England, Russia and the Straits question, 1844-1856 rj4305117

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
I. THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 (page 1)
II. THE COMMERCIAL PRELIMINARIES OF THE CRIMEAN WAR (page 76)
III. THE GERM OF THE CRIMEAN WAR (page 139)
IV. COLLAPSE OF THE AGREEMENT OF 1844 (page 189)
V. CANNING-FLEET MOVEMENTS-AND WAR (page 257)
VI. THE STRAITS AND THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE (page 340)
VII. THE EPILOGUE (page 413)
DOCUMENTARY APPENDIX (page 434)
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (page 450)
INDEX (page 469)

Citation preview

ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION 1844-1856

BY

VERNON JOHN PURYEAR, PH.D.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS IN HisToRY

Volume 20

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 1931

| ‘UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS IN HISTORY SO - Hersrrt Evcenr Botton and W1iLLiam A. Morris, Editors. Vol 1. Studies in American History. - 1, Colonial Opposition to Imperial Authority during the French and Indian

Wars, by Eugene Irving McCormac. Pp. 1-98.

2. The Viceroy of New Spain, by Donald E. Smith. Pp. 99-293. 38. The Beginnings of Spanish Settlement in the El Paso District, by Anne E. Hughes. Pp. 295-392. In paper cover, $2.75; cloth, $3.00.

oe Index to the volume, pp. 393-406.

$3.50.

VoL 2. , : , PAGE _ I. THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 1 THE RuSsSsIAN PoLicy REGARDING TURKEY 2 eecccccceeeeeeeece 7

| THE CONVENTION OF MUNCHENGRATZ OF 1833..................... 15

ANGLO—RUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1826-44... 27 Tsar NICHOLAS I VISITS ENGLAND................:ccccccceceeeeeeeeeees 40

THE NESSELRODE MEMORANDUM OF 1844....000000 0. «= 64

IT. THE COMMERCIAL PRELIMINARIES OF THE CRICOMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT oF SOUTHERN Russia, 1830-82... cee eee cence cee eeeceeecee nese eeeeerernesstrsseseeeneee 85

BRITISH COMMERCE IN THE NEAR East, 1830-53.............. 106 , THE PROBLEM OF THE DANUBE.-....-:.:---c0csccssesceceseeseseeseeee-ee-e 130

Ill. THE GERM OF THE CRIMEAN WAR.....W000000000 189 CoNTINUITY OF THE AGREEMENT OF 1844...L.00000000000...... 141

| A BritisH FLEET ENTERS THE DARDANELLES..................... 153 CANNING PLANS A TURCO-BRITISH ALLIANCE.................... 180

IV. COLLAPSE OF THE AGREEMENT OF 1844........002........... 189 TRANSFERS OF THE NESSELRODE MEMORANDUM................ 190

NICHOLAS I PROPOSES PARTITION PLANS FOR TURKEY...... 210 FRANCE THREATENS TO INVADE BELGIUM..................--..---... 242

V. CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR.............. 257 FAILURE OF THE MENSHIKOV MISSION.................-------:2------ 209 ' BRITISH WARSHIPS OPPOSE RUSSIA........0.........:::::-cceeeeeeeeeees 262 PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORTS CANNING.............2:::00-2-2220022-0---- 268

| [ix] | |

THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CRIMEAN WAR...................----. 274

PoLictes OF FRANCE, AUSTRIA, AND PRUSSIA.................... 316

| CHAPTER PAGE VI. THE STRAITS AND THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE 340

, THE SOROUR POINTS?) ooecccecccccccecececceeseeeeeeeseeeseseeteeestseeeeeeee B41 THE VIENNA. CONFERENCES OF 1855.0000.00000000000cccceeceeeeeeeeeeeee. 878

END OF THE CRIMEAN WAR.......0.....0000.00cc0cceeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeeee--- 406

THE CONGRESS OF PARIS IN 1856....00000000000000 ieee. 414 RESULTS OF THE CRIMEAN WAR........0.00..0022cc00eecceeeeeecceeeeeeeeee 427 |

DOCUMENTARY: APPENDIX o0oo.o.o..oceececeecceeeeeeeeteeeeeeeeeee 484 | A. SEPARATE ARTICLE OF THE TREATY OF UNKIARB, SEPARATE AND SECRET ARTICLES OF THE CONVENTION OF MUNCHENGRATZ.....0....ccccccccecccccceeeeeeeecceenceceeeneereenenee 435

C. BLOOMFIELD TO ABERDEEN, 21 SEPTEMBER 1844............ 486

, D. BLOOMFIELD TO ABERDEEN, 26 OCTOBER 1844................ 438

| E. THE NESSELRODE MEMORANDUM OF 1844.00.00... 439 I’. NESSELRODE TO ABERDEEN, 28 DECEMBER 1844............ 443 | G. ABERDEEN TO N ESSELRODE, 21 JANUARY 1845.._........... 444

: H. STRATFORD CANNING TO CLARENDON, 15 SEPTEMBER

| I. CLARENDON To CowLEy, 15 DecemBErR 1854.................. 447 J. DRouyn pE Luuys To Cow.ey, 19 DEcEMBER 1854.. 449 A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. ...0.....ccccccccccsssessseseeeseeeeeee. 450

[x] |

PREFACE The history of the Straits has by no means escaped the attention of historians of nineteenth-century Europe, but

it has been assigned a minor place in the more general surveys of diplomatic and commercial history. Perhaps no important. historical subject of modern times has been so much slighted, since access has not been easy to the authoritative information necessary to write an unbiased account of one of the most insistent problems of world polities. Serious research on the subject really began after 1910, when the penetrating analysis by 8S. M. Goriainov, of many of the Russian documents covering the diplomatic history

of the Straits, made its appearance in a French version, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles. There were, nevertheless, periodic publications of diplomatic dispatches by the British and French foreign offices, and numerous memoirs of statesmen and diplomatists, during the last seventy-five

years, adding a large body of source material. Several monographs have appeared since 1910, but with the single

exception of Kurt Rheindorf’s Die Schwarzemeerfrage (1925), these one-volume works have sought to analyze the problem for the entire modern era rather than to treat more limited periods. The result has been sketchy aecounts, the

general conclusions of which are finding revision in the light of more intensive investigations of short periods of the history of the Straits. None of the works available thus far have attempted to analyze the diplomatic ramifications of the Question of the Straits in its relation to what sometimes 1s regarded as the enigma of modern diplomacy, the

causes of the Crimean War. An attempt is made in the

[xi] ,

‘present work to fill that deficiency. |

TYhe necessity for a limitation of the subject for monographic treatment to a definite part of the whole problem became evident to the writer several years ago, and that conviction has been strengthened since he was privileged to pursue his research among the voluminous records of the British foreign office and of the Board of Trade in London. Although the present work is based almost entirely upon original manuscript material, care has been taken to utilize the published documents and printed secondary sources when practicable. Most of the published sources were found to be inadequate, however, after comparison with impor-

tant unpublished documents now open for inspection. Hence many of the topics treated herein are entirely new; others have resulted in a revision of the generally accepted opinions on the diplomacy of the Crimean War. The work

as a whole is an attempt to reinterpret objectively the forces which underlay the war, both political and economic. To prevent confusion, all dates have been given in the Gregorian calendar. An extensive appended bibliography lists the more important and useful of the works consulted.

he story of the diplomacy of the Crimean War in an important sense 1s wound around slender threads of reasoning’ incident to the moral effect on Turkey—and on Russia

—of the presence of two or three British or French warships in the Bosphorus at critical times. Twice within the period under examination, western warships contravened the pronouncements of treaties and entered the Dardanelles while the Porte was at peace. The first instance, in 1849,

was terminated by a British acquiescence to the Russian demands for a rigid enforcement of the Huropean Conven-

tion of the Straits; the second, in 1853, precipitated the crisis which resulted in the Crimean War.

The general causes of the Crimean War may be viewed from two principal angles: the imperial rivalries of Great Britain and Russia in Asia, in which the commercial and strategic potentialities of the Near East played a dominant [xii]

role, and the failure, in a time of crisis, of the diplomatic — oe arrangements embodied in the Anglo-Russian secret agree-

—- ment of 1844. The understanding provided for the coop-

a eration of the two Powers in all Turkish matters, including , a plan for an ultimate pacific partition of the Sultan’s dominions in Kurope. The history of the secret agreement - presents an amazing problem, that of the changing attitude

of official Britain in the affairs of Turkey and Russia ,

between 1844 and 1854. The riddle of the British departure from their obligations to Russia when in 18538 the con-

: templated downfall of Turkey appeared to be imminent

| involves a consideration of the personalities involved. In _ , Russia Tsar Nicholas I gave a continuity to policy in a long

reign, which was not possible in Great Britain under the parliamentary system. The individual who dominated the foreign policy of the United Kingdom longer than anyone else, before or since—Lord Palmerston—had his thirty-five years of service interrupted by Lord Aberdeen, a statesman

whose views on the Eastern Question were quite in contrast

to his own. This in part explains the paradox of British

- - policy in the Question of the Straits in the middle of the nineteenth century. Yet a fluctuating policy in the British : cabinet does not entirely explain the origin of one of the

most curious and unnecessary wars in history. If the present work assigns to an English diplomat who once was

refused acceptance as British ambassador at St. Petersburg

| the major immediate responsibility for the catastrophe of the Crimea, it is because extant evidence appears to justify

, such an assessment of guilt to Stratford Canning. That conclusion has become inevitable on a basis of documentary

evidence not heretofore analyzed. ,

Personalities certainly play their part in any international conflict; in the Crimean War, as in many other international anarchies, the fundamental conflict of national - interests explains and reinterprets the more subtle motives

guiding the conduct of ministers of State. In this study, Great Britain and Russia are found to be in diplomatic _

, [ xiii ] , ,

agreement on their ultimate action in an eventual partition

a of Turkey at a time when their respective political and commercial interests are in conflict with each other. It is

: through an attempt to analyze these factors, both of which centered in the region of the Straits, that a measure of historical truth in the large problem of the origin of the

| these pages. | |

, Crimean War, it is hoped, has been accomplished within Though exhaustive inquiry would have been impossible, many of the facilities of the larger libraries of the western world have been utilized, nevertheless, in the long process of compiling material. Of especial pleasure was the research

-_- earried on in the Harvard Library, the British Museum,

| and the Bibliothéque Nationale. If any especial merit from the standpoint of source material is found in this study, however, it has been due to the courtesy of the officials of the Public Record Office in London and of the Board of , Trade archives and library, who cheerfully made accessible the original documents on which this work in large part is

based. The chapter on the commercial preliminaries of the Crimean War, offering fundamentally new elements for his- :

, torical treatment, would have been fragmentary indeed

without the use of the last-mentioned archives, while the _ diplomatic manuscripts form the fundamental basis on - which the conclusions rest. The writer is indebted par, ticularly to Professor Robert J. Kerner, whose advice and

assistance have been unfailing. For errors of fact or of ,

, interpretation, however, I must myself assume responsibility. |

V.dJ.?P. BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA, , August 15, 1929. |

: | , , [ xiv ]

PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS Annales du Commerce: Annales du commerce extérieur; Russie, faits

commerciaux, 1843-1856, (1856) No. VIII.

B. T.: British Board of Trade (MSS). Eastern Papers: Parliamentary Papers (Eastern Papers) 1854: Cor-

respondence Relating to the Affairs of the Levant, ete. F. O.: British Foreign Office (MSS). | Goriainov, Le Bosphore: Goriainov, 8. M., Le Bosphore et les Dardaneltles.

Goriainov, Agreement: Goriainov, 8S. M., ‘‘The Secret Agreement of 1844 between Russia and England,’’ Russian Review (Liverpool), TI (1912)—III, 97-115; IV, 76-91. 3 Hansard: Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, third series. Harcourt: Harcourt, Bernard a’, Les quatre ministéres de M. Drouyn

de Lhuys. ' ,

Hertslet: Hertslet, E., The Map of Europe by Treaty. Hiibner: Hiibner, Graf von, N euf ans de souvenirs d’un ambassadeur ad’ Autriche a@ Paris, 1851-1859.

traités.

Martens, R. G.: Martens, G.-Fr., Recueil général de traités. Martens, N. R.: Martens, G.-Fr., Nouveau recueil de traités.

Martens, N. R. G.: Martens, G.-Fr., Nouveau recueil général de Martens, R. T. R.: Martens, F. F., Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangeres.

Noradounghian: Noradounghian, G. E., Recueil des actes internationauxs de l’Empire Ottoman.

P. P.: Parliamentary Papers. _ Poschinger: Poschinger, H. von, Preussens auswartige Politik 1850 bis 1856.

P. R. O.: British Public Record Office. | | R. F. O.: Russian Foreign Office. Schiemann, Beziehungen: Schiemann, T., ‘‘ Russisch-englische Beziehungen unter Kaiser Nikolaus I,’’ Zeitschrift fir dsteuwropdische

| Geschichte, IIIT (1913), 485-98. | . [xv]

Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands: Schiemann, T., Geschichte Russ-

lands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I. ,

Shilder: Shilder, N. K., Imperator Nikolai Pervyi. Shebunin: Shebunin, A. N., Rosstia na Blizhnem Vostokie.

State Papers: British and Foreign State Papers. Tatishchev: Tatishchev, 8., Vnieshniaia Politika Imperatora Nikolata Pervago. Turkey No. 16 (1878): Parliamentary Papers, Turkey No. 16 (1878):

Treaties and Other Documents Relating to the Black Sea, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, 1535-1877. _ Zhigarev: LZhigarev, S., Russkaia Politika v Vostochnom Voprosie.

[xvi] , ,

| Cuarter I THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 La raison qui conseille 1’établissement de cette accord , est. fort simple. Sur terre, la Russie exerce envers la Turquie une action prépondérante; sur mer, l’Angleterre occupe la méme position. Isolée, l1’action de ces deux puissances pourrait faire beaucoup de mal; combinée, elle pourra produire un bien réel: de la utilité de s’entendre préalablement avant d’agir.—From the NESSELRODE MEMORANDUM.

This is the most important public document ever submitted to parliament.—DISRAELI.

When Baron Brunnow remarked to Lord Clarendon during the peace negotiations at Paris following the Crimean War, that the main cause of the conflict had been mistrust of Tsar Nicholas, the foreign sec-

retary retorted that British confidence in the late Tsar had lasted much too long.’ Both were referring to the period of diplomacy from the summer of 1844 to the spring of 1853, when England and Russia had been in secret understanding respecting Turkey. The

untimely disruption of that understanding was the principal cause of the Crimean War. By the terms of the agreement, complementing a similar arrangement previously effected between Russia and Aus1 Clarendon to Palmerston, 18 February 1856. F. O. 27 France 1168, 3.

2 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

-tria, Great Britain and Russia had arranged to settle amicably their most difficult common problem—that of the decrepit Ottoman Empire, master of Constantinople and the Straits. It had been arranged when Nicholas I visited England in June 1844. In the literature of the Crimean War there does not exist a comprehensive analysis of this fundamen-

tal aspect of Anglo-Russian relations in the nine years which preceded the conflict in the Crimea. The

reason is obvious: the agreement was secret and verbal. Certain parts of the conversations which inaugurated the secret understanding were committed to writing, however, in a formal document known as the Nesselrode Memorandum of 1844, and

later there was an exchange of ministerial letters and other correspondence in acceptance of the tenets

of this Memorandum.’ These papers were guarded carefully while the agreement was effective, moreover, on account of the extreme secrecy necessary in

an arrangement which excluded France, through a sheer preponderance of power, from a share in the ultimate partition of Turkey. They were not made available even to statesmen in the respective British | and Russian cabinets or to their diplomatic representatives, much less to historians. When the agreement collapsed, prior to the outbreak of the Crimean War, the letters of acceptance and the correspondence immediately concerned were eliminated from the British archive records, leaving only the Memorandum—in itself not intelligible except through ~ conjecture on account of its unilateral character. The set of pertinent documents in Russia was hid2See Appendices HE, F, and G, and below, 64-65. 7

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 3

den carefully in the archives and was not rediscovered until the twentieth century. Hence historians have treated the whole subject in a fashion ~ which all but eliminated consideration of the AngloRussian secret agreement of 1844 as an element

of importance preceding the Crimean War. The sum of ayailable information on the problem prior to 1908 consisted of an official publication of the text of the Nesselrode Memorandum in 1854, parlia-

mentary diatribes against the makers of it after the outbreak of war that year, a letter in Baron Stockmar’s Memoirs published in 1872, spasmodic outbursts in the memoirs of certain British statesmen of the period—Malmesbury, for example—in themselves inadequate to trace the history of the negotiations, and sketchy paragraphs of suspicion in a few historical treatments—notably that by Tatishchev in

1886. In 1908 the discoveries of S. M. Goriainov, director of the Russian archives, were published in St. Petersburg, and in 1912 an English publication of the documents was made.’ Since that time the British archives on the period of the Crimean War have been opened for inspection, revealing several unpublished documents having a direct bearing upon the problem.

It now is possible to trace, with historical accuracy, the outlines of the origin, making, and collapse of the secret agreement. That has been the principal object of two chapters of the present work. 8 Cf. Eastern Papers, VI; 3 Hansard OXXXII (1854), 157 ff.; Stockmar, Baron, Memoirs, II, 112 ff.; Malmesbury, (8d) Earl of, Memoirs of an ex-Minister, I, 307, passim; Tatishchev, S. S., ‘‘Im-

perator Nikolai v Londonie v 1844 g.,’’ Istoricheskii Viestnik, Feb.—Mar. 1886; Zaionchkovskii, A. M., Vostochnaia Voina 1853-1856

(5 v., 1908); Goriainov, 8. M., ‘‘The Secret Agreement of 1844,’’

Russian Review, I (1912), III, 97-115, IV, 76-91. See below, note 158.

4 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

The conclusions inevitably have led to a new inter- ,

an pretation of the whole of Crimean War diplomacy.

oy

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the origin

and making of the agreement. |

| Only in its proper background is it possible to understand the full significance of the agreement of 1844 and its relation to the Crimean War. The agreement was based on two definite concepts given cur-

rency in Russian foreign policy under Nicholas I: conservation of:a weak Turkish Empire as long as

possible, and cooperation with other Powers of | Europe in an ultimate partition of Ottoman do-

- minions. Preceding the joint Angilo-Russian sanc-

, tion of these concepts in 1844, an international | basis had been given them in an extensive alliance

os program in which Russia and Austria—at Miinchen- gratz in 1833—had determined to cooperate in all matters regarding Turkey. Russia’s official adoption

| of these two bases occurred in 1829, during the events incident to the Treaty of Adrianople. These matters

| are to be discussed in their order.

The whole problem of Turkey and the Straits once was expressed aptly by Metternich as a question

simply of whether to turn ‘‘the sick man’’ over to the doctor or to his heirs. Clearly the latter alterna_ tive, a partition of Turkey, had been the major Rus-

| sian thesis from the eighteenth century,* and the adoption of the policy of preserving Turkey was in 4Cf. Laloy, E., Les plans de Catherine II pour la conquéte de Constantinople (Paris, 1913).

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 5

contrast to what usually is called the ‘‘historic mission’’ of the Tsars. It is this problem which is not

well understood. An example will illustrate the point: In 1845, when Christian uprisings against the , Porte were general, Count Nesselrode adopted a policy of opposition to the success of their revolu-

tions, and even offered to give the Turkish govern-- ment an efficacious support to maintain itself.’ Under

the eighteenth-century program, Russia might have i welcomed the opportunity presented for the internal

| dissolution of Turkey in which a seizure of Constan-

, tinople and the Straits would have been a corollary; in the first half of the nineteenth century, and notably

after the Peace of Adrianople, Russia consistently maintained a vigorous policy of preservation of the

| - Turkish Empire as it was then constituted. | Although Napoleon and Alexander at Tilsit did not admit it, the three great Powers most interested in the Question of the Straits before 1853 were Rus-

_ gia, England, and Austria. The direct interest of the two eastern Kuropean empires is evident to anyone who observes a map of the continent for the year — 18538, while Britain’s interest came logically from her

naval and commercial strength and the location of India, the economic jewel of her empire. That other

: Powers presumed to make the question one of major interest to themselves is of importance only as far as their actions affected the respective positions of | any one or all of the three Powers mentioned. But _

even Austria had no active policy in the Straits from — | 5 Nesselrode’s Report for 1845. Zhigarev, II, 5. At that time ,

Russian diplomatic officers in Turkey and Greece were given simultaneous orders to inform the elders of the local Christian communi-

ties that it was useless for them to expect assistance from Russia.

| 6 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION |

| 1815 to 1854. Hence the concern for diplomatic his-

| Powers.

tory largely centers about the activity of only two

If Austria’s interest was a passive one, however, it is to be explained by other reasons. The problem

| cof the maintenance of the old régime against far greater obstacles than were being encountered in

Russia at the same time preoccupied the Austrian

, | - internal administration. Foreign problems in Italy, the Germanies and the unwieldy Confederation, with

; the Zollvereim headed by Prussia, outweighed the immediate importance of Turkey and. the Straits. , Furthermore, with the increasing diplomatic strain on Metternich’s diplomacy presented by Turkey’s probable dissolution after the Greek War of Independence, it was prevented from becoming a major , Austrian concern after 1833 through the establish- |

| ~ ment of a treaty basis at Mtinchengratz for an amic-

| able concert with Russia on all matters pertaining to Turkey. The natural policy of Austria, being preoc-

cupied with other interests, was to maintain the independence and territorial ‘integrity of the Otto- | | man Empire. It will be shown that such a policy also |

| was adopted by Russia in 1829. It was possible, therefore, for the moribund Ottoman Empire to be ! éiven external support to prevent dissolution after 1833, in a joint Austro-Russian convention. Hence when England became Russia’s virtual ally in 1844, it amounted to an extension of the pre-

viously internationalized policy of maintenance of | , Turkey as long as possible and of concerted action in ~ an ultimate succession to the dominions of Turkey, the latter to be effected by pacific methods.

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 7

. IT | : ,

In general, it is clear from incontrovertible Russian sources, notably the archive researches of Professor I’. F’. Martens,° that the Imperial Government at St. Petersburg reversed the policy of Catherine II and determined to apply the principles of the Holy Alliance to the affairs of Turkey as well as to other States. Alexander I felt the necessity of preservation of the legitimate order everywhere, including Turkey. Nicholas I, while not basing his policy on the idealistic motives of his predecessor, nevertheless continued to apply the principle of legitimacy to the

Ottoman Empire.’ | ,

_ When Nicholas became Tsar in 1825, Metternich

was not convinced that he would wish to maintain Turkey.* Indeed, when the Anglo-Russian protocol

of 4 April 1826 relating to the independence of Greece’ was signed, Metternich regarded the Quadruple Alliance as having been broken.*® In 1827 he made a proposition to England, France, and Russia for an agreement among the Powers to maintain the

status quo in Turkey." War between Russia and

6 Martens, R. T. R., IV, passim. 7 Zhigarev, I, 5.

8 Tatishchev, 386-87. |

9 Noradounghian, II, No. 37.

10 To Emperor Franz, 9 October 1829. Aus Metternich’s nachgelassenen Papieren, IV, 598. Austria did not join the Triple Allianee,

nor was she sympathetic to it. |

, 11 Foreade, E., ‘‘L’Autriche et la politique du cabinet de Vienne en la question d’Orient,’’ Revue des Deux Mondes, XXII (1854), 852. Metternich formulated Austrian policy as follows: ‘‘ An invariable

principle of our policy is not to prevent the establishment between _ Austria and Turkey of any Power which can prevent our intervention in Turkey.’’

8 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

| Turkey having followed in 1828, Metternich tried to |

induce Prussia, ‘rance, and England to intervene to |

restore peace. This proposition offended Russia, and Nesselrode staunchly opposed it. The Habsburg monarchy at that time was rather isolated, and noth-

ing came of the proposal.”

It is the period of the Russo-Turkish War which | has become classic as one in which the preoccupation

of the Powers tended to throw Turkey upon the | merey of Russia. The success of Russian armies made it possible in 1829 to impose on the Sultan as humiliating or as liberal a peace as Nicholas desired.” The decision taken by the Imperial Government on

this point in September 1829 became the basis of Russian policy in Turkey until the outbreak of the

, Crimean War. |

When Adrianople, the second capital of Turkey,

| had fallen to the Russians, the problem of finding a

, government at Constantinople which would make |

, peace on terms favorable to Russia necessitated the a formulation of definite instructions to be given the | commanding general, Count J. Diebitsch-Zabalkanskii.“* Nicholas confided the study of this problem

to a secret committee presided over by Count | Kochubey and composed of the highest functionaries | 12 England was preoccupied with internal affairs ; France was parleying with Russia for an alliance. Forcade, op. cit., 853. _

, 18 Metternich particularly resented Russian victories. Shilder, I, | 231. Aberdeen implored Nicholas to use moderation., ibid., II, 249. Reports from Constantinople indicated that the immediate effect of a Russian invasion of the capital city would be the downfall of the Sublime Porte, and wholesale anarchy. Shilder, II, 246. 14 Diebitsch wrote Nicholas 25 August for expedited instruc-

tions. Shilder, II, 548. In advance of the decision of the secret : committee, the Tsar instructed Diebitsch to occupy the Dardanelles

and to use cannon fire to prevent the entrance of any fleet, if negotiations for peace were broken off for any reason.

} THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 9

of his empire. The object was not only to fix the _

, terms of peace, but to formulate a line of policy to | be pursued by Russia in the event of the Sultan’s refusal to negotiate a satisfactory treaty of peace. At the first meeting of the committee, 16 September 1829,**® Count Nesselrode read a remarkable memoir”

which demonstrated that it was to the interest of | Russia not to desire the destruction of Turkey. The preservation of the Ottoman Empire ‘‘is more advan-

tageous than detrimental to the true interests of Russia,’’ the memoir read, hence ‘‘any order of _ _ things which might be substituted would not balance

our advantage in having a weak Power—a State always menaced by internal revolt of its subjects—

as our neighbor.’’ But it was proposed that if Tur- | key dissolved, in spite of Russia’s desire, its restora- |

tion should not be supported in any way by Tsar Nicholas. When that moment occurred, moreover, | Russia should take energetic measures to safeguard her interests, and at once begin negotiations with other European Powers to determine the disposition

| of the territories and populations of the Turkish a Empire.** Nesselrode said in conclusion that to arrange the disposal of Turkish dominions without the concert of Europe would open Russia to a very 15 Prinee Tolstoi, Prince A. Galitzine, Count Nesselrode, Count Chernichev, and Privy Counselor Dashkov in addition to Count Kochubey, composed the committee. Shilder, II, 549; Martens,

R. T. R., IV, 438. |

| 16 Diebitsch meanwhile had negotiated the Treaty of Adrianople,

14 September 1829. Text, Martens, N. R., VIII, 152. See below, 80. ,

17 It was in essence the famous memoir prepared by Kochubey in 1802 for Alexander I. Cf. Dascovici, N., La question du Bosphore

et18des Dardanelles, 150. | The germ of Nicholas’ arguments to Austria and England for |

an advance agreement on the eventuality of Turkish dissolution is

contained in this clause. , an |

10 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

serious charge. In view‘of these considerations, the

Count proposed an international congress to be called at St. Petersburg to settle the succession whenever Turkey dissolved. In addition to this important document, Nesselrode communicated to the commit-

tee a memoir by Dashkov, a letter from Capodistrias,’® and several dispatches written by Lieven and

Pozzo di Borgo.” | .

_ Dashkov’s memoir, written in 1828, was a lucid argument which sought to demonstrate that the inevitable result of the destruction of Turkey would be a general Kuropean war. Therefore the privy coun-

selor concluded that Russia’s efforts should be directed, not toward the acquisition. of new terri-

tories, but to a solidification of authority and development of resources in the already extensive Russian dominions. He contended, furthermore, — 19 Count Capodistrias proposed the following plan for a political

reconstruction of the Balkan peninsula: The Ottoman Empire in Europe might be replaced by five States of the second order— Moldavia-Wallachia, Servia (including also Bosnia and Bulgaria), Macedonia (including Thrace and the adjacent islands), EpirusAlbania, and Greece (which would include the remaining insular system). The Count recognized that a guaranty of the existence of these small States would have to follow their creation. This object could not be accomplished, however, without a satisfactory dis-

position of .Constantinople, the city whose possession, according to

Napoleon I, would give universal dominion. To which of these States might Constantinople be assigned? Capodistrias was a

Greek patriot, but he did not presume to claim Constantinople and

the Straits for Greece. According to his plan, Constantinople

might become a free city, and. a center of the five federated Balkan States, each to be ruled by a prince from the families of the great Powers, and represented at Constantinople by a congress. The free city, furthermore, was to be given territory adjacent to it. Martens,

F. F., ‘‘Etude historique sur la politique Russe dans la question

IX20 The [1877], 70-71. | , documents are in R. F. O., ‘‘Committee on Affairs of the d’Orient,’’ Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée,

Orient, Record, Memoir 4/16 September 1829.’’ Publications of

pertinent excerpts are in Martens, op. cit., 70-75; Martens, R. T.-BR., IV, 438 ff.; Goriainov, Le Bosphore, 25-27. Some of the official correspondence with General Diebitsch is in Shilder, II, 547 ff.

| THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 11

that the expulsion of the Turks from Europe and

their confinement to Asia Minor would present new | difficulties for the Russian possessions in the Caucasus and beyond. But if Turkey should dissolve by the force of circumstances, the two alternatives of action outlined were: (1) a partition of Turkey by

, the great Powers or (2) its division into several independent territories. The second alternative, Dash_ kov was convinced, would present the least difficul- — ties. Russia was too large already to desire any territorial accretions. ‘‘The possession of the Dardan-

elles and the Bosphorus would aid our commerce,”’ he admitted, ‘‘but what a price we would have to pay to obtain them!’’ In the event of a partition of Turkey, Russia would be placed at a disadvantage by the

acquisitions of territory certain to be sought by other Powers because of their geographical locations. | Austria would take Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina,

Albania, and also Montenegro. England and France | would appropriate Egypt and Crete and the islands ,

of Greece. In this event Russia would have to face dangerous enemies in the south of Europe instead of the ‘‘careless Turks.’’ Finally, in opposing the proj- , eect of Capodistrias—who wanted Constantinople

made into a free city along with the creation of five © | independent Balkan States—Dashkov made the eriti- ©

- gism that Constantinople as an independent city | would not be sufficient to guard Russia’s access to | the Black Sea. If Nicholas permitted Constantinople | to become a free city, Russian garrisons would have

to be established on both banks of the Bosphorus.” | 21 Martens, R. T. R., IV, 439-40. Dashkov’s memoir particularly was commended to Diebitsch by Nesselrode. Shilder, II, 548.

12 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

After carefully examining these projects, and considering other ideas as well, the secret committee came to the following unanimous conclusion: ‘‘The

advantages of the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire are superior to the inconveniences which they present; its fall therefore would be contrary to the true interests of Russia; in consequence it would be prudent to seek to prevent it’’ and to conclude an

honorable peace with Turkey on other terms. If, however, Turkish dominion in Europe later came to

an end, Russia would take energetic measures to prevent the Straits falling into the hands of any great Power other than Russia. As to the final disposition of Turkish territories, Russia should concert with the other Powers. The conclusions of the committee were sanctioned by Nicholas,” and served as the basis of Russian policy in the Orient until 1853. Because neither the dissolution of Turkey nor the.

conquest of its Huropean provinces followed, it became a fixed Russian policy to maintain the status quo in southern Europe.” This definite line of action was adopted by Russia deliberately on her own coun-

sels as the less of two evils. Yet the establishment of conclusions regarding Turkey by the Russian government had no international basis, and there existed no means whereby the other major Powers might summon Russia to maintain without change a

decision to uphold Turkey. It was the further 22 The resolutions of the committee were communicated by Nicholas, under guise of instructions, to the Russian commander. Chernishev to Diebitsch, 19 September 1829. Shilder, II, 549-50. . They were received, of course, after the Peace of Adrianople had been signed. Diebitsch acknowledged their receipt 5 October 1829.

25-27; Dascovici, 169. : 23 Martens, R. T. R., IV, 439. |

Shilder, II, 550-51. Cf. Martens, Etude, 72; Goriainov, Le Bosphore,

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 13

decision at St. Petersburg, therefore, to give this unilateral action an international sanction in order to secure its peaceful continuance under any eventuality. The obvious method of such a sanction was through alhances. The first one was made with Austria at Munchengratz in 1833, from which point Russia was limited in a very real sense in her relations toward the Porte, and the second one was with England in 1844. In 1829, then, the decision of Russia was to maintain Turkey as a weak Power as long as possible, but to occupy Constantinople and the Straits in advance

of any other great Power in case Turkey dissolved as a result of internal weakness. Nicholas did not contemplate the construction of a new and powerful State by a former vassal of the Sultan as one result of the internal decay of Turkey; yet that was the problem, augmented by the participation of France, which faced him in 1832. Nevertheless the Tsar upheld his policy of maintenance of Turkey in the negotiations and actions provoked by the conflict between Mahmud II and his rebellious Egyptian

vassal, Mehemet Ali. ,

Turkey was unable to control the destinies of her

empire; the victorious armies of the vassal were threatening to occupy Constantinople and the Straits in 1832-83. It was obvious that France would be the

dominant Power in Turkey under a régime which might be established by Mehemet Ali. Hence Tsar Nicholas decided to give Turkey the support of an ally ;** not out of sympathy for the Porte, but because 24 Martens, R. T. R., IV, 440. On the Russian occupation of the Bosphorus in 1833, the comprehensive account of this episode is Muraviev, Russkie na Bosphorie, entire; the essential points are in

14 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

he believed that a vigorous young empire, supported

by France, on the ruins of the Ottoman structure would oppose the real interests of Russia. The Tsar

was convinced that Austria, no less than Russia, would oppose the establishment of an Arab-Egyptian

State on the shores of the Bosphorus; therefore he desired a complete agreement with Metternich on the

eventualities of the future. On account of the hostility of the western Powers to the conservative ten-

dencies of Russia and Austria, an accord with Hngland and France seemed impossible. When in 1833 the maritime Powers became insistent opponents of the Russian method of handling its problem of Turkey, Nicholas was convinced more than ever that cooperation with Austria, to prevent the possible alliance of the latter with the naval Powers of the west, was indispensable.”

Thus Russia faced a possible surrender of her historical position in dealing with Turkey. After the Egyptian episode, moreover, Nicholas was convineced that the downfall of Turkey was inevitable. Therefore he sought an alliance with Austria in order

also to prepare the ground for a gradual transition from the old to a new régime in the east. He was willing to cooperate with other Powers in the same aim, and knew that a concert with Austria could be arranged only by a policy of preservation of TurGoriainoy, Le Bosphore, 30 ff., Dascovici, 176 ff., and Phillipson and Buxton, 56 ff. Robin, R., Les Occupations militaires en dehors de Guerre, 219-21, presents another view. Fragmentary accounts are

Debidour, A., Histoire diplomatique de l’Hurope, I, 321-23, and Thureau-Dangin, P., Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet, II, 356 ff. 25 Brunnow’s memoir, analyzed by Tatishchev, 393. This Russian historian, writing in 1890, severely criticized the argument advanced

by Brunnow. Martens, R. T. R., IV, 441.

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 15

key.** That conformed entirely to his own plan of conduct. It was these considerations which presaged the internationalization and extension in 1833 of the policy adopted officially by Russia in 1829.

il Metternich had been dubious as to whether Russia would refrain from the destruction of Turkey, but the Peace of Adrianople was a powerful argument in that direction.”” The revolutionary events of 1830 in. Europe had restored much of the old friendship between Russia and Austria,?* while affairs in Turkey and Egypt had served to emphasize the need for an alliance between the two Powers to handle Turkish problems. Nesselrode prepared a

memorandum for Nicholas early in 1833, in which he stated that, while Russia did not desire the partition of Turkey, the internal condition of the empire was becoming so uncertain that something must be done to remedy the situation.” Thus Nicholas was forced by circumstances to communicate his ideas on 26 Zhigarev, 6; cf. below, note 29. 27 For Austro-Russian negotiations 1829-32, see Molden, E., Die Orientpolitik des Fursten Metternich, 1829-1833, 1-80.

28 Tatishchev, 386. .

29 Martens, R. T. R., IV, 441. Nesselrode feared that the vic-

tories of Mehemet Ali might lead to a definite dissolution of Turkey.

What was Russia to do in the face of that eventuality? The

Count recalled the decisions of the secret committee in 1829, and affirmed that since that time the Imperial Government had sought

to prevent the downfall of Turkey, but had insisted upon consolidation of immunities of the provinces which had been placed under Russian protectorate. France and England had been hostile; Austria was well disposed, but prudence was necessary in negotiations on the affairs of Turkey. Nesselrode stated that Russia was sure of the preference of Austria for the maintenance of Turkey, hence upon that point there was certain agreement with Russia.

Russia’s main object should be to prevent Turkey becoming a

menace to Russian interests and possessions.

16 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

Turkey to the Power with which Russia at that time was on more intimate terms than the others. Shortly after Nesselrode’s analysis was submitted to him, Nicholas told Ficquelmont, in St. Petersburg,

that the Turkish affair concerned only Russia and Austria, as neighbors of the empire, and that they should let nothing come between them. At the end of January Tatishchev appeared at Vienna with a secret note for Metternich, in which the Tsar amplified his initial suggestion. He wanted to use the opportunity offered by the Hgyptian crisis for coming to an understanding with Austria ‘‘on the 1mmi-

nent questions of the Orient, in order to consider hypotheses destined to formulate a plan of future action conforming to the views of the two friendly

and allied governments.....’’ Metternich in

reply spoke of the absurd internal reforms of Sultan Mahmud II, but insisted upon the necessity for the

preservation of Turkey.** , |

In a very remarkable conversation 20 February 1833, Nicholas spoke frankly and directly with Ficquelmont. He was willing to support Turkey when requested to do so, even though such action was contrary to the policy of his predecessors and to opposing religious principles.” Yet he feared that the end

of the Ottoman Empire was near at hand. ‘‘If it falls,’? declared the Tsar, ‘‘I shall do nothing to restore it.’? It was necessary, he pointed out, that the succession to the Ottoman Empire, when it crum30 Ficquelmont to Metternich, 17 January 1833 Molden, op. cit., 83. Nesselrode spoke in the same sense for an understanding with

Austria. |

81 Molden, op. cit., 86.

32 Nicholas did not conceal that Russian public opinion would not be pleased by, his new policy. Tatishchev, 388.

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 17

bled, be arranged according to the desires of Russia and Austria. Projects of various kinds might cause

the downfall of the decrepit political structure, in spite of the efforts of the two Powers. Since Russia had renounced the object attributed to Catherine IT, Nicholas saw no reason why the two States could not come to an understanding on the contingency of its

dissolution. In this regard, he remarked that ideas of partition had occupied the thoughts of the Powers

for a long time. The Austrian minister observed that it was impossible to partition all of Turkey, to which Nicholas agreed. Some possibilities were discussed. There was the beginning of a Greek State,

but Nicholas was unwilling to say definitely that King Otto was the one who should hold Constanti-nople. The Tsar emphasized that although he was aiding Turkey, it was the duty of Russia and Austria, as most interested States, to come to an agreement.**

The cabinet at Vienna took this overture under serious consideration, recognizing the gravity of the situation. Metternich assured Tatishchev that Austria would remain true to her alliance of 1815 with Russia, even though England was endeavoring to shake that determination. But Metternich did not entirely share the views of Nicholas. He at once put aside the re-establishment of a Greek empire on the ruins of Turkey, since a prince of Bavaria had been placed on the Greek throne, and that would make an adversary for Austria.** Metternich did 83 Martens, R. T. R., IV, 443. (Ficquelmont to Metternich, 25 February 1833. Molden, op. cit., 86-88.) Cf. Tatishchev, 388, which emphasizes the contradiction of Russia’s policy in Turkey in 1833 to the previous historical development of that policy.

Iv, 443 to Nesselrode, 11 March 1833, Martens, R. T. R.,

18 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

not at first offer any precise proposals, however, on the future organization of the Balkans. When the Russian ambassador became insistent early in May, the chancellor replied in generalities. Tatishchev then being convinced that Metternich did not have any definite plans, presented the prince with a sketch of Austrian and Russian political relations with Tur-

key. A detailed discussion followed, on 5 May. Metternich asked for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Danubian provinces, supporting his

argument by stating frankly that Austria feared Russia would annex Moldavia and Wallachia. Ta-

tischev countered by reminding Metternich that Europe had admitted Russia’s preponderant position in the Principalities. Metternich regarded it as ~ advisable, nevertheless, for Russia and Austria to prevent the construction of an Arabic empire on the ruins of Turkey, in conformity with French plans. Having said that, he emphasized that Austria was resolved to support the Sultan ‘‘to the last extremity’’; and in the event of its dissolution he was not willing that a State dangerous either to Austria or - to Russia should be constructed on T'urkey’s ruins. What he preferred to other solutions was the establishment of independent sovereign States out of the provinces of Huropean Turkey, the Christian States to be governed by princes and the Mohammedans by

khans. Finally, he was determined that the prince who became established at Constantinople should never assume the title of emperor.” 35 Tatishchev to Nesselrode, 5 May 1833. Martens, R. T. R., IV,

444, A similar dispatch was addressed by Metternich to Ficquelmont, Molden, op. cit., 89.

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 19 ,

Mahmud II, in distress for his empire, requested aid from England in 1832. Despite Canning’’s plea

that it be sent,®° Palmerston refused on account of Britain’s preoccupation with Belgium. The Sultan : next appealed to Austria and then to France. Fol| lowing their refusals, Russia was asked to send naval and military aid to defend Constantinople. Nicholas sent an army and a portion of his Black Sea fleet to

the Bosphorus in February 1833,°" without asking the permission or concerted action of any European

| Power. He considered that the ties of friendship between Russia and the two large German States by

that time had been re-enforced sufficiently to encoun- | ter no difficulties. This daring step did not meet with

disapproval at Vienna or Berlin. England and

France protested in vain, and were compelled to , withhold their fleets from the Dardanelles.** Austria |

and Prussia even congratulated Nicholas on this |

diplomatic success. Negotiations for a secret alli-

: ' ance between Russia and Turkey® were withheld

from Austria, but Metternich was the first to con- |

gratulate Nicholas when he learned of its conclusion.*° The document was none other than the famous

} Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelessi, signed 8 July 1833, which | | gave Russia a decided political preponderance in the 86 Memorandum, Canning to Palmerston, 19 December 1832. Text, Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, II, 638. 87 See above, note 24.

88 Admiral Roussin threatened to force the Straits 14 May 1833 in order to secure the admission of a French squadron, but Orlov’s presence resulted in Roussin’s forced withdrawal. Goriainov, Le

Bosphore, 37. ,

89 Gorlainov, ibid., 40 ff. | |

40 Tatishchev, 387. The attitude of Metternich is here described as mere pretense.

20 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

Straits. Turkey was made an ally, and was promised full military support, but the Sultan’s obligation, in the event of a war in which Russia was engaged,

was simply to close the Straits against the enemies

of the Tsar.” |

The preliminary negotiations from January to May 1833 prepared the ground for a complete agreement concluded between Russia and Austria at Miin-

chengratz in September. The immediate occasion, however, was the vigorous opposition of England

and France to the Treaty of Unkiar, which was expressed in identic notes of protest to the Porte 26 August. Both Powers plainly stated that the treaty produced a new relationship between Russia and Turkey, to which they were entitled to object; and that if Russia thereafter conformed to the treaty by an armed intervention in Turkey, the western Powers held themselves at liberty to act as if the treaty were not in existence.*? It became expedient for Russia at

once to secure foreign support for her policy in Turkey.

By means of personal negotiations between the sovereigns and their leading statesmen, and through exchanges of explanatory notes, the representatives. of the two Powers at Munchengratz elaborated a 41 Text in Martens, N. R., XI, 655; Hertslet, II, 925. See

Appendix A for text of the separate and secret article which was the fundamental part of the alliance. For the practical effect of the treaty, see Guizot, F. P. G., Mémoires pour servir a l’histoire de

mon temps, LV, 49.

42 Text of British protest in Hertslet, II, 928. The terms of the Russo-Turkish ‘‘secret’’ alliance were known throughout Europe within six weeks. Mischef, P. H., La Mer Notre et les Détroits de Constantinople, 291, incorrectly concludes that the only result of the joint protest was to create a new diplomatic tension which

rapidly became eritical. That was one result; the permanent result was the Convention of Miinchengratz.

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 21

program for future action.** Several agreements were signed in Bohemia, 18 September 1833, Prussia

acceding to some of them. The most important was the document which embodied the separate and secret articles of the Austro-Russian Convention of Minchengratz respecting Turkey.** There are two theses embraced in these articles, comprehensive enough to cover any eventuality in a general way. In the first place, Russia secured an ally by giving international sanction to her policy of preservation of Turkey as long as it was possible to do so, such a policy coinciding with the interests of Austria. In the second place, Russia admitted Austria as a full partner in

the future partition of Turkey, while Metternich committed Austria to a plan of definite cooperation with Russia in the ultimate partition, conditional — upon reversal, for any reason, of the régime then existing in Turkey.” This alliance, especially important in its provisions for Austro-Russian cooperation in an eventual partition of Turkey, 1s one of two great diplomatic landmarks in the history of Russian

foreign relations before the Crimean War. The second landmark was the adhesion of England to the plan, after 1844. Both, by a preponderance of power, excluded France from the partition of Turkey.

It is to be observed that the two theses of the secret alliance of Miinchengratz elaborate two distinct and opposing views, and provide no adequate 43 Martens, R. T. R., IV, 444. For comments on personalities at

the jneeting in Bohemia, see Nesselrode, Lettres et Papiers, VII, | 44 See Appendix B for text of the Austro-Russian secret convention on Turkey. Metternich, Ficquelmont, Nesselrode, Tatishchev

and Orlov signed the agreements. | 45 Cf. Appendix B, articles I and IT.

22 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

basis for a rectification of difficulties in the event of — conflicting interpretations later. This is the fundamental defect of the alliance, and Nicholas sought to correct it in 1844 while in Eingland.** Nevertheless, difficulties over interpretation of which part of the

alliance was operative for a given contingency brought catastrophe to both agreements in 1853. Whereas the clause of the alliance of Miinchengratz

which stipulated for the maintenance of Turkey might be read with confidence by either State in future contingencies, the second clause, providing for a partition of Turkey, might be called into opera-

tion at the same time by the other Power. The wording of the treaty is defective in regard to the partition of Turkey, because it stipulates that an agreement on the details of succession is to be effected only after the dissolution of the Ottoman

Empire. - |

- The admission of Austria into full partnership

with Russia in everything concerning Turkey, moreover, nullified the advantages secured by Russia at

Unkiar-Iskelessi. Under the alliance with Turkey,

Russia’s protectorate and preponderance were unquestioned, for Russia might exercise control over the Straits; under the agreement with Austria, Russia virtually promised not to acquire or to act upon

an isolated advantage of any kind. Thus Austria was admitted to the benefits of that treaty without having to share the responsibilities, or else the Treaty of Unkiar ceased to have any import at all. It is safe to conclude that Russia’s position secured at Unkiar-Iskelessi—which was the highest point of

327-28, | | |

46 See Appendix B, article II. Cf. below, 67, note 194; also,

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 23

achievement of Russian diplomacy in its relations with Turkey—while in theory continuing for eight years, in fact continued only ten weeks. After 18 September 1833 the Russian status in Turkey would have been the same as if the Treaty of Unkiar had not been in existence. Such was the result of the prompt and vigorous opposition. of the western Powers to Russian aggrandizement in Turkey in

1833.47 , : , oo

From this point of view, the distinct advantage achieved at Munchengratz was Austrian. One writer even emphasizes that this was the greatest point of success in all of Metternich’s colorful career.* Although Metternich might logically regard himself -as the victor at Munchengratz, it was a victory also for Nesselrode, the Russian champion of the maintenance of T'urkey.*® As long as the two opposing concepts embodied in the secret articles did not come

into conflict—and they would not while Turkey’s internal tranquility continued—the proper advantage was on both sides. One point seems to be certain: that in signing the convention, Metternich was thinking rather of the restraint upon Russia than the 47 The attitude of England is deferred for treatment in more detail in Chap. II, and an analytical study of the Franco-British answer to Unkiar-Iskelessi is in preparation by the writer. 48 Srbik, H., M etternich: Der Staatsmann und der Mensch, I, 689, shows that this convention would work both ways: ‘‘Es war nicht nur Osterreich an das Zarenreich, auch Russland war an den Habsburgerstaat gebunden.’’ Metternich achieved a victory in securing

Russian support for his Italian and German policies, as well as

checked the Tsar’s eastern objectives for the future. ,

49 Nesselrode, in his report for 1833, regards the Minchengratz

alliance as a ‘‘brilliant diplomatic victory.’’ He considered that the convention promised, in any future contingency, that ‘‘ Austria

will be with us and not against us.’’ Tatishchev, 395. |

24 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

eventuality of a partition of Turkey,” while Nicholas’ comments throughout the next twenty years pointed -

to the second alternative as his major reason for

desiring a concert with Austria.

The secret alliance was not communicated to any

of the other great Powers.*’ One immediate result of it was to secure Metternich’s mediation in quelling

the irritation which had arisen in England because of the Russian diplomatic success at Constantinople. The bellicose attitude assumed by Palmerston was allayed somewhat in 1834. Indirectly—through Ficquelmont at St. Petersburg—Metternich gave an emphatic statement to London that Russia did not want to seize Constantinople. The statement was

backed by the argument that Nicholas could not afford to annex the Turkish capital for fear that his southern provinces, including Georgia, the Ukraine, and Bessarabia, would gravitate toward Constantinople as a new political center and that the Russian

Empire would thus be cut into two parts; or that even a new Power, no longer Russia, would be ereated. Metternich stated that this view was held in St. Petersburg by ‘‘all thinking men.’’ Sharing this opinion, the T'sar would use moderation in his relations with Turkey and would attempt to maintain the weak Ottoman structure.” _ 50 Metternich wrote to Prokesch-Osten, at the end of 1833, that

he was with Russia then, but would not be so in a few years. He would cooperate with Nicholas only in the policy of maintaining

Turkey. Molden, op. cit., 117. 51 Martens, R. T. R., IV, 468. :

52 Ficquelmont to Esterhazy, 21 December 1833. Molden, op. cit.,

114. Metternich followed up his advantage promptly, and on 14

October 1835 by agreement with Russia provided for the incorporation of Cracow. into the Austrian dominions at the proper moment

(which came in 1846). Martens, R. T. R., IV, 449.

| THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 25

From the first news of the conferences at Miunchengratz, Palmerston’s suspicions had been — aroused.*®? An augmented British squadron appeared

in the Mediterranean. Nesselrode as well as Metternich sought to pacify the British and to discourage

continued cooperation between England and France. | British hostility resulted, nevertheless, in Russia taking steps to assure an occupation of Constantinople and the Straits by Nicholas’ forces in advance of a possible British assault upon Turkey.” As early as 1825 Pozzo di Borgo had enunciated

~ the dictum that Russia must have a continental ally | to prevent English hostility having any effect.*® In 1833 Russia had her continental ally, Austria. But

- - with France and England acting in concert on an , , opposing side, a mere balance of power had been created, and the Question of Constantinople and the

Straits was far from being poised for amicable solution. Russia’s problem now became one of substi-

tuting her preponderance for the equilibrium of ,

power by detaching either England or France from the western coalition. The Great Russia Party in 53 He thought the eastern Powers were about to partition Turkey.

Bulwer and Ashley, Life of Palmerston, II, 169. |

| IV, 444. | | 54 A Russian memorandum was sent to London in September, _ . 1838, in which Nicholas appealed to England not to support France in Egypt, ‘‘because [making use of the Napoleonic thesis] if the

Indies are vulnerable, it is through Egypt.’’ Martens, R. T. R.,

55 Muraviev, Russkie na Bosphorie, 456 ff. When the augmented English squadron appeared in the Mediterranean in 1834, Metter-

nich protested that Russia was not going to destroy Turkey.

| Russia, faced with this hostility, was opposed to explanations, , blaming English conduct on jealousy. Martens, R. T. R., IV, 466. | Nicholas proceeded at once to the natural alternative, and made _ plans for a vigorous military defense of the Straits. Cf. below,

notes 68, 69, 70. , 56 Dascovici, op. cit., 198.

26 HNGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

St. Petersburg believed with Pozzo di-Borgo that France was the natural ally of Russia.*’ But the fact remained that not. only was France regarded as the greatest opponent of conservatism in Europe, but

she was the Power which had taken the lead in

encouraging Hgypt to a revolt which threatened the

Russo-Austrian system of maintaining Turkey. Moreover, Kingland was the nation whose maritime strength could do more harm both to Turkey and to Russia. For some years, while British hostility con-

tinued, Russia tried to overcome the disadvantage by augmenting her own Black Sea fleet and the forti-

fications at Sevastopol. Undoubtedly the factor of English naval supremacy contributed largely to the Russian Decision to approach England rather than

France for an alliance.*® |

57 See below, note 180. The relations between France and Russia from 1825 to 1854 in general were marked by a lack of cordiality, Russia refusing to align with French policies which Nicholas always termed ‘‘revolutionary.’’ One point of French policy may be mentioned. In September 1829 France planned an entente with Russia on a basis of a permanent solution of the Eastern Question in favor of Nicholas, while France would become the dominant European Power. Polignae arranged to offer to support an ultimate Russian acquisition of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the establishment of her hegemony in Asia, in exchange for a French seizure of Belgium and establishment of a preponderance in the Mediterranean. In its final form, France would have expanded to the Rhine, Austria would have collapsed, Italy would have become independent, and Germany

would have been consolidated around Berlin as a capital. It is

unlikely that this gigantic scheme was ever presented to Nicholas, the

peace of Adrianople having been signed ten days after Polignic

secured the consent of Charles X to make the proposal to Russia and Prussia. At any rate, the decision of Nicholas’ secret council at that time precluded an acceptance of the plan by Russia. The documents on the project in the French archives have been read by the writer. Cf. Archives des Affaires Etrangéres (Paris), Russie vol. 178. An incorrect account of the proposal is given by Blanc, Louis, Histoire de diz ans, V, 98-101, and a summary of it is in Stockmar, Memoirs, I,

136-42. , ,

58 See the extract from the Nesselrode Memorandum quoted at the beginning of this chapter.

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 27

The Russian objective was first to detach Eng- |

| IV os . land from her concert with France, and then to create |

a preponderance against France for an eventual peaceful solution of the Question of the Straits. | The system which Nicholas thought necessary to

create was a group of Powers working in concert ,

through diplomacy to provide for the contingency | of the succession to the dominions of the Sultan: to

, solve Russia’s most difficult foreign problem by | pacific means. The alliance with Austria was a

notable start. It was not wholly satisfactory, for no provision had been made for an advance determination of the actual disposition of the various sections 7

| of territory under the Sultan. The fall of Turkey _ was to be the signal for such stipulations. Hence the alliance was simply an expedient, adopted promptly

| for a particular contingency, but worded so that it might continue indefinitely. Its continuity at least.

promised Austrian cooperation with Russia in | future. After Unkiar-Iskelessi Great Britain was adamant; Russia proud. It was not easy for Nicholas

to approach England for some years after 1833,

because for five years thereafter Great Britain was |

found to be opposing Russia at every turn. An aug- |

mentation of the British fleet followed Russian naval

- inereases. Nevertheless, Nicholas made extensive | arrangements to occupy Constantinople if it should | be threatened by England. Defense of Sevastopol | was even regarded as of prime importance. After 1839, however, cooperation between the two Powers

23 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

vot under way, resulting in two very important documents relating to the Near East: the Straits Convention of 1841 and the secret Anglo-Russian understanding of 1844. It 1s necessary at this point to retrace our steps briefly in order to outline the developments which culminated in the agreement. The relations between England and Russia from the last years of the reign of Alexander I to the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29 are well known. The young Tsar Nicholas, fascinated by the Duke of

Wellington, personally carried on diplomatic relations with George Canning from St. Petersburg,”® and.

entered into an agreement with England on 4 April 1826, which related to the independence of Greece.” The following year there was arranged a short-lived alliance between Russia, England, and France which

staged the battle of Navarino while Metternich reluctantly accorded a moral support.** In 1828-29 Russia engaged Sultan Mahmud II in a war while preoccupied Europe looked on. The foundations of

Turkey were rocked, but Nicholas approved the remarkably lenient terms arranged at Adrianople. Austria was convinced that Russia’s aim thereafter was to preserve Turkey, and the treaty of peace must have convinced England of the same thing.

The seals of the British foreign office passed from Lord Aberdeen to Lord Palmerston in 1830, bringing in an individual whose conduct thereafter was decidedly bellicose toward Russia. For some 59 Schiemann, Beziehungen, 486.

60 Noradounghian, IT, No. 37.

61 Martens, N. R., VII, 165; Soutzo, 15. Agreements and protocols for 1827-30 are in Soutzo, 23-217. See also: Crawley, C. W., The Question of Greek Independence (1930).

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 29

years after the July Revolution of 1830 in France, European politics seemed to be governed by the opposition of the western Powers to the more conservative eastern group of States. With its reform agitation, England appeared to Nicholas to be a revolutionary Power.”

This opposition was felt in every European political activity; in the relations between England and Russia they were more pronounced in the Kast-

ern Question. Shortly after the Russo-Turkish War, Nicholas plainly told the English government

that Russia had as much right to pursue its own course of action in Turkey as England had to do so in Portugal, and that Russia had as much right to guard the entrance of the Black Sea as England to protect the entrance of the Mediterranean.® Four years after Adrianople, cooperation ceased, for Nicholas had concluded a treaty with Turkey which neither England nor France ever recognized. Indeed, the vigorous protests of the Western Powers placed Russia on the defensive.** Palmerston determined to investigate the strategic and commercial possibilities in Turkey, and sent out a secret investigator, David

Urquhart, who at once began a series of political movements which antagonized Russia.* Opposition between England and Russia began to be manifested

62 Schiemann, Beziehungen, 487. ,

63 Nesselrode to Lieven, 2 February 1830. Tatishchev, 385. 64 See above, 20, and note 42. |

65 On the Urquhart mission, see below, 107-16. Ponsonby, in speaking to Stiirmer, 22 January 1834, conveyed a bellicose British

attitude which was typical at this juncture. He threatened that England would seal hermetically both the Dardanelles and the

Baltic against the commerce of Russia, and cause trouble in Poland ©

and elsewhere. F. O. 78 Turkey 235, 7.

30 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

in other quarters than Constantinople. The question of Poland had been raised in 1830. Alexander had accepted the Polish crown in 1815; England and

France favored the restoration of the monarchy, which Nicholas would not permit after the Polish revolution.®® Polish refugees fled to England and France, where they were given shelter. There were

difficulties in the Caucasus, in Persia, and in

Afghanistan.*

Sharp political differences resulted in an augmentation of the Russian fleet. Prince Menshikov, the aide of Nicholas, understood the problem and injected new life into the Russian squadron. In 1836 Russia’s navy was the second strongest in Kurope.® Likewise the Black Sea fleet stationed at Odessa and Sevastopol was increased to include twenty ships of the line.®? A plan was worked out in the office of the 66 Cf. Memorandum by Tsar Nicholas, in Shilder, IT, 582 ff. ,

67 Schiemann, 488. 68 In 1834-35 Russia plainly was preparing for war. The 5th

infantry corps located on the eastern shores of the Black Sea was prepared for transportation to the Bosphorus immediately in case of necessity, and its command was intrusted to General Muraviev. In his instructions, Tsar Nicholas authorized Muraviev to be prepared to sail for the Bosphorus immediately after the first command to do so. ‘‘We must seize the Dardanelles if the English who are responsible for all this trouble, happen to want to occupy this Strait.’?? He was convinced that the Russian infantry would be able to control the situation when it got there. ‘‘In the meantime, we must make our preparations indirectly and secretly.’’

Tatishehev, 403; Muraviev, 456-59. | |

' 68 Schiemann, Beziehungen, 488. Nesselrode was much pleased that Russia was preparing for a staunch defense against a possible attack by England after the vigorous protests following UnkiarIskelessi. To Vorontsov at London, he wrote, 20 January 1834: ‘‘Palmerston wants to avenge himself upon us for the sorry rdéle

he has played in the affairs of the east. He has hurled a most

insolent note at us, to which we have replied in the same manner. I hope everything will be limited to an exchange of notes and dispatches. However, everything is possible with men so enraged and so devoid of good sense as those who rule England today, for they are guided by revolutionary passions and sympathies and not

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 31

Russian ministry of war in anticipation of hostilities in the Straits.” The rivalry in fleets witnessed a test in 1837 in the affair of the ‘‘ Vixen,’’™ at a time when Nicholas

was charging that Palmerston was giving refuge in

England to organized bands of Poles. Nicholas nevertheless took the initiative in smoothing over the difficulties by sending Pozzo di Borgo, for twenty

years ambassador to Paris, to London for that purpose. Clearly England did not desire French preponderance in Turkey and Egypt any more than Russian domination. By 1839, therefore, the antiRussian sentiment began to weaken in England.” At that time British foreign policies began to

change. After 1833 the relations between Great

Britain and Turkey were not satisfactory, and France had begun to press forward anew in Egypt.” by the interests and calculations of sane reason. I shall therefore not be sorry to learn that we, at all events, are busily occupied in placing Sevastopol in a state of defense.’’ Weiner, A., Select Passages Illustrating Commercial and Diplomatic Relations between Russia and England, 54, quoting R. F. O., XL, Vorontsov, 83, 8/20 January 1833 [sic]. 70 Three alternatives were accounted for: (1) If England occupied the Dardanelles alone, threatening Constantinople, the Sultan being

faithful to his alliance with Russia; (2) if Turkey, on account of

weakness, allowed England to occupy the Bosphorus; (3) if Turkey made an alliance with England and permitted the British squadron

to enter the Black Sea. Nicholas told Muraviev that promptness was essential in any contingency, and that if the English were courageous enough to make a landing against the Russian infantry,

‘none of them will return to their vessels.’’ Muraviev, 456-59;

Tatishchev, 403. See above, note 55. ,

71 See P. P., Documents Relating to the Seizure and Capture of the Viaen by the Russian Government in 1887, and Robinson, G., David

Urquhart, 58 ff. Cf. Shebunin, 50-52, for Baron Brunnow’s contemporary analysis of the episode.

72 Schiemann, Beztehungen, 488. 73 Tatishchev, 408-16. Relations between Turkey and Egypt, ibid.,

420 ff.

32 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

In 1836 the French started activities in Tahiti, and in 1839-40 they were giving active support to Mehemet Ali. Both British and Russian interests stood in sharp contrast to the French Egyptian advance. Then it was that Russia took the initiative in terminating the Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelessi,’* which was

the immediate ‘‘bone of contention’’ preventing active cooperation between the two States. In 1839 when Mehemet Ali, backed by the French,

again menaced Constantinople, the question was whether to permit a repetition of 1833 or to stage a collective intervention. From the Russian point of view the second point was whether to permit the great Powers to make the Sea of Marmora a rendez-

vous for their squadrons. A firm stand was taken at St. Petersburg, Russia announcing that such a procedure would be a menace not to Egypt but to herself. Butenev was ordered to leave Constantinople if the Anglo-French squadrons entered the Dardanelles.” It was at this point that the Russian government took the initiative in negotiations with Austria which culminated in the establishment of the famous Kuro-

pean principle of closure of the Straits to foreign warships while the Porte remained at peace. Nich—olas believed the Austrian Emperor desired a greater

latitude than was allowed by the Convention of - Miinchengratz.”* He indicated a willingness, therefore, to enter into a special guaranty for the mainte74 Schiemann, Beziehungen, 489. See Goriainov, Le Bosphore, 52-82, for a comprehensive analysis of the period 1839-41.

, 75 Martens, R. T. R., IV, 480. | 76 Ibid., 484.

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 33

nance of the independence of Turkey, ‘and also to agree to the closure of the Straits to warships. Russia moreover offered to act as a mandatary Power for Kurope, and to send a fleet and army to the Bosphorus if the Powers would agree.”” Metternich in reply told Brunnow that he was opposed to the contemplated ‘‘naval picnic’’ in the Sea of Marmora and that he did not wish to guarantee Turkey’s independence, but that he was willing to have the Straits

closed to warships.” , | Asa matter of fact, the Convention of Munchen-

eritz was menaced in 1838-39.” The Austrian chancellor came to a definite conclusion in his own mind with reference to the final disposition of Constanti-

nople. ‘‘My project is ready,’’ he told Prokesch-

Osten at Vienna in 1839, ‘‘Constantinople may belong only to the Greeks.’’ When Prokesch inquired concerning the disposition of the lands between Constantinople and Athens, Metternich replied: ‘‘ All of

them; wherever Greek is spoken.’ Metternich’s personal idea stood in sharp contrast not only to his previous declarations but to an idea developed by

Tsar Nicholas in 1840. To prevent Mehemet Ali from destroying the Ottoman Empire and erecting a new state on its ruins, the Tsar believed it was indis-

pensable to enter into good relations with England. Metternich did not favor an alliance between Russia 77 Nesselrode to Tatishchev, 24 August 1839. Martens, R. T. R.,

IV, 484. Events proved concerted action unnecessary. See also Goriainov, Le Bosphore, 42-43, and Shebunin, 53. 78 Tatishchev to Nesselrode, 22 October 1839. Martens, R. T. R.,

IV, 485; XII, 322. See below, 275, note 63. | 79 Martens, R. T. R., LV, 475.

80 Tatishchev, 395, quoting Prokesch-Osten, II, 182; Friedjung, H., Der Krimkrieg und die Osterreichische Politik, 5.

34 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

and England.** Yet Nicholas well knew that a solution of the Egyptian crisis would not solve the whole problem of Turkey. In view of the eventuality of the dissolution of Turkey in spite of the efforts of the great Powers to maintain it, he announced an idea that any new order of things could be established in Turkey only in virtue of a general European agreement. He indicated, among other thing's, that Constantinople might become a free city, with the custody of the Bosphorus being confided to Russia and that of the Dardanelles to Austria and England. His ideas, however, admittedly were incomplete, and he told his chancellor that the best solution would be

to maintain Turkey if possible.” - |

Russia and Austria having agreed, however, on the principle of closure of the Straits, Brunnow was sent on a special mission to London in 1839, where he conveyed the T'sar’s offer to terminate the Treaty of Unkiar and to substitute for it a European treaty which would sanction a principle already recognized by Great Britain in the Treaty of the Dardanelles in 1809.** The chance for Palmerston to rid himself 81 Martens, R. T. R., IV, 449. The Austrian chancellor desired to hold France within conservative lines of conduct, and a dissolution of

the western entente would not have been conducive to that end.

Srbik, op. cit., IT, 139. ae ae 82 Martens, R. .T. R., IV, 496.

88 The Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelessi, not being in accord with the historical development of the relations between Russia and Turkey, was executed by both Powers in a sense contrary to its stipulations.

Nicholas had not anticipated that his support of Turkey might result in a war against Russia; mutual confidence in each govern“ment was shattered in 1839, over Egypt. England and France proposed a European conference to handle the new Turco-Egyptian conflict; Russia declined and upheld her refusal by resorting to the Convention of Miinchengratz with Austria. Both Metternich and Nesselrode opposed the suggestion to send a combined squadron into the Sea of Marmora. Goriainov, Le Bosphore, 52 ff.. See also Hasenclever, A., Die Orientalische Frage in den Jahren 1838-41; and.

_-«: THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 35

7 of the Treaty of Unkiar, his nightmare, was seized | with alacrity, regardless of the attitude of France. The result was the conclusion of the Four Power

pact of 15 July 1840, for the pacification of the | Levant, and establishment of the European prin-

ciple of closure of the Straits.™* | |

France was indignant, particularly at the British. ,

There was a real danger of an Anglo-French war in 1840.*° Nicholas was opposed to the ‘‘revolutionary’’

Louis Philippe; one month after the signature of the

~ Four Power pact, Brunnow wrote of some ‘‘good news’’ from London. The British had appealed to him to know whether, in case of war, England could depend upon the help of the Russian fleet. Brunnow

| observed that the same fleet England had feared was now being summoned for aid against France. Whereupon Nicholas ‘‘with joy’’ offered his fleet to Kingland, 26 August 1840.°°

France being isolated, the chance of securing an _ alliance with England must have appeared favorable Rodkey, F. 8., ‘‘Anglo-Russian Negotiations, 1840-41,’’ Am. Hist.

. Review, XXXVI (1931), 343-49. Text of the Anglo-Turkish treaty of 1809, recognizing the ‘‘ ancient Turkish rule’’ of closing the Straits to warships, is in Hertslet, IT, 370. | a |

84 England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia signed the pact. Text, ,

Martens, N. R., VIII, 695, 699; Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, IV, 506.

Tatishchev, 634, says that Russia not only got nothing in 1840, but

reduced her own rights in Turkey. This is quite true if one omits , consideration (as Tatishchev did, in the absence of available docu-

, ments) of the idea of the Tsar to make a concession to the English to gain their friendship. The basis of the agreement of 1844 rests

| on the negotiations of 1840. Furthermore, Russia had no guaranty that Turkey would fulfil the treaty under eritical circumstances.

| See the war plans of 1834, above, note 70. |

85 Documents on the crisis of 1839-41 are in P. P., Affairs of the

Levant (1841). For a brief contemporary account, see Greville Memoirs, V, 258-60.

| 86 Schiemann, Beziehungen, 490. Austria would have remained

, R. T. R., IV, 496. : | _

neutral. Tatishchev to Nesselrode, 29 September 1840. Martens,

36 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

to Nicholas. But the isolation terminated when the French government, faced by an overwhelming’ preponderance, gave way and joined the other Powers in the signature of the European Convention of the Straits, 13 July 1841.8" But even in 1841 Nicholas

had begun negotiations with Clanricarde in St. Petersburg, aiming at closer political relations with

Great Britain. He sounded Clanricarde as to the efficacy of the quadruple treaty of 1815, and found that Palmerston regarded it as still binding. Other communications followed, inspired by the bellicose activity of Thiers, which aimed at the shaping of an English policy by Russia.* Under the second Peel ministry, with Aberdeen at the foreign office, the relations were even more intimate. In 1842 Brunnow worked on the possibility of a concert with England to prevent the outbreak of general revolutionary movements in the event of the death of Louis Philippe.*® British Asiatic rivalry with Russia at that time appeared subservient to the greater rivalry with France.*° In Spain the French 87 The Straits were closed to warships of all Powers while the Porte remained at peace. Text, Martens, N. R. G., II, 128; de Clereq, IV, 598. Dascovici, op. cit., 198, says the Straits Convention was the _first European act which made a barrier to Russian ambitions in the Orient. See also, Demorgny, G., La question du Danube, 73. 88 Schiemann, Beziehungen, 490; Rodkey, loc. cit., 344.

89 Op. cit., 491. Metternich began to be concerned somewhat

about the growing intimacy between Russia and England. He

charged that Brunnow was cultivating the British cabinet in order to give Russia an isolated advantage. To Woyna, 12 April 1842.

Aus Metternich’s nachgelassenen Papieren, VI, 597. |

90 The installation of the new cabinet near the end of 1841 was

the signal for the Tsar to open eloser relations. He announced

a determination to act upon principles of conservation and peace in all European questions, following the lead of Aberdeen upon taking the seals of the foreign office. Moreover, ‘‘by a common application of these principles to the affairs of central Asia and Persia we hope to regulate existing complications,’’ was the over-

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 37

began to undermine British influence; the annexation of the Mayotte and Nossibé appeared to presage the annexation of Madagascar; the conflict in Tahiti was

very sharp; and the advance of General Bugeaud against Abdel-Kader, Bey of Algiers, was opposed by the British, who at that time feared the attack would extend also to Tunis.” The result was that England and Russia went

hand in hand in Persian matters from the outset,°* and in commercial affairs the growing rivalry”

was regulated by diplomatic friendliness. In July, 1842, Aberdeen had made it clear to Russia that England desired to adjust her commercial relations with Russia ‘‘on a footing of liberal reciprocity,’’” and early the next year a commercial treaty, giving sanction to this formula, was concluded.*®

During these years the relations between the British ambassador at Constantinople and the Turk-

ish government were not cordial.” In reports to ture dispatched by Nesselrode to Brunnow 2 October 1842. Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands, IV, 26, note, quoting F. O. Under this

note in the archives is a penciled addition: ‘‘Stuart was one of the Emperor’s oldest acquaintances; the Duke of Wellington his

personal friend. ’’

91See the correspondence relative to the proceedings of the

French in Tahiti, 1825-43, in P. P. LXT (1843), 363-91.

92 Schiemann, Beziehungen, 491. , |

93 Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands, IV, 30.

94 See below, Chap. II. | 95 B. T. 1842, 1762. , ,

96 Text of Anglo-Russian commercial treaty of 11 January 1843, P. P. LXI [1843], 325-37; Martens, R. T. R., XII, No. 451. 97 Canning reported the activity of Commander Robinson of the

British ship ‘‘Orestes’’ under his directions. The ambassador ‘‘took advantage’’ of the presence of the ‘‘Orestes’’ at the Dardanelles to secure the release of a British subject from illegal exaction there. He stated to Aberdeen that he next was going

to proceed to get the Porte to give relief to other British subjects _ (17 December 1843), presumably by similar methods. His conduct

38 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

London, Stratford Canning used almost the identical language being employed by Nicholas in his conversations with German diplomats in 1843. He reported his opinion to Aberdeen that the future prospects of

Turkey were gloomy, and that events were at hand which might endanger the peace of Europe. Turkish

internal difficulties came from |

the Porte’s adoption of a policy of enforcing at every risk its authority where it has fallen into decay—or originally had been incomplete; from the state of the Turkish army and finances; from general corruption of Turkish official

authorities; and from the excessive power which Riza Pasha, present favorite of the Sultan, has concentrated in his person. Each of these causes might suffice to overthrow even a better consolidated empire than Turkey.*®

In reply to this communication, Aberdeen gave his opinion as to the policy which should be pursued in Turkey. The foreign secretary believed that there was not much reason to despair of the maintenance of Turkey as a ‘‘substantive Power’’ in Europe as Canning had inferred, and reminded the ambassador that one could not compare Turkey to a well organ-

ized European State. Nevertheless, Aberdeen thought that all the ministers of the Christian in using a warship for such a purpose on that particular occasion was approved by Aberdeen, who regretted, however, the example

set by the British. Other Powers, the foreign secretary pointed out, might be disposed to imitate the British precedent. ‘‘It would

be disastrous to the independence of the Porte if all the Powers did that.’’ (20 January 1844.) F. O. 78 Turkey 552, 20. 98F. O. 78 Turkey 552, 18. This report is typical of one phase of Canning’s activity throughout his long tenure at Constantinople. The impression one derives from the documents is that whenever

Canning could dominate the ministry of the Sultan, the Turkish Empire was eternal; when he could not, the empire was on the

brink of dissolution. See below, 263, note 15. 9920 January 1844. F, O. 78 Turkey 552, 18,

| THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 39

‘Powers, when occasion demanded, should ‘‘hold to : the Porte a common language of exhortation and advice.’’*°° Canning’ was unconvinced, and urged | some definite action; perhaps a simultaneous appeal by the Powers respecting religious persecutions. On |

20 February 1844, Aberdeen still thought this

unnecessary." _. The Tsar’s views on the critical state of Turkey | date from his accession, but they were given expres- | sion to some of the chancelleries of Europe especially

in 18338, 1848, and 1844. His ideas were not kept | secret from the other two eastern Powers. Metter-

nich was his guest at Warsaw in September 1843'” | | when Nicholas expressed a belief in the imminence of the downfall of Turkey, and therefore felt the necessity for an advance solution of the problem of parti- = tion. Shortly after these expressions to Metternich, | Nicholas paid a visit to Berlin and made known his

- desire to come to an understanding with both of the | German Powers on a partition project for Turkey, to be arranged in advance of the contemplated Otto-

man dissolution. On the return trip from Prussia Nicholas spoke with Ficquelmont at Warsaw. ‘‘The position of Turkey at present is dangerous,’’ he told

- the Austrian diplomat; ‘‘before it is too late, we a must come to an understanding.’’ This threat even

slipped from his lips: ‘‘If you cannot decide to unite |

with me in this matter, I am determined to act

| alone.’? In Berlin as in Vienna, the governments _ : 100 20 January 1844, F, O. 78 Turkey 552,19. 101 F, O. 78 Turkey 552, 60. : 102 Aus Metternich’s nachgelassenen Papieren, VI, 626. There is

no record of what was said at this meeting except an account of a repetition of ideas in 1846, as recorded by Metternich in the Vienna archives. Text in Stern, Geschichte Europas, VI, 508.

40 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

held back cautiously.*? In March 1844 Nicholas told

the Austrian Colloredo that Turkey was dying, and asked what was to be done with the remains. But he gave his solemn word to covet none of the empire. ‘‘T do not want Constantinople,’’ he added, ‘‘but I do not want it to become either a French or British dependency.’’ He agreed with a view expressed by

Metternich in 1833 that a reconstruction of the

Byzantine Empire under King Otto was impossible. Finally he concluded, ‘‘You must become the heirs

of Turkey; you must stand in its place. .... I tell you that France and England will oppose this, but I promise you the whole force of Russia to aid you.’

|V

Two things are important at this juncture: (1) Tsar Nicholas was watching with interest the events of Anglo-French world rivalry,*”* especially in the

southern Pacific, and (2) the British government formally extended to him an invitation to visit Lon103 Stern, Geschichte Europas, VI, 64, quoting Vienna archives. Nesselrode wrote to Count Cheptovich 30 September 1843, however, that the Tsar’s negotiations in Berlin had been satisfactory. Lettres

et Papiers, VIII, 218. | ,

104 Stern, Geschichte Europas, VI, 64, quoting St. Petersburg, 29

March 1844, Vienna archives.

105 A visit by Queen Victoria to Paris in September 1843 did

little to assuage the difficulties. It was evident that English

friendship with France was only theoretical. Tsar Nicholas thought that now was the moment to include England in his system. Schiemann, Beziehungen, 492. In addition to political rivalry, there was a marked commercial hostility between England and France at this time, the result of free trade after 1842, on the one hand, and the French protective system, on the other. Efforts to come to a new understanding failed in 1843. The Anglo-French commercial treaty

below, 129. |

was dated 1826, when both countries were protectionist. Cf

THE SECRET ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1844 41

don.*** After some delay,**’ the Tsar suddenly acted

upon the invitation at a moment’s notice to his government, without even taking time to advise Bloomfield of his hurried departure for England.**® Nicholas

simply informed the vice-chancellor of his determination and instructed Nesselrode to meet him in Germany upon his return after a ten days’ sojourn in London. At the same time the chancellor called

upon the British government to ‘‘repair the incon-

ceivable folly’’ of Canning, so Nicholas would not | have to take decisions which would render peace

| impossible.*® England and France were requested to - jnfluence the Porte to accept the Russian proposi- _ | | tions, and to refrain from future encouragement of the Turks which might lead to a war between Russia

and Turkey.?’

Austro-Russian relations on a basis of the alliance

| of Munchengratz having been solidified under Franz 7 _Joseph,** Nicholas on 30 May—when he had learned 24 Zhigarev, II, 39. The Russian government announced that it by no means wished the Christian subjects of the Sultan to revolt,

but on the contrary would take all possible care to keep them in

obedience to their lawful sovereign. 25 Hastern Papers, I, 245-46; ef. Hearnshaw, F. J. C., in Cam-

bridge History of British Foreign Policy, II, 349. The date of this ultimatum is significant. See below, 281.

27 Zhigarev, II, 39. ) , 26 Martens, R. T. R., XII, 319. See also below, 273.

28In April 1851 Nicholas went to Olmiitz, where Franz Joseph

personally thanked him for the aid of 1849. A second meeting - was held in April of the following year at Vienna, when the two

| sovereigns renewed the alliance concluded and maintained by the

latter ’s predecessors with Nicholas. Franz Joseph wanted Prussia

CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR 267

of the reasons for Menshikov’s failure—made an extremely frank proposal to the Austrian Emperor.

, No words were spared: As Austria and Russia were the only neighbors of Turkey, they had more right | to determine the fate of the Ottoman Empire than other Powers. Nicholas wanted the common efforts of the two empires to be directed to the maintenance

of Turkey as long as possible; ‘‘but if it crumbles, we should be united in intentions and actions to pre-

vent the dangers which would menace us’’; and if © necessary to impose these intentions ‘‘on our enemies,

God will do the rest.’ Austria had experienced nothing which occa-

sioned alarm and Franz Joseph answered in pacific ,

| tones. Acknowledging the T'sar’s great service in giving protection to the Christian populations of Turkey, he recommended that the two Powers do the

same thing for the Turks themselves. Nicholas having determined to occupy the Prineipalities, how-

ever, Franz Joseph wanted to prevent an Anglo-

| French intervention as long as Turkey did not | regard the Russian occupation as an act of war.** He also included, to make a strong central European group. When

the Turco-Montenegrin breach occurred, Franz Joseph asked oO : Nicholas to stand in readiness to extend military aid if war resulted between Austria and Turkey. Cf. Friedjung, H., Der Krimkrieg und die osterreichische Politik, 14. The Tsar told his ally that the fundamental of Austro-Russian policy should be the maintenance of Turkey, not its destruction. Schlitter, H., Aus der Regierungszett

Franz Joseph I, 92. On 20 April 1853 Nicholas wrote Franz Joseph, : frankly telling him of his intention to occupy the Principalities if

, the Turks continued adamant, and hinted that Austria might also

occupy Serbia and Herzegovina if Turkey still presented difficulties. _

| Ibid., 93.

29 Nicholas to Franz Joseph, 30 May 1853. Schlitter, Regierungs-

, zeit, 93. Cf. Zhigarev, IT, 39.

80 Cf. Friedjung, Krimkrieg, 6. | |

, 31 Franz Joseph to Nicholas, 16 June 1853. Schlitter, Regierungszeit, 93.

- 268 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

| hoped in this way to prevent Nicholas from taking a hostile step against Turkey too hastily, and argued

that all the privileges of the Christian populations in Turkey, so solemnly stated, for a long time fully had satisfied Russia.”

Prussia, meanwhile, was convinced that Austria

| was with Nicholas, but Manteuffel was determined to retain Frederick William’s independence of action as long as possible.**

IT |

Official opinion in London, meanwhile, had been held in abeyance, awaiting Canning’s reports. They came, 26 April, marked by the implacable hostility

which might have been expected from that individual.** Canning’ sent word that the Russians aimed at an exclusive protectorate over the Orthodox popu-

lations of Turkey, and that they were surrounding —

| their negotiations with much secrecy. This report wounded the self-respect of Aberdeen, who accused the Russians of having compromised him by assurances with which their acts were not in accord. Communications from the British cabinet thereafter were

| marked by much irritation.”

Before these initial reports from Canning ar-

rived, Aberdeen and the cabinet had supported Russia to the extent of holding France in check. | A proposal 18 April by France, that the two western , 32 [bid., 93. See below, 324 ff. | 83 Manteuffel to Hatzfeldt (at Paris), 28 April 1853. Poschinger, II, 62. See below, 332 ff., for later developments, 84 Argyll, (8th) Duke of, Autobiography and Memoirs, I, 444. 85 Jomini, A., Diplomatic Study of the Crimean War, I, 174.

CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR 269

Powers now should tell Russia that any question

regarding Turkey must be settled by the united

action of the five great Powers, was refused on the , eround that such an action would be ‘‘doing’ too

much or too little’: If England and France still meant to confide in the honor of Nicholas, ‘‘which

events hitherto have justified,’’ it would be too strong a measure to adopt; if the T'sar was violating

, his engagements, and running the risk of a European | war, the joint note would be too small an act of retaliation.*® Just one day before the arrival of these

bellicose reports, Clarendon had declared in the | house of commons that ‘‘ Nicholas has practiced no

disguise whatever as to his intentions,’’ adding that | the Tsar placed full reliance on the British people and their government.* When Brunnow noted the displeasure of Aber- | deen and Clarendon at Canning’s reports, he warned Nesselrode that ‘‘Hnglish public opinion is in great anxiety.’** ‘T'wo weeks later he again emphasized

the fluctuating policy to be expected of England.

‘Aberdeen is in reality our only friend, but he begins to weaken. He will hold out as long as he 86 Clarendon to Cowley, reporting conversation 18 April with

Walewski. F. O. 27 France 956, 113. , 373 Hansard CXXV (1853), 376-80.

88 Brunnow to Nesselrode, 30 April 1853. F. O. 65 Russia 426, 207. The documents show that during April Nesselrode was laboring

under the impression that the agreement with England was still

, , intact, the point of divergence being only the date at which, and , circumstances under which, Turkey would crumble. Clarendon’s dispatch of 23 March 1853 (see above, 252-53), wag answered by a

conversation between Nicholas and Seymour 18 April, in which the ©

| Tsar accepted the British thesis that Turkey’s fall was remote, and by a letter from Nesselrode 21 April 1853 (received in London 2 May) offering no fresh observations. F. O. 65 Russia 426, 190. Nesselrode further believed that England wished to be on friendly terms with Austria. F. O. 65 Russia 426, 202. (29 April 1853.)

270 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

| can against his colleagues, and will seek to stay the course of events in the hope that time will bring

_ some remedy, but he will finish, I fear, by being over-

| borne.’”? That Aberdeen’s policy of hesitation at

| this time, leading soon to a ‘‘drift towards war,”’ did more harm than a vigorous and aggressive policy like Palmerston’s would have done was a later well-founded charge of the Russian foreign office.*° This policy contributed to prevent Russia from mak-

| ing concessions in time which might have averted the Eastern War.*t Although Brunnow called Russia’s attention to the gravity of relations between England and Nicholas, the ambassador continued to work in London as before, being the main instrument of a policy impelling to alliance between the two

| Powers after 1840. The result was an exchange of friendly assurances between Aberdeen and Brunnow, calculated to confirm rather than to weaken the confidence placed by T'sar Nicholas in the British

nation.”

Canning had followed his report, that everything |

was settled,*? by other reports in May, charging Russia with seeking new and extensive and danger-

| ous political advantages in Turkey.** Hismethod was — 89 Goriainov, Agreement, IV, 89, Clarendon would have been perfect, thought Brunnow, if ‘‘not so extremely afraid of the news-

_ papers, of parliament, and of public opinion in general..... Besides, he fears he may seem more cowardly toward us than

261, note 13. : | .

Palmerston would, were he in his place.’’» On Aberdeen, see above,

, 40 Jomini, Diplomatic Study, I, 292. 41 [bid., I, 292.

42 Ibid, I, 298. - ,

43 Canning’s word was accepted in London without question. ' Schmitt, B. E., ‘‘Diplomatic Preliminaries of the Crimean War,’’

American Historical Review, XXV (1919), 37. :

44Cf, Hastern Papers, passim.

CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR 271

to make it appear that Russia’s demand for a guar- |

antee for the future had no connection whatever

with the religious controversy, whereas that was the | main point at issue from the time Menshikov was ordered to the Porte. By 25 May there was panic on the Bourse in Paris as a result of expedited news of the severance of Russian relations with Turkey, and — consternation in London.”

| The general opinion in Paris, amid gay court parties, was that France would follow England if. | Nicholas went to war with Turkey.*® Clarendon’s

relations with France showed marked improvement , during April and May. The two Powers began to cooperate in negotiations with Austria at the end of

. Apriu,** and in May Anglo-French cooperation in

_ Chinese matters** was assured. | From May onwards, Seymour at St. Petersburg quite obviously had begun a vigorous opposition to Russian policies in Turkey.* At the middle of May, ~ Brouchére still thought the first French move in the

event of war in the east would be an attack on

Belgium.°° | Public opinion in England in May 1853 may be

judged by editorials then appearing in the London Times. Turkey admittedly was in a prostrate con45 Hiibner, I, 133.

: 46 Hiibner to Buol, 2 June 1853. Hibner, I, 136.

47 P, O. 27 France 965, 228. |

48, O. 27 France 957, 153. |

49 Seymour to Clarendon, 19 January 1854, reporting a conver. sation with Nesselrode respecting some charges ‘‘in high quarters’?

in Russia that he [Seymour] had deliberately misrepresented things to England. Whereupon Seymour countered by declaring that ‘‘towards the end of last May it began to be clear that the policy , of the Russian government was very different from that which’? the British cabinet had been led to expect. F. O. 65 Russia 444, 60.

50 F. O, 10 Belgium 174, 65. |

272 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

dition, and it was foolish to talk of maintaining Tur-

key’s integrity and independence without running

| the risk of war. England should be prepared to act, or cease to talk in such terms.” Nevertheless, the

problem of Belgium was important. It would be | “reprehensible’’ for Russia to have raised complica-

| tions in the east which would supply a ‘‘pretext for retaliation to the court of France,’’ Louis Napoleon

already having intimated that in the event of a Russian invasion of Turkey, he ‘‘would consider —_

| himself justified in seeking compensation elsewhere.’’ It was emphasized also that no two EKuro-

pean Powers at that time were prepared to act in

concert.”

During the month the British cabinet vacillated between Russia and France, and finally threw its lot with the latter when the insistent reports of Canning emphasized the existence of a serious situation

at Constantinople. The days just after the with- _ drawal of the Menshikov mission were decisive, as far as records show. Drouyn de Lhuys on 24 May renewed his proposal for a direct cooperation be-

tween England and France; Clarendon assured Walewski that English and French interests were ‘identical.’** Brunnow made a desperate effort to

Oo hold England in line with its former policy when Canning’s warlike reports were given wide publicity

in England at the end of the month. ‘‘You did not ask us for details of our negotiations with Turkey,’’

| he charged, ‘‘but reiterated your belief in the word

51 The London Times, 24 May 1853. | | 52 The London Times, 24 May 1858. On the Franco-Belgian problem, see above, 242-50. 53 FB, O. 27 France 957, 175.

| CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR 273

of Emperor Nicholas.’’ Brunnow then warned

Clarendon that the use of warships at Constantinople would complicate matters, ‘‘and make it impossible

, for Emperor Nicholas to follow his conservative and pacific intentions.’”** This was the second such warning Russia had delivered to England, the first

having been made when the Rose proposal of 6

March was known;’’ the one above occurred just five — days before Clarendon issued the order which placed

the British Mediterranean squadron at the disposal

of Canning. At St. Petersburg, Nesselrode believed that the cabinet would not sustain Canning.** Nicholas began overtures with Austria, nevertheless, for an Austro-Russian solution of the Eastern Question.*’

Canning’s move at Constantinople thus had been |

conducive of the severance of relations between Russia and Turkey, and had convinced the cabinet at London that a policy of opposition to Russia must. be adopted. As a result, two simultaneous develop| ments occurred 31 May 1853. Nesselrode addressed a note to Reshid Pasha which specifically announced the Tsar’s intention to occupy the Danubian Princi-

palities as a coercive measure if the Sultan failed | to accept Menshikov’s final ‘‘ projet de note’’ within

eight days,*® warning England candidly that war

54, 65 Russia 438, 404. 55O.See above, 240| 56 Seymour to Clarendon, 27 May 1853, received in London after

,

, the fleet had been ordered to move to the Near Hast. Hastern

Papers, I, 211-12. On 30 May Clarendon still expected Nicholas to keep his promise in no ease to resort to ulterior measures without previous notice to England. Greville Memoirs, VII, 65. By 4 June, having acted with the cabinet on a basis of Canning’s reports, the

: _ foreign secretary was blaming Nicholas for having ‘‘deceived’’ ,

57 See below, 324 ff. 7 , , 58 Hastern Papers, I, 243-46; see above, 266.

England. Ibid., VII, 68.

274 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

might result if the Porte persisted in refusal. The . | chancellor charged that whatever happened would _

| be the result of a policy of mistrust of Nicholas which had led to exciting the Porte against Russia;*? _ and that Canning had been responsible for Menshi-

- kov’s failure. Nesselrode urged a reconsideration of the case, however, despite this failure.’ On 31 | May also the British squadron under Admiral Dun- | das was placed at the disposal of Stratford Canning,

| after a vigorous argument in a divided British

cabinet. |

In issuing the dispatch of notification of the decision of the cabinet, Clarendon made it clear to Can-

| ning that the ambassador’s discretion was the only guide as to the use of the British fleet, and no intimation of the disregard of the Straits Convention,

| contemplated in the order, was made. Dundas was to ‘‘repair to such place’’ as Canning might direct, if the latter considered the presence of the squadron

necessary for the preservation of the Turkish Kmpire. Any well established act of hostility on the part of Russia would justify Canning in sending for the fleet, ‘‘which, however, would not pass the Dar-

danelles except upon the express demand of the

| Sultan’’ (which demand of course would come , 59 Nesselrode to Brunnow; communicated 8 June 1853. Hastern Papers, I, 238-41.

60 F, O. 65 Russia 438, 389. This note may be regarded as the

Tsar’s official notification to England of a change of policy. Nessel-

rode pointed out that the ‘‘grave menace’’ claimed to be found

by interpretation. , _ OO | in the Menshikov ‘‘ projet de note’’ was a conjecture derived purely

61 Malmesbury, (3d) Earl of, Memoirs of an Ex-Minister, I, 307. 62 The Convention of the Straits, signed 31 July 1841 by England, Russia, France, Austria, and Prussia with Turkey, provided that ‘‘as long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness the Sultan will

admit no foreign ships of war into the said Straits,’’ the five

CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR O15

through Canning’s ally, Reshid); England being | bound to maintain the independence of Turkey. The fleet was directed to proceed to the neighborhood

| of the Dardanelles,** and the action immediately notified to France. At the same time Clarendon ! announced this action to Russia in a dispatch which

contrasted the assurances given England by Nicho- . | , las with the Menshikov proceedings. That the Brit-

ish cabinet had acted precipitately on the advices of , Canning is shown by the fact that no opportunity | was given Russia to make explanations as to why >

Menshikov had severed relations. | The British order to its squadron had the effect

of establishing an identity of procedure with Powers engaging to ‘‘conform themselves to the principle’’ of - closure of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Cf. Hertslet, IT, 1024. See above, 36. The British instruction provided for passage

of the Straits simply on the request of the Sultan, while he was at |

peace; hence a distinct violation of the European Convention was contemplated.

, , 63 Clarendon to Canning, 31 May 1853. Eastern Papers, I, 199.

At this juncture England’s duty to maintain Turkey theoretically was derived from the Convention of the Straits of 1841, following the reasoning employed by Drouyn de Lhuys when the French fleet

- was sent to Greek waters in March. Aberdeen afterwards sought

, the views of Brunnow, as the principal author of the Straits Con-

vention, on this point. Explaining that a difference of opinion existed on the literal sense of the treaty, the prime minister asked | if England was bound to go to the aid of the Sultan if his peace

was menaced. In reply Brunnow gave his opinion that no engagement of this kind was taken by any of the contracting Powers.

He recalled that when the treaty was being arranged, Metternich . , proposed a guarantee clause, but Russia objected. Backed by

Palmerston, Brunnow succeeded in overriding the Austrian request. —

The preamble to the Straits Convention, Brunnow pointed out,

simply expressed the desire of the Powers to maintain Turkey, -

but contracted no obligation to do so. Brunnow to Nesselrode, 15 |

64 Kastern Papers, I, 210. ; |

June 1853. Martens, R. T. R., XII, 322. See above, 32~33.

65 Clarendon to Cowley, 31 May 1853, F. O. 27 France 957, 194. 66 Clarendon to Seymour, 31 May 1853. F. O. 65 Russia 421, 81; Eastern Papers, I, 200-01. Aberdeen had asked Clarendon especially to tell Russia that the move was not a hostile one. Gordon, A., Earl

of Aberdeen, 223. | |

276 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

France.” After 3 June the French and British

| envoys at Constantinople and St. Petersburg began to receive identic instructions from Paris and Lon-

| don. Announcements of an identity of views between

| Kngland and France were made shortly to both houses of parliament; Napoleon III expressed ‘“‘oreat joy’’ at the British attitude 5 June. The French Admiral Hamelin was ordered thereafter to cooperate with the British fleet, continuing to take

| orders, however, from La Cour. The French fleet was to appear at Besika Bay at the same time the

, British squadron arrived, as ‘‘proof of the under| standing existing between the two governments.’’® Rather naively, Drouyn de Lhuys said this demon-

| stration was warranted by Russian armaments, the right being found in the Straits Convention of 1841.” The foreign minister stated, however, that ‘‘we shall

wait, before entering the Dardanelles, until Russia

| shall have commenced hostilities ....and the

| Porte has declared that she considers herself in a state of war.’’ The acceptance by Clarendon of this memorandum, dated 5 June 1853, and approval of it

| three days later” constituted the written basis of Anglo-French cooperation. The common object was

- to be the preservation of the Turkish Empire.” By : 67 The French fleet had been placed under the direction of M. de La Cour 20 March 1853. See above, 45-46, note 145.

| 68 F. O. 27 France 988, 63. | | 69 Kastern Papers, I, 227, 28. The Moniteur made this announce-

ment 10 June 1858; on the following day Hatzfeldt observed to

: Manteuffel: ‘‘Mir scheint dass die grésste augenblickliche Gefahr voriiber ist, wenn die Flotten nicht in die Dardanellen einlaufen und man zum unterhandeln kommt.’’ . Poschinger, II, 95. 70 Hastern Papers, I, 227-28. 71 [bid., 234-35. 72 F. O. 27 France 988, 61.

CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR 277

15 June the newly-founded Anglo-French alliance was a principal element in the Kastern Question.” Prussia sought to check up on the probability of

war at this juncture. Manteuffel asked Count Miins- 7

| ter for his private opinion on Russia and the Hast- | ern Question,’* and the Prussian diplomat at the Tsar’s capital replied 8 June that Russia would oppose the establishment of a Christian empire at Constantinople, for it would constitute another dan-

gerous neighbor for her. Minster believed that Russia did not want a general war on account of

| financial unpreparedness and because a military opposition to constitutional governments might have , some effect on the absolutistic system in Russia. He

said that Canning had a fixed idea that Russia was | | only waiting to devour (verschlingen) European Turkey. Generals Berg and Lieven had reported this

| Til

disposition of the British ambassador. Seymour even had designated Canning to Miinster as a ‘‘fort mauvais coucheur.’’ The Turkish government having refused to com-

ply with the Russian ultimatum, Nesselrode issued a . -cireular 11 June which gave the Russian reasons for

| terminating the Menshikov mission.” Russia then

began preparations for an occupation of Moldavia | and Wallachia.” Meanwhile the western warships began a series of violations of the Straits Convention.

73 Hiibner, I, 139. |

74 Manteuffel to Minster, 2 June 1853. Poschinger, II, 74. — 75 Munster to Manteuffel, 8 June 1853. Poschinger, II, 81 ff. ©

76 Tt was published the following day. Cf. Journal de Saint-

Pétersbourg, 12 June 1853. , 77 See below, 281.

a 278 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

| The British squadron anchored in Besika Bay 13 June 1853," the French fleet arriving the following

| day.*® Orders already having been issued by the Sultan’s ministers for the admission of any number of British warships into the Straits for passage to

| Constantinople,®® Canning was requested by Calvert to provide instructions for the governor to admit British warships at night ‘‘in case of emergency.’ The result was that on 23 June orders were received

| by the military governor of the Dardanelles ‘‘to erant permission, in case of an emergency, for any

steamer of war, whether French or Kinglish, to pass |

~ the Dardanelles by night for Constantinople.’’ Ar- rangements were made by Calvert to distinguish such ships by particular signals.” This order was in

| fact acted upon before it was received, for the

a British steamer Retribution entered the Dardanelles at 2 a.m. 15 June for Constantinople. Other war-

ships soon followed. Late the same afternoon the | British steamer Niger passed for Constantinople. , , The same day the Wasp, already having been at the

Turkish capital, passed outwards for Besika. It returned to the Sea of Marmora 17 June. The | British warship Cardoc likewise passed outwards through the Straits 15 June, returning on the seventeenth, and remained at Constantinople until

27 June. On the afternoon of 17 June a 78 Calvert to Canning, 13 June 1853. F. O. 195 Dardanelles 391, 23. (The Eastern Papers, I, 309, incorrectly place the date of arrival

as 15 June.) ,

80 See above, 263. ,

79 Ibid., 25.

81 F. O. 195 Dardanelles 391, 24.

82 Calvert to Canning, 18 June 1853. F. O. 195 Dardanelles

ee 8 June 1853. Ibid., 29. - | |

_ CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR 279

French steam frigate entered the Dardanelles for Constantinople. ‘The mere issuance of orders which gave the British and French ambassadors authority to summon the fleets to pass the Straits was not a treaty violation, even though that was contemplated. But the actual passage of warships through the Straits in June 1853, as shown conclusively by the British consular records, was a violation of the treaty, both

in letter and spirit.*° However material was the moral support of England and France in the use of these warships at a critical period of negotiations, the fact remains that from 9 May 1853, when Canning virtually had promised the prompt appearance of a British squadron,** the Turks never wavered in — 84 Calvert to Canning, 18 June 1853. F. O. 195 Dardanelles 391, 26.

s5‘¢A flagrant infraction of the formal engagement’’ is the phrase used by S. M. Goriainov (Le Bosphore, 94) in referring to

the incident, and calling attention to the fact that the Porte remained at peace until 4 October 1853, the treaty still remaining

binding, according to its terms, to that time. This statement of

the Russian archivist is the one to which Professor B. E. Schmitt (loc. cit., 51, note) takes exception. Jomini, Diplomatic Study, I, 315; I, 386, says that one ship from each Power passed the Dardanelles in June 1853. It is quite clear that not only one or two warships evaded the treaty, but that a great many such ships likewise entered the Straits in defiance of the treaty from 13 June to 4 October 1853. The British cabinet even ordered Canning to summon the whole squadron 23 September 1853. See below, 295. The usual procedure after 13 June seems to have been to have one warship on the way to Constantinople, one leaving with dispatches, and a third awaiting the service of the embassy at the Porte. In addition, one or two warships were at Constantinople for repairs. Thus at any given time there would have been at least three war-

ships within the Straits in violation of the treaty, with two

squadrons at Besika awaiting a summons. See below, 293-94, and 301. See also Canning’s comments in September, Appendix H. The camouflage ‘‘service to embassy’’ appears ludicrous. Phillipson and Buxton, The Question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, 86, follow Goriainov on the point of entrance of the fleets of England and France in June 1853, Lane-Poole, Canning, II, 307, confirms

the clear violation in September. ,

86 See above, 262.

280 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

their refusal to come to terms with Russia. With the combined fleets at instant command of the western embassies from 13 June onwards, the negotia-

tions of several months thereafter seem to have been extremely futile. Count Buol was the guiding force in concocting new modes of solution of the Russo-Turkish difficulties, and Canning became the depositary of these proposals when they reached

Constantinople. |

While Clarendon and Drouyn de Lhuys were following their fleet demonstration by an effort to align Austria on the side of the western Powers,*” Russia

was preparing to comply with the dictates of her ultimatum of 31 May to Turkey. Nesselrode announced that Russia was not going to destroy Turkey, or encourage a revolt of the Sultan’s Christian populations®® which would have led to the same result. Canning temporarily adjourned any question of bringing up the whole squadron to the Bos-

phorus when he advised Turkey to restrict its activity to the contemplated Russian occupation to protest,®*® decision to this effect having been taken at

London in cabinet discussions 20 June.” 87 Clarendon to Ponsonby, 14 June 1853. SHastern Papers, I, 265. The foreign secretary admitted the existence of the Straits Convention, and hoped that Russia would do nothing to cause the Porte to ‘‘suspend the treaty.’’ Ibid. A careful examination of

the convention in question fails to reveal any provision for a

Turkish suspension of its terms short of actual war. Russia, however, had announced that her object in entering the Principalities was coercion and not war, and she might well cite the precedent of 1849, which had been acquiesced in by Europe. See above, Chap. III.

88 Zhigarev, II, 39; Hubner, I, 138. Reshid Pasha’s letter to

Nesselrode, declining to comply with the ultimatum, was dated 16

June 1853, shortly after the arrival of the squadrons at Besika. F. O. 65 Russia 438, 517. News of the rejection was received in

Paris 25 June. Hiibner, I, 140. : 89 Hastern Papers, I, 318. | | |

90 See below, 285. :

CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR 281

| A circular dispatch was addressed by Nesselrode | 2 July 1853 to all the Russian legations, explanatory

of its action,” and on the morning of 3 July the |

actual occupation of the Danubian provinces was

begun.” Russia made it clear to Europe that the |

measure of occupation was only coercive, and did not mean war. T'o Nicholas the internal situation of _ Turkey continued to appear grave. He held that the western Powers could not prevent a rising of the Balkan Slavs, and that if such an event occurred, the downfall of Turkey would follow immediately.**

In prospect of the probability that Turkey would erumble without war, the Tsar unfolded the follow-

ing plan to Franz Joseph: As Russia and Austria | did not desire any additional territory, they should arrange for a common protectorate over the new , Balkan States which would be established. The independence of the component parts of the Turkish Empire would be recognized, and they would be placed under princes of their own choice. As for Constantinople and its environs, ‘‘I do not see any a 91 Nicholas issued his order for the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia 26 June 1853, publishing it in the Journal de Saint-

Pétersbourg three days later. In the cireular dispatch of 2 July (ibid., 3 July 1853), Nesselrode specifically charged that the first

effective measure had been taken by England and France in

: advancing their fleets to the Dardanelles: ‘‘Les deux puissances maritimes prenant avant nous |’initiative, elles ont jugé indispensable de dévancer immédiatement par une mesure effectif. .... They already have occupied the waters and ports of the Ottoman dominions

| at the gates of the Dardanelles; their fleets already are in the region of Constantinople. .... We had made known that this would add new complications to the ecrisis.’’ Thus Nesselrode’s attitude was

that the spirit of the treaty of 1841 was infringed by this advanced

movement of the fleets; the British counter charge was that to them the occupation of the Principalities appeared to be inevitable. Cf,

| F. O. 65 Russia 421, 134 ff. | 92. O. 78 Turkey 934, 141.

93 Schlitter, H., dus der Regierungszett Franz Joseph I, 93.

282 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION |

, other possible outcome than that it be made a free

city under the guarantee of all the European

Powers,’’ although he wanted an advance under-

: standing with Franz Joseph on the fate of Constan-

tinople. As for the Straits, a demolition of the for-

tifications of both the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles

was proposed.” |

Franz Joseph understood that war was being

| inflamed, and that Turkey might fall and new territorial States originate.* In reply to Nicholas’ pro-

posal, therefore, he gave his concurring opinion that , | | Austria and Russia should work in closest harmony ‘‘to regulate the future of these countries bordering

oe on our empires.’’ He opposed the T'sar’s idea of a joint protectorate over the Balkans, however, because he thought that would give Russia dominion over the South Slavs. Nicholas’ plan for Constantinople also was opposed, for he contended that its establishment as a free city, with the neighboring provinces made independent, would tend to democ-

, ratize the South Slavs, and that as a matter of fact | Constantinople would become ‘‘the much sought | | meeting place for their political intrigues.’’ The | Austrian Emperor wrote that Switzerland had

oe served as a ‘‘warning teacher’’ for him, as well as Cracow, whose independence had to be terminated

and over which surveillance even then was a

problem.°** |

94 Nicholas to Franz Joseph, 2 July 1853. Shebunin, 60-61, quoting Zaionchkovskii, A. M., Vostochnaia Voina, II, pt. I, 547; Schlitter, Regierungszeit, 93. .

| 95 Schlitter, Regierungszett, 94. :

gett, 95.

96 Franz Joseph to Nicholas, 21 July 1853. Schlitter, Regierungs-

CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR 283

On the basis of these objections, Nicholas altered

his proposals. He was willing that Constantinople

be made a free city without territory, with the restriction that neither Constantinople nor the provinces should become a refuge for outlaws and con-

spirators; that Austria take the Dardanelles and that Russia appropriate the Bosphorus. The imminence of war with Turkey when this proposal was made—6 August 1853—made Nicholas believe that a

concert between the two sovereigns on partition terms would be quite in order, and he announced a readiness to enter into a frank exchange of opinions | with Franz Joseph.**’ These matters were discussed at Olmiitz near the end of September,**® but neither

Franz Joseph nor his cabinet desired to permit ‘adventuresome projects’’ to jeopardize the position of Austria.*° These frank overtures to Austria were a result of Nicholas’ conviction that Turkey had sold itself to England and France.*” Russia’s occupation of the Principalities did not provoke war. The Porte protested, but did not interfere with the movements of Russian warships going into the Danube.** The British government ad-

mitted that the Porte had no casus belli against Russia.*°? Then the British and Russian foreign sec- retaries began a diplomatic argument as to the part 97 Nicholas to Franz Joseph, 6 August 1853. Schlitter, Regierungszeit, 95. 88 See below, 325. 99 Cf. Friedjung, Krimkrieg, 7.

,, 101100 Shebunin, 60. : F, O. 78 Turkey 935, 157.

~ 102 F, O. 65 Russia 423, 278. This was recalled to the attention of England in September, when the claim was advanced in justification of a sweeping order for a movement of the fleet through the Straits, that Turkey actually had been at war with Russia since 2 July. See below, 297.

284. ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

played by Canning in creating a tense situation at Constantinople,’** and questions regarding the commercial navigation of the Danube were given heated — discussion.*** As to the relations of Canning and the British foreign office from July until December 1853,

Clarendon gave the ambassador unhesitating approval for all his acts, and he was left largely to his own discretion in handling the whole problem.’

| Canning privately charged that Russia had not made a Turkish refusal of her ultimatum a case for war in order to keep the Straits Convention intact, thus preventing British and French warships from navigating the Straits.*°° The other side of which is that western warships did navigate the Straits con-

tinuously, and that it was Great Britain which advised the Porte not to make the occupation of the | Prineipalities a casus bella.1%

The British government did not regard the occu- | pation of Moldavia and Wallachia as a casus bella for Turkey, and Brunnow was so notified officially. Clarendon promised also that the fleets would not

| pass the Dardanelles unless Constantinople was

| menaced by Russia.*°** Thus a continuance of the 103 July 1853. F. O. Russia 421, 130 ff. — 104 See above, 131 ff.

105 Cf. F. O. 78 Turkey 926, 101 ff.

106 Fastern Papers, I, 321. Canning was not really concerned about the binding force of the Straits Convention when this letter (to Westmorland at Vienna) was written. See above, 262 ff. It is interesting to note that both sides in the controversy used the Straits Convention as a mask for their aggressive activity in June and July

| 1853. Of. Goriainov, Le Bosphore, 93 ff.

107 See above, 278, and below, 285; also Appendix H. 108 Nesselrode, Lettres et Papiers, X, 248. This information was

: published, being reprinted in L’Indépendance Belge, 7 July 1853, and in the Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg, 15 July 1853. All the publications made the point that the Straits Convention was not nullified since this decision had been made by the British government.

CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR 285

principle of closure of the Straits was sanctioned by Kingland. The reception of Nesselrode’s circular on the occupation of the Principalities in France, however, was in contrast. The government of Napoleon IIT affirmed the right of the Porte to regard the occupation of the Danubian provinces as an act of war, and that it therefore would not be an infringement

| LV |

of the Straits Convention if the Porte declared the Straits open to the warships of England and | France.’”?

It is clear that in the summer of 1853 Canning was opposing the majority of the British cabinet in his bellicose conduct at the Turkish capital.*° When it became evident that a Russian occupation of the Danubian provinces was inevitable, Palmerston had proposed that England regard the act as a casus bella when accomplished. In this he was overruled by Aberdeen, Clarendon, and a majority of the cabi-

net.* Yet the Russian chancellor had been kept informed by Brunnow of the changing attitude of some of the statesmen at the helm of government in

England during June, and well knew that while Aberdeen continued to be friendly to Russia,"”” British newspapers were becoming increasingly

hostile. | ,

360-60 dispatch of Drouyn de Lhuys. SHastern Papers, I, 110 Cr, David, H., Hnglands europdische Politik, 418-19. Hatzfeldt to Manteuffel, 9 September 1853: ‘‘Das Englische Kabinet mag sich auch etwas vor Lord Stratford fiirchten, der hdchst unzufrieden ist.?’ Poschinger, IT, 134. - 111 The proposal was made 20 June 1853. Greville Memoirs, VII, “112 Our Aberdeen is the only one,’’ wrote Brunnow to Nessel-

rode, 29 June 1853. Martens, R. T. R., XII, 319.

286 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

As it presented itself to England, the problem was one which centered about the ultimate position to be taken by Turkey. If aid was requested by the

: Sultan, it could not be refused and due respect paid to British public opinion. Turkey’s position in this respect, however, was really in charge of Canning,

| for it was through his advice that the request for aid , would come. Nesselrode would have preferred a disavowal of Canning rather than compliance, but | he knew that the weight of English sentiment clearly , | would have opposed that method of procedure.***

| Many persons in close official circles felt that | Aberdeen and Clarendon were handicapped by the agreement of 1844;** certain it is that Aberdeen to

. the end of his career never gave up the idea of |

Oo cooperation with Russia in dealing with Turkey. 7 It was in pursuance of that idea that he labored in , the critical periods after the cabinet had become a secondary factor—having delegated control of the fleet to its ambassador extraordinary. Little could

be done by the prime minister in his curious posi- | tion.***> He succeeded, however, in checking parlia- _ mentary debate on the Eastern Question during the

month of July.*** Palmerston was active, bellicose.* |

307. | |

| X, 228-30. |

113 Nesselrode to Meyendorff, 16 June 1853. Lettres et Papiers,

114 Cf, Saintsbury, G., Harl of Derby, 87; Malmesbury, Memoirs,

: | 115 In June, Aberdeen did not advocate the recall of Canning in

cabinet sessions, but rather the transfer of negotiations from Constantinople to St. Petersburg or elsewhere. He also suggested per-

, sonal correspondence between Victoria and Nicholas on all political

questions. These proposals, and the further suggestion of sending an ambassador extraordinary to St. Petersburg, were disapproved by the cabinet. Martens, R. T. R., XIT, 322. 116 Greville Memoirs, VII, 73.

| l17 [bid., 76.

- CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR 287

He proposed to the premier that the combined squadrons be sent ‘‘up to the Bosphorus,’’ but Aberdeen did not concur. Then Palmerston took the matter up in cabinet meeting 6 July, attempting

to persuade his colleagues that this was a proper - procedure.*** The defeat of this proposal was evidence that the Aberdeen wing of the government was still in control of affairs.*’® Meanwhile, English public opinion became sharply

divided. Disraeli’s new opposition journal, The Press, attacked the government on the basis of fragmentary ideas concerning the secret understanding of 1844. On 2 July 1853 it reported Tsar Nicholas

' as complaining that ‘‘the conduct of Lord Aberdeen | is entirely at variance with the private declarations |

of that minister.’’ Gladstone, pacifically inclined, |

— -- sided with Aberdeen, as did Cobden.’*”? In the Rus-—

sian question Palmerston found an ally in his per- | sonal enemy, Urquhart.” Another strange ally was Karl Marx.’” In the face of these factors, Nesselrode, who was pacifically inclined, would not have been oe 118 Walpole, S., Lord John Russell, II, 283. ‘*‘Words may be properly answered by words, but acts should be answered by acts,’’ . was Palmerston’s argument to Aberdeen. Jbid. After this rebuff, Palmerston interested himself in home affairs for a time; when , _ another crisis had arisen in September, Aberdeen connived to get him

off to Scotland for a short period. He was well behaved until the Turkish declaration of war in October. Cf. Guedalla, P., Palmerston, 376 ff.

, 119 Of, Gladstone, W. E., ‘‘ History of 1852-60,’’ in English His- , torical Review, IL (1887), 281 ff. 120 Cobden did not want the shores of the Bosphorus to become the outpost of British armies of the Ganges. Cf. Political Writings,

210-29. , |

I, 25; Dawson, W. H., Richard Cobden and Foreign Policy (1926),

121 Qn publie opinion in England before the Crimean War, as | . deduced from contemporary newspapers, see Martin, B. K., Triumph

of Lord Palmerston, entire. | 122 Guedalla, Palmerston, 379.

288 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION —

averse to a Russian retreat, provided it could have

| been made simultaneously with one by England and | France.’*? The chancellor had been assured, however, that nothing further would be done by Eng-

| land and France without the aid of Austria.*** As | Nicholas was in direct communication with Franz

| Joseph, and an entente seemed assured,’” no pro| ~ . -posals to this effect were forthcoming at the time. Canning became restless shortly after the Rus- © sian armies crossed the Pruth. While the represen-

tatives of the great Powers were in frequent conferences with Count Buol at Vienna from 22 July

to 20 September 1853,'°° he maintained an astute leadership in all negotiations which reached Con-

| stantinople. Clarendon quite frankly expressed a fear that Canning would be a hindrance to the government. While the titular Sultan was for peace, the ‘‘actual Sultan,’’ he concluded, believed that the time had come for a termination of the Russian influence at the Porte.’”? As early as 7 July 1853 Canning

| had hinted to his government the course of action he was likely to pursue. He reported that ‘‘some well informed persons’’ had urged him to eall the squad-

| ron up to Constantinople to protect the Christian ' 123 Nesselrode to Meyendorff, 14 July 1853. Lettres et Papiers,

X, 247. Very generously, Canning had ‘‘thrown out the suggestion’? that the fleet would be withdrawn after Russia evacuated the provinces. Canning to Clarendon, reporting dispatch of early July 1853 to Seymour. F. O. 78 Turkey 935, 161.

124 Brunnow to Nesselrode, 25 June 1853. Lettres et Papiers, X, 234. As late as 24 August Aberdeen still evidenced his fear of the probable downfall of Turkey. This produced a great effect on Nicholas, who never ceased to insist upon this probability. On the margin of this dispatch from Brunnow, Nicholas wrote one word, an eloquent one: ‘‘Enfin!’’ Martens, R. T. R., XIT, 323.

, 125 See above, 267, and below, 324. , 126 On Buol’s reasons for taking the initiative, see below, 325. 127 Cf. David, Englands europdische Politik, 418-19.

CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR 289

population from violence, but that he was refraining from so doing because there were no well founded apprehensions respecting them, and the act would be regarded as a menace to Russia.’”*? When Clarendon

read this dispatch, he told Greville that Canning |

would ‘‘play some trick’’ at Constantinople, and

throw obstacles in the way of settlement of the |

Russo-Turkish dispute.*”

Negotiations centering at Vienna were produc- —

| tive of no result, for Turkey nullified the proposals suggested by the Powers. The charge that the rejec-

tion of the most famous of these proposals, the Vienna Note, was occasioned by the unofficial advice

of Stratford Canning, is well founded.**

| To this point in the development, the French government had not kept pace with Canning in providing for ‘‘contingencies’’ respecting the fleets. 128 Hastern Papers, I, 382. It has been charged by Greville and _Lane-Poole that Canning wrote his dispatches with a view to their eventual publication in the Blue Books. On 22 June and 4 July the ambassador addressed protests to the Porte (ibid., 383), despite his assertion that there was ‘‘no well founded apprehension’’ for the Christian subjects of the Sultan. 12910 August 1853. Greville Memoirs, VII, 80.

| 130 See Martens, N. R. G., XV, 534 ff., for details of the Vienna Note. On its rejection because of Canning’s unofficial advice, despite his instructions from London to press for its acceptance, see Walpole, S., in Cambridge Modern History, XI, 314; Martin, T., Prince Con-

sort, II, 4831; Walpole, Russell, II, 185, and other works. On 27 August Clarendon told Greville that he suspected Canning had not

made a sincere effort to induce the Turks to accept the note, despite his report of official recommendation of it. Greville Memoirs, VII, 82. A few days later Clarendon remarked that Canning’s hatred of Nicholas and the ambassador’s personal temper ‘‘had made him take a part directly contrary to the wishes and instructions’’ of the British government. Canning’s language, moreover, was hostile to his own government, as well as to that of all the Powers at Constantinople. Ibid., 85. The most damaging contemporary evidence of Canning’s guilt in the war in addition to the official dispatches is found in the newly published (1927) material, supplementary to the Memoirs, in Greville’s Diary, I, 458-80.

290 ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION —

| - Acting on the suggestion of Napoleon III, Drouyn — de Lhuys on 6 August instructed La Cour to ask for

| conditional orders for the passage of the French 7 squadron through the Dardanelles.*** A few days after La Cour received his instruction, these orders

were issued.” Reshid Pasha definitely refused to — request the presence of the French squadron at Con-

| | stantinople, when given an opportunity to do so by | La Cour on 26 August.*** The French ambassador, - in dealing with the Turks, had not consulted Can- , ning. Reshid told the British ambassador, however, — and the latter made the negotiations look like a dis-

| agreement between the two Powers in his reports to England. Explanations were necessary between Paris and London.*** A French battleship was per-

: mitted to go to Constantinople for repairs on 6 | | August. Having really been imjured, the circumstances of the treaty evasion disarmed censure.'* La Cour lost his position shortly after the Turkish declaration of war against Russia in October. Other _ things annoyed Canning also. For one thing, he 131 F, O. 27 France 974, 675.

| 182 F, O, 27 France 974, 718. 133 F, O. 27 France 937, 243. It is impossible to trace the movements of the fleets accurately from 23 June to 7 October 1853 from

| _ British consular reports, for there are no dispatches on record for

, the period 29 August to 7 October, and only a few for the months _ of July and August. Cf. F. O. 195 Dardanelles 391. I believe that

, these reports were sent to Canning from Calvert as personal letters so

of action. , | they would not appear in the archives.

, 134 Clarendon asked Cowley 10 September 1853 to find out about the report. F. O. 27 France 959, 259. T'wo days later Cowley stated

, that the French government had not intended to take a separate line

— 185 B, O. 78 Turkey 936, 198. Canning regarded the treaty of 1841 as binding at least upon France, contrary to his later interpre-

Principalities. , , |

tation that it had been broken by Russia 2 July 1853 in occupying the

CANNING—FLEET MOVEMENTS—AND WAR 291

reported secretly to Clarendon that the Sultan had a deranged mind.’* It was evident that Canning was having a difficult time preventing Abdul-Medjid from

countermanding certain indispensable orders, and

possibly vacillating towards Russia. |

As the winter season approached in 1853, and as the Bay of Besika was known to be inhospitable to ships after the month of November, the French and British governments began to confer on the problem. The refusal of the Turks to accept the Vienna Note promised to prolong the negotiations for some time. At the beginning of September, Walewski proposed to Clarendon that the fleets be instructed to enter the Dardanelles, but not go to Constantinople,™’ repeating the strategy employed by Canning in 1849. This would provide for the squadrons, and Russia could be told that they would withdraw entirely if the Principalities were evacuated.'** In other words, the Turks had rejected a diplomatic solution which Russia had accepted, and which had been arranged through the joint consultation of the Powers; now anew aggressive move, designed to nullify the rigid interpretation of the Straits Convention as established in 1849, was being proposed by France. This matter caused Clarendon and his colleagues some serious concern, for it clearly involved ‘‘the violation of a treaty.’”*? 136 F, O. 78 Turkey 936, 212, and ibid., 937, 237. ,

188 Ibid. a

137 Clarendon to Cowley, 2 September 1853, reporting conversation

of the previous day. F. O. 27 France 959, 344.

139 Tbid. I have quoted a part of Clarendon’s penciled addition on the first draft of the dispatch to Cowley. The French proposal came from Drouyn de Lhuys. FF. O. 27 France 989, 91.

292 HNGLAND, RUSSIA, AND THE STRAITS QUESTION

Clarendon asked Aberdeen, Graham,**° Russell,’

and Palmerston what answer to give France on this

overture. All agreed that any movement of the fleets should not be a retreat, but the better plan ~ would be to wait before making a final decision as

there was no danger to the ships continuing in anchorage at Besika at that time.’*? Nevertheless, Clarendon addressed the admiralty to give instructions to move the British fleet’** if necessary. During these halting developments in London, Canning again took definite action at Constantinople.

The Vienna Note had been rejected by the Turks at

Canning’s instigation; it had been altered by the Turkish government in a manner which changed its

original meaning. pro-

Treaty of Balta Liman. problem or eel ‘ 68 1; en-

Baltic, Black Sea ports and “~ test of Titov, 169, and fleet’s ports compared with those of, prompt. withdrawal, 172;

Footnote. Canning’s instructions as to,

Belgium, danger of French oc- 234-235. See also British cupation, 195; invasion of, Squadron; Fleet. threatened by France in British foreign office: interested

March, 1853, 242-250. in Near Eastern commercial Berlin, Orlov on mission to, affairs, 128; effect on, in

: 328-330. 1849 of decisive measures Bibliography, a selected, 450- taken by Russia, 176. | 468. British merchants, dominance Black Sea: Russia augmenting of, in Russian markets, 85. own, fleet, 26; Palmerston’s British policy: dual, in Eastern remedy to check Tsar at, 77; Question, 139; Stratford Canports and exports compared ning chief exponent of, in with those of Baltic, 95 foot- Straits, 148; France becomes note; Russian shipping’ ports key to, in March 1853, 242.

on, 105; slight increase in British purchases: from Rus-

English carriers in, 106; Eng- sia, 126, and from Danubian land enters trade competition provinces, 127 footnote. 137; Russia threatens to or- British squadron: in Mediterrader, squadron to enter Bos- nean augmented, 25; to enter

of, 122; eastern shores of, Lie . .

phorus, 173-174; Russia Dardanelles, 168; Hugh Rose warns British not to enter, summons, 236 ; placed at dis301; British war vessels sent posal of Stratford Canning,

into, 309-310; problem of 274.

Russian fleet in, 345-347; British warships, authorization ' France proposes neutraliza- of passage through Straits, tion of, 383; Russia refuses 154-155, 263.

INDEX 47] Brunnow: on special mission to | warships through Straits, 263 ;

London in 1839, 34; intimate Nicholas angered by interfer_ type of relationship between, | ence of, 265; reports influ-

and Aberdeen, 141; confers ence British cabinet prowith Palmerston regarding foundly, 268-269; British

- binding force of Straits Con- squadron placed at disposal vention, 157-158; fears. belli- of, 274; opposes British cabcose attitude of Canning, inet, 285; Crimean War guilt,

160-161; visits St. Peters- 803.

burg, 190; relations with Capodistrias, plan for Balkans, Malmesbury, 194; confiden- 10 footnote. en soa, “903 + beeen ‘on Caneasian provinces, European-

. a . :zation of, 95.of Sultan, public England, a a, . 939933. opinion Christianinsubjects

and Latin, status of, Buchannan discusses Greek commer-197. .

eae with Nesselrode, _ Cireassia ceded to Russia by treaty of Adrianople, 113.

Buol, attempts to mediate in Circassians, Urquhart wants to Austro-Russian . controversy support, 113. footnote. | about Constantinople, 329; Clarendon, becomes foreign seccounterpoise project at Vien- retary, 235; disappointed at na conference, 1855, 379; re- Tsar’s offer to England, 252; fuses to support British plan refuses to continue partition for strict naval limitation of of Turkey discussions, 252-

Russia in Euxine, 381-382. 253; rebuffed by Napoleon

Canning, Stratford, presents Til, 423.

gloomy outlook for Turkey, Closure of Straits: to foreign

38; fears Russia.’s commercial warships, 32; principle of, re-

preponderance in Turkey, 92; mained in full force and

chief exponent of British pol- vigor in 1849, 157. icy in Straits, 148; advocates Commerce: with Asia, 104; Angilo-Turkish alliance, 151; effect of Crimean War on, Brunnow fears bellicose atti- 130. See also Trade. tude of, 160-161; scheme for Commercial: question in Turfleet movement in 1849, 162- key a publie | issue in England,

163; William Parker com- 123; relations of England

plies with instructions of, 167— and Russia. 125: considera-

168; fails to duplicate treaty tions of Crimean War, 135of Unkiar-Iskelessi, 181; 138.“i, , , plans for an Anglo-Turkish

alliance, 182-183; seeks ex- Commercial _ treaty: Russia tension of Treaty of Balta © Signs new, with Turkey, 103; Liman, 183; Russell returns, between Austria and. England,

to Constantinople, 234; in- 123 footnote.

structions as to British fleet, Competition between Russia 234-235; sends false report. and the Turkish provinces in to London, 262; encourages Europe, 127. Turks to oppose Russia, 262; Congress. of Paris: representarestores Reshid Pasha to of- tion at, 414-415; negotiations fice, 262; secures authoriza- at, 416-427; official sessions

tion for passage of British _ of, 419.

A720 INDEX Constantinople: Mehemet Ali | gratz functions smoothly dur-

threatens, 13; Metternich ex- ing, 180.

cludes imperial title at, 18; Danube, quarantine regulations

Nicholas defends, 19; Nich- for, 83; Russian ports of,

08s s reetems as to meets ue double exchanges, 95; position Of, (1; hussia Britishtrade shipping on, 123; Ausseries of diplomatic reverses tria and the, River problem, at 2083 131-135; thrown sent to, jomingen 3 tngiandmission ex- with AustriaEngland in, 131-135; ns temporary, ation conflict Austria and 131RusOr, Dy tussiaoe 5 Imporsia in,ofRiver valle

tance of, 225; Russia not to 135; Straits ultimate " outlet

permit occupation of, by any of, 1386. See also Sulina chan-

other great Power, 227; Men- nel. ene ordered to, win Danubian competition Taordinary powers, . ) Odessaports, and Taganrog withof

Russell returns Canning to, 84. 5 5“ oom a ow polities at, wore Danubian Principalities: organ-

O97 hes aby OW ic law of, 83; compete for

presaged, . nee son: Non - European grain markets, 87;

Ia 981 Jy Pian OF NICh- steam transport augments

Convention waeiitiestariffs m ‘ ar } 100 7 otn "Miinchengriita: UZ: absencegrain of export restrictive

nner sors 15; terms in, 94; grain competition

need. 33.33; tender a3 vectsand with corrects southern Russia, aced, extends : — 123. , sys sgrovient of 1844, 53; fune- Danubian provinces: | British

roves pothy soph eppeale Russian occupation of, 281;

to, 328; terminated, 331. D Austria “teade 2 we ab

Convention of the Straits, 36; 3 : Lich. 193, fe t “ot ere y Brunnow confers with Pal- D nn 1s 7 “BR ey h one merston regarding binding ardane 5 Sy Will IMPS, P ker

force of, 157-158; violated, ing; oan ween Bonen

168; western warships violate, ordere to, 1o3; ritis 277-279; does not restrain squadron to enter, 164; Britwestern Powers, 296. ish fleet anchors within, 168;

Crimean War: England at. time Titov protests admission of of, 75; effect on commerce, British fleet into, 169; prompt 130; influence on Danubian withdrawal of British fleet

interests, 131-135; commer- from, 1725 France Sends cial considerations of, 135- large warshp through, im 138; Austria’s interest in, 1852, 198; cots ordered n° 137: responsibility of Can- be sent through, 295. See also

ning for, 303; policy of Straits.

France, 316-320, and of Dashkov opposes a war for Austria, 320-332; attitude ‘Straits, 10.

of Prussia, 332-339; aims of di Borgo, Pozzo, at London, 31. England, 356-367; results of, Drouyn de Lhuys goes to Vien427; influence of, on world na, 388-389; dismissed, 403-—

polities, 430-433. | : ~~ AOA, ,

Crisis of 1849: agreement of Dundas, Admiral, refuses to 1844 remains intact during, comply with Rose’s request,

177; agreement of Munchen- 237. 7

INDEX 473 Eastern Question, dual British _ France, 215-216; refuses © policy in, 139. See also Ques- overture for alliance with

tion of the Straits. France, 220; not to permit a

Eastern waters, French fleet temporary occupation of

sent to, 156. Straits by Russia, 224;

Economic uniformity, Metter- sought to support Russia,

nich wanted, in Turkey, 119. 231; Brunnow’s reflections on Egyptian government, Peel op- public opinion in, 2382-233;

poses strong, 46. Clarendon disappointed at

England: refuses aid to Tur- Tsar’s offer to, 252; termikey in 1832, 19; opposes nates agreement of 1844, 254; Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelessi, to uphold Turkey, 254; and 20; relations between, and France declare war, 311-312; Russia, 29; Nicholas offers France aids, 315; Austria armies to, against France in makes alliance with, and 1844, 46-47; complete agree- France, 350-354; Crimean ment between Russia and, on War aims of, 356-367; John

Turkey, 47; reason for Rus- Russell negotiates for, at.

sian understanding with, 47; Vienna, 372-378; Frederick fundamental agreement be- William. refuses to ally with, tween Russia and, in 1844, 373-374; signs guarantee 51-52; economic problem of, treaty with France and Aus-

at time of Crimean War, 79; tria, 429. See also Great sia advocated in, 76-77; English and Russian retail

- opposing policies toward Rus- Britain.

Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelessi - traders have unequal advanleads, to an aggressive Tur- tages in Turkey, 102-103. kish policy, 80-81; Russia English exports to Russia, dimiwins in trade balance with, nution of, 125. eS factors conflict which presagebetween English publicRusopinion,: 287. uture , sia. and, 86; Russia’s pro- European grain markets, Danuhibitive system. a disadvan- bian Principalities compete

tage to, 89; Urquhart occa- for, 87. sions sharp political differ- Kuropean commercial relations

ence between Russia and, 113— with Turkey, Treaty of Balta

114; enters competition for Liman basis of, 120.

Black Sea trade, 122; com- Europeanizing of Caucasian mercial treaty with Austria, provinces, 95. — 123 footnote; commercial Euxine, Buol refuses to support question in Turkey a public _ British plan for strict naval issue in, 123; commercial re- limitation of Russia in, 381lations of, and Russia, 125; 382. See also Black Sea. growth of Turkey’s trade Fleet: Palmerston explains, with, 127; thrown with Aus- demonstration of 1849, 158tria. in Danube River prob- 159; Stratford Canning’’s

lem, 133~1385; Nicholas I scheme for, movement in 1849, — wants cordial agreement with, - 162-168; reactions in Russia 191; résumé of political rela- to, movement of 1849, 171;

_ tionships of Russia and, in results of, movement of 1849; 1852, 199-200; Nicholas I - 187-188; Walewski proposes, makes proposal of partition movement, 291. See also of Turkey to, 208-214; Nes- British fleet; British squadselrode asks, to aid against ron; names of countries.

474 INDEX — ] Fleets to be sent through Dar- of Black Sea, 383; England,

danelles, 295. Austria, and, ‘sign guarantee

| ppe 156. gratz, 328. |

‘*Four Points,’’ the western treaty, 429. ,

Powers’ program of, 341- Franco-Russian relations in 342; Austria accepts, 348; 1852, critical, 197.

| : . , : pposes Nich. 862. tained by, 325-326;. appeals

France accepts British inter- Franz Joseph I o ‘ch.

pretation of third point, 361— olas, 282; Turkey to be main-

Prench fleet to Eastern waters, to convention of MiinchenFrench occupation of Belgium, Frederick William refuses to

danger of, 195. ally with England = and France: supports Mehemet Ali, _ France, 373-374.

13; and England oppose ‘Free trade: Turkey forced to treaty of Unkiar-Iskelessi, adopt, at Balta Liman, 119; 20; Great Russia Party be- in Turkey, 136. lieves, natural ally of Russia, Grain: Russian d 3 25-2 6; reaction in, to Nich- forced into manufacturing olas’ visit to London, 44; by unfavorable, niarkets, 101;

Nicholas offers armies to competition of Danubian

England against, in 1844, 46—- Prineipalities with southern

ral Peel chanenee® 285 pot Russia, 123. Ear dente og Grain export: Treaty of Ad:

trade with, 129-130; slight Ree ens probiem of

interest in Straits, 138; be- 35, S80 f Rus a atts iy m,

gan to raise larger questions ded 88; facilities’ aug. regarding status of pan Greek | ae te aaect and Latin Christian subjects vali ted in Danubian Princt-

of the Sultan, 197; sends Pre me dee OL nrestricted, large warship through Dar- nr om 0 oY ". .

danelles. in 1852, 198; -Nessel- Crain Taws: operated with dis:

rode asks England to aid avor for Russia, 87; repeal against, 215-216; Russell of, apphed generally, 101;

counsels, to moderation, 216; abolition of, benefits Russia,

England refuses overture for 102. alliance with, 220; orders Granville reaffirms secret agreefleet. to Levant, 237; becomes ment of 1844, 192. key to British policy in March Great Britain: immediately - 1853, 242; faced with isola- utilizes Treaty of 1844, 60; tion, forces British hand by in no way bound by Urquthreatening to invade Bel- hart reports, 108; grants fagium, 242-250; and England vors to Austrian shipping, declare war, 311-312; aids 123 footnote; Turkey refuses of, dur*. make mee — with, 186. ingEngland, Crimean315; War,policy 316-320; cé aso Engiand. ‘Austria makes alliance with Great Russia Party believed England and, 350-354; ac- France the natural ally of cepts British interpretation Russia, 25-26; pro-French,

of third point, 361-362; 77.

Frederick William refuses to Greek Catholics, negotiations ally with England and, 373— between Russia and Turkey 374; proposes neutralization regarding, in 1852, 197-98.

INDEX 475 India, Russia a permanent men- Moldavia: Russia wins political

ace to, 76; progressive ag- rights in, 82; freed commergrandizement of British, 125. cially by Treaty of Adrian-

Industry, indigenous Russian, — ople, 87. See also Danubian

develops, 85. Principalities, Danubian prov-

International trade factors of inees. _ |

the Straits, Ch. IT, 79-92. Miinchengritz, Austro - Russian

Kerner, R. J., first attempt to agreement arranged at, 20~ correlate many of the eco- 21, its two thesis with distinct nomic, political, and strategic and opposing views, 21. See factors before the Crimean also Convention of Miinchen-

War, 125 footnote. . gratz; Treaty of Miinchen-

Leiningen mission to Constanti- griitz. nople, 220,orders , Napoleon IIIh.follows advice0of Levant, France fleetHEmto, Britt 392: refuses refus aavice 237. See also Ottoman ish, 992; to sup-

oo :Turkey. port British extension pire; 7 eace bases, London, Pozzo di Borgo sent to, Pea423 soe

of

by Nicholas, 31; Brunnow on Navy. See Russian navy. special mission to, 34; Nich- Near Eastern commercial af-

ort to, . a oe

olas I visits, 40-52; Strat- fairs, British foreign office

rore ee sends false re- interested in, 128.

Malmesbury, relations with | Nesseltode, visits London and Brunnow. 194. es Memorandum of AngloManteuffel confers with Nich- Russian secret understanding,

olas I, 333-335. 62-64; conveys Tsar’s ap-

‘¢Mediating neutrality,’’ Prus- proval of Memorandum, 71;

sia and, 336 footnote. Buchannan discusses commer-

Mediterranean, British squad- cra matters with, 100-10 I;

ron augmented in, 25. Or s Hngland’s aid against Mehemet Ali: threatens Con- . th Be th ee pleasea

| stantinople, 13; supported by 18 53 339+ support early in

France, 13. : ) ; warns against use

Melbourne, confidence in Nich- of fleets, 240.

olas, 52 footnote. Nesselrode Memorandum of

Memorandum. See Nesselrode. 1844, 2; object, 64; summary,

Menshikov, secret instructions 64-65; acceptance and apto, for mission to Constanti- proval of, by Aberdeen and nople, 228; ordered to Con- Peel, 65-66; question as to stantinople with extraordi- disposition of, 66-67; Nichnary powers, 232; arrival in olas I alters text, 67, and imConstantinople, 235; effective portance of alteration, 67-68 in his negotiations at first, footnote; Nesselrode conveys 260; Turkey declines terms Tsar’s approval, 70; certifi-

of, 264. : cation of, 70; Aberdeen ap-

Merchant marine of Russia, 90-— proves, in writing, 72; de-

91, _ fended by Aberdeen, 73-74;

Metternich: excludes imperial method of transfer from _title at Constantinople, 18; eabinet to cabinet, 143-148; supports Russia, 24; opposes Palmerston and the, 144 guarantee of Turkey, 33; passim; documentary basis

Turkey, 119. | 148, ,

wants economic uniformity in | of Russia’s policy in Turkey,

476 INDEX _ Nicholaiev not to be neutral- Orlov, Count, heads Russian

ized, 416. Commercial Committee, 97— Nicholas I: defends Constantinad on mission to Vienna and sap, erlin, 328-330. nople, 19; system, desired for ? Turkey, 27; views on eritical » Ottoman Empire: Palmerston state of Turkey, 39, 46; visit advocate of closer commer-

to London in 1844, 40-52; cial and political relations offers armies to England with, 124. See also Turkey.

against France in 1844, 46- Pacifico dispute, 186. _ 47; Melbourne has confidence Palmerston, remedy to check

in, 52 footnote; the idealist, Tsar at Black Sea, 77; op56; Peel satisfied with visit poses Russia, 107; deter-

of, 58; alters text of Nessel- mined to examine commercial rode Memorandum, 67 passim ; and strategic possibilities of restrictions as to disposition Turkey, 107; rewards Urqu-

of Constantinople, 71; sup- hart, 115; dismisses Urqu-

ports Russia’s economic ad- : hart, 116; advocates closer vancement, 78; willing to en- commercial and political regage in economic partition lations with Ottoman Empire, of Turkey, 78; Victoria men- | 124; and the Nesselrode tions visit. of, 140; loans arm- Memorandum, 144 passim ; ies to Turkey, 149; wants not liked in Russia, 145; adcordial agreement with Eng- heres to secret Anglo-Russian land, 191; proposes comple- agreement, 146-147; bows to tion of arrangements of 1844, fait accompli, 150 footnote; 208-214; believes Austria in fails to recognize treaty of agreement with him, 228; 1841, 154; Brunnow confers - suggests partition plan for with, regarding binding force Turkey, 229; inexplicit as to of Straits Convention, 157— temporary occupation of 158; explains fleet demonstraStraits, 229; determined to _ tion of 1849, 158-159; apoloforce Turks to make conces- gizes to Russia, 176; attitude

sions to Russia, 259; Can-* on projected alliance with

ning’s interference angers; Turkey in 1849, 185; becomes _ tries to secure Austrian sup- aggressive, 304-306. port against Turkey, 266~< Parker, William, ordered to 267; ‘*Constantinople a free Dardanelles, 153; complies

city,’’ 281-282; Franz Jo- with Canning’s instructions,

_ seph I opposes, 282; writes to — 167-168.

Queen of England, 307; Paris. See Congress of; Treaty

Queen Victoria answers, 307— of. 308 ; Manteuffel confers with, Partition of Turkey: Polignac

333-335. See also Tsar. , project for, 26 footnote; no Odessa: and Taganrog, compe- time fixed for arranging tition with Danubian ports, terms of, in agreement of 84; importance of, 93; great- 1844, 56 } Nicholas I willing

est port for exports, 93; to ones ak soe oneal 78, principal export center of ane a 1 ma. qi Pee Old.

Russian Empire, 96; shipping Torreplies ane regaranss ae at. 96-105. : ohn Russell to Rus-

, | sian overture for, 223-224;

Olmiitz meeting, 283, 326... Nicholas I suggests plan, 229.

INDEX 477 Peel, Sir Robert: opposes strong das refuses to comply with |

EHgyptian government, 46; request of, 237. Oo

f elt obligation to nussia Russell, John: confidential consacred, O25 chal engrs ferences with Brunnow, 203; France, P33 _ Satisfied with counsels) France to modera-

ay Ov. T ’ ’ A a ae key, 223-224; returns Canwos _vastt, PN aor’ tion, 216; replies to Russian

uM. , mnomndwamn 66 essenroee _ overture for partition of Tur-

Persia dominated by Russia, ning’ to Constantinople, 234;

104 footnote. negotiates for England at

Polignac, partition project for Vienna, 372-378; quits Vien-

_ Turkey, 26 footnote. | na, 401. Ponsonby approves Urquhart’s Russia: Metternich supports, econduet, 114. 24; augments own Black Sea Problem of Russian fleet in Sawia “ A nd, 29; nave of in

the Black Sea .~—347. “on. |Treaty ‘ e Black Sea, 45-347 1836, 30; terminates

Problem of Turkey, British of Unkiar-Iskelessi, 32; Trea-

fleet key to, 111. _ty of Unkiar-Iskelessi not in

Prohibitive system of Russia a accord with relations between, disadvantage to England, 31. and Turkey, 34 footnote; Ab-

Prussia: attitude of, during comple te vnoroement between Crimean War, 332-339; and and England on Turkey, 47 . , mediating neutrality, ’’ 336 fundamental agreement. be-

| Footnote. | tween, and England in 1844,

Quarantine regulations for Dan- 51-52; Sir Robert Peel feels

ube, 83. obligations to, ‘‘sacred,’’ 52;

Queen of England, Nicholas I - industrial backwardness of, writes to, 307. See also Vic- 75; a permanent menace to

toria. , of | sey 5, Opposing reres Question the 76 Straits, inter- Owespo OCA ns est: of Powers in, before 1853, rand, LOTT sien as SUP

5; not settled in agreement Pe. wins p olitical rights n

Ores ae ee ° oe War Moldavia and Wallachia, 82; , i ? sO wins in trade balance. with Reciprocity, only basis on England, 85; factors which commercial concessions, 100. tween, and England, 86; in trade after 1840 at, 95. favor for, 87; grain exports Reports, Urquhart, 114~115. of, steadily expanded, 88; Redoubt Kalé, port of, increase grain laws operated with dis-

Reshid Pasha, restored to office fun ane to piace oF by Stratford Canning, 202 5 ortance, 88; attention in orders naval aid forgiven ConstanPOrPances ; fe 88; Q: tinople, 292-293. to manutactures,

ge gs prohibitive system of, disad-

Restrictive tariffs, absence of, vantage to England, 89; | in Danubian Principalities, seeks new markets n Asia,

93. | , 89; Merchant marine of,

Rose, Hugh: summons British small, 90-91; Asia commersquadron, 236; Admiral Dun- cial outlet of, 91; Stratford

478 INDEX | Canning fears commercial curity, 241; without allies by preponderance of, internal an Turkey,——termined April 1853, Nicholas 92; problem of to255; force Turksdeto

transportation in, 94; would make concessions to, 259; make commercial concessions Stratford Canning encouronly.on basis of reciprocity, _ ages Turks to oppose, 262; 100; benefitted by abolition © adopts halfway measures, of grain laws, 102; signs new 265-266; Turkish ultimatum commercial treaty with Tur- to, 300; warns British not to key, 103; dominates Turkey, enter Black Sea, 301; Buol 104 footnote; opposed by refuses to support British Palmerston, 107; Urquhart plan for strict limitation of, occasions sharp political dif- in Euxine, 381-382; refuses ference between, and Eng- _ naval limitation in the Black land, 1138-114; Cireassia Sea, 395-396; Austria deliv-

ceded to, by Treaty of Ad- ers ultimatum to, 409; aerianople, 113; grain compe- cepts Austrian ultimatum

tition of Danubian Prineipal-. 412. See also Great Russia ities with southern, 123; com- _ Party. »

mercial relations of England . . and, 125; diminution of Eng- Russian advantages nulited by

lish exports to, 125; British 39. y 0 DALAT ISKENCSS1, purchases from, 126; compe- 7 | tition between, and Turkish Rusisan industry, indigenous,

provinces in Europe, 127; develops, 85.

Boardwith, of Trade reports on. conflict Russian grain producers forced trade 128-130; int facture bf with Austria in Danube Val- ™m able tna: Kot 4 01 y untae Jey, 131-135; Turkey better Vorabie MAarKets, ms British customer than, 136; Russian occupation of the DanPalmerston not liked in, 145; ubian provinces, 281.

reaction in, to British fleet Russ] ot ‘al

movements in 1849, 171; UssTan a 18 44. 9799 com

threatens to order Black Sea mittee In a Me 2 oo. and its squadron to enter Bosphorus, TOCOMMMEDEATONS, YY

173-174; effect of decisive | Russian navy second strongest measures taken by, on British _ in Europe in 1836, 30.

foreign office in 1849, 176; . . | ;

Palmerston apologizes to, Bussian pony - nae g 50.

176; negotiations between, 0-12 . to a ee Fi a the. tatus and Turkey regarding Greek Wray tO Manta che sta us Catholics 1852, 197-198; quo Memorandum in southern Europe,doc12; , ge inys? . Nesselrode

résumé of political relation- t basis of. 148.

- ships of, and England in EMeNLALY VAsis OF; : 1852, 199-200; meets series Russian. ports: of Danube of diplomatic reverses at double trade exchanges, 95; Constantinople, 206; England shipping of, on Black Sea,

not to permit temporary oc- 105. cupation of Straits by, 224; : er not to permit occupation of Bussian, English ane, traders Constantinople by any other Tk - 1b9. 1 03 vantages 1

great Power, 227; England UPKOY aoe |

sought to support, 231; in St. Petersburg, Brunnow visits,

position of unwarranted se- | 190.

a INDEX , 479 Secret committee: fixes Russian Sulina channel of Danube, repolicy in Turkey in 1829, 9- sponsibility for proper main-

12; decision approved, 12. tenance of delta, 83; depth See also Agreement of 1844. of, 134.

Sevastopol falls, 408. Taganrog: competition with

| , Danubian ports, 84; principal

Seymour, conversations with Azov port, 95.

Nicholas I on partition plans Tariffs. See Restrict;

for Turkey, 208-214. ariffs, See Restrictive. Shipping: at Odessa, 96-105; Russian pe See Anglo

. Textile competition. See lo-

of Russian ports on Black | oo.

Sea, 105. See also Austrian . Titov protests admission of

shipping. pee fleet. into Dardanelles, Sinope, naval battle of, 310. Trade. See Black Sea; Board Southern Russia, rise oO f, to of Trade; Danubian Principlace of fundamental palities; Free Trade; ann ic importance, 88. Seeeconomalso national trade; Trans-Cauca-

Russia, Odessa; Taganrog. sian.

Steam transport. See Danubian ‘Trade exchanges, Russian ports

Principalities, 55. of Danube doubled, 95.

Straits: interest of Powers . near s-Caucasian trade routes,

in1853,question of the, before im ; 5; Dashkov opposes a Transportation, problem of inwar for, 10; closure of, to _ ternal, in Russia, 94.

foreign warships, 32; inter- Treaty of Adrianople, commer-

national factors ultimate of regionsproblem cial provisions of, 80; raises of, . IT, 79-92; of Russian competioutlet of Danube, 136; im- tion with European provinces portance of, 137-138; slight — ‘of Turkey in export of grain

- interest of France in, 138; to world markets, 82; frees

Stratford Canning chief ex- Moldavia and Wallachia component of British policy in, mercially, 87; cedes Circassia

148; authorization of pas- to Russia, 113. sage of British warships Treaty of Balta Liman: begun through, 154-155, and ‘‘ blank by Urquhart, 116; basis of checks’’ for their passage, European commercial rela155; principle of closure of, tions with Turkey, 120; Can-

vigor during peace, ; | |

remained in full force oe ning seeks extension of, 183.

geography of, 163; England rea or , 1841, Pet ge

not to permit temporary oc- re “0 0 ention of th Str fe an cupation of, by Russia, 224; 080 onven Ton 0 mae TaTtS. Nicholas I inexplicit as to Treaty of Munchengratz: funetemporary occupation of, tioned smoothly during’ crisis

229; Canning secures author- of 1849, 180; Austro-Russian ization for passage of British relations on basis of, 266. See warships through, 263; pas- also Convention of Miinchensage of warships through, in gratz; Miinchengratz.

June 1853, 279. See also Treaty of Paris: signed, 427;

_ Bosphorus; Convention of the terms of, 427-428. See also

Straits; Dardanelles. Congress of Paris. .

480 INDEX Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelessi: procedure in, 108; France not terms of alliance, 19; Eng- favored in, 110; British fleet land and France oppose, 20; key to problem of, 111; UrquRussian advantages nullified, hart attempts to secure trea-

32; Russia terminates, 32; ty with, 111-113 footnote; — not in accord with historical forced to adopt. free trade at development of relations be-- Balta Liman, 119; Mettertween Russia and Turkey, 34 nich wants economic unifootnote; leads England to | formity in, 119; Treaty of aggressive Turkish policy, Balta Liman basis of Euro80-81; nullified by British pean commercial relations fleet, 107; opposed by Urqu- , with, 120; unrestricted ex-

hart, 110; Canning fails to port of grain from, 121;

duplicate, 181. commercial question in, a

Tripartite guarantee treaty of public issue in England, 123;

1856, 430. : | growth of trade of, with

Tsar (Nicholas I): approves England, 127; free trade in, Nesselrode Memorandum, 70; 136; better British customer Palmerston’s remedy to check, than Russia, 136; Nesselrode at. Black Sea, 77; Clarendon Memorandum documentary

disappointed at offer of, to basis of Russia’s policy in,

England, 252. See also Nich- 148; Nicholas I loans armies

olas I. to, 149; Palmerston’s atti-

Turkey: England refuses aid tude on projected alliance to, in 1832, 19; Convention with, in 1849, 185; refuses

of Miinchengratz terms re- | to make alliance with Great specting, 21; system Nicholas Britain, 186; negotiations desired for, 27; Metternich between Russia and, regardopposes guarantee of, 33; ing Greek Catholics in 1852, Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelessi 197-198; general belief in not. in accord with relations instability of, 207; England between Russia and, 34 foot- to uphold, 254; declines note; Stratford Canning pre- Menshikov terms, 264; Nichsents gloomy outlook for, 38; olas I tries to secure AusNicholas’ views on eritical trian support against, 266—

state of, 39, 46; complete 267; to be maintained by

- agreement between Russia and Franz Joseph, 325-326. See

England on, 47; Treaty of _ also Levant: Ottoman EmAdrianople raises problem of pire; Partition of Turkey;

Russian competition with Turks.

European provinces of, 82; Turkish provinces, Aberdeen Stratford Canning fears Rus- uncertain as to disposition,

- gia’s commercial preponder- 933.

ance in, 92; Russian and a - ,

English retail traders have — aan policy, Treaty of : | nkiar-Iskelessi leads Eng-

unequal advantages in, 102- land to. 80-81 103; Russia signs new com- al °, oo mercial treaty with, 103; Turkish ultimatum to Russia, - Palmerston determined to ex- 300.

amine commercial-and strate- Turks: Nicholas determined to

gic possibilities of, 107; Da- force, to make concessions - vid Urquhart sent on special to Russia, 259; Stratford mission to, 107; Urquhart Canning encourages, to opwrites text book on British pose Russia, 262.

INDEX , 481 Unkiar-Iskelessi. See Treaty Vienna: Orlov on mission to,

of. 328-330; preliminaries of,

Urquhart, David: sent on spe- conferences of 1855, 363; ne-

cial mission to Turkey and gotiations at, in 1855, 365western Asia, 107; reports 3867; problem of, conferences in no way bound Great Brit- of 1855, 370; John Russell ain, 108; wrote textbook on negotiates for England at, British procedure in Turkey, 872-378; Drouyn de Lhuys 108; reports of, 109, 114— goes to, 388-389; John Rus115; opposes Treaty of Un- sell quits, 401; conferences kiar-Iskelessi, 110; attempt- close, 405; summary of, con-_ ed to secure treaty with ferences of 1855, 405-406. Turkey, lil-112 footnote; Vienna Note, rejection of, 289. tion as dependent upon Walewski proposes fleet moveregarded commercial situa-

political factors, 112; occa- ment, 291.

_ sioned sharp political differ- Wallachia, Russia wins politence between Russia and ical rights in, 82; freed comEngland, 113-114; wants to mercially by Treaty of Ad-

support Circassians, 113 rianople, 87. See also Danufootnote; Ponsonby — ap- bian Principalities; Danuvproves conduct of, 114; Pal- bian provinces merston rewards, 115; Pal- " merston dismisses, 116; Wheat, Russian landlords debegins Anglo-Turkish treaty pend on sale, 86. See also

of Balta Liman, 116. Grain; Grain export; Grain Victoria mentions visit of laws.

Tsar Nicholas, 140; answers Western Powers, Straits Con--

Tsar Nicholas’ letter, 307—- vention does not restrain, 308. See also Queen of Eng- 296; results of Austrian al-

land. liance with, 354-355.

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