The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances (Palgrave Studies in International Relations) 3031354478, 9783031354472

Table of contents :
Praise for The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances
Contents
List of Tables
1 Introduction
The Empirical Gap in IR Literature
The Theoretical Gap in IR Literature
The Realist View: Threats and Balancing Behavior
The Institutionalist View: Path-Dependence and Risk Management
The Book’s Main Argument
The Organization of the Book
Notes
Bibliography
2 The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances
The Basic Theoretical Framework
Weaker Ally’s Threat Perception
The Alliance’s Benefits for the Weaker Ally
How Threat Perception and Alliance Benefits Affect Choices
The Role of Autonomy in Asymmetric Alliances
The Roots of the Problem: Autonomy, Security, and Interallied Control
Asymmetry and Its Management
The Weaker Ally’s Quest for Autonomy
The Voice and Exit Alliance Processes
Research Design and Method
Research Goal and Types of Cases
Research Methodology
Case Selection Criteria and Empirical Cases
Notes
Bibliography
3 The Anglo-Egyptian Alliance in the Early Cold War: A Case of Alliance Termination
How to Define the Case: Egyptians’ Ambitions After World War II
The Alliance Variables
Egypt’s High-Threat Perception
Egypt and the Middle East Balance of Power: Cairo Increasing External Threats
Egypt’s Regime Instability: The Increasing Internal Threats
The Low Benefits of the Alliance
Egypt’s Voice Attempts and Their Ineffectiveness
The Anglo-Egyptian Relations from 1945 to 1951
The Framework of the Anglo-Egyptian Disputes
From the Sidqi-Bevin Agreement to the Egyptian Appeal to the Security Council
The Palestine Conflict
The Last Round of Negotiations
The Processes of Alliance Termination
Britain’s Policy of Hard Control
Egyptians Looking for Alternative Arm Suppliers
Egyptian Diplomacy: Undermining the British Primacy in the Middle East
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
4 The Anglo-Iraqi Alliance in the Early Cold War: A Case of Alliance Persistence
How to Define the Case: Iraq’s Ambitions at the End of World War II
The Alliance Variables
Iraq’s High-Threat Perceptions
External Threats: Iraq and the Middle East’s Balance of Power
Internal Threats: The Regime Instability and the Cold War Nexus
The Low Benefits of the Alliance
Iraq’s Voice Attempts and Their Effectiveness
The Anglo-Iraqi Relations from 1945 to 1955
The Iraqi-Turkish Agreement and the Conflict in Palestine
The Abortive Treaty of Portsmouth
Projects of Regional Defense: 1950–1954
The Formation of the Baghdad Pact
The Processes of Alliance Persistence
Britain’s Policy of Soft Control
The British Concessions to the Weaker Ally
Britain or the United States? The Iraqi Preference for London
Conclusions
Notes
Bibliography
5 New Zealand’s Exit from ANZUS in the Mid-1980s: A Case of Alliance Termination
How to Define the Case: New Zealand’s Ambitions Since the 1970s
The Alliance Variables
New Zealand’s Low-Threat Perception
The High Benefits of the Alliance
New Zealand Voice Ineffectiveness
The US–NZ Relations from the Mid-1970s to the Mid-1980s
New Zealand’s Pursuit of Greater Independence
The US–NZ Relationships in a Changing South Pacific
The Nuclear Ships Dispute
The ANZUS Split
The Processes of Alliance Termination
The US Policy of Hard Control
New Zealand’s New Strategic Posture
Conclusions
Notes
Bibliography
6 The US–Australia Relations in the Mid-1980s: A Case of Alliance Persistence
How to Define the Case: Australia’s Ambitions Since the Mid-1970s
The Alliance Variables
Australia’s Low-Threat Perception
The High Benefits of the Alliance
Australia’s Voice Effectiveness
The US–Australian Relationships from the Mid-1970s to the Mid-1980s
Rethinking Australia’s Place in ANZUS
The Hawke Government: Between Loyalty and Independence
The Persistence of the US–Australia Alliance
The Processes of Alliance Persistence
The US Policy of Soft Control
Australia’s Self-reliance Within the Alliance
The Australian Policy of Regional Denuclearization
Conclusions
Notes
Bibliography
7 The US–Philippines Alliance in the Mid-2010s: A Case of Alliance Persistence
How to Define the Case: The Philippines’ Quest for Autonomy After the Cold War
The Alliance Variables
The Philippines’ High Threat Perception
The Low Benefits of the Alliance
The Philippines’ Voice Attempts and Their Effectiveness
The US–Philippines Relationships in the 2010s
The Philippines in the US Pivot to Asia
The Philippines’ Geopolitical Shift and the US’s Strategic Review
The US–Philippines Alliance Adjustments
Toward the Joint Vision for the 21st Century
The Processes of Alliance Persistence
The US Policy of Soft Control
The Philippines’ Integration into the US Alliance System
Conclusions
Notes
Bibliography
8 Conclusions
The Weaker Voice and the Alliance Adjustments
The Security-Autonomy Trade-Off Revised
A Quick Look at the US System of Alliances’ Challenges
Conclusions
Notes
Bibliography
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances

Andrea Leva

Palgrave Studies in International Relations

Series Editors Knud Erik Jørgensen, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark J. Marshall Beier, Political Science, McMaster University, Milton, ON, Canada

Palgrave Studies in International Relations provides scholars with the best theoretically-informed scholarship on the global issues of our time. The series includes cutting-edge monographs and edited collections which bridge schools of thought and cross the boundaries of conventional fields of study. Knud Erik Jørgensen is Professor of International Relations at Aarhus University, Denmark, and at Ya¸sar University, Izmir, Turkey.

Andrea Leva

The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances

Andrea Leva Treasure Ministry of Economy and Finance Rome, Italy

Palgrave Studies in International Relations ISBN 978-3-031-35447-2 ISBN 978-3-031-35448-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35448-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © John Rawsterne/patternhead.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Opinions and thoughts expressed are only the author’s view, not reflecting those of the institution of affiliation.

Praise for The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances

“Alliances are commonly conceived as tools that major powers use to control weaker partners. From this perspective, then, whether alliances endure or collapse depends on the patron’s will. Andrea Leva challenges this view: while acknowledging the implications of power asymmetry in inter-allied management, the author contends that junior allies are not merely subject to their patron’s whims. In fact, they may have a critical role in bringing the alliance to an end. Building on a solid theoretical framework, the book convincingly argues that the main factor guiding small states is their quest for autonomy – or better, how effective they are in making their voice heard. Through an elegant five-case comparison, Leva uncovers the mechanisms at play in junior allies’ relations with major partners. By shedding light on a previously underscored phenomenon, this book is an important contribution to the theoretical literature on alliances.” —Andrea Locatelli, Associate Professor, Università Cattolica, Milan (Italy) “In a well-argued book, Andrea Leva sheds light on an overlooked area of alliance theory. IR has traditionally spent less attention on weaker members in asymmetric alliances. Instead, the author engages the reader with a compelling analysis of the unexpected impact that protégées can have on alliances. Contrary to the realist and institutionalist arguments,

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PRAISE FOR THE WEAKER VOICE AND THE EVOLUTION …

Leva suggests that junior allies’ quest for autonomy and voice opportunity can critically affect their security relationship with the patron, even affecting the alliance’s persistence or termination. The book’s model is then applied to several interesting case studies. A must-read for those interested in questioning a simplistic view of asymmetric alliances.” —Andrea Carati, Associate Professor, Università degli Studi di Milano Statale, Milan (Italy)

Contents

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Introduction The Empirical Gap in IR Literature The Theoretical Gap in IR Literature The Realist View: Threats and Balancing Behavior The Institutionalist View: Path-Dependence and Risk Management The Book’s Main Argument The Organization of the Book Bibliography The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances The Basic Theoretical Framework Weaker Ally’s Threat Perception The Alliance’s Benefits for the Weaker Ally How Threat Perception and Alliance Benefits Affect Choices The Role of Autonomy in Asymmetric Alliances The Roots of the Problem: Autonomy, Security, and Interallied Control Asymmetry and Its Management The Weaker Ally’s Quest for Autonomy The Voice and Exit Alliance Processes Research Design and Method Research Goal and Types of Cases

1 1 3 3 5 7 8 12 15 16 16 17 18 20 20 23 25 28 31 31 ix

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Research Methodology Case Selection Criteria and Empirical Cases Bibliography 3

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The Anglo-Egyptian Alliance in the Early Cold War: A Case of Alliance Termination How to Define the Case: Egyptians’ Ambitions After World War II The Alliance Variables Egypt’s High-Threat Perception The Low Benefits of the Alliance Egypt’s Voice Attempts and Their Ineffectiveness The Anglo-Egyptian Relations from 1945 to 1951 The Framework of the Anglo-Egyptian Disputes From the Sidqi-Bevin Agreement to the Egyptian Appeal to the Security Council The Palestine Conflict The Last Round of Negotiations The Processes of Alliance Termination Britain’s Policy of Hard Control Egyptians Looking for Alternative Arm Suppliers Egyptian Diplomacy: Undermining the British Primacy in the Middle East Conclusion Bibliography The Anglo-Iraqi Alliance in the Early Cold War: A Case of Alliance Persistence How to Define the Case: Iraq’s Ambitions at the End of World War II The Alliance Variables Iraq’s High-Threat Perceptions The Low Benefits of the Alliance Iraq’s Voice Attempts and Their Effectiveness The Anglo-Iraqi Relations from 1945 to 1955 The Iraqi-Turkish Agreement and the Conflict in Palestine The Abortive Treaty of Portsmouth Projects of Regional Defense: 1950–1954 The Formation of the Baghdad Pact The Processes of Alliance Persistence

32 33 40 47 49 50 51 52 54 55 55 57 58 58 59 59 61 62 63 67 69 71 73 73 75 76 78 78 79 80 81 82

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Britain’s Policy of Soft Control The British Concessions to the Weaker Ally Britain or the United States? The Iraqi Preference for London Conclusions Bibliography 5

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New Zealand’s Exit from ANZUS in the Mid-1980s: A Case of Alliance Termination How to Define the Case: New Zealand’s Ambitions Since the 1970s The Alliance Variables New Zealand’s Low-Threat Perception The High Benefits of the Alliance New Zealand Voice Ineffectiveness The US–NZ Relations from the Mid-1970s to the Mid-1980s New Zealand’s Pursuit of Greater Independence The US–NZ Relationships in a Changing South Pacific The Nuclear Ships Dispute The ANZUS Split The Processes of Alliance Termination The US Policy of Hard Control New Zealand’s New Strategic Posture Conclusions Bibliography The US–Australia Relations in the Mid-1980s: A Case of Alliance Persistence How to Define the Case: Australia’s Ambitions Since the Mid-1970s The Alliance Variables Australia’s Low-Threat Perception The High Benefits of the Alliance Australia’s Voice Effectiveness The US–Australian Relationships from the Mid-1970s to the Mid-1980s Rethinking Australia’s Place in ANZUS The Hawke Government: Between Loyalty and Independence The Persistence of the US–Australia Alliance The Processes of Alliance Persistence

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83 84 84 85 88 91 93 94 95 96 97 99 99 100 101 102 103 103 104 104 107 109 111 112 112 114 115 116 116 117 118 119

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The US Policy of Soft Control Australia’s Self-reliance Within the Alliance The Australian Policy of Regional Denuclearization Conclusions Bibliography 7

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The US–Philippines Alliance in the Mid-2010s: A Case of Alliance Persistence How to Define the Case: The Philippines’ Quest for Autonomy After the Cold War The Alliance Variables The Philippines’ High Threat Perception The Low Benefits of the Alliance The Philippines’ Voice Attempts and Their Effectiveness The US–Philippines Relationships in the 2010s The Philippines in the US Pivot to Asia The Philippines’ Geopolitical Shift and the US’s Strategic Review The US–Philippines Alliance Adjustments Toward the Joint Vision for the 21st Century The Processes of Alliance Persistence The US Policy of Soft Control The Philippines’ Integration into the US Alliance System Conclusions Bibliography Conclusions The Weaker Voice and the Alliance Adjustments The Security-Autonomy Trade-Off Revised A Quick Look at the US System of Alliances’ Challenges Conclusions Bibliography

119 120 120 121 124 127 129 130 130 131 133 134 134 135 136 137 138 139 139 141 144 147 147 149 151 153 155

Bibliography

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Index

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3

Basic theoretical framework Model of alliance persistence and termination Research design

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract The following chapter overviews the IR literature on the alliances’ persistence and termination, outlining some empirical and theoretical gaps in the realism and institutionalism research strands. On the one hand, the IR literature escapes inquiring into cases of weaker alliance members exiting a security agreement with the patron. On the other hand, it develops indeterminate models to interpret the alliances’ evolution. The literature analysis, therefore, notices the need to fill these gaps. The end of the chapter outlines the book’s structure and the main argument. Keyword Alliance persistence · Alliance termination · Realism · Institutionalism · Voice opportunity

The Empirical Gap in IR Literature Why a weaker ally prefers an asymmetric alliance to persist or terminate is an overlooked issue in IR literature. Most alliance theorists presume junior allies have reduced freedom of action, minimum bargaining leverage, and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Leva, The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35448-9_1

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rely on the more powerful partner’s defense.1 Moreover, the most established statistical studies doubt that a weaker ally’s agency can affect the alliance’s evolution toward persistence or termination.2 By contrast, diplomatic history provides several examples of junior allies that took themselves out of military agreements with a patron guaranteeing their security. On 8 October 1951, the Egyptian Parliament approved abrogating the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty and the 1899 condominium agreement on Sudan. Although the allies engaged in treaty renewal negotiations following the end of World War II, they could not avoid the alliance collapse. In the mid-1980s, New Zealand exited from ANZUS, not recognizing any obligation concerning nuclear cooperation. Although ANZUS was a showcase alliance for more than 35 years, the allies triggered processes of non-reciprocity until breaking the security relationship. On the other hand, we can find examples of junior partners that strengthened their alliance although going through deep interallied crises with their patron. In 1955, Iraq renewed its partnership with Britain once the latter signed the Baghdad Pact. The allies negotiated for almost ten years to replace the 1930 agreement, and several attempts failed, such as the 1948 Portsmouth treaty. However, they finally overcame the divergencies and avoided the alliance termination due in 1957. In the mid-1980s, Australia and the United States went through the most profound crisis in ANZUS history. Even though the allies had several sources of friction, they finally guaranteed the alliance’s endurance. The security relationship evolved toward persistence instead of termination, as was for New Zealand. Finally, the US–Philippines alliance survived a deep interallied crisis in the mid-2010s as the junior partner questioned the persistence of the security relationship, which later became more solid through several adjustments. In light of such cases, it is surprising that IR literature is largely silent on the alliance persistence and termination processes once a junior partner is actively involved. Although some studies recognize the weaker allies’ agency and leeway, only a few enquire why an unsatisfied junior partner might prefer to exit a military agreement with a great power instead of continuing to benefit from the interallied exchange.3 Even fewer studies compare cases of alliances persisting in changes and crises with others that could not.4 However, understanding the complexity of alliances’ endurance is crucial in current international affairs, as their collapse or persistence

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might significantly affect states’ relationships.5 Therefore, this book points out the following questions: how can we explain a junior ally’s stance on alliance persistence or termination? Under which conditions might it ask for changes in the alliance? Which processes trigger a security relationship’s collapse or endurance? How can we trace them?

The Theoretical Gap in IR Literature The Realist View: Threats and Balancing Behavior Looking at the origin and endurance of alliances, realist authors emphasize states’ ontological insecurity due to an anarchic environment. In this view, many scholars provide a symmetric explanation for alliance formation and termination by emphasizing threats as the glue for the security agreements’ persistence.6 Indeed, ancient and modern thinkers widely consider the value of joining forces against a third party.7 Similarly, contemporary realist authors describe alliances as expressing states’ cooperative behavior against common enemies.8 The well-known “capability aggregation” model relies on the idea of states deterring aggressive parties and keeping an international balance that escapes hegemony. The strict military cooperation among the allies comes from the convergence of interests on common foreign policy goals.9 Therefore, realist authors argue that military alliances aim to deter and eventually pursue conflict with an outside party. By considering interallied cooperation as a reaction to a threatening state, alliances find their place within the “balance of power” theory.10 The father of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz, called it external balancing.11 In his view, states ally to balance others’ power. Stephen Walt slightly modified Waltz’s argument by arguing that states do not merely balance a concentration of power but oppose perceptions of threats.12 As advocates of the balance-of-power theory, most realist scholars agree that states form military alliances to pursue an “external” target, namely opposing a common enemy. Shared threats attenuate potential incompatibilities among partners by favoring their military cooperation. In this view, there is no need to keep the agreement once the enemy is defeated or the menace disappears. The alliance and allies’ cooperation, in other words, persists until the common threat endures.13

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Other authors held that even domestic threats could be a source of international alignment.14 Steven David’s theory of ominibalancing famously accounted for Third World states’ alignment and realignment during the Cold War.15 Keeping the assumptions of the balance-of-power theory, the scholar introduced a domestic explanation relying on states’ internal weakness and political leaders’ lack of legitimacy. In his view, the key source of international alignments was the rational calculation of Third World statesmen who sought external powers guaranteeing them power. Similarly, other scholars argued that alliances can rapidly infuse funds and other resources, benefiting states’ internal economies.16 These contributions look at alliances as a source of economic and military resources and fit for states having limited assets and threats to domestic political stability. Indeed, security agreements can fulfill domestic and international purposes. Other scholars refined David’s argument using a leader-centric approach to explain alignment patterns. By considering physical threats to the leader—such as assassination attempts, coups d’état, secessionist movements, and opposition leaders and parties that may challenge the established leadership—two scholars found that former Soviet republics tend to favor an alliance with Russia if political leaders are concerned with ensuring their position against internal threats.17 Another author built on David’s model and defined the concept of a transnational alliance, investigating cooperative relations between states and foreign rebel groups, and finding that African leaders safeguard from internal threats to their political survival by allying with rebel groups of nearby states.18 Therefore, realist scholars share a common view about alliances’ persistence and termination by focusing on external and internal threats. An alliance endures as long as it usefully operates against a threat. Once changes occur in the original condition, such as the enemy’s defeat or disappearance, it will likely imply the dissolution of the agreement as the allies’ purpose erodes. In this view, a critical indicator of alliance termination is the change in states’ threat perceptions. However, the realist argument has been challenged in several studies. Two authors, for instance, claimed that the rise of new threats might incentivize a weaker ally to exit from the alliance if it doubts the ability or willingness of the patron to provide protection.19 More powerful partners in asymmetric alliances should reassure their protégées facing emerging threats; otherwise, they will likely break the partnership. On the other hand, other studies emphasized that threats’ disappearance does not

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necessarily imply the alliance end. This argument was raised at the end of the Cold War, opposing neorealist authors claiming that the disappearance of the original enemy could soon lead to NATO’s dissolution. By contrast, US alliances became the cornerstone of the post-Cold War international system.20 As the security agreements persisted despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union, critics argued that a low-threat environment does not necessarily lead to alliance termination. These circumstances paved the way for an institutionalist paradigm to interpret the evolution of alliances. The Institutionalist View: Path-Dependence and Risk Management Liberal scholars entered the alliances’ persistence and termination debate by introducing new views from the institutionalist theory. They developed alternative arguments to interpret NATO’s endurance despite a low-threat environment and the loss of the original enemy. Two crucial features emerged to explain alliances’ persistence: path-dependence processes and states’ attitudes to risk management. Robert Mc Calla paved the way in this research perspective.21 The scholar argued that highly institutionalized alliances placed at the center of an international regime—as NATO within the liberal-democratic one—respond more slowly to changes in threats than others that have not developed attendant norms, procedures, and functions. Once a regime exists, internal and external incentives increase to perpetuate it rather than create a new one when difficulties arise. Therefore, members of the leading regime’s organization adopt three general behaviors: resistance to change, affirmation of organizational necessity, and adaptation to change. The institutional theory supports that an alliance can become a security management institution. By accepting the realist assumption that states act within an anarchical environment, this research strand holds that institutions can be valuable to states by helping them cope with uncertainty.22 As states deal with the risk of conflicts and face the issues of uncertainty about other states’ intentions, institutions can inform and signal the interests, preferences, and intentions of other states.23 In this view, Celeste Wallander interpreted the persistence of NATO after the Cold War by focusing on mechanisms of institutional adaptation.24 Adaptation depends on whether “institutional assets” are specific—dealing with deliberate external threats and/or problems arising from instability and mistrust—or general—providing information and/or developing an

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operative mechanism for deliberation, decision-making, and implementation—and on whether its mix of assets matches the kinds of security problems faced by its members. As NATO successfully coped with security issues such as instability, uncertainty, and relations among allies, it persisted within the post-Cold War international system even without its original enemy. Similarly, Kirsten Rafferty engaged in a comparative study of NATO and SEATO, finding that the level of institutionalization affected these alliances’ evolution once a transformation in the environment occurred.25 In the case of NATO, deep institutionalization raised material and nonmaterial obstacles to exit, enhancing the alliance’s ability to perform its core military tasks and providing secondary benefits, such as affording allies greater voice opportunities in the alliance and other international forums. Therefore, at the end of the Cold War, changes in threat perceptions did not significantly affect the alliance so much as to trigger its collapse. Other authors extended this argument to the United States’ bilateral alliances in Asia–Pacific. J.J. Park found that two conditions have guaranteed alliances’ persistence.26 Firstly, member states considered the alliance a tool for order insurance. The security arrangements responded to undesirable long-term security trends, which could have occurred in order maintenance and building processes. Secondly, the allies introduced arrangements, such as concessions to a free trade agreement, to safeguard their agreement from challenges possibly arising because of intra-alliance mismanagement. Although these studies shed light on crucial processes of alliances, the institutionalist debate has some limits. Firstly, it focuses too narrowly on the case of NATO. Indeed, institutionalist arguments are difficult to apply to other cases of alliances. One statistical study found no empirical support for the hypothesis that the more alliances are institutionalized, the more they perpetuate themselves over time.27 Another study found that even alliances with a low level of institutionalization can persist in the face of changes in the international environment.28 Secondly, most institutionalist studies consider weaker parties in asymmetric alliances as status-quo and security seekers actors. This view undervalues that protégées might adopt various behaviors, even revisionist ones, by trying to gain more influence in regional affairs through the alliance.

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The Book’s Main Argument In light of the IR literature gaps, this book investigates why a weaker ally might prefer an asymmetric alliance to endure or collapse. It is worth stressing that alliance theorists rarely look at cases of a junior partner exiting an alliance with a Great power. Realist scholars judge alliances as tools to face threatening actors and assume that weaker alliance members have mostly security concerns discouraging alliance exit. On the other hand, institutionalist authors argue that path-dependence processes discourage alliances dissolution due to the benefits of cooperation and the increasing exit cost. Both theoretical frameworks mostly hold that the protégées follow the patron and comply with its preferences because of their dependence and the beneficial exchange of goods. Therefore, to solve the puzzle of weaker allies detaching from their patron, this book argues that a junior partner’s quest for autonomy and voice opportunity in the alliance can critically affect the security relationship with the patron. Once an alliance deficit occurs due to low security concerns or an unsatisfying interallied exchange, the protégé can develop specific needs and redefine its interests to preserve or increase autonomy vis-à-vis the more powerful ally. On the other hand, patrons can fail in managing interallied crises, adopting a coercive posture that denies a sufficient degree of autonomy to the weaker side. More precisely, the book argument relies on the following logic. Once the weaker partner suffers from some alliance deficits, it can start negotiating a greater leeway and autonomy from the ally. It might ask for an adjustment in the interallied exchange and renegotiation of agreements to obtain a better distribution of benefits. Here, the (mis)management of interallied relations can significantly affect the weaker side’s preference for alliance persistence or termination. A stronger side that always maximizes its advantage of relative power can favor the resistance and the sense of alienation of the partner. In these cases, the latter’s voice ineffectiveness can likely lead to the alliance termination. By contrast, if the more powerful side includes the partner’s interests in the alliance’s strategic posture, it can enjoy increased legitimacy and favor the sense of inclusion. Although the patron might pay some costs by investing its power resources in the short term, it is more likely to prolong the existing matrix of power in the long run. The weaker side’s voice effectiveness can likely lead to the alliance’s persistence.

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The Organization of the Book The text develops through one theoretical chapter and five empirical ones. A theoretical analysis characterizes Chapter 2, defining a model of asymmetric alliance’s persistence and termination. The main argument is that voice effectiveness affects the weaker ally’s preference for alliance persistence. Protégées can aim to increase their autonomy vis-à-vis the more powerful partner, asking for greater leeway and recognition of their national goals. If the alliance evolves strategically by including their interests, it creates incentives to keep the alliance. By contrast, alliance termination is likely once the patron adopts a coercive posture that denies the weaker ally’s quest for autonomy. Then, five cases of asymmetric alliances are analyzed empirically. On the one hand, Egypt and Iraq’s alliances with the United Kingdom during the 1950s show different outcomes on alliance persistence and termination. Chapter 3 describes the UK–Egypt alliance from 1945 to 1951 as a case of alliance termination. Chapter 4 illustrates the UK–Iraq alliance from 1945 to 1955 as a case of alliance termination. Then, New Zealand and Australia’s bilateral relationships with the United States during the 1980s are analyzed to test the theoretic expectations further. Chapter 5 analyzes the New Zealand detachment from ANZUS in the mid-1980s as a case of alliance termination. Chapter 6 examines the Australia–US relationship from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s as a case of successful alliance persistence. Finally, Chapter 7 describes the US–Philippines in the mid2010s as a case of alliance persistence during the severe interallied crisis following the junior ally’s geopolitical shift toward China. The five cases follow a similar format. Each begins with a brief introduction describing the alliance treaty’s main features and the interallied historical relations since the establishment of the treaty. The first section identifies the analysis’ trigger point, that is the junior ally’s quest for autonomy. The second section describes the alliance variables from the weaker ally’s view, considering its threat perceptions, the benefits coming from the alliance, and the voice opportunities. Then, it follows an indepth historical narrative of the interallied relations during the period under investigation, describing the main junctures. The last paragraphs develop a specific analysis of the persistence and termination processes and find evidence of cohesion or erosion in the interallied relations. Finally, the conclusive Chapter 8 develops a few final comments in light of the empirical analysis. It points out the value of the weaker

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ally’s voice and proposes to rethink the conventional wisdom on the autonomy-security tradeoff as it undervalues the protégées’ agency. In fact, as alliances can undergo changes affecting all its member states, theorizing on less powerful allies’ behavior improves our knowledge and paves the way to better understand current alliance policies.

Notes 1. Cha V., “Powerplay. Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/2010), pp. 158–196; Mattes M., “Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design”, International Organization, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 679–707; Beckley M., “The Mith of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of US Defense Pacts”, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 7–48. 2. See Morrow J., “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (November 1991), pp. 903–933. For a different view, Chung J., “Capability Change, Economic Dependence and Alliance Termination”, The Korean Journal of International Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (August 2016), pp. 209–240. 3. Catalinac A., “Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing “Opposition for Autonomy” in Asymmetric Alliances”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 6 (2010), pp. 317–338; Chung J., op. cit., 2016; Castillo J. and Downes A., “Loyalty, Hedging or Exit: How Weaker Alliance Partners Respond to the Rise of New Threats”, Journal of Strategic Studies (July 2020), pp. 1–39; Kim T., The Supply Side of Security. A Market Theory of Military Alliances, Stanford University Press, 2017; Izumikawa Y., “Binding Strategies in Alliance Politics: The Soviet-Japanese-US Diplomatic Tug of War in the Mid-1950s”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 62 (2018), pp. 108–120; Blankenship B., op. cit., 2020. 4. Morrow J., op. cit., 1991; Bennet S., “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816–1984”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 846–878; De Castro R., “Philippines Defense Policy in the 21th Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 403–422(20); Leeds & Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 4 (No., 2007), pp. 1118–1132; Park J.J., “The Persistence of the US-Led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: An Order Insurance Explanation”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 13 (2013), pp. 337–368. 5. Lanoszka A., Miliary Alliances in the Twenty-first Century, Polity Press, 2022.

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6. See classic books such as Morgenthau HJ, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Knopf, 1948; Liska G., Nations in Alliance. The Limits of Interdependence, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962; Waltz K., Theory of International Politics, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1979. 7. In his history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides describes the implications of the Peace of Nicias by identifying the Spartan threat as the fundamental reason for the birth of the League of Argos. Niccolò Machiavelli points out that the presence of powerful and dangerous enemies keeps the allies together. Jean Bodin argues that minor states jointly oppose the power of the strongest as much as possible to preserve their security. See Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Penguin Books, 2000; Machiavelli N., Lettera al Vettori, 10 August 1513; Bazzoli M., Introduzione, in Bazzoli M., L’equilibrio di potenza nell’età moderna. Dal Cinquecento al Congresso di Vienna, Unicopli, 2006. 8. Walt S., The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, 1987. 9. According to George Liska, states’ aligning decisions depend on identical national interests. Hans J. Morgenthau points out that an alliance requires a community of interests for its foundation. Glenn Snyder argues that alliances are cooperative endeavors in which states agree on combining their resources to pursue some common goal. Even Randall Schweller, although focusing on the phenomenon of bandwagoning, does not ignore that allies have compatible political ends. See Liska G., op. cit., 1962, pp. 26–27; Morgenthau HJ, “Alliances in Theory and Practice”, in A. Wolfers (eds.), Alliance Policy in the Cold War, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959, pp. 184–212; Snyder G., Alliance Politics, Cornell University Press, 1997, p. 1; Schweller R.L., “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, International Security, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (1994), pp. 72–107. 10. The «balance of threat» and the «balance of interest» arguments represent variations of this main argument. See Walt S., op. cit., 1987, and Schweller R.L., op. cit., 1994. 11. Waltz K. op. cit., 1979. 12. The author specifies the sources of threat perceptions by considering four factors: aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. The interweaving of these variables determines the propensity of states to enter into alliances. See Walt S., op. cit., 1987. 13. Wolfers A., Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1962, p. 29; Holsti O., Hopmann T., Sullivan J., Unity and Disintegration in International Alliance: Comparative Studies, John Wiley & Sons; 1st edition March 1973, p. 257.

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11

14. David S., “Explaining Third World Alignment”, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan. 1991), pp. 233–256; Barnett M. and Levy J., “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignment: The Case of Egypt, 1962–73”, International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991); Harknett R. & VanDenBerg J., “Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf Crisis”, Security Studies, Vol. 6, No 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 112–153; Miller E. and Toritsyn A., “Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States”, Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April–June 2005), pp. 325–363; Fumagalli M., “Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia: The Rationale and Implications of Uzbekistan’s Rapprochement with Russia”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2007), pp. 253–271. 15. David S., op. cit. (Jan. 1991), pp. 233–256. 16. Barnett M. and Levy J., op.cit., Summer 1991. 17. Miller E. and Toritsyn A., op.cit., April–June 2005, pp. 325–363. 18. Tamm H., “The Origins of Transnational Alliances. Rulers, Rebels, and Political Survival in the Congo Wars”, International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Summer 2016), pp. 147–181. 19. Castillo J. and Downes A., op.cit., pp. 1–39. 20. Garely J., The US Role in NATO Survival After the Cold War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. 21. Mc Calla R., “NATO Persistence after the Cold War”, International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 445–475. 22. Haftendorn H., Keohane R., Wallander C., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 5. 23. Ibidem, p. 4, 1999. 24. Wallander C., “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War”, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 705–735. 25. Rafferty K., “An Institutionalist Reinterpretation of Cold War Alliance Systems: Insights for Alliance Theory”, Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Jun., 2003), pp. 341–362. 26. Park J.J., op. cit., pp. 337–368. 27. Bennet S., op. cit., 1997. 28. Ohtomo T., “Enduring Unipolarity: Exploring US primacy after the Cold War”, Ph.D. thesis, unpublished manuscript, University of Tsukuba, 2013.

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Bibliography Barnett M. and Levy J., “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignment: The Case of Egypt, 1962–73”, International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991). Bazzoli M., Introduzione, in Bazzoli M. (ed.), L’equilibrio di potenza nell’età moderna. Dal Cinquecento al Congresso di Vienna, Unicopli, 2006. Beckley M., “The Mith of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of US Defense Pacts”, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 7–48. Bennet S., “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816–1984”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 846– 878. Castillo J. and Downes A., “Loyalty, Hedging or Exit: How Weaker Alliance Partners Respond to the Rise of New Threats”, Journal of Strategic Studies (July 2020), pp. 1–39. Catalinac A., “Why New Zealand Took Itself Out of ANZUS: Observing “Opposition for Autonomy” in Asymmetric Alliances”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 6 (2010), pp. 317–338. Cha V., “Powerplay. Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/2010), pp. 158–196. Chung J., “Capability Change, Economic Dependence and Alliance Termination”, The Korean Journal of International Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (August 2016), pp. 209–240. David S., “Explaining Third World Alignment”, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan. 1991), pp. 233–256. De Castro R., “Philippines Defense Policy in the 21th Century: Autonomous Defense or back to the Alliance?”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 403–422(20). Fumagalli M., “Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia: The Rationale and Implications of Uzbekistan’s Rapprochement with Russia”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2007), pp. 253–271. Garely J., The US Role in NATO survival After the Cold War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Haftendorn H., Keohane R., Wallander C., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space, Oxford University Press, 1999. Harknett R. & VanDenBerg J., “Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf Crisis”, Security Studies, Vol. 6, No 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 112–153. Holsti O., Hopmann T., Sullivan J., Unity and Disintegration in International Alliance: Comparative Studies, John Wiley & Sons, March 1973.

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Izumikawa Y., “Binding Strategies in Alliance Politics: The Soviet-Japanese-US Diplomatic Tug of War in the Mid-1950s”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 62 (2018), pp. 108–120. Kim T., The Supply Side of Security. A Market Theory of Military Alliances, Stanford University Press, 2017. Lanoszka A., Miliary Alliances in the Twenty-first Century, Polity Press, 2022. Leeds & Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 4 (November 2007), pp. 1118–1132. Liska G., Nations in Alliance. The Limits of Interdependence, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962. Machiavelli N., Lettera al Vettori, 10 August 1513. Mattes M., “Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design”, International Organization, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 679–707. Mc Calla R., “NATO Persistence after the Cold War”, International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 445–475. Miller E. and Toritsyn A., “Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States”, Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April–June 2005), pp. 325–363. Morgenthau HJ, “Alliances in Theory and Practice”, in A. Wolfers (ed.), Alliance Policy in the Cold War, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959, pp. 184–212. Morgenthau H.J., Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Knopf, 1948. Morrow J., “Alliances and Asymmetry: An alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4, November 1991, pp. 903–933. Ohtomo T., “Enduring Unipolarity: Exploring US Primacy after the Cold War”, Ph.D. thesis, unpublished manuscript, University of Tsukuba, 2013. Park J.J., “The Persistence of the US-Led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: An Order Insurance Explanation”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 13 (2013), pp. 337–368. Rafferty K., “An Institutionalist Reinterpretation of Cold War Alliance Systems: Insights for Alliance Theory”, Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Jun., 2003), pp. 341–362. Schweller R.L., “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, International Security, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (1994), pp. 72–107. Snyder G., Alliance Politics, Cornell University Press, 1997. Tamm H., “The Origins of Transnational Alliances. Rulers, Rebels, and Political Survival in the Congo Wars”, International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Summer 2016), pp. 147–181. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Penguin Books, 2000.

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Wallander C., “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War”, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 705–735. Walt S., The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, 1987. Waltz K., Theory of International Politics, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1979. Wolfers A., Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1962.

CHAPTER 2

The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances

Abstract This chapter theoretically investigates the junior ally’s stance on alliance persistence or termination. Firstly, it measures the protégé’s threat perceptions and alliance benefits. Then, it evaluates the role of autonomy in asymmetric relationships, focusing on the weaker side’s voice opportunities. A theoretical model is put forward to interpret historical and contemporary cases of alliances, treating the junior ally’s voice effectiveness as the leading independent variable. Finally, some causal mechanisms describe the processes that lead to alliance persistence or termination. Keywords Threat perception · Alliance benefits · Asymmetry management · Quest for autonomy · Voice opportunity · Alliance persistence · Alliance termination

IR scholars do not readily engage with cases of weaker parties unilaterally abrogating an alliance with a Great power. On the one hand, part of the IR literature considers alliances as tools to dissuade or face threatening actors, assuming that weaker members have mostly security concerns that disincentive alliance exit.1 Other authors argue that pathdependence processes discourage alliance dissolution due to the benefits

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Leva, The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35448-9_2

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of cooperation and the increasing exit cost.2 Moreover, the most established statistical analyses conclude that weaker ally agencies do not affect the evolution of asymmetric alliances.3 Certainly, weaker sides in asymmetric relationships can obtain several benefits: enhancing their security and territorial integrity, reducing uncertainty and potential for disputes with third parties, and enjoying good standards of international behavior from other compliant states. However, IR literature adopts restricted lenses interpreting protégées’ agencies. In fact, twentieth-century diplomatic history provides several examples of weaker alliance members that have unilaterally abrogated military agreements with great powers in charge of guaranteeing their security. Therefore, it is crucial to understand what can lead a junior partner to exit a security agreement with its patron while another can prefer to strengthen it. In light of these remarks, the following sections adopt an innovative perspective focusing on the weaker ally’s behavior, its search for autonomy, and the voice opportunities to account for an asymmetric alliance’s persistence or termination.4

The Basic Theoretical Framework The IR literature develops two primary arguments to interpret the endurance of alliances. Realist scholars focus on the degree of threat perception, while institutionalists concentrate on the benefits coming from the interallied exchange. Therefore, according to these theories, the following section develops a 2 × 2 matrix to define the weaker ally’s incentives and disincentives to abrogate or keep an asymmetric alliance. Weaker Ally’s Threat Perception The first variable is the junior ally’s threat perception. Here, we consider the main realist explanation for an alliance’s formation and persistence, pointing out the role of menacing third parties.5 In this view, states can experience both internal and external threats.6 In the former case, the occurrence of threats to the weaker ally regime’s survival might be the glue for preserving the alliance.7 However, once the domestic threats are defeated or disappear, the need for external support and legitimacy should decrease, making the alliance termination more likely. In the second

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case, external threats should increase when neighbor states show aggressive intentions or their military capabilities rise.8 Here, the need for the patron’s protection might decrease when significant disputes are settled, or regional rival states become significantly weaker.9 The threat hypothesis, therefore, can be formulated as follows. THREAT HYPOTHESIS: When threat perception is high, the junior ally is less likely to terminate the alliance; when threat perception is low, the weaker partner is more likely to end the alliance.

Then, how do states measure the entity and sources of threats? Firstly, one actor can reasonably expect to have conflicts within its politically relevant international environment. In operational terms, it looks at its neighbors and global powers. Security concerns, therefore, might increase if one out of these actors increases its offensive power and credibly menace a military move.10 However, a rising state might not express its aggressive intentions. In this case, the historical experience can justify an increasing perception of this potential external threat. Secondly, a state involved in a militarized interstate dispute experiences higher threat perceptions than one having peaceful external relations.11 Thirdly, domestic uprisings can indicate internal opponents seeking to delegitimize and destabilize the government or the ruling elite.12 The Alliance’s Benefits for the Weaker Ally The second variable concerns the alliance’s benefits for the junior ally. Alliance benefits consist of the remuneration coming from the interallied exchange, including the patron’s political support and the credibility of its security commitment. Moreover, it considers the opportunity to obtain substitute resources from other partners. Scarce alternatives imply that the alliance has a notable strategic value, while the presence of other potential partners makes it not strictly necessary. Therefore, in negative terms, this variable takes into account what would be lost if the partnership was broken, and what would be needed to do to receive similar advantages from other parties. It is worth stressing that the allies’ exchange of resources can bring benefits but can also be a source of dependency, particularly for a weaker side in an asymmetric relationship.13 Those scholars considering power as a property of social relations, rather than an attribute of the actors, define

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alliance dependence as a function of needs and alternatives.14 In this view, one ally depends on the other to the extent that the partner provides more significant advantages than those offered by the next-best option. Moreover, institutionalist scholars have added that exit cost is likely to increase once allies establish a favorable exchange. Therefore, the alliance benefits hypothesis can be formulated as follows. ALLIANCE BENEFITS HYPOTHESIS: When alliance benefits are high, the junior ally is less likely to terminate the alliance; when alliance benefits are low, the weaker partner is more likely to end the alliance.

Focusing on the weaker ally’s needs, the measurement of alliance benefits includes the partners’ military cooperation in arms transfers, military training exercises, officers training, and shared intelligence. The powerful ally’s resources have intrinsic and relative value for the other member state. On the one hand, they are highly significant in absolute terms because they satisfy some need of the ally; on the other hand, they acquire more or less value in light of their substitutability. In this view, the degree of resource substitutability points out how valuable interallied military cooperation is for the weaker partner. Moreover, alliance benefits can be measured by looking at the reliability of the patron commitment and the grade of its support once the junior one is involved in ongoing military conflicts or disputes with third parties. How Threat Perception and Alliance Benefits Affect Choices Once we combine the two variables, four ideal typologies for alliance evolution emerge. The following matrix illustrates it graphically (Table 2.1). First, we have a clear case for alliance persistence once threat perception and alliance benefits are high (the top-right cell). Here, the junior ally has strong incentives to keep the security agreement. On the other hand, the mirror-like case, having both low-threat perception and low benefits coming from the alliance, implies the inverse outcome. Here, an over-determinate case of alliance termination occurs since there are few incentives for the weaker ally to keep the agreement (the bottom-left cell). Considering the latter case, the IR literature recognizes two underlying causal mechanisms leading to the agreement’s dissolution. Firstly,

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Table 2.1 Basic theoretical framework High

Indeterminate Type I

Over-determinate Alliance Persistence

Threat Perception Low

Over-determinate Alliance Termination

Indeterminate Type II

Low

High Alliance Benefits

the “successful independence” hypothesis suggests that an alliance may become less attractive as one member state develops capabilities to face its enemies alone.15 For instance, one ally’s threat perception might decrease, given a significant increase in its relative capabilities. Enemies might be defeated, or rivalries with neighbors might be solved. In this case, as an alliance implies costs in terms of resource commitment, the disengagement could favor the internal relocation of resources by favoring domestic production and well-being.16 On the other hand, a rising ally might claim more independence to pursue changing foreign policy goals. As the partner might not be able or willing to set its commitments differently and conform to the new internal power balance, the alliance is more likely to terminate than when the allies’ relative capabilities remain stable.17 Secondly, the “declining credibility” hypothesis suggests that states can be persuaded to abrogate the security treaty as the alliance provides less benefit due to missing material support.18 For instance, a less dependent ally might lack the will to support the partner, changing its foreign policy goals. Moreover, a junior ally might question the patron’s reliability and resolve to keep its commitments. Asymmetric alliances can be particularly sensitive to this kind of issue. On the one hand, a patron deficient in the military cooperation field might signal its loss of capacity or will to fulfill the alliance obligations, triggering the weaker side’s exit. The partner’s reliability might be doubted, also observing its behavior in other alliances. Indeed, a state assuming a risky posture incentivizing the ally’s

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fear of entrapment or abandonment can induce restraining initiatives or even alliance abrogation.19 The two remaining alliance typologies are framed as indeterminate cases as both offer contradictory incentives to the weaker ally. These typologies cannot predict the alliance’s persistence or termination because the variables’ inducements diverge. Type I (the top-left cell) suggests that threat perception might be high while the benefits coming from the alliance are low. Here, a junior ally faces a significant alliance deficit in security as the patron does not provide sufficient military support. In a way, it resembles the scenario described by the “declining credibility” hypothesis. Inefficiencies and lack of material support make more substantial incentives for exiting the alliance. However, the risks of isolation and high-threat perception might discourage the agreement dissolution. Differently, Type II (the bottom-right cell) suggests that the threat perception might be low while the alliance’s benefits are high. The latter value indicates that interallied cooperation provides increasing returns that provide an inducement for keeping the agreement. Nevertheless, there is an alliance deficit due to the weaker side’s reduced need for protection. The “successful independence” hypothesis outlines the key features of this case as the junior ally might evaluate that costs and obligations are too high to preserve the agreement in light of a decreasing threat perception. Therefore, these typologies cannot infer by themselves if the weaker ally can prefer an alliance to persist or terminate. This theoretical gap might come from underestimating other critical features and functions of alliances. For this reason, we will focus on the role of autonomy in asymmetric alliances by formulating a new hypothesis about the junior allies’ incentives for alliance persistence or termination.

The Role of Autonomy in Asymmetric Alliances The Roots of the Problem: Autonomy, Security, and Interallied Control James Morrow famously defined the security-autonomy tradeoff model by arguing that members exchange different kinds of goods in asymmetric relations.20 Weaker parties are expected to give up their autonomy to obtain more security. Conversely, the patron acquires control over the protégé’s agency by guaranteeing its defense. Alliance theorists widely recognize this exchange, emphasizing how the more powerful side increases its leeway to influence the weaker partner.

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Studies examining asymmetric relationships find that patrons shape treaty designs to limit the risk of being entrapped.21 Cha argued that the US choice for bilateral agreements in North-East Asia after World War II came from the intent of reaching stricter control over potentially dangerous allies.22 Although the alliances aimed to contain the Soviet threat, bilateralism was preferred to multilateralism to constrain minor allies that could engage in aggressive behavior and wars against neighboring states. Other scholars examined major allies’ strategies to keep enduring control over smaller ones. Mattes pointed out that patrons use deeper institutionalization to influence their partners, while Blankenship found that reassurance mechanisms increase great powers’ control over allies.23 Gerzhoy, finally, found that the patron can successfully restrain the client’s nuclear ambitions once the latter is militarily dependent, and assurances are provided that threats of abandonment are conditional to its nuclear choices.24 These studies indicate that limiting the weaker ally’s leeway is a prerogative of more powerful sides in asymmetric relationships. Indeed, the patron has strong incentives to keep alliances alive to express dissatisfaction and advocate changes through its bargaining power rather than abrogating the agreement.25 Moreover, this view is coherent with IR classic works emphasizing that alliances imply mechanisms of control, mutual hindrance, and influence between the partners.26 As states can have compatible and incompatible interests, they might ally and keep an agreement alive to gain control over the ally, but not necessarily to face a common enemy.27 As Joffe argued, Bismarck’s pact mania did not aim to aggregate power but to devalue it.28 The web of Prussian agreements discouraged the formation of hostile coalitions by preserving German primacy on the European continent. Gaining control over minor states through establishing security agreements also increased German control over third states outside the alliance system. Similarly, Weitsman found that states can have incentives to form alliances with each other either to secure from common threats or to manage the danger they face from each other.29 This behavior, defined as tethering, indicates that perils come both from the ally and third parties outside the alliance.30 Pressman, then, argued that some alliances might originate from attempting to change the behavior of someone within the alliance more than facing any external state.31 In these cases, the failure or success of the restraint depends on the willingness to mobilize power resources.

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At the same time, weaker allies can interpret an alliance as a safer tool to deal with the most powerful partner. Ohtomo claimed that Japan and Germany preserved their post-Cold War security agreements to reassure allies and third parties about their status-quo intentions.32 Likewise, Press-Barnathan argued that NATO persisted in the demise of the original enemy to allow the weaker partners to engage in a division of labor strategy that restrained the hegemon and reduced the risks of abandonment and entrapment.33 Therefore, most IR alliance literature finds that weaker sides have incentives to keep agreements alive to preserve the status quo and their security. In this view, Morrow’s security-autonomy tradeoff leaves little leeway to conceptualize the weaker side’s agency beyond its need for protection. Similarly, classic authors in the realist and institutionalist research strands are silent on weaker actors’ quest for autonomy, presuming the latter has reduced freedom of action, minimum bargaining leverage, and relies on the more powerful partner’s defense. Analyses and comments on asymmetric alliance evolutions privilege the stronger side’s perspective, not considering the more vulnerable partner fully because of its dependence on the patron. In a nutshell, conventional wisdom holds that protégées have limited autonomy or almost none, particularly under bipolarity and unipolarity.34 However, more recent works have shown an increasing sensibility in examining conditions under which weaker states can achieve their goals and increase their leeway in an asymmetric relationship.35 Kassab found that autonomy directed to economic development can be achieved if weak and vulnerable states are considered non-threatening and do not impact the balance-of-power arrangement.36 Tang argued that small states could bolster their autonomy by pursuing liberal capitalistic economic development while competing great powers in the power transition system aim to include weaker actors in their alliance networks.37 Chung concluded that, under low economic dependence on the patron, junior partners increasing their capabilities are more likely to abrogate an asymmetric alliance if they are restrained from seeking autonomy.38 Moreover, the IR theory recognizes that weaker states can bind powerful ones through institutional mechanisms of consultations and decision-making. Indeed, these can be vital tools for less powerful actors working with stronger ones and aiming to escape domination in an asymmetric interaction.39 A weaker ally can address its concerns with the stronger one, either looking for its support or seeking to increase its own

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leeway. Moreover, it can try enhancing its status or regional influence, raising its voice depending on the need to impact the more powerful ally once the latter is involved in relevant international issues. Under specific conditions, such as a decreasing threat perception or a lack of remuneration in the interallied exchange, weaker allies might have greater incentives to fill the security gap by asking for more autonomy. As the alliance literature does not really engage in analyzing these processes, the following sections will pave the way for a more comprehensive understanding of interallied relations in an asymmetric context. Asymmetry and Its Management IR scholars stress that asymmetry implies a disparity in material capabilities—defined by differences in population, territories, militaries, and economies—that favors establishing a beneficial interaction among the allies. Indeed, states can profit from non-reciprocal commitments, exchanging different goods. In Morrow’s terms, the powerful ally can gain autonomy by acquiring a certain degree of control over the internal and foreign policy of the minor partner. At the same time, the latter can improve its security by enjoying the partner’s protection. This kind of agreement might imply the stronger side’s unilateral commitment to guarantee the weaker side’s security while the latter makes some political and economic concessions. Most IR literature recognizes that these beneficial features make asymmetric alliances more stable and durable than symmetric ones.40 Member states satisfy different needs developing a more stable exchange than those in symmetric relationships. As the bargaining space is wider, alliances will likely provide net advantages even when each side’s capabilities and interests change over time. Asymmetry, in other words, can help to overcome an interallied crisis by promoting a good division of labor.41 Yet, asymmetry has critical features, creating differences in attention and perspective among allies, which favor misperceptions.42 As the weaker side occupies a smaller share of the great power’s international horizon, it suffers from the sporadic and partial attention of the more powerful partner. On the other hand, the weaker side might be particularly concerned because it has more to gain or lose in the relationship than the stronger actor. In this context, misperceptions due to the stronger side’s lack of attention and the smaller sides’ over-attention might trigger an alliance crisis.43

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Non-reciprocal commitments and differences in the allies’ degree of attention are critical in asymmetric relations. These features develop within a specific relational framework, consisting of disparities in the bargaining power, degree of dependence, and ability to influence and obtain others’ conformity.44 Here, power differentials can be interpreted as a tool to define the outline and essential elements of the relationships, including through control methods.45 As the powerful ally is the preponderant one, it requires the conformity of the weaker alliance member to its preferences.46 This claim can originate from the exchange between the protection the stronger provides to the more vulnerable and the obedience the latter promises to the patron.47 The junior ally’s duty of obedience might concern different areas of state action. More specifically, the powerful ally can indicate friends and enemies or even inhibit the partner from fulfilling national ambitions (foreign policy control); it can require that its army transit the weaker side’s territory, placing troops permanently and demanding access to strategic areas (territorial control); it can assure itself the monopoly of the military command (operational military control); it can ask for privileged trade agreements, and it can require to share the alliance’s financial burden (economic and financial control); it can influence the internal processes of decision-making (domestic policy control); it can penetrate, finally, the weaker side’s society with its own customs and tradition (ideological and cultural control).48 Therefore, an asymmetric relation can imply acknowledging different degrees of the partners’ autonomy. Undoubtedly the stronger side is facilitated in preserving its freedom of action while influencing the weaker partner’s choices or even attempting to force its policies. However, it is worth stressing that an unbalanced power distribution does not necessarily mean unilateral dominion from the stronger to the weaker. Instead, our inquiry into alliance policies suggests excluding these extreme cases. It is more appropriate to judge asymmetric relationships as having one smaller side significantly more exposed than the bigger one because of a disparity in capabilities. Still, the latter cannot impose the terms of the relationship unilaterally.49 Indeed, relations having power imbalances also imply mutual rewards. Risks of resistance and retaliation might occur once the powerful actor either tries imposing his will through pure coercion or denies acknowledging the weaker side’s interests.50 In this view, the IR literature recognizes that two opposite forces affect asymmetric relationships. On

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the one hand, several features of asymmetry push the stronger side to establish strict control over the protégées’ agency. On the other hand, the successful management of asymmetry requires acknowledging a certain degree of autonomy from the powerful to the weaker side.51 Diplomatic history provides several examples of stronger actors facing the power management issue to preserve their primacy. According to Jacqueline de Romilly, in ancient Greece, hegemony was maintained through active and generous conduct toward the weaker actors and by avoiding any reduction of their autonomy.52 Autonomy and hegemony, therefore, were not contradictory terms. According to Brantly Womack, in ancient China, the Song dynasty was careful about managing its relations with the periphery. The rituals of the tribute system represented an exchange of central recognition of autonomy for signs of compliance from neighbors.53 Regarding the contemporary international system, many scholars have argued that the persistence of the US leadership and system of alliances after the Cold War required careful power management by the superpower and the complicity of the supporter states.54 Therefore, a successful asymmetric relationship relies not solely on material power preponderance but is configured in a well-managed exchange with the protégées. As an alliance providing protection can also strongly affect the weaker side’s autonomy and freedom of action, examining the latter’s view becomes a key variable to understanding how alliances evolve and why they persist or collapse. The following section analyzes this tradeoff critically by emphasizing the value of the weaker side’s autonomy and paves the way for building the book’s hypotheses on alliances’ persistence and termination. The Weaker Ally’s Quest for Autonomy The IR literature provides several insights to define the concept of autonomy. Two scholars have identified it as one of the state’s three national interests, together with physical survival and economic wellbeing.55 Another author has defined it as the ability of a state to exercise control over its allocation of resources and to make autonomous choices.56 Other scholars have recognized some distinctive features: in the political sphere, autonomy would represent a country’s ability to determine its defense strategy; in the operational field, its ability to plan and conduct military operations independently from others; and finally, in the industrial dimension, the ability to develop its military capabilities.57

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A. LEVA

For our purposes, autonomy is defined with reference to the policy of interallied control. Therefore, it firstly concerns a country’s leeway in foreign and domestic policy, and the ability to define its national security strategy, reach the desired political goals, and even pursue changes in the status quo.58 Then, from an operational point of view, it indicates the institutional capacity to plan and conduct military operations with limited or no assistance from third parties, including the ally. To be achieved, the latter dimension requires independent development in the military field and the increment of defense capabilities comprising advanced information systems.59 Finally, autonomy results in the ability to pursue changes in the bilateral alliance, obtaining new concessions or escaping old obligations fixed in the relationship with the patron.60 Undoubtedly, autonomy is a matter of degree, and allies have to renounce some amount of it to achieve cooperation. Once interests do not converge, one ally can measure its degree of autonomy by pursuing its national goals without assistance. However, this process does not necessarily imply a detachment from the alliance. Instead, it can trigger an adjustment if allies are willing to bargain a renovated convergence, taking into account the interests of the powerful and those of the more vulnerable. Therefore, it is critical to investigate how the weaker ally’s autonomy ambitions can affect the allied relationship and which goals are pursued.61 Alliance theorists recognize that alliances can provide significant opportunities for gain, and the junior ally might intend to maximize its goals.62 It can express the desire to possess some specific goods and attempt to change their distribution among states. Within the international environment, these goods might include territory, status, markets, ideology, and the creation or change of international law and institutions.63 Then, it might express an interest in pursuing a strategy to improve its regional status and influence. For instance, it might aim to increase its capability of external extraction to consolidate the state’s internal strength or reduce the capability gap with rival neighbor states.64 External extraction may be a helpful strategy for generating resources that reinforce the domestic position of the state and attenuate internal political instability. In a nutshell, it can positively affect the ability to invest more resources in domestic goals (more internal mobilization) and reduce domestic pressures (less internal extraction). On the other hand, other circumstances can occur. The junior ally can suffer if the patron appears less supportive or valuable, or it can fear

2

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27

becoming a satellite of the more powerful partner, losing its freedom of action.65 In both cases, it can attempt to negotiate some adjustments to satisfy its needs. It might ask to modify the alliance’s exchange patterns or renegotiate the agreement to obtain a better distribution of gains. For instance, the junior ally can request more involvement in the alliance operations to acquire more command and information. Moreover, it can advance new priorities and be open to relationships with third parties, pursuing a more self-reliant defense policy. Finally, the protégé can ask for adjustments concerning the agreements on foreign military bases and troops stationed on its territory. While such changes may be challenging to achieve for a weaker side in an asymmetric relationship, certain conditions might be favorable. Indeed, the quest for a greater degree of autonomy might compensate for an alliance deficit in security. Once the threat perception becomes low, or the benefits coming from the alliance are significantly decreasing due to missing support by the patron, the protégé might ask to reconsider the terms of the relationship. Indeed, greater autonomy can help to face an increasing threat successfully even though the more powerful ally does not provide the desired material support (Type I case). For instance, neighboring states might significantly improve their military technology or show aggressive intentions by imposing the weaker alliance member to extract resources from society rapidly. By increasing its leeway and taking resources from abroad, the latter can decrease domestic pressure and avoid affecting the internal state’s legitimacy negatively. Moreover, the junior ally might decide to interpret its alliance commitments differently once the original enemy is defeated or other threats disappear (Type II case). It might attempt to use the alliance as a tool to increase its regional status and influence, or recondition its alliance commitments.66 Therefore, once it loses some security benefits in the alliance’s exchange, the junior partner might try to recover a portion of the autonomy that was yielded initially. The patron might be more or less accommodating toward this goal, eventually containing the ally’s leeway in the regional context and its capacity for external extraction or denying other changes in the alliance relationship. Yet, the junior actor might need the more powerful partner’s benevolence or support to reach his goals. This makes it essential to investigate whether the quest for autonomy translates into political outcomes or is denied by the more powerful ally.

28

A. LEVA

The Voice and Exit Alliance Processes Analyzing a weaker ally’s behavior in the context of an alliance deficit recalls the famous Hirschman’s contribution about how actors react through the “exit, voice, and loyalty” options once the organization they belong to has declining performance.67 The exit option implies an actor accepting the organization’s decline and preparing to leave it. At the same time, the voice option indicates a member protesting, complaining, expressing dissatisfaction, and trying to persuade others to reverse the decline.68 In an alliance context, exiting might occur through a unilateral treaty abrogation by a member declaration, for instance, that the agreement is not even more recognized. On the other hand, a weaker alliance partner might avoid confrontation with the patron but be equally detached from the alliance, not embracing its purposes, and denouncing it until it breaks de facto. In these contexts of alliance crisis, evaluating if and how the weaker ally voice expresses and can trigger beneficial changes in the interallied relationships is crucial. Voice effectiveness can be defined as an institutional feature making the views of the allies not just expressed but reliably having a tangible impact on the outcomes of the strategic interactions.69 Once the alliance voice opportunity translates into shared political goals satisfying the weaker side, the allies operate in an asymmetric relation that escapes unilateral domination. This recognition implies that a junior ally can defend and pursue its interests within and through the alliance. Focusing on the weaker alliance partner voice opportunity, we adopt a power perspective that does not share Thucydides’ famous argument claiming that strong actors do what they can while the more vulnerable suffer what they must.70 Although power differentials matter, it is not opportune to assume that the more powerful actor is omnipotent while the less powerful is impotent. Indeed, an asymmetric approach investigates how the management of asymmetry can erode or strengthen, and then abbreviate or protract, the existing matrix of power by looking at both accommodative and coercive approaches.71 By building on the theory of asymmetric relationships, this section develops a new hypothesis about the persistence and termination of asymmetric alliances. It relies on the following logic. In the context of an alliance deficit in security (as described by Type I and Type II cases), if the stronger side always maximizes its relative power advantage in dealing with the ally, it favors its resistance and sense of alienation. In the short

2

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29

term, egoistic goals can be achieved successfully; however, losing the partner’s consensus might have a strategic cost in the long run.72 Indeed, the weaker side’s voice ineffectiveness can trigger processes of non-reciprocity and finally lead to the alliance termination. By contrast, if the more powerful side accommodates the partner’s needs, it can enjoy increased legitimacy by favoring the weaker actor’s sense of inclusion. Although the stronger side might pay some costs by investing its power resources in the short term, it is more likely to prolong the existing matrix of power in the long run. The weaker side’s voice effectiveness, then, can likely lead to the persistence of the alliance. These arguments imply that a more powerful ally can exercise a different degree of control toward the protégé. Adopting a policy of soft control triggers those forces that favor the persistence of the alliance. Two processes are at work in the context of an alliance deficit coming from less need for security or less remuneration from the exchange. Firstly, the leading ally successfully manages the asymmetric relationship by paving the way to adjustments accommodating the partner’s goals. Soft control can imply a patron bringing material and political resources to satisfy the junior side’s interests.73 Nonetheless, favoring too much freedom might be risky, incentivizing the weaker partner to consider more adventurous and aggressive behavior, which otherwise would be avoided. Therefore, this approach implies that the more powerful side manages the partner requests, considering them part of a broader alliance strategy. Although divergence of interests might occur, the dominant partner should be able to provide feasible alternatives by adjusting the alliance’s common goals. Secondly, the alliance gains internal cohesion as the junior partner recognizes the advantages of the hierarchical relations given the effectiveness of its voice opportunities. Successful management of asymmetry favors increased authority legitimacy from the more vulnerable to the stronger side. A weaker ally engages in acts of symbolic obeisance, acknowledging the advantages of the asymmetric relation.74 International obeisance implies following the leader and providing adequate support in the diplomatic and military fields. Therefore, we can formulate the voice effectiveness hypothesis as follows. VOICE EFFECTIVENESS HYPOTHESIS: When the weaker ally’s voice is effective, the latter is less likely to terminate the alliance.

30

A. LEVA

The voice effectiveness indicates that the junior ally’s views are considered and included in a more comprehensive alliance strategy. At the same time, the stronger side gains long-term from the renovated cohesion. By contrast, the patron fosters the mismanagement of asymmetry by adopting a policy of hard control toward the protégé. This approach obstructs any quest for autonomy by making the weaker ally’s voice opportunities ineffective. Here, two alliance erosion processes are at work. Firstly, the junior partner opens to new partnerships to diversify its foreign policy. As the duty of obedience and the limitation in resources inevitably constrain states to take sides and privilege one relation at the expense of another, the alliance erosion incentivizes the weaker side to evaluate how new friends are beneficial. For instance, the protégé might pursue a new formal alliance that better mirrors its interests. Other goals might be appeasement with a former rival and developing a new political-economic partnership with regional neighbor states. Finally, as alliances impede the members from entering into contradictory agreements with third parties, specifically with opponent ones, the junior ally might also consider the plausibility of improving relations with a rival state of its partner. Secondly, the alliance cohesion starts loosening because the weaker side thinks of the powerful ally as a strategic hindrance.75 Although the minor partner needs the patron’s partial collaboration (or at least its benevolent neutrality) to achieve its national goals, the allies have conflicting interests that obstruct cooperation. The weaker side, therefore, might seek to slow down interallied military exchanges, reducing the degree of policy coordination and showing greater concern about the distribution of benefits.76 According to these arguments, we can advance the voice ineffectiveness hypothesis as follows. VOICE INEFFECTIVENESS HYPOTHESIS: When the weaker ally’s voice is ineffective, the latter is more likely to terminate the alliance.

Therefore, the voice ineffectiveness feeds the weaker ally’s disaffection as the stronger side does not consider the former’s core interests. Although the more powerful ally maximizes its relative advantages in the short term, it triggers a process of alliance erosion in the long run. Table 2.2 summarizes the arguments of this section, showing how Type I and Type II alliances can evolve.

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Table 2.2 Model of alliance persistence and termination Scope condition

Quest for autonomy

Independent variable

Alliance processes

Outcomes

Effective

Policy of Soft Interallied Control Widening common alliance goals Strategic obeisance

Alliance persistence

Ineffective

Policy of Hard Interallied Control Foreign policy diversification Strategic Hindrance

Alliance termination

The Weaker Voice

Research Design and Method Research Goal and Types of Cases This study deals with two puzzles with different natures: empirical and theoretical. Empirically, alliance theory does not account for cases of minor allies actively involved in terminating their security agreement with Great powers. This means ignoring cases of diplomatic history, relying on the wrong assumption that junior partners have limited agency and leeway. Theoretically, the most established hypotheses lead to indeterminate outcomes concerning the persistence or termination of military alliances. This implies a gap in alliance theory. In order to solve these puzzles, this research introduces an omitted variable that integrates a preexisting theoretical framework, engaging in a hypothesis-modification study.77 In other words, it deals with a puzzle that previous contributions overlooked and adds an undervalued factor to solve it. It is worth defining the type of cases the study deals with. Type I cases are failed most-likely cases for realism if the minor ally terminates the alliance even though threat perception is high. On the other hand, these are passed least-likely cases for institutionalism whether the alliance persists although the benefits are low. Differently, Type II cases are passed least-likely cases for realism when the alliance continues, although

32

A. LEVA

threat perception is low. Finally, these are failed most-likely cases for institutionalism once the alliance terminates, although alliance benefits are high.78 Research Methodology The empirical chapters provide for the analysis of five cases, three Type I and two Type II cases. The cross-case analysis requires comparing similar cases differing on only one cause and having different outcomes (Method of Difference—MoD) and comparing different cases that share only one cause and have similar outcomes (Method of Agreement—MoA).79 However, for this study, the MoD constitutes the primary tool of hypothesis testing, while the MoA constitutes a logical extension aiming to emphasize further the empirical results in the view of their generalization. Table 2.3 shows the cases, the variables, and the outcomes. Then, by adopting the process tracing method, it is possible to identify the processes behind the junior ally’s preferences for alliance persistence or termination.80 As in each pair, the weaker ally’s voice opportunities are effective in one case and ineffective in the other, the theoretical framework expects two different processes at work. Some observable implications should be found to confirm the validity of the hypothesized causal mechanisms.81 In this view, the empirical sections provide evidence through a within-case analysis focusing on alliance processes. Primary and secondary sources are crucial for examining the processes shaping the alliances’ evolution within the political and military fields. Clues can be found in the documentation concerning the history of Table 2.3 Research design Case

Threat perception

Alliance benefits

Type

Weaker ally voice opportunities

Outcomes

(1)

High

Low

I

Ineffective

(2)

High

Low

I

Effective

(3)

Low

High

II

Ineffective

(4)

Low

High

II

Effective

Alliance Termination Alliance Persistence Alliance Termination Alliance Persistence

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the interallied relationships such as the bilateral joint statements, the guidelines for defense cooperation, and the alliances’ strategic concepts. Moreover, the writings and utterances of political leaders and the public documents of each state might give a more specific idea about the allies’ national interests. On the other hand, secondary sources, such as the interpretations of historians, can provide a broader understanding of the international context in which states acted. Case Selection Criteria and Empirical Cases Considering the type of cases this research deals with, the most relevant criterion for case selection is whether the empirical analysis produces surprising outcomes. Therefore, it is peaceful that cases are chosen intentionally because their score deviates from what is expected in the established theories.82 The empirical sections analyze the following cases: (1) UK–Egypt alliance from 1945 to 1951 as a case of alliance termination. (2) UK–Iraq alliance from 1945 to 1955 as a case of alliance persistence. (3) US–New Zealand bilateral relationship in ANZUS from the mid1970s to mid-1980s as a case of alliance termination. (4) US–Australia bilateral relationship in ANZUS from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s as a case of alliance persistence. (5) US–Philippines alliance in the mid-2010s as a case of alliance persistence. Given the research’s theoretical parsimony, these cases can be considered comparable. Indeed, they approximate the sketched ideal typologies once the situational variables (threat perception and alliance benefits) assume the expected values.83 The MoD is useful for comparing the British alliances with the Middle Eastern countries (case 1 and case 2) and the American alliances in the South Pacific (case 3, and case 4). More precisely, the case selection follows two main criteria. Firstly, considering the research’s theoretical framework, it looks for similarities among the weaker allies. Once the model’s basic variables assume the expected values, the trigger of the model is checked, that is the weaker side’s quest for

34

A. LEVA

autonomy. Moreover, the preferable comparing cases are similar on other relevant variables such as the state’s size, the internal political system, the geographic region, and the historical period.84 Secondly, alliances having the same leading ally were preferred to compare them through the MoD (for instance, UK–Egypt as a case of termination and UK–Iraq as a case of persistence). On the other hand, the logical extension through the MoA is possible because different cases (such as the UK–Egypt alliance and the US–New Zealand one) produce similar outcomes. Again, the dissimilarity comes first from the values the alliance variables assume. Then, other relevant differences occur, such as a different major ally, size, domestic political system, region, and historical period. Finally, given the model’s ambition to be generalizable, the empirical analysis is extended to examine an alliance in the current international system, such as the US–Philippines during the mid-2010s.

Notes 1. See classic books such as Morgenthau HJ, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Knopf, 1948; Liska G., Nations in Alliance. The Limits of Interdependence, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962; Waltz K., Theory of International Politics, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1979; Walt S., The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987. 2. See Mc Calla R., “NATO Persistence after the Cold War”, International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 445–475; Haftendorn H., Keohane R. and Wallander C., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 5. 3. See Morrow J., “Alliances and Asymmetry: An alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Nov., 1991), pp. 903–933; Bennet S., “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816–1984”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 846–878; Leeds B. and Savun B., “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Nov., 2007), pp. 1118–1132. For a different view, see Chung J., “Capability Change, Economic Dependence and Alliance Termination”, The Korean Journal of International Studies Vol. 14, No. 2 (Aug., 2016), pp. 209–240. 4. Several works pave the way in this research perspective. See De Castro R., “Philippines Defense Policy in the 21th Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Fall

2

5. 6.

7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19.

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2005), pp. 403–422(20); Catalinac A., “Why New Zealand Took Itself Out of ANZUS: Observing “Opposition for Autonomy” in Asymmetric Alliances”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 6, 2010, pp. 317–338; Chung J., op. cit., August 2016, 209–240; Castillo J. and Downes A., “Loyalty, Hedging or Exit: How Weaker Alliance Partners Respond to the Rise of New Threats”, Journal of Strategic Studies (Jul., 2020), pp. 1– 39. More general studies on minor allies are Rothstein R., Alliances and Small Powers, Colombia University Press, New York and London, 1968; Reiter E. and Gartner H. (eds.), Small States and Alliances, PhysicaVerlag, 2001; Von Hlatky S., America Allies in Times of War. The Great Asymmetry, Oxford University Press, 2013. Walt S., op. cit. 1987, 1987; David S., “Explaining Third World Alignment”, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan., 1991), pp. 233–256. Edry J., Johnson J.C., and Leeds B.A., “Threats at Home at Abroad: Interstate War, Civil War, and Alliance Formation”, International Organization, Vol. 75 (Summer 2021), pp. 837–857. David S., op. cit., January 1991. Walt S., “Why Alliances endure or collapse”, Survival, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1997, pp. 156–179. Other studies show that external and internal security challenges might reinforce each other. On interrelated threats, see Harknett R. & VanDenBerg J., “Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf Crisis”, Security Studies, Vol. 6, No 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 112–153. Walt S., op. cit., 1991. Correlates of War project provides a detailed data set classifying states’ involvement in MID. Gause F. III, “Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf”, Security Studies, No. 2 (Winter 2003/4), pp. 273–305. See Schweller R., “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72– 107, 1994; Chung, op. cit., 2016; Kim T., The Supply Side of Security. A Market Theory of Military Alliances, Stanford University Press, 2017. Snyder G., Alliance Politics, Cornell University Press, 1997. Berkowitz, “Realignment in International Treaty Organizations”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 77–96. See for instance Layne C., “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1997, pp. 86–124. Morrow J., op. cit., 1991; Chun J., op. cit., August 2016. Walt S., op. cit, 1997. Henry I.D., “What Allies Want. Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence”, International Security, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Spring 2020), pp. 45–83.

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20. Morrow J., op. cit., 1991. The Tradeoff Was Initially Defined by Altfeld M.F., “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and a Test”, Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1984, pp. 523–544. 21. Cha V., “Powerplay. Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/2010), pp. 158–196; Kim T., “Why Alliances Entangle But Seldom Entrap States”, Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2011, pp. 350–377; Benson B., Constructing International Security, Cambridge University Press, 2012; Mattes M., “Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design”, International Organization, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 679–707. 22. Cha V, op. cit., 2010. For a different understanding of US bilateral alliances formation in Asia-Pacific after WWI, see Izumikawa Y., “Network Connections and the Emergence of the Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System in East Asia”, International Security, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Fall 2020), pp. 7–50. 23. See Mattes M., op. cit., 2012; Blankenship B., “Promises Under Pressure: Statements of Reassurance in US Alliance”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 64, 2020, pp. 1017–1030; Blankenship B. and Lin-Greenberg E., “Trivial Tripwires? Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance”, Security Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2022, pp. 92–117. 24. Gerzhoy G., “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions”, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2015, pp. 91–129. 25. Sperling J. and Weber M., “Trump Foreign Policy and NATO: Exit and Voice”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2019, pp. 511– 526. 26. George Liska noticed that alliances might serve to restrain the more aggressive ally. Paul Schroeder argued that all alliances are “pacts of restraint” controlling the member states’ actions. Even Stephen Walt, although focusing on external threats, argued that aggregating power and managing weaker allies are not incompatible alliance functions. See Liska G., op. cit., 1962, p. 40; Schroeder P., “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management”, in K. Knorr (eds), Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, Lawrence, Allen, 1976, p. 230; Walt S., op. cit., 1987, p. 8, footnote 20. 27. Schroeder P., op. cit., 1976; Weitsman P., “Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances”, Security Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1997, pp. 156–192 and Weitsman P., Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004; Gilber D. and Rider T., “Prior Commitments: Compatible Interests Versus Capabilities in Alliance Behavior”, International Interactions, Vol. 30, 2004, pp. 309– 329; Pressman J., Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International

2

28.

29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34.

35.

36.

37.

38. 39.

40. 41.

42.

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Politics, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2008; Cesa M., Allies Yet Rivals, Stanford University Press, 2010. Joffe J., “‘Bismarck’ or ‘Britain’? Toward an American Grand Strategy After Bipolarity”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 94–117. Weitsman P., op. cit., 2004, p. 2. Ibidem, p. 5. Pressman J., op. cit., 2008, p. 19. See Ohtomo T., “Bandwagoning to Dampen Suspicion: NATO and the US-Japan Alliance After the Cold War”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 3, 2003, pp. 29–55. The original argument of “sheep in wolf’s clothing problem” is developed by Kidd A., “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other”, Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1997, pp. 114–154. Press Barnathan G., “Managing the Hegemon: Nato Under Unipolarity “, Security Studies, 2006, pp. 271–309. I thank one anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to my attention. See Walt S., “Alliances in a Unipolar World”, World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jan., 2009), pp. 86–120; Snyder G., op. cit., 1997; Waltz K., op. cit., 1976. Musgrave P., “Asymmetry, Hierarchy, and the Ecclesiastes Trap”, International Studies Review, Vol. 21, 2019, pp. 284–300; Efremova K., “Small States in Great Power Politics. Understanding the Buffer Effects”, Central European Journal of International Security and Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2019, pp. 100–121; Long T., A Small State’s Guide to Influence in World Politics, Oxford University Press, 2022. Kassab H.S., Weak States in International Relations Theory. The Cases of Armenia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Lebanon, and Cambodia, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Tang C., Small States and Hegemonic Competition in Southeast Asia. Pursuing Autonomy, Security and Development Amid Great Power Politics, Routledge, London and New York, 2018. Chung J., op. cit., 2016. Grieco J., “State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union”, Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1996, pp. 261–306. See Morrow J., op. cit., 1991; Bennet S., op. cit., 1997; Leeds A. Savun B., op. cit., 2007. See Locatelli A. and Testoni M., “Intra-Allied Competition and Alliance Durability: The Case for Promoting a Division of Labor Among NATO Allies”, European Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2009, pp. 345–362. Womack B., “How Size Matters: The United States, China and Asymmetry”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2001, pp. 133–134.

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A. LEVA

43. See Womack B., op. cit., 2001; Womack B., Asymmetry and International Relationships, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2015. See also Shin G.W., Izatt I. and Moon R., “Asymmetry of Power and Attention in Alliance: The US-Republic of Korea Case”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2016, pp. 1–21. 44. See Snyder G., op. cit., 1997; Cesa M., op. cit., 2010; Steinmetz R. and Wivel A. (eds.), Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities, Ashgate, 2010. 45. Long T., “It’s Not the Size, It’s the Relationship: From ‘Small States’ to Asymmetry”, International Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Mar., 2017), pp. 144– 160. 46. See Cesa M., op. cit., 2010, chapter 3. 47. Colombo A., La solitudine dell’Occidente, il Saggiatore, Milano, 1994. 48. Ibidem p. 39–52. See also Moon B., “Consensus or Compliance? ForeignPolicy Change and External Dependence”, International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring 1985), pp. 297–329; Colombo A., op. cit., 1994; Womack B., op. cit., 2001; Donnelly J., “Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2006, pp. 139–170; Lake D., Hierarchy in International Relations, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2009. 49. This understanding of asymmetry relies on Womack B., op. cit., 2015, p. 10. 50. Molm L., “Risk and Power Use: Constraints on the Use of Coercion in Exchange”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1997, pp. 113– 133. 51. Womack B., op. cit., 2001. 52. Romilly J., The Rise and Fall of States According to Greek Authors, The University of Michigan Press, 1991. 53. See Womack B., op. cit., 2015, Preface XIV. 54. See Goh E., The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia, Oxford University Press, 2013; Thalakada N., Unipolarity and the Evolution of America’s Cold War Alliances, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012; Walt S., “Keeping the World “Off-Balance”: SelfRestraint and US Foreign Policy” in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2002; Joffe J., op. cit., 1995; Goh E. and Sahashi R., “Worldviews on the United States, Alliances, and the Changing International Order: An Introduction”, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2020, pp. 371–383. 55. Alexander G., and Keohane R., “The Concept of National Interest: Uses and Limitations”, in Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy, ed. George, Westview Press, Boulder, 1980, pp. 217–238.

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56. Wendt A., Social Theory of International Politics, 1999, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 235. 57. Mauro F., Strategic Autonomy Under the Spotlight: The New Holy Grail of European Defence, Brussels, GRIP Report, 2018/1. 58. Morrow J., op. cit., 1991; Chung J., op. cit., 2016, footnote 2 p. 212. 59. Howorth J. and Keeler T.S., “The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy”, in Howorth J. and Keeler T.S. (eds.), Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the quest for European Autonomy, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 6; Meijer H. and Brooks S.G, “Illusions of Autonomy”, International Security, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Spring 2021), pp. 7–43. 60. Catalinac A., op. cit., 2010, p. 325. 61. Some studies have focused on the quest for autonomy as a significant factor in accounting for minor allies’ behavior. See De Casto R., op. cit., Fall 2005; Catalinac A., op. cit., 2010; Chung J., op. cit., August 2016. 62. Rothstein R., op. cit., 1968; Schweller R., op. cit., 1994; Henke M., “Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military CoalitionBuilding”, International Security, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Spring 2019), pp. 128– 162. 63. Davidson J., The Origins of Revisionist and Status-quo States, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 134. 64. Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno define external extraction as the “state efforts to accumulate resources from outside its borders.” See Mastanduno M., Lake D. and Ikenberry J., “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 457– 474. 65. Rothstein R., op. cit., 1968, pp. 61, 122. 66. Crawford T.W., Pivotal Deterrence, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2001, p. 35. 67. Hirschman A.O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Harvard University Press, 1970. 68. Loyalty indicates actors accepting the organizational decline but not exiting because of high cost or lack of alternatives. This behavior might also occur together with exit and voice processes. However, it does not enter the research design as the purpose here is to evaluate if and how weaker alliance partners strive to look for alternatives even when they are not immediately available. 69. This understanding of voice opportunities relies on Grieco J., op. cit., 1995, p. 288. 70. Thucydides, op. cit., p. 402. 71. Womack B., op. cit., 2015. p. 6. 72. For related arguments about the limitations on the power of the stronger side in asymmetric relations, see Ikenberry J., op. cit., 2002 and 2015; Deudney J., op. cit., 2006; Lake D., op. cit., 2009. 73. Pressman J., op. cit., 2008, p. 44.

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74. Lake D., op. cit., 2009. 75. See Xu R. and Rees W., “Comparing the Anglo-American and IsraeliAmerican Special Relationships in the Obama Era: An Alliance Persistence Perspective”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4 (June 2017). 76. Tomlin B., Dolan M., Reikhoff H., and Molot M., “Foreign Policies of Subordinate States in Asymmetrical Dyads”, The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1981, pp. 14–39. 77. Rohlfing I., Case Studies and Causal Inference. An Integrative Framework, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 9–11. 78. Rohlfing I., op. cit., 2012, p. 93. 79. See Rohlfing I., op. cit., 2012, pp. 97–124. 80. See Beach D. and Pedersen R. B., Process-Tracing Methods. Foundations and Guidelines, The University of Michigan Press, 2013. 81. Bennet A. and Checkel J., “Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices” in Process Tracing. From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 30. 82. Rohlfing I., op. cit., 2012, p. 93. 83. Lijphart A., “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Sep., 1971), pp. 682– 693. 84. Here, the main weakness is the difference in size between New Zealand and Australia.

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Blankenship B., “Promises Under Pressure: Statements of Reassurance in US Alliance”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 64, 2020, pp. 1017–1030. Blankenship B. and Lin-Greenberg E., “Trivial Tripwires? Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance”, Security Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2022, pp. 92–117. Castillo J. and Downes A., “Loyalty, Hedging or Exit: How Weaker Alliance Partners Respond to the Rise of New Threats”, Journal of Strategic Studies (Jul., 2020), pp. 1–39. Catalinac A., “Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing ‘‘Opposition for Autonomy’’ in Asymmetric Alliances”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 6, 2010, pp. 317–338. Cesa M., Allies Yet Rivals, Stanford University Press, 2010. Cha V., “Powerplay. Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/2010), pp. 158–196. Chung J., “Capability Change, Economic Dependence and Alliance Termination”, The Korean Journal of International Studies Vol. 14, No. 2 (Aug., 2016), pp. 209–240. Colombo A., La solitudine dell’Occidente, il Saggiatore, Milano, 1994. Crawford T.W., Pivotal deterrence, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2001. David S., “Explaining Third World Alignment”, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan., 1991), pp. 233–256. Davidson J., The Origins of Revisionist and Status-quo States, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. De Castro R., “Philippines Defense Policy in the 21th Century: Autonomous Defense or back to the Alliance?”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 403–422. Donnelly J., “Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2006, pp. 139–170. Edry J., Johnson J.C., and Leeds B.A., “Threats at Home at Abroad: Interstate War, Civil War, and Alliance Formation”, International Organization, Vol. 75 (Summer 2021), pp. 837–57. Efremova K., “Small States in Great Power Politics. Understanding the Buffer Effects”, Central European Journal of International Security and Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2019, pp. 100–121. Gause F. III, “Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf”, Security Studies, No. 2 (Winter 2003/4), pp. 273–305. Gerzhoy G., “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions”, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2015, pp. 91–129.

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Layne C., “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1997, pp. 86–124. Leeds B. and Savun B., “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Nov., 2007), pp. 1118–1132. Lijphart A., “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Sep., 1971), pp. 682–693. Liska G., Nations in Alliance. The Limits of Interdependence, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962. Locatelli A. and Testoni M., “Intra-allied Competition and Alliance Durability: The Case for Promoting a Division of Labor Among NATO Allies”, European Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2009, pp. 345–362. Long T., “It’s Not the Size, It’s the Relationship: From ‘Small States’ to Asymmetry”, International Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Mar., 2017), pp. 144–160. Long T., A Small State’s Guide to Influence in World Politics, Oxford University Press, 2022. Mastanduno M., Lake D. and Ikenberry J., “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 457–474. Mattes M., “Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design”, International Organization, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 679–707. Mauro F., Strategic Autonomy Under the Spotlight: The New Holy Grail of European Defence, Brussels, GRIP Report, 2018/1. Mc Calla R., “NATO Persistence after the Cold War”, International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 445–475. Meijer H. and Brooks S.G, “Illusions of Autonomy”, International Security, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Spring 2021), pp. 7–43. Molm L., “Risk and Power Use: Constraints on the Use of Coercion in Exchange”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1997, pp. 113– 133. Moon B., “Consensus or Compliance? Foreign-Policy Change and External Dependence”, International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring, 1985), pp. 297–329. Morrow J., “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Nov., 1991), pp. 903–933. Morgenthau H.J., Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Knopf, 1948. Musgrave P., “Asymmetry, Hierarchy, and the Ecclesiastes Trap”, International Studies Review, Vol. 21, 2019, pp. 284–300 Ohtomo T., “Bandwagoning to Dampen Suspicion: NATO and the US-Japan Alliance After the Cold War”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 3, 2003, pp. 29–55.

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Walt S., “Keeping the World “Off-Balance”: Self-Restraint and US Foreign Policy” in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2002. Walt S., “Alliances in a Unipolar World”, World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, pp. 86-120. Waltz K., Theory of International Politics, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1979. Weitsman P., “Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances”, Security Studies, VII, 1, 1997, pp. 156-192. Weitsman P., Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004. Wendt A., Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. Womack B., “How Size Matters: The United States, China and asymmetry”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2001, pp. 123–150. Womack B., Asymmetry and International Relationships, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2015. Xu R. and Rees W., “Comparing the Anglo-American and Israeli-American Special Relationships in the Obama Era: An Alliance Persistence Perspective”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4 (June, 2017).

CHAPTER 3

The Anglo-Egyptian Alliance in the Early Cold War: A Case of Alliance Termination

Abstract This chapter analyzes the Anglo-Egyptian alliance in the early Cold War, finding abundant evidence that voice ineffectiveness led Egypt to detach from the alliance. Indeed, following the failure of the BevinSidqi agreements, the alliance did not evolve strategically, excluding the weaker ally’s interests. Britain monopolized the administration of Sudan and denied the Egyptian’s project of unity, maintained three times the number of troops in the Suez Canal Zone permitted under the 1936 treaty, and denied Cairo the supplies of arms and equipment necessary for its defense. The more powerful ally’s policy of control made any Egyptian attempt to pursue changes in the alliance ineffective, paving the way for the weaker side’s decision to abrogate the security agreement unilaterally. Keyword United Kingdom · Egypt · Voice ineffectiveness · Alliance termination

Britain and Egypt signed a military alliance treaty in 1936 by modifying the agreements of 1899. The 1936 treaty consisted of 17 articles. Overall, it favored the weaker ally’s autonomy as Egypt gained full sovereign rights (art. 3), and the British government agreed to favor the abolition of the Capitulations in the country.1 At the same time, Cairo enjoyed

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Leva, The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35448-9_3

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fiscal freedom. However, strict military clauses permitted British control over the junior ally’s territory by limiting its regional aspirations.2 More specifically, Egypt granted Britain the military facilities to protect lines of communication and agreed on the permanence of British troops in the Suez Canal Zone during peacetime (art. 7–8). Then, Egypt allowed the unrestricted use of its land, water, and air to the British forces in case of emergency, while the Royal Air Force had no restrictions in peace and wartime. The pact signature confirmed the asymmetric nature of the AngloEgyptian relationship and left some issues unsolved. For instance, the joint administration of Sudan remained a source of complaints by Cairo. In the mid-1930s, although Egypt wanted to increase its influence over the Nile Valley, the treaty maintained the status quo in Sudan (art. 11).3 At the same time, the permanence of British forces was agreed upon until Egyptians would defend their territory and the Canal Zone autonomously (art. 8). During World War II’s outbreak, the Egyptian government adopted a pro-British foreign policy.4 However, the weaker ally’s willingness to actively support Britain vacillated with the fortunes of war.5 Cairo preferred a cautious foreign policy by accommodating the more powerful partner and avoiding confrontation with the ally’s enemies. Egypt clearly defined its foreign policy goals at the war’s end but soon realized that any regional plan needed the more powerful ally’s support. Our inquiry will analyze the 1945–1951 period as a case of alliance termination. We will see that the Allies did not overcome the internal crisis. Indeed, while Egypt needed to be more successful in its attempts to voice, Britain adopted a hard approach to bargaining, not including the partner’s interests in the overall alliance strategy. Indeed, at the end of World War II, Egypt engaged in a new foreign policy course by trying to improve its regional status and modifying interallied relations. Britain did not favor the junior partner’s quest for autonomy in the context of the alliance deficit in security. It made its voice ineffective, paving the way for the Egyptian unilateral treaty abrogation in 1951. The following chapter develops into four sections. Section “How to Define the Case: Egyptians’ Ambitions After World War II” describes Egypt’s ambitions at the end of World War II. As we need to focus on the weaker ally’s quest for autonomy as the trigger point of the inquiry, this section depicts the Egyptians’ plans for regional leadership and the

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sources of Cairo’s dissatisfaction with Britain. Section “The Alliance Variables” gives an account of the alliance variables. On the one hand, it measures Egypt’s threat perception and the alliance’s benefits to settle the framework for the empirical inquiry. Then, it accounts for the Egyptians’ voice attempts and their ineffectiveness. Section “The Anglo-Egyptian Relations from 1945 to 1951” describes the Anglo-Egyptian relations historically from 1945 to 1951. Finally, section “The Processes of Alliance Termination” gives an account of the alliance processes. It firstly evaluates the British policy of hard control. Then, it provides evidence of Egypt’s detachment before the unilateral abrogation. These processes of alliance erosion represent empirical evidence confirming the strength of the alliance termination model.

How to Define the Case: Egyptians’ Ambitions After World War II Following World War II, Egyptian strategists’ primary concern was what new order could arise in the Middle East.6 Two reasons make this historical juncture an appropriate starting point for our inquiry. Firstly, Cairo adopted a more ambitious foreign policy in its regional context, trying to establish its leadership in the Arab world.7 Indeed, Egypt was the richest, most populous, most innovative scientifically, and certainly the most powerful of the Arab states.8 Although other Arab states projected to expand their territories and improve their power status in the region (as Jordan through the Greater Syrian Project and Iraq through the Fertile Crescent Project), Egypt served its interests best, taking the lead of the Arab States League.9 Cairo’s position in the Arab League points out how Egypt was the dominant power among the Arab states, aiming to improve its status. Indeed, Egypt played a central role in establishing the League and preserved its leadership for three decades, holding crucial positions and functions within the organization. For instance, the League had its headquarters in Cairo, elected only Egyptians as secretaries-general until 1979, and Egypt was the main financial contributor.10 Moreover, Cairo influenced the League to undermine alternative projects of regional order. The first secretary-general, Abdul Rahman Azzam, firmly believed that the unity of the Arab world could only be pursued through Egyptian leadership.11 The League, therefore, became a valuable tool to promote

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Egypt’s foreign policy goals and expansionist ambitions, opposing rival projects of regional order from Britain and Arab neighbors.12 Secondly, Egypt changed its attitude toward Britain, its major security partner. On 20 December 1945, Cairo asked for a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The Egyptian government claimed that the circumstances determining the agreement were no longer effective. As its clauses did not recognize the country’s independence and dignity, the treaty had to be revised, harmonizing the content with the new international situation.13 Cairo aimed to stabilize Anglo-Egyptian relations on a level of equality to establish its regional leadership among the Arab states. For this reason, the junior ally raised two main points: the withdrawal of the British military forces from its territory and the unity of the Nile Valley. Although both issues were delicate, Egypt was less prone to compromise on the latter. Cairo strongly desired to reach political control over Sudan (or even to obtain unity under the Egyptian Crown) to ensure natural resources such as the Nile’s water, favor emigration for its surplus population, and increase favorable economic relationships and capital investments.14 Moreover, the control of Sudan would have implied the extension of Egyptian interests to the rest of Africa, improving Cairo’s status toward neighboring states.15 In sum, as World War II ended, Egypt aimed to take advantage of the new international environment. The achievement of Arab leadership and the establishment of more favorable interallied relations were not separate issues in the new Egyptian foreign policy course. This new course represents the trigger point of the chapter’s analysis, which is the junior ally’s quest for autonomy.

The Alliance Variables This section describes the model’s variables, measuring the Egyptian perception of threats and the alliance’s benefits. The values suggest that the Anglo-Egyptian alliance is a Type I case. Then, the weaker ally’s quest for autonomy and voice effectiveness is analyzed to verify the validity of the explicative model. Overall, the Anglo-Egyptian alliance fits the theoretical framework as a case of alliance termination. Firstly, the case successfully passes the selection test, as the Egyptians’ threat perception is high while the

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benefits coming from the alliance are low in the period under consideration. Secondly, the explicative variable comfortably fits the theoretic expectations as the ineffectiveness of Egypt’s voice led to the alliance’s termination in 1951. In the context of a deficit in security due to the low benefits of the alliance, the interallied relationship did not adapt strategically, and the patron did not recognize the weaker partner’s interests, paving the way for the agreement’s collapse. Egypt’s High-Threat Perception Egypt and the Middle East Balance of Power: Cairo Increasing External Threats By considering threats at the regional level, Egypt opposed projects of reunification embraced by the Hashemite countries.16 Starting in the 1920s, Jordan developed the Greater Syria Project by aiming to rule a reunified Tran-Jordan-Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. In the early 1940s, Iraq called for a more comprehensive union, the Fertile Crescent Project, which provided for the union between a greater Syria with Iraq. Egypt’s increasing concerns, therefore, came from the expansionist ambitions of Jordan and Iraq, which supported the reunification of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq while excluding Cairo. A lot was at stake in these inter-Arab relations: the regional leadership, the bargaining power toward Britain, the relationships with other extra-regional powers, and, more generally, the security of every regime. When the Palestine issue arose in late 1947, Arab countries wondered what political authority should replace the British mandate.17 More specifically, Egypt feared that Jordan (having refused to place its army under the control of the Arab League) could autonomously undertake a military intervention.18 Thus, Cairo supported a collective intervention to preserve its Arab leadership and diminish the power of the Hashemite Entente. At the end of the Palestine conflict, Jordan was weakened, and the economic consequences of the war put an end to the Greater Syrian Project. However, by supporting the Fertile Crescent project, Iraq replaced Jordan as the primary threat to Syria’s independence.19 Moreover, the rise of Israel quickly became a new source of danger for Cairo. The war confirmed that Israeli forces were well-organized and well-armed, while the Egyptian ones were ill-organized and ill-armed.20 Moreover, the Palestine conflict left Egypt with further strategic problems with its main

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ally. While Britain desired to establish favorable relations with Israel to define a regional defensive scheme for the Middle East against the Soviet Union threat, Egypt was preparing its army to fight a local war against Israel.21 Although the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement provided a truce period, a border war started in 1949, triggering a slow escalation toward the second Arab conflict of 1956.22 Egypt’s Regime Instability: The Increasing Internal Threats Internal turmoil in the Egyptian state characterized the entire period under our study. Anti-government public demonstrations, terroristic bombing attacks, assassinations of public figures, and attempted aggressions frequently occurred from 1945 to 1952.23 The Ikhwan (also known as the Muslim Brotherhood) had substituted the Wafd as the most radical group in Egypt, leading a campaign of violence in the country. In February 1945, Prime Minister Ahmad Maher was murdered, as well as in March 1948, the Cairo Court of Appeals Secretary because he participated in the Alexandria court trial that processed the Ikhwan members. As the hostilities in Palestine started in mid-1948, the government imposed Martial Law, thus reducing internal disorders. In December, Prime Minister Mahmud al-Nuqrashi ordered the dissolution of the Ikhwan. The organization responded twenty days later by murdering the Prime Minister when he went to his office. A few months later, although hostilities in Palestine ended, the Parliament extended the Martial Law for another year. The Low Benefits of the Alliance As the Anglo-Egyptian 1936 Treaty granted military sovereignty to Egypt, Cairo started developing plans to modernize its military forces.24 However, Britain had a monopoly over arms supply and armed forces training, making Cairo dependent on the approval of London to improve its military. Indeed, the more powerful ally had the right to train the Egyptian army according to its standards. Moreover, the Egyptian forces were obliged to use the same armament and equipment, land and air, as the British forces. Cairo could purchase arms exclusively from the ally, thus leaving it to the latter to evaluate how efficient the Egyptian army was and eventually how efficient it had to be.25

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Following the end of World War II, Egypt still had a notable geostrategic value for Britain. The country was considered a crucial ally as it connected the African and Asian continents, guaranteeing British power projection in the region and assuring oil supplies from the Middle East through the Suez Canal. At the beginning of the negotiation for the treaty revision in early 1946, Bevin declared that Britain aimed to modernize the ally’s military forces. However, the partners had different views about Egypt’s Middle East role: Cairo aimed to build a modern army to pursue its plans of primacy among Arab states; Britain, by contrast, did not have an interest in substantially strengthening the junior ally’s armed forces as it did not expect them to contribute to the Soviet Union’s containment significantly. The more powerful ally supported the development of a modest Egyptian army and focused on its capability to defend the air bases.26 For instance, during 1946–1947, Cairo ordered forty-eight planes and about seventy Centurion tanks to Britain. London escaped the ally’s request by assuming that the Egyptian army did not need these armaments. By April 1947, the Egyptian quest for arms extended to the United States. The Nuqrashi government sent a delegation asking for an arms deal, but the Egyptians again did not obtain consistent collaboration.27 In mid-1948, the United Nations approved an arms embargo on Middle East countries. The ban endured an entire year, forcing Britain to suspend any delivery of arms, mainly already ordered and paid for by Egypt. The lack of adequate British support in arms transfer and military modernization paved the way for Cairo’s defeat in the Palestinian conflict.28 Nonetheless, Egypt resumed its demands for arms as the Palestinian hostilities ended. For the fiscal year 1949, the government allocated £52 million for military expenditure to build the most formidable army in the Middle East. An Egyptian delegation spent around 40% of this amount in Britain, placing orders for jet planes, tanks, armored cars, and other military equipment. The delivery was planned to be realized in 2 or 3 years. However, Britain agreed with the United States and France on regulating arms supply in the Middle East to avoid an arms race. The Tripartite Declaration was signed in May 1950, establishing that delivery of arms to Arab countries was permitted only for self-defense and internal security.29 As Bevin admitted to Acheson at a Foreign Ministers meeting in May 1950, Britain preferred to keep the Egyptian army at a low level

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of modernization. Moreover, the Foreign Secretary admitted that Britain had mistreated the Egyptians by providing outdated arms.30 The arms supply deficit was also considered a coercive tool to persuade Egypt to comply with London’s requests during the treaty negotiations. In late 1950, Prime Minister Pasha stated to the Egyptian Parliament that Egypt no longer regarded the 1936 Treaty as a basis for AngloEgyptian relations.31 Britain reacted by freezing the deliveries to Egypt of the aircraft and Centurion tanks that were supposed to be supplied. Then, London also ignored Cairo’s request for sixty additional Centurion tanks.32 In late 1950, Britain suspended the delivery of weapons purchased by Egypt because its forces in Korea needed them. Therefore, the alliance’s insufficient remuneration pushed Cairo to look for other supply sources, such as Czechoslovakia, to modernize its army. This evidence points out that alliance benefits were low during the period under consideration due to the interallied exchange’s decreasing value and the presence of alternative channels in the arms supply. Moreover, Britain’s insufficient support paved the way for Egypt’s defeat in the Palestine conflict. Egypt’s Voice Attempts and Their Ineffectiveness In the period under study, the interallied disputes developed on two main issues raised by Egypt. Firstly, Cairo contested the presence of British troops situated on its territory. Secondly, it disputed the Nile Valley’s disunity, which implied Egypt’s lack of political control over Sudan.33 At the beginning of the negotiations for the treaty revision, Egypt attempted to increase its degree of autonomy without challenging the primacy of Britain. Cairo did not try to force the ally to renounce its claims on Egyptian facilities and territory. Instead, Egypt aimed to define an institutional framework to reduce and regulate British influence, minimizing interference in Cairo’s domestic affairs and increasing Egypt’s independence.34 In other words, the Egyptians attempted to establish a more balanced relationship with Britain. As the British ambassador to Egypt, Sir R. Campbell, conveyed in 1946, Cairo desired more freedom of action to be agreed upon in an amicable settlement.35 The ambassador reported a personal conversation with Sidky Pasha at the Foreign Office, pointing out that Egypt wanted an alliance on a footing of real equality. Although recognizing the asymmetric nature of the relationship with Britain, Egypt

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aimed to reduce some provisions that emphasized its unequal characteristics, such as the submission of Egyptian foreign policy to the more powerful ally (1936 Treaty, art. 5) and the presence of British troops on Egyptian soil.36 Similarly, Egypt considered the condominium over Sudan like a British occupation undermining Cairo’s ambitions of unity with Khartoum. Egyptians believed that Britain aimed to keep the separation between the two countries independent from the actual wishes of the Sudanese people. Therefore, Cairo did not support the policy of progressive self-government in Sudan promoted by the more powerful ally.37 Indeed, in 1947–1948 London and Cairo attempted to agree on the Sudanese constitutional reform. Although a committee of British, Egyptian, and Sudanese representatives was established, Cairo found the final draft agreement unacceptable. Indeed, the draft overlooked the fundamental principle of unity between Egypt and Sudan under the Egyptian Crown and increased the powers of the British Governor-General (rather than empowering the Egyptian king). Then, Egyptians had minimal participation in the Executive Council (two members out of eighteen), while the Sudanese participation was inadequate compared to the powers of the Governor-General.38 Despite the Egyptians’ claims, the British government decided to promulgate the ordinance unilaterally. For Egypt, it was a new display of indifference to its claims and preferences, although the existence of a formal condominium in Sudan.39 Therefore, London monopolized the administration of Sudan and denied the Egyptians’ unity project. Moreover, it maintained three times the number of troops in the Suez Canal Zone permitted under the treaty of 1936. From the Egyptian’s perspective, the lack of British recognition of Cairo’s national aspirations made any attempt to voice ineffective and pushed the junior ally to oppose the dominant partner directly.

The Anglo-Egyptian Relations from 1945 to 1951 The Framework of the Anglo-Egyptian Disputes Following the end of World War II, the Anglo-Egyptian disputes focused mainly on revising the alliance treaty. On 20 December 1945, Egyptians wrote to the British government by asking to start negotiations. Cairo pointed out the main issues to settle. Firstly, the presence of foreign forces on Egyptian soil during peacetime was wounding national dignity and a

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sign of mistrust by the British government. Secondly, the treaty revision needed to include the question of Sudan, which had to be inspired by the interests and aspirations of the Sudanese.40 In April 1946, London sent a delegation to Cairo. When the talks opened, Ernest Bevin—Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during Clement Attlee’s office period—expressed hope that Anglo-Egyptian relations strengthened as a free partnership between equals defending their mutual interests and with full respect for the independence and sovereignty of Egypt.41 Bevin wanted to preserve the leading aspects of the 1936 treaty and remove all grounds for Egyptian claims about the British occupation.42 Achieving both targets was challenging as he knew the British military presence in Egypt was strategically crucial. Whether Britain had moved out of the Mediterranean, Russia would have moved in, and the Mediterranean countries would have been lost from the point of view of commerce and trade, economy, and democracy.43 Moreover, London was committed to self-government in Sudan, and it was incompatible with the Egyptian’s project of unity with Sudan.44 On the other hand, Egyptian Prime Minister Ismail Sidqi Pasha received the British delegation and asked for the unconditional withdrawal of military forces from the country. Sidqi argued that the presence of foreign troops undermined Egyptian sovereignty, violating the United Nations Charter and interfering in Egyptian domestic policy.45 Although the British did not expect this tight line, Attlee and Bevin preferred accommodating the Egyptians announcing their intention to withdraw the troops from the country. The British preferred to make a bold gesture at the outset, hoping to gain the cooperation of the Egyptians in negotiating the bases and other requirements in Egypt.46 Therefore, London announced the troops to be evacuated from Cairo and Alexandria by the end of the year.47 However, Britain could not accept leaving the country unconditionally. When Bevin told the House of Commons that he would not leave a vacuum in Egypt, the negotiations in Cairo entered a prolonged impasse.48 Moreover, the issue of Sudan was even more complicated. In late April, General Governor of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Hubert Huddleston publicly favored a free and independent Sudan that would have autonomously defined its relations with Great Britain and Egypt.49 Cairo instead wanted the unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian Crown. Although Bevin publicly repudiated Huddleston’s statements, he was determined to support the Sudanese self-government. The status of Sudan

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soon became the stonewall (as Bevin used to say) of the Anglo-Egyptian discussions, even more than the troops’ withdrawal.50 From the Sidqi-Bevin Agreement to the Egyptian Appeal to the Security Council In October 1946, Sidqi traveled to London to negotiate a compromise with Bevin. The two leaders agreed on many issues, such as the evacuation of British troops and establishing a joint defense board to activate in the event of war in the Middle East. However, the Sudan issue was handled through an ambiguous compromise. While Cairo demanded the British recognition of Egyptian sovereignty in Sudan, the British invocated the Sudanese right to self-determination.51 The Bevin-Sidqi agreement finally settled by recognizing the framework of unity between Sudan and Egypt under the common Crown of Egypt and the right of the Sudanese people to achieve independence and decide their future.52 Therefore, the ambiguity of the agreement left room for diverging interpretations. In the British view, the protocol could have altered the status quo in Sudan only if the Sudanese people had asked for some change. On the other hand, Sidqi returned to Cairo by declaring he had secured Egyptian-Sudanese unity. The Egyptian Prime Minister’s claim provoked rioting in Khartoum by pro-British parties. Later, Bevin publicly repudiated Sidqi’s declaration, and Attlee explained that the British had to regard the real interests of the Sudanese people against the Egyptian elites.53 The socio-political turmoil favored Sidqi’s resignation. The new Prime Minister Nuqrashi publicly announced the break of the negotiations to the Egyptian House of Representatives. Since Britain aimed to divide Sudan from Egypt, Nuqrashi announced that Egypt would appeal to the Security Council to obtain the foreign troops’ withdrawal from the Nile Valley. In August 1947, Egyptian and British officials debated during the Security Council sessions at Lake Success. Cairo, however, could not obtain a favorable resolution in the following months due to British opposition.54 The impasse over the Canal Zone base and Sudan’s unification persisted in 1948. Meanwhile, British strategists reevaluated their plan of evacuating the Canal Zone base by 1949, opting for retaining facilities there as long as possible.55

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A. LEVA

The Palestine Conflict On 15 May 1948, Britain terminated its mandate over Palestine, leaving a massive power vacuum.56 That same day David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the state of Israel, thus triggering the Arabs’ armed reaction. The Egyptian government expected the war to be solved easily in a few days.57 However, Israel prevailed over the Arab states and invaded Egypt on 7 January 1949. At the end of February, notwithstanding the two countries signing a bilateral armistice at Rhodes, Cairo had brought back heavy losses in military and financial terms. The Arab defeat originated from Israeli military superiority, the interArab divisions, and their conflicting ambitions.58 The Palestinian conflict and the Israeli state’s establishment affected Anglo-Egyptian relations negatively in several ways. While Britain failed to respond to Egypt’s demands for help during the war, Cairo intensified the restrictions on the Suez Canal shipping. Moreover, the Israeli invasion of Egypt confirmed Cairo’s incapability of defending its territory without foreign assistance. That strengthened the British’s belief that complete and unconditional withdrawal was inopportune, especially in the Suez Canal Zone. On the other hand, the establishment of the Israeli state restricted the freedom of action of both allies. Egypt now considered Israel a stronger hostile neighbor to be worried about. Britain had lost Palestine as a possible alternative military base in the Eastern Mediterranean.59 The Last Round of Negotiations In early January 1950, Nahhas Pasha became Prime Minister of Egypt again. At that time, Bevin reached Cairo to converse with Egyptian ministers about the desirability of a new agreement. During the meetings, the British Secretary of State emphasized how, analogously to the British bases in Egypt, the American use of bases in the UK was an intrinsic part of the NATO defense plan. Moreover, as NATO focused on Western Europe and the US increasingly on the Far East, there was a gap in the Middle East that Britain could not ignore. The Egyptian Foreign Minister Saleh el-Din agreed with Bevin on the strategic role Britain detained in the region. However, he was unwilling to evaluate any defense pact that included foreign troops’ presence in the Canal Zone. For Egypt, this aspect of the 1936 Treaty and the Sudanese issue represented how inequal the Anglo-Egyptian relation was.60 Moreover, British forces in

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1950 numbered over three times the amount of 10.000 allowed. More precisely, the ‘Land Striking Force’ accounted for 7.000; the Royal Air Force and army defense units, 10.000; and the personnel of General Headquarters and base troops, 13.000.61 In March, the Egyptian government asked to resume negotiations. In late May, the formal meetings took place in Cairo. However, in late 1950, Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were still deadlocked, and relations further deteriorated.62 In September, Britain suspended arms shipments to Egypt. On 16 November, King Farouk declared the 1936 Treaty null and void, and anti-British protests broke out in Cairo.63 When Herbert Morrison substituted Bevin as Foreign Secretary, the British government still believed that an agreement favoring Egypt would have deteriorated the British’s position as a world power.64 After the failure of negotiations in mid-1951, the British tried to define a new security agreement with Cairo, known as the Middle East Command (MEC), including the United States.65 Although the combined Anglo-American engagement, London could not concede Egypt a genuinely equal voice on the most delicate strategic issues, like the traffic restriction on the Suez Canal or the command of British troops on Egyptian soil.66

The Processes of Alliance Termination This last section depicts the alliance processes leading to the security treaty termination. Firstly, it describes the British policy of interallied control. The analysis shows that the more powerful ally adopted a rigid posture increasing the weaker partner’s dissatisfaction. Secondly, it focuses on the Egyptian attitudes before the unilateral alliance abrogation. Since the failure of the Bevin-Sidqi agreement, we can find evidence of the Egyptian detachment on two main plans: attempts to diversify arm suppliers and to undermine the British primacy in the Middle East by defining an alternative system of alliances. Britain’s Policy of Hard Control After World War II, Britain still considered Egypt a key ally in the Eastern Mediterranean, given its geographical position connecting the African and Asian continents. Indeed, the Suez Canal Zone was an invaluable overseas asset, which assured the oil supplies from the Middle East and a quick connection with colonial and ex-colonial states. Therefore, keeping

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the military access to the Egyptian territory in wartime and eventually stationing troops in peacetime was a core British interest as much as the exclusive control of the Suez Canal Zone. In the British strategy, control over Sudan represented the best tool to restrain Egyptian ambitions and freedom of action.67 Because of the interdependence between the two countries, British politicians thought that by ruling Sudan, they could also control Egypt.68 In other words, the British power projection needed the division of the two Arab states. The unity of the Nile Valley would have paved the way for establishing a single country able to challenge Britain’s interests and authority in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.69 Thus, British imperial strategists considered it crucial to keep the status quo in Egypt to hold London’s primacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.70 In terms of grand strategy, Britain decided to preserve its control over the traditional sphere of interest, fearing losing its great power status.71 Indeed, British politicians opposed the “retreat thesis” in the Middle East to avoid Russian involvement in the Mediterranean and to preserve bargaining power with Americans. Moreover, British strategists valued that the increasing Soviet Union threat imposed the deployment of a significant military contingent in Egypt although Cairo’s opposition. The appeasement with Egypt in early 1946 originated from the belief that Palestine and Cyrenaica would have been available for stationing troops. However, following the decision in early 1947 to withdraw from Palestine and the failure of the Bevin-Sidqi agreement, the British reaffirmed the 1936 military clauses, which gave Britain the right to keep forces in Egypt in peacetime.72 When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the possibility of an enlarged conflict made strategic control of the Middle East essential. Notwithstanding Egypt’s demands, Britain considered Cairo a junior ally that had to conform to London’s requests. In May 1950, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee described the ideal military arrangements in the Middle East as a regional pact consisting of Britain, the Arab League States, Israel, Turkey, Iran, and possibly Greece, in which Egypt would have willingly provided the required base facilities.73 As Bevin’s biographer Alan Bullock pointed out, the Chief of Staff Committee expressed the widespread view that Egypt needed to conform to British interests as junior allies generally do. This strategic view was the core of the British policy of hard control and paved the way for the Egyptian’s detachment from the alliance.

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Egyptians Looking for Alternative Arm Suppliers Because of the British policy of weapons supply, since 1947, Egypt attempted to explore arms deals with third countries, both from the Western and communist blocs. In April 1947, Prime Minister Nuqrashi sent a delegation to the United States asking to establish a US military mission and to agree on a weapon supplies arrangement.74 The United States, however, preferred to avoid antagonizing the British and limited the aid to Cairo. Then, as the tension arose in Palestine, the State Department suspended any arms export to the Middle East.75 On the other hand, Cairo started negotiations with the communist bloc. In 1947, Egypt ordered weapons from Czechoslovakia, totaling 368 million Koruna, and requested 200 tanks, 200 armored vehicles, 60– 100 MIG-15 planes, 2.000 trucks, 1.000 jeeps, and other items.76 Fu’ad Haziz, Egyptian Director of Military Intelligence, confirmed that Cairo had an agreement with Prague by pointing out that Egyptians would have purchased arms elsewhere if the Western powers did not supply them.77 However, the embargo imposed by the Security Council made ineffective this attempt by Cairo to establish a new channel of weapons supply. Following the defeat against Israel in 1949, buying arms became an even more urgent issue. Egypt returned to the British, but London suspended the arms supply because of the deadlock in the treaty renewal negotiations. In a Cabinet Memorandum by Bevin dated 27 November 1950, the British acknowledged Egyptians’ claims on arms supply and the perils implying the contacts with Czechoslovakia.78 However, finding an agreement with Cairo was considered controversial by London due to delicate issues like the condominium over Sudan and the Canal Suez occupation. Therefore, Egypt attempted again to approach Communist countries to diversify its foreign policy. Contacts with the Soviet Union were already established in 1948 in the context of an agreement concerning the exchange of 38.000 tons of Egyptian cotton for 216.000 tons of Soviet wheat and 19.000 tons of corn cereals. In August 1951, Egyptian Foreign Minister Muhammad Salah al-Din met two Soviet diplomats to discuss the opportunity to sign a non-aggression pact between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Although no clear historical evidence exists that such a pact was signed, the meeting might have influenced the Egyptian decision to abrogate the treaty with Britain a few months later.79

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At the same time, the Waft government sent another delegation to Europe looking for arms.80 Through these efforts, Egypt signed a new agreement with Czechoslovakia on 24 October 1951, which committed Prague to provide arms and ammunition for 600 million Egyptian pounds, to be paid in Egyptian cotton.81 Although the delivery was delayed and only realized after the end of 1954, the agreement represented an attempt by Egypt to create an alternative path to the Western supply.82 Egyptian Diplomacy: Undermining the British Primacy in the Middle East Egypt’s detachment from Britain also showed on the strategic ground of international diplomacy. Firstly, as Cairo held one of the temporary seats in the Security Council, it challenged the more powerful ally by supporting anti-British initiatives. For instance, Cairo was the only member of the Council supporting Poland and the Soviet Union for the immediate withdrawal of British troops from Indonesia.83 Then, the failure of the Egyptian appeal to the Security Council concerning Sudan suggested focusing more strictly on inter-Arab relations. Since the collapse of the Bevin-Sidqi agreement, Egypt initiated an anti-British campaign looking for the support of the other British allies, Jordan and Iraq. In January 1947, the British ambassador in Cairo raised a severe warning writing to the government of London. The ambassador suggested that King Farouk and Abdul Rahman Azzam were acting to undermine Hashemite rulers in Iraq and Jordan and alienate Arab states from Britain. Consequently, it was necessary to firmly make clear that Britain would not have allowed to be driven out of the Middle East due to Egypt.84 Therefore, the new Egyptian attitude represented a critical shift in the interallied relations as the junior ally opposed the dominant partner directly. Following the British withdrawal from Palestine, Cairo strengthened its policy to undermine British primacy in the region. The establishment of a system of Arab collective security was realized in 1950. It was a further step toward pursuing Egyptian independence that excluded Britain and promoted Egyptian primacy in the region.85

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Conclusion In the context of alliance deficit in security, our inquiry found abundant evidence that voice ineffectiveness led to Egypt’s detachment from the alliance. The government of Sidqi had a vision of regional order that would have reduced, but not erased, British participation in regional defense.86 Following the failure of the Bevin-Sidqi agreements, Cairo could not establish good interallied cooperation, preferring to renounce the major partner’s protection. On 8 October 1951, Prime Minister Nahhas asked the Egyptian Parliament to abrogate the 1936 treaty and the 1899 condominium agreement. The Parliament approved with an overwhelming majority giving full support to Nahhas. The decision came from the lack of British recognition of Egypt’s national aspirations: London had monopolized the administration of Sudan and denied the Egyptian’s project of unity, maintained three times the number of troops in the Suez Canal Zone permitted under the 1936 treaty, and denied Cairo the supplies of arms and equipment necessary for its defense.87 Therefore, the British’s intransigence had made ineffective any Egyptian voice attempts and forced the weaker ally to oppose the more powerful one until the decision to terminate the alliance unilaterally.

Notes 1. That system made Britain responsible for protecting foreign interests in Egypt. 2. Morsy L., “The Military Clauses of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, 1936”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), pp. 67–97. 3. On the Sudan issue, an effort to forge an Anglo-Egyptian alliance was already collapsed in 1930. See Louis W. R., The British Empire in the Middle East 1949–1951, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 229. 4. See Marlowe J., Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800–1956, Frank Cass and Company, 1965, pp. 310–319. 5. Marlowe J., op. cit., 1965, p. 316. 6. Doran M., Pan-Arabism Before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 7. 7. Doran M., op. cit., 1999, pp. 140–141–153. 8. Marlowe J., op. cit., 1965, p. 322. 9. Hasou T., The Struggle for the Arab World, Routledge; 1 edition (4 January, 1985), pp. 6–12. 10. Hasou T., op. cit., 1985, pp. 17–47.

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11. Hopwood D., Egypt: Politics and Society 1945–1981, Unwin Hyman/See Routledge; 2nd Printing edition (April 1983), p. 28. 12. Doran M., op. cit., 1999, pp. 74–75. 13. CAB 129/6, CP(46)17, “Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936: Cabinet Memorandum by Mr. Bevin, 18 January 1946”, in Kent J. (eds), Egypt and the Defense of Middle East. Part I 1945–1949, Institute for Commonwealth Studies, London: The Stationary Office, 1998, pp. 69– 75. 14. Fabumni L.A., The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations. A Case Study in Power Politics 1800–1956, Greenwood Press, London, 1973, pp. 115–135. 15. Fabumni L. A., op. cit., 1973, pp. 165–171. 16. Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, pp. 313–315. 17. Doran M., op. cit., 1999, p. 116. 18. Doran M., op. cit., 1999, p. 139. See also Marlowe J., op. cit., 1965, p. 326. 19. Eppel M., op. cit., 2004, p. 129. 20. See Marlowe J., op. cit., 1965, p. 328. 21. Marlowe J., op. cit., 1965, pp. 362–363. 22. Oren M. B., “Escalation to Suez: The Egypt-Israel Border War, 1949– 56”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 24, No. 2, Studies on War (Apr., 1989), pp. 347–373. 23. See Vatikiotis P. J., The History of Egypt, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1969, pp. 355–368. 24. Gordon describes the British engagement in the late-1930s to improve and modernize the Egyptian army. See Gordon J., Nasser’s Blessed Movement, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, p. 41. 25. Morsy L., op. cit., 1984. 26. Tal D., “Weapons without Influence: British Arms Supply Policy and the Egyptian-Czech Arms Deal, 1945–55”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Sept., 2006), pp. 369–388. 27. The US policy toward arms supply to Egypt showed a clear will to collaborate with Britain regarding Egyptian affairs. The opportunity of supplying arms to Cairo had been evaluated since October 1947 as Egypt asked the US for aid to establish a small weapons factory. Although Americans were tempted to accept the request, they preferred to avoid antagonizing the British by advising the State Department to furnish Egypt with limited quantities of surplus weapons. However, when the Department suspended arms export to the Middle East the following month because of the Palestine conflict, even a limited supply became impossible. See Hahn P. L., The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–1956, The University of North Caroline Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1991, p. 65. 28. The Egyptian army consisted of three infantry brigades and one armored brigade equipped with light tanks, some without guns. Cairo had the

3

29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

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strongest air force in the Arab world, made of several dozen bombers and jet fighters, but mediocre maintenance and lack of skilled personnel paved the way for the defeat. See Tal D., op. cit., 2006. Tal D., “The Making, Operation and Failure of the May 1950 Tripartite Declaration on Middle East Security”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Aug., 2009), pp. 177–193. Cited in Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984. Cited in Tal D., op. cit., 2006. Tal D., op. cit., 2006. Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, p. 229. Doran M., op. cit., 1999, p. 71. FO 141/1081, no. 20, “Record of Personal Conversation with Ismail Sidky Pasha: Memorandum by Sir R Campbell o Egyptian Desire to Be Treated as Equals, 25 March 1946”, in Kent J. (eds), op. cit., 1998, pp. 83–85. Ibidem. Marlowe J., op. cit., 1965, p. 359. Fabumni L. A., op. cit., 1973, pp. 270–273. Fabumni L. A., op. cit., 1973, p. 272. CAB 129/6, CP(46)17, “Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936: Cabinet Memorandum by Mr. Bevin, 18 January 1946”, in Kent J. (eds), op. cit., 1998, pp. 69–75. Cited in Hahn P. L., op. cit., p. 31. Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, pp. 232–233. Cited in Hahn P. L., op. cit., 1991, p. 30. Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, pp. 230–231. Hahn P. L., op. cit., 1991, p. 30. Cited in Hahn P. L., op. cit., 1991, p. 30. Marlowe J., op. cit., 1965, p. 339. Cited in Bullock A., op. cit., 1983, p. 252. Cited in Hahn P. L., op cit., 1991, pp. 34–35. Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, p. 231. Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, p. 246–249. Bullock A., op. cit., 1983, pp. 323–324. Cited in Hahn P. L., op. cit., 1991, p. 34. For detailed accounts, see Marlowe J., op. cit., 1965, pp. 343–349 and Hail P.L., op. cit., 1996, pp. 23–43. Hahn P. L., op. cit., 1999, p. 63. See Hail J. A., Britain’s Foreign Policy in Egypt and Sudan 1947–1956, Ithaca Press, 1996, pp. 45–55. See Mayer T., “Egypt’s 1948 Invasion of Palestine”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 20–36.

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58. See Mayer T., “Arab Unity of Action and the Palestine Question, 1945– 48”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul. 1986), pp. 331–349. 59. Marlowe J., op. cit., 1965, p. 358. 60. Bullock A., op. cit., 1983, p. 752. 61. Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, p. 715. 62. See Hail J. A., op. cit., 1996, pp. 59–69. 63. Devereux D., The formulation of British Defense Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948–56, Palgrave Macmillan, 1990, p. 29. 64. Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, pp. 720–725. 65. Devereux D., op. cit., pp. 55–61. 66. Hanh P. L., op. cit., 1991, p. 129. 67. As Bullock points out, controlling Sudan implied the British power to prevent Cairo from assisting enemies in future world wars. See Bullock A., Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary 1945–1951, Heinemann, London, 1983, p. 472. 68. See interview with Prime Minister Noqrashi by International News Service (8 August 1947), reported in Oriente Moderno, Vol. 27, No. 7/9, 1947, pp. 183–184. 69. Fabumni L. A., op. cit., 1973, p. 199. 70. Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, p. 31; Kent J., British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1993. 71. Doran M., op. cit., 1999, p. 36. 72. Kent J., op. cit., 1993, pp. 134–182–183. 73. Cited in Bullock A., op. cit., 1983, p. 831. 74. Gordon J., op. cit., 1992, p. 41. 75. Hahn P. L., op. cit., 1999, p. 62. 76. Laron G., “Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal”, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #55, Wilson International Center, February 2007. 77. Ginat, R., “The Egyptian Left and the Roots of Neutralism in the PreNasserite Era”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2003, pp. 5–24. 78. CAB 129/43, CP (50) 283, “Egypt: Cabinet Memorandum by Mr. Bevin on Whether to Remain in Egypt or to Seek an Agreement Based on the Evacuation of Troops, 27 Nov. 1950”, in Kent J. (eds), Egypt and the Defense of Middle East. Part II 1949–1953, Institute for Commonwealth Studies, London: The Stationary Office, 1998, pp. 126–133. 79. Ginat R., op. cit., 2003. 80. Gordon J., op. cit., 1992, p. 41. 81. Laron G., op. cit., 2007. 82. Muehlenbeck P., Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945–1955, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 91.

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83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

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Doran M., op. cit., 1999, pp. 30–31. Cited in Doran M., op. cit., 1999, p. 48. Doran M., op. cit., 1999, pp. 194–196. Doran M., op. cit., 1999. Hail J. A., op. cit., 1996, p. 73; Fabumni L. A., op. cit., 1973, pp. 284– 285.

Bibliography Bullock A., Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary 1945–1951, Heinemann, London, 1983. Devereux D., The Formulation of British Defense Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948–56, Palgrave Macmillan, 1990. Doran M., Pan-Arabism Before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999. Fabumni L.A., The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations. A Case Study in Power Politics 1800–1956, Greenwood Press, London, 1973. Ginat, R., “The Egyptian Left and the Roots of Neutralism in the Pre-Nasserite Era”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2003, pp. 5– 24. Gordon J., Nasser’s Blessed Movement, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992. Hahn P.L., The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–1956, The University of North Caroline Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1991. Hail J.A., Britain’s Foreign Policy in Egypt and Sudan 1947–1956, Ithaca Press, 1996. Hasou T., The Struggle for the Arab World, Routledge; 1 edition (4 January, 1985). Hopwood D., Egypt: Politics and Society 1945–1981, Unwin Hyman/See Routledge; 2nd Printing edition (April 1983). Kent J., British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1993. Kent J. (eds), Egypt and the Defense of Middle East. Part I 1945–1949, Institute for Commonwealth Studies, London: The Stationary Office, 1998. Kent J. (eds), Egypt and the Defense of Middle East. Part II 1949–1953, Institute for Commonwealth Studies, London: The Stationary Office, 1998 Laron G., “Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal”, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #55, Wilson International Center, February 2007. Louis W. R., The British Empire in the Middle East 1949-1951, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984.

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Oren M. B., “Escalation to Suez: The Egypt-Israel Border War, 1949–56”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 24, No. 2, Studies on War (Apr., 1989), pp. 347–373. Marlowe J., Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800–1956, Frank Cass and Company, 1965. Mayer T., “Egypt’s 1948 Invasion of Palestine”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 20–36. Mayer T., “Arab Unity of Action and the Palestine Question, 1945–48”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul., 1986), pp. 331–349. Morsy L., “The Military Clauses of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, 1936”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), pp. 67–97. Muehlenbeck P., Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945–1955, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Tal D., “Weapons without Influence: British Arms Supply Policy and the Egyptian-Czech Arms Deal, 1945–55”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Sept., 2006), pp. 369–388. Tal D., “The Making, Operation and Failure of the May 1950 Tripartite Declaration on Middle East Security”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Aug., 2009), pp. 177–193. Vatikiotis P. J., The History of Egypt, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1969.

CHAPTER 4

The Anglo-Iraqi Alliance in the Early Cold War: A Case of Alliance Persistence

Abstract This chapter analyzes the Anglo-Iraqi alliance in the Early Cold War. As a case of alliance persistence, it points out how the allies overcame the internal crisis. Indeed, the signature of the Baghdad Pact showed that the weaker ally’s voice attempts were effective, and the alliance’s regional project centered on Iraqi core interests. The agreement established that Baghdad would not commit beyond its borders and transferred control to Iraq of the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba. Moreover, Britain made several concessions. Firstly, it joined a pact that invited other Arab states to adhere and excluded Israel. Then, it took sides between Iraq and Egypt in favor of Baghdad and linked the persistence of the Anglo-Iraq special agreement to the continuation of the Baghdad Pact. Within the context of an alliance deficit in security due to the low benefits coming from the interallied exchange, the strategic adjustments paved the way for the agreement’s persistence instead of its collapse. Keywords Brain · Iraq · Voice effectiveness · Alliance persistence

Britain and Iraq signed a treaty of defense alliance in 1930, which became effective after Iraq’s admission to the League of Nations in 1932. The treaty replaced all previous agreements between the two countries

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Leva, The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35448-9_4

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(Article 7) and was supposed to last 25 years (Article 11). It was a typical defense pact between one Great power and a minor one, including asymmetric and non-reciprocal obligations between the partners. On the one hand, Britain committed to protecting the weaker ally against third parties (Article 3). London, then, was in charge of Iraqi needs in the military field, such as arms supplies and military training (annex Article 5). On the other hand, Iraq guaranteed the use of facilities on its territory—such as railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes, and means of communication—and assistance to the more powerful partner in the event of war or imminent menace of war (Article 4). Moreover, Iraq granted Britain two sites in Iraqi territory to install airbases and maintain military forces (Art. 5). The treaty did not oblige Baghdad to consult the ally on domestic matters. Still, the system of British advisers in the Iraqi administration became an effective instrument of external political influence.1 In 1936, for instance, the parties signed an agreement transferring ownership of the Iraqi State Railways to the Iraqi government, but all the key positions were assigned to British officers.2 Similarly, the weaker ally used to conform to the partner’s choices in foreign affairs. As World War II broke out and Britain declared war on Germany, Baghdad broke diplomatic relations with Berlin and assured its cooperation with London. However, the allies faced a deep crisis because of the British request to station troops in Basra in early 1941.3 When London sought to enforce the treaty, the new Iraqi premier Rashid Ali Al-Kaylani opposed and led a revolt, fearing that the request hid a military occupation. The British suppressed the rebellion in four weeks and entered Baghdad by the end of May 1941. The new Iraqi government led by Nuri al-Said fully supported the major ally and declared war on Germany in 1943.4 For our inquiry, the 1941 interallied crisis cannot be considered a trigger point because Iraq missed control over its domestic and foreign policy. The State could not exercise effective sovereignty during World War II, and the country’s history was shaped by external actors operating far away from the Iraqi territory.5 Differently, we will analyze the period from the end of World War II to the British’s adhesion to the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The Baghdad Pact was not merely a product of the Cold War. It resulted from a struggle for regional dominance among Arab states and aimed to enhance Iraq’s international status and influence. The agreement permitted the allies to overcome the internal crisis and made the weaker partner successful in its quest for autonomy.6 Indeed, evidence shows that Iraqi Prime Minister

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Nuri looked at the Baghdad Pact as a substitute for the Fertile Crescent Project and the Arab League, organizations he had supported, but Egypt blocked and hindered.7 Britain was able to accommodate the weaker partner’s needs and support its regional plans. Therefore, the effectiveness of the Iraqi voice avoided the alliance termination. The following chapter develops into four sections. The first section describes the Iraqi ambitions at the end of World War II. As we need to focus on the weaker ally’s quest for autonomy as the trigger point of the inquiry, this section depicts Iraq’s plans for regional leadership and the sources of Iraq’s dissatisfaction with Britain. The second section gives an account of the alliance variables. On the one hand, it measures the Iraqi perception of threats and the benefits coming from the alliance to settle the framework for the empirical inquiry. On the other, it depicts the junior ally’s voice attempts and their effectiveness. The third section describes the Anglo-Iraqi relations historically from 1945 to 1955. The fourth section finally gives an account of the alliance processes. It first focuses on the British policy of soft control. Then, it analyzes the weaker ally’s strategic obeisance and the more powerful side’s policy concessions. These processes represent empirical evidence confirming the validity of the alliance persistence model.

How to Define the Case: Iraq’s Ambitions at the End of World War II At the end of World War II, the Iraqi quest for autonomy was expressed in two ways: the pursuit of regional leadership and the demand for changes in interallied relations. In 1943, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri already presented his plan to Britain, looking for the ally’s support to establish Baghdad’s leadership in the Arab world. He aimed to make Iraq the dominant State of the Fertile Crescent—an area including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, and Palestine—while marginalizing Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The union with Syria was the cornerstone of this regional project. Moreover, Iraq aimed to reinforce its status, becoming the leading intermediary between the Arab states and the non-Arab countries of the region, Turkey and Iran.8 Once Nuri failed to persuade Britain to realize his Fertile Crescent Project, he attempted to establish an interArab organization under Iraqi leadership. The Arab League, however, soon became the primary tool for the Egyptian’s foreign policy.

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Nuri regarded a regional defense pact centered on Baghdad as an effective measure to balance Egyptian domination of the League. Such a pact would have attracted other Arab states and isolated Cairo. Indeed, the Baghdad Pact became a modified version of the Fertile Crescent plan aiming to combine the three main Iraqi goals after World War II: achieving Arab hegemony, revising the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, and confronting the Soviet Union threat.9 Therefore, changes in interallied relations became a significant issue in the Iraqi domestic agenda after World War II.10 Iraqi politicians aimed to increase the country’s leeway by removing the limitations enforced by the 1930 treaty. In February 1946, the government instituted a committee to study the treaty’s revision. Meanwhile, British officials had started reporting increasing anti-British feelings expressed in press attacks on British advisers.11 Many issues were at stake in the treaty revision. Firstly, Iraqis considered the British control of the Habbaniya and Shaiba air bases as a limitation of their sovereignty. Baghdad believed an alternative defense system had to be defined to preserve its security and British interests.12 Then, the ally’s influence within the Iraqi administration and domestic policy had to be limited. It is not a case that in 1946 and 1947, most British advisers employed during the war were dismissed without any replacement.13 In foreign affairs, finally, Iraqi politicians desired greater freedom and support from the more powerful partner to gain leadership in the Arab world.14 However, Britain’s preference for Egypt impeded the realization of Iraqi regional leadership. In 1955, the powerful ally’s adhesion to the Baghdad Pact was hugely significant for the Iraqi ambitions: it was the first time Britain took sides clearly between Iraq and Egypt in favor of Baghdad. In sum, in the aftermath of World War II, Iraq clearly expressed a quest for greater autonomy. The effectiveness of the weaker side’s voice led to the persistence of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance through the Baghdad Pact. As we will see, the crisis erupted due to an unsatisfactory interallied exchange that provoked Iraq’s complaints about the lack of British support. For this reason, the alliance’s strategic adaptation to the weaker side’s interests was crucial to keep the alliance alive.

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The Alliance Variables The section describes the variables leading the empirical inquiry. Looking from the weaker side’s perspective, it measures the Iraqi perception of threats and the alliance’s benefits. The variables’ values suggest that the Anglo-Iraqi alliance is a Type I case. Finally, the section accounts for the weaker ally’s voice attempts and their effectiveness. Overall, the Anglo-Iraqi alliance fits the theoretical framework of the alliance persistence model. Firstly, it successfully passes the case selection test, as Iraqi threat perceptions are high while the alliance’s benefits are low in the period under consideration. Secondly, the explicative variables fit the theoretic expectations comfortably, as the effectiveness of the Iraqi voice led to the alliance renewal in 1955. Within a context of security deficit due to low benefits coming from the alliance, the Anglo-Iraqi relation evolved strategically by including the weaker ally’s interests and preserving the security cooperation. Iraq’s High-Threat Perceptions External Threats: Iraq and the Middle East’s Balance of Power At the end of World War II, external threats to Iraq still concerned the integrity of the country’s borders toward neighboring states such as Iran and Turkey. Although the three states had signed the Saadabad Pact in 1936, aiming to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state, Iraq still felt threatened by its stronger neighbors because of unsolved border issues and disputes.15 Moreover, Baghdad struggled to limit the influence of rising actors in the Arab world, such as Egypt and Israel. On the one hand, Iraq and Egypt undertook a competition for regional dominance by polarizing the Arab system into two main blocs: the Hashemite countries, Iraq and Jordan, as opposed to the Egypt-Saudi entente. Once Nasser took power in 1952, the struggle intensified as Cairo assumed a more aggressive policy aiming to lead the Arab countries against the Western powers. On the other, Iraq engaged in the Palestine conflict and lost the war against Israel.16 The war ended with the establishment of an Israeli state that confirmed Iraqi military weakness. Finally, the Soviet Union was a source of concern for Iraqi security due to the country’s domestic weaknesses. Following the end of World War II, Moscow pressured the “Northern Tier” countries by demanding

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territory and base rights from Turkey (Kars, Ardhan, and Bosporus) and supporting separatist movements in Iraq and communist forces in the Greek civil war.17 Therefore, Iraqi politicians feared the strengthening of the domestic challenge posed by the Iraqi Communist Party and the Soviet’s support for the Kurd minorities. Internal Threats: The Regime Instability and the Cold War Nexus Analyzing Iraqi state internal security since 1945, historians argue that the regime has been facing a daily struggle for survival, fearing the outbreak of disorders or coup d’état due to unsolved domestic problems and a large extent of discontent.18 More specifically, Iraqi internal security concerns regarded the maintenance of internal order, political stability, and the assurance of the subordination of ethnic groups as the Kurds to the central government. In the years following the end of World War II, the streets of Baghdad often held violent anti-government demonstrations led by illegal communist organizations.19 Iraqi politicians seriously perceived the threat of communism to the monarchy. Leftist ideas were widely appreciated by students (almost 85% of students of secondary and higher institutions belonged to leftist organizations by 1954), and the Communist Party reached approximately 5.000 members by 1953–1954.20 The first largescale uprising broke up in January 1948, known as Wathba. A few months later, as the Arab–Israeli war began, the government declared martial law to terminate the strikes and demonstrations. In November 1952, domestic unrest erupted in violent public disturbances. As the police could not keep order, the Regent turned to the army, declaring martial law. Although internal order was partially restored in 1953, the country’s political stability was not: from 1953 to 1958, 11 Cabinets changed, and nine different persons held the office of Prime Minister.21 On the other hand, Iraq’s internal weakness came from the complex composition of its population. Iraqi politicians began fearing Soviet support for Kurdish separatism and, eventually, the spectrum of coping with military invasion through Kurdistan. Indeed, Kurds composed almost 20% of the Iraqi population inhabiting adjacent areas in Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. Traditionally unreceptive to the rule of Baghdad, the Kurds rose against the central government in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.22 Once the Cold War reached its peak in the early 1950s, Iraqi felt that Kurds might achieve substantial support from an extra-regional

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superpower. The geographical proximity to the Soviet Union increased fear of Russian expansion in Iraqi nationalist parties and groups.23 The Low Benefits of the Alliance At the end of World War II, Britain reduced its ability to provide Iraqi military forces with equipment and supplies. The British inefficiency had two main reasons. Firstly, the United States had imposed restrictions on the country’s export of military equipment received under the LendLease program. Secondly, London had decreased its internal production of military equipment to favor the production of civilian goods.24 The alliance deficit in arms supply and military training increased tensions in Anglo-Iraqi relationships. Iraqis aimed to modernize the army by acquiring new military vehicles and equipment. Moreover, they wanted London to send a military mission to the country to train officers using modern weapons.25 However, Britain hesitated in accommodating the weaker ally’s requests. In mid-1947, Baghdad refused most of the second-hand equipment from the British forces evacuating the country.26 Then, once the Palestine conflict broke out, London adhered to the international embargo on arms supply to the Middle East. Although Baghdad had requested new provisions, Britain refused to sign any new arms contracts because of international restrictions and plausibly facilitated Israeli victory. Meanwhile, the Iraqis were not equipped with the necessary items for a modern army, such as tanks. In the mid-1950s, the Western powers aimed to avoid arms competition in the aftermath of the Palestinian conflict.27 Britain signed the Tripartite Declaration with France and the United States to control arms supply in the Middle East. However, Iraqi officials felt that Britain attempted to keep their army low-trained, just equipped for domestic issues, and overall, too weak to alarm the ally’s primacy in Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East.28 By February 1951, Iraq complained about the ally’s refusal to deliver arms as this behavior violated the 1930 Treaty obligations.29 A senior British intelligence officer reported on the Iraqi discontent, writing that the failure to supply the country adequately was encouraging a policy of neutrality and feelings of isolation by many Iraqis.30 By the end of 1951, Britain sold Iraq 61 aircrafts to reinforce the ally’s arsenal, made of outdated fight equipment bought in the late 1940s. However, half of the aircraft supplied were obsolescent, and none of them was jet aircraft.31

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A. LEVA

In February 1953, Nuri met British and American diplomats to pressure them for arms. The Iraqi Prime Minister stated he was not satisfied with the US and British governments’ posture concerning military supply. Nuri asked for the most modern components available by assuring Baghdad could pay for them. At the Iraqi request, the British answered quite coldly. Meetings between Nuri and the British ambassador to Baghdad Troutbeck confirmed Britain’s unwillingness to give Iraq further military assistance (unless as a part of a regional defense problem) because other British allies would have demanded the same.32 Although the alliance treaty established that Britain was in charge to provide the ally with “arms, ammunition, equipment, ships, and airplanes of the latest available pattern (…) whenever they may be required”,33 Baghdad’s officers and politicians were dissatisfied with the ally supplies, both in quantity and quality. Iraqi forces had sufficient equipment to keep internal order but could not afford an ambitious foreign policy in the Arab world. Therefore, the alliance remuneration was inadequate for Iraq’s goals and made the country low dependent on the exchange. Moreover, the lack of support from the powerful ally paved the way for the Iraqi defeat in Palestine. Finally, as we will see, the United States was ready to replace the British as Iraq’s patron. It gave a feasible strategic alternative to Baghdad, confirming that alliance benefits were low during the period under consideration. Iraq’s Voice Attempts and Their Effectiveness At the end of World War II, Iraqi politicians wanted to revise the alliance treaty to establish a balanced relationship with Britain, not as imposed by a stronger partner upon a junior one. Even formal aspects became disputed issues as they represented Iraqi subordinate status, like giving precedence to the British ambassador in Baghdad over the diplomats of other states or the status of the Iraqi legation in London, which still was not an embassy, as Egypt was.34 Another symbol of Britain’s overweening presence in Iraq was the British control of air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba. In August 1947, General Renton—the head of the British military mission in Iraq—wrote to the Foreign Office that the Iraqi army felt it humiliating and unnecessary to hold foreign powers’ bases in their country. Any attempt to keep it for a further period would have been a source of resentment.35

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Yet, Iraqi officers, especially those who graduated from the British Staff College, aspired to serve on a Joint Defense Board with the ally. As Renton reported in a later memorandum, the Iraqi army still desired more in-depth cooperation with the partner but on equal footing.36 Once the Iraqi parliament rejected the Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948, the two allies waited several years before entering into new negotiations. A second opportunity came in 1953–1954 when Iraq gained more internal stability, and Britain realized that Baghdad could be its main regional ally in the Middle East instead of Egypt. As the United States ambassador in Baghdad Waldemar Gallman (1954–1958) described in his memories, Prime Minister Nuri was determined to make the more powerful ally accept that Anglo-Iraqi relationships had to evolve on an equal footing. In August 1954, Baghdad notified the ally’s government that it did not intend to renew or extend the 1930 treaty unless Britain fully recognized Iraq’s sovereignty and independence, as defined by Articles 51–52 of the United Nations Charter.37 The British control of air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba was no more feasible. Moreover, the alliance’s strategic goals had to be redefined. Britain had already rejected Nuri’s plans on several occasions. In 1943, it did not favor the original Fertile Crescent project; in 1945, it did not support Iraqi leadership of the Arab League; in 1949 and 1951, Nuri proposed an Arab defense pact tied to the West, but London refused.38 In 1955, the plan for the Baghdad Pact became Nuri’s last occasion to raise the Iraqi voice, restoring the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty on favorable terms and establishing the basis for a regional defense organization centered on Baghdad.39 The British adhesion to the treaty in April 1955 evidenced that Iraqi voice attempts finally became effective. While the agreement established that Iraq did not commit beyond its borders (Article 3), the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba were transferred to Iraq’s sovereignty. Moreover, Britain made several concessions. London joined a pact that invited other Arab states to adhere and implicitly (but clearly) excluded Israel. Then, it took sides between Iraq and Egypt in favor of Baghdad, linking the persistence of the Anglo-Iraq special agreement to the continuation of the Baghdad Pact (Article 9, letter b). The Baghdad Pact finally realized the Iraqi requests to Britain since the end of World War II and made the weaker side’s voice in the alliance effective.

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A. LEVA

The Anglo-Iraqi Relations from 1945 to 1955 The Iraqi-Turkish Agreement and the Conflict in Palestine Following the end of World War II, Iraq aimed to formulate a new regional policy to enhance its international status. The failure of earlier projects—such as the Fertile Crescent plan, which Britain rejected, and the missed leadership of the Arab League impeded by Egypt—imposed a different strategy. To obtain a central role among the Arab states and gain a privileged position toward the Western powers, Iraq moved to strengthen its relationships with its main non-Arab neighbor, Turkey. In the summer of 1945, Nuri adopted an initiative to improve cooperation between Baghdad and Ankara. He aimed to counter Egypt by introducing Turkey to Arab politics and advantaging Iraq because of a special relationship with Ankara. Moreover, Iraq’s connection with Turkey could have encouraged Syrians to establish a federation with Baghdad.40 In March 1946, Nuri signed an Iraqi-Turkish agreement increasing economic, cultural, and security cooperation. During his visit, Nuri declared that Turkey had a new status as a leader of the Arab countries.41 Then, Iraq became the leading promoter of the Arab struggle against Zionism and the establishment of a Jewish state. At the Arab League conferences between 1945 and 1948, Iraq assumed uncompromising positions regarding the Palestine question by opposing the moderate approach favored by Egypt. It was a way to challenge Egypt’s status in the League by emphasizing how following Cairo’s interests, the Arab states were neglecting Palestine. Then, Iraq aimed to become the leading supporter of the Arab nationalist cause.42 From the 1930s, Iraq exploited the Palestine question to realize its ambitions in Syria and to pursue Arab leadership in the Fertile Crescent. Moreover, during the economic crisis of 1946–48, many Iraqi politicians thought that active involvement in Palestine could redirect public opinion from domestic issues to nationalist aspirations. At the end of the conflict, Iraq did not participate in the peace negotiations and did not sign the armistice agreement with Israel. This policy was meant to strengthen Iraq’s status as the leading supporter of the Arab nationalist struggle in domestic public opinion and among Arab states.43 The Palestinian conflict also produced tensions in Anglo-Iraqi relationships. In January 1948, when Britain still held the mandate, Iraq infiltrated about 900 volunteers—most former soldiers or police officers—in Palestine to support the other Arab armed sections. London

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protested against this illegal movement of armed forces within a territory still under its control, but Baghdad did not order any withdrawal. Once the conflict broke out in May, Iraqi officers criticized the British for not supporting them in the fights and for London’s adherence to the international embargo. On the other hand, Britain tried to uselessly persuade the weaker ally to accept the truce called by the Security Council and, later, Bernadotte’s proposal. Finally, the allies differed on the recognition of the Palestinian government in Gaza.44 The conflict in Palestine, therefore, aggravated the Anglo-Iraqi relations, which were already tense after the failure of the treaty revision. The Abortive Treaty of Portsmouth Britain and Iraq began talks for the treaty revision in May 1947 and concluded the negotiations in mid-January 1948. The Portsmouth Treaty confirmed the British interests in Iraq and improved the weaker ally’s position.45 Iraqi negotiators believed that the new agreement was better than the older one. They had obtained shared air bases and some control over Britain’s right to move troops across the country, escaping the commitment to consult with the ally on foreign policy issues and assuring financial assistance for training their officers in the British military schools.46 On the other hand, Britain obtained the right to use the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba in war and peace and to keep the British units under their command. Moreover, the treaty stipulated that Britain remained the only supplier for Iraq in military matters, from arms supply to officers training. Overall, the Portsmouth Treaty made several concessions to the weaker side. However, broad popular opposition in Iraq developed against the new agreement. While Iraqi negotiators ignored demonstrations in early January, the treaty’s signature was followed by two bloody protests, during which the police opened fire against the crowd and killed many protesters.47 As strikes and demonstrations broke out, the political forces demanded the rejection of the treaty transversally to end the British presence in Iraq. Iraqi politicians, even the pro-British ones, heavily criticized the agreement. The most important issue concerned the British use of the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba. Other criticisms focused on Article 3, which nationalist fringes feared could have forced Iraq to support Britain in all its conflicts.48

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A. LEVA

The popular insurrection of January 1948 became known as Wathba. It forced Prime Minister Sayyid Salih Jabr to resign, while the new government informed the British that the Iraqi parliament could not ratify the Portsmouth Treaty. However, the content of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty had become almost a marginal issue in the uprising. Some circumstances surrounding its signature, like the absence of an Arabic text translation, had favored an atmosphere of suspicion within nationalist circles. Moreover, most of the socioeconomic claims were due to the financial crisis that developed in 1948 and the events in Palestine.49 Further tensions in the domestic sphere had been provoked by the government’s rejection to concede civil liberties and change the electoral system to guarantee free and direct elections.50 Therefore, the repudiation of the Portsmouth Treaty was mainly due to a domestic crisis, which fed a firm anti-British opposition, rather than to objectively unfavorable agreement terms.51 Projects of Regional Defense: 1950–1954 After the defeat in the Palestine war and the failure to renew the agreement with Britain, Iraq made new attempts to settle a favorable regional defense system. In November 1949, Nuri proposed to Britain the establishment of an Arab defense pact tied to the West.52 Nuri aimed to oppose the Arab Collective Security Pact, which Egyptian King Faruq proposed to establish while attending the October 1949 session of the Arab League. The Iraqi Prime Minister was attempting firmly but in vain to ruin the Egyptian project. In November 1950, Nuri tried to persuade Syrian and Lebanese leaders to consider a regional pact based on the NATO model. In February 1951, Nuri made a last attempt by suggesting a different version of the Egyptian proposal to the British ambassador in Cairo, Ralph Stevenson, which made it possible for Britain and other states (such as Turkey) to join. However, the Arab states and Britain did not want to oppose Egypt, and both rejected Nuri’s proposals.53 On the other hand, Iraq tried to strengthen the Hashemite Union with Jordan. However, Britain opposed closer bilateral ties between Baghdad and Amman. During 1950 and 1951, the two countries exchanged several proposals to form a union, but London restrained the attempts of the two weaker allies.54 Therefore, to avoid isolation, Iraq joined the Arab Collective Security Pact led by Egypt in February 1951.55 From 1950 to 1952, Britain still judged Egypt as the leading Middle East actor. London had defined two regional defense system projects with

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the United States’ support, and both centered on Egypt. In September 1951, the two Western powers proposed the “Middle East Command”, which aimed to involve the United States, Britain, France, Turkey, and Egypt as founding members. In June 1952, Britain and the United States projected a new plan for establishing the “Middle East Defense Organization”. Both projects were built considering Iraq as a secondary actor and failed because of Egyptian refusal.56 In May 1953, the United States promoted the “Northern Tier” plan, which relied on Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq. It was the first Western regional project in the Middle East that excluded Egypt. As the cornerstone of this defense system, Turkey and Pakistan signed a security agreement in February 1954. The two signatories engaged in consulting and cooperating in three areas of defense: exchange of information, arms production, and defense against third parties. Besides, the treaty invited any state willing to cooperate in its goals to join.57 The Formation of the Baghdad Pact Iraq was warmly invited to join the Turkish-Pakistan pact, increasing Egypt’s fear of isolation. However, the agreement between Turkey and Pakistan needed to be more suitable for Baghdad’s goals. Nuri, for instance, felt that the terms for third states’ accession to the pact were too broad and did not exclude Israel explicitly. Moreover, the pact could not serve as a cover for the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty and did not enhance Iraqi aspirations for Arab hegemony. On the other hand, Britain did not pressure Baghdad to join as it feared losing control over the ally because of the direct American involvement in the project.58 In March 1954, Prime Minister Muhammad Fadhel Al-Jamali informed the governments of Turkey and Britain that Iraq would not have signed the pact. In the summer, Nuri opened new negotiations with the British. Again, Nuri proposed linking the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty to establishing a regional organization centered on Baghdad. While the attempt to include Egypt failed, Nuri undertook intense negotiations with Turkey. In January 1955, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan positively judged a possible Iraqi-Turkish agreement.59 Therefore, Nuri continued the talks with Ankara despite Cairo’s strong opposition. On February 24, Iraq and Turkey signed a treaty of alliance and opened to additional states to join.

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A. LEVA

As the American ambassador Gallman reported, Nuri’s speech following the signature of the pact emphasized that Iraq–Turkish cooperation relied on three principles. First, Iraq was not committed outside its borders or to those of the Arab League Collective Security Pact members. Second, Iraq was responsible for its defense, and no other government could impose any conditions for cooperation. Third, Iraq’s foreign policy relied on full sovereignty, and contracting parties had equal rights. Moreover, Nuri confirmed that Iran and Pakistan were welcomed to join the pact, as the United States and Britain were. If London had joined the Iraq-Turkish agreement, this new treaty would have substituted the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi one.60 The Iraqi-Turkish pact provided cooperation between the two countries in the security and defense fields. Article 5 allowed any Arab League states to join while implicitly excluding Israel. It was a watershed in Arab politics. The regional system was now divided into three camps: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen on one side; Iraq with Western countries’ support on the other; and, finally, the hesitant Arab states: Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.61 Britain joined the Iraq–Turkey pact officially on April 4, signing a Special Agreement with Iraq. The British adherence to the treaty had two functions. On the one hand, it permitted updating the AngloIraqi alliance. On the other, it was supposed to favor the Iraqi regional leadership inducing other Arab states to join the security agreement.

The Processes of Alliance Persistence This last section describes the processes leading to alliance persistence. Firstly, it depicts the British policy of interallied control. The analysis shows that the more powerful ally preferred a soft restraint strategy, neutralizing the sources of internal opposition. Britain favored the development of a system of regional defense that satisfied the weaker side’s needs and requests. On the other hand, Iraq preferred strengthening its relationship with its historical ally instead of turning toward a new one, such as the United States, which was a feasible strategic alternative in 1954.

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Britain’s Policy of Soft Control Britain’s approach to Iraq had two different phases. Following the end of World War II, London was more concerned with managing AngloEgyptian relations as the cornerstone of its strategy in the Middle East. However, during the Portsmouth Treaty’s talks in 1948, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin assumed an accommodative attitude toward Iraq. Looking at the collapse of the 1946 treaty negotiations, he wanted to avoid similar mistakes, acknowledging that nothing other than a basis of equality in interallied relations and complete independence could have satisfied the Iraqi aspirations.62 Indeed, although some rhetoric, the Portsmouth treaty effectively improved the junior ally’s autonomy. Unfortunately, it was not ratified because of Iraq’s domestic instability in 1948. In the late 1940s, Britain did not accommodate Iraqi plans for alliance renewal within a new regional defense system. London aimed to settle an agreement with the Egyptians as its regional hub. Indeed, Nuri often complained that Iraq deserved to be considered on an equal footing with Egypt instead of being treated as a secondary actor by Britain.63 However, in 1952 the British started changing their strategic thinking by looking at Iraq as the key Arab state of the Northern Tier schemes, which included Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Once the Egyptian alliance was lost, London had to secure cooperation with Baghdad in a regional defense pact.64 After Iraq rejected the American “Northern Tier” project in mid-1954, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden sent a note to the British mission in Iraq suggesting giving strategic leeway to the weaker ally. It was preferable, in Eden’s mind, to leave Nuri to decide whether to join or not the Turkish-Pakistan Pact or pursue another solution Iraqis judged more appropriate.65 In September 1954, the British ambassador to Iraq, Sir John Troutbeck (1951 to 1954), wrote to the Foreign Office, expressing a similar point of view. Troutbeck emphasized that tying Iraqis into an arrangement based on their idea was more promising than forcing them into a Western-made plan, as that strategy had already failed.66 Indeed, Britain preferred to adopt soft control on the weaker ally. During the Turkish–Iraqi negotiations in January 1955, Nuri wanted guarantees about the ally’s support for his initiative. The Prime minister was reassured that the Foreign Office judged the pact as in the best interests of Iraq and its Middle East neighbors. Moreover, London endorsed

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Baghdad in its diplomatic attempt to make other Arab states, Egypt included, accept the new regional security scheme.67 Therefore, Britain fully supported the Iraqi-Turkish pact and joined the Baghdad Pact establishing a pro-Western alliance where Baghdad was the leading Arab state. The British policy of soft control finally paved the way for the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance and temporarily preserved Britain’s dominant position in the region. The British Concessions to the Weaker Ally Britain made several concessions to the weaker partner to save the alliance from termination. We can consider three main points. Firstly, the Special Agreement of 1955 provided Iraqi control over Habbaniya and Shaiba’s air bases. Although Britain preserved the right to use the bases in wartime under Iraqi invitation, Baghdad increased its independence significantly. Secondly, Britain showed considerable strategic flexibility giving up its preference for a bilateral agreement—assuring more control on the weaker partner—in favor of a multilateral arrangement. Moreover, the Special Agreement of 1955 subordinated the Anglo-Iraqi alliance’s persistence to the Baghdad Pact’s success, which for Iraq meant achieving leadership among Arab states. Finally, Britain took sides in the Arab struggle for domination in favor of Baghdad. In the late 1940s, London aimed to preserve the alliance with Egypt by considering Cairo as the critical actor in the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact, by contrast, raised the Iraqi’s regional position and status, promoting a scheme that would have potentially isolated Cairo. In this regard, British support was enormously significant within Nuri’s plans. Britain or the United States? The Iraqi Preference for London Iraq demonstrated its strategic obeisance to the major ally once it felt recognized and favored its core interests. Evidence of this process includes the Iraqi preference for London instead of Washington as its main ally in 1954 and the Iraqi hard posture toward the Soviet Union in late 1954. In the early 1950s, the alliance deficits in security due to low remuneration pushed Iraq to strengthen relations with the United States. In 1951, the two countries concluded a technical assistance agreement that provided American advice and aid in agriculture, public health,

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and general economic development. In March 1953, Baghdad formally requested military assistance from the United States, expressing a preference for American arms.68 However, Iraqis preferred Britain when they had to choose between the historical ally and the United States in 1954. On the one hand, Iraq did not join the Turkish-Pakistani agreement, undermining the American “Northern Tier” project. On the other, Nuri excluded the United States from his plan and did not inform the State Department about the negotiations in late 1954.69 Indeed, the “Northern Tier” plan was the foundation of the American Middle Eastern policy and did not enhance the Iraqi leadership in the Arab world. By contrast, Nuri’s plan preferred to privilege the British ally, providing a framework for the alliance renewal and favoring the British influence in the region. Then, Iraq severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in January 1955, showing its willingness to draw other Arab states into the Western bloc. This proved to Moscow that the pact was directed against the Soviet Union and to Britain the renovated strategic convergence.70

Conclusions As a case of alliance persistence, the Anglo-Iraqi relationship from 1945 to 1955 appropriately represents how allies can overcome an internal crisis. The Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement of 1955 still provided for an alliance with asymmetric obligations under British leadership. However, the alliance was now strictly linked to the success of the Baghdad Pact (Article 9, letter b) and the establishment of Iraqi leadership among Arab states. Within the context of low benefits coming from the alliance, consistent evidence showed that Iraq’s voice effectiveness led to alliance persistence. Indeed, the weaker ally suffered a low remuneration in the allied exchange and could substitute the more powerful partner. However, the regional project of the Baghdad Pact centered on Iraqi core interests. Firstly, the agreement established that Iraq did not commit beyond its borders (Article 3) and transferred the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba to Iraqi control. Moreover, Britain made several concessions: it joined a pact that invited other Arab states to adhere and implicitly (but clearly) excluded Israel; it took the side between Iraq and Egypt in favor of Baghdad; it linked the persistence of the Anglo-Iraq special agreement to the continuation of the Baghdad Pact (Article 9, letter b).

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A. LEVA

Finally, the signature of the Baghdad Pact showed that the weaker ally’s voice attempts were effective by paving the way for the persistence of the alliance instead of its termination despite of low benefits coming from the interallied exchange.

Notes 1. Elliot M., Independent Iraq. The Monarchy and British Influence, Tauris, London-New York, 1996, p. 140. 2. Sassoon J., Economic Policy in Iraq 1932–1950, Frank Cass, London, 1987, p. 24. 3. Penrose E.T. and Penrose E.F., Iraq: International Relations and National Developments, London, Ernest Benn, 1978, pp. 101–103. 4. Hunt C., History of Iraq, London, Greenwood Press, 2005, pp. 71–72. 5. Penrose and Penrose, op. cit., 1978, p. 106. 6. See Seale P., The Struggle for Syria. A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945–1958, Tauris, London, 1965; Podeh E., The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World. The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, Brill, Leiden, 1995; Yesilbursa B.K., The Baghdad Pact. Anglo-American defense policy in Middle East, 1950–1959, Frank Cass, London-New York, 2005. 7. Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, intro. 8. Eppel M., “Iraqi Politics and Regional Policies, 1945–49”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan. 1992), pp. 108–119. 9. Cit. Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, p. 251. 10. Eppel M., Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny. From the Hashemites to the Rise of Saddam, University Press of Florida, 2004, p. 59. 11. Sassoon J., op. cit., 1987, p. 25. 12. Louis W. R., The British Empire in the Middle East 1945–1951, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 322. 13. Silverfarb D., The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East. A Case Study of Iraq 1941–1950, MacMillan, London, 1994, p. 77. 14. Eppel M., op. cit., 2004, p. 60. 15. Eppel M., op. cit., 2004, p. 60. 16. See Silverfarb D., op. cit., 1994, pp. 159–170. 17. Yesilbursa B. K., op. cit., 2005, intro. 18. Elliot M., op. cit., 1996, p. 36. 19. Silverfarb D., op. cit., 1994, pp. 84–87. 20. Romero J., The Iraqi Revolution of 1958. A Revolutionary Quest for Unity and Security, University Press of America, New York, 2011, p. 4. 21. Penrose E.T. and Penrose E.F., op. cit., 1978, p. 119. 22. Kolodziej E. A., “Iraq”, pp. 227–246, in Kolodziej E. A. and Harkavy (eds.), Security Policies of Developing Countries, Lexington Books, 1980; Silverfarb D., op. cit., pp. 39–53.

4

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

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Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, p. 325. Silverfarb D., op. cit., 1994, p. 100. Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, p. 325. Silverfarb D., op. cit., 1994, pp. 100–102. Jabber P., Not By War Alone. Security and Arms Control in the Middle East, University of California Press, Los Angel, 1981, pp. 63–81. Silverfarb D., op. cit., 1994, p. 107. Levey Z., “Britain’s Middle East Strategy, 1950–52: General Britain Robertson and the ‘small’ Arab States”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (March 2004), pp. 58–79. Cited in Perry R., Britain in Iraq During 1950s: Imperial Retrenchment and Informal Empire, August 2013, unpublished manuscript, p. 114. Levey Z., op. cit., March 2004. Williamson D., “Exploiting Opportunities: Iraq Secures Military Aid from the West, 1953–56”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 89–102. Anglo-Iraqi treaty, 1930, Clause 5. Silverfarb D., op. cit., 1994, p. 127. cited in Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, p. 327. cited in Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, p. 333. Gallman W. J., Iraq Under General Nuri. My Recollection of Nuri al-said, 1954–1958, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1964, p. 28. See Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, pp. 46–49. Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, pp. 140–141. Eppel M., op. cit., 2004, p. 70. Cit. Eppel M., op. cit., 1992. Eppel M., op. cit., 2004, p. 71. Eppel M., op. cit., 2004, p. 87. See Silverfarb D., op. cit., 1994, pp. 159–172. See Silverfarb D., op. cit., 1994, pp. 133–140. Silverfarb D., op. cit., 1994, p. 140. Romero J., op. cit., 2010, p. 94. Silverfarb D., op. cit., 1994, pp. 141–145; Al Marashi I., and Salama S., Iraq’s Armed Forces. An analytical history, Routledge, London and New York, 2008, pp. 66–67. Sassoon J., op. cit., 1987, p. 26. Cit. Romero J., op. cit., 2010, p. 94. Eppel M., op. cit., 2004; Hunt C., op. cit., 2005. Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, p. 46. Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, p. 48. Romero J., op. cit., 2010, p. 190. Eppel M., op. cit., 2004, p. 129. Eppel M., op. cit., 2004, p. 130.

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57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, pp. 69–81–82. Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, pp. 69–70. Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, pp. 106–107–110–111. Gallman W. J., op. cit., 1964, p. 55. Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, p. 125. Louis W. R., op. cit., 1984, p. 331. Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, p. 54. Williamson D., op. cit., 2004. cited in Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, p. 93. Cited in Jasse R. L., “The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism?”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp. 140–156. Jasse R. L., op. cit., 1991. See Williamson D., op. cit., 2004. Podeh E., op. cit., 1995, p. 92. Romero J., op. cit., 2010, pp. 28–29.

Bibliography Al Marashi I., and Salama S., Iraq’s Armed Forces. An analytical history, Routledge, London and New York, 2008. Elliot M., Independent Iraq. The Monarchy and British Influence, Tauris, LondonNew York, 1996. Eppel M., “Iraqi Politics and Regional Policies, 1945–49”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan. 1992), pp. 108–119. Eppel M., Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny. From the Hashemites to the rise of Saddam, University Press of Florida, 2004. Gallman W. J., Iraq Under General Nuri. My Recollection of Nuri al-said, 1954– 1958, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1964. Jabber P., Not By War Alone. Security and Arms Control in the Middle East, University of California Press, Los Angel, 1981. Jasse R. L., “The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism?”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp. 140–156. Kolodziej E. A., “Iraq”, pp. 227–246, in Kolodziej E. A. and Harkavy (eds.), Security Policies of Developing Countries, Lexington Books, 1980. Hunt C., History of Iraq, London, Greenwood Press, 2005. Levey Z., “Britain’s Middle East strategy, 1950-52: General Britain Robertson and the ‘small’ Arab states”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (March 2004), pp. 58–79. Louis W. R., The British Empire in the Middle East 1945–1951, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. Penrose E.T. and Penrose E.F., Iraq: International Relations and National Developments, London, Ernest Benn, 1978.

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Perry R., Britain in Iraq During 1950s: Imperial Retrenchment and Informal Empire, August 2013, unpublished manuscript. Podeh E., The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World. The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact, Brill, Leiden, 1995. Sassoon J., Economic Policy in Iraq 1932–1950, Frank Cass, London, 1987. Seale P., The Struggle for Syria. A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945–1958, Tauris, London, 1965. Silverfarb D., The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East. A Case Study of Iraq 1941–1950, MacMillan, London, 1994. Romero J., The Iraqi Revolution of 1958. A Revolutionary Quest for Unity and Security, University Press of America, New York, 2011. Williamson D., “Exploiting Opportunities: Iraq Secures Military Aid from the West, 1953–56”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 89–102. Yesilbursa B. K., The Baghdad Pact. Anglo-American Defense Policy in Middle East, 1950–1959, Frank Cass, London-New York, 2005.

CHAPTER 5

New Zealand’s Exit from ANZUS in the Mid-1980s: A Case of Alliance Termination

Abstract This Chapter examines New Zealand’s exit from ANZUS in the mid-1980s. As a case of alliance termination, it points out how a mismanaged interallied crisis can lead to the collapse of a security agreement. Although ANZUS was a cohesive alliance for more than 35 years, the New Zealand denuclearization policy and non-conformity to the patron’s requests triggered a process of non-reciprocity. In the context of lowthreat perception, the alliance strategy did not evolve, and Wellington could not improve interallied cooperation by including its interests. Therefore, the junior ally renounced the United States’ protection and military cooperation. Keywords United States · New Zealand · Voice ineffectiveness · Alliance termination

The ANZUS Pact was signed in September 1951 and came into effect early in 1952. It was the cornerstone of New Zealand’s security by establishing a new link with the United States and Australia. The treaty committed the member states to mutual aid, keeping and developing their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack (art. 2). Then, the allies agreed to consult in case of issues that would affect their territorial

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Leva, The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35448-9_5

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integrity, political independence, or security (art. 3). Finally, the treaty established the parties cooperating in case of an armed attack on any of them in the Pacific Area (art. 4). To New Zealand, the pact provided several benefits. Firstly, ANZUS guaranteed the US intervention against regional threats, such as a resurgent Japan or an aggressive China, and substituted the protection that Great Britain could no longer assure. Then, it paved the way for several bilateral and trilateral agreements to strengthen the country’s defense forces. Finally, the ANZUS Council annually provided an opportunity to exchange views and information to coordinate policies among the allies.1 On the other hand, the treaty provided a regional area for the United States forces to exercise and operate, assuring port and airfield access in the junior ally’s territory. At the same time, two American installations—a navy base and an astronomical observatory—were put in place on two of New Zealand’s south islands.2 Moreover, the United States enjoyed New Zealand’s support during the Cold War in the Asia Pacific. ANZUS was a cohesive alliance for over 35 years, providing a valuable tool to contain communism, promoting Western values of freedom and democracy, and bringing security and stability to the South Pacific region.3 New Zealand also took responsibility for collective defense supporting US forces in Korea and Vietnam. In the mid-1980s, an interallied crisis broke out, paving the way for the alliance’s termination. Wellington’s denuclearization policy and nonconformity to the patron’s requests triggered a process of non-reciprocity in interallied relations. On 11 August 1986, the United States formally ended its security commitment to New Zealand. Prime Minister Lange said that New Zealand was better out of ANZUS a few months later.4 The US–NZ relationship downgraded from the status of allies to that of friends, implying cordial ties that did not entail any alliance obligation.5 However, it is puzzling that Wellington preferred to pursue unilateral denuclearization by compromising its alliance membership. Although threat perception was low, ANZUS provided significant advantages in terms of military cooperation for a small country like New Zealand. Moreover, the alliance’s benefits were high, given that valuable alternatives to the American ally were lacking. The following chapter investigates how the junior ally’s quest for autonomy and voice opportunities affected the alliance’s evolution.6 It develops into four sections. The first section describes New Zealand’s ambitions starting from the end of the 1970s. As we need to focus on

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the weaker ally’s quest for autonomy as the trigger point of the inquiry, this section describes how New Zealand redefined its defense posture and which sources of dissatisfaction developed toward the United States. The second section accounts for the alliance variables, measuring the junior ally threat perception, the benefits of the alliance, and the effectiveness of voice attempts. The third section describes US–NZ relations historically from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. Finally, the fourth section explores the alliance mechanisms by focusing on the US policy of interallied control and New Zealand’s detachment from the alliance. The analysis will show that New Zealand’s voice attempts were ineffective, while the more powerful ally rigidly restrained the weaker one, paving the way for the alliance’s collapse. Indeed, the US–NZ relationship did not improve strategically by including the junior ally’s interests, so the latter renounced the patron protection and the benefits from the exchange. The alliance processes will show empirical evidence confirming the validity of the alliance termination model.

How to Define the Case: New Zealand’s Ambitions Since the 1970s Three main features characterized New Zealand’s posture in the early 1970s: the search for greater independence, a growing focus on the South Pacific region, and the denuclearization policy. In the early 1970s, the NZ government proclaimed the goal to achieve a higher degree of independence from its allies. The country aimed to move away from close conformity to the United States, defining a foreign policy that could reflect its ideals and interests.7 Indeed, Prime Minister Norman Kirk declared the will to pursue a more self-reliant and autonomous conduct in terms of judgment and action vis-à-vis its most influential ally.8 Since the mid-1970s, the governments led by the National Party equally supported a more independent strategic posture. The 1978 Defense Paper clearly expressed this change in defense posture. It noticed that historical alliances led the country to concentrate military efforts in distant areas, such as the Middle East, Korea, and Southeast Asia. However, the new international circumstances suggested that New Zealand could best contribute to world peace and security by acting mainly in the South Pacific.9 The 1983 Defense Paper confirmed this strategic view, addressing that New Zealand would promote training,

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exercises, and exchanges with the South Pacific countries, developing skills to manage low-level emergencies and supporting its broader regional interests.10 Although Wellington’s pursuit of greater autonomy did not imply an alliance exit, this paved the way for growing internal opposition. Interallied frictions developed primarily because of the policy of denuclearization. At the 1974 meeting of the ANZUS Council, New Zealand promoted the idea of a South Pacific nuclear weapons-Free Zone, which the United States rejected. In the mid-1980s, Wellington’s anti-nuclear instance strengthened. Former NZ diplomat Gerard Hensley described the origins of this policy as a reaction to the British and American nuclear tests in the South Pacific.11 Indeed, the New Zealanders felt the danger of these nuclear military exercises close to their coasts. Moreover, they thought the distance from the main geopolitical theaters permitted them to dissociate from this kind of defense. This view reinforced the country’s missionary consciousness and moral attitude, prone to give a positive example to the international community. As the Labour Party won the 1984 election, the government sacrificed New Zealand’s active membership in ANZUS to promote its anti-nuclear policy. Although Wellington did not aim to abrogate the alliance treaty, it was determined to change the terms of its cooperation. The junior ally called for the agreement’s renegotiation to establish its non-involvement in ANZUS nuclear activities. Therefore, New Zealand’s strategic posture has slowly changed since the early 1970s. A greater focus on the South Pacific implied a detachment from the global concerns of its major ally. The attempt to change the US-led status quo in the region is the trigger point of the inquiry.

The Alliance Variables The following section describes the model’s variables, measuring firstly New Zealand’s threat perception and the alliance’s benefits. The variables assume the value as a Type II case. Then, it is accounted for the junior ally’s quest for autonomy and voice effectiveness to report on the validity of the explicative model. Overall, the split of New Zealand from ANZUS in the mid-1980s fits the theoretical framework as a case of alliance termination. Firstly, the case successfully passes the selection test. New Zealand has a lowthreat perception, while the alliance’s benefits are high in the period under

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consideration. Secondly, the explicative variable comfortably fits the theoretical expectations, as New Zealand’s ineffective voice plausibly led to alliance termination. In the context of an alliance deficit in security due to a low threat perception, the alliance did not evolve strategically, excluded the junior ally’s interests, and collapsed. New Zealand’s Low-Threat Perception To New Zealand, the signature of the ANZUS pact in 1951 provided long-term security insurance against a resurgent Japan and an immediate one against any aggressive communist country, such as China and the Soviet Union. In 1957, the NZ Defense Paper concluded that threats mainly arose from the worldwide activities of communist countries.12 This view favored New Zealand’s military involvement in Malaysia and Singapore to support Britain, and Vietnam to support the United States. However, the security environment radically shifted at the end of the Vietnamese war. China improved relations with the Western nations while friction arose within the Communist bloc. The United States sought accommodation with both China and the Soviet Union. As the superpower rivalry decreased, New Zealand focused increasingly on specific South Pacific issues, such as economic survival and internal political unrest.13 All the major NZ political parties realized that external circumstances favored Wellington to formulate a new self-reliant policy concerning Asia.14 The country’s defense spending fell from nearly 4.7% of GNP in 1974 to about 1.8% in 1977, one of the world’s lowest figures. Although the Cold War tensions slightly increased at the end of the 1970s, New Zealand’s defense expenses did not increase significantly.15 In fact, the government emphasized the lack of a direct military threat to the country because of its distance from the Cold War’s main theaters.16 While geographical isolation was judged initially as a source of vulnerability, it was seen as a source of protection by the 1980s. Therefore, security perceptions significantly changed from the signature of the ANZUS pact in 1951. Diplomatic links were again established with China in 1973, and Japan became the country’s largest trading partner by 1984. The Soviet Union was still considered a menace, although significant trade links had been established. In the 1980s, the perceived communist threat undoubtedly had decreased if compared to the previous three decades.17

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In a 1985 paper, Labor Prime Minister David Lange wrote that New Zealand faced no threat of military aggression. Moreover, the country enjoyed internal political stability, and there was no source of domestic threats. The stability of the South Pacific became New Zealand’s primary concern. The Labor government realized that it could be pursued by favoring regional economic development and neutralizing outside destabilizing influences.18 The High Benefits of the Alliance To New Zealand, military cooperation with the United States provided remarkable advantages.19 Firstly, the junior ally enjoyed privileged access to American sources and information. The participation in the United States network (with the UK, Canada, and Australia) permitted Wellington to acquire the member states’ data and make special requests for additional information (for instance, regarding the French nuclear testing in the South Pacific in the early 1970s). Direct consultation and personal contact with the other partners paved the way for specialist advice and improved the working relationship with the ally.20 Secondly, New Zealand had the opportunity to purchase US military technology and equipment on very favorable terms. The basic US–NZ military cooperation arrangement was signed in May 1965 (the “Cooperative Logistic Arrangement Relating to the Supply Support of the Armed Forces of New Zealand by the United States Department of Defense”), establishing the common security objectives and the principles of mutual aid. According to the agreement, New Zealand’s requests enjoyed the same priority as those of the US armed services in peacetime. The “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU), signed in June 1982, covered the wartime supply of military equipment and logistic support. New Zealand was also privileged in applying the Arms Export Control Act (adopted by the US in 1976) by benefiting from a special status like Australia, Japan, and the NATO allies. Moreover, New Zealanders had the opportunity to exercise and train regularly with the ally’s armed forces. The modest Wellington’s defense forces obtained a high operational efficiency and professional competence, sharing operation doctrines and tactics with a more powerful partner. The allies conducted regular training, such as the RIMPAC maritime multilateral exercises operating in the Hawaiian waters (which involved NZ, US, Canada, Japan, and Australia in 1983 and 1985) and exercise

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TRIAD involving air, land, and sea forces from all ANZUS member states. These exercises provided military training in various tactical environments using high-technology equipment and benefited a small country like New Zealand.21 Finally, New Zealand enormously took advantage of the cooperation in the defense science domain with the Western allies. As the analyst Peter Jennings pointed out, the New Zealand Defense Science Establishment (DSE) was very small, carrying out little basic research. It relied on scientific cooperation with the United States and United Kingdom, most notably under the “Technical Cooperation Programme” which focused on sonar technology and Mine Counter Measures research. As the DSE argued in its Annual Review in 1986, scientific research in New Zealand heavily depended on international cooperation.22 Therefore, military cooperation with the United States provided remarkable advantages to New Zealand’s armed forces, which such a small country would not otherwise obtain. This evidence implies that the benefits coming from the alliance were high during the period under consideration. New Zealand Voice Ineffectiveness New Zealand’s voice attempts focused on advancing its anti-nuclear policy and including it in the alliance strategy, subject to the more powerful ally’s acceptance. Indeed, the Labor Party called for renegotiating the ANZUS treaty as far as it gained power in 1984. New Zealand required the following terms: the recognition of its anti-nuclear stance, the right to promote a nuclear-free South Pacific region, the establishment of an equal partnership implying unanimity on alliance decisions, and a guarantee of the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.23 The denuclearization policy was at the core of Wellington’s claims. Minister of Defence Frank O’Flynn wrote in the introduction to his ministry’s Annual Report for 1984–1985 that NZ’s participation in ANZUS did not require adopting nuclear defense strategies. The country would have met its collective security obligations in other ways.24 On the other hand, the junior ally believed that the United States “neither confirm nor deny” policy limited its own independence. In the 1985 speech at the Oxford Union debate, Lange declared that New Zealand was told it could not make autonomous decisions about how to

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defend itself.25 Then, commenting on the posture of its most powerful ally, the Premier said that compelling a partner to accept nuclear weapons against its wishes was like adopting the moral position of totalitarianism, which allowed for no self-determination.26 Once the NZ government denied access to the US Navy Buchanan, a deep interallied crisis followed. Nonetheless, Wellington tried to keep ANZUS alive in several ways. Lange suggested through diplomatic channels that a Perry-class frigate—believed as non-nuclear—was an acceptable substitute for avoiding intrusive port inspection, but Washington rejected the proposal.27 Then, the NZ government tried to involve the ally in its domestic legislation process. The Labors were prepared to share drafts of anti-nuclear legislation to find a compromise. Washington refused to discuss the bill, claiming that enhancing that legislation would have implied the termination of any defense obligations.28 Finally, New Zealanders proposed to solve the issue through a confidential US undertaking to send only non-nuclear-capable ships to New Zealand ports. However, Washington firmly denied the proposal.29 In mid-September 1985, Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer visited Washington. He talked with the Assistant Secretary of State for Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz, at the State Department, arguing that the United States and New Zealand had to recognize each other’s leading political principles as they were both democracies.30 However, the United States did not acknowledge the junior partner’s anti-nuclear policy. As Palmer returned from Washington, the Labor government started to think seriously about leaving ANZUS. Lange declared that if ANZUS required nuclear weapons, it was the alliance itself impeding a good relationship between New Zealand and the United States.31 Indeed, as one scholar’s interviews with NZ’s government officials proved, the junior ally aimed to speak with its own voice in international affairs, avoiding being considered a client state and having dictated its own policy agenda by others.32 In ANZUS, Wellington aspired to advance its interests through an independent foreign policy. Yet, the junior ally attempted to overcome the crisis, but the US firmness impeded the relationship from evolving strategically. Finally, Washington’s posture produced the opposite effect by hardening the New Zealanders’ attitude and paving the way for the alliance’s collapse.33

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The US–NZ Relations from the Mid-1970s to the Mid-1980s New Zealand’s Pursuit of Greater Independence As an Australian historian argued, New Zealand pursued economic independence in the 1970s and 1980s through a diversification policy to reduce its dependence on Western allies. This posture was surprisingly constant from the governments of the Labour Party and those led by the National Party.34 The new foreign trade policy did not conform to a traditional junior ally’s security and defense policy. In the early 1970s, Labour Prime Minister Kirk established relationships with the two major communist countries, China and the Soviet Union, promoting Wellington’s economic diplomacy. The government recognized the People’s Republic of China and reestablished an embassy in the Soviet Union (after recognizing the 1940 annexation of the Baltic states, which the United States did not).35 Moreover, in 1971 New Zealand voted for China’s admission to the United Nations, while the Nixon government refused to recognize the Chinese government until 1979. Following the 1975 election, the winning National Party embraced the Labour policy favoring expansive economic diplomacy. By emphasizing New Zealand’s need for greater leeway in its economic relations, Prime Minister Robert Muldoon declared in 1978 that New Zealand had to adopt a different stance in its relationships with friends and allies, giving up its habit of uncompromisingly following others.36 In this view, the Iranian case was significant. In January 1980, as Iran bought New Zealand products, Wellington refused to support the American proposal for an embargo on trade in non-food items with Teheran. Moreover, during the American hostage crisis in April 1980, Wellington did not follow the ally’s embargo on food shipments in Iran. Muldoon stated that New Zealand could not adopt self-damaging policies and that the United States had to understand.37 Furthermore, Wellington improved its relationships with communist countries. Although trading relations with the Soviet Union were ambivalent and fluctuating, bilateral trade increased in the late 1970s. The Muldoon government then confirmed a keen interest in a more solid relationship with China due to its trading potential. The Prime Minister’s first overseas visit in April 1976 included Beijing and advanced

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New Zealand’s interest in strengthening a cordial association.38 In 1979, although it called upon China to withdraw from Vietnam, Wellington did not strongly condemn the military invasion. Moreover, New Zealand did not consider the Chinese test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in May 1980 in the South Pacific as threatening its security.39 In the 1970s, economic diplomacy became New Zealand’s primary concern. The need for greater leeway in that foreign policy area came at the expense of traditional security considerations of collective defense. The US–NZ Relationships in a Changing South Pacific In the 1970s, several South Pacific microstates achieved independence by favoring New Zealand’s reorientation toward the South Pacific region. As colonies of great powers no longer surrounded it, Wellington and Canberra led these newly independent states to create the South Pacific Forum. The Forum was established in 1971 to regulate and improve regional economic cooperation. New Zealand shifted to South Pacific the majority of its bilateral aid (around 78% in 1985) by pushing for the economic-financial sufficiency of the region. Moreover, it dropped import controls from its neighbors under the SPARTECA arrangement.40 New Zealand financed the Forum and supported its weaker member states, also promoting some common regional interests. The first issue in the US–NZ relationship arose precisely because of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) initiative. While the Labour government proposal was strongly supported by the island states and by the UN General Assembly in early 1975, the United States vigorously opposed fearing to go through restrictions on nuclear-armed forces transit within the region.41 Meanwhile, the SPNFZ initiative weakened after the election of the conservative governments in New Zealand and Australia in late 1975. The Muldoon National Party government expressed formal support for the SPNFZ but judged the proposal unsuitable for keeping good relations with the United States. However, the same government condemned the ally when it failed the Law of Sea ratification in 1982.42 In the early 1980s, Wellington intensely promoted ANZUS cooperation in the South Pacific region. In fact, the 1983 Defense Paper emphasized New Zealand’s need for self-reliance within a framework of increasing interallied cooperation. In early 1984, the NZ Secretary of

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Foreign Affairs argued it was crucial to keep the South Pacific Westernoriented and avoid favoring conditions of instability that the Soviet Union or other unfriendly powers could have exploited.43 Following the election of mid-1984, the Labour government recommitted itself to the ANZUS Treaty and a close relationship with the American ally. Nonetheless, the government aimed to redefine New Zealand’s contribution to the alliance. This triggered the ANZUS crisis. The Nuclear Ships Dispute As the Labour Party won the 1984 election, it proceeded with its antinuclear policy. The government announced that nuclear-armed ships or aircraft would no longer be welcomed to New Zealand ports or airfields and reaffirmed its adherence to ANZUS in terms of conventional defense only. Therefore, New Zealand armed forces gave up their participation in joint exercises involving any use or simulated use of nuclear weapons.44 Yet, the United States had a growing need for reliable allies in the Pacific region. Washington planned to expand its combatant vessels from 345 to 600, and the number of ship visits to the Pacific countries was likely to increase.45 Although the United States could not accept any proposal to constrain its mobile nuclear forces, Washington avoided confrontation with the junior ally. The ANZUS Council regularly met in Wellington, personnel and intelligence exchanges continued, and the October 1984 TRIAD exercise took place in New Zealand as scheduled.46 The Labour government reiterated that ANZUS was not a nuclear treaty, taking further distance from the ally. As New Zealand’s armed forces did not exercise more in a nuclear mode, Wellington could not accept nuclear-armed vessels of the United States within its internal water and ports. Lacking assurances from the ally, Wellington had to assume that ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons were transporting them.47 Once the United States reaffirmed its “neither confirm nor deny” policy about the presence of atomic weapons on its vessels, New Zealand’s ban on nuclear-capable ships became a ban on all American navies and aircraft. The crisis escalated when Deputy Prime Minister Palmer denied port access to the USS Buchanan in January 1985. While Washington claimed that New Zealand infringed the ANZUS treaty, Wellington did not recognize any obligation concerning nuclear cooperation. Almost immediately, the United States adopted several countermeasures. The collaboration in

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terms of the joint exercise, military training, and exchanges of intelligence data concluded, and high-level US officials declined immediately to meet their New Zealand counterparts.48 Therefore, ANZUS quickly became inoperative as a trilateral alliance. The ANZUS Split In mid-1985, New Zealand supported the regional initiative for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The Labour government adopted a flexible attitude discouraging those, like the Melanesian Island states, from seeking stricter anti-nuclear provisions. As one Australian scholar argued, this was to prevent the emergence of regional alliances that could oppose ANZUS.49 Nonetheless, the Labour government advanced the legislative process concerning the anti-nuclear bill. In December 1985, it sent the “New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Bill” to Parliament. Nonetheless, the United States warned the junior ally that ANZUS was incompatible with a member’s anti-nuclear posture. On 15 April 1986, Ambassador Paul Cleveland made a speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs in Wellington. His warning anticipated Washington’s intentions. In fact, the United States was willing to review its security relationship with New Zealand if the draft legislation had been approved, implying the suspension of any commitment.50 Moreover, Lange received a written warning that developed the same argument and was personally delivered by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Lilley.51 These warnings did not impede the New Zealand Parliament from approving the Nuclear Free Bill. Indeed, the ANZUS split materialized in mid-1986. As the Nuclear Free Bill proceeded, on 27 June 1986, US Secretary Shultz suspended American security obligations to New Zealand by declaring that the two countries were no more obligated as allies.52 Then, the Memorandum of Understanding was not renewed in mid-1987, removing New Zealand from the group of allies enjoying easy access to US weapon supplies.53 Finally, the United States did not adhere to the Rarotonga treaty establishing the SPNFZ. Although the treaty did not hinder the US strategic posture in the Pacific, Washington feared that it could encourage other states to adopt an anti-nuclear policy as its former ally New Zealand.54

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The Processes of Alliance Termination This last section accounts for the alliance processes leading to the security treaty termination. Firstly, it describes the US policy of interallied control, showing that the most powerful ally exercised significant restraint over the weaker partner, increasing its dissatisfaction. Secondly, it focuses on New Zealand’s behavior. Although the junior ally avoided confrontation with the patron, trying to minimize the sources of friction, there is evidence of detachment in two prevailing attitudes: New Zealand’s focus on greater self-reliance and pursuing a closer relationship with Australia. The US Policy of Hard Control By the 1980s, the United States placed heavier emphasis on the Pacific region, actively promoting nuclear-powered units in the Navy. The Regan administration held that ships’ access to allied ports was necessary for a maritime coalition such as ANZUS, which had so far contributed to the US alliance system by assuring full cooperation.55 At the beginning of the ANZUS crisis, admiral W. Crowe (CINCPAC) sent a telegram to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, remembering that other allied countries had nuclear sensitivities and were watching closely how the United States handled the issue. Indeed, New Zealand’s anti-nuclear feelings could have encouraged Greece, Denmark, Spain, Iceland, and Japan. Moreover, Crowe recalled the State Department’s request in December 1984 for the blanket diplomatic clearance for 1985, anticipating a ship visit to New Zealand following the ANZUS Sea Eagle exercise. The United States aimed to unlimited port access while keeping the “neither confirm nor deny” policy.56 Being strongly determined to keep ships’ access to ports, the Regan administration announced its intent to retaliate against New Zealand the same day the access to the USS Buchanan was denied. Washington introduced severe punitive measures, cutting any form of military cooperation and abolishing the “open door” policy between officials of the two governments.57 These retaliatory measures imposed a de facto isolation on Wellington. New Zealander officials were excluded from meetings where US intelligence data were shared, lost easy access to the Pentagon for consultation, and could no longer benefit from US military training.58

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The US ambassador to Australia William Lake affirmed that New Zealand was like a bad boy who had to be punished.59 Although Washington took distance from this declaration, the US administration pursued harmful policies to discipline the weaker ally. New Zealand’s New Strategic Posture In the middle of the ANZUS crisis, New Zealand firmly pursued a policy of greater self-reliance. In the 1985 MOD Annual Report, Defense Minister O’Flynn reiterated that the country intended to refrain from modeling its army to support foreign forces and to deploy it in distant wars.60 Instead, New Zealand intended to develop armed forces to protect its sovereignty and the Pacific regional stability, moving quickly in case of requests for help from neighboring countries. The Labour government expressed these points in two Cabinet papers (18 March and 1 April 1985) by arguing that New Zealand had to do more on its own to ensure the stability of the South Pacific region.61 During the 1985–1986 ANZUS crisis, the government promoted the most significant change in defense policies since World War II. The 1987 White Paper recognized that the country had to exercise greater selfreliance and, as far as possible, keep the ability to deter credible threats to its security and interests by using its own resources.62 This view modified New Zealand’s strategic priorities, emphasizing the ability to operate alone in the region rather than as part of a coalition of allied forces. On the other hand, Wellington recognized the risks of isolation. Following the Buchanan diplomatic incident, the Labour government began supporting a closer military association with Australia. In fact, in early 1985, Defense Minister O’Flynn declared that the end of defense cooperation with the United States increased the value of New Zealand’s exercise and training with Australian forces. Growing links with Canberra became crucial to preserve regional stability and security.63 Indeed, the exit from ANZUS pushed New Zealand into another asymmetric relationship but this did not imply any nuclear obligation.

Conclusions As a case of alliance termination, the US–NZ relationship from the mid1970s to the mid-1980s appropriately represents how a mismanaged interallied crisis can lead to alliance termination. Although ANZUS was

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a cohesive alliance for more than 35 years, the New Zealand denuclearization policy and non-conformity to the patron’s requests triggered a process of non-reciprocity until alliance termination. For our purposes, we found sufficient evidence that the ineffectiveness of the New Zealand voice has led to the junior ally’s detachment from ANZUS. In a context of alliance deficit due to low-threat perception, Wellington could not improve interallied cooperation by including its interests. Therefore, it renounced the United States’ protection and military cooperation. The former allies preserved cordial relations avoiding the stricter obligations of an asymmetric military alliance.

Notes 1. Hoadley S., New Zealand United States Relation, The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, November 2016, p. 42. 2. Donnini F., ANZUS in Revision. Changing Defense Features of Australia and New Zealand in the Mid-1980s, Air University Press, Alabama, February 1991, pp. 26–29. 3. Donnini F., op. cit., 1991. 4. Alves D., “The Changing New Zealand Defense Posture,” Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Apr. 1989), pp. 363–381. 5. McMillan S., Neither Confirm Nor Deny. The Nuclear Ship Dispute between New Zealand and the United States, Praeger, New York, 1987, p. 155. 6. On New Zealand’s autonomy, also see Catalinac A., “Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing ‘Opposition for Autonomy’ in Asymmetric Alliances”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2010), pp. 317–338. 7. Cited in McCraw D., “From Kirk to Muldoon: Change and Continuity in New Zealand’s Foreign-Policy Priorities”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1982–1983), pp. 640–659. 8. Cited in McCraw D., op. cit., 1982. 9. Janaki K., “International Regimes, New Zealand and the Pacific”, in Alley R., New Zealand and the Pacific, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. 10. Alves D., op. cit., 1989. 11. Hensley G., Friendly Fire. Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of ANZUS, 1984–1987 , Auckland University Press, 2013, pp. 7–8. 12. Cited in Huntley W., “The Kiwi That Roared: Nuclear-Free New Zealand in a Nuclear-Armed World”, The Nonproliferation Review/Fall, 1996. 13. Pugh M., The ANZUS Crises, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 35. 14. McCraw D., op. cit., 1982.

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15. McKinnon M., Independence and Foreign Policy. New Zealand in the World since 1935, Auckland University Press, 1993, pp. 196–204. 16. Huntley W., op. cit., 1996. 17. Jackson K. and Lamare J., “Politics, Public Opinion and International Crisis: the ANZUS issue in New Zealand Politics”, in Bercovitch J. (eds.), ANZUS in Crisis. Alliance Management in International Affairs, MacMillan Press, 1988, pp. 162–163. 18. Cited in Johnston R., “Geopolitical Transition and International Realignment: The Case of New Zealand”, Geopolitics and International Boundaries, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter 1997) pp. 43–69. 19. See Donnini F., op. cit., 1991, pp. 29, 117–120; Hoadley S., op. cit., 2016, pp. 78–83. 20. Hoadley S., op. cit., 2016, p. 99. 21. Jennings P., The Armed Forces of New Zealand and the ANZUS Split: Costs and Consequences, Occasional Paper No. 4, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1988, pp. 8–9. 22. Jennings P., op. cit., 1988, pp. 27–28. 23. Cited in Carpenter P.G., “Pursuing a Strategic Divorce: The U.S. and the ANZUS Alliance”, Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 67, February 27, 1986. 24. Cited in Hoadley S., op. cit., 2016, p. 50. 25. Thakur R., “Creation of the Nuclear-Free New Zealand Myth: Brinkmanship WIthout a Brink”, Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 10 (Oct. 1989), pp. 919–939. 26. Thakur R., op. cit., 1989. 27. Thies W. & Harris J., “An Alliance Unravels: The United States and Anzus”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 98–126. 28. McKinnon M., op. cit., 1993, p. 284. 29. Jackson K. and Lamare J., op. cit., 1988. 30. Hensley G., op. cit., 2013, pp. 205–206. 31. Jackson and Lamare, op. cit., 1988. 32. Catalinac A., op. cit., 2010, p. 327. 33. Catalinac A., op. cit., 2010, p. 331. 34. McKinnon M., op. cit., 1993, p. 219. 35. McCraw D., op. cit., 1982. 36. Cited in McKinnon M., op. cit., 1993, p. 216. 37. Cited in McCraw D., op. cit., 1982. 38. Ibidem. 39. Ibidem. 40. Hoadley S., “New Zealand’s Regional Security Policies”, in Baker R. (eds.), The ANZUS States and Their Region. Regional Policies of Australia, New Zealand and the United States, Praeger, 1994.

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41. Hamel-Green M., The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty: A Critical Assessment, Australian National University, 1990, p. 2. 42. McKinnon M., op. cit., 1993, p. 269. 43. Cited in McKinnon M., op. cit., 1993, p. 259. 44. Hamel-Green M., op. cit., 1990, p. 75. 45. Hamel-Green M., op. cit., 1990, p. 110. 46. Hoadley S., op. cit., 2016, p. 50. 47. Hoadley S., op. cit., 2016, p. 49. 48. Hoadley S., op. cit., 2016, p. 53. 49. Hamel-Green M., op. cit., 1990. p. 80. 50. Cited in Hoadley S., op. cit., 2016, p. 53. 51. Hoadley S., op. cit., 2016, p. 53. 52. Hoadley S., op. cit., 2016, p. 53. 53. Donnini F., op. cit., 1991, p. 102. 54. Hamel-Green M., op. cit., 1990, p. 117. 55. Hensley G., op. cit., 2013, p. 112. 56. Cited in Clements K., “New Zealand’s Role in Promoting a NuclearFree Pacific”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 25, No. 4, Special Issue on Militarization and Demilitarization in Asia–Pacific (Dec., 1988), pp. 395– 410. 57. Donnini F., op. cit., 1991, p. 21. 58. McMillan S., op. cit., 1987, p. 98. 59. Cited in McMillan S., op. cit., 1987, p. 99. 60. Cited in Jennings P., op. cit., 1988, p. 52. 61. Jennings P., op. cit., 1988, p. 52. 62. Cited in Jennings P., op. cit., 1988, p. 53. 63. Jennings P., op. cit., 1988, p. 71.

Bibliography Alves D., “The Changing New Zealand Defense Posture”, Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Apr. 1989), pp. 363–381. Carpenter P.G., “Pursuing a Strategic Divorce: the U.S. and the ANZUS alliance”, Cato institute Policy Analysis no. 67, February 27 1986. Catalinac A., “Why New Zealand Took Itself Out of ANZUS: Observing ‘Opposition for Autonomy’ in Asymmetric Alliances”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2010), pp. 317–338. Clements K., “New Zealand’s Role in Promoting a Nuclear-Free Pacific”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 25, No. 4, Special Issue on Militarization and Demilitarization in Asia-Pacific (Dec., 1988), pp. 395–410. Donnini F., ANZUS in Revision. Changing Defense Features of Australia and New Zealand in the Mid-1980s, Air University Press, Alabama, February 1991.

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Hamel-Green M., The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty: A Critical Assessment, Australian National University, 1990. Hensley G., Friendly Fire. Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of ANZUS, 1984– 1987 , Auckland University Press, 2013. Hoadley S., “New Zealand’s Regional Security Policies”, in Baker R. (eds.), The ANZUS States and Their Region. Regional Policies of Australia, New Zealand and the United States, Praeger, 1994. Hoadley S., New Zealand United States Relation, The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, November 2016. Huntley W., “The Kiwi That Roared: Nuclear-Free New Zealand in a NuclearArmed World”, The Nonproliferation Review/Fall, 1996. Jackson K. and Lamare J., “Politics, Public Opinion and International Crisis: The ANZUS Issue in New Zealand Politics”, in Bercovitch J. (eds.), ANZUS in Crisis. Alliance Management in International Affairs, MacMillan Press, 1988. Janaki K., “International Regimes, New Zealand and the Pacific”, in Alley R. (eds.), New Zealand and the Pacific, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Jennings P., The Armed Forces of New Zealand and the ANZUS Split: Costs and Consequences, Occasional Paper No. 4, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1988. Johnston R., “Geopolitical Transition and International Realignment: The Case of New Zealand”, Geopolitics and International Boundaries, Vol. 2, No.3 (Winter 1997) pp. 43–69. McCraw D., “From Kirk to Muldoon: Change and Continuity in New Zealand’s Foreign-Policy Priorities”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1982– 1983), pp. 640–659. McKinnon M., Independence and Foreign Policy. New Zealand in the World Since 1935, Auckland University Press, 1993. McMillan S., Neither Confirm Nor Deny. The Nuclear Ship Dispute between New Zealand and the United States, Praeger, New York, 1987. Pugh M., The ANZUS Crises, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989. Thakur R., “Creation of the Nuclear-Free New Zealand Myth: Brinkmanship without a Brink”, Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 10 (Oct. 1989), pp. 919–939. Thies W. & Harris J., “An Alliance Unravels: The United States and Anzus”, Naval War College Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 98–126.

CHAPTER 6

The US–Australia Relations in the Mid-1980s: A Case of Alliance Persistence

Abstract This Chapter examines the US–Australia relations in the mid1980s. In the context of an asymmetric relationship, significant evidence exists that the junior ally’s voice effectiveness provided the needed benefits for guaranteeing the alliance’s persistence. Although the Australian quest for autonomy could erode the alliance, the US policy of soft control policy paved the way for accommodating the ally interests, including them in the overall alliance strategy. The security agreement persisted despite the changes and frictions that characterized the most critical period of the ANZUS alliance. Keywords United States · Australia · Voice effectiveness · Alliance persistence

At the end of World War II, Australia turned to the United States looking for protection against the possibility of a revived Japan rearmament and rising communist powers.1 The country ratified the ANZUS treaty in 1952, achieving two main benefits. Firstly, Canberra obtained the US assurance of aid during armed attacks from third countries (art. 4). Washington replaced Britain—Canberra’s erstwhile protector—that could no

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Leva, The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35448-9_6

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longer provide any security guarantee. Secondly, Australia obtained privileged access to the ally’s military hardware, training, and intelligence networks, confirming its status as the leading actor in the South Pacific region. On the other hand, Canberra supported the ally in its military campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s by sending 15.000 service personnel to fight in the Korean War and nearly 47.000 to the Vietnam War.2 Acting as a great power guaranteeing regional stability, the United States assured its presence in the South Pacific and positioned some military bases on Australian soil. The defense, communications, and intelligence installations—specifically, the agreements on the North West Cape communications station (1963) and the satellite intelligence facilities at Pine Gap (1966) and Nurrungar (1969), positioned in central Australia—became critical in Washington’s global strategic planning.3 For our inquiry, we will analyze the interallied relations from the mid1970s to the mid-1980s, during the most challenging crisis in ANZUS history. In the context of an alliance deficit due to Australia’s low-threat perception, the allies triggered the processes that have been favoring the alliance’s persistence. From the Australian perspective, alliance voice opportunities improved the relationship with Washington. As former Prime Minister Keating noticed, the alliance provided standing for Australia to have its voice heard in Washington, especially about developments occurring in the Pacific region.4 On the other hand, the United States accommodated the junior partner’s needs and requests for greater autonomy. Therefore, the alliance evolved by including the weaker ally’s interests and avoiding the agreement termination during the major crisis in ANZUS history. The following chapter develops into four sections. The first section describes Australia’s ambitions from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. As we need to stress the weaker ally’s quest for autonomy as the trigger point of the inquiry, this section focuses on Australia’s foreign and defense policy. Then, the second section accounts for the model’s variables, measuring Australia’s threat perception and alliance benefits, and settles the framework for the empirical inquiry. Then, it depicts the junior ally’s voice attempts and their effectiveness. The third section describes the US– Australia relationship historically from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. The fourth section finally gives an account of the alliance processes. It firstly focuses on the US policy of soft interallied control. Then, it analyzes how Australia gave assurances to its partner, still increasing its autonomy.

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These processes represent empirical evidence that confirms the validity of the alliance persistence model.

How to Define the Case: Australia’s Ambitions Since the Mid-1970s By the mid-1970s, three main aims characterized Australia’s policy in the alliance: the review of the agreements concerning the US military bases, a new defense policy aimed at self-reliance, and a regional policy of arms control and denuclearization. As it came to power in the early 1970s, the Labour Party started scrutinizing the interallied agreements concerning the US bases on Australian soil. The government judged that the US Naval facility at Northwest Cape violated the country’s sovereignty. Therefore, the allies agreed that the station would become a joint facility involving more Australian personnel in its operation, establishing an Australian National Communications center alongside the American station, and appointing an Australian naval officer as deputy commander of the entire facility.5 Moreover, the 1974 Barnard-Schlesinger agreement included two significant concessions to Australia. First, the Head of Australian Defense Staff in Washington obtained special access to high-level officials at very short notice. Secondly, the agreement defined a regular forum for discussions concerning the strategic implications of Northwest Cape to Australian security.6 This deeper cooperation between the allies favored the policy of self-reliance that Australia adopted during the 1970s. By 1959 Australia’s defense planners were already thinking of shaping the country’s defense forces independently of allies.7 However, the Cabinet rejected this view, preferring to prepare Australia for involvement in limited wars in Southeast Asia, and required organized forces to act effectively with the ally. The need for self-reliant defense arose more firmly during the 1970s and after the American defeat in Vietnam. In 1972, the Australian Defense Review argued for developing a more independent defense capability. The 1973 Strategic Basis of Australian Defense Policy asserted that Australia had to assume responsibility for its defense against any neighborhood or regional threats.8 In the early 1980s, Australia expressed unprecedented interest in arms control and nuclear disarmament.9 As the Labor Party won elections in 1983, the government committed to working toward meaningful

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détente and effective arms control measures, and opposed operations that would involve the use of nuclear weapons from Australian territory.10 The Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden went to the brink of becoming persona non grata in Washington because of his pressure over arms control issues.11 Indeed, the interallied relationship’s central issue was the Australian arms control policy and nuclear disarmament.12 The Hawke government opposed the US Strategic Defense Initiative— known as the Star War project—judging it as potentially destabilizing on the international strategic ground. Moreover, Canberra did not cooperate with the ally on the MX missile project.13 Therefore, by the mid-1970s, Australia made several attempts to increase its autonomy in the alliance. However, the successful management of the asymmetric relationship triggered the alliance persistence processes instead of the termination ones. Despite the alliance deficit due to a low-threat environment, the effectiveness of the junior ally’s voice permitted the partners to overcome several sources of crises and the alliance to persist.

The Alliance Variables The following section describes the variables that lead the empirical inquiry, measuring Australia’s threat perception and alliance benefits. These variables assume the values as a Type II case. Then, it is accounted for the weaker ally’s quest for autonomy and voice effectiveness to report on the validity of the explicative model. Overall, the US–Australia alliance fits the theoretical framework of the alliance persistence model. Firstly, the case passes the selection test, as Australia’s threat perception was low while alliance benefits were high in the period under consideration. Secondly, the explicative variable fits the theoretic expectations comfortably, as the effectiveness of the Australian voice led to several adjustments that favored the persistence of the alliance. In the context of an alliance deficit due to the weaker ally’s lowthreat perception, the security relationship evolved strategically, including the junior partner’s interests, and overcame the crisis. Australia’s Low-Threat Perception Following the end of World War II, Australia looked for the Unites States’ protection against potential Japan rearmament and rising threats from

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the communist powers. However, the South Pacific strategic environment changed significantly in the early 1970s. As three Australian scholars pointed out, the election of the Gough Whitlam government in 1972 made the low-threat outlook official. Defence Minister Lance Barnard declared that Australia expected not to face a threat in the next fifteen years.14 Although the 1975 Strategic Basis Paper recognized the potential for Soviet penetration of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, the strategic and political opportunities open to the Soviet Union did not provide any significant challenge to the US in the Pacific and, by association, did not menace Australia’s interests.15 Moreover, the 1975 paper recognized that there was no likelihood of strong strategic pressures or major military threats against Australia, its territories, maritime resources zones, or lines of communication.16 In the late 1970s, the liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser returned briefly to a high-threat narration concerning the country’s security, expressing concerns over the Soviet naval expansion in the Indian Ocean and the invasion of Afghanistan.17 Although anti-Soviet rhetoric characterized the government’s declarations, the professional advisers were significantly less alarmist in evaluating the Soviet threat. They continued to judge the possibility of a direct attack on Australian territory by the Soviet Union as remote and unlikelihood.18 The low-threat outlook came back in defense policy planning documents when the Labor Party won the election in 1983.19 Indonesia, which was considered a potential threat to the country’s security interests, was judged unlikely to develop a capacity to sustain intensive joint operations against Australia for at least ten years.20 The 1986 report to the Ministry for Defense Paul Dibb confirmed that Australia was one of the most secure countries in the world. It was distant from the main theaters of global military confrontation and surrounded by large expanses of water, making it difficult to attack. Moreover, neighbors had limited capabilities to project military power against it, and there was every prospect that these favorable security circumstances would remain constant.21 Therefore, Australian official assessments from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s reiterated that the country faced no foreseeable threats. As one scholar pointed out, the vitality of the US–Australia alliance was threat insensitive.22

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The High Benefits of the Alliance Australia gained by the alliance with the US on three levels: combined military exercises and training, military supplies, and intelligence sharing. Firstly, the regular and combined military exercises confirmed the United States as a reliable partner and favored regional stability and security, showing the allies’ strength and resolve.23 The Australian Defense Force (ADF) conducted copious exercises with the ally’s army, navy, air force, and marine corps. The most significant ones from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s were the Kangaroo exercises held in 1974, 1976, 1979, 1981, 1983, and 1986. These joint exercises focused on the defense of Australia and included the participation of the United States, Great Britain, and New Zealand.24 Secondly, Australia entered into many logistic agreements with the more powerful partner under the aegis of the alliance relationship. In 1951, the Americans declared Australia eligible for aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. In 1965, the allies signed a Memorandum on cooperative logistic support, which in 1980 was renewed through the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU, renegotiated in 1985).25 The 1980 MoU listed many defense items and services the United States made available to Australia in peacetime. These included: weapons systems and equipment; spare parts; munitions, ammunitions, and explosives; modification kits; test equipment; specialist services; training; repair services, and so on. The agreement implied that the United States guaranteed logistic support materiel and services to the junior ally during periods of international tension or armed conflict. The MoU was vital in Australia’s long-term national security planning process. In the 1987 White Paper, the government recognized that agreements with the United States providing munitions and equipment supply in an emergency alleviated the need for large-scale stockpiling by the ADF. In tabling the Paper, Defence Minister Beazley spoke confidently of Australia’s guaranteed access to ready resupply of essential war stocks.26 Finally, intelligence sharing was a fundamental resource assured by the alliance. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Australia hosted several American installations (the most important at North West Cape, Pine Gap, and Nurrungar) concerned with military communications, navigation, satellite tracking and control, and many forms of intelligence collection, including seismic stations monitoring underground nuclear detonations (NUDETS). Other facilities provided data for the US Ocean

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Surveillance Information System (OSIS).27 Australian governments on both political sides judged that maintaining the joint facilities was in Australia’s interests. In the early 1980s, Australians were increasingly involved in these facilities’ operations and used them for national purposes. In particular, the Royal Australian Navy became the principal user of the Northwest Cape communications station, increasing its communications with its submarines and Indian Ocean Fleet.28 Therefore, military cooperation with the more powerful ally provided remarkable advantages to Australia’s armed forces, which were hard to achieve. Moreover, the United States appeared as a reliable guarantor for the ally, implying that alliance benefits were high during the period under investigation. Australia’s Voice Effectiveness An influential voice in the alliance was essential for Australia when ANZUS was established. As an Australian scholar wrote, Canberra recognized that an asymmetric relation implied a partial lack of control over its policies. Therefore, being part of the alliance informational loop became fundamental to gaining influence on the more powerful partner.29 Paul Keating—Australian Prime Minister from 1991 to 1995—judged that ANZUS’s main and critical benefit was having Australia’s voice heard in Washington, especially about regional developments.30 During the period under investigation, we can find two significant occasions in which the junior ally’s voice attempts were effective. Firstly, Australia obtained a renegotiation of the US base arrangements on favorable terms. In 1979, the allies agreed that the United States had to keep Australia fully informed on decisions and operations concerning the joint facilities.31 These developments tied Australia more closely to managing global strategic affairs and, at the same time, added tools to influence Washington.32 Secondly, Australia preserved its regional arms control and denuclearization policy during the ANZUS crises in the mid-1980s and opposed the ally’s requests for nuclear cooperation. Indeed, the Hawke government could eschew any endorsement concerning the US Strategic Defense Initiative, declining Australia’s participation. However, it did not trigger processes of alliance erosion, as happened to the US–NZ relationship. Therefore, describing Australia’s policy in the 1980s, former Prime Minister Gareth Evans pointed out that Australia became very active and

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vocal both regionally and on the world scene on nuclear disarmament and arms control. Its hosting space-defense facilities jointly with the United States was not inhibiting in speaking out on global disarmament issues but helped establish the country’s credentials for doing so.33

The US–Australian Relationships from the Mid-1970s to the Mid-1980s Rethinking Australia’s Place in ANZUS In the early 1970s, Australia pursued independent initiatives according to the new climate in Asia and the South Pacific. Under the Whitlam Labour government (1972–1975), Australia recognized the People’s Republic of China, anticipating the ally, and prematurely withdrew its military forces from Vietnam.34 Canberra worked toward a new approach to the national defense, redefining the role and value of ANZUS.35 Although the Labour government seemed more prone to exposing the alliance to tensions, it was the liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser (1975–1982) that clearly expressed the country’s new perspective concerning the alliance relationship. In fact, as Fraser used to argue, the interests of the United States and the ones of Australia were not necessarily identical, and Canberra’s first responsibility was to assess its own.36 The seminal 1976 Defense White Paper released a more independent Australian defense policy and regionalized the country’s priorities, arguing that the primary strategic concern was the adjacent maritime area, the countries of the Southwest Pacific, Indonesia, and the Southeast Asia region.37 Moreover, the document suggested that the requirements and scope for Australian defense activity had to be limited to these areas closer to home. Finally, looking at the country’s defense requirements, it stated that the primary need was to increase self-reliance. It argued that Australia could not base its own policy on the expectation that the country’s navy, army, or air force could be sent abroad to fight as part of another nation’s force. It did not rule out their contribution to military operations in other regions if the requirement arose. Still, it held that Australian involvement was much more likely to occur in its neighborhood rather than in some distant theater.38 On the other hand, the Fraser government obtained a de facto reinterpretation of the ANZUS treaty. More specifically, the government received a written assurance from the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance

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that the treaty also covered Australian interests and territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (although the treaty mentioned only the latter). The change arose from Canberra’s reaction to the ally’s initiative to demilitarize the Indian Ocean. The formal enlargement of ANZUS activities was a strong testimony of the Australian diplomatic strength in the late 1970s.39 Nonetheless, in his March 1980 speech, Defence Minister Jim Killen announced that Australian military forces were to increase the frequency of air and naval deployments in the Indian Ocean and expand the airborne surveillance of Australia’s ocean.40 In September, the Prime Minister announced the agreement with Malaysia and Singapore to resume military exercises under the existing Five-Power Arrangements and the country’s participation in surveillance operations in the Eastern Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.41 The Hawke Government: Between Loyalty and Independence Bob Hawke described in his autobiography how he approached Ronald Regan in mid-1983, suggesting a review of the ANZUS alliance. He proposed not to derogate from the importance of ANZUS but to strengthen the alliance and enhance its relevance.42 Indeed, the Australian government asked to reconsider the arrangements for the joint facilities and proposed several arms control initiatives, including a nuclear-free zone for the South Pacific. The joint facilities’ renegotiation was successfully achieved and significantly enhanced Australia’s involvement. The allies established the principle that Australian Governments would have full knowledge and concurrence of their activities.43 Therefore, the government judged the relationship with the ally as more controlled and equal. Defence Minister Kim Beazley assessed that the government had obtained a deeper understanding of what the joint facilities did and their levels of capability. As the facilities’ activities were massive, it fully appreciated the value they could have for Australian purposes.44 Overall, the Hawke government reinforced the congruence of interests in the alliance. For instance, although the Labor Party activists still contested the Indonesian incorporation of East Timor, Canberra, and Washington converged about not antagonizing Jakarta. Then, when the United States invaded Grenada in late 1983, the Hawke government did not show the concerns of most left-wing governments elsewhere in the world.45

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Indeed, Defence Minister Kim Beazley reiterated that the alliance was serving Australia’s interests without hindering its capacity to develop and sustain an independent foreign and defense policy.46 The Labour government continued its predecessor’s policy supporting strategic nuclear arms control, CTB (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and non-proliferation. Its initiatives included the creation of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the establishment of a Peace Research Centre, and the appointment of a Disarmament Ambassador.47 The Persistence of the US–Australia Alliance By the mid-1970s, Australia looked progressively at the Pacific as its primary area of interest. In pursuing regionalism but preserving its relationship with the more powerful ally, the Hawke government reached several achievements, consolidating Australia as a Pacific regional power. The main result was the 1986 Rarotonga Treaty that recognized a nuclear-free zone in the Southwest Pacific. Then, Canberra solved a regional dispute, obtaining the signature of a Pacific fisheries treaty. The quarrel developed between small Pacific islands, which based their economy on exploiting the Exclusive Economic Zones, and powerful US lobbies (such as the American Tunaboat Association, which refused to pay fees). In late 1986, the parties reached an agreement thanks to the joint efforts of the US State Department, which provided a consistent amount of funds, and the Australian Foreign Service. In both cases, Australia assumed a crucial diplomatic role as a mediator between disputant parties. Moreover, Canberra limited damage during the ANZUS dispute between the United States and New Zealand. Firstly, it maintained its connection with the more powerful ally. Secondly, although criticizing Wellington for its unwillingness to compromise, Canberra preserved the relationship with the neighbor, which had an independent basis in the older 1944 ANZAC agreement. On 11 August 1986, when Washington formally declared suspended its security guarantee to New Zealand, Australia and the United States exchanged letters reaffirming their commitment to the security treaty.48 It implied a greater formalization of the US–Australia alliance. Therefore, during the mid-1980 and the ANZUS crisis, Australia assumed the delicate role of mediator within several issues involving the more powerful ally in the South Pacific region. By acting with significant independence and freedom of action, the junior ally consolidated

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the position of leading regional power, preserving the relationship with the more powerful partner.

The Processes of Alliance Persistence This last section depicts the processes that led to the alliance’s persistence. Firstly, it describes the US policy of interallied control. The analysis shows that the more powerful ally adopted a soft posture, neutralizing the sources of internal opposition. Washington did not oppose the weaker partner’s quest for greater autonomy and its regional denuclearization policy. On the other hand, Australia provided assurances to the ally by favoring the alliance cohesion while preserving the changes it aimed to achieve. The US Policy of Soft Control In the mid-1980s, the United States adopted a policy of soft control toward Australia in several circumstances.49 Firstly, once the junior ally’s government asked to reconsider the arrangements for the joint facilities, the renegotiation significantly reassessed Australia’s involvement. The Labors successfully enhanced Canberra’s participation in joint facilities activities and established the principle that Australian Governments would have full knowledge and concurrence of their operations.50 Secondly, the more powerful ally did not oppose the Australian strategy of self-reliance, which found definite expression in the famous Dibb report of 1987. As Kim Beazley pointed out, the United States had shown concerns in mid-1986 because of the evolution of the ally’s defense posture. The more powerful ally was concerned that Australia might reduce its support to allied efforts in the Cold War, diminishing its commitment to Southeast Asian security as New Zealand did.51 Yet, Washington supported Australian self-reliance plans by finding them appropriate to the alliance.52 Finally, Washington did not object to the junior ally’s regional denuclearization policy during the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) negotiations. Although the United States believed that the SPNFZ could indirectly endorse New Zealand’s policy on the nuclear ban, it did not block or prevent the treaty as it could have. Hawke wrote in his memories that the United States undoubtedly wished they had never heard of SPNZ, but they did not seek to stand in Australia’s way.53

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Australia’s Self-reliance Within the Alliance By the early 1970s, Australia abandoned the “forward defense” principle—as manifested in its military commitment to South Vietnam— preferring “self-reliance”.54 In March 1972, the William McMahon government assessed that the country was required to have the military capabilities to counterweight threats to its territory and maritime areas, and to pursue other interests in peacetime, preferably in association with others, but, if needed, alone.55 The 1976 White Paper explained the implications of this transformation, arguing that a primary requirement was increased self-reliance. Australia no longer had to base its policy on expecting that its forces could be sent abroad to fight as part of another nation’s forces. Although it did not rule out a contribution to operations in distant theaters, the country’s military interventions would have been more likely to occur in its neighborhood.56 Adopting a self-reliance strategy, Australia aimed to escape the stigma of dependency in the ANZUS relationship and achieve greater independence. More specifically, self-reliance implied that Canberra would no longer model its force structures principally to fight as part of Americanled coalitions in distant conflicts. It aimed to focus on the defense of the Australian continent, its maritime areas, and airspace. The 1983 Strategic Basis paper prioritized the development of military capabilities appropriate to defend Australia independently.57 According to some authors, Australia’s new posture relied on a feature the treaty pointed out as “continuous and effective self-help”.58 Indeed, self-reliance did not aim to achieve isolationism or any break with the ally. Instead, it meant that Australia still relied significantly on ANZUS. As former Defence Minister Kim Beazley argued during a speech in mid1988, the US gave Australia the technological edge that enabled 1% of the Earth’s population to guard 12% of its surface. The country could not have sustained a self-reliant defense posture without that support. Therefore, the alliance was literally essential to Australia’s self-reliance.59 The Australian Policy of Regional Denuclearization In late August 1983, Prime Minister Hawke proposed the creation of the SPNFZ at the South Pacific Forum held in Canberra. Three years

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later, the treaty of Rarotonga came into effect, banning the manufacture, stationing, testing, and use of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. Australia drove the development and ratification process, assuming leadership among the Pacific states.60 Canberra chaired the drafting process, leveraging its bureaucratic resources and political weight to shape the outcome toward its preferences. The main issue was the US hostility to the nuclear weapons free zone. On the other hand, many South Pacific countries had more radical non-proliferation views than Canberra. This forced Australia into a delicate diplomatic activity to address the more powerful ally security concerns while creating a document that the South Pacific countries could have supported. The Hawke government was successful, controlling the framing and the treaty language, and using methods of persuasion to obtain a favorable outcome.61 In the meantime, Canberra assured the ally that the treaty would not have restricted the transport of nuclear weapons or insulated the region, eschewing responsibility for maintaining the peace.62 Rarotonga Treaty was the most significant product of the Australian anti-nuclear policy in the South Pacific region. It entered into force on 12 December 1986, following the ratification of eight Forum states. The document required signatory states not to manufacture, station, or test nuclear devices in the region. On the other hand, the treaty enabled nuclear states to continue access to the high seas of the South Pacific while leaving restrictions or denial on port and airfield access to each signatory party to decide.63

Conclusions As a case of alliance persistence, the US–Australian relations from the mid1970s to the mid-1980s appropriately represent how allies can overcome an internal crisis. In the context of an asymmetric relationship, significant evidence shows that the junior ally’s voice effectiveness provided the needed benefits for guaranteeing the alliance’s persistence. Although the Australian quest for autonomy could have eroded the alliance, the US soft control policy paved the way for accommodating the weaker ally’s interests, including them in the overall alliance strategy. The security agreement persisted despite the changes and frictions that characterized the most critical period of the ANZUS alliance.

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Notes 1. Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 60. 2. Firth S., Australia in International Politics, Allen & Unwin, 2005, p. 34. 3. Ball D., “The Strategic Essence”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2001, pp. 235–248. 4. cited in Bisley N., “‘An Ally for All the Years to Come’: Why Australia Is Not a Conflicted US Ally”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 4, 2013, pp. 403–418. 5. Young T., “The Australian-United States Strategic Relationship: Merely an Issue of Suitable Real Estate?”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1989, pp. 125–138. 6. Ibidem. 7. Dibb P., “The Self-Reliant Defense of Australia: The History of an Idea”, in Huisken R. & Thatcher M. (eds.), History as Policy. Framing the Debate on the Future Australia’s Defense Policy, ANU Press, 2007, pp. 11–28. 8. Ibidem. 9. Findlay T., “Disarmament and Arms Control”, in Mediansky F.A. (eds.), Australia in a Changing World. New Foreign Policy Directions, MacMillian Press, 1992, p. 167. 10. Goot M. & King P., “ANZUS Reconsidered: the Domestic Politics of Alliance”, in Bercovitch J. (eds.), ANZUS in Crises. Alliance Management in International Affairs, MacMillian Press, 1988, p. 111. 11. Ibidem. 12. Cheeseman G., The Search for Self-Reliance. Australian Defence Since Vietnam, Longman Cheshire, 1993, pp. 8–12. 13. Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., op. cit., 1998, pp. 72–77. 14. Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., op. cit., 1998, p. 63. 15. Cited in Dupont A., Australia’s Threat Perceptions: A Search For Security, SDSD, Canberra, 1991, p. 78. 16. Cited in Dupont A., op. cit., 1991, p. 78. 17. Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., op. cit., 1998, p. 63. 18. Dupont A., op. cit., 1991, p. 81. 19. Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., op. cit., 1988, p. 63. 20. It was asserted in the 1983 Strategic Basic Paper, cited in Dupont A., op. cit., 1991, p. 85. 21. Cited in Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., op. cit., 1998, p. 63. 22. Ball D., op. cit., 2001. 23. Blaxland J., “US-Australian Military Cooperation in Asia”, in Dean P., Fruhling S., and Taylor B. (eds.), Australia’s American Alliance, Melboune University Press, 2016. 24. Ibidem.

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25. Brown G., Breaking the American Alliance. An Independent National Security Policy for Australia, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense, No. 54, 1989, pp. 66–67. 26. Cited in Brown G., op. cit., 1989, p. 68. 27. Ball D., op. cit., 2001. 28. Ball D., op. cit., 2001. 29. Bisley N., op. cit., 2013. 30. cited in Bisley N., op. cit., 2013. 31. Young T., op. cit., 1989. 32. Gelber H., “Australian Interests: Politics and Strategy towards the 1990s”, in Mediansky F.A. (eds.), Australia in a Changing World. New Foreign Policy Directions, MacMillian Press, 1992, p. 71. 33. Cited in Evans G., and Grant B., Australia’s Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s, Melbourne University Press, 1995, p. 29. 34. Bell P., and Bell R., Implicated. The United States in Australia, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 149. 35. Edwards P., Permanent Friends? Historical Reflections on the AustralianAmerican Alliance, Lowi Institute Paper 08, 2005. 36. Bell C., Dependent Ally. A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 146. 37. Defense White Paper, 1975. 38. Ibidem. 39. Bell C., op. cit., 1988, pp. 149–150. 40. Cheeseman G., op. cit., 1993, p. 11. 41. Ibidem, p. 11. 42. Cited in Jennings P., “The Politics of Defence White Papers”, Security Challenges, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2013), pp. 1–14. 43. Ibidem. 44. cited in Jennings P., op. cit., 2013. 45. Bell C., op. cit., 1988, pp. 179–180. 46. Cheeseman G., op. cit., 1993, p. 178. 47. Findlay T., op. cit., 1992, pp. 168–172. 48. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Security Treaty between Australia New Zealand, and the United States’, available at: https://www.info.dfat.gov.au/Info/Treaties/treaties.nsf/AllDocIDs/ 4D4287DDC882C3D6CA256B8300007B4B 49. Albinski H., “Australia and the United States”, in Mediansky F.A. (eds.), Australia in a Changing World. New Foreign Policy Directions, MacMillian Press, 1992. 50. Jennings P., op. cit., 2016. 51. Beazley K., “Sovereignty and the US Alliance”, in Dean P., Fruhling S., and Taylor B. (eds.), Australia’s American Alliance, Melbourne University Press, 2016.

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52. Ibidem. 53. Cited in Carr A., Australia as a Middle Power Norm Entrepreneur in the Asia Pacific, 1983–2010, University of Canberra, Ph.D. thesis, 2012. 54. Ball D., op. cit., 2001. 55. Cited in White H., “Four Decades of the Defense of Australia: Reflections on Australia Defence Policy over the Past 40 years”, in Huisken R. & Thatcher M. (eds.), History as policy. Framing the Debate on the Future Australia’s Defense Policy, ANU Press, 2007, pp. 163–188. 56. Ibidem. 57. Dibb P., op. cit., 2007. 58. Brown G., op. cit., 1989. 59. Cited in Cheeseman, op. cit., 1993. 60. Ibidem. 61. Ibidem, p. 93. 62. Ibidem. 63. Young T., op. cit., 1989.

Bibliography Albinski H., “Australia and the United States”, in Mediansky F.A. (eds.), Australia in a Changing World. New Foreign Policy Directions, MacMillian Press, 1992. Ball D., “The Strategic Essence”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2001, pp. 235–248. Beazley K., “Sovereignty and the US Alliance”, in Dean P., Fruhling S., and Taylor B. (eds.), Australia’s American lliance, Melbourne University Press, 2016. Bell C., Dependent Ally. A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1988. Bell P., and Bell R., Implicated. The United States in Australia, Oxford University Press, 1993. Bisley N., “‘An Ally for All the Years to Come’: Why Australia Is Not a Conflicted US Ally”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 4, 2013, pp. 403–418. Blaxland J., “US-Australian Military Cooperation in Asia”, in Dean P., Fruhling S., and Taylor B. (eds.), Australia’s American Alliance, Melboune University Press, 2016. Brown G., Breaking the American Alliance. An Independent National Security Policy for Australia, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense, No. 54, 1989. Carr A., Australia as a Middle Power Norm Entrepreneur in the Asia Pacific, 1983–2010, University of Canberra, Ph.D. thesis, 2012.

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Cheeseman G., The Search for Self-Reliance. Australian Defence Since Vietnam, Longman Cheshire, 1993. Dibb P., “The Self-Reliant Defense of Australia: The History of an Idea”, in Huisken R. & Thatcher M. (eds.), History as Policy. Framing the Debate on the Future Australia’s Defense Policy, ANU Press, 2007. Dupont A., Australia’s Threat Perceptions: A Search For Security, SDSD, Canberra, 1991. Edwards P., Permanent Friends? Historical Reflections on the AustralianAmerican Alliance, Lowi Institute Paper 08, 2005. Evans G., and Grant B., Australia’s Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s, Melbourne University Press, 1995. Findlay T., “Disarmament and Arms Control”, in Mediansky F.A. (eds.), Australia in a Changing World. New Foreign Policy Directions, MacMillian Press, 1992. Firth S., Australia in International Politics, Allen & Unwin, 2005. Gelber H., “Australian Interests: Politics and Strategy Towards the 1990s”, in Mediansky F.A. (eds.), Australia in a Changing World. New Foreign Policy Directions, MacMillian Press, 1992. Goot M. & King P., “ANZUS Reconsidered: the Domestic Politics of Alliance”, in Bercovitch J. (eds.), ANZUS in Crises. Alliance Management in International Affairs, MacMillian Press, 1988. Jennings P., “The Politics of Defence White Papers”, Security Challenges, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2013, pp. 1–14. Smith G., Cox D., Burchill S., Australia in the World: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1998. White H., “Four Decades of the Defense of Australia: Reflections on Australia Defence Policy over the Past 40 Years”, in Huisken R. & Thatcher M. (eds.), History as Policy. Framing the Debate on the Future Australia’s Defense Policy, ANU Press, 2007, pp. 163–188. Young T., “The Australian-United States Strategic Relationship: Merely an Issue of Suitable Real Estate?”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1989, pp. 125– 138.

CHAPTER 7

The US–Philippines Alliance in the Mid-2010s: A Case of Alliance Persistence

Abstract This chapter examines the US–Philippines alliance in the mid2010s. As a case of persistence, it analyzes how the allies overcame a recent internal crisis. The junior ally successfully promoted changes in the alliance strategy, reorienting the military cooperation with the more powerful partner. The Duterte administration insisted that relations with the United States had to rely on sovereign equality. Moreover, it obtained explicit reassurance from the ally concerning its security commitments in the South China Sea. Within the context of a security deficit due to low benefits from the interallied exchange, these crucial adjustments permitted the alliance to persist instead of collapse. Keywords United States · Philippines · Voice effectiveness · Alliance persistence

Given this book’s ambition to propose a generalizable model, extending it to some alliance in the contemporary international system is tempting. Indeed, the US alliances survived in a changing strategic environment after the end of the Cold War, facing multiple challenges across Europe and Asia. Some authors predicted the end of alliances or, at least, their decline due to the disappearance of the original enemy. By contrast, the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Leva, The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35448-9_7

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US system of alliances has become a crucial pillar of the contemporary system, favoring the international primacy of its most powerful member. The coming chapter will analyze the US–Philippines alliance, focusing on how it survived a deep internal crisis in the mid-2010s. The alliance was established after World War II by the subscription of three agreements: the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, the 1947 Military Assistance Agreement, and the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT). On the one hand, the Philippines benefited from the US security guarantee against armed attacks on its territory and within the Pacific area. The junior ally assured military cooperation and anti-communist support, sending troops in the Korean War and providing logistical support in the Vietnam War. On the other hand, the United States obtained a platform for projecting its power in Asia-Pacific. Washington provided military assistance and training to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), thus strengthening the hub-and-spokes security architecture in the region.1 The following paragraphs will examine the interallied relationships in the mid-2010s, during a crucial juncture for the alliance’s evolution. In the context of a security deficit due to the low benefits of the alliance, the partners fostered the processes of alliance persistence. During a severe crisis, the junior ally had its voice heard, obtaining the needed changes and reorienting the security cooperation. The patron eased the pressure on the partner’s domestic policy and gave assurances against the Chinese claims in the Asia-Pacific. The United States enforced the bilateral relation, avoiding alienating a crucial ally in the Asia-Pacific. To overcome the crisis, the alliance adjusted successfully by including the Philippines’ interests. Four sections follow to illustrate the empirical case. The first one evaluates the Philippines’ geopolitical shift toward China in the mid-2010s as the trigger point of the inquiry. Nonetheless, it finds that other events pointed out the junior ally’s desire for greater strategic autonomy after the Cold War’s end. The second section accounts for the model’s variables, measuring the Philippines’ threat perceptions and alliance benefits. Then the third one describes the interallied historical relationships in the 2010s. Finally, the last section depicts the alliance persistence processes, analyzing how the United States shifted from a hard to a soft approach toward the junior ally while the latter integrated increasingly into the American system of alliances in Asia-Pacific.

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How to Define the Case: The Philippines’ Quest for Autonomy After the Cold War After the Cold War, the MDT was enhanced by the 1998 Visiting Force Agreement (VFA), the 2002 Mutual Logistic and Support Agreement (MLSA), and the 2014 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The VFA extended legal guarantees to the US troops during joint exercises with the AFP, providing a juridical framework by which Americans could enter the ally’s territory without establishing a permanent base of operations. The MLSA allowed the United States to use the Philippines as a supply base for regional military operations. At the same time, special forces were deployed to the Sulu Archipelago, providing support to the AFP in counter-terrorism operations. Finally, the EDCA established the increased rotational presence of US military forces, ships, and aircraft in the Philippines and greater access to the junior ally’s military bases, including defense material and equipment storage. However, some interallied crises occurred because the Philippines long wanted to obtain greater strategic autonomy.2 In 1991, the junior ally did not renovate the agreement providing for the presence of US troops in the Subic Naval and Clark Air bases.3 In 2004, it withdrew its troops from Iraq against the more powerful ally’s wishes and deepened relationships with China, signing a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation. The Arroyo administration sent a clear signal to the United States that alternative options were available. From this perspective, the following Aquino administration’s tight approach to Washington was exceptional in the Philippines’ post-Cold War foreign policy.4 As Rodrigo Duterte gained the presidential election in 2016, the country’s foreign policy underwent a further geopolitical shift. Duterte announced that the government intended to distance itself diplomatically from the United States, pursuing a more independent foreign policy.5 The President envisaged alliances with China and Russia to do business and trade, choosing Beijing as his first major state visit.6 Once the International Court of Justice declared that China’s claims in the South China Sea were not legitimate, the Philippines preferred not to pursue the decision but to negotiate the issue bilaterally with the neighbor. The initiative radically changed the country’s foreign policy, conveying that the United States was no longer the main economic and political power in the AsiaPacif region. Indeed, China promised loans and investments amounting

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to $24 billion, and in March 2017, the two countries signed a six-year economic agreement to finance projects in the Philippines.7 The years of the Duterte administration were highly critical for the United States–Philippines alliance. The junior ally accommodated China’s interests, asking for changes in the security cooperation with the ally. Moreover, issues arose due to the Obama administration’s condemnation of human rights violations in Duterte’s anti-drug campaign.8 In February 2020, Duterte unilaterally abrogated the VFA, envisaging a downgrading of military cooperation with the ally. Afterward, the government extended the agreement for six months and finally withdrew the declaration in July 2021.9 From then on, the alliance stabilized. In November 2021, the allies signed the Joint Vision for the 21st Century, enforcing their security cooperation and planning to build an international coalition supporting a law-based maritime order in the South China Sea.10 Considering the Philippines’ foreign policy shift in the mid-2010s, more than the Chinese maritime threat would be required to account for the alliance revival, as Beijing’s claims were a constant factor during the Duterte administration. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how the allies overcame the crisis and what permitted the alliance to persist in these turbulent years.

The Alliance Variables The following paragraphs describe the alliance variables from the junior ally’s perspective, measuring the Philippines’ threat perceptions and alliance benefits. The period under investigation suggests that the US– Philippines alliance can be interpreted as a Type I case. Overall, it fits the theoretical framework of the alliance persistence model, successfully passing the case selection test. The Philippines’ High Threat Perception In the mid-2010s, the Philippines’ threat perceptions were high due to internal and external security concerns. On the one hand, the National Security Strategy 2018 (NSS 2018) recognized that the country had severe domestic security issues.11 The Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), remained the most enduring and challenging local revolutionary force. While the National Security Policy 2017 estimated that the NPA had fewer than

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4.000 soldiers, down from a pick of 26.000 in the 1980s, it still enjoyed support in the rural Philippines.12 Moreover, internal insurgencies in the Mindanao region became more complex to manage due to the fragmentation of the Moro movement and the Islamic State’s support. Although a peace deal was signed in March 2014, the five-month siege in Marawi in 2017 showed that Islamic forces still threatened the country’s unity and stability. On the other hand, increased uncertainty and unpredictability characterized the Philippines’ external environment. The NSS 2018 acknowledged that conflicting interests in South China and the Pacific Ocean threatened the relatively stable external environment that the Philippines had enjoyed since the end of World War II. Indeed, during the 2010s, the country increasingly focused on territorial defense due to China’s aggressive actions. During the escalation in 2012, following the Philippines’ dispatch of a navy frigate to arrest Chinese fishermen exploiting marine resources within the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone at Scarborough Shoal, China deployed its para-military vessels, menacing a military confrontation. Although both sides agreed to de-escalate, China did not withdraw and took control of the contested shoal.13 Therefore, territorial maritime disputes became a primary concern for the Philippines. Moreover, the NSS 2018 recognized that the country’s borders remained vulnerable to criminal international groups’ activities, such as high sea piracy, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and money laundering. During the period under investigation, domestic and international security threats were significantly high, playing a crucial role in the Philippines’ policies. The Low Benefits of the Alliance As China emerged as a regional power, the Philippines interpreted the 2011 Obama administration’s Pivot to Asia as a reinforced US assurance to fulfill its security obligations. Indeed, Washington’s strategic rebalancing altered the security relationship with the junior ally, shifting the focus from counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency to territorial defense and conventional warfare in the South China Sea.14 The renewed strategy implied intensifying the allied cooperation, strengthening Philippine defense capabilities, building its military’s maritime capabilities, increasing joint training exercises, and sharing intelligence. Therefore,

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the Philippines defined a five-year plan worth $900 million for military modernization, programming the acquisition of combat fighter jets, anti-ship missiles, patrol boats, naval helicopters, and even a submarine.15 However, the junior ally did not receive the expected support. The United States declared it could support the Philippines only to develop maritime domain awareness and security through intelligence sharing and delivering coastal radars and patrol craft. From 2010 to 2015, American military assistance to Manila dropped annually from $79.8 million to $67.4 million, and total aid to South East Asia countries decreased by $34.5 million. On the other hand, US military assistance to the Middle East and North Africa rose by nearly $1.3 billion over the same period.16 Washington sent little military aid to the Philippines compared to the Middle East non-treaty allies Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan. Moreover, while the latter countries received updated military technology, Manila received antiquated American military hardware handouts, partially dating back to the Vietnam War era, thus triggering complaints in the Philippines’ army.17 From 2016 to 2019, the country received a total amount of $554 million in military assistance from the United States, slightly increasing the aid annual average.18 It is worth noting that Washington immediately supported the junior ally during the Marawi crisis beginning in May 2017. The Armed Philippine Forces obtained equipment and arms, gaining assistance and training from additional American troops.19 However, the country’s armed forces remained among the weakest in maritime Southeast Asia. Although Manila improved its capabilities to check activities within its EEZ, resources were still limited to guarantee external security and deter stronger neighbor countries.20 A second factor lowered the alliance’s benefits for the Philippines. During the 2012 Scarborough Shoal stand-off, the United States failed to guarantee the junior ally’s territorial defense and did not publicly side with Manila, preferring to avoid confrontation with China. Washington neither anticipated nor later constrained Beijing and kept ambiguity whether the 1951 MDT covered the Philippines’ territorial dispute. Indeed, leading government officials, including President Obama, refused to clarify the conditions that would lead to the US intervention. Moreover, Washington did not mobilize ASEAN against Chinese maritime assertiveness and did not show much support to the ally even after the conclusion of the arbitration case. The United States called for calm and patience, preferring to reassure China and preserve their bilateral relationship.

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Overall, these episodes eroded the United States’s credibility as a security guarantor and its commitment to safeguarding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.21 As Duterte came to power, he admitted that the Philippines could not challenge China militarily. The President questioned the value of the alliance with Washington, openly challenging the American ambassador to Manila, Philip Golberg, on the lack of support in the South China Sea.22 Duterte held that the United States did not fulfill its role as guarantor of regional stability and opened deeper economic and diplomatic relations with China and Russia, showing that alternatives were available to the historical ally. Indeed, after the US Senate opposed the purchase of 26.000 American-made assault rifles due to human rights violations in the Philippines’ anti-drug campaign, Duterte turned to China, which offered $14 million worth of small arms and patrol boats along with $500 million in loans for the Philippines military’s acquisition of Chinese equipment. At the same time, Manila explored security cooperation with Russia, signing a Memorandum of Understanding in December 2016 that envisaged future military engagement, including joint military exercises.23 The Philippines’ Voice Attempts and Their Effectiveness In the context of alliance deficit, the effectiveness of the Philippines’ voice permitted the security relationship with the United States to evolve strategically, permitting the alliance to persist. Firstly, the Philippines successfully promoted changes in the alliance strategy, reorienting the military cooperation with the more powerful partner. As Manila aimed to improve diplomatic and economic relationships with Beijing and de-escalate maritime territorial disputes, it reduced planned military exercises with the United States in the South China Sea.24 In September 2016, Duterte announced that US Special Operations Forces in Mindanao had to leave the country and that the Philippines forces would stop joint patrols with the ally’s navy in its own EEZ. Then, joint military exercises were reduced from 28 to 13. Their focus was redirected from territorial defense and maritime security to humanitarian assistance and risk reduction, cybersecurity, anti-terrorism, and anti-narcotics operations. Moreover, Duterte canceled joint naval exercises as the PHILBEX and CARAT and denied the more powerful ally to use the Philippines bases to launch the Freedom of Navigation operations.25

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The Duterte administration insisted that relations with the United States had to rely on sovereign equality.26 In December 2016, Secretary Yasay declared that regional geopolitical changes implied reassessing the security relationship with Washington. He referred to Duterte’s earlier statement assessing that China’s military superiority in Southeast Asia had made a strategy based on Cold War concepts antiquated. Indeed, in early 2017, having received information that the United States was building a permanent arms deposit violating the Philippines Constitution, Duterte warned the ally that he would unilaterally abrogate the ECDA. Defense Secretary Lorenzana reiterated the warning, claiming that Manila would scrap the 2014 agreement to avoid becoming entangled in a war in the South China Sea.27 On the other hand, the Philippines expressed the need to obtain clear reassurance from the ally concerning its security commitments in the South China Sea. During his March 2019 visit to Manila, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo declared that any armed attack on Philippines forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea would trigger mutual defense obligations under Article IV of the MDT. It was the first time the United States publicly reassured the junior ally, confirming its military support relative to illegitimate Chinese claims in the South China Sea.28 In January 2021, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken reiterated under the Biden administration that the MDT applied to armed attacks against Philippines forces in the South China Sea.29 The junior ally, therefore, obtained Washington’s full support, which was further confirmed after provocative Chinese actions occurred in 2022 and 2023.30

The US–Philippines Relationships in the 2010s The Philippines in the US Pivot to Asia In November 2011, the US Pivot to Asia recognized the continent’s rising economic and strategic importance. Nonetheless, the Pivot intended to address China’s growing influence and emergence as a regional power. The Philippines held notable strategic value within the United States rebalancing plan for two reasons. Firstly, it was the sole American treaty ally in maritime Southeast Asia. Secondly, it was part of the so-called “first island chain” in the Pacific, enclosing the sea area next to China. Therefore, US policy envisaged a significant change in the relationship with the junior ally. Obama emphasized that Manila was the

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bedrock of security in Asia, and Secretary Clinton called for increasing ship visits to the country.31 Moreover, tensions in the South China Sea arose in 2012 due to the Chinese interfering with the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) activities. When the 2012 Scarborough Shoal stand-off was resolved, China kept military assets in the Spratly archipelago. These events encouraged Manila to adapt its military modernization and defense to the United States balancing policy. In 2013, the country requested an Arbitral Tribunal under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to rule on China’s claims. The United States supported a peaceful resolution upon international law but did not take a position on the territorial dispute.32 In April 2014, the allies signed the ECDA, authorizing regular longterm visits by the American military forces. The agreement paved the way for opening five naval bases in the Philippines’ territory to receive the ally’s ships. However, the alliance did not strengthen as planned by the US Pivot because of two main reasons. Firstly, the more powerful ally remained ambiguous concerning the Chinese claims in the South China Sea, not providing the needed assurance to its protégé. The Obama administration feared the junior ally’s adventurism and avoided affirming clearly its support in the event of an escalation with China. Secondly, to become the focal point of the US strategy in the Asia-Pacific, the Philippines needed to strengthen its defense capabilities, most of all the maritime ones, through intensified military cooperation with the ally. However, the limited defense budget impeded the Obama Administration from effectively following up on the Asia Pivot, and the Philippines’ alliance strengthening, as planned initially.33 The Philippines’ Geopolitical Shift and the US’s Strategic Review The Philippines underwent a significant geopolitical shift as Rodrigo Duterte won the 2016 presidential election. The President had a skeptical view of the US alliance, judged it not providing an explicit security guarantee in the South China Sea, and advocated a more independent foreign policy for his country. He chose Beijing as his first major state visit, envisaging deepening relations with China and Russia. Duterte admitted that the Philippines could not challenge the stronger neighbor in the South China Sea. Therefore, the administration sought ways to cooperate with China, promoting joint energy explorations and

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seeking development loans, investment, and assistance for infrastructural projects. The initiative initially succeeded, and in 2016, China pledged $6 billion in official development assistance, $3 billion in loans, and $24 billion in investments.34 This juncture was particularly challenging for the US–Philippines alliance. Manila accommodated China’s interests and asked for changes in the security cooperation with the historical security partner. Moreover, interallied tensions arose due to the Obama administration’s condemnation of human rights violations in Duterte’s anti-drug campaign. With the election of Donald Trump in 2017, the United States became more prone to accommodate the junior ally. During its visit to Manila, Trump abstained from accusing the Philippines of human rights violations and praised Duterte for its anti-drug campaign. Then, Washington agreed on reducing the number of military drills, thus favoring humanitarian assistance scenarios and risk reduction in joint exercises. Finally, it readily supported the Philippines during the Marawi siege in May 2017. The United States quickly deployed a P-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft and surveillance drones to sustain the AFP, providing grenade launchers, machine guns, and automatic rifles to the Philippines Marines. Thanks to the allied cooperation, the Philippines army retook the city in October 2017.35 Moreover, the United States updated its Asian strategic view. During his trip to Asia in November 2017, Trump promoted the idea of a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” made up of independent nations, respectful of other countries, and safe from foreign domination. The US alliances and economic partnerships were depicted as a strategic pillar to preserve American influence and values, while China was represented as a rival and revisionist power. This view was confirmed by the 2019 Defense Department’s “Indo-Pacific Strategic Report” which examined further the Chinese regional hegemonic quest in the near-term and its global prominence in the long term. It pushed Washington further to adjust its alliance posture with its sole security partner in the maritime Southeast Pacific.36 The US–Philippines Alliance Adjustments During the Trump administration, the alliance benefited on two primary levels. On the one hand, the United States demonstrated that the Philippines prominently figured in the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, solving the

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MDT’s treaty ambiguity commitment issue. During his March 2019 visit to Manila, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo reassured that any armed attack on the Philippines forces in the South China Sea would trigger the mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of the MDT. This public claim pleased the ally and directly challenged China’s activities and militarization of the land features. On the other hand, the Philippines–China relationship worsened during the second half of Duterte’s term. Indeed, only a tiny fraction of the pledged financing and investments were effectively realized. While the territorial disputes increased mutual distrust, military cooperation remained limited compared to US assistance. Moreover, some Filippino government officials raised skepticism about the desirability of long-term projects with China, considering it risky given the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.37 By April 2019, the US–Philippines alliance stabilized, and the allies conducted 28 major exercises testing and enhancing their capabilities in joint combat and humanitarian operations. Shared regional efforts in counter-terrorism advanced through Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines until 2020, while the allies agreed in 2019 to establish a new counterterrorism facility in the Philippines.38 Although on February 2020 the Philippines submitted to the US Embassy in Manila a notice of termination of the 1998 VFA, the agreement was confirmed in July 2021. At the same time, the Duterte administration acknowledged the 2016 UNCLOS ruling on the South China Sea dispute with China. Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin declared that the arbitration case won by the Philippines represented a significant contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea and to regional peace and stability. He acknowledged that China’s claims had no basis in law, and specific actions within the Philippines’ EEZ violated the country’s sovereign rights. Moreover, Locsin emphasized that constructing artificial islands aggravated tensions in the South China Sea.39 Toward the Joint Vision for the 21st Century Since the VFA’s confirmation, the alliance has increasingly strengthened. In October 2021, the two allies announced plans to return to fullscale military drills in 2022, stating they would invite observers from Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom. At the end of 2021, the

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maritime training activities “Sama Sama” and “Kamandag” were carried out successfully.40 In November 2021, the allies held the ninth Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, envisaging further cooperation in the Covid-19 pandemic, promoting a rules-based maritime order in the South China Sea, respecting human rights, and enforcing their armed forces’ interoperability. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III and Philippines Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana discussed recent events in the South China Sea, welcoming the efforts to strengthen the alliance and reaffirming their commitment under the MDT.41 The allies subsequently signed the Joint Vision for the 21st Century. The agreement enforced the alliance, envisaging the building of an international coalition sustaining a law-based maritime order in the South China Sea.42 Nonetheless, in 2022, the United States and the Philippines’ military forces held the largest-ever annual bilateral exercise, the Balikatan, which involved approximately 3.800 AFP and 5.100 American soldiers, focusing on improving interoperability and joint defense capabilities. In September 2022, the newly elected Philippine President, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., met with President Biden to discuss ways to expand bilateral cooperation on climate change, energy security, human rights, infrastructure, and security. Marcos reaffirmed the importance of the US– Philippines alliance, envisaging keeping a stable relationship with China. In February 2023, the allies expanded the 2014 EDCA, agreeing to increase the number of Philippines military bases to nine.43

The Processes of Alliance Persistence The following paragraphs account for the processes leading to alliance persistence, assessing how the allies overcame the crisis. On the one hand, it focuses on the US policy of interallied control, pointing out how the patron well managed the junior ally’s quests for changes to the alliance. On the other, it evaluates the Philippines’ integration into the US system of bilateral alliances in Asia-Pacific, finding that Manila significantly improved relationships with other crucial regional actors and favored US primacy.

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The US Policy of Soft Control The United States changed from a hard to a soft policy of interallied control in the period under investigation. During the Obama administration, Duterte felt that the more powerful ally was unjustifiably interfering in the Philippines’ domestic policy, thus preventing him from fulfilling its anti-drug campaign. Indeed, he replied rudely to Washington’s accusations of human rights abuses, emphasizing the ally’s hypocrisy over its own policy killings and declaring that the Philippines was not a vassal state.44 In retaliation, the United States canceled the bilateral summit planned during the September 2016 ASEAN meeting in Laos, deleted a shipment of firearms to the Philippine National Police, which was accused of extrajudicial killings of drug users and traffickers, and suspended the $400 million Millennium Challenge Corporation aid package renewal.45 These actions distanced the allies. In May 2017, explaining why Manila envisaged arms purchases from China and Russia, Defense Secretary Lorenzana declared that the United States conditionality discouraged exchanges with the ally.46 By contrast, the Trump administration was more prone to express solidarity and support for the junior ally, avoiding domestic interference. Indeed, worsening the US–Philippines ties would undermine America’s primacy in maritime Southeast Asia, where Manila remained the only treaty ally, paving the way to China’s territorial claims. During its November 2017 visit to Manila, Trump cultivated personal ties with Duterte, praising him for its anti-drug campaign. Moreover, Washington solved the chronic problem of the MDT’s ambiguity regarding the US commitment to Asia-Pacific. It favored the change in the alliance’s orientation that Manila aimed to, adjusting military cooperation and shifting from territorial defense to counter-terrorism and humanitarian actions.47 The Philippines’ Integration into the US Alliance System On the other hand, the Philippines expanded military relationships with the leading US allies in the Asia-Pacific region. During the Duterte administration, the country strengthened arms sales and transfer agreements with Australia, Japan, and South Korea, planning training and

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military exercises. Although no alliance treaty was established, these countries became the Philippines’ most important security partners after the United States. Australia guaranteed on-the-ground assistance during the Marawi crisis, highlighting the value of the Visiting Forces Agreement signed in 2007 and ratified by the Philippines in 2012. Canberra provided military training to the Philippines’ armed forces, and in October 2017, the two countries signed an agreement to improve information sharing and maritime security cooperation.48 The partnership with Japan expanded under the agreement on defense industrial cooperation signed in February 2016, allowing Tokyo to transfer defense equipment and technology, and conduct joint research and development. The security relationship with Japan developed mainly in maritime security, aiming to improve the Philippines’ surveillance capacity. Tokyo also provided favorable assistance loans to improve Manila’s armed forces.49 Finally, South Korea became the second most important arms provider and source of major military hardware to Manila after the United States. Moreover, in 2019, Seul invested in constructing factories in the Philippines to co-produce and co-develop ammunition and body armor.50 During the Duterte administration, increased military cooperation with these countries was favored by two factors. Firstly, they had shared interests with the Philippines in managing regional security threats, from counter-terrorism to territorial disputes with a rising China. Secondly, as fellow US allies, their military equipment and doctrines had higher interoperability with the Philippines than those of alternative partners, such as China and Russia. The Philippines’ deeper integration in the San Francisco hub-andspokes system of alliances led by the United States increased the junior ally’s autonomy and, at the same time, confirmed Washington’s primacy in Asia-Pacific. Indeed, this system of bilateral pacts, which defined regional order after World War II and survived the end of the Cold War, evolved into a networked security architecture, incentivizing overlapping bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements among Washington’s allies to channel and shape the trajectory of China’s rise.51 Therefore, the Philippines diversified its foreign policy by gaining more independence and still sustained the US-led regional order in Asia-Pacific.52

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Conclusions In the most challenging period of the US–Philippines alliance under the Duterte administration, the allies successfully managed their relationship, overcoming the internal crisis. The alliance strategy evolved, including the junior ally’s interests and making its voice effective. The Philippines successfully reoriented the alliance’s military cooperation and obtained the patron’s full assurance in the South China Sea. Both allies triggered the processes of persistence, the United States lowering the degree of interallied control and the Philippines integrating more in the American system of alliances.

Notes 1. Loewen H., “Foreign Relations Between the Philippines and the United States”, in Thompson M.R. and Batalla E.V. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Contemporary Philippines, Routledge, 2018, pp. 161–171. 2. De Castro R., “Philippines Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3, Fall 2005, pp. 403–422. 3. Capozzola C., Bound by War. How the United States and the Philippines Built America’s First Pacific Century, Basic Books, New York, 2020, pp. 284–286. 4. Heydarian R.J., “The Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy”, Asia Security, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2017, pp. 220–236. 5. Song W. and Velasco J.C., “Selling ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ Amid the US-China Rivalry: Populism and the Philippine Foreign Policy Under the Duterte Government”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 35, 2022, pp. 1–29. 6. Heydarian R.J., op. cit., 2017. 7. De Dios A., “Democracy Under Strain in the Philippines: The Populist Politics and Diplomacy of President Rodrigo Duterte”, in Patman R. et al. (eds.), From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. Diplomacy in a Contested Region, Global Politica Transition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2022, pp. 303–325. 8. De Castro R., “The Duterte Administration’s Appeasement Policy on China and the Crisis in the Philippines-US Alliance”, Philippine Political Science Journal, Vol. 38, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 159–181. 9. De Castro R., “The Philippines Hedging Between the United States and China: Is the Biden Administration Tipping the Balance?”, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2022, pp. 101–123.

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10. U.S. Department of State, Joint Vision for a 21st Century United StatesPhilippines Partnership, 16 November 2021, see https://www.state.gov/ joint-vision-for-a-21st-century-united-states-philippines-partnership/. 11. National Security Strategy 2018. Security and Development for Transformational Change and Well-being of the Filipino People. 12. National Security Policy 2017–2022. For Change and Well-being of the Filipino People. 13. Heydarian R.J., op. cit., 2017. 14. De Castro R., “The Philippines-U.S. Alliance and 21st Century U.S. Grand Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region: From the Obama Administration to the Biden Administration”, Defense Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 3, May 2022, pp. 414–432. 15. De Castro R., op. cit., May 2022. 16. Council of foreign affairs, “The Rebalance to Asia Led to Drop in Security Assistance for South East Asia”, 2016. 17. Heydarian R.J., op. cit., 2017. 18. De Castro R., op. cit., March 2022. 19. Wingner G., “Alliance Embeddedness: Rodrigo Duterte and the Resilience of the US-Philippines Alliance”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 17, Issue 3, July 2021. 20. De Castro R., op. cit., May 2022. 21. Heydarian R.J., op. cit., 2017. 22. Heydarian R.J., The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Struggle for Global Mastery, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, pp. 263–322. 23. International Security and Defense Policy Center, The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation. Deepening Defense Ties Among U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific, RAND Corporation, 2019, pp. 329–339. 24. Heydarian R.J., op. cit., 2017. 25. De Castro R., op. cit., 2017. 26. Wingner G., op. cit., 2021. 27. De Castro R, op. cit., 2017. 28. De Castro R., op. cit., May 2022. 29. US Department of State, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin”, 27 January 2021, see Secretary Blinken’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin - United States Department of State. 30. US Department of States, “On the Situation in the South China Sea” 19 November 2021, see https://www.state.gov/on-the-situation-in-thesouth-china-sea/; U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Support for the Philippines in the South China Sea, 13 February 2023, see https://www.state. gov/u-s-support-for-the-philippines-in-the-south-china-sea-3/. 31. Capozzola C., op. cit., 2020, pp. 317–318.

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32. Lum T. and Dolven B., The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests— 2014, Congressional Research Service, CSR Report, May 2014. 33. De Castro R., op. cit., May 2022. 34. Lum T., Dolven B. and Arabia C.L., The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, CSR Report, March 2022. 35. De Castro R., op. cit., May 2022. 36. US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnership, and Promoting a Networked Region, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2019. 37. De Castro R., “Caught Between Appeasement and Limited Hard Balancing: The Philippines’ Changing Relations with the Eagle and the Dragon”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 2022, Vol. 41, Issue 2, pp. 258–278. 38. Lum T., Dolven B. and Arabia C.L., op. cit., March 2022. 39. De Castro R., op. cit., 2022. 40. Lum T., Dolven B. and Arabia C.L., op. cit., March 2022. 41. Ibidem. 42. US Department of State, Joint Vision for a 21st Century United StatesPhilippines Partnership, 16 November 2021, see https://www.state.gov/ joint-vision-for-a-21st-century-united-states-philippines-partnership/. 43. Lum T. and Dolven B., The Philippines, Congressional Research Service, CSR Report, March 2023. 44. Wingner G., op. cit., 2021. 45. Heydarian R.J., op. cit. 2017. 46. International Security and Defense Policy Center, op. cit., 2019. 47. De Castro R., op. cit., May 2022. 48. International Security and Defense Policy Center, op. cit., pp. 304–309. 49. International Security and Defense Policy Center, op. cit., pp. 309–315. 50. International Security and Defense Policy Center, op. cit. pp. 315–321. 51. Dian M. and Meijer H., “Networking Hegemony: Alliance Dynamics in East Asia”, International Politics, Vol. 57, 2020, pp. 131–149; Meijer H., “Shaping China’s Rise: The Reordering of US Alliances and Defense Partnerships in East Asia”, International Politics, Vol. 57, 2020, pp. 166– 184. 52. De Castro R., “Fostering Military Diplomacy with America’s Bilateral Allies: The Philippine Policy of Linking Spokes Toghether”, in Chong A. (eds.), International security in the Asia-Pacif. Transcending ASEAN Transitional Polycentrism, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, pp. 219–254; De Castro R., “Preventing the Philippines from Pivoting Toward China: The Role of the US-Japan Security Alliance”, Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2023, pp. 381–399.

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Bibliography Council of foreign affairs, “The Rebalance to Asia Led to Drop in Security Assistance for South East Asia”, 2016. De Castro R., “Philippines Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3, Fall 2005, pp. 403–422. De Castro R., “The Duterte Administration’s Appeasement Policy on China and the Crisis in the Philippines-US Alliance”, Philippine Political Science Journal, Vol. 38, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 159–181. De Castro R., “Fostering Military Diplomacy with America’s Bilateral Allies: The Philippine Policy of Linking Spokes Together”, in Chong A. (eds.), International Security in the Asia-Pacif. Transcending ASEAN Transitional Polycentrism, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, pp. 219–254. De Castro R., “Caught Between Appeasement and Limited Hard Balancing: The Philippines’ Changing Relations with the Eagle and the Dragon”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 2022, Vol. 41, Issue 2, pp. 258–278. De Castro R., “The Philippines Hedging Between the United States and China: Is the Biden Administration Tipping the Balance?”, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2022, pp. 101–123. De Castro R., “The Philippines-U.S. Alliance and 21st Century U.S. Grand Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region: from the Obama Administration to the Biden Administration”, Defense Studies, Vol. 22, Issue 3, May 2022, pp. 414–432. De Castro R., “Preventing the Philippines from Pivoting Toward China: The Role of the US-Japan Security Alliance”, Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2023, pp. 381–399. De Dios A., “Democracy Under Strain in the Philippines: The Populist Politics and Diplomacy of President Rodrigo Duterte”, in Patman R. et al. (eds.), From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. Diplomacy in a Contested Region, Global Politica Transition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2022, pp. 303–325. Dian M. and Meijer H., “Networking Hegemony: Alliance Dynamics in East Asia”, International Politics, Vol. 57, 2020, pp. 131–149. Heydarian R.J., “The Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy”, Asia Security, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2017, pp. 220–236. Heydarian R.J., The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Struggle for Global Mastery, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, pp. 263–322. International Security and Defense Policy Center, The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation. Deepening Defense Ties Among U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific, RAND Corporation, 2019.

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Loewen H., “Foreign Relations Between the Philippines and the United States”, in Thompson M.R. and Batalla E.V. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Contemporary Philippines, Routledge, 2018, pp. 161–171. Lum T. and Dolven B., The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests—2014, Congressional Research Service, CSR Report, May 2014. Lum T. and Dolven B., The Philippines, Congressional Research Service, CSR Report, March 2023. Lum T., Dolven B., and Arabia C.L., The Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, CSR Report, March 2022. Meijer H., “Shaping China’s Rise: The Reordering of US Alliances and Defense Partnerships in East Asia”, International Politics, Vol. 57, 2020, pp. 166–184. Song W. and Velasco J.C., “Selling ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ Amid the USChina Rivalry: Populism and the Philippine Foreign Policy Under the Duterte Government”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 35, 2022, pp. 1–29. US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnership, and Promoting a Networked Region, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2019. US Department of State, Joint Vision for a 21st Century United States-Philippines Partnership, 16 November 2021. Wingner G., “Alliance Embeddedness: Rodrigo Duterte and the Resilience of the US-Philippines Alliance”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 17, Issue 3, July 2021.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusions

Abstract This chapter develops a few final comments. Firstly, it points out the relationship between the junior ally’s voice opportunity and the evolution of alliances in light of the empirical analyses. Secondly, it emphasizes that IR literature should rethink the conventional wisdom on the autonomy-security trade-off as it undervalues the protégées’ agency. Finally, it looks at the current US alliances in Northeast Asia and Europe to interpret their crucial challenges and possible sources of crises. Keywords Asymmetry · Voice opportunities · The quest for autonomy · Alliance adjustments · Alliance persistence · Alliance termination

The Weaker Voice and the Alliance Adjustments Alliances can be subject to many challenges. Shifts in regional strategic contexts and interallied power relations can trigger crises between the member states. Although most IR literature adopts the patrons’ perspective to interpret the evolution of asymmetric security relationships, this book has found that the junior partners’ agency also can shape the alliance’s historical junctures.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Leva, The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35448-9_8

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In fact, focusing on the protégé’s threat perceptions and the benefits coming from the alliance as destabilizing features of the interallied exchange has depicted how diverging alliance incentives can challenge the persistence of the security relationship. Egypt and Iraq complained about Britain’s lack of military and diplomatic support, while internal and external threats were arising significantly. The Philippines claimed the lack of US assurances and the unsatisfactory military cooperation that occurred in the context of destabilizing shifts in the regional balance of power. New Zealand and Australia promoted changes in their alliance relationships once the communist menace had decreased by leaving a low-threat environment. The analysis has shown that junior partners tried to fill the alliance deficits by raising their voices with the patron and promoting some adjustments in the relationship. Those who suffered from unsatisfactory military cooperation tried to acquire more leeway in their regional contexts. Egypt envisaged the unification with Sudan, aiming to ensure more natural resources and extend its interests to the rest of Africa. Iraq struggled to increase its influence among the Arab states and encouraged several defense arrangements centered on Baghdad. The Philippines engaged in improving its relationship with China, trying to benefit from the latter’s regional rise. On the other hand, those that had low-threat perceptions promoted changes in their alliance posture. New Zealand undertook a new foreign policy course that envisaged a nuclear-free South Pacific region. Australia endorsed a more self-reliant defense policy, regionalizing its priorities and promoting nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. Yet, the alliance adjustments could only be achieved through the patron’s cooperation. The cases of persistence have shown that recognizing the protégées’ interests gave renovated strength to the alliance. In fact, the signature of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 transferred the air bases of Habbaniya and Shaiba to Iraqi control and favored the junior ally’s plan of regional influence, avoiding detachment from Britain. Similarly, Australia in the mid-1980s obtained a rearrangement of the base agreements, increasing its involvement, and persisted in its nuclear arms control policy, achieving greater autonomy in regional affairs but strengthening the alliance with the United States. Finally, the Philippines reoriented the security cooperation with the ally and obtained clear reassurance on the patron’s commitment to the South China Sea. These adjustments permitted the allies to overcome the crises.

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On the other hand, the cases of alliance termination pointed out the critical features of asymmetric alliance mismanagement. In fact, while Egypt contested the more powerful ally’s troops’ presence and the Nile valley’s disunity, the British ignored Cairo’s national aspirations, not incentivizing the latter to keep the treaty. Similarly, New Zealand’s denuclearization policy and non-conformity to the patron’s requests triggered a process of non-reciprocity in interallied relations until the end of the alliance. Therefore, how the more powerful ally reacted to the partner’s voice attempts was crucial to the evolution of these agreements. Once the weaker side’s voice was effective, the views of the junior ally had a tangible impact on the outcome of the strategic interaction. In these cases, the alliances evolved by including the protégées’ interests, and the member states overcame the crises. By contrast, the junior ally’s voice ineffectiveness favored the processes of alliance termination, detaching the protégé from the patron. The weaker ally could not pursue its interests within and through the alliance and escaped the unilateral domination by exiting the agreement. In light of these remarks, it is helpful to rethink how asymmetric alliances are conventionally understood through the security-autonomy trade-off.

The Security-Autonomy Trade-Off Revised The most established IR literature acknowledges that asymmetric alliances imply different degrees of autonomy among the member states. Scholars hold that patrons preserve their freedom of action while influencing their weaker partners’ choices or coercing their behavior. While those latter enjoy a greater level of security, the power differential structures the relation through methods of control concerning different areas of state action. Indeed, all scrutinized empirical cases did not escape these dynamics. Britain restrained Iraq’s foreign policy during the entire decade following World War II’s end, and territorial control issues characterized the US–Australia relationships. Similarly, the British attempted to control Egypt’s foreign policy and territory, while New Zealand suffered from the stronger ally’s attempts to influence its domestic and foreign policy. Finally, territorial and domestic control issues characterized the US– Philippines alliance after the end of the Cold War, particularly in the period under investigation.

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Yet, the patron’s policy of interallied control occurred in specific circumstances. In fact, this research considered junior partners that suffered from an alliance deficit in terms of low-threat perceptions or low benefits coming from the alliance. Under these conditions, the empirical analysis showed that giving back autonomy to the weaker side has represented a successful policy, crucially pushing the partners toward overcoming the crisis. Although this could not fully compensate for the power differential, it mitigated the power relationship, paving the way for internal rebalance. Tracing the alliance processes during crises has shed light on the historical evolution of these security relationships. The successful management has implied a patron that considered the protégé’s requests and goals as part of the broader alliance strategy. This feature was particularly evident in the Anglo-Iraqi alliance as the Baghdad Pact established a pro-Western alliance where Baghdad was the leading Arab state. Likewise, the United States recognized and supported Australia’s policy of self-reliance and regional arms control, and then, reoriented military cooperation with the Philippines by focusing on humanitarian assistance, risk reduction, and anti-terrorism. Moreover, the alliance persistence model hypothesized that a less powerful partner would recognize the benefits of the hierarchical relations by virtue of the effectiveness of its voice opportunities. Indeed, Iraq preserved its security cooperation with the historical ally, although it could have switched to the United States. Australia engaged in regional consultations on arms control and denuclearization yet considering the ally’s interests during negotiations for the Rarotonga treaty. The Philippines integrated more fully into the US system of alliances in Asia-Pacific, thus legitimizing the regional security architecture led by the more powerful partner. Looking at the alliance termination cases, the focus was on the more powerful ally’s policy of hard control as an indicator of asymmetric relationship mismanagement. Here, two alliance processes were hypothesized to be at work. Firstly, the minor partner would have opened to new partnerships to diversify its foreign policy. This feature was particularly evident in the Anglo-Egyptian alliance once the junior ally diversified its arms suppliers by opening relationships with communist countries. By contrast, New Zealand’s exit was not preceded by the establishment of significant new partnerships in the security area.

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Secondly, the alliance termination model hypothesized that the weaker side would view the patron as a strategic hindrance, lowering the degree of policy coordination. Here, evidence was found in the Egyptian look for the support of other regional allies to undermine British primacy in the Middle East. Then, this feature was particularly significant in the US–NZ alliance concerning NZ denuclearization policy. Once the more powerful ally refused to recognize Wellington’s anti-nuclear posture, Lange declared that it was the alliance itself that damaged the US–NZ relations. Therefore, the analysis of the empirical cases has suggested that once an alliance deficit occurred, the asymmetric relationship had to be well managed to avoid triggering erosion processes. Giving back autonomy to protégées was a successful policy to prevent their detachment and avoid the alliance’s collapse.

A Quick Look at the US System of Alliances’ Challenges Asymmetric alliances in the current international system might face similar challenges due to shifts in the protégées’ threat perceptions and alliance benefits. Although the US system of alliances has demonstrated its resilience by surviving the end of the Cold War, its persistence is continuously subject to changes that need to be carefully managed.1 In fact, across Asia and Europe, interallied crises can be triggered by the overturning of strategic contexts, the exacerbation of regional competitions, the outbreak of wars, and shifts in bilateral alliance dynamics. The uncertainty on the US global leadership may impact the relationships with its weaker allies, making the latter doubt the patron’s credibility while external threats increase. This might require significant adjustments in the security partnerships. For instance, scholars have noticed several changes in Japan’s security policy following the end of the Cold War as Tokyo has begun decentering and diversifying from the previous exclusive focus on the United States.2 The country under Shinzo Abe has started a normalization process by increasing defense expenditure and circumventing constitutional constraints that limited its leeway in regional affairs.3 In the context of growing regional tensions in the East China Sea and the Korean peninsula, Tokyo might look for a more autonomous

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defense posture to handle the perception of the US’s decline in capabilities and resolve.4 Moreover, the outbreak of war in Europe due to the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty has incentivized the country to increase its defense efforts. Given the growing Asian geopolitical competition, further changes in the alliance might occur by introducing a dual-keyed US nuclear weapon in the country, if not an independent Japanese one.5 At the same time, the rise of China and the growing North Korean nuclear threat have increased uncertainties in the US–South Korea alliance. During the Trump administration, the interallied tensions have been exacerbated by the “America First” policy, which included pressures on the junior partner for greater burden-sharing. Then, President Moon Jae-in’s “balanced policy” fed Seoul’s strategic ambiguity in dealing with the United States (its leading security partner) and China (its biggest trade partner).6 Under these circumstances, South Korea has shown the need for a more autonomous foreign policy, as was suggested by the delay in the deployment of the US THAAD, the lack of full convergence with the ally’s Indo-Pacific strategy, and the attempt to transfer wartime Operational Control Authority (OPCON) from United States Forces Korea to the South Korea government.7 Therefore, specialists and policymakers have started to prospect the need to introduce adjustments in the alliance.8 However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which dangerously evokes a possible Asian scenario, seems to have driven South Korea away from its previous strategic ambiguity. Although competing views still exist on how the country might enlarge its strategic space in the context of increasing regional competition, Seoul has been more openly favoring the historical alliance with the United States and has looked less willing to accommodate China.9 In Europe, the EU’s Global Strategy paper of June 2016 has reopened the debate on strategic autonomy.10 Some authors have emphasized that the United States could benefit from greater European autonomy and should support it even though it may imply changes in interallied power relations.11 At the same time, a heated discussion has developed on the European countries’ ability to defend themselves alone despite their historical military dependence on the United States and their divergencies in threat perceptions.12 During the Trump administration, French President Macron’s declaration on NATO’s “brain death” has pointed out the alliance’s critical moment. Yet, the Russian military invasion of Ukraine has significantly

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changed the regional strategic context. Although the European quest for autonomy seems to be downgraded, EU member states have declared their intention to increase their defense spending.13 In fact, the US prioritization of its competition with China makes it unsure how the regional security architecture will be affected in the long term.14 While several analyses have been developing on how to reorganize the European defense in light of the new strategic context, it is still unclear if the war in Ukraine will be a watershed moment or a missed opportunity for rethinking the EU foreign and defense policies.15 In conclusion, the US alliances in Asia and Europe need to be well managed to avoid interallied crises and minimize the opportunities for regional destabilization. In the context of increasing external threats, the alliance’s benefits for the weaker American allies might decrease due to the patron’s limited reassurance and credibility, or a decline in interallied military cooperation. Under these circumstances, the evolution of alliances will be dependent both on the more powerful ally’s management of asymmetry and the junior partners’ changing incentives to keep the agreements alive. Should the latter undertake more autonomous policies, adjustments might be needed to preserve the security relationships alive and the US primacy intact.

Conclusions This book has aimed to start filling a gap in IR literature by focusing on the junior allies’ agency to interpret the evolution of asymmetric alliances. The empirical analysis has shown that the successful management of alliances implies appropriate adjustments while the strategic context and interallied relations are changing. As neutralizing tensions between security partners is crucial to eschew crises that would result in alliance collapse, keeping the focus on the weaker alliance members’ agency remains necessary, thus not assuming their limited leeway and bargaining power. Indeed, international affairs and alliance policies are dynamic and need flexible interpretation tools. By looking at the junior allies’ quest for autonomy and voice opportunities, this research has focused on some undervalued aspects in the literature. This view permitted to shed new light on the processes that shorten or prolong an existing power matrix, finding a link between the management of asymmetric security relationships and their persistence or termination. Hopefully, the weaker voice

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and agency will be better understood through further studies willing to go beyond the established conventional wisdom.

Notes 1. Sauer T., “US Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Europe and East Asia: A Comparative Analysis”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 53, Issue 3, 2022, pp. 500– 519; Wilkins T., “A Hub-and-Spokes “Plus” Model of Us Alliances in the Indo-Pacific: Towards a New “Networked” Design”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 53, Issue 3, 2022, pp. 457–480; Richey M., “US-led Alliances and Contemporary International Security Disorder: Comparative Responses of the Transatlantic and Asia-Pacific Alliance Systems”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2019, pp. 275–298. 2. Midford P. and Vosse W. (eds.), New Directions in Japan’s Security. NonUS Centric Evolution, Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies, 2021. 3. Richardson L., “The Autonomy-Alignment Tradeoff: Japan’s Evolving Defense Posture”, Asia Politics & Policy, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 27–39. 4. Fatton L.P., “A New Spear in Asia: Why Is Japan Moving Toward Autonomous Defense?”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 19, 2019, pp. 297–325. 5. Green M., “The War in Ukraine and the Northeast Asia”, Asia Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 2023, pp. 6–19. 6. Paradise J.F., “Changing Power Dynamics in Asia: Implications for the US-ROK Alliance”, in Akaha T., Yuan J., and Liang W. (eds.), Trump’s America and International Relations in the Asia-Pacific, Springer, 2021, pp. 53–76. 7. Park H., “The South Korea–US Alliance Under the North Korean Nuclear Threat: A Reluctant Return to the ‘Autonomy–Security Tradeoff’”, Pacific Focus, Vol. 34, No. 3, December 2019, pp. 447–472. 8. Fuchs M. and Bard A., How to Create a Durable U.S.-South Korea Alliance, Center for American Progress, 20 August 2019. 9. Maduz L., “Explaining Korea’s Positioning in the US-China Strategic Competition”, in Grano S. and Wei Feng Huang D. (eds.), ChinaUS Competition. Impact on Small and Middle Powers’ Strategic Choices, Palgrave Macmillan, 2023, pp. 247–274; Green M., op. cit., April 2023. 10. EEAS, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe—A Global Strategy for the European Union Foreign and Security Policies, June 2016, accessed at eugs_review_web_0.pdf (europa.eu) on 25 June 2023. 11. Haddad B. and Polyakova A., “Is Going It Alone the Best Way Forward for Europe? Why Strategic Autonomy Should Be the Continent’s Goal”, Foreign Affairs, 17 October 2018; Rizzo R., “The United States Should Rally Behind European Strategic Autonomy”, European Leadership Network, Commentary, 29 October 2018.

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12. Barrie D., Barry B., Béraud-Sudreau L., Boyd H., Childs N., and Giegerich B., Defending Europe: Scenario-Based Capability Requirements for NATO’s European Members, IISS, April 2019; Posen B., “Europe Can Defend Itself”, Survival, Vol. 62, No. 6, 2020, pp. 7–34; Meijer H. and Brooks S.G., “Illusions of Autonomy”, International Security, Vol. 45, No. 4, Spring 2021, pp. 7–43. 13. Dempsey J., Judy Asks: Is European Strategic Autonomy Over?, Carnegie Europe, accessed at Judy Asks: Is European Strategic Autonomy Over? Carnegie Europe - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on 30 June 2023. 14. Howorth J., The Ukraine War and Its Implications for European Security, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2023. 15. Giusti S. and Grevi G. (eds.), Facing War: Rethinking Europe’s Security and Defense, ISPI, Milan, 2022.

Bibliography Barrie D., Barry B., Béraud-Sudreau L., Boyd H., Childs N., and Giegerich B., Defending Europe: Scenario-Based Capability Requirements for NATO’s European Members, IISS, April 2019. Dempsey J., Judy Asks: Is European Strategic Autonomy Over?, Carnegie Europe, accessed at Judy Asks: Is European Strategic Autonomy Over? - Carnegie Europe - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on 30 June 2023. EEAS, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe—A Global Strategy for the European Union Foreign and Security Policies, June 2016, accessed at eugs_review_web_0.pdf (europa.eu) on 25 June 2023. Fatton L.P., “A New Spear in Asia: Why Is Japan Moving Toward Autonomous Defense?”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 19, 2019, pp. 297–325. Fuchs, M. and Bard A., How to Create a Durable U.S.-South Korea Alliance, Center for American Progress, 20 August 2019. Giusti S. and Grevi G. (eds.), Facing War: Rethinking Europe’s Security and Defense, ISPI, Milan, 2022. Green M., “The War in Ukraine and the Northeast Asia”, Asia Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 2023, pp. 6–19. Haddad B. and Polyakova A., “Is Going It Alone the Best Way Forward for Europe? Why Strategic Autonomy Should Be the Continent’s Goal”, Foreign Affairs, 17 October 2018. Howorth J., The Ukraine War and Its Implications for European Security, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2023. Maduz L., “Explaining Korea’s Positioning in the US-China Strategic Competition”, in Grano S. and Wei Feng Huang D. (eds.), China-US Competition.

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Impact on Small and Middle Powers’ Strategic Choices, Palgrave Macmillan, 2023, pp. 247–274. Meijer H. and Brooks S.G., “Illusions of Autonomy”, International Security, Vol. 45, No. 4, Spring 2021, pp. 7–43. Midford P. and Vosse W. (eds.), New Directions in Japan’s Security. Non-US Centric Evolution, Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies, 2021. Paradise J.F., “Changing Power Dynamics in Asia: Implications for the US-ROK Alliance”, in Akaha T., Yuan J., and Liang W. (eds.), Trump’s America and International Relations in the Asia-Pacific, Springer, 2021, pp. 53–76. Park H., “The South Korea–US Alliance Under the North Korean Nuclear Threat: A Reluctant Return to the ‘Autonomy–Security Tradeoff’”, Pacific Focus, Vol. 34, No. 3, December 2019, pp. 447–472. Posen B., “Europe Can Defend Itself”, Survival, Vol. 62, No. 6, 2020, pp. 7–34. Richardson L., “The Autonomy-Alignment Tradeoff: Japan’s Evolving Defense Posture”, Asia Politics & Policy, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 27–39. Richey M., “US-led Alliances and Contemporary International Security Disorder: Comparative Responses of the Transatlantic and Asia-Pacific Alliance Systems”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2019, pp. 275–298. Rizzo R., “The United States Should Rally Behind European Strategic Autonomy”, European Leadership Network, Commentary, 29 October 2018. Sauer T., “US Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Europe and East Asia: A Comparative Analysis”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 53, Issue 3, 2022, pp. 500–519. Wilkins T., “A Hub-and-Spokes “Plus” Model of Us Alliances in the Indo-Pacific: Towards a New “Networked” Design”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 53, Issue 3, 2022, pp. 457–480.

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Index

A Al-Jamali, Muhammad Fadhel, 81 Al-Kaylani, Rashid Ali, 70 Alliance adjustments, 148 Alliance benefits, 17, 18, 32, 33, 54, 76, 110, 112, 115, 128, 130, 151 Alliance deficit, 7, 20, 27–29, 48, 63, 75, 84, 95, 105, 110, 112, 133, 148, 150, 151 Alliance persistence, 2, 3, 7, 8, 18, 20, 32, 33, 71, 73, 82, 85, 111, 112, 121, 128, 130, 138, 150 Alliance processes, 32, 49, 59, 71, 93, 103, 110, 150 Alliance termination, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 16, 18, 29, 32, 33, 48–50, 71, 93–95, 104, 105, 149–151 al-Said, Nuri, 70 Arab League, 49, 51, 71, 77, 78, 80, 82 Asymmetry, 23, 25, 29, 30, 153 asymmetric alliances, 23, 28, 149 management of asymmetry, 25, 28

Attlee, Clement, 56, 57 Australia, 2, 8, 33, 91, 96, 100, 103, 104, 109–121, 137, 139, 140, 148–150 Autonomy, 7, 8, 16, 20, 22–27, 30, 34, 47, 48, 50, 54, 71, 72, 83, 94, 110, 112, 119, 128, 129, 140, 148–152 autonomy-security trade-off, 9, 20, 22, 149 quest for autonomy, 22, 50, 70, 71, 92–94, 112, 121, 153 Azzam, Abdul Rahman, 49, 62 B Baghdad Pact, 2, 70–72, 77, 84–86, 148, 150 Barnard, Lance, 113 Beazley, Kim, 114, 117–120 Bevin, Ernest, 53, 56–61, 64, 66 Bevin-Sidqi agreement, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63 Britain, 2, 47–54, 57–62, 69–72, 75–85, 95, 109, 148, 149

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Leva, The Weaker Voice and the Evolution of Asymmetric Alliances, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35448-9

171

172

INDEX

Britain (London), 35, 37–39, 52–57, 59–63, 66, 70, 75–81, 83, 84

C China, 8, 25, 92, 95, 99, 100, 116, 128–140, 148, 151–153 Control, 20, 21, 23–26, 29, 30, 48–51, 54, 59, 60, 70–72, 75–77, 79, 81–85, 93, 100, 103, 111, 112, 114–119, 121, 131, 138, 139, 141, 148–150 policy of hard interallied control, 31 policy of soft interallied control, 31, 110 Czechoslovakia, 54, 61, 62

D Dibb, Paul, 113, 119 Duterte, Rodrigo, 129, 130, 133–137, 139–141

E Eden, Anthony, 83 Egypt, 8, 33, 34, 47–54, 56, 57, 60–62, 71–73, 76–78, 81–85, 132, 148, 149 Egypt (Cairo), 48–50, 52–63, 73, 78, 80, 81, 84, 149 Evans, Gareth, 115 Exit option, 28

F Fertile Crescent, project/plan, 72, 78 Fraser, Malcom, 113, 116

G Great Britain, 56, 92, 114

H Habbaniya and Shaiba, air bases, 72, 77, 79, 84, 85, 148 Hawke, Bob, 112, 115, 117–121 Hayden, Bill, 112 Hypotheses, 25, 31 alliance benefits hypothesis, 18 threat hypothesis, 17 voice effectiveness hypothesis, 29 voice ineffective hypothesis, 30

I Ikhwan, 52 Indonesia, 62, 113, 116 Institutionalism, 31, 32 Iran, 60, 71, 73, 74, 81–83, 99 Iraq, 8, 33, 34, 49, 51, 62, 69–85, 129, 148–150 Iraq (Baghdad), 2, 71–81, 83–85, 148, 150 Israel, 51, 52, 58, 60, 61, 73, 77, 78, 81, 82, 85

J Jabr, Sayyid Salih, 80 Japan, 22, 92, 95, 96, 103, 109, 112, 137, 139, 140, 151 Jordan, 49, 51, 62, 71, 73, 80–82, 132

K Keating, Paul, 110, 115 Killen, Jim, 117 Kirk, Norman, 93, 99 Kurd(s), 74

L Lange, David, 92, 96–98, 102, 151 Lebanon, 51, 71, 81, 82

INDEX

M McMahon, William, 120 Muldoon, Robert, 99

N Nahhas, Mustafa, 58, 63 Nasser, 73 New Zealand, 2, 8, 33, 34, 91–97, 99–105, 114, 118, 119, 148–150 New Zealand (Wellington), 92, 94–105, 118, 151 Nile Valley, 48, 50, 54, 56, 57, 60, 149 Northern Tier project/plan/scheme, 81, 83, 85 Nuclear Free Bill, 102 Nuqrashi, Mahmud, 52, 53, 57, 61

O Obama, Barak, 130–132, 134–136, 139 O’Flynn, Frank, 97, 104

P Pakistan, 81–83, 132 Palestine, 51, 52, 54, 58, 60–62, 71, 73, 75, 76, 78–80 Palmer, Geoffrey, 98, 101 Path-dependence, 7, 15 Philippines, 2, 8, 33, 34, 128–141, 148–150 Portsmouth treaty, 2, 77, 79, 80, 83 Project, Fertile Crescent, 49, 51, 71, 77 Project, Greater Syria, 49, 51

R Rarotonga treaty, 102, 118, 121, 150 Realism, 3, 31 Regan, Ronald, 103, 117

173

S Salah al-Din, Muhammad, 61 Saudi Arabia, 71, 82 Security Council, 57, 61, 62, 79 Sidky, Ismail, 54, 65 South Korea, 139, 140, 152 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), 100, 102, 118–120 Soviet Union, 5, 52, 53, 60–62, 72, 73, 75, 84, 85, 95, 99, 101, 113 Sudan, 2, 48, 50, 54–57, 60–63, 148 Suez Canal, 53, 58, 59 Syria, 51, 71, 78, 81, 82

T Threat perception, 4, 6, 8, 15–20, 23, 27, 31–33, 49, 50, 73, 91–95, 105, 110, 112, 128, 130, 148, 150–152 Tripartite declaration, 53, 75 Trump, Donald, 136, 139, 152 Turkey, 60, 71, 73, 74, 78, 80, 81, 83

U United States (US), 2, 5, 6, 8, 21, 25, 33, 34, 53, 58, 59, 61, 75–77, 81, 82, 84, 85, 91–105, 109–121, 127–141, 148–153 US system of alliances, 150, 151

V Vance, Cyrus, 116 Voice, 9, 23, 28, 48, 49, 51, 55, 59, 63, 71–73, 77, 86, 93, 95, 97, 98, 105, 110, 112, 115, 128, 133, 141, 148, 149, 153 voice opportunities, 7, 8, 28, 92, 110, 153 voice option, 28

174

INDEX

Voice effectiveness, 7, 8, 28–30, 50, 85, 94, 112, 121 Voice ineffectiveness, 7, 29, 30, 63, 149 Voice opportunities, 6, 16, 29, 30, 32, 150

W Whitlam, Gough, 113, 116 Wolfowitz, Paul, 98 Y Yemen, 82