Turkish Foreign Policy: The Lausanne Syndrome in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East (SpringerBriefs in International Relations) 3030907457, 9783030907457

Table of contents :
Contents
1 Introduction: Turkish Foreign Policy Under the AKP and the Lausanne Syndrome
1.1 The Argument and Structure of the Book
2 A Neoclassical Realist Framework
2.1 Independent Variables—Systemic Stimuli
2.2 Intervening Variables—Leader Images and Strategic Culture
2.3 Dependent Variable—Status Quo Versus Revisionism
2.4 Operationalisation
3 From the National Pact to the Sèvres and Lausanne: The Birth of Two Syndromes
3.1 From the Armistice of Mudhros to the Sèvres Syndrome
3.2 From the National Pact to the Lausanne Syndrome
3.3 Summary of the Independent and Intervening Variables
4 Discursive Manifestations of the Lausanne Syndrome Since the Second Group, and the AKP’s Geopolitical Vision
4.1 The Weight of Ideation in New Turkey’s Foreign Policy
4.2 The Lausanne Syndrome in Leader Images and Strategic Culture: From the Second Group to the AKP
4.3 Shaping Collective Ideas and Assumptions
4.4 On Intervening Variables and Foreign Policy Outcomes
5 The Lausanne Syndrome and Revisionism Under the AKP: The Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East
5.1 The Systemic Context
5.2 Mavi Vatan and the Lausanne Syndrome in the Eastern Mediterranean
5.2.1 Geopolitical and Ideological Dimensions of Mavi Vatan
5.2.2 Cyprus: Shield and Bridgehead
5.2.3 Libya: Claiming the Past and a Gateway to Africa
5.3 The Lausanne Syndrome in the Middle East
5.3.1 Syria: From Alexandretta to the “Safe Zones” in Northern Syria
5.3.2 Iraq: Reclaiming Mosul
6 Conclusions
6.1 How Did the Lausanne Syndrome Emerge and What Does It Entail?
6.2 What Are the Boundaries of Erdoğan’s Heart?
6.3 What Is the Foreign Policy Behaviour Predicted by the Lausanne Syndrome?
6.4 Revising the Lausanne Treaty How? Has Turkey Been Successful?
6.5 What About the Lausanne Syndrome in Post-Erdoğan Turkey?
Bibliography

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SPRINGER BRIEFS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Zenonas Tziarras

Turkish Foreign Policy The Lausanne Syndrome in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East

SpringerBriefs in International Relations

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More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/16771

Zenonas Tziarras

Turkish Foreign Policy The Lausanne Syndrome in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East

Zenonas Tziarras Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Center Nicosia, Cyprus

ISSN 2731-3352 ISSN 2731-3360 (electronic) SpringerBriefs in International Relations ISBN 978-3-030-90745-7 ISBN 978-3-030-90746-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90746-4 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Thelma, my rock.

Contents

1 Introduction: Turkish Foreign Policy Under the AKP and the Lausanne Syndrome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The Argument and Structure of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 3

2 A Neoclassical Realist Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1 Independent Variables—Systemic Stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2 Intervening Variables—Leader Images and Strategic Culture . . . . . . . 10 2.3 Dependent Variable—Status Quo Versus Revisionism . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.4 Operationalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 From the National Pact to the Sèvres and Lausanne: The Birth of Two Syndromes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 From the Armistice of Mudhros to the Sèvres Syndrome . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 From the National Pact to the Lausanne Syndrome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Summary of the Independent and Intervening Variables . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Discursive Manifestations of the Lausanne Syndrome Since the Second Group, and the AKP’s Geopolitical Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Weight of Ideation in New Turkey’s Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Lausanne Syndrome in Leader Images and Strategic Culture: From the Second Group to the AKP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Shaping Collective Ideas and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 On Intervening Variables and Foreign Policy Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Lausanne Syndrome and Revisionism Under the AKP: The Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The Systemic Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Mavi Vatan and the Lausanne Syndrome in the Eastern Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Geopolitical and Ideological Dimensions of Mavi Vatan . . . . 5.2.2 Cyprus: Shield and Bridgehead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3 Libya: Claiming the Past and a Gateway to Africa . . . . . . . . . 5.3 The Lausanne Syndrome in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19 19 21 31 35 36 37 47 50 55 56 58 59 65 72 79 vii

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Contents

5.3.1 Syria: From Alexandretta to the “Safe Zones” in Northern Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 5.3.2 Iraq: Reclaiming Mosul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 How Did the Lausanne Syndrome Emerge and What Does It Entail? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 What Are the Boundaries of Erdo˘gan’s Heart? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 What Is the Foreign Policy Behaviour Predicted by the Lausanne Syndrome? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Revising the Lausanne Treaty How? Has Turkey Been Successful? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 What About the Lausanne Syndrome in Post-Erdo˘gan Turkey? . . . . .

91 92 92 93 96 96

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Chapter 1

Introduction: Turkish Foreign Policy Under the AKP and the Lausanne Syndrome

If the 2000s was a milestone decade for Turkish politics and Middle Eastern affairs, the following decade was one of tectonic shifts and radical changes that created centrifugal forces with long-term effects. Not only did the Middle East go through some of the most shocking events of recent decades but also Turkey itself underwent historic social, political, economic, and cultural transformations under the governance of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). Its rise to power in 2002 was surprising and, due to its political-Islamic heritage, it stirred debates and speculation regarding the political direction the party would follow. During the 2000s, certain commentators were suspicious and alarmist1 or at least concerned2 as to the negative impact that the AKP would have on Turkish democracy and the country’s relations with the West. Others thought that the changes taking place could have a positive and lasting effect on domestic and foreign policy, even if that meant having to deal with a more independent Turkey.3 By the end of the decade, it was becoming clear that Turkish foreign policy (TFP) was getting more “independent” than certain international actors or policymakers—especially in the West—would want it to be. Some tried to downplay the fears and provide some nuance to the discussion on the direction that TFP was taking.4 However, the debate was already revived focusing on whether the West was “losing Turkey,” and whether Turkey was pursuing conflicting interests to those of its traditional partners and allies in the region and the world.5

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Rubin (2005), Lewis (2006). Stephen Larrabee (2007). 3 Walker (2007), Kiri¸sçi (2009), Robins (2007). 4 Meral and Paris (2010). 5 Fuller (2010), 159–62, Menon and Enders Wimbusch (2007), Cagaptay (2014), 126–31, Hale and Özbudun (2010), 146–58. 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 Z. Tziarras, Turkish Foreign Policy, SpringerBriefs in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90746-4_1

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1 Introduction: Turkish Foreign Policy …

The 2010s did not make things any simpler for those following the developments in Turkey and the region. In 2012, George Friedman, an adept observer of global geopolitics, commented on Turkey’s—for many perplexing—strategy and concluded as follows: Turkey is interesting precisely because it is a place to study the transition of a minor country into a great power. Great powers are less interesting because their behavior is generally predictable. But managing a transition to power is enormously more difficult than exercising power. Transitional power is keeping your balance when the world around you is in chaos, and the ground beneath you keeps slipping away. The stresses this places on a society and a government are enormous. It brings out every weakness and tests every strength. And for Turkey, it will be a while before the transition will lead to a stable platform of power.6

Friedman was right in that Turkey faced a tumultuous rest of the decade both domestically and in its foreign relations. At the same time, it made great efforts to improve its international position and project more power politically, militarily, and otherwise.7 This was especially evident in the strategic initiatives that Ankara undertook in its broader neighbourhood, be it in Syria, Iraq, the Balkans, (North) Africa or the Eastern Mediterranean. It was in this context that the motives, geopolitical vision, and objectives of TFP came under scrutiny once again. Much of the hype about the changing TFP during the 2000s and early 2010s revolved around the writings and speeches of former foreign policy adviser to Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, Foreign Minister (2009–2014), Primer Minster (2014–2016), and International Relations Professor Ahmet Davuto˘glu. Eventually he was ousted from the Prime Ministry by President Erdo˘gan in 2016 after a number of disagreements developed between them.8 Davuto˘glu was considered the mastermind behind the AKP’s foreign policy; the one who intellectually articulated its geopolitical vision under the doctrine of ‘Strategic Depth,’9 concepts such as neo-Ottomanism, and principles such as ‘Zero Problems with Neighbours.’10 The latter was in line with the AKP’s party programme, and the priorities set in its electoral declarations. It was first articulated as early as 2004 among four other foreign policy principles and further developed in 2008, a year before Davuto˘glu became Foreign Minister.11 Turkish foreign policy at the time, during the first and second terms of the AKP, became very proactive, improving diplomatic relations, making political openings, as well as pursuing economic development and peace initiatives. It was in this context that the concept of the Turkish Model re-emerged and was supported by the West as something that could be emulated in the broader Middle East to spread democracy, liberal economy, stability, and battle extremism all the while respecting the cultural and religious values of Arab and Muslim majority states.12 6

Friedman (2012). Dal (2015), Tziarras (2019), Kasapoglu (2017), Bacik (2013). 8 Arango and Yeginsu (2016). 9 Murinson (2006). 10 Özkan (2014), Davuto˘ glu (2008, 2010). 11 Davuto˘ glu (2004); Davuto˘glu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007.” 12 Dede (2011), Tziarras (2013). 7

1 Introduction: Turkish Foreign Policy …

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Davuto˘glu’s ‘Zero Problems with Neighbours’ principle was, at its core, a way of delivering Turkey from its century old isolationist mindset and restoring it to the international position that the AKP’s ideological current thought it deserved as the heir of the Ottoman Empire. During the first decade of the AKP’s governance this vision was pursued primarily using “soft power,” diplomacy, economy, and values. Yet it still allowed Turkey to increase its influence on various levels, acquire an agenda-setting capacity, and emerge as a keen supporter of the Palestinian cause and “kin” populations abroad. This “soft” character of TFP changed when the AKP started consolidating power against the Kemalist-military establishment and Turkey was faced with the geopolitical shock of the Arab Uprisings from 2011 onwards. The power of the military started to erode in the mid to late 2000s as a result of European Union (EU) reforms that the AKP implemented, which increasingly civilianised various state institutions such as the National Security Council (NSC), the Higher Education Council and the Television Broadcasting Board among others.13 Moreover, the Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) investigations and trials were crucial in undermining the military’s power. In these cases, multiple military officers were accused of plotting to overthrow the AKP by ‘creating a country-wide atmosphere of chaos to justify a military take-over with the help of prominent figures from the media, business, trade unions, universities and civil society organizations.’14 The trials that were at least partly seen as an effort to weaken the military resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds of military officers.15 There is thus a consensus that since the early 2010s and especially after the failed coup of 2016 Erdo˘gan consolidated his power even more at the expense of democratisation and, as a result, whatever pro-western leanings Turkey had left deteriorated dramatically even as its foreign policy became more revisionist and less moderate.16 To be sure, although ousted, Davuto˘glu’s heritage and ideological imprint in terms of the country’s geopolitical vision never went away. After all, as I argue in the following chapters, he was only expressing and articulating ideas that have been long embedded in Turkey’s political-Islamic movement, and particularly the Milli Görüs (National Outlook Movement). Thus, the notion that he was the “mastermind” behind the AKP’s TFP is rather an exaggeration as well.17

1.1 The Argument and Structure of the Book Although Davuto˘glu’s works never became entirely obsolete in understanding TFP under the AKP, when Erdo˘gan consolidated more power and acquired a central role in the country’s political system, different discourses and policies started to take centre 13

Aknur (2013): 41–43. Ibid., 45; See also, Jenkins (2009). 15 Toksabay (2012). 16 Ba¸ser and Öztürk (2017), 2–4, Karda¸s (2021), Co¸skun et al. (2018), 94–95. 17 Özkan, “Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism.” 14

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stage and becoming more salient. Nonetheless, domestic transformations were not the only reason that certain geopolitical imaginations started to come to the fore by the AKP government and officials. In the mid-2010s, almost 100 years after it was signed (1923), the Treaty of Lausanne resurfaced as a matter of debate and controversy for some countries of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. These discussions were among other reasons triggered when the so-called Islamic State (IS) advanced into Iraq and took control of large swaths of territory in June 2014.18 As a consequence, many started to worry or think about the possibility—and opportunity—of border changes in the Middle East; the emergence of new states and, effectively, the overturn of a centuryold geopolitical order.19 In the face of such an eventuality national security anxieties were exacerbated even as new prospects were opening up for certain actors in the region. Turkey was one of them. Amidst the instability and insecurity brought about by IS, Ankara initially questioned the Lausanne Treaty geopolitical order through statements by Turkish officials. This was not the first time, but never before was it done so systematically. Not only were similar statements reiterated in the next years, but related foreign policies were followed as well. This book suggests that these discourses and the related policies followed by the AKP’s Turkey are expressions of what can be dubbed as the Lausanne Syndrome.20 A syndrome connected to certain historical memories and ideological narratives, indicative of certain strategic aspirations that stem from an undesirable geopolitical status quo. As such, I aim to introduce the concept and detail the content of Turkey’s Lausanne Syndrome under the AKP and ascertain the factors that brought it to the surface as well as the foreign policy behaviour it produces, with the help of a Neoclassical Realist (NcR) analytical framework. The main argument of the book is that the rise of the AKP to power brought about a new set of ideas and beliefs with historical depth at the elite level. These beliefs have been maintained and reproduced throughout history through certain ideological currents and segments of the society and politics. Therefore, the AKP elite ideas are an extension and expression of larger identity and ideological dynamics as well as collective expectations that exist among the society and are being mobilised and capitalised on by the government. The sum of these processes has consolidated and institutionalised the Lausanne Syndrome which functions as an intervening variable in policy- and decision-making, thus producing different foreign policy outcomes than those produced by the previous establishment in response to external geopolitical/systemic stimuli. It is furthermore argued that the leadership of Turkey under the AKP is no longer affected by the Sèvres Syndrome alone. Rather, one can simultaneously see the Lausanne Syndrome being at play as a distinct and salient ideological manifestation at the elite level that informs an important revisionist shift in TFP. The Lausanne Syndrome is analysed at the narrative-discursive and the political-practical levels, 18

Phillips (2014) [accessed; Stephen Larrabee (2007)]. Morris (2016). 20 The term was first introduced by the author in 2016 and presented in a short paper in Greek in 2018. See, Tziarras (2018). 19

1.1 The Argument and Structure of the Book

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respectively. In other words, beyond conceptualising and detailing the content of the Syndrome based on the views of key leaders, officials, intellectuals, and opinion makers the book also looks at case studies from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East that are indicative of its practical-geopolitical manifestation to further substantiate the argument. Some of the questions to be addressed in the following chapters are: How did the Lausanne Syndrome come about and what is its content? What do Turkish leaders mean when they question the Lausanne Treaty and call for its revision or updating? What boundaries is Erdo˘gan referring to when he speaks of the ‘boundaries of our heart’—boundaries that go beyond Turkey’s borders? What foreign policy behaviour does the Lausanne Syndrome predict? Within this framework, the book makes a threefold contribution: (a) It provides a better understanding of the role that ideational factors play in TFP; (b) it scrutinizes a rather stereotypical and monolithic analytical approach to TFP that is largely based on the Sèvres Syndrome; and (c) provides a theoretically informed NcR explanation of contemporary TFP in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East (with a focus on the latter half of the 2010s). The second chapter expands on the NcR theoretical framework and the way it is operationalised in the book. As the Lausanne Syndrome is a phenomenon with both a domestic and a foreign policy dimension, its external and domestic (historical and contemporary) sources need to be examined. The theoretical framework demonstrates how NcR allows this through the integration of both levels into the analysis. The independent variable introduced is (international) systemic stimuli and the intervening variables are leader images and strategic culture. The dependent variable regards the foreign policy behaviour (or foreign policy outcome) and can vary between status quo-oriented and revisionist behaviour. Chapter 3 focuses on the conditions that gave rise to the Sèvres Syndrome and the Lausanne Syndrome based on the synonymous Treaty of Sèvres and Treaty of Lausanne, respectively. However, it also analyses the National Pact—an agreement between nationalists and Ottomanists that pre-existed both Treaties and largely shaped the conditions, ideas, and expectations out of which both Syndromes emerged. The notion of a Lausanne Syndrome draws upon the widely used in TFP literature Sèvres Syndrome. There is a broad consensus that the Sèvres Syndrome emerged out of the circumstances that brought about the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Understanding the Sèvres Syndrome is essential before conceptualizing and explaining the Lausanne Syndrome. As such, Chap. 3 provides a brief historical overview of the events that took place between 1918 and 1923 to trace and identify both the systemic stimuli of the time (that shaped both Syndromes) and the two distinct ideological traditions that emerged back then and still clash today (i.e., the Sèvres Syndrome vs the Lausanne Syndrome; or the Republican vs the Imperial strategic culture paradigms). Chapter 4 looks more closely at how the Lausanne Syndrome manifests historically and under the AKP through discourses, narratives, perceptions, and beliefs. More specifically, it details the linkage of the AKP’s Lausanne Syndrome to the

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tradition of the disappointed conservative-Ottomanists of the 1920s during the twentieth century. The chapter presents speeches, writings, and interviews of officials belonging to the AKP and the broader political-Islamic movement associated with the AKP, as well as relevant public intellectuals or outlets. It focuses on the analysis of the unit-level variables of leader images and strategic culture(s) and ultimately navigates through the beliefs that these elites and their constituents hold or support regarding the Treaty of Lausanne (its geopolitics and history) and fleshes out the related geopolitical vision that they have. Lastly, the role of these intervening variables vis-à-vis the foreign policy outcome is expanded upon as the book moves on to the practical-policy aspect of the Lausanne Syndrome. Chapter 5 moves from the discursive to the practical-geopolitical manifestation of the Lausanne Syndrome. The chapter delves into four brief case studies from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East that demonstrate how the Lausanne Syndrome affects TFP. First, regarding the Eastern Mediterranean, the chapter focuses on Turkey’s maritime strategy and its policy vis-à-vis Cyprus, and Libya. In terms of the Middle East, the chapter looks at the cases of Turkey’s involvement in Syria and Iraq respectively, focusing on developments that took place especially since the mid-2010s with Turkey’s military interventions in these two countries. It is suggested that in these case studies the Lausanne Syndrome manifests in practice—i.e., by disputing the Lausanne Treaty status quo—demonstrating a pattern of revisionist foreign policy behaviour. Chapter 6 summarises the findings of the book and provides concise answers to the initial research questions. It also comments on related debates such as the issue of rationality and identity, as well the future of TFP in a post-Erdo˘gan Turkey.

Chapter 2

A Neoclassical Realist Framework

Although TFP is a well-studied phenomenon it is also a rather polarising one. The disagreements during the 2000s over where TFP was headed are very indicative. There is no shortage of theoretical and interpretive schemes in the literature that try to decode Ankara’s foreign policy behaviour under the AKP. From liberal-institutional and realist approaches to constructivist, neo-marxist and post-structural ones, there is an abundance of views1 that often reach conflicting conclusions. Some of the fundamental theoretical debates are whether TFP is mostly driven by international structural factors or domestic-level factors2 ; whether material drivers have primacy over ideological ones3 ; and whether Turkey is pursuing an agenda of international cooperation and peace promotion or a revisionist foreign policy.4 This book touches upon all the above debates to one degree or another. It suggests that the Lausanne Syndrome is a perceptual, ideological, cultural, and psychological phenomenon that has both a domestic and a foreign policy dimension. For this reason, both its external and domestic (historical and contemporary) sources need to be examined, albeit this book is mostly concerned with ideational factors and the Syndrome’s foreign policy manifestations. From this perspective, this study contributes to the external-domestic, material-ideational, and foreign policy behaviour debates and, at times, becomes a third-way approach. Neoclassical Realism provides a good toolbox to accomplish this as it allows for both levels and different types of drivers to be factored into the analysis. As a theory that sprung out of Neorealism and reemphasized certain tenets of Classical Realism, NcR retains Neorealism’s focus on the importance of the international level of analysis (i.e., the systemic level or

1

See, e.g., Grigoriadis (2009), Yalvaç (2012), Kesgin (2020), Aslan (2012), O˘guzlu (2008), Co¸skun et al. (2009). 2 See e.g., O˘ guzlu (2020). 3 See e.g., Hintz (2017). 4 See e.g., Kiri¸sçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State.”; Karda¸s, “Revisionism and Resecuritization of Turkey’s Middle East Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation.”; Altuni¸sik (2020), Tziarras (2018). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 Z. Tziarras, Turkish Foreign Policy, SpringerBriefs in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90746-4_2

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independent variable) while introducing intervening variables at the domestic (or national/unit) level. Since Gideon Rose first coined the term by classifying certain authors under this category,5 NcR came a long way. Apart from other studies6 two books in particular have advanced considerably this theoretical approach.7 Neoclassical Realism was first developed and employed primarily as a theory of foreign policy, as opposed to a theory of international politics, but later works argued that it can be used equally well for both purposes.8 Type I NcR as articulated by Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell deals with state behaviour that is inconsistent with systemic imperatives. This book goes beyond that and adopts a Type II theoretically informed NcR framework. In addition to the functions of Type I, Type II NcR also explains ‘a broad range of foreign policy choices and grand strategic adjustment’ as influenced by intervening variables such as leader worldviews, strategic cultures and domestic politics.9 Thus, in line with a growing body of NcR literature on foreign policy choices, Type II NcR can explain how ‘the fundamental orientation of a state as a defender of the status quo or as a revisionist challenger is determined not only by its relative power and position within the system’ (as Neorealism would have it) but also by the causal-intervening role of domestic factors.10 The independent variable employed here is systemic stimuli while the intervening variables are leader images and strategic culture. By ascertaining the dependent variable (i.e., the foreign policy outcome) I address two main questions of this book. The first one is about the kind of foreign policy behaviour predicted by the Lausanne Syndrome. The second question—i.e. how did the Lausanne Syndrome come about and what is its content?—is addressed by examining the relationship between the independent and intervening variables. These variables are expounded below.

2.1 Independent Variables—Systemic Stimuli Neoclassical Realism borrows much of its systemic approach from Neorealism. It agrees that the nature of the international system is anarchic, that states are the main actors/units that comprise the system, and that its structure is determined by the distribution of power and material capabilities among its units—particularly among its great powers.11 Depending on the number of great powers the structure of the international system can be, for example, unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. In turn, the structure of the international system presents the states with constraints out of 5

Rose (1998). E.g. Schweller (2008), Freyberg-Inan et al. (2009). 7 Lobell et al. (2009), Ripsman et al. (2016). 8 Ripsman et al. (2016), Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory. 9 Ibid., 29. 10 Ibid., 29–30. 11 Waltz (2010), 97, 100–01. 6

2.1 Independent Variables—Systemic Stimuli

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which emerge patterns of state behaviour.12 This is the central idea of the independent variable in Neorealism from which the Balance of Power theory follows as well; the notion that states make efforts or have tendencies to prevent another state or states from dominating the international system by multiplying their own power, through means of internal and external balancing.13 Although NcR draws its systemic approach from these assumptions it has advanced our understanding of the independent variable. Theoretical discussions in the NcR literature over the past years have managed to refine and enrich the independent variable to better cover the workings of the international system, particularly its structure and the systemic signals presented to the state such as security threats.14 For example, NcR has a broader understanding of system structure as it acknowledges that, beyond the Waltzian approach to the system, there are also other ‘broad systemic, but not structural, factors’ that affect the interactions among states.15 The independent variable employed in this book is that of systemic stimuli which encompasses both the structural aspects of the international system and the threats that come with it. Fear and threats are central to the (neo)realist reading of international politics. As Waltz notes, fear of ‘unwanted consequences’ for their preservation may stimulate ‘states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power.’16 However, the centrality of threats in Neorealism became more salient with Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory that was proposed as a ‘better alternative than balance of power theory’ and in a nutshell argued that ‘states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone.’17 Contrary to Neorealism that offers a theory of international politics, the Type II NcR employed here constitutes a theory of foreign policy. Within this framework, the independent variable of systemic stimuli is examined in relation to foreign policy outcomes rather than international political outcomes. In the context of systemic stimuli, and much like (Neo)realism, NcR accounts for the distribution of power in the international system—and changes within it—based on a combination of quantitative (e.g. size of military, economy and population) and qualitative (e.g. quality of leadership and diplomacy) indicators of national power.18 At the same time, it looks at polarity ‘as a function of the relative distribution of capabilities among the major states of the system’ acknowledging, however, that it is easier to know the polarity of the system (e.g. unipolar, bipolar, multipolar) at a given time in hindsight given that systemic configurations and transitions are not always clear or discernible at the time of their happening.19

12

Ibid., 92. Ibid., 117–22. 14 Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory. 15 Ibid., 39. 16 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 118. 17 Walt (1987), 5. 18 Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory, 44. 19 Ibid., 45. 13

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Furthermore, the independent variable of systemic stimuli also captures the security threats and challenges posed to the state by the shifts in the structure of the international system. Systemic imbalances and power transitions may present states with threats and constraints thus prompting or preventing certain foreign policy actions. Overall, the independent variable in NcR has causal primacy vis-à-vis the foreign policy outcome.20 However, as we will see in the next section, NcR is not restricted to the independent variable. It introduces intervening variables at the unit level of analysis that act as filters of systemic stimuli thus influencing the decision-making process and the foreign policy outcome.21 Intervening variables are also the focus this book.

2.2 Intervening Variables—Leader Images and Strategic Culture Waltz himself admitted that a theory of international politics, such as Neorealism, can tell us what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by systems of different structure, but it cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the units of a system will respond to those pressures and possibilities… A theory of international politics bears on the foreign policies of nations while claiming to explain only certain aspects of them. It can tell us what international conditions national policies have to cope with. To think that a theory of international politics can in itself say how the coping is likely to be done is the opposite of the reduction error.22

It is thus necessary to go beyond the basic premise of Neorealism that states are unitary actors—or “black boxes”—and look deeper into the unit level of analysis if we are to better understand national policies and how they come about in certain contexts. As Randall Schweller put it, Structural imperatives rarely, if ever, compel leaders to adopt one policy over another; decisionmakers are not sleepwalkers buffeted about by inexorable forces beyond their control. This is not to say, however, that they are oblivious to structural incentives. Rather, states respond (or not) to threats and opportunities in ways determined by both internal and external considerations of policy elites…23

This is one of the main weaknesses of the systemic analysis that NcR set out to rectify, and that is why a good amount of the NcR literature deals with the unit level and intervening variables. Much of this approach lies in the role and position of the Foreign Policy Executive (FPE), namely those responsible for making foreign (security) policy, that can be affected by both domestic and external dynamics. As Steven 20

Ibid., 19, 33–34; Rose, “Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.”; Taliaferro et al. (2009). 21 Rose, “Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 157–58. 22 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 71–72. 23 Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, 5.

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Lobell notes, ‘leaders can act internationally for domestic reasons or domestically for international purposes.’24 In the course of the NcR’s evolution a broad range of intervening variables has been introduced including decision-makers’ perceptions, political culture, ideology, identity, domestic interest groups, etc.25 In more recent years these have been narrowed down by Ripsman, Taliafero and Lobell and summarized into four main intervening variables: leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions.26 This study, given its focus on ideational factors, employs and integrates two of the above four intervening variables: Leader Images and Strategic Culture. The variable of leader images refers to the beliefs and images among the foreign policy executive27 that can affect ‘the perception of incoming systemic stimuli.’28 The discussion on the role of ideas in society and politics is far from new. Political ideologies and other worldviews have greatly affected the course of history throughout the centuries and that alone is a good reason not to disregard the importance of ideational factors. On the other hand, one should acknowledge that ‘ideas as well as interests have causal weight in explanations of human action.’29 At the same time, one should not assume that the continuous presence of various ideas in public discourse is necessarily connected to policy choices. Thus, the linkages between ideas and policy outcomes should be well articulated if we are to identify the causal impact of ideational factors.30 Despite structural realism’s disregard for such factors, classical realists did acknowledge their importance. Hans Morgenthau for example paid particular attention to ideology, its impact on policy-making as well as its role in rallying the public opinion behind a government’s foreign policy and extracting the necessary resources for its endeavours.31 However, he also highlighted the difficulty in recognizing ‘ideological disguises’ and connections between ideologies and policy outcomes.32 In essence, leader images—beliefs and/or ideas held by key decision-makers—‘help individuals fill gaps of knowledge about the material drivers of international politics.’33 Causal beliefs, more specifically, can provide ‘strategic guidance to human action,’ not least towards the achievement of their objectives.34

24

Lobell (2009), 43–44. Rose, “Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.”; Lobell et al., Neoclassical Realism. 26 Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory, 58–79. 27 Foreign policy executive (FPE) refers to individual decision makers such as the President, Prime Minister, cabinet members, ministers and advisors that have influence over foreign and security policies. See, ibid., 61–70. 28 Ibid., 61–62. 29 Goldstein and Keohane (1993), 4. 30 Ibid., 11. 31 Morgenthau (1993), 99–112. 32 Ibid., 111. 33 Meibauer (2020): 28. 34 Ibid.; Goldstein and Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” 10. 25

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Values, ideas, and beliefs are shaped and informed from past experiences and largely define the individual’s interaction with their social environment. Similarly, they determine to a great degree the leader’s vision, goals, perceptions, fears and so on. When these become core beliefs—i.e., beliefs that do not easily change—they inform how leaders process ‘incoming information about the outside world’ and bias their ‘perception of the external stimuli.’35 Hence depending on their images, different leaders will have different responses to systemic stimuli and thus a different effect on the foreign policy outcome. It is for this reason that accounting for leader images (and ideational factors more generally) in this study is important given that one of the central arguments is that the Lausanne Syndrome, at least as an ideational phenomenon, signifies a paradigm shift in TFP. Looking at leader images under the AKP will facilitate the better decoding of this shift. The second intervening variable under examination is Strategic Culture, a concept that emerged in the 1970s. At the time, the Americans thought that the way the Soviet Union was responding to the US strategy was unexpected; it demonstrated that the American model of the ‘generic rational man’ was not working.36 Contrary to this model, Jack Snyder proposed a strategic culture approach and a ‘Soviet man.’ In his report, he challenged the notion of a generic rationality and argued that ‘Neither Soviet nor American strategists are culture-free, preconception-free game theorists. Soviet and American doctrines have developed in different organizational, historical, and political contexts…’37 As such, Snyder contended, they ask different questions and develop different answers. That was the beginning of a large body of literature on strategic culture that for a long time was associated with the field of Strategic Studies and nuclear strategy.38 Strategic culture was also presented as a critique to ‘the ahistorical, non-cultural neorealist framework for analysing strategic choices’ that sees states as unitary actors.39 Just like leaders with different images or beliefs respond differently to systemic stimuli, ‘elites socialized in different strategic cultures will make different choices when placed in similar situations. Since cultures are attributes of and vary across states, similar strategic realities will be interpreted differently.’40 There is, however, some divergence among scholars of strategic culture particularly in terms of their definition of culture. Alastair Johnston categorized these differences into three ‘generations’ of strategic culture. Based on his classification, the first generation41 had a very broad concept of strategic culture that was shaped by a range of variables including the structure of the international system, geography, tradition, ideology, psychology, political culture, and others. Moreover, in the first-generation group, strategic thought and strategic behaviour were inextricably linked. At the 35

Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory, 62. Snyder (1977), 4. 37 Ibid., v. 38 See e.g., Gray (1986), Booth (1979), Jacobsen (1990). 39 Johnston (1995): 35. 40 Ibid. 41 See e.g., Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style; Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture. 36

2.2 Intervening Variables—Leader Images and Strategic Culture

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same time, according to Johnston, strategic culture was seen as monolithic, while there was not much room for analysing the possibility of the instrumentalization or manipulation of strategic culture.42 The “second generation”43 saw strategic culture ‘as a tool of political hegemony in the realm of strategic decision-making’ and thus suggested that there was a big difference between ‘what leaders think or say they are doing and the deeper motives for what in fact they do.’44 The second generation had a more constructivist approach to culture and employed strategic culture to explain how ‘states reproduced strategic policies in ways that served to construct, uphold or entrench a set of hierarchical power relations, both internal and external.’45 As such, it also saw a disconnect between strategic culture and strategic behaviour, arguing that choices are shaped by the interests of the elites rather than their strategic culture. A proposition that is, however, somewhat weak given that ‘elites, too, are socialized in the strategic culture they produce, and thus can be constrained by the symbolic myths which their predecessors created.’46 The “third generation” provided a less deterministic approach and allowed for variation in strategic culture. It also made a distinction between ideas and behaviour thus clarifying the independent from the dependent variable. In this context, Johnston defined strategic culture as ‘an integrated system of symbols (i.e., argumentation, structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences…’47 Moreover, just like culture in general, strategic culture is dynamic and can change in the course of history. As well, multiple strategic culture paradigms can exist at the same time, though usually only one paradigm is dominant at any given time.48 The third generation is more fitting for the purposes of this book. In the most comprehensive work there is on Turkish strategic culture, Malik Mufti also adopts Johnston’s third generation and the notion of multiple strategic culture paradigms. Mufti’s book focuses on the ‘interaction and tension’ between two main Turkish strategic culture paradigms: The Republican and the Imperial.49 As analysed below, the two paradigms correspond roughly to the two syndromes examined in this book, the Sèvres Syndrome, and the Lausanne Syndrome, respectively. In a broader and more simplified form, strategic culture has been incorporated into NcR as an intervening variable. Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell identify strategic culture as collective expectations, including ‘inter-related beliefs, norms and assumptions,’ that ‘shape the strategic understanding of political leaders, societal elites and

42

Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 36–38. E.g., Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism. 44 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 39. 45 Kaldor (2016): 7. 46 Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 40. 47 Johnston (1995), 36; see also, Kaldor, “Global Security Cultures,” 8. 48 Johnston, Cultural Realism, 35. 49 Mufti, Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture, 3–4. 43

14 Table 2.1 The two syndromes and intervening variables

2 A Neoclassical Realist Framework Sèvres syndrome

Lausanne syndrome

Republican strategic culture paradigm

Imperial strategic culture paradigm

Leader images

Leader images

even the general public.’50 Echoing other definitions of strategic culture,51 they note that ‘through socialization and institutionalization (in rules and norms), these collective assumptions and expectations become deeply entrenched and constrain a state’s behavior and freedom of action by defining what are acceptable and unacceptable strategic choices.’52 Whereas leader images regard the beliefs of individual leaders or decision makers, strategic culture is more about collective beliefs carried by leaders, elites as well as segments of the society. Both fall within the broad category of ideation which, as Gustav Meibauer suggests, ‘fills the gap between indeterminate systemic stimuli and concrete policies by narrowing down the range of policy options.’53 In this sense, leader images can be part of strategic culture even as strategic culture can inform leader images. In a country like Turkey, that took a radical authoritarian turn particularly during the 2010s, leader images and the dominant strategic culture paradigm are not easily distinguishable from one another. I thus argue that the Lausanne Syndrome cuts across the two variables as a historical and ideational concept that encapsulates both the Imperial strategic culture paradigm (including within a rather large segment of the society) and leader images within the AKP government and the broader Turkish political Islamic movement. From this perspective, the manifestation of the Lausanne Syndrome—just like that of the Sèvres Syndrome in the past—depends largely on the perceptions and attitudes of certain ideological currents both at the political and social levels. In this case, depending on the dominant strategic culture paradigm which also corresponds to certain leader images, the related Syndrome predominates and becomes influential over the country’s foreign policy behaviour (see Table 2.1). By presenting the Lausanne Syndrome as an ideational concept that integrates leader images and strategic culture it is not argued that other domestic factors are not at play when foreign policy decisions are taken. It is rather suggested that at the discursive level and in terms of certain policies, ideational factors have a central if intervening role between systemic pressures and foreign policy behaviour; especially when democratic processes are hindered, institutions become politicized and leaders become more important in decision making.54 Namely, when ‘structural impediments such as a division of powers, check and balances, and public support’ are no longer 50

Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory, 67. See a comparison of definitions in, Sondhaus (2006), 124–25. 52 Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory, 67. 53 Meibauer, “Interests, ideas, and the study of state behaviour in neoclassical realism,” 26; see also, Dueck (2006), 25. 54 Öktem and Akkoyunlu (2016), Öztürk and Gözaydin (2017). 51

2.2 Intervening Variables—Leader Images and Strategic Culture

15

able to ‘constrain democratic leaders’ from taking bigger foreign policy risks.55 And as such, the Lausanne Syndrome attributes a certain ideological and, in the absence of certain constraints, geopolitical direction to Turkish strategy.

2.3 Dependent Variable—Status Quo Versus Revisionism The dependent variable is the foreign policy outcome produced by the interaction between the independent and intervening variables, and a state’s behaviour vis-à-vis its external environment. Studying foreign policy or state behaviour is largely about studying how given foreign policy outcomes come to be, under what circumstances and driven by which factors. From a defensive realist perspective, Waltz argues that ‘States may alter their behavior because of the structure they form through interaction with other states.’56 Mearsheimer’s offensive realism suggests that state behaviour is driven by ‘the effect of the distribution of power,’ namely ‘whether the system is bipolar or multipolar, and if it is multipolar, whether or not there is a potential hegemon among the great powers.’57 Of course the two strands of Realism agree on the drivers but disagree on the outcome. Whereas defensive realism suggest that states have a mostly status quo-oriented behaviour, offensive realism points to revisionist behaviour. Although NcR does not reject but in fact accepts the causal primacy of international material-structural factors on foreign policy behaviour, it also considers unit-level factors (including ideational ones). Thus, NcR seeks to make more complex observations related with the conditions under which ‘collective ideational variables at the unit level [are] more likely to play an intervening role between systemic pressures… and specific foreign and security strategies states pursue at a given time.’58 In other words, foreign policy behaviour may vary across time and issues. The notion of variability in state behaviour goes against well-stablished Neorealist arguments; namely, that states are either pro-status quo pursuing security through power (in defensive realism)59 or power-maximisers and revisionists in their struggle for survival (offensive realism).60 Neoclassical Realism goes beyond this bias61 and considers security and survival as merely two out of ‘several possible state interests that may result in a strategy of either revisionism or the status quo.’62 For example, Jeffrey Taliaferro in his study defined the dependent variable as ‘the variation in the

55

Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory, 61–70. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 213–14. 57 Mearsheimer (2001), 335. 58 Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory, 158. 59 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126. 60 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 30–36. 61 Schweller (1996). 62 Rynning and Ringsmose (2008): 2, 27. 56

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types of intensity of the adaptive strategies the state will pursue: emulation, innovation, or persistence in existing strategies.’63 In this book, the dependent variable variation is between status quo-oriented and revisionist foreign policy behaviour. One of the two state behaviours is not in principle presupposed or excluded but rather both are seen as possible variations that can occur at different times depending on changes in system and unit level factors. For reasons that are explained below it is argued that the Lausanne Syndrome, as the manifestation of the intervening variables of leader images and strategic culture, predicts a revisionist foreign policy behaviour while the Sèvres Syndrome predicts a primarily status quo-oriented foreign policy. Both syndromes and their foreign policy expressions are directly related to the content of the two intervening variables. A status quo state is that which seeks to ‘maintain its position in the system’64 without upsetting the distribution of power in it.65 Status quo powers pursue more defensive strategies including, defensive war, internal and external balancing against a foreign aggressor, bandwagoning with the stronger power, appeasement, and isolationism.66 On the other hand, revisionism is defined in traditional realist terms as a state’s effort to change or overthrow its external geopolitical environment for its own benefit and be able to exert influence over the behaviour of other states.67 A state with revisionist behaviour is characterized by policies such as the projection of military, economic and cultural influence and control.68 Moreover, revisionist tools and strategies according to Jason Davidson could include ‘territory, status, markets, expansion of ideology, and the creation or change of international law and institutions.’69 Therefore, revisionism goes well beyond the use of hard power or other kinds of coercion such diplomatic or economic sanctions. Fareed Zakaria, for example, writes of expansionism as a type of revisionism but not necessarily in the form of imperialism70 ; because otherwise expansionism is commonly understood in terms of territorial conquest.71 Thus Zakaria mentions other methods that could be included in a revisionist foreign policy behaviour such as ‘protectorates, military bases, spheres of influence, and, most commonly, activist diplomacy’ concluding that, ‘political interests can be measured by political control over new territories, expansion of the diplomatic and military apparatus, and participation in great power

63

Taliaferro (2009). Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126. 65 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 51. 66 For more on revisionist and status quo strategies see, Trubowitz (2011), 10–13. 67 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 34; Rynning and Ringsmose, “Why are Revisionist States Revisionist?”; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 57. 68 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 70–75; Zakaria (1998), 5, 18; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 34. 69 Davidson (2006), 14. 70 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 5, 18. 71 Snyder (1991), 2–4. 64

2.3 Dependent Variable—Status Quo Versus Revisionism

17

decision-making’.72 Many of these strategies, as demonstrated in the next chapters, have been employed by TFP in recent years.

2.4 Operationalisation How will the independent, intervening, and dependent variables be operationalised? The following two chapters speak to the intervening variables. Chapter 3 presents the historical roots and dialectics of the Sèvres and Lausanne Syndromes. It explains the external and domestic conditions that shaped the two Syndromes, especially the Lausanne Syndrome, and their associated political identities and ideologies, not least through different interpretations of the historical juncture and political-ideological antagonism domestically. After detailing the content of the Lausanne Syndrome as an intervening variable that encompasses certain leader images and a strategic culture paradigm with specific prescriptions for domestic and foreign policy, Chap. 4 examines how it “travelled” through history and through various political-ideological currents. Moreover Chap. 4 looks at how and under what circumstances the Lausanne Syndrome manifests saliently in the AKP’s discourse.In other words, the fact it explains how ideas that are historically rooted in the Lausanne Syndrome resurface and find their way into the government’s hegemonic politics and narrative, also marking a clearer break from the previous, Kemalist, tradition. These ideas about Turkey and its external-geopolitical environment occur as a continuation of traumas experienced in the late days of the Ottoman Empire and early days of the Turkish Republic by a specific conservative-nationalist segment of the society and political elites. However, these manifestations do not prove that the Lausanne Syndrome has, in fact, a causal impact on TFP. They only prove that Turkish elites and institutions (given the AKP’s power consolidation) are bearers of certain ideas that may or may not be genuine, or merely that the AKP is populist. It is necessary, therefore, to establish a consistency of words and actions to properly assess the impact of the Lausanne Syndrome on the foreign policy outcome. Chapter 5 embarks on testing whether Ankara’s foreign policy in four case studies—Cyprus, Libya, Syria, and Iraq—is consistent with the Lausanne Syndrome discourse. It looks briefly at the historical connection of each case study with the ideas and geopolitical views of the Lausanne Syndrome. Considering the systemic environment as well, it then examines how TFP activity in each case study corresponds with specific ideas and strategic choices prescribed by the Lausanne Syndrome. Moreover, it identifies the various revisionist strategies employed as well as the conditions under which Turkey’s objectives are advanced or constrained. In other words, the fact that the Lausanne Syndrome has practical manifestations does not entail that the corresponding policy is successful or unchallenged. It only proves that the Lausanne Syndrome intervenes causally in the decision-making process. Alluding to the causal 72

Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 18.

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weight of domestic factors and the variability of decisions, Dueck notes that ‘changes in the distribution of power will encourage strategic adjustment in the form of a more or less expansive strategy.’73 Thus systemic as well as domestic constraints should be taken into account to better understand TFP behaviour and its limitations. The patterns of TFP behaviour under the influence of the Lausanne Syndrome are concisely addressed in the book’s conclusions.

73

Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 70.

Chapter 3

From the National Pact to the Sèvres and Lausanne: The Birth of Two Syndromes

I desire a geography broader than the National Pact boundaries. Second Group leader, Ali Sükrü. ¸

Before moving to the circumstances that gave rise to the Lausanne Syndrome one should look at the events of the period between the end of World War I (WWI) and the Treaty of Lausanne, starting with the Armistice of Mudhros (1918). Certainly, history does not start in 1918 and many of the dynamics manifested in Turkey at the time could be traced at least back to the late years of the Ottoman Empire and the political fragmentation within it. However, the external and domestic dynamics of the period in question were historic as they brought about great changes and were thus crucial in shaping political identities and ideologies that clash even today. To better understand the Lausanne Syndrome, it is necessary to first examine the widely accepted Sèvres Syndrome that occurred out of the shock that the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) was for the Ottoman Empire and the nationalist movement. Yet at the same time one should not disregard the parallel dynamics taking place at the social level, with the emergence of the nationalist-resistance movement that aimed to overthrow the Treaty of Sèvres and create different—though partly unfulfilled—expectations. These events and processes fuelled certain political divisions, they informed leader images and strategic culture back then, and still do to this today. It should be noted that this chapter does not present new historical facts or a history of the period in question; it simply revisits historical events to trace aspects that are relevant to this book’s objectives.

3.1 From the Armistice of Mudhros to the Sèvres Syndrome During WWI, the Ottoman Empire sided with the Central Powers (including Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria) against the Allied Powers. Having faced defeats on several fronts and the Arab Revolt in the Middle Eastern theatre of the war, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 Z. Tziarras, Turkish Foreign Policy, SpringerBriefs in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90746-4_3

19

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3 From the National Pact to the Sèvres and Lausanne …

the Ottoman Empire was by mid-1918 ‘exhausted militarily, economically, financially and morally.’1 Later in the year the Empire sought an armistice from the Americans but received no reply. A few days later another attempt at an armistice with the Allies was made, this time through the British. The Allies eventually authorised British Admiral Calthorpe to negotiate on their behalf with the Ottoman Empire. The talks took place aboard Agamemnon, a Royal Navy warship under Calthorpe’s command that was anchored in Moudhros harbour on the island of Lemnos. Negotiations lasted for four days (26–30 October 1918) at the end of which the Ottoman delegation accepted the armistice and all its 25 points without any major changes. The Armistice of Moudhros (also Mondros or Mudros) provided among other things for the Empire’s unconditional surrender, the opening of the Bosporus Straits and the surrender of their forts to the Allies, as well as the surrender and demobilization of the Ottoman army. The Ottoman Empire was also to free all allied and Armenian prisoners and surrender all its warships, while the Allies could take over important infrastructure (e.g., railroads, harbours, telephone and telegraph facilities).2 In January 1919, the Paris Conference commenced with the objective of determining the terms of the post-war peace. It took four months of bargaining and negotiations before the Allies could finalize the terms that were to be imposed on the Central Powers. Importantly enough, the Ottoman delegation sent to Paris headed by Grand Vizier Damat Ferit, submitted a memorandum to the Allies that ‘was decisive in terms of demarcating the territories in which Turks were the majority.’3 Among other territories that the memorandum mentioned should fall within Turkey’s borders it also stated: ‘Starting from the district of Kirkuk, the southern boundary shall be the Turkish-Arab national border line that follows Mosul, Ra’s al- ‘Ayn, Aleppo and ends at the Mediterranean Sea, at Ibn Hani point located to the north of Lattakia.’4 The memorandum was key in determining the territorial objective of the nationalist movement, but Kemalist discourse and historiography left it to obscurity as Kemal considered Ferit a traitor.5 More generally, the Paris Peace Conference apart from the Covenant of the League of Nations, also produced the Treaty of Versailles which set the peace with Germany, the Treaty of Saint-Germain which broke up the AustroHungarian Empire, and the Treaty of Neuilly which broke up Bulgaria. Moreover, Hungary had to accept the Treaty of Trianon and, finally, the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920.6 The signing of the Sèvres Treaty was a devastating development for the Ottoman Empire as it left it ‘only a rump state in northern Asia Minor with Istanbul as its capital.’7 Furthermore, it provided for an Armenian state in the east, French mandates over Syria and Lebanon, British mandates over Palestine, Transjordan and 1

Zürcher (2010), 189. Shaw and Shaw (1977), 328. 3 Özkan (2012), 82–83. 4 Budak quoted in ibid., 83. 5 Ibid. 6 Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 331–32. 7 Zurcher (2004), 147. 2

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Iraq (including Mosul); an Italian sphere of influence in southwestern Asia Minor, a promise for Kurdish autonomy and the right to appeal to the League of Nations for Kurdish independence.8 Despite the fact that the Treaty of Sèvres was never enforced it severely scarred the Turkish nation.9 As Mümtaz Soysal notes, the treaty’s map of the region ‘remained in the schoolbooks as a symbol of hostile intentions on the last piece of land left to the Turks at the end of their historic adventure from the steppes of Central Asia to the centre of Europe.’10 When stirred, this Turkish collective memory brings back feelings of ‘contraction, repulsion, expulsion, defeat, dismemberment, and disintegration’; feelings that have ‘produced an unhealthy mind-set, obsessive and paranoid, among the governing elite.’11 It is thus no surprise that this ‘obsessive and paranoid’ mind-set has had a serious impact on TFP since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. In Malik Mufti’s summary, TFP under the influence of the Sèvres Syndrome (or the Sèvres Complex) is characterised, by a conviction that the external world is essentially hostile and threatening; an anxiety about the ability of external enemies to infiltrate the body politic by exploiting internal divisions, leading to a preoccupation with national unity and homogeneity; a strong bias in favour of the geopolitical status quo; and a powerful aversion to foreign entanglements.12

These features stemmed not only from the harsh reality of the Ottoman Empire’s dismemberment but also from the role that the great (mainly western) powers of the time played in that result. The Arab Revolt of 1916, instigated by the British on the basis of a promise that was given to the Arabs for the establishment of an Arab Kingdom,13 was additional evidence of that western role and a historical fact that further informed Turkey’s caution and adversity towards engaging the Arab states and the Middle East more generally in the years that followed.14

3.2 From the National Pact to the Lausanne Syndrome The Sèvres Syndrome is only part of the explanation about TFP behaviour under the AKP. For the complete picture we also need to look at other events that took place in the post-WWI period, particularly Mustafa Kemal’s “War of Independence” (1919–1922) and its results. Soon after the Armistice of Mudhros an armed resistance movement started to develop in Anatolia under the command of former Committee of

8

Ibid.; McDowall (2013), 131–37. Guida (2008). 10 Soysal (2004), 41. 11 Çandar (2004), 57. 12 Malik Mufti, Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture, 3. 13 Zurcher, Turkey, 144. 14 Mufti, Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture, 31–32. 9

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3 From the National Pact to the Sèvres and Lausanne …

Union and Progress (CUP)15 leaders, through the creation of local Defence of Rights Societies. The resistance movement turned its focus to Greece. With the support of Britain, the Allies allowed Greece to occupy Izmir in May 1919. Later, the Greek incursion to Asia Minor ‘would take massive proportions’ as Greece ‘offered to act as the strong arm of the Entente and to force the Turkish resistance movement in Anatolia to accept the peace terms.’16 At that time, Mustafa Kemal, a celebrated war hero, military leader, and CUP officer, was ordered to oversee the demobilization of Ottoman troops according to the provisions of the Armistice of Mudhros. However, seeing the Italian and Greek occupation, Kemal disobeyed and, along with other leaders, organized the resistance movement. Based in Ankara the revolutionaries established a parallel government rival to the Ottoman government in Istanbul.17 In the summer of 1919 and while Greece had already launched its military operations, a Congress in Erzurum, the “capital” of eastern Turkey, was summoned by Kiazim Karabekir, one of the founders of the Revolution and the commander of the Eastern Army who refused to surrender to the Allies. Upon his arrival in Erzurum, Kemal decided to resign from the Ottoman Army and declared that he would fight for the national cause. Rauf Orbay, a former Ottoman naval officer and minister, and the chief of the Ottoman delegation at Mudhros, was also in Erzurum. He was one of the leaders of the resistance and a close friend to Kemal. Although Kemal’s undeclared objective at that point was the establishment of a Republic,18 in Erzurum Orbay declared that he would fight by Kemal’s side for the safety of the Sultanate and Caliphate.19 The Congress was attended by representatives of the local resistance societies (Defence of Rights groups) which had already been formed throughout the country in the aftermath of the Greek troops’ arrival. With encouragement from Karabekir, the delegates of the Congress elected Mustafa Kemal as their chairman and Rauf Orbay as vice-chairman. The Congress also chose an executive committee of representatives and compiled a first draft of what would later be called “National Pact” (Misak-i Milli), calling for the indivisibility of the country and resistance to foreign occupation.20

15

The CUP (or the Young Turks) were a heterogenous reformist movement that sought to reinstate the constitution that was abolished by Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1878 (two years after its drafting) and replaced with an absolutist rule. In 1908, the Young Turks led a revolution that overthrew Abdulhamid II and established the Second Constitutional Era. In 1911 the CUP split into the Freedom and Accord Party and the Union and Progress Party with the former being more liberal and the latter more nationalist. The new CUP (Union and Progress Party) seized power from the Freedom and Accord Party with a coup staged in 1913 and managed to control the Empire. The CUP was dissolved after the end of WWI but various of its members remained active and played an important role in the subsequent national resistance movement. See, Zurcher (2019), 17–55. 16 Zurcher, Turkey, 136. 17 Rogan (2016), 393. 18 Kinross (2001), 180. 19 Ibid., 177, 74–77. 20 Kirisci and Winrow (2004), 76–77; Kinross, Atatürk, 178–79; Jung and Piccoli (2001), 68.

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23

Kemal left Erzurum for Sivas where another Congress were to be held in September 1919. The Congress in Sivas was attended by approximately 40 provincial representatives and other military and civil authorities and constituted the next crucial step in the organization of the resistance movement.21 The Sivas Congress decided a number of things including, to unify all the local defence societies and form one Society for the Defence of Anatolia and Rumelia (SDRA-R)[;] to oppose the establishment of Armenian and Greek states on Ottoman lands; to protect the indivisibility of the country; to preserve the Islamic Caliphate and Ottoman Sultanate.22

Indeed, the way the oath sworn by the delegates was drafted aimed to give the impression that they still acted in the name of the Caliphate: ‘I shall follow no personal interest or ambition but the salvation and peace of my Fatherland and nation. I shall not try to revive the Union and Progress Party. I shall not serve the interests of any political party. This I swear in the name of Allah.’23 Certainly, many genuinely believed in and fought for the Caliphate. But it appeared that for Kemal it was more of a tactic for he had different plans. Although Orbay was concerned that Kemal’s election as the Congress chairman would render the movement too leader-centric, Kemal was eventually elected. The Congress accepted the Erzurum resolutions, strengthened the National Pact, and formed the Representative Committee which would act as the resistance’s executive. In October 1919, the last general Ottoman elections were held, and the sympathisers of the Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia won the most seats. It is worth mentioning that during his journey from Sivas to Ankara in December 1919 Kemal made a number of stops and spent time in places like Kayseri, Hacıbekta¸s, and Kır¸sehir where he met with and garnered the support of local religious dignitaries, religious orders (i.e., the Bekta¸sis) and young officials or youth groups.24 The resistance movement thus grew to be heterogenous, including religious pro-Caliphate conservatives, more secular nationalists like Kemal and everything in between. After the elections of January 1920, the last Ottoman Assembly took important decisions of constitutional nature, adopted the National Pact (see Table 3.1 for the complete provisions), and added to its demands25 ; a development that prompted the occupation of Istanbul by the Allies. Under pressure from the Allies Sultan Mehmet VI dissolved the parliament on 11 April 202026 and a fetva by the chief cleric of the Empire declared that the nationalists were infidels.27 However Kemal had already started to prepare the election of a new assembly, with five representatives from each 21

Zurcher, Turkey, 150. Zurcher mentions 38 attendees, Kinross mentions 39. See, Kinross, Atatürk, 185. 22 Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, 76. 23 Kinross, Atatürk, 187. 24 Mango (1999), 261–62. 25 Neziro˘ glu (2015), 17; Zurcher, Turkey, 151. 26 Kayali (1995): 281. 27 Mango, Atatürk, 275.

24

3 From the National Pact to the Sèvres and Lausanne …

Table 3.1 The six articles of the national pact, 1920 1

Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the Turkish Empire which are populated exclusively by an Arab majority, and which on the conclusion of the armistice of the 30th October 1918 were in the occupation of enemy forces, should be determined in accordance with the votes which shall be freely given by the inhabitants, the whole of those parts whether within or outside [note: some sources state only within] the said armistice line which are inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority, united in religion, in race and in aim [note: some sources state in race and in origin or aspiration], imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other and of sacrifice, and wholly respectful of each other’s racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance

2

We accept that, in the case of the three Sanjaks [Kars, Ardahan, and Batum] which united themselves by a general vote to the mother country when they first were free [from Russian occupation], recourse should again be had, if necessary, to a free popular vote

3

The determination of the juridical status of western Thrace also, which has been made dependent on the Turkish peace, must be effected in accordance with the votes which shall be given by the inhabitants in complete freedom

4

The security of the city of Constantinople, which is the seat of the Caliphate of Islam, the capital of the Sultanate, and the headquarters of the Ottoman Government, and of the Sea of Marmara must be protected from every danger. Provided this principle is maintained, whatever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and all other Governments concerned, regarding the opening of the Bosporus to the commerce and traffic of the world, is valid

5

The rights of minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between the Entente Powers and their enemies and certain of their associates shall be confirmed and assured by us—in reliance on the belief that the Moslem minorities in neighbouring countries also will have the benefit of the same rights

6

is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to date regular administration

Source As translated in Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (London, Bombay, Sydney: Constable and Company LTD, 1922), 207–08. Emphasis added. See also, Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 347–48; and, Zurcher, The Young Turk Legacy, 228, 337–38 n. 65 and 66

district, that would now be based in Ankara. Amid a civil war between supporters of Kemal and supporters of the Sultan, nationalist deputies and supporters travelled from Istanbul to Ankara. The nationalists of the resistance had effectively claimed the control of the country against the Allies-controlled government in Istanbul and asked the Sultan to accept the authority of the new parliament in Ankara.28 The Assembly, called Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT), was initially established on 23 April 1920 making Kemal president and Ismet ˙Inönü, a military general, close friend of Kemal and now deputy from Edirne, chief of the General

28

Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 349.

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25

Staff.29 It was soon declared that the GNAT’s aim was to protect and save the Caliphate and Sultanate from enemy influence and pressure.30 Later in the year, the new government in Ankara, faithful to the National Pact, opposed the signing of the Sèvres Treaty by the Istanbul government. Prominent nationalist, supporter of the Ankara government, and novelist of the time, Halide Edib, believed that ‘The only possible obstruction to the realization of the Treaty of Sèvres was the National Pact which the Turkish Parliament of the Nationalists in Constantinople had issued. It was practically the same declaration issued by the two Congresses of Erzerum and Sivas.’31 The discussions that took place within the GNAT after its formation are indicative of the political and ideological tensions that resurfaced at various points throughout Turkish history and in more recent years. Beyond the declared goals, the synthesis of the GNAT was rather diverse both in terms of its members’ backgrounds and their political beliefs. It encompassed government officials, professionals, landowners, wealthy businessmen and Muslim religious leaders, and beliefs ranging from republicanism and monarchism to radicalism, reactionaryism, Turkism and Ottomanism.32 By mid-1920 different political groups formed within the first GNAT (e.g., Solidarity Group, Liberty Group, Community Group, etc.).33 The heterogeneity and the pluralism of different views rendered the GNAT an ‘unruly body’ which Kemal wanted to control more efficiently.34 He thus initiated negotiations with individual members and groups of the Assembly to invite them to a newly-formed and bigger group that would reduce opposition and allow him to control the parliament. This Defence of Rights Group, also known as the First Group, was finally established in mid-1921 under Kemal’s chairmanship. Its declared purposes of formation were the achievement of victory against external powers in accordance with the National Pact, and the formation of a state and institutions based on the constitution.35 Having created the First Group, Kemal used the parliamentary majority to push decisions through the Assembly that were taken privately. Those who were not invited or accepted into the First Group—including many conservatives—remained ˙ in the opposition and formed the Second Group (Ikinci Grup) towards the end of 36 1921. One of the main concerns that united the opposition under the Second Group was that neither the constitution voted by the Assembly (i.e. the Law of Fundamental Organization) nor the First Group made any mention to the preservation of the Sultanate and the Caliphate, despite Kemal’s related proclamations during the 29 Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, 77–78; Mango, Atatürk, 272–73, 76; Gingeras, Eternal Dawn, 58–59. 30 Sariçoban (2019): 1577. 31 Edib (1930), 176. 32 Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 351. 33 Sarıçoban, “The Second Group in the First Turkish Grand National Assembly,” 1580. 34 Zurcher, Turkey, 159. 35 Sarıçoban, “The Second Group in the First Turkish Grand National Assembly,” 1581; Zurcher, Turkey, 159. 36 Mango, Atatürk, 313.

26

3 From the National Pact to the Sèvres and Lausanne …

first stages of the resistance movement.37 Beyond the Caliphate and the Sultanate, the Second Group’s declared principles were among others national unity according to the National Pact, the reform of existing laws, the protection of public rights, to fight against ‘innovations’—usually introduced by modernists of the First Group—that went against ‘national morality,’ and to favour innovations that respect the ‘religious and national needs of the people.’38 Contrary to accounts suggesting that the Second Group consisted mostly of conservatives,39 it has been argued that clerics, hocas and ulema existed in more or less equal numbers in the First and Second groups—with slightly more in the latter— although their political and ideological behaviour was clearly different at least in some respects.40 The fact that Second Group members pursued the preservation of the Caliphate and the Sultanate was a strong indication of their attachment to the Ottoman heritage rather than to the prospect of a modern state—as Kemal had imagined it. Moreover, the hocas of the Second Group (also called “religious group”) ‘tended either to not speak at all or, in contradistinction to the First Group, to speak very, very much’ with their greatest contribution being to the group’s orators.41 Therefore the leverage of the religious-Ottomanist element in the Second Group was significantly greater. By the end of September 1922 Kemal and the national movement emerged victorious from the war with Greece and the First Group was further strengthened. In October, the GNAT signed the Armistice of Mudanya with Italy, France, Britain, and Greece.42 In preparation of the Lausanne peace conference that ensued, Greece and Britain also invited the Ottoman government to participate, a move that enraged the nationalists in Ankara. It was at that point that many from the First Group started to question the office of the Sultanate which GNAT officially dismantled in November 1922. Kemal convinced the Assembly to vote for the abolition of the Sultanate by giving a long account advocating for the latter’s separation from the Caliphate.43 More specifically he argued that ‘The functions of caliph, as successor to the Prophet, and of the temporal ruler, or sultan,’ could be separated.44 The Caliphate was eventually abolished later, in 1924. While the war was ongoing, the Treaty of Sèvres was de facto abandoned. As the negotiations for the Treaty of Lausanne came to the fore, the National Pact aims were mitigated. The ‘imperial territorial vision’ was abandoned and ‘the Ankara government adopted a conciliationary attitude in accordance with [a] realistic assessment of military capabilities.’45 Ismet ˙Inönü was the person Kemal chose as head of envoy 37

Sarıçoban, “The Second Group in the First Turkish Grand National Assembly,” 1581. Ibid., 1582. 39 Ibid.; Teazis (2013). 40 Frey (1965), 312. 41 Ibid., 312, 23. 42 Kinross, Atatürk, 333–39. 43 Gingeras, Eternal Dawn, 94–95. 44 Mango, Atatürk, 364. 45 ˙Içduygu and Kaygusuz (2004): 33. 38

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27

for the Lausanne negotiations. Most of Turkey’s borders were already settled through agreements with France and Soviet republics. The main burning issue that ˙Inönü was called to negotiate was the future of Mosul while there were also those who insisted that western Thrace should be pursued as well. Both territories were included in the National Pact. During the Lausanne negotiations the GNAT saw many heated debates that created much resentment among members of the First and Second Groups. After all, the Second Group was suggesting that the caliph should replace Kemal and become head of state.46 Halide recalls a relevant conversation she had with Kemal even before the fall of Izmir that indicated Kemal’s intentions vis-à-vis the Second Group. ‘After you take Izmir, Pasha, you will rest, you have struggled so hard’ Halide told Kemal. ‘Rest; what rest? After the Greeks we will fight each other, we will eat each other’, Kemal responded. Halide insisted that there was no reason for something like that especially considering the nation-building work that lay ahead. ‘What about the men who have opposed me?’, Kemal replied referring to the opposition from the Second Group. And he went on, ‘I will have those lynched by the people. No, we will not rest, we will kill each other.’47 These intentions manifested during the period of the first GNAT as well as after the establishment of the Republic in 1923. The Second Group’s objections were not unfounded. Although the Turkish delegation was using the principles of Ferit’s 1919 memorandum and the National Pact to negotiate during Lausanne and even earlier, Kemal started demonstrating a new approach to the nationalist movement’s objectives. It seems that, just like his comrade Halide Edib, he belonged to what she called the ‘realist’ school of thought which developed in the early 1900s and became stronger after 1918. Contrary to the ‘romantic’ school of thought, realists contended that a homeland should be created in Anatolia and that the imperial vision should be abandoned.48 This expectation was now becoming clearer and more tangible. The issue of Mosul more specifically proved very challenging for the Turkish delegation. The position of both Kemal and ˙Inönü was that Mosul should remain a part of Turkey so that Iraqi and Turkish Kurds would not be separated. Such a scenario would enhance the separatist tendencies of Kurds in eastern Turkey. But the British insisted that Mosul should be part of Iraq which was under the British mandate. Being a realist, Kemal maintained that, for military reasons, it was unreasonable for Turkey to continue the war for Mosul and appeared willing to sacrifice it. For the same reasons, he disagreed with those who insisted on gaining possession of western Thrace and suggested that a referendum should take place among its population.49 Patrick Kinross records the tensions between the First and Second Groups in the assembly during discussions for a vote of confidence regarding the abandonment of Mosul and the resumption of negotiations in Lausanne:

46

Mango, Atatürk, 366. See, Adivar (2020), 407–08. 48 See, Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan, 76–77. 49 Mango, Atatürk, 367. 47

28

3 From the National Pact to the Sèvres and Lausanne … After a week of these polemics [regarding Mosul and the Lausanne negotiations] Kemal determined to bring the debate to a close. He reaffirmed the Government’s peaceful intentions and called upon the Assembly to sanction a new general directive to the Cabinet for the resumption of the Lausanne talks. These would not, he explained, cover the position of Mosul, which had already been dealt with… Ali Shükrü’s [leader of Second Group] repeated objections brought an outburst from Kemal, ‘You have been speaking for a whole week in a way harmful to the country. What is your purpose?’ Ali Shükrü protested, ‘You have no right to accuse anyone.’ … This created a turmoil … Members of the two groups stood face to face before the rostrum, hurling accusations and threats at each other, with Kemal in the midst of them. Ali Fuad [who was presiding the meeting] … flung the presidential bell between the opposing groups and… took immediate advantage to adjourn the session. After an interval the members returned to their places and the vote of confidence was taken. It showed less than a two to one majority for Kemal, while a large number of abstentions showed the great gulf which now existed between Parliament and Government. It was virtually a vote of no confidence.50

Yet negotiations continued and an agreement was reached. Article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty left the Mosul issue open noting that ‘the frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months’ or, in case of no agreement, ‘the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations’.51 After recurring negotiations, the Mosul question was resolved with the Frontier Treaty of 1926 that was signed by Turkey, Iraq and Great Britain following a recommendation by the Council of the League of Nations that Iraq should retain Mosul.52 Western Thrace remained to Greece although the Treaty of Lausanne (articles 37–45) set forth a number of provisions for the protection of minorities, including the Muslims in Thrace and Greeks/non-Muslims in Turkey. Özkan notes that the borders of the Turkish homeland ‘explicated by the Ottoman delegation in Paris became the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey… with four major differences: (1) the Batum district, (2) the Iskenderun district, (3) Western Thrace, and (4) the Mosul district’, although Ferit’s 1919 memorandum included Aleppo and other Syrian territories as well.53 The Treaty of Lausanne brought the Ottoman Empire effectively to an end. In his 1927 Great Speech (Nutuk), Mustafa Kemal famously declared: Gentlemen, I don’t think it is necessary any further to compare the principles underlying the Lausanne Peace Treaty with other proposals for peace. This treaty, is a document declaring that all efforts, prepared over centuries, and thought to have been accomplished through the Sèvres Treaty to crush the Turkish nation have been in vain. It is a diplomatic victory unheard of in the Ottoman history!54

This was the strong revolutionary narrative upon which Turkey’s modern state and nation building was based. Throughout Turkish history this was the dominanthegemonic narrative, associated with the dominant Kemalist ideology, and the truth 50

Kinross, Atatürk, 362. Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923). 52 For a thorough discussion on the Mosul Question see, Ço¸sar and Demirci (2006), Berriedale Keith (1926). 53 Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan, 84–85. 54 “Lausanne Peace Treaty”. 51

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29

for most Turks. The victory of the Lausanne Treaty was celebrated and legitimized against the tragic results of WWI. As Zurcher aptly puts it: Turkish historiography has conditioned us to juxtapose the defeat of 1918 and the armistice that ensued with the triumph of 1922, which resulted in the armistice of Mudanya and then, in 1923, the peace of Lausanne. Armistice, occupation and the treaty of Sèvres with its complete dismemberment of the Ottoman state and huge concessions to Greeks, Armenians, Kurds, Italians and French now all seems part of one dark page in Turkish history.55

But as we have seen, the Lausanne Treaty was not entirely unopposed, despite the great euphoria that ensued its signing. Second Group members that represented a pious and pro-Ottoman part of the society were deeply disappointed by the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate as well as by Kemal’s territorial concessions vis-à-vis the National Pact. The same was the case for the “romantic” pan-Turkist nationalists.56 The Treaty of Lausanne came to be seen either as a victory of the Turkish nationalists that reversed the geopolitical tragedy brought about by the Treaty of Sèvres, or as a failure to achieve the initial aims of the National Pact. Erdo˘gan argued specifically that because of the Lausanne Treaty ‘we could not even claim our National Pact’.57 For Kemalists, the Treaty of Lausanne was clearly a reason to celebrate, but for the conservative proponents of the Ottoman Empire it was a great disappointment. Both notions can be seen manifesting and clashing today. How could we then summarize the content of the Lausanne Syndrome? To begin with, it should be clear that it has both a domestic and an external dimension. With the Lausanne Treaty marking the end of the Ottoman Empire and Mustafa Kemal imposing a very strict (France-like) form of secularism, not only separating religion from state but also oppressing religious and political-religious manifestations, many were left nostalgic of the previous state of affairs. At the same time, many people who sided with Kemal early on felt betrayed by his change of heart regarding the Sultanate and the Caliphate. They even feared the radical social-political changes that Kemal was introducing and the prospect of him acquiring excessive power and authority in the context of the new polity. Even his entrusted friend, Hüseyin Rauf Orbay, turned against him after 1923 along with Kemal’s comrades Ali Fuad and Kiazim Karabekir and became leader of the opposition turning the Second Group into the short-lived Progressive Republican Party in 1924. Orbay had expressed early on that ‘he was bound by conscience, sentiment and tradition to the Sultanate and the Caliphate.’58 And although he eventually welcomed the Lausanne Treaty, he raised serious objections during the negotiations regarding what he thought were dangerous ¸ had concessions by Inönü.59 The earlier leader of the Second Group, Ali Sükrü, been more fierce in his criticism of Kemal and his handlings during the Lausanne negotiations, both in the Assembly and in public. Sükrü ¸ was eventually murdered 55

Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy, 193. Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan, 76–79, 85. 57 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2017a). 58 Kinross, Atatürk, 340. 59 Ibid., 369–73. 56

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3 From the National Pact to the Sèvres and Lausanne …

by Kemal’s bodyguard, Topal Osman. To temper the criticism against him, Kemal ordered Osman’s capture. Osman refused to surrender and died during the fight that ensued.60 In addition to the domestic aspect of the Lausanne Syndrome there is also an external aspect, very much related to territory. The National Pact is at its centre, but it is not limited to that. According to the Kemalist narrative none of the National Pact territories were sacrificed and the new status quo had to be respected and preserved as the new state was no longer an Empire. However, the issue of Mosul, western Thrace, northern Syria, and Batumi to say the least were not resolved in accordance with the National Pact—they remained outside Turkey’s new borders. At the same time, textual and translational controversies about the National Pact in Turkish historiography have created room for ambiguities regarding the exact territorial aims of the Pact (see, Table 3.1, point 1). In Nick Danforth’s61 words, the National Pact identified those parts of the empire that the government was prepared to fight for. Specifically, it claimed those territories that were still held by the Ottoman army in October 1918 when Constantinople signed an armistice with the allied powers. On Turkey’s southern border, this line ran from north of Aleppo in what is now Syria to Kirkuk in what is now Iraq.

And yet, as Zurcher notes, in recording the National Pact’s article 1 some sources make mention to territories ‘whether inside or outside the lines of the armistice’ (not just inside).62 This alternative translation of course changes a lot in terms of the Pact’s objectives. Between these ambiguities and the unfulfilled aspirations of the memorandum that Ferit submitted to the 1919 Paris Conference, the list of claims for Ottomanists and Pan-turkists could be stretched significantly. It is perhaps because of these factors that various maps of the National Pact (or Great Turkey, Büyük Türkiye) that emerged in recent years include areas such as parts of northern Iraq, northern Syria, western Armenia, southern Bulgaria, a number of Greek Islands, western Thrace, Cyprus (see more in Chap. 5), and Batumi in Georgia. But as noted, the external-territorial aspect of the Lausanne Syndrome is not limited to these discussions. Second Group leader and chief opposer of Mustafa Kemal on the issues of the Sultanate, the Caliphate and the Treaty of Lausanne, Ali Sükrü, ¸ had once declared: ‘Just like the Turkish nation, I desire a geography broader than the National Pact boundaries. Every place where the Ottoman Empire flag used to fly should be taken back. All Muslims are carrying this desire.’63 This sentiment was not uncommon among the members of the Second Group and die-hard Ottomanists. And though by the mid-1920s Kemal left the Second Group and the Ottomanist opposition toothless, the sentiment—as a social force and a political-ideological current—survived. The aspiration was that Turkey should somehow regain its former glory and size, though the extend of aspired territories or means varied and was never clearly specified. 60

Ibid., 361–63. Danforth (2016); Mufti, Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture, 19–20. 62 See, Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy, 228, 337–38 n. 65 and 66. 63 Quoted in, Alkan and Üçüncü (2017), 166. 61

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31

Table 3.2 Components of the two syndromes Sèvres syndrome

Lausanne syndrome

• • • •

• Trauma: the Sèvres Treaty as well as the Lausanne Treaty as a defeat • Ottoman nostalgia • Grievances regarding the abolition of the sultanate and caliphate • Anti-secularism attitudes • Perceptions of betrayal regarding the abandoned territories of the National Pact and Ferit’s memorandum • Aspiration to revive the Empire’s former glory and size; to return to the ex-ottoman space

Trauma: the Sèvres Treaty as a defeat The Lausanne status quo as a triumph Fear of territorial dismemberment Suspicion of external powers, especially great and western powers • Fear that external enemies will exploit internal divisions and infiltrate the nation • Aversion to imperial tendencies and adventures abroad • Pro-status quo international orientation

Seen in this light, the Lausanne Syndrome is much more than just a National Pact syndrome. It goes beyond that to encompass a nostalgia in terms of the Ottoman Empire’s international stature, its domestic socio-political and cultural order, and its geopolitical size and influence (see Table 3.2 for a comparison to the Sèvres Syndrome). The next chapter expounds on the linkages between the beliefs of the Second Group and those of the political-Islamic movement including the AKP.It also reviews the ideational and discursive manifestations of the Lausanne Syndrome under the AKP government.

3.3 Summary of the Independent and Intervening Variables The early twentieth century events, namely WWI, the Ottoman Empire’s defeat, and the involvement of foreign powers in the Empire’s dismemberment had contributed significantly to the shaping of the strategic culture and national psyche in the post1923 Turkish state. They influenced the characteristics of Turkish national identity, leader perceptions of and decisions on national security and foreign policy.64 With the establishment of the Turkish Republic and through the Kemalist discourse and narratives, the Sèvres Syndrome became gradually embedded and institutionalized in the new state. In turn, the collective assumptions and beliefs of the Sèvres Syndrome became constraining factors for the state’s behaviour as the NcR framework suggests, rendering it a mostly pro-status quo power with aversion to adventurism and a cautious stance towards great powers. The Lausanne Treaty was to be celebrated, but the bitter memory of the Sèvres Treaty was to be feared and at all costs prevented from happening again. In this sense the systemic stimuli of the time, that is, the Ottoman Empire’s disadvantageous relative power position vis-à-vis that of other states and the results of war, greatly influenced leader images, strategic culture 64

For a detailed discussion on the development of Kemalism and the different currents of nationalism in Turkey see, Bora (2003).

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3 From the National Pact to the Sèvres and Lausanne …

more broadly and ultimately Turkish foreign policymaking. And even though the Sèvres Syndrome has since then affected the Turkish secular-republican and Islamic political currents alike,65 it was around the same time that the foundations of the Lausanne Syndrome were laid as well. The Treaty of Lausanne was depicted as a great victory in Kemalist discourse and historiography against the would-be tragedy of the Sèvres Treaty, but it was seen and treated very differently by another part of Turkish politics and society. Whereas the demise of the Ottoman Empire from 1918 onwards affected all political currents equally, the 1919–1923 period proved particularly disappointing for the conservative Ottomanists and pan-Turkists who felt betrayed by how Kemal and his allies handled the outcome of the War of Independence and the Lausanne negotiations. They lamented the abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate as well as the loss of territories that they thought rightfully belonged to the newly established republic, the heir of the Ottoman Empire. In their view, Turkey could have claimed much more, based on Ferit’s memorandum and the National Pact. For some, Turkey was still entitled to even go beyond those narrow boundaries to claim many more formerly Ottoman territories. But the Imperial vision was long abandoned by Turkey’s new leadership. Therefore, the systemic stimuli that at the time had informed Kemal’s decisions, in conjunction to his own attitude and aspirations, gave rise to another political-ideological current that had proponents both at the elite and social levels. This current was reactionary,opposed to the Kemalist modernization model, and carried tendencies of revanchism. The duality of these political currents points to two distinct strategic cultures (and sets of leader images): The First and Second Group paradigms; or, as termed by Mufti, the Republican and Imperial strategic cultures, respectively. As noted in the theoretical framework, these two paradigms can be conceptualized as the Sèvres Syndrome and Lausanne Syndrome, respectively. Each encompassing the corresponding leader images and strategic culture. Leaders such as Kemal and the continuators of his vision had great influence over decision-making in a country that, over the course of its history, swung between dictatorship and semi-democracy.66 The same came to be the case in the twenty-first century, albeit in reverse ideological terms, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan.67 ‘When Erdo˘gan assumed control,’ Robert Kaplan notes, ‘he gave power to a wave of Islamism, strengthened by Özal, that had been creeping back into Turkish life under the radar screen of official Kemalism’.68 In this respect, the manifestation of the Lausanne Syndrome, though shaped in parallel to the Sèvres Syndrome and by the same geopolitical circumstances (systemic stimuli), has been conditional on the empowerment of a certain politicalideological current at the societal, institutional, and elite levels—i.e. leader images and strategic culture (see Fig. 3.1).

65

Guida, “The Sèvres Syndrome and “Komplo” Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press.” Karaveli (2018). 67 Yilmaz et al. (2017), Heper (2013), Görener and Ucal (2011). 68 Kaplan (2013), 292. 66

3.3 Summary of the Independent and Intervening Variables

33

Dominant paradigm until the late 2000s Sèvres Syndrome 1918-1923 Systemic Stimuli Independent Variable

First Group – (Republican) Leader Images & Strategic Culture

Intervening Variables Lausanne Syndrome

Second Group – (Imperial) Leader Images & Strategic Culture

pro-status quo foreign policy behaviour Dependent Variable Revisionist foreign policy behaviour

Largely suppressed until the rise of the AKP

Fig. 3.1 The emergence and function of the two syndromes

The next chapter examines evidence and manifestations of the Lausanne Syndrome under the AKP government but also in the broader political-Islamic movement out of which the AKP emerged. We can thus see better how the political, ideological, and even emotional elements that comprised the Lausanne Syndrome during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Turkish state survived through various channels to this day.

Chapter 4

Discursive Manifestations of the Lausanne Syndrome Since the Second Group, and the AKP’s Geopolitical Vision

Our physical boundaries are different from the boundaries of our heart. Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan.

This chapter focuses on how the Lausanne Syndrome manifests through perceptions and beliefs based on the analysis of the intervening (i.e., unit-level) variables leader images and strategic culture and their role as “filters” of systemic pressures in producing foreign policy outcomes. But before looking at related discourses and ideas, I first explain why ideation is important when discussing contemporary TFP based on the NcR framework. Arguably ideation has a place in the analysis of every state’s foreign policy and yet in some cases it carries more causal weight than in others. This depends to a great extent on the type of the political system. The more centralized and less democratic is a political system, the less space exists for ideological pluralism and domestic pressures in the process of policy and decision making. Likewise, in dictatorships and hybrid or majoritarian regimes, such as Turkey,1 the government feels little to not at all constrained by or compelled to consider domestic interest groups or the wider masses in an inclusive way. It often chooses to rally the votes of the supportive electoral majority, even if that is marginal, thereby reproducing societal divides and polarization. By extension it maintains a foreign policy orientation that is heavily influenced by the largely unchecked ideational filters of the government elites, particularly the Foreign Policy Executive (FPE). With these in mind, the following section provides a brief overview of the political developments under the AKP that rendered the government increasingly authoritarian. Tracking this process and the different milestones also demonstrates the growing weight that ideational factors acquired in TFP, particularly during the 2010s. The stage is thus set to examine ideational manifestations of the Lausanne Syndrome and their relation to foreign policy outcomes.

1

See, Ba¸ser and Öztürk (2017), Öktem and Akkoyunlu (2018).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 Z. Tziarras, Turkish Foreign Policy, SpringerBriefs in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90746-4_4

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4.1 The Weight of Ideation in New Turkey’s Foreign Policy During the AKP’s first term Turkey saw great democratic and economic progress. However, as years went by and the AKP moved to its second (2007) and third (2011) terms in power, the country started to gradually drift towards authoritarianism with much of the achieved progress being reversed.2 At the heart of this drawback was President Erdo˘gan’s desire and efforts to establish a presidential political system with himself at the helm. The road to presidentialism was neither easy nor short and went through at least six important milestones: (a) The constitutional referendum of 2007, (b) the constitutional referendum of 2012, (c) the first direct presidential elections of 2014 that elected Erdo˘gan to the presidency, (d) the failed coup attempt of 2016, (e) the constitutional referendum of 2017, and (f) the double—general and presidential— early elections of 2018 that implemented the constitutional changes of the 2017 referendum thus also launching the presidential system.3 As mentioned in the book’s Introduction, this process included the gradual erosion of the military’s power through democratic reforms that civilianised/politicised various state institutions, and legal trials that led to the imprisonment of hundreds of military officers on grounds of plotting against the government. Especially during the 2010s the AKP’s approach to democracy became increasingly majoritarian. It treated elections as a process that gives ‘the winners the right to impose their will on society at large with little regard for the concerns and interests of losers,’ thereby creating much ‘socio-political conflict and polarization.’4 In the early 2010s this tendency was in its early stages. And given that ‘even nondemocratic states must take into account the demands of powerful political actors such as the military, economic elites, and even, occasionally, the public as a whole, if they wish to remain in power,’5 Erdo˘gan remained vulnerable to some domestic pressures regarding both domestic and foreign policies for he still had to win a series of elections and constitutional referenda. But the more Erdo˘gan consolidated his power and came closer to his political objective the more majoritarian his approach and the less checked the exercise of his authority became. The summer of 2016 was a decisive milestone in Turkey’s drift towards authoritarianism. Erdo˘gan and his government used the failed coup of July 15 as a pretext to go after all real and perceived political enemies through a massive purge that included more than 150 thousand individuals from all state institutions, including the military.6 The consequences of the failed coup attempt had thus accelerated the processes of authoritarianism and, by extension, affected (foreign policy) decisionmaking processes. Because of the state of emergency that was enforced, Erdo˘gan could rule by presidential decrees. Moreover, various state institutions, including the military and the ministries of foreign affairs and defence came under the control of 2

Bakiner (2017). Cagaptay (2017), Bakıner, “How did we get here?”. 4 Akkoyunlu (2017), p. 58. 5 Ripsman (2009), 171. 6 See the latest data at https://turkeypurge.com/. 3

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the President while most opposition voices within those institutions were purged. Lastly, opposition political parties found themselves having to support the government against the putschists at least in principle. Because of the hegemonic anticoup narrative that the government constructed, it became very difficult for them to substantiate and legitimise any opposition to the government’s purge, at least in the beginning.7 As a result, Erdo˘gan managed to circumvent politico-social opposition and emerge as the core of state decisions and mechanisms.8 Therefore, the role of leader images became more dominant even as the Imperial strategic culture paradigm became more institutionalized. Both variables became central to TFP. It was not a coincidence that TFP after 2016 became more assertive and interventionist. Between 2016 and 2020 Turkey intervened in Syria four times, intervened and maintained troops in northern Iraq against the will of Baghdad, intervened in Nagorno-Karabakh on the side of Azerbaijan, intervened in Libya on the side of the Government of National Accord (GNA), and conducted multiple illegal marine surveys or drilling operations in the Eastern Mediterranean—particularly within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Republic of Cyprus. From this perspective, and as we will see in more detail in the next chapter, it seems that as Erdo˘gan consolidated his power more, the causal weight of the Lausanne Syndrome (as an inclusive ideational variable) increased. The next section presents manifestations of the Lausanne Syndrome—elements of leader images and strategic culture—among political leaders, societal elites, and the public.

4.2 The Lausanne Syndrome in Leader Images and Strategic Culture: From the Second Group to the AKP Beyond the 1918–1923 period, further evidence of the Lausanne Syndrome and the ideological continuity between the Second Group and the AKP can be traced in key periods of Turkish history that could be seen as parentheses and in statements of AKP leaders or leaders of the broader political-Islamic movement in Turkey. In one of the speeches that sparked the controversy in the mid-2010s, the leader of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, openly disputed the Treaty of Lausanne, making specific references to Mosul, Thrace, Cyprus, and Crimea, saying that Ankara ‘cannot ignore its kinsmen’ in those places. The Turkish President went on to say that ‘for years, they [the founding fathers of the republic and their successors] have tried to show Lausanne as a victory to us by comparing it with the Treaty of Sèvres’. And he added: ‘We cannot draw boundaries to our heart, nor do we allow it.’9 He was referring to the boundaries drawn in the region by the Treaty of Lausanne effectively ending the Ottoman Empire. Erdo˘gan was making clear that those boundaries are unacceptable, 7

Ta¸s (2018). Bechev (2016). 9 eKathimerini (2016). 8

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at least emotionally. He moreover made a direct reference to the National Pact by way of justifying Turkey’s current foreign policy, and he harshly criticized both Turkey’s main negotiator of the Lausanne Treaty, Ismet Inönü, and Mustafa Kemal himself calling them ‘two drunkards (iki ayyas)’ whose incompetence resulted in the limited territorial borders of Turkey.10 Perhaps not coincidentally the leader of the Second Group, Ali Sükrü, ¸ one of the most vocal critics of Kemal, used to often refer to and denounce Kemal’s drinking habits as well.11 This Lausanne Treaty-related discourse already showcases certain leader images that are also associated with the Imperial strategic culture paradigm and were historically suppressed under the Kemalist rule. To be sure this was not the first time in Turkey’s contemporary history that the Sèvres Syndrome was challenged and that the Lausanne Syndrome manifested through leaders and intellectuals of the same or similar “images” and politico-ideological tradition. Robert Olson writes that at least since the early 1970s some scholars started becoming critical of Kemal’s compromises breaking the monotonous refrain regarding his great successes: ‘Western Thrace, the Dodecanese Islands and Mosul are those mentioned. These areas were declared integral parts of Turkey during the war of independence, but at Lausanne and in subsequent agreements Turkey withdrew these claims.’12 Even from the time of Prime Minster Adnan Menderes (1950–1960) we can find elements of the domestic and external aspects of the Lausanne Syndrome—albeit in small degree. Menderes was not a conservative; he was in fact a member of Kemal’s Republican People’s Party (CHP). However, together with other members of parliament he maintained a critical approach towards the party’s leadership and in 1945 he suggested democratic reforms. In the same year he parted ways with the CHP and together with Celal Bayar founded the Democrat Party (DP). Ismet ˙Inönü, then leader of the CHP, accepted the development as he realised the need for a multiparty system and the creation of new parties that would not, however, challenge the authority of the CHP.13 The DP was eventually elected to power in 1950. Despite the DP’s Kemalist roots and the fact that its time in power was characterised by more continuity than change, Menderes did make some interesting moves. Domestically, apart from liberalizing the economy,he loosened the state’s grip over religion adopting a less strict interpretation of secularism.14 He also introduced a number of related initiatives such as the Imam Hatip (religious) schools, a Faculty of Divinity at the University of Ankara, religious radio shows, optional religious courses in primary schools, and the closure of People’s Houses (Halkevleri) – an enlightenment project that Kemal introduced to gain social support for his reforms and curve conservative opposition.15 As Hakan Ovunc Ongur notes, though these initiatives were ‘not directly aiming to dismantle the secular state structure,’ they 10

Quoted in Hintz (2017), p. 117. See also, Akdo˘gan (2018), p. 71. Kinross, Atatürk, 362. 12 Olson (1977): 233. 13 Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan, 172. 14 Danforth (2015): 101, Danforth (2021), 212. Kindle. 15 Ongur (2015): 420. 11

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‘helped to recall and normalize Islamic and Ottoman societal traditions,’ not least in the context of a pragmatic electoral strategy that involved the establishment of ‘local networks with extended families’ and religious orders.16 Somewhat similarly, the DP’s foreign policy maintained and reinforced the western orientation of the CHP against the Soviet threat of the time through Turkey’s accession to NATO in 1952 among other policies. And yet in the context of NATO’s security architecture, Turkey under the DP for the first time after 1923 made significant—though largely unsuccessful—openings to the Middle East such as the Baghdad Pact (1954) with Iraq, Pakistan, Britain and Iran which later (1959) transformed into the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).17 On the one hand, the DP’s foreign policy faced significant backlash in the Third and Arab World; it lacked the pragmatism of the Kemalist approach and was accused of being adventurist. On the other hand, however, Menderes’ foreign policy was also marked by Turkey’s official reengagement in the Cyprus issue with the argument that Cyprus was Turkish and that it should be given back to Turkey (see more in Chap. 5). Not surprisingly, the DP government used the Cyprus issue, an issue related with the results of Lausanne and resonated with the public, to divert the unrest that stemmed from domestic problems and crises.18 From the perspective of domestic and foreign policy, although Menderes and the DP were not really bearers of the Lausanne Syndrome, they had to acknowledge its presence among the society in developing a narrative and a political program that would help them expand their electoral base, as well as compete and survive politically against the CHP. It was thus not a surprise that, by appealing to these ideas, the DP won all three parliamentary elections of the 1950s (1950, 1954, 1957) every time winning in most provinces. Apart from a relative increase of votes in 1957, the CHP only won in ‘underdeveloped areas in the east, where landowners and tribal chiefs were still able to deliver blocks of votes.’19 For these and other reasons, Erdo˘gan often exalts Menderes and his time in office as a parenthesis of democratization in the history of the Kemalist state, despite Menderes’s drift towards authoritarianism in the latter half of the 1950s.20 Regarding Menderes’ imprisonment (and later execution) after the 1960 coup d’état, Erdo˘gan, who was 7 years old at the time, stated the following at the wake of his first term: ‘Some are saddened by things like this, and they give up. In my case, this sadness turned into an attraction for politics.’21 Erdo˘gan relates particularly to two aspects of the Menderes story: First, his early democratic approach and openings to religion that constituted the first break from the Kemalist political dominance and, second, his overthrow by the military. The latter, being the guardian of the Kemalist state, was seen by Erdo˘gan as undemocratic, the oppressor of religion and political Islam more 16

Ibid. Hale (2013), 91–94. 18 Olson, “Turkish Foreign Policy from 1923 to 1960,” 237–38. 19 Zurcher, Turkey, 223, 17. 20 Danforth, “The Menderes Metaphor,” 100. 21 Sontag (2003). 17

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specifically. As elaborated below, Necmettin Erbakan’s similar experience adds to Erdo˘gan’s perceptions, and the related images shared by AKP elites. To be sure the rehabilitation of Menderes in the public sphere started with Turgut Özal, the founder of the Motherland Party (ANAP), whose governance constituted another important milestone for the Lausanne Syndrome in Turkish history.22 Özal was both a pragmatist and committed to conservative-religious values while also a rumoured member of the Naqshbandi religious order. Just like Menderes, Özal focused a great deal on the economy and its liberalization. Among other things, his economic policy was characterized by open markets, incentives for foreign investments and especially “Islamic capital” from the Arab World, the development of cities in Anatolia, and an emphasis on exports.23 But Özal’s domestic policies had a strong religious component as well. Furthering the opening that Menderes initiated in the 1950s, he deviated from the Kemalist political paradigm and brought Islam and Ottoman nostalgia to the fore.24 In 1988 Özal became the first Turkish Prime Minister to go to Mecca for pilgrimage. He appointed members of the Naqshbandi order to his administration and legalised charitable donations to religious organizations. He enabled conservative businessmen and investors to improve their operations and organise politically even as he contributed to the emergence of a new, conservative middle class. Moreover, he adopted a much more tolerant stance vis-à-vis the activities of religious orders and brotherhoods (tarikats) that were banned under Kemal, such as the Naqshbandi, the Nurculuk and the Süleymancı, thus providing them with more freedom.25 When asked, Özal said that the objective of his governance was to accomplish three things: ‘face our Ottoman history and halt the genocide against the Bosniaks; use our shared Ottoman memories with the Muslim communities to expand the influence of Turkey and redefine ourselves not in ethnic terms but within the context of Ottoman Islam.’26 These sentiments had implications for foreign policy as well. Even though Özal remained pro-Western, he took a number of ‘initiatives to change the pattern of Turkish foreign policy’ that were strongly opposed by the Kemalist militarybureaucratic establishment.27 Not least, he attempted great openings to the Arab and Muslim World and at the same time flirted with adventurist and revisionist foreign policy ideas. Among other things he tried to make new identity-based openings to Iraq and in the Kurdish issue in the context of a more democratic policy domestically and a more outward policy externally.28 As Mufti notes for example, Özal’s Chief of 22

Turgut Özal served as Prime Minister between 1983 and 1989 and as President between 1989 and 1993. 23 Öni¸s (2004). 24 Ataman (2002). 25 See, Karakas (2007), 120; Öni¸s, “Turgut Özal and his Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical Perspective.” 26 Quoted in, Yavuz (2020), 122. 27 Çandar, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq,” 57. 28 Ibid., 57–58; Abramowitz (2013); Ço¸sar and Demirci, “The Mosul Questıon And the Turkish Republic: Before and After the Frontıer Treaty, 1926,” 58–59; Çandar, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq.”

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Staff Necip Torumtay ‘had no doubt that Özal intended to invade Iraq’ on the basis that Mosul and Kirkuk ‘fell within the National Pact borders’—despite the fact that the Turkey-Iraq territorial dispute had been officially settled in 1926.29 Özal never disputed the Lausanne Treaty officially, but his worldview often pointed to what was then dubbed neo-Ottomanism (i.e., nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire). His view was that ‘Being a Turk in the ex-Ottoman space means being a Muslim or vice versa’; he thus tried to construct an identity that would transcend other ethnic or linguistic identities based on shared historical experiences and Islam.30 Beyond aiming to bring about peace at home by bridging different identities, this approach re-conceptualized and re-interpreted Turkey’s external environment according to Ottoman nostalgia and prescribed a more active and assertive role for Turkey. After the collapse of the Soviet Union more specifically, Özal saw the opportunity to push for a new and wider geopolitical vision. He thus stated that ‘The current historical circumstances permit Turkey to reverse the shrinking process [of the Ottoman Empire] that began at the walls of Vienna [in 1683]’.31 Leader images and strategic culture under Özal manifested the Lausanne Syndrome not in the way that it manifests under Erdo˘gan with the direct disputing of Lausanne, but by reviving elements of the Ottoman past, be it in domestic or foreign policy. And though he did not challenge the geopolitical status quo in a territorial manner, he did try to transcend national borders through relations with “kin” groups and states on the basis of the Ottoman and Islamic identity to the end of gaining more influence abroad and enhancing trade relations.32 On the other hand, leader images connected to territorial revisionism have manifested through politicians belonging to the same or similar political-ideological currents. For example, Sadettin Tantan, former member of Özal’s ANAP, mayor of Fatih (1994–1999), Interior Minister (1999–2001), and later co-founder of the Homeland Party (Yurt Partisi), called for the updating of the National Pact arguing that ‘starting from Mosul and Kirkuk, Aleppo, all of Cyprus and the Aegean islands, Western Thrace, South Caucasus should be included’ in the new borders.33 Similar ideas were even more prevalent within Necmettin Erbakan’s Milli Görüs (National Outlook Movement) and a series of associated political parties since the 1970s,34 including the AKP. The National Outlook Movement was (and 29

Turgut Özal was also part of a Turkish political-Islamic tradition ‘that represented the revolt of Anatolia (the Asian portion of Turkey) against an elitist, Westward-looking establishment which tended to despise the values and traditions of Anatolia (which in fact derived its vitality from Islam).’ Yet he promoted a nuanced version of political Islam which tried to also encompass positive relations with Western states and institutions. See, Aral (2001): 72. 30 Quoted in Yavuz (1998): 24. 31 Quoted in Pipes (1994), 76. 32 Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire, 124–25. 33 Altan (2021). 34 In order of establishment: National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP), National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP), Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP), Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP), and the AKP. The SP is still in existence and considered the more traditionalist counterpart of the AKP. Both parties emerged from the dissolution of the FP.

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still is) known for its anti-Western, anti-European, anti-Semitic, and pan-Islamist ideology. When given the opportunity, Erbakan attempted a ‘re-traditionalization’ that ‘included the redefinition of the people’s identity through Islamic principles and the memories of the near, Ottoman past.’35 He aspired to elevate Turkey to the leadership of the Muslim World (the ummah) to antagonize the West and articulate an alternative civilizational identity. The belief was that TFP ‘should be adapted to reflect its [Ottoman-Islamic] history.’36 These ideas ‘echoed the resentment that had been accumulating since the end of the Ottoman Empire’ and were appealing among the dissatisfied ‘new urbanized poor that saw identification with Europe and the West as a characteristic of the rich elites.’37 When Erbakan became a Prime Minister for a short year in 1996, though not unaware of the prescripts of the Kemalist paradigm, he attempted significant foreign policy openings in the Arab and Muslim world with the aim ‘of creating a sort of “Islamic Common Market” and “Islamic NATO”’ under the leadership of Turkey.38 The overthrow of Erbakan by the so-called “post-modern coup” of 28 February 1997 did not allow him to unfold his foreign policy vision in full, though he did demonstrate tendencies that were clearly informed by the Lausanne Syndrome. After all, Erbakan believed that the Treaty of Lausanne ‘was introduced in order to create a state where the Turks would be alienated from their religion and all their institutions taken over by world Zionism.’39 Perhaps most indicative of National Outlook’s Lausanne Syndrome, however, was the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Back then Erbakan, as the leader of the National Salvation Party (MSP), participated in the CHP coalition government under Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and served as Deputy Prime Minister. Erbakan claimed the success of the Cyprus invasion saying that ‘the victory of Cyprus is an MSP victory.’40 Milli Görü¸s saw the Cyprus operation as an anti-Western campaign and in favour of the national interest. Yet at the same time, to them ‘the importance of Turkey’s 1974 military victory was that after almost 300 years of continuous territorial contraction, land was won back from the West’ and revitalized the ‘glorious Ottoman-Islamic past.’41 These images are part of the strategic culture paradigm that dates back to the days of the Empire, even though at the time of the invasion it was not yet institutionalised as the state was still dominated by the Kemalist tradition. And yet these ideational factors display many similarities to the geopolitical vision of the Second Group and are connected to both Ottoman nostalgia and the National Pact narrative that survived all the way from the Second Group and Milli Görü¸s to the AKP.

35

Çolak (2006): 595. Moudouros (2016): 323. 37 Calabro (2017): 178. 38 Hamid (2004): 114; see also, Robins (1997). 39 Cornell (2018). 40 Quoted in, Moudouros, “Between anti-Westernization and Islamism: Turkey’s ‘Islamic’ Vision in Cyprus,” 327. 41 Ibid., 325. 36

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In the same vein, Christos Teazis finds a great degree of convergence between the religious-Ottomanist belief system of the Second Group and that of the AKP, which points to a linkage and at least some continuity between the two in terms of political perceptions and thought.42 Apart from territorial and geopolitical matters, such convergences include a religion-based concept of democracy and the synthesis between capitalism, free economy, and cultural tradition. In agreement with other works,43 Teazis concludes that the AKP’s roots can be traced to the Milli Görüs, partially to the DP, and lastly to the Second Group. It could indeed be said that Milli Görüs was the product of a ‘stratum of Turkish Islamists [who] remained dedicated to an Islamic restoration’ after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of a new secular state under Mustafa Kemal.44 The Second Group’s support for a constitutional monarchy and a state where religion would have as much power as in the Ottoman Empire is very similar to Milli Görüs’s and the AKP’s vision for a strong—even authoritarian—presidential system and a more religious society. What is more, the Second Group had an overall ‘conservative aim of making the new Turkey—if there was ever to be a new Turkey in any basic sense—conform as far as possible to the customs and traditions of the old.’45 The resemblance between the Second Group’s “new Turkey” narrative and the AKP’s aim to inaugurate “New Turkey” in 2023, at the 100th anniversary of the establishment of Turkish Republic, is striking and telling. Against this background the conservative and pro-Ottoman Second Group, though not entirely homogenous, can be seen as a political predecessor of the AKP. This would also mean that many of the perceptions of the former never ceased to exist and have been transferred through history and the political Islamic movement, including the milestones of the DP and ANAP, through the belief system of Milli Görüs and into the AKP. After all, many members of the AKP have been Milli Görüs members while Erdo˘gan himself used to be Erbakan’s protégé. As far as the geopolitical vision is concerned, we have seen that the process of drafting the National Pact was intertwined with the evolution of the Turkish nationalist movement after 1919 and that it was supported by people from a wide range of political-ideological backgrounds. And although the National Pact effectively represented ‘a foundational break from the Ottoman political tradition’ due to its territorial and other aims, it was still adopted with the support of Sultan-Caliph loyalists as well which gave them, too, a sense of ownership over the decision.46 However at the time, the movement was still, in theory, not only committed to the territorial objectives of the National Pact but also to the preservation of the Sultanate and the Caliphate. These were important reasons behind the decision of many conservatives to support the resistance movement and the National Pact. Erdo˘gan himself highlighted the 42

Teazis, The Second Political Changeover in Turkey, 48. The AKP’s historical and ideological relationship with Milli Görüs is well documented. See, Da˘gi (2006), 90–94, Hale and Özbudun (2011), 103–05. 44 Reynolds (2015). 45 Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, 326. 46 ˙Içduygu and Kaygusuz, “The Politics of Citizenship by Drawing Borders,” 32. 43

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participation of muftis and imams in the resistance drawing an ideological association between the AKP and the pro-Caliphate/pro-Ottoman political current of that time.47 Similar images were demonstrated by key AKP intellectual, former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Turkey under the AKP, Ahmet Davuto˘glu, in his book Strategic Depth, among other writings. Davuto˘glu laments the fact that Turkey abandoned the Ottoman Empire’s lost territories and was overtaken by the anxiety of defending the new borders. According to him, ‘this situation prevented the formation of interim tactical plans, such as the creation of fields of influence between the areas of total domination and total abandonment’.48 Furthermore, he criticises the passivity of TFP arguing, in line with Milli Görüs discourse, that in order for Turkey to find its place in the world, the experiences of the Ottoman Empire’s late years should be evaluated carefully as Turkey is in a process of redefining itself domestically and in terms of foreign policy. Davuto˘glu attributes Turkey’s foreign policy passivity to psychological, identity and political cultural factors—akin to the Sèvres Syndrome and the Republican strategic culture paradigm—and calls for their recreation to the end of a new ‘civilizational opening’ and ‘strategic orientation’ in accordance with Turkey’s historical legacy and sphere of influence.49 The recreation that Davuto˘glu refers to is basically the enabling and manifestation of the Imperial strategic culture paradigm and a different mind-set at the policy-making level—both of which are components of the Lausanne Syndrome. In fact, Davuto˘glu goes one step further arguing that, by adopting the boundaries of the National Pact, the leadership of the Turkish Republic rejected a powerful position in the international system as well as the potential of becoming a state that could constitute an alternative to the Western axis.50 He further posits that, by compromising on the Treaty of Lausanne, the new Turkish state also diregarded the transnational Islamic identity of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate thus hindering its own influence over the post-Ottoman space.51 All of these ideas resemble the discources of Özal and Erbakan. References to the Lausanne Treaty and the National Pact became more frequent since the mid-2010s and Erdo˘gan spearheaded the articulation of a narrative influenced by the Lausanne Syndrome. This is important given that, as noted in the beginning of this chapter, the weight of Erdo˘gan’s images, opinions and worldview in decision making became even greater after the attempted coup of July 2016 as state power and authority became highly centralized to his person. For example, in the lead up to the anti-IS Mosul operation (see more in Chap. 5) Erdo˘gan insisted that Turkey should participate in the operations invoking the National Pact: Turkey will take part in the Mosul operation and hold a seat at the table. It is out of the question for us to remain outside. Because there is history in Mosul for us. If those gentlemen wish 47

“Speech at the Commemoration of Atatürk”. Davuto˘glu, Strategic Depth, 100. 49 Ibid., 156–60. 50 Ibid., 123. 51 Ibid., 124–25. 48

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so, they can read Misak-ı Milli [National Pact] and better understand what history we have in Mosul. Currently there are our brothers and sisters in Mosul, including Arabs, Turkmens and Kurds. Likewise, to the north towards the border, we have relatives there […] No one should expect us to withdraw from Bashiqa.52

Two months later, he expressed similar views about the Lausanne Treaty while speaking about the situation in Syria: Over the ten years preceding the establishment of our Republic, we regressed from three million square kilometers [of territory] to 780 thousand square kilometres. They imposed the Sèvres on us and we consented to the Lausanne. That is all. Is this what we deserve? We were the top state of the 17th and 18th centuries; however, now this is what we have left. Some say, ‘Where is the harm in losing any more?’ Wasn’t this what these dastards, these scums, called the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party], wanted? Were they not the ones who were seeking to establish a state in our southeastern region? […] A Muslim is not stung from the same hole twice. We are not stung from the same hole twice.53

In another speech he made for the start of the 2016–2017 academic year he talked of the importance of knowing about the National Pact for understanding (and justifying) Turkey’s geopolitical role: Should we fully comprehend the National Pact, we can realize what responsibility we have in Syria and Iraq. On the contrary, if we don’t know the National Pact, we cannot understand what responsibility we have in Iraq or Syria […] I have a historical responsibility here. We will be here. We will be both at the table and in the field.54

The Lausanne Syndrome, which includes both the National Pact narrative and Ottoman nostalgia, is very salient in these statements. However, Erdo˘gan became even more transparent about his views reminding Second Group leader Ali Sükrü’s ¸ wish for a national geography that extends beyond the boundaries of the National Pact. Commenting on the reactions to his remarks and tyring to appease fears about a Turkish expansionist agenda he stated: Whenever we talk of historical and legal rights, and bring up Lausanne, some come out and ask, ‘do you have an eye on Iraqi and Syrian lands?’ And today I saw some newspapers report that ‘Erdo˘gan mentioned the National Pact (Misak-i Milli) and thus stirred the pot.’ It is not me that says so, it is the history. Are we to forget such a reality that was noted down by the history? Are we not to speak of these truths? We don’t have an eye on anyone’s lands. On the contrary, we are against those who have an eye on the lands of these countries. […] As I have always said, our physical boundaries are different from the boundaries of our heart. From Europe to the depths of Africa, from Mediterranean to the limitless steppes of Central Asia; our brothers living in these geographies are all within the boundaries of our heart. To us, the Balkans are one half of our heart and the Caucasus the other half. While this is the case, how can we regard those that insistently work to exclude us from developments in Iraq and Syria as well-intentioned? […] How can I see Aleppo different from Gaziantep, Hasakah from Mardin, Mosul from Van! Be noted that we can explain this crooked understanding neither to our grandchildren nor to our ancestors.55 52

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016e). Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016b). 54 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016g). 55 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016d). 53

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Erdo˘gan’s efforts to reframe his statements are evident. However,several speeches demonstrate that he was unwilling or unable to conceal the revisionist character of his remarks which repetitively referred to the 1919–1923 historical juncture and the Ottoman past as well as to the Lausanne defeat or the National Pact boundaries: Our Republic […] is the name of the new path we drew up for ourselves on October 29, 1923 after our War of Independence ended in victory. As I always underline, the Republic of Turkey is not our first state. It is our last state. Do not mistake them! Our new state, which we founded following an agreement that we were compelled to approve under the circumstances of one century ago, of course is a very important achievement of ours as a nation. And the incidents that take place in Syria, in Iraq now. Ghazi Mustafa Kemal had drawn up a line of Misak-ı Milli [National Pact]. When I mentioned it, some got annoyed. Why are you annoyed? I am giving a history lesson, examine and see what is in the Misak-ı Milli. I mentioned Lausanne and they got annoyed. Why are you getting annoyed?56

In another speech he lamented once again the (territorial) fait accompli that the Lausanne Treaty imposed on the former Ottoman Empire with specific mention to the Greek islands: What did they do to us in history? They showed us the Sèvres in 1920 and then persuaded us to agree to the Lausanne in 1923. Afterwards, some have tried to pass off the Lausanne as a victory. All is obvious. And now you see the Aegean, don’t you? We gave away at the Lausanne the islands that you could shout across to. Is that the victory? Those places used to belong to us. There are still our mosques and sanctuaries. However, we are still talking ‘What will the continental shelf be? What will it be in the air, or at the sea?’ We are still struggling for this. Why? Because of the ones that were at the table in Lausanne.57

Erdo˘gan reiterated his views during a visit to Greece in December 2017.58 At their meeting, Greek President Prokopis Pavlopoulos commented on Erdo˘gan’s opinions: Using my former capacity [as a law professor] … I would like to tell you that, because you talk about updating the Lausanne Treaty, Treaties do not need updating or revision. The interpretation of the Law, the methods of interpreting the Law are those that allow the adaptation of the rule of the Law included in the Treaty to each time’s circumstances. The methods of interpretation exist, I am sure that your staff is completely adequate, I know who your staff on International Law matters is. Therefore, if we avoided certain terms that are not appropriate legally speaking, I think that certain misunderstandings would have ended at the right time.59

Erdo˘gan’s response was rather blunt: ‘I am not a professor of law but I have in depth knowledge on political law. In political law, the term of “updating treaties” does exist; and we do update them so long as countries come to an agreement. There are many examples of this in the world.’60 These images manifested through other AKP leaders as well. For example, a year after Erdo˘gan’s exchange with Pavlopoulos, Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlüt 56

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016c). Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2016a). 58 Hürriyet Daily News (2017). 59 Kathimerini (2017). 60 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2017c). 57

4.2 The Lausanne Syndrome in Leader Images …

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Çavu¸so˘glu also spoke about the need to update the Treaty of Lausanne with regard to the Aegean islets and islands.61 In the same vein Metin Külünk, who has been the Vice-President of the AKP’s foreign relations committee, a Member of Parliament and long-time member of Milli Görüs has posted a map to Twitter depicting a vision of a greater Turkey (an expanded version of the National Pact). The map includes territories from northern Syria, northern Iraq, Bulgaria, Greece, Armenia, Georgia, and the whole of Cyprus, while in his comment Külünk justified the map by invoking a history of ‘a thousand years.’62

4.3 Shaping Collective Ideas and Assumptions With the AKP’s consolidation of power by 2016, these images became dominant not only within state institutions but also in public discourse. Having controlled most mass media organizations in the country,63 Erdo˘gan has been able to take his ideas and those of the broader Islamic-Ottomanist movement out of obscurity and into the mainstream. Within this framework, dysphoria about the Treaty of Lausanne and Ottoman nostalgia is frequently reproduced on multiple levels. For example, the columnist of the pro-AKP newspaper Daily Sabah, Ekrem Bu˘gra Ekinci, argues that, apart from certain territorial adjustments, the Treaty of Lausanne is not much different from the Treaty of Sèvres. He essentially suggests that both treaties were equally devastating and concludes: Similar to the Treaty of Sevres, the Treaty of Lausanne was a plan to divide the Ottoman Empire, which had been collapsing for the last few centuries, into nation-states […] [T]he Ankara government [through the Lausanne Treaty] found the opportunity to establish a new nation-state for themselves, which was a triumph, while for the conservatives it was a loss, as they lost their entire history including their sultan, madrasahs, religious law and the fez.64

In the conservative pro-Erdo˘gan newspaper Yeni S¸ afak columnist ˙Ibrahim Karagül blamed the West for taking Turkey ‘hostage under the name of Westernization [and] Europeanization.’ He was also very forthright in suggesting that the Lausanne Treaty was a scheme to limit Turkey to its current (unsatisfactory) borders: ‘We were able to hold on here [Anatolia]. We took refuge in the “last fortress.” Lausanne was not enough for us, hence we were never satisfied. Because we were never satisfied about being limited to Anatolia […] And hence, we were always patient throughout the twentieth century.’ Karagül concluded arguing that after decades of patience under the control of the West, Turkey’s time has come: ‘the West’s hundreds-ofcenturies-long unilateral dominance ended […] Our memory was refreshed, our regional belonging was revived, our political and cultural identity was revived, and 61

Hürriyet Daily News (2018b). Metin Külünk, Twitter Account (@mkulnuk), 11 March 2021, https://twitter.com/mkulunk/sta tus/1370074998803664896. 63 See, Tziarras (2015), Co¸skun (2020). 64 Ekinci (2016). 62

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tutelage mechanisms started to gradually break down. We were returning to our core, to our self, to our power and claims.’65 Another columnist in the Islamicconservative and pro-AKP newspaper Yeni Akit exalted Erdo˘gan saying that thanks to him ‘even the most stubborn people realized that Lausanne was actually a defeat. It is interesting that hundreds of articles, papers, seminars and conferences explaining this have not been as effective as Erdo˘gan’s words.’ The columnist, Vehbi Kara, equated the Treaty of Lausanne with the Treaty of Sèvres and went on to argue that it prevented Islam from dominating the ex-Ottoman lands. Importantly, Kara associated Erdo˘gan’s actions with the ideas of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek as well.66 Kısakürek, a Turkish nationalist and Islamist, was one of the key intellectuals of the Turkish political-Islamic movement in the twentieth century with great impact on AKP figures and the Milli Görüs more broadly. Kısakürek led the Büyük Do˘gu Hareketi (Great Eastern Movement) that ‘sought to synthesize Islamism, Turkish nationalism, and conservatism’67 while elevating the Ottoman legacy. His ideas were characterised by anti-Westernism, anti-Semitism and defiance against the radical secularization and westernization project that Turkey was experiencing. He saw Turkey’s Islamic-Ottoman heritage as a remedy to these vices and believed that the country’s task was to ‘defend Islamdom… against Western imperialism.’68 Among other things, Kısakürek supported from early on that the Lausanne Treaty was a defeat rather than a victory. This was among the views and religious-Islamic ideas promoted through his journal Büyük Do˘gu.69 Key AKP figures were deeply impacted by the ideas of Kısakürek and Büyük Do˘gu. Hakan Yavuz argues that it was this journal ‘that sowed the seeds of the first phase of the political evolution culminating in Erdo˘gan’s emergence as the leader of the AKP.’70 In fact, Kısakürek was an inspiration and an ideological mentor for Erdo˘gan who often praised the intellectual’s impact on his own ideas and life.71 In one such occasion, at the 2014 Necip Fazil Awards Ceremony for Literature and Research, Erdo˘gan spoke about Kısakürek’s legacy all the while criticizing the first (Kemalist) republican period, If those who were marginalized in the past can now say ‘I exist’ in today’s politics, this is due to the self-confidence Necip Fazil instilled in those circles […] The Turkish Republic brought a new alphabet and language as well as a new understanding of culture and arts to Turkey. During the single party period, all these spheres were confined to certain templates. All bridges with the past were burned and links with our traditions were slashed. While we were becoming estranged from our own culture, Necip Fazil managed to get us in touch with our past and maintained that struggle with determination […] Necip Fazil was a monument

65

Karagül (2019). Kara (2016). 67 Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire, 86. 68 Ibid., 87. 69 Meydan (2018). 70 Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire, 87. 71 Ibid., 88–89; Meydan, “Küfür sıçanından teze˘ ge”; Cornell, “Erbakan, Kisakürek, and the Mainstreaming of Extremism in Turkey”. 66

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of self-confidence, who could say ‘I am here and because I am here, Turkey therefore exists,’ during our most oppressive period on words and thinking.72

Likewise, AKP founding member, former Foreign Minister and President Abdullah Gül acknowledged Kısakürek as the intellectual with the greatest impact on his worldview. For him and his friends, ‘Büyük Do˘gu was more than simply a journal of ideas. Fazil’s ideas of a “Great East” or “Great Orient” was a world vision and a grand one that held enormous appeal for many in Turkey at the time who were pondering their faith and sense of being Turkish.’73 Though initially on the side of the CHP, Kısakürek’s later “conversion” through his contact with Naqshbandi and other Islamist ideas, rendered him a prime bearer of the Lausanne Syndrome and source of the related political, geopolitical, cultural, and religious ideas for other intellectuals of the Islamic movement as well as for the conservative public.74 It is worth noting that after being convicted and imprisoned for insulting Turkishness in 1946, Kısakürek was among the political prisoners released by the Menderes government.75 However, in the 1950s he remained critical of the DP for not being harsh enough against the CHP and not deviating substantially from its ideology.76 Lastly, Turgut Özal was, too, among the leaders of the political Islamic current whose views were influenced by Kısakürek and like-minded writers.77 Another key intellectual in the history of the Lausanne Syndrome was controversial historian and writer Kadir Mısıro˘glu. His three-volume work in the 1960s and 70s Lozan Zafer mi, Hezimet mi? (Lausanne: Victory or Defeat?) became the intellectual cornerstone of the anti-Lausanne ideological framework within the politicalIslamic movement and contributed significantly to the reproduction and enhancement of the Lausanne Syndrome. Mısıro˘glu supported that the Lausanne Treaty was a foreign plan that ruined the glorious imperial legacy of the Ottoman Empire and left the Islamic world without a leader by punishing the Turks. According to him, Lausanne had a great spiritual cost for the Turkish nation because of the abolition of the Caliphate and the Sultanate, and great material costs for it sacrificed territories such as Batumi, Western Thrace, the Greek Islands, Cyprus, Hatay, Aleppo and Mosul.78 Erdo˘gan and other Milli Görüs members have been significantly influenced by Mısıro˘glu’s ideas; indeed Erdo˘gan’s narrative is virtually identical with that of Mısıro˘glu.79 When towards the end of his life Mısıro˘glu was hospitalized Erdo˘gan visited him. At the news of his death in 2019 he called him ‘one of the important history writers of our country.’ Erdo˘gan was joined by a number of AKP 72

Anadolu Agency (2014a). Maclean (2014), 48–49. 74 Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire, 86–87; Maclean, Abdullah Gül & the Making of New Turkey, 49. 75 Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire, 87–88. 76 Duran (2001), 270–74. 77 Heper, “Islam, Conservatism, and Democracy in Turkey: Comparing Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan,” 143. 78 Mısıro˘ glu (2014). 79 Kara (2018). 73

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officials who expressed their condolences for Mısıro˘glu’s death, including Presidential Spokesperson and advisor ˙Ibrahim Kalın, Parliament Speaker Mustafa Sentop, ¸ and then Finance Minister Berat Albayrak, all of whom praised him as an ‘important historian.’80 The leadership of the AKP,81 as part of a broader, non-monolithic, political-Islamic ideological current, evidently demonstrates deep dissatisfaction with how the Sèvres Syndrome confined TFP over the years, thus preventing it from reaching its full potential and rightful regional-international position. Likewise, it becomes more apparent that the worldview of key AKP leaders and, most importantly, Erdo˘gan himself has been shaped by ideas and narratives associated with the Lausanne Syndrome. With their rise to power these ideas manifested in an unprecedented way; as the AKP consolidated its power, they became institutionalized and created a hegemonic narrative about domestic and foreign policy that influenced both AKPcontrolled mass media and a large part of the society, most notably the party’s conservative-nationalist electoral base.

4.4 On Intervening Variables and Foreign Policy Outcomes A hundred and ten years ago, Yemen and Skopje and also Erzurum and Benghazi were parts of the same country. When we mention this, it is referred to as ‘neo-Ottomanism.’ Why is it that those who united all of Europe are not referred to as neo-Romans, however those who united the Middle Eastern geography are considered to be neo-Ottomans?82

These words are from a 2013 speech of then Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davuto˘glu. Davuto˘glu equated Turkey’s effort to unite the Middle Eastern geography under its aegis with the post-WWII project that united Europe. His argument was weak not only because of the apparent problems in the said comparison but also because in that same speech he contradicted his own point: He spoke against the notion or accusation of neo-Ottomanism but at the same time promoted it. He noted that within a hundred years since the early twentieth century Turkey has contributed to the closing of a series of historical parentheses: ‘the 1911 Tripoli war in 2011, the 1912 Bulgarian-Balkan migration in 2012, in 2017 it will be 100 years since Jerusalem’s division from the Ottoman Empire in 1917 and in 2018 it will be a century since our separation from the Middle East.’ All these events characterize the years of the Ottoman Empire’s demise, and Davuto˘glu suggested that Turkey is the continuator that will restore that legacy. He argued that this historical break (of 1923) is coming full circle, insinuating that the Ottoman Empire, in some form and shape, is coming back: Without going to war with anyone, without declaring enemies and without disrespecting anyone’s borders, we will be connecting Sarajevo to Damascus and Erzurum to Batum once 80

Habertürk (2019). Including individuals that belong or used to belong to Turkey’s foreign policy executive. 82 FM Davuto˘ glu: Why are we referred to as neo-Ottomans? (2013). 81

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again. This is the source of our strength. They may now appear to be separate countries; however 110 years ago Yemen and Skopje were both part of the same country. The same can be said for Erzurum and Benghazi. […] It is an honor to be tied to the history of the Ottomans, the Seljuks, the Artuqids and the Ayyubids, however we have never set our sights on another nation’s land.83

Of course, retrospectively, and as demonstrated in the next chapter, Turkey’s foreign policy plans did not proceed without war, enmities, or border violations. It is however interesting that Davuto˘glu and other leaders or intellectuals of the political-Islamic movement consider the post-Ottoman Republican period (starting even before the establishment of the Turkish state) as a problematic parenthesis, even a historical mistake that needs to be remedied. Similarly, Erdo˘gan said that his 2014 election to the presidency closed a parenthesis that opened with the 1960 military coup against Menderes.84 Meaning, a parenthesis of military coups, the intervening role of the military in politics, and the dominance of the Kemalist establishment. When it comes to the Lausanne Syndrome, although suppressed for the most part of the post-1923 history under the Kemalist establishment, we can see it manifesting in glimpses or exceptions within the century-long “parenthesis” suggested by Davuto˘glu. For example, we first saw it coming out of obscurity along with the loosening of the state’s grip on religion under Menderes and the DP after 1950. It then manifested in a more tangible way in the early 1970s with the participation of MSP and Erbakan in the government that invaded Cyprus. It later gained ground and a more institutional form under the governance of Turgut Özal during the 1980s and early 1990s, and again appeared when Erbakan became Prime Minister in 1996.85 It was then that the Imperial strategic culture paradigm started to make a meaningful comeback as well. The decisive moment for the Lausanne Syndrome came in the twentyfirst century with the rise of the AKP to power and especially during the 2010s. If not closed, it seems that Davuto˘glu’s “parenthesis” is in the process of closing. These historical exceptions to the “Kemalist” history of contemporary Turkey demonstrate the impact of ideational intervening variables on foreign policy outcomes. Every time they manifested, even as exceptions or weak and short-lived interventions, they had at least some impact on policy outcomes. If we see the Lausanne Syndrome as a complex set of beliefs, ideas, and perceptions not only at the leadership level but also among many conservative ideologues and opinion makers—who now have the power to speak out more freely than ever before—and a large part of the electorate, we can easily see the character of its intervening role in policymaking. In this sense, the Lausanne Syndrome, cutting across national levels from leadership to society, becomes the state’s dominant strategic culture paradigm, especially among the governing elite.86 The system of ideas, perceptions and beliefs included in the Lausanne Syndrome is no longer suppressed 83

Ibid. Danforth, “The Menderes Metaphor,” 100. 85 For the milestones of the gradual come-back of this marginalized societal strand see also, Yavuz (2021), 77–79. 86 Ripsman et al., Neoclassical Realist Theory, 67. 84

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or seen as an exception. It is a governing and institutionalized system of collective assumptions about Turkey’s identity, international position and national security that functions as a “filter” of systemic stimuli and constrains its foreign policy behaviour or defines acceptable and unacceptable strategic choices.87 Indeed, the discourse and rhetoric of AKP leaders and conservative opinion makers in relation to the Ottoman past, the National Pact, and the Treaty of Lausanne88 are very ideologically charged. They regard the creation of the Turkish Republic as an error, and its founder Mustafa Kemal, as less a visionary statesman and more a mistaken military officer whose horizons were limited by falsehoods of his time […] this worldview sees the key to Turkey’s security and prosperity as closer integration with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors and the wider Muslim world.89

Their aversion towards the geopolitical status quo showcases the salience of the Lausanne Syndrome. This is not to say that the Sèvres Syndrome does not have a role in TFP anymore, but to suggest that the government deals with the historical fears and insecurities that the Sèvres Syndrome carries in a largely different way. After all, both the Republican and Imperial ideological currents were scarred by the events that led to the Sèvres and by the Sèvres Treaty itself. Yet the new approach is to a great extent dictated by a different mind-set and set of ideas than those found within the Kemalist-Republican paradigm. The threat perceptions attached to the Sèvres Syndrome have not faded away. For example, the growing divergence between Turkish and Western interests, the empowerment of Kurdish movements in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey and their strengthened demands for autonomy or secession rendered traditional Turkish insecurities more salient than ever before.90 However systemic stimuli are no longer dealt with as much caution as in the past. Turkish foreign policy under the influence of the Lausanne Syndrome is often prone to revisionism as opposed to a pro-status quo behaviour. Ankara’s heightened diplomatic activity in the broader Middle East91 and its military operations are unprecedented in both nature and scale—often going beyond the confines of the National Pact geography. And it is not only that threats are countered with much more resolve but also that, provided a permissive systemic environment, they are treated as opportunities for diplomatic and military expansionism or, in other words, as a means of revising the geopolitical status quo to Turkey’s benefit in political, economic, security and other terms. It should be noted that the Republican strategic paradigm still exists in parallel, or even within the Imperial one. To exterminate it entirely would be a very difficult task, one that would take a lot of time (see more in Chap. 6). Elements of the previous establishment or variations of the Kemalist ideology can still be found in state institutions, notably in the military. Most importantly, this set of beliefs and 87

Ibid. See, Kutluk (2018). 89 Reynolds (2018); Özkan, “Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism,” 119–40. 90 ICG (2017), Barkey (2005). 91 Habibi and Walker (2011). 88

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ideas is still popular in various forms within the society. From this perspective, the AKP government cannot entirely ignore political and social tendencies that are in some way or another connected to the Kemalist tradition; if nothing else, to ensure its stay in power in electoral terms and safeguard its survival from severe Kemalist reactions akin to the coups of the past (especially those of 1960 and 1997). In fact, in the mid-2010s, because of the growing alienation of liberal elements from within the AKP and electoral uncertainty, Erdo˘gan had to include nationalists and Eurasianists in his governmental coalition. This coincided with a shift that TFP was attempting away from Europe and closer to Eurasia, not least through a closer partnership with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Russia and China.92 Among Turkish military officers one could find Conservatives (status quooriented), Neo-nationalists, Eurasianists, and Atlanticists (more educated and proWestern). Since 2014, Eurasianists (especially military officers) connected to the Patriotic Party (Vatan Partisi, VP) have become more influential, while since 2018 the AKP’s coalition with the MHP added a strong nationalist and far-right dimension to TFP.93 After the 2016 coup attempt a great number of military personnel was dismissed due to accusations of involvement in or connection to the coup. As a result, the number of Conservative and Atlanticist officers was reduced radically and Eurasianists became much more influential thus strengthening the Eurasianist and anti-Western orientation of TFP.94 This change boosted the TFP shift towards interventionism and revisionism, as certain elements of Eurasianism overlapped with the Lausanne Syndrome. Lastly, the AKP’s nationalist turn also caused a broader ideological transition towards the right among Turkish political parties prompting them to adopt more a nationalist discourse in their efforts to compete with the AKP.95 As seen in the case studies of the next chapter, the AKP instrumentalised the contribution of Eurasianists insofar as their geopolitical vision facilitated the dictums of the Lausanne Syndrome but refused to be restricted by their concerns and geopolitical confines.

92

Er¸sen (2013). Colako˘glu (2019). 94 Gurcan and Gisclon (2016): 13–15. 95 Colako˘ glu, “The Rise of Eurasianism in Turkish Foreign Policy”. 93

Chapter 5

The Lausanne Syndrome and Revisionism Under the AKP: The Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East

One could perhaps argue that the Lausanne Treaty rhetoric by President Erdo˘gan and other AKP officials is nothing more than populist rhetoric for domestic consumption. The AKP government was indeed accused of that. In 2012 and prior to Erdo˘gan’s Lausanne remarks, opposition parties CHP and MHP (Nationalist Action Party) accused the AKP ‘of selling off the country’ claiming that a number of Greek islands in the Aegean Sea actually belonged to Turkey and were occupied by Greeks.1 These claims were reiterated after Erdo˘gan’s remarks about the Lausanne Treaty a number of times. CHP’s leader, Kılıçdaro˘glu, in one of his addresses said: Sir, where is your nationalism? Look at [the] islands of Aegean, they are Greek islands. The islands that should be ours are occupied by Greece. The Greek flag is fluttering on islands belonging to Turkey. I want an answer for this, Erdo˘gan.2

It could then be suggested that Erdo˘gan’s statements aimed at appeasing the opposition and garnering support from more republican and nationalist segments of the society in the aftermath of the coup attempt of 15 July 2016 and in view of the AKP’s partnership with nationalist MHP. This may well be true. However, one could argue that in 2016, when the first remarks about the Lausanne Treaty were made, Erdo˘gan did not need to manipulate the public or the opposition with such a rhetoric as he was already ruling by presidential decrees within the framework of the post-coup state of emergency. More importantly, looking at the evolution of TFP retrospectively and its diplomatic-military openings in the region, the whole discourse about Lausanne could not have been just a populist act. Foreign policy goals and the need for domestic are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, for a governing elite, cultivativation of legitimisation and consensus domestically is necessary to support foreign policy endeavours. As a Hürriyet Daily News editorial pointed out3 : 1

Karakatsanis (2014, p. 219). Kokkinidis (2017). 3 Bekdil (2021). 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 Z. Tziarras, Turkish Foreign Policy, SpringerBriefs in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90746-4_5

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5 The Lausanne Syndrome and Revisionism Under … It is true that revisionist/nationalist rhetoric sells very well in Turkey’s marketplace of ideas (and, increasingly, in other countries too). It is also true that Mr. Erdo˘gan’s most imminent target audience is, naturally, the average Turkish voter – the man who can most easily be captured by any irredentist rhetoric dancing around appealing nationalist claims [...] Add to those the ‘we are the “most devout Muslims” rhetoric’ [and] you will not just catch a voter but a devoted fan who will be prepared to die or kill for you. But the fact that Mr. Erdo˘gan’s main target group is the average Turkish voter does not change the fact that he also wholeheartedly believes in what he says, or that he could turn rhetoric into some insane action one day if he thinks, out of a moment of miscalculation, Turkey is powerful enough to ‘correct the wrong flow of history,’ in the words of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davuto˘glu.

The question, then, is whether words, the discursive manifestations of the Lausanne Syndrome, are followed by actions in TFP under the AKP. As Davidson puts it, ‘we cannot categorize state goals on the basis of spoken claims alone;’ rather, foreign policy behaviour should be assessed based on ‘the willingness of the state to incur costs in the pursuance of their goals. For instance, a state that both declares that it has revisionist territorial goals and is spending heavily on offensive weapons (at the expense of domestic welfare programs) is probably not bluffing.’4 In this chapter, case studies of TFP in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East will provide the necessary evidence for this assessment. The next section briefly presents the systemic context in which Turkey operated mostly in the latter half of the 2010s. The chapter then proceeds to analyse policies produced towards the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East with the intervening role of the Lausanne Syndrome.

5.1 The Systemic Context As argued from the outset, because of the objectives and aspirations it articulates, the Lausanne Syndrome predicts a revisionist foreign policy behaviour as opposed to a pro-status quo one. The mere dispute of the borders drawn by the Lausanne Treaty on the basis of an Ottoman-Imperial past is evidence of revisionist—if rhetorical— tendencies. Throughout the 2000s geopolitical revisionism may have existed on a discursive and theoretical level among AKP officials without being expressed as such in practice. However, during the 2010s this changed. Systemic stimuli, the shifts at the international and regional level, presented Turkey with opportunities as well as challenges. As a result of a series of developments that took place in the post-Cold War era, the international system was once again in a process of transition. The US was still the only superpower, but it was no longer uncontested. The period of unipolarity, during which the US managed to exert power and control over various regions of the world and acquire the role of a global security provider in areas such as the Balkans and the Middle East was gone.5 The twentyfirst century ushered the US and the world in a new international environment of uncertainty. The Global War on Terrorism that followed the tragedy of 9/11 and the 4 5

Davidson (2006). . Krauthammer (1990).

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wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) wore down the American superpower leading decision-makers in Washington to rethink their country’s capacity, role, and place in the world. The 2007/8 global financial crisis inflicted additional costs on the American economy affecting cost–benefit calculations in relation to domestic and foreign policy.6 By 2011 the US had withdrawn its troops from Iraq. However, the results of the war were anything but favourable for the US. Iran’s influence in Iraq and over the central government in Baghdad more specifically had grown immensely,7 while deep economic problems, sectarian divisions, and the empowerment of terrorist groups (including IS) hindered stability in the war-torn country and the broader region.8 A global power transition towards multipolarity had already started to show. At around the same time the Arab Spring broke out with domino effects for the whole of the Middle East and significant humanitarian and security implications for other regions, especially Europe.9 Unable to adopt the same role as in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the US kept its distance from the Arab Spring conflicts taking the back seat on important and violent developments in Libya and Syria among others. By 2015, IS had already made its rapid and radical advances in Iraq and Syria upsetting the regional power balances once again and creating new security threats. The growing power vacuum that emerged in the broader Middle East after the American withdrawal from Iraq and the US’s policy shift away from interventionism created space and opportunities for other middle and great powers (as well as Violent Non-State Actors, VNSAs) to fill the gap.10 Apart from states like Turkey, Iran and the Saudi Arabia, Russia was able to make a forceful comeback to the Middle East through its 2015 military intervention in Syria on the side of the Bashar al-Assad government.11 Russia’s intervention was decisive in tilting the balance of the war in favour of Assad and against a variety of rebel groups. US managed to maintain a limited presence on the side of the Kurdish forces in eastern Syria, thus establishing an American sphere of influence within the country.12 In 2021 the US and other Western powers withdrew from Afghanistan, further solidifying the new trends of multipolarity, as the Taliban reasserted their control over Kabul and the rest of the country. Arab Spring-related events, the war in Syria, the advances of the Kurdish forces (including a 2017 referendum on independence in Iraqi Kurdistan) and IS triggered Turkey’s traditional insecurities. Particularly those that come with the involvement of great powers in the Middle East and the threat of territorial losses that is closely associated with the rekindling of the Kurdish issue. Under previous governments, these external challenges would normally be dealt with a mostly defensive foreign policy behaviour, as the Sèvres Syndrome and the Republican strategic culture paradigm 6

Fareed (2011). Fawcett (2013). 8 Tziarras (2017). 9 See, Bauer (2015), Ayoob (2012). 10 Tziarras (2016). 11 Borshchevskaya (2016). 12 Ioannou and Tziarras (2020). 7

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would dictate.13 The AKP’s Turkey eventually followed a quite different route. These systemic stimuli and related threats did not restrict the AKP government to a merely defensive reaction. They provided Ankara with the opportunity to make significant openings in the Middle East and expand its influence. After all, by the mid-2010s Turkey was also a rising power with great geopolitical aspirations. Regardless of the ideological drivers, the elevation of a country from one power status to another usually entails more foreign policy activism and the need for increased influence and power projection abroad.14 Turkey’s aspirations and policies became increasingly challenging for the country’s western partners, among others. American-Turkish relations deteriorated dramatically, especially after the 2016 coup attempt and Ankara’s deepening partnership with Russia. Moreover, Turkish-EU relations reached record low levels as Turkey’s democratic deficit was growing and the EU depended on Ankara for the management of the great refugee crisis that broke out after the advances of IS in the Middle East. Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean policy further worsened this relationship. One the one hand it prompted EU member-states Greece and Cyprus to form closer partnerships with other regional states that were dissatisfied with Ankara’s stance.15 On the other hand it led them to pursue the imposition of sanctions against Turkey through the EU and other countermeasures. Having in mind the systemic context is important. First because it is what produces the stimuli and signals to which (Turkish) political elites are called to respond and, second, because it provides the environment that a given state has to navigate in pursuing its foreign policy objectives. Mearsheimer suggests that state ‘behaviour is influenced not only by what states want, but also by their capacity to realize these desires’ in the context of the international distribution of power.16 In this sense, what Turkish elites want to achieve in foreign policy may never materialize if the country either does not have the necessary capabilities or is constrained by its systemic environment and/or domestic context. Therefore, the Lausanne Syndrome as an ideational intervening variable can shape the assumptions and define the strategic choices of TFP, but its practical-policy manifestation is always conditional on the permissiveness of the international system—and the extent to which decision-makers take its constrains and opportunities seriously.

5.2 Mavi Vatan and the Lausanne Syndrome in the Eastern Mediterranean We will not bow to the Sèvres sought to be imposed upon our country in the Eastern Mediterranean. 13

Mufti (2009), Uslu (2008). Mearsheimer (2001). 15 Tziarras (2019). 16 Mearsheimer (2001). 14

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Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan.

When a leading or hegemonic role just like the one sought by Turkey is undertaken by a—usually great—power, it is often accompanied by its ability and willingness to become a regional or global security provider as well. The most recent example is perhaps US foreign policy after the end of the Cold War and particularly during the 1990s, although one could also examine the efforts of other rising powers for such as role in the twenty-first century (e.g., Russia, China, India). Likewise, Turkey has been increasingly trying to project different kinds of power (political, economic, cultural, military), focusing especially on states that are culturally proximate and on various Turkish, Muslim or “kin” communities abroad, including in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.17 In this context, the Eastern Mediterranean plays an important role in the geopolitical vision and strategy of Turkey.

5.2.1 Geopolitical and Ideological Dimensions of Mavi Vatan One of the later manifestations of the Lausanne Syndrome, the doctrine of “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan), emphasized the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean for Turkey, especially in terms of maritime space and naval power. In 2019 this naval doctrine was supported by the two biggest naval drills in the history of the Turkish state—“Blue Homeland” and “Seawolf.”18 The former, reflective of the doctrine’s aims, extended to a maritime area of 462 square kilometres that included three Seas— the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean. The Blue Homeland doctrine is not entirely new in Turkish strategic thought, while the philosophy upon which it is based predates this specific term. One could perhaps draw parallels with the “two and a half wars” doctrine of the 1990s. However, things today are more complicated as Turkish strategic thought has advanced significantly, not least due to the impact that the AKP had on the country’s strategic direction. However, a comparison between the two can offer certain insights on the differences between the Republican and Imperial strategic paradigms in TFP as they are expressed in the Eastern Mediterranean. As seen earlier, the discussion about the transformation of Turkish strategy through the years is very much connected to the issue of strategic culture and the dominant ideas in the institutions of the Turkish state. Turkish ambassador Sükrü Elekda˘g was the inspirator of the “two and a half wars” doctrine and a strategic thinker of Kemalist convictions during the 1990s (as well as a member of parliament with the CHP). His entire analysis, published in 1996, was based on a rather phobic reading of the then geopolitical environment of Turkey. For example, he mentions that during

17 18

Tziarras (2019). Kasapoglu (2019), Daily Sabah (2019b).

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a military exercise in the southern coast of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal was explaining to his officers that, the only coastal opening and supply route of Turkey surrounded by islands in the Aegean coast which were under the sovereignty of foreign states was in the south. He also added that opposite the southern coast of Turkey was the island of Cyprus and consequently, if Cyprus was in the hands of a hostile country all supply routes to Anatolia would be cut off and Turkey’s security would be threatened.19

Elekda˘g also refers to the Greece-Turkey power balance during the 1989–1995 period based on which he concludes that Turkey had a relative advantage. However, he was concerned with Athens’s progress in that domain and the prospect of a change in favour of Greece. He perceived the Greek policy vis-à-vis Turkey as ‘expansionist’ and noted Turkey’s concern regarding the potential expansion of Greek national waters from six to twelve nautical miles—an act supported by the International Law of the Sea that would limit, however, the Aegean’s international waters from 56.2 to 26.1%.20 Similar were his concerns about Syria which at the time maintained a hostile stance towards Ankara through its support for the Kurdish-autonomist PKK and had good relations with Greece. The issue of the domestic—but also transnational— Kurdish threat was included by Elekda˘g among the most important security threats that Turkey faced at that time. Furthermore, he refers to the danger that a SyriaIsrael peace accord would entail, given that ‘Greece’s adventurist and unrealistic tendencies’ would also increase, even as he lamented NATO’s lost role for Turkish defence and the latter’s exposure to the Russian threat.21 Based on the above, the Turkish ambassador concludes that Turkey needs to adopt a “two and half wars” strategy for its national security. According to this strategy, Turkey would be able to have ‘adequate, deterrent and rapidly reinforceable forces in both the Aegean and the southern fronts’ (Greece and Syria, i.e., the “two wars”),22 while at the same time being able to handle the Kurdish threat at the domestic front (i.e., the “half war”); an element that, according to Elekda˘g, could also be instrumentalized by foreign powers at the expense of Turkey. Many of Elekda˘g’s ideas were later reiterated and expounded upon by Ahmet Davuto˘glu in his book Strategic Depth, published in 2001, but this time supported by a different ideological framework—that of neo-Ottomanism—and influenced by the Lausanne Syndrome. Davuto˘glu writes that the issues of the Aegean and Cyprus ‘are located in the space of interaction and passage of the areas of the Balkans and the Middle East’ thus increasing the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean.23 With these in mind he goes on to add that, ‘Turkey is not only a country of the Aegean but also a country of the Eastern Mediterranean, included in a broader framework within an area that begins from the Adriatic and extends to the gulf of Alexandretta and 19

Elekda˘g (1996). Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Davuto˘ glu (2010, p. 266). 20

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the Suez Canal.’24 And he adds: ‘A Turkey that has been excluded from the Aegean and has been encircled in the south by the Rum Administration of southern Cyprus [refers to the Republic of Cyprus] means that its room for an opening to the world has been significantly restricted.’25 Davuto˘glu repeats the same concerns regarding the Greek sovereignty and territorial waters in the Aegean as well as the notion that Greece follows an expansionist policy, while supporting that the current status quo in the Aegean restricts Turkey’s ‘living space’—and that it will do so even more if Greece decides to expand its territorial waters. His view on Cyprus is also interesting: A country that neglects Cyprus is impossible to have a decisive role in global and regional policies. It cannot be effective in global policies because that small island holds a position that can directly affect the strategic links between Asia and Africa, Europe and Africa, and Europe and Asia. And it cannot be effective in regional policies because Cyprus with its eastern end looks like an arrow turned towards the Middle East, and with its western end it constitutes the cornerstone of strategic balances in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans and North Africa.26

Beyond the similarities of what Davuto˘glu writes with the doctrine of “two and a half wars,” a product of the Republican strategic culture paradigm, in Strategic Depth we see the first comprehensive articulation of a strategic culture paradigm that although not entirely new it was never dominant after 1923; namely, the ImperialOttoman strategic culture paradigm, as elaborated in previous chapters.27 In the Republican paradigm of strategic culture, the main elements of foreign policy and national security strategy were based on feelings of insecurity, perceptions of external and domestic threats, and the need for national defence. These were directly associated with the Sèvres Syndrome. The Imperal-Ottomanist strategic culture, that is associated with the Lausanne Syndrome and became increasingly dominant during the AKP governance as its leader images and party ideology became more institutionalised, incorporated previous perceptions of national security threats, but demonstrated two additional and important features: First, it deals with national insecurities in a much more outward, assertive, and non-phobic way, and second, it is not restricted to matters of defence alone but includes the assertive or offensive projection of various types of power (military, economic, ideological, etc.). This is the difference between the two paradigms and between Davuto˘glu’s and Elekda˘g’s views as well. In other words, the Lausanne Syndrome goes beyond the confines of the security threats produced by Turkey’s environment and is concerned with its importance and role in the country’s regional and global aspirations. As such, the Sèvres Syndrome becomes integrated into the new foreign policy paradigm where the Lausanne Syndrome is, nonetheless, dominant. The culmination of this new foreign policy came with the concept of Blue Homeland. The intellectual “father” of the doctrine is retired Admiral Cem Gürdeniz who 24

Ibid., pp. 266–67. Ibid. 26 Ibid., pp. 267–270, 75. 27 See also, Mufti (2009). 25

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first coined the term in 2006 in his capacity as Director of the Plan and Policy Division of the Turkish Naval Forces Command Headquarters. His aim was to point out the maritime areas where he thought Turkey had jurisdiction. These included areas where Turkey did not officially have jurisdiction. In an interview he provided at the time of the Blue Homeland drill Gürdeniz states, among other things, that the drill ‘has taken place as a manifestation against the enlarging blocks against Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean’ while supporting that the three main geopolitical issues ‘involving Turkey’s future in the twenty-first century are energy resources in the seabed, the future of the so-called Kurdistan with a sea port, and the future of Northern Cyprus.’28 In the same spirit with Elekda˘g and Davuto˘glu, Gürdeniz reiterates once more Turkey’s concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean adding, however, the importance of the growing naval power of Turkey. According to him, Blue Homeland has become Turkey’s maritime doctrine and it shows Turkey is becoming a maritime power. Normally, Greeks have thought Turks are land people and believed the sea belonged to them. For the first time in centuries, Turks are saying, ‘we are now in the sea and we have a strong navy.’29

The term Blue Homeland was also used by Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar and Admiral Cihat Yayci, who used to be a long-time confidant of Erdo˘gan. In 2011 Yayci gave the Blue Homeland flesh and bones in a series of maps that he published in a paper with the Journal of Security Strategies (Guvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi), associated with the University of National Defence30 and later, in 2012, in another paper published with the Bilge Strateji magazine of the B˙ILGESAM institute.31 He further developed his ideas about Turkey’s maritime claims in a series of books published towards the end of the 2010s. Both the doctrine and naval drills demonstrate Ankara’s geopolitical ambitions, including its efforts to become a naval power. It is worth mentioning that, at least according to the 2021 Global Firepower Index, Turkey’s aggregate military power ranks 11th in the world and 1st in the Middle East. At the same time, its naval power ranks 20th in the world and 2nd in the Eastern Mediterranean (after Egypt which ranks 7th in the world).32 To be sure, a more comprehensive evaluation of national power would need to take into account not only material-quantitative but also qualitative factors of power such as the quality of training, operational capabilities, the ability to project power over long distances for long periods of time, morale, etc. Having said that, the Global Firepower Index provides an interesting indicator of regional power balances. The big picture shows that Ankara is pursuing a more global role that can only be achieved with the development of its naval power and presence, in addition to 28

Yinanç (2019). Ibid. 30 Yayci (2011). 31 Yayci (2012). 32 This index accounts for material components of power such as manpower, airpower, land forces, naval forces, natural resources, logistics, financials, and geography. See, Global Firepower Index 2021: https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp. 29

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the strengthening of its other national power components. It is no coincidence that in Thucydides’s account we read that ‘the rule of the sea is indeed a great matter’ ´ σ ης κρ ατ ´ oς ). Relatedly, John Mearsheimer writes about (Mšγ α τ o` τ Áς θ αλασ ‘the stopping power of water,’ explaining that a nation with seacoasts or surrounded by sea is less vulnerable to external interventions and threats. However, Mearsheimer adds that, for the same reason, the existence of maritime space renders the projection of military power abroad (and the attainment of global hegemony) a much more difficult endeavour.33 In other words, a state that wants to play a regional and, by extension, global role cannot ignore the development of its commercial and military navy. Blue Homeland is just one indication that this objective is pursued systematically in the context of a strategy influenced by the Lausanne Syndrome—but also by international systemic shifts. Responding to a question about the reasons that the Turkish navy acquired a presence in the Indian Ocean Gürdeniz said the following: If you are the world’s 17th largest economy, if you have business interests worldwide, if there are Turkish citizens scattered in almost every corner of the world who look at Ankara, and if you are dependent on sea transportation by 90 percent for your exports and imports, then you have to protect these seaways and your interests. Anywhere Turkish-flagged merchant ships are sailing, you need to have warships to protect them when needed. You first have to focus on your periphery, which are the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. During the piracy attacks in 2008, many Turkish merchant ships were hijacked and NATO was not active there at the time, which is the main reason why Turkey sent warships to the region.34

This is indeed one of the aspects of the issue at hand. However, it does not tell the whole story. If one looks at Turkey’s naval power projection in conjunction with the creation of forward military bases35 in the Horn of Africa, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf (e.g., Somalia, Libya, Qatar), apart from its presence in Syria, Iraq, and Cyprus, as well as its political-economic activity, they will be able to discern the country’s efforts of expanding its geopolitical zone of influence. Moreover, the growing role of the navy in TFP contributes to how the country responds to the geopolitical and energy competition, naval diplomacy, and the agenda-setting role that it wishes to play in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. This strategic dimension of the Blue Homeland was articulated in a more direct way almost 20 years prior to the drills, by Davuto˘glu, as an objective: For Turkey to become a true regional power, it has to increase its political and economic influence over the maritime arteries that extend from the Aegean to the Adriatic and from Suez to the Red Sea. It is inevitable for Turkey to follow a pro-active policy at every point that takes the Black Sea and the Aegean to the open seas.36

Today, Turkey seems to be on track towards achieving at least some of these objectives through the doctrine of Blue Homeland. 33

Mearsheimer (2001). Yinanç (2019). 35 Kasapoglu (2017). 36 Davuto˘ glu (2010, p. 270). 34

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Despite convergences between the views of Davuto˘glu and Gürdeniz there are also important differences. It is true that Gürdeniz does not fully identify with the AKP’s foreign policy while, coming from a Kemalist background, he has often been critical of TFP adventures as well as domestic policies.37 In one instance, he did not hesitate to suggest that Turkey should return to ‘Republican state tradition and the Ataturk’s vision,’38 or declare that he is a ‘dedicated follower of Kemal’s ideas.’39 The same goes for the case of Yayci who in 2020 was downgraded by Erdo˘gan and eventually resigned. Despite the frequent praises that Yayci had received from Erdo˘gan and the conservative establishment of the AKP, he never belonged to that ideological group. His roots were also Kemalist. More specifically, both Gürdeniz and Yayci belong to the Eurasianist strand of Kemalists. Gürdeniz was very transparent about his Eurasianist ideas during an interview for the Greek newspaper To Vima.40 Although this current has its own branches, these nationalists-Eurasianists want a more global role for their country on the one hand, but they also want to avoid an adventurous and high-risk foreign policy (a tendency inherent in the Sèvres Syndrome). Moreover, contrary to the Republican strategic paradigm, they have anti-Western, pro-Russia and pro-China attitudes even as they support a pivot to Eurasia for Turkey.41 Gürdeniz’s analysis on this is revealing: It is reasonable for Turkey to be more Eurasian than Atlantic in the 21st century. Geography and circumstances will impose it, as the Washington Consensus erodes. […] It should also be pointed out that the EU as a forward base of the Atlantic system is losing its special weight. We will see an EU distancing itself from the US. The EU-China relations will develop. According to these conditions, I can say that Turkey will adopt more independent policies, maintaining the capacity of the NATO member. Turkish-Russian relations will develop as the interests of the two countries coincide. In parallel, Turkey will become a naval state in the 21st century, playing a multidimensional role in its immediate neighbourhood but also in the Red and Arabian Sea, in Western Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf. The new geopolitical orientation will demand a closer cooperation with Russia and China.42

This approach by Eurasianists was also one of the reasons they managed to maintain a tactical relationship with the AKP in midst of Erdo˘gan’s conflict with the military, as we saw earlier. Interesting are the comments by Ahmet Erdi Ozturk who argues that the Blue Homeland, as presented by Gürdeniz, was used also by former members of the naval forces and, now, the Do˘gu Perinçek [leader of the Patriotic Party, VP] team, who are defined as Eurasianists and who attained their freedom by exploiting the conflict between the Gülen Movement and the AKP especially after mid2015. Eurasianists, carry the motto of the Blue Homeland as the National Pact at Sea, they embody a structure that collaborated with Erdo˘gan after the violent July 15 coup attempt and possess the power to profoundly influence him into veering Turkey’s bearings from a

37

Gürdeniz (2020). Gürdeniz (2020). 39 Interview to Angelos Athanasopoulos (2020, A6-7). 40 Ibid. 41 See also, Gurcan (2017), Dorsey (2020). 42 Blue Homeland is Turkey’s Maritime Worldview (2020). 38

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western-focused foreign policy towards the China-Russia bloc while questioning NATO’s importance for Turkey.43

It is because of this background that Gürdeniz and Yayci did not hesitate to occasionally express their reservations regarding the AKP’s domestic and foreign policy. And yet, their studies on Turkey’s naval strategy were well utilized by the AKP government which, however, interpreted and implemented them through its own prism, often changing the desires of their inspirers. The AKP borrowed elements from the thinking of Gürdeniz and Yayci which it then integrated into its own foreign policy strategy, without ever rendering TFP dependent on these persons. This demonstrates that the same policy proposals (e.g., those of Gürdeniz) can be conceptualised and instrumentalised in different ways from each strategic culture paradigm. More specifically, despite the non-isolationist particularities of Eurasianism, we could argue that Gürdeniz and Yayci have a perspective that mostly derives from the Sèvres Syndrome. The result is an almost “defensive” (not neo-Ottoman, albeit Eurasian) character in the policies that they propose. In fact, Gürdeniz stated that the assurance and protection of declared or undeclared maritime areas of jurisdiction is an essential guide for the Blue Homeland. Turkey’s characterisation as offensive or revisionist is a product triggered by unreasonable, unscientific opinions that go against what is right.44

To be sure, characterising TFP “revisionist” or “offensive” is not about passing moral judgement. It is rather about making an assessment based on methodological and analytical tools. These are after all theoretical and conceptual categories in the literature of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. If facts on the ground and their appropriate—theoretical and empirical—analysis and assessment point to a revisionist or offensive foreign policy behaviour, then the conclusion is anything but unscientific and unreasonable. But Gürdeniz’s statement demonstrates the Eurasianists’ perception that their policies have a security-driven and defensive orientation, regardless of how other states perceive or experience these policies. This perception is very different from the revisionist articulation of the Lausanne Syndrome by leaders of the AKP government, despite their occasional invocation of external threats. The full picture of TFP—under the veil of panIslamism or neo-Ottomanism—shows that the AKP uses these concepts and policies in a very different—offensive and revisionist—way than what Eurasianists theoretically intended them for. This is a significant difference Lausanne Sydrome and the Sèvres Syndrome.

5.2.2 Cyprus: Shield and Bridgehead Cyprus is an integral part of Turkish strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, also connected to the Lausanne Syndrome. First with the Treaty of Sèvres and later with 43 44

Oztuk (2020). Blue Homeland is Turkey’s Maritime Worldview (2020).

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the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey had lost Cyprus permanently. In articles 115 and 116 the Treaty of Sèvres states: (115) The High Contracting Parties recognise the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on November 5, 1914. (116) Turkey renounces all rights and title over or relating to Cyprus, including the right to the tribute formerly paid by that island to the Sultan.45

In articles 16 and 20 of the Lausanne Treaty this message is essentially repeated: (I6) Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned […] (20) Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November, 1914.46

With the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey ended up renouncing any rights over the island of Cyprus, accepting its annexation from Britain. Also interesting is the fact that Cyprus was not included in the National Pact, given that the Turkish population on the island was not the majority (see article 1 of National Pact, Table I). Yet, Cyprus used to be part of the Ottoman Empire. As such, in various maps of “Greater Turkey” circulating in pro-AKP media during the late 2010s, Cyprus seems to be part of Turkish claims. As Turkish politician and negotiator Nihat Erim47 stated in a 1978 interview, Up to then [1956] our official claim was based on the Treaty of Lausanne: We argued that we had transferred Cyprus to Great Britain by the Treaty of Lausanne. If Britain wanted to leave the island it should be returned to its original owner, i.e. to Turkey. I considered this legally inadequate even though it could be sustained politically on the ground that the Lausanne Treaty had established a Turkish-Greek equilibrium in the Mediterranean where Cyprus played a pivotal role. From the legal point of view, however, if the sovereignty of territory was unconditionally transferred to another country, the original owner could have no control over the new sovereign regarding the fate of that land.48

We could argue that Cyprus “returned” to Turkish plans especially in the 1950s, under the Menderes government, with the 1955 Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus held by the governments of the United Kingdom (UK), Greece and Turkey in London. The conference was summoned by the UK amidst international pressures and regional problems, such as Soviet expansionism, the 45

Treaty of Sèvres (1920). Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923). 47 Among other things, Nihat Erim was a Turkish politician and a jurist. He served as an MP with the CHP, a Minister of Public Works (1948–1949), a Deputy Prime Minister (1949–1950), and 13th Prime Minister of Turkey (1971–1972). He was the one who shaped Turkey’s Cyprus policy through the reports he authored upon then Prime Minister Menderes’ request which he submitted to the government in 1956. Erim was also Turkey’s chief negotiator on Cyprus, involved both in the England negotiations, the preparations for the Cypriot constitution and other Cyprus negotiations thereafter. 48 Erim (1978). 46

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process of de-colonization, the tensed Greek-British relations regarding Cyprus, the US efforts for increased regional influence and their concern about the British activity that threatened the cohesion of NATO’s southern flank, and the imminent crisis with Egypt over Suez.49 The aim of the British through the conference was ‘to divide the Greeks and Turks, so they [the British] could claim that they were the only power capable of preserving some element of stability…’.50 Davuto˘glu’s commentary on the subject is illuminating: No one can disregard the strategic location of Cyprus for which the British, although their grand period of colonialism has passed, decided and to this day to maintain a strategic base on it, just like no one can disregard that during the Cold War the island constituted a field of very heated crises.51

Given that the National Pact determined the minimum territorial objectives of the time while greater aspirations were very much alive, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the 1955 conference “cancelled” or bypassed in political terms the article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty regarding Cyprus. It once again offered Turkey a legal and political window to rights that it had renounced and opened the doors towards an expanded Turkish revisionism. It is however important to note that Ankara’s perception about Cyprus back then was fundamentally defensive, out of fear that Cyprus would unite with Greece and geopolitically encircle and choke Turkey. After 1955 Turkey’s involvement in Cyprus increased in various ways. Indicative are Nihat Erim’s two reports in 1956 on Turkey’s Cyprus policy that inter alia detailed the objective of partitioning the island.52 Since then, the trajectory of the Cyprus Problem and Turkish policy have led to today’s conditions of Turkish occupation in Cyprus and the multileveled dependence of the occupied territories on Turkey.53 Since 1974 Turkey has been adamant that the Cyprus Problem was resolved with the de facto division of the island and the creation of the Turkish-Cypriot statelet in the north. However, it has been argued that the AKP’s support of the UN-sponsored 2004 Annan Plan for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem, signified Ankara’s foreign policy shift towards the EU; that it was evidence of the AKP’s vastly different approach to the Cyprus Problem and other conflicts (e.g., the Kurdish issue) during its first years in power.54 Erdo˘gan supported the Plan despite opposition by the military, the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denkta¸s and his own party. Beyond the prospect of improved Turkey-EU relations that was attached to the eventuality of conflict resolution in Cyprus and informed Erdo˘gan’s decision, one should not disregard the pressures that Turkey faced from Turkish-Cypriot protests in favour

49

Mallinson (2005, pp. 21–22). Ibid., 26. 51 Davuto˘ glu (2010, p. 274). 52 Erim (1978). 53 See, e.g., Bozkurt (2014), Moudouros (2019), Moudouros (2018); Moudouros (2016), Mete Hatay and Ali Dayioglu (2019), Hatay (2017), Hatay (2015). 54 E.g., Asmussen (2004). 50

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of the Plan (though their leadership was against it),55 the pressure from the international community as well as Erdo˘gan’s cynicism about the matter. His pro-Annan approach was eventually supported by Mehmet Ali Talat who replaced Denkta¸s in the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, but his ultimate calculation, according to then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, was “not to refuse the plan because we were sure the Greeks would reject it.”56 This demonstrates that Erdo˘gan did not really want to solve the Cyprus Problem as such. He rather calculated that supporting the Plan would give Turkey the moral high ground in the blame game that would ensue and legitimize Turkey’s deeper involvement in the island in the future. Moreover, in either scenario, he envisioned better relations between Turkey and the EU, believing that the latter would reward Turkey’s stance. This in turn would help the AKP further consolidate its power domestically.57 The AKP has often leveraged the fact that Greek-Cypriots voted against the Plan (as opposed to the Turkish-Cypriot acceptance). It has blamed them about its failure and the obstacles that they raise in Turkey’s EU accession process when they call for the application of international law in Cyprus and the fulfilment of accession criteria by Turkey. Erdo˘gan and the AKP use this argument, among others, to justify Turkey’s anti-European stance, to demand an EU treatment on Turkish terms rather than abide by the EU’s conditionality, as well as to justify Turkey’s illegal activity in the Republic of Cyprus’ occupied territories and EEZ.58 Yet domestic developments in Turkey and its overall foreign policy behaviour even since the mid-2000s, as recorded in this book and beyond, demonstrate that its drift towards authoritarianism and revisionism has nothing to do with the Cyprus Problem or the stalemate in Turkey’s EU accession. Rather the growing independence and assertiveness of TFP is linked not only with external developments but also with the political objectives of the AKP and Erdo˘gan for more consolidated and centralised power domestically; not to mentioned their geopolitical aspirations. Considering the 1974 juncture and Turkey’s Cyprus policy under the AKP, one can observe that there is a difference between past deviations from the Sèvres Syndrome or from the maintenance of status quo (e.g., the 1974 invasion), and the radical reversal of the Kemalist foreign policy paradigm that the AKP brought about. In fact, the Lausanne Syndrome under the AKP has the particularity that it incorporates the element of the (post-Ottoman) conservative-Islamic identity in addition to the Turkish national identity which has rather fallen to a secondary place. From this perspective, under the AKP even the traditional (Kemalist) policy in Cyprus acquires a different character as it becomes incorporated into a different vision for the broader region. A vision that is unwilling to compromise with the status quo and pursues its alteration in various ways. In other words, Kemalist revisionism (that acted on the basis of preserving the status quo by creating a new one)59 and Erdo˘ganist revisionism (that 55

Smith (2021). Maclean (2014). 57 See, Çelenk (2007). 58 E.g., Anadolu Agency (2014b), Daily Sabah (2020c). 59 Mufti (2009, p. 46). 56

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is more offensive) are two overlapping but different things. Davuto˘glu writes about Cyprus’ importance for this broader geopolitical vision clearly in the context of the geo-cultural strategy that he proposes for Turkey: A Balkan policy and a Middle Eastern policy do not exist anymore as independent from the aspect of global and regional balances, but rather as a Middle Eastern-Balkan policy that is developing with the Eastern Mediterranean as its epicentre, where Cyprus constitutes its more essential instrument.60

The main axes that Davuto˘glu sets regarding the importance of Cyprus for Turkey are two: a) the pillar of the Turkish responsibility for the ‘Muslim Turkish community’ of the island, and b) the geographic location and geostrategic value of Cyprus. Regarding the latter, he writes: ‘Even if there was not a single Muslim Turk there, Turkey would have to maintain a Cyprus issue. No country can remain indifferent towards such an island that is located at the heart of its living space.’61 Perhaps more important is that he frames this perspective within Turkey’s broader strategic objectives: The Cyprus issue is transforming in continuously increasing speed into an issue of Eurasia and the Middle East-Balkans (West Asia-Eastern Europe). The policy on Cyprus has to be placed in a new strategic framework, in accordance with the already shaped new [international] strategic framework.62

This means that for the AKP’s Turkey, Cyprus is much more than just a space of containment of Greek influence. This approach was and still is associated with the military balance between Turkey and Greece. Turkey’s military presence in occupied Cyprus, that dates back to the 1974 invasion, is a factor that allows Ankara to maintain a degree of power and influence in the area. According to Can Kasapo˘glu, this military presence can be seen as a piece of a broader strategic posture of forward bases which includes Iraq, Syria, Qatar and Somalia, and ‘also develops robust security cooperation and partner capacity– building opportunities.’63 According to the same view, it also allows Turkey to have the upper hand regarding the power balance in the Eastern Mediterranean, an advantage that all Turkish governments tried to maintain despite their ideological differences.64 As Kasapo˘glu notes, Turkish contingent in Cyprus has for instance been viewed as an offensive deterrent in the military balance between Greece and Turkey. Within this context, it is argued that militarization of the Aegean islands by the Greek Air Force provides Athens with an invaluable advantage in conducting surprise deep strike capabilities. Yet, the Turkish Air Force lacks a reactive deterrent due to its air-bases’ geostrategic posture, which cannot rapidly generate enough sorties over the Greek mainland. Furthermore, the Thracian corridor is both too narrow and too distant from strategic Greek targets, which rules out a decisive land incursion by Turkey in response to a surprise air attack. Besides, the Turkish–Greek naval balance, 60

Davuto˘glu (2010, p. 277). Ibid., p. 279. 62 Ibid., p. 278. 63 Kasapoglu (2017). 64 Ibid., p. 10. 61

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5 The Lausanne Syndrome and Revisionism Under … as well as the geographical features of the Aegean, don’t allow conducting full sea-control by the Turkish Navy. Therefore, the Turkish deployments in Cyprus are regarded as a way of establishing a clear offensive superiority through fielding a massive numerical advantage over the Greek forces.65

In this sense, Cyprus has both a defensive and an offensive role in Turkish plans. Moreover, because Ankara wants to play a broader geopolitical role, it could be said that in the future Cyprus could be used by Turkey to expand its peacekeeping and humanitarian operations abroad, especially in the Middle East and (North) Africa. This would provide Turkey with more influence and render it more useful for international actors such as the UN, NATO, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).66 Although the military aspect of the balance of power was always the cornerstone of Turkey’s Cyprus policy, regional developments in the domain of energy since the mid-2000s—natural gas discoveries off Israel, Cyprus and Egypt—have increased the importance of the island for Ankara and its energy strategy.67 Among the various energy strategic aims of Turkey three pillars stand out: a) Energy security through the diversification of sources and energy imports, b) the liberalization of the energy market, and c) becoming a transit state and energy hub.68 The first and third pillars are advanced by projects that are completed or are under completion (e.g., the TANAPTAP and Turkish Stream pipelines, and new-found gas reserves in the Black Sea) and will help Turkey contribute to the EU’s energy security. As such, Cyprus becomes an essential actor for Ankara. The settlement of the Cyprus conflict or the management of its natural resources would create several possibilities for Turkey which would like to participate in the energy architecture of the Eastern Mediterranean. This would in turn be another building block in its efforts to become a central-hegemonic state in the area with agenda setting capacity and the ability to be a security provider.69 These aspirations stem both from the regional power vacuum and the emergence and consolidation of the Lausanne Syndrome in the Turkish government under the AKP. Indeed, after the rise of the AKP to power the tactics and means that Turkey uses in its relations with occupied Cyprus, with the Republic of Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean more broadly have been upgraded and enriched. Even stable objectives have changed content. For example, its demographic engineering policies have acquired an unprecedent conservative-Islamic character that is also reflected in the economic sector and social relations within the Turkish-Cypriot community.70 In 2019 Erdo˘gan approved the establishment of the Coordination Office of Cyprus Affairs that ‘oversees any agreement between Turkish public authorities and Turkish 65

Ibid., p. 11. IV. Turkey’s International Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011b), Ibas (2007). 67 Tziarras (2021). 68 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012), Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Energy (2015). 69 Tziarras (2021). 70 Hatay (2017), Latif (2020), Hatay and Dayioglu (2019), Moudouros (2019), Moudouros (2018), Bozkurt (2014), Moudouros (2016). 66

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Cypriots and contributes to the planning and coordination of economic, financial, and technical assistance.’ This, in conjunction with the fact that Vice President Fuat Oktay was burdened with the coordination of the Office, bypassing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reflected the increasingly centralised and personalised decisionmaking processes under Erdo˘gan.71 Moreover, the dependencies of the TurkishCypriot community have expanded, for example, to the sector of water supply and soon electricity, while Turkey is upgrading its military presence on the island with drones and plans for new military bases.72 At the same time, Ankara’s desire to acquire an agenda-setting role in the Eastern Mediterranean has become evident during the 2010s. Apart from its activity in the Middle East, Turkey demonstrated its intentions regarding the issue of natural resources when in February 2018 the Turkish navy obstructed ENI’s drillship SAIPEM 12000 from reaching target “cuttlefish” within block 3 of the Cypriot EEZ. The drillship remained under the blockade of the Turkish navy between 9 and 22 February and eventually departed for its next scheduled operation in Morocco.73 Within the framework of the same strategy, Turkey has acquired its own drilling ships and has since June 2019 sent them multiple times for illegal drilling operations within the Republic of Cyprus’ continental shelf and EEZ,74 actively disputing the Lausanne Treaty status quo and supporting the Blue Homeland doctrine. For these actions, the EU imposed sanctions on Turkey.75 These events point to a growing activity from the AKP’s part in comparison to previous Turkish governments. An activity associated with the shifts in the strategic choices of TFP under the AKP and the influence of the Lausanne Syndrome. Praising his government’s actions at the time, pro-Erdo˘gan columnist Ibrahim Karagül wrote: If we go beyond the land and seas, if we take into account Turkey’s ethnic area, we see a spectacular power from Europe to Asia, the Middle East to the depths of Africa. We’re now explorers. We’re making memory discoveries. True owners of the ‘valley’ are shaking the whole region… We are rediscovering the ‘memory’ that allows us to see the region, political history, our nation’s political codes, our history-maker and region-builder role, our perception of Turkey, our perception of the Ottomans and Seljuks, and to see all these in a single picture… The Seljuks are back; the Ottomans are back; the showdowns from World War I are back; the Anatolia defense is back; the claims of past centuries are back; in brief, everything that belongs to us is back. We have seen that they are all ours, they belong to us. Because the trust is now returning to the competent… We expanded our defenses with our drilling ships, battle ships, missile systems towards the West as well. We were also seeking natural gas. We were building our defense shield in the Mediterranean. We were implementing game-changer drills under the name ‘Blue Nation,’ and getting into preparations. We were strengthening the Turkish fleet to the utmost, building new battle ships along with submarines and airplane carriers using national capabilities. We were making extraordinary investments in the war industry in the fields of sonar systems, electronic software, among others, and building a 71

Ta¸s (2020). Dorian Jones (2019); Turkey plans to establish naval base in Cyprus (2019a). 73 Andreou (2018). 74 EU’s Borrell says Turkish gas drills off Cyprus ‘must stop’ (2020). 75 Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: Council adopts framework for sanctions (2019). 72

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5 The Lausanne Syndrome and Revisionism Under … defense industries revolution. Our unmanned air vehicles, aircraft, battle ships were now everywhere in the Mediterranean.76

Cyprus was not within the National Pact borders, but the Lausanne Treaty certainly made clear that the island, which used to be under Ottoman rule, was out of reach for Turkey. However, geopolitical circumstances brought the issue back to the surface. Chapter 4, demonstrated how the Cyprus Problem was instrumentalized in the 1950s by Menderes for domestic political reasons. We also saw how Erbakan and the National Outlook Movement tried to own the success of the 1974 invasion and frame it through their own ideological identity. The systemic dynamics of the twenty-first century in conjunction with the consolidation of the AKP’s power gave rise to a more assertive foreign policy that was also expressed in Cyprus. Moreover, Cyprus was now understood not only as a “shield” against Greek influence (or “Hellenic encirclement”) but also as a forward base and a bridgehead for Turkey’s broader geopolitical objectives. The ideological elements that drove Erbakan’s actions visà-vis Cyprus in the 1970s became dominant and institutionalised under the AKP. Turkey’s continuous violation of the Republic of Cyprus’ sovereignty, the employment of coercive strategies, and hegemonic tactics in the occupied areas are consistent with the definition of revisionism and demonstrate the unwillingness of the Ottomanist-Imperial strategic paradigm to compromise with the Lausanne Treaty status quo.

5.2.3 Libya: Claiming the Past and a Gateway to Africa Libya was never part of the National Pact either, but it did have an important place in Turkey’s Ottoman past. Tripoli, roughly the area of today’s Libya, was first captured by the Ottoman Empire in 1551 and became the Ottoman Eyalet of Tripolitania until 1864. Between 1864 and 1912 it was ruled as the Vilayet of Tripolitania. Though typically an Ottoman territory, for 124 years between 1711 and 1835 Tripolitania was run as autonomous by the Karamanli dynasty. Knowing the plans of European powers to dismember it, the Ottoman Empire reasserted its control over Tripolitania in 1835.77 At that time the Ottoman Empire had already started declining and losing territories. By the end of the century the provinces of Tripoli and Benghazi (or Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) were all the Empire had left in North Africa, having already lost Algeria (1830) and Tunisia (1881) to the French, and Egypt (1882) to the British.78 Now the Italians wanted to take advantage of the Empire’s gradual dissolution and claim the territory of Libya. Under the pretext that Italian subjects in Libya were in danger, Italy declared war on 29 September 1911 and launched a full-scale invasion.79 76

Karagül (2019). Orhan (2008), pp. 275–276. 78 Rogan (2016, p. 14). 79 Anderson and Hershey (1918). 77

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Domestically the Ottoman Empire was torn as to how they should respond. The Ottoman government was pessimistic about its ability to counter the attack and keep Libya. On the other hand, the Young Turks were determined to fight for it. With the initiative of several young military officers, Kemal being one of them, the Ottoman army became involved in Libya. Officially, these officers were acting against the will of the Empire but, in reality, they continued to receive its support.80 During the first couple of months of the war, the Young Turk officers with the support of local tribes managed to counter the Italian offensive which remained restricted to the coast and inflict serious damage on the Italian army. Italy decided to increase the pressure on the Empire by expanding its operations to other fronts as well. Moreover, it embarked on an effort to mobilize Balkan countries—Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria—against the Ottomans. The Balkan countries eventually declared war in October 1912 creating another major problem for the Empire.81 Bankrupt and unable to fight a war in the Balkans and North Africa at the same time, the Ottoman government had to accept the peace treaty that was signed in Ouchy, near Lausanne on 18 October 1912. It is known as the Ouchy Treaty but mostly as the Lausanne Treaty of 1912.82 In the following years, the Ottoman Empire found itself embroiled in the Balkan Wars and WWI which signified its end. Article 22 of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty stated clearly: ‘Turkey hereby recognises the definite abolition of all rights and privileges whatsoever which she enjoyed in Libya under the Treaty of Lausanne of the 18th October, 1912, and the instruments connected therewith.’83 Libya has a special place in Turkish collective memory as the last territory that the Empire controlled in North Africa, and is still considered an important country for Turkey. Davuto˘glu notes that Turkey’s relations with North African countries are very important because of ‘historical and nostalgic bonds’ as well as the proximate geographic linkages.84 In the same vein, the entry about Turkish-Libyan relations on the website of Turkish Foreign Ministry clarifies that ‘Turkey has deep rooted relations with the Libyan people. Due to its historical and cultural bonds, Turkey attaches utmost importance to the security and welfare of the Libyan people.’85 Under the AKP Turkey sees Libya, and other countries of the Arab-Muslim world, from the perspective of a “big brother” and protector.86 And as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the role of security provider is one that is usually sought by a state with leadership and hegemonic ambitions. In 2012 Davuto˘glu was writing: One strength of our foreign policy […] is the ongoing process of reconnecting with the people in our region with whom we shared a common history and are poised to have a common destiny. This objective will continue to shape our foreign policy priorities, and we 80

Rogan (2016, p. 15). Kinross (1977, pp. 588–589). 82 Kolo˘ glu (2008, pp. 419–420). 83 Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923). 84 Davuto˘ glu (2010, p. 333). 85 Republic of Turkey—Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011). 86 Wigner (2018), Davuto˘ glu (2012, p. 8). 81

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5 The Lausanne Syndrome and Revisionism Under … will not take steps that will alienate us from the hearts and minds of our region’s people for short-term political calculations […] Through increasing ties with neighbors, Turkey will be better positioned to play its role as a responsible country at the global level.87

During the time of Muammar Gaddafi (1969–2011) Turkish-Libyan relations had their ups and downs but they remained mostly positive. Under the AKP these relations improved to a great extent in sectors such as trade, constructions, culture, education, and immigration, within the framework of Turkey’s outward regional policy.88 But things deteriorated when the Arab Spring and the Libya war broke out. Erdo˘gan urged Gaddafi to step down and Turkey participated in NATO’s Libya operations, although it had initially opposed any intervention in the country.89 Thereafter Ankara tried to remain engaged politically, diplomatically, and economically in Libya but because of the instability it was not always easy. In 2012 power was transferred from the newly established National Transitional Council (NTC) to the General National Congress (GNC) with high expectations about the country’s transition to stability and peace. A military coup in 2014 by General Khalifa Haftar caused the collapse of peace efforts, led to a new civil war, and brought eastern Libya under his command. Turkey refused to recognise the Haftar-backed Tobruk government that was recognised by the United Nations (UN) Security Council and a number of other countries.90 Ankara opted for the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated GNC based in Tripoli.91 With the mediation of the UN, Tripoli and Tobruk signed in 2015 the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) to establish a consensual government and restore stability and democracy. The product of the agreement was the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA).92 Turkey supported the GNA and remained committed to it in the following years. However, the GNA did not receive adequate endorsement domestically. Only 101 out of 200 members of the House of Representatives (HoR) in eastern Libya endorsed it while not accepting to transfer the control of army authorities as stipulated in the LPA.93 In the meantime, the rift between the GNA in the west and Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east was gradually growing. In 2019 the LNA launched a new offensive in the country’s south to preserve ‘Libya’s territorial integrity,’ secure control over the oil and gas sector, and eliminate extremist groups.94 The campaign then expanded further to the west to the end of capturing Tripoli from the GNA, one of Haftar’s declared objectives since 2017.95 With Haftar closing in on Tripoli, Turkey launched a large-scale military intervention in Libya in December 2019 to support the internationally-recognised GNA and push back the LNA forces. In a rather prophetic speech, two years earlier, Erdo˘gan stated: 87

Davuto˘glu (2012, p. 4). Bagci and Erdurmaz (2018, pp. 40–41). 89 BBC (2011). 90 Bagci and Erdurmaz (2018, p. 43). 91 Barin Kayaoglu (2016). 92 Apap (2016). 93 LibyaProspect (2016). 94 Abdullah (2019). 95 Ghanmi (2017), Pack (2019, pp. 7–8). 88

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We will not be an onlooker to the schemes over Libya. […] We know that unless we treat the issue on a broad perspective, they will never leave us alone in these lands. It is the Turkish nation’s destiny to shoulder the burden of this entire geography from the Balkans to the Caucasia and the Central Africa to the Central Asia. Geography is destiny and we will not escape our destiny. On the contrary, we will continue to advance and if Allah permits, build a secure and prosperous future not only for us but for all our friends.96

In retrospect, these were not just empty words. After the intervention Erdo˘gan justified Turkey’s actions, again on the basis of identity: Those who think that Turkey’s interest in Libya is only due to economic, military, diplomatic and political reasons are wrong. Libya has never been a foreign place for Turkey. Libya, the heirloom of Barbaros, was an important part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries. We have very deep historical, human and social ties. No one can expect us to turn our backs on our Libyan brothers who seek help from our country. In this country, we have Berber, Amazig and Tuareg brothers targeted by Haftar. Haftar wants to destroy them. In Libya, there are the Köro˘glu Turks, who are the descendants of the Barbaros and Turgut Reiss, who are ethnically cleansed by Haftar, and whose number exceeds 1 million. Believe me, we feel sorry for our nation when we see those who are unaware of the existence of Turks in this country and that they are ethnically cleansed. Those who say, ‘What are we doing in Libya’ are ignorant of politics and history. Ask ‘Where is Libya’, believe me, they don’t know.

Turkey’s Libya operation was unprecedented in the history of the Turkish state particularly in terms of distance, not to mention that it constituted a major divergence from the Republican strategic culture paradigm that favoured non-interventionism. It was the first time since the Ottoman period that Turkey conducted a military operation so far away from its own borders. Turkey along with GNA forces were effective in countering Haftar’s offensive and launching a counter-offensive to the east that reached the outskirts of Sirte.97 Ankara had an indirect military involvement in Libya since 2013 through the government-associated SADAT Defence private military company.98 But this time Turkey’s military involvement included Turkish-made drones, radar and jamming systems, military vehicles and artillery, intelligence, naval support and ground forces, and not least Turkish-backed Syrian rebels.99 Following the victory against Haftar, Turkey and the GNA signed two Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs): One on the delimitation of maritime zones and one on security cooperation. The former was interpreted by Erdo˘gan as a step that turned the Sèvres ‘upside down’.100 The Sèvres Treaty is obviously not in effect as it was replaced by Lausanne. Erdo˘gan was thus referring to reversing the geopolitical order in Turkey’s favour under the pretext of defending its rights. Karagül shared similar thoughts: Just as their natural gas plans in the East Mediterranean went down the drain with the Libya deal, the Greece administration balance has also been ruined. Turkey and Libya directly became bordering countries. We build a shield right in the middle of the Mediterranean. One of Turkey’s biggest geopolitical breakthroughs since Lausanne was taking shape.101 96

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2017b). Ioannou and Tziarras (2020). 98 SADAT Defense (2013). 99 Ioannou and Tziarras (2020). 100 Milliyet (2019). 101 Karagül (2019). 97

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The issue of maritime zones is one of the most contentious issues in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially between Greece and Turkey. The Turkey-Libya MoU102 on the delimitation of their EEZs was an effort to solidify and legitimise Turkey’s maritime claims given that up to that point they were only shared by the TurkishCypriot administration. However, the said delimitation remains arbitrary as it disregards the sovereign rights of Greece and Egypt as well as their right to be involved in the negotiating process with Turkey on maritime jurisdiction areas. Turkey has not signed the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 (UNCLOS III) based on which other states in the area have delimited their EEZs (e.g., Cyprus-Egypt and Cyprus-Israel). Turkey’s Mavi Vatan doctrine disputes the Cyprus-Israel, Cyprus-Egypt, and GreeceEgypt EEZ delimitations, putting forth a revised version of maritime boundaries that entails a much larger EEZ and Continental Shelf for Turkey.103 From this perspective, Turkey’s involvement in Libya is not disconnected from its revisionist Eastern Mediterranean strategy (including its maritime surveys and drillings) and vice versa; that is, its new Eastern Mediterranean strategy was necessary for the Libya intervention to be possible. Suffice it to say that the notion of a Turkish-Libyan EEZ was publicised since 2011 in papers by Cihat Yaycı, one of the Eurasianist Admirals that collaborated with the AKP government after 2014.104 The 2019 MoU on maritime zones was the exact implementation of Yaycı’s prescriptions. In fact, a few months prior to the MoU, Yaycı published a book which further developed his analysis on the importance of Libya for Turkey strongly supporting, just like in 2011, the urgent agreement with Tripoli on maritime zones.105 As already seen, Ankara’s naval strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of a greater strategic plan that aims not only to provide Turkey with power projection capabilities beyond the Mediterranean, but also to render it a great power. The strengthening of its naval forces and the focus on maritime zones and offshore natural resources are integral to this strategy and Libya was instrumental in the accomplishment of these objectives. Beyond the issue of maritime zones, Turkey has managed to consolidate its military presence and influence in the country through the second MoU on security and military cooperation. The MoU includes 22 fields of security and military cooperation, including but not limited to training and consultancy services, experience transfer, intelligence, counter-terrorism, and provision of ‘buildings and estate (training bases) on condition that the ownership is retained.’106 In this context, Ankara pursued the use of two Libyan military bases, the Misrata naval base and the al-Watiya air base, and the preservation of its forces in the country.107 After the provisional Government of National Unity (GNU) between Tripoli and Tobruk was formed in March 2021, Turkey managed to reap several benefits. During the first visit of the GNU’s Prime Minister Mohammed Dbeibah in Turkey, the two 102

United Nations (2019). Tziarras (2021). 104 Yayci (2011). 105 Yayci (2019). 106 Bozkurt (2019). 107 Coskun and Gumrukcu (2020). 103

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governments held a meeting of the Turkey-Libya High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council and signed five agreements, including the construction of electricity plants, a new terminal at Tripoli airport, and a shopping centre by Turkish companies.108 The consolidation of Turkey’s economic, political, and military presence in Libya serves its broader Africa policy as well. As of 2020 Erdo˘gan had visited 28 African countries while Turkish embassies in the continent increased from 12 in 2002 to 42 in 2019.109 Moreover, several Turkish institutions got involved in Africa on various levels such as development, culture, education, religion, media, and tourism.110 Apart from the relations Ankara developed with countries like Somalia, Sudan, and Mauritania during the 2010s including in the military sector,111 its foothold in Libya allowed for the expansion of relations to neighbouring countries as well. A case in point is Niger with which Ankara signed a military pact in June 2020.112 These movements are related with Turkey’s efforts for greater influence in the continent but at the same time they fall within the broader framework of geopolitical competition and alliance formation against, for example, the influence of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, France, and Egypt.113 Davuto˘glu identified the importance of Africa from early on and highlighted the strategic role of both the Mediterranean and the Middle East in reaching (North) Africa and increasing Turkey’s international influence: To acquire either an international field of influence in the depths of Africa or a say in the balances of the Mediterranean, Turkey is forced to establish a strategic bridge between its Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern policy, as part of its policy on its proximate maritime area and its policies on the Balkans and the Adriatic, which are in turn part of its policy on its proximate land area so that, from this particular strategic point of view, it supports its policies on the central Mediterranean and North Africa.114

It seems that Turkey chooses to get involved or intervene in countries that have historical and ideological significance (e.g., based on the Ottoman past or religious/ethnic identity), geostrategic importance (in relation to its geopolitical aspirations and antagonisms), and that are usually in a vulnerable position be it economically, militarily or otherwise. Its involvement comes with various kinds of support for the recipient state that Ankara later exchanges with strategic influence. We have seen this happening not only in Libya, the “weakest link” of North Africa, but also Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Cyprus, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

108

Hürriyet Daily News (2021). Turkey-Africa Relation (2020). 110 These institutions include the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), the Yunus Emre Institute, the Turkish Maarif Foundation, the Turkish Religious Foundation, Anadolu Agency and Turkish Airlines. See, ibid. 111 Shay (2018); Barkey (2021), The Arab Weekly (2021). 112 Middle East Monitor (2020). 113 Ramani (2020), Middle East Monitor (2020). 114 Davuto˘ glu (2010, p. 334). 109

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During the GNU’s visit to Turkey Erdo˘gan made some interesting remarks that affirm the Lausanne Syndrome as seen in Davuto˘glu’s ideas and expressed in Libya and Ankara’s broader regional policy: We have long-standing, deep and special relations with Libya dating back more than 500 years. For centuries, we as two friendly, brotherly and related nations have cast our lots with one another for our survivals, for our crescents and stars. We have fought as one against those targeting our sovereignty. We have reached these days as a result of the blessed fights put up by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, Enver Bey, Fethi Bey, Nuri Bey, Muhammad as-Senussi, Lion of the Desert Omar al-Mukhtar and many other heroes. We have been building our future by the strength we derive from this shared history of ours. Our primary goal is the protection of Libya’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political unity; the prosperity of the Libyan people. Turkey embraces with affection the entire Libya from west to east, north to south. In this spirit, we will continue to provide the National Unity Government with every kind of support, as we did with the previous legitimate governments.115

Erdo˘gan underlined once again the (Ottoman) past that Turkey and Libya shared ever since the Eyalet of Tripolitania and pointed to the kin ties that bind the two countries. This shared past was disrupted initially with the Lausanne Treaty of 1912 and later with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. He also referred to several Young Turk officers, including Mustafa Kemal, and legendary Libyan tribal leader Omar Mukhtar, who joined the resistance and fought with the Ottomans against the 1911 Italian invasion of Libya. Interestingly he refrained from referring to Kemal as Atatürk (the father of Turks) and he only celebrated the actions that he took in the context of the Ottoman Empire (fighting for Ottoman lands), before he rose to the leadership of the Turkish resistance movement and decided to pursue the creation of a new, post-Ottoman state. The Young Turks’ fight for the Ottoman Empire was interpreted as deserving of honour; the results of their later decisions—the abandonment of Ottoman territories and the establishment of the republican state—are targeted by Erdo˘gan as historical mistakes. It is evident that the AKP’s Turkey sees Libya as a familiar and kin space with shared history and identity from the pre-Lausanne period. An area that was cut off from its natural (Ottoman) geopolitical environment, and where not only can Ankara rightly project influence, but has the responsibility to do so by making a strategic “come-back” to the areas that, according to Davuto˘glu, previous governments abandoned entirely.116 Turkey has made this “come-back” in many ways that, as seen earlier, brought about changes to the status quo. As explained in the beginning of this book, revisionism is not necessarily associated with territorial expansionism or control. In the case of Libya, we have witnessed other revisionist strategies, such as the establishment of military presence and the efforts to acquire military bases, the creation of fait accompli regarding the maritime boundaries of the Eastern Mediterranean through the deal with the GNA, and the expansion of its sphere of influence in Libya and neighbouring countries through agreements on construction, energy, maritime zones, and military cooperation. From this perspective Libya, more accurately western Libya, has also become dependent on Turkey at least in terms of 115 116

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2021). Davuto˘glu (2010, p. 100).

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domestic security and stability, and it therefore maintains a degree of loyalty towards Ankara. Very similar perceptions and strategies can be seen in Turkey’s Middle East foreign policy and particularly in the cases of Syria and Iraq that are examined in the following sections.

5.3 The Lausanne Syndrome in the Middle East The manifestation of the Lausanne Syndrome in Turkey’s Middle East foreign policy is perhaps even more visible than in the Eastern Mediterranean. For Davuto˘glu, the dominance over the Middle East is ‘the most important and necessary step made by any state that desires to rule globally.’117 It is directly linked to National Pact-related grievances, as elaborated in previous chapters, and specific interests and aspirations. Syria and Iraq are two countries where the effects of the Lausanne Syndrome have been felt strongly. During the 2010s and particularly after 2016 Turkey’s presence— and influence—in these countries increased greatly and took various shapes and forms. Beyond the historical and ideological incentives behind Turkey’s engagement, one can also trace systemic reasons and traditional security concerns. However, this should not distract from the fact that, even when Ankara sought to counter real or perceived threats to its national security through involvement abroad, its actions always corresponded to a revisionist agenda as well. In the next two sections I look at TFP in Syria and Iraq. I identify the place these countries have in the Lausanne Syndrome, examine how the latter’s prescriptions influenced Turkish strategic choices, and how Ankara’s revisionist foreign policy agenda was implemented in these cases.

5.3.1 Syria: From Alexandretta to the “Safe Zones” in Northern Syria The Syria front (an extension of the Palestinian front) during WWI was perhaps the most dramatic one for the Ottoman Empire and today’s governing elite. The Syria offensive by the British in September 1918 was decisive in defeating the exhausted Ottoman army and forcing the Empire to sign the Armistice of Mudhros. The Ottomans had to retreat from Palestine all the way to Aleppo through key cities such as Damascus and Homs.118 The key city of Aleppo fell on October 26, right at the beginning of the negotiations for the Armistice of Mudhros. According to the armistice signed on October 31, the Ottomans had to withdraw from their remaining garrisons including those in Syria. However, it also called for the demobilisation of 117 118

Ibid., p. 212. Rogan (2016, pp. 380–383).

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the Turkish army, ‘except for such troops as are required for the surveillance of the frontiers and for the maintenance of internal order.’119 Kemal, who was ready to fight the terms of the armistice, thought that the armistice was purposively ambiguous and favoured the British. He was specifically concerned about the ambiguity regarding the exact frontier of Syria. ‘Did it follow the line of the mountains behind Aleppo, the long-accepted northern boundary of the Ottoman province of Syria? Or was it to be prolonged down into Cilicia, to include the port of Alexandretta?’120 Alexandretta was to remain under Turkish control, but the British would use it for purposes of transportation and logistics. However, Kemal was convinced that the British were planning to occupy Alexandretta to stop the retreat of the Ottoman army and force it to surrender. With the beginning of the War of Independence that officially started in 1919, the territories of northern Syria, including Alexandretta, became a part of the National Pact. Kemal’s view was that at the time of the signing of the armistice Ottoman troops were still controlling some of these territories and were only pursued away by British forces later.121 Turkey’s southern border according to the Treaty of Sèvres stopped just south of Adana in the west and at the city of Mardin in the east. The National Pact included at least part of what is today the Aleppo governorate in Syria and some more Syrian territories along the Turkish-Syrian border. Eventually the Turkish-Syrian border was agreed on with the 1921 Treaty of Ankara between France and Turkey (the government of the Grand National Assembly). Kemal had to settle for somewhat less territories to those included in the National Pact, while Alexandretta (Hatay) acquired a special administrative regime and remained under the French mandate until 1937.122 According to the National Pact, Alexandretta, along with other Arab majority territories, would hold referenda on whether they wanted to become Turkish territories. In 1936 France negotiated a treaty with Syria and promised its full independence— which it eventually acquired in 1946. Kemal requested that Alexandretta become independent and then took the matter to the League of Nations. It was there agreed that Alexandretta would become independent. But in 1937 Syria pressured France to only allow a minority representation of the Turks in the provincial government. As a result, Ankara protested to the League and denounced its 1926 friendship treaty with Syria. Eventually Paris and Ankara managed to agree in 1938 that Alexandretta would become a joint Franco-Turkish protectorate. Right after the agreement, elections in the province provided the Turks with the majority in the National Assembly; the province was renamed into Hatay and asked to be united with Turkey. In 1939 France agreed to the annexation in exchange for a nonaggression pact with Turkey against the background of the unfolding WWII.123

119

Mudros Agreement: Armistice with Turkey (1918). Kinross (2001, p. 131). 121 Danforth (2016, pp. 132–133). 122 Campitelli and Gobet (1923). 123 Shaw and Shaw (1977, p. 377). 120

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The 1939 annexation created grievances in Syria that exist to this day, but it resolved the open issue of Alexandretta and fulfilled another objective of the National Pact, at least in part.124 Malik Mufti explains that the issue of Alexandretta, just like the issue of Cyprus after it, did not constitute a deviation from the dominant Republic strategic culture paradigm. According to him, the Turkish ‘security establishment lacked clear strategic culture guidelines on what to do, so the decision ultimately depended on the characters and inclinations of individual leaders.’125 We have already seen that, as an area not included in the National Pact, the case of Cyprus was more complicated—albeit part of the Lausanne Syndrome. Moreover, although largely a pro-status quo decision, there were also at the time manifestations of the Lausanne Syndrome and the Imperial strategic culture in Turkish policy through the participation of Erbakan and his party in the government. Alexandretta on the other hand was a simpler case of an unresolved National Pact issue that was influenced by the more assertive management of Kemal—and against more pro-status quo voices such as Prime Minister ˙Inönü’s—without affecting the country’s overall foreign policy orientation.126 Beyond Hatay, the Turkish state had to abandon the rest of the territories in northern Syria and compromise with its current borders. The matter resurfaced, not coincidentally at around the same time that President Erdo˘gan made the first statements regarding Lausanne. For Turkey, Syria became a major security problem after 2011. Despite the radically improved relations between Ankara and Damascus during the 2000s, the breakout of the Syrian conflict eventually forced Turkey, if with some delay, to ask from Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, to step down. By the end of 2011, Turkey’s Syria policy became one of regime change, while early in the next year it also warned with a military intervention.127 Turkey’s policy was triggered by systemic factors, notably the growing waves of refugees pouring into Turkey, the exacerbation of the Kurdish threat, as well as the domino of uprisings in the Middle East and Ankara’s desire to be ‘on the right side of history.’128 As part of its strategy Turkey started to support proxy groups against the Assad regime and occasionally Kurdish forces. By the mid-2010s the Kurdish threat became much more imminent and severe as forces of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), namely, the Syrian offshoots of the PKK, took hold of large swaths of territory in eastern Syria and were advancing to the west, past the Euphrates River. They had already established a de facto statelet called Republic of Rojava (or, Syrian Kurdistan) along the Turkish border, not least with the support of the US, thus triggering Turkish insecurities associated with the Sèvres Syndrome.129 The Euphrates River was Tukey’s “red line.” After Kurdish forces 124

Dündar (2017). Mufti (2009, p. 43). 126 Ibid., p. 63. 127 Tziarras (2012, pp. 132–134). 128 Davuto˘ glu (2012, p. 8). 129 Bertrand (2015). 125

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crossed the Euphrates Turkey conducted Operation Euphrates Shield in the Fall of 2016 and invaded the country with the help of its Syrian anti-regime proxies thus establishing a 2.225 square kilometre zone of control in the north reportedly setting up military bases in the towns of al Bab and Azaz.130 It did so again in January 2018 with the Olive Branch Operation in the Kurdish canton of Afrin in north-western Syria. The Afrin operation essentially extended the Jarablus-Azaz zone farther to the west and ensured that the Turkish border was “sealed” from the Kurdish and IS threats.131 Two more operations followed. The third was Operation Peace Spring in north-eastern Syria between October and November 2019 which created a zone of Turkish control from Tal Abyad to Ras al-Ain. As of 2021 Turkey’s last operation was called Spring Shield and took place between February and March 2020. It was conducted in the Idlib province of north-western Syria and managed to control a strip along the Turkish-Syrian border. Ankara’s justification for the first three operations was always related with threats to its national security, especially the terrorist threat of the PYD/YPG and/or IS. The fourth operation came as a response to an attack against Turkish troops in the area and, according to the Turkish government, it meant to protect the civilians in Idlib as well as counter the Syrian regime aggression.132 In this respect, Turkey was faced with a fourfold threat from Syria: (a) The Assad regime, (b) the PYD/YPG, (c) IS (and other extremist groups), and (d) the growing influx of refugees. Against this background, Ankara presented its operations in Syria as defensive and, to a certain extent, that was true. However, the Turkish strategy and thinking went beyond the defensive aspect of things. Referring to the developments in Syria and Iraq, President Erdo˘gan interpreted the threats facing Turkey as being part of a great international scheme that targets Turkey. He moreover stated that Turks needed ‘to reclaim the National Pact’ and that the operations and involvement in Syria sought to protect the National Pact borders as well as Turkey’s ‘kinsmen.’133 Importantly enough, despite Turkey’s involvement by proxy in Syria during the first half of the 2010s, its first military intervention came in 2016, a month and a half after the failed attempted coup. As noted earlier, the post-coup period accelerated and deepened control over all the branches of the government and especially in the military and security bodies. Thereby, owing to Erdo˘gan’s politics, the Imperial strategic culture paradigm was institutionalized even more. At the same time, due to the state of emergency that was imposed in the country and the legitimacy that the government enjoyed at that juncture, many domestic constraints were lifted. As a result, the strategic choices prescribed by the Lausanne Syndrome could manifest more easily. One could find elements of the Sèvres Syndrome behind Ankara’s decisions but, in the ways that its Syria strategy unfolded, the Lausanne Syndrome was also evident. Looking at the Jarablus-Azaz-Al Bab area, which Turkey controlled with the Euphrates Shield Operation, we could see how Ankara sought to strengthen 130

Sputnik (2017). Cavusoglu (2018). 132 Daily Sabah. (2020b). 133 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2017). 131

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its presence and expand its influence over the area in multiple ways. Also important is how the territories that Ankara ended up controlling in northern Syria along the border with Turkey were remarkably consistent with the territories included in Ferit’s memorandum that was presented at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference (see Chap. 3). It is not without reason that the Syrian government has accused Turkey of colonial practices in northern Syria. These practices included demographic engineering, military installations, economic activity, infrastructure, creation of parallel security structures, control of local administration, etc. Part of this strategy was about winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population and part of it was about consolidating the Turkish influence in Syria’s north. Since its first operation Turkey has set up multiple military installations in northern Syria and in the Euphrates Shield area more specifically. These also served as training centres for Syrian rebel groups and defence posts against the Kurdish, Syrian and Jihadist threats.134 Since 2016 Turkey has also trained more than 8000 Syrian Sunni Arabs as police officers to work in the areas controlled by Turkey; many of them were trained in Syria and others in Turkey.135 The pro-government newspaper Yeni S¸ afak published a video showing Turkish-trained Syrian security forces pledging allegiance to Turkey and President Erdo˘gan chanting, ‘Long live Turkey, long live Erdo˘gan and long live a free Syria.’136 In another example of Turkey’s growing influence in northern Syria, the Turkishbacked Syrian opposition has issued new ID cards—translated into Turkish—to Syrians who lost their IDs during the war. Moreover, the opening of at least five branches of Turkish post offices, the establishment of Turkish signposts and the control over local hospitals, all illustrate Ankara’s well-planned policy to create dependencies within the region and revise the status quo to its own benefit.137 The Turkish Ministry of Interior and the municipality of Gaziantep are directly involved in the area. In fact, ‘local councils … answer directly to the closest Turkish provincial governors.’138 For example, it has been reported that requests from the Al-Bab Local Council in Syria have to go through Turkish institutions such as the Gaziantep Governor’s office.139 The same is the case for the areas under Turkish control in north-eastern Syria, where Turkey has re-opened 146 schools, provides scholarships to students with high scores on Turkish government language exams, and exercises control through local authorities.140 Furthermore, Turkey has been investing heavily in northern Syria through development, construction and other projects. It

134

Haid (2017), Turkey sets up new military base north of Syria’s Raqqa (2021). Ibrahim (2017), Turkey trains 800 more Syrian police personnel (2018), Syrian policy receive training in Turkey to serve in areas liberated from terrorists (2020a), 620 Syrian police candidates to assume security duties in Afrin after being trained by Turkey (2018). 136 See, Yeni Safak’s ¸ video on Twitter (22 January 2017): https://twitter.com/yenisafak/status/823 174667250831360. 137 Kiri¸sci (2018), Iddon (2018). 138 Hatahet (2021, p. 1). 139 Stein et al. (2017). 140 Khaddour and Bareesh (2020). 135

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has contributed to the construction of industrial complexes e.g., in Al-Bab,141 and it provides electricity and water.142 It has also set up campuses of Turkish universities and facilitated the opening of at least four universities/academic institutions. As Fehim Tastekin notes: In 2016, Damascus International University began operations in Azaz in cooperation with Turkey’s Humanitarian Assistance Foundation. Free Aleppo University, which opened the same year, is affiliated with the Higher Education Ministry established by the Syrian opposition tied to the so-called Syrian Interim Government […]. The Basaksehir Arabic Language and Islamic Sciences Academy opened in 2017 in al-Bab. The academy, with departments of Sharia and Islamic economics, is under the control of the Istanbul/Basaksehir-based Inspiration Foundation.143

Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is equally involved in northern Syria. It has established charities and repaired or built multiple mosques in the region, hiring and training local Syrians to preach in them. Diyanet has essentially ‘evolved as Erdogan’s signature institution on par with Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT),’144 providing more evidence of the ideological drive behind Turkey’s Syria policy. Lastly, of great importance is Ankara’s demographic policy in these areas. Due to Turkey’s military operations tens of thousands of people have been internally displaced, in their majority Kurds, and many of them remain displaced. In Kurdish-majority and other areas of northern Syria, Ankara has been resettling Syrian refugees who had found resort in Turkey. According to the Turkish government, more than 400,000 refugees have resettled.145 Most of these refugees are Sunnis—and what Erdo˘gan would call “Turkey’s kinsmen”—who maintain anti-Assad sentiments and a degree of gratitude and loyalty to Turkey. However, this policy is deemed by experts as a violation of international law146 and a clear indication of Turkey’s efforts to alter the demographic dynamics of these areas, both to maintain effective influence and dilute the strong Kurdish presence.147 Lastly, in July 2021 Erdo˘gan announced that Turkey completed 50 thousand temporary briquette houses out of the 100 thousand that it is planning to build in northern Syria for returning refugees. Erdo˘gan described the policy as an “Islamic, humane, and sentimental approach.”148 It is evident that Turkey’s Syria policy goes well beyond security concerns. It has a clear revisionist character that operates on multiple levels. The areas in which Turkey has been projecting control and influence are virtually the same as those ceded by Turkey during the settlement of the Turkish-Syrian border. Therefore, strategic choices regarding Syria, starting with the revisionist policy of regime change in 2011 but especially after 2016, have been affected by both the Sèvres and Lausanne 141

al-Khateb (2018). Zaman (2017). 143 Tastekin (2018). 144 Tremblay (2018). 145 Sevencan (2020). 146 Lang (2019). 147 Fox (2019). 148 Ahmed (2021). 142

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Syndromes. This is not paradoxical given that, as already explained, the Lausanne Syndrome incorporates and can be affected by the threat perceptions of the Sèvres Syndrome. However, unlike historical periods during which the Sèvres Syndrome was dominant among Turkish leaders and in the Turkish state’s strategic culture, Turkey under the AKP is more decisive in dealing with those threats. Not only that, but it also uses the existence of threats as an opportunity to pursue a revisionist geopolitical strategy according to its ideological vision. It should be added that Turkish operations were of course permitted or facilitated by systemic factors without which Turkish strategic decisions would have been more difficult and constrained. More specifically, most of its operations were either done with the consent and even facilitation of the US and Russia after give-and-take processes, or they were simply tolerated at least to a certain extent.149 Overall, the leader images and Imperial strategic culture paradigm encompassed by the Lausanne Syndrome determined the long-term objectives of Ankara’s Syria policy and ultimately challenged the existing status quo in practical terms. In many ways, the various zones established in Syria through the Turkish operations de facto erased the Turkey-Syria border and moved it further to the south, within Syrian territories.150 Syria has thus become another practical manifestation of the Lausanne Syndrome in Turkish foreign policy behaviour. One that is closely associated with Turkey’s policy in Iraq, as analysed next.

5.3.2 Iraq: Reclaiming Mosul As seen in Chap. 3, right after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire Turkish–Iraqi relations revolved to a large extent around the question of Mosul. After 1920, the Turks embarked on an effort to incorporate Mosul into their territories as it was included in the objectives of the National Pact. After all, at the time of Mudhros Armistice Mosul was not yet captured by the British, they only entered it three days later. Rauf Orbay who negotiated the armistice for the Ottoman Empire objected to the British occupation of Mosul, arguing that it went against the armistice clauses and that Mosul should remain Turkish. British negotiator, Admiral Calthorpe, agreed with Rauf and communicated the message to London only to receive an adamant response that Mosul was not part of Turkey but Mesopotamia. Hence the Ottoman Empire had to surrender and evacuate the area.151 Despite the Turkish delegation’s best efforts, the Lausanne Treaty postponed the resolution of the matter. And although it was eventually settled in 1926 with the mediation of the League of Nations, and with Turkey abandoning its claims over it, Mosul remained important for TFP; especially during administrations that were influenced by the Lausanne Syndrome, such as that of Özal (see Chap. 4). 149

Aliriza and Yekeler (2018), Cebul (2019), Daily Sabah (2016). Khaddour and Bareesh (2020). 151 Kinross (2001). 150

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Mosul was certainly important not only territorially but also economically due to its rich oil reserves. At the same time, although Turkey was reluctant to become involved in Turkic communities abroad during the twentieth century, the case of Iraq’s Turkomans was an exception.152 Particularly after the end of the Cold War Turkey developed a policy towards and became invested in the significant Iraqi Turkoman population concentrated in the broader Mosul area (estimated at 3 million according to Turkey),153 not only because of ethnic and cultural ties but also as a means of dealing with the dynamics of Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq.154 Thus Turkey’s Iraqi policy in the past, including the cultivation of ties with kin communities, was largely affected by the Sèvres Syndrome, namely the fear of territorial loses due to the prospect of a domino of Kurdish autonomies (in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey).155 It was for the same reasons that Turkey conducted multiple cross-border military operations in northern Iraq over the years. During the 1980s Ankara received permission from the Iraqi government for cross-border counterinsurgency operations against the Kurdish secessionist party PKK. Indeed, in 1984 Turkey and Iraq signed a Border Security Cooperation Agreement that allowed them to enter each other’s territory for up to 5 km without prior consent.156 However, the agreement ‘only allowed hot-pursuit efforts following terrorist attacks, not long-term widescale operations.’157 During the 1990s Turkey conducted 29 incursions into Iraq despite Baghdad’s opposition.158 At least two of those were months-long large-scale operations (1995, 1997), involving approximately 35 thousand troops in a distance longer than 80 km into Iraq.159 This was the largest force Turkey ever sent to foreign territory. According to the Turkish military’s assessment at the time, the PKK ranked as the number one threat posed to national security.160 It is undeniable that Turkish perceptions of the Kurdish threat were driving these military incursions and that Turkish policy, even though it violated the related agreement with Iraq, was of a defensive nature. The same concerns resurfaced during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and one of the most significant crises in AmericanTurkish relations that broke out when the Turkish parliament denied US troops access to Iraq through Turkish territory.161 Turkish fears started to ease after 2005 when Iraq adopted a new federal constitution; Iraqi Kurds downplayed their hopes for an independent state, and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG, Iraqi Kurdistan) dissociated its position from the activities of the PKK.162 However the Kurdish issue 152

Altuni¸sik (2006, p. 192). Bassem (2016). 154 Altuni¸sik (2006, p. 192). 155 O˘ guzlu (2004, pp. 319–320). 156 Keskin (2008, p. 63). 157 Kasapoglu and Cagaptay (2015). 158 Cagaptay (2007). 159 Nachmani (2009, p. 11), Cagaptay, Soner (2007). 160 Özda˘ g and Aydınlı (2003, p. 114). 161 Altuni¸sik (2006, p. 189). 162 Hale (2013, pp. 235–236). 153

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and the PKK’s presence in northern Iraq remained a problem in the next couple of years. When a large-scale Turkish military incursion was averted in 2007 TurkeyKRG relations took a turn for the better and improved significantly over the next years—to the extent that KRG turned a blind eye to Turkish cross-border incursions into northern Iraq and saw its security as linked to that of Turkey.163 The improvement of relations with the KRG was historically important, not only because of traditional identity and security issues, but also because it signified increased economic benefits and political influence for Turkey—both in the KRG and Iraq more broadly. The AKP’s conception of Turkish identity that prioritized religion, and the decline of the military’s role over policymaking, allowed it to proceed to these Kurdish openings both in Iraq and domestically. Turkey’s growing influence in Iraq took other shapes and forms as years went by. The 2014 advances of IS and the capturing of Mosul presented Turkey with security threats as well as opportunities. Turkey has maintained a military presence in Iraq since the 1990s in the context of its anti-PKK operations. But due to the advances of IS, in 2015 it deployed a new force of around three thousand troops in Bashiqa, a town north of Mosul. Ankara’s objective was to train Kurds and Sunni Arabs against IS. Once again, there was a strong defensive component in its actions. Ankara feared the strengthening of IS and the PKK, the new refugee waves, and the growing influence of Iran and its Shiite proxies in Mosul and Turkmen areas more specifically.164 Then Turkish Prime Minister, Binali Yildirim, stated: ‘Turkey is in Bashiqa not arbitrarily but out of necessity. We see that important steps have been taken in clearing the area from Daesh [i.e., IS]. We will accordingly reach a solution in a friendly manner about this [PKK] issue as well.’165 In 2015 Kasapoglu and Cagaptay concluded that ‘With or without that base [Bashiqa], Turkey has already established a complex deterrent in northern Iraq.’166 Turkey’s involvement was indeed complex—more complex than in the past. But in fact, this time it went beyond mere security (defence or deterrence) considerations and included a strong element of offense and revisionism. Just like in the cases of Libya and Syria, Turkey capitalized the power vacuum and the security needs (either of itself or the local population) to strengthen its strategic foothold as well. In October 2016, the Iraqi parliament and Prime Minister decided that Turkey’s forces stationed in Bashiqa were a ‘foreign occupying force’ in violation of Iraq’s sovereignty and called for their withdrawal citing risks of ‘regional war.’167 Erdo˘gan’s response to the Iraqi Prime Minister was blunt: You are not my interlocutor, you are not at my level, you are not my equivalent, you are not of the same quality as me. Your screaming and shouting in Iraq is of no importance to us. You should know that we will go our own way. Turkey’s army hasn’t lost enough of its

163

Ibid., pp. 237–38. Kasapoglu and Cagaptay (2015), Erdemir and Tahiroglu (2016). 165 Hadi (2017). 166 Kasapoglu and Cagaptay (2015). 167 Sharma (2016). 164

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Ankara’s disregard for Baghdad’s calls was in clear violation of the country’s sovereignty and a sign of its efforts for more influence in Iraq. Yet Erdo˘gan insisted: ‘No one should talk about our Bashiqa base. It will stay there. Because Bashiqa is also an insurance against terror attacks targeting Turkey.’169 But Turkey seemed to have greater plans for Mosul. Its Lausanne Syndrome related leader images and strategic culture enhanced Ankara’s drive to participate in the operations against IS and thereby gain greater presence, influence, and control in and around Mosul through friendly or kin groups (non-state actors) e.g., Iraqi Kurds, Turkmens, and Sunnis. Then Turkish Defence Minister in an interview supported the ‘demographic structure’ of Mosul and the Turkmen city of Tal Afar against the growing Shiite presence: ‘The modification of this demographic structure would greatly discomfort Turkey […] Everyone needs to know that Turkey will not remain silent to a demographic restructuring.’170 Turkey wanted to safeguard and deepen its influence in Mosul. This was seen more clearly in Turkey’s support of the Hashd al-Watani group (later renamed Haras Nineveh). This was a Sunni Arab group that was backed and funded by Turkey, in alliance with the KRG, and based in Bashiqa.171 In the end they were not allowed to participate in the operations for the liberation of Mosul because of their relationship with Turkey, while their leader, Atheel al-Nujaifi, was later sentenced to imprisonment due to his ties with Turkey.172 Despite its insistence on participating in the Mosul operation Ankara had to settle with a training role and the involvement of its partners, mainly the KRG’s Peshmerga. ‘Can we leave Mosul on its own?’ Erdo˘gan asked. ‘We are present in the history of Mosul. And what is it they are doing now? They are plotting to grab Mosul from the people of Mosul and offer it to others. But we insist that in Mosul should live the people of Mosul.’173 An Al-Bayan Center report found that through the KRG and Hashd Nineveh Turkey tried ‘to establish a region within Iraq that will be friendlier towards Turkish interests, continue supplying Turkey with oil and enable Turkey to operate within while acting as a buffer between its own borders and Baghdad.’174 Having seen how the Turkish government associates Mosul with the National Pact and the notion of a “Greater Turkey” (see Chap. 4) as well as its instrumentalization of power vacuums and proxies in Iraq we could say that, apart from traditional security concerns, there is also a strong ideological aspect behind Ankara’s involvement in Mosul.175 It is not a coincidence that almost 15 years earlier Davuto˘glu was writing that the ‘non-political borders’ between Turkey and Iraq (‘north and south 168

Frazer (2016). Hürriyet Daily News (2016). 170 Isik (2017). 171 Gulmohamad (2016, p. 21). 172 Ali (2018). 173 We are present in the History of Mosul (2016). 174 Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies (2016, p. 14). 175 Hintz (2017, p. 117). 169

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Mesopotamia’) are ‘under the constant pressure of the real geopolitical elements,’ alluding to the notion that northern Iraq is part of Turkey’s natural geopolitical space.176 In 2017 Turkey and Iraq reached a deal about the former’s presence in Iraq. Although Turkey promised to withdraw its troops it did not do so. A year later Baghdad had to request Turkey’s withdrawal anew, without any success.177 But despite Ankara’s best efforts, Turkey’s foothold in Iraq remained limited. It still maintains military forces and bases in Bashiqa and the KRG, but it has achieved neither a stable deterrent—thus still needing frequent cross-border operations against the PKK—nor the safeguarding or enhancement of its influence in Iraq as is the case, for example, in Syria. Ankara sought to become a central player and agenda-setter in the day-after of Mosul both through its own presence and “kin” proxies. But opposition from the Iraqi government as well as the US government regarding the Mosul operation functioned as constraints that prevented the realization of its objectives. What is more, in September 2017 Turkey was presented with another significant concern that had to do with KRG’s referendum for independence. Despite the good relations that Erbil maintained with Ankara, KRG’s President Masoud Barzani had tried to capitalize on the role that Peshmerga forces played in the battle against IS to promote the region’s independence as well as re-negotiate its relations with the central government in Baghdad on several issues. Not only did Barzani receive little support from the international community, but he also stirred the anger of key actors, such as Baghdad, Iran and Turkey that reacted with various measures. Among other efforts to prevent the emergence of an Iraqi Kurdish state, Erdo˘gan threatened to cut off the flow of the oil exported from Iraqi Kurdistan through Turkey, an important source of revenue for the KRG.178 Although Iraqi Kurds voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence, the referendum’s result was never implemented. TurkeyKRG relations remained cold for the next couple of years but eventually entered a process of normalisation due to common political, economic, and geostrategic interests.179 Overall, in Iraq, just like in other cases, Turkey combined the elements of defence and offence in its foreign policy behaviour to both deal with security threats and revise the status quo by expanding its influence. Therefore, the influence of the Lausanne Syndrome was visible. However, also true was that in the case of Iraq this was a largely failed effort at revisionism, or at least one with limited results, not least because of the constraints that Turkey encountered. It was not able to participate in the Mosul operation as it desired and it did not manage to protect the Turkmen areas from Shiite influence nor to enhance its own. Likewise, it was not successful at preventing the Iraqi Kurdish referendum for independence, despite the close cooperation and dependencies that developed between Turkey and the KRG since the late 2000s. In this sense, both the revisionist and defensive objectives of Ankara were restricted to 176

Davuto˘glu (2010, p. 225). Goaran (2018). 178 Bektas and Toksabay (2017). 179 Pusane (2019). 177

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a great extent. On the other hand, Turkey has managed to maintain forces in northern Iraq, which shows both Ankara’s resolve and Baghdad’s limitations. This presence can provide some leverage in the future vis-à-vis Baghdad and the KRG or even other actors such as Iran and the US. The following and concluding chapter of the book provides concise answers to the initial research questions and articulates the connection between the discursive manifestations of the Lausanne Syndrome and the practical manifestations in foreign policy under the AKP. Moreover, it identifies certain patterns that can be observed in TFP behaviour under the influence of the Lausanne Syndrome and proceeds to comment on what may lie ahead for TFP.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

This study has set out to outline the content of the Lausanne Syndrome with the use of historical and NcR theoretical tools. But why is the analysis of such a concept important? The Lausanne Syndrome has been developed against the backdrop of the Sèvres Syndrome. The two syndromes share some features but they are overall very different. Examining the Lausanne Syndrome while maintaining a comparative view vis-à-vis the Sèvres Syndrome enables the better understanding of the differences between the paradigms or types of TFP. At the same time, it provides insights on the changes and continuities of TFP under the AKP. The initial research aims were: (a) To ascertain how the Lausanne Syndrome came about and its content, (b) to understand what Turkish leaders mean when they question the Lausanne Treaty and call for its revision or updating, (c) to specify what boundaries Erdo˘gan refers to when speaking of the ‘boundaries of our heart,’ and (d) to determine the foreign policy behaviour predicted by the Lausanne Syndrome. The book’s focus was, therefore, mostly on the unit level of analysis and ideational factors. In terms of theory but also the specific phenomenon of TFP under the AKP, the main contribution has been to the intervening variable in a NcR context without, however, disregarding the systemic level. The analysis has explained how leader images and the Imperial strategic culture under the AKP comprise the Lausanne Syndrome and how the latter can function as an intervening variable producing revisionist foreign policy outcomes—as opposed to status quo outcomes. The rest of this concluding chapter presents concise answers to the initial research questions and addresses additional issues that arise from the analysis of the Lausanne Syndrome and TFP more broadly.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 Z. Tziarras, Turkish Foreign Policy, SpringerBriefs in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90746-4_6

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6.1 How Did the Lausanne Syndrome Emerge and What Does It Entail? The argument is that systemic stimuli of the late 1910s and early 1920s along with domestic political, identity and ideological dynamics,created the conditions under which both the Sèvres and Lausanne Syndromes emerged.Systemic stimuli have been the main trigger of processes related with different—even conflicting—leader images and strategic culture(s) which, in turn, played a role in foreign policymaking.The initial antagonism and difference of opinion between the First and Second Groups of the GNAT was paradigmatic and shaped political-ideological struggles for years to come (Chap. 3).The two syndromes and the leader images/strategic culture of each ideological current(i.e.,Republican and Imperial) respectively are intertwined, for each syndrome is very much a product of how leader images and strategic culture are shaped and evolve. Based on nostalgic feelings about the Ottoman Empire, the Lausanne Syndrome encompasses views and beliefs about domestic and foreign policy. Domestically, a disappointment that is rooted in the abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate as well as the dominance of a strict type of secularism prompts a desire for a renewed role of religion in politics and society. This is accompanied by a revanchist attitude towards the Kemalist ideology and structures that ultimately creates a counter-revolutionary dynamic—from the AKP political and social forces against the former Kemalist paradigm. But most importantly the Lausanne Syndrome has a strong external-territorial dimension; a geopolitical vision that wants to reclaim influence or control over ex-Ottoman territories that were either lost or ceded during and after the Lausanne negotiations. This leads us to what Erdo˘gan refers to as the “boundaries of the heart.”

6.2 What Are the Boundaries of Erdo˘gan’s Heart? Based on the history of the political-Islamic movement in Turkey, the AKP and Erdo˘gan’s discourse, as well as TFP itself, the “boundaries of Erdo˘gan’s heart” seem to be a synthesis of various collective memories and geopolitical aspirations stemming from the country’s Ottoman past and the (post-)WWI dramatic events. They encompass the National Pact territories with their historiographic ambiguities, especially those abandoned by the new Turkish Republic with the Lausanne Treaty(e.g.,Mosul and northern Syria). They also include the territories that Ferit presented in his memorandum at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and ex-Ottoman territories that go way beyond Turkey’s “near abroad.” The activity of TFP especially in the latter half of the 2010s demonstrates that these could go as far as (North) Africa and the Caucasus. Depending on the objectives of TFP and the territories where it wants to expand its influence, the discursive mechanisms of legitimization range. Domestic and external legitimization could for example be pursued on the basis of

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the National Pact, the Ottoman Past and/or the protection of kin communities abroad (including Sunnis and Turkmens).

6.3 What Is the Foreign Policy Behaviour Predicted by the Lausanne Syndrome? In terms of foreign policy behaviour, the AKP’s Turkey under the influence of the Lausanne Syndrome has shown increasing signs and evidence of revisionism as opposed to the pro-status quo foreign policy behaviour that was usually salient when the Sèvres Syndrome was dominant at the state level. Through this reading of TFP emphasis has been given to domestic ideational factors which more often than not reflect the increasing tensions that exists between different political currents. These domestic tensions affect unavoidably the foreign policymaking process. Depending on which political-ideological current is dominant and how institutionalised its system of beliefs and strategic prescriptions are, systemic stimuli are filtered in different ways by governing elites thus producing varying foreign policy outcomes. Looking at TFP through the lens of the two syndromes may not be adequate to explain TFP as a whole but it surely sheds light on certain historical and contemporary aspects of it. Not least because Turkey has been undergoing a historic transformation in domestic and foreign politics; one that challenges its century-old international outlook and position. A transformation that demonstrates the salience and resilience of collective memories, identities and beliefs which have been shaped through the course of time and have the power to (re)determine a country’s self-perception and role in the international system. One might be tempted to discount the argument about a Lausanne Syndrome on account that Lausanne Treaty and Blue Homeland related rhetoric has been toned down at the end of the 2010s. However, as his book has demonstrated, it is not necessarily about how often, how systematically, or how saliently Lausanne is mentioned in public. It is about the fact that the rhetoric reveals something more essential and deep-seated that is unique neither to the AKP nor twenty-first century Turkey. It is a Syndrome that was shaped in the 1910s and 1920s and “travelled” through different political actors and intellectuals through the twentieth century to the AKP. The AKP is but the latest manifestation of the Syndrome. Moreover, the practical aspect of TFP revisionism speaks louder about the Syndrome than any rhetoric and discourse. Indeed, the examination of the four case studies has demonstrated that images of foreign policy revisionism are not simply a discursive mechanism that is often utilised to target domestic audiences. It has become clear that, in all four cases, Turkey has pursued revisionist objectives on the ground. It is from this perspective evident that, in rhetoric as well as in practice, Turkey under the AKP has followed revisionist geopolitical aspirations that go so far as to pursue the alteration of regional borders and maritime boundaries. Its Syria interventions, its military presence in northern Iraq, and the extensive naval activity in the Eastern Mediterranean are only a few

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examples. The establishment of military bases in Qatar and Somalia, and the related defence deals, also fall within the broader framework of this more assertive foreign policy. Based on the theoretical framework and the empirical evidence, Table 6.1 presents a summary of Turkey’s revisionist strategies in each case study. It has also become clear that TFP exploits weak state or non-state actors to advance its agenda. In all case studies Turkey faced minimal or ineffective opposition to its activities. The 1974 invasion of Cyprus took place against a much weaker military force. The same is the case with Ankara’s contemporary policies towards the island. Nicosia has limited means to deter Turkish actions even as it exercises restricted sovereignty over its territories due to the Turkish occupation in the north. EU reactions to Turkish activity off Cyprus has also been ineffective. In Libya, Ankara capitalized on the support it provided to the GNA in Tripoli at a time of great vulnerability to then exchange it with greater influence in the country. Syria was at best a country of limited sovereign control and great gaps of security and legality. Within a fragmented country and a conflict of “all against all,” Assad was in no position to deter the Turkish operations. Similar was the weakness of Baghdad after the devastation and the sectarian conflicts that the advances of IS brought about. Despite its opposition, the Iraqi government was unable to prevent Turkey’s incursions and long-term presence in Iraq, including through proxies—like in the case of Syria. It should be noted however that Baghdad has been more successful than actors in other cases in raising obstacles to Turkey’s influence and role in the country, not least because of the American and Iranian involvement in Iraq. At this point it is worth remembering that Turkey was able to advance its foreign policy objectives either because of lack of systemic (and domestic) constraints, or because it had managed to negotiate them on a transactional basis with key great powers such as the US and Russia. We saw that happening for example in Syria where there was a quid pro quo with Russia (for the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch operations) and the US (for the Olive Branch operation). It should be also noted that the participation in great power decision-making which Turkey achieved at least partly, is often a feature of revisionist foreign policies. And yet the limits of these operations were again subject to negotiation between Turkey and Russia or the US. Something similar happened in Libya where Turkey and the GNA restricted their counter-offensive to the outskirts of Sirte because of objections from Russia, Egypt, and the UAE among others. In Iraq, things were more difficult. Ankara was not allowed to participate in the Mosul operation against IS as it desired nor was it left unopposed in its efforts to consolidate its influence in Turkmen territories and northern Iraq more generally. In light of the above, it could also be extrapolated that revisionism in TFP is not synonymous with irrationalism. One of the characteristics of TFP especially under the effect of the Lausanne Syndrome is brinkmanship. This is a product of the high-risk and adventurous foreign policy prompted by the Lausanne Syndrome. To fulfil its ambitious and revisionist objectives TFP often needs to push the limits, especially in its relations with regional and international powers. There is admittedly no other way for a country that seeks to alter the geopolitical status quo; it inevitably ends up overstepping on other actors’ “red lines” and interests or, worse, violating

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the sovereignty of other states. One could indeed argue that, from a purely cost– benefit point of view, this foreign policy approach has cost the AKP government on a number of levels. For example, it led to the serious deterioration of relations with several countries, including the US, even as it contributed to the decline of Turkish economy and to the electoral decline of the party. From this perspective TFP has displayed a significant degree of irrationality. But the question should be about what the Turkish leadership considers cost or benefit. It seems that Erdo˘gan prioritises the maximization of Turkey’s power, the expansion of its sphere of influence, and its ability to negotiate with great powers on equal terms. That is, in addition to its political survival as the ultimate leader. If these objectives are at least partially achieved they provide Erdo˘gan and his increasingly authoritarian government benefits that, in their view, outweigh the above-mentioned costs. It seems that these prioritisations have something to do with the metaphysical-ideational aspect of their geopolitical vision as well. Even so, Turkey has not made any “paranoid” foreign policy decisions thus far. It pushed the limits a number of times and occasionally dealt with the costs of its actions, but it never entirely disregarded international constrains that could prove devastating. For example, it never crossed a line with Moscow in Syria or Libya. Apart from the 2015 incident where Turkey downed a Russian jet and then apologised, it never conducted operations of a scale or nature that Russia was not comfortable with. In fact, the two often coordinated on such issues and managed to resolve occasional tensions—e.g., in Idlib, Syria. Likewise, though Ankara pushed the boundaries multiple times, it never bypassed US warnings to limit its operations in Syria or Iraq, even though it insists on the S-400 issue. Turkey is well aware of the damage that US sanctions can inflict. On the other hand, Ankara’s elaborate policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and its continuous efforts to question the maritime sovereign rights of Cyprus in particular have benefited from the lack of any serious constraints either from Cyprus and the EU or other actors. All in all, TFP under the influence of the Lausanne Syndrome has been more ideologically driven and revisionist, often leading to brinkmanship. However, it does maintain a strong element of realpolitik that seems to be triggered when its objectives are met with severe systemic constraints that cannot be mitigated through negotiations and transactionlism with other powers. It could thus be argued that TFP is characterized by a form of ‘bounded rationality’ where satisfactory decisions are taken (based on the decision-maker’s adequacy criterion) as opposed to optimal decisions that maximize benefits and are based on strict cost–benefit calculations.1

1

Campitelli and Gobet (1921).

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6.4 Revising the Lausanne Treaty How? Has Turkey Been Successful? It is rather obvious that when Erdo˘gan or other Turkish officials talk about the revision or updating of the Lausanne Treaty they do not refer to a new international conference that would review its clauses and make amendments. They allude to ad hoc and de facto changes that could, however, effectively revise the geopolitical status quo of Lausanne. Thus, their approach is primarily political rather than legal. For example, the Lausanne order has been suspended in Cyprus at least since 1974 because of the occupation and Ankara’s re-engagement in the issue despite that it renounced its rights over the island through the treaty. Under the AKP, Ankara has stepped up its hegemonic policies in and around Cyprus further altering the status quo in the island’s north and challenging the country’s sovereign rights in the sea. In the long run, these political interventions may produce legal changes as well, either through the settlement of the Cyprus conflict or regarding the Eastern Mediterranean maritime zones. With its Libya policy, Ankara advances its revisionist maritime strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean and at the same time returns to ex-Ottoman territories with enhanced influence in the country and neighbouring areas. This is an example of an ad hoc effort to bring legal changes to the status quo through an arbitrary maritime deal that is otherwise legitimised only at the bilateral level. The case of Syria is even more serious. There, Turkey controls large territorial zones in the north which is gradually integrating into the Turkish economy and socio-political sphere. Turkey’s presence in Syria abolishes de facto the Turkish-Syrian border and, by extension, disrupts the Lausanne Treaty order. The same happens in northern Iraq where Turkey maintains a military presence and conducts frequent cross-border operations against the will of Baghdad. Has Turkey been successful? It has been evidently successful at least to a certain extent. All four case studies demonstrate the advancing of Turkish revisionist policies and the achievement of certain objectives. However, especially in the cases of Libya, Syria and Iraq we have seen that had Turkey been left unopposed it would have likely pursued greater gains: more territories in Syria, greater role and influence in Iraq, and further eastward expansion in Libya.

6.5 What About the Lausanne Syndrome in Post-Erdo˘gan Turkey? What happens to TFP in post-Erdo˘gan Turkey is a crucial issue given that the Lausanne Syndrome became dominant and institutionalized under the AKP and his premiership. It was during this time that the great debate about the changes of TFP emerged as well. If ideational factors associated with the AKP and Erdo˘gan have such an important intervening role in Turkish foreign policymaking, what would happen if

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the Turkish leadership changed? It is important to remember that significant changes in domestic and foreign policy under the AKP took years to fully materialise. This had to do with the party’s effort to consolidate its power and undermine the embedded Kemalist military-bureaucratic structures and ideology. From there on, the AKP worked systematically to create structures and networks that would solidify its own stay to power and advance its objectives. After two decades in power, it has managed to replace the Kemalist authoritarian structures with its own. In the process, the AKP had to incorporate discourses and policies familiar to the Kemalist political identity to both appease the dominant establishment and appeal to broader masses. Likewise, it had to respond to traditional security concerns both in rhetoric and in practice. In other words, the AKP’s politics were, at least at first, not entirely disconnected from the previous political-ideological paradigm. This was such because each governing elite reflects certain tendencies of the public opinion while also shaping collective expectations in the process. Subsequent governing elites that bear different ideas inherit certain public opinion tendencies and expectations and find themselves having to respect them, if only tactically. This was the AKP’s approach as well. But by the mid-2010s, the AKP’s majoritarian shift had disregarded the wide masses and started to gradually appeal only to the conservativenationalist segment of the society. Though marginal, the electoral percentages of this social segment were enough to maintain the AKP and Erdo˘gan to power. Now that Erdo˘gan’s ideological framework became dominant and institutionalised, much like the Kemalist framework before him, it will be very difficult and time-consuming for any new government to reverse it and freely assert its own vision in domestic and foreign policy, though not as difficult as it was for the AKP. It is no surprise that under the AKP the whole political scene has become more nationalist and conservative in an effort to compete with the government more effectively by appealing to the AKP’s electoral base. Another thing the AKP governance since 2002 confirmed, is that Turkish national identity is still in flux. For this reason, ideological and identity divisions run deep producing and reproducing polarisation between different kinds of modernization. Domestically, these manifest for example through debates about the nature of the political system and the role of religion in politics. With respect to foreign policy the tension is expressed through the pro-Western vs. Eastward-Eurasian orientation dualism. Although Erdo˘gan never abandoned the country’s participation in Western institutions and processes it went to great lengths to renegotiate, improve, and redefine Turkey’s place within the West as a largely independent partner that should be reckoned with. Next governments will find themselves having to manage the expansion of Turkey’s influence abroad as well as its new international role as a rising power between the West and East. Any effort to fully retreat from activities abroad or go back to being the West’s “obedient partner” will be met with disillusion domestically. What a new and ideologically different administration would likely do, however, is to try to strike a better balance between the country’s new international role and its relations with the US, NATO and the EU to alleviate some of the tensions and make the management of problems easier.

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Table 6.1 Turkish Foreign Policy Strategies Cyprus Revisionist • Expansion of Foreign Policy sphere of Strategies influence • Creation of a protectorate • Military presence and installations • Demographic engineering • Cultural transformation and expansion of ideology • Kin groups as proxies for influence in the community • Economic, social, and political dependencies • Violation of maritime sovereign rights (EEZ) with surveys and drillings

Libya

Syria

Iraq

• Expansion of sphere of influence • Military presence and installations (via a bilateral Memorandum) • Growing economic influence • Political dependencies and institutional influence • Expansion of ideology • Arbitrary maritime delimitation to challenge international legal norms and the regional status quo

• Expansion of sphere of influence • Regime change • Military interventions against the recipient’s will • Control of territories • Military installations • Demographic engineering • Kin groups as proxies for security and influence against local actors • Expansion of ideology • Institutional influence • Economic dependencies

• Expansion of sphere of influence • Military interventions against the recipient’s will • Control of territories • Military installations • Kin groups as proxies for security and influence against local actors • Expansion of ideology

Until then, Erdo˘gan will keep trying to maximize Turkey’s power and foothold abroad through assertive give-and-takes with greater powers as well as by mobilizing the nationalist-conservative segment of the electorate and maintaining a strong grip over the state against his political opponents. Only radical developments and costs could prompt Erdo˘gan to make a substantial shift towards more normalized relations with Western partners or towards a less adventurous and revisionist foreign policy.

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