rather forcefully made to the Maharaja of Rewa in 1903 when Curzon visited him with a view to having him engage with the Imperial Service Troops scheme. For a number of reasons Rewa was reluctant to do so, though he later contributed to the revised Indian State Forces scheme, but at the time he rebuffed Curzon’s approach, leaving the Political Agent in Baghelkhand to write to him after Curzon’s departure:

You will never be ordered^ or even officially requested to give Imperial Service Troops, but ... to offer such troops now will be in your best interests. If Imperial Service Troops are offered and successfully maintained. Your Highness can see, from the case of other Chiefs, what benefits can be expected. Military rank, visits to the Court of England, the personal friendship of the King and Royal Family, and appointments on His Majesty’s personal staff...On the other hand, if Your Highness cannot see the way to offering any such Troops, it is I fear certain that your protestations of loyalty and anxiety to help the Government of India in times of war, will lose a great deal of their value, and will perhaps not be as grate­ fully acknowledged in the future as they have been in the past. ’ As already mentioned, when war broke out Rewa offered horses, several aircraft and ‘the whole of his private means and jewellery to the Government’.' ' He also offered 30 gun elephants for use in France as well as the output of his leather factory, and it is tempting to ask if it was the carrot or the stick that persuaded him to do so. Meanwhile, following the collapse of Russia towards the end of 1917 and a pact between Germany and the Bolsheviks designed to extend the war effort into the East, the British Prime Minister appealed to India to re-double its war effort “To prevent

75 76

77 78 79

David Canadine, Ornamentalism: How the British saw their Empire (London: Penguin 2001), p. 89. Indian Civil Service and author (1846-1914) - The Protected Princes of India (London, 1894). P. 305. Canadine, Ornamentalism, p. 100. Nicholson, Scraps ofPaper, p. 213. BL/lOLR/L/MlL/17/5/2385, East India (Military), Papers relating to the support offered by the Princes and Peoples of India to His Majesty in connection with the War.

64

For The Honour of My House

the menace spreading to the East and gradually engulfing the world.”’" The Viceroy Lord Chelmsford, summoned a War Conference in Delhi which sat between 27 and 29 April 1918 with a view to seeking help to quash dissention and negative political propaganda, as well as boost further recruitment and use of resources. The Rulers were represented by Alwar, Baroda, Bhopal, Bikaner, Cooch Behar, Cutch, Dholpur, Gwalior, Indore, Jaipur, Kapurthala, Kashmir, Kolhapur, Nawanagar and Patiala. A number of sub-committees were formed to take forward the proposals of the confer­ ence and the Ruling Chiefs played their part on these.

The Religious Dimension The prospect of Turkey entering the war on the side of Germany was one that caused concern, particularly since Turkey was seen by Muslims as the last true living Muslim empire and, of course, the Sultan of Turkey was also the Caliph of Islam. Authorities were aware from the outset of the need to watch for any signs of Pan-Islamic agitation. There were occasionally concerns raised within the Indian Army over Muslims facing their co-religionists, particularly with some Pathan regiments Itased in Egypt, and a few regiments were moved from one theatre to another. As the Commander in Chief India was noted as saying, however, “There is no valid reason why they should not fight in Palestine as they have in Mesopotamia where they have shown no reluctance to fight against the Turks, ” and as he said directly to the Secretary, War Office, “I am not satisfied that reluctance to fight against the Turks was the cause of the trouble in the Pathan company of the 58th Rifles ... we have to be on our guard against reli­ gious sentiment being made a pretext to return to India.”’^ Taken as a whole it seems to have been a very small problem and as Bruce noted, ‘It was very wonderful during t e whole course of the War, to see how little the Mohammedan troops in the Indian rmy allowed their feelings for the Turks as co-religionists to interfere with their duty to t eir own land and to their own government.’” some State rulers the potential conflict of loyalty posed no problem at all. The an o Kelat, on learning that war had been declared between Great Britain and ur ey, immediately offered to send a telegram to the Turkish Sultan conveying an expression of his disapproval of the attitude assumed by Turkey, with full publicity

81

8.3

I F Rushbrook Williams, India in the Years 1917-1918 (Calcutta: Superintendent of 1919), p. 6 quoting Prime Minister to Viceroy 2 April 1918. Xz 7/5/3919, War Diary AHQ.India, Indian Expeditionary Force ‘E’/’E’ rvs/-' Vol. 31 (27/1), December 1917, (Appx. 108), Adjutant General India to Egypt dated 20 December 1917. ?'/!J\^{^^’'/^^L/17/5/.392O: War Diary AHQ_India, Indian Expeditionary Force ‘E’/’E’ - ’ 'Kl'Ph Vol. 32 (27/2), Jan 1918 (Appx. 124), C in C to Secretary War Office dated 29 January 1918. C Bruce, Himalayan Wanderer. (London: Alexander Maclehose & Co, 1934), p. 252.

Stepping Up

65

being given to the message. The Government decided it would serve no useful purpose and the idea was dropped.'*'' Others, such as the Aga Khan, were used to address troops on the ground, though as mentioned in chapter seven, many of those whom he addressed seemed not to know who he was, so the point of the exercise was somewhat lost on the audience."’ For other Muslim leaders, it was a painful personal choice to make, and none more so than the Nizam of Hyderabad who, as previously mentioned, was regarded not only as the Premier Chief in India but also as the leading Muslim of the country. Strenuous efforts were made to secure prompt declarations of support from leading Muslim associations and individuals and, from the outset, it has to be said, Muslim leaders had seemingly been of one voice with their co-religionist leaders of other faith groups. Addressing a Muslim gathering at Patna, M. Mazharul Haque said “We are Musalmans and we are Indians and we have to perform our duties in this double capacity. 1 am happy to believe that these two interests do not clash but are entirely identical.”"'’ Prasad went on to claim, however, that “All of these assurances and declarations of loyalty to the British. ..were neither spontaneous nor sincere, and did not truly reflect the perturbed Muslim mind in India at that time.”"' This asser­ tion certainly seems to be borne out by a closer study of the case of the Nizam of Hyderabad. The British authorities in India felt it imperative that the Nizam, along with other rulers, make a pro-British announcement as soon as war with Turkey was declared and lost no time in applying pressure on the various rulers to comply. Initially the Nizam was regarded as being ignorant of, or unable to appreciate the significance of, the issues at stake, as were the majority of his senior Hyderabad! advisers. The one exception was his Parsee Minister and adviser, Faridoonji, who recognised that “Undoubtedly the sympathies of all Mahomedans would be divided, for if Turkey were crushed Mahomedans would become merely like the Jews and Parsees in the world, and so far as Russia was the enemy, if Hyderabad were an independent country like Afghanistan she would wish to fight for Turkey against a country which had injured her in the past.”""

BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/2433: Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol. 13, Oct-Nov 1914 (Diaries 6736,6737,6851 and 6887 - 1-5.11.14), Correspondence, Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan - Secretary Government of India Foreign & Political. 85 See Chapter 7, f/n 31. 86 Yuvaraj Deva Prasad, Essays in British Imperialism: The Persian Gulf, Turkey and the Raj (1890-1920) (Delhi: Anamika Publishers and Distributors (P) Ltd. (2013), p. 116. 87 Prasad, Essays in British Imperialism, p. 90. 88 BL/IOLR/L/P&S/20/133/2: Hyderabad Affairs 1914-1919, File No. S of 1914, Stuart Fraser, Resident at Hyderabad, to J B Wood, Secretary Foreign & Political Department, 30 August 1914.

84

66

For The Honour of My House

As early as 15 September Mr (later Sir) Stuart Fraser, the Resident at HyderabarJ had been instrumental in having the Nizam, his immediate advisers and himself discuss the contents of a draft proclamation to be issued by the Nizam in the event nf Turkey being drawn into the war. Unfortunately news of this development leaked i^ Hyderabad and on 6 October Mr A C Hankin, Director General of District Policy advised the Resident that should the manifesto issue it would bring the Nizam “Into hatred and contempt with his people. It would be construed into distrust of Hij Highness by the British Government who had to force him to do something to show his loyalty ... He [the Nizam] has been told that if this manifesto is issued he will be dubbed a Kafir”"'' Shortly afterwards the Sultan of Turkey’s name was omitted from the Khatha or sermon during Friday prayers and rumours started to spread among the bazar that the Nizam intended to substitute the name of King George V, the potential damage only being allayed by the Sultan being prayed for on the following Friday. The reaction to the Khatba affair had led to abuse being levelled at Maulavi AnwarUllah, head of the Nizam’s Religious Department, and this led to him repeating to the Nizam the fear that he would be dubbed a Kafir. As the days dragged on the Nizam started to have second thoughts about the content of the manifesto and came to the conclusion that its issue would do more harm than good and preferred to send a letter to the Viceroy for publication, omitting any mention of Turkey or the Caliph but assuring the Viceroy of the Nizam’s support. The Nizam was forcefully reminded that he could not shirk his responsibilities to give guidance to his people in the diffi­ cult circumstances and he was sternly asked not to keep quiet but to stand up as leader and spokesman of the whole Muslim community in India. He agreed to revise his draft manifesto, but he omitted all that was thought might give offence to Muslim eeling. He was firmly reminded by the Resident in a note dated 9 October that his revised draft made no mention of the fact that the cause of England was both right an just, and that the Muslims must not allow themselves to be beguiled by any false ca in the name of Islam, two things which, the Nizam was told, he was bound to te the people and without which his manifesto would not be seen by the Viceroy ‘’P whole-hearted and convincing support. At this time, however, d seemed firmly to believe that Turkey would not be drawn into the war f erefore the wording of the manifesto seemed somewhat academic since it was n 1 ely to be issued. In fact, of course, war with Turkey broke out on 1 November 4 and the Nizam issued his manifesto the following day. A few days later the 11'^^^ to the Viceroy which he suggested should be published in full. iceroy decided not to do so, partly because the kharita contained references to

89

BL/IOLR/L/P&S/20/133/2; Hyderabad Affairs 1914-1919, File No. S.N.23-A, Hankiii to Resident, 6 October 1914.

Stepping Up

67

earlier correspondence “And the general public might gain the idea that the publica­ tion of the manifesto was not a wholly spontaneous act on the part of His Highness.”’*’ The Nizam’s Farman read; In view of the present aspect of the war in Europe let it be generally known that at this critical juncture it is the bounden duty of the Mohammedans of India to adhere firmly to their old and tried loyalty to the British Government, espe­ cially when there is no Moslem or non-Moslem Power in the world under which they enjoy such personal and religious liberty as they do in India, and when, moreover, they are assured by the British Government that, as it has in the past always stood the best friend of Islam, so will it continue to be Islam’s best friend and will always protect and cherish its Moslem subjects. I repeat and reiterate that in the crisis before us the Mohammedan inhabit­ ants of India, especially the subjects of this State, should, it they care for their own welfare and prosperity, remain firm and whole-hearted in their loyalty and obedience, swerve not a hair’s breadth from their devotion to the British Government, whose cause I am convinced is just and right, keep sacred the tie which binds the subject people to their rulers, and lastly that they should in no case allow themselves to be beguiled by the wiles of any one into a course of open or secret sedition against the British Government. Finally, I give expression to the hope that, as I, following the tradition of my ancestors, hold myself ever ready to devote my own person and all the resources of my State and all that I possess to the service of Great Britain, so will all the Muhammadans of India, especially my own beloved subjects, hold themselves whole-heartedly ready in the same way.”

The importance of the manifesto, and the significance of the Nizam’s support in delivering it at a very tense moment, were not forgotten by the British and this is explored further in chapter 10. Other prominent Muslim leaders faced similar personal quandaries. The Begum of Bhopal, the Nawabs of Rampur, Tonk and Janjira all made declarations in support of the British at the outset of the war, though for the Begum she had made it clear, when it became apparent in April 1915 that a 50-strong reinforcement draft to support the Alwar Infantry would serve in Egypt, that she did not want her troops to be sent against Turkish forces. The draft was withdrawn and replaced by men from other states.’^

90

91 92

BL/IOLR/L/P&S/20/133/2: Hyderabad Affairs 1914-1919, File No. S.N.49, J B Wood to Resident Hyderabad, 13 November 1914. BL/IOLR/L/P&S/20/133/2: Hyderabad Affairs 1914-1919, Enclosure 5 to S.N. 18. NAI: F&P Proceedings Internal 1915: F&.P-Intl-Sept-Nos.457-464-Part B.

68

For The Honour of My House

For the Nawab of Rampur the issue did not raise itself until late in the war. His regi­ ment of Infantry had been sent to East Africa where they served until March 1918 « On their return to India consideration was being given as to where to deploy them next when Major General Andrew Skeen, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (India) noted that it was understood the Nawab did not wish his infantry to be employed in either Palestine or Mesopotamia. Much later in the discussion, when possibilities had been raised and then dismissed to send them to Hong Kong, it was suggested that they might relieve an Indian Army regiment in the Persian Gulf, it was noted from the State that “His Highness adds that Government is already aware of difficulties in the way of employment of Rampur troops in Islamic countries and is very grateful to the British authorities for appreciating this sentiment.

The Diplomatic Dimension Away from religious implications, other rulers or senior State officers were involved in diplomatic relations and in various war and peace councils. The best example must surely be Sir Ganga Singh of Bikaner. He served briefly in France on the staff of HQ_ Ah Indian Division and then on the staff of the C in C, Sir John French. Personal circumstances forced his departure for India in January 1915, though en route, and while in Egypt, the circumstances apparently changed and he therefore requested and was given permission to serve with his Ganga Risala for a short while before eventu­ ally returning to India. He was soon agitating to return to France but the Viceroy refused, asking him to stay in India where his presence was required. The British Government decided in early 1916 that the progress of the War required closer cooperation between the Dominions and London and so an Imperial War Cabinet and Imperial War Conference were convened in London in 1917. Three Indian leaders were invited to participate alongside the Secretary of State for India, and aharaja Ganga Singh was one of those selected. He used the opportunity to press or political reform in the relationship between India and the UK and, as Panikkar observed, this led to the realisation amongst the British public that “Agitation in India was not to be equated with sedition as they had so long been inclined to think.”"'’ Ganga Singh used his time in London to ‘make the voice of India heard’ and at a meeting of the Empire Parliamentary Association, put the case for: ...making substantial advance on constitutional lines in regard to matters polit­ ical and economical and, ultimately attaining ... that freedom and autonomy which you in this country secured long ago for yourselves and which our more

91 94 95

See Chapter 5. NAI: F&P Proceedings Internal 1918: F&P lntl-Dec-Noli: a Ridge Too Far (Wollombi: Exisle Publishing, 2013), p. 238.

158

For The Honour of My House

been embedded with 4th Cart Corps under the command of Captain Gerald Aylmer, and steamed for Egypt, arriving on 11 April. By the third week of April the plans and the initial invasion force was complete, and the landings were timed to begin just before dawn on Sunday, 25 April. Hamilton took the unusual and catastrophic decision to divide his force between two location, the British 29th Division to land at Helles, on the southern tip of Gallipoli, and the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) troops, supported by 7 Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade,' to land further up the Aegean coast at Gaba Tepe, later to become known as Anzac Cove. As the invasion began 29th Division, including three Indian Army transport troops, landed at Helles after which the SS Ramazan sailed for Gaba Tepe to offload its trans­ port element, often under extremely heavy and withering fire. Apart from 7 Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade and the Mule Cart Train units no other Indian units were involved at this stage. Neither the Bharatpur nor Indore Transport Corps was included in this first landing. According to Watson," towards the end of April the troops were despatched to the harbour ofMudros, on the island of Lemnos, which Greek troops had recently seized from Ottoman forces, but for some unexplained reason were unable to disembark, remained on board ship at Mudros for a month and then returned to Alexandria. The first that Lieutenant Colonel Beville learnt of this was on 27 May, just short of three weeks after their first arrival off Cape Helles." They were to remain at Alexandria tor three months until, in August 1915, they were again sent to the Dardanelles. Two attempts were made by British troops at the Helles end of the Peninsula to consolidate their position from the initial landing beaches and form a line across the tip of the Peninsula. Both involved attempts to take the village of Krithia, the first fought between 25 and 28 April involved no fighting Indian units. On 1 May, however, 29 Indian Infantry Brigade, comprising initially 14th King George’s Own Ferozepore Sikhs, 69th Punjabis, 89th Punjabis and l/6th Gurkha Rifles, landed at Helles and was integrated into 29th Division. Between 6 and 8 May a second attempt was made to take the village of Krithia. As with the first attempt at the end of April, it was not successful, and in both attacks British troops suffered heavy casualties. 29 Indian Infantry Brigade had been held in reserve for this second attempt on Krithia and so suffered light casualties only from enemy shelling. In mid-May, based largely on unfounded rumours of disloyalty, the two Muslim regiments of the Brigade, 69th and 89th Punjabis, were withdrawn from Gallipoli and returned to Egvpt, to be replaced a few weeks later by l/5th Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force) and 2/lOth Gurkha Rifles.

6 7

8 9

Watson, A Short History ofthe Services Rendered by the Imperial Service Troops, p. 20. formed of 21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery (Frontier Force), 26th (Jacob’s) Mountain Battery and a Divisional Ammunition Column. Watson, A Short History op the Services Rendered by the Imperial Service Troops, p. 9 and p. 20. AWM;AWM6 189.

Gallipoli

159

On 4 June Hamilton planned an assault on the Turkish trenches at Helles, in what has become known as the Third Battle of Krithia. Assault troops included 29 Indian Infantry Brigade, including l/6th Gurkhas and 14th Sikhs. Although they broke through the Turkish lines towards Krithia, this advantage was not followed up and the Turkish line held. The British suffered more than 4,500 casualties, the French more than 2,000 and the Turks admitted to more than 9,000 dead and wounded. For 14th Sikhs the day had been a disaster. It had started with 15 British officers, 14 Indian officers and 514 men, of whom 50 remained as trench garrison. By the end of the day the battalion had lost twelve British officers, 11 Indian officers and 450 men killed or wounded, their effective strength having been reduced to three British officers, including the Medical Officer although he had been wounded, four Indian officers and 197 other ranks. The Gurkhas had also suffered heavy casualties. 14th Sikhs were to lose another seven killed and 30 wounded in attacks mounted on 2 July. By this time, however, Hamilton had approached Sir John Maxwell in Egypt to ask if he would spare a double company of the Patiala Imperial Service Infantry to serve on attachment to 14th Sikhs, at least until 14th Sikhs received new recruits ‘in 2 or 3 months’ time’."’ Maxwell was reluctant to comply unless he could be sent an equivalent number of Dogras or Rajputs but was told by Delhi that this would not be possible. The thought behind the request for the Patialas was that 14th Sikhs, as a class regiment, was comprised entirely of Jat Sikhs, many of whom were recruited from the Patiala district of the Punjab, and it would therefore be easier to assimi­ late the State unit into the regiment. Although the Maharaja of Patiala had to be consulted before this could be put into effect, such consultation was, by and large, a formality, though Maharaja Bhupindar Singh did express some concern that the iden­ tity of his regiment would be lost among the 14th Sikhs. This led to a telegram from C in C India to General Maxwell in Egypt, ‘Please arrange.. .that the double company Patiala Infantry...be kept as a complete double company and not split up amongst other double companies. In reporting casualties amongst this double company please ensure that they are reported as Patiala Infantry and not as 14th Sikhs.’” On 7 July ‘A’ Company was embarked at Alexandria on HT Uganda and consisted of two Mounted Indian Officers, Major Hardam Singh and Lieutenant Bakhtawar Singh, four Indian Officers, 175 NCOs and men and 12 followers.'^ It had been determined that no British officers were to accompany them but Captain Alastair Maclean of 33rd

10

11

12

BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/3902; War Diary Army Headquarters India, Indian Expeditionary Force ‘E’, Vol. 10, Appx.4, (Diary 13788), Tel P No 1379-E dated 1 July 1915 GOC Egypt to C in C India. BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/3902; War Diary Army Headquarters India, Indian Expeditionary Force ‘E’ and ‘G’, Vol. 10, Appx. 101 (Diary 15614),Tel. S-15614 dated 20 July 1915, C in C India to GOC Egypt. In due course Patialas were to be mixed with 14th Sikhs ‘which technically breached the understanding’, Stanley, Die in Battle, Do Not Despair, p. 252. TNA: WO 95 4423: War Diary 1 Patiala Infantry, August 1914-December 1915.

160

For The Honour of My House

Punjabis had independently been ordered to 29 Indian Infantry Brigade in Gallip^jj and Major General Alec Wilson, GOC Canal Defences, promised that he would attached to the company of Patiala Infantry. 2/Lieutenant Gilbert Whitfield, Sikhs, was also attached. 14th Sikhs had been with withdrawn to the island ol Imb^^^5 on 11 July for rest and recuperation where they were joined by the Patiala detac|^_ ment the following day. They remained on Imbros until the night of 5 August, then the earlier failures to move far from the two original landing sites of Helles a)^j Anzac Cove led to a new August initiative being planned, designed to force a bre^|. out from the Anzac beach-head and gain the Sari Bair range, the high ground tl^^j dominated the area north of Anzac. There was also to be a feint attack at Helles af,j a major landing five kilometres north of Anzac Cove at Suvla Bay in order to cre^^g a base for later operations. Ian Hamilton’s plan relied upon the arrival of fresh unjfj from Britain, including the 10th Irish Division,” and 54th (East Anglian) Divisi(^p of the Territorial Army. 29 Indian Infantry Brigade, including 14th Sikhs and its Patiala reinforcement, l^ff Imbros on 5 August and landed at Anzac Cove to join General Birdwood’s Australi^^p and New Zealand Army Corps as part of General Alexander Godley’s New ZealarjJ and Australian Division. The Turks shelled the beach as 14th Sikhs were coming ashore and so half the battalion had to move away and land later after dark. On 6 August the feint attack at Helles was launched by the British 29th Division with tfig aim of holding down Turkish reinforcements from the main thrust of the offensive — the night march up the Sari Bair range to take Chunuk Bair and Hill 971, and tfig British landings at Suvla Bay. 29 Indian Infantry Brigade, along with other Australian, New Zealand and British units, made their way from North Beach, Anzac, into tfig Sari Bair range and up towards Chunuk Bair and other peaks, though they were late leaving the start point because of a delay by an Australian brigade in front of them, and it was not until the early hours of 7 August that they started to move into what was supposed to be their allocated spurs, though in fact the guide had becoitie hopelessly lost and mistaken the gullies and spurs in the semi-darkness. Positions remained static throughout the day and heavy casualties were taken by the PatiaHs, including Captain Alastair Maclean killed in action. A further 41 were wounded, including Lieutenant Bakhtawar Singh and Jemadar Kakh Singh, a total of 52 casual­ ties for the regiment. Little progress was made on 8 August though 14th Sikhs and the Patiala double company suffered considerable losses with 13 killed, including 2/Lieutenant Gilbert Whitfield and Subedar Jaimal Singh, and a further 57 wounded, including Major Hardam Singh. Troops dug in as best they could overnight prior to another attack on 9 August. On that day 1 /6th Gurkhas did gain the crest of Sari Bair but without adequate support were unable to hold it, while 2/lOth Gurkha Rifles came within 60

13

Considered ‘New Army’because, along with other Divisions, it had been created from new recruits following the virtual annihilation of the BEF in France in August 1914.

Gallipoli

161

v'ards of their objective, the crest of Chunuk Bair, where they met intensive machine gun fire from Turkish troops and, having been mistaken for Turks by the Royal Navy, a gun bombardment from HMS Bacchante. This effectively marked the end of the attempt to take the ridge and the troops were ordered to withdraw. Had the operation been successful it would have cut the Turkish communications on the Helles front. As it was, the failure cost the 14th Sikhs (and the Patialas) dearly, and they numbered just 223 sepoys on 11 August. Returning now to the involvement of transport units. Captain Aylmer of the Mule Train embarked at Alexandria on the SS Ramazan on 1 August with details for the front, while the remaining six troops of No. 4 Cart Company were left at Alexandria under the supervision of Major Watson, the SSO with the State trans­ port. This detachment now consisted of two troops, each of 50 carts, of the Bharatpur corps, two troops of the Indore corps, one composite troop made up from both States’ transport, and one troop of Government transport, the total being 300 carts with the proportionate establishment of personnel and mules. These troops embarked on the SS St Oswald on 3 August, sailed the following day and arrived offMudros on 7 August before disembarking at A’ Beach, Suvla Bay, in three stages between 9 and 11 August.’’’ Meanwhile, the first landing at Suvla Bay had occurred on 6 and 7 August and was met with some opposition, especially Turkish artillery shelling the jetties as the troops came ashore. The Bharatpur detachment was allotted to 10th Division with 57 carts, 114 draught mules and 115 pack mules. The Indore detachment was allotted to 54th Division with 51 carts, 102 draught mules and 345 pack mules. The main task of both units was to carry rations and water to the trenches, both continually under fire. Within days of landing the two detachments had suffered a number of casualties, both among men and mules. On 17 August Sir Ian Hamilton informed Lord Kitchener that the August offensive had failed. He requested 45,000 reinforcements to bring units already on Gallipoli up to strength and another 50,000 to make further offensives possible. Despite the setbacks Hamilton still hoped to gain the high ground above the Anzac beach-head and a further break out was planned for 21 August. The Anzac Corps, to which 29 Indian Infantry Brigade had been attached, was ordered to devise attacks on Hill 60 and to seize the wells Susak Kuyu and Kabak Kuyu while the British 9 Corps, holding the Suvla line, was detailed to attack locally dominant hills to the north, in particular Hill 53 (Chocolate Hill), Hill 50 (Green Hill), Hill 70 (Scimitar Hill) and Hill 112. The attacks failed, though the attempts to take Scimitar Hill resulted in some of the largest battles of the entire campaign. “Of the 50,000 British troops engaged at Suvla and Anzac, the casualties in just four days’ fighting from 7 to 10 August had amounted to at least 18,000; the casualty toll

14

AWM: AWM 6 190; War Diary Mule Cart Train.

162

For The Honour of My House

Colonel Kishan Singh, Sardar Bahadur, OBI, and Sub Assistant Surgeon Sampuran Singh, two Indian officers of the Bharatpur IS Transport Corps who got all the mules and their carts off during the Suvla Bay evacuation. (Imperial War Museum: Q_1.3665)

increased to 40,000 by the end of August,”’’ Of these, 14th Sikhs suffered 30 casual­ ties, including seven Patialas killed. A further two were killed and two wounded on 26 August. The period also marked the greatest loss for the Bharatpur Imperial Service Transport Corps. On landing at Suvla Bay they had been allocated to ‘A’ Beach but on 24 August were ordered to transfer to ‘C’ Beach at Suvla so that the unit could be closer to its division. On 29 August an enemy 6-inch shrapnel shell burst above the camp, killing two men and wounding eight as well as killing 45 mules and wounding a further 31. Normally all work at ‘C’ Beach had to be done under cover of darkness but on this occasion casualty figures were increased because elements of 13th Division transport had been in the camp at the same time, so the total losses for the incident were 13 men killed or wounded, and 115 mules killed or wounded. The Mule Train war diary record of landings does seem at odds with a commenda­ tion written by General Hamilton to the C in C India in September 1915 in which he noted that:

The Train included contingents of Imperial Service Transport from the States of Bharatpur and Indore. This unit was landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula at the

15

Ashley Ekins, introduction to Ashley Ekins (ecl.) Gallipoli: a Ridge Too Far, ‘the most ghastly and costly fiasco’.

K

Gallipoli

163

commencement of operations here and has since been distributed throughout the Force at Helles, at Anzac and latterly at Suvla. I desire to place on record the excellent work which every one of his (sic) detachment has performed, thereby adding greatly to the efficiency and comfort of the fighting troops. This work has been carried out under trying and difficult conditions owing to constant shell fire, but in spite of casualties the whole Train retains its high standard of effi­ ciency and the spirit of the men remains excellent...! trust that my appreciation of the work done by these contingents will be brought to the notice of the two native States concerned.’*’

In early September l/4th Gurkha Rifles arrived at Anzac as further reinforcements for the force and on 25 September, C Company of the Patiala Infantry, under the command of Major Ishar Singh, with four Indian officers, 181 other ranks and 12 followers left Egypt for Gallipoli as reinforcements for 14th Sikhs. They were accom­ panied by Major Hector Campbell and Lieutenant Percy Clarke lARO, as SSOs. According to 29 Infantry Brigade war diary, however, apart from Major Ishar Singh only three Indian officers, 179 other ranks and 11 followers actually joined on 1 October so a few must have fallen out sick in transit. On 14 October the Dardanelles Committee dismissed General Sir Ian Hamilton as commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force and he was replaced by General Sir Charles Monro.At the end of October Monro advised a complete with­ drawal from Gallipoli but Lord Kitchener, unwilling to accept this advice, dismissed him and replaced him with Lieutenant General Birdwood, only to re-appoint Monro having made a personal visit to Gallipoli. Kitchener then repeated Monro’s advice to evacuate and this began from Anzac and Suvla in early December, finally being completed on the morning of 20 December, though done in such a way that the Turks were unaware of it happening. Helles was evacuated on 27 December 1915. The Patiala Infantry detachments had rejoined their own unit on 16 January 1916.'” Although 14th Sikhs were awarded a number of battle honours for Gallipoli, none of these was carried over to the Patiala Infantry. Both the Bharatpur and Indore Transport Corps were awarded the battle honours ‘Suvla’, ‘Landing at Suvla’ and ‘Scimitar Hili’, and the theatre honour ‘Gallipoli, 1915’. There does seem to be an anomaly in the way battle honours for the theatre were distributed as between Imperial Service units and similar units of the Indian Army, but this is discussed more fully in chapter 10.

16

17 18

BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/3905: War Diary Army Headquarters India, lEF ‘E’ and ‘G’, Volume 13, Appx. 101, (Diary 25382), Letter M.F.CL226-5 dated 27 September 1915. See Chapter 10 for a further discussion of Battle Honours given for this campaign. He was later to command the British First Army in France before becoming Commander in Chief India. BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/3908: War Diary Army Headquarters India, lEF ‘E’ and ‘G’, Volume 16 (Diary 34862),Tel S-447,16.1.16, GOC ‘E’to C in C India.

7 Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

Although Egypt was, at least nominally, still a part of the Ottoman Empire in I9I4, recognising the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan, it had effectively come und^^ British influence since the Anglo-Egyptian War of 1882 and had been distanced frotyi Constantinople by the British ‘advice’ given to the Khedive or Viceroy, with whic^ he was expected to comply. The Ottoman Empire had ostensibly remained neutr;ji when war was declared, though she was secretly preparing to support Germany. On j November Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire following an Ottoman nav;ji attack on the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. This was followed on 11 November by the declaration q{jihad against the allies, issued by Sheikh-ul-Islam, the religious leader ip Constantinople, closely followed by a similar declaration from Sultan Mehmed V. Op 18 December Britain declared Egypt a protectorate' and replaced the pro-Ottoman Khedive, Abbas Hilmi Pasha, with his more compliant uncle, Hussein Kamel, who was then declared Sultan of Egypt. Britain had maintained a garrison in Egypt since 1882, primarily for the protection of its strategic interest in the Suez Canal, a critical link between UK and the Empire. With the outbreak of war this link became even more important, with both Germany and the Ottoman Empire recognizing a potential weakness to be exploited. For the British, however, Egypt was not seen as an offensive theatre of operations but as an area of strategic defence. With the main war focus on Europe, front line British troops in Egypt were soon withdrawn to that theatre on the outbreak of war, to be replaced in due course by a Territorial Division and by troops from India. Two Indian Divisions, 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut), were detailed for service in Egypt but before they could reach the theatre London had decided they should proceed straight to Marseilles tor service in Europe. 9 (Sirhind) Brigade of the Lahore Division was temporarily landed in Egypt to reinforce the garrison at Ismailia until replaced by 22 (Lucknow) Brigade in mid-October. The Sirhind Brigade then re-joined 3rd Lahore Division in Europe. In addition to the Lucknow Brigade one Imperial Service cavalry brigade and one

1 164

IXJ: 3rd Supplement 29010 dated 18.12.1914 to LG dated 15.12.14.

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

165

Imperial Service infantry brigade had been formed in India to contribute to a longerterm solution to Egypt’s need for manpower and had already been sent to the theatre. At the same time as London decided to re-deploy 3rd and 7th Divisions to France, it was announced that Lieutenant General Sir John Maxwell was to take command of the Force in Egypt and that Major General the Hon. Julian Byng, who had been in command, would return to the UK. The pre-war scheme of defence for Egypt had identified the Canal as the natural line to hold. The expanse of the Bitter Lakes and Lake Timsah formed barriers in their own right which reduced the amount of ground to be covered in protecting the Canal, but as the main communication and supply route between Britain and India, the Canal itself was susceptible to enemy attempts to place mines in the water, or sink a ship in such a way that it would block navigation. By December 1914 Canal Defences had been organised under the command of Major General Alec Wilson into three sectors, each of which had a number of posts dug along the east bank of the Canal from north to south. The defence scheme comprised: Sector I, with its headquarters at Suez, covered the southern end of the Canal from Port Tewfik to Geneffe at the southern tip of the Little Bitter Lake with posts at El Shatt, Baluchistan, El Kubri, Gurkha, Shallufa and Geneffe. Tltis was covered by 30 Indian Infantry Brigade supported by one squadron of Imperial Service cavalry and one company of the Bikaner Camel Corps. Sector II, with its headquarters at Ismailia, covered the middle section of the Canal from Deversoir at the northern tip of the Great Bitter Lake to El Ferdan with posts at Deversoir, Serapeum, Tussum, Ismailia, Bench Mark and El Ferdan. This was covered by 22 (Lucknow) Brigade and later 28 Indian (FF) Brigade, again with support for the Sector from one squadron of Imperial Service cavalry and elements of the Bikaner Camel Corps. Sector III, with its headquarters at Kantara, covered the northern section of the Canal from El Ferdan to Port Said on the Mediterranean coast with posts at Ballah, Qantara, El Kab, Ras el Esh and Port Said. This was covered by 29 Indian Brigade, plus one battalion drawn from 22 Brigade and support from one squadron of Imperial Service cavalry and two companies of Bikaner Camel Corps. Defence of the Railway and Sweet Water Canal fell to one troop of Imperial Service cavalry, a half company of the Bikaner Camel Corps and a half company of Indian infantry.

2

See map 5.

166

For The Honour of My House

Sir John Maxwell had proposed structuring his Indian Brigades into two Divisions, 10th Division under Major General Wilson on the Canal front, and 11th Division under Major General Alexander Wallace for other units. This was accepted by the C in C India on 20 December.’ Given the requirement for British troops in Europe the usual convention of allocating one British battalion to each Brigade was dispensed with and the Brigades forming the two Divisions were composed entirely of Indian troops. The Imperial Service brigades raised at the beginning of the war for service in the defence of the Canal were:

15 (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade The Brigade was raised in mid-October 1914 at Deolali, India, as the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade. Brigadier General Arthur Watson, CB, CIE'* was appointed to command the Brigade supported by Major Lionel Arthur, 26th Light Cavalry, as his Brigade Major, Captain Henry Ward, 2nd Lancers, as Staff Captain and Lieutenant Charles Harvey, 38th CIH, as Orderly Officer.’ Major H.H. the Maharaja of Idar was attached to the Headquarters staff and remained with them for three months while Captain Zorawar Singh of the Bhavnagar Imperial Service Lancers was appointed Assistant Provost Marshal. The three main regiments to form the Brigade were:

Mysore Imperial Service Lancers, under Regimentdar B. Chamraj Urs, Sardar Bahadur, OBI with Major Maxwell Henderson, 26th Light Cavalry, and Lieutenant Kenmure Evans-Gordon, 39th CIH as SSOs. 'TLiis regiment also included two troops of the Bhavnagar Imperial Service Lancers as that regiment had been designated to provide 10 percent of reinforcements for Mysore. Colonel Desraj Urs, CIE MVO, Chief Commandant of Mysore State troops also sailed tor Egypt, though in what capacity he served has not been determined and, at the request of the Maharaja, he was returned to India in December 1915.'’

.3

4

-5 6

BL/IOLR/1 ,/MIL/17/5/.39O7: War Diary Army Headquarters India, lEF ‘E’ and ‘G’, Volume 15, Appx. 93. William Arthur Watson, born 1860 the son of General Sir John Watson VC of Indian Mutiny fame and brother of Harry Davis Watson (see f/n 9 below). First commissioned August 1880 into the Worcestershire Regiment, transferred to Indian Armyjune 1882 (Central India Horse). Major General Watson CB, CMG, CIE died 25 June 1944. Originally appointed as SSO to the Mysore Lancers but he spent the whole war with Brigade HQ; NAI: F&.P Proceedings Internal 1916: FScP-Intl-Feb-234-237-Part B.

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

•

•

•

167

1st Hyderabad Imperial Service Lancers under Major Mahommed Ali Mirza with Major Lewis Dening, 33rd Cavalry, as SSO and Captain Christopher Howell, 18th Lancers, as veterinary officer. Patiala Imperial Service Lancers under Colonel Nand Singh, with Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Pennington MVO, 9th Hodson’s Horse, and Captain Gerald Willis, 31st Lancers, as SSOs. In March 2015 they were reinforced by two officers and 68 men from the Kashmir Imperial Service Lancers. The Patiala Lancers left the Brigade in May 1916 and the Brigade then operated as a two regiment forma­ tion until the arrival of the Jodhpur Lancers from France in May 1918. The Bikaner Camel Corps, although nominally under the command of the Brigade for administrative purposes, was actually under the direct command of the officer commanding east bank defences and is therefore covered separately within this chapter.

A Signal Troop^ under Captain Henry Scott, 4th Gurkhas, two sections of 124 Cavalry Field Ambulance and the Imperial Service Cavalry Alobile Veterinary Section completed the establishment. The Brigade was not organised in accord­ ance with War Establishment India but on special establishments given by Inspector General 1ST. Unlike other brigades there was never the intention to allocate it Horse Artillery, an ammunition column or a field troop; neither machine guns nor pioneer equipment were initially made available; first line transport was to be provided over­ seas if required, with pack mules being supplied by Imperial Service Transport units if needed, while second line transport would be furnished overseas it required." On arrival in Egypt the Brigade was initially held in reserve at Moascar, less a total ot three squadrons, one for each defence sector, and one troop on Sweet Water Canal defence patrols. The Brigade formed part of 2nd Mounted Division when that Division was formed on 24 April 1918 and was subsequently re-numbered as 15 (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade on 22 July 1918 at the same time as the Division was re-numbered 5th Cavalry Division. The Brigade was disbanded in January 1920.

32 (Imperial Service) Infantry Brigade

The Brigade was raised in October 1914 as the Imperial Service Infantry Brigade and assigned to lEF ‘E’. Brigadier General Harry Watson CIE MVO was appointed

7

8

Kathiawar Signal Troop - just 39 signallers in strength, drew its numbers from the States of Junagadh (7), Nawanagar (7), Bhavnagar (7), Idar (12) and Ratlam (6). BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/2432: War Diary, Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol. 12, Oct 1914 (Diary 6011),Tel. 6011-W 22.10.14, CGS to GOC IS Cavalry Brigade.

168

For The Honour of My House

to command.’ Major Cyril Stansfeld, Sth Gurkhas, was appointed as Brigade Major (though his tenure turned out to be short-lived as he was taken ill only a couple ot months after arriving in Egypt and was eventually evacuated back to India), Captain Henry McRae, 45th Sikhs, as Staff Captain (though with the departure of Major Stansfeld on sick leave he took over as officiating Brigade Major and held the post until the Brigade was disbanded). Lieutenant Khan Sahib H D Akbar Khan ot Hoti attached as an extra Orderly Officer, Captain Andrew Jukes, 9th Gurkhas, Orderly Officer and Captain Harry Tree, 112th Infantry, as Signalling Officer. In mid-1915 Lieutenant (Honorary) Mehr Mohammed Khan, Khan Bahadur, of Maier Kotla, joined from India as an extra Orderly Officer to the GOC. At the outset it had been determined that the Brigade would comprise one regular battalion, 33rd Punjabis (Lieutenant Colonel Richard Ridgway), and three Imperial Service Infantry battalions;

•

•

The Alwar Jey Paltan under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Daod Khan, Bahadur, with its 10 percent reinforcement provided by drafts from the Alwar Lancers, by one company of the Bahawalpur Camel Escort, later designated No 7 Company, and a small detachment from the Khairpur Mounted Escort. Major John Bogle, Guides, and Captain Claude Shepherd, 53rd Sikhs, accompanied the regiment as SSOs. 4th Maharaja Bahadur Battalion, Gwalior Infantry, under the command ot Lieutenant Colonel Girdhari Singh, with Lieutenant Colonel Arthur FergusonDavie CIE DSO, 54th Sikhs (FF), and Captain Gerald Hughes, 43rd Erinpura Regiment, as SSOs."’

Harry Davis Watson, born 1866 the son of General Sir John Watson VC of Indian Mutiny fame and brother of William Arthur Watson (see f/n 4 above), commissioned 1885 into the Dorset Regiment, appointed to Indian Army June 1886 (1/1 and later 2 Gurkha Rifles), Equerry to the King 1910, he was serving as IG 1ST on the outbreak of the war. He was the author of A Sheri History ofthe Services Rendered by Imperial Service Troops during the Great War 1914-191S which is frequently cited as a reference source in this book. Major General Sir Harry Watson KBE, CB, CMG, CIE, MVO died on 7 May 1945. 10 There is some confusion over the identity of the commanding officer. TNA: WO 95 4423: War Diary 32 Imperial Service Infantry Brigade,‘Nominal Roll of all Officers of the Imperial Service Infantry Brigade’ undated but obviously prepared in Eg\pt c. November 1914 shows Lieutenant Colonel Keshorao Chohan in command. Mohammad Rafiullah, Gwalior's Part in the War (Gwalior: published by authority), p. 7 and Watson, A Short History oj the services rendered by the Imperia! Service Troops, p. 20, both refer to the Battalion sailing from India under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Girdhari Singh and the first ever published 1ST Army List dated 1 January 1915 also shows him in command, having been appointed to the regiment on 22 August 1914,TNA: WO 95 4423: War Diary 4th Gwalior Infantry is one of those war diaries that make little or no reference to Indian officers by name. No other reference has been found to Keshorao Chohan in any Gwalior documents consulted and it is therefore concluded that the reference in the ‘Nominal Roll’is an error. 9

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

•

169

Patiala Imperial Service Infantry, formed by an amalgamation of the two under­ strength 1st and 2nd Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Gurbuksh Singh with Captains Gordon Routh, 56th Rifles, and Hector Campbell MVO, Guides, as SSOs."

No 123 Indian Field Ambulance, under the command of Major William Tucker, IMS, was attached to the Brigade and a signals unit comprising Captain Harry Tree and twenty-two ranks, including two mounted signallers from Gwalior, completed the Brigade establishment. The Brigade concentrated at Deolali for training prior to embarkation. As mentioned in chapter three, the Imperial Service battalions had been re-armed with the short MLE rifle on mobilisation but had yet to be trained on the weapon. Two of the units had been provided with webbing equipment and the Sirhind Tool but the third had neither, and none of the battalions had either machine guns or telephones, nor could any be obtained from Ordnance prior to departure. Harry Watson originally envis­ aged that the period of concentration at Deolali could be devoted to Brigade training, but after a couple of days it was recognised that there was much more basic regimental training needed first which was best left in the hands of COs and SSOs. The Brigade Major noted:

The weak spot in the I.S. Battalions seems to be the Indian Double Company Commanders, and what we really want is about one months’ Double Company Training, with Double Companies going into camp in turn under SSOs, followed by at least a fortnight battalion training before they will be fit to work in a Brigade, up to a standard approaching that of a Regular Brigade.’’^ Priority was therefore given to musketry training, both on and oft the range, and the Hampshire Regiment dug some deep and narrow trenches to give the units some idea of what was required, with a composite company advancing against the trenches firing ball to show the men the result of their fire on the head cover. There was some doubt as to whether the medical examination of the Imperial Service units had been sufficiently thorough in their own states and a further exami­ nation at Deolali identified a considerable number as unfit. As mentioned in chapter three, a medical officer commented confidentially that he could have rejected 150 of the Patiala men for enlarged spleen if they had been for immediate active service,

11

12

Initially each Imperial Service Battalion had two SSOs attached but, as recounted in Chapter 3, this was gradually increased to six and towards the end of the war moves were afoot to increase the number still further to 12, but the end of the war saw that discussion shelved. TNA: WO 95 4423: War Diary 32 Imperial Service Infantry Brigade, note by Major Stansfeld dated 14 October 1914,‘Double Company training in accordance with Infantry Training 1914 - Company Training’.

170

For The Honour of My House

but left them in place on the grounds that they would recover under treatment with quinine on the voyage. In fact sickness, and a high number of men found unfit, meant that reinforcements became a problem for the Brigade throughout the period of its existence. The Brigade sailed from Bombay on 2 November, arrived at Aden on the 9th and at Suez on the 16th, though it took a further three days before it could be disembarked. Throughout the voyage physical training and musketry drills were carried out daily and discipline improved a good deal. On arrival in Egypt the Brigade, along with 31 Indian Brigade, was allocated to a general reserve at Moascar with the exception ot one battalion at the Advanced Ordnance Depot at Zagazig. Brigade headquarters was therefore established at Ismailia where it relieved 9 Indian Infantry Brigade who were under orders for Europe.

The Bikaner Camel Corps and Bir-el-Nuss

The first encounter with the enemy within the Egypt theatre fell to the Bikaner Camel Corps. First raised in 1889, by the outbreak of the First World War it had already served overseas as dismounted infantry during the campaign in China during the Boxer Rebellion (1900), and as a mounted infantry unit in the Somaliland campaign of 1903. Even before Britain had declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, the Maharaja had offered his own services and those of his State, and both were accepted soon after war was declared, the Maharaja destined for a staff role with 7th Meerut Division and the Ganga Risala for lEF A’ in Egypt. ' At the same time Major Arthur Rawlins DSO, private secretary to the Maharaja, was appointed Senior SSO, to be assisted by Captain Arthur Chope of 2nd Gurkha Rifles.’^ Before they had even left India the Commander in Chief asked GOC Karachi about rumours of some distur­ bance among the Bikaner men prior to embarkation but this was very quickly denied and nothing of a similar nature was ever raised again in connection with the Corps. ' The regiment, with an initial strength of two British Officers, 495 fighting ranks, 96 public followers, 12 private followers, 600 camels and four horses, sailed from Karachi on 17 October, arrived at Suez on the 29th and reached Ismailia on 5 November. The Corps was to remain in Egypt until January 1919. Its service can be summarised as an

1.3

BL/IOI.R L/MIL/17/5/2423: Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch'! correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol. 3, Aug 1914 (Diarv 1413), Secretary ot State for India to Viceroy (Army Department), Telegram P 473 of 15 August. 14 Arthur John Herbert Chope, born 23 August 1884, commissioned in The Duke of Wellingtons (West Riding Regiment) 1903, joined 2nd Gurkhas 1906. After his service with the Bikaner Camel Corps he returned to 2nd Gurkhas, eventually commanded 2nd Battalion 1927-1931 and finally retired as an Honorary Brigadier in 1938. 15 BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/2432: Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol.12 (Diary 6246 and 6263).

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

171

active and operational first eighteen months but, after the formation of the Imperial Camel Corps in early 1916, and later the introduction of light armoured car patrols, a less operationally demanding time servicing the less dramatic but still essential needs of coastal defence and Lines of Communication defence duties.”’ There already existed in Egypt a camel corps formed from the Egyptian Coast Guard, though as will be seen they soon showed themselves to be unreliable and were removed from active operations. This left the Bikaner Camel Corps as the only such unit in Egypt for the first eighteen months of the war and it was much in demand; no post was deemed to be complete without its Bikaner detachment. Within a couple of weeks of arrival at Ismailia the regiment had been divided, the Headquarters and the main body remaining at Ismailia but contingents being sent to man a number ot outposts, and this was to remain the pattern throughout the Corps’ four and a half vears in the theatre. The location of Regimental Headquarter.s shifted from time to time as new requirements were placed on the Corps, and new outposts established as older ones were abandoned to suit the needs of patrolling demanded by the changing focus of the campaign. As a result of this widespread dispersal the Corps took part in numerous engagements without ever having the opportunity to fight in any battle as a complete unit. At this early juncture in the war much of the patrolling was of a routine but essen­ tial logistics nature - getting to know the ground, identifying suitable water sources and locating possible landing sites for aircraft. Other patrols were of a clearly defen­ sive nature, ensuring the security of the Suez Canal and the Sweet Water Canal, ‘a most important duty as the canal was the only source of water supply for all troops and civilian population between Port Said and Suez.’” In addition the patrols followed up reports of possible enemy sightings, often from aircraft that had been fired upon, though by the time the camel patrols reached the relevant areas there was often little or no sign of the enemy. Yet further patrols were used in what might now be termed a ‘hearts and minds’ capacity, escorting Egyptian officials travelling with merchandise with a view to establishing regular trading markets in various localities, and then protecting those markets while they were open. One of the more significant detachments was established at Kantara just over two weeks after the Corps had arrived in Egypt, and with this detachment rests the distinction of the first engagement by British or Indian troops with the enemy in Egypt during the First World War. On 17 November 1914 a contingent of 100 rifles under Captain Chope and Captain Moti Singh was ordered to Kantara, which they reached on the 18th, and on the following day Captain Chope received orders to

Authorised in November 1915, the Imperial Camel Corps was formed from 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions, the Australian Light Horse and troops from New Zealand, British Yeomanry and Territorial Infantry. 17 Anon., History ofthe 15th Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade during the Great War, 19141918 (London: HMSO, 1919), p. 5. 16

172

For The Honour of My House

take a patrol to Bir-el-Nuss. Here, a patrol of the Egyptian Coastguard had been attacked while sleeping on the night of the 17th, though all eventually returned to base at Kantara. Taking a party of one Subadar, one Jemadar, 40 rifles, one interpreter and one guide, Chope left on the morning of the 19th, arriving at Bir-el-Nuss at 1345 hours?” The Egyptian Coast Guard patrol returned at 1400 hours and Chope arranged for them to bivouac for the night close to his own position, with orders that they were to be ready to move at 0700 hours the following morning. On the following morning, however, there was no sign of the patrol except tracks indicating movement northwards. Chope’s report indicated he thought the patrol had gone ahead of him and that he expected to catch up with them, but after marching tor one hour he halted on some high ground and could see no signs of anyone ahead. On resuming the march, the Bikaner patrol entered a long valley and within five minutes the advance guard halted on seeing near the head of the valley some 10 or 15 white camels halted, whilst a man of the party waved a white flag. Thinking this might be the missing Coast Guard patrol, though his interpreter immediately identified them as “the enemy”, Chope dismounted his men as a precautionary measure and shouted to the unidentified men to remain where they were, whilst one man came forward to speak. At that moment a dozen men on camels came down the slope, still without firing and still waving the white flag, but when within about 30 yards, the leader put up his rifle and aimed at Chope. The Bikaners opened fire just as a party of horsemen charged in on their front, firing as they came. As soon as this attack had been beaten olTwith considerable loss to the enemy Chope got his men onto higher ground on each side of the valley, leaving the camels in the valley. Enemy numbers were estimated at 50 concealed on a scrub-covered hillock 100 yards away. After suffering further losses the enemy retired, but a party of about 100 horsemen was seen to gallop round to the rear of the Bikaner position. Subadar Abdu Khan was ordered with his section to the high ground some 200 hundred yards in rear to cover the retirement of the remainder of the Bikaners and safeguard their line of retreat. As Chope gathered the remaining men to join the Subadar they came under attack again, but they continued their retirement to the higher ground under a fairly heavy fire and it was here that the Bikaners suffered most of their casualties. The whole unit then commenced retiring on Bir-el-Nuss, riding as fast as the heavy going would permit and also dismounting to fire every two or three hundred yards where the ground was favourable. On reaching a point about 1,000 yards from camp, the enemy, now numbering about 150-200,

IS

I NA: WO 94 4404: War Diary Bikaner Camel Corps, Aug 1914-Dec 1918, Chope’s handwritten note says that he left Kantara on the morning of 20th but since this was the date of the action, and he camped overnight between leaving camp and the action, it was an obvious error in his report. This was corrected in the War Diary entry for 19 November, repeated BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/3897: War Diary, Army Headquarters India, Indian Expeditionary Force 'E', Vol. 5, Feb 1915, Appx. 31 and BE/lOER/L/MIL/17/5/2436: Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol. 16 (Diary 8108).

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

173

ceased pursuing but continued sniping at long range. The enemy then lined the hills to the North-East and East of Bir-el-Nuss and Chope began to retire on Kantara, meeting a relief patrol of the Bikaner Camel Corps at Bir-el-Dueidar. The enemy made no further attempt to attack. Captain Chope’s patrol sustained one officer, 12 sepoys and his interpreter killed and three sepoys wounded.'"' There is much confusion between the various official accounts as to the names of those killed. Captain Chope wrote a handwritten report in which he listed all those killed and this forms part of the unit war diary.Later lists in Army Headquarters war diaries and lEF ‘E’ war diaries make changes to both names and regimental numbers and further confusion is caused by the CWGC listing separately those of the Bikaner Sadul Light Infantry who were attached to the Bikaner Camel Corps in the Egyptian theatre. That regiment did not serve there in its own right, but only as reinforcements for the Camel Corps. The guide who had deployed with the patrol, an El-Arish man, fled as soon as the firing commenced. The guide who accompanied the reinforcement party from Kantara was not seen again since the party halted at Bir-el-Dueidar, having deserted on one of the Bikaner camels. There was no sign of the missing Coast Guard patrol. Chope’s report ended: T am strongly of the opinion that this was no chance encounter with the enemy, but that it was a carefully planned ambush. If the enemy had been advancing along the track in our direction, I must have seen them from the high ground where I halted.’^’ In a follow-up report of 23 November Captain Chope brought to notice the conduct of 1534 Sepoy Ali Khan of B Company during the engagement. ‘This man was with me throughout the engagement and after all my non-commissioned officers had been killed, he was of the greatest assistance to me in taking command of the men who were left, and by his example undoubtedly steadied the others who were all young soldiers.’^^ Captain Chope’s assessment was supported by Major Rawlins who wrote that Ali Khan ‘displayed conspicuous gallantry throughout his engagement and showed an aptitude for command of a very high order, altogether beyond what is expected of a sepoy.’^ ’ Rawlins also brought to notice the three wounded survivors:

See Appendix II for details of the Bikaner Camel Corps killed. Interpreter Effendi, who was also killed, is not listed in that Appendix. 20 TNA: WO 95 4404: War Diary Bikaner Camel Corps, Aug 1914-Dec 1918, note by Captain Chope dated 21 November 1914,‘The list of killed is verified by the names of the men, who returned, of my party’. 21 TNA: WO 95 4404: War Diary Bikaner Camel Corps, Aug 1914-Dec 1918, note by Captain Chope dated 21 November 1914. 22 BL/IOLR/L/MII./l 7/5/3897: War Diary, Army Headquarters India, Indian Expeitionary Force ‘E’, ‘E and G’ Series, Vol. 5, Feb 1915 (Appx. 31), p. 31. 23 Gazette of India of 26 December 1914, Number 1168: Sepoy Ali Khan was subsequently awarded the Indian Order of Merit, the first to be awarded to Imperial Service Troops in the war.

19

174

•

•

•

For The Honour of My House

115 Sepoy Faiz Ali Khan [who] while attempting to take up on his camel a wounded comrade (who was afterwards killed) lost some time in making his camel sit down and a crowd of the enemy hurled themselves on him and alter depriving him of his arms, slashed him on the neck and forearm and left him for dead.* 486 Sepoy Karim Khan [who] experienced similar treatment. His camel was shot and he was brought violently to the ground, when he received a sword cut on the neck which was evidently regarded as fatal.*^"' 503 Sepoy Baghey Khan [who], when lying on the ground with a bullet in his shoulder, was fired at by some ruffian at point blank range, the bullet passing through his puggri; and another ruffian speared him in the side, the spear head glancing off his water bottle. He feigned death, so escaped further persecution.*'

The incident was obviously of great interest to the higher command and on 24 November General Maxwell asked that Captain Chope be told T have been very interested in reading his report and I think that he and the Camel Corps behaved with the greatest gallantry and that all did exceedingly well under very difficult circumstances.’^'’ He also wrote to the Secretary, War Office, on 3 December saying:

Captain Chope ... in my opinion deserves great credit for the way he handled his patrol. He was, no doubt, let in by the stupidity of the Coastguards, and was lucky in getting out of a tight place as he did. I have dispensed with the services of the Egyptian Coastguards for active work, and have handed their camels over to the Bikaner Camel Corps, who are under establishment on account of casual­ ties in camels due to injuries etc.'^^ The Officer Commanding the Egyptian Coastguard Camel Corps, Bimbashi (Major) G. Morice, attempted to account for the actions of his unit:

24 The two men marked * were of the party of four men comprising the advance partv but safely returned to camp. They were both taken prisoner at the commencement of the fight and Sepoy Karim Khan was taken some distance before the enemy cut him down and left him for dead. 25 BL/lOLR/L/MIL/17/5/3897: War Diary, Army Headquarters India, Indian Expeitionary Force E , E and G' Series, Vol. 5, Feb 1915 (Appx. 31), p.32. Sepoy Faiz Ali Khan was subsequently awarded the IDSM, Gazette of India of 26 December 1914, Number 1169. 26 I NA: WO 95 4404: War Diary Bikaner Camel Corps, Aug 1914-Dec 1918, (folio 393), GOC, Army of Occupation in Egypt, to GOC Canal Defences. 27 BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/3897: War Diary, Army Headquarters India, Indian Expeitionary Force E ,'E and G'Series, Vol. 5, Feb 1915 (Appx. 31), pp.27-96 Coastguard camels and their guns were handed over to the Corps at the end of November and more shortlv afterwards.

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

175

I am at a loss to account for the extraordinary disappearance of the Coastguard Camel Corps on the morning of 20th instant. In my opinion it is quite impos­ sible that Mulazim Tani Ahmed Effendi Abdel Meghid, whom I know person­ ally to be a most excellent and loyal officer, to have taken it into his head to have sided with the enemy; moreover the warrant officer, non-commissioned officers and men of this Coastguard patrol (all Soudanese) are all good men and bear excellent records. My personal opinion is that Mulazim Tani Ahmed Effendi Ahmed Meghid^“ either mistook Captain Chope’s orders or through an excess of zeal pushed off east with his patrol before dawn hoping to get in touch first with the enemy before the arrival of the Bikaners. Should my latter surmise be correct the probabilities are that the patrol got ambushed, and were either cut up or taken prisoner. [He then named the 18 additional members of the patrol].^ '

The fate of the missing Coastguard patrol has not been determined. Following the dispersal of the Egyptian Coastguard the Bikaner Camel Corps was ordered to send a detachment of 56 men to Campamento (near Suez) to replace Coastguard patrols on the Ein el Sadr and Campamento-Kebrit sections, and to replace Coastguard patrolling from Kantara. Other daily patrols visited Deversoir and Serapeum. Major Rawlins asked for an additional draft of 150 fighting men and camels and 22 followers, to which the Maharaja agreed, saying that to save time they could be drafted from the Bikaner Infantry if necessary, though the efficiency of the infantry was not to be impaired and should be brought back up to strength immediately.’” There was no further contact with the enemy, and the remainder of 1914 was given over to preparing defences and organizing troops.

The Infantry Brigade For the Imperial Service Infantry Brigade this proved to be a frustrating time. As already noted, on arrival in Egypt the Brigade, along with 31 Indian Brigade, was allocated to a general reserve at Moascar with the exception of one battalion at the Advanced Ordnance Depot at Zagazig. Once settled at Ismailia 33rd Punjabis imme­ diately relieved 1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles of Ferry Defence duties and Ferry Post was put under the overall command of the Brigade’s commander. Brigadier

28 29 30

Mulazim Tani [equivalent rank to Second Lieutenant] Ahmed Effendi Abdel Meghid was the patrol leader. BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/3897: War Diary, Army Headquarters India, Indian Expeitionary Force ‘E’,‘E and G’ Series, Vol. 5, Feb 1915 (Appx. 31), p. 31. BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/2438: Collection of Army Department (General Service Branch) correspondence relating to the European Crisis, 1914, Vol. 18, Nov-Dec 1914 (Diary 9355), Tel P No 1462 13.12.14, Secretary of State to Viceroy (Army Department).

176

For The Honour of My House

General Harry Watson, where the Brigade was joined by one section of 26th Indian Mountain Battery. For the remainder of 1914 the three Imperial Service battalions were primarily engaged in clearing ground and constructing defences around the Ferry Post until early December when, having completed the main defence works, 28 (FF) Infantry Brigade arrived from India and relieved the Imperial Service Brigade of Canal Defences, leaving the Imperial Service Brigade to concentrate at Moascar Camp tor training. 51st Sikhs (part of 28 Brigade) relieved 33rd Punjabis and Major General Sir George Younghusband CB KCIE relieved Brigadier General Harry Watson. Frustrations in attempting the necessary training became apparent; an application tor blank training ammunition was refused, as was a proposal to train at two outlying camps at Abu Sueir and Mahsaha, and the Brigade officers were hampered by a lack of horses, influenza having struck the Brigade HQ_and Patiala Infantry animals. At the same time an epidemic of mumps affected the Imperial Service troops and on one day alone in mid-December 158 men were admitted to the Field Ambulance. Nevertheless, improvements were noted since the initial mobilisation at Deolali, though on one inspection visit the Company Commander of one unit was noted as having displayed almost perfect theoretical knowledge, but the practical application was bad. On a later inspection Sir John Maxwell commented that, on the whole, an attack practise against enemy positions was well done but that platoon commanders needed more training. In late December 1914 the Brigade was paraded for inspection by Major General Alec Wilson, accompanied by H.H. The Aga Khan who addressed the Indian officers on the subject of the war with the Ottoman Empire. The Brigade War Diary noted that A good many of the Mahomedan officers did not know who the Aga Khan was and the result of his visit as regards removing any possible doubt is probably very small.’’' As 1914 drew to a close the Brigade was re-designated 32 (Imperial Service) Infantry Brigade and, with 22 Indian Infantry Brigade and 31 Indian Infantry Brigade, was formed into the 11th Indian Division (Major General Alexander Wallace), with 32 Brigade continuing to form a part of the General Reserve to the Canal Defence Force.” It was, of course, incumbent on the State Darbars to maintain the active strength of the units in the held by furnishing reinforcements when necessary to replace sick or injured men. The first batch of reinforcements arrived in late March, though some were sent back as unfit and, of the Gwalior reinforcements, only nine of the 45 soldiers had been trained in musketry with the new rifle, so their ability to fit in immediately

31 32

TNA: WO 95 4423: War Diary 32 Imperial Service Infantry Brigade, 26 December 1914. General Order No 1060 by GOC Forces in Egypt dated 28 December 1914. 28, 29 and 30 Indi an Brigades were formed into 10th Indian Division at the same time.

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

177

was limited. A later reinforcement of five signallers for the Signal Section came from the Gwalior Lancers and was found to be armed with swords and carbines. There were continuing concerns about the number of men unfit for service and a svstematic medical inspection, on which would be based the calculation for a Third Reinforcement identified: Unit IO R&F Alwar } Bahawalpur ] Gwalior Patiala Signal Sect

Strength Medically 1 April Unfit 26 685 2 70 26 814 33 810 21

7 4 34 11 4

Remainder fit

Reinforcement required to make up WE 10%

}2 8 748 } 22 780 33 799 17

}1 56 } 4 + 1 MO 81 22 5 5 + 1 MO 164

The Brigade Commander noted that there were ample men in Gwalior and Patiala Imperial service depots to meet the reinforcement and, indeed, the next reinforcement detail from Patiala slightly exceeded the number required for that State with all but two being regarded as of average physique. The Gwalior reinforcement, however, fell short by four officers and over 30 men, with the senior medical officer reporting their physique in the majority of cases as indifferent, and with a fair percentage as poor. He reported that practically all were debilitated and out of condition and six were unfit for service. When another contingent arrived in mid-July they were regarded as “A slightly better lot than the former draft but quite untrained, although very keen. Colonel Ferguson-Davie is of the opinion that it will be another 4 months before they are fitted to take their place in the ranks.”’’ Alwar’s manpower position proved to be a deteriorating problem, with two officers and 46 men needed to complete their marching detail by the end of May. The Brigade Commander suggested that the Alwar draft should be furnished by some other State, to be selected by the Inspector General 1ST, and this turned out to be the case in July when reinforcements arrived from the Bahawalpur Camel Corps Escort and the Khairpur Camel Corps Escort, but none from Alwar itself. Nonetheless, those who did arrive were considered to be a fine body of men, well set up and comprising some trans-frontier Pathans, the rest Punjabi Mohammedans. Additional SSOs joined the battalion - Lieutenants John Powell-Price, Beverley Covell, both lARO, and Terence Grant, lA. Later Captain Shepherd was recalled to his own battalion and replaced by Lieutenant Basil Humphreys, lARO, and Major Bogle was recalled to command his

.33

TNA: WO 95 4423: War Diary .32 Imperial Service Infantry Brigade, 19 July 1915.

178

For The Honour of My House

own battalion and was replaced by Major Hector Campbell, MVO, Guides, pre\,j. ously SSO with the Patiala Infantry. The lack of training among not only the reinforcements but also the men that had originally deployed meant that there was some serious catching up to do. The scattered deployment of Brigade troops meant that Brigade training was severely hamper^j though individual units did what they could to keep up musketry training. As wij.}, the latter part of 1914, the early part of 1915 still saw the troops largely engaged fatigue duties, continuing to improve trenches and, with the frequent khamsin sanj. storms which rapidly filled trenches with fresh sand, maintain them in good order deploying at least once a week. The extreme heat of the storms was trying on the and this constant fatigue duty impacted on training. Despite these difficulties Captain Mark Vincent, 33rd Punjabis, the Brigajde Machine Gun officer, made great strides in training Imperial Service units in the Usg of the Maxim Gun, although initially he was given unserviceable weapons without mounts with which to begin the task. By mid-April Alwar Infantry had 16 rngn partially trained, but without guns or equipment; Gwalior Infantry had 24 men nearly fully trained and had two guns, but only six mules and were lacking some equipment, but even so were able to take to the field along the Canal; while the Patiala Infantry was described as having a team practically trained, complete with equipment and full of promise. In late May, 36 mules arrived from India for the gun teams, 12 eayh for Alwar, Gwalior and Patiala, though on inspection two of the mules were found to have only one eye each, a sign, perhaps, that if properly led they didn’t need both! Continuity training for the machine gun sections was provided by NCOs from 33rd Punjabis who spent periods on attachment with the respective Imperial Service units even after the regiment had been transferred to Suez in July 1915. Other musketry training was, however, hampered by a shortage of practice ammu­ nition, with only 66 boxes being allocated to the Brigade as a whole in July 1915. 33rd Punjabis, who had spent much of the previous year on the frontier and marching in relief columns, had not fired a musketry course for two years and yet received only enough to allow 18 rounds per man. Gwalior, with its more than 150 inexperienced and untrained recruits, had never fired a proper course with a charger loading rifle. Alwar and Patiala received even less of an allocation but, despite frequent pleas for more, none was available. Despite these difficulties the Alwar Infantry, for example, was able to demonstrate later in the year that with just 10 rounds per man, and ISO rounds for the machine guns, they had improved considerably and the machine guns demonstrated how quick they were at getting on the target. Operationally, an advance by Ottoman troops to Nekhl in early January, followed by their reported occupation of Moiya Harab, 25 miles east of the Little Bitter Lake on the 26th, led to a decision to man the trenches that had been prepared on the west bank of the Canal, initially with a platoon each but then increased to a half companw Within No II Sector (Deversoir to El Ferdan) Brigadier General Harry Watson with his Imperial Service Infantry Brigade assumed command of the west bank from Bench Mark Post to Ballah. Two of his units, Alwar and Patiala, were already deployed

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

179

elsewhere, so the line was covered by 4th Gwalior Infantry taking from Bench Mark to El Ferdan and 33rd Punjabis from El Ferdan to Ballah. Sth Gurkhas manned the only post within this section on the east bank, opposite El Ferdan. HMS Clio, a third class cruiser, was in position in the Canal but acting independently, while the French cruiser D’Entrecasteaux was deployed on Lake Timsah. The first action reported in Brigade War Diaries involved 4th Gwalior Infantry firing on a hostile patrol on the night of 30 January 1915. Over the next two days the enemy was observed entrenching in a number of areas south east of El Ferdan and Bir Abu Aruk, at distances of 4,000 to 8,000 yards and with numbers ranging from a couple of hundred to a couple of thousand. This activity culminated in a number of ineffectual attacks by the enemy on the morning of 3 February, with incoming fire from a distance of about 5,500 to 6,000 yards until silenced by fire from 20th Battery and HMS Clio. A small number of prisoners were brought in and sent on to Ismailia, including five Turkish machine gunners from Constantinople: “They were as fat as butter and well found - very clean.””* By the middle of the month the threat was apparently deemed to have receded since it was decided that only sufficient men were required to keep open existing west bank trenches, construct new ones as required and prevent unauthorised persons from crossing the Canal. Brigade HQ_and the bulk of the two battalions therefore moved to standing camps at Ismailia and Moascar, leaving just six platoons from each battalion to carry out the required duties. The continual damage caused to trenches by the frequent khamsin sandstorms soon meant that the number of platoons assigned had to be increased. On 1 May the west bank defences were abandoned and 32 Brigade took over the duties of Ferry Post, Bench Mark Post and Ismailia from 31 Indian Brigade, re-locating Brigade HQ_back to Ismailia. For the first half of the year the Imperial Service battalions, along with 33rd Punjabis, regularly exchanged posts, moving between Bench Mark, El Ferdan, Ferry Post and Moascar. Major Stansfeld, who had been sick for much of the period from the end of November 1914, was finally evacu­ ated to India in early May and the duties of Brigade Major fell to Captain McRae who continued in the post until the brigade was disbanded, his place as Staff Captain being taken by Captain Ralph Pollock, 51st Sikhs (FF). Some minor enemy activity was observed in the latter half of May and into the beginning of June with infiltrators apprehended having swum the Canal with the aid of kerosene tins as floats, with small bodies of Ottoman troops noticed by intelligence agents reconnoitring an area about 20 miles or so from El Ferdan, and with a picquet of 33rd Punjabis coming under fire when confronted by a party of some 50 Ottomans and Bedouin under a German officer. Others were seen at Katib Abu Aruk on 31 May but by the time a combined force had been sent to apprehend them the enemy spotted the intended ambuscade party from 33rd Punjabis and retreated.

34

TNA: WO 95 4423: War Diary 32 Imperial Service Infantry Brigade, 6 February 1915.

180

For The Honour of My House

With the disbanding of the short-lived 11th Division on 31 May and the depar­ ture of Major General Wallace to the Dardanelles, 32 Brigade came directh' under HQ_Canal Defences. Not only did battalions regularly exchange posts but Brigades also relieved each other in different sectors. For example, at the end of June 1915 32 Brigade relieved 22 Brigade in the Serapeum section of No II Sector, a 10 mile stretch of the Canal from Deversoir Gate at the north end of the Great Bitter Lake, to Gebel Mariam at the southern end of Lake Timsah. This involved moves for the Alwar Infantry to Deversoir and Serapeum west, and for the Gwalior Infantrv to Serapeum east, Tussum and Gebel Mariam, while the Patiala Infantry and 33rd Punjabis remained at Moascar and Ismailia respectively. Within a few days of this move, however, on 9 July, 28 Indian Brigade was ordered for service near Aden and so, that same afternoon, 33rd Punjabis (less one company) was ordered to Suez to relieve 28 Brigade units garrisoning Shallufa and Gurkha Posts within No I Sector. With this move. Lieutenant Colonel Ridgway, 33rd Punjabis, was appointed to command No I Sector Canal Defences, with Captain Mark Vincent appointed as Brigade Major, thus denying 32 Brigade of its Machine Gun Officer, a post subsequently filled b\ Lieutenant Covell. Regimental HQ_moved immediately but it was not until 15 luh that the bulk of 33rd Punjabis transferred to Suez. Also in earlyjuly 1915 one company of the Patiala Infantry was ordered to Gallipoli as reinforcements for 14th Sikhs who had suffered severe casualties.'' Captain Mohammad Akbar Khan, Chief of Hoti, Extra Orderly Officer to the GOC O Brigade, was also transferred to Gallipoli as SSO Indore Transport Corps which was serving there. By the end of July 1915, therefore, the Brigade was reduced to its three Imperial Service battalions with the bulk of the Alwar Infantry at Serapeum and a sizeable detachment at Deversoir, the bulk of the Gwalior Infantry at Serapeum East, a size­ able detachment at Tussum and a smaller detachment at Mariam, and the’ Patiala Infantry at Moascar, less the company attached to 14th Sikhs in Gallipoli. In addition to manning their posts the units continued to face the demand for fatigue parties. On the battlefield near Tussum many of the Ottoman dead had received a surface burial only and fatigue parties were continually called upon to rebury those whose bodies had been exposed by the ever-shifting sand. Similarly, the upkeep of the trenches on the west bank, which had been abandoned earlier in the year, was a matter of considerable difficulty owing to sand storms filling them in. Eventually the Brigade Commander decided not to repair them until such time as sappers and miners became available to supervise some significant repairs. In early August the Patiala Infantry relieved Gwalior Infantrv in the Tussum sub section, the Gwalior Infantry relieved the Alwar Infantry in the Deversoir sub section (Post Deversoir), and the Alwar Infantry replaced the Patiala Infantrv at Moasc ir With these moves. Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson-Davie, SSO Gwalior, assumed

35

See Chapter 6 for details.

J

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

181

command of the Deversoir sub section and Major Routh, SSO Patiala, of the Tussum sub section. On 15 August Brigadier Harry Watson was ordered to Suez to take over command of No I Sector Canal Defences from Lieutenant Colonel Ridgway as 33rd Punjabis had been ordered to France. Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson-Davie therefore assumed command of the Serapeum sub-section of No II Sector with Capt Ralph Pollock as his Staff Captain. By 21 August two companies of the Alwar Infantry had arrived to take over No 1 Post (El Shatt) and No 2 Post (Baluchistan) from 33rd Punjabis. Gwalior Infantry followed in mid-September and went into Suez Camp. Meanwhile, the Patiala Infantry was transferred to 22 (Lucknow) Brigade with a view to mounting railway defences out of Zagazig. The Brigade was also joined by 9th Bhopal Infantry, who had returned from their deployment to Aden with 28 Brigade. In summary, therefore, 11th Division saw little action and was a short-lived command, being disbanded on 31 May 1915. 32 Brigade, which had also seen little action, continued as an independent formation under GOC Canal Defences, though its duties were largely of a routine nature until January 1916 when it was also disbanded. 33rd Punjabis left the Brigade at that point, as did 125th Rifles which had only joined in September 1915; the Alwar Infantry went to Lines of Communication and then to 10th Indian Division and 4th Gwalior Infantry joined 20 Brigade, 10th Indian Division. 1st Patiala Infantry had already transferred to 22 Indian Infantry Brigade on 16 September 1915.

The Cavalry Brigade The Brigade sailed from Bombay on 2 and 3 November 1914 with the exception of a wing of the Mysore Lancers and the Bhavnagar detachment, unavoidably detained when their transport ship developed engine trouble, started to arrive at Suez in mid­ November and was in place at Ismailia by 20 November. Within a couple of days of arrival two squadrons of the Patiala Lancers had been deployed to Kantara, a troop of the Mysore Lancers to Port Said and another to the east bank of the Canal for daily patrols. Essentially the Brigade role, at least for the first 14 months, was in defence of the Suez Canal against Ottoman raids, with squadrons frequently working in support of Bikaner Camel Corps patrols. Duties included apprehending anyone in the vicinity of the outer defences, and tracking and apprehending deserters. As with the Bikaner Camel Corps, an essential function of the patrols was reconnaissance for water supplies and/or destroying wells if it was thought they would be of use to the enemy. There are several war diary references in the early deployments of units to the fact that early morning departures meant the horses would not drink before leaving, and a failure to find adequate supplies during the day led to problems of exhaustion due to the heavy sand over which they were patrolling. Early engagements with the enemy were of a relatively minor nature. In earlyjanuary 1915, for example, a patrol of the Patiala Lancers was fired on north east of Kantara

182

For The Honour of My House

Mysore Imperial Service Lancers and a regiment of Bengal Lancers with the Bikaner Camel Corps (Ganga Risala) in the Sinai Desert, 1915. (Imperial War Museum: Q_15568)

by the enemy hidden in low ground. The following day, a patrol under a Havilda,r was sent in the direction of Hill 70 from Ballah to look for the enemy. On approach they mistook the enemy for Gurkhas and the patrol had to retire at a gallop under a heavy cross fire before reaching safety, with only one horse being hit. Other combined cavalry, camel and infantry deployments on 26 and 27 January to dislodge the eneiny on Hill 70 were inconclusive. On 30 January, aerial reconnaissance reported Hill 7o to be occupied by 50 Bedouin only. The cavalry was ordered forward to verify and, if true, occupy Hill 70 but when within 2,000 yards of their target came under heavy enemy fire from a force estimated at nearer 300 than 50. A much stronger force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Palin, 14th Sikhs, moved out on 31 January and over the next three days several skirmishes occurred until, by 3 February, the outpost lines had been strengthened. There were no casualties throughout this operation. Also at the end of January, the posts at Kubri and Baluchistan were attacked by about 200 of the enemy, though they were easily driven off without casualties. Early the following morning a sniper was spotted lying in a position at about 800 yards range and was ridden down and captured by a patrol from ‘D’ Squadron, Hyderabad Lancers - he turned out to be an Indian from Hyderabad Sind, enlisted and armed by the Turks. For the Bikaner Camel Corps the beginning of 1915 was marked by a visit at the end of January from the Maharaja of Bikaner, on his way back to India from France. On 1 February the Maharaja went out with one of his patrols from Ismailia, conducting a reconnaissance south east of Ferry Post. At a distance of six miles from base the patrol came under fire and contact was maintained with the enemy throughout the day.

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

183

The following day ‘B’ Squadron, Mysore Lancers and a 50-strong detachment of Bikaner Camel Corps mounted a reconnaissance to a line of hills known as Bullseye and V target hills where they found the enemy apparently entrenched in strength (later established at being between 200 and 300). Deploying the Maxim Gun section and Camel Corps to a central position, the cavalry divided into equal parties on the flanks and then held their ground pending the arrival of reinforcements from 56th Punjabi Rifles (FF), 51st Sikhs and No 21 Mountain Battery RA, as well as further Camel Corps numbers. Risaldar Subbaraj Urs went forward with six men to recon­ noitre in the direction of a group of men and reported:

I advanced towards the men indicated and at about 500 yards 1 saw that there were about 100 men in echelon trenches of about 20 men each. 1 saw a man standing up and fired at him. He appeared to drop and my fire was not returned and 1 thought 1 had fired on our own men as Captain Woolley of the 56th had said that some of his men were reconnoitring in that direction. 1 therefore signalled with my rifles and on receiving a reply 1 advanced again. We held our rifles straight above our heads and the enemy did the same. We got to within 25 yards when fire was opened on us. We turned and galloped away and about 300 yards from the enemy a sowar fell from his horse. 1 stopped and picked him up on my horse and we all rode in. No man was wounded.’'' The Maharaja of Bikaner, who accompanied the Corps patrol which reinforced the troops, left for Cairo and then India shortly afterwards. There were similar minor skirmishes over the next three months involving all three cavalry regiments, although with very low casualties among them, but leading to the capture of a number of Ottoman and Arab prisoners, the recovery of quantities of arms, ammunition, animals and equipment. Meanwhile, the cavalry horses had been suffering from an outbreak of glanders and in March 1915, 173 horses of the Mysore Lancers were destroyed. ’' The alarming proportion of these numbers, together with the fact that similarly large numbers reacted to the mallein test in the rest of the brigade, induced the veterinary depart­ ment to treat the case specially and to defer the destruction of horses, which were apparently healthy, until such time as the disease should show some active symp­ toms. As a result the regiment (exclusive of the composite squadron at Ferry Post) was formed into two squadrons of non-infected horses, one of infected horses and

36

37

TNA: WO 95 4423: War Diary Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, Oct 1914-Dec 1914, Appendix XI, dated 2 February 1915. Subsequent enquiries by the SSO indicated that Risaldar Subbaraj Urs must have picked up the fallen sowar about 400 yards from the enemy trenches and carried him for 500-600 yards. He was awarded an IDSM for this act (Gazette of India 528, 5 June 1915). The regiment had already lost 50 destroyed because of glanders in an earlier attack.

184

For The Honour of My House

two infected troops, which corresponded to the original reinforcement. The reinforce­ ments (Bhavnagar Lancers) were by this means distributed throughout the regiment. A more significant engagement occurred on 22 March involving patrols from the Hyderabad Lancers based at Kubri. B Squadron (Lieutenant Charles Horne and Captain Ashgar Muza) and D Squadron (Captain Kasim Ali) accompanied a mixed infantry force (l/5th Gurkhas, 51st Sikhs, 53rd Sikhs, and four guns of RFA Territorials) under the overall command of Colonel Boisragon, l/5th Gurkhas, to advance against an enemy force of about 800 infantry and 200 cavalry with some guns in camp about seven miles east of the Canal. Thirty rifles of the Bikaner Camel Corps had been detailed to join the force but because of delays at the ferry crossing were left behind. Cavalry reconnaissance patrols located enemy guns and about 100 cavalry in position and both cavalry and infantry were deployed to cut off" any possible retreat. The enemy opened fire on the advancing forces with shrapnel and rifle fire but they were engaged with dismounted fire at ranges from 1,000-1,200 yards before the enemy was observed returning towards some high hills to the north east. The horses were by now exhausted and the nature of the country suggested further advances were impracticable but B Squadron was ordered to advance as rapidly as possible - several horses came down from exhaustion - and the rear parties of the enemy were finally engaged at effective range for a short period. Mounted attacks, or pursuit, would have entailed long gallops over undulating and heavy sand and into very hilly country but since the horses had now been without water the whole of the 22nd, and under saddle from 0300 hours on 23rd, the decision was taken to retire to Kubri, the cavalry to form a screen to the infantry rear guard. The Imperial Service Lancers lost only one horse but the attack force as a whole lost two men killed and several wounded. The enemy carried off several casualties and left much equipment and ammunition on the field. There were two important administrative changes at this time. On 24 March the Patiala Lancers were reinforced by a detachment from the Kashmir Lancers Ressaldar Firoz Khan, Jemadar Nasib Singh, 68 NCOs and men, and six public followers. On 27 March the issue of Maxim Guns to the Brigade was authorised and arrangements were made with 11th Division for the machine gunners to be trained by instructors from 22 and 31 Infantry Brigades. There was, however, no immediate increase in the war establishment of the regiments and men for the Machine Gun squadrons had to be found from within existing establishments.’** 29 April saw, perhaps, one of the more significant encounters of this early period of the war involving Imperial Service Troops though, as might be expected from different unit war diaries compiled from their own particular perspective of events, accounts vary as to exactly what happened. The Bikaner Camel Corps patrols operating out of Ismailia encountered the enemy on 28 April 1915 when a combined party consisting of 67 fighting ranks of the Corps, a Maxim Gun detachment, a section of Mounted Sappers, a Wireless Section and a

,18

CSO Canal Defences No 63/17 dated 21 March 1915.

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

185

party of Arab guides left Ferry Post, Ismailia, for Egeidet Um Nasr with the intention of recovering some enemy gun ammunition said to be buried there. Aerial recon­ naissance reported the area to be clear but the patrol ran into an enemy body esti­ mated at 200 men, dressed in black uniforms with tarbushes, advancing on them in skirmishing order. There was a heavy exchange of fire lasting some time as the Bikaner patrol executed an orderly retirement until the enemy gave up the attack, but not without the loss of one Bikaner sepoy and one Egyptian sapper killed, one havildar dying of his wounds the following day, one sepoy severely wounded, one Egyptian sapper missing in action, and two Bikaner personnel” and one Egyptian sapper slightly wounded. It was estimate that up to 20 enemy had been killed in the action. Major Rawlins noted that “All ranks behaved with coolness and promptitude in rather trying circumstances and the cooperation between the Maxims and the rifles was very marked throughout. The men of each unit were ready to assist any one they found in difficulties; as the enemy’s attack developed very quickly we were unable to get our casualties away to the rear.”'’" That evening Canal Defences HQ_ ordered a brigade level attack to move and attack the enemy. Nine squadrons of Imperial Service Cavalry (three from Mysore, the Hyderabad Lancers and the Patiala Lancers less two troops), a half battalion of 27th Punjabis under Lieutenant Colonel Carey, two guns of the Egyptian Artillery, a Field Ambulance and a 250-strong camel convoy for water supplies moved out that evening.'” By early morning on the 29th there was still no sign ol the enemy but a patrol to the south eventually reported heavy tracks and found the position at which Major Rawlins had encountered the enemy the previous day. Several wounded camels were found and were destroyed. Just before dawn on the 29th, when the Brigade had reached a point about half a mile north of Hawawish, the guide from the Bikaner Camel Corps acknowledged that he was lost. An aeroplane dropped a message that the enemy had evacuated Hawawish and was now 100-150 strong with 100 camels and much baggage at Mahadat to the north east, though the aircrew warned that Hawawish should be approached with caution as the enemy might be hiding in pits dug there. Another aeroplane message at 0645 hours reported a small force only at Mahadat, confirmed several hours later when camels were reported to be grazing there. At this point there seemed to be a degree of confusion as to where elements of the attack force were located. Lieutenant Colonel Carey reported that the infantry.

.39 40 41

Including Major Rawlins. TNA: WO 94 4404: War Diary Bikaner Camel Corps, Appx. A for 29 April 1915. TNA: WO 95 4423: War Diary Mysore Lancers refers to the Mysore squadrons being led by Regimentdar B Chamaraj Urs but there is some confusion here since elsewhere it is mentioned that he had been injured by his horse on 26 March and did not return to duty until 4 May. At this time the Patiala Lancers were without a senior SSO, Lieutenant Colonel Pennington having left for France on 20 March to take command of 9th Hodson’s Horse - to be replaced by Lieutenant Colonel R B Low, also 9th Hodsons Horse, though he did not arrive until 18 May.

186

For The Honour of My House

Artillery, Field Ambulance and Transport were halted at Hill 353 as the men were tired, but the message was late reaching the brigade commander who then ordered the infantry to advance on the position he was now leaving, but that Transport and the Field Ambulance should remain at Hill 353. At 1015 hours a message from Canal Defences HQ_said that the aeroplane would give directions to Mahadat and urged the Brigade to hurry up or the enemy would have moved away.'*^ At 1055 hours the aeroplane reported the enemy had pitched camp and showed no signs of moving. The GOC therefore decided to clear Hawawish before proceeding to Mahadat. At approximately 1140 hours, when about 4 miles south of Mahadat, the Brigade halted to enable the guns to close up and in reply to a query on progress from GOC Canal Defences, Brigadier General Arthur Watson replied saying that he was approaching Mahadat but that he was “Awaiting arrival of guns which are still an hour behind me.”’ Meanwhile he had been joined by Lieutenant Colonel Carey and by Captain Gee of the Egyptian Artillery, and ordered the former to bring as many men as were fit to march along with the guns. The Advance Guard, found by B Squadron Patiala Lancers (Captain Balwant Singh), was ordered to despatch an officer’s patrol under Jemadar Manna Singh towards Mahadat to give the GOC immediate news if the enemy was leaving his position. The Brigade finally resumed its advance at 1315 hours once the guns had caught up, though the majority of their infantry escort had fallen out on the way and a troop of Hyderabad Lancers was detached to act as escort. At 1345 hours firing could be heard in the direction of the left flank of the Advance Guard and some small bodies of the enemy were sighted on the sand dunes above the wells. Shortly afterwards the aeroplane reported that about 100 enemy infantry were lining the top of the dune facing the line of advance and another 100 lining the dunes to the north-north-east of Mahadat. Although enemy tents were still pitched, ^®Sg3ge camels were being loaded. Finally, at 1415 hours, the GOC and his Advance Guard reached the dune overlooking Mahadat and saw the enemy retiring in column of route to the north east in three parties with guns in position to the East. Prior to this the OC of the Artillery unit insisted that his men must have a halt and he was told to do so IVi miles south of Mahadat, but on seeing the enemy withdrawing he was ordered to bring his guns forward to the Col overlooking the Mahadat wells. Meanwhile the GOC had ordered the SSOs of the Mysore and Patiala Lancers (Major Henderson and Captain Willis respectively) to pursue the enemv as rapidh’ as possible - the Patiala Lancers to direct their attack against the enemy’s right rear, and the Mysore Lancers, moving further to the East, to attack the advanced parties ot the enemy. The two squadrons of Hyderabad Lancers would follow, with the machine

42 4.3

Given that a party of Patiala Lancers had escorted sappers to Mahadat on 20 February, and the Bikaner Camel Corps had conducted a reconnaissance on 2 April, it seems odd that a major brigade deployment could not find its way there. TNA: WO 95 4423, War Diary Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, Vol 5,28 April-28 Mav 1915,Appx.XXXVni.

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

187

guns of Mysore Lancers in support of the attack. At this time the enemy was about 4,000 yards to the north east of Mahadat. The pursuit was launched at about 1435 hours, but the heavy sand and steeply undulating nature of the country, combined with the long period without water which the horses had been forced to endure, and the fact that they had been under saddle for over 17 hours, slowed their pace consid­ erably. Nevertheless the leaders acted with great vigour and at about 1505 hours the Patiala Lancers overtook and charged a small body of the enemy, taking two pris­ oners. The regiment then swept on in a broken line over the crest of a ridge into a valley, at the eastern end of which a party of 15 or so of the enemy was in ambush. This party opened fire and simultaneously the regiment came under machine gun fire and shrapnel from a ridge about 600 yards to the east. The enemy was again charged with Captain Willis, Lieutenant Barr Goldie, Major Mahomed Yusuf Ali Khan and Captain Gajjan Singh leading. The enemy resisted with rifles and hand grenades, and, though all were eventually cut down, they succeeded in severely wounding Captain Willis and Lieutenant Goldie, in killing Major Mahomed Yusuf Ali Khan and 1458 Sowar Abdul Karim, and in wounding six other men. The accuracy of the machine gun and artillery fire, and the loss of their leaders, caused some confusion in the ranks and the regiment, with the exception of some 22 men under Jemadar Rattan Singh, retired partly up the valley across which the attack had been made and partly to the north and north-west. Meanwhile Major Henderson and the Mysore Lancers had occupied a position, dismounted, a few hundred yards to the south east and endeavoured to cover the mounted attack of the Patiala Lancers with rifle fire, while the reserve was some distance in the rear. During this period the enemy were directing an accurate and rapid fire with machine guns and rifles at about 600 yards range on Jemadar Rattan Singh’s party and on the position occupied by the Mysore Lancers. The Reserve, which by this time had arrived to the left rear of the Mysore Lancers, was ordered to continue the line, and the Mysore Lancers machine gun section was ordered into action on a commanding position still further to the north. The detachment under Captain Zorawar Singh, Indian Land Forces, though only partially trained, acted with great coolness, opening fire at 1,200 and 1,500 yards, at a body of the enemy who meanwhile had begun to retire. The enemy machine guns ceased fire almost at once and the GOC then ordered Major Henderson to continue the pursuit and endeavour to get round the enemy’s left, while the two squadrons of Hyderabad Lancers, much reduced in strength owing to the exhaustion of the horses and a large number of stragglers, were ordered to move forward to where Jemadar Rattan Singh s troop was still in position. The GOC and Staff went forward to find that Captain Willis and Lieutenant Goldie had been moved under cover by Captain Scott, 4th Gurkhas and Brigade Signalling Officer, who had galloped forward a few minutes previously when the fire was much heavier. Some four officers and 22 men of the Patiala Lancers had taken cover in a small depression to the east of the main spur, one Ottoman officer and 10 men were lying in a hollow, seven of whom were found to be wounded while three were feigning dead but were actually unharmed. The majority of the wounds

188

For The Honour of My House

were ound to be lance or sword thrusts. By this time firing on both sides had ceased, ut the pursuit was still being pressed by the Mysore Lancers, though owing to the extreme exhaustion of the horses they were unable to gain on the enemy who were running very fast and, according to a report received from an aeroplane, in consider' able disorder. At this point the action was broken off. It was not until some 40 minutes after the action had ceased that the infantry finally arrived at their position, but the Second Line Transport and Field Ambulance had still not appeared and so arrangements were made to improvise stretchers.'*'’ The Mysore Lancers returned and occupied the position on which they had originally dismounted, the machine guns a little to their left rear. While this was being done it was found that about 150 men of the Patiala Lancers had been rallied by Captain Balwant Singh in the direction of Mahadat, but nothing more was seen of the remainder of the regiment that night.'*’ It was subsequently discovered that about 130 of them had arrived in considerable disorder on the Canal late in the evening and during the night of 29/30 April. Brigadier Arthur Watson subsequently observed: “The only excuse I can offer for this conduct is that they were shaken through the loss of their leaders. I am going into this matter very carefully with the officers of the regiment.”'*' Owing to the urgent necessity of procuring surgical assistance for Captain Willis,"' whose right arm was shattered close to the shoulder (it was believed by a flat nose bullet from a revolver fired at close range), and in view of the fact that the horses had now been over 24 hours without water, the GOC decided to march as quickly as possible on Ismailia. The wounded were very laboriously transported as far as Mahadat, the heavy undulating character of the country making frequent changes of stretcher bearers necessary and it was during this phase of the withdrawal that Lieutenant Goldie died in great pain.'*' By 2030 hours they had reached Mahadat and joined up with the Egyptian Mountain Battery, but the exact position of the infantry with 1st and 2nd Line Transport was still not known and since the lamps of the Signal

44

45 46

47

48 49

Despite being sent for by the GGC several times, Maj or O’Leary, IMS, never made an appearance. He died in a swimming accident at Lake Timsah on 9 October 1915. TNA: WO 95 442.3: War Diary Patiala Lancers, records that Captain Balwant Singh’s horse fell in the first advance and he did not take part in the attack. TNA: WO 95 4423: War Diary Patiala Lancers, claims that the regiment rallied and re-joined the Brigade after the attack but Major Arthur, Brigade Major, has annotated the entry Inaccurate - 6 Troops only re-joined the Brigade’ and a later entry names five officers and gives a number of 94 men found to be missing who re-joined the regiment on 1 May. TNA: WO 95 4423, War Diary Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, Vol 5, 28 April-28 May 1915, Appx. XXXVIII, dated 30 April 1915 Athough the October 1915 London Gazette entry for his DSO (see Appendix III) does not contain a citation it seems almost certain that it would have been given for this action. Lieutenant Barr Herbert Goldie, lAR, had only joined the regiment as SSO on 26 February 1915, along with Lieutenant Walter Murray. Lieutenant Edward Belcher had joined four days earlier.

Middle East (Egypt and Palestine)

189

"froop were with 1st Line Transport it was impossible to communicate. Only half a squadron of the Patiala Lancers had at that time re-joined the brigade. The march fO Ismailia was extremely slow owing to the necessity of frequently changing the stretcher bearers and the already exhausted condition of the men, the brigade now paving covered some eight miles. Early on the morning of 30 April news was received from CSO Canal Defences (;O the effect that about 137 officers and men, mostly Patiala Lancers, and including few wounded, had arrived at Kantara, Ballah and Ferdan the previous night, that a double company from 33rd Punjabis had been sent out to look for further stragglers, ^nd that ambulance transport was being sent from Ferdan towards Mahadat. They {ook over the wounded and the body of Lieutenant Goldie. By 0930 hours the brigade pad reached Ferry Post and crossed over at once. The horses had been under saddle for about 40 hours, had covered between 55 and pO miles through exceedingly heavy going, and with tew exceptions had not been vvatered since 1800 hours on the evening of the 28th. The men had had only two (opportunities for sleep - one in the early morning of the 29th when the Brigade paired for IVi hours, during part of which the horses were being fed - and the second from about 0315 hours to 0415 hours on the 30th. It was to be expected, therefore, that there would be casualties among the horses and the final figure of 11 killed, 13 wounded and eight died of exhaustion was, perhaps, in line with these expectations, though much credit was due to Captain Simpson, the veterinary officer, who was able \vith the help of strychnine to keep the stragglers going, though many of the horses were unfit for further work for a week following the action. Of the manpower, the brigade suffered two British officers wounded, one of whom subsequently died of his wounds, one Indian officer killed, one sowar killed and six tank and file wounded. The enemy were estimated to have lost 20 killed, one officer and eight men wounded and prisoners, and two unwounded prisoners.'" A court of enquiry was subsequently assembled by order of the GOC to report on the conduct of certain officers of the Patiala Lancers during the operation on 29/30 April. In his report to the Chief Staff Officer, Canal Defences, Brigadier General Watson named the five officers (see footnote 46) and noted that not only had they retired from the scene of action ‘but did not halt till they reached the Canal’. He continued: My first intention was to send these officers back to Patiala; but, on reflection, it seemed to me that to send men back to their State in these circumstances was likely to cause trouble not only in the State but to the Government of India. I

50

By March 1917 the wells at Mahadat were all revetted and covered in. Two RE sappers lived there and pumped out two wells daily in rotation, the water being very plentiful and good for both men and horses to drink. One Imperial Service cavalry troop was permanently stationed there to guard the wells and send out patrols.

190

For The Honour of My House

n the presence of my staff and Colonel therefore called them to my office where, m^^ recently come off the sick list Nand Singh, commanding the regiment j^ring the operations) told them and was unable to accompany the they had behaved in a manner that they had failed in their duties as ea^e jgserved severe punishment. It unworthy of the name of Sikh, and t a^ farther trial but to give them an was my intention, however not to procee ^hat I should write a letter to opportunity of clearing their reputatio but if, on a further occasion, they the Patiala Durbar reporting their con u jgfrer would be cancelled. Their proved themselves more worthy so rnen who had shown thempromotion would, in the meantime, e st p^ ^^.^j^pred to their heads. selves brave and capable under fire wou on the subject of the On 5 May I paraded the regiment an reminding them of the Saragarhi stigma which they had cast upon t ems example that I hoped would Monument at Amritsar which commemor be followed in future. Colonel Nand Singh also addressed the r S , Adjutant, Gaffan Singh, Captain On 1 May. however, rhe GOC inter/'™''Singh and c«jgrarulare.i Bakhtawa, Singh, Reasaldar laher Singh and Jemadar Ka g g them on rheir good work ar the time of theinvestigate the On 2 July Major General Bak.h.sh S n£,^^^^d in the brigade war conduct of the regiment at Mahadat but g diary, including his visit to Cairo on 6 July lutely no mention of him in the Patiala Laneers ^f Patiala to his troops - "1 What does survive is a message sent fro ^^^^^ich is in your hands.”- What is rely on you to maintain the honour or my n , .De1, 1Lancers nnrers found removed trom not in question IS that the Patiala touiiu themselves largely ? . -einwewh;... ” m et-,e. vpar thoueh they continued with routine active operations for much of the rest of the year inoug y patrols, reliefs of posts, and with training. In April 1916 London ordered that the Patiala Lancers, a5ong with 14th Sikhs and 2/lOth Gurkhas, were to proceed east­ wards and call at Aden for definite instructions.^^ One sad outcome of this even.

51

52 53 54

55

NAl: F&P Proceedings Internal 1916: F&P-lntl-June-404-467-Part B, Confidential Letter No 80.3 dated Ismailia, 9 May 1915. TNA: WO 95 4423, War Diary Patiala Lancers. TNA: WO 95 4423, War Diary Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade. BL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/3901: War Diary, Army Headquarters India, Indian Lxpeitionarr Force‘E’,‘E and G’Series, Vol. 9, Appx. 68 (Diary 12544), Tel P S-12544 dated 17.6.1? from C in C India to GOC Egypt. irrT'ii TBL/IOLR/L/MIL/17/5/3911: War Diary Army Headquarters India, ILh E & G, Volume 19, April 1916,Tel. No 15524-Cypher-MO from CIGS to C in C India. A separate reference, TNA: WO 95 5246, War Diary Patiala Lancers, shows that they remained in Egypt until May 1916 when they departed for Mesopotamia, landing in Basra on 24th. ft had been decided that they would form a part of lEF D. NAI: Fi