Executive's Guide to Personal Security 2019051845, 2019051846, 9781119574378, 9781119574392, 9781119574385, 1119574374

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Executive's Guide to Personal Security
 2019051845, 2019051846, 9781119574378, 9781119574392, 9781119574385, 1119574374

Table of contents :
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Contents
About the Authors
Preface
Introduction
Chapter 1 Developing a Security Mind‐set
Learning Awareness—The Color Code System
Condition White
Condition Yellow
Condition Orange
Condition Red
Physical and Psychological Responses to Fear
Mental Preparedness to Mitigate the Effects of Fear/Stress
Conclusion
Note
Chapter 2 Planning for Emergencies in the Office
Why Plan?
Situation: Cardiac Arrest
All‐Hazards Emergency Action Plan
Situation: Airborne Hazard
What Do You Need to Plan For?
The Three Responses to an Emergency in the Office
Critical Elements of a Good Plan
Ongoing Updates
Cooperation
Command Center
Decisive Action
Individual Actions
Communication
Expertise
Notes
Chapter 3 Receipt of Suspicious Mail and Packages and Bomb Threats
Delivered Packages
Basic Protective Measures
Dos and Don'ts for Handling a Suspect Item
Receipt of Mail and Packages at Your Desk
Suspicious Bags/Packages or Other Items Left Unattended
Bomb Threats and Bombings
Notes
Chapter 4 Violence in the Workplace
Prevention of Workplace Violence
Security‐Related Responses
Supporting Local Authorities
Chapter 5 Surviving an Active Shooter Incident
Background and Definition
Behavioral and Motivational Factors
Assessment and Response
Avoid
Barricade
Confront
Notes
Chapter 6 Personal and Business Travel Security
General Recommendations
Keep a Low Profile
Arranging Social Encounters
Avoid Routine Patterns of Behavior
Moderate Your Behavior
Know Where You Are Going: Pre‐Travel Research
Avoid Politically Unstable and High‐Risk Countries
Obtaining Emergency Medical Care
Local Criminal Activity
Local Laws and Customs
Preparing to Travel
Necessary Documents
Medication and Medical Insurance
Flight Check‐in
In‐Flight Briefing
Behavior on Arrival
Notes
Chapter 7 Travel to High‐Risk Areas
Principles of Route Selection and General Vehicle Safety Measures
Rule 1. Be Alert
Rule 2. Avoid Choke Points or Bottlenecks
Rule 3. Avoid One‐Lane Roads
Rule 4. Watch the Car in Front of You
Rule 5. Watch the Car behind You
Rule 6. Avoid Predictable Travel
Rule 7. Beware the “Box”
Rule 8. Avoid Heavily Congested Roads
Rule 9. Look for Safe Havens
Rule 10. Choose Well‐Lit Roads
Emergency Vehicle Operation
Analysis of a Car Attack in Pakistan
Countersurveillance
Surveillance Is Commonplace
What Is Surveillance?
Detecting Surveillance: The Golden Rule
Methods of Surveillance
Team Surveillance Techniques
Technical Surveillance
Additional Vehicle Safety Measures
Vehicle Preparation and Selection
Secure Your Valuables
Recognize a Setup
Vehicle Safety Check
Parking
Car Bombs
Roadside Emergency Equipment
Evacuation of Personnel from High‐Risk Areas
Chapter 8 Hijacking and Hostage Survival
Hijacking
Change of Terrorist Goals Warrants Change in Strategy
Recommendations
Confronting the Threat
Rescue Attempts
Hostage Survival
Cooperate or Resist?
What to Expect
Keep Physically and Mentally Active
Notes
Chapter 9 Espionage and Fraud Protection: The Executive Perspective
Commercial Espionage: Background and Use
Scams and Frauds
Executives Are Prime Targets
Executives Are Most Vulnerable while Traveling
Modern Frauds: The Mailbox Is Constantly under Attack
Don't Be Your Own Worst Enemy
Notes
Chapter 10 Executive Protection
Mission and Scope
Setting Up an Executive Protection Program
Risk Assessment, Scenarios, and Response
What a Good Plan Should Include?
Selecting an Executive Protection Specialist
Chapter 11 Running a Successful Security Business Function
Recent Trends in the Corporate Security Function
The Creation of the CSO Role
New Challenges
Elements of Success
Set Up the Right Reporting and Command Structure
Build Relationships and Manage Resistance
Bridge Culture Differences
Create Alignments
Communicate Proactively
Use the Business Jargon
Chapter 12 Breaking into a Security Career in the Private Sector
How to Move to the Private Sector
Transitioning from One Career to Another Career Is a Journey
Draw Up Your Plan Well in Advance of Your Departure Date
Accept the Need to Learn New Things
Know Your Audience and Make the Proper Adjustments
Gather Information to Help You with Your Plan
Know What You Are Worth and What Is the Right Business Setting for You
Build Your Soft Skills for a Soft Landing
Prepare Your Brand
Chapter 13 Carrying a Firearm for Personal Protection
Notes
Index
EULA

Citation preview

Executive’s Guide to Personal Security

Executive’s Guide to Personal Security SECOND EDITION

David S. Katz Ilan Caspi

© 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All right reserved. This second edition first published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey. Published simultaneously in Canada. Edition History John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (1e, 2003) No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning, or otherwise, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, (978) 750–8400, fax (978) 646–8600, or on the Web at www.copyright.com. Requests to the Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, (201) 748–6011, fax (201) 748–6008, or online at www.wiley.com/go/permissions. Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and author have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives or written sales materials. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a professional where appropriate. Neither the publisher nor author shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages. For general information on our other products and services or for technical support, please contact our Customer Care Department within the United States at (800) 762–2974, outside the United States at (317) 572–3993, or fax (317) 572–4002. Wiley publishes in a variety of print and electronic formats and by print-on-demand. Some material included with standard print versions of this book may not be included in e-books or in print-on-demand. If this book refers to media such as a CD or DVD that is not included in the version you purchased, you may download this material at http://booksupport.wiley.com. For more information about Wiley products, visit www.wiley.com. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: Names: Katz, David S., 1960- author. | Caspi, Ilan, author. Title: Executive’s guide to personal security / David S. Katz, Ilan Caspi. Description: Second edition. | Hoboken, New Jersey : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., [2020] | Includes index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019051845 (print) | LCCN 2019051846 (ebook) | ISBN 9781119574378 (paperback) | ISBN 9781119574392 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781119574385 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Executives—Protection. | Executives—Crimes against—Prevention. | Business travel—Safety measures. | Violence in the workplace—Prevention. | Corporations—Security measures. | Office buildings—Security measures. | Emergency management. | Private security services. Cover Design: Wiley Cover Image: © Pressmaster/Shutterstock Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To my writing partner, colleague, and friend, Ilan Caspi. For my late parents, Beatrice and Alvin. For my beautiful wife, Galina, and my sons, Daniel, Michael, and Benjamin. For my in-laws, Nelli and Yefim, and especially for my grandmother-in-law, Sofya, for making me feel like a grandson again. – David S. Katz

To my writing partner, colleague, and friend, David Katz. For my parents, Etti and Yossi, for all your support and love. For my brother, Amit, and my sisters, Nira and Hagit—while our paths may be different, the bond between us will remain forever strong. For my daughters, Ella and Maya, and my son, Jacob, for giving me new meaning to life and adding endless joy to each day. – Ilan Caspi

CONTENTS

About the Authors

ix

Preface

xiii

Introduction

xv

Chapter 1 Developing a Security Mind-set

1

Chapter 2 Planning for Emergencies in the Office

15

Chapter 3 Receipt of Suspicious Mail and Packages and Bomb Threats

47

Chapter 4 Violence in the Workplace

65

Chapter 5 Surviving an Active Shooter Incident

73

Chapter 6 Personal and Business Travel Security

91

Chapter 7 Travel to High-Risk Areas

113

Chapter 8 Hijacking and Hostage Survival

157

Chapter 9 Espionage and Fraud Protection: The Executive Perspective

169

Chapter 10 Executive Protection

185

Chapter 11 Running a Successful Security Business Function

195

Chapter 12 Breaking into a Security Career in the Private Sector

205

Chapter 13 Carrying a Firearm for Personal Protection

217

Index

227 vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

David S. Katz is a former senior Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the chief executive officer of Global Security Group, Inc., a company providing protective and investigative services, security and fire/life safety consulting, and highly specialized training for both private sector and government clients. He is an expert in conducting complex domestic and international investigations, executing high-risk arrests, conducting undercover and surveillance operations small unit and defensive tactics, preparing security assessments, conducting intelligence analysis, and planning large-scale tactical operations. He is a nationally recognized expert in active shooter response and prevention. David is a federally certified firearms and tactical instructor who spent four years as a Primary Firearms Instructor at the FBI/DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia, where he taught firearms and tactics to several thousand federal agents, state and local law enforcement officers, SWAT teams, military personnel, and foreign military and law enforcement counterparts. A recognized authority in law enforcement arrest tactics, he has provided training to police units and tactical teams around the world including the Israeli General Security Agency, the New York City Police Department Emergency Services Unit, and the Marine detail assigned to HMX-1, the president’s official helicopter. David was also the DEA liaison to the Israeli Secret Service, developing a cooperative relationship with their field agents and training staff. He has provided advanced tactical firearms training to Israeli General Security Agency (Shin Bet) instructors in Israel and firearms and tactical training to the Diplomatic Security Service Agents and U.S. Marines guarding the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv and the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem. David also observed and participated in training given to Shin Bet security officers, EL AL Israel Airlines security agents, and operators from elite Israeli counterterror units. David’s background, skills, and training have made him a highly soughtafter security consultant. He has prepared the risk/threat/vulnerability assessments and created the emergency action plans for more than 100 ix

x

About the Authors

commercial properties, including many of the most prestigious in New York City. His investigative expertise is in great demand in the private sector, and he has conducted and supervised many high-profile investigations for numerous commercial clients and well-known law firms. He has testified as an expert witness as both a law enforcement officer and subsequently in private practice in high-profile federal civil lawsuits involving hundreds of millions of dollars in prospective damages. David is perhaps best known for his expertise with respect to active shooter response and prevention. During his tenure at Quantico, he developed lesson plans for teaching law enforcement officers how to quickly and dynamically enter the scene of an active shooter situation and effectively engage the shooter. After leaving government service, David utilized his knowledge with respect to active shooter response in order to create the Active Shooter Response Training program, widely regarded as the most comprehensive, action-oriented active shooter response program in the nation. A strong proponent of proactive preventive measures, David developed the Active Shooter Threat Recognition program using his extensive experience as well as research from the nation’s top law enforcement agencies. The program identified a number of commonalities shared by active shooters and other perpetrators of incidents of mass violence. He has personally provided this training to hundreds of clients including Fortune 50 firms, corporations, universities, private and public schools, religious organizations including mega-churches and the nation’s largest and most highprofile synagogues, hospitals, government and law enforcement agencies, and residential properties. David is also directly involved with assisting the Fire Department of the City of New York in the creation of the active shooter response protocols that are taught to New York City’s fire and life safety directors. At the request of that department, he allowed some of the material he developed to be included in the study materials for the FDNY Active Shooter & Medical Emergency Preparedness course. He has also provided corporate Workplace Violation Recognition & Prevention training to corporate clients across the country. This program stressed the importance of establishing a “zero-tolerance” policy for incidents of workplace violence as well as the development of proper reporting and documentation procedures for all such incidents. The program also teaches how to deescalate conflicts and the role of law enforcement and private security in situations requiring a more robust response. In addition, David has provided security during numerous “hostile terminations” and is familiar with the measures required to prevent such terminations from leading to violence.

About the Authors

xi

David is the author of articles on safety while traveling abroad and has written approximately 50 articles on emergency planning, personal safety, investigative practice, protective equipment, terrorism, and other related topics. He has lectured throughout the world and has provided security and safety training to senior executives and the executive protection personnel of some of the world’s leading corporations. David is a frequent guest on nationally broadcast television and radio programs including Fox News, CNN, and others. He has a law degree from Hofstra University School of Law. Ilan Caspi is a business executive. For the last fifteen years, he has worked with senior management in large corporations to solve complex business challenges and improve business performance. Prior to his business career in the private sector, Ilan served as a member of the Israeli General Security Agency (Shin Bet), the Israeli Diplomatic Security Service, and EL AL Israel Airlines. He is an expert in executive protection, threat assessments, and developing comprehensive security protocols for international organizations. Before joining the Israeli intelligence and security community, he served in a combat unit in the Israeli Air Force and participated in many antiterrorist operations. During his service, he received the President of Israel’s “Most Distinguished Soldier” award. As a member of Shin Bet, Ilan served in the Office of the Prime Minister of Israel, where he specialized in the field of executive and dignitary protection. With EL AL Israel Airlines, he acquired extensive operational practice in the field of airport security management and civil aviation. He conducted security surveys at various airports and served as an on-board security agent. Ilan applied his knowledge and skills in the international arena as a member of the Israeli Diplomatic Security Service. He conducted vulnerability assessments of international facilities and updated security protocols. During his tenure at the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC, he reviewed the embassy’s existing security protocols, implemented improvements, and trained diplomats on personal security awareness while traveling and working abroad. As an expert in radical Islamic terrorist organizations, Ilan routinely analyzed intelligence data and formulated response plans to meet identified threats. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree (cum laude) in Political Science and International Affairs from the Open University of Israel in Tel Aviv. He holds an MBA from the University of Chicago, Booth School of Business (Dean’s Honor List, 2007) with a concentration in Strategy, Marketing, and Finance.

PREFACE

I

since we wrote the first edition of this book. At the time, less than two years after the attacks of 9/11, we had both separated from service to our respective countries and entered the private sector. The country still was in a heightened state of alert. Civilians working in the private sector had been deliberately targeted, and companies and individuals were forced to reconsider the way they viewed security. Our initial goal when we wrote the first edition of this book was to address the changing security needs of private companies in the period immediately following the attacks of 9/11. A good portion of the first edition, therefore, provided measures to address the concerns posed by acts of terrorism or potential acts of terrorism on U.S. soil and abroad. In the years after the book was published, we consulted and trained hundreds of companies, government agencies, law enforcement agents, private security personnel, and executives. Ilan received his MBA from the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. He has worked as a management consultant and is currently a senior executive with a major international company. David founded Global Security Group, Inc., a firm providing a number of services including personal protection, fire and life safety consulting, planning and drills, private investigations, and highly specialized training. It was this private sector experience that provided us both with a clearer view into the current state of security in corporate America and what is needed to continue to move toward the goal of greater safety and security in the workplace. Although the threat of terrorism will continue to be an issue that can potentially affect the private sector, this book focuses more on the more common safety and security concerns that companies face each day. Today businesses face a much more complex set of security challenges than ever before. Whether your company is relatively small and limited to a particular city or region or is a major international corporation with a significant international footprint, you must remain cognizant of the potential safety and security issues facing your organization and employees and how they are changing. T HAS BEEN MORE THAN SIXTEEN YEARS

xiii

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Preface

Concerns about workplace violence, active shooter incidents (usually a result of unaddressed workplace violence issues), intellectual property and asset protection, and other issues such as health emergencies, weather-related hazards, natural disasters, travel safety and overseas political upheavals, or localized violence are more pressing. Failure to address these issues in the workplace could lead to significant or even catastrophic results for your business and employees. In this second edition, we leverage our combined experiences from our careers working in government service and in the private sector to teach security personnel, corporate executives, and employees how to recognize and prepare for the real threats facing ordinary individuals and companies in today’s world. This book provides the type of information necessary to empower you with the knowledge to protect your business, yourself, and others. This knowledge, formerly provided only to government security professionals, is made available to you in this book in a format suitable for the corporate environment. You will learn how the fear and stress experienced during a dangerous incident causes changes in cognitive ability, perception, and the ability to make critical decisions and how those effects can be mitigated. You will learn how to detect the warning signs of a potentially violent employee and what to do to prevent violence from occurring. You will learn the survival strategies to employ in the event you are caught in an active shooter incident. If you are an executive responsible for the safety of your employees and corporate assets, you will learn how to secure your employees and your facility, how to formulate emergency protocols, and how to manage the response to a fire or non-fire emergency. If you plan to travel abroad or are an expatriate working for your company in another country, this book will arm you with the necessary knowledge to take the actions that will enhance your physical safety and security as well as the safety of your family and coworkers. Finally, if you are an executive responsible for corporate security and life safety issues, this book will provide you with the knowledge to run a successful security operation and establish yourself as a valuable asset within the corporate business environment. David S. Katz Ilan Caspi September 2019

INTRODUCTION

T

that applies to any serious discussion of security and it is this: Unless you are committed to developing a security mind-set, you will not be able to make use of most of the information that is provided in this book. The security mind-set is far more valuable than any technology or security procedure or protocol we can put in place; the human factor is by far the most critical element when it comes to addressing security and life safety concerns. As you read this book, each chapter stresses a different aspect of security that is designed to greatly enhance overall safety, whether you are at work, at home, or traveling abroad. Each of the recommendations provided has been proven over the years to be effective in improving your overall security posture. However, unless you learn how to pay attention to your surroundings and identify threats before they materialize, very little of the information contained herein will be of use to you. The following is a short synopsis to what we are going to cover in this book. Chapter 1: Developing a Security Mind-set. Your brain is your most valuable tool with respect to personal security and overall life safety so we begin by discussing how to develop the same mental skills that well-trained security professionals have. This chapter makes the case that developing proper observational skills and learning to draw the right conclusions from those observations is the single most important thing anyone can do to become less vulnerable to harm. We explain in detail the effects that stress and fear experienced during a critical incident can have on your cognitive and perceptual ability. Ideally, the goal is to teach you to recognize dangerous situations before they occur; avoiding a dangerous situation is always better been trying to extricate yourself from danger once it has begun. Chapter 2: Planning for Emergencies in the Office. How do you handle an emergency or emerging incident in the office? What if an employee, client, vendor, or guest has a medical emergency? What about a fire in your building or on your floor? There are also many non-fire-related emergencies, ranging HERE IS A FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLE

xv

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Introduction

from severe weather, to accidents, to acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, that can threaten your safety. Do you currently have procedures in place to handle these types of incidents, or would you be forced to try to respond appropriately during a critical incident without a plan and while under extreme stress? What about protecting your business? Are there actions related to business continuity you would need to take in the event there is an evacuation or in-building relocation? How would the closure of your office or facility for an extended period affect your business? In this chapter we teach you how to develop plans on how to respond in the event of an emergency to ensure the safety of your employees, the protection of your assets, and the continuity of your business. Chapter 3: Receipt of Suspicious Mail and Packages and Bomb Threats. How would you handle a bomb threat at the office? Would you immediately evacuate the building or wait for the police to arrive and tell you what to do? The chance that your place of business will receive a letter or package bomb is extremely remote, but many businesses will have to deal with such a threat at one time or another so prior preparation is a necessity. Are most threats legitimate? No, most such threats are intended to disrupt your daily business activities. Does that change what your response would be? How would you handle the receipt of a suspicious letter or package? What about an unattended item left in the office that no one can identify? What would you do if one of your employees reported receiving a letter that was leaking some sort of powder or liquid and had a strong or noxious smell? In this chapter we cover all these issues and delve into some motivations that drive threats made to the office. These types of incidents always generate a law enforcement response, but the steps you take before the first responders arrive are critically important and are discussed in great detail in this chapter. Chapter 4: Violence in the Workplace. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, homicide is the third leading cause of death in the workplace. Sometimes the threat is external; retail businesses, for example, have a risk of being robbed. However, in many other cases, the threat of harm to employees comes from other employees. Employee-generated violence in the workplace is a frightening prospect for any company, particularly because, absent the creation of the appropriate reporting system, it can be difficult to detect and address before an act of violence occurs. Companies must establish a zero-tolerance policy toward violence in the workplace and exercise vigilance in order to deal with aggressive, belligerent, and potentially violent employees. This chapter analyzes the risk posed by violent individuals in the workplace and suggests appropriate preventive measures to maintain a safe environment in

Introduction

xvii

the office. The chapter also addresses how to deal with acts of domestic violence affecting employees, as such violence often finds its way to the workplace. Chapter 5: Surviving an Active Shooter Incident. FBI statistics reveal that the number of active shooter incidents is increasing. These events are unpredictable, chaotic, and happen very quickly. Organizations can never completely eliminate the risk of such an attack occurring, but they may take many actions before an attack in order to try and prevent it, during an attack to mitigate potential damage and loss of life, and after an attack to return to normal operations as quickly as possible. This chapter reviews active shooter incidents, particularly with respect to such incidents in the workplace, and provides information needed to survive an active shooter incident in the event one occurs. Chapter 6: Personal and Business Travel Security. The type of business a company performs and the parts of the world where the work is done can also create security issues. International companies may have to deal with potential threats to their overseas business travelers and expatriate employees. Companies and their employees located in politically volatile areas may get caught up in local or regional conflicts or even terrorist attacks. In this chapter we provide valuable information on how to prepare for a trip and how to conduct yourself while overseas. This chapter addresses residing abroad as well. Chapter 7: Travel to High-Risk Areas. Most criminal or terrorist operations are not conducted at random. Virtually all terrorist or criminal attacks are preceded by a pre-operational stage where intelligence is gathered about the intended target. Following a target in order to learn his or her daily routine is one of the most critical elements of this stage, and the objective is to identify a place and/or time where the target is most vulnerable. In this chapter we discuss how surveillance is performed in order to help you understand how to utilize countersurveillance techniques to detect whether you are being watched or followed. You learn the principles of route selection to reduce vulnerability while driving and recognize the importance of knowing the location of the nearest safe haven. If you are required to travel to potentially dangerous areas or are a high-profile individual or a security professional responsible for protecting someone, this chapter will be of extreme interest to you. Chapter 8: Hijacking and Hostage Survival. The subjects of how to respond during a hijacking and how to survive a hostage situation are extremely complex. There are several schools of thought on what to do if you become embroiled in either or both of these situations. Because currently there is little consensus on the best ways to respond, in this chapter we share the different approaches. We discuss the pros and cons of the various approaches in order to familiarize you with the prevailing expert opinions on this topic.

xviii

Introduction

Chapter 9: Espionage and Fraud Protection: The Executive Perspective. Theft of intellectual property and fraud constitute major sources of revenue and inventory loss to businesses. Counterfeit goods, pirated software, and theft of trade secrets together represent an “economic loss” to the U.S. economy of between $225 billion and $600 billion annually, according to the findings of a 2017 research report from the bi-partisan IP Commission, The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy. Despite knowing this, businesses are still making the same mistakes. Can we protect the company’s most critical information from falling into the wrong hands? Executives are often the targets of scams, both simple and complicated. Can anything be done to reduce this risk? In this chapter we cover basic fraud prevention and protection of intellectual property. Chapter 10: Executive Protection. Protecting an individual is a very different discipline from securing a facility. Top executives can’t be locked down. They are necessarily mobile, and that mobility can expose executives to a variety of risks. Over the last sixteen years, we have had the opportunity to provide security and close protection to business executives, A-list celebrities, ambassadors, political figures, and dignitaries. We have also trained the personnel who protect some of the world’s most well-known and high-profile businessmen and -women. What we have learned is that there is no more widely misunderstood security role in private industry than the role of the executive protection professional. For some executives, a security detail simply means that they have a driver who is a former police officer and is armed. For many in the entertainment industry, the security team seems to be valued by the pound; agents are extremely large, physically imposing types whose job is to simply act as mobile bouncers for the client. This chapter describes what an executive protection program can and should be. Chapter 11: Running a Successful Security Business Function. Over the last decade there has been a marked increase in the number of companies that have centralized their security functions and established a new role called a chief security officer or head of security. This individual is the person responsible for overall corporate security, which includes the physical security and safety of employees, facilities, assets, and protection of information. In recent years, the role has expanded to include additional related areas, such as business continuity planning, and loss and fraud prevention. This position is highly challenging, and success requires a lot more than just technical knowledge. The role demands leadership, strong business acumen, and management skills. Many in this role come from a law enforcement or military background but lack business experience and an understanding of corporate culture. This issue may

Introduction

xix

be problematic as they are faced with competing for budget dollars and must make the case for increased funding for the security budget against seasoned business veterans in other divisions seeking the same funds. Learning to navigate in the corporate environment is a new skill, and this chapter provides you with the knowledge you need to develop, manage, and run a successful corporate security operation. Chapter 12: Breaking into a Security Career in the Private Sector. We decided to add this chapter to recount our experiences in making the transition from government service to the civilian market. Over the last fifteen years we have learned a lot and realized that the lessons we learned would be helpful for individuals currently working in law enforcement, the military, or a government agency with a security function who are preparing to embark on a new career in private industry. A lot can be done before you submit your retirement papers, and this chapter provides the kind of guidance we wish we had when we made the transition. It also helps managers and executives understand the level of talent that is available from the public sector and how they can incorporate that talent into their business. Chapter 13: Carrying a Firearm for Personal Protection. We each have been asked more times than we can count to give our opinion as to whether an executive should consider carrying a firearm for personal protection. In this final chapter, we address this question in great detail and give a detailed and comprehensive answer to this very difficult question. Let’s get started.

CHAPTER 1

Developing a Security Mind-set

W

E LIVE IN A DANGEROUS WORLD.

You don’t need anyone to tell you that. The goal of keeping yourself safe and free from harm seems to be almost impossible to achieve, and even the most cautious and security-conscious individuals sometimes get injured or killed. However, while safety cannot be guaranteed, it can be dramatically enhanced. The first and most important step in achieving this goal is to develop what is known as a security mind-set. Doing this requires little more than looking at the world in a slightly different way. You simply need to develop a sense of vigilance that becomes almost subconscious, and that is what this chapter focuses on. The good news is that it is not as difficult as you might think. The initial task is to learn to be more aware of your surroundings. Learning to be more observant and how to draw the correct conclusions from your observations is without question the most important element in this discussion; paying attention to what is going on around you is your best defense against unforeseen danger. None of the other recommendations in this book will help unless you first learn to become more observant and, more important, to appreciate the significance of things you see. To give you an idea of the importance of this concept, consider that virtually all police officers, federal agents, professional security officers, and others in similar professions are taught observational skills as the building block in the development of their survival mind-set. Without exception, every law enforcement academy teaches its students how to be observant and what 1

2

Executive’s Guide to Personal Security

things to look for. Well-trained law enforcement personnel scrutinize their environment. Their eyes are always moving and taking stock of their immediate environment. After only a short while it becomes a natural and unconscious habit; they are always aware of what’s going on around them and are able to draw appropriate conclusions from the things they observe. Experienced police officers notice the unusual: things that look out of place, such as an unfamiliar car parked in a particular neighborhood or someone wearing an overcoat in warm weather. This skill is an absolute necessity for anyone in police work. It is also an indispensable skill for those seeking to reduce their chances of becoming victims. This skill isn’t very difficult to learn. Look for things that appear to be out of place and assess them with respect to whether or not they may have some adverse effect on your personal safety. Awareness training is generally the first thing taught in the survival and security courses given to government agents, military personnel, and police officers. In the Office of Training of the Drug Enforcement Administration in Quantico, Virginia, new DEA agents receive a special block of training called Agent Survival before graduating and embarking on their rewarding albeit dangerous careers. This particular course deals with how to survive the violent encounters that they will all face. Much of it is psychological preparation intended to train agents to be prepared to use all necessary means to survive a violent encounter by developing a combat mind-set. The course is very intense, and more than one individual has decided to resign after sitting through it. But before the psychological training begins, the first thing the agents are taught is the overwhelming importance of being aware of their environment. Because threats must be identified before they can be addressed, awareness is the first lesson in learning how to survive. The same is true for Israeli security agents, and their training in this skill is taken to an even higher level than that of DEA agents. An Israeli agent is taught how to spot a well-disguised suicide bomber or other attacker by reading the most subtle body language indicators. Nonverbal communication is actually more reliable an indicator of intent than the spoken word, and it is this “human element” that is the most important factor in identifying a potential threat. Technology is a great help and a wonderful tool, but it still cannot match human intuition. This level of awareness is common in some civilian populations that are, tragically, the targets of terrorism. Ilan was born in Israel, where he learned to be observant at an early age, long before he undertook the extensive security training provided to Israeli security agents and before he gained experience protecting Israeli diplomatic personnel. Israelis have, by necessity, learned these lessons

Developing a Security Mind-set

3

from seeing their friends and neighbors murdered before their eyes. If someone leaves a bag unattended on an Israeli city street for even a second, citizens either call for the owner to identify him- or herself or alert those around them. As a rule, Americans don’t do that. For a brief period in post–September 11 New York City, people were cognizant of packages that were left unattended. However, people have short memories. The farther we are from an event like September 11, the more complacent we become. The same dynamic is true with respect to the anthrax attacks that occurred shortly thereafter and the bombing that occurred at the Boston Marathon on April 13, 2013. As we have stated, effective observational skills are critical as the first step to take if you wish to reduce your risk of harm. You need to become more aware of your immediate surroundings and know how to identify a potential threat to your safety. Doing this will allow you to see danger before it materializes and act appropriately to forestall it. In addition, there is an added benefit to developing a sense of vigilance. Anyone looking at you with the intent to do you harm will notice that you are paying attention to what is going on around you, and that immediately makes you a less desirable target.

LEARNING AWARENESS—THE COLOR CODE SYSTEM How do you learn to become aware of your surroundings? DEA instructors teach a color code awareness system borrowed directly from Colonel Jeff Cooper’s excellent book Principles of Personal Defense.1 This system breaks down levels of awareness and readiness into four colors: white, yellow, orange, and red. It is a simple and effective system for teaching awareness and is worth repeating here.

Condition White The white stage is the sleep state, the dream state, the state in which you are completely unaware of your surroundings. It is mentioned first because the most important point to take away from this chapter is that you must never allow yourself to be out in public in condition white. We can all relate to the experience of driving a car while lost in thought. When we arrive at our destination, we are somewhat surprised as we really have little or no conscious recollection of making the trip. Despite this fact, we were able to keep the car on the road, brake when necessary, and avoid other vehicles. While we were driving, we were on autopilot. Driving becomes an almost unconscious, reflex activity. We become so used to driving that we allow our ordinary sense of awareness to slacken.

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Executive’s Guide to Personal Security

This almost robotic state is common to many of the routine tasks that we perform each day. Routine actions tend to lull us into condition white. Understand that if you allow yourself to be in condition white and you are attacked, you have given all the advantage to your assailant. The only thing that might save you is the attacker’s own ineptitude. Condition white is not an acceptable state to allow yourself to be in outside the home.

Condition Yellow When in public, your level of awareness always must be condition yellow and you must adopt this condition each time you leave the house. What is condition yellow? It is the state of relaxed alertness. You are aware of your surroundings, but there is nothing you see that warrants closer attention or an elevation in your condition of readiness. Basically, you are just paying attention to the world around you. You are relaxed and you are able to notice the unusual. When you leave the house in condition yellow, you naturally observe the street or parking area. You know what is usual for your neighborhood and what is not. You would immediately notice an unfamiliar vehicle parked nearby. Most likely it is nothing to concern you at all, but you notice it anyway. This is the appropriate condition to be in when you are out and about.

Condition Orange Something that you have noticed in condition yellow has gotten your attention. Your focus is now on a particular potential threat, and you begin to quickly assess your options. This is where you need to establish what is known as a mental trigger. You say to yourself “If he does X, then I will do Y.” If the potential threat turns out to be nothing, you simply shift back into condition yellow.

Condition Red Condition red is either “fight” or “flight.” Those are the only options that are appropriate once danger has materialized. However, there is a third “f”: “freeze.” That is the one thing you must not do, but it is the likely reaction of someone unaware and unprepared. If you have identified your threat in condition orange and have established your mental trigger, you will not freeze: You will act. In order to illustrate these concepts, we are going to use an example frequently provided by our good friend and colleague, John Friedlander. John is

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a well-respected security consultant for Kroll Inc., a division of Duff & Phelps, a consultancy firm, and is also an adjunct professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City. Imagine you are shopping at the supermarket late one night. The parking lot is relatively empty, and you are parked in a somewhat isolated part of the lot. Always in condition yellow, as you exit the store you observe your surroundings. As you wheel your cart toward your vehicle, you notice a lone male walking across the parking lot. At this time there is no reason for you to believe that this person poses any sort of threat to you. You simply are aware of his presence and you keep him on your radar. You reach your car and as you begin loading your groceries into the car, you observe that the individual has changed direction and is walking directly toward you. You now shift to condition orange and begin setting up your mental trigger. You do not “lower your six”; you are still aware of your surroundings, particularly to your rear, as there may be other threats in the area. The person walking toward you may have a partner, or as you evaluate a possible means of escape, you are aware of traffic that might pose a hazard to you if you were forced to flee. Your trigger is a simple one. You think, “If he gets another fifty feet closer to me, I will … ” You may decide to turn around and move quickly back into the store. Or stop loading your groceries, get into your vehicle, lock the door, and drive away. If you are armed, you consider what action would lead you to draw your weapon and engage this person. Or you might simply decide to turn toward the person and make sure he sees that you are aware of his presence. You might not necessarily assume a defensive posture, but at least you are prepared to do so if necessary. If the individual crosses the line you set, you act immediately. You are now in condition red, fight or flight. It is the mental trigger that you established in condition orange that allows you to act quickly and decisively and not freeze when doing so would place you in jeopardy. Remember, there are only two alternatives: fight or flight. If you must fight, your counterattack must be swift and violent. If you flee, you must literally run for your life. In this situation, you will also likely experience the physical and psychological responses to fear that we discuss later in the chapter. The bottom line for purposes of this discussion is for each of you right now as you read this book to make up your mind to pay attention to your surroundings and respect the little warning bell you have in your head. Everyone is observant under certain situations. Put an upper-middle-class guy in an inner-city neighborhood, and he will become quite cognizant of his surroundings. The trick is to do it all the time, not just in places that you find unsettling. Don’t get lulled into condition white under any circumstances. Remember, you are often most vulnerable in familiar surroundings. Generally, as you get closer to home,

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you tend to become more relaxed. That is the time you may be most at risk. Bad guys and terrorists know this and may very well decide to hit you in your comfort zone. Complacency on your part makes their job easier. Remember, becoming familiar with your surroundings gives you a huge advantage over potential attackers. Becoming complacent shifts the advantage to them. Do not cede the advantage to the bad guys. As our economy becomes more and more global, executives may find themselves living in places where they face the added danger of terrorism. You may be an attractive target to terrorists because of your national origin or because of the company you work for. In such high-risk locations, your biggest enemy is your daily routine. Terrorists always conduct surveillance on their intended targets, and predictable routines make it easier to plan a violent act against you. By becoming as familiar as possible with your surroundings and by changing your daily routine, you can prevent an attack while it’s still in the preplanning stage. Ilan has had the occasion to interrogate terrorists subsequent to their capture. The ones who talk—and generally that is most of them—always mention how scared and uncomfortable they were while they collected intelligence information on the target before the attack. They all felt that someone was always watching them, and many times it caused them to choose a different target. Use this fact to your advantage. Stay alert and pay closer attention to your surroundings. Soon you will be able to pick out the unusual, including the presence of a terrorist or criminal who is targeting you. In addition, your alert demeanor will not be lost on anyone evaluating you as a potential target. By becoming more conscious of your environment and alert to things out of the ordinary, likely you will cause a potential assailant to move on to an easier target. When David attended the security overseas seminar put on by the U.S. Department of State, he heard an interesting story. A U.S. Army sergeant had been marked for kidnapping by terrorists while serving overseas. The security personnel at the U.S. embassy knew that he had been selected because a raid on a terrorist safe house turned up a list of individuals targeted by this group, and the sergeant’s name was on that list. The sergeant’s name, however, had been scratched off and the reason for his deselection had been documented. Next to the name there was a notation indicating that this particular individual was security-conscious and had a habit of looking up and down the street every morning before he left the house. Embassy security agents talked to the sergeant because they wanted to learn what extraordinary steps he was taking that had actually dissuaded a dangerous group of terrorists from carrying out their plot. The sergeant was perplexed. He told the agents that he hadn’t been doing anything unusual that he could recall. He did explain, however,

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that he had been having some problems with the kid who delivered his early morning newspaper, who apparently threw it and couldn’t get it to land in the same place. He said, as a result, that each morning he had to go outside and search for it. An amusing story. But think about it. The simple action taken by this man to look around outside every morning, despite the fact that it had nothing to do with antiterrorism, was enough to deter potential attackers. They perceived him to be security conscious and alert and decided to move on to the next guy, who wasn’t paying attention to security. Unfortunately, they did so with tragic results; the other guy wasn’t so lucky. The basic lesson that must not be overlooked is that even the mere appearance of taking security precautions often is enough to prevent an attack. Human nature is a funny thing. People, including bad guys and terrorists, often see what they expect to see. Terrorists planning an attack or abduction don’t see a man looking for his newspaper. Instead, they see a soldier obviously well trained in counterterror techniques. Humans generally choose the explanation that matches their level of anxiety. One frequently heard comment is that people don’t want to live their lives in fear, waiting for something bad to happen. We agree completely. Being aware of your environment doesn’t equate to living in fear. Quite the opposite. You won’t live in fear. You will live with the understanding that the world can be dangerous and with the confidence that you will be aware enough to see trouble coming if it happens to you or your family. It isn’t all that difficult. Look around and pay attention. It is as simple as that.

PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO FEAR Everyone reading this chapter probably will agree that people facing a critical incident likely will feel fear and the stress that it produces. This fear and stress will almost certainly have a negative impact on their cognitive ability and the way they perceive their environment. Fear is generally a good thing. It is your body telling you that you are in danger. Unless fear becomes paralyzing, it can help you fight harder or run faster by causing the release of adrenaline into your bloodstream. However, the adrenaline rush also causes humans to experience certain reactions that can be quite disconcerting to those who are not prepared for them. These reactions include tachypsychia, auditory exclusion, tunnel vision, and cognitive dissonance. The term “tachypsychia” describes the perception of people under stress that the passage of time changes and everything is moving in slow motion. For

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example, during an attack, victims often perceive the attacker to be moving in slow motion. One of the senior executives at Global Security Group, Mark Novak, a retired New York Police Department captain, recounts his harrowing experience running for his life during the collapse of the Trade Center towers during September 11. Mark, an extremely athletic individual and marathon runner, felt that he and those around him were running from the collapsing buildings in slow motion. Most assuredly he was not; he was running full tilt and managed to escape without injury. His perception during the incident, however, was that time had slowed dramatically. A great deal of study has gone into trying to understand this phenomenon, and it is believed that the perception of time passing more slowly is actually a defense mechanism which may well aid in survival during a dangerous incident. It is thought that this phenomenon is caused by the brain processing information more quickly to allow for a faster defensive response. Unfortunately, most people experiencing this phenomenon become disoriented by it and are affected negatively. Recognizing the effect of tachypsychia allows you to use it to your advantage. Auditory exclusion is another common thing that occurs to humans when they are under extreme stress. This term refers to the brain’s ability to block hearing while focused on a threat. For example, many police officers involved in shooting incidents report that they never heard the sound of gunfire, either from the assailant’s weapon or their own. To those of you who have some experience with firearms, this is somewhat surprising; gunfire is quite loud. The reason auditory exclusion occurs is that the brain simply blocks auditory input to allow you to focus completely on the threat. During a gunfight, for example, your brain discriminates among the five senses. At the moment of confrontation, you need more than anything else to see the threat and respond to it. You certainly don’t need to taste, touch, smell, or even hear your opponent. This effect has both positive and negative ramifications. The increased ability to focus is a positive. However, auditory exclusion can cause you not to hear things that you need to, such as the sound of another attacker coming at you from behind. We know of no way to moderate this effect other than to be aware that it happens and to recognize that by focusing on your hearing, it will come back. Until it does, you need to scan your immediate area and “check six,” meaning to glance to your rear each time the opportunity presents itself. In a civilian setting, the loss of hearing is equally problematic. You might not hear an announcement over the public address system providing directions during an emergency, or you might not hear the sound of gunfire or the approach of other dangers. Be cognizant of the potential for hearing loss and focus on getting your ears working again.

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The term “tunnel vision” refers to the narrowing of your field of view as you focus on a particular thing. The authors have experienced this effect many times and find it to be quite dangerous. With tunnel vision, you lose peripheral vision, which prevents you from identifying additional assailants or other dangers that may be approaching from the side. Training yourself to keep your eyes moving can mitigate the effect of tunnel vision. DEA agents, for example, are taught to scan their immediate area after they engage a particular threat. They do this to avoid “tunneling” in on one threat and becoming oblivious to others. A final effect that must be examined is known as cognitive dissonance or denial. This refers to disassociation with the actual events as they occur. Sometimes, during a crisis or attack, victims feel they are watching the events unfold as if they were happening to someone else. This reaction is perhaps the most dangerous of all. Disassociated minds reject the idea that something so terrible could be happening to them. The disassociation is a way for the mind to cope with the sudden and unpleasant reality that is now confronting the person. The danger lies in the fact that, by denying the event as it happens, a person in this state is also negating his or her own ability to fight back effectively or run. Another related phenomenon is the tendency people have in many instances to accept a “less scary” explanation that may fit with the facts and circumstances they are experiencing. For example, during the active shooter incident in the movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, in 2012, members of the audience observed James Holmes enter the theater with a number of firearms and clad in a tactical vest. Many persons interviewed after the event reported thinking that what they observed was some sort of publicity stunt or live-action role play related to the opening of the Batman movie. They put aside the more frightening explanation that Holmes was about to start firing into the crowd in favor of something that was less terrifying. The willingness of our minds to come up with less frightening alternatives when confronted with extreme danger is problematic. The old adage “better safe than sorry” is good advice. You can always hope for the best—as long as you assume and prepare for the worst.

MENTAL PREPAREDNESS TO MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF FEAR/STRESS Is there a way to reduce the negative impact of fear and stress on our cognitive and perceptual ability? The answer is yes, and it is largely accomplished through mental preparation. For example, earlier we discussed the concept of establishing a mental trigger when confronted with a potentially dangerous

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situation. If you do that, you will act appropriately, which mitigates the negative effect of stress and fear. As a street agent, David often played the “what-if” game with his partner. Many times they would be sitting in their car on a lengthy surveillance in high-crime neighborhoods. David would ask his partner: What would we do if a car pulled up behind us and two men got out with guns? How would we respond? What would the partner do? What would David do? Then they would change the scenario to something else. By talking about it, they were also preparing themselves for such emergencies. Each of us must ask ourselves what we would do in a particular situation. What would we do if we notice a strange car following us? Or hear the sound of someone breaking into our home in the middle of the night? Or, while walking at night, we hear the sound of footsteps following us down a dark and deserted street? You need to consider these possibilities and ponder the what-ifs for yourself. A well-known axiom known as the 6 P Principle best sums up this notion: Proper prior planning prevents poor performance. We discuss prior planning in more depth when we cover fire drills and evacuation plans. But for purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to understand that even the practice of considering options in advance can allow you to act appropriately at the moment of crisis. When a person is under stress, thinking clearly becomes quite difficult. By planning in advance, you have, in effect, already done the thinking. Now all you need to do is act. The worst thing that you can do is to freeze, and preplanning helps reduce the chance that you will do so. Both of us have considerable expertise in the use of small arms and defensive tactics. While he was a firearms instructor at the FBI/DEA Academy in Quantico, David heard one of his favorite pieces of advice from an outstanding firearms instructor, DEA Special Agent Allan Ponseigo: “Don’t freeze. Doing something, even the wrong thing, is preferable to freezing. If you make a mistake, make it going 100 miles an hour.” Generally, this admonition was given to DEA Special Agent trainees as they stared numbly at a weapon that had malfunctioned. Rather than executing the universal response to a failure to fire, tap, rack, target (seat the magazine, rack the action, and get back on target), some trainees froze. That reaction is probably the only one that is guaranteed to get you killed. Taking action, even if it is not the best course of action, is better than doing nothing. Once you begin to move, your mind begins to work as well. One additional issue with respect personal security and the development of the proper security mind-set is necessary to discuss. All the recommendations, protocols, and procedures that we have suggested apply to anyone, both male and female. However, because women face additional security concerns, it is necessary to address these specific issues. In addition to all the other risks

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business executives face at home and while traveling abroad, women have an additional vulnerability. Assaults directed at women, particularly sexual assaults, are common all over the world. In some places, it is not hyperbole to state that the frequency of such attacks reaches epidemic proportions. Abroad, cultural differences also play a great role in both the prevalence of sexual assault and the manner these crimes are addressed by local law enforcement. Your authors were born and raised the United States and Israel. Our two countries share common values, among them the idea that crimes directed against women are abhorrent and must be investigated vigorously and dealt with in the most severe manner. That view, however, is not shared in many parts of the world. In some countries, the rape of women, particularly women from Western nations, is not a particularly serious matter of concern. In fact, all too often, complaints lodged by women who have been sexually assaulted are largely ignored. It is therefore prudent that women traveling abroad make sure that part of their pretravel research focuses on the safety of female travelers. One precept we keep stressing when it comes to personal safety is that avoiding a situation is far easier than getting out of one. Before we discuss what to do if, G-d forbid, you are a female and you are attacked, let us once again make this most important point: Do not put yourself in a situation where your personal safety is at risk. This is always sage advice for men, and it is doubly true for women. We live in an egalitarian society where the goal is for men and women to have equal opportunities, and that is as it should be. However, these principles of equality cannot and should not be applied to any discussion about personal safety. This viewpoint may not seem to be sensitive or politically correct, but our goal here is to provide the best advice we can and not avoid a difficult subject in order not to give offense. If you are a female executive, you must understand that you will face difficulties and vulnerabilities that a male executive may not. That is not to suggest that there are not well-trained women who are more than capable of defending themselves. There certainly are, but that is not relevant to this discussion. Most women are not highly trained in self-defense. And for those women (and men as well) who may be physically strong and well trained in martial arts, there are a number of important factors to consider as well. An attacker may strike with complete surprise and thereby negate a counterattack. Also, since potential assailants will not know that a particular man or woman is physically capable of protecting herself, they may try anyway. Even if you prevail against the attacker, you are still in great risk during the attack. Once again, avoiding the incident entirely is the best choice. The point is that although these concerns apply to both sexes, women need to be aware that they may be targeted because of their sex, and they must pay even

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more attention to the principles of awareness and personal security than their male counterparts. Let’s discuss for a moment a question that comes up a great deal: Should women, and men too for that matter, take self-defense classes? Both of us believe that it is important for everyone to be able to defend themselves if the need arises. Both of us have had training in martial arts and have been taught how to quickly and effectively neutralize an attacker. But self-defense is like any other athletic endeavor. The development of skill requires time and a great deal of effort. Unless maintained on a regular basis through training, those skills will degrade, more quickly than most people think. If you think that you will be able to deter or incapacitate a determined adversary just because five years ago you took a couple classes in unarmed combat or self-defense, think again. You may have learned a few techniques that may be effective in a given situation, but unless you have been practicing these techniques, they may actually do more harm than good. There is something to the old joke that a person can know just enough karate to get badly hurt. If you expect to be an effective fighter or to learn self-defense techniques that you will be able to employ under the worst possible circumstances, you must approach training with the understanding that it requires a lot of time and effort. The best technique that we you can teach you, which requires far less training, is this: Always keep yourself in condition yellow; constantly observe your surroundings; make good decisions as to where you go, what time, and with whom; and establish a mental trigger if you ever observe something that looks like it might represent a risk to your safety. One question common to those in the security industry is whether a person who was being attacked, male or female, should resist or comply. So let’s put that in more stock terms. Should a woman facing the prospect of being raped resist or comply? Ultimately that is a decision that each of us must make for ourselves, but we do have a few suggestions. If you fight back, you need to have the ability to do so successfully. If you fight, understand you may well be fighting for your life and losing is not an option. You must also consider where you are attacked. Will the noise of the struggle or your cries for help be heard and responded to? Even so, the decision is still a very difficult one. In the case of a mugging or robbery, where an attacker is demanding your wallet, it is far easier to suggest that we think long and hard about risking our lives simply to protect property. When the choice of submitting or not will result in the violation of your body, the question is much harder to answer. In addition, you also must consider that possible exposure to a sexually transmitted disease may impact your life even if you survive the attack.

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While traveling abroad, another factor to consider is whether local laws against certain crimes have any unintended consequences. In the Philippines, for example, rape is punishable by death. Since murder also merits the death penalty in that country, there is no reason for rapists to leave their victims alive. If you were in a country with laws such as these and you knew rape was likely to be followed by your murder, wouldn’t it be easier to decide to resist with all your strength? But here again, the focus must always be on avoiding such an incident instead of having to survive it.

CONCLUSION Anyone can find him- or herself in a situation that is life threatening. Each of us must realize that it can happen to us. Every day we read of terrible events that have befallen others. There are only two reasons why it hasn’t happened to you: providence or preparedness. If a life-threatening event happens to you, expect to be afraid. Simply stated, fear is the body’s natural reaction to being put in an unnatural situation. There is no shame in being afraid. Everyone feels fear, even your assailant. Not being afraid is not what makes you brave. True bravery is doing something even when you are afraid to do it. By realizing that we may be subject to a sudden and violent assault, we can mentally prepare ourselves for the reality if it ever comes.

NOTE 1. Jeff Cooper, Principles of Personal Defense (Boulder, CO: Paladin, 1989).

CHAPTER 2

Planning for Emergencies in the Office

V

IRTUALLY EVERY GOVERNMENT AGENCY,

facility, and installation has an emergency action (or response) plan. In the event of an emergency, these plans, which discuss anticipated emergency situations and appropriate responses to initiate in given situations, are implemented. This process has been proven successful over time, and some in the private sector have adopted this practice and have created their own emergency plans. The majority of businesses, however, have not. This chapter discusses the need for such plans and recommends specific courses of action that should be taken during various emergency situations.

WHY PLAN? The first and most obvious question to ask is: Why do you need an emergency action plan? The answer is that during a crisis, such as a bombing, bomb threat, fire, release of hazardous materials, armed attack, or natural disaster, stress, fear, and panic can lead to state of confusion. A confused workforce will rely on management to provide the appropriate direction. Managers, however, will be under the same stress as their employees; the state of panic will limit or prevent

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the ability of management, security officers, or other designated persons from making the right decisions. A well-organized plan allows those in charge to make the right decisions under pressure during an emergency. The plans must be well thought out, well organized, accessible, and have contingencies carefully preplanned prior to the stress of a critical incident. During an emergency, people should not have to think about what actions to take while under extreme pressure; they need only to execute the prearranged plan. In this way, the right decisions can be made, saving lives, protecting property, and eliminating disruption to the organization, such as loss of productivity, increased financial expenses, and decline in employee morale. Having emergency action plans at work also makes a lot of sense from the subjective perspective of our own personal security and life safety interests. Consider how many hours each year we spend at work. For many of us the forty-hour workweek is a bare minimum, but let’s do a little calculating using the standard workweek as a base. Let’s also assume four weeks of vacation each year. Out of fifty-two weeks, we are left with approximately forty-eight weeks in the office. If we multiply our forty hours per week times forty-eight weeks, we get 1,920 hours. Let’s say we reduce that number by an additional 120 hours in consideration of federal and state holidays and sick days; that leaves approximately 1,800 hours each year we are in our office. There are approximately 8,730 hours in a year. That means we spend a little over 20 percent of our lives at work. That statistic alone strongly suggests that we should always be cognizant of how well prepared we are in the office to deal with a variety a potential emergencies that can impact our safety. Let’s take a look at what we should be doing to make our place of employment safer. There is a wide spectrum of issues to address, from the basic question of what access control measures are in place to prevent unauthorized entry, to how to address issues related to workplace violence, to how well prepared we are to respond appropriately to a wide number of potential emergencies and critical incidents that may occur in the workplace. As we have worked with corporate clients all over the world, we have noted that overall security and life safety preparedness varies greatly based on locale. In New York City, for example, every high-rise office building, hotel, and public assembly venue is required to implement a variety of security and life safety measures. The level of overall preparedness is relatively high because it is driven by local law. Having a robust fire safety plan, for example, is mandated by Local Law 5 (LL5). This law was instituted in 1973 as a response to a number of fatal high-rise fires. The Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) promulgated this law and established a method to ensure the safety of building occupants in the event of a fire

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or smoke condition. In addition to a number of technological requirements with respect to having a public address system, warden phones, pull stations, strobe lights, smoke detectors, and the like, there is also a requirement that the building have a written fire safety plan approved by the FDNY. Buildings falling under this law must also have trained individuals on duty at all times the building is occupied who are familiar with the plan and trained to implement it in the event of a fire or smoke emergency. This law has been expanded several times with the goal of always increasing the level of safety in the buildings covered by this ordinance. After the attacks of September 11, it became clear that the training provided to fire safety directors was not enough to protect occupants from a wide number of emergencies other than fire. In 2004, Local Law 26 was passed, which required that building plans and training include a variety of non-fire emergencies including attacks using weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters, and other types of potentially dangerous incidents. Subsequent to the implementation of this law, building personnel now must be trained beyond simply in how to respond to a fire/smoke condition but how to respond to a chemical weapons or hazardous materials incident by securing the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems and sealing buildings. They were taught how to respond to a bomb threat or bombing, explosions, gas leaks, and others, and the process didn’t end there. The NYC Fire Code of 2014 required that building fire safety directors be designated as building fire and life safety directors (FLSDs) and mandated that they receive training in how to respond to active shooter incidents and medical emergencies. As a result, in office buildings in New York City, an FLSD must be on duty when the building is occupied during normal business hours, and an evacuation supervisor must be on duty during nonbusiness hours when the building is occupied by at least one person. The training provided to the FLSD is not insignificant; twenty hours on the responses to fire and smoke emergencies, seven hours on how to respond to non-fire emergencies, and five hours on active shooter response and medical emergency preparedness. The FLSD and all deputies must pass a rigorous onsite exam administered in the building by the fire department, and they must demonstrate a complete knowledge of building systems, utilities, elevators, and communication apparatus and correctly respond to a number of scenario-based questions. The goal is to ensure that building personnel can safely direct occupants in the event of an emergency. If you work in New York City, you still need to take steps to handle your own business continuity issues, but your life safety concerns largely will be handled by the well-trained FLSD backed up by a brigade comprised of security officers, building management, and engineering representatives. Each FDNY-approved

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plan has contingencies to ensure that all building occupants are informed about the emergency in a timely manner and are quickly directed as to what actions to take. Occupants requiring special assistance are also cared for; each plan requires that individuals known to management to have any physical, emotional, or mental condition that would prevent them from participating in the emergency action plan must be identified in advance and the means by which they would be either evacuated or relocated specified in detail. In the event guests or visitors require special assistance, the plan must also address how they will be provided for during an emergency. All occupants of a high-rise building, for example, must be accounted for during a partial or full building evacuation or in-building relocations. Furthermore, the plans include detailed floor plans and information on the building’s elevators, stairwells and emergency exits, communication systems, fire and smoke suppression systems, building systems and utilities, and location of all relocation areas and outside assembly areas. The fire department has copies of those plans and ensures that they are both accurate and contain the correct responses so that during an emergency, all occupants can be provided for quickly and safely. Office buildings, hotels, and public assembly venues are required to conduct numerous drills every year and to hold training sessions for all building staff involved in emergency actions and all tenant floor wardens and searchers. A great deal of time, effort, and expense goes in to making New York City buildings safer. Furthermore, most office buildings in New York City have security guards posted in the lobby who require visitors to show valid state-issued ID before allowing access. These measures have proven successful over the course of time, and buildings in New York City are widely considered to be among the safest and most secure in the country. The only problem is that not everyone lives and works in New York City. During the more than fifteen years we have spent working in the private sector, we have traveled all over the United States and abroad and have observed how various jurisdictions deal with issues of both security and life safety. In the United States, even some of the most cosmopolitan cities in the country lack the preparatory measures taken in New York City. So we are left then with the obvious question: If you work in an area where there are no required plans of how to respond to emergencies and virtually no trained in-house staff who are required by law to manage any emergency or critical incident, what should you do to make your workplace safer? Has your company developed any plans or procedures to deal with potentially life-threatening incidents at work? If the answer is no, then you have some work to do.

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To help you understand the practical benefit of even the most basic plan, let’s walk through perhaps the most common workplace emergency so you can see how a proper plan literally can mean the difference between life and death.

Situation: Cardiac Arrest Assume that someone at work is experiencing sudden cardiac arrest as the result of either coronary artery disease or heart attack. During cardiac arrest, the heart stops beating, which deprives the brain and body of oxygen. According to a report from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), approximately 10,000 sudden cardiac arrests occur in the workplace in the United States each year. Waiting for the arrival of emergency personnel resulted in a survival rate of only 5 to 7 percent while use of defibrillators, according to one study, showed a survival rate of 60 percent.1 Furthermore, many survivors must cope with the effects of oxygen deprivation, which can begin three minutes after arrest. We discuss the likely response and outcome in an office without any emergency action plan and one with a plan that is coordinated with building management.

Scenario #1: No Plan in Place You work in a high-rise office building on the twenty-fifth floor and are at your desk when you become short of breath and feel a sharp pain in your chest. You collapse and lose consciousness ten seconds later. A coworker hears you fall, rushes into your office, and finds you unresponsive. Your heart stopped beating thirty seconds ago. The coworker yells for help. Others rush in. The initial call to 911 is made. Sixty seconds have elapsed. The 911 operator is gathering information and has dispatched medical first responders. Ninety seconds have passed. Coworkers are frantically trying to find out if anyone knows cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). There is no automated external defibrillator (AED) on premises. Two minutes have now gone by. The 911 operator is explaining how to perform chest compressions. Two minutes and forty-five seconds after your heart stopped, an untrained coworker, following the directions of the 911 operator, begins chest compressions, which are not administered properly. Approximately seven minutes into the incident, the paramedics arrive at your building and enter the lobby. The security guard has no knowledge of the medical emergency but attempts to facilitate the movement of first responders

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to your floor. The guard scrambles to get the elevator key, which allows the guard to recall the elevator and place it in independent/manual mode, and brings an elevator down to the lobby. The first responders get in and proceed to the twenty-fifth floor. That takes an additional two minutes thirty seconds. They exit the elevator and gain access to your office space. Someone on the floor realizes they have arrived and escorts them to your office. By the time the trained professionals begin to assess your condition, unpack the defibrillator, and set up the oxygen tank, nearly eleven minutes have passed without your heart beating. The prognosis becomes even bleaker when you consider that response times in many cities is even longer and are also impacted by the local traffic conditions and adverse weather conditions.

Scenario #2: Company Has a Comprehensive Plan You work in a high-rise office building on the twenty-fifth floor and are at your desk when you become short of breath and feel a sharp pain in your chest. You collapse and lose consciousness ten seconds later. A coworker hears you fall, rushes into your office, and finds you unresponsive. Your heartbeat stopped thirty seconds ago. Your coworker alerts a second coworker about the emergency and remains by your side. Following the plan, the second coworker alerts the crisis management team (CMT), who immediately carry out their predefined duties. They alert the nearest CPR-certified employees, who arrive within thirty seconds with an AED (which is available in multiple locations in your building). Your company offered CPR training and provided an incentive to employee volunteers who attended and received their certification. As a result, there are a number of certified individuals on your floor who respond immediately. They all have CPR kits. One coworker begins compressions and rescue breaths as needed and another unpacks the AED. All this is occurring less than two minutes after your heart stopped beating. At the same time, another CMT member has called 911 and provided all relevant information. The CMT also contacted building management and advised them as to the nature of the emergency. The building independently initiates its own emergency medical response protocol. The building engineer pulls an elevator out of service and puts it into independent/manual mode. This ensures that an elevator dedicated for use by the arriving first responders is waiting in the lobby. Following protocol, the engineer took care to select an elevator large enough to accommodate a stretcher. A building representative is assigned to wait outside the lobby to escort the paramedics into the building. Another building representative responds to the scene of the incident and,

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working with your coworkers, makes sure the ambulance crew has direct access once they arrive on your floor by opening all doors and moving furniture and bystanders out of the way. Meanwhile the CPR team has connected the AED and is listening to the instructions. The unit indicates that a shock is recommended. The AED automatically initiates the cycle, and on the second shock of the second cycle, the AED detects a heartbeat. As in scenario #1, the paramedics arrive at the building in seven minutes. In this case, however, they are met by building staff and escorted into the waiting elevator. They arrive on your floor sixty seconds later and are escorted to the scene of the incident. Upon arrival, they find a patient in critical but stable condition, breathing with rapid heartbeat. Despite the fact that the answer to the following question is obvious, let’s ask it anyway: If you were the person who underwent the medical emergency, which of the two scenarios would you prefer to occur? Isn’t the better outcome worth a bit of preplanning and practice?

ALL-HAZARDS EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN Medical emergencies, while probably the most common of all workplace emergencies, are only one of many potentially dangerous situations that can occur at work requiring a preplanned response. Where, then, do you start the process of creating an all-hazards emergency action plan? Unless you or someone in your organization has experience in creating emergency action plans, a project like this is going to require the assistance of an outside consultant. Finding the right consultant is no easy task, and we address that presently. Most consultants are likely to suggest beginning the process with a complete risk assessment to identify the hazards and other incidents that could possibly affect your facility and employees. There is no doubt that the assessment process is critical to the success of the ultimate plan, and we will get to that as well. However, before taking that step, there is a larger hurdle to overcome: buy-in by the company’s senior executives. Without the full and complete support of senior managers who actually understand the importance of the process, the end result will be less than perfect. In addition to the involvement of senior management or their representatives, the planning process needs the participation of the major departments in the company. A partial list of indispensable participants includes security, facilities management, human resources (HR), information technology, the

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general counsel’s office, and others as necessary. This corporate-wide planning approach allows for the greatest understanding of the needs of the company and its employees and the best ways to accomplish the goal of protecting lives and assets and ensuring business continuity. However, to reiterate the point we just made, in our experience, unless the highest levels of management are either driving the process or fully supporting it, the end result will be little more than a nice-looking document in a corporate binder that management can point to as an example of their attention to safety and security. It will never be a truly workable and effective action plan that achieves the goal of creating a safer work environment. Another reason the involvement of senior management is extremely important involves how the plan will be implemented during a critical incident or emergency. One of the most important elements in the planning process is the identification of the primary decision makers and the establishment of a chain of command. In the plans created by Global Security Group, we organize command and control into command and implementation. The senior managers are included in the CMT. They are command and control and are responsible for assessing the nature of the incident or emergency, deciding on the appropriate course of action, and providing direction to the persons responsible for plan execution. The persons involved in the implementation of the plan are identified as the members of the crisis response team (CRT). These individuals will carry out the directions of the CMT and ensure the plan is implemented correctly. CRT members typically include mid-level managers, frontline supervisors, and those working in the facilities department. It is strongly recommended that you have a good idea of which individuals will be assigned to these teams and clearly define who will be the primary decision maker and who is qualified to act as an alternate in case the senior manager is not present or is incapacitated. How will the plan play out? During an emergency, the members of the CMT would be made aware of the nature of the incident in various ways, such as by direct observation, hearing a media report or public address announcement, hearing a weather-related warning or alert from local law enforcement or emergency management, or receiving an email or text message. The CMT would quickly evaluate the information and make a determination as to whether to activate the emergency action plan or not. If the plan is going to be implemented, the CMT would alert the CRT who is responsible for executing the plan. CRT members would include, for example, employees of the facilities department. They might take any action with respect to office systems and utilities. CRT members from the information technology department might be tasked with securing computer systems or forwarding operations to another location.

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Other CRT members would be supervising the actions directed by the CMT. For example, in the event of an evacuation, designated CRT members would ensure that all employees are notified and are aware that an evacuation had been ordered. They would coordinate with searchers to make sure the premises were in fact clear. They would also be assigned to conduct an accounting of all personnel under their supervision. The CMT, meanwhile, would continue to monitor the situation and determine if additional action is required. This system is patterned on the National Incident Management System (NIMS). According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), NIMS is a comprehensive, national approach to incident management that is applicable at all jurisdictional levels and across functional disciplines. It is intended to be applicable across a full spectrum of potential incidents, hazards, and impacts, regardless of size, location, or complexity. One element of the NIMS system, the concept of unified command, is also represented in the application of corporate emergency action plans. The CMT consists of senior executives from various divisions within the company. Their disparate knowledge and abilities will be immediately available during an emergency, in the same way it is necessary to have representatives from the police department, the fire department, the office of emergency management, the office of the mayor or governor, the buildings department, and other agencies involved in emergency actions to any major incident. The CMT is unified command applied to incidents and emergencies affecting your office. If you are a manager or executive in a company with office space in a multitenant high-rise building, one important issue has probably already occurred to you: As a tenant, you do not have control over building systems and utilities. In many instances, certain emergencies require that action be taken with respect to those utilities. For example, in response to the smell of isopropyl mercaptan (an odorant for natural gas), the gas supply to the building might need to be turned off. A broken pipe might require that water be turned off; electric power may need to be cut during a flood; most important, the HVAC system may need to be secured to prevent the introduction and dispersion of a toxin into the building. This issue is not a problem if you are located in New York City. According to local law, high-rise office buildings (and several other classes of occupancies including hotels and public assembly venues) are required to have fire/life safety directors (FLSDs) on duty during working hours to manage and direct all emergencies. These individuals are supported by a fire/life safety brigade, and all are trained to take whatever action is necessary with respect to protection of building occupants and building systems. A walk-through of a possible response to a few scenarios will illustrate the point.

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Situation: Airborne Hazard Assume a truck containing a hazardous material was involved in an accident in close proximity to your building. You are located downwind from the incident. As a result of the collision, a toxic substance is leaking from the vehicle. The substance becomes airborne and is blown in your direction by a gentle but consistent breeze. Further assume that whatever the substance is, it is extremely dangerous or perhaps even fatal to humans. Once again, we are going to analyze the response to this type of incident in dual scenarios. In scenario #1, you are in New York City or another jurisdiction that requires trained personnel to be on site in order to ensure the correct response to a fire or non-fire emergency. In scenario #2, the jurisdiction in which the building your office is located has no such requirement.

Scenario #1: No Building-Wide Plan in Place A security guard or two may control access to the building, and building engineer and support staff may deal with the routine maintenance in mechanical issues that must be attended to on a daily basis. None of those individuals has ever been trained in how to respond to a non-fire emergency and each has only the barest familiarity with how to respond to a fire or smoke incident. The building is very close to the toxic substance leak. Limiting exposure, therefore, is the correct response from an emergency action standpoint. Since the danger is outside, evacuation would not be the correct response, as it would expose persons exiting the building to the harmful substance. Knowing the dangerous situation outside, the senior person in your company tells all employees to stay in the building and shelter in place. An hour passes and people in the building are starting to feel dizzy and sick. Would implementing the shelter-in-place protocol without taking any action to prevent the introduction of the toxic substance into the building be enough, given the circumstances just described? The answer clearly is no. The building is drawing fresh air in from the outside. Depending on the location of the air intakes and whether the substance leaking from the truck is heavier or lighter than air, there is a chance that the building’s HVAC system would actually pull in the toxic chemicals and recirculate them throughout the building. The movement of elevators would also tend to spread any airborne contaminant throughout the building through the elevator shaft as the cars move up and down. The doors to the building and loading dock, if there is one, would also provide a route of entry for the toxic substance.

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Scenario #2: Building Has a Proper Emergency Plan In response to the airborne hazard, the building security guards and engineer direct all employees to remain inside the building and implement the shelter-in-place protocol. In addition, the guards and engineer execute few additional safety measures in line with their emergency action protocol. They lock down the building main lobby door and other access points, shut down the HVAC system, and take the elevators out of service. These measures ensure that toxic air does not enter the building; at least if it does, it is less likely to spread. As a tenant, you have no control over any of these actions and are completely dependent on building personnel to do them quickly and correctly. This would be the response in a building with its own emergency action plan; individual tenants need only comply with directed actions. In a municipality like New York City, building fire/life safety personnel have the primary responsibility to provide for the safety of all occupants. Upon becoming aware that an incident involving the release of a hazardous material in the vicinity, the building’s FLSD would immediately assemble the fire and life safety brigade and quickly determine the correct course of action. (In other proactive jurisdictions, building security or the head of corporate security could perform this function.) The FLSD and brigade are trained in how to implement shelter in place in the event of a toxic airborne threat and would immediately take the correct action. The HVAC system would be shut down immediately and all elevators returned to the lobby or lowest floor of travel. If ancillary air handling units are controlled by tenants, the FLSD team would make sure those were shut down as well by the appropriate brigade member or by directing the tenants to take that action. The security representative of the brigade would make sure that the building was locked down, and the FLSD would immediately make an announcement similar to this one: “Emergency! A truck containing a hazardous material has been involved in an accident near the corner of Seventh Avenue and 44th Street. The material leaking from the truck is extremely dangerous. We are implementing our building shelter-in-place protocol. The HVAC system will be secured, the building locked down, and the elevators taken out of service in order to prevent the material from getting into the building. We are in contact with the fire department and are being directed to continue our shelter-in-place procedure until further notice. We will update you as soon as possible.” In this situation, you, as the senior executive of your company, would simply have to ensure that your personnel were complying with the directions from the FLSD.

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So now we return to the previous question: How can you provide for the safety of your employees if you are not located in an area where building personnel would implement this type of response? The answer is through a robust partnership with building staff and management. It has been our experience that building personnel will work in cooperation with tenants if they are asked to do so. If they decline to work with you in such a cooperative relationship, then you face two possibilities: Accept the fact that you will be at greater risk because of their refusal to manage emergencies at the building level or, next time your lease is up, look for another landlord who is not averse to providing for the security and life safety of their tenants. If you are a chief of security officer, identifying and developing emergency action protocols is a critical part of your job. You must inform senior management of the status of these protocols and train employees regularly.

WHAT DO YOU NEED TO PLAN FOR? Let’s now look at identifying which incidents and emergencies the emergency action plan should address. The first step is to conduct a risk assessment of the facility, weighing such factors as location, nature of the business, size of the facility, number of employees, local weather patterns, geological instability, local levels of crime, and degree of facility control. As we briefly touched on earlier, although this is something that can be done in house, there is a steep learning curve. The better option is to engage a qualified security consultant. This leads us to another issue: How do you find a consultant who actually knows what they are doing? Recommendations from associates are one way to go, but never be afraid to ask the consultants you are interviewing to see examples of their prior work product and projects done for others in your industry. If consultants balk or try to tell you that they cannot show you the work they prepared for others, choose someone else. Sensitive information can be easily redacted, and you don’t need to keep any hard or digital copies. We don’t leave samples with potential clients, but it is certainly acceptable to allow prospective clients to thumb through some work samples in the office during a meeting. Once an accurate assessment has been prepared by an experienced professional, he or she creates the plan. The accurate assessment is crucial because the emergency plan must clearly define which action should be undertaken

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in response to a specific incident. Potential incidents requiring action include these: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Active shooter Biological incident/Release Blackout/Power loss Bomb—Human-borne explosive Bomb threat Vehicle-borne explosive Chemical incident/Release Earthquake Explosion Fire/Smoke condition Flood Hostage situation Intruder/Threatening individual Medical emergency Radiological or nuclear incident/Release Severe weather Suspicious mail Suspicious item/Possible explosive device

Depending on where you are located, more or less emphasis on specific incidents may be indicated. For example, a West Coast business might put greater focus on responses to earthquakes, mud slides, and wildfires than a business located in an area where these incidents are of less concern. A New York–based business may address the threat of a tornado (yes, they happen in New York City on rare occasions) but not to the same extent as tornado threats would in addressed Texas, Kansas, or Oklahoma. The assessment of exactly which emergencies and incidents is addressed in the EAP. Now those in the decision-making loop must be identified. Earlier, with respect to the roles of the CMT and CRT, we stressed the importance of who is going to be your scene commander. Will it be a single individual or a small group of key decision makers? The person or group that will decide whether it is necessary to take action must be identified, as well as how that person or group will receive needed information and how their decisions will be communicated to the workforce.

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What will trigger the implementation of the plan? For each potential emergency, criteria for initiating an emergency protocol must be established, and these criteria must include actual emergencies as well as threats of potential emergencies. Credible information—such as phone threats, intelligence information, a suspicious piece of mail, or package delivered or planted by a suspect—may trigger the plan. The observation of a parked truck with a heavy load emitting an unusual odor might be a triggering factor. A medical emergency, the sound of gun shots, or a weather report might also trigger plan implementation.

The Three Responses to an Emergency in the Office For each of the emergencies or critical incidents identified, there are clearly defined responses. These procedures are designed to assist the decision makers in deciding whether to implement the action part of the plan. With the exception of a medical emergency or active shooter incident, which we discuss in Chapter 5, no matter what type of emergency is encountered there are only three possible responses: evacuation (full or partial), shelter in place, or in-building relocation.

Evacuation Evacuation is the movement of people from a building or area in response to an incident that may or will cause harm to occupants if they remain. Evacuation is the term to describe the movement of occupants, usually under exigent circumstances with a limited duration of time, from an endangered area to a place of relative safety. The movement of all occupants out of a building is called a full evacuation; the movement of occupants from only an endangered area to a place of safety is termed a partial evacuation. Typically, persons not in the endangered area do not have to evacuate. Here is the FDNY definition of a full building evacuation: “The emptying of a building of all building occupants in response to an emergency.” The FDNY defines a partial building evacuation as “the emptying of a building of some but not all building occupants in response to an emergency.” These and the following definitions are found in the New York City Fire Department document “Office Building Emergency Action Plans.”2

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Shelter in Place In the context of an office environment, sheltering in place simply means that you stay safe simply by remaining inside your building. No movement to areas of refuge within your building is needed; you can move about freely as long as you do not leave the building. The FDNY definition of shelter in place is this: “The precaution of directing building occupants to remain inside the building, at their work locations, in response to an emergency.”

In-Building Relocation In-building relocation is the term used for “the controlled movement of building occupants from an endangered area of a building to an in-building relocation area within the same building in response to an emergency,” according to the FDNY. In-building relocation areas (IBRAs) are predesignated and provide more protection than simply remaining at your workstation, as occurs during the implementation of shelter-in-place protocols. Typically, an IBRA is located in the core of the building, which provides the occupants with protection against threats that can penetrate the exterior. Care must be taken when selecting IBRAs to ensure they are large enough to accommodate the number of employees and other occupants, have access to bathrooms, and have no or few windows. A point that needs mentioning is that the emergency plan must be prepared in such a way that it is easy for all employees to understand. Shortly after the attacks on September 11, then-CNN commentator Jack Cafferty discussed on air the emergency action plan that was prepared for the network by a security consulting company. Cafferty held up the handsomely bound emergency response book and lamented that after going through it, he couldn’t understand what needed to be done in the event of an emergency. Furthermore, no one at CNN made any attempt to explain the security measures to personnel; nor had any drills been scheduled to practice the measures specified in the plan. It is critical that emergency plans are clear and understandable with directions that are easy to follow. Further, the responses must be drilled on a regular basis. If employees are directed to evacuate, they need to know where the exits are, where they terminate, and where the outside assembly areas are located. If the direction is to relocate, employees must know with certainty where the IBRAs are and how to get there. Remember that cognitive ability and perception is

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severely impacted during a crisis. Recall our discussion in Chapter 1 regarding the effects of tachypsychia, tunnel vision, cognitive dissonance, and auditory exclusion. Clarity in the plan will go a long way toward limiting confusion when these effects strike. Even more important is the scheduling of frequent drills so that every employee understands what to do during an emergency and how to do it. We discuss the importance of drills later on.

CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF A GOOD PLAN A number of important items must be addressed in any effective emergency action plan. The plan must be updated as needed and checked on a regular basis. The command center must be identified and cooperation between departments defined. Communication, the most frequently problematic element of any plan, must be defined and redundancy included. And, of course, the actions individuals must take during each emergency must be delineated.

Ongoing Updates Once the plan is created, it must be updated frequently or when there is any significant change in personnel or anything that might affect plan implementation. It is a virtual certainty that emergency plans more than several months old will need to be reviewed and updated. For example, emergency plans direct certain employees to do specific things during an emergency. Employees may be designated as team leaders, searchers, and first aid providers or placed in other positions critical to the plan’s success. Obviously the plan needs to be updated each time an employee is hired or leaves the company, unless that employee did not have a vital role in the plan. If the individual was a team leader, a revision is mandatory. In addition, the plan must be updated to reflect any changes in the facility’s physical structure. For example, the closing of an exit, stairwell, or elevator is cause for a plan revision. Similarly, the addition of exits also must be reflected in the plan. The plan should be updated at least quarterly even if there are no changes to the facility or its personnel. However, when any change does occur, a determination must be made by the designated responsible person regarding whether it will impact the emergency action plan. Whenever an employee leaves, the HR department must check the plan and determine whether that person had an important role in the plan’s execution. Such a check also must occur whenever an employee goes on leave or is transferred to a different department. Whenever there is a transfer or departure, HR must

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inform security or whoever is responsible for updating the plan so they may assess whether the plan is affected. If a replacement is required, HR must assist with replacing the missing team member. A similar requirement must exist with regard to the physical plant management department. Both the engineering and maintenance departments must check the emergency plan and consult with the security department before they begin any construction or maintenance. A determination will then be made as to whether the planned activity will interfere with the execution of the emergency action plan. If it will, the plan must be adjusted to take the activity into account.

Cooperation Remember, the key to developing and maintaining a successful plan lies in the cooperation between the various departments within the company. Each department must be included in every phase of the plan’s development. Exhibit 2.1 details the departmental responsibilities by area. Exhibit 2.1

Departmental Responsibilities in Emergency Action Plan Development

Security

Evacuation and Response

Management

Organizational Funding

Engineering and Maintenance

Floor Plan, Construction, and Access

Supervisory Personnel

Direction of, and Accounting for, All Employees

As you can see, each department is involved in the planning process and provides input unique to its specific function within the company. Management must coordinate input from the various departments to reach the goal of having a workable emergency plan. Without such coordination, the plan will be unworkable and ineffective.

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Command Center It also is advisable to have an emergency command center within the company facility. It should be equipped with secure communications equipment, tape recorders, the company emergency action plan, and a log to record all actions taken during the emergency. Ideally, the command center should have a backup generator as well as a supply of food and water, but that is often extremely difficult to do in office space located in high-rise buildings. Command center personnel should have access to a complete printed list of employees and to hard copies of employee emergency information forms. They also must have a printed list of the emergency contact numbers for all vendors, local agencies, and other persons or companies providing critical services. Batteries die in phones and electronic devices so keep hard copies in case power is affected. The command center phone should allow for direct access without going through a switchboard or receptionist. The number should be a distinct one that is familiar to every employee; that number should never ring busy. Calls should spill over into other overflow lines to handle increased call volume during an emergency.

Decisive Action One of the most common elements of any emergency action plan deals with the full or partial evacuation of the facility. Although the need for such evacuations is not common, on occasion a timely evacuation can make the difference between life and death for building employees, visitors, and guests. Nearly 3,000 people were killed in the World Trade Center attack. Apart from the several hundred who died instantly as the planes crashed into the towers, the rest died because they didn’t get out of the buildings quickly enough. The heroic firefighters, police officers, and civilian security guards and other building staff members who helped evacuate the buildings at the cost of their own lives saved thousands. Interviews with many survivors revealed that most had no idea what to do in the moments after the impacts. Many people who had escaped gathered in at the base of the Twin Towers. After the North Tower had been struck and before the second plane hit the South Tower, many people were told it was safe to remain in or return to their offices in the South Tower. Thousands of occupants of the South Tower stayed in their offices and were not evacuated. They were unsure what to do and had no idea of what was yet to come. Few businesses had emergency action plans; instead, they relied on building management to be

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responsible to provide direction in the event of an emergency. Few had considered just how long it would take to walk down fifty or seventy-five flights of stairs in stairwells filled with panic-stricken people in the dark. No provisions had been made for people with special needs, such as those in wheelchairs or using walkers. How many additional lives were lost by this failure to prepare for disaster? Still, there were some exceptions. A former soldier and Vietnam combat veteran named Rick Rescorla was the vice president of security for Morgan Stanley Dean Witter. His office was on the forty-fourth floor of the South Tower. Rescorla was serious about the need for training and preparation and conducted evacuation drills at least twice a year. He had been present during the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and personally ensured that every one of his firm’s employees was safely evacuated. On September 11, Rescorla was at work when the first plane struck the North Tower. The Port Authority officials at the trade center did not order an evacuation but told the tenants of the South Tower to remain in the building. Rescorla, grasping the significance of what had happened, ignored the officials’ directive and personally led the evacuation of Morgan Stanley’s 2,700 employees who occupied floors 44 through 74 of the South Tower. He acted so quickly and decisively that most company employees were safely evacuated by the time the second plane hit the South Tower. All but six of the company’s workers survived. Rescorla was one of the lost six. The last time he was seen, he was walking back into the stairwell in the South Tower to make sure everyone had gotten out safely. Several years after the attack, David was teaching a class on the implementation of emergency action plans and the importance of planning, training, drills, and, most important, leadership. To make this point, David related the story of what Rescorla had done. One person in attendance raised his hand and said he had worked for Morgan Stanley and had gotten out that day. He explained how many of the employees at the company didn’t care for Rescorla; he was too “gung ho” for their liking, and they felt his insistence on training and drills was absurd. The man confessed that he had shared that view, and then he quietly said that if it had not been for Rick Rescorla, he would have been killed that day. He said he thanks Rescorla every single day. The critical element in an emergency is decisive action. The clichés “To ponder is to perish” or “Act or accept” is never truer than under emergency circumstances. Fortunately for the employees of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, they were led by a man who knew how to act and lead. Over 800 employees of the U.S. Customs Service in an eight-story building adjacent to the World Trade Center made it out safely. A publication later issued by the Office of Compliance,

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the enforcement arm of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, noted that the fact that both Morgan Stanley and the Office of Customs had spent a great deal of time and effort restructuring their evacuation plans after the 1993 bombing attack allowed almost all their employees to escape.3 Each of these entities had a well-thought-out plan and practiced it. In the final analysis, the key element was that both also had managers who were decisive leaders who chose to act and execute the plan. This was not true for many employees of other firms, who sat in their offices waiting for someone to tell them what to do. There is no way of knowing how many people owe their lives to Rick Rescorla. It is up to each one of you to decide right now to act as he did, should you face a similar situation. Do not wait for someone to get up and lead. You can be that someone. Most people are followers. It only takes one person to galvanize an entire office into action. How do you know when to direct an evacuation, either full or partial, of your building? Or, for that matter, when to shelter in place or relocate? The decision is based on the type of the building, the nature of the emergency, and the number of people present at the time. For purposes of the emergency action plan, there must be a clear and unambiguous set of criteria for initiating the protocol. If a certain event occurs, then an evacuation is initiated. This must be done without hesitation, second-guessing, or discussion. Get your people out to a place of safety. However, the easiest way to understand how to decide whether to evacuate is to ask if conditions in the building are safer or more dangerous than conditions outside the building. If remaining inside exposes occupants to greater risk, then you evacuate. This reasoning process would have led to the evacuation of the South Tower on September 11. A case could be made that if the first strike had been an accident, evacuating the untouched tower might have exposed occupants to the risk of being struck by falling debris. The more persuasive argument, however, is that no one knew whether the plane strike was an accident or a deliberate act so the worst-case scenario should be accepted for purposes of deciding the course of action. Further, both towers shared the same footprint. The proximity would argue for evacuation but through exits on the side of the tower farthest from the area of danger. What about situations where the danger outside the building is greater? You are then left with two choices: Either shelter in place or move to your predesignated in-building relocation areas. If the danger outside the building cannot penetrate the building, it will be sufficient to direct your employees the shelter in place. Doing so would be appropriate in the event of extreme weather, a demonstration outside the building, or some danger involving a toxic substance in the air. However, if the danger could penetrate the building, then

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you would direct implementation of the in-building relocation protocols. For example, severe weather worsens and windows are either being blown out or debris carried by the winds is striking and breaking the glass. In that case, you would relocate. If there was a shooter outside the building, you make the assessment that bullets can penetrate glass and, depending on the construction of your building, in some cases walls as well. Again, you would relocate. In each of these situations, the CMT decides which procedure to implement. The CRT would carry out that directive and would make sure that all personnel were able to participate in the actions that were being taken. During an evacuation or a relocation, searchers, as directed by the CRT, would make sure no one remains in the office, break room, or bathrooms. The CRT would also direct first-level managers to conduct an accounting of all personnel during an evacuation or relocation. (This accounting typically is not required during shelter-in-place scenarios.) Remember, there must be a mechanism by which visitors, guests, contractors, and vendors can also be accounted for in the event of an emergency.

Individual Actions A few additional points are worth noting. In the event of an evacuation, remember to take anything that you must have in your possession if it becomes impossible to return to your office. If it is cold outside, do not evacuate without your outerwear. If you take medicine, make sure you take it with you. Don’t forget your car and house keys. Another suggestion that we urge you to follow is to encourage all personnel to have a change of footwear available in the office. Imagine trying to evacuate down fifty flights of stairs wearing a high heels. This recommendation applies to men and women. During the New York City blackout of 2004, David had to walk from his office in Midtown Manhattan to his residence, a distance of approximately 15 miles. He was very glad to have his New Balance running shoes in his gym bag that day. Now we need to discuss how exit routes should be identified to avoid confusion in a crisis. Virtually everyone has been in a building where the emergency exit signs are located close to the ceiling or are labeled in a very confusing manner. We can all relate to trying to leave an unfamiliar building and spending several frustrating minutes trying to figure out exactly where the exits are. Remember, this type of confusion only gets worse during a crisis. We recommend a very simple approach, one that has been used successfully in Israeli government buildings for many years: Paint colored lines indicating direction on the walls close to eye level, in such a way so as not to unduly affect the building decor.

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For example, say that in a particular section of the building, the colors red and blue are used. The red line will lead personnel toward primary evacuation point A. The blue line will direct personnel to alternate evacuation point B. This system is simple and, more important, easy to follow during an emergency. It also allows personnel to move in the right direction quickly. All management needs to do is to direct all employees, visitors, and guests to exit the building using primary route A or alternate route B, which may be done by following the red or blue lines on the walls. This system has been proven to work well under even the most extreme conditions. If this color-coding system is not an option, make sure signage is clearly visible and occupants know the location of the exits, how they are designated (e.g., Stairwell A), and where stairwells terminate through training and drills.

Communication We’ve spoken a great deal about the importance of communication and timely notification to company personnel. How should such notification be made? Optimally, the message should be sent via as many ways possible. The fastest and most wide-reaching method is through the public address (PA) system. If you don’t have a wired PA system, many phone systems have a public address function. Mass notification services are very common and effective. A message can be typed in or spoken and the system sends out the content of the message as a voice mail, email, or text message. Many of these systems have the capability to allow the recipient to respond with the same message (e.g., “I am safe”). Some methods are less than ideal. For example, a fire alarm is one very common choice. However, this type of alarm conveys only one message: “Exit immediately.” Alerts of this nature can convey no additional information. Further, the practice of simply evacuating upon alarm is problematic. In New York City, for example, occupants are told not to evacuate upon alarm but instead to wait for direction from the FLSD. The alarm is used simply to get everyone to pay attention to the forthcoming announcement. Evacuating immediately upon alarm might expose you to danger. Perhaps the exit nearest to you is unsafe. The announcement would alert occupants to that danger, but unless you wait you might be at risk. Also, active shooters have pulled alarms to expose more people to harm. If an alarm is the only practical option, it may be possible to combine a fire alarm with a simple lighting system utilizing the same colors used to

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designate the primary and alternate escape routes to convey more information. For example, if we are using red and blue to mark the evacuation routes, we also use red and blue lights in conjunction with the fire alarm to alert personnel of the need to exit the building and which fire route to use. Telephones also may be used as a means of notification. The number or length of rings may convey simple messages. For example, two short rings on each phone could mean a demonstration is going on outside the building. A long ring could indicate that the demonstration has become violent and employees should stand by for further instructions. This method, however, requires a highly trained workforce to ensure complete understanding of the system. Similarly, information may be conveyed via direct verbal communication by supervisory personnel or via use of alternate alarms. The critical point is to make sure that the messages that must be conveyed to the workforce are clear, unambiguous, and easy to understand. Every emergency action plan also must establish procedures to deal with visitors and others not familiar with the plan. The way to accomplish this is to direct the person who is being visited to be responsible for the visitors. If that person is designated to perform a particular function during an emergency, it is his or her responsibility to find someone else to provide direction to the visitors. The plan also must provide for special-needs individuals. There are many ways to do this, but they must be planned before the emergency. For example, an individual who uses a wheelchair may be evacuated quickly using a chair-type stretcher or a stair chair. This equipment must be both available and accessible, and specific personnel must be trained to use it. Understand that during an emergency, there is no time to think about the plan, only to implement it. Success is completely dependent on the level of training given to your employees. To properly prepare for helping persons requiring special assistance during an emergency, all such individuals must be identified in advance and placed on a list. During an emergency, employees will attempt to assist those persons directly. If they cannot, it is the responsibility of the CMT to get that list to the first responders when they arrive. Once the building has been evacuated, specific procedures must be established to account for company personnel as well as visitors at designated assembly areas or upon relocation to IBRAs. There also must be an established procedure for preventing employees from coming to work in the event an evacuation protocol is initiated before normal working hours. The presence of arriving employees will only lead to confusion and hamper any attempts at rescue. The plan also must facilitate a return to normal conditions once the event is over.

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In addition to having an emergency action plan to deal with general emergencies that affect the entire company, it is also necessary to have an employee-specific emergency plan. Management must maintain information on each employee that includes emergency contact numbers, the names of family members and where they can be contacted during the workday, relevant medical history, and special instructions in case of emergency. Having this information readily available will not only enhance the personal safety of the employee but also will make it easier to support the family of an employee who is injured, killed, or experiencing a medical emergency. Management should strongly consider having a family support unit within the HR division to coordinate any help that the family might require. Both the employee’s immediate supervisor and the HR department should maintain copies of the employee emergency information form in an off-site facility. This will ensure that the information is available even if the entire facility is destroyed. See Exhibit 2.2 for an example of such a form. This form is a sample that is recommended for every single employee in the company. During a crisis, such as a terrorist attack, fire, or natural disaster, there will be a need to have as much information as possible to aid in treating the injured or identifying the dead. In either case, the families of employees who have become casualties will need assistance, both spiritual and material. A simple employee information form will make that task easier during a time when speed is of the essence. This form also can include fingerprints and DNA samples. It is a morbid subject even to discuss, but considering that the identification of victims from the attacks on the World Trade Center continued for more than a year after the fact, it is an option that should at least be considered. Fingerprints are easy to obtain, and a small envelope with a tuft of hair is all that is needed for DNA sampling. It is unfortunate that this has become part of the discussion in the field of emergency planning and management, but the fact is it has.

Expertise A properly prepared emergency action plan requires both expertise and input from all relevant departments. Only an experienced and well-trained person can design an effective plan. Companies should hire a well-trained security officer to supervise the security needs of the company or hire a reputable security consultant to coordinate the task. It may also be advisable to utilize the services of a consulting firm to periodically update the emergency plan, conduct surprise

Planning for Emergencies in the Office Exhibit 2.2

39

Employee Emergency Information Form

Name _________________________ Date of Birth _____________________ Address _______________________________________________________ Department ____________________ Ext. ____________________________ Telephone (home) ____________________ Cell _______________________ Marital status:

◽ Single ◽ Children

◽ Married

◽ Separated

◽ Divorced

Spouse _______________ Daytime contact number ____________________ Spouse’s Address _______________________________________________ Physician________________________ Phone ________________________ Address _______________________________________________________ Minor Children

Age

School Address

School Phone #

1. ____________________________________________________________ 2. ____________________________________________________________ 3. ____________________________________________________________ Adult Children

Address

Contact

1. ____________________________________________________________ 2. ____________________________________________________________ Special Health Conditions or Allergies: _______________________________ ______________________________________________________________ Blood type __________ Living will:

◽ Yes

◽ No

◽ (If yes attach)

Religion _____________ Clergyman _____________ Phone _____________ Special Instructions: ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________

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drills to gauge its effectiveness, and provide specialized security training for your staff. Exhibit 2.3 is a sample of an emergency action plan form to guide you in creating one for your own company. Remember, we do not recommend that you create such a plan without the assistance of trained security professionals. Exhibit 2.3

Emergency Action Guide

Why Do We Need to Create a Plan? • In a crisis such as a bombing or bomb threat, stress, fear, and panic can lead to a state of confusion. This can result in the loss of organizational control and of the lives of employees. • A well-organized plan and the ability to make the right decision in a crisis can limit interruptions to the organization. Potential interruptions include: daily activity, lost production time, additional financial expenses, and the reduction of employee morale. Preplanning in the form of a structured, detailed, and well-practiced system of evacuation can limit these emotional reactions and organizational interruption and increase the level of safety for all personnel involved. General Information Name of Organization: ____________________________________________ Location: _______________________________________________________ Size of facility: Control of facility:

◽ Small ◽ Medium ◽ Company-controlled ◽ Multiple corporations

◽ Large ◽ Management company

Number of employees: ____________________________________________ Risk factor:

◽ Low

◽ Medium

◽ High

Basic Plan Requirements 1. Representatives from each group should be included in all aspects of planning: ◽ Management

◽ Security

◽ Plant Engineer

◽ Maintenance

2. Instructions must be prepared in a format that is easy for employees to understand. 3. The plan must be continually updated and reflect changes in personnel and the physical structure of the facility.

Planning for Emergencies in the Office Exhibit 2.3

41

Emergency Action Guide (Continued)

4. A regularly scheduled drill of the evacuation plan must be mandated. 5. A schedule review of the plan must be established after each practice. Critical Elements in Plan Development 1. Define departmental roles and responsibilities. Department Security Management Engineering and maintenance Supervisors (site responsibility)

Responsibility Evacuation and response Organizational and funding Floor plan, construction, access Direct personnel and account for all employees

Departmental Representatives Security: _________________________________________________ Management: _____________________________________________ Engineering and maintenance: _______________________________ Supervisory personnel: _____________________________________ ________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ 2. Define emergency situations and establish criteria for initiating an emergency for each. Situation based on: • •

Credible information: phone threat, intelligence. Suspicious item, mail, or other object in or near facility.

Type of Emergency

Criteria for Initiating an Emergency

Car bomb

______________________________

Bomb threat

______________________________

Suspicious object

______________________________

Violent demonstration

______________________________

Physical attack

______________________________

Fire

______________________________ (continues)

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42 Exhibit 2.3

Emergency Action Guide (Continued)

3. Identify the assembly area. This must be strongest place in the facility and should be as far as possible from the bomb blast effect and free from risk of secondary explosion. ___________________________________________________________ 4. Define evacuation routes and assembly areas for each situation. Situation A: _________________________________________________ Route ______________________________________________________ Assembly area _______________________________________________ Situation B: _________________________________________________ Route ______________________________________________________ Assembly area _______________________________________________ Situation C: _________________________________________________ Route ______________________________________________________ Assembly area _______________________________________________ Situation D: _________________________________________________ Route ______________________________________________________ Assembly area _______________________________________________ Situation E: _________________________________________________ Route ______________________________________________________ Assembly area _______________________________________________ Situation F: _________________________________________________ Route ______________________________________________________ Assembly area _______________________________________________ 5. The decision to conduct a full or partial evacuation is based on the type of building, type of event, and number of employees. Full evacuation: Situation: ____________________________________________________ Partial evacuation: Situation: ____________________________________________________

Planning for Emergencies in the Office Exhibit 2.3

43

Emergency Action Guide (Continued)

6. Establish a method of evacuation notification that insures all employees receive the instruction. ◽ Fire alarm ◽ Public address ◽ Microphone ◽ Telephone ◽ Alarm 7. Establish a procedure for visitors or others who are not familiar with the evacuation plan. 8. Establish a procedure for accounting for people in the assembly area and during the evacuation. 9. Establish a procedure to account for and evacuate visitors at the assembly area. 10. Establish a procedure to prevent people from coming to work when an evacuation protocol is initiated before normal work hours. 11. Establish a procedure to go back to normal once the event ends. Nature of Emergency

Criteria for Initiation

Method of Notification

Full/Partial Routes Assembly Evacuation Areas

Car bomb

Suspicious car or vehicle next to facility

Public address Full

Phone threat

Phone call to one of the employees

Alarm Microphone

Partial/Full

Suspicious object

Object discovered by an employee

Alarm Microphone

Partial/Full

Violent demonstration

Demonstration outside with the potential for violence

Alarm Microphone

None

Fire

Fire, smoke

Fire alarm

Full

How should the plan be physically structured? Each consultant arranges plans differently; some draft the plans in paragraph form, some in bullets. Our practice is to create plans based on the tactical plan format David used while he worked as a DEA Special Agent. We recommend simple, concise layouts that are accessible and easy to implement. A good visual of how an emergency plan should work can be seen in the movie Sully based on the ditching of US Airways Flight 1549 on January 15, 2009, after bird strikes caused the Airbus A320 to lose both engines. A dramatic scene in the film depicted the actions of Captain Chesley Sullenberger and First Officer Jeffrey Skiles (played by Tom Hanks and Aaron Eckhart) as they responded to the catastrophic loss of both engines. Hanks tells Eckhart to “get the QRH”—quick reference handbook—as they try

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to restart the engines. The instructions are short and concise, with no wasted language. That is the goal we are always trying to attain. The same plan structure can be applied to any emergency. Each separate incident has its own specific response; the response to a natural disaster will differ from the response implemented in response to a suspected explosive device secreted in a delivered package. Those differing response procedures will almost always lead to an evacuation, shelter in place, or in-building relocation. Those actions will be largely consistent across the spectrum of all emergencies and critical incidents. Note that a single emergency could result in a partial evacuation of employees in one area of the facility, the relocation of employees in another, and a directive to shelter in place to employees already in a safer location. While building the plan, you need to cover the following points: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Personnel assigned to CMT Personnel assigned to CRT Personnel assigned as floor wardens and searchers Critical operations personnel (assigned to secure systems, engage generators, etc.) Notification methods List (hard copy) of all contacts of closest first responders List (hard copy) of all contacts of all contractors/vendors List (hard copy) of all contacts of closest medical facilities List (hard copy) of contact information for all employees List of CPR-certified personnel and location of AEDs, first aid kits, or other emergency medical equipment (e.g., stair chairs) Identification of emergency supplies (food, water, blankets, etc.) List (hard copy) of all employees requiring assistance in an emergency Identification of IBRAs Identification of outside assembly areas and routes of travel to them Accounting procedures Comprehensive response checklist for each type of incident/emergency Detailed evacuation protocol Detailed shelter-in-place protocol Detailed protocol for in-building relocation

The implementation of the plan needs to be coordinated with building management and security. As mentioned earlier, the extent of cooperation will vary greatly depending on where you are located. In our consulting practice, we have found that this widely different level of preparedness by building staff is often a critical issue. We have also found, on more than a few occasions, conduct

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that rose to the level of criminal negligence on the part of the building owner or management company. During one instance where Global Security Group was engaged to prepare a comprehensive all-hazard plan in a major metropolitan area, we requested that the building provide copies of any emergency action plan that was in place at the site. That plan had been prepared by an outside consultant in their local area and had been in place for several years. Upon review, we found a number of serious and dangerous directives in the plan, responses that are universally rejected by virtually every governmental and private sector security and life safety expert. One particularly glaring example was the direction to occupants, in the case of a fire on floors below them, to take the stairs to the roof. The plan stated that the city’s fire department was trained to evacuate building occupants from the roof in the event of a fire using helicopters. One of Global Security Group’s senior fire safety consultants, a retired officer of the FDNY and veteran trainer, was shocked to see this in the plan as it is expressly contraindicated by the FDNY. The consultant called the chief of the department in question and inquired as to whether the protocol was correct. The chief replied that their protocol was the same as the FDNY with respect to building evacuation: Do not evacuate to or take shelter on the roof. He explained wryly that the assurance to occupants that the local fire department would rescue them from the roof by air might be problematic in any case, as the department didn’t have a helicopter. Make sure your plan is created in cooperation with local departments and have them review the final product.

NOTES 1. OSHA, “Saving Sudden Cardiac Arrest Victims in the Workplace: Automated External Defibrillators,” OSHA 3185-09N, 2003. https://www.osha.gov/ Publications/3185.html. 2. New York City Fire Department Notice of Promulgation of 3 RCNY §6-02, “Office Building Emergency Action Plans.” http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/rcny/ rcny_6_02_final_rule.pdf. 3. Emelia J. Benjamin, Salim S. Virani, Clifton W. Callaway, et al., “Heart Disease and Stroke Statistics—2018 Update: A Report from the American Heart Association,” Circulation 137, no. 12 (January 2018): e67–e492. https://doi.org/10 .1161/CIR.0000000000000558.

CHAPTER 3

Receipt of Suspicious Mail and Packages and Bomb Threats

I

we covered office emergencies in general with the goal of stressing the importance of having a plan in place. While we discussed general responses to a few different types of emergencies, we did not go through each and every type of incident and emergency and describe the appropriate responses to each. To do so would take a separate book on each topic. There are, however, a few issues that are common enough to warrant their own chapter and a discussion on how to respond to such incidents if they occur. The responses discussed here are general in nature, and they will likely change given the location of your business or facility, the level of cooperation with building staff, and the time it takes for police to respond. N THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER

DELIVERED PACKAGES Let’s start with delivered packages. For numerous reasons, terrorists and other criminals have long favored attacks via the mail or other package delivery services. It is a strategy that allows the perpetrator to strike from a position of relative safety. When an explosive is sent through the mail, for example, an

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attack can to be delivered by unwitting third parties, while the attacker remains anonymous. These attacks can be terrifying and effective, and letter and package bombs have claimed hundreds of lives and maimed hundreds more all over the world. One individual or a group of individuals can target multiple subjects in widely disparate areas without risking capture. In the case of explosives, the detonation not only causes injury to the person opening the package but also results in partial destruction of the evidence. Packages often find their way directly to the intended target and, if the devices are well concealed, they are impossible to detect until it is too late. Furthermore, terrorists are not the only ones to use this method to attempt to kill or injure others. Disgruntled employees, deranged individuals, and even jilted lovers have been responsible for many such attacks. Cases involving the use of the mail system for terror are usually difficult and require a long time, even many years, to solve. Remember the Unabomber case. The bomber, Ted Kaczynski, terrorized the country for years, sending bombs to unsuspecting victims in order to promote his bizarre agenda. Ordinary investigative techniques did not lead to his capture. After years of fruitless attempts to solve the case, behavioral scientists with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agreed to one of the bomber’s demands, to publish his “Unabomber Manifesto” in the national press. The FBI, armed with an extensive psychological profile of the subject, gambled that someone would recognize the content or style of the manifesto and alert the police. This is exactly what happened; Kaczynski’s brother turned him in after reading the published piece. Explosives are not the only mechanism of injury that can be secreted in a letter or delivered package. Many will remember the anthrax attacks delivered by mail in the weeks following the attack of September 11. In those attacks, five persons were killed and another seventeen were infected. The case was ultimately closed by the FBI in 2008 after they publicly identified a microbiologist named Bruce Edwards Ivins as the sole perpetrator of the attacks, a conclusion that was subsequently challenged. Although no scientific evidence conclusively proves Ivins’s guilt, the case was closed nonetheless. As a result of the widespread panic that recognized the apparent ease by which a lethal substance could be spread by the mail, the United States Postal Service (USPS) implemented countermeasures to ensure that anthrax can never again make it through the mail delivery system. However, other toxic substances, including chemical and biological agents, still can be potentially sent through the mail. This type of threat will continue to be used to inflict terror as long as there is a mail delivery system.

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Basic Protective Measures How can individuals and companies protect themselves against attacks using the mail or other common carrier? Within the borders of the United States, there are postal inspectors dedicated to helping police the mail system. The government is working hard to stay ahead of the threat curve by obtaining additional technical equipment as it becomes available to monitor the mail and detect explosives, poisons, and biohazards before they are delivered. If you are living overseas, unless you live in Israel, such safeguards are unlikely. Once again, you are left with the necessity of taking personal responsibility for safeguarding yourself from attacks that use the mail delivery system. Let’s talk about some of the basic commonsense measures that are the first level of defense against a letter attack. There is a big difference between the measures we will implement at home or in the office and those we will implement while working abroad. First of all, while living abroad, you should make every effort not to receive mail, packages, or deliveries at home. We discuss the issue of deliveries later on, but whenever possible, have mail and packages delivered to an alternate location, such as your place of business. For government employees, this is automatic. Each member of the embassy staff uses the Army Post Office (APO) as a mailing address. Mail is scanned with X-rays and, in some cases, explosive detection equipment and is sorted within the embassy. The mail room staff is trained in proper handling procedures and is better able to identify suspicious items. However, individuals in the private sector do not have the luxury of having trained government employees screen their mail. Private industry is beginning to realize just how vulnerable it is to this type of attack and has begun to address some of these issues in private mail rooms. We encourage this trend. If, during a threat assessment, we see flaws in a company’s mail handling procedures, we design company-specific measures to fix them. Still, companies are slow to implement necessary security changes. And, unfortunately, although security is often ratcheted up after an attack occurs, it usually slackens as the memory of the incident fades. As a result, every individual needs to be his or her own safety inspector. Most of the measures dealing with the receipt of mail and packages are based on common sense. First rule: Trust your instincts. They usually are right. If you get an item that for any reason seems suspicious or makes you uncomfortable, do not open it. Carefully place it aside and calmly consider your options. (We discuss what those options are below.)

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The easiest way to separate mail is to look at the return address. A letter or parcel from a familiar sender or mail received in the normal course of business is not a threat (with the possible exception of an ex-wife or ex-husband). The same is true regarding expected packages. For example, if you order something from the Eddie Bauer catalog and two weeks later you receive a package from Eddie Bauer, it is safe to assume that the package is legitimate. You can include most periodicals and other items that you subscribe to in the same “safe” category. Mail falling under the category of ordinary business mail—utility bills, for example—are also in this category. What about the rest? For example, you receive a box with a return address that is unfamiliar to you. You don’t recall ordering anything so you pay a bit more attention to the type of package. You notice it is from a U.S. location and a company name is on the box. So you call information in the United States or check the internet to get the name of the company and its number. If you learn that it is something that your spouse ordered and forgot to tell you about, you have solved the mystery. It is also possible that you ordered something and simply forgot and the small bit of research jogs your memory. What types of mail or packages should set off alarm bells and have you calling the police or the embassy for guidance? The best set of general guidelines has been set forth by the USPS. Few people realize that the USPS has its own investigative division of armed postal inspectors. Many of these inspectors are experts in recognizing explosive devices disguised as letters or packages. Next we describe some of the USPS recommendations and other governmental agencies about how to detect a mail bomb.

Restrictive Endorsement A mail bomb may include the words “Private” or “Personal/Confidential” or “To be opened by addressee only.” The reason for this is obvious. The bomber wishes to ensure that the intended victim, not the secretary in the office or someone else at home, opens the package and sets off the explosive. This is particularly significant if the package comes to the office where the addressee is not in the habit of receiving personal mail. Other wordings, such as “Fragile,” “Rush,” or “Handle with Care,” are also common in mail bombs.

Suspicious Lettering on the Envelope Obviously, if the envelope is addressed with letters clipped from a newspaper or magazine, the way ransom notes used to be depicted in old movies, you would

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pay attention to it. Something that unusual is enough to get anyone to notice. Equally as significant, though far less obvious, are things like spelling errors, including the incorrect spelling of the recipient’s name, or an incorrect title of the addressee. In addition, the handwriting may be distorted or smudged. Simply put, the lettering will look unusual when compared to normal mail.

Return Address The return address may be nonexistent or fictitious, or it may be delivering a message as well. For example, an industrialist accused of releasing toxic substances into the environment might receive a letter with a cemetery plot as a return address. This type of return address is particularly significant and should cause your alarm bells to go off immediately.

Physical Signs A package or letter containing an explosive may have protruding wires, aluminum foil, or oil stains. The package itself may feel stiff, look lopsided, and feel as if it has liquid sloshing around. It may have an excessive amount of wrapping and an obviously irregular shape. Mail bombs generally also have excessive postage. There may be a strange odor coming from the package or even an electronic buzz. While handling the package, you may get the impression that it feels heavier than it looks or the weight is not evenly distributed throughout the package.

Postmark Check the postmark and compare it with the return address. There should be a general correlation between the two. For example, if the return address says John Smith, 123 Main Street, Anyplace USA, and the postmark is from someplace else, that is a potential warning sign.

Contents Difficult to Remove Once you open the package, you may feel some pressure as you are removing the contents. This might be indicative of the triggering device pressing against the inside of the container. Once the contents are removed, the pressure holding the trigger down is released and detonation occurs. The next figure was created by the USPS to highlight the warning signs of suspicious mail.

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Misspelled words. Badly typed or written.

Restrictive markings. No return address.

Sealed with tape.

Unknown powder or suspicious substance.

Possibly mailed from a foreign country. Excessive postage.

Protruding wires. Rigid or bulky. Lopsided or uneven.

Excessive tape. Oily stains, discolorations, crystallization on wrapper.

To order this poster, call 1-800-332-0317.

Strange odor.

Incorrect title or addressed to title only.

Poster 84 September 2006 PSN 7690-07-000-7097

This poster may be downloaded in PDF format at no charge at this link: https://about.usps.com/posters/pos84.pdf.

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Dos and Don’ts for Handling a Suspect Item What do you do if you receive a package or letter that you suspect may contain a bomb or hazardous substance? The first thing to do is remain calm to allow yourself to think dearly. Remember, the package has been handled extensively during the delivery process, so moving it to a safe location will likely be okay. In case it is not obvious, DO NOT OPEN THE ITEM. Do not even attempt to open a portion of the package to try to observe the contents. If it is a bomb or biological weapon, any tampering may cause it to detonate or release the toxic substance. Put the package or letter down in an open area. If you are dealing with a suspected explosive, do not place it in a drawer, cabinet, or other confined space. By confining the object, you can actually enhance the explosive force. Isolate the item and clear the area. With a small device, the danger is to anyone on the floor or in the immediate area. Clear the floor and call police using a landline. If the device contains a suspected contaminant, you do want to contain it, preferably in plastic. Do not move the package throughout the building, especially by elevator. If there has been a release of some suspected dangerous substance, the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system should be shut down to avoid spreading the material throughout the building. Do not submerge the object in water. Many chemicals explode on contact with water. In any event, water probably will not disable the device. Instead, water may short out electronic detonators with unfortunate results. Leave the package unmolested and evacuate the area.

RECEIPT OF MAIL AND PACKAGES AT YOUR DESK How can you avoid having a mail bomb or letter containing a biohazard from smoothly passing through the office mail room and getting delivered to you at your desk? Is there a way to make office mail rooms your first line of defense to protect against this type of attack? The answer, of course, is yes. You just need to systematically apply the commonsense steps you would take at home to the office. In combination with policy and procedures to handle mail properly, mail room employees need to be taught what to look for and how to determine which items get delivered immediately, which need greater scrutiny, and which get rejected and discarded or returned. Simply teaching the warning signs of suspicious mail and packages goes a long way toward preventing these threats from endangering you, your coworkers and employees, and your facility.

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In addition to training, there are a lot of technological solutions to the problem of securing the mail room at work. Businesses are more likely to be able to afford technical equipment that allows for rapid assessment of a suspicious package. Items such as X-ray machines and metal detectors are widely available and may be purchased for the mail room. All of the companies that manufacture these types of equipment also provide instruction to end users on site. They will train your staff in the proper use of the machines and enable them to detect threats that would be otherwise impossible to observe. In addition, it is also possible, and relatively inexpensive, to separate the air space in the mail room from the building’s ventilation system. Doing so will prevent the contamination of the entire facility in the case of an attack with a hazardous chemical or biohazard. Exposure would be contained and would not spread beyond the mail room. This precaution may be implemented quickly, and it dramatically reduces the number of individuals exposed in the event of such an attack. If you are an executive in firm with a history of receiving threatening mail and packages, you should make it a priority to establish such a plan in your place of business. If you’re not an executive or manager, you may consider the need to bring this issue to the attention of management or the appropriate decision maker. We have included a basic mail room protocol to assist you in understanding the steps to be taken to properly secure your mail facility. However, implementation of an effective screening system requires a comprehensive methodology tailored to the unique needs of your facility. In addition, the system is only as good as the people operating it. Laziness, incompetence, poor training, and human error can cause the system to fail. Therefore, a truly effective screening system also should include personnel selection criteria, training guidelines, and an ongoing evaluation process. It also should provide a mechanism for reporting and correcting lapses and failures. Exhibit 3.1 is a sample mail room screening protocol. Remember, sometimes a package will display several of the warning signs listed in the exhibit; sometimes it will display only one or two. Sometimes bombers are cognizant enough of screening procedures to pack a bomb or biohazard bearing none of the warning signs. As a general rule, however, there will be at least some indication that the package or letter deserves to be given a greater level of scrutiny. Exhibit 3.2 shows an otherwise innocuous-looking package bearing a restrictive endorsement. It also lacks a return address. The package may very well be legitimate and pose no risk at all. However, an effective and well-operated screening system would certainly identify this package as deserving of additional attention.

Receipt of Suspicious Mail and Packages and Bomb Threats Exhibit 3.1

55

Mail Room Protocol

General Letter or package bomb incidents have occurred at businesses, universities, government offices and installations, and private residences. The motivation for this kind of attack could include revenge, insurance fraud, and political or environmental terrorism directed against a person or organization. Using Mail as Bomb Delivery Method Mail or package service can be a desirable tactic for terrorists or criminals for several reasons: • Sending a bomb through the mail allows the attacker to strike a specific target from a distance. • The mail or package can reach any target at any lime. • The attack is delivered by an unwitting participant—the postal carrier or parcel delivery person. • It is very difficult to identify a suspicious item; it may appear to look like any other piece of mail. All of these factors make a mail attack desirable as there is a reduced risk of capture and increased probability in the success of the attack. Create a Plan The main goal of a mail bomb security plan is to detect the weaponized letter or package before it reaches the intended recipient. Therefore, companies need to have a well-established screening procedure to limit the risk. A mail room protocol together with common sense and good judgment can achieve the goal of reducing the level of vulnerability to this type of attack. Important Elements to lnclude in the Plan • While creating a plan, you must differentiate between business mail, regular mail, and nonregular mail. Business mail and regular mail are received on a routine basis from other businesses, clients, or customers. Nonregular mail gets the greatest degree of scrutiny. • When dealing with packages, it’s important to create a way for employees to notify security or mail personnel about the anticipated arrival of a package. (continues)

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Mail Room Protocol (Continued)

The employee needs to provide information such as the recipient’s name, department, and phone number as well as the name of the sender, the package contents, and its anticipated size. • Security personnel and any person who processes the mail need to be familiar with suspicious signs and to be trained regularly. The next list presents different warning signs for letter and packages based on previous incidents. Address A handwritten address or one that is poorly typed ⚬ An incomplete or illogical return address ⚬ An uncommon return address ⚬ Foreign return address on a package, indicating it was not sent by a local business ⚬ No return address ⚬ Unusual manner of delivery (during nonwork hours or by a person not belonging to a parcel service) ⚬

Sense and Feeling The size and weight are not proportionate. ⚬ The item is lopsided or feels unusual (e.g., powdery feel). ⚬ It has a strange odor. ⚬ The envelope feels stiff, rigid, or contains heavy cardboard, metal, or plastic that prevents the envelope from bending. ⚬ Sounds (ticking, buzzing, clicking) or other strange noises are coming from the package. ⚬

Visual The envelope or package is torn or opened. ⚬ There is an oil stain on the envelope or package. ⚬ Powder or any substance is leaking from it. ⚬ A threatening message is on the envelope or package. ⚬ An excessive amount of postage is on the envelope or package. ⚬ Wires are protruding from the envelope or package. ⚬ The envelope or package is sealed with excessive amount of tape or string. ⚬ Common words, addresses, and/or names are misspelled, all of which might suggest difficulty with English. ⚬ The envelope or package uses company titles but no reference name. ⚬ The envelope or package is marked “Personal,” “Confidential,” or “Private.” ⚬

Receipt of Suspicious Mail and Packages and Bomb Threats Exhibit 3.1

57

Mail Room Protocol (Continued)

The plan must include procedures for emergency situations involving a concerning letter or package. When a piece of mail has been determined to be suspicious, the primary concern should be your personal safety and the safety of other employees. Remember, your job ends when you discover a suspicious package. At that point, the responsibility belongs to law enforcement professionals who train for this kind of situation. When You Discover a Suspicious Letter or Package Remain calm. ⚬ Set the item down. ⚬ Don’t move the item or carry it outside. ⚬ Evacuate the area. ⚬ Notify security and management. ⚬ Notify law enforcement. ⚬

Mail bombs, unfortunately, do not require a great deal of sophistication to build and send. Exhibit 3.3 is a photograph of a very simple explosive device and trigger system. Packed with nails and screws, such a device becomes an extremely deadly weapon that can shower a large area with shrapnel. Companies may choose to purchase for the mail room a specially constructed container designed to contain the effects of a small explosive device, such as a letter or package containing a bomb. Several companies manufacture these devices, which are designed to absorb lateral blast energy and all lateral explosive fragmentation. The force of the blast will be directed upward, preventing the lateral dispersal of lethal shrapnel.

Exhibit 3.2 Innocent-Looking Package Requiring Special Handling Procedures

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As we mentioned, depending on your level of risk and the volume of mail you receive, you may wish to consider purchasing metal detectors, X-ray equipment, and other similar devices. Many locations X ray every piece of mail. This is always a good practice. However, the cost of an X-ray machine capable of dealing with large volumes of mail may be prohibitive. Many companies, therefore, scan mail with metal detectors, which is a less expensive alternative. This practice is based on the premise that a bomb cannot be made without metallic components. Although this is generally true, the X-ray option certainly is among the better options to safeguard an office. Other technology is available that includes equipment that detects explosive compounds. In some locations, bomb-sniffing dogs are used to screen packages and deliveries as well. One of the services offered by Global Security Group is a comprehensive assessment and overhaul of corporate mail rooms. This assessment includes the creation of a company-specific mail-handling procedure and integrates the best and most cost-effective technological detection systems. However, nothing works without having a well-trained and alert workforce.

Exhibit 3.3 Simple Package Bomb and Triggering System

SUSPICIOUS BAGS/PACKAGES OR OTHER ITEMS LEFT UNATTENDED The scenario where a guard or employee discovers an unattended bag or other item also warrants discussion. How do we determine whether to initiate a comprehensive response protocol for a bag, for example, whose owner is unknown? More likely than not, someone simply left the bag by accident, but our response cannot make that assumption. We can and should investigate that possibility but while we are doing so, the area must be cleared. Remember, a small bag or even a suitcase is not a threat to the structure of the building in the

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same way a truck bomb filled with several thousand pounds of explosives would be. The proper thing to do is to follow the lateral response strategy, clearing the immediate area around the package and anywhere else in proximity that may be at risk, such as adjacent offices with sheetrock walls. Call the police using a landline and wait for them to investigate. In the meantime, you have ensured that no one will be hurt if the package does turn out to be an explosive device.

BOMB THREATS AND BOMBINGS Imagine yourself sitting in your office and the phone rings. You answer and hear the voice of a man saying “I hate your country (or your company, race, religion) and within a few minutes a bomb in your facility is going to explode.” What do you do? What should you do? Do you alert all your coworkers directly and immediately evacuate the building, or do you discuss what to do with other senior managers? What is the likelihood that the threat is legitimate? You may have to decide in a very small window of time. Most bombings occur with no warning. However, on relatively rare occasions, an individual who has placed an explosive device in a particular location will call or otherwise contact the targeted facility to warn that a bomb will go off within a certain amount of time. Although it hardly makes sense to speak of bombers as having a sense of humanity, a warning allows the occupants of a building to evacuate, thereby reducing the number of human casualties. The resultant damage will be to property, not people. That is the exception and not the rule. In this period of history, damage to property alone does not satisfy today’s terrorists. No distinction is made between combatants and noncombatants or among men, women, or children. Often the only call a bomber makes is to take credit for the attack, not to warn. Even so, a bomb threat protocol must be included in any emergency action plan. If a bomb threat is received, it is crucial to obtain as much information from the caller as possible, as time is of the essence. Acquiring this information is best accomplished by using a bomb threat checklist. Exhibit 3.4 is a sample bomb threat checklist that we developed over the years. We have combined what we feel are the best elements of checklists created by the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, the FBI, and various other federal state and local police agencies. Additionally, we have color coded the questions to prioritize them in order of

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Sample Bomb Threat Checklist

Exact date and time of call: ____________________________________________ Received by: _______________________________________________________ Number receiving call: ________________________________________________ Exact words of caller: _________________________________________________ Questions to ask caller: 1. When will the bomb explode? _______________________________________ 2. Where is the bomb? _____________________________________________ 3. What does it look like? ____________________________________________ 4. What will cause it to explode? ______________________________________ 5. What kind of bomb is it? ___________________________________________ 6. Did you place the bomb? __________________________________________ 7. Why did you place the bomb? _______________________________________ 8. What is your name? ______________________________________________ 9. Where are you calling from? ________________________________________ 10. What is your address? ____________________________________________

Background noise:

Familiarity with threatened facility:

Factory



Much



Street



Some



Airplanes Office sounds Voices

◽ ◽ ◽

None



Did the caller sound familiar?

Trains



Yes



Party



No



Quiet



Music



If yes, whom did he sound like?

Animals



_____________________________ _____________________________

Receipt of Suspicious Mail and Packages and Bomb Threats Exhibit 3.4

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Sample Bomb Threat Checklist (Continued)

Voice

Speech

Accent

Loud



Fast



Local



High pitched



Distinct



Foreign



Raspy



Stutter



Intoxicated



Slurred



Language

Soft



Distorted



Educated



Deep



Nasal



Fair



Pleasant



Lisp



Poor



Other



Other



Abusive



Foul



Manner Calm

Sex ◽

Mate

◽ ◽

Rational



Female

Coherent



Approx. age: ______________________

Daliberate



Caller ID: _________________________

Righteous



Ethnicity __________________________

Angry



Remarks _________________________

Irrational



_________________________________

Amused



_________________________________

CALL 911 (or its local equivalent) IMMEDIATELY. Keep caller talking as long as possible.

importance. Questions related to safety should be asked first. If the caller is willing to answer, answers to these questions should be documented: • • • • •

When will the bomb explode? Where is the bomb? What does it look like? What will cause it to explode? What kind of bomb is it?

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Before we go much further into the use of the checklist, we must explain that the overwhelming majority of bomb threats are hoaxes, not legitimate. There are a number of reasons why such threats are made: • A disgruntled employee desires to disrupt the workplace to cause loss of morale and have a negative financial impact. • An activist has some grievance against a company or industry. • A criminal or terrorist is testing the response to a threat. • To extort funds (e.g., recent threats to facilities and schools across the United States and Canada demanding payment in Bitcoin.) • To generate panic and fear. In fact, absent extraordinary circumstances, the police will not direct an evacuation of the building or facility based solely on the threat. If the response to all bomb threats was to immediately evacuate, anyone with malicious intent could effectively empty the buildings with a single call, text, email, or letter. A bomb may be difficult to introduce into a building; certainly a bomb large enough to do structural damage is. A terrorist who desires to attack a large number of people would make a bomb threat knowing that hundreds or thousands of the persons inside would now be coming outside where they would be more vulnerable to attack. This has, in fact, happened. That is why the first response to a bomb threat is to assess the situation. Absent some extraordinary situation or evidence that the threat is real and immediate, evacuation is not the correct course of action. An example of a threat that would warrant immediately evacuating the premises is a call stating that a particular truck parked adjacent to the building was filled with 2,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil and will explode in twenty minutes. Security confirms that a truck of that description is located where the caller stated, and inspection reveals it appears heavily loaded. While police are being called, video footage is quickly reviewed and shows the truck being parked close to the building, and the driver can be seen hurriedly exiting the vehicle and jumping into a car driven by someone else. The facts in this case would suggest a twofold strategy: Direct all building occupants to the side of the building farthest from the threat, and immediately evacuate via the stairwells on that side of the building. Let us walk through a situation where the content of the threat suggests that the threat is real. The time of detonation is of paramount importance, particularly if the building is going to be evacuated. The location of the bomb is also critically important because it will determine which evacuation route will be selected. And of course the question of what will cause the bomb to explode is important because it might provide information that will prevent the device from detonating.

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Before we discuss some of the other questions on the checklist in Exhibit 3.4, we should make it very clear that the first and foremost priority after receiving a bomb threat is to quickly gather information that will help save lives. The checklist contains a number of questions to ask the caller. As we have mentioned, the person receiving the call should ask the safety-related questions first. The first five questions (they should be color coded in red when you use this checklist in printed form) are the safety-related questions, which must be asked first. Questions 6 through 10 are investigative in nature. They are designed to obtain additional information that will be needed later by the authorities. The check-listed boxes are also geared to assist in a subsequent investigation of the attack or threat. These questions do not need to be answered during the phone call. However, these details will be very useful to help the person receiving the call to remember as much detail as possible. The instructions at the bottom of the form say to call 911 and report the threat, but of course police emergency numbers vary from country to country. Every employee should know the local equivalent of 911 or how to contact the police as quickly as possible. If there is no indication of immediate danger, the aim is to keep the caller talking as long as possible. That suggestion, of course, gets tossed right out the window if the caller says the bomb will explode in several minutes. Otherwise, try to get as much information from the caller as you can. When you evacuate, take the form with you and try to fill it out while the information is still fresh in your mind. Remember, safety is the overriding concern when receiving a bomb threat. Do not waste precious time attempting to engage the caller and obtain additional information if by doing so you put your life or anyone else’s life at risk. Again, the overwhelming numbers of bomb threats are baseless hoaxes. The answers to the questions on the checklist will allow responding law enforcement professionals to assess the situation. A likely response internally and by responded law enforcement officers to a threat is to search for a suspected device. While doing so, the use of handheld radio and cell phones is contraindicated as any radio transmission could potentially trigger a device controlled in that manner. The search focuses on things that are clearly out of place, such as a briefcase or duffel bag in an area where such items would be highly unlikely. The search must be thorough and systematic and focus on: • • • •

Public areas Lower levels first Evacuation routes Outside walls

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64 If a device is found: • • • •

DO NOT touch or examine the device. Evacuate, isolate, and contain the area. DO NOT use a cell phone or radio. IMMEDIATELY REMOVE yourself and others to a safe distance.

The theory when responding to a suspicious package is to implement a lateral response strategy first followed by the floor(s) below and above if you are in a multifloor office or facility. Interior sheetrock walls will not provide sufficient protection if the device explodes. Remember, a small improvised explosive device will not pose a serious threat to the structure of the building. In general, this type of explosive poses grave threats to persons in the vicinity who are not protected by cover. Stay away from glass windows and secondary hazards (gas, electric, etc.) and get behind a hard cover or off the floor if in an office building. The floors/ceilings of high-rise office buildings are made from reinforced concrete, which affords people significant protection; the interior walls are most likely sheetrock, which does not. Let us shift for a moment from the threat of a bomb blast to an actual explosion that occurs as the result of the threat. If there is a detonation, do not assume the threat is over. There may be a risk of structural collapse, secondary explosions, or even multiple devices. The Israelis learned the hard way that often terrorists plant two or more explosive devices in the same general area. The first device detonates. After the initial shock, police, rescue workers, and additional civilians rush to the scene and try to help the victims. The bombers watch from a safe distance until they are satisfied with the number of people at the scene, then they remotely detonate the second device. This is a no-win situation. Very few people can suppress their humanity and allow fear to prevent them from helping the wounded. If possible, try to allow trained professionals to secure the area before you rush in. These types of dual explosive attacks are also being used to kill civilians who survive an initial attack and then run to seek cover in the closest protected area. It is a favorite tactic of Hamas, which routinely tries to kill additional civilians in Israel in this way. The bombers plant the first explosive device in an area calculated to kill the greatest number of people. They place a second device in an adjacent area to which the survivors would be likely to run to for shelter. The terrorist murderers watch from a safe distance until enough men, women, and children have reached the area of presumed safety and then detonate the bomb with a simple cell phone call to a phone attached to the device.

CHAPTER 4

Violence in the Workplace

W

that is familiar to anyone working in the private or public sector. As defined by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration, workplace violence is “any act or threat of physical violence, harassment, intimidation, or other threatening disruptive behavior that occurs at the work site. It ranges from threats and verbal abuse to physical assaults and even homicide.”1 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, more than 2 million people in the United States each year report being the victims of workplace violence and it is a virtual certainty that even more incidents go unreported. Violent acts directed at employees, clients, contractors, vendors, customers, and visitors resulted in injury and death. These statistics also show that homicide is currently the third leading cause of fatal injuries in the workplace. Many of these homicides are the result of personal relationships, and most of the victims in this category are women.2 Violence perpetrated by employees presents a number of difficulties from a security viewpoint because typically employees have unrestricted access to the facility unless they have already been terminated and have had their access revoked. However, even after termination, employees’ familiarity with entry points, screening, and camera locations makes it possible for even banned employees to get into the building and act violently if that is their intention. Nevertheless, the level and frequency of employee violence can be greatly reduced if warning signs are recognized and the response is timely and appropriate. ORKPLACE VIOLENCE IS AN ISSUE

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Many people believe that workplace violence is a random act executed by an unstable person that could not be anticipated or prevented. This is far from the true. In fact, after an act of violence occurs in a workplace, it is common to learn that coworkers had concerns about the employee but didn’t report them. In almost every instance of workplace violence, there were warning signs that should have been picked up and acted on but were not. Not only were obvious warning signs of impending violence ignored or not recognized, but actual and direct threats were ignored as well. It would seem obvious to anyone, regardless of their level of security training, that an individual who has just been fired and states that he is going home to get a gun and then will come back and kill everyone needs to be given the appropriate level of attention. However, often management does nothing, even in these extreme cases. Management does not call the police, and often the security department is not even notified that this individual has made threats and told that he or she must not to be admitted into the building. Tragically, many times these individuals are as good as their word and do return, with deadly results. The circumstances are all the more heartbreaking because they could easily have been averted. The initial step to take to prevent workplace violence is the implementation of a zero-tolerance policy. Most companies have adopted this practice but are somewhat lax in its enforcement. Zero means zero; no exceptions. The second component is to encourage employees with safety concerns about a fellow employee to share them with management. As we mentioned, a common refrain seen in the aftermath of active shooting incidents or other acts of extreme violence in the workplace are statements of surviving coworkers that they had recognized some of the warning signs that suggested violent behavior and had done nothing about it. Management needs to implement explicit notification procedures to ensure supervisory awareness and action to make sure potentially violent employees are identified. These programs must include a complaint process that transcends the usual chain of command in instances where, for example, procedures call for employees to notify the first-level supervisor, when it may very well be this person who is causing the problem. There also must be a clearly defined procedure for employees to follow when they notice unusual behavior in a coworker. Management must be made aware of such behavior as soon as possible to allow for the implementation of appropriate intervention techniques. Often the human resources department can employ the services of a mental health professional familiar with employee-related crises. An evaluation by such a trained person is a very good first step to take before a problem becomes more serious.

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PREVENTION OF WORKPLACE VIOLENCE As with most security threats, a good place to start is with prevention. Averting a potentially dangerous situation before it evolves into a violent act is the goal. When it comes to workplace violence, the place to start is in the hiring process; you clearly want to avoid hiring anyone who can pose future threat. For that to happen, the organization must have robust process that includes preemployment screening for drug and excessive alcohol use and a criminal background check. These checks must be done in compliance with federal, state, and local laws, and such laws may severely restrict the employer’s ability to perform certain checks. Human resource personnel will be aware of the limits imposed by law. It is also a good practice to get in touch with former employers and check references to assess if there are any behavioral concerns. While on the job, it is a good practice for managers to discuss, during talent management reviews with workers under their supervision, whether they have any behavioral issues or concerns with any of their coworkers. This may include poor performance, low motivation, signs of anger, disputes with coworkers, and others. Although it may be hard to predict an actual act of violence, the identification of potential warning signs and an intervention strategy is straightforward. Early intervention could not only mitigate a catastrophic outcome but could also help a frustrated or angry employee to get a position better suited to their disposition before the situation deteriorates to the point of having irreversible consequences for the employee. To reach this goal, a training plan covering workplace violence issues must be developed and executed for all employees. As part of this plan, all employees should be required to review the organization’s workplace violence policy and understand the consequences of violation. This is a mandatory training that should be monitored, and all employees need to be in full in compliance. Awareness is also a critical element of prevention. All employees need to learn how to recognize the warning signs associated with acts of violence in the workplace. In most cases, a person who is angry about something happening at work will behave or communicate in a way that causes alarm. Perhaps the person has been passed over for promotion, either justifiably or unjustifiably, and is expressing anger over what he or she perceives as unfair treatment. That perceived slight will engender a change in conduct predictive of impending violence. Violence may also be triggered by a number of other things, including relationships with coworkers, disciplinary action, financial problems, and relationship difficulties.

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It is important for employees to recognize these triggers as well as the behavioral cues, types of communication, and the other signs associated with violence. (These warning signs are more fully explained in Chapter 5.) In our practice, we have provided a great deal of this training along with written assessment procedures emphasizing the importance of prevention over response. In addition to teaching employees to recognize the warning signs of violence, organizations should include training on diversity and inclusion to promote better understanding of between employees with different ethnic backgrounds, religious beliefs, and sexual orientations. Also, training on how to resolve conflicts and manage stressful situations is extremely helpful. Finally, organizations should provide free external consultation and support for individuals who would like to work with a professional on how to manage anger, stress, or other issues that impact their work performance.

SECURITY-RELATED RESPONSES Let’s discuss some appropriate security-related responses to employee violence. Definitive measures should become standard protocol when a person is suspended or dismissed. For example, after a person is terminated, he or she must immediately be denied access to every area of the facility. Certainly there will be matters that the person will need to take care of. Desks need to be cleaned out, final paychecks cut, and other financial matters must occur, such as the disposition of any funds in a company pension fund or thrift savings program. The company should appoint a single individual to act as a liaison between the employee and management to handle these matters. This designated person must handle anything that needs to be resolved. The employee should not be allowed to contact anyone in the office, barring personal friendships, of course, to discuss matters related to separation from the company. What is an appropriate response when an employee actually threatens violent behavior? First, security needs to be made aware of the circumstances of the incident and the nature of the threats. The ability of the guard force to handle the matter needs to be evaluated by senior management. In most cases, local authorities need to be alerted immediately, and their input should be obtained. In many jurisdictions in the United States, laws make the utterance of threats of violence a crime. In such cases, the ability of the police to make an arrest will depend on what the individual actually said and the availability of evidence to support a charge.

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If you are working abroad, you should consult the local police for guidance, assuming there is a professional police force in the country in which you are residing as an expatriate. In the event that the employee is an American citizen, it is also a good idea to contact the embassy or consulate and ask the regional security officer for advice. The regional security officer will also have a relationship with the local authorities and may be in a position to obtain their help faster than you can. In addition, embassies have liaison offices that may be able to provide appropriate support from a social services standpoint. While all this is being done, security needs to prepare an individual specific threat upgrade. If, for example, an employee has stormed off stating he is going home for a gun, this threat must be taken seriously. Anyone in a position of authority or, in their absence, anyone at risk should immediately call 911. Law enforcement officers will determine whether the threat is actionable. In addition, in-house preparations must be considered. What type of security force do you have? Are its members armed? Is there a sufficient access-limiting system in place to stop an armed intruder? Once local authorities arrive, they will take charge of the situation. Until then, the security staff has the responsibility of protecting the employees present on premises, particularly by controlling access. That alone might be a difficult proposition. Many places of employment have many points of access, particularly manufacturing and distribution centers. There may be a number of constantly operating loading docks and multiple doors constantly used and propped open by people who smoke. Perhaps the incident occurs during the warmer months when doors are left open in order to manage temperature inside. If your workplace has any of these characteristics, the time to consider how to address them during an emergency is now, before one occurs. Consideration also must be given to what measures are to be taken if an armed individual has either taken hostages or is randomly shooting company employees. Active shooter response measures are discussed in Chapter 5, but an armed and barricaded subject in your building will necessitate a police response. Have you considered how your personnel can facilitate their arrival? Do you have building floor plans readily available? Is there anything your security force can do pending the arrival of police? Plans for hostage rescue situations require an extremely high level of professionalism from your security detail; their level of training, ability, and experience must be quite high if you expect the team to be able to conduct such an operation. Except for rare circumstances in high-risk areas, your security detail will almost never attempt to rescue hostages. To our way of thinking, every company operating in such locales with the wherewithal to fund a highly proficient force should do so.

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This matter is even more critical in countries where the local police are not well trained or well equipped. The internal security force will be the only option available if a critical situation occurs in a country low on law enforcement assets. Creating such a security force is not so formidable a task as you may think, although it does require the allocation of considerable resources. Many private security contractors are capable of executing that mission. If the caliber of the security employees is high and if they have been given appropriate training (reinforced by regular practice and drill), such a force is not difficult to maintain on premises. Your company will need to decide whether the safety of its employees is worth the expense of such a security staff.

SUPPORTING LOCAL AUTHORITIES What is the function of the security staff in the event that local police are responding to an armed attack or hostage situation? Quite simply, it is to provide as much support and intelligence to the police as they can. To facilitate that role, it is recommended that every emergency action plan include information that a police tactical unit would need if it had to respond to an emergency in your facility. The information should include diagrams of the facility and surrounding areas. This information will allow a tactical team leader to evaluate the location before initiating any operation. The location of all windows, access points, and vents and crawl space areas must be included. If there are active security systems that can be used to monitor the subject, someone from security will need to be assigned to remain with the police and provide whatever technical assistance is required. This task of preparing such a plan will likely require the assistance of an experienced security consultant, and several very capable firms can prepare a complete emergency plan of this nature. The building should have all floor plans including changes made by tenants. The plan should provide details of the entire facility and identify appropriate points of entry if assault is necessary, as well as appropriate areas for helicopter support or Medivac units. This type of plan is also suitable for incorporation into a corporate emergency action plan and is strongly recommended. In a hostage situation or an armed attack, the time an assault team needs to prepare itself costs lives. If a professionally made operational plan is waiting when a law enforcement teams arrives on scene, the team will be able to act much more quickly and decisively. It is worth noting that in New York City, all high-rise office buildings, hotels, and public assembly venues must prepare active shooter emergency action kits to allow police officers to quickly

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respond to such incidents. The kits must be kept available at the building’s fire command station and must contain building floor plans and the building information card, which contains all relevant information about the building’s elevators, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems, utilities, stairwells, and the like. The kits must also contain access keys or cards and information about armed security officers and how they are to be identified in the event they are also responding to the incident.

NOTES 1. United States Department of Labor, “Workplace Violence.” https://www.osha.gov /SLTC/workplaceviolence/. 2. Bureau of Labor Statistics News Release, “National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2017,” December 18, 2018, USDL-18-1978. https://www.bls.gov/news .release/pdf/cfoi.pdf.

CHAPTER 5

Surviving an Active Shooter Incident BACKGROUND AND DEFINITION a few weeks go by before there is another breaking news headline advising of an active shooter incident in an office or other commercial setting or at a school, church, or hospital. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies report that these incidents are on the rise, but what exactly is an active shooter, and how do these acts of violence differ from other shootings? The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines an active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area. Implicit in this definition is the shooter’s use of one or more firearms.”1 This definition is a bit different from the FBI’s previous definition, which had the added requirement of the incident being perpetrated in a “confined and populated area.”2 It is worth noting that while the most dangerous active shooter incidents are perpetrated in confined and populated areas, a number of incidents have occurred outdoors, absent structural confinement, and these incidents are as difficult to flee as incidents perpetrated in a building or theater. Escape, even outdoors, is difficult because crowd movement hinders or makes impossible even properly considered action. The shooting in Las Vegas on October 1, 2017, perpetrated by Stephen Paddock is an example of this dynamic. Running directly away from a shooter firing from an elevated

IT SEEMS THAT NO MORE THAN

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position in an open area without cover is the wrong thing to do, as we discuss later. However, if 20,000 people are moving in that direction, your ability to move elsewhere is essentially zero. The crowd itself is the confining factor. The FBI study just cited as well as supplemental reports for shootings occurring in the years 2014–2015, 2016–2017, and 2018 analyze 277 active shooter incidents that occurred in the United States between the years 2000 and 2018.3 One of the most important points noted in these studies is that active shooter incidents are becoming increasingly more common. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies recommend that every business, school, government facility, hotel, and public assembly venue prepare for this type of emergency. This admonition from the FBI is a clarion call in this regard: The enhanced threat posed by active shooters and the swiftness with which active shooter incidents unfold support the importance of preparation by law enforcement officers and citizens alike.4

Some local governments are acting proactively; in late 2016, New York City became the first major municipality to require that all high-rise office buildings, hotels, and public assembly venues include active shooter response training in their fire safety and emergency action plans. This response was largely driven by the fact that the largest category of all active shooter incidents occurs in commercial venues (44 percent).

Active Shooter Incidents by Location 2000–2018 0.36% 4% 4.33%

4% Commercial Educational

13%

44%

Governmental Open Spaces Residential Houses of Worship

9%

Healthcare Facilities Other 20.58%

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As this chart reveals, 44 percent—close to half of all active shooter incidents—occur in commercial settings. The study further breaks down shootings in commercial settings into two subcategories, “Commercial Open to Pedestrian Traffic” and “Commercial Closed to Pedestrian Traffic.” The distinction between the two relates to access; a corporate office in a high-rise building is an example of a “closed” venue while a shopping mall is considered “open.” In the majority of incidents in closed commercial settings analyzed by the FBI, the locations and occupants had been deliberately targeted; there was a connection between the shooter and the targeted location and victims. In the overwhelming number of cases, the shooter was a former or current employee or, occasionally, the spouse of an employee. The targets here were deliberate, not random. In addition, a review of active shooter incidents conducted by the New York City Police Department found that 41 percent of the victims of such attacks had a professional relationship with the attacker.5 A study by the U.S. Secret Service concluded that these types of incidents have specific and predetermined targets and therefore present a direct risk to all company employees.6 Since it is clear that shooting incidents in the workplace are almost always perpetrated by known persons, it is reasonable to conclude that this type of attack can be anticipated and prevented. The question is how. The increase in the number of active shooter incidents in the workplace has led many private sector companies to provide active shooter response training to their employees. This training generally pays little attention to how to train corporate human resources personnel and senior managers to recognize the warning signs of disgruntled employees or other known individuals exhibiting concerning or threatening behavior. A common refrain heard from survivors of an active shooter incident in the workplace is that warning signs were observed but not properly acted on. In some cases, intervention by law enforcement is required. In many others, however, the criminal justice system will not be helpful if a particular individual’s conduct, while concerning, does not rise to the level of criminality. This was the case in the June 28, 2018, attack at the Capitol Gazette where law enforcement was ineffectual because the conduct that caused concern was either not criminal or amounted to only a low-level criminal offense. In this case, a police detective actually stated his belief that the individual posed no threat to the victims—a belief later proven incorrect after the subject shot five employees to death.7 It is important to note that while law enforcement officers may have a wealth of real-world experience, they are not trained in evaluating the level of risk connected to a known and identified individual. What is needed is a tool to enable employers to at least conduct a basic

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assessment of an individual whose conduct causes concern. There are always warning signs and behaviors associated with later acts of violence that employers can look for.

BEHAVIORAL AND MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS According to the Secret Service, a number of behavioral and motivational factors are common among persons committing attacks against multiple persons.8 Many of these indicators may not be researched prior to employment. Both federal and state laws limit how and when criminal inquiries may be used in the hiring process. This concern would not apply, however, in situations where an employee was terminated and the employer investigated past history while assessing the potential risk of violence posed by a former worker. The Secret Service study found that 71 percent of these attackers had histories of criminal charges beyond minor traffic violations. The active shooting incident on February 15, 2019, in Aurora, Illinois, that occurred as we were finalizing the draft of this book is a classic example. A gunman who killed five people and wounded several police officers at a warehouse was a terminated employee with a felony conviction. He opened fire during his meeting with the warehouse manager and human resources personal after being told that he was being fired during this meeting. Other warning signs from this shooter have been reported as well. It is our belief that application of the assessment concept that we discuss in this chapter may well have prevented the attack. Many more workplace attackers had contacts with law enforcement that did not lead to charges. Fully one third of the attackers studied had histories of violence related to acts of domestic abuse. In addition, 54 percent of the attackers had a history of illicit drug/substance abuse, which often correlates with other criminal activity. Unsurprisingly, mental health issues were commonly encountered among attackers with 64 percent having diagnosed mental health issues prior to their attacks. The most common symptoms related to psychosis (paranoia, hallucinations, or delusions) or suicidal thoughts. Fully 25 percent of attackers had been hospitalized for treatment or prescribed psychiatric medications prior to their attacks. In addition, the likelihood that attackers had undiagnosed mental illness or illnesses for which they did not seek treatment suggests this number is higher than reported. Again, the law makes inquiries into mental health or other health-related issues difficult if not impossible. However, these issues might become known during an employee’s tenure or after dismissal.

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Active shooters and other perpetrators of mass casualty attacks have a motive or motives for their actions. The Secret Service study identified a number of these motives9 : • Grievances: 46 percent (workplace: 21 percent; domestic: 18 percent; personal: 7 percent) • Ideological or racially based: 21 percent • Mental health/Psychosis: 14 percent • Political: 4 percent • Fame: 4 percent • Unknown: 14 percent Examining these factors and learning to recognize risk factors is the first step in preventing acts of violence in the workplace before they happen. Although these items are not predictive, they are suggestive of problems that may be far more serious than disgruntled or disruptive employees. Grievances are the most significant risk factor in assessing potential for violence. Grievances, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “a real or imagined wrong or other cause for complaint or protest, especially unfair treatment,” motivated 46 percent of the perpetrators of acts of mass violence including active shooter incidents. Often persons in the workplace make the mistake of trying to evaluate a grievance with objective criteria. That is an incorrect and potentially dangerous way to view grievances. Look through the eyes of potential attackers. What is their perception or delusion? That is how we must assess this type of situation. You don’t have to agree that the grievance is legitimate; you need to try to determine the extent to which the grievance may cause the employee to act out violently. Although, according to the Secret Service, 57 percent of all attacks analyzed resulted in harm to only random persons and only 14 percent (four attacks) resulted in harm to only preselected individuals known to the attacker (e.g., coworker or supervisor), those four attacks were motivated by workplace grievances. The Secret Service study defines a fixation as “an intense or obsessive preoccupation with a person, activity, or belief to the point that it impacted many aspects of their lives.”10 The study states that fixations are often “evidenced by seeking or consuming a significant volume of information regarding the object of their fixation” and that fixations “often carried an angry or emotional undertone and revolved around several themes, including personal vendettas, romantic conflicts, personal failures, perceived injustices, delusions, sociopolitical ideologies, or other incidents of mass violence.” How would this type of behavior manifest itself? Many people have hobbies and strong interests, some

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bordering on obsessive or compulsive behavior. What differentiates a fixation from a strong interest is that in these cases the fixation becomes the central focus of a person’s life. That, coupled with extreme emotion, particularly anger, may become a dangerous motivation. Other factors of concern mentioned in the Secret Service study are listed next. • Significant stressors: All attackers had at least one stressor in their lives in the five years leading up to the attacks. • Family/Romantic relationships: Spousal estrangement, divorces, romantic breakups, rejected proposals, physical or emotional abuse or death of a parent • Personal issues: Unstable living conditions, physical illnesses, or other significant disorders • Work or school environments: Being fired or suspended, filing grievances, being bullied at work or school, feeling disrespected, or being the subject of real or perceived gossip • Contact with law enforcement not leading to arrest/charges: Being the subject of domestic disturbance calls or being sought for a crime unrelated to the attack • Financial instability: These financial stressors included an inability to maintain employment; living in homeless shelters; failed business ventures; and civil court filings and proceedings, such as judgments, evictions, tax warrants, and wage garnishments. • Rigidness, hostility, or extreme self-centeredness: Some inappropriately asserted control over others, as observed by their histories of domestic violence, sexual assault, harassment, or harming animals. Others had a history of violent/angry outbursts following interpersonal conflicts with coworkers, neighbors, or family members. Some attackers displayed an inflated sense of self or entitlement, unrealistically believing that they were deserving of certain relationships, successes, or benefits, with some reacting angrily when they did not obtain what they believed they deserved. Again, it is what they believe that matters, not whether we agree with their perception. • Threatening communications: 79 percent made threats or engaged in other threatening communications. These may be overt or veiled and both verbal and nonverbal. • Concerning communications: 75 percent engaged in other concerning communications that did not reach the threshold of a threat (i.e., made

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overly angry statements, racist comments, references to past attackers, suicidal language, or comments indicative of their intent to carry out an attack). • History of eliciting concern: Overall, 79 percent engaged in some type of conduct or behavior that caused concern in others. Another fact of interest is that 82 percent of the attackers exhibited behaviors indicative of aggressive narcissism. There are many names given to personality disorders involving narcissism (aggressive narcissism, malignant narcissism, etc.), but they all fall under the umbrella of a condition generally known as narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). Notable features of this condition are worth analyzing. According to the Psychology Today website, individuals with (NPD) exhibit a lack of ability to empathize with others and have an inflated sense of self-importance.11 The hallmarks of narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) are grandiosity, a lack of empathy for other people, and a need for admiration. People with this condition are frequently described as arrogant, self-centered, manipulative, and demanding. They may also concentrate on grandiose fantasies [e.g., their own success, beauty, brilliance] and may be convinced that they deserve special treatment. These characteristics typically begin in early adulthood and must be consistently evident in multiple contexts, such as at work and in relationships. [People with narcissistic personality disorder believe they are superior or special] . . . and often try to associate with other people they believe are unique or gifted in some way, which can enhance their self-esteem. They tend to seek excessive admiration and attention and have difficulty tolerating criticism or defeat.

Narcissistic personality disorder is indicated by five or more of these symptoms: • A grandiose sense of self-importance • Preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love • Belief that one is special and can only be understood by or associate with special people or institutions • A need for excessive admiration • A sense of entitlement (to special treatment) • Exploitation of others

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• A lack of empathy • Envy of others or the belief that one is the object of envy • Arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes

Any program that seeks to identify employees with a potential to act out violently should consider these criteria as well. Other law enforcement agencies have also compiled lists of behavioral indicators associated with violent actors. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) identifies “Indicators of Potential Workplace Violence” in its Active Shooter booklet.12 These indicators may include: • Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs • Unexplained increase in absenteeism or absenteeism explained by vague physical complaints • Noticeable decrease in attention to appearance and hygiene • Depression/withdrawal • Resistance and overreaction to changes in policy and procedures • Repeated violations of organizational policies • Increased severe mood swings • Noticeably unstable, emotional responses • Explosive outbursts of anger or rage without provocation

In addition, the individual exhibits signs of suicidal behavior (e.g., makes comments about “putting things in order”) or paranoia (e.g. “everybody’s against me”). Other factors that DHS includes are: • • • • • •

Increasingly talks of problems at home Escalation of domestic problems into the workplace Talk of severe financial problems Talk of previous incidents of violence Empathy with individuals committing violence Increase in unsolicited comments about firearms, other dangerous weapons and violent crimes.∗

∗ Disclaimer:

This list of behaviors is not comprehensive, nor is it intended as a mechanism for diagnosing violent tendencies.

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ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE In our practice, Global Security Group has created a comprehensive assessment process in how to identify a potential threat of violence by recognizing the behaviors, personality traits, types of communication, motivations, triggering events, and other concerning behavior common to active shooters and other individuals capable of violent acts. This assessment is not dispositive of the issue; it simply identifies warning signs that may require intervention. In our view, prevention, not simply a robust response, is the preferred method of dealing with potential workplace violence issues. The question is how to respond. What should a company do if an individual is deemed a potential risk by management or human resources personnel? That largely depends on the exact nature of the conduct, but the response typically follows a two-pronged approach: law enforcement involvement and in-house security measures. This comprehensive approach may not always be possible. As mentioned, the criminal justice system is poorly suited to addressing incidents where an employee is displaying concerning or even threatening behavior. Absent conduct that violates criminal law, the police will not be able to take any action. In fact, in many jurisdictions, even documented and provable threats of violence will only amount to a minor criminal violation with associated penalties that offer little in the way of a serious deterrent. In that event, the company must focus more heavily on what can be done privately. Access to the office or facility must be controlled. In some cases where the threat is deemed severe, armed security may have to be engaged. If it becomes necessary to hire armed guards, you must ensure that the guards are well trained and capable of engaging an armed and determined attacker. In our practice, we frequently encounter situations where the persons charged with protecting clients are ill suited to the task. They are not well trained and lack even a basic level of fitness. As a consumer of security services, you have a right to expect a qualified individual, and you have a duty to ensure that whoever is assigned to your site is capable. The first and perhaps most important step to survive a shooting incident at work is to prepare yourself mentally to respond before the incident occurs. This is of extreme importance because when you are under extreme stress, you will suffer a degradation of cognitive ability. In simple terms, you will lose the ability to think clearly. You will also likely experience one or more of the most common psychological responses to fear or extreme emotional

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stress, such as tachypsychia, auditory exclusion, tunnel vision, and/or cognitive dissonance, that we explained in Chapter 1. These effects can be disorienting and extremely dangerous because they prevent you from responding in an appropriate manner. You need to mentally prepare yourself to respond before an incident happens. Mental preplanning, or rehearsal in your mind, has been proved to be an effective antidote to these effects. A simple example of what we are talking about is something we all can do when we take our family to the movies. Most people, wherever they are, will try to exit a location from the same point they entered, even during an emergency. For example, if there is a smoke or fire condition in a theater and the audience must evacuate, most theatergoers will try to leave by the main entrance through which they entered. When you go to the movies, pay attention to the exits located on either side of the screen. Visualize the route you would need to take to either of those exits and imagine moving quickly along that route. With respect to the active shooter scenario, the same advance mental preparation is required. If you understand the possible responses to an active shooter incident and plan out a strategy in advance, you will act rather than freeze. To do this you must understand the recommended survival strategies and how and when to employ them. You may have heard these strategies commonly referred to as Run-Hide-Fight, but our preference is to use the terms “Avoid-Barricade-Confront” (A-B-C), because avoid, barricade, and confront are better descriptors of the responses we are trying to convey. You may avoid the shooter by running or moving surreptitiously; the point is to get away from the threat. Doing so requires an understanding that you are moving from a location where you are at risk to a place of safety. The term “avoid” describes that concept more accurately than does the term “run.” The contrast is far clearer with the term “barricade” over “hide.” Hiding is not part of the survival mind-set; barricading against an adversary is. Hiding suggests simply finding a place where it is unlikely the shooter will find you; barricading is superior because while you may also be hidden, you are creating a physical impediment that will prevent or at least delay the shooter from getting to you. The original “fight” (or even “attack”) might be a better descriptor of the action needed, but the acronym A-B-F (Avoid-Barricade-Fight) doesn’t have the same ring as A-B-C. How do you use these strategies in the event of an active shooter incident? You do not try each in order; you simply select the appropriate response given your circumstances and the location of the shooter. If you have a clear way out, then you “avoid.” Remember, you must be sure you are moving to a place of

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safety; if you do not know where the shooter is, you cannot be certain you are not exposing yourself to greater risk by moving. In this case, look for a room in which you can take refuge and implement the “barricade” strategy. This does not mean simply finding a place to hide; it means finding a place you can create a barrier that denies entry to anyone one trying to enter and do you harm. Ideally, this location will allow you to barricade the door quickly and can provide some protection in the event rounds are fired in your direction. If the shooter is in close proximity and you can neither avoid nor barricade, then you must “confront” the shooter immediately and violently. We discuss each strategy individually in the next sections.

Avoid Clearly, avoiding a dangerous situation is the preferred option. Get away from the shooter if you have access to a safe exit. Remember, bullets are moving with extreme velocity and will penetrate doors and interior walls. Until you are behind an object with substantial mass, you are not safe from rounds fired in your direction; an interior wall may provide concealment but will not protect you. Always know where the nearest exits are and where they take you. Know the termination points of stairwells; a stairwell may terminate in the basement, but the exit out may be on the ground floor. Blindly following the stairs until they end is not acceptable. Visualize the entire route and then move; the visualization strategy helps your effort to escape even when the stress caused by extreme fear causes you to lose the ability to think clearly. Even ordinary actions will become difficult to perform when you are in fear for your life; turning a doorknob, generally a simple task, may become problematic. Visualization helps overcome these issues. Make sure you are not headed toward the shooter. That may not be difficult if you can actually see the shooter; once you know where he or she is, you can determine whether escape is possible. If you attempt to evacuate, remember that bullets pass quite easily through most interior walls and doors, so you will still be in danger until you are completely clear of the scene, off the floor, or have an intervening structure between you and the shooter that will stop bullets. If you cannot see the shooter, this task becomes more problematic. Some people believe that you can determine the location of the shooter by hearing the gunshots; that is not true. Sound is an unreliable indicator of location and direction. Most of us can relate to stopping at an intersection,

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hearing an approaching siren, and not being sure from which direction the siren is approaching. The location of the source of gunshots may be equally difficult to determine. If you guess wrong, you run the risk of encountering the shooter while trying to evacuate. Given a choice between evacuating blindly and barricading yourself in a suitable location, often it is better to choose the safer alternative and barricade until such time as the shooter’s location is known with reasonable certainty and you can exit safely. As you exit, you must be mindful of the fact that arriving law enforcement officers do not know who the shooter is and therefore will not (and should not) assume persons fleeing the scene are innocent victims. Shooters often try to escape by blending in with others running for safety. Abdulkadir Masharipov, the shooter in the January 1, 2017, attack at the Reina nightclub in Istanbul, reportedly escaped by covering himself with victims’ blood in order to appear a victim himself. Keep your hands up, palms open and fingers spread. Obey all commands given to you by responding officers, and do not interfere with them.

Barricade If you cannot get out or if you are not sure where the shooter is, look for a room or other location that you can quickly and effectively barricade against entry. Ideally, the room should be out of the shooter’s view and should provide some protection against shots fired in your direction. The room does not have to be impregnable; it only needs to be able to delay a shooter from entering easily. According to the 2013 FBI study cited earlier, 69.8 percent of all active shooter incidents where length of time could be determined were over in five minutes or less.13 A shooter cannot afford to delay and will not have the time to try to breach a barricaded room. Many questions can be asked with respect to securing a room against entry: How can a room be quickly barricaded? Can any room serve as a place of refuge? Does it matter if the door has no lock or opens out rather than in? What is the most effective way to stop someone from getting into a room? The best way to answer these questions is through use of the well-known adage “One picture is worth a thousand words.” In Exhibit 5.1, the simple expedient of jamming a chair against the door makes a light barricade effective when a 250-pound man threw his weight and strength against it. One frequently asked question involves barricading a room with the door that open outward. If the amount of furniture and equipment is sufficient, the shooter will be deterred from trying to enter. Outward-opening doors may also be tied off, as shown in Exhibit 5.2.

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There are many other ways to prevent a door from opening, but Exhibits 5.3 and 5.4 should provide an ample overview of the premise. Once you have barricaded yourself, remain quiet. Silence your cell phone and turn off the vibration feature, which also may be audible. Call 911 and alert the authorities to what is happening. If the shooter is in close proximity and you fear your call will be heard, then simply call 911 and leave the line open. An open 911 call will generate a response. Remember to lower the volume on your phone Exhibit 5.2 Tying off a Door to prevent the 911 operator’s voice from being heard. Do not mute your phone; you want the operator to hear what is happening. An increasing number of jurisdictions now offer “Text 911” options as well. Consider what you should do to protect yourself in the event the shooter fires through the barricade. There are two basic tactical options: Get behind substantial cover and/or get into the preferred barricade position. Both these concepts must be explained. Exhibit 5.1 Using Furniture to Barricade an Inward-Opening Door

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“Substantial cover” refers to an object or structure containing sufficient mass and density to stop a bullet. As mentioned, most interior construction will not stop even a modestly powerful handgun round. Bullets easily penetrate Sheetrock walls and wooden doors. What will stop a bullet in a typical office environment? Heavy objects, such as large copy machines, servers, or filing cabinets filled with files, offer protection if rounds are fired in your direction. Exhibit 5.4 Tying a Door to a Large/Heavy Object If objects of this nature are nearby, use them as cover. If not, you must put yourself in the preferred barricade position, which accounts for the path of a bullet fired through a wall or door. If you imagine the possible paths that a bullet might take if rounds are fired into the room through a door or wall, you can position yourself in a way to minimize your chance of being hit. Getting behind cover is preferable. If there is a substantial object in the room, such as a full filing cabinet, get behind it and make sure you are positioned in a way that a bullet would have to go through the files if a round struck the cabinet. Exhibit 5.3

Tying a Door Closing Mechanism

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Confront What if the shooter is blocking the only way out and you cannot “avoid” or if there is no time to barricade? The only option available to you is to “confront” the shooter and fight for your life. How you engage the shooter will depend on the situation. For example, if you are in a room that cannot be locked and there is no time to barricade or if the room you are in offers nothing with which to create an effective barricade, then you will position yourself to physically attack the shooter from a position of advantage. If you are in your office, you would close your door and move to the opening side of the door. The shooter will likely enter the room with weapon extended. Crouch down and prepare to spring at the shooter once he or she enters the room; your goal is to grab the firearm and force it to the ground. If you are with another person, that person should tackle the shooter and bring him or her to the ground while you control the weapon. If you were surprised by the shooter, you would not have this option. You could respond by throwing things and then attacking the shooter with improvised weapons or your bare hands. The best time to attack the shooter is when his or her weapon runs empty or during a reload or if the weapon misfires. Control the weapon first; avoiding the muzzle, grab the weapon and force it downward pointing at the ground. Some advocate forcing the weapon upward, saying that it is harder for an attacker to bring the weapon back down than it is to lift it up. Rather than engage in a long discussion about the relative strengths and weaknesses of these methods, there is one overriding issue: Your head is up, and if you miscalculate, you or someone else may be shot in the head. Force the weapon down and hold it until someone helps you take the shooter off his or her feet. Remember, if you are grabbing a rifle or shotgun by the barrel, it may be very hot. Disregard that and hold on. Knock the shooter off his or her feet with a tackle, just like you are playing football. Accelerate at your target, lower your shoulder, and wrap your arms just below the shooter’s butt. Drive into the shooter as you encircle him or her with your arms. The impact and the shooter’s body hitting the ground should do some damage. Do not let the shooter up; keep him or her down by any means necessary. Remember, the shooter may have a second or even multiple firearms and other weapons. Be mindful and control the shooter’s hands. Active shooter incidents occur in commercial settings, schools, government installations, open spaces, residential areas, houses of worship, healthcare

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facilities, and others. Each location has different specific characteristics; the dynamics of a school shooting are different from those in a theater or house of worship. With respect to active shooter incidents in the workplace, certain factors will enable us to prevent the incident entirely. Workplace shooting incidents are almost always perpetrated by a former or current employee, the former spouse or lover of an employee, or another person known to have some grievance against the company. The person is known to you before the attack and has, in almost every instance, acted in a way that puts you on alert as to the fact that he or she may commit an act of violence. Do not ignore these warnings. The A-B-C survival strategy has been proven effective, if you take preventive action, it may never be needed.

NOTES 1. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015.” https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/activeshooter incidentsus_2014-2015.pdf/view. 2. J. Pete Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, “A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000–2013,” Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington DC, 2014. https://www.fbi.gov/filerepository/active-shooter-study-2000-2013-1.pdf/view. 3. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2018,” April 2019. https://www.fbi.gov/filerepository/active-shooter-incidents-in-the-us-2018-041019.pdf/view. 4. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2016 and 2017,” April 2018. https://www.fbi .gov/file-repository/active-shooter-incidents-us-2016-2017.pdf/view 5. Police Department of the City of New York, “Active Shooter Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation,” 2016 edition. https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ nypd/downloads/pdf/counterterrorism/active-shooter-analysis2016.pdf. 6. Department of Homeland Security, United States Secret Service, “Mass Attacks in Public Spaces—2017.” https://www.secretservice.gov/forms/USSS_NTACMass_Attacks_in_Public_Spaces-2017.pdf. 7. Tamar Lapin, “Detective Didn’t Believe Alleged Newsroom Shooter Was a Threat before Attack,” July 1, 2018. https://nypost.com/2018/07/01/ detective-didnt-believe-alleged-newsroom-shooter-was-a-threat-before-attack/.

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8. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, “Mass Attacks in Public Spaces—2017.” 9. Note: Percentages exceed 100 as one case had two motives. 10. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, “Mass Attacks in Public Spaces—2017,” p. 4. 11. “Narcissistic Personality Disorder,” Psychology Today, 2019. https://www .psychologytoday.com/us/conditions/narcissistic-personality-disorder. 12. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter: How to Respond,” Washington, DC. https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet .pdf. 13. Blair and Schweit, “A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000–2013.”

CHAPTER 6

Personal and Business Travel Security GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS Those who live in New York City are always amazed by how many millions of people visit New York as tourists each year. They come from all over the world. When you attend a Broadway show, more often than not you will hear the folks sitting next to you speaking a foreign language. (Come to think of it, in New York that really doesn’t prove our point, as nearly 60 percent of New Yorkers were born somewhere else.) When you strike up a conversation with them, you find they are here visiting from Germany, France, England, Holland, Japan, and virtually every other country in the world. Sitting in a darkened theater, you really can’t identify tourists. When you walk down the street, however, you pick out the visitors immediately. They are the people with the cameras around their necks looking up at all the tall buildings. Or their dress is a bit out of place. Sometimes you just know that a person is not a native New Yorker without even being able to say what it was that tipped you off. Average New Yorkers find it very easy to spot tourists immediately. Unfortunately, the predatory criminals working the streets of New York can do it even better. When they see tourists, they also see dollar signs hanging on easy targets. They may follow tourists into a restaurant and grab their bag or wallet or purchases. Tourists may be marked for robbery or even sexual assault, or it may be something as simple as the CD 91

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scam, where a street thug posing as musical artist stops a tourist and asks for their name. The unsuspecting tourist replies, at which time the “artist” writes the name on the CD and then demands payment for it. If the tourist balks, the thug acts aggressively and suggests that now the CD cannot be sold to anyone else, and the tourist owes five or ten dollars. No overt threat may be made, but the implication is enough to get most tourists to hand over the cash. Criminal activity targeting tourists happens everywhere. While the CD scam may be unique to New York City, there is no shortage of similar scams in other parts of the world. When we travel abroad, we stand out and can be identified as tourists, especially by criminals. Why are tourists the frequent target of robbery and assault? The reason is obvious. Affluent Americans traveling abroad probably have a lot of cash and a minimal ability to fend off an attack. By the way, this targeting of tourists is not reserved only for American travelers visiting abroad. We have more than enough criminal predators in our own country. Years ago in South Florida there was a horrific rash of robbery homicides in which several European tourists were murdered. Human predators deliberately targeted these unfortunate folks. They were picked because they were likely to have a great deal of cash. They were also easy to spot because at that time, rental cars in Florida bore specific and readily identifiable plate numbers identifying them as rentals. This was significant because Florida is a relatively liberal state as far as concealed weapons laws are concerned. A mugger targeting a native Floridian could never be sure if the intended victim was armed. It was, however, a sure bet that out-of-state or foreign tourists would not be. Nor would tourists be likely to know what to do in the case of an assault. The state of Florida ended up dealing quite harshly with persons convicted in such attacks and mandated that rental cars no longer could be identified by specific tag numbers. Certain countries have industries devoted to the victimization of foreigners. Sometimes it is through nonviolent means, as in the case of credit card theft or the simple theft of property without violent attack, as is common in Nigeria. When federal agents travel abroad, they pay for their accommodations and meals with their government credit cards. It was standard operating procedure for agents who had traveled to Nigeria to cancel their cards immediately upon returning to the United States. In virtually every case, unauthorized charges had already been made on the accounts even before they could be canceled. In Russia, groups of professional thieves and armed robbers stake out the airport in Moscow waiting for affluent foreign visitors. Once they spot people they believe to be worthwhile targets, they follow them to their hotel. Then they can follow the visitors at their leisure and wait for the opportune time to strike.

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Remember, as a nonresident, you will be unfamiliar with the places you visit. Locals know what areas to avoid. They know the dark alleys to steer clear of. Tourists or new foreign residents do not.

Keep a Low Profile Victims of nonviolent theft can consider themselves lucky. Unfortunately, in many instances crime involves more direct forms of confrontation. The task that we as foreign visitors have is to make ourselves less conspicuous and thereby less attractive as potential targets. This book is designed to teach you how to become a difficult and therefore less attractive target. This chapter in particular contains several general rules that you must learn to follow. You will learn how to keep a low profile and not stand out quite so obviously in a crowd. If you stand out while out and about, you are also standing out to the criminal element. It is important to realize the importance of certain simple steps to avoid being the one selected for victimization. Dress and behave conservatively. This is just simple common sense. If you are traveling to a country where $100 represents a month’s salary, don’t wear designer clothes while sporting a Vacheron Constantin watch. By the way, this is also true in Western nations. During the editing of this book, a travel agent we work with told us about an incident that happened to a client vacationing in Spain. While exiting a cab at Nikki Beach Marbella, someone slid a $280,000 Richard Mille watch off this gentleman’s wrist. The thief, believed to be associated with Russian, Ukrainian, or Bulgarian organized crime, was a pro. The watch was taken and the perpetrator disappeared before the victim knew it was gone. As a foreign national, you will already stand out to some extent anyway. Don’t make it worse by flaunting affluence or by acting in a loud, boisterous manner. Anything you do to make people take notice of you also applies to the local criminal element as well.

Arranging Social Encounters If you are meeting with people who are unknown to you, meet only in familiar and very public places. One of the first lessons that David learned after becoming a Special Agent is to always arrange undercover meetings in public places. Agents shun the common movie scenario of meeting bad guys in dark alleys. Agents arrange meetings in crowded restaurants, for example, even while armed

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and supported by backup teams. One veteran agent used to say “Make the bad guy kill you in public.” The implication is that it is more unlikely that you will he assaulted in public, regardless of whom you are meeting. If armed agents choose public places to meet unfamiliar people, it is even more critical that tourists or resident aliens living abroad do the same. If you don’t know someone well, stay away from isolated areas. If you live and work overseas, you may be even more vulnerable than tourists. This is merely a function of exposure to the local population. When you live abroad, you will come into contact with many more locals than the average tourist ever will. You travel to work; you shop in the local markets and explore your new surroundings much more than tourists do. Remember that you are still a foreigner even if you have lived overseas for several years.

Avoid Routine Patterns of Behavior Although this recommendation is more important in high-risk areas, as a basic security practice, it should become part of your life abroad no matter which country you reside in. One of the most common points of attack, in particular for kidnapping or attempted assassination, comes while expatriate workers are on their way between home and work. Most people settle into predictable routines. They leave the house for work at the same time every morning. They leave the office and return to their car at the same time each night. Anyone intent on assaulting you has a relatively easy time in setting up an ambush because of your unvarying routine. You will need to train yourself to change your route to work. Settling into a predictable routine makes it too easy for someone to make you a target. If you use company vehicles for transportation, it is a good idea to routinely and randomly exchange vehicles with coworkers. Doing this will prevent someone who is targeting you from being certain that you will be driving a particular car at a particular time. You have to conduct yourself in a way that will make the bad guys move on to someone else.

Moderate Your Behavior Several other points need to be addressed regarding the things that you, as a visitor to a foreign country, need to be cognizant of. We already discussed how certain types of behavior can draw the wrong type of attention to you. This suggestion extends to respect for local customs and practices. Remember, you are living in a country where social mores and acceptable conduct may be quite different from what you are used to. Offense may be given where none

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is intended. Certain activities considered acceptable in the United States may actually be criminal in the country of your residence. A gesture, a manner of dress, or a disrespectful comment may give extreme offense where none is meant. Simple social contacts with politically active individuals may get you marked by a country’s intelligence services. You need to be aware of what type of personal conduct is both acceptable and safe in the culture of your new country of residence. What types of activities should you avoid? There is a long list that will vary from country to country so consult the Department of State website to understand how to act in the country you are visiting. Remember, the Bill of Rights is not transferable to other countries. You are personally responsible for learning what activities normal to you as an American are off limits in other countries.

KNOW WHERE YOU ARE GOING: PRE-TRAVEL RESEARCH A few hours on a plane can take you from the comfort and luxury of the first world to places where basic sanitation is not a universally accepted standard. When going abroad, you need to realize that where you are going will dramatically change the level of attention you need to pay to security. Danger is common to all corners of the map. However, the nature and extent of those dangers change from country to country and even many times from locality to locality and neighborhood to neighborhood. You should take certain basic steps for security purposes no matter where you go. The extent to which you upgrade those steps depends on your exact destination. Most travelers know which countries have drinkable tap water and in which countries they must use bottled water and avoid salads, unpeeled fruit, and ice in drinks. You must conduct the same basic research to familiarize yourself with country-specific security concerns. There are many databases that you can consult prior to travel. The U.S. Department of State website at www.state.gov (http://travel.state.gov) is a good place to start. Consult its Consular Affairs home page. The Department of State site also offers many excellent suggestions and has published a guide through its Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). In addition to providing basic information about every country in the world, the Department of State also posts advisories and alerts for each country using a guide with four advisory levels: • Level 1—Exercise Normal Precautions: This is the lowest advisory level for safety and security risks. There is some risk in any international travel. Conditions in other countries may differ from those in the United States and may change at any time.

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Executive’s Guide to Personal Security • Level 2—Exercise Increased Caution: Be aware of heightened risks to safety and security. The Department of State provides additional advice for travelers in these areas in the Travel Advisory. Conditions in any country may change at any time. • Level 3—Reconsider Travel: Avoid travel due to serious risks to safety and security. The Department of State provides additional advice for travelers in these areas in the Travel Advisory. Conditions in any country may change at any time. • Level 4–Do Not Travel: This is the highest advisory level due to greater likelihood of life-threatening risks. During an emergency, the U.S. government may have very limited ability to provide assistance. The Department of State advises that U.S. citizens not travel to the country or to leave as soon as it is safe to do so. The Department of State provides additional advice for travelers in these areas in the Travel Advisory. Conditions in any country may change at any time.1

Furthermore, the Department of State provides additional and specific information about the source of concern in each country for all levels 2 to 4 based on these risk indicators: • C–Crime: Widespread violent or organized crime is present in areas of the country. Local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond to serious crimes. • T–Terrorism: Terrorist attacks have occurred and/or specific threats against civilians, groups, or other targets may exist. • U–Civil Unrest: Political, economic, religious, and/or ethnic instability exists and may cause violence, major disruptions, and/or safety risks. • H–Health: Health risks, including current disease outbreaks or a crisis that disrupts a country’s medical infrastructure, are present. The issuance of a Centers for Disease Control Travel Notice may also be a factor. • N—Natural Disaster: A natural disaster, or its aftermath, poses danger. • E—Time-limited Event: Short-term event, such as elections, sporting events, or other incidents that may pose safety risks. • O—Other: There are potential risks not covered by previous risk indicators. Read the country’s Travel Advisory for details.2

If a country that you are going to is listed at level 2, 3 or 4, you should take the advisory seriously. In the past, it took a bit of evidence and, unfortunately, the occasional tragedy before an alert was posted. The reason for this is political

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reality. It is important to remember that the Department of State is a government (hence political) agency run by diplomats. The art of diplomacy is complicated. People at the Department of State recognize that posting a travel advisory has many consequences. Many countries depend a great deal on tourist dollars. Alerts may have immediate and potentially dire consequences for many economies. They also put a chill on relationships between the United States and the country that is the subject of the alert. In the pre–September 11 world, political issues often delayed the posting of alerts. If circumstances required the maintenance of positive relationships with a particular country that ordinarily would have been the subject of an advisory, pressures within the Department of State often delayed the issuance of an alert or watered an alert down. This is not mere cynicism. Sometimes world political issues require delicate handling. However, since September 11, alerts have been posted more rapidly and have been more explicit. For example, consider the next excerpt from a World Caution posted on the Department of State’s Travel Advisory website on January 15, 2019. This latest update to the Department of State’s Worldwide Caution provides U.S. citizens with general information regarding terrorist activities, political violence and criminal activity that transpire abroad, as well as specific recommendations on how to prepare for possible contingencies, receive information on breaking security events and ensure that travelers can be contacted in an emergency. This version replaces the Worldwide Caution dated July 2, 2018. As terrorist attacks, political violence (including demonstrations), criminal activities and other security incidents often take place without any warning, U.S. citizens are strongly encouraged to maintain a high level of vigilance and practice good situational awareness when traveling abroad. When planning a trip and prior to departing the United States, U.S. citizens should consult country specific Travel Advisories and information pages on travel.state.gov. Travelers are also urged to enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) to receive security messages and to make it easier to locate you in an emergency. The Department uses these security messages to convey information about terrorist threats, security incidents, planned demonstrations, natural disasters, etc. In an emergency, please contact the nearest U.S. Embassy or consulate or call the following numbers: 1 (888) 407-4747 (toll-free in the United States and Canada) or 1 (202) 501-4444 from other countries.

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Executive’s Guide to Personal Security U.S. government facilities worldwide actively monitor potential security threats and may temporarily close or periodically suspend public services to assess their security posture. In those instances, U.S. embassies and consulates will make every effort to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens. U.S. citizens abroad are urged to monitor the local news and maintain contact with the nearest U.S. Embassy or consulate. Terrorist groups including ISIS, al-Qa’ida, their associates, and those inspired by such organizations, are intent on attacking U.S. citizens wherever they are. Extremists may use conventional or non-conventional weapons to target U.S. government and private interests. Terrorists are increasingly using less sophisticated methods, including edged weapons, pistols and vehicles, as weapons to effectively target crowds. Extremists increasingly aim to identify and attack “soft” targets, such as: • high-profile public events (sporting contests, political rallies, demonstrations, holiday events, celebratory gatherings, etc.) • hotels, clubs and restaurants • places of worship • schools • parks • shopping malls and markets • tourism infrastructure and tourist sites • public transportation systems • airports In multiple regions, terrorists, guerrilla groups and criminals seek to kidnap U.S. citizens to finance their operations or for political purposes. The Department also remains concerned that terrorists could again seek to down aircraft using concealed explosives or hijack commercial flights. Private U.S. citizens should not travel to any country to participate in armed conflict. U.S. citizens are reminded that fighting on behalf of, or providing other forms of support to, designated terrorist organizations can constitute the provision of material support for terrorism, which is a serious crime that can result in penalties, including prison time and large fines.3

As you can see from the clear and unambiguous wording of this document, the Department of State is greatly concerned about the safety of American citizens and possessions abroad and specifically recommends that citizens take responsibility for their own personal safety. Its website also offers country-specific warnings and contact numbers that should definitely be consulted before traveling. While the Department of State does a great deal to inform Americans of the risks attendant to travel to certain regions, even now in the aftermath of the worst terrorist attack in our history, political, business,

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and diplomatic considerations create bizarre reactions to the ways we protect ourselves. For example, on January 27, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order temporarily blocking entry into the United States for immigrants and nonimmigrants from seven Muslim countries—Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Yemen—and later Venezuela and North Korea.4 This block will continue until the government can tighten security procedures to screen out terrorists under President Trump’s proposed “extreme vetting” program. The president explained that the ban affected countries with high rates of terrorism because of the possibility that terrorists could enter the United States from those countries. Surprisingly, however, Afghanistan and high-risk Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were left off the list. That is somewhat problematic as fifteen of the nineteen terrorists involved in the September 11attacks were Saudi citizens. The late Osama Bin Laden, arguably the world’s most notorious terrorist, was also a Saudi citizen. At least some special additional scrutiny should be given to Saudi nationals, but there are both financial and political reasons why this is not done. American oil interests do billions of dollars’ worth of business with the Saudis, and the Saudi government is an important ally in the fight to stabilize the Middle East, contain Iraq, and keep peace between Israel and its neighbors. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are also arguably in a different category from the nations listed above in that they have an infrastructure to allow criminal and other background checks to be conducted while nations in turmoil do not. Afghanistan, however, is far less reliable in that regard, and yet the country is not part of the same ban. Several private companies provide local intelligence updates to Americans abroad on the security conditions in virtually every foreign country. These companies maintain intelligence databases that deal with all manner of dangers and include information about local crime, terrorist activity, medical dangers, and the medical infrastructure. As a tourist or future expatriate, you may want to check the intelligence provided by one of these companies. Each country is unique; you must find out a few basic points about the local criminal element, level of terror cell activity, medical information, and political stability. Remember, there is no such thing as having too much information.

Avoid Politically Unstable and High-Risk Countries One of the most important factors that must always be considered when traveling abroad is whether a specific travel alert has been posted for the country in question.

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Political stability is something that Americans take for granted. In many parts of the world, however, this is not the case. In America, we transfer power via the electoral process. In many countries, governments change when the current leader dies or is overthrown. A government friendly to U.S. interests today may, literally overnight, become hostile to America and its citizens. The deposed Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, was a strongly pro-Western leader. His overthrow by the radical Islamic regime headed by the late Ayatollah Khomeini was as strongly anti-American, and the new regime’s first action was to storm the U.S. embassy in Tehran and take American citizens hostage. Radical Iranian “students” held American citizens for 444 days. On July 2016 in Turkey, gunfire and explosions were reported on the streets of Istanbul and the capital, Ankara, only hours after an uprising began. Clashes among the government, the military faction opposition, and the public played out in one of the world’s most ancient and civilized cities. Violence associated with politics can happen anywhere and does on a daily basis. Even here in the United States, demonstrations have become increasingly more violent. While it is impossible to accurately predict an unexpected coup d’état, proper intelligence will provide you with an overall view of the government. What is the nature of the current regime? How is power transferred? Is there a tradition of democracy or dictatorship? Analysis should provide a historical overview of the nature of government as well as an in-depth history of how power was transferred over the last fifty years. The instability of the government in your country of residence is a critical element in formulating security plans for yourself, your family, and your company. Unstable political situations, especially in countries with a history of the violent overthrow of past regimes, require that you have an emergency evacuation plan in place during your stay. At the time of this writing, there is currently an emergency situation in Venezuela. The U.S. Department of State put Venezuela at a category 4 level, “Do Not Travel”: Do not travel to Venezuela due to crime, civil unrest, poor health infrastructure, and arbitrary arrest and detention of U.S. citizens. . . On January 24, 2019, the Department ordered the departure of non-emergency U.S. government employees and family members due to ongoing political instability. The U.S. government has limited ability to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens in Venezuela. Read the entire Travel Advisory. Violent crime, such as homicide, armed robbery, kidnapping, and carjacking, is common. Political rallies and demonstrations occur, often with little notice. Demonstrations typically elicit a strong police and security force response that includes the use of tear gas, pepper spray,

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water cannons, and rubber bullets against participants and occasionally devolve into looting and vandalism. There are shortages of food, electricity, water, medicine, and medical supplies throughout much of Venezuela. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Level 3 ‘Avoid Nonessential Travel’ notice on May 15, 2018 due to inadequate healthcare and the breakdown of the medical infrastructure in Venezuela. Consular access to detained U.S. citizens who also have Venezuelan nationality is severely restricted by the Venezuelan government and the U.S. Embassy may not receive access in these cases. Security forces have arbitrarily detained U.S. citizens for long periods. Venezuelan authorities may not notify the U.S. Embassy of the detention of a U.S. citizen, and consular access to detainees may be denied or severely delayed.5

The conditions in Venezuela are so well publicized that it is unlikely that anyone considering travel there would not know how dangerous the situation has become with respect to severe political unrest. A concise assessment posted on the Department of State website at the time of the writing of this book reads as follows: Demonstrations: Political marches and demonstrations are frequent in all areas of Venezuela, including major cities and tourist destinations. Avoid demonstrations as even peaceful demonstrations may turn violent or result in arrests. Follow local news media reports or contact the U.S. Embassy for up-to-date information.6

Continuing with the example of Venezuela, in addition to the politically unstable situation, it is not a safe country to travel to for many other reasons, as shown in this travel alert: [V]iolent crime is pervasive throughout Venezuela. Be alert to your surroundings at all times and take personal security precautions to avoid becoming a victim of crime. • Maintain a low profile. • Carry as little U.S. currency as possible. • Do not display signs of wealth, such as wearing expensive watches or jewelry. • Avoid having cell phones or other electronic devices visible. • Remain vigilant even in upscale residential areas. • Do not take public transportation. • Be extra vigilant when visiting banks or ATMs. • Travel in groups. • Provide your itinerary to a family member or friend.

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Executive’s Guide to Personal Security Avoid traveling at nighttime. Avoid police activity. Corruption within police forces is a concern. Individuals wearing uniforms and purporting to be police officers or National Guard members have committed robberies and other crimes. Criminal gangs operate openly and with little repercussion, often setting up fake police checkpoints. Armed robberies take place throughout the country, including in tourist areas. Some robberies involve individuals robbed at gunpoint and taken to make purchases or to withdraw as much money as possible from ATMs. Heavily armed criminals have used grenades and assault rifles to commit crimes at banks, shopping malls, public transportation stations, and universities. Only a very small percentage of crimes result in trials and convictions. Popular tourist attractions, such as the Avila National Park in Caracas, are associated with violent crime. Travel in groups of five or more and provide family or friends with your itineraries prior to departure. Homicides: According to the non-governmental organization Venezuelan Violence Observatory (VVO), there were 26,616 homicides in Venezuela in 2017, amounting to a rate of 89 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, among the highest in the world. Kidnapping: Kidnappings are a serious problem. • Virtual kidnappings: Criminals collect information on minors and then use the data to call parents for ransom without the children being taken, • Inside kidnappings: Domestic employees are paid large sums of money for keys and information in order to kidnap children for ransom. Drugs: There is an active narcotics trade in Venezuela. Do not accept packages from anyone, and keep your luggage with you at all times. U.S. citizens have been actively recruited to act as narcotics couriers or “drug mules.” U.S. citizens arrested at the airport with narcotics in their possession can expect to serve extended jail terms in Venezuela under extremely difficult prison conditions. Taxis: Do not use “libre” taxis or any taxis hailed on the street. Taxi drivers in Caracas are known to overcharge, rob, injure and even kidnap passengers. Use only radio-dispatched taxis or taxis from reputable hotels. Call a 24-hour radio-dispatched taxi service from a public phone or ask hotel, restaurant, or airline staff to contact a licensed taxi company. Public Transportation: Do not use public transportation such as city buses and the metro (subway) in Caracas. When traveling by bus, travel only during daylight hours and only by first-class conveyance. Avoid Driving. If you do drive, be aware of attacks in tunnels and avoid obstacles in the road. Maiquetía International Airport: Only travel to and from Maiquetía International Airport near Caracas in daylight hours. Kidnappings,

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robberies at gunpoint, thefts and muggings are common. Be wary of all strangers, even those in official uniform or carrying official identification. Do not pack valuable items or documents in checked luggage. Individuals wearing what appear to be official uniforms and displaying airport or police credentials have been involved in crimes inside the airport, including extortion, robberies or forcing travelers to sign documents in Spanish they do not understand. Make advance plans for transportation from the airport to your hotel or destination using a trusted party or dispatch taxi service. Money: Do not change money at the international airport. You are encouraged to use major credit cards, but be aware of the widespread theft of credit card data. Do not use travelers’ checks. It is possible to exchange U.S. currency at approved exchange offices near major hotel chains in Caracas. Hotels cannot provide currency exchange. (The use of U.S. currency in exchange for goods or services is illegal in Venezuela.) Obtaining local currency, the bolivar fuerte, is difficult as cash is scarce. Even if you have a Venezuelan bank account, daily cash withdraws are limited to small amounts. ATMs: Most ATMs do not accept U.S.-issued debit or credit cards and malfunctions are common. Use only those located in well-lit, public places. ATM data is often hacked and used to make unauthorized withdrawals from users’ accounts. Criminals target ATMs to rob people making withdrawals. Many ATMs do not have cash. When cash is available, the lines are often very long with customers regularly waiting 15–60 minutes for their turn.7

As you can see, this alert covers a wide range of topics and is emphatic in its message. This alert should immediately give pause to anyone considering going to Venezuela for any reason. If you learn nothing from this book other than this: Heed travel warnings! If you must go to a country deemed unsafe for work or some other compelling reason, follow the recommended precautions.

Obtaining Emergency Medical Care What is the state of the medical infrastructure of the country? Where are the country’s doctors trained? How well staffed and supplied are the hospitals? The Department of State has all of this information and has designated regional areas as evacuation points in the event of medical emergency. For example, if you are traveling in Southeast Asia, the medical evacuation point is located in Bangkok, Thailand. Among the countries in that region, Thailand has an exceptionally good medical system with well-trained doctors. If you are visiting

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ancient Khmer ruins in Cambodia and you need surgery of any level of complexity, your chances of survival may be greater if you wait for transportation to Bangkok rather than trust local hospitals. However, even in Thailand, if you are in a remote village area and are sick or injured, you may be the better part of a day away from an emergency room. Learn about the locations of hospitals and the level of medical care. By the way, evaluating the capabilities of specific hospitals is done routinely in law enforcement, even in the United States. Agents and police officers also know which hospitals are trauma centers and which are not. That information is listed in the operational plan prepared before undertaking an anticipated enforcement action. Street cops and firefighters always know where to take their own in an emergency. There are definitely some hospitals that you want to avoid at home. This is doubly true overseas. Research the availability of medications, both over the counter and prescribed. Many countries have no pharmacies except in the major cities. Prior knowledge of the availability of a local drugstore will allow you to prepare an emergency kit with appropriate medications taken from home. In this same regard, research the prevalence of local diseases. In many countries, malaria, hepatitis, cholera, and rabies are at epidemic levels. Know the country and you will know how to protect yourself with appropriate vaccinations before you land in it. Both the Department of State and the Centers for Disease Control can provide you with this information.

Local Criminal Activity An often-overlooked fact is that most Americans overseas have a greater risk of being victims of criminal rather than terrorist acts. Many countries have criminal industries devoted entirely to victimizing Western tourists. In poor countries, people traveling from abroad are almost guaranteed to have more cash and valuables that the local populace. The same is true for expatriate Americans. You are simply a very desirable target. In addition, locals know the places to avoid and the places that are safe. Not being familiar with the neighborhood or district you are wandering around in is one sure way to be victimized. The contents of your wallet may very well represent several months of salary to persons living in undeveloped countries. The same is true for an expensive watch or fine jewelry. Our cell phones, which have become a part of our everyday lives, are also attractive targets for criminals. To illustrate this point, as we write this book there has been an alarming increase in robberies involving the forcible taking of cell phones from individuals in New York City. Remember, your cell phone isn’t simply a phone any longer. It is a small computer that may have a sticker

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price of more than $1,000. Imagine the value of your cell phone in a much less prosperous country rife with crime. While David was attending law school, he was acquainted with a young woman who worked out in the gym he went to. One winter she accompanied her parents on a vacation to the Dominican Republic. She stayed with her family for a week and then needed to return to the States earlier than her folks. Her father and mother rented a car and drove her to the airport. While driving through a small town, their car was deliberately rammed broadside by an old truck. The small rental car they were in was crushed. The young woman and her mother were killed. The father survived. As he lay bleeding and unable to move, he watched the locals pull the jewelry off the bodies of his dying wife and daughter. No one even bothered to call for help. To our knowledge, the perpetrators were never caught. Crimes like the incident just described happen every day. This was undoubtedly not the first time these criminals had used this tactic. Did the local consulate know about this type of criminal activity? If it did, why didn’t it post a travel advisory to Americans visiting the Dominican Republic? And even if one had been posted, would anyone have checked to see whether there were any such alerts? Might they have been dissuaded by the alert if they had checked? Could a little prior research into the nature of the criminal situation have prevented a warm and lovely young woman of twenty from dying such a senseless death? People who have never been victimized always tend to view crime as something that hap pens to other people. It can happen to you. Read the alerts and pay attention, and your chances of becoming a victim will be drastically lowered.

Local Laws and Customs Give special attention to learning the local laws and customs of the country to which you will be traveling. Many seemingly innocuous actions in the United States will give extreme offense in some countries or might even result in your arrest. In Thailand, for example, the feet are considered the lowest and dirtiest part of the body. The head is the most sacred. To sit with your feet up pointing toward someone, especially someone’s face or head, is considered unspeakably rude. Therefore, if you are riding in a train in Thailand and put your feet up to get more comfortable, you are not only running the risk of being considered an uncultured slob but may actually find yourself in a physical confrontation with a Thai national who thinks you just mortally insulted him. This type of behavior certainly won’t make you friends and might even provoke someone to assault you. A dear friend of ours, a wonderful Thai woman, lives in the suburbs of

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Washington, DC. One day, while on the Washington Metro system, she sat across from a young man who was leaning back in his seat and had his feet propped up against the pole used by commuters to keep upright while the train is in motion and no seats are available. She was very distressed by the man’s actions, although he probably had no idea that someone was viewing his behavior as offensive. If he had put his feet up on a train in Bangkok, he may very well have been assaulted. Know where you are going and gain at least a passing familiarity with local manners and etiquette. The Thai people are overwhelmingly Buddhist. Some of the most exquisite artwork in the world can be found in the religious structures and statues of Thailand. However, if you are visiting some of the beautiful Buddhist temples and decide to have a picture taken as you sit atop a statue of Buddha, it is very likely that you will be arrested. The police don’t want to hear any excuses about not knowing the local laws. You sit on the wrong statue, you are going to jail. It is only common sense to learn as much as you can about the local laws and customs before you go. Along the same lines, learn a bit about the social mores and customs of the country you are traveling to.

PREPARING TO TRAVEL After you have completed your initial research, you are able to begin actual preparations for your journey. The research time you have spent has given you a much better idea of the steps you must take and the items you must bring. Where should you start? The U.S. Department of State offers a wealth of information for the traveler about which items to bring, which to leave home, and a whole host of other helpful things. Go to the website (https://www.state.gov/travelers/) and download the travel checklists. Doing so will help you immeasurably in packing the right way. Also consult some of the many commercially available travel books about the types of items you should bring to the country you’re traveling to. The excellent Frommer’s travel series is a treasury of important travel knowledge. For our purposes, however, we deal only with issues of safety and health in our preparatory travel section. Department of State personnel travel more than anyone in the world, except for pilots and flight attendants. The Department of State’s website contains a tremendous amount of valuable information from the most experienced foreign travelers around. It will be more than adequate to help you identify the dozens of items to take care of before your trip.

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Necessary Documents Check your passport. Has it expired? Will it expire while you are abroad? Some folks like to live dangerously in this regard. For example, if your trip will last two weeks and your passport has three weeks until the expiration date, you may be tempted to put off getting a renewal. Don’t do this. Furthermore, you must check the rules in the country to which you are planning to travel. In some countries, your passport must be valid for at least three months counting from the date of departure the United States; some countries require six months. Unforeseen events, illness, or just a change of mind can easily have you abroad with an expired passport. Passports become useless the day they expire (although a U.S. citizen can repatriate with an expired passport within six months of the date of expiration). New passports can be reissued at the nearest embassy or consulate, but securing one can be time consuming and unnecessary headaches. In some cases, the passport can be replaced expeditiously, but if you are unlucky enough to expire while you are in a third world country far from the embassy, the consulate might not be able to get you a passport for weeks. It is a good idea to make several copies of your passport and place them in separate pieces of luggage. In addition, make sure you obtain the necessary visas if the country of your destination requires them. As soon as you have finalized your itinerary, give a copy of it to someone at home. Include all the phone numbers and email addresses that you can, and arrange to check in with friends or relatives at regular intervals. Checking in is particularly important. If you are missing for some reason, no one will come to look for you unless someone knows there is a problem. You also must use a bit of common sense while selecting your own personal lifeline back home. Besides being a responsible individual, he or she should also be the type of person who can handle an unexpected crisis.

Medication and Medical Insurance What happens if you need medical attention while you are overseas? Several years ago David took his wife on a trip to Malta, where he was to provide training for the Maltese police. It never occurred to them to check to see whether their policy covered care while traveling abroad (it did not). While government employees are traveling on orders, the local embassy will provide medical care and access to the in-house medical services. Dependents, however, unless they are traveling on orders as well, do not qualify. On the return trip between Malta and London, his wife experienced excruciating pain from a sinus infection.

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They decided to stop over in London and find a doctor. The hotel offered to arrange a house call from a local doctor for the “reasonable” fee of £100. Or, they were told, they could just walk down the street to the hospital. They decided to go to the hospital. Although they had to wait a few hours, they were seen by an excellent physician who treated David’s wife and provided enough medication to see them home. In the United Kingdom, there is no cost for the service; providing basic medical care is free under the British system, even for U.S. nationals. However, had they been somewhere else, they would have had to pay out of pocket. Call your insurance provider before you travel and find out whether you are covered outside the United States. If you do not have coverage (seniors take note: Medicare and Medicaid do not cover you overseas), several companies provide inexpensive overseas coverage to travelers. This issue is even more important if you are going to be residing abroad for extended periods of time. The companies not only identify the best medical facilities in the region you are traveling to but also deal with medical emergencies requiring rapid evacuation to a quality healthcare facility. If you are currently taking prescription medication, make sure you take enough with you. Splitting the contents up and placing some in carry-on luggage and some with checked baggage is a good idea. Try to do the same for glasses or contact lenses, and make sure you have a copy of your prescription. Leave prescription medicines in their own properly labeled bottles to avoid any questions from foreign customs agents or police officers. When you split your prescriptions as recommended, have the pharmacy provide you with a second labeled bottle. It isn’t a bad idea to have a doctor’s letter explaining your need for certain medications if they might be unlawful to possess in the country you are traveling to. Most savvy travelers know that opioid-based prescription pain medication may pose a problem, but there are other, almost innocuous medications that may be illegal in certain countries. Make sure you consult the OSAC website (https://www.osac.gov/) for specifics areas of concern and the Centers for Disease Control (https://www.cdc.gov/) for comprehensive lists of vaccinations recommended for specified locations.

Flight Check-in At the airport, expect to experience the usual long delays that have become associated with international air travel since the attacks of September 11. Plan to arrive at the airport at least three hours before all international flights. Watch your luggage and carry-on bags at all times. You will, of course, have to put your bag through the X-ray machine before you get to the boarding area.

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Pay particularly careful attention to your bag at that time. Teams of practiced criminal groups stalk major airports and specialize in grabbing bags off the conveyor belt while their owners walk through the metal detector. If you are traveling with someone, have one person go through the detector and wait while you place your bags onto the conveyor for the X-ray machine. The person on the outside should watch the bags as they pass into the machine. The person who has already cleared the checkpoint should watch the bags as they pass through and collect them. In this way the bags are never unattended except for the few moments when they are physically passing through the machine. Make sure that you are not carrying anything that could even remotely be considered a weapon. Nothing sharp or pointed, and, unless you don’t mind spending time in a holding cell, don’t forget to check any firearms you may have. Never, under any circumstances, agree to take anything on board for someone else. This, of course, does not apply to bringing a box of Grandma’s cookies overseas to your relatives. But it does apply to just about everyone else. Do you remember the preflight question that used to be asked of travelers on airplanes? Passengers used to be asked: “Has anyone unknown to you asked you to carry an item on this flight?” This is no longer the case, as bombs have been unwittingly carried by persons taking a package for someone they knew, or thought they knew, very well. Consider the case of Anne Murphy, five months’ pregnant by her Jordanian boyfriend, Nezar Hindawi. Hindawi gave her a package containing three pounds of plastic explosives, more than enough to bring down the plane, to carry onto an EL AL flight between London and Tel Aviv. Murphy and the package were intercepted before she boarded, and no one was harmed. But consider the absolute abrogation of every instinct of humanity in this act. Hindawi was indifferent not only to the murder of his girlfriend in furtherance of his attack but of his unborn child as well.

In-Flight Briefing While flying, pay attention to the security briefing given by the flight attendant. Almost everyone tunes out this presentation instead of paying attention to it. Locate the emergency exits and decide which one will be easier to access in an emergency. Know where the next closest one is as well in case you are unable to get to your choice. These kinds of emergencies are rare but do happen; on January 15, 2009, Captain “Sully” Sullenberger was forced to land his Airbus A320 on the Hudson River.

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Once you arrive at your destination, you will need transportation to your hotel or new place of residence. Whenever possible, try to arrange transportation before you go. Many hotels have their own transportation vans, which make regular runs between the hotel and the airport. If you cannot make prior arrangements, use only properly marked and identifiable livery vehicles. Do not accept the services of local residents using personal vehicles to take fares from the airport under any circumstances.

Behavior on Arrival While you are out and about in a foreign country—or anywhere for that matter—the way you walk will allow potential assailants to classify you as a victim or someone to pass by. We all present a certain body language while we walk. If we have a strong, purposeful stride, we present the image of being a direct person with a place to go. Such people walk with confidence, with a stride that tells the world that they know what they’re about. This isn’t the type of person to invite an attempt at mugging or other street crime. However, those of us who may walk with a bit of uncertainty or trepidation send a different message. Do not walk like a victim. Walk with purpose and confidence, and look as if you have somewhere very important to go. Also, do not ask directions from people on the street. Try to find a police officer or someone in a position of authority. Not only will asking for directions tell a potential criminal that you have no idea where you are, but you will have told a complete stranger where you will be going. Don’t do that. Use WAZE, a global positioning system, or find a cop, cabbie, or someone else more likely to assist you. Exhibit 6.1 is page 1 of a sample checklist that you can use to assist you in making safe travel decisions. Some of the recommendations have already been discussed; others are explained in greater detail later in this book. Use this form as a guide to help you make the right decisions and take the appropriate precautions. Our checklist is mainly concerned with safety, security, and health. Remember, for additional tips to make your trip more enjoyable, consult the Department of State website. The entire checklist is available for download on the website for this book.

Personal and Business Travel Security Exhibit 6.1

Security Pre-travel Checklist

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NOTES 1. U.S. Department of State, “Safety and Security Messaging: Travel Advisory,” last updated April 9, 2019. https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/ international-travel/before-you-go/about-our-new-products.html. 2. Ibid. 3. Travel.State.Gov, U.S. Department of State—Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Worldwide Caution,” January 15, 2019. https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/ traveladvisories/traveladvisories/worldwide-caution.html. 4. The White House, “Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” January 27, 2017. https://www.whitehouse .gov/the-press-office/2017/01/27/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreignterrorist-entry-united-states. 5. Travel.State.Gov, U.S. Department of State—Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Venezuela Travel Advisory,” April 9, 2019. https://travel.state.gov/content/ travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/venezuela-travel-advisory.html. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid.

CHAPTER 7

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are not conducted at random. Virtually all terrorist or criminal attacks are preceded by a preoperational stage where intelligence is gathered about the intended target. If you are required to travel potentially dangerous areas or are a high-profile individual or a security professional responsible for protecting a high-profile individual, this chapter will be of extreme interest to you. We discuss the principles of route selection to reduce vulnerability while driving. You will learn how surveillance is performed in order to understand how to utilize countersurveillance techniques to detect whether you are being watched or followed and also learn the importance of not falling into predictable patterns of behavior. Additionally, we cover the topic of evacuation of personnel from high-risk area. OST CRIMINAL OR TERRORIST OPERATIONS

PRINCIPLES OF ROUTE SELECTION AND GENERAL VEHICLE SAFETY MEASURES Attacks on individuals who are driving their vehicles are common with both terrorists and common criminals. An individual traveling by car can be quite vulnerable. If the bad guys have spent any time at all watching you, they will know exactly when and where you will be most vulnerable and act against you at that moment. It is for this reason that we have devoted a separate chapter to teaching Americans living in or traveling to the more problematic parts of 113

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the world how to minimize risk involving vehicles. Since attacks while driving are common and are extremely dangerous, you must learn how to drive (or be driven) in a manner calculated to enhance safety. It is worth noting that this subject is taught in virtually every intelligence academy throughout the world. The goal is to reduce the number of people assaulted, kidnapped, or assassinated while driving or getting in and out of their vehicles. One of the most important ways you can increase your level of security is to carefully select the roads you drive on whenever possible and adhere to the principles of route selection and driving. This block of training is generally broken down into a short summary known as the 10 rules. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Be alert in and around your car. Avoid choke points. Avoid one-lane roads. Watch the car in front. Watch the car to the rear. Avoid predictable patterns of travel. Beware the “box.” Avoid heavily trafficked roads. Use roads with safe havens. Use well-lit roads.

Most, if not all, disciplines and fields of studies have their own unique rules. Many of them merely state the obvious in order to make an instructional point. Take, for example, firearms training. There are many rules that are common to the discipline of firing a weapon in anger. However, the initial rule that is somewhat wryly stated is “The first rule in a gunfight is to have a gun.” The parallel of this rule as applied to driving security is “Pick your road.” You must understand that security is a daily concern and that part of your new security mind-set is to consciously select roads to drive on that place a would-be attacker at a disadvantage. This is no different from a general selecting the most advantageous terrain for a battle. In August 2002, CNN obtained a copy of a tape showing the type of training that Al Qaeda terrorists undergo. There are a number of more recent videos, but this one is probative because of the focus it places on vehicle assaults. A review of those tapes can provide many valuable security lessons. One example that is directly on point for this discussion is the section showing how Al Qaeda terrorists assault a moving vehicle in order to kidnap the occupant. The clip shows several terrorist vehicles following the target. The vehicles box the victim’s vehicle in, and the assault is initiated. In seconds the victim has been pulled from

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the vehicle and is thrown into one of the terrorists’ cars. Had the objective been merely to kill, the attack would not have taken even that long. The tape reveals a great deal about the terrorists’ level of training as well as the types of operations they are training for. The first thing that is readily apparent is that the team on this tape is organized and has thoroughly drilled the techniques they are practicing, even though the techniques are somewhat primitive compared to what U.S. or Israeli tactical teams would do. The terrorists coordinate between units with different assignments; they have an assault team as well as perimeter security. The operation is well coordinated, and the teams communicate with hand-held radios. They also use different vehicles for different purposes. They use pickup trucks to transport the assault team and motorcycles for the perimeter security team. They handle their prisoners quickly and efficiently. Once the assault is completed, they signal the command to withdraw by using the car horn. As they withdraw and their teams leave the area, they detonate explosive devices. However, perhaps the most frightening element in the video is the fact that members of the assault team are giving commands in English. Even more to the point, the people playing the victims are pleading with their captors in English. Whom do you think they are preparing for? How can anyone protect themselves from this type of attack? Certainly there are ways. One way is an effectively armored vehicle and security personnel in lead and chase cars. However, since most of us do not have the luxury of that level of security, we must act so that we never get to the point where we will be the target for that type of assault. To do this you need to follow the recommendations of this chapter religiously. Although doing so is no guarantee that you will not be attacked, it certainly will lower your chances of being the victim of this type of assault. It is vitally important never to deviate from these procedures for any reason.

Rule 1. Be Alert Be alert for anything unusual even before you enter your vehicle. Think about it. You are about to drive someplace in a foreign country. You really don’t know the rules of the road and generally can’t yet spot things that are out of the ordinary because you don’t really know what is or is not ordinary in that country. You might have already been targeted for a robbery, carjacking, kidnapping, assault, or assassination. So you pay extra-careful attention to your vehicle and to the vehicles and individuals in close proximity to your car. Remember that you are

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particularly vulnerable while you’re getting into a car. The next time you are in a busy parking lot, take a few minutes to observe people as they walk to their cars. Few people bother to look around and see if anything looks unusual, suspicious, or out of place but you need to.

Rule 2. Avoid Choke Points or Bottlenecks Avoid choke points or bottlenecks. This concept is critical while planning safe routes of travel. Understanding the dangers presented by a choke point or bottleneck is central to avoiding an ambush or other assault. What is a choke point? It is any point through which you must pass to get to a location known to your potential attackers. For example, say the travel time between your home and office is approximately forty minutes. Your home is located in a secure neighborhood, and there are several roads that you can take to get to work. However, there is a bridge that you must cross regardless of the route you choose. Or no matter which side street you take from your residence, they all funnel into one street or avenue that you must take for you to reach your destination. That is a bottleneck or choke point (see Exhibit 7.1).

Exhibit 7.1

Choke Point Diagram

CHOKE

Point

Assume the small square represents your home or place of business. Although there are several possible routes that may be taken, they all lead or “funnel” into the choke point. This allows an assailant to easily set up an ambush, kidnapping, or attack by roadside bomb.

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Why is a choke point or bottleneck significant? Because it allows potential assailants the ability to stage an ambush and/or roadblock with relative ease. Whether their goal is kidnapping or assassination, they will know where to find you on any given day. If you are not being driven in a security motorcade with advance and chase vehicles, you will be completely vulnerable to attack. You must, therefore, avoid choke points, at least those that you must cross on a regular basis. This means that you must consider your travel options when you are selecting a hotel to stay in or a place to live.

Rule 3. Avoid One-Lane Roads Always drive on a road with a few lanes rather than with just one. The reason is simple: Narrow roads or single-lane roads are easy to block and afford potential attackers an easy place to set up an ambush. Roads with multiple lanes allow you to escape; criminals and terrorists tend to avoid planning ambushes on such roads. However, roads with several lanes allow for other types of attack, which we discuss below.

Rule 4. Watch the Car in Front of You Always pay attention to the vehicle directly in front of you, especially if you are on a one-lane road or come to stop sign or traffic light. The reason is clear. On a single-lane road, an effective roadblock can be something as simple as a car stopped in front of you. The same is true if you’re following closely behind a vehicle as it comes to a place where you will normally expect a vehicle to stop, such as at a red light or stop sign. In the United States and abroad, many tactical enforcement teams use a technique called the rush and snatch or rush and grab during arrests of potentially dangerous criminals who are driving a car. This is the scenario: There is one car directly in front of and behind the subject to be arrested and is moving in traffic. The car in front comes to a stop sign or red light and slows to stop, which is what you would expect any car to do. The car behind the subject slowly pulls up close to the rear of your vehicle. Again, it is doing what you’d expect any ordinary car and driver to do. The agents or officers in the lead car will then put the their car in reverse and begin to back slowly into the subject’s vehicle. The subject’s first reaction probably will not be that they are being arrested. The natural reaction is to wonder why to driver in front of you is backing up. They usually blow their horn when they see the backup lights come on. While their attention is fixed on the front vehicle, armed agents exit the car

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that has moved up within inches of their rear bumper, effectively pinning the subject between the two undercover law enforcement vehicles (see Exhibit 7.2). Before the subject even realizes what is happening, armed agents have them at gunpoint. Terrorists have learned this technique, and they practice it. Exhibit 7.2

Two-Car Blocking Method: Stop Sign or Light

If you allow yourself to be boxed in this manner, before you can react, armed attackers are outside your window screaming and pointing their weapons at you. The windows of your vehicle probably will be smashed, and you’ll be pulled from the car at gunpoint. There is no correct tactical response that we can teach you to enable you to escape a situation like this unscathed. Even if you were armed, which is unlikely on foreign soil, and are very well trained, you can do little in this type of situation. A technique taught in counterterrorist schools that might help is to attempt to defeat the ambush by ramming the blocking vehicles (usually the one in front but to the rear in certain circumstances). However, in order to perform this technique successfully, you need some room to generate speed and maneuver. Always keep enough distance between your car and the car in front of you to take these actions if necessary. Even if the car begins to back up, you can still react if you have left enough distance between your car and the one ahead. Some professional driving schools teach ramming escape techniques, and you might want to consider taking one of their courses if you are headed to dangerous parts of the world. However, even if you were very well trained, are you prepared to actually start ramming cars in traffic in a foreign country? Consider how dire the circumstances would have to be before you would make that decision. Better avoid the situation entirely. We discuss how to accomplish this goal when we explain how to detect the presence of surveillance.

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Rule 5. Watch the Car behind You Use your mirrors while you are driving. If you are being targeted, you will be followed. Unless you have been targeted by an extremely well-trained surveillance team, you’ll be followed by individuals driving a car directly behind you or within a car or two back. Check your mirrors frequently and pay attention to who is behind you. Again, we explain countersurveillance techniques further later in this chapter.

Rule 6. Avoid Predictable Travel Vary your route between home and work. We have already discussed the importance of varying your routine in high-risk areas, and this applies to driving as well. Avoiding predictability makes it harder for someone to follow you. Remember, if you are being followed, those who are watching you will have a certain degree of paranoia. If you act in such a way as to make them think you are surveillance conscious, they will likely move on to an easier target. Even if they do not switch targets, you are still making it difficult for them to follow you, and it will be easier for you to detect their presence.

Rule 7. Beware the “Box” Boxing assailants in is a common tool for enforcement personnel and, unfortunately, bad guys as well. On a two-lane road, assailants in several vehicles will attempt to box you in by placing a vehicle in front of you, behind you, and to your side and forcing you to stop (see Exhibit 7.3). Exhibit 7.3

Three-Car Blocking Method: Alongside Barrier

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In this exhibit, three blocking vehicles surround the target’s car. Since the barrier prevents escape in that direction, all that attackers need to do is to block the front, rear, and open side. This is a coordinated maneuver that requires all three blocking vehicles to slow down at the same time and force the target to stop. If the technique is poorly executed, the target may be able to drive out of the box and escape. If, however, the cars slow in a coordinated manner, the target may find escape difficult (but not impossible). In addition to the ramming techniques, antiterror driving schools teach student drivers several methods to defeat this trap. Again, you must learn the countermeasures from professionals in a well-respected school. You also must practice the techniques on a fairly regular basis. Another version of the same attack may be carried out by four blocking vehicles on wide, multilane roads with no hard barrier separating the two directions of travel (see Exhibit 7.4). As you can imagine, this attack is even more difficult to execute well. If you have ever seen some of Fox Television’s Scariest Police Chases, you will know that even trained professional police officers sometimes have a hard time coordinating a stop in this manner. All of these techniques Exhibit 7.4 Four-Car Blocking require some coordination and prior practice on the part of the bad guys. And, as the Al Qaeda training tape obtained by CNN shows, the bad guys do practice. If you haven’t accepted that reality by now, watch the tape. Even so, if you are alert you can see danger coming and drive out of it. As we have said, even if you do get boxed in and if you are driving a car with some mass and horsepower, you can still defeat the boxing-in maneuver by using the techniques we described. Realize that you will probably be shot at during your escape. However, we would rather risk being shot while trying to escape than being taken by captors. As frightening as this scenario may be, it requires surveillance and coordination and can be defeated by detecting the bad guys well in advance of the attack.

Rule 8. Avoid Heavily Congested Roads Whenever possible, avoid roads where you are likely to get stuck in traffic. This is easier said than done, as traffic is a reality all over the world. If the road

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conditions in your country of residence are such that you will encounter heavy traffic in the same place and time on a daily basis, you must pay particular attention to vary your routes of travel. Stop-and-go traffic makes it very easy for you to be assaulted or kidnapped. Remember, the motorcycle is the traditional vehicle used in assassinations. A motorcycle allows assailants to approach targets quickly, even in heavy traffic. Escape is also a simple matter on a motorcycle, even during rush hour.

Rule 9. Look for Safe Havens It is better to drive on a road with a police station on the way than on one without a police station. The simple reason is that if you do need police assistance, they are nearby. This is also true of other safe havens, such as hospitals and the embassies of friendly countries.

Rule 10. Choose Well-Lit Roads Travel on well-lit roads whenever possible. Light is always a deterrent to crime. It allows you to see the road ahead of you and makes driving safer for you. Unfortunately, in many parts of the world, finding roads with adequate lighting is difficult.

EMERGENCY VEHICLE OPERATION A final point for anyone considered to be a high-risk target or someone living in a dangerous region: Don’t merely consider taking an emergency vehicle operations course (EVOC); take one immediately, and follow it with a course in antiterrorist driving techniques. The average citizen can learn many things in three to four days of training. An EVOC program will teach you the basics of high-speed driving. You will learn to take corners and turns safely and at high speeds. Emergency braking techniques, lane changes, and high-speed backing are taught and form the basis for the antiterrorist driving course. This course teaches students to defeat the types of vehicular attacks commonly used by terrorists and criminals. Typically you will be taught how to defeat a roadblock, how to escape an ambush, the pursuit intervention technique maneuver, and how to reverse direction from a standstill or at high speed. High-speed backing will also be taught to escape a roadblock where a “J” turn isn’t possible. Even apart from the obvious advantage of learning how to defeat an attack against

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you while you are in your vehicle, such courses will improve your overall level of safety during normal driving as well. Remember, common traffic accidents are the single greatest cause of death for travelers under the age of thirty-five as well as for travelers of any age in good health. You have a far greater chance of being killed in a car accident than you have of becoming the victim of terrorism or criminal violence. Antiterrorist driving techniques are skills you should seriously consider acquiring. If you have a driver, bodyguard, or security detail, have them undergo training. If you are relying heavily on locally hired drivers, their training is critical. The following analysis makes this point more clearly.

Analysis of a Car Attack in Pakistan Here we analyze a tragic attack that resulted in the murder of five people, four of whom were Americans. By reviewing incidents like these and learning what mistakes were made, we can prevent the loss of any more innocent lives. This incident occurred in Karachi, Pakistan, on November 12, 1997. Although we feel uncomfortable Monday morning quarterbacking this incident while the families of the victims are no doubt still feeling their terrible loss more than two decades later, we believe that ignoring the practical value of the lessons that can be learned renders the victims’ deaths meaningless. If another family might be spared the loss of their father, mother, or child, then the lessons learned from this tragedy may have some positive meaning. While we discuss this situation, bear in mind the rules that we have just described. We do not have all the facts relative to this attack, but it is clear that the failure to follow basic vehicle security rules 1, 5, and 6 (and the principles of countersurveillance discussed in the next section) contributed to the murders. On November 12, 1997, at approximately 8:00 am, four employees of the Union Texas Petroleum (UTP) Company were picked up at their hotels by a Pakistani driver employed by their company. The local driver was operating a blue four-door Nissan station wagon. Three of the men were staying at the Hotel Pearl Continental; the fourth was lodging at the Sheraton. As the vehicle left the hotel area, it was followed by a red Honda Civic with two or three men inside. Apparently, the Civic had fallen behind the Nissan in traffic, and the driver had to weave in and out of traffic aggressively in order to catch up. Surprisingly, the driver of the Nissan either did not notice or was not alarmed by the presence of a red vehicle pursuing them. Law enforcement and undercover agencies generally do not choose red vehicles as surveillance vehicles because they are very easy to pick out and remember. In this case, the color of the vehicle made

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no difference. The driver of the Nissan failed to be mindful of traffic behind them, violating rule 5, even though the vehicle was brightly colored and was being driven erratically. At approximately 8:10 am, the red Civic caught up to the Nissan, cut it off, and forced it to stop. One or two assailants, armed with AK-47 assault rifles, exited the Civic and killed the driver by firing through the windshield. The driver’s murder ensured that the vehicle would not be able to escape. The terrorists then moved to the sides of the Nissan and executed the four Americans by firing through the windows. A third assailant may have been firing from inside the Civic. There can be no doubt that the four UTP employees had been under surveillance before the attack. Although the reported account of this incident says nothing about such surveillance, it is inconceivable that such an attack could have been planned and executed without the gathering of prior intelligence through physical surveillance. Apparently neither the driver of the Nissan nor the four UTP employees detected the presence of that surveillance. We discuss how to determine whether you are under surveillance as well as countersurveillance measures at length in the section on countersurveillance. Another security lapse was the failure of the driver and his passengers to vary their patterns of travel by altering the route they took and their times of travel. No effort was made to avoid predictability, in violation of rule 6. In addition to the violation of several vehicle-related security rules, other mistakes were made. The first mistake, and one that is the easiest to correct, is to use a properly armored vehicle while transporting employees in high-risk areas. A properly armored vehicle could have provided sufficient protection against the 7.62x39mm rifle rounds fired by the terrorists. In addition, a properly trained driver would have increased the chances that this attack could have been prevented. Numerous EVOC and antiterrorist driving courses teach a variety of specific techniques to use while operating an armored vehicle; such courses are important because the added weight of the armor dramatically changes the handling characteristics of a vehicle. The antiterror phase of such training teaches proper observational skills, which are invaluable. In addition, the courses also teach how to defeat a vehicular roadblock. Defeating a roadblock is not difficult to learn during hands-on instruction. All you need is a vehicle of sufficient mass and power. In the case here, a four-door station wagon was blocked by a Honda Civic. If you are alert and the blocking vehicles are not well positioned, you may be able to escape the ambush. You can learn how to perform this type of maneuver in any professional antiterrorist driving school. Another good habit to begin right now is to never roll up too close to the vehicle directly in front of you.

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Make sure that when you stop, you can see the rear tires of the car ahead of you. Make this a constant practice, and you will always maintain enough room between you and the car in front of you to allow you to react in case of attack even if the car in front backs up. Our recommendation is to try to attend schools that have instructors with prior experience as law enforcement or intelligence officers for the Secret Service, Diplomatic Security Service, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), or Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). There are also several emergency driving schools whose nonagent instructors have taught for well-respected academies, such as the FBI/DEA Academy, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, or the Secret Service Academy in Beltsville, Maryland. By getting training yourself or having your drivers trained, you can significantly improve your chances of surviving even a well-planned and coordinated attack. You will learn to evade and escape. Furthermore, you’ll learn how cars can be used as weapons. Your car is a several-thousand-pound object moving at high speed. Simply crashing into the blocking car, perhaps repeatedly, can disable and possibly kill the attackers. Needless to say, running over armed terrorists will put them out of business permanently. One point to remember if you are driving in an armored vehicle is that the protective armor adds a great deal of weight to it: The suspension systems of such vehicles are enhanced to accommodate the added weight, but, as discussed, the handling characteristics will be dramatically different from a regular vehicle. If you are planning to take a driving course, you will need to use your own armored vehicle or find a school that has such vehicles in its fleet. Other security lapses also contributed to the murder of the UTP employees. The attackers in this case were members of the Mutehida Qaumi Movement, a radical Islamic group. The timing of the attack, just one day after a Pakistani national named Mir Aimal Kansi was sentenced to death in Fairfax, Virginia, for the murder of two CIA employees at CIA headquarters in 1993, led investigators to link the two events and term the killings in Karachi a terrorist act of reprisal. Two Pakistani nationals were arrested, tried, and convicted of the crime in Pakistan. Other members of the group who were involved remain at large. In November 2002, Kansi was executed for his crimes by the state of Virginia. The Department of State warned of the possibility of attacks against Americans in Pakistan immediately before the UTP employees were killed. By heeding the warning and deferring travel, this incident could have been avoided. The U.S. Department of State expects such retaliatory attacks each time the United States or Israel strikes against terror. If you are truly concerned about being attacked in this manner, you will need to armor your vehicle and learn

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counterterrorist driving techniques. By taking these actions in combination with adherence to other basic rules of vehicle safety and route selection, you can dramatically reduce your chance of being targeted. Although these measures may seem extreme, there is no other way to defend against an armed and coordinated vehicle assault.

COUNTERSURVEILLANCE Most terrorist and criminals operations are not conducted at random or haphazardly. Virtually all terrorist and criminal attacks are preceded by a preoperational stage where intelligence is gathered about the intended target. Typically, terrorists compile lists of potential targets that they believe will further their political goals. Potential targets include military installations, economic centers, civilian population centers, and specific individuals. Many targets are selected for their country of origin, with citizens of the United States and Israel being the most desirable. The exact selection procedure itself is unclear. One thing that is clear, however, is that terrorists do not commit resources to an attack until they have acquired extensive information relative to the likely success or failure of an operation. This is true for even small-scale operations like an individual assassination or kidnapping. Basically, terrorists conduct the equivalent of a feasibility study. The tragic murder of Laurence Foley, an American diplomat, in Amman, Jordan, on October 27, 2002, provides an unfortunate reminder of this fact. Foley was shot to death as he left his home. According to an Associated Press wire service report, he had been under surveillance by his assailants for some time before they struck. The report quoted a Jordanian police official who stated, “The killing appeared to have been carried out by professionals who had been following Foley for some time to determine his schedule.” Foley, a career diplomat, was sixty years old and was a senior administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development. His duties involved helping the Jordanian people develop projects that were for their own sole benefit. What possible motivation would a terror group have in killing such a man, apart from the fact that he was an American diplomat? The answer is, most likely, that they had no specific reason for murdering Foley. In all probability, their goal was to kill anyone associated with the embassy of the United States. The terrorists conducted surveillance of embassy personnel and selected a target based on the opportunity he afforded. This means they would be looking for a target with a regular and predictable schedule; someone without a security detail and who did not appear

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to be overtly conscious of the presence of surveillance. Foley, quite simply, was murdered because the terrorists felt that attacking him would expose them to the lowest level of risk. As you read this book, there are no shortages of online “how to do it” instruction manuals for terrorists. Many radical Islamic websites publish guides with titles such as “How to Kidnap American Citizens,” which is nothing more than a reworking of the original “How to Kidnap Israelis” published by Hamas. Much of this “guide” is spent discussing the ways in which intelligence may be gathered on prospective targets before an attempt is made. This “gathering of information” refers to physical surveillance of intended victims. Terrorists spend months and even years researching their targets and potential methods for attack. They have become quite adept at doing their homework. They use the internet extensively to search for photographs and building blueprints. They access public documents. They pay for information in much the same way as our government and law enforcement agencies pay informants. However, there is no substitute for getting direct information and ascertaining the facts on the ground. Extensive use of surveillance is an integral part of the process of intelligence gathering. Terrorists use many of the same methods as do those in the law enforcement and intelligence communities. They rent apartments with a direct line of sight to potential targets. They photograph and follow potential targets of a kidnapping or assassination. Common criminals also conduct a type of surveillance, although on a far less elaborate scale. Criminals who are contemplating a burglary will watch the location first, sometimes for only minutes or sometimes for several months. In law enforcement terms, this is referred to as “casing” a prospective target. Some criminal organizations and individuals conduct extensive surveillance of individuals or locations for purely criminal purposes. In Chapter 6 we mentioned that some organized criminal groups in Russia stake out the Moscow airport looking for affluent foreigners to victimize. Typically, one or more individuals on foot watch passengers as they deplane. It isn’t very difficult to identify those with money, especially those who ignore the general rule about not appearing too flashy or well off. Someone working at the airport may do the foot surveillance. Flight attendants, who have a great deal of time during a long flight, may even be the ones making the initial evaluation of the target’s potential value. It is then a simple matter of following the subject to the hotel. A local taxi driver may be directed to pick up that person; thus the group will know exactly where he or she is staying without multiple car surveillance. In any event, the person has been identified as a target for robbery or property theft, and the intelligence gathering the criminals perform

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virtually guarantees a successful and profitable outcome. The goal may be to wait several days until the person goes out on the town and then conduct a simple mugging. Or perhaps the criminals will just identify the hotel and room, wait for the person to go out, and then enter the unoccupied room and steal whatever valuables have been left there. In any case, the same principles of surveillance detection apply whether the perpetrators are terrorists or common criminals.

Surveillance Is Commonplace Surveillance of Americans and Western Europeans living, working, or even traveling abroad has long been common. Frequently it has been associated with surveillance conducted by the foreign intelligence officers looking for activities inconsistent with the subject’s stated reason for being in the country. More commonly, the object of the surveillance may be wholly commercial in nature. Commercial espionage at its highest level is undertaken by government operatives trained at the highest level with unlimited resources. Commercial espionage represents a value to the gathering government in the billions of dollars and our clients have been the targets of such surveillance in the past. This will continue to be the case and surveillance by government actors, terrorists and criminals being the norm. Because of this reality, the Department of State provides some instruction on countersurveillance for government employees overseas as part of the Security Overseas Seminar. In addition, the department also has recognized the importance of educating nongovernmental employees of civilian companies working abroad and offers this type of training for civilians as well. To this end, the department published Security Guidelines for Americans Working Overseas, which stresses the importance of being aware of your surroundings in order to detect the presence of possible surveillance. Although the document is no longer available, the next sections teach you how to do just that.

What Is Surveillance? What exactly is surveillance? Surveillance is really nothing more than gathering information, generally from physical observation or the interception of telephone, fax, and email or radio communications. The specific purpose of surveillance is to compile intelligence relative to the movements, associates, and activities of the target. In law enforcement, the purpose of surveillance is to

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acquire evidence or intelligence, usually to support a criminal prosecution of the subject. In special circumstances, law enforcement does not use surveillance as an end to a prosecution but rather to amass intelligence information on suspected foreign agents, organized crime, or other subversive domestic groups. Terrorists and/or criminals conduct surveillance as a prelude to committing a crime or terrorist attack. Surveillance can be conducted in several ways. Both physical surveillance and technical surveillance (the use of technology to track or monitor a target) can be used. “Physical surveillance” generally refers to watching the movement and activities of the subject of the surveillance. The surveillance can either be mobile or stationary but is generally both. Mobile surveillance involves actively following someone on foot, in a vehicle, or both. The purpose is to track subjects’ movements: determine where they go, routes of travel, what they do, and whom they meet. “Stationary surveillance” refers to a fixed location from where the surveilling agent can watch the subject. It may be done from an adjacent building, a parked vehicle, or even from a fixed position on foot. Exhibit 7.5 shows a typical setup for a fixed surveillance point using a parked car as the point, or eyeball. Notice the number of intervening cars between the target and surveillance vehiExhibit 7.5 Fixed Surveillance cle. This gap makes it less likely that the target will detect the presence of surveillance. The curvature of the street also works to the advantage of the surveillant as it allows for the observation of the entire driver’s side of the vehicle from a position of cover. Notice also that this street is one-way only. The point vehicle needs only to alert other surveillance operatives that the subject is in the vehicle and is departing. Other units can be waiting farther along the subject’s known or anticipated route in order to pick up the mobile surveillance away from the subject’s residence.

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Detecting Surveillance: The Golden Rule Let’s discuss the common ways that you may be followed or otherwise be subject to surveillance. By understanding the technique, you will become sensitive to what to look for and be able to detect all but the most sophisticated attempts at surveillance. How do you know if you are being followed? The first thing to be mindful of is your level of awareness. If you are wandering around in condition white (see the color code definitions in Chapter 1), you will be oblivious to the presence of even the most ineptly run surveillance. Pay attention to your surroundings. That is the single most important thing to do. The central rule in detecting whether you are the subject of surveillance is: If you see the same individual or vehicle, separated by time and distance, at least three times, you can assume you are being followed. Surveillance is an art, not a science. Its object is to observe someone without being detected. The greater the skill of the individual or individuals conducting the surveillance, the more difficult it will be to realize that they are there. We discuss a physical, mobile surveillance first—following someone, either on foot or in a vehicle. A discussion of this technique will make you understand the point about surveillance being an art. It will also give you a basic understanding of standard surveillance techniques.

Methods of Surveillance Let’s assume for a moment that you are being followed by terrorists. Perhaps you are a prominent businessperson and have been selected as a possible target for a kidnapping. The terrorists decide to follow you to evaluate your level of security and select the best time and place to grab you. If you have been following the advice given thus far, you should appear quite alert and aware of what’s going on around you. As mentioned earlier, this fact in and of itself may persuade the bad guys to look for an easier target. But say they begin to follow you. Typically, the surveillance will begin from a location that they associate with you. If their intelligence has allowed them to identify your residence, they might begin from there. If not, then they are likely to try to get to you from your place of business. The initial stage of the surveillance would begin with someone watching you from a stationary point—perhaps inside a car parked down the street from your home or from an apartment nearby that offers a good vantage point from which to observe you. Remember, they do not need to be physically close to you.

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By using a decent pair of binoculars, they can stay quite a distance away if they have a clear field of vision. If your home, for example, is located in an area where there is only one road that you can possibly take, they don’t even need to watch you at your home. They can station someone at an intersection that you must pass and begin the surveillance from there. Incidentally, this stage offers you your first opportunity to detect their presence. Even if you have only lived in a place for a short while, you will begin to focus in on things that seem unusual or out of place. An unfamiliar vehicle, for example, parked on your street might be an indication that you are being watched. Assume you enter your vehicle and begin to drive somewhere. If you are being followed and are cognizant of your surroundings, you will have your second chance to pick up on their presence. Doing so will depend to a great extent on the number of people following you and their skill level. Remember, surveillance requires skill. The bad guys need to see you while attempting to avoid being observed in turn. The easiest surveillance to detect is single-unit surveillance, especially if the person following you is not particularly adept. You drive down your street. Immediately, a car that was parked along your block starts up and pulls into traffic behind you. If the person is operating alone, he or she will need to keep you in sight at all times. The car will stay behind you and match your speed. When you turn, the car will turn. If the person tailing you is completely inept, he or she will lock on your bumper—be right behind you at all times. If you change lanes, the other car will do so as well. Obviously this type of behavior should be easy for you to notice. You look into your side and rearview mirrors and mentally note who is behind you. If a vehicle makes more than a few moves that match yours, then it is time to pay closer attention to it. It is easy to confirm whether a vehicle is following you or not by doing a few simple things. While doing so, it is important not to make it obvious to the person or persons following you that you are aware of their presence. We discuss techniques like squaring blocks and varying your speed later in this chapter. A lone individual attempting to follow you may be more successful if he or she is skillful at surveillance. A competent person will not lock on your bumper but will stay behind you at a discreet distance. The person will follow you from an offset position rather than to your rear. For example, say you are on a highway traveling in the left lane. The surveillance vehicle is behind you, a few cars back, shielded by other vehicles in the right lane. The driver can observe you, and you are less likely to pick the tail up when the car is not directly behind you. If you begin to change lanes and prepare to exit, the person is perfectly positioned in

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the right lane to turn off without changing lanes and then follow you onto the ramp (see Exhibit 7.6). Exhibit 7.6

Point Vehicle Following from the Offset Position

Team Surveillance Techniques The preferred technique of mobile surveillance is a multiple vehicle surveillance team rather than a single car. Here’s how it typically works. You leave your home. An individual in a stationary spot alerts other team members that you are on the move. As you begin to drive, someone in the stationary vehicle radios your vehicle description and direction to the rest of the team. A second car can then easily pull in behind you in a fluid and unobtrusive way. The rest of the team members follow at a distance and prepare to assume the point position, as directed by the individual leading the surveillance. For example, say you are driving your vehicle down a busy street. In traffic, it is easy for someone following you to blend in with the other cars on the road and avoid detection. Suppose, however, that you make a turn onto a small and lightly trafficked road. The lead car may turn with you and maintain the point. However, in this quiet area with little traffic, it becomes easier for you to notice a car following you, so the lead car’s driver becomes more cautious. The lead car will stay with you until the driver feels the need to break off to avoid detection. Perhaps the lead will stay in contact until you are ready to make another turn. Now the lead car must choose whether to turn with you again or not. If the lead car decides to break off to avoid being detected, the driver radios the next car in line (commonly called the alternate) and tells it to make the turn. The lead car goes straight and a new vehicle with a different face behind the wheel assumes the point position. This procedure

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is repeated frequently, with surveillance cars switching off to avoid having the same car follow for too long. The more cars that are used, the harder it is to spot their presence. Harder, but certainly not impossible. How can you pick up on the presence of surveillance vehicles if multiple vehicles are used? There are several ways. First, if you pay attention to the cars around you, you may notice the same car reappearing behind you at regular intervals. Remember, this technique is only as good as the people using it. For example, one member of the surveillance team may possess less skill than other team members and may remain as the point vehicle for too long. Even skilled surveillance agents are sometimes forced to hold the “eyeball” because their alternate is too far back in traffic to help out and the choice is to risk detection or risk losing contact with the target. If this happens, you will have the opportunity to pick up on the surveillance. Other group surveillance methods require a higher level of training and more surveillance vehicles. For this reason, these methods are more likely to be utilized by professional intelligence officers or specialized police units. These techniques are used by premier American law enforcement agencies, such as the DEA and FBI. Agencies or groups that are superbly trained will use numerous surveillance vehicles, stationary surveillance points, cars running along parallel streets and even ahead of the target. The system shown in Exhibit 7.7 is extremely effective because prepositioned vehicles cover every possible route that the target can take. The wide coverage makes it unnecessary to take turns with the target. Think about it: If you are driving and there is one car behind that mirrors your movements, you will take notice and you will identify their presence quite rapidly. Identification of trained teams is much more difficult because they keep placing different cars behind you. Identification is even more difficult if team members stage themselves in positions along your route and simply alert other members by radio that you have just passed a particular location. Teams using six to ten cars will be hard to detect. Commonly available technology can make matters even worse for anyone trying to detect the presence of surveillance. If a team augments its surveillance with electronic tracking devices, it may be almost impossible to detect. However, once again, all it takes is a little human error to blow the entire operation. You still have an advantage because you know what is usual for your surroundings. Keep alert. Remember the rule: If you see the same car or individual three times separated by time and distance, you are being followed. Again, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of terrorists or common criminals using some of the more sophisticated surveillance techniques. If you are the subject

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Moving Box Surveillance

of an elaborate and well-trained surveillance team, it is far more likely that you are being targeted by the host country’s intelligence service. That being said, even amateur-level operatives can follow you effectively using cell phone technology. On October 4, 2018, Sylvester (Sally Daz) Zottola, a reputed associate of the Bonanno organized crime family, was shot to death at a McDonald’s drive through in the Bronx five days after a tracking device was placed under his car. The next type of mobile surveillance we discuss is foot surveillance. Again, your ability to detect the presence of surveillance is contingent on many factors. How many people are on the street? Is there anything particular about the appearance of the person following you? Unusual dress or physical characteristics will obviously help you figure out that you are being followed. You would be far more likely to observe Dennis Rodman following you than you would Dennis Franz. By the way, this cuts both ways. Remember the advice in Chapter 1 about dressing and behaving conservatively? If you are sporting pink hair, you are not going to blend in—unless you are in certain neighborhoods in Los Angeles, New York, or London. Foot surveillance techniques can be similar to the techniques used in a mobile surveillance. A team is more effective than a single-person surveillance operation. One person follows on foot, not too closely behind you. The person may be following in an offset fashion by walking behind you on the other

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side of the street. When you turn, the tail does not but rather allows the alternate to pick you up. Once again, the technique is only as good as the individual operative’s skill level. The same mistakes that allow you to identify mobile surveillance hold true in regard to foot surveillance. It is also likely that anyone following you will need to remain in radio contact with other team members still in their respective vehicles. Years ago, agents in law enforcement agencies used miniature microphones either clipped inside their lapel or built into an earpiece, allowing operatives to use the same equipment to transmit and listen to responses or other radio traffic while in their vehicles or on foot. Today, with the prevalence of cell phones, it is no longer necessary to use clandestine microphones to transmit while following someone on foot. It is commonplace to see people walking down the street and talking on their cell phones. This will not be something that will catch your attention. However, if the cell phone activity is coupled with other patterns of behavior consistent with someone conducting surveillance, it may indicate that you are being followed by a team using both vehicular and foot surveillance techniques.

Technical Surveillance The most effective surveillance combines physical surveillance techniques with technical surveillance. This allows for the most complete acquisition of information with the lowest probability of detection. Surveillance conducted in this manner by a professional and well-trained team can be extremely difficult to detect and defeat. “Technical surveillance” is a broad term that refers to the use of electronic or optical equipment to gather information. The range of such equipment is vast, including cameras, listening devices (bugs), tracking transmitters, infrared and microwave radiation, parabolic microphones, cell phone tracking, and wiretapping. Although these devices do not replace the need for physical surveillance, they certainly provide a substantial addition to the effort. The use of eavesdropping equipment, for example, can allow people to gather information that would otherwise have been impossible to collect. The use of a simple video camera can allow a particular location to be monitored by a signal transmitted to a point remote from the actual site of the surveillance. Most video surveillance systems are internet based anyway so they can be monitored from anywhere there is connectivity. Generally, stationary and mobile surveillance techniques are used in tandem. However, if the subject appears to be surveillance conscious—that is, if

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he or she takes precautions to avoid being followed—then a stationary surveillance method may be used exclusively. This method also may be utilized quite effectively with technical surveillance techniques, such as wiretaps. Let us assume that a stationary surveillance is set up on the residence of Subject A in conjunction with a wiretap on Subject A’s phone. The wire tap intercepts a call where Subject A arranges to meet someone at a particular location later that day. Stationary surveillance may then be set up at the location of the anticipated meeting. This technique seemingly avoids the necessity of following Subject A from his or her residence to the meet location. However, surveillance agents would still attempt to follow Subject A to the meet location in order to see where the subject went before the meeting. Perhaps the subject went to another location and removed a package from an unknown residence that would be transferred at the meeting. A thorough surveillance technique would try to see if that is, in fact, what happened. This scenario is quite common in narcotics investigations. Therefore, it is standard practice in the DEA and other law enforcement agencies to keep a subject under constant surveillance even while a wiretap is operative. Telephonic intercepts may not provide all the information that is needed. For example, a DEA wire tap may reveal that the subject is going to meet someone to conduct a drug transaction. If the subject is a supplier, for example, it may be clear from the intercepted conversations that he or she is going to deliver a large quantity of drugs to a customer. It is common for drug dealers to keep their supply of narcotics in a safe location known as a stash house. If the location of the stash house is unknown and it is believed that the subject will go there before the meeting, surveillance will try to follow the subject from the residence to find where the drugs are being stored. They will combine a wiretap and other technical surveillance techniques with an aggressive physical surveillance. Remember, tapping a phone is far easier in many countries than it is in the United States. In addition, it is not all that difficult to place a transmitter in a vehicle or other location to eavesdrop on your conversations. The technology needed to accomplish all of these things is available online or at your nearest spy shop. Surveillance is frequently augmented with video cameras. This is a bit high tech for the average criminal or poorly trained terrorist, but it is certainly within the grasp of well-funded and well-trained terror groups. Needless to say, if you are being targeted by an intelligence service of a foreign country, expect them to rely heavily on such devices. As we noted, it is also quite easy to place tracking devices on your vehicle, which gives the opposition the luxury of being able to track your movements on a map accurately to within several feet. These devices can also measure the target’s direction of travel and speed and show which

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intersection he or she is approaching. The use of this type of technology is likely to go unnoticed (unless you engage a professional service with equipment that can detect the presence of active or passive equipment). That is the bad news. The good news is that it is extremely unlikely that any terrorist cell, no matter how well funded it is, will have this type of equipment. And even if the terrorists do have such equipment, there is always the human factor to consider. A mistake by surveillance operatives can compromise even the most elaborate operations. In fact, an alert subject can observe and compromise even a competent team after only a single mistake. In law enforcement parlance, this is referred to as “burning the surveillance” or simply “getting burned.” What should you do if you believe you’re being followed or monitored? The general rule is to avoid making it obvious to those watching you that you are aware of their presence. This is recommended for a number of reasons, the first being your own personal safety. We certainly recommend that you appear to be an alert and cautious person to anyone trying to follow you. You will remember the story of the army sergeant in Chapter 1 who was crossed off a terrorist hit list because he seemed to be alert to possible surveillance. Projecting a sense of awareness may very well mark you as a difficult target, and you may be passed over for an easier one. However, if you do detect surveillance, here are a few pointers: • Do not change your routine. Look as if you are going about your business oblivious to the presence of surveillance. • Stay in well-lit and populated areas only. • Do not stare at the people following you or attempt evasion unless you have reason to believe an attack on you is imminent. • Calmly proceed to a safe haven like the U.S. embassy (or an embassy of a friendly nation), a hospital, or a police station. • Contact the regional security officer (RSO) as soon as possible. The reason not to show that you are aware that you are being followed is that you do not know how they will react. Therefore, it is prudent not to provoke any reaction. It is conceivable, not likely, but possible, that you are being followed in order to be assassinated. Any action you take may cause those following you to attempt to kill you rather than allowing you to escape. Perhaps you are being followed by the country’s intelligence service or by local police. Alerting them to the fact that you have become aware of their activities may cause an unwelcome reaction. You may be taken into custody for interrogation or you may receive a beating. A friend of ours who worked as an agent for the Diplomatic Security Service related a story about agents finding surveillance devices in hotel rooms

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they were staying in while in Russia. The agents tore out such devices only to find the tires on their vehicle slashed the next morning. The message being delivered was “You know the game, and you need to play by the rules.” What is the correct response when you realize that you are being followed? The Department of State recommends that you contact the embassy or consulate immediately. The embassy RSO will decide whether the local authorities need to be notified or whether to handle it in-house. This decision will depend on several factors, most important of which is the level of mutual cooperation between the embassy and local authorities. In some countries, the relationship is less than cooperative, and, as mentioned, it may well be that the local police or intelligence agencies are the ones following you. This is particularly true in many developing nations, where corruption is rampant and the police sometimes are working for the bad guys. The embassy will know whether that is likely and will proceed accordingly. How can you check whether people are following you? Remember, your goal is to identify that you are being followed without tipping your hand. During David’s tenure with the DEA, he participated in hundreds of surveillance operations. Sometimes the surveillance would get burned. Targets wouldn’t do anything to tip their hand but later confided to an informant or an associate on a wiretapped line that they were being followed. Occasionally a bad guy would write down a license plate number and get a motor vehicles check done on it. DEA vehicles were “flagged” with the local motor vehicle department, and the state authorities would notify the agency if someone ran the plates. On rare occasions a target would try to confront a surveillance agent or simply wave, acknowledging the agent’s presence. The object of surveillance detection for our purposes is never to confront those following you but simply to figure out that you are being followed without the surveillance team realizing that you did. Many techniques are effective for picking up the presence of people following you. Counterespionage schools and schools specifically designed to teach criminals to watch out for surveillance exist. Years ago, Colombian cocaine traffickers began mandating that their workers abroad attend these schools to prevent them from getting arrested in possession of millions of dollars in cash or drugs. In schools operated by expatriate Americans, Cubans, Israelis, and Russians, students were trained to drive in a manner designed to frustrate surveillance. The premise of these techniques is actually quite simple: Do things that are unusual and see if anyone does the same thing. For example, one such technique is called squaring the block. Drive to an intersection and turn right (or left). Drive to the next intersection and make another right (or left). Repeat the

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process two more times and you are back where you started, going in the same direction. This is certainly an unusual move to make. Look in your rearview mirror. Is anyone doing the same thing? If so, you may be being followed. Remember, the fact that this is an unusual move will not be lost on the surveillance team. If you do this maneuver, it is best to disguise your purpose with a plausible excuse for the series of turns you make. Let’s say you drive past a side street with a Starbucks on the right. Continue to the next side street and turn right. Take the first available right and turn again. Making another right will put you on the street with the Starbucks. Notice if the car you suspect made those turns with you. In any case, pull over and grab a coffee, which provides an explanation for the series of turns you made. When you leave, notice if the same car leaves with you. Remember that the team could have put another car in its place. Another method is to drive into a store parking lot and see who follows you in. Does the same vehicle leave when you do? (Remember that if multiple vehicles are used, someone in another vehicle may follow you out.) If you are on a highway, try to vary your speed. Does anyone seem to slow down or speed up with you? By the way, one of the most effective ways to compromise surveillance is by driving on a highway below the posted limit. In point of fact, most people routinely break the speed limit. If you are driving at an almost painfully slow speed, most people will pass you. See who does not. It is very difficult to slow down enough to stay behind someone under those conditions. Surveillance operatives often have the lead car pass and exit the highway when possible. The alternate stays comfortably back to allow for distance to be eaten up slowly if it must eventually pass the subject. The more effective method is to use a helicopter to stay with a subject looking for a tail. Another effective method is to use tracking devices. If the folks on you are this sophisticated, then you have a problem. Use your rear- and side-view mirrors but not in a way that makes it clear you are aware you are being followed. Casually notice cars around you, especially cars that seem to mirror your movements. If you are able, jot down their license plate numbers. An easy way to do this is use the text-to-speech function on your smartphone. If you are paying attention, detecting surveillance is not all that difficult to do. Remember, your goal is to detect the presence of surveillance without doing anything to indicate that you are aware that you are being followed. There are many more aggressive ways to “burn” surveillance. Some people suggest that you let your tail follow you down a one-way street or that you radically change speed or change lanes repeatedly. You may exit a highway and then immediately reenter back onto the same road. Double back along your

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route. Avoid using these and other such methods; while they are very likely to reveal whether you are being followed, they alert those following you that you are aware of their presence. You need to be very low key and select only those techniques that don’t advertise the fact that you are checking to see if you are being followed. When you are being followed, you are at risk. Stay calm, try to confirm your suspicions, and do nothing to confront or antagonize the people who are tailing you. You have the advantage as long as the bad guys believe they are invisible. Once they realize that you know they are there, they can change from surveillance to assault, if that is their ultimate purpose. If you find yourself the subject of surveillance, you need to start to “what-if” the situation. If you are attacked, where can you go for help? How far is it to the embassy or consulate? Are the local police likely to assist you? The first and best choice, when possible, is to drive immediately to the embassy, where you will be safe and where you can speak with the RSO or a subordinate. That person will advise you what to do and will notify whatever local authorities he or she deems appropriate. If the officer believes that you are in imminent danger, he or she will assist you in safely leaving the country if necessary.

ADDITIONAL VEHICLE SAFETY MEASURES We have covered route selection and countersurveillance so now let’s discuss specific threats while driving. Attacks can come in many forms: car bombs, road bombs, drive-by shootings, ambush, roadblocks, and carjacking, to name but a few. You must appreciate the dangers that driving abroad may present and learn to minimize those risks. Before we go into detail about specific security-related issues, we want to reiterate the point that the greatest danger to Americans who are driving overseas is traffic accidents. It is estimated that at least 200 Americans die each year in traffic accidents overseas. In fact, traffic accidents abroad kill far more Americans each year than disease, violence, or terrorism. According to the Association for Safe International Road Travel (ASIRT), “The chances of being killed on the roads in countries to which many Americans currently travel is from 20 to 70 times higher than in the United States.” All internationally bound Americans should consult ASIRT. It provides excellent analysis of road and travel conditions around the world as well as detailed information about the road conditions, driver behaviors, patterns of

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traffic, seasonal hazards, night travel, medical care, and traffic safety statistics. A visit to its website (asirt.org) is highly recommended.

Vehicle Preparation and Selection When driving abroad, the absolute first step to take is to make sure that whatever car you drive is reliable. Most parts of the world do not have the Automobile Association of America or roadside assistance. Your vehicle must run well and reliably. Maintenance is an absolute necessity and is far more important than it is in the United States. You must be sure that oil is changed, belts are replaced periodically before they exhibit excessive wear, and your car undergoes frequent engine inspections. If you are renting a car, select one with low mileage and from a reputable company. Rent a make and model common to the country. Avoid choosing a vehicle that would clearly mark you as being affluent or a tourist, but do select one with the best crash rating available. Since, as we’ve said, more Americans abroad are killed in traffic accidents than are the victims of terrorism or street crime, you need to make sure the vehicle is equipped with seat belts and air bags as well. Is there anything about the rental car that will identify it as such to an interested observer? In the past it was common in the United States to issue license plates that clearly identified the cars as being rentals. (The situation is less common today.) Are there markings of that sort on the vehicle you are renting? Recall our discussion about how predatory criminals in the United States looked for the license plates that indicated that vehicles were rentals. This is equally true, and perhaps even more so, abroad. As we have repeatedly noted, to a criminal in a developing country, an American tourist or resident is far more likely to have something worth taking than a local citizen. In many countries, most locals cannot afford to rent a car; affluent tourists and foreigners are the predominant customers of car rental companies. Drive with the doors locked and, whenever possible, with the windows closed. Make sure the climate control system works. If you are in a country in where air conditioning in cars is not common, you will have to drive with windows open, which places you at greater risk.

Secure Your Valuables It is always sound advice to secure your valuables and not leave anything worth stealing in plain view even when you are in the car and driving. Many people

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have enough sense not to leave their wallet, camera, or other items that will attract the attention of a would-be thief in a parked car. You must get in the habit of securing your valuables even when you are driving. Often criminals post themselves at heavily trafficked intersections and observe the interior compartments of vehicles as they pass. Once they see an item of interest, it is a simple matter for them to smash the window, grab the object, and disappear into the crowd before you even have time to react. Thieves on motorcycles or motor scooters routinely drive in between lanes of traffic. How difficult would it be for someone on a moped to reach into your open window, grab your purse or wallet on the seat next to you, and escape? Professional thieves make their living doing this every day. Furthermore, by having some item of value visible in the car, you also may attract the attention of a nonprofessional who may seize on the opportunity that you have presented. You can easily prevent these crimes of opportunity. Remember, in many parts of the world, the monthly salary of a factory worker putting in a fifty-hour workweek equals what you may pay to have dinner with your spouse at a fancy hotel restaurant. Your brand-new digital camera or laptop or phone on the front seat is equal to several months’ wages. Don’t tempt locals with unnecessary displays of affluence.

Recognize a Setup In case this point isn’t already obvious, you should never pick up hitchhikers or stop for any reason in an area that is not populated and well policed. Often female hitchhikers induce cars to stop. Then the drivers are victimized by the hitchhiker’s companions who were hidden nearby. Do not offer to give a ride to anyone whom you do not know well. Criminals have unlimited numbers of ways to deceive motorists into stopping and provide them a chance to strike. These techniques are common wherever there are criminals; that means everywhere. A technique that is often tried at night in the United States is called the stop sign bump. Criminals select a motorist. Perhaps the car is a valuable model; if a sexual crime is being attempted, the driver is a female driving alone. When the targeted vehicle approaches a stop sign and comes to a halt, the criminal’s car gently moves up dose behind and lightly bumps the target vehicle. In almost every case, the driver of the “accidentally” struck vehicle stops and gets out to check the damage, exchange license and insurance information, or yell at driver who just hit him or her. That is exactly what the bad guy is counting on, and that is when he will strike. If this happens to you, do not stop on the road. Drive to the nearest area of safety, such as a police station or hospital, and stop there.

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Often the bad guys pose as good Samaritans themselves. A few years ago in Long Island, New York, a series of sexual assaults were perpetrated by a man who prowled the highway looking for females driving alone late at night. The assailant would pull alongside the victim’s car and start shouting that there was something wrong with her tire. The man was clean cut and well dressed and seemed sincere and concerned. The driver would pull off the road to check what was wrong, with the “good Samaritan” pulling in behind and offering to provide assistance. That is when the women were raped. Do not stop anywhere you would be vulnerable to attack. Drive to a safe place and then check your tire. Sometimes criminals pose as injured victims themselves. Concerned drivers who stop to offer assistance are assaulted. Contact the local embassy or consulate for information to prepare yourself against local crimes involving vehicles or otherwise. A particular country may have recently experienced a rash of carjackings that follow a particular pattern. Being forewarned is truly being forearmed. Learn how the criminals operate, and you can protect yourself through vigilance and proper avoidance measures. Another thing for you to always bear in mind: Criminals frequently work in groups. Just like a pickpocket who uses an accomplice to “accidentally” bump the victim while the pocket is being picked, thieves, robbers, carjackers, and the like also use others to distract or deceive the victim.

Vehicle Safety Check We mentioned before how important it is to be aware of your surroundings and to change your routine frequently. These are things we can control. Unfortunately, there are other things we can’t control. We can’t watch our car all the time or always park it in a secure parking area. Criminals and terrorists who might want to attack us know that and may try to use your unattended car as a tool to fulfill their goal. Although we can’t watch the car all the time, the minimum we can do is to check it before we get in. The following discussion deals with the necessity and method of checking your vehicle. It is good practice to give your vehicle a quick safety check anytime you are going somewhere. Do this prior to your trip, in a safe area. Check the tires for wear, low pressure, or flats. Check the spare tire as well. Also examine fluid levels and the condition of the engine belts. In many areas of the world, the danger of becoming a bombing victim is all too real. Therefore, it is necessary to physically examine the vehicle for explosive devices. This may seem to be an inconvenience, but to quote one of Tom Clancy’s characters in The Hunt for Red

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October, “There is no extravagance in the pursuit of safety.” When should such an “extravagant” inspection be made?

Parking Where will you park your car? Do you have a garage or secure lot at your residence? Is parking at work secure or accessible to the general public? If at all possible, avoid parking on the street, and use established and trustworthy parking garages. Obviously, if you must park on the street or in an unsecured lot, you are going to be exposed to greater risk. If you are tired of your brand-new laptop, just leave it in your car. You will be shopping for a replacement in short order. In addition, although ordinary crime statistically presents greater danger to you than acts of terrorism, using secure parking facilities will enhance your security in that regard as well. Car bombs can be attached to a vehicle quickly and unobtrusively, but generally would-be bombers require a bit of privacy to affix them. Perhaps your attacker wants to disable your vehicle by tampering with your engine or electrical system or by slashing your tires. These types of activities are far easier to accomplish on a dark lonely street or quiet public garage than inside a secure private lot. Where you leave your car definitely impacts the level of scrutiny that you must give to it. As we have noted, the general rule is that you must check your car every time you do not have direct eye contact with it. If you are, for example, working at the U.S. embassy and park in a secure lot guarded by vetted security personnel, you probably can skip the intensive inspection. If, however, you are parking anywhere where potential assailants can approach the vehicle unhindered, you need to give it at least a cursory examination. Before you discount the importance of this practice, remember why terrorists often select car bomb attacks. Because a car is usually used by the same person, generally on a regular schedule, cars are perfect choices for successful method of attack. People who want to hurt you know that at some point they will be able to find you in the driver’s seat at a specific time and in a specific location. This can be a deadly combination. Just because you may not be a particularly high-profile target, don’t assume that you will not be attractive to a terror group operating in the local country. The purpose of terror is to terrorize. A slated goal of many terrorist organizations is the murder of Americans anywhere in the world.

Car Bombs Car bomb attacks occur all over the world. Even the United States has its share of car bombings every year. While David was an agent on Long Island, a Suffolk

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County Narcotics detective named Dennis Wustenheuff was killed by a car bomb in the driveway of his home. Internationally, car bombs continue to be used to kill specific persons, so this threat cannot be discounted. Ilan has trained Israeli diplomatic personnel in the proper techniques to check a vehicle. Often when he starts to discuss the issue, students commonly say, “This is a waste of time. I am not a mechanic, and if someone put a bomb in my car’s engine I will never find it.” Ilan privately agreed with that argument and decided to research actual car bombings to evaluate the effectiveness of the program he was teaching. He spent several years analyzing many attacks that involved placing a car bomb on a vehicle. To his surprise, he found that in almost all of the incidents, loss of life could have been prevented easily. In almost all the incidents he reviewed, the attacker placed the bomb somewhere it would have been very easy to find if the driver had been trained where to look and had made a car inspection a routine precaution. Why is this so? Can’t expert bombers hide an explosive in a place that can’t be readily observed? To address this point, we need to remember a few facts. First, criminals and/or terrorists have a limited amount of time in which to install a bomb. Terrorists generally gain access to the car while it is parked in a public place. They need to work quickly because a passerby might observe them while they are attempting to place the device. Even terrorists get nervous and worry about the risk of detection and arrest. Consequently, they try to limit the amount of time they are exposed to reduce their risk of getting caught. Second, criminals and terrorists both assume that people are not checking their cars. Therefore, why risk detection by doing something that is complicated and time consuming, like opening the car’s hood and planting the bomb inside the engine compartment? That would only increase their risk of exposure without greatly enhancing mission success. One of the easiest ways to bomb a vehicle is to place the explosive in a crumpled-up brown paper bag and to put it under the car. The bag looks like just another piece of trash, perhaps the remnants of someone’s lunch. Bombers wait for the victim to return to his or her vehicle and then remotely detonate the explosive. Often they use a cell phone for this purpose. Cell phones operate on batteries. Devices that use batteries cause electrical current to flow. It is easy to redirect this current to an electronic detonator. All bombers have to do is call the number of the phone attached to the bomb, and it will detonate. How do you check your vehicle? You do not need any special skills to prevent an attack. All you need to do is to learn which areas of your vehicle are likely spots for a bomb to be placed, then devote a few minutes to examining these vulnerable points each time your car has been out of your direct eye contact. Once you learn where to look, it will be very easy to find anything unusual.

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The four points on your vehicle that are most vulnerable to a bomb placement are: behind the tire, on top of the tire, under the car, and in the trunk or engine compartment.

Bomb behind the Tire A common technique used by terrorists attempting a car bomb assassination of a particular individual is to hide the explosive device behind the tire as you are facing it (see Exhibit 7.8). Exhibit 7.8

Bomb behind Tire (left) and Bomb behind Tire Close-up (right)

In Exhibit 7.8, a bomb is simply placed behind the wheel closest to the driver’s seat. We have wrapped the “bomb” in white to allow you to clearly see what we are describing. Don’t expect a real bomb to be so noticeable! The triggering device may be a simple wire that your car pulls as you drive away. Or a simple pressure switch can be attached to the explosive and stuffed under the tire. The weight of the tire keeps the switch depressed. When the wheel moves, the switch activates and detonates the device. It is, therefore, critically important to check underneath the car after you park. If nothing is there when you arrive but something is present when you return, you may have a problem.

Bomb on Top of Tire In Exhibit 7.9, the bomb has been placed on top of the driver’s side wheel. Before you think that a bomb like this is easy to spot, consider the situation of a dark-colored device placed on top of the tire in the evening. Even this somewhat amateurish attempt will succeed most of the time. People returning to their cars at night after having dinner out usually do not spend much time checking their cars. The areas on top of or behind the front tires or wheels and underneath the car are not immediately visible unless someone squats down. Although attackers

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can install a bomb behind any of the tires, statistics show that in most instances, terrorists generally place the device behind the front tire closest to the driver’s seat. This is not surprising because the closer the bomb is to an intended victim, the less explosive is required and, hence, the smaller the bomb can be. This is important for several reasons. First, a smaller device is less likely to be observed. Second, often terrorists can acquire only a small amount of explosive material. If a group is contemplating multiple bombings, it will need to be somewhat parsimonious with its supply of explosive material. This method of placement is also quite desirable because it can be done quickly, without the attacker being exposed for very long. This technique is so quick to accomplish that it can be used on a vehicle parked on a public road or openly accessible parking area. The method of detonation is generally a simple triggering device. As soon as the vehicle moves, the trigger (or the pin on a hand grenade) is pulled and the device is detonated. Although this method is very common because of the relative ease with which the bomb can be rigged, it is also very easy to detect the device. All you need to do is to take a quick look behind the tires, paying extra attention to the area behind the tire that is closest to the driver’s seat. Remember, this positioning will change between left- and right-hand-drive cars.

Exhibit 7.9

Bomb on Top of Tire

Bomb under the Car In a bombing attempt on a vehicle, simply placing a large explosive device under a car is the method chosen most frequently by terrorists. Attackers who possess sufficient quantities of explosive materials use this method quite frequently. The reason for this is very simple. With enough explosive material, the attackers can assemble a bomb that is large enough to destroy the car completely and thus ensure the target’s death. Also, it is very easy for attackers to place this type of bomb, because it doesn’t need to be attached physically to any part of the car. Attackers can prepare the bomb at home and then merely place it directly

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under the car (see Exhibit 7.10). Attackers are exposed for only a very short time, and therefore their risk of detection and capture is very low. Usually this type of device is detonated with either a remote control or a timing device. It is, therefore, critically important to check underneath the car after you park, and again when you leave, to be sure that nothing has changed. In Exhibit 7.10, the bomb has been put inside Exhibit 7.10 Explosive in Box beneath Car a light-colored box, which was placed under the car. The bomb could easily be mistaken for a pizza box that had fallen to the ground. If you were parked near a pizza shop, you might ignore it. Terrorists are counting on you to accept the most plausible explanation there is. Don’t forget, though, that dark boxes placed at night might be invisible unless you make a thorough search every time. As mentioned before, it’s very easy for attackers to plant bombs in this manner, but it is also easy for alert drivers to prevent this kind of attack. Just as attackers can place a bomb under a car, targets can look under their cars and see the bomb very clearly. One note of caution, however: Remember the paper bag trick. During your inspection, if you see a crumpled-up bag that is larger than a balled-up piece of sandwich wrap, suspect it. Remember to check the area under the car after you park. Be suspicious if you notice something when you return that wasn’t there when you first arrived.

Bomb inside the Trunk or Engine Compartment Placing a bomb inside the trunk or engine compartment is less popular with terrorist attackers because it requires that the car be broken into prior to the placement of the explosive. However, if it can be accomplished without detection, it is an excellent to place a bomb where it will not be seen (see Exhibit 7.11). Since this type of bomb takes more time to install than the ones already discussed, attackers will need to operate in a closed or secluded place where nobody can see them. They may also install such bombs in a parking garage where you leave your keys with the attendant.

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While the risk for attackers is higher and requires more sophisticated techniques, this method has been used when the objective has been to deliver a bomb into a secure facility. It is easier to have a bomb driven into a secure location inside a car familiar to the security force than inside one that is not. For example, an employee driving to work each day in the same car will likely pass through security without inspection. In most government facilities, even secure locations, security generally either waves through familiar vehicles driven by recognized individuals or performs a perfunctory check of a picture ID. Neither of us has ever had a vehicle inspected by security anywhere. Once we have shown our ID, we have always been waved right through the guard gate. The same is true for thousands upon thousands of federal agents, intelligence analysts, military officers, and others with unfettered access to sensitive facilities. As a rule, agents and military personnel are not given instruction in the methods of securing their private or issued vehicles. It would not be especially difficult to place explosives in an agent’s car and have the agent unwittingly deliver it inside a sensitive facility. Because the object is to bomb a facility, attackers use a large amount of explosive material. Therefore, it is easy to find when you open the trunk of the car. Furthermore, even without checking the trunk, aware and alert drivers can feel the extra weight in their trunk by the change in the handling characteristics of the vehicle. It is somewhat more difficult to find a bomb that has been placed in the engine compartment, but a little training can solve that problem. Whenever we check inside the trunk or under the hood, we need to be aware to the possibility that an attacker has attached a bomb to the hood or the trunk and rigged it to explode when the hood or trunk lid is raised beyond a certain point. In either case, we should open it very slowly and not all the way at once, as Exhibit 7.12 shows.

Exhibit 7.11

Bomb inside Trunk

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As the exhibit shows, Exhibit 7.12 Bomb inside Engine Compartment generally a long length of wire, with a fair amount of slack, is attached to the trunk lid or hood. The simplest method of detonating the device is to use the opening of the trunk or hood to pull the wire taut, thus triggering the bomb or pulling the pin on a hand grenade. The slack is present because the bomber must be able to affix the bomb to the vehicle and attach the wire to the lid without setting it off. The bomber tapes the bomb in place and partially closes the lid or hood, then ties the detonation wire to the lid or hood. You can understand the need for slack in the wire if you try to imagine installing this bomb and not pulling the detonation wire during the installation process. Because there is slack in the wire, by carefully opening the lid or hood by inches and looking underneath, you should be able to see any tripwire before you cause the bomb to explode. Attackers can also easily disable the engine to ensure that the hood gets opened by the target as he or she tries to diagnose engine trouble. The bomb may also be set with a timing, motion, or other detonation method with the wire as a secondary method. However, just as electronic trunk release buttons on a key chain will allow a trunk to be safely opened and inspected, there are also electronic remote opening features for hoods. Some security-conscious individuals also place double-locking devices on the hood and trunk or indicators in strategic areas of the car to detect whether anyone has been in the trunk or under the hood as added precautions. Every James Bond fan will remember 007’s trick of moistening a long hair and sticking it between two folding closet doors. If the hair is disturbed, it is clear that someone has been in the closet. You can use a small piece of strategically placed tape or thread to detect an unauthorized entry into your vehicle. It is also a good idea to have a small flashlight on your key chain. Do not rely on a flashlight that you keep in your vehicle for use during an inspection of your vehicle. You should begin your inspection before

150 Exhibit 7.13

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you are even near the vehicle, as it is easier to see under the car while you are some distance away. If you notice something and it is dark, you need to have a light with you. There are many good, small lights available on the market (see Exhibit 7.13) and, of course, everyone’s cell phone easily doubles as a flashlight.

Roadside Emergency Equipment It is also a good idea to keep a basic roadside emergency kit in your vehicle. The basic equipment is the same as you should maintain in your personal or work vehicle at home. Make sure you have an inflated, full-size spare tire. The emergency donuts that usually come with vehicles are not suitable. You may need to drive a long way over poorly maintained roads before you can get to a service area where your tire can be repaired or replaced. The donuts are not recommended for more than 25 miles and limit the speed at which you can travel. Make sure there is a functional jack and lug wrench. If your car has locking lugs on the tires, make sure the key is in your car. You will also need a basic tool kit that includes an adjustable wrench, slotted and Phillips head screwdrivers, pliers, duct tape or PVC tape, booster cables, a water-resistant flashlight, extra batteries stored in a waterproof plastic container, a siphon pump, one can of tire inflator, and six road flares. An excellent piece of equipment that you should also consider is a rechargeable jump starter. This is a battery with which you can jump-start your vehicle in the event your battery fails and no one is around to give you a boost. Many of these units have a built-in compressor that allows you to inflate a tire under emergency roadside conditions. You must also expand this basic kit to include items specifically required by the environment in which you will be traveling. For example, in very hot climates, you will need to bring extra coolant for your radiator as well as an ample supply of drinking water. In cold weather, stow aboard an ice scraper, a small folding shovel, emergency candles, waterproof matches, and gloves. A small first aid kit consisting of Band-Aid strips, gauze pads, and adhesive tape is also a good idea.

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If you are traveling cross-country, a compass is an indispensable item. Nowadays a global positioning system (GPS) system is even better and can allow you to pinpoint your location to within several feet on a map. Depending on the country that you are in, the GPS may be able to provide you with the same type of detailed driving instructions that you can get in the United States. If not, the system still can tell you your location and direction and show it on a map. Prices for serviceable GPS systems have fallen a great deal, and units are available at very reasonable prices, largely because highly sophisticated GPS systems are downloadable right to your smartphone. As long as you have a charged battery and connectivity, you can not only locate yourself with precision but send that location to anyone you wish or even allow others to see where you are in real time.

EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL FROM HIGH-RISK AREAS In most instances, the nature of an emergency will not necessitate the evacuation of corporate personnel from the country. However, quite often it will be necessary to convey specific warnings to personnel about dangers in a particular area. For example, if there is a major, antiwestern demonstration near the main shopping area in a particular city, it will be necessary to warn personnel of this development and direct them to stay clear of the area. In some instances, a situation in a host country deteriorates to the point that evacuation becomes necessary. The best thing to do under such circumstances is to mirror the policy of the embassy or consulate. Every year the Department of State initiates evacuations, either partial or full, for many diplomatic missions throughout the world. Obviously when this action becomes necessary, the Department of State also recommends the evacuation of nongovernmental U.S. citizens. If the department decides that dependents of embassy personnel are at risk, they will be evacuated first. It may be prudent to follow the dictates of the Department of State in this regard. Dependents generally are evacuated before the situation deteriorates to the point of total collapse. At that time, it is still possible to leave the country on commercial airlines or via charter aircraft. The time to evacuate dependents is before even the trip to the airport will be fraught with danger. Essential personnel will likely stay on in the embassy as the crisis worsens. A large part of their function will be to look after the welfare of American citizens who have not left. If this is the type of situation you find yourself in, you must stay in constant contact with the embassy. If closing the embassy is being considered, it is time for

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you to leave as well. The embassy staff will assist you during an evacuation if you cannot leave safely on your own. It is extremely irresponsible to ignore the reality that no matter where overseas you are located, there may come a time when evacuation is necessary. It is critical, therefore, especially in high-threat areas of the world, to have a complete evaluation plan in place. This plan must be coordinated with the local embassy. The RSO should be consulted during all phases of plan formulation. The plan must provide for a complete or partial evacuation of employees and their families in the event of civil unrest, terrorism, natural disaster, or medical emergency. An appropriate country or location of refuge must be determined in advance, and arrangements must be prearranged with facilities and agencies of the country chosen to handle the arrival of all or some of your personnel. Evacuation plans are solely the responsibility of the individual company. The embassy has neither the resources nor the mandate to provide for the evacuation of private sector employees. It does, however, have the responsibility to apprise local U.S. citizens of any potential dangers to their safety or property and will coordinate and assist in the development of any evacuation plans. During times of crisis, embassy personnel will do everything possible to assist all U.S. citizens in safely leaving the country if it becomes necessary. Preplanning in conjunction with the embassy or consulate is essential to make this happen without loss of life or injury. Perhaps the most important role of the local embassy is the monitoring of the security situation within the country. Remember, embassy staff has access to high-level governmental contacts and intelligence that private companies do not. Even large corporations having contacts at the highest levels of the local government may not perceive the warning signs of an impending crisis. The government often controls the media, and content may reflect the government line and not necessarily the truth. Close contact with the embassy is necessary to monitor deteriorating situations and begin the implementation of steps necessary to effect an evacuation if it becomes necessary. The Department of State recommends that each company designate a senior-level manager, assisted by appropriate individuals, to be responsible for the planning of any evacuation as well as to monitor the political and security situation in the host country. The designated manager and his or her support team should meet at least twice a year to review the plan and the local situation. Regular meetings are particularly important, as personnel changes may need to be reflected in the planning details. Any significant change in the stability of the situation locally or in the region in general should cause the

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evacuation committee to meet more frequently. Prior to each meeting, a test of the employee notification system should be conducted. The results should be discussed during the meeting, and shortcomings should be identified and corrected. Again, in high-risk areas, the testing must be done on a more frequent basis. The plan should identify a secure assembly area where employees can gather in the event an evacuation is ordered. The assembly area must be carefully selected for its defensibility as well as its proximity to the airport or point of embarkation. Particular attention should be given to the nature of the roadway between the assembly area and the point of departure. More than one possible route is preferred. The Department of State strongly recommends that evacuees gather at a secure staging area rather than the point of embarkation to minimize evacuees’ exposure to danger. The plan must allow for the possibility that one or more of the planned routes will be impassible for one reason or another. Transportation of evacuees to the airport, for example, is done in appropriately sized groups that can be protected en route and will not overwhelm the ability of the carriers to transport them. The last thing you want is for your employees to be forced to wait for hours or even days to get on a flight. The plan also must identify secondary assembly areas in the event that a disturbance or natural disaster renders the primary staging area unsafe. Similarly, secondary points of departure should be identified in the event the airport or other primary choice is closed. If your company is in constant contact with the embassy and is monitoring the situation closely, it should be possible to evacuate the staff smoothly via commercial carriers before the condition reaches a critical level. In the event commercial carriers are filled or not available, arrangements for charter flights can be made in conjunction with other companies in-country also ordering an evacuation. Contacts with charter airlines should be made long before an actual emergency arises. If the situation results in a complete breakdown of all services and government functions, the Department of State advises staying put in a secure area and not attempting to move around the country in an attempt to get out. Moving around exposes personnel to far greater danger than does sitting tight and waiting for the conditions to stabilize, the Department of State has found. Once an evacuation is deemed necessary, no company personnel should unilaterally attempt to leave the country or travel internally. The assembly area should be amply stocked with nonperishable food items, fresh water, and medicine. Anyone taking prescription medication should have enough on hand to weather the crisis. The Department of State has identified three phases of an evacuation and a fourth that necessitates staying in place. Each stage has a specific set

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of procedures attendant to it. According to the Overseas Security Advisory Council, the phases are: Phase I, Alert Stage: A warning to companies and individuals of host country instability. Phase II, Limited Action: Increased preparation for evacuation includes those preparations made under conditions of increased tension or instability that could lead to partial or complete evacuation of expatriate employees and their dependents. Phase III, Evacuation Phase: Final preparation and/or evacuation includes those preparations made under conditions in which the decision to evacuate is imminent or has already been made. Withdrawal and cessation of business is imminent or under way. Standing Fast: Could be implemented in the event that evacuation is not considered prudent. Under this concept, employees and their dependents would remain in their quarters (or other designated location) for an extended period of time until tensions abate. In Phase I, a situation begins to develop in the host country or region that engenders some concern from the embassy. Typically, the embassy will issue a warning or simply advise the expatriate community of the nature of the incident causing some concern. This notice should be considered akin to a hurricane warning or perhaps a report from the U.S. Geological Survey detailing some minor seismic activity that may foreshadow an earthquake. It is at this stage, the earliest twitch, that preplanning should be done. The evacuation committee should meet and discuss the recent events. The evacuation plan should be reviewed and assessed. Every what-if should be pondered, and the employee notification system should be tested. The Department of State recommends that evacuation priorities be established. It suggests: First priority: Dependents Second priority: Individuals other than key expatriate employees Third priority: Key expatriate employees This is basically the same system that is used by the government. If you will pardon the sexism, it is the modern equivalent of “women and children first.”

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Dependents are, quite naturally, the first concern. The government then makes the distinction between “essential” and “nonessential” personnel. In the private sector, this is defined as the difference between ordinary employees and key personnel. In a gradually developing situation, an evacuation will be ordered for government employees along these lines. Dependent family members are considered most vulnerable, and evacuation is generally attempted before any real danger develops. If conditions worsen and operations are gradually curtailed, nonessential employees are sent home next. Essential personnel remain until the last possible moment, generally assisting nongovernmental citizens who disregarded earlier warnings and stayed in country too long. Evacuation plans should be organized along those lines for corporate employees. Throughout Phase I, evacuation plans should be constantly updated, and all personnel must be made aware of the process if evacuation is necessary. In the office, planning should include the protection of assets and proprietary information in case evacuation becomes necessary. Backups of corporate records and computer files should be made and sent to a secure site or to the home office. Teams should be assigned to identify what documents or equipment might need to be destroyed or what computer information would need to be removed from computer hard drives. Assume that in an unstable situation, foreign assets will be deliberately searched, looted, and possibly destroyed. As conditions continue to worsen, Phase II is reached. Evacuation may be a real possibility or may be imminent. Additional planning is made and all assets are placed in a standby status. Management must continue to monitor the situation and know the whereabouts of all employees and their family members at all times. Management should be in constant contact with the embassy, the home office, and other in-country expatriate companies with which cooperative evacuation protocols have been established. Phase III is reached when the senior corporate manager, who has been in constant contact with the embassy and home office, determines that the situation has become dangerous, volatile, or otherwise unstable and nonessential employees and that all dependent family members must be evacuated. Assets should have already been put in place in Phase II to support the evacuation. During this stage, the senior manager must decide whether to assemble all personnel at a secure staging area or allow everyone to remain in their homes pending the actual call to evacuate. The staging area should be assessed again for its defensibility, and routes to the airport or other departure points should be scouted and assessed for safe passage. Under certain conditions, staying put and hunkering down may be determined to be a safer choice than evacuating. Employees and their family

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members would be instructed to remain in their homes or report to alternate secure assembly points. Families should have prepared stocks of food, water, and medicine in case this becomes a necessity. The decision as to where to hunker down will be made by management in conjunction with the RSO. It is important to understand that merely having a plan is not enough. For the plan to be effective, it must be thoroughly and regularly drilled. At first the drills must be frequent. Once personnel become familiar with the plan, unscheduled drills should be conducted on a quarterly basis at the very least. Ideally the plan should be drilled each time critical personnel are changed. More frequent drilling is indicated in high-risk locations or if the nature of the business is inherently dangerous or a high-profile target. Particular attention should be given to communication in order to make absolutely sure all personnel are able to receive notifications and direction as needed. In military operations and tactical law enforcement, there is a concept known as a postoperational brief back. This is nothing more than a critical review, conducted by the participants, of the operation. The purpose of this review is to provide the necessary feedback required to make subsequent operations even more successful. Similarly, postdrill reviews must be held after any run-through of the emergency plan. For the reviews to be effective in eliminating plan weaknesses, representatives of each of the departments must attend the meetings. In addition, for the plan to be effective, it must be coordinated with the appropriate departments or agencies within the local host government, as long as the inclusion of local the government is safe and prudent. Representatives from the local police and fire departments as well as any emergency management agencies should be consulted. Unless there is some security reason to prevent it, these government contacts should be consulted in the planning stage and also should be invited to sit in on operational meetings. If agency representatives are willing, they should be involved in drilling the plan once it is in place and in any “tabletop” exercises (exercises where key decision makers and emergency management personnel discuss responses to various simulated incidents and emergencies around a table rather than during an actual formal drill or exercise) designed to prepare management to implement the plan in an emergency and to evaluate performance during a mock crisis.

CHAPTER 8

Hijacking and Hostage Survival HIJACKING We gave a great deal of thought about whether to include this chapter in this edition. The original chapter was written just after hijackers brought down the Twin Towers and attacked the Pentagon with planes they commandeered. Since then, the Transportation Security Administration was created, and airport security, while still far from perfect, is much better than it was. Hijacking has become less likely as security has improved. Why then did we decide to include this chapter? In December 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) posted the following warning about conditions at Ninoy Aquino Airport in the Philippines: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) today announced the determination that aviation security at Ninoy Aquino International Airport (MNL), which serves as a last-point-of-departure airport for flights to the United States, does not maintain and carry out effective security consistent with the security standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). This determination was based on assessments by a team of security experts from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).1

It is clear from that warning that security lapses in some countries can create opportunities for hijackers to exploit. Therefore, we address the topic again in 157

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this edition. That being said, the subject of hijacking is perhaps the most difficult on which to provide instruction. The traditional school of thought, advocated by experts who had studied the hijackings perpetrated in the 1970s and 1980s, always focused on compliance with the hijackers and cautioned against taking any action against them. Some years ago, the Department of State published a set of guidelines that listed the most effective ways to survive a hijacking by keeping a low profile. These guidelines are no longer being disseminated, but they stressed that the most important thing to do was to remain below the hijackers’ radar by being docile and unobtrusive. These guidelines and others provided by other government departments instruct readers on how to avoid being noticed or singled out and how to stay away from areas that terrorist hijackers may focus on. This material suggests that you begin planning to avoid being noticed even as you purchase your airplane seat. You should ask for a window seat rather than an aisle seat. If the plane is hijacked, you will be close to the window and farther away from the attention of the bad guys. Keep as much distance between you and them and avoid catching their eyes. Obey the terrorists and don’t do anything to challenge or antagonize them. Remember, the most dangerous moments of a hijacking are the initial takeover and during any attempt at rescue. The terrorists are likely to be nervous as well, the guidelines say, especially during the initial assault. They will be very tense and agitated; as humans, they will feel the effects of adrenaline, and that makes them dangerous. Interestingly, the fact that they do have human reactions (at least some of them) is something you may use to your benefit later. Use the common thread of humanity that you both share; try develop a rapport with the captors and gradually make some small requests for items to enhance your personal comfort. If you have family pictures with you, showing them will be to your advantage. Everyone has family. It may be the way to bridge the gap that exists between you and the hijackers. (This advice is sounder when applied to long-term hostage ordeals.) Once you become humanized to them, they will be less likely to harm you. The hijacking guidelines published by the government remind readers to maintain dignity while being held hostage. This seems to be quite a tall order under the circumstances. On the whole, these guidelines are very similar to the suggestions given by most experts about how to behave during a kidnapping or hostage situation. Because in some cases a hijacking can degenerate into a prolonged hostage situation, there are common elements to both scenarios. However, there are also marked differences and, therefore, reasons to approach each scenario differently. On balance, the advice given is sound with one caveat, which is discussed next.

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Change of Terrorist Goals Warrants Change in Strategy Recent events have caused airline security experts all over the world to rethink traditional ideas on how to behave during a hijacking. Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, airline security experts almost uniformly recommended the submissive and nonconfrontational approach during a hijacking incident. The reason was obvious. Prior to September 11, hijackers took planes to use them as bargaining chips. Their goal was to gain control of the plane and then divert it to somewhere from which they could get other terrorists aboard to assist them. Then they would threaten to kill the hostages unless and until their demands were met. The premise underlying the submissive approach was that the lives of the hostages had value; therefore, the hijackers wouldn’t harm or kill anyone without provocation because doing so would be contrary to their goals. The advice was always to “Obey the hijackers,” “Keep a low profile,” and “Avoid eye contact with the hijackers.” As we noted, lesson plans went into great detail about where to sit to stay below the terrorists’ radar. Passengers were encouraged to fly wide-bodied aircraft because the large number of passengers and multiple aisles made them too difficult to manage. All of these theories (except the fact that hijackers still do not prefer wide-bodied planes) went out the window on September 11. All of a sudden the goal was to turn passenger planes into missiles. Those who attempted to formulate effective guidelines for passengers who found themselves in the middle of a hijacking did not factor this possibility into the equation. Silently obeying the commands of fanatics whose actions would certainly result in your death was no longer the best advice. Suddenly the experts were recommending passenger rebellions and pilots armed with pistols. The bottom line is that no one really knows what to do; Monday morning quarterbacks always know what should have been done. Unfortunately, the majority of us can’t read minds. If you knew that all your assailants wanted was to take you on a nice plane ride to Cuba, submitting quietly would seem to make sense. Now, however, you don’t know if they intend to fly the plane into the airspace of a country friendly to them or into something they wish to destroy. In fact, in Osama Bin Laden’s taped discussion of the attacks, it is clear that most of the hijackers themselves did not know what the true nature of the mission was. Apparently only a few knew that the mission was a suicide bombing using an aircraft as a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.

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Once it becomes clear, however, that the planes are to be flown into buildings, passengers have no choice other than to act. To do nothing virtually guarantees you will perish if the plane is crashed into a target or if the president directs the military to shoot down the plane. As Francis X. Taylor told the Congressional Committee on International Relations: One result of the terrorists’ stark “us” vs. “them” attitude is their willingness to kill large numbers of innocent people in suicide attacks without claiming responsibility or stating a measurable demand. In the past, when terrorists hijacked aircraft or took over a building, they did so in pursuit of specific and quantifiable political goals, such as forcing governments to release previously captured colleagues or the media to publish manifestos. The September 11 attacks were a continuation of the trend to inflict maximum casualties, without regard to loss of life or likelihood of achieving specific demands. The planners used a ghastly scenario of the kind that could be imagined only by people so full of hatred that they are beyond the civilized pale.2

This tactic represents a quantum shift in the mind-set of terrorists who continue to use airliners in furtherance of their goals and argues against docility. Almost every American is aware of the now-famous last recorded words of Todd Beamer, a passenger on United Airlines Flight 93. The passengers on board knew they were the fourth plane hijacked that day, and they knew the fate of the other three planes. Beamer and several other passengers decided not to go “gentle into that good night.” Instead, they fought the terrorists and prevented them from crashing the plane into any major government target. Ordinary citizens, untrained and unarmed, fought with five armed terrorists and won. Tragically, they were able to save the lives of their fellow Americans on the ground at the cost of their own. Beamer’s words, “Let’s roll,” will always be remembered as an example of how ordinary citizens, when put to the test, became heroes. The passengers aboard the first three planes—two of which hit the World Trade Center and one that hit the Pentagon—apparently did not resist but followed the advice given by our federal government. They sat quietly and tried not to be noticed as the terrorists flew the planes into their targets. This is not criticism; the passengers on the earlier flights had no idea of the terrorists’ goals; those on Flight 93 did know the fate of the other planes Although they lost their lives, their valiant behavior saved the lives of countless others who would have been killed had the fourth plane hit its intended target.

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Recommendations Is there currently a consensus on what to do in the unlikely event that you are aboard a hijacked airline? Probably no. The truth of the matter is that knowledgeable security experts weigh in on both sides of the issue. Our approach is to cover both methods recommended by experts in the field. If you are ever the victim of this type of attack, you will need to decide for yourself the correct course of action. If the terrorists seem to be using passengers as bargaining chips, then opt for the traditional advice: Maintain a low profile and try not to be noticed. However, if it even appears as if something other than that is happening, then you must begin to switch your mind-set to fight back with every bit of strength and ferocity you can muster. The philosophy that we have espoused in this book is somewhat different from that in most other security publications. You need to be able to understand how to play both cards. At the onset of a hijacking, it is probably sound advice to try to keep a low profile and avoid having terrorists focus on you. However, this is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself. There may come a time when you personally need to act. The situation is, quite literally, one of life or death. If you don’t have to physical ability to fight, then perhaps you can support others who can. You may need to be a leader and rally others. This approach means that every single person must make a conscious decision not to simply sit and do nothing while vicious and depraved sociopaths take away their lives and futures. Do not make any moves right away. An armed air marshal may be on board and may be planning to take action, and you need to stay out of the way if shooting starts. Armed security agents typically wait to assess the nature of the opposition before they act. They will be readying themselves to attack the hijackers as they try to ascertain how many bad guys they will be facing. They will prepare themselves to go for their weapon and wait for the terrorists to become distracted and turn their attention away. When the agents move, it will be quickly and decisively. Remember, if you are on board an aircraft during a hijacking and a security agent takes action, once the shooting starts, do not get out of your seat and try to help. The agent does not know who you are and will likely view you as another target who must be engaged. Hijackers may have accomplices or “sleepers” among the passengers. Stay down and if you are traveling with children, get on top of them. If the time comes and you need to fight, understand that you are in a fight for your life and the lives of your family. Do whatever is necessary to put the hijackers down and keep them down.

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Confronting the Threat As of this writing, the recommendations of the Department of State have not changed: Passengers should do nothing and not fight back. Travelers are advised not to get involved if they observe a disturbance or attack. We reject this advice. While in some instances such behavior may be appropriate, today the people likely to confront you on a plane don’t need you alive to bargain with. In fact, your presence is actually incidental to them. To sit by and do nothing only makes it easier for them to end your life. If you must fight, these rules must he burned into your mind: • • • •

Maintain the will to live. Do not give up. Fight despite your fear or injuries. Initiate immediate violent, effective action to terminate the threat to your life.

We are aware that this seems to be an almost impossible task, but be assured that fighting for one’s life is well within everyone’s ability. The attackers have a plan. Dealing with determined resistance is not something they are counting on. Their plan is to attack violently, perhaps brutally murdering passengers before your eyes to cow everyone into obedience. Having to fight dozens of enraged passengers is not something they expect, yet fighting may very well be your only way to survive. There are many instances of ordinary citizens rising up to meet threats. For example, on December 7, 1993, a gunman opened fire on passengers aboard a Long Island Rail Road Train near the Merillon Avenue station in Nassau County, New York. Three heroic passengers physically attacked the gunman while he was reloading his 9mm pistol and ended the rampage, which left six dead and seventeen wounded. On December 22, 2001, an airline passenger named Richard Reid, a British citizen of British and Jamaican ancestry, attempted to blow up a plane with explosives hidden in his shoe. Passengers and flight attendants overpowered Reid, who has since been linked to radical Islamist terrorist organizations, when they observed him trying to touch a lit match to his sneakers during the Paris-to-Miami flight. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents testified at Reid’s bail hearing that the explosive in his shoe was of sufficient quantity and destructive power to have blown a hole in the plane’s fuselage. As you may recall from the discussion of active shooter incidents in Chapter 5, in many cases unarmed civilians have restrained shooters and saved lives. Incidents like these and dozens of others are leading aviation security experts to encourage passengers to take action during a hijacking or other crisis.

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Rescue Attempts Attempts to retake the aircraft also present extreme dangers to passengers and crew. Ordinarily, hijackings are treated in much the same way as hostage situations: Trained hostage negotiators attempt to end the situation peacefully by establishing a dialogue with the hijackers. The assault option is held as a last resort if negotiations fail or if the hijackers begin killing the passengers. If an assault is attempted, it will, if the entry team is well trained, be fast and violent. The doors may be breached by explosive charges, and flash bangs (stun grenades) will likely be used both as a diversionary tactic and to disorient the hijackers. If the assault team is wearing night-vision equipment to give them a tactical advantage over the hijackers, the lights may be cut, plunging the plane into total darkness. Your only option is to get yourself and those with you as low as possible. Do not stand up for any reason. The assault team will be yelling for you to get down. Anyone standing, especially someone who rises quickly, will probably be shot. Once the plane is secured, everyone will be ordered off. Standard procedure is to have passengers exit with their hands up. This is done because the police or military team conducting the rescue has no way of knowing if you are a passenger or a hijacker. There have been several documented cases of hijackers attempting to escape by exiting along with the passengers. Until the rescuers are sure of your identity, expect to be considered a possible suspect and follow the commands of the rescuers. Once you have been properly identified, you will in all likelihood receive considerable assistance from the Department of State officials monitoring the situation. Your health and safety will be their first concern, as will letting you contact your loved ones as soon as possible if you are unable to do so with your own device. You also can expect to be extensively debriefed by law enforcement and intelligence personnel, especially if you have been released through negotiated efforts while others are still being held. Your duty is to assist officials and provide as much detailed information as you possibly can. It may well be that something you remember or noticed while you were held will facilitate the release of others. If the hijacking leads to a drawn-out situation where passengers are being held for a long period of time, try to remain as calm and clear-headed as possible. Everything is being done to facilitate your release. The U.S. government’s policy is firm: It will negotiate but not make concessions. It is the responsibility of the host government to deal with the situation. This may or may not be good news. If you are in Britain, Germany, or Israel, you will be in good shape. The governments there are responsible, and they possess the ability to mount

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a rescue operation if necessary. If you are being held in Lebanon or Venezuela however, you may be in trouble. Avoid resistance and sudden or threatening movements. Do not struggle or try to escape unless you are certain of being successful. Weigh many factors carefully before deciding to attempt an escape. You must take into account your personal ability and physical condition. Have you had any training in unarmed combat or escape techniques? If you are being held, prepare yourself for the possibility of a long ordeal. Now is the time to follow the Department of State’s suggestions and remain inconspicuous. If addressed, speak normally. Do not be argumentative or belligerent, and comply with all orders and instructions. If the hijackers interrogate you, cooperate and answer their questions as briefly as you can. We go into further detail on this subject in the next section.

HOSTAGE SURVIVAL A great deal has been written on the subject of how to survive being held as a hostage. Former victims, some of whom were held by their captors for many years, have penned scores of books about their ordeals. As you read this book, many people, including American citizens, are being held against their will in countries all over the world by individuals seeking money for ransom or by those using humans as bargaining chips to try to further their political agenda. The first thing to accept regarding this subject is that while your odds of being kidnapped are very low, anyone can be taken hostage. If you are a high-profile individual, you can assume that your odds are somewhat higher than others. However, sometimes you can just be in the wrong place at the wrong time and wind up a victim of this terrible crime. In many countries, kidnapping has become an industry. Foreign business personnel are likely to be snatched as kidnappers recognize that corporations will pay hefty ransoms for their release.

Cooperate or Resist? Here again, traditional techniques of hostage survival are being rethought as a result of changing abductors goals. Hijackings used to turn quickly into hostage-taking events, often for long periods. Kidnappings often were perpetrated for the same reason: Grab a valuable hostage and trade him or her for

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something of value to the hostage taker. Since a hostage has value, it made sense to recommend that victims remain passive and not resist. The problem with automatically applying the passive approach is that your kidnapper may have no intention of using you to trade. Often individuals are kidnapped for interrogation, torture, and execution. The 2002 kidnapping of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl is an example. From the very beginning of that incident, it was clear that his kidnappers had no intention of releasing him based on the nature of their purported demands. Daniel Pearl was taken not to bargain but to terrorize. His abductors took him to savagely strike back in a way that only pathetic and vicious sociopathic criminals know how to do: by inflicting pain on someone helpless to prevent it. Did murdering Pearl further anyone’s cause? Of course the answer is no. Nothing tangible could have been gained from such a senseless act. Terrorists aren’t the only ones who kidnap people just to kill them. In 1986, Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena was kidnapped in Guadalajara, Mexico, by police officers working for drug traffickers. He was tortured to extract information about law enforcement knowledge of the traffickers’ operation. Then Camarena was tortured to death for the amusement of his abductors. The traffickers even had a doctor present to keep Camarena alive for as long as possible to prolong his agony. The point in discussing these stories is to emphasize that no single approach is correct. In hindsight, it would have been better for Pearl and Camarena to resist their kidnappers to the point of death. The problem is that you cannot know whether you are being taken for trade or to be murdered by your abductors so they can post the gruesome act online. Ultimately, the decision is up to you. If you are being kidnapped, will the situation get better or worse? There is no way of knowing. Each of us must decide for ourselves how we intend to react if we are placed in that situation. As a general rule, most authorities and experts on the dynamics of hostage situations still recommend cooperation. This is even truer if you are taken hostage in a known location and not kidnapped and taken some place convenient for the kidnappers. For example, if you are taken hostage by bank robbers after a botched robbery, it is likely that law enforcement has been alerted to the situation and will dispatch appropriately trained negotiators and assault personnel to end the crisis. In that case, unless an opportunity presents itself for you either to escape or to overcome the bad guys, you should wait and allow the professionals to handle the job. According to security experts, even if you are being abducted, you still have a better chance of survival if you cooperate and comply with the demands of the kidnappers.

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What to Expect If you have chosen to be compliant, you must expect to be handled roughly, even brutally. Physical violence is likely even if you follow the abductors’ demands. Expect to be blindfolded. There are several reasons for this. First, blindfolded people are more helpless as a natural result of the disorientation they feel being deprived of their sight. Second, blindfolds prevent victims from learning where they are being taken. This will reduce the chance that they will try to escape, even if the chance arises, because of the uncertainty of not knowing where they are. It will also prevent victims from disclosing where they are being held in the unlikely event that they are able to pass a message or communicate with the outsideworld. Many other indignities will be perpetrated on victims of a kidnapping. While it is difficult to prepare to endure them, knowing about them beforehand may allow you to anticipate what is going to happen next. Kidnappers will almost certainly continue to try to keep you disoriented. Disorientation, by the way, is a favorite technique of hostage takers and kidnappers, especially if they believe you may have information useful to them. Common tricks are to vary your sleeping times, serve meals associated with certain times of day at the wrong times, and keep you in total darkness to prevent you from being aware of whether it is day or night. It is important to try to maintain a sense of the passage of time. Activity generally is higher during the daylight hours and lower at night; if you can hear street sounds, it is safe to assume that it is daytime. Also, since it is usually cooler at night, you can determine the time of day from paying attention to the temperature. Observe the condition of your guards or others with whom you come in contact. They are people, too, and are affected by the human biorhythmic cycle. If it is three in the morning, it is very likely that the guards will look lethargic and sleepy. Try to count the passage of days and record the date. An easy way to do this is to scratch a simple tick mark someplace to mark the passage of every day. You may be physically abused throughout the ordeal. You may be beaten to obtain information or merely to amuse the criminals holding you. Women, and to a lesser extent men, may be sexually abused. Remember, you must do everything you can to stay alive. If you are assaulted in this manner, you will probably have no option but to endure it. Do what you must to survive the ordeal.

Keep Physically and Mentally Active Try to exercise whenever possible. Keeping your body as physically fit under the circumstances is vital to your survival. A healthy, fit individual is likely to be more

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resistant to disease. Exercise is also one of the best ways to relieve stress, which will be one of your most difficult challenges during captivity. Eat whatever you are given, whenever it is offered to you. Your appetite will certainly not be what it should be, but food is a basic necessity and you need to survive. You have no way of knowing whether food and water will be withheld as a punishment or whether the kidnappers have sufficient resources to “waste” on their victims. It is also extremely important to exercise your mind. If you have never seen the movie Midnight Express, rent it to see a depiction of how a prisoner’s mind can deteriorate over the course of captivity. Any mental exercise you can come up with will keep your wits intact. Try to remember the soliloquies of Hamlet, Macbeth, or any of your favorite Shakespearean characters. Try to recall the names of your classmates from the first grade. Mentally relive your favorite vacation or replay your favorite movies. You can see the point here. Think actively and vigorously. If you are given writing materials, you can compose the great American novel. Pray. Pray often and earnestly and rely on the Creator of the Universe to sustain you. Prayer is an extremely powerful thing, even more so in captivity. While communication with other prisoners is also important if possible, it is always possible to talk with G-d. If you are of Jewish or Christian heritage, recall the psalms as best you can. Admiral Jeremiah Denton, a pilot held captive for over seven and a half years by the North Vietnamese during the war in Vietnam, has written of the way that prayer sustained him as he endured one hellish day after the next. Denton was confined to a coffin-size cell and tortured. In fact, while being filmed as a prisoner of the North Vietnamese in 1966 just ten months after his capture, Denton used Morse code to blink the word “torture” to the outside world. His devout faith as a Roman Catholic sustained him during his incarceration. As an aside, Denton has spoken at length of how he kept his mind active. He stated that his clarity of thought became such that he was able to calculate the formula for centrifugal force in his head, something he hadn’t been able to do with pencil and paper at the U.S. Naval Academy. Make mental notes about the location where you are being held and the people holding you, using as much detail as possible. Not only will this help keep your mind active, it also will provide assistance to those trying to locate and identify the bad guys after you are ransomed or rescued. Try to notice the weak points in your abductors’ security. Escape is a difficult prospect even for well-trained individuals. For now, consider escape mainly as a mental exercise. Plan your escape, even if it is not an option for you. The general consensus regarding escape is that attempts are not recommended for many reasons. You probably don’t know where you are being held.

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If you managed to escape, you have no idea whether you are in the middle of a hostile neighborhood or terrorist enclave. Or perhaps, like the dozens of people kidnapped and held in the jungles of the Philippines or Colombia, you may be miles away from help. Could you find your way out of a jungle with no equipment, food, or water? If you do try to escape and are recaptured, you probably will be severely punished for the attempt. Certainly, any rapport you have managed to build with your captors will be gone. You may be beaten, starved, or otherwise abused. The rule to follow is not to do anything that may antagonize the kidnappers, including escape, unless some extraordinary opportunity occurs. Even then you must assess your own personal abilities accurately. Can you fight if necessary? What is your physical condition and your level of fitness and strength? Can you run long distances swiftly under difficult conditions? Would you know how to orient yourself without a compass? Only you will be able to assess your own abilities and your chances for success.

NOTES 1. “Department of Homeland Security Issues Travel Advisory to the Republic of the Philippines,” December 26, 2018. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/12/26/ department-homeland-security-issues-travel-advisory-republic-philippines. 2. Testimony to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, by Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, September 25, 2001. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/ testimony_092501.asp.

CHAPTER 9

Espionage and Fraud Protection: The Executive Perspective

M

at protecting corporate executives and other individuals from physical harm; protecting intellectual property (IP) and protecting against scams and other fraud seem unrelated to the other topics. We have elected to include this material because business executives are often the targets of commercial espionage or financial fraud, and the best way to protect against such acts is by modifying behavior in much the same way we defend against threats of physical harm. For example, the first line of defense against physical harm is becoming a more security-conscious individual; awareness enhances safety. This same principle applies to defending against IP theft and fraud. Maintain a sense of vigilance and make small but significant changes to your daily routine, and you will greatly reduce your risk of becoming a victim of commercial espionage or financial fraud. Before we get into this topic, here are a few words for clarification. We are going to provide information about a few different types of attacks. By no means, however, does this represent a complete list of these crimes; we simply provide a few examples of some of the common tactics that we have seen criminals use. We and offer them as examples as to how changing behave reduces OST OF THIS BOOK IS DIRECTED

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vulnerability. You may find some surprising, even more so when you realize that many executives become victims of even the most obvious scams. We are not going to discuss how to protect computers from a technological perspective. Many cybersecurity books cover that. Our objective is to provide executives and corporate security personal a general understanding of these threats and how to avoid them by adjusting behavior and maintaining the same level of vigilance we employ to avoid harm.

COMMERCIAL ESPIONAGE: BACKGROUND AND USE Espionage, commonly known as spying, dates back to prehistory. Ever since the first primitive clans competed against one another for survival and primacy in the ancient world, the value of collected intelligence has been recognized as having supreme importance. Before Moses led the Israelites into the land of Canaan over 3,000 years ago, he sent out twelve spies to scout the land and the opposition. More than 2,500 years ago, the Chinese warrior Sun Tzu penned The Art of War. In it, he discusses every aspect of preparedness for a successful military campaign: when to fight and when to withdraw, how to choose terrain to your advantage, how to lead, and how to feint. The work, still relevant after more than two millennia, values one thing above all else: intelligence, or information gathered from spies. In Chapter 13, “The Use of Spies,” Sun Tzu says: Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men.

Spies, he notes in paragraph 14, have a value beyond all others and warrant special treatment: Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved.

Sun Tzu advises his readers to “Be subtle! Be subtle! And we your spies for every kind of business.”

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Sun Tzu’s final words in this masterwork underscore the value of intelligence acquired through the use of spies: Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results. Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army’s ability to move.1

It should come as no surprise that the government of Communist China is by far the most aggressive nation in its use of state intelligence resources to target commercial information; leaders there are simply heeding the country’s ancient icon of strategy and realize that economic preeminence leads to military superiority. That is why the Chinese are as aggressive with respect to stealing economic secrets as they are in stealing military ones; the two are inextricably linked. Nor have these words been lost on corporate managers elsewhere in the world who have recognized their applicability to the business battlefield. Every government in the world has an intelligence-gathering apparatus. Knowledge of the intentions and capabilities of enemies or competitors provides an advantage that can be obtained through no other means. Intelligence may be obtained through the exploitation of technology and many other methods. Still, it is often the case that the best information is obtained through the use of spies. Spies can make visual observations, overhear conversations, or gain the confidence of specifically targeted individuals having information of value to the nation supporting the intelligence operation. A spy may be a trusted member of a targeted government, agency, group, or corporation and may pass information helpful to the opposing side. This type of spy, or “mole,” is most dangerous as, by necessity, he or she is privy to highly classified and compartmentalized information. The information that moles can provide is the most valuable and provides the greatest advantage to the group gathering the information. Often the government’s interests in espionage go behind national security and include economic espionage. If a country can dominate a market, that country’s strategic situation will also be enhanced. A strong market position and a healthy and productive economy are always in a country’s national interest. For that reason, national intelligence-gathering organizations often provide economic intelligence to domestic industries that might benefit from such knowledge. This poses an extremely difficult problem to solve since these nations are using the full resources of their intelligence services to steal secrets from you.

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Governments are not the only ones to recognize the value of spying. Corporate espionage is the practice of using espionage techniques for commercial or financial purposes and has long been a vital tool for companies competing for dominance in a competitive world market. Common techniques that come to mind including trespassing onto a competitor’s property or accessing their files without permission, posing as a competitor’s employee in order to learn company trade secrets or other confidential information, wiretapping a competitor, hacking into a competitor’s computers, or attacking a competitor’s website with malware. It is impossible to precisely assess the value of American intellectual property and business intelligence (IP/BI) that is stolen via espionage each year, but it is thought to be upward of $600 billion. This number may be underestimated, as many executives prefer not to report losses in order to avoid public embarrassment or to protect the company if knowledge of a breach or loss of critical information becomes public. You should have no doubt that your information has value, but you should also appreciate how minor changes to your mind-set can dramatically lower your risk of victimization just as it can lower your risk of becoming the victim of violent crime.

SCAMS AND FRAUDS A scam is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “a dishonest scheme, a fraud.” Businessdictionary.com defines a scam as “a fraudulent scheme performed by a dishonest individual, group or company in an attempt to obtain money or something else of value.” Years ago frauds were more likely to be perpetrated in person by con men and were not common occurrences. Today, anyone on the internet or even anyone with a cell or home phone is deluged on a daily basis with attempts to steal money from them. Here we focus on the types of attempts that business executives are likely to encounter.

Executives Are Prime Targets Executives are attractive targets for corporate espionage and commercial fraud for two main reasons. First, the more senior the executive is, the more sensitive the information in his or her possession is. The information stored on the executive’s mobile computer, mobile phone, iWatch, or similar technology can be very valuable for competitors or for criminals who can sell the information to competitors. Second, executives and, to a greater extent, senior executives usually have the authority to direct large transactions, which makes them

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attractive targets of corporate fraud. The fact that these executives are also well compensated and have considerable personal wealth makes them attractive targets for other types of fraud as well. To make matters even worse, online and public presence facilitates these kinds of crimes. Executives are the public face of their company. A great deal of information about these public figures is published and easily discoverable, which make the executives easy targets. We have seen executives publish their own biography on social media sites that includes such sensitive information as the name of the town they reside in, information about their family, the schools their children attend, their hobbies, and the golf clubs they belong to or the gyms they work out in regularly. Sharing this kind of information publicly puts their personal privacy at risk and makes the executives easy targets for common criminals or commercial spies. It is a good practice, therefore, to set up a review process that examines the risk of any information that is going to be shared externally.

Executives Are Most Vulnerable while Traveling Criminals, agents of foreign governments, and corporate competitors target business travelers because those travelers often have vital information. Such information in the wrong hands could significantly eliminate a competitive advantage or provide a competitor with information that could ultimately drive your company out of business. The threat is not only from direct competitors but includes foreign governments that compete with the United States, such as China, North Korea, Russia, and some European countries, and criminals who are looking to sell your information to the highest bidder. One thing you can count on: Good information will always find a buyer. The convenience of current technological advances makes of securing information very difficult. Executives carry with them all their “office” information in their smartphone or laptop bag. They are vulnerable when traveling not only because of the information they carry but also because they and their electronics are highly accessible. Only a few decades ago a corporate spy had to physically infiltrate an office to obtain the kind of information executives carry in their pocket. Today there is no need to figure out how to breach security or have a spy get through a background check to gain access to a company as an employee. Information is far easier to obtain today. Next we discuss a few of the most common techniques used to access and exploit information. When we advise clients about overseas travel, we emphasize that one of the most dangerous locations anyone can use to check and send email is an international airport terminal and hotels. Complimentary Wi-Fi networks

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are notorious for allowing operatives to intercept data. In many cases, host governments provide these networks specifically to create data-collection opportunities. This threat is very real in foreign hotels. It is a misconception that staying in a U.S. name brand hotel is safe. Many of these hotels are watched by foreign governments precisely because they attract U.S. business travelers with valuable information. Remember, your hotel room is not your office or home. Criminals and industrial spies can easily gain access to your room so be careful what you leave accessible. Let’s talk about a nontechnological technique to gather information: the elicitation technique. According to the FBI, elicitation is used to collect information that is not readily available from a person who is deliberately selected and targeted, without raising suspicion that specific facts are being sought. A trained elicitor takes advantage of several fundamental traits of human nature, including the fact that most people desire to be polite and helpful and answer questions honestly even to strangers. There is also a common human desire to appear well informed about our profession and to feel appreciated and the need to show that we are working on something important. Often we tend, therefore, to expound on particular topics when given a cue to do so. Finally, people enjoy talking about themselves or sharing their opinions. As a result of these natural human tendencies, many executives fall into the trap of sharing more information than needed about themselves, their companies, their projects, and even their families. You can encounter elicitors anywhere. They may contact you by phone or on the internet, but a face-to-face conversation is the most effective. For this reason, you may be exposed to elicitation techniques during a business meeting outside of work and while traveling. Here is a good example. You meet someone at a business conference. He or she approaches you and very quickly a natural conversation about the weather or the details of your trip to the conference turns to a work discussion. You never mention your name, your title, or the company you are working for so you feel somewhat safe in your anonymity. However, the “stranger” knows exactly who you are and says something to elicit a response designed to provoke a revealing response, such as “The solution to the problem discussed in the last presentation is never going to work,” in the hopes that you will expound on the statement and either confirm or refute what was said based on your knowledge and experience. Because you still think that this person has no idea where you work or what you do, you may think there is no harm offering an opinion. However, you are quite mistaken. The “stranger” knows exactly what you do and has structured the question to tap into knowledge that perhaps is known only to you and a select few in your company. He or she relies on your

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desire to be honest and appear knowledgeable to provide this highly sensitive competitive information. Elicitors make deliberately false statements so you can “correct” them; by doing so, you just gave the elicitor the information he or she needed. There are many types of elicitation techniques, and multiple techniques may be used in an elicitation attempt. The following are descriptions of some of the most common techniques elicitors use. Assumed Knowledge: Pretend to have knowledge or associations in common with a person. “According to the computer network guys I used to work with … ” Bracketing: Provide a high and low estimate in order to entice a more specific number. “I assume rates will have to go up soon. I’d guess between five and fifteen dollars.” Response: Tell an extreme story in hopes the person will want to top it. “I heard Company X is developing an amazing new product that is capable of … ” Confidential Bait: Pretend to divulge confidential information in hopes of receiving confidential information in return. “Just between you and me … ” “Off the record … ” Criticism: Criticize an individual or organization in which the person has an interest in hopes the person will disclose information during a defense. “How did your company get that contract? Everybody knows Company X has better engineers for that type of work.” Deliberate False Statements / Denial of the Obvious: Say something wrong in the hopes that the person will correct your statement with true information. “Everybody knows that process won’t work—it’s just a DARPA dream project that will never get off the ground.” Flattery: Use praise to coax a person into providing information. “I bet you were the key person in designing this new product.” Good Listener: Exploit the instinct to complain or brag by listening patiently and validating the person’s feelings (whether positive or negative). If a person feels they have someone to confide in, he/she may share more information. The Leading Question: Ask a question to which the answer is “yes” or “no,” but which contains at least one presumption. “Did you work with integrated systems testing before you left that company?” (As opposed to: “What were your responsibilities at your prior job?”) . . . Mutual Interest: Suggest you are similar to a person based on shared interests, hobbies, or experiences, as a way to obtain information or build a rapport before soliciting information. “Your brother served in the Iraq war? So did mine. Which unit was your brother with?”2

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Many other threats exist. What measures can you adopt to reduce the risk on your next trip and avoid becoming a target for corporate espionage or fraudulent act? 1. Keep your travel information as private as possible. Do not disclose travel plans and details outside your family and people you trust. 2. Remember, travelers are vulnerable in hotel rooms. People can gain access to the rooms. Never leave sensitive business materials and your laptop unattended in a hotel room; make sure your laptop and your phone are with you at all times and watch what you throw away. Trash is always a good source of information. 3. Your computer is a valuable target. It contains tens of thousands of documents. Always carry your computer in your carry-on bag. Do not use public Wi-Fi service. Always use a trusted virtual private network and use an encryption program on your computer for your emails. 4. Do not volunteer information. The hotel bar is a perfect place for elicitation. After a busy day and a few drinks, most people let their guard down. This is the exact time and place for a competitor or foreign agent to target you. Be suspicious to people who start a conversation and quickly get into a discussion related to your work. 5. Be aware of sexual blackmail. Many business executives fall into this trap. They find themselves disclosing sensitive information in exchange for keeping away a sexual encounter from the front page in the newspaper or having it disclosed to their family.

MODERN FRAUDS: THE MAILBOX IS CONSTANTLY UNDER ATTACK Email is a convenient and powerful communications tool. Unfortunately, it is also a convenient and easy tool for scammers to target executives for fraudulent attacks. Before email was invented, scammers had to communicate with victims by mail or telephone or directly. These types of communication methods demanded that scammers invest large amounts of time and risk potential exposure. Email brought the convenience of targeting hundreds of victims with one simple click of the “send” button. Additionally, scammers maintain anonymity, which reduces their risk of getting caught. To protect yourself from these kinds of attacks, you must understand what they are, how they work, and what you should do to avoid becoming a victim.

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A good place to start is to ask why executives are frequently a target for fraudulent attacks. Executives often order payments to employees and to contractors to execute large projects. They also receive and send classified information. Junior employees, when receiving orders from a senior executive, tend to complete them without asking the reason for the money transfer or how much is involved. Perpetrators understand this and know how to use it to their advantage. A common scam is a payment diversion. This often occurs when the targeted executive is traveling and not at the office. The scammers send a fake email from the executive to a targeted employee (e.g., a bookkeeper, accountant, or executive assistant). The scammers usually pretend to be an executive with the authority to direct payment to another party. The request is usually for a wire transfer in order to secure immediate transfer of funds. The targeted employee believes he or she is sending money to a familiar account, just as has been done in the past. But the account numbers are slightly different, and the transfer of tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars ends up in a different account. Criminals are always attempting to solicit personal information from individuals by employing social engineering techniques or phishing. To that end, they craft emails to appear as if they have been sent from legitimate organizations or known individuals. These emails often attempt to drive users to click on a link that will take users to a bogus website. That legitimate-looking website downloads a virus or software that will compromise the computer. Or the victims are tricked into entering personal information that can be used to obtain access to a computer or personal bank account. For example, an email can be crafted to look like it is from the Internal Revenue Service with an exciting subject line, such as “Contact us for a refund.” The body of the email will explain that a mistake was found in your tax return and therefore you have a credit ready to be sent to you. In order to receive the refund, you need to use the link provided. The link will take you to a site that looks and feels like the IRS site but it bogus. Once at the site, you will be asked to enter your personal information, including bank account number and password, into an online form so a direct deposit can be wired to your account. With that information, the scammer’s route to your account is short and quick. This technique is very common, and scammers use it to pretend an email was sent from banks, credit card companies, and other financial institutions. And while “everyone” knows that the IRS never sends emails, still many people fall into this trap. Mining information from social media combined with creativity and patience has resulted in even more sophisticated scams that have a higher rate

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of success. Assume the next email address is the correct one and John Smith is the chief executive officer (CEO) of the company: [email protected] Now look at this one: [email protected] Now look when we change the font and size: [email protected] Notice how a lower case “r” placed next to a lower case “n” looks like an “m.” When someone looks at these email addresses quickly, they might easily be mistaken as legitimate. How would the creation of a bogus email similar to the CEO’s real one benefit a criminal? The answer will become clear with a little basic research into the social media presence of key people in our fictitious firm. Our “Mr. Smith” likely has an account of LinkedIn, and a LinkedIn profile provides a great deal of information to anyone attempting to defraud your company. One thing the profile provides is the ability to look at your contacts and find others in your company, along with information on their positions and job functions. Many people also post quite a bit of personal information on their social media sites, such as Facebook and Instagram. Criminals looking at your company website also can gain some idea of the command structure, as can innocuous phone calls placed to your company with sham excuses and asking simple questions, such as “Who is responsible for accounts payable and may I speak to that person please”? Now that the criminals have done a bit of homework over several months, they can attempt to steal money from your company. They have already set up a dummy company that have purported products and services that your company would likely utilize. They know from your Facebook page that you are now on vacation somewhere with your family since you updated your status and posted a number of vacation-related videos. Your kids have done the same on Instagram. At that point, the criminals send an email from an account that at first glance is indistinguishable from your own to someone who typically sends wire transfers to your legitimate vendors and other service providers. Perhaps the criminals even include a picture in the email from “our wonderful vacation.” In the email, the criminals then direct your accounts payable person to transfer the sum of $250,000 to a particular bank account associated with a

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fictitious company. The individual posing as you, the CEO of the firm, states in the email that it is critically important that the payment get processed immediately and that you will be sending the customary documentation as soon as you get back to your hotel room. Your employee thinks nothing is out of place and executes the transfer of funds. As you read this description, you may be saying to yourself that there is no way that something like this could ever happen in your company. You have, after all, implemented a number of safeguards to prevent such things from happening. We have investigated cases for clients who have lost considerable amounts of money to this exact scam and have heard that refrain over and over and over again. It can happen and does on a daily basis. What can you do? You must change company safeguards and make them absolutely inviolate no matter who is directing payment and under what circumstances. Employees need to know that electronic communications can be easily faked and that even phone calls from familiar numbers are not trustworthy. Verification by more than one individual should always be an absolute requirement for any transfer of funds, regardless of amount. Employees handling funds must always be cognizant of the fact that the people attempting to defraud you have seen it all before and often have plausible stories to counter even some of the most robust verification procedures. Simple scams that threaten to expose personal conduct to embarrass an executive for the purpose of blackmailing may also be very successful. A perfect example is this one that one of your authors received the morning this chapter was being written: Your account was infected! It will be good idea to change your pswd right this moment! You do not heard about me and you are definitely interested for what reason you are reading this particular message, right? I’m a hacker who opened your email box and digital devices some time ago. Don’t try to communicate with me or alternatively look for me, it’s hopeless, considering that I directed you this message from YOUR hacked account. I created special program on the adult videos (porno) website and suppose that you enjoyed this website to have some fun (you realize what I mean). When you were taking a look at movies, your internet browser started out functioning like a RDP (Remote Control) that have a key logger which granted me authority to access your desktop and web camera. After that, my software stole all information. You have wrote passcodes on the web services you visited, and I sniffed all of them. Without a doubt, you could possibly change them, or perhaps already changed them. Even so it doesn’t matter, my app updates information every time.

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Executive’s Guide to Personal Security What actually did I do? I got a reserve copy of the system. Of all files and contact lists. I created a dual-screen video file. The 1 section reveals the video you were watching (you’ve got a good preferences, wow...), the second screen displays the recording from your webcam. What must you do? So, I believe, 1000 USD will be a inexpensive amount of money for this very little secret. You will make the payment by bitcoins (in case you don’t recognize this, go searching “how to purchase bitcoin” in Google). My bitcoin wallet address: 132tEVF7uDYfVQpoangEsnUWcKj5W9WaR2 (It is cAsE sensitive, so copy and paste it). Warning: You have 48 hours in order to make the payment. (I have an exclusive pixel to this email, and at the moment I know that you have read through this email). To track the reading of a message and the actions inside it, I set up a Facebook pixel. Thanks to them. (Anything that is used for the authorities might actually help us.) If I fail to get bitcoins, I shall undoubtedly direct your video files to each of your contacts, along with relatives, co-workers, and many more?”

If you look at the email, it will seem as if it came from your account, which may give you reason to believe it is true. It did not, of course, and your account has not been hacked, although it appears as if it had been. The content might strike a nerve, and you are unsure as to what to do. What course of action should you take? Let’s try something simple, like copying the message and pasting it into the browser. When we tried it, we immediately found a number of messages explaining how spoof emails make it appear as if the message came from your own account. The advice from a number of reputable sites that are in the cybersecurity business suggest simply ignoring such emails. Often, however, victims simply pay the demanded sum without question. Even some targets that you think would be too savvy to be caught in something so easy have opted to pay. One unverified story told to us concerns a scam very similar to the one above that was sent to a police department of a major city. The department alleged paid the scammer. Additional email scams have existed for a long time. The Federal Trade Commission has a list of the 12 most common (http://www.ftc.gov). The list includes bogus business opportunities, chain letters, work-at-home schemes, health and diet scams, easy money, “free” goods, investment opportunities, bulk email schemes, cable descrambler kits, “guaranteed” loans or credit. How can you protect yourself from these kinds of scams? The answer is simple: Awareness, training, and proper procedures in place. 1. Verify all wire transfer requests. Any request for wire transfers, especially ones that must be made urgently, should be viewed as suspect. In many

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cases a quick phone call to confirm the transfer with the person erroneously believed to have directed it could prevent this kind of scam from succeeding. Just as you wouldn’t open the door to someone you don’t know, do not open emails from people you do not know. Opening an email is like an invitation to compromise your own privacy. Also, never open an attachment to unsolicited email. Most important, never click on a link sent to you in an email unless you have determined it is legitimate. Verify the change whenever a vendor changes an account or when you get an unexpected invoice. Discuss with your security department at work the need to mark every external email received as [EXTERNAL]. When you see the word [EXTERNAL] next to the email address, use extra caution. Do not open emails or links from external sources unless you know the senders. Carefully examine any email purporting to be from banks and other financial institutions. Most financial institutions have instituted policies against asking for personal or account information in emails, so you should regard any email making such a request as being illegitimate. Prevent spam from getting into your mailbox. Install antivirus software and a personal firewall, and keep both up to date. Finally, participate in ongoing security awareness training for all employees at all levels to stay updated on the latest security scams.

DON’T BE YOUR OWN WORST ENEMY So far, we discussed two areas of vulnerabilities where executives could become a victim for scams or corporate espionage. The first one is while traveling, either directly utilizing face-to-face elicitation techniques or indirectly by stealing electronics to gain access to sensitive business information. A second one is a direct attack on the email box by sending scam emails to obtain valuable information. A third area of vulnerability is becoming a very popular destination for scammers: social media websites and web applications. The use of social media sites is exploding. Many people are using social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, LinkedIn, dating sites, blogs, and others, which make them perfect places for scams. We use social media to share photos with family members, catch up with old friends, get to know new people, get daily news, and for other purposes. Unfortunately, social media has become a tool used by scammers to

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take advantage of people as well. The number of social media scams is increasing, and you should know what to look for and how to protect yourself. Before we discuss ways to protect yourself, let’s review a few popular social media scams. Romance scams: “Joe” is looking for a match on a dating site. He received a friendly request from “Michelle” to connect. They have been exchanging texts, and everything seems to move in the right direction. Michelle introduced herself as an American living in Canada for work. They plan to meet each other soon and plan a vacation in the summer when Michelle would be back in the United States. In preparation of their trip, Michelle sent Joe a $3,000 check but suddenly asked him to send $2,000 back to her because she had been laid off from work and needed the money for rent. Joe, who is very excited to meet Michelle, wired the money immediately. A few days later, he was contacted by his bank, which told him that the $3,000 check he deposited had no cover. The check was bad, and “Michelle” never existed. She disappeared and Joe never heard from her again. Viral videos: Viral videos are huge on social media, especially if they are political, funny, or promise to reveal interesting information. However, since they are irresistible to most of us, they are also a perfect way for scammers to trick their victims. When you click on one of these videos, you will be asked to update your video player. When you do, it downloads and installs a virus onto your system. Fake charity: Powerful, touching images of people in need and victims of disasters make all of us want to do something to help. Unfortunately, criminals learn to take advantage of people’s natural desire for kindness and create fake websites asking for money for a good cause. Just because a charity is on social media or your friend forwarded it or posted it doesn’t mean it’s legit. Who is viewing my profile: This Facebook scam appears as ads or messages posted on your wall by your friend that invites you to check who is viewing their profiles. Clicking on such messages gives spammers direct access to your Facebook account and network, as well as possible access to people on your friends list. Don’t click: Scammers try to trick you into clicking on a link by hiding it under another hyperlink you want to click on. This can result in users unknowingly downloading malware or revealing sensitive information. For example, scammers may claim to be from a legitimate financial institution,

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offering a special credit to sign in to a program if you complete a survey. You complete the survey, not realizing that you are sharing sensitive information with a scammer that can put you at risk for fraud or identity theft. Burglary: Criminals also use social media pages, such as Facebook, to determine if a potential victim is at home or not. Public sharing of information about vacations and other times away is exactly what burglars are looking for. There are many other types of scams on social media. Remember, social networking means opening and sharing information online with others. There is some information you should never share online, and there are a few practices to follow to ensure you are not going to be the next victim. What can you do to protect yourself? Here are the dos and don’ts when it comes to social media. 1. Limit access. Be suspicious of unsolicited requests from strangers to connect or be friends. Don’t accept a “friend” or “follow” request from a stranger. People are not always who they say they are, and the best way to keep scammers out of your life is to never let them in. Likewise, don’t answer cell phone texts from people or numbers you don’t recognize. 2. Don’t log on to social networking sites on public computers. Use your own computer or smartphone instead of the computers at libraries and other public places. Your login information can be intercepted on public computers. 3. Keep your information private. Be careful what information you share and post online and with whom you share it. Obvious information not to share is your Social Security number, address, and date of birth. What about posting “Away on vacation”? You wouldn’t put a note on your front door stating you are on vacation and will return in about a week, right? Avoid posting a front-facing picture of your full face. Scammers can copy the image and use it to create a photo ID that can be used to steal your identity. What about posting your full resume online for everyone to see? Probably not a good idea. It would be too easy for identity thieves to use the information to fill out a loan application. Limit your work history details on sites like LinkedIn. If you feel you need to post information for a job search, remove the information after you have a position. 4. Practice good password security. Use strong passwords (minimum of eight characters with a mix of uppercase and lowercase characters and at least one wildcard character). Change your passwords regularly, and

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have a different password for each social networking site so that if one password is stolen, not all of your accounts will be at risk. Click links with caution. Always be wary of suspicious links, messages, and ads, however tempting they may be. Even if they’re sent by your friends, make sure to verify with them to make sure the links are legitimate. Be extra cautious about any request for money. If you receive such a request for a friend, call him or her to check the request is real before responding. Customize security options. Take advantage of the privacy options to restrict your information so it can be viewed only by select people. Sites increasingly give users more control over their own privacy settings. Don’t assume the default settings are best to protect you. Check the settings, configuration, and privacy sections to see what options you can limit to whom and what type of your personal information is visible. Facebook, for example, has privacy options that gives users control over who can see your basic information, personal information, photos, friends, and posts: no one, friends, friends and networks, or everyone. If you’ve just joined a social networking site, or even if you have been a user for some time, log onto your account and view and adjust the privacy settings. Search yourself. It is a good idea to search your name on the internet. Understand what information is available about you and where are you showing up. If you see your name someplace you don’t recognize, it could give you a heads-up that someone else is using your identity online. Educate your family and your children on the dangers of social networking scams. Younger social media users may be more computer savvy than you, but they are unaware of the dangers.

NOTES 1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated from the Chinese by Lionel Giles (1910). 2. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Elicitation.” https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/elicitation-brochure.pdf.

CHAPTER 10

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misconception when it comes to executive protection. Most people think the best way to enhance personal security is to hire an extremely large and intimidating individual or individuals to accompany them wherever they go. This fundamental error in understanding the actual role of the protective specialist is responsible for a disappointed client base, numerous excessive-force lawsuits, public relations disasters, and even the death of celebrities and high-profile executives. The value of an effective executive protection professional (EPP) lies in his or her knowledge rather than the amount of muscle they carry. EPPs need to know how to conduct risk assessments, put a plan together, and prepare contingency plans for a number of different scenarios. EPPs must be able to blend into the executive’s milieu to ensure his or her safety and to minimize the impact of a security detail on the executive’s daily life. We have personally trained hundreds of protective specialists guarding chief executives, celebrities, and political figures, and here we share the first lesson we teach to individuals seeking to fill this role: We are not bouncers, nor are we bodyguards. We are professional protection specialists. What is the difference between a bodyguard and a protection specialist? A bodyguard lacks professionalism, training, and the ability to plan, and cannot provide a fully integrated approach to the client’s well-being. A protection specialist is so much more than a large individual whose value lies in body mass alone. In fact, the first thing we tell big guys who come to our school for training is that they must not allow their value to a client to be defined by their size. There is no shortage of large human beings. If height and muscle are all you have to offer, you can always be replaced by the next six-five, 300-plus-pound guy who HERE IS A BIG (AND COMMON)

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comes along. A specialist’s value must be based on more than just a powerful physique. Of course, part of the job is to keep the client safe from assault, and physical prowess is a requisite skill. However, fighting off attackers is the least likely task the EPP will face on a daily basis, and other concerns must be preeminent. Remember, the EPP is responsible for protecting the health and public image of the clients in addition to their physical safety. The EPP must be mindful of the risks from auto and other common accidents. The EPP must monitor their client’s health and physical and mental well-being and be sensitive to a client’s personal struggles, battles with addiction, or stress that comes with being in the public eye twenty-four hours a day. The EPP needs to be aware of the types and doses of all medication taken by the client and understand possible interactions with over-the-counter drugs and alcohol. He or she must also be mindful of whether prescription drugs are being abused or taken in a manner inconsistent with the prescription. The EPP will even need to be a gentle voice of reason when the person they are protecting is about to do something that shows poor judgment that may negatively impact their life or career. Bodyguards aren’t trained to do that. EPPs are.

MISSION AND SCOPE The word “protection” means “(1) the act of protecting or the state of being protected; preservation from injury or harm; (2) a thing, person or group that protects.” The phrase “preservation from injury or harm” best captures the concept and mission of the EPP and any properly implemented corporate executive protection program. To understand the mission fully, all anyone needs to do is to consider how broad the term “injury or harm” actually is. These words certainly are not limited solely to a physical attack. While preventing physical assault is without question a core responsibility of the EPP, physical attack is also one of the least common issues EPPs face while providing close protection for a corporate client in the United States. If an executive needs to travel to Mexico, for example, to visit a prospective site of a new factory, the dynamic shifts; the mission is, first and foremost, centered on preventing physical attack, kidnapping, armed robbery, and the like. However, executive protection has a broader definition in addition to physical protection. A good protective program is comprehensive and holistic and addresses: • Health-related issues • Safe transportation • Protection of reputation

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• Protection of intellectual property • Protection from fraud and financial crimes • Physical protection

SETTING UP AN EXECUTIVE PROTECTION PROGRAM As you can see, the value of the protective program goes far beyond simply acting as a mobile bouncer. A good EPP must have broad security knowledge and strong ability to coordinate activities across many internal and external stakeholders. The question is what changes you need to make to your existing program, if one exists, or how you should establish one. A good place to start and one common issue is the determination as to which department the protection detail will fall under. If there is a chief security officer coordinating all aspects of security, the answer is clear. If not, will the detail report to the Office of General Counsel? Human resources? Some local security manager? The issue is an important one as it impacts on the ability of the protection detail to function. Is there a separate budget for protection, or is it drawn from a general pot assigned to another division? These questions are quite complicated and take quite a bit of time to cover in the EPP training programs we provide. Protection should not be overbearing; a good analogy is of executive protection program as virus protection software running in the background of your computer. You realize it’s there only when it alerts you to some issue of concern. It can, however, assist you in managing many aspects of your daily routine. How can a properly structured, staffed, and managed executive protection program make a difference to the daily lives of the covered executives? Think about how much easier your daily life would be if you had a traveling concierge with you. We make that analogy because, in effect, that is what the security presence would provide above and beyond the core functions of protecting the principal. When introducing a new executive protection program, you have to realize that a person who has just been put under the care of such a program is going to have three concerns in mind: First, how much can I trust my security detail? A protective professional spends significant time together with the principal. The EPP is going to listen to private calls and conversations and observe every part of the executive’s daily life. Can EPPs keep what they see private? When Ilan worked as a security agent for government officials, he heard very private situations and moments, which of course he never divulged and cannot discuss

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here. Sharing what he heard or saw could have exposed the principal and even the country to a severe risk. Second, how much freedom will I have? Executives want to be able to maintain a normal life as much as possible. How would new security measures limit what they can do? Where they go? With whom they meet? Executives are busy people with clear business objectives. Third, will the new executive protection plan slow them down? Good EPPs can do their job with minimal impact to the executive and provide additional benefits, such as saving traveling time by finding the most secure, shortest, and effective way to get from point A to B, both when traveling on foot and in a vehicle. Eventually, principals come to wonder how they ever got along without their personal security detail. The following discussion will help you better understand how to plan or hire the right executive protection service.

Risk Assessment, Scenarios, and Response What does “comprehensive protective assessment” mean? Does it mean that every aspect of your principal’s daily routine is managed through a security and life safety prism? Does it mean that the principal’s protection plan includes security only during domestic or international travel? What about home, the office, and special events? What about protection of the spouse and children? If it covers the children, there is a lot of work to do with respect to assessing the school the children attend and the manner in which they are dropped off and picked up. The scope must be clearly defined. The way to answer these questions and define the scope of the protective assignment is with a comprehensive risk assessment. This assessment includes identifying those individuals in the organization who are critical to the business, which is a decision made at the executive level. Once you have identified the individuals who need protection, you need to learn everything about their public and private lifestyles. Every protective plan must be individualized, and an assessment is the first step. The assessment must be solid, or whatever else follows will be flawed. You need to assess their level of risk and make a determination if that risk is elevated as the result of political affiliations, notoriety, the nature of the industry they are in, and other factors. Where are they most vulnerable, and how can those risks be mitigated? A critical question to ask as part of the analysis is whether there is a history of threats against any of these executives. What is the source of the threats? For example, is there a palpable kidnap risk? Often kidnap risk is directly related to the client’s economic and political

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profile and notoriety. Are there risks to safety and possible blackmail or loss of reputation? Does the executive have a hectic daily schedule of public appearances and private meetings? How often does the executive travel internationally? Is the executive targeted by ANTIFA or PETA? An assessment should also include health concerns. Does the principal have any risks associated with their medical condition? What about food allergies? Are any medications needed on a daily basis? Based on what you, as the individual responsible for establishing an executive protection program, learn about executives, you can get a clearer picture of what kinds of risks need to be considered and the security measures you’ll need to put in place. At this stage you can start to answer these questions: Who should drive the principal? What type of vehicle is needed? What level of driver training is needed? If the principal is the target of a serious threat, is an armored vehicle needed? What about the level of preparedness in the office to security and life safety issues? These determinations are critical and should be made in conjunction with the EPP you engage. In summary, a large factor is evaluating if the high-value asset is also a high-value target. It’s important to keep in mind that risks evolve and change, so you need to establish a baseline level of security and keep updating the plan regularly. Risk is not a constant thing, and neither is the executive protection plan.

What a Good Plan Should Include? When building an executive security protocol, a good place to start is with the executive’s daily routine. Start with the home setting and the way to and from the office. A protocol must be built to cover not only the daily routine but all aspect of activities outside of the office, including travel and events. A variety of scenarios must be anticipated, and responses should be planned to address each of them. Some scenarios, such as receipt of a mail bomb at the office or threatening phone calls, are situations that have been addressed if your firm prepared and developed an appropriate emergency action plan. However, a good plan must expect the unexpected. If you are the executive responsible for overseeing the executive protection detail or if you are the person being protected, it is your responsibility to ensure that a wide range of contingencies are being considered. That means that the EPP you engage has experience in handling corporate clients and knows how to plan for the unexpected. Don’t take it for granted. Ask questions and confirm that even minor hiccups in the routine are going to be handling professionally. For example, the chief

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executive is on a business trip out of town. At 3:00 am, he wakes up with a severe toothache. No worries, because as part of the security team’s advance protocol, the agent has already identified local medical and dental providers who can respond in the event of just such an emergency, even at three in the morning. The security detail is mindful of the principal’s medical history. Suppose the principal has an allergy to certain foods, such as shellfish or avocado or gluten. When the principal is attending a dinner or other function, the security agent will assess the menu in great detail to make sure not only that the main dishes are free from allergens but that ingredients used in food preparation do not have an adverse effect on the principal. If there are other medical issues to address, the detail leader may assign an agent who is a paramedic as an additional precaution. A good EPP protects the client’s reputation and image as well. Assume you are giving a speech at a highly publicized event. Your EPP notices wires creating a trip hazard on the steps you must ascend to get to the stage and saves you from an embarrassing or harmful fall. Say a group of volatile and aggressive protesters targeting your firm show up at the event. Their intent may be simply disrupting your speech, physical assault, or worse. Your EPP detail ensures they get nowhere near you. Or perhaps when you are traveling abroad in a volatile area, your EPP detects the presence of surveillance and you are saved from attempted robbery, kidnapping, or an assassination attempt. These are the skills a good EPP will possess. Make sure you discuss these scenarios with the EPP in order to determine whether the person you engaged is capable enough to handle any or all of these circumstances. EPPs must also protect high-value business information that executives possess. Consider whether the personnel you engage are qualified in this regard. Many business operations and interactions today take place while traveling using mobile devices and mobile computers. In many cases, executives use the same devices for work and for personal needs. Separating personal devices from those used for business can significantly reduce the risk to business information. It’s imperative that any devices executives use for business be highly secure and have the latest protections. Successful business executives are among the biggest targets of phishing and a bewildering array of scams. EPPs must educate executives in what to look for to prevent devices, and the information of them, from being compromised. Protecting intellectual property and information security was covered in Chapter 9, but it also falls under the responsibility of the EPP. If your security personnel aren’t being proactive in this regard, either have them trained or have them replaced.

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Many elements of physical security have been discussed in other chapters, but often it is the mundane issues that take precedence. While physical security and preventing a direct attack on an executive is an obvious concern, other physical concerns such as an accidental injury must be taken into consideration. Ilan recalls that when he worked as a security protection specialist during President Clinton’s visit to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, one of the biggest concerns of both the Secret Service and the Israeli Security Services was that the president not trip on the steep stairs.

Selecting an Executive Protection Specialist In many situations, the executive protection function needs to be outsourced. This can be due to lack of in-house expertise, short staffing, or upcoming international travel to high-risk area. Before you select a vendor, you need to fully understand what the risk is and assess the security requirements as discussed earlier. This task is quite different from setting up security for home or an office; planning security for an executive travel assignment is complex and requires advance groundwork and a great deal of coordination at the destination country and elsewhere. Protecting individuals on the move is a lot different from protecting a building. You cannot lock down individuals, and there is more than one door to control. Hiring an executive protection service is not cheap so it’s critical that you fully understand your needs and make sure your money is well spent. Additionally, many firms that offer executive protection services hire former law enforcement agents. Although the physical aspect of personal protection can be taught, other important elements require special experience and knowledge. As we have stressed over and over, a good EPP is more than a muscle with a gun. An EPP must have the right attitude, integrity, and broad amount of security knowledge. Even former agents of the Secret Service or the Diplomatic Security Services branch of the Department of State have to adjust to performing the protective function in the private sector. The Secret Service can close down 42nd Street in New York City from the FDR Drive to the West Side Highway for a presidential motorcade. There is clearly no ability to do that while protecting a private sector client. What should a celebrity, senior executive, or high-net-worth individual look for when seeking a professional protective specialist? As you read over very impressive firm backgrounds and personal biographies, perception can easily overshadow reality. You may have to choose from bodybuilders, ex-cops, and

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military veterans, but that type of experience alone is not enough. How can you narrow down the field of options and ultimately select the best one? The interviewing process is critical in this regard. First assess the firm and candidates’ overall demeanor. Do they project a sense of quiet confidence? Ask candidates to describe their general approach to the job. How will they proceed if engaged, and what can they offer you as a client that may be different from other firms? Keep in mind that the likelihood of personal attack against you is extremely low. Look with skepticism at someone whose first response is to tell you of their martial arts prowess and/or skill with a firearm. Those skills are important, to be sure, but they are not the ones that will be needed each and every day. In fact, it is entirely possible that you will use the same EPP for years and never get into the kind of situation where martial prowess will be needed. What you need to focus on are the more common realities of your day-to-day life and decisions as to whether your prospective employee can be of value beyond fending off attackers that may never materialize. What, exactly, should be the focus? It largely depends on your individual circumstances, but there are basic skills that every EPP should have. Do they know how to prepare an overall security and life safety assessment of you and your immediate family? Ask your applicant or the firm you are considering engaging how they manage travel. Ask them to describe in some detail the steps they would take if they needed to plan a six-week travel schedule that includes several states and a number of foreign countries. Do they have experience with international travel, customs, and immigration issues? Local laws and customs? Do they have helpful language ability? A network of vetted contacts worldwide? How is their logistical ability? A good protective specialist will arrange each detail, including where you will stay, how you will be transported, and where you can and cannot travel safely. Ask them if they have any training as a first responder, emergency medical technician, or paramedic. Unrecognized medical emergencies have caused the death of celebrities in the past so you want to make sure they are very solid in this regard. Ask yourself whether this is the person you would want to be with you if you were choking or having a heart attack. Don’t forget other basic concerns, such as protecting yourself against liability. Ask the candidate whether he or she maintains liability insurance and the limits of coverage. A good barometer is to assess the candidate’s knowledge base and whether your candidate brought up things you didn’t anticipate. The EPP should be an expert in the field and a resource to you as an employer or direct client. Finally ask for professional references. Preferably, they should be from someone with needs similar to your own. Call each reference provided and ask for feedback. Engage the reference as deeply as possible. How did the

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candidate perform? What did the reference like and not like about the person as an employee? What type of duties were expected? What is the applicant like as an individual? Lack of judgment in a protective specialist is going to cause you problems and may expose you to liability so this point is very important. Has the applicant demonstrated the ability to react calmly and appropriately during a critical incident? Is he or she articulate? Can he or she write well? Will the person be able to work well with others in the company? Will your children be comfortable around this person? These skills represent the bare minimum you should expect from the person or persons to whom you will entrust your life and lives of your family. Do not neglect due diligence. The EPP you select will likely become privy to the intimate parts of your life and therefore must be beyond reproach. He or she will be with you from morning until night and sometimes around the clock. The EPP will coordinate your travel, keep you on schedule, protect you from harm, and look after your health and reputation as vigorously as he or she protects your person. You won’t get that from a bodyguard. You will from an EPP.

CHAPTER 11

Running a Successful Security Business Function

W

E WOULD LIKE TO DEDICATE this chapter of this book to those of you who

are running security operations for their firms. Perhaps you are the chief security officer (CSO) or other senior executive responsible for managing the security and life safety issues for your company or are considering a position in that role. This chapter is for you. In the preceding chapters, we addressed a number of specific threats to the safety and well-being of those in private industry. We began with basic concepts, discussed various threats and concerns, and explained how to mitigate them through the use of planning and other tools. Technical knowledge with respect to security and life safety is important and foundational but often is not enough. In our work with private sector clients, we have had the opportunity to work with the heads of security of many companies. They possessed very strong security backgrounds and displayed a high level of general security knowledge. The majority of these individuals had impressive backgrounds in law enforcement or the military. Nevertheless, despite these impressive credentials, they were unable to elevate the overall level of safety of employees, information, and other assets, not because they do not know how to do so but because they were unable to make their case in the business environment. They struggled to communicate effectively with key policy and decision makers and ultimately were unsuccessful because they failed to navigate the corporate matrix.

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To run a successful security function within any organization, additional skills and knowledge are required. What are these skills? Why they are important? And what knowledge is required to achieve the most dramatic results? We discuss and explain all of these in this chapter. However, before we discuss specific skills and critical success factors, it is important that we start by reviewing several trends that have occurred over the last few years that have affected the corporate security function and understanding the type of challenges these trends are creating.

RECENT TRENDS IN THE CORPORATE SECURITY FUNCTION Prior to the events of September 11, corporate oversight over security-related functions was often scattered or nonexistent. Security issues had never been addressed holistically and comprehensively, and the responsibility for employee safety, executive protection, asset protection, internal or external investigation, cybersecurity, background checks of key personnel, and other due diligence issues was divided among several stakeholders based on their function (information technology [IT], human resources [HR], legal, asset management, etc.). In the aftermath of 9/11 and with physical threats increasing, an increasing number of companies have centralized security-related functions and created a new role for a CSO to address all kind of risks to employees, facilities, and information. Most companies that follow this trend are large ones with broad international business interests or other U.S.-based companies with responsibility for critical infrastructure (e.g., the financial service industry, transportation, telecommunications, electricity, gas and other utilities, and IT). These companies not only have taken steps to centralize security responsibility under one department but also have improved coordination externally with law enforcement and government agencies. Other companies, mainly smaller and mid-size firms, mainly focus on improving internal coordination between functions that own different aspects of security. Still others continue managing security functions in a decentralized manner, usually divided into three main functions: physical security of employees and assets, IT for cyber and data protection, and financial management for risk mitigation and reduction of financial loss. Each of these functions has its own reporting structure, responsibility, and accountability and operates independently of the others.

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THE CREATION OF THE CSO ROLE Companies moving to centralize all security responsibilities under a single umbrella have realized that they lack a single owner with the authority to carry out the entire spectrum of security functions of their organization. If there was a single person accountable for all security-related issues, the result would be a streamlined security operation as well as an increase in the effective coordination and dissemination of information throughout the corporation. Additionally, a single person would manage the overall security budget, so security spending could be prioritized and managed more effectively. This need led to the creation of the CSO position, which was created to address the issues raised above and to integrate all the company’s security aspects into a cohesive strategy. When people think about a CSO, they think about guards, access control, and surveillance cameras. Over the last few years, the roles of the CSO and the security function have changed significantly. In addition to typical physical security, CSOs are tasked with a broad range of responsibilities across the entire business including: • Employee safety: Conduct employment background checks and new-hire screenings; address issues of workplace violence; and implement security protocols for employees traveling on business. • Information protection: Implement a comprehensive strategy to focus on and address cybersecurity threats, the protection of IP and corporate espionage. • Financial loss mitigation: Conduct investigations and create processes and measures to protect supply and prevent financial crimes, fraud, and litigation. • Emergency planning: Develop and prepare emergency plans for a broad range of risks all the way from fire and natural disasters to active shooting, biological and chemical hazards, bombs, and suspicious mail.

NEW CHALLENGES Emerging threats are always developing and require monitoring. Existing security measures must be evaluated in light of new threats, and it may be necessary to implement new security measures in response. The CSO role,

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therefore, requires an individual with the right attitude, a deep curiosity to learn more, and the drive to always look for ways to improve. Any emergency plan can be enhanced, and every security drill can be improved with additional training. A CSO with a proactive security view is preferred over someone with a reactive mind-set. To properly cover the expanded role and increased responsibilities of a centralized security program, the CSO must have not simply a wide range of technical security expertise across different disciplines but also a broad set of business and management skills. In order to be successful, the CSO must have excellent interpersonal and communications skills with a solid understanding of the company’s core functions. The CSO manages a larger budget with a larger project scope than a traditional security manager. Consequently, he or she must be able to make a sufficiently strong case to secure the necessary budget. All departments compete for a larger budget share, and therefore the CSO must demonstrate how the business will benefit from apportioning additional funds to security. Further, the expanded CSO role demands greater access to information, a broader range of engagements, and a greater level of coordination of efforts with other business functions and external entities. Working closely with a diverse set of other internal functions creates more efficient structural alignments, which, in turn, address the critical needs of multiple stakeholders. In their role, the CSO needs to anticipate short- and long-term risks, prioritize concerns, and mobilize resources to mitigate them. For the CSO, failure is not an option. The managers of other departments in the business generally do not face making the kinds of mistake that puts you out of business. The CSO does.

ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS Set Up the Right Reporting and Command Structure Based on our experience, about 50 percent of CSOs report to the company chief executive officer (CEO), 25 percent report to the chief information officer (CIO), and the rest report to the chief operating officer (COO), head of facility management, or others. Each of these reporting structures has pros and cons. When the CSO reports to the CIO, it usually results in an increased alignment between physical security and information security. However, this arrangement creates some challenges related to prioritization of budget and overall visibility to physical threats versus cyber threats.

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If the CSO reports directly to the CEO, the CSO has a higher visibility and greater ability to drive change. However, the CSO may have very limited time with the CEO, due to his or her busy schedule. As a result, critical decisions could be delayed. There are other variables and considerations for each structure but, from what we have observed, CSOs are most successful when they report to and are empowered by the CEO. In this structure CSOs can bring issues up directly with the most important decision maker and get help removing barriers to change. CEO support is also critical to securing the required budget. However, as we discuss later, CSOs also must find ways to align with other key decision makers, such as the HR, COO, and CIO, to better sell their idea to the CEO.

Build Relationships and Manage Resistance Imagine you are the new chief of security. The director of information security within the IT department, who used to report to the head of IT, is now going to report to you. Or the head of physical security, who used to report directly to the COO, is also now reporting to you. Or the head of HR was asked to turn over to your organization the responsibility for conducting background checks and employee screening. With any change to organization structure, you can anticipate resistance. This could be due to fears of a perceived loss of control, the need to establish new relationships, or the need to learn something new. Whatever the motivation is, people naturally resist change. This resistance can be hard to overcome. If it is not managed correctly, it may create significant obstacles to accomplishing the daily mission. While the fear of loss of control and other reactions are natural, there are ways to lessen their impact, and you should prepare and develop a plan to address them. You must listen to the concerns of others and find a way to win their hearts and minds. Find a way to create a vision that they can own. Ensure them you are there to support them and that you are going to help them accomplish their goals.

Bridge Culture Differences Refer again to the last example. You just assumed responsibility for both the information security department and the physical security department. People working in these departments have significant background differences and

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experiences. Also, historically there was limited interaction between them. It is critical to realize the cultural differences between the two groups. You must find a way to build one culture. The question is: How is that done? The first step clearly is to realize and accept these culture differences and understand each group’s interests and motivations. Create a security forum that meets on a regular basis to discuss issues and identify areas for increased collaboration. An effective way to build better understanding between the groups is to establish training programs for both to attend. Be aware that the development of a new, shared culture will take time. Plan constructive steps, implement them, and do not expect dramatic change to happen immediately.

Create Alignments In your capacity as the CSO, you did your homework, collected all the data and information, and polished your presentation. You are ready to sell your next big idea and need a budget to support it. You enter a room with ten other executives. Everyone is ready to hear your presentation. You are nervous as you get started. You put your presentation up on the projector but get stuck on the first slide. A few of your fellow executives are starting to argue between themselves. “Why are we doing this project?” “What is the purpose?” “It does not align with what I am planning.” “We already started going down a different path.” The discussion bogs down, and you are unable to progress. An hour passes and the meeting ends with no decision being made. You feel you have not accomplished anything, and scheduling a follow-up meeting will prove difficult. You are frustrated as you spent a significant amount of time preparing what you thought was a winning presentation. Why was the presentation not successful? What did you miss? The answer is you failed to meet the most important goal of the meeting: the creation of early alignment with the stakeholders before the meeting even took place. Prior to a meeting like the one just described, you must build allies and leverage their support to sell your idea. A great way to build support is to create a win-win situation for others. Find a few stakeholders who can benefit from the change you are driving; it is a lot easier to obtain approval for a budget if it can achieve more than one goal. Package your idea by explaining how a change driven by security will create benefits for the company overall. For example, you are trying to get funding for a new security access system. Although your focus is on how it will improve the safety of employees and the facility, by explaining how the new system will improve productivity by increasing speed of access and of supply delivery and the overall level of visitor satisfaction, you have packed

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your solution around several benefits and you can demonstrate the value it can add to business. Discuss with your allies what kinds of questions are likely to come at the meeting. Who is likely to bring these questions up? Ask how your allies can help you to address these questions during the meeting. Meet individually with a few other senior executives, obtain their reaction, adjust your plan, and get buy-in. Put yourself in the other executive’s position; ask what you would want to know about the effects of your proposal if you are the head of HR or the COO. Before asking for a significant budget increase and a broad alignment, another good idea is to run a pilot. Show on a small scale that the initiative you are driving could be successful and add strong business value. Nail it first and scale it later. You will find it is a lot easier to get a buy-in that way.

Communicate Proactively Why does a CSO need to master communication skills? After all, this person should be focusing on security. Consider that the CSO role is not always widely popular within the corporate landscape. The CSO and the security function are left out of important meetings and decisions very often. Thus, CSOs need to master the ability to communicate and influence internal stakeholders and earn their trust both inside critical meetings and outside of them. A CSO who proactively communicates can be more effective by attending important meetings where decisions are made even if the meetings are not specifically focused on security. For example, if the CSO is invited to a meeting about the supply chain, the objective of which is to find ways to reduce transportation costs, an assertive and proactive CSO could communicate that the objective is not only to reduce transportation costs but also to guarantee safe shipping and uninterrupted supply. The CSO not only needs to be able to understand the connection between business risks to a business objective but also be able to articulate it. Further, CSOs are public figures who must inspire confidence when speaking with external stakeholders. They must be able to rebuild trust in customers in the event of data breach that leads to, for example, several thousand customers’ credit card information being compromised. Or in the event of loss of employee lives due to a workplace violence incident, CSOs must be able to assure employees that everything is being done to ensure that the workplace is safe. Incidents like these and others are occurring with greater frequency, unfortunately, and leading during such crises demands extremely strong communication skills.

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Use the Business Jargon Expanding technical security knowledge is important. Interpersonal and leadership skills are critical, as we discussed, but any new project or initiative requires money. Security projects have the traditional disadvantage of being viewed primarily as a cost rather than a source of business value to a company. Given that corporate decision making is directly linked to the company’s revenue generation, management likely will reject a security project that has no direct impact on revenue or cost reduction. An additional challenge is the fact that proactive security initiatives generally are designed to reduce risk and the probability of future catastrophic incidents. It is always difficult to obtain funding to prevent something that may not ever occur. How do you secure such investment? How do you build a business case? Please notice that we are using the term “investment,” not “budget.” It is critical that you position your project as an investment. Investments yield positive returns that increase business value; budgets are perceived only as expenses that need to be minimized. So, the words you are using and how you are positioning your request for money is critical. Let’s start with general terms. Return on investment (ROI) is defined as the measure of return, usually profit or cost saving, that an organization can earn for a given investment. ROI is used as part of building a business case for executives as to why a given project should be approved. A project’s value is determined by the relationship between what the organization will invest (project costs) and what it will get back (benefits). A strong value means that the aggregated amount of benefits expected from the project far exceeds the overall project costs. Remember, business executives expect the CSO to use the same ROI definition and calculate the financial benefits to justify a project just like any other department does. However, unlike other business projects where financial benefits are quantifiable and the leading drivers for investment, security projects are often led by nonfinancial benefits with the goal to mitigate a future risk. Often executives reject security investments that are based only on nonfinancial returns because they cannot be quantified and are probability based. Think, for example, about an investment proposal to install a new physical access system at the corporate main office that could improve overall employee confidence or new virus protection software that may enhance customer trust and satisfaction. These projects have “intangible” returns that are significant but hard to quantify and prove. To sell such a project and secure investment, you

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have to identify metrics that prove each of these nonfinancial benefits. Ideally, you could use these benefits as added benefits for the investment. Your main task is still to connect the security investment to specific financial benefits that have a direct impact on the organization’s ability to either reduce costs or increase revenue or both. Security investment that connects to the business’s mission will always get your CEO’s attention.

CHAPTER 12

Breaking into a Security Career in the Private Sector

P

This chapter is for you. A good many corporate security professionals are drawn from law enforcement, the military, and other government security agencies. Government security employees make attractive candidates for private sector security jobs for a number of reasons: leadership skills, expertise in managing complex security operations, knowledge of security procedures, knowledge of advanced security technologies, broad experience with managing relationships with federal and state law enforcement agencies, and managing large budgets and large numbers of people. There are a number of reasons to transition to the private sector, including the opportunity for higher compensation, better work-life balance, greater flexibility, and the opportunity of trying something different. While the decision to opt for a career in the private sector seems like a natural evolution, the transition from a government security job to the private sector is not that straightforward. A successful transition to a position in corporate security, consulting, or another private sector job is more than just informing potential employers about your past career experience. The biggest factors common to those who are not able to make a good transition is that they don’t have a clear understanding of the role they are expected to fill, their employers’ expectations, and the corporate environment and other LANNING TO GO PRIVATE?

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characteristics unique to the private sector. Before initiating a move to the private sector, you should consider how working private industry differs from working as a senior executive in a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency or the military. Consider also the emotional aspects involved with making a change because managing these aspects well will determine if you will be able to transition successfully. Therefore, the transition process must start early and thought through completely. Both of your authors worked in the public sector for many years. David was a senior special agent with the Department of Justice/Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) prior to founding Global Security Group. During his tenure with the DEA, David’s responsibilities included the totality of conducting investigations into the manufacture, importation, and distribution of illegal narcotics and dangerous drugs. That entailed reviewing documents, conducting hundreds of hours of surveillance, sitting on wiretaps, conducting interviews and interrogations, serving subpoenas, posing as a drug trafficker in an undercover capacity, conducting car stops and effecting arrests, executing search and arrest warrants, and planning and executing raids. In the years prior to his separation from government service, David was a Primary Firearms Instructor at the DEA academy in Quantico, Virginia, where he taught the tactical and combat use of pistols, submachine guns, shotguns, and carbines to thousands of federal agents and state and local law enforcement officers. It was at the academy where David learned to be an effective instructor, a skill that turned out to be the linchpin of the services offered by his company. Ilan was a Special Protective Agent with the Israeli General Security Agency serving in the Office of the Israeli Prime Minster, the Israeli Foreign Ministry Office, and the Israeli airline, EL AL. Prior to that Ilan served with the Israeli Defense Force in a combat unit. Both services have taught him a great deal about leadership, managing people, and tough situations requiring the use of cutting-edge security techniques to mitigate and handle a variety of threats. Although both men transitioned to the private sector, they took different paths and landed in different careers. David founded a security firm providing a number of services to the private sector including personal protection, fire and life safety, private investigations, consulting, and specialized training. Ilan took a different route, earning his MBA and becoming a business executive with several large corporations. Although they had different career experiences and took different paths into the private sector, they both went through a similar process and shared similar experiences as they transitioned from the government to the private sector. One realization they shared was that it was their ability to take the knowledge and experience they acquired in their prior careers and translate

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that knowledge into service offerings needed by the private sector. The process, however, was far from easy. There are several dramatic differences between working for the government as a law enforcement officer and working for a private corporation or even for yourself as a company owner. The culture between the public and private sectors is as different as day and night, and so are the expectations. It brings to mind a line delivered by Dan Akroyd playing the role of Dr. Raymond Stantz in the original version of the 1984 movie Ghostbusters. While discussing their expulsion from their comfortable job teaching in a university with Bill Murray’s character, Peter Venkman, Dr. Stantz opines: “Personally, I liked the university. They gave us money and facilities; we didn’t have to produce anything! You’ve never been out of college! You don’t know what it’s like out there! I’ve WORKED in the private sector. They expect results.” That is not to say that working for the government in a law enforcement or protective capacity is by any means easy. It does mean, however, that a level of job security exists for public sector employees that has no equal in private industry. It is doubly true when you go into your own business. You either provide a service people are willing to pay for and succeed, or you do not and fail; there is no civil service protection for an entrepreneur. To be successful, you need to make a transition from public to private, and in order to do so, you must understand the corporate culture and adapt to it. Too many extremely qualified cops and agents fail in this process because they are unable to change. Many feel that the extensive and valuable experience they obtained in their former careers is enough to get them by and are bewildered when they don’t make it. Remember, your goal is to take that experience and knowledge and package it in a manner suitable for private sector clients or employers. There is a process that must be followed to make it happen. What, exactly, does this process entail? How can you prepare yourself, and what are the critical steps you can take now that will help you make the best transition?

HOW TO MOVE TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR Transitioning from One Career to Another Career Is a Journey As with any journey, unless you know your destination, it will be hard for you to reach it. It is very similar to using a Google map to plan your next trip. When you travel from point A to point B and need direction, you must enter two pieces of information, the starting point and the destination. Remember, you must

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choose your own destination. What will yours be? The private sector offers a broad range of opportunities, each with its own unique path. Are you planning to start your own security business and offer security services? Do you want to join a large corporation as an executive performing a security function? What about changing careers altogether? Each of these roles will have very different paths. Whatever your destination is, there are common elements to consider in your path to ensure successful transition.

Draw Up Your Plan Well in Advance of Your Departure Date Making a career change takes time and effort. Consider the impact a change in career or a possible move might have on you and your extended family, and resolve any issues early on. As discussed, identify what type of career you seek. You may need different knowledge and skills for each role. If you choose to start your own security firm and offer services, you will need to learn how to build and run a business, how to manage your financial books, how to submit service proposals, how to price your services, and so on. If you decide that a career within a large corporation is what you seek, you better learn early that corporations are profit driven, so you need to understand productivity, financial performance, and corporate culture and develop managerial skills appropriate for the private sector. Further, you need to understand the compensation models in private industry. There are differences in salary structures and various other incentive programs. This knowledge will help you formulate realistic salary goals and inform your ability to negotiate benefits. This issue is particularly important for former government employees who may retire with good benefit packages. If, for example, you do not need to be covered under the company’s health plan, it may be possible to negotiate other benefits or simply a higher salary.

Accept the Need to Learn New Things Recognize that you will have to learn new things, even in areas in which you have strong knowledge base and a great deal of experience. A good example is an issue that David encountered in his transition from public service to private. While attempting to put his investigative knowledge and experience as a successful federal agent to work as a private investigator, he realized that simply having prior experience was not enough; there are many important differences in private investigative practice. Interestingly, the transition from special agent to private investigator proved to be the area where he had to make the

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greatest adjustment. David had conducted hundreds of significant investigations at home and abroad, and he thought it would be very easy to capitalize on his background, talent, and skills as a criminal investigator by offering private investigative services to corporations and private individuals. Why wouldn’t a major corporation want to engage a firm managed by someone with such a background to provide for its investigative needs? There is some logic to this line of reasoning, but David did not anticipate one highly significant issue: The manner of conducting investigations as a private investigator is substantially different in most regards from what it was as a law enforcement officer. As an agent, David had a full range of investigative tools available to him. For example, all federal criminal databases were available at the touch of a button. It was a simple matter to run a comprehensive criminal history for any individual by accessing the National Criminal Information Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As a private investigator, there are still ways to run criminal background checks, but the process is far more cumbersome. In addition, private investigations are quite different from criminal ones in a number of ways. Federal agents have the use of the administrative subpoena to get information that would otherwise be unavailable by any other means. This fact alone means that certain information will never be generally available to the private investigator (PI). For those readers unfamiliar with the term, an administrative subpoena is a tool that allows agents to compel production of documents without the need to go through the U.S. Attorney’s Office or state or local prosecutor. It is a powerful tool, and there is no civilian version available to the PI; subpoenas are not available unless the PI is working on a case that is being litigated in court in conjunction with an attorney. In those instances, the attorney can issue a subpoena duces tecum (an order to produce evidence or documents) or a subpoena ad testificandum (an order to appear in court and testify). Thus, there is a significant difference in the extent to which a PI can uncover evidence if engaged on a matter not being litigated. The power of a grand jury subpoena is also available to federal agents and other law enforcement officers. The grand jury is a powerful investigative tool that, again, has no private sector counterpart. Also, of course, being in law enforcement affords an investigator a very persuasive and almost coercive effect. For example, there is a greater likelihood of gaining compliance from a witness while knocking on a door as a federal agent as compared to doing the same thing as a private investigator. The moment you leave law enforcement, you lose the use of all of these tools and techniques. As a result, many very effective investigators become far less effective after leaving their respective agencies; a considerable learning curve is required to enable a former special agent or

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detective to function effectively in the private investigative market. A former law enforcement officer also needs to learn what databases are available to the civilian investigator and be able to interview potential witnesses using finesse and congeniality as a substitute for the compulsion afforded to those carrying a badge. In short, it is far more difficult to conclude an investigation as a PI than it is as a special agent or police detective, and those who leave government service absolutely must learn these new methods of work. The majority of former law enforcement officers transitioning to private sector security jobs have another problem. For example, David’s tenure as a federal agent working narcotics cases didn’t prepare him to make a seamless entry into the security industry. Ilan’s core function was providing security; David’s was not. The learning curve is therefore much steeper for anyone whose job description was more investigative or tactical in nature rather than protective; an FBI agent will have far less experience providing security than a Secret Service agent.

Know Your Audience and Make the Proper Adjustments Training is a good example where differences exist in the manner of instruction depending on the composition of the group you are presenting to; different audiences are trained in markedly different ways. Even within law enforcement circles, there is a tremendous difference between how you would train a group of DEA Basic Agent Trainees and groups of veteran and senior special agents, state and local law enforcement officers, SWAT teams, military special operations units, and others. Teaching Basic Agent Trainees is fairly straightforward. In the academy setting, the trainees are attentive and disciplined and, quite frankly, are a captive audience. Training veteran law enforcement officers and military personnel is more challenging; to be successful in front of that type of audience, you must establish your knowledge and credibility. However, since you share common experiences and “speak the same language,” establishing bona fides is your only major hurtle as long as you present relevant material in a professional manner. The same is not true with private sector audiences. You have to do so much more to make an effective presentation to a civilian audience. The material must still, of course, be relevant, but you must present it in a way that individuals with no law enforcement or military background can accept and digest. Topics familiar in the law enforcement world will be completely foreign to employees of major financial institutions, law firms, universities, newsrooms, hospitals, and the like. You need to explain all your points in a manner understandable to your students; you will have to use plain English without any

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police language or jargon. Perhaps the topic is a bit daunting or even terrifying to the crowd. You need to put the class at ease, perhaps with a little humor. In the end, you will be measured by your ability to impart information that will benefit the employees of the firm that engaged you, and you need to do it in an interesting and even entertaining way. David’s presentations are very well received because, after years of providing service to corporate clients across the country and world, he has learned to make things fun for the audience even while addressing topics of an extremely serious nature. The more the topic is likely to cause anxiety in the audience, the greater the need to make the presentation nonthreatening and even entertaining. Often corporate clients will ask to see your presentation prior to delivery to a live audience. Some companies have review processes, and often your material will need to be approved by the firm’s Office of General Council and Human Resources. Many times clients will mark up the presentation and request wording changes to make something more politically correct or less daunting. Sometimes the changes are minor and have no effect on content; other times they could substantially alter the impact and effectiveness of the course itself. The training programs that David is requested to give most often are Active Shooter Response Training and Active Shooter Threat Recognition. On occasion clients suggest that David not use the term “active shooter” in order to avoid upsetting the attendees. In one instance, David asked what term the client would prefer he use instead. The client asked if the presentation could be titled “Responding to Violence in the Workplace” instead of “Active Shooter Response Training.” The shooter would be euphemistically referred to as “a potentially violent individual” rather than an “active shooter.” David explained why those changes would not be in the interest of the employees. The debate was kicked upstairs where a senior C-level executive was asked to weigh in. The executive took the commonsense position that trying to shield employees would hinder the goal of the training and left the content unaltered. David would have declined to present a watered-down version anyway, but the process itself was illuminating. For those with a law enforcement background, it would be akin the changing the name of a course titled “Agent Survival” to something like “Employee Safety and Wellness.” It is now more than fifteen years since David entered the private security market. During this time it has become easier for him to package tactical and law enforcement knowledge and training in a manner suited to private sector customers as his understanding of corporate culture has grown. He could teach civilians principles that were taught to law enforcement officers to help them survive deadly force encounters, as long as the material was packaged in the appropriate way. The key was not trying to teach corporate employees the same

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way agents were taught in the academy. A former military or law enforcement trainer cannot simply take the program that he or she has taught to others in the law enforcement field and provide it unchanged to a corporate audience. The material needs to be made relevant and accessible to everyone regardless of their background. The basic principles and learning points are the same. The key for David was learning how to make all this knowledge accessible and easy to implement to whatever audience was in attendance.

Gather Information to Help You with Your Plan Network with others who have made the leap. Gather information from people who are working in a job similar to the one you are trying to get. Utilize your network of people who have made the transition to understand what the corporate security structure looks like in their organizations. Doing this will help you assess where you most likely fit now and where opportunities for growth exist. Consider hiring a career coach who has verifiable experience working with people to transition them from one sector to another. Opportunities for career advancement may be less straightforward or obvious than the environment you are now in.

Know What You Are Worth and What Is the Right Business Setting for You The more you talk with former public employees who are now in the private sector, the better you are going to be able to understand and negotiate a compensation package. Private sector companies, which are able to structure and restructure positions much more easily than the government can, build compensation packages that may include salary, benefits, stock options, bonuses, pension, 401(k)s, and others. What about setting up your own business? When David elected to go into business for himself, there were even more questions to answer. For example, since you will be charging for your services, how you do set the price for those services? Setting a value for your services is a difficult issue to reckon with. How much should your hourly consulting rate be? What about private investigations? How much will you charge per training program or for the creation of an emergency action plan? What is your rate to prepare an expert report for a civil or criminal trial, and how much will you bill if you are required to testify? Then there are the nuts and bolts of running a business. How do you incorporate? What type of corporation makes the most sense to form? What licenses

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will you need? What about insurance? Most insurance companies want a history of prior coverage before issuing the multimillion-dollar coverage that many high-end clients demand of their vendors. Then there is the payroll and banking and invoicing and so on. David faced a constant stream of things to learn that were completely foreign him, with his background in law enforcement. Taking even small steps prior to leaving government service, such as learning to use QuickBooks, will be an enormous help.

Build Your Soft Skills for a Soft Landing One of the biggest challenges when transitioning to the private sector is the need to adapt to the faster pace of business and a role with a greater accountability. Further, working within a team concept and managing others without the authority of your former departmental rank are two real challenges that all individuals eyeing such a move need to understand and accept.

Prepare Your Brand You have contemplated for months, possibly even years, the idea of going private, and you are finally ready to make the leap into a new career. You followed everything we discussed earlier, but before you get your desired job, you must convince someone that you are qualified and capable of performing that job. A career transition requires effectively communicating how your experiences transfer to your desired job using language that articulates well not only your past experience but the value it brings to your new role in a private company. A good place to start is by evaluating your current and past responsibilities and identifying skills and competencies that are transferrable. Once you identify your skills and experiences, spend time reading job descriptions and industry news to gain a sense of the skills that employers are seeking. After you have identified your skills and have a good sense of what employers require, the next step is to write your resume. There are many good books on how to write a good resume. However, we want to emphasize a few important elements that could be more relevant to your job search than the advice you will see in a tutorial on how to prepare a resume. As we mentioned, you must tell the story about your transferable skills to a hiring manager, explaining how qualifications from your previous career are still applicable and relevant. Don’t cut yourself short by preparing a resume that is simply a reverse chronological work history. Also, while writing your resume,

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avoid using government jargon to describe your experience and achievements; it is a language that is foreign to private sector audiences. A good idea, however, is to include your objective, which should appear on the top of your resume. Highlight what type of job you are seeking. The true purpose of the objective section is to sell hiring managers on your candidacy. In the objective section, connect the dots for hiring managers and make it clear how your former career has provided you with the skills you need in your new field. Be sure to mention the job you are applying for in particular. We strongly recommend that you add a short section that highlights your skills and explains them in plain English. If you were the Special Agent in Charge of a major field division of the FBI, you need to describe your day-to-day job responsibilities, highlight your skills, and make the text accessible (and impressive) to the private sector person reading your resume. This will make it very easy for hiring managers to see right away that you have the skills for the job. Additionally, in today’s age of automated screening processes, computers scan for key words before resumes even land in the hands of a hiring manager. This is another good reason to capture your relevant skills in a section up front so the computer can identify you as a person with whom the company may want to schedule an interview. A good resume should be accompanied with a cover letter that creates a strong first impression, so put good effort into writing a compelling one. It is another opportunity for you to convey the meaningful connections between your professional past and the skills you can bring to the job going forward. Remember, these connections are not always obvious. Don’t assume that the reader can make the leap between your experience as a Secret Service Agent and your fit for a position in corporate security. Spell it out. You’ll be up against candidates with job experience that seems a more obvious fit, so do your best to convey why your background makes you a better fit for the role and company. You do not have to exhaustively list every position or responsibility you have had. Include only the highlights that will help your resume seem relevant to hiring managers in your new field. Sometimes less is much more! Landing an interview means you succeeded in selling your experience on paper and you are well on your way in the career-changing transition process. Now your job is to help an employer see the value that your experience will bring to the team live in an interview. Companies want to know you can achieve goals and make a strong positive financial impact while working in their fast-paced environment. Prepare for the interview. Learn to spin your past positions to explain how your work history lends itself to the transition you’re seeking and for the job for which you are interviewing. Develop a list of talking points for

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interviews that demonstrate what you can achieve despite having come from an environment that some perceive as slow moving, bureaucratic, and nonfinancially driven. Specify what kind of value you will immediately add if you are hired. Prepare good examples to paint a picture of your experience and abilities for employers. Give specifics rather than answering questions with hypotheticals, such as “In this kind of situation, I think I may want to ...” You must convince the hiring manager that you know exactly what to do and you have done it successfully in the past. This is critical for a career change in particular; real examples help an employer understand how your experience fits into a new role. Finally, don’t wait until you’re in front of your interviewer to consider how to explain the reason for your career change. Make no mistake, you will be asked this question. Plan in advance and practice your response so you aren’t trying to articulate it aloud for the first time in an important interview. Avoid complaining or being negative about how working for the government was or how horrible your boss was. Keep it simple, positive, and future-oriented. A sample response might be: “I feel like I have done a lot of great work over the past ten years with the government, but I have reached a point in my life where I feel like it’s time to move on. I’m ready for a different kind of challenge.”

CHAPTER 13

Carrying a Firearm for Personal Protection

O

NE OF THE THEMES THAT we have stressed over and over again in this book

is the idea that individuals need to take responsibility for their own safety and security. We have stressed the need for vigilance and explained the importance of maintaining a constant level of awareness whenever you are in public. We have discussed changes in personal behavior as an important component and making yourself a less attractive target to those who might wish to do you harm. The last concept to include is a discussion of enhancing your level of security not simply by learning and following some basic security guidelines and protocols but by direct action. There is always the chance that, no matter how careful you are or how diligently you plan and prepare for unforeseen dangers, danger still finds you. If that happens, you may have no choice but to defend your life and the lives of your loved ones. This chapter, therefore, focuses on self-defense and carrying a firearm for personal protection. Let’s begin this discussion by addressing carrying a firearm for personal protection in terms of both opportunity and suitability. First let’s examine whether you as an individual even have the opportunity to carry a concealed weapon in the city, state, or country in which you live. In New York City, for example, it is almost impossible for a private citizen to obtain what is known as a full carry permit or unrestricted carry permit. Absent some extraordinary cause or proof that you are handling large sums of cash or other valuables on a daily basis, you can 217

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forget getting a carry license in New York City. On occasion the New York City Police Department (NYPD) will make an exception for an executive or celebrity with documented threats against his or her life, but that is an extreme rarity. Even recent Supreme Court cases have not changed the practice of the NYPD in requiring what it considers valid cause to receive such a permit. Absent some unforeseen victory in some of the Second Amendment cases working their way through the federal court system, we do not expect this situation to change anytime in the near future. This is also true in a number of other major cities, where obtaining a license to carry a concealed weapon with no restriction is either extremely difficult or virtually impossible. Now let us discuss the question of suitability. Carrying a firearm is not appropriate for everyone. A great deal of responsibility comes with owning a firearm. Number one is having a complete and unwavering commitment to safety, especially with respect to keeping firearms out of the wrong hands and in particular those of the young and most curious among us. In our time, we have seen agents lose loved ones to improperly stored firearms. Safety precautions must be adhered to 100 percent of the time without exception. There is also the commitment to train and practice. Using a handgun is not an easy skill to master. It requires a lot of practice including training of a very specific type. If you intend to carry the firearm for personal defense, you need to know everything there is to know about the laws with respect to the use of deadly force, and you need to be trained in how to make quick and correct judgments while under extreme stress. Finally, you need to ask yourself the most important question of all: Do I think I am capable of shooting another human being if I am forced to do so? If you conclude that owning and carrying a firearm is an option you wish to explore, let’s go through the steps you will need to take. The first thing to do is to find out all the legal requirements that apply to carrying a firearm in your home city. In New York City, for example, you would go to the NYPD website and find the pistol license division. The requirements may be viewed online at https://licensing.nypdonline.org/app-instruction/. The process is long and deliberately burdensome, and unless you can show some demonstrable need, it is unlikely you will get a carry license. However, obtaining a premises permit, which allows you to own a firearm and keep it at home, is far less difficult. Go online and do a little research as to the requirements in the jurisdiction where you live and work. Check both because there may be differences in the requirements from city to city or county to county. In the state of New York, for example, counties may have different requirements regarding obtaining a carry permit. This is somewhat curious as a carry permit issued in any county in New York State is valid in any other county with the exception of the five counties of New

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York City. If you are an executive working in New York City and you reside in Nassau, Suffolk, or Westchester County (the counties contiguous with the city), you may be able to get a carry permit in your home county, but that permit will not be valid within the city of New York unless validated by the NYPD. Check your state and local laws in order to find out if any differences would apply to your particular circumstances. If you pass the legal hurdles, then the next step is to determine the type and caliber of the firearm you will get and where and how you will be trained. Many jurisdictions require that anyone wishing to obtain a pistol license must attend, at a minimum, a firearms safety course. This applies even if you have prior experience using weapons. Additional training may be required, and even if it is not, you need to find a place to be properly trained. We cover training later, but let’s begin with a discussion of firearm types and how to select the right one for you. Modern handguns are either semiautomatic pistols or revolvers. A semiautomatic pistol, also known as a self-loading pistol, uses the energy of the fired cartridge to cycle the action of the weapon. When the firing pin strikes the primer of a cartridge it causes rapid combustion which, in turn, creates pressure. That pressure forces the bullet out of the barrel and the energy of the fired round forces the slide of the pistol to the rear. This causes the empty shell to be extracted, then ejected. As the slide returns to battery, a fresh round is taken from the magazine and chambered. To fire the next and all subsequent rounds, all the shooter needs to do is to reset the trigger and press it again. Once the last round in the magazine has been fired, the slide will lock to the rear, indicating that the empty magazine must be removed and replaced with a loaded one. A revolver is a different type of handgun that has a cylinder containing multiple chambers that rotate or revolve as the trigger is pulled (in double-action revolvers) or the hammer is cocked (in either single- or double-action revolvers). As the cylinder rotates, a fresh round aligns with the barrel and is fired. Once empty, the cylinder must be opened and the empty shells ejected. New cartridges can be loaded into the cylinder either one at a time or all at once with a speed loader. Both types of handguns have their advantages and both are acceptable for personal defense. Semiautomatic weapons offer certain tactical advantages, including larger magazine capacity and the ability to reload quickly, although anyone who has ever watched Jerry Miculek, a professional speed and competition shooter, fire and reload a revolver might dispute that point. Small-frame revolvers can still pack a punch, and hammerless designs allow revolvers to be carried without snagging on clothing. We generally prefer large-frame semiautomatic pistols for work but have been known to carry a small

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hammerless .357 Magnum revolver when there was a need to carry something smaller that would still be effective. Which make and model pistol should you consider for personal defense? Not to punt on the question, but the answer is “the gun you shoot best with.” The way to find out is to try to fire a number of different weapons and see which you feel most comfortable with. Perhaps you have an acquaintance who is an experienced shooter with a number of different weapons, or you can visit a local range and have an instructor let you fire a number of range-owned handguns. The only caveat is to make sure the weapons you are considering are effective for defensive use. There are many small-caliber weapons that can be concealed but are chambered for rounds that are not suitable for personal defense. Well-performing defensive rounds include .38, .357, .357 Sig, 9mm, .40, .44, .45, and 10mm.There are others but these are the most commonly available. Larger, heavier, and more powerful rounds recoil more so consider that as you make your decision. How should you carry a handgun? There are many modes of carry, but the only tactically acceptable method is carrying in a holster on your strong (dominant) side. Shoulder holsters and cross-draw holsters have some utility while sitting in a car for long periods in a position that makes a strong side draw difficult, but for everyday defensive purposes, carry a pistol on your hip. Whichever holster you select, make sure it holds the pistol securely, has good weapon retention properties and is comfortable enough to wear for extended periods. Remember, a holster requires wearing a substantial belt to support it, and most gun belts are less than fashionable. In addition, if you carry a semiautomatic pistol, you will need to carry at least one extra magazine on your support side in a magazine pouch on your belt. If you carry a revolver, you may carry an extra speed loader where it is convenient to your strong hand. How should you train to use a handgun effectively? There is a significant difference between learning the fundamentals of marksmanship and combat shooting. That being said, you must learn the fundamentals of marksmanship before learning to shoot in combat. Initial training must be extensive and regular, and it must be supported by consistent practice. That doesn’t necessarily mean going to the range every week, but it does require some form of practice, either dry firing (i.e., practicing with a safe and empty weapon) or using some of the excellent shooting simulators on the market. Of course, firing actual rounds at the range is necessary and confirms the validity and effectiveness of your other forms of practice, but the bulk of your training may be done without firing live rounds. Remember, if you practice with an empty weapon, you must be sure the weapon is unloaded, and never point the weapon in the direction of anything you do not wish to destroy.

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What is the most important element in preparing individuals to use a firearm in defense of their lives? We believe it is providing them with a complete understanding of the laws regarding the use of deadly force and teaching them to apply the law while making a split-second decision under extreme stress. Even law enforcement training academies often neglect this part of the tactical shooting equation, but you must not. We have spoken at length about the effects of stress on perception and cognitive ability. Let us apply those concepts to understanding what happens in a deadly force incident to a person attempting to defend his or her life or the lives of loved ones. It is absolutely beyond dispute that a shooter will perform better on the range, absent the stress of combat, than he or she will during a deadly force encounter. Fear and stress affect not only perception and cognition but also physical performance, particularly with respect to fine motor skills. Without going into too deep an analysis, it is enough to state that a shooter’s ability to shoot quickly and accurately will diminish in a combat situation. Consider this statistic: Most law enforcement shootings occur at very close range 3 to 7 feet between the police officer and his or her adversary. And yet, despite the close proximity of the combatants, 80 percent of the rounds fired by law enforcement officers miss their intended targets. That is a staggering statistic and should serve to highlight the insufficient training given to law enforcement officers. Every police department, federal agency, and other law enforcement entity require their officers to qualify on the range—that is, to demonstrate their proficiency with a firearm by firing a target and demonstrating a minimum level of competency. Typically, a passing score on these qualification courses is between 70 and 80 percent. It is interesting to note that these percentages are roughly the same percentages as the failure rates experienced by officers in actual shootings. It is clear that teaching basic marksmanship and requiring officers to fire from static positions on nonmoving targets absent the inducement of stress in no way, shape, or form prepares them for actual combat. Simply put, our officers are not being trained to shoot the way they need to and under the circumstances they will encounter during a deadly force encounter. Now let’s make matters worse. We just explained in detail how stress and fear have an extremely negative impact on the ability to shoot quickly and accurately. Now let us add to that mix the additional necessity of shooting only when it is necessary to do so. It is even more difficult to exercise judgment and apply the law regarding deadly force to a given situation while under stress. You must have a complete understanding of the law and in, a split second, make a decision based on the circumstances as to whether it is legal and justified to fire their weapons. Add to this equation all the effects that fear and stress have on your ability to think and perceive. You are likely experiencing tunnel vision, auditory

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exclusion, tachypsychia, and cognitive dissonance at the same time you are trying to make a life-or-death decision. Let’s talk for a moment about use of force and when the use of deadly force is justified under the law. The justification to use deadly force is based solely on a consideration of self-defense. You can shoot at someone or use some other form of deadly force only when you are acting under the reasonable belief, by objective, not subjective, standards, that you are about to either be killed or seriously injured. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) deadly force policy, which is largely mirrored in virtually every jurisdiction in the nation, reads as follows: “Law enforcement officers and correctional officers of the Department of Justice may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to another person.”1 An additional situation that also justifies the use of deadly force involves fleeing felons. The DOJ policy continues: Deadly force may be used to prevent the escape of a fleeing subject if there is probable cause to believe: (1) the subject has committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury or death, and (2) the escape of the subject would pose an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to another person.

It is clear that deadly force can be used only if you have the reasonable belief that you or an innocent third person are about to be subjected to either deadly force or some level of force that would seriously injure you. “Serious injury” is generally understood to mean the type of injury that would cause permanent disability or disfigurement. There are also other and somewhat surprising situations where deadly force is also legally justified. In New York State, the laws covering the use of force are found in Article 35 of the New York State penal code, which lists specific instances where the use of deadly force is authorized under the law. The general rule in New York State is: A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating … 2

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This so-called retreat rule is often at the center of controversies. Article 35 of the New York Penal Code also enumerates exceptions to the retreat rule, followed by a rather odd section identifying other situations where deadly force is justified. The retreat rule does not apply if the individual is in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer at the latter’s direction or he or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act, or robbery. New York law allows deadly force to be used even to prevent crimes, escape from arrest, or in defense of premises. Deadly force may be used to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of arson. If a person in “possession or control of, or licensed or privileged to be in, a dwelling or an occupied building” reasonably believes that another person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary of such dwelling or building, that person “may use deadly physical force upon such other person when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of such burglary.” Physical force is, of course, permissible in order to effect an arrest. However, it is surprising that deadly force is also justified when making an arrest or preventing escape from custody, and it is worth understanding this provision in greater detail. Article 35 states: A private person acting on his or her own account … may use deadly physical force … when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to … effect the arrest of a person who has committed murder, manslaughter in the first degree, robbery or forcible criminal sexual act and who is in immediate flight therefrom.

It is clear, according to New York law, that a private citizen or police officer catching someone in the act of committing one of the aforementioned crimes is authorized to use all means of force to effect the arrest and prevent escape up to and including the use of deadly force. Let us look at a possible scenario that illustrates justification for using deadly force in those circumstances. Imagine you are coming home late one night and, as you approach your apartment building, you hear screams coming from a nearby alley. You run to try to help the person in distress and come upon the scene of a woman being raped at knifepoint. You are armed and draw your weapon and order the perpetrator to stop and drop the knife. Your orders are

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obeyed. The knife clatters to the ground and the assailant moves away from his victim. At this point you order the perpetrator not to move. There is no immediate threat to either you or the victim, and the perpetrator remains motionless. All of a sudden you see the perpetrator’s eyes dart toward the end of the alley, and you realize he is considering his options for escape. You tell him to freeze, but he makes a break and runs. Under New York law, can you fire your weapon to prevent his escape? If you answered in the negative, you are mistaken. The law in the state of New York authorizes you to take any means necessary, including using deadly force, to effect arrest and prevent escape as long as two criteria are met: The perpetrator must be caught in the commission of one of the serious crimes listed above and the perpetrator must be in immediate flight therefrom. In other words, you have to catch the bad guy in the act, and there can be no substantial break in time between the commission of the crime and the attempted escape. Under these facts, the moment the perpetrator tries to escape after you catch him committing the forcible rape, you can order him to stop. If he refuses to do so and tries to flee, you can fire your weapon to prevent escape. If, however, the attempt at escape was not in “immediate flight therefrom,” you cannot use deadly force. An example would be where you come upon the rape in progress and the perpetrator runs before you can take any action. The following day, while walking in the same neighborhood, you see the rapist. You know it is him beyond any doubt, and you order the man to stop. He ignores your command and runs again. Can you fire your weapon to prevent escape? Clearly the answer is no because of the intervening period of time between the commission of the crime and the escape. The exact same justification for the use of deadly force applies if you just witnessed someone committing murder, robbery, manslaughter in the first degree, or forcible rape or sodomy, now defined as a forcible sexual act. If the use of deadly force is related to self-defense, how does the use of force in these particular instances make sense, given the self-defense justification for deadly force? The answer is that these particular crimes are viewed as so serious, so heinous, and such a danger to the community in general that deadly force is permitted to protect the community at large. One thing that should be apparent from the preceding discussion is the complexity of the laws pertaining to the use of deadly force. And even though the rules might seem clear and easy to understand as you read them, they really become much less clear in the context of an actual deadly force encounter. For example, the law says that you are permitted to use deadly force if you reasonably believe that deadly force is about to be used against you or an innocent third party or that you are about to be hurt severely. But now try to analyze the law as it would apply to a number of different possible circumstances. We would

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likely all agree that if a physically strong assailant picks up a baseball bat and charges at you with the bat raised high, under these circumstances it would be reasonable for you to assume that you are at great risk of harm and may be either badly hurt or killed. Under those circumstances, deadly force would be justified. If you fire your weapon when confronted by such an attacker, your action would be legally justifiable. But what if your attacker was not a strong, hulking individual but someone frailer? Would that be a factor to consider before discharging your weapon? What if the weapon being used was not a baseball bat but instead a child’s lacrosse stick? Certainly that is a far less formidable weapon, but it still probably could hurt you to some extent. Would you be reasonable if you assume that your attacker could kill or maim you or with a lacrosse stick? What is someone unarmed indicates an intention to attack you violently? Assume that you are 5 feet 8 inches tall and weigh 160 pounds. Your attacker is 6 feet 4 inches tall and weighs 280 pounds. In this scenario, isn’t it also likely that a person who is far bigger and stronger could hurt you seriously or even kill you? Would you be allowed to use your weapon to defend yourself under those circumstances? What about if the disparity in size and strength was not that great? What then? We could discuss scenario after scenario, but our point should be obvious. These issues are not as simple as they may seem; perhaps you even had a difficult time responding to each question as you read in a comfortable setting absent the stress induced by a violent confrontation. Now imagine that you are walking to your car late one night when suddenly you are accosted by an armed individual who tries to attack you. You are caught by surprise, it is late at night, there is very little light, and you have less than a second to act. Do you think making the right decision under those circumstances would be more or less difficult? If you are going to carry a firearm for personal protection, you need to be able to shoot accurately and quickly even when you are absolutely terrified. Doing that requires a great deal of training and a commitment to practice regularly. Shooting is like anything else; your skills degrade over time unless they are reinforced by practice. In addition to keeping your shooting ability sharp, you need to practice and develop the ability to make quick judgments under the worst possible conditions. You have to train in realistic situations, and that training needs to include placing yourself under stress and forcing yourself to make fast decisions. There are a number of ways this can be accomplished including the use of electronic simulators, going through combat courses requiring fast decision making after exhausting yourself through physical activity, or doing a number of other drills designed to force you to make shoot or no-shoot decisions. This type of training is quite difficult to find. In fact, even the nation’s leading law enforcement agencies often lack such training. You, however, cannot neglect to train under stress. You are a successful individual

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with a lot to lose. Do not risk your liberty or treasure by making a bad decision simply because you never trained how to exercise judgment under stress. Consider liability insurance covering concealed carry. A number of companies offer policies that cover criminal and civil liability in the event you are arrested or sued as the result of using a firearm in self-defense. Various websites even offer a comparison of coverage between the companies offering this type of insurance. Policy rates, at the time we are writing this chapter, range between $130 and $599 per year. This is a relatively small cost to gain a good deal of peace of mind. Check if these policies are available under the laws of your state. A final thought: If you ever are forced to shoot someone in a self-defense situation, put your weapon back in your holster as soon as it is safe to do so. Remember, the police will respond and will have no idea who you are or what happened. All they will know is that they are responding to a call of “shots fired” and will be extremely aggressive in their actions. What do you think will happen if they arrive to find you, gun in hand, standing over someone that was just shot? By the way, if the police arrive and give you commands (i.e., drop the weapon, hands up, etc.), follow them immediately without hesitation. Make no statement to arriving officers. Every shooting will be investigated. Even though you may have done everything right and your actions were legally justified, you will be under a great deal of stress, and we already know what stress does to our ability to think. You will be flustered and may say something that puts you in legal jeopardy. You also should go to the hospital and get checked out. Tell the arriving officer you want to go to the hospital and that you want to talk to a lawyer before making any statement. We ended this book with a discussion of taking action in defense of your life or the lives of others for a reason. Our safety depends, to a great extent, on our ability to act; therefore, our inherent bias should always be toward action. There is a saying of unknown origin: “Act or accept.” This expression is an excellent creed for those intent on having a more secure life. Stay alert, stay safe, and, if necessary, take whatever action is necessary to survive a threat to your life.

NOTES 1. Attorney General October 17, 1995 Memorandum on Resolution 14, Policy Statement, Use of Deadly Force. https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/attorneygeneral-october-17-1995-memorandum-resolution-14-attachment-0. 2. New York Senate, The Laws of New York, Consolidated Laws, Penal, Part 1: General Provisions, Title C: Defenses, Article 35: Defense of Justification, Section 35.15. https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PEN/35.15.

Index

A Absenteeism, increase, 80 Access (social media), limitation, 183 Active shooter attack time, 87 emergency action kits, preparation, 70–71 enhanced threat, 74 FBI definition, 73 scenario, mental preparation (requirement), 82 Active shooter incident assessment/response, 81–88 background/definition, 73–76 barricades, 84–86 behavioral/motivational factors, 76–80 confrontation, 87–88 danger, avoidance, 83–84 location, percentages, 74 motives, Secret Service identification, 77 number, increase, 75 occurrence, 87–88 potential, 27 survival, 73 Active Shooter Response Training, 211 Active shooters, alarms (setting), 36 Active Shooter Threat Recognition, 211 Activist, grievance, 62 Admiration, need, 79 Agent Survival training (DEA), 2 Airborne hazard (office emergency), planning, 24–26 absence, 24 presence, 25–26 Airports, soft targets, 98 Akroyd, Dan, 207 Alcohol, usage (increase), 80 Alert stage (OSAC phase), 154 Alignments, CSO creation, 200–201 All-hazards emergency action plan, 21–26

Al Qaeda terrorists, training (video), 114–115, 120 Anger, outbursts, 80 Anthrax attacks, 48 ANTIFA (targeting), 189 Antivirus software, installation/update, 181 Appearance, attention decrease, 80 Army Post Office (APO), usage, 49 Arrival, behavior, 110 Arrogance, 80 Art of War, The (Sun Tzu), 170 Assassination, attempt, 94 Assaults, commonness, 11 Association for Safe International Travel (ASIRT), 139–140 Assumed knowledge (elicitation technique), 175 ATMs, usage, 103 Audience, knowledge, 210–212 Auditory exclusion, 8 effects, 30 Aurora, Illinois (active shooting incident), 76 Automated external defibrillator (AED) absence, 19 CPR connection, 21 first aid kits, location, 44 supply, 20 Avoid-Barricade-Confront (ABC), 82 Avoid-Barricade-Fight (A-B-F), 82 Awareness learning, 3–7 level, 2–4 supervisory awareness, ensuring, 66 Ayatollah Khomeini, impact, 100

B Barricades, 82, 84–86 door, tying, 85e, 86e furniture, usage, 85e

227

Index

228 Barricades (continued) position, 86 strategy, 83 Behavior, routine patterns (avoidance), 94 Biohazard, presence, 53 Biological incident/release, incident potential, 27 Blackout/power loss, incident potential, 27 Blindfolds, usage, 166 Bodyguard, protection specialist (contrast), 185–186 Bombers, demands (FBI agreement), 48 Bombings, 15, 59–64 warnings, absence, 59 Bombs. See Vehicles blast, threat, 64 bomb--human-borne explosive, incident potential, 27 description, 61 engine compartment, placement, 147–150, 149e placement, 145–150, 147e questions, documentation, 61 shrapnel, 57 trunk, placement, 147–150, 148e Bomb threats, 15, 59–64 checklist, sample, 60e–61e incident potential, 27 making, reasons, 62 protocol, 59–60 receipt, 47 Boston Marathon, bombing, 3 Bottlenecks, avoidance, 116–117 Bottom up search, 63 Box, avoidance, 114. See also Vehicles Bracketing (elicitation technique), 175 Brand, preparation, 213–215 Building exterior danger, 34–35 fire and life safety directions (FLSDs), designation, 17 occupants, direction, 62 Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms checklists, 59, 61–62 Burglary, impact, 183 Business jargon, usage, 202–203 setting, selection, 212–213 Business intelligence (BI), value, 172 Business travel security, 91 behavior moderation, 94–95 routine patterns, avoidance, 94

pre-travel research, 95–106 profile, control, 93 recommendations, 91–95 social encounters, arrangement, 93–94

C Cafferty, Jack, 29 Capital Gazette (attack), 75–76 Cardiac arrest (office emergency), planning absence, 19–20 comprehensiveness, 20–21 reason, 19–21 Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) CPR-certified employees alert, 20 list, 44 knowledge, 19 Car, driving (alertness), 114 Career adjustments, making, 210–212 advancement, opportunities, 212 learning, 208–210 plan, information gathering, 212 self-worth, knowledge, 212–213 soft skills, building, 213 Career, transition, 207–208 Cars. See Vehicles Cell phones, visibility (avoidance), 101 Change, stakeholder benefits, 200 Chemical incident/release, incident potential, 27 Chief security officer (CSO), 195 alignments, creation, 200–201 business executives expectations, 202 business jargon, usage, 202–203 challenges, 197–198 culture differences, bridging, 199–200 proactive communication, 201 relationships, building, 199 reporting/command structure, setup, 198–199 resistance, management, 199 role, creation, 196, 197 success, elements, 198–203 Children, education, 184 Choke points avoidance, 114, 116–117 diagram, 116e Civil Unrest (U), risk indicator, 96 Closest first responders, contacts (list), 44

Index Closest medical facilities, contacts (list), 44 Clubs, soft targets, 98 Cognitive dissonance, 9 effects, 30 Color code system, 3–7 Command structure, setup, 198–199 Commercial espionage, background/use, 170–172 Communications consideration, 78–79 proactive communication, 201 threats, 78 Computers, target value, 176 Condition Orange, 4 Condition Red, 4–7 Condition White, 3–4 Condition Yellow, 4 Confidential bait (elicitation technique), 175 Confrontation, 87–88 Congested roads, avoidance, 120–121 Congressional Committee on International Relations, 160 Consular Affairs home page, consultation, 95 Contents, removal (difficulty), 51 Contractors, contacts (list), 44 Cooperation (hostage situation), decision, 164–165 Cooper, Jeff, 3 Corporate security function, trends, 196 Counterespionage schools, 137 Countersurveillance, 125–139 instruction, 127 Counterterrorist schools, techniques, 118 Countries, political instability/high risk (avoidance), 99–103 Crime (C), risk indicator, 96 Crimes, occurrence, 105 Crisis management team (CMT), 22 alert, 20 components, 23 decisions, 35 personnel, assignation, 44 roles, 27 Crisis response team (CRT), 35 alert, 22–23 directive, 35 members, identification, 22 personnel, assignation, 44 roles, 27 Critical operations personnel, 44 Criticism (elicitation technique), 175 Culture differences, bridging, 199–200

229 D Danger avoidance, 83–84 indication, absence, 63 Dangerous weapons, comments (increase), 80 Deadly force, usage, 222 Deadly physical force, usage (avoidance), 222 Deliberate false statements (elicitation technique), 175 Delivered packages, 47–53 contents, removal difficulty, 51 envelope, suspicious lettering, 50–51 physical signs, 51 postmark, 51 protective measures, 49–51 restrictive endorsement, 50 return address, 51 Demonstrations, travel assessment, 101 Denial, 9 Denton, Jeremiah, 167 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Ninoy Aquino Airport conditions, 157 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “Indicators of Potential Workplace Violence,” 80 Department of Justice, deadly force policy, 222 Department of State advisory levels, 95–96 evacuation priorities, 154 risk indicators, 96 security overseas seminar, 6–7 Travel Advisory website, 97 Departure date, plan, 208 Dependents, priority, 154 Depression, violence indicator, 80 Device submersion, avoidance, 53 Device, discovery, 64 Diplomatic Security Service, 124 Disorientation, usage, 166 Door closing mechanism, tying, 86 tying, 85e, 86e Dream state, 3–4 Driving, alertness, 115–116. See also Vehicles Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 206 Office of Training, Agent Survival training, 2 Drugs, packages (avoidance), 102 Dual explosive attacks, 64 Dual-screen video file, 180

Index

230 E Earthquake, incident potential, 27 Elicitation techniques, types, 174–175 Emails, opening (caution), 181 Emergencies decisive action, importance, 33–34 planning, 15, 197 Emergency Action Guide, 40e–43e Emergency action plan (EAP), 27, 32 procedures establishment, 37 Emergency Action Plan Development, departmental responsibilities, 31e Emergency braking techniques, usage, 121 Emergency medical care, obtaining, 103–104 Emergency plans, updates, 38, 40 Emergency vehicle operation, 121–125 Emergency vehicle operation course (EVOC), 121, 123 Emotional responses, instability, 80 Empathy, absence, 80 Employee Emergency Information Form, 39e Employees contact information, list, 44 safety, 197 Employment places, access points, 69 safety, increase, 16–17 Engine compartment, bomb placement, 147–150, 149e Entitlement, sense, 79 Envelope, suspicious lettering, 50–51 Envy, impact, 80 Escape routes, 37 Espionage commercial espionage, background/use, 170–172 executive perspective, 169 government interest, 171 Essential personnel, nonessential personnel (distinction), 155 Evacuation office emergency responses, 28 phase (OSAC phase), 154 priorities (Department of State), 154 protocol, detail, 44 routes, search, 63 Evasion, attempt, 136 Executive protection, 185 mission/scope, 186–187 plan, components, 189–191 program, setup, 187–193 response, 188–189

risk assessment, 188–189 scenarios, 188–189 specialist, selection, 191–193 Executive protection professional (EPP), 185–186 Executives espionage perspective, 169 prime targets, 172–173 skepticism, 192 vulnerability, 173–176 worst enemy role, avoidance, 181–184 Exploitation, 79 Explosion, incident potential, 27 Explosives, impact, 48

F Facebook, usage, 181 Facility, bombing (objective), 148 Facility control, 26 Fake charity, 182 Family education, 184 relationships, 78 Fantasies, preoccupation, 79 Fear benefit, 7–8 effects, mitigation (mental preparedness), 9–13 generation, 62 impact, 221 physical/psychological responses, 7–9 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 23 Financial crimes, protection, 187 Financial instability, 78 Financial loss mitigation, 197 Financial problems, discussion, 80 Firearms carrying, 217 comments, increase, 80 Fire Department of New York (FDNY), safety plan, 16–17 Fire/life safety directors (FLSDs) brigade, assembly, 25 Fire/life safety directors (FLSDs), requirement, 23 Fire/smoke condition, incident potential, 27 First-level managers, CRT direction, 35 Fixation, Secret Service definition, 77–78 Fixed surveillance, 128e point, setup, 128

Index

231

Flattery (elicitation technique), 175 Flight check-in, 109–110 Flood, incident potential, 27 Floor wardens, personnel (assignation), 44 Foley, Laurence (murder), 125–126 Foot surveillance techniques, 133–134 Foreigners, victimization, 92–93 Four-car blocking, 120e Frauds, 172–176 mailbox attack, 176–181 protection, 187 executive perspective, 169 scams, protection, 180–181 Full building evacuation, FDNY definition, 28 Funds, extortion, 62 Furniture, barricade usage, 85e

G Global positioning system (GPS), 110, 151 Global Security Group assessment process, 81 creation, 81 plan creation, 22 senior fire safety consultants, 45 services, 58 Good listener (elicitation technique), 175 Governments instability, impact, 100 intelligence-gathering apparatus, 171 Grand jury subpoena, power, 209–210 Group surveillance methods, 132

H Handguns, advantages, 219–220 Haughty behavior, 80 Health-related issues, 186 Health (H), risk indicator, 96 Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems securing, 17 shutdown, 25 toxic chemicals, 24 High-risk areas personnel, evacuation, 151–156 travel, 113 High-risk countries, avoidance, 99–103 High-speed backing, usage, 121 Hijacking, 157–164 drawn-out situation, 163–164 guidelines, 158

recommendations, 161 rescue attempts, 163–164 strategy, terrorist goals (change/impact), 159–160 threat, confrontation, 162 treatment, 163 Holmes, James, 9 Hostage cooperation/resistance, decision, 164–165 expectations, 166 physical/mental activity, maintenance, 166–168 situation, incident potential, 27 survival, 157, 164–168 Hostility, 78 Hotels drills, 18 rooms, travelers (vulnerability), 176 soft targets, 98 “How to Kidnap American Citizens,” 126 Human nature, strangeness, 7 Human resources (HR), 21, 38, 196, 201 Hygiene, attention decrease, 80

I Illegal drugs, usage (increase), 80 In-building relocation areas (IBRAs), 37 identification, 44 predesignation, 29 In-building relocation, office emergency responses, 29–30 In-building relocation, protocol, 44 “Indicators of Potential Workplace Violence” (DHS), 80 Information privacy, protection, 183 protection, 197 securing, technological advances, 173 volunteering, avoidance, 176 Information technology (IT), 21–22, 196 Intangible returns, 202–203 Intellectual property (IP) protection, 187 value, 172 Intelligence databases, usage, 99 value (acquisition), spies (usage), 171 Internal coordination, improvement, 196 Internal security force, option, 70 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), security standards, 157

Index

232 Intruder/threatening individual, incident potential, 27 Inward-opening door, furniture (usage), 85e ISIS (terrorist group), 98

K Kansi, Aimal, death sentence, 124 Key chain, small flashlight, 150e Key expatriate employees, priorities, 154 Kidnapping, seriousness, 102

L Lane changes, usage, 121 Large/heavy object, door (tying), 86e Law enforcement contact, 78 personnel, environment analysis, 2 Leading question (elicitation technique), 175 Legal asset management, 196 Letter attack, defense, 49 Libre taxies, avoidance, 102 Limited action (OSAC phase), 154 LinkedIn, usage, 181 Links, clicking avoidance, 182–183 caution, 184 Local authorities, support, 70–71 Local criminal activity, 104–105 Local embassy contact, 142 role, 152 Local intelligence updates, 99 Local laws/customs, 105–106 Local police, guidance consultation, 69 Long Island Rail Road Train, physical attack, 162 Low profile, maintenance, 161

M Mail bombs postage, excess, 51 simplicity, 57 Mailbox, spams (prevention), 181 Mail, receipt, 53–58 Mail room protocol, 55e–57e Mail room, securing (technological solutions), 54 Maiquetia International Airport, 102–103 Malware, usage, 172

Masharipov, Abdulkadir, 84 Medical emergency, incident potential, 27 Medication/medical insurance, usage, 107–108 Miculek, Jerry, 219 Midnight Express, 167 Mobile surveillance techniques, usage, 134–135 Money, changing (care), 103 Motives, Secret Service identification, 77 Moving box surveillance, 133e Mutehida Qaumi Movement, 124 Mutual interest (elicitation technique), 175 MySpace, usage, 181

N Name, self-search, 184 Narcissistic personality disorder (NPD), 79 symptoms, indications, 79–80 Narcotics investigation, 135 National Incidental Management System (NIMS) system, 23 Natural disaster (N), risk indicator, 96 New York City, Code of 2014, 17 Ninoy Aquino Airport, Philippines (DHS warning), 157 Non-fire emergency, response, 24 Novak, Mark, 8

O Obvious, denial (elicitation technique), 175 Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 34 “Office Building Emergency Action Plans” (FDNY), 28 Office buildings, drills, 18 Office emergencies, incidents, 27 Office emergencies, plan, 15 building, elements, 44 command center, 32 communication, 36–38 cooperation, 31 decisive action, 32–35 delineation, 26–30 elements, 30–45 expertise, 38–45 individual actions, 35–36 ongoing updates, 30–31 reason, 15–21 Office emergencies, responses, 28–30 One-lane roads, avoidance, 114, 117 Organizational policies, violations (repetition), 80

Index

233

Other (O), risk indicator, 96 Outside assembly areas/routes, identification, 44 Outside walls, search, 63 Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) guide, 95 phases, 154

P Package bomb, triggering system, 58e Packages presence, 58–59 receipt, 47, 53–58 special handling procedures, 57e Paddock, Stephen, 73 Pahlavi, Reza, 100 Pakistan, car attack (analysis), 122–125 Panic, generation, 62 Paranoia, 80 Parking, caution, 143 Parks, soft targets, 98 Passports, uselessness, 107 Password security, practice, 183–184 Payment diversion (scam), 177 Pearl, Daniel (kidnapping), 165 Pentagon, attack, 157 Performance, problems (prevention), 10 Personal firewall, installation/update, 181 Personal information, solicitation, 177 Personal issues, 78 Personal protection, firearms (carrying), 217 Personal security, 10–11 Personal travel security, 91 behavior moderation, 94–95 routine patterns, avoidance, 94 pre-travel research, 95–106 profile, control, 93 recommendations, 91–95 social encounters, arrangement, 93–94 Personnel, evacuation, 151–156 PETA (targeting), 189 Philippines, Ninoy Aquino Airport (DHS warning), 157 Physical force, permissibility, 223 Physical protection, 187 Physical signs (delivered packages), 51 Physical surveillance, 128 technical surveillance, combination, 134 Point vehicle, offset position tracking, 131e Political unstable countries, avoidance, 99–103

Ponsiego, Allan, 10 Predictable travel, avoidance, 119 Prescription medication, amount (adequacy), 108 Pre-travel checklist, 111e Pre-travel research, 95–106 countries, political instability/high risk (avoidance), 99–103 emergency medical care, obtaining, 103–104 local criminal activity, 104–105 local laws/customs, 105–106 Principles of Personal Defense (Cooper), 3 Private person, deadly physical force, 223 Private sector movement, 207–215 security career, entry, 205 Proactive communication, 201 Problems, discussion (increase), 80 Profile, viewing, 182 Protection, definition, 186 Protection specialist, bodyguard (contrast), 185–186 Protective measures, 49–51 Protective program, comprehensiveness, 186–187 Public address (PA) system, usage, 36 Public areas, search, 63 Public assembly venues, drills, 18 Public computers, logon (avoidance), 183 Public events, soft targets, 98 Public transportation, avoidance, 101, 102 Public transportation systems, soft targets, 98

Q Quick reference guide (QRH), usage, 43–44

R Radiological/nuclear incident/release, incident potential, 27 Rage, outbursts, 80 Rear-view mirrors, usage, 138 Regional security officer (RSO) consultation, 152 contact, 136–137 Rental cars, usage, 140 Reporting, setup, 198–199 Reputation, protection, 186 Rescorla, Rick, 33 Rescue attempts, 163–164

Index

234 Resistance (hostage situation), decision, 164–165 Response (elicitation technique), 175 Restaurants, soft targets, 98 Restrictive endorsement, 50 Resume, usage, 214 Retreat rule, 223 Return address, 51 examination, 50 Return on investment (ROI), 202 Revolvers, usage, 219 Risk indicators, 96 mitigation, 196 reduction, 176 Roadblock, defeating, 123 Roads congested roads, avoidance, 120–121 usage, rules, 115 well-lit roads, usage, 114, 121 Roadside emergency equipment, 150–151 Romance scams, impact, 182 Romantic relationships, 78 Route selection, principles, 113–121 Routine, change (avoidance), 136 Run-Hide-Fight, 82

S Safeguards, implementation, 179 Safe havens arrival, 136 search, 121 Safety measures. See Vehicles Scams, 172–176 protection, 180–181 romance scams, 182 social networking scams (dangers), family/children (education), 184 School environments, 78 Schools, soft targets, 98 Searchers, personnel (assignation), 44 Secret Service active shooter motive study, 77 motivation factors, concern, 78–79 Security awareness training, participation, 181 career entry, 205 transition, 207–208 corporate security function, trends, 196 department, external emails (marking), 181

mind-set, development, 1, 10–11 operation, running, 195 options, customization, 184 overseas seminar, 6–7 pre-travel checklist, 111e security-related responses, 68–70 staff, function, 70 Security Guidelines for Americans Working Overseas, 127 Self-centeredness, 78 Self-importance scene, grandiosity, 79 sense, inflation, 79 Self-protection, knowledge, 11–12 Semiautomatic pistols, usage, 219 Services, breakdown, 153 Setup, recognition, 141–142 Severe weather, incident potential, 27 Sexual assaults, commonness, 11 Sexual blackmail, awareness, 176 Shelter FDNY definition, 29 office emergency responses, 29 shelter-in-place protocol, detail, 44 Shooting incident, survival, 81–82 Shopping malls/markets, soft targets, 98 Side-view mirrors, usage, 138 Single-unit surveillance, 130 Skiles, Jeffrey, 43–44 Skill, development, 12 Sleep stage, 3–4 Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP), enrollment, 97 Social encounters, arrangement, 93–94 Social media access, limitation, 183 self-protection, 183–184 usage, 181–182 Social networking scams (danger), family/children (education), 184 sites, public computer logon (avoidance), 183 Soft skills, building, 213 Soft targets, identification/attack, 98 Spams, prevention, 181 Specialness, belief, 79 Spies usage, 171 value, 170 Standard fast (OSAC phase), 154 Stantz, Raymond, 207

Index

235

Stationary surveillance, 128 usage, 134–135 Stop-and-go traffic, assault/kidnapping, 121 Stress, 7–8 effects, mitigation (mental preparedness), 9–13 impact, 221 Stressors, 78 Sullenberger, Chesley, 43–44, 109 Sun Tzu, 170–171 Supervisory awareness, ensuring, 66 Surveillance. See Countersurveillance augmentation, video cameras (usage), 135–136 burning, 138–139 commonness, 127 criminal conduct, 126 defining, 127–128 detection advice, 136 golden rule, 129 fixed surveillance, 128e methods, 129–131 moving box surveillance, 133e presence, obliviousness, 136 team surveillance techniques, 131–134 technical surveillance, 134–139 Suspect item, handling (advice), 53 Suspicious bags/packages presence, 58–59 response, 64 Suspicious item/possible explosive device, incident potential, 27 Suspicious lettering, 50–51 Suspicious mail incident potential, 27 poster, 52 receipt, 47 Suspicious packages, poster, 52

T Tachypsychia, 7–8 effects, 30 Taylor, Francis X., 160 Teaching Basic Agent Trainees, 210 Team surveillance techniques, 131–134 Technical surveillance, 128, 134–139 Terrorism (T), risk indicator, 96 Terrorists attack, 62 goals, change (impact), 159–160

interrogation, 6 training level, 115 Threat (hijacking), confrontation, 162 Threat response, criminal/terrorist test, 62 Three-car blocking method (alongside barrier), 119e Time-limited event (E), risk indicator, 96 Tire, bomb placement, 145–146, 145e, 146e Tourism infrastructure/sites, soft targets, 98 Tourists, robbery/assault target, 92 Toxic substance, leakage, 24 Training plan, 67 Transportation, safety, 186 Travel arrival, behavior, 110 avoidance, 96 caution, increase, 96 departure date, plan, 208 documents, requirements, 107 emergency vehicle operation, 121–125 executives, vulnerability, 173–176 flight check-in, 109–110 group travel, usage, 101 high-risk areas, 113 personnel, evacuation, 151–156 information, privacy, 176 medication/medical insurance, 107–108 Pakistan, car attack (analysis), 122–125 precautions, 95 preparation, 106–111 pre-travel research, 95–106 reconsideration, 96 risk, reduction, 176 route selection, principles, 113–121 safe havens, usage, 121 setup, recognition, 141–142 travelers, vulnerability, 176 valuables, securing, 140–141 vehicle safety measures, 113–121 well-lit roads, usage, 114, 121 Triggering system, 58e Trip hazard, creation, 190 Trunks, bomb placement, 147–150, 148e Tunnel vision, 9 effects, 30 Twitter, usage, 181 Two-car blocking method (stop sign/light), 118e

U Union Texas Petroleum (UTP) Company, attack, 122–124

Index

236 US Airways Flight 1549, emergency landing, 43–44 U.S. currency, minimization, 101 U.S. Department of State, information, 106

V Valuables, securing, 140–141 safety check, 142–143 Vehicles (cars) bombs, 143–150 attachment, 143 placement, 145e–150e, 146–150 bottlenecks, avoidance, 116–117 box, avoidance, 114, 119–120 choke points, avoidance, 114, 116–117 congested roads, avoidance, 120–121 driving, alertness, 115–116 emergency vehicle operation, 121–125 four-car blocking, 120e key chain, small flashlight, 150e one-lane roads, avoidance, 114, 117 Pakistan, car attack (analysis), 122–125 parking, caution, 143 point vehicle, offset position tracking, 131e predictable travel, avoidance, 119 preparation/selection, 140 roadblock, defeating, 123 roadside emergency equipment, 150–151 roads, usage (rules), 114 safe havens, search, 121 safety measures, 139–151 principles, 113–121 three-car blocking method (alongside barrier), 119e tire, bomb placement, 145–146, 145e, 146e two-car blocking method (stop sign/light), 118e vehicle-borne explosive, incident potential, 27 watching, 117–119 well-lit roads, usage, 114, 121 Vendors, contacts change, 181 list, 44 kidnapping, seriousness, 102 Venezuela, category 4 level (“Do Not Travel”), 100–101 ATMs, usage, 103 demonstrations, frequency, 101 driving, avoidance, 102

drug trade, activity, 102 homicides, number, 102 libre taxis, avoidance, 102 Maiquetia International Airport, 102–103 money, changing (care), 103 public transportation, avoidance, 102 taxis, selection, 102 Venezuelan Violence Observatory (VVO), homicide information, 102 Vigilance, sense (maintenance), 169 Violence employee perpetration, 65 incidences, discussion, 80 indicators, 80 Violent crimes comments, increase, 80 pervasiveness, 101 Viral videos, impact, 182

W WAZE, usage, 110 Well-lit roads, usage, 114, 121 Wire transfer requests, verification, 180–181 Withdrawal, violence indicator, 80 Witter, Stanley Dean, 33 Work environments, 78 Workplace active shooter incidents, number (increase), 75 attackers, law enforcement contacts, 76 domestic problems, increase, 80 Workplace violence, 65 BLS report, 65 prevention, 67–68 training plan, 67 warning signs, 66 World Caution, 97 World Trade Center attack, 157, 159 deaths, 32–33 Worship, places (soft targets), 98 Wustenheuff, Dennis (murder), 144

X X-ray equipment, usage, 58

Z Zero-tolerance policy, implementation, 66 Zottola, Sylvester (murder), 133

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