Egypt since 1936: A survey of trends and problems

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EGYPT SINCE 1936:

A SURVE^ OP TRENDS AND PROBLEMS

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of History The University of Southern California

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

by Fred Paul Burns August 1950

UMI Number: EP59622

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T h is thesis, w r it t e n by

,......... FRED..P. BURNS............ u n d e r the g u id a n c e o f h.%s.. F a c u l t y C o m m i t t e e , and approved

by a l l

its

m em bers, has

been

presented to a n d accepted by the C o u n c i l on G r a d u a t e S tu d y a n d R e s ea rch in p a r t i a l f u l f i l l ­ m e n t o f the re q u ire m e n ts f o r the degree o f

MASTER OF ARTS

---------------_______

Faculty Committee

^•V

j u o j S vi

.

\>j Chairman

TABLE OP CONTENTS CHAPTER

PAGE

I . BACKGROUND ............................

1

Ismail • •

1

Suez Canal transaction .......................

1

.................

3

British occupation of Egypt

Egypt before British administration

II.

. . . . .

. . . . .

3

British administration in E g y p t .............

ij.

The first World W a r ............

7

Egyptian nationalism

7

.....................

Egyptian move for independence..........

8

The Milner M i s s i o n ............................

9

The Milner-Zaghlul Pact

9

. . . . .

...........

Declaration of Egyptian independence ........

10

Anglo-Egypt!an affairs 1922-193& .............

H

Italian expansion in A f r i c a .................

13

The Anglo-Egypt!an treaty of alliance

13

. . . .

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ..........................

l6

Nahas Pasha and Wafd p o l i c i e s ..............

16

Dismissal of Nahas P a s h a .....................

17

Mahummed Mahmoud Pasha’s c a b i n e t .............

17

Aly Maher Pasha fs c a b i n e t ...................

18

Effect of the second World War on Egypt’s p o l i t i c s ....................................

20

iii CHAPTER

PAGE Hassan Sabry Pasha*s cabinet .................

21

Italian invasion of Egypt

22,

................... ...............

23

The Lamp son a f f a i r ............................

2lf

Nahas Pasha!s c a b i n e t ........ .. ............

2lj.

Egyptian e l e c t i o n s ............................

2lf.

Nahas Pasha* s regime . ........................

25

Dismissal of Nahas p a s h a .....................

26

Ahmed Maher Pasha*s cabinet

.................

26

Egypt declares war on A x i s ...................

27

Assassination of Ahmed Maher Pasha ...........

27

Mahmoud Nokrashy Pasha* s c a b i n e t .............

27

Egypt*s post war n a t i o n a l i s m .................

27

Sidky Pasha* s c a b i n e t .......................

28

Sherif Sabry Pasha*s cabinet .................

29

Sidky-Bevin treaty talks .....................

29

Nokrashy Pasha*s second cabinet

.............

29

..............................

29

Hussein Sirry Pasha*s cabinet

Egyptian unrest

The Moslem B r o t h e r h o o d .......................

30

Assassination of Nokrashy Pasha

31

.............

Ibrahin Abdul Hadi Pasha *s cabinet . ...........

31

Coalition cabinet

33

..............................

Fall of the all party c a b i n e t ...............

33

Egyptian 1950 e l e c t i o n s ...............

33

iv CHAPTER

III.

PAGE Wafd v i c t o r y ..................................

33

Wafd opportunity . . ..........................

3i|.

EGYPT AND THE SECOND WORLD W A R Egypt* s position in the treaty of alliance

.

35

. .

35

Axis s t r a t e g y ................................

36

Italian invasion of Egypt

37

...................

38

Axis psychological warfare in theMiddle East Allied Psychological warfare in the Middle E a s t ........................................ Effects of psychological warfare on Egypt

IV.

. .

ij.0 Ip.

Italian d e f e a t ................................

1^2.

German invasion of E g y p t .....................

lj_2

German d e f e a t ................................

l\.3

Reasons for Egypt *s non-belligerence........

lj.3

Egypt *s contribution to Allied effort

Ij.5

. . . .

l\h

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN R E L A T I O N S .......... Treaty provisions for r e v i s i o n ...............

lj_6

British policy toward r e v i s i o n ...............

lj.6

Egyptian political confusion over revision . . R i o t s ................ 1 ......................

lf-7

British offer to withdraw t r o o p s .............

Ij.8

British interests in the Middle E a s t ........

lj-9

Issues in the negotiations'...................

50

Politics in Egypt during negotiations

$1

Sidky-Bevin talks

. . . .

............................

52

V

CHAPTER

PAGE

..................

£2

Attlee»s d e n i a l ........................

£2

Sidky*s announcement s

Britain1s last concessions ..................

53

Egyptian u n r e s t ...........

53

Sidky*s r e s i g n a t i o n ....................... 5k

Nokrashy Pasha*s p o l i c y ........ ........... British actions in the S u d a n ............ Negotiations broken off

54-

....................

55

What happened at the Sidky-Bevintalks . . . .

55

Egyptian chances before the United Nations

$6

Security Council ......................... Reasons for negotiations* breakdown

........

57

The problem placed before the United Nations Security Council .........................

V.

58

The Egyptian c a s e ...........

59

The British c a s e ....................... . .

60

United Nations Security Councilaction . . . .

60

Present status of Anglo-Egyptianrelations . .

62

EGYPT AND THE PALESTINE P R O B L E M ..........

63

Introduction ...............................

63

History of the Palestine problem . . . . . . .

6I4.

British policy in the Near East during the first World W a r ......... The MacMahon letters....................

65 65

vi CHAPTER

PAGE Anglo-French attitude in the Near East . . . .

66

The Hogarth m e s s a g e ..........................

68

The Balfour d e c l a r a t i o n .....................

JO

The Shaw . c o m m i s s i o n ..........................

71

The British White Paper of 1930

71

The Peel commission

71

.

The British White Paper of 1939

73

Effect of the second World War on the Palestine p r o b l e m .......................... Pan-Arabianism.................

75

Alexandria Protocol

.........................

jG

Pact of the Arab L e a g u e .....................

77

End of the British mandate over Palestine

73

• .

........

JQ

Egypt declares war on I s r a e l .................

79

Egypt* s failure in the w a r ..............

79

Reason for Arab f a i l u r e .....................

80

E C O N O M I C S .............. - ......................

82

Creation of the state of Israel

VI.

75

Egypt’s national wealth

.

. . . . . . . . . . .

82

A g r i c u l t u r e ..................................

82

C o t t o n ........................................

8I4.

Corn l a w s ....................................

8l|.

Land d i s t r i b u t i o n ....................... .. .

85

Suggested agricultural reforms ...............

86

vii CHAPTER

PAGE I n d u s t r y ......................................

86

Future of Egyptian industry

.................

87

Textile industry ..............................

88

Transportation ................................

89

Effect of the second World War on Egyptian E c o n o m i c s ..........

90

Post war a d j u s t m e n t ......................... Egypt!s attitude toward foreign investments

VII.

92 .

92

Distribution of national w e a l t h .............

93

Suggested reforms for Egypt 1s economy

. . . .

93

..............................

95

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Introductory statements

.............

95

Egypt 1s p r o b l e m ..............................

95

P o p u l a t i o n ....................................

95

Social structure

99

.....................

The K i n g ..........

100

L a n d l o r d s ....................................

100

B o u r g e o i s e ....................................

101

Petty B r o u g e o i s e ..............................

101

P r o l e t a r i a t ...........

102

F e l l a h e e n .................................

.

103

Communism in E g y p t ............................

lOlj.

Governmental social measures

105

...........

The cooperative m o v e m e n t .....................

105

viii CHAPTER

PAGE The village e x p e r i m e n t .....................

106

H e a l t h ......................................

107

Health measures . , * .......................

108

I l l i t e r a c y ..................................

108

E d u c a t i o n ....................................

109

Effect of British administration of Egyptian e d u c a t i o n .................................. Progress of Egyptian education

.............

110 Ill

Social welfare progress ...........

113

Labor l e g i s l a t i o n ...........................

113

VIII.CONCLUDING R E M A R K S ................................

115

B I B L I O G R A P H Y ............................................

118

INTRODUCTION In 1936, the Kingdom of Egypt established its first independent sovereign since the rule of the last Ptolmey-Cleopatra.

During the interval from 1936 to 19^9 9 Egypt

involved herself in two episodes of conflict* which attracted world wide attention.

A student of history will quickly

describe Egypt’s behavior as being nationalistic.

It is the

purpose of this thesis to examine Egypt’s nationalism, and reveal the social and economic forces which generate it. Is it an indication of vigorous and healthy nationhood, or is it, rather, a symptom of a serious social pathology?

The

writer will not give definite statements in answer to these questions.

Instead, it is hoped that the material contained

in this thesis will enable the reader to provide his own responses. Chapter I is a general description of Egyptian affairs prior to 1936.

The succeeding chapters attempt to describe

the social, political and economic trends characteristic of contemporary Egyptian civilization.

Three chapters dealing

with foreign relations are concerned with Egypt’s role in: the second World War, the Anglo-Egyptian-Sudan issue, and the Palestine question. Because of the fact that there are no comprehensive studies of present day Egypt, comparable to the Earl of

X

Cromer*s excellent Modern Egypt which covers the period from

1876 through the British administration in Egypt, the writer relied primarily upon newspapers--especially the New York Times, and The Manchester Guardian Weekly--for purposes of chronology and analysis of events.

Charles Issawi*s book,

Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis, is a valuable source of statistical data and descriptive material pertinent to the period studied.

Richard William-Thompson* s study, The

Palestine Problem, and the ESCO Foundation*s two volume work, Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, are outstanding as sources of valuable material on the Palestine problem.

The Round Table, The Middle East Journal, and Fort­

nightly contain adequate studies of the Palestine and Sudan issues.

The San Francisco Egyptian Consulate provided several

collections of documents and pamphlets relative to the same subject. The writer wishes to express his thanks to the Faculty Committee on this thesis, Dr. T. W. Wallbank, Chairman, Dr. Colin R. Lovell and Mrs. Della T. Early for their assistance and helpful suggestions.

CHAPTER I BACKGROUND During the middle of the nineteenth century, Egypt, under the leadership of Muharamed ’Ali, was introduced to Western civilization.

Ali*s immediate successors, however,

were not as intent as he upon the Westernization of Egypt, and it was not until the appointment of Ismail as Khedive that Western ideas and practices were again encouraged.'*' Ismail*s reign proved to be one of great historic moment for the land of the Pharaohs.

He had traveled in Europe, was

ambitious and imaginative and here the vendors of culture, with an eye on the cotton profits inflated by the American Civil War, allowed Ismail to indulge to the point of satu­ ration.

After years of financial irresponsibility, Ismail

found it necessary to offer his block of Suez Canal shares for sale, and in 1867, Great Britain purchased these shares for $20,000,000.

It would have been unwise of England had she not

taken advantage of Ismail*s predicament.

For the often repeated

reasons of Empire security, the Suez Canal was and will remain for some time of the utmost importance to the British Common­ wealth.

Shortly following the Suez transaction with England,

1 F. Heyworth-Dunne, "Society and Politics in Modern Egyptian Literature: A Bibliographical Survey,” The Middle East Journal, 2:309» July, 19^4-8*

2 Ismail!s European creditors pressed their governments to act in their behalf, to safeguard their Egyptian investments, as Ismail had announced his inability to meet interest payments. A joint commission of French and English officials was formed to study Egypt *s fiscal condition, and to seek a way whereby interest due Egypt’s foreign investors could be paid. It was decided, by this board of international auditors, that the surest way to restore Egypt’s financial respectability was through indirect control of Ismail’s government.

Such

interference in his government’s affairs engendered the natural reaction of obstructionism on the part of Ismail, and the commissioners soon realized that so long as he was Khedive, fiscal rehabilitation would be seriously hampered, therefore, pressure was applied to the Sultan in Turkey, and on June 26, 1879* Ismail received a telegram from his Sultan addressed to the Ex-Khedive of Egypt. Tewdik, hereditary successor of Ismail, found himself in the impossible position of arbitor between France and England, and his ministers who sorely resented foreign inter­ ference.

This chaotic situation inspired strong Egyptian

nationalistic feelings, and on June 11, 1880, anti-foreign demonstrations occurred in Alexandria during which about fifty Europeans were brutally massacred.

The riots spurred the

European powers to intervene in the name of order, but differ­ ences between France and Turkey made their concerted action

impossible.

In the meantime, the situation grew worse; the

French fleet left Alexandria, leaving the British naval force to do as it would.

It might be well to point out that England

was desirous of obtaining the multilateral action of other major European powers, but her requests met with no response. It would seem as though the European world saw England with the Egyptian "hot potato" in her hands, and was content that it should remain so. Ytfhen Arabi, the Egyptian nationalistic leader, threatened to block the Suez Canal, England commissioned General Wolseley to protect the canal and restore order.

On September 13, 1882,

British forces defeated Arabi at the battle of Telel-Kebir and Egypt came under the control of Great Britain. Before one attempts an evaluation of the British ad­ ministration in Egypt, it is well that he consider conditions and trends in Egypt before this event.

The general unsavory

picture of Egypt under Turkish suzerainity is one of the evils a Westerner usually associates with the decaying Ottoman empire. The condition of the fellaheen, was extremely desperate.

He

was not only troubled by the immediate necessity of staving off imminent starvation, but he was constantly harassed by an irresponsible, self-indulgent, corrupt autocracy,

symbolized

by the courbash and corvee, which gave little evidence of its being aware of his sad plight.

The army required reorganizing

and was sorely lacking morale.

If Egypt*s finances were to

k be made sound, a more humane and efficient system of tax gathering would have to be employed.

Agriculture needed to

be modernized if Egypt was to feed her increasing population. Egyptian jurisprudence had to be reordered.

In other words,

some type of reform was needed in almost every facet of Egyptian life. When one realizes that this sad condition represented the end result of an ancient cultural complex, and that in order to alleviate it, England had to cut sharply across here­ tofore acceptable procedures, the Egyptian question presented serious problems to her conqueror.

England had also assumed

the responsibility of administering Egypt’s foreign debts which meant that she would act as an arbitrator between the various creditors.

The entire problem had to be dealt with

in the face of certain criticism from suspicious and possibly envious world powers. Egypt’s finances were unbelievably chaotic.

Ismail’s

career of irresponsible spending, and the period of national­ istic warfare preceeding England’s administration had drained the state’s treasury.

The struggle to remedy the situation

was long and difficult, and it was not until 1888 that financial stability was reached. The Egyptian army was thoroughly reorganized.

New

systems of recruitment, training, and care were soon to deve­ lop an army which when only three months old, drew favorable

5 criticism from military authorities.

Egypt’s new army proved

its value in 1889, when it was called upon to quell the Mahdi uprising in the Sudan. The Egyptian judicial system was made up of four court types— religious, mixed, consular, and native.

Religious

courts heard cases involving the personal status of all Mo ­ hammedans, and because' of their religious nature no attempt was made to reform them even though many Mohammedan judges had scant knowledge of secular law.

However, the other three

courts were brought under a Committee of Survillance which, by advice and circular directives, gave these courts a con­ sistency they heretofore never had. Egypt’s civilization is based upon agriculture.

Con­

sequently, the science of adequate water distribution is of paramount importance.

British experts found that through the

utilization of modern engineering methods, the nation’s water resources could be more fully exploited.

It required a re­

designing of the slope and alignment of canals.

The problem

of water storage was partially solved by a system of dams and reservoirs.

Better drainage was also gained by English

engineering skill.

These improvements in water distribution

made the water’s deposit of fertile silt on the Hile valley floor more certain, thereby increasing the soil’s fertility. By these methods of scientific irrigation, Egypt became the world’s greatest cotton producer when measured in terms of yield per acre.

6 British agricultural experts also encouraged the Egyptian farmer to cultivate other plant varieties— especially the food producing ones.

After propaganda was used to enliven

the fellah*s interest in fruits and vegetables, intensive ! educational programs on the proper care during growing periods were followed.

The over-all picture of Egyptian irrigation

and agriculture after the British administration, was one of considerable improvement. The principle type of Egyptian education, prior to British control, was purely religious.

The schools, or Wakfs,

were designed primarily to instruct in the Koran, and to supply the Mosques with religious authorities.

If a young

Egyptian desired technical, or professional training, he was obliged to study in a foreign country--more frequently Prance. The cost of such an education made it unobtainable for more than 90 P© 3? cent of the Egyptians.

The few educational plants

in existence were sorely in need of funds.

In l897> the British

administrators instituted wide educational reforms.

By 190&

there were lj-,554 village schools offering training in the three R*s to both sexes.

Trade and technological schools were also

established to provide four year apprenticeships in various forms of manufacturing.

The British also founded the Gordon

Memorial College at Khartum to train young men to become teachers, government officials, and craftsmen.

Highly bene­

ficial reforms were also made in the field of charities.

7 New hospitals were built, and old ones put on a more efficient basis.

Training programs,

supervised by qualified English

doctors, were developed to provide Egypt with desperately needed medical personnel. The British control of Egypt also saw a more humane penal system replace the corrupt, age-old, the Turks.

cruel system of

British humanitarianism ended the Koran approved

traffic in slaves.

After l881j., slave trading was declared

illegal, and a salve could obtain his emancipation by applying to a Bureau of Manumission. Anglo-Egyptian relations were dramatically changed by the advent of the first World War.

Previous to 19li|-> Khedive

Abbas Hilmi demonstrated his aversion for the British intrusion and affiliated himself with Turkey.

When Turkey and Britain

became enemies, the Khedive chose to ally himself with the Sultan.

On December 12, 191^*

British government deposed

the Khedive and declared Egypt to be a British protectorate. The Egyptians were elated and considered the protectorate to be a temporary war measure which would be replaced by complete Egyptian independence when peace was restored.

The lofty

doctrine of self-determination gave a cast of possibility to these hopes.

Under these circumstances, the spirit of Egyptian

nationalism waxed strong and found political expression in the Wafd party under the direction of Zaghlul Pasha.

8 Shortly after the armistice, a committee headed by Zaghlul Pasha demanded complete Egyptian independence from Great Britain as just reward for Egyptfs part in the war effort.

When an ambiguous reply was given Zaghlul, he re­

quested permission to place the matter before the British government.

The request was refused for fear of weakening

the position of Egypt1s official ministers. It was finally arranged that the Egyptian Premier, Rushdi Pasha, would go to London to confer with the British government, but he refused to do so unless Zaghlul Pasha accompanied him.

The British Foreign Secretary refused this

request because of Zaghlul»s extreme demands.

Zagihlul then

began a plan of action designed to embarrass his government, and thereby intimidate the British into making concessions. The British retaliated by arresting Zaghlul, and three of his aids. The high-handed treatment of these men only served to set off violent acts of sabotage.

It also glorified Zaghlul

Pasha in the minds of the fellaheen, and assured their support of any policy connected with his name. In 1922, London sent Lord Allenby to reinstate order. Allenby soon discovered that a London promise of some sort of an investigative mission would be necessary to soothe the outraged Egyptian nationalism.

After some delay, the Milner

Mission arrived in Egypt, but the intransigence of the Egyptian

9 leaders and the impossibility of its task--that of recon­ ciling Egyptian nationalism and British imperial interests in the Middle East--precluded the mission*s success.

One

important conclusion the Milner Mission did make was the necessity of negotiations being conducted with Zaghlul Pasha. The Milner Mission and Zaghlul Pasha discussed the problem for six months, and produced the Milner-Zaghlul Agreement which was a treaty of alliance granting Egypt independence and England certain safeguards for her imperial communications.

However, the hated capitulations were not \ ended and British financial and judicial advisers were to be retained. Although Zaghlul pasha was not Egypt* s official Premier, he was unquestionably the only person in Egypt who enjoyed the acclaim of the Egyptian masses.

It was in view

of this fact that the British government consented to ne­ gotiate with Zaghlul.

However, the Milner-Zaghlul Agreement

failed to receive the approval of the more responsible Egyptians primarily because an official declaration of Egyptian independence was considered more desirable than an agreement of this nature.

The failure of the Zaghlul-Milner

Agreement convinced the British government that future negotiations would have to be conducted between the official representatives of both governments.

10 Following the Milner-Zaghlul attempt, unsuccessful negotiations were carried on between Adly Pasha, the Premier of Egypt, and British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon.

The

Adly-Curzon conferences failed because of different inter­ pretations of what constituted imperial communications.

Lord

Curzon held that all forms of transportation were imperial which meant that British troops could be stationed anywhere in Egypt.

Adly Pasha contended that imperial communications

only applied to the Suez Canal. Adly Pasha resigned as Premier, and Sarwat Pasha was asked to form a new government.

Sarwat Pasha agreed to do

so providing the British government accepted his policy calling for a British acknowledgment of Egyptian independence. The British government accepted.

However, a new Egyptian

ministry was not forthcoming due to former Premier Adly Pasha*s refusal to support Sarwat Pasha. Lord Allenby had long advocated a less conservative attitude toward Egyptian national aspirations; therefore, it was fortunate that the British government chose him to seek an Anglo-Egyptian understanding.

Lord Allenby met with

Lloyd Q-eorge in London, and on February 28, 1922, after a ten day period of secret cabinet meetings, the British government made a unilateral declaration of Egyptian inde­ pendence. The terms of this declaration stated that the British

11 protectorate over Egypt was terminated, and that Egypt was now an independent state. discussions were made.

Certain reservations for future

The question of imperial communi­

cations was set aside, as were the problems involving Egyptian defense, foreign interests in Egypt, minorities,

and the

Sudan question. The period from 1922 to 193& can be divided into three major phases.

The first was essentially concerned with the

establishment of an Egyptian dynasty, setting precedents, and drafting the 1923 constitution.

During this time, the

political scene was dominated by Zaghlul Pasha as President of the Wafd, and Premier of Egypt.

However, this powerful

leader chose to ignore the Declaration of 1922, and his official position as Premier, and pressed for a complete withdrawal of British forces and influence from Egypt. deadlock in Anglo-Egyptian relations ensued.

A

This state of

affairs was dramatically changed by the murder of Sir Lee Stack, Governor General of the Sudan, by nationalistic extremists.

Zaghlul Pasha resigned his office, and was

succeeded by Sarwar Pasha. During the second phase, Egyptian politics were so uncertain due to Wafd policies that King Pouad I was obliged to rule either personally, or through men chosen from the palace retinue.

Sarwar Pasha suspended the liberal consti­

tution of 1923, and ruled by decree for about eighteen months

12 when the liberal forces allied themselves and agitated for a return to constitutional government.

A coalition cabinet

was formed with Adly Pasha as its Premier.

Within a year,

Sarwat Pasha succeeded Adly Pasha, and the third phase— one of Anglo-Egyptian reapproachment— began. In the meantime, Zaghlul Pasha had died, and Nahas Pasha became the leader of the Wafd.

Nahas Pasha continued

his predecessors policies for Egyptian independence and complete British withdrawal from the Nile Valley. situation existed in Egypt at this time.

A curious

The Wafd party,

representing the people's will, could not rule because Egypt's King Pouad I chose men who followed a liberal policy in regard to British interests as his premiers, and the persons officially designated to conclude a treaty with Great Britain could not do so unless they were reasonably sure of Wafd support. The succeeding months saw the rise and fall of several cabinets because of the Anglo-Egypt!an-Wafd enigma.

Sarwat

Pasha was the first to attempt a solution only to fail because of Wafd non-support.

Nahas .Pasha, Wafd leader, followed, but

his highly individualistic air soon alienated King Pouad I, and he was obliged to resign.

Mohammed Mahmud Pasha followed

Nahas, but he met with the same fate as Sarwat Pasha.

Nahas

again headed the Egyptian government, but an Anglo-Egypt!an understanding was still made impossible by the stringency of his demands.

13 In order to understand the sudden change In this impasse, it is necessary that we examine the international picture.

Italy was in the sway of fascism and thirsted for

African colonies.

In 193^., fighting broke out between

Ethiopian and Italian forces; by May, 1936, Italian troops had entered Addis Ababa, and the tragically uneven war came to an end. Italian expansionism in Africa caused considerable British alarm over the possible fate of her East African colonies.

The Blue Nile has its head waters in Ethiopia,

consequently, the disposition of that territory is of vital concern to British policy in the Sudan and Egypt.

In the

face of these circumstances, it would be of great benefit to Britain if she could be sure of Egyptian cooperation and friendship.

Egypt, on the other hand, must have pondered

the advisability of reestablishing herself within a warm friendship with Great Britain.

Both countries were now ready

to make concessions. Nahas Pasha, as head of an Egyptian delegation repre­ senting his nation1s major political parties, met with Sir Miles Lampson, British ambassador to Egypt, in London, and after six months of deliberations, on August 26, 1936, a treaty uniting Egypt and England in an alliance of two sover­ eign nations was signed. The treaty, which is still in effect, provides for a

ll). permanent friendship and an alliance between the signatories. Both members promise not to enter into an agreement with a third party inconsistent with their treaty.

The treaty is

to continue for twenty years before being subject to revision. After this period, revision, in keeping with circumstances, can take place if either power requests it.

Should both

powers desire to change the treaty’s provisions, it can be done after ten years. British military occupation of Egypt was terminated, and the Suez Canal was defined as a universal means of communi­ cations of special value to the British Empire.

Britain was

allowed to maintain air and ground forces in Egypt to secure the canal until such time as Egypt was able to do so.

British

forces can be increased in the event of a national emergency. Egypt agreed to construct certain military installations, and transportation facilities for British troops, and to design her army after that of the British. The Sudan question was not solved by the treaty. Instead the condomium agreement of 1899 was restated.

However,

certain provisions were made to negate causes for possible future disagreement.

The betterment of the Sudanese’s welfare

was made a guiding principle of the signatories, to be imple­ mented by a close coordination between the Governor General of the Sudan and high Egyptian officials. Egypt promised her responsibility for the lives and

15 interests of foreigners, and England pledged her support of Egypt in bringing about the abolition of the capitulatory system.

The two nations exchanged ambassadors, and Egypt

was sponsored by Great Britain for membership in the League of Nations.

Should any difficulty in the interpretation of

the treaty arise, the parties promised to abide by the provisions of the League Covenant.

CHAPTER II POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS On July 31, 1937 9 the newly crowned King of Egypt, Parouk I, as his first duty under the Constitution of 1923* formed a government, and asked Wafd leader Nahas Pasha to act as Premier.

When the new cabinet was announced, the

names of two high ranking Wafd officials were missing.

This

was the first hint that all was not going politically serene within the Wafd.

Nokrashy Pasha and Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha,

formerly Ministers of Communications and President of the Chamber of Deputies, had been excluded from the inner Wafd circle.

f,The . . . two were not always in agreement with

Nahas Pasha and . . . did not hesitate in cabinet meetings to question and oppose the Premier."^ The ill will between the Premier and Nokrashy Pasha had started in 1935 because of the latter* s opposition to the "Blue Shirts"— a kind of youth organization sponsored by Nahas and designed supposedly to encourage athletic training and discipline along military lines.

The young King Parouk,

who was advised by Ahmed Hassaneian Pasha, a moderate with liberal views, also looked with royal disfavor upon Nahas* ffSoldiers of the Wafd.”

This already tense situation reached

its climax when Parouk appointed Aly Maher Pasha, a non-Wafdist New York Times, October 31* 1937* IV 5s8«

17 to the important post of Chief of the Royal Cabinet.

Nahas

Pasha asserted that his authority as Premier was flouted by Aly Maher*s appointment, and asked for a vote of confidence which he received with a majority of 172 votes.

Friction

between the palace and Nahas continued to develop over the question of $195*000 requested by Nahas for secret funds. The kind vetoed the request.

Nahas warned that unless Farouk

reversed his position, the bill would, after ten days, be passed over the royal veto.

Farouk countered with an ultimatum

demanding complete recognition of royal prerogative and the dissolution of the tfBlue Shirts,” or he would ask for Nahas* resignation.

The Premier, backed up by a parliamentary reso­

lution not to support any government from which Nahas pasha was excluded, at first refused the ultimatum, but on December 22, 1937, he offered to change the ”Blue Shirts,” now 2lj.,000 strong, into a boy scouts group.

This tilt over royal

prerogative was finally settled on December 30 when Farouk dismissed his Premier and asked Mahummed Mahmoud Pasha to form a government. Mahummed M. Pasha was President of the Liberal Con­ st! tutionalists, but he headed a cabinet representing every Egyptian political party except the Wafd because of Nahas* refusal to enter a coalition government.

The new Premier

announced Egypt*s determination to keep faith in the AngloEgyptian agreement.

He also moved to dissolve the debatable

18 11Blue Shirts.”

On January 2, 1938, Mahummed Mahmoud Pasha

decided to prorogue the present Wafd controlled parliament and call for new elections.

When Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha, who,

it will be recalled, was formerly in the higher ranks of the Wafd, began reading the kingfs decree, Nahas and his followers created such a disturbance that Dr. Ahmed was obliged to order the Chamber cleared— but to no avail.

Maher ordered the lights

out, and Nahas1 aids lighted matches so their leader could read a statement of non-confidence in the government.

Later

that same evening, Nahas read Dr. Ahmed Maher out of the Wafd executive.

11After all, what happened here in the past few

weeks was only a tussle between Premier Nahas Pasha, seeking dictatorial power, and the democratic Parouk, who despite his youth, would not allow politicians to overstep their bounds, to ignore him, or infringe his royal prerogatives.r,2 King Parouk was desirous of having a cabinet made up of the best men from each party.

However, Mahummed Mahmoud

Pasha considered it politically advisable that he be supported by a predominately Liberal Constitutionalist cabinet.

A new

rift developed between the government and the throne. Mahummed Mahmoud Pasha resigned, but later formed another cabinet which included Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha, former Wafdist, and now, leader of the new Saadist party.

The new eabinet

2 New York Times, January 9> 1938> IV lj.:8.

19 consisted of five seats from each of the Saadist and Liberal Constitutionalist parties and three non-party men.

The

Shaabists, Ittehadists and the Wafdists were not represented. In a letter from the throne, the king asked his second cabinet to follow policies for internal reform and continued trust in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance. Nahas Pasha continued to follow a policy of complete non-participation in the government.

The Wafd asserted that

the British foreign office kept Mahummed Mahmoud in power, and that Britain by so doing was not acting in the spirit of their alliance.

Rumor of a rift between King Parouk and his

Premier added to Mahmoud Pasha1s untenable position. Finally, on August 13, 1939> Mahummed Mahmoud Pasha resigned the premiership because of ill health, and Farouk asked Aly Maher Pasha to form a government.

Premier Aly

Maher’s policies were designed primarily for the social and economic rehabilitation of the Egyptian 11common man.”

In

a speech he said, ”lt is time that something was done for the Egyptian fellaheen laboring classes.

For centuries this

element which forms the bulk of Egypt’s population and con­ stitutes the backbone and soul of the country has been sadly neglected.”3

see his policies put into effect, Aly Maher

Pasha filled cabinet posts with non-party specialists.

3 New York Times, August 1ij., 1939> 5^7*

The

20 new Premierfs initial reforms in Egypt’s foreign and domestic policies indicated a more realistic and constructive approach to his country’s problems.

Egypt’s foreign policy was brought

up to date by an official recognition of the Soviet Union. An international committee was organized to fight the two most serious threats to Egypt’s economic and public health— the cotton worm and bilhazia.

Certain administrational

reforms were made and a national guard was established.

In

short, it seemed as though Egypt, after three years of political floundering following her independence, was finally preparing herself to meet those responsibilities which come with independence.

Unfortunately, however, Aly Maher’s

government was not allowed to see its promising program become effective.

After only one month in office, Aly Maher

was faced with the problem of Egypt’s position in a world at war. On September 3, 1939* the second World War began with England as the principle belligerent against the Axis powers. The question of Egypt’s position, as a party in the AngloEgyptian treaty of alliance, immediately arose.

The Wafd

made its support of the war effort conditional upon England agreeing to the following terms:

(1) Britain’s soldiers

must leave Egypt immediately after the war;

(2) Britain must

promise that as soon as the war ends, she will initiate nego­ tiations for a settlement of the Sudan question;

(3) Egypt

21 must b© present at the peace conference to defend her rights; (Ij.) restitution be made for Egyptian cotton losses suffered as a result of the British blockade, and (5) Egypt is to decide whether martial law shall continue. In the meantime, Aly Maher Pasha tendered his resig­ nation on July 21, l9l|-0.

It is highly probable that this

change in government was brought about because England felt Aly Maher Pasha*s government was lax in its attitude toward the Anglo-Egyptian treaty*

It is known that Parouk I sent a

note to King George VI presumably seeking aid in disposing with Egypt *s cotton crop* The question of whether or not Egypt should enter the war as an active ally of Great Britain against Italy was the reason for grave concern to the Egyptian rulers--especially in view of the fact that in 19^ 0 » the w a r ’s eventual outcome was highly uncertain.

The king conferred with former Egyptian

Premiers, including Nahas Pasha, and debates were carried on in the Egyptian parliament to find a solution.

It was decided

that Egypt would remain a non-belligerent, and conduct her affairs in striet compliance with the terms of the AngloEgyptian treaty of alliance. Seven days after Aly Maher Pasha resigned the Premier­ ship, Parouk appointed Hassan Sabry Pasha, former Egyptian minister to London, to head a coalition cabinet of four Saadists, four Liberal Constitutionalists, one Ittehadist,

22 one nationalist and six non-party men. refused its support.

Again the Wafd

The British government advised that

Adly Maher Pasha*s resignation be succeeded by Nahas Pasha, but Nahas refused to accept the premiership unless King Farouk formed a non-party cabinet to dissolve the parliament and decree new elections.

Farouk refused.

The Saadist party strongly advocated Egypt1s immediate declaration of war on Italy.

Minister of Finance Nokrashy

Pasha said, "We consider that it is our duty to defend our own country against invasion whether it is demanded of us or not.

"4-

Dr. Ahmed Pasha maintained that it was Egypt1s duty

to fight Italy tfregardless of whether we are fully prepared from a military point of view11and that it was "incompatible with national dignity to let Britain shoulder the whole defense b u r d e n . A t

this time, Italian forces had pene­

trated sixty miles into Egyptian territory.

When the Hassan

Sabry government still refused a declaration of war upon Italy, four Saadist cabinet members resigned in protest. On November lij., 194-0» at the opening of the Egyptian parliament, Farouk I bestowed the Grand Collar of Mohammed Ali— Egypt* s highest recognition— upon his Premier.

Following

this ceremony, Hassan Sabry Pasha began reading Farouk*s

New York Times, September 22, 194-0* 28:5» 5 Ibid., 28t5.

23 speech from the throne.

The Premier, overcome by the honor

just paid him, fell dead of apoplexy. The next day, Parouk asked Hussein Sirry Pasha, a non-party man, to form a coalition government. followed its usual policy of non-support.

The Wafd

Nahas also main­

tained that the Anglo-Egyptian treaty had proven harmful to Egypt in-as-much as an enemy of Britain had attacked British forces on Egyptian soil.

He also argued that England, by

assuming the role of Egypt1s defender, had not kept faith in the treaty since the document specifically called for co­ operation between the two countries.

Sirry Pasha followed

the.non-belligerent policy of his predecessor, and again the Saadist members resigned in protest. The Egyptian royal family has always maintained close ties of friendship with Italy*s House of Savoy, and although it is difficult to ascertain the actual sentiments of Farouk, it is safe to say that he found his position in the war far from his liking.

FaroukTs sympathies become even more question

able when one considers that his Premier, Sirry Pasha, was rfviciously anti-British and agressively pro-Italian.tf°

A

successful coordinated prosecution of the war necessitated the British taking high Egyptian authorities into their con­ fidence on certain matters of war strategy.

Shortly after

6 E. Lengyel, Farouk I and The Fellaheen,” United Nations World, 2:28-31, August, 19l}-8.

Sirry Pasha1s appointment as Premier, some very high secret defense plans were found on the body of an Italian staff officer shot down over Egypt.

Sir Miles Lampson, British

ambassador to Egypt, put two and two together and got palace intrigue.

He went to Farouk, and demanded that Sirry Pasha

be replaced by Nahas Pasha; when the king refused, Sir Miles surrounded the palace with tanks.

Farouk is reported to

have said, ,fYou leave me no choice, but I shall never forget. At any rate, on February If, 19lf2, Farouk asked Wafd leader Nahas Pasha to form a cabinet— the first united government since the European War began.

Nahas1 first acts

were to abolish the ministeries of Social Service and Civil Defense and appoint himself Minister of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Supply. of Finance.

Makram Ebeid Pasha was named Minister

Later that same week, Nahas obtained Farouk*s

decree appointing him Military Governor of Egypt with extra­ ordinary powers and calling for new elections. The new Premier declared his government would adhere to the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance, avoid war,, and provide governmental aid to Egypt*s poorer classes.

When

the election returns came in, they gave the Wafd an over­ whelming majority— 2lf6 out of a possible 26If seats.® 7 Ibid., p. 29 . 8 New York Times, March 26, 194-2> 3*5*

25 With a majority in the Egyptian parliament to support his powers as Minister of Interior, Supply, Foreign Affairs, and Military Governor, Nahas Pasha would not suffer any criticism of his government, or dissident attitudes within it.

On April 8, l$J-2> Nahas arrested former Premier Dr. Aly

Maher Pasha "for reasons relating to the safety and security of state.”

During the latter part of the next month, Nahas

reformed his cabinet; when the new cabinet was announced, Makram Ebeid Pasha, Nahas1s long time friend and adviser, was excluded.

Two months later, Nahas expelled Makram Pasha

and nineteen other influential Wafdists from the party. Makram Pasha announced the formation of a new party from twenty-six former parliament members expelled by Nahas. He also issued a black book accusing Nahas of nepotism, theft, and.listing various other charges against the Premier. Nahas1 dictatorial proclivities reached their climax when he ordered the arrest of Makram Ebeid, and other important members of the Egyptian Independent Party for "distributing political propaganda leaflets of a seditious nature."9 During the first week of October 19^ 4-1 an incident occurred which convinced the king of the danger in his Premier1s assumption of power.

On the K ingfs way to the

Mosque to celebrate Ramadan, he saw a poster which read 9 Ibid., May 10, 19I4J4., 9:1^.

,fLong Live Nahas Pasha,rt and/ the king ordered the Director of Public Security to remove it* Nahas, he dismissed the director*

When word of this reached Tension between Nahas and

his king continued until Parouk was obliged to dismiss his swaggering Premier, and ask Ahmed Maher Pasha--brother of the Nahas imprisoned Ali Maher Pasha — to form a new govern­ ment and ’’see Egypt ruled constitutionally."^ Ahmed Maher accused Nahas of setting up concentration camps for political deserters and asserted, dictatorship is now ended.

"This veiled

Within the limits of security we

mean to give back to the people liberty and equality*

I

have ordered the liberation of all prisoners held for political reasons.1’^ Egypt successfully pursued her war time policy of non­ belligerency, and considered her actions within the spirit and letter of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance sufficient evidence of her valuable contribution to the allied cause. When President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill disclosed their plan at the Yalta conference for a United Nations Conference in which only active war participants could sit, the Egyptian government realized that if it was to hope for post-war realization of its claims, Egypt must

J-Q New York Times, October 9> 1944* 12:6. 11 Ibid., October 10, 1944* 6:4.

27 enter the war.

On February 2l\., 19k$ 9

Premier Ahmed Maher

Pasha appeared before the Egyptian parliament to read a Royal declaration of war against Germany and Italy.

On his

way from the Senate to the Chamber of Deputies, he was assassinated by a young pro-Axis lawyer.

King Farouk asked

Saadist leader Mahmoud Nokrashy Pasha to form a government. With the war over, the Egyptian government, goaded by an immature nationalism, followed the precedent of pro­ ceeding regimes--to project the results of its own incompe­ tence upon an outside factor. Egyptian treaty was blamed.

In this instance, the AngloPremier Nokrashy spent the

major part of his time and energy negotiating with Great Britain In order to accomplish a revision of the treaty, or when the conversations appeared unfavorable to Egypt, quieting riots and student demonstrations.

By January of 19^6* It was

evident that Nokrashy1s position was becoming more untenable. Makram Pasha and two other important ministers resigned in protest against the governments harsh handling of student demonstrators.^

The Wafd, the Moslem Brotherhood and a

strongly nationalistic group calling themselves ”Young Egypt” relentlessly attacked the governments policy in regard to the revision negotiations with Great Britain, and demanded that the problem be taken to the United Nations Security

12 New "York Times, January 279 19^4-6> 10si*

28 Council,

Nahas announced his non-support of the government,

nor would he be tfbound by the result of negotiations con­ ducted by weak and irresponsible men.,f-^3

Finally, on

February l6, 19M>, Nokrashy resigned and was succeeded by Ismail Sidky Pasha, Sidky Pasha had neither political affiliation, or qualms to act in a direct and dictatorial manner.

During a

previous ministry, he had suspended Egypt*s constitution and created a parliament favorable to his program.

His appoint­

ment gives us some measure of the seriousness of Egypt*s internal disorders.

Sidky announced his intention to continue

the treaty revision negotiations, and asked for internal reform and peace. By this time, October 1 9 M >$ it was apparent to Sidky that Egypt would have to make concessions if an agreement with England was to be concluded.

However, these concessions

would have to be made by a government which could claim the support of all Egyptians--a coalition government.

On Sep­

tember 12, igij.6, Sidky reshuffled his cabinet to include: Independents, Saadists and Liberal Constitutionalists. However, without Wafd support, the government was still too weak and the Wafd refused to enter the government unless Farouk decreed new elections.

On September 28, 19^6* Premier

13 New York Times, February Ij., 19^4-6* 7 si*

Sidky resigned his office and was succeeded by Sherif Sabry Pasha.

Two days later, Sabry Pasha resigned for thesame

reason, and Sidky returned to the premiership. Thus far, the treaty negotiations had failed to pro­ duce a suitable revision,

so Sidky announced his intention

to go to London for direct negotiations with the British Foreign Secretary.

He returned to Egypt and triumphantly

announced that Egypt would at long last realize her dream of the Unity of the Nile Valley.

When British Prime Minister

Attlee denied in the House of Commons the truthfulness of Sidky*s statements, the Sidky government began to crumple. On December 8, 19^1-6, the Premier resigned, for reasons of ill health, and was succeeded by Nokrashy Pasha. Nokrashy*s second government terminated the treaty negotiations with Great Britain and unsuccessfully presented it3 case before the United Nations Security Council.

When

this unfavorable outcome was realized by Egypt*s fanatical young nationalists, the problem of internal order became very grave.

All the details of this period of intense unrest are

not wholly known since the Egyptian government kept a close censorship over all communications, but it is highly probable that Egypt bordered on open rebellion. Egypt*s failure before the United Nations Security Council caused her young nationalists to feel sullen resent­ ment against the western powers for their not being

sympathetic to Egypt1s cause, and against the Egyptian government for mismanagement of its plea.

When this pre­

disposition for violence was added to the shock of Egypt1s humiliating defeat at Zionist hands in Palestine, Egypt*s nationalistic extremists were spurred to commit fanatical crimes against anyone suspected of not sharing their zeal. Attempts were made upon the lives of Wafd leader Hahas Pasha, and the Vice President of the Saadist party.

Investigations

revealed proof that the Moslem Brotherhood was the chief instigator of a long series of riots, strikes, and assassinations.

demonstrations,

The Moslem Brotherhood was founded

approximately twenty years ago to further a purer Islamic religion, and later became a fanatic order with mystic over­ tone s . I t

is not improbable that the Brotherhood planned

to seize power through the intimidation of authorities.

It

certainly afforded an avenue of resentment to unemployed university students and the lower ranks of the army who saw no chances for future advancement.

It has been estimated

that there were 6,000 members of the Brotherhood in the Egyptian army.

The Egyptian soldier from the war in Palestine,

undoubtedly blamed the government for his ignominious defeat. It is true that the Egyptian government left much to be desired. lij. New~York Times, Eebruary 12, 19^1-9> 26:1.

31 For example, a report based upon the State Auditor General1s investigations of corruption 11to which we can no longer close our eyes” exposed ,!unauthorized exemption from taxes, fees and duties, serious arrears in revenue collec­ tions, improper exploitation of State’s lands, disappearance of important documents, embezzlements and improper purchasing procedures.f,l$

The government also published a long and

tiresome list of police measures used to combat the Brother­ hood.

On November 20, 191-1-8* officials of the Moslem Brother­

hood were arrested, and nine days later, Nokrashy read a decree dissolving the Brotherhood.

On the same day, Nokrashy

was assassinated by a Brotherhood member "because he caused Egypt to lose the Sudan, surrendered Palestine to the Jews and dissolved the Moslem Brotherhood which had been the only organization fighting for Islam in the past twenty years, and to unify the hearts of Egyptians for the glory and prestige of the fatherland.,f^ The new Premier, Ibranin Abdul Hadi Pasha, also from the Saadist party, continued his predecessor’s program of vigorous attacks against the Moslem Brotherhood.

His govern­

ment was also confronted with the appointment of a Palestine peace delegation.

Expediency and past Wafd history ruled

15 IbidT, January llj., 19^7* 17si* 1 6 Ibid., December 29* 19^1-8> 12:$.

that such a body include the Wafd.

Nahas Pasha was agreeable

providing the government filled six cabinet portfolios with Wafdists.

The Premier refused.

The W a f d ’s departure from

tradition can be interpreted in two ways.

Either the Wafd

leaders, having reached political maturity, saw the necessity of Egypt’s presenting a united front in re-establishing domestic peace, and for greater authority in negotiating at the Palestine peace conference, or they knew of the forth­ coming elections and wanted their men in strategic positions for political reasons.

The next election was scheduled to

occur during October, 19^-9• Egypt’s defeat in the Palestine war convinced all thinking Egyptians that the newly formed state of Israel must under the pressure of continued unrestricted Jewish migration inevitably become expansionistic.

Premier Hadi, initiated

measures to increase Egypt’s preparedness.

A program of

national defense, costing huge sums of money, will have far reaching effects upon future Egyptian affairs.

In all

probability, Egypt will abandon many plans for social im­ provement in her haste to become invincible against the new state of Israel.

Whether the government can afford to risk

social disquiet in the face of increasing communistic sympa­ thies, is a problem which must be of grave concern to the Pashas.

One thing is certain, taxes will rise, and the

fellaheen will be further squeezed between the cost of govern­ ment and a depressing standard of living.

33 On July 25> 19^9> 3-n preparation for the coming elections, Hadi resigned in favor of Hussein Sirry Pasha, Independent, who headed a coalition cabinet of Wafdists, Saadists, Constitutional Liberals, Nationalists and Inde­ pendents.

This cabinet can hardly be described as being

unified, in the Western sense of the word.

It was formed

because the various party heads wanted to be present to make certain his political opponent did not take undue advantage of his official position, rather, than from their desire to create conditions under which a truly free expression of the people*s will could be heard.

The increase in Egypt *s popu­

lation necessitated a proportionate increase in the Chamber of Deputies from 261}. to 319 seats.1?

^ bitter argument over

the drawing up of voting districts ensued, and this experiment at working together failed.

On November 3* 19lj-9> the coalition

cabinet fell, and Sirry Pasha formed an all Independent cabinet to conduct the elections set for January, 1950. The Wafd Party received 71 per cent of the popular vote and a majority of 63 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. It is a tribute to the honesty of Sirry Pasha that the Wafd won since it was a foregone conclusion that the great masses of Egyptians would continue to support Nahas Pasha as the heir of the illustrious Zaghlul Pasha.

17 New York Times, January 12, 1950,

3k

The elections also revealed the first political signs of the socio-political changes going on -in Egypt.

For the

first time in Egypt1s history, the Socialist party was able to seat a representative in the Chamber of Deputies.

Even

though the vote of one man cannot possibly have any conse­ quence, his actions and words will have considerable importance. The Wafd has been given an extraordinary opportunity to make its term in office one of the most eventful and progressive periods in Egypt*s modern history.

By concluding

a new treaty with Great Britain, Egypt can fulfill a role which will mean tranquility not only for Egypt, but for the whole Arab region.

Egypt*s internal affairs present the

greatest challenge to the Wafd.

Land reforms, a program for

industrialization, various public works, and the social services will demand positive governmental leadership.

If

the Wafd is mature enough to look above personal politics, which it has been unable to do in the past, and act, it can initiate a new era for Egypt.

CHAPTER III EGYPT AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR On September 3* 1939* the Kingdom of Great Britain declared war ■upon Germany.

Egypt’s immediate concern was

the question of her obligations to Great Britain as defined by the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance.

According to the

terms of the treaty, article seven, Should . . , either of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in war, the other High Contracting Party will . . . immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally. The aid . . . will consist in furnishing to his Majesty the King and Emperor on Egyptian terri­ tory, in accordance with the Egyptian system of admini­ stration and legislation the use of his ports, aerodromes and means of communications. It will accordingly be for the Egyptian Government to take all the administrative and legislative measures, including the establishment of martial law and an effective censorship, necessary., to render these facilities, and assistance effective. Article five of the treaty states, ,fEach of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to adopt in relation to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the Alliance . . . It should be noticed that these terms do not require Egypt to enter the war as an active belligerent. treaty obligations are:

Egypt’s

(1) to sever diplomatic relations

with the enemy of Great Britain, and (2) to allow British Collection of Documents, ’’Egypt-Sudan,,f Cairo: Government Press, 1957* P» 22. 2 Ibid., p. 21.

36

forces to use Egyptian ports and aerodromes,3 In compliance with these provisions, the Egyptian government proclaimed the nation to be in a state of siege, evoked martial law to be enforced by military courts, and placed a censorship code over all communications.

On June

10, 19^0, Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Italy, and on the day

following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, Egypt

also broke

relations with that country.

The Axis knew that victory depended upon their offen­ sive being swift and massive enough to paralyze the foe. Continental Europe had succumbed to these tactics, and Great Britain was next in this precision conflict.

After many

months of being bombed, England gave no indication of di­ minishing her indomitable will to withstand the best Germany’s Luftwaffe could offer.

Chancellor Hitler found it necessary

to modify his grand strategy and prepare for a prolonged war. This meant Germany must avail herself of the vast mineral, food, and oil supplies to be found in Africa and the Near East.

f,He

has proved

has struck at itsheart in Britain, but that heart to be unshakable.

Now he intends to assault its

most important nerve center in and around Egypt.

By bringing

the Near East under German control, a mortal blow would be struck against Great Britain’s Empire defense system.’1^* 3 Raoul Aglion, War In The Desert, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 19^1)* P* 106. E. W. Poison Nev/man, "Egypt and the War," Contemporary Review, 158:1^91» November, 19^0.

37 After Mussolini completed his vicious ffstab in the ’ back11 of the already enerverated Prance, he was assigned the task of taking Egypt.

“Hitler and Mussolini, by a gigantic

pincer movement from the Balkans and Russia in the north, and from Africa in the west, tried to win over the Arab states, seize the Suez Canal and get control of the richest petroleum reserves in the w o r l d . I f Egypt were successfully taken, Italy would have immediate relief from the British blockade of East Africa and a way for Germany to regain control of a

Tanganyika would be opened. On September 12, 194-0* Italian forces under the command of Marshal Graziani began their invasion of Egypt from the Libyan frontier.

Great Britain’s Near Eastern forces were

under the command of General Wavell.

“General Wavell realized

that at that time he could not openly stand against the in­ vader.

He withdrew his troops slowly,

the advancing enemy.“7

constantly harassing

The British commander continued to

withdraw until Marshal Graziani reached Sidi-Barrani, sixty miles beyond the Libyan-Egyptian border and there he paused long enough to rest his forces and receive supplies.

s. B. Fay , “The Arab League,” Current History, 13:82-87 9 August, 194-76 E. W. Poison Newman, “Egypt and the War,“ Contemporary Review, 158:4-89* November, 194-0. 7 Aglion, 0£. cit., p* 14-5*

Meanwhile, Italian aircraft bombed Alexandria, Cairo and the Suez Canal. At this stage in our study, it is well that we examine the types of psychological warfare used upon the Arab popu­ lations in the Middle East.

The Arab world was the target

of propaganda campaigns from: Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Great Britain, Prance, and the United States.

We shall deal

separately with the efforts of each of these nations. Germany.

To be effective, propaganda must capitalize

upon the immediate psychological peculiarities of the subject by convincing him of your sympathy for his unique problems and aspirations. it to the utmost.

Germany realized this canon and exploited At this time, the Arabic nations were

strongly anti-Zionist and therefore, anti-Semitic.

Dr. Goebels

claimed Germany to be the champion of the Islamic cause.

Had

not Germany entered into an inhuman pogrom against the Jews? Radio Berlin made the usual accusations of: "greedy imperialism ,11 "scheming partners," "untrustworthy, perfidious and decadent individuals,” "dollar imperialism,” and supporter of Zionism against the United States and Great Britain. Britain was also blamed for the inflation and high taxes current in the Arabic states.

Assertions that the British

navy was "an old and worn out museum piece" were repeated. Russian communism and Jews were associated, and the French were declared to b© to tool of all.

Germany*s propaganda efforts in Turkey were very active and have been described thus:

"The propaganda activi­

ties of no other nation— Allied or Axis— in the entire Middle East was as multiform, as thorough, as well organized, and as expensive as those of the Germans in Turkey.11®

Turkish news­

papers were furnished with German press services, books, films, and pamphlets were distributed with a lavish hand. Parties for doctors and professors, and scholarships for their students were part of this generous campaign. In general, Germany1s radio propaganda was character­ ized by music high in entertainment value and all with a strong emotional tinge.

The objective was to inspire open rebellion

against the Allied powers. Italy. Arab world.

Radio Bari beamed Mussolini’s message to the

England was again posed as being an imperialist

with the Puce in the role of the protector of the beautiful Islamic culture. place.

Anti-Semitism was also given a prominent

This rather monotonous echoing of radio Berlin was

sweetened with poetry and music. Japan.

Nippon attempted to convince the Moslem Nations

that her culture and their*s were essentially aesthetically the same.

The spiritual qualities of Islam were identified

6 Seth Arsenions, "Wartime Propaganda in the Middle East,” The Middle East Journal, 2:1^27 •

]}.o with those of Japan and both must battle the gross materialism of the West*

Asia for Asiatics was expanded to include Islam

for Mohammedans.

The Japanese programs lacked entertainment

value and were aloof, pedantic and bookish. Axis propaganda had as its liet-motif the greed and imperialism of the democracies and the beneficience of their cause for Islam. Great Britain.

The British Broadcasting Corporation

limited its propaganda to reliable news releases and talks by Arab scholars.

These programs were described as being

"dull and unimaginative,"9 but later, music and other more entertaining media were used to good advantage. United States. informative newscasts.

The basis of American propaganda were An effort was made to acquaint the

Arabs with the American way of life by describing the history and function of American political, social, economic and religious institutions.

The American radio refrained from

arguing with the Axis over their charges of American dollar imperialism; instead, America*s treatment of the Philippines, in grating them independence, was used to discredit the Axis1 charge s .

Russia.

Russian propaganda first limited itself to

reporting war news with little comment.

Later, the Russian

broadcast became more critical of the politics current in Turkey and Iran.

In Iran, for example, the views of the

editors of leftist newspapers were supported, and occasionally, the official governments were attacked. France.

The French radio stations located at Rabat,

Algiers, Tunis and Brazzaville designed its propaganda with strict regard to the French political situation in Worth Africa.

The greater part of broadcast time was spent in

defending France against charges made by the Italian Propa­ gandists. The fall of France gave the Nazis tremendous propaganda a d v a n t a g e . T h e German army*s high degree of efficiency in sweeping across Europe added convincing proof to Axis charges of Western decadence.

It is probably true that many of Egypt*s

Pashas found that they preferred the fascistic negation of the individual to the democratic ideal of the four freedoms. On the other hand, the fellah was enticed to revolt against his landlord with promises of land.

When questioned as to

why he remained in Alexandria, or Cairo during the Italian air raids, a landlord replied, MI*d rather face bombs than my fellaheen .11

Indeed, in certain districts the fellaheen

10 Ibid., p. 14-17.

had made plans for the distribution of his Pasha*s estate* In Sidi-Barrani, the Italian and British armies were preparing for the battle which would decide the fate of Egypt i

and perhaps even the war.

Fighting began on December 10, and

ended two days later with a complete British victory.

Admi­

ral Sir Andrew Brown Cunningham, commanding the British Medi­ terranean fleet, and General Wavell had worked effectively together to achieve victory in the face of numerical enemy superiority.

General Wavell continued the destruction of

Italian positions in North Africa, and after the fall of SidiBerrani, on December 11, 194-2* Bardia fell on January £, 1943» and Tobruk on January 22, Berna on January 30, and finally Benghazie on February 6 . ^ British arms had been successful, but Egypt was to know another invasion before the w a r ’s end.

The German General,

Erwin Rommell, commanded two German tank divisions, a German infantry division, a German frontiers group, and the remnants p

of the Italian army including an Airete division. 1

The

newly created British Eighth Army under General Auchinleck opposed Rommel. of Graziani’s.

General Rommel’s tactics were the reverse Where the Italian commander scattered his

strength in the form of holding units along the African coast, 11 Aglion, 0£. cit., p. 26l. 12 Edgar Mclnnis, The War, Press, 1944)* vol. 3, p. 27*

(New York: Oxford University

Rommel kept his striking force in tact and highly mobile. His strategy was to attack and withdraw using his tank and air power to the best advantage. On January 22, 19lp2, General Rommel launched his counter offensive in Libya; by July 1, the Afrika Korps had reached El Alamein.

By this time, the German forces had

suffered heavy losses in tank and air power— the very factors which enabled their spectacular recovery of territory lost by

G r a z i a n i , ^

Meanwhile, the British Eighth Army was re­

ceiving a steady flow of material through the Suez Canal region.

On October 23, the Afrika Korps was turned back at

a terrific battle of machines at El Alamein, and the British army-began their offensive.

On November 11, 19^2, the

superior Army of the Nile pierced the Axis defenses and sent Rommel in full retreat.

By the twelfth of November,

the enemy was once again pushed out of Egypt. It remains for us to consider some of the possible reasons why Egypt chose to remain a non-belligerent in spite of two invasions of her territory by the Axis powers.

Perhaps

the most obvious reason was the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of Alliance.

Since the treaty1s provisions did not specifically

call for Egypt1s active participation with Great Britain in a war against a third power, Egypt chose to act according to

13 Ibid., vol. 4-, p. 27*

the treaty*s provisions and rely upon British forces to protect her.

The fact that Egypt had not had an aetive

army since 1898, and that the Egyptian army existing in

19^2 was considered unfit for extensive military service would have made Egypt*s contribution to the war effort of doubtful v a l u e . ^

Egypt*s entry into the war would have

offered the Axis a reason to bomb the highly concentrated population areas around Cairo and Alexandria. would have been terrible in the extreme.*^

The panic

The great masses

of Egyptians do not think of their homeland as including the waste desert

regions, therefore, the war along the Libyan

frontier did

not psychologically prepare them to fight.

Farouk*s declaration of war might have been construed, by the suspicious Egyptian, to be an example of British inter­ ference.^

From the British point of view, the psychological

effect upon the Arab of seeing the British war effort partly in behalf of the Arab nations would greatly enhance allied prestige.

It can be seen from these reasons that Egypt best

assisted the allies by remaining a non-belligerent while ob­ serving the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. li-i- A. El din, "inside Egypt," Current History, 53:32-

3I4-, June, 19^1 • 15 Loc. cit. 16 p. Crabites, "Farouk I and the Egyptians," Common­ weal, 3V. 29I4--297, JulT 18 > 19lp-*

In appraising Egypt *s contribution to the allied war effort Winston Churchill said in a speech: The Egyptian troops have during the war played an important part. They have maintained order through­ out the Delta and guarded many strong points and depots and in all kinds of ways have been of assis­ tance to our war effort. We have had every facility from the Egyptians under our treaty of alliance . . . in a manner we rightfully deem most effective. Egypt is an associate power and she should take her place as a future member of the world organization as one of its founders. . .17

17 Hew York Times, February 28, 19^5* 15*3*

CHAPTER IV ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS According to the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance, article sixteen, "negotiations may be entered into at any time after the expiration of a period of ten years, with the consent of both High Contracting Parties."^Shortly after the end of the second World War, Wafd leader, Nahas Pasha, began a policy of urging the various Egyptian *

governments to initiate treaty revision negotiations,

Nahas

Pasha contended that Great Britain had not acted according to the treaty1s terms when she assumed the role of Egypt’s pro­ tector during the second World War when the treaty specified that the two states should act as allies.

On January 27>

194-6* the British government handed Egypt a note stating that it would hold a Tlfriendly attitude"^ toward proposed negotiations.

The British government expressed the desire

of examining the treaty "in light of the lessons of the *3 second World W a r . The British government established a policy to which it was consistently to adhere throughout the entire period of negotiations when on January 30, 194-6, it stated 1 Collection of Documents, ment Pres"s7 19^*7 , P • 3 ?

Egypt-Sudan ,11 Cairo: Govern­

^ ^ew York Times, January 28, 194-6* 3:2. 3 Ibid., January 31* 194-6, 10:2.

His Majesty*s Government • . . take leave to ob­ serve that one of these lessons was the essential soundness of the fundamental principles on which the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 193& was based . . . His Majesty*s Government declare themselves willing to undertake with the government of Egypt a review of treaty arrangements. . . on a footing of full and free partnership as between equals.hThere followed a period of about twenty-four days during which political confusion and student riots wracked Egypt.

The Wafd announced that it would not accept the re­

sponsibility of forming a government unless the British agreed beforehand, to evacuate Egypt and guarantee complete unity of the Nile Valley.

Student riots proved to be a serious matter.

The wanton destruction of life and property evoked harsh eriti cism of Egypt from members of the British parliament. for the Cairo riots, these are nothing new.

nAs

They recur in

eyeles . . . Gratitude is not always an Egyptian quality, yet we saved that country from invasion and despoliation, making her rich and leaving her untouched by enemy actions.,f^

The

Prime Ministers of both governments made speeches before their parliaments in which they denied responsibility for the riots. The British government sent a sharp note demanding: on demonstrations,

(1) a ban

(2 ) punishment of responsible persons, and

(3) compensation for British property destroyed in the

k- New York Times, January 31* 19-^6, 10:2. 5 Ibid., March 2^, 19I4.6 , VI p. 18.

Lj.8 disturbances.

The Egyptian’s reply stated that demonstrations

had already been banned, and that persons of proven guilt would be punished.

However, Cairo insisted that the question

of compensations would have to await full inquiry since Egypt was due certain compensations from Great Britain. On the thirty-first of March, Sir Ronald Campbell, British ambassador to Egypt, paid a formal call on Premier Sidky Pasha; on the same day Makram Pasha met with other members of Egyptfs treaty delegation to map plans for the negotiations.

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin an­

nounced that he would head the British delegation during the final stages of the negotiations.

This announcement was

interpreted in Egypt as Premier Sidky Pasha’s second victory. The first being the replacement of Lord Killearn by Sir Ronald Campbell as Britain’s ambassador to Egypt.

To the

Egyptians, Lord Killearn symbolized the old regime. On May the seventh, three days before the formal con­ vention of the treaty delegates, Great Britain offered to withdraw all her forces from Egyptian soil within two years if Egypt would agree to a military alliance calling for mutual assistance ,fin time of war, or the immediate threat of war ,11^ and if the Egyptian government would permit the location of British troops at certain strategic locations. h New York Times, May 18, 19^i-6, 2:6.

In any event,

k-9 Britain committed herself to withdraw her troops from Cairo, Alexandria, and the Delta region by July, 19I4.6 . Underlying this policy is the deep conviction that in this new age of nationalism when former Tbackward 1 peoples are fast surging upward toward political m a ­ turity and violently demanding sovereignty and inde­ pendence, the British empire can only be held together by turning it loose.7 The f,British government . . . put social and political cono sideration ahead of strict strategic factors.” The problem of meeting Egypt 1s demands for complete evacuation of Egyptian territory within twelve months had grave consequences for the defense of the British Empire. The Suez Canal had long been the cornerstone of its defense system, and no British government would dare relinquish con­ trol of that vital area without first insuring itself certain safeguards.

It was these assurances that would be embodied

in the proposed Anglo-Egyptian military alliance.

Egypt

flatly refused to comply on the grounds that she had fully demonstrated her ability to defend her territory in the war just past.

W* E. Beckett, legal adviser to the British

delegation said, ftIs has almost come down to a case of Egypt *s asking to be excused from the British empire defense system . . Since Egypt and the Suez Canal are the pivots of the British defense position in the Middle East, such an attitude is a

^ ^ew York Times, May 18, 19M>, 2:6. 8 Loc. cit.

serious matter for the Empire,"9

British firmness on this

issue was expressed by Foreign Secretary Bevin*s explanation of the British position before the House of Commons, "There is one thing I will give assurance on.

I will be no party

to leaving a vacuum . • . that is if we are gone and there is nothing there--no regional defense and no organization to take its place— that I can never agree to."*^ In the negotiations from June until September, England attempted to satisfy Egyptian sovereignty and at the same time secure British positions in the Middle East and justify her presence in the Sudan.

Britain first attempted to obtain

a military alliance calling for joint effort in the event any Middle Eastern state were attacked.

Egypt took the position

that her help should not be forthcoming unless adjacent territories--Libya, or Palestine— were attacked,

Britain* s final

terms on this point were a joint defense council convened by mutual consent, instead of by unilateral request,

Britain

also agreed to evacuate Egyptian soil within two to three years.

The Egyptians would not agree to any time greater

than twelve months.

The Egyptian delegation also demanded

that the phrase "Unity of the Nile Valley"‘be inserted in the new treaty*s protocol, but the British preferred to separate 9 New York Times, June 2, 19M>, 10 Hansard* s Parliamentary Debates, H, C. DEB, 5s, Vol. i\Z 3, p. 766.

51 the Sudan question from the other issues, and to consider it at a later date* The political situation in Egypt was far from favor­ able to successful negotiations.

The Wafd found a splendid

opportunity to embarrass Sidky Pasha*s government by clamoring for the full realization of Egypt*s aims, and if this was not forthcoming, the severance of relations with Britain and relief sought in the United Nations Security Council.

The

Moslem Brotherhood was equally fanatically zealous for the ?1Unity of the Nile Valley ,11 and demonstrated with numerous anti-British riots and bombings. On September 12, 1 ^ 6 ,

Premier Sidky Pasha obtained a

decree from his king to form a new, and stronger government made up of:

Independents, Saadists, and Liberals, but when

this design failed, he resigned his office on September 28. It is probable that Sidky sought some means whereby he could form a government which would include the Wafd.

With this

support he could modify Egypt *s demands, and effect a com­ promise with G-reat Britain.

His resignation could also be

interpreted as a maneuver which would place the responsibility of ending the negotiations upon the British government. Parouk I asked his uncle, Sherif Sabry Pasha, to form a government, Sabry declined, however, when he saw the im­ possibility of including the Wafd in a proposed coalition New ~York Times, September 29 » 19M>, 3lpl*

52 government, and the king recalled Sidky to the Premiership, Early in October, Sidky Pasha proposed that the f#. .. . nego­ tiations be transferred from the quarrelsome political scene in Cairo to the calmer atmosphere of London”

where he

could talk directly with Foreign Minister Bevin.

M r » Bevin

said he would be glad to talk with the Egyptian Premier from October 17 until October 25Sidky Pasha returned to Cairo on October 25 and joyously announced that he had consummated a new treaty with Great Britain which provided for the complete withdrawal of Britain* s troops from Egyptian soil within twenty-seven months, and the recognition, in principle, of Egypt *s right to the Sudan. In London, meanwhile, questions were being asked in the House of Commons concerning Sidky Pasha’s stunning an­ nouncements.

Prime Minister Attlee explained that Sidky*s

statements were ,fpartial and misleading” and that Mno change in the existing status quo and administration of the Sudan was contemplated and there is no impairment of the Sudanese peoples* right to decide their own future.”-^3 Meanwhile, Sidky Pasha presented what were to be Britain’s last concessions to the Egyptian treaty delegation. 12 Hew York Times, October 5, 19^6, 2:8. 13 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, H. G. DEB. 5s, Vol. ij-28, p. 295-

England promised to withdraw completely from Egypt within three years, and to recognize Egyptian sovereignty— in nomineover the Sudan, but the Condomium of 1888 was to remain effec­ tive until the Sudanese could select their own form of govern­ ment, any nature of which would be acceptable to the British. The proposed Anglo-Egyptian joint defense council would be empowered to order Egypt into an alert only, delegation found these terms unacceptable.

Egypt’s treaty Sabry Pasha and

Makram Pasha headed the opposition declaring that three years were too long, and that the new treaty represented no funda­ mental change in the Sudan.

Sidky Pasha was convinced that

Britain had made her last concessions and seemed opposed to submitting the question to the United Nations Security Council He asked for, and received, a royal decree dissolving the treaty delegation, and sought a vote of confidence from the Chamber of Deputies*

However, when it was learned that the

public was to be barred from entering the Chamber‘during the treaty discussions, three members refused to vote and fiftyfour others walked out. Public feeling in Egypt was aroused to the point of numerous anti-British riots, bombings and mass student demon­ strations against Sidky*s government.

The most secret pro­

posals, while negotiations were still on a conversational level, had leaked out from the delegation, and were used by the Wafd and Moslem Brotherhood to incite students, and the

other petty bourgeois© to riot*

It had been this tense

atmosphere that led Sidky to suggest London as more con­ ducive to deliberations.

To add to the furor, Nahas Pasha

announced that he would lead the Wafd in organizing a nation­ wide campaign against the Sidky-Bevin treaty, but the decree of December 1 stopped it.

The two major Sudanese political

parties, both claiming to represent the Sudanese, sent dele­ gations to London during the Sidky-Bevin conversations. Finally, seeing his efforts frustrated, Sidky resigned his office on December 8 , for reasons of ill health. The day following Sidky*s resignation, Farouk asked Saadist leader Mahmoud Fahmy Nokrashy Pasha to form a govern­ ment.

Nokrashy Pasha was described as being ” . . . efficient

shrewd and trustworthy . . .

a bitter foe of student actions.”

In an address to the Egyptian parliament, Nokrashy committed his government to the policies of its predecessor in regard to internal disturbances, and in its attitude toward Great Britain. Two events heightened Egyptian suspicion of England. Sir Hubert Huddleston, Governor General of the Sudan, let it be known that, "Continued silence by the Sudan government in the face of one-sided interpretations which aroused the feelings of a large section of the Sudanese people would have ^4- New York Times, December 10, 19^4-6, l5sl*

resulted in serious unrest if not worse,!t and that ”. . . all the British government are endeavoring to do is to establish that, when the time is ripe for the Sudanese to choose their future, they shall be free to say . . . that they choose the status of an independent state,” or union with Egypt.

. . they may choose

Sir Huddleston* s position was supported -i /I

by Prime Minister Attlee. °

Later during December when the

office of G-rand Cadi (Chief religious official) became vacant, the Governor General appointed a Sudanese instead of an Egyptian incumbent.

The Egyptian Premier interpreted these

remarks and actions as 11direct encouragement” by the British of the Sudanese to separate themselves from Egypt.

On January

27, 194-7, Nokrashy Pasha announced the breaking off of negotiations with Britain and his government^ intention to take the problem to the United Nations Security Council.^ At this point it is interesting to note what really occurred between Bevin and Sidky pasha during their London meeting.

The British took the position that provision for the

Sudanese self-determination should appear in the protocol of the proposed treaty.

Sidky Pasha is reported to have said,

”No, that really is not necessary.

After all, it is well

3-5 New~York Times, December 10, 194-^, 15:1. 16 Ibid., January 1, 194-7, 3ij.:5. 17 Ibid., January 27, 194-7, 8:4-

recognized that every people has its right to liberty, and anyway this in principle is sanctioned in article seventythree of the San Francisco charter.

Mr. Bevin agreed

with Sidky, but insisted that the conversation be published with the minutes of the meeting. are:

In brief, the two positions

British— full right of self-determination for the Sudan­

ese; Egyptian— right of Sudanese self-determination so long as the determining is done while under the Egyptian crown. Serious misgivings as to Egypt*s possibilities of success before the.United Nations Security Council were ex­ pressed by some of Egypt*s leaders.

Sidky Pasha urged the

resumption of negotiations based upon his discussions with British Foreign Secretary Bevin.

The fact that the United

States had not as yet expressed sympathy for the Egyptian position caused considerable doubt as to how it would vote in the case.

Some of the Middle Eastern nations expressed

anxiety over their security if the United Nations Security Council should rule in Egypt*s favor, and British forces were withdrawn as a consequence.

Iraq, for one, being so near the

Soviet border, was reluctant to see this happen.

There was

always the question of the effect of Soviet propaganda upon the impoverished Egyptian masses should the Soviet Union support Egypt.

19

lb N e w "York Times, January 25* 19^7 $ 6:2. 19 Ibid., January i|., 19^7> 5:5*

Nokrashy Pasha said the negotiations had broken down because Egypt wanted immediate evacuation of British forces from all of Egypt and the Sudan* The Egyptian leader held that, MEgypt is in a better position and more anxious than Great Britain to prepare for the self-government of the people of the same race, the same religion and dependent for their 20 way of existence on the same Nile.”

Prime Minister Attlee

denied in the House of Commons that negotiations had broken down over complete and immediate evacuation of Egypt and the Sudan, or the maintenance of Nile Valley unity, but the real reason was the w . . . endeavor of the English government to construe one phase of the protocol on the Sudan as meaning they (the Sudanese) could rely upon the support of His Majesty*s government not to deny to the Sudanese complete freedom of choice when the time came for them to choose their future s t a t u s . T h e

British government made it clear that

negotiations could still be resumed, and continued to de­ commission its installations in Cairo, Alexandria and the Delta area.

Britain also said it would not object to Egypt*s

placing the question before the United Nations Security Council*

Secretary Bevin explained his government*s position

before the House of Commons: 20 New York Times, March ij., 19^7* 5 j5*

Vol.

2lHansard*s Parliamentary Debates, H. C. DEB. j?s, P • Hip-*

58 His Majesty*s Government must maintain continuing interest in that area if only because our economic and financial interests in the Middle East are >pf vast importance to us and to other countries as well . . • If those interests were lost to us the effect on the life of this country.would be a considerable . reduction in the standard of living, I care not whether they take this to the Security Council or • anywhere e l s e . 22 On May 18, 1937* Nokrashy announced- that he would personally head Egypt’s delegation to the United Nations. He arrived in New York on July 23. On July 11, Egypt, using the authority granted under articles thirty-five and thirty-seven of the United Nations Organization Charter (disputes likely to endanger inter­ national peace and security) placed its case before the Security Council and requested the council to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 193&.,

The British representatives

asked the council for a brief delay to enable Britain to assemble her experts.on the issue, and the date for the council’s consideration was set for August 5* 19^-7* The entire Anglo-Egyptian question is contained in the different views the disputants take toward the nature of the contract.’ The Egyptians charged that the Condomium between Egypt and Britain of 1888, and -the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of

1936 were both null and void by reasons of non-adherence on the part of the Sudanese and Egyptians.

On a still more

22 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, H. C. DEB. 5s., Vol. I4 .3 7 > p. 1984.

59 philosophical plane, Egypt held that the 1936 treaty was entirely unfitted to the contemporary context of world con­ ditions and was, therefore, void. in the Egyptian case were:

Specifically, the points

(1) when the Condomium of 1888

was concluded, Egypt was under Turkish suzerainity thus making her ineligible to treat with another country,

(2 ) the conquest

of the Sudan was made under the name of the Khedive of Egypt, (3) the Sudan was under Turkish suzerainity until November 5* 19li|-j therefore, Egypt could not conclude a treaty with that country,

(I4.) the Condomium grants equal rights to England and

Egypt, however, that country,

Britain has monopolized the administration of

(p) the conditions which led to the Anglo-

Egyptian Treaty of 1936 no longer exist,

(6 ) the treaty is

contrary to the Charter of the United Nations,

(7) the dis­

armaments resolution of the G-eneral Assembly supersede the 1936 t r e a t y . ^

The Egyptians also stressed the natural and

historical unity of the Nile River Valley, and presented con­ vincing statements by leading Englishmen to support this claim.

Outstanding of these men is Winston Churchill who

wrote-, H . . .'the Sudan is joined to Egypt by the Nile, as a diver is connected with the surface by his air pipe.

23 On December 13* 19^6, the General assembly recom­ mended 11the withdrawal . . . of forces stationed in the territories of members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter. . .,f

6o Without it there is only suffocation,

*Aut Nilus, aut Nihli,.n^-

The British case rested upon the essential legality of the condomium and Anglo-Egyptian Treaty*

Britain also

maintained that EgyptTs two basic demands— total evacuation of British troops from Egypt and the Sudan, and the termi­ nation of the present administrative system in the Sudan would be satisfied when the Anglo-Egyptian treaty expired in 1956. Britain explained that the reason for the presence of British troops on Egyptian territory was because Egypt is a communi­ cations center, consequently, British personnel had to be stationed there in order to hasten the British Empire*s return to a peacetime status.

Perhaps the most telling argument

against Egyptian assertions that foreign troops infringed upon sovereignty were examples of American troops in Panama, the Philippine Islands and on British leased Atlantic bases, and Soviet troops stationed at Port Arthur.

As far as the

unity of the Nile Valley was concerned, carried to its logical limit, Egypt could lay claim to Uganda and Ethiopia.

The

British asserted that the preparation of the Sudanese for eventual self-government was an example of 11constructive im­ perialism. fl^ On August 20, 19J4-7 , the representative from Brazil 2 k Winston Churchill, The River War (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1933 )> P* !•

25 New York Times, August li|_, 19^7 > 5s!•

6i suggested, ’’This case is a political problem involving juridical aspects” and that a United Nations Security Council decision would be ’’fragmentary, unilateral and frought with the possibility of error.

In view of this fact, he pro­

posed that the entire issue be handled by the World Court. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Prance, and the United States voted for the Brazilian proposal; Poland, Russia, and Syria voted against it.

Colombia, had she voted for the

Brazilian suggestion would have closed the case, but she chose to submit a new proposal.

Colombia suggested that a

compromise be reached between the disputants, and recommended the immediate resumption of .negotiations for the earliest possible British evacuation of Egypt, and the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between the two nations for the protec­ tion of the Suez Canal.

Colombia also recommended that the

Condomium of 1888 be rescinded in the interest of Sudanese self-determination.

Egypt and Great Britain were to keep the

United Nations Security Council i n f o m e d as to the progress of their negotiations.

The United States was the only nation

to support the Colombian proposal providing the provision for a treaty be omitted.

Belgium, Prance and the United States

and Australia, supported Belgium when the latter reentered Brazil’s suggestion.

Prance and Australia thought the Sudanese

should be consulted. ^

New "York Times, August 2 7 , 19^4-7> 11:2.

62 The council voted to adjourn until the ninth of September when it would again resume study of the question, China made the last significant proposal on the eleventh of September calling for the resumption of negotiations and evacuation of British troops.

When this proposal failed to

receive the required number of votes, the council became deadlocked.

The Anglo-Egyptian question remains an open

issue. On the tenth of Eebruary, 19^4-8* ^-n London at a meeting commemorating Faroukfs birthday, Foreign Secretary Bevin ex­ pressed belief in the soundness of Anglo-Egyptian relations, "The only thing now is how to achieve equality, with no risk to the defense of your country or to our communications.

We

will enter into a mutual obligation together and we will carry them out with honor and dignity,"^7

The Egyptian am­

bassador to Great Britain, Abdul Fattah Amr, replied, "Egypt and Great Britain have fundamentally so much in common that an agreed solution ultimately will prevail,

27 Hew "York Times, February 11, 19^8* 15*3 28 Loc* cit.

CHAPTER V EGYPT AND THE PALESTINE PROBLEM At some future date, a historian might well regard the twentieth century as an epoch of intra-cultural conflict for Western civilization regardless of where it existed upon the earth.

The historian, after surveying the sequence of

terrible wars in modern times might even conclude that during the nineteenth andtwentieth centuries, Western civilization was a victim of intellectual poverty to such a degree that its adherents were unable to reconcile, what will seem to him, the simplest differences of human nature.

But when he is

confronted with the data on racial disputes and the sad manner in which they were handled, he will become convinced of his theoryfs validity.

With regard to the problem of the Jew,

the plain.facts are that Western civilization failed to absorb the Jewish culture, and in a paraoxiysim of defeat, ruthlessly ejected the entire problem into the lap of another culture-the Islamic. History tells us that when two different cultures are brought into intimate contact, two things usually happens (1) there is a tense period of mutual appraisal, during which time wars are common, and (2) both cultures undergo changes prompted by the other.

Today, Egypt and Israel might properly

be considered as being in the first phase of their joint

history.

The problem has many more implications than a casual

glance may reveal— especially for Egypt.

Egypto-Islamic

culture is, in general, less energetic and therefore not as technologically advanced as the Israelian culture which is wholly Western with the exception of certain religious prac­ tices.

This, unfortunately, tends to put Egypt on the

defensive, thereby directing her attention outwardly instead of upon the many serious problems which assail her from within. On the other hand, the presence of Israel might well stimulate the Islamic culture to make many economic and sociological reforms which, from the Western standpoint, are urgently needed.

By so doing, Islam could become a positive and

dynamic factor in world history. The genesis of this problem occurred in early nine­ teenth century Europe, when anti-Semitism was once again plaguing peoplefs minds.

Europe>s Jews, proud of their

cultural past and confusing its relationship with their un­ deniably great contribution to Western civilization, reacted to anti-Semitism by rallying around Jewish culture and life. In 1855> Jewish nationalism took steps to realize its dream of a Jewish homeland, and founded a colony at Acre.

Twenty-

six years later, Baron Edmond d fRothschild established the Jewish Colonizing Association to facilitate Jewish migration to Palestine.

Prom this time until the advent of the first

World War, a sufficient number of Jews had accumulated in

65 Palestine to constitute a powerful element in the Near East* VS/hen the first World War was declared and Turkey joined the Central powers, Great Britain, as guardian of the Suez Canal, assumed the role of liberator-protector of the Near Eastern nations.

Britain1s next concern was to insure

the cooperation of the Near Eastern peoples.

It should be

remembered that the spirits of independence and self-determi­ nation were strongly intrenched in the minds of the Near Eastern peoples.

Great Britain, therefore, dangled the

possibility of independence before their eyes as a reward for their cooperation with the Allies during the war. An understanding between the Arabic nations and the government of Great Britain was arrived at in a series of letters between Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner at Cairo, and Sherif Hussein of Mecca. On July 1I4., 19l£> Sherif Hussein sent a letter to Sir Henry in which he expressed his sympathy for the allied cause, and requested that Great Britain recognize the independence of the territory within the following boundaries: To the North: Mersina and Adana to the 37° of latitude on which fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin and Midiat Jezirat (IbnfUmar), Amadia up to the border of Persia To the East:

Persia to the Gulf of Basra

To the South: The Indian Ocean except for Aden To the West:

The Red and Mediterranean Seas to Mersina

66 Sir H e n r y k answer to this request was evasive, and suggested that decisions reached in the !,heat of war1^ might later prove themselves to have been arrived at prematurely. Sherif Hussein* s reply was sufficiently forceful to convince the British government that some definite stand must be taken, and on October 21}., 1915? the following statement of policy was issued: The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, and Aleppo can not be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded. With the above modification and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limit s. ^ In the balance of the correspondence, Great Britain stated that previous commitments to her ally, France, pre­ vented complete freedom of action in negotiating with the Arab nations.

This referred to the Anglo-French declaration

of November 7* 1918, which stated: In order to carry out these . . . France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous governments and adminis­ trations in Syria and Mesopotamia now liberated by the Allies, and in territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing and recognizing these as soon as they are actually established.3 1 "Palestine: A Leaf Turned ,’1 The Round Table, Z t y i l t f l , June, 1939• 2 Ibid*, p. J4.72 . 3 Ibid*, p* i|-73*

Prance and Great Britain also declared that the doctrine of self-determination would be a guiding principle in their future relations with the Arab nations, and that they would work with the Arab leaders to bring justice, education and political reform to the Arab peoples.^-

However

within those areas not affected by the Anglo-French agreement the British government would:

1.

Hrecognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits de­ manded by the Sherif of Mecca,u

2.

guarantee the Holy Places and recognize their import,

3.

assist the Arab nations in establishing f,suitable forms of government,"

1^..

insist that the Arabs seek and use the advice and aid of British experts,

5*

require the right to use the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra ,fto secure these territories from foreign agression . . and to safeguard our mutual in­ terests •ff5 On November 5* 1915* the Sherif of Mecca replied to

Sir Henry's letter of October.

Sherif Hussein agreed to

renounce the vilayets of Mersina and Adana, but insisted that because those of Aleppo and Beirut were purely Arab, he could not sanction their separation from the Arab kingdom.

Sir

Henry explained that the districts of Aleppo and Beruit were *

affected by the French-Anglo declaration.

Sherif Hussein

then agreed, 11to avert our eyes ’1 from the question in the 7

--

.

.

.

.. _

interest of the bond between France and Britain; thereby, hasten the end of ’’the present wars and calamities.” he assured the British government that it was

But

. . im­

possible to allow any derogation that gives France or any fa other power a span of land in those regions,” and when

peace, was restored, the Arab Kingdom would ask for those regions. During 19l8> the government of Great Britain, in two declarations, further guaranteed the Arab nations her good offices in their effort to secure independence.

One of

these is the Hogarth Message which Cbmmander Hogarth de­ livered to King Hussein during January, 1918-

This message

is crucial in our study because it is the first indication that Great Britain realized the difficulty of her position resulting from seemingly conflicting promises made to the Arabs and Jews.

Regard for Palestine*s holy places was again

assured and a special regime was tentatively suggested to protect them.

However,

custody of the Mosque of Omar was

to be entirely in Arab hands.

The message included the

factors of Jewish immigration and World Jewry’s desire for a homeland which the British government insisted must also

6 Ibid., p. 24-73•

69 b© considered in future Arab-British discussions.

However,

the British government intended to restrict Jewish immigration to the absorptive power of economic and political health,

A

gentle hint to the Arabs is couched in this sentence: In this connection the friendship of world Jewry to the Arab cause is equivalent to support in all states where Jews have a political influence. The leaders of the movement are determined to bring about the success of Zionism by friendship and co­ operation with the Arabs, and such an offer is not one to be lightly thrown aside.7 The Hogarth message represents the British governments first attempt to reconcile the conflicting promises it made to the Jews and Arabs during the exigencies of the first World War.

It also seeks to impress the Arab world with the

necessity of its taking a more liberal attitude toward the question, and should the Arab leaders fail to recognize the advisability of such an attitude, the message hints that con­ flict is one possible result.

It also implies that Arab

obstancy will meet with failure in view of the fact that the rest of the world is vitally desirous of A^Q-b cooperation. In effect, the British government was attempting to avoid conflict, but should it arise, the British government wanted it understood that the Arabs would have to share the blame. On December 9, 1917, Palestine was surrendered to General Allenby,

Shortly before this event, on November 2,

7 Ibid., p. 1^7i4-.

70 1917 9 the British government, in order to dispell any mis­ givings as to Britain’s sentiments toward the Zionist dream, issued its famous Balfour Declaration: His Majesty’s Government views with favor the es­ tablishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of that object. It being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.^ In answer to the Balfour Declaration, an Arab congress met in Cairo and resolved that the Balfour Declaration was null and void in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims and that pro­ hibition of Jewish immigration into Palestine was essential for peace.9

Thus it can be seen from the outset that the

Arabs were dead set against any Jewish state in Palestine. During the next phase of this problem, from the beginning of the British mandate over Palestine on July 2lj., 1922, until Britain relinquished her mandatory power on May 15, 19^8, ^he British government attempted to reconcile the claims of the Arabs and Jews.

It is important to note that

the principles of the Balfour Declaration were included in the British mandate. A series of committees were sent to Palestine to 8 Richard William-Thompson, The Palestine problem, (New York: Andrew Milrose, Ltd.), p. 28. 9 "Palestine: The Wider Hope,” The Roundtable, 29s26ij., March, 1939*

71 study the highly explosive situation and make recommendations Tor governmental action.

The first of these was the Shaw

Commission, and its outgrowth— the British White Paper of 1930-

♦

The commission found the fundamental causes of a series of outbreaks between the Arab and Jewish populations were Arab feelings of animosity arising from the fear that, by Jewish Immigration and purchases of land, they might ”be deprived of their livelihood and eventually pass under Jewish domination.fl^ On April 3, 1930* the British government issued a statement of policy in which a firm position of determined fairness to both racial groups in Palestine was taken.

To

do this, the British government would grant complete autonomy to Palestine in successive stages during which time, Jewish immigration into Palestine and Jewish purchases of land from 1 *i Arabs would be restricted. **■ This policy met with such a violent storm of Jewish protest that Prime Minister MacDonald was obliged to dispatch another commission under Lord Peel. The Peel Commission Report is an exhaustive and wholly sympathetic study of Arab and Jewish claims.

The Palestine

10 ESCOFoundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19^7 )> Vol. II, p. 625. 11 f,Palestine: The Wider Hope ,*1 o£. cit., p. I4.63 .

72 dispute is described as not being one of ’’right v wrong,11 but of f,right v right,”

and in view of that fact, all

parties concerned are urged to work toward the best possible solution.

.The commission recommended the partition of

Jerusalem into autonomous Arab and Jewish states, and in cases where the actual transference of populations seemed advisable, the British government should effect such trans­ fers.

The question of Palestine was to be settled by an

international mandate ever that city. 11 J

The British govern­

ment accepted all these recommendations except that of population transfers. After the Peel Commission, the Woodhead Commission, appointed in 193&* attempted to untie the Palestine knot. These experts abandoned the idea of population transfer,

and

made certain changes in the partition boundaries set up by . the Peel Commission’s recommendations.

Still another plan

was designed with the Peel Commission's findings as its basis. This came to be known as plan ”B tf.

In effect, Plan ”B ” was

to exclude the predominately Arab city of Galilee from the Jewish section.

However, the question of what to do with

Galilee proved insoluable and the entire scheme was abandoned. The Woodhead Commission then conceived a plan of its own.

By now, the commissioners realized that if peace were ^

Loc« cit.

13 Loc. cit.

73 to b© maintained, the two races would have to be separated into culturally autonomous groups.

The commission was also

convinced that the geographical economics of Palestine would have to be strictly observed for the sake of peace. problem was:

The

how can two different cultural structures be

superimposed upon a single geographical unit.

To do this,

both contestants would have to forego ^certain sovereign rights.

The scheme called for a complex cultural remapping

of the Palestine area, with certain sections autonomous, and others as mandates, and the whole under international economic administration. ^4*

As an outcome of these commissions, the

government of Great Britain issued its famous White Paper of

1939. The general theory of the new policy is contained in this sentence, MHis Majesty1s Government will do everything in their power to create conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being within ten years.111*3

The new state was envisioned as one in which both

Arabs and Jews would share equally in all its activities. During the ten-year transition period, the Jews and Arabs under the guidance of British experts were to be trained in the usages of government; as time progressed, and both parties wPalestine: The Wider Hope,1* ©£. cit., p. I4.68 . 15 E3C0 Foundation for Palestine, Inc., ©£. cit., Vol. II, p. 905.

71*. demonstrated their ability to govern themselves successfully, the British officials would be withdrawn. Unrestricted Jewish immigration was the principle Arab cause for alarm.

Previous declarations by the British

government and the terms of its mandate over Palestine com­ mitted it to support Zionist aspirations, but at the same time, Arab interests had to be respected.

The White Paper

of 1939 sought to compromise between these two obligations. According to its provisions, Jewish immigration was allowed during the next five years subject to the limitation that the total Jewish population could not exceed one-third of the total population, and that the ’’criterion of economic absorptive capacity” was to be determined by the British High Commissioner who would also supervise transfers of land from Arabs to Jews.

At the expiration of the five year im­

migration period, Jews would be permitted to enter Jerusalem tA

only if the Arabs agreed. 0

The British government also

expressed its determination to exert all efforts to prohibit illegal entry of Jews into Jerusalem./^

Despite harsh criti­

cism from Arabs, Jews and influential members of the British parliament,

the provisions of the Malcolm MacDonald White

Paper remained steadfast throughout the second World War. i r a j T cit. 17 Ibid*, p. 907.

During the years of the second World War,

two factors

arose whieh further complicated the issue; one of these is purely psychological. When a world*s peace is disturbed, a reaction of hate against the culprit is a natural result.

Chancellor Hitler

had not only caused war, but he had also persecuted, most inhuman fashion, a minority group.

in a

The transformation

of hatred for Hitler, engendered by the war, into complete support for the victims of his pogrom when added to sincere pity for them, predisposed many people, who heretofore, had never given the Palestine question a single thought, of the Jewish cause.

in favor

Consequently, politicians, who would

remain in power, had to satisfy this popular opinion. The other factor was the attempted unification of the Arabic nations into an Arab League.

Historically, the modern

spirit of Pan-Arabianism had its first stirrings in the early part of the nineteenth century.

However, the effects

of European imperialism shattered the dream of an United Arab Peoples.

It is not until contemporary times, that this

spirit was again awakened.

Obviously, the energy causing

this revival stems from the fear of Zionist aims. The first attempt at some semblance of a unified Arabic purpose came in 19^-2, when Nuri al-Said, Premier of Iraq;, published a Hblue book’1 setting forth what should be the aims of the Arabic world.

Nuri al-Said wanted to create

76 a "Greater Syria" to be made up of his country and Syria. His plan did not meet with the approval, principally because Egypt remained aloof•

The other Arabic nations wisely con­

cluded that an Arabic Union which did not include Egypt would be powerless and totally unable to command international respect.

Another objection was that a G-reater Syria would

defeat the very purpose for which it was created— hinder the further development of Zionism.

It was reasoned that due to

the impossibility of distinguishing Jews from non-Jews, a Greater Syria would provide a much greater area for Zionist operations. Two years later, Egypt took the initiative to form an Arab League.

At the request of Egypt’s Premier Nahas Pasha,

representatives of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Palestine and Egypt met, and conferred from September 25 until October 18,

The outcome of this

deliberation was the Alexandria Protocol. The sentiments embodied in this document are remarkably un-nationalistic.

For example, the decisions of the Council

of Arab Nations are binding upon all member nations--even in case of conflict between member nations. agreed to abandon the use of.force.

All member nations

Member nations were

allowed to enter into foreign, relations with outside powers only so long as such agreements did not conflict with the purposes of the Arab League.

11In no case would a state be

permitted to pursue a foreign policy which could be detri-

\

mental to the policy of the League or to any of its members.” Members of the League bound themselves to cooperate in pro­ grams to solve economic, cultural and social problems in the Near East.

The balance of the Alexandria Protocol declared

the members to be in support of the spirit,

but not the

details of the British White Paper of 1939* The Alexandria Protocol

... was a strongly popular

(italics in the original) document, appealing constantly to fpublic opinion throughout the Arab world,* and *the Arab nations.”^9

*the Arab people,

jt also ”made the problem of

Palestine once and for all the responsibility of the whole Arab world. However, this sudden sweeping away of all national­ istic treasures of sovereignty was far too drastic and incon­ sistent with the realities of politics.

Again in March,

19I4.5 , the leaders of the Arab Nations met in Cairo, and signed the Pact of the Arab League. The Pact reflects an almost complete attitude taken in the Alexandria Protocol.

reversal of the Where in the

Protocol Arabic political maturity shown from every paragraph 1 8 Cecil A. Hourani, ”The Arab League in Perspective,” The Middle East Journal, 1:125* January, 19^-7* 19 Ibid., p. 131. 20 Ibid., p. 132.

78 in the pact,

sovereign rights became taboo.

Its prologue

merely states that the signatories are, nDesirous of strength­ ening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab states.

. .,f and intended to do so ,fupon a basis of

respect for the independence and sovereignty of these

s t a t e s . r|2 1

It also states that no member nation shall interfere in the domestic issues of the others. Essentially, the pact represents a complete return to ante-Alexandria Protocol status.

A stronger attitude toward

the Palestine issue is taken in the de jure recognition of Palestine*s independence.

It also provided for the acceptance

of non-independent, non-member Arabic nations within the various Arab League planning committees. In contrast to one prominent Arabian*s opinion that, f,The ideas of Mazzini express perhaps better than any others the dominant concepts of the Arab nationalistic spirit in­ corporated into the League,” the history of Arab unity measures between 19lj-2 and 19^4-5 leave one with the impression of puerile impetuousity and weakness. On May l£, 1 9 W ,

the British mandate over Palestine,

established in 1923 by the League of Nations, came to an end; at the same time, the new State of Israel was proclaimed by David Ben-Gurion and immediately recognized by the United

21 Ibid., p. 137.

79 States.

Egypt and Trans-Jordan declared a ffJIhad,f (holy war)

against Israel on the same day, and backed up their action with a bombing raid on Tel Aviv.

Egypt declared that she

entered the war for 11the restoring of security and order in that country and putting an end to the massacres perpetuated by terrorist gangs against the Arabs and against humanity.”22 King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan became supreme commander of all forces on three fronts and was advised by a joint Arab military staff.

Syrian and Lebanon armies were unified

for a push from the north, Iraq and Trans-Jordan armies from the east, and Yemenite forces from the south.

Saudi Arabian

troops were joined with Egypt1s on Siani for an invasion of Palestine.

Egypt, Trans-Jordan and Iraq supplied the bulk

of all troops. For Egypt, the Palestine war was a bitter experience. The Egyptian government, as a show of unified purpose and strength of the Arab nations,

declared war on Israel on May

15 , 19^-85 and signed a humiliating armistice agreement with the victorious Israelian armies on January 6, 19^4-9• the war, Egypt again suffered bombing.

During

When the Egyptian

navy shelled Caesarea, an Israeli warship and several planes drove the Egyptian vessel back.

Sadist of all, were her war

ventures in the Negeb Desert area.

Egyptian forces were

22 New York Times, May 1 1 9 ^ 8 *

2:3.

80 completely out-maneuvered;

some were trapped for the duration

of the war, and still others were completely routed.

Finally,

all Egyptian holdings in that sector were wiped out, and under the duress of further Israelian encroachment, Egypt agreed to sign an armistice which gave most of the Negeb to Israel. Egyptian nationalism was dealt a blow by the Israelian invasion of Egypt*

Israelian troops pursued the retreating

Egyptian army across the Negeb area thirty miles into Egypt, and there they remained for three days while airfields, rail­ roads, and bridges were destroyed.

When the Negeb troops

returned to Egypt, and the fiasco became generally known, Egypt went through a period of shocked resentment.

This

mauling might have been averted had the other Arabian armies come to Egypt1s rescue*

Rahman Assam Pasha, Egyptian Secre­

tary General of the Arab League, deplored the lack of assis­ tance given to Egypt in this crisis by the other League members. When ore numerically compares the Israeli forces with the Arab legions, the outcome of the Palestine war seems fantastic.

But when It is remembered that in modern warfare,

superiority only in numbers does not assure.victory, and that the less tangible factors of organization and the feeling of identity which an individual living in a modern society-has for his state plus technological preparedness are as equally important as military personnel, the Palestine debachle

becomes a logical result.

Without exception, all of the Arab

states are either still bound by tribal feudalism, or as in the case of Egypt, just beginning to transform into a modern society.

With the possible exception of Lebanon and Palestine,,

the populations of the Arab states are made up of -underfed illiterates who are hopelessly ignorant of the usages of modern government.

These two facts account for the lack of

organization not only among the Arab states, but within them. At the time of the war, there was a total lack of an indi­ genous armaments industry in the Arab nations comparable to that of Israel*s.

In short, the Arab states did not have a

sufficiently strong political,

social, economic, or military

basis on which to undertake war. Egypt and the other members of the Arab League have been taught a bitter lesson by their failure in Palestine.

It must

be apparent to them now that they must design a pact which will actually unite the Arab world into a cohesive region.

If

the Arab nations are to successfully meet the challenge of Israel, many internal social, political, and economic reforms will have to be made to end righteous criticism of their ways and thus lend validity to their claims.

Illogical, intrans­

igent attitudes toward outside powers, of proven friendliness, must cease and a more cooperative attitude cultivated in the interest of the world*s problems as a whole.

In other words,

the Arab leaders must look at the existence of the Israeli state dialectically and meet its challenge peaceably.

CHAPTER VI ECONOMICS Egypt*s national wealth is found in the extraordinary fertility of .her soil--a veritable treasure made inexhaustible by the annual Nile flood deposits.

To compliment this fer­

tility Egypt receives an abundance of warm sunshine.

These

two elements plus an elaborate system of irrigation consti­ tute one of the world* s most favored agricultural regions. Egypt’s economy, therefore, has been in the past, and for reasons to be discussed later, will continue to be essentially agricultural,

perhaps the most eloquent testimony of the

Nile V a l l e y ^ fertility is the growth of its human population. Nearly twenty million people press upon an area approximately eight hundred miles long, and in some places only two to three miles wide.

This Malthusian nightmare means that in

Egypt land is the measure of all things.

In the last analysis,

land is actually the real power behind the throne.

Land

ownership is the goal of every Egyptian from the powerful industrialist down to the humble fellah. Because of a super abundance of people, Egyptian agri­ culture is not as highly advanced as one might expect.

flMost

of the implements used are of the type depicted on the Ptolemaic temples.

. .ff^

There is an established specialization

1 Charles Issawi, Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 19 V/7)> p. 6 l.

in one crop--cotton.

Cotton culture plus the elaborate

network of irrigation ditches make the use of machinery impracticable if not impossible. by absentee landlordism.

The system is also cursed

The average landowner, with

holdings sufficiently large to make him affluent, is only too willing to live in Cairo and Alexandria, or at some European resort, and intrust the care of his land to an ignorant peasant.

Since the lease term is short, often

for only one year, the peasant has little incentive to protect the soil. The crop rotation plan commonly employed in Egypt covers a growing period of two years.

The first crop, either

wheat or clover, is grown during the first six months.

During

the next two months, June and July, the soil is allowed to rest.

Following this, corn is grown for four months, and

is followed by two more months of fallow. months are devoted to cotton culture.

The next ten

Thus, we have three

crops in two years with only four months of rest.

This

program is a severe drain upon the natural fertility of the soil, and makes the use of artificial fertilizers mandatory. A few farseeing landlords are beginning to favor a triannual rotation period which will provide the soil longer recuper­ ation periods, but 11the immediate future seems to lie with biennial rotation and increased use of fertilizers . • » although the ultimate consequences to the soil will probably

82j. be disasterous. Great masses of cheap labor, and the facility with which cotton is grown, in terms of a truly prodigious yield, plus it

the fact that thefiber’s excellent qualities insures a ready market, tend tomake cottonE g y p t ’s

staple

crop.

The yield of cotton per acre is 606 pounds (compare this figure with 368 pounds for Russia, 238 pounds for the United States, or 112 pounds for

I n d i a ) .

3

The migh marketability of Egyptian cotton does not make it immune to the laws of supply and demand.

When com­

puted over a number of years, there is a fairly high corre­ lation ratio between price and supply.

This means that the

landlords must have some means to absorb any difference between the anticipated and the actual return on his cotton. Wheat is his answer.

It should be noted that Egypt has for

some years maintained its own set of corn laws which make the use of domestic wheat compulsory.

Consequently, the

price of wheat can be adjusted to absorb any loss on the cotton market.

Since the extent of grain culture is wholly

limited by the domestic capacity to consume, and grain revenue is manipulated as a contingency fund against cotton losses, any reduction in cotton income will further depress £

Ibid., p. 63 .

3

Ibid., p. 65*

the already abysmally low standard of the fellah1s living. Unless certain agricultural reforms are made, the increasing discovery and use of synthetic fibers cannot but seriously effect Egyptfs economy and civilization. Other principle crops are:

beans, millet, barley,

rice lentils, helbs, sugar cane, and onions.

For the most

part, these are used to supplement the fellah1s diet, or to reinvigorate the soil.

Onions are exported in some quantity.

Fruits are considered a luxury, therefore, their culture is restricted by the wealthy class* capacity to consume them. All the problems facing contemporary Egypt generate from the glaringly unequal distribution of its land.

tfOnly

3.5 P©** cent of Egypt* s land, 8,600,000 acres is fertile; and only 5*350,000 of these acres are under cultivation. ”Whereas 1,750,000 peasant families hold 700,000 acres of land averaging two fifths of an acre per family, 12,200 landowners hold 2,500,000.

Less than one half of one per cent of the

landowners hold almost three and one half times as much land as half of the entire peasant p o p u l a t i o n . I f Egypt is to remedy her pressing social, economic, and political problems in order to assume a more dominate role in Near Eastern

4- K. Roosevelt, ”Egypt*s Inferiority Complex,” Harper, 1952 360* October, 194-75 Maurice G. Hindus, In Search of a Future Persia, Egypt, Iraq and Palestine (Garden City, New York: Double day and Company, IncT, 194-9)* P* 3-4-6•

affairs, sweeping land reforms must be made. Since land reforms are apparently not a possibility in the foreseeable future, the Egyptian government’s agri­ cultural policy should encourage a more profitable use of the land.

Egyptian soil is far too precious and scarce to

be used for grain culture.

It would be far more logical for

Egypt to depend upon countries as Argentina, Russia and the United States having vast wheat regions and machine methods for grain, and fully exploit her peculiar advantages.

The

land now used to grow grain crops should be used to produce more cotton and to grow fruit and vegetables.

In this way,

the masses of rural Egyptians could have year around employ­ ment cultivating cotton, or food crops for exportation and domestic use.

But, of course, to do this, the landlord must

be shown that there is real profit in the production of fruit and vegetables as it is he who maintains the corn laws. It must be obvious to the Egyptian industrialist that the above program will benefit him in terms of increased labor efficiency and reduced labor costs. The association of economic independence with indus­ trial competence inspired the creation of the Egyptian Federation of Industries in 1922.

Two years previously, the

Egyptian Bank was founded to foster Egyptian industry and finally in 1930, a protective tariff covering most manu­ factures was enacted.

This active government sponsorship of

87 industry gives us a key to Egypt*s industrial structure. It is concentrated- to the extent which economic historians usually associate with the mature stage of capitalistic growth.

For example,

,f. . . only 1.2% of the firms have a

capital of over LEI,000

and only 0 .$% a capital of over

LE10,000,f yet !fown 7/8 of the total invested in industry.’^ Each industry sends a representative to its respective Chamber of Industry.

The chambers are grouped into the

powerful Federation of Industries which is presided over by an ex-premier; his connection with the government insures governmental support.

Egyptian industry is truly an economic

monstrocity wielding unlimited power in comparison with the consumer. Another potential advantage to Egyptian industry is the plentiful supply of cheap labor.

It is potential because

as yet, technologically skilled labor in appreciable amounts is lacking.

There are other equally serious-reasons for

Egypt1s retarded industrial development, and this writer feels that these obstacles are sufficiently crucial to delay Eg y p t rs dream of industrial might for many years.

First,

there is the very narrow domestic market for manufactured goods.

The fellah with an annual income of LElj-.OO or the

8 LE

s

Pounds Egyptian as distinguished from British

pounds. 7 Issawi, op. cit., p.

89.

88 industrial worker earning at the maximum LE26.0Q a year, certainly has very little money to implement a demand for manufactured wares, and those Egyptians fortunate enough to be in the market for such articles usually prefer foreign products.

Consequently, Egyptian industry must limit itself

to a few products which are widely used.

Another serious

obstacle to industrial might is Egypt!s natural lack of production* s basic prerequisite--energy.

As yet, the com­

plete electrification of the Nile Valley remains on blue paper.

An almost totally lacking public demand for elec­

tricity is the primary cause of this.

The Egyptian government

has spasmodically supported further improvements upon the Aswan.dam which would greatly increase the production of electricity, however, unsettled political conditions are the reason for its incompletion.

Egypt*s total lack of coal

deposits is a serious obstacle to a possible steel industry. A recent discovery of extensive iron ore deposits of ex­ ceptionally high iron content, and easy accessibility near the Aswan dam region will most certainly brighten the Egyptian economic scene.

When the Aswan hydro-electric potential is

finally realized, the site has a good chance of becoming a Middle Eastern steel center of major importance. One would think that Egypt*s textile industry would present the most favorable side of Egyptian economics. marily because of governments! policy, controlled by the

Pri­

great cotton growers, the opposite is true*

In order to

reserve the Egyptian market for domestic cotton, Egypt has an almost 100 per cent value tariff on all cotton imports. Therefore, the mills are obliged to purchase the fine Egyptian fiber at a high figure if they are to weave.

This

means that the cloth is priced so high that it cannot compete favorably on the world market, and must limit its production to luxury articles.

One solution to this problem

would be for the government to reduce its tariff in order to permit mill owners to mix the cheaper fibers with the Egyptian But a real impasse is created when the mill owners insist that such would not be of real benefit to them, since the use of the cheap, short fiber would necessitate their converting present machinery,

designed to handle the long Egyptian fiber,

to accomodate the short fiber.

This redesigning of plants

would prove too costly for the present capital surplus to absorb.

A possible solution would be for the government to

finance this reconversion, but again this will depend entirely upon Egyptian politics. Egypt* s economy of place is generally considered to be good.

Egypt*s level topography plus a strategic importance

in world commerce have attracted foreign capital for the development of adequate, state owned transportation systems. However, railway finances leave much to be desired primarily because the water and road ways tend to run parallel with

the railroads resulting in unwise competitive practices. Both the canal and road systems are in need of extensive repair.

Although there are no great distances to be covered

in Egypt, air transportation over Egypt will undoubtedly become increasingly important for the same reasons that are usually associated with the Suez Canal,

At the present

time, the British, Dutch, Italian and French nations operate air routes over Egypt.

Egypt herself maintains air routes

with Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Cyprus.

Topography suitable

for landing fields and excellent flying conditions, are certain to enhance Egypt as one of the world1s air centers.

The

Suez Canal plays a very small part in Egypt’s economy except for a handsome royality paid to the Egyptian government, and some tourist trade around Port Said. The second World War greatly stimulated Egypt’s economy. Thousands of foreign troops spent an estimated tens of millions of pounds purchasing goods of all kinds.

Egypt’s industrial

system underwent a swift expansion, creating jobs for thousands of Egyptians.

The allied forces also employed a

considerable portion of the vast labor supply.

The cotton

growers sold the entire 19I4-O crop to Great Britain, and in I 9I4.I, one-half of the cotton crop was sold to government, and the other half to the British.

the Egyptian However, this

great outpouring of wealth upon Egypt came to rest in the hands of those who were least in need of it, and the chasm

91 between the very rich and the very poor widened.

A good

indication of the w a r ’s Midas touch upon Egypt was regis­ tered in the increased number and value of savings accounts from 1936 to 1914.5*

In 1936* LE3*120,002 was deposited by

32,636 persons,® and in

LE 6o!j.,100 by 1^7,901 persons.^

Another indication of Egypt’s war profits is the excess of revenues over expenditures in government finance.

In 1939*

the surplus was LE9* 303* 027*^ and for 19J4-6 , it was LE13*980,

563

11

to which should be added the unusual high cost of

living account which amounted to LE10,965*751*

In 1937*

E gypt’s imports almost equaled her exports--LE38,038 ,098 and LE39,759*066 respectively ,^"2 but in 1914-7* imports were LE103* 903*14-71 and exports were LE85* 978,1j-73* ^ of

these last figures in terms

instead of balance of

ofEgyptian

trade formula we

If we think

buying power

can get

an idea of

her increased wealth. This influx of wealth naturally increased buying power in a restricted market, and inflation ensued.

Note circulation

d S. H.Steinberg, The Statesman’s Year-Book (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), p • 81^7• 9 Ibid., 19I4-8 ,

p. 858.

10 Ibid., 19I4.3 , p. 853. 11 Ibid., 19I4-8 ,

p. 852.

12 Ibid., 19i|.0,

p. 851*

13; Ibid., 19lf9,

p. 900.

92 rose from LE27,600,000 in 1939li4' to LE126,500,000 in 19J4.5 . For the first time in Egypt's modern history,

she was a

creditor nation, with England as her largest debtor with a debt estimated at Ll|_, 000, 000. Egypt* s post war adjustment was seriously hampered by the conditions prevailing in international finance— especially with reference to the dollar and sterling blocks.

Mamdouh

Bey Riza, Egypt's Minister of Commerce in 19if7, said that Egypt needed American industrial equipment, agricultural machinery and fertilizers, and to obtain these she must have dollars.

It is estimated that Egypt needs from sixty to

eighty million dollars per year.

Although Egypt is not now

a member of the sterling block, her finances are still in­ volved with the soft currency nations.

When England froze the

London sterling balances, Egypt had about L370,000,000 affected.

England agreed to turn over some $25,000,000 to

Egypt in 19J4-85 8:1:1^ will probably continue to do so until 17 balance is reached. Egypt exhibits a rather schizophrenic attitude toward foreign investments.

She insists that such aid will be

highly welcome, and at the same time, enacts laws which tend 1If Ibid., 19^0, P* 855*

Ig Ibid., 19I4.8, p. 859^

N ew York Times, October 6, 19^-7, ifsg«

17 Ibid., January if, 19il9* 68:If#

93 to discourage outside investments.

For example, according

to the Egyptian Company Law of 19if7> 90 per cent of the unskilled labor and 75 Per cent of the technical employees employed by all corporations must be of Egyptian extraction. However, according to Mamdouh Bey Riaz, Egyptian Minister of Commerce, any enterprise can escape these restrictions by remaining unincorporated. In every study of Egypt»s economic condition the shockingly uneven distribution of national wealth is shown to be a paramount weakness.

Accurate statistical studies

are either lacking, or when available, are difficult to interpret.

However,

certain facts offer clues.

income in the form of stocks,

Unearned

shares, bo rids, and rents repre­

sents 27 P©i* cent of the national wealth. sent over one half of the total income.

Land rents repre­ Another indication

of the unequal distribution is found in the fact that in the earned income bracket only 110,000 persons paid an income tax (out of If, 165,000 workers). indicative.

The salary range is also

The average agricultural worker earns an average

of LE10.00 per year, the industrial worker LE26.00, govern- . ment ministers (many of whom are also large landowners) receive LE2,500*00 and bank chairmen (also landowners) re­ ceive LE3,000.00.

A more ghastly measure is that the con­

sumption of essential goods (i.e., tobacco, coffee, £ea, sugar, meat, cereals, and textiles) is decreasing in the face

9t

of an increasing population while the consumption of luxury items is increasing.

For example, Egypt is the world*s third

largest importer of diamonds after the United States and Great Britain. Egypt1s government could contribute greatly to the people1s welfare and its own stability by following more efficient methods of administration.

The cost of government

should be equalized by enacting laws requiring accounting systems of domestic corporations and establishing an inheri­ tance tax.

Government expenditure accounts should be subject

to careful auditing--as it is now, only 10 per cent of the government's accounts are subject to audit.

The Egyptian

government should explore ways to encourage a wiser use of Egypt*s land resources.

By following a policy of free trade

with respect to cotton and wheat, Egypt could hasten her industrial development.

CHAPTER VII SOCIAL CONDITIONS In all human relations from the simple social intro­ duction to the vastly more complex meeting of two unlike civilizations, time is a crucial factor.

The two person­

alities, or civilizations must adjust to each other, and this adjustment, if it is to be successful, requires time. The Islamic and Western Civilizations are today engaged in just such an adjustment*

But in their case, time, not only

as an element of adjustment, but also as an evolutionary factor is lacking.

The situation becomes even more compli­

cated when one realizes that the painfully slow process of adjustment will have to occur within a context in which time is again important because of its absence. More specifically, the problem facing Egypt today is twofold:

(1) Egypt must accelerate the evolutionary process,

which would normally cover hundreds of years, in her politi­ cal and economic thinking, and (2) while this is going on she must develop an intimate contact with Western civilization As if this were not already sufficiently eomplex, we must add another factor which may well doom all efforts to failure the problem of over population. Within the complex behavior pattern we grossly term "nationalism" there is perhaps some factor of mass psychology

96 which induces a people to increase their rate of procreation, and Egypt is an outstanding example of this phenomenon.

In

1821, at the beginning of the Arabic nationalistic rennaissance, Egypt had a population of only three million. in 19l|-7, Egypt* s population is 19,500,000.^

Now

It is true that

the intervening years saw many improvements in irrigation, agriculture and other population supporting elements, and this might lead one to conclude that an increase in population is the natural result of an increased food supply.

But the

truth of the matter is that those persons who do most of the procreating, the fellaheen, are the ones least benefitted by the increased national wealth. The above figure represents only the population in­ crease and is, therefore, only a crude estimation of Egypt*s feeundity.

Prom the standpoint of social planning, an

estimation of birth rate must be had if the ghastly effects of the Malthusian formula are to be avoided.

A closer ex­

amination of the statistics show that the percentage of increase, computed over ten year periods, is decreasing. For example, the rate of increase statistic for 1907 is l6*l per cent greater than that for 1897, and the percentage of 1917 over 1907 is 13*7 P®** cent.

The next three percentage

i K* Roosevelt, ftEgypt*s Inferiority Complex,” Harper, 195:359, October, 1914-7.

figures are 11#5 per cent, 12.3 per cent and l6.1 per eent.^ A marked decrease is noticeable from 1897 to 1937> and then there is a sharp acceleration from 1937 to 19^-7 which is attributable to the industrialization following 1930 which would not show, its increase in population until 19^4-7-

The

migration of the people from the country to the city, with its cramped and monotonous life, most certainly contributed to the increase and, of course, there is always the stimulus of the seeond World War to consider. Another indication of the gradual decline in the birth rate is the decrease in the ratio between the popu­ lation of children, under five, and females aged fifteen to forty-nine years.

The ratios computed on a ten year basis

from 1897 to 1937 are:

700, 68l, 579. and

I .7 .3

5 4

Although

the statistic for the 1937 to 19if7 period is lacking, an in­ crease is to be expected. In spite of the hopeful decline shown by these statistics, !!the Egyptian birth rate, averaging over lj.0 per thousand, is the highest in the w o r l d . S o m e

possible ex­

planations for this have already been suggested.

Charles

Issawifs views on the matter are valuable because he speaks 2 Charles Issawi, Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 19^7) > pTTflj..

98 with the authority of an Egyptian actually on the scene. believes the first cause to be psychological.

He

The fellah

procreates to escape the wretchedness and boredom of his life.

The second cause is economic.

In a cotton economy,

children are looked upon as a necessary labor supply.

Issawi*s

third reason is the almost obligatory custom of early marriages. Married women enjoy more social prestige and eertain legal con­ siderations which their single sisters do not. and ignorance might be added to these causes.

Illiteracy The ignorant

fellah only knows that his life is one of endless privation, but he has little concept of why.

The relationship between

population and natural resources and his standard of living can have but little meaning to illiterate, undernourished, and diseased people. The Egyptian historic preoccupation with death finds real credence and logicality today, for Egypt leads the world in death rate--twenty-six per thousand.

Issawi be­

lieves that this figure may be underestimated by four due to the lack of accurate rural statistics. is even more shocking.

Of one thousand babies born to

Egyptian parents living in and in 1935 2211_ died.

5 Ibid., p. 1).5. 6 Loc. cit.

Infant mortality

Alexandria in 1913* 255 died,

Computed on a basis of the total

99 number born, this means that one child in four will not com­ plete his first year of life, and one of the remaining three will die before reaching his fifth year.

The life expectancy

of an Egyptian boy of ten years is only thirty-eight years? (compare this with fifty-six for England and fifty-nine for New Zealand). Egypt’s social structure is as ancient as Egypt her­ self.

There have always been the Pharaoh, the landowners and

the fellah.

The only changes, which were really not changes,

which have occurred have been in the racial stock of the two ruling strata.

The laboring class has always consisted of

the indigenous Egyptian.

It is only in comparatively recent

times that the socio-economic classes characteristic of industrial societies have made their appearance, but as yet, they play a minor role in Egyptian affairs. The classes in their order of political importance are:

(1) the king and his retainers,

his immediate subordinates, petty bourgeoise,

(2) the landlord and

(3) the bourgeoise,

(lj.) the

(5) the proletariat, which is divided into

skilled and unskilled labor, and (6) the fellaheen.

Through­

out the literature on contemporary Egypt there is little, or no mention of a class which in Europe has gained considerable coherence— the intellectual. say that none exists in Egypt. 7 loc. cit.

But of course, this is not to

100 King Farouk cannot by any demand upon one1s imagination be considered an Egyptian. Albanian and Turkish.

His racial stock is essentially

Farouk*s personality is an interesting

mosaic of the Italian and French cultures cemented together by an English education.

The king feels strongly his total

lack of identity with the land he rules; this is probably one reason he makes such a fettish of his religion.

Royal

visits to Cairo*s major mosques are frequent and ostentatious affairs.

The crown in Egypt is no mere symbol.

He is by God appointed, by law established, by family tradition reverenced, and by personal fortune one of the wealthiest men in his country. He is the supreme commander of his military forces. Further he sanctions and promulgates laws and can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and rule by his personal authority, if he so chooses. He may declare war, make peace; and conclude treaties. He appoints and dis­ misses ministers at will# He appoints all senior personnel of the public s e r v i c e s . 8 Farouk has a real sense of his kingship, and Royal prerogative has often held firm even in the face of what could be termed the voice of the people. The king* s enormous land holdings tend to make him a landlord first and a king last.

Egypt*s domestic policies

have so consistently been designed to favor the landlord that one is tempted to think of Farouk as a super landlord rather than a king. The landlord class has been described as follows: 8 P. .Hughes, r,Three Classes in Egypt,11 Fortnightly, 167 (ns l6l) p. 269 .

101 f,Few classes have justified their existence so little as the Egyptian landowners, who have all the defects of a privileged class unredeemed by any of the virtues of a ruling class.u9 Absentee landlordism is the rule rather than the exception. The majority of landowners prefer to spend their time seeking amusement in Cairo, Alexandria, or by astounding the Europeans with examples of conspicuous waste on the Riviera.

This style

of life necessitates a restless quest for more funds which to the landlord means more land#

To achieve this, he must

mortgage the land he has in order to buy more; consequently, most of the landlords are deep in debt.

Their place of pre­

carious power makes them very reactionary.

The landlord

believes that the fellah is not troubled so much by star­ vation and worms as he is by a deficiency in religious zeal and training. The larger industrialists,

commercial and professional

leaders constitute E g ypt1s bourgeoise.

Their more frequent

contact with foreigners make them, in general, more socially conscious, and receptive to new ideas.

However, most of them

are motivated by a land incentive, and would be only too happy to qualify for the next highest class.

As yet, the

bourgeoise are relatively politically ineffectual. The petty bourgeoise are the less successful members of the professions, petty government officials, tradesmen, 9 Issawi, o£. cit., p. llj-9#

102 and the upper layer or artisans, small businessmen, and army officers.

To this group belong the nintellectual unemployed.”

This term describes the great number of students who have earned a Bachelor of Arts degree to qualify for a secure governmental position only to find that they are unobtainable. The petty bourgeoise realize their inability to rise to the higher classes, except under very extraordinary circumstances, and express their resentment by an extreme xenophobe attitude. The Wafd draws much of its support from this class. The formation of a proletariat class is a rather recent development in Egyptian culture.

Living conditions of these

people, despite a larger annual income, are not much better than that of the agricultural worker. an unskilled laborer has

The average family of

persons who live in one room,

work an aggregate of seven and one half weeks per year and earn PT909*^^

Their monthly expenditures amount to PT52 for

food, PT10 for rent, PT8 for clothing, PTlj. for amusements, PTlj- for medicine and PT5 i*or tobacco.

The more prosperous

families of skilled workers have five persons who live in one and one half rooms. LE21.075*

The work 37*2 weeks per year and earn

Their monthly expenditures are PT121 for food,

PT25*3 for miscellaneous purposes.

There is some evidence of

10 One Egyptian Pound (LE) z 100 Piastres (PT) = one pound sterling.

103 debt in tills higher income group which is absent in the lower income group. At the bottom of this social structure the fellaheen are found.

Two attitudes toward the fellaheen are inescapable.

They are admired and respected as a class, and the "sinew and IP continuity of Egyptian life.tfxc: At the same time, the fellah’s indescribable way of life often repells and causes one to think of him as being !lbrutal and half-savage is the best place for him.f,^3

. . . whose mud

Both these concepts are true;

however, we do not have to look far back into history, or exhaustively analyze contemporary Egypt to find the reasons for his deplorable state.

Historically speaking, the fellaheen

have supported countless regimes, foreign and domestic which were contrived to exploit the Nile Valley.

The geographical

strategicness of his homeland has encouraged outside powers, to whom unrest in Egypt represented advantage, to trouble the waters, and then fish in them. mass social progress is slow.

Under such circumstances,

In the past century the

fellah’s numbers have increased, thereby, reducing his utility as an individual even more.

The fellaheen of today

impresses one as a giant organism with little, or no evalu­ ation of its social function.

This lack of social consciousness

11 Issawi, o£. cit., p. 152. 12 p, Hughes, o p . cit., p. 25• 13 Ibid., p. 25.

104

makes him the ready tool for the unscrupulous and the despair of many sincere statesmen who would improve the fellah* s lot. As might be expected, foreign ideologies offering panaceas for Egypt’s woes find a certain amount of acceptance. 11Communism in Cairo is finding lots of sustainers and hard believers, especially the students of both universities . . . they don't care what happens to them so long as they believe everyone is to become owners of the land he plants and have free treatment and education and work.11*^

Early in 19^5*

student food and clothing riots were numerous.

The New York

Times reported that “Premier Stalin is cheered frantically when his picture is shown in news reels and Russian popularity is high.”-^5

Early in 19^9* after the assassination of

Nokrashy Pasha, Premier Hadi appealed to the United States for Marshall Plan Aid “before it is too late to turn back the ebb of Communism.”

Premier Hadi warned “Communism

exploits the discontented classes.

If big and small nations

do not cooperate loyally in respecting each other’s rights in striding to raise the standard of living, the danger will 17 surely be inevitable.11 lij- 0. Tweedy, “Anglo-Egyptian Relations,” Fortnightly, 169 (nslo3) p. 308* 15 New York Times, February 10, 19^4-5* ^-55* 16 Ibid., February 20, 19^9> 3>k-* 17 L o c . cit.

10$ During 19^4-6, the Egyptian government, alarmed at the continued spread of Communism took steps to "counteract communists by energetic social measures to eliminate waste and devote all possible efforts to reducing illiteracy."-*-® A royal decree was issued for the apprehension and arrest of persons overtly advocating communism, and the seizure of seditious books and pamphlets.

The government also out­

lawed the communist party and declared all propaganda punish­ able as an act of violence against the state.

However,

the

lesson implied in these communistic activities was not lost to the rulers of Egypt.

Social reforms had to be made if

Egypt was to avoid class warfare. The Ministry of Social Affairs is currently sponsoring two major plans for social improvement in the form of an experiment in village administration and measures which will constitute a planned economy, patterned after that of Great Britain. The cooperative movement was introduced into Egypt by the British government during the latter*s administration. However, the effects of the first World War weakened the progress the cooperatives had made, and it is in this weakened condition that they came under the Egyptian govern­ ment* s control during 1923 and 1927-

The main objectives

New "York Times, January 21, 19i|-69 62$.

io6 of the cooperatives are to aid the small landholder, or renter in obtaining cheap credit, and in marketing his pro­ duce.

Fully developed, the cooperatives will offer certain

advantages to the fellah as a consumer of manufactured goods, seeds, fertilizers and farm techniques. One would tend to think that in the face of such real and great need, the cooperative movement would be assured of swift success.

Unfortunately, the contrary is true.

In

July, 19^0, only 90,000 fellaheen and businessmen with a capital of LEI,200,000 had been recruited. this lag are obvious.

The reasons for

First, Mthe fellah*s ignorance and

imperfect appreciation of the benefits of the cooperatives,1* ^ and secondly, the conservative viewpoint of the large land­ lords, without whose support, inasmuch as they control the government, cooperative economic planning is doomed.

However,

following the second World War, the economic conditions of Egypt became so precarious that a commission was sent to Great Britain to study their success with cooperatives. In a country such as Egypt, village life represents the fundamental form of social organization.

After so many

generations of irresponsible exploitation of the peasant, village life is primitive in the extreme.

In 1939* the

Ministry of Social Affairs began an experiment in village rehabilitation. 3-9 Issawi,

At first, two villages, different in

0£.

cit., p. 80.

107 population and cultural attainments, were studied for the purposes of methodology*

The cooperation of the fellaheen

was sought in a broad educational program aimed toward improving every phase of village life*

It can be readily

seen that in this manner, the seeds of self-government are being planted.

A model village is a kind of a club to which

the fellaheen contribute LEI,500 and the government LE10,000. Under the guidance of government technical experts, the villagers construct their own recreation rooms and administer their affairs.

The success of the plan is shown in the fact

that since 19^ 2 * eighty model villages have been established*

OA

Egyptfs public health problem is reflected in her death rate— twenty-six to thirty deaths for every thousand persons.

The problems of preventive medicine and treatment

are of such proportions that they must be handled on a national scale by the ministries of Public Health and Social Affairs. Foremost among the contributing causes of Egypt1s poor health are the unsanitary practices of the fellaheen. epidemics are not unusual.

Serious

In 1902, 35*000 persons died of

cholera in six months; during the year 1916-1919* li|-6,000 died of influenza, and more recently in 19^ 3 * 80,000 died of malaria.^ The Monthly Labor Review, July, 1 9 ^ * 21 Issawi, o£. cit*, p. lj-5» 22 Hughes, o p . cit*, p. 308.

5l2^-3*

108 The greatest menaces to public health are the debili­ tating diseases which should be thought of as being systemic in Egypt.

A prominent member of the Pouad I university

estimates that 90 P er cent of the people have tracoma, 75 per cent are infected with parasitical diseases, and on the average, every Egyptian suffers from three endemic

d i s e a s e s . ^3

Parasitical diseases are spread by water, therefore, the present system of water storage and year around canal irri­ gation serve to increase the incidence of sickness.

f,Por the

landlord Egypt is the most wondrous paradise in the Mohamme­ dan Middle East.

For the fellah, it is an inferno of pj.

Disease, Poverty and Ignorance.” ^

Egypt*s health picture,

however, is not one of unrelieved gloom.

Since 19^3> one

hundred and fifty new health centers have been established and the Ministry of Health has plans for fifty m o r e . ^ All these preventive medical measures will naturally further raise the population level which in turn will ulti­ mately defeat any social welfare plan no matter how ambitious it may be.

In the last analysis, it is the problem of over­

population which is*the nemesis of contemporary Egyptian 23 The Moslem World, October 195^> 32:355* 2l[. Maurice G. Hindus, In Search of a Future Persia, Egypt, Iraq and Palestine (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, IncTT 195977 P* 201. 25 The Manchester Guardian, May lij., 1959* P* 5*

log civilization.

Since Egypt is the acknowledged leader of the

Arabic world, and because of her importance in international affairs, Egypt’s problems take on a more personal hue for the other nations of the world.

The British government is

keenly aware of this logic, and since the failure of the Egyptian case before the United Nations Security Council, it has ’’given a priority * . . to economic and social schemes pi rather to political schemes.”^ In a country where illiteracy is estimated to be between 80 and 85 p©r cent of all persons over five years of age, social, economic, and political problems have igno­ rance as their common cause*

Egypt’s population continues

to rise because the people are ignorant of the relationship between geographical constants and biological progressions. Monstrous political and economic structures are allowed to exist simply because the people don’t know, or are too weak to care what should be done about them.

Farsighted leaders

as early as Mohammed All realized that if Egypt was to assume the responsibility of its own destiny, the people must be educated.

However, the enlightenment had to be of

a new type with emphasis placed upon secular ideas.

For

one thousand years previous to Mohammed Ali, Islam dominated Egyptian instruction. was centered

The Islamic philosophy of education

around the Koran and its perpetuity*

2b Ibid.,' July 28, I9J4.9, p. 1 3 .

Another

110 condition which adversely affected the course of education was the intellectual decline of Islamic thought during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,

Mohammed Ali established

an educational system patterned after that of Prance. cal, secondary and primary schools were introduced.

Techni­ Prom

1868 to 1880, attempts were made to form a national educational system with elementary,

compulsory education.

This magnifi­

cent start was abruptly halted in 1882 when Egypt.was occupied by Great Britain. During Great Britainfs

control over Egyptian affairs,

many social, economic and humanitarian reforms were effected. However,

it seems as though the officials, charged with the

responsibility of governing Egypt were shortsighted in regard to educational

policies.

11During the period of British con­

trol of education, little progress was made .

..”^7

British agents "concentrated effort chiefly on the development of those schools which helped to provide government officials."^® The British were among the first to recognize their error. We have hardly yet approached the urgent question of popular education beyond multiplying the old Kuttabs and trying to extend their usefulness . . . to something more than the mere learning the Koran by heart,^9 27 W. S. Gray, "Education in Egypt," Elementary School Journal, May, 19^9• 28 Ibid., p. i{.88. 29 Loc. cit*

Ill Attendance in the British sponsored schools was made pro­ hibitive to an estimated 95 P©r cent of the people because of high tuition.

It is estimated that the British occupation

retarded Egypt1s educational program for about fifty years* In 1922, Britain recognized Egypt’s independence, Eg y p t ’s new constitution granted an education to every citizen, and in 19^ 5 , the government initiated a broad plan to expand its educational facilities.

This emphasis upon education is

registered in the following statistics showing the growth of schools directly under governmental supervision. Secondary Schools Year 19IT

22

No. of Schools

10

23

10 11

2L\.

12

16 I! 27

17 18

Male

373% 3,786

Female 28 44

5.591

121 '9

9',; 58