The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo: After the Siege, the Role and Impact of the International Community (The Urban Book Series) 3030805743, 9783030805746

Table of contents :
Preface
Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
1.1 Methodology
1.2 Structure of the Book
References
2 Framing the Double Transition and the International Intervention
2.1 Socialist and Post-Socialist Cities
2.2 The Question of Ethno-Territorialities
2.3 Peacebuilding and Political Institutions
References
3 The Division and Destruction of Sarajevo
3.1 Common Life and Urban Expansion Until the Early 1990s
3.2 Towards the Urban Division of Sarajevo
3.3 The Siege of Sarajevo
3.3.1 The International Military Response
3.4 The DPA and the Sarajevo’s Final Ethno-Territorial Division
References
4 The Consolidation of the Division After the War
4.1 The Reintegration of Sarajevo
4.1.1 The Rome Meeting and the Transfer of Authority in the Serb-Held Districts
4.2 OHR’s Response to SDA and SDS Ethnocratic Practices
References
5 The Struggle to Rebuild Ethnic Diversity in Sarajevo
5.1 International Approach to Minority Returns Before the Empowerment of the High Representative
5.2 The Empowerment of the High Representative and the Adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration
5.3 The Complex Implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration
5.3.1 International Response to Obstructionism
5.4 The Limited Impact of the Sarajevo Declaration on the Reconstruction of Ethnic Diversity
References
6 The Incomplete Economic Transition
6.1 The Neoliberal Economic Transition Internationally Imposed
6.2 The Privatisation of Companies in Sarajevo
6.2.1 The Privatisation of Holiday Inn and Sarajka
References
7 The Urban Spatial Reconfiguration of Sarajevo
7.1 The Post-Socialist Urban Spatial Restructuring
7.2 Urbanisation on the Slopes and Suburbanisation
References
8 The Ethnic Reconfiguration in the Area of Sarajevo
8.1 The Evolution of the Division Between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo
8.1.1 From Physical Border to Boundary: Spatial Practices Across the IEBL
8.1.2 Visions on the Division of the Urban Area of Sarajevo
8.2 Common Life in Post-War Sarajevo
References
9 Conclusions
Index

Citation preview

The Urban Book Series

Jordi Martín-Díaz

The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo After the Siege, the Role and Impact of the International Community

The Urban Book Series Editorial Board Margarita Angelidou, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece Fatemeh Farnaz Arefian, The Bartlett Development Planning Unit, UCL, Silk Cities, London, UK Michael Batty, Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis, UCL, London, UK Simin Davoudi, Planning & Landscape Department GURU, Newcastle University, Newcastle, UK Geoffrey DeVerteuil, School of Planning and Geography, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK Paul Jones, School of Architecture, Design and Planning, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia Andrew Kirby, New College, Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA Karl Kropf, Department of Planning, Headington Campus, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK Karen Lucas, Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK Marco Maretto, DICATeA, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Parma, Parma, Italy Ali Modarres, Tacoma Urban Studies, University of Washington Tacoma, Tacoma, WA, USA Fabian Neuhaus, Faculty of Environmental Design, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada Steffen Nijhuis, Architecture and the Built Environment, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands Vitor Manuel Aráujo de Oliveira , Porto University, Porto, Portugal Christopher Silver, College of Design, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA Giuseppe Strappa, Facoltà di Architettura, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Roma, Italy Igor Vojnovic, Department of Geography, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA Jeremy W. R. Whitehand, Earth & Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK Claudia Yamu, Department of Spatial Planning and Environment, University of Groningen, Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

The Urban Book Series is a resource for urban studies and geography research worldwide. It provides a unique and innovative resource for the latest developments in the field, nurturing a comprehensive and encompassing publication venue for urban studies, urban geography, planning and regional development. The series publishes peer-reviewed volumes related to urbanization, sustainability, urban environments, sustainable urbanism, governance, globalization, urban and sustainable development, spatial and area studies, urban management, transport systems, urban infrastructure, urban dynamics, green cities and urban landscapes. It also invites research which documents urbanization processes and urban dynamics on a national, regional and local level, welcoming case studies, as well as comparative and applied research. The series will appeal to urbanists, geographers, planners, engineers, architects, policy makers, and to all of those interested in a wide-ranging overview of contemporary urban studies and innovations in the field. It accepts monographs, edited volumes and textbooks. Indexed by Scopus.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14773

Jordi Martín-Díaz

The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo After the Siege, the Role and Impact of the International Community

Jordi Martín-Díaz Department of Geography Universitat de Barcelona Barcelona, Spain

ISSN 2365-757X ISSN 2365-7588 (electronic) The Urban Book Series ISBN 978-3-030-80574-6 ISBN 978-3-030-80575-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80575-3 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Als meus pares i, especialment, al meu germà.

Preface

During the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia and amid a concomitant process to divide Bosnia ethnically, Sarajevo suffered through a siege that, after three-and-a-half years, resulted in a completely new social, political and territorial order. Following the signing of the peace agreement in Paris in December 1995, to end the war in Bosnia, the city simultaneously experienced a transition from war to peace and from socialism to capitalism. This double transition was marked by an increasing intervention from the international community, which had deployed an administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement. Despite the fact that no specific local peace-building mission was established in Sarajevo, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), in charge of supervising the civilian annexes of the agreement, became particularly involved in the coordination and even execution of several key processes shaping its post-war and post-socialist urban transformation, such as the economic transition and the reconstruction of Sarajevo’s ethnic diversity. This book, which is based on my Ph.D., analyses the role of the OHR in the urban transformation of the symbolic Bosnian capital city during the post-war period with an ultimate focus on the impact of those policies developed since the end of the war until 2003, in the contemporary ethnic and spatial configuration of the city. Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain

Jordi Martín-Díaz

vii

Acknowledgements

I am writing these lines after six weeks of lockdown. In this crisis caused by COVID19, it is possible to see better than ever that we can hardly progress alone. Fortunately, this research counted with the support and participation of many people so, under current circumstances, these words take a particularly special meaning. ˇ Firstly, I would like to thank Profs. Carles Carreras i Verdaguer and Nihad Cengi´ c for their supervision of my Ph.D. and Prof. Gerard Toal for his orientation during my research stay at Virginia Tech. Many other people shared knowledge, contacts and experiences. Special thanks to Fermin Cordoba, Mirza Hajri´c, Valerie Hopkins, Almir Kasumagi´c, Mladen Klemenˇci´c, Philippe Leroux-Martin, Adis Maksi´c, Adam Moore, Valery Perry, Ljiljana Sulenti´c, Sead Turˇcalo and Manel Vila. To Saša and Jelena Golijanin for your kindness and help, as well as to Jordi Nofre and Marc Oliva for your continuous and warm support. Also, I would like to thank everyone who had the consideration to accept interviews and share their experiences, too often about delicate topics. To the staff and professors at the Planning Chair of the University of Sarajevo, who made me feel extremely comfortable during my research stays at the Faculty of Architecture. Also, to everyone at the Spanish Embassy in BiH for their support. At the Department of Geography of the University of Barcelona, special thanks to Meritxell Gisbert, Núria Font and Profs. Xavier Úbeda, Francesc Nadal and Núria Benach. Finally, I am also very indebted to all my family, for their unconditional support and patience before and during this long journey, and to the rest of my friends. All of them are spread, among other lovely places, in Premià de Mar, Edinburgh, Barcelona, Mataró, Sarajevo and Madrid. This research was funded by the Program Formación del Profesorado Universitario of the Spanish Ministry of Education (grant number AP2010-3873).

ix

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Structure of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 5 6 7

2 Framing the Double Transition and the International Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Socialist and Post-Socialist Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Question of Ethno-Territorialities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Peacebuilding and Political Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 9 12 14 18

3 The Division and Destruction of Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Common Life and Urban Expansion Until the Early 1990s . . . . . . . 3.2 Towards the Urban Division of Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 The Siege of Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 The International Military Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 The DPA and the Sarajevo’s Final Ethno-Territorial Division . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23 23 28 34 39 42 46

4 The Consolidation of the Division After the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Reintegration of Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 The Rome Meeting and the Transfer of Authority in the Serb-Held Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 OHR’s Response to SDA and SDS Ethnocratic Practices . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51 51

5 The Struggle to Rebuild Ethnic Diversity in Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 International Approach to Minority Returns Before the Empowerment of the High Representative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 The Empowerment of the High Representative and the Adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55 59 65 69 69 74

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Contents

5.3 The Complex Implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 International Response to Obstructionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 The Limited Impact of the Sarajevo Declaration on the Reconstruction of Ethnic Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76 80 84 86

6 The Incomplete Economic Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 6.1 The Neoliberal Economic Transition Internationally Imposed . . . . . 89 6.2 The Privatisation of Companies in Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 6.2.1 The Privatisation of Holiday Inn and Sarajka . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 7 The Urban Spatial Reconfiguration of Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 The Post-Socialist Urban Spatial Restructuring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Urbanisation on the Slopes and Suburbanisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

103 103 108 112

8 The Ethnic Reconfiguration in the Area of Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 The Evolution of the Division Between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1.1 From Physical Border to Boundary: Spatial Practices Across the IEBL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1.2 Visions on the Division of the Urban Area of Sarajevo . . . . . 8.2 Common Life in Post-War Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

115 115 118 120 122 125

9 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Abbreviations

ARBiH BiH DPA HDZ IEBL IFOR IPTF JNA KM NATO OHR OSCE PLIP RRTF SAO SDA SDS SFOR UNHCR UNPROFOR USAID VRS

Army of the Republic of Bosnia–Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina Dayton Peace Agreement Croatian Democratic Community Inter Entity Boundary Line Implementation Force International Police Task Force Yugoslav People’s Army Convertible Mark North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Office of the High Representative Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Property Law Implementation Plan Reconstruction and Return Task Force Serb Autonomous Region Party of Democratic Action Serb Democratic Party Stabilisation Force United Nations High Commissionaire for Refugees United Nations Protection Force United States Agency for International Development Army of Republika Srpska

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List of Figures

Fig. 3.1

Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 7.1

Fig. 7.2 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2

Sarajevo’s historical urban expansion from mid-fifteen century to early 1990s. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sarajevo’s urban administrative composition since 1977. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Besieged Sarajevo during the war. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sarajevo’s division in Dayton between the two entities. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The administrative reorganisation of Sarajevo. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New major urban projects in the City of Sarajevo developed or redeveloped during the post-war period (1996–2016). © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Redevelopment of the Marijin Dvor area, with the Sarajevo City Center. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved . . . . . . Multifamily housing developed in Lukavica (a) and (b) Pale. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved . . . . . . . . . . . . The IEBL dividing Sarajevo and East Sarajevo in Dobrinja neighbourhood. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26 27 36 44 60

106 108 116

118

xv

List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 5.1

Land allocations in Srpsko Sarajevo (in bold) in the context of Republika Srpska (ESI 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ethnic composition in the Sarajevo Canton in 2013. Municipalities in bold constitute the city of Sarajevo (ASBiH 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

85

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract This chapter frames the study and also the long international involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the end of the war. Since it became the final authority in the country, it contextualises the evolution of the Office of the High Representative and its direct involvement in Sarajevo during the period of maximum international intervention. Subsequently, it presents the methodology of the research and, finally, the main analyses conducted in the rest of the chapters. Keywords Sarajevo · Bosnia and Herzegovina · International Community · Post-war intervention · Office of the High Representative (OHR) My first visit to Sarajevo took place as a student of Geography in early February 2006, a month and a half after the tenth anniversary of the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). At that time, the legacy of destruction was already limited to a certain number of buildings, some of them symbolic and impressive such as the Bosnian Parliament and the Hotel Europe. The built environment showed that the city was leaving behind one of the darkest episodes of its history and opening, in theory, a brighter one. With the construction of new major urban projects that stood out in neighbourhoods developed during Socialist Yugoslavia, Sarajevo was beginning a similar spatial transformation to the one experienced in other European post-socialist cities. In parallel, the presence of European military troops in the streets was illustrating that the other transition, the one from war to a sustainable peace, was not apparently sealed. The easiness to meet corpulent soldiers dressed in uniforms socialising in lively pubs also triggered my interest on the role of the international community after the war. I was not aware of the circumstances of the city during the post-war period, but such a 10-year mission in absence of war could easily be hypothesised as a more determined intervention than the one conducted by the international community during the longest siege in modern history. That first glimpse of Sarajevo significantly shaped my doctoral research conducted in successive annual fieldwork between 2012 and 2016. This book analyses the complex urban transformation of Sarajevo during the post-war period, caused by this double transition and an increasing international interventionism. A focus on Sarajevo is worthwhile, undoubtedly, as the city has long been holding a special significance in European and World history for crucial events, © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Martín-Díaz, The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80575-3_1

1

2

1 Introduction

i.e. the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914 that triggered the onset of the First World War, and also for having a long tradition of ethnic diversity and coexistence since its foundation. Sarajevo symbolises human diversity, in the sense that common life among people of different religion and cultural backgrounds has been an intrinsic feature of the city. Different governments, with a few exceptions until very recently, promoted such diversity. After the Second World War, and during Socialist Yugoslavia, Sarajevo experienced its major urban expansion, acquiring attributes of socialist cities amid a period of social, cultural and economic burgeoning that culminated in the celebration of the Winter Olympic Games in 1984. For all that, the collapse of Yugoslavia ended dramatically for the city. In the spring of 1992, Bosnian Serb leadership inflicted, in conjunction with a Serb-dominated Yugoslav Army (JNA), the greatest attack on human diversity pursuing its ethnic division. Less than a decade after the Olympics, the city captured again an international media attention that lasted during the more than three-and-a-half years of siege. Encircled, divided and significantly destroyed, Sarajevo began a process of significant urban transformation following the signature of the peace agreement in December 1995. Unlike the military passivity during the siege, the international community played a leading role during the post-war period. This intervention created a particularly acute and complex multi-scalar power struggle that can be featured, on the one hand, by the myriad of international organisations with different hierarchies that were directly involved in the physical reconstruction of the country and in the implementation of a liberal peace, such as the World Bank, the United Nations and European agencies, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). On the other hand, there were ruling ethno-national parties, i.e. SDA (Bosniaks), SDS (Bosnian Serbs) and HDZ (Bosnian Croats).1 These parties had come to power in the first multi-party elections held in 1990 and, after the conflict, sought the consolidation of economic, ethnic and territorial war gains. In other words, ethno-national parties continued to pursue wartime goals by political means (Leroux-Martin 2014). This struggle should not be understood as a stable binary opposition but rather as two entities in evolution and with significant cleavages. Actually, diversity of agendas and performances within both local and international actors hindered the implementation of the peace agreement since the early stages. While obstructionism aimed at preventing the execution of some of its core principles, international actors only challenged ethno-national parties when greater consensus was reached regarding the civilian annexes. As a result of this development, the international community turned out to be the final authority in Bosnia in December 1997 through the figure of 1

The three ethno-national parties dominant during the 1990s were formed in 1990 on the eve of the elections. These parties represented and mobilised the Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks, the Bosnians Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, achieving a majority of votes in the November 1990 election. A large part of the Bosnian population converted to Islam during the Ottoman Empire, becoming an absolute majority between the sixteenth and seventeenth century in the territory of modern Bosnia and Herzegovina (Malcolm 1994). In 1993, Bosnian Muslims decided to rename themselves as Bosniaks.

1 Introduction

3

the High Representative, who was granted with executive and legislative powers by the Peace Implementation Council, the international body in charge of supervising the enforcement of the peace agreement.2 The so-called Bonn Powers allowed the High Representative to impose legislation and dismiss obstructive elected authorities and officials. Bosnia became thus a sovereign member state of the United Nations with an international administration formed by representatives not accountable to any elected institution and which acquired unlimited authority. In the pursuit to secure a sustainable peace, the empowerment of the High Representative was instrumental for the international community since it entailed strengthening the ad hoc international institution responsible for overseeing the fulfilment of the civilian annexes of the peace agreement, i.e. the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which counted with the supervision and political guidance of the Peace Implementation Council. Both the figure of the High Representative and his office, the OHR, were shaped in previous negotiations between great powers and subsequently created under the peace agreement, formally denominated as the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.3 The OHR significantly evolved in parallel to the increasing focus on the civilian annexes and the reinforcement but, initially, the extended authority had little clear policy direction or end point. Since March 2000, the approval of the agenda for European integration of countries in South-Eastern Europe started a transformation under the leadership of the European Union, which implied the gradual subordination of the peace agreement to the requirement for the eventual European Union membership (Chandler 2005). Previously, the European Union had been closely involved in the work of the OHR but playing a subordinate and supporting role within the Dayton framework. This transition took form in 2002 with the adoption of organisational changes to provide a clearer European co-ordinating role within the Peace Implementation Council, while the High Representative came to represent also the European Union.4 Such transformation took place amid an improved regional context, which facilitated the progress in the establishment of state institutions particularly under the leadership of Paddy Ashdown.5 The British diplomat and former leader of the Liberal Democrats acted as High Representative between June 2002 and January 2006.

2

The Peace Implementation Council is formed by fifty-five countries and agencies that have been supporting the peace process in BiH, providing troops, funding or directly managing operations. 3 The European concern on civilian operations in previous discussions on the role of the military resulted in a French proposal to appoint a High Representative that provided political representation and civilian coordination (Bildt 1998). Before the final negotiations in Dayton, there were further discussions on its role within the Contact Group, which had been formed in spring 1994 by France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, while Italy joined in 1996. 4 In 2011, the post of European Union Special Representative was de-coupled from the one of High Representative to foster the European Union pre-accession strategy. 5 The new state institutions established included intelligence and state police agencies, the Ministry of Defence and a unified Defence Forces, or the Court of BiH and a State Prosecutor.

4

1 Introduction

The centrality of the OHR started to diminish with the conclusion of his tenure, ten years after the end of hostilities. At that time, the prevailing view within the international community was that Bosnia had reached an irreversible and self-sustaining stage (Bassuener 2012). Consequently, the Peace Implementation Council abandoned the extensive use of Bonn Powers in what was considered the necessary step before ending the post-war international administration. This was well illustrated during the opening speech of Christian Schwarz-Schilling as High Representative on 31 January 2006, given that he made clear the intention to use his authority only in specific circumstances (OHR 2006).6 However, the fact that the international community reduced its interventionism before the reforms were completed, contributed to the deterioration of the political situation that started in 2006 after the failure to approve the reform of the constitution (Azinovi´c et al. 2011). Ultimately, a process expected to last a relatively short period of time turned into a dead end as highlighted by the fact that the OHR is still formally the final authority in Bosnia even though it has been too weak to act during the last decade.7 In Sarajevo, governance lay in local parties and, formally, it was not established a local peacebuilding mission at the end of the war, unlike those missions developed in Mostar and Brˇcko. But in practice, the international community was specifically or indirectly involved in the city throughout the period of maximum international intervention. While Bonn Powers were extensively used until 2005, this involvement was decisive at the local scale once the implementation of the peace agreement started in December 1995 until 2003, when it was re-established the real estate market in May and a few months later, in December, it was transferred to Bosnian authorities the supervision of the return of displaced persons. In those circumstances, the OHR was in charge of the coordination and even of the execution of several key policies and initiatives such as the re-establishment of local multiethnic institutions in Sarajevo in 1996, the strategy to rebuild its ethnic diversity since February 1998, the economic transition from 1996, and the four-year land-ban allocation since May 1999. Therefore, the evolution of the city during the post-war period cannot be understood in isolation from the international administration established in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Due to its authority and performance throughout the period of maximum international involvement, this book focuses on the role of the OHR in the urban transformation of Sarajevo and on the influence of such intervention in its spatial and ethnic contemporary configuration. 6

Christian Schwarz-Schilling had been a German politician and mediator in the Federation of BiH, one of the two entities in which Bosnia was divided. 7 In autumn 2007, the Slovak diplomat Miroslav Lajˇ cák, who was the successor of Christian Schwarz-Schilling as High Representative, adopted a strategy to restore its powers after months of non-interventionism. Yet, against the opposition of Bosnian Serb authorities, the High Representative could not hold the imposition of a decision on amending the law on the Council of Ministers because the international community was divided on the exact role of the OHR. The defeat in this battle showed that the OHR no longer enjoyed the power to enforce decisions, marking the end of an era (Leroux-Martin 2014). Since then, the political relevance of decisions by the High Representative decreased with the last one being made in August 2014 to lift the ban on twenty-eight authorities and officials.

1.1 Methodology

5

1.1 Methodology This is a qualitative research on a case study that has resorted to several techniques during the 13 months of fieldwork conducted in Sarajevo between 2012 and 2016.8 Among the central techniques, systematic observational fieldwork included direct observation for the identification and analysis of the spatial transformation in the area of Sarajevo. This observation employed an empirical approach, which focuses on the morphology and consideration of what people see and do in an urban context (Lefebvre 1970). To overcome any statistical shortcomings, it facilitated the generation of data on major new urban projects in the four central municipalities of Sarajevo.9 The observational fieldwork also included participant and floating observations. The former allowed frequent conversation conducted on a face-to-face basis with Sarajevans on the social and political situation, and the latter consisted of wandering without an accurate destination while being carried along by casual meetings (Pétonnet 1987). Archival research was central in order to obtain maximum evidence, particularly about the role of the OHR and the struggle with local parties. The OHR’s website was a primary source, providing information on executive and legislative initiatives, along with declarations and interviews. Archival research conducted in the municipal archive focused on Oslobodjenje, the daily newspaper that continued publishing during the siege and which became the main local source of information on the post-war period. After the identification of news related to the processes and events analysed, those with relevant information were translated later by a local person since my ability in the former Serbo-Croatian language had not reached the level of an independent user at that time. Interviews were another central technique to collect and validate information. Seventy-eight semi-structured interviews and countless informal interviews took place particularly, but not exclusively, during research stays in Sarajevo.10 The “snowball technique” was used to identify individuals who could provide information in every field (Farquharson 2005). Interviewees belonged to the main international institutions and organisations, as well as local authorities and technicians in order to 8

Some of the main characteristics of qualitative research developed in the research are multiple sources of data, emergent design, reflexive and holistic account, and the researcher as a key instrument and presence in the setting of study (Cresswell 2014). 9 The identification of the temporal patterns of new constructions was facilitated by the website Sarajevo Construction (https://sa-c.net/). Interviews and the consultation of historical pictures of the city from a pictorial bibliography which covered most of the city (Prstojevi´c 1994), allowed me to contrast and confirm any new urban projects identified during these fieldworks. 10 Other interviews took place in Washington DC, during a research stay, and in Barcelona given that intense cooperation with Sarajevo was set in 1992. The Olympic connection, since the Summer Olympic Games coincided with the early stages of the siege of Sarajevo, triggered a significant mobilisation from local institutions and individuals to send aid to the Bosnian capital. This collaboration took on more stable forms during the post-war period. In 1996, Barcelona’s Mayor declared Sarajevo as its 11th District, setting a framework that allowed the beginning of a series of collaborative projects in which many other Catalan municipalities, NGOs, and organisations were involved.

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1 Introduction

understand the role and performance of local actors. Academics and journalists were interviewed to fill any existing gaps, related to the impossibility to interview some key actors or the lack of concretion from interviewees in sensitive and controversial issues. If informants accepted, I recorded interviews to be able to focus my attention on their nonverbal communication. In these cases, silences, evasions or nonverbal signals were registered in my fieldwork notebook as an integral part in the process of data collection and analysis, because of its importance in the context of political violence and other political phenomena (Fujii 2010). Finally, this book also incorporates the human dimension to avoid relegating or erasing experiences of people and everyday understandings of the phenomena analysed (Megoran 2006). Nineteen biographical interviews were conducted with people currently living in Sarajevo (seven) and former Sarajevans living in East Sarajevo (twelve), in an attempt to grasp the experiences lived and visions regarding the urban area of Sarajevo since the late 1980s. Due to the focus on Bosniak and Bosnian Serbs actors, most interviewees were persons belonging to these two ethnicities. Interviewees from East Sarajevo were Sarajevo Serbs who left the city because of war. These biographical interviews included questions regarding: (1) life before war, (2) life during war, (3) housing repossession or return to Sarajevo, (4) division of Sarajevo, (5) current daily life and spatial practices and (6) ethnicity. People interviewed had distinct socio-economic backgrounds and were thirty-five years or older to better capture the full experiences from the entire period under consideration. Unless any of them expressed otherwise, the anonymity of all interviewees is protected.

1.2 Structure of the Book Beyond this introductory chapter, Chap. 2 frames theoretically and conceptually analyses conducted in this book, developing main features regarding socialist and post-socialist cities, ethno-territorialities and, finally, political institutions and international intervention in post-war contexts. Chapter 3 contextualises the historical evolution of the city in terms of its urban expansion and ethnic coexistence prior to addressing the process to divide Bosnia ethnically, the siege, and the final ethnoterritorial division of Sarajevo set in the DPA. With a focus on the ethnic, institutional and economic dimensions, the following three chapters analyse the role of the OHR during the intervention conducted since the end of the war until 2003. Chapter 4 deals with the response of the OHR to material and institutional ethnocratic practices aimed at consolidating an ethno-territorialised urban area of Sarajevo after the war while, in Chap. 5, the focus turns on the complex implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration, adopted to rebuild the intrinsic ethnic diversity of the Bosnian capital. Subsequently, Chap. 6 focuses on the international performance on the economic transition, which produced limited and even counterproductive outcomes during the period analysed. In order to assess the influence of the OHR intervention in the current structures,

1.2 Structure of the Book

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Chaps. 7 and 8, respectively, address the spatial and ethnic contemporary configuration of the area of Sarajevo. Finally, conclusions address analyses conducted in respective chapters.

References Azinovi´c V, Bassuener K, Weber B (2011) Assessing the potential for renewed ethnic violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a security risk analysis. Atlantic Initiative Democratization Policy Council Bassuener K (2012) Catalysts for change: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s downward spiral and the need for U.S. and German leadership. In: Dzihic V, Hamilton DS (eds) Unfinished business: the western balkans and the international community. Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations SAIS, pp 105–120 Bildt C (1998) Peace journey: The struggle for peace in Bosnia. Weidenfield and Nicolson, London Chandler D (2005) From Dayton to Europe. Int Peacekeeping 12(3):336–349 Cresswell J (2014) Research design: qualitative and quantitative approaches. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks Farquharson K (2005) A different kind of snowball: Identifying key policymakers. Int J Soc Res Methodol 8(4):345–353 Fujii LA (2010) Shades of truth and lies: Interpreting testimonies of war and violence. J Peace Res 47(2):231–241 Lefebvre H (1970) Le Révolution Urbaine. Gallimard, Paris Leroux-Martin P (2014) Diplomatic counterinsurgency: lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Malcolm N (1994) Bosnia: A short history. Macmillan, London Megoran N (2006) For ethnography in political geography: experiencing and re-imagining Ferghana Valley boundary closures. Polit Geogr 25(6):622–640 OHR (2006) High representative’s TV address to citizens of BiH. January 31 Pétonnet C (1987) Chemins de la ville: enquêtes ethnologique. Éditions du C.T.H.S, Paris Prstojevi´c M (1994) Sarajevo: ranjeni grad. Ljubljiana: PP Ideja

Chapter 2

Framing the Double Transition and the International Intervention

Abstract Following the signing of the peace agreement in Paris in December 1995 to end the war in Bosnia, Sarajevo simultaneously experienced a transition from war to peace and from socialism to capitalism. This double transition was marked by an increasing intervention from the international community, which deployed an administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the implementation of the peace accord. Even though no specific local peacebuilding mission was established in the Bosnian capital, the OHR became particularly involved in policies shaping its urban transformation. This chapter addresses socialist and post-socialist cities to frame analyses conducted on Sarajevo’s urban spatial restructuring. Secondly, the production and reproduction of ethno-territorialities is considered in order to analyse the division of Sarajevo’s urban area and its consequences. Finally, international intervention in post-war contexts is explored through the characterisation of peacebuilding missions and political institutions in ethnically divided societies, which will allow an assessment of the OHR intervention and the struggle between local and international actors during the post-war period. Keywords Sarajevo · Post-socialist city · Ethno-territorialities · Peacebuilding · Political Institutions

2.1 Socialist and Post-Socialist Cities Analysing the post-socialist urban transformation of Sarajevo requires a consideration of the urban development produced during socialist times and the subsequent transition towards a capitalist system. Yugoslavia differed from other countries of Central and Eastern Europe since a distinct economic model was developed from the late 1940s after the country was expelled in 1948 from the Cominform, the main communist organisation during the early stages of the Cold War.1 Through the development of the self-management system, the country was more decentralised 1

The Cominform, an abbreviated form of the Communist Information Bureau, was created in 1947 after a conference called by Joseph Stalin to deal with divergence among communist governments on whether it was necessary to attend the Conference on the Marshall Plan held in Paris. The Cominform grouped European communist parties with the purpose to coordinate their activities.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Martín-Díaz, The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80575-3_2

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compared to other socialist states and, in the 1960s and 1970s, approved reforms towards a market economy, which implied the abandonment of their unique system and a move towards western-type capitalism (Estrin 1991).2 However, spatial planning was a legislative tool that maintained the core principles of Marxist ideology, seeking to direct and inform society at large, based on the principles of equality, selfmanagement, solidarity and safety (Djurasovic 2016). Hence, while acknowledging those specificities in the model of socialism, urbanisation in former Yugoslavia is framed within the category of socialist cities. Socialist cities are defined as those urban areas developed under state socialism or other forms of socialism and where the urban development was featured by the absence of real estate markets and the dominance of public actors. Early works concluded that urbanisation in cities of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union fundamentally differed from those developed in capitalist or market-economies (French and Hamilton 1979). The high control of the State over land ownership, land use, industrialisation or capital investment in all sectors and at all levels of the economy, meant that the State had a power to determine the pace and the form of urban development far greater than that exercised by any Western government. This specific political–institutional framework directly shaping urban policy under state socialism produced distinct urban forms compared to Western cities and with differences that progressively diminished at a lesser scale (e.g. Musil 2005; Tosics 2005). Internal spatial features of socialist cities included greater compact urban areas, visual monotony, grand-scale public projects, oversupply of industrial and undersupply of commercial land uses, and finally, absence of key built forms typical for capitalist cities, such as squatter settlements or upscale suburbs (Hirt 2013). Consequently, population density gradients differed; very low density of the transitional belt areas close to the centre, extremely high density of the large housing estates on the urban fringe, and sudden decrease of density in agglomerations immediately beyond the urban edge (Tosics 2005). As metropolitanisation and suburbanisation processes played reduced roles in shaping urban expansions, cities were more compact and had higher densities. Besides, minor processes of metropolitanisation implied major concentrations of population in medium-sized cities and the collectivisation of agriculture caused a rapid depopulation of small rural communities (Musil 2005). There is consensus that cities developed under state socialism had particular characteristics, but disagreement appears on whether these differences are fundamental in relation to capitalist cities or simply a consequence of contextual factors. In other words, there is no consensus on whether state socialism produced a distinct process of urbanisation, understood in this book as the socio-spatial process of agglomeration of population, infrastructure and investment in certain locations. This disagreement 2

The socialist development of Yugoslavia created its own political-economic path, the so-called self-management system, after the Tito-Stalin split in 1948. In 1950, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia passed the “Basic Law on the Management of State Enterprises by Working Collectivities” (Rojek and Wilson 1987). The Worker’s Council became the basic unit of self-management system, having managerial responsibility.

2.1 Socialist and Post-Socialist Cities

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is seen in the two main approaches, the environmental and the neo-Weberian, to the understanding of the nature of urbanisation in socialist states. The environmental approach within urban sociology was inspired by Darwin’s theory of evolution and has influenced urban studies during several decades since the 1920s. Widely developed by the Chicago School, this approach focused on the creation of a theory regarding the multifaceted dynamics of the new industrial city. It understands the city as a process of urban expansion based on extension, succession and concentration (e.g. Burgess 1925). Environmentalists consider that the process of industrialisation is the decisive factor in the modern urbanisation and it utimately leads to the same spatial consequences everywhere such as rural–urban migration, separation of working zones and residences, and the suburban development (e.g. Van den Berg et al. 1982; Enyedi 1990, 1996; Musil 2005; Smith 1996). While recognising that specific features appear depending on the degree to which the government intervene, they reject that urban development in socialist countries led or would eventually lead to cities with different social, economic and physical structures (Van den Berg et al. 1982). Hence, the environmental approach considers that state socialism did not produce a new model of urbanisation and argues that those differences between Western and Eastern cities were also the result of delayed development (Enyedi 1990; Musil 2005). Alternatively, the neo-Weberian approach presumes that different socio-economic orders produce qualitatively distinct urban conditions. From it, Szelenyi (1983, 1996) provides the main account in the debate regarding the nature of urbanisation in socialist countries. Based on the comparison of the process in socialist and capitalist societies in several stages of development, which included the beginning of the postindustrial age during the 1980s in some Central and Eastern Europe countries, the author concludes that socialist countries produced several patterns of urbanisation, and all of them differed from the urbanisation in capitalist economies at similar stages of growth (Szelenyi 1996). More particularly, all socialist societies industrialised with a less spatial concentration of population than market capitalist economies. Contrary to parallel growths in industrial employment and population from the late nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century in capitalist societies, this correlation did not exist under state socialism, with a faster increase of industrial jobs than a rise of population in urban settlements. As Szelenyi (1996) correctly holds, this gap was a product of resource redirection from personal and collective consumption to industrial development, which can only occur in an economic regime that limits private property and where planners can effectively redistribute the surplus. This book is closer to the neo-Weberian approach and considers that the politicaleconomic conditions are an important factor in the urban development. The collapse of socialist systems and the transition towards a capitalist system inevitably transformed mechanisms of the socialist urbanisation. The two cornerstones of the transition in Central and Eastern European countries can be summarised as the liberalisation of the economy, particularly the land market and the decentralisation of power (Kovács and Hegedüs 2014). Such economic and political restructuring has implied the introduction of market-based principles in the allocation of real estate

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investments which has triggered a significant restructuring of the urban space. Thus, particular urban spatial features of socialist cities have undergone intense erosion in elements such as the overall spatial articulation, scale of urban development, functional balance, building typologies and urban aesthetics (Hirt 2013). While the fall of the Berlin’s Wall and the consequent dismantlement of the socialist system in Europe led to a significant social and spatial transformation of Central and Eastern European cities, it is not yet clear that these cities are converging with capitalist ones. This responds to the fact that regardless of the apparent similarities, there are still some differences in the functioning of markets. Cases such as Moscow, analysed by Pagonis and Thornley (2000), revealed an unusual strong influence in market contexts of public actors in the production of space. Other realities highlight that a weak state leads to highly informal means of spatial production, typical of developing countries (e.g. Tsenkova 2009). This uneven transition has resulted in significant regional contrasts as featured by Tosics (2005), who presented a categorisation based on the development in postsocialist cities in the early 2000s. Interestingly, and with the exception of Slovenia, cities in former Yugoslavia were featured at that time as experiencing a slower transition due to armed conflict, destruction, mass refugee movements and, initially, a limited capital investment. Individual investments into illegal or unofficial property markets resulted in a parallel process of densification and sprawl through unregulated development. Relevant literature to post-socialist cities analyse the significant and multiple transformations that occurred in cities from Central and Eastern Europe since the collapse of state socialism (e.g. Andrusz et al. 1996; Czaplicka et al. 2009; Hamilton et al. 2005; Stanilov 2007; Tsenkova and Nedovi´c-Budi´c 2006). This literature covers changes in the urban form (Hirt 2006, 2008, 2013; Sýkora 2007), the forces producing the transition (Hamilton 2005; Tosics 2005), the rising of the socio-spatial segregation (Marcinczak et al. 2013; Sýkora 2009), the emergence of gated communities as a significant manifestation of such segregation (Hirt 2012; Kovács 2014), or the process of gentrification (Bernt 2016; Kubeš and Kovács 2020; Sýkora and Špaˇcková 2020). Despite the rise of literature in the field of post-socialist cities in the past 20 years, the urban transformation of cities affected by war has hardly been analysed (e.g. Djurasovic 2016). In these former socialist cities, the transition from state socialism to capitalism was not the only driving force of urban change nor the most significant one during an extended period. Therefore, it is necessary to broaden the conceptual and theoretical approaches beyond the urban post-socialist scope in order to analyse the urban transformation of Sarajevo. The focus now turns on the issue of ethnoterritorialities to frame the final division of the Bosnian capital set in the peace agreement and the consequences of this partition in the ethnic composition during the post-war period.

2.2 The Question of Ethno-Territorialities In a context in which urbanisation has been unavoidable in modern times, national or ethnic groups need a larger city as a centre and main attraction for their culture as well

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as a focus for urbanisation (Hepburn 2004). This need will be seen in the project to divide Sarajevo ethnically, conducted by Bosnian Serb leadership, which was part of a national policy exceeding urban dynamics in the capital city. This policy illustrates the close interrelation between nationalism and territory since the former can be understood as a political principle holding that there should be a congruent political and national unit (Gellner 1983). Similarly, Kaiser (2002) argues that nationalism is always a struggle for control of land and that, as an ideology and political movement, it pursues converting land into national territory. This conversion is neither banal nor conclusive and significantly shapes human relations, even in the age of globalisation in the view of the fact that territories are still an important factor in the construction of societies even with the rise of flows and mobility (Antonsich 2009). Territoriality is a useful concept to frame this process and the practice of elites that will be analysed in subsequent chapters. In the incipient debate on human territoriality, Sack (1983) placed it in the sphere of human behaviour, departing from the biologists’ views that conceived territoriality as an instinct shared with other territorial animals. More particularly, Sack (1986) defined territoriality as a powerful spatial strategy to control people and things by controlling an area. It involves three elements: a form of classification, some form of communication such as a boundary and, finally, an attempt to enforce control over access and elements within an area. These three core elements of territoriality illustrate the logic and potential effects, clearly differentiating territory from other kinds of spaces. In this sense, a bounded space becomes a territory only when boundaries are used to affect behaviour. In parallel, and rather than simply looking at territoriality as a strategy designed to produce territorial and social ends, Raffestin (1984) developed a relational approach in which territoriality was seen as a process produced by a set of relationships that link individuals, groups and material and discursive environments in which they are situated. Raffestin’s relational approach is critical to capturing the territorial ideas and practices of everyday life, as these cannot be reduced to simple strategies used to control space. Thus, territoriality should be also conceived as a significant cultural artefact that reflects and incorporates the features of the social order that creates them, so it is a powerful element with many individual and collective implications. In other words, it is both a material and a metaphysical phenomenon that implicates and is implicated in ways of thinking, acting, and being in the world (Delaney 2005). Interestingly, the fusion of territoriality with ethnic or national claims has been scrutinised by Moore (2016), who defines ethno-territoriality as the social and political project aimed at establishing an explicitly spatial basis for claims involving ethnic identity, cultural rights, and political authority. The author also identifies four practices through which the process of ethno-territorial configuration is made and remade. These practices are discursive, when there is a representation of the ethno-territorial relationships, including rhetoric resources, myths and cartography; embodied, more or less conscious individual and collective activities that involve the making and remaking of places, such as daily socio-spatial patterns and the participation in public events; material, the built environment and infrastructure including design of monuments and temples, the physical delimitation of boundaries or the destruction of cultural landmarks to erase traces of diversity; and institutional, when

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there is an incorporation of the ethno-territorial principles into political structures and government. Considering that this merging of territoriality with ethnic claims is an ongoing process in which political elites play a central role, institutionalisation becomes an important mechanism for the (re)production of ethno-territorialities. Ethnocracies are the mode of rule that expresses the identity and aspirations of one ethnic group over others in an ethnically divided society (Sautman, 2004; Howard 2012). Although these regimes present a diversity of forms, they share the feature of ethnicisation of politics by a dominant ethnic group and follow the logic of capturing the state machinery, the subsequent distribution of resources and power through ethnic rather than civic lines, and the production of a gradual ethnicisation of politics (Ghanem 2012). In order to put ethnocracies into some perspective, it is interesting to see to what extent they can be differentiated from nation-states. Brubaker (1995, 1996) analysed the rights of ethnic minorities and the tendency of nation-states to advance in the project of domination by the main ethnic group. The author talks of nationalising states to emphasise a dynamic political position that considers the nationstate as unrealised and disposed to promote language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing or political hegemony of the main national group. Since even those states portrayed as models of interethnic harmony conduct nationalising policies and practices, Brubaker suggests that we must place the focus on how and how much states nationalise, instead of whether states are nationalising. However, the potential path towards the homogenisation of nation-states does not equalise them with ethnocracies. It is the rupture of the notion demos what qualitatively differentiates these regimes from most nation-states, as argued by Yiftachel and Ghanmen (2004). For the authors, ethnocratic regimes work constantly for the marginalisation and exclusion of ethnic minorities and, even though the project of building a community of equal citizens is incomplete in most nation-states, ethnocracies prevent ethnic minorities from any feasible path of inclusion. This logic under which ethnocratic regimes operate in relation to other communities may substantially condition the daily life of the population in ethnically divided countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also became a central obstacle to the implementation of the peace agreement during the post-war period. The importance of institutions is now further developed in conjunction with peacebuilding missions. This is another key element to analyse the post-war urban transformation of Sarajevo conducted in this book, which allows the intervention of the OHR to be framed.

2.3 Peacebuilding and Political Institutions Following the definition of Boutros-Ghali (1992), in An agenda for peace, peacebuilding is understood as the post-conflict action to identify and support structures that tend to strengthen and solidify peace. Boutros-Ghali explicitly pointed that one of the aims of the United Nations should be addressing the deepest causes of conflict,

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i.e. economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. The conceptualisation and recommendations of the Secretary-General of the United Nations transcended the negative peace, understood as the absence of violence, and was framed within the positive peace, i.e. the peace that goes beyond the mere absence of violence and is self-sustained.3 Therefore, contemporary peacebuilding pursued the consecution of a positive or sustainable peace through the construction of a new environment. This new environment took the form of democratisation in the emerging geopolitical order at the beginning of the 1990s. In this regard, in an unprecedented resolution passed by the General Assembly in December 1991, the United Nations declared that the right of everyone to participate in the government, through the celebration of periodic and genuine elections, was a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment of a wide range of human rights (UN 1991). There was an increasing consensus regarding the fact that, over the long term, democracy was the receipt for sustainable development and lasting peace (Boutros-Ghali 1996). The number of peacekeeping missions dramatically increased at the end of the Cold War, with the development of more United Nations missions between 1991 and 1994 than in the previous forty-five years (Zaman 2020).4 The peacebuilding mission developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of this emerging interventionism that expanded the traditional peacekeeping activities. In a study about the contemporary international missions in war-torn territories developed in the nineties, Caplan (2005) concluded that international administrations differed from traditional operations due to the more comprehensive scope and broader power. While colonial administration and military occupation were historic precedents for the exercise of such broad power, international peacekeeping operations had never been vested with executive, legislative and judicial authority. As a result, international administrations had a greater responsibility in the transition towards a liberal democracy.5 Indeed, in the construction of a new environment to avoid the recurrence of violence, liberal internationalism became the single paradigm guiding international administrations and peacebuilding since the end of the Cold War until recently, when Western states have shifted their strategy from liberal peacebuilding to stabilisation and counterterrorism (Karlsud 2019).6 Despite being based on the assumption that it is the surest foundation for international peace and within states, the implementation 3

John Galtung (1969) developed a conceptualisation of positive and negative peace widely accepted in peace and conflict studies. He went beyond the narrow conception of violence that refers to the intentional physical incapacitation or deprivation of health to those situations in which humans are physically and mentally below their realisations. 4 The United Nations had deployed thirteen peacekeeping missions from 1948 to 1978. Subsequently, missions did not materialise because of tensions between the United States and former Soviet Union (Zaman 2020). There were 279 vetoes cast in the Security Council, what left the United Nations powerless to intervene in a context in which there were over 100 major conflicts since its creation in 1945 (Boutros-Ghali 1992). 5 As Jarat Chopra (1999) analyses, international administrations had different degrees of authority which ranged from supervision to direct governance. 6 As argued by John Karslud (2018) in the book entitled The UN at War: Peace Operations in a New Era, the United Nations has been increasingly asked to deploy troops to situations where there

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of liberal principles was not a particularly effective model for establishing stable peace in the post-Cold War order since the transition from war-shattered states into market democracies exacerbated societal conflicts in states insufficiently prepared to managed competition induced by economic and political liberalisation (Paris 1997). Interestingly, this vulnerability during the transition is not restricted to post-war contexts. As concluded by Mansfield and Snyder (1995), states in the process of democratisation are more likely to fight wars than those with a stable regime. Two key factors of this tendency in transitional regimes are the weakness of state institutions and the resistance of those social groups who are threatened by the process of democratisation, which highlights the importance that institutions and elites play in any transition. The dangers of implementing democratisation and economic liberalisation in a post-war context was further analysed by Roland Paris (2004) in the book entitled At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Considering all fourteen major peacebuilding missions deployed between 1989 and 1999, the author concludes that missions seeking to quickly transform war-shattered states into liberal market democracies produced unanticipated consequences, undermining the liberalisation process itself and even endangering internal peace.7 In fact, the application of a rapid democratisation and marketisation of the economy as the strategy to consolidate peace produced destabilising effects that endangered the very peace to be consolidated. To avoid counterproductive outcomes, the author advocates for limiting political and economic liberalisation until the establishment of domestic institutions with the capacity to manage the tensions of liberalisation. Rather than a quick transition, his strategy of institutionalisation before liberalisation seeks a more effective peacebuilding through a smoother and less hazardous transition to a market democracy.8 The sequence of reforms is certainly one of the key aspects for the consolidation of a sustainable peace, but the enduring importance of strategy, states and geopolitics must also be considered in the making of peace. As argued by Selby (2013), peace agreements are important tools to restructure power relations amongst local parties and are rooted primarily in geopolitics rather than in liberal principles. This restructuration of power relations pursues a political accommodation that, by allowing the management of conflict democratically in the political arena, prevents a relapse of violence after the war. In this regard, former rivals can agree to a transition towards is no peace to keep, what implies that the traditional goal of ending conflict is being replaced by the more limited one of protecting civilians. This is a consequence of the perception among many member states that the United Nations need to deal with contemporary challenges, such as the rise of terrorist groups with regional and global aspirations. 7 In the political realm, liberalisation means democratisation, or the promotion of periodic and genuine elections, constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power, and respect for basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly and conscience. 8 The main elements of this strategy include the postponement of elections until the creation of moderate parties; the regulation of hate speech, the development of effective institutions and a professional bureaucracy or the promotion of economic reforms that moderate rather than exacerbate societal tensions.

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democracy as long as a stable balance of power exists, which ensures access to political power and economic resources (Joshi 2010). Consequently, the design of institutions is central to this accommodation of political power. In ethnically plural states, the configuration of political institutions that are more appropriate remains unresolved and has become one of the most contentious debates in the peacebuilding literature. The two opposing approaches are consociational, also known as power-sharing, and the centripetalist. Both approaches pursue managing the effects of ethnic conflict and accept the existence of ethnic cleavages. In any political system, the recognition of ethnicity seeks an effective inclusion and participation of all groups’ representatives in political decision-making. Focusing on the model adopted in Bosnia, consociationalism considers that the only way to accommodate the interests and demands of communal groups in countries with deep ethnic cleavages is through a combination of power-sharing and autonomy (Lijphart 2004). Power-sharing is the system of governance in which all major groups in a society have a permanent share of power, while group autonomy implies that ethnic groups have the authority to run their internal affairs. This autonomy can be either territorial, when communities are concentrated spatially, or non-territorial, when there is heterogeneous spatial distribution. In this case, the proposal of autonomy is that respective groups keep control in areas like culture and education.9 However, power-sharing may have counterproductive outcomes in societies emerging from war. As Jarstad (2008) holds, it entails choices between the promotion of peace or democracy in war-torn societies. On the one hand, some of its mechanisms even condition the prospect of sustainable peace. These are the cases of the inclusion of warring parties, the international dependence, and the levelling of power relations between contending groups. On the other hand, power-sharing becomes attractive in the resolution of conflict due to the two-player game logic in peace negotiations, in which conflict is seen as a result of a situation where either both parties strive for total political control or one of them demands partition. Under such circumstances, the only solution is the joint rule.

9

Consociational mechanisms to ensure sustainable power-sharing arrangements usually include: (1) grand coalition governments in which all ethnic groups are represented; (2) proportional representation of different groups based on their numbers in the general community in both legislative seats and in civil service; (3) a power of veto over key decisions by minority groups; and (4) a decentralised ethno-territorial system in societies in which communities are spatially divided. Departing from the regime of ethnic guarantees offered by power-sharing, centripetalists seek to place party competition at the moderate centre rather than the extremes, tackling exclusion of moderate elites. The main tool is providing electoral incentives to benefit ethnically based parties by appealing to voters of other ethnic groups. As argued by Horowitz, the underlying mechanism is to address voters of other ethnicities in order to foster the formation of inter-ethnic coalitions so ethnically based parties must demonstrate that they are moderates and willing to compromise on ethnic issues (Horowitz 2008). In terms of spatial autonomy, centripetalists are wary of granting autonomy in ethnically homogeneous territories as decentralisation of power in these cases, i.e. ethno-federalism, may increase the possibility that alternative nation-state projects challenge the common state (Roeder 2009).

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Therefore, power-sharing in war-torn societies has a dual character with positive attributes in negotiations to settle a peace agreement and dubious outcomes for establishing political institutions that foster cooperation and inclusion among ethnic groups in the long term. Since the very institutional structures devised to reach peace may undermine the path towards a stable peace, revision of the peace agreement becomes a useful tool to overcome deadlocks (Walter 1999). All this highlights the complexity of simultaneously building peace and creating a functional democracy. This revision on peacebuilding missions, the sequence of reforms and political institutions designed to mitigate conflict, illustrates the complex and multifaceted character of contemporary peace operations. Importantly, there is no one causal factor determining the positive or negative impacts of international interventions in the process to create conditions for a stable peace as demonstrated by Adam Moore (2013) in Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns. The cases of Mostar and Brˇcko are comparatively analysed since they became the only two local peacebuilding missions deployed by the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war. Moore correctly refutes the argument that the significant progress achieved in Brˇcko was a result of major international resources on the ground (e.g. Doyle and Sambanis 2006), given that resources in personnel and aid were actually inferior to Mostar. Rather, a conjunction of four factors explains the contrasting outcomes of both missions; these factors are the design of local political institutions, the local and regional legacies from war, the sequencing of political and economic reforms and the practice and organisation of international peacebuilding efforts. For the author, it is the spatial and temporal contingent configuration of these factors that explains the different outcomes of both peacebuilding missions (Moore 2013). Brˇcko, set as a District in 1999, has become the only multi-ethnic city in post-war Bosnia while Mostar is divided in Bosniak and Bosnian Croat areas. Despite the fact that the international community did not set a specific peacebuilding mission for Sarajevo, the focus on the role of the OHR in the urban transformation of the Bosnian capital is justified by the significant and broad intervention carried out by this institution, directly or indirectly, in the city.

References Andrusz G, Harloe M, Szelenyi I (1996) Cities after socialism. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford Antonsich M (2009) On territory, the nation-state and the crisis of the hyphen. Prog Hum Geogr 33(6):789–806 Bernt M (2016) How post-socialist is gentrification? observations in East Berlin and Saint Petersburg. Eurasian Geogr Econ 57(4/5):565–587 Boutros-Ghali B (1992) An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. United Nations, New York Boutros-Ghali B (1996) An agenda for democratization. United Nations, New York Brubaker R (1995) National minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands in the new Europe. Daedalus 124(2):107–132

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Brubaker R (1996) Nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in the new Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Burgess R (1925) The growth of a city: an introduction to a research project. In: Park RE, Burgess EW, Mackenzie RD (eds) The City. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press Caplan R (2005) International governance of war-torn territories. Oxford University Press, Oxford Chopra J (1999) Peace-maintenance: the evolution of international political authority. Routledge, London Czaplicka J, Gelazis N, Ruble B (2009) Cities after the fall of communism: reshaping cultural landscapes and European identity. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC Delaney D (2005) Territory a short introduction. Blackwell, Oxford Djurasovic A (2016) Ideology, political transitions and the city: the case of Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Routledge, New York Doyle M, Sambanis N (2006) Making war and building peace: united nations peace operations. Princeton University Press, Princeton Enyedi G (1990) Specific urbanization in East-Central Europe. Geoforum 21(2):163–172 Enyedi G (1996) Urbanization under socialism. In: Andrusz G, Harloe M, Szleneyi I (eds) Cities after socialism. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp 100–118 Estrin S (1991) The case of self-managing market socialism. J Econ Perspect 5(4):187–194 French RA, Hamilton FEI (1979) The socialist city: spatial structure and urban policy. John Wiley & Sons, New York Galtung J (1969) Violence, peace and peace research. J Peace Res 3(6):167–191 Gellner E (1983) Nations and nationalism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Ghanem A (2012) Understanding ethnic minority demands: a new typology. Natl Ethn Polit 18(3):358–379 Hamilton FEI, Dimitrovska K, Pitchler-Milanovic N (2005) Transformation of cities in central and Estaren Europe: towards globalization. United Nations University Press, Tokyo Hamilton FEI (2005) The external forces: towards globalization and European. In: Hamilton FEI, Dimitrovska K, Pitchler-Milanovic N (eds) Transformation of cities in central and Estaren Europe: Towards globalization pp 79–115. Tokyo: United Nations University Press Hepburn AC (2004) Contested cities in the modern west. Palgrave, New York Hirt S (2006) Post-socialist urban forms: notes from Sofia. Urban Geogr 27(5):464–488 Hirt S (2008) Landscapes of postmodernity: changes in the built fabric of Belgrade and Sofia since the end of socialism. Urban Geogr 29(8):785–810 Hirt S (2012) Iron curtains: gates, suburbs and privatization of space in the postsocialist city, Malden and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Hirt S (2013) Whatever happened to the (post)socialist city? Cities 32(1):29–38 Horowitz D (2008) Conciliatory institutions and constitutional process in post-conflict states. William Mary Law Rev 49:1213–1248 Howard LM (2012) The ethnocracy trap. J Democr 23(4):155–169 Jarstad A (2008) Power sharing: former enemies in joint government. In: Jarstad A, Sisk T (eds) From war to democracy: dilemmas of peacebuilding. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 105–133 Joshi M (2010) Post-civil war democratization: promotion of democracy in post-civil war states, 1946–2005. Democr 17(5):826–855 Kaiser R (2002) Homeland making and the territorialization of national identity. In: Conversi D (ed) Ethnonationalism in the contemporary world. Routledge, London, pp 229–247 Karlsrud J (2018) The UN at war: peace operations in a new era. Basingstoke, Palgrave Karlsrud J (2019) From liberal peacebuilding to stabilization and counterterrorism. Int Peacekeeping 26(1):1–21 Kubeš J, Kovács Z (2020) The kaleidoscope of gentrification in post-socialist cities. Urban Studies 57(13):2591–2611 Kovács Z (2014) New post-socialist urban landscapes: the emergence of gated communities in East Central Europe. Cities 36:179–181.

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Kovács Z, Heged˝us G (2014) Gated communities as new forms of segregation in post-socialist Budapest. Cities 36:200–209 Lijphart A (2004) Constitutional design for divided societies. J Democr 15(2):96–109 Mansfield E, Snyder J (1995) Democratization and the danger of war. Int Secur 20(1):5–38 Marcinczak S, Gentile M, Stepniak M (2013) Paradoxes of (post) socialist segregation: metropolitan sociospatial divisions under socialism and after in Poland. Urban Geogr 34(3):327–352 Moore A (2013) Peacebuilding in practice. Local experience in two Bosnian towns. Cornell University Press, New York Moore A (2016) Etho-territorality and ethnic conflict. Geogr Rev 106(1):92–108 Musil J (2005) City development in Central and Eastern Europe before 1990: historical context and socialist legacies. In: Hamilton FEI, Dimitrovska K, Pitchler-Milanovic N (eds) Transformation of cities in central and Eastern Europe: towards globalization. United Nations University Press, Tokyo, pp 22–43 Pagonis T, Thornley A (2000) Urban development projects in Moscow: market/ state relations in the new Russia. Eur Plan Stud 8(6):751–766 Paris R (1997) Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism. Int Secur 22(2):54–89 Paris R (2004) At war’s end: building peace after civil conflict. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Raffestin C (1984) Territoriality a reflection of the discrepancies between the organization of space and individual liberty. Int Polit Sci Rev 5(2):139–146 Roeder P (2009) Ethnofederalism and the mismanagement of conflicting nationalisms. RegNal Fed Stud 19(2):203–219 Rojek C, Wilson D (1987) Worker’s self-management in the world system: the yugoslav case. Organ Stud 8(4):297–308 Sack R (1983) Human territoriality: a theory. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 73(1):55–74 Sack R (1986) Human territoriality: Its theory and history. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Sautman B (2004) Hong Kong as a semi-ethnocracy: race, migration and citizenship in a globalized region. In: Agnes K, Ngai P (eds) Remaking citizenship in Hong Kong: community, nation, and the global city. Routledge, Oxford, pp 115–138 Selby J (2013) The myth of liberal peace-building. Confl Secur Dev 13(1):57–86 Smith D (1996) The socialist city. In: Andrusz G, Harloe M, Szleneyi I (eds) Cities after socialism. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp 70–99 Stanilov K (2007) The post-socialist city. urban form and space transformations in Central and Eastern Europe after socialism. Springer, Netherlands Sýkora L (2007) Office development and post-communist city formation: the case of Prague. In: Stanilov K (eds) The post-socialist city: urban form and space transformations in Central and Eastern Europe after socialism. Netherlands, Springer, pp 117–146 Sýkora L (2009) New socio-spatial formations: places of residential segregation and separation in Czechia. Tijdschr Voor Econ En Soc Geogr 100(4):417–435 Sýkora J, Špaˇcková P (2020) Neighbourhood at the crossroads: differentiation in residential change and gentrification in a post-socialist inner-city neighbourhood. Hous Stud. https://doi.org/10. 1080/02673037.2020.1829562 Szelenyi I (1983) Urban Inequalities under state socialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford Szelenyi I (1996) Cities under socialism-and after. In: Andrusz G, Harloe M, Szleneyi I (eds) Cities after socialism. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp 286–317 Tosics I (2005) City development in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990: the impacts of internal forces. In: Hamilton FEI, Dimitrovska K, Pitchler-Milanovic N (eds) Transformation of cities in central and Eastern Europe: towards globalization. United Nations University Press, Tokyo, pp 44–78 Tsenkova S, Nedovi´c-Budi´c Z (2006) The urban mosaic of post-socialist Europe: space, institutions and policy. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg Tsenkova S (2009) Housing policy reforms in post socialist Europe: lost in transition. PhysicaVerlag, Heidelberg

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UN (1991) Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections. General Assembly Resolution, 46/137. 17 December Van den Berg L, Drewett R, Klaassen L, Rossi A, Vijverberg C (1982) Urban Europe a study of growth and decline. Pergamon Press, Oxford Walter B (1999) Designing transitions from civil war: demobilization, democratization, and commitments to peace. Int Secur 24(1):127–155 Yiftachel O, Ghanem A (2004) Understanding ethnocratic regimes: the politics of seizing contested territories. Polit Geogr 23(4):647–676 Zaman RU, Biswas NR (2020) Not business as usual: changing realities and the transformations in peace operations. Polit Sci Stud 56:299–317

Chapter 3

The Division and Destruction of Sarajevo

Abstract This chapter contextualises the profound transformation that occurred in the city of Sarajevo from the early 1990s until the signature of the peace agreement. It does this in order to frame the analyses conducted in subsequent chapters, on the role of the OHR and its influence in the urban transformation of the city during the post-war period. Firstly, it presents Sarajevo’s specific heterogeneity and its urban expansion throughout history. It is followed by analyses on the territorialisation campaign conducted by SDS in the early 1990s to ethnically divide Bosnia and Sarajevo. For SDS leadership, Sarajevo was a central priority in the policy to create a Bosnian Serb state. The siege of Sarajevo conducted by Bosnian Serbs is subsequently analysed and considers also SDA and international performances. Finally, the resolution of the conflict is addressed, with a focus on the final ethno-territorial solution for Sarajevo and the role assigned to the OHR within the peacebuilding mission. Keywords Yugoslavia · Bosnian war · Siege of Sarajevo · Dayton peace agreement · Urban division · Ethno-territorialisation

3.1 Common Life and Urban Expansion Until the Early 1990s Bosnia and Sarajevo have traditionally embraced human diversity. The Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic and Sephardic-Jewish traditions have coexisted in significant harmony throughout modern and contemporary history. Religious rivalry and violence were not part of Bosnia’s heritage and, generally, members of all faiths tolerated each other while religiously motivated conflicts seldom took place. During the Ottoman period, wars were not perceived as religious clashes between different communities but against the regime and the social order (Donia and Fine 1994; Malcolm 1994). This heterogeneity has taken the form of coexistence, which implies a common history with people belonging to the same culture. Cultural and spiritual life was firmly defined by religion, whereas people mostly had a common ethnic origin, speaking one language and having common cultural features (Lovrenovi´c 2001; Markowitz 2010). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Martín-Díaz, The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80575-3_3

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As argued by Donia (2006a) in the most compelling work on the historical evolution of the city, Sarajevo stands out for its path through history, in which human and especially religious heterogeneity has been a hallmark since it was founded in the fifteenth century, after being promoted by the Ottomans, Austro-Hungarians, and South Slavs Socialists. Illustrative of the spirit, values and vision regarding relations with other communities, Sarajevans have usually referred to it as common life or neighbourly relations instead of multi-ethnic, which implies the existence of diversity but not necessarily intermixing between different groups. As a consequence of the progressive transformation of religious affiliation into a national consciousness, nationalist aspirations targeted and eroded common life on several occasions during the twentieth century.1 The first episode of violence along ethno-national lines occurred following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, when Croats and Muslims engaged in violent anti-Serb demonstrations during the evening of 28 June and much of the following day. Subsequently, large-scale intergroup violence occurred in the Second World War (1941–1945) and the prolonged siege of the Bosnian War (1992–1995). In both conflicts, most Sarajevans defended the city against the aggression to diversity and pluralism conducted by an alliance of neighbouring and local nationalist political formations. During the Second World War, German and Ustaša atrocities resulted in the extermination of Sarajevo’s Jewish, and affected also Serbs in particular. Liberated on 6 April 1945 by Tito’s Partisans, the character of common life once again blossomed quickly during Socialist times. As the republic with a major heterogeneity, the Yugoslav socialist policy fostering interethnic relations particularly favoured Bosnia and Sarajevo, where the highest rate of mixed marriages in Yugoslavia was reached. A choice of generic instead of sectional first names for children and a wide variety of cultural productions transcending, mixing and even caricaturising the constraints of ethnic boundaries, expressed both interethnic tolerance and pan-ethnic solidarity (Markowitz 2010).2 Having acquired cosmopolitan features, Sarajevo was much more than an ethnically mixed city at the beginning of the past decade of the twentieth century. Many Sarajevans often completely neglected ethnicity, or were not aware of it, until the collapse of state socialism and the reawakening of nationalism. In terms of urban space, one of the main features of the city is the material reflection of its intrinsic diversity. Particularly in the old city, there is a close disposition of 1

During the period of Austro-Hungarian domination, religious affiliation transformed into a national consciousness among the Orthodox, who considered themselves Serbs, and Catholics who became Croats. The substitution of religion for national identity among Bosnian Muslim was more complex. Bosnian Muslims defined group identity principally by religion and not nationality, like Jewish. Muslims could adopt Serb or Croat national identity while participating in public life as Muslims. This changed during the 1971 census when Muslims could declare themselves ethnically rather than as a religious group. Thus, national or ethno-confessional communities became more distinct and almost all Serbs and Croats were aware of their nationalities based on, and largely congruent, with their religious identity. 2 As analysed by Tone Bringa (1995), in rural areas there was a sense of sharing a locality and a history with members of the other ethnic groups while being aware of boundaries and differences. When Yugoslavia faced dissolution, those differences that had been innocuous, were politically exploited.

3.1 Common Life and Urban Expansion Until the Early 1990s

25

temples, cultural and educational institutions of each religious community. The urban expansion of the city was concentrated during eras in which common life had been promoted, i.e. during the Ottoman period (especially between 1460 and 1600), the period under Austro-Hungarian administration (1883–1914) and during Socialist Yugoslavia (particularly from 1945 until the 1984 Olympic Games). The city was founded and developed in a particular geographical setting along the Miljacka River plain. It was in the eastern edge, in the sector in which the plain is narrower, where its modern development began since the foundation of the city by Ottoman authorities in the mid-fifteenth century. Urbanisation followed an irregular plan adapted to morphology but with a strict separation of public and private spaces. In the flat sector the bazaar—named Bašˇcaršija—was built as a typical urban unit of Islamic culture that also combined religious, political, economic and military institutions, whereas the residential areas were developed uphill and were divided into neighbourhoods called mahalas. During the period under Austro-Hungarian rule (1878–1918), the introduction of capitalism and the first wave of industrialisation produced a significant transformation and the initial westward expansion alongside the Ottoman bazaar. The urban model implemented by the Austro-Hungarian authorities imitated the European capitalist cities of Central and Western Europe, where there was high urban density and housing in the central area (Carreras and Moreno 2007). These multi-family buildings of European design were multifunctional and, along with equipment and infrastructures, reorganised commercial forms and public spaces. Sarajevo re-arranged the central urban space inspired by Vienna’s Ringstrasse. Large avenues were adapted to the development of the tramway and the streets became the main public space, replacing the organisational role of mahalas.3 Sarajevo was neglected during the inter-war period by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, to the detriment of the cities that represented the nations of the first Yugoslavia, i.e. Belgrade, Ljubljana, and Zagreb.4 The city became stagnant due to the economic and political crisis despite increasing its population from 58,000 in early 1919 to approximately 90,000 by 1941 (Donia 2006a). This period contrasted with the Socialist Yugoslavia (1943–1992), under Tito’s rule until his death in 1980. During that time, Sarajevo experienced the most important period of urban expansion in its history, multiplying several times the territory urbanised in the previous five centuries (Fig. 3.1). With a significant rural–urban migration, the total urban population increased from 99,000 to 244,000 inhabitants between 1948 and 1975,

3

It was conducted under the figure of Benjamin Kállay, joint Minister for Finance. This large project was conceived in the spirit of romantic historicism and set out during the second half of the nineteenth century to replace the medieval walled fortifications with monumental structures (Donia 2006a). Yet, Sarajevo’s geomorphologic setting along the Miljacka River plain and the architectonic legacy, with few medieval fortifications, prevented the reproduction of the same encirclement project. 4 Kingdom of Yugoslavia replaced the official name of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in October 1929.

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Fig. 3.1 Sarajevo’s historical urban expansion from mid-fifteen century to early 1990s. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved

recording an annual population growth rate of 6.4% that represented the third highest growth in Yugoslavia (Hamilton 1979).5 The transformation of Sarajevo was a consequence of the profound modernisation of Yugoslavia, one of the most rural countries in Europe after the end of the Second World War. The urban development of the city sought to fulfil the socialist principles of egalitarianism in relation to employment and housing. Public housing took place mostly in the flat valley bottom through the construction of modernist residential complexes developed westwards in the Marijin Dvor area.6 The municipalities of Novo Sarajevo and Novi Grad, with neighbourhoods such as Grbavica, ˇ Hrasno, Cengi´ c Vila or Alipašino Polje, were built following the mikroraion model, in which districts formed a nested hierarchy ensuring a hierarchical provision of services. As it will be analysed in Chap. 7, Sarajevo displays the bounded duality 5

Industrialisation ensured that in major fields such as electric energy, coal mining or wood industry, figures doubled or tripled in the 1940s, resulting in the development of several large and successful companies that functioned as monopolies in the semi-planned economy. Bosnia’s industry was based on mining, metallurgy and other basic manufacturing industries while Sarajevo’s companies such as Energoinvest, Sipad and Unis were usually within the ten largest companies in Yugoslavia and developing significant international activity (Andjeli´c 2003). These companies competed in international markets especially because of the relationships developed with countries belonging to the non–Aligned Movement. 6 Socialist realism was officially the architectural style of the Communist Party, but not implemented with rigidity in Yugoslavia. In 1950, the Association of Yugoslav Architects voted to abandon socialist realism as a guiding philosophy for their work (Donia 2006a).

3.1 Common Life and Urban Expansion Until the Early 1990s

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Fig. 3.2 Sarajevo’s urban administrative composition since 1977. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved

between the urban fabric and functionalism of the socialist period, with the high-rise residential buildings on the Miljacka valley, and the mainly single-family houses on the surrounding slopes and suburbs. The 1970s and 1980s were especially dynamic culturally and the city became dominant in Yugoslavia through film and music production. The Yugoslav new wave period, considered the richest of pop and rock music, hit the Bosnian capital and led to the creation of several important groups, such as Bijelo Dugme and Zabranjeno Pušenje.7 Moreover, the urban expansion under socialist rule took a step further in the late seventies, on the eve of the celebration of the XIV Winter Olympics. The city’s administration expanded to ten municipalities in 1977 with the addition of the neighbouring municipalities of Ilijaš, Hadži´ci, Pale and Trnovo (Fig. 3.2). Previous municipalities were Centar, Novo Sarajevo, Ilidža and Vogoš´ca. Centar

7

In the district of Koševo, there was the emergence of an urban sub-cultural movement known as New Primitivism, in reaction to the New Romanticism predominant in the UK at the beginning of the decade, in which the film director Emir Kusturica was one of the more regular contributors. For ˇ more details on sub-cultural movements in Sarajevo during the so-called Golden Age, see Cengi´ c and Martín-Díaz (2018).

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was reorganised in Stari Grad and Centar, and Novo Sarajevo into Novo Sarajevo and Sarajevsko polje, renamed later as Novi Grad. These municipalities were annexed to the city in anticipation of further urban expansion, albeit some of them related to the developments conducted to celebrate the Olympics. All four peripheral municipalities had small urban settlements that were functionally linked to the city, possessing some factories and transportation facilities. In addition, each one had small villages and extensive areas of underdeveloped rural land generally in the mountainous terrain. With the announcement of the Winter Olympics, the city embarked on a modernisation of services and development of new constructions such as the neighbourhood of Mojmilo, built as the Olympic Village, the Zetra Sports Centre, the Unitic Towers and the Holiday Inn Hotel. Following the celebration of the Winter Olympics, the city finally stalled its urban expansion amid an increasing political and economic crisis.

3.2 Towards the Urban Division of Sarajevo The League of Communists of Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1990 into different republican parties. To prevent risks of nationalism in a territory with such an ethnically mixed population, the parties organised along ethnic principles were prohibited by law during socialist rule. The ban was finally overruled by the Constitutional Court in June 1990 when other republics had already celebrated elections (Andjeli´c 2003). The Bosnian League of Communists, which turned into a social-democrat party, and the Alliance of Reformist Forces, led by Prime Minister Ante Markovi´c, were the only two pan-ethnic parties in terms of programme and support (Cohen 1995). Between May and mid-August amid a context of expanded opportunities for the emergence of new political movements, HDZ, SDA and SDS were founded to respectively represent Bosnian Croats, Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs. By identifying members of a single ethno-national group as their respective constituencies, all three main nationalist parties more or less contributed to the process of ethno-politicisation and ethnicisation of Bosnian society after decades of inter-ethnic policy in Socialist Yugoslavia, illustrated by the often championed slogan of Brotherhood and unity. Ethno-politicisation refers, as defined by Maksi´c (2014), to the activities of elites that elevate the political relevance of ethnic affiliations. This politicisation of ethnicity at the elite level is mutually constitutive with a more general social ethnicisation, so it leads to a broader ethnicisation and vice versa. For that purpose, all three nationalist parties created exclusive symbolism without interfering with the symbols of other nationalities. The three parties had different visions on the future of Yugoslavia and the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the SDS party, the main goal was preventing an eventual separation of Bosnia from Serbia, amid the increasing political crisis of the Yugoslav federation. On the other hand, Bosniaks in the SDA and Croats in the HDZ generally considered a confederation acceptable, with or without Serbs (Cohen 1995). SDA was the only independent party as SDS and HDZ had respective powerful patrons

3.2 Towards the Urban Division of Sarajevo

29

in Serbia and Croatia. In this regard, HDZ was a descendent of the Croatian HDZ party, with the real power and influence lying in Zagreb, and more particularly in the figure of the Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman. The emergence of SDS was influenced by the formation of SDS in Croatia, with initial conversations taking place in Belgrade in the winter of 1990. SDS leader in Croatia, Jovan Raškovi´c, publicly stated the intent to extend SDS into BiH as soon as the ban on ethno-national parties was lifted (Maksi´c 2014). This pattern of external influence was similar before the war in the case of SDS even though Slobodan Miloševi´c tried to exercise his influence covertly. In practice, the future of Bosnia and its integrity was challenged by Serbian and Croatian nationalisms amid the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. It was illustratively contested in the meetings celebrated in Karadjordjevo and Tikveš between late March and midApril 1991, where the elected presidents of Serbia and Croatia set a framework of negotiations to discuss the division of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia. At that meeting, there were no specific agreements but both leaders converged on the idea to divide the central Yugoslav republic resorting to population exchanges and episodes of ethnic cleansing, thereby allowing for an option to create a small Bosnian Muslim state between a Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia (Veiga 2011). In contrast to Serbs, the Croatian policy to divide Bosnia was considered by its proponents as a possibility rather than a necessity to be realised (Hoare 1997).8 Between the two visions emanating from Belgrade and Croatia, SDA found itself in a very delicate position. Bosniaks perceived Bosnia and Herzegovina as their homeland, being the most interested ethnic group in the integrity of the central Yugoslav republic. Contextually, the preference of the SDA leadership was to transform Yugoslavia into a confederation. This was considered the best solution since it facilitated the maintenance of the Bosnian integrity and the continuation of economic and cultural links with other republics. It was important for the existence of a Bosniak community in the Sandžak region, extended between Serbia and Montenegro.9 For Bosniak leadership, advocating initially for a confederation rather than the independence of Bosnia was motivated by a series of factors. The initial commitment of SDA to the upholding of Yugoslavia can be explained by the strong attachment of the Bosnian Muslims to the Yugoslav idea. Furthermore, it is explained by the specific influence of the pan-Islamist current within the party despite not being numerous. This current saw the retention of some aspect of Yugoslavia as an essential condition for uniting the whole historical and cultural Muslim circle of the Yugoslav space, i.e. Bosnia and the Sandžak region (Bougarel 1999).10 8

Dozens of meetings at a lower level followed meetings between Miloševi´c and Tudjman in order to continue negotiations on the future of Bosnia and Croatia and continued in May 1992, once war had started in Bosnia. Franjo Tudjman viewed Bosnia as an artificial colonial creation that was a source of regional instability and envisioned its partition, in line with the traditional Croatian nationalist vision of Bosnia as a Croatian land and Muslims as Croats of Islamic faith. 9 It had been part of the Bosnian Pashaluk, a primary administrative division of the Ottoman Empire, until the Congress of Berlin in 1878. 10 The so-called pan-Islamist current came from the Young Muslims organisation, a Bosnian Muslim cultural organisation emerged in 1939 that was formed with the aim of the spiritual, cultural and

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Thanks to far superior resources, SDS was the leading agent in the process of ethno-politicization among all three main nationalist parties in Bosnia (Maksi´c 2017). His leader, Radovan Karadži´c, was resolute in his opposition to any efforts to separate Bosnia or Bosnian Serbs from their mother country, Serbia, even resorting to threats of disorder and bloodshed if such an attempt was made (Treanor 2002). SDS articulated a programme based on the non-negotiable continuity of Bosnia within Yugoslavia or as part of a Greater Serbia.11 Links with Serbia were not constrained to the foundational process of SDS but, rather, the project to create an exclusive Bosnian Serb polity was an integral part of the policy to create a Greater Serbia state conducted by the main political Serbian actors in Belgrade. As explicitly expressed by Miloševi´c at a meeting of republican leaders in January 1991, if Yugoslavia became a confederation of independent states, Serbia would demand territory from neighbouring republics to bring all eight and a half million Serbs of Yugoslavia into a single new state (Sudetic 1991a). Indeed, the political agenda of Bosnian Serb leadership was to be achieved with political, material and logistical backing from Belgrade, and with JNA capacity in any eventual confrontation with Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. In this sense, a political and military plan was elaborated upon during 1990 in Serbia. Subsequently named RAM (the frame), the purpose of this plan was the organisation of Serbs in other Republics, consolidating control over the newly constituted SDS parties in both Bosnia and Croatia, and preparing arms and ammunition for the eventual incorporation of these territories into an enlarged Serbian state (Cohen 1995; Judah 2000). The newly established Bosnian Serb militias were armed as early as 1990 in several regions of Bosnia. Among these regions, there was the mountainous Romanija region in the surroundings of Sarajevo, which included the municipality of Pale (Ramet 1999). This plan took a decisive step in spring 1991 through the so-called regionalisation campaign that pursued the establishment of an intermediate regional level of government between the republic and the municipalities. Bosnian Serbs formed new Communities of Municipalities where they had a majority or plurality (Treanor 2002). While the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of BiH recognised the association of municipalities to promote economic and cultural activities, SDS initiative

material progress of Bosniaks in the former Yugoslavia. Izetbegovi´c was one of the members of the current, which became prominent in the top ranks and exercised high influence in the party as argued by Xavier Bougarel in his different analysis on the party (1997; 1999). Such influence was highlighted by the aspiration of gathering the Bosniak population in Yugoslavia, reflected in a SDA political project that revolved around three main goals: (1) the sovereignty of the Bosnian Muslim nation; (2) the independence, and territorial integrity of BiH; and, (3) the territorial autonomy of the Sandžak region. 11 In the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and policies for its internal reorganisation, remaining in a Yugoslav state would resemble very little of the Socialist federation under Tito’s rule. The so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution conducted in late eighties allowed the creation of a dominant pro-Serbian voting bloc within the Yugoslav presidency council after deposing governments allies of Miloševi´c in Montenegro and in the Serbian autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.

3.2 Towards the Urban Division of Sarajevo

31

could not be legally grounded as it was an ethnically based unilateral move.12 These Communities were progressively enlarged and organisationally strengthened until the process explicitly recognised its ethnic nature. It occurred on 7 September 1991, when SDS officials adopted a resolution in which the Communities of Municipalities were proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAOs).13 Along with revealing the nature of the regionalisation campaign, the declaration placed the majority of these areas outside the control of the central government in Sarajevo and with no participation of any other community in local government (Klemenˇci´c 1994). The formation of the five SAOs allowed a takeover by Bosnian Serb authorities of almost 33% of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 1.8 million people, out of which only 46% were Serbs.14 Importantly, Sarajevo had a central position in the process of ethnoterritorialisation of Bosnia. The fate of the city was often expressed by Bosnian Serb leadership. In the autumn of 1991, Karadži´c did not hide his desire to either confine or eliminate Sarajevo’s Muslims, reflecting his longstanding animosity towards the city’s multiethnic character. In this sense, the political leader of Bosnian Serbs threatened his adopted city and described it as a monstrosity in the early 70s, when he published a poem entitled Sarajevo (Markowitz 2010). Despite its centrality in the construction of a Bosnian Serb ethno-territoriality, the vision of SDS leadership in relation to the Bosnian capital city evolved over time and was also adapted to the particular audience (Donia 2006b). After Karadži´c’s inflammatory discourse in the Bosnian Assembly on 15 October, in which he claimed that Izetbegovi´c would take Bosnia to hell if he neglected the political will of the Serb people, SDS leadership began to use the term separation or territorialisation when referring to the political and ethnic division of Sarajevo into Bosniak and Serbian parts. Strategically, SDS leadership saw the city as a hub connecting the various Serb territories in Bosnia. To create a well-integrated nation, the control over territories that allowed linking Sarajevo and Banja Luka, the second largest city in terms of population, was planned long before the war. From an urban perspective, the idea was allowing Muslims a partial rule of Sarajevo, with Radovan Karadži´c considering before the war that Izetbegovi´c could have only half of the territorial authority (Djogo and Karadži´c 1991). This project of ethnic division heavily contrasted with the reality on the ground. This division clearly benefited Bosnian Serbs, who represented 30% of Sarajevans, and neglected Bosnian Croats. No less important, this project could have serious human consequences because the city lacked ethnic enclaves in inner areas. After the territorial gains achieved during the early stages of the 12

Out of the 109 municipalities of the Socialist Republic of BiH, SDS achieved absolute majorities in thirty-two and relative majority in four. 13 The decision had a long form: “Decision on the Proclamation of Autonomous Regions as Inseparable Parts of the Federal State Federative Yugoslavia and Integral Parts of the Federal Unit Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Well as the Separation of Populated Places from One Municipality and Their Incorporation into Another”. 14 Five SAO’s were Eastern Herzegovina, Bosnian Krajina, Romanija, Northern Bosnia and Ozren Posavina, formed in November.

32

3 The Division and Destruction of Sarajevo

war, Karadži´c expressed hopes that areas under the control of VRS, i.e. the so-called Serbian Sarajevo, would become the centre of a post-war Serbian state (Donia 2006b). Therefore, the process of ethno-territorialisation of Bosnia did not exclude the administrative territory of the city. Pale was the unique municipality incorporated in the SAO Romanija in September 1991, but the founding authorities declared their intention to include parts of other municipalities with a majority of Bosnian Serbs. As part of this regional policy, Sarajevo’s government already faced a systematic campaign from SDS to remove municipalities from the jurisdiction of the city in the spring of 1991 (Donia 2006a). Most of SDS’s members supported the separation of Serb-inhabited areas from the city’s jurisdiction, whereas SDA and HDZ leaders defended the unity. SDS leadership moved to expand the party’s authority in the area of Sarajevo beyond Pale and, on 25 September, the Sarajevo city board of SDS established a committee formed by at least one representative from the ten municipalities of Sarajevo for implementing the so-called regionalisation campaign. Bosnian Serb leadership showed the determination to culminate the process of ethno-territorialisation in December 1991, when SDS abandoned the voluntary approach that had previously triggered internal resistance within the party.15 On 19 December 1991, the document entitled “Instructions for the organisation and activity of organs of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in extraordinary circumstances” defined the methodology for the takeover (SDS Main Board 1991). SDS leadership instructed municipal boards to establish Serb executive and legislative bodies in most municipalities, through the formation of the “Crisis Staff of the Serb people” and “an Assembly of the Serb people”. The Crisis Staff had to assume governmental functions in municipalities during periods of crisis and its composition varied depending on whether Serbs constituted a majority in the municipality (Variant A) or not (Variant B).16 Hence, the inclusion of Variant B revealed SDS plans to takeover even those municipalities that were not under the control of the party. This crucial step in the process of ethno-territorialisation of Bosnia was implemented in Sarajevo 5 days after instructions to municipal boards. SDS leaders from Sarajevo’s constituent municipalities formed a crisis staff and the municipal assembly of Ilijaš, where Bosnian Serbs were the main ethnic group, voted to withdraw from the city and join the SAO Romanija (Donia 2006b). A few days later, in early January 1992, SDS municipal leaders also created a Serb municipal assembly in Ilidža. In addition, Pale’s SDS leaders ensured that their municipality was prepared to become the backup capital for Serb-ruled parts of BiH. Essentially, Bosnian Serb authorities 15

Radovan Karadži´c coercively used his authority over party members to secure application of leadership decisions. During 1991, Karadži´c frequently repeated to SDS local leaders the need to respect party hierarchy and discipline, threatening to fire everyone on municipal boards who did not follow the leadership line (Treanor 2002). 16 In the first variant, these bodies were formed by both civilian and military officials, i.e. SDS municipal and Main Board leaders, the Serb police commander, the Serb Territorial Defence commander or the JNA commander of the area. In the second variant, party representatives only integrated the Crisis Staff. Notwithstanding, in both cases the Instruction detailed a second stage in which the Serbian Municipal Assembly had to form a Municipal Executive Board before the mobilisation of police and military units.

3.2 Towards the Urban Division of Sarajevo

33

separated the Ski resort and hotels from their downtown Sarajevo headquarters and created their own enterprise (Donia 2006a). The political manoeuvres of Bosnian Serbs to seize exclusive control over territories regarded as Serbian went hand in hand with military preparations from the beginning of the process of ethno-territorialisation (Cigar 1995; Caplan 1998; Hoare 2004; Donia 2006b). Through the implementation of the RAM plan, Bosnian Serbs were well armed in the summer of 1991 (Ramet 2006).17 Military preparations were already apparent in Sarajevo well in advance of the declaration of sovereignty passed by the Bosnian Assembly in mid-October 1991, and it also involved Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats (Hoare 2004).18 As denounced in an article published in the Sarajevo magazine Slobodna Bosna, which means Free Bosnia, SDS had a detailed plan to besiege and attack Sarajevo. This plan also included the departure and reallocation of Sarajevo Serbs in the surrounding areas that were under their control after the regionalisation campaign (Donia 2006b). The first artillery pieces were placed in the surrounding area of Mount Trebevi´c in October 1991 and, the following month, SDS took military control of Jahorina, the ski resort in the Pale municipality. The objective of this manoeuvre was to establish the area as the key-control centre of JNA operations while members of Serbian paramilitary militias were already positioning themselves in Romanija (Cigar 1995; Hoare 2004).19 The division of Sarajevo officially became a core political and military goal as soon as the war started. In its 16th Session held in Banja Luka on 12 May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted the “Strategic Objectives of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. The first goal defined the separation of the Bosnian Serb population from the two other major ethnic communities in Bosnia through the creation of a State border (McCloskey 2010). The rest of the objectives were related to this separation and included, in the fifth out of the six objectives, the division of Sarajevo. This goal pursued the establishment of effective State authorities in the so-called Serb and Bosnian Muslim districts. When explaining this goal to the Assembly, Karadži´c underlined the importance of the city in the outcome of the war and the fate of Bosnia. The Bosnian Serb political leader claimed that Alija Izetbegovi´c would not have a state as long as Serbs had a part of the city and insisted on the idea, repeated more than once, that war would start and end in Sarajevo (Donia 2006b).20 17

By March 1991, the Serb-controlled JNA had distributed firearms to Serb paramilitaries and SDS (51,000 and 23,000 respectively). 18 Since the autumn of 1990, SDA sponsored the formation of two paramilitary groups; the Green Berets and the Patriotic League. Both groups were committed to Bosnian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Meanwhile, Bosnian Croats formed the Croatian Armed Forces (HOS), a military wing of the HDZ in favour of the incorporation of Bosnia in a Greater Croatia. 19 Other actions involved the replacement of the Muslim commanding officers in Pale with a Serb officer or the transfer of an anti-aircraft battery with 4,000 shells from a warehouse in Zrak (central Sarajevo) to the outskirts of the city, from where Sarajevo would be bombed. 20 Other Strategic Objectives included the construction of a corridor between Semberija and Krajina; the establishment of a corridor in the Drina River valley effectively eliminating the river as a border

34

3 The Division and Destruction of Sarajevo

3.3 The Siege of Sarajevo When active military preparations to besiege Sarajevo had started, in the autumn of 1991, SDS leaders argued that the city could be enclosed at any time (Donia 2006b). Yet, initial actions to block the city did not take place until 1 March 1992, at the end of the two days of voting for the referendum for Bosnian independence. Following a recommendation by the European Commission in early 1992, to determine whether the independence had majority support among the Bosnian population, the Bosnian Assembly approved the holding of the referendum even with the objection of SDS delegates. Bosnian Serb leadership called to boycott the polling and, a few hours after the voting ended, set up barricades that were patrolled by masked and armed men who blocked all roads leading to the city. The first barricade episode took place with SDS leaders in Belgrade consulting with Miloševi´c so, instead of trying to control the city, it had a more limited objective of showing SDS opposition to Bosnia’s independence and demand the JNA’s support to prevent it (Donia 2006a).21 Violent incidents occurred like the shooting dead of four people, allegedly by Serbs angered by the referendum, and the subsequent killing of one Serb who was attending a wedding in Sarajevo’s old Serbian Orthodox church (Heritage 1992). The SDS claimed in their public statement that the location of the barricades was for self-defence after the shooting. On 2 March, the crisis escalated as SDA members and supporters erected their own barricades in strategic locations. Despite the war in Croatia and the escalation of tensions in Bosnia, many Sarajavens could hardly believe that conflict would occur in the city. The long tradition of coexistence strengthened during Socialist Yugoslavia, along with the absence of ethnic enclaves in the central urban areas, were powerful elements in the public perception that war was not probable. As expressed eloquently by Kurspahi´c (1997), the fundamental conditions necessary for a war to break out among Sarajevans did not exist and, if it happened, it would certainly be a dramatic conflict because of the intermixing of Muslims, Serbs, Croats and Jewish in apartment buildings, made impossible to shoot one another without shooting your own people. For him, the fear of what war could bring in such an environment would be a sufficient deterrent. On 5 April, in response to the military escalation in Eastern Bosnia, thousands of people demonstrated in Sarajevo calling for peace and defending the right of coexistence between ethnic groups. The demonstration proceeded to the Marijin Dvor area, where the main institutions were concentrated, and people rallied in front of the Parliament before moving towards the Holiday Inn, where the SDS leadership was gathered. Armed people patrolling the rooftops of the hotel shot at antinationalist demonstrators producing the first victims of the lingering siege. Once again, SDS placed barricades encircling the city and, unlike the previous occasion, these were separating Republika Srpska and Serbia; thirdly, setting a border on the Una and Neretva Rivers; and, fourthly, ensuring access to the sea for Republika Srpska. 21 Through the regionalisation campaign and the self-proclamation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Serbs controlled about 60% of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territory at that time and warned that they were ready to defend it with arms (Sudetic 1991b).

3.3 The Siege of Sarajevo

35

not removed as the Bosnian Serb political leadership was unwilling to end the crisis peacefully. Widespread violence started in early April, just before the international community recognised the independence of BiH. While the European Commission’s recognition of new states is often considered a central factor in the aggravation of conflict in Yugoslavia, Bosnia was the only republic with a correlation between recognition and intensification of hostilities. However, the recognition of the European Commission was essentially a pretext for Bosnian Serbs to accelerate a process already put in motion, rather than a cause (Caplan 1998). On 1 April, there was the beginning of the military escalation in eastern Bosnia with Bosnian Serbs, along with nationalists from Serbia, taking control of Bijeljina and expelling the Bosniak population. Thus, the beginning of the siege of Sarajevo in early April followed a larger scale operation conducted by JNA and paramilitary units from Serbia, such as the Tigers of Željko Ražnatovi´c, better known as Arkan, and the Eagles of Vojislav Šešelj, to capture territories and expel citizens from other nationalities. In early May, a JNA that was finally at the disposal of Bosnian Serbs, became the military force that deployed the main effort to divide Sarajevo.22 The two military attempts conducted by the Yugoslav Army also sought to force the Bosnian government to capitulate (Hoare 2004). The first attack failed primarily due to the imbalance between besieging forces and the defensive force of the Bosnian government in and around Sarajevo. The offensive, however, allowed Serb nationalists to gain control of some areas of the city and, particularly, the central neighbourhood of Grbavica.23 The second attempt was conducted on 16 May. The attack on Pofali´ci was launched in order to capture Hum Hill from Vogoš´ca and connect it with the central Marshal Tito Barracks in the Marijin Dvor area, thereby cutting the city along the site of Pofali´ci and Veleši´ci, next to Army barracks (Fig. 3.3). The first and only significant attempt conducted by VRS to divide the city took place in early June. It was successfully impeded on 8 June by the Bosnian defence of Zuc Hill, and resulted in the liberation of Orli´c, the highest peak in the northern hills of the city. The incapacity to conquer Sarajevo by Bosnian Serbs due to an insufficient number of troops, and the unwillingness of SDA leadership to try to break the siege, ensured that the frontline besieging the city subsequently stabilised. Despite having become a key political and military goal after the approval of the Strategic Objectives, statements from SDS leaders during 1992 demonstrated the absence of a defined vision as to where the division of Sarajevo should take place. Biljana Plavši´c, SDS Member of the Presidency of Bosnian Serb Republic of BiH, along with Radovan Karadži´c and Nikola Koljevi´c, claimed that Bosnians Serbs pursued the seizing of everything west of the Holiday Inn. That objective would give 22

The transition from the JNA to VRS took place in May. After the recognition of BiH as an independent state by the European Community and the United States on 7 April, the Yugoslav federal collective presidency decided to withdraw JNA to ensure that the international community did not consider military activity as a foreign aggression. 23 Military action was followed the same day by the kidnapping of Alija Izetbegovi´ c, the Bosnian President, at Sarajevo airport when he returned from peace negotiations in Lisbon.

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3 The Division and Destruction of Sarajevo

Fig. 3.3 Besieged Sarajevo during the war. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved

the Serbs, who accounted for 30% of the city’s population before the war, more than half of the city (Burns 1992). In general, leaving the mostly Bosniak areas of Bašˇcaršija and Stari Grad to the Bosnian Muslims was the core element of the plan to divide the city (Donia 2006a). After the huge urban expansion conducted during Socialist regimes, this comprised a very small area developed in the narrowest sector of the Miljacka River plain and its contiguous slopes. Although no other serious attempts to divide Sarajevo took place afterwards, a divisional line was decided upon in 1993 based on the situation on the ground. Karadži´c traced it along the Miljacka River with the purpose of consolidating the capture of areas under control of VRS such as the central neighbourhood of Grbavica. As defined in the Strategic Objectives, the policy of Bosnian Serb leadership did not simply pursue an exclusive political control of territories but also an ethnic homogenisation of areas seized by force. Hence, there were attempts in the area of Sarajevo to separate Bosnian Serb people from the two other ethnic communities. The towns of Ilijaš, Vogoš´ca and Ilidža, as well as the central neighbourhood of Grbavica, were among those sectors that fell under Bosnian Serb control in April and May 1992. In these particular areas of Sarajevo, the take-over was followed by abuses that took away many lives. Local Bosnian Serbs and Serbian paramilitary units routinely detained non-Serbs or put them under house arrest, while non-Serb property and cultural monuments were also systematically targeted and destroyed to eliminate material traces of coexistence (Krasi´c 2012).

3.3 The Siege of Sarajevo

37

In Pale, where the SDS leadership set its field of operations and maintained a comfortable absolute majority in local institutions, ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb population took place during the early stages of war, highlighting their determination to carve out ethnically pure territories. Bosnian Muslims were fired from police, administration and, finally, from all state-owned companies (Vuksanovi´c 2004). Equally, Bosnian Serb authorities forbade Bosnian Muslims from public spaces and advised them to leave Pale. As in other areas of Bosnia, the Bosniak population often signed documents prior to expulsion saying that they relinquished all claims to their properties. This signature was used to provide a legal cover for their dispossession while preventing any subsequent return (Agencies 1992). The threat of mass expulsion in Pale materialised between June and July 1992, when authorities began to bus Bosniaks to Sarajevo. Bosnian Serb authorities finally decided that all Muslims had to leave Pale and the surrounding villages by 5 July (Vuksanovi´c 2004). The failure to divide the central areas of the city modified the Bosnian Serb strategy, which put offensives to bisect Sarajevo on hold and developed a strategy to weaken the city through the maintenance of the siege and a persistent shelling from the surrounding hillsides.24 The use of constant shelling by VRS had several objectives. One of them was weakening the resistance and influencing political events, as heavy shelling occurred on numerous occasions before or during peace conferences. Furthermore, it targeted strategic areas and buildings, such as public utilities to disturb the daily life of citizens.25 Shelling also terrorised the civilian population through a random pattern, with projectiles targeting the civilian areas of the city at different times and without any apparent sequence. As a result, the built environment of Sarajevo suffered widespread affectation during the siege. VRS also pursued the direct destruction of buildings with the greatest cultural value, i.e. those evoking long-standing coexistence either from specific ethnic groups or from the heterogeneous Bosnian culture. This material ethno-territorial practice aimed at destroying the legacy of centuries of pluralism and tolerance in Bosnia, creating and naturalising the idea of separate, antagonistic and sovereign territorial entities (Coward 2004).26 The most representative episode in Sarajevo occurred in August 1992, when VRS destroyed Vje´cnica, the National Library built during the Austro-Hungarian rule in a neo-Moorish architectonic style.27

24

According to estimates from UNPROFOR and city officials, daily shelling of the city ranged from 200 to 300 impacts on a quiet day to between 800 and 1,000 shell impacts, with a high of 3,777 impacts on 22 July 1993 (UN 1994). 25 Some examples were the Bosnian Parliament, the twin UNIS Towers, the Hotel Europe, the Koševo Hospital, the Sarajevo Radio and Television Stations, the Oslobodenje Newspaper Building or the public transportation system. 26 This practice not only affected Sarajevo and it was especially illustrative in areas where no combat took place. These were the cases of Banja Luka, where all mosques in the city (sixteen) were destroyed between April and September 1993, and Bijeljina, where Bosnian Serbs blew up six mosques in one night in March1993 (Riedlmayer 2002). 27 Damage and even destruction also affected buildings associated with Serb cultural and religious life such as the Serb cultural society Prosvjeta and the new Serbian Orthodox Church (Donia 2006a).

38

3 The Division and Destruction of Sarajevo

In opposition to the strategic goal of Bosnian Serb leadership, SDA did not envisage any ethnic division of Sarajevo prior to the war. However, as claimed by Pejanovi´c (2004), Bosnian Serb member of the Bosnian Presidency throughout the war, Croats and Bosniaks ultimately joined SDS in the vicious circle of territorialisation and ethnic division. In practice, diplomatic isolation and military inferiority led Alija Izetbegovi´c to abandon one of the founding principles of the SDA, namely, the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bougarel 1999). The fact that war became more complex, particularly due to the simultaneous fight of the Bosnian government against Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats to preserve the Bosnian state, progressively strengthened the influence of militant Bosniak nationalists and weakened those more moderate members in the leadership favouring the creation of a liberal multi-ethnic state (Cohen 1995).28 The discussion of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan in summer 1993, also called Union of Three Republics, was a turning point in Izetbegovi´c public position. Despite his previous opposition to proposals on the ethnic cantonisation of Bosnia, the Bosnian President and SDA leader indicated a willingness to accept the division of Bosnia into a loose confederation of three states. The eventual refusal of the Plan ended the formal possibility to establish a Muslim state, but SDA leadership proceeded with the goal while remaining formally committed to a unified country (Hoare 2004). Indeed, despite reiterating its commitment to a united and multi-ethnic Bosnian territory, SDA progressively turned those territories under their control, including Sarajevo, into a de facto Bosniak entity. The construction of an ethnocratic regime was highlighted when Izetbegovi´c made clear that loyalty and obedience to SDA, instead of competence and qualification, would be prioritised in ministries and state companies (Pejanovi´c 2004; Andreas 2008).29 In this process, the party leadership took advantage of extraordinary circumstances and exploited the favourable environment created by the siege to extend and consolidate their political and economic power. On the one hand, a new political elite was built around Izetbegovi´c’s family connections and the prevailing conservatives in the leadership (Hoare 2004). On the other hand, the siege also created great economic opportunities for war profiteering, theft and redistribution of wealth. In an internal reproduction of the siege, the so-called siege within the siege, the Government in Sarajevo also participated in the obstructionist practices against Sarajevo’s residents. It was the case of water restraints put in place by both Bosnian Serb and Sarajevo authorities. This internal reproduction of restrictions was particularly controversial within a besieged city seeing as how people became further vulnerable to sniper fire and mortar attacks in their pursuit of water. As analysed by Peter Andreas (2008) in 28

The HDZ declared Herceg-Bosna in October 1992, becoming the second para-state in Bosnia after the Republika Srpska, and started a war between ARBiH and the HVO that lasted until February 1994. Several statements and decisions revealed the increasing influence of most conservative ´ members in the party. SDA Secretary-General, Mirsad Ceman, claimed that mixed marriages should be an exception while endorsing the ban on new folksongs from Serbia taken in September 1994 by Enes Kari´c, the Minister of Culture. 29 A hierarchy of trust was developed in which top officials should be members of SDA. The second level of trust was for Bosniaks and, finally, members of other nationalities.

3.3 The Siege of Sarajevo

39

the account on the political economy of the siege, there were several explanations to the performance of the Sarajevo government. These included the exploitation of people’s suffering to maintain international sympathy and support, the smuggling practices of Government agencies tracking water as well as those related to the Brewery. In a context of polarisation caused by the aggression of Bosnian Serb leadership, the internal erosion of the ethnic diversity was another extremely sensitive issue for a Bosnian government that officially defended a multi-ethnic country. The stay of thousands of Sarajevo Serbs in the city during the siege, with many of them explicitly rejecting the SDS policy of ethnic separation, perfectly embodied Bosnia’s and Sarajevo’s intrinsic tradition of mutual respect and coexistence. Even though their stay undermined SDS policy, they also suffered the pressure of Sarajevo civilian and military police. At the beginning of the war, when every Serb could be seen as a potential traitor, inspections and detentions of Sarajevo Serbs resulted in harassment and even killing, which inevitably increased motives for leaving the city (Pejanovi´c 2004).30 In contrast to the policy of SDS, however, there is no evidence that these practices were a product of a policy to persecute Sarajevo Serbs on the part of political and military leadership (Hoare 2004). The siege produced a massive transformation in the social, ethnic and cultural composition of the city. An initial exodus of Sarajevo Serbs took place at the beginning of the siege, often following SDS instructions. Those Sarajevo Serbs who left the city at that time argued that the transformation of the social environment since the 1990 elections and rising concerns regarding security were the motives behind their departure (Armakolas 2007). A second large mass displacement occurred during the ceasefire that culminated in the DPA, with an estimation of 25,000 Sarajevans leaving the besieged city (Pomfret 1995). Undoubtedly, this departure further contributed to the social and cultural transformation of the city as more intellectuals and skilled people abandoned the city looking for better opportunities and, at the same time, leaving behind an increasingly uncomfortable political and social environment.31

3.3.1 The International Military Response Military preparation in Bosnia, especially intense since the autumn of 1991, did not come as any great surprise to the international community as evidence of the Yugoslav crisis and preannouncements of a path towards violent conflict in the Republic were numerous and already in circulation. Despite the context of escalation, the initial international response was disapproval of the use of force and the attempts to violently alter the internal border. As argued by Josip Glaurdi´c (2011) in the research account 30

Local commanders of ARBiH, some of them with criminal backgrounds, acted independently, conducting lawless abuses on individuals, especially against Sarajevo Serbs. 31 For instance, in the Academy of Arts and Sciences of Bosnia-Herzegovina, two-thirds of its forty-eight members in the city had left Sarajevo in October 1995 (Pomfret 1995).

40

3 The Division and Destruction of Sarajevo

of Western policy towards Yugoslavia, no individual with any influence on Western foreign policy wished to see Yugoslavia disintegrate so subsequently gave very little or no support to the federation periphery, i.e. Croatia and Slovenia, backing the central government in Belgrade.32 In a context in which the Soviet Union was crumbling, the position towards Yugoslavia pursued stability despite the lack of democratic credentials from political and military apparatus in Belgrade. Such thinking had a critical error of confusing Miloševi´c’s willingness to protect Yugoslavia’s unity, when the real motivation was creating an enlarged Serbian state on its ruins. Consequently, the Western policy heavily undermined the prospect of a nonviolent resolution of the crisis in Bosnia in the context of the ongoing war in Croatia. As seen in negotiations on whether to deploy United Nations peacemaking troops, the weaker side was ignored to the detriment of Miloševi´c, leaving in practice an easy path in attempts to ethnically divide Bosnia by violent means. On 12 November 1991, Izetbegovi´c called for the immediate deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces to prevent impending violence and, the following week, the Bosnian government presented Cyrus Vance’s assistant with a plan that envisaged the deployment of 2,000 troops (Caplan 2005). Despite the evidence of Serbian military preparations to commence armed action in Bosnia, the proposal and requests from the Bosnian government to the United Nations for a peacekeeping contingent were ignored. The international response, once the war started, included several dimensions but it was again insufficient and damaging for the Sarajevo government. The response was a combination of economic sanctions against Serbia for the support to Bosnian Serbs, the reaffirmation of the regional arms embargo, that placed the Bosnian Army at a significant disadvantage, and a large-scale humanitarian mission that had its centre at the airport of Sarajevo. The United Nations set in motion the operation in May 1992, and subsequently included the demilitarisation of the airport and the creation of a corridor, under the control of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), to allow delivery of humanitarian aid (UN 1992a,1992b). The operation sought to guarantee certain conditions for the delivery of aid to civilians but, having to negotiate with Bosnian Serbs the content and size of every aid delivery, the United Nations became ironically accomplices of their policy to besiege the city (Holbrooke 1998). The United Nations operation was the most important component of the international response to the Bosnian war, and it was often portrayed as a success. Nevertheless, the airlift had immediate political consequences, with the most important one being the reduction of the prospect of Western military intervention. In perspective, the airport agreement was a crucial turning point in the transformation of the perception of the conflict. It turned from a war of aggression into a complex humanitarian emergency, institutionalising the siege and making it politically acceptable (Andreas 2008).

32

Western consensus on the need to preserve Yugoslavia ended with the commencement of hostilities as Germany began to support the cessation of Croatia and Slovenia. Furthermore, it implied the beginning of disagreements in the military and diplomatic field among the principal players over virtually every aspect of Western’s policy.

3.3 The Siege of Sarajevo

41

Sarajevo was subsequently declared a Safe Area in May 1993, in a resolution approved by the Security Council that, after the experience in Srebrenica, included other vulnerable locations (UN 1993b).33 Safe Areas pursued the cessation of armed attacks and any other hostile acts, and the inclusion of Sarajevo also responded to the aspiration of preserving its symbolism of coexistence between all the communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (UN 1993a), something that was in contradiction with the logic of ethnic partition followed in the successive peace proposals. In practice, the declaration of Safe Areas did not alter the extent of the military involvement because the United Nations forces sustained a limited mandate to self-defence rather than the protection of the Safe Area. Thus, the international military intervention in Sarajevo was restricted to the protection of humanitarian assistance, with UNPROFOR performing a questionable equidistant role. With the end of the Cold War, the relations between the United States and Europe entered a new phase and became particularly tensioned by developments in Bosnia. Within the world’s foreign policy community, the conflict was widely perceived as a test for European institutions since the Maastricht Treaty, signed in February 1992, also pursued a common foreign and security policies. It fit together with the United States since the conflict did not pose a direct threat to NATO states and Bosnia lacked economic valuable resources (Tuathail 1999). However, the transatlantic alliance remained divided on many crucial issues because of different attitudes towards the use of force, as well as distinct geopolitical interests and responsibilities. More specifically, differences centred around four main issues: the peace plans proposed between 1992 and 1994, the United States policy proposal to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government, the expansion of NATO’s air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs aimed by Washington, and the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from enforcing the arms embargo on Bosnia (Bellou 2003). Such transatlantic disagreements prevented a more assertive military intervention to end the war earlier, with NATO effectively becoming an acquiescence of the siege of Sarajevo and ethnic cleansing throughout Bosnia (Allin 2002). In the summer of 1995, Clinton’s administration finally assumed the leadership and modified its policy of ceding to Europe the management of the crisis after realising that the Western failure in Bosnia was damaging the position of the United States. The practical refusal to confront Bosnian Serbs for most of the war led to a series of military and political setbacks for the Bosnian government while, at the same time, it implied a loss of credibility amongst the population. As expressed by wartime Sarajevo’s Mayor, Tarik Kupusovi´c, people in Bosnia felt betrayed by the international community as all promises made by the West had never been fulfilled (Hedges 1995).

33

Along Sarajevo, this were the cases of Žepa, Goražde, Tuzla and Biha´c. In cases such as Goražde, Žepa and Srebrenica, people who had survived episodes of ethnic cleansing in eastern Bosnian fled into these three enclaves where the ARBiH had resisted. In Srebrenica, for instance, the population swelled from 9,000 to 42,000 (Hartmann and Vulliamy 2015).

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3.4 The DPA and the Sarajevo’s Final Ethno-Territorial Division Due to its significance for the future of Bosnia after the war and its symbolism, Sarajevo was always a central issue in the negotiations to reach a peace agreement. It was highlighted in the adoption of the policy entitled Sarajevo first during the early stages of the war, which pursued the demilitarisation of the city prior to solving other questions (Owen 1995). Actually, the United Nations and the United States negotiated putting the city under the administration of the former for two years and to establish complete demilitarisation. In Dayton, the city maintained its centrality in negotiations and an agreement on the Bosnian capital was set as one of the four key conditions outlined by Warren Christopher, the U.S. Secretary of State, during the opening ceremony. The United States negotiators proposed that the city did not belong to either of the two entities in which Bosnia was to be divided. A proposal was made to reunify the city as a federal polity similar to Washington, DC. The city would become an enclave to be ruled, unlike the rest of the country, by the three constituent ethnic groups with a rotational Mayor (Holbrooke 1998). At the same time, Sarajevo could be divided into several semi-autonomous municipalities. The municipal government would be responsible for the citywide services such as transportation, utilities and sanitation, while the local municipalities would control education, cultural services and local health services (Chollet 2005). In terms of police, the proposal defined a multi-ethnic force to be trained and monitored by the international community. At that time, Bosniaks sought to have total control over a reunified city but showed increasing interest in this proposal considering the limited chances that Bosnian Serbs would give up districts of the city under the control of VRS. Following on from this, the proposal was reduced to a ten-point plan that included a Municipal Council with a rotating Mayor, a unified police force, and local municipal control over education, cultural and religious activities. This proposal was rejected by Slobodan Miloševi´c, who was the main representative of Bosnian Serbs in the final peace negotiations. Following the strategic objective to divide the city ethnically, Miloševi´c tabled several counterproposals that sought a compromise in a loose unification of the city but which, at the same time, left the possibility of an eventual division.34 Despite an initial commitment to solve the Sarajevo issue, Miloševi´c finally rejected the DC proposal arguing that his Bosnian Serb colleagues would never accept it (Chollet 2005). On 18 November, however, he made an unforeseen concession to solve one of the most divisive issues of the Dayton peace negotiations. Arguing that Izetbegovi´c had earned the city by not abandoning it during the siege, Miloševi´c rejected any federal plan and decided to deliver near-total control over Sarajevo to the Federation of BiH in exchange for some minor territorial concessions in northwest Bosnia. 34

Momˇcilo Krajišnik, President of the Assembly of Republika Srpska, and other Bosnian Serbs representatives not indicted by war crimes, unlike Karadži´c, could be in Dayton but only as members subordinate and passive to the Serb delegation so they played a marginal role. Their authority to negotiate for Bosnian Serbs had been delegated to Miloševi´c in a ceremony in Belgrade in October.

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As the Bosnian Serb leadership did not intend on sharing power with other ethnicities but pursued exclusive control over the essential areas of the city under VRS, the concession was a pragmatic solution to removing one of the remaining obstacles to seal the peace agreement. Such concession was also favoured by the internal dynamics of post-Dayton Serbian leadership which, according to Richard Holbrooke (1998), worked towards weakening the leadership of Bosnian Serbs, especially Karadži´c and Momˇcilo Krajišnik, in order to preserve Belgrade’s influence over Serbs in Bosnia.35 While Miloševi´c’s decision on Sarajevo effectively unblocked a sensitive issue of the peace negotiations, uncertainty emerged in relation to its implementation. This decision to relinquish Serb-held districts inferred a material, economic and symbolic loss for Pale leadership in their efforts to create a Bosnian Serb entity in BiH. It was a betrayal for the Bosnian Serbs authorities as it gave up one of the central Strategic Goals adopted in May 1992. All this was seen by the reaction of Krajišnik who, despite being the highest representative of Bosnian Serbs in Dayton, was only permitted to view the final map shortly before sealing the peace agreement. Outraged by the decision to deliver the Serb-held districts, he rejected to sign and participating in the ceremony. This loss was accentuated by the final delimitation of the division set in the negotiations, with the only exception of the Dobrinja neighbourhood.36 The InterEntity Boundary Line (IEBL) dividing both entities, namely, the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska, was mostly drawn at the other side of the hills from which the city had been shelled. Thus, there was no internal division in the central urban areas of Sarajevo, unlike cities such as Belfast, Berlin, Jerusalem and Nicosia. Even with this division, a significant area at the outskirts that had belonged to the city since its expansion in 1977 was integrated into Srpsko Sarajevo, the formal capital of Republika Srpska and which was later renamed as East Sarajevo (Fig. 3.4).37 Instead of becoming another classical example of a divided city, with that division, Sarajevo became a frontier city, i.e. an urban interstice between opposing political territories (Bollens 2001).38 35

Miloševi´c’s relationship with SDS leadership had deteriorated since Pale leadership refused to accept the Vance Owen Peace Plan in early May 1993. Miloševi´c and Belgrade elites accepted the Plan that secured an ethno-territorial partition of Bosnia and had to produce an end to the embargo in rump Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro. Since then, Miloševi´c decreased its role in the Bosnian war (Veiga 2011). 36 Due to the scale of the map chosen in Dayton during the negotiations, it was not possible to accurately demarcate the boundary in the unique neighbourhood of Sarajevo to be divided. The Arbitration Award for Dobrinja I and IV was resolved in 2001 by the OHR, setting the precise sector where the IEBL divided the neighbourhood. 37 The Constitutional Court of BiH ruled in 2004 that references to ethnicity had to be removed from names in towns and municipalities. The Constitution of Republika Srpska defines East Sarajevo as its capital but Banja Luka concentrates most of the institutions, becoming de facto the capital. 38 Despite peace calls to avoid another Berlin, i.e. urban division, the idea of partition was not widespread. As expressed by wartime Mayor, Tarik Kupusovi´c, they never accepted that the city was divided during the siege as only 10% of the urban part of Sarajevo was held under Karadži´c’s control (Agencies 1995).

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Fig. 3.4 Sarajevo’s division in Dayton between the two entities. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved

Territorially, the DPA essentially contained the division of Bosnia into ethnoterritorialities, a measure that in distinct forms had prevailed during successive peace proposals. Since the Contact Group Plan was elaborated in 1994, the ethnic partition of Bosnia should take place on a 51:49 proportion between Muslim-Croat and Serbian entities. Then, the DPA was a culmination of a series of arrangements that followed the logic of ethnic partition. The only exception took place in August 1992, when the London International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia established a series of principles to safeguard Bosnia’s multi-ethnic character and avoid rewarding ethnic cleansing. Consequently, the international intervention during the war legitimised exclusive projects of nationalist parties and made a return to spatial coexistence less imaginable. No less important, while seeking to end the war, international peace proposals paradoxically encouraged violence because of assumptions about ethnic identity, territory and conflict, did not correspond to the reality on the ground at the beginning of the war (Campbell 1998). Essentially, the DPA maintained that Bosnia and Herzegovina should remain a unified state with three constituent peoples but organised in two entities ethnically

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based, the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska.39 The peace agreement defined a political system that was largely based on classic consociational prescriptions. These prescriptions included grand coalition governments with proportional representation from all ethnic groups, a right of mutual veto among ethnic groups, and a decentralised ethno-territorial system where communities are spatially divided. Power-sharing was adopted at the state level between all three constituent ethnic groups and in the Federation of BiH between Croats and Bosniaks.40 At that time, it was widely recognised that this consociational framework was the only feasible model for a united Bosnia and Herzegovina, with people arguing a decade later that it was still the only realistic institutional organisation for the country (Belloni 2004). Beyond the territorial and political organisation, the transatlantic disagreement was reproduced in the conception of the peace agreement. For the United States, it should be a military operation with some form of civilian annexes while, for the Europeans, political issues and perspectives were the main concern. This absence of shared vision on the nature of the peace agreement was inevitably transferred to negotiations and subsequent structures, such as those regarding the civilian annexes and the role of the High Representative. In relation to the mandate of the High Representative, the United States and Europe had agreed on the creation of an authority to implement the peace agreement before starting the negotiations that culminated with the DPA. In Dayton, after having accepted the command of the United States on the military side, the Europeans held a formal, albeit rare, instruction from the Council of Ministers of the European Union that the civilian counterpart had to be a European. This contrasted with the vision of the Clinton Administration that, with special pressure from Pentagon officials, rejected that a European High Representative had any control over American military forces on the ground (Chollet 2005). Once Washington finally accepted, the United States delegation was instructed to work to restrict the mandate of the High Representative, modifying the previous agreement that allowed the civilian authority to make judgements and express views on military issues (Neville-Jones 1996; Bildt 1998).41 The United States went beyond in the objective to keep close control over the peacebuilding mission and refused since early stages to accept the appointment of the High Representative through the Security Council, preventing the established pattern of developing peacebuilding missions under the authority of the United Nations. This created a situation whereby the High Representative, despite informing the United Nations, would not be fully answerable to an uncontested international authority, 39

Brˇcko was set as a District later, in 1999. In 2002, Bosnia became a triple power-sharing system that was adopted in both entities and at a cantonal level in the case of the Federation of BiH (Bieber 2006). This constitutional amendment followed the Constitutional Court decision taken in 2000, which defined the discrimination of Croats and Bosniaks in Republika Srpska and Serbs in the Federation of BiH. 41 The peace agreement clearly divided competence of the international community into two realms: the military and the civilian. Annexes 1A, 1B and 2, dealt with military aspects of the peace settlement mandated to the NATO-led implementation force. On the other hand, Annexes 3 to 11 correspond to the civilian issues of the peacebuilding mission. 40

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leaving its operation in an uncomfortable and unconvincing limbo (Neville-Jones 1996). In absence of the United Nations involvement, the Europeans responded with the idea of establishing an international body, the Peace Implementation Council, to provide some sense of international legitimacy and, at the same time, to ensure that Washington included the Europeans and others in the policy process. This design should allow to cohere the post-war international management without the restrictive ties of international law (Chandler 2005). Such ad hoc institutional organisation to supervise the implementation of the peace agreement was completed in the Peace Implementation Conference held in London in early December 1995, before the signature of the DPA in Paris on 14 December. The Peace Implementation Council became the linear successor of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and it was established a Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council under the chairmanship of the High Representative. Composed of representatives of the Contact Group countries, Canada, Japan, the European Union, the European Commission, and Turkey representing the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council would meet monthly to provide political guidance to the High Representative. Moreover, the London Conference approved the designation of Carl Bildt, a former Swedish Prime Minister and Mediator of the European Union for Former Yugoslavia, as the first High Representative. Illustrating this particular institutional organisation, the Peace Implementation Conference invited the United Nations Security Council to agree to Mr. Bildt’s designation as High Representative (UN 1995). Finally, the peace accord defined that the High Representative should maintain close contact with every actor in order to foster the full compliance of local parties to civilian issues of the agreement and, also, the promotion of a high level of cooperation among international organisations (DPA 1995). Importantly, the role of the High Representative was restricted to give general guidance to other international organisations and agencies about the impact of their activities on the implementation of the peace agreement while, at the same time, respecting their autonomy within respective spheres of operation. The fact that the High Representative was not initially an empowered actor explains the limited capacity of the OHR to significantly influence over certain civilian annexes during the early post-war stages, as it will be visible in Chap. 4.

References Agencies (1992, August 12) Thousands more muslim face eviction. The Washington Post Agencies (1995, December 11) Interview: Tarik Kupusovic: No Sarajevo Without Serbs. Transitions Online Allin D (2002) NATO’s Balkan interventions. Oxford University Press, Oxford Andjeli´c N (2003) Bosnia-Herzegovina: the end of a Legacy. Frank Cass Publishers, London Andreas P (2008) Blue helmets and black markets: the business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London

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Armakolas I (2007) Sarajevo no more? Identity and the experience of place among Bosnian Serb Sarajevans in RS. In: Bougarel X, Helms E, Duijzings G (eds) The new Bosnian mosaic: identities, memories and moral claims in a post-war society. Ashgate, Aldershot, pp 79–99 Belloni R (2004) Peacebuilding and consociational electoral engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina. International Peacekeeping 11(2):334–353 Bellou F (2003) US policy in Bosnia: from obersavation to leadership. Transatlantic disagreements in managing the crisis. Biannu Publ Intitute Balk Stud 44(1–2):181–190 Bieber F (2006) Post-war Bosnia: ethnicity, inequality and public sector governance. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Bildt C (1998) Peace journey: the struggle for peace in Bosnia. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London Bollens S (2001) City and soul: Sarajevo, Johannesburg, Jerusalem Nicosia. City 5(2):169–187 Bougarel X (1997) From ‘Young Muslims’ to the party of democratic action : the emergence of a Pan-Islamist trend in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Islam Stud 36(2):533–549 Bougarel X (1999) Bosnian Islam since 1990: cultural identity or political Ideology? Paper presented for the annual convention of the association for the study of nationalities, Columbia University, New-York, April 15–17 Bringa T (1995) Being Muslim the Bosnian way. Identity and community in a Central Bosnian village. Princeton University Press, Princeton Burns J (1992, September 27) Sarajevo siege deepens, defying efforts at peace. The New York Times, p 12 Campbell D (1998) National deconstruction. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis Caplan R (1998) The European community’s recognition of new states in Yugoslavia: the strategic implications. J Strat Stud 21(3):24–45 Caplan R (2005) Europe and the recognition of new states in Yugoslavia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Carreras C, Moreno S (2007) Los procesos de modernización en Sarajevo: La incierta dirección de la flecha del tiempo. An Geogr Univ Complut Madr 27:29–44 ˇ Cengi´ c N, Martín-Díaz J (2018) Night-time economy and urban development in post-socialist Sarajevo. In: Nofre J, Eldridge A (eds) Exploring nightlife: Space, society and governance. Rowman & Littlefield International, London, pp 53–67 Chandler D (2005) From Dayton to Europe. International Peacekeeping 12(3):336–349 Chollet D (2005) The road to the Dayton accords: a study of American statecraft. Palgrave McMillan, New York Cigar N (1995) Genocide in Bosnia: the policy of ethnic cleansing. Texas A&M University Press, College Station Cohen L (1995) Broken bonds: Yugoslavia’s disintegration and Balkan politics in transition. Westview Press, Boulder Coward M (2004) Urbicide in Bosnia. In: Graham S (ed) Cities, war and terrorism: towards an urban geopolitics. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 154–171 Djogo G, Karadži´c R (1991) Conversation between Gojko Djogo and Radovan Karadži´c on 12 October 1991. [Telephone intercept]. The Hague: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Donia R (2006a) Sarajevo: A biography. Hurts & Company, London Donia R (2006b) From elections to stalemate: the making of the Sarajevo Siege, 1990–1994. The Hague: International Criminal Tribunal forthe Former Yugoslavia. ICTY Case IT-98-28/1 Donia R, Fine J (1994) Bosnia and Herzegovina: a tradition betrayed. Hurst & Co, London DPA (1995) The general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Initialed in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. www.ohr.int/dpa/def ault.asp?content_id=380 Glaurdi´c J (2011) The hour of Europe: Western powers and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Yale University Press, New Haven and London

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Hamilton FEI (1979) Urbanization in Socialist Eastern Europe. The macro-environment of internal city structure. In French RA, Hamilton FEI (eds) The socialist city: spatial structure and urban policy. New York: Wiley, pp 167–194 Hartmann F, Vulliamy E (2015, July 4) How Britain and the US decided to abandon Srebrenica to its fate. The Guardian Hedges C (1995, July 30) Sarajevo: abandoned by the west unfilled promises fuel anger, hatred in city where art, culture once flourished. The New York Times Heritage T (1992, March 3) Vote for independence sparks gunfire in Bosnia. Chicago Sun-Times Hoare MA (1997) The croatian project to partition Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1990–1994. East Eur Q 31(1):121–138 Hoare MA (2004) How Bosnia armed: the birth and rise of the Bosnian army. Saqi Books, London Holbrooke R (1998) To end a war. Random House, New York Judah T (2000) The Serbs: history, myth and the destruction of Yugoslavia. Yale University Press, New Heaven and London Klemenˇci´c M (1994) Territorial proposals for the settlement of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bound Territ Brief 1(3):1–74 Krasic Z (2012, June 22) The prosecutor vs. Vojislav Seselj, IT-03-67-T, The Hague: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Retrieved from https://www.icty.org/x/cases/ses elj/custom5/en/120622p2.pdf. Accessed 8 March 2020 Kurspahi´c K (1997) As long as Sarajevo exists. Pamphletter’s Press, Connecticut Lovrenovi´c I (2001) Bosnia a cultural history. Saqi Books, London Maksi´c A (2017) Ethnic mobilization, violence, and the politics of affect: the Serb Democratic Party and the Bosnian War. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstroke Malcolm N (1994) Bosnia: A short history. Macmillan, London Markowitz F (2010) Sarajevo: A Bosnian kaleidoscope. University of Illinois Press, Urbana McCloskey P (2010, July 14) Prosecutor vs. Vujadin Popovic, Lljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Radivoje Miletic, Milan Gvero, Vinko Pandurevic. Case IT-05-88-T. The Hague: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Neville-Jones P (1996) Dayton, IFOR and alliance relations in Bosnia. Surviv: Glob Polit Strat 38(4):45–65 Owen D (1995) Balkan Odyssey. San Diego: Harcourt Brace and Company Pejanovi´c M (2004) Through Bosnian eyes: the political memoir of a Bosnian Serb. Indiana: Purdue University Press Pomfret J (1995, October 15) Thousands are abandoning their city. The Washington Post Ramet S (1999) Balkan Babel: the disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to war for Kosovo. Westview Press, Boulder Ramet S (2006) The three Yugoslavias: state-building and legitimation, 1918–2005. Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Washington Riedlmayer A (2002) Destruction of cultural heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina,1992–1996: a post-war survey of selected municipalities. Bosnia-Herzegovina Cultural Heritage Report SDS Main Board (1991) Instruction for the organization and activity of organs of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in extraordinary circumstances. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Hague Sudetic C (1991a, January 11) Serb chief warns of land demands. The New York Times Sudetic C (1991b, December 28) Bosnia fears it’s next in Yugoslav Civil Strife. The New York Times, p 6 Treanor, P. (2002). The Bosnian Serb leadership 1992–1995. The Hague: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Tuathail G (1999) A strategic sign: the geopolitical significance of ‘Bosnia’ in U.S. foreign policy. Environ Plan D: Soc Space 17(5):515–533 UN (1992a) Resolution 757. UN Security Council, May 30 UN (1992b) The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: resolution 46/242 adopted by the General Assembly. United Nations, August 25

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UN (1993a) Resolution 819, 3199th meeting; Distr. General S/RES/824, April 16 UN (1993b) Resolution 824, 3208th meeting; Distr. General S/RES/824, May 6 UN (1994) Final report of the United Nations commission of experts established pursuant to security council resolution 780. UN Security Council, May 27 UN (1995) Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held at Lancaster House, London, on 8 and 9 December 1995. UN Security Council, December 12 Veiga F (2011) La fábrica de las fronteras. Alianza, Madrid Vuksanovi´c M (2004) From enemy territory: Pale diary. Westbourne Grove, London

Chapter 4

The Consolidation of the Division After the War

Abstract The division of the urban area of Sarajevo between the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska significantly modified the siege line and frustrated the long pursuit of SDS leadership to ethnically divide Sarajevo’s urban core. This chapter deals with practices to consolidate an ethno-territorialised urban area of Sarajevo after the signature of the peace agreement and, generally, OHR’s reactive actions. Firstly, it focuses on the performance of international actors and nationalist parties in the transfer of authority from the five Serb-held districts of Sarajevo, which resulted in a mass exodus of Sarajevo Serbs and Bosnian Serbs. Subsequently, it examines the international response to material and institutional ethnocratic practices conducted, respectively, by SDS and SDA. Thus, the OHR was directly involved in the remaking of multi-ethnic institutions in Sarajevo and in the prevention of land allocations to consolidate ethnic majorities, ultimately becoming the institution responsible for dealing with land transactions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Keywords Sarajevo · Srpsko Sarajevo · Ethnic engineering · Ethnocratic practices · Land management

4.1 The Reintegration of Sarajevo The start of the implementation of the peace agreement, set on 19 December 1995, marked a ninety-day period for the completion of the transference of authority between entities of those territories exchanged during peace negotiations to meet the 51/49% territorial division of Bosnia. Also known as the reintegration of Sarajevo, the transfer of authority in the Bosnian capital involved the Serb-held districts that had been under the control of VRS during the siege and became the first real test of civilian implementation. These districts included the central neighbourhood of Grbavica and four suburbs, Vogoš´ca, Ilidža, Hadži´ci and Ilijaš. Being the unique one among entities where a significant population lived at the end of the war, with around 80,000 people, this transfer of authority was as meaningful as complex. It was especially symbolic for Sarajevo Serbs, i.e. those Bosnian Serbs who had been living in the urban areas of Sarajevo before the war.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Martín-Díaz, The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80575-3_4

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In this context, the OHR faced a significant challenge shortly after the signature of the peace agreement. Aware of this, Carl Bildt considered the management of Sarajevo as his highest preference in the first months as High Representative, making clear to his staff that the situation in and around the capital city of Bosnia was the only priority (Bildt 1998). Bildt expressed the difficulties of keeping people living in the Serb-held districts once reintegration was completed and warned of the negative implications that a massive departure would have for both post-war Bosnia and Sarajevo. Pursuing the creation of appropriate conditions in relation to security and governance for people who wished to stay, the OHR managed the transfer of authority operating formally through the Joint Civilian Commission on Sarajevo; a body subordinate to the Joint Civilian Commission that dealt with a variety of issues related to the civilian implementation of the peace agreement. Carl Bildt handled the management of the transfer of districts to his Deputy, Ambassador Michael Steiner, former German representative within the Contact Group. Steiner usually chaired the Joint Civilian Commission on Sarajevo, integrated by two representatives of the Federation of BiH, two others from the city of Sarajevo and three local Serbs from the districts to be transferred. The group of local Serbs was led by Maksim Staniši´c, president of the Democratic Initiative of Sarajevo Serbs and coordinator of the various Serb-held districts of Sarajevo. They accepted the peace agreement but, as it was particularly difficult to assimilate an exclusive Bosniak rule, they sought alternatives within the Federation of BiH. However, any effort within the Commission was constrained by the limits set at the peace agreement. As a result of a supervisory role with no mandate to instruct other actors, the OHR had authority only to coordinate and ensure that implementation would take place on the occasion of a consensus. These limits were a product of the transatlantic disagreement, which was reproduced during early post-war stages and marked the international dynamics in certain civilian issues, particularly when these implied the involvement of the military. Therefore, this consensus was difficult to reach within the Commission since the United States representatives usually blocked initiatives arguing that these were against their policy or interest, making the decision-making process more difficult. Moreover, the OHR was further constrained in terms of capacity, lacking the proper funding and staff, initially much smaller than the existing personnel in some embassies. Again, the United States worked to restrict these already limited powers, depriving the High Representative access to all the United Nations resources reserved for NATO and refrained from providing any single funding (Bildt 1998). The first round of talks to deal with the transfer of the Serb-held districts showed that around 50% of people would leave regardless of the conditions in which the transfer would take place (Sell 1999). Generally, people with property expressed a wish to stay but demanded assurances that their own representatives would have a role to play in the local administration. In addition, they required the transfer to be strictly monitored by internationals, with the involvement of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the International Police Task Force (IPTF), and that Serb police

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should be allowed to join the incoming security forces of the Federation of BiH.1 Negotiations continued to deal with political and practical issues such as police, utilities, or housing. An agreement was central for the prospect of Bosnian Serbs to remain after the transfer of authority because of the ambiguity of the peace agreement. As recognised by Western diplomats, the security issue was one of the great gaps in the DPA since it did not clarify the situation in Sarajevo between the period in which the Bosnian Serb Army left the suburbs and 20 March, when the Bosniak police force would take over (Pomfret 1996a). It did not define the role of Bosnian Serb representatives, so the Democratic Initiative of Sarajevo Serbs required a postponement of the deadline regarding the transfer of authority to create appropriate conditions. As stressed by Maksim Staniši´c, time and solutions were needed to let people decide freely whether to stay or not (Daly 1996). The prospect of keeping a significant number of people after the transfer of authority was weakened by the performance of both local and international actors. SDS leadership contested the transfer of authority from the beginning. Radovan Karadži´c responded claiming that the city would be blooding for decades if the provisions on Sarajevo were not renegotiated (Agencies 1995). SDS leadership was unwilling to easily concede the Serb-held districts after Miloševi´c’s concession so, in parallel to threats, the party also pushed for the modification of the DPA through the orchestration of demonstrations and the celebration of a referendum by midDecember in the five Serb-held districts to be transferred (Sell 1999). SDS pressure continued and, a few days later, United Nations officials reported that Bosnian Serb authorities were blocking people from leaving districts as part of a campaign to make peace negotiators change their minds (Pomfret 1995). In parallel, Pale’s leadership adopted a strategy to gain time, with Momˇcilo Krajišnik requesting the delay of the reunification of Sarajevo for up to one year during the first visit of Leighton Smith, IFOR’s Commander, to Pale in late December (Wilkinson 1995). Delaying the transfer of authority was again one of the three solutions presented by Krajišnik in a letter sent to both Admiral Smith and Carl Bildt. Firstly, Krajišnik proposed to postpone the handover at least until 15 December 1996 to enable new elections in the suburbs. Secondly, he required international funds for the construction of new temporary dwellings to resettle approximately 45,000 families on the Serbian side of the IEBL, i.e. in the territory of Srpsko Sarajevo. Finally, if the transitional period was not extended by 10 January, Krajišnik threatened that all people would leave by mid-March in a chaotic way (Bildt 1998). Clearly, SDS contestation to the territorial provisions of the peace agreement on Sarajevo pursued not relinquishing the policy of dividing the city ethnically. This was seen at the first session of the Assembly of Republika Srpska celebrated after the signature of the DPA, when Momˇcilo Krajišnik forcefully rejected a proposal to accept the new living conditions of Sarajevo Serbs under the rule of the Federation of BiH. Illustratively, Krajišnik argued that such proposal violated the first Strategic 1

With a one-year mandate, IFOR was the force led by NATO and deployed to supervise the implementation of the military annexes of the peace agreement. This task was also conducted by the IPTF, a United Nations civilian police force to train and monitor local police.

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Objective and the very purpose for which the Republika Srpksa had been created. After recognising that they needed time to deal with a post-Dayton situation in Sarajevo that was not envisioned by Bosnian Serb authorities, he stressed that nobody had the right to create any solution in which Sarajevo Serbs stayed together along with Muslims and Croats in a common polity (Krajišnik 1995). In absence of progress to get an extension of the transitional period, Bosnian Serbian authorities tried to persuade people to leave districts on the eve of the deadline set by Krajišnik on 10 January. Thus, police special forces visited apartments seeking to convince citizens from Grbavica and Ilidža to depart (Agencies 1996a). The following day, the departure of people living in Serb-held districts formed a two-mile caravan of vehicles entering Republika Srpska in the surroundings of Sarajevo airport (Agencies 1996b). According to United Nations officials, about 12,000 people had left the Serb-held districts by early February 1996 (Pomfret 1996b). Yet, the SDS was not alone in creating the conditions for a mass exodus of people as SDA also intervened to prevent that a majority of Sarajevo Serbs and Bosnian Serbs remained in Grbavica and the four suburbs. In a more subtle performance, discursive practices of Bosniak leaders portrayed an ambivalent position on the security and right of Bosnian Serbs to stay in Sarajevo (Daly 1995). Moreover, they postponed temporarily the adoption of measures of the peace agreement, such as the enactment of the general amnesty that assured freedom from arrest and persecution for all people but war criminals. The general amnesty was a key measure for most of the adult males, as they had served in the VRS at some point during the war. This delay took place amid a widespread rumor that Izetbegovi´c’s men had already a list of all the VRS soldiers in the area (Žíla 2020). In a context in which nationalist parties acted more or less openly to prevent that a significant number of Bosnian Serbs remained after the transfer of authority, intense negotiations mediated by Michael Steiner continued. The OHR team, which included the U.S. diplomat Louis Sell (1999), finally agreed to a proposal for a smooth transition that was acceptable to all participants in the negotiations. Some provisions included the possibility of joining the police force by incoming Serbs who were not indicted as war criminals, the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in local administration, or the Serbian curricula in schools. However, these measures had little or no effect for many people at the end of the war and following the ethno-territorial division of Bosnia set at the peace agreement. Louis Sell recognised that they had failed to identify the degree of institutional guarantees needed to make power-sharing a reality and to give Bosnian Serbs the status of the constituent nation in the capital city of Bosnia. As he correctly pointed out, it could only have worked as part of a broader arrangement that gave Sarajevo special status outside both the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska. This special status was the organisation of Sarajevo as a District. While this would have certainly contributed to create a favourable environment for a significant number of Bosnian Serbs to stay, its realisation was incompatible with the project of SDS leadership to divide Sarajevo ethnically. People’s will to count on their own authorities to remain in the Serb-held districts after the transfer of authority had been rejected by both Pale and Belgrade political leadership during peace negotiations.

4.1 The Reintegration of Sarajevo

55

Along with the limitations of these measures, the OHR’s proposal for a smooth transition in the Serb-held districts was confronted by international actors. In the early post-war stages, the military priority was establishing basic security without being significantly involved, so the IFOR did not back the proposal arguing that the clause permitting Bosnian Serb policemen to stay until 20 March implied a modification of the deadline set at the peace agreement. This decision was central to the viability of the initiative, considering that the civilian mission required military enforcement in a context of high insecurity and fear. Beyond the military, the United States strategy to weaken the OHR took a decisive step in early February 1996 when Warren Christopher, the US Secretary of State, did not support Carl Bildt in addressing the increasing difficulties in the imminent takeover (Bildt 1998). Izetbegovi´c and Hasan Muratovi´c, BiH Prime Minister, took advantage and used Christopher’s visit to press their maximalist positions and even to attack Bildt’s position after considering that they had the Americans on their side. The absence of military involvement and Christopher’s lack of support for Carl Bildt did not only mean failure to achieve a strong international position in which to address the transfer of the Serb-held districts, but also implied that a weak OHR lost legitimacy in front of local parties in the subsequent negotiations. This transatlantic disagreement was soon exploited by SDA. The party turned their initial approval into direct opposition of the proposal to include transitional power-sharing arrangements until the first post-war elections were held (Sell 1999). Izetbegovi´c declared the agreement inconsistent and invalid with Dayton. Consequently, Pale’s leadership began to sabotage open prospects of an orderly transition with Gojko Kliˇckovi´c calling for the evacuation of people from the Serb-held districts within forty-eight hours. Kliˇckovi´c headed an emergency committee, the Operational Staff for the Accommodation of Residents of Serb Sarajevo, which had been created to reallocate people from the suburbs in Respublika Srpska.

4.1.1 The Rome Meeting and the Transfer of Authority in the Serb-Held Districts International conferences took place after the signature of the DPA to define the generic and ambiguous civilian provisions of the peace agreement and monitor their implementation during the early post-war stages. The objective of the Rome Meeting, celebrated on 18 February 1996, was to achieve a compromise of political elites in issues like Sarajevo and the Federation of BiH. As a result of the resolution on Sarajevo, the capital city of BiH was reaffirmed as a united city in which there would be equal treatment and non-discrimination for Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Others, while setting the Joint Civilian Commission on Sarajevo as the consultative and

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4 The Consolidation of the Division After the War

coordinating body for this purpose (NATO 1996).2 This statement meant the approval of all essential elements of the agreement negotiated by the OHR members, but it had a weak foundation because of the transatlantic disagreement on the international involvement. The transfer of authority was finally defined, and it was to commence in Vogoš´ca on 23 February at a six-day interval. The implementation of the agreement and the transition of local structures, including the police, had to be completed as scheduled by 19 March. The definition and confirmation of the transfer of authority in Rome increased the severity of the SDS performance to prevent that people stayed on after the takeover, with party cadres deploying several methods of intimidation and violence to push for the mass departure of people (Kurtovi´c 1997). Furthermore, there was disruption of public services and spreading of fear by media of Republika Srpska (Agencies 1996d). Increasing manoeuvres from Bosnian Serbs authorities to displace people produced an organised departure, on 17 February, of 800 families of soldiers killed during the war. This took place amid calls for the mass departure of people from the self-designated Foreign Minister of Republika Srpska, Aleksa Buha, who claimed that the international community would not ensure the safety of Bosnian Serbs (McDowall 1996). The pressure from SDS leadership intensified and residents were surprised, when a televised announcement on 19 February, stressed that everyone in Vogoš´ca should have departed by the start of the transfer of authority four days later and that transportation, including dozens of buses, would be provided from Pale by Bosnian Serb authorities (Murphy 1996). Once the transfer of authority started in Vogoš´ca on 23 February, most of the Bosnian Serbs had already departed. This first transfer of authority highlighted the complexity of the situation and the success of multiple forces propelling a mass departure of people. The small number of people who remained, most of them elderly, faced further pressure during the takeover. Actually, a crisis ensued from the outset in the municipal building where about 1,000 people were gathered. Vogoš´ca’s Mayor, Rajko Koprivica, suffered intimidation when the police of the Federation of BiH arrived. The police instructed him to leave contravening the agreement which defined that the civilian administration would be left untouched and turned his office upside down on the pretext of searching for hidden bombs (Bildt 1998). The Mayor criticised Bosnian Serb authorities for their statements, which pushed people out, and internationals for doing nothing to help despairing residents who were fearful of remaining but also overwhelmed by the prospect of moving (Murphy 1996). Actually, the international management of the transfer had been highly criticised even among international officials in Sarajevo, who recognised that the performance had little, if any, consideration of the fear that people felt in relation to the incoming takeover (Roane 1996). The difficulty, if not the impossibility, that a significant 2

The peace agreement recognised only three constitutive ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian minorities such as Yugoslavs, Albanians, Jewish or Roma, are represented in the category “others” as long as they do not have the status of a constitutive group. The Declaration was supported by President Izetbegovi´c, President Miloševi´c, Prime Minister of the Federation of BiH, Hasan Muratovi´c, the President of the Federation of BiH, Krešimir Zubak, and the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Rajko Kasagi´c.

4.1 The Reintegration of Sarajevo

57

number of people stayed in a territory ruled exclusively by another ethnic group shortly after the cessation of hostilities, was very well illustrated by people’s reaction to symbols. The coat of arms of the Republic of BiH, worn by some of the Federation of BiH police despite calls to wear red badges with the words of Federal Police, enraged and frightened the around 1,000 Bosnian Serbs who had stayed following the transfer of authority (Agencies 1996c).3 Similarly, the replacement of the Serbian by the Liljan flag, the official Bosnian flag at that time, further increased fear among the population (Kuzmanovi´c 1996).4 At the beginning of the transfer, Admiral Leighton Smith and Carl Bildt were in Pale talking to Momˇcilo Krajišnik. They went to Vogoš´ca because of pressure from Bildt and Smith, whereby Krajišnik hesitantly encouraged people who wanted to stay to do so. Afterwards, he asked for help in the evacuation of people who did not want to stay. Arguing that there was no alternative and based on humanitarian grounds, both Admiral Smith and the High Representative authorised Bosnian Serb authorities to send trucks to Vogoš´ca in order to evacuate the remaining people who wanted to leave (Bildt 1998). Assistance in the evacuation of people was not restricted to Vogoš´ca. The day after the transfer of authority, NATO and Bosnians Serbs negotiated a plan to allow for the evacuation of people in the four remaining Serb-held districts of Sarajevo. In the suburbs to be transferred, the DPA banned the presence of Serb military personnel and equipment, but the negotiated agreement permitted Serb army vehicles driven by unarmed and un-uniformed soldiers to help in the evacuation of civilians (Kinzer 1996). Hence, the international military forces contributed to the mass exodus of people from the Serb-held districts. This was accentuated by the fact that during the transfer, in a context in which security was a central issue for those who wished to stay, neither the IFOR nor the IPTF played a proactive role. The insufficient intervention of police and military international organisations was highlighted by their performance before the transfer of authority, which was limited to handing out a list of good reasons for remaining (Roane 1996).5 After the turmoil that occurred in Vogoš´ca, a similar fate of mass exodus was anticipated in the rest of Serb-held districts. In Ilijaš, most people had already left when the transfer took place on 28 February. The transfer of authority in the northwestern municipality of Sarajevo implied the connection of the territory of Sarajevo to the rest of the Federation of BiH, allowing federal authorities to officially declare the end of the siege of Sarajevo (Barber 1996). In the subsequent transfer of Hadži´ci, however, another axis of the complex political and territorial post-war transition 3

Despite the IPTF promoted registration of people who wished to stay, not everyone did so for fear of being identified. 4 The coat of arms and the Lilijan flag were the official Bosnian symbols until 1998, when they were modified by Carlos Westendorp, the successor of Carl Bildt as High Representative, after the Parliament of BiH failed to agree a solution. Both had strong resistance from Bosnian Serbs as this was related to Bosnian independence and subsequent war. 5 Despite IPTF’s responsibility in monitoring the takeover, the peace agreement had defined a limited role that was restricted to monitoring the Federal police. Furthermore, they were understaffed and incapable of dealing with the transfer.

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4 The Consolidation of the Division After the War

flourished. This corresponded to Croat-Bosniak relations within the Federation of BiH. Twelve men, thought to be Bosnian Croat police officers, tried to obstruct the transfer by occupying the police station (Hedges 1996). They complained that no one had consulted them on the ethnic composition of the new federation police, which consisted of fifty Muslims, five Bosnian Croats and fifteen Bosnian Serbs. But unlike the passivity of the military to protect civilians, in this case, the occupation was tackled by 100 heavily armed NATO troops. Prior to the important transfer of authority in Ilidža and Grbavica, in terms of symbolism and population numbers, Bosnian Serbs elites ordered citizens to plunder housing upon leaving the city. Equally, intimidation occurred with Bosnian Serbs gangs, who were blamed for burning several buildings and even committing a murder (Agencies 1996e). Despite the agreement to increase the presence of military and international police reached after the mediation of Steiner, lawless activities were particularly violent in the subsequent transfer conducted in the municipality of Ilidža. SDS leadership exploited the passivity of an IFOR that still refrained from intervening because of its minimalist approach. It produced astonishing situations such as the inaction of Italian troops when an elderly couple required intervention to prevent Bosnian Serb gangs blasting their house (Holbrooke 1998). When the takeover of central neighbourhood of Grbavica was completed by 19 March 1996, Sarajevo was fully reintegrated after a painful and lingering siege. Its completion, however, had the cost of further decreasing the city’s ethnic diversity given that only about 10% of the people, out of the 80,000 Bosnian Serbs living at the end of the war, stayed. The poor involvement of the military, more concerned with avoiding casualties, allowed SDS leadership to freely push Sarajevo Serbs and Bosnian Serbs out of the districts to be transferred. Carl Bildt recognised the failure of the international community in the management of the transfer of Grbavica and the four suburbs. Frustrated also by the performance of Bosniak leadership, Bildt claimed that international mistakes were only overshadowed by the fact that Alija Izetbegovi´c was responsible for betraying the multi-ethnic city (Bildt 1998). The performance of the SDA leadership in Sarajevo was not in line with any authority allegedly committed to the preservation of ethnic diversity in the Bosnian capital city. Nonetheless, the focus of Carl Bildt on the betrayal made by Izetbegovi´c ignored the fact that SDS leadership had actively and comprehensively acted to produce a mass exodus of people in line with the wartime policy of dividing Bosnian Serbs from other ethnic groups. Moreover, the institutionalisation of ethnoterritorialities in the peace agreement was both a heavy burden and a very effective mechanism against the preservation of ethnic diversity. Actually, it produced that the departure towards areas controlled by people’s own ethnic community became the most reasonable option to feel secure at the end of three-and-a-half years of war.

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59

4.2 OHR’s Response to SDA and SDS Ethnocratic Practices SDA and SDS continued conducting ethnocratic practices after the transfer of authority in the area of Sarajevo. As it is analysed in a forthcoming paper, SDA worked to assure exclusive control over institutions with the dissolution of the City Council and the formation of a mono-ethnic Canton. It also adopted discriminative housing legislation that cancelled the right to repossess homes from displaced people and, finally, it resorted to ethnic engineering to consolidate a Bosniak population in the city, through the reallocation of internally displaced persons from other areas of Bosnia into abandoned apartments in the former Serb-held districts. In contrast, SDS aimed at compensating for the loss of the Serb-held districts and developed a project to urbanise the mainly rural municipalities of Srpsko Sarajevo. SDA ethnocratic practices during the first half of 1996 were tackled distinctively by the OHR. Both housing policy and ethnic engineering were hardly responded because of the passivity of the international community in 1996 and 1997 in relation to Annex VII, which recognised the right of displaced people to return to pre-war homes. As it will be analysed in Chap. 5, it was not until the empowerment of the High Representative and the subsequent signature of the Sarajevo Declaration that the international community turned towards the implementation of Annex VII. Prior to the High Representative’s reinforcement, SDA housing policy favouring temporary residents was only responded to with calls demanding the removal of a legislation that was contrary to the peace agreement. In contrast, the mono-ethnic institutional reorganisation of Sarajevo was quickly addressed to secure stability within the Federation of BiH. The international intervention pursued an organisation that guaranteed the inclusion of all ethnic groups, with negotiations taking place in the Federation Forum under the co-chairmanship of Michael Steiner and the US Assistant Secretary of State (Chandler 1999). The United States maintained a significant influence over developments within the Federation during the early post-war period after being the architect of the Federation of BiH that halted the war between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats in 1994. Moreover, the role of the Deputy High Representative within the Federation of BiH’s affairs was reinforced as chairman in the Federation Implementation Council established in 1996, as one of the most important committees within the Federation Forum. In this context, the organisation of the city of Sarajevo was dealt with, at the invitation of Michael Steiner, a mere fortnight after the SDA’s mono-ethnic reorganisation. After a principle agreement signed in April 1996, the Protocol on the Organisation of Sarajevo was finally agreed between Alija Izetbegovi´c and Krešimir Zubak, as President of the Federation of BiH, in October (OHR 1996). Sarajevo would be organised in three layers: an overarching Canton with the city and its suburban municipalities; a City integrated by the four core municipalities, i.e. Stari Grad, Centar, Novo Sarajevo and Novi Grad; and a District under the authority of BiH, which corresponded to those buildings of the state institutions (Fig. 4.1).6 The Protocol set also a power-

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Fig. 4.1 The administrative reorganisation of Sarajevo. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved

sharing system based at that time on the two constituent nations of the Federation of BiH, Bosniaks and Croats, guaranteeing also the participation of representatives from minority ethnic groups in all administrative levels. Since the Constitution of the Federation of BiH did not recognise Serbs as a constitutive group until 2002, they 6

Pale was the unique municipality of Sarajevo that had not remained, partially or integrally, within the Federation of BiH. The District was not subject to the jurisdiction of either Entity, and it was formed by the Presidency of the BiH, Governmental buildings (Council of Ministers), Parliamentary Assembly, Constitutional Court, Central Bank and Commission on Human Rights.

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61

had limited representation within the “Others” marginal category during that period. Finally, the balanced representation of each ethnic group should be extended to all levels of the Cantonal judiciary and executive.7 Despite the insistence of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, the implementation of the Sarajevo Protocol experienced continuous delays and shortcomings, as seen in the three-layer reorganisation. A year and a half later, the Canton had not yet adopted a Law on the City of Sarajevo and the City Council remained in a weak position because of the few competencies and resources vested after being re-established. No less important, while other ethnic groups were once again represented in the institutions of Sarajevo, the power-sharing mechanisms did not develop, in early post-war stages, a governance system promoting cooperation and effective political inclusion of all three Bosnian constituent groups. From a powerful position, the SDA ethnocratic regime was not affected by the three-layered multiethnic institutional reorganisation of Sarajevo and the power structure essentially continued under exclusive party domination until November 2000, when the SDP, for the first time, won Cantonal elections.8 In the case of SDS, the party responded with a project to urbanise Srpsko Sarajevo after the loss of the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo. The project was defined as vital and symbolic for the survival of Serb people both in BiH and Serbia (Agencies 1997), and its comprehensive nature sought to avoid any functional dependence on Sarajevo. However, the project counted on a very modest budget of 107 million KM (Srpsko Sarajevo 2002).9 Due to this limitation, housing was to be developed through the provision of materials to the population and the distribution of land plots in socially owned land.10 This practice of distributing socially owned land amongst the population aimed at consolidating territories ethnically homogeneous during the post-war period. It was widespread in Republika Srpska and in areas of the Federation of BiH controlled by the HDZ. One of the best examples in the Bosnian Croat areas of the Federation of BiH was the construction of around 1,500 new housing units ˇ in the Stolac and Capljina area, much of it on agricultural land formerly used by displaced people (OHR 1999b). Srpsko Sarajevo was particularly active in building commercial enterprises on formerly owned social land. Its municipalities were among the highest in the rate of land plots under development in the Republika Srpska in 2002 (Table 4.1). In the rest of the Bosnian Serb entity, the distribution of socially owned land was particularly

7

In the re-established City of Sarajevo, each group identified in the constitution of the Federation of BiH, i.e. Bosniaks, Croats and Others, were guaranteed a minimum of 20% of the seats, which in practice benefited SDA and HDZ. Bosniaks and Croats were guaranteed between 15 and 20% of positions within the Government, the same proportion for the third group, the so-called “Others” (OHR 1996). 8 Previously, SDA ran in coalition with the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) in 1998 elections, so the executive authority was shared between members of both Bosniak parties. 9 The Bosnian convertible mark (KM) was introduced as the currency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998. 10 Offically defined in 1953, the Yugoslav system was based on the social property.

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Table 4.1 Land allocations in Srpsko Sarajevo (in bold) in the context of Republika Srpska (ESI 2002)

Land plots allocated

Plots under development

% of plots under development

Bijeljina

3,580

600

16.8

Prijedor

2,600

575

22.1

Zvornik

2,540

956

37.6

Modrica

1,775

790

44.5

Pale

1,037

500

48.2

Teslic

845

175

20.7

Doboj

740

140

18.9

Srpsko Ilidža

500

400

80.0

Srpsko Novo Sarajevo

500

170

34.0

Vukosavalje

458

319

69.7

promoted by Milorad Dodik when he became Prime Minister in January 1998.11 His government modified legislation to facilitate the free allocation of land to displaced persons (Toal and Dahlman 2006). This policy counted initially with the approval of international actors and the OHR only suggested two changes that were accepted. Firstly, there should not be allocation of land previously used for residential, religious or cultural purposes. Secondly, the selection of beneficiaries should prioritise people living in properties claimed by displaced people. However, once the international community intensified the implementation of Annex VII, the allocation of socially owned land to displaced people was increasingly seen as an undermining factor in the right of people to decide whether to return to their homes of origin. In absence of a reform of legislation on socially owned property, the second High Representative, the Ambassador of Spain to the United Nations and former Ministry of Foreign Affairs Carlos Westendorp, enacted a decision in May 1999 suspending the right of local authorities to reallocate socially owned land used before the war for cultural or religious services, or by natural persons for residential, business or agricultural purposes (OHR 1999a). The decision prohibited this typology of transactions to protect the rights of displaced people. The initial concern of the OHR was to regulate the reallocation of minority land use rights to avoid creating a further obstacle to returns and reintegration. The decision to restrict the reallocation of socially owned land was not supported by all international organisations. This fact illustrated the absence of a strategic vision on key policy questions and the reproduction of transatlantic disagreement between 11

Milorak Dodik has been the leading political figure in Republika Srspka in the last fifteen years. In the late 1990s, he received strong support from international actors, who sought a moderate leader to defeat SDS. Since 2006, he has been defending more nationalist positions and even threatening with the cessation of the Bosnian Serb entity. Dodik has been occupying all key political positions, including the Presidency of Republika Srpska and, currently, the Serb membership of the Presidency of BiH.

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63

the OSCE, which was led by successive diplomats from the United States, and the European-headed OHR. In this sense, the OSCE considered that the free decision to return had to prevail instead of developing a comprehensive control over land and returns. There was a divide between minimalist and maximalist visions within the OHR about its role in Bosnia but advocates of the maximalist approach took the lead and the policy on land allocations evolved from the initial decision, which focused on protecting the possibility of displaced people to return, to an opposition of any kind of allocation. Indeed, Wolfgang Pretrisch, the Austrian diplomat who became the third High Representative after replacing Carlos Westendorp in August 1999, further extended the decision for six months at the end of its validity, on 31 December 1999. This was not simply a temporal extension as the new decision dropped the word reallocation. Consequently, all kinds of allocations in the categories defined were prohibited, regardless of whether these had previously been used by displaced people (OHR 1999b). While recognising violations and the existence of some problematic cases, the resolution stressed that the Decision had been effective in strengthening the negotiating position of RRTF officers in dealing with municipal authorities and, at the same time, in the reduction of the number of reallocations of socially owned land.12 In the extension, the OHR also recognised the interference that the Decision was causing in the development of commercial projects and noted the possibility of granting exemptions in certain cases. With a strong sense that land allocation and new housing constructions were a threat to the implementation of Annex VII, the High Representative again modified the concept with a significant and retrospective expansion of the land ban allocation before the deadline set for 30 June 2000. With the new decision adopted on 27 April, local authorities of any institution in BiH were prevented from taking any decision regarding socially owned land, i.e. disposal, allocation, transfer, sell or rent. Any operation of socially owned land made by the authorities of the Entities after the beginning of war, in April 1992, was considered discriminatory unless proven otherwise (OHR 2000). By imposing a general ban, the OHR tried to set transparency and tackle discrimination in land planning. The control of abuses in the distribution of socially owned land were developed through a system of granting waivers. In this regard, a written exemption to the prohibition was only given in case that the competent authority clearly demonstrated that the proposed transfer was non-discriminatory and in the best interest of the public. With the April 2000 decision, the OHR became the main planning authority in the country and had the responsibility for approving most of the transactions in cities like Sarajevo, as socially owned land was the exclusive category in urban areas.13 The OHR’s role was not solely to act as an appeal body, but to review every single land 12

The Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) was established to coordinate international efforts on the refugee-return process. It brought together the key agencies and organisations dealing with the return of refugees and economic reconstruction, such as the UNHCR, the OHR, the World Bank or the European Commission. 13 In order to ensure effective planning of socialist cities, urban construction land was nationalised and converted into socially owned land. There was no urban private construction land.

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4 The Consolidation of the Division After the War

transaction produced in the nineties, what expanded OHR’s power and responsibility in the management of land beyond the existing control of any European country (ESI 2002). This massive intervention contrasted with the initial support to Dodik’s policy in 1998, showing the important evolution of the OHR in an issue that had significant political and economic implications. This evolution and the subsequent implementation of the April 2000 decision highlighted the absence of an overall strategy after the empowerment of the High Representative and the organisational limitations. With funding and employees being allocated by members of the Peace Implementation Council, the OHR had expanded to an organisation of over 700 staff with an annual budget of more than US$30 million (ESI 2000).14 But its configuration was often criticised by other international actors. The staff was composed of many people on short-term secondments who could even lack relevant experience in areas where they were called upon to make decisions. Shortcomings were also present in a poor and inefficient field presence beyond Sarajevo. In terms of strategy, many considered that it was the OHR’s fault, with a discoordination caused by the absence of a clear and efficient management structure (ICG 2001). In fact, it was not until January 2003 when the OHR devised a Mission Implementation Plan to identify the main tasks needed to accomplish its mission, which was being oriented towards the European integration of Bosnia. In this context, the OHR significantly widened its intervention in the land policy without proportionally increasing knowledge and resources to ensure enforcement, so the revision of all land transactions in Bosnia, except in the Brˇcko District, became an administrative nightmare. The revision depended on the information supplied by the municipalities regarding the proposed land transactions. But the OHR lacked expertise in planning and had no more than three full-time staff devoted to the task, so the waiting period for a waiver could last well over a year (ESI 2002). Moreover, the April 2000 Decision failed to develop an adequate implementation procedure as it never resolved the basic question of whether the OHR considered public support for resettlement to be legitimate and in the best interest of the public. Instead, the OHR reserved the right to make judgements in each individual case without clarifying procedures for judging the public interest. It inevitably appeared as arbitrary decisions, affecting the legitimacy of its intervention in this field. Illustratively, senior OHR officials soon warned that the Decision had put the organisation in a very precarious position as they were unable to implement a law imposed by themselves. The original decision to ban those allocations that intended to discourage returns was clearly warranted and precisely targeted. However, decisions retroactively extending the ban to all allocations discouraged legitimate investments and forced 14

The European Union contributed with the 50.6% of the budget until May 1999, when it increased the per centage to 53% (EC 2007). The other main donors were the United States (22%), Japan (10%) Russia (4%), Canada (3%), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (2.5%) and other non-EU countries, including Balkan countries (5.5%). Despite the growth of the OHR, it was still the least costly of the principal international organisations and its budget was reduced to 25 million e two years later, in 2001.

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65

most transactions into informal channels, which further damaged the OHR’s credibility (Wiliams 2013). In absence of a mechanism to monitor the extent of land allocation and means to enforce decisions, the main tool of the OHR was the dismissal of authorities in non-compliant municipalities such as the removal of six mayors and other municipal officials between 2001 and 2002. Yet, these dismissals had little effect on local practices as authorities relied on the assumption that international organisations would not destroy houses already built (ICG 2002).15 Hence, the OHR’s land policy was ineffective and unable to stop illegal constructions. Due to the lack of an integral reform of the system, including land property, the decision to restrict the allocation of socially owned land finally lasted four years. In May 2003, and only two months after the last extension, the OHR enacted harmonised Laws on Construction Land in both entities by dividing socially owned construction land into state-owned and private property, largely based on whether it had been developed by a private actor (OHR 2003a; b). The end of the land-ban allocation had been supported by the report of the European Stabilization Initiative (2002) that assessed the management of land at the request of the OHR. The report concluded that land allocation had not been a determining factor in the choice between return and resettlement as it had only affected about 5% of the population. In addition, new housing programmes did not represent attempts to defeat Annex VII considering that, at that time, it was widely implemented in relation to the repossession of housing. Thus, the approval of the Law on Construction Land for the entire country culminated reforms enacted by the High Representative and, as it is analysed in Chap. 7, it became a turning point in the post-socialist urban transformation of Sarajevo.

References Agencies (1995, November 27) Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadži´c is demanding that provisions of the accord concerning Sarajevo be renegotiated. Balkan Watch, vol 2.46 Agencies (1996a, January 10) Specijalci tjeraju gradjane. Oslobodjenje Agencies (1996b, January 12) Bosnian Serbs flee homes in Sarajevo. The New York Times Agencies (1996c, February 28) More Serbs abandon Sarajevo. The Columbian Agencies (1996d, March 4) On thursday, Bosnian Federation police deployed to Ilijas. Balkan Watch, The Balkan Institute, vol 3.10 Agencies (1996e, March 11) Sarajevo put to test; Again chaos fanned in suburbs before Federation takes over. Associated Press Agencies (1997, June 21) The development of the Serbian Sarajevo represents the vital interest of the Serbian people on the both sides of the Drina river. Srpska Republika News Agency Barber T (1996, March 1) Siege of Sarajevo declared at an end. The Independent Bildt C (1998) Peace journey: the struggle for peace in Bosnia. Weidenfield and Nicolson, London Chandler D (1999) Bosnia: faking democracy after Dayton. Pluto Press, London Daly E (1995, November 30) Serbs Threaten to Quit Sarajevo. The Independent Daly E (1996, January 11) Sarajevo Serbs put case to Bildt. The Independent 15

Illegal constructions comprised the development of housing without obtaining the necessary building permit or the illegal transactions of land. These constructions did not only involve land allocations promoted by authorities to consolidate ethnic majorities, as it is analysed in Chapter 7.

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EC (2007) Commission Decision C/2007/6202 on support to the operational budget of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina from January to June 2008. December 14 ESI (2002) From Dayton to Europe, land development and the future of democratic planning. European Stability Initiative, Berlin/Sarajevo Hedges C (1996, March 7). Bid to foil a Sarajevo transfer is ended by a NATO threat. The New York Times Holbrooke R (1998) To end a war. Random House, New York ICG (2001) Bosnia: reshaping the international machinery. ICG Balkans Report, 121, November 29 ICG (2002) The continuing challenge of refugee return in Bosnia & Herzegovina. ICG Balkans Report, 137, December 13 Kinzer S (1996, February 25) NATO to aid Serbs fleeing Sarajevo to “reduce tension”, relief agencies to allow military vehicles to aid in evacuating refugees. The New York Times Krajišnik M (1995) Assembly of Republika Srpska 1992–1995, 56th Session. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 0215–4842, The Hague Kurtovi S (1997, February 4) Pale odgovorne za egzodus. Oslobodjenje, p 7 Kuzmanovi´c J (1996, February 24) Shaky start for rebirth of Sarajevo—Muslims Harass Fleeing Serbs. Chicago Sun-Times McDowall L (1996, February 18) Peace-shy Serbs flee Sarajevo, imminent takeover by Muslim-led government strikes fear of reprisal. Associated Press Murphy DE (1996, February 21) Bosnian Serbs desperately try to evacuate Sarajevo suburb. Los Angeles Times NATO (1996) The Rome Statement. February 18 OHR (1996) Conclusions: guiding principles of the Civilian consolidation plan, PIC Paris. November 14 OHR (1999a) Decision suspending the power of local authorities in the Federation and the RS to re-allocate socially-owned land in cases where the land was used on 6 April 1992 for residential, religious, cultural, private agricultural or private business activities. May 26 OHR (1999b) Decision extending until 30 June 2000 the Decision on certain types of socially-owned land of 26 May 1999. December 30 OHR (2000) Decision on re-allocation of socially owned land, superseding the 26 May 1999 and 30 December 1999 Decisions. April 27 OHR (2003a) Decision Enacting the Law on Construction Land of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. May 16 OHR (2003b) Decision Enacting the Law on Construction Land of Republika Srpska. May 16 Pomfret J (1995, December 23) Sarajevo Serbs prepare to go: factory machines, bodies being packed for departure. The Washington Post Pomfret J (1996a, January 31) Police force slow to deploy around Sarajevo. The Washington Post Pomfret J (1996b, February 3) Many Serbs pulling up stakes in Sarajevo suburbs. The Washington Post Roane K (1996, February 23) Bosnia-Herzegovina: Sarajevo Serbs driven to flee by own side. Inter Press Service Sell L (1999) The Serb flight from Sarajevo: Dayton first failure. East Eur Polit Soc 14(1):179–202 Srpsko Sarajevo (2002) Informacije o projektu I i II u Srpsko Sarajevo za period 1996–2002. Srpsko Sarajevo, Pale Toal G, Dahlman C (2006) The ‘West Bank of the Drina’: land allocation and ethnic engineering in Republika Srpska. Trans Inst Br Geogr 31(3):304–322

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Wilkinson T (1995, December 27) Sarajevo unity hits a snag: more time needed, Serb leaders tell U.S. Chicago Sun-Times Williams R (2013) Post-conflict land tenure issues in Bosnia: Privatization and the politics of reintegration of displaced. In: Unruh J, Williams R (eds) Land and post-conflict peacebuilding. Earthscan, New York, pp 145–176 Žíla O (2020) The flight of Serbs from Sarajevo: not the Dayton agreement’s first failure, but its first logical consequence. Nationalities Papers, 1–19.https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.52

Chapter 5

The Struggle to Rebuild Ethnic Diversity in Sarajevo

Abstract This chapter focuses on the international strategy to rebuild Sarajevo’s ethnic diversity after its urban area had been territorially divided between the two entities in the peace agreement. Firstly, there is an analysis of the changing interest of the international community in relation to minority returns during the first two postwar years. Subsequently, the empowerment of the High Representative in December 1997 is addressed considering that it culminated an increasing international involvement in the civilian annexes of the DPA and became a turning point in the promotion of minority returns. A direct consequence of the empowerment of the High Representative was the adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration, the internationally devised strategy aimed at remaking the symbolic ethnic diversity of the city. Finally, the focus on its complex implementation reveals SDA obstructionist practices as well as the limitations of the Sarajevo Declaration, which failed to rebuild ethnic diversity despite finally succeeding in the restitution of housing. Keywords Ethnic diversity · Sarajevo declaration · Minority returns · Housing restitution · Obstructionism

5.1 International Approach to Minority Returns Before the Empowerment of the High Representative The Bosnian War resulted in the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War (Hitchcok 2003), with about half of the 4.4 million Bosnian citizens displaced during the conflict. While the peace agreement legalised ethnoterritorialities, it also included Annex VII. This was a key provision recognising the right of displaced people to freely move back to places of origin, and more particularly to their home, as well as the creation of a safe environment and the harmonious reintegration of people displaced. The right of people to repossess pre-war homes was initially included in the London International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia held in August 1992, and again incorporated in the Basic Principles set in Geneva in September 1995 before the peace negotiations conducted in Dayton. Interestingly, this right constituted a new precedent in international politics because in previous peace agreements, such as in Angola, Afghanistan and © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Martín-Díaz, The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80575-3_5

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Cambodia, returns were defined to occur to the whole country of origin, to their homeland or to a place of their choice, avoiding in all cases to include the return to “home” (Albert 1997; Rosand 1998). Thus, Annex VII could become the main instrument to reverse the outcomes of ethnic cleansing, having the potential to erode the ethno-territorial order legalised in the peace agreement. In the case of Sarajevo, a successful implementation could produce the reconstruction of the ethnic diversity existing before the war. Annex VII also defined that early returns were an important objective to settle the conflict in BiH, and even placed it in a central position during the early post-war stages. In practice, the international community refrained from the very fulfilment of Annex VII. This was observed when first attempts to go back to their homes of origin took place in the spring of 1996. In this sense, there were notable incidents between late April and May when groups of Bosniaks, encouraged by political authorities, tried to return to Republika Srpska, resulting in the death of two people and dozens injured (Toal and Dahlman 2011). Violence also occurred in the area of Sarajevo, when Bosnian Serbs attacked Bosniak vehicles outside Trnovo. The municipality of Trnovo had been divided between the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska but the town was entirely under the control of Republika Srpska. Bosnian Serbs showed their determination to keep Bosniaks out claiming that the IEBL was a real border and that they could not live together (Roane 1996). The main international organisations, namely the OHR, IFOR, IPTF and UNHCR were quick to respond to the violence generated and, on 27 April 1996, IFOR’s Operation Shortstop was announced. Its purpose was to tackle violence without changing the minimalist concept of military intervention previously seen in Chap. 4. With IFOR refusing to support returns and engaging in the creation of a secure environment, the Operation restricted and prevented large-scale movement of vehicles between entities to reduce the risk of incidents. IFOR established its own checkpoints along the line of separation between entities, protecting the Republika Srpska from incursions from other ethnic groups (Toal and Dahlman 2011). Consequently, the operation turned the IEBL into a physical border and suspended indefinitely Annex VII. These early clashes illustrated that SDS and SDA responded differently to minority returns. On the one hand, Annex VII was a threat to the SDS party’s foundational goal of creating an ethnically homogeneous polity of Bosnian Serbs in BiH, legalised in the peace agreement with the recognition of Republika Srpska. The right to repossess pre-war homes challenged the essence of the SDS political project, which saw Dayton as the first step to complete separation. This opposition was visible in the diplomatic arena during peace negotiations. Arguing that Bosnian Serbs from the Federation did not wish to go back to their homes, Serbs hoped to reduce the potential impact of

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returns of people belonging to other ethnic groups and pushed to include the right of compensation in circumstances where properties could not be restored (Cox 1998).1 SDA, on the other hand, also followed the policy of ethnicisation of territories under its authority but, unlike SDS and HDZ, it was the only party advocating for the implementation of Annex VII and the defence of the right to go back to homes of origin. Despite the fragile environment, SDA authorities propelled the early return of Bosniaks, resorting to several strategies to develop the parties’ own political and territorial agenda. These strategies included the provision of financial support and political backing to the association’s representative of the displaced, direct assistance regarding mobility, and the push for the return of displaced populations, relying on the moral argument that Bosniaks had been the ethnic group most affected by war (Ito 2001). Politically, the return of pre-war Bosniak population throughout the Bosnian territory was a key element in SDA policy. As Bosniaks constituted the main ethnic group in BiH, a mass displacement to homes of origin could result in the SDA regaining numerical parity or even superiority in those territories where the Bosniak population had been violently expelled during the war (Ito 2001; Woodward 2001). Therefore, the authorities had the potential to exploit returns as a political strategy to erode or reverse the war gains of the two other nationalist parties. In a context in which Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat authorities sought the consolidation of ethnic constituencies within respective territories, prominent Bosniak politicians adopted maximalist stances amid claims that Annex VII could only be satisfied by the physical return of every displaced person. Haris Silajdži´c, wartime Prime Minister of the Federation of BiH and then president of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, went even further and advocated the use of force if necessary (Williams 2005). During the first two post-war years, ethno-territorial boundaries prevailed over the right of displaced Bosnians to move back to pre-war homes. Annex VII was only rhetorical as big capitals had other priorities and there was no political support to push for minority returns (ICG 1998b). Hence, the international community did not address the inherent political conflict existing from the return of people to an ethnoterritoriality ruled by a distinct community, privileging the less conflictive situation of the so-called majority returns. It was seen in the repatriation plan elaborated by the UNHCR and announced in June 1996. The Target Area Return Programme should allow a smooth and progressive return of displaced people only to those areas where they constituted an ethnic majority after the war.2 In practice, this approach 1

This clause certainly weakened the prospect of domicile return as parties could legitimately choose between allowing return and providing compensation. In practice, however, the right to compensation was largely ignored during the peace implementation because of the concern that the option of receiving compensation would deter people from going back to pre-war homes (Rosand 2000). 2 The fundamental criterion for the selection of those targeted areas was that the return of former residents was feasible from a political and security point of view. Its High Commissioner, Sadako Ogata, reaffirmed such an approach in the Peace Implementation Council celebrated in June 1996, when she stated that the UNHCR would continue pursuing returns to areas where people were part of the ethnic majority and where destruction, and not security, was the major obstacle (UNHCR 1996).

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contributed to the consolidation of the ethnic territorial division of Bosnia during the early post-war stages since there were 45,523 minority returns out of 431,355 in 1996 and 1997 (MHRR 2005). While the policy of promoting majority returns still prevailed in 1997, the temporary suspension of Annex VII evolved because of local pressure and the increasing focus on the civilian annexes of the peace agreement. On the one hand, displaced people became more organised as seen in the Coalition for Return, a multi-ethnic movement of displaced persons from all the country formed in late 1996 that lobbied authorities to change the prevailing political obstructionism (ICG 1997).3 On the other hand, the international community turned its attention to the civilian annexes of the DPA. In November 1996, the Peace Implementation Council held in Paris concluded that the resettlement of displaced people was a priority and requested the implementation of principles for the civilian consolidation of the peace process in a two-year plan (OHR 1996a). The Action Plan approved the following month confirmed the importance of creating favourable conditions to encourage the free return of refugees and displaced persons to places of their choice (OHR 1996b). A few months later, at the Peace Implementation Council held in Sintra in May 1997, there was a breakthrough in relation to Annex VII. For the first time, minority returns were established as a priority and due consideration began, which was defined in the DPA, as a central factor in the stabilisation of Bosnia (OHR 1997a). Assistance for housing and local infrastructure was to be included in the acceptance of return and priority was given to those municipalities receptive to ethnic minorities. The first step in the progressive involvement of the international community to implement Annex VII and promote minority returns was a conscious political decision (Ito 2001; Toal and Dahlman 2011). It was a consequence of the increasing attention on those civilian provisions that had been initially neglected in detriment to the military concerns. This was attributable to changes in U.S. foreign policy after Clinton’s re-election in November 1996. Regarding Bosnia, the government of the United States conducted a major policy review in spring 1997 and launched a more determined civilian implementation of the DPA (GAO 1998). It implied that the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which had replaced IFOR’s mission in December 1996, increased its involvement in supporting civilian aspects of the peace operation, including local security for people going back to their pre-war homes in summer 1997. A key figure in NATO’s progressive departure from the minimalist approach was Madeleine Albright, the Secretary for State after Clinton’s re-election, who contributed to moving the Pentagon towards a more muscular approach in Bosnia. This shift was strengthened by Clinton’s choice of a veteran of the Dayton negotiations, Wesley Clark, to serve as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (Toal and Dahlman 2011). Such departure from the minimalist military approach was related to the increasing awareness that a military mission could not be completed unless conditions on the ground improved and, equally, that the strength of nationalist parties could be reduced through the return of displaced people from other ethnicities. Moreover, 3

In 1997, the Coalition organised three major conferences in Banja Luka, Mostar and Tuzla.

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there was increasing pressure from European countries in their desire to repatriate Bosnian refugees. Germany was the country hosting more Bosnian refugees with up to 320,000 people and started their repatriation on 1 October 1996 (Agencies 1996). The expected return of 200,000 refugees during 1997 increased pressure on international agencies involved. Unless there was a sudden advance in the field of minority returns, the repatriation would result in a reallocation to majority areas as 70% of Bosnian refugees in Europe had become ethnic minorities in their homes of origin (USIP 1997). Repatriation of Bosnian refugees from Germany was often voluntary, and it was caused by the threat of deportation and the suspension or reduction of social benefits (Cox 1998). Authorities and media increasingly reported that conditions had changed sufficiently to allow returns to Republika Srpska, ignoring declarations from local authorities regarding security threats and discrimination that ethnic minorities would have to face (ICG 1998a). In that context, the UNHCR launched the first programme in the promotion of minority returns in March 1997, but it held the technical approach adopted in previous programmes. In the Open Initiative, municipalities could receive reconstruction aid only by declaring themselves open to minority returns and committing to their reintegration. The initiative did not produce a change of tendency as it fostered the return of ethnic minorities without politically tackling the inherent obstructionism of ethnocracies. During the first ten months of the programme, there were only 580 out of the 50,000 cases targeted by mid-1998 (ICG 1998c). The reduced impact of this initiative and other smaller programmes to foster minority returns was also illustrated by the results of repatriation from abroad produced in the second half of 1997, with about 70% of returns being in the form of resettlement in the majority areas (ICG 1998a). Yet, the initiative certainly showed the progressive transformation in the conception to promote minority returns since it received approximately 80% of UNHCR’s funds in 1998. Sarajevo presented a higher number of minority returns compared to the rest of the country, totalising the 44% in the Federation of BiH (ICG 1998c).4 However, opposition and obstructionism also existed. UNHCR spokesperson, Kris Janowski, claimed that episodes of ethnic discrimination were identified in a programme funding the rebuilding of apartments in neighbourhoods like Dobrinja, Oteš and Grbavica (Kuki´c 1997). Early petitions of displaced Sarajevans to repossess homes were generally rejected by the Government. In 1997, 80% out of the 1,118 complaints filed dealt with a violation of the right to repossess pre-war homes (ICG 1998c). SDA called to implement Annex VII and pushed for the return of Bosniaks to areas where they had been expelled. But at the same time, it tried to prevent a mass return of non-Bosniaks to the city. This double standard became particularly visible during the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration, when the city became the centre of the international effort to promote minority returns. 4

These numbers were much higher than the 3,078 minorities who had moved back to Republika Srpska during the same period. Relative figures clearly demonstrating higher returns to Sarajevo encouraged international actors to start the full implementation of Annex VII in the capital city of BiH after the High Representative was empowered in December 1997.

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5.2 The Empowerment of the High Representative and the Adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration During the first year and a half of the peace implementation, the restricted authority of the High Representative constituted a limitation for the implementation of the civilian annexes. While this weak position began to evolve in 1996, when the Peace Implementation Council urged the OHR to issue strong recommendations to local politicians and to advise other international organisations, the High Representative’s powers remained limited to making non-binding suggestions. A turning point regarding its role arrived in May 1997, when the Steering Board authorised the High Representative to take stronger action to prevent political manipulation of the media on the eve of municipal elections. More specifically, the Steering Board conferred the right to curtail or suspend any media network or programme whose output was in persistent contravention of the DPA (OHR 1997c). This right permitted the High Representative to adopt a more assertive role in coordination with SFOR. It was remarkable the operation carried out in Pale in October 1997 to seize control of the Serbian Radio and Television, the public broadcasting corporation in Republika Srpska under the control of SDS. The success of the operation contributed to a transformation of the vision held by the main international actors, which acknowledged that the challenge of the political power from nationalist parties was both feasible and appropriate (ESI 1999b). In the Peace Implementation Council celebrated in Bonn in December 1997, lack of progress in key areas of the civilian annexes and the prospect of a gradual reduction of aid, ensured that new mechanisms were approved. It was then when the Peace Implementation Council granted the High Representative specific powers to effectively implement the civilian annexes. The High Representative was authorised to make any lawful decisions ensuring the execution of the peace agreement as well as the functioning of public institutions. In other words, the High Representative was given powers to enact legislation and dismiss obstructive authorities. Accordingly, the role of the High Representative graduated from a mere supervision of the civilian annexes into the final authority in Bosnia with legislative and executive authority. Its reinforcement must be seen as a strategic tool for political interventions at the disposal of the broader post-war international mission in BiH. In this sense, the OHR would continue operating within the framework of the Peace Implementation Council, particularly of its Steering Board, and being dependent on the political support of main powers. Significantly, no explicit limits to the powers were defined in Bonn so the High Representative could interpret the scope of his own powers. Such extraordinary measures, which could easily undermine the process of democratisation inherent to the liberal peacebuilding mission, were conceived temporary and exceptional as pointed by the High Representative in his discourse in Bonn. In this sense, Carlos Westendorp expressed the need for firm and rapid action to clear away the most serious obstacles as time was limited (OHR 1997b). At the same time, the Peace Implementation Council held in Bonn culminated the increasing focus on minority returns, and finally became a central goal in the

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implementation of the peace agreement. Taking advantage of the new powers vested in the High Representative, the OHR developed into the main organisation to manage Annex VII through the appointment of the Deputy High Representative as head of the RRTF. With these changes, international actors finally adopted the political approach to deal with minority returns, leaving behind the humanitarian stance that had prevailed under the coordination of the UNHCR. To test the new approach, the international community focused on the city of Sarajevo and endorsed the High Representative to develop a strategy to rebuild ethnic diversity. Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Council expressed disappointment at the failure of the authorities in Sarajevo to encourage and facilitate the safe return of Sarajevans who had left. Remarkably, it also pointed that ensuring a multi-ethnic city was central to the implementation of the DPA, claiming Sarajevo’s position as the capital of BiH would remain impaired as long as the city remained largely mono-ethnic (OHR 1998a). The decision to begin the promotion of minority returns in the Bosnian capital was symbolic because of Sarajevo’s long tradition of ethnic diversity and coexistence, as well as pragmatic. For international actors, Sarajevo was instrumental to ignite the process throughout Bosnia. It was the biggest city and concentrated most international agencies and staff, so the promotion of Annex VII in the city should facilitate triggering returns elsewhere in the country. Equally important, the responsibility to making Annex VII work was transferred to SDA and Bosniak elites, after their performance influenced into opening up minority returns during the two first post-war years.5 Shortly after the empowerment, in early February 1998, the High Representative co-chaired the Sarajevo Return Conference to define the strategy. The Conference was attended by the main local and international authorities, including senior representatives of the OHR and the Peace Implementation Council, the UNHCR, the United States, the European Union, as well as members of BiH’s Presidency and other senior State, Entity and Cantonal officials. Because of its status as the capital city and its historical multi-ethnic character, the participants agreed that the Sarajevo Canton should be a model of coexistence and tolerance for the rest of the country and had to take the lead in the unconditional right of every Bosnian citizen to go back home (OHR 1998b). More specifically, the Sarajevo Declaration set a comprehensive approach to create appropriate conditions for returns through an intervention in five fields: legislative, housing, public order and security, employment and education. In order to supervise implementation, participants agreed on several measures and deadlines to meet these obligations. For instance, economic assistance was conditioned to adequate progress such as in the adoption of property and housing legislation by the Federation of BiH and the return of at least 20,000 minority pre-war residents in 1998.6 5

Further local pressure came from NGO’s like the Coalition for Return, the Serb Civic Council and other citizen movements that pushed for returns. 6 About 228,000 people who had left the Sarajevo Canton had not yet returned by the end of 1997 (ICG 1998a). Ensuring the return of 20,000 Sarajevans belonging to non-Bosniak ethnic groups was

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In order to address the inherent obstructionism conducted by nationalist parties, the new political approach was put in place. Through the supervision, assistance and orientation of local authorities, the international community was closely involved in those mixed bodies created to implement the Declaration. These were the cases of the Employment and Return Committee, the Education Working Group and the Sarajevo Housing Committee, in which local officials held the authority of implementation.7 Chaired by Mirza Hajri´c, advisor of Alija Izetbegovi´c, the main organ was the Sarajevo Return Commission and included members of Cantonal and municipal institutions, representatives of displaced persons from all ethnic groups, and international organisations such as the OHR and the UNHCR.

5.3 The Complex Implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration During the post-war period, SDA had been working to consolidate a Bosniak ethnocratic regime in Sarajevo through distinct practices. Despite formally accepting the adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration, this policy would only change if ethnic minorities could also go back to the rest of the country. This position was perfectly seen in the Sarajevo Return Conference, when the Bosniak leader expressed doubts regarding a mass return of displaced Sarajevans. Resorting to the reciprocity argument, Alija Izetbegovi´c claimed that he was not ready to assume the specific obligations set in the Declaration unless a similar conference was organised to ensure that non-Serbs went back to Republika Srpska (Kebo 1998).8 This stance was incorporated in a subtle way in the plan approved by Cantonal authorities to implement the Declaration. While the plan estimated that the rebuilding of housing should allow a return of 40,000 people, it set limits to implementation through the inclusion of a provision stating that eviction would only take place in cases in which people illegally accumulated more than one apartment in the city, i.e. the so-called multiple occupancy (Beˇcirovi´c 1998a, b). Multiple occupancy occurred a landmark defined to supervise implementation. It was a small proportion of minority displaced but it could only be achieved with a strong commitment from local authorities, this would imply breaking the obstructionism from ethnocratic regimes to the return of people belonging to other ethnicities. 7 This model contrasted with the one developed in the Brˇ cko District during the same period, where the return of refugees and internally displaced persons was strictly developed by international organisations (see Moore 2013). 8 The Return Conference in Republika Srpska reclaimed by Izetbegovi´ c took place on 28 April 1998 in Banja Luka (OHR 1998c). The double-way return was a reciprocity argument used by nationalist parties to justify absence of implementation of provisions included in the peace agreement. According to HDZ, for instance, Bosnian Serbs should only be allowed to live back to their homes in Drvar if Croats were able to return to Kakanj in Federation of BiH or to Bosanski Brod in Republika Srpska. Bosnian Serbs also used this argument, claiming that returns to Republika Srpska were not possible without the prior return of Serbs to Croatia (ICG 1998b).

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when families used more than one property after the occupation of abandoned apartments, and affected around 5,000 houses and apartments in the Sarajevo Canton (ICG 1998a). This provision conditioning evictions was reaffirmed a few months later by the Sarajevo Canton Prime Minister, Midhat Haraˇci´c (Kalamuji´c 1998). As a result, the creation of housing space for the return of displaced people was limited to the reconstruction of destroyed apartments and the elimination of cases of multiple occupancy. Finally, it was emphasised that the Plan did not go against people who had defended the city or were in Sarajevo after having been expelled from other areas of Bosnia. This also highlighted the complex social environment existing in Sarajevo at the end of the war. Along with the supervision of respective Committees, the OHR was directly involved in the process of housing restitution through the work of its Human Rights department and the RRTF. Rather than dealing with individual property claims, the Human Rights department took the lead in terms of legislative change and issues at a political level (Philpott 2005). The empowerment of the High Representative and the clear instructions defined in the Declaration produced results shortly after its adoption. In this sense, the creation of a legal framework for the restitution of property, defined as a priority in the Declaration, took a step ahead in 1998 after two years in which calls from international officials had little impact. The Sarajevo Declaration set mid-February as the deadline to amend property laws that discriminated displaced persons and authorities of the Federation of BiH finally adopted amendments in early April in a manner that was initially acceptable to the OHR.9 However, amendments did not set a legal framework fully supportive of displaced people, as several clauses still favoured temporary occupants. Among these clauses limiting the rights of pre-war occupants, there was a six-month deadline to file a claim for housing restitution and a one-year deadline to go back following the granting of the claim (ICG 1998c). Despite OHR’s calls of modification, the authorities refused to do so arguing, once again, the lack of progress in Republika Srpska. Consequently, the High Representative used Bonn powers to extend the deadline set for claiming socially owned apartments until April 1999. Beyond housing legislation, the property claim process continued to be much affected by embedded local obstructionism. In Bosnia, nationalist parties had inherited the tools of social and economic control existing during socialist times, the so-called nomenklatura system, while developing a more authoritarian power during the war (ESI 1999b). The key element was the control by the dominant party of all significant appointments in managerial positions in the economy and in institutions, including the judiciary. It implied the eradication of the separation of powers, given that parties ensured the subordination of institutions through their influence over personnel as well as the maintenance of loyalty and discipline by virtue of the exclusion of any dissenting voices from those in influential positions.

9

Generally, the Federation of BiH was in charge of legislative issues while cantonal and municipal authorities were more involved in the implementation and operational work.

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Thanks to this direct influence on the work of authorities involved in the process of housing restitution, SDA had the capacity to obstruct the implementation of the Declaration. As a consequence, there was a poor resolution during the first five months, with only 528 decisions issued out of 6,557 property claims (OHR 1998e). The thirty-day period required by law was systematically unfulfilled through different practices such as setting unnecessary requirements of hearings with pre-war occupants. Other obstacles appeared during the registration of the claim when officials refrained from issuing necessary documents or they required documents that were not necessary by the law or were impossible to procure. Poor performance in property claims affected a rate of returns that inevitably fell short of the ambitious milestone set in the Declaration of 20,000 minority returns in 1998. Only 1,292 non-Bosniaks were back to Sarajevo in the first seven months of the Declaration (ICG 1998c). This low number of minority returns contrasted with the return to the Canton of more than 5,000 Bosniaks. Half of them had never lived in the city before, which implied further occupation of abandoned apartments. Apparently, SDA policy to reallocate Bosniaks from other parts of the country continued during the early implementation of the Declaration amid claims from the authorities that the slow progress of the Declaration was attributable to the housing shortage. In practice, the party was using apartments as a source of patronage even once evictions started in 1998 with apartments also being distributed among people with SDA connections. It contravened the core principle of the Plan for returns to Sarajevo approved in midFebruary by the Sarajevo Canton, which defined that eviction would only take place in cases of multiple occupancy.10 Despite obstructionism was at the core of poor results, such slow progress was also a result of the difficulty to implement the Declaration. In this sense, the opposition to a mass return of displaced people was not only political but also social. In post-war Sarajevo, there was an important social categorisation that differentiated between people who had remained in the city during the siege and those who had left, the former being considered defenders of the city. A “defender of the city” included everyone who had stayed in Sarajevo, regardless of whether they had been involved in the military. In contrast, Sarajevans were often unwilling to accept back people who had fled during the siege, a resentment that could encompass former neighbours, and even family members or friends from the same ethnic origin. The huge challenge of implementing the Declaration was highlighted by the work of housing officials. While they had little independence, their performance should not be simply reduced to a mere act of ethnic discrimination upon following party instructions. Often, delays in property claims hardly differed between minority and majority returns with officials facing the dilemma of having to evict vulnerable groups and other people who stayed and defended the city to the detriment of those who had left. Thus, officials were also exposed to a tough social environment that increased 10

In late March 1998, the Ombudsmen brought multiple occupancy to the attention of the Cantonal Governor and relevant Ministers before receiving assurance from them that such practice would stop. Significantly, it not only continued but even increased after the Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments came into force.

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once the city stood at a more advanced stage than the rest of the country in terms of housing restitution, which was directly contested by internally displaced persons resettled in the city. Different organisations such as the Association Sarajevo Declaration and the Association of Trade Unions, lobbied to prevent evictions until people could move back to pre-war homes in Republika Srpska, targeting the international approach to focus on Sarajevo to trigger returns elsewhere and demanding the cessation of eviction until property laws of Republika Srpska were adopted (Omeragi´c 1998a).11 This imbalance had consequences on people resettled in Sarajevo. Often, they could not go back to their homes of origin once evictions started, causing some famiˇ lies to move as many as five times from apartment to apartment in the city (Cengi´ c and Skotte 2010). In this context, protests from people internally displaced in Sarajevo targeted the international community, which paradoxically contributed to the lack of housing space because non-Bosnian people working in foreign organisations were occupying a few thousands of apartments in the city (Omeragi´c 1998b).12 When 200 Bosniak families evicted from temporary housing congregated in front of the OHR’s headquarters in September 2001, they expressed despair with the continuous delays from both locals and internationals, and pressured for securing solutions for evictions occurring without the provision of an alternative housing (Agencies 2001b). The international community recognised that it was important to avoid eviction of vulnerable families without providing interim accommodation but, at the same time, recommended that alternative accommodations were temporary and of a basic standard, in order to encourage individuals and families to find their own solutions to their housing problems (OHR 2000c). The absence of alternative accommodation in Sarajevo often affected internally displaced persons that had completed the restitution of housing but who did not want to live again in places where they had become an ethnic minority. Actually, even security was not yet guaranteed when people began to repossess pre-war homes. Five years after the end of the war, those Bosniaks and Croats who were returning to Republika Srpska could still be subject to physical assaults and extensive destruction of properties (ICG 2001). Evidence of the hostility against a potential recovery of ethnic diversity in the Bosnian Serb ethno-territoriality was highlighted by serious riots that occurred in Banja Luka and Trebinje in early May 2001, during ceremonies to start the reconstruction of Mosques. Resulting in one death and many more injured,

11

The Association Sarajevo Declaration called for a moratorium of property law implementation and the cessation of about 200 evictions. Equally, the Association of Trade Unions demanded the immediate stop to evictions until two-way returns took place and sent a critical letter to Carl Bildt, the Sarajevo Cantonal Governor and Mirza Hajri´c, chair of the Sarajevo Return Commission. The letter stated that to make returns possible, returns to all areas of Bosnia were required. In other words, free returns to Sarajevo would be only possible if the 74,000 expellees accommodated in Sarajevo could go back to homes of origin (OHR 1998d). 12 Around 15,000 foreign civilians were reportedly working in Sarajevo as employees of various international NGOs, members of international multilateral and bilateral organisations (ICG 1998a; Barakat and Kapizasovic 2003).

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5 The Struggle to Rebuild Ethnic Diversity in Sarajevo

these incidents were well organised and aimed at discouraging displaced Bosniaks from returning home (Agencies 2001a). Finally, the work of the Sub-Group on Textbooks, one of the mixed bodies to implement the Sarajevo Declaration in which local officials held the authority, showed further tensions and limitations of the international strategy to rebuild ethnic diversity in the city. Again, the initial focus on the Bosnian capital created grievances among Bosniak authorities. In the process to eliminate and modify any materials promoting hatred and intolerance towards other ethnic groups, international representatives went beyond the required advisory role and took the lead with the preparation of reports and submission of recommendations to local educational authorities (Donia 2000). Yet, the eradication of offensive material from textbooks was not completed by Cantonal authorities. The release of a guideline document with the relevant recommendations for amendments triggered intense and largely hostile media attention amid accusations that the international community was attempting to deny the facts of the war (OHR 1998f). The hostile reaction was a response to the international performance and, particularly, for the specific nature of the material released. Among the proposed changes were some simple but very sensitive issues such as one that suggested replacing crimes for errors in a book of grammar rules for eighth-graders.13 The mandate of the Sub-Group on Textbooks was consistent with the OHR’s immediate objective of facilitating an orderly and large-scale return of minority refugees to Sarajevo. However, it was based on the false premise that tolerance could be achieved through the superficial eradication of specific terms and passages in Sarajevo’s textbooks, bypassing other more fundamental issues of justice, pluralism and tolerance in education (Donia 2000).14

5.3.1 International Response to Obstructionism International actors did not hesitate to confront obstructionism. As the Declaration granted aid to further implementation, some international organisations quickly responded in the form of economic sanctions. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) froze nine million Deutschmarks for reconstruction while the European Commission inserted a similar clause in three reconstruction contracts with non-governmental organisations for a total of eighteen million 13

The OHR fiercely criticised most local media who they claimed conducted a campaign of disinformation and defamation based on biased, incomplete or simply wrong information in relation to changes. But the Cantonal reaction was a response to a unilateral initiative of the UNESCO Sarajevo Field Office to distribute recommendations in October 1998, which stated and stressed that all teachers were obliged to follow these recommendations (OHR 1998e). 14 In post-war Bosnia, competence on education lies at the cantonal level in the Federation of BiH while it is highly centralised in the Republika Srpska. Different education systems not only exist in distinct ethno-territorialities but also in mixed Cantons in the Federation of BiH, populated by Bosniaks and Croats (Perry 2003).

5.3 The Complex Implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration

81

Deutschmarks (ICG 1998c). Despite being unilateral decisions from donors, the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, expressed his support and warned Sarajevo authorities that he would take decisive measures against those who were obstructing implementation (Zivak 1998). Economic sanctions revealed the new vigorous approach of international actors to boost minority returns. In April 1999, the U.S. Ambassador warned the Sarajevo Canton that new sanctions would be imposed again if the implementation of the Declaration did not improve (Agencies 1999a). To avoid counterproductive outcomes, the High Representative recommended four months later that the European Commission unfroze economic assistance for the reconstruction projects of the Sarajevo Housing Fund in order to increase the availability of apartments and facilitate the implementation of the Declaration (OHR 1998f). These unilateral decisions from donors also exposed the fact that even though the OHR was playing a key role on policy issues, had little influence on the way international funds were spent. The main funding agencies, such as the European Commission, USAID, and the World Bank, were reluctant to accept the direction in their work. Over time, they became more inclined to seek the OHR support as a result of the increasing political obstacles to their programmes (ESI 2000). Beyond economic sanctions from donors, the international community used the authority of the High Representative to dismiss officials. In November 1999, SDA Minister of Justice, Jusuf Zafiragi´c, became the first authority of Sarajevo dismissed by the High Representative for having continuously violated agreements reached in the framework of the Declaration and the amended property laws (OHR 1999c). Zafiragi´c’s practices illustrate the performance of SDA in the restitution of housing given that he endeavoured to repeatedly obstruct the process. In a closed session of the Cantonal Government, the Minister overturned agreements at the Sarajevo Housing Committee to improve procedures for the management of socially owned apartments. Zafiragi´c also repeatedly issued instructions to the judiciary to prevent the execution of court-ordered evictions. Moreover, the Minister abolished the Sarajevo Cantonal Housing Department in mid-December 1998 and included an illegal clause to withdraw property rights if people were not back to their apartments fifteen days after restitution. The abolition of the Cantonal Housing Department and the delay to reappoint a director blocked temporarily the resolution of 17,000 cases, 700 of which were evictions pending only the signature of the Director. In the context of obstructionism from strategic Cantonal government positions, the OHR not only played a reactive role dismissing authorities and officials who unfulfilled the Declaration. Along with other international organisations, the OHR also pushed for the transformation of officials working in institutions dealing with returns. In this sense, and within the Sarajevo Housing Committee, there was strong coordinated political pressure on the Cantonal Government to improve management systems and ensure that housing institutions were staffed with cooperative officials (ESI 1999a). An early intervention in May 1998 affected the Cantonal Housing Department which replaced the Head of the Housing Department following international recommendations. This change affected the rate of property claim resolution

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5 The Struggle to Rebuild Ethnic Diversity in Sarajevo

of socially owned apartments from a few cases at the end of June to more than 400 per week in September (ICG 1998c).15 Other measures were at the request of the Deputy High Representative, Andy Bearpark, to the Minister of Housing Affairs, Resul Baši´c, for the restructuration of the Housing Cantonal Ministry. The demand included the replacement of fifteen inspectors and administrative staff as well as four heads of departments at the housing municipal service. Besides, the Deputy High Representative asked for further changes to increase diversity in the ethnic composition of the staff as defined in the Sarajevo Declaration (Agencies 1999b). In parallel, the OHR looked for cooperation from SDA-moderate members to unblock evictions and returns. OHR members exploited the argument that Bosniak authorities were morally equivalent to SDS and HDZ in the prevention of returns to make authorities more cooperative in Sarajevo (ICG 1999b). Therefore, coercion was not only performed with the contingency of dismissal and economic sanctions but also persuasion. These actions implied an erosion of one of the features of ethnocracies, which was the tight control of institutions. In this regard, the judiciary and administrative authorities responsible for implementing property laws were becoming progressively less responsive to the SDA in the area of Sarajevo (ESI 1999a).16 Progress encouraged Wolfgang Petritsch, the third High Representative, to bring a more invigorate mandate. From this point onwards, the number of dismissals increased because of the High Representative becoming less reluctant to use Bonn Powers to support minority returns. The dismissal of Jusuf Zafiragi´c in late November 1999 was part of a second major action taken by Wolfgang Petritsch since he further dismissed twenty-one public and housing obstructive officials (OHR 1999d). Dismissals came after the imposition of property laws in both entities on 27 October 1999. This first major action allowed to harmonise legislation, which had been a barrier for the early implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration, and set finally a legal framework that fully recognised the rights of people displaced. In this sense, several clauses had been favouring temporary occupants even after the intervention of the High Representative to extend the deadline set for claiming socially owned apartments until April 1999. Moreover, the international community adopted the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) in October 1999 to monitor and ensure the enforcement of the new legislation. The objective of the plan was for property rights to be recognised and enforced to every individual regardless of political considerations, treating the restitution of property as a question of the rule of law. Thus, the international community worked to turn a highly politicised issue into a simple question of neutral application of law (OHR 2000c). No less important, PLIP developed a coherent strategy fostering a collaborative relationship between main international organisations engaged in 15

One of the measures taken by the new director was hiring twenty new employees, some of them minorities, to increase the number of staff to ninety-eight. 16 The reproduction of the nomenklatura system by nationalist parties implied that the judiciary personnel became almost exclusively mono-ethnic. Many pre-war judges left or were replaced by inexperienced and underpaid colleagues appointed on ethnic and political criteria (ICG 1999a).

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property activities, and used the existing field networks of the OHR, OSCE and UNHCR, to oversee the resolution of property claims by local authorities throughout the country. This new approach exploited the fact that Bosnian authorities, despite not being interested in the promotion of minority returns, agreed on the need to make progress in the transparent and fair implementation of laws before European Union membership could even be considered (ICG 1999b). Bonn Powers not only evolved quantitatively but also qualitatively. Even though these powers were conceived as an extraordinary measure to unblock peace implementation, dismissals also became a tool to deal with purposes not related to obstructionism. Such evolution of Bonn Powers was well exemplified in the dismissal of Mile Marˇceta, the Mayor of Drvar, in north-west BiH. Although it was recognised his great contribution to the return of refugees and displaced people to Drvar, he was dismissed because he could not carry out his duty on a daily basis for a physical attack and the continuous threats to his security (OHR 1999b).17 Ultimately, the High Representatives dismissed about 190 politicians and other officials between December 1997 and December 2010 (Willigen 2012), while 84% of the 905 decisions in all fields were made before international actors left behind the extensive use of Bonn Powers in early 2006. In that context, obstructionism evolved towards more subtle administrative forms. It was seen in September 2000, when the High Representative dismissed once again housing officials in Sarajevo. Officials removed included the Head of the Centar/Stari Grad office of the Sarajevo Cantonal Housing Department, Sevala Brankovi´c, and the Senior Lawyer of the Centar/Stari Grad office of the Sarajevo Canton Housing Department, Sanja Srna (OHR 2000a; b). Both officials were removed from their positions because of their perceived failure to address cases of multiple occupancy, scheduling unnecessary hearings which slowed the process of property law implementation or the failure to instruct staff on further implementation of the property legislation. Once property claims resolutions began, obstructionism moved from property issues to the implementation of decisions, so the non-execution of eviction orders became another barrier to complete restitution. Local police contributed to the lack of implementation by not attending or not acting in evictions, which violated their legal obligation (OHR 1999a). The greater majority of Sarajevo Serbs who had left the city and were interviewed for this research commented that eviction of temporary residents delayed up to several months the completion of the process of housing restitution. Yet, in the early twenty-first century, these practices only had the capacity to delay the restitution of housing. The adoption of the PLIP proved to be effective and allowed to put finally in motion the mass restitution of housing in Bosnia. The fact that this new approach fostered international collaboration to implement Annex VII, produced a dramatic increase of property claims and resolutions since 2000, with an implementation rate 17

The qualitative evolution of the role of the High Representative while using the exceptional Bonn Powers is explained by Knaus and Martin (2003) in their analogy of the situation in Bosnia with the liberal imperialism of the British East India Company in the nineteenth century.

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5 The Struggle to Rebuild Ethnic Diversity in Sarajevo

of property claims that jumped from 20.8 to 92.5% between December 2000 and December 2003 (MHRR 2005). In Sarajevo, Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats increased restitutions earlier so, at that stage, this pattern particularly favoured Bosnian Serbs with 17,891 of them completing the process in 2001 and a further increase the following year (ICG 2002), which contrasted with the residual rates during the early implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration. After having processed more than 90% of property claims by December 2003, the international community transferred the supervision of the implementation of Annex VII to the Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights.

5.4 The Limited Impact of the Sarajevo Declaration on the Reconstruction of Ethnic Diversity The restitution of housing was central in the implementation of Annex VII and was successfully completed ten years after the signature of the peace agreement. Yet, this mass restitution of pre-war homes did not imply a reconstruction of ethnic diversity as, in the majority of cases, people sold or exchanged the property after completing restitution.18 The process of transferring property that occurred throughout the country was dealt with in interviews conducted with Sarajevo Serbs who are currently living in East Sarajevo. None of the twelve people interviewed lived in Sarajevo having completed restitution, not even temporarily. Only one among the interviewees expressed an intention to move back during the post-war period but this did not materialise because of the absence of funds to rebuild the apartment. The first census of the post-war period finally confirmed that mass restitution did not subsequently turn into a significant and permanent return of displaced Sarajevens to the city (Table 5.1). The city has a largely Bosniak population, which increased from 50 before the war to over 80%. In contrast, the population of Sarajevo Serbs has dramatically fallen. From 30% before the war and more than 150,000 inhabitants, people who defined themselves as Bosnian Serbs, respectively, represent 3.7 and 3.2% of the inhabitants in the City and the Canton. Therefore, Sarajevo’s profound ethnic transformation was neither reversed nor significantly altered by the process of housing repossession. The restitution of housing was certainly a precondition for the return of displaced people, but it was neither the unique nor the most important factor determining whether or not to go back to pre-war homes. The place of residence was inexorably affected by broader considerations on individual and familial well-being, such as job opportunities, and the provision of basic public services such as access to pensions, health care, education and other social benefits. These elements were denied to minority returnees in respective ethno-territorialities what reduced the prospect of a mass minority return that reversed the ethnic cleansing conducted during the war. 18

That percentage was higher in cities rather than in rural areas, where people often went back to develop agrarian activities or simply maintained the premises as a weekend cottage.

5.4 The Limited Impact of the Sarajevo Declaration …

85

Table 5.1 Ethnic composition in the Sarajevo Canton in 2013. Municipalities in bold constitute the city of Sarajevo (ASBiH 2016) Municipality

Bosniak

Croats

Serbs

Others

Total 55,181

Centar

41,702

3,333

2,186

7,960

Novi Grad

99,773

4,874

4,367

9,539

118,553

Novo Sarajevo

48,188

4,639

3,402

8,585

64,814

Stari Grad

32,794

685

467

3,030

36,976

Hadži´ci

22,120

179

218

1,374

23,891

Ilidža

58,120

3,030

1,600

3,980

66,730

Ilijaš

18,151

382

421

649

19,603

Trnovo

1,376

4

97

25

1,502

Vogoš´ca

24,351

321

542

1,129

26,343

Total

346,575

17,447

13,300

36,271

413,593

Despite having a comprehensive scope, the Sarajevo Declaration failed to create appropriate conditions for the mass return of Sarajevans who had left the city. Issues beyond housing reconstruction and restitution were insufficiently addressed by the international community, both in Sarajevo and in the rest of BiH, ignoring the fact that the creation of a safe environment conducive to the voluntary return and the harmonious reintegration of displaced people constituted the second article of Annex VII. In this regard, the Inter-Agency Working Group on Employment recognised that opportunities for returnees had not been given enough consideration by the international community when the bulk of restitution was taking place. Overall, the implementation of objectives to foster economic, educational and labour market opportunities for returnees defined in the Peace Implementation Council celebrated in May 2000, had not started two years later (ICG 2002).19 In parallel to the absence of returns, many Bosniaks preferred to remain in the city in order to avoid both the uncertainty and the existing disadvantages of living as a minority in a Bosnian Serb or a Bosnian Croat ethno-territoriality. The adaptation to urban life after several years in the city was an important factor influencing the decision to remain. This was particularly significant among the younger generations, which appreciated more diverse opportunities in relation to employment, education or leisure. Equally important, having lived in many instances through extraordinary experiences of loss, forced displacement and survival, many people simply did not want to return to places where they had been expelled, as the life they had known before the war was gone forever.20 19

Impediments that were not tackled or resolved during the early years following the conclusion of the war could remain unalterable afterwards. Ethnic curricula in education were not substantially modified and, the following decade, the Peace Implementation Council still urged Bosnia’s education ministries to reform the school system to end segregation and discrimination (Jukic 2013). 20 As argued by social anthropologist Hariz Halilovich (2013) for people who suffered forced displacement, those places of humiliation and suffering are at the same time places of desire.

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References Agencies (1996, September 1) Njemaˇcka šalje Bosance ku´ci. Oslobodjenje, p 6 Agencies (1999a, April 23) Opravdano upozorenje Sarajevu. Oslobodjenje Agencies (1999b, July 17) OHR traži smjene u op´cinama. Oslobodjenje Agencies (2001a, May 8). Bosnian Serb crowd beats Muslims at mosque rebuilding. Associated Press Agencies (2001b, September 4). Srbi svoje kuce izdaju por kiriju a bosnjacke ne napustaju. Oslobodjenje Albert S (1997) The return of refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Peacebuilding with people. Int Peacekeeping 4(3):1–23 ASBiH (2016) Census of population, households and dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013: final results. Sarajevo: Agency for Statistics of Bosna and Herzegovina Barakat S, Kapizasovic Z (2003) Being lokalci: evaluating the impact of international aid agencies on local human resources: the case of post-war Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Eur J Dev Res 15(1):55–72 Beˇcirovi´c A (1998a, February 14). Utvrdjen plan povratka Sarajlija. Oslobodjenje, p.11. Beˇcirovi´c A (1998b, January 25) Usvojen plan povratka Sarajlija. Oslobodjenje Cox M (1998) The right to return home: international intervention and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Int Comp Law Q 47(3):599–631 ˇ Cengi´ c, N., & Skotte, H. (2010). Property, Possession and Conflicts in Re-Building Settlements: Sarajevo. PROPOCON Project Report. Donia R (2000) The quest for tolerance in Sarajevo’s textbooks. Hum Rights Rev 1(2):38–55 ESI (1999a) Interim evaluation of reconstruction and return task force (RRTF) minority return programs in 1999. Eur Stab Initiat, September 14 ESI (1999b) Reshaping international priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosnian power structures. Eur Stab Initiat, October 14 ESI (2000) Reshaping international priorities inBosnia and Herzegovina: International Power in Bosnia. Eur Stab Initiat, March 30 GAO (1998) Bosnia peace operation: Pace of implementing Dayton accelerated as international involvement increased. United States General Accounting Office, June 5 Halilovich H (2013) Places of pain: forced displacement, popular memory and trans-local identities in Bosnian war-torn communities. Berghahn, New York Hitchcock WI (2003) The struggle for Europe: the turbulent history of a divided continent 1945– 2002. Doubleday, Ontario ICG (1997) Going nowhere fast: Refugees and internally displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia Report, 23, May 1 ICG (1998a). Rebuilding a multi-ethnic Sarajevo: the need for minority returns. ICG Bosnia Project, 30, February 3 ICG (1998b) Minority return or mass relocation? ICG Bosnia Project, 33, May 14 ICG (1998c). Too little too late: Implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration. Balkans Report, 44, September 9 ICG (1999a) Rule over law obstacles to the development of an independent judiciary in BiH. ICG Report, 72, July 5 ICG (1999b) Preventing minority return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the anatomy of hate and fear. ICG Report, 73, August 2 ICG (2001) Bosnia: reshaping the international machinery. ICG Balkans Report, 121, November 29 ICG (2002) Bosnia’s alliance for (smallish) change. Balkans Report, 132, August 2 Ito A (2001) Politicisation of minority return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the first five years examined. Int J Refug Law 13(1/2):98–122 Jukic E (2013, December 6) PIC Urges Bosnia to Reform Schools. Balkan Investigative Reporting Network

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Kalamuji´c, A (1998, August 7). Deložacije samo kod zloupotreba. Oslobodjenje, p.7. Kebo A (1998, February 5) Izetbegovi´c traži garancije, Oslobodjenje Knaus G, Martin F (2003) Travails of the European Raj. J Democr 14(3):60–75 Kuki´c S (1997, April 4) Srbi i Hrvati se vra´caju u Sarajevo, Oslobodjenje, p 5 Moore A (2013) Peacebuilding in practice: Local experience in two Bosnian towns. Cornell University Press, New York MHRR (2005) Comparative analysis on access to rights of refugees and displaced persons. Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, Sarajevo OHR (1996a) Conclusions: guiding principles of the civilian consolidation plan, PIC Paris. November 14 OHR (1996b). Making peace work: PIC London conclusions. December 5. OHR (1997a). Declaration from ministerial meeting of the steering board, PIC Sintra. May 30 OHR (1997b) Speech by the high representative, Carlos Westendorp, to the Peace Implementation Council in Bonn. December 9 OHR (1997c) Declaration from ministerial meeting of the steering board, PIC Sintra. May 30 OHR (1998a) Sarajevo returns conference February 1998. January 27 OHR (1998b) Sarajevo declaration. February 3 OHR (1998c) Transcript: deputy high representative Andy Bearpark. April 23 OHR (1998d) Bulletin 69. Office of the High Representative. April 24 OHR (1998e) Sarajevo declaration quarterly implementation review. August 11 OHR (1998f) BiH TV news summary. November 3 OHR (1999a) Human rights report. Office of the High Representative. May 15 OHR (1999b) Drvar arbitration award. September 16 OHR (1999c) Decision removing Mr. Jusuf Zafiragic from his position of Minister of Justice, Canton of Sarajevo. November 29 OHR (1999d) RTRS news summary. November 30 OHR (2000a) Decision removing Sanja Srna from her position as lawyer with the Cantonal Housing Department Sarajevo, Municipalities Centar/Stari Grad. September 7 OHR (2000b) Decision removing Sevala Brankovic from her position on the appeals body of Cantonal Housing Department Sarajevo. September 7 OHR (2000c) Property Implementation Plan (PLIP) Inter-Agency framework document. October 15. Omeragi´c A (1998a, November 24) Grad je ponovo pod opsadom. Oslobodjenje, p11 Omeragi´c A (1998b, December 26) Delozacije u vrijeme blagdana. Oslobodjenje, p 5 Perry V (2003) Reading, writing and reconciliation: Educational reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. European Centre for Minority Issues, Working Paper 18 Philpott C (2005) Though the dog is dead, the pig must be killed: Finishing with property restitution to BiH’s IDPs and refugees. J Refug Stud 18(1):1–24 Roane K (1996, May 7) Bosnia-Herzegovina: refugees fear they will never go home. Inter Press Service Rosand E (1998) The right to return under international law following mass dislocation: the Bosnia precedent. Mich J Int Law 19:1091–1139 Rosand E (2000) The right to compensation in Bosnia: An unfulfilled promise and a challenge to International Law. Cornell Int Law J 33(1):113–158 Toal G, Dahlman C (2011) Bosnia remade: ethnic cleansing and its reversal. Oxford University Press, Oxford UNHCR (1996) UNHCR identifies key target areas for Bosnia return. Press Releases, June 13 USIP (1997) Dayton implementation: the return of refugees. Special Report, 26, September 1 Williams R (2005) Post-conflict property restitution and refugee in Bosnia and Herzegovina: implications for international standard-setting and practice. Int Law Polit 37:441–553 Willigen N (2012) International administration and institutional autonomy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. East European Politics 28(4):429–451

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Woodward SL (2001) Labours of Sisyphus? A framework for considering the return of refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in the coming period. In: Vergottini G, Evans R (eds) Strategies for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. G. Giappichleli Editore, Torino Zivak V (1998) Sarajevo under Sanctions: they sign everything, but implement nothing. Alternative Information Network Sarajevo. July 14

Chapter 6

The Incomplete Economic Transition

Abstract This chapter analyses the complex process of creating a market economy because of the struggle between local and international actors. The international community implemented a neoliberal economic transition despite the potential destabilising effects for the peacebuilding mission and the opposition of nationalist parties. Subsequently, the analyses of the process of privatisation in Bosnia and the reform of the payment system highlight uneven and even counterproductive outcomes of the economic transition. Finally, the focus on the process of privatisation in Sarajevo, with particular attention on the cases of Holiday Inn and Sarajka, reveals the exploitation of economic assets by SDA and the performance to conduct an ethnic privatisation once the process started. Keywords Sarajevo · Economic transition · Liberal peacebuilding · Ethnic privatisation

6.1 The Neoliberal Economic Transition Internationally Imposed Economic factors are at the heart of the risk of conflict, with low per capita income and low rates of economic growth being two strong factors that increase the risk of civil war (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). In regions where conflict is endemic or peace is fragile, the process of economic liberalisation often endangers internal peace because of its negative impact on vulnerability to poverty, crime and persistent social unrest (Collier 2006; Paris 2004; Pugh and Cooper 2004). For this reason, economic policies promoted by the international community in post-war contexts are central to the consecution of a sustainable peace. Nonetheless, liberal peacebuilding missions deployed in the 1990s did not develop a distinct economic approach in post-war environments as, generally, there was little discussion of how economic policy should be adapted to special circumstances of countries emerging from war (Boyce and Pastor 1997). With the unique particularity of elaborating a reconstruction programme that was in line with the broader economic strategy, international actors defined in Bosnia a neoliberal policy that contained all elements of the theory and practice adopted in © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Martín-Díaz, The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80575-3_6

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Eastern European countries in transition (Stojanov 2001). In this sense, the architect of the transition in Eastern Europe, the economist Jeffrey Sacks, proposed to implement the free market prescriptions of the Washington Consensus through the strategy of “shock therapy”, which aimed at taking advantage of the periods of crisis to ensure that the transition was irreversible (Klein 2007).1 As defined by the World Bank (1996), the state was urged to concentrate on the maintenance of healthy macroeconomic conditions and on the establishment of a relevant legal and institutional framework to allow an uninterrupted functioning of a free market. Based on macroeconomic stabilisation, price liberalisation and mass privatisation, the strategy devised by the International Financial Institutions contended that economic recovery should rest upon the private sector while the state should diminish and shift its role played in the economy to favour and guarantee ˇ private economic initiative (Cauševi´ c 2015). Renowned Bosnian economic figures warned that a neoliberal development strategy for the transition towards a market economy could provide nothing other than a disaster in the context of fragmented economy, caused by the ethno-territorial division of the country, and poverty.2 The OHR worked closely and coordinated with the main international organisations. In fact, its economic department counted with representatives of International Financial Institutions and the European Commission. The existing international consensus in the economic field, unlike cleavages that appeared in other civilian areas, made certain that the OHR played an active role since 1996. This role became instrumental after the empowerment of the High Representative as the legislative and executive authority could be used to advance the transition towards a market economy. In early 1997, the OHR presented the economic Quick Start Package at the Council of Ministers. The Package included the establishment of economic institutions such as the Central Bank of BiH, and basic legislation to establish a stable macroeconomic environment and to develop a market economy (OHR 1997a). After the approval of the Quick Start Package, international actors continued to push for reforms all the while resorting to new international powers. The first economic laws enacted by the High Representative responded to the failure of state institutions to approve them. This was the case of the Framework Law on Privatisation, relevant to the Privatisation of Banks and Enterprises. It was imposed by the High Representative on 22 July 1998 after the failure of the BiH House of Peoples to pass the law because of the negative vote from Bosnian Serb members. The Draft Law had originally been submitted by the OHR to the Council of Ministers in February 1

The Washington Consensus was a thought based on the idea that the introduction of a pure free market would solve market inefficiencies in developing countries in Latin America. Coined by John Williamson in 1989, it was a ten-policy recommendation for macro-economic stability, which included fiscal discipline, public expenditure priorities, tax reform, financial liberalisation, exchange rate, trade liberalisation, foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation and property rights (Williamson 1990). However, the implementation of such premises to trigger market efficiency was questionable as many markets presented structural problems (Godoy and Stiglitz 2004). 2 Three years after the signature of the DPA, pensions and unemployment compensations were paid late and below minimum. Only employees in financial institutions and public administration earned enough to maintain any standard of living above the poverty line (Stojanov 2001).

6.1 The Neoliberal Economic Transition Internationally Imposed

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1998 (OHR 1998), and representatives of the international community pressurised Bosnian authorities for a quick adoption of the law according to the model proposed by the World Bank and USAID (Simi´c 1998a). For international actors, the creation of a market economy was a non-negotiable condition (Pugh 2002). This position clashed with the nationalist parties that exploited state assets for their own political and economic benefit; something that had started during the war, when these nationalist parties transformed the socially owned into state-owned enterprises under the pretext to protect them from plunder and abuse (Foˇco 2005). Leaving behind the self-governing bodies that had managed socially owned companies during Socialist Yugoslavia, parties started to appoint Boards of Management upon a political party principle as a reward for political activity, obedience and loyalty. In the areas of the Federation of BiH controlled by the Army of BiH, one such condition to become a director was membership of SDA (Simi´c 1996). These changes allowed that public enterprises became an essential source of revenue and patronage, with a large part of the profit made by state-owned assets ending up in the cashboxes of political parties (Skopljiak 1998). The struggle in the economic transition was particularly visible when the push for reform was increased by Wolfgang Petritsch, who implemented in November and December of 2000 a wide-ranging package of laws and amendments fulfilling the demands of the International Financial Institutions (OHR 2000f). At that time, there was neither a Bosnian common market nor any level of government capable of implementing the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital incorporated in the Constitution (ESI 2000). These packages included amendments to the Framework Law on Privatisation of Enterprises and Banks and the reform of the payment system, both having significant political and economic implications. On the one hand, the integral reform of the payment system implied the abolition of the payment bureaux in BiH. Descending from the Social Bookkeeping Service of Yugoslavia, it was divided into three separate payment bureaux during the war. It allowed that parties gained access to funds and control money flows, including payment transactions, all public and private financial activity, savings or private and public expenditure (USAID 1999). The imbricate relationship between politics and economy in ethnocracies was seen by the fact that the Bosniak payment bureaux funded SDA election campaigns (Pugh 2002). Thus, their elimination was a crucial step towards the creation of a market economy, and it jeopardised the reproduction of local regimes given that they could lose a significant source of revenue and a mechanism to control the economy within respective ethno-territorialities. The OHR was instrumental in the elimination of payment bureaux which became a requirement within the European Union Road Map and to qualify for membership of the Council of Europe (OHR 2000f). The High Representative was in charge of imposing those laws and amendments necessary for the integral reform of the payment system. The dismantling process was managed within the International Advisory Group for Payment Bureaus and Payment System Transformation. Chaired by the USAID, it was comprised of the US Treasury, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, the Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office, funded by the European Union, and the OHR.

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Again, it was an internationally imposed reform as substantial changes in the draft presented to the local parties were not accepted. But unlike other policies loosely supervised by international organisations, the most positive outcomes achieved in the reform of the payment system were explained by a close and determined intervention that involved setting new institutions and also providing resources to strengthen their capacity (Zaum 2005). In this sense, the international community closely coordinated its efforts through the International Advisory Group and used a range of elements of its political authority to promote the reform, providing expert advice as well as pressuring the governments formally and informally. On the other hand, the privatisation of companies was much less successful in short and mid-term, producing counterproductive outcomes for the broader goals of the peacebuilding mission that included the creation of favourable economic, political and social conditions. The implementation of a voucher-based privatisation programme followed the logic of shock therapy, i.e. privatising as quickly as possible taking advantage of the crisis.Governments provided citizens with vouchers depending on certain criteria including age or military service, and which could be sold for cash in the black market or used to purchase shares in privatised companies. This formula was not altered by evidence from other countries in transition. The experience in Russia had shown that quick privatisation conducted without appropriate institutions did not contribute to wealth creation but rather led to asset stripping and the large concentration of wealth in a few hands. Quick privatisation in BiH was conducted in absence of efficient institutions underpinning the rule of law, a functioning and well-regulated capital market or an effective banking system (Donais 2002). Developing privatisation of companies without independent institutions facilitated the domination of the process by ethnocracies. This control was favoured by the international passivity. Despite the High Representative established a Privatisation Monitoring Commission in June 1998, there were little international resources and commitment to the initiative (ESI 2000). There was only a committee of three foreign experts that did not meet until 1999, and a secretariat of three professional staff. In practice, the Commission never developed a capacity to exercise the powers given on paper, including the right to inspect the records of state-owned enterprises. Initially, the opposition from ethnocratic regimes regarding the loss of control over economic assets caused that privatisation was hardly implemented during early post-war stages.3 However, the continuous pressure of the international organisations to privatise companies meant that local ethnocracies changed progressively from opposing the process to attempting to benefit from the same. Ethnic privatisation was a compromise that emerged when nationalist elites sought to control the process of privatisation. The model involved the creation of shadow boards to take over enterprises prior to privatisation to ensure through contractual continuity that existing directors would own privatised firms (Pugh 2002).

3

By the end of 1998, only twenty six out of 1,600 companies in Republika Srpska and 258 out of 1,600 in the Federation of BiH had prepared privatisation plans (PSD 1999).

6.1 The Neoliberal Economic Transition Internationally Imposed

93

Evidence of manipulation by nationalist parties soon appeared. A random study of seventeen small companies in eastern Republika Srpska, privatised through a public auction, found that fourteen had ended up in the hands of the previous director or a powerful local member of the SDS (ICG 2001). There was a similar pattern in the Federation of BiH, where there was the creation of thirteen privatisation agencies, one for each Canton, and another for the Federation of BiH to manage the privatisation of companies operating in several Cantons. As the cantonal privatisation agencies were the agents for the sale of companies within respective territories, mass privatisation ˇ was conducted for the most part on the ethnic principle (Cauševi´ c 2015). Importantly, members of the OHR recognised that privatisation was entrenching economic positions of nationalist parties and reducing the prospects of ethnic reintegration, rather than setting the foundations for sustained economic growth and recovery. As noted by the head of OHR’s Economics Department, Daniel Besson, the privatisation in Bosnia was a case of the cure being worse than the disease and recognised that what they were creating with this type of privatisation was worse than what existed before (Donais 2002). The fact that privatisation was a goal in itself, as a cornerstone of the neoliberal economic transition, produced that international pressure for a mass and quick privatisation continued regardless of shortcomings and evidence of manipulation. Insistence on privatisation was argued by International Financial Institutions as a requirement to depoliticise the economy and provide the basis for economic recovery and growth but the privatisation process was failing in both issues. Surprisingly enough, influential think-tanks like the International Crisis Group (ICG), which conducts research and analysis on global crises, continued pushing to speed up privatisation in spite of reporting the abuses from nationalist parties and recognising the risk that some enterprises fell into unscrupulous hands. The argument was that over time privatised assets would end up in the hands of people most capable of maximising their economic potential (ICG 1999). The response from some local economic figures was proposing an alternative privatisation that overcame the existing deficiencies of a quick privatisation in a framework in which institutions were controlled by ethnocracies. Within the Cantonal Agency for Privatisation of Sarajevo, Bosnian economic expertise proposed a new privatisation law in mid-2000 to tackle the shortcomings produced during the previous years (Stojanov 2001). It was only partially included in the High Representative’s amendments in autumn 2000 when the privatisation of tender started to be promoted. Their proposal also contained the creation of a Privatisation Tender Bureaux and a Development Fund at the state level to link privatisation with broader economic development. Illustratively, some foreign institutions refused to consider any element of the proposal arguing, inaccurately, that privatisation was already at an advanced stage. During the year 2000, international pressure intensified to begin the privatisation of large and strategic companies. In May, the High Representative dismissed the head of the President of the Management Board of the Federation Privatisation Agency, Stiepo Andriji´c, for delaying both the adoption of international-standard tender regulations and insisting on the adoption of an arbitrary and unnecessary deadline for

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the publication of all tenders. His decisions led to tendering of enterprises without proper preparations and under flawed regulations, resulting in suspension of the tender process in the Federation of BiH (OHR 2000c). Finally, within the legislative pack adopted by the High Representative in October, a specific by-law in the Framework Law on Privatisation was introduced to place greater emphasis on tender privatisation. This change encouraged new management of enterprises and new capital, but it did not trigger privatisation of big enterprises in the short term. Expectations that greater inflow of foreign capital would accompany privatisation proved to be unrealistic because of the absence of a business climate, a harmonised legal system or the high fiscal obligations, in which up to 80% of profits had to be set aside for various taxes and fees (Zivkovi´c 2001). Privatisation and the reform of the payment system were important measures in the long path to create a market economy. In point of fact, the economy became one of the priorities of Paddy Ashdown’s tenure as High Representative after replacing Wolfgang Petritsch in late May 2002. The High Representative continued to inform and agree within the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, but the British diplomat was able to devise the strategy, unlike previous High Representatives. The backing of the United States was crucial in the shift that also placed the High Representative under the major influence of the European Union. In October 2002, Paddy Ashdown enacted twelve more laws and other initiatives to tackle administrative barriers in what became the last major intervention in the economic field made by the High Representative. Nevertheless, the continuous international intervention did not produce a self-sustained economic growth. By the end of 2002, the High Representative declared that the economic situation in BiH was simply untenable (OHR 2003b), and the Deputy High Representative, Larry Butler, recognised in 2005 that poverty eradication, massive investment and job creation had not been achieved after years of international reforms (OHR 2005). In fact, the vulnerability of many people was not accompanied by measures reducing the adverse social impact of war and the adoption of liberal policies. Impoverishment, unemployment or industrial policy were either neglected or treated as a kind of unavoidable collateral damage in the mission to make BiH profitable for investors (Stojanov 2001; Pugh 2005).4

6.2 The Privatisation of Companies in Sarajevo As elsewhere in Bosnia, obstructionism in the privatisation of enterprises took place in Sarajevo since the early stages of the post-war period. Foreign investors encountered serious difficulties when trying to purchase companies and start activity. This

4

The absence of an employment policy in Bosnia during the period of maximum international intervention was evident. Even the OHR’s introduction of a ‘Jobs and Justice’ programme in 2002 heavily relied on the operation of market forces (Pugh 2005).

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95

situation affected even those companies that had been operating in the area of Sarajevo in joint ventures with local enterprises before the war, such as Coca-Cola and Volkswagen (ICG 1999). Obstacles to foreign investments followed the logic of maintaining economic assets under party management in order to reproduce the political-economic structure forged during the war. In Sarajevo, SDA exercised political direction over companies since being captured by nationalist parties in 1994 after the transformation of socially owned property into a state-owned property. The Bosniak party administered public companies through the figure of Edhem Biˇcakˇci´c, an ally of Alija Izetbegovi´c. As Prime Minister of the Federation of BiH between December 1996 and January 2001, Biˇcakˇci´c controlled the lucrative public utility companies that became a source of revenue for the party (ESI 1999). Removed by the High Representative from his position as General Manager of Elektroprivedra in February 2002, Biˇcakˇci´c was accused of abusing the powers during his tenure as Prime Minister to redirect public revenues through a complex and corrupt system of financial diversions with large sums of money ultimately benefiting SDA. Among other irregularities, he allegedly abused his authority to divert employment funds for unauthorised purposes after creating the Federation Employment Agency (OHR 2001). He authorised the illegal transfer of 825,000 KM from the Federation budget to the Association of Families of Fallen Soldiers or, also, he used an account improperly established in the name of the Government of the Federation of BiH to fund activities without accountability or transparency, which included funds that were ultimately transferred to the SDA election campaign. At the same time, this case illustrates how dismissal of individuals had limited impact since it did not necessarily result in any improvement of the institution nor in the exclusion of the individual dismissed from power. In post-war Bosnia, the control of parties over significant appointments, including State institutions and managerial positions in the economy, meant that political influence was not derived from official posts. Consequently, individuals could sustain their capacity to influence simply by changing their position within the system (ESI 1999b, 2000). Indeed, Edhem Biˇcakˇci´c was dismissed again by the High Representative in March 2003. Despite the fact that the first Decision banned him from holding any official, elective or appointive public office, Biˇcakˇci´c’s new position in Elektroprivreda, one of the largest Bosnian companies, allowed him to manage the portfolio related to the acquisition of new enterprises which involved significant sums (OHR 2003a). The resistance to lose direct control over sources of revenue and patronage caused that the SDA continuously obstructed the change of ownership in big and strategic enterprises in Sarajevo. The non-adoption of a privatisation programme by directors of companies was a technique used to obstruct the process thanks to the strategic role that Management Boards played for parties. This was a general practice as seen when the Sarajevo Canton Privatisation Agency announced in June 2000 that the deadline for public registration of shares would be postponed. Out of the 127 included in the privatisation programme, ninety-four companies had failed to adopt the programme of privatisation (OHR 2000e).

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Beyond the management and redistribution of resources from lucrative public companies and the early general obstruction to privatisation, SDA also aimed at maintaining control over companies after privatisation. At the SDA Economic Council celebrated in summer 1998, the party demanded that privatisation certificates were invested in strategic enterprises for Bosniak national interest (Simi´c 1998b). SDA planned to retain control of strategic assets in Bosniak areas through Privatisation Investment Funds such as the SIB-ARINVEST dd Sarajevo, established by the BiH Alliance of Military War Invalids.5 Alija Izetbegovi´c announced that he would provide the first million Deutschmarks of capital and informed Bosniak veterans that it was their “patriotic duty” to invest their privatisation vouchers in the Fund (ESI 1999). Despite offering support to international reform programmes, SDA manoeuvred to retain its power over public companies after completing the process of privatisation. The use of Privatisation Investment Funds to acquire shares in the privatisation of small and medium companies was complementary to the manipulation conducted by institutions in charge of tender privatisation since the early 2000s. In this sense, the Sarajevo Canton Privatisation Agency was responsible for opening balance sheets and preparing the privatisation programmes of companies. Even though a team of renowned experts headed the Managing Board of the Sarajevo Canton Privatisation Agency between 2000 and 2002, practices altering the recommendations received from the OHR and the Privatisation Monitoring Commission were conducted by the director of the Agency to avoid a scenario whereby the SDA lost any advantage over companies during the privatisation process. This practice was illustrated in the privatisation of Hotel Maršal in May 2000, which was annulled because the real buyer of the Hotel was the public company Energoinvest (OHR 2000b). Along with widespread obstructionist practices and attempts to maintain control over companies after privatisation, limited domestic capital and lack of foreign interest were two other factors that increased the complexity of the privatisation of big companies. On the contrary, the privatisation of small enterprises was much faster because of the simpler procedure. The quick privatisation of small companies occurred between 1999 and 2001 and main political actors were also involved. In the privatisation of small companies, buyers often aimed at obtaining centrality in the city with these purchases. In April 2000, privatisation in the Federation of BiH was turning into a battle for real estates, with enterprises being purchased but with no intention to continue with the original business (OHR 2000a).

5

Privatisation Investment Funds were an essential part of the voucher privatisation. These Funds managed shareholders’ investments on their behalf, providing expertise and saving administrative expenses.

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97

6.2.1 The Privatisation of Holiday Inn and Sarajka Two of the most important privatisations that took place in the Bosnian capital city during the period of maximum international involvement are now analysed in order to shed light on the politics of privatisation in Sarajevo and understanding whether privatisation brought a depoliticisation of the economy and provided the basis for economic recovery and growth, as claimed by International Financial Institutions and other international organisations. These are the cases of the hotel Holiday Inn and the Sarajka Department Store. The Holiday Inn appears in the literature regarding the politics of privatisation in Bosnia as an illustrative case of dark and corrupt privatisation where a well-connected local entrepreneur of the right ethnic group gained control of a key state-owned asset for a small amount of money (Donais 2005). The Holiday Inn became the most symbolic hotel of Sarajevo during the siege since it was the only hotel that continued operating. Built in the early 1980s for the fourteenth Winter Olympics, celebrated in the city in 1984, the hotel was headquartering SDS leadership prior to the start of the siege. From its roof, people were fired upon while rallying peacefully in the 100,000 demonstration that reclaimed a peaceful and multi-ethnic BiH on 5 April 1992. Because of its economic value, the Holiday Inn was an important privatisation with corruption and cronyism appearing in the sale of the hotel from the very beginning. ˇ Nedim Cauševi´ c was a prominent Sarajevo business figure with connections to Stiepo ˇ Andriji´c, who was a close relative of Edhem Biˇcakˇci´c. Cauševi´ c’s company Agora and Teleoptica acquired 51% of the Hotel in March 2000 for a price of fifteen million KM, much below the value of the package to purchase the majority of shares situated ˇ at twenty-four million KM (Omeragi´c 2001b). More precisely, Nedim Cauševi´ c paid only 5.2 million KM in cash—around three million dollars—and ten million KM in certificates, which had been bought for as little as 4% of the nominal value. The undervalued acquisition of the hotel was not the only irregularity in the privatiˇ sation but the whole process was decisively manipulated to favour Cauševi´ c’s bid. In this sense, the sale contract included some provisions that hindered the participation of other groups and the tender finally had only one bid after the participation of other investors in the procedure. One such provision was that the owner should take responsibility for all debts appearing after the publication of the tender, a condition that could only be accepted by investors possessing privileged information (Omeragi´c 2000a). The purchase of the hotel at a much lower price than the actual value aroused suspicions regarding the legality of the sale. Despite being involved in the process as a member of the Managing Board of the Sarajevo Canton Privatisation Agency, the Cantonal Minister of Economy Zaim Backovi´c, quickly determined that the sale had been legitimate in order to seal the case. Yet, the sale had two lawsuits by July 2000, one signed by the workers and the other by the financial police. After one year of litigation, the contract on the sale of 51% of the hotel was cancelled after negotiations between the owner and the Cantonal Agency for Privatisation. The agency had to ˇ reimburse Cauševi´ c and his company 5.2 million KM in cash, 9.7 million KM in

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certificates and 190,000 KM in compensation. By law, the Agency could hold the money if the buyer had not met bidding obligations, which in the case of Holiday Inn had to be determined by 8 March. However, the cancellation of the contract on 14 February prevented the obligations to be eventually declared unfulfilled, which ˇ again benefited Cauševi´ c (Omeragi´c 2001a). After the cancellation of the sale, the hotel was temporary back in the state’s ownership. Later, it was included as one of the ten companies to be sold within the Bulldozer Initiative, launched by the High Representative to tackle administrative barriers (Agencies 2003a).6 The tender was opened in May 2003 with the cooperation of USAID and the International Advisory Group on Privatisation. The only bidder was the Austrian company Alpha Baumanagement which, having fulfilled all criteria and conditions set at the tender, finally purchased 100% of the state capital of the Holiday Inn for 44.4 million KM (Agencies 2003b). The second privatisation of the Hotel became the most successful foreign direct investment in the Federation of BiH, with the new company envisioning the development of a tower of 22 floors in the project called Holiday Inn—Grand Media Center. The Holiday Inn was used as an example of one of the successes that were taking place amid the economic reforms pushed by international actors, but the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council claimed that this case was rather an exception, defining the pace of privatisation as unsatisfactory (OHR 2004). In practice, the Holiday Inn represents both the attempts of ruling parties to manipulate the process of privatisation and the fallacy that it was necessary a quick privatisation since foreign capitals would bring the most capable hands to maximise economic potential. Ultimately, the management of Holiday Inn by the Austrian ownership collapsed after the abandonment of the Grand Media Center project, leading to the temporary closure of the hotel in 2013 and the loss of the franchise from the InterContinental Hotels Group (Agencies 2011). Sarajka is the second case considered in analysing the privatisation of the strategic companies in Sarajevo. Effectively, this case would confirm that the privatisation in the capital city of BiH was all but an apolitical process technically resolved in tender procedure and serving for the depoliticisation of the economy. Sarajka was a department store that opened in the mid-1970s in a central location between Bašˇcaršija and Marijin Dvor. Built following the project of architect Vladimir Zarahovi´c, it was conceived as the central site of consumerism in a context of economic growth, the strengthening of the middle class and a widespread increase in living standards (Agencies 2015). With such a strategic location in the main street, Maršala Tita, its privatisation offered a great opportunity for further commercial development activity in the ongoing process of tertiarisation of the economy. Soon, international companies

6

Using a bottom-up methodology to increase public awareness and mobilise the local business community, the Bulldozer Initiative was launched in November 2002 and aimed at dismantling the legal and administrative barriers to investments in the short term. It delivered fifty reforms in 150 days (Herzberg 2004).

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showed interest in buying Sarajka and, in April 2000, negotiations between representatives of the Italian company Benetton and the Sarajevo Cantonal Agency for Privatisation took place on the eve of tender publication (Agencies 2000). The tender was opened twice but no agreement was reached to complete the privatisation, with Benetton giving up Sarajka at the second attempt in March 2001 because of the high price requested by the Agency (Omeragi´c 2002a). A few months later, interest from different sides pushed the Cantonal Agency for Privatisation to open a new tender. Bosna Bank International (BBI) and the company Inter-Invest from Hercegovina generated bids along with Benetton. None of the three companies offered the entry price of eighteen million KM, including debts, for Sarajka. Inter-Invest was offering 12.5 million KM and both Benetton and BBI offered twelve million KM. The main difference was in the budget for investment in redevelopment. Benetton offered between eighty and ninety million KM, whereas the two other companies offered ten million KM (Omeragi´c 2002b). The final resolution of the tender was unusual since BBI finally purchased Sarajka after being the lowest offer and the removal from the two other companies. The owner of Interinvest, Dinko Slezak, withdrawn from the competition and Benetton subsequently found itself in premier position when, in April 2002, it was declared winner of the tender (Omeragi´c 2002c). Surprisingly enough, the representatives of Benetton did not appear at the Agency to sign on 10 June 2002 after having prepared all documentation for completion of the contract, which permitted BBI to turn into the winner of the tender. Benetton was in disposition and ready to purchase Sarajka after more than two years of interest and negotiations, so this late withdrawal could have been caused by pressures to clear the way for BBI. More specifically, the fact that the outcome in the privatisation of Sarajka was a product of Sarajevo’s ethno-national politics is plausible considering that BBI was closely intermingled with Bosniak elites, who had efficiently merged within the Bank’s structures after the Islamic Development Bank, the Dubai Islamic Bank and the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank founded BBI in October 2000. Political and religious elites, such as Bakir Izetbegovi´c, Haris Silajdži´c, Hasan ˇ Cengi´ c and Mustafa Ceri´c, who served as the leader of the Islamic Community of BiH between 1993 and 2012, were all members of the board of directors of the bank or part of its VIP business club. In this regard, Bakir Izetbegovi´c declared that he had earned 30,000 KM for his work on the board of directors despite being then the director of the Construction Institute of the Sarajevo Canton (Buturovi´c 2007).7 As noted by Lati´c (2011), prominent journalist and brother of pan-Islamist SDA member Džemaludin Lati´c, BBI became the main centre around which the political and economic power of the Bosniak national and religious elite was concentrated. Links were especially close between BBI and four powerful families in SDA, Bukvi´c, ˇ Cengi´ c, Izetbegovi´c and Živalj, all of them former members of Young Muslims.

7

In relation to religious leaders, the head of the Islamic Community at that time, the Grand Mufti Mustafa Ceri´c, has since become President of the Sharia Committee of the Bank.

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Such incorporation of Bosniak elites within BBI was strategic for ideological and economic purposes. BBI turned into the first bank in Europe to operate on the principles of Islamic banking in 2000. In its business plan, the Bank had as objective the expansion of Islamic banking into South-Eastern Europe and, more importantly, the capture of foreign direct investments particularly from Islamic countries that reverted on the economic development of the area of Sarajevo (Bokhari 2001). These goals were politically in line with conservative sectors in SDA. The privatisation of Sarajka also offered an excellent economic opportunity for its redevelopment into a modern shopping mall in Sarajevo’s main retail axis. Unlike other privatisations, the case of Sarajka certainly brought economic development and job creation during its construction and after the inauguration of BBI Centar in 2009. The economic and ideological dimensions seemed to coalesce in the controversial inauguration as the new shopping centre started to operate following some basic Islamic principles. On the entire surface, it was not allowed the sale of pork and alcohol, with gambling also being prohibited. This project can simply be framed as an economic project operating coherently with an investor that follows the Islamic banking rules. Yet, the influence of local politics in the nature of the project cannot be disregarded. The fact that the privatisation of Sarajka and the subsequent development of the BBI Centar was a product of Sarajevo’s ethno-national politics is not only plausible considering the concentration of powerful political and religious figures within the Bank, but it is also concordant with a production of space that has been hugely dominated by political elites during the post-socialist period, as analysed in Chap. 7.

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Pugh M (2005) Transformation in the political economy of Bosnia since Dayton. Int Peacekeeping 12(3):448–462 Pugh M, Cooper N (2004) War economies in a regional context. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Simi´c D (1996, October 21) Privatization in B&H: New class vs. impoverished citizens. Alternative Information Network Sarajevo Simi´c D (1998a, May 15) Privatization in the B&H Federation: Bidding for obedient party members. Alternative Information Network Sarajevo Simi´c D (1998b, July 8) Privatisation according to national quotas: A pile of money in exchange for power. Alternative Information Network Sarajevo Skopljak S (1998, September 2) Economy in the service of politics: (Ab)use of Managers. Alternative Information Network Sarajevo Stojanov D (2001) Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1995: transition and reconstruction of the economy. In: Papic Z (ed) International support policies to SEE countries—lesson (not) learned in BosniaHerzegovina. Open Society Fund Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, pp 44–70 USAID (1999). Payment bureaus in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Obstacles to development and a strategy for orderly transformation. Sarajevo: USAID. WB (1996) Bosnia and Herzegovina: towards economic recovery. The World Bank, Washington, DC Williams R (2013) Post-conflict land tenure issues in Bosnia: Privatization and the politics of reintegration of displaced. In: Unruh J, Williams R (eds) Land and post-conflict peacebuilding. Earthscan, New York, pp 145–176 Williamson J (1990) Latin American adjustment: how much has happened. Institute for International Economics, Washington Zaum D (2005) Economic reform and the transformation of the payment bureaux. Int Peacekeeping 12(3):350–363 Zivkovi´c S (2001, April 11) Why foreign investors ignore Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alternative Information Network Banja Luka

Chapter 7

The Urban Spatial Reconfiguration of Sarajevo

Abstract After the analyses conducted in previous chapters about the role of the OHR in the urban transformation of Sarajevo since the end of the war until 2003, this chapter deals with the spatial transformation resulting from the economic transition and the re-establishment of the real estate market. Firstly, it analyses the consequences of the approval of the Law on Construction Land in terms of production of space and the subsequent urban spatial restructuring. This transformation was similar functionally and morphologically to other European post-socialist cities, but the production of space in Sarajevo is marked by a significant interventionism from municipal authorities and political elites. The subsequent focus on the construction on the slopes surrounding the central areas of the city and the suburban development of gated neighbourhoods illustrates that the spatial reconfiguration of Sarajevo is both a result of the economic transition and the consolidation of ethno-territorial orders in post-war Bosnia. Keywords Sarajevo · Post-socialist city · Spatial restructuring · Suburbanisation · Gated communities

7.1 The Post-Socialist Urban Spatial Restructuring With the demise of Socialist Yugoslavia, there was the transformation of the economic and political structures that had been shaping the urbanisation for more than forty years. This systemic change affected all countries in transition which, under different paces and levels of intensity, increased commodification of factors intervening in the production of space (Hamilton 1995). These included an increasing interaction between public and private actors in the decision-making process and the privatisation of the means of production, urban housing and land. In Sarajevo, municipal authorities moved quickly to define the strategies for the future development of the city after the war. In search of more flexible planning paradigms and approaches after the collapse of socialism, the elaboration of the Sarajevo Canton Development Strategy until the year 2015 was determined by the City Council when Dayton peace negotiations were starting in early November 1995

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Martín-Díaz, The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80575-3_7

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(KS 2000).1 The transition towards a capitalist city was central in the fourteen points of the Plan, finally approved in 1998. More particularly, the creation of a profitable business environment was based on private ownership and a successful economy that permitted the free flow of capital, goods, services and people; so the plan also identified the introduction of an urban land market system, the privatisation of public assets and the strengthening of sectors such as banking and finance. Despite this reorientation, the resistance of ethnocracies to the economic liberalisation implied that the international community ultimately conducted those reforms for the transition to a market economy, including the real estate market (Martín-Díaz 2014). The international community pursued improving procedures and setting the legal certainty needed for local and foreign private property developments. When the attempts of international actors to control allocations of land were finally abandoned, as analysed in Chap. 4, the High Representative enacted a harmonised Law on Construction Land in both entities in May 2003 (OHR 2003a).2 Land management reverted back to the municipalities and, eventually, it was incorporated into the market and open to mass privatisation. In this sense, Article 39 of the Law transformed the permanent right of use of urban land that existed during Socialist Yugoslavia into private ownership.3 Due to the policy to consolidate ethnic majorities in respective territories, the approval of the Law and the end of the land ban allocation implied that land acquired economic value after a period in which it had become a high-value political asset (Williams 2013). The Law on Construction Land was a logical step in the postsocialist transition and had counted in February 2000 with a backing from the Constitutional Court, which judged that the category of socially owned property was not compatible with the goal of a market economy defined in the Constitution of BiH (Begi´c 2000). More specifically, the Constitutional Court ruled that socially owned property created, in theory and practice, a serious obstacle for the process of privatisation. With the approval of the Law on Construction Land, land-use regulations had hardly changed but the decision-making process of public institutions had already been oriented towards private profit. As it will be analysed below, political and economic elites define and shape urban development in post-war and post-socialist Bosnia, in what is often termed as investor urbanism (e.g. Djurasovic 2016; Pobric 1

The adoption of strategic plans was embraced in transitioning cities as a way to involve the business community and the broader constituency in the definition of a shared future (Albrechts 2004; Tsenkova 2006). 2 The Law on Construction Land was mutually related to several other laws such as the Law on Administrative Procedure, the Law on Land Registry, the Law on Expropriation, the Law on Urban Planning, the Law on Land Registry, the Law on Property and Legal Relations, the Law on Transactions with Immobile Properties and the Law on Inheritance. 3 After nationalisation, urban land in Socialist Yugoslavia had a three-parcel structure of approximately 500 m2 each one. The first parcel was automatically privatised. Previously, it contained a right for permanent use with no possibility for inheritance. In the second parcel, there was a priority right to build for personal needs only, i.e. growing family, but no right of ownership or transaction. In the third parcel, there was a temporary right to use.

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and Robinson 2019). As a result, and after being a tool based on the principles of equality and solidarity during the socialist period, planning was downgraded to the detriment of the private priorities of landowners and local politicians, who became prevalent over existing regulations. It culminated a process that had begun in the late eighties, in which the importance of planning and regulations in the production of space started to diminish because of the rampant economic and political crisis, as seen in the notorious case of the gas station built at the eastern edge of the city in 1989.4 The Law on Construction Land was the turning point in the post-socialist production of space. Since then, Sarajevo has undergone a significant spatial transformation that has produced the rise of functional and morphological diversity so characteristic for other post-socialist cities such as Sofia (Hirt 2006), Prague (Sýkora 2007), Budapest (Kovács 1994), or Belgrade (Hirt 2008). In projects mapped during fieldworks, tertiary economic activities are predominant and represent more than 70% of the post-war urban projects identified.5 New projects include office real estates, commercial properties, hotels and mixeduse developments, and may have been developed on the site of old industrial companies, small workshops and warehouses (Nurkovi´c 2016). This process of deindustrialisation and tertiarisation is a clear manifestation of the post-socialist transformation, which reduces the quantitative and qualitative shortcomings in service provision that generally existed in socialist cities because of the resource redirection from personal and collective consumption to industrial development (Hamilton 1979; Szelenyi 1996). New urban projects have particularly transformed the spatial structure and landscape in the municipalities of Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo (Fig. 7.1), where there is the greatest spatial legacy of socialism. This concentration is a consequence of the existing inner land available in socialist neighbourhoods and a more favourable geomorphological setting compared to the two other municipalities of the City of Sarajevo, i.e. Centar and Stari Grad, as the Miljacka flood plain widens westwards. Such concentration takes place particularly in the Bulevar Meše Slimovi´ca, where office and commercial properties have developed in the narrow free land existing between the longitudinal avenue and the impressive residential buildings. These 4

Energopetrol began the construction of a gas station in Bentbaša eight months prior to the granting of the building permit. The construction took place amid protests from citizens as the location of the gasoline reserve tank jeopardised the ruins of the dervish quarter built by Isabeg Ishakovic, the founder of the city, around 1462 (Donia 2006). 5 As detailed in the methodology, the database of these projects was elaborated during fieldworks through several techniques such as direct observation, informal interviews and historical pictures (Prstojevi´c 1994). Projects selected were both newly developed or redeveloped after the war, with functional or significant morphological transformation. New single-family dwellings developed mostly in the suburbs were not considered. Multifamily housing was especially developed in the past few years with most projects in the central municipalities developed privately. New temples and memorials have also been built during the post-war period. New temples are generally mosques but there are also examples of constructions of new churches in the municipalities of Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo.

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Fig. 7.1 New major urban projects in the City of Sarajevo developed or redeveloped during the post-war period (1996–2016). © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved

new urban projects have produced an urban densification and a significant morphological transformation as the new post-modernist architecture contrasts with the predominantly modernist in socialist neighbourhoods.6 Foreign investments have notably shaped the urban transformation of postsocialist cities during the transition, especially in the creation and recreation of central business districts in capital cities (Hamilton 2005). These districts were consolidated and began to resemble those of Western metropolises. In Sarajevo, it is the case of the Marijin Dvor area, the modern central district of the city located between de municipalities of Centar and Novo Sarajevo, and which centrality has been reinforced during the post-socialist period thanks to this form of investments.7 These were the cases of the headquarters of Raiffeinsein, the main bank in BiH, and three of the large new shopping centres in the city: Alta Shopping Centre, Importanne Centre and Sarajevo City Centre. Equally, it has seen the development of the UNDP headquarters and two embassies with political significance for BiH, namely the United States and Turkish embassies. 6

Socialist realism was officially the architectural style of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, but as it was not implemented with total rigidity, some distinctive housing complexes were produced such as the complex in the Ciglane neighbourhood. 7 Located in the municipalities of Novo Sarajevo and Centar, Marijin Dvor is a relatively wide sector at the edge of the Austro-Hungarian city that allowed the development of political, military and cultural buildings during Socialist Yugoslavia. These include the Parliament, the National Museum, the Museum of the Revolution, the Yugoslav army barracks (former Austro-Hungarian barracks), several faculties of the University of Sarajevo such as Philosophy and Science, as well as the towers UNITIC and the hotel Holiday Inn, developed during the 1980s for the needs of the Winter Olympics.

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These new developments highlight the logic of the contemporary production of space in post-war Bosnia. In this sense, local politicians are the main decisionmakers while local politics, rather than planners, significantly shape regulation plans (Djurasovic 2016). This is a feature of the neoliberal urban development, turning planning into a mere corrective mechanism without formulating an overall policy to regulate development (Tasan-Kok 2012). In this respect, ad hoc changes take place to adapt regulation plans to new urban projects, which are often developed bypassing existing regulations. The headquarters of the Raiffeisen Bank is an illustrative example since its construction was developed regardless of the City Council’s refusal to change the regulation plan for its adaptation to the project. The building project completely disregarded regulations because of its design of ten floors doubled the maximum height permitted. Yet, the Bank conducted a silent agreement with the developer, in which the building would be acquired only if the surface required by the bank was met. The plot ratio defined in the regulation plan was also exceeded in other projects developed in the Marijin Dvor such as the case of the Turkish embassy and the Importanne Centre. The fact that the Turkish embassy was able to overcome this regulation solely for one extra floor, acted as the pretext to regularise all buildings that had been developed in the Marijin Dvor area no matter the magnitude or the nature of the irregularity. Indeed, in Sarajevo political elites and municipal authorities exercise a higher control and influence than in free market economies. It was seen in the construction boom that occurred after the approval of the Law on Construction Land. As claimed by an interviewee, there was a significant interest of Western investors seeking to develop new urban projects in the city between 2005 and 2008, but only those with political links were able to confront excessive obstacles regarding the obtention of licenses to materialise projects. This control in the contemporary production of space may imply, too often, a requirement of bribes to change planning regulations or to ensure that municipalities grant the construction permit. The so-called Reket affair involved the social-democratic party in 2009, which was ruling the municipality of Novi Grad. The former director of ASA Group, Nihad Imamovi´c, a distinguished entrepreneur from Sarajevo, was asked a commission of 3.5 million KM by SDP leadership, President Zlatko Lagumdžija and Vice President Damir Hadži´c, for issuing a building permit (Ašˇci´c 2016). The existence of a limited real estate market is a feature of those post-socialist countries where political power still plays a dominant role.8 In Sarajevo, an important actor in the production of space is Bakir Izetbegovi´c, the leader of the SDA since 2014, architect and the son of the first Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovi´c. Bakir Izetbegovi´c served as director of the Construction Institute of Sarajevo between 1991 and 2003. At that time, officials of the OHR and Western diplomats already 8

For instance, the development of major urban projects in the late 1990s did not take place in a free market in Moscow. Yuriy Luzhkov, Mayor of Moscow between 1992 and 2010, was a major actor through his control over decision-making and ownership of certain companies (Pagonis and Thornley 2000).

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Fig. 7.2 Redevelopment of the Marijin Dvor area, with the Sarajevo City Center. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved

considered him as one of the most powerful and wealthiest men in BiH (Hedges 1999).9 According to a number of people interviewed, he has continued operating in the real estate sector through his influence on the development of new major urban projects and even direct investment in a close partnership with architect Sead Gološ. During the past fifteen years, Gološ has been responsible for designing some of the main projects developed in the city such as the BBI Centar and the Sarajevo City Center (Fig. 7.2). It was controversial in the case of the BBI Centar, as Sead Gološ finally developed the project even though architect Slobodan Andjeli´c won first prize for its construction.

7.2 Urbanisation on the Slopes and Suburbanisation In parallel to the densification of neighbourhoods built during socialist times with the development of new major urban projects, the city has also experienced a process of urbanisation since the late 1990s because of the pressure of internally displaced. Representing around one-fifth of the post-war population, the Canton of Sarajevo still hosted about 70,000 internally displaced persons in 2002 when the bulk of housing 9

He owned, for instance, 15% of Air Bosnia, the state airline, and took a cut of the extortion money paid out by local shopkeepers to Sarajevo gangsters, according to diplomats. Furthermore, he influenced and allegedly made profit from socially owned apartments. People who required occupancy rights had to pay Bakir Izetbegovi´c $2,000 as claimed by several individuals affected.

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restitution was taking place (ESI 2004). This demographic pressure triggered new housing constructions in the suburbs and on the slopes surrounding the central areas of the city. In terms of the urbanisation on the slopes, it is an epiphenomenal process of the urban development of the city. Conditioned by the topographical features of the Miljacka valley, urban development has traditionally situated housing at lower gradient sectors since the very foundation of the city in the Ottoman period (MartínDíaz et al. 2018). During Socialist Yugoslavia, constructions on the stable ground on the slopes surrounding Sarajevo continued. Private construction also played a significant role in the intense process of urbanisation so, in this context, the cheaper price of land and a closer proximity to the workplace, with industries being located in the flat areas next to foothills, meant that developing housing on the slopes was seen as a more effective option than building on the flat areas in the suburbs of the city. However, the new wave of self-construction of housing on the slopes produced after the war had a different nature because most of the new constructions were a ˇ consequence of ethnic cleansing (Cengi´ c 2011). As analysed in Chap. 5, the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration did not bring a mass return to their pre-war homes of those internally displaced who resettled in the city. In the absence of a meaningful production of public housing, people internally displaced looked for their own alternatives once evictions from temporary housing started.10 In other words, the selfconstruction of housing was often the unique alternative to get permanently settled in the city after the war. It was particularly necessary for those displaced who had suffered several evictions from temporary apartments during the process of housing ˇ restitution (Cengi´ c and Skotte 2010). Generally, new constructions were built in circumstances of budget constraints, so these were often developed without the required building permit or the legal transaction of land.11 Post-war urbanisation on the slopes occurred despite the modification of the regulatory regime carried out by the Development Planning Institute of Sarajevo in anticipation of the wave of returns and expected urbanisation (Martín-Díaz et al. 2015). Changes in the regulatory regime were launched in 1997 to control urban development in neighbourhoods of mixed housing types on higher slope gradients. This did not prevent the development of several thousands of single-detached houses with some of them taking place on the most vulnerable sites on the slopes, even in gradients higher than 30%. All this implied both a degradation of urban life and a rise

10

According to the Cantonal Ministry of Veteran Affairs, only 955 new apartments had been built with public funds between 1999 and 2002, including 160 for war invalids and 450 for demobilised soldiers (ESI 2004). The Ministry also donated 750 packages of building material for self-construction of housing to veterans, valued at around 6,000 KM for each one. 11 During the socialist period urban land was public and a significant amount on the slopes had the title of “priority right to build”. This title could not be transferred to another person without approval from the municipality. However, the approval of the Law on Construction Land unlocked land transactions and triggered a relaxation of illegality.

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of geomorphological risks (Martín-Díaz et al. 2018).12 Legalisation of constructions built without permission was progressively adopted by the municipalities of Sarajevo but, with limited resources, these settlements were kept within the domain of grey spaces (Legrand 2013). Ironically, successive waves of legalisation encouraged people to continue the illegal constructions. Along with the numerous self-housing constructions built on the slopes surrounding the central areas of the city, new single-detached dwellings were developed in the suburbs of the city. It has contributed to a population growth in the municipalities of Ilidža and Vogoš´ca between 1991 and 2013, which contrasts with the significant reduction of inhabitants in the Canton and the four central municipalities that administratively constitute the city (ASBiH 2016). More specifically, population increased from 67,000 to 71,000 inhabitants in Ilidža and from 24,000 to 32,000 inhabitants in the municipality of Vogoš´ca, while the four central municipalities of Sarajevo lost 86,000 inhabitants.13 Such a process of suburbanisation implied the erosion of one of the main spatial features of socialist cities, which were generally more compact and had a sharper urban edge. The fact that housing developed on the slopes and in the suburbs is a consequence of the consolidation of ethno-territorialities, reveals that the process of suburbanisation so-characteristic of post-socialist cities has also an ethnocratic nature. This combination is also shaping the more recent development of gated communities, which constitute a specific spatial manifestation of the economic transition and, more particularly, of the liberalisation of the housing market and the flourishing of foreign investments (Hirt 2012; Kovács and Hegedus 2014). Gated communities began to spread as new forms of housing around major cities of post-socialist countries in the 1990s and came to be dominant residential spaces in the urban landscape by the following decade (Kovács 2014). They contain the feature of being physically restricted but also legally restrictive, as agreements usually tie the residents to a common code of conduct and collective responsibility for management (Atkinson and Blandy 2005). In Sarajevo, however, foreign investors from the Persian Gulf, i.e. Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have been developing these privatised residential spaces, such as the Sarajevo Resort, Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone.14 In 12

There is no official data on new constructions on the slopes, only vague estimations ranging from 20,000 to 40,000 (Martín-Díaz et al. 2015). In the analyses conducted on the slopes in five study areas (Martín-Díaz et al. 2018), which encompass a total of 7.3 km2 out of the 141 km2 occupied by the city of Sarajevo, a rise of housing during the post-war period ranges between 11 and 30%. 13 The municipalities of Stari Grad and Novo Sarajevo were divided by the IEBL at the outskirts, so the loss of population caused by the partition was not significant in the central municipalities of the city. 14 The Saudi Al-Shiddi group built the project Poljine Hills, located in the northern areas of the Centar municipality. It is a gated complex of more than 200 urban villas and intended both for Arabs and wealthy Bosnians. The Buroj Ozone project is being developed in the municipality of Trnovo. It is a 2.5-billion-euro development by a businessman from Dubai. This project is developing at least 3,000 villas, apartments, a hospital and a sports hall, with the purpose that Arab tourists feel at home in BiH (Agencies 2016a). The construction of the project has progressed very slowly in the past few years after accumulating several delays (Agencies 2020).

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October 2015, the Sarajevo Resort became the first project to be inaugurated, in the municipality of Hadži´ci. The Resort, developed by the company Gulf Real Estate with an inversion of over fifty million KM, was designed to provide accommodation for visitors from the Middle East with a capacity of 1,125 people (Agencies 2015). In line with the development of the BBI Centar after the controversial privatisation of Sarajka, these new suburban projects are apparently closely intertwined with Sarajevo’s local politics and Bosniak elites, especially those entrenched within BBI. These projects have been promoted as part of a policy that prioritises the attraction of foreign investments from the Persian Gulf, while the Bank became the main centre around which Bosniak national and religious elite concentrated, including members that pursue a greater rise of the public presence of Islam in areas with a majority of Bosniak population, like Sarajevo. As analysed in Chap. 6, the Bank set out in its business plan the capture of foreign direct investments, and particularly capital from Islamic countries, to boost the economic development of Sarajevo. The Bank had already started to lobby in order to attract Persian Gulf investments during the construction boom that started after the approval of the Law on Construction Land (Agencies 2007). Significantly, in a context of mass real estate development in these countries, the capture of this type of investment became an official part of the development programme for the Federation of BiH in April 2008 during a meeting between BBI’s founding banks and local government officials in Sarajevo (Agencies 2008). The attempt to attract foreign direct investments from the Islamic world went further in 2010, with the celebration of the first Sarajevo Business Forum organised by BBI. This event brought together international investors from over forty countries and a significant representation of financiers from Arab countries as well as Turkey. Referring to the arrival of Gulf tourists and investors, the chief executive officer of BBI, Amer Bukvi´c, explained during the inauguration of the Sarajevo Resort in October 2015 that this was the first of this type of investment as long as stability was preserved (Smajilhodzic 2016). Amer Bukvi´c argued that BBI attempts to strengthen ties with the Islamic world were not part of an ideological project but simply a pragmatic way to address the difficult economic situation of Bosnia. These economic links were presented as a continuation of the connections that had been established by members of the NonAligned Movement during the times of Socialist Yugoslavia, which were especially fruitful for Sarajevo’s main companies. Bukvi´c’s argument is an attempt to depoliticise these practices as it neglects the great political and ethnic transformation of Bosnia and Sarajevo since the beginning of the war. In this context, current economic ties with Persian Gulf countries in post-war Bosnia differ politically and in terms of meaning compared to the ties that previously existed. These investments have been controversial as they are concomitant with tourism development from Gulf countries.15 Because of the upsurge of tourists and land acquisition, voices in favour of and against have risen among the local population, 15

In 2010, there were only sixty-five registered visitors from the United Arab Emirates, but they had increased by 13,000 in the first seven months in 2016 (Agencies 2016b). Bosnia’s statistics agency counted further increases in overnight stays in Bosnia by Kuwaitis, close to 40,000 in 2015,

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generally more secular. Some people only see economic benefits, whereas others have also expressed doubts about their presence and the eventual cultural influence on new generations (Sito-Sucic 2016; Smajilhodzic 2016). This reveals somehow a gap between the population and elites, as the former have often not been reacting positively towards foreign Islamic influence. In contrast, the religious and political links that emerged during the war with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, to overcome isolation, have only strengthened after the cessation of hostilities (Karˇci´c 2010). Such controversy has a potential destabilising effect on the delicate religious balance in BiH and, particularly, in the area of Sarajevo (Durakovi´c 2015).

References Agencies (2007, July 19) Stvoriti bosanski lobi za agresivniji nastup prema zemljama Zaliva. Dnevni Avaz Agencies (2008, April 17) Ulaganje islamskog kapitala u razvojne programe FBiH. SEEbiz Agencies (2015, October 17) Sveˇcano otvoreno rezidencijalno naselje “Sarajevo Resort”. OsenikKlix.ba Agencies (2016a, January 22) Arabs are coming to Bosnia because of Profit. The Economist Agencies (2016b, August 22) Bosnian Businesses Welcome Arab Real estate Investments. Gulf Digital News Agencies (2020, January 12) Is Buroj Ozone Project in Bosnia-Herzegovina doomed to Fail? Sarajevo Times Albrechts L (2004) Strategic (spatial) planning reexamined. Environ Plan b: Plan Des 31(5):743–758 ˇ c, Ivani´c…. Were dropped. Ašˇci´c M (2016, February 8) How the charges against Šarovi´c, Covi´ Dnevni Avaz Atkinson R, Blandy S (2005) Introduction: International perspectives on the new enclavism and the rise of gated communities. Hous Stud 20(2):177–186 Begi´c K (2000) Partial decision U5/98-II of 18 and 19 February 2000. Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ASBiH (2016) Census of population, households and dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013: final results. Sarajevo, Agency for Statistics of Bosna and Herzegovina ˇ Cengi´ c N (2011) Remodelling urban meaning—the Sarajevo case. In: 4th international conference on Hazards and Modern Heritage (CICOP), Sarajevo ˇ Cengi´ c N, Skotte H (2010) Property, possession and Conflicts in re-building settlements: Sarajevo. PROPOCON Project Report Djurasovic A (2016) Ideology, political transitions and the city: the case of Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Routledge, New York Donia R (2006) Sarajevo: a biography. Hurts & Company, London Durakovi´c E (2015, September 30) Obijest s opasnim posljedicama: Dok Evropu preplavljuju arapski besku´cnici, Bosnu kupuju arapski mo´cnici! Depo Portal ESI (2004) Governance and democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: post-industrial society and the authoritarian temptation. Sarajevo, European Stability Initiative Hamilton FEI (1979) Urbanization in socialist Eastern Europe: The macro-environment of internal city structure. In: French RA, Hamilton EI (eds) The socialist city: spatial structure and urban policy. New York, Wiley, pp 167–194

while overnight stays by tourists from Saudi Arabia leapt from 11,494 in 2014 to 30,000 in the first eight months of 2016 (Mikuli´c and Rose 2016).

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Chapter 8

The Ethnic Reconfiguration in the Area of Sarajevo

Abstract This chapter analyses the contemporary ethnic configuration of Sarajevo in order to assess the impact of the OHR, and more particularly, of the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration in the reconstruction of ethnic diversity. To do so, it considers the division between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo from several dimensions. Firstly, it presents the urban, political and functional relationship between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo to frame the transformation throughout the post-war period. As a result of the dependence of East Sarajevo, the subsequent focus is on the evolution of the cross-entity spatial practices which illustrate the increasing porosity of the IEBL during the post-war period, particularly among Sarajevo Serbs who moved to East Sarajevo. Finally, analyses on visions about the partition in the area of Sarajevo and contemporary common life in the city reveal the impact of war and the success of subsequent policies to consolidate an ethno-territorial order. Keywords Sarajevo · East Sarajevo · Ethnic division · Boundary · Functional integration

8.1 The Evolution of the Division Between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo The division of Sarajevo at the outskirts of the central urban areas implied the legalisation of the policy of ethno-territorialisation conducted by SDS since 1991. As analysed in Chap. 4, the impossibility to keep the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo after the war was responded to by SDS leadership with a project to build a Serbian Sarajevo. In the short and mid-term, the project was insufficient to provide housing and an economic foundation for the thousands of Sarajevo Serbs who had left the city. Yet, urbanisation subsequently accelerated in East Sarajevo, whose urban area increased 29% in the period 2000–2012 (Draškovi´c et al. 2016). The process was more intense in the period 2000–2006, when most of Sarajevo Serbs completed the repossession of housing amid the OHR’s land policy that ultimately imposed, until 2003, a general ban on the allocation of socially owned land. Afterwards, it took denser forms once private developers started to build multifamily housing, which has reinforced the ethnic division in the area of Sarajevo (Fig. 8.1). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Martín-Díaz, The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80575-3_8

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Fig. 8.1 Multifamily housing developed in Lukavica (a) and (b) Pale. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved

Today, East Sarajevo is a polycentric city composed of small urban centres dispersed in a large territory mostly comprised of mountains and agricultural land. The intensity of urbanisation in East Sarajevo decreases with distance from Sarajevo and, mostly, it took place in Pale and Lukavica which are twenty-five km from each other. From a population of 61,516 recorded in the 2013 Census, these two areas concentrate 64% of the population in the city of East Sarajevo. The area of Lukavica has a compact urbanisation with a density of 424 inhabitants per km2 and contains 35% of the population of the city (Mutabzija 2016). The municipality of Pale has 29% of the city population and a lower density of forty-five inhabitants per km2 .

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Both areas concentrate institutions of Republika Srpska with different degrees of importance at local, entity and state level.1 However, the fragmentation of East Sarajevo and its limited urbanisation makes it to depend on Sarajevo in the provision of services, culture, employment or health. After a period in which the IEBL had little porosity, the urban imbalance at both sides of the boundary contributed to recover the functional links in the area of Sarajevo, especially between the ten municipalities that had composed the city since its expansion in 1977. This is particularly seen in the urban centre built in Lukavica after the war, which has a spatial continuity with the Dobrinja neighbourhood. Lukavica had a military function before the war, but it has become one of the most attractive ˇ local community centres in the urban area of Sarajevo (Cengi´ c and Hodo 2016).2 The functional reintegration was also favoured by an OHR initiative launched in 2000 to boost cross-ethnic social and economic links through the creation of five economic regions in Banja Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica (Kebo 2000). These macroeconomic regions were similar to the four regions, Banja Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo and Tuzla, defined in the 1981 Spatial Plan of the Socialist Republic of BiH (Žulji´c et al. 2015). In the area of Sarajevo, the plan culminated in 2004 with the establishment of the Sarajevo Economic Regional Development Agency (SERDA). Funded mostly with European funds, SERDA economically integrated the two cities, Sarajevo and East Sarajevo, along with some other municipalities of the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska, thirty-two and thirteen, respectively. This initiative contributed to the increase of human and material flows between entities, and it also worked for the development of mutual projects between both cities in areas like infrastructure, e.g. the reconstruction of the Trebevi´c cable car, and tourism development, e.g. the joint organisation of the 2019 European Youth Olympic Winter Festival. Yet, cooperation between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo is restricted to specific projects and has not altered the political and institutional division. Despite the economic potential for the development of the East Sarajevo, the idea of a reintegration with Sarajevo has constantly been rejected by main local authorities from East Sarajevo. As claimed in 2012 by its mayor, Vinko Radovanovi´c, they do not want to drown into something bigger, with Bosniaks being much numerous, and losing identity (Agencies 2012b).3

1

The division of East Sarajevo has been continuously implemented from the perspective of urban planning. The Spatial Plan published in 2008 ratified the city as a combination of small urban centres and villages, between 1000 and 20,000 inhabitants, which totalised almost 65,000 inhabitants (Aquilué and Roca 2016). Subsequently, the regional plan of the Bosnian Serb entity reaffirmed the existence of East Sarajevo and equated the new city constituted during the war with the five other cities of the Republika Srpska, i.e. Banja Luka, Bieljina, Doboj, Prijedor and Trebinje (Bassi 2013). 2 More specifically, it is the twentieth out of 100 local community centres (mjesna zajednica), which are a form of local self-government within municipalities. 3 This declaration was a response to the Presidency Chairman of BiH, Bakir Izetbegovi´ c, who suggested that both Srebrenica and Sarajevo should be districts with a special regime. Izetbegovi´c, who would become SDA President the following year, claimed that the party proposed the expansion into a District including the ten pre-war municipalities (Agencies 2012a).

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8.1.1 From Physical Border to Boundary: Spatial Practices Across the IEBL The psychological effect from long periods of violence generally prevents people from occupying formerly insecure or forbidden areas (Calame and Charlesworth 2009). In this context, the boundary delimiting the division between the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska constrained daily spatial practices among many Sarajevans and former Sarajevens for a long time after the war. The power of these areas is particularly highlighted by the experience of Sarajevo Serbs who moved to East Sarajevo since they left the city for a semirural area on the other side of the IEBL (Fig. 8.2). The dismantling of checkpoints during the early post-war stages, as well as the unification of car plates conducted by the OHR in 1997, facilitated the mobility between entities but crossing the IEBL was still rather an exception for many people. Actually, some of those interviewed living in East Sarajevo after the war spent several years without going to Sarajevo because of fear. In the late 1990s, the boundary was still remarkably influential around Sarajevo and there was not the purpose to soften it. Occasional violent incidents and stories about them were used to portray how Serbs were not safe in the Federation of BiH, which contributed to maintaining the symbolic power of the boundary (Armakolas 2007).

Fig. 8.2 The IEBL dividing Sarajevo and East Sarajevo in Dobrinja neighbourhood. © Springer Nature 2021. All Rights Reserved

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Nonetheless, people at some point needed to return to Sarajevo and initial visits often took place to address issues regarding the restitution of housing. Emotions during the first visits were especially high with uncertainty, discomfort and fear being predominant. Insecurity was especially felt by males who had been enrolled in the VRS as they were fearful of the police controls and social interactions, with concerns about meeting old acquaintances or pre-war friends. These emotions were progressively eroded in many cases after first meetings with acquaintances: My first time in Sarajevo was in 2001 or 2002, I was afraid of reactions if I met people I had known. I had no idea what to say. I was shopping with my girlfriend and one lady came and recognised me. Nothing happened and that feeling progressively disappeared (Research Interview; Informant 1).

Lacking bad experiences, attitudes improved and were more positive once people re-commenced to visit Sarajevo. Over time, daily spatial practices were often less conditioned by the separation. The IEBL evolved from a border during the war and early post-war stages to a powerful symbolic boundary that in many cases reduced gradually the emotional burden related to violence and conflict. Indeed, the rise of the mobility to Sarajevo by former Sarajevo Serbs was crucially influenced by the limited urban development of East Sarajevo. Daily or periodical mobility to Sarajevo is related to employment, administrative issues, consumption, leisure or visits to family. The opening of the main shopping centres since 2009, with the development of post-socialist flagships like BBI Centar, Importanne, Alta or the Sarajevo City Centre, increased the mobility from East Sarajevo to Sarajevo. The fact that the two main shopping centres, i.e. BBI and SCC, are operating following some basic Islamic norms has not produced any restriction in their pattern of visits. Most of the people interviewed were fully aware and had experienced some of the limitations, like the impossibility of buying alcohol. However, people did not react negatively but rather showed indifference: It is not a problem for me that it is been built following sharia principles; what irritates me, is that my daughter wants to go to each and every boutique (Research Interview; Informant 2).

The impact of new projects is simply economic for the former Sarajevo Serbs interviewed. These projects are essentially affixed to modernity and are new options of entertainment and consumption instead of constituting a disturbing element of the transformation of the city. This was observed by an interviewee who, going once a week to Sarajevo to visit friends and shopping, felt that BBI was like any other shopping centre (Research interview; Informant 3). Often, those elements in the landscape more explicitly related to the Bosniak nationality are more disturbing. In this sense, the interviewee complained about the development of new mosques which made the city look like Saudi Arabia for him, as those developed by foreign donors have often broken the tradition of building small mosques in the Balkans, with only one minaret. Among Sarajevans, spatial patterns are substantially different. Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats living in Sarajevo have also increased mobility to East Sarajevo

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since the end of the war, once polarisation decreased and flows resumed, but not with the same intensity. Most of the Bosniaks interviewed, who go periodically or frequently to East Sarajevo, live in Dobrinja or Ilidža which are closer to Lukavica; whereas people living in other areas of Sarajevo rarely go often to East Sarajevo. In terms of work, socialisation or consumption, the spatial practices of many Sarajevans bring them to different places within the city or in some municipalities of the Sarajevo Canton, meaning that crossing the IEBL from the Federation of BiH is less frequent. In spite of the evolution of spatial patterns and the resume of mobility in the area of Sarajevo, the war-time experience can be decisive in mobility across the boundary for many people. As pointed out by Jansen (2013) in the analysis on the materialisation of the IEBL in Dobrinja, some people on the side of the Federation of BiH were still reluctant to enter East Sarajevo because it is the place from where they had been shelled during the siege. It contrasts with the fact that they dared to go to other places in Republika Srpska or to Serbia. Thus, this increasing porosity did not turn the IEBL into a meaningless boundary, something that is confirmed in the following analysis about the visions on the division.

8.1.2 Visions on the Division of the Urban Area of Sarajevo In order to consolidate the spatial order that emerged from the war, the Republika Srpska has been a particularly strong nationalising state (Touquet 2012). The Cyrillic alphabet has been used as a marker of Serb national identity in BiH, and it has also become particularly effective in differentiating the Bosnian Serb entity from the rest of the Bosnian territory (Sen 2009; Bassi 2015). Other ethno-territorial markers have been the use of distinct colours in road signs, the renaming of the streets with Serbianrelated names like in Lukavica (Ristic 2015), and the toponomy which included ethnic references in towns and municipalities until the prohibition of the Constitutional Court. This was the case of Srpsko Sarajevo subsequently renamed as East Sarajevo. These markers are tools in the process of ethno-territorialisation and contribute to strengthening links between space and ethnic categories. Then, changes in the spatial patterns across the IEBL do not imply that the essence of the division between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo has essentially been transformed. It is highlighted by the vision of former Sarajevo Serbs about the city. A sense of urban identity may be retained by some people who moved to East Sarajevo, but it exists under the enormous weight of ethnicity. When talking about Sarajevo, some of the interviewees claimed that they missed urban life and, even in some cases, that they somehow regretted having left Sarajevo for Pale or Lukavica. While nostalgia for a previous life in Sarajevo and fascination for the city is not hidden, they mostly show themselves detached from post-war Sarajevo by pointing to the essentially distinct character of the city and its inhabitants. This sense for Sarajevo remains fully compatible with the defence of Republika Srpska and it has been consolidated during the post-war period. In this regard, observations from Ionnanis Armakolas

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(2007) already showed that, four years after the end of the war, Sarajevo Serbs living in Pale could calmly switch from this nostalgia for a multi-ethnic city to powerful separatist messages. In terms of the division, it was identified a clear dichotomy between residents from Sarajevo and those from East Sarajevo. The fact that Sarajevo is not an internally divided city means that the perception of the division differs significantly between people from different ethnicities and places of residence. In East Sarajevo, there was a consensus that the city was divided in all senses. Several interviewees claimed that the division was the very purpose of conflict, as in the case of a public employee in the administration, who objected to the name when talking about the construction of Srpsko Sarajevo after the war. For him, the decision to build the city was good despite the problems that emerged during its development, but it would have been necessary a name that makes it easier to identify and to explain that there are two cities (Research Interview; Informant 4). Interestingly, some Sarajevo Serbs living in East Sarajevo denounced that many people in Sarajevo did not recognise division. It was observed in interviews with Sarajevans, who did not categorically consider the city divided and nuanced answers unlike the responses from former Sarajevo Serbs. Some interviewees argued that Lukavica, the closest urban sector of East Sarajevo, is simply a suburb of the city. In cases in which division was recognised, emphasis was put on the fact that Sarajevo is not a typical example of a divided city: Of course, it is divided. It is an administrative-political division, but it doesn’t have roots in logic or urban science. We don’t feel it is divided; we used that space before. We have that political pollution, but real life doesn’t work like that. Real life doesn’t feel like that. I feel the whole BiH division is only in human minds (Research Interview; Informant 5). The vision regarding the division is from above; East Sarajevo is a village, a fake city. It is accepted as it is and becomes more present in discussions or in specific events such as celebrations in Lukavica for some basket championship of Serbia (Research Interview; Informant 6).

Recognition of division, especially among former Sarajevo Serbs, shows a partial achievement of the SDS policy to divide ethnically the central areas of Sarajevo. More successful was the policy to separate the Bosnian Serb population from the two other main Bosnian ethnic groups. Even among people who showed nostalgia for pre-war Sarajevo, ethno-politicisation and the reproduction of ethno-territorialities has inevitably transformed visions on ethnic coexistence and eventual reintegration: My choice was not living in Sarajevo. A double standard is living in Sarajevo and sending kids to East Sarajevo. No reintegration, Muslims over there and Serbs here (Research Interview; Informant 7).

Crucially, even in those cases with regular positive experiences, interethnic interactions have not produced any significant alteration in visions relative to the division. In this sense, encounters with people from other ethnicities in Sarajevo, either Bosniaks or Croats, exist on a daily basis in professional contexts, which has been praised in interviews. However, these experiences may have no essential impact on any such ideals connected with the spatial division:

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I started to go to Sarajevo daily because of work in 2008. I feel great being there like I feel being here [Pale]. I was very accepted at work, no problems. There are eight employees from other nationalities. I did not try to live in Sarajevo after the restitution of my home. It is OK going out but not living. You can live there but it is not the same feeling. There aren’t specific problems but living in the Federation of BiH is rather a psychological issue. I wouldn’t live elsewhere; I consider that my home is in Pale (Research Interview; Informant 8).

These words show that there is a sharp distinction between visiting Sarajevo and living there among former Sarajevans. Fear of going to Sarajevo progressively disappeared in all cases a few years after the end of the war, but the impact of living in East Sarajevo was identified in the interviewees from Pale and Lukavica. Most of them claimed that they felt good and safe in a mono-ethnic environment and explicitly rejected an eventual return to Sarajevo. When talking about elites’ role in the process of division, some interviewees complained about the nepotism and war profiteering of their own politicians but, at the same time, supported and justified leadership performance. Interestingly, a differentiation between the social and political functions of their leaders, between their individual behaviour and their role as head of the state, is the best illustration of the achievement from the Bosnian Serb leadership in an effort to create an ethnically exclusive polity in BiH (Armakolas 2007). Significant differences were again visible between people from Sarajevo and East Sarajevo in relation to the preservation of the IEBL. While the former were not greatly inconvenienced and generally agreed on an eventual removal of the boundary in the area of Sarajevo, the latter in most cases opposed arguing that it provided security for them. An interviewee from East Sarajevo cited Brˇcko as an example of conditions under which they would accept a modification of the current division. Hence, a different institutional configuration was the key factor, in this case, to ensure that former Sarajevo Serbs feel again safe and comfortable in the city: I am afraid of not feeling safe in front of authorities (police, politicians, etc). I am a war veteran, and my card could cause me problems. When the police are half Serb / half Muslim you feel free and secure. It is a problem that the administration is mono-ethnic. A lot of us are hoping that Sarajevo someday will be like Brˇcko, we will then return. If it were like Brˇcko I would be back like lots of other Serbs. We have talked about this with friends (Research Interview; Informant 1).

8.2 Common Life in Post-War Sarajevo Pre-war Sarajevo was featured by the richness of its ethnic diversity and the symbolic coexistence of the main Bosnian groups. In the census conducted in 1991, before the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Sarajevo was a city with half a million of residents, of whom 49.2% declared themselves as Bosniak, 29.8% Serb, 10.7% Yugoslav, 6.6% Croat, and 3.6% Other. Such diversity was very present in most of the municipalities since, in six out of ten, no ethnic group represented more than 51% of the population. Even in the municipalities of Novo Sarajevo and Ilijaš, the differences between Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs were, respectively, 1 and 3%.

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As a result of the war time and post-war policies to divide the population ethnically, the census conducted in 2013 confirmed the huge transformation of the ethnic diversity in the Bosnian capital. Now, Bosniaks represent a clear majority in Sarajevo and Bosnian Serbs in East Sarajevo, which implies a clear differentiated pattern at both sides of the IEBL. In the Sarajevo Canton, 83.8% of the population identified themselves as Bosniak, 4.2% Croat, 3.2% Serb, and 8.8 Other (ASBiH 2016). This demographic composition illustrates the important decrease of Sarajevo Serbs after the war and the internal division of the Federation of BiH between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. In contrast, 94.2% of the inhabitants in East Sarajevo declared themselves as Serbs, 3.9 Bosniaks, 0.7 Croats and 1.1 Other. In the municipality of Pale, whose territory was not divided by the IEBL, Bosnian Serbs increased from 69% before the war to 97% afterwards, so the ethnic cleansing conducted against Bosnian Muslims in June and July 1992 has been consolidated even with the success of the international community and the OHR in the repossession of housing. This ethnic division has reduced inevitably encounters and socialisation between people of different ethnic backgrounds in Sarajevo. At the same time, insufficient contact is a key element in the reproduction of the ethnic division considering that it constitutes one of the two main obstacles, along with the existence of denial and competing truths, to any reconcialiation process (Clark 2009). Nevertheless, many Sarajevans keep a cosmopolitan idea of citizenship, reflected in the tradition of living together. It takes place even when governmental practices and cultural hegemony combine to reinforce national purity as morally right and politically desirable (Markowitz 2010). Among Serbs and Croats who did not leave the city, there were some of the most respected cultural, intellectual and political leaders of the pre-war city. In the aftermath of the war, they have joined with many others of a Bosniak majority to continue the tradition of common life in the city (Donia 2006). Alongside these individuals, coexistence has been fostered from national cultural societies such as the Serb Civic Council, the Croat National Council and the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals. The promotion of common life during the post-war period, confronting bloody campaigns to divide ethnic groups and political structures inherited from the peace agreement, shows that many people keep and reproduce the special character of the city. Examples of transcending ethnicity in social relations in post-war Sarajevo reserve a special significance in the case of Sarajevo Serbs because of the siege inflicted by VRS. The situation of Sarajevo Serbs was delicate since the beginning of the war. Their departure was always a sensitive issue since people saw the case of Sarajevo Serbs as siding with the enemy who had attacked the city and its spirit.4 Bosniaks who left the city could be viewed as cowards, whereas the departure of Serbs, regardless of the personal motives for which they left, contributed to the achievement of SDS political goals and bolstered their propaganda machine that claimed that, rather

4

Blaming Serbs is not consistent all over BiH. There are changes depending on the local dynamics of war. In Mostar, for instance, Bosniaks consider Bosnian Croats as the major aggressors.

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than attacking Sarajevo, Serb forces were merely defending people against Bosniak persecution. Then, Sarajevo Serbs who did not leave the city are not subject to the suspicion of friends, neighbours and colleagues who know their war-time pedigree, unlike people who left the city (Sorabiji 2006). But even in cases of departure, the daily lives of Sarajevo Serbs did not necessarily suffer a dramatic transformation during the postwar period. This is claimed by a forty-two-year-old who returned to Sarajevo in June 1996 after staying in Belgrade during the war to escape military mobilisation: In terms of friendship, there have been little changes in my life though we don’t talk with the same freedom about some topics as it was before war. The situation is pretty similar in my circle; we live somehow in a bubble, a safe area that is very related to pre-war inhabitants and sharing of values. Establishing relations with newcomers is possible but generally these relationships are superficial (Research Interview; Informant 18).

Even so, becoming an ethnic minority in post-war Sarajevo significantly constraints daily life in several dimensions, including a certain concern that may still shape social interactions. This is the case of Sarajevo Serb women of pre-war generations, who make small alterations in gesture and body language to prevent being read by others as Serb (Golubovi´c 2019). Intentional alterations take the form, for instance, of kissing twice in greetings instead of three times, which is associated with Serbs. The need to perform ethnic ambiguity reveals that the urban soul of post-war Sarajevo is distinct, and in which ethnic discrimination exists unlike in the pre-war city. As expressed by a Sarajevo Serb who was heavily involved in keeping Bosnian Serbs in the city after the transfer of authority in the Serb-held districts, the environment has not considerably improved in the past few years: Often you are not allowed to obtain employment; it is not likely that you will be able to start a private business. There is no equal treatment in the police station, neighbours don’t salute you or they share rumours about Serbs as nation, considering everyone as war criminals, chetniks and aggressors. That’s the climate that makes people leave (Research Interview; Informant 19).

The negotiation of daily life is also affected in terms of employment opportunities, since jobs in the large public sector are still very much linked to ethnicity and party connections. Paradoxically, Sarajevo Serbs are discriminated against compared to those living in East Sarajevo. In this sense, only people living in Republika Srpska are eligible to be employed in common institutions located in Sarajevo, which triggered that many Sarajevo Serbs moved to East Sarajevo in order to be eligible. On the contrary, the situation of Sarajevo Croats in the city is less difficult both politically and socially compared to Sarajevo Serbs. Ultimately, Bosnian Croats were not considered aggressors in the city, as the war between ARBiH and HVO did not take place in the Bosnian capital. As part of the Federation of BiH, they were generally less distrusted and secured more rights than Sarajevo Serbs until 2002, when the OHR amended the Constitution of the Federation of BiH to fulfil the Constitutional Court decision taken in 2000 that required to ensure the full equality of the three constituent peoples of BiH in both entities.

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Hence, the ethnicisation of the Bosnian society and the significant erosion of the diversity so characteristic of the city have substantially reshaped interethnic interactions, as well as the quality of socialisation and daily life for individuals who have become ethnic minorities. But coexistence should also be considered in a more multidimensional way, and not only from the lens of ethnicity, including the social and cultural change caused by forced rural–urban migration and the departure of many Sarajevans. This transformation is illustrated in the powerful distinction between locals and newcomers, which had also appeared in socialist Yugoslavia with the mass rural–urban migration triggered by the process of industrialisation (e.g. Simi´c 1973). Today, many Sarajevans feel uncomfortable with the existing socio-cultural gap between them and people who arrived during or after the war. Such differentiation transcends ethnic categorisation and responds to a cultural superiority of people from the city. As Anders Steffanson (2007) argues, the three central socio-cultural dichotomies in Sarajevo are local/newcomer, urban/rural and ‘cultured’/ ‘non-cultured’. These are interconnected in such a way that, ideally, locals are opposed to the rural newcomers with inferior cultural habits and knowledge. Thus, Sarajevans are featured by relative wealth, high levels of education, cosmopolitanism, Europeanness and low levels of religiosity.5 It contrasts with people from the countryside, who are depicted as rural, poor, primitive, traditional, religiously radical and non-cultured. Certainly, Sarajevo has suffered a profound transformation that for many of its inhabitants makes it a different city and it will be very hard to be what it was before the siege, regardless of whether they presently constitute an ethnic majority.

References Agencies (2012a) Izetbegovi´c: Srebrenica i Sarajevo treba da budu distrikti. Glas Srpske Agencies (2012b) Srbi nikad ne´ce u´ci u Distrikt Sarajevo. Slobodna Bosna Aquilué I, Roca E (2016) Urban planning after the Bosnian war: the division of regional territory in Sarajevo. Cities 58:152–163 Armakolas I (2007) Sarajevo no more? Identity and the experience of place among Bosnian Serb Sarajevans in RS. In: Bougarel X, Helms E, Duijzings G (eds) The new Bosnian mosaic: identities, memories and moral claims in a post-war society. Ashgate, Aldershot, pp 79–99 ASBiH (2016) Census of population, households and dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013: Final results. Sarajevo: Agency for statistics of Bosna and Herzegovina Bassi E (2013) Sarajevo: divided or redoubled? Regul represent pract bound (PhD diss). Milano: Università degli Studi di Milano–Bicocca Bassi E (2015) Divided Sarajevo: space management, urban landscape and spatial practices across the boundary. Eur RegNal 3(4):101–113

5

When it is definable, many Sarajevans still consider their ethnic origin as one among other components of their identities, defining themselves as Bosnian Herzegovinians as well as Sarajevans. Both forms of the self-identification are conceptually similar since they do not deny the existence of ethnonational groups and identities but, on the contrary, include all of them and rely on plurality and cultural heritage (Piacentini 2020).

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Calame J, Charlesworth E (2009) Divided cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar and Nicosia. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia ˇ Cengi´ c N, Hodo A (2016) Sistem centara grada i funkcionalna atraktivnost mjesnih zajednica: Sarajevo. Sarajevo Arhit Fak Sarajevo Clark JN (2009) From negative to positive peace: the case of Bosnia and Hercegovina. J Hum Rights 8(4):360–384 Donia R (2006) Sarajevo: a biography. Hurts & Company, London Draškovi´c B, Dreškovi´c N, Miri´c R (2016) East Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) twenty years later–changes in land use. Geogr Pannonica 20(3):161–167 Golubovi´c J (2019) To me, you are not a serb: ethnicity, ambiguity, and anxiety in post-war Sarajevo. Ethn 20(3):544–563 Jansen S (2013) People and things in the ethnography of borders: materialising the division of Sarajevo. Soc Anthropol 21(1):23–37 Kebo A (2000) Pale ponovo u Sarajevu. Oslobodjenje, p 11 Markowitz F (2010) Sarajevo: a Bosnian kaleidoscope. University of Illinois Press, Urbana Mutabzija G (2016) Sarajevo-Romanija region: a fluid space between the rural and urban. Eur CtrySide 3:296–303 Piacentini A (2020) Nonaligned citizens: ethnic power-sharing and nonethnic identities in Bosnia Herzegovina the case of Sarajevo. Natl Pap 48(4):707–720 Ristic M (2015) Intangible borders everyday spatialities of ethnic division in Postwar Sarajevo. Fabr 25(3):322–343 Sen S (2009) Cyrillization of Republika Srpska. Perspect Glob Dev Technol 8:509–530 Simi´c A (1973) The peasant urbanities: a study of rural-urban mobility in Serbia. Seminar Press Inc., New York Sorabiji C (2006) Managing memories in postwar Sarajevo: individuals, bad memories, and new wars. J R Anthropol Inst 12(1):1–18 Stefansson A (2007) Urban exile: locals, newcomers and the cultural transformation of Sarajevo. In: Bougarel X, Helms E, Duijzings G (eds) The new Bosnian mosaic: identities, memories and moral claims in a post-war society. Ashgate, Aldershot, pp 59–77 Touquet H (2012) The Republika Srpska as a strong nationalizing state and the consequences for postethnic activism. Natl Pap J Natl Ethn 40(2):203–220 ˇ ˇ Žulji´c V, Cengi´ c N, Cakari´ c J (2015) Sarajevo metropola: model razvoja. Sarajevo: Acta Architectonca et Urbanística

Chapter 9

Conclusions

Abstract This book has analysed the role of the OHR in the urban transformation of Sarajevo and the impact of those policies developed since the end of the war until 2003, in the contemporary ethnic and spatial configuration. Considering the unfolding of transitions from war to peace and from socialism to capitalism, this chapter presents the main conclusions of the different analyses conducted in previous chapters while, in the end, it provides the final assessment on the influence of the OHR in the urban transformation of Sarajevo. Keywords Sarajevo · International Community · Office of the High Representative (OHR) · Urban transformation · Economic transition · Post-war transition On 3 February 1998, in a passionate and optimistic speech, High Representative Carlos Westendorp claimed that Sarajevo was recovering its status as a thriving cosmopolitan city. It was during the celebration of the Sarajevo Return Conference that took place a few weeks after becoming the final authority in Bosnia. His words clearly pointed to the need and convenience to start the promotion of minority returns in the Bosnian capital, given that its name was a synonym for perseverance, endurance and reconciliation. Aware of the difficulty to achieve the return of 20,000 non-Bosniaks Sarajevans during the year, the High Representative rhetorically asked whether it was more difficult than what the city had managed to achieve during the siege. This milestone, established two years after the end of hostilities, was part of the challenging task faced by the international community in the city which, like the rest of country, simultaneously experienced a double transition from war to peace and from socialism to capitalism. In terms of the long transition from war to a sustainable peace, it was remarkably constrained by the agreement to end hostilities. Despite being a product of ethnic cleansing, the DPA defined a political system largely based on consociational prescriptions of power-sharing and spatial autonomy through the establishment of two entities ethnically based. This design has shown the dual character of powersharing in post-war contexts, being effective to accommodate political power at the end of the war but at the same time, setting political institutions that hardly promote inclusion and cooperation among ethnic groups. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Martín-Díaz, The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo, The Urban Book Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80575-3_9

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The first clear manifestation of the consequences of legalising ethno-territorial orders was the reintegration of Sarajevo within the ninety-day period since the beginning of the implementation of the peace agreement, set on 19 December 1995. In absence of a specific status in the DPA, the early international intervention in Sarajevo had a very weak foundation which facilitated the reproduction of the transatlantic disagreement within the Joint Civilian Commission on Sarajevo. The OHR inaugurated its mission in Bosnia concentrating on the difficult task of creating favourable conditions for the stay of people who did not wish to leave the Serb-held districts. However, the insufficient measures proposed were further weakened by the United States since it acted to avoid any civilian interference in the work of the military. The transfer of authority of the Serb-held districts resulted in the first episode of ethnic engineering in post-war Sarajevo because of two key factors. Firstly, SDS and SDA leadership worked more or less subtly to prevent that people stayed after the takeover, taking advantage of the international inconsistencies between the civilian and the military missions. The strongest contestation came from an SDS that openly rejected the concession of Slobodan Miloševi´c made in Dayton and intervened to produce a mass exodus after failing to modify the peace agreement. Secondly, the ethno-territorial division of the country fundamentally undermined the prospect that a meaningful number of Sarajevo Serbs and Bosnian Serbs remained in the city and its closest suburbs after the reintegration. This episode of the early post-war stages showed that even though DPA had silenced weapons, the institutionalisation of the spatial autonomy would reproduce and consolidate the ethnic division. The OHR faced less serious international constraints when it reactively intervened to further SDS and SDA ethnocratic practices, albeit its intervention had again a very limited impact. On the one hand, Sarajevo’s multi-ethnic institutional reorganisation put in place power-sharing mechanisms in the autumn of 1996, but these were slowly implemented and hardly altered the hegemony of SDA in the city during the nineties. On the other hand, and after being granted executive and legislative powers by the Peace Implementation Council in December 1997, the OHR tackled the allocation of socially owned land in the whole country, a policy that directly affected the project to urbanise Srpsko Sarajevo traced by SDS. The ban on the allocation of land ineffectively expanded the responsibility of the OHR in a task administratively unviable for the existing capacity. In practice, the OHR was unable to implement a law imposed by itself, exposing organisational limitations and the absence of a clear policy direction after assuming Bonn Powers. In the beginning, the transition from war to a sustainable peace was also remarkably constrained by the security concerns of the international community amid a minimalist military involvement. These circumstances marked the policy on the return of refugees and people internally displaced in 1996 and 1997. International actors contravened Annex VII and the UNHCR promoted the return of people to places where they constituted an ethnic majority. To consolidate peace, the international community was reproducing the logic of ethnic division that had embraced in successive peace proposals to end the Bosnian War. However, this logic was partially amended when the focus turned on the civilian implementation and international actors pursued to challenge the political power of nationalist parties.

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In those circumstances, the international community did not initially foresee the reconstruction of the human diversity so characteristic of Sarajevo. The Peace Implementation Council only recommended the adoption of a strategy to rebuild Sarajevo’s ethnic diversity when it reinforced the High Representative and adopted a political approach to promote minority returns. Therefore, the adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration in February 1998 was essentially a pragmatic and instrumental decision to test the new international policy on minority returns in the best possible context. Considering that the political approach jeopardised the balance of power agreed at the peace agreement, the Declaration was conditioned and hindered by SDA since the beginning. The new powers of the High Representative were instrumental in ultimately overcoming the embedded obstructionism of local authorities in the restitution of housing. In the joint bodies of competent local institutions and international organisations, the use of coercion and persuasion allowed to gradually erode obstructionist practices. The international community finally achieved the widespread restitution of housing in the early twenty-first century, but it did not produce a meaningful and permanent return of non-Bosniak Sarajevans. The Sarajevo Declaration was insufficiently conceived and implemented beyond property issues for the demanding task of rebuilding human diversity in a country that seemed to have solidified its ethnic division in the immediate years after the war. Hence, the international community ignored the fundamental causes of displacement that structurally prevented a mass return of pre-war Sarajevans, nor intervened properly to any great extent to create opportunities for returnees. After years of conflict and ethno-politicisation, these central shortcomings entailed that international actors left most of the heavy burden connected with returns and reintegration on individuals and families. Importantly, the massive gap between repossession of housing and returns was a consequence of the limitations of both transitions, which illustrated the absence of a positive peace that went beyond the mere absence of violence. Along with the consolidation of an ethno-territorial order of space, the implementation of a liberal peace did not contribute to create conditions conducive to returns when most of the Bosnians repossessed housing. The economic transition counted with an international consensus in which the OHR strategically served the international community through the legislative and executive intervention. Despite the centrality of economic factors to prevent the relapse of conflict, the international community imposed a neoliberal economic transition that clearly ignored local circumstances, and which was particularly hazardous in a country emerging from war and ethnically divided. The unfolding of this transition produced another power struggle with ruling local actors and illustrates the centrality of institutions as well as the importance of the sequence of reforms in countries in transition. Nationalist parties confronted the process of liberalisation with a performance that pursued keeping control over stateowned companies, since these were an important source of revenue and patronage after the nationalisation conducted during the war. On the contrary, the international community pushed for a mass privatisation of state-owned assets with a limited intervention based on the imposition of legislation and the insufficient dismissal of corrupt and obstructionist public authorities. In absence of appropriate institutions and with

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a poor international supervision, ethnocracies could easily attempt to manipulate the process to guarantee, ultimately, ethnic privatisations. As analysed in Chap. 6, the cases of Holiday Inn and Sarajka show the manipulation of the process once the privatisation of big companies was put in motion in Sarajevo. Propelled by the neoliberal paradigm, the international community hardly modified its approach even with evidence that a rapid privatisation was undermining the liberalisation itself and it did not serve the goals of economic growth and depoliticisation of the economy. On the contrary, the integral reform of the payment system contributed to erode the pervasive control of ethnocracies on the economy. Unlike the process of privatisation, a broader and determined intervention established new institutions and provided resources to strengthen their capacity. The logic of both transitions, in which nationalist parties either obstructed reforms or relied on international organisations, meant that the international community was also in charge of re-establishing the real estate market. This intervention was more adapted and contextualised to other objectives of the peacebuilding mission given that the management of land conducted by the OHR in the late 1990s, regardless of the limited impact, aimed at preventing the undermining of the implementation of Annex VII. After the four-year period of land ban allocation, the High Representative finally enacted a harmonised Law on Construction Land in both entities in May 2003, culminating the re-establishment of the real estate market and the privatisation of socially owned land. Integral reforms enacted by the High Representative during the period of maximum international intervention contributed to create conditions for a postsocialist production of space. As analysed in Chap. 7, the approval of the Law on Construction Land was a turning point in the restructuration of the space. Sarajevo has thus experienced a spatial transformation in line with other post-socialist cities, albeit starting a decade later because of war and the subsequent slow economic transition. Nonetheless, this liberalisation has resulted in a hybrid model because of the significant political control exercised by either political elites, such as Bakir Izetbegovi´c, and municipal authorities. While this is certainly a feature of post-socialist cities in countries where political power still plays a significant role during the long and incomplete transition, an important specificity of post-socialist Sarajevo lies in the fact that its urban spatial restructuring has also an ethnocratic nature. As observed in the absence of conditions conducive to returns, the production of the space in contemporary Sarajevo is also shaped by the imbrication of both transitions. The process of suburbanisation and the self-construction of housing on the slopes is a consequence of the consolidation of ethno-territorialities and, on the other hand, the commodification of factors intervening in the production of the space, including the privatisation of urban housing and land. Furthermore, the development of new major urban projects and gated neighbourhoods in the suburbs show the fusion of global capitals and local politics since these are often a result of investments from the Persian Gulf amid a BBI lobbying campaign. With the main Bosniak elites entrenched in the bank and in a real estate market with significant political control, these projects are a manifestation of the Bosniak character of contemporary Sarajevo

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while, at the same time, contribute to reinforce the ethno-territorial spatial order at both sides of the IEBL. Indeed, the performance of local elites and the legalisation of ethno-territorialities in the peace agreement have been central factors shaping the particular economic transition and the consolidation of the ethnic division even with the widespread restitution of housing. As noted in Chap. 8, the Bosnian capital has suffered an important human transformation that has considerably transformed its remarkable character as a city ethnically diverse and cosmopolitan. Today, ethnicity matters and influences daily life among many Sarajevans, with most of Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs living now separated by the IEBL in what constitutes an important factor that makes more difficult the restoration of coexistence. Although the SDS-driven project to build a Serbian Sarajevo was far from sufficient in the short and midterm, it created the basis for a subsequent urbanisation that has gradually reinforced the ethnic division of the area of Sarajevo. In this urban context, the limited and fragmented urbanisation of East Sarajevo explains the raise of mobility across the boundary during the post-war period, particularly among Bosnian Serbs. The present asymmetrical cross-entity spatial patterns in the area of Sarajevo are thus a result of the functional dependence of East Sarajevo, but this mobility has not certainly altered the essence of the division pursued by SDS since 1991. The defence of the division and the preference to live in mono-ethnic environments, even among those who miss the pre-war Sarajevo and praise inter-ethnic socialisation, highlights the fact that ethno-territorialities are a material and metaphysical phenomenon with many individual and collective implications, including the way of thinking and acting. While Bosnian Serb political and military leadership could not ultimately divide the central areas of Sarajevo, their leading agency in the process of ethno-territorialisation and the separation of Bosnian Serbs from other ethnic groups has ultimately succeeded. Thus, the contemporary socio-spatial configuration of Sarajevo shows that both transitions have been remarkably intertwined. It also illustrates the importance of political institutions and the limits of developing international administrations in post-war contexts, even if these missions become the final authority. At the end of hostilities, the impossibility to agree a federal solution was undoubtedly a crucial obstacle to address the complex and symbolic transformation that Sarajevo faced as the capital city of a country ethnically divided. Even so, the imposition of policies that too often ignored the context, the sequence of reforms, and the subsequent poor implementation, were key factors undermining the effectiveness of the liberal peacebuilding mission. Therefore, the impact of the OHR in the urban transformation of Sarajevo was qualitatively much below the broad intervention conducted, particularly since being empowered. Undermined by the absence of a coherent and contextualised mission engaging cooperatively major local and internationals actors, such intervention was instrumental for the post-socialist production of space while, on the other hand, it was useless to rebuild the ethnic diversity so characteristic of the city. In the end, the international community failed to repair what it had not prevented to erode severely throughout the long war.

Index

A Alija Izetbegovi´c, 33, 35, 38, 58, 59, 76, 95, 96, 107 Amer Bukvi´c, 111 Andy Bearpark, 82 Arkan, 35 Austro-Hungarian, 24, 25, 37, 106

B Bakir Izetbegovi´c, 99, 107, 108, 117, 130 Banja Luka, 31, 33, 37, 43, 72, 76, 79, 117 Bašˇcaršija, 25, 36, 98 BBI Centar, 100, 108, 111, 119 Belgrade, 25, 29, 30, 34, 40, 42, 43, 54, 105, 124 Benetton, 99 Biljana Plavši´c, 35 Bonn Powers, 3, 4, 77, 82, 83, 128 Bosna Bank International (BBI), 99, 100, 111, 119, 130 Bosniak entity, 38 Bosniak leadership, 29, 58 Bosniaks, 2, 6, 18, 28–31, 33, 35–38, 42, 45, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58–61, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, 78–80, 82, 84, 85, 91, 95, 96, 99, 100, 111, 117, 119, 121–124, 127, 129–131 Bosnian Croats, 2, 18, 28, 30, 31, 33, 38, 56, 58, 59, 61, 71, 84, 85, 119, 123, 124 Bosnian Muslims, 2, 24, 29, 30, 33, 36, 37, 123 Bosnian Serb leadership, 2, 13, 30–32, 34, 36, 38, 39, 43, 122 Bosnian War, 24, 40, 43, 69, 128 Boundaries, 13, 24, 71, 117–120, 122, 131 Brˇcko, 4, 18, 45, 64, 76, 122

Bulevar Meše Selimovi´ca, 105 Bulldozer Initiative, 98

C Cantonal Housing Department, 81, 83 Carl Bildt (High Representative), 46, 52, 53, 55, 57, 58, 79 Carlos Westendorp (High Representative), 57, 62, 63, 74, 81, 127 Central and Eastern Europe, 9, 11, 12 Centripetalist, 17 Christian Schwarz-Schilling (High Representative), 4 City Council, 59, 61, 103, 107 City of Sarajevo, 23, 52, 59, 61, 75, 85, 105, 106, 110 Civilian implementation, 51, 52, 72, 128 Coexistence, 2, 6, 23, 34, 36, 37, 39, 41, 44, 75, 121–123, 125, 131 Consociationalism, 17 Consociational prescriptions, 45, 127 Croatia, 29, 30, 33, 34, 40, 76 Cyrus Vance, 40

D Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), 1, 6, 39, 42, 44–46, 53, 55, 57, 69, 72, 74, 75, 90, 127, 128 Densification, 12, 106, 108 Discrimination, 45, 63, 73, 78, 85, 124 Displaced people, 59, 61–63, 69, 71, 72, 77, 78, 83–85

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134 E East Sarajevo, 6, 43, 84, 115–124, 131 Economic liberalisation, 16, 89, 104 Economic sanctions, 40, 80–82 Economic transition, 4, 6, 89, 91, 93, 103, 110, 129–131 Edhem Biˇcakˇci´c, 95, 97 Elektroprivreda, 95 Elites, 13, 14, 16, 17, 28, 38, 43, 55, 58, 75, 92, 99, 100, 103, 104, 107, 111, 112, 122, 130, 131 Empowerment of the High Representative, 3, 59, 64, 69, 74, 77, 90 Energoinvest, 26, 96 Ethnic cantonisation, 38 Ethnic diversity, 2, 4, 6, 39, 58, 69, 70, 75, 79, 80, 84, 115, 122, 123, 129, 131 Ethnic engineering, 59, 128 Ethnic privatisation, 89, 92, 130 Ethnic separation, 39 Ethnic composition, 12, 58, 82, 85 Ethnocracies, 14, 73, 82, 91–93, 104, 130 Ethnocratic practices, 6, 51, 59, 128 Ethnocratic regime, 14, 38, 61, 76, 92 Ethno-politicisation, 28, 121, 129 Ethno-territorial division, 6, 42, 54, 90, 128 Ethno-territorialities, 6, 9, 12–14, 31, 44, 58, 69, 71, 79, 80, 84, 85, 91, 110, 121, 130, 131 European Commission, 34, 35, 46, 63, 80, 81, 90 European Union, 3, 45, 46, 64, 75, 83, 91, 94

F Federation of BiH, 4, 42, 43, 45, 51–61, 70, 71, 73, 75–77, 80, 91–96, 98, 111, 117, 118, 120, 122–124 Foreign direct investments, 90, 98, 100, 111 Franjo Tudjman, 29

G Geomorphological risks, 110 Gojko Kliˇckovi´c, 55

H Hadži´ci, 27, 51, 57, 85, 111 Haris Silajdži´c, 71, 99 ˇ Hasan Cengi´ c, 99 HDZ, 2, 28, 29, 32, 33, 38, 61, 71, 76, 82

Index High Representative, 3, 4, 45, 46, 52, 57, 59, 62, 63, 65, 73–75, 77, 81–83, 90–95, 98, 104, 127, 129, 130 Holiday Inn, 28, 34, 35, 89, 97, 98, 106, 130 Hotel Maršal, 96 Housing oficials, 78, 83 Housing policy, 59

I Ilijaš, 27, 32, 36, 51, 57, 85, 122 Implementation Force (IFOR), 52, 53, 55, 57, 58, 70, 72 Institutions, 3, 5, 6, 9, 14, 16–18, 25, 34, 37, 41, 43, 51, 59, 61, 63, 74, 76, 77, 81, 82, 90, 92, 93, 95–97, 104, 117, 124, 127, 129–131 Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), 43, 53, 70, 115, 117–120, 122, 123, 131 International community, 1–4, 9, 18, 35, 39, 41, 42, 45, 56, 58, 59, 62, 69–72, 75, 76, 79–82, 84, 85, 89, 91, 92, 104, 123, 127–131 International organisations, 2, 46, 57, 62, 64, 65, 70, 74, 76, 80–82, 90, 92, 97, 129, 130 International Police Task Force (IPTF), 52, 53, 57, 70 Islamic influence, 112

J Jahorina, 33 JNA, 2, 30, 32–35 Joint Civilian Commission on Sarajevo, 52, 55, 128 Jusuf Zafiragi´c, 81, 82

K Kemal Kurspahi´c, 34 Krešimir Zubak, 56, 59

L Law on Construction Land, 65, 103–105, 107, 109, 111, 130 Leighton Smith, 53, 57 Liberalisation, 11, 16, 90, 110, 129, 130 Liberal peacebuilding, 15, 74, 89, 131 Ljubljana, 25 Louis Sell, 54 Lukavica, 116, 117, 120–122

Index M Majority returns, 71, 72, 78 Maksim Staniši´c, 52, 53 Marijin Dvor, 26, 34, 35, 98, 106–108 Market economy, 10, 89–91, 94, 104, 107 Michael Steiner, 52, 54, 59 Midhat Haraˇci´c, 77 Miljacka river, 25, 36 Minority returns, 69–75, 78, 81–84, 127, 129 Mirko Pejanovi´c, 38 Miroslav Lajˇcák (High Representative), 4 Momˇcilo Krajišnik, 42, 43, 53, 57 Mono-ethnic institutional reorganisation, 59 Mostar, 4, 18, 72, 117, 123 Multiethnic institutions, 4, 51 Mustafa Ceri´c, 99

N ˇ Nedim Cauševi´ c, 97 Nikola Koljevi´c, 35 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 41, 45, 52, 53, 56–58, 72

O Obstructionism, 2, 72, 73, 76–78, 80, 81, 83, 94, 129 Office of the High Representative (OHR), 1, 3–6, 9, 14, 18, 23, 43, 46, 51, 52, 54– 56, 59, 61–65, 70, 72, 74–83, 90, 91, 93–96, 98, 103, 104, 107, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, 127–131 Operational Staff for the Accommodation of Residents of Serb Sarajevo, 55 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 2, 63, 83 Orli´c, 35 Ottoman, 2, 23–25, 29, 109

P Paddy Ashdown (High Representative), 3, 94 Pale, 27, 30, 32, 33, 37, 43, 53–57, 60, 62, 74, 116, 120–123 Pan-Islamist current (SDA), 29 Payment bureaux, 91 Peace agreement, 2–4, 9, 12, 14, 16, 18, 23, 42, 43, 45, 46, 51–59, 69, 70, 72, 74–76, 84, 123, 128, 129, 131 Peacebuilding, 4, 9, 14–18, 23, 45, 89, 92, 130 Pofali´ci, 35

135 Post-socialist cities, 1, 6, 9, 12, 103, 105, 106, 110, 130 Power-sharing, 17, 18, 45, 54, 55, 60, 61, 127, 128 Privatisation, 89–100, 103, 104, 111, 129, 130 Privatisation Monitoring Commission, 92, 96 Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP), 79, 82, 83 Restitution of housing, 69, 79, 81, 83, 84, 119, 129, 131

R Radovan Karadži´c, 30–32, 35, 53 Real estate market, 4, 10, 103, 104, 107, 130 Republika Srpska, 34, 38, 42, 43, 45, 51, 53, 54, 56, 61, 62, 70, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 80, 92, 93, 117, 118, 120, 124 Reunification of Sarajevo, 53 Richard Holbrooke, 43 Romanija, 30–33 RRTF, 63, 75, 77

S Safe Area, 41, 124 Sarajevans, 5, 6, 24, 31, 34, 39, 73, 75, 76, 78, 85, 118–123, 125, 127, 129, 131 Sarajevo, 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 12–14, 18, 23–28, 30– 44, 51–61, 63–65, 69, 70, 73, 75–85, 89, 93–100, 103, 105–112, 115–125, 127–131 Sarajevo Canton, 75, 77, 78, 81, 83, 85, 99, 103, 120, 123 Sarajevo Canton Privatisation Agency, 95– 97 Sarajevo Declaration, 6, 59, 69, 73–77, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 109, 115, 129 Sarajevo Economic Regional Development Agency, 117 Sarajevo Protocol, 61 Sarajevo Return Conference, 75, 76, 127 Sarajka, 89, 97–100, 111, 130 SDA, 2, 23, 28–30, 32–35, 38, 51, 54, 55, 58, 59, 61, 69–71, 73, 75, 76, 78, 81, 82, 89, 91, 95, 96, 99, 100, 107, 117, 128, 129 SDS leadership, 23, 31, 32, 34, 37, 43, 51, 53, 54, 56, 58, 97, 115 Serb Democratic Party (SDS), 2, 23, 28–35, 38, 39, 43, 51, 53, 54, 56, 59, 61, 62,

136 70, 71, 74, 82, 93, 115, 121, 123, 128, 131 Serb-held districts, 43, 51–55, 57, 59, 61, 115, 124, 128 Serbia, 28–30, 34, 35, 38, 40, 43, 61, 120, 121 Serbian Autonomous Regions, 31 Šešelj, 35 Slobodan Miloševi´c, 29, 42, 128 Socialist cities, 2, 10, 12, 63, 105, 110 Socially owned land, 61–63, 65, 115, 128, 130 Spatial practices, 6, 115, 118–120 Spatial structure, 105 Srpsko Sarajevo, 43, 53, 59, 61, 62, 120, 121, 128 Stari Grad, 28, 36, 59, 83, 85, 105 Stiepo Andriji´c, 93, 97 Strategic objectives, 33, 35, 36, 42, 54 Sub-Group on Textbooks, 80 Suburbanisation, 10, 108, 110, 130 T Tarik Kupusovi´c, 41, 43 Territorialisation, 23, 31–33, 38, 115, 120, 131 Territorialities, 13, 14 Transatlantic disagreements, 41, 45, 52, 55, 56, 62, 128 Transfer of authority, 51–59, 124, 128 Trebevi´c, 33, 117 Trebinje, 79, 117 Trnovo, 27, 70, 85, 110

Index U United

Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 37, 40, 41 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2, 80, 81, 91, 98 Urbanisation, 10–13, 25, 103, 108, 109, 115–117, 131

V Vjecnica, 37 VRS, 32, 35–37, 42, 43, 51, 54, 119, 123

W Warren Christopher, 42, 55 Washington, 5, 41, 42, 45, 46, 90 Wolfgang Petritsch (High Representative), 82, 91, 94

Y Young Muslims, 29, 99 Yugoslavia, 1, 2, 9, 10, 12, 24–31, 34, 35, 40, 43, 44, 46, 69, 91, 103, 104, 106, 109, 111, 122, 125

Z Zagreb, 25, 29