U.S.-Japan Security Alliance : Why it Matters and How to Strengthen it 9780313013300, 9780275978051

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THE WASHINGTON PAPERS . . . intended to meet the need for an authoritative, yet prompt, public appraisal of the major developments in world affairs. Series Editor: Walter Laqueur Managing Editor: Donna R. Spitler MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION The Washington Papers and Praeger Publishers welcome inquiries concerning manuscript submissions. Please include with your inquiry a curriculum vitae, synopsis, table of contents, and estimated manuscript length. Manuscript length must fall between 30,000 and 45,000 words. All submissions will be peer reviewed. Submissions to The Washington Papers should be sent to The Washington Papers, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006. Book proposals should be sent to Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, P.O. Box 5007, Westport, CT 06881-5007.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Osius, Ted. The U.S.-Japan security alliance : why it matters and how to strengthen it / Ted Osius ; foreword by Watanabe Akio. p. cm. — (The Washington papers ; 181) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–275–97805–2 (HB : alk. paper) — ISBN 0–275–97806–0 (PB : alk. paper) 1. Japan—Military relations—United States. 2. United States—Military relations—Japan. 3. Japan—Military policy. 4. United States—Military policy. 5. United States—Foreign relations—Japan. 6. Japan—Foreign relations— United States. 7. Japan—History—Heisei period, 1989– 8. United States— History—1993– I. Title. II. Series. UA845.O837 2002 355’.031’09730952—dc21 2002002060

The Washington Papers are written under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and published with CSIS by Praeger Publishers. CSIS, as a public policy research institution, does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in the volumes of this series should be understood to be solely those of the authors.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2002 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2002002060 ISBN: 0–275–97805–2 (cloth) 0–275–97806–0 (paper) First published in 2002 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To Leon S. Fuerth and Cameron R. Hume, who taught me the rigorous practice of diplomacy and who demonstrate the practiced rigor of maintaining integrity in all life’s arenas.

Contents

Foreword

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

Preface

xiii

1. Defense of Japan The Burdens of History Contemporary Examples U.S. and Japanese Interests Options for the Future

1 1 2 6 6

2. The Korean Peninsula U.S. Interests Japanese Interests The Current Situation on the Peninsula Options for the Future A New Deal? The China Factor

9 9 11 13 14 15 18

3. Taiwan U.S. and Japanese Interests Fear of Entrapment The Cross-Strait Situation Options for the Future

22 22 24 27 28

vii

4. China A Triangular Relationship U.S. Interests Japanese Interests Options for the Future Human Rights Energy and the Environment

32 32 33 35 37 39 40

5. The East Asian Region U.S. and Japanese Interests in Russia U.S. and Japanese Interests in Southeast Asia Options for the Future Security Communities Humanitarian Activities U.S. Overstretch

44 44 45 46 49 50 50

6. The Problem of Okinawa: A Shared Challenge Background The Burden Reducing the Impact Options for the Future Economic Development Discussing Why the Bases Matter

53 53 55 58 61 62 63

7. Japanese and U.S. Challenges and Opportunities Japan’s Dilemma Peacekeeping The Role of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces America’s Challenge America’s Opportunity

66 66 69 70 73 74

8. Opportunities for a Strengthened Alliance Strategic Dialogue A New Strategic Framework Theater Missile Defense China’s Opposition Transnational and Multinational Cooperation

81 81 83 87 89 90

Bibliography Index About the Author

93 99 105 viii

Foreword

It is already fairly common to speak of a new era ushered in by the terrorist attacks on September 11. The loosely phrased “post–Cold War” era is clearly over. The new era is most likely to be characterized by an increasing need to cope jointly with a common threat emanating from desperate actors on the international scene. The world is becoming more dangerous as weapons of mass destruction spread to states and non-state actors that fall easily into sins of extremism. There are reasons for optimism, however, and we can envision a less dangerous world in the future. The United States and its allies are much stronger in economic and military power than their antagonists. That is exactly why the weaker actors are tempted to resort to acts of nontraditional warfare such as terrorism, the only available means to inflict damage on their stronger opponents. Terrorists, however, cannot expect to gain broad, sustainable influence unless buttressed by powers of persuasion of one kind or another. The problem for us is, therefore, how to win the struggle for moral leadership. In that campaign, I believe, time is on our side. Liberal democracy provides the most powerful reason for optimism, because by appealing to liberal democratic values we can expect to enlist the widest possible circle of peoples and states for international cooperation to fight terrorism and other forms of extremism. The U.S.-Japan security relationship proved to be a very valuable asset in the international effort to deal with formidable challenges related to the East-West contest for power and moral compeix

tition. Despite its bilateral structure, it functioned as the bedrock for regional stability in Asia and the Pacific. In that respect, the U.S.Japan alliance parallels NATO in the transatlantic world. A real test for the U.S.-Japan alliance is how it can function as the foundation for a regional security mechanism in an age of deepening interdependence between the United States, Japan, and Asia. What happened during the past decade or so in Japan’s security policy, including adoption of the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and enactment of a peacekeeping law, helped Japan adjust to a new role in the post–September 11 era of international security. Ted Osius is an ideal interpreter of Japan’s security policy and the U.S.-Japan security alliance for outsiders. He describes his role as providing “an outside observer’s view of an inside debate.” It is from this vantage point that he describes the domestic debate in Japan over constitutional issues. It is from a broader perspective, however, that he considers the larger theme of this book—the U.S.Japan alliance. An alliance is, by nature, an international (in this case bilateral) institution. Alliance partners do not necessarily have an insightful understanding about each other’s needs, aspirations, fears, and the like—hence the need for a good interpreter. Both American and Japanese readers can gain a better understanding of their security relationship by reading this book. As a diplomat with a broad range of practical experience not only in Asia but in other parts of the globe, Ted Osius is also a good interpreter for readers who are neither Americans nor Japanese. This has special merit because the U.S.-Japan alliance has always had regional implications and today has even more. His volume should have a wide readership throughout the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. WATANABE AKIO President, Research Institute for Peace and Security Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo and Aoyama Gakuin University

x

Acknowledgments

I thank the Council on Foreign Relations and Hitachi, Ltd., sponsors of the International Affairs Fellowship in Japan, for enabling me to live in Tokyo and learn about Japan and its neighbors from January to July 2001. Thanks also to the Japan Institute of International Relations for warm hospitality during my tenure there, and to its director, Ozawa Toshiro, for his intellectual acuity. I am grateful to the U.S. Embassy staff, particularly James Foster, David Marks, Tom Navratil, and Madeleine Ioannov for unstinting support during my stay. I also appreciate the wise counsel of my academic adviser, Professor Watanabe Akio, who has honored me by writing a superb foreword to this volume. Thanks to Kurt Campbell of CSIS for his encouragement and guidance and for introducing me to James Dunton and to my capable and patient editor, Donna Spitler. Finally, I thank the 95 individuals in six Asian cities, listed at the end of this book, for giving their time and sharing their insights into why the U.S.-Japan alliance still matters. The views and opinions expressed in this volume are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government.

xi

Preface

For more than three decades, the multifaceted alliance between the world’s two largest and most technologically advanced economies has deterred aggression and provided the bedrock for Asian stability. It has fulfilled its founders’ stated purpose of “contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.”1 Now, however, the United States and Japan are reexamining some assumptions on which their alliance is based. The Cold War’s end revealed new sources of potential threat at a time when Japan’s national self-confidence has been shaken by nearly a decade of economic stagnation, a highly fluid political situation, and an inadequate institutional structure for crisis management and strategy formulation. Japan is trying to redefine its identity from a nation whose constitution renounces war as a sovereign right to a “normal” country involved in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations and regional military relationships—a nation likely capable of projecting power beyond its own territory. By adopting the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the alliance evolved to permit joint operations between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and U.S. forces in Japan (USFJ). These activities were restricted to the defense of Japan in a contingency. In the mid-1990s, however, the alliance evolved further, beginning with the 1994 Higuchi Report, calling for a U.S.-centered multilateral approach to security and for an end to the freeze on Japanese peacekeeping force operations. In response, Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye launched an enhanced bilateral dexiii

fense dialogue, culminating in the Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Security Declaration of April 1996. External events forced the pace, as China dropped missiles into the sea near Taiwan in March 1996 and North Korea launched a long-range missile, the Taepo Dong-1, in August 1998. Concerns about cross-strait tensions and North Korea caused Japan to tighten its security ties with the United States by revising the 1978 guidelines to address issues of rear-area support in a regional contingency and by adopting an acquisition and crossservicing agreement important to cooperation between the two navies. In 1999, Japan’s Diet adopted legislation implementing most of the recommendations, and the two countries began joint technical research on theater missile defense (TMD) the same year. In October 2000, a bipartisan group headed by Richard Armitage published a report stressing the alliance’s critical role in the U.S. global security strategy and recommending ways to strengthen bilateral ties.2 In May 2001, as deputy secretary of state, Mr. Armitage urged Tokyo to move toward a relationship with Washington more like the alliance between Great Britain and the United States. In September 2001, the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review shifted the focus and forces of U.S. military power away from Europe and the Atlantic and toward Asia and the Pacific. During its first nine months, the Bush administration stressed ballistic missile defense as its signature foreign policy initiative, presenting both a challenge and an opportunity to the alliance. Also during this period, the administration (1) withdrew support for an International Criminal Court; (2) abandoned the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; (3) suggested it would abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; (4) withdrew from a United Nations conference limiting illegal trafficking of small arms; (5) rejected proposed enforcement measures for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; and (6) pulled out of the UN Conference on Racism. Collectively, these actions seemed to indicate a unilateralist approach to foreign policy. Then, on September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon altered the security landscape, causing the United States to build a global coalition against terrorism. These events also forced Japan to reassess its role in the bilateral alliance and within the global coalition. In October 2001, Tokyo enacted controversial legislation to allow its military to go abroad to back U.S.-led strikes in Afghanistan: the first overseas deployment of Japanese forces in a war situation since World War II. The new law permitted Japan to provide rearguard logistical support, as well as humanitarian aid for xiv

refugees, to support the war against terrorism. Japan also provided the United States with increased intelligence, diplomatic support, and stepped-up protection of U.S. military installations in Japan. The events of September 11 significantly accelerated Japan’s internal debates over collective security and defense cooperation with the United States. Although the United States and Japan clearly want a stronger alliance, they have yet to decide how to accomplish that shared goal. To strengthen security ties over the next decade, both countries must explain why the alliance matters. For an alliance to succeed, its members’ interests do not need to be identical, but they must overlap sufficiently. Chapters 1 through 5 of this volume focus on the purpose of the security alliance and maintain that U.S. and Japanese interests coincide enough not only to sustain that alliance, but also to warrant strengthening, enhancing, and promoting it. The alliance remains relevant in today’s rapidly changing Northeast Asian security context for five reasons. First, it provides for the defense of Japan and, in so doing, reassures Japan’s neighbors that there will be no return to the militarism of the 1930s and 1940s. Second, the alliance helps deter North Korean aggression. Third, it helps prevent cross-strait tensions from boiling over into hostilities. Fourth, although their security alliance is not aimed at China, the United States and Japan can identify shared interests and coordinate policies to affect the choices China makes. Together, they can help bring China into international security, economic, and environmental institutions, because a stable, prosperous China integrated into the world community is preferable to a weak, divided, and fearful China. Fifth, the alliance helps the United States and Japan manage potential regional conflicts, involving Russia, Indonesia, or other Asian nations. Indeed, America’s bilateral alliances provide a basis for an Asia-wide security architecture that can begin to build trust where little exists. Advancing a multilateral security framework—one that includes China and, perhaps in the long run, North Korea—will build confidence and prevent American overcommitment in the region. Although the alliance demonstrably serves U.S. and Japanese interests, other Asian countries will also benefit from efforts to maintain and strengthen it. As in Europe after the war, Asia must build a system that will enhance stability and trust between the region’s historical antagonists, and the U.S.-Japan alliance contributes to that process. Chapters 6 through 8 examine the challenges and opportunities for a strengthened alliance between the United States and Japan xv

over the next decade. Incidents in Okinawa and the sinking of the Japanese ship Ehime Maru by a U.S. nuclear submarine heightened public distrust of the U.S. military and increased calls for a reduction of its Japan-based forces. Okinawa’s strategic location and painful history dictate that managing “the Okinawa problem” will challenge the United States and Japan for the next decade at least. Constrained by its postwar constitution, Japan is determining an appropriate role for its self-defense forces, participation in multinational peacekeeping efforts, and the balance between security needs and individual and civil rights. Public debate suggests a gradual shift toward more assertive nationalism, a wish for more autonomy, and a willingness to assume greater responsibility for Japan’s own security. Japan appears ready to embark on a slow but steady development of defense capabilities that do not just complement those of U.S. forces, but also provide limited self-sufficiency. For its part, the United States must combat unilateralist tendencies and learn to share decisionmaking authority with Japan if it is to succeed in defending against threats to stability in Asia. Numerous opportunities for the alliance arise from today’s global challenges and developing technologies. A bilateral strategic dialogue will help the United States and Japan clarify roles and missions and meet the challenges of a rapidly changing Asia. Cooperation in the war against terrorism, on ballistic missile defense, and in information sharing could tighten the alliance where it is weakest. Together, the United States and Japan can address broadly defined security concerns, such as energy supply, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, transborder crime, piracy, and illegal narcotics, as well as environmental issues, infectious disease, economic development, and humanitarian and disaster relief. If it is to thrive, the U.S.-Japan alliance must remain dynamic rather than static and must be nurtured, sustained, and enhanced. TED OSIUS

Notes 1. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, Article VI, January 19, 1960. 2. Richard Armitage et al., The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership, Institute for National Strategic Studies Special Report (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, October 2000). xvi

1 Defense of Japan

The Burdens of History The legacy of World War II imposes significant constraints upon Japan even today. The United States–Japan alliance (commonly known as the U.S.-Japan alliance) grew out of that legacy, as victors and nations that suffered from Japanese actions wanted to prevent Japan’s remilitarization. The United States did not force postwar security arrangements on Japan, nor was a NATO-style multilateral alliance created as in Europe at the outset of the Cold War. Instead, Japan’s leaders accepted a bilateral security arrangement with the United States in the decade following the war, and this alliance has been at the center of Japan’s diplomacy ever since. In 1951, the United States and Japan signed a security treaty (revised in 1960) stipulating that the United States would defend Japan in the event of an armed attack against Japanese territory. For its part, Japan agreed that after withdrawal of the occupation forces, the United States could continue to maintain and use military bases without major restrictions on the use of those facilities or on the deployment of troops. No treaty area was delineated; according to Article VI of the revised treaty, the facilities were to be used for “contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” Although a traditional alliance arrangement commits both parties to support each other militarily, the lopsided security arrangement between the United States and Japan reflected their re1

2 The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

spective postwar roles. The original security treaty was more like a basing arrangement than a traditional alliance agreement, as a joint response was required only if an adversary attacked Japanese territory.1 Under Article 9 of its postwar constitution, Japan viewed commitments to aid the United States militarily as impossible. For 50 years, these arrangements proved beneficial to Japan and to the world. Since 1976, Japan has kept defense spending within 1 percent of its gross national product (GNP). It has provided the most generous host-nation support to U.S. troops of any ally.2 Japan has been the world’s top provider of official development assistance, contributing $80 billion in assistance to its Asian neighbors since 1969. Through the Miyazawa Initiative in 1997, Japan helped Indonesia and Thailand during the Asian financial crisis. Japan could not have kept its commitments to Asian and global development—part of a broad policy of “comprehensive security”—without the security of its alliance with the United States. Today, 74 percent of Japan’s citizens support maintaining the security alliance with the United States,3 and, far from remilitarizing, Japan has distanced itself from the past, transforming into a society that is mostly pacifist in its legal and political outlook. In the process of rejecting the militarist elements of its past, however, Japan has not succeeded in coming to terms with its prewar and wartime history. Not until 1993, with the statement of a chief cabinet secretary, did Japan acknowledge its soldiers’ abuse of an estimated 200,000 Korean, Taiwanese, and Filipino “comfort women.” Forced labor complaints are only beginning to be heard by Japan’s courts. Historians and Tokyo politicians insist that accounts of the 1937 Nanjing atrocities, when Japanese soldiers reportedly killed 150,000 to 300,000 citizens, are exaggerated. And nationalists seek to justify Japan’s World War II aggression as needed to liberate Asia from colonization or, in the case of Korea, to aid that country’s modernization.4

Contemporary Examples Two recent controversies illustrate Japan’s difficulty in coming to grips with its history and the deep sensitivities that continue to surface in South Korea and China. The first involves a junior-highschool history textbook, a particularly emotional issue because critics maintain that Japanese schools have neglected to teach the

Defense of Japan 3

causes and effects of wars involving Japan. The controversy inflamed emotions in South Korea, where the older generation remembers the 1910–1945 occupation all too clearly, and Seoul recalled its ambassador from Tokyo for a brief period in the spring of 2001. Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan stated that Japanese accountability for its imperial history is critical to continued relations. The textbook’s editors, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, characterized Japan’s aggression as anticolonial and maintained that its annexation of Korea was “necessary to defend Japan’s security” rather than “a simple matter of good and evil.”5 One editor, Tokyo University professor Fujioka Nobukatsu, charged foreign critics with “blatant interference” and criticized those who acknowledge Japanese acts of aggression for holding a “masochistic” view of history.6 Editorialists suggested that changes to the text “would compromise Japan’s integrity as an independent nation . . . and deal a crushing blow to its dignity as a sovereign state,”7 and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro rejected Korean- and Chineseproposed revisions. To defuse the controversy, Koizumi and Korean president Kim Dae Jung sought a diplomatic palliative through exchanges between Japanese and South Korean historians. They also revived a joint commission to promote historical research, moribund since its establishment in 1997. Since 1996, the Society for East Asian History, an independent group of Japanese, Korean, and Chinese historians, has worked on a transnational supplementary history text,8 which could prove useful in the future. To date, fewer than 2 percent of Japanese schools have actually adopted the controversial textbook. The textbook issue appeared to be a bump in the road toward Japan–South Korea reconciliation, advanced significantly by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi’s 1995 apology for the war and by a 1998 joint declaration confirming a shared determination to face the past and build a future partnership. In the short term, costs of the controversy included the postponement of joint exercises between Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force and South Korea’s navy; cancellation of a visit to Japan by South Korea’s chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; postponement of Japanese ship visits to the port of Inchon; a South Korean boycott of some Japanese goods and cultural products; threats of linkage to negotiations over a Free Trade Agreement; street demonstrations in Seoul; and a six-day hunger strike by South Korean lawmaker Kim Young Jin in Tokyo. The brouhaha also may have contributed to the cancellation of a

4 The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

planned visit by Japan’s emperor to South Korea, originally scheduled to coincide with jointly hosted World Cup soccer finals; some had hoped the visit would be a cathartic event. In the long run, economic and military cooperation will continue, but the controversy harmed the reconciliation process. Prime Minister Koizumi touched off a second contretemps when he visited the Yasukuni shrine on August 13, 2001, near the anniversary of the war’s end. Previously, only one postwar prime minister (Nakasone Yasuhiro) visited Yasukuni in an official capacity. An emblem of Japanese militarism for the postwar generation, the shrine once held rituals centered on the emperor and symbolizes the nation’s former fusion of politics and religion.9 Recorded there are the names of 2.47 million soldiers and sailors who died in Japan’s wars since the mid-nineteenth century—and 14 Class A war criminals, including General Tojo Hideki, the wartime prime minister. A military museum on the premises contains a statue of a kamikaze pilot, but generally the shrine honors those who died in battle without glorifying Japan’s wartime past. Defending his visit, Koizumi stated that he wanted to pay respect to the nation’s dead, and he added, “Japan should never again walk on the path to war.”10 Sixty-five percent of Japanese supported Koizumi’s visit, while 28 percent opposed it, according to an August 20, 2001, opinion poll conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun. Chinese and South Korean officials vigorously denounced the visit, and citizens in Hong Kong, Manila, and Singapore objected to its symbolism. As a possible way out of the dilemma, Koizumi’s government is considering creating a national cemetery separate from Yasukuni at Chidorigafuchi. Japanese officials lay wreaths at Arlington National Cemetery in the United States; senior American officials could similarly honor Japan’s dead, as long as war criminals were entombed elsewhere. As a site for Asian visitors, a national cemetery would carry even more symbolic importance. Just as President Reagan’s visit to Bitburg, Germany, and Clinton’s visit to Vietnam proved cathartic for many Americans, so could a Korean or Chinese leader’s visit to an appropriate Tokyo site help heal divisions in Northeast Asia. Koizumi took an important step toward mending the wounds of war on October 8, 2001, when he visited the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing. At the site of a 1937 incident used by Japan to justify widening its invasion of China, the prime minister apologized to

Defense of Japan 5

Chinese victims of Japanese aggression. Although he also expressed profound regret for the pain caused to Koreans during Japan’s colonial rule, the prime minister’s visit to Seoul a week later still brought bitter antagonism to the surface. South Korean legislators canceled his scheduled visit to the National Assembly, and demonstrators tried to stop his motorcade from reaching a monument bearing the names of Korean victims of colonial abuse. In the United States, the $140 million blockbuster film, “Pearl Harbor,” did not cause the increase in anti-Japanese sentiment that its critics feared. However, an issue involving reparations for U.S. “slave” labor may have more impact on Japan. More than 40 Japanese companies, including Mitsubishi and Nippon Steel, used the forced labor of more than 36,000 American soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and civilian construction workers during the war. Former prisoners-of-war and their heirs filed a major lawsuit in California on December 7, 1999, timed to coincide—to the hour and minute—that bombs began falling on Pearl Harbor 58 years before. The U.S. Justice and State Departments opposed the plaintiffs’ case, because the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty included comprehensive claims settlement provisions and provided for the sale of $4 billion worth of Japanese property in allied countries to pay reparations to war victims.11 Still, the U.S. Congress passed legislation in the autumn of 2001 allowing American veterans the right to seek redress from the corporations that used their labor during the war. Legislators argued that Japan’s prime minister, in a 1951 confidential exchange of letters with the Netherlands’ foreign minister, agreed that the treaty could permit claims against private Japanese citizens and corporations. Although concerned about the implications of this issue for its relations with the United States and Canada, Japan recognizes that the larger question is how to handle forced labor claims from Chinese and Korean wartime prisoners. To manage its Asian relationships successfully during the coming decade, Japan needs an open, forthright argument about its history—a missed opportunity during the debate over history textbooks. Germany could not have assumed a position of leadership in Europe without sustained atonement for its Nazi past. South Korea and China, where between 6 and 20 million Chinese were killed by Japanese, have not yet forgiven Japan for its wartime actions. In Europe, a framework of community building followed the war, but in Asia it has yet to take root, largely because of the burdens of history.

6 The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

U.S. and Japanese Interests Five decades after the war, the United States is not providing for Japan’s defense just to reassure Japan’s neighbors. Since the Korean War, the United States has viewed its military presence in Japan as necessary to preserve East Asian stability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. interests continued to be served by defending Japan and maintaining its basing arrangements there. The United States and Japan benefited from a grand bargain: the United States provided a nuclear umbrella and power projection capabilities for Japan’s defense, while Japan provided host-nation support and basing rights with a minimum of hindrance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Clinton administration worked quickly to redefine NATO, but aimed at a slower evolution of the U.S.–Japan alliance that reflected the pace of change in Japan, the United States, and Asia. The Bush administration considers a strong alliance relationship to be vital, but not only for bilateral reasons, as U.S. interests continue to involve the region as a whole. Fully 85 percent of Americans support the alliance as important for U.S. security.12 As with any nation, Japan’s first security concern remains territorial defense. However, Japan’s view has gradually evolved, so that it, too, views regional stability as vital to its interests. Japan depends on the Middle East and Persian Gulf for 80 percent of its oil and on freedom of navigation through sea-lanes for the health of its economy. Within Japanese society, support for the alliance’s carrying out of territorial defense and extraterritorial duties remains quite broad; passage of the 1999 guidelines-related legislation and ongoing planning for regional contingencies indicate the depth of this support at the political level. But even if only a small minority opposes the alliance, many Japanese wonder why it cannot be more equal and less constraining on Japan’s role in the world.

Options for the Future At two extremes, Japan would appear to have two options—to rearm and become an active, independent player or to remain a passive junior partner, dependent under the U.S. security umbrella. The burdens of history make rearming difficult, however, and Japan’s citizens will likely resist the increased military expenditures

Defense of Japan 7

that would be needed for Japan to become a major military power. For the next decade, at least, Japanese society will undergo a significant transformation. The population will continue to decline owing to a sagging birthrate and insufficient in-migration: already Japan has more people over 65 than under 15, and 50 years from now a third of its citizenry will be older than 65. This growing proportion of elderly citizens will strain fiscal resources, already stretched by the biggest deficits among G-8 nations. Although cheaper than achieving similar capability by conventional means, acquiring nuclear weapons would be terribly costly from a domestic political standpoint and in terms of Japan’s relations with other Asian nations. Both U.S. and Japanese interests also dictate against a passive, dependent role for Japan. Japan, however, can choose a middle road, between these two extremes, by becoming a more autonomous, proactive partner within the alliance structure over the next 10 years. Younger Japanese, less troubled by history than the older generation, will favor a more active role for Japan. Japan’s neighbors, similarly experiencing a passage of the wartime generation from positions of influence, will gradually become less sensitive to Japan’s role as a contributor to security in the region, provided that it remains within the context of an alliance with the United States. China’s tacit acceptance of Japan’s military deployments in support of the war against terrorism suggests that this process is well under way.

Notes 1. Watanabe Akio, “The Past and Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance,” Japan Review of International Affairs 15, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 173. 2. Japan contributed $4.13 billion in 2000, constituting 58 percent of the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Japan, according to USFJ (U.S. Forces Japan) headquarters in Yokota. Host-nation support accounts for 9 percent of Japan’s defense expenditures and includes payment to 24,000 Japanese employees. More than 53,000 U.S. military personnel and an additional 57,000 civilians live in Japan more cheaply for the U.S. taxpayer than the combined corresponding costs for the next 10 countries where U.S. forces are stationed. USFJ data from United States Forces, Japan, headquarters, “Forward Presence Maintaining Peace, Security and Stability.” 3. Asahi Shimbun, May 2, 2001. 4. It is important to distinguish between Japanese nationalists and ultra-nationalists. Nationalists generally support democracy and do not

8 The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

harshly criticize the United States or the alliance. Even nationalistic Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintaro, who receives sky-high public approval ratings, grudgingly supports the alliance as in Japan’s interest. Ultra-nationalists, on the other hand, desire to rearm Japan and revive the emperor and generally oppose the U.S. presence in Japan. For the most part, their current efforts appear centered on symbolic issues such as history textbooks and visits to Yasukuni shrine. Most Japanese citizens reject the ultra-nationalists’ antiAmericanism. 5. Don Kirk, “Seoul Demands Tokyo Rewrite History,” International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shimbun, May 9, 2001, p. 25. 6. Reported by Doug Struck, “New Text Reopening Old Wounds,” Washington Post, April 18, 2001, p. A14, and Kiroku Hanai, “Textbook Serves Japan Poorly,” Japan Times, April 23, 2001, p. 18. 7. Yomiuri Shimbun, May 27, 2001. 8. Asakura Takuya, “Multinational Historians Address East Asia,” Japan Times, June 23, 2001, p. 3. 9. See Herbert Bix, “Japan’s New Nationalism,” New York Times, May 29, 2001. 10. Doug Struck, “Japanese Leader Visits Provocative War Shrine,” Washington Post, August 14, 2001, p. A9. 11. Article 14(B) of the treaty states: “Except as otherwise provided in the present treaty, the allied powers waive all . . . claims of the allied powers . . . and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course and prosecution of the war.” 12. According to a Gallup poll, 89 percent of the general public and 82 percent of opinion leaders view the alliance as “important” for U.S. national security. Reported by Nihon Keizai, June 9, 2001, p. 2, and Japan Times, June 9, 2001, p. 3.

2 The Korean Peninsula

U.S. Interests When analyzing how the U.S.-Japan alliance serves the purpose of maintaining peace and deterring aggression on the Korean peninsula, it is also important to examine where the two nations’ interests overlap and where they differ. Over the next decade, the United States has a number of vital interests at stake in Korea: (1) keeping the peninsula free of nuclear weapons; (2) heading off the development of long-range missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory; (3) preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology to ”states of concern” such as Iran and Iraq; and (4) ending North Korean support for terrorism. For advancing the first goal, the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, which froze North Korea’s plutonium processing, is the best vehicle to date. If it fails and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) goes ahead with its nuclear program, the United States must consider military options that would risk the lives of American and South Korean troops and many South Korean citizens. Although danger to the continental United States from longrange missiles is perhaps 10 to 15 years in the future, medium- and short-range missiles already threaten U.S. forces and America’s allies in the region. WMD proliferation and terrorism concerns are equally real and immediate. In November 2001, U.S. under secretary of state John Bolton asserted that North Korea had a “dedicated national9

10

The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

level effort to achieve a biological weapons capability” and said it “likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of the decision to do so.”1 Diplomatic efforts on nuclear issues or toward a verifiable missile deal may require prolonged negotiations (as the Agreed Framework showed). Meanwhile, the U.S. troops on the peninsula must deter aggression and prevent crisis escalation. In the long term, it is in America’s interest to prevent an implosion or explosion of North Korea and to support a North-South reconciliation process that favors values such as democracy and market capitalism. Because progress depends on DPRK behavior, reconciliation appears likely to be a decades-long process. Until then, the United States seeks to help the Republic of Korea (ROK) increase its capabilities so it can defend itself. Relative to DPRK capabilities, South Korea’s military capacity has increased significantly since the early 1970s. Since the Korean War, the United States has stationed troops in Asia to deter North Korean aggression, including 37,000 troops on the peninsula who help maintain the armistice. Should deterrence fail, their mission is to defeat an attack. The Third Marine Expeditionary Force (3rd MEF) is based in Okinawa because of its proximity to Korea and other locations where its capabilities would be required in a contingency. The 3rd MEF could begin deploying to the Korean peninsula within 18 hours of an outbreak of hostilities. U.S. forces in South Korea view the bases on Japan as a critical source of supplies for a peninsular contingency. As it demonstrated with the 1992 end to the Philippines basing agreement, the United States will withdraw its troops from allied territory if they are not welcome. Currently, however, three-fourths of South Koreans support the U.S. presence, and fewer than 10 percent want U.S. forces out now. Even while they hope for a rapprochement, South Korean citizens remember the DPRK nuclear program in 1994 and the 1998 launch of a long-range Taepo Dong-1 missile. Most seem to realize that, without American troops, the ROK would enjoy neither peace nor prosperity. One high-level official asked rhetorically: “Without the U.S. presence, who would invest in South Korea?”2 If a second North-South summit should occur and result in a peace declaration, support for the U.S. troop presence might decline, but most opinion leaders view the U.S. force presence as a precondition for successful North-South negotiations. The United States considers that conventional military forces should be reduced

The Korean Peninsula 11

before a peace declaration is signed, an important factor for Seoul, as ROK leaders hope the United States would be among the guarantors of a peace pact. With mandatory conscription of males, Korean citizens have pragmatic views of the military and of threats to their security (in contrast to the antimilitary sentiments prevalent in Japan). In 2000, the United States and ROK successfully addressed some difficult issues—the No Gun Ri investigation, changes to the Status-of-Forces agreement,3 and other issues pertaining to the burden imposed by the bases. Plans are under way to consolidate the 96 U.S. facilities and reduce their footprint. Even if nationalist sentiments rise to the surface during the 2002 presidential campaign in Seoul, it appears that South Koreans will continue to support America’s presence. American taxpayer support is not guaranteed, however. Should peace break out on the peninsula, pressure in the United States to bring American troops home may increase markedly.

Japanese Interests In an asymmetrical alliance, fear of entrapment often alternates with fear of abandonment on the part of the junior partner. When President Carter stated his intention to withdraw U.S. forces from Korea, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo sent a message through Vice President Mondale that U.S. forces played a crucial balancing role between North and South and were “of great importance to Japan.”4 The 1997 Revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation emphasize that bilateral military cooperation “in areas surrounding Japan” is a situational rather than geographic concept.5 Since 1969, however, Japan has viewed the security of the ROK as “essential to Japan’s own security.”6 Japan includes the Korean Peninsula in its legal definition of the “Far East” for the purposes of the guidelines. In addition, seven bases under UN command in Japan (three in Okinawa, one in Sasebo, and three on the Kanto plain) can be used without prior permission for defending Korea. Under the guidelines, planning for a Korean contingency has steadily progressed. At any given time, 30,000 Japanese businesspeople, tourists, and officials are in South Korea,7 and, although each government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals, both can rely on a high degree of cooperation in dealing with a Korean contingency. Japan’s security interests would be greatly enhanced by sustainable North-South reconciliation, because the likelihood of a

12

The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

DPRK attack on Japan decreases as the possibility of North-South hostilities declines. Japan shares U.S. concerns about the DPRK’s nuclear program and supports the Agreed Framework and Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Taepo Dong-1 and No Dong missiles can reach Japan in about six minutes, so naturally Japan wants the DPRK to scale back its medium-range missile program, or at a minimum to freeze its growth and development. On the matter of WMD proliferation, Japan is a strong advocate for arms control and has an unbending policy against exporting arms itself. Japan viewed America’s pursuit of a missile deal in the Clinton administration’s last months with some uneasiness, however, because Tokyo feared a U.S.-DPRK agreement might not enhance its own security, address the problem of existing mediumrange missiles, or bring real peace to the peninsula. The United States has yet to remove North Korea from the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism. Japan has suffered from DPRKsupported terror attacks, and Pyongyang may continue exporting ballistic missile technology to terrorist organizations and states that harbor them. The United States and Japan share a vital interest in ensuring that such sales cease. Japan also has domestic concerns not shared by the United States (though not incompatible with American interests). Ten cases of suspected abductions by North Korea during the late 1970s and early 1980s remain unresolved; one, a ten-year old girl from Niigata, bears particular significance and political symbolism. The DPRK’s refusal to engage on the issue limits Japan’s ability to address other North Korean demands. For its part, the DPRK demands an apology and compensation for Japan’s wartime aggression. Although an apology could be forthcoming, Japan’s leaders remain skeptical about North Korean intentions and want to see if the DPRK will redirect resources from the military toward agriculture or industry. They know the DPRK educational system continues to foster anti-Japanese sentiment, and under present circumstances the Diet is unlikely to support payment of compensation to the DPRK regime.8 Japan therefore prefers a slow, gradual approach toward North Korea, allowing time to defuse historic tensions, rather than the summit diplomacy favored by Kim Dae Jung and the Clinton administration. Twenty to fifty years from now, Japan could view a unified Korea—especially one closely tied to China—as a regional rival;

The Korean Peninsula 13

from Japan’s perspective there is no guarantee it would be friendly or nonassertive. In short, U.S. and Japanese interests on the peninsula, while not identical, for the most part overlap.

The Current Situation on the Peninsula Although the June 2000 North-South summit underscores how unpredictable the Korean situation can be, most observers agree that any reconciliation process “will at a minimum be punctuated by periods of North Korean–provoked crisis and tension.”9 In 2000, the DPRK increased its military capabilities,10 and North Korea will likely pose a military threat for at least 10 years, with the process of reconciliation taking 20 to 30 years. For a decade or more, U.S. forces will most likely serve as a stabilizer, and the United States and its allies will need a diplomatic strategy combining engagement and containment of North Korea. Support for President Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine” policy within the ROK has gradually eroded, as the president’s critics charge that the threat from the North has not declined and the DPRK has insufficiently reciprocated the South’s efforts toward peaceful coexistence.11 President Kim’s government seeks to restore momentum to the reconciliation process, but it is concerned about the pace (as of this writing, Kim Jong Il still has not committed to a return visit) and the expenses involved. The ROK could not absorb the cost of an immediate DPRK collapse—an amount that would likely be on the order of five times the cost of East-West German reunification—and thus favors inducing gradual change in the North rather than immediate unification. To avoid an abrupt influx of people to the south and upgrade living conditions in the north, the International Institute of Economics estimates South Korea will have to invest as much as $3.17 trillion.12 Faced with these extraordinary potential demands on its resources, the ROK government is not eager to accommodate the burden-sharing pressures of the United States. Yet Seoul also opposes any suggestion that the United States might reduce its force presence, because reductions would undercut South Korea’s ability to respond to the DPRK militarily and weaken its hand in negotiations. Although Kim Jong Il drives North Korean policies, his pronouncements are often inconsistent and his motives difficult to

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The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

fathom. Clearly, he wants American recognition and a peace treaty with the United States. He appears to have consolidated leadership with support from the Korean People’s Army, through governance by the National Defense Commission, and by selecting the members of the Supreme People’s Assembly.13 Above and beyond regime survival, however, the North Korean leader apparently seeks improvement of the DPRK’s ailing economy and may be considering Chinese-style economic reforms for North Korea, as suggested by his January 2001 trip to Shanghai and his comments to a visiting European Union delegation in June. North Korea needs electricity,14 food, and fertilizer and finds its ideology of juche (self-reliance) threatened by depending on foreign aid for one-third of its food consumption. A North Korean defector described how the juche ideology justified abrupt policy changes and how it allowed the DPRK to redefine its interests and quickly switch allegiance.15 Kim Jong Il told Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in November 2000 that he supported a continued U.S. force presence on the peninsula, perhaps because he believed it would prevent the ROK from absorbing the DPRK. On other occasions since then, he and his representatives have called for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Options for the Future In 1999, former secretary of defense William Perry developed a mechanism to coordinate the policies of the United States, Japan, and South Korea—the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). He cites TCOG’s creation as his most important contribution to North Korean diplomacy. The following year, the pace of North-South developments worried Japan, as Tokyo feared Washington would overlook its interests in the pursuit of a missile deal. Today, it is equally important for these three nations to remain in sync and not to permit the DPRK to exploit policy differences. As discussed in chapter 1, the burden of history complicates the improvement of ROK-Japan relations. South Korea’s national identity has been defined in part against Japan, and candidates can score political points by blaming Japan for everything from the division of the peninsula to Korea’s economic woes. In Korean elections, “everyone is a nationalist,”16 and that is likely to hold true dur-

The Korean Peninsula 15

ing the presidential elections in December 2002. But overall trends in the relationship are favorable, and deepening economic ties serve as a brake on oscillations. Two-way trade exceeded $50 billion in 2000. While acknowledging the damage caused by the history textbook and Yasukuni shrine controversies, an adviser to President Kim said, “We want a transnational alliance between Japan and [South] Korea.”17 Similarly, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated that Japan and the ROK are already “strategic partners.”18 The younger generation in South Korea likes Japanese products and culture and may warm up to Japan further during the jointly hosted World Cup soccer finals. However, even college-age students, who did not experience the colonial occupation, oppose an activist Japanese military posture. The onus is on Japan to handle historical issues gingerly and carefully manage an ongoing territorial dispute over Dok-to (Takashima) Island. Over the next decade, the Japanese government intends to continue improving the legal status of 500,000– 700,000 ethnic Koreans living in Japan; progress in this realm will further encourage those who aim to strengthen bilateral ties. The TCOG also provides Japan and South Korea with an important forum for influencing U.S. policies. After the March 2001 summit meeting with Kim Dae Jung, the new U.S. administration faced an apparent split with a key Asian ally. Washington undertook an in-depth policy review, partly as a means to bridge the gap. Then, in a joint statement released after the May 2001 TCOG meeting in Honolulu, the three countries agreed on a basic approach: (1) continue to support Kim Dae Jung and his engagement efforts; (2) continue the trilateral consultative process; and (3) honor obligations under the Agreed Framework. The statement also emphasized the three countries’ expectation that Kim Jong Il would pay a return visit to Seoul. The TCOG process had successfully tested the Bush administration’s stated resolve to support U.S. allies and strengthen its alliances.

A New Deal? Perhaps to distinguish its policies from those of the previous administration, the Bush administration places great emphasis on verification and monitoring in the DPRK of all North Korean com-

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The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

mitments. Four useful precedents for on-site monitoring and verification can be cited: (1) U.S. teams conducted inspections in connection with the search for soldiers missing-in-action from the Korean War; (2) the Energy Department monitored facilities at Yongbyon; (3) U.S. teams inspected the Kumchang-ni suspected nuclear site;19 and (4) KEDO teams have conducted on-site verification activities. Still, the DPRK will resist intrusive inspections. Unlike Iraq, North Korea has not been defeated on the battlefield, so no precedent exists for imposing inspections. Significant incentives will be needed to reach agreement with North Korea on an appropriate verification and monitoring regime. A light-water reactor probably cannot be completed by the target date of 2003, and under terms of the Agreed Framework, the United States must supply heavy fuel oil to North Korea until a reactor is built and producing electricity. Possibly, therefore, the United States will seek to supplement KEDO’s light-water reactors with conventional (thermal) power, so the North could have electricity sooner. Any discussions that opened the Agreed Framework to new negotiations would, of course, first require extensive consultations with South Korea and Japan. The TCOG process and Japan’s participation in KEDO ensure that Japan will help shape future decisions. The United States and its allies would like North Korea to take early steps toward compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection obligations. The IAEA must analyze spent nuclear fuel rods and plutonium waste to determine how much plutonium North Korea produced before 1994—a process likely to take two to three years. The United States will strongly support IAEA efforts to negotiate the details of a special inspection as early as possible—and Pyongyang will probably resist those efforts. On the matter of missile production, deployment, and exports, the United States and its allies face a number of significant choices. In October 2000, a DPRK envoy to the United States reaffirmed an earlier proposal that Kim Jong Il had raised with President Vladimir Putin of Russia: North Korea was willing to “forgo” its long-range missiles if the West would agree to launch civilian satellites for Pyongyang. Kim Jong Il offered several important concessions during Secretary of State Albright’s visit to Pyongyang the following month. He said he would forgo missiles with a range of more than 300 kilometers20 if North Korea could receive two to three satellite-launching services per year and assurances that its sovereignty and security

The Korean Peninsula 17

would remain intact. The North Korean leader also indicated willingness to halt all missile exports, including missile components, technical advice, and brokering services. In lieu of cash, Kim said he was prepared to accept $1 billion worth of nonmonetary assistance, such as energy-generating machinery, food, coal, and other commodities for North Korea’s stricken economy.21 Clearly, the DPRK wanted an agreement with the United States. But any deal that requires North Korea to give up weapons exports—its only source of hard currency—will require a compensation package beyond the means of the United States alone to deliver. Japan has reportedly begun studying the creation of an international framework to buy up North Korea’s export missiles.22 After completing its spring 2001 policy review, the Bush administration resumed discussions with the DPRK, albeit at a lower level. The agenda was to include “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea’s nuclear activities; verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile programs and a ban on its missile exports; and a less threatening conventional military posture.”23 In the short run, it will be difficult to make progress on this agenda, especially since senior administration officials continue to give the impression they seek the demise of the DPRK regime, greatly complicating the task of U.S. negotiators to establish trust. Linking North Korea to Iraq and Iran in an “axis of evil” also undercuts Seoul in its dealings with Pyongyang. The DPRK views the U.S. decision to include conventional weapons on the agenda as an attempt to weaken North Korea through negotiations and has rejected discussion of reducing its forces while U.S. troops remain. It may be necessary to consider a division of responsibilities, with the United States focused on resolving nuclear and missile issues, while North and South Korea settle the issue of conventional weapons directly. To emphasize support for South Korean engagement efforts and for the ROK’s leading role in negotiations, the United States could, in talks with the North, underscore the ROK’s call for additional North-South confidence-building measures, such as progress on construction of a railroad linking Seoul and Pyongyang, advance notification of construction activities, and communication between the two militaries. At present, talks on confidence-building measures could hold a greater prospect for success than focusing on reducing conventional weapons. The Nunn-Lugar threat reduction initiative, originally aimed at nations of the former Soviet

18

The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance .

Union, might be applied to North Korea. Its goal could be converting weapons-production facilities to peaceful pursuits. Multilateral energy projects could also contribute to political confidence building, as well as to the energy security of both Koreas and to political stabilization in Northeast Asia. A North Korean defector said it would be a mistake to conclude that the DPRK will buckle if America takes a hard-line approach. Instead, he maintained, the United States has sufficient power and leverage to adopt a flexible approach and change North Korean society. “The lion can control the fox,” he concluded.24 Through its alliance with the United States, Japan can help guide the lion and perhaps persuade it to be appropriately flexible. Too slow a pace will strengthen the South Korean opponents of reconciliation and provide ammunition to those who claim that the United States, through its military presence, seeks to keep the peninsula divided.

The China Factor China’s medium-term interests on the Korean peninsula do not differ fundamentally from those of the United States and Japan. Over the next 10 years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) wants to see a stable, non-nuclear Korea, and in the long run it has a significant economic interest in proposals for a “Marshall Plan” for DPRK reconstruction. China has more influence than any other nation over North Korean developments: Kim Jong Il visited China twice in 12 months, and President Jiang Zemin visited Pyongyang in autumn 2001. Still, the DPRK has defied China in several ways: (1) by seeking an independent nuclear capability; (2) by attempting to establish ties with the United States and thus weakening China’s influence; (3) by launching the 1998 Taepo Dong-1 missile, the effect of which was to bring the United States and Japan together, especially with regard to joint research on theater missile defense; and (4) by establishing (quiet) ties with Taiwan.25 In short, the DPRK’s juche policies have greatly frustrated Beijing. U.S. and Chinese long-term interests diverge, however, over the matter of a U.S. force presence on the Korean peninsula. With an eye toward Taiwan and Tibet, China cannot endorse open-ended foreign involvement in what it views as an internal conflict, and

The Korean Peninsula 19

therefore Beijing advocates withdrawing U.S. forces when military conditions permit. China will play a crucial role in the future of Korea during the next decade. Beijing may press the DPRK to return to the Four-Party Talks to discuss replacing the armistice with a permanent peace mechanism. Recognizing China’s political influence and growing role in the East Asian economy, South Korea since 1992 has worked to improve relations with the PRC, and economic ties between the two nations have expanded dramatically. From Seoul’s perspective, the worst possible alignment of forces would be China, Russia, and North Korea lined up against South Korea, Japan, and the United States. South Koreans would like to play an intermediary role between China and the United States and may be in a good position to do so. The Korean peninsula should be an area where America and China can cooperate, rather than compete. And Japan plays a role in shaping U.S.-China relations, as the next two chapters discuss.

Notes 1. As quoted by Doug Struck, “U.S. Talk of North Korea as a Terror Target Gives Seoul the Jitters,” International Herald Tribune, December 21, 2001, p. 7. 2. Interview with Kim Sung-Hwan, director general, North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seoul, May 3, 2001. 3. South Korea wants increased jurisdiction over military personnel in handling criminal offenses. 4. Watanabe, “The Past and Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance,” p. 183. 5. “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” signed by U.S. and Japanese foreign and defense ministers in New York, September 23, 1997, http:/www.usia.gov/abtusia/posts/JA1/wwwt2410.txt, p. 7. 6. Joint declaration signed by President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku on November 21, 1969, and restated in the joint communiqué of President Gerald Ford and Prime Minister Miki Takeo in August 1975, as cited by Watanabe, “The Past and Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance,” pp. 180 and 182. 7. Interview with Tokuchi Hiroshi, planning and programming division director, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, April 16, 2001. Japanese visitors to South Korea hit a record 2.4 million in 2000. 8. The Diet did, however, support providing 500,000 tons of rice to North Korea in 2001.

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The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

9. Zalmay Khalilzad et al., The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), p. 8. 10. In an interview on May 1, 2001, USAF MGEN Michael Dunn, deputy chief of staff of U.S. Forces Korea and the UN Command, said the DPRK had increased its overall artillery capability by 25 percent (and that in the range of Seoul by 60 percent), boosted production of tanks, submarines, and ships, expanded its fiber-optic network, carried out more training exercises than at any time in the past 10 years, and added 120,000 soldiers to its forces along the DMZ. Although agreeing that the DPRK had increased its capabilities during the past year, Korean government officials stressed the importance of viewing these changes in a longer-term perspective and maintained that the threat from the North had declined overall since 1995. 11. President Kim’s critics were emboldened when comments to the press by President Bush and Secretary of State Powell during the March 7, 2001, summit suggested differences between U.S. and South Korean approaches to the North. In fact, the joint statement issued by the two leaders showed much common ground: President Bush supported South Korea’s policy of engagement with North Korea; he supported President Kim’s leading role in resolving inter-Korean issues; and the new administration reaffirmed U.S. commitments to the Agreed Framework. Still, public perceptions matter, and in South Korea, some press coverage depicted the United States as a force against unification. 12. Study by Marcus Noland, cited by Bertil Lintner, “Coming in from the Cold?” Far Eastern Economic Review (October 25, 2001): 62. 13. For this analysis, I am indebted to Xue Chen, a visiting fellow at the Japan Institute of International Relations during the winter and spring of 2001. 14. DPRK factories are now operating at 20 percent to 30 percent capacity, according to Kim Sung-Hwan, North American Affairs Bureau director general, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an interview in Seoul, May 3, 2001. 15. Interview with Cho My-Chol, Korean International Economic Policy Institute, Seoul, April 30, 2001. Cho’s father was minister of construction during the Kim Il Sung era; Cho taught economics at Kim Il Sung University until his defection in 1994. While linking most DPRK policies to juche, Cho acknowledged that it is an ideology more often than not observed in the breach. 16. According to a senior Korean diplomat, Tokyo, May 28, 2001. 17. Interview with Dr. Moon Chung-In, dean of the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, May 1, 2001.

The Korean Peninsula 21

18. Interview with Kim Sung-Hwan, North American Affairs Bureau director general, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seoul, May 3, 2001. 19. If Kumchang-ni had been a real nuclear site, the DPRK would not have allowed inspections. 20. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) governs missiles with a range of more than 300 kilometers. 21. Michael Gordon, “How Politics Sank Accord on Missiles with North Korea,” New York Times, March 6, 2001, p. 1. Since that time, Pyongyang has maintained a moratorium on testing long-range missiles. 22. Tokyo Shimbun, June 4, 2001, p. 1. 23. Statement by the president, June 6, 2001, http://www.usinfo. state.gov. 24. Interview with Cho My-Chol, Seoul, April 30, 2001. 25. Interview with Kurata Hideya, Tokyo, February 20, 2001.

3 Taiwan

U.S. and Japanese Interests After the Korean peninsula, a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait presents the most daunting challenge to future Northeast Asian stability. China is more sensitive on the subject of Taiwan than any other issue, and Beijing’s leaders fear that the post–Cold War U.S.Japan alliance aims to separate Taiwan from the mainland. From the perspective of Tokyo and Washington, the bilateral security alliance is not directed at China or any other single nation but rather designed to defend Japan and maintain stability in East Asia. Still, there is little doubt that the U.S. military presence in Asia and security support for Taiwan have so far deterred the Chinese from forcibly attempting to unite their nation. Although far from identical, U.S. and Japanese interests regarding Taiwan over the next 10 years overlap in such areas as (1) deterring cross-strait conflict, (2) avoiding the unnecessary provocation of China, and (3) preserving Taiwan’s free-market economy. On the question of unification with China versus Taiwanese independence, both countries prefer the status quo in the near term, but recognize that it may not be sustainable in the long run. For longerterm strategic reasons (the location of the island near vital sealanes), neither the United States nor Japan wants Taiwan united with a potentially hostile PRC, because access to Taiwan’s ports would enormously boost China’s efforts to establish a deep-water navy.1 In an interview, President Chen Shui-bian’s deputy chief of 22

Taiwan 23

staff stressed this point, saying that Taiwan’s geographic position makes it “vital” to Japan.2 To deter conflict, the United States discourages Taipei from declaring independence and Beijing from forcibly attempting to unite Taiwan with the mainland. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States supplies Taiwan with weapons necessary for defense against the mainland.3 Given China’s size and resources, however, Taiwan cannot achieve security based solely on independent military capabilities. Taipei relies on Beijing’s fear that the United States would defend it in the event of a cross-strait conflict. Because U.S. forward-deployed forces are in Japan, Taiwan also depends on a strong and stable U.S.-Japan alliance. The United States has a stake in Taiwan’s economy. Taiwan is America’s seventh-largest trading partner and, in 2000, purchased twice the value of U.S. exports than did the PRC. On a per capita basis, Taiwan imports more U.S. agricultural products than any other country, and it is the second largest customer (after Saudi Arabia) for U.S. arms sales.4 It is also the world’s third largest manufacturer of information technology (IT) products.5 Because the computer-producing sector accounts for about 2.8 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), an interruption of Taiwansupplied IT products would cut GDP by 0.7 percent (or $5.5 billion a month).6 On the matter of unification versus Taiwanese independence, U.S. policy tends to oscillate between two poles. American idealists welcome Taiwan’s democracy and insist that its people have a right to self-determination, while realists, who agree that Taiwanese democracy serves America’s interests, consider that its independence would threaten East Asian stability. Seeking to engage China, President Clinton in 1998 dispatched former assistant secretary of defense Joseph Nye to tell President Lee Teng-hui that, if Taiwan declared independence, the United States could not guarantee its defense. In an ABC television interview on April 25, 2001, President Bush appeared to abandon 23 years of American strategic ambiguity when he said the United States would do “whatever it took” to help Taiwan defend itself. As Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew noted, such clarity could “encourage a situation in which the Taiwanese government, relying on American support, decides that there is no need to discuss eventual reunification with China. In that case, the

24

The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

danger of armed conflict between Taiwan and China is greatly increased and America will be drawn in.”7 The president’s statement, if it reflected a change in America’s position, would suggest that conservative idealism has a stronger foothold in the Bush administration than in previous administrations. At his first summit meeting with Chinese president Jiang Zemin in October 2001, however, President Bush reaffirmed America’s “one China” policy and remained silent when China shouldered Taipei’s representative out of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum meeting in Shanghai.

Fear of Entrapment As discussed in chapter 2, fear of entrapment often alternates with fear of abandonment in an asymmetrical alliance. Japan worries that it could become embroiled in a Taiwan Strait conflict where its direct national security interests are not at stake. Japan’s entanglement concerns pose one of the greatest challenges to the workability of the alliance, because the American public and leadership would react strongly if Japan, fearing China’s wrath, prevaricated in a Taiwan crisis that directly involved the United States. Similarly, if Japan were to become entangled in a conflict contrary to its interests, Japanese citizens would react angrily, and the consequence would be serious damage to the alliance. The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, when Chinese missile exercises caused the United States to send two carrier battle groups to the area, demonstrated the potential for conflict and heightened Japanese fears of entrapment. Although not prejudging the level of Japanese involvement if conflict should erupt, Prime Minister Hashimoto prudently made contingency plans to rescue Japanese nationals, deal with refugee flows, and provide rear-area support to the United States. However, Hashimoto did not receive Diet support for his efforts.8 A month after the crisis, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto signed a Joint Declaration on Security, and the following year the two nations completed the revised guidelines. The allies defined contingencies for their coordination according to situation, not geography, and neither included nor excluded conflict in the Taiwan Strait as an event that would cause Japan to provide tangible support to the United States.

Taiwan 25

Japan has no legislation comparable to America’s Taiwan Relations Act, so the Diet would have to decide—under pressure of a crisis—whether to risk conflict with China to help the United States provide for Taiwan’s defense. Whether the guidelines should be applied to a Taiwan contingency is the subject of ongoing political debate in Japan. However, joint planning for a Korean peninsula contingency provides the “template” for a Taiwan contingency, if Japanese political leaders decide to grant a U.S. request for support.9 According to National Defense Academy president Nishihara Masashi, if forced to choose between the U.S. alliance and smooth relations with China, Japan will always choose the United States. A Japanese prime minister, he said, “will provide whatever rear-area assistance the U.S. needs—but might lose his job afterwards as a result.”10 Others in Tokyo disagree, stating that Japan has quietly disabused those in Taipei who believe Japan would back the United States in a cross-strait crisis in order to preserve the alliance. They maintain that Japanese interests do not warrant defending Taiwan, and forcing Japan to act contrary to interest would surely strain relations immensely, risking great damage to the alliance. Some Japanese leaders focus on what process could lead to a change in the status quo for Taiwan. If Taiwan were to declare independence—no matter what actions the United States takes—Japan would be less likely to consider the ensuing conflict a situation “which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan”11 and take appropriate action. On the other hand, if China used force against Taiwan without provocation, then Japan would more likely act in concert with the United States. Aside from providing rear-area support for the United States, Japan would probably utilize economic leverage in its dealings with China (for example, by suspending yen loans).12 Like the United States, Japan balances official ties to China with unofficial and commercial ties to Taiwan. Since normalizing relations with the PRC in 1972, Japan has been involved in Taiwan’s economic development and integration into the region. Business ties have expanded until Taiwan is now Japan’s second largest export market—just ahead of China—with exports totaling nearly $30 billion and overall bilateral trade $42 billion in 1999.13 Japan’s business community has much at stake on both sides of the strait, however. To the extent that it influences Japan’s political leadership on

26

The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

this issue, the business community is likely to stress avoiding Beijing’s antagonism and maintaining the status quo. The Japanese political context certainly includes idealist versus realist debates, but they appear less sharply etched than debates in the United States over Taiwan. Whereas U.S. policy oscillates on the issue of independence for Taiwan versus unification with China, a large number of Japanese leaders appear to hope that a consensus compromise—peaceful reunification “with the assent of the Taiwanese”—can be achieved.14 Japan’s policy appears to rest on the “tacit assumption that Beijing’s flexible approach to unification would ultimately result in Taiwan’s being absorbed by the mainland.”15 As part of its long-term interest in political change on the mainland, the United States enthusiastically supports Taiwan’s democracy. It regarded Lee Teng-hui’s 1996 election and the 2000 victory of Chen Shui-bian as triumphs, partly because Taiwan’s successful democratic development holds the promise of influencing the PRC’s political development as well. In theory at least, reformminded mainland leaders can point to a democratic entity of 22 million Chinese as a model. Japan, too, supports Taiwanese democratization, but more quietly and conditionally: Taiwanese democracy is laudable as long as it does not lead to independence. The United States also maintains that its security commitment to Taiwan, if broken, would undercut the credibility of its commitments throughout Asia. But although this concern may be important to Washington, it seems to weighs much less heavily in Japan than do concerns about entrapment into the use of force in a Taiwan Strait conflict. Long-term political links exist between Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Taiwan’s Nationalists (KMT), and newer ties connect Japan’s opposition parties to Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).16 An older generation in Japan has strong, emotional ties to Taiwan, and anticommunist, pro-KMT hawks such as Tokyo governor Ishihara frequently visit Taipei. Realists in the younger generation, on the other hand, tend to focus on the importance of Japan-PRC relations. Educational ties to Taiwan are strong: although the United States is the first choice for Taiwanese who study abroad, Japan comes in a close second. In Taipei, young Taiwanese closely follow Japanese trends in style and entertainment, spawning a cultural phenomenon dubbed “Japanomania.”

Taiwan 27

The Mori government’s decision to give a visa to former president Lee Teng-hui in early 2001 illustrated that, even though Japan does not wish to provoke China, significant popular sympathies lie with democratic, free-market–oriented Taiwan. Japan’s official policy emphasized that Lee, now a private citizen, requested the visa on humanitarian grounds and pledged not to engage in political activities while in Japan. Beijing responded by canceling the scheduled visit of National People’s Congress chairman Li Peng, but took no further action. Japan has specific domestic concerns about the immediate effect of any cross-strait conflict. More than 10,000 Japanese nationals are in Taiwan at any given time (compared with 50,000–75,000 Americans), and Japan’s southern islands (especially Okinawa) would be the natural destination of Taiwanese refugees.

The Cross-Strait Situation China will not accept a permanent separation of Taiwan that appears to violate Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. Beijing’s leaders want reunification to take place according to a “one country, two systems” formula. For its part, Taiwan is reluctant to begin talks on a “One China” basis that could jeopardize its claim to a separate identity. China poses an asymmetrical threat to Taiwan, with more than 300 missiles in southern China opposite Taiwan, a number that may increase to 650 over the next few years.17 The Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) is deploying new warplanes, destroyers, submarines, and surface-to-surface missiles. China at present cannot expect to triumph militarily, however, so an uneasy cross-strait stability prevails. If Beijing continues its missile buildup, the military balance will be threatened, and the United States will likely counter China’s moves. Although China and Taiwan began their own process of managing cross-strait relations in the 1980s, both sides continued to look to the United States to play a constructive role. The United States actively promoted and advocated unofficial cross-strait dialogue during President Lee Teng-hui’s tenure and immediately engaged Chen Shui-bian after his election, making parallel efforts in Beijing. Until recently, Beijing refused to carry on a dialogue with Chen’s administration and instead sought to isolate his govern-

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ment, since the DPP for many years advocated independence. The December 2001 election in Taiwan, which strengthened Chen politically, may have persuaded Beijing to abandon this tactic. In January 2002, Chinese vice premier Qian Qichen invited DPP members to visit China and called for renewed dialogue and stronger economic ties across the strait.

Options for the Future The U.S. and Japanese challenge for the next decade is to help reduce cross-strait tension, facilitate communication, and urge both parties to enter into a meaningful dialogue that can lead them to resolve their differences.18 The two countries can also promote confidence-building measures in such areas as protecting sea lines of communication, combating piracy, and conducting rescues at sea. Japan’s near-term ability to promote these goals alone is inhibited by three factors: (1) it lacks the military wherewithal to back up its pledges; (2) it is burdened by its colonial history in Taiwan and a wartime legacy involving China; and (3) Beijing remains deeply suspicious of Japan’s motives. In concert with the United States, however, Japan can help promote official and unofficial cross-strait dialogue that could advance U.S. and Japanese shared interests in deterring cross-strait conflict, improving relations with China, and preserving economic interests on both sides of the strait. There is some evidence for optimism. In December 2000, Qian Qichen indicated that the PRC and Taiwan could be seen as equal parts of a new political entity and that the definition of one China would not be determined by Beijing alone. Taiwanese president Chen responded by offering to begin the “integration of our economies, trade and culture” and to gradually build “a new framework of permanent peace and political integration.”19 Chen proposed an open-ended process without a predetermined outcome, one that excludes neither unification nor independence for Taiwan. Qian’s January 2002 remarks did not preclude a future visit by Chen to Beijing. In a fractious political environment, Chen’s government works cautiously to develop trade, transportation, and telecommunication ties across the strait, and tourist exchanges began in January 2002. Unofficial cross-strait links are already the norm. Chen’s

Taiwan 29

government broke with a decades-long policy of restricting crossstrait trade by lifting a $50 million investment cap for Taiwanese doing business on the mainland and by allowing Chinese to invest in Taiwan’s real estate and stock markets. Faced with a recession at home, Taiwan’s businesspeople know where the future lies. They invest in the mainland at a phenomenal rate—more than $60 billion to date—and cross-strait trade reached a $32 billion annual rate in 2000.20 The United States, Japan, and other trading partners helped facilitate cross-strait economic integration by bringing the PRC and Taiwan into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. The WTO will provide Beijing and Taipei with a potentially effective forum for communication and for resolving disputes. A process of economic integration involving Taiwan and the mainland seems to have persuaded Beijing for now that time is on its side. Because of the military balance cited above, a desire to maintain stable relations with the United States, and Beijing’s plans to host the 2008 Olympics, Beijing will not likely take action before its Communist Party Congress in 2002. Across the strait, threefourths of Taiwanese continue to support the status quo, while only 10 to 12 percent support immediate independence, and a similar number support immediate unification with the mainland.21 Since May 2000, President Chen has maintained his inauguration pledge that, as long as China did not use force, Taiwan would not declare independence. He also promised not to refer to two states in the constitution, to keep the flag, and to refrain from holding a referendum on independence. If cross-strait hostilities can be deterred for the next decade, possibly long-term trends will make the issue much easier to manage. Still, noted Tokyo University professor Tanaka Akihito, “Taiwan is the central focus of the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy.”22 Nationalist dictates will not likely lessen with the ascent to power of a new generation of PRC leaders in 2002. And the desire of at least some of Taiwan’s people for self-determination will probably continue. Although the United States and Japan have overlapping interests regarding Taiwan, they have been unclear, even to each other, about their respective roles and responses if in the near future Beijing uses force or establishes an economic blockade of Taiwan, or if Taipei declares independence. To avoid a damaging rift in the alliance, Tokyo and Washington must address these issues

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The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

through quiet dialogue and alliance planning, even if they risk a hostile response from Beijing.

Notes 1. This theme surfaced in interviews with Tokyo University professor Tanaka Akihito (February 20, 2001), National Defense Academy president Nishihara Masashi (February 27, 2001), and Asahi Shimbun chief diplomatic correspondent Funabashi Yoichi (May 17, 2001). 2. In an April 23, 2001, interview, Deputy Secretary-General Eugene Chien (and later foreign minister) also stated his opinion that, because Taiwan is vital to Japan and Japan is allied to the United States, these relationships create a “virtual” U.S.-Taiwan alliance. 3. To avoid unnecessarily provoking China, each U.S. president must perform a delicate balancing act, seeking to reconcile commitments to China (Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, Joint Communiqué on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations in 1979, and the August 1982 Communiqué on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan) with unofficial and commercial ties to Taiwan and with the legal requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act. 4. Briefing by the American Institute in Taipei, April 24, 2001. 5. In 2000, Taiwanese companies made 53 percent of the world’s laptops and 25 percent of its desktop personal computers. They made an even larger percentage of computer peripherals such as scanners, monitors, and keyboards, accounting for as much as 80 percent of the world’s output of computer motherboards. Mark Landler, “China’s High-Tech Role Worries Some U.S. Firms,” International Herald Tribune, May 30, 2001, http:// www.iht.com. 6. Unofficial estimate by the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers. 7. Interview by UPI’s Arnaud de Borchgrave, “SM Lee on Future Global Threats,” Singapore Business Times, May 19, 2001, p. 4. 8. In Alliance Adrift, Funabashi Yoichi describes Hashimoto’s actions. When this writer interviewed him on May 17, 2001, however, Funabashi said that Hashimoto did not receive political support for his efforts. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999). 9. Three senior officials at the Japan Defense Agency and two at the Foreign Ministry made or confirmed this point in separate interviews in April, May, and June 2001. 10. Interview in Yokosuka, February 27, 2001. 11. “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century,” Article 5, section b.

Taiwan 31

12. Amako Satoshi, “Japan and Taiwan: A Neglected Friendship,” Japan Review of International Affairs 15, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 51. 13. Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) data. 14. Interview with Tanaka Akihito, February 20, 2001. 15. Amako, “Japan and Taiwan,” p. 43. 16. In an interview on April 27, 2001, DPP secretary-general Wu Nai-jen said his party has gone beyond its ties to the opposition in Japan and is “reaching out to the Young Turks” in the LDP. 17. Interview with Eugene Chien, deputy secretary-general to the president, Taipei, April 23, 2001. 18. The movie “Thirteen Days” made a deep impression on Taiwan’s leaders, because it showed the danger of having no open communication channels during a crisis. Without communication, there can be no trust. 19. “Cross-Century,” remarks by President Chen Shui-bian, Taipei, December 31, 2000, in Seeking Constructive Cross-Strait Relations: Taipei’s Current Mainland Policy Documents, Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, ROC, April 2001. 20. Taiwan Board of Foreign Trade estimates. 21. Interview with James Huang, Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), Taipei, April 23, 2001. MAC commissioned the poll, which suggests that the proportion of Taiwanese favoring reunification with China either immediately or at some time in the future had risen to 24.4 percent in March 2001. 22. Interview in Tokyo, February 20, 2001.

4 China

A Triangular Relationship As chapter 3 notes, the U.S.-Japan security alliance is not aimed at China. In 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto explained to China’s leadership that the revised guidelines are not directed toward any specific country or area.1 Indeed, the U.S. forward presence in Japan is not appropriate for dealing with a potential China threat. But the alliance enhances bilateral relations, enabling the United States and Japan to better identify shared interests and coordinate policies that may affect the choices China makes. U.S. and Japanese interests in Taiwan differ, but also overlap. Regarding the PRC, however, the two countries share an overarching goal: both want to see China integrated into the world economy and the global community, and both want to see it adhere to international norms of behavior. Historically, the rise—or reemergence— of great powers is usually a time of uncertainty for other nations.2 The United States and Japan share the goal of ensuring that China’s rise not jeopardize their vital strategic and commercial long-term interests in Asian stability. Perhaps inevitably, the United States and Japan regard China, a potential regional competitor ruled by an authoritarian government, with suspicion. U.S.–China relations have been particularly turbulent since the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. American wariness has increased with each successive charge of espionage, report of repressive behavior, and poor handling by Beijing of such incidents 32

China 33

as the reconnaissance plane collision near Hainan Island. U.S. and Chinese views differ on key principles, including the importance of sovereignty and single-party rule versus pluralist democracy. Japan’s concerns about China are, if anything “more acute”3 than those of the United States. Until the Meiji Restoration, a strong China and a weak Japan defined the landscape of East Asia. The Sino-Japanese war reversed this equation, yet China considers the past 100 years of relative Japanese strength to be the exception. In the long sweep of East Asian history, China has generally regarded Japan, like Korea or Vietnam, as a lesser power. The current era, when China is strong politically and Japan is strong economically, requires difficult adjustments for both nations. For its part, China fears encirclement by U.S. alliances, including the strengthening U.S.-Japan alliance, and objects to U.S. plans for ballistic missile defense (see chapter 8). China regularly condemns American interventionism and use of force: it criticized the U.S.-led NATO air campaign against Serbia, military actions in Iraq, and the supply of defensive weapons to Taiwan. Travel to the United States by President Chen Shui-bian and the Dalai Lama in 2001 further fueled China’s suspicions about American motives. Many Chinese leaders believe Japan will ultimately become a military power. Japan’s recent efforts to acquire reconnaissance satellites and possibly air tankers contribute to Chinese concerns about a rise in Japanese military capabilities, and China’s worries were aggravated by the ascendancy in 2001 of conservative leaders in Washington and Tokyo.

U.S. Interests In the short term, U.S. interests dictate preventing a direct military conflict with China; even with its current long-range nuclear arsenal of only 20 to 24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, China could inflict unacceptable damage on the United States. In the longer term, China’s efforts to modernize the PLA make sustaining U.S. military supremacy in Asia more costly and difficult. A Defense Department report on Chinese military power (June 2000) concluded that China would seek the status of a great military power as its economy grows. China planned to increase defense spending by 17.7 percent in 2001, and some analysts say the real figure is

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three times as high, bringing China’s expenditures almost on a par with Japan’s at $45 billion to $50 billion annually.4 Two Chinese military strategists, seeking to address a vast force imbalance with the United States, included nontraditional warfare— terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, and computer virus propagation—in China’s plans for offensive operations. Assessing U.S. military doctrine, these PLA analysts identified the growing dependence of America’s advanced technology forces on information technologies as a potential critical weakness.5 In the near term, President Jiang Zemin will seek to be named head of the powerful military commission during the 16th Communist Party Congress in 2002 (he steps down as party general secretary in 2002 and as president in 2003). To achieve his objective, Jiang must counter his record of cutting PLA benefits and business ties and mollify the military with arms purchases and increased defense spending. In the longer term, however, the PRC must bring defense spending to within a sustainable level. Given the size of China’s debt payments, spending on the military is already more than one-third of the PRC’s discretionary budget, and continued increases would crowd out education, health, and social welfare spending to an unsustainable degree. If China can maintain an annual growth rate of 7 percent, the PLA’s budget will probably not grow more than 10 percent to 12 percent a year.6 If economic growth declines, however, China will face serious challenges in containing internal strife. If it cannot resolve internal problems, China’s government would likely employ its traditional strategy of focusing citizens on external issues, such as Taiwan or its rivalry with the United States. For 150 years the United States opposed the emergence of a regional hegemon in Asia and fought wars to prevent such a rise. Preventing China’s ascendancy would thus seem to be in America’s long-term interest. However, the greatest threat China poses to America’s vital interest in Asian stability derives not from power projection capabilities but from its potential weakness and internal instability. China’s wealthier 200 million citizens live in coastal areas and cities, while more than 80 percent of its population, or more than 1 billion people, live at or near subsistence level in the hinterland. In this dual society, internal friction over income distribution, water scarcities, transportation, and the environment will certainly occur. 7 Unlike the regime in Pyongyang, China’s leaders cannot expect to maintain absolute control.

China 35

If most or all of America’s and China’s interests differed fundamentally, an appropriate strategy would be to force China into an arms race that would break it economically. The trends cited above suggest that such a strategy would have a reasonable chance of success. After all, a similar strategy worked in the case of the U.S. rivalry with the former Soviet Union, where two antagonists’ interests could not be reconciled. Should U.S. leaders decide, however, that China is the next great enemy, replacing the Soviet Union, they would risk a course of action that would create a self-fulfilling prophecy. The United States, China, and Japan share a vital interest in China’s emergence over the next several decades as a stable, prosperous, and peaceful nation. U.S. and Japanese long-term interests are decidedly not served by a weak, fragmented, unstable China. As Secretary of State Colin Powell said in his confirmation hearings, “China is not an enemy and our challenge is to keep it that way.”8 On the matter of political change in China, the United States and Japan share similar concerns about the pace of any transition to democratic rule. In the long run, by fostering China’s integration into the global economy, the United States, Japan, and others have wagered that economic modernization will eventually lead to political opening in China as well. For its part, Beijing has calculated that economic opening and all it entails—reform, growth, and rising living standards for the Chinese people—are needed for the Communist Party to remain in power. Historically, such gambles have led to political opening, as the examples of Chile, Spain, Taiwan, and South Korea demonstrate.9 Within the next decade, however, neither the United States nor Japan envisions or indeed desires a multi-party democracy in China. Gradual reform, order, and stability, rather than dissolution along the Soviet model and ensuing chaos, would best serve the long-term strategic interests of the United States and Japan.

Japanese Interests Japan has specific, short-term security concerns with regard to China. An ongoing territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands flared up as recently as 1996, when Japanese ultra-nationalists built a makeshift lighthouse and claimed Japanese sovereignty over the islands.10 During the 1998–2001 period, Chinese “research” vessels intruded into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone on more than 50

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The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

occasions.11 Although the U.S. government generally avoids pronouncements on conflicting territorial claims, in this dispute it has quietly reminded China of the importance of “a peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts and the security of international maritime traffic.”12 Japan has exercised careful restraint in responding to Chinese provocations. Early in 2001, China and Japan agreed to provide advance notice of maritime research activities, but that agreement did not end the incursions. For now, Japan relies on quiet diplomacy and has decided that overt U.S. involvement might do more harm than good. As former secretary of state Cordell Hull said, “When goods do not cross borders, armies do.”13 The U.S. and Japanese stake in China’s economic integration is strategic and good for business. China’s economy—the world’s seventh largest—includes a fifth of the world’s people. Already, with $120 billion in annual trade between the two countries, China is the fourth largest U.S. trading partner. Although the bilateral trade deficit is huge and growing, the United States exported $16 billion in goods and services in 2000, providing jobs or other direct benefits to 400,000 U.S. workers.14 China’s accession to the WTO will greatly improve the trade picture. Although a study by the International Institute of Economics estimated a $3.1 billion annual increase in total U.S. exports to China,15 a Goldman Sachs study was even more optimistic, estimating that exports to China could potentially rise by up to $13.9 billion a year by 2005.16 The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that China’s WTO accession would triple U.S. farm exports in five years, from $1 billion to $3 billion annually. Over time, implementation of the agreement should lead to higher incomes in the United States and a decrease in the overall U.S. trade deficit.17 Japan’s postwar history has taught it that geographic domination is not a prerequisite for prosperity: a free trade regime is a sufficient substitute. In this regard, Japan sees both challenges and opportunities in China’s economic integration. Two-way trade between Japan and China exceeded $80 billion in 2000.18 When Japan began providing official development assistance (ODA) to Beijing, China’s GDP was one-tenth of Japan’s; now it is one-fourth. By 2010, China’s GDP will be half the size of Japan’s. China’s growth and economic integration will inevitably lead to friction, as demonstrated by Tokyo’s decision in spring 2001 to enforce safeguards against the import of leeks, shiitake mushrooms, and grass for

China 37

tatami mats (worth $100 million), and China’s retaliation against automobiles, cellular phones, and air conditioners from Japan (worth $475 million in the second half of 2001). The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry’s “White Paper on International Trade 2001” warned of the danger from Chinese economic competition and recommended that Japanese companies implement aggressive restructuring measures and make the most of their comparative advantage in information technology.19 Another area of common concern for Japan and the United States is China’s environmental degradation. China faces a daunting array of environmental challenges, including severe air and water pollution, deforestation, acid rain, and fresh-water scarcities. China’s cities are among the world’s most polluted, and more than half the Chinese population lacks access to clean water. Only 22 percent of Beijing’s sewage is treated, and the situation is worse in most other Chinese cities. China is the world’s second largest emitter of greenhouse gases, mainly from coal combustion. It is also the number-one chemical exporter among developing countries and the leading producer of ozone-depleting substances. Japan instantly feels the effects of Chinese environmental neglect, because acid rain, air-borne pollutants, and yellow dust (the result of desertification) cross the Sea of Japan on prevailing winds. With more than 1.3 billion people, one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, and rapidly increasing energy and resource demands, China’s environmental problems are only becoming more urgent.

Options for the Future The best strategy for the United States and Japan to achieve broad shared objectives regarding China is through a policy of engagement, defined as a continuous, multifaceted interchange at many levels (for example, involving senior officials, technical specialists, business associates, students) and in many arenas (government, business, academia, the military, people-to-people).20 As former vice president Al Gore declared, “We have to engage China—even as we challenge China on key areas of difference. It is in America’s clear national security interest to do so. It is in America’s vital economic interest to do so. And in the long run . . . it is the only way to bring freedom and reform to the people of China.”21

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Before President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi took office, six U.S. presidents and 16 Japanese prime ministers pursued variants of this policy. Despite talk of China as a “strategic competitor,” President Bush welcomed Qian Qichen to Washington, saying he wanted “to lay the foundation for 30 years from now,” and assured the vice premier that “nothing we do is a threat to you.”22 Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, China has broken with its policy of staunchly opposing any “interference” in the affairs of others. Instead, it acquiesced in the U.S. air strikes on Afghanistan, offered moral and political support to the war against terrorism and, more significantly, provided the United States with intelligence and information. The real question, therefore, is not whether to engage, but how: how to achieve a stable relationship with China that encourages responsible behavior, recognizes how to play elements of cooperation and competition, and imposes a high cost on irresponsible behavior.23 China’s entry into the WTO now subjects it to the multilateral dispute settlement process, so the United States, Japan, and other trading partners can, for the first time, hold China accountable under rules of international trade. Like any sovereign power, China will act in its own interest in the WTO. However, its pattern in international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank suggests that China adapts to these institutions’ existing systems rather than disrupting them.24 The United States will benefit from following Japan’s lead and providing technical assistance and rule-of-law training to Chinese officials to facilitate China’s ability to implement the WTO accession agreement. Along with bringing China into the WTO, Japan’s most important tools for stabilizing the bilateral relationship include trade, investment, technology transfers, and ODA.25 At the 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum meeting, Chinese trade minister Shi Guangsheng and his Japanese counterpart, Hiranuma Takeo, agreed to launch a bilateral “economic dialogue” modeled on the U.S.-Japan framework. However, doing business in China entails significant risks, and so far most investors have received only low rates of return on investment. American and Japanese companies regularly express frustration with their Chinese business partners, with the lack of legal transparency, and with inadequate distribution systems.

China 39

Winning combinations have also been found. Senior engineers involved in Chinese manufacturing—the “Silver Peace Corps”— have established profitable ties using Japanese expertise and China’s comparative advantage in labor. Fast Retailing makes 90 percent of its Uniqlo brand of products in China, where production costs are one-tenth of Japan’s.26 The list of Japanese companies outsourcing manufacturing to China now includes Sony, Matsushita, Toshiba, and Konica. In 2001, for the first time, Japanese manufacturers established more facilities in China than in North America. Mitsubishi Rayon and Teijin, two textile manufacturers, have been rejuvenated by Chinese investments. Juki Corporation plans to start producing sewing machines in Shanghai in 2002.27 Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s visit to Tokyo in 1998 led to agreement on 33 issues, including arms control, an exchange of military officials, and law of the sea and piracy agreements. However, it also underscored important differences between the two countries on such issues as Japan’s wartime legacy (Jiang was a child in Nanjing during the events of 1937), China’s military buildup, the treatment of Japanese investors in China, and robberies perpetrated by illegal Chinese immigrants to Japan. Academic and cultural ties between China and Japan may help to improve the relationship. Chinese make up the largest group of foreign students in Japan, Japanese the largest group of foreign students in China. Yet the quality of dialogue between the two nations remains poor. After a two-year hiatus, China and Japan reconvened their bilateral security dialogue, but it remains formulaic, with little prospect of producing concrete results. A three-way Track II dialogue involving the United States, Japan, and China (organized by the Japan Institute of International Affairs) has held five meeting sessions so far; further engagement on this unofficial level could prove fruitful.

Human Rights The stalemate over Tibet, disturbing crackdown on members of the Falun Gong sect, continued arrest and imprisonment of democracy activists and scholars, and harassment of underground churches demonstrate that China still does not adhere to international human rights norms. Yet China has changed dramatically over the

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The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

past two decades. In 1978, Chinese citizens could not move from one village to another, engage in commercial transactions, or read the Bible. Today, the realm of personal freedom has expanded: rural and urban Chinese are highly mobile, depend far less on the government for jobs and benefits, and now have access to a growing range of domestic and foreign information and influences. The 1996 elections in 900,000 Chinese villages marked an important step forward. However, anything that challenges the political primacy of the Communist Party receives an immediate negative reaction. After failing to produce results by explicitly linking trade with China to human rights improvements, the United States moved in the mid-1990s to internationalize its human rights differences with China by pursuing them in multilateral fora. Although Japan no longer cosponsors America’s annual human rights resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, it continues to advocate a multilateral approach to induce gradual change in China. By insisting that Beijing live up to international human rights standards, the United States, Japan, and others can help those seeking to expand individual rights in China and shrink the role of the state. Plans to host the 2008 Olympics will serve as a constraint on Beijing in the realm of human rights, and even in PRC relations with Taiwan.28

Energy and the Environment By the early 1990s, China’s leaders realized they could not tackle environmental problems alone. The Clinton administration responded by creating the U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development to expand bilateral cooperation and dialogue on sustainable development and environmental protection. Under the leadership of Vice President Gore and Premier Zhu Rongji, the forum encouraged U.S. and Chinese cooperation: to combat global threats such as climate change; to ensure continued trade in biotechnology products that do not harm the environment; to effectively manage fresh-water, coastal, and land resources; to develop cleaner production methods as well as cleaner and more efficient sources of energy; to minimize air pollution and its effects on human health; and to mitigate and reduce natural disasters. For decades, Japan has engaged in a program of Green Aid to China.

China 41

Nowhere in the world are the opportunities greater for clean energy and environmental services than in China. Beijing is implementing a long-term strategy to reduce China’s reliance on coal (currently 75 percent of the energy mix) and is developing cleaner energy options such as natural gas, wind, hydropower, clean coal technologies, nuclear power, biomass, and solar energy. Over the next decade, the market in China for energy-efficient goods and services alone could exceed $200 billion. U.S. and Japanese companies could profit from this situation, while at the same time building trust in a key strategic area. As its energy demands have increased, China has become a net oil importer. Today, technology has the potential to reduce the importance of resource scarcities as reasons for tension between nations. Science and market forces can bring resources where they are needed, and energy is the most fungible of all resources. Engaging with China on energy issues opens the door to a much broader strategic engagement. China still embraces a concept of “energy security” that stresses domestic self-sufficiency in resources and production and minimizes reliance on the global marketplace and imported fuels. Through strategic engagement, as well as through promotion of trade, investment, and world-class business practices, the United States, Japan, and China can move toward an enhanced notion of energy security, relying on diversification of supply, investments in new technology, and strengthening of market mechanisms.

Notes 1. Beijing was not convinced. As cited by Keio University professor Kokubun Ryosei in an unpublished essay, The People’s Daily on May 27, 1999, described the revised guidelines as a threat, defining them as “significant measures by which militant elements in Japan will strengthen cooperation with the U.S. military, and Japan will expand its military role in the Asia-Pacific region.” 2. Ted Osius, “Discussion of ‘The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,’” Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (February 2001): 43. 3. Interview with Kawai Chikao, North American Affairs deputy director general, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, March 2, 2001. 4. International Herald Tribune, March 6, 2001. 5. Sha Lin, “Two Senior Colonels and ‘No Limit’ Warfare,” Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, Beijing, June 28, 1999, p. 5.

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6. Interview with Kunihiro Michihiko, former ambassador to China, Tokyo, April 3, 2001. 7. Interview with Tanaka Hitoshi, Economic Affairs Bureau director general, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, May 11, 2001. 8. U.S. Senate confirmation hearings, January 17, 2001, http:// usinfo.state.gov. 9. Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2000): 55. 10. Nakai Yoshifumi, “Policy Coordination on Taiwan,” in Nishihara Masashi, ed., The Japan-U.S. Alliance: New Challenges for the 21st Century (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), p. 84. 11. David Lague and Nayan Chanda, “The Spying Game Heats Up,” Far Eastern Economic Review (May 3, 2001): 23. 12. Reinhard Drifte, “U.S. Impact on Japanese-Chinese Security Relations,” Security Dialogue 31, no. 4 (December 2000): 456. 13. As quoted by Vice President Al Gore, East Room of the White House, May 9, 2000, http://usinfo.state.gov. 14. Secretary of State Colin Powell, “The Promise of China Trade,” Washington Post, June 1, 2001, p. A31. 15. Daniel Rosen, “China and the World Trade Organization: An Economic Balance Sheet,” Institute for International Economics Policy Brief No. 99-6, June 1999. 16. Fred Hu, “WTO Membership: What This Means for Greater China,” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 14, April 26, 1999, p. 4. 17. The International Trade Commission’s limited model simulates the effects of China’s April 1999 tariff offer as (1) U.S. GDP rises by $1.7 billion; (2) America’s overall trade deficit decreases by about $800 million; (3) U.S. exports to China rise by 10.1 percent and imports from China rise by 6.9 percent. The ITC’s calculation of benefits focuses almost exclusively on the effects of lowering China’s tariffs. Tariff concessions, however, are but a portion of China’s very broad market opening commitments. 18. Zhu Jianrong, “Fear, Obsession Hold Back Japan-China Ties,” Japan Times, March 2, 2001, p. 19. 19. “White Paper Says Japan No Longer Engine of Growth for East Asia,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 2, 2001, p. 1. 20. This definition arises from Thomas Fingar’s presentation to a Stanley Foundation Conference on New Generation, New Voices: Debating China’s International Future, held in San Francisco, Calif., August 13– 14, 1999. Drifte and Shinn distinguish between unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, comprehensive or constructive engage-

China 43

ment, robust engagement, “congagement,” coercive engagement, and constrainment. Drifte, “U.S. Impact on Japanese-Chinese Security Relations,” and James Shinn, ed., Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996), p. 4. 21. Vice President Al Gore, Remarks to the International Press Institute, Boston, Mass., April 30, 2000. 22. Transcript: Background briefing on Bush-Qian meeting, March 22, 2001. 23. The EP-3 reconnaissance plane incident underscored the need for direct communication between U.S. and PRC decisionmakers and the need to persist with military exchanges despite China’s frustrating lack of transparency and reciprocity. 24. David Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989–2000 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2001), chapter 4. For a perspective on the internal changes that WTO accession will bring to China, including expanding the rule of law and the role of civil society, see Ted Osius, “Legacy of the Clinton-Gore Administration’s China Policy,” Asian Affairs 28, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 125–134. 25. Within Japan there is a growing debate over the appropriateness of extending large amounts of development assistance to China out of concern for China’s military buildup and Beijing’s own foreign assistance to other countries. In autumn 2001, the Diet was considering whether to sharply reduce ODA to China and redirect it from economic infrastructure projects along China’s coast to environmental conservation and improving the standard of living in inland provinces. 26. Interview with Funabashi Yoichi, Tokyo, May 17, 2001. See also, Funabashi Yoichi, “‘Made in China’ and Opening for ‘Made in Japan,’” International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shimbun, May 2, 2001. 27. “Yen and Yuan,” Economist, July 28, 2001, p. 59. 28. Interview with Yen Wan-Ching, Straits Exchange Foundation deputy secretary-general, Taipei, April 26, 2001.

5 The East Asian Region

U.S. and Japanese Interests in Russia Russia falls within Japan’s legal definition of the “Far East” for purposes of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. America has a vital interest in the future disposition of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, not least because terrorist groups may seek to obtain and use nuclear weapons. Dismantling or neutralizing nuclear weapons–grade materials in Russia will cost at least $30 billion over the next decade, according to U.S. ambassador to Japan Howard Baker. The United States wants its allies, including Japan, to contribute to this process.1 Japan’s interests in Russia include the return of the northern territories/Kuril Islands. The 1956 Tokyo Declaration calls for return of two islands following conclusion of a Japan-Russia Peace Treaty. Negotiations in 2001, at the end of Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro’s tenure, led to the possibility that Russia might return the Habomai islets and Shikotan2 in the short term, while continuing to negotiate over the future of the remaining two—Kunashiri and Etorofu. However, Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko rejected the Mori administration’s approach, insisting instead that Japan-Russia negotiations begin by settling the question of all four islands. At present, there appears to be little room for compromise. A slight plurality of the island residents favors transfer of sovereignty to Japan.3 Resolution of this dispute left over from World War II would permit more Russia-Japan economic engagement. For its part, Russia wants to remain a player in Asia, as demonstrated by President Putin’s 2001 visits to North Korea and Vietnam and by Russian efforts to strengthen ties to China. Russia and 44

The East Asian Region 45

China pursue shared goals in the Caspian region via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, founded in June 2001 with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. They have also established confidence-building measures along their shared border, and in July 2001 Presidents Putin and Jiang Zemin signed a Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation symbolizing their nations’ continuing rapprochement. The Russian Far East is rich in coal, oil, natural gas, and thermal power; its tremendous oil and gas reserves could significantly contribute to meeting Northeast Asian energy needs. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are world’s largest importers of liquefied natural gas and may benefit greatly from the construction of pipelines originating in West Siberia, Irkutsk, Yakutsk, and Sakhalin.4 Energy integration in Northeast Asia could contribute significantly to enhancing the region’s stability.

U.S. and Japanese Interests in Southeast Asia The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises 10 nations not included in Japan’s definition of the “Far East,” as pertaining to the Security Treaty and Guidelines. But the United States and Japan share key interests in Southeast Asia. Within ASEAN, Indonesia once provided direction and leadership; now it is ASEAN’s primary problem. The United States and Japan share a vital interest in preserving Indonesia’s territorial integrity and viability as a nation for a number of reasons. First, one lesson from the war in Afghanistan is that ignoring state failure is more costly than ever anticipated. Terrorists operate most freely in a power vacuum, and some have identified Indonesia as a potential place to relocate if they are driven out of South Asia and the Middle East. Currently, only minimal links exist between Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda group and Muslim extremists in Indonesia, and the United States and its allies must isolate these groups and eliminate all ties. A second shared interest derives from Indonesia’s strategic location astride critical sea-lanes. Eighty-five percent of Japan’s oil and half of America’s come from the Persian Gulf and Middle East; much of it passes near Indonesia. Third, piracy is on the rise in the waters around Indonesia, some of it conducted by the Indonesian

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navy. Of the world’s 400 reported cases of major piracy in 2000, 65 percent occurred in the Indonesian region, especially near the Malacca Straits. Japanese concern has heightened as entire cargo ships have disappeared. According to the Nippon Foundation’s Department of Marine Affairs, most of the piracy is committed by antigovernment guerrillas whose freedom to act is enhanced by the continuing political unrest in Jakarta.5 Indonesia’s dissolution would have “dire consequences” for the region, according to Malaysian defense minister Datuk Seri Najib,6 who expressed greatest concern about potential refugee flows from Indonesia. Aside from its regional concerns, Japan also has specific interests separate from those of the United States. Before the fall of Suharto, 18,000 Japanese citizens lived in Indonesia, although now that number is significantly lower. In May 1999, the Japanese SelfDefense Forces sent C-130s to Singapore and prepared additional civilian aircraft to stand by in case a rescue was needed.7 Japan has determined that its economic interests in Asia and elsewhere are best served by a more proactive approach to expanding trade and economic networks. Viewed from Japan, Europe continues the process of deepening and widening its economic integration, while Western hemispheric integration proceeds via the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, and talks aimed at a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, or FTAA. China and ASEAN agreed in November 2001 to create the world’s largest Free Trade Area within 10 years. For its part, Japan has concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Singapore, launched FTA negotiations with South Korea, and begun joint study of a possible FTA with Mexico. Separately, Japan is pursuing a “Closer Economic Relations” trade agreement with Australia and New Zealand and a “Comprehensive Economic Partnership” with ASEAN. Tokyo has also floated proposals for future FTAs with China, Thailand, and Chile.

Options for the Future In the short term, U.S. and Japanese interests in the Asian region as a whole are best served by fostering multilateral security institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and economic institutions such as the APEC forum. APEC broke its tradition of

The East Asian Region 47

steering clear of security matters when, in October 2001, its members issued a statement condemning the September attacks on the United States and calling for better cooperation against terrorism. Asia’s regional security architecture has evolved slowly since 1991, when Japanese foreign minister Nakayama began promoting the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, whose members created the ARF in 1994. The ARF now focuses on preventive diplomacy, but its principal measures for preventing conflict between states include only those that are (1) diplomatic; (2) noncoercive; and (3) respectful of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and noninterference in the internal affairs of each state.8 Multilateral approaches to Asian security have long been hamstrung by Chinese and ASEAN attachment to the principle of noninterference and the sanctity of national sovereignty. For the most part, exceptions to the noninterference policy have been limited to economic matters. But some ASEAN members may be moving toward a more flexible approach on political and security matters as well. For example, in 1998, the Philippines and Thailand sought (unsuccessfully) to persuade the Malaysian government to halt its prosecution of former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim. The same year, an ASEAN troika explored means to cope with increasing unrest in Indonesia. In 2001, Malaysia’s flexible engagement policy helped begin luring Burma out of its self-imposed isolation. After Prime Minister Mahathir publicly urged Burmese leader Than Shwe to hold elections in Burma, Malaysia’s defense minister described Mahathir’s approach as “gentle persuasion” consistent with ASEAN’s noninterference policy. The Burmese leadership, he said, had signaled in advance its acceptance of Mahathir’s proposal. In addition, Thai defense minister Gen. Chawalit Yongchaiyut proposed that Thailand mediate disputes between minority groups and the Burmese regime. A near-term test case for the ASEAN principle of noninterference may come in the Indonesian province of Aceh. Because core U.S. interests are not at stake in Aceh, Indonesia’s Asian neighbors should be the first to provide help to the government in containing the conflict and preventing further escalation. More than 600 people were killed in Aceh during the first four months of 2001, and violence now threatens freedom of navigation in the sea-lanes around the province. Together with ASEAN nations, Japan might

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assist the Indonesian government and Free Aceh Movement (commonly known as GAM) work toward a negotiated solution at a Track II level. If the Indonesian government saw advantages to assistance from outside and did not reject such offers as threatening to its sovereignty, the international community could provide an official imprimatur at a later stage. If ASEAN were to relax its noninterference policy, the adjustment would eliminate a huge obstacle to multilateral approaches to security in East Asia. Chinese thinkers such as Dr. Wu Xinbo, a professor of international politics at Fudan University, acknowledge that China might also benefit from a change in approach.9 Officially, however, China and Vietnam resist any alteration to the noninterference policy for political and security matters. Beijing’s interest in Asia’s economic integration continues to grow, however, and in 2001 China took a leading role in economic integration efforts by hosting the APEC forum and proposing a Free Trade Area with ASEAN. In the future, Beijing may see similar merit in greater security integration. The fledgling ASEAN plus three grouping also holds promise for enhanced regional integration. Asian countries appear to believe that they are better off collectively than individually for meeting the challenges of globalization, as demonstrated by the Chiang Mai initiative for currency stability. The ASEAN plus three may be a forerunner of a more structured East Asian Community or East Asian Prosperity Zone and could lead to creation of an Asian Monetary Fund for crisis management and long-term planning. The ASEAN plus three could also undertake initiatives to complement the ARF by establishing confidence-building measures and discussing security issues, according to Malaysian defense minister Seri Najib, who suggested that such discussions would contribute to a higher degree of confidence in the region. He also proposed increased military-to-military exchanges within ASEAN plus three.10 During his January 2002 tour of Southeast Asia, Prime Minister Koizumi proposed that expanding ASEAN plus three to include Australia and New Zealand would effectively address regional problems such as piracy. In the decades leading to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Americans and Europeans developed overlapping security institutions designed to prevent major wars in Europe. European integration proceeded step-by-step, however, and functional arrangements preceded political ones in that process. Last year, the Japan-ASEAN Eminent Persons group recommended promoting functional coop-

The East Asian Region 49

eration in Asia on such issues as energy supply and environmental protection and through means such as educational and journalistic exchanges, training in rule of law, and information technology.11

Security Communities Five of America’s seven mutual defense treaties are with Asian nations: Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia. U.S. bilateral alliances can contribute to the gradual process of Asian security integration by providing a foundation for future multilateral arrangements. Admiral Dennis Blair, commander-inchief of the Pacific (CINCPAC), presented a convincing case for “security communities” in the Pacific to help resolve differences without resorting to the use of force. He envisioned “a web of regional relationships and capabilities that reinforce security for individual states, discouraging armed aggression as a way of settling disputes, and developing habits of regional military cooperation and professional military behavior.”12 Blair endorsed the ASEAN plus three dialogue as providing a crucial link between Northeast and Southeast Asia on security cooperation. He described the U.S. presence in Asia as the driving force for promoting regional security integration. In 2001, Blair linked the U.S.-Thai bilateral exercise “Cobra Gold” to two other exercises, “Tandem Thrust” (the United States and Australia) and “Balikatan” (the United States and Philippines). The resulting joint combined exercise, “Team Challenge,” included noncombatant evacuation operation and crisis management scenarios and may serve as a model for the kind of military cooperation now feasible in the region.13 In the future, such exercises could focus on counterterrorism and might include Japan. Some Asian countries have recently strengthened bilateral defense cooperation with the United States. The Philippines completed the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States in 1998; Australia consulted intensively with the United States throughout the process of its 2000 Defense Review; and Singapore opened its new naval base at Changi with a visit by a U.S. aircraft carrier in February 2001.14 Recognizing the importance of ending the SDF’s long isolation, Singapore arranged for Japan’s navy to use Changi as well. The Malaysian navy also stepped up joint exercises (“Bai Tak”) with the United States and joined 21 other nations observing “Team Challenge.”

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Humanitarian Activities The U.S.-Japan alliance can facilitate the gradual process of security integration in Asia through military involvement in humanitarian activities. Already, the 1997 guidelines permit the U.S. and Japanese militaries to cooperate in humanitarian and disaster relief. For example, the 3rd MEF joined Japanese SDF troops in relief work following the Kobe earthquake and flooding in northern Japan. Earlier, U.S. forces independently provided assistance after natural disasters in the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, China, and Bangladesh. Now such operations can be bilateral—even multilateral. In October 2001, six Japanese C-130H military transports flew to Pakistan carrying relief supplies for an influx of refugees fleeing the fighting in Afghanistan. The guidelines also provide for searchand-rescue and noncombatant evacuation operations, activities that the ASEAN Regional Forum has already undertaken or begun considering for multinational cooperation. Except for a reference to activities aimed at the “Maintenance of International Peace and Stability,” the 1997 guidelines do not yet include provisions for other “soft” security cooperation. In the future, the United States and Japan will almost certainly increase cooperation on counterterrorism, energy security, WMD proliferation, transborder crime, piracy, and illegal narcotics, as well as on certain issues identified in their common agenda: environmental protection, infectious disease, and regional and global economic development.

U.S. Overstretch The United States must be careful about overextending its commitments, however. The East Timor crisis of 1999 serves as a good example of how to manage an issue when U.S. interests, but not vital interests, are at stake. Australia led a coalition including many Asian nations during the initial intervention stage, before the United Nations established a peacekeeping operation. The United States provided logistical support and information to Australia, helping ensure the mission’s success. Although U.S. interests did not dictate sending American troops to East Timor, the U.S. commitment to the alliance with Australia secured its indirect military involvement and support for joint goals.

The East Asian Region 51

Japan’s former ambassador to the United Nations, Owada Hisashi, noted that the United States could avoid overcommitment in Asian regional affairs through selective use of multilateral security institutions. “While bilateral relations between the U.S. and other countries continue to be the basis for the security framework in this region,” he wrote, “an emphasis on bilateral relations alone will in the long run weaken even the basis of bilateral relations.”15 The U.S.Japan alliance and other bilateral arrangements provide a foundation for maintaining East Asian stability, building confidence, and allowing time for a regional security architecture to develop. This architecture must include China. The United States and its allies should encourage Chinese cooperation in counterterrorism, preventive diplomacy, and peacekeeping operations, remembering that China, too, has a stake in regional stability and peaceful development. In the long run, as Asian economic integration deepens, and as Asian nations cooperate on such nonpolitical issues as energy and the environment, trust will accumulate. Over time, regional institutions can gain strength and become places where disputes are resolved and communication facilitated. Enduring peace in Asia will then become much more attainable.

Notes 1. “Japan Should Share Expense of Disarming Russia: Baker,” Japan Times, March 30, 2001, p. 1. 2. Shikotan sits astride one of the world’s three largest fishing grounds. In 2001, Japan barred Korean fishing boats from the Sanriku region in retaliation for Seoul’s signing an agreement worth $850,000 with Russia that secured rights to fish in the lucrative area near Shikotan. 3. According to a September 1998 survey conducted by the Moscowbased All-Russian Public Opinion Survey Center, 44 percent of island residents favor return of the islands to Japan versus 42 percent who favor Russian retention of sovereignty. Hiroshi Kimura, Distant Neighbors, vol. 2, Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin (Amonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 267. As cited by Victor Larin, presentation to Japan Institute of International Affairs, February 23, 2001. 4. Valentina Buldakova, “The Russian Far East as a Subject of Northeast Asia Integration,” study sponsored by the Japan Institute of International Affairs fellowship program, February 2001, p. 26. 5. Tokyo Yomiuri Shimbun, October 1, 2001, p. 19.

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6. Discussion meeting at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 21, 2001. 7. Interview with Tokuchi Hiroshi, planning and programming director, Japan Defense Agency, April 16, 2001. 8. Jimbo Ken, “From a Threat-Driven to an Interest-Oriented Security Arrangement,” http://www.jiia.or.jp. 9. In an article for the CSIS Pacific Forum, Dr. Wu wrote: “The establishment of an Asia-Pacific security community is possible because states in the region have shared interests in a peaceful and stable security environment, because they increasingly benefit from growing economic interactions. This nascent mechanism for regional security will evolve over time into a more effective means for promoting regional cooperation on security issues.” As quoted by H.C. Stackpole in conference papers for the Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs/Global Forum Japan Dialogue, May 28, 2001, p. 17. 10. Meeting at Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 21, 2001. 11. Final Report, “Towards Vision 2020: ASEAN-Japan Consultation Conference on the Hanoi Plan of Action,” Japan Institute of International Affairs and ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, October 2000. 12. Dennis Blair and John Hanley, “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements,” Washington Quarterly 24 (Winter 2001): 16. To date, China has rejected Blair’s argument. 13. Interview with Lt. Gen. Earl Hailston, commander of Marine Corps bases in Japan, Okinawa, April 9, 2001, and briefing by Col. Harold Walker, J5 plans and policy director, Yokota Air Base, March 29, 2001. 14. Interview in Singapore with Benjamin William, policy, planning, and analysis director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Stanley Loh, deputy chief of mission, Singapore Embassy in Washington, D.C., May 21, 2001. 15. Ambassador Owada Hisashi, “The Bush Administration and East Asia: From Rhetoric to Policy,” Remarks to the Fifteenth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, June 5, 2001, http://www.jiia.or.jp.

6 The Problem of Okinawa: A Shared Challenge

Background In Roppongi, a honky-tonk quarter of Tokyo frequented by foreigners, pimps, and gangsters, a popular Japanese “cabaret” features musical vignettes from Japanese contemporary life and history. One act stands out among the often funny, sometimes raunchy, and always colorful scenes. As a boy and girl dressed in white watch their world destroyed by Japanese invaders, the haunting music of Okinawa fills the theater. In a final tableau, three soldiers take turns raping the girl. It is a chilling reminder that the 1995 rape of a 12year-old Okinawan schoolgirl by three American soldiers is seared into Japan’s collective memory. A “culture of victimization” characterizes Okinawa.1 Okinawa has legitimate complaints: it is Japan’s poorest prefecture; American bases occupy 19 percent of its densely populated main island; and citizens have valid concerns about noise, safety, and incidents involving U.S. service personnel and their dependents. Yet Okinawa has a per capita income higher than that of France;2 the U.S. presence has steadily declined since the reversion to Japan; the land occupied by bases is steadily shrinking; and U.S. troops are there at Japan’s invitation, first to provide for Japan’s defense. Okinawa’s strategic location—between the main Japanese islands, the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, mainland China, the Philippines, and the South China Sea—accounts for its painful history. A “shrimp between whales,”3 Okinawa has been ruled by Ryukyu kings, has paid homage to China, and has been conquered 53

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by Japanese and Americans. As nominal vassals of China’s Middle Kingdom, the three separate Ryukyu kingdoms united into one in 1429. Japan colonized Okinawa in 1609 and maintained a military presence there for the next four centuries. The initial period of Japanese nationbuilding in the early nineteenth century did not include Okinawa. In 1879, the Meiji government annexed the islands, and until 1925 Okinawans and Japanese lived under separate systems of government, strengthening the islanders’ enduring sense of second-class status. The 1945 Battle of Okinawa took the lives of 25 percent to 30 percent of Okinawa’s civilian population (130,000–140,000 people). American troops also killed 73,000 Japanese soldiers, but far from protecting Okinawans, Japan’s military used civilians as a “human shield” and killed many. As successors to Japan’s Imperial Army, Japan’s SDF remains the object of lingering hostility. The 600,000 Okinawan survivors of the 1945 battle were placed under U.S. rule and gradually moved back to their homes in 1946. Second only to Hiroshima, Okinawa is considered the most pacifist of Japan’s prefectures. Marines returned to Okinawa during the Korean War and again during the Vietnam War. In the 1950s, Okinawa served as a symbol of the “Ugly American,” and U.S. vice president Richard Nixon recognized as early as 1960 that the Okinawan problem was political “dynamite.”4 In 1971, anti-American protests reached a boiling point with the Koza riots, and Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972. The reversion agreement granted the United States the right to maintain military facilities on the islands. Historically grounded themes of “discrimination” and “sacrifice” remained part of the political culture even after Okinawa returned to Japanese sovereignty and most forms of discrimination had ended. Okinawa’s leaders pursued an assimilation policy throughout the 1970s and 1980s, so that now most island residents speak standard Japanese. Cultural assimilation came at a cost, however. After reversion, many local companies went bankrupt or merged with Japanese companies. Even today, the stresses of Japanese corporate culture exact a toll: Okinawa has Japan’s highest suicide rate, especially among men in their thirties and forties. The late 1980s saw a revival of the Okinawan language. But the prefecture’s scant involvement in the national leadership (Japan’s cabinet has included only two Okinawans in the 28 years since reversion) continues to corroborate the claim that Okinawans are separate from but not equal to the rest of Japan’s citizens.

The Problem of Okinawa 55

The Burden The prefectural government readily described the “burden” imposed on Okinawa’s citizens by American bases.5 Complaints include the amount of land occupied by America’s 37 facilities, threat to civilian safety, noise and environmental pollution, alleged missed economic opportunities, and crime and incidents involving U.S. troops. The bases cover 10.5 percent of Okinawa’s total land area and constitute 75 percent of the land area of all U.S. military facilities in Japan.6 Although only 12 percent of the land used for America’s other bases is owned privately (the Japanese government owns the remainder), 30 percent is privately owned in Okinawa, and municipal and village governments own much of the rest, giving rise to numerous legal quarrels. Futenma Air Station is the first target of complaints, owing to inconveniences imposed on local residents by its location in the center of Ginowan City. Futenma’s urban location also makes it the focus of safety concerns. In 1959, an American jet stationed at Kadena Air Base crashed into the Miyamori elementary school, killing 11 children and 6 adult residents and injuring more than 200. The previous governor of Okinawa, Ota Masahide, once taught at Miyamori.7 Minor accidents involving aircraft have occurred often in the decades since the crash, and the Ehime Maru disaster, while far from Okinawa, reminded residents that military accidents can result in loss of life. Schools and hospitals surround Futenma, and it is easy to imagine the havoc that would be created by a major accident today. By acreage America’s largest overseas military facility, Kadena Air Base draws the most complaints about noise. Since 1990 Kadena has worked to reduce aircraft noise, including refitting engines, halting flights between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m., and building huge barriers with Japanese government support. Environmental concerns include worries about the disposition of toxic substances; potential damage to coral reefs if Futenma is relocated to an offshore facility in the northern Henoko district; and possible harm to dugongs— rare sea mammals that frequent the area. The local government also maintained that the bases hamper industry and transportation in Okinawa. The average income in the prefecture is less than 80 percent of the overall Japanese average income, and island unemployment, at 8.5 percent, is twice that of the rest of Japan. However, these disparities may have other causes unrelated to the base presence. Okinawa’s education level is

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Japan’s lowest,8 and infrastructure does not reach the standard of the rest of Japan. Okinawa also suffers from limited resources and high transportation and utility costs that render it less competitive than other Japanese locations as a site for industrial investment. Some local authorities acknowledge that the U.S. presence brings significant economic benefits: 8,400 Okinawan citizens work at the bases, and, at 10 percent of the prefecture’s gross product, base-related benefits compose the third largest source of income, after subsidies from Tokyo (30 percent) and income from the 4.5 million tourists who visit annually (12 percent). Base rents make up 15 percent of the prefecture’s budget, while 76 percent comes from the central government. Municipalities also receive threefourths of their support from Tokyo, and those hosting bases receive the most.9 If agreement is reached on relocating Futenma Air Station, a critical symbol of willingness to reduce the bases’ impact, Nago and 12 other northern municipalities will receive an additional $1 billion over 10 years. Okinawan politicians know quite well that the bases provide leverage for extracting resources from the Japanese Diet. Of the 25,000 U.S. servicemen and women based in Okinawa, 15,000 are Marines—many of them young and far from home and family. Although the off-base crime rate is less than that of Okinawa’s citizens10 and less than that of the 1st and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Forces in the continental United States, it will never reach zero. Serious crimes have been committed, including murder, rape, and arson. In the superheated atmosphere of Okinawan politics, however, even the smallest incident can hit the front pages, and Tokyo’s leaders sometimes overreact. In March 2001, Japan’s foreign minister protested to CINCPAC Admiral Blair about an incident where Marines used a toy gun to tease a pizza deliveryman. A joint working group of Okinawan officials, U.S. military commanders, and civilians is seeking new ways to prevent incidents. The military also conducts “courtesy patrols” and wages internal campaigns to improve troop discipline, resulting in a marked decrease in the number of incidents over the past 10 years. Politicians in Tokyo called for a Status-of-Forces (SOFA) revision after a June 29, 2001, incident where a U.S. airman was charged with raping a woman in Chatan, Okinawa. The U.S. military relinquished custody of the suspect, handing him over to Japanese authorities before actual charges were filed, making him the second

The Problem of Okinawa 57

American serviceman to be turned over prior to indictment under rules established after the 1995 rape. Local media play a crucial role in the politics of Okinawan “victimization” by American troops. The combined readership of the local Ryuku Shimpo and Okinawa Times exceeds 97 percent of the newspaper-buying public. Their editorial writers particularly oppose the U.S. presence. The local press is effectively protected from competition with mainstream Japanese newspapers through a reversion-era agreement that prevents publication of nonlocal papers within the prefecture. Papers shipped from Kyushu arrive in the afternoon, after Okinawans have purchased the local ones. According to polling data, these newspapers do not reflect the political inclinations of their readership. Sixty-one percent of Okinawa’s population supports the U.S. base presence (versus 64 percent for Japan overall).11 Roughly 20 percent to 30 percent of Okinawa’s voters favor anti-bases candidates, mostly leftist in orientation, while an equal number favor conservative government. Since the 1972 election, however, the left has frequently dominated local government. Former governor Ota in particular mastered the politics of victimization and succeeded in making the base presence a national issue. Inamine Keiichi, who won a narrow victory over Ota in 1998, supports relocating Futenma to an alternate facility in the north, provided that Tokyo fulfill three conditions: (1) impose a 15year limit on military use of the facility; (2) establish a special economic program for the north; and (3) protect the environment. Tokyo has presented three construction methods and eight possible plans for the new facility and is working on development measures, but the 15-year-limit proposal remains a potential stumbling block. Conservatives make up the majority (26 of 48 members) in the prefectural assembly. In the April 2001 Liberal Democratic Party elections, the Okinawa chapter supported Prime Minister Koizumi’s key LDP rival, Hashimoto Ryutaro, perhaps hoping he would push Japanese bureaucrats harder to reduce the U.S. presence. Prime Minister Koizumi’s emphasis on strengthening the bilateral alliance makes some Okinawan politicians uneasy. However, an assembly member estimated that he could help persuade up to 30 fellow members to press Governor Inamine to set aside his demand for a 15-year limit.12 However, his constituents’ interests regarding the bases, and those of his fellow assembly members, are far from uniform.

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According to the Clinton-Hashimoto joint declaration of 1996, the United States and Japan will consult about the number of U.S. troops in Japan and other military matters ”in response to changing international situations.” As chapters 1 through 5 argue, the region’s future stability is not guaranteed. For Tokyo, the will of the Okinawan people must be a factor in bilateral deliberations. At the community level, relations with the bases are good and, even considering residents’ valid complaints and media hype of each incident, it appears that Governor Inamine’s description of “sitting on a pool of magma” in Okinawa may be exaggerated. Important political milestones in the prefecture include the February 2002 Nago City mayoral elections and November 2002 gubernatorial elections. The Marines on Okinawa do not hold a monopoly on problems with local residents; other services also face challenges in Japan. Night-landing practice (NLP) near Atsugi Naval Air Facility has given rise to local complaints, and the Navy is seeking alternate sites. NLP is essential readiness training if Yokosuka is to remain the homeport for the 7th Fleet’s USS Kitty Hawk. In 1975, Kobe city passed a declaration prohibiting visits by ships carrying nuclear weapons, and no U.S. Navy ship has visited Kobe since then. Tokyo governor Ishihara has criticized the U.S. Air Force for restrictions on flight space near Yokota Air Base, and local complaints about Misawa Air Base increased after an F-16 fighter crashed in the sea in April 2001. This volume focuses on Okinawa, however, because it is among the most difficult challenges to America’s presence in Japan and to the alliance in general. Ironically, Japan’s economic downturn has led at least one municipality to solicit a military presence. Southwest of Okinawa, Shimoji Island opened a 3,000-meter runway in 1979, but residents insisted that only civilian aircraft would be welcome to use the airport. Japan Defense Agency (JDA) director general Nakatani Gen reportedly expressed surprise when the island’s mayor, pleading poverty, offered use of the airport to the Air Self-Defense Forces.13

Reducing the Impact In an interview before returning to the United States, Lt. Gen. Earl Hailston—Marine Corps commander and USFJ Okinawa coordinator—stated his firm commitment to reduce the bases’ “footprint” in

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the prefecture.14 According to Hailston, a 50 percent reduction in the land area occupied by Marine bases could be accomplished without reducing the effectiveness of the U.S. forward presence in Okinawa. If reconsolidation in the sparsely populated northern part of the island could be carried out in a rational manner, the Marines could return Camp Kinser in Urasoe, Futenma Air Station, and most of Camp Foster without increasing the cost of maintaining the bases. Hailston acknowledged, however, that Okinawan politics are not often rational. Status quo interests would object to reducing rents for the current base facilities, and those now profiting from the bases will resist a move north. Similarly, many northern residents would object to an influx of troops and bases. Development of new facilities in the vicinity of Nago would change the nature of that city and of several resort areas. A RAND report proposing to move the Air Force to Shimoji Island (the same island that is courting military use of its runway) immediately drew criticism from Okinawa’s governor. The problems of Okinawa cannot be resolved with a single “silver bullet” solution. Hailston and his successor, Maj. Gen. Wallace Gregson, strongly support the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) process aimed at reducing the burdens to the people of Okinawa. Already, 15 out of 27 SACO initiatives have been completed, with agreement reached on the return of 10 of 11 former U.S. facilities to Okinawa, reducing the base footprint by 20 percent.15 SACO was established after the 1995 rape, but at first local officials did not participate. Today, while still maintaining that SACO “doesn’t go far enough,”16 Okinawan leaders are directly involved and recognize (in private) that Tokyo and Washington hear their concerns and take them seriously. Officials in Okinawa and Tokyo question when the number of U.S. troops on Okinawa can be reduced. For now, 15,000 Marines are stationed there “to plan, direct and coordinate Marine AirGround Task Forces for employment in support of the defense of Japan and for contingency plans and operations in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.”17 As long as the most likely contingency is a crisis on the Korean peninsula, it is difficult to see how troops could be cut by two-thirds, as one observer has suggested.18 Before assuming command, General Gregson stated, “We have nothing that is non-essential on Okinawa.”19

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Early in 2001, however, after it appeared that the United States might consider troop reductions, the prefectural assembly adopted a resolution calling for fewer troops, and then prime minister Mori raised the issue with President Bush. In the short run, the Marines must continue exploring ways to reduce their impact in response to Okinawan concerns. If Korean tensions subside, the role and size of the Marine force will certainly change. For the next decade, however, Tokyo and Washington are likely to conclude that a significant Marine presence is still needed on Okinawa to engage with other forces in the region. In 2001, Japanese foreign minister Tanaka Makiko added her influential voice to the calls for U.S. military training to shift outside of Okinawa as much as possible. In a discussion with JDA director general Nakatani Gen, Marine commandant James Jones reportedly said the Marines “have increased and will probably continue to increase our training outside of Okinawa’s islands.”20 In fact, the Marines conduct 90 percent of their training off Okinawa, and, on any given day, half of the Marines based there (and onefifth of Air Force personnel) are not on the island. Only small unit training, such as that needed by the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), now occurs on Okinawa. To prepare for regional contingencies, the 31st MEU requires urban and jungle warfare training. Much of that training has moved to Guam in response to local objections. The Marines no longer conduct off-base conditioning marches or artillery training on Okinawa and will move parachute training to Iejima Island. Night training, which enables troops to fight “in any time and place,”21 has been restricted.22 Reducing the Marines’ impact on Okinawa can also be accomplished by making the troops more mobile. Since the 3rd MEF’s mission requires flexibility and an ability to deploy quickly to crisis spots (certain units are on alert 24 hours a day, every day, to cover possible evacuations from regional trouble spots), the Marines are eager to reduce the cost of deploying their forces. After witnessing high-speed catamarans ferry Australian troops from Darwin to East Timor, one Marine colonel developed a plan to cut 80 percent in transportation costs by using the catamarans. “Instead of hanging around the base and getting in trouble,” he said, “my troops can be in the field, training with our allies.”23 If embraced, this sort of creative ingenuity can help U.S. forces accomplish their mission while reducing the burden on Okinawa.

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Options for the Future Basing the 3rd MEF on Okinawa provides important budgetary benefits to the Marines, and some have argued that, within the current U.S. fiscal environment, if the Marines left Okinawa they would no longer be able to maintain three divisions.24 The strategic rationale for the Marine presence, however, includes consideration of the multilateral opportunities for building trust discussed in chapter 5. If American forces cannot come face-to-face with other regional militaries, the U.S. military presence will not be felt. Today, forces on Okinawa provide key support for joint training with the South Korean, Thai, Philippine, and Australian militaries. The 3rd MEF is the only combined air-ground combat unit in Asia that can be deployed anywhere in the region, and, although some of its training occurs on Japan’s main islands (not in Okinawa), most takes place outside of Japan. A joint force doctrine requires bringing different forces together regularly to train together, and it is costly. More joint training outside Japan’s territory is possible, but resources must be identified to support it. At present, Japan can contribute to training that occurs within Japanese territory, but some consider joint training outside Japanese territory to be in Japan’s interest and therefore worthy of budget allocations.25 On Japan’s main islands, the SDF shares the use of Misawa Air Base; Sasebo, Atsugi, and Yokosuka Naval Bases; and the Army’s Camp Fuji and its headquarters at Camp Zama. In Okinawa, the Maritime SDF shares White Beach facility with the U.S. Navy, and in theory all U.S. military facilities can be used jointly. Civilian aircraft can use portions of Misawa, and the future replacement facility for Futenma was designed to enable civilian aircraft use. Gradually, the Japanese public has grown more accepting of the SDF (only in 1994 did Prime Minister Murayama reverse a decades-old policy of the Japanese Socialist Party and recognize its existence). Historically based antipathy toward Japan’s military is more deeply rooted in Okinawa, however, and polling shows that shared and joint use of military bases does not now change the public’s view about its presence in the prefecture. Over the next decade, however, the United States and Japan will certainly expand the joint use of military facilities. At present, U.S. forces do not train with the SDF on Okinawa. The United States and Japan are missing opportunities for search-

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and-rescue operations, minesweeping practice, humanitarian relief drills, vessel inspections, and the chance to prepare the Coast Guard to join regional anti-piracy efforts.26 Some of these activities would help the SDF deal with its deficiencies, including a lack of “jointness” between the services. The United States stockpiles emergency relief supplies at Camp Kinser, preparing for natural disasters in the region, but so far U.S. forces distribute them independently without the support of Japan’s military. Taking advantage of opportunities to train and work together would go far toward strengthening the alliance, and peacetime activities such as relief work could alter Japanese views of the purpose of military forces.

Economic Development Okinawa’s governor has written that he wants to seek solutions to his prefecture’s economic difficulties that “balance economic growth with the U.S. military presence.”27 His administration has already established a Special Free Trade Zone, tax incentives for the tourism and telecommunications industries,28 and reductions in highway tolls and airport fees. Three U.S. companies at the top of the Fortune 500 list (Citibank, IBM-Japan, AIG/America Home Direct) operate customer service call centers in Okinawa. Nago City mayor Kishimoto Tateo wants to establish a special tax-free financial services district in his growing municipality. To build on these dreams and create an “international digital network through a concentration of telecommunications firms” (as the governor envisions) will require a large pool of expertise. Economic spillover from the bases, as in the field of aircraft maintenance, also requires skilled workers. Clusters of telecommunications industries have formed around San Diego and Washington, D.C., partly as a result of military technology transfers to private business.29 A major challenge, therefore, is to boost the education and skill levels of Okinawan citizens. Before reversion, the United States educated 1,000 Okinawans annually. After former governor Ota made the bases a national cause, the Japanese government increased the number of Okinawan students it sent each year to the United States, and when President Bill Clinton visited the island for the Group of Eight summit, he brought additional scholarships for study at the East-West center. Two U.S. university graduate degree programs providing on-base

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instruction include 30 local students and would like to recruit more. A new science and technology university, with English-language instruction, is in the planning stages. These efforts will pay longterm dividends in terms of Okinawa’s economic development and in base-community relations. Community activities also matter to Okinawa’s population. Volunteers from the U.S. military community teach English in 19 schools, clean up beaches, and help in orphanages, nursing homes, and a leper colony. The bases also sponsor local schools, stage athletic and cultural events, and carry out human resource development programs. The Navy has begun inviting journalists on warship tours. Overall, however, the United States has a spotty record of media outreach, probably exacerbated by the language barrier and attitudes of the local media. For the U.S. presence to be understood and appreciated, it is less useful to field questions from Stars and Stripes than to address the concerns (and rebut the charges) of the local media.

Discussing Why the Bases Matter Polls show that Okinawan perceptions of the bases’ importance to Japan’s defense and to regional stability significantly affect their willingness to accommodate the U.S. presence. Okinawans see a trade-off between their obligation (Japan’s security) and the island’s burden (for which they expect compensation). They also share some abandonment and entrapment concerns about the alliance felt by other Japanese. The March 2001 EP-3 reconnaissance plane incident underscored worries that, in a potential conflict between the United States and China, Okinawa could be entrapped— especially because the plane had taken off from Okinawa’s Kadena Air Base. Many wonder why, with the Cold War over and peace coming to the Korean peninsula, they must continue contributing so much to Japan’s peace and security. Okinawa needs a public discussion of the strategic rationale for the alliance even more urgently than the rest of Japan. Ultimately, the sensitive balance between Tokyo and Okinawa cannot be resolved simply by sending more subsidies. Greater autonomy for Okinawa, such as that enjoyed by Scotland within the confines of the United Kingdom, may help in the long term. At a minimum, Tokyo might consider granting Okinawa relief from

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regulatory regimes that hamper local economic development. For the next 10 years, however, the United States and Japan must coordinate and cooperate to manage the problems of Okinawa.

Notes 1. From a briefing by J5 Lt. Col. David Hunter-Chester, Yokota Air Base, March 29, 2001. 2. Henzan Hideo, “The Okinawan Economy,” unpublished briefing paper, April 2000. 3. Interview with Professor Shimabukuro Jun, Ginowan City, April 6, 2001. 4. Interview with Professor Higa Mikio, former deputy governor and professor, Naha, April 6, 2001. Higa assisted Robert Scalapino, author of the Conlon Report delivered to Senator Fulbright in 1959. 5. Briefing by the prefectural government’s Base Countermeasures Office, Naha, April 9, 2001. 6. The Okinawan islands combined make up about 1 percent of Japan’s landmass. 7. Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, p. 37. 8. Post-reversion adjustments to Japanese business culture have not been easy, and many of those interviewed stressed the difficulty faced by Okinawans when they try to compete economically in other parts of Japan. However, large families and strong social relations also distinguish Okinawa’s culture, helping to account for the fact that 70 percent of university graduates, even if they study elsewhere, want to stay and work locally. 9. Of Okinawa’s 53 municipalities, 25 give host U.S. bases, but most are concentrated in 9 municipalities. 10. Citing Okinawan prefectural police statistics, Lieutenant Colonel Hunter-Chester said the off-base crime rate for U.S. Marines is one-seventh to one-eighth the local crime rate. Yokota Air Base, March 29, 2001. 11. U.S. Department of State, Office of Research Opinion Analysis, “Okinawan Views on U.S. Military Base Issues,” January 30, 2001, p. 5. It should be noted that, although most favor retaining some bases on Okinawa, 71 percent favor further moderate reductions in the size and number of the bases. A separate Japanese Cabinet–sponsored survey conducted in February 2001 showed that 46 percent of Okinawans accepted the base presence versus 44 percent opposed. 12. Interview with Odo Tohru and Osamu Ashitomi, Naha, April 6, 2001. Odo said four Komeito members will insist on the limit, an idea pushed by Inamine aide Higa Yoshihiko, formerly an aide to Governor Ota.

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13. “Tiny Okinawan Isles Courting the Military,” International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shimbun, July 4, 2001, p. 1. 14. Interview in Camp Courtney, Okinawa, on April 9, 2001. 15. Interview with Colonel John Freund, chief, USFJ Okinawa Field Office, Kadena Air Base, April 9, 2001. 16. Oyakawa Seiichi, Base Countermeasures Office director general, Naha, April 9, 2001. 17. Mission statement: www.usfj.yokota.af.mil. 18. Michael O’Hanlon, “Come Partly Home, America: How to Downsize U.S. Deployments Abroad,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2001): 6. 19. Presentation to Japan-SAIS Forum, “A Focus on Okinawa,” May 1, 2000. 20. Reported by Nihon Keizai, June 23, 2001, p. 1. 21. Lieutenant General Hailston, April 9, 2001. 22. In response to local complaints, even Japan’s own Air SDF is considering relocated firing practice outside of Japan—if possible, to the western United States. 23. Col. Michael Godfrey, G-4, 3rd MEF, Camp Courtney, April 6, 2001. 24. Patrick Cronin, “Symposium on Northeast Asian Security,” Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, May 18, 2001. 25. Interview with Professor Morimoto Satoshi, Tokyo, March 19, 2001. Former prime minister Hashimoto reportedly told senior U.S. officials in early 2001 that when Japan makes requests of the United States on the matter of Okinawa it must be prepared to pay for them. 26. Japan’s Coast Guard wants to participate in joint training with Southeast Asian nations in the Malacca Strait and neighboring areas, and Tokyo is prepared to propose a regional anti-piracy treaty. 27. Inamine Keiichi, “Okinawa: Reflections on the Postwar Years and a Vision for the Future,” Japan Review of International Affairs 14, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 34. 28. Arguably, tax incentives will do more for the Okinawan economy than the current system of Japanese government subsidies and construction contracts. 29. Morisada Maeshiro, “Toward the Crossroads of Asia: Discovering and Developing the Value of Okinawa,” unpublished paper for JapanSAIS Forum, “A Focus on Okinawa,” May 1, 2000. Security considerations limit the utility of applying this model to Okinawa, but the basic point is correct: economic spillover from the bases could be more substantial.

7 Japanese and U.S. Challenges and Opportunities

Japan’s Dilemma For reasons of national sovereignty, Japan must manage a certain set of challenges to the alliance without perceived or actual pressure from the United States. Yet, because the future of the alliance may be determined by a successful outcome to these debates, the United States will watch carefully and lend support when Japan desires it. The challenges require tackling constitutional dilemmas and include deciding if and when collective self-defense may be carried out; taking an active role in multilateral peacekeeping; implementing appropriate legislation for dealing with emergency situations; protecting national secrets; and, ultimately, becoming a “normal” country militarily. Some in Japan recognize that a possible solution to the baserelated challenges described in chapter 6 involves Japan’s assuming a greater role in its own defense, in defense of the region, and in multilateral security institutions. However, devising a strategy for such a “grand bargain” (a stronger Japanese military in exchange for a reduced American presence) means addressing some of the strongest political taboos and clarifying the most entrenched ambiguities of Japanese society. These are therefore “Japan’s challenges,” not America’s, and the following description is an outside observer’s view of an inside debate. Article 9 of Japan’s postwar constitution states:

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(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The constitution does not rule out defending Japan from attack, however, and since a 1959 Supreme Court ruling, most Japanese citizens recognize the SDF as legitimate. While the SDF’s role remains strictly defensive, the revised guidelines permit it to provide limited rear-area support to U.S. forces. In mid-1999, the Diet established two committees to begin a process of reviewing the entire constitution; they are scheduled to make recommendations by 2005. Amending the constitution requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of the Diet, followed by majority support in a national referendum, a process that might take an additional five years. Public opinion polls suggest that more than 60 percent favor changing the constitution. Two-thirds of Diet members want to revise or reinterpret the constitution to allow an expansion of Japan’s military role in the region, and 90 percent of Diet members under the age of 50 support constitutional revision.1 The Institute for National Strategic Studies Special Report (known as the Armitage report)2 refrains from commenting on Article 9, and Bush administration officials have remarked that revising Japan’s constitution is a strictly internal matter for the people of Japan to decide. The Armitage report notes, however, that “Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation.” This prohibition appears to conflict with Article 51 of the UN Charter and also with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which states that both countries recognize “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations.”3 Since 1981, the Japanese government has interpreted this apparent contradiction by stating that Japan as a sovereign state has a right to collective self-defense, but the exercise of that right would exceed the constitution’s limit on the use of force to the minimum necessary to defend Japan.4

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In a hypothetical case, if North Korea planned to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile aimed at an American city, and Japan had advance information about Pyongyang’s intentions, intervening on behalf of the United States would violate the prohibition on exercising the right to collective self-defense. As Japan’s only ally, the United States should naturally express concern about this prohibition. As deputy secretary of state, Armitage emphasized that, although the decision on collective self-defense is up to Japan’s leadership, the “lack of an ability to participate in collective defense, although [Japan] is signatory to a defense treaty, is an obstacle” to strengthening the alliance.5 It also hinders enhanced security cooperation between Japan and Asian nations such as South Korea, Thailand, or India. In March 2001, an LDP panel on defense proposed that the government change its interpretation to permit the exercise of Japan’s right to collective self-defense. To deal with opposition, including from the ruling party’s coalition partner Komeito, Japan’s government weighed several alternatives for moving forward. Its options included (1) revising Article 9 of the constitution; (2) passing a Diet resolution or formal legislation reinterpreting the prohibition on collective self-defense; or (3) requesting the Cabinet Legislation Bureau or CLB (which issued the 1981 opinion) to reverse its earlier stance on the matter. Although the first option would be the most definitive, debate could take as long as 10 years, especially as Japan has never amended its constitution. The second or third options could be pursued while proceeding more slowly toward constitutional revision.6 By custom, the Diet has unanimously passed resolutions on fundamental issues such as those involving the constitution and the use of force. In the near term, unanimous passage of a resolution on the matter of collective self-defense is not feasible. An alternative approach—passing a basic law on national security—might avoid the need for unanimity. Although the LDP defense panel mentioned above recommended submitting basic security legislation, as it could identify the permissible scope of Japan’s exercise of collective self-defense, opponents might question the constitutionality of such legislation. The third option, a new interpretation by the CLB, presents its own difficulties. Designed to remain immune from political pressure, the CLB provides the cabinet with impartial legal advice

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on constitutional issues, pending legislation, and treaties.7 The CLB takes pains, however, to build each case on legal precedent, so overturning an earlier decision could be problematic, especially if political pressure appeared to be a factor in formulating the new interpretation. Even within the LDP, there is no consensus on the matter of collective self-defense.8 But support appears to be growing for changing Japan’s approach. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Japanese Diet took only a few weeks to enact a terrorism countermeasures law and to approve troop deployments to the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Vigorous, open debate over collective self-defense marked a clear break with the past, and the Koizumi government showed it was fully committed to “ensure that Japan-U.S. security arrangements function even more effectively.”9

Peacekeeping A related debate over Japan’s role in multilateral peacekeeping has proceeded somewhat further. After contributing $13 billion to the 1991 Persian Gulf War (a sum that required a special tax increase), Tokyo was stung by widespread criticism of its “checkbook diplomacy.” Following the government’s inability to provide even medical teams or evacuation aircraft to Operation Desert Storm, the Diet in 1992 passed legislation permitting noncombat participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and humanitarian disaster relief. SDF forces and national police personnel have since participated in PKOs in Cambodia, Rwanda, Zaire, Mozambique, El Salvador, and most recently East Timor, but only in cases where the conflict had ended and the country in question agreed to welcome UN peacekeepers.10 Japan’s legal restrictions on peacekeepers’ activities11 have led to peculiar arrangements, such as the French Foreign Legion’s escorting Japanese peacekeepers on transportation duty in Cambodia. In autumn 2001, the Diet revised the 1992 law to permit additional noncombat duties such as patrolling cease-fire zones, inspecting vehicles, monitoring disarmament, and collecting and disposing of abandoned weapons. Legislators also partially relaxed the rules governing the use of force. With Japan’s PKO ex-

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perience quite limited, Diet debate focused on two concerns: (1) taking a more active peacekeeping role might remind other countries of Japan’s past aggressions; and (2) given restrictions on its use of force, peacekeeping could put the SDF at risk. 12 Still, the Diet agreed to permit PKO participation when a ceasefire is recognized. According to polls conducted in early 2001, nearly 80 percent of Japanese respondents support a Japanese role in PKOs.13 Japanese law distinguishes between collective self-defense and collective security. The UN’s peacekeeping record shows that sending in foreign troops before the nations involved are ready to accept them does not work, and PKOs succeed only under conditions of impartiality, consent of the parties, and nonuse of force except in selfdefense. Japan’s constitution therefore does not preclude core peacekeeping activities, according to former ambassador to the United Nations Owada Hisashi: “The Constitution prescribes that Japan cannot engage in belligerent activities, but that prescription should not be confused with the issue of accepting risks in the form of participation in a UN PKO.”14 In the future, JDA director general Nakatani said that Japan will consider requests for Japanese force contributions on a case-by-case basis.15

The Role of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces Japanese tend to view the SDF warily: the military is not a prestigious occupation, and most young people prefer to pursue careers in business or government. Only a handful of universities include security studies in the curriculum. Support for the SDF remains soft and fluctuates depending on what SDF role is considered. Only 45 percent support an SDF role in providing for the nation’s defense, while 67 percent believe it should be involved in disaster relief. SDF involvement in multilateral humanitarian activities elicits support from four in five respondents.16 In June 2001 discussions with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Nakatani reportedly emphasized his commitment to Japanese and U.S. forces training and working together in multilateral humanitarian activities such as rescuing refugees and aiding disaster victims.17 Also in June 2001, Maritime Self-Defense Forces joined the navies of 14 nations in the first large-scale minesweeping drill held in the

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western Pacific. In late 2000 and again in 2001, Japan joined Singapore, South Korea, and the United States in submarine rescue exercises in the South China Sea. The government has prepared, but not yet submitted to the Diet, legislation that would elevate the JDA to a full-fledged ministry. Fully recognizing the SDF as a military force requires fundamental changes, however. A web of national laws and regulations place enormous restrictions on SDF operations even within Japan. In the event of an attack on Japanese territory, the SDF still needs permission from numerous other agencies and ministries to carry out its functions. If the hostilities occur outside of Japan, the legality of SDF actions depends on criteria contained in the law on situations in areas surrounding Japan. “Until Japanese laws are revised to adequately permit the SDF to respond to all manners of national crisis between peace-time to the outbreak of conflict,” Commander Mark Staples wrote, “then the U.S. should not assume that rear-area support under the new Defense Guidelines will be planned or conducted in a smooth, efficient manner.”18 The JDA is aware of these deficiencies. Operations planning director Yamauchi Chisato acknowledged that, “while we have upgraded the Guidelines, we have made no progress toward operationalizing them.”19 Since 1977, the JDA has studied obstacles to passing a legislative package on emergencies and war preparedness. Although previous governments did not go beyond assessments, the Koizumi cabinet appeared prepared to push debate over a legislative package,20 possibly in spring 2002. Legislation under consideration would probably include: (1) JDA-drafted modifications to its responsibilities; (2) legislative changes to other ministries’ roles; and (3) a new bill on issues that fall through the cracks, including the prime minister’s role in an emergency.21 When completed, the legislation would likely grant emergency powers to the prime minister in case of a major disaster or outbreak of hostilities and define situations when the SDF could use weapons, seize ships, and generally act as a de jure rather than de facto military force. After it passes the Diet, the law would apply to any security situation where the government determines Japan’s interests are at stake. The Armitage report also challenged the United States and Japan to improve intelligence cooperation, arguing that it would “help Japan to improve its own policymaking, crisis management,

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and decision-making processes.”22 The report further suggested that an appropriate division of labor would benefit a resourcestrapped intelligence community. According to JDA officials, a significant legal obstacle to this goal must be surmounted, as Japan’s political leaders are currently under no obligation to protect secrets. Legislation to remedy this problem is under consideration. In fact, the opportunities for a strengthened alliance described in chapter 8—a strategic dialogue that includes planning for contingencies, counterterrorism, cooperation on command-and-control functions for theater missile defense—require the ability to maintain some level of secrecy. Japan also faces challenges resulting from interagency rivalries, since intelligence sharing between agencies is currently insufficient.23 Japan’s constitution prohibits crossing the line between defense and offense, although it is not always clear where logistical support ends and the use of force begins. Already, the SDF has the largest navy in the Pacific, after the United States, and spends $45 billion to $50 billion annually on defense. Japan has purchased 130 multirole F-2 fighter-bombers,24 plans to purchase more 767s, and intends to acquire a mid-air refueling capability. With these acquisitions, and with deployments supporting the war against terrorism, the distinction between defensive and offensive capabilities is becoming increasingly academic. Debates over the postwar constitution, collective self-defense, peacekeeping, the SDF’s role, intelligence, and future military capabilities touch on many hot buttons in Japan, where memories of military rule have not disappeared and where citizens cherish hard-won individual and civil rights. Still, Diet deliberations and media debates begin to suggest that Japan is prepared to reclaim its status as a “normal” country. As an outsider, the United States must refrain from applying pressure—and avoid creating the perception of pressure—on Japan’s leaders during these debates. U.S. leaders know that it is for Japan to decide whether to revise its constitution and how to resolve dilemmas involving the Japanese military’s use of force and the protection of secrecy. As Japan’s only ally, however, it is appropriate for America to identify specific areas of cooperation that, if pursued, would benefit the alliance. Some of those opportunities are outlined in chapter 8.

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America’s Challenge In May 2001, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew stated his perception of Asia’s “growing discomfort” at U.S. unilateralism, adding that the world is “fed up with being told what to do by the U.S.”25 Lee’s harsh words reflected what some Japanese said (usually behind closed doors) in softer tones.26 Japan shared the concerns of other U.S. friends and allies when, during the first year of the Bush administration, the United States seemed to shift toward a unilateralist approach to foreign policy. Washington announced that the United States will withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, opposed multilateral efforts to strengthen enforcement and compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, and abandoned the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Although Tokyo muted its criticism of these three actions, Japan strongly objected when, in March 2001, the Bush administration withdrew support for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, without presenting a viable alternative. By 2010, Kyoto would have required the United States, by far the largest producer of greenhouse gases, to cut its emissions to 7 percent below 1990 levels.27 Because the developing world would not be required to participate in the protocol’s carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emission cuts (and because certain business and political elements opposed the protocol), the president said the United States would instead pursue new research and create partnerships to monitor, measure, and mitigate emissions.28 Officials noted congressional opposition to the protocol and Governor Bush’s pledge during the 2000 presidential campaign that, if elected, he would reject it. Shortly after this decision, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences issued a report emphasizing the threat from global warming, stating that a century of human activity (most of it in the industrialized world) had caused global warming, and warning against underestimating its effects. In April and September 2001, Japanese environment minister Kawaguchi Yoriko traveled to Washington to urge the United States to return to the Kyoto process. Her missions were unsuccessful. During Prime Minister Koizumi’s June 2001 visit to Washington, he and President Bush issued a joint statement acknowledging differences over the Kyoto Protocol. The statement called for “government-to-government consultations to explore common ground and areas for common action on climate change.”29 In discussions

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in London and Paris following his trip to Camp David, Koizumi proposed amendments to the protocol that he hoped might lure the United States back into the process. However, he could not bridge the gap between the United States and Europe. U.S. officials initially suggested that Washington would try to produce a new framework for global climate change discussions in time for the Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6) in July 2001. In August, White House chief of staff Andrew Card said he hoped a cabinet-level policy review would produce new proposals at COP-7 in November. Climate change policy undoubtedly assumed a lower priority after the events of September 11 and the war in Afghanistan. At the COP-7 meetings in Marrakech, a sufficient number of countries pledged to ratify the protocol to allow it to take effect without U.S. participation. In announcing Japan’s intention to ratify the protocol, Tokyo stated that it would continue to seek a constructive response from the United States and push for developing country participation. In May 2001, UN members voted the United States off the UN Human Rights Commission, where it has held a seat since 1946, and off the International Narcotics Control Board. These were not the only occasions when the United States failed to muster the votes needed for an important UN post, mistakenly relying on its status as the UN’s most influential member and largest contributor to the New York–based institution. The votes might, however, have expressed UN members’ frustration that the United States had refused to endorse the creation of an International Criminal Court, blocked a worldwide ban on antipersonnel land mines, failed to pay all UN arrearages, and abandoned the Kyoto Protocol. Some member nations clearly wished to exact a price for the U.S. decision to thwart collective action. It surprised and angered many when the United States—the chief architect of postwar collective security and collective action—acted unilaterally to protect what appeared to be its narrow national interests.

America’s Opportunity Separated from Asia and Europe by vast oceans, the United States through much of its history tended toward unilateralism. In the war against terrorism, however, collective action is essential. At-

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tacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, as well as the powerful forces of globalization, have shown that America’s fate is also bound up in happenings across the oceans. Fortunately, the United States has vast experience over the past half-century in establishing collective security arrangements. This experience contributed to the Bush administration’s successes in building a coalition to combat terrorism. One great lesson of post–Cold War diplomacy has been that, to cope with difficult global issues, the United States needs coalition partners. Even Henry Kissinger, for decades a student of balance of power, criticized the unilateral statements of the Bush administration’s early months. He stated, “The U.S. should not be afraid of the process of translating its convictions into consensus. We have to find a balance between abdicating our convictions to multilateral institutions and imposing them on the world by fiat.”30 After September 11, Washington must recognize that it needs the support of friends (and former foes) in the battle against terrorism and to achieve its other goals. As an integral part of the war against terrorism, the United States, its friends, and allies must define the kind of world they intend to create in the future. As one astute observer wrote, We will be making a strategic mistake to conclude that defenses alone can win this war for us. We also must have an affirmative plan for the future of the world, attractive to the citizens of many countries. . . . We must ask whether unchecked pandemics are not a security threat; whether environmental damage on a global scale is not a security threat; whether the continuing extreme poverty of billions isn’t a security threat. . . . Hope destroys the resources of terror by denying it recruits. The United States—alone among nations—can represent hope in the armor of action. If we so will it. That choice remains uniquely ours.31

The Armitage report challenges the U.S.-Japan relationship to evolve from one of “burdensharing” into “power-sharing.”32 Armitage’s actions since joining the government suggest his sincerity in pursuing this goal. In Senate testimony, he reiterated themes from the autumn presidential campaign: “Close and constant consultation with allies is not optional. It is the precondition for sustaining American leadership. . . . To the extent that our behavior reflects arrogance and heightened sense of position, our claim to leadership will become, in spite of our military prowess, the thinnest of preten-

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sions.”33 The United States can, in fact, gain from power sharing, as long as it learns to tolerate it. America and the United Kingdom fought shoulder-to-shoulder in wars, share a language and cultural roots, and pursue democratic and free market values in many shared endeavors around the globe. The United States regularly takes British views into account when dealing with European matters. Although decades may pass before the U.S.-Japan relationship reaches that level of trust, Japan is the world’s second-largest economy and a nation that shares America’s commitment to democracy and a free market. Japan needs to make its views known, especially regarding Asia,34 and America must in return listen respectfully and with an open mind. Although it is difficult to imagine as effective a foreign policy partner as Prime Minister Tony Blair, in Asia the United States needs an Asian partner empowered, at times, to play a parallel role. Consultation, according to the Brookings Institution’s Ivo Daalder, implies “give-and-take, putting one view on the table, hearing the other view and seeing if what emerges from the disagreement is a way forward that satisfies both sides. . . . Unilateralism has nothing to do with whether you’re willing to talk to people. It’s whether you’re willing to take their views into account.”35 Japan can help the United States deal with its challenge, as the world’s only superpower, in taking other views into account. Japan can also help the United States take advantage of the opportunities in Asia to engage in real consultation and to build coalitions to address today’s complex global issues. Watching America’s contradictory impulses, and its oscillations between support for multilateral solutions and unilateral approaches, gives Tokyo an excuse to hesitate about tightening the alliance. However, America’s historical pattern as part of collective security and collective economic arrangements should provide significant reassurance. The United States led the way in building the UN, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, APEC, and other regional and global institutions. In addition, America’s allies in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia have shown that a U.S. partner can, in fact, say “no” and avoid entrapment. A country such as Saudi Arabia can decide when and if its bases will be used for specific operations and whether to continue hosting U.S. bases. On numerous occasions, the Saudis have refused American proposals to act against Iraq. America’s partner says “no,” and yet the alliance endures.

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As noted earlier, the United States withdrew from the Philippines in 1992 when the Philippine Senate failed to ratify an extension of the bilateral basing agreement. This, of course, gave rise to fears of “abandonment” by America’s other Asian allies. Termination of a security relationship (and the Philippine-U.S. security relationship suffered an interruption, not a conclusion) is a drastic final resort, only to be pursued if all else fails. As long as U.S. and Japanese interests overlap significantly (and chapters 1 through 5 of this book demonstrate that they do), consultation, give-and-take, and even power sharing should result in the best possible outcomes for both alliance partners.

Notes 1. From a March 2000 poll conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun. Cited by Jimbo Ken, “From a Threat-Driven to an Interest-Oriented Security Arrangement,” unpublished article. 2. Richard Armitage et al., The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership, Institute for National Strategic Studies Special Report (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, October 2000). 3. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, preamble, January 19, 1960. 4. Interview with Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko, Tokyo, March 22, 2001. 5. Howard French, “Top Bush Aide Urges Japan to Form In-Depth Ties with U.S.,” New York Times, May 9, 2001, (http://www.newyorktimes.com). 6. Diet member and former foreign minister Kakizawa Koji and Kyorin University dean Takubo Tadae, Mansfield Center/Global Forum: “U.S.-Japan Security Relations under the New U.S. Administration,” May 28, 2001. 7. Interview with Councilor Sunaga Kazuo, Office of the Prime Minister, Tokyo, March 14, 2001. 8. A poll conducted in June by Nihon Keizai indicates that 58 percent of Japanese citizens approve exercising the right to collective self-defense, while 24 percent oppose. However, as former assistant secretary of defense Kurt Campbell noted: “If you ask the definition of collective self-defense of ten Japanese people, you would get ten different answers.” Interview by Mainichi Shimbun, June 25, 2001, p. 25. 9. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, policy speech to the 151st Diet session, May 7, 2001. Some have argued that an “open, vigorous debate” in Japan about security issues cannot be achieved. In his book on Japanese culture and society, Jonathan Rauch wrote that “Japan is a great power

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whose social institutions are consistently, perhaps fundamentally, hobbled by the trouble they have setting an agenda. A powerful nation which is too big to push around but which often cannot push itself: that is Japan.” The Outnation: A Search for the Soul of Japan (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), p. 157. In 1974, Henry Kissinger told Deng Xiaoping that Japan “even now lacks any strategic concepts.” Lamenting a dearth of political leadership in Japan, Chuo University professor Sakamoto Masahiro said, “Japan’s objectives are unclear, its strategy intangible, and its tactics very prominent. The U.S., by contrast, has clear objectives, a robust strategy, and flexible tactics.” Mansfield Center/Global Forum: “U.S.-Japan Security Relations under the New U.S. Administration,” May 28, 2001. At the beginning of his administration, Prime Minister Koizumi established a National Strategy Center, including former prime ministers Nakasone and Miyazawa, to help address some of the deficiencies in Japan’s foreign policy agenda. 10. Richard Cronin, “Japan’s Changing Security Outlook: Implications for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, July 9, 1999, 18–19. Japanese forces also participated in a humanitarian relief operation in Honduras after Hurricane Mitch and in the UN observer force in the Golan Heights. 11. Five principles governed peacekeeping operations: (1) a cease-fire must be in effect; (2) all parties to the conflict must accept the peacekeeping forces and Japan’s participation in them; (3) impartiality of the peacekeeping force must be maintained; (4) Japanese forces will withdraw from the mission if the principles are broken; and (5) Japanese personnel must not use weapons except for small arms in self-defense. 12. Regarding the first concern, Malaysian defense minister Najib said on March 21, 2001, that his country would “welcome” SDF participation in training exercises for peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and in the work of Malaysia’s new peacekeeping center. Regarding the second, when a Japanese civilian volunteer and a member of the civilian police force died during the Cambodian PKO, their deaths led to extensive debates in the Diet and in Japanese society, showing the great sensitivity to any loss of life in PKOs. 13. U.S. Department of State, “Public Attitudes toward the SDF,” June 12, 2001, http://usinfo.state.gov. 14. As quoted by Takahashi Junko, “Peacekeeping Shackles Hobble Japan,” Japan Times, May 3, 2001, p. 3. 15. Hiei Toshio, “Nakatani Sees SDF Role in E. Timor,” The Daily Yomiuri, June 23, 2001, p. 1, and Sankei Shimbun, June 8, 2001, p. 2. 16. U.S. Department of State, “Public Attitudes toward the SDF.” 17. Shibata Gaku, “Japan, U.S. to Join Hands for Humanitarian Drills,” June 19, 2001, p. 1.

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18. Mark Staples, “Legal Reform of the Self-Defense Forces,” p. 46, in the Pacific Forum CSIS report, United States–Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines, http://www.csis.org/pacfor/us_japan_dialogue.pdf. 19. Interview, Tokyo, June 14, 2001. 20. “Defense Contingency Eyed for Diet Debate,” and “Emergency Defense Legislation: Government to Work Out Basic Policy This Fall,” Asahi Shimbun, June 15, 2001, pp. 21 and 1. 21. Interview with Morimoto Satoshi, March 19, 2001. 22. Armitage et al., The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, p. 5. 23. Interview with Takamizawa Nobushige, intelligence director, Japan Defense Agency, April 20, 2001. 24. Brian Bender, “Japan May Soon Have Modern Military,” The Daily Yomiuri, June 18, 2001, p. 12. 25. Interview by de Borchgrave, “SM Lee on Future Global Threats,” p. 4. 26. One editorialist commented, “Thanks to U.S. efforts during the Cold War, democracy is no longer a U.S. monopoly. Readjusted relations with a unifying Europe and the democratic areas in East Asia will also serve the U.S. long-term interests. A roof supported by three pillars will be more stable that one roof with only one pillar.” Saito Susumu, “U.S. Unilateralism Not a Realistic Way of Thinking,” International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shimbun, June 20, 2001, p. 28. 27. The protocol will take effect when ratified by countries whose combined carbon dioxide emissions account for 55 percent of the industrialized world’s total emissions in 1990. In 1990, the United States accounted for 36 percent, the European Union 24 percent, and Japan 8.5 percent. 28. Remarks by the president on global climate change, June 11, 2001, http://usinfo.state.gov. 29. See http://usinfo.state.gov. 30. As quoted by Fareed Zakaria, “America’s New Balancing Act,” Newsweek, August 6, 2001, p. 37. 31. Leon Fuerth, “Digging Out,” Washington Post, September 16, 2001, p. B7. 32. Armitage et al., The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, p. 4. 33. Richard Armitage, testimony at Senate confirmation hearing, March 15, 2001, http://usinfo.state.gov. 34. In an interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 22, 2001, foreign policy deputy director general Kohno Masaharu noted that, during the early 1990s, the United States rejected Japanese suggestions

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about approaches to be taken in Cambodia, stating that Japanese officials did not understand “the meaning of an alliance.” Similarly, the United States and Japan have taken different approaches to Burma, where the United States maintains economic sanctions while Japan grants more aid than any other nation. Southeast Asia is beyond the purview of the alliance, based on Japanese legal definitions of the “Far East.” However, it may be in the interest of both nations for the United States and Japan to consult on all security matters pertaining to Asia. 35. As quoted by Frank Bruni, “Bush’s Easygoing Words and Hard Line Actions,” New York Times, June 18, 2001, http://www.newyorktimes.com.

8 Opportunities for a Strengthened Alliance

Strategic Dialogue At their June 30, 2001, summit meeting, President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi agreed to begin a bilateral strategic dialogue on two levels: one at the vice-minister level on global and strategic matters and a second under the rubric of a revived security subcommittee on bilateral security issues, the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). Although the talks will (and should) overlap, discussions chaired by Deputy Secretary Armitage and his counterpart will focus on “consultations on the Asia-Pacific region and other areas of the world” with particular emphasis on terrorism and on China, Taiwan, and the Korean peninsula. The security subcommittee talks will stress “an assessment of the regional security environment, and areas such as force structure and force posture, security strategies, bilateral roles and missions during contingencies, and cooperation in peacekeeping.”1 Pursued rigorously, this strategic dialogue could help transform the alliance from a consultative mechanism to one that includes operational cooperation. It can also strengthen the alliance and build the trust needed to sustain its development. Talks between deputy foreign ministers might begin by examining where U.S. and Japanese interests overlap and diverge in combating terrorism, providing for the defense of Japan, deterring North Korean aggression, preventing cross-strait tensions, and coordinating China policies to encourage “China’s constructive role 81

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in the international community.”2 A quiet, realistic assessment of PLA modernization and a joint determination about how it will influence America’s military presence in Asia must be related to that effort. By starting from a shared evaluation of the strategic environment in Asia and a clear understanding of each country’s basic interests, the United States and Japan will be better able to devise a successful joint strategy. The dialogue should include frank acknowledgment of fundamental differences in interests and in outlook, as talks that include disagreements will benefit the alliance far more than maintaining current ambiguity about interests and intentions. Based on a common strategic vision, it should be possible to identify an appropriate “force structure and force posture” and determine the “bilateral roles and missions during contingencies” that will be the subject of the security subcommittee discussions. Consultations under the rubric of a revived security subcommittee will include the problems of Okinawa, other base-related issues in Japan, and Japan’s challenges in the areas of peacekeeping, guidelines implementation, and matters pertaining to the use of force. By omitting reference to Japan’s constitution, collective self-defense, the safeguarding of secrets, or the future role of the Self-Defense Forces, the leaders’ June 2001 statement avoided any suggestion that the United Stated had a direct role in Japan’s domestic debates. The president and prime minister committed to consult closely and continue bilateral joint research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) technologies. They gave a nod to “global challenges,” including infectious disease. Curiously, their statement included no concrete references to some key transnational and multinational issues, such as terrorism (the summit occurred 10 weeks before the September attacks), energy and environmental protection, transborder crime, piracy, or illegal narcotics. As this volume argues, bilateral cooperation in those areas will greatly facilitate security cooperation across the board.3 Since the Cold War’s end, U.S. leaders have come to realize that these “new” security challenges cannot be addressed unilaterally, but require transnational solutions instead. Sufficient consultative mechanisms exist for supporting a U.S.Japan strategic dialogue. At the highest level, the 1960 treaty established a Security Consultative Committee; in 1990 the two countries agreed that it should include the U.S. secretaries of state and defense and Japan’s foreign minister and JDA director general. The

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security subcommittee, consisting of vice-minister and bureau chief–level officials from the State and Defense Departments and the Foreign Ministry and JDA, will guide consultations on bilateral security issues. The Status-of-Forces Agreement established a Joint Committee in Japan, cochaired by the USFJ deputy commander and a senior Foreign Ministry official, with members from relevant ministries and agencies. Established in 1979, a special Tripartite Liaison Committee of senior U.S. military commanders, Okinawan officials and a Foreign Ministry representative was revived in 1999 to address matters of mutual interest and concern in Okinawa. The revised guidelines established a military-to-military Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC). In June 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Director General Nakatani of the JDA agreed to create working-level teams of Japanese and U.S. civilians and uniformed officers to prepare for BPC deliberations, revise security strategies, and report to the security subcommittee on bilateral security issues, thereby filling a gap in the consultative structure. The Japanese and U.S. governments, however, suffer from the perennial predicament of all bureaucracies—turf battles. A successful strategic dialogue must cut across bureaucratic structures, overcome intragovernmental enmities (such as those between the State and Defense Departments and between the Foreign Ministry and JDA). Ultimately, dialogue conclusions require the blessing of the two countries’ top political leaders. The president and prime minister delivered the first set of marching orders; hard work must follow.

A New Strategic Framework On the matter of missile defense, the president and prime minister agreed to “consult closely.” If properly managed, a joint approach to missile defense, especially theater missile defense (TMD), could strengthen the alliance. On the other hand, if U.S. officials view missile defense as a “litmus test” of Japan’s commitment to the alliance, it could hamper progress toward stronger security ties. Japan will evaluate national missile defense (NMD) and TMD in light of its own national interests. Deputy Secretary Armitage’s May 2001 visit to Tokyo began a serious consultation process within the alliance over this issue, and neither side needs to rush to any premature conclusions.

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In a May 1, 2001, speech to the National Defense University (NDU), President Bush outlined a “new strategic framework,” where deterrence would no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation but would include ballistic missile defenses. He said he intended to reduce the size and change the composition of America’s nuclear forces to reflect post–Cold War realities—that is, a more diverse, less predictable set of threats. Then, in a November 2001 summit with President Putin, Bush said he would reduce the U.S. arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed nuclear weapons over the next 10 years. The Bush administration had carefully previewed its break with past strategy. In his January 17, 2001, confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Powell said it is important to “look at missile defense within the context of our entire strategic framework. This framework includes offensive nuclear weapons, our command and control systems, our intelligence systems, arms control including our non-proliferation efforts, and missile defense.”4 According to NDU’s James Przystup, the origins of this shift in U.S. strategic thinking can be found in the Gulf War.5 Then, Secretary of State James Baker warned Iraqi deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons if Iraq used chemical weapons against coalition troops. Since nuclear retaliation against a weaker adversary would be viewed as a disproportionate response, U.S. strategists questioned the adequacy of nuclear deterrence for dealing with second-tier adversaries such as Iraq or North Korea. Particularly in a regional contingency, a U.S. adversary might define a line below which WMD use would not likely result in nuclear retaliation. In such a case, nuclear deterrence could prove insufficient. In testimony to the Senate in June 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted that, since 1972, the number of nations pursuing biological weapons has grown to 13; the number of nations with chemical weapons programs has grown by 6 to 16; the number of nations with nuclear weapons programs has increased by 7 to 12; and the number of nations with ballistic missiles has jumped from 9 to 28.6 Especially since the September 11 attacks, U.S. strategists have ceased viewing biological and chemical weapons as weapons of last resort, only to be used for regime survival. Instead, they considered that terrorist groups or “states of concern” might acquire WMD in order to counter U.S. conventional superiority and to di-

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vide the United States from its allies. In theory, an Iraqi attack on Israel (or North Korean attack on Japan) using a WMD-armed ballistic missile, might not result in U.S. retaliation if the final result would be an attack against the U.S. homeland. In his NDU speech, rather than designate a specific architecture for ballistic missile defense, the president said the United States would develop and deploy defenses as soon as possible using the best technologies available. He left open the options of air-, sea-, or land-based defenses, and missile interception at the launch phase, in mid-course, or after reentry into the atmosphere. Unlike the previous administration, the Bush administration did not distinguish between NMD and TMD, perhaps to counter U.S. allies’ arguments that NMD represents a unilateral approach and an American intention to decouple from its allies. (For analytical purposes, however, it is still useful to differentiate between NMD and TMD.) Following the president’s speech, and after consultations with U.S. allies plus Russia and China, many questions still remain. First is the question of strategic stability. In the upper tier of nuclear states (the United States, Russia, and China), it is not yet clear whether NMD, coupled with reductions in U.S. nuclear forces, would enhance stability or detract from it. For 50 years, the logic of “mutually assured destruction”—that stability depends on each side’s vulnerability to a “second strike”—has prevailed. As long as an adversary can inflict crippling damage by striking second, it has no more incentive than the United States would to strike first. Combining deep unilateral cuts with defensive systems, however, might increase the temptation to launch first because, as noted by Vice President’s Gore’s national security adviser, “one side might hope to destroy as much as possible of the other side’s nuclear forces before they can be launched, and then rely on defenses to soak up the remainder.”7 However, if cuts in strategic forces result from a legally binding, negotiated agreement, each side would know the other’s capabilities and could verify the disposition of the “cut” nuclear weapons. If the Bush administration carries out its pledge to withdraw from the ABM treaty—which has helped stabilize the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship for 30 years—it would be well advised to seek a successor agreement that includes negotiated, verifiable nuclear weapons reductions. Remarks by Secretary of State Powell in early February 2002 suggest the U.S. administration will pursue a legally binding agreement with Russia. Still, the problem of China remains.

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Second, questions persist about whether BMD will work, how effective it will be, and when it could be deployed. The U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and each of the military services are working on different systems. For intercepting a missile at the launch or “boost” phase, the Air Force is conducting research on airborne and satellite-based lasers. For mid-flight attack, the Navy is studying theater-wide defense (NTWD) and theater high-altitude area defense (THAAD) systems. For the reentry or “terminal” phase, a ground-based system of interceptors continues to be tested using existing radar and rockets. According to a Defense Department report to Congress, NMD testing has fallen behind schedule and suffered too many failures to justify deployment within the next four years, as the Bush administration had hoped. “Deployment means the fielding of an operational system with some military utility which is effective under realistic combat conditions,” the report states. “Such a capability is yet to be shown to be practicable for NMD.”8 To deal with the technical problem of “countermeasures,” or decoys launched to confuse the intercepting missiles, a boost-phase interception system may hold promise. The least mature of all current NMD systems, boost-phase requires an early warning system, perhaps involving existing satellites, to detect the intense flame of a boosting rocket rather than having to locate a missile in the vacuum of space or as it reenters the earth’s atmosphere. Richard Garwin, a member of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States, argued that “to intercept a North Korean launch, interceptor missiles could be deployed either on Russian territory south of Vladivostock and abutting North Korea or on U.S. military cargo ships in the Japan basin.” He maintained that a boost-phase system “would be much more capable against North Korean missiles, yet would not pose a threat to either Russian or Chinese ICBMs, and thus would not undermine their deterrent capability.”9 A third set of questions involves the cost of NMD, the opportunities forgone, and whether the U.S. taxpayer would support it. The Pentagon requested $7.8 billion for NMD in fiscal year 2002 and again in fiscal year 2003. These outlays might come at the expense of modernizing U.S. conventional forces. The administration proposed cutting the budget for the Nunn-Lugar program, designed to help Russia dismantle old nuclear weapons and safeguard the weapons materials. Given the dangers of such weapons

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in terrorist hands, it might be more prudent to increase, not pare back, efforts to prevent weapons leakage. A poll taken in spring 2001 showed that, if NMD were to cost between $60 million and $100 million, public opposition (47 percent) would exceed support (45 percent) for the program. Opposition increased when doubts were raised about the system’s ability to provide absolute protection to the United States.10 Of course, NMD was not designed to protect against terrorist weapons delivered by commercial plane, car, boat, suitcase, or the U.S. Postal Service.

Theater Missile Defense Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are faster than short- and medium-range missiles, and while the ABM treaty prohibits all but very limited defense against ICBMs, the United States and Russia agreed in 1997 that it does not prohibit TMD for protecting against slower short- and medium-range missiles. The United States has been developing TMD systems to defend forward-deployed U.S. troops and to defend America’s allies, including Japan. The Navy’s area-wide defense (NAD) and the Army’s Patriot advanced capability (PAC-3) system are among those under development for lower-tier defense against short-range missiles and aircraft. For upper-tier TMD, the Navy is studying theater-wide and theater highaltitude area defense systems. Questions to consider include the extent of the threat; the technological feasibility of TMD; its cost; whether to use a land-, sea-, or air-based system, or some combination; and whether TMD will prompt an arms race or fit into an arms control and antiproliferation framework. Other questions involve the division of defense contracts between U.S. companies and those of its allies, and the management of TMD by air, ground, and/or maritime military services. In peacetime, China’s 1996 missile exercises near Taiwan showed that ballistic missiles without warheads could be used to try to intimidate an opponent. In 1998, North Korea launched its Taepo Dong-1 missile to apply pressure without being clear about the specific intent. In a time of war, such as a conflict on the Korean peninsula, conventional ballistic missiles might be used against military forces in South Korea and U.S. forces in Japan. In such a case, existing air defense systems are of little use.

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In 1998, Japan decided to participate in joint technology research on a naval-based theater-wide ballistic missile defense system (NTWD), expected to take five to six years and cost Japan $280 million (more than 30 billion yen). The JDA awarded research contracts to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Raytheon. Ground- and sea-based tracking radar would be used to track missiles, and current PAC-2s could be upgraded to PAC-3s. (During the Gulf War, PAC-2s shot down some Iraqi SCUD missiles, showing the feasibility of ballistic missile defense over an extremely limited range.) Today, systems capable of intercepting short- and medium-range missiles are further advanced than systems designed to intercept ICBMs. The choice of missile defense architecture will be important to Japan; for example, a mobile sea-based system could be used to defend Taiwan, and Japan might resist a system that could be deployed for that purpose. JDA officials worry that the cost of deploying TMD could exceed $2.5 billion (300 billion yen), diminishing Japan’s ability to upgrade conventional forces. They recognize that Japanese leaders could face a skeptical public and that opposition to TMD will increase among the leadership if it cannot be shown to guarantee absolute protection. However, JDA officials appear to welcome joint work on TMD that requires the United States and Japan to develop advanced information-sharing systems, command-and-control functions, and a joint operating doctrine for the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Forces in Japan.11 They state that TMD development, if not deployment, will lead to strengthened cooperation between the two militaries, because an effective TMD system requires a high degree of interoperability.12 As the only nation to experience nuclear destruction, Japan strongly supports arms control and arms reduction efforts. Tokyo would have difficulty in choosing TMD at the expense of the nonproliferation and disarmament treaties it has advocated for so long. In their strategic dialogue with the United States, Japanese officials will likely stress the importance of pursuing a comprehensive strategy, similar to that outlined by Secretary Powell, that includes diplomatic initiatives in pursuit of arms control and nonproliferation. They will be particularly interested if TMD helps lure such Asian nations as China into a regional arms control regime. Japan’s leaders could defer deployment decisions on TMD until 2003 or later.13 Their decision will test Japan’s willingness to exer-

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cise its right to collective self-defense. Supporters argue that, because TMD is strictly a defensive system, its deployment would be consistent with Japan’s constitutional prohibition on the use of force for offensive purposes. Opponents worry that, if America and its allies deploy TMD systems without the tacit agreement of Russia and China, they might risk provoking a new Cold War.

China’s Opposition The greatest challenge to missile defense plans may be overcoming Chinese opposition. Despite Washington’s official reassurances to the contrary, Beijing’s initial reaction to President Bush’s “new strategic framework” was to declare that it could start an arms race and threaten world peace. Contending that the ABM treaty was critical to strategic stability, China joined Russia in asserting that missile defense would threaten the international arms control agenda.14 At the heart of China’s opposition is fear that U.S. NMD could negate its small nuclear force of 20 to 24 ICBMs. Chinese strategists will certainly consider increasing its strategic nuclear arsenal, developing countermeasure technology, and accelerating improvements to the survivability of its ICBM forces. China has taken a different approach toward TMD. Sha Zukang, director general of arms control and disarmament for the Foreign Ministry, said in March 2001, “China is not opposed to [TMD]. . . to protect troops and military bases.”15 China has concerns that, by limiting the effectiveness of its medium- and short-range missiles, TMD deployment would strengthen the U.S.-Japan security alliance, increase its potential for containing China, and give Japan the protection and technology it needs to rearm. However, Beijing’s overriding goal remains preventing the deployment of missile defense systems on Taiwan. Japan security expert Ozawa Toshiro has pointed out that “upper-tier TMD for Taiwan would be militarily meaningless.”16 Taipei’s eagerness to obtain Aegis cruisers, however, suggests that it hopes in the long run to be linked to U.S. missile defense systems. In May 2001, U.S. assistant secretary of state James Kelly began a dialogue with China on ballistic missile defense. A sustained dialogue with China would challenge Beijing to show its seriousness about enhancing strategic stability. China’s defensive capabilities need not be threatened by greater transparency about its doctrine

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and the ultimate size and composition of its strategic forces. Although acknowledging that the U.S. Congress would not be receptive to his argument, Thomas Schelling maintains that “over time, stability might be enhanced by the Chinese, like the Russians, having a second-strike capacity.”17 For the United States to tacitly endorse a significant nuclear buildup by China would indeed be difficult. However, a regional arms control regime, based on restraint by all Asian participants, might be shown to be in the self-interest of China, the United States, and Japan.

Transnational and Multinational Cooperation As chapters 1 through 5 discuss, the U.S.-Japan alliance can contribute to the gradual process of security integration in Asia. Already, the revised guidelines provide for military-to-military cooperation in search-and-rescue, humanitarian and disaster relief, and for measures to deal with refugee flows and noncombatant evacuation operations. Cooperation in each of these areas can enhance the status of Japan’s SDF and increase opportunities for future joint action with other militaries in the region. For five decades, Japan’s defense forces have been isolated from other forces in the region. Emerging from that isolation will enable the SDF to clarify its purpose, roles, and missions in ways that should prove reassuring to neighboring countries. China’s forces have also remained isolated for much of the past half-century, and China, too, should embrace the opportunity to engage in regular peacetime exchanges. If a crisis should occur, intermilitary ties will make defusing it far easier. Within the next decade, the United States and Japan may decide to expand cooperation to matters not covered by the guidelines, but still pertaining to the security of both nations. Already Japan has acted with uncharacteristic speed to support the U.S.-led war against terrorism. The United States and Japan carry out substantial joint efforts in environmental protection, space development, and the life sciences. Further bilateral cooperation on energy security, transborder crime, piracy, and illegal narcotics can lead to multinational cooperation and will enhance overall stability in Asia. Only recently have infectious disease and regional and global economic development been recognized by the international community as security matters. In these areas, too, the world’s two rich-

Opportunities for a Strengthened Alliance 91

est nations together can do far more than they can do separately.18 These are the alliance’s newest challenges and opportunities, and its leaders will serve their nations and the world by addressing them.

Notes 1. “Joint Statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi: Partnership for Security and Prosperity,” Camp David, June 30, 2001, http://usinfo.state.gov. 2. Ibid. The two leaders’ June 30 joint statement also included the importance of furthering global nonproliferation efforts and obtaining for Japan a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Japan wants to be one of 10 permanent members in a 24-member expanded council, but needs to secure support from P-5 member China to achieve its goal. 3. Essentially a political document, the leaders’ statement omitted specific reference to joint training for humanitarian relief, search-and-rescue and noncombatant evacuation operations, or measures to deal with refugee flows. However, the revised guidelines already include provisions for these activities, and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and JDA director general Nakatani discussed them a week before the summit. Although the statement did not specify a need to align and coordinate policy approaches to Russia or Indonesia, it referred to “the Asia Pacific region and other areas of the world.” Finally the joint statement did not stress export control cooperation, preferring instead “non-proliferation efforts around the globe.” 4. U.S. Senate confirmation hearings, January 17, 2001, http://usinfo. state.gov. 5. Mansfield Center/Global Forum: “U.S.-Japan Security Relations under the New U.S. Administration,” May 28, 2001. 6. Testimony on June 21, 2001, http://usinfo.state.gov. 7. Leon Fuerth, “Tampering with Strategic Stability,” Washington Post, February 20, 2001. 8. James Dao, “U.S. Study Casts Doubt on Shield,” International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shimbun, June 26, 2001, p. 1. 9. Richard Garwin, “ABM Treaty Should Put a Lid over North Korea, Not America,” New Perspectives Quarterly 18, no. 3 (Summer 2001), http:// www.npq.org/issues/v183/lid_over.html. 10. Steven Mufson, “Democrats Plot Strategy on Missile Defense,” Washington Post, May 20, 2001, p. A14. 11. According to National Defense Academy president Nishihara, de facto U.S. control over decisions to use TMD assets would create a backlash in Japan. Before TMD deployment, the two allies would need to agree

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on rules governing the defense of Japan and the protection of U.S. forces in Japan. Interview in Yokosuka on February 27, 2001. 12. Interviews on April 16, April 20, and June 14, 2001. 13. On NMD, decisions can be postponed even longer, and Japan’s government so far has taken a wait-and-see approach. The United States has yet to demonstrate how NMD and TMD would be integrated, since upper-tier systems remain in the testing stage. Emphasizing its “understanding” of the Bush administration’s new strategic framework, Tokyo officially stated that it (1) welcomed further cuts in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal; (2) shared Washington’s concern over the ballistic missile threat; (3) would continue with joint TMD research; and (4) wanted arms control and nonproliferation efforts—and talks with China and Russia— to continue. International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shimbun, June 5, 2001. 14. Asked if Russia had a reciprocal obligation to take China’s strategic concerns into account in its discussions with the United States, President Putin stressed his commitment “to preserve the balance of security that we have now in the world as a whole and in this sense, China is an important element.” Patrick Tyler, “Putin Says Russia Would Counter U.S. Shield,” New York Times, June 19, 2001, p. 1. Putin appeared to soften his opposition to the “new strategic framework” by the time he joined President Bush for a summit meeting in November 2001. 15. As quoted by John Pomfret, “Beijing Eases Stand on Missile Defense,” Washington Post, March 15, 2001, p. A21. 16. Ozawa Toshiro, “Missile Defense: Trends, Concerns and Remedies,” unpublished article. 17. As quoted by Fareed Zakaria, “Misapprehensions about Missile Defense,” Washington Post, May 7, 2001, p. A19. 18. Although Japan’s economic reform is beyond the scope of this essay, the “U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth” launched at the June 2001 summit was designed to support growth and prosperity in both countries and the world. Tokyo and Washington also agreed on the importance of a new WTO round of trade negotiations, then led the way toward launching that round in Doha in November 2001.

Bibliography

Amako Satoshi. “Japan and Taiwan: A Neglected Friendship.” Japan Review of International Affairs 15, no. 1 (Spring 2001). Armitage, Richard, et al. The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership. Institute for National Strategic Studies Special Report (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, October 2000). Blair, Dennis C., and John T. Hanley. “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements.” Washington Quarterly 24 (Winter 2001). Calder, Kent. “The New Face of Northeast Asia.” Foreign Affairs (January/ February 2001). Drifte, Reinhard. “U.S. Impact on Japanese-Chinese Security Relations.” Security Dialogue 31, no. 4 (December 2000). Fuerth, Leon. “Return of the Nuclear Debate.” Washington Quarterly 24 (Autumn 2001). Funabashi Yoichi. Alliance Adrift. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999. Inamine Keiichi. “Okinawa: Reflections on the Postwar Years and a Vision for the Future.” Japan Review of International Affairs 14, no. 1 (Spring 2000). Khalilzad, Zalmay, et al. The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001. Kokubua Ryosei. “Japan-China Relations after the Cold War: Switching from the 1972 Framework.” Japan Echo (April 2001).

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Lampton, David M. Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989–2000. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Nishihara Masashi, ed. The Japan-U.S. Alliance: New Challenges for the 21st Century. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000. Nye, Joseph. “The ‘Nye Report’: Six Years Later.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 1 (2001). O’Hanlon, Michael. “Come Partly Home, America.” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2001). Rauch, Jonathan. The Outnation: A Search for the Soul of Japan. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992. Rice, Condoleezza. “Promoting the National Interest.” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2000). Shinn, James, ed. Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996. Watanabe Akio. “The Past and Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.” Japan Review of International Affairs 15, no. 3 (Fall 2001). ______. “First among Equals.” Washington Quarterly (Summer 2001).

Interviews by the Author Tokyo Akiba Takeo, Executive Assistant to the Vice Foreign Minister, Foreign Ministry Akiyama Masahiro, Chairman, Ship and Ocean Foundation Foster, James, Political Minister Counselor, U.S. Embassy Funabashi Yoichi, Asahi Shimbun Hosokawa Masahiko, Director, Americas, Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry Jimbo Ken, Japan Institute of International Affairs Jun Bong-Geun, Keio University Kawai Chikao, Deputy Director General, North American Affairs, Foreign Ministry Kohno Masaharu, Deputy Director General, Foreign Policy, Foreign Ministry Kokubun Ryosei, Keio University Kunihiro Amb. Michihiko, NTT Data Kurata Hideya, Japan Institute of International Affairs Masuda Kohei, Counselor, Defense Policy, Japan Defense Agency Mizuno Takaaki, Asahi Shimbun

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Morimoto Satoshi, Director, Nomura Research Institute Navratil, Thomas, Security Policy Unit, U.S. Embassy Nishihara Masashi, President, National Defense Academy Okazaki Amb. Hisahiko, Director, Okazaki Institute Ozawa Toshiro, Japan Institute of International Affairs Saiki Naoko, Director, North American Affairs II, Foreign Ministry Staples, Cmdr. Mark, Mansfield Fellow, Foreign Ministry Sunaga Kazuo, Counselor, Office of the Prime Minister Takamizawa Nobushige, Director, Intelligence, Japan Defense Agency Tanaka Akihito, Tokyo University Tanaka Hitoshi, Director General, Economic Affairs, Foreign Ministry Tokuchi Hiroshi, Director, Planning and Programming, Japan Defense Agency Watanabe Akio, Director, Research Institute for Peace and Stability Yamauchi Chisato, Director, Operations Planning, Japan Defense Agency

Yokota Air Base Bell, Lt. Kevin, J-5 Clark, Cmdr. Eric, J-3 Gerlaugh, Col. Robert, J-4 Hunter-Chester, Lt. Col. David, J-5 McNeill, Col. Ronald, J-5 Richardson, Dave, J-2 Sauve, Cmdr. Pete, J-6 Vivori, Lt. Col. Joseph, J-1 Walker, Col. Harold, J-5

Okinawa Ashitomi Osamu, Member, Prefectural Assembly Betts, Timothy, U.S. Consul General Bishop, Lt. Jeffrey, USAF Favors, Col. Rose Marie, USMC Freeman, Hisae, Political-Military Liaison, USFJ Freund, Col. John, USA, USFJ Godfrey, Col. Michael, USMC Hailston, Lt. Gen. Earl, USMC Commander and Okinawa Area Coordinator Higa Mikio, Professor Ito, Nobuaki, Counselor, Office of the Governor

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Kokuba Kouichirou, Business leader Mire, Lawrence, Political-Military chief, U.S. Consulate General Odo Tohru, Member, Prefectural Assembly Oyakawa Seiichi, Director General, Office of the Governor Shapiro, Lt. Col. Stevi Ann, USAF Shimabukuro Jun, University of the Ryukyus Yamada Yoshito, Director, Military Base Affairs, Office of the Governor

Taipei Chang Chau-Hsiung, Vice Chairman, People First Party Chen Lee, Taipei World Trade Center Chen, Stephen, National Policy Foundation Chien, Eugene, Deputy Secretary General, Office of the President Chuang Ming-yao, Secretary General, National Security Council Deng, John, Vice Chairman, Mainland Affairs Council Donovan, Joseph, Political Counselor, American Institute in Taipei Huang, James, Mainland Affairs Council Kao, Stanley, Director General, North America, Foreign Ministry Kau Ying-Mao, Senior Adviser, National Security Council Lai Shin-Yuan, Senior Adviser, National Security Council Lien Chan, Chairman, Nationalist Party Lin Chao-Tsan, Director, Planning and Information, Straits Exchange Foundation Lin Yi-Fu, Administrative Vice Minister, Ministry of Economic Affairs Linghu, Bruce, Deputy Director General, North America, Foreign Ministry Liu, Andres C.Y., Director General, International, Ministry of Economic Affairs Mak, Ray, Vice President, Macronix International Co., Ltd. Shen Ssu-Tsun, Director General, International Organizations, Foreign Ministry Su Chi, National Policy Foundation Wu Nai-Jen, Secretary General, Democratic Progressive Party Wu Tzu-Dan, Deputy Minister, Foreign Ministry Yan Jiann-fa, Director, Chinese Affairs, Democratic Progressive Party Yang, Philip, National Taiwan University Yen, Randy, Director, Hsin Chu Science Park Yen Wan-Ching, Deputy Secretary General, Straits Exchange Foundation Young, Stephen, Deputy Director, American Institute in Taiwan

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Seoul Cho Myoung-Gyon, Deputy Director General, Ministry of Unification Cho Myung-Chul, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy Collins, Robert, Adviser, U.S. Forces Korea Dunn, Maj. Gen. Michael, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, J-5, U.S. Forces Korea Goldbeck, Brian, Political Section External Unit Chief, U.S. Embassy Hong Ihk-Pyo, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy Kim Hyon-Du, Ministry of Unification Kim Sung-Hwan, Director General, North America, Foreign Ministry Lee Chan-Woo, Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia Moon Chung-In, Dean, Yonsei University Shim Yoon-Joe, Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Office of the President Sinclair, Col. E.J., USA, U.S. Forces Korea Straub, David, Political Minister Counselor, U.S. Embassy

Singapore Loh, Stanley, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy to U.S., Foreign Ministry William, Jeyaraj Benjamin, Deputy Director, Policy Planning, Foreign Ministry

Conferences, Symposia, Seminars, Lectures, and Meetings December 4, 2000—Pacific Forum CSIS: “U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines,” Washington, D.C. January 31, 2001—Tokyo University: “The Changing Nature of the State in Asia” March 7, 2001—Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA): Meeting with Dr. Chris Hughes March 9, 2001—JIIA: Air War College Regional Studies Seminar March 14, 2001—Foreign Ministry: “International Symposium on Conflict Prevention” March 21, 2001—JIIA: Meeting with Malaysian Defense Minister Datuk Seri Najib

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March 22, 2001—JIIA: “U.S.-Japan Relationship,” Meeting with Dan Quayle March 22, 2001—German-Japan Friendship Society: Lecture by Reinhard Drifte March 26, 2001—JIIA: Harvard Weatherhead Center May 16–18, 2001—JIIA: Symposium on Northeast Asian Security May 28, 2001—Mansfield Center/Global Forum: “U.S.-Japan Security Relations under the New U.S. Administration” July 6–7, 2001—JIIA: “At the Front Lines of Conflict Prevention in Asia”

Study Groups and Presentations March 13, 2001—Asahi Shimbun: Presentation to study group March 28, May 28, and June 26, 2001—Korea-Japan study group April 18, 2001—Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA): Presentation May 15, 2001—U.S. Embassy: Presentation to study group May 24, 2001—Hitachi Ltd: Presentation to President and Board of Directors May 31, 2001—ERINA: Presentation to members, Niigata

Index

Baker, Howard, 44 Baker, James, 84 Ballistic missiles: Ballistic missile defense (BMD), 86; Taepo-Dong 1 and No Dong missiles, xiv, 10, 12, 18, 87; U.S. dialogue with China on defense using, 89 Bangladesh, 50 Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC), U.S.-Japan, 83 Biological weapons, 84 Biological Weapons Convention, 73 Blair, Dennis, 49 BMD. See Ballistic missiles Bolton, John, 9 Burma, 47 Bush, George W.: announces U.S. reduction of ABM arsenal, 84; on defense of Taiwan, 23; “one China” policy of, 24; outlines new strategic framework (2001), 84, 89 Bush administration: building coalition to combat terrorism, 75; discussions after policy review with DPRK, 17; policy review related to South Korean relations, 15; use of TCOG process, 14–15; verification and monitoring of North Korean commitments, 15–16

Afghanistan, 45 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty: defense against ICBMs under, 87; U.S. proposed abrogation of, xiv, 73, 85 Armitage, Richard, xiv, 68, 75, 81, 83 Armitage Report, 67, 71–72, 75 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): China-Japan trade initiative (2001), 38; as multilateral security institution, 46–47 Asian countries: benefits from U.S.Japan alliance, xv; Japan’s policy to restore relations with, 3-5; Japan’s provision of developmental assistance to, 2; U.S. troops stationed in, 10. See also Southeast Asia Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 46–47; China-ASEAN trade agreement, 46; Japan-ASEAN Eminent Persons group, 48–49; noninterference policy of, 47–48; Post-Ministerial Conference, 47; problem of Indonesia in, 45–46; Regional Forum, 50 Atsugi Naval Air Facility, Okinawa, 58 Australia: bilateral defense cooperation with United States, 49; intervention in East Timor, 50; mutual defense treaty with United States, 49 99

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Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), Japan, 68–69 Carter, Jimmy, 11 Chemical weapons, 84 Chen Shui-bian, 26; cross-strait policies of, 28–29; post-election strength of, 28; proposal for Taiwan-China relations, 28; on Taiwan’s independence, 29; travel to United States, 33; U.S. postelection engagement with, 27 China: interest in Asian economic integration, 48; interests in Korean peninsula, 18–19; as member of WTO, 29, 36, 38; North Korean defiance of, 18; policy related to Taiwan-China reunification, 27; position on NMD and TMD, 89; potential future role in Korea, 19; problems of doing business in, 38– 39; U.S. forces providing disaster assistance, 50; U.S.-Japan goals for and concerns about, 32–33; as U.S. trading partner, 36; view of U.S.Japan alliance, 33; weakness and internal instability, 34 CLB. See Cabinet Legislation Bureau Clinton, Bill: visit to Okinawa, 62 Clinton administration: summit diplomacy preferred by, 12; U.S.China Forum on Environment and Development, 40 Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Security Declaration (1996), xiv, 58 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 73 Conference of the Parties (COP) [sixth and seventh], 74 Constitution, Japan: Article 9 statement related to war, 66–67; limits on defense of Japan, 67–68, 70; line between defense and offense in, 72; proposed amendment or revision to, 67–68; review committees formed (1999), 67 Daalder, Ivo, 76 Dalai Lama, 33 Datuk Seri Najib, 46, 48 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan, 26, 28

DPRK. See North Korea Education of Okinawans, 62–63 Ehime Maru (ship), xvi, 55 Energy issues: China’s increasing energy demands, 41; oil suppliers to Japan, 6, 45; Russian oil and gas reserves, 45; transport of oil from Persian Gulf and Middle East, 45–46; U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation, 90 Environmental issues: in China, 37; Chinese environmental degradation in Japan, 37; Kyoto Protocol, xiv, 73– 74; U.S.-China cooperation related to, 40, 90; U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development, 40; U.S.-Japan differences about, 73–74 Falun Gong, 39 Foreign policy, U.S.: under Taiwan Relations Act, 23; withdrawal from some international initiatives, xiv Four-Party Talks, 19 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 46 Fujioka Nobukatsu, 3 Fukuda Takeo, 11 Futenma Air Station, Okinawa, 55–57 Garvin, Richard, 86 Geneva Agreed Framework (1994), 9, 10, 12, 16 Gore, Al, 37, 40 Gregson, Wallace, 59 Hailston, Earl, 58–59 Hashimoto Ryutaro, 24, 32, 57 Higuchi Report (1994), xiii Hiranuma Takeo, 38 Hull, Cordell, 36 Inamine Keiichi, 57, 58 Indonesia: conflict in province of Aceh, 47–48; East Timor crisis (1999), 50; Japanese assistance to, 2; Muslim extremists in, 45; piracy practiced by, 45–46; as problem for ASEAN, 45–46

Index Institute for National Strategic Studies Special Report (Armitage Report), 67, 71–72 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 87; under ABM Treaty, 87; U.S. nuclear force of, 89 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): estimating North Korea’s pre-1994 plutonium levels, 16; special inspection of North Korea, 16 International Criminal Court, xiv Japan: annexation of Ryukyu islands, 54; ethnic Koreans residing in, 15; Green Aid to China, 40; interests in Southeast Asia, 45–46; issue of collective defense, 67–70; manufacturing outsourcing in China, 39; as member of TCOG, 14–16; mutual defense treaty with United States, 49; official development assistance to China, 36; Okinawa’s reversion to, 54; participation in KEDO, 16; perception of TMD deployment, 88– 89; policy related to Taiwan-China reunification, 26; policy related to terrorism, xiv–xv; position on Kyoto Protocol, 73–74; role in multilateral peacekeeping, 69; role in Taiwan’s economic development, 25–26; security interests related to Korean peninsula, 11–12; view of potential Taiwan Strait conflict, 24 Japan Defense Agency (JDA), 58; position on TMD, 88; potential as full-fledged ministry, 71; research contracts for ballistic missile defense, 88 Japan-Russia Peace Treaty (1956), 44 JDA. See Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Jiang Zemin: Bush’s meeting with (2001), 24; future political objectives of, 34; visit to North Korea (2001), 18; visit to Tokyo (1998), 39 Joint force doctrine, 61 Jones, James, 60 Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, 55 Kawaguchi Yoriko, 73

101

Kazakhstan, 45 KEDO. See Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) Kelly, James, 89 Kim Dae Jung, 3, 12; sunshine policy toward North Korea, 13; U.S.-Japan continued support of, 15 Kim Jong Il: expected visit to Seoul, 13, 15; leadership of, 13–14 Kim Young Jin, 3 Kishimoto Tateo, 62 Kissinger, Henry, 75 Koizumi Junichiro, 3; position on Okinawa, 57; proposed expansion of ASEAN, 48; visit to China, 4–5; visit to Washington, 73; visit to Yasukuni shrine (2001), 4 Korea: as potential regional rival, 12– 13; U.S. vital interests in, 9. See also North Korea; South Korea Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO): Japan’s support for, 12; light-water reactors of, 16; on-site verification activities of, 16 Kuril Islands, 44 Kyoto Protocol: ratification, 74; U.S.Japanese differences over, 73–74; U.S. withdrawal from, xiv, 73 Kyrgyzstan, 45 Lee Kuan Yew, 23–24, 73 Lee Teng-hui, 23, 26, 27 Li Peng, 27 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan: defense panel on collective selfdefense, 68–69; link to Taiwan KMT, 26 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Okinawa, 57 Malaysia, 49 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF): based on Okinawa, 10, 61; humanitarian activities of, 50; 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit of, 60; training by, 61 Military sector: China’s defense spending in, 33–34; Japan’s annual defense spending, 72; potential for expansion of, 67

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Missile defense issues: U.S.-Japan consultation about, 83–87; U.S. strategic missile defense policy, xiv. See also National Missile Defense (NMD); Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Missiles: China’s launch near Taiwan, xiv; North Korean conditions for foregoing, 16–17; North Korean Taepo Dong-1 and No Dong, xiv, 12, 18; U.S. proposed abrogation of ABM Treaty, xiv. See also National Missile Defense (NMD); Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Miyazawa Initiative (1997), 2 Murayama Tomiichi, 3 Nakatani Gen, 58, 70, 83 National Missile Defense (NMD): boost-phase, 86; China’s perception of U.S., 89; cost of, 86–87; different from TMD, 85; Japan’s evaluation of, 83; testing of, 86 Nationalist Party (KMT), Taiwan: link to Japan’s LDP, 26 Nishihara Masashi, 25 Nixon, Richard M., 54 NMD. See National Missile Defense North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 46 North Korea: “axis of evil” link to Iran and Iraq, 17; cost of potential collapse of, 13; defiance of China, 18; under Geneva Agreed Framework, 9–10; increased military capabilities (2000), 13; juche ideology of, 14, 18; light-water reactor, 16; material needs of, 14; Nunn-Lugar threat reduction initiative applied to, 18; Putin’s visit to (2001), 44; suspected Kumchang-ni nuclear site, 16; Taepo Dong-1 and No Dong missiles, xiv, 10, 12, 18, 87; U.S. troops in Asia to deter aggression of, 10 Nuclear weapons: as deterrent, 84; nations pursuing, 84; North Korean program, 9, 10; Russian arsenal, 44

Nunn-Lugar threat reduction initiative, 17–18, 86 Nye, Joseph, xiii, 23 Okinawa: assimilation policy of, 54; colonization by Japan, 54; perceptions of importance of U.S. bases on, 63; proposed greater autonomy for, 63–64; Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), 59; Special Free Trade Zone, 62; strategic location of, xvi, 53; U.S. Marines based in, 10 Ota Masahide, 55, 57, 62 Owada Hisashi, 51, 70 Ozawa Toshiro, 89 Papua New Guinea, 50 Peacekeeping operations (PKOs): of Japan, 69–70; of United Nations, 70 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China: defense spending, 33–34; military buildup, 27; modernization of, 33–34 Perry, William, 14 Persian Gulf: Japan’s monetary contribution to war in, 69–70; oil supplies from, 45–46 Philippines: bilateral defense cooperation with United States, 49; end of U.S. basing agreement with (1992), 10; mutual defense treaty with United States, 49; U.S. forces providing disaster assistance, 50; U.S. withdrawal from (1992), 77 PKOs. See Peacekeeping operations Powell, Colin, 35, 84, 85, 88 PRC (People’s Republic of China). See China Przystup, James, 84 Putin, Vladimir: summit with Bush (2001), 84; visits to North Korea and Vietnam (2001), 44 Qian Qichen, 28, 38 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (2001), xiv

Index ROK (Republic of Korea). See South Korea Rumsfeld, Donald, 83, 84 Rumsfeld Commission (1998), 86 Russia: nuclear weapons program, 44; return of Kuril Islands to Japan, 44; ties with China, 44–45 Ryukyu islands, 54 Saudi Arabia, 76 Schelling, Thomas, 90 Security Agreement, U.S.-Japan (1951,1960), 1–2, 67, 82–83 Security Consultative Committee. See Security Agreement, U.S.-Japan (1951,1960) Security issues, U.S.-Japan: research on ballistic missile defense, 82; Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), 81–83 Security Treaty, U.S.-Japan (1951,1960). See Security Agreement, U.S.-Japan (1951,1960) Self-Defense Forces, Japan: bases in Japan and on Okinawa shared by, 61; deficiencies of, 62; emerging from isolation, 90; humanitarian activities of, 50, 70; Japanese perception of, 70; joint operations with USFJ, xiii; joint submarine rescue exercises of, 71; joint use of facilities on Okinawa, 61; laws and regulations restricting, 71; maritime forces joint minesweeping drill, 70– 71; navy and air force, 72; recognized legitimacy of, 67; role of, xvi; sent to Singapore (1999), 46 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 35 Sha Zukang, 89 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 45 Shi Guangsheng, 38 Singapore: Japanese SDF sent to, 46; Japan’s Free Trade Agreement with, 46; naval base at Changi, 49 South Korea: concerns related to potential collapse of North Korea, 13; Japan’s free-trade negotiations with, 46; as member of TCOG, 14– 15; mutual defense treaty with

103

United States, 49; nationalism of, 14–15; relations with China, 19; steps toward reconciliation with Japan, 3–4, 15; steps toward reconciliation with North Korea, 13; U.S. troops based in, 10 Southeast Asia: economic integration, 46–48; U.S. and Japanese interests in, 45–46 Special Free Trade Zone, Okinawa, 62 Staples, Mark, 71 Status of Forces Agreement, U.SJapan, 83 Taiwan: democracy in, 26; dependence on U.S.-Japan alliance, 23; geographic position of, 23; as member of WTO, 29; North Korean ties with, 18; potential for unification with China, 23; U.S. and Japanese interests in, 22, 32; U.S. security commitment to, 26; U.S. stake in economy of, 23 Taiwan Relations Act, 23 Taiwan Strait: 1996 crisis, 24; crossstrait tensions, 26–29; cross-strait trade, 29; potential for conflict in, 22–23, 24; U.S.-Japan role to reduce cross-strait tension, 28 Tajikistan, 45 Tanaka Akihito, 29, 60 Tanaka Makiko, 44 Tang Jiaxuan, 3 TCOG. See Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) Territorial issues: Dok-to (Takashima) Island, 15; Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone, 35–36; return to Japan of northern territories and Kuril Islands, 44; Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 35 Terrorism: APEC position on, 47; China’s support for war against, 38; Japan’s counterterrorism law, 69; Japan’s policy related to, xiv–xv, 12, 90 Thailand: Japanese assistance to, 2; mutual defense treaty with United States, 49

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Than Shwe, 47 Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, 86–87 Theater Missile Defense (TMD): China’s approach to, 89; cost to deploy, 88–89; difference from NMD, 85; Japanese-U.S. technical research on, xiv; Japan’s evaluation of, 83; JDA position on, 88; U.S. development of, 87 Theater-Wide Defense (NTWD) systems, 86–87 Tibet, 39 TMD. See Theater Missile Defense Tokyo Declaration (1956), 44 Trade, international: China-ASEAN free trade agreement, 46; ChinaJapan economic dialogue agreement, 38; China’s accountability under rule of, 38; Japan’s approach to expansion of, 466; NAFTA and FTAA integration plans, 46; TaiwanJapan, 25; U.S.-China and JapanChina, 36–37 Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation, China-Russia, 45 Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), 14–16 Trust building, 61 United Nations: bases in Japan under command of, 11; peacekeeping mission in East Timor, 50; votes United States off some UN agencies, 74 United States: bases on Okinawa, 53, 55; Cold War policy toward Japan, 6; defense treaties; interest in Northand South Korean reconciliation, 10–11; interests in Southeast Asia, 45–46; as member of TCOG, 14–15; need to engage China, 37; policy related to Taiwan-China reunification, 23–24; role in East Timor crisis, 50; role to support North-South

Korean reconciliation, 10; security commitment to Taiwan, 26; stake in Taiwanese economy, 23; as supplier of heavy fuel oil to North Korea, 16; threat of China to Asian interests of, 34; withdrawal from Kyoto Protocol, 73; withdrawal of support from some international initiatives, xiv, 73 U.S. Army, Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 system, 87, 88 U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, 86 U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development, 40 U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ): joint operations with SDF, xiii U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: 1978 Guidelines, xiii–xiv; 1997 Revised Guidelines, 6, 11, 24–25, 32, 83, 90 U.S.-Japan security alliance: China’s view of, 33; contribution to security integration, 90; function of, 22; post– World War II emergence of, 1; relevance of, xv; role in Asian security integration process, 50 U.S. Navy, Area-Wide Defense (NAD), 87 USFJ. See U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) Uzbekistan, 45 Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs): acquisition by terrorists, 84–85; Japan’s position on proliferation of, 12; North Korean program related to, 9–10; U.S. concerns about North Korea’s, 9–10; U.S. prevention of proliferation of, 9 World Trade Organization (WTO): China and Taiwan as members of, 29, 36, 38 Wu Xinbo, 48 Yamauchi Chisato, 71 Zhu Rongji, 40

About the Author

U.S. Foreign Service officer Ted Osius is currently the regional environmental affairs officer for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, based in Bangkok, Thailand. From January to July 2001, he studied the U.S.– Japan security alliance and northeast Asia security issues at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. The Council on Foreign Relations and Hitachi, Ltd., supported Mr. Osius’s stay in Tokyo through the International Affairs Fellowship in Japan. From 1998 to 2001, Mr. Osius served as senior adviser on international affairs to Vice President Al Gore, with a portfolio encompassing Asia, international economics, and trade issues. In 1985 and 1986, Mr. Osius worked on defense, foreign policy, and trade for then senator Al Gore and in 1988 participated in Mr. Gore’s first presidential campaign. Ted Osius joined the U.S. Department of State in 1989. Following his first tour, as a political and consular officer in Manila, Philippines, he served as the political and administrative officer at the U.S. embassy to the Vatican. Beginning in 1993, he worked as executive assistant to then permanent representative to the United Nations Madeleine Albright and subsequently advised her on Middle East and North African issues in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Starting in 1996, he served as senior political officer in the U.S. embassy in Hanoi and in 1997 opened the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City, becoming the first American political officer in Saigon in 23 years. Mr. Osius holds a B.A. in political theory from Harvard University (1984) and an M.A. in international economics and U.S. for105

eign policy from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (1989). He worked as assistant to the president of the American University in Cairo in 1984–1985 and edited and researched Let’s Go: Israel and Egypt, Let’s Go: Greece, Let’s Go: Italy, and Let’s Go: Europe while an undergraduate at Harvard.

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