The Sovietization of Azerbaijan: The South Caucasus in the Triangle of Russia, Turkey, and Iran, 1920-1922 160781594X, 9781607815945

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Maps
Preface
1. Introduction
2. The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century
3. The Domestic and International Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation
4. The Eastern Policy of Soviet Russia and Iran
5. The Sovietization of Armenia: Moscow’s Secret Plans for Karabagh
6. Collaboration after Occupation: Drawing South Caucasus Borders after Sovietization
7. The Russian-Turkish Conference in Moscow and Azerbaijan
8. From Moscow to Kars
9. The Struggle for Baku Oil and the Formation of the Soviet Union
10. Conclusion
Notes
Abbreviations
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan The South Caucasus in the Triangle of Russia, Turkey, and Iran, 1920–1922

Jamil Hasanli

The University of Utah Press Salt Lake City

Copyright © 2018 by The University of Utah Press. All rights reserved. Utah Series in Middle East Studies M. Hakan Yavuz, series editor. The Defiance House Man colophon is a registered trademark of The University of Utah Press. It is based on a four-­foot-tall Ancient Puebloan pictograph (late PIII) near Glen Canyon, Utah. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Hasanli, Jamil, author. Title: The Sovietization of Azerbaijan : the South Caucasus in the triangle   of Russia, Turkey, and Iran, 1920–1922 / Jamil Hasanli. Other titles: South Caucasus in the triangle of Russia, Turkey, and Iran,  1920–1922 Description: Salt Lake City : University of Utah Press, [2017] | Series: Utah   series in Middle East studies | Includes bibliographical references and   index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2017033436 (print) | LCCN 2017035128 (ebook) | ISBN   9781607815945 () | ISBN 9781607815938 (cloth) Subjects: LCSH: Caucasus, South — ​Relations  — ​Soviet Union. | Soviet — ​Relations  — ​Caucasus, South. | Turkey — ​Relations  — ​Caucasus, South. |  Union    Caucasus, South — ​Relations  — ​Turkey. | Iran — ​Relations  — ​Caucasus, South. |   Caucasus, South — ​Relations  — ​Iran. | Petroleum industry and — ​Caucasus, South  — ​History.  trade  Classification: LCC DK509 (ebook) | LCC DK509 .H38 2017 (print) | DDC — ​dc23  947.54084/1  LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017033436 Printed and bound in the United States of America.

Contents

List of Maps   vi Preface   vii 1. Introduction   1 2. The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century   16 3. The Domestic and International Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation   38 4. The Eastern Policy of Soviet Russia and Iran   78 5. The Sovietization of Armenia:

Moscow’s Secret Plans for Karabagh   117

6. Collaboration after Occupation:

Drawing South Caucasus Borders after Sovietization   158

7. The Russian-­Turkish Conference in Moscow and Azerbaijan   220 8. From Moscow to Kars   277 9. The Struggle for Baku Oil and the Formation of the Soviet Union   332 10. Conclusion   388 Notes   395 Abbreviations   449 Bibliography   451 Index   461

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Maps

1.1. Azerbaijan and neighboring Caucasus states, 1994   10 2.1. The Republic of Azerbaijan and its territorial claims, 1919   18 5.1. The South Caucasus after 1921 and the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-­Karabagh   148

vi

Preface

The world’s leading states are commemorating the 100th anniversary of the start of World War I, one of the first and bloodiest wars of the twentieth century. The “Great War” was marked by the collapse of three large empires — ​ the Russian Empire, Austro-­Hungarian Empire, and Ottoman Empire — ​and the subsequent creation of dozens of new states in Euro-­Asia and Africa. The formation of the League of Nations inaugurated a new era of international relations. In 2017, when Russia and Turkey looked back 100 years, they remembered great injustice and lawlessness in respect to the Russian and Turkish peoples. In the earlier twentieth century formerly prosperous Russia (defeated in the war when the Bolsheviks signed the treaty of Brest-­Litovsk) and Turkey (with its complicated statehood), with their 100,000 casualties, changed from rivals into allies. During World War I they were members of the two opposing military blocs with their own military, political, and ­strategic plans. In particular, Russian plans included seizure of the Turkish Straits, a­ nnexation of the Mediterranean Sea, and advance to the south as a patron of the Middle East Christian population. In turn Turkey planned to stir up religious and ethnic sympathy among the Muslim population of the Caucasus and the Russian Empire. Its goal was to create protective buffer states to oppose the northern danger and draw 30 million Russian Muslims under the patronage of an ­Islamic caliph, the sultan. Similar plans were nurtured by Iranian Turks residing in South ­Azerbaijan (the northern part of Iran). Reports from the Russian Embassy in Tehran to St. Petersburg put forward a concept of annexing Iranian Azerbaijan with its “identical language population” to the Caucasus province of Russia. Even better, a report in 1911 stressed that rumors were afloat that Azerbaijan was preparing to separate from Iran. Although not involved in the war, Iran hoped to derive certain benefits from it. In the first move, the shah’s government tried to get rid of tsarist units, particularly desperado Cossack regiments that took control of the northern part of the country, as described in the British-­Russian Treaty of 1907. Iranians dreamed of reclaiming territory from the lower part of Derbend to the Caucasus and from the lower part of Syr Darya to Central Asia once owned by the Safavid state if Russia grew weaker in the course of the

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Preface

war. It should be noted that this idea was mirrored even in official statements by Iran to the Paris peace conference. It has to be kept in mind that the European states did not have any serious plans concerning the South Caucasus. Yet since the nineteenth century the British Empire had shown great interest in the remote provinces of Russia in the Caucasus. With that end in view, the British tried to weaken their future ally by devising various projects. British special services were involved in stirring up national clashes in the Caucasus in 1905 and 1906, especially the Armenian-­Muslim confrontation. During World War I the way to Central Asia, Afghanistan, and India for Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany was via the Caucasus. With this in mind, German consulates, missionary societies, and special societies headquartered in Baku and Tiflis were engaged in gathering information about the Caucasus during World War I and sending it to Berlin, especially about the natural resources (including the Baku oil industry) and the German community in the region. At the end of World War I geopolitical interest in the Caucasus was of an increasingly practical nature. When Russia lost control over outlying districts after the 1917 Revolution, the South Caucasus held a central position in the strategic plans of belligerent powers. As combat operations needed ever greater petroleum supplies, military campaigns against Baku intensified in the spring of 1918. British troops were trying to enter Baku from the South Caspian, Turks from Iranian Azerbaijan, Germans from Ukraine and Georgia, and Russians from the north by means of the White Guard led by Gen. Anton Denikin. In order to prevent the German eagle from perching on the Baku oil derricks, the British lion was ready to pounce on the Absheron Peninsula from the Caspian south.1 In a short while the situation became increasingly complicated. In May 1918, when Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia declared their independence, a fierce struggle for control of the South Caucasus region followed. Baku passed through many hands. First came the British then the Turkish Islamic army that liberated Baku. After the defeat of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria-­Hungary, the Ottomans, and Bulgaria) in autumn 1918, Entente troops entered Baku and seized control over the entire ­Caucasus. A new geopolitical reality sprang up in the Caucasus. Newly established Caucasian states linked their future with the West under British security patronage. Therefore the Paris peace conference gave de facto recognition to the independence of the South Caucasus Republics in January 1920. This situation laid down legal principles for their integration in the West. In mid-­January 1920, however, the Politburo of the CC RCP (B) decided on its course of intervention in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan in regard to the “pro-­British” Caucasus governments. Moscow did not want to endure the presence of the West on the former borders of the Russian Empire. B ­ olshevik



Preface ix

Russia hastily drew up plans for attacking Baku, the principal industrial center of the South Caucasus. The Bolsheviks acted not only to gain oil but to thwart the western European states’ aspirations to lay their hands on the ­energy resources of the Caspian Sea. So in 1920 and 1921 the Bolsheviks did their best to overthrow the national governments of the Caucasus. In so doing Russia succeeded in deriving profits from collaboration with Britain’s former ­enemy  — ​Turkey. It was anti-­Western hysteria that made Bolshevik Russia and Kemalist Turkey close allies. Four years of blood-­and-guts hatred went completely out of their minds. The location of the Caucasian Republics in the triangle — ​Russia, Turkey, and Iran — ​and their orientation toward the West promised to bring new geopolitical realities into the region and disturb the balance established in the empire epoch. In the early 1920s a principal issue of the military, political, and diplomatic struggle for the Caucasus was how to keep balance. The main players of the Caucasian game were Soviet Russia, Kemalist Turkey, and Great Britain as the West’s representative. The main political goal of the Soviets was to prevent the West’s penetration into the Caucasus. Moscow had been perpetually concerned that South Caucasian states would fall under the influence of the West and specifically Britain. To prevent this, Russians used not only the stick but the carrot as well. Soviet Azerbaijan, which had already lost its independence, was declared to be a lighthouse at the East’s gate. On August 10, 1920 (the date of signing of the Treaty of Sèvres), Soviet Russia hastily concluded an agreement with the Armenian Republic. Territorial concessions to Armenians promised by the Western allies and set forth in the treaty were promised to Erivan (renamed Yerevan by a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union on August 17, 1936) by Moscow. In the summer of 1920 the Russian Foreign Commissariat suggested granting the Van, Mush, and Bitlis Provinces of Turkey to Armenia in an attempt to keep Armenians away from the influence of the Entente. Although this step by Russia could sever Turkey from its ally, Bolsheviks made this move to alienate the Caucasus from the influence of the West. If Ankara turned away from Moscow and toward the West, the Russians proposed a barrier to this step: the division of Turkey and establishment of the second Turkish state — ​the so-­called East Anatolian Republic. In that case anti-­imperialist forces headed by Soviet Russia would embrace the Turkish state and the Gilan Soviet Republic. But the Bolshevik experiment in Gilan was a failure. After the Moscow and Kars Treaties in 1921, a Soviet-­Iranian treaty in February of that year determined the future of the South Caucasus, limiting the West’s influence in this region. That was the end of the first stage of geopolitical struggle for the Caucasus. A new struggle began after the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s. A distinctive feature of the epoch was the enhanced strategic significance and

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Preface

economic importance of the South Caucasus for the West. In the 1990s international agreements on the energy resources of the Caspian basin played not only an economic role but primarily a political one. Leaders of the South Caucasus Republics that had lost their independence in 1920 and 1921 were now restored, in the belief that “at present Washington is the global capital.” Russia is still far from giving up its position in the region, however. Making use of the Karabagh conflict, Moscow has contrived to retain control over Azerbaijan and concurrently keep Armenia under its political control. The Georgian-­Abkhazian and Georgian-­Ossetian conflicts may easily be defined as the Russian-­Georgian conflict. The Russian aggression against Georgia in August 2008 was the result of Tbilisi’s orientation toward the West. Georgia failed to get appropriate aid from the West when Russia attacked, however, and as a consequence the Crimea was occupied as well. The main reason for the bloody Ukrainian developments is Russia’s unwillingness to have the West as its near neighbor. Russia has had this fear for a hundred years now. To under­stand the true meaning of the Ukrainian developments and the ­occupation of Crimea, it is appropriate to look back to the 1920s, examine events in the South ­Caucasus from a historical point of view, and thus understand Moscow’s lack of acceptance of the West. The hundred years that have passed since World War I have made it necessary to take a new approach to the world map. The world’s leading actors are engaged in struggles for natural resources and territories, as they were a century ago. As they did then, these struggles started with small areas and countries and probably will end with unrealized promises. The threat of the division of Iraq and Syria is fraught with the possibility of establishing a Kurdish state. Russian intervention in the Syrian crisis has aggravated the situation of the Middle East, and Turkish-­Russian relations have deteriorated to a dangerous level. Increasing confrontation in Ukraine tends to disrupt Russia’s control over an enormous area and threaten the formation of small states. Another battlefield is the Caucasus, with its advantageous geographical location and rich natural resources, which make it necessary to apply new approaches to the maps of newly established states and their political authority. As it was a century earlier, the Caucasus is becoming a contested place for the great powers. Azerbaijan, famed as an oil country, was the first to fall prey to this struggle in 1920.

1

Introduction

I

n April 1920 Azerbaijan took the path of Sovietization and thus marked a new stage in the country’s life. A distinctive feature of this seventy-­year historical path was the loss of independence and the republic’s entry into the system of Soviet socialist administration. The totalitarian Bolshevik regime of the 1920s gradually grew into a dictatorship and resultant Stalinist terror and subsequently, after a period of a bureaucratic, administrative-­command style of management, led to the strengthening of the power of the Party ­apparatus. Together with other Soviet republics, Azerbaijan went through all of the stages of this system, passed all the tests, and made full use of its possibilities. This country, with its own political life, economic wealth, and cultural diversity, became an integral part of the federal state entitled the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Under the pretext of dispatching troops to Anatolia, the 11th Red Army burst into Azerbaijan by armored train and established a bayonet-­based occupation regime in Baku and the surrounding regions. The seizure of Baku was followed by the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, forced change of the administrative system, and the organization of punitive revolutionary committees. In response to the occupation and violence of the Bolsheviks, anti-­Soviet revolts swamped the country, beginning in May 1920. The popular uprisings of 1920– 21 were put down with particular cruelty in Ganja, Karabagh, ­Terter, ­Zakatala, Sheki, and Lankaran. Additional troops were brought in, then previously routed Soviet bodies were restored. An eloquent testimony to the anti-­Soviet movement in Azerbaijan was a May 1920 revolt in Ganja. Mortal combat between the national army units and the enemy for the sovereignty and independence of the republic initially assumed the nature of a universal uprising, an unparalleled feat of the people, who sacrificed their lives for the triumph of the national idea. The death of over 10,000 Azerbaijanis and the destruction of the town by shelling enabled the Bolsheviks to quell the a­ nti-­Soviet 1

2

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

­ prising in Ganja. These events put an end to Bolshevik illusions about the u establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan peacefully; therefore the new regime had to rely on bayonets to retain its power. Despite great sacrifices, the movement of national resistance failed to achieve serious results. Mahammad Emin Rasulzade was right in saying that successful struggle against the Bolsheviks was possible only during a serious crisis situation in Russia. Examining failed anti-­Soviet insurrections in the Caucasus republics, he wrote: “Until Russia is involved in a serious war or a domestic crisis is at hand, no armed insurrection will lead to victory.”1 Rasulzade’s conclusion of 1924 later proved to be true in the 1980s–90s when the Soviet Union fell into crisis, the empire broke down, and the national republics gained their independence. Recognized by the world community in 1920 as a subject of international law and relations, the sovereign Azerbaijani state was occupied fraudulently by Soviet Russia. The confidence of the international community previously earned by the national government was rapidly eroding. The independent foreign political line of the country in 1918–20 was thereafter subordinated to the interests of Bolshevik Russia. Soviet Azerbaijan turned into a principal arena of dissemination of Communist ideas in the countries of the East. Azerbaijan played a key role in the confrontation between Soviet Russia and Britain in the East as well as the transformation of Iran and Turkey into a proving ground for Bolshevik experiments. The 1st Congress of the Peoples of the East in September 1920 in Baku demonstrated that Azerbaijan had become a center of anti-­imperialist struggle. Exploiting the Azerbaijani and Central Asian Muslims, Moscow was eager to discredit Great Britain in the Middle East, force European countries out of the region by stirring up attacks on national governments in Baku and Tashkent, and make London accept Soviet terms. On the eve of signing a treaty with England in 1921, Vladimir Lenin, the head of the Soviet government, in an attempt to mobilize the peoples of the East against Great Britain, gave secret instructions to the Soviet diplomatic ­apparatus: Oblige Sokol’nikov “inadvertently” to establish a Khorasan Soviet Republic by spring; send special envoys to Baku and Tashkent, explaining to them that it is necessary to intensify attacks on British imperialism, not on our behalf but on behalf of Azerbaijan and Bukhara; and never mention it in notes and letters. Eastern people should be told that we are sure to dupe England; this should be done orally, without any docu­ ments.2 Mobilized for the struggle against world imperialism, “oppressed” ­laborers of the East sought aid from Azerbaijan, which had already lost its independence, national identity, and material resources. However, commissioned to

Introduction 3

act as a lighthouse at the gates of the East, Azerbaijan did not even dare to take a drop of oil to light its own lamp. Even the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia had to state in its report to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), or CC RCP (B), that the command of the Red Army was totally inconsiderate of the local government and carried on a policy of colonialism in Azerbaijan.3 In consideration of this, Rasulzade declared that the national policy of the Soviets with Stalin as its head was absolutely no different from that of t­ sarist ­Russia. There was no essential difference between “white Russia” and “red Russia” regarding the rights of peoples.4 In 1920 the political system of Azerbaijan changed. Political, economic, and social freedoms gave way to Bolshevik orders called the “proletarian dictatorship.” Private property was outlawed, and tens of thousands of owners of small and medium-­sized businesses fell prey to Bolshevik pillage and marauding. The oil industry and other riches of the country fell under Soviet Russia’s control. As Nariman Narimanov put it, “Soviet Azerbaijan voluntarily declared that its oil belonged to the laborers of Soviet Russia, but why was ‘a monarchy’ established in the Soviet Republic led by ‘a king,’ Serebrovskii, who believes that he has duped these Azerbaijanis with their crescent and star?”5 It was the repressive methods of oil industry management applied by the Russian government that ruined the representatives of big capital. Note that these oil producers for decades had played a key role in the economic and social life of the country. Disintegration of the management system, extermination of thousands of specialists, and incessant Bolshevik expropriations led to the collapse of the country’s economy. “There are seventy thousand people to whom bread is refused because they do not belong to the manual laboring classes, being declared ‘Boorjoi,’ enemies of bolshevism.”6 Oil was required to restore the civil war–torn life of Soviet Russia. Rule-­ of-thumb oil extraction resulted in pillaging the Baku oil industry. In the first years of Soviet rule the volume of oil extraction in Azerbaijan dropped to the lowest level ever. In 1920 just 176 million poods of oil were extracted, lower not only than in 1913 but even than in 1888.7 In 1921 a famous American drilling engineer named Morris arrived in Baku. Witnessing the uncontrolled exploitation of oilfields and catastrophic impoverishment of the country’s population, he noted: “You are beggars sitting on gold and starving.”8 At the same time, “oil diplomacy” was one of the major spheres of the foreign political activity of Soviet Azerbaijan. International conferences of the 1920s in Genoa and The Hague planned to discuss the development of Baku oil. In the course of these conferences, the world’s largest companies struggled for Azerbaijani oil and for concessions to develop the oil-­bearing lands of the ­Absheron Peninsula.

4

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

It was the chaos in all aspects of social life in the first years of the ­Bolshevik occupation that paralyzed the foreign relations of Azerbaijan. On orders from the Russian Soviet government, foreign diplomats and representatives of the business and military circles of European countries were arrested in Baku, giving rise to a serious international scandal. Profiting from this step taken by Soviet Azerbaijan contrary to the standards of international law, Moscow pursued its own interests: in return for certain concessions from Soviet Russia, the foreign diplomats were gradually released from Baku prisons. However, these actions, pernicious for Azerbaijani diplomacy, greatly damaged the country’s prestige and reduced political and diplomatic confidence in the newly formed state. The foreign policy of Soviet Azerbaijan, after the April coup of 1920, marked the first diplomatic steps in reply to aggressive actions on the part of neighboring countries of the South Caucasus. On the eve of the April coup, the Armenian Dashnaks and Georgian Mensheviks entered into a separate collusion with Moscow. In exchange for their loyalty in the occupation of Azerbaijan, they hoped to earn their share from the Bolsheviks. The new diplomacy of the Soviets in South Caucasus led to deterioration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan in the first years of Soviet rule. Lands reputed to be indisputably Azerbaijani in the Republic of Azerbaijan period (1918–20) were now looked upon as disputed ground, and lands considered ­Azerbaijani for thousands of years were put up for auction. Soviet Russia tried to build friendly relations with Dashnak Armenia and Menshevik Georgia at the expense of “land concessions” by Soviet Azerbaijan. Eloquent testimony to this policy is found in a treaty entered into by Soviet Russia and the Republic of Georgia on May 7, 1920, in Moscow and an additional agreement on May 12. Under this treaty Zakatala, Karabagh, Zangezur, Nakhchivan, Sharur-­Daralayaz, and other lands of Azerbaijan became the objects of political intrigue. Playing an important role in the Bolshevik occupation of the South Caucasus, authoritative Communists Sergei Kirov and Grigorii (Sergo) Orjonikidze called the policy against Azerbaijan “Zakatalovshchina,” openly saying that Armenians at the center of Soviet policy were behind these diplomatic games. However, in the summer of 1921, after a conference in Tiflis (renamed Tbilisi by a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on August 17, 1936) to regulate internal borders between the South Caucasus republics, the parties reached an agreement. On November 15, 1921, the Georgian Soviet Republic renounced all claims to the Zakatala district. Soviet diplomacy’s aspiration to rule the South Caucasus by staging artificial territorial disputes cost the Azerbaijan Republic a lot: the country’s territorial integrity faced danger of dissolution. Attempts to get out of local crises in the South Caucasus in the 1920s proved to be common under the ­Soviet

Introduction 5

policy. The Turkish-­Armenian War began in September 1920 and ended in November of the same year with the utter defeat of the Armenian Dashnak army. However, Soviet Russia made Azerbaijan responsible for reparation of the war-­caused damage. Apprehensive about repeating the 1918 developments, the Russian diplomats decided to grant a part of Zangezur, historical Azerbaijani land, to Armenia and thus cut Turkey off from Azerbaijan. On the advice of Orjonikidze and Stalin, key figures in the Caucasus policy of the Soviet government, Moscow broke off direct territorial communication between Turkey and Azerbaijan to complete the transfer of Zangezur to A ­ rmenia. ­Daralayaz, as a place of permanent residence of Azerbaijani Turks, was the first victim of the Soviet policy in the South Caucasus. Nakhchivan was threatened with serious danger. It was the Turkish diplomats’ activity in the region and Turkey’s hard line at the Moscow talks that helped Nakhchivan out of the impasse. The Moscow and Kars Treaties of 1921 assured that Nakhchivan would remain under the Azerbaijan protectorate forever and assigned international status to this act. It is interesting that prior to the signing of the Treaty of Moscow the Bolsheviks considered mountainous and low-­lying parts of Karabagh to be integral parts of Azerbaijan. Beginning in the spring of 1921, however, Moscow ventured risky diplomatic maneuvers with the object of giving a mountainous part of Karabagh to Armenia. This was apparent on June 3, 1921, at a meeting of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B), which secretly passed a decision on a mountainous part of Karabagh belonging to Armenia. It was a resolute rebuff from Narimanov, chair of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary ­Committee (ARC) and the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), that prevented Armenia from carrying out this secret decision of the Caucasus Bureau directed against the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan SSR. After that, Moscow-­led diplomatic steps related to Karabagh led to direct confrontation. In July 1921, at a plenum of the Caucasus Bureau in Tiflis, a more serious attempt was made to tear away a mountainous part of Karabagh from Azerbaijan and give it to Armenia. It was Narimanov’s resolute protest that made the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP disavow this faulty decision. As a result, ­Mountainous (­Nagorno-)Karabagh remained a part of Azerbaijan with the status of an autonomous region. These fruitless conflicts accompanied by perturbations in the political life of Karabagh and the national destiny of the republic as well as the establishment of the Mountainous Karabagh Autonomous Region as part of the Azerbaijan SSR brought a new stage of development. It must be kept in mind that Narimanov was reputed to be a key actor in the foreign and domestic policy of Azerbaijan. His name and authority were taken full advantage of in the process of Sovietizing Azerbaijan and subsequent Bolshevik policy in the Near East. Upon arrival in Baku after the April

6

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

coup, Narimanov heard detrimental news from his followers that Azerbaijan was suffering from mass arrests, executions, and plundering of property right and left. So his dreams of local Soviet power on the basis of national communism to manage the country were a failure. Owing to the establishment of Soviet power later in November 1920, Narimanov as chair of the ARC made a statement on November 30 regarding some territories of the republic that seriously damaged his political career. He made this statement under pressures from Orjonikidze, Moscow’s envoy to the Caucasus. Thus the Azerbaijani leaders, with Narimanov as their head, became hostages of their errors.9 Note that serious differences emerged between Narimanov and Moscow’s henchmen, foreign Bolsheviks who held top positions in Baku in the first days of the April coup as well as local Muslim Communists. These differences touched some issues involved in the Soviets’ developing internal and foreign policy of the republic. Orjonikidze reported to Lenin and Stalin that a group of Narimanov’s supporters had been encircled and discreditable materials had been marshaled against them.10 In the spring of 1922 Narimanov was transferred to an executive position first in Tiflis and later in Moscow. These steps were initiated to remove him from the republic. A question arises: What was Narimanov to the Soviet leadership? A clear answer is mentioned in Stalin’s letter to Georgii Chicherin, which stressed that Narimanov was not needed to lead the eastern policy; he was just an emblem used as decor.11 Narimanov did not want to be a figurehead, however; hence he was nominated to various leading offices and removed from Azerbaijan. In reply to his protests against the policy of Azerbaijan’s loss of identity his political rivals did not consider Narimanov’s anti-­Soviet statements to be incidental, especially as these statements coincided with the “unappeasable canvassing campaign” of Rasulzade in Istanbul.12 As for issues related to foreign policy, contradictions between Narimanov and Moscow, especially the Russian foreign commissar, Chicherin, arose in eastern policy, particularly in regard to Iran and Turkey. Narimanov considered Chicherin’s views on the revolutionary movements in Iran and Turkey to be wrong: “ensnared by the British, Chicherin put out the light of the Iranian revolution.”13 Narimanov believed that Chicherin’s attitude about the Iranian revolution was attributable to his excessive inclination toward the Western countries. In fact, Narimanov admitted that he aimed, as did Chicherin, to create immediate conditions for social revolution in Europe. But Narimanov meant to start with the East and thus initiate a social explosion in the West. On the contrary, Chicherin “turned away from the East and tried to launch revolution in the West by dint of propaganda and rapprochement with European capital.”14

Introduction 7

Such a confusion of approaches affected the socialist diplomacy of Soviet Azerbaijan. In some issues the Foreign Commissariat of Azerbaijan rushed back and forth between instructions from Narimanov and orders from Chicherin. The collapse of the Iranian revolution was explained by ­Narimanov as being due primarily to the whim of David Lloyd George.15 While ­addressing the 8th Congress of the All-Russian Soviets in December 1920, Lenin called the ­Kemal­ists “Turkish Octobrists.”16 However, Soviet Russia’s attitude toward Turkey remained ambiguous. Narimanov wrote: “If we had led the liberation movement in Persia and Turkey, we would have dictated terms to the Entente. Two major points — ​straits and gates to India — ​would have been under our direct influence.... That’s the so-­called eastern question I’ve always referred to.”17 Among the first to oppose the Soviet leaders was Mirsaid Sultan-­Galiyev, a representative of the Turkic-­Muslim peoples. He justly noted that Soviet Russia did not have a single political line with respect to Turkey. Moscow ­waffled: who was to be chosen — ​Mustafa Kemal, Enver, or “leftist” Enverists?18 Nevertheless, treaties concluded by Soviet Russia in February 1921 with Iran and in March with Turkey put an end to the revolutionary intent not only of Moscow but of the newly established Soviet republics of the South Caucasus in their relations with neighboring eastern countries. At a conference in Kars in September–October 1921, representatives of the South Caucasus republics signed the first international document ever. Baku, Tiflis, and Erivan signed an interstate treaty with Turkey, which had a positive effect on their international authority. By signing the Kars Treaty, the Armenian republics had thus recognized the Moscow Treaty of 1921 concluded between Soviet Russia and Turkey. Ipso facto, the so-­called Armenian question was ended, an issue that had been at the forefront of international political circles. Inclusion of a special item about Nakhchivan’s remaining a protectorate of Azerbaijan in the Moscow and Kars Treaties proved to be an important result of the geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus. Soviet Azerbaijan’s relations with neighboring Caucasus republics had a special place in the country’s foreign policy. The question of the form of diplomatic relations between the Soviet republics and the Russian Federation, as well as among themselves, had long been a point at issue. Therefore formal diplomatic relations between the national Soviet republics persisted until the summer of 1922. Starting in the summer of 1921, the process of unification of various economic entities of the South Caucasus republics began. Within a year the republics’ Commissariats for Foreign Affairs were abolished and a Secretariat for Foreign Relations was set up instead. On December 30, 1921, by decision of the Board of the Russian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the authority of foreign missions of the national Soviet republics was curtailed.

8

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

Even worse, afterward they were closed entirely. First diplomatic missions of the South Caucasus republics in Iran and Turkey were closed. In June–July 1922 the foreign political activities of these republics were suspended. In December of the same year the foreign political functions of the Union Republics were delegated to the USSR. Various academic literature in various countries and in different languages worldwide deals with the history of the foreign policy of Azerbaijan and the other South Caucasus republics in the period 1920 to 1922 and examines some aspects of the foreign policy of Soviet Azerbaijan.19 Interesting research has been published on Soviet Azerbaijan and neighboring countries, with an emphasis on the formation of diplomatic relations with Russia and hence weakening of ties with European countries. The scientific importance of these works lies in the establishment of extensive political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties in the 1920s among Soviet Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey. The works consulted deal with some aspects of Azerbaijan SSR’s participation in the international and regional conferences.20 Some of the works issued in Azerbaijan and abroad discuss the role of oil in world policy, the diplomatic struggle for Azerbaijani oil in the 1920s, and the influence of Baku oil on international relations.21 Events of this period, particularly the Caucasus policy of Turky, relations between Ankara and Moscow, and conferences in Gumru, Moscow, and Kars, found their parallel in Turkey and other countries.22 In addition, the scientific literature examines the role of the Karabagh question in Azerbaijani diplomacy, especially during the Bolshevik occupation.23 In regard to the indubitable achievements of the present-­day historiography on Azerbaijani history about 1920–22, it would be appropriate to note that the political life of Soviet Azerbaijan (its political steps aimed at resolving the Azerbaijani question and so forth) was broadly reflected in research works and materials. In distinction from previous works, this book is of a generalized nature and provides an overall picture of the political history of Soviet Azerbaijan in the early 1920s. Sovietization of non-­Slavic regions in the early 1920s continues to be significant for historical studies. Archival documents on this issue were kept restricted for a long time, which made it necessary to study the Sovietization of peripheries of the empire and the controversial moments of political relations among Russia, neighboring countries (mainly Iran and Turkey), and regions like the Caucasus and Central Asia. Exposure of Caucasian and Central Asian nations to the Bolshevik invasion and occupation of these regions by the Soviet Russia became the topic of research in Soviet historiography in the middle of twentieth century.24 Facing the pressure of Soviet ideology, these works were mainly focused on a number of progressive social policies (such as putting an end to the tyranny and persecution of large landowners,

Introduction 9

efforts aimed at establishing a civil society, elimination of illiteracy, emancipation of women, and combating religious obscurantism), official propaganda of the Soviet government, and criticism of capitalist states’ policies in the region. After the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Soviet society became more open to foreign researchers. Increasing leftist trends in the Western historiography also led to a number of interesting works on the history of the Soviet Union and its political system, especially on the issues of Sovietization and Soviet national policy.25 Although these works were written from a leftist prospective, they acknowledge that Soviet political system and its society were facing serious problems. These scientific works give extensive insights into the sociopoliti­cal situation in the peripheries, negative attitudes, harassment and violence against non-­Slavic peoples, and the difficulties that they encountered in various fields such as practicing their national culture, language, religion, customs, and traditions. At the end of the twentieth century the collapse of the Soviet Union, emerging ethnical conflicts on the eve of its demise, and increasing struggle among the leading global powers and regional states for influence brought quite a new approach to these issues. First, on the eve of the collapse of the Russian Empire, expanded national independence movements within its boundaries, emergence of national states in the South Caucasus, and the resistance movement against Sovietization and its social as well as ideological origins became the subject of research. A number of interesting research works were published both in the new independent states and in Western countries.26 Moreover, a comparative analysis of the historic studies of Central Asia and the Caucasus reveals significant distinctions in interpretation of these problems. Most of the publications printed in the Central Asian republics still maintain the spirit of Soviet ideology, while historical works on the Caucasus region are full of severe criticism of the Soviet government and its politics. The historic studies in Central Asia do not involve sufficient use of Russian archival materials, so some aspects of the Sovietization of Turkestan are not well researched and new research rarely introduces new approaches. Although studies on the Sovietization of Turkestan and national revival are very similar, in terms of historiography the Sovietization of the Caucasus and its independence involve more diverse topics. During Soviet times in the Caucasus, especially in its southern part, the issues related to Sovietization were addressed within the framework of a holistic ideological approach. Post-­Soviet historiography led to a shift: prole­ tarian internationalism as an ideology was replaced by local and national conflicts. In Georgia the archival documents related to the national independence movement, the short period of independence, the Communist Party,

Map 1.1. A 1994 U.S. State Department map showing Azerbaijan and neighboring Caucasus states.

12

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

and Sovietization became accessible much earlier than in other Caucasian countries. In fact, this resulted in the publication of a number of interesting studies on Sovietization of the country and the region in generally. A broader image of the national-­independence movement and Sovietization in Armenia has been created in a fundamental work by Richard Hovannisian. This comprehensive study is based on rich sources and numerous references. The author has managed to cover a wide range of important issues like cooperation and conflicts between Armenia and Soviet Russia during the Sovietization of Armenia, political processes in Armenia affected by Soviet-­Turkish relations, the Armenian-­Turkish War, numerous agreements between the two countries, and finally the Sovietization of Armenia by the Bolsheviks in the late 1920s. In terms of deep analysis of events and interpretation of historical processes, this book by Hovannisian is very extensive compared to the studies published in Soviet and post-­Soviet Armenia.27 Hovannisian used a wide range of docu­ ments and materials deposited in the archives of France, Britain, and the United States as well as new documents from the archives of the Republic of Armenia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Hovannisian does not deal with Russian archival materials on a number of important issues of Sovietization and ignores some issues, suggesting that in some cases he fails to prove his arguments. For example, Hovannisian tries to liken Armenian Communists’ and Dashnaks’ views on Sovietization, an idea that was proved to be wrong by later developments. Some members of the Dashnak government defeated by Turkish army took part in the newly formed Armenian Soviet government. Both Dashnaks and Armenian Bolsheviks were defending the idea of national statehood. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some research works published in Azerbaijan in recent years have covered new aspects of the problem. These new approaches can be seen in the works by Dr. Ismail Musayev, Shalala Mammadova, and Ilgar Niftaliyev.28 Of course, the works by Professors Tadeusz Swietochowski and Audrey Altstadt published in the United States during the time of the Soviet research restrictions also reflected a different conceptual approach to Sovietization.29 Although these works were giving different interpretations, however, they lacked rich sources. After the collapse of the Soviet Union newly discovered archival documents revealed a different picture of the invasion of Azerbaijan by Soviet Russia in 1920s and the Bolshevization of the country. In this respect, special mention should be made of recent research by Audrey Altstadt (2016). Her book mainly explores the cultural policy of Soviet Azerbaijan in the period from 1920 to 1940, offering a very interesting and new assessment of the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, the attitude to the personality and activities of Narimanov, and disputes over the leadership of the Soviet Azerbaijan in regard to the national question.30

Introduction 13

Professor Jörg Baberowski from Humboldt University cast new light on these events in his monograph. The book covers the events in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus region from 1824 until 1939 and mainly focuses on the 1920s. Baberowski made effective use of the archives in Moscow, Baku, and Tbilisi. He elaborates on the disagreements and tragedies in Azerbaijan caused by Sovietization, the conflicts among the Bolshevik elite, and the political triumph and personal tragedy of the country’s first Communist leader, N ­ ariman Narimanov. Noting the Soviet leaders’ initial confidence in Narimanov, ­Baberowski writes that Narimanov “represented the center in the periphery and the population of the periphery in the center.”31 Baberowski notes that soon some hidden hand got involved. As a result, Narimanov’s career was on rise. He served in public offices in Tiflis then in Moscow, basically because the Soviet leaders wanted to end his ties with Azerbaijan. However, this significant work also has some mistakes and inaccuracies. For example, Baberowski portrays Narimanov as “undisputed leader” of the Azerbaijan Socialist Revolution and restless defender of “Independent Soviet Azerbaijan.”32 He fails to mention that the decisions made by Nerimanov were of a formal nature and were revised by the Baku Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (CPA). Complex analysis of national and foreign historiography dealing with sociopolitical processes that were taking place along the frontiers of the former USSR at the beginning of the twentieth century provides some generalizations. First, after new archival materials and official documents became available, both historiographies agree that those processes were not simple consecutive historical events and therefore emphasize the importance of analyzing these processes within a longer historical term and broader geographical context. Second, the idea of political independence and national independence movements in the peripheries at the time of the collapse of the Russian Empire, which resulted in ethnical clashes and bloody wars, requires close analysis of the role that imperial Russia’s state institutions played in the lives of ethnic minorities. Third, on one hand, national historiography studies political processes from a nationalistic perspective; on the other hand, foreign historiography addresses the issue from an anti-­Soviet standpoint, which leads to biased opinions. In this regard, the book by the American historian Richard Hovannis­ian is a good example. He explores the processes of a short period from indepen­ dence to Sovietization and severely criticizes all political figures of the time, from Mustafa Kemal pasha, who was the leader of the Turkish national movement, to the American president Woodrow Wilson and the ­leaders of the Allied powers. But he does not say a word about the mistakes of the Armenian political leaders, who were fighting on three fronts (against Turkey,

14

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

­ zerbaijan, and Georgia) from the very first day of independence. President A Wilson stressed the need for the Senate’s approval of an American mandate in Armenia. But, according to Hovannisian, Wilson “requested authorization for the mandate at a time when rejection was a foregone certainty, making his action seem either brazenly pathetically naive or cynical.”33 In fact, Hovannisian suggests that the fate of Armenian boundaries was not dependent on the historical reality, relations with neighboring countries, and the position of the Armenian politicians but was in the hands of Wilson ­personally. Fourth, analysis and interpretation of the decisions and positions of national politicians are not objectively addressed in both national and foreign historiography. Both historiographies tend to draw parallels between ideologists and activists from the national liberation movement and the Bolsheviks or to situate them against each other. For instance, Hovannisian does not see any significant difference between the political positions of the Armenian Bolsheviks and Dashnaks, while Baberowski places Musavatists and Turkish Bolsheviks in separate camps. Recently researched archival documents provide evidence that political opponents in the Caucasus were giving each other political and even financial support. It is not a secret that Armenian Dashnaks were providing significant financial support to the Bolsheviks and that there were close family ties between the two. When it comes to the Muslim politicians who are described as Communists in both national and foreign historiography (especially in the latest book by Baberowski), it should be noted that their positions with regard to national issues were actually not different from internationalism and were only apparent when it came to territorial claims and language. In the course of researching this work, I relied on a wide range of sources, including the Archive of Political Documents of the Presidential Administra­ tion of the Republic of Azerbaijan, State Archives of the Azerbaijan ­Republic, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi at the Center d’Études des Mondes Russe, Caucasien et Centre-­Européen (CERCEC), at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Archives Diplomatiques of the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Russian State Archive of Social-­Political History, State Archive of the Russian Federation, Russian State Archive of Modern History, National Archives and Records Administration (United States), National Security Archive Georgian State History Archive, Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, and others. Note that a large number of archival documents have been used for academic purposes for the first time here. Some countries, particularly the Russian Federation, have archival holdings with valuable materials on the subject; unfortunately, however, these materials proved unobtainable, despite all of my efforts.

Introduction 15

In addition, collections of documents and various materials were used in the course of my research. Archival documents contributed to wider coverage of the history of diplomacy of Soviet Azerbaijan and made it possible to carry out a comparative analysis of quite a number of foreign political issues from the 1920s. Part of the published material deals with the Karabagh question as a major aspect of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy as well as with the country’s histori­ cal past, particularly diplomatic conflicts around the question in the 1920s.34 Other documents and materials published in different countries cover the period from the Sovietization of Azerbaijan to the establishment of the USSR. These materials provide information about relations between the Azerbaijan SSR and Iran and relations with Turkey as well as Azerbaijan’s participation in international and regional conferences during the period reviewed.35 Some published documents reproduce political-­diplomatic activities of the Azerbaijani emigrants in the European countries and Turkey in the 1920s to 1930s. Quite a number of works, letters, diplomatic notes, and appeals distributed by leaders of the Azerbaijan Republic during the emigration years are a valuable source to examine the foreign policy of the Azerbaijan SSR and the history of diplomacy. Works of opposition leaders published in various publications, notes and appeals to the League of Nations, and statements by organizers of some international conferences, heads of European states, and U.S. officials make it possible to trace changes in the international situation in connection with Soviet Azerbaijan.36 Reports, speeches, letters, and appeals of the leaders of Soviet Azerbaijan were also used. Of interest are works by Nariman Narimanov, who headed the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars of the Republic.37 His secret letter titled “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries” addressed to the CC and personally to Joseph Stalin, Lev Trotskii, and Karl Radek is of inestimable value for the study of the eastern policy of Soviet Russia and Azerbaijan SSR. I have been successful in integrating the memoirs and diaries of government and military leaders and diplomats of this period as well as press kits.38 I take this opportunity to extend my thanks to all those who have rendered disinterested aid in the preparation of the monograph, including archivists, authors of useful materials, and the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme — ​all of whom created necessary conditions for me to work at the archives in France. Special thanks go to Dr. George Mamoulia (Paris) for his assistance in obtaining a number of documents and materials; Valerii Shepe­ lev, deputy director of the Russian State Archive of Social-­Political History; Dr. Eldar Abbasov; and Ramiz Abutalybov, who provided great service in the collection, preservation, and publication of the heritage of the leaders of the Azerbaijan emigration.

2

The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century

D

espite its relatively small size, Azerbaijan, one of the most ancient countries in the world, has often found itself at the center of events due to its geographical location and strategic importance. East–west trade routes pass through its borders, and the destructive marches of great emperors and world conquerors have traversed its territory at different points in time. The Russian Empire ventured into the Caucasus at the beginning of the nineteenth century, once again plunging Azerbaijan into the center of conflict. Georgia became part of Russia under a decree of Emperor Aleksandr I in 1801, while the North Azerbaijan khanates joined Russia under the Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchai (1828) Treaties between Persia (modern-­day Iran) and the Russian Empire, which concluded the Russo-­Persian Wars of 1804–13 and 1826–28. With this agreement the people of Azerbaijan were divided into two parts: the southern part remained a province of Persia, while the northern part was occupied by Russia. After colonization within the Russian Empire, North Azerbaijan followed an interesting historical path. The end of the nineteenth century saw the beginning of a fundamental struggle to determine the history and fate of Azerbaijan. These were the years when Azerbaijan entered the stage of a radi­ cal turn in its fate and history, when Mirza Fatali Akhundov and Hasan bey Melikov-­Zardabi’s cultural-­educational concepts started acquiring a national sense and political meaning. As a great thinker, Zardabi realized that the way to national self-­ consciousness lay though schools and science. Having embarked upon the path of great struggle, he founded the newspaper Ekinji (Plowman) as a public organ seeking to return to national roots. In the first issue ( June 22, 1875) he pointed out that his newspaper’s principal objective was to disseminate scientific information. The newspaper also promised its readers that it would 16



The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century 17

publish trade and political news. According to American historian Audrey Altstadt, “Zardabi not only gave advice on forestry and agriculture, but on schools and education. Hence the dual meaning of the name — ​Ekinji  — ​not only one who sows seeds for crops, but one who ‘plants’ ideas.”1 Deeply sensitive to the calls of his time, Zardabi gathered together the talented youth of the country to unite around Islamic spiritual values, the Turkic language, and progressive Western thinking. Azerbaijani enlighteners, having noticed that the whole world was entering the age of nationalism, changed the centuries-­old paradigm of the Asian community in a transition to national thinking in the new century. In substantiating the necessity of transition from the traditions of the Oriental spiri­ tual school to schools with a new methodology of secular education, they determined the way toward national salvation. The great enlighteners were followed by Ali bey Huseinzade, Ahmed bey Aghayev (Aghaoglu) and Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov, who, inspired by this concept, carried the whole burden of transition from a community to a nation on their shoulders.

The First Russian Revolution and Azerbaijan The development of the petroleum industry, trade, and transport turned Baku by the early twentieth century into one of the major cities not only of the South Caucasus but of all Russia as well. Also, the prospect of earning big money quickly and unrestrictedly attracted foreigners and adventurers to Baku. The population of the whole empire flew into the city in quest of bread. It should be noted that the population of Baku in 1863 was just 14,500; by 1903 the figure stood at 143,786. Baku thus became the largest city of the South Caucasus. This spontaneous growth of the population was attributable to the influx of foreigners and concurrent changes in the national-­ethnic composition.2 The world saw the unprecedented prosperity of Baku due to the production of oil as a major strategic commodity. It is sufficient to compare production indices over the past three decades of the nineteenth century. While 26,000 tons of oil were produced on the Apsheron Peninsula in the first years of the twentieth century, 10,979,000 tons of oil were produced in Baku, which made up more than half of the total world output. Peter Hopkirk, a British intelligence officer in the Middle East, wrote about the Baku oil as follows: At the end of the last century Baku had been one of the wealthiest cities on earth. The discovery of vast oil fields in this remote corner of the Tsar’s empire had brought entrepreneurs and adventurers of every nationality rushing to the spot. Experts calculated that Baku had enough

18

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

Map 2.1. Map of the Republic of Azerbaijan as printed in 1919 by the French publisher J. Forest Geographe and commissioned by the Azerbaijani official peace delegation in Paris. It shows (with crosshatching) the territory claimed by Azerbaijan and (in the solid darker shade) the undisputed territory of the republic.

oil to heat and illuminate the entire world. So sodden was it with the stuff that one had only to toss a match into the Caspian off Baku for the sea to catch fire for several minutes.... For a few short years the town became a Klondike where huge fortunes were made and gambled away overnight. Baku’s new rich, some of them barely literate, built themselves palaces of great opulence on the seafront.3 In the earlier twentieth century Baku outran the United States to become one of the two largest world oil producers.4 Its developing petroleum industry and related novelties had their impact on the national life of Azerbaijan. The appearance of millionaires, including Musa Naghiyev, Haji Zeynalabdin Taghiyev, Shamsi Asadullayev, Murtuza Mukhtarov, and others essentially consolidated the social and economic foundations of the Azerbaijani national idea. At the turn of the twentieth century, a period characterized by national­ ization trends, the newspaper Tarjuman (Translator), headed by Ismail bey Gasprinskii (Gaspıralı) and issued in Bakhchisarai, and the Russian-­language Kaspii (Caspian), headed by Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov and issued in Baku, became major centers of the national idea on the eve of great events. A principal goal of Kaspii was to equalize “minor” populations of Russia (such as Muslims) with the ruling “titular” people of the empire (Orthodox Christians). The newspaper maintained close spiritual ties with the populations of



The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century 19

Povolzh’e, Nizhnii Novgorod, Kazan, Ufa, and Orenburg as well as Crimean Muslims.5 Emerging question about the rights of the Turkic nation were put on the agenda in cultural life, in literature, and on the pages of press organs. At the same time the deepening movement of Jadidism (a reform movement among Muslim intellectuals from the late nineteenth century to the 1920s) was observed. On the threshold of the first Russian revolution the Azerbaijani national bourgeoisie and representatives of the national spirit came to influence the political sphere. The year 1905 started for Russia on January 9. The revolutions that shook Europe and America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reached Russia very late: it was not until 1905 that the Russian Empire underwent a powerful revolutionary blow. Military failure in the war against Japan in 1904 caused a wave of mass discontent. The failure stirred up the 30 million Muslims of the empire. Located in a geographically distant province, the city of Baku was industrially the third city of Russia. In the first days of the revolution in Russia the Azerbaijani intellectuals managed to pass a bill through the Baku municipal Duma (assembly) to equalize the rights of the Muslims of South Caucasus with those of the Christian population of Russia on an exclusively official basis. It would be appropriate to remember that the developments in Baku in 1905 broke out against the background of a “national massacre.” That was not a surprise. After sustaining a defeat in Turkey in the 1890s, Dashnaks moved to the Caucasus, including Baku. The Caucasus governor-­general, Prince G ­ rigorii Golitsyn, warned the tsar in 1900 that Armenians had seized power in Baku and Tiflis and pointed out the demographic changes in the area, noting that “when Russians conquered South Caucasus the number of local Armenians did not exceed 45,000, and now there are above 1.5 million Armenians in the Caucasus.”6 Eight out of ten officials in the Tiflis municipal bodies were ­Armenians.7 The region was in turmoil. The first days of 1905 in Baku were full of rumors of an “Armenian-­Muslim war.” These rumors soon became a reality. On February 6, 1905, the Armenians began the first offensive, which lasted four days in succession. As a result, 400 people were wounded; 130 Muslims and 170 Armenians were killed.8 Against all expectations, they sustained a defeat, and the carefully prepared action was prevented on February 10. The international carnage in the Caucasus failed to push the national-­ liberation revolution into the background. Earlier in the year the tsar had retreated to issue a draft on February 18, 1905, for the establishment of a State Duma. This mission was given to interior minister Aleksandr Bulygin, who convened a meeting of the government on March 15 to identify rights and duties of people’s representatives. Headed by Bulygin, the special secret meeting began its work on March 12, much earlier than the fixed date. It became

20

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

evident from the first day of the meeting that debates over the law at the State Duma would be long. So Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov preferred to make a special mission to Petersburg. With that end in view, progressive i­ ntellectuals of Azerbaijan gathered at Haji Zeynalabdin Taghiyev’s home on March 15 to discuss a document prepared by Topchibashov entitled “Statement on the Needs of Muslims.” It was decided to send this document, consisting of seventeen clauses, to the government for consideration. The national needs of Caucasian Muslims included “renovation of city life; expansion of rights of Muslims in the municipal administration; improvement of living conditions and educational level of the people, and others.” The document called for an end to the discrimination against Muslims; their employment and public institutions; liquidation of restrictions against Muslims during their participation in municipal elections; equal rights for Turks as compared with other nationalities; provision of Muslims with the right to hold meetings, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press; education in their native language; and ensuring national and civil rights, including religious and cultural rights. The meeting selected a group of authorized persons — ​Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov, Ahmed bey Aghayev, Ali bey Huseinzade, and Farrukh bey Vezirov — ​and instructed them to notify the government of the demands of Muslim intellectuals and the living conditions of Caucasian Muslims.9 As a member of the Baku Duma, Topchibashov arrived in Petersburg in April 1905, where he met with Bulygin, the interior minister, the developer of the draft for the State Duma and head of the special secret meeting. In addition, a document personally compiled by Topchibashov and approved by intellectuals, members of the national bourgeoisie, and large landowners of Baku and Ganja was handed over to Bulygin. This document, signed by Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov, Ahmed bey Aghayev, Rashid khan Shirvanskii, Adil khan ­Ziyadkhanov, Mahammad Rza bey Vekilov, and other figures from Baku and Elizavetpol provinces, put forward the principal demands of Muslims. In April 1905 Bulygin submitted a petition from the Baku representatives to the Cabinet of Ministers. The government had to discuss the demands of Muslims. On April 17, 1905, on the basis of this petition, a governmental decree was signed that took into account just a small part of the Muslims’ demands. They were allowed to elect muftis, kazis, and local clergy. During this same period Topchibashov was received by a new Caucasian governor-­ general, Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-­Dashkov, which proved to be an important result of the mission to the capital.10 Speaking on behalf of the delegation, T ­ opchibashov succeeded in convincing the governor-­general of the urgent need to reform the areas of administration, courts, land, taxes, and others. On April 22 permission was given to issue a daily newspaper Hayat (Life) in T ­ urkic.11 Upon his return to Baku, Topchibashov (as the owner of



The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century 21

the ­newspaper) entrusted Ali bey Huseinzade and Ahmed bey Aghayev with issuing Hayat. The Petersburg voyage of the Azerbaijani enlighteners became an important event in shaping the all-­Turkic unity. On April 8, 1905. Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov, Ali bey Huseinzade, Ahmed bey Aghayev, Farrukh bey ­Vezirov, Bunyamin Ahmed, and Sadri Maksudov gathered at the apartment of Abdurashid Ibrahimov in St. Petersburg. They came to the conclusion that it was necessary to create a political party of Russian Muslims. It was Ismail bey Gasprinskii who brought a practical aspect to this concept. The parties agreed that the organization should be titled Ittifag al-­Muslimin (Union of Muslims) or, as some documents say, “Union of Russian Muslims.”12 The first congress of Muslims was opened on August 15 on the boat Gustav Struve on the river Oka in Nizhnii Novgorod. The delegates from different parts of the empire were welcomed by Gasprinskii as the editor of Tarjuman. He suggested electing Topchibashov and Yusuf bey Akchurin to the ­presidium of the congress.13 Topchibashov made an extensive report on the political, economic, cultural, national, and religious issues of Russian Muslims. Ali Mardan bey was followed by Abusugud efendi Akhtyamov, Gasprinskii, and some others.14 Their speeches stressed the necessity of establishing a political party capable of uniting all the Muslims of Russia. The speakers’ resolutions and statements showed that the first congress of Russia’s Muslims was based not on religious postulates but on a national idea. The resolution of the first congress provided for the division of Muslim regions of Russia into sixteen districts, with Baku as a temporary center of the Russian Muslims. The congress also passed a decision to mark the day of August 15 as a holiday for all Russian Muslims.15 By the time the Azerbaijan delegation returned to Baku from Nizhnii Novgorod in August, the city was on fire. As distinct from the February developments, the August Baku events spread beyond the bounds of the city. Fires in the oilfields of the Absheron Peninsula and Baku villages were massive: half of the oil derricks were destroyed or disabled.16 Fires transformed the oilfields of Balakhany, Zabrat, Ramana, Bibi-­Heybat, and other settlements near Baku. While in Baku, a correspondent for the Times of London asked a newly appointed Baku governor for his view on the August Baku events. Gen. Semen Faddeyev replied: “The main culprits of the Baku events are Armenian intellectuals.”17 Note that the Caucasian governor-­general Vorontsov-­ Dashkov responded to the bloody events as well. On September 7, 1905, he arrived in Baku and was received by a Muslim delegation. On the initiative of the governor-­general, a meeting of Muslim and Armenian representatives was held. Vorontsov-­Dashkov offered terms of armistice to both parties as drawn up by Baku’s Bishop Ananii Shirvanatsi. On September 14 the parties accepted these terms. Then the Muslim, Armenian, and Russian population of Baku

22

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

a­ rranged a joint peace demonstration. However, despite various promises and even joint performance of the lezginka (a very popular Caucasian dance), no long-­term peace in Baku was achieved. The problem was that “mutinous Armenians hostile to Muslims” served among the Russian troops stationed in Baku, according to the newspaper Russkoe Slovo.18 Despite serious efforts by the Muslim intelligentsia, Armenian-­Muslim war broke out in Baku on October 20, 1905. This confrontation was of a particularly destructive nature and lasted until October 30. The Slavic population of Baku, which witnessed massacres committed by Armenians, demanded that the Armenians be disarmed and evicted from the city. Touching upon the Baku events, the Petersburg telegraph agency reported: “Baku looks like a war city. Russians demand the disarmament and eviction of Armenians. According to the police, 20, 30, or 50 bombs have exploded every day.” Armenians alleged that 800 bombs were enough to raze Baku to the ground.19 Numerous appeals from the city of Baku to Russian prime minister Sergei Vitte yielded no results. The prime minister replied: “What can I do? The situation is identical across Russia; this does not depend on me.”20 Under the pressure of the revolutionary forces, Tsar Nikolai II published the manifesto of October 17, 1905. As in other big towns of Russia, the manifesto caused great concern in Baku. This manifesto, which came as a result of deepening revolution and the national-­liberation movement, became official recognition of the formation of political parties in Russia and gaining of some freedoms. The document heightened the people’s expectations of organizing the Union of Russian Muslims. On December 11, 1905, Tsar Nikolai II declared the convocation of the State Duma. Thus the Caucasian Muslims were admitted to the Duma. A couple of days later, in early January 1906, the Azerbaijani delegation went to Petersburg to participate in the 2nd Congress of Russia’s Muslims. The first meeting of this congress was held at the apartments of Hasan Habibullah, a rich Muslim of Petersburg. The participants of the congress began discussing a program and a charter for the Union of Russian Muslims as set forth by Topchibashov. A draft charter consisting of twenty-­ three articles was adopted by the 2nd Congress on January 22. The debates over the program, however, were put off until the 3rd Congress.21 Following this charter, Russian Muslims created a Union political party to act in the political arena of the empire as a single organization. The charter stipulated that the Central Committee of the Union of Russian Muslims would be headquartered in Baku, which was also recognized as a political center for all Russian Muslims. According to the charter, all provinces popu­ lated by Muslims were divided into sixteen regions. The congress recommended to Russian Muslims that the Union of Russian Muslims take part in the elections jointly with the Constitutional Democratic Party. All the



The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century 23

delegates ­unanimously agreed that joint participation in the Duma elections was in accord with the interests of the Muslim population of Russia. During the first Russian revolution, Altstadt notes, “no Russian political party would ally with national minorities or add nationality demands to their program until the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) did so in 1906–1907 — ​and they did not entirely fulfill their pledges.”22 The congress’s recommendation concerned in particu­lar Muslims in election districts where they constituted a majority of the population.23 The Bolsheviks figuratively called the Muslim-­ Constitutional bloc “Tatars’ constitutionalism in a turban.”24 A month after the completion of the 2nd Congress of Russian Muslims a congress of Armenian and Muslim representatives was arranged in the Tiflis Sardar palace on the initiative of the Caucasian governor-­general on February 20, 1906. Attending the congress were officials of the Caucasian public institutions and authoritative figures from the Armenian and Muslim parties. On March 4 the proposals of Azerbaijani representatives at the Tiflis congress included three items. To give the congress decisions a practical nature, it was suggested to set up a special meeting of elective representatives of the local population under the Caucasian governor-­general. The Duma elections in Baku, Elizavetpol (Ganja), and Erivan Province were over in the second half of May. Elected to the 1st State Duma from Azerbaijan were Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov, Ismail khan Ziyadkhanov, ­Asadulla bey Muradkhanov, Abdurrahim bey Hagverdiyev, Mahammad Taghy Aliyev, and Agha khan Irevanskii. Baku proved to be the single city and province in the Russian Empire that delegated deputies from a local nationality (Azerbaijanis) to the State Duma.25 This victory was the result of a deepening national movement in Baku at the turn of the nineteenth–­twentieth centuries. In early June all of the Muslim deputies of the First State Duma from the South Caucasus headed for Petersburg.26 On June 21, 1906, the first session of deputies from the Muslim provinces of Russia was held in Petersburg. Topchibashov was elected as the leader of the Muslim faction of the 1st State Duma, with thirty-­six delegates present. The Muslim faction of the first State Duma operated only for eighteen days, from June 21 to July 9.27 On Sunday, July 9, Nikolai II signed a decree dissolving the State Duma. A manifesto of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) was drawn up in a short while. Nine out of nineteen members of the Muslim faction in Petersburg signed the “­Vyborg Declaration.”28 The dissolution of the 1st State Duma and persecution of deputies-­signatories of the Vyborg Declaration caused great alarm among Muslims of Russia. In August 1906 the 3rd Congress of Russian Muslims was held. The main point of the congress was the adoption of Topchibashov’s program of the “Party Union of Russian Muslims,” which consisted of eleven sections and

24

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

seventy-­five paragraphs.29 It was based on the program principles of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets). The newly adopted document gave the union a national character and presented it as a superclass structure. From a political standpoint, the program favored the idea of a constitutional monarchy and declared private property to be inviolable. The program also touched upon a question of national-­cultural autonomy.30 The congress adopted the charter of the union and the organizational structure of the party. The 3rd Congress adopted three resolutions. The first resolution backed by leftist delegates touched upon the Armenian-­Muslim clashes in the Caucasus. The second resolution welcomed Iranian shah Mozzaffar ad-Din, who granted a constitution to his people. The third resolution protested against the murder of Mikhail Gertsenstein, a deputy of the State Duma. Thus the 3rd Congress had concluded its work. Topchibashov as chairman of the Muslim faction of the State Duma and head of the Party Union of Russian Muslims was officially recognized as a leader of Russian Turks.31 Despite the dissolution of the 1st State Duma, the tsarist government did not dare to ignore the convocation of the conference of people’s representatives. After necessary preparatory measures had been taken by the govern­ ment, elections to the 2nd State Duma were announced in late 1906 and early 1907. However, prior to the elections, in September 1906 the Council of Ministers discussed the question of inadmissibility of simultaneous public service and political party membership. Elections to the 2nd State Duma in Baku and Baku province were held on February 6, 1907. The total number of the deputies to be elected to the 2nd State Duma from the Caucasus was twenty-­ eight: eight from the Northern Caucasus; twelve from the Eastern Caucasus; and eight from the Western Caucasus. Thus the South Caucasus was represented by twenty deputies.32 Elected to the 2nd State Duma were from Baku non–Party member Ismail Taghiyev, the son of Haji Zeynalabdin Taghiyev; from Baku Province Mustafa Mahmudov and Zeynal Zeynalov; from Elizavetpol Province Fatali khan Khoiskii and Khalil bey Khasmammadov; and from Erivan Province Mahammad agha Shahtakhtinskii. The 2nd State Duma started its work on February 20, 1907. As a whole, the Muslim provinces of Russia were represented by thirty-­eight deputies,33 which compared well with the 1st Duma. But not all of them joined the Muslim faction: a “Muslim labor group” was established, with six members. On March 17, 1907, the formation of the Muslim faction was completed. Azerbaijanian MPs joined this faction, and Fatali khan Khoiskii and Khalil bey Khasmammadov were members of the bureau of the Central Committee of the faction.34 But the 2nd State Duma did not exist long. Nikolai II issued a manifesto on June 3, 1907, on dissolution of the State Duma, which stressed that most members of the Duma were inclined to upset the bases of the empire. Thus expectations of changing Russia by means of liberal reforms ended in failure.



The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century 25

In the autumn of 1907 a special department of the Petersburg Judicial Court finished the Vyborg trial. On December 12–18, 1907, the 167 former deputies of the 1st State Duma from Petr Stolypin’s list of those who signed the Vyborg Declaration heard a verdict through article 129 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Empire. In addition to serving three months of confine­ ment, all Vyborg signatories were banned from being elected to the State Duma and other elective bodies. The convicted persons included six members of the Muslim faction: Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov, Abusugud Akhtyamov, Said-­Girei Alkyn, Selim-­Girei Janturin, Ali khan Bukeikhanov, and Ismail khan Ziyadkhanov. By the time the judgment was pronounced, elections to the 3rd State Duma had ended. The number of Muslim deputies was minimized in the 3rd State Duma, which began work on November 1, 1907. The Caucasus was now represented by ten deputies instead of the earlier twenty-­eight. Under a new election law, the Muslim population of Baku, Elizavetpol, and Erivan provinces was represented by only one deputy at the Duma, while in the past each province had three deputies. Under the law the election center of three provinces was placed in Elizavetpol. Khalil bey Khasmammadov, a member of the Party of People’s Freedom, took one deputy seat during the autumn elections of 1907. Formed on November 10, 1907, the Muslim faction of the 3rd State Duma consisted of only nine members. The sharp decline in the number of deputies from thirty-­ six at the 1st Duma and from thirty-­eight at the 2nd Duma to nine was attributable to restrictions set forth in the new election law. The Muslim faction of the 3rd State Duma maintained close relations with the Muslim Bureau, as set forth by the decision of the third Union of Russian Muslims. The events of June 3, 1907, were followed by strengthened anti-­Muslim policy led by prime minister Petr Stolypin. These circles launched an intensive campaign against the so-­called mythical pan-­Islamism. Russians arranged searches, baseless arrests, and exiles of Muslims as well as the closure of Muslim educational institutions and press organs. Ideologists of Russian nationalism insisted that the Russian Empire was a state of Russians and for Russians. Muslims who had lived in this territory since the dawn of time found themselves neither citizens nor patriots.35 Persecutions of Muslim organizations and societies and prominent figures continually gained in scope in Baku, Elizavetpol, Erivan, and Tiflis in 1908. National organizations, particularly “Difai” (an organization created in Ganja in 1908 primarily to protect the Muslim popu­ lation from Armenian terrorist organizations), were also persecuted. Their offices were searched and smashed up. The reaction in Russia was in full swing in 1909, so any political activity was banned. With his tough policy, Stolypin managed to seize control over all political processes in the empire. All demo­ cratic institutions were disbanded and meetings and street demonstrations were prohibited. Transgressors faced three months of imprisonment and a fine

26

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

of 500 rubles.36 Former deputies of the dissolved 1st and 2nd State Dumas — ​ over 120 “mutineers” — ​were deprived of political rights and opportunities to earn money. Some of them were arrested, while others remained jobless. As a result, many Turkic progressive, enlightened people preferred to go abroad. While some prominent Turkic intellectuals went abroad and others gave up active political struggle, the Musavat (Equality) Party was set up in 1911 as a bearer of the national idea. In that same year Muslims received the majority of votes to Baku’s Duma. It was the activity of the town’s Muslim elite that contributed to Baku’s transformation into a political and cultural center of the Caucasian Turks. In the autumn of 1913 the leader of the Musavat Party, Mahammad Emin Rasulzade, returned from emigration to Baku. On the eve of World War I he proposed the idea of National Revival, based on the need for independence, and turned those dreams into a system of theoretical views. During his observation of hostilities, Rasulzade concluded that the war reshaped the political map of the world.37 The action period of the 3rd State Duma came to an end in June 1912. ­Under the election law of 1907, elections were held to the 4th Duma in ­autumn 1912. On October 20 Mahammad Yusif Jafarov was elected as a representative of Muslims of Baku, Elizavetpol, and Erivan. The newly composed Duma got down to work on November 15, 1912. The Muslim representatives included Mahammad Yusif Jafarov from the South Caucasus; Kutlu-­ Muhammed Tevkelov, Ibnyamin Akhtyamov, and Gabdullatif Bayteryakov from Ufa; Gaysa Yenikeyev from Orenburg; and Mingazetdin Minnigaliyev from Samara. The number of Muslim deputies in the faction dropped from nine to six as compared with the previous Duma. Despite the small number of members of the Muslim faction in the 4th State Duma, it did manage to raise a number of important issues related to the rights of Muslims. First, the deputies succeeded in launching public debates over removal of political discrimination against citizens based on their religious affiliation as well as ensuring the legal equality of all nationalities irrespective of their beliefs. World War I began in the summer of 1914 and soon spread across the Middle East and the Caucasus. Russia’s declaration of war against Turkey was accompanied by open anti-­Muslim rhetoric. Calls to make short work of Muslims were heard at the Duma rostrum, meetings of the intelligentsia, the chauvinistic-­nationalistic press, and elsewhere. The start of combat operations on the Caucasian front strengthened the Russian authorities’ sympathies with the Armenians. The Elizavetpol governor personally welcomed squads of Armenian volunteers specially arranged to fight Turks, which caused serious anxiety among the local Muslim population. Professor Jörg Baberowski wrote that some of these Armenians believed that the war against Turkey would end with measures to slaughter the Muslim population of the province.38 Inspired



The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century 27

by promises from the tsar and the calls of spiritual leaders, Armenians began hastily organizing voluntary detachments in the South Caucasus. In autumn 1914 these detachments launched combat operations against Muslims. Secret information said that the Dashnaktsutiun Party raised funds from Baku Armenians in early 1915 to help Turkish Armenians “fighting against Kurds.”39 The tragic consequences of this policy were discussed at the Duma. Muslim deputies of the Duma were indignant about the Russian troops in the towns of Kars and Batum that committed illegal actions against Muslims in December 1914 and January 1915. In connection with these developments the Muslim faction of the Duma made a special statement entitled “On the Situation around Muslims on the Caucasian Front.”40 The newspaper Iqbal (Luck), published in Baku, wrote: We are informed that Muslims are going through unbelievable hardships and massacres on the battlefield near the Ottoman borders: men are exterminated, women are kidnapped, children are scattered about mountains and woods; the region is in ruins.... Refugees are naked and hungry, utterly impoverished.... Our poor co-­religionists suffered so much grief and trouble that, if our newspaper described it, our readers would get ready for mourning, not a holiday.41 A massacre in Kars committed by Armenian gangsters caused great anxiety in Azerbaijan. As soon as the Azerbaijani public learned about mass murders of Muslims by Dashnak militants (including in Kars), Ali Mardan bey Topchi­ bashov and Aghabala Guliyev from Baku as well as prominent representatives of Ganja and Erivan Provinces immediately left for Kars. The purpose of their journey was to ascertain the Armenian crimes and inform the ruling bodies about them as well as “ask the authorities to protect Muslims against Armenians striving to annihilate Muslims.” A Muslim delegation headed by Topchibashov intended to ask the authorities for “permission to raise money on behalf of Tatar families who lost their lives because of the bloody crimes of Armenians in the Kars region.” They came to see Gen. Aleksandr Myshlaev­ skii, who permitted them to raise money and “promised to take appropriate measures against impertinent Armenians.”42 Shootings of the peaceful Muslim population of Ajaria in the spring of 1915 raised a new wave of protest against the anti-­Turkic policy of the Russian Empire. This event aroused a stormy response in the Muslim environment; the Muslim faction of the State Duma made a statement that caused anxiety in the ruling circles of Russia. However, the government decided to dismiss pro-­ Armenian Caucasian vicegerent Vorontsov-­Dashkov (seventy-­eight years old), which was not the best way out of the impasse. On August 23, 1915, he was replaced by Grand Prince Nikolai Nikolaevich, who became the last ­vicegerent

28

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

to perform the duties of commander of the Caucasian front.43 In the midst of these events, the newspaper Açıq Söz (Open Word) had been issued since autumn 1915 under the leadership of Mahammad Emin Rasulzade. This newspaper was to play a crucial role in the activity associated with the national idea in Azerbaijan. Later in 1916 World War I problems deepened the political crisis in Russia. Military defeats on different fronts, economic difficulties, failure of the monarchist system, and restriction of political and national freedoms led t­ sarist Russia to national collapse and revolution. As the military, political, and economic crisis in the country deepened, the trust of non-­Slav peoples decreased and pressures on them grew. While in emigration, Ali bey Huseinzade, Ahmed bey Aghayev, Abdurashid Ibrahimov, and Yusuf bey Akchurin appealed on behalf of 25 million Russian Muslims on May 9, 1916, from Stockholm to the president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson. The appeal asked the United States to interfere and save Russian Muslims from annihilation.44

The Road to Independence: The Republic of Azerbaijan By the end of World War I, the growing need for fuel forced the ­competing sides to turn their gazes to Baku. The contradictory developments on the Caucasian Front and the political upheavals triggered by the 1917 Russian Revolution inevitably shook the South Caucasus and Azerbaijan as part of it. The 1917 February revolution in Russia not merely deposed the monarchy but dealt a heavy blow to the vast country’s imperial pillars: the “inmates” of the “prison of nations” rose up to demand their liberation.45 This accelerated political developments in the Caucasus. On March 9 the South Caucasus deputies of the Russian State Duma initiated a Special Committee with Constitutional Democrat Vasilii Kharlamov as its head to administer the region. Azerbaijanis were expecting a lot from the February revolution, which had resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy. Intellectuals of the country, who had taken an active part in the national movement and its political activity since the turn of the century, welcomed the upheaval. According to Rasulzade, “the revolution of 1917 would give freedom to condemned classes and independence to condemned nations.”46 As soon as the news of the revolution reached Baku, different national groups, the council of oil producers, and other organizations came together to create an Executive Committee of Social Organizations to govern the city, chaired by right-­wing Menshevik Luka Lavrentievich Bych. Mahammad Hasan Hajinskii and Rasulzade represented the Azerbaijani population. On March 27 representatives of Muslim organizations and societies in various localities met in Baku to form the



The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century 29

Muslim National Council with a temporary executive committee chaired by the architect-­engineer Mahammad Hasan Hajinskii. The Musavat Party was founded in Baku in 1911 by Rasulzade. It had the greatest weight in the council and soon emerged as the all-­Azerbaijani party. In the election to the Baku Council held in October 1917, the Musavat Party collected nearly 40 percent of all the votes cast: 9,617 votes of some 25,000. This success was due to the fact that the Muslim masses were being attracted to political processes and to the demands of national organizations to grant Muslims full political rights. The idea of national and territorial independence was discussed for the first time at the Congress of Caucasian Muslims held in Baku on April 15–20, 1917. After long debates, the congress passed the following resolution on the national issue: “The federal democratic republic is to be recognized as the best structure for securing the interests of Muslim nations within the Russian state system.”47 An argument between Turks who were in favor of territorial autonomy and Islamic leaders and socialists who were in favor of national cultural autonomy lasted for ten days after the conclusion of the congress and continued at the All-­Russian Congress of Muslims held in Moscow on May 1, 1917. At the Moscow congress, socialists justified their objection to territorial autonomy by stating that it would undo the achievements of the revolution and that the Russian central government would act as the guarantor of the protection of the rights of Muslims within a framework of national cultural autonomy. On May 3 Rasulzade, in his main address to the congress, explained the importance of demanding territorial autonomy and backed his words with strong arguments. For those who stressed the Islamic factor as the crucial one, he noted that many Turkic nations had already realized that “first of all, they are Turks and then they are Muslims.” Rasulzade stated that the question must be put in the following way: What is a nation? I am sure that such characteristics as unity of language, historical relations, and traditions create a nation. Sometimes, when Turkic Tatars are asked about their nationality, they say they are Muslims. However, this is an incorrect viewpoint. Christians do not exist in one nation; neither do Muslims. There must be a place for Turks, Persians, and Arabs in the large house of the Muslim faith.48 Despite the strong opposition from the proponents of cultural-­national autonomy, the idea of territorial autonomy proposed by Rasulzade was accepted, with 446 votes in favor versus 271 against.49 That was a great victory of the advocates of the territorial autonomy of Caucasian Turks, a delegation of Baku representatives, and, most of all, Rasulzade, who entered the Russian political arena as a mature politician.

30

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

After the October 1917 coup in Petrograd, the political organizations of the South Caucasus gathered in Tiflis to discuss the situation. To manage the region, they decided to create a Transcaucasian Commissariat. On 14 November the composition of the commissariat was made public: it included representatives of all the Transcaucasian nations, with Georgian Menshevik Evgenii Gegechkori as its head. Two weeks after the establishment of the commissariat, elections to the Constituent Assembly were held on November 26 to 28. As a whole, during the elections to the Constituent Assembly the Musavat Party headed by Rasulzade and the Muslim National Committee led by Topchibashov and Khoiskii received 63 percent of the votes of Caucasian Muslims.50 This great victory showed that national forces of the Caucasus had turned into a strong political organization. As a consequence, the national bloc received ten seats; a bloc of Muslim socialists two seats; and Ittihadists one seat.51 The elections went to show that most Muslims from Baku, Ganja, Erivan, and Tiflis provinces were supportive of Azerbaijani political figures in their struggle for territorial autonomy. In February 1918 the commissariat conveyed its function to the Transcaucasian Seim (parliament). In the Seim formed by representatives of parties that took part in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, ten political parties came to be represented: Mensheviks, Musavatists, Dashnaks, Constitutional Democrats, Socialist-­Revolutionaries, Social Federalists, National Democrats, members of the Union party, Muslim Socialists, and members of the Hummet (Endeavor) Party. For the most part, the parties consisted of representatives of the three South Caucasus nations. On February 10, 1918, the Seim decided on the legal separation of the South Caucasus from Russia. But worrying news from Baku about bloodshed organized by the combined efforts of Armenian and Bolshevik forces worsened the situation of the Seyim. After the October Revolution in Petrograd, Baku was in Bolsheviks’ hands. Most of the Bolsheviks were of Armenian nationality. The head of the Baku Bolshevik was Stepan Shaumian. He came out into the open when he wrote about the slaughter of Muslims.52 Earlier in 1918 Shaumian, in charge of the decree “On Turkish Armenia,” had treated Azerbaijanis who dreamed of transforming Baku into the capi­ tal of Azerbaijan differently. Under these circumstances the Baku Council decided to act, especially as secret agreements had already been reached between the Baku Council troops consisting primarily of Dashnaks and other Armenian nationalistic organizations to cleanse the city of Muslims by means of physical extermination. The slaughter against Muslims arranged in March 1918 by the Baku Council and Dashnaks aimed to seize power in Azerbaijan. This appalling crime clearly demonstrated the true attitudes of the Bolsheviks and Soviet Russia as a whole toward Azerbaijanis who proclaimed the right of



The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century 31

nations to self-­determination. Further developments reaffirmed this. Having given their blessing to the Armenians’ carnage, the Bolsheviks tried to undermine the social base of national forces. Stepan Shaumian came out into the open about the slaughter of Muslims: “Should they gain the upper hand in Baku, the city would be announced as the capital of Azerbaijan and all non-­ Muslim elements be disarmed.... It is obvious that the Muslims’ victory in Baku would lead to the loss of Transcaucasia for Russia.”53 Historian Tadeusz Swietochowski fairly noted that “the very word ‘Azerbaijan’ sounded mocking in Shaumian’s pronunciation and that, instead, Bolsheviks treated Dashnaks cordially and vice versa.”54 On the eve of these tragic events the Armenian nationalistic Dashnak Party invited Muslims to fight jointly against Bolsheviks, but at night they immediately changed their mind and turned into Bolsheviks. However, the events became bloody after the Dashnaks’ betrayal, so in the course of the three-­day tragedy that started on March 30 12,000 Muslims were killed.55 Also, the editorial offices of the Kaspii newspaper where Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov had worked for the greater part of his life were burnt to the ground. The same was true of the Ismailliye building, a printing office of the news­ paper Açıq Söz (Open Word); the mosque Teze Pir; Muslim charity societies; and other educational and religious institutions. Armenians were razing to the ground everything that had any relation to Turkism or Muslimism. Topchibashov witnessed these developments: “Armed Armenians attacked Muslim homes, killed old people, women, children.... Armenians killed Muslims even despite the latter’s left-­wing party affiliation.”56 After the massacres of Baku and the Baku province, the Seim did not long remain in power. On May 26 the Georgian National Council declared Georgia an independent country. On May 27 the Azerbaijan faction met to discuss the crisis caused by the disbandment of the Seim. The situation called for prompt decisions. In view of this, the faction unanimously decided to shoulder the functions of the government and proclaimed itself as the National Council of Azerbaijan, with Rasulzade as its chairman. On May 28 the National Council met for the first time to declare state independence and issue a corresponding document.57 The National Council instructed Fatali khan Khoiskii to form the cabinet. Thus the National Council of Azerbaijan performed its historic mission of creating the first secular Muslim state. On May 30 a radiogram was sent to the foreign ministers of the world’s leading countries, which said: “Since the Federative Transcaucasian Republic was broken up after Georgia became separated from it, the National Azerbaijan Council announced on the 28th of the current month the independence of Azerbaijan, formed by the Eastern and Southern Transcaucasus and declared the Azerbaijan Republic.”58 At the same time, the Armenian National Council in Tiflis declared the independence of Armenia.

32

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

Each of the newly established national republics remained in Batum with its own peace conditions. On June 4 the process ended with a Treaty on Peace and Friendship, which the three republics signed with Turkey. On the same day the Imperial Ottoman Government and the Republic of Azerbaijan signed a friendship treaty. This was the first treaty that the Republic of Azerbaijan signed with a foreign state. Under article 4, the most important for Azerbaijan, the Ottoman government pledged to extend military assistance to the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan if it needed help to maintain law and order in its territory.59 As soon as it received detailed information about what was going on in the republic, the Azeri delegation in Batum decided to ask for Turkish military assistance on the strength of article 4. Turkey, in turn, had to move cautiously so as not to alarm Germany. It was decided to set up a joint Caucasus Islamic Army made up of Turkish regular units and Azeri volunteers.60 Ottoman units started moving toward Ganja, while the 5th Division under Mursel Bakü pasha entered the city early in June. Nuri pasha Killigil and his headquarters joined them in Ganja. After spending its first eighteen days in Tiflis, the Azerbaijan National Council and the cabinet moved to Ganja, where a government crisis destroyed the first cabinet. On June 17 a second cabinet under Khoiskii was put together. Six of the former ministers who retained their posts were joined by six new recruits. On June 23 the worsening situation forced the new government to introduce martial law in the country.61 The second cabinet hastened to appoint delegates to the Istanbul Conference of the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-­Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria). In anticipation of vitally important decisions for the country’s future, the government appointed a delegation of three members (Rasulzade, Khasmammadov, and Aslan bey Safikurdskii) with the authority to conduct negotiations on political, economic, financial, and military issues with all the delegations and conclude agreements.62 Further developments in the summer of 1918 in regard to Baku, both inside and outside the country, made liberation of the city an absolute must. At the concluding stage of World War I, it became the center of the conflicting interests of Germany, Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and Soviet Russia. The Baku Council and the Council of People’s Commissars as its executive structure not only refused to recognize the national government of independent Azerbaijan but also employed all political, economic, military, and diplomatic measures to interfere with its functioning. Soviet Russia was very much concerned about the Turkish movement toward Baku. The Baku Council of P ­ eople’s Commissars resolve to spread its power to the entire country was ­likewise disturbed. On June 12 Stepan Shaumian informed Lenin and ­Stalin by phone that the military units of Baku were starting to move toward Ganja. At the end of June mixed Azeri-­Turkish units checked the Bolshevik



The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century 33

onslaught. On June 27 they clashed at Goychay; on July 1 the Bolsheviks were stopped; on July 20 the Islamic Army, which had liberated Shamakhy, stopped in the environs of Baku when the diplomatic maneuvering reached its highest point. Late in July hostilities resumed with new vigor when the Azeri-­Turkish units reached Baku and accelerated the crisis of Bolshevik authority in the city. The military failures of the Baku Council of People’s Commissars under­mined its position in Baku. The question was whether the city should be abandoned or defended. On July 24 speaking at rallies of non-­Muslim workers, the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and Dashnaks demanded that the British should be invited to defend the city against the Turks and Azeris. On July 31 members of the Baku Council of People’s Commissars resigned; it was replaced with a puppet government called the Central Caspian Dictator­ ship and the Presidium of the Interim Executive Committee of the Soviets based on an alliance among the Socialist-­Revolutionaries, Dashnaks, and Mensheviks.63 The newly established Central Caspian Dictatorship saw Britain’s arrival in Baku as its priority. The British were very much concerned with the Turkish victories in Baku: on the one hand, this meant that the German-­ Turkish bloc might lay its hands on Baku oil; on the other, they never excluded the possibility that Nuri pasha might press on further to Central Asia, Afghanistan, and India. The British government planned to cut short Turkey’s eastern march in Baku. On August 4 the first British unit under Col. Claude Stokes arrived in Baku.64 On August 9–17 three battalions, one battery of field artillery, and several armored vehicles entered the city to represent the British Army.65 After learning that the information about the numerous British troops landing in Baku was false, the Islamic Army began final preparations. On September 15, 1918, the Azeri and Turkish troops launched their general offensive on Baku. On the same day the British military left the city,66 with the troops of the Central Caspian Dictatorship beating a retreat. On September 15 the Azeri-­Turkish army liberated Baku. This has become the second most important date in the history of Azerbaijan after Independence Day on May 28. In the fall of 1918 the German-­Turkish bloc lost World War I. On October 30 the Ottoman Empire had to accept the onerous conditions of the ­Mudros (Mondros) Armistice, which left a scar on the history of the Azerbaijan Republic. Under article 11 the Ottoman Army had to pull out of Azerbaijan and the Transcaucasus immediately. The Ottoman units had to evacuate Baku in one week and leave Azerbaijan in one month. On November 10 prime minister Fatali khan Khoiskii and acting foreign minister Adil khan Ziyadkhanov sent a telegram to Woodrow Wilson asking him to facilitate recognition of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the great powers. The telegram said: “Before turning to the great powers of Europe, the Azeri people and government are

34

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

pinning their hopes on you as a well-­known humanist and patron of subjugated peoples. We are hoping for your support and recognition.”67 On November 17 British troops entered Baku under the Mudros Armistice.68 The next day the government of Azerbaijan published an official statement on the entry of the Entente troops into Baku. It said that the troops were temporarily moved in and would be stationed only in Baku to concentrate military power in their hands. The document further stated that the government hoped that the Allied troops would not infringe on the sovereign rights of the Azeri people.69 After several days in Baku, Gen. William Thomson realized that what he had heard from the Russian National Council members about “Azerbaijan being an invention of several hundred political racketeers” was far removed from reality. He announced that “Britain would support” the “parliamentary cabinet of Khan Khoiski” as “the only legal authority in Azerbaijan.”70 During the hardest days for the republic, the National Council took important measures to alleviate the crisis. On November 19 the National C ­ ouncil passed a Law on the Azerbaijan Parliament, which played an important role in the country’s history. The parliament had 120 seats distributed on a national basis: 80 seats went to the Azeris; 21 to Armenians; 10 to Russians; 1 each to Jews, Germans, Georgians, and Poles; and 3 each to the Union of Trade Unions and the Union of Oil Industrialists.71 On December 7, 1918, Rasulzade, the chairman of the National Council, opened the first sitting of the newly elected parliament. He stressed the importance of electing the best person as speaker. After long deliberations, the deputies elected Topchibashov (who was still in Istanbul) as chairman; Hasan bey Aghayev was elected his deputy and Rahim bey Vekilov his secretary. Formation of a new cabinet was another important task: although the Musavat faction was the largest, it was not large enough to form the government, which meant that a coalition cabinet could not be avoided. On December 26 Fatali khan Khoiskii, who was entrusted with putting together the new cabinet, came up with its membership. On December 28 General Thomson announced recognition of the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan; he stressed that the coalition government under prime minister Khoiskii was the republic’s only legal body of power and promised all-­round support from the allied commanders.72 The political leaders of Azerbaijan not only smoothed out all problems caused by the Allies’ arrival in Baku. Their ­concerted d­ iplomatic efforts also convinced the Allied command to recognize the Azerbaijan democratic state de facto. On December 28, 1918, the Cabinet of the Ministry selected delegates to the Paris Peace Conference: Speaker Topchibashov was appointed delegation head; Mahammad Hasan Hajinskii was his deputy. On April 22, after waiting



The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century 35

for three months in Istanbul, the Azerbaijan delegation departed for Paris.73 Immediately upon their arrival on May 7 the Azerbaijan delegates plunged into hectic activities. In May they met with the delegations of Poland, Georgia, the North Caucasus, Armenia, and Iran. On May 23 they met member of the British delegation Sir Louis Mallet to discuss political, military, and economic situation and the status of the Allied troops in Azerbaijan.74 The American president personally received the Azeri delegation on May 28, the first anniversary of the independence of Azerbaijan. Topchibashov said: “The fact that President Wilson received our delegation was most important. Normally, he, like all the other Entente heads of state, does not meet any dele­ gations personally.”75 Early 1920 marked the turning point in the fates of the new states in the territory of the former Russian Empire. The Great Powers, in particular the United Kingdom, feared the spread of Bolshevism to the Middle and Near East once it had established itself beyond the Caucasian Range. Early in January 1920 Oliver Wardrop, British high commissioner in Tiflis, kept the Allies and the British government informed on an almost daily basis about Denikin’s retreat to the south under Bolshevik pressure. Wardrop suggested that the positions of the South Caucasus republics and the North Caucasus Mountain Republic must urgently be fortified by recognizing their independence: if Britain alienated the Caucasus republics, they would have to talk to the Bolsheviks.76 The mounting Bolshevist threat in the Caucasus forced the Entente countries to discuss the situation in greater detail and start moving. The presence of the Red Army in the Caucasus meant that Bolshevism would move further, to the Middle and Near East, Iran, and Inner Asia. The rapidly unfolding events meant that the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia became a priority. On January 11, 1920, the Supreme Council passed the following decision suggested by Lord George Curzon: “Principal Allied and Associated Powers should together recognize the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan as ‘de facto’ governments.”77 Thus on that date the Paris Peace Conference gave de facto recognition to the independence of Azerbaijan. Another date was added to the list of significant dates in the history of Azerbaijan (May 28 and September 15, 1918). On January 11, 1920, the Paris Peace Conference recognized the independence of Azerbaijan and opened wide the vistas of its cooperation with the world community. Soon after the independence of Azerbaijan was recognized by the Entente states, the Red Army was already approaching the borders of Azerbaijan. The Russian Bolshevik government did not intend to resort to open invasion of Azerbaijan, believing that it would be possible to overthrow the state with the help of local Communists. For this purpose, the Communist Party of Azerbaijan was provided with a large supply of weapons and ammunition as

36

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

well as material support in 1920. At this time of heightened Bolshevik activity, the Armenians started a revolt against the Azerbaijani government in Upper Karabagh on March 20. Later it became clear that the origins of this revolt were linked to Moscow. The intention was to weaken the defense of Baku while danger from the north was growing. Chicherin had written to Lenin that “applying force against Azerbaijan would set our friends against us on an international level. Lansbury [George Lansbury, one of the leaders of the British Labour Party and owner of the Daily Herald newspaper] and ­people like him are sympathetic toward the Azerbaijanis.” He continued: “Our good friend Kenworthy [ Joseph Kenworthy, a Liberal member of the British Parliament] writes passionate articles about ‘little independent Azerbaijan.’ We should not give them grounds to take us for imperialists.”78 However, the Azerbaijani Communist Party, with its limited social base, did not have enough strength to overthrow the government. Soviet Russia’s stance toward Azerbaijan was related to economic rather than political factors. By spring 1920 the civil war had more or less come to an end, and the difficult task of restoring the collapsed economy arose. Restoration of the economy depended first and foremost on oil. In fact, behind the diplomatic confrontations of January 1920 lay the intention of getting access to Baku’s oil. In a telegram that Lenin sent to the revolutionary military Soviet of the Caucasian front in March, he clearly alluded to the issue regarding the occupation of Baku: “Occupation of Baku is very, very important to us. Try your best in statements to be diplomatic, and absolutely convince them that a strong local Soviet government is being prepared.... Arrange the issue about bringing in troops with a general commander.”79 Directive No. 490, which the Caucasian Front Command sent to the 11th Army commanders and the Volga-­Caspian navy on April 21, stated that the main force of Azerbaijan was occupied in the west of the country. The 11th Army and V ­ olga-­Caspian navy were ordered, over the signatures of Mikhail Tukhachevskii, Sergo ­Orjonikidze, and Georgii Zakharov, to cross Azerbaijani borders on April 27 and implement the Yalama-­Baku operation within five days. A second directive, sent at 3:30 am on April 21, stated that all members of the Azerbaijani government were to be arrested and that the 11th Army should capture the Kurdamir railway station to prevent their escape from Baku to Ganja.80 On April 23 this directive was changed, and a new order was given: the last task of the 11th Army was to occupy not just the province of Baku but the whole of Azerbaijan.81 On April 27 the ultimatum was presented to parliament with the signature of Chingiz Ildyrym, commander of the Red Navy of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic, which had not yet been established: “The Red Navy of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic proposes that you immediately surrender power to



The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century 37

the Azerbaijani Worker-­Peasant Government with Comrade Nariman Narimanov in charge. In that case the Red Navy will guarantee to protect the peace and stability of the entire population of Baku regardless of nationality. An answer should be given two hours after receiving this document; otherwise we will open fire.”82 After the Azerbaijani parliament made its decision about surrendering power, a message was sent After discussing your letter dated April 27 and comparing it with the current situation, the commission that we have selected accepts your proposal along with the following: 1. total maintenance of the indepen­ dence of Azerbaijan ruled by the Soviet government; 2. the government that the Azerbaijani Communist party forms will be a temporary body; 3. without any external pressure the Azerbaijani parliament will maintain an Azerbaijani style of governance with representation from workers, peasants, and soldiers; 4. employees at governmental offices will maintain their posts (only officials will be replaced); 5. the newly established Communist government will ensure the life and property for the [former] members of the government and parliament; 6. measures should be taken so that the Red Army does not enter Baku by force; and 7. the new government will fight against any external interference that tramples on the independence of Azerbaijan. Taking all these things into consideration, the Azerbaijani parliament by a majority of votes makes the decision to pass power over to the Muslim Communists, for they have declared that they would fulfill these commitments.83 Several hours later, in violation of this agreement, the 11th Red Army entered Baku. A little later all the territory of Azerbaijan was occupied by the Red Army of Soviet Russia. Thus an important event in the history of Azerbaijan (twenty-­three months of independence) ended. Azerbaijan was again occupied by Russia.

3

The Domestic and International Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation

T

he Bolshevik 11th Red Army’s entrance into Azerbaijan in April 1920 had actually marked the beginning of the occupation of an independent democratic state, a subject of international law, and a participant in international relations. Two years of struggle for independence ended with the Bolshevik aggression when the legal government of the Republic of Azerbaijan was overthrown by foreign intervention. The great powers, guarantors of the Versailles system, were perfectly indifferent to this action of the Bolsheviks that brought innumerable distress to Azerbaijan. Attempts to restore the Russian Empire within the bounds of 1914 turned the wheel of history backward. Shortly afterward the two other republics of the South Caucasus were occupied. A new stage in the political life of the region began in 1920. The situation then was sharply different from the political course of 1918–20. In a short while independence had been lost.

The Political Situation and Anti-­Soviet Uprisings in Azerbaijan after the Russian Occupation On April 28, 1920, the Interim Revolutionary Committee formed the first government of the Soviet power in Azerbaijan. Narimanov was confirmed as the first chair of the newly formed Council of the People’s Commissars of the Azerbaijan SSR. He was also in charge of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Narimanov, as a head of the new government, was well known in the Caucasus and Soviet ruling circles. Starting at the beginning of the twentieth century, Narimanov played an important role in the social, political, and cultural life of Azerbaijan. His political views were compatible with social democracy, but after the October Revolution of 1917 he tended toward Bolshevism. Foreign forces exploited this factor to overthrow the Republic of Azerbaijan. 38



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 39

Secret correspondence of the Soviet leaders revealed that they aimed to exploit Narimanov as a symbol of Sovietization of Azerbaijan without delegating any real political power to him. As far back as 1919, when the question of strengthening Narimanov’s role in the eastern policy of Soviet Russia was put on the agenda, Stalin wrote in reply to Chicherin’s inquiry: The presence of Lev Karakhan [Levon Karakhanian], Armenian by nationality, in the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the only “eastern person” to represent peoples of the East, grates upon the ears and disturbs the harmony of our eastern policy, and weakens the power and effectiveness of our policy in the eyes of the peoples of the East, in particular Muslims.... Considering this, while in Moscow, I suggested to comrade Lenin that he raise a question at the Central Committee about Karakhan’s replacement by a Muslim with average Party training. Narimanov is the Muslim I referred to above. It does not matter that he lacks a world political perspective; he won’t be in charge of politics. It will be the responsibility of the Central Committee and the ­People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Narimanov matters mostly as an emblem only. I consider it absolutely necessary to change the s­ cenery and leave Karakhan in the background; instead, I suggest putting a Muslim in the foreground. It should be noted that comrade Lenin gave his consent. This initiative would be appreciated by Muslims and raise the significance of our political line among them. The objection that Narimanov is old and sluggish is of no importance for me because ­Narimanov, in my view, is ineligible to run the eastern policy. For me, he is only an emblem, a cloak.1 Thus, not only in eastern policy but also in the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, Narimanov stood out as a plaything in the hands of Soviet Russia, camouflaging its strategic plans. A telegram sent to Moscow on the eve of the April occupation stressed the necessity of Narimanov’s presence in Baku; however, a dispatch addressed to Lenin recommended essentially restricting his authority to rule Azerbaijan.2 The delegation of the authority as the people’s commissar for foreign affairs to Narimanov in the structure of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Azerbaijan SSR (formed on April 28, 1920) and the four- to five-­day tenure of this office (he resigned before arriving in Baku) resulted from these “recommendations.” It has to be kept in mind that Narimanov was a political figure with wide experience in foreign policy in comparison to other appointees in the government, as head of the Middle East Department under the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia since mid-­1919 and then deputy commissar for nationalities under Stalin. He frequently had to face Russian

40

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

foreign commissar Georgii Vasilievich Chicherin and criticize him for his political line with respect to the eastern countries, particularly regarding the question of independence of these countries. This confrontation later evolved into irreconcilable contradictions. In autumn 1919 Narimanov wrote Lenin a wrathful letter regarding a dispute between the deputy people’s commissar for foreign affairs, Karakhan, and the ambassador from Afghanistan to Moscow: Yesterday, without my knowledge, comrade Karakhan, possibly on Chicherin’s instructions, negotiated with the Afghanistan ambassador and said as if incidentally: “We do not recognize Bukhara as an independent state.” The Afghanistan ambassador told me: “I do not understand whom I should believe — ​comrade Lenin, who openly expressed the workers’ and peasants’ view on this state, or comrade Karakhan as an official person who denies the above. I must immediately inform my government about it and I do not know what consequences this would involve....” From the ambassador’s words, I inferred that he was interested in our sincerity when making official statements rather than in the question of Bukhara. On my part, I quieted the ambassador, saying, “You may inform your government about everything on the basis of official documents only, except on the basis of the oral statement of comrade Karakhan.” He agreed with me. Dear Vladimir Ilyich! I kindly ask you to pay attention to my last report “On the Afghanistan Issue” and to other questions awaiting their solution. If you consider it impossible, I insistently ask you to relieve me of the post of the head of the Muslim Near East Department because under the current circumstances I cannot bear the responsibility for politics in the Muslim East.3 It should be noted that the Bolshevik biography and the Moscow life of Narimanov were full of conflicts. These conflicts led to Narimanov’s dismissal from the post of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and his replacement by Mirza Davud Huseinov, whom Stalin characterized as an “inexperienced and superficial politician.”4 Huseinov was born in Baku in 1894, graduated from the Baku nonclassical secondary school in 1913, and attended the Moscow Commercial Institute, faculty of economics. In 1917 he returned to Baku, started disseminating socialist ideas among Muslim students, and joined the Hummet Party. In February 1920 Huseinov took part in the establishment of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. The 1st Congress of the CPA, which was held in secret, elected him a member of the CC CPA and the bureau; at the first plenum of the CC CPA he was approved as chair of the presidium of the CC CPA. Huseinov became a member of the Interim Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan on April 26, 1920. A Soviet government was formed on April 28, 1920. Huseinov was appointed a deputy chair



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 41

of the Council of People’s Commissars (CPC) and finance commissar. Before Narimanov’s arrival in Baku, Huseinov headed the government. Leader of the foreign policy of the Azerbaijan SSR since May 2, 1920, ­Huseinov was a participant in diplomatic talks aimed at normalizing interstate relations. However, the work of the Republic’s Foreign Commissariat as a guarantor of the independent state grew weaker. Foreign diplomatic representatives in Azerbaijan curtailed their activity and left Baku; in turn, Azerbaijani representations abroad had to curtail their activity. After coming to power, the Bolsheviks started reducing their relations with Western countries that were established by the Republic of Azerbaijan. Directives drawn up right after the Sovietization of Azerbaijan focused on foreign political priority in the Muslim East, so it was recommended to the close departments for Europe and Soviet Russia and set up instead a department for the countries of the East.5 These “reorientations” were followed by the closing of the Foreign Commissariat of the Azerbaijan SSR, From mid-­May 1922 to mid-­1944 Azerbaijan, like other Soviet republics, had no institution for foreign policy, which testified to the level of its state independence.6 On May 16 Nariman Narimanov, head of the new government, arrived in Baku. By this time Soviet power had been established in the whole of Azerbaijan, except for Nakhchivan. Note that the punitive and repressive ­machinery of Bolshevism started working at full speed. A special department under the 11th Red Army turned into a terrorist organization to regulate political processes in Azerbaijan. The 11th Red Army symbolized not only Soviet rule but Russia-­tested methods of persecution, punishment, terror, and violence as well. It was no mere coincidence that the first words that Narimanov heard about the land of Azerbaijan were “doctor, Azerbaijan is being plundered far and wide; people are being shot right and left.”7 Narimanov tried to stop this political butchery but failed. Set up on the first day of Sovietization, the Extraordinary Commission (EC) and the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal turned into repressive machinery. According to foreign representatives visiting Baku in this period, the local population was intensely frightened by the EC, which characterized the worst of the new power.8 In his political report sent to London in July 1920, the British officer H. Spoer pointed out that the requisitioning of the houses was accompanied by the confiscation of the furniture, shiploads of which were sent to Russia. Since the beginning of July, the requisitioning of a house or office includes also its entire contents. There is a new order that no one is allowed to have more than a change of wearing apparel and that no one is permitted to lay in a stock of food — ​for all of these a house to house search is going

42

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

on. One can scarcely imagine to what extremities the unhappy population of Baku is being brought.9 In Spoer’s words, “the first shiploads of food which were requisitioned were sent...according to the official newspaper reports to Moscow ‘as a present from the grateful inhabitants of Baku.’”10 A recently released consulate agent, Vagneux Duroy, confirmed this fact. In his conversation with Damien de Martel, a French commissar for the Caucasus, Duroy claimed that the actions of the new authorities had stirred up the enmity of Azerbaijanis with respect to Russians. The local population increasingly realized that the Bolsheviks arrived in the East pursuing their specific goals. Everything confiscated as a result of roundups and searches was sent to Russia. In addition to oil, Russians were engaged in transporting cattle, foodstuffs, and even furniture.11 Witnessing the events of those days, Aziz Alpoud wrote: Having occupied the country, the 11th Army established itself in the region and was openly engaged in pillage and marauding. Having filled their pockets, the occupants were sending everything to Russia: ­utensils, carpets, jewelry, and so forth. All of these were transported by ships and carriages equipped with cynical transparencies: “Gift to Russia from Soviet Azerbaijan.”...In the meantime workers and peasants of the oil region of Azerbaijan had not a whit of kerosene to light their lamps. All of the riches of Azerbaijan were exported to Russia by sea and rail. In realizing the authentic meaning of the Russian words “social­ism,” “fraternity,” and so forth, those fawning upon the new power began repenting.12 After visiting Baku in September–October 1920, the agent reported in December to the high commissioner of France for the Caucasus, Abel C ­ hevalier, that “for six months the Bolsheviks have contrived to destroy the Orient’s most beautiful city.” He added that “if the Bolshevik power continues for a couple of months, Azerbaijan will turn into a desert.”13 It should be added that any decision by the 11th Red Army command and the head of the special department, Semen Pankratov, was fulfilled implicitly. Rasulzade was right in holding that Pankratov was “a real dictator of Azerbaijan and no one could go against him.”14 According to official data, from April 1920 to August 1921 approximately 48,000 people were shot in Azerbaijan for political reasons.15 Thus prime minister Nasib bey Usubbeyov left Baku after the Bolshevik aggression but was deceitfully killed en route. The first prime minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, Fatali khan Khoiskii, was shot by an Armenian terrorist in Tiflis on June 19, 1920. Chairing all of the sessions of the Azerbaijan Parliament, Hasan bey Aghayev was also killed by militants of the Armenian terrorist organization Dashnaktsutiun in Tiflis. Following the



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 43

Bolshevik aggression, Mahammad Emin Rasulzade had for some time been hiding himself in Lahich; however, he was arrested on August 17, 1920, in the village of Garamaryam in Goychay uyezd (province) and forwarded to Baku. Genuine terror was unleashed against leaders of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan (DRA), notwithstanding a document on peaceful surrender of power that provided for inviolability of the life and property of the members of the government and parliament of the DRA after April 27. In fact, their fate was predetermined a week before the entrance of the 11th Red Army into Baku. An order of April 21 instructed the command of this army (signed by the commander of the Caucasus front, Mikhail Tukhachevskii; Sergo Orjo­ nikidze, a member of the War Council; and chief of staff Georgii Zakharov) “to capture the current Azerbaijani government, especially as its members try to go to Elizavetpol, to halt them along the railway leading to the station at Kurdamir.”16 Note that any disobedience to the Soviet power was quelled mercilessly. An eloquent testimony to this was the Ganja uprising of May 28, 1920. Under a pretext of army reorganization, proficient officers of Ganja military units were replaced by Bolshevik commanders, causing serious displeasure in the army. On the night of May 28–29, the Ganja garrison rose in rebellion against the Soviet power. Street fighting lasted a week; in the end, the rebellion was put down. On May 12 the governor of Ganja, Khudadat bey Rafibeyli, and seventy-­six top officers of the national army were shot near Baku, on Nargin Island.17 In his telegram to Moscow on June 2, Orjonikidze wrote: The Ganja rebellion has been put down; however, it is still in progress in the province as a whole. The 18th division is currently engaged in mopping up the territory. The 28th division is occupying Baku and its environs to set things right. The 20th and 32nd divisions number 4,000 bayonets. The 7th Caucasus division is occupying an area of Shamakhy-­ Nukha-Zakatala. If the 28th and 32nd divisions are taken off, the troops would be withdrawn from the whole of Elizavetpol Province and Baku. In this case, we would have control of only the Absheron Peninsula.... Counterrevolutionaries are playing up rumors that all of our army will retreat. So the withdrawal of the division could cause a number of complications. The population is armed, one and all; Azerbaijani troops are not reorganized to attack us at any point. It is the presence of the 11th Red Army that guarantees the tranquillity and order in Baku. Otherwise, we risk losing Baku, Daghestan, and other principal localities in the Northern Caucasus.18 Orjonikidze’s telegram provides insight into the methods of Sovietizing Azerbaijan. The Ganja rebellion threatened to grow into a movement of nationwide resistance, so the Bolsheviks preferred to suppress it completely. One

44

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

of the organizers of this carnage, S. I. Mel’nikov, an inspector of the 11th Red Army, described the developments as follows: “A contingent of rebels was included all of the Muslim population. There were cases when women fired guns, pistols, and even a woman on a roof of the house armed with a machine gun.” As for Armenian attitudes toward the events, Mel’nikov pointed out: “In reply to Tatar [meaning Azerbaijani] attacks, Armenians came down from the mountains in small armed detachments and offered their services. There were a total of 3,000 or 4,000 soldiers, but they were unarmed, so we had to refuse them. Armenians feared us, so they were unable to arrange a massacre, preferring instead to arrest captured Muslims and turn them over to us.”19 “A Report on the Results of a Trip to Ganja” by Mustafa Suphi, a chair of the Central Bureau of the Turkish Communist Organizations, is useful in clarifying the hidden motives of the Ganja developments. The report was submitted on June 9 to the CC CPA, to the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, and personally to Orjonikidze. Suphi insisted that rumors of the arrest of Rafibeyli played an important role in kindling the rebellion. Note that foreign commissar Mirza Davud Huseinov admitted this fact. He made a special report on the first months of Sovietization in Azerbaijan, saying that the arrest of Ganja’s governor caused great discontent among the broader masses: “Following his arrest, scores of people arrived in Baku to solicit his release. It was very difficult to persuade our comrades.”20 Owing to the possible influence of Rafibeyli’s arrest on the expansion of the rebellion, Mustafa Suphi wrote: Despite the heroic effort of our [Communist] military units, the city yielded three times, the railway station changed hands many times, and the asker [Musavat] units destroyed and pillaged shops and everything that happened to be within reach. The troops disposed of six to eight pieces of ordnance, so our units had to open fire in the city using all twenty-­five cannons. The city was extensively damaged and shops in the railway station area fully destroyed. The Muslim part of the city was damaged as well. Owing to the fact that the majority of our troops were stationed in the Armenian part of the city, this part was damaged insignificantly. The fighting lasted for six days. On the seventh day our troops occupied the city. The Red Army men were merciless, carried out search and requisition, and plundered shops and other property. The command was helpless to seize control over the situation. An antiprofiteer detachment was standing on a bridge separating an Armenian part of the city from the Muslim one. However, the desperate Armenians swam across to the other shore and began an agitation campaign among our military units. They nosed out allegedly bourgeois estates,



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 45

poured oil on the flames, and as a result both rich and poor suffered. About 3,500–4,000 of the civilian population (women and children) were killed, and no wounded were reported. All the dead bodies were found in gardens, inside buildings, and in cellars. This is because the civilian population had to hide in gardens, homes, basements, and so forth, to cheat death after the arrival of Red Army soldiers. Some say that was the doing of the Armenians; others allege that it was Red Army soldiers.21 In his report, Suphi noted that the Bolsheviks killed and wounded 1,500 soldiers and commanders of the national army and arrested 12,000 locals. Among those arrested, he mentioned General Dmitrii Stankevich, governor Israfil bey Israfilbeyov, chair of the Trophy Commission Adil khan Zulgadarov, and former sheikh-­ul-islam Akhund Pishnamazzade.22 In its report on the Ganja events sent to Paris, the French mission to the Caucasus wrote about the terrible tragedy: “All of the Muslim part of the town is destroyed; children aged two to three killed. We discovered an eight-­year-old girl who was raped. As a whole, Muslim losses amount to 10,000.”23 The Ganja events demonstrated not only the nature of the new power but also the heroism of people fighting for independence, to protect the national government. In 1937 the novel Ali and Nino was published in Austria in German to win the sympathy of readers across Europe. The book described the Ganja events as follows: We drove to town, and the town was like a carnival. Farmers from the outlying villages came and brought the machine guns they had been hiding, and ammunition. From the other side of the river, in the Armenian quarter, we heard a few shots. Over there was already Russian territory. The Red Army Cavalry flooded the land.... Russian battalions were concentrating towards Ganja, and the town became crowded with refugees from Baku. They told the executed ministers, of imprisoned parliamentarians, and of corpses, weighted with stones, sunk into the deep Caspian Sea.24 The novel describes the love of ordinary Azerbaijanis for their democratic republic and their preparedness to fight and die for the national idea. It became famous as a historical-­fiction chronicle of Azerbaijanis and gained worldwide fame. Europeans perceived it as a love story, while Azerbaijanis viewed the principal character, Ali khan Shirvanshir, as a devoted patriot facing the choice between his year-­old baby who moved to Tiflis with his dearly beloved wife of Georgian origin, Nino, and his country, which had embarked upon the path of democratic development two years ago. In fact, that was the

46

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

choice of tens of thousands of patriots. In Ganja alone, the number of anti-­ Soviet insurgents exceeded 10,000.25 Concurrently with the Ganja uprising, the anti-­Soviet movement involved Karabagh as well. The Karabagh uprising started in the beginning of June 1920 when the cavalry and regiments set out. Shortly afterward Shusha, Aghdam, and Barda rebelled. Using additional forces, the Bolsheviks mercilessly suppressed the uprising in the mid-­1920s. The resistance to the Sovietization process lasted for a while in some uyezds (provinces) of Azerbaijan. For instance, an anti-­Soviet movement that started in Lenkaran uyezd in May 1920 lasted until autumn 1921. An uprising in Zakatala lasted nearly two weeks. Rumors were afloat among civilians that under the Treaty of Moscow of May 7, 1920, the Zakatala district had allegedly been given to Georgia; these rumors soon grew into a sort of uprising. A little later it turned out that the transfer really did take place. In their reports, the commanders of the Red Army said that the Zakatala uprising was mercilessly suppressed like the Karabagh one. More than six thousand Russian and foreign-­made rifles were confiscated, including eight machine guns, scores of pistols, and ammunition.26 On June 18, a day after the suppression of the uprising, foreign commissar Chicherin sent instruction to Orjonikidze, which characterized Soviet Russia’s attitude to the Azerbaijani lands occupied by the Red Army: A counterrevolutionary center has been set up in the Zakatala district, which is contrary to the treaty with Georgia. Kirov [the Russian representative to Tiflis] is sure to smash the center, but we should not bring new troops into the district. Karabagh, Zangezur, Shusha, Nakhchivan, and Julfa cannot join Armenia or Azerbaijan but remain under Russian occupation forces, and local executive bodies should be established. Any other decision would frustrate our peace policy as necessitated by the general situation.27 In fact there were serious contradictions between the Bolsheviks operating in the Caucasus and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia with respect to the Zakatala district. Making use of the occupied status of Azerbaijan, Chicherin, at the suggestion of his deputy Karakhan, decided to transfer this district to Georgia. To speed up this process, Georgia intended to introduce its troops into the Zakatala district. Having learned that these lands were to be transferred to Georgia under the Treaty of Moscow, Orjonikidze and Kirov sent a note on May 10 to Lenin: The Zakatala district to be transferred to Georgia is indisputably Azerbaijani Muslim territory and Georgia has no claim to this territory. At present, Georgia has started the offensive on this district with your permission. The population of the district rose up against the G ­ eorgian oc-



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 47

cupants. If we recognize this occupation as legal, this means that S­ oviet power in Azerbaijan is ending. We want you to explain this attitude toward Azerbaijan, which is a hundred times more important than Georgia. You should either revise the treaty or recall us, because we do not intend to be responsible for the Russian Foreign C ­ ommissariat’s incompetence in the Caucasus questions. Once again, we’d like to call your attention to the fact that Karakhan’s incompetence puts this oil region under the threat of national slaughter, with all of the ensuing tragic consequences of 1918.28 The opinion of the Caucasus Bolsheviks aroused great indignation from Chicherin, who replied in a ciphered letter: Our policy is the world policy and not restricted to the Caucasus only. In all of your reports, you are ignoring our world interests by placing special emphasis on local interests. In so doing, you may greatly damage our world relations. As for Great Britain, we cannot speed up subsequent developments, so our peace with Georgia will have the greatest effect ever on Great Britain, impede the Churchill group’s political line, and thus enhance our prestige worldwide. At present, we are interested in putting obstacles on this track. You should restrain your friends from ventures that may damage our interests. The question of some gorge or another is inferior to major world problems. However, the gorge you mentioned has not been given to Georgia. You are mistaken because the border has been demarked by the Revolutionary War Council in agreement with the Caucasus front. Local Georgians reaffirm possession of the Zakatala District to Georgia; however, it was because of your protest that we ordered the Georgian troops to cease invading the region. It is our responsibility to solve all such disputes.29 Starting on April 28, 1920, the Sovietization process in Azerbaijan evolved into mass extermination of young national cadres to promote the Bolshevik terror under the pretext of struggle against the counterrevolution. Tens of thousands of people, including hundreds of prominent state figures — ​active participants in the building of the republic, representatives of the national government, thousands of patriots in charge of state building during the DRA — ​were arrested along political lines. Narimanov’s attempts to save some political figures were successful in rare cases. In particular, Narimanov wrote to Lenin regarding the arrest of Samed bey Mehmandarov, war minister in the Republic of Azerbaijan government, and his deputy Aliagha Shikhlinskii: During the Ganja uprising, all officers of the old Azerbaijani army were arrested, including generals Mehmandarov and Shikhlinskii. ­Following

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

a careful investigation, it was established that these generals were innocent. To consolidate our position in common interests, we decided to send them to you because they are irreplaceable as military experts. One of them, Shikhlinskii, was reputed to be “a god of artillery” in the army of Nikolai II. I recommend that they work in Moscow before the termination of the Polish front and then, I ask you, send them to us to assist in forming our military units. They need special care now. To earn Lenin’s goodwill, Narimanov had to add that these generals “hate Musavatists and that they are confident that Azerbaijan cannot exist without Soviet Russia; besides, they are enemies of England and love Russia.”30 It should be noted that generals Mehmandarov and Shikhlinskii were a few of the top military officials of the Azerbaijan Republic who managed to escape the Bolshevik terror. In 1920, when the two generals were controlled by Moscow, Lenin corresponded with Stalin on how to maintain control over all of Azerbaijan. Stalin’s note to Lenin is of interest: “I think it would be enough to send five to six new divisions to Azerbaijan by five echelons a day.” Lenin’s reply read: “I’m for six new divisions, five echelons a day.”31 It has to be kept in mind that these divisions headed by non-­Azerbaijanis behaved as Azerbaijan-­like colonialists. Things went so far that the Russian Foreign Commissariat had to appeal to the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party on August 4, 1920, and ask for help in pacifying Red commanders who were raging in Azerbaijan: Comrade Shahtakhtinskii, a representative of the Azerbaijan Soviet government in Baku, provided plenty of materials telling about the hard and ambiguous situation in Soviet Azerbaijan. Local Red Commanders are acting regardless of everything, ignoring the opinion of the Azerbaijani government, and are engaged in colonialist rule. All agents arriving from Russia are throwing aside all restraints, while the local Russian population is acting like colonialists, oppressing locals, as is the Russian population in Central Asia.32 Note that these confessions made by the leaders of the Soviet government are eloquent testimony to the pure declarative nature of independence of ­Soviet Azerbaijan and the disastrous condition of the country. The U.S. consul to Tiflis, Charles Moser, informed the State Department about the seizure of Azerbaijan by the Bolsheviks: Baku has suffered far more than any other city in Transcaucasia. An estimated 30,000 people have been executed by the Bolsheviks in the city commencing since April 1920. At present living conditions are bet-



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 49

ter than before. In July 1920 the Bolshevik government arranged the so called “gangster’s week” when the city was divided into 700 sections with detachments engaged in a seven-­day pillage. Thus soldiers burst into apartments and compelled residents to give them all they had. They took valuable things with them, including works of art, metal, clothes, ammunition, and furniture, put it in carriages, and then shared it with other soldiers or sent it abroad to Russia. Note that the majority of the plunder spoiled and became unfit for use. All of this testifies to the abnormality and ignorance of the Bolshevik regime.33 As the Bolshevik army advanced across the districts of Baku and plundered everything, the situation was repeated in the provinces as well. For example, a report from Shusha on May 29, 1920 said that the Dashnaks had burned thirty Muslim villages and killed numerous women and children. A report from Goychay on June 3, 1920, said that counterrevolutionaries were being arrested; a report from Yevlakh on June 2 said that the Bolshevik military units were ignoring local authorities and plundering everything, including food and horses, from the local population. As a result, resistance was organized in Barda when local peasants refused to let the Red Army into the region’s territory. A report from Hajigabul on June 7 said that local peasants were hostile to the Red Army and that there were a lot of Armenians in the ranks of the Russian troops. A report from Quba on June 16 said that one hundred people had been arrested and twelve executed by shooting.34 Reports of this sort came from all parts of Azerbaijan. In his directive to Behbud bey Shahtakhtinskii, Azerbaijan’s political representative to Moscow, Narimanov, the head of the government, pointed out that he was receiving foot messengers from various localities of the country who complained that the Russians “have taken everything from them; the Red Army was morally degrading and misappropriating everything that they see lying around. At the same time, we are powerless without the Red Army.” Narimanov instructed his political representative as follows: “[T]ell comrade Stalin that if the situation proceeds like this I’ll have to go or ask to be appointed a member of the Caucasus front. Maybe we’ll be able to normalize our relations with the military authorities. There is no other way out of the impasse.”35 In fact, after the arrival of Narimanov in Azerbaijan, tensions arose between him and Red Army commanders as well as with other Soviet executives from Moscow due to their illegal and arbitrary actions. In particular, Narimanov was opposing mass searches in Muslim quarters of Baku. However, despite all of his efforts, non-­Azerbaijanis of the Baku Communist Party Committee presented his actions as if Narimanov had been aiding and a­ betting the bourgeoisie and tried to use his statements against him. N ­ arimanov claimed that

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

when confiscating it was necessary to pay attention to the living standards of the people regardless of their class affiliation. He stressed that it was inappropriate to make raids on homes without exact information about the residents. In so doing, the Bolsheviks were losing the authority of the Soviet power in the eyes of the local population. In autumn 1921 Narimanov sent a report to Lenin entitled “Results of the Soviet Building in Azerbaijan,” which said that former Dashnak student and later ardent Communist [Anastas] Mikoian opposed the Dashnaks ad nauseam to earn confidence and replace the late Shaumian. Mikoian used to say that we should not be afraid of Narimanov’s influence because the workers were in their hands while Narimanov was only a formal figure. Moscow recalled Mikoian, who left a certain Sarkis [Sarkis Ter-­Danelian] behind him. This faithful Communist and resident of the Echmiadzin Dashnak seminary became famous as someone who immensely corrupted the Baku workers. Specifically, he and his associates used to say: “Comrades, workers, our commissars are driving cars and eating everything they want while you are hungry and barefoot. We want to dress you and make you rich with bourgeoisie properties; however, the Azerbaijani revolutionary committee in the person of Narimanov does not allow us to do that.” In the meanwhile Narimanov told Lenin: “I predicted all these disgraceful happenings that occurred during searches.”36 Realizing that he was impotent in opposing this arbitrariness, Narimanov wrote to Behbud bey Shahtakhtinskii in 1920: A well-­known group of persons like Mikoian, [Levan] Gogoberidze, [Vissarion] Lominadze, and company thought that it was unrevolutionary, so they decided to burst into homes, look for diamonds in the breeches of Muslims, and tear earrings from Muslim women. The case will be considered by the Baku executive committee, whose composition is well known to you, and I’m sure it will cancel my order and decide on merciless plundering.37 Narimanov appealed to Orjonikidze, Stalin, and other Communists who knew the Caucasus very well and reminded them that the mistakes of 1918 were being repeated. “It would be stupid to believe that tearing out the earrings of the bourgeoisie is a revolutionary act,” he wrote to Orjonikidze.38 ­Narimanov’s displeasure later became apparent in his letter to Stalin titled “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries”: I was to go to the Caucasus to create an independent-­model Soviet ­Republic there and open up a window to the East. Before my d­ eparture,



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 51

I was received by comrade Lenin, who approved and blessed my project above. While at Bilajary, I was welcomed by some comrades who were pleased to see me. “Maybe you will be able to put an end to the disgraceful happenings that took place before your arrival. Azerbaijan is being plundered; people are executed by shooting everywhere.” These were the words that some comrades welcomed me with.39 In his letter to Stalin, Narimanov emphasized mass acts of marauding in the course of confiscations. He stressed that “these actions were illegal to embrace the whole of Azerbaijan. A revision was carried out to uncover illicit distribution of things plundered; builders misappropriated much money with the connivance of the chief inspirer, comrade Sarkis, etc.”40 In his letter to newly appointed political representative Shahtakhtinskii, Narimanov noted that “Sarkis is still engaged in swindling,” so he insisted on “Sarkis’s immediate withdrawal from here.”41 Narimanov arrived in Baku with the purpose of building independent Soviet Azerbaijan; all of his expectations soon collapsed, however, and he had to write letters to a person guilty of overthrowing the independent republic — ​ Stalin. He reminded Stalin that Orjonikidze had raised a question before the CC before the occupation of Azerbaijan: “Should the Azerbaijan Republic exist independently or join Soviet Russia as a part of it?” It is interesting that the young Communists Aliheydar Garayev and Mirza Davud Huseinov actively insisted that “we are not in need of independence; Azerbaijan must join Soviet Russia.” Then Orjonikidze appealed to Narimanov and asked him to have his say. Narimanov was firm and categorical: “The Azerbaijan Republic must be independent before Sovietization of Georgia and Armenia, and after that we’ll see.”42 Upon his arrival in Baku, however, Narimanov observed not even the slightest traces of independence in the country. Azerbaijan was officially ruled by the Council of the People’s Commissars. But in reality the power was in the hands of the Baku Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party that had been set up before Narimanov’s arrival. He admitted that the Baku Committee was an absolute power. Before Narimanov’s arrival in Baku, ­Orjonikidze demanded in a secret telegram from the council that Narimanov not be provided with any power to rule Azerbaijan.43 In turn, Anastas Mikoian instructed his apprentices to seize the Baku Party Committee and thus take control over Azerbaijan as a whole. Just as socialist-­revolutionary Sako Saakian and Bolshevik Stepan Shaumian were successful in transferring power in Baku from one authority to another after the overturn of 1917, Mikoian did the same with the Baku Committee when he granted power to Sarkis and to Levon Mirzoian. Narimanov was indignant at all of these developments: “In all probability, Mirzoian will be followed by Kasparov, etc.”44 In his letter to the political

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

representative of Azerbaijan to Moscow, Behbud bey Shahtakhtinskii, Narimanov noted that “the whole of Azerbaijan must be subordinated to us from a tactical point of view, but not to those who are here today and in Armenia tomorrow.”45 But Narimanov had no authority to attain this goal. A representative of the Italian mission to Turkey arrived in Baku in September 1920 and shared his views on political processes in Azerbaijan and on Narimanov in particular: “The Azerbaijani government is headed by Narimanov, an elderly person.... Thanks to his great efforts, he became an urban teacher first and later received a doctorate diploma. However, he does not have enough determination to accord with the position he is holding. He is referred to as a great idealist.”46 Ahmed Ahmedov, an adherent of “national communism” who reaffirmed this concept after his arrest in 1927, held the same view. During interrogations, he stressed that, “as a statesman, Narimanov disposed of no appropriate ­talent, that is, he was lacking a firm will, a broader world outlook, a clear and strict political line; had no specific political platform; was unable to order and insist on his decision, etc. He was a kind and good-­natured man, the purest ­idealist.”47 Azerbaijani cadres that went back to the DRA period had now been banished from enterprises, state institutions, education, and cultural centers. In the first months of the Bolshevik reign, all of these were managed by non-­ Azerbaijanis. For this reason Narimanov, with his dreams of building independent Soviet Azerbaijan, had to keep a statistical record of the national composition of the personnel of enterprises and institutions. By his estimate, two of ten senior officials of the Baku Council, four of twenty-­six officials of the Administrative Department, twenty of forty-­five of the Communal Department, three of thirty-­three of the Land Department, one of one hundred officials of the Water Supply Department, one of forty-­five officials of the Health Department, and five to seven of sixty officials of Public Education were Azerbaijanis. Narimanov pointed out that the seventeen vocational-­ technical schools had 1,192 Russian students and just 26 Turks; of the 1,179 students at technical colleges, just 252 were Turks.48 That was a real picture of the distressing Bolshevik power in Azerbaijan. Problems of Azerbaijan in the first years of Sovietization and the reasons for material, spiritual, and terri­ torial losses were primarily attributable to the fact that “Azerbaijan is ruled by foreigners.”49 Narimanov instructed his representative in Moscow, Behbud bey Shahtakhtinskii, saying: “You must categorically insist on Pankratov’s removal and narrowing of the work of the Special Department. Ilyich must order the Extraordinary Commission not to exceed its powers. Comrade Kseno­fontov regards the Azerbaijan republics as a Baku province of Russia.”50 Narimanov instructed Shahtakhtinskii to “raise this question to Ilyich and



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 53

comrade Chicherin. If they intend to retain Baku, they must lend an attentive ear to our view.”51 A certain Nikolai Solov’ev was assigned to an executive position in Baku after the April overturn. He sent a report a Lenin entitled: “Our Policy in Azerbaijan over Two Months (May–June) after the Coup,” which said that prior to the coup many Azerbaijani intellectuals had sympathized with the Soviet government. The new government (revolutionary committee) consisted only of Muslims. That was good, but it was not a secret that the CC CPA had been behind the revolutionary committee. That was bad, due to mistrust of Muslims in not only Armenia but Georgia as well.... Intellectuals and representatives of the bourgeoisie were arrested and executed by shooting, and all of them were Muslims. Armenians gloated over detained crowds of Muslims in the streets. In 1918, under the Bolsheviks, the Muslims were slaughtered by the Armenians; under the Turks, the Armenians were slaughtered by the Muslims. The impression was that from now on it was the turn of the Muslims to be slaughtered. Forecasts of Muslim nationalists who warned that the triumph of the Soviet power means the triumph of the enemies of Muslims are becoming reality.52 Solov’ev’s views were shared by H. Spoer, a commander of the British Near Eastern regiment, who noted that “the higher positions are occupied mainly by Tartars [Azerbaijanis] while the carrying out of orders is largely in the hands of the Armenians.”53 Solov’ev had to admit that the Musavat-­led Ganja uprising was routed by the Red Army with the help of Armenians: the Ganja Armenians’ aid enhanced the Red Army men’s trust in the Armenians as a whole. Profiting by the situation of Armenian nationalists and other dregs who started provoking Red Army men to rob and use violence against Muslims, some detachments of the Oprodkomarm 11th acted in the same manner by forcibly taking items of food from the local population. According to Solov’ev, “the most oppressive was the withdrawal of arms from Muslims in the Muslim villages bordered by Armenia. That meant that Muslims were doomed to annihilation by Armenians. Suffice it to say that there were two hundred and fifty Muslim villages in the bordering area but all of them were ‘liquidated,’ and now there is not a single Muslim there.” Touching upon self-­willed and violent actions in the first months of Sovietization, of which the population had daily complained to Narimanov, Solov’ev reported

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

the following to Moscow: “The chair of the revolutionary committee, Narimanov, was incessantly besieged with crowds of weeping women; however, his attempts to remedy the situation in the Central Committee ended with charges of being a nationalist and ‘right-­wing’ revolutionary.”54 In his letter to Lenin in September 1920 Orjonikidze fully shared Solov’ev’s views. He pointed out that Narimanov’s nationalism intensified during Orjo­ nikidze’s month-­long absence in Azerbaijan, according to Sergei Kirov. In so doing, Kirov insisted that “this old man [Narimanov] was not good for anything” and that his nationalism threatened no one, for he was an absolute mediocrity.55 For this reason Rasulzade believed that the power in Communist Azerbaijan was fully in the hands of foreigners and that the Bolsheviks played a treacherous part in overthrowing Azerbaijan’s independence. Rasulzade pointed out in his work The Republic of Azerbaijan that the Azerbaijani people came to know the grief and hardships of the April occupation, and “a month later he realized with bitterness that the Azerbaijani state had become prey to barefaced conquest.”56

The Regional Policy of Russia in the South Caucasus The first days of the advent of Bolshevik power in Azerbaijan saw attempts by some figures to challenge the identification of the historical lands of the country. During the DRA these lands had been indisputably Azerbaijani. Now they had suddenly become disputed territories, allegedly no-­man’s-­lands, and the Red Army established an occupation regime there. Playing the part of arbiter in territorial disputes, Soviet Russia started granting lands to not yet Sovietized Armenia in an attempt to increase its international authority. At first Narimanov and other old Bolsheviks under the influence of the April coup in Azerbaijan stood up for the Red Army’s advancement toward Georgia and Armenia. In a telegram to Lenin on May 4, 1920, Orjonikidze and Kirov promised that “Georgia will face the same fate that Azerbaijan did” and advised their leader “not to negotiate with Georgia.”57 Three days later, in a telegram to Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin, they returned to this question, saying that the situation was favorable due to the struggle of Georgian forces against the Menshevist government: “The situation is likely to repeat itself here as it did in Azerbaijan. Finally, the conquest of Azerbaijan and the abandonment of Georgia will have an abominable effect on Muslims, especially as the previous Azerbaijani government was ready to make any concessions for the sake of peace with us.”58 Nevertheless, while realizing the futility of hopes for socialist revolutions in Western countries and trying to join in international cooperation and ease the indignation of international circles at the occupation of Azerbaijan, the central Bolshevik government concluded a treaty with Georgia in Moscow on May 7.



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 55

For strategic reasons, Bolshevik Russia sought to Sovietize Azerbaijan and applied efforts to dissuade Georgia from its obligations to Azerbaijan as set forth in an Allied war treaty. For this reason Georgia was given certain political and economic promises. When a plan of conquest of Azerbaijan was approved on March 21, 1920, Lev Trotskii warned Stalin: “You should take into account the possibility of Georgia’s support of Azerbaijan.... So it would be advisable to make a deal with Georgia by promising it absolute inviolability and oil.”59 On the eve of an offensive against Azerbaijan, these promises were conveyed to the head of the Georgian government, Noe Zhordaniia, suggesting that he send an authorized representative of the Georgian government to hold talks in Moscow. They said that Lenin, the head of the Soviet government, would allegedly agree to recognize the independence of Georgia. In his memoirs Zhordaniia wrote: The Versailles conference did not recognize Georgia de jure. It was evi­ dent that Russia, though weakened, was still to be reckoned with, and the West did not want it to be divided. This issue had to be approached differently. In considering that talks and propaganda failed to start the political bargaining with Russia, I believed that if Russia would recognize us, then we could appear at the European court and thus attain our goal. I decided to send my agent to Moscow, one whom Lenin and his staff, from the times of social democracy, knew personally. I chose ­Grisha Uratadze, who took part in the Stockholm and London congresses. I had talks with him and he immediately gave his consent even despite the great difficulties he would have to face. Thereafter, I visited the Foreign Ministry, met with minister Evgenii Gegechkori, and shared my views with him. He replied: “For a month, a certain Georgian Communist has been entreating me to send our representative to Moscow. He is sure that Lenin will recognize the independence of Georgia.” This Georgian Communist in question was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia (RCP). He agreed, and two weeks later he and Grisha left for Russia by sea. To make a go of it, it was essential to keep a secret, that is, Georgian Communists were not to learn about it; otherwise his undertaking would fail to attain its goal. No one in Georgia knew of Grisha’s departure to Moscow. I’m surprised that Moscow did not demand that its confederates give their view on the subject. We needed Moscow to recognize the independence of Georgia and its borders. All other issues were minor and we could discuss them later. I instructed Grisha Uratadze to be guided by these directives. Yet I had no particular hopes of succeeding in the talks to come.60

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Zhordaniia adds: In April I received a message from Grisha Uratadze. He informed me about the course of negotiations and a draft treaty. Our basic demands were accepted. Minor questions were disputed, particularly that no foreign troops could be stationed on Georgian territory. We demanded removal of this item from the agenda because we enjoy sovereign rights on our territory. Grisha conveyed to us by direct line that Moscow refused to remove this item, insisting that our territory could be used as a foreign military base against the Soviets.... Evgenii Gegechkori opposed it, saying: we do not need their recognition because they are meddling in our business, etc. As for me, our principal aim was to be recognized legally, so that we could be recognized by other states de jure. I gave Grisha my permission to sign the treaty.61 Zhordaniia explained his actions saying that the occupation of Azerbaijan untied Russia’s hands to occupy Georgia. In his view, there were two standpoints in Russia concerning Georgia: one of them was a policy of neighborliness advanced by Lenin; second, a policy of imperialism backed by Stalin and Lev Trotskii. Zhordaniia wrote: Trotskii and Stalin ordered troops stationed in Azerbaijan to set out against Georgia and occupy it. They hoped to occupy Georgia easily but were met with a strong rebuff. Lenin realized that the war would be bloody, so he decided to conclude a treaty with us. Today we understand all the tragic consequences of the dissolution of united Transcaucasia. Azerbaijan sided with Turkey; Armenia dreamed of Russia, saying “only they can save us from the Turks”; Georgia remained alone; it dreamed of independence but was too weak.62 Owing to the recent discovery of a previously unknown store of archival documents, many arguments of the head of the Georgian government seem to be untenable. Instead of complying with its Allied obligations and struggling jointly with Azerbaijan against the Bolshevik aggression, Georgia agreed to conduct separate talks with Moscow and thus facilitated the occupation of Azerbaijan and later its own collapse. With the blessing of Zhordaniia, a treaty between Soviet Russia and Georgia was signed in Moscow on May 7, 1920. The treaty was made up of sixteen articles and signed by Levon Karakhan, a deputy foreign minister, and Grisha Uratadze, a member of the Constituent Assembly.63 Under article 1 Soviet Russia recognized the state independence of Georgia; under article 2 Russia committed not to interfere with Georgia’s internal affairs; article 3 defined borders between Russia and Georgia; and article 4 set forth the establishment



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 57

of a joint border commission and recognized former areas of the Russian Empire, specifically districts and uyezds of the Tiflis, Kutaisi, and Batum Provinces and the districts of Zakatala and Sukhumi, as integral parts of Georgia, taking into account the views of other states besides Russia (implying Azerbaijan). Article 5 forbade stationing of foreign military forces on Georgian territory that threatened its sovereignty or were capable of transforming its territory into a base for military operations against the Russian Federation. Under article 6 Russia undertook not to admit groups and organizations to its territory that claimed to act as a government of Georgia. Articles 7 and 8 regulated some issues arising from articles 3, 4, 5, and 6. Article 9 noted that Georgians residing in Russia who reached eighteen years of age might campaign in favor of Georgia, while Russians residing in Georgia might campaign in favor of Russia. Article 10 provided for release of those arrested in Georgia for campaigning in favor of the Russian Federation and the Communist Party. Article 11 provided for mutual respect for the flag, emblem, and other state attributes; articles 12 and 13 regulated economic relations. Under article 14 the parties were to establish diplomatic and consular relations at the earliest possible date. Article 15 stipulated that special Russian-­Georgian commissions were responsible for public and legal issues. The question of disposing of and commissioning a part of the Batum-­Baku oil pipeline that crossed Georgian territory was to be addressed through a special agreement between the contracting parties. Article 16 reaffirmed that this treaty was taking effect from the date of its signing and would be subjected to no ratification.64 As noted, articles 4 and 15 dealt with outright encroachment upon the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and shameless pillaging of its basic resource — ​ oil. Five days after the signing of the treaty the complementary agreement of May 12 followed, under article 2 of which the issue of the Zakatala district belonging to Azerbaijan was called into question. Meanwhile a conflict flared up between Azerbaijan and Georgia concerning the arrest of Georgian diplomats following recriminations over the capture of some frontier points. A full-­scale war of telegrams broke out between Baku and Tiflis in the first half of May 1920. This correspondence resulted from illegal crossing of Azerbaijani frontiers at populated localities in Gazakh, Poylu, Shikhly, Red Bridge, and the Zakatala district. Taking advantage of the anarchy that was reigning in Azerbaijan after the April occupation, as well as the weakness of the bodies of the Soviet government and the separate Russian-­Georgian collusion agreed to in Moscow, the government of Georgia attempted to alter borders to its advantage. The deputy foreign commissar of Azerbaijan, Mirza Davud Huseinov, wrote on May 3 to the Georgian Foreign Ministry that the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee was authorized to report that the Georgian Menshevik government had made a treacherous attack on Azerbaijan. He added: “Our

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

country will never give a single inch of our land to those who raise their hands against the peaceful civilians of Azerbaijan. If the Georgian government is unwilling to intensify the gulf between the two fraternal peoples, it should step back to previous borders and punish the incident’s culprits.”65 Zhordaniia later admitted that Georgia had made a serious mistake when trying to capture alien territory. He wrote: “We made a false step in trying to annex regions with an alien population, but our strategic interests required this to protect our borders.”66 On May 9 Huseinov sent a telegram to Evgenii Gegechkori demanding that the offensive of Georgian troops against the village of Govagchol in the Zakatala district stop. A copy of this telegram was sent to Chicherin.67 In his telegram on May 10 Huseinov noted that the workers’ and peasants’ government of Azerbaijan had no intention to attack workers and peasants of Georgia but wanted to see Georgian workers and peasants as free as in Azerbaijan. A copy of this telegram was forwarded to the Russian foreign commissar, Chicherin.68 As the border conflict between Soviet Azerbaijan and Menshevist Georgia became aggravated, the correspondence between emissaries of the Soviet leader­ship operating in Azerbaijan and Bolshevik leaders in Moscow intensified. Telegrams signed by Orjonikidze, Kirov, and Ivar Smilga ran from Baku to Moscow. An exhaustive reply finally came from Stalin on May 10: “Further information: first, about the border between Azerbaijan and Georgia under a treaty between these states prior to the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan; second, a border desirable for Soviet Azerbaijan to be based on ethnographic principles.”69 Stalin’s directive was followed by preparations for a peace treaty with the Georgian Republic. Although local bodies of the Soviet power in Azerbaijan had been set up following the April occupation, Soviet Russia kept treating Azerbaijan as a province and misappropriating its foreign political functions. This was an indispensable attribute of independence. However, the independence seemed to offer and needed to offer real security. The agreements between Soviet Russia, Georgia, and Armenia at the expense of Azerbaijani lands without the knowledge of Azerbaijani leaders are striking evidence of this. Putting up Azerbaijani lands for auction contributed to the peaceable image of the Bolshevik state in the international arena. In other words, Soviet Russia assumed the right of representing the foreign political interests of Azerbaijan in spite of the wishes of Azerbaijan. Since the summer of 1920 the interests of Azerbaijan in the course of talks with neighboring Caucasus states had been represented by non-­Azerbaijanis. In the meantime Armenia was represented by Armenians and Georgia by Georgians. Talks in this format and signed diplomatic documents had a distressing impact on the subsequent destiny of Azerbaijan.



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 59

On June 12, 1920, a peace treaty was signed at the Akstafa station between the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic and the Georgian Democratic Republic u­ nder the mediation of Soviet Russia. That was the first unfortunate d­ iplomatic docu­ment in the foreign policy of Soviet Azerbaijan. Paradoxically, in this period, Soviet Azerbaijan had already been Sovietized and remained under Russian influence, so it was not surprising that Moscow forced its will on Azerbaijan; in particular the aforementioned treaty had provisions that catered to the interests of Georgia. Note that an earlier treaty between Russia and Georgia had ignored the interests of Azerbaijan and questioned its territorial integrity. Some provisions of that treaty were apparent in the Akstafa treaty. The peace treaty was signed by Mirza Davud Huseinov, the foreign commissar of Azerbaijan and deputy chair of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee; Grigorii Lordkipanidze, war minister of Georgia; Simon ­Mdivani, deputy chair of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia; and Aleksandr Andronikov. Under article 1 the parties declared a ceasefire, their adherence to the stable peace and friendship, and the return of military forces to previous positions. Article 2 provided for a borderline between the parties. Under article 3 the parties agreed on a neutral area between Red Bridge and Poylu as well as the left bank of the Kur River for a term of one year from the date of signing of the treaty. Under article 4 administrative matters and territorial management remained in the hands of Azerbaijan; however, Azerbaijan had no right to fortify its position and introduce troops. To supervise the treaty’s implementation, it was essential to set up a special commission consisting of representatives of the four parties (two for each party). Under article 5 Red Bridge was to be guarded by Georgians from the Georgian side and by Azerbaijanis from the Azerbaijani side. At the same time, to maintain contacts with Kars and Babakar, Georgia could make use of the bridge at its own discretion. Under article 6 it was an arbitration commission’s responsibility to settle a Zakatala district issue, as set forth in a supplementary agreement between the Russian Federation and the Georgian Democratic Republic of May 12, 1920. Under article 2 of the agreement none of the parties was entitled to bring new military units into the Zakatala district prior to an appropriate decision by the arbitration commission. To meet this requirement, a supervisory commission composed of four people (one for each party) was set up. Under article 7 the parties unreservedly recognized the independence and sovereignty of one another and refused to interfere with each other’s internal affairs. Article 8 provided for a deferential attitude toward the state flag and emblem, and article 9 dealt with the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations. Under articles 10 and 11 the parties undertook not to render assistance on their territories (in Azerbaijan and Georgia) to persons, institutions, and organizations seeking to seize power and to stop

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

their activity. Articles 12 to 17 provided for economic trade; also, Azerbaijani cattle breeders could freely use summer pastures in the territory of Georgia. Article 18 stipulated that the agreement took effect from the date of its signing, to be ratified within two weeks.70 On the same day, June 12, one more agreement consisting of four articles was signed in Akstafa under which the Azerbaijan SSR committed to delivering one million poods of oil to Georgia within a month. In return Georgia undertook to discharge the indebtedness with manufactured goods and paper as well as to repair a share of the Poylu bridge.71 A little later other agreements were signed between the parties. A financial agreement signed in Baku on July 28, 1920, provided for the resolution of credit-­financial problems.72 A report of the Azerbaijani Foreign Commissar for 1920 appraised this agreement and a supplement thereto as a “Window to Europe” and “access to the Black Sea.” The report noted that the Akstafa agreement would allegedly have a positive effect on trade turnover with European countries. The Foreign Commissariat added that the agreement was of strategic importance, especially as an Azerbaijani diplomatic mission was going to be opened in Tiflis and a consulate in Batum. Thus Azerbaijan intended to obtain vast information from Georgia and the European press. At the same time, the foreign commissar regarded the Akstafa agreement as a triumph of the Communist idea in Georgia and thus sought “to stage a domestic explosion” there.73 Befuddled by ideas of the world revolution, the leaders of Azerbaijan laid an emphasis on the ideological significance of the concept and took pride in “clearing a path to Europe.” In fact, however, they tightly closed doors to Europe that had been wide open during the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan and thus threatened the territorial integrity of the republic. True, the arbitration commission later decided the Zakatala district dispute in favor of Azerbaijan; yet the treaty with Georgia on June 12, 1920, proved to be an initial and unfortunate diplomatic document for the Soviet Azerbaijan government. Under the treaty the Z ­ akatala district’s status as indisputable territory of Azerbaijan during the DRA was questioned during the Soviet period and depended upon a decision by the arbitration commission. In the meanwhile even the venerable Bolsheviks Orjonikidze, Kirov, and Smilga admitted that Georgia had never had claims on these lands. Of 92,500 residing in the district, 85,000 were Muslims and just 7,500 non-­Muslims.74 Bolsheviks acting in the Caucasus were well aware of this. At the same time, some territories along the Gazakh-­Borchaly border between Azerbaijan and Georgia were defined as neutral and thus brought into question the sovereign rights of Azerbaijan. The treaty of June 12 said nothing of the fate of the Azerbaijani population residing in Georgia. The documents of this period stated the relative populations of the Borchaly sector as 3,000 Azer-



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 61

baijanis, 4,000 Georgians, and 34,000 Armenians. In Garayazy Muslims constituted 89 percent of the total population and Russians and representatives of other nationalities 11 percent. The corresponding figures for Akhaltsykh were Muslims 73.5 percent; Armenians 12.5 percent; and Georgians 8.8 percent. The western part of the Signah uyezd was wholly populated by Georgians; its eastern part wholly by Azerbaijanis.75 Further developments showed that the treaty of June 12 with Georgia and related diplomatic documents had been signed under pressure from Moscow. A CC RCP document titled “Instructions for the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front” on Chicherin’s presentation of July 4 said that “the treaty with the Georgian government must be rigorously observed in all of its items” and that the Russian Soviet authorities should comply with this treaty in their relations with Georgia. The instructions noted that one exception to this rule was an article on the Zakatala district, which was “a disputed area between the two republics, the possession of which is to be established by a mixed commission headed by a person appointed by the Russian Federation. An appropriate resolution is set forth not in the main text but in the additional one.” According to the instructions, the Soviet policy in respect to Georgia was to withdraw British and foreign troops and not to admit White Guard detachments. Russia intended to solve these issues legally and enable Georgian Communists to act openly. The document noted: “An item of the agreement regarding amnesty for Communists will be construed in the sense that the Communist Party is to be legalized in Georgia.”76 Item 9 of the instruction returned to the Zakatala question: “The Zakatala district cannot be occupied by Russian military units. The number of troops already stationed in this district cannot be increased. The possession of the district is to be resolved by the mixed Georgian-­Azerbaijani commission chaired by a Russian representative.”77 As far back in 1918, due to the tough policy of the DRA, the government of Georgia had officially rescinded its claims to this district. Orjonikidze and Kirov pointed out that Musavatists were alleging that the new Azerbaijani government had already sold the Zakatala district.78 The diplomatic representative of Georgia in Azerbaijan in charge of Baku talks for Georgian-­Azerbaijani relations made a promising offer to Azerbaijani foreign commissar Huseinov: if the Azerbaijani party will not support Communists in Tiflis, the Georgian government is ready to inform the Azerbaijani party about all the secrets of a counterrevolutionary coup to be attempted in Azerbaijan. He warned about plans to prepare a new coup in Azerbaijan and that British were ready to start an offensive from the territory of Iran. In so doing, the Georgian diplomat asked that this information be conveyed only to Narimanov. When Huseinov obtained this information, however, he sent a detailed report on “Azerbaijan and Georgia” to Moscow.79

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

After the April coup overturn of 1920, relations between Soviet Azerbaijan and Dashnak Armenia became increasingly complicated. Mutual relations between Georgia and Armenia had an interesting aspect: in enlisting the support of Muslim Communists, Soviet Russia promised them that Georgia and Armenia would be Sovietized too. The intentions of Orjonikidze and Kirov to start advancing toward Georgia and Armenia were based on the Moscow arrangements. From the date of his arrival in Azerbaijan, Narimanov demanded Sovietization. He was surprised that after the Sovietization of Azerbaijan the Russian Communist Party decided to agree to bourgeois governments in Armenia and Georgia based on mutual concessions. Among these concessions was a decision by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on June 30 on ending the Russian military units’ advance toward Armenia.80 A day before this decision Chicherin wrote to Lenin: the new situation should have its effect on our plans in Transcaucasia and make us cautious in respect to offensive plans of comrades Orjo­ nikidze, Polikarp (Budu) Mdivani, Narimanov, etc. These comrades have initially sought to establish Soviet power in the Georgian and Armenian militarily, so they were very disappointed when the CC ­rejected their plan. In his telegrams comrade Narimanov insisted on the necessity of immediately Sovietizing Georgia and Armenia.81 Armenians did their best to help Soviet Russia seize the Azerbaijan Demo­ cratic Republic unimpeded. To make the Azerbaijani army move to positions on the northern borders and away from the capital, the Armenian army began an offensive in Karabagh. The Azerbaijani government considered it a top priority to suppress this offensive. After the April occupation, profiting from the lack of power in Azerbaijan, the Armenians had a good chance to implement their plans. Armed detachments headed by the Dashnaks’ Dro Njde (­Drastamat Kanaian) and others were engaged in gangsterism and marauding in Gazakh, Karabagh, and Zangezur. With his rich experience in exterminating Muslims in eastern Anatolia, Dro began applying this experience in Karabagh and Zangezur and pillaging populated localities.82 The new government of Azerbaijan saw a way out of the impasse by establishing bilateral relations with Soviet Russia and arranging official diplomatic relations. Upon completion of the occupation of Azerbaijan, the CC RCP Politburo adopted a decision on May 25 titled “On Azerbaijan.” Chicherin was instructed to appeal to the Azerbaijani Soviet government with a proposal to begin talks for establishment of official relations. In a note addressed to Narimanov, Chicherin suggested starting talks with a view to defining forms of these mutual relations as well as sending a representative to Moscow to conduct these talks.83



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 63

On July 13 and 15, 1920, the CC CPA Bureau held intensive debates over the candidature of commissar of justice Behbud bey Shahtakhtinskii to take the position of extraordinary and plenipotentiary envoy of Azerbaijan to Soviet Russia and directives for his activity in Moscow. Following these debates, Shahtakhtinskii, as a member of the executive committee of the council of workers and soldiers of Baku district, was sent to Soviet Russia on July 15 as an envoy of Azerbaijan. He was entitled to hold discussions with Soviet Russia on behalf of the Azerbaijani government on any questions of a political or economic nature and to sign the appropriate documents.84 At the same time, the Azerbaijani Foreign Affairs Commissariat gave Shahtakhtinskii a special certificate for all military, civilian, and railway authorities asking them not to impede him in discharging his duties but instead to render him any assistance in points that he would indicate.85 Commissar Huseinov and extraordinary envoy Shahtakhtinskii arrived in Moscow later in July 1920 and were received by Lenin and Chicherin. It should be noted that Narimanov did not trust Huseinov and was anxious about his trip to Moscow. In his letter to Shahtakhtinskii, he pointed out: “I do not know what political line comrade Huseinov is pursuing in Moscow, but, to be frank, he is an irresponsible person with respect to Azerbaijan and the East.”86 After these meetings Chicherin’s attitude toward Moscow changed for the better, which was apparent in his letter to the CC RCP Politburo on August 4. But this change did not involve increasing respect for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. The letter touched upon the discipline in the Soviet Army and colonialist behavior of the Red Army in Azerbaijan. The talks between top officials of the two countries ended on August 5 with a decision of the CC RCP plenum “On Relations between the Azerbaijan Republic and the Russian Federation.” A commission for Iranian affairs composed of Chicherin, Karl Radek, and Nikolai Krestinskii was entrusted to define principles of mutual relations between the Azerbaijan Republic and the Russian Federation.87 Shahtakhtinskii’s letter to Lenin on August 4 undoubtedly called on Soviet Russia to identify its political priorities with respect to Azerbaijan. The content of the letter revealed some concepts authored by Narimanov. First, Narimanov had put forward the concept of the formation of a federative alliance between Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet Russia before the April coup. The letter noted: “Today’s Soviet Azerbaijan is a product of Soviet Russia, which is a champion of the ideas of world communism. The government of Soviet Azerbaijan decided to become a part of the Communist federation, which is being formed around the Moscow Center as the core of the world Communist federation.”88 However, the April coup and the question of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan that increasingly complicated this complex question. Hence

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

S­ hahtakhtinskii stressed Azerbaijan’s preparedness to join “a federation around the Moscow Center as soon as the international situation made it possible.” Azerbaijan was to remain independent prior to joining this federation and concluding an allied agreement with Russia. Shahtakhtinskii explained this as being due to the political situation in the South Caucasus and the eastern policy of the Soviets, noting that in addition to considerations arising from the international situation, at the moment the independence of Azerbaijan is necessary for reasons of politics in the East; until then Armenia and Georgia remain independent. Enemies of the Soviet power point out that Georgia and Armenia declined an alliance with Russia and thus not only preserved their independence and escaped a hard economic crisis but also received new territories previously owned by Azerbaijan before the arrival of the Red Army. Shahtakhtinskii, as the first Azerbaijani representative to Soviet Russia, indicated in his letter to Lenin that Zakatala district, Karabagh, and Nakhchivan, which had belonged to Azerbaijan before the April coup, should remain part of this country. He pointed out that under the Musavat government these territories were indisputably Azerbaijani, were integral to it, and were closely related to this country historically, ethnographically, and economically. For moral and political reasons, Russia should not alienate these territories of Soviet Azerbaijan and give them to the Dashnaks and Georgian Mensheviks for further annihilation. These issues, particularly the ideas and opinions of the Azerbaijani leaders within the framework of the eastern policy, were detailed in a later letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Lenin on September 20. Beyond any doubt, Narimanov was the ideological author of this letter and even some of its phrases. A copy of this letter was presented to the main inspirer of the anti-­Azerbaijani policy, deputy Russian foreign commissar Levon Karakhan. In the first lines of his letter Shahtakhtinskii warned Lenin that the situation in the East as a whole and in Azerbaijan in particular was utterly critical: if the policy in respect to Azerbaijan did not change, the consequences would be deplorable: Prior to the overturn in Azerbaijan, popular masses of the country greatly tended toward Russia. The same was true of the Muslim intellectuals. Neither the people nor the intelligentsia were afraid of nationalization of the oil industry, for foreign capitalists were interested in the large-­scale industry; next came a small group of Muslims whose interests were of minor importance.89



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 65

Shahtakhtinskii added: “The coup in Azerbaijan was accomplished without bloodshed thanks to the mood of the intelligentsia and the people. Azerbaijan was an example of a country where Soviet building occurred almost peacefully. Unfortunately, the activity of the new Soviet power proved to be revolutionary in its form and reactionary in its results. As a result, formerly neutral strata of the population, including the majority of the peasantry, tended to the right.” Furthermore, “The Red Army is doing its utmost to disarm the Muslim population even in the regions bordered by Armenians. The Muslim population is being disarmed while the armed detachments of the Dashnaks are mercilessly exterminating Muslim villagers. The peasants are fleeing to mountains, abandoning their gardens, farms, goods, and chattel.” Narimanov’s categorical protests against acts of disarmament of the Muslim population of bordering regions and his letters to Red Army commanders yielded no result. In this connection Solov’ev forecast in his above-­mentioned letter to Lenin that the disarmament of Azerbaijanis in regions bordering ­Armenia would end with their complete extermination. In his September 20 letter Shahtakhtinskii stressed that the previously disciplined Red Army had now turned into a reactionary factor. Now Azerbaijani peasants were begging for one thing only: take everything you want and save us from daily searches that profane our family traditions. Shahtakhtinskii wrote: “Azerbaijan had its own bread but now it has nothing, while previously hungry Georgia and Armenia are prospering.” It has to be kept in mind that the majority of this letter is devoted to the artificially staged territorial disputes with Georgia and Armenia. The letter stressed that these disputes were successfully resolved with the help of Soviet Russia at the expense of Azerbaijani lands. Shahtakhtinskii noted: Enemies of the Soviet power are triumphant that Georgia and Armenia declined an alliance with Russia and, using the support of the Entente, preserved their independence and escaped economic difficulties. Even better, these countries are receiving new territories from Soviet Russia. At first, the population of Azerbaijan believed that the Soviet policy in Baku was a matter of local authorities, so these people believed in Moscow, hoping that it would protect their interests. However, the population was greatly disappointed when the Zakatala district with its mostly Muslim population (90 percent Muslims, 5 percent Georgians, and 5 percent other nationalities) was given to Georgia without the knowledge and consent of Azerbaijan. A further complication was that Russia discussed with Armenia questions concerning only Azerbaijan, but the government of Azerbaijan knew nothing of it. The Azerbaijani popular masses were shocked when the entire Nakhchivan region was given to Armenia. For three years, England, Persia, and Armenia

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

had been seeking to open this major strategic, economic, and political railway; this region struggled over this important point, however, and succeeded in saving itself from enemies of the Soviet power. From now on, the prestige of the Armenian and Georgian governments grew and revolutions in these countries were out of the question, as evidenced by information from the Russian Foreign Commissar. The letter sums up the current developments as follows: “So it was our unfortunate policy in Azerbaijan that created the impression in the countries contiguous to Azerbaijan that the alliance with Russia creates hunger, destruction, and loss of independence.” The CC RCP plenum considered a draft agreement with Azerbaijan on September 20, 1920, and approved it on September 29. Long discussions ended on September 30, 1920, with a “military and economic alliance” between Soviet Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation. The preamble of the treaty said: The government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, on the one hand, and the government of the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic, on the other, proceeding from common interests of the working people of Russia and Azerbaijan and taking into account that the complete unification of forces of the two fraternal republics may secure success in the hard struggle against the common enemy, the imperialist bourgeoisie, decided to conclude this agreement; for this end they appointed their authorized people’s commissar for foreign affairs Georgii Vasilievich Chicherin from the Russian Federation and the people’s commissar for justice Behbud Shahtakhtinskii from the government of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic.90 Article 1 of the treaty declared that Russia and Azerbaijan were concluding a close military and financial alliance. Under article 2 the governments of the two republics should unify their military organizations and military command, organs of national economy and foreign trade, organs of supply, railway transport, postal-­telegraph departments, and financial bodies as soon as possible. Article 3 stipulated that the order and form of unification of structures in charge of national economy should be secured by special agreements of the two governments. It also said that the treaty was to take effect from the date of its signing and would be subject to no special ratification. On the same day an additional six amendments to this agreement to the treaty were signed in Moscow. The most important was an agreement on military-­marine questions consisting of eleven articles. Under article 5 of this agreement a commander of the Russian navy was concurrently a commander of the Azerbaijani navy.91



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 67

The parties also signed an agreement on post, telegraph, telephone, and radio­telephone communications, which consisted of seven articles. It stipulated that resolutions, regulations, and tariffs operating in Soviet Russia were binding for Azerbaijan, while implementation of the international postal-­ telegraph communication of Azerbaijan fell under the control of the Russian Post and Telegraph Commissariat.92 Under article 6 of the agreement on unification of the food policy of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan would automatically be affected by all state monopolies of the Russian Federation, currently operating or to be operated in the territory of the Russian Federation, including bread, potatoes, meat, dairy products, eggs, and so forth.93 Article 8 of the financial agreement stipulated: “The Russian ­Commissariat of Finance will appoint its authorized agent under the Council of People’s Commissars of the Azerbaijan Republic with the right to cast a vote.”94 The parties also concluded an agreement on unified economic policy, under which Azerbaijan would transfer some major aspects of economic life to Russian control.95 Among the documents signed is an interesting agreement on foreign trade, under which Azerbaijan would be entitled to get oil and petroleum products in accordance with an appropriate contract with the Russian Foreign Trade Commissariat and Commissariat of Economy to comply with its domestic needs.96 It should be noted that the treaty and the agreements of September 30 in Moscow contained not a single word on recognition of the independence, territorial integrity, or sovereignty of Azerbaijan. Even worse, after the April coup, Azerbaijan reassigned to Soviet Russia some major functions needed for the independent state to function, including rights regarding the economic and social life of the country. Following the signing of these documents, representatives of Soviet Russia who had been free to rule the country arbitrarily received official status. Privileges granted to Russia in the sphere of unified economic policy, foreign trade, and food policy not only cast doubts on the economic independence of Soviet Azerbaijan but reaffirmed the illusory nature of the country’s political independence. The Moscow documents said nothing of the Azerbaijani lands deliberately declared disputed and given to Georgia and Armenia under appropriate arrangements with Russia and gave no indication of canceling appropriate articles of these agreements. In these documents the political and economic independence of Azerbaijan was so slight that even the Communist “compromising” republican leadership of the republic was ambivalent toward them. The questions asked on May 1921 at the 1st All-­Azerbaijani Congress of ­Soviets after a speech by Narimanov and a report by Huseinov on foreign

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

p­ olicy provide eloquent testimony to this. Participants asked: “Of what independence are you speaking? Where is your independence? Do you own our native oil?” Narimanov replied: “What made the British speak about an agreement with Russia when Russia had not been recognized before? Without a doubt, it was oil. When we declared that our oil is owned by Soviet Russia, it became a trump card in the hands of the Soviet power.” Narimanov also admitted that “if Musavatists were present in this hall they would not do that. However, for Azerbaijani Communists, Soviet Russia is more important than oil.”97 In this sense, the words of Audrey Altstadt are completely true: “[T]he Bolsheviks in 1917 had decreed freedom from tsarism and promised to respect native languages. Despite their rhetoric of modernization, the Bolsheviks were not first and foremost modernizers and certainly not in Azerbaijan. They came to Baku for the oil.”98 The documents signed with Russia did not settle confrontations in the Azerbaijani power-­holding structures, however, or conflicts between Muslim Communists and foreign Bolsheviks. At the end of September the CC RCP Plenum sent Stalin to the Caucasus. His mission was to identify the conflict situation in Azerbaijan. Stalin asked the Politburo to postpone this trip, but the situation proved so critical that he was refused.99 On instructions from Party leaders, Stalin left for the North Caucasus on October 16 and arrived in Baku in early November. While in the North Caucasus, Stalin received information from different places and telegraphed Lenin on October 26 about the situation in the area. In his telegram he warned about attempts by interventionists from Batum to start attacking Baku. A month earlier Orjonikidze had received a telegram from Shalva Eliava, which said: “The British are threatening Baku; the situation inside Azerbaijan is alarming.”100 A meeting of the CC CPA bureau was held on November 4 with the participation of the members of the Caucasus CC RCP bureau, where Stalin stated Moscow’s views on the relations of Azerbaijan with neighboring countries. Touching upon territorial disputes among the leaders of the republic, he said that “if they want to know to whom Zangezur and Nakhchivan are to belong, it is not possible to grant them to the current government of Armenia; if they will belong to the Soviet government, then it is possible.” As for Georgia, Stalin noted: “Georgia is like a fiancée who has many fiancés — ​all are flirting with her but she is swaggering. In the end, we are flirting with Georgia to benefit from her. The Entente is willing to set up an alliance against us.”101 An enlarged CC CPA plenum with the participation of Stalin was held on November 8. Attending the plenum were members of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC CPA and Baku Party Committee. The plenum identified profound contradictions in the leadership of Azerbaijan on a number of major



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 69

issues. Aliheydar Garayev’s statement on behalf of the population reflected the ­reality in the leadership of Azerbaijan: There are two groups among the Muslim Communists. One of them is pro-­Narimanov; another, pro-­Garayev and Huseinov. The second group betrayed Azerbaijan to Russia; the first stands up for the independence of Azerbaijan.... In fact, underground meetings are held here to discuss questions that do not concern them. They say that Garayev, Huseinov, and others are selling Azerbaijan to Russia.102 Stalin spoke at the plenum and revealed Moscow’s position on the independence of Azerbaijan: “There is an independent Azerbaijan, which voluntarily became a part of Russia. You are surrounded by bourgeois states that allege: ‘Russia misappropriated everything.’ It is profitable for us to demonstrate the independence of Azerbaijan. However, a Communist cannot be independent from a Communist. It is essential to demonstrate the independence of Azerbaijan, but one should know that there is a close alliance with Russia.”103 On November 9 Stalin made a report “On Upcoming Party and Soviet Work in Azerbaijan” in which he openly confessed the superficial nature of Azerbaijan’s independence. He examined the current situation in the Caucasus and its influence on Azerbaijan as follows: The Caucasus is threatened with clouds. The Entente is eager to transfer the scene of warfare to the south of the Caucasus. Wrangel may retreat to Kuban and thus cut Russia off from the oil. Further aggravating the case is Turkey’s offensive against Armenia. Azerbaijan is likely to face the armed limits of its freedom. We are currently faced with external complications that may evolve into a storm.104 As for the independence of Azerbaijan, Stalin declared: I’m against the independence of Azerbaijan. There cannot be independence of one Communist from other Communists; Soviet Russia cannot do without the Baku fuel. At the same time, Azerbaijan would be lost without the help of Soviet Russia, without its army, and so forth. Hence, a complete alliance is inevitable. All the states must rely on either Soviet Russia or the Entente; there is no third option. I think that all comrades, Muslims and Russians, are well aware of this. In the meantime, agents of the bourgeoisie are crying everywhere that Russians have come and eaten up Azerbaijan. They are setting intellectuals against us; they are maintaining close relations with the countryside, and they are stirring up nationalism there. To take this weapon out of

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the hands of intellectuals we must say that Azerbaijan is an independent country that voluntarily became a part of Russia. Without this alliance, Russia would be weakened and Azerbaijan would be subordinated by the Entente. Such an external independence is a matter of our political strategy. In the meantime, on November 13, anxious about the situation around Baku, Lenin sent a telegram to Stalin, who was in the North Caucasus. Lenin was interested in how Baku was fortified and what measures were taken for this. Stalin depicted the situation as an utter crisis: “at least five divisions are required to secure Baku against threats. Beyond any doubt, the enemy will occupy Elizavetpol first and this will enable them to establish the Azerbaijani bourgeois government and capture Baku.”105 At the end of his message Stalin reminded Lenin that it was essential to instruct Orjonikidze properly to escape danger. The most surprising result of Stalin’s stay in Baku was the release of Rasulzade from Bailov prison, where he had been jailed by the Bolsheviks on August 17, 1920. It is interesting that Stalin took Rasulzade with him to Moscow. Rasulzade worked for two years at the People’s Commissariat for Nationalities. Rasulzade left Soviet Russia in 1922. On November 27, 1920, a meeting of the CC RCP Politburo heard a report from Stalin about the results of his trip to the Caucasus. Then participants of the meeting began discussing his report. Following the results of discussions, the Politburo passed a resolution to instruct Orjonikidze to stay in Baku and head the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee. Stalin was instructed to hold talks with Chicherin through the mediation of Orjonikidze to pursue a correct foreign political line on the borders of the Caucasus states. The r­ esolution stressed that a peaceful policy was to be used in the relations between Russia and Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, and Iran. It was also essential to avoid ­possible warfare by refusing to campaign against Georgia, Armenia, and Iran. The main mission was to preserve Azerbaijan and capture the Caspian Sea. For this to happen, it was essential to station at least seven divisions in Azerbaijan. The People’s Commissariat of Railways and the Supreme Council were instructed to send at least eight echelons of troops to Baku every day. Trotskii was instructed to supervise the implementation of the resolution.106 Thus the April occupation was followed by a second decision to introduce a large contingent of troops in Baku to preserve Azerbaijan under the control of Soviet Russia. In fact, that represented the completion of Azerbaijan’s occupation, liquidation of its independence within the narrow framework of the Soviet system, and its complete subordination to Soviet Russia.



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 71

Stalin’s visit to Baku and these discussions at the Politburo unmasked all the secret aspects of Moscow’s attitude toward the independence of Azerbaijan. Even the most slow-­witted Muslim Communists understood that the Soviet leadership was making use of Azerbaijani independence only as a decoration. Faith in the independence of Azerbaijan, which still existed at least in words, had now disappeared. It was the plenipotentiary representative of Moscow who put an end to the question by declaring that the independence of Azerbaijan was like beautiful, deceptive tinsel. Analysis of the April 1920 occupation developments leads to the conclusion that the people themselves are the guarantors of independence of any country and nation. Despite affiliation with various political trends, all political organizations operating in the country must speak from a single position in respect to the question of independence. Attempts by Muslim Communists to play at independence in April 1920 and their search for independence not inside but outside the country yielded bitter historical fruits. In Rasulzade’s words, a banner of independence that had cost many victims was changed into a piece of red calico. Azerbaijan could have acted as a model republic at the gates of the East; however, under the pressure of the Bolsheviks, it lost not only its independence but also a part of its territory. That was the commencement of tragic events in the history of the Azerbaijani people that are still in progress today.

The International Scandal over the Arrest of Foreign Diplomats in Baku The first conflict between Soviet Azerbaijan and Georgia arose during the April coup when representatives of all foreign missions, including the Georgian one, were arrested in Baku. On April 30 the Georgian government submitted a protest to deputy foreign commissar of Azerbaijan Mirza Davud Huseinov.107 It was Anastas Mikoian who first put forward the idea of arresting members of foreign missions during the advance of the 11th Red Army toward the station of Bilajary. The Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee was not aware of this plan. Mikoian recalled: While at the station of Khachmaz, we got a Baku newspaper, which said that on April 27 the Azerbaijani government was giving a reception in Baku for foreign representatives. It would be a good thing for us to seize Bilajary and intercept the diplomats’ retreat by railway to Tiflis — ​I told Mikhail Efremov. He looked at his watch and said: “We have time enough; they won’t run away.” “Do you understand why it

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is important to detain foreign diplomats in Baku?” I asked Mikhail Efremov. “We must detain them as hostages to exchange them for revo­lutionaries arrested by the British.” Efremov backed Mikoian; diplomats failed to leave Baku and were arrested. However, after a while, Chicherin sent a telegram demanding their release, so we had to fulfill this demand.108 It has to be kept in mind that the April coup in Baku involved the arrest of a total of four hundred foreign diplomats, military personnel, and trade and economic representatives.109 These included thirty-­two British officers headed by the first lord of the British Admiralty, Sir Bruce Fraser, who traveled from Istanbul to Enzeli by the Tiflis–Baku railway. The arrestees were held under unbearable conditions. Four hundred prisoners were accommodated in an area of 110 square meters and consumed water from only one faucet, so men and women had to wait for hours. Every arrestee received one pound of black bread a day, but warders misappropriated parcels from the outside.110 “Taking control” of a representative of the British military mission in Baku, Major Daly, caused serious concern in London. The British ­ambassador to Paris was instructed to appeal to the French Foreign Ministry, asking it not to extend the visas of Azerbaijani representatives in the French capital until the problem of the British military mission in Baku was settled.111 The French Foreign Ministry did not heed the British Embassy’s request, however, basing its refusal on the fact that the Azerbaijani political figures in Paris were representatives of the Republic of Azerbaijan government and had no relation to the Bolsheviks.112 The British military mission urgently left for Enzeli, because the British fleet was stuck in the southern part of the Caspian Sea and Gen. Anton Deniken’s navy was under the threat of assault. Gen. George Milne, commander-­in-chief of the Black Sea army, sent a detailed report to the British War Ministry on January 7, 1921, reporting that all officials who came from France and Great Britain in May, during the establishment of Soviet power in Baku, had been interned.113 A head of the political department of the Azerbaijani Foreign Commissariat confidentially told Vagneux Duroy, a French consular agent to Baku, that the Russians were deliberately arresting French diplomats and representives of other countries to ruin the Allies’ impression of Azerbaijan.114 Owing to the arrest of British officers in Baku, Walter Long, first lord of the Admiralty, made a sharp speech at the British Parliament on June 9, 1920. It should be recalled that it was initially a British project that provided for the restoration of the Russian Empire within the borders of 1914. Leonid ­Krassin, a representative of Soviet Russia, had secret talks in London with Lloyd George, head of the British government. Noe Zhordaniia, former head of



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 73

the Georgian government, wrote in his book issued in Paris many years later: “It was no secret that the invasion of Bolshevik troops in Georgia became possible with the knowledge and approval of Lloyd George’s ­government. It was Chicherin who blurted out this secret.”115 As is well known, British prime minister Lloyd George assured Krassin, head of the trade office, that the British government would not interfere with Soviet Russia’s affairs. This carte blanche gave the Russians a green light for practical actions based on international guarantees. In other words, all international institutions that could have backed the Republic of Azerbaijan during the Bolshevik occupation were practically canceled out. Hence no serious response to the bringing of the Red Army to Baku came from the international community. Moreover, following Krassin’s talks in London, Lord Curzon stressed the importance of Baku oil exports via the Batum port. The British petroleum department believed that “despite the occupation of Baku by the Bolsheviks, it is still possible to increase trade volumes.”116 Heightened international interest in Russia’s restoration within the bounds of 1914 was important to the West. It was no mere coincidence that Entente member countries kept silent about the Bolshevik occupation of Azerbaijan. With political shocks inside Russia after the Bolshevik revolution, Russia decided to capture the Baku oil and concurrently seize the whole of Azerbaijan. To use the colorful expression of old Azerbaijani socialist Samed agha Aghamalyoghlu, “the fate of Azerbaijan will be sealed by its bowels, not by its surface. While there is oil, it, not we, will reign above us. We’ll have just a little kerosene to light a lamp in the office. Life in Russia is built on our oil. It is an unhappy coincidence, but this black mud has caused the loss of the two countries! Therefore, there is not a territorial problem for us; there is just a problem of oil.”117 Thus both the occupation of Azerbaijan by Soviet Russia and the arrest of Western diplomats in its capital were integral parts of the struggle for Baku oil. The situation involving the arrest of Western diplomats in Baku became clearer in mid-­June. A secret report by Damien de Martel, a French commissioner for the Caucasus, was sent to French prime minister and foreign minister Alexandre Millerand on May 24. The report spoke about detention of the representatives of the diplomatic missions of France, England, Italy, Poland, and other Western citizens in Baku.118 Talks on the fate of the arrestees went on until autumn 1920. At first the Council of People’s Commissars voiced its disagreement with the arrest. In the course of his meeting with a British representative, foreign commissar Huseinov stressed that Britain should “not judge Bolshevism by the chaos presented by the conditions in Baku.”119 ­Huseinov’s note to the Russian foreign commissar Chicherin on August 30, 1920, talked about the Azerbaijan Soviet government’s preparedness to exchange

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­Baku-­detained British diplomats for the Kemalists arrested in Istanbul.120 In his telegram to Shahtakhtinskii (the political representative of Azerbaijan to Moscow), Kirov (the political representative of the Russian Federation to Georgia), and Akbar agha Sadygov (deputy head of the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission to Tiflis), Huseinov suggested exchanging the British diplomats and military personnel for the detained Kemalists. Lists of Mustafa Kemal’s supporters arrested in Istanbul by the British occupation army and later exiled to Malta were submitted to Shahtakhtinskii, Kirov, and Sadygov on August 28. The list of 58 names was largely composed of prominent representatives of the Party of Union and Progress.121 In fact the idea of the exchange came from Moscow. As far back as August 16, in his telegram to Narimanov, Chicherin had emphasized that in exchange for the Baku British detainees “you may demand the release of Istanbul-­detained Muslim nationalists.”122 Chicherin’s telegram was followed by debates over the fate of the arrested diplomats at the meeting of the CC CPA Politburo. It passed a decision on raising the question of exchanging the arrested British diplomats for the Kemalists.123 Talks regarding the arrested diplomats continued until autumn 1920. Huseinov asked Chicherin to submit this proposal to Russian representative Maksim Litvinov, who was holding talks in London at that moment.124 At the same time, Huseinov brought up this question in a special note to L ­ itvinov, which stressed the necessity of exchanging the Baku-­detained British for “our arrested comrades.”125 On September 6 a British representative to Tiflis appealed to the foreign commissar of Azerbaijan, asking him to improve the prison conditions of British subjects. In his telegram in response, Huseinov assured him that the government of Azerbaijan would take all necessary measures to ease the conditions of the British. The minister added that the arrestees had been transferred to the so-­called Polish Home and provided with food; their relatives and acquaintances could freely come and see them. Huseinov added: “As for the matter in question, I gave necessary instructions to comrade Litvinov to hold talks on the subject with the British government.”126 A detailed conversation was held in Tiflis on September 12 between Huseinov and the British representative to Tiflis, Sir Harry Charles Luke, who expressed his failure to understand the motives of the Azerbaijani government in suggesting the exchange of the British arrestees for the Kemalists on Malta. For the Turks, the Kemalists were not citizens of Azerbaijan; just one of them was Azerbaijani according to Luke. In turn, Huseinov stated that the proposal of the Azerbaijani government should not astonish Luke: there was a precedent when the Dashnaks arrested in Azerbaijan were exchanged for Communists arrested in Armenia. Among the Dashnaks were scores of Armenian subjects, while the Communists were all its citizens. For this reason Huseinov believed that this proposal was worthwhile and that the question



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 75

of citizenship was not a key condition. When asked about the conditions of the prisoners in Malta, Luke replied that the prisoners allowed fresh air and had a right to correspondence and, even better, that the British authorities had built a mosque for them. Luke expressed his desire that identical conditions be created for the British arrestees. In reply, Huseinov said ironically: “[W]e regretfully have no island like Malta; otherwise, we could provide greater freedom to the detained British.”127 In the end Luke submitted his written proposals aimed at improving the prison conditions of the British. These included a right to censorship-­free correspondence, increase of time outdoors, relocation of British vice-­consul Gewelk to a special room, permission for British national Greg to continue on his way from Iran to England via Azerbaijan, and so forth.128 Huseinov disagreed about the censorship-­free correspondence but pointed out that the prisoners could correspond through the mediation of the Azerbaijani Foreign Commissariat.129 It was the detainees’ problem in Baku that led to the crisis in the relations between Great Britain and Soviet Russia. In a telegram to Narimanov on October 2, 1920, Chicherin noted that the detained diplomats’ crisis had resulted in perpetual debates with the British party, saying: “[W]e cannot give a fitting answer to London without your assistance.” He added that all other talks with the British were suspended and that England categorically refused to link this issue to the Kemalists arrested in Istanbul.130 A telegram from Chicherin to Narimanov concerning the arrest of French diplomats in Baku had a similar message: the French insisted on their immediate release without any preconditions. Chicherin complained that the exchange of the British for the ­Kemalists was not possible; the right time had passed, so the only thing to do was to bring up the question of collective exchange of prisoners of war from all over the Russian Empire for the British who had been arrested in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan.131 In his correspondence with the Foreign Office Chicherin had always emphasized that the liberation of the British arrestees was the responsibility of the Azerbaijani Soviet government, so London decided to seek help from the Republic of Azerbaijan delegation attending the Paris peace talks. In a letter to Lord Curzon on October 10, 1920, Topchibashov stressed that Azerbaijan had lost its independence after the Bolshevik occupation, so Chicherin’s words were to be perceived as “Bolshevik inventions.” Topchibashov said that he considered it his moral duty to assist in liberating the Baku-­arrested British, so he had repeatedly sent telegrams to the Azerbaijani Foreign Commissariat.132 In a letter dated November 1, the Foreign Office expressed its thankfulness to Topchibashov on behalf of Lord Curzon and touched upon the talks with Soviet Russia regarding the arrested British.133 Following these long debates, the Mikoian-­initiated arrests of the British were disavowed. The arrestees were released by decision of the government of

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the Azerbaijan SSR. Contributing to this decision was a prudent attitude in British official circles toward the occupation of the Azerbaijan Republic by Soviet Russia. Note that it was through Lord Curzon’s representation that the Versailles Supreme Council recognized the de facto Azerbaijan Republic in January 1920. In October 1920 the CC RCP Politburo expressed its consent to ­Chicherin’s proposal to release the British arrestees in Baku and gave appropriate instruc­tions.134 Having received Soviet consent, the British agreed to exchange Russian prisoners of war for the British diplomats. In his note to the Soviet Foreign Commissariat, Lord Curzon said that he had instructed appropriate institutions to agree on the date of exchange of Russian prisoners for the British diplomats.135 In connection with this note from Lord Curzon, Chicherin telegraphed Narimanov that the British mission in Tiflis would be instructed to establish the date of release of the Russian prisoners of war. Chicherin added that the release of the British diplomats would be timed to the same date. Taking advantage of the arrest of Western diplomats in Baku, Chicherin, in reference to an appropriate decision of the Politburo on the issue, instructed Narimanov immediately to agree with British and French representatives in Tiflis on the details and date of the exchange of prisoners of war for the arrested diplomats. Lord Curzon stated in his radiogram that the Russian prisoners would be brought to Odessa on November 5 from Egypt and Istanbul, so it was necessary to deliver the British diplomats to Tiflis on the same date.136 The release of the arrested British diplomats that had been staged by Mikoian took place by a decision of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Azerbaijan SSR in late October, the British detainees were brought to Tiflis. Greatly contributing to this was the restrained response of the British government to the occupation of Azerbaijan in April 1920 on the part of the British government, even though the Republic of Azerbaijan had de facto been recognized as a subject of international relations by the Supreme Versailles council at the Paris Peace Conference on the suggestion of Lord Curzon in January of that year. In other words, as soon as Moscow made certain that its occupation of Azerbaijan was not met with rebuff from Western states, it decided to release the arrested British diplomats in Baku. Even better, the foreign commissar of Azerbaijan left for Tiflis to remove probable administrative, bureaucratic, and diplomatic obstacles to the deportation of foreign diplomats. Together, the senior official of the Russian mission to Tiflis, Leonid Stark, and the British supreme commissioner for the Caucasus, Col. Claude Stokes, signed a protocol of exchange of British diplomats for Russian prisoners. It was planned to release sixty-­two British nationals and bring them to Tiflis.137



The Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 77

On November 5, 1920, all foreign diplomats were finally released and escorted from Baku to Tiflis, where they were delivered to British and French representatives. Narimanov reported to the French government on the release of French diplomats.138 While in Baku in this period, Stalin told Chicherin that Baku did not oppose the release of British diplomats. Stalin expressed his bewilderment that Chicherin and his commissariat, which had numerous materials on British involvement in killing twenty-­six Baku commissars, had created unhealthy anti-­Soviet propaganda.139 The release of foreign diplomats in Baku in autumn 1920 helped Soviet Azerbaijan resolve serious international problems. After the Soviet government made certain that Western countries, engaged in establishing a new world order and a new Versailles system, would take no measures against the occupation of Azerbaijan, it decided to release the British arrested on April 28, 1920. It is interesting that even the Azerbaijani foreign commissar personally left for Tiflis to settle some administrative and legal problems for the departure of the foreigners to their native land.140 Thus after the April occupation the involvement of the Azerbaijan Republic, whose independence had been recognized de facto at the Paris Peace Conference, came to an end. Shortly after the April occupation, it became evident that “independent Soviet Azerbaijan” was a propaganda declaration. The ­people’s resistance against the Sovietization process was mercilessly suppressed by revolutionary methods. The May 1920 Ganja uprising is eloquent testimony to this. Dozens of people involved in the political process during the time of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic were bayoneted by the Bolsheviks. Azerbaijan had again been captured by Russia and lost all its attributes of a national and state system. From the first days of the April aggression, the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan was questioned. As the 11th Red Army advanced deep into the country, the Azerbaijani lands became a setting for activities that led to countless tragedies. A logical result of the domestic and international position of Azerbaijan in the first months of the April coup was that independent Azerbaijan fell into the hands of foreign occupants, in the words of Rasulzade.

4

The Eastern Policy of Soviet Russia and Iran

I

n addition to the occupation of Azerbaijan, the Bolshevization of Iran’s northern provinces occupied an important place in the eastern policy of the Soviets in 1920. Appropriate preparatory work began in January 1920. Indeed, the Bolsheviks regarded the seizure of Azerbaijan as a beginning of expansion eastward, viewing occupied Baku as a base point for conquering the East. As the revolutions that had started in the West (and socialist ideas in Europe) were unsuccessful, the significance of the East in Soviet policy increased. Following the defeat of the revolutions in Germany, Hungary, Finland, Austria, and other countries, the Bolsheviks became firmly convinced that the losses in Europe could be compensated at the expense of activation of the socialist revolution in Asia, primarily the Near and Middle East. Thus Iran and Turkey were gradually turning into proving grounds for the spreading of Bolshevik doctrine. The 1st Congress of Communist organizations of Turkish citizens and former prisoners of war was held in Astrakhan as early as January 1919. In his report titled “The Influence of the October Revolution upon the Proletariat of the East,” Narimanov told the congress that if “you want to save unfortunate Turkish proletarians from death and slavery, you have to organize and incite a socialist revolution in Turkey.”1 According to Narimanov the main target of Bolshevik policy should be an anti-­imperialist and socialist revolution in Turkey and Iran. Northern Iran, especially the Gilan region located along the Caspian’s southern shore, was chosen for occasional Bolshevik experiments. Following the Anglo-­Russian Treaty concluded in August 1907, Russia’s pressure on the sphere of its influence, primarily seaports located along the whole Iranian coast of the Caspian Sea, increasingly intensified. These regions became strategically important for the Russian Empire during World War I. By the end of the war, however, the weakening of the empire affected the discipline of 78



The Eastern Policy of Soviet Russia and Iran 79

Cossack regiments deployed in the north of Iran. These regiments, which had been professionally trained and disciplined, turned into a Cossack settlement of freemen. The British, seeking to capture Baku by the end of World War I, strengthened their position in Gilan and tried to establish control over the Caspian Sea via the port of Enzeli, which strengthened the region’s political, military, and diplomatic significance. The fall of the Baku Bolshevik commune, the Russian Cossack regiments’ withdrawal from Iran, and the weakening of Soviet Russia’s influence upon the whole shoreline of the Caspian Sea, except for Astrakhan, ended with G ­ ilan’s collapse under British control in 1918. Denikin and other White Guard generals were completely defeated in early 1920. The Denikin Fleet retreated to the Enzeli shores under Bolshevik pressure. The occupation of Azerbaijan that pursued the goal of drawing a line separating Soviet Russia from Iran made it possible to convert the Gilan region and the entire northern part of Iran into an object of Bolshevik expansion. The Khiyabani-­led movement, which expanded in Southern Azerbaijan, and the Jangali (Forest) movement in Gilan were anti-­English; this also favored the activation of the Bolsheviks in Northern Iran.2

The Gilan Adventure of the Bolsheviks The new Sovietized Azerbaijan occupied an important place in Soviet Russia’s policy on Iran. Indeed, Bolshevik Russia developed its plans to invade Northern Iran simultaneously with plans to occupy Azerbaijan. In March 1920 it was decided to seize Azerbaijan, which had already been recognized de facto by the international community. Then the Soviets included the “Enzeli Operation” in their strategic plans. The shift of trenches of the world socialist revolution from the western front to the eastern one increased the role and significance of the Russian Empire’s Muslim nations in the Red expansion actions. Yet in May 1919 the Bolshevik press proclaimed that the Russian proletarians would go hand in hand with “working Muslims” to free Iran, India, Afghanistan, and other countries of the East.3 From this point of view, Azerbaijan was to play the role of a key base in the Sovietization of Iran and export of the revolution to Gilan. Indeed, Soviet Azerbaijan and its new leader Narimanov, for strategic reasons, were extremely eager to spread the socialist revolution within the boundaries of Iran and Turkey. The successes and failures of the Bolshevik Revolution’s eastern front were politically crucial for Narimanov. On the one hand, Narimanov, who had occupied senior posts in the Russian People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, was one of the initiators of the Bolshevik Revolution’s transfer from the West to the East. During his service

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in Moscow, he entered into harsh disputes with Chicherin, Karakhan, and other influential people over the eastern question. For instance, Chicherin believed that the eastern policy of the Soviets had to depend directly on the treaty with the West. Narimanov, on the contrary, did not consider the treaty with the West a promising one, especially following the failure of the socialist revolutions in Europe. In his view, the world revolution’s main road had to pass through the liberation movement in Iran and Turkey. Narimanov considered it necessary to bring members of the Entente, primarily England, to their knees at the Turkish Straits and India’s gates (in Iran and Afghanistan) and force a way for the world revolution to break through to targets in the West only through the mediation of the East.4 He insisted that England’s expulsion from the East should have begun in Iran. He also suggested establishing a “secret commission” on the Iranian question. Narimanov even had an open conflict with Chicherin over how this commission had to be guided.5 The idea “Toward the West through the East” remained a cause of discord between Narimanov and Moscow until the end of his life. On the other hand, Narimanov connected not only Azerbaijan’s place in the developing Soviet-­socialist geographic system but also his own political fate with the Bolshevization of the East. He perfectly understood that the transfer of the revolutionary front from the West to the East could not only make Azerbaijan one of the leaders of the new world but also make him a leader on a global scale. Narimanov and the camp of “national Communists” that he led did not even rule out the idea that the problem of Southern Azerbaijan could be resolved through this process.6 Without a doubt, Narimanov’s personal ambitions and desire to become a “Lenin of the East” played a certain role in this. Thus the trenches of the new revolutionary front passed through Azerbaijan, so Narimanov intended to have the deciding word to spread the revolution over the whole of the East. But Soviet Russia’s People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, led by Chicherin, which feared this influence, kept the “Iranian revolution” (being prepared for at the time) a secret from Narimanov. In particular, this was clearly displayed in early April 1920 when the Turkestan regional committee of the Adalet ( Justice) Party, which was masterminding a revolution in Iran, called up a Party conference in Tashkent and formed the leadership without Narimanov’s consent. In dissent, Narimanov sent to Turkestan his trustee, “an old, tested Iranian revolutionary” named Heydar khan Amuoghlu, who openly told “Adaletists” that he himself would become in Iran who Trotskii was in Russia: he would perform the function of military organizer of the Iranian revolution.7 Measures to form a revolutionary army to work in the territory of Iran commenced on two fronts — ​the Caucasus and Turkestan — ​in the spring of 1920. In the Caucasus this was the formal responsibility of the leadership of



The Eastern Policy of Soviet Russia and Iran 81

Azerbaijan. But some circles in Soviet Russia — ​justifying their actions by the desire to help the Iranian revolution — ​tried to make use of a suitable opportunity to expel the Azerbaijani army (whose political orientation they strongly distrusted) from the country, against the background of Bolshevik occupation. In his note to Lenin in June 1920, Chicherin advanced this suspicion as a substantiated one.8 Sending an army on behalf of Soviet Azerbaijan to Iran, however, favored Soviet Russia from a diplomatic point of view. In the context of the international press, Russia tried to make the Azerbaijan SSR responsible for the invasion in Iran in order to eliminate the West’s suspicions and charges that it was Russia that exported revolution to Iran. Thus, at the very beginning of the expedition to Gilan, upon a proposal of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Politburo of the RCP (B) CC made a decision that ships of the Soviet fleet moored in Enzeli were to sail under the Azerbaijani flag.9 On May 14, when an attack on Enzeli was in preparation, the Iranian government passed a note to Soviet Russia. The note’s very first phrase stated that the Iranian government recognized Azerbaijan as an independent state and had plans to conclude treaties with either the government of Soviet Azerbaijan or Soviet Russia in the near future. Also, it was reported that two teams were moving from Tehran to Baku and Moscow respectively to accomplish these goals. The note read: The decree proclaiming the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic caused the delight of both the government and the Persian nation, since this decree confirms that the Soviet government is really striving for the liberation and restoration of the rights of minor nations. Thus, the Persian government firmly believes: the Soviet government will realize, without violations, the 1918 decree recognizing Persia’s independence and annulling treaties concluded with Persia before the October coup. Contrary to the improvement of Russia’s relations with Persia that was expected to happen, closure of lines of communication occurred. We think that the reason probably is that the Azerbaijani and Russian governments fear for the fate of ships in Persian waters. The Persian government guarantees an obstacle-­free return of all the ships under the Russian and Azerbaijani flags to Russian and Azerbaijani ports.10 In addition, the Iranian government wanted to know Soviet Azerbaijan’s opinion on treaties that had been signed earlier with the government of the Azerbaijan Republic. In particular, the note asked: Owing to the aforesaid 1918 decree, the Persian government once began to conclude treaties with the Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Georgian republics, but the change of power interrupted the course of the

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negotiations; thus the Persian government wants to know whether the Azerbaijani Soviet government recognizes the treaty that was signed and adopted by the Muslim government and whether the Azerbaijani Soviet government agrees to sanction it.11 On the same day that this note reached Moscow (May 18), however, Soviet Red Fleet ships began firing on Enzeli in the morning. In a retaliatory note to the Iranian side on May 23 Chicherin positively spoke of the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between the Azerbaijani SSR, RSFSR, and Iran but made every effort to refuse to recognize the occupation of I­ ranian territory by the Soviet troops. He tried to assure the Iranians that the Enzeli operation had been carried out by the military command without the central government’s knowledge and that the Russian Soviet government was informed of this incident only after the military actions were over.12 Rakhman Mustafa-­zade, the author of an interesting monograph about Azerbaijani-­ Russian relations in the 1920s, notes that in regard to Iran Chicherin attempted to realize his famous conception that “diplomatic recognition alone is not recognition of a government.” For the first time, he suggested applying this idea with respect to democratic Azerbaijan in January–March 1920.13 The Bolsheviks felt real euphoria as they took over Enzeli and the Iranian shore of the Caspian Sea within a short period. While in the beginning, on May 18, the joint Azerbaijani and Russian Red Fleet led by Fedor Raskol’nikov moving toward Iran initiated the military operation for strategic reasons in a move to demand the return of ships, weapons, and ammunition belonging to Denikin’s men, soon the operation entered the stage of an open occupation of the Iranian shoreline. Simultaneously with the landing in Enzeli, the Soviet Cavalry crossed the Iranian border from the Lenkoran side, invaded Iranian Astara, and moved toward the port of Enzeli. Though Chicherin announced on May 20 that the Soviet troops did not plan to interfere with Iran’s internal affairs and that they appeared in Enzeli just to take the property of the White Guards, Raskol’nikov, the commander of the Bolshevik troops, stated in an open, soldierly manner the next day that the Soviet fleet would remain in Enzeli even after the property of Denikin’s men was returned.14 In a telegram to Lenin, Raskol’nikov reported that the assigned military task in the Caspian had been fulfilled.15 After Enzeli was occupied, the newspaper Pravda solemnly announced that the Caspian Sea had become Soviet.16 It is noteworthy that 23 ships, 50 cannons, 20,000 shells, and other military hardware were brought from Enzeli to Baku as Russian property. As soon as the news of Enzeli’s seizure was received, the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee sent Raskol’nikov the following congratulatory telegram: “The Revolutionary Committee of the Azerbaijani Socialist Soviet Republic, having learned



The Eastern Policy of Soviet Russia and Iran 83

during its May 19 gathering that the Red Fleet occupied the town of Enzeli, welcomes the heroic Red mariners who are freeing the workers of Persia and the whole East from the chains of slavery.”17 At its meeting in May, the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee decided to return the properties of the former voluntary army as well as to return the goods owned by Baku merchants.18 In fact Enzeli’s occupation was a direct continuation of military invasion in the East that Soviet Russia started with Azerbaijan. Only twenty days passed between the occupation of Baku and the occupation of Enzeli. Having passed throughout Azerbaijan to the Iranian border, the Red Army invaded Iranian Astara from the side of the Lenkoran province and commenced military actions against Enzeli and Ardebil.19 The Tabriz revolt that began in Southern Azerbaijan on April 7 started spreading to nearby regions simultaneously with Enzeli’s occupation. In fact this movement, led by Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani, acquired an anti-­ English character. On May 23 Orjonikidze informed Moscow about this and demanded instructions. He wrote: Ardebil is occupied by Muslim divisions. There is no particular difficulty in exploding the whole of Persian Azerbaijan-­Tabriz. We are afraid of acting at full force. Otherwise, we will get a scolding again and thus I ask you to reply immediately. My opinion is as follows: it would be appropriate to proclaim the Soviet power with the help of Mirza Kuchek khan [whose real name was Younes] and the Persian Communists, occupy town by town, and drive the British out. This will make a huge impression on the whole Near East. Everything that will be done will have the appearance of being well done.20 On May 25 the Politburo of the CC of the RCP (B) held a discussion of Orjonikidze’s appeal, Raskol’nikov’s report about Enzeli’s seizure, and the emergence of a revolutionary situation in Gilan. In the agenda this question was designated “On Eastern Policy.” A decision was made “On Persia,” to approve a common policy offered by the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in order to provide help to the liberation movements of nations of the East. Raskol’nikov was instructed to use all possible means, including the provision of instructors to help Kuchek khan with all he needed, transfer ­Enzeli (ruled by Soviet troops) and other Iranian locations to his control, remove ships from these locations, and tell everyone that this was being done in line with the instructions of the Soviet government, which in no way desired to interfere with Iran’s internal affairs. The decision’s final section stated that it was necessary to keep a sufficient quantity of ships in Enzeli as if for police functions but under the Azerbaijani flag, in order to provide permanent assistance to Kuchek khan.21

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The Soviet government’s stricter, clearer directives pertaining to the I­ ranian question were issued in Trotskii’s telegram to Raskol’nikov on May 26 and in Karakhan’s telegram to Raskol’nikov and Orjonikidze on May 30. Trotskii’s directives, strictly composed militarily, demanded preventing any war action under the Russian flag or on behalf of the Russian expeditionary corps, in direct reference to Moscow’s demand to pull Russian troops and the fleet out of Enzeli, and leaving no doubt that Russia was not eager to interfere with Iran’s internal affairs. At the same time, Trotskii noted that Kuchek khan and the whole popular-­liberation movement in Iran had to be assisted with all possible means (volunteers, instructors, money, and other assets) and that the lands invaded by Russian troops had to be passed to Kuchek khan’s control. If Kuchek khan needed warships for further victories, it would be sufficient to use these ships under the flags of the Azerbaijan Republic and provide assistance to Kuchek khan on behalf of Azerbaijan. Trotskii planned to fulfill the decision of the Politburo of the CC of the RCP (B) by creating a wide network of Soviet organizations in Iran. Finally, Trotskii considered it extremely necessary to assure England’s ruling circles that the Soviets did not plan to interfere with the internal affairs of Iran and the whole East and to guarantee that further plans of such sort were inadmissible.22 Approximately the same instructions were also contained in the telegram of Karakhan, who recommended being very cautious in implementing the policy of Sovietization of Iran. At the same time, however, Karakhan warned: it was not possible to hypothesize the revolutionary nature of the whole population of Iran based only on the sentiments of the population of Enzeli, Resht, and Azerbaijan-­bordering regions. According to Karakhan, it was important to unite the forces of Kuchek khan, the Iranian Communists, and other demo­ cratic groups against England. The deputy people’s commissar of foreign affairs did not object to creating a Soviet-­style state administrative system in Iran and creation of a new rule in the form of Soviet government there. However, he thought that this system should be different in terms of social content and cover a larger circle of workers, including bourgeois elements as well. That was the only means of realization of the national task of driving the British out of Iran.23 In the last days of May, in conversations with Mirza Kuchek khan, especially at a secret meeting with Orjonikidze and Raskol’nikov on May 27, Soviet representatives were able to achieve consent to the Red Army and Bolshevik Fleet’s stay in Gilan. They convinced Mirza Kuchek khan that significant aid consisting of armored machines, airplanes, weapons, and ammunition would arrive from Baku in the near future. Without a doubt these promises, especially the transfer of Enzeli and Resht (which had been invaded by the Soviet troops) to the leader of the Jangali movement, radically affected Kuchek



The Eastern Policy of Soviet Russia and Iran 85

khan’s attitude toward the Soviets. Influenced by revolutionary fervor, Mirza Kuchek khan praised Soviet Russia’s liberation mission when he was making a speech at a rally in Resht on June 4. The Soviet troops that had to return to Baku according to a Party decision now stormed nearby Iranian towns jointly with Kuchek khan. After Resht was invaded, Soviet representatives sent a telegram to Baku asking for an immediate delivery of troops, armored machines, airplanes, and other military hardware to Gilan.24 Despite the officially declared pullout of Soviet troops from Gilan, a 5,000-­strong Iranian Red Army composed of members of military detach­ ments arriving from Baku, Astrakhan, and Krasnovodsk started being formed.25 At first this army was commanded by Ehsanullah khan, who was considered a close friend of Kuchek khan; the command of the Iranian Red Army was soon resubordinated to the 11th Army Headquarters, however, with the Bolsheviks appointing their man — ​the former tsarist general Vasilii (Shapur) Kargareteli — ​as the commander. Without a doubt, Mirza Kuchek khan and his military aides Ehsanullah khan and Khalu Gurban did not fail to notice this act of distrust. For a certain time they managed to maintain the independence of their military detachments. Despite the Soviet Army’s successes in Gilan, Soviets feared that the ­Iranian events could cause a serious international scandal. This is clearly illustrated by the text of Trotskii’s June 4 telegram addressing Lenin, Chicherin, Lev Kamenev, Nikolai Krestinskii, and Nikolai Bukharin. In the telegram Trotskii warned: all of the information outgoing from Khiva, Iran, Bukhara, and Afghanistan indicated that Soviet coups in those countries could cause great difficulties for Russia. The Soviet power hardly survived even in Azerbaijan, which had long-­standing ties with Russia and its own oil industry. Before the situation in the West as well as the situation in industry and transport became stabilized, invading the East would be more dangerous than the war in the West.26 Trotskii’s warning went unheeded. An Iranian provisional revolutionary government led by Mirza Kuchek khan and an Iranian Military Revolutionary Council (MRC) were established in Gilan on the night of June 4–5. Ivan Kozhanov and Batyrbek Abukov, two Soviet representatives who supported Kuchek khan, were also appointed as members of the council and took Iranian citizenship in order to participate in the Gilan revolutionary movement. Ivan Kozhanov acted under the name of Ardashir. On June 7 Gilan’s population was read the manifesto of the Iranian Soviet Republic established in Gilan.27 On June 5, on instructions from Raskol’nikov (the commander of the Russian and Azerbaijani Caspian Military Fleet), Muslim Israfilov was appointed as Soviet Russia’s chargé d’affaires under the head of the Iranian revolutionary government.28 Another instruction from Raskol’nikov on June 5 appointed

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Andrei Pylaev as the RSFSR military envoy under the head of the Iranian revolutionary government, Kuchek khan.29 Pylaev had already been acting in Gilan, so his mandate was passed over to Israfilov. On the same day, Mirza Kuchek khan (chair of the Military Revolutionary Council under the Iranian revolutionary government), Ehsanullah khan (commander of armed forces), and Mir Saleh Muzaffarzade (member of the Military Revolutionary Council) sent the following welcoming telegram to Trotskii as chair of the RSFSR Military Revolutionary Council: The newly organized (as instructed by Persia’s Soviet of People’s Commissars) Military Revolutionary Council of the Persian Republic is sending its sincere welcome to the Red Army and Red Fleet in the person of comrade Trotskii, creator of the strong Russian Red Army. With great difficulties and hardships over the two years, you managed to defeat the internal counterrevolution, which was nothing but a mercenary of international capitalism. Through the will of the working people Soviet rule was established in Persia, which began to create creating the Red Persian Army on the principles of creation of the Russian Red Army in order to destroy the enslavers of the Persian people. Long live the fraternal union of the Russian Red Army and the young Persian Army.30 On June 8 the Politiburo of the CC of the RCP (B) discussed the situation in Iran and decided that Raskol’nikov, who had been appointed as commander of the Baltic Fleet before the Gilan events, was to be recalled and Abukov and Kozhanov would be permitted to continue to act as volunteers who had accepted Iranian citizenship. Chicherin was instructed to draft instructions about the behavior of Communists who worked in the East.31 In performing this task, Chicherin drafted a document on June 14 entitled “Theses concerning the Work of Communists in the East” and sent it to the appropriate bodies. Chicherin believed that such an instruction might be drafted only in separate countries. In regard to the East as the whole, it would be pre­ferable to develop an instruction in the form of theses. Chicherin recommended never officially linking the actions of Communists in the East to the line of the Soviet government and its representatives. In his opinion Communists, in conversations with the revolutionary masses in the East, must only explain the revolutionary mission of the Soviet power and the RSFSR, avoiding making specific promises on behalf of the Soviet government. The only exceptions were cases in which the RSFSR intervention was formally decided, for instance, under the occupation of disputed localities in the Caucasus.32 At this time these territories belonged directly to Azerbaijan. In late June an armored machine called “Free Iran” was brought from Baku to strengthen the



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Iranian Red Army. A specially designated detachment of 700–800 men also arrived from Azerbaijan and was included in the composition of the Iranian Red Army.33 The attitude to the Gilan events was a topic of serious discussion at the 1st Congress of the Iranian Communist Party on June 22–24. After Raskol’nikov was recalled, Soviet representatives began struggling for key posts in Gilan. Representatives who had arrived from Baku were particularly concerned about the activity of a member of the Comintern Executive Committee, M ­ ahammad Hasan Sultanzade (Mikaelian Avetis Sultanovich), who was patronized by Moscow. Yet in April 1920, during the first Turkestan regional conference of the Adalet Party in Tashkent, Heydar khan Amuoghlu, instructed by ­Narimanov, openly spoke against Sultanzade and noted that ­Mikaelian Avetis (who had become Mahammad Hasan) could not be elected a member of the regional committee of the Adalet Party.34 It had been planned to hold the 1st Congress of the ICP in Baku, but the speed of the seizure of Gilan inspired Communists to hold the congress in Enzeli. Attending the congress were almost sixty delegates, the majority of whom had left Iranian Azerbaijan when they were young. The congress’s first meeting was opened by Kamran Aghazade, who had arrived from Baku. Elected as honorary chairs of the congress’s presidium were Lenin (chair of the RSFSR Soviet of People’s Commissars), Narimanov (chair of the Azerbaijan Soviet of People’s Commissars), Dadash Bunyadzade (member of the CC CPA [B] and former participant of the meshrute movement, fighting for a constitution in Iran), and Victor Naneishvili (secretary of the CC CPA [B]), who had arrived from Baku to Enzeli on Moscow’s instructions. Note that twenty delegates arrived at the congress from Baku together with Naneishvili. Mir Bashir Gasymov welcomed the congress on behalf of the Baku Soviet. Representatives Avetis Sultanzade and Mahammadgulu Alikhanov of Turkestan and representatives Kamran Aghazade and Mir Jafar Javadzade (Seyid Jafar Pishevari) of Baku were elected as members of the congress’s presidium.35 The congress resolved to defend Mirza Kuchek khan. The Communists were displeased with him, however, and considered him the main obstacle on the path toward the expected socialist revolution. Immediately after the congress strong discord emerged between Kuchek khan and Sultanzade, the elected head of the CC ICP, who was known for his leftist views. In the opinion of Mirza Kuchek khan, the revolution was over because his provisional revolutionary government had been established. Sultanzade, in contrast, believed that the revolution was only beginning. Hence, upon the completion of the congress, the Communists set the goal of deepening the Iranian socialist revolution and spreading it over the whole East. All that they had to do was to get Mirza Kuchek khan out of the way.36

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To seize power in Gilan, in early July the CC CPA (B) leadership, not having agreed with Moscow, established an “Iranian Bureau” consisting of Narimanov and Polikarp (Budu) Mdivani from the CC RCP (B), Anastas Mikoian and Vissarion Lominadze from the CC CPA (B), and Bunyadzade and Alikhanov from the CC of the Iranian Communist Party. They had all become the leaders of the CPA (B) CC after the April coup.37 In the opinion of Russian researcher Moisei Persits, the Azerbaijani leadership was eager to Sovietize Iran because only this process could create the real conditions for Iranian Azerbaijan’s reunification with Soviet Azerbaijan.38 The creation of an “Iranian Bureau” in Baku intensified the Communist nature of the Gilan revolution. Sultanzade began to implement the transition from the bourgeois-­democratic faction led by Kuchek khan to an absolutely Communist one. The questions that had been agreed upon with Kuchek khan started being perverted in a rough manner. Aghayev and Mdivani, who had arrived from Baku, as well as Abukov (an active participant of the Gilan events) and others, began suggesting ideas that were not quite realistic for the young, newly established Communist Party. Kuchek khan had to pay an expensive price for his telegram to Lenin in which he asked him to send people who had the experience of work in the Russian Revolution (primarily Mdivani, who had lived in Iran) to Gilan.39 Having taken Mirza Kuchek khan’s request into consideration, the Orgburo of the CC RCP (B) made a decision to send Mdivani on a mission to Iran starting on July 21.40 After assessing the Gilan events, Mdivani concluded that the Iranian Communist Party should become a leader of the revolutionary movement and take control of the country: Currently the personality of Mirza Kuchek khan matters only in Gilan. If Mirza Kuchek khan does not grow into a significant revolutionary figure, it will become necessary to remove him; this is very likely to occur soon.... Baku will continue to be a reserve of Party forces for a long time. A military and political base should be created to organize work in Azerbaijan and Julfa.... A foreign division should start organizing divisions of guerrillas, shooters, and terrorist groups. The terror must be directed against the shah and his government, all enemies of the Persian Revolution, and representatives of the British authorities. Budu Mdivani described a wide area of guerrilla war covering Kasr-­e S­ hirin, Kermanshah, Hamadan, Gazvin, and Tehran, with access to the Basra-­ Baghdad railway.41 Russian sailors, however, who were considered the key support of the ICP, unexpectedly rose in a rebellion in Resht on July 18. They demanded not only to leave the frontline but also to return to Russia. That delivered a blow to the dream of a Communist revolution in Iran and evidently showed that the



The Eastern Policy of Soviet Russia and Iran 89

hopes of seizing the Basra-­Baghdad railway were an illusion, as were plans pertaining to the victory of the world revolution. Upon the initiative of an Iranian Bureau, a detachment of 1,000 men was sent from Baku to Enzeli on July 20 to suppress the sailors’ rebellion.42 At a meeting in Resht on July 30 the CC ICP decided to oust Kuchek khan and his supporters. Mikoian made a long report. The key thesis of his speech was that the historical course of the Iranian revolution would inevitably lead the Communist Party to power.43 On the whole, analysis of those events shows that Moscow had no clear long-­term program concerning Iran. While the Bolsheviks, on their mission to the Caucasus, spoke on behalf of the CC Communist Party of Azerbaijan and were fully determined to carry out a socialist revolution in Iran, certain circles in Moscow planned to use the Gilan events as a means of pressure against England. For instance, when the Baku-­ based Iranian Bureau decided to overthrow Kuchek khan, Karakhan wrote an urgent telegram to Orjonikidze and Narimanov: We have absolutely no reports about the situation in Persia; our in­ quiries go unanswered. We, in a roundabout way, have been told that the Persian government asks for Enzeli port constructions to be transferred to it. It is not clear what Persian government is meant. To examine all these matters, Kuchek khan needs to appoint a representative to Moscow as soon as possible, as we have telegraphed you repeatedly but still have no reply. As we have already told you, it is desirable to appoint Professor Gaffarov as our representative. This acquires particular importance due to the London negotiations and our probable demands for the removal of British troops from Persia and cancellation of the 1919 Anglo-­Persian Treaty.... These demands need to be confirmed by a representative of Kuchek khan to Moscow.44 Following this instruction, Kuchek khan’s personal interpreter Konstantin Gauk and Muzaffarzade went to Moscow. As Kuchek khan’s representatives, they had three weeks of talks with Chicherin and Karakhan. When they returned at the end of August, however, they were arrested by Mdivani.45 In fact Mirza Kuchek khan realized that the Bolshevik idea of staging a ­socialist revolution in Iran was groundless and senseless. In a telegram to ­Lenin on July 20, he noted that Iran was unprepared to struggle for socialism. Never­ theless, he promised that he would make a sharp turn in his policy as soon as the capital Tehran was seized and direct the popular will toward an open ­struggle with capitalism. In particular, Kuchek khan wrote: “And then we will have enough supporters finally to break our relations with all those whose ideas we dislike.” Not admitting the revolutionary changes that had quite recently occurred in Azerbaijan and strongly affected the state of ­minor merchants,

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he complained that while the Soviet government (in a treaty with the Azerbaijani government concluded at the end of June) guaranteed inviolability of the property of Iranian citizens these guarantees were being openly violated at present. He feared that such precedents would lead to tragic consequences for revolutionary Iran, whose social base consisted primarily of small proprietors, and even weaken the revolutionary process across the East. At the end of his telegram Kuchek khan reported that the Iranian Soviet of People’s Commissars planned to send its envoys to Baku to draft bases of interrelations with Soviet Azerbaijan and Russia in the political, economic, and military spheres. In his view, determination of interrelations in these spheres should have really accelerated the revolution in the East, the decisive victory over the English and the capitalists, and also should have sped up the development of world revolution. In line with the style of the Bolshevik written correspondence, Mirza Kuchek khan ended his telegram with the “Communist greeting.”46 Despite Mirza Kuchek khan’s promises, the CC ICP and leftists in Kuchek khan’s government, at a joint meeting on July 30, made a decision to oust him and take armed repressive measures against his supporters. On July 31, following the coup in Gilan, a new government led by Ehsanullah khan was established, as proposed by the Bolsheviks sent on a mission to Iran. Matilda Bulle, a member of the CC ICP and Military Revolutionary Soviet, reported a Communist coup in Gilan in a radiogram on the same day. She said that the Communists and leftists had seized power and formed a provisional revo­ lutionary committee consisting of eight persons.47 The new government’s program assumed various reforms, including requisition of all means of production and primarily distribution of privately owned large land plots among peasants. All of the armed measures had a single aim: to provide success in a campaign against Tehran that was expected to occur very soon.

Azerbaijan and the Iranian Policy of Soviet Russia Following the July coup Mirza Kuchek khan returned to the Gilan forests and settled down in his previous headquarters (Fumen), together with his ­closest associates. The Communists’ attempt to surround and kill him failed. But a harsh battle resulted in the deaths of some four hundred of his ­followers; hundreds of fighters who had arrived from Azerbaijan and Russia were killed in the battle.48 It is not a mere coincidence that Kuchek khan, in his letter to ­Lenin, accused specific Communists and Soviet Azerbaijan of these events. Despite the Iranian Republic’s protests, he wrote, the Azerbaijani government, in contrast to what it had promised, did not allow sending Iranian citizens’ goods confiscated in Baku to the Red Army and the population. Kuchek



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khan complained that the Azerbaijani government prevented the free return of ­Iranian citizens to Iran and noted that even an official note from Nikolai Bravin, the Soviet envoy to Tehran, who had been appointed upon an oral agreement with Raskol’nikov, permitted transfer of Russian concessions in Iran to the people of this country while the Azerbaijani government was opposed to it. Based on these facts, Kuchek khan asked Lenin to assure the promises of Soviet Russia’s representatives that Soviet Azerbaijan would not interfere with Iran’s internal affairs, would defend the lives and properties of Iranian citizens within the boundaries of Soviet Azerbaijan, and, given that Iran is an eastern country, would develop a program of action of the Communist Party there.49 As for the question of Persian merchants’ property touched upon by Mirza Kuchek khan, the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee made the following decision on July 13: Everything that merchants own was earned with the sweat and blood of workers; and given that the workers and peasants have power in the territory of Azerbaijan, no confiscated goods should be returned. Don’t let the swindlers leave Baku for Persia. Upon arrival in Persia, they would commence counterrevolutionary propaganda to direct the unenlightened masses against the revolutionary movement and thus may delay the development of Revolution in Persia.50 The total value of the goods confiscated from Iranian merchants reached 30 million gold rubles.51 This decision contradicted the terms of the treaty signed by the Azerbaijan SSR and the Iranian Soviet Republic in June 1920. For instance, clause 1 of the treaty envisioned that Iranian citizens arrested in Soviet Azerbaijan should be freed and handed over to the Iranian revolutionary government. In accordance with clause 2, the Azerbaijanis had to facilitate Iranian citizens’ return to their homeland.52 With all this in mind, Narimanov signed an act envisioning the return of the confiscated properties to Iranian merchants.53 Mikoian, one of the ideological inspirers and practical leaders of the Gilan coup, immediately returned to Baku and made a long report entitled “About Persia” at a meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B) on August 3. After he reported, it was decided to appoint Heydar khan Amuoghlu as head of the Persian government; to send an Azerbaijani detachment and one armored machine to Iran; to appoint Budu Mdivani as Azerbaijan’s envoy and place the military mission under his command; to send goods to Iran without causing the Azerbaijan Republic damage; to instruct Sarkis Ter-­Danelian to calculate the quantity of goods to be sent; and so on.54 Of all the decisions made at the meeting, the one to send Azerbaijani troops to Iran was fulfilled first, so an Azerbaijani regiment of 1,200 men moved to Gilan on August 11.55

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Nevertheless, the central Soviet government had no clear idea of the Gilan events, not to mention that it had no consistent program of action. All these events turned to be a result of spontaneous actions of the Bolsheviks, who had been sent on a mission to the Caucasus and most likely were desired by active participants in the Sovietization of Azerbaijan to spread the revolution eastward. In its foreign policy, Moscow most of all wanted to use the Gilan events against England. For instance, when the Gilan venture was in full swing on August 3, Chicherin — ​one of the key personages — ​wrote the following to Kamenev: It is rumored that Mirza Kuchek escaped; it seems that he fled to the British, but this doesn’t matter; his commander-­in-chief, who is more leftist, took his place. In turn, Soviet Persia will exist without him. Kuchek is useful as a popular figure, but in part he does damage due to his complete misunderstanding of the revolutionary policy because of his slowness and lack of prudence. He cannot dare, but this is exactly what we need now. His chief commander will be able to play this role better.... In all, our position in the East is improving. Revolutionary sentiments are pervading the masses of the army, which means that the whole reactionary system is shaking.... A breakthrough has occurred, primarily due to the Persian movement. Evidently the pace and intensity of our policy in the East will depend on our policy concerning England. It is possible to stress in talks with the English that if they commence war actions in Europe they won’t strongly hurt us, except for pinpricks on the peripheries. At the same time, if we use all the available opportunities in the East, we will be able to do the greatest ­irreparable damage to England’s position in the whole world.56 Chicherin, who on August 3 bragged of the successes of the revolution in the East, the next day complained about an extremely difficult situation in Soviet Iran to the Politburo of the CC RCP (B): “The situation is so serious that we propose to the Politburo immediately to send a person who is more authoritative and has a wider world outlook than comrade Mdivani toward Persia and endow him with broad authority.” Chicherin believed that Eliava would cope with this task.57 On August 5, after having discussed the “Situation in Persia,” the CC RCP (B) plenum made a decision to send Eliava on a temporary mission to enable him to organize work there jointly with ­Orjonikidze.58 Despite a number of urgent measures taken by the CC RCP (B), the Iranian Red Army’s first campaign against Tehran in mid-­August was not a success. Moreover, the Red Army was forced to retreat after it suffered heavy losses in battles at Menjil. The Bolsheviks, who were sent to Gilan on a mission, explained this defeat by the inefficient fighting of Iranian peasants sent from



The Eastern Policy of Soviet Russia and Iran 93

Russia and the Caucasus and the unwillingness of detachments that had been sent from Azerbaijan to fight.59 Taking part in the attack on Tehran were the 2nd Azerbaijani Regiment (1,607 bayonets and 23 machine guns), which had been sent from Baku to Enzeli and turned out to be completely inefficient, as well as the 244th Regi­ ment of Russia’s 28th Division. These military units were sent to Gilan on a direct order from Orjonikidze.60 Having suffered a shattering defeat at Menjil and Gazvin and facing the threat of being kicked out of Resht, Soviet officials thought that the only way out was a reinforcement of 1,500 well-­trained soldiers from Soviet Russia. On an order from Baku, the town of Resht was temporarily won back, but the Iranian Red Army failed to stay there and was forced to leave the town during the horror on September 22. Resht repeatedly changed hands during the battles. As a result, 45,000 inhabitants also left the ruined and pillaged town. Several thousand people died in the town as a consequence of awful weather conditions.61 Resht’s citizens, having dispersed over nearby towns and villages, spread very negative information about Communists. Religious figures spoke in mosques calling the people to a holy war against the Bolsheviks. Menjil’s English garrison cared for refugees by supplying them with food, clothes, and transport vehicles.62 In light of the serious situation and out of a wish to regain its lost positions in Iran, the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) made a series of decisions at the end of August. On August 21 it asked Moscow to provide reinforcements: 1,200 men to attack Tehran. At the same time the Caucasus Bureau, in order to accelerate developments in Iran and make payments on behalf of Azerbaijan, asked for 1.1 million Iranian tumans and 2 million gold rubles. These matters were considered so significant that Mirza Davud Huseinov was told to assign the required sum from the gold reserve of the Finance Commissariat of Azerbaijan until the money arrived from Moscow, in order to accelerate the developments in Iran.63 A few days later, after discussing the military situation, the Caucasus Bureau decided that the loss of Enzeli and Resht could in no way be accepted and thus resolved to send additional forces to Iran to reinforce the front. The Caucasus Bureau noted that the Gilan government was actually led by RSFSR representatives and that members of the Iranian Communist Party might occupy various state posts only with permission of the government.64 After the August defeat, on September 9, 1920, Karakhan addressed the CC RCP (B) in a detailed letter about the Soviet policy in Iran: “[A]s a consequence of political mistakes and politically tactless actions, the revolution in the Gilan province was strongly compromised. The revolutionary power did not have enough time to win the sympathies of the population, primarily peasants. The participation of Russians, Armenians, and Georgians (as foreigners) in the revolution and the fact that they behaved as if in a conquered

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country very quickly made the whole population rise against us and weakened [the population’s] hostile attitudes toward the English, not to mention that trade circles became closer to the English.” In analyzing the Gilan events, Karakhan wrote: “Losing Persia now and yielding it to the British would hit us strongly either internationally (as a sign of our weakness) or specifically regarding England, because England would become convinced that it should not be afraid of us in the East, as we can do nothing and quickly retreat at even the ­smallest failure.” In summarizing the information obtained from Iran, especially ­Eliava’s report, Karakhan defined the political line: (1) The existing forces in Enzeli should be reinforced by an expeditionary corps of 8,000–10,000 men, which will enable us to seize Tehran and overthrow the shah’s government and will be quite sufficient for a further struggle and complete removal of the English from Persia. In Tehran, a non-­Communist but Soviet-­style government composed of national-­democratic elements should be created. The policy of this government would be based upon the peasantry, without hurting trade income for the time being. Comrade Eliava is prepared and has the necessary number of employees to realize such a plan. (2) We would leave Persia but keep Enzeli under our military rule. We would enter into relations with the Tehran shah’s government (we have not broken relations with it and have been in written correspondence until the last few days), send our diplomatic representation to Tehran, and conclude a friendly treaty with the shah’s government.... It is for the CC to decide which of the two ways is to be chosen. Politically, we currently need the first approach, for it produces an immediate effect and hits England and thus, under the change of England’s policy that would occur, would provide the most positive influence upon the sentiments of Lloyd George and Curzon and prove that we are a serious direct threat to England and that our aggression in the East directly depended on England’s policy toward us: if they strike us, we strike back.... If the CC approves the first path, it will become essential to establish a commission of the Comintern, People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and RCP CC to develop a plan of action and draft appropriate instructions for Eliava.65 A day after having received this letter, the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) discussed the situation in Iran and decided to send an armed detachment of 1,200 men there, in order to keep Enzeli and Resht under control. It also decided to send Heydar khan Amuoghlu to Tabriz to work there, to close the Baku Iranian Bureau, and to turn all matters over to the Caucasus Bureau of the RCP, except a “Soviet of Propaganda and Action in the East” in



The Eastern Policy of Soviet Russia and Iran 95

Baku, and authorize Kirov, Eliava, and Elena Stasova to choose the membership of the composition of the Soviet.66 While this decision was being made, the Iranian Bureau was involved in mobilizing the Iranian Red Army and had already attracted 832 volunteers, including 635 from Azerbaijan.67 Great promises were made in other places, but the number of volunteers was not getting larger. As the attack on Tehran failed, the Bolsheviks sent on a mission to Iran were forced to return to the idea of cooperation with Mirza Kuchek. In the second half of August Mdivani tried to put the blame on Kuchek khan for the breakup of links with the Communists, but on September 9 he expressed his readiness to cooperate with Kuchek khan in written form: “If your aim is really freedom for Iran and for the unhappy Iranian nation, and if you really want this with all your heart, I will come to you with great happiness and confidence. We will talk together and agree to do business together.”68 In his reply on September 11 Kuchek khan championed his correctness in separate matters but eventually agreed to meet with Mdivani and cooperate with the Soviets.69 Of course, Kucheck khan made this decision partially because he was aware of the beginning of diplomatic talks between Soviet Russia and Tehran. Restoration of Kuchek khan’s links with the Communists took a lot of time, however, so they concluded a weak accord in the beginning of May 1921. Discussion of the Gilan events was one of the key questions of the 1st Congress of Nations of the East that was opened in Baku on September 1, 1920. The Comintern’s idea of calling up a congress of nations of the East was initially proposed on June 18, 1920, at a meeting of the Politburo of the CC RCP (B), and an appropriate decision was made to approve the proposal and convene a congress of nations of the East in Baku, find out what Narimanov and Stalin’s opinion of this was, and discuss this matter again at the next meeting of the Politburo.70 The next day the Comintern Executive Committee comprehensively discussed the question of convening a congress of nations of the East in Baku and made a decision substantiating the significance of extension of the revolutionary work in the East.71 On June 22 the Politburo examined this matter again. Orjonikidze and Stasova were instructed to create an organizational bureau jointly with devoted comrades, in order to make preparations for the congress of nations of the East. On the same day Grigorii Zinov’ev was instructed to report the decision directly to Orjonikidze.72 In accordance with the Politburo’s decision, a meeting of the Comintern Executive Committee was called. In the course of discussions, it was concluded that the 2nd Congress of the Comintern scheduled to take place in July should immediately be followed by the congress of nations of the East in Baku. An organizational bureau chaired by Orjonikidze with Stasova as secretary was formed to make preparations for the congress. The membership of the organizational bureau

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included Narimanov, Mikoian, and others. As a result of all the preparatory measures, the Politburo of the CC RCP (B) on June 26 made an official decision to hold the congress of nations of the East in Baku.73 Alexander Bodrero, a member of the Italian mission to Turkey who visited Baku in September 1920, also confirmed that the idea of holding the congress in Baku “came from Moscow.” He wrote: “Though the Baku congress gathered representatives of nations inhabiting a huge territory from Bulgaria to Japan, it was clear that it was organized primarily for the oppressed nations of Asia Minor and Middle Asia.”74 Over two hundred of the more than two thousand delegates invited to the congress were from Iran. On September 1 Narimanov, chair of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee, opened the 1st Congress of Nations of the East in a solemn atmosphere: The gray-­haired East, which was the first to have given us the notion of morality and culture, here today will shed tears and speak of grief and heavy wounds inflicted on it by the capital of bourgeois countries. Each of the eastern nations, living its own life, could not help knowing the horror and oppressive influence of this capital. However, here today, after we know each other’s positions, we will see everything, and only then all will these nations of the East learn the oppressing influence of this capital. This will force all these nations to unite and come to the common conclusion: they must unite to smash and break the chains of this capital.... I think that two worlds are meeting here today: the world of the oppressed and the world of oppressors. Without a doubt, if representatives of the world of oppressors were delegates from the bourgeois class, the gray-­haired East’s tears probably would not have mattered, but the happiness is that the delegates present represent the working class of bourgeois countries, who have sensitive, noble hearts: they will understand these tears and speed developments and give us the opportunity rapturously to declare the rule of the 3rd International shortly.75 The congress’s agenda consisted of many questions. But the majority of them touched upon the Iranian events. In consideration of the importance of the Gilan Revolution and in order to arm Iranian delegates with socialist ideas, all the reports and speeches at the congress were translated, as a rule, into the Persian language. In the congress’s first days Zinov’ev and Radek made reports as representatives of Soviet Russia and the Comintern. Their reports had a propagandistic, anti-­English tone.76 Although Amuoghlu spoke as the key reporter on behalf of Iran’s delegates, his report did not reflect the mistakes committed during the Iranian revolution, the Bolsheviks’ unsuccessful attempts to build communism in Gilan, or the actions of the leftist group



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c­ oncentrating around the ICP CC leader Sultanzade. Under pressure from Narimanov, not Sultanzade but Amuoghlu spoke at the congress’s second meeting on behalf of Iranian Communists. One of the congress’s leaders, Karl Radek, later informed the Politburo of the CC RCP (B) that the Baku congress revealed the following: “Led by Nari­ manov, Azerbaijani comrades refuse to work with the Sultanzade-­led group of Persian comrades, members of the Communist Party. The true reason was the anti-­Armenian sentiments of comrade Narimanov and others, who noted that it was not possible to work with the sultan, as an Armenian, in Persia.” Unlike the situation in Turkey, however, the Comintern said that there was no Armenophobia in Iran. The Azerbaijanis staked their faith in Heydar khan, whom they viewed as a future leader of the revolutionary-­democratic movement. During the congress both Heydar khan and Sultanzade seemed to be subordinated to the Comintern’s discipline. Upon the completion of the congress, however, Sultanzade was actually driven out of the Baku work.77 Radek noted that Heydar khan’s actions in Iran were a success due to substantial assistance from the Azerbaijani leadership. The Iranian side was well aware of Soviet Azerbaijan’s interference with the Gilan events, so the Iranian consul to Tiflis expressed a protest on this occasion, in a note to the Foreign Commissariat of Azerbaijan on September 13, 1920.78 During the Baku congress, on September 4, Heydar khan was able to gather Iranian delegates and put forward a series of accusations against the CC ICP for the mistakes made in the Gilan events. The gathering of 121 delegates charged the CC ICP with breaking the ties with Kuchek khan, violation of ICP decisions, and ending the transfer of donations to the Gilan republic’s treasury, which resulted from actions against national-­revolutionary forces and movement of numerous Tehran Cossacks to the side of counterrevolution. This was a consequence of disarmament of a Hamadan Cossack detachment in Resht, organization of artificial barriers that prevented Kuchek khan from moving forward, inability to attract part of Tehran, Tabriz, and Astara’s population with revolutionary sentiments to its side, failure of a campaign against Mazandaran, inability to create a state apparatus that would have fulfilled CC decisions correctly and honestly, a bad attitude to the peasantry, the criminal abandonment of Resht, and so forth.79 Heydar khan and his supporters, who accused the old members of the CC ICP of being leftists, were in reality leftists to the same extent. Heydar khan believed that an Iranian Red Army should be formed in Baku on a national basis, in order to invade Tabriz, establish a Soviet republic there, and subsequently attack Tehran.80 Organization questions were discussed on the last day of the congress, September 7. A Soviet of Propaganda and Action of Nations of the East was established under the Comintern Executive Committee. This permanently

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operating body was meant to launch propagandist work in the East and organize publication of magazines and other printed materials in the Asian languages. An Academy of Public Sciences was planned to open to intensify the training of cadres in the East. The Soviets included Narimanov, Orjonikidze, Mikhail Pavlovich (Mikhail Lazarevich Veltman), Kirov, and representatives of countries of the East, including Amuoghlu and Sultanzade.81 Analysis of the materials of the Baku congress of nations of the East shows that all the congress’s work was subordinated to Soviet Russia’s policy both politically and ideologically. This was the first large gathering of Communist and leftist organizations of nations of the East. It was apparent that Soviet Russia was trying to use this factor against England. Narimanov felt this tendency even before the congress began. A month and a half before the congress he had asked Lenin whether the interests of multimillions of the oppressed masses of the East were so dear to the Bolsheviks. In addition, he summed up: “And if the East is just a temporary instrument needed to force England to leave us alone, as comrade Chicherin believes and acts, then that is another thing.”82 After the solemn closure of the congress of nations of the East, Narimanov received a direct letter from Chicherin instructing him not to provide any assistance to Iranian revolutionaries, which would hinder normalizing relations with England. It should be recalled that the talks between Soviet Russia and Britain began in London in May 1920 and that the Russian negotiators were driven out of the country on September 1, the day the Baku congress of nations of the East opened. A month after the congress, Lord Curzon, the British foreign minister, stated in a note to Chicherin that this congress “raised a true hurricane of propaganda, intrigue, and plots against British interests and British rule in Asia.”83 Without a doubt, Chicherin’s letter to Narimanov and the recommendation urging him not to interfere with Iran’s affairs were a reaction to Britain’s growing pressure on Soviet Russia. Thus Narimanov was displeased with the outcome of the Baku congress and three years later caustically wrote that the Bolsheviks wanted to show nations of the East how much and how beautifully they could talk and demonstrated the level of development of the photographic art by taking photographs of orators in various poses: “Lloyd George, having received a photograph where representatives of nations of the East hold bare poniards, revolvers, sabers, and knives and threaten the European capital, probably smiled and wrote to comrade Chicherin the following: ‘We agree to hold talks with Soviet Russia over trade relations.’”84 Eliava, on his mission to Gilan, could not make serious changes on the front. Thus, in his telegram to Moscow on September 14, he suggested three options for Soviet Russia’s Iranian policy. The first suggestion envisioned the full occupation of Iran with Gazvin-­Tehran at its center, and redeployment of



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the Soviet armed forces to Soviet Azerbaijan bordering Iranian Azerbaijan. In his opinion, this was necessary either to keep Baku in hand or to launch an attack against Kermanshah. Second, Eliava believed that it was possible to commence talks with the Iranian government (formally anti-­English but in fact Anglophile) and then, having used this for the purposes of propaganda, to launch military operations to ensure its interests in Iran. Third, it was essential to remove military units and political workers from Gilan and move new people there, who understood Russia’s tasks in the East. Eliava admitted that the Iranian Communist Party did not consist of Iranians.85 A day later Eliava tried to persuade Chicherin to preserve Enzeli, “Russia’s gates” in the Caspian Sea. He substantiated this, saying that if Enzeli fell under the Soviets’ control, the British would have no opportunity to create an airbase there to raid Baku. But if talks were commenced in Tehran, Soviet Russia have an effective means of pressure.86 The government of Ehsanullah khan, established at the end of July 1920, also turned out to be short-­lived. In mid-­September this government got rid of the Communists and included representatives of the bourgeoisie and even landlords.87 Following the defeat on the front and changes in the composition of the government, the CC ICP was forced to move its headquarters from Resht to Baku. A meeting of the presidium of the Soviet of Propaganda and Action of Nations of the East held in Baku on September 17 and attended by Narimanov, Pavlovich, Stasova, and Eliava comprehensively discussed the reasons for the Gilan defeat. It was concluded that the key reason for the fall in prestige of Soviet policy in Iran was the proclamation of a “socialist republic” based upon the Adalet Party, which had no authority among the population, or popularity, or real strength. The participants of the meeting admitted that the hasty realization of Communist measures ended in looting and pillage and whole populations that were displeased with the Soviet policy. At the same time, the policy of the Bolsheviks in Soviet Azerbaijan and the mistakes that they made led to peasant rebellions that negatively affected Iran. A top secret document sent to Moscow read: “[A]s the leaders of Azerbaijan themselves admit, the Soviet power survives only due to Russia’s bayonets.”88 Sergo Orjonikidze, who had been eager to attack Tehran, was now full of pessimism after the defeat in Iran. On September 19, 1920, he wrote to Lenin that nothing serious (not to mention a socialist revolution) was expected to occur in Iran. In his view it was possible to stir up a revolutionary movement among peasants by giving them land. But that would require strengthening their troops and delivering a shattering strike. In Orjonikidze’s view, the best option in the current situation was to conclude peace with Iran and temporarily remove troops from there, in order to prepare and free these lands later.89

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As the tendency to make the ICP responsible for the defeat of the attack on Tehran was getting stronger, on September 20 the ICP CC prepared a detailed letter to the CC RCP (B), sending copies to Chicherin and Zinov’ev. The letter read: We are accused of not having informed Moscow and not having adhered to the line mutually agreed upon with Moscow. These accusations are unsubstantiated. Members of the Caucasus Bureau (later Iranian Bureau) banned us from direct contact with Moscow.... The Iranian Bureau, through its members Mdivani and Mikoian, categorically noted that the CC ICP should work under the direct leadership of the Iranian Bureau and keep in contact with it and that in the event of any attempt at spontaneous action it will deprive us of any backing from the Azerbaijani Communist Party and the RCP. In accordance with this, we were guided by the Iranian Bureau’s instructions.90 The letter noted that Kuchek khan’s removal from the revolutionary events was caused by two things: Narimanov’s decree about confiscation of Persian merchants’ goods in Baku and a resolution (brought by Budu Mdivani) assuming an immediate start of the agrarian revolution and overthrow of Kuchek khan’s authority. The authors of the letter directly linked the overthrow of Kuchek khan’s government with the actions of Mdivani and Mikoian. This letter, as well as information from other sources, took the opportunity to remove Mikoian, Lominadze, and Mdivani as well as other members of the “leftist” group from Iranian affairs after the Iranian Bureau was closed. Thus the first stage of the Gilan revolution ended in the serious defeat of Soviet Russia in Iran.

Disagreements between Baku and Moscow about the Iranian Revolution Unlike the events in Gilan, events in Southern Azerbaijan did not favor the Bolsheviks. In April 1920 the Bolsheviks tried to use the revolt in ­Tabriz to their own advantage, but Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani, in contrast to Kuchek khan, preferred not to get closer to the Bolsheviks. Heydar khan Amuoghlu wrote to Narimanov: “If we receive 2,000 rifles and ammunition, I, ­Heydar khan, would like to assure you that we will seize Tehran in a couple of months.”91 The Special Commission’s envoy to the Azerbaijan SSR, Karl Lander, who attentively observed the Tabriz process, reported to Moscow in July 1920 that the situation in Iranian Azerbaijan favored Russia and that the movement there was so strong that Iranian Azerbaijan centered in Tabriz had



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declared its independence from Tehran.92 As for the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, Russian Bolsheviks did not take Azerbaijan’s sovereignty into account. This forced Khiyabani to be cautious. He understood that the Russians had the last word in Baku and thus had growing doubts that the Russian assistance had no cost.93 Unlike Mirza Kuchek, who was burdened by cooperation with Russian Bolsheviks and soon fell victim to this cooperation, Khiyabani, as the leader of the Tabriz movement, rejected the help offered, preferring the idea that “Iran must be made free by Iranians.”94 Analysis of events shows that Khiyabani was irreconcilable to Bolshevism at the movement’s initial stage except for some minor aspects. Based only upon his own forces, Khiyabani demanded that Tehran declare a republic in Iran, provide autonomy to Azerbaijan, realize the Iranian Constitution’s Article on Enjumens (Councils), expel foreign troops and military advisors from the country, make the government of Mirza Hasan khan Vosug ed-­Doule resign, denounce the 1919 Anglo-­ Iranian treaty, establish diplomatic relations with the Russian government, and restore trade links.95 Khiyabani was seeking the initial point of struggle only inside the country. Thus he addressed Azerbaijan, saying: “You look like an exhausted strongman, a hero so tired that he can stand on his feet only if his conscience and honor are addressed. First of all, you should help yourself; you should save yourself.”96 The inflexible sheikh made the revolt nationwide, so Tehran representatives were forced to leave Tabriz. At the end of June the power in Tabriz went to the Khiyabani-­led national government. Upon a proposal from Khiyabani’s associate Ismail Amir Khizi, the newly created state was called “Azadystan.” Amir Khizi explained this on the basis of Azerbaijan’s exceptional role in the struggle for Iran’s constitution and independence. But a state called Azerbaijan already existed in the world. Thus a country that chose the way of national independence should be called “Azadystan.” Khiyabani approved this idea, saying: “We officially declare today that the name of Azerbaijan is changed to Azadystan.”97 During the initial period the majority of Tabriz’s community defended the Khiyabani government. Democrats undertook serious measures to improve the system of popular education. Children from poor families in Tabriz were given the opportunity to attend school and were taught in the native Turkic language. Classes for girls were opened in some schools. Khiyabani often made speeches to the nation propagating the democratization of the Iranian community and explaining the necessity of becoming integrated with the modern world.98 Khiyabani’s cautious attitude to Northern Azerbaijan was explained first by the British influence upon the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan and then by its occupation by Soviet Russia. He was against any

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foreign i­nterference by either England or Russia. Khiyabani declared that if the Bolsheviks seized any part of the territory of Iran “Persian Azerbaijans would fight against them to the last man.”99 Without a doubt, Khiyabani was not indifferent to the events in Northern Azerbaijan. The overthrowing of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic coincided with the revolt in Tabriz, so he viewed the April 28 coup in Baku sympathetically, as a victory for the former Hummetists hoping for trade and diplomatic links with the Narimanov regime.... But the May 18 landing of the Red Army forces in Enzeli in support of Kuchek khan made it clear to him that the position of Azadystan had been endangered. When the Bolshevik forces turned toward Zenjan, as if with the intention to enter Azerbaijan, the Tabriz Democrats, whose social base was of bazaar merchants and artisans, denounced the Enzeli landing.100 In Northern Azerbaijan, however, Bolshevism’s true essence was displayed so evidently, the Soviet policy’s reliance upon Russian bayonets was so apparent, and the struggle with Sovietization was drenched in blood so cruelly that Khiyabani began to question the potential freedom of Northern Azerbaijan. At this moment “Azadystan was becoming a refuge for Azeris feeling from the violent suppression of their resistance north of the Araxes. Among the refugees was an infantry regiment that had taken part in the Ganja uprising.”101 Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani regarded the Azerbaijani democracy as a force capable of freeing Iran. At the same time, he attached great importance to the freedom and independence of the peoples inhabiting this country. He attached exceptional significance to the nation’s independence: “The primary condition of a nation’s well-­being is its independence. A dependent nation has neither strength nor respect.”102 Owing to the events in Gilan and Azerbaijan, the political tension in Iran was permanently growing. The Anglophile government of Vosug ed-­Doule was replaced by the Mosheer ed-­Doule government, which chose Azerbaijan as its prime target. Mokhber ol-­Saltaneh (Mehdi Qoli khan Hedayat), who was appointed the new ruler of Tabriz, started gathering all those who were disgusted, including the Russian commander of an Iranian Cossack regiment deployed near Tehran. This regiment began to attack Azadystan on September 12, 1920. Forces devoted to Khiyabani were concentrated in the country’s north, where they fought the tyranny of local feudal lords. Cossack detachments seized Tabriz within three days after encountering no strong resistance. The democrats and their supporters suffered severe reprisals. Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani was killed on September 13. He spent his last two nights in the house of his close friend Haji Sheikh Hasan khan, who proposed to his guest



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to ask Mokhber ol-­Saltaneh to guarantee his security. But Khiyabani replied: “I prefer dying, not surrendering. I will never fall on my knees before enemies. I am a son of the constitutional epoch; I come from the dynasty of Babek Khurramit, who did not bow his head before the Arab Caliphate.”103 This was the end of one of the focuses of the Iranian revolution that clearly and discreetly had been the center of attention of Soviet Azerbaijan. The power of Tehran was restored in Tabriz. Naturally, Soviet Azerbaijan’s leadership did not remain indifferent to the defeats either in Tabriz or in Gilan, especially the closure of the Iranian Bureau. On September 8, 1920, Narimanov, in a secret letter to Shahtakhtinskii in Moscow, complained about the tyranny of the Red Army in Azerbaijan and the provocative activity of Mikoian, Levan Gogoberidze, and Lominadze and described their serious attempts to reduce the influence of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee among the local population. He wrote that the trouble is that irresponsible persons under revolutionary flags were engaged in counterrevolutionary activity. Is this what happened in the Iranian revolution? Mikoian himself made all of us go astray after he returned from there. Based on his report, a movement was commenced against Kuchek khan; by the way, I had always been afraid of this. What happened? Now we are thinking how to keep Enzeli in our hands. I would like to note openly: I was not listened to, so a requiem can now be played for the Iranian revolution.104 Narimanov reported to Shahtakhtinskii that Lenin and Chicherin should be asked a question point-­blank: do they trust the government of the Azerbaijan SSR? Narimanov noted openly that “thinking of a coup in the East in our favor was senseless because the East has temporarily died for us as a result of the actions of Iranian ‘dealers.’” He warned that if Lenin and Chicherin plan to hold Baku, they must listen to our voice. This is connected with the question of Persia. By the way, Eliava, who has returned from ­Persia, says that many should be arrested. My fears are all coming to pass. Mdivani disobeyed me and thus now has to think of how to save the surviving units. When you see all this, you cannot keep silent, so I also don’t want to keep silent and serve as a cover. Having received such a harsh letter from Narimanov, Shahtakhtinskii, as Azerbaijan’s plenipotentiary representative to Moscow, addressed Lenin in a long letter on September 20, 1920, writing that “successful organization of the Persian movement would have moved the sphere of our domination toward India, Mesopotamia, and Arabia and would have assured the Muslim world that Soviet Russia really wants to make the East free and independent; but,

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regretfully, our awkward policy in Persia set the Persian popular masses against us, so they already have a hostile attitude toward us.”105 Given the serious situ­ ation, Shahtakhtinskii proposed instructing employees who knew local conditions and the psychology of the folk masses of eastern countries to work in Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey and recommended as follows: The most suitable person for heading the policies in these countries is comrade Narimanov, who should be authorized to choose employees and establish and carry out tactical methods of work in the East under Moscow’s control. There is no need to state that the triumph of communism in the East is the highest goal of life for Narimanov and other Muslim Communists. In Shahtakhtinskii’s opinion, if the candidature of Narimanov was rejected, comrade Stalin’s stay in Baku to head the policy in the East would be useful. The “leftist” group was pushed aside in Iranian affairs due to Narimanov’s strong pressure; however, Zinov’ev, chair of the Comintern Executive Committee, upon his arrival in Baku to attend the congress of nations of the East urged the RCP (B) Organizational Bureau to cancel the decision about recalling Mikoian, Lominadze, and other members of the “leftist” group from Baku. In his opinion, recalling these comrades from Baku might have been seen as backing the policy of Narimanov’s supporters and as repression.106 Though he had been an ardent opponent of Mikoian, Narimanov later admitted that Mikoian had been removed from the Iranian affairs without his participation. He allegedly did not know why Mikoian had been recalled from Baku and “whether this was related to the Communist Revolution in Iran or happened for another reason.”107 The ICP CC broadly discussed the Gilan events at a meeting in Baku on October 25–26. Taking part in the discussions were Narimanov, Pavlovich, Anatolii Skachko (all from the Soviet Propaganda and Action of Nations of the East), Mustafa Suphi from the Turkish Communist Party, and others. Sultan­zade and Amuoghlu gave reports about the tactics of Communists in Iran. Sultanzade, after enumerating internal and external factors that had caused the defeat in Iran, also mentioned the interference of the CC of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (Bolsheviks) and the command of the Russian Bolshevik Army in Iran with the Gilan events. Amuoghlu, in contrast, thought that the defeat had been caused primarily by the CC ICP leadership and the breaking of ties with Kuchek khan. He called Sultanzade a direct culprit in the defeat. In his speech Sultanzade criticized the leadership of Azerbaijan, so Narimanov asked him to tell the participants of the meeting about the content of a conversation six months



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earlier, before his first departure for Iran. Sultanzade replied that in those days Kuchek khan sent a letter in which he called the Bolsheviks adventurers and refused to cooperate with any party. At the time, Sultanzade believed that an agrarian revolution was necessary and that landlords would never support the revolution. “I always held shared this view, and now I think that in Iran it is essential to fight not only the British and the shah but also landlords,” said Sultanzade. Narimanov countered: “Six months ago Sultanzade came up to me and asked for advice. So I told him which path they should take in Persia, but he disagreed and went another way. And only now, six months later, he announces that the way I pointed out was right. However, he did not follow this way all these six months.”108 In the meeting’s resolution a decision of the Soviet of Action to dissolve the ICP CC was recognized as right and valid. In the autumn of 1920, when the sharp polemic between Iranian Communists and Baku Bolsheviks around the tactics of attacking Tehran was in full swing, the Moscow government, not yet having recovered after the shattering defeat in Gilan, chose to hold negotiations with the Iranian government in an effort to establish diplomatic relations. To counterbalance the offensive tactics substantiated by Karakhan on September 9, the CC RCP plenum on September 20 decided to commence talks with Tehran. The document read as follows: “To instruct the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to adhere to the second of the two lines offered, that is, talks with the shah’s government, indispensably bringing Enzeli to our side against the British.... To send comrade Stalin to the Caucasus in order to...sort out our whole policy in the Caucasus and in the East.”109 By this time the Iranian side had also taken a series of actions to restore diplomatic relations with Russia. In October 1920 Moshaver ol-­Momalek (Ali Qoli khan Ansari) went to Russia as an extraordinary ambassador but on his way there visited Baku, where he met with Narimanov and people’s commissar of foreign affairs Huseinov as well as Orjonikidze, Moscow’s deputy in Azerbaijan. Orjonikidze reported to Moscow that the ambassador raised the question of pulling Soviet Russia’s troops out of Persia, an end to the Resht front, and a start-­up of peace talks between Tehran and Moscow.110 In a conversation with the ambassador, Narimanov directly noted that the troops deployed in Gilan and the reinforcements sent three days earlier belonged to Azerbaijan, which used this anti-­English army to defend its interests. Referring to this statement by Narimanov, Orjonikidze announced that no Soviet Russian troops were stationed in Iran, so any armistice was out of the question. At the same time, he noted that Russia was ready to act as a mediator between the governments of Iran and Azerbaijan. Yet Mehdi Ala al-­Saltaneh, Iran’s ambassador to London sent a note to Chicherin on September 7, notifying him that the army units in Iran belonged to Soviet Russia.

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The note reported “with regret” that the Persian troops, having entered Gilan, took prisoners of war, including the fighter Mikhail Shutov. When Shutov was interrogated, he noted that his regiment consisted of eight hundred Russians and that all its Communists were Russian. The Iranian ambassador voiced regret that such undesirable events had happened at a time when the extraordinary ambassador was preparing for talks in Moscow. Naturally, Mehdi Ala al-­Saltaneh’s note put Chicherin in a hopeless situation. Angered, he wrote to the People’s Commissariat on Naval Affairs: “We claim that we have no troops in Persia and that we are sending no troops there. However, captives say...that there are such troops in Persia. It turns out to be a scandal.” Then Chicherin addressed Narimanov, saying: “How could this scandal happen? The Gilan units should have been registered as voluntary or as troops in ­Persia’s ­service!”111 Narimanov, having strengthened his position after the congress of nations of the East, proposed to Heydar khan (whom he viewed as a close acquaintance) and other Iranian Communists that they establish ties with Kuchek khan and promote Narimanov himself to establish these links. Narimanov established a direct link with Kuchek khan through Narimanov’s personal envoy to Gilan. Kuchek khan assessed Narimanov as “the leader of a revolutionary movement in the East, the founder of the first Muslim political party in the world, a writer who reflected all the peculiarities of the spiritual world and lifestyle of the Orient in his historical works.” Narimanov’s letter that disclosed his proximity to the Iranian revolution strongly influenced Kuchek khan, who, in turn, called Heydar khan “dear friend” and believed that his arrival in Iran would positively influence the Gilan revolution.112 In November 1920, during Stalin’s stay in Baku, the situation in the ICP CC and questions of the eastern policy of the Soviets were heatedly discussed. Stalin spoke against establishing ties between the Communists and Kuchek khan but defended Heydar khan, one of the key supporters of rapprochement with Kuchek khan. Heydar khan, but not Sultanzade, was invited to a meeting with Stalin on the sidelines of a joint gathering of the Caucasus Bureau, the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, and other Soviet organizations.113 In his telegram to Lenin on November 16, Stalin reported that the composition of the ICP CC had changed, that Sultanzade and his fellows had replaced old Iranian revolutionary Heydar khan and Iranian proletarians from Baku, and that it had been commanded to shift the center of the Iranian revolution to Tabriz, which was considered a more revolutionary province. Stalin believed that it was possible to stage only a medium class-­based bourgeois revolution in Iran and gave Iranian Communists given appropriate instructions.114 On November 27 the Politburo of the CC RCP (B), having discussed Stalin’s extensive report about the Caucasus affairs, made an ­appropriate



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d­ ecision. The Politburo instructed Stalin to agree with Chicherin to find additional opportunities to pursue a clearer foreign policy concerning countries bordering the Caucasus states. In its decision, the Politburo said: “Keep as much reconciliatory policy with respect to Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, and Persia as possible in order to avoid war. Don’t take on the task of campaigning against Georgia, Armenia, or Persia. The main task is to defend Azerbaijan and to have firm possession of the whole Caspian Sea.”115 Several days before this decision, on November 15, the Politburo had approved the candidature of Fedor Rotshtein as Soviet Russia’s envoy to Iran.116 In presenting Rotshtein to the Politburo, Chicherin noted that Rotshtein knew England’s world policy well, having especially deep knowledge of Anglo-­ Iranian relations and the modern history of Iran. After listing all positive qualities of Rotshtein, Chicherin summed up: “[H]e has no equal among our comrades.”117 On November 28 the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs told the Iranian government that Rotshtein had been appointed as the RSFSR plenipotentiary envoy to Tehran. Despite these decisions and the official start of talks, the Bolsheviks continued their military-­political interference in the Gilan matter for a certain period. The commander of troops in Iran was changed in November 1920. On orders from Orjonikidze, Nikolai Gikalo was called up to Baku, where he replaced Vasilii Kargareteli as the commander.118 On November 29 Gikalo became the leader of the Iranian (Gilanian) revolutionary army, whose main staff came from Russia and Soviet Azerbaijan. Gikalo reported to Orjonikidze that decadent sentiments ruled the army and that he would not be able to cope with the specified tasks with such soldiers. Gikalo particularly complained about Azerbaijani soldiers (who were not ­eager to fight, according to him), troops who had no longer looked like Red Army soldiers, and a growth in the number of negative phenomena despite the strengthening of punitive measures. Most importantly, Gikalo reported that the local population did not treat Soviet soldiers well and that only Russian military units should be sent to Iran.119 Despite Gikalo’s proposals, it turned out not to be possible to change the situation in the Iranian revolutionary army. As of early 1921 this army had 3,500 fighters and officers. Only 800 of them were representatives of the local population, while all the rest were Russian and Azerbaijani Red Army s­ oldiers.120 Narimanov’s mediation evidently made minor achievements in the restoration of links with Kuchek khan possible. In the autumn of 1920, however, Soviet Russia began to make official the policy of its talks with Iran aimed at establishment of diplomatic relations. Upon a presentation by Chicherin, the Politburo in early December 1920 and the CC plenum a bit later approved the main principles of a trade agreement with England and a treaty to be signed with Iran.121 On December 7, when plenum of the CC RCP (B) approved

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the text of the treaty with Iran, Karakhan sent a telegram to Eliava in Baku indicating the terms of Soviet troop removal from Enzeli and Resht. Karakhan wrote that the troops had to pull out right after the English decided to leave the territory of Iran, explaining that “these points are occupied by Red troops of the Azerbaijan Republic solely with the purpose of securing its own borders endangered by British, who armed Enzeli and Resht with offensive bases against Azerbaijan.” Karakhan warned that conclusion of the treaty should be preceded by liquidation of the Ehsanullah khan government.122 On January 6, 1921, Karakhan notified the CC RCP (B) that the talks with the Iranian government were over. According to him, all the CC directives except for the clause on legalization of all political parties operating in Iran were respected in the text of the treaty. Naturally, the Iranian side strongly opposed legal operation of only Communist and leftist parties in the country, based on an agreement with a foreign state. Only political parties that did not contradict the Constitution of Iran and did not aim at violent change of Iran’s state and social system were permitted to exist. On behalf of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (PCFA), Karakhan explained that the signing of the treaty would be delayed if the Soviets urged inclusion of this clause, which would make it difficult for the treaty to pass in the Iranian parliament. Thus the PCFA suggested leaving the text of this clause as it had been offered by the Iranian side.123 In addition the Iranian side categorically refused to sign secret protocols offered by Soviet Russia in regard to the treaty. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the secret protocols should have reflected Soviet Russia’s right to move its troops to Iran in special cases (for instance, if hostile forces were operational in the territories of the parties to the treaty or if any third country tried to use the territory of Iran for the reasons of war). However, the Iranian side refused to agree to the secret protocols, justly believing that these clauses might be included in the main treaty.124 Another disputed aspect of the Soviet-­Iranian talks was the question of the return of Iranian merchants’ property that had been confiscated by the Baku authorities on Moscow’s instructions. Unjustified barriers for the return of property and goods worth thirty million rubles in gold were being created, even though Narimanov’s instruction had been issued in a way that circumvented the CC CPA (B) and SPC.125 Referring to this governmental act signed by Narimanov, the Iranian side insisted on a strict return of the confiscated goods. Shahtakhtinskii, who was taking part in the Soviet-­Iranian conference, tried to ascribe the delay in the solution of this question to minor bureaucratic obstacles. Iran did not realize that a document signed by the head of the government was not worth two cents and that the signature of a representative of this government could not be regarded seriously.



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It should be noted that the first plenary meeting of the Soviet-­Iranian conference was wholly devoted only to this important problem. After having failed to reach agreement, the sides announced a break for three whole months.126 Aside from this, the issue of the Iranian confiscated goods caused a serious squabble between Chicherin and Narimanov. The chair of the government of the Azerbaijan SSR called the position of the Soviet people’s commissar of foreign affairs on the Iranians two-­faced.127 Only after achieving agreement on this matter, on January 22, 1921, did Karakhan send a special note to Moshaver ol-­Momalek proposing to establish an Anglo-­Azerbaijani commission chaired by a Tehran representative. The commission was tasked with dealing with the matter of withdrawing English and Azerbaijani troops from Iran.128 On February 5, 1921, Ehsanullah khan, Reza Sarkhosh (a member of the revolutionary committee of his government), and Gikalo (commander of the Iranian Red Army) sent an urgent telegram to Lenin asking him not to conclude a treaty with the Iranian shah’s government. They reasonably noted that the shah, like his father and grandfather, had not been elected by the people and thus had been making Iran a cemetery for centuries and killing any aspiration for freedom within the nation. People were disgusted with all the treaties concluded by the shah and his government and thus could not recognize them.129 The media information about the Soviet-­Iranian talks in Moscow and the forthcoming withdrawal of Red Army units from Iran caused serious anxiety for the Iranian revolutionary government. On February 14 the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee’s plenipotentiary representative to Iran reported to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that the Iranian revolutionary government had spent ten days in continuous discussions of the prospects of development of the situation after the Soviet troops were withdrawn and developed a plan of action for a crisis period.130 Despite all the objections, Soviet Russia and Iran signed the treaty on February 26, 1921, under pressure from the PCFA. The Tehran developments also prompted the soonest possible conclusion of this document. On February 21 a coup had been staged in Tehran with the participation of Red Army regiments. As a result Seyyed Zia’eddin Tabatabaee led the government and the commander of the Cossack units, Reza khan Pahlavi, became the war minister. The first foreign political step of the new cabinet was its agreement to sign the Soviet-­Iranian treaty.131 On February 21 Chicherin had written to Orjonikidze that before Leonid Krassin signed a treaty in London it was essential to conclude the treaty with Iran but added: “Iran won’t sign a treaty with us until the Soviet government in Enzeli is abolished.”132 Despite the doubts of the foreign political leader of Russia, an Iranian representative to Moscow signed the treaty on February 26.

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In the treaty’s preamble Soviet Russia annulled all the treaties, accords, and tractates concluded between tsarist Russia and Iran, wishing to see the ­people of Iran independent, prosperous, and free. According to the treaty’s first clause, the RSFSR gave up its policy of force against Iran. In clause 2 Soviet Russia annulled all of the clauses concerning Iran of the treaties concluded by tsarist Russia with third countries. Soviet Russia refused to ­participate in any treaty that violated or hurt Iran’s sovereignty. In accordance with clause 3 of the treaty the Russian-­Iranian frontier was to be secured in line with the 1881 convention. Under the treaty’s fourth clause the parties refused to interfere with each other’s affairs. Under clause 5 each side banned a­ ctivities (in their territory) of organizations, groups, or individuals fighting the other side. Thus each party to the treaty took on the obligation not to let third c­ ountries’ armed forces, which threatened the borders, interests, and security of the other side, be placed in their respective territory. According to clause 6, if third party countries used the territory of Iran as a base to threaten Soviet Russia and its allies and Iran turned out to be unable to eliminate this danger, “the Russian Soviet government will have the right to move its troops onto the territory of Persia to take the necessary measures for reasons of self-­defense.”133 Upon elimination of this threat Soviet troops should leave the territory of Iran immediately. The inclusion of this clause in the treaty forced England to act extremely cautiously in regard to Iran. Under the treaty’s eleventh clause, Soviet Russia’s government recognized the right of Iranian ships to sail in the Caspian under the Iranian flag. Other clauses of the treaty regulated post/ telegraph, transport, and economic issues. Of twenty-­six clauses of the Soviet-­Iranian treaty, seven concerned Azerbaijan to various extents. In analyzing this treaty in his work “The Eastern Policy of the Bolsheviks,” Rasulzade noted that Soviet Russia’s generosity in the East was proportional to “opposition” to it in the West.134 Despite the existence of a series of aspects favoring Iran, the February 26, 1921, treaty was not as politically equal as had been declared. While this document canceled the inequality of treaties with tsarist Russia, clause 6 laid the foundation for new unequal relations.135 The open-­ended Soviet-­Iranian treaty of March 29, 1921, was ratified by the All-­Union Central Executive Committee, but the I­ ranian side delayed ratification until all disputed matters were settled. People’s commissar Chicherin believed that whoever ruled in Iran would be forced to ratify this treaty. In his view this treaty not only delivered a strong moral blow to England but also would force Great Britain to respect Soviet Russia. In a note to the Iranian ambassador, he stated that the Azerbaijani Red Army would be withdrawn from Northern Iran as soon as British troops left. The Iranian ambassador reacted pessimistically to Chicherin’s proposal to establish an Anglo-­ Azerbaijani commission for this reason, replying that Britain was not likely to



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agree to participate in such an organ jointly with Azerbaijan; furthermore, it expressed the desire to work with Russia.136

Collapse of the Iranian Experiment of the Bolsheviks Following the signing of the treaty, the Baku PCFA received daily directives demanding it to liquidate the Gilan republic. Under pressure, Narimanov and Huseinov responded in a telegram to Orjonikidze in Tiflis on March 17, 1921 “We are not against liquidation of the Gilan republic; we only think that it is advisable to raise this question in the course of Azerbaijani-­Persian talks that must commence immediately. Inquiring about this occasion yesterday, Shahtakhtinskii promised to give an answer today, after having learned the opinion of comrade Chicherin. If you agree with the beginning of talks with Persia, please inform us about this.”137 Despite the treaty signed in Moscow, the Iranian side did not want to let in the appointed extraordinary envoy Rotshtein until the Gilan republic existed. On March 21 the Iranian consul in Baku told Iran’s plenipotentiary and extraordinary ambassador in Moscow that the Gilan republic had not been liquidated despite Moscow’s order. Moreover, not a single step had been taken in this direction.138 Rotshtein reported to Chicherin in a secret telegram that the Iranian side explained its refusal to let him enter Iran by the continued existence of the Gilan republic and nonwithdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran.139 Rotshtein managed to arrive in Tehran only at the end of April after wandering for a long time across the whole of Northern Iran.140 In his telegrams addressing Orjonikidze on March 30, April 2, April 5, and April 7, Chicherin categorically demanded liquidation of the Gilan republic. He wrote: We categorically urge you to use your iron hand to stop attempts at frustrating our policy in Persia, for this undermines our whole eastern policy. You should in no way let any new venture occur. Take decisive measures to prevent local people from being engaged in ventures in Persia. The E ­ hsanullah khan Soviet government must be liquidated immediately. This does not mean transferring the rule to the shah’s governor, as the Azerbaijani occupation rule will remain in Enzeli until the British and Azerbaijanis simultaneously leave Persia. However, the Soviet government in Gilan must be dissolved right now.141 The leadership of Soviet Azerbaijan strongly opposed such directives from Moscow. On April 11 Levin, a member of Rotshtein’s Baku-­based mission, reported to Chicherin: “Having heard Orjonikidze’s report containing Moscow’s categorical demand to liquidate the Gilan republic, Aliheydar Garayev

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made the following substantiated proposal: Moscow may declare the Gilan republic liquidated, but Azerbaijan, as an independent republic, not only will liquidate the Gilan republic but will also continue to provide any possible assistance to it with men and arms due to the Tehran events.... Members of the Gilan government and their detachments will strongly oppose being liquidated, however, and thus will put a wrench in the works.”142 At a meeting of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) on June 4, Orjonikidze and Narimanov were instructed to examine the state of the revolutionary movement in Iran comprehensively and provide assistance to it.143 Nevertheless, the resistance of the Azerbaijani leadership and Ehsanullah khan was broken by Moscow’s pressure: on May 6 Orjonikidze disbanded the Iranian Red Army and its Military Revolutionary Soviet. The liquidated ­Iranian army became part of a separate infantry brigade created in the area of Resht-­Enzeli based on military units of the Azerbaijan SSR and the 11th Army. Gikalo was appointed as commander of the brigade. All of the detachments of the liquidated Iranian army were sent to Baku to be put under the control of the Azerbaijani Naval Commissariat. Despite all changes of a military character and the agreement of cooperation signed between Kuchek khan and the CC ICP led by Heydar khan on May 6, 1921, however, the second attempt to storm Tehran in the summer of 1921 was a failure. The agreement envisioned development of friendly relations with the governments of Soviet Russia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia as well as receipt of assistance from them.144 The May 6 agreement was followed by certain victories of local importance, but the defeat was not handled well. When Narimanov’s telegram noting Ehsanullah khan’s victory under Mazandaran was published by the newspaper Izvestiia on July 13, the Iranian ambassador used this information as confirmation that Russian volunteers had stayed in Gilan and quoted Nari­ manov’s telegram exactly in a letter to Chicherin. The ambassador informed the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that “the Russian-­Persian treaty is nothing to Azerbaijan.”145 Upon Chicherin’s insistence, the Politburo made a decision obliging the Azerbaijani government to make an official statement to the press. On July 26 Huseinov, people’s commissar of foreign affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR, made a statement that the Azerbaijani government was not linked with Ehsanullah khan in any way and thus provided no assistance to him.146 Huseinov reported this story published by the newspaper Kommunist to Chicherin in a ciphered telegram on July 29.147 Soviet ambassador Rotshtein, in his telegram to Chicherin, urged him to put an end to Azerbaijan’s interference with Iran’s affairs: “The very gods can do nothing against the foolishness of Persian revolutionaries, but, as for Azerbaijanis, tough measures must be taken against them.”148 Rotshtein categorically demanded in a telegram to Chicherin with a copy sent to Lenin: “Either



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Baku will unconditionally be subordinated to me in everything that concerns Persia or I must be subordinated to Baku. No other variant exists. And if they subordinate me to Baku, I will have to lower the flag and leave Persia.”149 ­Rotshtein later added: “If you approve such a double policy, I have nothing to do here.”150 Rotshtein also sent similar letters to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. In a letter to Huseinov he reported: “Your purely Baku Iranian policy, which counters national interests, is like a bone in my throat, completely disturbing my work. And while continuing informal contacts between Baku and the various khans who call themselves revolutionaries it would be impossible to build correct relations with Tehran.”151 Rotshtein warned that the Iranian army could easily knock these khans out of their positions and that Reza khan “asked my permission for this almost with tears in his eyes.”152 In truth, the delay of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Gilan in June 1921 was connected with the change of the government in Iran. Ahmad Qavam os-­Saltaneh, who came to power, and his cabinet were Anglophiles. Thus Rotshtein, in his telegrams addressed to Orjonikidze and Chicherin, recommended postponing evacuation of the troops. He wrote: The existence of a certain front in Gilan is required now in order to ­terrorize the shah’s new cabinet, so you’d better wait a little. I forwarded to the cabinet a series of demands, upon satisfaction of which I will tell you to evacuate the troops. At the same time, I would like to ask you to prevent the Iranian revolutionary committee and Kuchek from any actions and continue to keep a position threatening Iran, for the same reasons. If my demands are met or another cabinet appropriate for us is established, stop providing assistance to the revolutionary committee; I will let you know this in a particular way.153 On June 19 Rotshtein sent a similar telegram to Chicherin.154 Rotshtein sent notes to the Iranian Foreign Ministry notifying it of the Soviet troop pullout from Gilan. Having been acquainted with the texts of these notes, Chicherin reprimanded Rotshtein: why had he started talking about troop removal from Gilan only now, given that he and Raskol’nikov had left there last year and now only the Azerbaijani army remained?155 After Raskol’nikov was recalled from Iran, Chicherin recommended in all his telegrams to make no more mention of the Soviet army in Iran and claimed that units of the “Azerbaijani occupation army” remained in Gilan.156 It is a great pity that Azerbaijan’s “independence” was recalled only at moments when an unattractive and duplicitous game was being played. During a meeting with prime minister Qavam, Rotshtein was promised that changes would occur in the cabinet. But this promise was not kept. In a report to Chicherin in October 1921 the Soviet ambassador wrote that Qavam

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had promised to follow the advice but “deceived me and the Soviet government to my face.”157 Qavam made changes to his cabinet in October 1921 only upon a request of Rotshtein and pressure from military minister Reza khan. Following Rotshtein’s telegraph war with Moscow and Baku, Lenin, who had been on leave in mid-­August 1921, decided to interfere personally in the case. He quieted Rotshtein, saying that according to Chicherin Baku men had stopped helping Ehsanullah khan. Lenin’s letter addressing Rotshtein contains a very peculiar phrase: “It seems that I agree with your cautious policy in Persia.... Will you write works about Persia to teach all of us two very interesting unknown things?”158 Orjonikidze’s report “On the Situation in Persia” was given at a meeting of the plenum Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) on August 15. It was decided to deny support to Kuchek khan and Ehsanullah khan, to propose that they be evacuated together with their troops if they agreed to do so, and to strengthen work to organize a Communist Party in Persia.159 Thus the Gilan venture masterminded by the Soviets in the spring of 1920 was nearing its end. Following the conclusion of the February 26, 1921, treaty, Soviet Russia’s attempts to create a revolutionary movement in Gilan through volunteers failed to succeed. Information that Baku was going to campaign against Tehran obtained by Rotshtein from “reliable sources” and urgently reported to Moscow on September 24 did not prove to be true. In a ciphered telegram Rotshtein told Chicherin about plans involving “Azerbaijani Soviet imperialism at the expense of Persia.”160 As if unaware of the “Gilan adventure,” he continued to view Baku as the culprit in all the events. At the end of 1921, in another telegram to Chicherin, he wrote: Under the tsarist regime we viewed Persia as our legal loot, which could not be made a province or a series of provinces of the Russian Empire solely due to the counteraction of the British. I suspect, and I am even convinced, that this exact imperialist instinct is alive among our Baku and partially even Tashkent men, in whom it naturally acquires a Soviet or even Communist form, in accordance with our new system.161 All of this intrigue and discord led to a quarrel between Kuchek khan and Heydar khan Amuoghlu and, in general, between Jangalis and Communists in September–October 1921. This bloody confrontation resulted in the deaths of Kuchek khan and Heydar khan Amuoghlu and, moreover, made their numerous supporters leave the revolutionary arena. On October 3, having discussed a question “About Persia,” the RCP CC instructed Kirov to prevent Azerbaijan from providing any assistance to Kuchek khan and other forces in Iran, noting that Kirov was made personally responsible for the observance of this decision.162 On November 7 Ehsanullah khan and his fellows arrived in Baku



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from Enzeli, and on November 8 Orjonikidze and Kirov solemnly reported to Lenin and Stalin: “All is over in Persia.”163 The Politburo of the CCRCP (B) gave a hostile reception to Orjonikidze and Kirov’s proposal to form an illegal “Iranian Committee of Freedom” of cadres that had arrived in Baku from Iran. Taking any steps in this direction was banned.164 One of the aspects delaying ratification of the treaty was the Iranian side’s displeasure with clauses 5 and 6. The Iranian government handed a note of protest to the Soviet government in December 1921. On December 12, however, Rotshtein, the Soviet plenipotentiary envoy to Iran, explained to the Iranian side that these clauses would take effect only if Russia and the Soviet republics were subjected to an armed attack.165 Following this explanation, on December 15, 1921, the parliament of Iran ratified the treaty between Iran and Soviet Russia that had been concluded in Moscow on February 26.166 In early 1922 Azerbaijan’s Andrei Andreev, deputy commissar of foreign affairs, reported to Moscow that Gilan was completely finished, that Ehsanullah khan was hiding in Azerbaijan, that Kuchek khan had been killed, and that Rotshtein proposed to the revolutionaries to leave Resht and hide in Russia. Andreev added that Qavam os-­Saltaneh wanted to place the cut-­off head of Kuchek khan in a square but gave up this idea after Rotshtein protested.167 The defeat of the Iranian revolution was a strong blow to the political authority of Narimanov. He carried the pain of this defeat throughout his life and never reconciled with Chicherin. Later on, he frankly wrote to Ibrahim Abilov: “[A]ll of Chicherin’s ideas used in the eastern policy are absolutely false. Iran definitely turned away from us. Deceived by the British, Chicherin extinguished the light of the Iranian revolution with our hands.”168 Full of expressions of grief, Narimanov’s letter addressing Stalin, “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries,” was in part devoted to the failures of Soviet policy in the East. As for the death of the Iranian revolutionary process by “Rotshtein’s hand,” he wrote: “With our hands, we killed the liberation movement in Persia in the way that Lloyd George needed, because that was how some of the comrades understood the eastern policy.”169 Chicherin was forced to give a written reply to Narimanov’s direct accusations of the failure of the Iranian revolution. Narimanov accused the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in the section “Eastern question” of his letter to the RCP (B) CC addressing Stalin, Trotskii, and Radek. In a letter to the secretary of the RCP (B) Control Commission, Emel’ian Iaroslavskii, Chicherin justified himself, saying that he had not stepped away from the Central Committee’s line in the Party’s eastern policy: On the contrary, in this period, the eastern policy of comrade ­Narimanov so sharply contrasted with the line of the CC RCP (B) that

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at the ­meeting of the Politburo and at the plenum of the CC RCP (B) it became necessary to tell the Caucasus comrades that it was necessary to act in line with the CC policy. The Caucasus comrades, including comrade Narimanov, exaggerated the events in Northern Iran and backed the adventurous policy. At present, none of the leading comrades doubts that such an exaggeration strongly hurt the Communist movement and the international position of the Soviet republic.170 It should be noted, however, that these were Chicherin’s late concessions, while the defeat of the Iranian revolution became the most striking example of depravity in Moscow’s policy of exporting revolution. That was how the circumstances of 1920–21 involved Soviet Azerbaijan in the “Iranian epic,” a dramatic detective story with a sad conclusion. After a series of defeats of the proletarian revolutions in the West, the hopes of the nations of the East were undermined by the example of tragic events in Gilan. The atmosphere of Bolshevik revolutionary pathos and romanticism, born after the occupation of Azerbaijan, did not survive long in Iran. Moscow’s plan to Sovietize Iran by using the Azerbaijani platform failed. Though the Bolsheviks thoroughly hid themselves behind Soviet Azerbaijan in the Gilan events, which had anti-­English orientation, in order to “stay afloat” and avoid an international scandal, they failed to hide their true intentions. Soviet Russia could not accomplish its key goal: to knock Great Britain out of Iran. The revolutionary wave in Southern Azerbaijan did not become permanent, while the defeat of the Khiyabani-­led movement was being accompanied by the strengthening of despotism. The Iranian revolution’s light that was extinguished destroyed the idea of making Soviet Azerbaijan a bright lighthouse in the East. Discord between Narimanov and Moscow on eastern policy became deeper. Soon after this the Gilan events would be tied to all the failures of the Bolsheviks in the eastern direction and occupy the central position in the persecution of Narimanov, who would have to bear the bitterness of this defeat in his personal life.

5

The Sovietization of Armenia Moscow’s Secret Plans for Karabagh

T

he Karabagh problem stems from the first years of the nineteenth century, when Russia directly appeared in the region. Under the national governments in the South Caucasus (1918–20), the Armenian community of the mountainous part of Karabagh undertook to recognize the sovereignty of the Azerbaijani government. After April 1920, with the advent of the Bolsheviks, Karabagh became an arena of political confrontation. Following the occupation of Azerbaijan by Soviet Russia, the situation in the area gradually began changing. Previously indisputable Azerbaijani territories were looked upon as debatable ground.

The Karabagh Question: From Sovietization of Azerbaijan to Sovietization of Armenia During the April occupation, Azerbaijan had repeatedly undergone large-­scale aggressions on Armenia’s side. For this reason one of the first foreign political steps of the Soviet government in Baku was a note to the Armenian government on April 30, 1920. Signed by the Azerbaijani foreign commissar, Mirza Davud Huseinov and delivered to the Armenian Foreign Ministry, the note said: “The worker-­peasant government of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic in the person of the Revolutionary Committee demands: (1) to clear your troops from the territories of Karabagh and Zangezur; (2) to move away to our own borders; (3) to cease the international slaughter. Otherwise, the Revolutionary Committee of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic will consider itself to be at war with the government of the Armenian Republic. An answer to the note is to be given within three days.”1 To enlist the support of the European countries, the Armenian party urgently resent this note to Avetis Agharonian, the head of the Armenian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. An enciphered covering telegram 117

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said: “Bolshevik and commissar of the Northern Caucasus Orjonikidze confirms that refusal to meet the demands of Azerbaijan may be recognized as a war with Soviet Russia. The situation is critical. It is urgent to have a talk with ­allies on credit purchase of rifles, cartridges, and equipment.”2 The exchange of notes between Azerbaijan and Armenia lasted until mid-­May 1920.3 ­Reporting on this “war of notes,” a French mission to the Caucasus pointed out that a lot of Armenians lived in the disputed Karabagh district, although Azerbaijanis made up the majority of the population.4 An appeal of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry to the Armenian ­people and the Armenian government on May 11 enumerated acts of violence committed by the Armenian armed detachments in Nakhchivan, Sharur-­ Daralayaz, Novo-­Bayazit, and Echmiadzin uyezds, Kars vilayet, Karabagh, Zangezur, and Gazakh starting from 1917. It also demanded that the Dashnak government terminate the policy of terror and violence.5 Intensification of the Armenian activity in Karabagh and other places in Azerbaijan from the outset of Sovietization and their unpunished crimes against the Muslim population were explained as being due to the weakness of Azerbaijan and its army as well as demobilization of its armed forces. Taking this opportunity, the Armenians burst into the defenseless country, occupied lands, and killed Muslims mercilessly. On June 29, 1920, Kirov told Chicherin that the Dashnaks had killed not only Muslims but Russians as well. He wrote: “Of 30,000 Russians in the Kars region only 15,000 survived; the rest fled to Turkey or Russia or died.”6 On June 19 Narimanov, Mdivani, Mikoian, and Avis Nurijanian sent a telegram to Chicherin, which talked about the advance of the Dashnak army and its success in Gazakh and Gedabey. A copy of this telegram was sent to Orjonikidze in Vladikavkaz: “Armenians are actually at war with Azerbaijan. As for allegedly disputed Zangezur and Karabagh as parts of Soviet Azerbaijan, we categorically declare that these places are henceforth an integral part of Azerbaijan.”7 From this standpoint, one of the first decrees of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee on May 12 was issued to secure Soviet power, setting up the post of extraordinary commissar for Karabagh and Zangezur. Dadash Bunyadzade was appointed to act as extraordinary commissar of Azerbaijan for Karabagh and Zangezur and Armenak Karakozov as his assistant.8 On May 18 Narimanov arrived in Baku to sign the decree as chair of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee (ARC).9 Bunyadzade performed his functions until the end of August. In the meantime Armenian foreign minister Hamo Ohanjanian sent a reply note to the ARC dated May 1, which alleged that the Musavat govern­ ment of Azerbaijan incited riots and committed massacres in “Armenian Karabagh” and burned towns and villages. Hence the population of Karabagh



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repeatedly, through free expression of its will, declined to join Azerbaijan. Therefore the Azerbaijani army was stationed in this region to prevent the self-­determination of the Armenian people, who had no army of their own within the borders of Azerbaijan. The Armenian government proposed that the new Azerbaijani government withdraw its troops from the Armenian part of Karabagh. Ohanjanian added that under the current circumstances there was no need for threatening notes and pointed out that the government of Soviet Russia had already recognized the independence and sovereignty of Armenia to comply with a decision of the 4th All-­Russian Congress of Soviets and Lenin’s decree.10 A copy of this note was sent to Lenin, Chicherin, and Orjo­nikidze. On May 9 Orjonikidze received another telegram asking him to send it to Lenin. The telegram was signed by Pirumov and Erzinkian, representatives of Karabagh Armenians. In their view, according to the Azerbaijani ultimatum of April 30 the two regions — ​Zangezur and Karabagh, allegedly consisting only of Armenians — ​had been annexed to the Azerbaijan Republic, while the populations of these regions categorically declined to be included in Azerbaijan.11 Not content with this, a group of Karabagh Armenians headed by Pirumov was going to leave for Moscow in the summer of 1920. During his conversation with Vissarion Kvirkveliia, Orjonikidze openly stated: “Why are Pirumov and others going to visit Moscow? There is no point in going there. The population of Zangezur and Karabagh is not overwhelmingly Armenian; on the contrary, it is half and half, as the census of 1917 says. At any rate, Moscow won’t deal with the Karabagh question.... That’s all nonsense!”12 At the same time, Armenian Communists Gurgen Aykuni and Ruben Katanian wrote a letter to Lenin to advocate an appeal to “Tiflis fellow countrymen” regarding Zangezur and Karabagh.13 Ohanjanian’s statement that the Armenians refused to stay in Azerbaijan at the congress of peasants’ deputies of Karabagh was clearly not true. The truth was that representatives of Armenian peasants from the mountainous part of Karabagh had made a decision in August 1919 about subordination to the Azerbaijani government. Some Armenian authors note that this decision was adopted under British pressure,14 not taking into account that the British had left Azerbaijan two weeks before this decision was made. On August 22 an interim agreement had been concluded between the government of Azerbaijan and Karabagh Armenians. Not only Bolshevik Muslims but Communists of other nationalities — ​Armenians, Georgians, Russians, and Jews — ​admitted that Karabagh, both the low-­lying and mountainous parts, was an integral part of Azerbaijan under the Musavat government. Anastas Mikoian, a member of the Caucasus regional committee of the RCP, noted in his report to Lenin: “The Dashnaks — ​agents of the Armenian government — ​are seeking to annex

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Karabagh to Armenia; however, this means that the population of Karabagh would lose the source of its life, which is Baku, and instead be linked to Erivan, to which it had never been related.”15 Angered that the Bolsheviks of authority who had long been working in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Baku as a whole opposed the central Soviet leadership’s policy, Chicherin sent a letter on June 22, 1920, to the Politburo of the CC RCP, complaining about the “lack of discipline of Baku comrades and an outrageous contradiction between their actions and a CC-­specified political line.” He suggested appointing a competent and respected comrade to represent the interests of the Sovnarkom in Baku, one unrelated to the Caucasus group of Communists: Grigorii Sokol’nikov.16 Chicherin explained this step on the basis that “Baku comrades” were frustrating compromises and rejecting a CC-­required agreement with Armenia. He complained to Lenin about Narimanov, who persistently advocated for the sentiments of Azerbaijanis.17 To Chicherin’s thinking, a transfer of the disputed territories currently occupied by Russia to Azerbaijan would render an agreement with Armenia impossible. For this reason, in the summer of 1920, half of the Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan were sent to Karabagh and Zangezur at Moscow’s insistence.18 Chicherin’s logic on the matter is interesting. Two months earlier, primordial Azerbaijani lands had been occupied by Soviet Russia and declared disputed; now the point was not their “belonging” to Azerbaijan but “annexation” to Azerbaijan. He wrote: “The aggressive rhetoric of Baku comrades runs contrary to the CC-­prescribed political line.”19 When debating the Karabagh issue, Chicherin did not hesitate to confuse even Lenin. Admitting “his lack of awareness of Caucasus affairs,” Lenin asked Chicherin to clarify the situation. The Russian foreign commissar wrote: “Karabagh is a primordial Armenian locality; however, after Armenians were massacred in the valley, Azerbaijanis settled down there, while Armenians had to go to the mountains.” Chicherin added that Russia would not grant this territory to Armenians because Russians were unwilling to hurt Azerbaijanis. “When Georgia and Armenia are Sovietized, all these problems will automatically be resolved.”20 Numerous explanatory notes and telegrams from Chicherin to ­Lenin, Orjonikidze, and Narimanov indicate that the Russian foreign commissar tried to benefit by using Karabagh as bait to pressure Armenia. Lies, courting, and threats by Chicherin did not persuade Narimanov and his allies. It was the increased pressure of Armenians laying their claims to the mountainous part of Karabagh that made prominent Caucasus Bolsheviks Mdivani, Mikoian, Victor Naneishvili, and members of the council of war of the 11th army (Iakov Vesnik, Mikhail Levandovskii, and Boris Mikhailov) write a letter to the CC RCP:



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We consider it our duty to convey our unanimous view on the matter of Zangezur and Karabagh. The point is that the talks with Armenia tend to adopt an interim decision, which is contrary to the interests of revolution in the Caucasus. Note that under the Musavat government Karabagh was an integral part of Azerbaijan. The indissolubility of the cultural and economic ties of Karabagh and Zangezur with Baku, tens of thousands of workers from these provinces employed in this city, and their absolute isolation from Erivan clearly manifested themselves in 1919. A peasants’ congress of Armenian Karabagh, despite the intolerable conditions of the Musavat regime and the provocative work of Armenian agents, voted for unity with Azerbaijan, provided that Armenians were guaranteed a calm, innocuous life. The letter summed up, saying that “the Muslim mass will take it as betrayal if the Soviet power fails to preserve Azerbaijan in its previous borders and even explain it as Armenophilism and the impotence of this power.” Signers of the document warned the Soviet leadership against any diffidence on the matter of Karabagh and Zangezur “in order to avoid Azerbaijan’s transformation into a sort of bastard fed by the Red Army and shared between Armenia and Georgia.”21 To officialize the recognition of Armenia by Soviet Russia, on June 22, 1920, Chicherin declared the assignment of Boris Legrand as Russia’s plenipotentiary representative to Erivan. In his view, this assignment would establish good-­neighborly relations between the two countries, settle controversial issues, remove differences, and boost peace between Russia and Armenia. At the same time, the mission set the goal of drawing up a treaty between Soviet Russia and Armenia.22 A day after Legrand’s assignment, despite active opposition on the part of Narimanov and the Caucasus Bolsheviks, the Soviet leadership (pressured by Chicherin) made a decision to cease the Red Army’s advance toward Armenia. With reference to a resolution of the Politburo of the CC RCP on June 30, Chicherin stepped up the pressure on Moscow’s representatives in charge of political processes in Azerbaijan. In a telegram to Orjonikidze on July 2 he reported that territorial contact was necessary for Russia at the beginning of the talks with the National Turkish Center of Russia. Hence a treaty with Armenia was required to have contacts through Armenian territory. Chicherin pointed out that a treaty with Armenia was the only way to secure Bolshevik influence in Asia Minor.23 Chicherin tried to persuade Orjonikidze that Soviet Russia needed a compromise with the Armenian Dashnak government:

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The Azerbaijan government declares not only Karabagh and Zangezur but also Sharur-­Daralayaz uyezds as disputed territories. The latter has never been declared disputed and even the Musavat government recognized its belonging to Armenia. Without it, almost nothing of Armenia is left. After long resistance the Armenian peace delegation agreed to admit Karabagh and Zangezur as disputed territories in the hope that a substantial part of them would sooner or later go to Armenia. At the same time, the Armenian party refused to recognize the Sharur-­ Daralayaz uyezd as disputed. However, we need an agreement with the Azerbaijani government to bring our treaty with Armenia into conformity with the demands of Azerbaijan. In considering your enormous influence on official Baku, we kindly ask you to make the Azerbaijani government recognize only Karabagh and Zangezur as disputed, not the Sharur-­Daralayaz uyezds.24 After the enciphered telegram from Chicherin dated July 2, 1920, and discussions with Legrand, the newly appointed plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Russia in Armenia, and Saak Ter-­Gabrielian, Orjonikidze reported to Moscow by direct line: Azerbaijan insists on immediate and unreserved annexation of Kara­ bagh and Zangezur. In my opinion, that is right, since both uyezds economically tend toward Baku and are absolutely isolated from Erivan, especially as the Bayazit Turkish division is edging its way into the region. If these territories remain disputed, they are sure to be occupied by the Turks and the whole Armenian population slaughtered. We are in no position to stymie the process. Their annexation to Azerbaijan would enable local Communists to play their best card and open up the way for nomads. In comrade Gabrielian’s words, the Armenian delegation is sure to agree with this option, for Azerbaijan will be intimidated to retreat from other regions. My belief is that Karabagh and Zangezur are to be annexed to Azerbaijan. I will compel Azerbaijan to declare the autonomy of these regions, but this must come from Azerbaijan and not be specified in the treaty.25 In another report to Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin on a direct line, Orjo­ nikidze openly declared that the Armenian government was misleading ­Moscow: Today Gabrielian told me that in the case of Azerbaijan’s renunciation of Sharur-­Daralayaz uyezd and the Nakhchivan region, the Armenian dele­gation would immediately give its consent to Karabagh and



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­ angezur’s annexation to Azerbaijan. We agreed with him that upon Z our arrival in Baku we would talk with Narimanov in the same vein. As you see, there is no misunderstanding on the matter. I am convinced that Mountainous Karabagh must be annexed to Azerbaijan in the name of consolidation of Soviet power in the country and preservation of Baku. As for the low-­lying region of Karabagh, it has always been Azerbaijani. Also, Azerbaijan stakes its life on the safety of the Armenian population. Let us organize the autonomy here without bringing Muslim military units into the ­region. Orjonikidze further warned that if the issue is solved differently, our position in Azerbaijan will be precarious; even worse, we will lose in Armenia as well. I understand that we may still need Armenia under certain political situations. Do as you please; we will do everything that we are ordered to do. At the same time, I would like to inform you that such an attitude to Azerbaijan is likely to discredit us among broader strata of Azerbaijan and thus boost the spirits of our opponents.26 It should be noted that after the April 1920 Bolshevik coup Orjonikidze for some time had backed Azerbaijan in Azerbaijani-­Georgian and Azerbaijani-­ Armenian relations, which caused discontent in some political circles in Moscow, especially the Russian Foreign Commissariat. It was no mere coincidence that Chicherin blackmailed Orjonikidze (who called him “a hidden Orientalist-­Muslimophile”) for his stance. In reply, Orjonikidze stressed that he had no relation to Muslims and that no Turk had ever been his kin.27 Orjonikidze was well aware who was stirring up trouble, which is why he asked Nadezhda Allilueva, Stalin’s wife, to drop Chicherin from the list of his addressees. He asked: “Where’s Stalin? I’m interested in his view on the subject. Convey to him that Chicherin and Karakhan are seeking to drive me into a corner.”28 The next day Stalin replied: “One cannot endlessly maneuver between the parties; it is definitely essential to back one of the parties, in our case, Azerbaijan and Turkey. I had a talk with Lenin about it; he does not mind.”29 Chicherin, who had a different opinion, sent a telegram to Orjonikidze: We are well aware that sooner or later Armenia will be Sovietized, but it is too early now. The most important thing to do now is to declare Karabagh and Zangezur disputed territories, but we need the consent of the Azerbaijani government. We must conclude an agreement with Armenia, and for this to happen it is essential to declare Karabagh and Zangezur to be disputed.30

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It has to be kept in mind that Chicherin and Karakhan carried out the Foreign Commissariat’s activity by collaborating with Armenia at the expense of Azerbaijan. Failing to oppose this political line, Orjonikidze telegraphed Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin, requesting them not to conclude a peace treaty with Armenia until an Azerbaijani delegation arrived. He wrote: “Local comrades are very nervous about the peace with Armenia without Azerbaijan’s participation.”31 Mikoian, a member of the CC CPA, was of the same opinion and wrote to Orjonikidze on June 29: “We are indignant at Moscow’s policy in respect to Karabagh and Zangezur. I want you to uphold our point of view before the central leadership. We are not against the peace with Armenia but not at the expense of Karabagh and Zangezur.”32 It seemed very strange that Soviet Russia and Dashnak Armenia were conducting secret talks regarding Azerbaijan without Azerbaijani participation and consent. The situation surrounding Armenia was similar to the situation of Georgia a month before. An enciphered telegram from Orjonikidze and Kirov addressed to Lenin and Stalin contained interesting ideas. They believed that the conclusion of a treaty with Georgia without Azerbaijan’s involvement would lead the Soviet policy to collapse: “Why are we concluding an agreement with Georgia but declining to do the same with Azerbaijan? If the Azerbaijani question is solved differently, please let us know about it.” On June 12 the authors sent an enciphered telegram to Moscow: “Karakhan may in no way come out as the leader of eastern policy. The Zakatala scandal is recalled as the scheme of an Armenian.”33 Without a doubt, Karakhan figured prominently in shaping and realizing the anti-­Azerbaijani political line of the Soviet Russian Foreign Commissariat. Enciphered and open documents of this period are illustrative of his villainous, incendiary role in the Karabagh question. Thus Orjonikidze openly confessed: “Karabagh is the second Zakatala of our Foreign Commissariat. The point is the enormous provocation carried out by Armenians in Moscow.”34 In his enciphered telegram of July 19, Chicherin wrote to Legrand: Your proposal, with which Azerbaijan agrees, is that Karabagh goes to Azerbaijan and Zangezur is declared to be disputed, while the rest goes to Armenia. This is unacceptable to the Armenian delegation. Therefore the issue can only be resolved through direct negotiations with the Armenian government. The Armenian delegation in Moscow considers itself unauthorized to make such serious territorial concessions.35 The same day Chicherin sent another telegram to Armenian foreign minister Ohanjanian, trying to persuade him that “all the actions of Soviet Russia in the Caucasus aim to contribute to the development of the Armenian people.” Chicherin added that the question of the Russian-­occupied “disputed terri­



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tories” would be discussed impartially, without worry.36 In turn, Kirov assured Legrand: “Chicherin will be glad if Armenians agree with this decision, give up Karabagh, and accept Zangezur, provided Nakhchivan will go to Armenia. It is your mission to attain this goal in Erivan.”37 Despite Kirov’s strong pressures, however, he failed to draw Russia’s stance nearer to Armenia’s. His talks with people’s commissar Huseinov and Armenian representatives in Tiflis yielded no desirable results. On August 6 Kirov wrote a letter to Chicherin, which said that Azerbaijanis only agreed to cede the Sharur-­Daralayaz uyezd to Armenia, with the rest — ​Nakhchivan uyezd, Ordubad, Julfa, Zangezur, and Karabagh — ​to be owned by Azerbaijan. In turn, Armenian representatives laid their claims to these regions. A principal Azerbaijani argument was that under the Musavat government these lands were owned by Azerbaijan and that their concession today would undermine the authority and prestige of Soviet power in the eyes of the Azerbaijanis, Iranians, and Turks.38 In another telegram to Legrand on July 20, Chicherin, to placate Narimanov, explained the suspension of the Red Army’s advancement toward Armenia, allegedly by an order of the Revolutionary War Council due to the threat of a Turkish presence in Nakhchivan. To set Narimanov at rest, Chicherin wrote to Legrand: “Please explain to comrade Narimanov that, at his urgent request, I demanded that the Revolutionary War Council take measures and protect Azerbaijani lands against the Dashnak aggression.”39 Indignant at Chicherin’s stance on the issue, in early August Narimanov wrote to Shahtakhtinskii, who had arrived in Moscow on July 31 as the ambassador of Azerbaijan: Armenian gangs completely pillaged border villages but this is not a war; rather, it is the occupation of Azerbaijan’s territory. The summary of operations says that the Armenian regular parties are approaching Gerus. Comrade Chicherin tells me that we cannot tolerate the national butchery and that the Azerbaijani military units should join the battle, and so forth. However, why are Armenians allowed to butcher Muslims along the borders with Armenia? Comrade Chicherin must have known that Moscow’s political line would lead to these tragic consequences. In his telegram comrade Chicherin states that I allegedly blame him for the latest developments. In the meanwhile I should have sent dozens of protests. To avoid misunderstanding, we should have pursued a firm political line in respect to this mercenary Armenia.40 As a result of the Moscow and Erivan talks, a treaty was made on August 10, 1920, including six articles. Four articles dealt with an intentionally provoked territorial dispute with Azerbaijan. In a preamble to the agreement Soviet Russia recognized the sovereignty and independence of the Armenian Republic.

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Under article 1 military actions between the Russian Federation troops and the Republic of Armenia were declared ended as of August 10, 1920, at noon. Article 2 noted that, except for an area set forth in the treaty for relocation of Armenian troops, the Russian Army would be stationed in the disputed regions of Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhchivan. Article 3 specified that the occupation of the disputed areas by the Soviet army does not decide the rights of Armenia and Azerbaijan to these territories. In occupying these territories, the Russian Federation aims to create favorable conditions for peaceful resolution to territorial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the grounds to be specified in a peace treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia in the near future. Article 4 made it incumbent upon both parties to cease concentration of military force in either disputed or border territories. Under article 5 it was the mission of the Railway Department of Armenia to operate a Shahtakhty-­ Julfa branch line, provided that this line would not be used for war purposes. Article 6 stipulated free passage to Armenia of military units of the Armenian government beyond areas occupied by the Russian troops.41 It should be noted that the treaty was signed by Legrand as plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Federation and Arshak Jamalian and Artashes Babalian of the Armenian government. On August 13, 1920, Chicherin reported back to the Russian Politburo on the Russian-­Armenian treaty, which was approved.42 In fact the haste with which the treaty between Russia and Armenia was concluded was because the Treaty of Sèvres between Turkey and the Entente was concluded on the same date. Also, the Treaty of Sèvres promised Armenians great dividends, so the Russian diplomats feared that Armenia might be influenced by the Entente. The Treaty of Sèvres became a pivotal external factor that made Chicherin’s haste on the agreement with Armenia. Diplomatically unfinished, the treaty was signed under Moscow’s pressure, and the Red Army-­occupied Azerbaijani lands were promised to Armenia as disputed ones. Armenian leaders frequently reminded Moscow that Britain allegedly attached greater importance to Armenia than to Georgia or Azerbaijan. They explained that the geographical location of Armenia enabled it to act as a bridge for the spread of British domination in the Middle East. Armenia might insidiously be exploited to oppose the Muslim and Turkish world. As for the Soviet policy, the document maintained that “if the Entente and its henchmen try to use the slogan ‘freedom of unfortunate peoples of Turkey suffering from the Ottoman yoke’ they may have luck in Asia Minor.” In that case Armenia might be exploited to set up a buffer state on the Turkish territory. This state, though not purely Soviet, could join the sphere of influence of Soviet Russia.43



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From the very start of Azerbaijan’s Sovietization, its opponents made efforts to declare Azerbaijani lands to be disputed, as was evident in the Russian-­ Armenian treaty above. On June 19, 1920, while in Azerbaijan, Orjonikidze sent telegrams to Lenin and Chicherin declaring that “Soviet power has been proclaimed in Karabagh and Zangezur, and both territories consider themselves a part of Azerbaijan.” He warned: “Azerbaijan cannot do without Karabagh and Zangezur. In my view, it is imperative to call a representative of Azerbaijan to Moscow and jointly address problems concerning Azerbaijan and Armenia, and this must be done before signing a treaty with Armenia, for the same old Zakatala story will ruin us here.”44 The treaty of August 10, 1920, between Soviet Russia and Armenia, in secret from Azerbaijan, came as a result of the political line of the central Bolshevik government, specifically the Russian Foreign Commissariat. This policy was directed at infringing on the interests of Azerbaijan. The treaty was in the hands of the Dashnaks so completely that the Armenian government did not consider it necessary to discuss any territorial or border questions with Azerbaijan. In reply to Huseinov’s proposal to convene a conference for discussion of moot cases, Armenian foreign minister Ohanjanian reported on August 23 that “under a preliminary agreement between representatives of the Armenian government and plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Federation Legrand dated August 10, territorial disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia will be settled to comply with provisions of the peace treaty to be concluded between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia in the near future.”45 The Azerbaijani party suggested holding a conference in Gazakh. Although the Azerbaijani delegation included two Armenians (Isai Dovlatov and Mikoian) and one Georgian (Lominadze), the Armenians refused to attend the conference.46 Armenia’s confidence was due to the fact that the Armenians had appealed to Soviet Russia in May 1920, asking it to mediate in the dispute with Azerbaijan. On behalf of the governments of Soviet Russia and Azerbaijan, K ­ arakhan declared: “Before settling territorial claims, the disputed areas will be occupied by the Red Army. The Russian military command has already given an appropriate order.”47 Some people cherished hopes of giving preference to Armenia in the territorial dispute. For that purpose some senior Moscow officials resorted to lies and provocations. Long before the signing of the treaty, Chicherin wrote a memorandum to Lenin: The Azerbaijani government is laying claim to Karabagh, Zangezur, and Sharur-­Daralayaz uyezd together with Nakhchivan, Ordubad, and ­Julfa. The majority of these regions are actually in the hands of the Armenian Republic. Azerbaijan should dispatch Muslim troops to take these regions back. However, these troops are composed of

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s­ oldiers who are against the Soviet power. So sending Azerbaijani military units against Armenians is absolutely unacceptable. It would be the greatest crime. It is especially unacceptable now that the Turks are on the offensive in the south. As a whole, the matter of military units seems to be rather embarrassing. These units are about to revolt, and the Turks’ approach is likely to speed up the process. It would be appropriate to send them to Persia, but I am not sure that is feasible now. At any rate, it is out of the question if the Azerbaijani soldiers try to fight against Armenians in an attempt to deprive them of regions that the Azerbaijanis claim.48 In his own words, Chicherin was not very well informed on the domestic policy of Azerbaijan, painting a grim picture of future life if the official demands of Baku were met: Another way to satisfy Azerbaijan is to occupy all the named regions with our troops to present them later to Baku. Narimanov kept in mind a situation of this sort. Comrades arriving from the area say that Muslim troops are meant to be withdrawn. The Baku Soviet government through its domestic policy has driven the population into confrontation with a considerable mass of Muslims, so this government is eager to remedy the situation through bribing nationalist-­minded elements by seizing ­localities declared to be disputed. It is not admissible to attain this goal with the help of the Russian military units. Our mission is to be absolutely impartial and disinterested in the dispute. It would be a fatal blow if we give preference to one party in contrast to another. To take an area away from Armenians and give it to Azerbaijanis is only a demonstration of one-­sided, biased policy in the East. Intentionally aggravating the situation, Chicherin saw a way out of the impasse by establishing a Russian occupation regime in the disputed areas. To his thinking, these areas could be given neither to Azerbaijan nor to Armenia. Chicherin approached the issue only within the framework of the Russian-­ Armenian treaty: “On the basis of the military status quo we may hope to reach understanding with Armenia, a prerequisite for implementation for our peace policy in Transcaucasia. Hence everything indicates that we must not occupy new localities, except those already occupied. It is essential for us to conclude a treaty with the Armenian Republic as soon as ­possible.” Chicherin managed to include some of his plans in official documents and instructions that he sent to the Revolutionary War Council of the Caucasus front. On behalf of the CC, he gave an order not to let Azerbaijani or Armenian authorities into the disputed areas.49 However, these allegedly “­disputed



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territories” were actually owned by Azerbaijan and controlled by the Azerbaijani authorities. Thus Chicherin’s order was regarded by official Baku as a gross violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Five days before the treaty was created, the Foreign Commissariat of Azerbaijan drew up a document entitled “Description of the Borders of the Undisputed Territory of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic with Armenia.” The docu­ment was signed by foreign commissar Huseinov and dispatched to Moscow.50 When the treaty with Armenia was being drawn up, Narimanov and H ­ useinov sent the document promptly to Moscow, but this important information about the borderline was ignored. It is easy to see that difficult days were setting in for the new Azerbaijan authorities. On the one hand, guided by the revolutionary impulse, the Azerbaijani Soviet power considered itself to be close to Soviet Russia, which had misappropriated lands that belonged to Azerbaijan under the previous government. Ironically, by seizing Azerbaijan with the help of Azerbaijani Communists, Soviet Russia found new allies in the South Caucasus at the expense of Azerbaijani territories, concluded allied agreements with Armenia and Georgia, and thus projected its “peace-­loving image.” These processes were so repulsive that even Soviet officials who made business trips to Azerbaijan had to admit injustices in respect to the republic. Thus Solov’ev, the chair of the Council of National Economy of the Azerbaijan SSR, wrote: Hopes were pinned on Moscow. But the peace treaties with Georgia and Armenia, which granted some Muslim-­populated parts of the Azerbaijani territory to the said republics, has undermined if not completely ended faith in Russia. In fact Moscow not only seized Azerbaijan but also expanded Georgia and Armenia with Azerbaijani lands. It seemed to be a perfect humiliation: when negotiating with Georgia, an Azerbaijani delegation included Georgians; when negotiating with Armenia, it included Armenians as well. Why then were Azerbaijanis not in the Georgian and Armenian delegations? The treaty with Armenia left a painful impression: part of the Azerbaijani territory was populated exclusively by Muslims; a railway of enormous strategic and economic importance was granted to Armenia; the sole corridor linking Azerbaijan with Turkey was destroyed. Suffice it to say that some members of the Azerbaijan Communist Party explained this treaty as having been made on the instructions of influential Armenians from the central Soviet leadership, calling themselves Communists but being in fact conscientious or unintentional nationalists.51 Prior to the April occupation Muslim Communists treated the foreign policy of the Azerbaijani national government mockingly and wrote to Moscow

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that de jure recognition of Azerbaijan by the Paris Peace Conference would ensure the territorial integrity and security of the republic. However, this diplomatic campaign would be a failure.52 Now they were utterly depressed and linked all the troubles of Azerbaijan to the schemes of Armenians in the central leadership as was evident from their numerous letters to Moscow. On July 15, 1920, an extraordinary and plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan to Moscow was appointed. Shahtakhtinskii was one of the first to protest against the Russian-­Armenian treaty, although it did not help. A letter on August 13 to Lenin says that Shahtakhtinskii learned about the treaty from newspapers and naturally had no idea about the treaty’s articles: Placing the Shahtakhty-­Erivan (about 100 versts) and Shakhtahty-­Julfa (identical) railways with all their rolling stock at Armenia’s disposal means that the Dashnaks will be in control of the whole of Persian Azerbaijan and be linked to British forces in Persia, while we will be deprived of any ties with the Turkish revolutionary movement.... Over the past few years the population of Nakhchivan has been upholding its independence. The intervention of Britain forcibly granted the region to the Dashnaks, despite its population’s protests. As soon as the British left the region, an uprising broke out. Regular Dashnak troops with their numerous artillery, machine guns, and armored cars were defeated utterly. The transfer of the region with its workers who struggled for three years against the enemy and reunited with Azerbaijan, the region where there are no Armenians, openly violates a universal principle of self-­determination of peoples as well as the inalienable rights of Soviet Azerbaijan.53 Azerbaijani foreign commissar Huseinov openly confessed to Krestinskii that rumors were afloat among the population that “Russians have come to conquer Azerbaijan and that the independence of our republic has been violated and that the Red Army is the same tsarist army.”54 Despite desperate attempts by Azerbaijan to resist the treaty, Orjonikidze (who had earlier opposed its signing) after secret and open pressure from Moscow sent a telegram to Chicherin promising to comply strictly with the treaty’s clauses of August 10.55 The same day Chicherin received a second telegram from Orjonikidze, which said: “I repeat once again: the treaty with Armenia of August 10, 1920, must be strictly observed.”56 It was reckless advocacy on behalf of the Armenians by Chicherin, despite the views of the authorized Russian agent in Armenia, Legrand, as well as patronage of Armenia in his statements of August 11 and 21 that angered Legrand in Tiflis. On August 29 he wrote to Chicherin: “Armenians are engaged in cashing in on some local questions. Your statements of August 11 and 21 fail to impress people and neglect the provocative nature of Ohanjanian’s speech.”57



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It should be observed that Narimanov was indignant at the tyranny of Soviet Russia on the subject of Azerbaijan. He understood very well that Chicherin, an ardent critic of the eastern policy that Narimanov advocated, and his aide Karakhan were running the show in these provocations. Their top position in the Soviet establishment enabled them to pursue the foreign political line of the Soviets, especially the eastern policy. They were very negative about Azerbaijan and built the South Caucasus policy of Soviet Russia in regard to Armenian and Georgian factors even though these two republics had not yet been Sovietized. Chicherin’s anti-­Azerbaijani policy was per­ceptibly affected not only by the Armenian Karakhan but by other factors as well. Former tsarist diplomat Chicherin matured in the pro-­Armenian traditions of the Russian Empire’s eastern policy, including the Caucasus. Chicherin’s Armenophilism was natural, for this diplomatic mutant absorbed the identifying features of tsarist official and Soviet commissar. Confrontation between Chicherin and Narimanov sprang from the conflict of worldviews. Narimanov later wrote to Abilov, a plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Azerbaijan to Turkey, that the “ideas of Chicherin in conformity with the eastern policy are absolutely erroneous.... We made a voluminous report on the eastern policy of Chicherin and criticized it to death.”58 In turn, Chicherin wrote to Stalin: “To give benefits to Islam, we have to reckon that one day the anti-­Bolshevik tendency may prove to be stronger than the anti-­British one. I have always warned against the one-­sided view on Islam only, represented by Narimanov.”59 When in conflict with Chicherin, Narimanov sought salvation from Lenin, who had earlier given “firm ­promises” to remedy the situation prior to the Sovietization. Still with faith in L ­ enin’s just stand on the Azerbaijani issue, Narimanov wrote in mid-­July: A telegram from Chicherin reveals that you are being informed uni­ laterally or that the central leadership is submitting to these people, who, together with Denikin supporters, are acting against the Soviet power in Azerbaijan. If Moscow is ready to sacrifice Azerbaijan and leave Baku because of its self-­interest (that is, oil) let it be so! However, I want to warn you: Baku cannot be held without all of Azerbaijan in the neighborhood of traitors — ​the Dashnaks and Georgian Mensheviks. On the other hand, I would like to know Moscow’s relation to us as Muslims and the ways in which it is going to solve major issues without our participation. The central leadership is distrustful of us, but there are senior officials such as Orjonikidze and Mdivani who disagree with the Center’s decision. I will level with you; Moscow has weakened us and through its Karabagh decisions left us with no arguments against Musavatists, who repeat over and over again that Muslim Communists have allegedly sold Azerbaijan to Russia, which recognizes the

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independence of Armenia and Georgia and concurrently believes that undisputed Azerbaijani lands are disputed. Comrade Chicherin tells us about subordination to Moscow’s policy but says nothing of the ­fallacies that we are compelled to serve. We are plainly told: “You cannot secure absolutely indisputable Azerbaijani lands but instead waffle about the liberation of the East.” At the end of this grievous message Narimanov added: “Our representative is leaving today, so I kindly ask you to suspend Moscow’s decision on Azer­ baijan.”60 In another letter to Lenin the Azerbaijani leader warned about a serious danger threatening Azerbaijan: “The situation is very hard. The Soviet leadership recognized the independence of Georgia and Armenia then Azerbaijan; however, indisputably Azerbaijani lands are granted to Armenia. Should these lands be granted to Georgia, it would be possible to oppose public opinion; however, it is an irremediable mistake to give them to Armenia, the Dashnaks.”61 It has to be kept in mind that letters of this sort shook the Moscow’s faith in Narimanov’s loyalty. On July 19, 1920, a certain Karl Lander, a special All-­Russian Extraordinary Commission agent, secretly telegraphed Krestinskii, Viacheslav Menzhinskii, Feliks Dzerzhinskii, and Lenin, saying that “Azerbaijan’s political line fills us with serious misgivings. There is an obvious tendency toward self-­sufficiency. The rightist nationalistic wing is headed by Narimanov.”62 A meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPA was held on August 26, 1920, at Narimanov’s request. The meeting concerned aggravation of territorial disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia (which was patronized by Russia). The Politburo adopted a decision to assign Aliheydar Shirvani (­Mustafabeyov) as extraordinary commissar of Azerbaijan for Karabagh and Zangezur and Armenak Karakozov as his deputy.63 Narimanov’s apprehension was due to the Bolshevik army of Soviet Russia’s disarmament of the entire Muslim population while it shut its eyes to the arming of the Armenian population. The Azerbaijan SSR home secretary’s authorized agent, S. Atayev, told the people’s commissar, Hamid Sultanov, that Shirvani’s arrival in Shusha “marked no substantial progress in the work of the Revolutionary Committee’s apparatus.”64 He wrote: all Armenians call themselves Communists but none of them has any reliable documents to confirm his Party affiliation. All of them are Communists as of April 28, 1920. When auditing the work of financial and food departments, controllers reveal huge funds sent only to the ­mountainous Armenian villages while ravaged and ruined ­Muslim



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v­ illages receive nothing. The Party is composed of 900 Armenians (Russia has failed to set up an organization of this type over three years) who enjoy the widest popularity among broader masses, including the support of a local guard battalion consisting of Armenians only. The Party is armed to ignore any orders regarding weaponry possession. “We are Party members,” say members of this organization when asked about any weaponry. By the way, all of the mountainous Armenian villages are armed to obey agents of the Ararat government only and to disobey the surplus-­appropriation system. The Party dispatches its agents to the Armenian villages, but it is unknown what they are doing there.65 Despite the Narimanov’s tough opposition, Soviet leaders preferred to humiliate Azerbaijan to comply with the Russian Foreign Commissariat’s policy. In a diplomatic dispatch of July 20 addressed to Narimanov, Chicherin sarcastically noted: Until now, none of your or Orjonikidze’s telegrams has explained properly why occupation of Karabagh and Zangezur by Russian troops does not suit you and local Communists and why a formal annexation to Azerbaijan is required.... We need to establish relations with Armenia in cases where Turkey sets out against us; in this case Armenia, though Dashnakist, will turn against us as an outpost to oppose the aggressive Turks.66 In another letter Chicherin warned the Politburo that Armenian-­ Azerbaijani relations had to be approached from a Turkish policy standpoint: “When discussing Armenian-­Azerbaijani disputes I stressed time and again that in cases of Turkish conquests in the Caucasus Armenia would be a barrier to protect us.”67 Rakhman Mustafa-­zade, a researcher into the Russian-­Azerbaijani relations of 1918 to 1922, comes to the conclusion that as the positions of Soviet Russia in Azerbaijan strengthened, Azerbaijan turned into a sort of “contributor” in the regional policy of the Bolsheviks to please Georgia and Armenia at the expense of its natural reserves and annexed territories, and thus created favorable conditions for the Sovietization of Armenia.68 In Narimanov’s words: Armenia, which has always backed Denikin, gained its independence together with territories of Azerbaijan. So did Georgia, with its double-­ faced political line. Of all three Caucasus republics, Azerbaijan was the first to have flung itself into Soviet Russia’s arms and now has lost its territories and independence.69

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Legrand sent an encoded telegram to Lenin on September 23, 1920, that defined Soviet Russia’s plans regarding Azerbaijani territories: “[It is] not at all terrible to give Zangezur and Nakhchivan to Armenia.”70 In a telegram of October 24, 1920, addressed to Chicherin, Legrand described his arrangements with Armenians concerning Azerbaijani territories: Armenians categorically insist on granting them Nakhchivan and Zangezur. I replied that the issue cannot be solved without Azerbaijan’s participation and that if Armenia gives up Karabagh we can raise the question with Azerbaijan. Following long discussions, the Armenians agreed, with the proviso to abandon their claims for Karabagh.71 This renunciation turned out to be short-­lived, however, and at the end of November 1920, after the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia, the struggle for the mountainous part of Karabagh reached a new stage. The chief aim was to take the mountainous part of Karabagh away from Azerbaijan with the help of Moscow and give it to Armenia.

Sovietization of Armenia: The Karabagh Issue on the Agenda The establishment of Soviet power in Armenia on November 29, 1920, gave the Communists advantages to put the Karabagh problem on the agenda again. But Armenians saw the revolutionary romanticism in the spirit of the “brother­hood of the world proletariat” only through the prism of their own interests. Owing to the proclamation of Soviet power in Armenia, Narimanov as chair of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee and Huseinov as people’s commissar of foreign affairs sent a welcoming telegram to the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia on November 30. There were serious discrepancies between the text of this telegram and the decision of a November 30 joint meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B). Also, the famous speech that Narimanov made at a solemn meeting of the Baku Council on the occasion of establishment of the Soviet power in Armenia in many ways contradicted the declaration that he read on December 1, 1920: Soviet Azerbaijan, in accordance with the goals of the struggle of the fraternal Armenian working people against the power of the Dashnaks, who have been making our best friends, the Communists, shed their innocent blood within Armenia and Zangezur, declares that from now on no territorial question may become a reason for mutual bloodletting by the two centuries-­old neighboring peoples: Armenians and Muslims. The territory of the Zangezur and Nakhchivan provinces is an



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integral part of Soviet Armenia. The working peasants of Mountainous Karabagh are given the full right to self-­determination; all military actions within Zangezur will be stopped; and Soviet Azerbaijan’s troops will be withdrawn.72 It should be stressed that the text of the declaration of December 1 contradicts the decisions made by the CC CPA (B) on November 4 and 30. At a meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPA (B) on November 4, 1920, when some Azerbaijan-­related provisions of the draft of the Russian-­Armenian treaty were discussed in the presence of Stalin and Orjonikidze, it was decided that “the article assuming transfer of Nakhchivan and Zangezur to Armenia was not beneficial either politically or strategically.” However, as a counterbalance to this decision and in connection with the Soviet power’s victory in Armenia, the CC CPA (B) at its meeting on November 30 decided to transfer Zangezur to Armenia. That decision did not touch upon the question of ­Nakhchivan at all.73 Thus it is not a mere coincidence that Legrand in his telegram to Orjonikidze on December 2 said that of the three mentioned Azerbaijani territories Soviet Russia recognized only that Zangezur had become part of Armenia.74 At the same time, the declaration drafted based on a decision of November 30 and read by Narimanov on December 1 mentions Nakhchivan, in addition to Zangezur, as a territory to be transferred to Armenia. The text of the declaration publicized in the Baku press was falsified by Orjonikidze before it was reported in newspapers. In a ciphered telegram to Legrand and Chicherin on December 1, he wrote: “Azerbaijan has already responded by passing Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Mountainous Karabagh to Soviet Armenia.”75 He sent a similar report to Lenin and Stalin on December 2: “Yesterday, Azerbaijan already declared the transfer of Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Mountainous Karabagh to Soviet Armenia.”76 This “happy” news was published by Pravda on December 4, 1920. A question arises: was Orjonikidze unaware of the matter or did he purposefully mislead the leadership of the country and the public? After the Soviet power was established in Armenia (proclaimed in the Azerbaijani provincial center Gazakh, although the Armenian bordering town Dilijan was noted in the documents upon a request from Armenian Communists), Orjonikidze reported his own interpretation of the text of Narimanov’s declaration in a direct telephone conversation with Amayak Nazaretian. In particular, Orjonikidze noted: At a solemn meeting of the council in Baku today, Narimanov read the declaration of the Azerbaijani government indicating that there are no more borders between Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan, that the

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territory of the Zangezur and Nakhchivan provinces is henceforth an inseparable part of Soviet Armenia, and that Armenians of Mountainous Karabagh are given the right to self-­determination. Azerbaijan’s riches — ​oil and kerosene — ​are the property of both union republics. This news caused a strong surge of emotion in Nazaretian, who exclaimed: “We’ll begin to shout ‘Bravo, Azerbaijanis!’ in the press.”77 Evidently Narimanov’s December 1, 1920, declaration endured an outwardly insignificant but in fact essential distortion. According to the Baku-­ based newspapers Kommunist (December 2, 1920) and Bakinskii Rabochii (December 3, 1920), the point was giving Mountainous Karabagh’s working peasants the “right to self-­determination,” but the Armenia-­based news­ paper Kommunist (December 7, 1920) alleged “recognition of Mountainous Karabagh as a constituent part of the Armenian Socialist Republic.” The question arises: did those in Armenia see the true text of the declaration? Apart from Orjonikidze’s words and written correspondence, another telegram containing the text of the declaration sent to the Armenian Revolutionary Committee was signed by Narimanov and Huseinov. Based on this document, Askanaz Mravian, a member of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia, reported to Saak Ter-­Gabrielian, the Armenian envoy to Moscow, that Azerbaijan declared that Zangezur and Nakhchivan joined Armenia and reported a referendum in Mountainous Karabagh.78 Even later, in the collection of documents entitled “Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Power in Armenia” published in Erivan in 1957, the text of a declaration was published that is identical to the original, which is stored at the Central State Archive of Armenia.79 Nevertheless, since the mid-­1980s Armenian authors have preferred not the original text but its “corrected” version. Why did Narimanov’s declaration contain the idea of ceding Zangezur and Nakhchivan to Armenia? This actually was proposed by Moscow’s Politburo of the CC RCP (B); Orjonikidze was the main proponent of the idea. Jörg Baberowski claims that Narimanov was forced to promise to cede Zangezur, Karabagh, and Nakhchivan to Armenia in the summer of 1920 because of pressure from Orjonikidze.80 Yet on November 4, 1920, during Stalin’s ­notable tour of the Caucasus, participants in a joint meeting of the CC CPA (B) and the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) heard Legrand’s report on the situ­ ation in Armenia and made an appropriate decision. The decision’s point “b” pertaining to the treaty between Russia and Armenia under discussion noted: “At the same time, the Politburo’s opinion that the treaty’s clause envisioning the ceding of Nakhchivan and Zangezur to Armenia is not beneficial either politically or strategically and thus can take place only in the worst case.”



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Point “d” instructed Narimanov to substantiate the Politburo’s opinion about ­Nakhchivan and Zangezur.81 As we can see, the Karabagh problem did not exist at all at the time and hence was not under discussion. A diplomatic mission from Soviet Russia arrived in Erivan on November 20, 1920. One of the mission’s earliest steps was to track the course of negotiations in Gumru (old Alexandropol) between Turkey and Armenia and look into Armenia’s territorial claims against Azerbaijan and Georgia. As people’s commissar of foreign affairs of the RSFSR Chicherin received information that “the existence of the Armenian people now depends not on war strength but rather on diplomacy. It would be appropriate to rid the Party of romanticism and become armed with rigorous realism.”82 But why did Orjonikidze, who had recognized that Zangezur belonged to Azerbaijan, suddenly give up his convictions? In reality he wanted to drive a wedge between Azerbaijan and Turkey by ceding Zangezur to Armenia, in order to reduce Turkey’s threat to Azerbaijan to zero. On his way from Baku to Moscow on November 23, 1920, Stalin reported to Lenin from Rostov-­onDon in a direct telephone conversation that according to Orjonikidze the key danger now was that the Turks wanted to have a common border with Azerbaijan. In connection with this, Orjonikidze suggested foiling the Turks’ plans by ceding Zangezur to Armenia.83 For this reason the Turks viewed the treaty between Soviet Russia and Dashnak Armenia (as well as friendly relations between these countries following Sovietization of Armenia) as a barrier on Turkey’s path toward the Muslim nations of the Caucasus.84 To prevent this, on November 30, 1920, the CC CPA (B), pressured by Orjonikidze, made a decision assuming the ceding of Zangezur to Armenia. Though the ceding of part of Zangezur Province took place in the context of Armenia’s Sovietization-­related revolutionary pathos, the “concept” of Azerbaijan’s voluntary ceding of the upper part of Karabagh was not realized. All the further crucial decisions in the region were to be made through diplomatic games, while Azerbaijan became the captive of a series of resolutions of the Caucasus Bureau of the RCP (B). On June 3, 1921, a meeting of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) was held, attended by Orjonikidze; Filipp Makharadze; Narimanov; Alexandre Miasnikov; Ivan Orakhelashvili; Nazaretian; Iurii (Iakov) Figatner; Grigorii Kaminskii, Caucasus Bureau member candidate and secretary of the CC CPA; and Shalva Eliava, a member of the CC of the Communist Party of Georgia (CPG). The agenda of the plenum’s evening meeting raised three issues: (1) the Azerbaijani question; (2) the Zangezur question, and (3) nomads. The decisions on the first and third questions are reflected in protocol 6. Concerning the second question,

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however, instead of presenting the text of the very resolution, it says: “see the appendix to the protocol.”85 Such formalization of a Party document was made intentionally. First, the Caucasus Bureau’s seven-­point decision on the Zangezur question was classified as “top secret,” while protocol 6 had no such classification, which contradicted the rules of office work. Second, only six of the seven points of the “secret” decisions concerned Zangezur, while point 5 concerning Mountainous Karabagh read: “To indicate in the Armenian government’s declaration that Mountainous Karabagh belongs to Armenia.”86 In other words, in a “top secret” document Armenia was instructed to announce a governmental declaration indicating that Mountainous Karabagh belonged to Armenia. In Armenian editions, this Party document was presented in a form not classified as “top secret”; furthermore, newspapers intentionally ignore the fact that Mountainous Karabagh was included in the document under the heading of the “Zangezur question.”87 It should be noted that the Caucasus Bureau was not authorized to make such a decision: on May 2, 1921, the CC plenum instructed not the Caucasus Bureau but a presidium of three men — ​ Orjonikidze, Makharadze, and Figatner — ​to carry on all the work between plenums.88 Evidently the Caucasus Bureau turned out to be in the hands of a handful of people, with Azerbaijan not even represented in this presidium. Based on this decision, the Council of People’s Commissars of Armenia issued a decree on June 12 to link the Mountainous part of Karabagh to Armenia: On the basis of a Declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and an accord between the Socialist Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is proclaimed that Mountainous Karabagh from now on is an inseparable part of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia.89 This decree, signed on June 12 by Alexandre Miasnikov (Martuni) and M. Karabekian, was discussed on June 15 by the CC of the Communist Party of Armenia, which resolved “to publish the decree on linking Mountainous Karabagh to Soviet Armenia.” The meeting’s fifth point was “On sending an envoy to Karabagh.” The decision was “to send comrade Mravian, together with Pirumov, Akop Ioanisian, Ter-­Simonian, and a group of other comrades to Karabagh.”90 In accordance with this decision, the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia published the governmental decree in the press only on June 19, after a one-­week delay. Askanaz Mravian was appointed as an extraordinary envoy to Mountainous Karabagh. A day after the publication of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia’s decree in the press, for with the purpose of making this document effective and strengthening positions in Zangezur as a



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source of arms to take over Karabagh, on June 20 the CC of the Communist Party of Armenia made a decision “On Strengthening of Underground Work in Zangezur by Sending New Workers There.”91 In this connection, Sarkis Lukashin (Sarkis Srapionian) as chair of the Economic Council of Armenia and justice commissar Artashes Karinian were sent on a mission to Zangezur on June 28. According to a decision of the CC of the Communist Party of Armenia on June 28, Boghos Makintsian, who had held the post of interior minister in the Armenian government since May 1921, was sent to Zangezur as an extraordinary envoy. Ter-­Simonian, the post and telegraph commissar, was appointed as chair of the Zangezur Revolutionary Committee. He was instructed to leave immediately “to occupy Gerus.” Also, the CC CP of Armenia asked Isai Dovlatov to send aides to Askanaz Mravian.92 These behind-­thescenes secret Party decisions caused protests and disturbances of the predominantly Muslim population of Zangezur, however, so both commissars of Armenia had to return to Erivan in early August. At a meeting of the CC CP of Armenia on August 7 Makintsian and Ter-­Simonian were blamed for having fled Zangezur without having agreed with the CC and left their posts. A new decision sent Ter-­Simonian to Zangezur on a two-­month mission on the authority of the CC CP Armenia and Council of People’s Commissars.93 A study of the text of the decree of the CPC of Armenia of June 12 shows the utter bankruptcy of the reference to the declaration of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee, which contained no hint about the transfer of Mountainous Karabagh to Armenia or that no “agreement” between the two republics was reached. In fact the authors of the so-­called decree copied the “top secret” decision on the “Zangezur question” that had been made by the Orjonikidze-­chaired meeting of the Caucasus Bureau (with Figatner as secretary) on June 3. It is easy to understand why the June 12 decree contains no reference to the Caucasus Bureau’s June 3 decision. First, that was prevented by the “top secret” mark. Second, the Caucasus Bureau was not authorized to issue such a resolution. It should be noted that the government of Armenia made the initial step to get Mountainous Karabagh ceded to Armenia in the spring of 1921, when governmental circles drafted a six-­point document entitled “Key Provisions of the Question on Linking Mountainous Karabagh to the Republic of Armenia.” It indicated that Mountainous Karabagh was separated from Lower Karabagh by a natural border in the form of a low ridge. Armenians undoubtedly cared about this mountainous ridge as well, believing that it should be linked to Mountainous Karabagh for two reasons. First, this area was allegedly used by the Armenian population; second, although the ridge did not contain a lot of arable land, it was capable of supplying the local population with bread. Of no less interest is the document’s fifth clause: “As Mountainous Karabagh

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becomes linked to the Republic of Armenia, so-­called Kurdistan occupying a narrow mountainous ridge between Karabagh and Zangezur must naturally be linked to Armenia as well. However, owing to the specific location of this region and the continuing existence of nationalistic tendencies among the population, certain complications of this question may arise.”94 The document’s sixth and final clause quite clearly discloses the ­intention of the Armenian government: “south of Kurdistan along the Hakari ­Valley are the Kaladarasi and Jamilli communities, largely populated by settled Armenians. The highway passes this strip, so this is the only way to link Mountainous Karabagh to Zangezur for the purposes of creating a common administrative unit and common rule. Without this link it would be senseless to cede Mountainous Karabagh to the Republic of Armenia.”95 For these reasons, and having no legal grounds, in May 1921 the Armenian government made a unilateral decision to link Mountainous Karabagh to Armenia.96 On May 23, 1921, the plenum of the CC CP of Armenia appointed Hakop Ioanisian as Armenia’s commissioner to Mountainous Karabagh. To receive instructions from Alexander Bekzadian, he was recalled from Baku to Tiflis by telegraph. The same plenum discussed the question of a revolutionary committee of the Alexandropol Province. Drastamat Ter-­Simonian was appointed as a commissar of the Daralayaz province. Having listened to Pirumov’s report concerning a Zangezur commission statement, they made the following decision: “To abstain from passing the note to Azerbaijan until the question of Mountainous Karabagh is clarified at the forthcoming plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the RCP (B).”97 Thus in May Armenia began taking practical steps to have Mountainous Karabagh linked to it. Armenia also knew that the question of Mountainous Karabagh would be discussed at a plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) in June. Hence Armenians sought ways of realizing this illegiti­ mate step and its “legal” formalization through a Caucasus Bureau decision. This necessitated a “recommendation” from the Caucasus Bureau to Armenia and the decision of June 3 assuming the ceding of Mountainous Karabagh. In turn the leadership of Azerbaijan took a series of preventive organizational measures relating to the Karabagh question in May 1921. Armenak Karakozov, who had kept a leading post at the extraordinary commissariat of Karabagh and Zangezur from May 1920 to January 1921, returned to Azerbaijan after approximately one year of service at the Economic Council of Armenia. In its decree of May 3, 1921, the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee appointed him as an extraordinary commissar for Karabagh and Zangezur. However, as Armenia had unilaterally proclaimed Mountainous Karabagh to be an “inseparable part” by that time, the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee was not in a hurry to send Karakozov endowed with “extraordinary, unlimited



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powers” to Karabagh, not to mention that Narimanov described Karakozov as “having one foot in Armenia and the other in Azerbaijan.”98 On May 15 the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee recalled its May 3 mandate to Karakozov and shifted him to the position of deputy extraordinary commissar for the Karabagh district. In its decree of May 15 the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee appointed Bashir Buniyatov as a temporary extraordinary commissar for the Karabagh district.99 When Kirov later began to lead the Party organization of Azerbaijan, however, he had Karakozov sent to Karabagh as a representative. A decision of a joint meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B) on February 5, 1922, says that “Comrade Karakozov will receive work-­related directives from the CC CPA.”100 The second part of the decision oddly noted that Karakozov would be delegated as “a representative of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee and the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia and the CC CPA.” It appears that the CC CPA (B), actually led unilaterally by Kirov or on instructions from above, at the same time regarded Karakozov as a representative of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia to Karabagh. It becomes evident from protocol 3 of the meeting of the Caucasus Bureau plenum that Narimanov attended the work of the plenum and that decisions against his rivals were made on the agenda’s first point. Sarkis Ter-­Danelian was immediately dismissed, while the CC CPA(B) was told to change the working positions of Habib Jabiyev, Ruhulla Akhundov, Suren Agamirov, Ol’ga Shatunovskaia, and Grigorii Lordkipanidze in a way that would not damage the work of the Baku committee.101 Analysis of documents of that critical period shows that Narimanov, who was actually left alone and without support (Kaminskii definitely could not support him) at the June 3 meeting, probably did not voice his attitude toward the Caucasus Bureau’s decision but decided to continue to struggle with the help of the republican bodies. But the Caucasus Bureau’s secret decision on the “Zangezur question” signed by Figatner and stamped by the Caucasus Bureau was sent to all bureau members, including those in Baku, such as Narimanov.102 As we can see now, the lack of immediate reaction and protest from Azerbaijan on the occasion of the illegitimate inclusion of the Karabagh-­related article led Armenians to strengthen their claims to Karabagh and take practical steps in this direction. The protocol of a June 4 meeting of the Caucasus Bureau plenum also illustrates that other leaders of Azerbaijan, including Mukhtar Hajiyev, chair of the Central Executive Committee; Kaminskii and Akhundov as secretaries of the CC CPA (B); and Sarkis as secretary of the Baku Committee also were in Tiflis and attended the plenum that day.103 They were present because the agenda of the June 3–4 plenum of the Caucasus Bureau included many questions concerning Azerbaijan. Despite being in Tiflis, none of them

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except for Narimanov and Kaminskii attended the June 3 evening meeting of the plenum, though “the Azerbaijani question” — ​about an extraordinary congress of the CPA (B) — ​was the first item on the agenda. Documents illustrate that on the morning of June 3 Hajiyev as chair of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) complained that he had not been provided a special train because he had no relation to the “Azerbaijani question.”104 Akhundov and Sarkis, at a June 4 meeting of the plenum, made a broad report to convene an extraordinary congress of the CPA (B),105 though this matter had been examined a day before. Although the leading figures mentioned above did not attend the June 3 evening meeting of the plenum, it is hard to prove that they were not informed about the Mountainous Karabagh decision made within the framework of the “Zangezur question.” Another factor is also worthy of note. The Azerbaijani leadership impatiently waited for news about the victory of Soviet power in Armenia and Georgia. Narimanov himself displayed great interest in this. Before Azerbaijan was Sovietized he had been assured by Moscow that “a campaign against Armenia” was planned and was prepared to make significant concessions for the sake of the triumph of the socialist idea in the neighboring republic.106 He told the first all-­Azerbaijani congress of Soviets in May 1921: “We need to create the type of atmosphere that makes Armenian workers and the poorest peasants feel that living under the Bolsheviks is better than living under the Dashnaks. Comrades, I tell you that this entirely depends on us. Little Azerbaijan should also think of Georgia and Armenia and should provide the life of these two republics.”107 The June plenum of the Caucasus Bureau included other strange events as well. For instance, the twelfth point of the agenda of a June 3 morning meeting was about confirmation of the composition of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia. According to a list set up beforehand and submitted for approval, Mravian as commissar of foreign affairs should have been among the members of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia. According to a decision of the plenum of the CC of the Communist Party of Armenia, however, he did not become a member of the Revolutionary Committee but kept the post of commissar of foreign affairs.108 The reason for such discord was clarified later the same day when a decision on Karabagh was suddenly made within the framework of the “Zangezur question.” It is easy to guess that the Armenian leaders had planned to use Mravian in the context of the Karabagh question, so on June 19 he was appointed as a Revolutionary Committee of Armenia representative to Mountainous Karabagh. What was the true motivation of such hasty, illegitimate actions of the Armenian leadership and Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) in May–June 1921 over the ceding of Mountainous Karabagh to Armenia? A Kirov-­led commission, which had been established at a plenum of the Caucasus Bureau on



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May 2, 1921,109 should have commenced work in Tiflis on June 15 to settle border matters and specify the interior borders among the Transcaucasian republics. Thus the Caucasus Bureau, by its June 3 decision, and the Armenian government, by its June 12 decree assuming Mountainous Karabagh’s link to Armenia, wanted to make Azerbaijan a fait accompli on the eve of the Tiflis discussions. On May 23, 1921, the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan included Huseinov as commissar of foreign affairs and Samed agha Aghamal­ yoghlu as deputy chair of the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan, a delegation that was to arrive in Tiflis to discuss border questions.110 The composition of the delegation was later expanded due to the significance of these negotiations. On June 13, 1921, the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan approved new members for the Azerbaijani delegation, including Huseinov, Hajiyev (chair of the republic’s CEC), his deputy Aghamalyoghlu, and Dr. Mahammad Rza Vekilov. They were authorized to draw borders for the Azerbaijani SSR, Soviet Armenia, and Soviet Georgia at a conference to open in Tiflis on June 15.111 The instructions from the Council of People’s Commissars were definite and simple: to display as much activity as possible to defend and preserve the republic’s borders. On June 14 Narimanov sent a telegram by telephone to Huseinov: “As resolved by the Council of ­People’s Commissars, today you must leave for Tiflis to take part in discussion of the question of borders at a meeting of the commission on June 15. Hajiyev, Aghamalyoghlu, and Dr. Vekilov will follow you.”112 At its meeting on June 26, 1921, the Azerbaijani Council of People’s Commissars discussed a report by Aliheydar Garayev about his tour to Mountainous Karabagh and Nakhchivan. It was considered expedient to form a group of three persons (Shahtakhtinskii, Vezirov, and Aliyev) to study Armenia’s claims to Mountainous Karabagh and draft a detailed report for the ­Council of ­People’s Commissars. In addition, the Council of People’s Commissars decided to cancel the authority assigned to Mravian by the Armenian government until the work of this group was finished and to inform Orjonikidze, Alexandre Miasnikov (chair of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia), Garayev (naval commissar of Azerbaijan), and Mravian himself about this.113 In a telegraphed message on June 27 Narimanov informed Orjonikidze and Miasnikov that the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan unanimously viewed the unilateral solution of the Mountainous Karabagh problem by the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia without discussing the problem at the Armenian Council of People’s Commissars and the appointment of “comrade Mravian” as Armenia’s extraordinary envoy to Mountainous Karabagh as “an unprecedented political and tactical mistake.” On behalf of the Council of People’s Commissars, Narimanov asked that Mravian be recalled immediately.114 Kirov, who had been elected as first secretary of the

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CC CPA (B) in July 1921, requested the text of Garayev’s report on Mountainous Karabagh at a meeting of the Council of People’s Commissars on June 26.115 However, Aliheydar Shirvani, business manager of the Council of ­People’s Commissars, replied that Garayev had made an oral report speech at the June 26 meeting and that no shorthand record had been made, so it was not possible to restore the text.116 A joint meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B) was held on June 27. Following discussion of the issue “On Borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia,” the Politburo and Orgburo declared a question on Mountainous Karabagh from Alexander Bekzadian to be illegitimate, because Mountainous Karabagh was indisputably tied economically to Azerbaijan. Hence the proposal assuming separate places of residence of the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations in Armenia and Azerbaijan could not be accepted from the point of administrative and economic expediency. The only solution to the problem, as noted in Narimanov’s declaration, was to involve the Armenian and Muslim (Azerbaijani) populations in the villages in the broad construction of the Soviet system; this matter was to remain open ­until information from Tiflis was obtained. Narimanov instructed that Tiflis should be informed of this decision of the Politburo and Orgburo.117 Yet, during the meeting, Shirvani reported this decision to Huseinov in Tiflis and added: “The Council of People’s Commissars also joins this resolution. Comrade Narimanov asked me to tell you that the matter should be settled only in this way; otherwise, the Council of People’s Commissars will not accept any responsibility. If Soviet Armenia desires to impress the Dashnaks and nonpartisan masses of Armenia, do not forget that in doing so we are restoring the same anti-­Soviet groups as the Dashnaks in Azerbaijan.” At that moment Narimanov came up to the telephone and continued the conversation with Huseinov: “Tell them that this is the opinion of the Politburo and Orgburo. If they are referring to my declaration, it literally reads as follows: ‘Mountainous Karabagh will be given the right to free self-­determination.’” Huseinov promised to report on the processes in Tiflis in detail during a personal meeting but added: “Our decision, without a doubt, will be received very coldly.” He also reminded Narimanov about a conversation that he had held with Orjonikidze a day before: “Yesterday I talked to comrade Sergo, who directly says that the Karabagh issue is a question of the honor of all Soviet republics and that it must be solved exactly in the manner that I told you yesterday.” Narimanov added that “today a telegram was sent to you and a copy of the telegram to Sergo, Miasnikov, and Garayev, about the recall of comrade Mravian from Karabagh.”118 Huseinov noted that the situation had become very difficult and that they needed to seek a solution:



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I suppose that first of all we have to discuss the question in detail because, on the one hand, the Council of People’s Commissars of Armenia composes a declaration and sends its extraordinary envoy to Karabagh without our knowledge, though our comrade Armenians allege that all this has been done with our knowledge and consent. On the other hand, we send them a telegram that nearly annuls their decisions. I do not know what to do. Narimanov replied not quite confidently: “I think that the matter should be discussed once again, as I do not know another solution. Certainly, now I will now seek advice from comrade Sergo and will report to you once more before leaving.” Huseinov asked Narimanov to tell Orjonikidze that “if he becomes acquainted with the material we currently have, he will be against it. When you bring all this material to Tiflis, it will become evident that our comrades the Armenians think solely about the territory, not about the prosperity of the poorest population of Armenians and Muslims or about strengthening the Revolution.” A question arises: who gave the Armenians the right to make decisions on behalf of the Azerbaijani leadership? In saying “Armenians do everything with our consent,” Huseinov was apparently hinting at Narimanov’s silence at a meeting of the Caucasus Bureau on June 3. Narimanov’s inaction undoubtedly played a negative though temporary role in the discussion of the Karabagh question, But further developments illustrated that the ones giving “anonymous” consent to Armenians on behalf of Azerbaijan were the people with real power in the Caucasus in their hands: Orjonikidze and Kirov. They sought ways of ceding Karabagh to the Armenians and submitted the concept of division of Karabagh on a national ethnic basis, as reported by Alexander Bekzadian to Narimanov in a telegram on June 26: If you want to know our opinion, it is as follows: for the final solution of all discord and establishment of truly friendly relations under the solution of the question of Upper Karabagh, it is necessary to proceed from the following principle: none of the Armenian villages should be linked to Azerbaijan, and none of the Muslim villages should be linked to ­Armenia.119 Having received Narimanov’s instructions, on June 27 Huseinov submitted the matter for discussion to the Caucasus Bureau, which resolved as follows: To convene an extraordinary plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP and send the following telegram to comrades Narimanov and Miasnikov: “The presidium of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP

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proposes to you, upon receipt of this message, to leave immediately for the extraordinary meeting of the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau. The question of demarcation of the republics is on the agenda. Six members of the Caucasus Bureau are currently in Tiflis. If you fail to arrive, the decision made by the Caucasus Bureau’s six members in Tiflis will be considered binding. Thus we insist upon your immediate arrival.”120 The next meeting of the Council of People’s Commissars chaired by Narimanov was held on June 28. Miasnikov’s declaration proclaiming Mountainous Karabagh “a part” of the Armenian SSR was discussed and subsequently rejected; the recall of Mravian, Armenia’s extraordinary envoy to Mountainous Karabagh, was demanded. The government noted in its decision: “Owing to comrade Narimanov’s visit to Tiflis to discuss the question at the Caucasus Bureau, the Politburo and Orgburo’s resolution on the matter of June 27, 1921, should be viewed as a guide.”121 Owing to Armenia’s growing claims on the mountainous part of Karabagh, Bashir Buniyatov (chair of the Shusha provincial executive committee) submitted to Narimanov and Hamid Sultanov (people’s commissar of internal affairs) a report “On the Position of Shusha Province,” noting: The Armenian segment of the population [of Mountainous Karabagh] has no aspiration to separate from the Azerbaijan SSR, first, because they are perfectly aware that they will die if they are cut off from the lowlands; second, they will receive nothing but circular orders from hungry, poverty-­stricken people of Zangezur; and third, they know that, as a part of the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR, they will always have a strong voice, the voice of those who demand and hope that their demands will be met first, unlike what will happen in the Armenian SSR.... And the statement of the Armenian segment of the population that they are allegedly stepsons in the Azerbaijan SSR is nothing but the tactless, inappropriate behavior of some workers.122

Formation of the Mountainous Karabagh Autonomous District as a Part of Soviet Azerbaijan Putting aside historical and ethnographic factors, only the economic link between Karabagh and Azerbaijan was taken as the basis of the decision of a meeting of the Caucasus Bureau of the RCP (B) on June 27, 1921. Nevertheless, at the next plenum of the Caucasus Bureau on July 4, with Stalin in attendance, a vote was held. Kirov, a leader-­to-be of the Party organization of Azerbaijan, and Orjonikidze, who directly controlled the republic, voted for the following resolution: “Mountainous Karabagh will be included in the



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composition of the Armenian SSR; a plebiscite will be held only in Mountainous Karabagh.”123 Attending the plenum were Stalin as a member of the CC RCP, and members of the Caucasus Bureau Orjonikidze, Makharadze, Narimanov, Miasni­ kov, Kirov, Nazaretian, Ivan Orakhelashvili, and Figatner. The discussion of the Karabagh question revealed two points of view. Votes were held on the following questions. (1) Karabagh will remain a part of Azerbaijan (voting in favor: Narimanov, Makharadze, and Nazaretian; against: Orjonikidze, Miasnikov, Kirov, and Figatner). (2) A plebiscite will be held throughout Karabagh with the participation of the whole population of Armenians and Muslims (voting in favor: Narimanov and Makharadze). (3) The Mountainous part of Karabagh will be included in the composition of Armenia (voting in favor: Orjonikidze, Miasnikov, Figatner, and Kirov). (4) The plebiscite will be held only within Mountainous Karabagh, that is, among Armenians (voting in ­favor: Orjonikidze, Miasnikov, Figatner, Kirov, and Nazaretian).124 In addition, the protocol contains the following note: comrade Orakhel­ ashvili was absent from the voting on the Karabagh question. This seemed more honest than the votes of Kirov (who was to lead the Azerbaijani Party organization) and Orjonikidze (who had repeatedly telegraphed Lenin and Chicherin demanding that the upper and the lower parts of Karabagh remain a part of Azerbaijan) on the last two questions, involving for Mountainous Karabagh’s inclusion in Armenia. This led to a decision against the territorial integrity of the republic. Here an interesting question arises: Orjonikidze and Kirov, who just months earlier had insisted that Mountainous Karabagh remain a part of Azerbaijan and “could not imagine Azerbaijan without Karabagh,” for some reason radically changed their views in June–July 1921. What caused this? As Moscow’s trusted envoys to the Southern Caucasus, they both synchronically voted against Azerbaijan’s interests at the July 4 meeting of the Caucasus Bureau. This appears to be the result of secret instructions from Moscow, which becomes clear if we consider a report on the work done in 1920–21 submitted by the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR to the 9th All-­Russian Congress of Soviets. This document speaks of Mountainous Karabagh as follows: “In July, an agreement was concluded with Azerbaijan over Mountainous Karabagh, which is to be included in the composition of Soviet Armenia.”125 Note the dates: the report in question was drafted at the end of December 1921 and speaks of an event that did not happen: no agreement over Mountainous Karabagh’s inclusion in Soviet Armenia was signed in July 1921. Thus the report reflects not the fact of a concluded agreement but the content of the instructions from the RSFSR People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to

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Map 5.1. The South Caucasus after 1921 and the establishment of national borders between the Caucasus republics and Turkey on the basis of the Moscow and Kars Treaties of 1921. The map shows the formation of the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabagh from Mountainous Karabagh. The arrow indicates that Nakhchivan is part of Azerbaijan.

the Caucasus Bureau and Moscow executives in the Southern Caucasus. These instructions were in the internal circulation of documents of the ­People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, so the composer of the report, who was unaware of the real situation automatically included its contents as fact. In fact, making Mountainous Karabagh a subject of secret discussions in June–July 1921 and later a subject of open discussions at the Caucasus Bureau and attempts to cede Mountainous Karabagh to Armenia by force were linked with the Moscow Treaty between Soviet Russia and Turkey concluded on March 16, 1921, which contained a separate clause stipulating that Nakhchivan would remain a part of Azerbaijan. After these attempts failed, on July 5, as a compensation for the failure of efforts to cede Nakhchivan to Armenia, the card of autonomy for Mountainous Karabagh was played, in Orjonikidze’s typical rough fashion. In mid-­1921 Orjonikidze began behaving as the true lord of the Caucasus; his inflated self-­appraisal bordered on Bonapartism. Permanent intrigue at high levels of the Party and among Soviet authorities of the Southern Caucasus were directly caused by his arrogance in contacting people. Narimanov later wrote: Before leaving for Genoa, comrade Stalin once told me: “Sergo [Orjonikidze] became demoralized.” No, he did not become demoralized,



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but he was made demoralized as his state of mind was overestimated.... He thought that the Revolution’s only salvation was to fight. He used every kind of trick at the last congress of the Communist organizations of Transcaucasia to kill his enemies. It is a shame to speak of all this.126 Narimanov used to believe that “[a]ny work is unthinkable as long as Sergo and Kirov remain in the Caucasus.”127 After the July 4 decision by the Caucasus Bureau, its text and the political motivations behind it were subjected to various interpretations, even falsifications. In analyzing this decision, academician Tofig Köçerli wrote: “Armenian authors performed a ‘small’ operation upon this decision: they replaced the expression ‘remain’ with the verb ‘transfer.’”128 The statement of Narimanov, who demanded that the Karabagh question should be resolved through a final decision of the CC RCP, put the participants of the meeting to the test. Literally, his statement was as follows: “Owing to the importance of the Karabagh question for Azerbaijan, I believe that it is up to the CC RCP finally to decide it.” Thanks only to Narimanov’s sharp protest, the meeting made its final decision in the following formulation: “As the Karabagh question has caused strong discord, the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP considers it necessary to transfer it to a final decision of the CC RCP.”129 As we can see, the “Karabagh question” was examined as the fifth issue and Narimanov’s statement as the sixth issue, at the same meeting. The decision made on the sixth question fully rescinded the results of the previous voting. In any case, the majority of the participants in the plenum voted for Nari­ manov’s statement, though this decision was not submitted for consideration to the CC RCP (B). This happened primarily because Orjonikidze gave up his erroneous of the day before and, together with Nazaretian, suggested revising the previous plenum’s resolution on Karabagh.130 As a result of harsh opposition by Narimanov and revision of ­Orjonikidze’s previous view, the Caucasus Bureau plenum on July 5 discussed the agenda’s second question and made the following decision: (a) proceeding from the necessity of national peace between Muslims and Armenians, economic links between Upper Karabagh and Lower Karabagh, and its permanent link with Azerbaijan, Mountainous Karabagh will remain within the boundaries of the Azerbaijan SSR and possess a broad district autonomy administratively centered in the town of Shusha, which is part of the autonomous district; (b) to instruct the CC of Azerbaijan to specify the borders of the autonomous district and submit them for approval to the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP; (c) to instruct the presidium of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC to negotiate with the CC of Armenia and the CC of Azerbaijan

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over a candidate for extraordinary envoy to Mountainous Karabagh; (d) the degree of Mountainous Karabagh’s autonomy will be determined by the CC of Azerbaijan and submitted for approval to the Caucasus Bureau of the CC.131 The Armenian side explains the cancellation of the first “fair decision” on linking Mountainous Karabagh to Armenia by the unexpected visit to Tiflis of Stalin, who allegedly rendered protection to Azerbaijanis in his peculiar manner. Why do Armenian historians, in falsifying the known documents of the Caucasus Bureau, connect the “remaining” (as they say, “transition”) of Mountainous Karabagh as a part of Azerbaijan with the name of Stalin? First, this was related to a large-­scale unveiling of Stalin’s crimes during the breakdown of the USSR, so Armenians had the opportunity to present themselves as victims of the Stalin regime and against this background to allege that the breakdown of the Soviet Union would bring a restoration of justice. Armenian authors and politicians who explain the transition of Mountainous Karabagh to Azerbaijan only as “Stalin’s will” are seeking the favor of the international community, as it “became fashionable to blame Stalin for all of the hardships.”132 These “errors” are repeated in the works of foreign Armenian authors. They claim that, in the name of national unity, the Communist Party “solved” the territorial issues that had caused so many difficulties for the Republic of Armenia through fiat on July 5, 1921. Lori was added to Soviet Armenia, while Karabagh and Nakhchivan were given to Azerbaijan.133 Let us consider protocol 11 of a meeting of the Caucasus Bureau plenum on July 4 and protocol 12 of the July 5 meeting. It is obvious, first, that Stalin attended both meetings and, second, that he did not speak on the Karabagh question on either July 4 or July 5. Protocol 8 (see the details given below) of the meeting of the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) of July 2 and July 3 is stored at the same archive with the protocols of the July 4 and July 5 meetings. All the protocols mention the name of Stalin as the first of those present.134 An attachment to protocol 8 states that “formation of nationalistic ‘Communist’ groups in Transcaucasus Communist organizations is stronger in Georgia and Armenia and weaker (in terms of quantity and quality) in Azerbaijan.”135 Indeed, the discussion of the Zangezur question on June 3, 1921, and the Mountainous Karabagh question on July 4–5 had direct links to the Nakhchivan question, as had been reflected in the March 1921 Moscow Treaty between Soviet Russia and Turkey that caused a rise of Communist nationalism in Armenia, and to Moscow’s attempts to quiet down this nationalism. The Armenian delegate to the Moscow negotiations, commissar Bekzadian, sent a long letter of protest to Chicherin on April 15, 1921, harshly accusing



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S­ oviet Russia of having failed to stand for the interests of Armenians at the talks with Turkey: “The Armenian delegation considers it essential that the Turkish delegation to the conference at all times acted as a defender and protector of the Muslim population of Transcaucasia, particularly the interests of Soviet Azerbaijan.” Bekzadian was particularly concerned that Turkey managed to keep Nakhchivan as a part of Azerbaijan, a very important region in terms of the security of Turkey’s eastern borders. He stressed: “The resolution of the Nakhchivan and Sharur-­Daralayaz question adopted at the conference deprives Armenia of the opportunity to normally govern what it owns — ​Zangezur.”136 Chicherin wrote to Ter-­Gabrielian — ​the representative of the Armenian Soviet government — ​that he was greatly surprised by Bekzadian’s attempt to whitewash the actions of the Armenian delegation at the Moscow conference and blame the Russian delegation for everything. He noted that the Armenians had been perfectly aware of the key objective of this conference. Despite Chicherin’s special permanent contacts with the Armenian delegates, they never complained about the decisions made.137 Chicherin sent approximately the same telegram to Legrand in Tiflis, writing: “I’d like to protest the actions of Bekzadian, who has tried, first, to make the Russian delegation guilty and, second, to protect the Armenian delegation from accusations by certain readers or listeners that I do not know by perverting the facts and concealing what the Armenian delegation could not know.”138 Possibly the Armenians used such blackmail to seize the moment to misappropriate Karabagh and receive strong backing from Moscow in the context of closed-­door discussions at the Moscow Soviet-­Turkish conference. The Armenian leaders, who kept silent during the Moscow conference and now forwarded claims against Soviet Russia, desired compensation. Karabagh was chosen as a specific “subject of compensation.” The repeated discussions of the Mountainous Karabagh question on July 5 occurred at the insistence of Orjonikidze and Nazaretian, as shown above. For clear reasons, some Armenian authors distort reality by writing that it was not Nazaretian but Narimanov who raised this question jointly with Orjo­ nikidze.139 The erroneous statement that Mountainous Karabagh became part of Azerbaijan due to a July 5 decision by Stalin alone recurred in an article by Vladimir Zakharov and Sergei Sarkisian published in Moscow.140 However, we know that Stalin had been in Tiflis since the end of June and hence could not have arrived there “unexpectedly” on July 5. As a representative of the central Soviet leadership, Stalin and Armenophile Chicherin influenced the making of the Caucasus Bureau’s first decision on the transition of Mountainous Karabagh to Armenia. Stalin suggested this concept in Baku in November 1920. However, the first decision of the Caucasus Bureau plenum on

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July 4 was so disputed and so strongly countered Transcaucasus Communists’ views formed during an entire year of discussions that on the same day it was decided to submit the question to an extended meeting of the CC RCP (B). Hence the July 4 decision was denounced later the same day. In addition, it becomes evident from Lenin’s telegram to Orjonikidze that he was very surprised by Stalin’s actions in Tiflis. Stalin — ​one of the creators of the empire — ​was eager to create disputed situations that he later masterfully manipulated. Why did Stalin arrive in Tiflis at all? The answer can be found in the materials of a plenum of the CC of the Communist Party of Georgian (CPG) that took place simultaneously with the Caucasus Bureau’s plenum. The plenum of the Caucasus Bureau continued its work on July 7 and, with Stalin in attendance, made a decision to link a neutral area between Georgia and Armenia to Armenia. The second issue at the same meeting was a proposal to cede the regions of Akhalkalak and Khram to Armenia. The question was submitted to the CC CPG to be further submitted to the next plenum.141 Documents illustrate that on the same day a plenum of the CC CPG (B) was held and attended by all the Caucasus Bureau members except Narimanov. The protocol even contains a note that members of the Caucasus Bureau came to the meeting at 11:00 a.m. and Stalin and Orjonikidze at 12:25. The Batum question was discussed first. The bureau asked Stalin to make a report about the course of his talks with the delegation of Ajaria. The next question related to Narimanov’s statement at a July 5 meeting of the Caucasus Bureau that it was essential to strengthen work among the Muslim population of Georgia. The plenum proposed to the CC CPG to use Omar Faig Nemanzade for this purpose.142 The agenda of a Party CC plenum on July 7 included a question “On the Establishment of a People’s Commissariat for the Affairs of Muslims of Georgia.” The plenum approved only the establishment of a special agency for the affairs of Muslims of Georgia and, to specify the organizational forms and functions of the agency, created the commission led by Nemanzade, consisting of Kavtaradze, Kvirkveliia, and Tumanov. Also, the CC CPA was requested to send three to four Muslim Communists to create a nucleus of the agency. The plenum discussed two more questions (“On the Press” and “On the Operation of Georgia’s Extraordinary Commission”) then moved to the main agenda item that made Stalin come from Nalchik to Tiflis: changing the leadership of Georgia. Taking into consideration the sad situation in the country, Stalin suggested dismissing Makharadze from the post of chair of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia and replacing him with Budu Mdivani. Following the vote on the issue (six in favor, four abstentions; including the Caucasus Bureau members, nine votes in favor and four abstentions), Mdivani was appointed as chair of the Georgian Revolutionary Committee.143



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For years Armenian and some Russian historians have made unsuccessful attempts to find a “Karabagh track” in Stalin’s sudden arrival from Nalchik in Tiflis in July 1921. But the true objective of this arrival was to take G ­ eorgia away from Filipp Makharadze, who pursued a more or less independent policy and confronted Orjonikidze, and pass it to Budu Mdivani, who was more closely linked to Moscow. In November of the same year Orjonikidze demanded removal of Makharadze not only from Georgia but also from the Caucasus. On November 2, 1921, he wrote to Lenin and Stalin that “it is quite necessary to remove Filipp from the Caucasus.”144 The Dashnak revolt in Zangezur was finally suppressed on July 13, 1921. This immediately affected the destiny of Mountainous Karabagh. On July 16 the CC CP (B) of Armenia held a meeting to discuss the results of the Caucasus Bureau’s plenum. For some reason the Armenian Communists decided to continue to struggle for Akhalkalak but took quite a contrary position concerning the Karabagh question. In fact, they made an apostate recommendation. As the Caucasus Bureau’s decision was not good for Armenia, this question should no longer be submitted for consideration to the Caucasus Bureau: a specific, clearly formulated question on the essence of the autonomy should be submitted to the next meeting.145 On July 19, 1921, the presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan discussed the July 5 decision of the Caucasus Bureau and the general results of Narimanov’s visit to Tiflis. In regard to Narimanov’s report, the following resolution was adopted: “Mountainous Karabagh will remain an inseparable part of Soviet Azerbaijan with the right to internal self-­governance within the frame of the Soviet Constitution, to be headed by a district executive committee.”146 Aside from this, Narimanov made a report on the establishment of Azerbaijan’s external borders with the rest of the republics of the Southern Caucasus. He noted: Owing to the existence of considerable working masses in Shusha, the point is about the establishment (apart from a district executive committee) of the urban executive committee of Shusha. The CC CPA should do the same with regard to Party organizations in Mountainous Karabagh by creating the urban Party committee jointly with the district one. Interrelations among the district executive committee, the urban one, and Party committees are similar to those in Baku [that is, between the Baku Party Committee and the CC CPA].147 Following a meeting of the presidium of the Azerbaijani CEC, on July 20 the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B) heard Garayev’s informational report about the situation in Karabagh and decided to create a commission consisting of representatives of the Commissariats of Internal Affairs, Justice,

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and Foreign Affairs to draft a constitution for the autonomous district. An extract from this resolution was sent to S. Chvanov (at the People’s Commissariat of Justice), Hamid Sultanov (at the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs), and Andrei Andreev (at the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs). The decision allowed Surkhai Adygezalov to keep the post of secretary of the Shusha provincial committee of the Communist Party for a certain period.148 Though the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) on July 5 made a decision that Karabagh would remain a part of Azerbaijan, various Armenian organizations continued taking destructive actions against Azerbaijan. On July 23, in a telegram from Shusha, Garayev reported to Narimanov and Huseinov: Comrade Ter-­Simonian, the extraordinary envoy of Soviet Armenia, in his order in the Muslim, Russian, and Armenian languages, announced in Gerus that Karabagh’s upper part would be linked to Soviet Armenia. This provocation was accompanied by Ter-­Simonian’s appointment of Musayev [Ojaggulu Musayev] as extraordinary envoy to Kurdistan. In connection with this, the political situation in Shusha is extremely complicated, though it is getting better little by little. Ter-­ Simonian disquiets the Gubadli provincial executive committee in a desire to link it to Zangezur at any possible price. As for the Minkend area, Musayev disbanded local executive committees and created certain revolutionary committees. It is necessary to take any possible action to put an end to the bacchanalia and undertake decisive measures against Ter-­Simonian. This telegram contains Narimanov’s resolution: “To the Caucasus Bureau: Wire a request to take measures.”149 In addition, by a decision of the Politburo and the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the ACP (B) dated August 8, Ojaggulu Musayev was expelled from the Communist Party for abuse of authority and for interference in party and Soviet work in Kurdistan.150 The so-­called Karabagh case was submitted for discussion to the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B) on September 26, 1921. Following the discussion, they decided to ask the Caucasus Bureau once more to explore the opportunity of providing autonomy to Mountainous Karabagh and to refrain from declaring the autonomy until this decision appeared. Narimanov and Bunyadzade were against this decision. They believed that the Caucasus Bureau should make a decision to grant the status of autonomy to Mountainous Karabagh as soon as possible. To collect materials on the matter under discussion, a commission was created consisting of Garayev, Mejid Efendiyev, Stukalov, and Mirzoian. This commission was to leave for Karabagh on a mission after the session of the Azerbaijani CEC was over. At the same time,



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this c­ ommission was to lead the Party and Soviet work in Karabagh.151 To strengthen this decision, the Orgburo of the CC CPA discussed this matter again on October 6 in the absence of Narimanov and told the commission that every­one but Stukalov was to leave for Karabagh not later than October 9. In the meantime the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan instructed commissar of financial affairs Nasir Taghiyev to assign 1 billion rubles for four Karabagh provinces and pass this money to the departing commission; told commissar of internal affairs Mir Jafar Baghirov to appoint authorized persons to accompany the commission; and ordered naval commissar Garayev to give the commission 500 sets of uniforms for the Karabagh militia and provide three kilograms of quinine for Karabagh to fight malaria.152 Having examined the situation in Karabagh, on October 21 the commission, jointly with the Organizational Bureau of the CC CPA (B), held a conference of authorized workers including both Azerbaijanis and Armenians in Karabagh (Shusha, Javanshir, Gubadly, and Karyagin). After a report by Garayev and multihour debates on this topic, the conference decided that it was not expedient to convert Mountainous Karabagh into an autonomous district.153 The commission made a report concerning its visit to Karabagh; based on materials of the conference of authorized workers, the report was submitted for discussion to the Orgburo of the CC on October 24. Upon completion of the discussions, the Azerbaijani State Political Department was instructed to strengthen the struggle against banditry in Karabagh. The commission decided to try to find 1.5 billion rubles for the four provinces within a short period. The Commissariat of Land suggested sending authorized commissions to settle land disputes. It was also considered expedient to reorganize the Party and Soviet work in all four provinces. As a first step, Shamil Mahmudbeyov was removed from the post of chair of the executive committee of the Shusha province and replaced by Aligulu Babayev. The decision of the Orgburo created a special commission consisting of representatives of the Commissariats of Land, the Navy, and Internal Affairs, in order to define the borders of the autonomous part of Karabagh.154 This happened despite the fact that three days earlier a conference attended by members of the Orgburo of the CC CPA (B) and a wide circle of Karabagh’s leaders had considered it inexpedient to grant the status of autonomous district to Mountainous Karabagh. Following the decision of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) on granting autonomy to the mountainous part of Karabagh, Moscow attentively traced any small nuances in this direction. On May 22, 1922, in a letter to the first secretary of the CC CPA (B) Kirov, Stalin sarcastically asked: “Do they say that ‘the true Karabagh native’ Fonshtein represents Karabagh at the CEC of Azerbaijan?”155 In a reply on June 18 Kirov explained to Stalin that someone

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had misled him and enumerated the CEC members from Karabagh: Ahmedov; Arzanian; Alekperov; Mamedkhanov; Mirzabekiants, and Ildyrym. The CEC membership candidates were Hajibeyli, Avetisov, Khanbudagov, and Hajiyev. Aside from this, Mirzabekiants was appointed as a commissar of the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan.156 At the same time, Moscow made certain efforts to prevent inclusion of the Karabagh Party in the Azerbaijani Communist Party. Armenians failed to achieve this goal because of Moscow’s influence. However, on August 1, 1922, Kirov, secretary of the CC CPA, and Ivan Matiushin, head of the organizational department, telegraphed Moscow, reporting that “the territory of Karabagh is becoming part of Azerbaijan and, hence, its Party organization is a part of the CPA.”157 A certain lull followed the July 5, 1921, decision. On the initiative of Kirov and Orjonikidze, however, on October 27, 1922, a meeting of the presidium of the Transcaucasus Regional Committee was held that decided to instruct the CC CPA (B) to take practical steps to put into effect the Caucasus Bureau’s July 5 decision. The Karabagh Committee, a body established by the Transcaucasus Regional Committee at the end of 1922, drafted proposals on May 20, 1923, entitled “Draft of Resolution of the Karabagh Question.” On June 20 this draft was submitted to the presidium of the CC CPA for discussion. At its meeting on July 1, 1923, the presidium of the CC CPA (B) proposed to the CEC to formalize the autonomy of Mountainous Karabagh centered in Khankendi legislatively. Following the decision of the presidium of the CC, the decree should have indicated that borders and other questions pertaining to Mountainous Karabagh would be resolved by a special commission. Before an executive committee was formed, a revolutionary committee consisting of five persons led by Karakozov and a district Party committee consisting of five persons led by Manutsian should be created. To demarcate the borders of Mountainous Karabagh, it suggested establishing a commission led by Garayev including Armenak Karakozov, Ivan Sviridov, Chingiz Ildyrym, and Dadash Bunyadzade. The commission should submit its proposals to the presidium of the CC within seven days.158 On July 4 these proposals were approved at a meeting of the presidium of the CEC. In paragraph 1 of its decision the CEC noted: “An autonomous Karabagh district will be formed in Karabagh’s upper part centered in Khankendi.”159 After two years of preparatory work, the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan finally issued a decree on July 7, 1923, to form an Autonomous Karabagh district as a part of the Azerbaijan SSR. The decree signed by Mir Bashir Gasymov, deputy chair of the CEC of Azerbaijan, Mahmud Khanbudagov, secretary of the CEC, read:



The Sovietization of Armenia 157

Elimination of national oppression and inequality, no matter what form it takes, and replacement of national hostility and hatred with the international solidarity of workers and fraternal cooperation of peoples in a common state union is one of the key tasks of the workers-­ peasants’ revolution and Soviet power. To execute this task, the Azerbaijani Central Executive Committee of Soviets resolves: 1. to make the Armenian part of Mountainous Karabagh an autonomous district, as a constituent part of the Azerbaijani SSR, with its center in a locality of Khankendi.160 That was the end of the struggle over Mountainous Karabagh’s territorial status in the early years of Soviet power in Transcaucasia. Kirov, who led Azerbaijan, said the following about Mountainous Karabagh’s autonomy at the 6th Congress of the CPA (B) in May 1924: “Our greatest achievement in this sphere is that the so-­called Karabagh matter has been settled to a significant extent, if not completely. This issue is one of the questions dictated by the Transcaucasus Federation.”161 Narimanov, having analyzed this process, wrote to Stalin on May 27, 1924: Mountainous Karabagh has been declared an autonomous district due to Mirzoian’s intensified pressure. Under my rule, this was not possible, not because I was against this autonomy but simply because the Armenian peasants did not want this. During this period, Mirzoian, who enjoyed the help of the Dashnak teachers, prepared grounds and passed the question through the Transcaucasus Regional Committee.162 Narimanov realized perfectly that this was not the end of Azerbaijan’s troubles. He foresaw that granting autonomy to Mountainous Karabagh was not an end but the beginning of a future tragedy. Narimanov wrote: “Further, the point is about the mountainous part of Ganja, and so forth. The Dashnak policy in Azerbaijan is in full swing. I have no doubt that the CC RCP in the face of Sergo and Stalin distrusts us, as Turks, and that Armenian Dashnaks have been instructed to determine the fate of Azerbaijan.”163 A long-­term tragedy initiated by the provision of autonomy to Mountainous Karabagh had its roots, as Narimanov used to say, in trusting strangers. In effect, a delayed-­action bomb was placed under Azerbaijani statehood, in order to cause an explosion when Russia left the Caucasus. Orjonikidze’s idea “to declare autonomy in Karabagh and organize the Armenian population” in July 1920 passed the test of time.164 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Karabagh question became an efficient mechanism of controlling the region in Russia’s hands.

6

Collaboration after Occupation Drawing South Caucasus Borders after Sovietization

F

ollowing the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, the question of relations with Turkey formed the pivot point of the foreign policy of the new Bolshevik government. The Ottoman Empire with its indisputable services to the independence of Azerbaijan in May 1918 and the liberation of Baku from the country’s enemies had collapsed, with its top officials scattered across the globe, and the search for reliable allies to combat England resulted in some major failures. Former war minister Enver pasha, who played a fairly important role in the destiny of Azerbaijan, tried jointly with the Russian Bolsheviks to put up a front against England. Such a political line keeping a balance between yesterday’s animosity and today’s alliance reflected the irony of fate rather than reality. Enver pasha’s desire to agree with the Bolsheviks in Moscow and liberate Anatolia enabled the Bolsheviks to invade Azerbaijan under the pretext of campaigning against Turkey.

Soviet Azerbaijan in Russian-­Turkish Relations On the eve of the 1920 April occupation, the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party had twice (on April 20 and 23) discussed Enver pasha’s appeal regarding the publication of the two Turkish newspapers in Moscow and at the last meeting decided to render material aid to Enver and his associates.1 One of these newspapers was to be circulated in Turkey and the other in Muslim countries outside the Russian Federation. The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs opined that the agreement with Russia banned propaganda outside Russia while restrictions of this sort were applied inside the country. Taking that into consideration, Bolsheviks hoped that Enver pasha’s news­ papers would represent Soviet Russia as a savior of all the oppressed peoples of the East. Chicherin wrote to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party: 158



Collaboration after Occupation 159

Owing to differences between Enver and the Kemalists, he cannot publish his newspapers anywhere but Russia. It is of the utmost importance for us to support those far from the Kemalists and thus exert greater pressure on the latter. Note that Enver has already helped us in our relations with the Kemalists. He is a very subtle politician proficient in all the refinements of policy. We suggest that he publish two newspapers and that we render him all possible assistance; also, we want to instruct Communists proficient in Turkish to monitor the said newspapers and regularly inform us about their content. In his memorandum Enver pasha stresses the necessary formalities to start issuing these two news­ papers; he does not touch upon subsidies. At present, this question needs to be resolved in principle.2 In fact Enver pasha was flirting with the Bolsheviks, as would German emperor Wilhelm II in due time.3 While political figures of old Turkey sought salvation from Russia, patriots of new Turkey stirred up action against the Entente and were ready to collaborate with Russia at the expense of the Caucasus republics. On the eve of the offensive on Baku, Orjonikidze reported to Lenin and Chicherin that “the leader of the national movement in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal pasha, demands that Azerbaijan let the Soviet troops into the borders with Turkey to protect them against the British attacks.”4 As early as the autumn of 1919 the Turkish emissaries in Azerbaijan, headed by Khalil Kut pasha, aimed “to draw the Soviet influence nearer to the Turkish borders” by the spring of 1920. In his memoirs Khalil pasha wrote that extension of Soviet boundaries to Turkey meant surrender of Azerbaijan to the Russians. Azerbaijan is a part of my homeland; we have made so many efforts to gain sovereignty for this country that I regard it as a betrayal to place Azerbaijan under Russian control regardless of political reasons. While we were fighting in Anatolia for independence, this step seemed to me and other Turkish pashas to be nothing other than moral suicide.5 Nevertheless, Kazım Karabekir pasha, who was in charge of the Turkish eastern policy, continued to instruct Turkish officers heading for Azerbaijan as follows: At present the Musavatist government is governing in Azerbaijan. Despite my repeated messages, they are not helping us by considering Turkey dead already. However, sooner or later we are sure to overwhelm the Armenians. Without a doubt, Bolsheviks will cross the Caucasus Ridge in a day or two, so the government of Azerbaijan should,

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without further delay, establish ties with the Bolsheviks and foster rapprochement between the Turks and Bolsheviks in the tributaries of the Arpachay River.6 Under the current political conditions in the spring of 1920, the leaders of the Turkish national movement regarded the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence by the Paris Peace Conference and the Entente’s attempt to prevent consolidation between Turkey and Soviet Russia as directed against the Anatolian national movement. Contributing to this idea was secret information from Turkish Communists in the Caucasus about collaboration between the Azerbaijan government and the British against Bolshevism contributed to this idea.7 Simultaneously, the Turkish Communists provided the central Bolshevik press with materials of the alleged Communist nature of the national movement in Anatolia. On April 1920 the newspaper Izvestiia published a report from Vladikavkaz entitled “Turkish Revolutionaries Stand Up for Soviet Russia.” It noted that a revolutionary committee had been established at the conference of Anatolian provinces to liberate Turkey. A resolution of the conference declared that Soviet Russia was the exclusive savior of the peoples of the East.8 Following numerous anxious reports from the command of the Eastern Army and Turkish Communists of the Caucasus about the possibility of making an agreement with the Bolsheviks and the British, a newly formed Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) decided to collaborate with Russia. On April 26, 1920, Kazım Karabekir pasha was informed about the GNAT’s consent to act jointly with the Bolsheviks. With that end in view, he was empowered to organize, instruct, and send a special mission to Baku. At the same time, a letter written by Mustafa Kemal pasha on behalf of the GNAT was sent to the Soviet government via Novorossiisk: First, we assume the responsibility to unite our work and all our mili­ tary operations with Russian Bolsheviks aiming to combat imperialistic governments and liberate all the oppressed. Second, if the Soviets intend to launch military operations against Georgia or make G ­ eorgia join the alliance diplomatically and then oust the British from the Caucasus, the Turkish government undertakes to start combat operations against imperialistic Armenia and assumes the responsibility to compel the Azerbaijan Republic to join the Soviet republics. Third, in order to oust the imperialist forces occupying our lands, populated by our ­people, and to strengthen our internal resources for continuation of our common struggle against imperialism, we ask Soviet Russia to



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grant us 5 million Turkish liras in gold, arms, and ammunition, as well as the needed military-­technical means and foodstuffs for our army, which is to be used in the East, as the Soviet authorities demand.9 Though an April 26 letter from Mustafa Kemal pasha addressed to the Soviet government was accompanied by a great deal of talk, in reality this letter played no great role in the Bolshevik occupation of Azerbaijan. The letter reached Moscow on June 3, long after the occupation of Azerbaijan by the Russian troops. Nevertheless, the message from the Turkish revolutionary government was heartily welcomed in Moscow. As soon as the letter was received, Chicherin immediately informed Lenin about it. A reply was prepared the same day, and on June 4 a message written by Chicherin was sent to Ankara.10 During this same time, the Soviet leadership received information about the Anatolian movement from the first Turkish representatives who arrived in Moscow. Following completion of their mission to the April occupation, Khalil pasha, and one of the prominent representatives of the Turkish Communist Party (TCP), Dr. Fuad Sabit bey, left for Moscow at the end of April 1920. On April 30 members of the Russian Telegraph Agency (RTA) reported from Piatigorsk they were heading for Moscow to negotiate the instructions of the Anatolian government of Mustafa Kemal pasha. During a conversation with the RTA members, correspondent Khalil pasha pointed out that Turkey was hard pressed. From now on the allies, primarily the British, were running the show in Istanbul. The entire Asian part of Turkey was divided among the conquerors. Greece captured the whole seacoast in the environs of Izmir (Smyrna): France seized Syria. In Khalil pasha’s words, for some time the 10 million people of Asia Minor had leaned toward adopting the Soviet political system. On his behalf, the RTA informed Moscow that “the Soviet system of country administration is regarded by the Turks of Asia Minor as good enough.... The new government is lacking arms and ammunition. That’s why Khalil pasha and his assistant, Dr. Fuad Sabit bey, left for Moscow. They intended to get ammunition from Soviet Russia and establish a defensive alliance against the Entente.”11 In mid-­May Khalil pasha and Dr. Fuad Sabit bey arrived in the Russian capital. On May 15 the RCP Politburo discussed the question “On Khalil pasha” and approved Chicherin’s proposals on talks to be held the next day. The Politburo passed a decision to learn Orjonikidze’s opinion on the subject and, if Chicherin considered it necessary, to arrange a meeting between Khalil pasha and Lenin.12 On May 16 Turkish delegates met with Chicherin. The talks lasted for more than three hours. Touching upon the results of the talks, Chicherin wrote to Lenin:

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

We should not concentrate on our imaginary perspectives and plunge into adventure; yet I must say that the development of ties with the Turkish National Center (TNC) may appreciably contribute to strengthening our policy in the East. The National Center has not yet split into various parties, and no domestic policy program has been developed so far. At any rate, the point is about the republic. They explained that the Turkish masses are primarily made up of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. They are oppressed by bureaucracy, senior pashas, and profiteers; they dispose of Western capital; the upper bourgeoisie are Armenian and Greek. Large-­scale farming in Asia Minor was destroyed in the time of Mahmud II; since then it has partly been restored. However, the number of these landlords is insignificant, and they are probably being driven out. No grounds for communism are available; however, Bolshevism is utterly popular; hatred against the Western capital and domestic oppressors is enormous. Having clarified our stance on the subject, Khalil pasha is going to return to Sivas and then visit us again. He asks us to send our representatives together with him as well as Armenian comrades, due to strained relations with Armenia. He insists that we open our permanent office in their country together with printing houses, libraries, books, and magazines. They also ask us to include both Muslims and indigenous Russians in our office. In so doing, we will have full freedom of propaganda. It is possible to establish a Soviet Republic there, but this will not be our Sovietism, for all peasants are fond of their own land plots, so Communism has to be popularized in the country gradually, step by step. I personally see no benefit from such a fake Sovietism, which will only create confusion. Militarily, Khalil asks for ammunition and money. They recognize the self-­determination of all nationalities and are ready for separation and autonomy. Khalil’s program is a sort of Monroe Doctrine for Asia, a struggle of all Asian peoples against European imperialism. He considers Russia to be the sole friend of the Asian peoples, who realize that they are sure to perish without us. Concerning Persia, he is ready to help us send Turkish guerrillas to fight against the shah and feudalism, for an agrarian revolution that does not concern the urban bourgeoisie so far. His agents are likely to bolster our policy in Afghanistan and India. Thus the center of gravity of our Near Eastern policy will shift to Turkey. The necessity of direct contact with Turkey makes us exploit Armenian railways, and for this to happen we should conclude an agreement with Armenia. We should warn Georgia against the British seizure of the points needed for us to maintain contact with Turkey.



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Weapons may be delivered under the cover of Azerbaijan. Practically all military aspects have to be clarified very soon by our military jointly with Khalil.13 By this time Khalil pasha had become famous in Azerbaijan, Russia, and the whole of the Caucasus and even on the pages of the European press.14 In his report to the CC RCP Politburo on June 22, 1920, Chicherin noted: “We must finally speed up implementation of our plans in Turkey.”15 When Mdivani reported on the appearance of Turkish military units in Nakhchivan a week later, members of the Russian Foreign Commissariat worked toward a more sensible policy in respect to the Kemalists. On the one hand, they assessed this as “an abrupt change in the policy of Turkish nationalists of Asia Minor”; on the other hand, they appraised it as “an act of a separate group pursuing its own policy” under the influence of Musavatists who fought against the Soviets. Even under these uncertain circumstances, however, Chicherin attempted to keep up with the interests of Armenians and contribute to the transfer of disputed territories to Armenia. He did his best to prevent the advance of the Red Army that had captured Azerbaijan toward Armenia and wrote to Lenin: “The largest part of the so-­called territories is in the hands of the Armenian Republic. The Turkish offensive makes us reject further advance [toward Armenia]. The Revolutionary War Council categorically demands us to limit ourselves to the protection of Baku.” Chicherin advised waiting a little while to give arms to the Kemalists, until Eliava’s reports came from ­Ankara. Only after that would it be possible to fulfill a Soviet promise on arms ­deliveries to the Turks. Chicherin feared that these arms would directly or indirectly be used against the Soviets.16 In the summer of 1920, after his accidental arrest in Lithuania, Enver p­ asha returned to Moscow. In the meanwhile Jemal pasha, together with several members of the Party of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki), arrived in Russia from Berlin. Enver pasha’s Moscow trip turned out to be an adventure.17 What did Moscow want from him? First, Enver pasha had closely scrutinized developments in Anatolia and during his Moscow meetings did not conceal that the Russian government was ready to fight if the Ankara government took any steps, such as transfer of Izmir to the Greeks, in accordance with the Treaty of Sèvres. If the allies succeeded in bribing Turkey and using it against Moscow, the Russians, backed by Enver pasha, were ready to rout the new Turkey. Hence Enver pasha was very valuable for Russian foreign policy. He was exploited by Moscow as an effective instrument for turning the Kemalists into allies of the Bolsheviks. Russian diplomacy intended to set Turkey, in the person of Enver pasha and Young Turks, against the Entente. The Bolshevik leaders believed that they would be able to maneuver between

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

green Islamic banner and Red Turk banner. This would resemble the bitter lot of “someone fallen and unaccommodating in search of a guardian in an absolutely alien milieu.”18 Enver pasha was well aware, however, that the concept of Turanism, based on principles of Islam, was unlikely to match the ideas of “proletarian ­revolution” as a principal Russian policy of the Bolsheviks, so it is difficult to imagine that these ideas could have lived long. While at a hospital on the bank of the Moscow River, Enver pasha was unexpectedly asked whether he was an imperialist and sadly conceded: “Yes, I’m an imperialist, the only question is the size of the empire.”19 But, according to Arthur Ransom, Enver was believed that the Bolsheviks used him as “a sort of trump card.... In case the Ankara Turks should fail them. The allies had squared Constantinople, and if they should succeed in squaring Ankara would find themselves face to face with Enver.”20 Ottoman leaders were well aware of the Russian attitude to Azerbaijan regardless of their political course. As early as 1918, during the Berlin talks, Mehmed Talaat pasha had touched upon the question of the recognition of the Caucasus republics of Soviet Russia. The Russian ambassador, Adolf Ioffe, stated that there was no problem in respect to Georgia and Armenia; however, the independence of Azerbaijan might be recognized on the condition that the Baku district would be owned by Russia.21 During Berlin talks with the Turkish prime minister, the Russian ambassador stated that the Soviet government might, as a sign of mercy, accept violation of the Treaty of Brest-­Litovsk by the Ottoman Empire or recognition of the independence of Caucasus republics unrecognized by Russia. But it could not be reconciled with the capture of Baku, and “this created a breakthrough in the sentiments of the Russian people, who are well aware of Baku’s importance for Russian industry and trade.”22 These talks as well as the perception of Baku as a purely Russian town had not become a concern of the remote past. Another interesting point caused by Enver pasha’s arrival involved the Muslim movement. Enver pasha told Chicherin that national-­revolutionary parties of all the Muslim countries, including Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, had a united center in Berlin and wanted to conclude an agreement with Soviet Russia on mutual aid and thus back the Bolshevik policy in the East. Chicherin pointed out that “they want to get aid from us in money and other means, such as to organize a school in Moscow to train future terrorists, and so forth I told him that our general principle was to support national-­ revolutionary movements; specifically, however, forms and objects of aid will be considered separately. Therefore Enver will call three to four representatives of these parties.”23 Enver pasha was cordially welcomed in Moscow by the Bolshevik leaders. Earlier, in June 1920 the Bolshevik leaders had given their answer to the letter



Collaboration after Occupation 165

from Mustafa Kemal pasha’s letter of April 26. A message of June 4 signed by Chicherin said that Mustafa Kemal’s letter, in which he offered to become involved in the struggle against the foreign imperialism threatening the two countries, provided the main principles of foreign policy of the new Turkish government. First, declaration of Turkey’s independence. Second, inclusion of undeniably Turkish territories in the Turkish state. Third, proclamation of Arabia and Syria as independent states. Fourth, a decision by the Grand National Assembly to empower Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazistan, the Batum region, Eastern Thrace, and territories with a mixed Turkish-­Arab population independently to decide on their own destiny. A free referendum would be held in these areas with active participation by refugees and emigrants forced to leave their motherland for reasons beyond their control, Fifth, a declaration by the Grand National Assembly granting all rights to national minorities within the framework of the new Turkish state as set forth for national minorities of Europe. Sixth, submission of the question of the straits to the consideration of states contiguous to the Black Sea. Seventh, elimination of the capitulations and foreign economic control. Eighth, annulment of influence areas of any sort. Chicherin’s letter said that the Soviet government hoped that diplomatic talks would enable a Grand Turkey, on the one hand, and Armenia and Persia, on the other, to establish strict borders on the principles of justice and self-­ determination of nations. At the same time, Chicherin hinted that the Soviet government was ready to act as mediator in most cases, on the invitation of the parties concerned. Finally, the Russian foreign commissar suggested establishing diplomatic and consular offices to maintain friendly relations between Turkey and Russia.24 Apparently, the majority of the Chicherin principles were lacking in the letter from Kemal pasha on April 26. Without waiting for an answer from Turkey, Soviet Russia appointed its diplomatic representative to Ankara on June 8, 1920. The Politburo decided to consider a request from the Foreign Commissariat on sending comrade Eliava as a diplomatic and military representative of the Turkish national government of Kemal pasha.25 Three days later the Orgburo, at the request of the Foreign Commissariat, included a man named Skachkov in the Turkish commission.26 At the same time, the Politburo decided to help the government of Mustafa Kemal with arms and gold. On June 28 Chicherin told the Politburo that the aid to the government of Kemal Atatürk, the dispatching of an ambassador to Turkey, and the Politburo decision on rendering aid to Iran and Afghanistan all illustrated that “our policy in the East is manifest not in direct military aid to oppose the Entente but rather in arms and gold. On the basis of the resolutions adopted by the CC, we made appropriate statements and gave promises that should be kept.” Chicherin added:

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

Turkey should immediately be armed, for delaying this initiative will make Mustafa Kemal regard us as empty talkers, and the worst of it is that revolutionary Turkey risks being crushed; in the meantime, even our insignificant aid could be of great practical and moral importance. However, despite Politburo decisions, we cannot get arms. We are discredited and our prestige in the East is undermined when a political entity says one thing today and does another tomorrow, promises aid today but declines to give it tomorrow.27 Given the critical nature of this document, on June 29 the Politburo commissioned Efraim Sklianskii, a deputy chair of the Revolutionary Council and member of the Labor and Defense Council, and deputy foreign commissar Levon Karakhan to come to an agreement on Turkey and Afghanistan issues.28 On June 30, 1920, the Politburo resolved to instruct Chicherin to prevent “Russian armed units from moving deep into Armenia and thus avoid intensification of the Turkish offensive.”29 In reality, this issue was resolved after the occupation of Azerbaijan (on April 28). On that day Chicherin wrote to Lenin that “we also face the question of Armenia, and we must do our best to minimize this factor.... We must make Armenia not oppose us. Armenia should also be supplied with bread. In so doing, the question of Armenia will shortly be solved.”30 The point is that Karakhan warned Orjonikidze in his telegram dated May 11, 1920, that Lenin had instructed them not to hasten the spread of Soviet power outside Azerbaijan. He wrote: First, to secure Azerbaijan; second, to avoid expansion due to serious problems on the Western Front and in consideration of our international position. In fact Armenia is of no interest to us in the immediate future, while it simply brings turmoil. One cannot exceed the limits set by Azerbaijan, while disputed territories should not be occupied by ultimatum form but seized peacefully, for instance, through the mediation of a joint commission under our chairmanship. You are well aware of the risk of new carnage plus the Turkish factor. If our advancement led to new carnage, this would seriously damage our prestige in England and America, so we suggest limiting ourselves only to Azerbaijan.31 On July 2, 1920, Chicherin told Orjonikidze that the lack of forces prevented them from occupying greater territories than had already been seized: “Our troops are occupying Shusha and Jabrail, and we had to give up capturing Nakhchivan and Julfa. Tell the government of Azerbaijan that we have to limit ourselves to Shusha and Jebrail. Please tell the government of Azerbaijan about the impossibility of capturing Nakhchivan and Julfa today and enumerate the objective reasons that force us to content ourselves with the



Collaboration after Occupation 167

military status quo.”32 On the same day Chicherin sent another telegram to Orjonikidze, which said that he had started talks with the Turkish national center: “We need a territorial contact, and with that end in view we must conclude an agreement with Armenia.... An agreement of this sort is the only way for us to influence matters in Asia Minor.”33 Note that Chicherin meant to resolve all the problems by giving Nakhchivan to Armenia. The Politburo approved instructions for the Revolutionary Council of the Caucasus Front and diplomatic representatives in Georgia, Armenia, and Turkey drafted by Chicherin.34 The document said that Turkey promised not to hamper free Communist propaganda; for political and timely reasons and with due regard for the military position of Russia, it was essential to explain to the militant activists of Georgia, Armenia, and Turkey that at present they should not try to overthrow the present governments.35 On July 2 Chicherin, through the mediation of the respected Soviet trustee Khalil pasha, sent a letter to Mustafa Kemal that paid the respects of Soviet Russia to the revolutionary government of Turkey, saying that the interests of the Soviet and Turkish peoples coincided in quite a number of areas.36 In actually, however, this letter proved to be not so much a sign of respect for the government of Turkey as a sign of trust in Khalil pasha, who assisted the Bolsheviks in occupying Azerbaijan. Mustafa Kemal replied to the letter belatedly on November 29. The Turkish leader stressed the Turkish people’s admiration of the Russian people, who had cast off their chains and for two years had been fighting for freedom to eliminate oppression and tyranny worldwide. He added: “Our nation fully appreciated the grandeur of sacrifices made by the Russian peoples for the salvation of humankind and for protection of the Muslim world, while European imperialists were eager to capture the Muslim world.” Kemal pasha expressed his deep confidence that the day would come when Western workers on the one hand and the oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa on the other hand would unite against international capital. “The high moral authority of the government of the Russian Federation among ­workers of Europe and the love of the Muslim world for the Turkish ­people give us confidence that our close alliance will be sufficient to unite those against ­Western imperialists who unconsciously provide them an oppor­ tunity to reign over us.”37

The Beginning of the Struggle for Nakhchivan Following the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, the return of Russians to the Caucasus became a reality. For this reason the new Ankara government decided at its first meeting on May 5, 1920, to send a delegation to Moscow to hold official talks with the Bolsheviks. The delegation was headed by foreign minister

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

Bekir Sami bey Kunduh of the new government. Yusuf Kemal bey T ­ engirşenk (the minister of the economy) and Osman bey Özgen (a deputy from Lazi­ stan) were also delegation members, while Dr. Ibrahim Tali bey Öngören and Seyfi bey Düzgören joined them in Erzurum as military experts at the ­suggestion of Kazım Karabekir pasha.38 However, the government of Armenia did not allow the Turkish delegation to head for Moscow via Armenian territory, which resulted in the delegation being stuck in Erzurum for a month.39 On May 11, the day the Sami bey delegation departed from Ankara, Lloyd George submitted a draft of the Treaty of Sèvres to the government of the Ottoman Porte in Istanbul. The draft provided for the “liberation of all non-­ Turkic peoples from the power of the Turks.”40 A mission led by Bekir Sami bey set out across the Black Sea on July 11, 1920, and arrived in Moscow on July 19. Except for brief unofficial meetings with Karakhan on July 24 and August 4, no Soviet officials received the Turkish delegation (not even Dr. Fuad Sabit bey, the representative of the Communists) until mid-­August. On the one hand, Soviet Russia did not want to negotiate with the Turks officially until the complete clarification of relations with Armenia.41 On the other hand, Bolshevik leaders were waiting to see what Turkey would be faced with after signing of the Treaty of Sèvres earlier in August and the response of the new Turkish government. On August 10, 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, and Turkey lost 80 percent of the territories previously owned by the Ottoman Empire.42 The Ankara government led by Mustafa Kemal rejected the crushing terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, however, and a new stage of struggle against the Entente, particularly the British and Greeks, began in the country. The Russian foreign commissar sent a letter to Mustafa Kemal pasha through the mediation of Ibrahim Efendi that raised the question of definition of borders with Armenia. It should be noted that the letter referred to “Turkish Armenia,” which caused great displeasure in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In his letter of July 4 Bekir Sami bey noted that after the signing of the Batum Convention Turkey had been the first to recognize the Armenian government and some of Armenia’s borders: Under this convention we undertook to preserve conditions of friendly and neighborly relations. However, from the date of truce with the Entente powers, the Armenian government, backed by England and guided by the concept of a Grand Armenia at our expense, has incessantly pursued a policy of extermination of Muslims on indisputably Turkish territories currently occupied by Armenians, which resulted from their evacuation to comply with the terms of the armistice. A major aim of these pogroms and destructions carried out regularly



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by Armenians was the creation of a false Armenian majority in these indigenous Turkish areas. Every day hundreds of refugees from these villages without any livelihood are arriving on our borders. Continuation of these brigandlike and terrorist actions made us take decisive measures and put an end to this inhuman political line, so we gave the order to mobilize the eastern army for occupation of pivotal strategic points. However, following your letter, we considered it necessary to postpone this urgent measure. We strongly hope that the government of the Russian Soviet Republic will take vigorous steps in regard to the Armenian government to finally to put an end to unjustfiable attacks on a defenseless population. The Turkish national government, highly appreciating the importance of friendly relations with the Russian Soviet Republic, instructed me to leave for Moscow with a mission delegated by the Supreme Assembly with a view of defining the principles of our diplomatic relations and settling future relations between our two countries prior to receiving your letter of ­response.43 Before the mission from Bekir Sami bey reached Moscow, a certain Niyazi Zekeriya, authorized by the people’s government of the GNAT, delivered all the necessary information about the Turkish government’s actions and the situation as a whole to the Information Bureau of the Foreign Commissariat in Moscow. Judging by the first document, the GNAT government authorized Niyazi Zekeriya to convey cordial regards to the Soviet Republic and wishes for success in the struggle against Western imperialists. The GNAT government hoped that this information would strengthen relations between the two governments, who were firmly resolved to fight against the imperialism in the spirit of cordial comradeship.44 The second document contained a detailed list of members of the Turkish government. Note that Bekir Sami bey held the post of foreign minister and Yusuf Kemal bey held the post of minister of the national economy in the government of Mustafa Kemal pasha.45 The third document was entitled “Replies to Questions Asked” and covered issues such as the political system of Turkey, the structure of the government, its social base, denial of the capitulatory policy of the sultan’s government, protection of national interests and struggle against imperialism, the determination of the Turkish people to the fate of their country, and the economic life of Turkey. The document consisted of twelve clauses. Clause 9 said that 12 million people were under the control of the people’s government. Of this population, 8 million were peasants, workers, servants, and officials; 2 million were nomads; and 2 million were large landowners, merchants, and industrialists.46 Each of the three documents was sealed by GNAT.

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On July 27, 1920, military units of the 11th Red Army entered N ­ akhchivan. Declaration of the Soviet power in this region gave a new impulse to Russian-­ Turkish relations. The Nakhchivan revolutionary committee, a body of supreme power, was set up on July 28. It included Mahammad Bektashov, Abbas Gadimov, Faramaz Mahmudbeyov, and others. The Nakhchivan Soviet ­Socialist Republic was proclaimed.47 Following the April coup in Azerbaijan, the local agencies of the Musavat government were destroyed, while the newly formed Soviet power had not yet pursued its own clear political line. Therefore the Armenians tried to benefit from terror in Nakhchivan and purges of the local Muslim population. Leaders of Azerbaijan were in no position to put an end to the massacre independently but nevertheless were ordered to withdraw Turkish detachments from Nakhchivan. A decision of the CC CPA Bureau of July 13, 1920, said: “[C]onsidering that the Nakhchivan region, as an integral part of Azerbaijan, is presently occupied by the Turkish troops and willing to avoid any clashes, it is imperative to clear the Turkish troops from the area.” To remedy the situation, the bureau decided to set up a delegation to negotiate with Khalil pasha that included Narimanov, Mikoian, Garayev, Naneishvili, and Huseinov.48 No practical steps were taken in this direction, however, and on July 15 the CC CPA Bureau adopted quite a different decision, “On the Nakhchivan region as an integral part of Azerbaijan.” Bureau members Egorov, Mikoian, Huseinov, Orjonikidze, Stasova, and Legrand discussed the question “Оn peace with Armenia.” The second item of this decision said: “To disclaim ­Nakhchivan and other territories, suggest that Russians occupy this area.”49 An order from Moscow was addressed to the leaders of Azerbaijan to disclaim ­Nakhchivan and Sharur-­Daralayaz, and appropriate talks were held in Moscow between Armenian delegates and the Russian Foreign C ­ ommissariat. Under this decision, the Bolsheviks showed interest in the political situation in Nakhchivan; even before introducing troops into this region, they inspected the military potential of the Bayazit division of the Turks and Armenian troops.50 On the same day Orjonikidze sent a telegram to the Revolutionary Council of the Caucasus front that stressed the necessity of a special new directive agreed upon by the general headquarters and Chicherin to move toward Nakhchivan, Julfa, and Ordubad. He wrote: “At any rate, our advance to capture Nakhchivan, Julfa, and Ordubad cannot be carried out until we get a new directive from Glavkom, as agreed by Chicherin in reply to our enquiry.”51 The Russians’ major doubts about advancing toward Nakhchivan were primarily due to their intent to grant Nakhchivan, Sharur-­Daralayaz, and Ordubad to Armenia.52 The only obstacle on this path was Turkey. Along with the leaders of Soviet Azerbaijan, the plenipotentiary representatives of the Turkish government in eastern Anatolia were also in a hurry to



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yield Nakhchivan to the Russians. In reply to a report from Veysel bey Ünüvar, the head of Turkish detachments stationed in Nakhchivan, on the political situation in the region as of July 11, Karabekir pasha resolved that any stay of Azerbaijani armed forces in Nakhchivan was not expedient regardless of its form. For this reason the population was ready to rise against the Bolsheviks. The Turks would be accused of this action, which would be a tragedy for the Turks and Nakhchivanians. Karabekir pasha suggested transferring all Azerbaijani soldiers from Nakhchivan to Bayazit and then finally removing them. The decision of Azerbaijani leaders to disclaim Nakhchivan and the desire of the Turkish revolutionary government to have a common border with the Bolsheviks in Nakhchivan led to the crisis situation in the region. Armenians had long cast covetous eyes on Nakhchivan, and in tsarist times Russia had tried to seize the region by changing its national-­ethnic composition. Now that World War I was over, they wanted attain their goal within the framework of the Treaty of Sèvres as imposed on Turkey by the Entente or by dint of the “eastern diplomacy” of Bolshevik Russia. Emissaries of the Armenian government, as well as authoritative Armenians from the top Party and governmental circles of Soviet Russia, provided Bolshevik leaders with false information about Nakhchivan. Those arriving in the region, however, discovered a radically different picture. It became evident that a great number of Armenians from Iran and Turkey had settled down there after the occupation of the Erivan and Nakhchivan khanates by Russia. The commission’s report noted that during ten months in 1829–30 approximately 50,000 Armenians had migrated from the Bayazit and Kars pashadoms of the Ottoman Empire to the Erivan province. An investigation carried out of the Bolshevik commission is of greater interest in regard to the Nakhchivan province. According to an official report of 1832, the Nakhchivan district had 6,538 families, totaling 16,095 males and 32,000 people. Of these, 59.0 percent or 3,859 families were Turks; and 8.2 percent or 533 families were Armenian elders; 32.8 percent or 2,145 families were migrant Armenians. A report of the special committee emphasized: “As is evident, the Turks formed the majority in the Nakhchivan district not only before the Treaty of Turkmenchai but after it as well.”53 The document added that ­Nakhchivan was subordinated to the Musavat government. In the summer of 1920, owing to the complex political situation in Nakhchivan and uncertainties surrounding Armenia’s position in Soviet-­Turkish policy, some influential circles in Anatolia, especially on the Eastern Front, felt the need to establish ties with the Baku-­headquartered Central Bureau of the Turkish Communist organizations. As commander of the Eastern Front Karabekir pasha sent a message on July 23, 1920, to Mustafa Suphi, chair of the Central Bureau, saying that he “had been a supporter of Bolshevism from the

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very start of the implementation of the concept.” Karabekir pasha informed Suphi about the population and situation in Anatolia, including the social composition of the army: the small stratum of aristocrats, nobles, and bourgeois was not represented in the government and the Ankara government was not appointed by the padishah but elected by workers and peasants. Karabekir pasha pointed out that there were no obstacles to ousting imperialists from the country and concluding a treaty with the Soviets. He noted: But there is an issue unknown outside the country: we have no armory and cartridge factory, while the long-­suffering Turkish people are continuing the struggle for their physical survival against British, French, and Greek troops. While at Smirna, Balykesir, and Bursa, peasants fought tooth and nail. Imperialists conquered the best Turkish lands and slaughtered local Turkish peasants. The people will continue the struggle against aggressors to their last breath. However, our losses are growing every minute and we simply lack the strength to sustain the effort. My army can’t go to the west for help because the Armenian Dashnak government, as the agent of British capitalists, is eager to capture our eastern vilayets, so the Armenian units, jointly with imperialist troops, started moving toward the western borders. Now one and all of the village poor have been massacred. All these horrors were committed in the direct presence of the Bolsheviks, these liberators of the oppressed worldwide.54 Karabekir pasha asked Mustafa Suphi to ask the Soviet government and Azerbaijan to help unfortunate Anatolia explain that Dashnak butchers were exterminating poor residents of Anatolia located between Turkey and Armenia. These Dashnaks were blocking Russia’s way to the east and breaking off ties between Turkey and Russia. He wrote that a small group of people is engaged in impeding the ideas of Bolshevism to get inside our country. We don’t understand why the Bolsheviks, ­bearers of lofty ideals, are indifferent to Dashnak massacres and unwilling to put an end to the Armenian crimes, whereas my army, jointly with Russian and Azerbaijani armies, could have done away with these thugs and ­robbers.55 In a letter to Khalil Kut pasha, Karabekir pasha assured him that he had no aggressive intentions at that moment against Armenians as a whole and asked him to inform the Bolsheviks that the Russian-­Turkish alliance was eternal. He wanted his army to be allowed immediately to fight the Dashnaks, together with the Red Azerbaijani troops and Red Russian military units and liberate the railway. Karabekir pasha believed that Anatolia would be helped via railway. He wrote that



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the situation in the motherland is becoming worse and is currently criti­cal: every village is spending its last cartridge, gathering its last strength to protect the nation’s honor.... So we ask you to persuade our Russian brothers to trust and enable us to overthrow the Dashnaks and open the railway for unimpeded communication, assistance, and a campaign against the British.56 This letter imbued with Bolshevik spirit was sent to Mustafa Suphi via the governor of Trabzon, Rushdi pasha.57 Despite Karabekir pasha’s serious attempts, the army of the Armenian government assumed the offensive and captured Shahtakhty and on July 27 sent an ultimatum to Nakhchivan residents to give up the town within forty-­eight hours. Signed by Armenian foreign minister Ruben Ter-­Minasian and containing fifteen clauses, the ultimatum demanded that the National Council of Nakhchivan declare on behalf of the population that the Nakhchivan and Sharur uyezds were an integral part of the Armenian Republic and that all members of the population were to be citizens of the Armenian Republic. The second clause of the ultimatum stipulated that the Nakhchivan national committee and residents of the uyezd were committed not to let in the Turks and refugees from Vedi Basar, Zanghi Basar, and Sharur and propagandists from Azerbaijan. The sixth clause provided that within two weeks 300 horses with saddles worth 75,000 rubles each and 200 cattle worth 30,000 rubles would be sold to the government of Armenia. Also, the government of Armenia was to get 300,000 poods of wheat (of which 150,000 poods were free and 150,000 poods would cost 2,000 rubles per pood). The ninth clause allowed one rifle per home, totaling at least 7,000 rifles, and 80 cartridges per rifle. All military units should surrender their weapons within forty-­eight hours of the date of the ultimatum. This process would be completed in fifteen days, provided that all military units were to lay down their arms on the first day. To guarantee that clause 9 would be implemented within that time, they demanded hostages from the Nakhchivan National Committee (two per village and three per town), who would be kept at Erivan and Gumru. A destroyed section of the railway south of the station of Shahtakhty was to be repaired by the Muslim population at its own expense and given to the Ministry of Railways of Armenia.58 This barefaced and diplomatically unacceptable ultimatum to the Revolutionary Committee that had replaced the National Council due to the Sovietization of Nakhchivan was received very severely. A note in reply to the government of Armenia said that “the working men of the Nakhchivan region have declared themselves to be an integral part of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic, which is allied with the Russian Federation and relies on ­valiant ­unconquerable Russian, Turkish, and Azerbaijani armies.” The note also

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said that from now on the Armenian government should directly appeal to the central Azerbaijani government and the joint command of the Russian, Turkish, and Azerbaijani Red armies that had seized the Nakhchivan region. Owing to changes in Nakhchivan, the note pointed out, “the Revolutionary Committee has been set up here and the National Council dissolved.”59 Armenian armed units, who had failed to enter Nakhchivan, nevertheless succeeded in capturing Shahtakhty. Thousands of Muslims had to flee to Iran. More than one hundred Muslim villages were razed to the ground. Karabekir pasha was indignant at the inactivity of the Soviet Russian govern­ ment in the face of Armenian Dashnak crimes; however, he had to limit himself to r­ egrets. The Dashnak offensive was stopped in early August of 1920. Khalil ­pasha wrote to Narimanov and asked him to take measures against the Dashnaks and liberate Nakhchivan and its Sovietized suburbs from the yoke of Armenian imperialists.60 In the meantime the Russians did not intend to move from Nakhchivan to Shahtakhty. They regarded the occupation of ­Nakhchivan as their greatest success and meant to compel Armenia to sign a treaty on August 10. On that day Orjonikidze telegraphed Lenin, Trotskii, and Chicherin that ­Nakhchivan had been captured by the Soviet army and that Legrand had signed a ceasefire agreement with Armenia. Under this agreement, the Armenian government accepted the occupation of Nakhchivan by the Soviet army.61 On September 24, 1920, Chicherin sent an urgent diplomatic dispatch to Eliava: “The agreement of August 10 is the maximum achievable. It was vitally important for us to conclude this agreement. Granting an opportunity for Armenia to use the railways was, according to Legrand, a necessary condition to conclude an agreement and gain Armenia’s recognition of our occupation of Nakhchivan.”62 The point was not the railway but a transfer of the majority of Nakhchivan to Armenia. On the day of signing the Armenian-­Russian treaty, Mahammad Bektashov, chair of the Nakhchivan revolutionary committee, wrote to Narimanov that by a decision of the overwhelming majority of the Nakhchivan population this region had been recognized as an inalienable part of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.63 On August 13 Shahtakhtinskii informed Lenin that the population of Nakhchivan had restored the Soviet power and refused even to consider that Soviet Russia could, transfer Nakhchivan to the Dashnaks, against the people’s will. Otherwise, not only would the Soviet power collapse but the very physical existence of the Muslim population would be endangered, as it was in the territory of Dashnak Armenia.64 Following the Armenian-­Russian treaty, the Politburo of the CC CPA discussed the situation in Nakhchivan and instructed the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee to examine the Nakhchivan question and specify an Azerbaijani-­Armenian border. Aside from this, the committee was instructed,



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following consultations with the Military Revolutionary Council of the 11th Army, to organize power structures in Nakhchivan and decide on candidates for commissar of the region. Mir Jafar Baghirov was nominated for the post. Victor Naneishvili was entrusted to deal with Baghirov’s dismissal from his current post for reassignment. Having discussed the situation in Nakhchivan, the Politburo considered it inexpedient to disarm the population of the region. The Orgburo and the Secretariat were commissioned to send Party functionaries and appropriate literature to Nakhchivan. The same meeting of the Politburo discussed the Turkish question. It was decided to protect the national-­liberation movement in Turkey. Soon afterward, however, it became clear that no Communist events had been permitted to be held in Turkey.65 A close look at these developments enabled Karabekir pasha to realize that Soviet Russia would disagree with the military actions of the Turkish troops against Dashnak Armenia. On July 31, 1920, he wrote to Khalil pasha: In his letter to the Grand National Assembly Chicherin said that border issues between us and Armenia would be solved through the mediation of Soviet Russia. Chicherin’s letter hinted at Russia’s unwillingness to have the Turks join the battle against the Dashnaks. Your letter of July 4 addressed to Mustafa Kemal pasha also stressed Soviet Russia’s unwillingness to allow confrontation between the Armenians and us. For this reason I did not take part in large-­scale operations and dealt with defensive actions only. In the letter Karabekir pasha asked for “permission, jointly with the Russian and Azerbaijani Reds, forcibly to remove this Dashnak obstacle and thus accelerate our common cause and resolve the eastern question.”66 The Turkish command was determined to win Shahtakhty back from the Armenians, according to Chicherin’s cipher-­text to Legrand via Vladikavkaz. Even if the Russians failed to take part in the operation, the Turks demanded the opportunity to liberate Shahtakhty and Sarykamysh from the Armenians independently, unassisted by the Red Army. Through the mediation of Leonid Ruzer, Chicherin authorized a Tiflis agent of the Russian Foreign Trade Commissariat to inquire about Orjonikidze’s view on the subject.67 Karabekir pasha was very specific in his calculations. On July 27 Chicherin dispatched a message to Legrand as Russian representative in Armenia, demanding that he go to Erivan. He noted: Under current circumstances and the ongoing offensive of the Turks we cannot demand that Armenia halt the fighting unilaterally. To obtain a result, all parties concerned should be involved. So it is essential for you immediately to arrive in the place on time. The Armenian Catholics

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are currently pleading for France to create a mandate for Armenia; if that fails, then comes Belgium. In all probability, they are looking for patrons cognizant that we are sure to reinforce soon. Having captured Nakhchivan, the Turks established Soviet power there, suggesting that our troops would enter the town. Our military units have already been ordered to occupy Nakhchivan, and I told you about it. In other words, it is not for the Turks or any other people to decide where and how we should act.68 Despite this harsh criticism, the Bolsheviks were in need of the Kemalists. Russian attempts to collaborate with them were explained not only by their joint struggle for world internationalism and their dream of “liberating” oppressed peoples of the East. In some cases they regarded the Kemalists both as security guarantors in the occupied Muslim territories and as guarantors of success in their eastern policy. In his memo to the Politburo on July 31, 1920, Chicherin pointed out that the Kemalists were within an inch of ruin for lack of arms: They have soldiers enough, but their arms are exhausted, their cartridges are running out. Their situation is critical. Arms may be delivered only through the Armenian territory. Three months ago the Armenians agreed to provide us with a transit passage; however, it was Azerbaijan’s stubbornness in border disputes that hampered the execution of the agreement. Now the Armenians are ascendant and have become insolent beyond all measure. According to Kirov, the Dashnaks received cartridges from Wrangel (to be exact: from the Entente via Wrangel). In comrade Sergo’s words, it is practically useless to try getting the right of carriage through Armenia. Comrade Sergo maintains that no strong army is required to Sovietize Armenia. He discussed the case with Glavkom and found out that it is possible to acquire the necessary troops. In this case Armenia is badly in need of Sovietization. Otherwise we have no effective contact with Turkey. The Kemalists’ collapse would ruin our cause in the East.69 Touching on this issue in September 1920, Chicherin wrote to Lenin: The reports of Eliava and Kirov, as well as those of western radio, make it possible to infer the catastrophic situation of the Kemalists, suffering from lack of arms and ammunition. The ruin of the Kemalists would result in a triumph of reaction backed by the Entente and Muslim fanati­cism. There is a threat that the sultan would appear in Asia Minor to declare a jihad against them. This may lead to a large-­ scale counterrevolution movement and the loss of Baku and perhaps



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Turkestan — ​in other words, to serious challenges in our East. The question of the Kemalists is vital for us. First of all, we must supply them with arms. During talks with our military, they asked us to give them 250,000 rifles and a related number of cartridges. During talks with Khalil, our military agreed on 60,000 rifles. However, we refused to give this quantity and sent just 6,000. The question of the transfer matters if we have enough to provide them with. Now Enver has a new proposal: He will go to Germany and obtain arms for the Kemalists there; he will reach our harbors and we will lead him to Asia Minor via our territory. If this is successful, the question of transfer is feasible; in other words, not only Armenia but also Georgia may be Sovietized, for the bourgeois Georgian government will not provide arms for the Kemalists. Bekir Sami suggested more: they may get arms themselves from Italy, provided we open a credit line, and they will be in position to pay for these in goods.70 As for the question of transfer of arms to Turkey, the Soviet leaders considered it possible to transport them via the Armenian territory. As Russian representative to Erivan Legrand proposed to the chair of the Council of People’s Commissars that some lands were to be granted to Armenia and that it was not risky to concede Nakhchivan and Zangezur to Armenia.71 In the summer of 1920 Shahtakhtinskii was appointed plenipotentiary representative in Moscow. On September 20 he submitted a detailed report to Lenin. It became obvious that the leaders of Soviet Azerbaijan were aware of Moscow’s plans to transfer Nakhchivan to Armenia. Shahtakhtinskii expressed the views of Azerbaijani leaders led by Narimanov that Nakhchivan’s transfer to Armenia meant intentional and irrevocable rupture of relations with Turkey. He added that the Turks’ prohibition against attacking the Dashnaks meant that in the near future Russia would yield some vilayets in Anatolia to Armenia. Shahtakhtinskii believed that the alliance with Turkey enabled the Soviets to exploit their authority in the struggle against imperialism in the East. But an excessively cautious political approach to the Armenian question would result in the loss of confidence in the policy of the Bolsheviks in the East and the triumph of the Entente.72 After signing a peace treaty with Dashnak Armenia on August 10, 1920, Soviet Russia succeeded in safeguarding Armenia against the claims of victorious powers. On the same day these powers signed a treaty with the Ottoman Porte, which provided for the creation of the Armenian state upon the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.73 In a telegram addressed to Legrand and sent on the date when the treaty with Armenia was signed, however, Chicherin informed Armenian leaders about some important aspects of the matter. Fearing the West’s response to the policy of Soviet Russia in the Caucasus, Chicherin

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stressed in his secret telegram to the Legrand that “all of our provincial policy will be tested. Both Georgia and Armenia have become very insolent lately.” Chicherin had to admit that “our temporary infirmity on the Caucasus front makes them look arrogant without thinking of the results that will take place tomorrow. It was our support that saved Armenia from the Turkish invasion, for the Kemalists have already conducted mobilization and started an offensive against Armenia. However, we sent them an official note and they had to stop.”74 After the signing of a peace treaty with Armenia, the situation changed in favor of Russia. Thereafter the Foreign Commissariat acted as Armenia’s ­savior. On August 13, 1920, the first official meeting with the Turkish delegation was held in Moscow. The Turks learned about the signing of a peace treaty between Dashnak Armenia and Soviet Russia. Chicherin came forward in defense of the Armenians. He tried to reanimate the privileges as set forth in the Treaty of Sèvres and then suggested discussing the question of ceding the Turkish vilayets Van, Mush, and Bitlis to the Armenians. He added that Turkey would be aided subject to this proviso and that this plan had already been accepted by Khalil pasha and Jemal pasha. The Turkish delegation raised a vigorous protest, however, saying that such a political course was in effect identical to the Entente’s plans to break up Turkey. Aside from this, Khalil pasha and Jemal pasha had no right to negotiate on behalf of Turkey. It was Chicherin’s claims that complicated the situation and endangered the further course of negotiations. On August 14 the Turkish delegation met with Lenin, who admitted “making an error when we signed this treaty. If we fail to fix it, you do it.”75 In his Moscow Memoirs Ali Fuat Cebesoy noted that at this meeting Lenin informed the Turkish delegates about the forthcoming Sovietization of Armenia and Georgia.76 But Lenin’s promises seemed unimportant. On August 17, 1920, Russian diplomats Evgenii Adamov and Andrei Sabanin, following talks with the Turkish delegation, drafted a Russian-­Turkish treaty of eight items as an initial step. However, Chicherin’s demands to grant east Anatolian lands to Armenians suspended the talks.77 Chicherin’s pro-­ Armenian position endangered Turkish-­Russian relations. The Soviet foreign commissar was carried away by Armenophilia to a degree even greater than that of the Entente representatives who signed the Treaty of Sèvres. Chicherin became the main exponent of claims to “Great Armenia” drawn up by the Dashnaks and Armenians in the Kremlin. These actions exasperated some authoritative Bolshevik leaders, who, unlike Chicherin, knew the Caucasus sufficiently well. Thus, when Stalin learned about an impasse with the Turks due to the territorial claims of Chicherin in favor of the Armenians, he indignantly wrote to Lenin:



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Comrade Lenin, yesterday I learned that Chicherin lodged an i­diotic and provocative claim to the Turks about ceding Van, Mush, and ­Bitlis, Turkish provinces with an overwhelming majority of Turks. This pro-­ Armenian imperialist decision cannot be accepted as our choice. Chicherin should be forbidden to send notes to the Turks dictated by nationalist-­minded Armenians.78 It should be noted that Stalin received this information from Orjonikidze, who had telegraphed a day before to Chicherin, Lenin, Trotskii, and Stalin: Chicherin’s claim regarding Mush, Van, and Bitlis has strengthened the Entente’s adherents, so Mustafa Kemal pasha began pursuing the opportunity to find a path of rapprochement with Constantinople [the Entente].... At present there is a struggle between the two groups in Anatolia: one stands up for agreement with us (populists); the other for the Entente. Not daring to join the Entente openly, the latter group is plotting intrigue against us, playing various tricks in Armenia, and spreading prevocational rumors against us. The Armenian question is the sorest issue of the Turkish policy. Years-­long hatred of Armenians, despite some efforts of the supreme command, cannot stave off excesses, which are overstressed and fanned into flame by Armenian comrades. Propaganda is spread in the military units of the adverse party that we have allegedly ruptured relations with Ankara because of the Armenians, so the K ­ arabekir command has distributed an army order that all these are lies and provocations. I have to admit that many Armenians are standing up for the war against the Turks. All of their information is obtained in most cases from non-­ Communists.... There is not the slightest rapprochement between the Turks and Armenians. Mutual antipathy between the p­ arties is in full flower. To my thinking, irrespective of the Ankara government’s desire to tend toward Russia or the Entente, it still has to focus on us, because the sentiments of the army and the population require this. Without a doubt, claims on Mush, Van and Bitlis will be used to demonstrate our relations with the Turks. All claims of this sort must be removed from the agenda, and an agreement be concluded to spread appropriate propaganda against possible provocations. If Ankara defects to the Entente, eastern Anatolia will stay with us, and it’s very important for us. The Armenian question is a matter of eastern Anatolia. Because the Entente demanded the granting of Mush, Van, Bitlis, and so forth, to Armenia, the population of eastern Anatolia holds a grudge against the Entente.79

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Orjonikidze’s enciphered telegram to leaders in charge of Soviet Russia’s policy unmasks many latent features of this line in regard to Turkey. It has to be kept in mind that Chicherin kept pursuing a protectionist policy in respect to the Armenians. On September 15, 1920, he sent a letter to Soviet representatives in Turkey, Armenia, and Georgia. The letter raises the question of granting independence to Turkish Armenians as a principal aspect of Soviet-­Turkish relations: Special emphasis has to be given to our relations with Turkey. The point concerns the center of gravity of our eastern policy. Efforts have to be made to meet the Turks’ demands, especially as our own position makes it possible. Principles of agreement are outlined, including the new popu­lar policy of Turkish revolutionaries and their democratic views, particu­larly self-­determination of nationalities and independence of territories in Turkey for Turkish Armenians.80 In terms of “establishing ties with revolutionary forces of Turkey,” some participants of the August debates at the Caucasus Bureau gave their preference to the immediate Sovietization of Georgia as a path to Turkey. As early as August 5 the Caucasus Bureau telegraphed Trotskii, Krestinskii, and Chicherin that for military-­strategic reasons the front command considered the seizure of Georgia to be easier than the seizure of Armenia. The leaders of the Caucasus Bureau considered the occupation of Armenia to be the opening of a second path to Turkey after the Georgian one. It is interesting that Chugunov, head of the ciphering department, instructed that the original document be burned after deciphering the telegram.81 On September 16 a meeting of the political and organizational bureau of the CPA discussed the situation in the South Caucasus. Narimanov delivered a detailed report, which analyzed the position of the Kemalists. In his view, too few armed actions against the Kemalists in Anatolia weakened their positions in Turkey as a whole. The primary intent of the Entente was to attack Azerbaijan and thus disconnect Russia from its main oil source — ​the Baku oilfields. Narimanov stressed that the time had come to pass a pressing decision and inform Moscow about current developments and thereby share the burden of resolving the problem. Egorov spoke at the debates, stressing the importance of not making errors in respect to the neighboring Caucasus republics of Georgia and Armenia. He noted that the joint efforts in the revolutionary movement in Anatolia would strengthen the position of the Azerbaijani government. Egorov was followed by Garayev, who stressed the necessity of prevent states such as Georgia and Armenia from acting as a rear base to protect the forces of Baron Petr Wrangel if he retreated from the Crimea. Vano Sturua agreed with this, saying that “to preserve Baku for the world revolution, it is essential to unite with the Anatolian revolutionary movement and transfer the center of gravity to Turkey.”82



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Yusif Gasymov suggested declaring war on Georgia and Armenia in order to unite with revolutionary Anatolia. Having heard these opinions, Stasova pointed out that Moscow was aware of the current situation in the South Caucasus. In terms of a difficult situation on the Western Front and in the Crimea, Moscow was unlikely to provide troops to make war against Georgia and Armenia. Stasova openly stated that the present troops under arms would be in no position to pull out. At the same time, she agreed with a proposal that Armenia had to be dealt with urgently. In the case of Georgia, it would be appropriate to wait a little, since the war against it could be interpreted as encroachment upon its state independence, which was contrary to Russian interests. Following the debate, it was decided to Sovietize Armenia immediately and thus start struggling with the Entente in the Middle East and Turkey. It was also essential to inform Moscow about appropriate measures to be taken.83 The results of the Turkish-­Armenian War at the end of September 1920 put an end to Armenia’s attempts to seize control over Nakhchivan. Thereafter the Armenian side in the struggle for Nakhchivan resorted only to diplomatic measures only gain help from Soviet Russia.

The Turkish-­Armenian War and the South Caucasus A war between Turkey and Armenia started late in September 1920 to put an end to Armenian attempts to capture Nakhchivan militarily. Afterward they attempted to use only diplomatic means, specifically using the territories and privileges stipulated by the Treaty of Sèvres. The Entente soon took measures to arm Armenia. Weaponry and ammunition sent by the Military Council of the allies to the Caucasus republics, including Azerbaijan, went to Armenia. Earlier in July a part of this weaponry was sent by France to Batum for the Armenians. On June 12, 1920, a secretary of the French Foreign Ministry informed Lord Curzon about the transfer of weapons to Armenia.84 At the same time, the Entente leaders were confident that in the near future Soviet Russia, jointly with the Turkish Kemalists, would force Armenia to its knees. Entente representatives knew that Soviet Russia had ceased delivering oil to Armenia and that no railway traffic operated.85 With a call to arms, Armenia declared the mobilization of citizens aged eighteen to forty-­ five. In the spring and autumn of 1920, taking advantage of the fact that Turkish troops were engaged in fighting against Greeks in the west of the country, Armenians seized some Turkish territories in eastern Anatolia, Olty, and other areas. Eliava, the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Federation to Iran and Turkey, telegraphed Orjonikidze on September 18 about the arrival of Khalil pasha and the aggravation of Turkish-­Armenian relations. He considered it necessary to clarify the course of events and immediately send Chicherin the required proposals.86

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On September 21, several days before the hostilities, Eliava wrote to Lenin, Chicherin, and Trotskii: Armenia, fed by Georgia and properly equipped, was waiting for the right moment to launch an offensive. In turn, England was seeking to create a Kurdish buffer to the north of Mesopotamia, holding talks with chiefs, unsuccessful so far. In a letter to our command, Sardar of Maku vows friendship and concurrently is holding talks with the Dashnaks on joint actions against us. Inside Anatolia, the agents of England and the sultan were staging an uprising under the slogan “Struggle against Mustafa and his allies.” All were headed by the caliph and the green banner of the Prophet.87 On September 24 the Armenians began implementing their plans and started military operations in eastern vilayets of Turkey. On September 28 the Turkish army led by Karabekir pasha forced the Armenians out of Sarykamysh and Merdenek. However, wary of complications, the Turkish government suddenly suspended any further advance. On September 30 the Turks fortified themselves along the Sarykamysh-­Laloghlu line. This wait-­and-see policy was attributable to the Turkish government’s desire to clarify the response of Soviet Russia, Georgia, and the Entente to the developments.88 Liberation of Sarykamysh and the Turks’ impetuous advance in the first years of the war seriously concerned Soviet Russia. Anxious about the brilliant successes of the Turkish troops under the leadership of Karabekir pasha, Legrand informed Chicherin about developments on the Turkish-­Armenian border on September 29: “The Turks started an offensive at the Kars front and occupied Sarykamysh. It is imperative for the Soviet government to decide on an immediate halt of the Turkish offensive; otherwise our position risks becoming ambiguous. If the Turks are halted and combat operations suspended, our chances to attain our goals in Armenia peacefully are rather high.”89 Touching upon the tasks of Soviet diplomacy in Armenia, Legrand thought first of the transfer of “disputed territories” to Armenia. At the same time, he was well aware of the delicacy of the issue. On October 2 he sent a secret letter to Chicherin, saying: As you must remember, a great tragedy broke out in Baku due to disputed territories. It is important to understand that one could not give an answer within five minutes regarding transfer of disputed territories to Armenia, particularly Zangezur and Nakhchivan. Sentiments in Azerbaijan say that this could result in disaster. So there was a need to discuss the issue for many days running, and negotiators came to the conclusion that at present there was no possibility to grant the disputed



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territories to Armenia, so the issue remained open. Comrades conversant with the Caucasus consider your expectations to convey arms via Armenia to be illusory.... So the question of the disputed territories with Azerbaijan remains open.90 At this juncture Chicherin was mostly interested in halting the advance of the Karabekir pasha’s army and safeguarding Armenia against utter defeat. Early in October Chicherin asked Orjonikidze to contact the Kemalists immediately and dissuade them from assaulting Armenia. Chicherin wrote: “We consider military operations to provoke the Entente government untimely and dangerous. I ask you to do your utmost to stem this skirmish.” At the same time, Chicherin reminded Orjonikidze of Soviet Russia’s possible mediation between Turkey, on the one hand, and Armenia and Georgia, on the other.91 In his letter to the Politburo Chicherin noted that “we agreed with the Turks that with the purpose of establishing contact with us they will occupy the Sarykamysh-­Shahtakhty line irrespective of us.”92 On October 5 Chicherin telegraphed Legrand: [I]f the Turkish offensive will not overstep the Sarykamysh-­Shahtakhty line and will get in contact with us without affecting Armenia, all of this means that no peaceful transfer via Armenia for further arming is possible. Direct contact with the Turks is quite workable. Our agreement is unlikely to be harmed even if some towns are occupied by the Turks. There is reliable information about a great volume of arms conveyed by the Entente via Armenia.93 In a telegram sent to Legrand the same day Chicherin noted that “if the Turks move forward deep into Armenia and remain on the Sarykamysh-­ Shahtakhty line, there is no need to interfere, but if they go farther, we’ll have to take adequate steps.”94 A telegram from Trotskii to Lenin and Krestinskii warned that the Kemalists’ attempts to seize Ardahan and Batum might provoke the Entente to land troops under Batum. He believed that the current conditions of the Kemalists would not allow them to stir up provocations against the Entente. Trotskii wrote: “France seeks a pretext for landing troops directed against Soviet Russia and Soviet Azerbaijan, not against the Kemalists.”95 The Russian Foreign Commissariat frightened the Turks with the prospect of the Entente inciting an attempt to save the Armenians from unavoidable defeat. Chicherin wrote a telegram to Orjonikidze, which expressed his misgivings that the Turks’ advancement could trigger the Entente. Therefore he instructed Orjonikidze to dissuade the Kemalists from imprudent actions.96 Having received this directive, Orjonikidze instructed Leonid Stark and Sergei Kavtaradze to inform

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the Kemalists about Chicherin’s proposals to halt the Turkish offensive and thus prevent the Entente from landing.97 Before the start of the war, the Russian Foreign Commissariat had sent letters to the Soviet representatives in Turkey, Armenia, and Georgia to remind them that from now on the center of the eastern policy of Soviet Russia had shifted toward Turkey. However, Soviet-­Turkish relations were not supposed to disrupt the trade talks of Leonid Krassin in London or hamper the revolutionary work of Lev Kamenev in England. The letter noted: “In England they are badly in need of customers, with great expectations being pinned on our market and raw materials; hence all invectives of Lloyd George are addressed to Lev Kamenev alone, while Krassin remains clean as a new pin.”98 ­Chicherin’s document stressed the necessity of providing the Turkish Armenians with lands and independence as the top priority of Soviet policy. After Sarykamysh, the Turks liberated Ardahan and thus put Armenia in great danger. Soviet Russia kept using all means to halt the Turkish offensive. On October 19, 1920, Chicherin instructed Orjonikidze: The continuation of the Turkish offensive is utterly undesirable. Try to dissuade them from doing it because they are provoking the Entente’s interference. It is reported that the Entente is seeking to set G ­ eorgia and Armenia against us due to the offensive on Baku. The Turks’ ­advance deep inside Armenia gives us cause to protect Armenians, so the landing troops are likely to be popular in the West, even among ­leftists.99 In September 1920, in a conversation with Alexander Bodrero, an Italian official from Russia’s mission to Tiflis, Russian trade representative Leonid Ruzer stated that the Bolsheviks were trying to keep Baku at any cost.100 Leonid Stark, the Russian representative to Georgia, sent alarming news to Moscow from the Turkish-­Armenian front, specifically to Chicherin and Trotskii in Moscow and Orjonikidze in Baku. He informed the Bolshevik leaders that “on the night of September 28 two Turkish divisions launched an offensive on Olty, Badras, Karakurt, and Argaj. On the night of September 29 the Armenians mopped up Sarykamysh. However, an Armenian regiment suffered great losses near Merdenek, and eight heavy guns were disabled. Also Armenians left Ardahan and Kaghyzman without offering any resistance.”101 On September 29 Legrand informed Chicherin about current developments on the Turkish-­Armenian front.102 In fact Mustafa Kemal pasha was very cautious about a war with Armenia. When the first Soviet proposals about the cessation of military operations came in mid-­October, he refused to discuss them with Moscow. Earlier Moscow had demanded that Van, Mush, and Bitlis be ceded to the Armenians. During a private conversation with a secretary of



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the Soviet mission in Ankara, however, Kemal pasha declared that “we are ready to accept any offer, except for encroachment upon our territory.”103 As soon as the Armenians sustained the first defeat on the Turkish-­ Armenian front, on September 30, the Armenian foreign minister sent an urgent telegram to Chicherin. Copies of this telegram were intended for the Tiflis office of the Russian Federation, for Legrand, and for Tigran Bekzadian in the Armenian office. In his telegram Ohanjanian reminded Chicherin that his telegram of July 20, 1920, had said that the government of the Russian Federation was eager to exploit its friendly relations with the Turkish national government in order to provide the Armenian people with an area in Asia Minor under the protectorate of the Soviet government. Now Ohanjanian sarcastically asked whether Chicherin knew that the Turkish troops had assumed the offensive and what Chicherin was going to do: As for the government of Armenia, it is hopeful that the government of the Russian Federation with its friendly attitude to the Republic of Armenia will make efforts immediately to halt the offensive of the allied Turkish forces against Armenia and withdraw them from the borders of contemporary Armenia. In so doing, the government of the Russian Federation will enable my [the Armenian] government to discuss with its authorized representative the terms of an agreement to be concluded between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia.104 Based on Ohanjanian’s telegram and other information from the Caucasus, on October 5 Chicherin prepared a report for the Politburo, which noted that the Turks, in order to establish a necessary contact between Russian and Turkey, would occupy the Sarykamysh-­Shahtakhty line irrespective of Russia. Chicherin considered it possible to make a landing in Batum, since 86,000 Entente troops had already mustered in Istanbul. This landing party might pose a serious threat to Baku. Should the Turks proceed with the offensive, Chicherin drew the Politburo’s attention to Orjonikidze’s proposal: the troops of Soviet Russia would capture all of Armenia’s territory. Proceeding from this information, however, Chicherin put forward the idea that the Turkish offensive had encouraged all counterrevolutionary circles of the Caucasus to oppose Soviet power: “Even worse, there is also Nuri pasha, conqueror of Baku and a distinguished representative of anti-­Bolshevik policy.”105 The arrival of Enver pasha jointly with Grigorii Zinov’ev in Baku in September 1920 to attend the 1st Congress of the Peoples of the East stirred up anti-­Soviet sentiments among the local population.106 Visiting Baku at that time, the Italian representative Bodrero noted: “His arrival in Baku caused extraordinary ecstasy in the Muslim population of Azerbaijan. He was heartily welcomed everywhere; locals kissed his hand. The state reception in his honor

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cannot be explained by his being converted to communism. That was due to inexhaustible hatred between Azerbaijanis and Armenians.”107 In his memoirs Aziz Alpoud describes the arrival of Enver pasha in Baku: A few in Azerbaijan did not know who Enver pasha was — ​a hero of the battle for Edirne and Sarykamysh. Azerbaijanis treated him lovingly. It was no mere coincidence that many boys born in Baku and other towns and regions of the country were named after Enver pasha. Azerbaijanis were happy to congratulate one another on this event. Emotional upheaval unrecognizably changed people. All of them forgot about their misfortunes and hoped that the freedom would remain in their country after Enver pasha’s arrival. The staple subjects of the talk in town streets and markets, blacksmith shops, and ploughed fields were his life and feats.108 In the meanwhile Memduh Shevket Esendal, a diplomatic representative of Mustafa Kemal pasha, attempted to attend the 1st Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku. With that end in view, he and a military attaché, Omer Lutfi, left Ankara on August 15. However, they reached Baku after the congress had already ended. Mustafa Kemal pasha attached great importance to the opening of a diplomatic mission in the country. In his telegram to Karabekir pasha he pointed out that the opening of Soviet Azerbaijan’s Embassy in Ankara would mark the transformation of the Baku diplomatic mission into a plenipotentiary Turkish Embassy in Azerbaijan.109 As head of the first diplomatic mission of Turkey, Esendal was authorized to act not only in Azerbaijan but in the entire Caucasus as well. According to written instructions composed of nine clauses, Esendal was entrusted to gather and send to Ankara information about the government of Azerbaijan, principles of its functioning, its staff, their political views, and so forth. He was also instructed to gather information about the political, economic, and diplomatic ties of the government with Russia, Iran, Armenia, and Georgia. Clause 9 stipulated that Esendal should identify relations between Azerbaijan and the Turkic population in the north of Iran and their scope and level of development, if not the means of their establishment.110 In a short while Esendal succeeded in establishing stable and confidential ties with members of the Azerbaijani government, public figures, and ordinary Azerbaijanis. The so-­called uklonists (deviationists) and national Communists privately told him that the fraternal Turkish aid would deliver “Russification-­pregnant Azerbaijan” from the yoke of “Red imperialism.”111 An atmosphere of general enthusiasm took hold after a victory of the Turkish army in the western part of the country on August 30, 1922. On September 14 of the same year Esendal sent a cipher text to Mustafa Kemal pasha, which



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said that this victory inspired a feeling of pride in the whole Turkic population of Azerbaijan, from members of the government and intellectuals to ordinary people. Narimanov sent congratulatory messages to Ankara on the strength of it.112 Memduh Shevket Esendal performed his duties until March 31, 1924, when Turkey had to close its diplomatic mission due to the formation of the USSR and transfer of foreign political functions to the Union Center.113 Following the termination of talks in Moscow, Yusuf Kemal bey returned to the capital of Turkey, Ankara (the capital of Turkey, Angora, was renamed Ankara in 1930) with an approved text of the agreement. After the completion of the 1st Congress of the Peoples of the East, Ibrahim Tali and Enver pasha left for Berlin via Moscow, Osman Nuri Özgen headed for Tupse to deliver Russian aid to Turkey, and Seyfi bey Düzgören arrived in Baku.114 Bekir Sami bey left for Vladikavkaz to see his sister. However, according to Orjonikidze, he was propagandizing ideas of independence and freedom among Ingushes and thus caused a lot of trouble for the Foreign Commissariat. Chicherin told the Politburo that “Bekir Sami said that he was heading for Vladikavkaz to see his sister. We could not refuse to let our ally see his sister, but I agreed with Menzhinskii that his sister would be waiting for him in Rostov. Upon the pretext of alleged uprisings in the region, we were not going to let him go farther. I don’t understand how we could have done that.”115 All these things made the Bolsheviks apprehensive about the Turks. In considering the aggravation of the situation in the Caucasus, Chicherin insisted on Stalin’s going to the region immediately. On October 6 the Politburo discussed Chicherin’s proposals on the Turkish-­Armenian War. After the Georgian government lodged a note with Soviet Russia about this war, Chicherin was instructed to send a reply to the Georgian government, as set forth in the Politburo debates. Chicherin considered it necessary to send an authoritative Soviet representative to Tiflis. In considering the statement of the Russian foreign commissar, the Politburo passed a decision to send Aron Sheinman to Tiflis within forty-­eight hours and to decline Stalin’s request to postpone his visit to the Caucasus. He was instructed to start out immediately.116 Stalin was the single political leader capable of predicting the political consequences of the Turkish-­Armenian War. Unlike Chicherin, he believed that the continuation of the Turkish offensive “was playing into our hands.”117 To counter the Entente’s attempts to draw Georgia into the war, a Turkish delegation led by Binbaşı Talaat bey, a senior officer from the 3rd Caucasus Division, was sent to Tiflis. The chief aim of this delegation was to convince Georgians that there were no aggressive plans against Georgia and to seek its neutrality in the Turkish-­Armenian War. Col. Claude Stokes, the British representative to Tiflis, did his best to embroil Georgia in this war and thus help the Armenians. He sent a ­telegram on

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October 13 to Lord Curzon promising that Georgia would help A ­ rmenia.118 Armenians residing in Georgia were greatly concerned about Armenia’s defeats on the front line early in October. To remedy the situation and strengthen the Armenian army, the Armenian community of Tiflis announced mobilization of men aged eighteen to thirty-­five.119 The number of volunteers was 2,000. However, none of them ever reached the front line. On October 6 the ­Tiflis Armenians held a meeting against the Turkish offensive and then made their way to the Russian Embassy to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with Soviet aid to Turkey.120 Shortly after a Turkish delegation arrived in Tiflis, during talks between Georgian officials and Aron Sheinman (the Russian representative to Georgia), Sheinman assured them that Turkey would stand by the clauses related to Batum as set forth in the Treaty of Moscow signed on May 7, 1920. Visits by Colonel Stokes to Erivan, his consultations with Italians and Americans engaged in matters of economic and philanthropic nature, and even deliveries of Romanian oil by the British to the Armenian front failed to assist the Dashnaks under pressures of the Turkish army. According to Stokes, the only salvation of the South Caucasus was the formation of a Caucasus Confederation to include all three republics and Daghestan. The British saw Musavatist Azerbaijan as a part of this confederation. In Legrand’s words, however, “Armenians refrain from agreement with England owing to the British refusal to recognize disputed areas as Armenian and concurrently their consent to cede these areas to the Musavatists.”121 In his reports to Moscow earlier in October, Legrand had suggested dissuading Armenia from forcibly capturing lands, as set forth in the Treaty of Sèvres. He opined that Armenia should rely on a mediation mission from Soviet Russia, which was solely capable of solving the Armenian territorial dispute with Turkey: “Armenia’s consent to these terms is, in my view, the way out of the situation. That would enable us to demand that the Turks suspend their military operations and clear the Armenian territory.”122 At the same time, Legrand was very cautious about the idea that the Turks’ offensive might have been a favorable point to start Sovietizing Armenia. He believed that until Russia disposed of any large army in the region it would be hard to avoid using Turkish forces for the same purpose and thus add a scandal to the whole operation. Legrand asked for appropriate powers to demand that the Turkish command immediately suspend combat operations and leave the Armenian territory, subject to Armenia’s consent to Russian terms. In the meantime detachments of Nakhchivan volunteers, encouraged by the advance of the Turkish troops, won back a section of the Shahtakhty-­Julfa railway, which the Russians gave to Armenia under an agreement of August 10. Transfer of this section to the Dashnaks by the Bolsheviks caused great displeasure to Mustafa Kemal pasha. In a conversation with a Soviet represen-



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tative in Ankara he pointed out that the transfer of the Shahtakhty-­Julfa railway to Armenians was inexplicable, for this act was against the interests of ­Russians.123 In reply to Legrand’s information about the railway, Chicherin noted: “We are not going to seize it; it is not our task to win it back for the Armenians. We should not fight against the Turks, as set forth in the treaty. We are ­washing our hands of it, for we don’t need this railway. Disputed areas have to be u­ nder our control; they cannot be ceded to either party.”124 A letter addressed to Legrand compared disputed areas to the Gordian Knot and examined the political situation arising from the Entente’s aid to Armenia. Legrand was instructed as follows: You must inform us about the internal situation in Armenia and its political parties. Which parties oppose the Dashnaks, how are they fighting with each other, what are the sentiments of the Armenian peasantry? The situation sharply changed after the Turkish offensive. The Sarykamysh-­Shahtakhty line is a borderland; but if the Turks go farther, deep inside Armenia, the League of Nations will face a serious political crisis.... When contacting the Dashnaks, tell them categorically that we are not going to damage Armenia in any way. We don’t mind acting as mediators if the Dashnaks want this.125 Armenia’s foreign minister Ohanjanian, realizing the loyalty of Soviet Russia to the Turks, expressed to Chicherin his dissatisfaction not only with the Turkish offensive but with Khalil pasha’s arrival in Zangezur. There he allegedly collected signatures from Armenian peasants pledging their preparedness to submit to the Azerbaijani government. The Azerbaijani army had entered Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhchivan, neutral territories as set forth in a Russian agreement of August 10. Ohanjanian emphasized that Soviet Russia had turned a blind eye to all of these things.126 Without a doubt, the Turkish-­Armenian War and the heavy military losses of Armenia suited the interests of Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, the Armenians continued laying claim to Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhchivan as a matter of dispute. The Bolsheviks tried to exploit the Turkish offensive as a chance to bring Armenian Communists to power in Armenia. On October 13, 1920, Chicherin wrote to Legrand: Orjonikidze reports on a probable Dashnak resignation. Inform me without further delay about domestic perspectives in Armenia and the possibility of a surrender of power to the Communists without external pressure, for today we have to avoid any pressure and instead come out as peacemakers.... Emphasize our sincere friendship toward the Armenian masses and our desire to help them.127

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Legrand arrived in Erivan on October 11 and three days later informed Chicherin by telegram that if the Turks gave up their claims framed in the Treaty of Brest-­Litovsk and the Treaty of Batum then Armenians would accept Soviet Russia’s mediation on the Turkish issue. “Armenians are complaining about replacement of the Red Army by local guerrillas and Azerbaijan units. They also object to the presence of the Turkish active forces in ­Nakhchivan, with whom the Armenians are at war today.”128 The Armenian government did its best to shift the blame for the conflict with Turkey onto Azerbaijan. In the course of talks with representatives of Soviet Armenia, the Armenians demanded recognition of Zangezur and ­Nakhchivan as parts of Armenia as a precondition for Russian passage to Turkey through Armenia.129 On October 26, 1920, Legrand sent a report to Moscow, which described the situation on the front line according to the Armenians, saying that a line of combat operations went across Demir-­Kapy and the Ziaret mountains.130 Foreign radio stations trumpeted the story that Soviet representative Legrand had allegedly issued an ultimatum to the Armenian government. For this reason Chicherin advised him: We must not put forward threats.... The present conditions of our forces in Transcaucasia do not allow us to threaten anyone. Keep saying that we are peacemakers. Tell the government and mass media that we do not threaten anyone; that we have no alliance with the Turks; we just want to make use of our authority for purposes of peace. Hence we offer mediation services. At the same time, we demand that Armenia terminate its alliance with Entente, but we do not threaten or issue an ultimatum.131 In response to this Avetis Agharonian, the head of the Armenian delegation to Europe, addressed the Supreme Council of Versailles, placing emphasis on a joint offensive by the Turks and the Russian Bolsheviks.132 Despite desperate Armenian resistance, the Turks occupied Kars on October 30; hence the Armenians had to fall back to Gumru. The liberation of Kars by the Turks pushed Armenia to agree with Russia’s mediation. However, their claims were directed at returning territories lost in the course of battle diplomatically through the “friendly mediation” of Russia. According to the first condition set by Armenia, Zangezur and Nakhchivan were to join Armenia, and the Russian troops stationed there were to be replaced by Armenian units. In this case, Armenia would voluntarily relinquish all of its claims on Karabagh. The next demand of the Dashnaks was that 25 percent of all ammunition, arms, and military equipment would be transported to Turkey via ­Armenia. The third demand was granting Armenia credit worth 2.5 million gold rubles. Aside from this, Turkey was to cease military ­operations,



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­ ithdraw its troops to the borders of 1914, and pledge that all items and equipw ment would be transported to places not closer than the Trabzon-­ErzurumMush-­Bitlis line.133 Legrand saw fit to agree to the proposed terms, provided that ­Azerbaijan would agree on the disputed territories. To his thinking, such a formulation of the question would displease the Kemalists but make Armenia happy, free it from the fetters of the Entente, and even lead to the establishment of a Georgian-­Armenian alliance. In turn, such an alliance would consolidate Russia’s position in the South Caucasus. “As for Azerbaijan,” noted Legrand, “I’m confident that if you put your foot down we will be able to persuade Azerbaijan to adopt a desirable decision.” Owing to Stalin’s arrival in Baku, Legrand was about to leave for Baku and discuss the issue with “Baku comrades.” Finally, he warned: “The Dashnaks are holding a firm position in Armenia; the Communists are weak, so the occupation of the Armenian territory by the Turks or by us will be necessary only to liquidate the Dashnaks.”134 Despite the equality of forces on the plain, the Armenians yielded Kars without a blow and thereby caused the Soviet representatives to worry. They feared that the same old story would occur when the Turks held maneuvers in May 1918. The defeat of Kars revealed an absolute unavailability of the Armenian army, particularly its command staff. Despite the government’s calls to the army and the nation, the Armenians sought help from other countries. A day after the defeat, on October 31, 1920, they appealed to Soviet Russia. At the same time, the Armenians spread rumors that the Entente headed by England had allegedly encouraged the Kemalists to launch an offensive on Armenia and thus urged Musavatists in Baku to oust the Soviet power from the South Caucasus. However, these rumors remained within the government and the parliament, which tried to convince Russians that “representatives of nearly all Entente member countries have allegedly assembled in Ankara.”135 On November 4, with the participation of Stalin, a joint session of the CC CPA and the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP discussed the situation in Armenia and Georgia. On November 3 Chicherin had sent a telegram to the Turkish Foreign Ministry that expressed Soviet Russia’s willingness to act as mediator between the Turks and Armenians. The Russian representative in Tiflis, Aron Sheinman, described the situation in Georgia, saying that the Georgian government would like to have guarantees of security by Russia in case of an offensive by the Kemalists. Sheinman believed that Ambassador Stark should meet with Kemal pasha to clarify the situation. However, Stalin disagreed with this initiative: Moscow knows nothing of Kemal. A telegram from Moscow was sent to Kemal to halt the offensive, but it remains unknown whether he

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has received it. Neither the Turkish Communist Party nor Kemal’s representatives here are aware of what is going on in their country. A Communist from Kemal has recently arrived; he met with both the Kemalists and Soviets (military and civilian), and he insists that K ­ emal has no objection to negotiating with the sultan, who represents the Entente. The ­Kemalists aspire to have their own faction but have no money and supplies. Talks with the sultan threaten to change the situation unfavorably for us. I agree with Sheinman’s suggestion to send an envoy to Turkey to become acquainted with the situation, and in this respect it would be fitting to send Mdivani jointly with Shahtakhtinskii and Korkmazov (Stark’s candidature is admissible but Georgia needs him today); besides, Mdivani is more suitable for Baku than Stark. As for the offensive, we sent a note to Kemal, but no reply has come so far. We will decide on the matter as soon as a reply is ready.136 Although Sheinman kept insisting on sending a representative of the central Soviet leadership in Moscow to Kemal pasha, Stalin’s proposal was passed. After Legrand reported on the situation in Armenia, his proposal on ­ceding Nakhchivan and Zangezur to Armenia was rejected. Stalin was commissioned with finalizing a CC RCP decision on Nakhchivan and Zangezur. A protocol of the session said that the ceding of Nakhchivan and Zangezur to Armenia was not advantageous either politically or strategically. Following Legrand’s report on Armenia, his proposal to make an ­agreement with Armenia at the expense of Azerbaijani lands was disapproved. Stalin was instructed to identify the CC RCP’s final view on the agreement. The transfer of Zangezur and Nakhchivan to Armenia in order to conclude such a treaty was not recognized as being either politically or strategically relevant. Being familiar with the draft treaty between Soviet Russia and Armenia that envisioned transition of Nakhchivan and Zangezur to Armenia, Stalin and Orjonikidze sent a telegram to Chicherin on November 5: “The draft treaty gives Armenia the Nakhchivan and Zangezur uyezds, and we will receive the right to export arms and other goods to Turkey if the Turks go back to the 1914 boundary due to our pressure. The draft may not be signed immediately and thus requires detailed consideration and substantial change.”137 In a telegram addressing Chicherin later the same day they reported that “Azerbaijan is on our side” regarding all questions under consideration and suggested immediately sending mandates to Polikarp Mdivani, Jelaleddin Korkmazov, and Behbud Shahtakhtinskii to hold talks with the Mustafa Kemal government: “this very trio should have been given directions regarding questions of offending Armenia. Any delay on our side is dangerous. We are already late.”138 In a secret telegram to Lenin on November 5, Stalin wrote that



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the situation in Turkey is unclear and may become dangerous if Kemal reaches accord with the Entente, for neutralization of Kemal would make it easier for the Entente to assault Baku; without a detailed exami­ nation and identification of the situation in Turkey it is not possible to sign a treaty with Armenia that gives Armenia [that is, the Entente] the most important Muslim-­populated strategic region, which would cause conflict between us and Turkey. As for a treaty with Armenia, we should delay it for a while, pretending that we desire a peace that favors Armenia, and we will see what happens next. The 11th Army is weak and won’t repel an attack if the Entente assaults Baku. We need to deploy one more army here.139 The Bolsheviks were particularly concerned over foreign news reports alleging that “Britain is holding talks with the Musavatists and refusing to give the Armenians Zangezur and Nakhchivan in a desire to present these two regions to the Musavatists to morally strengthen a counterrevolution in Baku.”140 Owing to the critical character of the situation, Moscow immediately reacted to telegrams sent from Baku. In particular, on November 7 Chicherin sent a telegram to the representative of Soviet Russia in Azerbaijan, saying: “The RSFSR People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs authorizes comrades Mdivani, Korkmazov, and Shahtakhtinskii to hold talks and conclude a treaty with representatives of the Turkish national government on the question of suspension of military actions between Turkey and Armenia.”141 On November 7 Chicherin sent the same information to Russia’s representative in Erivan, Legrand: “The Turks allege that they are willing to free Armenia from the Dashnaks. This is a deception. We have to stop transferring arms to them until they conclude an armistice. All this will happen if Armenians approve our demands.”142 The question of the Soviet attitude toward to the Kemalists was once again discussed on November 9, at a joint meeting of the CC CPA, Baku City Committee, and Caucasus Bureau of the RCP (B) with Stalin in attendance. In his report to the meeting members, Stalin noted that the Kemalists, in order to force Armenia to give up a series of Turkish vilayets that were transferred by Turkey to Armenia according to a treaty concluded under pressure from the Entente, were eager to seize Gumru to isolate Armenia from Georgia: The Kemalists say that they want to free Armenia from the Dashnaks. This is not true. The Kemalists represent a revolutionary-­bourgeois party struggling with the Entente. Russia considers Kemal’s plans regarding Armenia negatively. It is evident that the Soviet government should find an appropriate way to suggest that the Kemalists stop their

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activities, in order to prevent Armenia from being defeated. Generally speaking, the Kemalists have begun seeking ways to conclude a series of accords with the Entente. Britain has become more compliant due to revolts in the East. How the situation will develop is hard to say. It is not denied that Turkey will reconcile with the Entente and become a source of arms for their struggle against us; at the same time, it is also possible that Turkey will continue waging a war against the Entente. We will send a delegation to Turkey in the near future in order to clarify the situation there. The delegation will be instructed to examine the situation on site and act, depending on the situation.143 Following the Baku meeting, Legrand sent an urgent report to the S­ oviet mission in Armenia, noting that with Stalin present the meeting took a negative attitude to “our treaty”: first, the withdrawal of Turkish troops to the 1914 boundary would strongly complicate Russian relations with Turkey; second, the importance of the opportunity to influence the developments in Iran through disputable territories was stressed. Legrand wrote: At the same time, they believe that we actually can do nothing against the Turks’ assault, though our attitude to this remains strongly negative. Formally, Turkey is not linked with us by a treaty, so we cannot make demands on it. As for transit, this question is not urgent in the existing situation due to lack of information. Aside from this, they believe that the Turks, if they conclude an armistice with Armenia, will not find it difficult to get passage for themselves, while ceding the disputed regions to Armenia instead of using transit is an expensive price.144 After Kars surrendered, Soviet Russia’s policy regarding Turkey, Caucasus Muslims, and the whole eastern policy turned out to be very precarious. This becomes evident from a detailed letter that Chicherin sent to Stalin in Baku on November 5. He reported a lot of information from various sources about a sharp, fundamental turn in the Entente’s policy regarding Turkey and the Kemalists’ policy regarding the Entente, but the situation was not clear yet. Chicherin accentuated relations between the Kemalists and the Istanbul government and stressed the justice of Kemalist concepts: historically, whoever ruled Anatolia later took over Constantinople, but whoever ruled Constantinople without Anatolia permanently lost Constantinople. Chicherin feared that Great Britain, which had previously ruled key centers of global seaways, could make concessions to the Kemalists in exchange for the Kemalists’ yielding Constantinople to the English: It is quite unclear whether this is a simple compromise on the part of the Kemalists for reasons of self-­preservation or whether this is joined



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by a 180-­degree turn against us in the form of joining the anti-­Bolshevik coalition of world reaction and a desire to be compensated at our expense, following the example of the Turkish policy of 1918. We must take into account but cannot yet answer the questions of whether Bekir Sami is creating grounds in the North Caucasus to assure an offensive policy of Turkish nationalists who had changed sides, whether the policy of Nuri pasha is winning, and whether Khalil pasha is striving for this in his work in Kashgar. We don’t know yet whether Bekir Sami and company are our friends or our enemies. In our relations with Armenia and Georgia we should not forget even for a minute that a new turn of the wheel of history can bring a barrier against invaders over the offensive policy of the Turkish nationalists that have changed the front. In staking our fortunes on Muslimhood, we must always take into consideration that one fine day the anti-­Bolshevik tendency may turn out to be stronger than the anti-­British one, as happened in Afghanistan. I have always warned against that one-­sided stake on Muslim­hood, of which Narimanov was our representative. At present we are not yet planning to change our attitude to the Kemalists in order not to lose what may still remain in our hands and not push those who are hesitating toward the other side.145 In his letter to Stalin on November 9 Chicherin openly expressed his opinion about the Caucasus problems. He noted that “the question of the transfer of Zangezur and Nakhchivan should remain open; anyway, now is not the time to give these regions to Armenia.” In this letter Chicherin gave up his demands for the independence of Armenia, which had been discussed with Bekir Sami, and noted that this independence was unpromising due to the extremely small number of Armenians residing there. In particular, he admitted, Bayazit Province, between Turkish Armenia near Lake Van and Russian Armenia, is totally inhabited by Muslims. Of course, it was encroached on by the Dashnaks, who settle ethnographic matters very simply: by annihilation of Muslim populations; but we are forced to take the purely Muslim population of Bayazit into account. In the opinion of Chicherin and a decision of the CC RCP (B) Politburo, the solution to the established situation was Sovietization of Armenia and joining Turkish Armenia to Russian Armenia. He wrote: “In that case, it would be possible to raise the question of uniting the Caucasus Soviet ­republics into a single republic.” Chicherin regarded a united Caucasus state as a means of safeguarding Baku against a potential attack by the Entente.146 On November 2 the Turkish army command suggested that Armenia conclude an armistice. Understanding that it was not possible to stop the Turkish

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army from attacking Gumru, the Armenians agreed to halt war opera­tions on November 6. The Turks had already reached Gumru on that day. The armistice terms were accepted on November 8, as proposed by Armenian foreign Minister Hamo Ohanjanian.147 The terms of the armistice gave the Armenians twenty-­four hours to transfer 2,000 operating rifles, 60 machine guns, 3 c­ annons, 4,000 boxes of cartridges, 60 cannon shells, 2 steam locomotives, and 60 carriages to the Turks. The Armenian army was given three days maximum to withdraw from Gumru and retreat to a position fifteen kilo­ meters south of Arpachai, while the Turkish army would occupy the fortress of Gumru, the railway, and a ten-­kilometer zone surrounding the town.148 A seven-­point armistice covering a period of seven days stipulated that the Turks would preserve the security of the civilian population and ensure order in the town. All military actions had to be stopped.149 On November 10 Ohanjanian passed a note to the Turkish side expressing his agreement with the terms of the armistice.150 At the very last moment, however, the Armenians refused to sign this agreement, explaining that it would enable the Bolsheviks to conduct propaganda against the Armenians. Thus on November 14 the Turkish armed forces restarted military actions, which lasted until the Armenians surrendered and sat at the negotiating table. With such a dangerous turn of events in mind, on November 7 Chicherin had telegraphed Stalin about the possibility of deployment of Soviet troops in Armenia: “Trotskii replied that we have become militarily stronger in the Caucasus so he does not object to sending troops to Armenia for the purpose of Sovietization; we need to solve this question politically and we think that you should settle the matter on site. There are two opportunities: the best one assumes saving Armenia at the expense of its Sovietization.” Chicherin noted that it was Stalin’s responsibility to make a choice between beginning a Communist revolt and sending troops to Armenia, claiming that if “there is even a single Red Army soldier in Armenia, the Turks won’t touch him.” Furthermore, Chicherin reported that he had already sent mandates to Shahtakhtinskii and Korkmazov to impart to Mustafa Kemal and that he had replaced Mdivani with another person “due to Persian events.”151 Not satisfied with telegraph communication with Stalin, on November 7 Chicherin told Legrand in a conversation by direct wire that the offer of a draft treaty had already become obsolete and that now all means had to be used to stop the Turks from moving forward. He noted: “The question of Zangezur and Nakhchivan should remain open. Georgia needs to be calmed down by a report that we have been holding talks [with the Turks] to prevent Georgia from being embraced by Britain.” Chicherin said that if Armenians accepted the intermediary terms of Soviet Russia they would demand that



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the Turks stop the attack. He noted: “We will continue to give arms to the Turks only if they first stop attacking, but this should happen if Armenia, for its part, approves our terms of mediation and, second, makes a commitment to drive the Entente out of Batum if the latter seizes it.” Chicherin reported again that the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs had issued mandates to Mdivani, Shahtakhtinskii, and Jelaleddin Korkmazov to hold talks with the Turks.152 As for the question of deploying Soviet troops in Armenia, Chicherin believed that it was possible only if a decision was made about the ­Sovietization of Armenia. He also did not rule out the possibility of occupation of ­Georgia, which, in his opinion, should be done so that the Georgian government, scared by the Bolsheviks, would not have time enough to be embraced by Britain. However, the point at present was the location of certain forces at the border with Armenia that could be put into action if necessary.153 On November 11 the Military Revolutionary Council of the Caucasus front issued a mandate to Budu Mdivani to carry out an intermediary mission.154 On the same day Chicherin notified Mustafa Kemal pasha and the government of Armenia that Mdivani had been sent to the Armenian-­Turkish negotiations as a mediator: “Due to the Armenian government’s request that Soviet Russia mediate between Armenia and Turkey and the Turkish national government’s agreement with this, the Soviet government would like to notify you that it accepts the mediation and thus sends its plenipotentiary representative Mdivani to the area of military actions.”155 Supplied with this mandate, Mdivani traveled via Dilijan to Erivan, arriving on November 19. The Armenians had already approved the Turks’ demands a day earlier. On November 25 the RSFSR People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs issued the same mandate to Korkmazov and ­Shahtakhtinskii.156 They were authorized to participate in peace talks between the GNAT government and the government of the Armenian Republic. Before leaving for Erivan, Mdivani had received from instructions from Stalin that differed from the instructions issued by Chicherin, ordering him not to confront the Turks because of the Dashnaks, to draw the Turks’ attention to the Batum district, not to make strong demands that Turkish military units retreat to the old borders, to demand only establishment of a joint commission with Soviet Russia as a participant, to promote a split among the Dashnaks and lead the left-­wing movement toward the formation of a revolutionary committee, and not to make decisions without the official sanction of Moscow.157 Having failed to withstand the pressure of the Turkish troops, on November 15 the government of Armenia reported to Kazım Karabekir pasha that it

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had failed to meet some of the November 8 demands of the Ankara government, allegedly only for technical reasons. On the night of November 17–18 the Armenian government was notified that the Turks had agreed to conclude an armistice, so all of the military actions stopped on November 18.158 As reported by Legrand, the Armenians, unlike in the case of the armistice of November 8, were prepared to follow the terms of the November 15 armistice and had already begun observing its terms.159 The front line between the sides now passed via Surmali, Arax Station, and Mount Alagez. The Armenian army was ordered to withdraw from Karakilisa. The defeat resulted in a serious difference of opinion inside the Party of the Dashnaks. According to Legrand, they “realized the erroneous nature of their propaganda calling for invasion of Turkish Armenia and adherence to the Treaty of Sèvres.” After the Turks seized Gumru, the Armenian Communists of Alexandropol published an appeal welcoming the revolutionary Turkish army that had arrived in order to free the Armenian people from the Dashnak yoke. Legrand informed Moscow that they “were under a threat of being drowned in the process of victorious Kemalization first of Armenia and then perhaps of Georgia as well. Even comrade Mdivani, despite his short-­term contact with the Kemalists, trusts their plans of Sovietization of Armenia and currently suggests using a ‘Revolutionary Committee of Soviet Armenia’ established by the Turks.”160 Concerned over the Turks entering Gumru, Orjonikidze started realizing his long-­standing concept of ceding Zangezur to Armenia in order to strengthen the positions of Armenian Communists on the one hand and to break the direct land link between Turkey and Azerbaijan on the other. The triumph of Karabekir pasha on the Turkish-­Armenian front made the Bolsheviks fear recurrence of the events of September 1918 when the Caucasus Islamic army led by Nuri pasha Killigil entered Baku. In a telegram on November 15 addressing Lenin, Stalin noted that Baku was endangered: “The enemy would invade Elizavetpol [Ganja] at the very first attack, which would enable it to establish a bourgeois-­national government of Azerbaijan based on the 1918 example and make it easier to occupy Baku.”161 In such conditions, Sergo Orjonikidze proposed to Stalin (who had arrived in Baku to discuss the critical situation in the South Caucasus) the transfer of Zangezur to Armenia, which would end Turkey’s direct access to Azerbaijan. To pretend that Bolshevik Russia had no preconceptions Orjonikidze suggested offering a Zangezur-­ related initiative on behalf of the leader of Sovietized Azerbaijan: Narimanov, chair of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee. It should be noted that in the summer of 1920, before a peace treaty between Soviet Russia and Armenia had been signed, Orjonikidze, under pressure from Chicherin, had made his first attempt to force Narimanov to give



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up Nakhchivan, Ordubad, and the Sharur-­Daralayaz uyezd in favor of Armenia. In a conversation by direct wire on June 20, 1920 Chicherin, Russia’s ­people’s commissar of foreign affairs, instructed Sergo Orjonikidze, who was in Vlad­ikavkaz: “My telegram to comrade Narimanov was met with confusion. Z ­ angezur and Karabagh must be linked. Nakhchivan, Ordubad, and ­Julfa should in no way be linked to either Azerbaijan or Armenia. These ­localities must be occupied by Russian units, not Azerbaijani or Armenian ones. Russian occupation authorities, not Azerbaijani or Armenian authorities, must stay there. Soviet power in these localities must be subordinated to the Russian occupation authority.”162 Having received Chicherin’s instructions, ­Orjonikidze immediately reported to Narimanov: I just now talked with Chicherin about Karabagh and Zangezur. I suggest linking these regions to Azerbaijan immediately, unconditionally. You should give up claiming other regions [Nakhchivan, Ordubad, ­Julfa, and Sharur-­Daralayaz uyezds] and provide autonomy to Mountainous Karabagh and Zangezur. That should in no way be indicated in a peace treaty [between the RSFSR and Armenia] and should be offered solely as your own initiative.163 In returning from Baku, Stalin was also greatly concerned over this circumstance. Staying in Vladikavkaz on November 16, he telegraphed Lenin: Baku may be endangered from three sides. First: danger may stem from the south from Britain if Enzeli and Resht are passed to the shah’s govern­ment [that is, Britain], which now represents the only real power in ­Persia. Second: danger may arise from Turkey if Turkey is strengthened in Armenia and receives a common border with Azerbaijan. To prevent this danger, it is essential to use the existing situation to ­Sovietize Armenia, to drive an Armenian Soviet wedge between Turkey and ­Azerbaijan. Third: danger arises from Georgia [that is, from the Entente]. In fact the territory between Tiflis and Elizavetpol is quite defenseless against a strike from the west. At the very first attack, the enemy may take over Elizavetpol, where it undoubtedly will establish a bourgeois Azerbaijani government.164 Huseinov, Azerbaijan’s people’s commissar of foreign affairs, after a meeting with Turkey’s new representative in Georgia, Kazım Dirik, sent Stalin a message stressing that “as for our proposal for withdrawal from Armenia as well as Alexandropolis and Kars, Dirik voiced his agreement except for Kars, which the Turks allegedly would never leave; besides, they claim that it is necessary to transfer Nakhchivan to the Turks or to Azerbaijan.”165

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The Turkish troops approaching the borders of Azerbaijan caused substantial anxiety in Baku as well. A long discussion of the situation under Orjonikidze’s leadership took place on November 22 with members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia and Narimanov in attendance. At these discussions Orjonikidze reported that “the situation is becoming rather complicated; I think that we’re on the brink of a large ­Caucasus war.... We should no longer wait and should drive a wedge immediately,” meaning transfer of Zangezur to Armenia and driving “an Armenian wedge” between Turkey and Azerbaijan. “We are told that the Musavatists are sending every kind of petition on behalf of Azerbaijani peasants to Kemal.”166 Orjonikidze reported this proposal to Stalin, who was in Rostov. Stalin replied: “We would have hurried too much if we drove a wedge right away, without waiting for new units to approach; I’m afraid that the units to move will turn out to be units cut off from Georgia if the latter regards the planned operation as a special case. I think that we’d better wait a little.” He added: “But if you go on insisting, I will talk with Moscow today and demand a sanction in the spirit of your proposal.” Finally, Stalin reported: “You should now prepare the Revo­ lutionary Committee [of Armenia] to get ready for war, and I will now talk with the Old Man [Lenin].”167 Turkish troops with directly access to the borders of Azerbaijan strengthened Stalin’s suspicions. Having interrupted his conversation with Orjonikidze, he telephoned Lenin to report directly to him about the established situation. On November 23, in a telephone conversation with Lenin, Stalin expressed his concern: 1. Information obtained from Mdivani from Erivan indicates that the Armenians no longer have troops, so the Turks may occupy the whole of Armenia easily, if they desire. Kemal’s representative in Tiflis, Kazım Dirik, behaves more than suspiciously; moreover, Mdivani thinks that the occupation of Armenia has become possible due to a certain accord between the Kemalists and Georgia with the knowledge, and perhaps consent, of the Entente. 2. As reported by Orjonikidze, the Turks are already trying to establish links with dissatisfied elements in Azerbaijan, receiving petitions from them, and trying to gain possession of a common border with Azerbaijan, which is now particularly dangerous. 3. A Turkish government note that was submitted to you yesterday as a reply to our note about mediation is indicative of more than an evasive stance by the Turks. 4. As reported by Orjonikidze, several thousand British sepoys are being concentrated in Persia against Enzeli and Resht, and in general there is great preparatory work aimed at strengthening the position of the British



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in Persia; moreover, an Anglophobe cabinet in Persia has been substituted for an Anglophile one. 5. In summarizing these data, Orjonikidze believes that we’re facing a new great war in the south of the Caucasus arranged by the Entente under the mediation of Georgia and, perhaps, with the neutrality of Turkey in the best case and, in the worst case, in an alliance with Turkey against us, primarily against Bolshevik Azerbaijan. I quite agree with Orjonikidze. 6. As a practical step, Orjonikidze now suggests driving a wedge between Turkey and Azerbaijan [a week later Zangezur was transferred to ­Armenia for exactly this reason]. I think that this step is risky at the moment because we have no railway communication with Erivan, without which we will not be able to deliver foods to either the people or the army in Erivan. Thus I suggest postponing an Armenia-­related operation until new units arrive. It is evident to me that we are awfully late in deploying the troops; meanwhile the events are accelerating, and a threat to Azerbaijan from the Turks is growing from day to day. Anyway, we have nothing to do but postpone the operation that Orjonikidze proposed for a short period.168 Having listened to Stalin’s arguments, Lenin replied that he could say nothing until the Politburo gathered and recommended that Stalin submit his specific proposal to the Politburo, act himself based on his authority, or accelerate his arrival in Moscow to solve the whole Caucasus question. Stalin said that he would arrive in Moscow that same night and ordered Orjonikidze to carry out preparatory work and wait for instructions from Moscow.169 Stalin reported to Orjonikidze: “I just now talked with Lenin. He asks me to accelerate my trip to Moscow. I’m leaving today. You’ll receive a directive after three days. For the time being, it has been decided to carry on preparatory work in the spirit of your proposal and speed up deployment of new units.”170 Thus on November 23, as a result of direct talks among the greatest political leaders of Soviet Russia, Lenin, Stalin, and Orjonikidze decided to transfer Zangezur to Armenia with the aim of separating Azerbaijan’s territory from Turkey. To take the initiative at the talks, Soviet delegates hurried to arrive in Gumru. The Turks, who had defeated the Armenians, tried to avoid the inter­mediary services of Russians, while the Dashnaks, who desired to stay in power, were eager to conclude an independent treaty with the Turks. The Dashnaks’ stance was explainable by the Turks’ humanistic attitude toward the Armenian population. At the beginning of the military actions, the govern­ ment of Armenia and Soviet officials had made loud statements that the Turks were going to exterminate the Armenian civilian population. However, these

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fears were left unrealized. A message sent by Orjonikidze to Stalin in the period between November 16 and November 22 says that “there is no massacre in the area of Turkish occupation.”171 The Dashnaks planned to get out of this war-­related crisis at the cost of establishing a coalition government jointly with pro-­Russian socialist revolutionaries and Mensheviks.172 For this reason Hambarsum Terterian and Dro (Drastamat Kanaian) were co-­opted into the composition of the cabinet. On November 21 Legrand and Mdivani reported to Stalin and Orjonikidze that the Dashnaks were forming groups to accept a program of Sovietization of Armenia. Heading one such group was Dro, according to Legrand: With the aim of seizing power, efforts are underway to unite these groups. If a Soviet government is formed, it will become necessary to allot to the Dashnaks a much wider representation than the one planned in Baku. According to a plan adopted in Baku, as soon as the new Soviet government addresses us with a request, we will guarantee deployment of the Red Army in Armenia soon.173 In a telegram to Chicherin and Orjonikidze a day later Legrand expressed his interest in the quantity of troops in Gazakh and whether they were ready to enter Armenia.174 It is evident from another urgent telegram from Le­grand that Karabekir pasha did not find Mdivani’s mediation necessary; this decreased Soviet Russia’s trust in Turkey. From now on the Soviet representatives’ belief in the Turks’ promise not to invade Batum depended on how the Turks would behave regarding the Armenian question.175 On November 24, 1920, Mdivani arrived in Gumru, where he met later the same day with Karabekir pasha, who told him that the Armenians had approved all the terms and that the government of Ankara regarded Soviet Russia’s mediation as unnecessary. Karabekir added that he had been instructed by Ankara to hold talks only with the Armenians. At the same time, apart from the Armenian-­Turkish talks without Russians, Karabekir pasha did not rule out Russian-­Turkish talks as “friends striving for the same aim” without Armenians. At these talks Karabekir reiterated that Moscow had promised the Turkish command that the Soviet army in Azerbaijan would start attacking Armenia at the same time as the Turks do so. Unfortunately, this did not happen.176 On the same day a second meeting was held between Mdivani and Karabekir pasha. Karabekir insisted that the Red Army should immediately move from Azerbaijan to occupy Tiflis. He promised that if the British tried to assault Batum he and his army would block the way to Tiflis.177 On November 26 two influential members of the GNAT who were followers of Kara­ bekir pasha held talks with Mdivani. They insisted that a treaty, even a formal one, had to be concluded between the two states. On this special occasion Mdivani wrote to Stalin and Orjonikidze:



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They demand help in the form of arms only. They are making the commitment to conduct an irreconcilable struggle against the British to pursue our policy in the East. Proceeding from their suggestions regarding a treaty and deployment of our units in Armenia and Georgia under their support in order to prevent a strike by the British from the direction of Batum, I think that they still have no treaty with Britain.178 When the Turks refused the Russians’ mediation and the Dashnaks preferred acting independently, a Soviet delegation immediately began masterminding new plans to keep Armenia under its influence. Legrand informed Moscow that the Turks, having rejected their mediation, had created a situation that required urgent decisions. “It is necessary for us to have a program of independent actions in the Caucasus that the Turks would be forced to take into consideration.” The Bolsheviks planned to implement this program of actions through Drastamat Kanaian (Dro), who had been included in the new government. Legrand wrote that he and the government of Ohanjanian, protecting his group that had tried to conclude an independent treaty with Turkey behind Soviet Russia’s back, had suffered a defeat. Now the Dro government, which declared itself a supporter of the federation with Russia and establishment of the Soviet system in Armenia, was in power. “Dro is seeking an agreement with us, to find out whether we can guarantee an armed force if necessary if the Armenians demand territory.”179 A report from Erivan indicated that Dro was not afraid of Armenia’s losing its independence, for he believed that Armenia might continue to exist only as a federative part of Soviet Russia.180 On November 25, 1920, a new cabinet of ministers of Armenia chaired by Simon Vratzian had been declared. In this government Dro was appointed as the minister of war and Terterian as the minister of charity.181 On November 26 Legrand reported to Chicherin and Orjonikidze that “the governmental crisis was resolved on the basis of compromise; the cabinet consisted of pro-­Russian supporters, including Terterian and Dro.” Reports from Mdivani illustrate that he did not consider it necessary to forward any demands to Turkey regarding Armenia, because the Turks refused to cooperate. Legrand wrote: “I regard this as a mistake, so it is necessary immediately to issue instructions to Mdivani over acceptable terms of peace with Armenia.”182 The Soviet representatives tried to identify the terms on which the Turks and Armenians were planning to conclude a peace treaty. The Russians did not want to be detached onlookers as the Turks took over Armenia. Legrand reported to Mdivani in Gumru, to Orjonikidze in Baku, and to Chicherin in Moscow: “The Turks are freeing Nakhchivan for themselves”: they allegedly had stopped attacking Armenia by order of the Entente, and a certain Musavatist unit was under the control of Karabekir pasha. Legrand wrote:

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Dro declared that he would force the government to make a decision to deploy Soviet troops in Armenia in the coming days. I raised the question of releasing Communists and the return of our prisoners who are in Armenia. There are grounds to expect a favorable outcome. Measures have been taken to establish telegraph communication with Baku via Dilijan and Gazakh.183 In another radiogram sent to Orjonikidze on the same day, Legrand confirmed that Nakhchivan had been seized by the Turks and expressed his belief that participation of a Soviet detachment in this joint assault would be extremely unfavorable.184 Legrand reported to Chicherin: “The trouble is that our command yields to the nationalistic sentiments of Azerbaijani circles and that the army is deprived of good leaders.”185 The appearance of the Turks in the Caucasus and the related deep crisis in Armenia, as well as the worsening of the Armenian-­Turkish conflict, made the CC RCP (B) Politburo fear that the events of 1918 would recur. Having discussed the situation in the South Caucasus, the Politburo decided that the priority task was to strengthen the defense of Azerbaijan and take over the whole area of the Caspian Sea.186 The Politburo took urgent measures to strengthen Baku, particularly by sending additional military force.

The Alexandropol (Gumru) Agreement and the Closing of Turkish Routes to Baku Peace talks were to start in Gumru on November 28. After a new ­government was formed, a peace delegation with the appropriate powers arrived in Gumru. It included Alexander Khatisian (former head of the government and MP); Abraham Gulkhandanian (former minister of finance and MP); and Stepan Korganian (deputy internal minister).187 Representatives of Turkey at the Gumru talks were Karabekir pasha; Hamid bey Kapancı, the governor of ­Erzurum; and Suleyman Nejati bey, a member of the GNAT from Erzurum.188 However, the fate of Armenia was sealed not only in Gumru but in Dilijan and the Gazakh uyezd of Azerbaijan as well. On instructions of Soviet Russian leaders, Armenian Communists were urgently mobilized and sent to Gazakh and from there to Dilijan to proclaim Soviet power in the region. Two revolutionary committees were set up in Armenia later in November. One of them was formed by the Turks, composed of Armenians willing to collaborate with them; another committee was formed in Gazakh by Russians, composed of Armenian Communists. The struggle for Armenia entered into its final stage. By the beginning of the talks Mdivani, Shahtakhtinskii, and Korkmazov had arrived in Gumru as representatives of Soviet Russia but were not allowed



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to attend the talks. Later in November Orjonikidze received an urgent telegram from Chicherin to be sent to Mdivani: Inform me immediately about progress in talks in Alexandropol [Gumru] and Mdivani’s contribution thereto. I want him to report on the latest developments. It is crucial for us that the issue of Armenian-­ Turkish demarcation is given to a mixed commission with our direct involvement. Mdivani’s task is to keep us constantly informed about current developments.189 Orjonikidze explained to Chicherin that Mdivani had no direct links with Baku (he maintained contacts only via Legrand) and that Chicherin’s instructions would be delivered as necessary.190 From the beginning of the Turkish-­Armenian talks, Soviet Russia showed interest in the Turks’ view of the agreement to be concluded, where, and with whom they should negotiate. To find out the intentions of the Turks, Orjonikidze and Sheinman advised Chicherin to negotiate as follows: 1. The borders of Soviet Russia are specified by agreement with Russia; 2. The date of the offensive against Georgia is specified by agreement with Russia; and 3. Resumption of warfare with the Entente. The advisors wrote: “Arms, finances, and so forth, are provided if these terms are kept.”191 Although it is interesting that no Sovietization of Armenia had so far been announced on the date of this telegram, the point is the discussion of the borders of Soviet Armenia. After Bekir Sami bey’s return from the Northern Caucasus, an unfinished draft had been prepared by him and the Soviet representatives, which was forwarded to Ankara via Yusuf Kemal bey. Chicherin asked Mdivani via Legrand: We’d like to know whether the Turkish government received the draft treaty that we had worked out with Bekir Sami and forwarded to Ankara via Yusuf Kemal bey. Does the Turkish government consider it appropriate, and how does it appreciate the clauses, over which there are differences between us and Bekir Sami, who could not make a ­decision?192 In referring to Mdivani, Legrand reported to Chicherin and Orjonikidze on November 28 that the Turks were going to announce their peace terms that day, which were expected to be hard. Mdivani needed to be instructed on how to act if the Turks declined mediation and what terms favoring Armenians should be advocated. Mdivani considered it necessary to provide Armenia with a Karakilisa-­Gumru-Erivan-­Nakhchivan branch line, which suited the

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interests of Russia. Legrand asked: “Will military support be provided to Armenia by bringing our troops at the demand of the Armenian government if the Turks lay down hard terms? Under Stalin-­initiated Baku directives, I gave appropriate assurances to the Armenians.” Legrand considered it possible to form an Armenian Soviet government mostly composed of Communists and several Dashnaks — ​followers of Dro. However, the Turks’ refusal of Russia’s mediation, formation of the Turk-­initiated Revolutionary Committee of Armenia, and the new demand to the Armenian command to withdraw its troops from the southeastern part of Sharur uyezd and Shahtakhty (an adjacent station) all testify to the Turks’ aspiration to push the Russians aside and take the initiative. That was Legrand’s view on the subject.193 On November 28, 1920, from Gumru Mdivani sent a radiogram to Orjo­ nikidze in Baku: “Here there is a revolutionary committee called the Revo­ lutionary Committee of the Armenian Soviet Republic. The membership of the revolutionary committee is weak. It receives backing from the Turkish command. It is essential to send authoritative comrades to this place because the Turks tend to distrust Armenian Communists.”194 On the opening day of the talks, November 28, Karabekir pasha separately met with representatives of Soviet Russia. After long talks about tsarist Russia and the Entente’s policy of dismembering Turkey and the Bolshevik revolution and the political results that it caused, Karabekir told the representatives of Soviet Russia: The Turks, having decided to support Soviet Russia with all their forces, however, are not at all inclined to establish a Soviet system immediately in their country. This does not mean at all that Communist ideals are alien to us. The Turks are currently experiencing a period when they can successfully be pushed toward a national-­revolutionary movement; furthermore, there is nothing to arouse the interest of the Turkish ­peasantry due to the lack of an agrarian question, while we don’t have any working army due to the lack of trade and industrial entities. E ­ very Turk perfectly realizes that several sensitive strikes on the Entente would make the proletariat of the West take up power to establish the Soviet system there. If the Soviet system is established in Europe, it will become unnecessary to speak about the rest of the countries, for the Soviet system will be established in these countries by itself. A politically mature person cannot think differently; hence our sincerity should be unquestionable to Soviet Russia. The latter is well aware that it was the Turks who first responded to the Russian revolution and bolstered the coup in Azerbaijan in the hope that Russia would establish ties with revolutionary Turkey via Azerbaijan. However, Russia did nothing to establish any ties with Turkey.195



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As for the situation in the South Caucasus, in a conversation with representatives of Soviet Russia on November 28, 1920, Karabekir pasha referred to the past, noting: Russia had suggested that Turkey give up any idea of attacking Armenia as the sincerest ally of the Entente. Although Armenia had always stabbed Turkey in the back during its struggle against the Entente, Turkey nevertheless decided to refrain from any actions, to please Russia. After that, Soviet Russia demanded that Turkey give some regions of Anatolia to Armenia. For the benefit of the revolution, Turkey destroyed the more viable Armenian Muslim state in Azerbaijan, while Russia, to the clear detriment of the case, wanted to create a reactionary so-­called Great Armenia, without Armenians, at the expense of Turkey and Azerbaijan. In the meantime Armenia itself was trying to create a coalition with Georgia, Persia, and Armenia jointly to oppose Russia in Azerbaijan. Finally, Russia gave to Armenia the Nakhchivan region, which had been the sole corridor linking Turkey with Russia. Note that this step by Russia practically disarmed the Turkish revolutionary ­leaders in the eyes of the Turkish masses, who lost belief in Russia’s support. Rumors that horrors were occurring in Azerbaijan spread. All of these enabled our enemies to allege that no good could be expected from Russia, so it was necessary to fear Russia. As for the last Turkish-­Armenian War, Karabekir pasha noted: Russia allowed us to occupy Sarykamysh and the Nakhchivan region but declined to render any military aid to us. At the same time, Armenian troops began attacking and massacred Muslims in the Olty region. The patience of the Turkish people was exhausted, so they demanded punishment of the Dashnaks. My task was not easy, though it was not difficult to cope with Armenia alone; however, everything indicated that in attacking them [the Armenians] we would have to deal with Armenian-­Georgian armies, so I had to gather a force that could have defeated either the Armenian or the Georgian army. We defeated the Armenian troops so rapidly that Georgia could not even regain its senses. At the gateway of Erivan the government of Armenia asked for mercy and declared its readiness to agree with all of our terms. We are well aware that our movements within Armenia have started being interpreted in Russia as an indication of our intention to conquer Azerbaijan and it is believed that we and the Entente had agreed upon this. Thus any of our actions, even the ones in response to our great victims and directed against a common enemy, cause suspicion and may cause distrust of us.

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The content of this conversation was recorded in detail by its participant Shahtakhtinskii on the same day, November 28 and later submitted to Orjo­ nikidze, chief specialist on Caucasus questions. Rumors that Turkey and the Entente had concluded an accord to occupy Azerbaijan were so widespread that on December 1 Turkish foreign m ­ inister Ahmet Mukhtar was forced to forward telegrams of refutation to Kazım Karabekir (chief commander of the Eastern Front) in Gumru, to Memduh Shevket Esendal (Turkish representative in Baku), and to Kazım Dirik (a GNAT representative in Tiflis). The telegrams said: According to available reports, the British are resorting to various tricks to cause us [the Turks] to quarrel with the Muslim world and with the Bolsheviks. They hope that if they succeed then they will be able to do away with us separately. These provocative canards allege that the British promised to give us Azerbaijan in exchange for our alleged refusal of the Bolsheviks and so forth. You are authorized to deflate these rumors immediately with the help of all remedies at your disposal.196 Orjonikidze sent the text of this telegram to the Russian Foreign Commissariat. On December 2, 1920, Turkish foreign minister Аhmet Mukhtar sent a special telegram to Chicherin, which said that rumors about the transfer of Azerbaijan to Turkey in exchange for aid in the struggle against Soviet Russia were malicious lies.197 The Bolsheviks were angry that their mediation services at the Gumru talks had been turned down, as was evident from the instructions of Legrand to Mdivani on November 29. Legrand harshly criticized Mdivani for having given the initiative to the Turks: Have you received an official notification from the Turkish government about refusal of our mediation? What are the Turks’ terms to conclude a truce with Armenia? What did they tell you about it? What statements did you make? You should not remain indifferent to the Turks’ aspiration to debar us from resolving the Armenian question. ­Karabekir demanded that Armenia withdraw troops from Shahtakhty and a part of Sharur uyezd.198 As for the Turkish-­initiated Revolutionary Committee of Armenia, Le­ grand asked who the members of the committee were: local Armenian Communists or members of another form of organization? Legrand wrote It has to be kept in mind that our comrades cannot be sent to this revo­ lutionary committee; in all, an invention of the Turks does not have any credibility because they continue to pursue quite an independent



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policy in Armenia and do not desire to recognize our mediation. They must be notified of this in some form.199 Stalin, in the spirit of the telegram to Lenin on November 16, sent a similar telegram to a Soviet mission in Erivan on November 29, recommending the following to Legrand and Mdivani: You don’t hurry; you wait for reinforcement. You don’t need to fight the Turks because of the Dashnaks; however, you should not yield to the Turks either; it is essential to make the Turks yield Alexandropol to Armenia; the question of Kars should still remain open. Evidently the Turks are acting in Armenia upon the knowledge of the Entente; for this reason they should not be trusted; they must be separated from the Entente and stirred up against Georgia in order to find out whether they will act against Georgia.200 Wanting to play a role in such a serious situation, Soviet Russia tried to resume the interrupted peace talks with the Turks in Moscow but at the same time were masterminding a coup in Armenia. On November 27, 1920, the CC RCP (B) Politburo listened to Stalin’s report entitled “On Caucasus Affairs” and made an appropriate resolution. Item 1 of the resolution read: “Orjonikidze must be obliged to stay in Baku to act as the political leader of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee and the Council of Action.”201 This resolution of the Politburo aimed to subordinate Narimanov to Orjonikidze on the brink of expected changes in Armenia. On November 29, at 2:30 in the afternoon, Orjonikidze reported from Baku to Lenin and Stalin: I have just received the CC resolution. The Revolutionary Committee of Armenia, currently in Gazakh for preparatory work, is overloaded with calls from the regions of Karavansarai and Dilijan that there is no central power; the army has scattered, so they ask for help. The ARC independently crossed the border at night to head for Dilijan with the intention of proclaiming Soviet Armenia.202 Five minutes later ­Orjonikidze telegraphed Legrand in Erivan and Mdivani in Gumru: “According to the latest information, the ARC has crossed the border by night and been cordially welcomed by locals. You should take measures to back Erivan with followers of Terterian and Dro. They should be guaranteed admittance to the Revolutionary Committee and the Dashnaks will be perfectly safe.”203 On November 28 the revolutionary committee established by the Turks had announced the establishment of Soviet power in Gumru. A revolutionary committee established in Gazakh did the same a day later. Though the

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r­ evolutionary committee’s declaration read “Dilijan” in order to attach legitimacy to the new power and neutralize the Turks’ resistance, Soviet power was in fact declared in Gazakh. A day later, on November 30, the revolutionary committee arrived in Dilijan.204 While in Tiflis, British commissar Col. Claude Stokes sent a ciphered telegram to UK foreign chief Lord Curzon informing him that the proclamation of Soviet power in Armenia had occurred in Azerbaijan and that a detachment of 2,000 armed Armenians had been sent from there to Armenia.205 However, this report contained certain inaccuracies. First, the forces that occupied Armenia consisted not of Armenians but of Russian Bolsheviks. Second, not 2,000 Bolshevik soldiers but 1,500 were moving toward Erivan.206 When the revolutionary committee moved to Dilijan, only one member of the committee — ​Avis Nurijanian  — ​was already in place. He was joined a bit later by committee chair Sarkis (Ter-­Gasparian) Kasian, while the rest of the members of the revolutionary committee arrived from Baku on December 3.207 The two revolutionary committees fiercely competed for the right to enter Erivan, to be recognized on an Armenia-­wide scale, and to seize power in the country. On November 30 Narimanov as chair of the Azerbaijan Revo­ lutionary Committee and Huseinov as people’s commissar of foreign affairs sent a congratulatory telegram to the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia in Dilijan on instructions from Moscow, which was actually behind the creation of this Revkom in Dilijan. The purpose of this telegram was to attach importance to the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia and facilitate its formal takeover of Erivan. As soon as a telegram from Gazakh was received, confirming the proclamation of victory of the Armenian Soviet power in Dilijan, the CC CPA (B) Politburo and Orgburo met on November 30 to discuss this question. The meeting was attended by Orjonikidze, Sarkis, Stasova, Kaminskii, Narimanov, Garayev, Huseinov, and others, who made the following decision: no borders would henceforth exist between Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet Armenia. It was reported that Zangezur and Nakhchivan had become part of Armenia.208 At a solemn meeting of the Baku Council on December 1 Narimanov as chair of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee made an extensive ­report regarding the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia. The council announced: “In an attempt to assist the fraternal Armenian working people in struggling against the power of the Dashnaks who shed and are shedding innocent blood of our best Communist comrades within the bounds of Armenia and Zangezur, Soviet Azerbaijan declares that from now on no territorial questions may be a reason for mutual bloodshed of the two neighboring ­peoples  — ​Armenians and Muslims; the territory of Zangezur and Nakhchivan



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uyezds is an integral part of Soviet Armenia.”209 Armenia had been resoundingly defeated by Turkey and had totally collapsed, while the Soviet power declared in Dilijan and Gumru had not yet been established in Erivan, so this statement proved to be a great surprise for Armenians themselves. When Orjonikidze reported this breaking news to Nazaretian in a conversation by direct wire on November 30, Nazaretian exclaimed: “Bravo, Azerbaijanis!”210 Narimanov yielded Zangezur and Nakhchivan to Armenia at the moment when the old Armenian government had broken down and the Soviet government in Dilijan existed only on paper and did not even dare to leave for Erivan, for fear of protests by the Turks. While at Gumru Shahtakhtinskii testified that this unexpected step of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee caused deep regret on the part of Armenia’s victor, Karabekir pasha. In a conversation with Shahtakhtinskii in those days he said: “For tactical reasons the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee should not have hurried to settle this matter, at least until the end of the conference, for this act is ascribed to Russia’s influence.” After this talk with Karabekir pasha, Shahtakhtinskii saw a way out of such a senseless step by the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee only by declaring the independence of Nakhchivan under a Russian protectorate: This region of utmost strategic importance cannot be put under the Turks’ protectorate. The independence of this region under Russia’s protectorate is supposed to please the Turks as well. Probably, in the near future, circumstances will force us to make a move in the direction of Persian Azerbaijan on behalf of an independent Nakhchivan region; however, this can never be done by or on behalf of Armenia.211 On the whole Russian representatives also backed the concept of transferring Nakhchivan to the Turks, but only if Turkey took on the whole burden of the revolutionary movement in the Muslim East. In connection with this, Legrand wrote to Chicherin: If it appears that the Turks are in position to exert revolutionary pressure on neighboring Muslim countries and that they will be able to incite a revolutionary movement in the East, that will be excellent; in that case they must have carte blanche, dispose of Nakhchivan, put pressure on Soviet Armenia, and so forth. However, the Turks have to be tested first.212 Legrand informed Mdivani and Chicherin about the Turks’ dissatisfaction with a well-­known statement of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee. In particular, he pointed out:

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The Turks begin trusting in our military might and want to conclude an alliance with us to oppose the Entente; however, they waffle about whether to trust us or not; they are not sure if Russia wants to exploit Turkey only in its own interests. From this point of view, they are dogging our steps, our proposals, particularly our attitude to the Armenian question. They are daunted by our behavior in this matter, believing that we are pursuing the interests only of Armenia, not of Turkey, and even exploiting Turkey in favor of Armenia. The Turks’ doubts stem from the declaration of our representative in Erivan on behalf of Russia that ­Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Karabagh are part of Armenia. Moreover, recognition of this by Azerbaijan is also ascribed to our influence.213 In the early days of December the Dilijan-­based revolutionary ­committee was not planning to move toward Erivan until the results of the Gumru peace talks were declared. Despite the breakdown of Armenian governmental structures, the Revolutionary Committee, though formal, preferred to restrain itself to waiting tactics. Being in possession of certain armed forces, Dro considered it appropriate for the revolutionary committee to appear in Erivan on December 3, because the Gumru peace treaty was likely to be signed on December 2. Before terms of the treaty were announced, Legrand hurried to declare recognition of Soviet Armenia on behalf of Soviet Russia. The territory of Armenia recognized by Russia included the Erivan province, a part of the Gazakh province (as specified by a treaty of August 10), and a part of the Tiflis province that Armenia had seized before the Turkish assault. The revolutionary committee had issued a decree to release Communists from prisons, which had already started to be implemented. Measures were taken to move the military force toward the borders of Armenia if the Turks displayed hostility.214 Legrand informed Chicherin that it was necessary to prevent Russian troops from penetrating into Armenia’s internal regions until December 3. For this period Dro made a commitment to make every effort to let Soviet troops avoid resistance by the Erivan government and a series of military units.215 Orjonikidze explained Legrand’s stance, saying that the Soviet representative had promised too much to the previous Armenian government.216 Simultaneously, the command of the Gazakh group of the Red Army was instructed not to move toward Armenia until the political situation was clarified.217 On December 2, 1920, Orjonikidze reported to Lenin and Stalin that Soviet power had already been proclaimed in Erivan, that the old government had been abandoned, and that all power had been transferred to a Dro-­led military command until the arrival of the revolutionary committee. The army was commanded to take the side of the revolutionary committee that had stayed



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in Dilijan and was expected to arrive in Erivan the next day. The revolutionary committee had already received congratulations from Karabekir pasha and was on its way to Erivan. “A comrade who arrived from Alexandropol today reports that the Kemalist troops have extremely friendly feelings for us; the troops wear red badges and consider themselves Red Army soldiers. Yet yesterday Azerbaijan declared the transfer of Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Mountainous Karabagh to Soviet Armenia.”218 Stalin published that exact statement, falsified by Orjonikidze, in the newspaper Pravda. The same issue of Pravda contained a long article by Stalin about the victory of Soviet power in Armenia.219 Karabekir pasha forwarded a telegram congratulating the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia to Chicherin as well. He wrote: “I was glad to hear that the Red troops have arrived in Dilijan. On behalf of the Turkish army that is your friend and ally, I would like to welcome your arrival in Dilijan, and I hope that you defeat imperialism for the sake of the well-­being and prosperity of the working proletariat.”220 After these congratulatory messages, Sarkis Kasian (chair of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia), and committee member Avis, who represented the former government of Armenia defeated by Turkey, arrived in Erivan as victors on December 4. They were followed by the Red Army, which entered the town on December 5.221 A peace treaty between Armenia and Turkey was signed in Gumru on December 2, 1920. To avoid misunderstanding, on the same day Karabekir pasha asked Mdivani that Russian military units located nearby in Nakhchivan not cross a frontline between St. Arax (where Turkish units were deployed) and Mount Alagez before the treaty was concluded.222 Thus the Turks signed the Treaty of Alexandropol in a quiet atmosphere. Despite numerous disputes over territorial questions, the Turks did not give up their initial demands. Clause 1 of the treaty confirmed that the war between Armenia and Turkey was over, while clause 2 determined a border between Armenia and Turkey. Nakhchivan, Sharur, and Shahtakhty, regions lying south of the line from the Kuku Mountains to Hamasur, Gurdgulag, Mount Saat, Arpachai, Mount Gamarli, Mount Saray-­bulag, St. Ararat, and a territory south of the place where the Karasu River spills into the Arax River had to remain outside Armenia’s control. These areas temporarily remained under Turkey’s ­protectorate, and Armenia later would have no right to interfere with the expression of the population’s will through a referendum, regardless of the form of the new administration. Final specification of borders had to be carried out by a mixed commission with representatives of both sides two weeks after the treaty was signed. Clause 3 of the treaty specified questions of the referendum, while clause 4 defined the number of Armenia’s army, gendarmerie, and frontier troops as

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well as the quantity of military hardware. Under clause 5 Armenia agreed to receive a Turkish political representative, who would stay in Erivan to inspect execution of the terms above. For its part, the GNAT government made a commitment to provide military aid to Armenia in the event of external or internal threat if Armenia asked for help. Clauses 6 and 7 dealt with the question of refugees, while clause 8 confirmed that both sides give up any claims for compensating losses. Clause 9 expressed Turkey’s sincere desire to provide help to the government of ­Armenia to develop and strengthen its authority. In clause 10 the Armenian government agreed to regard the Treaty of Sèvres, which had categorically been rejected by the GNAT government, as annulled. Also, the government of Armenia was obliged to recall from Europe and America its delegations as a tool of the machinations of the Entente. Clause 11 obliged the government of Armenia to protect the rights of the Muslim population in the territory of the republic as well as their religious and cultural development and not prevent a free election of muftis and the sheik-­ul-islam. Under clause 12 Armenia yielded any rights to transfer customs ­duties for goods that passed through Turkey to Azerbaijan, Persia, Georgia, and back. The government of Turkey was obliged to give Armenia free transit to Persia and Maku via Sharur-­Nakhchivan-Shahtakhty and Julfa. Under clause 13 the government of Turkey would have the right to take military measures in the territory of the Republic of Armenia that did not violate the rights granted to Armenia by this treaty. According to clause 14, the government of Armenia recognized all treaties that had been concluded to the detriment of Turkey as annulled. Clauses 15, 16, and 17 regulated trade and commercial, postal, telegraph, telephone, consular, and other questions as well as exchange of prisoners of war. Clause 18 stipulated that the treaty should be ratified within one month.223 Thus Armenia officially recognized the transfer of the Kars region, the Artvin district, and the Surmali uyezd of the former Erivan province to Turkey.224 The greatest diplomatic and political success of Turkey pertaining to the Treaty of Alexandropol was that the government of Armenia openly annulled the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres.225 The signing of the Treaty of ­Alexandropol marked the beginning of the process of international revision of the Treaty of Sèvres that culminated in a victory of Turkish diplomacy at the Lausanne Conference. The main Treaty of Alexandropol, especially the borderline questions reflected in it, was delivered to Orjonikidze in Baku on December 3.226 Due to Soviet Russia’s pressure, however, the Treaty of Alexandropol was not recognized by either the Armenian Communist power or the Soviet government. As soon as the treaty was signed, Stalin immediately instructed all responsible officials in the Caucasus to stop supplying arms to the Turks.227



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Otto Silin, Soviet Russia’s representative in Erivan, and the Dro government still under formation entered into a military-­political agreement on December 2. Article 3 “enumerated the territories which were to constitute the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia.”228 In this way Azerbaijan ended up being separated from Nakhchivan and at the same time from Turkey. On the same day, Lenin as chair of Russia’s CPC forwarded a telegram of greetings to Kasian as chair of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia. He entertained a hope that Kasian would do his best to restore the fraternal cooperation of the workers of Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.229 However, the very first step of the young Soviet government of Armenia was to request Chicherin not to recognize the Treaty of Alexandropol.230 On December 10 Bekzadian as commissar of foreign affairs of Soviet Armenia asked Ahmet Mukhtar bey and Karabekir pasha to denounce the Treaty of Alexandropol.231 For his part, Ahmet Mukhtar urged the Armenian Communist government to join the treaty signed by the Dashnaks. In the early days of December the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia was still not fully aware of processes occurring around Armenia; nevertheless, it submitted instructions regarding the Turkish question to the CC RCP (B) Politburo. Having discussed the instructions, the Politburo approved them on December 4.232 The instructions said: If we don’t provide diplomatic assistance to Soviet Armenia, this will disappoint all supporters of Sovietism. Regretfully, we are still unaware of what Turkey’s peace terms are. Mdivani must restrain the Turks to reduce their demands regarding Armenia. Also, he must prevent them from attacking Georgia due to the effect that it would have on the Entente after Sovietization of Armenia. That makes it necessary to be extremely cautious in respect to the Entente. Mdivani could make his demands cautiously; specifically, he might tell the Turks that this moment is not appropriate, that it is ill-­timed for a further assault. The Turks expect us to continue to provide assistance in the form of arms and gold to them, so we have another powerful way of affecting them. Evidently they are not yet receiving or have so far received insufficient arms and money from the Entente. We could promise the Turks that we would restart aid to them if they withdraw from Armenia. It has to be kept in mind that Kars is a key to Baku. When we were about to yield Kars in Brest, military specialists explained to us that this elevated locality is a necessary shelter for Tiflis. In the existing situation when Sovietization of Georgia is expected to occur in the near future, while Turkey’s further orientation remains a big question, we have to take these factors into consideration. It is necessary to conclude a treaty with the Turks, but this should be a harmless treaty that will not hurt

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our treaty with Britain. No aid to the Turks should be mentioned in this treaty or in any paper. A written treaty should include only common provisions about friendly relations. The independence of Armenia must be guaranteed; we have to continue to insist that borders need to be determined by a mixed commission with our participation. We need to guarantee the independence of Georgia, not the inviolability of its present-­day borders, because Turkey is claiming disputed localities in Georgia, which can be yielded to Turkey in the further course of ­developments. The independence of a certain part of Turkish Armenia still needs to be striven for but not through an ultimatum, in order not to make this a stumbling block in our friendly relations with the Turks.233 By the disputed territories in Georgia, the Soviets meant Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalak. On December 10 Chicherin instructed the Soviet mission in Armenia: “If the Turks try to occupy Georgia’s disputed regions, more exactly, Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalak, we will not object. We will only demand that they not move further; but don’t tell them this in advance, for the initiative should originate from them, not us.”234 Even before this instruction, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on December 6 forwarded to the CC RCP (B) its suggestions regarding certain aspects of a treaty to be concluded with Turkey. These suggestions reflected questions of recognition of the independence of Armenia and Georgia, historical-­ethnographic terms of determination of borders with Turkey, Russia’s careful handling of the Entente, the desire to keep Batum a part of Georgia, and other issues. The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs wrote to the CC: For the sake of caution, it is essential not to formulate mutual assistance against Britain in the treaty. The treaty should give general speci­ fications of longtime friendly relations between the two states, as has already been done in our joint draft with Bekir Sami bey. Aside from this, it is necessary to make the exchange of secret notes that was also agreed upon with Bekir Sami bey, with a mutual promise to notify one another in the event of any change of attitude toward the Entente. This draft has already been approved by Bekir Sami bey and thus will not compromise us before Britain.235 On the same day the Russian People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs received from the Turkish Foreign Ministry a letter clarifying Turkey’s stance concerning Georgia. Ahmet Mukhtar bey reported to Chicherin that the Georgian government had expressed its desire to commence talks with Turkey



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to specify interrelations within the boundaries set up by the Treaty of Moscow of May 7, 1920. Ahmet Mukhtar asked Soviet Russia to express its opinion regarding this question as well as to send the text of the treaty of May 7 to Ankara.236 The Turks had approached Moscow with such a request via Mdivani on November 22. However, this request did not get to Moscow.237 While in Gumru, Shahtakhtinskii had talks with Karabekir pasha and other Turkish representatives to discuss the Nakhchivan issue. Both parties considered it expedient to conclude a treaty between Azerbaijan and Turkey. On December 7 Shahtakhtinskii wrote to Azerbaijani foreign commissar ­Huseinov: The Turks do not deny the possibility of making an agreement with the Entente in the future and hence wish to turn the Nakhchivan uyezd, part of the Sharur-­Daralayaz uyezd, and the Maku khanate into a self-­governing unit to serve as a base for Turkish insurgents fighting against the Entente in the East. They suggested choosing the Bayazit sanjak and Van vilayet as a base for this goal. The question is open and it is Moscow and the Turks’ mission to solve this issue. To finalize the Turks’ stand on the subject, I suggested to them to draw up a draft agreement with Azerbaijan, and Kazım pasha gave his consent. I offered him a draft agreement that he had accepted and later telegraphed Ankara.... Kazım pasha is confident that Ankara has nothing against this agreement.... I am sure that we will get along with Karabekir and win him over to our side if the National Assembly desires to join the Entente. He asked me to recommend a prominent Communist versed in the East with whom to corre­spond and establish friendly relations. He mentioned comrade Stalin. Perhaps he [Karabekir] will head a dele­ gation to leave for Moscow to make an agreement.238 A draft agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey that Karabekir pasha sent to Ankara and Shahtakhtinskii sent to Baku consisted of seven items. Pursuant to the first item, revolutionary Turkey and Soviet Azerbaijan undertook to apply all their forces against the Entente for the complete liberation of peoples of the East. According to the second item, if Turkey for some reason or other had to make an agreement with the Entente, it should secretly protect the revolutionary East through its emissaries. The third item stipulated that if Turkey entered into an agreement with the Entente it would have to provide Azerbaijan with an adequate number of soldiers, with their costs defrayed by Azerbaijan. The fourth item stated that Azerbaijan might support a national liberation movement, provided that the population of revolutionary regions independently inquired into this. According to the fifth item, Azerbaijan had no right to enter into an agreement with the Entente during the

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r­ evolutionary period in the East without Turkey’s consent. Pursuant to the sixth item, Turkey undertook to help Azerbaijan if it was attacked by the Entente. The s­ eventh item stipulated that, during Turkey’s involvement in the revolutionary movement in the East, Azerbaijan was to supply it with oil and petroleum products in the volume set forth by a special commission.239 Following appropriate consultations, however, Soviet Russia considered it unacceptable to conclude a direct agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Chicherin sent telegrams to Orjonikidze on December 8 and to Mdivani and Karabekir on December 9, which said that Azerbaijani representatives were to attend the Moscow conference as members of the Soviet delegation.240 The Soviet leaders believed that “it will be up to the Soviet government to d­ ecide in Moscow.”241 The Turks insisted on holding talks in Baku. Chicherin disagreed, however, saying that as foreign minister he could not be away for long.242 Even after the Moscow talks had been accepted, Chicherin was prudent with the Kemalists. In particular, he was apprehensive about “the great influence of traditional national-­Turkish vestiges of the Kemalists.” To his thinking, these vestiges, as well as the pro-­occupation sentiments of the some Kemalists, might be transformed into support for Musavatists and anti-­Soviet elements in the Northern Caucasus. He noted: “Our policy has the goal of politically consolidating the leftist Kemalists against right-­wingers, that is, strengthening the elements opposed to those who are guided by nationalistic, religious, and imperialist survival directed against us and linked with the previous compensation policy in the Caucasus.” Chicherin instructed Eliava to protect Armenians with every possible means: “The role of mediator that we had earlier wanted to take on between the Turks and the Dashnaks is much more important to take on between Turkey and Soviet Armenia. The principal interests of communism as a world force demand that we not leave the newly formed Soviet Republic in the lurch.”243 In his letter to the Turkish minister Ahmet Mukhtar bey Chicherin had to admit that Dashnak Armenia displayed savagery with respect to the Turkish population, so he understood the response of the Turkish command. At the same time, he wrote that the Soviet government was confident that “the Turkish army will without any further delay mop up the Alexandropolis uyezd and other populated localities to the north and the east of Kars province and thus finalize the Armenian-­Turkish borders.”244 As for the Georgian question, Chicherin informed Eliava: Our policy in respect to Georgia should be particularly cautious under these conditions. Of specific importance for us is the matter of Batum. This is nothing other than a commercial outlet for Baku and concurrently a sound base for a possible offensive on Baku; a matter of Batum



Collaboration after Occupation 219

is, in fact, the question of Baku.... If Georgia declines to conduct a hostile policy against us, refrains from an offensive on Baku together with the Entente, and does not prevent us from supplying Armenia with bread and oil, the further existence of bourgeois Georgia seems to be acceptable.245 Following the change of power in Armenia, Soviet Russia applied great efforts to attain its goals. But Karabekir pasha declined to revise the Treaty of Alexandropol. He declared: “The Turkish people incurred so many losses that Turkey will never agree and never understand why it should make concessions to Armenians, who brought so much harm on the Turks. It is still unknown what the current Armenian Soviet power is, especially as the Dashnaks are not yet liquidated and are resentful that Turkish persons such as Dro are still in office.”246 Karabekir pasha took the view that the Dashnaks were being harbored by the Soviet power, while educated and rich Armenians were still abroad to continue their dishonest business. It was vitally important, in Karabekir’s opinion, to exercise maximum vigilance in regard to Armenia for a year and control its behavior. For this reason, the Turkish party did not trust the Communist authorities of Armenia. In mid-­December Mdivani told ­Stalin and Orjonikidze that the Turks did not believe that the change of power in Armenia would lead to any alterations. They thought that the Dashnaks would continue their previous policy under the Soviet mask.247 Having bene­ fited from Dro’s efforts to Sovietize Armenia, Orjo­nikidze believed that “it would be appropriate to use Dro in a supporting role not only in the interests of the Soviet power but also as a means of resolving territorial disputes.” He wrote to Kasian (chair of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia) that if Dro remained in the government “Narimanov will be a thousandfold right if tomorrow he will replace Garayev with Khosrov Sultanov [governor-­general of Karabagh during the Musavat government, 1919–1920].”248 In fact the Turks were right in viewing the formation of Soviet Armenia and its friendly relations with Moscow as an obstacle to Turkey’s rapprochement with Muslim countries of the Caucasus.249 Despite this distrust, however, a few days after the Treaty of Alexandropol the GNAT announced the composition of the Turkish delegation to conclude an agreement with Soviet Russia. The delegation included minister of the economy Yusuf Kemal bey, minister of education Rıza Nur, and the newly appointed (on November 21, 1920) ambassador to Moscow, Ali Fuat Cebesoy. On December 14 the delegation left Ankara for Russia’s capital to hold hard talks with the Russians.

7

The Russian–Turkish Conference in Moscow and Azerbaijan

T

he Sovietization of Armenia in November 1920 favored the transition of Russian-­Turkish relations toward a legal framework and preparation of bases for interrelations between these two countries. As noted, the Turkish side wanted the talks with Soviet Russia to be held in Baku; however, Chicherin, on various pretexts, insisted on holding the Russian-­Turkish conference in Moscow. So Turkey had to agree. In a telegram to Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Mukhtar, Chicherin wrote: The conference that will be attended by representatives of Turkey, Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan is extremely important for the Soviet government, for it may establish mutual friendship and understanding among countries participating in it. Regarding this conference as a matter of para­mount importance, the Soviet government has appointed me to lead a delegation of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to attend the conference. In such a situation, conducting talks in Baku would have required all of the leaders of our foreign policy to miss work, which seems quite impossible. For this reason the Soviet government suggests holding a conference in Moscow instead of Baku.1 The same document reported that Mikhail Atabekov, an Armenian by nationality, had been appointed as a plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR to Azerbaijan. On December 31, 1920, as the Turks agreed to arrive in Moscow, Chicherin instructed Eliava to invite the delegations of Azerbaijan and Armenia on behalf of Soviet Russia to attend the forthcoming conference.2 It should be noted that Armenia (like Chicherin) was also against holding the conference in Baku. The Armenians wanted the conference to take place in Moscow. 220



The Russian–Turkish Conference in Moscow and Azerbaijan 221

Saak Ter-­Gabrielian, appointed as Armenia’s plenipotentiary representative to Russia, was supposed to represent Armenia at the conference together with Bekzadian.3 In addition Askanaz Mravian and Mikhail Atabekov (members of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia) were sent on a mission to Moscow at the end of 1920 (joined by Ter-­Gabrielian there) in order to reach an agreement with the Soviet leadership in several territorial questions, primarily ceding Turkey’s Kars district to Armenia. In December this delegation held a series of meetings with Lenin, Trotskii, Chicherin, and Karakhan without the participation of Stalin, who was undergoing treatment in a hospital. The purpose of these meetings, the delegation insisted, was to transfer the regions of Kars and Nakhchivan to Armenia and to obtain dismissal of Azerbaijan’s plenipotentiary representative, Shahtakhtinskii. However, Lenin openly stated that Kars was a Turkish town and that “Russia currently does not want to and cannot wage war, especially because of Kars.” In a move to neutralize Stalin and notify Lenin of evidence of the fairness of its position, the Armenian delegation decided to leave Ter-­Gabrielian and Karinian in Moscow.

Azerbaijan and the Preparation for the Moscow Conference In mid-­January 1921 Kazım Karabekir pasha on behalf of the Ankara government told the RSFSR’s plenipotentiary representative to the Turkish government, Budu Mdivani, that Turkish representatives were prepared to leave immediately to conclude a political treaty and military alliance with Soviet Russia in accordance with a ciphered telegram from Lenin and Stalin.4 Later the same day Mdivani sent a return telegram to Karabekir pasha, confirming that he had received a directive signed by Lenin and Stalin: “[I]t is possible to conclude a political and even a military treaty between Turkey and Russia.”5 The Turkish side was also aware that the top Soviet leadership’s influential representative Trotskii also backed the idea of concluding such a treaty.6 The Turkish delegation left Ankara in mid-­December 1920 and reached Kars on January 7, 1921. Instructed by Ankara, on December 16 Karabekir pasha solemnly welcomed Ali Fuat pasha and the Turkish Embassy staff on their way to Moscow. Both delegations were united in Kars.7 Concerned by the delay of over a week by the Turkish delegation in Kars, Orjonikidze (on the basis of information that he had received from that city) telegraphed Chicherin that possibly “the Turkish delegation is waiting for our reply to Ahmet Mukhtar bey’s note about Armenian districts (Mush, Van, Bitlis). The Turks categorically refuse to discuss this question with us.”8 A week later the members of the delegation took a train. On their trip to the Russian capital, they stayed ten days in Tiflis and then reached Baku

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

on January 29.9 At the Baku railway station the Turkish delegation was welcomed with great honors by Dadash Bunyadzade (commissar of education of the Azerbaijan SSR), Aliheydar Garayev (naval commissar), Behbud bey Shahtakhtinskii (Azerbaijan’s plenipotentiary representative to Moscow), Anatolii Gekker (commander of the 11th Army), Shalva Eliava and Iakov Vesnik (members of the Military Revolutionary Council), and other officials. A military welcoming ceremony was arranged in two parts of the city to greet the guests. On the day of the delegation’s arrival Nariman Narimanov as chair of the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan and Sergo Orjonikidze as a member of the Military Revolutionary Council of the 11th Army received the Turkish delegation. A concert of Oriental music was arranged in the city theater in the evening to honor the guests. Narimanov hosted a reception on behalf of the Azerbaijani state.10 Orjonikidze tried to send the delegation to Moscow as soon as possible, but the Turks managed to stay several days in Baku to exchange views with the government of Azerbaijan on a number of questions. Narimanov gave some recommendations to the guests. He warned that Chicherin, who was continuously making mistakes in the eastern policy, would cause problems for the Turkish delegation, so it was extremely important to meet Lenin personally. In case that was not possible, Narimanov recommended asking Stalin for help.11 However, on the whole, these talks did not justify the Turks’ hopes. The cool attitude of the Azerbaijani government toward the Turkish delegation was due to Moscow’s instructions. Nevertheless, the Baku talks turned out to be important in identifying the positions of the sides. After unsuccessfully attempting to sound out the Azerbaijanis’ opinion, the Turkish delegation left for Moscow on February 6, 1921. Making use of this opportunity, Narimanov sent a letter to Lenin through Shahtakhtinskii containing his conclusions on the talks with the Turks.12 It was evident from Chicherin’s December 5, 1920, telegram to Eliava that the Armenian question would indisputably be put on the agenda as a matter of great importance for Soviet Russia. Chicherin informed Eliava, who had been appointed as a plenipotentiary representative to Ankara, that the independence of at least several parts of Turkish Armenia had to be demanded from Turkey in order to provide security for the Armenian population of Eastern Anatolia.13 Chicherin perfectly understood that the Russian-­Turkish talks that had begun in Moscow in the summer of 1920 had been frustrated precisely because of his unserious demands regarding Armenians. Yusuf Kemal — ​ a member of the delegation led by Bekir Sami bey — ​informed Kemal pasha and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in October 1920 that the Russians’ proposal for a “fraternal treaty” was good for all. But when Chicherin



The Russian–Turkish Conference in Moscow and Azerbaijan 223

made ceding Mush, Van, and Bitlis to Armenia a condition of signing this treaty, this was strongly opposed by Turkish political circles. In a report about the talks submitted to the parliament, Yusuf Kemal noted that the population of these districts consisted largely of Turks. So it looked as though Chicherin was demanding: “Remove the Turkish population from there and we will place the Armenians there.” The Turks explained Chicherin’s stance by the influence of Levon Karakhan and Varlam Avanesov (commissar on Armenia under the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities of the RSFSR from 1918 to 1921). A Soviet representative to Ankara wrote: “The Turks understand this as the beginning of Soviet Russia’s neo-­imperialistic policy.” Having listened to Yusuf Kemal’s report about Chicherin’s demands, deputies voiced a loud protest: “We don’t need such help.”14 Mustafa Kemal pasha decisively stated that Turkey would not yield an inch of its territory.15 The first secretary of the Soviet representative to Ankara openly wrote to Moscow that the government of Kemal pasha would not be able to sign a treaty on these terms, for it was equivalent to self-­destruction of the government. Upon meeting the Soviet representative, Mustafa Kemal did not hide his astonishment: “It is hard to understand how the Soviet government can raise an insignificant question of third importance about Turkish Armenia along with the question of unification of revolutionary Russia and Turkey, which is of vital importance for the world revolution.” Referring to Kemal pasha, Ian Upmal-­Angarskii wrote: “If they give up this proposal [for Turkish Armenia], he will agree with all the rest of the conditions. He will even be able to force Turkey to enter a confederation with Soviet Russia.”16 In a telegram addressing Orjonikidze in mid-­January 1921 Chicherin complained that the Turks misinterpreted his thoughts about “Turkish Armenia.” He allegedly proposed to the Turkish population and to the Armenian popu­ lation to live separately. In order for this to happen, the Turks and Armenians should mutually be removed from certain territories so that each nation would be able to live separately.17 By “Turkish Armenia” he meant Turkish lands that had to be made vacant so that Armenians, who had long ago lost their historical homeland, would settle there. The Turks understood well what Chicherin’s plan meant. He believed that it was not possible to resolve the Armenian-­ Turkish confrontation without a radical change of borders and thus wrote: “We could not sign a treaty with Turkey without having the matter of territory settled.”18 The Soviet leadership had no strict position regarding this question. Hence Soviet plenipotentiary representatives to the Caucasus and Turkey received contradictory instructions from Moscow. On January 20, 1921, responding to the accusation of having fallen under Turkish influence and pursuing a policy favoring the Turks, Mdivani wrote to Orjonikidze:

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

The most horrific thing is that some in Moscow say one thing, while ­others say another thing. Just imagine what confusion occurred: in an official telegram, Koba [Stalin] and Ilyich [Lenin] tell me that it is not possible to quarrel with the Turks because of Kars; while Chicherin, it appears, demanded Van and Mush, and I learned this only from a response note from Ahmet Mukhtar. We won’t go far with such a policy.19 However, long before the talks began, Shahtakhtinskii, as plenipotentiary representative of the Azerbaijan SSR to Moscow, recommended in a report to Soviet Russia’s CPC not discussing the Armenian question at the Moscow conference: “The Armenian question may serve as a stumbling block in talks with Turkey. As for the Armenian question, the Turks are as obstinate as possible and say that if they compromise concerning this question they will find themselves in the position of the Constantinople government. To conclude a strong alliance with the Turks, we should not make the Armenian question a subject of our talks. Another, more appropriate moment can be found to obtain the final resolution to the Armenian question.”20 Turkey desired to conclude separate treaties with other republics of the South Caucasus apart from Soviet Russia. But the Soviet leadership planned to create a common front against Turkey by inviting representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia to the Moscow talks. Thus both republics were invited to attend the Moscow conference. While the Turkish delegation was on its way from Kars to Baku, Chicherin telegraphed Orjonikidze that it would not be bad to invite Georgia to attend the conference as well, if the Turks agreed.21 In a letter of January 14 to Stalin, Chicherin asked him to express his opinion on this occasion and said that it was possible to invite representatives of Iran, Bukhara, Khiva, and Afghanistan to Moscow. To a significant extent this was caused by Russia’s distrust of Turkey. Chicherin reported to Stalin that extremely large funds had already been delivered to Azerbaijan from England for propaganda purposes. At the same time, it was no secret that Karabekir pasha was getting closer to the French, indisputable evidence of a plot between the Turks and the Entente. In such a situation Chicherin attached great importance to Georgia’s participation in the Moscow conference. In his view, Georgians “may play the role of Entente’s spies.”22 However, Moscow believed that the Soviet republics had to participate in the conference not as separate delegations but as a common team led by Soviet Russia. In that case the chair of such a complex delegation should have been a Soviet Russian representative. On this occasion a “Provision on Interrelations between the Chair and Members of the Delegation to Conduct Talks with Foreign States” was even drafted, so that the young Soviet republics would not get involved much in



The Russian–Turkish Conference in Moscow and Azerbaijan 225

their independent status. The very first clause of this “Provision” stipulates that “it is up to the chair of the delegation to hold talks at conference meetings.” Members of the delegation could receive the opportunity to speak only after a preliminary solution of this question at the delegation’s meeting and with the consent of the chair, who was authorized to give members of the delegation the floor at his own discretion. In case of disputes between the chair and members of the delegation, the chair had the right to bear his own responsibility for resolution of the question, while members of the delegation had the right to complain about the chair to the government. The chair should notify the delegation of his reports to the government and his written correspondence with the government. “In facing the opposite side, all members of the delegation were obliged to observe discipline and accept decisions even if they disagreed with them.”23 With all this in mind, Turkey preferred to hold talks with the Soviet republics of the South Caucasus not in Moscow but within the region. ­However, Soviet Russia greatly feared Turkey’s direct bilateral talks with these republics. Immediately after the completion of the Treaty of Alexandropol, with Moscow’s help, the Soviet representation to Erivan tried to pressure Ankara to convene an Armenian-­Turkish peace conference with Russian participation. Karabekir pasha managed to evade the issue, however, saying that the Armenian question would be discussed at a Russian-­Turkish conference in Moscow where the Armenians would have minimal representation as well.24 As a matter of fact, Karabekir pasha made this political move in order to avoid questioning the terms of the Treaty of Alexandropol. Exactly for these reasons Shahtakhtinskii’s report to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Russia not only touched upon the Armenian question but also covered the new political situation established in the South Caucasus after the Sovietization of Armenia and all aspects of Russian-­Turkish relations in this geopolitical sphere. Shahtakhtinskii believed that it was his duty to appraise the position of countries that were going to arrive in the Moscow conference a few days later. In the beginning of his report he emphasized four negative facts. First, the arrival of Ahmet Izzat pasha, a representative of the Istanbul government, in Ankara, who conducted talks with the Kemalist government. Shahtakhtinskii informed Orjonikidze about this on December 8, 1920, when he was at the Gumru talks. Shahtakhtinskii regarded the arrival of a large delegation led by Izzat pasha as an attempt by the Entente to enter into an agreement with the Kemalists.25 Second, as Shahtakhtinskii noted, the Dashnaks, after having dispersed across Daralayaz and Zangezur, would now be able to use the terms of the Treaty of Alexandropol to demand that the Turks defend the Dashnak government against external and internal enemies. In Shahtakhtinskii’s opinion,

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the Dashnaks, whose proclamations called on Muslims to fight the B ­ olsheviks jointly with Armenians, did not yet demand that the Turks observe their commitments under the treaty because the Entente had not yet reached accord with the Turks. The Turks would hardly be strong enough; this question would be raised again immediately. Third, Shahtakhtinskii said after the Sovietization of Armenia A ­ leksandr Khatisov allegedly had arrived from abroad, who signed a treaty with the Turks making Armenia an autonomous region of Turkey. In his opinion Khati­sov was unlikely to sign such a treaty, and only the Entente would be able to force him to do this. Fourth, the Turks categorically refused to leave Gumru before the conference was over, though it was reliably known that they had no interests there.26 In his report Shahtakhtinskii pointed out five factors that positively influenced the situation. In his view, two groups currently existed in Turkey. The first group contained Bekir Sami (the former head of the Turkish mission in Moscow) and many members of the Ankara government who had lost faith in Soviet Russia and regarded any relations between revolutionary Turkey and Russia as unpromising. Indeed, the Bekir Sami mission in Moscow hopelessly failed. In October 1920 Upmal-­Angarskii (first secretary of the Soviet mission in Ankara) reported to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that Chicherin’s demands related to the Armenian question strongly upset the Turks, who had arrived in Moscow in a good mood, ready to sign a treaty. As for the information obtained in Ankara, Upmal-­Angarskii wrote: “When Turkish delegates arrived in Moscow, they were offered a draft treaty that was generally accepted, following a subsequent discussion. Then it was suddenly demanded that they cede several regions to Armenians, as a condition to conclude the treaty. They ascribe this to the personal influence of Karakhan and Avanesov.”27 In Shahtakhtinskii’s view, the second group consisted of Yusuf Kemal (the current head of the Turkish mission) and some members of the cabinet. They believed that revolutionary Turkey should not have given up ties with Russia because Turkey could not withstand the Entente’s pressure without these ties. In his report Shahtakhtinskii assessed the political views of Yusuf Kemal, Ali Fuat, and Dr. Rıza Nur: As for Ali Fuat pasha, his faith in Soviet Russia is boundless. He has told military units that he believes that he will manage to open warehouses in Moscow to send everything possible to Turkey. The agents that he sent managed to buy a portion of arms and smuggle them to Anatolia. Upon distribution of these arms, in his official order he declared that the arms had been sent by an allied fraternal revolutionary



The Russian–Turkish Conference in Moscow and Azerbaijan 227

Russia. He is one of the initiators of the revolutionary movement in Turkey and all the time was a chief commander of the western Anatolian front. The Entente assigned 40,000 golden Turkish liras to organize an attempt against him. Several unsuccessful attempts were made on his life; however, the very organizer of these attempts fell into his hands after all. The third delegate — ​Rıza Nur  — ​is believed to be a great Anglophobe but trusts us only a little because of the Armenians.28 Shahtakhtinskii informed the CPC that all the Turks, young and old alike, were convinced that a sincere treaty with Russia undoubtedly meant a death sentence for the Entente. As for Eastern Anatolia, Shahtakhtinskii wrote: All of Eastern Anatolia and its leader Kazım Karabekir pasha are our most ardent, sincerest friends. Psychologically, this is also explainable as follows: Eastern Anatolia, which has felt the bereaving hand of Russia in previous wars, is convinced that Russia is invincible, with endless human material. Russia turned out to be the victor in all the wars. In contrast, the unsuccessful Anglo-­French raid on the Dardanelles shattered the myth of England’s omnipotence. Kazım Karabekir pasha is perfectly aware of this sentiment of the masses; and, besides, in his literary works, which are studied in all the schools of Anatolia, he shamelessly abuses England out of a wish to make Turkish youngsters have suspicious attitudes toward the British. Thus spreading the Entente’s influence over Anatolia would mean the end of Karabekir, who is currently the most influential, popular person in all of Anatolia. It is evident from Shahtakhtinskii’s report that some Turkish circles speaking against a treaty with Soviet Russia feared that Russian Bolshevism might be fleeting. Turkey could find itself face to face with Europe or even with nationalistic Russia. To reduce this anxiety, Shahtakhtinskii explained to ­Karabekir pasha during his stay in Gumru that the Bashkir, Kyrgyz, ­Turkestan, Khiva, Bukhara, and Azerbaijan republics currently existed thanks to Soviet Russia. In his view, if communism spread all over the world, Muslims would be glad. But if communism suffered a defeat and Russia became a factor of pressure against Turkey, the Muslim republics, strengthened under Soviet Russia’s patronage, undoubtedly could successfully counteract the aggressive policy of this non-­Soviet Russia in the East. Shahtakhtinskii suggested “once and forever giving up the thought that the Turks want to snatch a certain amount of gold and arms from us, in order to leave us afterward or even use these arms against us.” At the same time, he noted that “the Nakhchivan area, as the strategically most important region, should in no way be given the status

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of a p­ rotectorate of the Turks. To the same extent it is not possible to let it be linked to Armenia, because, first, the very population of this region will oppose this, and, second, the Turks will not agree with this.” Shahtakhtinskii suggested making this region a self-­governing district u­ nder Soviet Russia’s protectorate for a while. Such a resolution of the matter would shift the Turks from the position that they had taken and could not help but please Armenia. He wrote: Possibly circumstances once will force us, on behalf of an independent Nakhchivan region, to make a diversion toward Persian Azerbaijan or maybe even against Turkey, but such steps can never be made by or on behalf of Armenia. Finally, it has to be kept in mind that, if the N ­ akhchivan region is linked to Armenia, the Maku khanate will immediately declare itself a part of Turkey, which disfavors us in all ­respects. As for the situation in Azerbaijan and throughout the Caucasus, Shahtakhtinskii concluded at the end of his report that the situation in the region remained strained. He thought that it would not be possible permanently to keep a large army in Azerbaijan and that certain revolts might occur in the spring. In Shahtakhtinskii’s view, all this made it necessary to conclude a treaty with Turkey: An alliance with Turkey would give us the opportunity immediately to realize the Sovietization of Georgia, where counterrevolutionaries from Daghestan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia have gathered and work well. Georgia’s Sovietization would finally disarm c­ ounterrevolutionaries and give us the opportunity to lead a bigger part of the army out from Azerbaijan to the North Caucasus. If no treaty was concluded in Moscow, what would the Turkish delegation have to do? In Shahtakhtinskii’s view, in that event Ali Fuat pasha would remain in Moscow as an ambassador of the Ankara government, while the delegation itself would immediately come back. At the same time, the GNAT would tell all Muslims of the East that a revolutionary Turkey no longer had links or allied relations with Russia and that the Turks were struggling independently, without any help from Soviet Russia. In this report prepared for Soviet Russia’s People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs Behbud ­Shahtakhtinskii clearly believed that it was politically necessary and strategically useful to conclude a treaty with Turkey. However, in contrast to the opinion of Shahtakhtinskii and a number of Bolsheviks acting in the Caucasus and in Turkey who recommended con-



The Russian–Turkish Conference in Moscow and Azerbaijan 229

cluding a necessary treaty with Russia, Chicherin had his own opinion: he believed that it was not possible to yield to Turkey’s demands, especially the ones regarding the Armenian question. On January 11, 1921, he wrote to ­Orjonikidze: If the Turks wrangle, entreat, and blackmail: this does not mean that we must yield everything to them immediately. On the contrary, we also must wrangle with them, not capitulate. They must know that we don’t feel any particular partiality for Armenians at all, that our principled policy is that all nations have the right to self-­determination, so we cannot provide any assistance to a policy that infringes on this self-­determination. Of course, we will not yield to a preposterous reference by the Turkish representatives to a 1918 plebiscite. Naturally our policy must be flexible; stubbornness is alien to us, but it would be quite unfounded to yield to any of Turkey’s demands immediately. The very fact of Sovieti­zation of Armenia has serious political consequences for us, because the prestige of Soviet power does not allow us to leave a fraternal Soviet republic to the mercy of fate. We must get through this contradictory situ­ation carefully, not inclining toward one of the sides without restraint. After all, friendship with Turkey is a matter of paramount importance for us. But we cannot sacrifice everything regarding this matter.29 In addition Chicherin disagreed with the calculations that Mdivani sent to him from Kars. Mdivani warned that a reactionary government would be formed in Ankara if no concessions were made to Turkey regarding the Armenian question. He thus insisted that they yield to Turkey immediately. However, Chicherin explained these demands by saying that Mdivani had fallen under the strong influence of the Turks: It seems to me that no such rapid compliance or weakness should be manifested in relations with the eastern nations, because their claims will grow immediately, hugely, as a result. We must display firmness and consistency. Concessions are possible only in a pinch, in an appropriate atmosphere. Thus it seems to me that any changes regarding our previous proposals should be given before the Moscow conference is held and that we should not yield to any intimidation by Turkey.30 The Bolsheviks acting in the Caucasus, however, especially Orjonikidze, were well aware of events occurring in the South Caucasus, so they disagreed with Chicherin’s anti-­Turkish stance. On February 6, 1921, after the Turkish delegation left Baku for Moscow, Orjonikidze sent a telegram to Lenin

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and Stalin suggesting withdrawing Chicherin’s territorial claims to Turkish ­territory and accelerating the conclusion of a Russian-­Turkish treaty. He wrote that according to available information Chicherin’s claim to Mush, Van, and Bitlis had strengthened the positions of the Entente’s supporters in Turkey and that Mustafa Kemal has started seeking ways of getting closer with the Istanbul government. Orjonikidze warned that the Armenian question was the most sensitive point in Turkish policy. At the same time, he believed that the Armenians exaggerated the Turks’ longtime hatred for them. Orjonikidze wrote: “Without a doubt, the Turks will use our every step, like the one claiming Mush, Van, and Bitlis, to demonstrate our attitude to them. All claims of such a nature must be given up, and a treaty of purely propagandistic character should be concluded.”31 Kazım Karabekir pasha in turn tried to make every effort to maintain tranquillity in the region before the Moscow conference began and to dissuade the Russians away from patronizing the Armenians. He wrote to the command of the 11th Red Army that Armenians would always and permanently act in the interests of the Entente and thus would try to sow hatred between the Turkish and Russian nations. In his view, the Armenians, even after having become Bolsheviks, went on acting jointly with the Dashnaks. He wrote: “They use thousands of tricks to sow discord.”32 Delegates of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia left Baku on February 6, 1921, and reached the capital of Russia only on February 18. Yet in December 1920 Chicherin instructed Orjonikidze to send the Turkish delegation from Baku to Moscow by a special fast train.33 They left Baku by an express train; in Rostov, however, their coach was connected with a freight train, which led to long stops on the way. Though the Turkish delegation initially explained the lengthy delay in Rostov as being due to Bolshevik negligence or other extraordinary circumstances occurring in Moscow, they soon became convinced that the reason was different. When Yusuf Kemal bey, the head of the Turkish delegation, and Shahtakhtinskii sent a note of protest to Chicherin, it became clear that the head of the Rostov railway station was an Armenian. In the opinion of delegation member Rıza Nur, Armenians played this game to frustrate the Moscow talks.34 Even the Turkish delegation started exploring the opportunity of going back home on February 12 as a sign of protest against such a disrespectful attitude. They believed that all this was caused by the unwillingness of Russian governmental circles to see the Turkish delegation in Moscow. Alarmed by these sentiments of the Turks, the train’s commander Chechulin immediately informed Chicherin that in connection with this situation the delegation refused to go to Moscow.35 Only then was the delegation again put on a fast train. On February 18 it was given a solemn reception in Moscow by a parade



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of Moscow cadets and an orchestra. Ali Fuat pasha accepted the parade of cadets on behalf of the whole delegation.36 On February 19 the Turkish delegation was received by Chicherin and Karakhan. On the same evening Ali Fuat pasha handed over his credentials to Chicherin.37 The talks were continued on February 21, but the Soviet side held firm to its previous stance: demands regarding Van, Bitlis, and Batum put forward by Chicherin in talks with Bekir Sami bey on August 27, 1920, were repeated. Further talks promised nothing good. Chicherin’s attitude toward the Turks caused no positive sentiments. The Turks apparently felt that Chicherin did not want to talk with them because he had started being inclined toward the West. In fact the Soviet leadership, including Chicherin, understood well that Turkey, acting within the framework of the just-­proclaimed National Pact (Misak-­i Milli), was not going to share its territory with any of the neighboring countries. While the Turkish delegation was on its way to Moscow, Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal held a conversation with the plenipotentiary representative of the Council for Propaganda and Action of Peoples of the East, Efrem Eshba, and told him: “I understand well that no question about borders between national states will exist under communism.” As an example he referred to Communist Azerbaijan, which “voluntarily ceded part of its territory to Communist Armenia.” Kemal pasha stressed that if Armenians put forward territorial claims against Turkey, however, “the people, influenced by the fresh, strong national idea, of course will not be reconciled with this and will struggle against it.”38 Eshba immediately reported the contents of his January 29, 1921, conversation with Kemal pasha to Moscow. In preparing for the talks, Armenia experienced an anti-­Soviet revolt that led to the overthrow of Soviet power, so an extremely unfavorable situation was established for the Armenian delegation to the Moscow conference. ­Narimanov immediately informed Lenin about the events in Armenia: “You already know that Soviet power in Armenia was overthrown. With this in mind, I would propose that the Armenian question should not play a role in talks with the Turkish delegation.”39 Grigorii Kaminskii, first secretary of the CC CPA (B), made a voluminous report on this special occasion. Narimanov urged Lenin to pay serious attention to the report of comrade Kaminskii. Following the first preliminary working meeting with the Turkish delegation, Chicherin sent an extensive report to Lenin. Apart from other questions, he noted: I knew nothing of what you and comrade Stalin had sent in a ciphered telegram to comrade Mdivani. I am still unaware of the exact content of this ciphered message; however, based on it, comrade Mdivani on behalf

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of our government, as you can see from this written c­ orrespondence, officially proposed a political and military alliance with the Turks. Chicherin reminded Lenin that we always carefully avoided using the word “alliance” in our talks with the Turks because an alliance with the Turks is incompatible with an alleged agreement with England. The treaty that we drafted jointly with Bekir Sami last year and that remained unsigned due to certain unidentified particularities was called a treaty of friendship and brotherhood; nevertheless, at the time we refrained from introducing the word “alliance.” Incidentally, comrade Mdivani, in response to your ciphered message, suggested concluding not simply an alliance but a political and military alliance. The Turks caught onto this idea, and the mandate of the delegation prescribes that Turkey hold talks with us over the conclusion of a political and military alliance.... At present, it is quite unclear to me to what extent we can yield to the Turks in this case.40 To pressure Chicherin, on February 22, the Turks met with Stalin: this meeting made them definitely hope that the talks would go on. Stalin stressed that Soviet Russia might cede Artvin and Ardahan to the Turks.41 It was Orjonikidze who proposed to Moscow to involve Stalin in the talks. When the Turkish delegation was still on its way to Moscow, Orjonikidze had sent the following ciphered telegram to Moscow: “Stalin’s participation in the talks with the Turks is quite necessary: Chicherin is distrusted; Karakhan is hated.”42 After the meeting with Stalin the talks were restarted; however, Chicherin’s provocative demands forced the Turks to interrupt the talks again. They suspected that all this was a result of Karakhan’s influence.43 The next unofficial meeting of the delegations of the RSFSR and Turkey took place on February 23. As a rule, such meetings were primarily designed to find out the positions of delegations. More restrained than in previous meetings, Chicherin voiced a hope that the preparatory stage had been completed and that it was possible to turn to opening the conference. Yusuf Kemal bey shared this opinion and clarified a number of questions raised by Chicherin. The questions primarily regarded the reasons why the Russian representatives had not been allowed to attend the Armenian-­Turkish talks in Gumru as mediators. Furthermore, Yusuf Kemal bey paid attention to the word “alliance,” a subject of discussion at a previous meeting, saying: You have said that you are in the process of concluding a trade agreement with England. I think that you are using this agreement to weaken our enemies. You need to help us as soon as possible; we must trust



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each other. Don’t question our goodwill. We can say that our Turkish history is proof that Turkey will always remain devoted to its promise. Turkey gave its word to Russia. At the same time, he noted that Soviet Russia had promised to supply 4 million cartridges, but “Turkey has so far received only 250,000 cartridges.”44 As for the Armenian question, the head of the Turkish delegation noted: “We do not believe that Armenia has become Communist all at once: there is a Communist government, but there is also a great influence from the Dashnaks. Turkey is fully prepared to enter into sincere friendly relations with Armenia and do away with hostility between the poor people of the two countries once and forever, but only if this is surely necessary.” As a response, Chicherin suggested forgetting old disputes and noted that “the most important question is the question of your security; this is the help that we can offer you.” He added that “some decisions should remain secret, others should be included in the text of a treaty, with consideration of the previous treaty and with the necessary amendments regarding settlement of disputes; at the same time, we will reach a final consensus on the question of aid.” Furthermore, Chicherin asked the Kemalists to clarify the interrelations of Istanbul and Ankara and express opinions regarding the Ottoman Empire’s properties. In his response Yusuf Kemal bey stressed that all these questions were reflected in the National Pact (Misak-­i Milli): We have a National Pact. This document contains answers to the majority of your questions. There we have indicated the territories that the nation demands and expressed our vision regarding the previous provinces of the Ottoman Empire.... We won’t allow anyone to divide us into zones of influence.... Our only support is the strength of the nation. We’ve proven this by our struggle with the imperialists. As for Chicherin’s question about the fate of the Turkish sultan, Dr. Rıza Nur noted that the sultan had to remain a Muslim pope. The question of the boundaries of the sultan’s power was a separate article of the new constitution, which had already been adopted by the Grand National Assembly. Then the floor was taken by Yusuf Kemal bay, who said: “We will always work with you, and on behalf on my government I’d like to ask you to give up any suspicions. When we were told in Baku that we are feared, we — ​I don’t know why — ​ laughed.” Having stressed that observing security was essential for Turkey as well, Chicherin asked another question: “Though your position has become stronger, you should always, as you have said, fear an attack. If the Entente offers the following transaction: Asia to you and Frakiya and Syria to us, will you refuse or accept this offer? Or have you lost interest in these countries?”

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In the opinion of Yusuf Kemal bey, the GNAT would not accept such an offer. At the end of the conversation Chicherin noted that technical and military questions must be put aside; it is essential for you to meet with Sklianskii, Kamenev, and Lebedev; the results are not to be disclosed on paper and should be kept secret. On the other hand, we must examine a treaty of friendship and brotherhood to decide what articles we should add or change in the initial treaty and so forth. Finally, we have to dispose of all the misunderstandings. For this to happen, we would like to invite a representative of Azerbaijan, which we should trust fully, for it is a Muslim republic. Aside from this, Azerbaijan is playing a certain role in the Caucasus. I have learned that ceding Azerbaijan’s regions to Armenia made you concerned. Thus we will hold three separate consultations. Understanding that Chicherin’s proposal on inviting Azerbaijan would be followed by a similar step regarding Armenia, Yusuf Kemal bey declined to touch on this question. The Turkish delegation noted that it was concerned over military aspects most of all. Yusuf Kemal bey stressed that “we prefer starting and ending military talks over military hardware supply and only then going on to other questions.” Questions raised at the first meeting were so unacceptable that the Turks were forced to take a one-­week break. As for Chicherin’s inclination toward the West, Yusuf Kemal noted that Chicherin did not believe that Turkey was capable of withstanding a strike by the Entente and thus recommended reaching an accord with the Entente in exchange for certain concessions. ­Yusuf ­Kemal noted that Chicherin had even tried to have him meet with an English trade representative in Moscow. Such actions and the attitude to the Turks further strengthened the negative attitude toward Chicherin and his policy.45 The initial important success of the Turkish delegation was that it became possible to dismiss Karakhan (deputy people’s commissar of foreign affairs of Soviet Russia) before the talks officially began. In addition the Turkish delegation advanced the argument that it was authorized to hold talks only with Soviet Russia, so the Turks protested the participation of the Soviet republics of the South Caucasus in the Moscow conference. Soviet Russia was forced to agree with this.46 Upon his arrival in Moscow, Shahtakhtinskii urgently delivered Narimanov’s letter to Lenin. Lenin then instructed Mikhail Kalinin, candidate for membership in the CC RCP (B) Politburo and chair of the All-­Russia Central Executive Commission, to acquaint all members of the CC RCP (B)



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with the text of this letter. At the same time, Lenin asked Stalin to refer to Narimanov’s concepts. The original letter contains attestations by CC members Nikolai Krestinskii, Aleksandr Serebrovskii, Grigorii Zinov’ev, Karl Radek, Aleksei Rykov, Lev Kamenev, and Nikolai Bukharin that they are acquainted with the letter. Narimanov wrote: Dear Vladimir Ilyich! A Turkish delegation with our representative ­Behbud Shahtakhtinskii is going to Moscow. Here I spoke to the Turkish delegation in detail. I absolutely don’t doubt that the Ankara representatives sincerely want to link their destiny with us against England. For them, the most delicate question is the Armenian one: they displayed as much energy as possible to settle this matter in their favor. I had hardly started talking about Batum and Akhaltsikh when they interrupted me, saying: “The Armenian question is the question of life and death. If we yield in this question, the masses will not follow us. Incidentally, a solution of this question in our favor will make us strong.” It goes without saying that they are against the Entente and prepared to fight England jointly with us until the last man, but if Moscow alienates the Ankara representatives because of the Armenian question, they may desperately be embraced by England. What may happen then?47 Narimanov warned Lenin that Chicherin was complicating the eastern question and was too keen on the Armenian question. It was Chicherin who disrespected all of the consequences that threatened to occur if relations with the Turks were severed because of the Armenian question. Narimanov firmly insisted: if in the current situation in the Caucasus (in Daghestan and Georgia) there is a wish to conserve Azerbaijan, a strong alliance should still be concluded with the Turks. If Soviet Russia failed to reach accord with Turkey, Narimanov warned, the Turks might carry out a mission to head the liberation movement of the East conquered by European imperialism and declare a sacred war against England. Thus they would win great respect in the Muslim world, while the Soviets would see the Eastern Front opposing them and would lose their influence on the Muslim East. Narimanov wrote: If England, by making use of this opportunity, opens a Western Front in the face of Poland and Romania, just imagine what our position with our ruin will be. Dear Vladimir Ilyich! I foresee a hard hour, so I consider it necessary not to hide anything from you. I am trusted and talked to by everyone: I have oral and written reports about the ­position and

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attitude of all the outlying autonomous republics toward us. In all the reports they talk about a colonialist policy of Soviet Russia. These sharp words from Narimanov greatly concerned the Soviet leadership. Furthermore, in the beginning of 1921, other authoritative Communists of countries of the East began speaking about a colonialist trend in Moscow’s policy.

Opening of the Moscow Conference and the Russian-­Turkish Discussions The Moscow conference that began on February 26 was headed by Georgii Chicherin and Jelaleddin Korkmazov on behalf of the Soviets and Y ­ usuf ­Kemal bey, Dr. Rıza Nur, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy on behalf of Turkey.48 Chicherin chaired the first meeting of the conference. In his opening address he noted that the Moscow conference would play an important role in the history of the East and would strengthen the friendship between Russia and Turkey. As for the recent history of both countries, Chicherin noted that the mass deaths of Russian soldiers at the walls of Erzurum and Russian soldiers’ punitive actions against the Muslim population were primarily a reflection of the tsarist Russian authorities’ hatred for Turkey. Nikolai II erroneously believed that placing a cross on the St. Sofia Cathedral was the desire of all the Russian people. This was a concept of autocracy, an ideal of the complacent nobility; however, the broad masses of the Russian nation, the Russian peasantry, never shared such aggressive intentions. In the same manner, it was not the old Turkey of Abdul-­Hamid times or a Brest-­Litovsk era Turkey that entered one of the rival imperialist coalitions and was now becoming a close friend of the new Russia, but a new Turkey that transformed itself like A ­ ntaeus and became a natural ally of the revolutionary Russian people.49 As for the liberation struggle of the Turkish people, Chicherin stressed that the Treaty of Sèvres had brought many misfortunes to the country; he voiced his confidence that Turkey would be able to uphold its right to existence. Furthermore, he noted: In the treaty that we are creating silence should not be kept about the question of Constantinople. On behalf of the Russian government I have to declare that Constantinople is and must remain a Turkish town. We have once and forever given up all of the previous claims of the Russian governments, which aimed to conquer ­Constantinople. Here, at Nesselrode and Gorchakov, I solemnly declare that we have forever given up, reject, and condemn these centuries-­old claims.



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Constantinople must be the national capital of Turkey. Its adjacent shoreline must also belong to Turkey. Having spoken enthusiastically about Turkey, the Turkish people, and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Chicherin declared the conference opened. Chicherin was followed by the head of the Turkish delegation, Yusuf ­Kemal bey. He thanked Chicherin for his praise of Turkish soldiers and all of the Turkish people struggling for the independence of their country. Yusuf Kemal bey assured the delegates that the Turkish people would never be reconciled with the burden of the Treaty of Sèvres articles and would fight world imperialism jointly with the Russian people, saying that the Turks stretched out their hands toward the Russian people with a wish for victory and open hearts. Yusuf Kemal bey noted: Geographical, historical, economic, and political conditions have shown us the way to Russia. I would like to tell new Russia’s representatives with a great deal of sincerity typical for a Turk: trust us. Let’s consult those who direct world policy; they are unable to change the course of history, and all of the meetings that we are having will not force us to step aside from the right path that we are standing on. Following an exchange of speeches, the Russian side submitted for discussion a project that had been drafted at previous talks and had to be corrected and improved. The Turks agreed with this document. During the discussions it was decided to create political, legal, and editorial commissions. The first meeting ended in the evening, and the starting date of the next meeting was to be declared based on mutual consent. On the same day, Shahtakhtinskii sent detailed information about the opening of the Moscow conference to Mirza Davud Huseinov, the people’s commissar of foreign affairs of Azerbaijan. In his message he described the course of the first day’s discussions and expressed his thoughts about Azerbaijan’s participation in the work of the conference: A conference with the participation of representatives of Russia and the Ankara government begins today, Saturday, February 26. A treaty between the Turks and Azerbaijan will separately be concluded in Baku. The Turks don’t want the conference to be attended by representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia and note that there is absolutely no disputed matter between them and Azerbaijan and that a treaty with Azerbaijan will be concluded separately. They are against the participation of Armenia because they continue to regard the Treaty of

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­ lexandropol as valid and thus don’t desire to abstain from it. Russia, A naturally, has nothing to object to regarding conclusion of a separate treaty with us; nevertheless, it wants the conference to be attended by a representative of Azerbaijan first and then a representative of Armenia. I personally negatively assess Azerbaijan’s participation in the conference, for I definitely have nothing to talk about there; it does not profit us at all to act against the Turks for minor reasons, because I have great influence on them and I will have many moves to make in Anatolia; however, I could lose all of this if at the conference I speak against the Turks on questions having nothing in common with Azerbaijan. My statement will be discussed today, and I don’t know what decision will be made.50 As for Russian-­Turkish relations, Shahtakhtinskii wrote: “Russia concludes with Turkey a treaty of friendship and brotherhood but not an alliance, because talks with England are underway, so that the treaty is supposedly almost completed. Financial and other assistance to the Turks will be provided in another form, not under a treaty to be concluded.” Shahtakhtinskii discussed all these questions with Chicherin during two long conversations and one short one. A day before the Moscow conference began, on February 25, Soviet Russia managed to Sovietize the third South Caucasus republic: Georgia. This action caused a new geopolitical situation in the region and strengthened Soviet Russia’s positions at the Moscow conference. When Shahtakhtinskii as plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan was asked his opinion on the Sovietization of Georgia, he suggested that “all of the Transcaucasian republics, including Daghestan, should be put in a common cauldron: one Caucasus republic should be established that should join the Russian Federation. This is the only way to put an end to disputes about borders and so forth. Supposedly we will return to this question once again and discuss it here in broader detail.” However, the Sovietization of Georgia coincided with an anti-­Soviet revolt in Armenia. Soviet authorities escaping from Erivan strongly complicated the situation, though Moscow viewed this as a temporary phenomenon. The question of unification of the Caucasus republics and making them a province of Russia still remained under consideration. Shahtakhtinskii wrote: “I determined the independence of Azerbaijan before the Sovietization of Armenia and Georgia. The Sovietization of these countries will cause a new form of governing in the Caucasus. It is up to me to propose the initiative.” No one had to wait for long. On March 1 Shahtakhtinskii submitted his proposals to Lenin, the CPC chair.



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In Shahtakhtinskii’s opinion, in places with mixed residence of many nationalities the principle of self-­determination of nations is interpreted extremely broadly, so, in order to put an end to territorial disputes among the South Caucasus republics, it is necessary to unite them under the common name of the South Caucasus Republic and to include it as part of Russia. Other­wise, some republic, in an effort to justify its actions by protection of historical rights, economic circumstances, and defense of state borders, might invent new “principles,” which would lead to increasing displeasure in these republics and provoke their inclination toward England, Turkey, and other countries. He wrote: “In my opinion, of all possible forms of resolution of territorial, economic, and other disputes in Transcaucasia the most beneficial, appropriate, and expedient one is to unite all of the Transcaucasian republics, including Daghestan with the highlands, into a single Caucasus republic that is to join the Russian Federation.”51 At the end of this letter, however, Shahtakhtinskii added that he would not insist on Daghestan’s inclusion in a Caucasus republic if there was an objection. He attached a reference about territories that were the subject of dispute among the South Caucasus republics.52 As plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan Shahtakhtinskii shared the Turks’ opinion regarding Azerbaijan’s participation in the Moscow conference. But two other disputed issues remained in the Russian-­Turkish talks: the first connected with Batum and the second with Nakhchivan. Turkish representatives attached great importance to the Nakhchivan questions at unofficial meetings before the conference and at the conference itself. Before his departure for Moscow, Yusuf Kemal bey met Mustafa Kemal pasha and asked him: “Pasha! If Russians insistently desire Nakhchivan, what will we do?” ­Kemal pasha replied: “Nakhchivan is the gateway for the Turks. Proceeding from this, do your best.”53 Despite solemn assurances at the opening of the conference, discussions in the commissions were far from smooth. The Turks suggested the concept of a National Pact that included notions such as recognition of Batum, Kars, and Ardahan as Turkish territory, conducting a plebiscite in these places, and keeping the Treaty of Alexandropol in force. To substantiate their stance, the Turks prepared statistical material about the ethnic and confessional composition of the population of this region since 1831. According to the prepared documents, in 1831 Muslims made up 92.8 percent of the population of Kars, while the number of Christians was only 7.2 percent. Despite significant growth of the population of Kars as of 1871 (207,876 Muslims and 14,982 Christians), the ethnic/religious ratio of 93 percent to 7 percent remained. This ratio changed slightly only as a result of the Russian-­Turkish war of 1877–78: the share of Muslims dropped to 88.6 percent (255,780) while the

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share of Christians rose to 11.4 percent (29,160). According to the Turkish delegation, despite a significant decrease in the population in these regions of the Caucasus theater of war actions resulting from World War I, in 1918 the combined population of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum was 318,926, of whom 272,691 (85 percent) were Muslims and 46,235 (15 percent were Armenians).54 Even the Moscow-­based RSFSR People’s Commissariat for the Affairs of ­Nationalities journal, Zhizn’ Natsional’nostei (Life of Nationalities), noted at the time that Armenia’s claims to Kars and Ardahan were a manifestation of imperialist policy, primarily because 67 percent of the population of these regions was Muslim.55 This question was discussed at a six-­hour meeting of the political commission on February 28. Having submitted a voluminous report on this meeting to Stalin, Chicherin reported that the talks with the Turks were difficult: Their demands are unbelievable in all respects; moreover, they demand that the government give an answer within three days and threaten that otherwise they will leave the conference. First of all, we have discovered that their “National Pact,” 56 which is like a charter, was adopted in Constantinople before the parliament was dissolved and thus is considered something sacred, untouchable, to them. The pact’s second article reads that Turkey agrees once again to conduct a plebiscite in the sanjaks of Batum, Ardahan, and Kars that already had decided to join the homeland in 1917.57 However, Chicherin wrote to Stalin that he considered it inappropriate to carry out a referendum in a sanjak where the population is composed mostly of Ajar Muslims. After long and tense talks Yusuf Kemal suddenly told Chicherin that Soviet representative Mdivani had privately recommended that the Turks occupy Batum. Chicherin asked Orjonikidze to check whether this was true after the conference was over. Even the fact that Karabekir ­pasha hints at this in his letter seems rather strange.58 When it became known that the fate of the Russian-­Turkish treaty depended on Batum, Rıza Nur, a member of the Turkish delegation, made a casual remark that he could s­ imply make a note that the Batum question would be discussed separately and adopt the National Pact. Yusuf Kemal was categorically against this, however, believing that the National Pact should be adopted without any preconditions. In his view, the National Pact and the Treaty of Alexandropol should be kept ­inviolable. Chicherin wrote to Stalin: In fact, their argument is that the Armenian Communists are allegedly the repainted Dashnaks. Formally they declared that the question of



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Batum concerns Georgia and that the question of the Treaty of Alexandropol [Gumru] concerns Armenia, so these questions need to be interpreted by these states, not by us; furthermore, the delegation is not authorized to hold talks with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The sole authority of the delegation is to conclude a treaty about political and military alliance with Russia. They may leave, so their government may later send another delegation to talk with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. However, they cannot afford to do this. They did not say this at our preliminary meetings. This argument appeared only today. As a result, they categorically demanded that our government give an answer within three days.59 In his report to the Soviet political and military leadership about the course of the talks, Chicherin stressed: “The Turks put an ultimatum before us.”60 He suggested settling problems through personal contacts with members of the Turkish delegation. He tried to use Jelaleddin Korkmazov for this purpose. However, Chicherin did not trust him fully either. After trustworthy conversations with Yusuf Kemal bey, Korkmazov told Chicherin that if the National Pact was officially recognized, a provision about Batum could be adopted. Chicherin wrote to Stalin: As for the Treaty of Alexandropol, Yusuf Kemal allegedly noted that if Turkey faced Communist Armenia the Treaty of Alexandropol should be considered senseless.... Anyway, these days we should accelerate private conversations because it seems evident that it is possible to negotiate with them only through private conversations. It is essential to use Khalil [Khalil Kut pasha] and other Turks to attain this goal. Obviously they won’t give up their Turkish arrogance at meetings and in talks with me.61 When the Russian-­Turkish talks broke down, only the interference of Shahtakhtinskii and Enver pasha, who was staying in Moscow, helped bring them out of the crisis. Enver pasha recommended that Ali Fuat Cebesoy not spoil relations with the Russians because of a single settlement. In long conversations with the Turks, Shahtakhtinskii promised them Stalin and Chicherin’s backing in exchange for minor concessions on the eastern borders.62 Having analyzed the National Pact, Russian experts submitted to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs a reference noting that Batum, Kars, and ­Ardahan allegedly were not included in the National Pact and that Russia had not ever, anywhere, recognized these sanjaks as Turkish territory.63 Chicherin’s letter to Krestinskii on March 1 shows that due to current conditions the Turkish delegation might interrupt talks and return to Ankara. Chicherin wrote that

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the question of their attitude to Turkey was very serious and had reached a crisis state. He warned that Turkey’s whole orientation could change and that such a turn would cause grave consequences for the whole policy of Soviet Russia in the East. In such conditions Chicherin believed that the absence of a Russian ambassador in Ankara was unacceptable. He did not appreciate the work of the Soviet mission’s secretary Ian Upmal-­Angarskii and suspected Mdivani of having fallen under the Turks’ influence. The candidatures of Karl Danishevskii and Viacheslav Menzhinskii, whom he had proposed as a plenipotentiary representative to Ankara, were both rejected. Chicherin put forward the candidature of Danishevskii in January 1921. In a letter addressing the CC RCP (B) on January 24 he wrote that the absence of a plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Russia in Ankara was a true catastrophe for the eastern policy of the Soviets. Aside from this, Chicherin did not want the seat of a Soviet ambassador in Ankara to be occupied by a representative of the Caucasus nations.64 Chicherin suggested the candidature of Menzhinskii in a letter to Krestin­ skii on February 8. He noted that the Turks were already on the way to Moscow with the appointed ambassador, Ali Fuat pasha, while “a secretary of the mission” (Upmal-­Angarskii) in Ankara in an open radio transmission recommended cooling down relations with Ankara. Considering the Ankara government’s bad attitude toward the Communists, Upmal-­Angarskii identified Mustafa Kemal pasha as a sultan and in a ciphered telegram sent to Moscow recommended: “Stop providing any aid to Anatolia, for we cannot have anything in common with the sultan.” Chicherin noted that the matter of recalling Upmal-­Angarskii had already been settled. Given that the military was in power in Turkey, it would be appropriate to appoint as ambassador a military, authoritative person such as Danishevskii or at least the non-­military Menzhinskii, who worked for the central apparatus and had the experience of diplomatic work. The CC RCP (B) Politburo initially approved the candidature of Danishevskii as a plenipotentiary representative to Ankara, but he was rejected.65 Thus Chicherin was urgently looking for an authoritative Soviet official to occupy the position of ambassador to Turkey. He wrote: At the moment relations with Turkey have reached a serious crisis. The Turkish delegation announced that the “National Pact,” declaring Batum, Ardahan, and Kars Turkish territory and holding a plebiscite there only once, and the Treaty of Alexandropol stipulating that a significant part of Armenia is Turkish territory, as well as all the other parts of Armenia, actually making them vassal provinces of Turkey, should be considered inviolable. We may fear Batum being occupied by



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the Turks in days to come. No matter what the outcome of the present conference, we will inevitably have to pass through an extremely difficult period in our relations with Turkey. It now appears that the post of our ambassador in Ankara is one of the core knots of global policy. Considering the role that Turkey is playing in the East and the current importance of the eastern question, it turns out that Ankara is one of the most important points of our diplomatic work. With all of these reasons in mind, we believe that one of the most prominent diplomats should be appointed as our ambassador in Ankara. Given that comrade Litvinov has nearly completely ended the chaos in Revel, we would like to suggest appointing comrade Litvinov as our plenipotentiary representative to Ankara.66 Chicherin believed that this action was of particular importance after the whole Caucasus was Sovietized and foresaw an opportunity to explain this appointment to England. Aside from this, Chicherin thought that, in order to prevent failure of the Russian-­Turkish talks because of the National Pact and the Gumru Treaty and keep the Turkish delegation from going back home, it was essential immediately to publicize a decree appointing Litvinov in news­papers to convince everyone that Soviet Russia desired peace and friendship with Turkey. He wrote that this appointment “will, to a certain extent, eliminate the extremely hazardous consequences of the Turkish delegation’s departure. It is thus essential to do this immediately, because the Turkish dele­gates demanded to hold the next meeting on Thursday, so they may leave quite soon.”67 Chicherin’s letter to Stalin on March 2, however, demonstrates that ­Litvinov categorically refused to go to Ankara, though “soldiers and the masses support us in Minor Asia.” After Soviet Russia managed to occupy Georgia, the problem of appointing an ambassador to Ankara became more urgent. In a telegram to Chicherin Mdivani warned that the Georgian events had whetted Ankara’s appetite for moving toward Batum, apart from the claims to Artvin and Ardahan. He wrote that the Turks considered it more appropriate to absorb Armenia under the Dashnaks than Soviet Armenia backed by Soviet Russia.68 During the talks Chicherin asked Stalin to familiarize the PCFA beforehand with the content of a statement that he was going to make at a meeting with Turkish delegates on the occasion of Soviet Russia’s potential compromises. In a response to this request of March 6 Stalin wrote: 1. The majority of the Batum district will remain part of the RSFSR; Artvin and Ardenuch will join Turkey; a new border between the RSFSR and Turkey is to be drawn approximately on the line from Liman to Borchkha

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to the Chorokh River to the Imerkhevi River and eastward up to the Kars district border. 2. Military leaders do not agree to cede Ardahan to Turkey, viewing it as a key to Tiflis; nevertheless, I will try to persuade them to make a concession so that the border between the RSFSR and Turkey will pass approximately along the line of the previous border between the Kars district and the Tiflis province. 3. The Turks will withdraw from Alexandropol; a strip approximately twenty versts deep along the whole railway Alexandropol-­Kamarli (west of this line) will be a part of the RSFSR. 4. As for the Nakhchivan question, it is up to the representative of Azerbaijan to say his last word. Stalin noted that the borderline he offered in points 1 and 2 was only approximate and that the exact borderline was to be defined by an appropriate commission.69 In responding to an inquiry by the Russian PCFA, on March 4 the Soviet Army headquarters officially spoke against the transfer of Ardahan to Turkey. Ardahan was of importance for the Soviets for the following reasons: 1. If Kars and its plateau are given to the Turks, the Ardahan region will be a suitable region for us to concentrate forces to assault either Kars or Olty and Erzurum. If we own the whole Ardahan region, we will keep it as a locality surrounding Kars. 2. If Ardahan and its region are given to the Turks, they will deeply penetrate the present-­day Georgian lands and approach the Akhaltsikh valley and thus access to the center of Georgia will be facilitated. To the same extent the possession of the Ardahan region brings the Turks nearer to the Batum region. Aside from this, from the Ardahan region the Turks will always be threatening our routes stretching from the north to Alexandropol via Akhalkalak or even Khram. However, given that the main routes to Kars stretch from Alexandropol, the main routes that lead from Tiflis via the Borchali Province and the Ardahan region cannot be considered among those most necessary for us, so that we would be forced to make them an inviolable condition of the talks.70 On March 7 Shahtakhtinskii informed Stalin that he had talked with the Turks the day before and found out that they cared very little about the questions of Nakhchivan and Batum. They had become convinced that any debates relating to these regions were useless. Now they only wanted some changes regarding the borders of the Batum region. Shahtakhtinskii noted that the Turks now largely focused on the question of a twenty-­verst railway



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from Erivan to Kars along the River Arax. In the same letter Shahtakhtinskii reported that the Turkish delegation urgently desired to meet with Stalin.71 In addition, Shahtakhtinskii submitted detailed information to Chicherin, telling him that the Turks had asked Stalin to be given three hours to discuss all the articles of the treaty.72 On the same day Chicherin told Stalin that such a meeting would have been “very desirable.” The Turks were quite eager to see a railroad in the Arax Valley, the border passing through the same area, but objected to the twenty-­ verst railway from Gumru to Kars, which would have reduced the military importance of Kars. Chicherin wrote: “As for the Arax Valley, don’t forget that in the adjacent mountains of the southern part of the Surmali Province and south of it there reside Kurds, bandits of their kind. If the border crosses Arax, nothing will stop the Kurds from continuing to rob the valley’s population.” Chicherin also noted: “The western media, especially right-­socialist bodies, are conducting a great propaganda campaign that Moscow imperialism allegedly attacked the free Georgian people. Through Baku comrades, I thus told comrade Orjonikidze that it would be appropriate to issue an appeal to workers of all countries on behalf of the Georgian Soviet government to allow the Western public to see Georgian-­Soviet leaders, not only Moscow.”73 Taking all this into consideration, Soviet Russia urgently tried to involve Georgia in the Moscow conference. For this reason Chicherin asked H ­ useinov to tell the Tiflis Revolutionary Committee immediately that a Georgian comrade should come to Moscow with a mandate from the Georgian Soviet government, because the Moscow conference was expected to examine the question of borders between Turkey and the Caucasus republics.74 While this “invitation” was on its way, however, Eliava had already telegraphed to Chicherin an inquiry about whether it was possible for a representative of the Georgian Soviet government to attend the Russian-­Turkish conference.75 As soon as permission was obtained, Mikhail Tskhakaia was urgently appointed as a representative of the Georgian government to the Moscow conference. On March 7 Chicherin reported to Shahtakhtinskii that he had already written to Stalin that it was desirable to arrange frequent meetings with the Turks. As for the border’s passing along the Arax River valley, he believed that in the existing conditions it was unlikely that it would be possible to safeguard the valley’s population against attacks by the Kurds living in the foothills.76 Aside from this, the Russian side viewed very cautiously the Turkish delegation’s proposal to amend the treaty with a clause giving the Muslim population of the country the right to emigrate freely to Turkey. On March 8 Chicherin submitted a written request to the All-­Russian Extraordinary Commission (AREC) asking it to express its opinion regarding the Turks’ proposal. The commission replied a day later that mass resettlement of Russian Muslims to

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Turkey was not practically possible due to the current ruined state of the railways. However, this was only a technical issue. The commission believed that a mass emigration of Muslims to Turkey, as provided by the treaty, might have caused deteriorated relations between the state and Muslims from the point of the internal security of the RSFSR. As for international relations, inclusion of such a clause in the treaty would have allowed the Turkish government to interfere with the internal affairs of Soviet Russia. Security agencies believed that this clause would have enabled the Turks to act as defenders of Muslim Soviet citizens and in the event of conflict would have allowed them to cancel the treaty and make the future of Soviet eastern policy dependent on Turkey’s will.77 Following Shahtakhtinskii and Chicherin’s request, Stalin heeded the requests of the Turkish delegation and allotted a time to meet with them. The second meeting of the Turkish delegation with Stalin took place on March 9. A whole series of important accords was reached at this meeting.78 At its meeting a day later the political commission announced that the government of Soviet Russia had approved these accords.79 Given that a meeting of the political commission was scheduled for the evening of March 10, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs should have agreed upon a draft treaty with the Turks with the appropriate commissariats and the whole Soviet leadership (with all amendments to it). The draft treaty was submitted to almost every member of the Politburo. Letters sent to various institutions clearly illustrate that Soviet Russia’s foreign political institute, in fear of angering England, tried to avoid using the expression “struggle against imperialism” in the treaty’s title and text. Chicherin wrote to the CC RCP (B): I would like to stress the Turks’ proposal to add the following words: “in realizing its solidarity in the struggle against imperialism” to the treaty’s preamble. This is an attempt to draw in the very text of the treaty an alliance against imperialism that we excluded from the title. However, in fact, it seems to me that the formulation offered by the Turks is very cautious and can be approved. It is essential to give them this satisfaction, in order not to let them think that we are simply playing with them or not treating them seriously. This formulation does not contain a hostile action directed against England.80 In a letter to Stalin on March 10 Chicherin detailed some aspects of talks with the Turks, particularly their desire to reflect the issue of passing the promised weapons and gold to Turkey in the treaty in a written form. In the Turks’ explanation, they had prescribed not oral talks but written documents in the mandates. Chicherin wrote: “They did not mention this earlier and, in recalling all the talks with them, I am convinced that they invented this only now.” As for the financing and gold, he reported to Stalin:



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The sum of 150,000,000 gold rubles is undoubtedly a demand of the eastern people. Last year Bekir Sami insisted on 8,000,000 rubles. The Central Committee agreed to assign 5,000,000 gold rubles, of which the Turks have already received 3,000,000 rubles. Thus they had to receive 2,000,000 rubles. Yet...naturally, this is a tiny assistance to their budget. Given that we can give them very few weapons, they insist on being given a larger sum in gold to be able to buy weapons. In fact this clause plays a huge role, for rapprochement with us gives the Turks very little real assistance if we don’t help them in such a considerable way. If we don’t help them, they actually may consider themselves forced to change their policy. Thus this clause deserves particularly serious ­attention.81 In a letter to Lenin on March 10 Chicherin reported that the draft treaty had already been agreed upon in all districts and recommending signing it as soon as possible. Specifically, he mentioned the names of justice commissar Dmitrii Kurskii and Andrei Lezhava, who were expected to give references immediately.82 The text of a treaty submitted to the Justice Commissariat the next day was returned to the PCFA with one minor correction.83 On the evening of March 10 a political commission of the Russian-­Turkish conference began work. Chairing this meeting was the head of the Turkish delegation, Yusuf Kemal bey. The discussions started with border questions. The Soviet delegation (Chicherin and Korkmazov) announced that it was ready to recognize the National Pact submitted by Turkey, reflecting territorial questions as well. However, it was essential to add a series of changes to it. Most of these concerned the Batum question. The Soviet diplomats stated: Owing to close links connecting all the Soviet republics, the Russian delegation believes that Batum is a doorway to the Caucasus and the only Black Sea port as such, of vital importance for the whole Soviet world. It is essential that this port, the railways it serves, and highways belong to Soviet republics, in this case, the Georgian Soviet Republic.84 Furthermore, the statement generalized a border between Georgia, Armenia, and Turkey. As proposed by Russia, Armenia would own Akbaba and Kyzyl-­Dash as well as the whole territory linked to Armenia according to the Alexandropol peace treaty. The Russian government would not insist on drawing a borderline east of Arpachai and south of Arax; however, the need to secure the Gumru-­Nakhchivan railway from a military point of view and against possible raids by Kurds and other gangs led the Russian government to ask Turkey to make a commitment not to maintain troops, not to build blockhouses within a strip not more than eight versts from the border where the railway is at a distance from the river. The Turks approved this proposal.

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As for Batum, they did not object passing the town and the port to Georgia’s sovereignty under certain conditions: 1. broad autonomy of the population; 2. recognition of Muslim rights to culture, religion, and free use of lands; 3. free transfer to/from Turkey of goods and trade items, with free use of the port and exemption from all taxes and duties. In Turkey’s view, if residents of Ajaria were provided this autonomy and these privileges, Turkey could make concessions regarding the Batum question. The Russian delegation agreed with Turkey’s demands with minor amendments and noted that it would agree upon this with the Georgian government. The second disputed issue at the political commission’s meeting was discussion of the Nakhchivan question. The Turkish delegates said: Because the population called for Turkish troops, Nakhchivan is under the protectorate of Turkey. Nevertheless, it is ready to yield this protectorate to Azerbaijan if the latter promises not to yield this protectorate to a third state. Turkish troops would have found it difficult to remain impartial if the local population was beaten again, as once before. The Russian side similarly emphasized the danger of such a principle of intervention because the beating of the non-­Muslim population had occurred to the same extent, for instance, in Kars. Thus the Russian side simply suggested putting Nakhchivan’s autonomy under the protectorate of Azerbaijan. If this clause of the treaty was violated, the whole treaty would be considered violated. Aside from this, the Russian side rejected a formula in which Turkey was to concede its right to a protectorate because the Alexandropol Treaty had not yet been ratified, while the population’s calling for Turkish troops could in no way be regarded as legal grounds for such a protectorate. Finally, it seemed difficult to amend the treaty with a commitment from Azerbaijan, because this state was not represented at the talks. Thus the Russian delegation suggested finding a formula stipulating that the Nakhchivan region would be permanently linked with Azerbaijan and enjoy autonomy under the latter’s protectorate. However, the Turks insisted on editing the second part of this formula: “on the condition that Azerbaijan will not yield this protectorate to any third state.” The minutes of this meeting contain no indications that the Soviet delegation objected to this, so everyone apparently agreed. As for the borders of Nakhchivan itself, it was the responsibility of military experts to demarcate them. After major questions pertaining to Batum and Nakhchivan as well as the borders were agreed upon, at the end of the talks the two sides specified some formulations and some amendments. The Russian delegates reported that two more questions of principle would be submitted to the next meeting because of their importance. The first question envisioned including the following



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clause in all of Soviet Russia’s treaties: “Each party will be obliged not to allow the formation of armed forces hostile to the other party or lodging them in its territory as well as organizations claiming to govern the whole territory of the other party or its part.” The second proposal read: “Each party will be obliged not to conclude treaties regarding the other party without warning the latter about this.” This was applicable, for example, to both Russia and Turkey’s talks with England. The discussions ended late at night; the next meeting was scheduled for March 12. However, news was received on March 11 that Turkish military units, “applauded by the population,” had already entered Batum: this complicated the situation to some extent.85 In fact the entrance of Turkish units into Batum, Akhyska, and Akhalkalak on March 8 was caused by extraordinary events in the region. The population of Akhyska rose against the Mensheviks, so the Georgian government itself wanted the Turkish troops to enter these regions. At the same time, this question was also raised in London, where talks were held with a Turkish delegation led by Bekir Sami bey, so Turkey’s seizure of these regions was considered appropriate. Certainly influenced by information from Georgia and London, “on March 8 Ankara made a decision to invade these three regions.”86 While the Russian-­Turkish talks in Moscow were underway, both Russia and Turkey were holding talks in London with the British government, so both sides tried to take this into account. Bekir Sami bey, who in the summer of 1920 had headed a mission to Moscow, upon his return from Russia was sent to the London conference as a representative of the Ankara government. From February 21 to March 12, 1921, he held intensive talks with British politi­cal circles, including Lloyd George. The British prime minister promised that the whole South Caucasus, including the oil-­rich region of Baku, would be become Turkey’s protectorate if Turkey began acting against Soviet Russia.87 On February 26, the first day of the Moscow conference, discussions on the Armenian question began in London. A meeting chaired by the British foreign minister, Lord Curzon, was attended by political experts: Robert Gilbert Vansittart, Harold Nicolson, Henry Howord, and Lt.-Col. Francis Walker from England; Filippe Berthelot, Charles Kammerer, and secretary René Massigli from France; Prince Carlo Sforza and Carlo Galli from Italy; Baron Yorihito Higashi and secretary Naotake Sato from Japan; Osman ­Nizami ­pasha (representative of the Ottoman government in Rome), head of the delegation and foreign minister Bekir Sami bey of the Ankara government (a deputy from Amassiya), Dr. Nihad Reshad bey, and Münir Sürreya bey from Turkey; and Boghos Nubar pasha (representing the diaspora), Avetis Agharonian, James Malcolm, and Gen. Hakob Bagratuni from Armenia.

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Both Armenian delegations demanded that the Supreme Council back the integrity of the Treaty of Sèvres. However, Lord Curzon noted that the hardships could be subdivided into three groups: Bolshevism in Russian Armenia, the occupation of a bigger part of the Armenian territory by Mustafa Kemal, and the inability of other powers to send considerable forces to help Armenia. The British foreign chief asked the Armenian delegation to state what territorial borders of Armenia it considered appropriate. Lord Curzon said that President Wilson had established a border that included several sections of the Turkish territory, as well as the port Trapezund (Trabzon). Evidently it would be extremely hard to establish such a border in practice. Having heard from Lord Curzon that the borders designed for “Great Armenia” included even Trabzon, Boghos Nubar on behalf of the Armenian delegation noted that “Armenians themselves never claimed Trapezund.” When the British minister asked Agharonian to express his opinion about the Gumru Treaty, he replied that “this treaty was imposed, so the Armenian categorically rejected it.” French delegate Berthelot explained to the British minister his country’s attitude toward the question of Cilicie: “France has always displayed its determination to do its best to defend the Christian minority.” The expression “Christian minority” caused a protest from Nubar p­ asha, who noted that: “in fact the Armenians constitute the majority of Cilicie’s population.” To substantiate his assertion, he referred to figures from a recent book, La Cilicie et le problème ottoman, by French officer Pierre Redan. This book reported some numerical data from an “Oriental Year Book” published in Constantinople, noting that the population of the province of Adana consisted of 185,000 Muslims and 215,000 Christians.88 To clarify the question of the true figures of the population of Cilicie, Berthelot suggested appealing to the expert Charles Kammerer, who, quoting official data, told the conference that “the population of the province of Adana in 1914 consisted of 314,000 Muslims, 55,000 Christian Armenians, and a certain number of Greeks. Moreover, the French authorities reported that before the war or even at the end of the war the province’s population consisted of three-­fourths Muslims and one-­ fourth Armenians.” Having detected a serious disparity between the figures reported by the Armenian side and the official data, Lord Curzon refused to give the floor to Boghos Nubar, who failed to clarify the matter.89 According to Boghos Nubar, significant changes regarding Armenia had occurred due to a number of events. In addition Lord Curzon believed that the Gumru “treaty was never ratified and thus had no force of the law.” He added that he wanted to be quite frank so that the Turkish delegation would understand clearly that Europe (the powers that had won the war) had made a solemn commitment to create an independent state of Armenia. Bekir Sami bey noted that “this government in every possible way desires



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an independent Armenia to be created in those regions where there is an Armenian majority and where an independent state can logically be created. Aside from this, they very much desire to leave Armenia in peace.” The documents signed with the Dashnak government of Armenia had not yet acquired the force of law. He stressed: “True, the treaty is not ratified; however, now that the Dashnaks have returned to power the government of Ankara waits for ratification every day.” Bekir Sami bey continued: “I was glad to pay attention to Lord Curzon’s statement that the treaty, which has not been ratified, has no force of law. He hopes that the same principle will be applied with regard to the Sèvres treaty as well.” He once again noted that the Armenians constituted an insignificant part of the population of these regions and that the Turkish authorities were ready to conduct a referendum among the local population. These words from the Turkish representative displeased Lord Curzon, who noted that Turkey actually claims a territory that didn’t belong to it for more than fifty years, so it is unthinkable that Turkey, after having been defeated in this war, left it with an increased territory.... at the moment, I only want to clearly tell the Ottoman delegation that the powers are fully determined to create independent Armenia, a country within rather broad scales and with sufficient independence to ensure its existence. Naturally, Kars, Ardahan, and Alexandropol must be included in such an Armenia. Though the attempts of the British at the London conference coincided with the Russians’ intention to push through the concept of “Great Armenia” at the Moscow conference, the superpowers failed to dictate their terms to Turkey due to the extremely low number of Armenians in these regions. Bekir Sami bey, as a representative of one of the prominent tribes of the North Caucasus, in his talks with Lloyd George on March 4 paid particular attention to independence of the Caucasus nations, including the North Caucasus. He even told the British prime minister that it would become possible to unite the Caucasus nations around Turkey with England’s help, in order to carry out a successful struggle against Bolshevism.90 To create such a coalition, Bekir Sami bey plotted with Caucasus emigrants in Europe and took a number of efficient steps. At the end of March he discussed questions of the independence of the Caucasus nations and the struggle against the Bolsheviks with Akaki Tchenkeli and Zurab Avalaashvili as representatives of the Georgian emigration; Azerbaijani emigrants Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov, M ­ ahammad Maharramov, Akber agha Sheikhulislamov, and Jeyhun bey Hajibeyli; and Abdul-­Mejid Chermoyev, Vassan Girey Jabaguyev, and Aytek Namitekov as representatives of North Caucasus emigrants.91

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However, a Russian-­British trade agreement and the Treaty of Moscow between Soviet Russia and Turkey signed at the time made other questions a matter of secondary importance. On his voyage to Russia, Dr. Rıza Nur saw with his own eyes that the independence declared by the Bolsheviks was purely formal, so upon his return to Ankara he declared: “There is no ‘republic’ in Azerbaijan; there is a fat man — ​Narimanov  — ​who is commanded by every Red Army soldier.” Narimanov himself was even wittier in saying that he himself and Friday ( juma, the Muslim holy day and day of rest) were the only remaining symbols of Azerbaijan’s independence.92 On March 10 the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs urgently submitted two documents that it had drafted — ​“On the Treaty with Turkey” and “On the Territorial Accord with the Turkish Delegation” — ​to governmental circles. The first document noted that a territorial accord with Turkey would be a constituent part of the treaty. Moreover, the treaty itself would include only the main clauses, while a detailed description of the border would will be in a special protocol. Furthermore, the document described discussions regarding separate clauses, stressing that the Turks “want to force us to say that we are acting jointly with them against imperialism and express it in the treaty but in a manner that does not violate the terms of the Krassin treaty” with England.93 The second document outlined the discussions concerning the Batum question and indicated that “Batum will be under the sovereignty of Georgia, that is, will enjoy broad local autonomy.” The Soviet leadership was informed that “Nakhchivan will be recognized as an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan on the condition that Azerbaijan will not pass this protectorate to any other state.” Chicherin wrote: “All these provisions are an indispensable condition of concluding a treaty with Turkey and thus have been approved by me.”94 On the evening of March 12, 1921, the next meeting of the political commission of the Moscow conference began. Military experts attended the meetings jointly with the delegations. The military experts were Aleksandr Samailo and Ardalion Bobrishchev of Russia and Seyfi bey Düzgören and Saffet Arıkan of Turkey. This meeting was chaired by Chicherin. Both sides came to the meeting with their own draft treaties. The one prepared by Russia consisted of fifteen articles. The Nakhchivan question, included in article 3, was incomplete, as the question of borders of the region remained unresolved.95 However, in their counterproject consisting of sixteen articles the Turks considered it necessary to present the main contours of an exact borderline between Nakhchivan and Armenia in order to avoid additional problems. The Turkish document’s article 2, unlike the Soviet draft, indicated that Batum would be conceded directly to Georgia. There were also certain discrepancies



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regarding the local Batum population’s right to land use and related transit questions.96 At a meeting of the political commission on March 12 the Turks were ­eager to demarcate the borders more precisely, whereas the Soviet side tried to submit the question to military experts for consideration. In response to the Soviet delegation’s proposals on safeguarding the population against Kurdish raids along Turkey’s borders with Armenia and Georgia, Yusuf Kemal bey replied brusquely: British imperialists really tried to use Kurds to do away with the Turkish revolutionary movement. For this purpose they sent officers, troops, and money to incite the Kurds to rise up in a rebellion under the pretense of their independence but in reality to enslave them. However, the Kurds clearly understood that they could be saved if they joined the Turks in struggling for their common goal. The Kurds seized officers and British detachments as well as Anglophile propagandists and took the side of Turkey. During repeated attempts of this sort, the Kurds always acted similarly, never losing an opportunity to declare their devotion to Turkey. Thus the attitude of the Kurds to the Soviet republics is similar to that of the Turks themselves, so the Turkish delegation cannot agree with the Russian delegation’s remarks regarding the Kurds.97 Yusuf Kemal bey also rejected the Soviet proposal to safeguard Turkey’s non-­Muslim population against robberies. He stressed that there was no written or oral evidence of mass beatings of the non-­Muslim population of Kars. Yusuf Kemal bey noted: Even American delegations that have been in Kars and Erivan for one and a half years testify that the non-­Muslim population remained untouched during the whole period of Turkish operations. We believe that these false rumors about violence and beatings are a maneuver used to cover all those numerous atrocities and beatings committed against Muslims in this region. Chicherin, the people’s commissar for foreign affairs, wrote to the people’s commissar of foreign affairs of the government of the Grand National As­ sembly of Turkey on December 19: The Russian government admits that the government of the Dashnaks committed atrocities and that the Turkish army command could not remain indifferent to these atrocities. We have many documents, translations of which we will deliver in the near future, and our government has published an almanac regarding these atrocities. The atrocities took

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place primarily after the 1918 armistice. For example, after the government of the Soviet of Kars was overthrown due to British intrigue, the district was occupied by an Osepian-­led army that shot dead 100 Muslims and 20 members of the soviet in the town. In January 1920 in the Kars district 253 Muslim villages were destroyed and 14,620 Muslim men, women, and children were annihilated. In the area of Sarakamysh 32 Muslim villages were destroyed, leaving 2,000 men, women, and children dead. The discussions revealed one more disputed theme: the sovereignty of the South Caucasus republics. The Soviets in various ways tried to force Turkey to recognize the sovereignty of the Soviet republics of the Caucasus and wanted this to be reflected in future treaties. At the same time, the Soviet delegates believed that future treaties between Turkey and these republics should not be separate or harm their sovereignty. The Turks replied that the actions and statements of the GNAT government had already proven to everyone that it did not intend to harm anyone’s sovereignty but fought for the freedom of its people and other peoples. In the Turkish delegates’ view, it was first essential to identify to what extent the Soviet republics of the Caucasus were independent: An independent state may conclude treaties: the close links that exist between these republics and the great Russian Republic can only be expressed through Russian advice. If the Russian delegation keeps its intention to object to any treaty restraining their sovereignty, it becomes absolutely necessary to identify what should be understood as such. Otherwise, given that any treaty is to a certain extent a mutual restriction of sovereignty, the possibility of conflicts between Turkey and Russia emerges, so it is absolutely necessary to identify exactly which articles restrain sovereignty. One of the questions discussed at the March 12 meeting was the issue of the border between the Nakhchivan region and Armenia. Russian representatives noted that the borderline established by military experts exceeded the maximum demands of Azerbaijan, which had never expressed its desire to protect any part of Erivan Province and had always recognized the Wolf ’s Gate as its extreme border. Though this question was of no paramount importance due to the existing close links among the Soviet republics, it nevertheless would have been preferable to restrain the border to the Wolf ’s Gate and the Sharur-­Daralayaz district. The Turkish delegation disagreed with this statement of the issue. It reminded the Russians that this very locality had witnessed terrible events that forced the population to call for Turkish troops and that the whole region was



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populated by Muslims. The Turks voiced their confidence that Soviet Azerbaijan would do its best to perform its duty before Turkey, Russia, and all of humankind, so it was also desirable to instruct Azerbaijan to establish its protectorate over this territory. The Russian delegates disagreed with this proposal. They wanted the border between Nakhchivan and Armenia to be temporary. If any changes between these two states occurred in the future as a result of their direct talks, these changes should not be viewed as a violation of Azerbaijan’s commitment not to give up its protectorate. The Turkish delegation, however, began insisting that this question was very important for the security of Turkey’s eastern border and that this issue had to be settled with finality to avoid the possibility of any talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan on this occasion. The Russian delegation noted that it would then be appropriate to observe the border that Azerbaijan had demanded before, because it was not possible for Moscow to establish a change of the borderline without asking the government and popu­ lation concerned. In line with the Turkish delegation’s offer, it was decided to refer the district of Sharur-­Daralayaz to the territory of Nakhchivan, while the borderline starting in the disputed part of the Erivan district from Komurlu Dagh to Sari-­Bulag Dagh to Ararat Station had to be ratified by a mixed commission with representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey (one from each side). At the end of the discussions it was decided that a protocol prepared by military experts would be signed by both delegations simultaneously with the treaty. The talks ended in the evening. The next meeting was scheduled for March 14. On the night of March 13 Shahtakhtinskii urgently telegraphed Huseinov: A treaty with Russia has been concluded. The Turks will get the Kars region, Ardahan, Ardanuch, Artvin, and the bigger part of the Batum district. The border will be located twenty versts west of Batum. Surmali will also become a part of Turkey. The only question to be settled is help with money and weapons: this question will be settled rapidly. An accord concluded prior to the Turks’ talks envisions that the Nakhchivan region will be transferred to Azerbaijan. The treaty with the Turks stresses that this region will never be ceded to Armenia. The Turks will be compensated by a promise that Russia will not object if the Maku khanate joins Turkey.98 On March 14 the meeting of the political commission began very late. It was attended by all of the members of the delegations (except for Samailo), as well as military experts from both sides. The meeting was chaired by Y ­ usuf ­Kemal bey. Both sides detailed the content of some articles of the treaty and paid greater attention to the explanation of the political meaning of some

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terms. Turkey believed that the most important thing was a reliable defense of Kars, the Russians that it was the security of the Nakhchivan-­Erivan railway. A detailed discussion of articles of the treaty followed. Some stylistic amendments were made in the introductory part. The final specification of Turkey’s northeastern border stretching from Sarp to the Kars sanjak took place. The Russian delegation objected to using the word “yield” regarding Batum at a time when the Turks insisted that this question occupied an important place in the National Pact and thus requested the Russian delegation to give in on this point. In article 3 and an appendix, the Turks obtained the final determination of the political and legal status of Nakhchivan. This put an end to the Azerbaijani Soviet government’s policy of compromise in regard to the Nakhchivan question. Both sides to the treaty agreed that this region would remain under Azerbaijan’s protectorate, without the right of being ceded to a third country. The meeting of the political commission ended on the night of March 15. The next meeting was scheduled for March 16.99 In the course of negotiations, starting on February 18, Chicherin and Bek­ zadian as people’s commissar for foreign affairs of the overthrown Armenian government had discussed all provisions pertaining to territorial and border questions of a future treaty between the RSFSR and Turkey. Some Bolshevik leaders noted that Bekzadian was making political statements on behalf of the already overthrown government of Soviet Armenia. On the eve of signing the Russian-­Turkish treaty, Bekzadian, as a people’s commissar of the government of Soviet Armenia, had disclosed his attitude to this document in a letter addressed to the CC RCP (B), Chicherin, Stalin, and the army command. Though Bekzadian was not categorically against the treaty, he mentioned that some of its provisions could cause dangerous consequences for the South ­Caucasus.100 Such tricks by Bekzadian exasperated Orjonikidze, who wrote to Chicherin that the former people’s commissar of Soviet Armenia continues to speak in Moscow on behalf of the Republic of Armenia. We consider it essential once again to draw your attention to the fact that all the representations and institutions of the government of Soviet Armenia were annulled on February 18 along with all the powers issued to anyone in the Armenian government. Thus the speech by Bekzadian as a representative of Armenia is a crude usurpation of rights not belonging to him.101 Nevertheless, Chicherin continued to consider it necessary to reach an agreement with Bekzadian on the documents of the Moscow conference. On March 15 Chicherin informed Stalin of the course of the talks. However, this information concerned behind-­the-scene talks rather than discus-



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sions within the political commission. The Turkish delegates tried to get Russia’s written assurance that it would provide financial and military aid to Turkey. Russian diplomats answered that their government was busy with preparations for a Party congress and thus tried not to make written commitments. Chicherin directly told the Turks that “the government will not do this.” As for the treaty itself, Chicherin reported to Stalin that “not much work remains to be done. The stumbling block is the question of aid and a written commitment.”102 In mid-­March the talks were nearing an end. On March 15 the PCFA of Soviet Russia was informed by the Central Division for Evacuation of the Population about the possible timelines for Turkish prisoners of war returning home. According to this detailed information, due to the existing transport capabilities it was not possible to gather all the former Turkish captives along with their things and property from faraway corners of Siberia and Turkestan within a period of two months.103 On March 16 the commandant of the Caucasus army telegraphed to the PCFA the description of a borderline between the Soviet republics of the South Caucasus and Turkey, stretching from the village of Sarp to the sources of the Karasu River along the Arax River.104 A day meeting of the political commission on March 16 started with discussion of the information from the Central Division for Evacuation of the Population. The Turkish representatives noted that Turkey had no Russian prisoners (either prisoners of war or civil prisoners). At the same time, they insisted that many Turkish prisoners of war still remained in Russia. By their calculation, 12,000 Turkish prisoners were kept in Siberia, several thousand in Ukraine, and one regiment had been moved from Baku to Tiflis some days before. The Turkish representatives wanted each side to deliver prisoners of war to a borderline point at its own expense. They agreed to the following timelines for evacuation: the captive Turkish prisoners of war and civil prisoners would be withdrawn from European Russia and the Caucasus within three months and from Asian Russia within six months. In turn Turkey promised to find Russian captives and return them to Soviet Russia within the same period.105 At the end of the talks both sides were obliged (in the first exchange of notes) to inform each other of the conclusion of a treaty with a third country and not to conclude treaties harming the interests of the other side.106 According to the terms of the second exchange of notes, if Turkey’s foreign policy or orientation toward Soviet Russia changed substantially, the Soviet government should be notified immediately. A note submitted to the Turkish ambassador assured him that Russia would act similarly in the same case.107 The Turkish representatives suggested exchanging the ratification certificates in Kars after the Treaty of Moscow was ratified. That is how the political commission ended its work.

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The Soviet-­Turkish treaty that went down in history as the treaty of March 16 was not truly signed until March 18. On the eve of its signing (March 17), Chicherin wrote to Lenin: When I told the Turks during the last meeting that we are giving a certain quantity of weapons and 10 million gold rubles (half now after the Turks withdraw from Batum and the rest later) they said nothing. However, they returned to this question today. They noted that this was too little and demanded a written commitment immediately. Following long debates, they finally declared that they were ready to sign the treaty on the following terms. 1. I must give a promise that we will give them 10 million rubles annually for several years; 2. They agree to avoid a written commitment regarding weapons but insist on a written commitment that they will be given 10 million rubles annually for several years and propose writing that this is needed for the economic restoration of the country so that this will not be a hostile act against England, which itself is giving them a loan. This money is needed to buy weapons because we are giving too little, but they need the weapons to be safeguarded against the Entente. 3. All is ready to be signed. We will sign the treaty tomorrow evening, but before signing it they should receive this paper from me.... According to them, an annual subsidy of 10 million rubles will calm down the Majlis and make opponents keep silent. I am determined to give them such a subsidy. The Soviet republics will thus painlessly take over Batum. The treaty itself will be impressive. And the diplomatic position of the Soviet republics is excellent. France especially is flattering them, and the annual subsidies are a matter of the future. Nothing is steady nowadays. I need an answer before 6 in the evening to have enough time to write the paper, so sign it without delay. The treaty will be dated March 16, when we did not know yet that Krassin had signed a treaty with England.108

The Conclusion of the Treaty of Moscow and Consolidation of Azerbaijan’s Position in the South Caucasus The last plenary meeting of the Russian-­Turkish conference chaired by Yusuf Kemal bey and not attended by experts took place on March 18 at 10 in the evening. Both delegations summed up the results of the political commission’s work and checked the legality of their mandates to sign the treaty.109



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Following a primary discussion of procedural rules, Soviet Russia and Turkey on March 18 signed a treaty consisting of sixteen articles and two appendixes. This treaty of “Friendship and Brotherhood” was signed by Georgii Chicherin and Jelaleddin Korkmazov on behalf of Soviet Russia and Yusuf Kemal bey, Dr. Rıza Nur, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy on behalf of Turkey. The treaty covered a wide circle of interrelations between Russia and Turkey. It reflected the notes exchanged on March 16; the territories provided by the National Pact recognized in Istanbul on January 28, 1920, by the Ottoman House of Representatives under the title “Turkey,” published in the media, and submitted to the superpowers for consideration; providing assistance to the struggle of nations of the East; providing an opening of the straits; development of the international status of the Black Sea in a way not damaging to Turkey’s sovereignty, including Istanbul’s security; cancellation of treaties between tsarist Russia and Turkey for not serving national interests as well as annulment of financial payments imposed on Turkey; incompatibility of the regime of capitulations and free national development in Turkey; and agreement not to let organizations or groups vying for the role of being a government of the other side to be formed or remain within its territory. Russia and Turkey made the same commitment regarding the Soviet republics of the Caucasus on the condition of reciprocity; nonstop operation of the railway, telegraph, and other means of communication as well as the provision of free traffic of people and goods; stipulation that rules will be established and applied in every country concerning entry/exit of people and goods; and an agreement to favor citizens of both sides to the treaty who reside in the territory of the other side as much as possible. All residents of territories that constituted a part of Russia prior to 1918 and now were recognized by the RSFSR government as being under Turkey’s sovereignty had the right to leave Turkey freely with their things and property. Russia made a commitment to deliver Turkish prisoners of war to the Turkish borders within three to six months at its own expense. Also, the treaty included articles on future conclusion of a consular convention and an agreement regulating all economic, financial, and other questions. Regarding the South Caucasus republics, Russia would take the steps necessary to be recognized by these republics in the treaties that they would conclude with Turkey as well as this treaty’s articles directly concerning them.110 The most significant parts of the treaty — ​the questions of Batum and Nakhchivan — ​are reflected in article 2 and article 3. In article 2 Turkey agreed to cede sovereignty over the port and town of Batum to Georgia on the condition that the population of localities indicated in the treaty would have broad local administrative autonomy so that each commune could enjoy its cultural and religious rights. At the same time, Turkey was authorized freely to transfer goods tax and duty-­free via the port of Batum, without delay.111 Appendixes

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1(A) and 1(B) described Turkey’s northeastern borders with the Soviet republics of the South Caucasus, including Batum.112 Article 3 and appendix 1(B) concern the Nakhchivan question: Both sides to the treaty agree that the Nakhchivan region within the boundaries indicated in appendix 1(B) to this treaty will form an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan on the condition that Azerbaijan will not yield its protectorate to any third state. Within the triangle of the Nakhchivan territory, the area stretching between a thalweg [line connecting the lowest points of a valley] of the Arax River, the line from Mount Dahna (3,829) to Veli Dagh (4,121) to Bagyrsag (6,587) to Komurlu Dagh (6,930), the borderline of said territory starting from Komurlu Dagh (6,930), crossing the mountain of Sari Bulak (8071) to Ararat Station, and ending at a crossing of the Kara-­Su River and Arax River will be corrected by a commission consisting of delegates from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.113 Appendix 1(C), entitled “Territory of Nakhchivan,” read: “Station Mountain Ararat, Saray-­Bulak (8071) to Komurlu Dagh (6,839), (6,930)–(3080) to Sayat Dagh (7,868) to the village of Kurt-­Gulag to Hamesur Dagh–height 8022 to Kuki Dagh and the eastern administrative border of the former Nakhchivan province.”114 Thus the Treaty of Moscow for the first time ever fully clarified the question of Nakhchivan’s status as a protectorate of Azerbaijan and territorial integrity. The signing of the Treaty of Moscow resulted in the legal formalization of the return of territories that had been linked to Russia as a consequence of the Russian-­Turkish War of 1877–78 to Turkey. Under the treaty Soviet Russia returned the territory taken over by tsarist Russia according to the St. Stefan peace accord and the Berlin congress to Turkey: 23,600 square kilometers covering Kars, Kagyzman, Ardahan, Olty, Artvin, the southern part of the Batum district, and the Surmali Province, with a population of 572,000.115 However, this was not all that Turkey had lost in the South Caucasus in 1878. According to the Berlin Treaty of 1878, Batum (seized by tsarist Russia as a strategic point) was passed to Georgia by Turkey. Thus, except for having conceded Batum to Georgia, Turkey managed to get its borders in the Caucasus region restored to their 1829 status.116 In terms of Azerbaijan’s interests and Turkey’s security, the fair resolution of the Nakhchivan question marked a great victory of Turkish diplomacy at the Moscow conference. The Azerbaijani diplomats contributed to this victory as well. On this special occasion Narimanov wrote to Azerbaijani delegate Behbud Shahtakhtinskii: “Thank you for Nakhchivan! Obviously, you already know what to do; you’re doing business correctly. This makes me glad because



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some of our opponents have been telling me that my choice was unsuccessful, etc.”117 A day after the Treaty of Moscow, on March 17 Ali Fuat pasha noted in his statement that Nakhchivan had become Azerbaijan’s protectorate but that imperialist forces were carrying out operations in the territory of Maku, so Turkey was forced to provide Maku’s security from the east.118 This meant the Turkish troops would stay in Nakhchivan for a while. The signing of the Treaty of Moscow was a cause for celebration in Azerbaijan. Inspired by this news, Huseinov, sent a congratulatory telegram to Kazım Karabekir pasha, Chicherin, Shahtakhtinskii, Orjonikidze, Ivan ­Orakhelashvili (commissar of foreign affairs of Georgia), and Memduh Shevket Esendal (Turkey’s diplomatic representative to Baku), praising the Treaty of Moscow.119 As a first shipment of aid, the government of Soviet Azerbaijan sent thirty cisterns of oil, two cisterns of benzene, and eight cisterns of kerosene to revolutionary Turkey on the Baku-­Tiflis-Kars route. Several days earlier, on March 14, Narimanov as chair of the CPC of Azerbaijan had solemnly opened the Baku-­Tiflis-Batum oil pipeline, an event that would play an important role in Azerbaijani-­Turkish relations.120 On the day the Treaty of Moscow was announced Chicherin telegraphed Orjonikidze that the Batum and Nakhchivan questions had been included in the treaty: Batum would be passed to Georgia, while Nakhchivan would become an autonomous region under Azerbaijan’s protectorate. Chicherin also reported that Ali Fuat pasha desired to deliver the text of the treaty via Tiflis or Baku directly to the Turkish representatives in Kars. Ali Fuat pasha voiced his interest in the situation in Armenia and Nakhchivan following the conclusion of the treaty: “The Turkish delegation declares that it demands the Turks’ immediate pullout from Batum, Akhaltsikh, and Akhalkalak. What’s going on in Erivan? Where is Vratsian? Where is the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia? What’s going on in Nakhchivan?”121 In a telegram on March 19 to Platon Kerzhentsev, the Russian trade representative in Stockholm, Chicherin summed up the content of the Treaty of Moscow: “A Russian-­Turkish treaty was signed in Moscow on March 16. Batum will belong to Georgia but enjoy autonomy. Nakhchivan will be u­ nder the protectorate of Azerbaijan. Turkey’s debt to Russia has been annulled. The territory of Turkey has been determined based on the Turkish National Pact. The status of the Straits will be worked out by a commission of Black Sea states.”122 Immediately after the RSFSR and Turkey concluded this “Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood” the command of the 11th Red Army and Orjonikidze as a member of the Military Revolutionary Council were instructed by Moscow that Soviet troops had to observe a borderline stretching from Sarp on the Black Sea shoreline to the lower stream of the River Kara-­Su.123 On March 24

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the text of the Treaty of Moscow and its appendixes was telegraphed through PCFA secretary Aleksandr Tsuriupa to Orjonikidze in Tiflis.124 On March 25 the CC RCP (B) Politburo approved the decision by the CC Orgburo Bureau to appoint Sergei Natsarenus as a plenipotentiary representative in Ankara.125 Having ended affairs in Moscow and taken the 4 million gold rubles assigned by the Soviet government, the Turkish delegation left for Baku on April 1. On their way home the Turks planned to conclude one more treaty in Azerbaijan in order to give its independence a practical character. However, Soviet Russia concentrated both political and economic ties with Turkey in its hands in an effort to centralize all the aid that it was providing. Moscow was particularly displeased that Azerbaijan, inspired by the Treaty of Moscow, had opened a separate oil route to Turkey and viewed this as “tyranny.” To prevent actions of such sort, on April 1 (the day the Turks left Moscow) the PCFA sent the CC RCP (B) instructions to prevent independent actions by the Caucasus republics in their relations with Turkey. This document was based on ­Chicherin’s letter to the CC RCP (B) on March 24, while the Turkish delegation was still in Moscow. Chicherin had written that the Turks wanted to conclude a treaty with the Caucasus republics in Tiflis in an effort to “snatch” something from them. He thus suggested sending someone from the Russian government to Tiflis, in order to have their own representative at the Turks’ talks with the Caucasus republics. In Chicherin’s opinion, Leonid Stark, who then worked in Revel and was well aware of the Caucasus affairs, could be this representative. An appropriately instructed Soviet representative and his close contacts with representatives of the Caucasus republic would be quite essential until the Turks got to Tiflis.126 Although the instructions dealt with the Caucasus Soviet republics, the essence of the document was directed against Azerbaijan: The tactic of the Turks is to conduct separate talks to try to snatch from the Caucasus republics something that they failed to get from us. To prevent the Turks from separating the Caucasus republics through artistic tricks or getting inappropriate benefits, it is essential for the Caucasus Soviet republics to act in an extremely consolidated manner, in full contact with us during the forthcoming talks with the Turks. It would be appropriate to fear that not everything will go well in this respect, particularly for Azerbaijan. If we don’t take measures to prevent any undesirable deviations, they may easily happen. Thus it is essential for the CC to resolve categorically, definitely that the Caucasus Soviet republics should first submit to our government the treaties that they will conclude with Turkey.127



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On April 3 the CC RCP (B) Politburo discussed the notification of the PCFA, approved Chicherin’s proposal, and banned the Soviet republics of the South Caucasus, primarily Azerbaijan, from taking independent steps in relation to Turkey.128 In an April 4 telegram Chicherin informed Orjonikidze, a member of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) and Military Revolutionary Council of the Caucasus front, and Orakhelashvili, a member of the revolutionary committee of Georgia, that Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s separate talks with the Kemalists were inadmissible and that the main question — ​the Gumru Treaty — ​might not be recognized in these republics’ future treaties with Ankara. It was essential to contact representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia to explain to them that they should not enter into talks with the Turks or give us surprises. At the same time, the telegram noted that immediate advice from Moscow would be necessary if the Turks raised new questions in talks with the Caucasus republics. It was recommended that Armenia reject all of the previous treaties, including the Gumru Treaty, which the Turks still recognized as valid. Chicherin wrote: We told them a million times at the Russian-­Turkish conference that we don’t recognize the Alexandropol Treaty and that if the Turks suggest it once again we will have to state categorically that it has no force of law; refer to our statement. I can send you a special paper on this. The Alexandropol Treaty is so monstrous that any reference to it must be categorically denied; we can state directly that the Russian Republic would stop at nothing if there was a repeated attempt to force Armenia to recognize the Alexandropol Treaty.129 Chicherin’s telegram contained interesting nuances regarding Azerbaijan. He recommended reproducing article 3 of the Russian-­Turkish treaty in a treaty with Azerbaijan but keeping links between Turkey and Azerbaijan under control: It is essential to prevent adding to the treaty with Azerbaijan the impossible, inadmissible articles that in a project that the Turks drafted jointly with Shahtakhtinskii, where Turkey actually acted as the protector of Azerbaijan. The Turks tend to assume the role of protectors of all Muslims of all countries. This tendency should in no way be indulged; in particular Azerbaijan must, in a most determinative way, stand for its independence from any of Turkey’s attempts to play the role of the protector of Muslims of other countries. The Turks may act only as protectors of Muslims who originated from or are natives of the Turkish territory and nothing else.130

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On the same day Chicherin telegraphed Mdivani, instructing him to urge the Turks to withdraw from Gumru immediately and retreat to the borders specified by the Treaty of Moscow.131 On the basis of a treaty concluded with the Dashnaks, however, the Turks were not in a hurry to leave Gumru. Orjonikidze believed that it was not possible to defend Erivan without Gumru and that in such an event the Soviets would have no authority in Armenia.132 Chicherin calmed him down, saying that Ali Fuat pasha himself had promised to leave Gumru and that “a war between Turkey and Soviet Armenia would mean a war between Turkey and Soviet Russia.”133 But Karabekir pasha insisted that he would not withdraw from Gumru until the Armenians laid down all of their arms. Forced to withdraw from Gumru due to strong pressure from Soviet Russia, Karabekir pasha burned all the Armenian arsenals to ashes. One of the reasons for the Turks’ refusal to leave Gumru was a revolt in February 1921, as a result of which the Dashnaks again took over power in Erivan. Because the Communists did not want to recognize the Gumru Treaty, Ankara did not regard the Dashnaks’ return to power too negatively. A new defense minister in the Dashnak government arrived in Igdir, where he concluded a secret accord with the Turks, under which “the government of Ankara made a commitment to supply the Dashnak government with weapons and ammunition.” Thus the Turks received an opportunity to influence Soviet Russia and revive the Gumru Treaty rejected by Moscow at the same time. But the Entente countries, primarily the United States, were concerned that the Kemalists could benefit from the crisis of Armenia. U.S. commissar and admiral Mark Lambert Bristol submitted to the GNAT government a note urging Mustafa Kemal pasha to abstain from actions against Armenia jointly with Enver pasha, who stayed in Azerbaijan. He attempted to frighten Ankara, saying that the whole world would be against this step by the Kemalists.134 On the first day of April Erivan again was taken over by the Bolsheviks, so Chicherin reported to Ali Fuat pasha that Armenia had again become Soviet and thus it was high time for the Turkish army to observe the terms of the Treaty of Moscow by retreating to the specified borders.135 Although Chicherin was extremely polite in written correspondence with the Turkish ambassador and other officials, he was not ashamed to threaten the Turks in letters addressed to the leading Soviet officials of the Caucasus republics. On April 7 he wrote to Mdivani: “Tell the Turks about the fatal consequences of clashes and that their war with one of the Soviet republics would mean a war with us. We must do everything possible to avoid such an outcome, so the Turks must leave Alexandropol immediately.”136 On the same day Ali Fuat pasha expressed to Chicherin his satisfaction



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that Erivan had again been taken over by the Communists on April 2 but repeated that Gumru had to remain under the control of the Turks to provide security on Turkey’s eastern borders. He added that Gumru would be left as stipulated in the Treaty of Moscow as soon as the danger of an Armenian counterrevolution disappeared.137 That same day Turkish war minister Fevzi Chakmak pasha noted that in order to ensure a balance of forces the T ­ urkish troops would stay in the Caucasus for a while. This statement exasperated Chicherin. Fevzi pasha noted that the Turkish troops would withdraw from the region after the terms of the Treaty of Alexandropol were observed. Angered by this, Chicherin sent the Turkish ambassador in Moscow a note reminding him that it was the responsibility of the united Red Army of the Soviet republics to create a balance of forces in the Caucasus. He threatened that if the Treaty of Alexandropol was left in force the Treaty of Moscow would no longer have the force of law: “Wishing for observation of the Alexandropol Treaty is similar to annulling the Treaty of Moscow.”138 Aside from this, Chicherin demanded that Orakhelashvili, the Georgia’s people’s commissar of foreign affairs, report back on the situation in Gumru: “I talked very seriously about this with Ali Fuat.... We cannot tolerate Turkish troops staying there in conflict with the treaty.”139 In his response Ali Fuat pasha referred to the situation in Armenia, promising that Ankara’s relations with Moscow as well as with our fraternal republics would be based on building a good neighborhood. As soon as the actions of aggressive elements endangering the eastern borders of Turkey were put to an end, his government would act on the demands of the articles of the Treaty of Moscow.140 The Turkish troops left Nakhchivan on April 16, 1921, exactly in accordance with the Treaty of Moscow. An instruction from Ankara ordered the Turks not to hurry to leave Gumru, however, until the Dashnaks were fully defeated, so the Turkish troops stayed there until April 23.141 The Armenians explained an anti-­Soviet rebellion in Armenia on February 17 by lack of success in solving their national problems and the collapse of hopes for Soviet Russia. Having seized power in Erivan, on February 18, the Dashnaks asked the government of Georgia for help. The overthrown Armenian Communists retreated back to Dilijan and Agstafa.142 The first step of the Erivan Dashnak government was to close foreign offices of the Soviet Republic of Armenia abroad. At the same time, the illegality of the actions of the Armenian delegation to the Moscow conference led by Bekzadian was announced.143 A slapdash assault by the Red Army against Tiflis on February 25 and the Sovietization of Georgia were to a large extent related to the events in Armenia. A “Report Note” drafted in early April after the revolt was suppressed states that the most important condition of the transition of power to Soviet

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organs (signed by RSFSR plenipotentiary representative Legrand on December 2) was a commitment by Russia “to include all of Erivan province, Zangezur uyezd, the mountainous part of the Gazakh uyezd of Elizavetpol [Ganja] province, the whole territory of the Borchali uyezd of the Tiflis province, and the southeastern part of the Kars region within the limits of the independent Soviet Republic of Armenia.” In the opinion of Armenians, however, none of the items of the agreement signed between Legrand and the Armenian government were observed. “Despite being under the Communists’ power, the Nakhchivan uyezd refused to join Armenia, for it had a preference now for Azerbaijan and for Turkey; Armenian political circles regarded this as another manifestation of the weakness of Soviet power.”144 After the Treaty of Moscow was signed, the Armenians announced that the borderline between Turkey and the South Caucasus specified by the treaty weakened the defense of the South Caucasus and reduced the opportunity to defend Armenia to zero. The Armenians sent letters to the CC RCP (B) and copies of the letters to Chicherin and Stalin, alleging that the new borders put Armenia in a hopeless position and that its central towns — ​Erivan and Gumru — ​had become frontier towns. Most of all, however, in this document the Armenians were concerned about the “security of Baku.” Ceding Kars, the Kars plateau, and Ardahan to Turkey puts the defense of Baku, a vital nerve not only of Transcaucasia but also of the whole of Soviet Russia, in a grave position. In the event of war, the new border will give Turkey great opportunities in terms of invading Baku. In the Armenians’ explanation, the Turks opened the way to Baku largely by making Nakhchivan an Azerbaijan protectorate. In their view the transfer of Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan gave the Turks two routes to Baku. The first one was Nakhchivan to the ­Bichenek Pass to Gorus to Shusha to Yevlakh to Baku. The second one was ­Nakhchivan to Ordubad to the Khudaferin Bridge to Yevlakh to Baku (or the ­Khudaferin Bridge to the Karabagh steppe to Baku). Armenians saw particular danger in the second route, crossing a solely Muslim region.145 The Armenian Communists maliciously called the borders specified in Moscow a new Brest border. In his letter to Viktor Kopp, the representative of Soviet Russia in Germany, Chicherin called Kars a key to the Caucasus but explained the transfer of Kars and Ardahan to the Turks as a forced inevitability: “no peace with Turkey would have been possible if Batum was not ceded to Georgia and Nakhchivan was not ceded to Azerbaijan.”146 On the date of the Turkish delegation’s arrival in Baku on April 9, Huseinov received a telephone call from Chicherin forbidding the “Baku comrades”



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to enter into talks with the Turks without agreement with the rest of the Caucasus republics. Chicherin reported: “The policy of the Turks is to provide any kind of assistance to Azerbaijan, play the role of its protector, become its guardian, create grounds to interfere with its affairs, and do everything to stick to it.” Chicherin warned “the Caucasus republics against signing treaties without having asked us.” He notified Huseinov of a CC decision on April 3. Chicherin not only instructed the Caucasus Soviet republics but also submitted to them a draft of a treaty that they should sign with Turkey.147 The Turkish delegation stayed in Baku until April 19 and held several meetings with governmental officials. The Azerbaijanis, however, in strict compliance with Chicherin’s instructions, declined to sign any document. Chicherin was very nervous about the long stay of the Turkish delegation in Baku and urgently recommended that Azerbaijan show the Turks the door under any pretense. Huseinov quieted Chicherin, saying that the Turks would never be able to play the role of protector of Azerbaijan in any form. Aside from this, in accordance with the government’s decision, Turkey would receive several hundreds of thousands of poods of petroleum products; no other unilateral treaty would be signed with Turkey. If it became necessary to create a common front of the republics of the South Caucasus, this could be explained to the Turks. But it was not possible to propose to the Turks to leave Baku just because the talks would be held in Tiflis.148 Chicherin was very jealous of the Turkish attempts to continue talks in Baku. Though Huseinov promised on April 12 not to conclude separate ­treaties, on the same day Chicherin telephoned him to explain tasks related to the Treaty of Moscow and once again gave instructions on how the Caucasus republics, primarily Azerbaijan, should behave with Turkey. Chicherin under­ stood well that the March 16 treaty included the question of Nakhchivan and that the Turks wanted to receive Azerbaijan’s assurance that this region would not be ceded to a third country. Attempts by the Turkish delegates to enter into talks with members of the government of Azerbaijan were due to this anxiety. They wanted Nakhchivan to remain an integral part of Azerbaijan in the future and desired to strengthen the political and legal status of this region. But Soviet Russia feared a separate treaty between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The Russians preferred a joint treaty between the republics of the South Caucasus and Turkey, the treaty that should have been drafted in Moscow. Chicherin noted: A treaty or several treaties to be concluded with the Caucasus republics first of all should contain nothing restraining the sovereign power of the Caucasus republics, so any rules for Turkey’s control of Armenia

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must no doubt be eliminated. To the same extent, it is inadmissible to make resolutions like the one in the draft treaty with Azerbaijan that Shahtakhtinskii showed me, which oblige Turkey to defend Azerbaijan or even supply it with armed forces. Any forms of interference with internal affairs should unconditionally be rejected.149 The instructions also contain lengthy thoughts about the Batum question in the Treaty of Moscow before returning to Nakhchivan again: There is the question of Nakhchivan with Armenia and Azerbaijan. The article by a trilateral commission of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to specify a border in a triangular zone states as follows: when it was decided that Nakhchivan was to be transferred to Azerbaijan’s protectorate, the Turks specified the border of the Nakhchivan region in accordance with the Treaty of Alexandropol, including the southern triangular area of the Erivan district in the territory of Nakhchivan. Because of a mistake and without our knowledge, this was approved by a special commission of military experts. Thus when this question was again submitted to the conference the only thing that we could do was to protest the border’s extending into the southern triangular zone. After a long struggle, it was decided that a commission from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey would finally specify this section of the border. When Shahtakhtinskii talked with us about Nakhchivan earlier, he regarded the Wolf ’s Gate as the extreme border of the Nakhchivan region. Incidentally, the triangle zone (the southern triangular part of the Erivan district) lies beyond the limits of the Wolf ’s Gate and beyond the line proposed by Shahtakhtinskii. Discuss it preliminarily and report where in your opinion the border between Nakhchivan and Armenia should pass. It will be essential to establish this border preliminarily in order to know which Armenian and Azerbaijani representatives will join the trilateral commission with Turkey. As for common questions, Chicherin noted that the Turks tried to play the role of protector of Muslims in all countries. The Turkish delegation in Moscow had demanded recognition of Russian Muslims’ right to emigrate to Turkey. He stressed that Turkey would control “Caucasus Tatars” and recommended considering the actions of the Turks as protectors of all Muslims unacceptable in all cases. As a consequence of these instructions from Soviet Russia, the Turkish delegation was given a cold reception in Baku. High-­ranking officials of the Azerbaijani government used various pretexts to avoid meeting guests, including not appearing at the rendezvous that had been determined in advance.



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This undoubtedly offended the pride of the Turkish diplomats, so delegate Dr. Rıza Nur, in his later speech at the GNAT, characterized what was happening in Baku as “something insulting the Turkish delegation.”150 Despite all the obstacles, however, the Turks managed to meet Narimanov, the head of the Azerbaijani government, and Huseinov, the people’s commissar of foreign affairs. On April 14 Huseinov and Yusuf Kemal bey held a long conversation in the presence of Orjonikidze. To distract his interlocutor from the main issues, Huseinov began voicing his interest in the reasons for ­delay of the Turks’ evacuation from Gumru. Yusuf Kemal bey replied that he had held a long conversation with Chicherin in Moscow and even received a note from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs stressing the necessity of pulling out from Gumru.151 Baku often asked the Turks when they were going to leave Gumru because Baku had been instructed by Moscow to do so. After attending the Baku talks, Orjonikidze informed Stalin: “We’ll try to liberate Alexandropol.”152 This meeting held with Huseinov was very harsh. Because the Turks constantly expressed their wish to discuss the question of signing a treaty with Azerbaijan, Narimanov asked them what treaty they were talking about. The Turkish side explained that it is necessary to sign a treaty; this is the question of Nakhchivan. It must be signed because we have put Nakhchivan under Azerbaijan’s protectorate on the condition that this right will not be ceded to a third country. One day Communists may gain the upper hand, so Azerbaijan will be willing to pass Nakhchivan to Armenia or Russia. That is why we need our treaty, in order to keep Azerbaijan’s protectorate over Nakhchivan.153 The Turks were right in their calculations. On June 29, 1921, Legrand, the Russian representative to the South Caucasus, complained to Chicherin and Orjonikidze that Nakhchivan was behaving as an independent state. The recognition of Azerbaijan’s protectorate over Nakhchivan would lead to undesirable consequences. He believed that this is not only bowing to the Islamist policy. We will need to have a closer acquaintance with this question. We are too distant from Nakhchivan. Garayev, people’s commissar of the navy of Azerbaijan, returned from there some days ago. He reports that a Soviet of People’s Commissars has been established in Nakhchivan and that the N ­ akhchivan government definitely tends to consider itself the government of an independent republic. I will have to tour this place in the near future, in order to become acquainted with the situation on site.154

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Instructed by Chicherin, Narimanov told the Turks: “We want to create a union of three republics. It will include Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and probably Daghestan. Furthermore, we want to conclude an alliance between the union of these governments and Turkey.” In answer to the Turks’ question regarding which side this union of republics was directed against, Narimanov replied: against imperialism. When Yusuf Kemal bey tried to specify the exact direction from which imperialism could come, Narimanov assured him that imperialism could come from elsewhere. He noted: “If a Soviet government falls even in Russia, it indispensably will be replaced by an imperialist government; then we will conclude an alliance against it as well.” The Turkish delegation stated that it was not authorized to hold talks with a Caucasus union or to conclude a treaty with it. Throughout this conversation Narimanov made every possible effort to persuade the Turks to give up the Treaty of ­Alexandropol.155 Following these indefinite answers from Narimanov as the chair of the CPC of Azerbaijan, the Turkish delegation interrupted the talks and expressed its protest to the PCFA of Azerbaijan through the Turkish ambassador in Baku. In reaction to all this Dr. Rıza Nur, a member of the Turkish delegation, stated in Ankara: “Azerbaijan pulled the wool over our eyes.” Yusuf Kemal bey, the head of the Turkish delegation, shared this opinion. Upon his return from Moscow he was appointed as foreign minister. In a conversation with Ibrahim Abilov, the plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan in Ankara, he stressed: “When we were leaving for Moscow to conclude a treaty with the RSFSR, we planned along the way to conclude a treaty first with Azerbaijan, then with Georgia, and finally with Armenia. Regretfully, the Azerbaijanis treated this question differently than we expected them to.”156 After a broad campaign was launched against Narimanov in 1923, the participants in Shahtakhtinskii’s Baku talks described these events a bit differently in letters to the CC RCP (B) and to Stalin. In particular, Shahtakhtinskii wrote: On its way from Moscow to Ankara, the Turkish delegation stayed in Baku to conclude a political treaty with us. It should be noted that the Turks made desperate attempts to conclude separate treaties with the Transcaucasian republics, especially Azerbaijan, while Moscow’s directive banned any separate treaty. Narimanov had to pay a return visit to the Turks. Huseinov and I instructed Narimanov and supplied him with all the necessary arguments to let the Turks know once and forever that any separate treaty was out of the question, in order to ease our tasks. To our horror, we learned from him that he had given the Turks his full final agreement by concluding a separate treaty. Narimanov put



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us in such a silly position that we could not appear before the Turks for five days. At last we visited them, and Yusuf Kemal launched an assault immediately, saying that the head of the government had expressed his full consent and thus demanded that we conclude a separate treaty.157 Shahtakhtinskii included this episode illustrating “the state wisdom” of Narimanov in a letter to Stalin as well.158 The Turks encouraged the Azerbaijani leaders to pursue an independent policy. After a long conversation with Huseinov, however, Yusuf Kemal bey understood that all of this was useful.159 At a meeting with Huseinov on April 16 Memduh Shevket Esendal tried to explain to the Azerbaijanis that Azerbaijan, as an eastern country, had particular positions in relations with Turkey. He suggested opening an Azerbaijani-­Turkish conference in the days to come. Huseinov interrupted him, saying: “We cannot let Azerbaijani-­Turkish relations be different from Turkish-­Armenian or Armenian-­Georgian relations.” To confirm his words Huseinov noted that the South Caucasus republics would unite their railways, foreign trade, and economy in the near future. He assured Shevket bey that “the Transcaucasian republics should jointly conclude a treaty with Turkey.” Shevket bey objected, saying that the Turkish dele­ gation was authorized to conclude a treaty with Azerbaijan and with Georgia but was not authorized to conclude a treaty with Armenia. For this reason Huseinov “recommended” that the Turkish delegation go to Kars to connect with the Turkish government jointly with Karabekir pasha, in order to explore the opportunity to get a mandate to conclude a treaty with the South Caucasus republics.160 On April 19, 1921, Huseinov telegraphed Chicherin: [T]oday Shahtakhtinskii and I talked to the Turks, who were extremely displeased by my proposal of talking only within a Transcaucasus-­ Turkish conference. After a long exchange of views, the Turks agreed to a Transcaucasus-­Turkish conference on the condition that treaties to be drafted jointly should be signed separately with each of the republics. We agreed with this. The Turks insist on holding the conference in Kars, saying that it will be easier for them to contact Ankara from there. On behalf of Azerbaijan, we expressed our acceptance of Kars and at the same time noted that the consent of Georgia and Armenia was required as well. If our new condition is approved, we think that it will be possible to agree with Kars.161 Huseinov simultaneously sent the text of this telegram to Orjonikidze and Orakhelashvili in Tiflis and to Mravian in Erivan. He informed Tiflis and Erivan that a Turkish delegation headed by Yusuf Kemal bey had left for Kars

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via Tiflis and Gumru on April 19 at 11:00 p.m.162 As soon as the Turkish delegation left Baku, Huseinov telegraphed Chicherin and Bekzadian that it was necessary to start preliminary “plotting” in Baku, due to the common interests of the Transcaucasus republics in establishing firm relations with Turkey. He had already reported his opinion on this occasion to Orjonikidze.163 Even such a minor manifestation of independence by the Azerbaijani government, which had expressed its agreement to conduct a conference in Kars, was met with protest by Russia’s representatives in the Caucasus. Legrand wrote to Narimanov and Huseinov: Though your answer to the Ankara government is unlikely to cause objections from the rest of the participants in the conference, nevertheless, after our preliminary meeting in Baku we expect that you will not act independently in such matters and that you will find out other republics’ attitudes beforehand in order to work out a joint decision. Incidentally, in telegram #2289, I quite definitely asked you to provide a draft of your answer by telephone. However, you have now informed us after the fact; this is absolutely unacceptable, so I categorically ask you not to take such steps without the knowledge of the plenipotentiary representation of the RSFSR anymore.164 Another factor causing anxiety in Turkish-­Azerbaijani relations was that Baku used various methods to put off sending its diplomatic representative to Ankara. Shevket bey as Turkish diplomatic representative in Azerbaijan repeatedly raised this question to Huseinov. However, Azerbaijan was apparently not in a hurry to take this step. This in turn caused various rumors in Ankara. The nationalistic circles explained this by the lack of independence in Azerbaijan and the concentration of all power in the hands of non-­ Azerbaijanis. In their view, “if Azerbaijan was independent, its representative would have already been in Ankara for a long time.”165 To soften the undesirable tension, on April 23 Narimanov and ­Huseinov sent a congratulatory telegram on the occasion of the anniversary of the opening of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal pasha, Ahmet Mukhtar, Kazım Karabekir pasha, Yusuf Kemal bey, and Memduh Shevket bey received the following solemn message: “The free workers and peasants of Azerbaijan send their warm greetings to the government of revo­lutionary Turkey.”166 Several days earlier, however, the Turks had seen for themselves in Baku to what extent Azerbaijan was “free” and to what extent the ­greetings were “warm.” It has to be kept in mind that in the spring of 1921, when the Moscow talks were in full swing, information about the strengthening of ­nationalist sentiments in Baku was regularly reported to the Russian capital.167



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The European countries, especially Azerbaijani political emigrants residing there, displayed a great interest in the signing of the Treaty of Moscow and made every effort to find the text of this document. Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, a member of the Azerbaijani delegation to the London conference that was taking place simultaneously with the Russian-­Turkish talks in Moscow, managed to get the text of the Treaty of Moscow and pass it to Topchibashov in Paris in May 1921. In his cover letter Mehdiyev noted that the text of the treaty was of great interest, so he considered it necessary to send it “to you because I think that its content should be examined attentively, comprehensively.”168 The Armenians, who calmly observed the course of the talks in Moscow, started protesting actively after a March 16 treaty was signed. In early April a Communist member named Khardanmariants of Kharkov submitted to Iurii Steklov, the editor of the newspaper Izvestiia, a letter expressing his displeasure with the eastern policy of Soviet Russia. Khardanmariants noted that he could not absolutely comprehend the eastern policy but, from the so-­called congress of nations of the East to the peculiar statements by comrade Zinov’ev, saw a lot of serious, unexplainable mistakes that inevitably would lead to the collapse of this policy. “It is extremely important for us, ordinary Communists who are perfectly aware of the East, the interests of Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, to understand what the real state of affairs is because we cannot bear any moral responsibility for a policy that, in our deepest conviction, is quite erroneous,” the Armenian Communist wrote, claiming that a peace policy with regard to Turkey was quite mistaken.169 Before publishing this letter in the newspaper, Steklov sent it to the PCFA of Soviet Russia. Chicherin replied that “the very name shows that the ­author is an Armenian rather inspired with Armenian nationalism.” He recommended that Steklov not publish this article due to the established relations between Turkey and Russia. The article was also somewhat inaccurate, particularly concerning analysis of the Kemalist movement. Chicherin wrote: The Kemalist movement is distinct in that a nationalistic, petty bourgeoisie that had made a profit from the war appeared on the scene. The class of landowners does not matter under the Kemalists, so all prominent Kemalists originate from the petty bourgeoisie or minor officials. This is a typical eastern petty bourgeois movement. All conclusions in the article by Khardanmariants are quite wrong and are easily explained by his undoubted link with the Armenian nationalists.170 But this was only the beginning. A week later Chicherin addressed a broad statement from Bekzadian, the chair of the Armenian delegation to the Moscow conference and people’s commissar of foreign affairs of Armenia. The

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statement blamed “the corrupt (traitorous) character of the Treaty of Moscow regarding the national interests of Armenia.” It became necessary for the ­Armenian delegation to make such a statement after it became acquainted with the text of a treaty concluded between the RSFSR and Kemalist Turkey on March 16, 1921, and with the protocols of meetings of the Russian-­Turkish conference of March 10, 12, 14, and 16. First, the Armenians stressed “ceding large territories to Turkey at the expense of Soviet Armenia.” They complained that they had not been allowed to participate in the conference and that their opinion was not taken into account in discussion of questions directly regarding Armenia. In their view, the protocols included the Turkish delegation’s statements about atrocities committed by Armenian detachments against Transcaucasus Muslims in 1918 but said nothing about the Armenian victims from 1914 to 1921. The Armenian delegates were disgusted that the Turks often acted as guardians of the Muslim population of the South Caucasus. The Armenians believed that only Soviet Russia was authorized to act as the patron of Caucasus Muslims and should not yield this role to anyone, especially “the ideologists of a semifeudal aristocracy of the East and pan-­Turkism.”171 In their statement the Armenians filed serious claims against the question of Nakhchivan and Sharur-­Daralayaz and its statement at the Moscow conference. Bekzadian writes: As for the question of Nakhchivan and Sharur-­Daralayaz, the Russian delegation was not insistent enough to insist on its stance and thus allowed the Turkish delegation to act as a patron of Muslims of this region, though the fate of Nakhchivan and its region was determined by a December declaration of the Azerbaijani revolutionary committee and an additional January declaration of the Azerbaijani revolutionary committee. In debates on this very Nakhchivan question, the Turkish delegation explained the establishment of an autonomous Nakhchivan within its indicated boundaries, saying that “this question is very important for the security of the eastern border of Turkey.” The Armenian delegation believes that the Turkish delegation’s reference to a potential danger to the eastern border of Turkey was directed against Soviet Armenia and that this was not rejected by the Russian delegation on the basis that Soviet Armenia could not have aggressive intentions or aims with regard to the neighboring Turkish people. The statement stressed that ceding the Armenian territories to the Turks was a strong blow to the Armenian people and to the Bolshevik-­declared principle of self-­determination of nations. The Armenians insisted that the stubbornness that the Soviet delegation had displayed regarding the Batum question was not at all in view with regard to the Armenian question. Con-



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cerning certain territories, Russia backed the sovereignty of Georgia and sovereign rights of Azerbaijan and did not raise the question of Kars at all. This action of the Armenians angered Chicherin. On April 21 he wrote to Saak Ter-­Gabrielan, the plenipotentiary representative of Armenia in Soviet Russia, that Bekzadian’s references to the protocols of the political commission of the Moscow conference were senseless because behind-­the-scenes talks with the Turks “with the assistance of influential comrades” had begun almost two weeks before the political commission started its work. According to Chicherin, the Armenian delegates knew about this process and were notified of all these questions but did not protest even once while the talks were underway. Disagreeing with Bekzadian’s statement, Chicherin insisted on two points: First, compromises at the Moscow talks were mutual. Second, all compromises with the Turks were made by a decision of the CC RCP (B) and Bekzadian was informed of this.172 Chicherin sent the text of this letter by a telegram to Legrand in Tiflis. He regretted that Bekzadian had made this statement after having left Moscow, so it was not possible to explain to him some key aspects pertaining to the course of the conference. Chicherin was particularly angered that Bekzadian’s statement was apparently designed to lay the entire blame on the Russian delegation and avoid bearing any responsibility.173 In a letter to Molotov, Chicherin wrote: We beseech the Central Committee categorically to demand that the Caucasus Soviet republics not insist that Turkey change the border proposed by Moscow.... First, this will never be approved by Turkey, which hardly agreed even with the border proposed by Moscow. Second, this will make the most horrific impression on Turkey, so it will start viewing the Treaty of Moscow as something vicious, as a scrap of paper.174 Following a letter of protest from the Armenian delegation and Bekzadian, the CC CP (B) of Armenia at its plenum on May 16 listened to a report from Bekzadian about participation of the Armenian delegation in the Russian-­ Turkish talks and approved the actions of the delegation.175 Nevertheless, the Armenian government was not in a hurry to recall its representatives from Nakhchivan. On July 13, 1921, Huseinov even had to appeal to Mravian, the people’s commissar of foreign affairs of Armenia, and to Orjonikidze to tell the CPC and other governmental bodies of Armenia to recall their representatives from Nakhchivan, in conformity with the terms of the Treaty of Moscow. He wrote that some comrades in Erivan perhaps had a poor understanding of the current international situation or misunderstood the common policy in the Nakhchivan region. Not only comrades from the CPC of Armenia but also comrades from central institutions of the Armenian

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SSR showing no respect for all the complications of the Nakhchivan question and “potential misunderstandings between us and the Turks that may stem from Armenian institutions’ official claims to the Nakhchivan region, acting in the Nakhchivan region as if the Nakhchivan region has not yet been placed beyond the control of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia.”176 Huseinov reported that such actions of some comrades unlikely will remain unnoticed by the Turkish command in the borderline regions and are expected to cause new attempts to claim the Nakhchivan region under the pretense of failure to observe the Treaty of Moscow; for this reason I’d like to ask you, for the sake of our common interests, immediately to eliminate everything causing complications in the Nakhchivan question and now either recall all comrades delegated by the Soviet of People’s Commissars of Armenia from the territory of the Nakhchivan region or subordinate them to common directives dictated by our common policy. Despite the signing of the Treaty of Moscow, Chicherin, a former tsarist diplomat who had long worked in Europe, could in no way give up the policy of partition of Turkey. Russian historian Petr Moiseev writes that Moscow was masterminding a fantastic adventure against Turkey.177 A month after the treaty with Turkey was signed, on April 22, 1921, the people’s ­commissar of foreign affairs of Soviet Russia proposed to the Central Committee of the RCP (B) to promise Petr Wrangel’s followers political amnesty and an obstacle-­free return home, in order to use them to seize Istanbul, which should then be transferred to the control not of the Kemalists but of organized, armed left-­wing working elements led by Russia.178 In fact such proposals were a continuation of the secret treaty signed by Russia, England, and France in March–April 1915, which envisioned the transfer of Istanbul and the Straits to Russia.179 Finally, on July 20, 1921, the Central Executive Committee of the Russian Federation ratified the Treaty of Moscow. A week later the Grand National Assembly of Turkey also ratified this treaty with two hundred one votes in favor, five votes against, and one abstention.180 An exchange of the ratification documents took place in Kars on September 22 of the same year. Thus a “Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood” of March 16, 1921, between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey entered into force of law. The Treaty of Moscow marked a great success of the eastern policy of Turkey. Recognition of the Turkish borders by a superpower such as Russia within the framework of the National Pact was an internationally important event that laid the foundation for long-­term relations in the region.

8

From Moscow to Kars

T

he events in Iran and Turkey intensified the activity of Soviet Azerbaijan a bit, as it had no opportunity to pursue its own foreign policy. However, this activity served the concept of ridding the much-­suffering East of the “yoke of imperialism” rather than developing the foreign diplomatic relations of Azerbaijan. Narimanov, chair of the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan, voiced rather controversial views regarding foreign policy issues in his speech at the first All-­Azerbaijani Congress of Soviets in May 1921. He even admitted that in some cases Soviet Azerbaijan had no foreign policy, especially with respect to the Soviet republics. Narimanov reacted to broad rumors that Kemalist Turkey had been strengthened and that a unified Islamist state had been created in his lengthy speech on May 8. He noted that “you will never gather nations under the flag of Islam; a Persian will never agree to live under the Turkish flag, and the Turks will never agree to be dominated by an Iranian tribe.” At the same time, in regard to talks with a Turkish delegation held in Baku several days earlier, Narimanov underscored the invaluable importance of Soviet Russia for the Anatolian government: “Revolutionary Turks understand this well. Similarly they understand the great danger that a monarchist Russia may represent to Turkey, if Soviet Russia suddenly ceases to exist.” Narimanov noted that the Turks remembered the words of tsarist Russia’s foreign minister Pavel Miliukov: “We Russians will be quieted only after we seize Constantinople.”1 Taking into account the revolutionary role of Azerbaijan and its influence on countries of the Middle East, primarily Iran and Turkey, the information division of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan began issuing the Herald of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR in the spring of 1921. The first issue included Narimanov’s article “Azerbaijan as a Vanguard of Liberation of Peoples of the East”; an article by 277

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Evgenii Lavrov (advisor to the PCFA) about the Russian-­Turkish treaty; and an article by Vladimir Tardov about the Iranian revolution.2 Believing that the Iranian and Turkish orientation of Azerbaijani foreign policy would be lasting, the PCFA took certain steps to train cadres for the diplomatic corps in these countries. Baku State University had no diplomatic cadre training faculty, so it was decided to train them at the Institute of Oriental Studies to be opened under the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Reports indicate that Iran and Turkey were chosen as the main areas of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. The Institute of Oriental Studies was considered appropriate to train a cadre of Azerbaijani diplomats to work for either the central apparatus of the commissariat or in Iran and Turkey. At the same time, it had to perform the functions of both an educational institution and a scientific institution: to accumulate historical, economic, legal, and political information about countries of the Middle East, process it, and subsequently submit it to the PCFA for practical use. Another function of the institute was to propagate the Azerbaijani history and culture in the Near East. The report noted that this was the way to make Azerbaijan famous in countries of the Middle East as well as to expand the actions of the republic’s PCFA beyond the current narrow framework. As an increase in the diplomatic corps was urgently needed, the report suggested making these training courses short-­term (three months long). Students had to be engaged in lessons 10 to 11 hours daily to listen to about 1,000 hours of lectures, including 664 hours of theoretical lessons and 336 hours of linguistic training. Students had to pass an examination in the Turkish language and, at the end of the training, in the English, French, Turkish, and Persian languages as well as a European language and an Eastern language.3 Due to the establishment of the USSR and the liquidation of Commissariats of Foreign Affairs in the republics, however, it became senseless to train cadres for them. The idea of establishment of the Institute of Oriental Studies under the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan was realized only in 1958.

The South Caucasus Republics and the Preparation for the Kars Conference Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Moscow, the policy of Soviet ­Russia and the Moscow-­controlled Azerbaijan Soviet Republic regarding Turkey became clearer. At a plenum of the Azerbaijan Communist Party in August 1921, a report by Huseinov made it clear to all that talks about upcoming Communist power in Anatolia were put on the back burner. He noted that now the main task of the Soviets was to make every effort to defend the Kemalists in Turkey and thus drive the Entente out of the East. Orjonikidze, a leader of



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the Caucasus Bureau of the RCP (B), obviously shared this opinion and had agreed on the whole Eastern policy with Moscow. Orjonikidze had earlier made a lengthy report in Tiflis on these issues, particularly Sovietization of the Caucasus republics and the activity of the Caucasus Bureau. He noted that he had to deal with Chicherin in Moscow whenever the question of Sovietization of a certain Caucasus republic was raised. ­Orjonikidze admitted that Chicherin had once been against the Sovietization of Azerbaijan.4 After the Moscow Treaty, Azerbaijan began displaying serious interest in expanding relations with Turkey as well as paying increased attention to the political processes and military operations in Anatolia. On May 29, 1921, M. Mahammadov, first secretary of the Russian Federation’s plenipotentiary representation to Ankara, composed a broad report about the situation in Turkey and sent it to Huseinov. Mahammadov considered it necessary to acquaint Baku with “trustworthy information” on the political and social situation in Turkey that he had gathered during an eight-­month stay there, which he hoped would influence the Middle Eastern policy of Azerbaijan. Mahammadov described the correlation of forces in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, noting that some deputies led by Mustafa Kemal pasha were Anatolians elected after the Sivas congress, while the rest of the deputies were Rumelians who had escaped Constantinople. “Of course, there are no representatives of the poorest urban population and peasantry in the GNAT though its official name is ‘popular.’”5 From November 1920 to March 1921 the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was composed of two groups. The first group consisted of deputies believed to be supporters of the sultan and the West, including second chair of the GNAT Jelaleddin Arif, finance minister Ahmet Ferid Tek, education minister Hamdullah Suphi, and Bekir Sami bey, who had returned from his Moscow voyage. The second group, which “expected salvation” only from the East and had friendly ties with Soviet Russia, included foreign minister Ahmet Mukhtar, industry minister Celal Bayar, and press director Muhiddin bey Birgen. In Mahammadov’s view, the strengthening of the opposition in the GNAT had led to rumors that it was to be dissolved. The report described Mustafa Kemal pasha as a very clever, energetic, strong-­willed man who feared nothing in striving to attain his goal, was cautious in communicating, and could get people on his side by using a stick or a carrot; in a word, he was a historical personality. Mahammadov wrote: Kemal is a central figure from which all the threads go out, and he holds all the reins; a man damned by many (Anatolians), with many people fawning upon him. Without a doubt, owing to the role he plays in the political life of Anatolia, Kemal cannot belong to either a reactionary

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group or an Eastern policy group, because these groups were created by him and his agents. He needs them to keep balance in his policy. It can be noted with confidence that no agreement with the sultan is possible until Kemal heads the national movement. In Mahammadov’s opinion, the strength of Kemal pasha was the organized, disciplined army that had been formed under the leadership of İsmet İnönü within a short period: “While this army exists, Kemal may quietly feel himself the lord of a semifeudal Turkey.” As for issues of foreign policy, Mahammadov believed that Kemal pasha maneuvered between the West and the East, between the Entente and Soviet Russia. On the one hand, he wanted to convene a Muslim congress in Ankara with the help of the Comintern, but he regarded this congress as a response to the Baku Congress of Peoples of the East. On the other hand, as a head of the delegation to the London conference, Kemal had introduced Bekir Sami bey, who returned from Moscow to Ankara as an ardent opponent of the Bolsheviks. In Mahammadov’s view, “at the London conference the Turks sustained a shattering defeat, so the supporters of the Eastern policy were strengthened, while Kemal became sober.” Mahammadov assesses Mustafa Kemal’s actions as “tricks,” writing: “I don’t know how the failure of the London conference affected Kemal, but I think that Kemal now feels freer, more independent from the East than he did four to five months ago.” In conclusion, on his way from Ankara to Baku via Moscow, M ­ ahammadov as first secretary of the Russian Embassy to Turkey insistently recommended opening an Azerbaijani diplomatic representation under the Ankara government. He thought that “having escaped Azerbaijan, the Musavatists began conducting harmful propaganda. Official circles and the intelligentsia seized this moment to make speeches against communism. Based upon false rumors, these circles started speaking openly about violence against Azerbaijan.” Despite the provocative rumors, Mahammadov wrote, the Turkish ­people felt a great love for Azerbaijan, and “this love must be used for our further work in Anatolia.” With these factors in mind, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan decided to choose a candidate for plenipotentiary representative, who was to be sent to Ankara in May 1921. The Russian People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was asked to affirm this candidature. Narimanov and Huseinov recommended Ibrahim Abilov — ​deputy people’s commissar of foreign affairs of Soviet Azerbaijan — ​as the ambassador. In his telegram on May 26, 1921, Chicherin told Huseinov that Moscow did not object to ­Abilov as the plenipotentiary representative of the Azerbaijan SSR to A ­ nkara.6 ­Abilov was appointed to this post in June 1921, which was announced in the media.7



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It was universally believed that Abilov would be able to help develop relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey as well as help expand links between Soviet Russia and the GNAT government in fighting the Entente. Aside from this, Abilov would coordinate his actions with RSFSR plenipotentiary representative to Turkey Sergei Natsarenus, who had been performing his duties since early May.8 Choice of the embassy’s employees was up to the republic’s ­People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, but Moscow was very anxious. In his telegram of July 19 Chicherin told Huseinov that the choice of the e­ mbassy’s employees had to be made very carefully and recommended not choosing people who could easily fall under someone else’s influence and make mistakes against their own will.9 Ibrahim Maharram oghly Abilov was considered one of the closest acquaintances of Narimanov, the chair of the Council of People’s Commissars. Owing to this closeness and Narimanov’s own recommendation, Abilov was appointed to the post of plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan to Turkey. He was born in the town of Ordubad in 1882. At the beginning of the twentieth century Abilov became an active participant in the socialist movement in the South Caucasus. In 1908 he was sent by Narimanov on a mission to southern Azerbaijan during the fight for the constitution. In 1909 he returned from Iran and for a certain period worked as a journalist in Baku. In 1912 he became the editor of the newspaper Bakinskaia Zhizn’ (Baku Life). Abilov was arrested by the police more than once before he was deported to Astrakhan in 1913. After the February 1917 revolution he resettled in Tiflis, where he became one of the prominent representatives of a Menshevik organization, Hummet. Abilov established close links with Narimanov while in Astrakhan. After the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, Abilov arrived in Baku and was elected as a socialist deputy of the parliament established in December 1918. Following Sovietization of Azerbaijan in April 1920, he served for a while as deputy commissar of internal affairs. In September 1920, on Narimanov’s recommendation, Abilov was elected as first secretary of the council of propaganda of peoples of the East at the First Congress of Nations of the East. At a meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B) on May 21 Ibrahim Abilov, Gazanfar Musabeyov, and Mikhail Kakhiani were elected as members of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Third Congress of the Comintern.10 In regard to the activity of the Propaganda and Action Council of the ­Peoples of the East, Abilov reported to a plenum of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) on June 4, 1921. Given that he had been elected as a delegate to the Third Congress of the Comintern to be held in Moscow, the post of the first secretary of the council was passed to Ruhulla Akhundov.11 In July 1921 Abilov attended the Third Congress of the Comintern in Moscow, where his

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candidature as a plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan to Turkey was approved. On July 24 the CC CPA (B) Politburo and Orgburo recommended that he leave for Ankara as soon as possible.12 On July 31 the CC Politburo discussed the question of gifts to Mustafa Kemal and members of the Ankara government. Commissar Huseinov was instructed to settle the matter.13 In August 1921 Abilov left for Turkey. On his way he paused for several days in Tiflis to solve certain technical and financial questions. On August 15 a plenum of the CC RCP (B) Caucasus Bureau assigned 300,000 gold rubles to the Azerbaijani mission in Ankara.14 The next day the wages of employees of the Azerbaijani mission were decreased to the maximum possible, with the explanation that it was essential to level the wages of employees of the diplomatic missions of Azerbaijan and Russia.15 Abilov reported in his letter to Huseinov that Orjonikidze had assigned him 150 million rubles designated for the mission and that this money would be enough for three to four months of work, taking into account the high living standards in Ankara. If the wages of every employee of the mission were 90,000 paper rubles, the monthly wages fund would total 300 million rubles. As a temporary solution he managed to receive 50 million rubles from the PCFA account with the help of Mir Jafar Baghirov (chief of the State Political Department of Azerbaijan), who had arrived in Tiflis. On the eve of his departure for Ankara, Abilov asked the PCFA to provide 10,000 poods of kerosene for the needs of the mission and issue instruc­tions about currency to ensure the future work of the mission. In his letter Abilov also told Huseinov about a meeting on August 25, 1921, with Aleksandr Svanidze, people’s commissar of foreign affairs of Georgia, and noted that Tiflis was displeased with some clauses of the Treaty of Moscow. Svanidze warned Abilov that Georgia was going to take a series of steps at an upcoming conference of Turkey and the Caucasus republics. The Georgians disagreed with some clauses of the Treaty of Moscow that specified the Turkish-­ Georgian border and planned to raise this issue again in Kars. Abilov told Svanidze that the question of the border with Georgia had been discussed at length at the Moscow conference, so it would not be appropriate to raise it again at the forthcoming conference, reasonably noting: “It is evident from the Turks’ sentiments and hints that they won’t make any compromises or concessions now.” Abilov claimed that “raising these questions at the conference would cause undesirable precedents for our reality.”16 Abilov recommended that Huseinov discuss these and similar urgent questions with Georgian comrades before the conference. Svanidze intended to protest against a Treaty of Moscow clause giving national and religious rights to the Muslim population of Batum. He was going to demand ­expansion of



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the borders of Batum and giving Ardahan and Artvin back to Georgia and had already appealed to Chicherin in May 1921.17 Svanidze wrote that Georgians “want to demand that Turkey give the whole southern part of the Batum region that has been given to Turkey according to the Treaty of Moscow back to Georgia.” Chicherin immediately warned Molotov and the CC RCP (B) that the Turks would never agree to Georgia’s demands and that Moscow as a great hardship had agreed with part of Batum being annexed to Georgia.18 The Turks also were notified that the Georgians and Armenians were openly and secretly displeased with the Treaty of Moscow. As they suspected, the source of this displeasure was Soviet Russia. Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin representatives elected as GNAT deputies tried to explain the situation to the population and recommended treating changes in Russia with caution. In the opinion of Turkish official circles, if Soviet Russia proclaimed the principle of self-­determination of nations, it should understand the desire of a Muslim nation surrounded by infidels from both sides to be united with Turkey. “We as Turks knew the tsarist policy, but we don’t know to what extent this policy (imperialism) has changed; gradual Sovietization (simply speaking, seizure) of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and now Georgia makes us worry about the integrity of our eastern border. If Soviet Russia has no imperialist aspirations, the just annexation of Muslim districts to us [Turkey] cannot cause a Russian protest.” Many Turks openly noted that they were most threatened by communism from the eastern borders. They regarded the eastern provinces as a buffer between the Turks and the Bolsheviks.19 Especially in a period of aggravation of the situation on the Greek front, a secret appearance of Enver pasha as the head of a small group in Batum in August 1921 caused serious questions within the leading circles of the Kemalists. In his memoirs Khalil Kut pasha wrote: “A house was arranged for us in front of a park near the sea in Batum. On the very first day we became acquainted with comrade Éduard Goltzman, who worked there as Moscow’s representative. Once he came up to me and reported: ‘Enver pasha has secretly arrived in Batum; he will visit you this night in secret from all others.’”20 The presence of Khalil pasha in Batum in those same days strengthened suspicions that the Russians had secretly collaborated with the Ittihadists. Rumors were spread in European newspapers that Enver pasha’s supporters had allegedly moved the center of their activity from Baku to Batum.21 Even Orjonikidze was unaware of Enver pasha’s arrival in Batum and voiced his surprise at such “close links” between Moscow and Enver pasha in his enciphered telegram to Stalin. Orjonikidze asked to what extent the arrival of Enver and Khalil was appropriate during a time when the deadly war against the Greeks was being fought and the destiny of the Kemalists was at stake.22

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Enver pasha’s arrival in Batum turned into a subject of international discussion. Upon his return from South Caucasus, U.S. army general James Harbord reported: Various rumors place Enver Bey as scheming in the Transcaucasus, and a French officer is the authority for the statement that he has been in Tiflis within two months conferring with Government officials. This man is in Turkish eyes a heroic figure; risen from obscurity by his own efforts, allied by marriage to the Imperial House of Osman, credited with military ability, the possibilities of disturbance are very great should he appear in command of Muslim irregulars on the Azarbaijan-­ Armenian frontier.23 The Times of London reported that Soviet Russia was standing behind Enver pasha’s possible actions against Anatolia.24 Orjonikidze admitted the political significance of Enver pasha for the Soviets in his telegram to Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin but claimed that Enver pasha’s current arrival in Batum would make a collision with the Turks inevitable: “The people from Anatolia came to visit Enver some days ago and, as he confesses, asked him: as you go this way Russia backs you, but does it mean the Communists will act as lords in our country? We will back you, but we will fight Communists mercilessly.” Enver replied: “I do not know and this is not important; the only important thing is how this will end. I do not interfere with this story for it is too late (I’m afraid, they’ve already been aware of his stay in Batum). They are supposed to hold a conference some days later. There we have a man who will inform us.” Budu Mdivani “believes that this should not have been done now and that Enver should have been recalled.”25 Based on the statement “I believe that my return there will be useful,” it is true that Enver pasha was ready to go to Anatolia by motorboat. Khalil pasha dissuaded him from this: I don’t think that your trip to Turkey is right. If you want to know the truth, in such a situation your followers and the followers of Mustafa Kemal pasha will quarrel and diverge. Then the people on the Greek front will find themselves in a state of disorder, and the Motherland and the people will be damaged as a result of a personal whim.26 Enver pasha’s written correspondence with the Central Committee of the Unification and Progress Party was intercepted by the Russian embassy in Ankara. The CC warned common members of the Party to be cautious with Kemal and not repeat the unsuccessful experience of the Communist Party. Enver pasha recommended that the Ittihadists continue the war, no matter how hard this was. That was the only possible way to prevent realization of the



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Treaty of Sèvres.27 Several days later Enver pasha gave up the idea of returning to Anatolia because he understood that it would cause undesirable results. Thus the plans of certain circles in Soviet Russia that had tried to weaken the positions of Mustafa Kemal pasha on the eve of the Kars conference by sending Enver pasha to Anatolia were frustrated. Nevertheless, the Soviet diplomatic service in Ankara maintained close links with Enver’s supporters, whom it considered “allies” in the political circles of Turkey.28 On various issues and even inside the government these allies were used to remove undesirable persons who were against Russia.29 The appearance of Enver pasha in Batum made the Kemalists more cautious. They took control of all Soviet diplomatic institutions in Ankara and all towns along the Black Sea shoreline and began seriously examining all Russian ships arriving in Turkish ports and even subjected the crews of some of the ships to temporary arrest. Turkey intensified the activities of Azerbaijani Musavatists, Russian White Guard members, and other emigrant organizations. Natsarenus, Soviet Russia’s plenipotentiary representative to Turkey, wrote to Moscow: “Here in Ankara there are Azerbaijani Musavatists whose impudence is beyond any bounds of politeness and tact.” He reported that he had notified foreign minister Yusuf Kemal bey of all this in written form on August 18 and September 14.30 Mustafa Kemal pasha was deeply concerned over the provocative game of the Russians. Boris Piskunov, an employee of Soviet Russia’s embassy in Ankara, wrote to Chicherin on September 15, 1921: “Dozens of times I have heard both Yusuf Kemal’s and Mustafa Kemal’s complaints about Moscow’s support and help to Enver pasha and about certain military preparations of the Transcaucasus Republics directed against Turkey.”31 Kemal pasha even told Natsarenus: “If Russia desires to Sovietize Turkey, it is easier to do it through me than through Enver.”32 In the spring of 1921 Soviet diplomatic representative to Ankara Ian Upmal-­Angarskii had tried to persuade Mustafa Kemal p­ asha that Soviet Russia’s friendly attitude toward Turkey depended on Turkey’s communization. With this in mind Kemal pasha created and controlled the organization entitled the Turkish Popular Communist Party (TPCP). When Chicherin later explained that Russia had no urgent need for communization of Turkey, the TPCP was dissolved. Russian Bolsheviks did not trust Mustafa Kemal to be devoted to communism. The presidium of the Council of Peoples of the East believed that the Mustafa Kemal government was engaged in intelligence work under the pretext of communism.33 During his two meetings with Chicherin in August 1921, Turkish ambassador to Moscow Ali Fuat pasha frankly expressed his opinion. In handing over a memorandum signed on August 4 by Turkish foreign minister Yusuf Kemal bey, Ali Fuat pasha said: “When the Greek army was about to win in July

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we sent Enver pasha with comrades and provided him with help and funds to establish a new government in Anatolia to replace our government and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which was under threat of collapse, and he did not even notify us of this. What were you going to do with Enver pasha?”34 Chicherin began denying any joint actions of Enver pasha and Soviet Russia against Turkey but had to retreat due to the burden of proof cited by Ali Fuat pasha. As a justification he noted that Enver pasha headed a party with many supporters in Turkey, so Russia was forced to maintain a link with him. Chicherin even forecast the probability of Enver pasha’s coming to power, so he deserved a respectful attitude: “Enver pasha led people who had established friendly Turkish-­Russian relations.” In objecting to Chicherin, Ali Fuat pasha noted that “it is yet unknown in what situation Enver pasha will find himself when he arrives in Turkey. Enver pasha was the war minister and deputy chief-­ commander of a government that lost the world war. I’m well aware of the personality of Enver pasha. I don’t think that he will be engaged in ­politics again until he answers for what he did in the past.” Ali Fuat pasha again stressed the necessity to display a respectful attitude toward the treaty that the two countries had signed.35 At the same time, Ali Fuat pasha noted that Russia was not observing its commitments on arms supply and money payment to Turkey and that Soviet institutions in the Caucasus and along the Black Sea coastline refused to let weapons enter Turkey. Starting in May, Ali Fuat pasha bombarded the Russian PCFA with notes stressing the necessity of providing Russian assistance for the success of the summer war campaign but failed to attain success in this area. The Turkish ambassador said that this aid would not be worth a pin if it was provided after the decisive battles were over.36 An instruction sent from the GNAT to the ambassador to Moscow read: “The government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey has received from Russia only a tiny part of the financial assistance that it planned to receive, so it was extremely difficult for the government of the Grand National Assembly to show the Turkish people this part of the assistance obtained from our great powerful ally.”37 This open diplomatic demarche of the Turkish ambassador deeply concerned the leaders of Soviet Russia. Russia tried to cover Turkey’s displeasure with alleged preparations for the Kars Conference, about which various ­rumors had already been spread. On September 14 Chicherin informed Stalin of meetings with Ali Fuat ­pasha in which he demanded arms and money as well as Yusuf Kemal bey’s note on this topic. Chicherin reported a sharp change in the situation on the Greek front: the Greeks had retreated from their positions and the Turks



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u­ rgently needed financial aid. He also noted that Yusuf Kemal bey’s note contained elements of blackmail and wrote: “It appears from your latest telegrams that the Greeks’ retreat is acquiring the character of panicked escape and that we can expect the wheel of fortune to turn back.”38 On the night of September 16–17 Ali Fuat pasha managed to meet ­Stalin. He hoped for Stalin’s help as before when the relations between the two countries had been aggravated. In those same days, the Turks celebrated a great victory at Sakariya. Stalin was interested in the reasons for defeat at Eskisheher and Kutahya, details of victory at Sakariya, and information about Turkish-­ French talks that made the Russians panic. By making use of the map of Anatolia politely brought in by Stalin, Ali Fuat pasha answered all the questions in detail. He explained that the talks with the French were not directed against the Russians but aimed to sow discord between Turkey’s two strong enemies: “We know that you maintain a hostile attitude to the French. However, they understand that any actions against you together with us are in vain, so they don’t even suggest this to us. In fact, this is the sense of the Turkish-­French accord.” Having listened to Ali Fuat pasha’s explanations, Stalin noted: “Be sure, I personally absolutely do not care about the Turkish-­French accord. However, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs has made comments that can really sow panic.”39 Then Stalin helped to restore Soviet aid to Turkey.40 On September 17 Ali Fuat pasha sent Chicherin a personal letter reflecting various debatable questions of Russian-­Turkish relations, the political situation in Turkey, the military situation on the Greek front, and the economic situation in Anatolia. Ali Fuat pasha suggested starting a joint examination of all sides of modern political life and holding regular consultations on all the questions in the spirit of the Treaty of Moscow now, after the breakthrough on the Greek front.41 In September Yusuf Kemal bey sent Chicherin a letter noting that a whole series of problems had seriously damaged the Russian-­Turkish relations. The main problem was that Moscow was defending some persons who had fled from Turkey. He wrote: “This is a kind of support that Moscow renders to certain disgraced careerists who, after having fled abroad at the most critical moment of our country’s history, plot against us and want to return to the country as winners.” According to Yusuf Kemal bey, the second most important problem was that Turkey was being harassed by some Soviet agents in the Caucasus and that preparations in Georgia had increased after the beginning of the Greek offensive. The third important problem was the rumor about close Russian-­Greek trade talks that would make a very grave impression on Turkish public opinion. At the end the letter warns: “Otherwise, our enemies will try to interrupt talks to solve the Eastern question that was raised based on the strong Turkish-­Russian accord, without which the attempts by ­Western

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powers to defeat us separately and pull us away from our military goals by giving us important concessions could have been a success.”42 On September 22, 1921, Natsarenus, Soviet representative to Ankara, reported to Chicherin that Mustafa Kemal’s brilliant victory over the Greeks had increased his authority in the country to an unprecedented level: “This victory is the greatest success of Mustafa Kemal, where he showed himself as a great military leader.”43 That summer the world media began publishing articles praising Kemal pasha. Even the U.S. newspaper Philadelphia Public compared him with George Washington in an article entitled “Turkish Washington,” with the captions “Turkish George Washington” under the portrait of Mustafa Kemal pasha and “American Mustafa Kemal” under the portrait of George Washington.44 In late September Chicherin sent Mustafa Kemal a telegram containing solemn congratulations on the occasion of the brilliant victory against the Greeks. Kemal pasha’s answer was delivered to Moscow on September 29 through Natsarenus: “Your congratulations touched me most of all because they come from Soviet Russia’s working people who, at the most difficult moment, did not hesitate to admit the correctness of our business and the lawfulness of the struggle that the Turkish people have been carrying out for their freedom and independence.”45 Questions raised in Yusuf Kemal bey’s memorandum and Ali Fuat pasha’s personal letter were answered very late by the Russian side, when the Kars Conference was nearing its end. In a lengthy letter on October 10 Chicherin reported to Ali Fuat pasha that the government of Turkey had exaggerated the danger a bit regarding the stay of Turkish political circles — ​nonmembers of the ruling party and the GNAT — ​in Russia. Chicherin noted decisively: I can categorically tell you that no assistance or help was provided by the Russian government to political persons or political movements that maintain a hostile attitude to the current government of Turkey and decisively refute any contrary assertion. In strict compliance with the principle of noninterference with the internal affairs of Turkey, we believe that we are not interested in the struggle of parties within the Grand National Assembly. Chicherin insisted that the Turkish government’s fears that the movement of troops in the Caucasus republics was hostile in intent or that these republics were about to undertake hostile actions against Turkey were groundless: “A treaty between Turkey and the Caucasus republics that should be signed in Kars in the near future will be another element to confirm and strengthen our friendly relations.”46



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Of course Chicherin was not being quite frank. He delayed his answer until October 10 because he had received an enciphered report from Natsarenus on October 3 indicating that France and Turkey had reached a secret treaty on Russia. The essence of this treaty was that the Turks would formally keep the treaty signed with Russia in force but would seek a cause to cancel it. Natsarenus also added that under the terms of the signed secret treaty the government of Ankara made a commitment to back the former Caucasus governments in their struggle against the new Soviet republics of the South Caucasus.47 This news alarmed the whole Soviet leadership. Disturbing telegrams of this sort had been arriving from Ankara since mid-­September. At its meeting on September 29, 1921, the Politburo of the CC RCP (B) had the question “On Assignment of Military Equipment Items to Turkey” on the agenda. Those present — ​Lenin, Trotskii, Stalin, Kalinin, Kamenev, Krestin­ skii, Viacheslav Molotov, and Iosif Unshlikht — ​made a unanimous decision: “To reject it.”48 Starting from the summer of 1921, and the aggravation of the situation on the Greek front, Turkey generally did not receive the expected material and moral assistance from Russia. In June of the same year Ali Fuat pasha sent an open statement about this to Chicherin: while all the great powers were about to attack little Turkey, the whole world proletariat should act against this through its statements and actions. Ali Fuat pasha proposed to the Comintern to issue a special resolution. In replying to these claims, Chicherin noted that Communists were persecuted in Turkey and that Armenians were allegedly being killed in Gumru. Ali Fuat pasha responded: “The Communists of Turkey are persecuted when they, using erroneous tactics, weaken the Turkish front of the struggle against imperialism, so the law is applied against them.” Rumors about atrocities committed against the Armenians were absolutely false. The ambassador’s statement ended: “The Turkish nation, having suffered huge losses, continues to fight against imperialism at a time when the Communist world, its natural ally in this struggle, has already passed into a period of peace with imperialism and thinks that it has the right to ask for at least moral support from the Communist world, for reasons of common business.” Forced to agree with these arguments, Chicherin wrote to Zinov’ev that two resolutions had to be adopted: one urging the proletariat to oppose the Entente’s attack on Turkey and the second one blaming the Turkish government for actions against the Communists.49 Having seized power in Erivan in February 1921, the Dashnaks suffered a defeat in April. Their main forces retreated to Zangezur, where tough battles with Soviet troops began. The leadership of the Berlin-­headquartered Armenian Revolutionary Federation (the Dashnaksutiun) wanted to be connected

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with Chicherin to “settle” this matter. In turn Chicherin viewed this as a suitable chance to lead the Dashnaks out of Turkey’s control. Russia’s representatives had already been engaged in secret talks with the Dashnaks in Riga. These talks were aimed at removing the Kemalists’ influence over the Dashnaks, who had a “propensity” toward the Turks following the Gumru treaty. At a meeting on June 10, 1921, the Politburo of the CC RCP (B) approved these talks and instructed Ter-­Gabrielian as representative of Soviet Armenia to Moscow to hold the talks. Another negotiator had to be specified jointly by Ter-­Gabrielian, Chicherin, and Molotov. In addition Adolf Ioffe would be involved in the Riga talks.50 On June 20 this question was discussed at the CC of the Communist Party as well. Armenian Communists did not want the talks between Moscow and the Dashnaks to be official. Thus they sent additional instructions to Ter-­Gabrielian and made a CC decision to send new employees to Zangezur to strengthen the underground work there.51 Talks with the Dashnaks were repeatedly the subject of discussion for the Politburo on June 25, when it was decided to keep the decision of June 10 in force.52 Representing the Party of the Dashnaks at the Riga talks were ­Vahan Papazian (chair of the delegation) and Vahan Navasardian and Avetik ­Isaakian. As a result the CC RCP (B) and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation concluded a secret treaty that was further initialed on July 14, 1921.53 The Soviet leadership, however, having heard that the Dashnaks had signed a “Declaration of Cooperation” in Paris in June 1921 with representatives of the other Caucasus republics, tried to keep their distance from the Riga treaty. Furthermore, the Dashnak armed gangs in Zangezur had already been disarmed by this time.54 On July 26 the Politburo of the CC RCP (B) listened to Ioffe’s report on the treaty with the Dashnaks and resolved categorically to reject the draft treaty that had been agreed upon by Ioffe and the Dashnaks.55 On August 13, 1921, Ioffe passed the following message to the Dashnaks through the RSFSR representation to Latvia: “In connection with the recent reports of the Transcaucasus Republics to Briand and Pietro Torretta in Paris and Rome, I consider it impossible to report to the CC RCP that the treaty we have concluded or stand up for it until the political position that you have taken gives me such an opportunity.”56 The Dashnak leaders who had attended the Riga talks on August 17 sent a letter to the CC RCP (B), noting that the Paris declaration had been made a month before the Riga meeting and that all of Europe’s media and even Moscow’s radio reported this. The declaration did not disturb the beginning of the talks. Now Armenians declared their readiness to continue and complete the talks.57 In actuality the Dashnaks were playing a double game: on the one hand, they entered secret talks with Soviet Russia; on the other hand, they were eager to be represented in the Caucasus solidarity patronized by the West.



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Precisely for this purpose, on June 10, 1921, Avetis Agharonian (chair of the delegation of the Republic of Armenia) together with Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov (head of the Azerbaijan Republic), Abdul-­Mejid Chermoyev (chair of North Caucasus Republic), and Akaki Tchenkeli (chair of the Republic of Georgia) signed the Paris declaration.58 After the April talks in Baku and Tiflis, Turkey no longer had hope that Azerbaijan would pursue an independent policy and thus was no longer e­ ager to hold a news conference jointly with the Caucasus republics. The Turks viewed this conference as a direct continuation of the Moscow conference. Their best hope was that the South Caucasus Soviet republics would confirm the Treaty of Moscow as a legal document at the Kars conference.59 Moscow made every effort to make the South Caucasus republics act as a common team at the conference. Thus the commissars of foreign affairs of all three republics were called to Tiflis on May 7, 1921. Shahtakhtinskii represented Azerbaijan in these discussions together with Huseinov. Under the leadership of Orjonikidze and Legrand, the meeting decided that all three republics of the South Caucasus would act as a common front at the forthcoming conference. The decision indicated that the basis of talks with Turkey and of treaties under preparation should be the Treaty of Moscow.60 This idea was officially reflected in a note handed over by commissar Chicherin to the Turkish ambassador to Moscow. In his view, the treaty had to be signed not only by Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia but also by all three Caucasus republics, including Armenia. This treaty would be added to the one concluded in Moscow.61 In the Turks’ opinion the new treaty should have reflected Armenia’s official renunciation of Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin in favor of Turkey, as provided by the Treaty of Alexandropol.62 Yet during talks in Baku and Tiflis the Turkish side attained Azerbaijan and Georgia’s consent to conduct a conference in Kars. After Yusuf Kemal bey returned home, however, he was appointed as foreign minister, so he began insisting on conducting the conference in Ankara. On July 3, 1921, he sent Huseinov a telegram inviting Azerbaijan to attend the Ankara conference. He also asked commissar Huseinov to appoint his representatives to settle relations between the GNAT government and the fraternal Azerbaijan Republic as well as to strengthen a part of the Treaty of Moscow regarding Azerbaijan in a treaty between the two countries.63 In the same telegram Yusuf Kemal wrote that the Grand National Assembly had greatly trusted him in appointing him as foreign minister, so he could not leave the capital for a long period. He suggested Ankara as the venue for the talks, given that it had all of the appropriate conditions. “It turned out not to be possible to talk to the leadership of Soviet Armenia on the topic of the conference; however, if the Erivan government desires it may send its representatives to Ankara. I would like to ask you to

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extend this invitation to them.”64 Turkey’s diplomatic representative Memduh Shevket bey delivered this telegram from Yusuf Kemal bey to Huseinov, who immediately sent it on to Chicherin.65 Yusuf Kemal bey also reported to the leadership of Georgia and Armenia that he planned to hold a conference in Ankara and even invited the two republics to attend the event.66 On July 9, 1921, he sent a note to Chicherin, which reached Moscow on July 12. Yusuf Kemal bey wrote: With the aim of settling all the unsettled questions between Turkey and the Transcaucasus states and in order to emphasize the related resolutions of the Treaty of Moscow and conclude treaties with each of them, my government has now asked the governments of these states to appoint their delegates to a conference where all these matters will be examined and settled. My government would be very happy if the Soviet government also agreed to send its delegates to this conference.... Given that my government once hurried to agree with your statements of December 19, 1920, envisioning the transition of the venue of the event from Baku to Moscow, I would be very much obliged if you use your influence on the Transcaucasus Soviet republics to arrange the conference not in one of Eastern Anatolia’s towns as orally agreed between me and the governmental officials of Azerbaijan and Georgia but in Ankara itself. The reason for this request is the very same information in your telegram of December 19, 1920.67 But Soviet Russia did not allow transfer of the conference venue to Ankara.68 On August 8, 1921, Chicherin confirmed Soviet Russia’s desire to ­attend the Turkey-­Caucasus conference and informed Ali Fuat pasha about this. He wrote that the Russian government did not consider it a­ ppropriate to revoke the previous decision about conducting a conference in Kars. Chicherin also asked Ali Fuat pasha to inform him of the date of the Kars conference.69 After this answer from Russia, the other republics of the South Caucasus took a similar stance: to respect the decision made in Baku and Tiflis in April 1921 that the conference would be conducted in Kars. On July 21 Huseinov reported to Yusuf Kemal bey: [W]hen you were still in Baku, in discussing certain questions regarding conclusion of a treaty I insisted on arranging a conference in either Baku or Tiflis but you expressed a desire to convene a conference in Kars. Both then and now, given that it is greatly important for us to have a permanent telephone connection with our governments, I would be happy if you and your government agree to convene a c­ onference in



From Moscow to Kars 293

Baku. If we had a firm, permanent link with our governments, however, I would not have objected to Kars as a venue for the conference and would have made a commitment to get my friends’ consent. While valuing your kind attitude to the Soviet republics and sincerely desiring your presence in the composition of a Turkish delegation at a Turkish-­ Azerbaijani-Georgian-­Armenia conference I, regretfully, will not be able to give my consent to convening a conference in Ankara.70 In a note to Turkey on July 31, 1921, the Georgian PCFA refused to hold a conference in Ankara and suggested holding it in Batum. On August 24 the Armenian government sent a similar note to Turkey.71 Finally, on August 26 Turkey made a decision to hold the conference in Kars at the end of September.72 On August 29 Yusuf Kemal bey sent notes to the governments of the RSFSR and South Caucasus republics, inviting them to attend the Kars conference.

The Kars Treaty and the Recognition of Borders between Turkey and the South Caucasus Soviet Republics Serious preparations for the Kars Conference were underway in the summer months of 1921. At the end of August Huseinov warned in a telephone conversation by direct wire with Abilov, who was in Tiflis, that serious questions were about to be solved in Kars, so it was essential to meet Orjonikidze to persuade him that Azerbaijan should be represented by a sizable delegation.73 At the same time, he wanted to know who would represent Armenia. During the conversation Huseinov told Abilov that he probably would head the Azerbaijani delegation himself if there were no other candidates. Abilov would have to stay in Tiflis for a while.74 Following preliminary discussions, the Azerbaijani government decided that Abilov had to leave for Kars before leaving for Ankara; after Abilov’s meetings in Tiflis with Narimanov and Huseinov, however, the opinion prevailed that he had to leave for Ankara.75 At its meeting on August 26 the Politburo of the CC CPA (B) discussed the question of sending a delegation to conclude a treaty with Turkey. Shahtakhtinskii was appointed to head the delegation.76 In the last days of August he and thirteen members of the delegation left for Tiflis.77 The candidature of Shahtakhtinskii was approved, first, because he had attended the talks on the sidelines of the Moscow conference and, second, in relation to the situation in Nakhchivan. Though the Treaty of Moscow clearly defined the destiny of Nakhchivan, the government of Armenia did not give up its territorial claims to this region and thus was taking various provocative steps to destabilize the situation. A day

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before Shahtakhtinskii was appointed as head of the Azerbaijani delegation (on August 25) a meeting of the CC CPA (B) Orgburo listened to a report from Bunyadzade about an unfavorable situation in Nakhchivan. The Politburo Bureau was instructed to discuss this question, while Shahtakhtinskii was told to visit Nakhchivan soon.78 The decision came on August 22, when the region’s committee drew up a lengthy report about the Armenian government’s interference with the affairs of Nakhchivan. The report noted that the CC of the Communist Party of Armenia still could not clarify how it should interact with Nakhchivan, so it tried to interfere with Nakhchivan’s internal affairs even on a most insignificant issue: [A] secret agent, Sayadian, was sent to Nakhchivan from the CC Armenia. He calls himself head of the Registration Division of Armenia to Nakhchivan and an employee of the Caucasus Bureau ROSTA [Russian Telegraph Agency], works quite independently with his employees in the territory of the region, and recognizes neither local Party committee nor local Soviet power. On July 14 the CC of the Armenian Komsomol appointed a certain Riza Akhundov, as the responsible secretary of the Komsomol Orgburo to the Nakhchivan region, who began sending various letters to the Armenian CC containing perverted facts pertaining to the true situation in the region and established no link with the local Party committee. In this letter the secretary of the CC CPA asked the Caucasus Bureau to put an end to this abnormal situation and insisted that “the CC of Armenia should carry out any undertaking in the territory of Nakhchivan with the knowledge and permission of the CC CPA.”79 This peremptory attitude toward Nakhchivan on the part of the Party and governmental circles of Armenia was caused by the Caucasus Bureau’s disorderliness on the matter. In discussing the situation in Nakhchivan in the early days of September, a plenum of the Caucasus Bureau made a decision to deliver aid to this region through Armenia: “To propose to the CC of Armenia to assign 20,000 gold rubles to the Nakhchivan region.... To propose to the CC of Armenia to pay the utmost attention to providing aid to the Nakhchivan region in the form of manufacture and money.”80 Armenian political circles had such a careless attitude to the Nakhchivan-­ related clauses of the Treaty of Moscow that even after a March 16 treaty entered into force they continued to refer to a known statement of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee in written correspondence with Moscow. Mikhail Atabekov, diplomatic representative of Armenia to Baku, telegraphed Ter-­Gabrielian of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia in



From Moscow to Kars 295

Moscow, saying: “The Turks absolutely ignore Azerbaijan’s declaration of the Nakhchivan annexation approved by the Soviet power of Armenia.”81 This telegram was delivered to Krestinskii, the secretary of the CC RCP (B). Taking all of this into consideration, the leadership of Azerbaijan, aiming to strengthen Nakhchivan, ensured the appointment of Behbud Shahtakhtinskii as chair of the Council of People’s Commissars of Nakhchivan before the Kars Conference was over and added new cadres into the composition of the ­government.82 The Turks also were perfectly aware of Armenia’s provocative activity against Nakhchivan and of Soviet Russia’s turning a blind eye to this. In August 1921 Turkish ambassador Ali Fuat pasha notified commissar Chicherin of all the facts and then asked him: “We’ve heard that the Armenians want to seize Nakhchivan. Is it true?” Chicherin replied that the Armenians had no such intentions of any sort.83 Turkey’s irreconcilable stance concerning the Nakhchivan question later strengthened the Armenian diaspora’s hatred for Turkey and became one of the reasons for terrorist acts committed against Turkish diplomats by the multinational terrorist organization ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia).84 Related written correspondence was underway in Soviet Russia at the end of August. Stalin suggested Sheinman to represent Russia at a South Caucasus–­ Turkish conference in a letter to Chicherin, saying: “I’m unaware of other candidates for the Turks.”85 Nevertheless, a bit later the Russian PCFA chose Iakov Ganetskii, Russia’s plenipotentiary representative to Latvia, who further represented the Moscow government of Moscow at the conference in Kars. Ganetskii first visited Turkey in 1918, when he attended the Brest-­Lithuanian talks as a member of the delegation of Soviet Russia. As a result of active written correspondence between the foreign ministries of Soviet Russia and Turkey, the opening of the Kars Conference was scheduled for September 26.86 In a personal conversation with Mustafa ­Kemal, Russian representative Natsarenus said: “At a difficult time for Turkey, Russia tried to render its moral support through accelerating, right now, the Kars conference.”87 On September 21 Huseinov sent Yusuf Kemal bey a telegram expressing Azerbaijan’s consent to the opening date of the conference and announced that Shahtakhtinskii had been appointed as an extraordinary and plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan. He wrote: “It is an honor for me to notify you that your desire is quite in line with the intention of my government, and thus I am fortunate to have the opportunity on behalf of the Azerbaijani Soviet government to notify you about consent to the convening of a conference in Kars on September 26.”88 A copy of this telegram was sent to Mravian, who had been instructed by the CC of the Communist Party of Armenia on August 26 to deal with all the questions pertaining to ­preparations

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for the Kars Conference. He was directed to receive instructions from Moscow through Legrand and to establish links with the delegations from Azerbaijan and Georgia.89 Though the Armenians were not pleased with the Treaty of Moscow, the new leaders of Soviet Armenia nevertheless perfectly realized that it was Moscow that had brought them to power, so they were prepared to follow any of its desires on the eve of the Kars Treaty.90 While preparations for the conference were underway, Memduh Shevket bey reported to Huseinov that the situation on the Turkish front was very difficult and that it was desirable to conclude a military-­defensive alliance against the Entente to strengthen the Soviet republics’ military assistance to Turkey. He noted that the Caucasus-­Turkish front was quite secure and thus Turkey wanted to redeploy its troops from Eastern Anatolia to the Greek front. In a conversation with Huseinov on August 28 Shevket bey raised a question about establishing a Russia-­led alliance composed of Turkey, the Caucasus republics, Iran, Turkestan, and Afghanistan. In his view, it would be more appropriate if Azerbaijan suggested that Soviet Russia lead this alliance.91 Something like this was expressed by Karabekir pasha, who was speaking on September 8 in Sarykamysh during a reception in the honor of Islam ­Hajibeyli, the newly appointed consul of Azerbaijan to Kars, said: We have become convinced that the friendship of Turkey and all Muslim countries with Russia is the only salvation for us; only if allied with the Russian nation will we be able to defend our independence and physical existence against the imperialistic aspirations of Western predators, especially England, so we and Azerbaijan, Persia, and Afghanistan should do our best to keep and strengthen the existing friendship with Russia.92 In fact both Shevket bey and Karabekir pasha were feeling the pulse of Azerbaijan in order to find out whether Baku was ready to accept the idea of a military alliance with Turkey. Shevket bey knew that the successful military actions of Turkey against foreigners in the national-­liberation struggle had strongly increased Azerbaijani society’s sympathies for the Kemalists. Narimanov (who was striving for maximum possible independence by pressuring Moscow) and the Communist-­nationalists surrounding him in spring 1921, especially at the first All-­Azerbaijani Congress of Soviets in May, gained the advantage and at the same time hope for the independence of Azerbaijan’s politics. However, this advantage did not last long. The process of isolation of Narimanov that soon began revealed that all the hopes for independence were in vain.93 Jörg Baberowski writes that “emissaries of Moscow, in all probability, managed to neutralize Narimanov’s followers politically as well. Latent threats and political promises helped make his friends his enemies.”94



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Immediately after a meeting with Shevket bey, Huseinov telegraphed to Legrand in Tiflis the contents of a conversation on August 28. Legrand in turn reported this information to Chicherin through an urgent diplomatic message. The higher this information ascended through the bodies of power, the more markedly its sense changed. Moscow regarded this information as Azerbaijan’s eagerness to conclude a military alliance with Turkey. When Chicherin reported this to Stalin, he was indignant at such “tyranny” from Azerbaijan. Stalin reported back to Chicherin: As far as I know, Azerbaijani units exist on paper only (under the tsar Azerbaijan provided no soldiers, so there are no old soldiers there and thus it still would not work out to form purely Azerbaijani units). Even if such units existed, however, I would decisively have objected to an “alliance” with the Turks. I have a lot of motives that I can report to the Politburo, if necessary. In particular, I must say that Huseinov (he seems to have told you that an “alliance” is desirable) cannot be trusted as a politician, as he is an inexperienced, lightweight person (it is not his place to speak about the desirability of an “alliance”).95 Turkey’s intention of concluding an alliance with not only Azerbaijan but also with Iran and Afghanistan greatly troubled the Russians. At a meeting with Ali Fuat pasha in August 1921 Chicherin did not fail to ask about this, but Ali Fuat pasha replied that “there is nothing more natural than conclusion of an allied treaty among Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. That is because the independence and freedom of all three are suppressed by common enemies.”96 In fact Soviet leadership began displaying anxiety in May 1921 when it learned that Kemal pasha was eager to convene a Muslim congress, creating the danger of the formation of a Muslim alliance by the Turks. This question took on such a serious character that the CC RCP (B) submitted it for discussion to the Politburo on May 31. It was decided, for the purpose of closer familiar­ ization with this question, to establish a commission of representatives of the PCFA, Comintern, and Narkomnats, the bodies most familiar with the Turkish question. In its decision the Politburo emphasized: “All members of the commission must be reliable Communists.” Zinov’ev was instructed to form the commission.97 At its plenum on September 3 the CC RCP (B) Caucasus Bureau discussed the question “About the Kars Conference.” Attending the meeting were Huseinov, Shahtakhtinskii, and Abilov, in addition to Narimanov and Kirov, who were the Caucasus Bureau’s members from Azerbaijan. An eight-­point decision was made. The first seven points were about the Kars Conference, while the eighth point concerned Abilov. It noted that Abilov had to leave for Ankara immediately. In regard to the conference itself, the plenum’s decision was:

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1. To hold talks in strict compliance with the framework of the Treaty of Moscow. 2. To demonstrate the Caucasus republics’ solidarity with Ankara in the latter’s fight against the Entente. 3. To provide extended aid in this struggle (with money, etc.). 4. To consider it impossible, under the existing conditions, to conclude a military treaty between the Caucasus republics and Ankara but not to deviate from a closer political rapprochement of the Transcaucasus Republics with Ankara, Persia, and Afghanistan if this question is raised by the Ankara delegation. 5. In the course of the talks to raise the question of the use of pastures and salt mines in the area of Kagyzman as well as copper concessions in the area of Chorokh. 6. In no way to allow isolated statements by separate Caucasus republics; to display unanimity on all of the questions. 7. The starting date of the talks and agenda of the conference are to be worked out by the delegation itself.98 Immediately following the completion of the plenum, on September 4, Huseinov sent Yusuf Kemal bey a note with Azerbaijan’s consent to hold the conference in Kars.99 In the first days of September Georgia and Armenia also formed their delegations. Representing Georgia at the conference were Svanidze (commissar of foreign affairs and finance) and Eliava (naval commissar). The Armenian representatives were members of CPC (established in May 1921): Askanaz Mravian (commissar of foreign affairs) and Boghos Makintsian (commissar of internal affairs).100 Fearing that the Armenians could hinder preparations for the conference, Chicherin undertook certain tough measures against them and accused the Erivan government of giving up relations with revolutionary Turkey. Ter-­Gabrielian, the Armenian plenipotentiary representative to Moscow, complained in his letters to the CC of the Communist Party (B) of Armenia that his appeals on the elements of the policy of Soviet Armenia caused Chicherin’s contrary reaction, in terms of both form and content. Alarmed by this circumstance, a secretary of the CC of the CP of Armenia on August 10 appealed to Chicherin: The CC CP (B) of Armenia does not at all support interruption of the alliance between revolutionary Turkey and the Soviet republics. The Central Committee knows perfectly well that the interests of a revolutionary movement in the East require strengthening of this alliance.... The CC CP (B) of Armenia is convinced that the strengthening of peace with revolutionary Turkey may only accelerate the day of final liberation of the workers of Armenia from the nationalistic frenzy.101



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One manifestation of this anxiety was that (unlike the Azerbaijan and Georgia delegations) the Armenian delegation to the conference was led by Mravian as first secretary of the CC CP (B) of Armenia. On August 28 he replied positively to a note from Kemal bey dated August 24 and announced that Armenia would attend the conference in the near future. He also stressed that a treaty would be signed not between Turkey and Armenia but between Turkey and the republics of the South Caucasus. He considered this more appropriate, as a close political and economic alliance had been established among these republics.102 Heading the Turkish delegation was a GNAT deputy from Edirne: the chief commander of the Eastern Front, Kazım Karabekir pasha. The delegation included Veli Saltıkgil, a deputy from Burdur; Ahmet Mukhtar Çilli, the chief engineer-­builder of the railways of Eastern Anatolia; Memduh Shevket Esendal, Turkey’s diplomatic representative to Soviet Azerbaijan; and, in the capacity of advisors, deputy Edip bey; Muvaffak bey, controller of Turkey’s tobacco industry; Gadri bey, commander of the Eastern Front headquarters; and Col. Veysal bey and Col. Talaat bey. The conference’s secretariat on the Turkish side included Foreign Ministry employees Inhan Zuhtu bey and Osman bey and two aides to the Eastern Front commander, Nazmi bey and Selaheddin bey.103 Persons who had attended the Moscow conference were not included as members of the Turkish delegation: Yusuf Kemal bey, who had become the foreign minister; Ali Fuat bey, who had become the ambassador to Soviet Russia; and Dr. Rıza Nur, who spoke against the Kars Conference.104 On September 13 Rıza Nur spoke at a closed meeting of the GNAT and explained his stance, saying that the main goal of Russia and the South Caucasus republics in Kars would be to take Armenians under their patronage in order to force Turkey to revoke the Gumru Treaty. “After having united, they will force us to do this.” In his opinion Russia’s desire to hold this conference was also an attempt to establish a certain Caucasus confederation, which also contradicted Turkey’s interests. Finally, upon his return from Moscow, Rıza Nur loudly expressed his indignity at the behavior of the Azerbaijani and Georgian leadership and even told a meeting of the parliament that he felt insulted. Yusuf Kemal bey, who agreed with him, reported to the parliament: “When we arrived in Baku the leaders (the commissar of foreign affairs and the head of the government) were not eager to conclude a treaty with us. For instance one day we were given a promise but the next day they did not arrive in the place that they had promised; they appointed another time but again did not come.”105 The Turks were hurt. However, along with this, Yusuf Kemal bey also saw the great respect that the Azerbaijani people displayed for Turkey’s envoys. In his memoirs, he noted:

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On the first day of April, at 9 o’clock in the evening, we went from Moscow straight to Baku. On the eighth day in the afternoon we were given a reception in Baku that we had never been given before. In the streets our captured soldiers lined up like Azerbaijani soldiers. Women kissed the earth where our carriage passed. We stayed in Baku until April 19. Baku residents gave us a very warm reception. The number of different dishes at our table sometimes reached eighty. Once we told our hospitable hosts: “Why this waste?” We were told: “Don’t say that to us. If we could, we would have sent all the riches of Azerbaijan to Turkey with you. Unfortunately, this is beyond our power.”106 His love for the Azerbaijani people was a natural response to the feelings that he had experienced from common Azerbaijanis. Several days before the opening of the Kars Conference, on September 17, Yusuf Kemal bey gave the Turkish delegation very clear instructions containing important notes on each of the South Caucasus republics. First, he described meetings that were held at the Moscow conference and then in Baku and Tiflis and analyzed the positions of the sides at these talks. He reminded Karabekir pasha that if any of the South Caucasus republics protested against the Treaty of Moscow out of its own interests, the Russian delegation should be urged to observe its commitments and none of the articles of the Treaty of Moscow of March 16, 1921, should become a new topic of discussion. Kemal Bey recommended the following approach while concluding a treaty with the Azerbaijan Republic: the text of the treaty should be clear, written in Turkish; the preamble should contain statements confirming the fraternal relations between the two peoples; the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey should not accept treaties or international acts offered to only one of them; the Azerbaijani side must guarantee that it would not give any state the right to patronize Nakhchivan, as agreed in the Treaty of Moscow; the treaty should be include a separate article regulating attitudes toward Turkish migrants residing in Azerbaijan and to Azerbaijani migrants residing in Turkey; the Turkish government should be free in its actions on giving citizenship to Azerbaijani emigrants residing in the territory of Turkey, in accordance with their wishes; the treaty should reflect transfer of a portion of Baku oil to Turkey; education in Azerbaijan should be free; a Batum-­related clause of the treaty with Georgia should not be included in the treaty with Azerbaijan and a Nakhchivan-­related clause should not be included in the treaty with Georgia. The rest of the instructions dealt with future talks with Georgia, Armenia, and Russia.107 The most important aspect of Yusuf Kemal bey’s instructions was the emphasis on interest in concluding treaties with each of the South Caucasus



From Moscow to Kars 301

­republics separately.108 However, the very principle of forming delegations of the South Caucasus republics and the instructions given to them by Soviet Russia indicated that Turkey’s attempts to conclude separate treaties would face ­serious opposition. Aside from this, the decision by the Caucasus Bureau on September 3 proves that Russia’s desire was law to the rest of the republics.109 In early September the newly appointed consul of Soviet Azerbaijan to Kars, Islam Hajibeyli, was given a solemn reception in eastern Anatolia. In attendance at the meeting ceremony at the station were Rushdi pasha, commander of the Eastern Front headquarters; Nasimi bey, chief of the Kars Gendarmerie; the town’s commandant; and other officials. On September 4, on his arrival in Kars, Islam Hajibeyli telegraphed the Eastern Front commander, Karabekir, and asked to be given a reception. In the first days of his duty ­Hajibeyli visited military and civic institutions of the town. In a letter to Huseinov on September 11 he wrote: “They all received us very politely, asked what the situation in Azerbaijan was, and assured us that the Turkish people and government had fraternal feelings toward the Azerbaijani government and people.” On September 8 Karabekir pasha had invited the Azerbaijani consul to Sarykamysh, where, on behalf of the commander of the Eastern Front, “the first representative of fraternal Soviet Azerbaijan to Turkey” was greeted by Nazmi bey, as aide to the commander. On the same evening, to the sounds of an orchestra, a solemn reception was held in honor of the Azerbaijani consul, with top military officials present. During the reception Karabekir pasha asked about the political, economic, and public life of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Nakhchivan region. Before returning to Kars, consul Hajibeyli met the Russian consul to Sarykamysh, Aleksei Norman, and the Armenian consul to Kars, Sarkisian.110 The representatives of the Soviet republics to Eastern Anatolia had enough time to discuss certain questions of preparing for the Kars Conference as well. At the end of August 1921, after a 24-­day wait in Tiflis, the Azerbaijani delegation left for Kars as part of a delegation of Soviet republics totaling 150 persons. Led by Norman, the newly appointed consul general of Soviet Russia, a delegation of Russian diplomats arrived in Kars on September 20. Norman was appointed as the consul general at the beginning of the Kars conference, through transfer from Sarykamysh to Kars. The ratified copies of the Treaty of Moscow were exchanged in a solemn atmosphere on September 22.111 Also attending the ceremony was Azerbaijani consul Islam Hajibeyli, who had been performing his duties in Kars since September 4. Having left Tiflis, a delegation of Russian, Azerbaijani, Georgia, and Armenian representatives arrived at 11:30 a.m. on September 26 in Kars and was solemnly met. At 7:30 that evening, in a specially prepared building on the Army Street, Karabekir pasha opened the conference with a welcoming

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address.112 He was followed by Russian delegate Ganetskii, while Mravian greeted the conference on behalf of all of the Southern Caucasus republics. Ganetskii noted that “the glorious Turkish and Armenian peoples will prove to the whole world not in words but in deeds that the hostility between these two nations has been abandoned once and forever. They approach each other not with a hidden poniard but with a warm fraternal love.”113 Mravian said that the conference’s documents should reflect the Southern Caucasus ­peoples’ wishes for the fraternal Turkish people of a victory over imperialism and violence. To win the trust of the Soviet representatives, at Mustafa Kemal pasha’s suggestion, during the Kars Conference the GNAT adopted an act of amnesty regarding Communists taken into custody.114 Based on a proposal from the South Caucasus representatives, at the first meeting of the conference two commissions were established: an economic one and a commission in charge of the study of border questions. This meeting included a hot debate over the form of the final treaty. Karabekir pasha suggested concluding Turkey’s treaties with each South Caucasus republic separately. Stressing that this was the opinion of the Turkish government, he noted that he was authorized by the government to sign a treaty with each of the republics separately. Karabekir pasha noted that the Russian Soviet government recognized the South Caucasus republics as sovereign states and insisted that he wanted to conclude a separate treaty with each of the independent republics. However, Russian representative Iakov Ganetskii objected to this idea. In particular he stressed that after the conclusion of the Treaty of Moscow the situation in the South Caucasus had changed radically: now all three fraternal peoples strove for unification both politically and economically. Ganetskii tried to prove that only a joint treaty of the three republics with Turkey might lead to a close alliance with Ankara against the common enemy and give a new impetus to the struggle.115 Karabekir pasha did not consider the Russian representative’s arguments to be weighty and once again stressed the necessity of concluding separate agreements with each of the republics. Having consulted with Ankara, he reported to the conference that a treaty should be signed with each of the South Caucasus republics. During the meeting on September 28 he said that he would maintain this stance. Right after this meeting Ganetskii telegraphed Chicherin as the Russian people’s commissar of foreign affairs, saying: The conference’s third meeting has just now ended. Initially the question of borders was discussed. The Moscow text was adopted with ­minor changes; one article specifies borders for all three republics. We found great difficulty in making the Turks establish one mixed border commission with the participation of an RSFSR representative. Then



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we offered them our formulation of the introduction to the treaty; they considered it acceptable but noted that they were instructed by their government to sign a treaty with each of the republics separately. We spent a lot of time in proving that we cannot sign separate treaties. The Turks replied that they would ask Ankara once again, but it seems that they will agree, as they appear unable to counter our arguments.116 Discussion of this question started to take on a harsh tone, and this situ­ ation lasted until September 30. On that day Karabekir pasha proposed at the conference’s fourth meeting to make the treaty consist of two parts: the first ­ aucasus repart should include general provisions regarding all three South C publics, while the second one should reflect trade and border questions with each of the republics separately. However, this proposal by Turkey was opposed as well.117 Ganetskii sent a new telegram to Chicherin describing the course of the conference: No meeting was held yesterday; we are preparing articles and their translations that we passed to the Turks this morning. Our draft of a common treaty is based on categories of questions, not republics. ­Owing to our major explanations about the existing political and economic alliance among the Caucasus republics, the Turks sent an inquiry to Ankara and withdrew their initial decision to sign separate treaties. They agree to sign a common one but insist on editing the articles not on questions but republics. It was not possible to agree with this because it appears from the behavior of the Turks in the border and economic commissions that they would have offered a version quite unacceptable to us, so we then could find ourselves unable to reject the system itself. We therefore rejected their proposal, again arguing that under these alliances all questions related to one of the republics must be resolved jointly with the other republics. After a long discussion the Turks replied that they needed to ask Ankara again and that the latter was quite unaware of these alliances. They refused to pass on our statement to Ankara because they claimed that this should be done in a diplomatic manner. Initially they demanded that each capi­ tal send appropriate statements to Ankara. They also demanded that Russia make a similar statement. We pointed out the unacceptability of such formalism and noted that we would pass an appropriate statement signed by the present people’s commissars of foreign affairs of Georgia and Armenia and deputy chair of the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan, separately to Karabekir to be submitted to Ankara. I am

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offering a draft statement. If there is no reply from you by morning these statements will be sent. Maybe you will send a signed appropriate statement addressing Yusuf Kemal. The Turks in the commissions are very demanding, give the impression of distrusting the Transcaucasus Republics, and try to solve all the questions from a strategic viewpoint. We have already had meetings for five days but have not really moved forward. The behavior of the Turks makes a painful impression on our Caucasus comrades.118 Karabekir pasha’s hopes to draw Azerbaijan to Turkey’s side during the discussion were not fulfilled. In his speech on September 30 Shahtakhtinskii, the representative of Azerbaijan, was on Ganetskii’s side. He noted that revolutionary necessity had “made us conclude a common treaty.” The common treaty was appropriate for the South Caucasus republics, which had already unified economically, politically, and militarily. Shahtakhtinskii tried to convince his listeners that a common treaty was much more profitable for Turkey in terms of the struggle of the Caucasus and Turkic nations against a common enemy. He ended his speech by saying: “On behalf of the Azerbaijan Republic, I propose that the treaty be a common one and contain no special clauses on each republic.”119 Representatives of the South Caucasus Soviet republics told the Turkish GNA government on October 3, however, that all questions had to be solved jointly in this context because of the close political and economic links among them.120 Shahtakhtinskii’s report regarding the normal work of the conference was published in Baku newspapers.121 After this development Karabekir pasha was forced to retreat and agree to a joint treaty. Thus the most complex moment of the conference was overcome. In early October Hajibeyli, the Azerbaijani consul to Kars, wrote to Huseinov that “the conference’s work is successful and will end soon; it is being delayed due to the absence of good French-­language typists.” Aside from this, Hajibeyli reported an overall revival of activity in Kars due to the conference and the fears of Turkish ruling bodies in regard to the Bolshevik propaganda: “Thanks to my personal acquaintances and assurances by the Turks that Bolsheviks in general, and Azerbaijani Bolsheviks in particular, are their sincere friends and prepared to take every action to help them in their liberation struggle against the imperialists, the Turks fully trust me, an Azerbaijani consul.”122 Soviet Russia very much feared that the conference would be frustrated, so in sending Ganetskii to Kars the government supplied him with 1,100,000 gold rubles out of the money that Moscow had promised to the Turks. However, the PCFA let him pass this money to Karabekir pasha only after a treaty on Chorokh mines was concluded. During the Kars conference Chicherin



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told the CC RCP (B) to give this money to the Turks immediately, without preconditions; otherwise the Turks would begin complaining that the Soviet government did not keep its promises. Chicherin wrote: “Of course the Turks will also inculcate this idea, so it orients them toward the West. Bekir Sami is returning from Paris and using this together with the French. Thus it seems to me that it is necessary to assign the supposed sum immediately and at the same time appoint experts to settle the Chorokh matter.”123 When Yusuf Kemal bey learned that the allocation of money promised on March 16 was being made dependent on the Chorokh mines, he protested. He brought up “a letter of March 16 regarding annual payments without any conditions and a notification to Ali Fuat pasha that a part of the promised sum will be paid during an exchange of ratification documents of the Treaty of Moscow.”124 Following a note of protest from Yusuf Kemal bey, Chicherin again appealed to the Politburo, insisting that it was essential for the Soviet government to observe its commitments.125 At the same time, in his letter to Stalin, he stressed the importance of expansion of economic relations.126 Although Stalin was pessimistic about this issue, Chicherin tried to assure him that it was appropriate to establish links with these countries to strengthen their influence on the national-­liberation movement of the East, expand the social base of the bourgeois-­democratic revolution in Turkey, and in general acquire influence across the East.127 On October 3 Ganetskii sent Chicherin a detailed report regarding all disputed questions that arose during the meetings: “The questions of Nakhchivan and Batum were hotly debated because the Turks demanded supplying each article with an appendix to the treaty that would accurately specify the general bases of autonomy of these regions to be worked out right here, at the conference, by respective republics jointly with the Turks.”128 Another important question raised by the Turkish delegation in connection with Azerbaijan was related to the Baku oil. The Turks suggested that Azerbaijan must make a commitment to supply oil and petroleum products annually to Turkey according to Turkish demand. Shahtakhtinskii noted that Turkey would be provided assistance in a special form, but Azerbaijan would not make an official commitment.129 Ganetskii wrote that after Baku’s minor oil-­related corrections to the treaty the Turks made a suggestion: Azerbaijan will be obliged annually to supply oil and petroleum products to the Turkish government in a quantity corresponding to Turkey’s needs. These petroleum products will be given to Turkey in Kars or Batum as Turkey wishes. We disagree with this article and we will make minor promises that oblige us in terms of neither time nor quantity. This article may help you understand how the Turks behave.130

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The Turkish delegation’s proposal at the Kars Conference caused serious concern in Moscow. When this report was being made, Ali Fuat as ambassador of the GNAT government told Stalin that the Turks could mediate between France and the RSFSR in Moscow’s favor. The ambassador also suggested establishing a mixed Russian-­Turkish clandestine commission to spread revolutionary propaganda in all colonial countries of Africa and Asia. Having summed up all of Ali Fuat’s proposals, Stalin wrote to Lenin: “We still need to keep our previous stance (formally) and at the same time take measures to strengthen the Transcaucasus borders.... It appears from all this that the Turks have already ensured (is it for long?) their business and are seeking new forms of collaboration with us.”131 On October 3 Chicherin sent a telegram to Natsarenus, plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Russia to Ankara, expressing his displeasure with the delay of the conference’s work: “The Turks are displaying unusual stubbornness and making extreme claims. The conference is being terribly delayed, so every step requires a very long, tough struggle.”132 Chicherin asked him to pressure the Ankara government to speed up the work of the conference. During further talks the two sides made political, economic, and cultural proposals. Georgian delegates and Ganetskii, who was speaking on behalf of the Armenian delegation, suggested conducting archaeological excavations in eastern Anatolia, especially at the Ani ruins, returning the railway equipment that had been confiscated in Gumru to Armenia, providing aid to the starving population of Erivan, jointly using the Kulp salt mines and Igdir pastures, and so forth. Except for the railway equipment and aid to the starving population, the Turks regarded these proposals as interference with their internal affairs and thus rejected them.133 In turn the Turks suggested returning Turkish citizens’ properties confiscated in the South Caucasus republics, not nationalizing these privately owned immovable properties, enabling Turkey to use the Batum port freely, and so forth. Karbekir pasha noted that the Turks had yielded Batum only because this port was of vital importance for the Caucasus republics, but this port was essential for Turkey as well. Georgian delegates had to agree with this proposal, because it had already been determined in the Treaty of Moscow. As for Azerbaijan, Karabekir pasha suggested giving Turkey the right to provide citizenship freely to Azerbaijani emigrants as they wished. According to Turkish law persons who had resided in Turkey for three months and had not submitted a document about citizenship in any other country would auto­ matically be considered citizens of Turkey. When mobilization of men aged twenty to forty-­five was announced, Azerbaijani emigrants to eastern Anatolia had to choose either to return to Azerbaijan, though many of them had left for political reasons, or to accept Turkish citizenship and thus be subordinated to



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Turkish legal provisions. The Azerbaijani consul to Turkey noted that this decision directly depended on the war and that serious changes were occurring in Turkey: “Everything is excellent at the front; the most important thing is that the Turkish people decide to win or die: naturally such people will win.”134 Of all the Kars Conference questions concerning Azerbaijan, the Nakhchivan issue was the most important. Turkish diplomats suggested a project in the spirit of the Treaty of Moscow. Karabekir pasha first asked the Georgian and Azerbaijani diplomats to report on the situation in the autonomies of Ajaria and Nakhchivan. Eliava, on behalf of the Georgian delegation, and Shahtakhtinskii, on behalf of the Azerbaijani delegation, gave brief information. In particular Shahtakhtinskii noted: Azerbaijan has a Soviet government. Nakhchivan will become autonomous according to the Russian example. Given that Nakhchivan is a faraway district, the form of rule there will go beyond autonomy. A Majlis [Council] of people’s commissars has been established. There are few figures of science and art, so the Russian language is in use in official circles. A law has been issued to nationalize enterprises; the first steps in this direction have been taken. Azerbaijan manages Nakhchivan’s finances. An army has not been created yet. Three-­year primary schools teach in the Turkic language. Marriages, divorces, and other religious questions are resolved freely, as before.135 All questions were discussed in Tiflis beforehand on the eve of the Kars Conference. The delegations of Azerbaijan and Armenia also discussed the Nakhchivan question. As a result of these discussions the Turkish delegation was given a special memorandum noting the Soviet republics’ common stance on the Nakhchivan question. In addition to a whole series of other questions, this memorandum contained some border corrections favoring Armenia and envisioned “Establishment of the Autonomous Nakhchivan Soviet Republic as a Part of the Azerbaijan SSR.” Diplomatic trickery before the conference and this memorandum as the outcome of Azerbaijani-­Armenian discussions under Russia’s “aegis” were primarily intended to take the Nakhchivan question out of Turkey’s control. Discussions at the conference, contrary to the Treaty of Moscow, suggested that Soviet delegates including Azerbaijanis “will try not to let a mixed commission that includes a Turkish representative visit Nakhchivan; in all, they will make the Nakhchivan question their own internal matter that can be settled without the participation of official Ankara.”136 Turkish diplomats, however, had a very sensitive attitude toward the Nakhchivan question and did not want to be deceived. Karabekir insisted on the inclusion of the Nakhchivan issue in a new treaty between Turkey and South Caucasus republics, in accordance with the Treaty of Moscow. After

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long debates, they agreed to include this legal question in a treaty reflecting Nakhchivan’s borders in the following form: “The Turkish government and the Soviet governments of Azerbaijan and Armenian will agree that the Nakhchivan region, within the bounds indicated in appendix 3 of this treaty, will form an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan.”137 This statement offered by Turkish diplomats was advantageous because Armenia recognized that the Nakhchivan region belonged to Azerbaijan and made political and legal commitments by signing the treaty. Unlike the treaty of March 16, 1921, however, this treaty contained no statement that Azerbaijan had no right to concede Nakhchivan to any third country. Following Moscow’s “advice,” the leaders of Soviet Azerbaijan tried in every way to relieve themselves of this commitment to the Turks. Azerbaijan objectively weakened Turkey’s positions due to its devotion to Soviet solidarity with Armenia. The question of refugees was to be discussed at the conference’s meeting on October 6. However, the Turkish delegation suggested postponing this question for the next day. The Soviet delegation suspected that the Turks were delaying the conference’s work for a special purpose. Ganetskii wrote in a telegram to Chicherin: “Rumors have been spread in the town that a war on Poland will be declared today or tomorrow, and we definitely know that the Turkish delegation profits from this.”138 At the October 7 meeting the delegations began discussing the issue of compensation of losses due to military actions and return of the confiscated goods. The delegations of the Soviet republics proposed to the Turkish side to discuss the question of compensating all the losses that Gumru had suffered. In response the Turkish delegation demanded discussion of the question of compensating all the losses that the populations of the towns of Erzurum, Kars, and Sarykamysh had suffered because of military actions. To make this proposal easier to accept, the Turkish side suggested not going beyond the framework of the Treaty of Moscow.139 On October 6 the sides began discussing the postponed questions. After being agreed upon by appropriate commissions, articles of the treaty on border questions as well as specification of a series of aspects concerning the use of the Batum port were submitted for consideration to a plenary meeting. On the same day Ganetskii telegraphed Chicherin that the treaty would most likely be signed on Monday or Tuesday.140 However, sharp discussions about the Batum port continued on Monday as well. Finally the Turks gave up their demand for an additional protocol on the Batum port in exchange for the Soviet delegation’s refusal of Gumru-­related demands, so path toward signing the treaty was cleared, with the signing ceremony scheduled for Wednesday.141 Despite a whole series of discords and disputes, the bases of interrelations between Turkey and the South Caucasus republics were reflected in the Treaty



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of Kars, which was signed on October 13, 1921, at 2 in the afternoon. This treaty consisting of twenty articles and three appendixes was concluded between Turkey and the republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan with the participation of Russia.142 In the treaty both parties recognized “as annulled and invalid all the treaties concluded between governments that were previously responsible for the sovereignty of territories of the agreeing parties concerning these territories as well as treaties concluded with third countries regarding the Transcaucasus Republics.”143 Article 2 of the treaty notes that the term “Turkey” in the treaty means territories included in the National Turkish Pact of January 28, 1920. Parties to the treaty agreed not to recognize any peace treaty or other international acts that one of the parties to the treaty was committed to by force. This article marked the refusal of all three Caucasus republics to observe the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920, primarily recognition of Turkish bounds specified in the National Pact by Armenia. Most importantly, it meant giving up claims based on the Treaty of Sèvres for the existence of a “Great Armenia.”144 According to article 3, all three South Caucasus republics, “in admitting that the regime of capitulations is incompatible with free national development of any country as well as the full realization of sovereign rights, will consider any actions or rights relating to this regime to be invalid and canceled.” Article 4 drew a borderline between Turkey and the South Caucasus republics stretching from the village of Sarp to the lower reaches of the Kara-­Su River. A more exact borderline was defined in appendixes 1 and 2. Article 5 stipulated that “the Turkish government and the Soviet governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia agree that the Nakhchivan region within the bounds indicated in appendix 3 of this treaty will form an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan.”145 Thus Armenia recognized Nakhchivan’s transfer into Azerbaijan’s protectorate, while Azerbaijan accepted this responsibility. At the same time, the condition “not to give this protectorate to any third state” specified by article 3 of the Treaty of Moscow was not included in the Treaty of Kars. The treaty’s appendix 3, entitled “Territory of Nakhchivan,” marks the region’s borders: Village of Ourmia, from there by a straight line to the Arazdayan station (leaving it to SSR Armenia), then by a straight line to mountain Dash-­Burun west (3142), watershed of mountain Dash-­Burun east (4108), crosses the river Jahaanam-­Darassi to the south of the inscription “Rodn.” (Boulakh) (South), following the watershed of mountain Baghyrsagh (6607) or (6587), and from there follows the administrative border of the former Erivan and of Sharur-­Daralayaz uyezds by

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the elevation 6629 to the mountain Komurlu-­dagh (6839) or (6930), and from there to the elevation 3080, Sayat-­dagh (7868), village Kurt ­Kulag (Kyurt Kulak), mountain Hamessur-­dagh (8160), elevation 8022, Kuki-­dagh (10282), and the eastern administrative border of the former Nakhichevan uyezd. Under article 6 Turkey agreed to accept Georgia’s sovereignty over the port of Batum and a territory stretching north from a border indicated in article 4 and included in the composition of the Batum port. Georgia was to grant broad local autonomy to the local population, provide every commune with its cultural and religious rights, and give the population the opportunity to make use of the land law at will. In addition Turkey was granted duty-­free, tax-­free transfer of goods through the Batum port. Article 7 obliged Turkey and Georgia to ease crossing of the border by resi­ dents of bordering areas. According to article 8, the governments of Georgia and Turkey took into consideration the necessity to allow residents of bordering areas of both countries to make use of summer and winter pastures located on the other side of the border. Article 9 included the international status of the Black Sea and the straits. Both parties agreed that solution of this question should not damage the full sovereignty of Turkey as well as the security of Turkey and its capital, Istanbul. Under article 10 parties to the treaty agreed not to allow formation in their respective territories of organizations or groups claiming the role of government in another country or in a part of its territory. Article 11 made it clear that citizens of the parties to the treaty who stayed in the territory of another party would be subject to all rights and duties of the country that they stayed in, except for national defense-­related duties, from which they would be exempted. Questions pertaining to citizens’ rights to inheritance and family law were the exception to this article. Article 12 obliged parties to favor citizens of each of the parties to the treaty as much as possible. Article 13 stipulated that residents of territories that had been a part of Russia before 1918 over which Turkey’s sovereignty had now been recognized would have the opportunity, if desired, to give up Turkish citizenship and freely leave Turkey, taking along their things and property or their value. The same right would be given to residents of territories that had been ceded by Turkey to Georgia. Articles 14, 15, and 16 stipulated that within a six-­month period a special accord on refugees of the wars of 1918–20 would be reached, immediately declared full amnesty for crimes and deeds committed by citizens of the opposing side as a consequence of war at the Caucasus front, and demanded that former prisoners of war and civil prisoners would be returned to their homeland within two months. Articles 17, 18, and 19 dealt with questions



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concerning restoration of railways, telegraphs, and other means of communication; trade, economic, and financial issues; and the commitment to sign conventions about consul relations within a three-­month period. According to article 20, the governments of Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia had to ratify the Treaty of Kars and that the exchange of ratification notes had to take place in Erivan as soon as possible. Signing the treaty were Askanaz Mravian and Boghos Makintsian on behalf of the government of Armenia, Behbud Shahtakhtinskii on behalf of the government of Azerbaijan, Shalva Eliava and Aleksandr Svanidze on behalf of the government of Georgia, Iakov Ganetskii on behalf of the government of the RSFSR, and Karabekir pasha, Veli bey, Memduh Shevket bey, and Mukhtar bey on behalf of the government of Turkey. In some instances the Treaty of Kars repeated the articles of the Treaty of Moscow. Nevertheless, the Moscow and Kars Treaties marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish-­Russian relations.146 With short breaks, this era lasted until the end of World War II. Despite being somewhat limited, the Treaty of Kars became an important victory of Turkish diplomacy. From the point of view of postwar international relations and revocation of the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, this treaty became the first crisis of the Versailles system. Having signed a treaty with the Southern Caucasus republics with the participation of the RSFSR, Turkey affirmed the victory of its eastern policy. The four neighboring countries recognized Turkey’s borders as specified in a National Pact, which strengthened the internal and international position of Turkey. Opening the third meeting of the GNAT in 1922, Mustafa Kemal pasha noted: “On October 13 in Kars we signed a treaty with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia based on the Treaty of Moscow. This treaty has legally strengthened our current position in the East and become a reality indicating that it is no longer possible to realize the Treaty of Sèvres.” Together with the Moscow Treaty, the Treaty of Kars removed the international legal basis of claims for establishment of a “Great Armenia,” ensuring that this dream would never come true. On March 1, 1922, Mustafa Kemal pasha told the Grand National Assembly: “What was called the Armenian question was beyond the true interests of the Armenian people, would have served the economic interests of world capitalism, and found its most correct solution in the Treaty of Kars.”147 As a long-­term target of the policy of the Dashnaks and the Bolsheviks, Nakhchivan acquired an international status while remaining a part of the territory of Azerbaijan. Sovietization of Armenia was followed by a Nakhchivan-­ related crisis, but the Treaty of Kars put an end to any fabrications once and for all. After the Treaty of Kars was concluded, this status could not be violated by either Armenia or even Soviet Azerbaijan. In a series of Soviet conditions based on “international sentiment” rather than on national interests, the

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Treaty of Kars became the most reliable international legal guarantor of the destiny of Nakhchivan. The Turkish media attached great importance to the treaty’s article regarding Nakhchivan. The newspaper Tevhidi Efkar (Common Opinion) wrote that “as the Treaty of Kars stipulates, the transfer of the Nakhchivan region to the protectorate of Azerbaijan will provide the establishment of links between Turkey and this fraternal, friendly republic.”148 Armenian newspapers based in Europe were deeply concerned over the transfer of Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan. In their opinion Turkey had conquered Armenia and the whole Southern Caucasus by gaining Kars, Ardahan, and Surmali under the treaty. The Armenian newspaper Zhoghovurd Tsain (­People’s Voice) wrote: The seizure of Kars and Ardahan, the establishment of Nakhchivan’s autonomy, and the separation of the Armenian regions of Karabagh and Zangezur from Armenia caused new claims by Azerbaijan upon Armenia. Armenia has been deprived of all economic means and means of political development; it is deprived of the coal of Olty and the forests of Sarykamysh.149 The Iran-­based Armenian newspaper Haik (Armenian) wrote on November 13, a month after the Treaty of Kars was signed: “Commanders of the glorious Red Army not only failed to insist on the borders of 1914 as constituting an unquestionable part of Armenia that joined the Soviet Federation but also could not grab little Nakhchivan from the Kemalists.”150 Chakatamart (­Battle), another Dashnak newspaper, believed that the decisions of the Kars Conference pleased only Azerbaijanis.151 The conclusion of the Treaty of Kars was followed by certain changes in the system of administrative government of the Nakhchivan region and a ­series of organizational measures. Yet two days before the treaty was signed, on October 11, 1921, a meeting of the Orgburo and Politburo of the Nakhchivan regional committee of the CPA established a Council of P ­ eople’s Commissars that include a commissar of foreign affairs. CPC deputy chair Abbas Gadimov was appointed to this post.152 After he visited Tiflis in December 1921, the post of commissar of foreign affairs no longer existed in the Nakhchivan CPC. At its meeting on December 18 the Nakhchivan CPC united some commissariats due to the small size of the region. Upon his return to the Caucasus Bureau from a tour on December 21, Gadimov reported to a meeting of the presidium of the Nakhchivan regional c­ ommittee that Orjonikidze as chair of the Caucasus Bureau and secretary Figatner were seriously concerned over “Nakhchivan’s being actually isolated from the central Soviet government.” They recommended that Nakhchivan keep close links with Moscow through the Caucasus Bureau. Taking these wishes into



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c­ onsideration, Abbas Gadimov suggested strengthening links with the Caucasus Bureau by sending reports and thus increasing the authority of the Nakhchivan Republic. Gadimov reported that the question of establishing a Federation of South Caucasus Republics had been suspended until a congress of Soviets was convened.153 The first congress of Soviets of the South Caucasus that was held in December 1922 made a decision about the establishment of Nakhchivan’s autonomy as a part of the Azerbaijan SSR. With this in mind, the Caucasus Committee of the RCP (B) in January 1923 made the following decision: “Proceeding from the decisions of the congress of the Soviets of the South Caucasus, to propose to the CC CPA (B) to make Nakhchivan an autonomous region.”154 On February 27, 1923, the 3rd All-­Nakhchivan Congress of Soviets decided that the Nakhchivan SSR was to join the composition of Azerbaijan as an autonomous region: “the whole Nakhchivan region with all of its institutions is to join the Azerbaijan SSR as an autonomous region.” This decision was followed by a broad discussion of the Nakhchivan question at the fifth congress of the CPA (B), which opened in March 1923. The congress noted that putting as large a territory as the Nakhchivan Republic under Azerbaijan’s protectorate did not meet several requirements, so it was considered appropriate to recognize Nakhchivan as a constituent part of Azerbaijan as a autonomous unit. The third session of the CEC plenum of the second convocation in June 1923 reacted to the appeal from the congress of Soviets of Nakhchivan and drafted a provision about the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The CEC of the Azerbaijan SSR, in recognizing the Turks as an indigenous population of N ­ akhchivan, declared this territory to be an autonomous part of the Azerbaijan SSR and decided to name it the Nakhchivan ASSR of the Azerbaijan SSR.155 Such radical changes of the status of Nakhchivan strongly troubled Turkey. Owing to the great difficulty in transferring Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan’s protectorate according to the Moscow and Kars Treaties, Ankara feared that in Soviet Russian political conditions these changes might lead to the loss of Nakhchivan for Azerbaijan. The government of Turkey thus protested against Azerbaijan’s violation of a Nakhchivan-­related article. In a note of June 25, 1923, to the PCFA of Soviet Russia, the Turkish Foreign Ministry said: “This resolution of the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan is a direct violation of article 3 of the Moscow Turkish-­Russian treaty of friendship of March 16, 1921, and article 5 of the treaty of October 13, 1921, that Russia signed as well.”156 On August 17, 1923, the PCFA Board of the USSR discussed the current situation and set up instructions for a PCFA USSR representative to the South Caucasus. From then on, the South Caucasus republics had to observe the directives of the PCFA USSR in international treaties and in foreign

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­policy issues.157 The PCFA instructions were approved, with minor changes, at a meeting of the Politburo on August 23. It would be appropriate to say that all points of the instructions were caused by controversial moments that had emerged in relations between Turkey and the South Caucasus republics. One of these contradictions was the Nakhchivan question. After protests by Turkey, Chicherin wrote to Stalin and other members of the Politburo: Under the Moscow and Kars treaties Nakhchivan is regarded as an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan. The Turkish government has learned that by a decision of the CEC of the Azerbaijan Republic Nakhchivan has been made part of the territory of Azerbaijan, which contradicts the treaties with Turkey. All our respec­ tive letters and telegrams sent to Tiflis went unanswered. When comrade Orjonikidze arrived in Moscow, I wrote to him about this; now I have received an answer from him in Berlin that a congress of the Nakhchivan region has declared the region an inseparable part of Azerbaijan and that it currently enjoys the rights of an uyezd. Comrade Orjonikidze says that he did not object to this and that he supposes that Nakhchivan has the right to this. Regretfully, this is wrong. If a certain territory has a known status according to the treaty, this status cannot be changed without agreement between parties to the treaty. For instance, Luxembourg cannot be annexed to Germany or France or Belgium no matter what the desire of Luxembourg is. This case is a real violation of our accords with Turkey. Why can’t Nakhchivan be declared an autonomous region? In fact, this won’t differ much from its position as an uyezd.158 Following this letter, the question “About Nakhchivan” was submitted for discussion to the CC RCP (B) Politburo on August 23, 1923, at the suggestion of Chicherin and Narimanov. It appears from the decision made that Chicherin’s proposals cited above were taken into account and that the CC secretariat was instructed to “settle the Nakhchivan matter with the Transcaucasus regional committee.”159 Once this was done the Azerbaijani CEC again returned to the Nakhchivan question and made a decision to establish an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a part of the Azerbaijan SSR. On January 8, 1924, the CEC of the South Caucasus approved a decision of the Azerbaijani CEC on the establishment of the Nakhchivan ASSR. On February 9 the Azerbaijani CEC issued an appropriate decree. That is how all disputes arising from the Nakhchivan question were settled. The leadership of the USSR had to return to the Nakhchivan question once again in 1966. Iurii Starchenko, head of the Department of Organizational and Party Work of the CC CPSU, asked the leader of the Foreign



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Ministry of the USSR to prepare a reference on the status of Nakhchivan. A three-­page reference signed by Sergei Kiktev, head of the Department of Near Eastern Countries of the USSR Foreign Ministry, and Oleg Khlestov, head of the Legal Department, was submitted to the CC CPSU on May 31, 1966. The reference noted that “revision of the status of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic...might have led to aggravation of Soviet-­ Turkish relations.... In this connection the Department of Near Eastern Countries and the Legal Department would consider it inappropriate to take any steps to change the status of the Nakhchivan ASSR.”160 Without a doubt the leader­ship of the USSR displayed its interest in the Nakhchivan question ­inappropriately.

Establishment of the Azerbaijani Embassy in Ankara Before the Treaty of Kars was signed, Abilov arrived in Ankara as plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan. Abilov first visited foreign minister Yusuf Kemal bey and reported on this meeting to Huseinov: During a conversation about the current political situation Yusuf ­Kemal bey answered my question about interrelations between France and Turkey in the following way: “Arriving in Ankara quite recently was a French mission headed by Henry Franklin-­Bouillon, who had previously visited Ankara unofficially. Our enemies interpret our stay at this mission in Ankara to mean that we and France are about to conclude a certain treaty directed against the RSFSR. Such a provocative activity by our enemies has caused a certain doubt in us on the part of the RSFSR. As for rumors that the Turkish-­French talks counter our common interests with the RSFSR, I can only say that nothing of the sort has ever been planned in Turkey and that, as long as I head the foreign policy of Turkey, and my comrades and I head the government, nothing malicious can be undertaken against the RSFSR.161 In his first report to the Azerbaijani PCFA, Abilov noted that he trusted the words of Yusuf Kemal bey. In his second report sent later the same day, however, he wrote: “I suppose that any agreement with the French and, in general, with our enemies won’t favor us and will weaken our common Eastern Front.” Abilov asked to be linked with Moscow directly to receive directives. He had still been playing a national, all-­Eastern, all-­Muslim tune. At the same time, Abilov recalled that he had talked with Enver pasha on a similar topic in Batum. He also noted that the Kemalists were aware of Enver pasha’s stay in Batum.162

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Rumors had spread in the autumn of 1921 that Enver pasha had allegedly gathered his followers in Batum, overthrown the government of Ajaria, and declared the establishment of the Soviet Republic of Ajaria with a government composed of members of the Unity and Progress Party. Karabekir pasha thus gave Enver pasha an ultimatum to leave Ajaria within six days and restore the Ajaria government in line with the Treaty of Kars. Otherwise Karabekir pasha threatened to commence military actions. After this ultimatum Enver pasha was forced to leave either Batum or the entire Caucasus region.163 It should be noted that after the Treaty of Kars was signed the top leadership of Soviet Russia, in the person of Stalin, admitted its guilt in playing the Enver pasha card against Mustafa Kemal pasha. In a letter to Chicherin on October 17, 1921, Stalin wrote: “We ‘sinned’ by letting Enver plot against Kemal and for a brief moment ‘betrayed’ the latter.”164 During a meeting with Abilov and Mikhail Frunze in January 1922 Mustafa Kemal pasha read them two letters from Ahmet Jemal pasha regarding Enver pasha. In the first letter Jemal pasha recommended reconciling with Enver pasha and using him outside Turkey. In his second letter Jemal pasha wrote that Enver pasha is a crazy adventurer unworthy of any respect. He is deceiving both Turkey and the RSFSR. Having now felt that Russia’s attitude to him has cooled down, he has masterminded a new venture. According to available information, he is moving to Bukhara and Fergana to raise a revolt against Russia. I made every effort to make him give up this idea. I don’t know if I have succeeded. It seems to me that it is now high time to do away with the pan-­Islamist campaign among all Muslims of the East. Having been acquainted with this letter, Kemal pasha told Frunze, who was about to leave for Moscow, that Jemal pasha would arrive from Berlin in Moscow one month later and asked to explain the current situation to him. If it turned out to be possible to remove the remains of Enver’s past influence, it would become possible to use Jemal pasha to act in the East. Jemal pasha also sent a letter containing an extremely negative characterization of Enver pasha from Munich to Chicherin as well. He wrote that he had found great difficulty in recalling Enver back to Moscow from Batum: “Enver lost his mind.” To justify the decision of the Orgburo of the CC RCP (B) recalling Enver pasha from Bukhara, Chicherin showed Jemal pasha’s secret letter to Stalin.165 During a meeting between Abilov and Yusuf Kemal bey, they discussed a number of economic and commercial issues. Abilov reported on the abundance of tobacco, cattle, and wheat in Anatolia. When Abilov asked Kemal bey about the possibility of transporting these goods to Azerbaijan, he replied that it was impossible in respect to other countries but it was possible in return



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for petroleum products. Abilov wrote to Huseinov that Azerbaijani consulates were to open in Trabzon and Samsun for expansion of trade and economic relations as well as to strengthen the position of the consulate in Kars.166 He added that the opening of additional consulates would foster control over the activities of Azerbaijani emigrants in Turkey. The leaders of Soviet Azerbaijan were greatly interested in this, so the instructions from the PCFA recommended diplomatic missions in Turkey to f­ocus on the matter. Deputy foreign minister Andrei Andreev warned ­Hajibeyli, the consul in Kars, that the Kars region served the interests of Azerbaijani and Caucasian emigration as a whole. Abilov informed Huseinov and Orjonikidze that Dr. Khosrov bey Sultanov from Trabzon had organized a ­charity society with a view to aiding refugees from Azerbaijan. According to the charter, the society was expected to open branches along the Black Sea coast of Anatolia and in Kars. Abilov opined that a network of Azerbaijani counterrevolutionaries would function in Turkey under the cover of this ­society and “thereby launch its black work in Transcaucasia.”167 According to the pleni­potentiary representative of the Russian Federation in Ankara, the Azerbaijani emigrants had a strong impact on Turkish public opinion and political circles. The Russian Embassy explained that persecutions of Communists in Turkey were due to the unfavorable situation in Azerbaijan, so numerous counter­revolutionaries were flowing into Anatolia.168 Abilov reported that two representatives of the local committee of national defense were members of the society. Abilov, who had previously acted as deputy minister of internal affairs, tried to supervise the emigrants’ organization. He even recommended that Huseinov keep the Turkish diplomatic mission in Baku under observation, saying that it maintained secret ties with local Ittihadists. Abilov wrote: According to my information, the Turkish mission in Baku is showing interest in Ittihadist counterrevolutionaries engaged in the Azerbaijan SSR. Although Memduh Shevket is far from all of them, his staff members are maintaining contacts with these organizations. That is why I ask you to have these people shadowed. Also, I would recommend planting an experienced and authorized agent into the Turkish mission and thus getting necessary information from him.169 In another report to Baku Abilov noted: “A staff member of the Turkish mission, Osman bey, left for Baku; he was accompanied by a certain Hamdi who acted as a kavas [guard] at the Turkish mission in Baku. Both are related to Kemal’s counterintelligence, so I ask you to take appropriate measures and supervise the Turkish mission in Baku.”170 Abilov pointed out that the intelli­ gence and counterintelligence of Turks operated perfectly and that they were

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well aware of what was happening both in Turkey and abroad. For example, they were informed about the details of a confidential meeting held in T ­ iflis. “Mustafa Kemal pasha informed comrade Natsarenus, who was going to leave for Russia in a day or two, about this meeting and may inform you on the subject.”171 Information from Turkish intelligence proved to be correct. A conference attended by Ittihadists and representatives of Soviet Russia and the Caucasian Republics was held in mid-­October in Tiflis, after which the Soviet representatives declared mistrust of Mustafa Kemal pasha. In the course of the talks the Soviet party tried to make the Ittihadists seize power, but they refused, saying that this step would weaken Anatolia’s resistance. Natsarenus sent a secret telegram to Chicherin, which warned that Kemal pasha was aware of the conference and entreated him to avoid holding conferences of this sort in the Caucasus, where there were “too many blabbers.”172 On October 14, 1921, Mustafa Kemal pasha received Abilov, who said: Dear gazi [hero], Your Majesty. With your permission I am authorized to convey, through your mediation as a representative of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and commander-­in-chief of the Turkish army, fraternal greetings from the socialist Soviet government of Azerbaijan and Azeri Turks. On behalf of my government I cordially welcome the GNAT, famed for its bravery and heroism, the heroic Turkish army, and people of the whole Turkish nation, who are laying down their lives to protect the political and economic rights of the nation. Abilov touched upon the “Western oppressors” who had brought misery to the Muslim peoples by dictating the Versailles and Sèvres treaties. He also stressed the major role of the Turkish national movement in the struggle against the imperialistic yoke: “Azeri Turks freed from slavery thanks to the great Russian revolution are ready to sacrifice the lives of their sons to liberate Turkey and all oppressed peoples of the East.” Abilov told Kemal pasha that the latest victories of the Turkish army delighted Azeri Turks and the rest of the Islamic world.173 In reply Kemal pasha welcomed the people of Azerbaijan on behalf of the GNAT, saying: We want to live freely and independently within our borders, and we are fighting for implementation of this idea. Our nation is proud of bolstering efforts in the name of Islamic salvation and improvement of the welfare of the oppressed peoples worldwide. Our nation is extremely happy to hear the confirmation of this truth from representatives of fraternal Azerbaijan. The peoples of Rumelia and Anatolia are aware that the hearts of Azeri Turks are beating in unison with their hearts. That is why they are praying for the rights of Azeri Turks to be



From Moscow to Kars 319

preserved and for freedom from slavery. The misfortunes of the Azeri Turks are ours; their joys are ours too.174 On October 22, 1921, Abilov gave Kemal pasha his credentials as the plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan.175 On November 18 at 1:00 in the after­ noon Mustafa Kemal pasha hoisted the flag of Azerbaijan over the embassy building. Attending this grand event were prime minister Fevzi ­Chakmak ­pasha; members of the GNAT; foreign minister Yusuf Kemal bey; the mini­ sters of education, justice, public health, and internal affairs; Tochi, the representative of Italy; Sultan Ahmad khan, the ambassador of Afghanistan; secretary Hidayatullah khan; Mikhailov, secretary of the Russian diplomatic mission; and other officials. When opening the meeting, Abilov declared: During the last war the world leaders tried to enhance their might and despotism. However, Azerbaijan was successful in upholding its rights and building its independence. Dear commander-­in-chief, history has provided us with a chance to raise our red banner near the Turkish scarlet banner. Today is a momentous day for all the oppressed worldwide. On behalf of all independent Azerbaijanis I would like to thank you and all our Turkish brothers. Two years ago our tricolor rose above Istanbul. At that moment this flag was tricolored like souls of the rulers of Azerbaijan. But today our flag is one-­colored, revolutionary. Azerbaijanis are free due to the great Russian revolution and dream of living in friendship with Russian and other peoples worldwide. I hope that all oppressed minority peoples will gain independence and live as a fraternal family. Once again I would like to thank you, your army, and all Turks.176 Abilov was followed by Mustafa Kemal pasha: Dear ambassador! Let me personally and on behalf of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey express to you my gratitude for today’s holi­ day. I highly appreciate this holiday because I had the honor to raise the banner of our brother country. Our enemies attempted to hoist a hostile Greek flag over Ankara. Praise Allah that they failed to do that, and today we have hoisted the fraternal flag. It is obvious today that relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are sincere and open-­hearted. Greatly contributing to this is our respected Ambassador Abilov. The geographical location of Azerbaijan also contributed to the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries. Dear ambassador! It is a great holiday for us to watch the flag of Azerbaijan flying next to the Turkish flag. Once again I would like to repeat my cordial gratitude for this inimitable holiday.177

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Upon completion of the flag-­raising ceremony at the embassy building, Abilov held a grand reception in honor of the guests and on behalf of the Azerbaijani government presented a golden Caucasian belt with the inscription “To the Hero of the Turkish Revolution, Mustafa Kemal pasha.”178 Thus at the end of 1921 the seemingly independent diplomatic mission of Azerbaijan started its activity. However, this did not last long. In early December the Turkish newspapers wrote that Azerbaijani ambassador Abilov had given seventy-­five Turkish liras to the relief fund for the wounded. That was the last decision independently made by the Azerbaijani ambassador.179 In regard to the activity of the Azerbaijani Embassy, Mikhailov wrote to Orjonikidze on November 8, 1921: “The Azerbaijani Embassy is actually standing idle. Embassy members were cordially welcomed in the province; however, the situation in Ankara was different. Turks are harping on the same tune about Azerbaijan’s ‘dependence’ and making it known that they do not regard Azerbaijanis as having enough political strength to deal with.” As for Abilov’s activity, Mikhailov told Orjonikidze about Mustafa Kemal pasha’s opinion of comrade Abilov: “He is excessively and obviously Communist and a very bad diplomat.”180 The Soviet Caucasian Republics were not in a hurry to ratify the Kars Treaty of October 13, 1921. They explained the delay as being due to the formation of the South Caucasian Federation. In the meanwhile urgent ratification of the treaty, especially by Soviet Armenia, mattered most for Turkey. During the first conversation between Abilov and Frunze and Mustafa Kemal pasha on December 25, 1921, as well the second conversation on January 4, 1922, the parties touched upon some disputed questions. In the course of the second conversation Yusuf Kemal bey openly declared that some suspicion and mistrust between the Soviet Republics and Turkey were linked to the malignant actions of the Russian Foreign Ministry and Chicherin personally. He noted that Chicherin’s activity made a bad impression on the Turks. Perhaps influenced by Levon Karakhan, Chicherin tended toward the West rather than toward the East. Thus when questioned by Yusuf Kemal bey Frunze gave evasive answers: It is widely known that Russia’s domestic and foreign policy is ruled by the Party and its Central Committee. As for Chicherin’s personality, he is an exemplary Communist; however, his twenty-­year stay in Western Europe has given him a fondness for the West.... In the meantime Karakhan is not such a bigwig that he should influence Chicherin’s policy.181 The meeting between Abilov and Yusuf Kemal bey on January 26, 1922, was devoted to debates about ratification of the Kars treaty. In the beginning



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of the talks Yusuf Kemal bey reported that at the request of Azerbaijan he had instructed the Interior Ministry to liquidate all counterrevolutionary organizations in Azerbaijan, so he was confident that in a day or two the interior minister would take measures to achieve this goal. When Yusuf Kemal bey asked Abilov about the prospects of the South Caucasus Federation, Abilov replied that he had no full information on the matter. Should it be formed, however, the South Caucasus Federation’s attitude to Turkey would remain invariable. He added that Narimanov was expected to be assigned as chairman of the Council of the South Caucasus Federation and Shahtakhtinskii as commissar for foreign affairs. Other positions would be announced later. In Abilov’s view, this process accounted for the delay in ratifying the Kars Treaty. He noted that the treaty would be approved by the union council on behalf of the Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Georgian Soviet Republics. Yusuf Kemal bey expressed his joy that Narimanov and Shahtahtinskii would be assigned to high positions. At the same time he was concerned that the Kars Treaty had not yet been ratified and that he had no answer to the tricky questions of members of parliament. You have just pointed out that the treaty will be ratified after the establishment of the All-­Union Confederation. I must say that during the Kars Conference there was not a federation or a representative, so we are not satisfied with the reasons for the postponement of ratification. When going to Moscow to make a treaty with the Russian Federation, we intended to conclude treaties first with Azerbaijan, then with Georgia, and finally with Armenia.... but we were told in Moscow that we should conclude not separate treaties but a unified treaty with all three republics. We had to agree. While at Kars, however, we had agreed not with the general mission of the Union federation but with separate representatives of the Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Georgian Soviet Republics.182 Abilov endeavored to persuade Yusuf Kemal bey that there was no great difference between ratifying the treaty with separate republics or with a Union Council. During the Kars Conference all three republics had acted as a comprehensive whole. The treaty would remain valid if it was ratified separately by these republics and also it would also be valid if ratified by the Union Council of the South Caucausus republics. Under this circumstance Yusuf Kemal bey claimed: Ratification of the treaty by Azerbaijan makes no difference to us. The same goes for Georgia. The treaty’s ratification by Armenia, however, is of great importance for us. As you know, we are supposed to attend a

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conference on the eastern issue. Also, as a result of skillful propaganda work by Armenians in the West stormy debates and scandals are underway on the Armenian question. Hence the probability remains that either England or the United States will bring up this question. In this case we shall be able to protect your interests provided that agreements are reached both with Armenian Dashnaks and with Armenian Communists. If the Kars Treaty is ratified not by the separate republics of the South Caucasus but by the Union Council, then the conference may assert that it is not a manifestation of the Armenian people’s will and that it has been forcibly imposed by Turkey and Soviet Russia. Now you understand that the free ratification of the treaty by Armenia is of paramount importance and we need it badly. So I ask you not to refuse contacts with comrade Narimanov and take measures aimed at ratifying the Kars Treaty by each of the republics and step up this process. Following these frank explanations from Yusuf Kemal bey, Abilov said: “If you are interested in the matter, I’ll personally get into contact with Narimanov and ask him to solve the ratification issue in a manner you like.” Yusuf Kemal bey in turn asked for a Russian diplomatic representative to be sent to Ankara to speed up the Kars Treaty ratification. On January 24, 1922, Boris Mikhailov telegraphed Chicherin that the Federation of Republics causes the Turks concern over the destiny of the Kars Treaty.... When it comes to ratification, I had talks with Mustafa Kemal pasha, who stressed that in view of Transcaucasian developments the Turkish government expects the [South Caucasus] republics of the federation to create a federal government; however, if we go on insisting, Turkey will be the first to ratify the treaty. I’m confident that if the matter of Chorokh is of no importance it would be appropriate to get the Turks to ratify it first. But it is desirable that the Transcaucasian authorities should ratify it first, for this could make a powerful impression in our favor and thus dissipate any rumors about the aggressive nature of federalization spread in the Majlis by the followers of Bekir Sami, who is Ossetian by origin and an expert on the Caucasus.183 Various rumors were afloat about the South Caucasus Federation in Turkey. Istanbul newspapers commented on this as a strengthening of Russian imperialism in the Caucasus. According to Soviet diplomatic sources, some official circles regarded the issue differently. They believed that “the f­ ederation



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is expected to enhance Moscow’s influence in the Caucasus and remove the ‘separatism’ of the foreign policy of the Transcaucasian states, which is an eyesore to the Turks.”184 Azerbaijani emigrants in Turkey regarded the federation as an irrevocable loss of independence. Therefore Abilov had to report to the embassy that Musavatists had appealed to the League of Nations with a statement that they did not recognize the Azerbaijani government. In doing so they were eager to turn Azerbaijan into an obstacle to the eastward spread of Bolshevism. Abilov openly declared that the South Caucasus republics would not survive without economic, political, and administrative relations.185 These serious and insistent actions by Turkey caused the CC CPA to convene meetings of the Politburo and Orgburo on February 14, 1922, which put the ratification of the Kars Treaty on the agenda of the March session of the CEC of Azerbaijan.186 Thus Azerbaijan was the first to ratify the treaty on March 3, 1922; then the GNAT on March 17; Armenia on March 20; and finally Georgia on June 14. The exchange of ratifications was held on September 11, 1922, in Erivan.187 It should be noted that in the autumn of 1921 Kemalists were holding talks with the French. Apprehensive of any anti-­Russian statements in the course of these talks, the plenipotentiary Soviet representative warned Kemal pasha that Russia would have to take countermeasures if some anti-­Russian provisions were included in a treaty to be concluded with France. These measures included England’s refusal under Russian pressure to recognize the treaty; conducting war games in the Caucasus and thus bringing the Soviet army into a strategically advantageous position; and return of Greek prisoners of war currently held in Russia to their motherland. The Foreign Ministry collegiums believed these threats to be serious enough to respond properly. The proposal of the PCFA pointed out that Soviet Russia’s strongest weapon in Turkey was its high popularity among the broader masses of the Turkish population and the priority of finding Enver’s followers who sympathized with Russia: Natsarenus explained to intractable Enverists that “we must be unified in the matter.” The Foreign Ministry suggested holding war maneuvers in the Caucasus if an agreement of this sort was reached against Kemal pasha’s allegations. It added the following: “It is essential to agree on the subject with Lev Davidovich [Trotskii], especially as Semen B ­ udennii is about to eradicate gangsterism in the region, so his advance in the Caucasus could have the strongest impact on Turkish rulers. All this could happen if the Turkish government betrays us.”188 Michael Frunze, an outstanding Soviet commander, had been appointed in August 1921 as an extraordinary and plenipotentiary representative of the

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Ukrainian Soviet Republic to Turkey. In October of that same year he was duly instructed by the Russian Foreign Ministry and sent to Ankara. That was done, on the one hand, to gain the sympathies of popular Turkish masses; on the other, to scrutinize the military might of Ankara. The instructions noted: “We need a professional assessment of the war capability of Turkey by a military expert as well as the risk levels that we may face. Try to learn the military might of the Turkish army, its management, and its ammunition. Our mission is to identify the Turkish army’s fighting efficiency, its prospects, and possible surprises.”189 Guided by these instructions and carrying 1,100,000 gold rubles given by Boris Legrand in Tiflis, Frunze left for Turkey with a 24-­member delegation (including 8 Red Army men) on November 5, 1921, and reached Ankara on December 13.190 On the day of the Kars Treaty was signed (October 13, 1921) Turkey also signed an agreement with France. On October 20 the GNAT approved this document. The agreement was composed of thirteen articles and signed by foreign minister Yusuf Kemal bey and former French minister Henry Franklin-­ Bouillon. Unlike the earlier British-­Russian trade agreement, this agreement was of a political nature. Under article 1 all combat operations between the parties were terminated from the date of signing of the agreement. Other articles provided for the release of prisoners of war and detained civilians, railway concession, resolution of customs issues, fair division of water resources on the Turkish territory, use of pastures by Syria and Turkey, and so forth.191 It was obvious that the agreement between France and Turkey contained no provisions against the Moscow or Kars Treaties. The document proved to be Turkey’s initial step toward Europe. Soviet diplomatic institutions in Ankara gave the Turkish-­French agreement a hostile reception. In this period the Turkish press considered Soviet Russia an imperialistic power and issued many publications about “the great power-­hungry, imperialistic politics of Bolsheviks,” which worried Russians very much.192 On October 21, 1921, Natsarenus sent an enciphered telegram to Chicherin that touched upon some ambiguous aspects of the agreement. At the same time, he pointed out that the Turkish government rejected a French version of the article dealing with Russia and the Caucasus.193 Mikhailov, secretary of Soviet Russia’s political mission, wrote to Orjonikidze that this agreement “threw Turkey into the arms of the allies.” To his thinking, this agreement was likely to turn Turkey into a second Egypt within a year and a half. Anxious about the current developments, Mikhailov wrote: “There’s a kind of sale going on there in Turkey. Big and small state mongers — ​ there are lots of them in Turkey — ​are warming their hands.”194 Abilov sent a text of the agreement with France to Baku. However, he believed that the basic text was kept secret:



From Moscow to Kars 325

In the course of talks Franklin suggested that the Turkish government sever relations with the Soviet republics and foster restoring the previous Transcaucasian republics. Later on this proposal was amended, saying that Turks would not oppose this restoration. In my view, these provisions were turned down by Turks. During our meeting Mustafa Kemal pasha and Yusuf Kemal bey assured me that agreements with Western countries would not run counter to the interests of the Soviet Republics and would not be directed against our friendly relations.195 At the same time Abilov spoke about the signing of an agreement with ­England that provided for exchange of prisoners of war. He said that fifty Turkish prisoners of war from Malta had already been brought to Inebolu and would arrive in Ankara in a day or two. The letter added that an Italian governmental delegation headed by Alberto Tuozzi had arrived in Turkey on October 24. Abilov told Orjonikidze that by all appearances the Entente, owing to the latest victories of Turks and growing influence in the East, has finally rejected the concept of minor Ententes and stirring up peoples one against the other and is currently applying efforts to resolve the eastern issue peacefully. Apprehensive about closer relations between Kemalists and the Soviet republics and in an attempt to sever friendly relations with the latter, the Entente is likely to make a number of concessions and thus create a constant barrier between the Soviet republics and the East.196 A report by the Soviet representative to Chicherin said that, although the Italians had arrived in Turkey under the mask of a trade delegation, none of them concealed that they had been authorized to sign a document with the Turkish government on behalf of the Italian government. As a whole, the report provided alarming information about talks between Turkey and France, Italy, and England.197 Further complicating the case was an enciphered telegram from Leonid Krassin to Lenin, Trotskii, and Stalin. It reported: A reliable source reports secret provisions of the Ankara treaty that provide for the capture of Transcaucasia and banishment of Bolsheviks. The plan is backed by a bloc of the former bourgeois Transcaucasian governments with [Aristide] Briand behind it.... Fearing carnage, Armenians refused at first, but Ankara furnished a security that they would not be harmed. Enver pasha’s group will sooner or later betray the Soviet government and help the Turks to capture Transcaucasia. As a diversionary move, it will intimidate with offensives against Poland, Rumania, and Karelia and thus draw forces away from Transcaucasia. It

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is planned to start an offensive simultaneously against Kars and Ajaria before spring. I consider this information to be serious. In so doing, Briand is seeking to reconcile the British with the Ankara treaty.198 Lenin wrote to Stalin: “I ask you to pay attention to Krassin’s information, which seems to me similar and very important. Upon Ordjonikidze’s arrival we need to arrange a meeting with Chicherin on the subject and draw up some proposals to push it through the Politburo.”199 A week after the signing of the Kars Treaty Chicherin sent a letter to Lenin that clarified Turkey’s political line on the issue. Based on the appeals of Ali Fuat pasha and the materials of Kars talks, he inferred that the Turks were likely to agree with the Entente if they were not assisted by the Russians. He wrote: Kemal cannot openly fight us, since this would defame his popularity. Still, he is in a position to put a spoke in our wheel in the Caucasus, send gangs, and sponsor anti-­Soviet elements, as the Georgian government did before Sovietization. In Narimanov’s words, the Soviet power has established itself in Azerbaijan, and in Nakhchivan the Turks have aroused hatred against themselves, so the forced change in Kemal’s front line poses no threat to Baku, as it did half a year ago, provided that Narimanov is right.200 As additional factors Chicherin cited the exhaustion of Anatolia caused by its struggle with foreign aggressors and the Soviet authority’s growth in Turkish society. At the same time, he admitted a certain anxiety about the Soviets in Georgia, especially in Batum. For this reason Chicherin advised Moscow to fortify Soviet troops in the region. But in his letter to Stalin on November 5 he warned that Turkey’s special role in the Muslim East could greatly impact the Soviet eastern policy.201 Of course, Stalin was kept abreast of everything and considered the Turkish threat to be terrible. In his view, forming the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP after the Sovietization of Georgia, its location in Tiflis, and the removal of Orjonikidze from Baku to Tiflis to run it were serious mistakes. In late 1921 Stalin sent a letter to Lenin that suggested, on the basis of the Orgburo’s decision, permanently stationing Orjonikidze in Baku, not Tiflis, and instructing him “to keep his eye on ‘affectionate people’ from Turkey lodged in Baku and then oust them immediately from Azerbaijan. Turmoil in Baku comes from the Turks.”202 Chicherin touched upon the relation to Enverists in a letter to Lenin. He pointed out that “if the GNAT ratifies the treaty, we are sure to face the problem of Enverists.” According to Chicherin, the Soviets has already confronted the Turks over financial questions:



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If we refuse to give much money to Enver, all his attempts will be futile. If he seizes power, he’ll face the same financial difficulties as Kemal did and even greater, so he won’t hold out long without our subsidies and loans. Should we decide to back Enver, it would be appropriate to make certain that we are in position to pay such a stiff price for this. The question has to be properly scrutinized. A greater rapprochement with Enver may result from probable cooling of relations between us and Kemalists. Note that Jemal pasha is also linked to Enver. It was the former’s contribution that enabled us to sign a treaty with Afghanistan. Hence the question of Jemal seems to become important due to changes in the Kemalists’ position. Chicherin added that a major argument of Soviet supporters in Afghanistan was friendly relations between Russia and Kemal pasha and that a change in the sentiments of Kemal would have a strong influence on relations between the Soviets and Afghanistan.203 This detailed report from the Russian foreign commissar to the head of the government makes it clear that after the Moscow and Kars Treaties the S­ oviets had to choose between Kemalists and Enverists without having a unified approach in respect to Turkey. At the last minute the Soviet leaders tended to collaborate with Kemalists. In late 1921 Kirov informed Orjonikidze that Khalil pasha intended to hide himself in Azerbaijan and was going to stir up a rebellion in Nakhchivan. Kirov also noted that Enverists from Batum were engaged in strengthening their groups in Azerbaijan. He suggested expelling Khalil pasha from Azerbaijan and arresting the rest.204 The Soviets’ attempts to remove Enverists from the Caucasus were related, among other things, to fear that Enver pasha and Mustafa Kemal pasha could have united their efforts. Mikhailov, secretary of the Russian mission to Ankara, wrote on November 8, 1921, to Orjonikidze that Enver could strike a bargain with Mustafa Kemal pasha.205 The Russian Embassy to Ankara told Chicherin that Kemal pasha wanted to negotiate with Enver pasha provided that Enverists were admitted to the government in view of some political concessions from the Committee of Union and Progress. In relation to this he was going to send Haydar Hilmi bey, a member of the GNAT, to Moscow. The Soviet Embassy associated probable success along this line with the Soviet influence on Enver.206 On January 3, 1922, Mikhailov confessed in a letter to Orjonikidze: The longer you live in Turkey, the more you become convinced that ­Enver has a grudge against Mustafa Kemal pasha personally; he is unlikely to alter the social structure of Turkey or to change power. As for consolidation of our presence in Turkey, under the current

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c­ ircumstances we can operate confidently under Mustafa Kemal pasha as well. He is partly an opportunist and prone to various indecisions, so it is easier to make him closer to Russia.207 Mikhailov wrote to Chicherin about this: We must politically stake our bets on Mustafa Kemal and back his power openly and steadily.... Flirting with Enver has to be stopped; Enver is a guarantor of Turkey’s further democratization; he is a personal opponent of Mustafa Kemal and nothing more. It is possible and essential to make friends with Mustafa Kemal pasha. Enver has to be removed, because our flirting with him creates the risk that all our policy will fail in Turkey. For instance, the Batum history had a grievous role in relations with Turkey.208 Despite the great quantity of information provided by diplomatic and military representatives in Ankara, leaders of Soviet Russia were well aware that Turkey was in no position to attack the Soviets. If Chicherin tried to convince Trotskii earlier to accelerate military preparations in the South Caucasus, later in November he changed his mind and tried to persuade Trotskii that “Turkey cannot fight against us in reality.” He explained this as being due to the growth of the sympathies for the Soviets among broader strata of the Turkish population after the signing of the Moscow Treaty and the hatred of Turkish nationalists against the British who had captured Istanbul as well as by the fact that “the Caucasus, including Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, opposed the Turks after they stationed their troops in the region.”209 Chicherin’s allegations undoubtedly came from reports and messages to Moscow made by senior Bolsheviks from Azerbaijan seeking to curry favor with superior authorities. In December 1921, when the Azerbaijani Embassy in Ankara got down to work, two events occurred in Baku and Moscow that greatly saddened Abilov. Purges hit Muslim Communists, especially those close to Narimanov, and affected Abilov as well. The Armenian- and Russian-­dominant Baku party organization removed from the party the active diplomats Shahtakhtinskii, Abilov, and Shirvani (Mustafabeyov). It is noteworthy that several days earlier a meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA had been held, which appointed Shahtakhtinskii as a plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan to Iran.210 Some factions went so far as to demand the removal of Narimanov as well. Orjonikidze wrote to Lenin and Stalin: “The task has been assigned to overthrow Narimanov. It is rather difficult to keep him intact.... You cannot believe Akhundov and Huseinov in regard to Narimanov.”211 Realizing an impossibility to work under these circumstances, Narimanov appealed to the



From Moscow to Kars 329

CC CPA Politburo and asked to be discharged from the post, saying that he was going to engage in literature. However, he was refused.212 The Foreign Commissariat told Abilov that the “purges affected you as well to yield essential results.... Shahtakhtinskii found himself nonpartisan. You were discredited at first. The city commission brainwashed you.”213 Abilov sank under this last blow after he began working in Ankara. Mikhailov wrote about that to Orjonikidze: “A story about the resolution of the Control Commission had an awful effect on comrade Abilov; he is unsettled and in no position to discharge his duties. I’m confident that it was a misunderstanding, so I thought badly of our Party functionaries when I witnessed this gray-­ haired official weeping.”214 That did not last long. On December 16, 1921, Narimanov appealed to the CC CPA and characterized Abilov as a staunch follower of the proletarian revolution.215 As a result on December 22 Ibrahim Abilov was rehabilitated as a member of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.216 The Azerbaijani Foreign Commissariat told Abilov that “Narimanov signed a statement to the central commission, following which your rights as a member of the CPA have been reinstated.”217 Anxious about Turkey’s gradual alienation from Soviet Russia and rapprochement with France, England, and Italy, Narimanov sent a letter to the plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan. He wrote: Dear comrade Ibrahim, I’ve read your telegram and the last letter. Your political line is correct, and I hope no mistake will be made henceforward. But you cannot forget that there are certain persons from Russia and Turkey seeking to muddy the waters. When you were here, I told you that the point was about Dashnaks. All counterrevolutionaries of Transcaucasia are seized by this idea and eager to turn the region into a hotbed of bloodshed. Some Turkish adventurers are blind and try to take no notice of possible consequences. There are a great number of adventurers of this sort in Georgia and Armenia. The eastern policy of Chicherin is erroneous, Iran has turned away from us.... The same errors are committed in respect to Turkey. The latter puts forward a slogan of unification of Islamic states. I believe that if Turkey wants to survive, it should reject this concept. Otherwise it risks being lost. . . . Our duty is to make the two parties anxious about it. They made a long report on Chicherin’s policy, harshly criticizing him. You must apply all your efforts and make them understand that we must not break ties with Russia. Turkey should become closer to Russia if it wishes to save the East. Only with the Russian slogan can we save the East.... Turkey may ruin the whole of the East and become a prey to its own selfish

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

purposes.... I’m confident of it. If the Bolshevist imperialism disturbs the Turks, it is their own fault. If a revolution occurs in Europe, Bolshevist imperialism is likely to disappear per se. This has to be addressed.218 More bad news for Abilov came in a meeting of the CC RCP Politburo on December 8, 1921. At Chicherin’s suggestion the attendees discussed relations between the Soviet power and plenipotentiary representatives of the national republics. An appropriate decision was adopted, which instructed representatives of the union republics abroad to obey a plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR. If views differed on some issues, the instructions from the Russian representative took priority. When it came to disputed questions, the representative of Russia should report back to Moscow. The central bodies were to solve problems with the union republics. On the same day, on Chicherin’s instructions, the Politburo passed one more decision: “Rules for Treaties Made by Soviet Republics.” The Politburo’s decision noted that the Soviet republics had no right to make any treaties without a preliminary agreement with the Russian Foreign Commissariat. It was the responsibility of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and Commissariat for Nationalities to make out a list of “authorized republics.”219 This question had been brought up by Chicherin as far back as October 1921. After the signing of the Kars Treaty, a decision on the subject was adopted by the Politburo on his initiative, which in turn had been forwarded to leaders of the South Caucasus.220 These decisions were primarily directed against Azerbaijan and its missions abroad. The point is that in this period other Soviet Republics had no plenipotentiary missions abroad except for small consular institutions in bordering towns of adjacent countries. Legrand, the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Federation to the Caucasus, complained in his diplomatic reports that Azerbaijan was utterly independent in respect to the Soviet republics and foreign countries. He pointed out that the Caucasus had three independent countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia), two autonomous regions (­Nakhchivan and Ajaria), and an uncertain entity, Abkhazia. As a further complication, interrelations between the central Soviet power and local republican authorities so far remained vague. Legrand wrote: At present they are poorly linked to the Russian mission and eager to estrange themselves from the mission’s interference. In cases where appeal to the Russian Foreign Ministry is inevitable, they prefer to address you directly without the mission’s interference. This applies to Azerbaijan in particular.... Beyond any doubt, I’ll try to influence comrade Huseinov, but in an utterly mild form, sparing “independent” psychology and other conventionalities.221



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Legrand proposed that the Soviet republics and their foreign missions maintain ties with the RSFSR only through its plenipotentiary representative. At his suggestion, the Russian Politburo passed a decision to instruct the Caucasian republics to build their foreign policy on the basis of Moscow directives.222 On October 31, 1921, the Caucasus Bureau passed a decision to entrust Boris Legrand with drawing up the constitution of the Nakhchivan region.223 On November 3 the bureau decided to close the mutual diplomatic missions of the South Caucasus republics within seven days.224 Legrand telegraphed the leaders of Azerbaijan about the December 8 decision of the Russian Politburo. The telegram was discussed at the joint meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo on December 13. Kirov and Shirvani (Mustafabeyov) were commissioned with informing the CC RCP and PCFA about this decision, which said: “No orders to representatives of the Azerbaijan SSR on the subject may be given until an appropriate explanation is made.”225 In late 1921 Sergei Natsarenus was recalled from Ankara. Moscow was dissatisfied with his work, as were Ian Upmal-­Angorskii and Budu Mdivani. On January 5, 1922, Semen Aralov was appointed plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Russia to Turkey. Upon arrival in Turkey, he first met with Abilov, who informed him about the state and public life of Turkey, distinctive features of diplomatic and political work in the East, and the political climate in Ankara. On January 31 Aralov presented his credentials to Mustafa Kemal pasha and became a central figure of Soviet diplomacy in Ankara until the end of April 1923. Thus in 1920–22 the Soviet policy balancing between Kemalists and ­Ittihadists after Mustafa Kemal pasha’s victory over foreign aggressors under ­Sakaria was leveled out. From then on, plans were contrived to eliminate E ­ nver pasha physically and politically as a “headache” for Soviet policy.

9

The Struggle for Baku Oil and the Formation of the Soviet Union

T

he year 1922, which ended with the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), put an end to the foreign political functions of these republics. The narrowing of links between the national republics and foreign countries that had become apparent since the end of 1921 resulted in the formation of the Soviet Union on December 30, 1922. Foreign affairs became the responsibility of the central state, while the old commissariats of foreign affairs built on local ideas of independence were simply liquidated. The formation of the USSR completed the process of restoration of Russia within the boundaries of 1914. The tsarist empire was replaced with the Bolshevik empire. Laying the foundations of the USSR started with unification of the financial, economic, transportation, postal, and communication systems of the South Caucasus republics. This was followed by centralization of politi­cal structures and culminated in the formation of a Transcaucasus Soviet Federative Republic. Although some historians write that the concept of the South Caucasus Federation was suggested by Narimanov and Shahtakhtinskii, the true source of this concept was Moscow. It has to be kept in mind that the GOÉLRO (Gosudarstvennaia Komissiia po Élektrifikatsii Rossii: State Commission for Electrification of Russia) plan presented the Caucasus as a single economic region. Presenting the issue this way in Soviet Russia’s first economic plan assumed the future unity of the Caucasus republics. The question of the “unification of the Caucasus republics within a common economic sphere” was raised decisively at a meeting of the Central Soviet of All-­Russia Trade Unions on April 11, 1921, and appropriate practical steps were taken.1 The treaties with neighboring countries (Iran and Turkey) that Soviet Russia signed in February–March 1921 were the main guarantee of security of the South Caucasus Soviet republics. Directly or indirectly these treaties confirmed Soviet Russia’s right to the South Caucasus republics and limited the opportunities of other countries to interfere with the political life of the region. 332



The Struggle for Baku Oil and the Formation of the Soviet Union 333

Formation of the South Caucasus Union Following the Sovietization of Georgia, the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) was ranked higher than the Party organs of all three South Caucasus republics: this was the initial step toward unification of the Party structures of these republics. It had already been proven that the Caucasus Bureau led by Orjonikidze as a common center for the political government of the South Caucasus benefited Moscow. The step by step movement of the South Caucasus republics toward a federation was documented in the Caucasus Bureau. The placement of the Caucasus Bureau residence in Tiflis ruined the plans of Narimanov, who wanted Baku to be the center of a new structure.2 The unification of trade unions in March 1921 and the subsequent unification of youth organizations in September of the same year accelerated putting the question of the political unity of the three republics on the agenda. The development of such regional unity gradually eliminated the independence of republican organs and gave them rights similar to those of Soviet Russia’s provinces. On April 18, 1921, representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia signed an agreement on the rules of use of the South Caucasus railways. To continue this process, on May 2 of the same year the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) made a decision to close customs stations and frontier posts among the republics of the South Caucasus. In accordance with this decision the CPC of the Azerbaijan Republic issued a decree in June 1921 eliminating customs stations on the borders with Armenia and Georgia. On April 21, 1921, Georgia and Azerbaijan concluded a convention on postal and telegraphic communication. The next step was taken on June 2, 1921, when the People’s Commissariats of Foreign Trade of all three republics were united.3 They had agreed to unite the foreign trade bodies on April 26 at a meeting of representatives of the Caucasus republics led by Orjonikidze. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia signed an agreement to establish a joint foreign trade organ on June 21, 1921. Under the agreement signed by Makharadze, Narimanov, and Miasnikov trade at foreign markets fell under the ­purview of this new organization.4 A “foreign trade union” representing all three republics was to be headquartered in Tiflis, managed by a board to be created with the consent of these republics. The key task of the organ was to supply Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan with food and raw materials. The liquidation of foreign trade commissariats and the establishment of a joint organ put an end to the independence of the South Caucasus Soviet republics, especially Azerbaijan, which had great potential to enter foreign markets. Moscow fully monopolized this sphere of the economy. On August 26, 1921, Molotov as secretary of the CC RCP (B) sent Orjonikidze a ciphered telegram expressing the Central Committee’s pleasure with the Caucasus Bureau’s

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

decision to establish common organs and the expediency of unification of the economic opportunities of the South Caucasus republics.5 A plenum of the Caucasus Bureau with Molotov in attendance started its work in Baku on November 2, 1921. The agenda included the question of establishing a federation of the South Caucasus republics. After detailed discussions, a November 3 morning meeting accepted Shalva Eliava’s proposal to establish a federation of the South Caucasus. Eliava and Miasnikov were instructed to draw up a draft resolution on the federation by the evening meeting.6 That evening the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP (B) adopted a resolution on a Federation of Republics of the South Caucasus, indicating that the separate existence of the Caucasus republics weakened them in the eyes of capitalist and bourgeois countries and that a close political alliance of the republics would offer a strict guarantee against any encroachment by counterrevolutionary forces and strengthen Soviet power along the borders boundaries of the Middle East. The document also noted that economic separation worsened the depressed economic situation in the Caucasus and the poverty of the popular masses and caused many misunderstandings among the republics. In the Caucasus Bureau’s view, a political alliance would enable the republics to establish a true close economic union. The document read: “The Caucasus represents a single economic whole, so it may develop economically only through a common Caucasus economic union.”7 The resolution condemned the existence of numerous People’s Commissariats and institutions that duplicated one another’s work. With this in mind, the Caucasus Bureau considered it “urgent and necessary to establish a federative union among the republics primarily in the spheres of military, economic, financial, and foreign policy.” The resolution recognized that it was necessary to establish an administrative-­economic and political Center of the Transcaucasus Republics (the Union Council) in the town of Tiflis. A commission including Eliava, Soltan Mejid Efendiyev, Lukashin, Vasilii Egorov, and Legrand was set up to draft a resolution on the Union Council. The deadline for the commission’s work was November 25. Later the same day the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau discussed the question of military conventions of the South Caucasus republics. A six-­point decision was made. Legrand, Eliava, Miasnikov, and Garayev were instructed to compose a text of agreement. The decision had to be carried out within twenty days.8 On November 6 a plenum decided to form various commissions to compose the draft for the federal commissariats of the South Caucasus and Economic Union. Congresses of local Soviets had to take place no later than February 25, 1922. The plenum approved the draft of a union treaty and planned to convene a Party congress of the South Caucasus no later than February 15, 1922, which was regarded as an important step toward the



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e­ stablishment of the Transcaucasus Federation. Republican Party congresses should have completed their work by this time. The presidium of the Caucasus Bureau would specify the agenda of the Party congress of the South Caucasus and the norms of representation.9 After the plenum Orjonikidze sent a telegram to the CC RCP (B) and Stalin: “The plenum of the Caucasus Bureau made a unanimous decision to establish a Transcaucasus Federation by uniting economic, financial, military, and foreign policy through a Union Council. The resolution was sent to Moscow. I’m asking the CC to reach a conclusion. An open campaign on this topic has been a success.”10 The plenum decided to hold a meeting of Party organs of all three republics under the leadership of Sergei Kirov to explain some questions and clarify disputed situations relating to the formation of the South Caucasus Union. A November 1921 meeting focused on discussion of four questions. In his opening speech Orjonikidze explained that the meeting had to clarify the following questions: 1. In what sense should the independence of Caucasus republics be understood? 2. Is it possible to approach independence through the bourgeois interpretation of this question? 3. Can the Soviet republics of the South Caucasus be independent from the RSFSR? 4. Can the Soviet republics of the South Caucasus be independent from one another?11 Discussions around these questions demonstrated that certain circles in the governments of the South Caucasus republics, primarily Georgia and Azerbaijan, feared federalization and regarded this issue as premature. In October 1921 Narimanov told a plenum of the CEC of Soviets of Azerbaijan: “This merger now seems a bit artificial. It would be appropriate to give these republics the opportunity to grow; these republics should really, naturally feel this rapprochement.”12 On November 16, 1921, the newspaper Tribuna (­Tribune) of the Georgian Socialist-­Federalists published a long article against federalization. In criticizing the Bolsheviks’ economic arguments for federalization, Tribuna asked a question: What economic ties link Georgia with Armenia? The newspaper sought to prove that economic federation was needed by Armenia and Azerbaijan. But Tribuna asked fairly: Are the neighboring republics now separated by a Chinese wall? Do any Soviet and revolutionary committees exist that are propagating different aims and renouncing Russia? Aren’t all Soviet republics oriented toward Russia? After all of these rhetorical questions, the article concluded that haste, lack of wisdom, and the r­ eckless

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

decision by the Caucasus Bureau to establish a federation were politically harmful. In the newspaper’s opinion, not only the Red Army but also citizens of Communist countries should act against counterrevolutionaries.13 The Georgian-­language newspaper Shroma (Labor) in its November 20 issue spoke out against Miasnikov’s article backing federalization in the Kommunist newspaper: “We are told that a federation is necessary to fight counter­ revolution, the bourgeois bloc, to defend Soviet power against attacks by imperialism.” In the newspaper’s opinion, if federalization is essential to fight enemies, why was no one in France, Britain, Italy, America, or Japan struck by the thought that they should give up their independence and create a federation in order to fight Germany and gain the upper hand? Shroma described Miasnikov’s proposal that oil, coal, copper, manganese, salt, cotton, tobacco, and grapes would equally belong to Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia after federalization as absurd, asking in what sense natural riches belonging to one country may belong to another one. The newspaper asked how independence could be conserved in the Bolshevik-­propagated conditions of a federation: “However, no one in Georgia is so deaf as to fail to understand what independence is and what of independence remains if there is a federation. Back to Russia! That’s the only way to interpret the meaning and logic of the Caucasus Bureau’s resolution.”14 Without a doubt, such publications in Georgian newspapers affected the course of meetings of Party organs. Some participants in the disputes did not consider it appropriate to give up independence and tried to prove that broad popular masses would be affected negatively by the change. Speaking on this topic, Stalin clarified a series of disputed aspects. Unlike the Ukraine and Belarus, he explained, which were administrative-­autonomous units of the Russian Federation and autonomous republics, the full independence of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan had been recognized by the central Soviet government for a whole spectrum of reasons. He emphasized that the national governments that had existed in these three republics for three years had left a deep trace on public consciousness. Sovietization would not eliminate this all at once. “It became necessary to work in a roundabout way. This is their radical distinction from all the rest of the republics.” Stalin believed that not only the Communists but the population as well should get ready for the question of federalization, saying: “It will become necessary to take the population into account because the number of people in the population is approximately 3 million and the number of Communists is approximately 15,000: too little.”15 Stalin added that, except for proletarian Baku, the rest of the population of the South Caucasus consisted largely of peasant masses that should permanently be kept under control. A CC RCP resolution drafted by Stalin indicated that mistakes and imprudence could divide the petty bourgeois strata of



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peasants and intelligentsia from Soviet power and make them oriented toward pan-­Islamism, toward pan-­Turkism in Azerbaijan, and toward the Entente in Georgia and Armenia.16 It was necessary to activate the popular masses because the Communists opposed the concept of a federation. Unification of institutions of foreign trade and railways was not justified. Displeasure among the republics started growing. A group of Party leaders headed by Budu Mdivani in Georgia, as well as prominent Party workers Ruhulla Akhundov and Mirza Davud H ­ useinov in Azerbaijan, believed that it was premature to establish a federation. On November 18 the CC RCP (B) Politburo gave them two days to give a written explanation of their displeasure with the Caucasus Bureau’s decision to establish a federation.17 In his letter addressing Lenin, Narimanov also claimed that haste in the question of a federation was harmful: “I always told the Caucasus Bureau meetings that a union was necessary but should not be rushed. The existence of a united system of foreign trade and railways persuades me once again that we are continuing to spout nice phrases. What Azerbaijan has suffered because of these unions this time is hard to say.”18 Narimanov believed that all this haste had been instigated by Orjonikidze, who had concealed Lenin’s project of unification of the South Caucasus republics and was advancing his own project instead.19 When the materials of the Caucasus Bureau Baku plenum were delivered to Moscow, the CC RCP (B) Orgburo began asking new questions. It was decided to send a telegram to the Caucasus Bureau, asking: What is your opinion about relations between the Union Soviet of the newly established federation of the South Caucasus and the RSFSR? As for military u­ nification, the CC RCP (B) recommended first drafting a military convention between the Russian Federation, on the one hand, and Azerbaijan, Armenia, and G ­ eorgia, on the other hand. Orjonikidze was instructed to complete it as soon as possible.20 On November 24 Orjonikidze sent Molotov a telegram giving detailed answers to all questions on Moscow’s behalf. He noted that the Caucasus Bureau’s decision to establish a federation had received backing from the Baku organization of the CC CPA (B), the CEC and the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan, as well as the Communist Parties of Armenia and Georgia. In Orjonikidze’s view, opponents of the federation were in the minority, so he insistently recommended that the CC RCP (B) make a decision on this question.21 However, Orjonikidze’s answers did not please the central Soviet leadership. Molotov believed that Orjonikidze had tried to explain interrelations inside the federation at a time when Moscow wanted him to explain what form relations between the Union Soviet of the South Caucasus ­Federation

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and the RSFSR would take.22 Thus in November Orjonikidze started sending decisions and resolutions approved by the Caucasus Bureau to the CC RCP (B). On November 25 he distributed a commission-­drafted document of the union treaty among the South Caucasus republics.23 The draft indicated that the supreme organ and top authority of the union of republics was to be a pleni­potentiary conference of representatives to be elected equally by the governments of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Azerbaijan’s representative Efendiyev disagreed with such a principle of formation of the top power ­organ. In his opinion the top organ should be based on a proportional principle, so he included his particular opinion in the draft treaty. The draft treaty envisioned that the executive organ of the plenipotentiary conference would be the “Union Soviet,” whose members would be elected and recalled by the conference. The Union Soviet would bear responsibility for military affairs, finance, foreign policy, foreign trade, communications, international relations, the struggle against counterrevolution, and economic policy management in the territories of republics in the treaty. The Union Soviet would consist of a chair and a deputy as well as people’s commissars of military affairs, finance, foreign affairs, post and telegraph, foreign trade, communications, and chair of the Extraordinary Commission combating counterrevolution. These commissariats would be abolished in the union republics. Only the Republican Extraordinary Commissions would continue to operate but would be subordinated to the Extraordinary Commission of the Union Soviet. The military, finance, and post and telegraph commissariats had their representatives in each of the three republics, while the commissariats of foreign affairs and foreign trade were wholly subordinated to the Union Soviet. A Higher Soviet of the Economy (HSE) was to be formed as a permanent commission of the Union Soviet to unite all economic organs in the territories of the republics in the treaty. As a representative of Azerbaijan, Efendiyev protested against the establishment of the Higher Soviet of the Economy, believing that the HSE was redundant due to the existence of the Union Soviet. The Azerbaijanis, who possessed richer economic resources than their neighbors, feared that an organization established on the basis of parity could fall under Armenian and Georgian control. Efendiyev’s opinion was a reflection of this anxiety. Note that HSE decisions were compulsory for republics, so management of the Azerbaijani economy would have been wholly transferred from Baku to Tiflis. Efendiyev voiced his opinion on numerous questions before the republican CEC drafted instructions in mid-­November. The CEC of Azerbaijan announced at its meeting on November 16 that uniting the South ­Caucasus republics into a single federative union was an urgent necessity. However, ­Efendiyev, as the Azerbaijani representative on a commission in charge of



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drafting a union treaty, was given special instructions by the Azerbaijani government.24 The final document envisioned that interrelations between the South Caucasus union and the RSFSR would be regulated based on a union treaty.25 After all the documents were sent to Moscow, Orjonikidze telegraphed Molotov on November 30 that the Caucasus regional organization of Communists would hold a meeting on December 5 to discuss the draft treaty of the South Caucasus Federation. He believed that before this meeting it would be appropriate to have a CC RCP (B) decision approving the ­federation.26 On November 29, 1921, however, a day before Orjonikidze’s telegram was received, the CC RCP (B) Politburo (at the suggestion of Budu Mdivani, chair of the revolutionary committee of Georgia) had already held a discussion on the concept of a federation of the South Caucasus republics and positively settled this matter. Lenin displayed his interest in the Caucasus Bureau’s decision on the federation. In the first version of the draft resolution for the Politburo he proposed that “several weeks are needed to reach this decision.” Stalin replaced the expression “several weeks” with “a certain period required for discussion.” To justify this, Stalin noted that it was not possible to establish a federation in Georgia in just a few weeks, in the “Soviet mode.” He noted that the soviets in Georgia were under construction and remained unfinished (a month earlier no soviets had existed at all). It was unthinkable to convene a congress of soviets there within several weeks. “But a federation without Georgia would be a paper federation.” Stalin suggested “spending two to three months to allow the concept of a federation to win over the broad masses of Georgia. Otherwise, we will only ease the work of the Mensheviks and other nationalists.”27 Lenin offered a draft containing Stalin’s amendment, which was considered the basis of the Politburo’s decision recognizing the formation of the South Caucasus federation as absolutely correct and opportune but requiring a “certain period of time for discussion.” The document said: “To propose to the CC of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (through the Caucasus Bureau) to submit the question of federation for broader discussion to the Party and masses of workers and peasants, propagate the federation energetically, and make it come true through congresses of soviets of each republic; in the case of greater opposition, report to the RCP CC specifically and immediately.”28 Orjonikidze, Mdivani, and Figatner were notified of the Politburo’s decision signed by Molotov via ciphered telegram on December 1.29 After the Politburo Bureau made this decision, establishment of the federation became unavoidable. Considering Azerbaijan’s important role in the region, Narimanov tried to take advantage of this circumstance as possible and make Baku the center of the united Transcaucasia. He wrote to Lenin:

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Since the very onset of the coup, Azerbaijan has heroically been proving its internationalism regarding Soviet republics. In declaring its wealth the common wealth of Soviet republics, it proved this by its deeds. Azerbaijan even gave up its territory in favor of Armenia at a time when this could not be done for political reasons.... Both Georgia and Armenia, in their internal instructions, quite often violate decisions of the Caucasus Bureau. Azerbaijan has been sacrificing for the sake of the common wealth; however, neither of these republics desires to sacrifice. This is the key reason for all of the misunderstandings. It seems to me that if this situation continues, we will have a scandal under future alliances. Without a doubt, we will do everything properly, in a Party way; however, what such mutual attitudes will lead to is difficult to say. Anyway, given that the question of unification has already been solved by the Russian government based on comrade Sergo’s report, it is essential to insist on making Baku, not Tiflis, the center of the Union Soviet. This will ease the situation a bit. Narimanov also reported that eight uyezds of Azerbaijan were already starving and that the exchange rate of the ruble continued to drop.30 When the concept of establishment of a federation of the South Caucasus republics was submitted for discussion and initial practical steps were taken, the question of specification of internal borders had just been solved. Having begun its work in June 1921, a joint commission had managed to reach accords and specify internal borders by November. When the commission began to work, however, Narimanov and Makharadze signed a treaty in Tiflis on July 5, 1921, to resolve all disputed matters regarding internal borders and the frontier line. The Garayazy field that had been used by peasants of the Gazakh uyezd remained a part of this uyezd. Under a treaty on the Zagatala district, the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic gave up all its claims to this district, and the Georgian Revolutionary Committee made a statement accordingly.31 On November 15 Mukhtar Hajiyev (chair of the Azerbaijani CEC) and Budu Mdivani (chair of the Georgian Revolutionary Committee) signed a treaty determining a borderline between the two countries.32 All the clauses of the treaty of July 5, 1921, were preserved in this treaty. As for the lands bordering the Gazakh uyezd that had been seized by the Armenians, Azerbaijani representatives to the joint commission were only partly successful in raising the question of retaking the lands. These lands had once been owned by Gazakh’s beys, the Vekilovs and Sharifovs, and were landed estates in the Askipara valley. The commission decided that 2,000 dessiatinas (1,818 hectares) of the woodland and plots of land should be returned



The Struggle for Baku Oil and the Formation of the Soviet Union 341

to Azerbaijan. However, the Vekilov land had been ceded by local a­ uthorities to Armenians, so the commission recognized this decision. As for internal borders, the questions accepted by the commission and signed by Mukhtar Hajiyev, chair of the Azerbaijani CEC, Georgia’s representative Tengiz Zhgenti, and Armenia’s representative Isai Dovlatov were submitted to the CC RCP (B) Caucasus Bureau for consideration on November 12.33 A border between Armenia and Georgia passing through settlements populated by the Turks was specified by a treaty signed by Miasnikov, chair of the Armenian CPC, and Mdivani, chair of the Georgian ­Revolutionary Committee.34 Nevertheless, a joint commission consisting of Sarkis L ­ ukashin, ­Huseinov, Svanidze, and Orakhelashvili that had been given the task of drafting a common treaty on border questions failed to sign such a treaty. In April and May 1922 the CEC of each of the three republics and the Union Soviet of the South Caucasus Federation made different decisions. But the “general agreement among the governments of the Caucasian republics was never signed. And the territorial question remained urgent throughout the 1920s–​ 1930s.”35 To discuss the question of establishing a South Caucasus Federation, the First Transcaucasus Party conference was convened on December 7, 1921. The conference resolved that the concept of a federation had to be propagated broadly, that the question should come into practice through the soviets, and that the federation should be established as soon as possible. Despite the serious intentions of Party and soviet organs, opposition to the concept of a federation was growing. The struggle of ideas entered the political arena. Any criticism of the concept of unification was stigmatized with the label of nationalism, which enabled Party and soviet organs to launch repressive measures. In regions opposed to the concept of a federation, many new ideas sprung up. Fears were openly voiced that a new union of states would eliminate Azerbaijan’s rights, so the principles of such a union were being rejected. The fourth congress of the CPA (B) held in February 1922 passed a special resolution to establish a federative state of the South Caucasus, instructing the Party CC “to make every effort to fight nationalistic tendencies and manifestations of indifference to the decisions of Party organs” in connection with the establishment of the federation.36 On February 18–22, 1922, the Communist Parties of the South Caucasus gathered at their first congress in Tiflis and decided to centralize the work of the Party organs of all three republics in order to help centralize all the governing structures of the South Caucasus. The congress adopted and approved a draft of the union treaty and a charter of the Higher Soviet of the Economy drawn up in the last days of November 1921. A State Committee of the South

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Caucasus was elected, composed of Narimanov, Seid Jafar Yagubov, Kirov, Sarkis Lukashin (Srapionian), Mdivani, Miasnikov, Orakhelashvili, Orjonikidze, and Mikhail Pleshakov. Garayev, Moisei Lisovskii, Filipp Makharadze, Levon Mirzoian, and Nikolai Okujava were elected as candidates for State Committee membership. The first plenum of the newly elected united Party organ decided to convene a conference of the CEC of the South Caucasus republics. At its third session on March 3, 1922, the Azerbaijani CEC approved a treaty of a Federative Union of the South Caucasus Republics and a provision on the Higher Soviet of the Economy. Azerbaijan sent twenty-­five delegates with deciding votes and three delegates with advisory votes to a plenipotentiary conference that was officially to proclaim the federation. A plenipotentiary conference of the Central Executive Committees of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan started its work in Tiflis on March 11 and decided on March 12 to establish a Federative Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the South Caucasus Republics. The conference proclaimed the Union Soviet and its presidium, composed of three persons — ​Nariman Narimanov from Azerbaijan, Polikarp (Budu) ­Mdivani from Georgia, and Alexandre Miasnikov from Armenia — ​as the supreme ­organ of this new entity. They led the work of the Union Soviet’s presidium until the last days of December 1922. The appointed members of the South ­Caucasus government were Eliava as commissar of the navy, Svanidze as commissar of finance, Bekzadian as commissar of post and telegraph, Musa­beyov as commissar of foreign trade, Yagubov as commissar of labor; in addition Boyukagha Talybly led the workers and peasants’ inspection, Petr Shuskov headed the railway department, and Rusakov led the ­Extraordinary ­Commission.37 This list demonstrates that the foreign political institutions of Trans­ caucasia were united, but no post of commissar of foreign affairs existed in the government any longer. Foreign policy questions on the whole were made the responsibility of the Union Soviet. A union treaty adopted at the conference indicated that the plenipotentiary conference of all three republics, proceeding from the nations’ right to self-­determination, recognizes the independence and sovereignty of each of the parties to the treaty, realizing the necessity of consolidation of its forces for reasons of economic development, and declares that the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republics henceforth are part of a close military, political, and economic alliance.38 Thus the Union Soviet’s authorities covered the military, financial, and foreign political spheres, foreign trade, transport, postal and telegraph services,



The Struggle for Baku Oil and the Formation of the Soviet Union 343

economic administration, and combating counterrevolution. That was the end of the first stage of the unification of state and governmental organs in a common federative union. The Second All-­Azerbaijani Congress of Soviets ratified the union treaty on April 28, 1922. A limited independent era that had lasted in Azerbaijan for only two years came to an end. A major part of the republican power, especially its foreign policy, was transferred to the South Caucasus union. What did membership in the presidium of the Union Soviet of the South Caucasus mean for Narimanov: promotion or demotion? At the beginning of 1922 rumors spread that Narimanov would become chair of the Union Soviet. Azerbaijan’s plenipotentiary representative in Ankara, Ibrahim Abilov, told Yusuf Kemal bey during a conversation on January 26, 1922, that, according to Baku, Narimanov would be elected chair of the Union Soviet of the Trans­ caucasus Federation and that Shahtakhtinskii would be appointed as commissar of foreign affairs of this new entity. Abilov gave this explanation primarily because Azerbaijani emigrants in Turkey were commenting on news reports on the Federation of Transcaucasus Republics, saying: “Russia destroyed the independence of the Transcaucasus Republics; the Russian commissar, comrade Orjonikidze, will lead the federative power.”39 Yusuf Kemal bey replied that the Turks welcomed Nariman bey’s and Behbud bey’s appointment to such high posts. He voiced his confidence that the friendly relations that Turkey achieved with the Soviet republics of Transcaucasia would continue after the federation of these republics.40 But this promotion of Narimanov, as it appeared, hid certain calculations. In fact the point was to remove him from the post of chair of the republic’s CPC, which was the true governing body. In the eyes of Baku leaders, especially Orjonikidze and Kirov, Narimanov had already become persona non grata by that time. In November 1921 the Azerbaijani Extraordinary Committee sent the following secret report to Moscow: “Narimanov maintains contacts with Turkish nationalists in order to use them to realize the nationalist concept of a common East.” Extraordinary Committee members even suspected the head of the government of being a latent counterrevolutionary.41 Under these circumstances Moscow found a painless way to remove Narimanov from Azerbaijan by using the establishment of a federation in Transcaucasia. The residence of Narimanov as a member of the Union Soviet’s presidium from now on was shifted from Baku to Tiflis. An attempt by Nari­ manov to remain chair of the Soviet of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan with the help of his supporters was a failure. Moscow firmly insisted that the head of the Transcaucasus Federation’s government could not occupy a post in Azerbaijan. Narimanov repeatedly protested against this “promotion” but was not allowed to retake the post of head of the Azerbaijani government.

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The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

It was beyond any doubt that Orjonikidze managed to dissuade Narimanov, who desired to leave big politics and busy himself with literary activity.42 Narimanov later commented on his removal from the chairmanship of the Azerbaijani CPC: When the Party announced that comrade Musabeyov was to be elected chair of the Soviet of People’s Commissars, voices were heard: “And what about Narimanov?” They were answered that comrade Narimanov had been elected chair of the Union Soviet. Their agents immediately began to persuade all those disagreeing with this decision and consoled them, saying that comrade Narimanov henceforth was the head of all three republics. Isn’t it a lie?43 In a letter to Stalin Narimanov openly wrote that Sergo Orjonikidze needed his removal from the Caucasus in order to destroy everything standing in the way of his “Caucasus policy.”44 It should be noted that both Orjonikidze and Kirov and even Stalin, who had previously been prejudiced against national communism, saw no alternative to Narimanov as the leader of Azerbaijan. Saying that Soviet leaders highly trusted Narimanov, Jörg Baberowski noted that he “represented a center on the periphery and the population of the periphery in the center.”45 After Narimanov was removed from Azerbaijan, Muslim Communists began to feel orphaned.46 Another point of interest is how Narimanov was removed from Baku after his important victory over rivals in October–November 1921. Because of this conflict, a telegram was delivered from the CC RCP (B) Politburo in early October urging Narimanov to leave for Moscow to sit at the negotiation table with the instigator of the conflict, Sergo Orjonikidze, in order to reconcile the two men.47 Moscow initially backed Narimanov in the factional struggle in the Communist leadership of Azerbaijan. On October 15, 1921, the CC RCP (B) Politburo discussed the “Baku question.” Huseinov and Akhundov were ordered to stop any factional struggle and come to Moscow immediately “to explain the right Communist policy in Azerbaijan.”48 Lenin added a six-­point warning, saying that “any attempt to resume the factional struggle in the CC will unconditionally be followed by exclusion from the Party.”49 This was a direct victory for Narimanov with Lenin’s help. The Politburo returned to this question again on October 19. It decided to demand that the Azerbaijani Communist Party and Baku committee form leading cadres of Muslim Communists to work in Party cells and occupy other responsible Party posts. This decision was made at Narimanov’s suggestion. Under Narimanov’s guarantee, the same meeting included Mir Jafar Baghirov and Aliheydar Garayev in the composition of the Caucasus Bureau in ­order to help combat factionalism.50 Instructions drafted and approved by



The Struggle for Baku Oil and the Formation of the Soviet Union 345

the ­Politburo recommended that employees of the CPA (B) CC involve the local population in the broad project of Soviet construction by paying utmost attention to peculiarities of the population’s everyday life and level of cultural development.51 Without a doubt, Narimanov participated in drafting these instructions. Though the RCP CC (B) Politburo condemned Huseinov, Akhundov, Sarkis (Ter-­Danilian), and other faction leaders, Narimanov allowed them to stay in Baku. Eventually the Politburo instructed Stalin to order Huseinov and Akhundov to come to Moscow to work for the Commissariat of Nationalities.52 Mirza Davud Huseinov was even appointed later as deputy commissar for nationalities of the RSFSR.53 It was not easy to drive Sarkis out of Baku. In August 1921 the Caucasus Bureau, at Narimanov’s insistence, made a decision condemning the factional actions of Sarkis and his followers; however, Sarkis disobeyed the decision. Then Narimanov, just as he had expelled Mikoian from Baku in September 1920, put Sarkis in a sealed carriage by force and drove him out of Baku.54 On this special occasion Shahtakhtinskii noted that Narimanov wanted to have Azerbaijan “subordinated” to him in order to prevent “irresponsible” Armenians from breaking up the country.55 Thirty leading Party, soviet, and trade union workers were expelled from Baku due to Narimanov’s command, including such prominent leaders as Lominadze, Sturua, Mikoian, Sarkis, Jabiyev, Akhundov, and Huseinov.56 After Narimanov managed, with great difficulty, to finish ridding Baku of undesirable leading elements, he himself was removed from Azerbaijan on the pretense of transition to a higher post. Having achieved Narimanov’s departure, Moscow managed to fulfill its task of loss of Azerbaijan’s identity. Narimanov, as chair of the Soviet of ­People’s Commissars, was replaced with Gazanfar Musabeyov, whose activity was excellently characterized by Stalin: “It appears that chair of the Soviet of People’s Commissars Musabeyov does not dare to buy hay for a horse without the special permission of the secretary general of the CC CPA.”57

The Genoa Conference and the South Caucasus Shortly after the leadership of the South Caucasus Federation was formed, representatives of all three republics at the Union Soviet’s presidium were invited to Moscow to join a delegation to attend an international conference in Genoa. Following its meeting in January 1922 the CC RCP (B) Politburo included Narimanov, Mdivani, and Bekzadian in the Soviet delegation. This step was apparently intended to make a statement, however, and stemmed from the international situation. Further developments demonstrated that Soviet Russia was not going to let Narimanov or any one of the provincial delegates

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get close to diplomatic talks. Nevertheless, on February 9 the Politburo sent Orjonikidze a telegram, notifying him that the arrival of Narimanov, Mdivani, and Bekzadian in Moscow had to be organized no later than February 22.58 The participation of the South Caucasus delegation in the Genoa conference drew Turkey’s attention. During his conversation with Abilov on January 26, 1922, Turkish foreign minister Yusuf Kemal bey wanted to know whether the South Caucasus republics, primarily Azerbaijan, had been ­invited to the Genoa conference. If so, would they attend the conference as independent delegations or would they be represented through Russia? Abilov replied that he had not yet been informed about this topic by his government and added that if invited “Transcaucasus Republics will send their representatives, of course, if this is necessary, or will be represented through Russian representatives.” Yusuf Kemal bey noted that the participation of delegates of the Transcaucasus Republics in the conference would be very desirable: “then we would have tended to form an Eastern Entente and could enjoy each other’s support.”59 After all, why were Narimanov and other representatives of the C ­ aucasus republics included in the Soviet delegation? Without a doubt, this was primarily connected with Europe’s opinion about the Caucasus republics. The European media published daily reports about the South Caucasus. Representatives of emigrants who found asylum in Europe predicted the fall of Soviet power soon in the South Caucasus. Soviet intelligence services knew well that Caucasus emigrants were going to make joint statements in Genoa. The Bolsheviks included South Caucasus representatives in the Soviet delegation to the Genoa conference because they were eager to demonstrate that independent governmental organs were operating in these republics. The Soviets needed the representatives of the Caucasus republics themselves to deny rumors circulating in Europe.60 This is evident from instructions issued by “workers” to Narimanov at a joint meeting of the Baku City Council on February 11.61 Another reason for inclusion of the South Caucasus representatives in the Soviet delegation was the political discussion around oil concessions that sprang up in the early 1920s. For instance, the key issue of the London conference of February–March 1921 was the question of Baku oil. British prime minister Lloyd George proposed to the conference to explore the opportunity of making Baku with its oilfields and the whole South Caucasus subordinate to Turkey. Although these had no practical outcome realization, the aggravated diplomatic struggle for the Baku oil entered a new stage.62 In his statement after the London conference Bekir Sami bey explained that it marked a substantial step toward international peace; however, without a doubt, Europe would need one more conference along this track.63



The Struggle for Baku Oil and the Formation of the Soviet Union 347

In the autumn of 1921 the CC RCP (B) Politburo repeatedly raised the question of oil concessions and thus formed various commissions. The Soviet leadership planned to restore Baku’s and Groznyi’s oil industry destroyed by the revolutionary nonprofessionalism of the Bolsheviks with the help of foreign concessions. At its meeting on November 5, 1921, the Politburo discussed the question “On Oil Concessions” and gave Leonid Krassin and Aleksei Rykov three days to discuss the state of Baku’s and Groznyi’s oilfields with specialists then report to the Politburo on how to avoid the approaching disaster. The Politburo was eager to know the types and amounts of the required foreign investments.64 On November 16 the Politburo returned to this question and decided not to submit it for intra-­Party discussion. The secretariat was instructed to carry out a poll to determine the opinions of CC members and submit it to the Politburo for approval.65 Because the question of oil concessions was to be discussed in Genoa, Nari­ man Narimanov was included in the Soviet delegation as the “true owner” of oil. At its meeting on February 13, 1922, the Politburo discussed the question of oil concessions again, recognizing that it was necessary to form a commission of experts (Leonid Ramzin, Ivan Strizhov, and Andrei Shibinskii) and arrange a meeting with Krassin, who was holding talks in Europe. Professor Iosif Trakhtenberg of the Higher Soviet of the Economy (HSE) was included in the composition of the Genoa delegation as an expert, so the ­Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was instructed to ask the government of Italy to issue him a visa.66 The Politburo sent a telegram to Ivar Smilga, deputy chair of the HSE and head of the Main Fuel Division, instructing him to provide the experts with all the necessary materials.67 The discussions and documentation demonstrated that the Soviet government planned to discuss the question of oil concessions at the Genoa conference. Though it was not officially declared, all sides concerned understood that the oil issue would be key at the European economic conference. In his book Oil in International Policy Mir Yagub ­Mehdiyev noted: “The official aim of the conference was to correct and regu­ late the European economy that had just come out of war. The true aim was kept top secret (a preference for Baku oil).”68 With this in mind and in order to deprive all the Soviet republics but the RSFSR of the opportunity to hold independent talks on concessions, on March 1 a letter from Litvinov, deputy people’s commissar of foreign affairs, to the Politburo indicated that representatives of fraternal Soviet republics who were about to go abroad to hold talks about concessions for the natural riches of the federative republics often appeared to be unprepared for such work. Litvinov proposed that the Party prohibit governmental representatives of Soviet federative republics from holding talks without approval by a concession division under the State Planning Committee.69

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Following Litvinov’s appeal, Soviet Russia and the Soviet republics of the South Caucasus concluded a treaty on foreign trade and concessions. Signing the treaty were Lenin as chair of the CPC and deputy commissar of foreign trade Lezhava on behalf of the RSFSR and Georgia’s representative Orakhe­ lashvili, Azerbaijan’s representative Aliyev, and Armenia’s representative Ter-­ Gabrielian on behalf of the South Caucasus republics. The treaty indicated that the economic links of the South Caucasus Soviet republics with other countries should be realized based on their treaty with the RSFSR that henceforth would unite the trade representations of the South Caucasus republics in foreign countries with the trade representatives of the RSFSR in those, who would represent the interests of all Soviet republics. The South Caucasus republics might now conclude either trade agreements or concession-­related accords only with the consent of the RSFSR. According to clause 5, Moscow would send its plenipotentiary representative to a united Commissariat of Foreign Trade of the South Caucasus in order to defend the economic interests of the RSFSR and control questions arising from this treaty.70 Following the conclusion of this treaty, control of foreign trade and concessions of the South Caucasus republics was passed to Felix Rabinovich, who was appointed as the representative of the RSFSR Commissariat of Foreign Trade and RSFSR Higher Soviet of the Economy in the South Caucasus republics on May 6, 1921.71 A program of actions suggested to Rabinovich by the government of Azerbaijan noted that the republics of the South Caucasus were independent in their actions; however, “concessions to agreements within the republics will be given to foreigners upon the RSFSR’s consent.”72 This evident anxiety of the Soviet leadership stemmed from the intensification of the oil policy of Western countries in the early 1920s. To become closer to Baku oil, a series of European and U.S. companies planned to acquire concessions in Iran, Turkey, and the Middle East. On March 3, 1922, Abilov in Ankara wrote to Narimanov that Americans had acquired an oil concession in North Iran and now sought an opportunity to export the oil by sea. Abilov also noted that geological research identified the oil of Erzurum as being identical to the Baku oil and part of the same underground oil deposits. This explained the American oil company’s desire to commence oil production in Erzurum through talks with the Turkish government.73 Soviet Russia attached great importance to the Genoa conference that was designed to promote restoration of the European economy. Hopes for a world proletarian revolution had been lost, so the Bolsheviks were seeking an opportunity to establish normal diplomatic relations with Europe. For Bolshevik leaders who dreamed of a revolutionary link between the West and the East, for proletarians of the West and the oppressed masses of the East, Genoa was a suitable transition from revolutionary rhetoric to a search for compromise.



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The Genoa conference coincided with the transition toward the new economic policy inside Soviet Russia, a clear indication that Russia had parted from its previous revolutionary sentiment. Indeed Soviet Russia’s note to the superpowers on October 28, 1921, accepting compromises on the question of debts to Russia was a diplomatic manifestation of Russia’s need for international recognition. Before the Genoa conference Narimanov asserted that capitalists “need us as much as we need them.” He referred to Lloyd George’s statement: “It is not possible to restore the European economy without Russia’s participation.”74 In November–December 1921 diplomatic talks were held in preparation for the global economic conference. A Cannes meeting held on January 6–13, 1922, was a significant event on this topic. At the end of 1921, right before this meeting, the British government asked the Soviet leadership for permission send a special British mission to the region to study the economic position of the South Caucasus republics and to defend British interests. After consultations with the plenipotentiary representatives of the South Caucasus republics to Russia — ​Eliava, Mdivani, Bekzadian, and Baghirov — ​the British government was denied its request. Krassin, who was in London at this time, told the British government that no British mission could be sent to the South Caucasus republics because they were not recognized by London. Karakhan also instructed the South Caucasus plenipotentiary representatives to give similar answers if the British representative appealed to them.75 At the Cannes meeting it was decided that the heads of governments of invited countries needed to participate in the conference in order to let all the resolutions of the Genoa conference take effect immediately.76 On this basis on January 7, 1922, the Foreign Ministry of Italy invited Soviet Russia to attend the Genoa conference. Active preparations for the conference began in Moscow on January 8. Before the official invitation was received, the CC RCP (B), referring to a telegram from Krassin on January 5, formed a commission consisting of Chicherin, Litvinov, Sokol’nikov, Ioffe, Lezhava, and Krestinskii. On January 10 the Politburo discussed the question of ­Lenin’s invitation to the European conference and decided that his trip to Genoa would be inappropriate.77 After this discussion Chicherin reported to the Foreign Ministry of Italy that the Soviet government would accept an invitation to the conference with pleasure, but Lenin was extremely busy fighting against starvation in the country as chair of the CPC and thus could not leave the capital. Chicherin assured the Italians that the absence of “citizen Lenin” at the conference would not harm the conference’s work because the authority and influence of the Russian delegation would be the same as those of a delegation led by Lenin.78 In response to this telegram, Italian prime minister Ivanoe Bonomi sent Chicherin an official letter of invitation, requesting preliminary information

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about the Russian delegates and the people accompanying them. At its meeting on January 17, 1922, the CC RCP (B) Politburo approved the text of the Soviet leadership’s consent to attend the Genoa international conference, drafted by Chicherin and amended by Lenin. The same meeting approved Chicherin’s proposal regarding the composition of the delegation. The Politburo believed that on the eve of the Genoa conference representatives of “independent republics” should hold a meeting in Moscow in order to speak at the international event in unity. Thus this meeting instructed Stalin and Chicherin to draft and send an appeal about conducting a Moscow meeting to the CEC of the “independent republics” as soon as possible.79 In fulfilling this Politburo decision Kalinin as chair of the All-­Russian CEC and Chicherin as commissar of foreign affairs sent telegrams to Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Bukhara, Khiva, and the Far Eastern republic, proposing that they act as one against the capitalist countries at the European economic conference scheduled to take place soon.80 To finalize a list of delegates to the Genoa conference, an extraordinary session of the all-­Russian Central Executive Committee was convened on January 27. Chairs of the CECs of the “independent republics” also attended the session. The Bolshevik leadership considered it extremely important for every participant in the Soviet delegation to receive a mandate from all the Soviet republics. A collective mandate principle prohibited the representatives of national republics from taking an active part in discussions regarding their respective countries. The extraordinary session appointed Lenin as chair of the delegation and Chicherin as his deputy. In the event of Lenin’s absence from the conference all his powers were to be transferred to Chicherin. The composition of the delegation included Krassin, Litvinov, Narimanov, V ­ atslav Vorovskii, Jan Rudzutak, Mdivani, Bekzadian, and others.81 At Lenin’s suggestion, the CC RCP (B) Politburo approved the issue of the Genoa talks on February 3 and discussed the question of the work of experts and directives of the commission regarding preparation for the conference on February 6.82 The candidacy of Narimanov as a representative of the Azerbaijan Soviet republic to the Genoa conference was approved on February 11, 1922. He was supplied with a mandate from the CEC, CPC, and People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan that obliged him, as a member of common delegation of Soviet republics, to protect Azerbaijan’s interests. This mandate authorized Narimanov to make statements, make decisions, and sign acts and treaties.83 On February 24 Lenin drafted a resolution on the tasks of the dele­ gation to Genoa. The document noted once again that all powers of chair of the delegation were given to Chicherin. Lenin’s instructions were discussed at a meeting of the CC RCP (B) Politburo on March 2. Representing the delegation at this meeting were Chicherin, Litvinov, Krassin, Shliapnikov,



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Timofei Sapronov, Ioffe, Rudzutak, Mdivani, Narimanov, Bekzadian, and Kristian Rakovskii. The members of the preparatory commission — ​Gleb Krzhizhanovskii, Sokol’nikov, Lezhava, and Evgenii Preobrazhenskii — ​were also invited to attend the meeting.84 The main program of action and the political platform of the Soviet delegation to Genoa were discussed, with the participation of representatives of the South Caucasus republics. On March 23, 1922, the Politburo discussed the question “About the ­Genoa Conference” and passed the following instructions to the Soviet delegation: all principal matters have been settled in Moscow, so the leader of the delegation should completely follow these decisions. In the event of c­ ertain unforeseen major questions requiring a solution, the chair should submit them for discussion to the diplomatic corps; all the proposals must be presented to the Party CC Politburo. The Politburo also approved a Soviet delegation consisting of Chicherin as chair and Litvinov, Krassin, Rakovskii, Ioffe, Vorov­ skii, and Rudzutak as members. The chair of the delegation was permitted to submit current questions for discussion, to the Politburo, or to the whole delegation. At the same time, the instruction gave the chair priority in solving all issues without exception.85 Before leaving for Moscow, Narimanov had a long interview with a reporter from the newspaper Bakinskii Rabochii. The interview was published under the title “Our Near-­Term Perspectives.” In this conversation he tried to substantiate the meaning of Azerbaijan for Soviet policy and world r­ evolution, stretching within a huge territory from the Ganges River to the Medi­terranean shores and the Nile River. As for the eastern policy of the Soviets, Narimanov attached great importance to the treaties with Turkey signed in Moscow and Kars and stressed Azerbaijan’s linking role between kindred Turkey and the fraternal Soviet republics. Narimanov explained the need for the Genoa conference, saying that the West economically needed Soviet Russia, which meant that Europe recognized Soviet power. In his view, if the conference was frustrated and became a game of the West, the capitalist world would lose much more than Soviet Russia.86 Armed with such a dubious faith in the future, Narimanov arrived in Moscow on March 25. It is remarkable that on March 27 Narimanov wrote a letter to Stalin expressing his displeasure with the eastern policy of the Soviets and with Chicherin personally. These thoughts strongly differ from the ones published in Bakinskii Rabochii: Our foreign policy, hoping for a developing crisis in the industrial life of Europe and after a devastating war, inappropriately assessed our internal situation. If everything went well in our country, if we could eliminate the economic crisis at our own expense, then we would have

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expected the results of the emerging contradictions in the life of capitalist Europe.... Our proposed compromises at the Genoa conference indicate that we, first, do not particularly hope for backing from the working class of Europe and, second, that our internal situation is not very good. Furthermore, Narimanov noted: I was extremely struck by comrade Chicherin’s statement at a meeting of delegates, where he said: “European powers do not trust us under our current law” and should have added: “we must do something about this.” Why was it necessary to reach such a situation? There was a moment when the whole of the Middle East was under our influence. The Near East viewed us as the only savior and liberator.87 Narimanov explained the current situation as being the fault of Chicherin’s mistakes and further wrote: Yet in my report I drew the Politburo’s and comrade Chicherin’s attention to this circumstance and asked him to take advantage of it and without hesitation gather the Muslim East together to strike the sensitive spot of European capitals, deprive them of trade, decrease the volume of raw materials, and thus accelerate a crisis.... Nevertheless, our foreign policy gave up the Near Eastern question, apparently in hopes of the Entente’s nobleness. This not only gave the Entente a large expanse in the Middle East but also pushed the East away from us by the Soviets’ awkward policy. With our own hands, we killed a revolution in Persia and, by our unsteady, oscillating policy regarding the Turks who are fighting for independence, forced the latter to conclude the treaty with France. Despite being perfectly aware of who Enver is, our foreign policy is sending him to Bukhara, apparently to make him act on our side against Kemal if the latter threatens us. Without waiting for this, Enver has begun acting against us. Narimanov also made the following suggestions: to revive work in the East, immediately to dismiss Rotshtein from the post of Russia’s chargé d’affaires in Iran; to send a plenipotentiary representative who knows local conditions apart from the Russian ambassador in order to help the ambassador in his work; to assign money to the Iranian Communist party in Baku to strengthen its work; to make every effort to help the Ankara government; and immediately to correct the mistakes made in Turkestan and Bukhara. Narimanov wanted to be authorized to hold talks with Enver pasha: “The situation forces



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me to give up any modesty and state: not only Persian revolutionaries but also leaders of tribes in Persia are waiting for my instructions and trust only me.” This letter demonstrates that Narimanov did not pin particular hopes on the Genoa conference. Immediately upon his arrival in Moscow, he requested that Stalin include him in the delegation to leave for Tatariia, Bashkiriia, and Kirgiziia. Narimanov wrote: “I personally think that the Genoa conference will give us nothing, so if you find it necessary you may take me to Tatariia, Bashkiriia, and Kirgiziia. I’m attaching great importance to this. Then I should stay in Transcaucasia to have communication with and lead events in Persia.” Narimanov’s attitude to Genoa evidently was due to the Russian delegation’s appropriation of the powers of the delegations of the national republics. But he was also seeking an opportunity to hold a detailed discussion of the Caucasus situation with Stalin. Foreseeing Stalin’s trip, Narimanov drafted for him a large document entitled “Our Current Attitude toward the Muslim East.” It emphasizes the great importance of the Asia Minor movement led by Mustafa Kemal pasha entitled “Do Away with British Violence.” Unlike Moscow “diplomacy,” the ­treaties that the British concluded with Iran and Afghanistan did not strengthen Britain’s influence on the East. Narimanov urged the Soviet leadership not to fear pan-­Islamism and even considered it possible to use pan-­Islamism as a means to unite the nations of the East in a common anti-­imperialist camp. He viewed pan-­Islamism as lather that would gradually be forced out through a national-­cultural competition. With the aim of weakening Britain, Germany was plotting with anti-­British forces in the East and German spies were conducting extreme propaganda in the Volga region, Turkestan, and other Muslim regions. Strengthening of Party work among the Muslim population would ensure the success of Soviet policy in the East, according to Narimanov: “With this in mind, we must immediately make every possible effort to promote the Party work as much as possible among the Volga region residents, Tatars, Kyrgyz, and Bashkirs, and primarily in Turkestan.”88 Despite this unusual stance, Narimanov found himself a member not of a Stalin-­led mission to Turkic regions but of a Chicherin-­led mission leaving for Genoa.

Beginning of the Struggle for Baku Oil Having completed all the preparations, a Soviet delegation consisting of ­Georgii Chicherin, Leonid Krassin, Maksim Litvinov, Vatslav Vorovskii, Jan Rudzutak, Adolf Ioffe, Kristian Rakovskii, Nariman Narimanov, Polikarp (Budu) Mdivani, Alexander Bekzadian, Aleksandr Shliapnikov, and Boris Shtein left for Genoa on March 31. On their way there, they held talks in

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­ erlin with the German government for several days. The core of the talks B was to unite the efforts of Russia, which had found itself isolated from the rest of the world as a result of the revolution, and Germany, which had found itself in the same situation after its defeat in World War I. On April 6, 1922, the Soviet delegation arrived in Genoa. The very first serious issue that it faced in Italy was the Caucasus question. Practically all of the Caucasus emigrants in Europe had arrived in Italy, which was quite undesirable for the Soviets. Narimanov admitted that they had to listen ­either officially or unofficially to the half-­confessions of shy lovers.89 The Soviet dele­ gation immediately reported to Moscow the anxiety that it felt because of the former leadership of the Caucasus republics. Chicherin demanded that the PCFA deliver materials on Georgia immediately. The Soviet delegation suspected that the speeches of the Caucasus emigrants had been arranged by the British. A day before the conference opened, Trotskii drafted his suggestions to counteract the emigrants from the South Caucasus and submitted them for consideration to the CC RCP (B) Politburo. To cancel the protests of the Caucasus political emigrants, on April 9 Trotskii suggested sending letters on behalf of Party organizations, trade unions, and other organizations of ­Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia to the labor organizations and trade unions of Britain as well as the bureaus of all three internationals, ­demanding that they investigate the circumstances of the execution of the twenty-­six Baku commissars. He believed that on May 1, 1922, demonstrations should be staged under the mottoes: “Imperialists Are Reaching the Caucasus While International Social-­Democracy Shows the Imperialists the Way: Workers of the Caucasus, Red Army Soldiers, Save the Caucasus”; “International ­Proletariat! Don’t Forget Your Heroes Executed by Hangmen: We Must Get a Trial for the Killers!”; and others.90 Trotskii suggested publishing a book by Vadim Chaikin about the twenty-­six Baku commissars and another book by him about Georgia and widely distributing these books in European languages.91 On the day of the opening of the Genoa conference, April 10, the Politburo approved Trotskii’s proposal.92 The anti-­Soviet propaganda campaign organized by the Caucasus emigrant governments in European countries reached such a broad scale that the Soviet delegates considered it necessary to take active countermeasures. For this reason Narimanov made an appeal in an open letter to Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov, Aleksandr Khatisov, and Iraklii Tsereteli, who represented themselves as the legal leaders of the South Caucasus republics in Europe. The letter was written in accordance with the rules of Soviet ideology and p­ ropaganda: Dear Lords, before the opening of the Genoa conference you are haunting the doorways of Poincaré and Lloyd George and stating that you



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are the only legal representatives of the Transcaucasus Republics. I must disappoint you and your former and current guardians, who are eager to see you as representatives of peoples of the Transcaucasia for personal benefits. Who do you mean by saying “people-­population”? If by the word “population” you mean several hundred beys, khans, dukes, and several thousand merchants and traders, then what happened to the millions in the working masses of peasants and workers who definitely hate you for your past actions? They follow us, the Bolsheviks, and bless Soviet construction in Transcaucasia.93 Narimanov accused the former leaders of the Caucasus, who had been fighting against the oppression of tsarist autocracy for long years, of thoughtlessly admiring the policy of Tsar Nicholas, plunging their peoples into national discord for the sake of staying in power, and pursuing a policy of confrontation in Zangezur, Karabagh, and Zakatala. The letter contained many such senseless and groundless ideological accusations. Narimanov noted that the Soviet government, having transitioned to the new economic policy, had won over the petty bourgeois masses as well and thus deprived the former leaders of the South Caucasus republics of a social base. He wrote to the representatives of emigrant governments who had managed to launch a propaganda campaign in Europe based on the Caucasus republics’ occupation by Russia and the loss of independence of the peoples of this region: Our close collaboration with Soviet Russia makes you say that the Transcaucasus Republics have been deprived of independence. This is wrong. From the very beginning, we stated the question clearly: when can independent Transcaucasus Republics exist? Under Soviet Russia or under Nicholas, whom they stubbornly tried to restore by backing Denikin. Alternatively, your heads were turned by Britain and France’s promises that your republics would remain independent ­under the restoration of Kadet (Constitutional Democrat) or tsarist rule in Russia. Come to your senses: what are you getting from European super­powers? Do you want to annihilate Soviet power in Russia? Do you take into account further stages of development under the current situation? We do, and for this reason we not only cooperate with Soviet Russia but also sacrifice everything possible to strengthen and prolong Soviet Russia’s life because our lives depend on it. The whole trouble is that you trust imperialism and entrust your happiness to it, while we trust good-­natured honest Russian workers and peasants and hope that our independence is in their hands. If you are telling tall tales to Mr. Poincaré and Lloyd George because you are missing the Caucasus, this is worse for you. We still hope that you will come to your senses,

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understand the demands of the moment, learn the true reason for the troubles of [our] nations, return to the homeland, and give it what it currently needs: knowledge.94 In the spring of 1922, of course, Narimanov himself understood that the situation in Azerbaijan that he had been expelled from and in other republics of the Caucasus was by far not as good as the situation depicted in his letter to the emigrant leaders. The Genoa conference of European countries was opened under chairmanship of Italian prime minister Luigi Facta on April 10, 1922, at 3 in the afternoon. Twenty-­nine countries attended the conference (thirty-­four countries if British territories were included). The agenda consisted of purely European questions, so the United States did not officially take part in the conference. However, in accordance with a note sent by the U.S. secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes, to Italy’s Foreign Ministry on March 8, 1922, Robert Child, the U.S. ambassador in Rome, attended the conference as an observer. Opening the conference on behalf of the Italian government, Facta entertained the hope that in the growing economic crisis the conference would help the countries of the continent find a common language to restore the devastated economy of Europe. He was followed by British prime minister David Lloyd George, who stressed the conference’s important role in restoration of the European economy. Louis Barthou, a justice minister and a minister for Alsace Lorrain in the cabinet of Raymond Poincaré, welcomed the participants on behalf of the French delegation. Japan’s representative Baron Uchida and Belgium’s representative Georges Theunis also wished the ­conference ­every success. Narimanov noted that a representative of Germany, a country that had suffered from the war most of all, “was humble about the desperate situation of his native country.” Finally, the floor was given to Chicherin, who also touched upon the question of concessions, which was of great interest to the West. On behalf of the Soviet government he announced the beginning of a broad program of concessions that primarily concerned Siberian mineral riches that could become a raw material for European industry. Chicherin noted that in connection with transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP) Soviet Russia was prepared to change a number of its legal acts and open international transit routes in order to expand its economic links with capitalist countries. He also mentioned a series of questions that baffled the leaders of Western countries, in particular: “If Europe really wants to establish peace and restore the war-­devastated economy, it must be disarmed and distribute the global gold fund among needy states.”95 For this purpose, Chicherin suggested



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convening a new conference with the participation of representatives of the working class. Chicherin’s proposal was strongly opposed by many delegates. The head of the delegation of France, a country that had suffered from the German World War I invasion most of all, objected to discussing the question of disarmament at a conference devoted to economic questions. He noted that disarmament was out of the question and that it was inadmissible to speak of questions not included in the conference’s agenda. The resolution of the Cannes conference should be considered obligatory for the Genoa conference’s program. Louis Barthou started reading out the six clauses of the Cannes conference’s resolution. To soften the confrontation, Lloyd George interrupted the discussion, noting that the Genoa conference should be regarded as a failure if it did not pave the way toward disarmament. However, before talking about disarmament, it was essential to conclude an armistice and come to agreement on a whole number of important questions. In his opinion, disarmament required a basis: if the question of disarmament was raised without this basis, the conference would be doomed to failure due to the burden of these discussions.96 Narimanov described the emerging tension: “Lloyd George, taking into account that Barthou desires to frustrate the conference, takes the floor and in his half-­hour speech persuades everyone that it is essential to act carefully, criticizes both Barthou and Chicherin, and thus quiets down the participants of the conference.”97 Lloyd George rebuked Chicherin, saying that “the ship we’ve arrived on is loaded enough; if it is overloaded, you and I will sink to the bottom.” Barthou replied: “Chicherin’s bomb did not explode, so what are you afraid of ?”98 To stop the squabbling, Luigi Facta as chair of the meeting urged Barthou and Chicherin to stop their mutual assaults. Facta noted that the delegations did not object, so the Cannes resolutions were to be considered approved. Further, he read out the titles of the conference’s commissions: political, financial, economic, and transport. A break for an indefinite period was announced. The commissions should have begun to work on April 11. Soviet delegates celebrated the first day of the conference as a victory. The Italian reporters, who had long had no opportunity to see Soviet leaders, followed Chicherin around. Liberal-­pacifist ideals that were spread across Europe, especially Italy, made the Soviet delegation attractive to the Italian newspapers. Soviet propaganda and demagogy were initially interesting for an expanding socialist movement in Europe. As for outcomes of the first day of the conference, the Rome-­based Corrierre della Sera wrote: “The speech of Chicherin was applauded, followed by

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anxious silence.”99 Inspired by this “victory,” Narimanov wrote that the Soviet representatives in Genoa “unmasked the European bourgeoisie and showed its true face.... Examiners collapsed at an examination. The statement of such questions in such a frank form frustrated all the plans of the conference’s organizers.”100 Narimanov believed that the Soviet delegation’s statement in Genoa opened the eyes of European workers, who had considered it possible to hobnob with their bourgeoisie.... We stated: Do you want to save Europe from devastation? Okay. Here you are given large fields, the richest ore mines, and all of Siberia is put at your disposal. You invest your capital, and we will guarantee to you that your capital will be safe and that you will gain a profit. If you want to create overall peace, let’s disarm. This explains why Barthou was infuriated. How can the French be disarmed if they haven’t squeezed out Germany’s last juices yet?101 Narimanov’s impressions from the conference’s first days pertained to Lloyd George, whose eastern policy he often condemned. Narimanov recognized his important role in European and global policy: Without a doubt, Lloyd George is a clever man. Another question is to what and how he applies his mind. He has seriously comprehended the essence of everything happening in the life of Europe. He wants to solve the aggravated questions somehow in order to prevent a new war because a new war will lead Europe to complete devastation and God knows what may happen then. At the same time, he is a representative of the bourgeoisie and hence cannot help but advocate for its interests.102 On April 13, 1922, Chicherin reported back to Moscow in approximately the same spirit, saying that their aims have been reached: at the first meeting they suggested a pacifist program and thus produced the planned effect.103 One of the first questions discussed by the political commission was the issue of participation of the Paris-­based representatives of the South Caucasus national republics in the work of the conference. On the opening day of the conference, April 10, a memorandum from the national governments of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan was submitted to the conference’s secretariat through the French delegation. A mixed group of the South Caucasus representatives led by Evgenii Gegechkori arrived in Genoa. This delegation also included Mir Yagub Mehdiyev and Mahammad Maharramov, the Republic of Azerbaijan representatives to the Paris Peace Conference. Aside from this, the conference was supposed to discuss the question of Baku oil. Thus Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov also arrived in Genoa at that time.104



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Before the conference, on March 31, French premier Poincaré had stressed Azerbaijan’s particular importance for France while delivering a speech to the parliament. He noted that the Caucasus republics, which were considered ­Asiatic, were not invited to Genoa; but Russia, which had seized them by mili­ tary force, was not authorized to speak on their behalf. Poincaré openly stated that he planned to continue a successful oil policy in Baku: “We will not recognize any actions violating the sovereign rights of the Azerbaijani government. America’s stance regarding this question fully coincides with ours.”105 Abilov as Azerbaijani ambassador to Ankara wrote to Narimanov that secret information obtained from an employee of the former Republic of Azerbaijan embassy in Istanbul indicated that the French government had given the large sum of 3.5 million francs to Azerbaijani emigrants to strengthen anti-­Soviet activity.106 To give the Caucasus emigrant governments in Paris official status, the Poincaré government recognized the government of occupied Georgia de jure on April 1 and declared this decision the next day, after the conference opened. On April 11 this decision was passed to Akaki Tchenkeli. Thus the government of France officially recognized the emigrant government of Georgia in Paris as the authority of Georgia. Panicked news reports that the Bolsheviks had sold a portion of the Baku oil to Royal Dutch Shell made French ruling circles extremely concerned. They intended to obtain a certain degree of influence on Baku oil through the Caucasus emigrant governments.107 A declaration of the Soviet delegation read that the Western countries showed interest in gaining concessions for the natural riches of Siberia; however, one of the key goals of the conference was Baku oil. In the opinion of the European newspapers, “no one region of the world may replace Baku oil. The amount of oil produced in the Baku oil basin of Azerbaijan is produced nowhere else in the world, not even in Mexico. The oil reserves of this region are unlimited. Thus the key aim of our activity must be Baku.”108 A series of leading British newspapers viewed the oil question as one of the most important issues of the Genoa conference. In the opinion of the Manchester-­based Guardian Commercial, given that Russia was represented in Genoa, one of the main discussions at the conference would concern the oil question.109 In the period that followed the April 1920 occupation, the production capacity of the Baku oil industry decreased to the lowest mark in the twentieth century (2,915 million tons in 1920 and 2,457 million tons in 1921). The largest oil companies that entered the struggle for oil at the Genoa conference, however, were perfectly aware of the oil reserves of the Absheron region.110 Oil specialists who worked in Baku in the early 1920s and tried to save the oil industry suggested that Moscow shift to an American way of drilling. This required purchase of U.S.- or German-­manufactured equipment.

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A telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin in June 1921 clearly illustrates that the Bolsheviks had a great need to establish links with Western companies.111 The attitude toward the Baku oil not only aggravated confrontations between Western countries and Soviet Russia but also caused a struggle among the oil companies of Western countries. This was clearly manifested during the conference by Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil. The two companies tried to get a concession for Baku oil and thus became serious rivals. An inter­ view by an Italian newspaper with Leonid Krassin, who on April 11, 1922, announced the Bolsheviks’ plans for lease oil areas in concessions, was particularly inviting. Yet the CC RCP (B) Politburo had held many discussions on this topic before the conference and suggested various projects. Referring to these projects, Krassin told the Italian newspaper Informazioni that Soviet Russia was prepared to give oil concessions to the superpowers.112 He provided details about this question in his further interviews. Krassin announced that the Soviet government planned to keep a quarter of Azerbaijan’s oilfields and lease the rest as a concession to France, Britain, America, and Belgian companies.113 Narimanov also considered this possible. In his opinion, “a partial leasing of Azerbaijani oilfields in concessions would be useful for the republic as well by opening broad opportunities for industrial development.”114 Upon their arrival in Genoa, however, the Republic of Azerbaijan representatives noted that Soviet Russia had no right to lease the Baku oil in a concession. On the second day of the conference Maharramov told Italian journalists that the Bolsheviks had no right to sell oil deposits owned by the Azerbaijani people. He justified this statement by saying that Russian capital did not play a considerable role in the Baku oil industry. Thus the oil-­rich deposits of the Absheron Peninsula must belong to the Azerbaijani people and foreign companies that invested their capital there.115 A fire in the Baku oilfields that occurred in the first days of the conference confirmed that the anti-­Soviet propaganda of Azerbaijani political emigrants was true.116 The London-­based Azerbaijani News Bureau reported growing displeasure with Soviet power in Azerbaijan and arson in the oilfields around Baku. At talks with British financial-­industrial circles, representatives of the Azerbaijani national government noted that “the Azerbaijani people will never agree to the Baku oil transfer to concessions by the Bolsheviks.”117 The broad propaganda campaign of Azerbaijani emigrants left traces. Speeches in the media, notes of protest, and statements not only made the delegates of Soviet Russia nervous but also forced Western political circles to act cautiously and made large European and American companies step back. Referring to this broad campaign, the Times of London wrote that “the media is full of oil these days.”118



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The concession promises of the Soviet representatives triggered rivalry among oil giants — ​the Nobel Brothers Company, Standard Oil, and Royal Dutch would have large capital investments in the Baku oil. This rivalry leaked into the media. For instance, Royal Dutch Shell reported that Standard Oil had allegedly seized the Nobel Brothers investments in the Baku oil. However, Emmanuel Nobel denied this report.119 In turn, the New York Times, close to Standard Oil, reported that Royal Dutch Shell had concluded an agreement with the Bolsheviks and received great concession rights in Russia.120 The struggle for oil and discussions about oil concessions gradually became so harsh that U.S. government officials were forced to interfere with this question. On May 3, 1922, Arthur Millspaugh, economic advisor to the Department of State and renowned specialist on oil policy, composed a broad memorandum for the secretary of state on talks on the Baku oil conducted by Krassin in the early 1920s. In regard to secret talks between Krassin and a British-­Iranian oil company at the end of 1921, Millspaugh writes that the point was granting Baku and the Groznyi area in concession to the British-­ Iranian company.121 On the same day, May 3, Child reported to the secretary of state: “The representatives here of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan state that the region of Baku is full of agents of the Dutch-­Shell. The representatives of these three states are furious because of the prospect that the field may be closed to American interests.”122 On May 5, 1922, Alfred C. Bedford, chair of the Board of Directors of Standard Oil, was forced to disclose in written form all the behind-­the-scenes machinations of Royal Dutch and the representatives of Soviet Russia in a report to secretary of state Charles Hughes.123 Based on the May 11 reports, Bedford’s letter, and the memorandum of representatives of Western countries passed to Russia, Hughes stated that the United States did not recognize any agreement denying the participation of American capital. At the same time, he added that the United States would not agree with any national or international plan that did not provide for an “open door” principle and did not give equal rights to all parties concerned.124 The United States did not participate in the Genoa conference but was not going to remain indifferent regarding the question of oil concessions. Thus the United States planned to act jointly with France and Belgium in order to weaken Britain in the sharing of concessions. Mehdiyev described the battle among the largest companies not for life but for death: Standing behind Lloyd George, according to a figure of speech of Lord Admiral Fisher, was the chief of Royal Dutch, Sir Henry Deterding, “brave as Napoleon and impatient as Cromwell.” The American ambassador also had a strong rearguard representation by Bedford, the head

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of the Standard Oil Company.... Two fronts were formed! As an old firm, Royal Dutch is maneuvering like a fox, while young Standard Oil looks like a lion. All minds are now busy with Baku oil, depending on the cunning of a fox or the attack of a lion.125 As a result Sir Laming Worthington-­Evans of the British delegation told American ambassador Child that “the supposed Krassin, Boyle, Dutch-­Shell agreement has been signed. Evans states that the information would have been given to his delegation if it were true.”126 However, Western political circles rapidly denied “an oil intrigue” between the large companies. Western countries reacted exactly the same to Nari­manov’s ambiguous phrasing: “we have oil; we can produce it or we can grant it in concession.” Representatives of Western oil companies noted that it would become possible to conclude contracts for concessions only after the Baku oilfields were returned to their former legal owners.127 Furthermore, the Nobel Brothers Company, Standard Oil Company, Royal Dutch Shell, and other companies in 1922 created a united front syndicate and made the commitment not to enter into separate talks with Russia. Thus the oil war that had begun at the Genoa conference produced no result; the question of concessions for Baku’s oil-­rich deposits caused harsh disputes. Henry Deterding, the head of Royal Dutch, wrote to John Davison Rockefeller Jr. that the bloody Soviet regime would fall soon if he would stop trading with Moscow.128 Staying in Genoa in those days, Mehdiyev wrote: Those at the conference undoubtedly smelled the Azerbaijani oil in Genoa’s air, though no word was said about oil in either the official notes of great powers or official discussions at the conference. This plot of silence around oil was broken only by notes of protest from Azerbaijani emigrants. The protesting cries of Azerbaijanis violated the harmonious silence. The loud noise made by an Azerbaijani delegation of patriots unnerved Lloyd George and Chicherin and troubled Krassin and Henry Deterding, who had launched unofficial trade talks on Baku oil and disturbed them, easily accomplishing their goal.129 The French, who had enjoyed a great advantage in the Baku oil industry before the Russian Revolution, tried to regain it during the conference. France’s Le Figaro believed that the French should not face significant obstacles in this issue and that “the old owners should have kept the concessions absolutely and retaken the Baku oil.”130 Oil-­related confrontations affected political relations as well. The attitudes toward the political-­legal status of the Soviet republics among the members of the Russian delegation were different. Chicherin presented Azerbaijan and



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other Soviet republics as allies of Russia; this was objected to by Lloyd George. The British prime minister viewed these republics not as “allies” of Russia but as “Soviet republics” occupied by the Bolsheviks. In this respect he received backing from the Paris emigrants. In an interview with Corriere Mercantile Topchibashov explained that the states had come to in Genoa for the sake of peace and tranquillity, to restore world economic order. Aside from this, the states suggested that the Soviet government withdraw troops from the territory of Azerbaijan, giving the hard-­working people of Azerbaijan the opportunity to rid themselves of the yoke of the Bolsheviks.131 In such a situation the representatives of the Soviet republics in Genoa proved to be useful after all. Just after the Western countries made a statement about occupation of the Caucasus, Chicherin presented to the political commission the documents signed by the Soviet republics about alliance with Russia. These documents indicated that all of the Soviet republics represented at the conference, primarily Azerbaijan, which was in the focus of political discussions regarding the question of oil concessions, “are allied republics of Russia.” Following this “diplomatic” move by Chicherin, on May 13 the political commission rejected the claims of the emigrant governments of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia to be official representatives of these republics to the Genoa conference.132 The full Soviet delegation appeared at a meeting of the political commission on April 11. Having taken the floor, Lloyd George suggested basing the work of the political commission on a memorandum drafted by experts in London. The Soviet delegation asked for a break to have an opportunity to become familiar with this memorandum, so a two-­day break in the commission’s work was announced. Narimanov commented on the British memorandum: There are two evident clauses there: 1. Interference with Soviet Russia’s internal affairs; 2. To extract everything possible, give nothing. We are responding to these clauses as follows: 1. We are adopting the tsarist government’s commitment on prewar debts as well as municipal and secured railway loans by covering them with our counterclaims. By the way, we are including these with our claims for our gold, which is stored abroad. We are about to pay off the tsarist government’s debts to other governments and private persons’ claims with this very gold. We are making an exception for minor holders of prewar Russian loans, to whom, in the event of accord between governments and ourselves, we will be ready to pay the tsarist government’s debts if a certain check identifies that they are truly minor shareholders. 2. We are rejecting the demand to recognize commitments on payment of military debts, for

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we are view them as financing of a common venture that has already benefited allies at a time when Russia, having suffered more victims than other states and been damaged by an insuperable force, has not received these benefits. 3. We are agreeing to make a commitment regarding private persons and foreigners who suffered from actions of Russian authorities but on the condition of recognition of our counterclaims covering these commitments. In cases when a foreign owner may favor production in Russia, we suggest using the right to first priority to get this former property as a concession or through inclusion of this property, as a constituent part, in the property of joint companies and trusts to be formed. The latter will offer the owner a share for the sake of compensation. This is an indispensable condition that should become the basis of any treaty between Russia and other powers with full legal recognition of Russia.133 The British representatives knew in advance that Soviet Russia would give a negative reply to their memorandum, so the meeting that had been scheduled for April 14 was postponed. Experienced politician Lloyd George planned to soften Russia’s position through a personal meeting with Chicherin. For this reason he invited selected leaders of the Soviet delegation — ​Chicherin, Litvinov, and Krassin — ​to his Villa Alberts residence to have an unofficial conversation. Taking part in the conversation together with Lloyd George were Louis Barthou, head of the French delegation, Italian foreign minister Carlo Schanzer, and Belgian prime minister Georges Theunis. The Alberta meeting remained the subject of discussions and disputes for several days. During the talks Lloyd George used various methods to try to get the property left in Russia returned to its former owners and creditors and force the Bolsheviks to admit all the debts of Russia.134 Western experts estimated these debts at 18 billion gold rubles. However, the Soviet side’s counterclaims initially expressed at the conference assumed a much larger sum. As calculated by the Soviet government, during the years of foreign intervention, Western countries did damages to Russia worth 30 billion gold rubles.135 This sum included the damage done to the Baku oil industry. For this reason and in line with a decision of the CC RCP (B) Politburo the working group of the commission’s experts also included specialists from Baku. The sum of the damage calculated in January– March 1922 was approved by the Politburo. Lloyd George suggested sending Lenin the following telegram: “The ­powers will accept a counter-­claim for the four years of civil war if Russia agrees to return factories and plants to their former foreign owners as property.” Lloyd George took care of not only foreign capitalists but also local ones



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who had owned industrial enterprises in the tsarist era. In his opinion, disputes between Soviet organs and owners of enterprises should be resolved by special courts composed jointly of Soviet power representatives and ­foreigners.136 Despite all Lloyd George’s attempts, Litvinov noted that the Bolsheviks would never agree to return the properties confiscated from foreigners to the f­ ormer owners. Then Lloyd George offered two options: the Bolsheviks would either lease the confiscated property for a period of ninety-­nine years to the former owners or pay them compensation worth 2.6 billion British pounds. In response Litvinov raised the question of compensation for the damage that Russia had suffered during the years of civil war. Mir Yagub Mehdiyev alleged that standing behind the Villa Alberts talks were oil companies waiting for privileges from Baku oil.137 These talks produced no serious political or economic results but caused rumors that the British and French had come to an agreement with the Russians.138 Behind-­the-scenes talks between Russia and the Western powers strongly unnerved the representatives of Germany. The fear of boycott made them approach Soviet Russia more closely. As a result, a Soviet-­German treaty was signed on April 16 in the locality of Rapallo, a place of residence of the Soviet delegation. Representatives of the South Caucasus Soviet republics were not permitted to attend the Rapallo talks at all.139 Under the treaty both sides forgave each other the damage done in World War I. If Russia did not satisfy other countries’ claims, Germany would also give up its claims for nationalized enterprises. The two countries agreed to restore diplomatic and consul relations and created favorable conditions for mutual trade. Soviet Russia and Germany were obliged to exchange views to resolve their relationship. The Rapallo treaty undoubtedly came as a bombshell for the Western leaders gathered in Genoa. For instance, Richard Child, the U.S. ambassador to Italy, noted that Rapallo shook the whole world and delivered a heavy blow at the conference.140 The most important thing is that the conference’s key goal — ​ the question of oil concessions — ​became a matter of secondary importance. Mehdiyev wrote: “The Rapallo treaty marked one of the turning points in the international struggle for oil.”141 While a propaganda campaign on the Rapallo treaty was on the rise, inside the Soviet delegation itself differences of opinion emerged on a series of questions. On April 16 Rakovskii and Krassin submitted their opinion regarding this treaty to the Politburo. It rejected their opinion, however, and in a ciphered telegram on April 17, 1922, ordered them to stand up for the treaty until the end. Moscow was displeased with Chicherin’s activity as well. On April 20 the Politburo submitted for discussion a question “About the Genoa Conference” and decided to send a telegram to Chicherin. It read: “First of all, we would like to express our surprise at the fact that you nowhere indicate the

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allies’ agreement to assign a loan to us, without which the whole transaction becomes quite senseless for us.”142 Chicherin was aware of the CC RCP (B)’s stance. His interest in some of Lloyd George’s proposals and his tolerance of attempts to interfere with the internal affairs of the Soviet Russia were explained by precisely this factor. The Western countries agreed to decrease the sum of war debts and interest rate but firmly insisted that the losses of foreign citizens in Russia had to be compensated and that their seized properties be returned to them. This concerned primarily the key role of foreign capital in the ­Russian economy, especially in the Baku oil industry. Following the April 1920 events, 272 private companies were liquidated under nationalization of the oil ­industry in Azerbaijan, the majority of which had been owned by foreign companies or citizens.143 In a response to the proposals from the Allies, Chicherin sent Lloyd George a letter promising that if they gave up the war debts, elimi­ nated the interest rates of all the debts, and provided financial aid to Russia the Soviet delegation would be ready to discuss and approve, with minor exceptions, a number of proposals suggested by the allies.144 A series of Soviet delegates gave a hostile reception to Chicherin’s proposals to Lloyd George. In particular, Rudzutak, Safronov, Mdivani, Narimanov, Preobrazhenskii, and Bekzadian noted that they violated the CC RCP (B) Politburo’s instructions. Rudzutak reported all the details to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on April 22.145 After receiving Rudzutak’s telegram the Politburo immediately decided to dissuade Chicherin from taking such steps. After the Rapallo treaty was signed, Louis Bathou, the head of the French delegation, was called to Paris for consultations. While he was in Paris, ­Gegechkori, one of the leaders of the Georgian national government, met with Poincaré and told him that the Georgian people had been hurt by Bolshe­vism to the utmost degree and thus would fight the occupiers. Poincaré noted that the day before he had ordered the French delegation to raise the question of letting Georgian representatives attend the Genoa conference.146 The states represented at the conference, however, regarded the question of letting in the emigrant governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia very cautiously.147 Thus Poincaré instructed Barthou to stand firmly against the Russians and to take control of unofficial talks at Genoa regarding oil concessions. In order to get closer to Soviet Russia, Britain considered it possible to compromise by giving foreign citizens their properties in Russia on a long-­term lease, at a time when the French and Belgians demanded return of the seized properties to their owners. Attending a reception honoring representatives of the British-­American media at the end of April, Lloyd George recommended that everyone be more patient to prevent frustration at the conference. He noted that two to three



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weeks were not a long time for the solution of such a difficult questions. Lloyd George stressed: The Washington conference lasted three months but accomplished its goal. Six months or even a year would not have been too long a period for this. I don’t want to say that we will stay here for three months or a year. However, we should not hope to overcome difficulties within two, three, or four weeks. We must be armed with patience because we’re facing great tasks. At present, we belong to the dominating group of winners. However, this will not last forever. If our triumph turns into oppression of other nations, humankind will accuse us of abusing the victory gifted to us by God, and then we will not avoid the punishment we deserve.148 In his interviews the British prime minister very much stressed his desire that the Genoa conference would end in real peace; otherwise, despite minor achievements, he would consider the conference doomed to failure. The Soviet delegates celebrated the May 1 holiday together with Italian Communists. In fact, they regarded the European conference as finished. Having signed the Rapallo treaty with Germany as one of their defeated enemies, the Bolsheviks regarded this as a successful beginning in breaking the capitalist blockade around Soviet Russia. The policy of Western countries that aimed to tame the Bolsheviks was not a great success. On May 2, 1922, the Soviet delegation passed a memorandum agreed upon by Western countries. It indicated that Russia had been a necessary link to the economic system of Europe in the past and that restoration of this system could play an important role for both Russia and the development of the European economy. Signed by representatives of eight states, this document indicated that in order to provide financial aid to Russia the Entente states might establish an international consortium with capital of 20 million pounds. Britain guaranteed to supply goods to Russia on credit in the amount of 26 million pounds. In exchange the allies demanded that the Bolsheviks give up propaganda designed to change the political system of other states and recognize all the debts except for military ones. All the counterclaims of the Soviet delegation were rejected. As for the key disputed question relating to return of the confiscated properties, the memorandum stated that the Soviet government must either return this property or compensate for its value. In his report on May 2 Richard Child noted that he hoped that “the Russians will delay and then refuse to accept.”149 On May 3 the second plenary meeting of the Genoa conference was held. In order not to frustrate the conference, the Western countries preferred to treat Soviet Russia gently. Narimanov wrote:

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The second plenary meeting of the Genoa conference is occurring today. Everything is as solemn as it was the first time. We were the last to enter the hall. The audience’s attitude to us this time is quite ­different. The malevolence that evidently characterized the first meeting has disappeared. Unlike the first time, they are not taking arrogant, derisive looks at us. Today we were smiled at in a friendly way and were shown the way to our seats. Our voices were listened to with evident attention and proper seriousness.150 At this meeting reports were made by the financial and transport commissions that had been established on April 10. According to Narimanov, both reports were unanimously approved. But nothing was decided because everything depended on the political commission that discussed the Russian question. The Soviet delegation made its proposals regarding foreign c­ redits. Soviet Russia needed credit worth a total of 8,797 billion gold rubles. It planned to receive this money within three to five years. This money had to be distributed as follows: 2,797 billion rubles for agriculture development, 1 billion rubles for industry, and 5 billion rubles for transport. However, these proposals by Russia were not responded to seriously. The Western Allies still waited for a r­ eply to the memorandum of May 2. The Soviet delegation decided to meet the U.S. ambassador to break the common front of the Western countries. Child refused to meet Krassin, however, “until Russia has replied to the latest memo­ randum from the Allies.”151 On May 11 the Soviet delegation gave its answer: the property of foreigners will not be returned in any form. Any economic compromises to the West will be premised on de jure recognition of Soviet Russia. As for the Western countries’ demand for repayment of Russia’s debt, the Soviet delegation replied: in the years of civil war and military blockade attempts against the lives of 140 million people were made and a measureless reserve of raw materials was destroyed. “Russia has come to the conference in a spirit of conciliation and still cherishes the hope that its efforts will be crowned with success.”152 Despite this seeming optimism, Western delegates regarded the statement as an end to the conference. Speaking on the same day, Lloyd George voiced his disappointment with the Bolsheviks’ answer and noted that without help from the West, Russia would not be able to revive for a whole generation.153 In fact the Genoa conference ended its work on the same day. Delegations went home without waiting for the official closing because it was senseless to remain in Genoa any longer after such an answer by the Russians, according to Mir Yagub Mehdiyev. As for the Russians, “all they had to do also was to pack things and return to Russia.” The official closing of the conference took place on May 19. Discussion of unresolved questions was postponed for the



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Hague conference. Mir Yagub Mehdiyev explained the ignominious end of the Genoa conference by the hidden actions of oil companies: “The world’s largest secret force — ​Standard Oil Company — ​broke the Genoa conference down and hindered the Bolsheviks from cooperating with Royal Dutch. That was the end of the Genoa conference epic.... The struggle between the British and Americans for Azerbaijani oil is scattered over the political and economic pages of history.”154 Despite the Genoa conference’s failure regarding the Baku oil, the superpowers believed that “the game is complex, but not all has yet been lost.” Especially the French were going to take advantage of this game to make Baku a key aim of France’s oil policy.155 When France further mobilized the strength of Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, and Turkey against the Soviet republics in order to continue this policy, Narimanov wrote: “[W]e don’t believe that Turkey, which is friendly to Soviets, will join this coalition.” In his opinion, Turkish nations on the peripheries of the Soviet republic would be among the key opponents of France’s coalition. “During this period we had an opportunity to prove to the whole world that self-­determination of nations is important to us, not expansion of territory.”156 On May 6, 1922, Narimanov and Ioffe left Italy to report the results of the Genoa conference to the All-­Russian Central Executive Committee. Mdivani and Bekzadian had planned to return to Moscow together with them, but “the Armenian and Georgian questions kept them in Genoa.”157 The s­ udden departure of part of the Soviet delegation aroused the serious interest of Western delegates. Lloyd George assured American ambassador Child in a conversation that Ioffe and other Soviet delegates had left for Berlin to attend a secret meeting and discuss Moscow’s instructions pertaining to the West’s memorandum.158 Representatives of the Caucasus emigrant governments intensified their efforts in Europe in early May. For this reason, before leaving Genoa, Narimanov gave an interview to the media about the situation in the South Caucasus. He reported that the most important event was the formation of a Federation of the South Caucasus Republics. Having stressed that the concept of a federation had long been spread across the region, Narimanov noted: The Transcaucasus Republics had to do a great deal of work to eliminate the traces of the chauvinist policy of Georgian Mensheviks, Armenian Dashnaks, and Azerbaijani Musavatists. Soviet power gradually allowed Transcaucasus peoples to unite, to be frank, with extreme difficulty. At present the Transcaucasus Federation is not only a political but also a cultural and international union of republics. Legally the federation has been the result of an actual federation that was established much

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earlier. In particular, railways and foreign trade offices were united much earlier. Transcaucasia has had enough time to establish firm trade relations with America, Italy, Bulgaria, and other countries.159 On May 11, 1922, a train to Moscow crossed the Soviet border. Journalists displaying a great interest in the Genoa conference beleaguered those arriving from Italy to learn their impressions of the trip. Narimanov gave a long interview with the newspaper Izvestiia. According to him, the Soviet words about disarmament were heard all over the world. Before the conference Soviet delegates had been treated with suspicion, like “animals” or “Bolshevik barbarians,” “but when we were the first to suggest disarmament we woke up not only those sleeping in the conference hall but also all the public circles of Europe.” As for the question of oil concessions, Narimanov explained that “the question of giving certain oilfields on concession has not yet been completely resolved. Anyway I assume the probability of such a partial leasing of oilfields (the Bibi-­Heybat area) will also benefit the Azerbaijan Republic, because this will provide the opportunity for proper development of our state industry.”160 All these explanations, however, had only one aim: to deny Soviet Russia’s responsibility for the conference’s failure. Owing to the high probability of failure of the European economic conference in the second ten days of May, the presidium of the Caucasus regional committee on May 13 sent instructions to all Party committees explaining the nature of this failure and laying the entire blame for the Genoa conference failure on the European countries. Party committees were to use these instructions for their written and oral propaganda.161 On May 13 the newspaper Pravda published a report about the return of the members of the Soviet delegation to Moscow. As soon as Narimanov got to Moscow, Orakhelashvili telephoned him from Tiflis on May 14 and asked him directly: What have you returned with: victory or defeat? ­Narimanov replied: Of course, with victory, adding that he and Ioffe had come to report this to the All-­Russian CEC. He noted that other delegates from the South Caucasus should already have come back, but Mdivani and Bekzadian had been forced to stay in Genoa due to the Armenian and Georgian issues. “In fact, Mensheviks launched a broad campaign there; French newspapers make almost daily reports about revolts in Georgia.... A telegram that we received yesterday reports that the commission of powers that had convened the ­Genoa conference rejected the question of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Thus the campaign of the Mensheviks failed and yielded no results.” Asked by ­Orakhelashvili what the conference’s attitude toward delegates of the South Caucasus republics was, Narimanov replied that the conference’s attitude was good and that in Genoa they had met Gegechkori and social-­



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federalist M ­ divani (Budu’s brother). Narimanov explained that the talks were underway and that the Entente states were gradually retreating on every front. The French delegation was still waiting for a reply from Paris. Narimanov believed that Russian questions would in all probability be submitted to a special commission of experts to avoid frustration for the conference. This would be followed by separate talks with Russia. Narimanov noted: “This is our great victory. Another victory is that Europe and the whole world have become convinced that we seriously desire to cooperate; however, France violates the overall peace because of the interests of a handful of capitalists. All of the European newspapers write about this.... Lloyd George noted that he considered it madness not to take into account the great peoples of Russia and Germany during such a weighty moment.”162 Narimanov and Ioffe made a similar report at a May 16 plenum of the CC RCP (B) in the presence of Lenin. Thus the CC approved the activity of the Soviet delegation before the Genoa conference was over. A day later, on May 17, the third session of the ninth convocation of the all-­Russian CEC listened to a report of the Soviet delegation to Genoa. The session’s resolution drafted by Lenin indicated that the delegations of the RSFSR and Union Soviet republics had performed their duties correctly.163 Having completed his Moscow affairs, Narimanov returned to Baku at the end of May. He had not taken an active part in the Genoa talks; never­theless, he was given a solemn reception in Baku. Newspapers published detailed materials about his Genoa trip. On the first suitable opportunity in Baku (a congress of women of the South Caucasus) he took the floor to report on the Genoa conference, which was published in its entirety in Azerbaijani newspapers. The newspaper Bakinskii Rabochii published a long interview on Narimanov’s Italian impressions. This article, entitled “The Genoa Results and the Hague Perspectives,” covered key aspects of the Genoa conference and clarified the political aspects of the European economic conference. In Narimanov’s opinion, the main political result of the Genoa conference was a victory over “the former men” — ​representatives of the South Caucasus republics. Referring to a speech by Lloyd George at the British House of Commons, at the end of his interview Narimanov noted that the West had three ways to resolve the Russia question: to use force, to leave Russia to the mercy of fate, or to conclude a treaty with it. In his opinion, the first way had already been a fiasco due to White Guardists and the counterrevolution that bared its sword in the years of civil war. As for the second way, Russia has already proved that it could do without a link to the West. Narimanov noted: “There are not three ways; there is only one way: a treaty with Russia, in the Hague or after the Hague, it does not matter.”164

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Speaking at a meeting of the Baku Soviet on June 1, Narimanov reported on the course and results of the Genoa conference. He stressed: “All the time we planned to use the conference. This was a directive of the Central Committee. For this reason all the time we had to find words and expressions to be able to continue talks or frustrate them if necessary. Until lately we didn’t know how to deceive each other, but there we were taught a lesson in diplomacy.” A resolution regarding Narimanov’s report noted: Having listened to the Genoa conference report of our delegate to the Genoa conference, comrade Nariman Narimanov, the Baku Soviet on behalf of the Baku proletariat and all working masses would like to state that the Soviet delegation championed the interests of the masses of workers and peasants and all the gains of the Great Revolution at the Genoa conference with honor and that comrade Narimanov together with the whole delegation of the Russian Federation brilliantly fulfilled the order of the Baku Soviet. The Baku Soviet also made a decision to intensify work to strengthen the Red Army, because the Genoa conference had rejected a proposal of overall disarmament.165 After the resolution was adopted, Narimanov made his closing speech. It was wholly devoted to the eastern question, primarily the events in Iran and Turkey. Unlike the situation in 1920, this time Narimanov noted that “we are not moving to the East with a Communist program; we must give all the enslaved nations of the East the opportunity to choose their fates. For this to happen, it is essential to train revolutionaries-­to-be in the East.”166 Bakinskii Rabochii published Narimanov’s article devoted to the Genoa conference. The article alleges: “While the brain is in the thrall of capital, the sway of brute force will go on.”167 Impressed by the Genoa euphoria, Narimanov spent several days observing Baku realities and began to understand what brute force in Azerbaijan was. Much had changed in the country in the brief period while he was away. Newspapers had launched a campaign against the Turkic language, the number of theater plays in the Turkic language had decreased; and speakers of the Turkic language were persecuted openly and secretly. Professor Baberowski writes that sending obstinate Caucasus nationalist-­Communists to Italy enabled the Transcaucasus regional committee to shift national Party organizations to a new basis. During this period Narimanov’s opponents inside the Party shook the institutional basis of the authority of the head of the government; they removed his supporters from senior posts or excluded them from the Party’s ranks.168



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After a cycle of articles about his Genoa impressions, Narimanov published a long article entitled “Answer to Some Comrades” in the newspaper Bakinskii Rabochii. He noted that lately in the media some high-­ranking comrades had suggested decreasing the number of lessons in the Turkic language and the number of plays in the Turkic language. They referred to this as a Marxist point of view. Narimanov responded to this campaign by using the words of Karl Marx, who said: “The more conscious the working class is, the more productive its work is, the stronger the power it will seize.” Narimanov wrote that a Turkic worker or peasant needed theater more than any other nation. Though the Turkic theater had existed for thirty years, it had only three actresses and Turkic women had finally just received the opportunity to go to the theater. He angrily asked: “Using what language do you want to make children of Turkic workers and peasants closer to children of other nationalities? The children of the Turks must know verses by not only Pushkin but also Shakespeare and Schiller, but first of all they should know the menacing battles, the verses of a truly proletarian poet, our native son Mirza Alekber Sabir, as well as folk poets Mullah Panah Vagif, Gasym bey Zakir, and Mullah Veli Vidadi.”169 Narimanov suggested that those desiring to cut the number of lessons in the Turkic language should learn this language themselves to be able to comprehend the prophetic verses of Sabir. Then there would be no representative who would have asked: “And why should we erect a monument to a certain Sabir during such a hard time? This is one of two things: either these comrades do not know the Azerbaijani realities and thus make mistakes or they learned Marx badly and can in no way interpret the questions that Marx wrote about long ago.” Narimanov called such senior officials “migratory birds” and reproached them: “The Turkic language is declared the state language in Azerbaijan and thus should enjoy all the rights and advantages thereof. No one is authorized to or will dare to revoke this. Owing to certain political and economic reasons, Azerbaijan may give up its natural riches; however, it cannot give up its native language and will not allow anyone to belittle the significance of this language in Azerbaijan. Let those who act against the Turkic language in Azerbaijan know with certainty about this.” Historian Audrey Altstadt correctly pointed out that, “once the Azerbaijani elites lost political power to the Bolsheviks in April 1920, they strove to defend their cultural and national identity in key areas of language, education and the arts.”170 Narimanov’s article is followed by an afterword from the Bakinskii Rabochii editorial staff members, who considered it their duty to indicate that no article directed against the Turkic language or Turkic theater had been published or would be published by the newspaper. The harsh style of this article made the Azerbaijani leaders anxious. On June 19 it was submitted

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for discussion to the presidium of the CC CPA, which resolved: “A speech by a responsible official with such articles disrupting the Party organization in the central Party organ should be considered inadmissible. A copy of this article together with the CC opinion has been submitted to the Transcaucasus regional committee, which will discuss this question at its next plenum, to take place in Baku.”171 Narimanov arrived in Tiflis early in July. He spoke at various meetings of the Caucasus regional committee and Tiflis City Council, reporting on the Genoa conference and events there, especially the demands of the Western countries and activities of the Caucasus emigrants. This information was reported as the background for Soviet diplomacy’s victory over Western diplomacy.172 By this time Mdivani had returned from Genoa and actively joined the process of propagating the conference’s results according to a decision of the presidium of the Transcaucasus Regional Committee.173 The Hague conference, as a continuation of the Genoa conference, opened on June 15, 1922. On May 17 the Genoa conference had decided to put off discussion of the “Russian question” until the Hague. But the Hague conference substantially lagged behind Genoa in terms of the political weight of the delegates, who were primarily representatives of business circles. Lloyd George, Barthou, and even Chicherin (who was resting in Germany) did not attend the conference. So participation was limited to Lloyd Greame, the British minister of foreign trade, and John Leslie Urquhart, the former Russian-­ Asian Bank director, from Great Britain; Charles Alphand, director of the bureau that defines French citizens’ property in Russia; and others. Even the emigrant governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia sent “diplomats of second importance” to the Hague.174 Chairing the conference was the Dutch foreign minister, Herman Adriaan van Karnebeek. The participants of the conference spent eleven days ­discussing the “Russian question” without Russians, in order to take a common stance. A Russian delegation led by deputy people’s commissar of foreign affairs Litvinov arrived at the conference on June 28. Nevertheless, Moscow had seriously prepared for the conference. On June 12 Politburo had discussed readiness for the conference and selected the delegation.175 On the opening day of the conference, June 15, the Politburo again discussed this question in the presence of PCFA representatives Maksim Litvinov (head of the delegation), Leonid Krassin, Nikolai Krestinskii, and Grigorii Sokol’nikov from Soviet Russia. In its decision the Politburo noted that instructions that had been given to the Russian delegation to Genoa would remain in force in the Hague as well, given that the question of military debts remained unsolved. The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs instructed the delegation of Litvinov, Krassin,



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and Krestinskii to leave immediately and to arrive in the Hague no later than June 26. Both the CC RCP (B) Politburo and the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs knew well that the Hague conference’s key target was Baku oil. The discussions related to oil concessions at the Genoa conference discussions had caused hot debates but produced no fruit. Thus everyone was notified in advance that the Hague conference would deal only with Baku oil.176 Two weeks before the Hague conference, however, the French parliament discussed the situation established after the Genoa conference and the Rapallo treaty and expressed fears about Bolshevik activities in the East and their attempt to lead the Muslim world. These discussions suggested as a necessary step an immediate restoration of the independence of the Caucasus republics occupied by the Soviets.177 On the same day the French government passed a note regarding Baku oil to Britain, based on the principles enunciated by Louis Barthou at the Genoa conference. The French demanded that foreigners’ properties confiscated in Russia were to be returned to them. In a reply on June 10 the British government noted that the question of returning properties to their former owners in Russia or compensation of losses was the sole responsibility of the Soviet government. Unlike the French, British official circles considered it possible for foreigners to rent their former property in Russia, including the Baku oil industry. While large oil companies held behind-­the-scenes talks in Genoa, they took a direct part in the Hague conference. Even newspapers openly called the conference “an oil meeting.” They explained even the choice of Hague as the conference’s venue, saying that the head of one of the biggest oil companies was Henry Deterding, a Dutchman by origin.178 Unlike the Genoa delegation, however, the Soviet delegation to Hague included no oil representatives of either Baku or other republics. At its meeting on June 15 the Politburo instructed the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to gain recognition of the Rapallo treaty by all of the Soviet republics. But it was no longer necessary for these republics to attend the Hague conference.179 Of course this was a reflection of the different political context of the Genoa conference and different economic context of the Hague conference. It was a manifestation of the irreversible character of Soviet centralization in foreign policy. The Soviet delegates arrived in the Hague on June 26, 1922. In his very first speech at the conference on June 27 Litvinov talked about Soviet Russia’s financial needs and even declared that he would not join discussions until Russia’s demands for credit were met. In Litvinov’s opinion, a sum of credit (such as 3,224 billion gold rubles) should be announced and Russia should be given

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assurances that it would get this money. If these guarantees were not given, the Soviets would not compensate the former owners’ losses or even discuss the question of returning property.180 However, the Soviet delegates were forced to yield to pressure of Western diplomats and business owners. This was due undoubtedly due to Russia’s urgent need for credit and the terrible starvation throughout the country. On July 7, in the Hague conference’s commission on questions of property, Litvinov announced the terms under which the Soviet government might provide privileges to private owners. He presented a document containing a map of territories to be given in concession and a list of enterprises. This document covered the operational and prospective oilfields of Azerbaijan, the North Caucasus, and Turkestan. Litvinov even announced that “if foreigners who were never involved in oil affairs in the North Caucasus, especially Azerbaijan, desire to receive privileges, their appeal will be examined; a share of oilfields indicated in the list will be provided to them.”181 Litvinov assured his listeners that all proposals made by foreign capitalists would be considered in Moscow to find out if they were economically viable; in choosing a foreign candidate, preference would be given to the former owners.182 It became evident from Litvinov’s statement that the Soviet ­government reserved the right to determine which oilfields were subject to these p­ rivileges and would use this opportunity to cause conflicts between Western ­countries. Naturally the West disagreed with this. Now not only the French and ­Belgians but also the British, who had surprised Europe by their tolerance of the ­Soviets, were forced to reject Russia’s proposals. A speech by British representative Lloyd Greame on July 12 came as a surprise to many. He demanded clarification of the process of restitution of the confiscated foreign property. Greame wanted to know how the violated rights of owners would be restored and what rules would be used for payment of compensation.183 As soon as Litvinov declared the opportunity to lease Azerbaijan’s oilfields in concessions on July 7, the Azerbaijani emigrant organizations in Europe intensified their efforts. While the Hague conference was underway, in London a representative of the Azerbaijani government of political emigrants gave an interview with Reuters warning all the governments that it would not allow the national riches of the country to be robbed in such a manner when the rights of the Azerbaijani national government were restored. Representatives of the emigrant government in Paris also addressed the Hague conference with a memorandum of similar contents.184 While the crisis in Bolshevik Russia was growing and many regions were starving, political rumors strengthened. The political and business circles of the West continued to regard the Soviets as a temporary phenomenon. Thus such statements were of major importance.



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On July 19 Litvinov stated that he expected a telegram from Moscow that would permit softening of the conditions of concessions. However, neither politicians nor business owners trusted his promises any longer. They regarded the statements of Soviet leaders as meaningless. In a situation where the Soviet delegation expected no obstacle, on July 20 Belgian delegate Baron Cattier read a resolution stressing the necessity to act as a common front against Russia, so the conference was shut down. The resolution noted that governments represented at the conference should not be mediators in the process of buying back foreign properties seized in Russia after November 7, 1917, without the consent and participation of the owners. It also stated that the governments represented at the Hague should make such a decision jointly.185 The document was evidently intended to prevent separate talks with Russia. Thus, like the Genoa conference, the Hague conference produced no fruit. It turned out not to be possible to restore business links with Russia and to repay Russia’s former debts, especially debts on large investments in the Baku oil industry in the early twentieth century. On July 20 the Politburo submitted the initial information from the Hague to the Moscow Council for a broad discussion. Trotskii drafted conference-­ related theses, which were distributed among localities. These theses noted that current European authorities did not care about restoration of economic relations but planned to continue a policy of force, to which the Genoa and Hague conferences were an eloquent testimony. Adopting a final resolution on the conference was postponed until receipt of final information from the Hague.186 Shortly after the Hague conference, at the end of July 1922, on the initia­ tive of the French government, a Paris oil conference was convened that was aimed at gathering together oil companies with an interest in the Caucasus and acting as one against Soviet Russia. Attending the Paris gathering were the largest companies (Standard Oil Company, Royal Dutch Shell, the British-­Iranian Company) as well as numerous companies that had once operated in the territory of tsarist Russia. Representing the Azerbaijani national government at the conference was the former trade and industry minister of the DRA government, Mizra Asadullayev. The meetings, chaired by Henry ­Deterding, sought ways of battling against the Bolsheviks to make them surrender. The conference decided that state officials, companies, and separate property owners should not conclude treaties with the Soviets and that “every­one should observe the common interest, as well as the interest of every individual.”187 This looked like a declaration of a blockade against the Soviets and was the end of the first stage of the European countries’ stubborn struggle for Azerbaijani oil.

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Formation of the USSR and Transfer of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Political Functions to the Union State The summer of 1922 marked the beginning of discussions of the form and content of the union, ways to realize it, and the national, autonomous, and federative bases of a union. These discussions were accompanied by shutting down diplomatic institutions inside “independent” Soviet republics and in neighboring foreign countries. After the Union State of the South Caucasus was established in March 1922, the People’s Commissariats of Foreign Affairs continued to work with personnel but not for a long period. On April 18, 1922, the presidium of the CC CPA (B) made a decision that representatives of all countries having no appropriate treaties with Azerbaijan should leave Azerbaijan immediately. The CPC of Azerbaijan was instructed to execute the decision.188 On June 13, 1922, the Transcaucasus Union Soviet issued a decree on unification of the foreign policies of the South Caucasus republics. The decree indicated that common leadership of the policies of these republics was the responsibility of the Soviet Union. Clause 2 of the decree assumed liquidation of the People’s ­Commissariats of Foreign Affairs of the South Caucasus Soviet republics; their functions were to be passed to the Soviet Union’s Department of Foreign Relations. The department’s work was to be headed by a presidium of the Soviet Union or by a republican CPC. The decree eliminated representations of the Soviet republics to the Russian Soviet Federation and other Soviet republics. It was permitted to establish a plenipotentiary representation of the South Caucasus Union in the RSFSR if necessary. However, diplomatic representations of foreign countries in the South Caucasus republics and plenipotentiary representations of these republics abroad had to work through the Department of Foreign Relations.189 This was not a lengthy process either: following discussions, it was decided on November 9, 1922, to establish a Secretariat for Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus republics.190 On August 21 the Soviet Union of the South Caucasus issued a decree entitled “On Unification of Foreign Policy.” The decree, signed by Narimanov, indicated that common leadership of the foreign policies of the South Caucasus republics would be the responsibility of the presidium of the Soviet Union, which should carry on this leadership through the Department of Foreign Relations. The representative of each republic to the presidium at the same time was considered a commissar of foreign affairs of the respective republic. Each of the three republics had to establish a Secretariat for Foreign Affairs led by a plenipotentiary representative to be appointed by the Soviet Union.191



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After the Soviet Union issued the decree, a Secretariat of Foreign Affairs was established in Azerbaijan in August 1922. Shirvani (Mustafabeyov), who was close to Narimanov, had once worked as Azerbaijan’s plenipotentiary representative in Moscow, and was appointed as ambassador in Iran in June 1922 but did not begin working in Tehran, was appointed as leader of this entity.192 The first task of the newly created secretariat was, in response to an inquiry from the Department of Foreign Relations of the Soviet Union of the South Caucasus on August 26, to collect information about foreign representations in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan’s representatives abroad. The report was sent to Tiflis.193 Diplomatic representations of Azerbaijan in several neighboring countries continued to operate in the autumn of 1922. The embassy in Ankara and the consulate in Kars did not stop working. After the Azerbaijani representation in Iran was eliminated in November 1921, Shirvani was appointed as a pleni­ potentiary representative in Iran in June 1922 but had not yet reached there. Appointed as a plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan in Afghanistan, Ali Jabbar Ismailov left for Kabul on November 4. A diplomatic representation of the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, plenipotentiary representations of Iran and the Bukhara People’s Soviet Republic, as well as a German representation continued to operate in Baku in autumn 1922.194 The diplomatic representations of Belgium, Greece, Denmark, Poland, Finland, Sweden, Italy, Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and other countries that had previously operated in Baku had already ceased to operate, according to a decision of the Azerbaijani Soviet government.195 After the South Caucasus Union was established, the South Caucasus regional committee considered it unnecessary to maintain three representations of the three republics in Ankara. On August 5, 1922, the presidium of the Transcaucasus Regional Committee told the Armenian and Georgian govern­ ments that their representations in Ankara were no longer appropriate. Thus Erivan and Tiflis were instructed to transfer these powers to Russia or Azerbaijan.196 On September 25, 1922, the presidium of the Transcaucasus regional committee made a decision to instruct Ibrahim Abilov to represent all three South Caucasus republics in Turkey. The decision also noted that it was possible to open staff positions for advisors for Georgia and Armenia under the Azerbaijani government.197 In the spring of 1922, however, rumors spread that Abilov had been recalled. In May Turkish newspapers alleged that Abilov had tried to conclude an anti-­ Russian Turkish-­Azerbaijani treaty and thus would be recalled on the order of the Soviet government. The Armenian newspaper Zhogovurd (­People), a source of this misinformation, even wrote that Soviet authorities had attained documents compromising Abilov.198 On June 12 Abilov published a refutation

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in the newspaper Varlyk (Entity), saying that the issue of recalling him had not been raised; furthermore, any Turkish-­Azerbaijani treaty was out of the question. Abilov noted that these rumors were provocative, concocted by enemies of Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. A day later the same newspaper published a letter from Narimanov to the Grand National A ­ ssembly of Turkey. It noted that the question of recalling Abilov had been raised because he was likely to be appointed as a commissar of education; however, there was no one to substitute for him, so he would continue to work in Ankara.199 Indeed at its meeting of June 19, 1922, the CC CPA (B) made a decision to leave Abilov in Ankara. At the same meeting Mustafa Guliyev took the post of commissar of education.200 The broad discussion of such rumors stemmed from Abilov’s complaints that Moscow had cut the powers of Soviet republics, primarily the South Caucasus republics, in neighboring countries. Yet on February 3, 1922, Abilov wrote to CPC chair Narimanov that some days before the Russian mission had received a letter from Chicherin expressing his displeasure with attempts by the South Caucasus republics to pursue an independent foreign policy. It appears from Chicherin’s letter that exactly for this reason the Central Committee had made a decision to transfer the powers of representatives of the S­ oviet republics abroad to a RSFSR representative. Abilov wrote to ­Narimanov: I regard this measure as quite unnecessary because we — ​representatives of the Soviet republics — ​elsewhere pursue a mutually accepted policy, so such measures would only help our enemies strengthen their work. I have still had no report on this subject from you. I don’t know if you have received a copy of this resolution; if you have, then tell me whether you held talks with the CC and comrade Chicherin on this topic. I would like to ask you to detail about this question. I find this phenomenon to be abnormal and practically unrealizable.201 The tension related to Abilov continued. When he temporarily arrived in the Caucasus on September 10, 1922, to spend a holiday, Asker Askerov, the military attaché of the Azerbaijani embassy in Ankara, fled to Germany. This enabled Abilov’s opponents to launch a broad campaign against him again. A report made by the State Political Department (SPD) of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR (NKVD) on October 4, 1922, indicates that Askerov was an officer of the DRA army and even had contacts with Turkish counterintelligence and secretly promoted the arrest of Soviet intelligence agents who had operated in Anatolia.202 Another reference was composed as well: an official of the SPD Eastern department, Vasiukov, drafted a very tough reference regarding Abilov:



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Abilov, the former Menshevik, who acted against the Communist movement before 1920, is currently a Mohammedan [Muslim] White Guardist rather than a Communist and Soviet worker.... In his speeches he isn’t ashamed of noting: “Do away with the Extraordinary Commission, do away with its members! I’m a Muslim, I love my Azerbaijan, and I will fight the RSFSR and Communists.” In his nonstop plots against the Russian mission, he even arrested his mission’s employee for four days for the latter’s acquaintance with a Russian mission employee. He was continuously playing into the hands of Kemal pasha even to the detriment of interests of the RSFSR, as he apparently thinks that the national tasks of Muslims are above all. Abilov’s keeping this post further may turn to be too harmful to our affairs in Turkey. Furthermore, Abilov ignores local Communists, which has caused the latter’s hostile feelings to the Azerbaijani government.203 On the basis of Vasiukov’s scribble, on October 5 deputy chair of the SPD Henrikh Iagoda and head of the SPD Eastern Department Iakov P ­ eters submitted negative information to Levon Karakhan, deputy head of the PCFA. The SPD leadership suggested that the PCFA leadership “consider it impossible to let Abilov leave the boundaries of the RSFSR.”204 Based on these references, on October 7 Karakhan wrote to Stalin: “The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs believes that it is not possible for comrade Abilov to keep the post of Azerbaijani SSR plenipotentiary representative in Turkey any longer.”205 However, Stalin disagreed with the hasty decision of Karakhan and Peters and added the following resolution to the PCFA decision: “To comrades Karakhan and Peters. Despite Askerov’s escape, I view recalling an SPD representative without checking up on him through the CC of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan unfair and untrustworthy.”206 Following this resolution, Abilov-­related materials were submitted for investigation to the Regional Committee of the South Caucasus and then with a cover letter from Nazaretian to Kirov in Baku.207 A secret investigation carried on in Azerbaijan demonstrated that Moscow’s accusations against Abilov were false. Thus the leadership of Azerbaijan and South Caucasus Union considered it possible to let Abilov continue work in Ankara. In fact some of the accusations forwarded by the SPD were based on letters that Abilov had once written to Narimanov. In these letters he made no secret of his sympathy for Kemal pasha and confessed that he secretly maintained links with some emigrants for the purpose of successfully struggling against the counterrevolution.208 It is interesting that during the same period (October 1922), Semen Pankra­ tov, deputy chair of the South Caucasus Extraordinary Commission, collected

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“compromising material” against Islam Hajibeyli, Azerbaijani consul in Kars. He wrote to Narimanov: According to Transcaucasus Extraordinary Commission agents’ reports, Hajibeyli Islam bey, consul of the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic in Kars, served as an investigator for the White Guardists in Kuban when they were in power; when Kuban was Sovietized, he, fearing to face responsibility for his actions, escaped to Batum and from there left for Baku and joined the Party.... Hajibeyli has a brother, Arif bey Hajibeyli, who serves the Turks as a secretary of the Turkish consulate in Erivan. The brothers maintain mutual links; aside from this, Hajibeyli Islam bey maintains links with the Azerbaijani White emigration in Turkey and even resented the latter’s written correspondence with their friends in Azerbaijan.209 This letter, with Narimanov’s resolution attached to it, was submitted for investigation to Kirov, secretary of the CC CPA (B). However, the consulate of the Azerbaijan SSR in Kars was closed later, in November, so the question was no longer important. Only after Stalin’s resolution and the investigation carried on in Azerbaijan on behalf of the already nonexistent Commissariats of Foreign Affairs of the South Caucasus republics was Abilov entrusted to represent the republics under the government of the GNAT. The credentials issued to Abilov by the Soviet of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan and the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs indicated that he would represent the political, economic, and trade links of Soviet Azerbaijan in Turkey.210 The credentials of November 10, signed by Eliava, contained a request to the GNAT government to trust all of Abilov’s statements made on behalf of the Georgian Soviet Republic and provide necessary assistance to him.211 Also, the credentials of November 10 signed by Miasnikov on behalf of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs authorized Abilov to represent the interests of Soviet Armenia in Turkey.212 These were the last credentials handed over to a plenipotentiary representative of the South Caucasus republics abroad. At its meeting on the same day, November 10, 1922, the Regional Committee of the South Caucasus discussed the question “On Foreign Diplomatic Representations of the Transcaucasus Republics.” The committee made a decision eliminating representations of the South Caucasus republics in Kars, Tehran, Tabriz, and Bukhara (except for the Ankara office); their powers were to be transferred to Soviet Russia’s diplomatic representations in these towns.213 The representations of the South Caucasus republics existed until the death of Ibrahim Abilov himself, on February 23, 1923.214 Following the sudden, suspicious death of Abilov at the Turkish economic conference in Izmir, no new



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ambassador of the Transcaucasus Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR) was appointed and the plenipotentiary representation was eliminated. The process of liquidation of foreign representations of Azerbaijan and other republics of the South Caucasus directly depended on serious preparations for the establishment of the USSR since the summer of 1922. On August 10, 1922, the CC RCP (B) Politburo created an appropriate commission to discuss future relations among the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, Belarus SSR, and Transcaucasus union. The preparatory measures led to the idea of turning the South Caucasus union into a Transcaucasus Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Under the Stalin commission’s draft, the Transcaucasus Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus were to join the Russian Federation as autonomous ­entities. At a meeting on September 11, 1922, the presidium of the CC of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (B) resolved that the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic should immediately join the All-­Russian Federation with broad autonomy.215 On the same day a plenum of the Central Committee approved the concept of autonomization suggested by the presidium. At vari­ ous discussions in September 1922 all representatives of the Soviet republics, except for the representatives of Georgia, approved Stalin’s plan of “autonomization.” All the Georgian leaders but Eliava believed that Soviet republics’ joining the RSFSR as autonomous entities was premature.216 In his written appeal to members of the CC RCP(B) Politburo on September 26, however, Lenin strongly criticized Stalin’s plan of “autonomization.” He wrote: “We recognize ourselves as equal with the Ukrainian SSR and other republics and join a new union, a new federation, equally with them.”217 At Lenin’s suggestion, a plenum of the CC RCP (B) on October 6, 1922, resolved that it was necessary to unite Ukraine, Belarus, the Federation of Trans­ caucasus Republics, and the RSFSR in the form of a “Union of Socialist Soviet Republics,” authorizing each of the republics to leave the union freely if it so desired.218 At the same time, the plenum strongly criticized Mdivani’s suggestion to dissolve the Transcaucasus Federation, in order to accept the South Caucasus republics into the new union. On October 10 the presidium of the CC CPA (B) and on October 18 a plenum of the South Caucasus regional committee approved the decision of the plenum of the CC RCP (B) and resolved to convene a congress of the South Caucasus Soviets. On December 10, 1922, the first congress of Soviets of the South Caucasus opened, chaired by Narimanov. It declared the establishment of the Transcaucasus Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and adopted its constitution. Narimanov reported on the activity of the Union Soviet at the congress, and Orjonikidze reported the establishment of the USSR. The congress approved both the domestic and foreign policy of republics entering the Trans­caucasus Federation and noted that these policies aimed at strengthening the bases

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of political, military, and economic unity.219 The congress elected a Trans­ caucasus Central Executive Committee of 150 members and candidates, its presidium with 13 members, and a Transcaucasus Soviet of People’s Commissars with 11 commissars. Orakhelasvhili was elected chair of the SPC of the Transcaucasus; Huseinov and Miasnikov were elected his deputies. The process of establishment of the USSR ended soon after the Trans­ caucasus SFSR was established. The 10th All-­Russian Congress of Soviets that took place on December 23–27, 1922, with the participation of representatives of the Transcaucasus SFSR, Ukrainian SSR, and Belarus SSR made a decision to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On December 30 representatives of the Soviet republics signed a declaration treaty establishing the USSR. That evening the First All-­Union Congress proclaimed the establishment of the USSR based on a report by Stalin. The Central Executive Committee of the USSR was established as a supreme executive organ of the newly established union of the four republics. Elected as chairs of the USSR CEC were Mikhail Kalinin, Grigorii Petrovskii, Nariman Narimanov, and Aleksandr Cherviakov. Thus Narimanov climbed the Mount Olympus of power of the newly established Soviet Union. Soon after that he asked the Politburo for permission to return to Baku, because the Moscow climate was hazardous for his family’s health. Narimanov was even prepared to leave his high leadership post. He had suffered a heart attack in Moscow just a year ago, and physicians told him that the Moscow climate was hazardous both for him and for his son, who was often taken ill with pneumonia.220 However, further developments demonstrated that Narimanov’s desire to return to Baku was due not to the natural climate of Moscow but to its politi­ cal climate. He asked Stalin to plead for him: Dear comrade Stalin! I beseech you to back my request to the Politburo because my health and the health of my child force me to take this step. I think that my thirty-­year literary-­public work and eight-­year leadership work on the Party’s instructions give me the right to appeal to the Politburo of our Party with such a request. In attaching the certificates of health, I would like to ask the Politburo to permit me to live in Baku. If this is prevented by the post that I occupy as a member of the presidium of the USSR CEC, I ask you to release me from this post.221 This pleading letter is indicative not of the illness of Narimanov’s little son Najaf but rather of Narimanov’s personal tragedy. A letter “About the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries” that he submitted to Stalin and to the Central Committee in June 1923 is full of the bitterness of this tragedy. In ad-



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dition to being submitted to the CC, this letter was also found during a search of the house of Sultan-­Galiyev, who was arrested.222 The central Soviet leaders initially wanted to arrest Narimanov as well, but Stalin did not allow them to do so. This created the necessity to produce a detailed analysis of this letter. Materials collected by the Party Control Committee of the RCP (B) led by Emel’ian Iaroslavskii demonstrated that Narimanov was a loner both within the Soviet elite and in his personal life.223 Owing to the scandal caused by this letter, both Narimanov’s opponents and former supporters spoke against him. Even Azerbaijani “young Bolsheviks,” at a meeting of the commission, accused Narimanov of “Musavatism.” When Narimanov reminded Ruhulla A ­ khundov about his own past as a socialist revolutionary, Akhundov replied: “It is better to be a Communist and former socialist revolutionary than a Musavatist like comrade Narimanov.” Akhundov warned: “It is necessary for us to uncover, once and for all, the evil that we have in Azerbaijan — ​Narimanovism  — ​for otherwise we will be threatened with facing Sultan-­Galiyevism.” Huseinov said at the same meeting: “Narimanov is developing a frenzied campaign against us at a time when Rasulzade is launching a frenzied campaign against us in Constantinople; he’s published his book and is grouping all our counter­ revolutionaries around him. Of course, I don’t think that Narimanov is linked with Rasulzade. However, he repeats Rasulzade’s arguments exactly. Narimanov should take this into consideration.”224 The materials against Narimanov collected in Baku and Moscow suggested a criminal investigation rather than a Party investigation. The commission-­ arranged speeches of young Communists to workers were blasphemous in those years. They used to say: “Narimanov told us: ‘Why are you lagging behind the Armenians; have you forgotten 1918?’” Despite such accusations, Narimanov, having been acquainted with the protocol of the commission of June 13, 1923, asked commission secretary Iacobson to add the following to the protocol: “I have been viewing the policy of Mikoian, Sarkis, and Mirzoian as harmful for Azerbaijan because they tried to take away the identity of Azerbaijan.”225 The wish of one of the leaders of the Soviet state to return to Baku under the pretext of his own and his son’s disease was explained by the unbearable conditions created for him. Factors that caused his premature death are clearly indicated in the protocols of the meetings against him. The last discussion of materials regarding Narimanov by the Iaroslavskii commission was held in November 1923. By this time, the meeting of the activists of the Azerbaijan Communist Party had already accused him of nationalism and his reports sent to the Central Committee, Stalin, and others were being considered anti-­Marxist. The decision of the Azerbaijan Communist Party meeting in July read:

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The Narimanov report is an anti-­Party act in essence and is aimed at dividing and creating national and other factions within the Party. His accusations against the whole range of Azerbaijan Communist Party officials are nothing more than the unsubstantiated claims of a selfish man and a sheer nationalist who puts his own interests above the interest of the Party and the working class. The work of the commission to establish the veracity of the accusations that are directed against many officials is completely legitimate. This process must reach a definitive conclusion in order to put an end once and for all to any kind of ambitious attempts to divide the Party. Noting that the Narimanov report is an illiterate document that is anti-­Marxist in essence, and rejecting all the accusations therein, which profit no one but our enemies, the meeting of senior officials calls upon members of the Party not to fall for provocative statements by certain people or groups but to unite even more strongly as a single international Communist family.226 Later, on July 28, 1923, the Party Control Commission of the RCP (B) adopted a very harsh secret decision against Narimanov, stating: Deliberately incorrect information on the conditions of the Azerbaijan organization was provided to the Central Committee by Narimanov. Several slanderous attacks and disgraceful unconfirmed accusations were made against members of the Central Committee of the RCP (B) Orjonikidze, Kirov, and Mikoian. Narimanov’s report is saturated with completely non-­Communist nationalism, Armeniaphobia, anti-­ Semitism, and so forth. The Central Control Committee of the RCP considers that Narimanov should be severely reprimanded for his ill-­ treatment of his Party comrades and the Central Committee, where he has also appeared. It is also necessary to consider that his recent trip to Azerbaijan was undesirable. Commission members Grigorii Petrovskii, Emel’ian Iaroslavskii, and Matvei Shkiriatov.227 Narimanov was left almost alone in these discussions. In the course of the meeting there were calls for his expulsion from the Party, arrest, and even execution. It was difficult to work under these conditions and stress, so Narmanov submitted his resignation letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. However, due to his reputation and authority in the East and in general among Muslims and the crucial role that he had played in the Eastern policy of the Soviet Union, on November 15, 1923, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party adopted a decision to express its political confidence in Narimanov, noting that “(a) the incident triggered by the report of Narimanov and the counterreport of Iaroslavskii



The Struggle for Baku Oil and the Formation of the Soviet Union 387

is to be considered resolved; (b) [we] declare that Narimanov enjoys the full confidence of the Central Committee and ask him to withdraw his resignation letter.”228 After this expression of confidence, Narimanov withdrew his resignation and continued his duties as one of four chairmen of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR until the end of his not-­so-long life. These discussions and intrigues did not fade away without leaving a scar. On March 19, 1925, Narimanov died at the age of fifty-­five from heart failure. Although Azerbaijani leaders made some attempts to bring his body to Baku, the Soviet leadership decided to bury him in Red Square in Moscow. The honor ceremony was held on March 22. The wreath laid by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party bore the following words: “To the revolutionary leader of the people of the East and fighter for the freedom of those suffering under the yoke of imperialism.”229 His burial day was declared a Day of Mourning in the whole USSR: all government offices were closed and all government institutions, USSR embassies, and commercial representations abroad as well as military and commercial ships lowered the state flag for five minutes. At 1:00 p.m. Moscow time Narimanov was buried in Red Square, next to the Kremlin walls, to the sounds of the cannons fired by the National Guard of the Red Army. Speaking at the ceremony, the chairman of the USSR Central Executive Committee, Mikhail Kalinin, said: “In the person of comrade Nariman Narimanov, we are burying our friend from the ranks of the dearest Party and Red Square is accepting the first sacrifice of the Eastern people.”230 The solemn burial ceremony of Narimanov in the capital of Russia (coming after the death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924) was the end of his tumultuous life in the first years of the Soviet Union. The establishment of the USSR meant the end of the foreign political activity of Soviet Azerbaijan and the Transcaucasus Federation, of which the republic had been part. Under a treaty signed on December 30, 1922, all Soviet republics that joined the USSR transferred the conduct of foreign affairs to Moscow. By its order of December 8, 1923, the Azerbaijani PCFA eliminated all diplomatic representations that had been operational in Baku, except for the embassies of Iran and Turkey. Furthermore, the foreign political relations of the Azerbaijan SSR were only designed to use central Soviet and republican security organs to persecute Azerbaijani political emigrants in Turkey and Europe, their various organizations, and their print organs.

10

Conclusion

T

he foreign policy of Soviet Azerbaijan ran through certain stages within the historical framework. Starting on April 28, 1920, after the occupation of Azerbaijan by Bolshevik Russia, some radical changes were made in the international position of Azerbaijan and its foreign policy. The state recognized de facto by the Supreme Council of Versailles in January 1920 was driven out of the international arena. These changes ended with the loss of a major attribute of the republic’s independence — ​foreign political functions. The overthrow of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan marked the beginning of a new power in the country. Dependent on the bayonets of the Red Army, the Soviet power rejected all achievements in the social and political life of the independent state by the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan as well as the traditions of national statehood. The Republic of ­Azerbaijan was replaced by a dictatorship of bayonets cultivated by the Bolsheviks. The occupation regime in the country showed that the slogan “independent ­Soviet Azerbaijan” was an empty phrase that had no political, legal, or practical significance. Azerbaijan, as the first target of the Bolshevik aggression in the South Caucasus in April 1920, had to suffer all the hardships of gaining political, economic, cultural, moral, and national independence. The newly independent republic that for two years had combined the morals of the East and values of the West and tried to integrate into the newly formed system after World War I was forcibly removed from the free world. Azerbaijani Communists played a decisive role in the occupation of Azerbaijan and its Sovietization by force of weapons; however, their dreams of independence on the principle of socialist ideas did not come true. A little later they were forced out of all major areas of state administration. Narimanov’s notion that Azerbaijan is ruled by foreigners is eloquent testimony of this. The right to control the political, national, and spiritual life of the country 388

Conclusion 389

and the right to dispose of the economic riches of Azerbaijan were transferred to Moscow’s emissaries. They ruled everyone, even local Bolsheviks who tried to supervise the country. The political situation in the post-­April occupation clearly reaffirmed that power that did not rely on the will of the people could not preserve national ideals. The April 1920 occupation was followed by a period of Sovietization of Azerbaijan by terror and violence, which led to the removal of national cadres from state administration and then to their complete extermination. Politi­cal parties that played a significant role in the management of Azerbaijan during the Republic of Azerbaijan, their leading cadres, and a broader social base became the major target of Bolshevik terror. Worst affected by the terror and violence was the institute of foreign policy of the republic and its diplomatic corps. The dissolution of the Republic of Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry, outlawing the national government’s missions abroad, delivered heavy blows to Azerbaijani diplomacy. Fatali khan Khoiskii, who led the Azerbaijani governments in 1918–20, was killed by an Armenian terrorist in Tiflis. The other top officials of the Foreign Ministry and other diplomats of the country were arrested and exiled. After the overthrow of the democratic republic, the diplomatic corps of the Azerbaijan Republic abroad became the first generation of the Azerbaijani political emigrants and were literally exterminated. Narimanov, a central figure of the Soviet government in Azerbaijan and a champion of foreign policy of the republic in the first years of Sovietization, was the target of Bolshevik plots. In charge of the eastern policy of Soviet Russia, first in the Commissariat for Nationalities and later in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Narimanov failed to apply his political and diplomatic experience accumulated in Moscow. Orjonikidze, Moscow’s chief deputy in the Caucasus, succeeded in setting not only non-­Muslim Communists but also Muslim Communists against Narimanov. As a result, Narimanov, who dreamed of turning Azerbaijan into a lighthouse at the gates of the East, remained alone in Soviet Azerbaijan. This political solitude continued after he was separated from Azerbaijan. Numerous accusations against Narimanov in the summer of 1923 by the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party clearly demonstrated his isolation in the Bolshevik society, not only politically but morally and socially as well. Officially he was one of the leaders of the Soviet state but in fact he realized that the ideals he served had failed to make him or his country happy and prosperous. Following this isolation, he did his best to get back to Baku to attain his goal. A review of Narimanov’s last years in Moscow suggests that he could not conceive of Azerbaijan’s happiness without Soviet Russia. While in the Kremlin he regretted his Communist ideas and realized the tragedy of his errors and suffered great failures in his personal life and political aspirations. Harsh

390

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

political pressures, ideological frameworks, and moral solitude in Moscow hastened Narimanov’s death. He passed away prematurely in 1925, a tragic finale to the life of the head of the Azerbaijani government under Soviet power in 1920–25, who was one of the leaders of the South Caucasus federation and later the Soviet state. The Sovietization of Azerbaijan started with territorial losses. From the first days of the April occupation of the territory of the republic, it became the object of “compensations” within the framework of the Soviet political approach in the South Caucasus. Embraced by Soviet Russia, Azerbaijan began losing not only its freedom but also its land. Territories regarded as indisputably Azerbaijani in the DRA period were now “granted” to neighboring states and sold by “auction.” The policy of friendship between Soviet Russia and Menshevist Georgia and Dashnak Armenia was entirely based on concessions of Azerbaijani lands to them. This political line found its diplomatic parallel in the Treaty of Moscow on May 7, 1920, and the Russian-­Armenian treaty concluded in Erivan on August 10 of the same year. Suffice it to say that the fate of the republic’s territory was decided in the course of diplomatic talks with neighboring states without the participation of Soviet Azerbaijan. After the April occupation, the prestige of the Azerbaijani Soviet diplomacy was at its lowest level ever: the Azerbaijani delegation was represented by an Armenian during talks with Armenia and by a Georgian during talks with Georgia. In the first years of Soviet power Azerbaijan suffered from this diplomacy of mistrust to the fullest measure. Research involving numerous archival documents showed that the territorial losses of Azerbaijan in this period were the logical result of Moscow’s policy directed toward discrediting Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan had to pay for numerous plots of the two leading figures of Russian foreign policy: Chicherin and Karakhan; for confrontation between Narimanov and Chicherin on the eastern policy; and for confrontation between Stalin and Orjonikidze on administration of the Caucasus and separation of the mountainous part of Karabagh from its low-­lying part. Attempts were repeatedly made to annex the mountainous part to Armenia and, if that proved to be impossible, to create permanent conflicts in the Azerbaijani government. That was the deplorable finale of the Moscow policy in respect to Azerbaijan through the mediation of the Caucasus Bureau of the CC RCP. The research on the history of Azerbaijani diplomacy, the Caucasus policy of Soviet Russia, and the complex and contradictory national relations in the South Caucasus in the 1920s makes it possible to establish the truth about the controversial fate of the mountainous region and cleanse its history of falsifications. The analysis shows that longtime allegations that Karabagh belongs to Armenian lands as well as allegations that Stalin took Karabagh away from

Conclusion 391

Armenia and gave it to Azerbaijan and other empty talk have nothing to do with the historical truth. Study of the documents and materials of the 1920s for this book reaffirms the groundlessness of these claims. Such a brazen lie about the recent history of Karabagh is explained by attempts to justify occupation of Azerbaijani lands by Armenia over the past few years. Research into the foreign policy of Soviet Azerbaijan in 1920–22 indicates that in the first two years of Soviet power the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs formally functioned within the framework of the government of Azerbaijan. Suffice it to say that this commissariat that operated in the newly formed government of Soviet Azerbaijan fell under the complete control of Moscow when all foreign relations of the country were regulated to comply with instructions and directives of Russian foreign commissar Chicherin. As a result, by 1922 Azerbaijan and other Soviet republics had been deprived of any right to maintain international relations. Soviet Russia’s directive diplomacy ended with the disenfranchisement of all union republics, which could no longer pursue their own foreign policy. Analysis of the foreign policy of Soviet Azerbaijan and the history of its diplomacy has identified a factor that led to the formation of the USSR as a union not a federative state. The concept of a national independent republic, which had successfully been implemented in the South Caucasus in 1918– 21, had already seized the minds of the public. The idea of independence so strongly penetrated into the life of the South Caucasus peoples that it proved to be impossible to reject it later. Even Stalin as an architect of the new alliance of states had to concede that it was essential to build the USSR as a union of republics with equal rights precisely under the influence of previously independent states of the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan and the other republics only enjoyed the status of independence formally. The right to secede from the USSR was purely formal. Suffice it to say that none of the union republics succeeded in exercising this right throughout the whole period of the USSR’s existence. One of the major directions of the foreign policy of Soviet Azerbaijan in the 1920s was related to Iran. For the Bolsheviks, Azerbaijan was a comfortable springboard to expand their influence to Iran (particularly its Caspian area near Gilan) and disseminate Communist ideas to the east. The defeat of the revolutionary process in the West after World War I made the Bolsheviks reorient their efforts toward the East. In the first years of the Bolshevik power the eastern policy of Soviet Russia and the whole Communist camp covered Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. Azerbaijan was in the center of this policy, as evidenced by the 1st Congress of the Peoples of the East, which was held in Baku. However, the decisions of the congress were full of ­revolutionary romanticism and had no practical effect. The principal aim of the Baku c­ ongress

392

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan

was to mobilize the public opinion of the Eastern peoples against Great Britain. During this period emphasis was placed on the resources of the Azerbaijan SSR as a front-­line country in the context of the struggle against the British Empire through Iran. Iranian developments, particularly Bolshevik experiments in the Gilan region, as well as attitudes to the Soviet-­Iranian treaty of February 1921, caused differences between Narimanov and Chicherin, between Moscow and Baku. However, Azerbaijan’s activity in these developments did not mean that the country pursued its own independent foreign political strategy. Azerbaijan served as an instrument in the struggle of Soviet Russia against Great Britain. The warships of Soviet Russia sailed in the Caspian Sea under the Azerbaijani flag; military units of the Bolsheviks fought in Gilan under the mask of the Azerbaijani army. When negotiating with political circles in London, the Soviet diplomats were eager to weaken the power of the British Empire in the East by using the Azerbaijan and Bukhara Soviet republics in an effort to drive the British from Iran and Afghanistan. Soviet Azerbaijan undeniably had national interests in the Iranian policy of Soviet Russia. But the point here is the question of South Azerbaijan. The movement of Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani and the Tabriz uprising were attractive to the Soviet Azerbaijani leadership not only because of their anti-­ British nature but also because of the factor of national revival. Azerbaijani Communists regarded the Soviet policy of expansion eastward as an opportune moment to unify South Azerbaijan with Soviet Azerbaijan. Emphasis was generally placed on Turkey in the foreign policy of Soviet Azerbaijan and the Bolsheviks in particular. The Azerbaijani diplomacy followed an interesting path of development in relations with the Ottoman Empire that was defeated in World War I and Kemalist Turkey as a proponent of the national will of the Turks. This book examines relations between Turkey and Soviet Azerbaijan from the April occupation to November 1920 (prior to Sovietization of Armenia), from Russian-­Turkish talks in Moscow to the signing of a treaty on March 16, 1921, and during the Kars Conference in 1921 and the mission of Ibrahim Abilov in Ankara. The most serious failure of Azerbaijan diplomacy within this historic framework was the pro-­Armenian position of Soviet Russia, through which a basic part of Zangezur and Daralayaz was lost, and the well-­known declaration of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee related to the fate of Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Karabagh became public. Research into this issue shows that this declaration was not a result of a voluntary decision by Narimanov but was dictated by Moscow and its representatives to the Caucasus. Orjonikidze and Stalin recommended that the Soviet government carry out a plan of annexation of Zangezur to Armenia.

Conclusion 393

This was necessitated by their desire to prevent the Turks from having access to Baku. My research is the first attempt to reach such a conclusion of paramount importance for the historiography of Azerbaijan based on historical documents and facts. It should be noted that the Nakhchivan issue was at the center of the foreign policy of Soviet Azerbaijan. Turkey’s assistance at the Moscow and Kars talks and respective agreements confirmed that Nakhchivan would come under the protectorate of Azerbaijan. At the same time, in an attempt to make the protectorate permanent under pressure from Turkey, the Treaty of Moscow stipulated that Azerbaijan had no right to cede the protectorate over Nakhchivan to another country. During a conference in Kars, along with Turkey and Soviet Russia, the Armenian Soviet Republic confirmed Nakhchivan’s transfer to the protectorate of Azerbaijan. Keeping Nakhchivan a part of Azerbaijan to comply with interstate treaties proved to be a great success in the foreign policy of Azerbaijan. In April–May 1922 a conference was held in Genoa, attended by Narimanov as a representative of Soviet Azerbaijan. This study shows that the main focus of the Genoa conference was Baku oil and that all the debates concerned oil concessions. However, Azerbaijan’s participation in the conference was only for show. From the start of Sovietization Azerbaijan had no right to dispose of its principal mineral resources. Suffice it to say that Narimanov was not allowed to speak at the conference. Although the conference yielded no specific results, the Soviet diplomats, including the Azerbaijani leaders, succeeded in exploiting its outcome in their own interests for propaganda purposes. In 1922, following the formation of the USSR, all the national republics had to transfer their foreign political functions to Moscow. In so doing these republics, including Soviet Azerbaijan, lost a major attribute of their independence.

Notes

Preface 1. Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, 10–11. Chapter 1: Introduction 1. Salavat Iskhakov, comp., A.M. Topchibashi i M.E. Rasulzade: Perepiska, 1923–1926 gg., 53. 2. “Vladimir Lenin’s Thesis about Grounds to Secure an Agreement with England” (1921), Russian State Archive of Social-­Political History (hereafter referred to as RSASPH), fund (f.) 2, record (r.) 2, vol. 1292, pp. 1–2. 3. Information from the Russian Foreign Commissariat in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), August 4, 1921, Archive of Political Documents of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan (hereafter referred to as APDPARA), f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2а, p. 22. 4. Text of Rasulzade’s conversation with workers of the daily Istanbul newspaper Yeni Shark, February 6, 1923, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 746, p. 26. 5. Nariman Narimanov, Ucqarlarda inqilabımızın tarikhine dair Merkezi Komiteye, I. Staline mektub, 35; Nariman Narimanov, Mektublar ve Qarabağ meselesine dair senedler, 39–40 (all translations are my own unless otherwise noted). 6. H. Spoer, “Political Report on Bolshevik Movement in Azerbaijan: A Confidential Report,” July 29, 1920, in Azerbaijan Democratic Republic: Archival Documents of Great Britain, 443. 7. See Azerbaycan tarikhine dair materiallar: Azerbaycan tarikhi muzeyinin eserleri, 309. A pood is the equivalent of about 36 pounds. 8. B. M. Shpotov, “Ispol’zovanie opyta SShA v rekonstruktsii sovetskoi neftianoi promyshlennosti v 1920–30 gg.,” 164. 9. Iorg Baberovskii [ Jörg Baberowski], Vrag est’ vezde: Stalinizm na Kavkaze, 237. 10. Secret telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin and Stalin, November 2, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 24а, p. 26. 11. Letter from Stalin to Chicherin, August 16, 1919, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 824, p. 4, 12. Minutes of a meeting of the committee to discuss the report and written request of ­Narimanov, June 13, 1923, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 2, vol. 176, p. 81. 13. Letter from Nariman Narimanov to Ibrahim Abilov, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 92, p. 116. 14. Narimanov, Ucqarlarda inqilabımızın tarikhine dair, 13. 15. Ibid. 16. Mirsaid Sultan-­Galiyev, “Who Am I?: Autobiographical Notes,” letter to members of the CC RCP (B), May 23, 1923, RSASPH, f. 82, r. 2, vol. 262, p. 63. 17. Narimanov, Ucqarlarda inqilabımımızın tarikhine dair, 46. 18. Sultan-­Galiyev, “Who Am I?: Autobiographical Notes.” 19. Firdovsie Ahmedova, Nariman Narimanov — ​ideal ve gerçeklik; Musa Qasımlı and Elmira Hüseynova, Azerbaycanın kharici işler nazirleri; Hasan Hasanov, Nariman Narimanovun milli dövletçilik bakhışları ve fealiyyeti; Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle 395

396

Notes to pages 8–9

for Transcaucasia (1917–1921); Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920; Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History. 20. Iusif Bagirov, Iz istorii sovetsko-­turetskikh otnoshenii v 1920–1922 gg.; Ismail Musayev, Azerbaycanın Nakhçıvan ve Zangezur bölgelerinde siyasi veziyyet ve kharici dövletlerin siyaseti (1917–1921-­ci iller); Ismail Musayev, Azerbaycanın kharici siyaseti: İkinci hisse, 1920–1991; Moisei Persits, Zastenchivaia interventsiia: O sovetskom vtorzhenii v Iran i Bukharu v 1920–1921 gg.; Vladimir Plastun and Semen Agaev, “The Communist and National Liberation Movement in Iran in the 1920s”; Vasif Qafarov, Turkiye-­Rusiya münasibetlerinde Azerbaycan meselesi (1917–1922); Musa Qasımov, Kharici dövletler ve Azerbaycan; Musa Qasımov, Azerbaycan-­Türkiye diplomatik-­siyasi münasibetleri (aprel 1920-­ci il–dekabr 1922-­ci il); Vladimir Genis, Krasnaia Persiia: Bol’sheviki v Giliane, 1920-­1921; Solmaz Rüstamova-­Tohidi, Kominternin Şerq siyaseti ve İran, 1919–1943; ­Rakhman Mustafa-­zade, Dve respubliki: Azerbaidzhano-­rossiiskie otnosheniia v 1918– 1922 gg. 21. Eduard Godzishevskii, Russkaia neft’ na mirovom rynke; Ali Aliyev, Sovet hakimiyyeti illerinde Azerbaycanda neft senayesinin; Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol; Şirkhan Salimov, Azerbaycan nefti beynalkhalq münasibetlerde (1920–1922-­ci iller); Farkhad Dzhabbarov, Bakinskiia neft’ v politike sovetskoi rossii (1917–1922). 22. Stefanos Yerasimos, Türk-­Sovyet İlişkileri Ekim Devriminden Milli Mücadele’ye; ­Stefanos Yerasimos, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Türk–Sovet İlişkileri, 1917–1923; Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusiya; Kamuran Gürün, Türkiye-­Sovyet İlişkileri (1920–1953); Selami Kılıç, Turk-­Sovyet İlişkilerinin Doğuşu; İbrahim Ethem Atnur, Osmanlı Yönetiminden Sovyet Yönetimine Kadar Nahçivan (1918–1921); Serpil Surmeli, Türk–Gürcü İlişkileri (1918–1921); Betül Aslan, Turkiye–Azerbaycan İlishkileri ve İbrahim Ebilov (1920–1923); Kaya Tuncer Çağlayan, British Policy towards Transcaucasia, 1917–1921; Yavuz Aslan, Birinci Doğu Halkları Kurultayı; Nurcan Toksoy, Revan’da Son Gunler: Türk Yönetiminden Ermeni Yönetimine; Taylan Sorgun, Bitmeyen Savaş: Halil Paşa İttihad ve ­Terakki’den Cumhuriyet’e ; Candan Azer, Babadan Oğula Güney Kafkasya: Türkiye– Güney Kafkasya İlişkileri. 23. Tofig Köçerli, Qarabağ: Yalan ve hegiget; Jamil Hasanli, “Karabakh: Looking into the Past in Search of the Truth”; Jamil Hasanli, “How the Caucasus Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B) Discussed the Karabakh Issue in 1920–1923”; Jamil Hasanli, “­Nagorno-­Karabakh: Old Delusions and New Interpretations.” 24. Cemil Quliyev, V.İ.Lenin ve Azerbaycanda Sovet hakimiyyetinin qelebesi ve möhkemlendirilmesi uğrunda mübarize; Zülfeli İbrahimov, V.İ. Lenin ve Azerbaycanda sosialist inqilabının qelebesi; Piustakhanum Azizbekova, V.I. Lenin i sosialisticheskie preobrazovaniia v Azerbaidzhane (1920–1941 gg.); A. D. Rafikov and A. A. Karimova, Velikii oktiabr’ i obrazovanie natsional’noi gosudarstevennosti v Srednei Azii; Abdousamad Babakhojaiev, Proval angliiskoi politiki v Srednei Azii i na Srednem Vostoke (1918–1924); Sh. B. Batyrov and I. I. Mints, Pobeda sovetskoi vlasti v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane. 25. Stephen Cohen, “Bolshevism and Stalinism”; Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917–1958; Robert Conquest, Religion in the USSR; Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled; Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923; Edward Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923; Ronald Grigor Suny, ed., South Caucasus, Nationalism, and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaizhan and Georgia; Alex Marshal, The Caucasus under Soviet Rule; Alfred Rieber, Stalin and the Struggle for Supremacy in Eurasia; and others. 26. Grigol Zhvania, Velikii Oktiabr’ i pobeda sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii; Aleksandr Kvashonkin, “Sovetizatsiia Zakavkaz’ia v perepiske bol’shevistskogo rukovodstva,



Notes to pages 12–18 397

1920–​1922 gg.”; Nikolai Dzhavakhishvili, Bor’ba za svobodu Kafkaza; George ­Mamoulia, Bor’ba za svobodu i nezavisimost’ Kavkaza (1921–1945); Galust Galoian, Rossiia i narody Zakavkaz’e: Ocherki politicheskoi istorii ikh vzaimootnoshenii s drevnikh vremeni do pobedy Velikoi Oktiabr’skoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revolutsii; Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde; Yerasimos, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Türk-­Sovet İlişkileri; and others. 27. Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, vol. 4: Between Crescent and Sickle: Partition and Sovietization. 28. Musayev, Azerbaycanın Nakhçıvan ve Zangezur bölgelerinde siyasi veziyyet ve ­kharici dövletlerin siyaseti; Shalala Mamedova, Interpretatsiia totalitarizma: Stalinizm v Azerbaiidzhane, 1920–1930; Şalala Mammadova, “Azerbaycan SSR-­de inzibati-­amirlik sistemi: 1920–1930-­cu iller”; Ilgar Niftaliev [Niftaliyev], Azrbaidzhanskaia SSR v ékspansionistskikh planakh armian (20-­e gody XX veka); Ilgar Niftaliev, Istoriia Azerbaidzhana v arkhivnykh dokumentakh (aprel’–dekabr’ 1920 goda): Na osnave materialov Rossiiskogo Gosudarstvennogo Arkhiva Sotsial’no-­Politicheskoi Istorii. 29. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition; Audrey Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule. 30. Audrey Altstadt, The Politics of Culture in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1920–1940. 31. Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde, 274. 32. Ibid., 217–18, 237. 33. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia: Between Crescent and Sickle, 1. 34. K istorii obrazovaniia Nagorno-­Karabakhskoi avtonomnoi oblasti Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR: Dokumenty i materialy. 35. Sovetsko-­iranskie otnosheniia v dogovorakh, konventsiakh i soglasheniakh; Sovetsko-­ turetskie otnosheniia: Sb. dokumentov; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 2; ­Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 3; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol, 4; ­Persidskii front mirovoi revoliutsii: Dokumenty o sovetskoi vtorzhenii v Gilian (1920– 1921); Azerbaijan Democratic Republic: Archival Documents of Great Britain; Türkiye Böyük Millet Meclisinin Gizli Celese Zabıtları; Ismail Soysal, Türkiye’nin Siyasal ­Andlaşmaları; and others. 36. Мahammad Emin Rasulzade, Sbornik proizvedenii i pisem; Iskhakov, A.M. Topchibashi i M.E. Rasulzade: Perepiska: Mahammad Emin Rasulzade, Azerbaycan cümhuriyyeti; Mahammad Emin Rasulzade, Bolşeviklerin Şerq siyaseti. 37. Nariman Narimanov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia; Narimanov, Ucqarlarda inqilabımızın tarikhine dair Merkezi Komiteye. 38. Zurab Avalov, Nezavisimost’ Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoi politike; Noe Zhordaniia, Nashi raznoglasiia; Noe Zhordaniia [Noe Nikolaevich Zhordania], My Life; Ali Fuat ­Cebesoy, MoskovaHatıraları; Yusif Kemal Tengirşenk, Vatan Hizmetinde; Semyon Aralov, Bir Sovet Diplomatının Türkiye Anıları; Dr. Rıza Nur’un Moskova-­Sakarya Hatıraları; Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz; Aziz Alpoud, Heyatımın hekayeleri; Anastas Mikoian, Tak bylo: Razmyshleniia o minuvshem; and others.

Chapter 2: The Political Situation in Azerbaijan in the Early Twentieth Century 1. Altstadt, The Politics of Culture in Soviet Azerbaijan, 10 2. Baku po perepisi 22 oktiabia 1903 goda, 7–8. For additional information, see Sevda ­Süleymanova, Azerbaycanda ictimai-­siyasi herekat (XIX yüzilliyin sonu–XX yüzilliyin evvelleri), 19. 3. Peter Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire, 331–32.

398

Notes to pages 18–27

4. Monopolisticheskii kapital v neftianoi promyshlennosti Rossii (1883–1914): Dokumenty i materialy, 8–9. 5. Ali Mardan-­bek Topchibashev [Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov], Maiak Azerbaidzhana, 76. 6. Documents of meeting of the Special Council of June 14, 1900, Russian State Military Historical Archive (hereafter RSMHA), f. 2000, r. 1, v. 6593, p. 14. 7. Aleksandr Alektorov, Inorodtsy v Rossii, 59. 8. For more information, see Dzhamil’ Gasanly, Ali Mardan-­bek Topchibashev, 105–17. 9. “Toptchibachi Ali Mardan bek Ali Akbar bek oglu,” Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey ­Toptchibachi, carton no. 6/2, 2. 10. “Topchibashi Ali-­Maradan bey,” December 16, 1951. Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey ­Toptchibachi, carton no. 3, 1. 11. “Biographical Information about Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov: Part I (in concise form),” Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 6/2, 7. 12. Diliara Usmanova, Musul’manskie predstaviteli v Rossiiskom parlamente, 134. 13. Gasanly, Ali Mardan-­bek Topchibashov, 127–31. 14. Musa Bigiev, Osnovy reform, 176. 15. “Topchibashov: Congresses of the Muslims of Russia,” Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 7, 10; Bigiev, Osnovy reform, 177. 16. Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde, 76 17. Syn Otechestva, September 7, 1905. 18. Russkoe Slovo, August 22, 1905. 19. Tiflisskii Listok, November 4, 1905. 20. Tiflisskii Listok, November 2, 1905 21. “Biographical Information about Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov, Part I (in concise form),” Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 6/2, 9; For more infor­ mation, see Gasanly, Ali Mardan-­bek Topchibashev, 138–43. 22. Altstadt, The Politics of Culture in Soviet Azerbaijan, 5. 23. “Biographical Information about Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov: Part I (in concise form),” Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 6/2, 9. 24. Galimdzhan Ibragimov, Tatary v revoliutsii 1905 goda, 150. 25. Usmanova, Musul’manskie predstaviteli v Rossiiskom parlamente, 149. 26. For the list of deputies elected from Baku, Elizavetpol, and Erivan Provinces, see Ali Mardan-­bek Topchibashev [Ali Mardan Bey Topchibashov], Musul’manskaia ­parlamentskaia fraktsiia, 25–26. 27. Topchibashov, Musul’manskaia parlamentskaia fraktsiia, 2–3. 28. Gasanly, Ali Mardan-­bek Topchibashov, 156–59. 29. “III Congrès des musulmans de Russie,” Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, ­carton no. 7, 2–3. 30. Diliara Seidzade, Azerbaidzhanskie deputaty v Gosudarstvennoi Dume Rossii, 35. 31. For more information, see Gasanly, Ali Mardan-­bek Topchibashov, 159–68. 32. Seidzade, Azerbaidzhanskie deputaty v Gosudarstvennoi Dume Rossii, 35. 33. “Biographical Information about Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov: Part I (in concise form),” Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 6/2, 12. 34. Gasanly, Ali Mardan-­bek Topchibashov, 174. 35. Salavat Iskhakov, comp., A.M. Topchibashi: Dokumenty iz lichnykh arkhivov, 16. 36. Usmanova, Musul’manskie predstaviteli v Rossiiskom parlamente, 183. 37. Aidyn Balaev, Mamed Emin Rasulzade (1884–1955), 30–31. 38. Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde, 88–89.



Notes to pages 27–34 399

39. “Announcement of Baku city governor. 1915,” APDPARA, f. 276, r. 8, vol. 498, p. 19. For more information, see Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde, 88. 40. Musul’manskie deputaty gosudarstvennoi dumy Rossii, 206. 41. Iqbal, February 19, 1915. 42. “Letter of the Head of the Elizavetpol Province Gendarmerie to the Gendarmerie of the Caucasian Vicegerent,” February 1915, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 8, vol. 463, p. 23. 43. For more information, see Gasanly, Ali Mardan-­bek Topchibashov, 243–44. 44. Revue du Monde Musulman 56 (December 1923): 146–47. For more information, see Ol’ga Seniutkina, Tiurkizm kak istoricheskoe iavlenie, 490–91. 45. Hasanli, Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 10. 46. Rasulzade, Azerbaycan cümhuriyyeti, 26. 47. State Archive of the Azerbaijan Republic (SAAR), f. 970, r. 1, vol. 18, p. 3. 48. Açıq Söz, May 28, 1917. 49. “Topchibashev: Muslim Congresses in Russia,” Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey ­Toptchibachi, carton no. 7, 35. For additional information see Salavat Iskhakov, ­Rossiiskie ­musul’mane i revoliutsiia (vesna 1917 g.–leto 1918 g.), 176. 50. Serge Zenkovsky, Pan-­Turkism and Islam in Russia, 257. 51. S. Belen’kii and A. Manvelov, Revoliutsiia 1917 goda v Azerbaidzhane, 219. 52. Stepan Shaumian, Izbrannye proizvedeniia v dvukh tomakh, vol. 2, 1915–1918, 245–46. 53. Ibid., 192. 54. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 114. 55. “Report of member of the Extraordinary Commission Alexander Kluge to chairman of the commission Alekber bek Khasmamedov on the case of violence, on the Muslim population of Baku, July 1919,” APDPARA, f. 277, r. 2, vol. 27, p. 18. For more information, see Dzhamil’ Gasanly, Russkaia revoliutsiia i Azerbaidzhan, 100–136. 56. “Biographical Information about Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov: Part I (in concise form),” Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 6/2, 22. 57. “Minutes of Meeting #2 Held by the Muslim National Council, May 28, 1918,” SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 50. 58. Radiogram from the chairman of the council of ministers, Fatali khan Khoiskii, to the foreign ministers of a number of stating the proclamation of the independence of the Azerbaijan Republic, May 30, 1918, SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, vol. 4, pp 9–10. 59. “Friendship Agreement between the Government of the Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijan Republic, June 4, 1918,” SAAR, f. 894, r. 2, vol. 88, p. 2. 60. Kemal Öke Mim, Ermeni meselesi, 164. 61. A. M. Stavrovskii, ed., Adres-­Kalendar’ Azerbaijanskoi Respubliki, 22. 62. “Resolution of the Council of Ministers on Sending Delegation to Istanbul for Participating at the International Conference, June 18, 1918,” SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, vol. 138, pp. 3–5. 63. Jamil Hasanli, Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 96–97. 64. “Recollections of Revolutionary Events of 1917–1918 in Baku and Azerbaijan: From Blyumin’s Memoirs, 1922,” APDPARA, f. 276, r. 2, vol. 20, p. 20. 65. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, Archives Diplomatique (MAEF), vol. 832, folio 2. 66. “Les anglais battus à Bakou,” MAEF, vol. 832, folio 3. 67. Mirza Bala Mehmetzade, Azerbaycan Milli Нarekаti, 99. 68. “Les troupes anglo-­russes sont à Bakou,” MAEF, vol. 832, folio 14. 69. Azerbaijan, November 19, 1918. 70. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 142.

400

Notes to pages 34–43

71. “Law on Establishment of the Azerbaijani Parliament, November 19, 1918,” SAAR, f. 895, r. 10, vol. 2, p. 24. 72. Azerbaijan, December 10, 1918. 73. Report from the extraordinary and plenipotentiary minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan Topchibashov, 1919, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 6/1, 3; SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, vol. 70, p. 3. 74. Hasanli, Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 202–3. 75. “Report of Topchibashov to Nasib bey Usubbeyov, May 28, 1919.” SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, vol. 143, p. 7. 76. Richard Ullman, Anglo-­Soviet Relations, 322. 77. Bulletin d’Information de l’Azerbaidjan, January 17, 1920. For more information, see Hasanli, Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 325–46. 78. Note from Chicherin to Lenin, March 1920, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 71, p. 65. 79. Telegram sent by Lenin to Orjonikidze on the occupation of Baku, March 17, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 1, p. 1. 80. “Directive from Tukhachevskii, Orjonikidze, and Zakharov to 11th Army Command, April 21, 1920,” RSASPH, f. 85, r. 8, vol. 1, p. 79. 81. Internatsional’naia pomoshch’ XI armii v bor’be za pobedu sovetskoi vlasti v ­Azerbaidzhane, 19. 82. Ultimatum of Chingiz Ildyrym to the Azerbaijani Parliament, April 28, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 27, vol. 313, p. 20. 83. Télégramme à chiffrer No. 30, April 29, 1920, Haut Commissaire Français Constanti­ nople, Ministère des Affaires Étrangère de France, vol. 639, f. 13.

Chapter 3: The Domestic and International Position of Azerbaijan after the Bolshevik Occupation 1. Reply of Stalin to Chicherin, August 16, 1919, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 824, pp. 3–4. 2. Telegram of Orjonikidze and Kirov to Lenin, May 4, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 12, p. 101. 3. Letter of Narimanov to Lenin about conversation of Karakhan with the ambassador of Afghanistan, November 13, 1919, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 1218, pp. 1–2. 4. Memo of Stalin to Chicherin, September 10, 1921, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 824, p. 11. 5. Qasımov, Kharici dövletler ve Azerbaycan, 34. 6. Qasımlı and Hüseynova, Azerbaycanın kharici işler nazirleri, 60–67. 7. Tetradi po istorii rabochego i revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia, 127. 8. Alexander Bodrero, Report of trip to Baku, September 18, 1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­ bey Toptchibashi, carton no. 1, 9. 9. H. Spoer, “A Political Report on Bolshevik Movement in Azerbaijan,” in Azerbaijan Democratic Republic: Archival Documents of Great Britain, 443. 10. Ibid., 444. 11. Telegram from de Martel from Tiflis to Constantinople, July 26, 1920, Ministère des Affairs Étrangeres de France, Archives Diplomatiques, vol. 639, folio 140. 12. Aziz Alpoud, Heyatımın hekayeleri, 179. 13. Monsieur A. Chevalier, Haut Commissaire de la République au Caucase, à Monsier le Président du Consul Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Tiflis, December 17, 1920, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, Archives Diplomatiques, vol. 639, folio 188. 14. Cited in Nesiman Yaqublu, Müsavat partiyasının tarikhi, 128. 15. Ahmedova, Nariman Narimanov, 53. 16. Tukhachevskii, Orjonikidze, and Zakharov to the Commander of the 11th Red Army, April 21, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 8, vol. 1, p. 79.



Notes to pages 43–52 401

17. Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, 101. 18. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin and Trotskii, June 2, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 31, pp. 1–2. 19. Report of infantry inspector of the 11th Red Army Mel’nikov about Ganja events, sent to member of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Caucasian front, RSASPH, f. 298, r. 1, vol. 112, pp. 2–3. 20. Report on the situation in Azerbaijan, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 86, vol. 125, p. 8. 21. Mustafa Suphi, Report on the results of a trip to Ganja, June 9, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 34, pp. 1–2. 22. Ibid., 3. 23. “Récit de la tragédiee d’Elisabetpol par une personnalité politique rentrée d’Azerbaidjan, Tiflis, le 11 juin 1920,” Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, Archives ­Diplomatiques, vol. 639, folios 109–11. 24. Said Kurban, Ali and Nino, 234. 25. Fezail İbrahimli, Azerbaycan kendinde sosial-­siyasi prosesler (1920–1930), 45. 26. Azerbaycan tarikhi, vol. 6, 49. 27. Instruction of Chicherin to Orjonikizde, June 18, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 4, p. 5. 28. Note of Orjonikidze and Kirov to Lenin, May 10, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 1, p. 5. 29. Cryptogram of Chicherin to Orjonikidze, May 11, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 4, p. 5. 30. Letter from Narimanov to Lenin, August 1, 1920, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 1. 31. Note from Stalin to Lenin and Lenin’s note on it, December, 3, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 44, vol. 118, p. 41. 32. Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of RSFSR to the Politburo, CC PCP (B), August 4, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 44, vol. 118, p. 29. 33. Charles K. Mouzer [Moser], “Zapiski o Zakavkaz’e,” 184. 34. Information about the attitude of the local population of the districts of Azerbaijan to the Red Army, June 2–16, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 123, vol. 13, pp. 80–96. 35. Letter from Narimanov to Shahtakhtinskii, August 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, pp. 59–60. 36. Report from Narimanov to Lenin, “Results of Soviet Development in Azerbaijan,” September 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 1219, pp. 6–7. 37. Letter from Narimanov to Shahtakhtinskii, September 8, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 62. 38. Letter from Narimanov to Orjonikidze, September 11, 1920, CC CPA (B), RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 100, p. 5. 39. Narimanov, “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries,” 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 176, pp. 7–8. 40. Ibid., 19. 41. Letter from Narimanov to Shahtakhtinskii, February 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 58. 42. Narimanov, “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries,” 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 176, p. 8. 43. Telegram from Orjonikidze and Kirov to Lenin, May 4, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 12, p. 10. 44. Narimanov, “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries,” 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 176, p. 22. 45. From Narimanov to Shahtakhtinskii, September 8, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 63. 46. Alexander Bodrero, Report on trip to Baku, September 18, 1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Topchibachi, carton no. 1, pp. 7–8.

402

Notes to pages 52–61

47. Ahmed Ahmedov, “National Movements in Azerbaijan during the 1920s,” December 22, 1927, APDPARA, f. 12, r. 1, vol. 152, p. 22. 48. Narimanov, “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries,” 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 176, pp. 45–47. 49. Report from Narimanov to Lenin, “Results of Soviet Development in Azerbaijan,” ­September 15, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 1219, p. 10. 50. From Narimanov to Shahtakhtinskii, February 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 58. 51. From Narimanov to Shahtakhtinskii, September 8, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 63. 52. Report from Nikolai Solov’ev to Lenin, “Our Policy in Azerbaijan over Two Months (May–June) after the Coup,” 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 58, pp. 13–14. 53. Spoer, “A Political Report about Bolshevik Movement in Azerbaijan,” in Azerbaijan Democratic Republic: Archival Documents of Great Britain, 449. 54. Report from Nikolai Solov’ev to Lenin, “Our Policy in Azerbaijan over Two Months (May–June) after the Revolution,” 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 58, pp. 14–15. 55. Letter from Orjonikidze to Lenin, September 20, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 5/с, vol. 4, p. 11. 56. Rasulzade, Azerbaycan cümhuriyyeti, 69–70. 57. Telegram from Orjonikidze and Kirov to Lenin, May 4, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 12, p. 100. 58. Telegram from Orjonikidze and Kirov to Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin, May 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 1, vol. 245, p. 1. 59. Valerii Krasnov and Vladimir Daines, Neizvestnyi Trotskii, 366–67. 60. Zhordaniia, My Life, 105–6. 61. Ibid., 107–8. 62. Ibid., 109. 63. Traité entre la Géorgie et la Russie, May 7, 1920, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, Archives Diplomatiques, vol. 639, folios 172–76. 64. Agreement between Russia and Georgia, May 7, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 55, pp. ­15–21. 65. Kommunist, May 5, 1920. 66. Zhordaniia, My Life, 112. 67. Note of Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan to the Ministry of Foreign ­Affairs of Georgia, May 9, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 38, p. 10. 68. Kommunist, May 11, 1920. 69. Telegram from Stalin to Orjonikidze, May 10, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 1, p. 11. 70. Peace agreement between Azerbaijan SSR and Democratic Republic of Georgia, June 12, 1920, Georgian State History Archive (hereafter referred to as GSHA), f. 14, r. 1, vol. 5, pp. 121–23. 71. Agreement between Azerbaijan SSR and Democratic Republic of Georgia, June 12, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 55, pp. 7–8. 72. Agreement between Azerbaijan SSR and Democratic Republic of Georgian, July 28, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 55, pp. 38–39. 73. “Report about Activities of the People’s Commissariat on Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic for the Year 1920,” SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 90, pp. 38–39. 74. Shahtakhtinskii to Lenin, “Territories That Are Subjects of Debate among Trans­ caucasian Republics,” March 1, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2796, p. 4. 75. Ibid., 4ff. 76. “Instructions for the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasus Front,” July 4, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 94, p. 6.



Notes to pages 61–68 403

77. Ibid. 78. Letter from Orjonikidze and Kirov to Lenin, June 12, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 29, vol. 2, p. 2. 79. Report from Mirza Davud Huseinov, “Azerbaijan and Georgia,” sent to Nikolai Krestin­skii, September 16, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 86, vol. 125, pp. 40–41. 80. Excerpt from Minutes of Political Bureau CC RCP (B) about terminating the advance of Russian troops toward Armenia, June 30, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 93, p. 2. 81. Letter from Checherin to Lenin, June 29, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2а, p. 12. 82. For more detailed information about Kanaian (Dro), see “Document on Kanaian Drastamat (Dro),” AMNS, f. 862, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 56–64. 83. Note from Chicherin to Narimanov, July 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 126, p. 1. 84. Mandate given to the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the Azerbaijan SSR and RSFSR Shahtakhtinskii, July 15, 1920, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 162. 85. Certification given to Shahtakhtinskii by People’s Commissariat Foreign Affairs (PCFA) of Azerbaijan Republic, July 15, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 6, p. 41. 86. From Narimanov to Shahtakhtinskii, August 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 60. 87. Extract from minutes no. 33/5 of the Plenary Congress of the CC RCP(B), August 5, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2f, p. 21. 88. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Lenin, August 4, 1920, Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation (hereafter referred to as FPARF), f. 4, r. 51, fol. 321а, vol. 54859, pp. 1–2 (following quotations from this letter also from this source). 89. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Lenin, September 20, 1920, FPARF, f. 4, r. 51, fol. 321a, vol. 54859, pp. 6–8ff. (following Shahtakhtinskii quotations also from this source). 90. Contract of Russian and Azerbaijan on a war-­economic commission of both republics, September 30, 1920, FPARF, f. 4, r. 99, fol. 461, vol. 62413, p. 1 (following information on this contract also from this source). 91. Agreement between the government of the RSFSR and the government of the ASSR on naval affairs, September 30, 1920, RSFSR, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2021, p. 1. 92. Agreement between the government of the RSFSR and the government of the ASSR on uniting postal, telegram, telephone, and radiotelegraph systems, September 30, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 61, p. 26. 93. Agreement between the government of the RSFSR and the government of the ASSR on uniting food production policy, September 30, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 61, p. 27. 94. Agreement between the government of the RSFSR and the government of the ASSR on financial affairs, September 30, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 61, p. 28. 95. Agreement between the government of the RSFSR and the government of the ASSR on developing a unified economic policy, September 30, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 61, p. 29. 96. Agreement between the government of the RSFSR and the government of the ASSR on foreign trade, September 30, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 61, p. 30. 97. Narimanov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 489. 98. Altstadt, The Politics of Culture in Soviet Azerbaijan, xvii. 99. Extract from minutes no. 47 of meeting of the Politburo of the CC RCP (B), October 6, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 111, p. 1. 100. Telegram from Eliava to Orjonikidze, September 18, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 50, p. 1. 101. Minutes no. 1 of joint meeting of CC CPA (B), BC CPA (B), Caucasus Bureau of CC RCP (B), Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, Baku Executive Committee, and commissars and presidiums of CPA regional executive committees, November 9, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 14, p. 19.

404

Notes to pages 69–75

102. Minutes no. 2 of the plenary CC CPA, together with the Caucasian Bureau of the CC RCP and Baku committee CPA, November 8, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 14, p. 9. 103. Ibid., 10. 104. Minutes no. 1 of joint meeting of CC CPA (B), BC CPA (B), Caucasus Bureau of CC RCP (B), Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee, Baku Executive Committee, and commissars and presidiums of CPA regional executive committees, November 9, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 14, pp. 16–17 (following Stalin quotation also from this source). 105. Telegram from Stalin to Lenin, November 16, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 74, vol. 36, pp. 1–2. 106. Minutes no. 66 of Politburo CC RCP (B) meeting, November 27, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 125, p. 1. 107. Evgenii Gegechkori to Mirza Davud Huseinov, April 30, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 38, p. 2. 108. Anastas Mikoian, “Memoirs,” March 9, 1967, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 3, vol. 237, pp. 120–21. 109. “Information Renseignements sur Bakou, le 25 août 1920,” MAEF, vol. 639, folio 158. 110. Agent consulaire de France à Bakou Duroy, “Attitude de l’Azerbaidjan Sovietiste a l’égard de la France, Tiflis, le 24 juillet 1920,” MAEF, Archives Diplomatiques, vol. 639, folio 145. 111. Ambassade d’Angleterre–Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, May 7. 1920, MAEF, vol. 639, folio 29. 112. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, “Note pour la Direction Administrative (Surveillance des Étrangers), le 11 mai 1920,” MAEF, vol. 639, folio 37. 113. Kaspiiskii transit, vol. 1, 324. 114. Agent consulaire de France à Bakou Duroy, Attitude de l’Azerbaidjan Sovietiste à l’égard de la France, Tiflis, July 24, 1920, MAEF, vol. 639, folio 145. 115. Zhordaniia, Nashi raznoglasiia, 45. 116. Azerbaijan Democratic Republic: Archival Documents of Great Britain, 675. 117. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, 208. 118. Monsieur de Martel, commisaire français au Caucase à son Excellence Monsieur ­Millerand, Président du Conseil Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, May 24, 1920, MAEF, Archives Diplomatiques, vol. 639, folio 77. 119. Spoer, “A Political Report about Bolshevik Movements in Azerbaijan,” in Azerbaijan Democratic Republic: Archival Documents of Great Britain, 448. 120. Note from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Chicherin, August 30, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, v. 168, p. 14. 121. Qasımov, Kharici dövletler ve Azerbaycan, 94. 122. Telegram from Chicherin to Narimanov, August 18, 1920, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 195, p. 37. 123. Minutes no. 1 of the meeting of the Bureau of the CC CPA (B), August 27, 1920, ­APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 22, p. 5. 124. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Chicherin, August 28, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 86, vol. 125, p. 24 125. Note from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Litvinov, August 28, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 168, p. 14. 126. Letter from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Harry Charles Luke, representative of the British Government, September 11, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 86, vol. 125, p. 23. 127. Meeting of Mirza Davud Huseinov with English representative Luke, September 12, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 86, vol. 125, pp. 22–27.



Notes to pages 75–82 405

128. Letter from the head of the British mission in Tiflis, Harry Charles Luke, to Mirza Davud Huseinov, September 12, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 86, vol. 125, p. 26. 129. Letter from the commander of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan SSR, Mirza Davud ­Huseinov, to the head of the British mission in Tiflis, Harry Charles Luke, September 14, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 86, vol. 186, p. 25. 130. Telegram from Chicherin to Narimanov, October 2, 1920, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 195, p. 39. 131. Telegram from Chicherin to Narimanov, October 9, 1920, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 195, p. 40. 132. Letter from Topchibashov to Lord Curzon, October 10, 1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­ bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 9, 1. 133. From Foreign Office to Topchubashov, President of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, November 1, 1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 9, p. 3. 134. Extract from Minutes no. 50 of the meeting of the Politburo of the CC RCP (B), October 11, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 114, p. 1. 135. Qasımov, Kharici dövletler ve Azerbaycan, 97. 136. Telegram from Chicherin to Narimanov, October 2, 1920, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 63, p. 12. 137. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 3, 313. 138. Qasımov, Kharici dövletler ve Azerbaycan, 99–100. 139. Telegram from Stalin to Chicherin, November 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 1, vol. 1989, p. 1. 140. Narimanov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 394.

Chapter 4: The Eastern Policy of Soviet Russia and Iran 1. Narimanov, “Influence of the October Revolution on the Proletariat of the East,” January 7, 1919, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 2, vol. 12, p. 130. 2. For additional information, see Takashi Kuroda, “A Glance into the Relation between Iran and the Soviet Union in the Last Period of the Jangali Movement,” 95–104. 3. Zhizn’ Natsional’nostei, May 25, 1919. 4. Narimanov, “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries,” 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 176, p. 37. 5. Letter from Chicherin to the Politburo, CC RCP (B), November 12, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 103, p. 3. 6. Gorobchenko, Moroz, and Zhukov to CC CPA (B), to comrade Dovlatov, Notes of Ahmedov, April 27, 1928, APDPARA, f. 12, r. 1, vol. 152, pp. 24–25. 7. Genis, Krasnaia Persiia: Bol’sheviki v Giliane, 194. 8. Note from Chicherin to Lenin, June 29, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2а, p. 13. 9. Extract from minutes no. 15 of the meeting of the Plenum of the CC RCP (B), “On Eastern Politics: On Iran,” May 25, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2а, p. 8. 10. Note from the Government of Iran to the Government of the RSFSR, May 14, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 109, vol. 100, p. 1. 11. Ibid., 2. Among documents signed in March 1920 between Iran and Azerbaijan was a consular agreement that was still valid during the first month of Soviet power. See Louis Nettement, le Consul de France, à son Excellence Monsieur Millerand, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à Paris, “Convention Consulaire conclue entre l’Azerbaidjan et la Perse, le 15 mai 1920,” MAEF, vol. 639, folio 43. 12. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 2, 542–43.

406

Notes to pages 82–88

13. Mustafa-­zade, Dve respubliki: Azerbaidzhano-­rossiiskie otnosheniia, 277. 14. Telegram from Raskol’nikov to Trotskii and Lenin, May 22, 1920, RSASPH, f. 562, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 1. 15. Persits, Zastenchivaia interventsiia, 96. 16. Pravda, May 23, 1920. 17. Telegram of the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan SSR to Raskol’nikov, May 20, 1920, RSASPH, f. 562, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 51. 18. Minutes of the meeting of the Presidium of the Azerbaijan Sovnarkom, May 1920, ­APDPARA, f. 1, r. 45, vol. 210, p. 101. 19. “Le Gérant du Consulat de France à Tauris à M. Millerand, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à s. situation générale en Azerbaidjan, le 10 mai 1920,” MAEF, vol. 639, 33. 20. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin, May 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 38, pp. 2–3. 21. Minutes no. 15 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), “On Eastern Politics: On Iran,” May 25, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 83, p. 1. 22. Directives of Trotskii to Raskol’nikov, May 26, 1920, RSASPH, f. 562, r. 1, vol. 21, pp. 10–12. 23. Telegram of Karakhan to Raskol’nikov and Orjonikidze, May 30, 1920, RSASPH, f. 562, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 17. 24. Radiogram from Ivan (Ardeshir) Kozhanov in Baku to Orjonikidze, June 4, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 13, p. 4. 25. L’Agent consulaire de France Duroy, “Situation actuelle de l’Azerbaidjan, le 27 juillet 1920,” MAEF, vol. 639, folio 150. 26. Persidskii front mirovoi revoliutsii, 47. 27. Manifesto of the Iran Soviet Republic in Gilan, June 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 532, r. 4, vol. 32, pp. 53–54. 28. Certification of Muslim Israfilov, June 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 562, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 31. 29. Certification of Andrei Pylaev, June 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 562, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 30. 30. Congratulatory telegram of the Military Revolutionary Council of Persian Republic to Trotskii, representative of the MRC of the RSFSR, June 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 562, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 44. 31. Extract from minutes no. 18 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), June 8, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 86, pp. 1–4. 32. Chicherin, “Theses concerning the Work of Communists in the East,” June 14, 1920, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 2, vol. 312, p. 2. 33. Genis, Krasnaia Persiia, 102. 34. Ibid., 126. 35. Materials of the first session of the “Adalet” Iranian Communist Party, June 1920, RSASPH, f. 495, r. 90, vol. 4, pp. 1–4. 36. Saleh Aliev, Istoriia Irana: XX vek, 123. 37. Summary of activities of the Iranian Bureau, July 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 20, pp. 19–20. 38. Persits, Zastenchivaia interventsiia, 110. 39. Telegram from Mirza Kuchek khan to Lenin, July 17, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 112, vol. 53, p. 42. 40. Extract from minutes no. 38 of the meeting of the Organizational Bureau, CC RCP (B), July 21, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 112, vol. 53, p. 5. 41. Report of Budu Mdivani on meeting of the Iranian Bureau, 20 July 20, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 20, pp. 32–35.



Notes to pages 89–95 407

42. Secret message about the uprising of sailors in Resht, July 20, 1920, RSASPH, f. 495, r. 90, vol. 15, pp. 9–14. 43. Persits, Zastenchivaia interventsiia, 117. 44. Urgent telegram from Karakhan to Orjonikidze and Narimanov, July 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 25, p. 277. 45. Persidskii front mirovoi revoliutsii, 129. 46. Telegram from Mirza Kuchek khan to Lenin, July 20, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 23, pp. 120–22. 47. Radiogram on Communist overthrow in Gilan, July 31, 1920, RSASPH, f. 454, r. 1, vol. 22, p. 61. 48. Rüstamova-­Tohidi, Kominternin Şerq siyaseti ve İran, 179. 49. Letter from Mirza Kuchek khan to Lenin, August 4, 1920, RSASPH, f. 2 r. 2, vol. 361, pp. 6–7. 50. From summary of the activities of the Iranian Bureau, September 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 20, p. 28. 51. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Stalin, August 1923, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 50. 52. Agreement between the Iranian (Gilanian) Soviet Republic and the Azerbaijani SSR, June 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 45, vol. 210, p. 103. 53. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Stalin, August 1923, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 50. 54. Extract from minutes of the joint meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B), August 3, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 20, pp. 45–46. 55. Persidskii front mirovoi revoliutsii, 153. 56. Dispatch from Chicherin to Kamenev, August 3, 1920, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 2, vol. 359, p. 1. 57. Letter from Chicherin to Politburo, CC RCP (B), August 4, 1920, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 2, vol. 361, p. 9. 58. Extract from minutes no. 5 (33) of the Plenum of the CC RCP (B), August 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 2, vol. 33, p. 1. 59. Telegram from Command of the 11th Red Army to member of the MRC of the ­Caucasus Front Trifonov, September 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 8, vol. 23, p. 277. 60. Genis, Krasnaia Persiia, 133, 255. 61. Persits, Zastenchivaia interventsiia, 29. 62. Rüstamova-­Tohidi, Kominternin Şerq siyaseti ve İran, 181. 63. Extract from minutes of the meeting of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), August 21, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 6. 64. Extract from minutes of the meeting of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), August 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 13. 65. Message from Karakhan to the CC RCP (B), September 9, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 2, vol. 208, p. 1. 66. Extract from minutes of the meeting of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), September 10, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 16. 67. From summary of activities of the Iranian Bureau, September 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 20, p. 32. 68. Letter from Mdivani to Kuchek khan, September 9, 1920, RSASPH, f. 495, r. 90, vol. 11, p. 5. 69. Ibid., 6. 70. Extract from minutes no. 21 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), June 18, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 89, p. 1. 71. For more details see Rüstamova-­Tohidi. Kominternin Şerq siyaseti ve İran, 94–97.

408

Notes to pages 95–104

72. Extract from minutes no. 22 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), June 22, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 92, p. 2. 73. Politbiuro TsK RKP(B)-VKP(B): Povestka dnia zasedanii, 71. 74. Alexander Bodrero, Report of trip to Baku, September 18, 1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­ bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 1, 9. 75. Pervyi s”ezd narodov vostoka: Stenograficheskoi otchet, Baku, 1–7 sentiabria 1920 g., 27–28. 76. For more details, see Rüstamova-­Tohidi. Kominternin Şerq siyaseti ve İran, 107–17. 77. Genis, Krasnaia Persiia, 272. 78. Note from the Iranian consul in Tiflis to the people’s commissar of foreign affairs of the Azerbaijani SSR, September 13, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 86, vol. 125, p. 33. 79. Resolution of the meeting of the Persian Communist delegates’ group at the 1st Congress of Eastern Peoples, April 4, 1920, RSASPH, f. 495, r. 90, vol. 5, pp. 7–8. 80. Genis, Krasnaia Persiia, 279. 81. Pervyi s”ezd narodov vostoka, 219. 82. Ibid. 83. Rüstamova-­Tohidi, Kominternin Şerq siyaseti ve İran, 144. 84. Narimanov, “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries” (1923), RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 176, pp. 7–8. 85. Telegram from Eliava to Lenin, Chicherin, and Trotskii, September 14, 1920, RSASPH, f. 670, r. 1, vol. 51, p. 121. 86. Telegram from Eliava to Chicherin, September 15, 1920, RSASPH, f. 670, r. 1, vol. 51, p. 122. 87. Message from Grigorii Friedland, September 1920, Russian State Military Historical Archive (hereafter referred to as RSMHA), f. 110, r. 1, vol. 84, p. 58. 88. Conclusion of the Presidium of Soviet Propaganda and Activities of the Eastern ­Peoples, September 17, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 20, p. 58. 89. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin, September 19, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 5с, vol. 4, p. 5. 90. Letter from CC ICP to RCP (B), copied to Chicherin and Zinov’ev, September 20, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5c, r. 2, vol. 144, p. 4. 91. Letter from Amuoghlu to Narimanov, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 172, p. 160. 92. Letter from Lander, “Azerbaijan and Iran,” to Krestinskii, Menzhinskii, Dzherzhinskii, and Lenin, July 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 86, vol. 125, p. 29. 93. Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917–1923, 250. 94. Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, 97. 95. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920, 187. 96. Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani, Azerbaycan ve Azerbaycan demokratiyası, 10. 97. Seid Ahmed Kesrevi, Tarikh-­e Hijdahsale-­ye Azerbaijan, 873. 98. Aliyev, Istoriia Irana, 111. 99. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 187. 100. Ibid., 97. 101. Ibid. 98. 102. Şövket Tağiyeva, Akram Rehimli, and Semed Bayramzade, Güney Azerbaycan, 195. 103. Ali Azeri, Azadıstan devleti ve Şeyh Mühammed Hiyabani, 1918–1920, 266. 104. Letter from Narimanov to Shahtakhtinskii, September 8, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, pp. 61–62 (following Narimanov quotations also from this source). 105. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Lenin, September 20, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2а, pp. 27, 28, 30 (following Shahtakhtinskii quotations also from this source). 106. Letter from Zinov’ev to the Orgbureau of the CC RCP, September 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 112, vol. 72, p. 9.



Notes to pages 104–111 409

107. Narimanov, “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries” (1923), RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2c, vol. 3, p. 17. 108. From verbatim notes of the meeting of the CC, Iranian Comparty and senior officials of Persia, October 25–26, 1920, RSASPH, f. 544, r. 3, vol. 2, p. 67. 109. Decision of the Plenum of the CC RCP, September 20, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 2, vol. 34, p. 3. 110. Persits, Zastenchivaia interventsiia, 141–42. 111. Ibid., 142–43. 112. Rüstamova-­Tohidi, Kominternin Şerq siyaseti ve İran, 268–69. 113. Report from Stalin about trip to Caucasus, November 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 3, vol. 258, p. 3. 114. Telegram from Stalin to Lenin, November 16, 1920, SARF, f. 130, r. 4, vol. 464, p. 119. 115. Extract from minutes no. 66 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), November 27, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 125, p. 1. 116. Politbiuro TsK RKP(B)-VKP(B): Povestka dnia zasedanii, 84. 117. Letter from Chicherin to Krestinskii, November 14, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 2, vol. 12, p. 57. 118. Urgent telegram from Orjonikidze to Trifonov, November 22, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 2, p. 252. 119. Report of Gikalo to Orjonikidze, December 10, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 27, p. 12. 120. Dispatch of the deputy plenipotentiary representative of the Azrevkom in Iran to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR, February 14, 1921, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 108, p. 4. 121. Extract from minutes no. 66 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), December 4, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 126, p. 1; extract from minutes of the Plenum of the CC RCP (B), December 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 2, vol. 42, p. 3. 122. Letter from Karakhan to Eliava, December 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 34, p. 41. 123. Letter from Karakhan to the CC RCP (B), January 6, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 3, vol. 208, pp. 5–6. 124. Persidskii front mirovoi revoliutsii, 371–72. 125. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Stalin, August 1923, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 54. 126. Ibid. 127. Narimanov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 449. 128. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 3, 491–92. 129. Urgent telegram from Ehsanullah khan, Reza Sarkhosh, and Gikalo to Lenin, February 5, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2198, p. 3. 130. Dispatch of the deputy plenipotentiary representative of the Azrevkom in Iran to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR, February 14, 1921, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 108, p. 4. 131. Qasımov, Kharici dövletler ve Azerbaycan, 191. 132. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, February 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 38, p. 2. 133. Sovetsko-­iranskie otnosheniia v dogovorakh, konventsiiakh, i soglasheniiakh, 74–82. 134 Rasulzade, Bolşeviklerin Şerq siyaseti, 37–38. 135. Dzhamil’ Gasanly, SSSR-­Iran, 9. 136. Letter from Chicherin to Viktor Kopp, March 20, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/Turkey, vol. 29, p. 42. 137. Telegram from Narimanov and Huseinov to Orjonikidze, March 17, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 38, p. 7.

410

Notes to pages 111–115

138. Telegram from the Iranian consul in Baku to the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ­ambassador in Moscow, March 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 38, p. 8. 139. Telegram from Rotshtein to Chicherin, March 24, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2198, p. 9. 140. Urgent telegram from Rotshtein to Chicherin, April 27, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2198, p. 13. 141. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, April 5, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 38, p. 12. 142. Telegram from Levin to Chicherin, April 11, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2198, p. 11. 143. Extract from minutes no. 7 of the meeting of Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP, April 4, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 80. 144. Agreement about unifying forces between Communists (Heydar khan) and Jangalis (Kuchek khan), May 7, 1921, RSASPH, f. 544, r. 3, vol. 70, p. 123. 145. Letter from Chicherin to the Politburo CC RCP, July 14, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 2, vol. 740, p. 1. 146. Kommunist, July 26, 1921. 147. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Chicherin, July 29, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 18, p. 1. 148. Telegram from Rotshtein to Chicherin, July 12, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2198, p. 30. 149. Telegram from Rotshtein to Chicherin, July 11, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2198, p. 32. 150. Telegram from Rotshtein to Chicherin, July 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2198, p. 35. 151. Rüstamova-­Tohidi, Kominternin Şerq siyaseti ve İran, 300. 152. Persidskii front mirovoi revoliutsii, 403. 153. Urgent telegram from Rotshtein to Chicherin, June 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 38, p. 13. 154. Telegram from Rotshtein to Chicherin, June 19, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2198, p. 24. 155. Telegram from Chicherin to Rotshtein, August 11, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2113, p. 17. 156. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, April 18, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2097, p. 23. 157. Report from Rotshtein to Chicherin, October 8–10, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2153, pp. 32–35. 158. Letter from Lenin to Rotshtein, August 13, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 24615, p. 2. 159. Extract from minutes no. 16 of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP, August 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 138. 160. Cryptogram from Rotshtein to Chicherin, October 27, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 2, vol. 1015, p. 1. 161. Telegram from Rotshtein to Chicherin, December 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2153, p. 93. 162. Extract from minutes no. 64 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), October 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 210, p. 3. 163. Telegram from Orjonikidze and Kirov to Lenin and Stalin, November 8, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 2, vol. 999, p. 1. 164. Extract from minutes no. 77 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), November 17, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 231, p. 1. 165. “Request for Views as to the Consistency of Certain Articles of the Soviet-­Iranian Treaty of February 26, 1921, with the Charter of the United Nations,” NARA, RG 59, Box 3398, NND 7600050, Doc. 761.91/2–648. 166. Telegram from Rotshtein to Chicherin, December 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2198, p. 108. 167. Telegram from Andreev in Moscow, December 1922, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1,



Notes to pages 115–122 411

pp. 66–67. Ahmed shah appointed Qavam os-­Saltaneh as prime minister on May 29, 1921. See Aliev, Istoriia Irana, 134. 168. Letter from Narimanov to Abilov, no date, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 92, p. 116. 1 69. Narimanov, Ucqarlarda inqilabımızın tarikhine dair Merkezi Komiteye, 85. 170. Letter from Chicherin to Iaroslavskii, August 31, 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 177, p. 98.

Chapter 5: The Sovietization of Armenia: Moscow’s Secret Plans for Karabagh 1. Kommunist, May 1, 1920. 2. Telegramme à chiffre, Constantinople, C. A. A. à Guerre, May 5, 1920, MAEF, vol. 639, folio 27. 3. Musayev, Azerbaycanın Nakhçıvan ve Zangezur bölgelerinde siyasi veziyyet, 236. 4. Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, Service des Affaires Russes, May 4, 1920, MAEF, vol. 639, folio 24. 5. Kommunist, May 12, 1920. 6. Telegram from Kirov to Chicherin, June 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2178, p. 1. 7. Telegram from Narimanov, Mdivani, Mikoian, and Nurijanian to Chicherin, June 19, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 211, p. 115. 8. Minutes of the meeting of the Azrevkom, May 12, 1920, SAAR, f. 410, r. 1, vol. 78, p. 6. 9. Azrevkom decree appointing Bunyadzade extraordinary commissar of Karabagh and Zangezur, May 18, 1920, SAAR, f. 420, r. 1, vol. 5, p. 2. 10. Note from the Armenian government to the Azrevkom, May 1, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 169, vol. 249/II, pp. 2–3. 11. Telegram from Pirumov and Erzinkian to Orjonikidze, May 9, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 18, p. 1. 12. Conversation of Orjonikidze by direct wire with Kvirkveliia, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 5с, vol. 5, p. 1. 13. Niftaliev, Azerbaidzhanskaia SSR v ékspansionistskikh planakh armian, 45. 14. Pravda o Nagornom Karabakhe, 26, 29. 15. From the report of member of the Caucasus regional Committee RCP (B) Mikoian to CC RCP (B) and chairman of the Sovnarkom to Lenin, May 22, 1919, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 169, vol. 249/II, p. 1. 16. Bol’shevistskoe rukovodstvo: Perepiska, 1912–1927, 134–35. 17. Answer from Chicherin to the question of Lenin, June 1920, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 1451, p. 2. 18. Agence Consulaire de France à Bakou, “Situation actuelle de l’Azerbaidjan,” July 27, 1920, MAEF, vol. 639, folio 150. 19. Letter from narkom of foreign affairs Chicherin to Politburo, CC RCP (B), June 22, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2а, p. 9. 20. Answer from Chicherin to the question of Lenin, June 1920, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 1451, p. 1. 21. Letter from Narimanov, Mdivani, Mikoian, Naneishvili, Vesnik, Levandovskii, and Mikhailov to CC RCP (B), July 10, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 44, vol. 118, pp. 25, 27. 22. Message of Chicherin by direct wire to Bekzadian, Oganesian, and Kirov, June 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 8. 23. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, July 2, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 3, vol. 2, p. 3. 24. Cryptogram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, July 2, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 3, vol. 2, p. 3.

412

Notes to pages 122–130

25. Answer from Orjonikidze by direct wire dispatch to Chicherin, July 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 3с, vol. 2, p. 6. 26. Reminder from Orjonikidze to Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin by direct wire, July 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 3с, vol. 2, pp. 8–9. 27. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Chicherin, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 17, p. 53. 28. Note from Orjonikidze by direct wire to Allilueva, July 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 3с, vol. 2, p. 20. 29. Answer from Stalin to the question of Orjonikidze, July 8, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 3с, vol. 2, p. 11. 30. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, July 8, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 17, p. 60. 31. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin, July 16, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 3с, vol. 2, p. 12. 32. Telegram from Mikoian to Orjonikidze, June 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 17, p. 134. 33. Cryptogram from Orjonikidze and Kirov to Lenin and Stalin, June 12, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 2, pp. 9–11. 34. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Chicherin, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 17, p. 304. 35. Telegram from Chicherin to Legrand, July 19, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 13. 36. Telegram from Chicherin to Ohanjanian, July 19, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 12. 37. Telegram from Kirov to Legrand, July 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 20. 38. Telegram from Kirov to Chicherin, August 6, 1920, RSASPH, f. 80, r. 4, vol. 102k, pp. 1–2. 39. Telegram from Chicherin to Legrand, July 20, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 14. 40. Letter from Narimanov to Shahtakhtinskii, August 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2, vol. 3, p. 59. 41. Text of agreement between the RSFSR and the Republic of Armenia, August 10, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 169, vol. 249/II, pp. 11–12. 42. Extract from minutes no. 24 of meeting of Politburo, CC RCP (B), August 13, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2a, p. 10. 43. On the importance of strengthening Armenia and conditions of Soviet power there, July 20, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 183, p. 8. 44. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin and Chicherin, June 19, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 169, vol. 249/I, p. 34. 45. Telegram from Ohanjanian to Azerbaijani foreign commissar Huseinov, August 23, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 104, p. 12. 46. Narimanov, “Azerbaijan and Armenia,” August 1920, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 40. 47. Telegram from Karakhan to minister of foreign affairs of Armenia, May 15, 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 99, p. 100. 48. Note to Lenin, June 29, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2а, pp. 13–14 (following Chicherin quotations also from this source). 49. Instruction from RWC to Caucasus Front, July 4, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 94, p. 7. 50. “Description of the Borders of the Undisputed Territory of the Azerbaijan Soviet ­Socialist Republic with Armenia,” August 5, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 169, vol. 249/II, pp. 15–16. 51. Information from Solov’ev to Lenin (Soviet policy in Azerbaijan over two months [May–June] after the coup), 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 58, p. 15. 52. Report on the economic and political situation in Azerbaijan, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 86, vol. 119, p. 2. 53. Letter to Lenin from extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of Azerbaijan Shahtakhtinskii, August 13, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2796, p. 1.



Notes to pages 130–137 413

54. Report from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Krestinskii, “On the Situation in Azerbaijan,” September 16, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 86, vol. 125, p. 10. 55. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Chicherin, August 26, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 6, p. 3. 56. Ibid., 3–5. 57. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, August 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2178, p. 8. 58. Letter from Narimanov to Abilov, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, pp. 107–8. 59. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, November 5, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, f. 232, vol. 52987, p. 43; Mustafa-­zade, Dve respubliki, 267. 60. Letter from Narimanov to Lenin, July 1920, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 71, pp. 41–42. 61. Narimanov, Ucqarlarda inqilabımızın tarikhine dair Merkezi Komiteye, 117. 62. Telegram from Lander to Krestinskii, Menzhinskii, Dzherzhinskii, and Lenin, July 19, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 86, vol. 125, p. 12. 63. Minutes of the meeting of Politburo, CC CPA (B), August 26, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 22, p. 2. For more detailed information, see personal dealings of Aliheydar Shirvani (Mustafabeyov), APDPARA, f. 12, r. 3, vol. 7523, p. 29. 64. Report from Atayev to CC CPA (B), December 12, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 141, p. 24. 65. Ibid., p. 26. 66. Urgent dispatch from Chicherin to Narimanov, July 20, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2097, p. 1. 67. Letter from Chicherin to Politburo, CC RCP (B), October 5, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 40. 68. Mustafa-­zade, Dve respubliki, 145. 69. Narimanov, Ucqarlarda inqilabımızın tarikhine dair Merkezi Komiteye, 118. 70. Telegram from Legrand to Lenin, September 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 144. 71. Secret telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, October 24, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2178, p. 20. 72. Kommunist, December 2, 1920. 73. Minutes of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo, CC CPA (B), November 30, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 74, vol. 124, pp. 58–59. 74. Radiogram from Legrand to Orjonikidze, December 2, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 33, p. 16. 75. Cryptogram from Orjonikidze to Legrand and Chicherin, December 1, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 33, p. 12. 76. Message from Orjonikidze to Lenin and Stalin, December 2, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 33, p. 20. 77. Conversation of Nazaretian and Orjonikidze by direct wire, December 1, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 37, p. 1. 78. From a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee (Mravian) to the chairman of Soviet Armenia, Ter-­Gabrielian, January 4, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 14. 79. Velikaia oktiab’rskaia revoliutsiia i pobeda sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii, 437–38. 80. Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde, 237. 81. Minutes no. 4 of the joint meeting of the CC CPA (B) and Caucasus Bureau, November 4, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 22, p. 20. 82. To narkom of foreign affairs Chicherin from Soviet Russia’s diplomatic mission in Erivan, November 1920, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 38, p. 15. 83. Conversation of Stalin by direct wire with Lenin, November 23, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 4.

414

Notes to pages 137–143

84. Letter from Legrand to Chicherin, December 22, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 212733, p. 5. 85. Minutes no. 6 of the evening meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), June 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 76. 86. Appendix to minutes no. 6 of the evening meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus ­Bureau, CC RCP (B), June 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 77. 87. Pravda o Nagornom Karabakhe, 44. 88. Minutes no. 2 of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), May 2, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 57. 89. Bakinskii Rabochii, June 22, 1921. 90. Minutes no. 8 of the meeting of the CC CP (B) of Armenia, June 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 105, p. 11. 91. Minutes no. 9 of the meeting of the CC CP (B) of Armenia, June 20, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 105, p. 12. 92. Minutes no. 11 of the meeting of the CC CP (B) of Armenia, June 27, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 105, p. 17. 93. Minutes of the meeting of the CC CP (B) of Armenia, August 7, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, v. 105, p. 18. 94. Main provisions on the issue of annexation of Mountainous Karabagh to the Republic of Armenia, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 137, p. 7. 95. Ibid. 96. Karen Brutents, Nesbyvsheesia: Neravnodushnye zametki o perestroike, 335. 97. Minutes no. 4 of the meeting of the CC CP (B) of Armenia, May 23, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 105, p. 5. 98. Letter from Narimanov to Shahtakhtinskii, September 8, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 63. 99. Notebook of outgoing documents from the Azrevkom for 1921, SAAR, f. 410, r. 2, vol. 14, pp. 14, 7. 100. Minutes of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B), February 5, 1922, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 71, vol. 123, p. 26. 101. Minutes no. 6 of the evening meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), June 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 76. 102. Appendix to minutes no. 6, top secret, June 3, 1921, SAAR, f. 410, r. 1, vol. 98, p. 5. 103. Minutes no. 7 of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), June 4, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 80. 104. Minutes no. 5 of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), June 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 71. 105. Minutes no. 7 of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), June 4, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 80. 106. Narimanov, “Azerbaidzhan i Armeniia,” August 24, 1920, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 40. 107. Narimanov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 491. 108. Minutes no. 5 of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), May 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 58, p. 6. 109. Minutes no. 2 of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), May 2, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 57. 110. Minutes of the meeting of the CPC of Azerbaijan, May 23, 1921, SAAR, f. 411, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 1. 111. Decision of CPC on sending Azerbaijani delegation to Tiflis for the meeting of the



1 12. 113. 114. 115. 1 16. 117. 118.

119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 1 24. 125. 126. 1 27. 128. 129. 130. 1 31. 132. 133.

134.

135.

Notes to pages 143–150 415 commission made up of representatives of Transcaucasian Republics to determine the borders of the Transcaucasian Republics, June 13, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 36, p. 9. Narimanov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 516. Minutes of the meeting of the CPC of Azerbaijan, June 26, 1921, SAAR, f. 411, r. 1, vol. 12, p. 1. Telegram from Narimanov, Orjonikidze, and Miasnikov, June 27, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 98, p. 1. From the CPC of the Azerbaijani SSR to the CC CP (B) of Azerbaijan, July 28, 1921, SAAR, f. 411, r. 1, vol. 12, p. 3. Letter from Shirvani to the CC CPA (B), August 4, 1921, SAAR, f. 411, r. 1, vol. 12, p. 1. Minutes no. 20 of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B), June 27, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 74, vol. 1231, p. 64. Conversation of Shirvani and Narimanov by direct wire with Mirza Davud Huseinov, June 27, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 215, p. 14 (following quotations from this conversation also from this source). Cited in telegram from Orjonikidze and Kirov to Narimanov, June 26, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 229, pp. 1–2. Minutes no. 5 of the meeting of the Presidium of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), June 27, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 2, p. 73. Minutes of the meeting of the CPC of Azerbaijan, June 28, 1921, SAAR, f. 379, r. 3, vol. 9, p. 10. Report from the chair of Shusha County to Buniyatov, Narimanov, and Sultanov, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 169, vol. 249/II, pp. 31–32. Minutes no. 11 of the evening meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), July 4, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 118. Ibid. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 4, 711. Narimanov, “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries” (1923), RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 36. From Shahtakhtinskii to the CC RCP (B), 1923, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 52. Köçerli, Qarabağ: Yalan ve hegiget, 172. Minutes no. 11 of the evening meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), July 4, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 114. Minutes no. 12 of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), July 5, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 122. Ibid. İgrar Aliyev, Dağlıg Garabağ: Tarikh, Faktlar, Hadiseler, 84. Levon Chorbajian, Patrick Donabedian, and Claude Mutafian, The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-­Garabagh, 136; Simon Payaslian, The History of Armenia: From the Origins to the Present, 174; Richard Hovannisian, The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times: Vol. 2, Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century, 353. Minutes no. 8 of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), July 2–3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, pp. 87–88; minutes no. 8 of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), with representatives of local party and professional organizations, July 2–3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 59, pp. 12–13. Minutes no. 8 of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP(B), with representatives of local party and professional organizations, July 2–3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 59, p. 14.

416

Notes to pages 151–156

136. Letter from Bekzadian to Chicherin, April 15, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, pp. 58–59, 62. 137. Ibid., 63. 138. Telegram from Chicherin to Legrand, April 22, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 65. 139. G. Melik-­Shakhnazarov, “Politizatsiia istorii kak istochnik napriazheniia mezhnatsional’nykh otnoshenii,” in Maiendorfskaia deklaratsiia 2 noiabria 2008 goda i situatsiia vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha, 311. 140. V. A. Zakharov and S. T. Sarkisian, “Azerbaidzhano-­Karabakhskii konfilikt: Istoki i sovremennost’,” in Maiendorfskaia deklaratsiia 2 noiabria 2008 goda i situatsiia vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha, 221. 141. Minutes no. 13 of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), July 7, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 128. 142. Minutes no. 12 of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), July 5, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 122. 143. Minutes of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC CP (B) of Georgia, July 7, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 133. 144. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin and Stalin, November 2, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 24а, p. 26. 145. Minutes no. 11 of the meeting of the CC CP of Armenia, July 16, 1921, Central State Archive for Documents of Social-­Political Organizations of the Republic of Armenia (hereafter referred to as CSADSPORA), f. 1, r. 1, vol. 39, p. 5. 146. Minutes of the meeting of the CEC of Azerbaijan, July 19, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 31, p. 122. 147. Narimanov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 533–34. 148. Minutes no. 22 of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B), July 20, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, v. 18, p. 94; RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 92, p. 51. 149. Telegram from Shusha from Garayev to Narimanov, chairman of the CPC of Azerbaijan, July 23, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 104, p. 209. 150. Minutes no. 27 of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B), August 8, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 18, p. 114. 151. Minutes no. 30 of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B), September 29, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 18, p. 158. 152. Minutes of the meeting of the Orgbureau, CC CPA (B), October 6, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 74, vol. 125, p. 9. 153. Minutes of the meeting of the joint conference of senior officials of Karabagh (Shusha, Javanshir, Gubadly, and Karyagin) and members of the Orgburo, CC CPA (B), October 21, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 74, p. 23. 154. Minutes no. 20 of the meeting of the Orgburo. CC CPA (B), October 24, 1921, ­APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 15, pp. 15–16. 155. Letter from Stalin about the situation of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and about the representation of Karabagh in the CEC of Azerbaijan, May 22, 1922, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 746, p. 1. 156. Secret letter from Kirov to Stalin, June 18, 1922, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 746, p. 2. 157. Telegram from Kirov and Matiushin to CC RCP (B), August 1, 1922, RSASPH, f. 80, r. 25, vol. 2, p. 1. 158. Minutes no. 20 of the meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPA (B), July 1, 1923, ­APDPARA, f. 1, r. 74, vol. 132, p. 145. 159. Extract from minutes no. 14 of the meeting of the Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan, July 4, 1923, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 74, vol. 129, p. 38.



Notes to pages 157–165 417

160. Decree of the CEC of Azerbaijan, “Formation of the Autonomous District of Mountainous Karabagh,” July 7, 1923, SAAR, f. 379, r. 3, vol. 73, p. 135. 161. From the report of Kirov at the 6th Congress of the CPA (B), May 5, 1924, ­APDPARA, f. 1, r. 169, vol. 249/II, p. 4. 162. Narimanov, Ucqarlarda inqilabımızın tarikhine dair Merkezi Komiteye, 59. 163. Ibid., pp. 59–60. 164. Reminder by direct wire to Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin, July 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 3с, vol. 2, p. 8.

Chapter 6: Collaboration after Occupation: Drawing South Caucasus Borders after Sovietization 1. Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b): Povestka dnia zasedanii, 97. 2. From Chicherin to CC RCP (B), April 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 2, vol. 315, p. 38. 3. Bodrero, Report of trip to Baku, September 18, 1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey ­Toptchibachi, carton no. 1, 13. 4. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin and Chicherin on situation in Baku, April 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 6, p. 1. 5. Sorgun, Bitmeyen Savaş, 324. 6. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, vol. 1, 328. 7. Ibid., 513, 577–78. 8. Izvestiia, April 16, 1920. 9. Letter from Мustafa Kemal pasha to Soviet government, April 26, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 51, fol. 321а, vol. 54868, p. 1. 10. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 2, 555. 11. Message from Russian Telegraph Agency, May 3, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 51, fol. 321а, vol. 54868, p. 2. 12. Extract from minutes no. 10 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), May 15, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 78, p. 2. 13. Report from Chicherin to Lenin about talks with Khalil pasha, May 16, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 51, fol. 321а, vol. 54868, pp. 3–4. 14. Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 4, 75. 15. Message from Chicherin to CC RCP (B), June 22, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2а, p. 9. 16. Letter from Chicherin to Lenin, June 29, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2а, pp. 11, 13–14. 17. For more detailed information, see Bodrero, Report of trip to Baku, September 18, 1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 1, 10–11. 18. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, 192. 19. Arthur Ransom, meeting with Enver pasha in Moscow, July 25, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 3, vol. 364, p. 45. 20. Ibid., 46; Manchester Guardian, December 2, 1922. 21. Telegram from Ioffe to Lenin and Chicherin, September 21, 1918, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2183, p. 47. 22. Service note from Ioffe to Lenin and Chicherin, September 22, 1918, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2183, p. 51. 23. Service note from Chicherin to Lenin, August 16, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 28. 24. Letter from Chicherin to Мustafa Kemal pasha, June 4, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 51, fol. 321а, vol. 54868, pp. 5–6. 25. Extract from minutes no. 18 of the meeting of Politburo, CC RCP (B), June 8, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 86, p. 4.

418

Notes to pages 165–172

26. Extract from minutes no. 22 of the meeting of Orgburo, CC RCP (B), June 11, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 112, vol. 37, p. 3. 27. Message from Chicherin to the Politburo, CC RCP (B), June 28, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 2, vol. 314, p. 12. 28. Extract from minutes no. 23 of the meeting of Politburo, RCP (B), June 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 92, p. 8. 29. Extract from minutes no. 24 of the meeting of Politburo, RCP (B), June 30, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 93, p. 1. 30. Respublika Armenia v 1918–1920 gg., 183. 31. Telegram from Karakhan to Orjonikidze, May 11, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 29, p. 1. 32. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, July 2, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 3с, vol. 2, p. 3. 33. Second telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, July 2, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 3с, vol. 2, p. 1. 34. Extract from minutes no. 25 of the meeting of Politburo, CC RCP (B), July 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 94, p. 2. 35. Letter from Chicherin to Krestinskii, copied to Narimanov, Kirov, Legrand, and Eliava, July 4, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 94, pp. 5–6. 36. Letter from Chicherin to Мustafa Kemal pasha, July 2, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 23. 37. Letter from Мustafa Kemal pasha to Chicherin, November 29, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 51. 38. Öztürk, Atatürk Dönem’inde Türkiye’nin Kafkasiya Politikası, 103. 39. Mustafa Kemal’ [Kemal], Put’ novoi Turtsii, 293–94. 40. Öztürk, Atatürk Dönem’inde Türkiye’nin Kafkasiya Politikası, 103. 41. Qafarov, Turkiye-­Rusiya münasibetlerinde Azerbaycan meselesi (1917–1922), 373. 42. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 2, 555. 43. Letter from Bekir Sami bey to Chicherin, July 4, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 9. 44. From Grand National Assembly of Turkey to the Commissariat of Foreign Policy, ­Division of Relations with the East, July 12, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 18. 45. Composition of the Turkish government, July 12, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 19. 46. Answer to proposed question, July 12, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, pp. 20–22. 47. Musayev, Azerbaycanın Nakhçıvan ve Zangezur bölgelerinde siyasi veziyyet, 286. 48. Minutes of the meeting of Politburo and Orgburo, CC CPA (B), July 13, 1920, ­APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 18, p. 12. 49. Minutes of the meeting of Bureau, CC CPA (B), July 15, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 18, p. 13. 50. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Gittes, July 17, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 7, p. 3. 51. Telegram from Orjonikidze to MRC of Caucasian Front, July 17, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 7, p. 4. 52. Telegram from Orjonikidze and Legrand to Chicherin, July 14, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 51, p. 1. 53. Report from Special Investigative Commission on Nakhchivan Region, June 9, 1925, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 25, vol. 523, p. 14. 54. Letter from Kazım Karabekir pasha to Mustafa Suphi, July 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p. 17.



Notes to pages 172–180 419

55. Ibid. 56. Letter from Kazım Karabekir pasha to Khalil pasha, July 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, pp. 21–21. 57. Letter from governor of Trabzon Rushdi bey to Mustafa Suphi, August 13, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, pp. 19ff. 58. Conditions for recognition of the Muslim population of Nakhchivan uyezd of the ­Republic of Armenia, July 27, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, pp. 25ff. 59. To the commander of the Armenian detachment in Shahtakhti to be presented to the Armenian government, July 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, pp. 26ff. 60. Letter from Khalil pasha to Mustafa Suphi, August 4, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p. 20. 61. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin, Тrotskii, and Chicherin, August 10, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 5, p. 10. 62. Urgent diplomatic dispatch from Chicherin to Eliava, September 24, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 37. 63. Letter from Bektashov to Narimanov, August 10, 1920, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 6, p. 3. 64. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Lenin, August 13, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2796, p. 2. 65. Minutes of the meeting of Politburo, CC CPA (B), August 28, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 22, p. 6. 66. Letter from Kazım Karabekir pasha to Khalil pasha, July 31, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p .22. 67. Telegram from Ruzer to Orjonikidze, July 17, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 10, vol. 14, p. 2. 68. Urgent diplomatic dispatch from Chicherin to Legrand, July 27, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2099, p. 1. 69. Note from Chicherin to the Politburo, CC RCP (B), July 31, 1920, FPARF, f. 132, r. 3, fol. 2, vol. 1, p. 1. 70. Service note from Chicherin to Lenin, September 27, 1920, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 3. 71. Message from Legrand to Lenin and Chicherin, September 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 144. 72. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Lenin, September 20, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2а, pp. 26–27. 73. For the full text of the peace agreement signed between RSFSR and Armenia on August 10, 1920, see Respublika Armeniia v 1918–1920 gg., 248–49. 74. Telegram from Chicherin to Legrand, envoy to Armenia, August 10, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 51, fol. 321а, vol. 54870, p. 18ff. 75. Türkiyе Böyük Millеt Mеclisinin Gizli Celese Zabıtları, 166. 76. Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 72–73. 77. Tengirşenk, Vatan Hizmetinde, 178–80. 78. Note from Stalin to Lenin, November 12, 1920, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 388, p. 4. 79. Cryptogram from Orjonikidze to Chicherin, Lenin, Trotskii, and Stalin, November 11, 1920, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 388, pp. 4ff. 80. Letter from Chicherin to Eliava, Stark, and Legrand, September 15, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 82987, p. 35. 81. Cryptogram from Caucasus Bureau to Trotskii, Krestinskii, and Chicherin, August 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 59, p. 10. 82. Minutes of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo, CC CPA (B), September 16, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 24, p. 13.

420

Notes to pages 181–186

83. Ibid., 13. 84. Aide materielle à preter à la Géorgie et à l’Arménie, May 6, 1920, MAEF, vol. 644, ­folios 30, 61–68. 85. Bodrero, Report of trip to Baku, September 18, 1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey ­Toptchibachi, carton no. 1, 14. 86. Telegram from Eliava to Orjonikidze, September 18, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 50, p. 1. 87. Cryptogram from Eliava to Lenin, Chicherin, and Trotskii, September 21, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 36. 88. Sürmeli, Türk-­Gürcü İlişkileri (1918–1921), 571. 89. Telegram from Legrand, plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Armenia, to Chicherin, people’s commissar for foreign affairs, with a proposal to suspend the placement of Kemalist troops in Armenia, September 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 49. 90. Letter from Legrand, envoy in Armenia, to Chicherin, October 2, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 51, fol. 321а, vol. 54970, p. 12. 91. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, October 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, v.15, p. 2. 92. Letter from Chicherin to the Politburo, CC RCP (B), October 5, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 40. 93. Telegram from Chicherin to Legrand, envoy in Armenia, October 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 283. 94. Ibid., 284. 95. Telegram from Trotskii to Lenin and Krestinskii, October 5, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 39. 96. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, October 14, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 15, pp. 3–4. 97. Service instructions from Orjonikidze to Stark and Kavaradze by direct wire, October 14, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 18, p. 1. 98. Letter from Chicherin to Eliava, Stark, and Legrand, September 15, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 34. 99. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, October 19, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 15, p. 5. 100. Bodrero, Report of trip to Baku, September 18, 1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey ­Toptchibachi, carton no. 1, 1. 101. Telegram from Stark to Chicherin, Trotskii, and Orjonikidze, October 15, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 16, pp. 3–4. 102. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, September 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 149. 103. Cited in cryptogram from Upmal-­Angorskii to Chicherin, October 18, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2203, p. 3. 104. Urgent telegram from Ohanjanian to Chicherin, September 30, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, pp. 150–51. 105. Letter from Chicherin to the Politburo, CC RCP (B), October 5, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 40. 106. For more detail about the travels of Enver pasha to Azerbaijan and his participation in the 1st Congress of Peoples of the East, see Yavuz Aslan, Birinci Doğu Halkları ­Kurultayı, 246–304; Rüstamova-­Tohidi, Kominternin Şerq siyaseti ve İran, 122–30. 107. Bodrero, Report of trip to Baku, September 18, 1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey ­Toptchibachi, carton no. 1, 11.



Notes to pages 186–191 421

1 08. Alpoud, Heyatımın hekayeleri, 186–87. 109. Bilal Şimşir, Bizim Diplomatlar, 76. 110. Bilal Şimşir, Azerbaycan: Azerbaycan’ın Yeniden Doğuş Sürecinde Türkiye–Azerbaycan İlişkileri, 59; Bilal Şimşir, Atatürk ve Yabançı Devlet Başkanları, 397–98. For more detailed information about the views of the political circles of the Azerbaijan SSR in Iranian Azerbaijan, see Akhmedov, Natsional’noe dvizhenie, partii i obschestvennye deiateli Azerbaidzhana v 1918–1925 godakh glazami ochevidtsa, 56–59. 111. Ahmedov, Natsional’noe dvizhenie, partii i obschestvennye deiateli Azerbaidzhana, 72–​ 79 (includes information about secret meetings with the diplomatic representatives of the Turkish Republic in Baku). 112. Şimşir, Azerbaycan, 63. 113. Şimşir, Bizim Diplomatlar, 84. 114. Öztürk, Atatürk Dönem’inde Türkiye’nin Kafkasiya Politikası, 104. 115. Letter from Chicherin to the Politburo, CC RCP (B), October 5, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 40. 116. Extract from minutes no. 47 of the meeting of Politburo, CC RCP (B), October 6, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 114, p. 1. 117. Telephone conversation of Stalin with Lenin, Orjonikidze, and Chicherin, October 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 24461, p. 1. 118. Yerasimos, Türk-­Sovyet İlişkileri Ekim Devriminden Milli Mücadele’ye, 188. 119. Telegram from Stark to Orjonikidze, October 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 16, pp. 1–2. 120. Sürmeli, Türk-­Gürcü İlişkileri, 577. 121. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, October 14, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 189. 122. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, October 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 17, p. 3. 123. Upmal-­Angorskii, Report from deputy people’s commissar for foreign affairs, November 8, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2158, p. 7. 124. Telegram from Chicherin to Legrand, October 9, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 172. 125. Instructions given to Legrand from Moscow, October 9, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, pp. 173–74. 126. Letter from Ohanjanian to Chicherin, October 10, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, pp. 175–76. 127. Telegram from Chicherin to Legrand, October 13, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 183. 128. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, October 14, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 181. 129. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, October 24, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 188. 130. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, October 26, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 191. 131. Telegram from Chicherin to Legrand, October 26, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2099, p. 4. 132. MAEF, vol. 644, folio 142. 133. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, November 1, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 196. 134. Ibid., 197. 135. Telegram from Silin to Chicherin, November 14, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 231.

422

Notes to pages 192–199

136. Extract from minutes no. 4 of the joint meeting of the Politburo, CC CPA (B) of Azerbaijan, and Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), November 4, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 22, pp. 18–19. 137. First telegram from Stalin and Orjonikidze to Chicherin, November 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 1, vol. 5224, p. 1. 138. Second telegram from Stalin and Orjonikidze to Chicherin, November 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 1, vol. 5224, p. 2. 139. Telegram from Stalin to Lenin, November 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 1, vol. 1987, p. 1. 140. Note from Chicherin to Legrand, November 8, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 221. 141. Telegram from Chicherin to Babkin, envoy of the RSFSR in Azerbaijan, November 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 314. 142. Note from Chicherin to Legrand, November 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 209. 143. Extract from minutes no. 1 of the joint meeting of the Politburo, CC CPA (B), and Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), BC CPA (B), and others, November 9, 1920, ­APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 14, pp. 18–19. 144. Telegram from Legrand to Soviet mission in Erivan, November 6, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 203. 145. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, November 5, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, f. 232, vol. 52987, pp. 42–43. 146. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, November 9, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 51, f. 321а, vol. 54870, pp. 4–6. 147. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, November 19, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 17, p. 4. 148. Armistice terms of the Ankara government, November 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 24, p. 2. 149. Telegram from Sheinman to Chicherin, November 9, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 19, p. 1. 150. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, November 19, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 17, p. 6. 151. Telegram from Chicherin to Stalin, November 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 205. 152. Conversation of Chicherin with Legrand by direct wire, November 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, pp. 207, 212–13. 153. Telegram from Chicherin to Stalin, November 9, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2097, p. 9. 154. Credentials issued by the Military Revolutionary Council of the Caucasian Front to Polikarp (Budu) Mdivani, November 11, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 20, p. 1. 155. Message from Chicherin to Мustafa Kemal pasha and Aleksandr Khatisov, November 11, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 229. 156. Credentials issued to Korkmazov and Shahtakhtinskii, PCFA, RSFSR, November 25, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 25, pp. 2–3. 157. Telegram from Stalin to Lenin, November 16, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 44, vol. 118, p. 38. 158. Telegram from Mikhailov to Brizanovskii, secretary of Stalin, November 19, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 21, p. 3. 159. Telegram from Legrand to Brizanovskii, November 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 23, p. 2. 160. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, November 28, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, pp. 252–54. 161. Telegram from Stalin to Lenin, November 15, 1920, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 1, vol. 1999, p. 1. 162. Conversation of Chicherin and Orjonikidze by direct wire, June 20, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 17, p. 18.



Notes to pages 199–204 423

163. Conversation of Orjonikidze and Narimanov by direct wire, June 20, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 17, p. 34. 164. Telegram from Stalin to Lenin, November 16, 1920, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 1, vol. 1999, p. 3. 165. Note from Mirza Davud Huseinov, commissar of the Azerbaijan SSR, to Stalin, November 20, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/Turkey, vol. 23, pp. 1–2. 166. Recording of conversation of Stalin with Orjonikidze and Lenin by direct wire, November 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 1, vol. 2004, pp. 1–2. 167. Recording of conversation of Stalin with Orjonikidze and Lenin by direct wire, November 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 16244, p. 2. 168. Recording of conversation of Stalin with Lenin, November 23, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 47. 169. Ibid. 170. Conversation of Stalin with Orjonikidze by direct wire, November 23, 1920, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 1, vol. 2004, p. 16. 171. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Stalin, November 16–22, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 30, p. 5. 172. Cryptogram from Legrand to Chicherin, November 22, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 17, p. 8. 173. Cryptogram from Legrand and Mdivani to Stalin and Orjonikidze, November 21, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 243. 174. Cryptogram from Legrand to Chicherin and Orjonikidze, November 22, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 244. 175. Cryptogram from Legrand to Chicherin, Stalin, and Orjonikidze, November 21, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 17, p. 19. 176. Radiogram from Legrand to Chicherin and Stalin, November 24, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 17, p. 24. 177. Cryptogram from Mdivani to Stalin and Orjonikidze, November 25, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 246. 178. Cryptogram from Mdivani to Stalin and Orjonikidze, November 29, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 52. 179. Radiogram from Legrand to Orjonikidze, November 28, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 17, p. 25. 180. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, November 28, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 253. 181. Information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia on the new composition of the Cabinet of Ministers, November 25, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 248. 182. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin and Orjonikidze, November 26, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 249. 183. Radiogram from Legrand to Mdivani, Chicherin, and Orjonikidze, November 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 17, pp. 31ff. 184. Radiogram from Legrand to Orjonikidze, November 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 17, p. 32. 185. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, November 28, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 253. 186. Telegram from Krestinskii to Orjonikidze, November 28, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 29, p. 1. 187. For more detailed information about the activities of Khatisian in the post of prime minister of the Republic of Armenia, see Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, Vol. 1: The First Year, 1918–1919, 151–52, 380–408.

424

Notes to pages 204–212

188. For more detailed information on the composition of the Turkish delegation, see ­Yılmaz, Gümrü Antlaşması, 84–91. 189. Urgent telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, November 26, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 26, p. 1. 190. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Chicherin, November 27, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 26, p. 3. 191. Telegram from Orjonikidze and Sheinman to Chicherin, November 29, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 49. 192. Telegram from Chicherin to Legrand, December 2, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 26, p. 6. 193. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, November 28, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, pp. 255–56. 194. Radiogram from Mdivani to Orjonikidze, November 28, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 33, p. 6. 195. Karabekir quoted in letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Orjonikidze, November 28, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. c/Turkey/, vol. 31, pp. 3–4 (following Karabekir quotations also from this source). 196. Telegram from Mukhtar bey to Karabekir pasha, Shevket bey, and Kazım Dirik bey, December 1, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 53. 197. Letter from Mukhtar bey to Chicherin, December 2, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 58. 198. Telegram from Legrand to Mdivani, November 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 259. 199. Ibid. 200. Telegram from Stalin to Legrand and Mdivani, November 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 260. 201. Extract from minutes no. 66 of the meeting of Politburo, CC RCP (B), November 27, 1920, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 125, p. 1. 202. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin and Stalin, November 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 33, p. 2. 203. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Legrand and Mdivani, November 29, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 333. 204. Conversation of Orjonikidze and Nazaretian by direct wire, November 30, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 37, p. 1. 205. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, First Series. vol. 12, 655. 206. Talks of Orjonikidze with the Revkom of Armenia members Nurijanian and Kasian and military commanders Velikanov and Kurishko by direct wire, November 30–December 3, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 35, pp. 1–24. 207. Letter from Legrand to Chicherin, December 22, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2127, p. 2. 208. Minutes of the meeting of Politburo and Orgburo, CC CPA (B), November 30, 1920, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 24, pp. 51–52. 209. Kommunist, December 2, 1920. 210. Conversation of Orjonikidze and Nazaretian by direct wire, November 30, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 37, p. 1. 211. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Orjonikidze, November 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/Turkey, vol. 31, pp. 1–2. 212. Letter from Legrand to Chicherin, December 22, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2127, p. 5. 213. Letter from Legrand to Mdivani and Chicherin, December 3, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 272.



Notes to pages 212–218 425

214. Telegram from Legrand to Orjonikidze, December 2, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 33, p. 16. 215. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin, November 30, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 264. 216. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin, December 9, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2178, p. 35. 217. Telegram from Bobrishchev to the command of the Gazakh group of the Red Army, November 30, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 269. 218. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin and Stalin, December 2, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 33, p. 20. 219. Pravda, December 4, 1920. 220. Telegram from Karabekir pasha to Chicherin, December 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 61. 221. Letter from Legrand to Chicherin, December 22, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2127, p. 3. 222. Telegram from Mdivani, December 3, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 50, p. 1. 223. Peace agreement between Turkey and Armenia, Gumru, December 2, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 28, pp. 5–7; Yılmaz, Gümrü Antlaşması, 103–7; Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 289; Armeniia v dokumentakh mezhdunarodnoi diplomatii i sovetskoi vneshnei politiki, 683–87. 224. The Boundary between Turkey and the USSR, CIA/RR M-­17, Secret, January 1952, NARA, CIA-­RDP 79, p. 8. 225. Yılmaz, Gümrü Antlaşması, 111. 226. Telegram from Ruben to Orjonikidze, December 3, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 28, pp. 1–4. 227. Telegram from Kamenev to Orjonikidze, December 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 3/с, vol. 7, p. 1. 228. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 290; see also Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History, 130. 229. Telegram from Lenin to Kasian, December 2, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 38, pp. 1–2. 230. Telegram from Bekzadian to Chicherin, December 12, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2178, p. 40. 231. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 292. 232. Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b): Povestka dnia zasedanii, 85. 233. Letter from Chicherin to the Politburo, CC RCP (B), December 3, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 6. 234. Instructions from Chicherin to the Soviet mission in Erivan, given by radio, December 10, 1920, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 279. 235. Letter from PCFA to CC RCP (B), December 6, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, f. 232, vol. 53001, p. 9. 236. Letter from Ahmet Mukhtar bey to Chicherin, December 6, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 62. 237. Letter from Chicherin to Eliava, December 14, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, f. 232, vol. 52987, p. 64. 238. Telegram from Shahtakhtinskii to Мirza Davud Huseinov, December 7, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 143, p. 1. 239. Agreement project between Azerbaijan and Turkey, December 7, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 78; RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 143, p. 1. 240. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, December 8, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39,

426

241. 2 42. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 2 48. 249.

Notes to pages 218–223 fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 71; telegram from Chicherin to Mdivani and Karabekir pasha, December 9, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 52, p. 10. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin, December 8, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2178, p. 34. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 3, 391–92. Letter from Chicherin to Eliava, December 14, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, pp. 65–66. Letter from Chicherin to Ahmet Mukhtar bey, December 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, pp. 83–84. Letter from Chicherin to Eliava, December 14, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 67. Karabekir quoted in telegram from Mdivani to Stalin and Orjonikidze, December 5, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 50, p. 6. Telegram from Mdivani to Stalin and Orjonikidze, December 15, 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 50, p. 20. Note from Orjonikidze to Kasian, December 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 35, p. 27. Letter from Legrand to Chicherin, December 22, 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2127, p. 5.

Chapter 7: The Russian-­Turkish Conference in Moscow and Azerbaijan 1. Telegram from Chicherin to Ahmet Mukhtar bey, December 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 12. 2. Instruction from Chicherin to Eliava, December 31, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 75. 3. Information from members of the Revkom of Armenia to Ter-­Gabrielian, the representative of Armenia in Soviet Russia, January 4, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 14. 4. Telegram from Karabekir pasha to Mdivani, January 14, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 18. 5. Telegram from Mdivani to Karabekir pasha, January 14, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 526, p. 5. 6. From Cevat Acikalin, Turkish ambassador in London, to Ernest Bevin, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, March 4, 1946, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Box 4010, NND 7600050, Doc. 761-67, 3–446. 7. Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 113. 8. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Chicherin, January 14, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 15. 9. Sürmeli, Türk–Gürcü İlişkileri (1918–1921), 615. 10. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Chicherin, January 29, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 27, pp. 4–7. 11. Candan Azer, Babadan Oğula Güney Kafkasya, 298. 12. Hüseyin Adıgüzel, Atatürk-­Nerimanov ve Kurtuluş Savaşımız, 103–7. 13. Telegram from Chicherin to Eliava, December 5, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 7. 14. Statement of Мustafa Kemal pasha to Upmal-­Angarskii, first secretary of the Embassy of the RSFSR in Turkey, October 25, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 3. 15. Nikolai Kireev, Istoriia Turtsii: XX vek, 140. 16. Statement of Мustafa Kemal pasha to Upmal-­Angarskii, first Secretary of the embassy of the RSFSR in Turkey, October 25, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 3.



Notes to pages 223–232 427

17. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 2, 726. 18. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, January 18, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 18, p. 6. 19. Letter from Mdivani, ambassador of the RSFSR in Ankara, to Orjonikidze, January 20, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 106, pp. 1–2. 20. Report from Shahtakhtinskii to CPC RSFSR, no date, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 77. 21. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, January 18, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 34, p. 1. 22. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, January 14, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 12. 23. “Provision on Interrelations between the Chair and Members of the Delegation to Conduct Talks with Foreign States,” 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 5. 24. Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin and Orjonikidze, December 16, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 8. 25. Telegram from Shahtakhtinskii to Orjonikidze, December 8, 1920, RSASPH, f.159, r. 2, vol. 56, p. 41. 26. Report from Shahtakhtinskii to CPC RSFSR, no date, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 76. 27. Interview of Upmal-­Angarskii with the commissar of foreign affairs, October 25, 1920, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 2. 28. Report from Shahtakhtinskii to CPC RSFSR, no date, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 76–77 (following Shahtakhtinskii report quotations also from this source). 29. Letter from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, January 11, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 33, p. 1. 30. Cryptogram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, January 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 33, p. 2. 31. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin and Stalin, February 6, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 3, p. 8. 32. Letter from Kazım Karabekir pasha to command of 11th Red Army, February 8, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 37, p. 6. 33. Correspondence of Chicherin with Orjonikidze, December 1920, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 49, p. 24. 34. Dr. Rıza Nur’un Moskova-­Sakarya Hatıraları, 67–68. 35. Telegram from Chechulin to Chicherin, February 13, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 56, p. 56. 36. Telegram from Voznesenskii to Narimanov and Orjonikidze, February 18, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 257, p. 1. 37. Kireev, Istoriia Turtsii: XX vek, 140. 38. Conversation of Мustafa Kemal pasha with Eshba, January 29, 1921, RSASPH, f. 544, r. 3, vol. 46, pp. 48–49. 39. Letter from Narimanov to Lenin, February 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 24504, pp. 1–2. 40. Letter from Chicherin to Lenin, February 22, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 2, vol. 526, pp. 1–2. 41. Letter from Stalin to Chicherin, March 6, 1921, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 824, p. 7. 42. Answer from Orjonikidze to encoded telegram from Stalin, February 12, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 1247, p. 3. 43. Conversation of Mikhail Frunze and Ibrahim Abilov with Мustafa Kemal pasha and Yusuf Kemal bey, January 4, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 68, p. 4.

428

Notes to pages 233–244

44. Minutes of informal meeting of the delegation of the RSFSR and the government of the GNAT, February 23, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52998, pp. 1–15 (following quotations from this meeting also from this source). 45. Conversation of Mikhail Frunze and Ibrahim Abilov with Мustafa Kemal pasha and Yusuf Kemal bey, January 4, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 68, p. 4. 46. Meeting of the Political Commission of the Moscow Conference, March 12, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 12, p. 52. 47. Letter from Narimanov to Lenin, February 19, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 24503, p. 1 (following Narimanov quotations also from this source). 48. Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 146. 49. Russian-­Turkish conference in Moscow, plenary session, February 26, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 12, pp. 26–30 (following quotations from this conference also from this source). 50. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Huseinov, February 26, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 2 (following Shahtakhtinskii quotations also from this source). 51. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Lenin, March 1, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2796, p. 3. 52. Territories that are subject to disputes between the Transcaucasian republics, March 1, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2796, p. 4. 53. Türk Dünyası Tarih Dergisi 64 (April 1992): 5–6. 54. “Short Synopsis of the Region of Kars and Ardahan,” NARA, RG 59, Box 4010, NND 7600050, Doc. 761.67/3–446. 55. Zhizn’ Natsional’nostei, March 4, 1921. 56. The “National Pact” (Misak-­i Milli), including the main decisions of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, prepared by Мustafa Kemal pasha on January 28, 1920, in Istanbul, was accepted by the Ottoman Parliament and was announced worldwide on February 17. For more detailed information, see Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi, 185–87. 57. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, February 28, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 16. 58. Letter from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, April 28, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2097, p. 22. 59. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, February 28, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 17. 60. Selahi Sonyel, Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika, 54. 61. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, February 28, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 17. For more detailed information about the activities of Khalil pasha in Moscow, see Sorgun, Bitmeyen Savaş, 244–54. 62. Sürmeli, Türk–Gürcü İlişkileri, 650–51. 63. Russian expert review by Chicherin on the National Pact, March 2, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52997, p. 17. 64. Letter from Chicherin to the CC RCP (B), January 24, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 14. 65. Information from PCFA to the CC RCP (B), February 10, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 11. 66. Letter from Chicherin to Krestinskii, March 1, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 2, vol. 315, p. 20– 21. For more information about Litvinov, see Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov: revoliutsioner, diplomat, chelovek. 67. Letter from Chicherin to Krestinskii, March 1, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 2, vol. 315, p. 21. 68. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, March 2, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 21. 69. Letter from Stalin to Chicherin, March 6, 1921, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 824, p. 8. 70. Report from Lebedev to Chicherin, March 4, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 21.



Notes to pages 245–252 429

71. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Stalin, March 7, 1921, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 1, vol. 3529, pp. 1–2. 72. Information from Shahtakhtinskii to Chicherin, March 7, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 24. 73. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, March 7, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 22. 74. Instruction from Chicherin to Mirza Davud Huseinov by direct wire, March 9, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 26. 75. Telegram from Eliava to Chicherin, March 9, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 27. 76. Message from Chicherin to Shahtakhtinskii, March 7, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 23. 77. From Chicherin to the AREC of the RSFSR and AREC of the RSFSR to Chicherin, March 9, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 25. 78. Cevat Acikalin, Turkish ambassador in London, to Ernest Bevin, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, March 4, 1946, NARA, RG 59, Box 4010, NND 7600050, Doc. 761.67/3–446. 79. Gürün, Türkiye-­Sovyet İlişkileri, 67–68; Azer, Babadan Oğula Güney Kafkasya, 299. 80. Letter from PCFA to the CC RCP (B), March 10, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 32. 81. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, March 10, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 31. 82. Letter from Chicherin to Lenin, March 10, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, pp. 29–30. 83. Letter from Kurskii to Chicherin, March 11, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 37. 84. Session of the political commission of the Moscow conference, March 10, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, pp. 36, 39–40, 42 (following quotations from this session also from this source). 85. Kireev, Istoriia Turtsii: XX vek, 140. For more detailed information about the Batum question on the eve of the Moscow conference and in the period of Russian-­Turkish talks, Sürmeli, Türk–Gürcü İlişkileri, 604–703. 86. Yerasimos, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Türk–Sovet İlişkileri, 347. 87. The Soviet Union and Turkey, December 10, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box 4010, NND 7600050, Doc. 761.67/12–1045; Qafarov, Türkiye-­Rusiya münasibetlerinde Azerbaycan meselesi, 395. 88. Pierre Redan, La Cilicie et le problème ottoman, 15. 89. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, vol. 15, 210–12, 215–16 (following quotations from the conference also from this source). 90. Sonyel, Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement, SAGE, Studies in 20th Century History, vol. 3 (London, SAGE Publications, 1975), 101–2; Kireev, Istoriia Turtsii: XX vek, 141–42. 91. Georges Mamoulia, Les combats independantistes des Caucasiens entre URSS et puissances occidentales: Le cas de la Géorgie (1921–1945), 40–41. 92. Türkiye Böyük Millet Meclisinin Gizli Celese Zabıtları, 228–29. 93. Chicherin, “On the Agreement with Turkey,” March 10, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 34. 94. Chicherin, “On the Territorial Accord with the Turkish Delegation,” March 10, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 36.

430

Notes to pages 252–261

95. Russian project presented and discussed at the conference, March 12, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52997, p. 38. 96. Turkish counterproject presented and discussed at the conference, March 12, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52997, pp. 41–44. 97. Session of the political commission of the Moscow conference, March 12, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 12, pp. 48–50, 52, 54–56 (following quotations from this session of the conference also from this source). 98. Telegram from Shahtakhtinskii to Mirza Davud Huseinov, March 13, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 137. 99. Session of the political commission of the Moscow conference, March 14, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 12, pp. 61–68. 100. Report from Bekzadian to Chicherin, Stalin, and Glavkom of the republic, not earlier than March 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 44, pp. 32–34. 101. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Chicherin, March 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2178, p. 54. 102. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, March 15, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 38. 103. From the Central Division for Evacuation of the Population to the PCFA, March 15, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 39. 104. Telegram from the command of the Caucasus army to the PCFA, March 16, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 40. 105. Session of the political commission of the Moscow conference, March 16, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 12, pp. 74–77. 106. First exchange of notes between Turkey and Russia, March 16, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 12, pp. 77–78. 107. Second exchange of notes between Turkey and Russia, March 16, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 12, p. 79. 108. Information from Chicherin to Lenin, March 17, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53004, p. 44. 109. Plenary session of the Russian-­Turkish conference, March 18, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 12, p. 85. 110. Agreement between Russia and Turkey, March 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, pp. 77–80. For the Turkish text of the Moscow Agreement, see Soysal, Türkiye’nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları, 32–38. For the English text of the Moscow Agreement, see the “Treaty of Friendship between Russia and Turkey Signed at Moscow, 16 March 1921,” in British and Foreign State Papers, 1923, 990–96. 111. Agreement between Russia and Turkey, March 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 77. 112. Appendixes 1(А) and 1(B) to Agreement between Russia and Turkey, March 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, pp. 80–81. 113. Agreement between Russia and Turkey, March 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 77. 114. Appendixes to Agreement between Russia and Turkey, March 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 81. 115. Zavriev, K noveishei istorii severo-­vostochnykh vilaietov Turtsii, 111. 116. The Boundary between Turkey and the USSR, CIA/RR M-­17, Secret, January 1952, NARA, CIA-­RDP 79, p. 8. 117. Letter from Narimanov to Shahtakhtinskii, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 62. 118. Statement of the Embassy of the GNAT to Moscow, March 17, 1921, FPARF, f. 132, r. 4, fol. 4, vol. 3, p. 109.



Notes to pages 261–267 431

119. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Kazım Karabekir pasha, Orjonikidze, Chicherin, and others, March 24, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 65, p. 1. 120. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Orjonikidze, Chicherin, Shahtakhtinskii, and others, March 14, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 144, p. 1. 121. Cited in telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze, March 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 29, pp. 31ff. 122. Telegram from Chicherin to Kerzhentsev, trade representative of Russia to Stockholm, March 19, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 45. 123. Telegram from Pugachev and Pecherskii to Orjonikidze, March 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 29, p. 1. 124. Telegram from Aleksandr Tsuriupa to Orjonikidze, March 24, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 29, p. 22–24. 125. Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b): Povestka dnia zasedanii, 91. 126. Letter from Chicherin to the CC RCP (B), March 24, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 7789, pp. 1–2. 127. Letter from the PCFA to the CC RCP (B), April 1, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 37. 128. Extract from minutes no. 8 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), April 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 145, p. 1; Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b): Povestka dnia zasedanii, 93. 129. Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze and Orakhelashvili, April 4, 1921, RSASPH, f. 298, r. 1, vol. 106, p. 3. 130. Ibid. 131. Telegram from Chicherin to Mdivani, April 4, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2117, p. 13. 132. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Chicherin, April 6, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 18, p. 21. 133. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 4, 50. 134. Aralov, Bir Sovet Diplomatının Türkiye Anıları, 34, 306. 135. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 4, 49. 136. Dispatch from Chicherin to Mdivani, April 7, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2117, p. 14. 137. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki, vol. 4, 49. 138. Ibid., 54. 139. Telegram from Chicherin to Orakhelashvili, April 12, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 266, p. 1. 140. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 4, 54–55. 141. Toksoy, Revan’da Son Günler, 320. 142. Message from Atabekian by direct wire to Orjonikidze, February 25, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 137, p. 31. 143. Telegram from the Armenian Committee for Salvation to Orjonikidze and Chicherin, March 17, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2178, p. 54. 144. Report note about the uprising of the Armenian people against Soviet rule in Armenia, April 9, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 137, pp. 1–3. 145. Letter to the CC RCP (B), 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 29, pp. 32–34. 146. Letter from Chicherin to Kopp, March 20, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 29, p. 41. 147. Telephonogram from Chicherin to Mirza Davud Huseinov, April 9, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, pp. 196–97. 148. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Chicherin, April 12, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 214.

432

Notes to pages 268–275

149. Instructions from commissar of foreign affairs Chicherin to Mirza Davud Huseinov by direct wire, April 12, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, pp. 52, 55 (following quotations from the instructions also from this source). 150. Türkiye Böyük Millet Meclisinin Gizli Celese Zabıtları, 229. 151. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Chicherin, Legrand, Orakhelashvili, and Mravian, April 19, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 49, p. 1. 152. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Stalin, April 12, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 84, p. 1. 153. Türkiye Böyük Millet Meclisinin Gizli Celese Zabıtları, 227. 154. Letter from Legrand to Chicherin and Orjonikidze, June 29, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 44, p. 7. 155. Türkiye Böyük Millet Meclisinin Gizli Celese Zabıtları, 229. 156. Cited in Türkiye Böyük Millet Meclisinin Gizli Celese Zabıtları; conversation of ­Ibrahim Abilov and Yusuf Kemal bey, January 26, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, v. 68, p. 19. 157. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to the CC RCP (B), August 1923, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с, vol. 3, p. 50. 158. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Stalin, August 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 177, p. 50. 159. Letter from Legrand to Chicherin and Orjonikidze, June 29, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 44, p. 4. 160. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Chicherin, Legrand, Orakhelashvili, and Mravian, April 19, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 149, pp. 1–2. 161. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Chicherin, April 19, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 200. 162. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Orjonikidze, Orakhelashvili, and Mravian, April 19, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 199. 163. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Chicherin and Bekzadian, April 1921, ­APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 201. 164. Telegram from Legrand to Narimanov and Mirza Davud Huseinov, July 22, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с/ (Turkey), vol. 100, p. 3. 165. Report from Mamedov to Mirza Davud Huseinov on “The Government Policy of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Leaders of This Policy,” May 29, 1921, APDPARA, f.609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 110. 166. Kommunist, April 26, 1921, 167. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Stalin, April 22, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 3с, vol. 8, p. 12. 168. Letter from Mehdiyev to Topchibashov, May 24, 1921, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 1, 100. 169. Letter from Communist Party member Khardanmariants to Steklov, editor of the ­Izvestiia newspaper, April 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 43. 170. Letter from Chicherin to Steklov, April 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 43. 171. Statement of Bekzadian, commissar of foreign affairs of Armenia, to Chicherin, April 15, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, pp. 57–59, 61 (following Bekzadian ­quotations also from this source). 172. Letter from Chicherin to Ter-­Gabrielian, April 21, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, pp. 63–64. 173. Telegram from Chicherin to Legrand, April 22, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 65. 174. Letter from Chicherin to Molotov, May 29, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 82. 175. Minutes no. 3 of the meeting the of Plenary of the Armenian SSR, May 19, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 105, p. 3.



Notes to pages 276–283 433

176. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Mravian and Orjonikidze, July 13, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 151, pp. 4, 6–7 (following Huseinov quotation also from this source). 177. P. P. Moiseev, Rossiisko-­turetskie otnosheniia, 122. 178. Rem Kazandzhian, Bol’sheviki i mladoturki, 12–13. 179. Iu. V. Kliuchnilov and A. V. Sabanin, Mezhdunarodnaia politika noveishego vremeni v dogovorakh, notakh i deklaratsiiakh, 25–27, 53–54. For additional information about the secret agreement on the Russian transfer of Istanbul and the Straits in 1915, see Division of Iran and European Turkey, from brochures by S. Koska, “Secret Contracts and Agreements of 1918,” SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 68, pp. 69–70. 180. Telegram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, July 27, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2203, p. 117.

Chapter 8: From Moscow to Kars 1. Narimanov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 495–96. 2. Letter from Lavrov to Andreev, April 14, 1921, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 12, p. 26. 3. Report on the issue of organizing preparatory courses for diplomatic service, 1921, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 55, pp. 179–84. 4. Materials no. 2 of the meeting of the plenum of the CC CPA (B), August 20, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 90, pp. 53–55. 5. Report from Mahammadov to Mirza Davud Huseinov on “Government Policy of ­Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Leaders of This Policy,” May 29, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, pp. 100–103 (following quotations from this report also from this source). 6. Telegram from Chicherin to Mirza Davud Huseinov, May 26, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 96, p. 43. 7. Kommunist, June 5, 1921, 8. Principal points in the political life of Turkey (from November 1920 to November 1921), historical canvas, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 3, vol. 630, p. 51. 9. Telegram from Chicherin to Mirza Davud Huseinov, July 19, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 15, p. 137. 10. Minutes no. 15 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC CPA (B), May 21, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 18, p. 80. 11. Minutes no. 7 of the meeting of the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), June 4, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 80. 12. Minutes of the meeting of the Politburo, CC CPA (B), July 24, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 92, p. 52. 13. Minutes no. 25 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC CPA (B), July 31, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 18, p. 113. 14. Minutes no. 15 of the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), August 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 58, p. 21. 15. Minutes no. 16 of the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), August 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 58, p. 23. 16. Letter from Ibrahim Abilov to Mirza Davud Huseinov, August 26, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 81, pp. 9–10. 17. Azer, Babadan Oğula Güney Kafkasya, 303. 18. Letter from Chicherin to Molotov, May 29, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p. 91. 19. Report from Mahammadov to Mirza Davud Huseinov on “Government Policy of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Leaders of This Policy,” May 29, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, pp. 102ff.

434

Notes to pages 283–289

20. Sorgun, Bitmeyen Savaş, 358. 21. About the supporters of Enver pasha, 1921, SAAR, f. 6, r. 1, vol. 134, p. 201. 22. Cryptogram from Orjonikidze to Stalin, August 18, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 4, p. 1. 23. James G. Harbord, Conditions in the Near East: Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia, 10–11. 24. Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 258. 25. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin, August 26, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 5, p. 1. 26. Sorgun, Bitmeyen Savaş, 266–67. 27. Telegram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, September 28, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p. 104. 28. Telegram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, October 6, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p. 116. 29. Cryptogram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, November 18, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, pp. 118–19. 30. Cryptogram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, September 27, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, pp. 114–15. 31. Report from Piskunov, employee of the government of the RSFSR, to Chicherin, September 15, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232 vol. 52992, p. 26. 32. Principal moments in the political life of Turkey, no date, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 3, vol. 630, p. 51. 33. Report on Communist factions of Soviet propaganda and actions of eastern peoples, March 20, 1921, RSASPH, f. 544, r. 3, p. 4, vol. 2, p. 200. 34. Memorandum from Ali Fuat pasha to Chicherin, August 4, 1921, FPARF, f. 132, r. 4, fol. 4, vol. 2, p. 78. 35. Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 257–59. 36. Note from Ali Fuat pasha to Chicherin, May 15, 1921, FPARF, f. 132, r. 4, fol. 4, vol. 4, p. 25. 37. Instruction from the government of the GNAT to Ali Fuat pasha, May 25, 1921, FPARF, f. 132, r. 4, fol. 4, vol. 4, pp. 62–63. 38. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, September 14, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 2, vol. 315, pp. 153–54. 39. Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 275–77. 40. Gürün, Türkiye-­Sovyet İlişkileri, 70. 41. Letter from Ali Fuat pasha to Chicherin, September 17, 1921, FPARF, f. 132, r. 4, fol. 4, vol. 2, p. 79. 42. Letter from Yusuf Kemal bey to Chicherin, September 1921, FPARF, f. 132, r. 4, fol. 4, vol. 5, p. 48. 43. Telegram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, September 22, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p. 107. 44. Information from Division of Information of the PCFA of Azerbaijan, July 25, 1921, SAAR, f. 6, r. 1, vol. 134, p. 17. 45. Telegram from Мustafa Kemal pasha to Chicherin, September 29, 1921, FPARF, f. 132, r. 4, fol. 4, vol. 5, p. 154. 46. Letter from Chicherin to Ali Fuat pasha, October 10, 1921, FPARF, f. 132, r. 4, fol. 4, vol. 2, p. 80. 47. Cryptogram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, October 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 388, p. 1.



Notes to pages 289–293 435

48. Minutes no. 63 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), September 29, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 208, p. 1. 49. Cited in letter from Chicherin to Zinov’ev, June 8, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, pp. 93–94. 50. Minutes no. 38 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), June 10, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 175, p. 1. 51. Minutes no. 9 of the meeting the CP (B) of Armenia, June 20, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 105, p. 12. 52. Minutes no. 42 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), June 25, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 179, p. 4. 53. Letter from Papazian, Navasardian, and Isaakian to the CC RCP (B), August 17, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 183, p. 12. 54. Minutes no. 10 of the meeting of the CP (B) of Armenia, July 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 105, p. 14. 55. Minutes no. 53 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), July 26, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 192, p. 3. 56. Cited in letter from Papazian, Navasardian, and Isaakian to the CC RCP (B), August 17, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 183, p. 12. 57. Ibid. 58. “Déclaration des répresentants des républiques d’Arménie, d’Azerbaidjan, du Caucase du Nord et de Géorgie, Classe le 15 juin 1921,” MAEF, vol. 639, folios 205–9. 59. Letter from Legrand to Orjonikidze, June 29, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. c /Turkey, vol. 44, p. 4. 60. Meeting of representatives of the South Caucasus republics about negotiations with Turkey, May 7, 1921, SAAR, f. 28, r. 2, vol. 27, p. 30. 61. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 4, 287. 62. “The Pan-­Turanian Idea,” NARA, CIA-­RDP 83, p. 97. 63. Telegram from Yusuf Kemal bey to Mirza Davud Huseinov, July 3, 1921, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 49, p. 8. 64. Telegram from Yusuf Kemal bey to Mirza Davud Huseinov, July 3, 1921, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 66, p. 28. 65. Betül Aslan, Türkiye-­Azerbaycan İlişkileri ve İbrahim Ebilov, 138; telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Chicherin, July 5, 1921, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 49, p. 8. 66. Principal moments in the political life of Turkey (from November 1920 to November 1921), historical canvas, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 3, vol. 630, p. 51. 67. Cryptogram from Yusuf Kemal bey to Chicherin, July 9, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2203, p. 109. 68. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 4, 227–28. 69. Note from Chicherin to Ali Fuat pasha, August 8, 1921, FPARF, f. 132, r. 4, fol. 4, vol. 2, p. 63. 70. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Yusuf Kemal bey, July 21, 1921, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 26. 71. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 4, 228, 292. 72. Telegram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, August 27, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p. 101. 73. Conversation of Mirza Davud Huseinov and Ibrahim Abilov by direct wire, August 1921, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 1. 74. Conversation of Mirza Davud Huseinov and Ibrahim Abilov by direct wire, August 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 81, pp. 27–28.

436

Notes to pages 293–299

75. Aslan, Türkiye-­Azerbaycan İlişkileri, 179. 76. Minutes no. 15 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC CPA (B), August 26, 1921, ­APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 16, p. 85. 77. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to the CC RCP (B), August 1923, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 2с., vol. 3, p. 49. 78. Minutes no. 10 of the meeting of the Orgburo, CC CPA (B), August 25, 1921, ­APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 15, p. 85. 79. Letter from the secretary of the CC CPA (B) to the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), August 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 24, p. 37. 80. Minutes no. 20 of the meeting of the Plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), September 5, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 58, p. 33. 81. Telegram from Atabekov to Ter-­Gabrielian, November 2, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 183, p. 6. 82. Minutes no. 49 of the meeting of the Orgburo of the Territorial Committee of the CPA, October 11, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 100, pp. 5–6. 83. Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 259–60. 84. “Worldwide Report Terrorism: For Official Use Only,” June 21, 1982, NARA, CIA–RDP 82, p. 23. 85. Letter from Stalin to Chicherin, August 30, 1921, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 824, p. 9. 86. Qasımov, Azerbaycan-­Türkiye diplomatik-­siyasi münasibetleri (aprel 1920-­ci il–dekabr 1922-­ci il), 102. 87. Cryptogram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, September 23, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p. 112. 88. Telegram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Yusuf Kemal bey, September 21, 1921, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 133, p. 19. 89. Minutes of the meeting of the CC CP (B) of Armenia, August 26, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 105, p. 23. 90. “The Boundary between Turkey and the USSR: Secret,” January 1952, NARA, CIA–RDP 79, p. 8. 91. Cryptogram from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Legrand, August 28, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 44, p. 9. 92. Cited in letter from Islam Hajibeyli to Mirza Davud Huseinov, September 11, 1921, ­APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 81, p. 12. 93. Ahmedov, “The National Movement in Azerbaijan,” December 22, 1927, APDPARA, f. 12, r. 1, vol. 152, p. 28. 94. Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde, 275. 95. Letter from Stalin to Chicherin, September 10, 1921, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 824, p. 12. 96. Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, 259. 97. Minutes no. 35 of the meeting of the plenum of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), May 31, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 172, p. 5. 98. Minutes no. 17 of the meeting of the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), September 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 144. 99. Note from Mirza Davud Huseinov to Yusuf Kemal bey, September 4, 1921, A ­ PDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 26. 100. Mahad Sofiyev, Güney Qafqaz respublikaları Sovet-­Türkiye elagelerinde (1922–1936), 45. 101. Letter from the secretary of the CC CP (B) of Armenia to Chicherin, August 10, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 183, p. 11. 102. Note from Askanaz Mravian to Yusuf Kemal bey, August 28, 1921, APDPARA, f. 132, r. 4, p. 4, vol. 5, p. 69.

1 03. 104. 105. 106. 107. 1 08. 109. 110. 1 11. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 1 20. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 1 26. 127. 128. 1 29. 130. 131. 132. 133.

Notes to pages 299–306 437 Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, 956. Toksoy, Revan’da Son Günler, 321. Türkiye Böyük Millet Meclisinin Gizli Celese Zabıtları, 230, 227. Tengirşenk, Vatan Hizmetinde, 223. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, 1112–16; Qafarov, Türkiye-­Rusiya münasibetlerinde ­Azerbaycan meselesi, 409–10. Azer, Babadan Oğula Güney Kafkasya, 303–4. Aslan, Tüurkiye-­Azerbaycan İlişkileri, 140. Letter from Islam Hajibeyli to Mirza Davud Huseinov, September 11, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 81, pp. 11–12. Aslan, Türkiye-­Azerbaycan İlişkileri, 141. Ibid., 141–43. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 4, 372. Telegram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, September 29, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p. 111. Minutes no. 1 of the meeting of the Kars Conference, September 26, 1921, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 81, p. 3. Telegram from Ganetskii to Chicherin, September 28, 1921, RSASPH, f. 298, r. 1, vol. 108, p. 4. Minutes no. 4 of the meeting of the Kars Conference, September 30, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 81, p. 21; Toksoy, Revan’da Son Günler, 322. Telegram from Ganetskii to Chicherin, September 30, 1921, RSASPH, f. 298, r. 1, vol. 108, pp. 6–7. Minutes no. 4 of the meeting of the Kars Conference, September 30, 1921, APDPARA, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 81, p. 30. Sofiyev, Güney Qafqaz respublikaları Sovet-­Türkiye elagelerinde, 45. Kommunist, October 4, 1921, Letter from Islam Hajibeyli to Mirza Davud Huseinov, October 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 81, p. 23. Letter from Chicherin to the Politburo, CC RCP (B), October 7, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 2, vol. 991, p. 1. Note from Yusuf Kemal bey to Chicherin, October 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2203, p. 190. Letter from the PCFA to the Politburo, CC RCP (B), November 6, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 85. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, November 19, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 86. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, November 22, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, pp. 89–92. Telegram from Ganetskii to Chicherin, October 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 298, r. 1, vol. 108, p. 8. Bagirov, Iz istorii sovetsko-­turetskikh otnoshenii v 1920–1922 gg., 73–74. Telegram from Ganetskii to Chicherin, October 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 298, r. 1, vol. 108, p. 9. Note from Stalin about conversation with Аli Fuat bey, ambassador from the GNAT to the RSFSR, October 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 388, p. 1. Telegram from Chicherin to Natsarenus, envoy to Ankara, October 3, 1921, FPARF, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52994, pp. 37–38. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, 1119–1122; Qafarov, Türkiye-­Rusiya münasibetlerinde Azerbaycan meselesi, 411–12.

438

Notes to pages 307–316

134. Letter from Islam Hajibeyli to Mirza Davud Huseinov, October 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 81, pp. 22–23. 135. Cited in Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, 963–64. 136. Musayev, Azerbaycanın Nakhçıvan ve Zangezur bölgelerinde siyasi veziyyet, 350. 137. Aslan, Türkiye-­Azerbaycan İlişkileri, 145. 138. Telegram from Ganetskii to Chicherin, October 6, 1921, RSASPH, f. 298, r. 1, vol. 108, p. 16. 139. Telegram from Ganetskii to Chicherin, October 7, 1921, RSASPH, f. 298, r. 1, vol. 108, pp. 20–21. 140. Telegram from Ganetskii to Chicherin, October 6, 1921, RSASPH, f. 298, r. 1, vol. 108, p. 28. 141. Telegram from Ganetskii to Chicherin, October 10, 1921, RSASPH, f. 298, r. 1, vol. 108, p. 35. 142. “The Boundary between Turkey and the USSR: Secret,” January 1952, NARA, CIA–RDP 79, p. 9. 143. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 4, 420–26 (contains the full text of the ­agreement). 144. Azer, Babadan Oğula Güney Kafkasya, 304–5. 145. Trascaucasus-­Turkey agreement, October 13, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, pp. 112, 116, 114 (following quotations from this agreement also from this source). 146. Gürün, Türkiye-­Sovyet İlişkileri, 71. 147. Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, vol. 1, 247, 248. 148. Press about the Kars Conference, November 1921, SAAR, f. 6, r. 1, vol. 139, p. 196. 149. Ibid., 197. 150. “The Torn Curtain,” Haik, November 13, 1921, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 234, pp. 124–25. 151. Musayev, Azerbaycanın Nakhçıvan ve Zangezur bölgelerinde siyasi veziyyet, 352. 152. Minutes no. 49 of the meeting of the Orgburo and Politburo of Regional Committee of the Nakhchivan CC CPA (B), October 11, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 100, p. 5. 153. Minutes no. 49 of the meeting of the Orgburo and Politburo of the Regional Committee of the Nakhchivan CC CPA (B), December 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 100, pp. 21–22. 154. Musayev, Azerbaycanın Nakhçıvan ve Zangezur bölgelerinde siyasi veziyyet, 357. 155. Information on “Nakhchivan АSSR in Soviet-­Turkish agreements,” prepared by MFA of the USSR for the CC CPSU, May 31, 1966, Russian State Archive of Modern History (RNAMH), f. 5, r. 58, vol. 3, p. 8. 156. Ibid., 9. 157. Minutes of the meeting of colleagues of the PCFA, August 17, 1923, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 375, p. 4. 158. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, August 21, 1923, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 375, p. 12. 159. Minutes no. 27 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), August 23, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 375, p. 2. 160. Information on “The Nachchivan АSSR in Soviet-­Turkish agreements,” prepared by the MFA of the USSR for the CC CPSU, May 31, 1966, RNHSA, f. 5, r. 58, vol. 3, pp. 6–9. 161. Letter from Ibrahim Abilov to Mirza Davud Huseinov, October 16, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 117. 162. Ibid., 124. 163. Transcaucasia and Ankara: Activities of Enver pasha, December 1921, SAAR, f. 6, r. 1, vol. 134, p. 223. 164. Letter from Stalin to Chicherin, October 17, 1921, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 824, p.16.



Notes to pages 316–324 439

165. Cited in second conversation of Mikhail Frunze and Ibrahim Abilov with Мustafa ­Kemal pasha, January 4, 1922, SAAR f. 28, r. 1, vol. 68, p. 6. 166. Letter from Abilov to Huseinov, October 16, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, pp. 121–22. 167. Letter from Abilov to Orjonikidze, November 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 96, p.46. 168. Talks between comrade Yusifzade and comrade Lara, October 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 81, p. 15. 169. Letter from Abilov to Huseinov, November 16, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 134. 170. Letter from Abilov to Huseinov, November 21, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 135. 171. Letter from Abilov to Orjonikidze, November 16, 1921, RSASPH, f.85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 96, p. 45. 172. Cryptogram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, October 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 2, vol. 990, p. 1. 173. Speech of Abilov, October 14, 1921, RSASPH, f. 544, r. 3, vol. 115, pp. 175–76. 174. Reply of Mustafa Kemal pasha, October 14, 1921, RSASPH, f. 544, r. 3, vol. 115, p. 177. 175. Letter from Abilov to Huseinov, November 8, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 130. 176. Flag of Azerbaijan above Ankara, Information Office, December 21, 1921, SAAR, f. 6, r. 1, vol. 134, p. 169. 177. Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, vol. 2, 23–24. 178. Bagirov, Iz istorii sovetsko-­turetskikh otnoshenii v 1920–1922 gg., 84. 179. Azerbaijani ambassador’s present, Information Office, December 25, 1921, SAAR, f. 6, r. 1, vol. 134, p. 214. 180. Letter from Mikhailov to Orjonikidze, November 8, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 96, pp. 42–43. 181. Second talks between Frunze and Abilov with Мustafa Kemal pasha, January 4, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 68, pp. 4–5. 182. Conversation between Abilov and Kemal bey, January 26, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 68, pp. 17–20 (following quotations from this conversation also from this source). 183. Telegram from Mikhailov to Chicherin, January 24, 1922, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2204, p. 18. 184. Letter from Mikhailov to Orjonikidze, January 17, 1922, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 96, pp. 58–59. 185. Protocol no. 9 of the meeting of staff members of the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Turkey, January 31, 1922, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 136, pp. 4–5. 186. Protocol no. 6 of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA, February 14, 1922, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 74, vol. 126, p. 57. 187. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 4, 429. 188. PCFA proposal to the Politburo of the CC RCP, October 17, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 163, vol. 201, pp. 7–8. 189. Frunze’s instructions from the Russian PCFA, October 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 2, vol. 315, pp. 181–82. 190. Roster of the Ukrainian SSR Embassy, December 29, 1921, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 49. 191. Text of the Turkish-­French treaty, October 20, 1921, SAAR, f. 6, r. 1, vol. 134, pp. 103–8. 192. Telegram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, October 30, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p. 117.

440

Notes to pages 324–330

193. Enciphered telegram from Natsarenus to Chicherin, October 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 2, vol. 990, p. 2. 194. Letter from Mikhailov to Orjonikidze, November 8, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 96, pp. 39–40. 195. Letter from Abilov to Huseinov, November 8, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 131. 196. Letter from Abilov to Orjonikidze, November 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 96, p. 45. 197. Reference of the Soviet diplomatic mission to Ankara for Chicherin, November–­ December 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 96, pp. 47–49. 198. Cryptogram from Krasin to Lenin, Trotskii, and Stalin, November 13, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 22439, p. 4. 199. Memo from Lenin to Stalin, December 17, 1921, RSASPH, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 22439, p. 2. 200. Letter from Chicherin to Lenin, October 20, 1921, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 388, p. 2. 201. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, November 5, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 84. 202. Letter from Stalin to Lenin, 1921, National Security Archive at the George Washington University, Box 2, 1920–22, Russian and Eastern Archive Documents, R 10087, Washington, DC. 203. Letter from Chicherin to Lenin, October 20, 1921, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 388, p. 2. 204. Telegram from Kirov to Orjonikidze, November 30, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 13, vol. 92, p. 1. 205. Letter from Mikhailov to Orjonikidze, November 8, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 96, p. 41. 206. The Russian Embassy’s reference to Ankara for Chicherin, November–December 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 96, p. 49. 207. Letter from Mikhailov to Orjonikidze, January 3, 1922, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 96, p. 57. 208. Telegram from Mikhailov to Chicherin, January 9[?], 1922, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2204, p. 8. 209. Letter from Chicherin to Trotskii, November 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 88. 210. Protocol no. 33 of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA, November 28, 1921, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 18, p. 160. 211. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin and Stalin, December 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 99, p. 1. 212. For more details about Narimanov’s struggle against his opponents, see Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde, 272–78. 213. Letter from the Azerbaijani PCFA to the ambassador in Turkey, November 2, 1922, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 65. 214. Letter from Mikhailov to Orjonikidze, November 1, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 96, p. 55. 215. Letter from Narimanov to the CC CPA, December 16, 1921, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 126. 216. Aslan, Türkiye-­Azerbaycan İlişkileri, 219. 217. Letter from the Azerbaijani PCFA to the plenipotentiary representative in Turkey, January 2, 1922, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 65. 218. Letter from Narimanov to Abilov, 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 92, pp. 115–19. 219. Protocol no. 7 of the meeting of the Politburo of the CC RCP, December 8, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 242, p. 2. 220. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, October 27, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 2, vol. 315, p. 213.



Notes to pages 330–337 441

221. Letter from Legrand to Chicherin, October 18, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. с /Turkey, vol. 100, p. 5. 222. Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, October 28, 1921, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 2, vol. 315, p. 213. 223. Protocol no. 11 of the meeting of the CC RCP, Caucasian Bureau, October 31, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 2, p. 82. 224. Protocol no. 23 of the meeting of the CC RCP, Caucasian Bureau, November 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 58, p. 39. 225. Protocol no. 35 of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo, December 13, 1921, ­APDPARA, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 18, p. 181.

Chapter 9: The Struggle for Baku Oil and the Formation of the Soviet Union 1. Vladimir Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 380. 2. Letter from Narimanov to Lenin, 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 62, p. 18. 3. Azerbaycan tarikhi, 156. 4. Agreement between Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Armenian SSR about uniting organs of foreign trade, June 21, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 13, vol. 385, p. 16. 5. Cryptogram from Molotov to Orjonikidze at the Caucasus Bureau, August 26, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 3. 6. Minutes no. 22 of the morning meeting of the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), November 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 183. 7. Resolution of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), about the formation of the federation of South Caucasus republics, November 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, pp. 187–88 (following quotation from this resolution also from this source). 8. Minutes no. 23 of the evening meeting of the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), November 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 187. 9. Minutes no. 24 of the evening meeting of the plenum of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), November 6, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, pp. 193ff. 10. Telegram from Orjonikidze to CC RCP (B) and Stalin, November 8, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 327, p. 3. 11. Minutes of the meeting of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), CC of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and members of the North Caucasus Mountain Committee, November 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 200. 12. Narimanov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 568. 13. “Federation,” translation from Tribuna newspaper, November 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 216, pp. 16–19. 14. “About Federation,” translation from Shroma newspaper, November 20, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 216, pp. 21–23. 15. Minutes of the meeting of the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), CC of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, members of the Baku Committee, the Tiflis committee, the presidium of the Sovprof of Georgia, MRC Division of the Caucasus Army, and members of the North Caucasus Mountain Committee, November 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 223–24. 16. Resolution of the CC RCP (B), April 5, 1922, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 61, p. 9. 17. Minutes no. 78 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), November 18, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 232, p. 5. 18. Letter from Narimanov to Lenin, November 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 62, p. 17. 19. Minutes of the meeting of the committee investigating the report and statement from Narimanov, June 13, 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2 , vol. 179, p. 7.

442

Notes to pages 337–344

20. Telegram from the CC RCP (B) to the Caucasus Bureau, November 17, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 328, p. 1. 21. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Molotov, November 24, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 328, pp. 2–4. 22. Telegram from Molotov to Orjonikidze, November 25, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 328, p. 6. 23. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Molotov, November 25, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 328, p. 8. 24. Azerbaycan tarikhi, 159–60. 25. Union Treaty of the Socialist Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, November 25, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 328, p. 11. 26. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Molotov, November 30, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 328, p. 15. 27. Note from Stalin to Lenin, November 29, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 163, vol. 220, p. 11. 28. Decision of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), minutes no. 80а of the meeting of the Politburo, November 29, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 237, pp. 1–2. 29. Cryptogram from Molotov to Orjonikidze, December 1, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 328, p. 16. 30. Letter from Narimanov to Lenin, November 1921, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 62, p. 18. 31. Decision on the definition of internal borders between the Azerbaijan SSR and the Georgian SSR, November 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 61, p. 7. 32. Decision on the definition of internal borders between the Azerbaijan SSR and the Georgian SSR, November 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 61, p. 5. 33. Letter from members of the border committee Mukhtar Hajiyev, Zhgenti, and Dovlatov to the Caucasus Bureau, CC RCP (B), July 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 61, p. 13. 34. Decision on the definition of internal borders between the Azerbaijan SSR and the Georgian SSR, November 6, 1921, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 61, p. 4. 35. Sitare Mustafayeva, “Soviet Russia and Formation of Borders between States of the Caucasus (Based on a Case Study of Azerbaijan and Armenia),” p. 203. 36. Rezoliutsii i postanavleniia IV c”ezda AKP(b), 22. 37. Federal Council of the Transcaucasian Republics, March 16, 1922, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 216, p. 58. 38. Azerbaycan tarikhi, 162. 39. Cited in letter from Abilov to Narimanov and Lenin, February 3, 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 169. 40. Conversation of Ibrahim Abilov with Yusuf Kemal bey, January 26, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 68, p. 17. 41. Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde, 274–75. 42. Ibid., 277. 43. Narimanov, “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries,” June 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 176, p. 33. 44. Narimanov, Ucqarlarda inqilabımızın tarikhine dair, 105. 45. Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde, 274. 46. Narimanov, “On the History of Our Revolution on the Peripheries,” June 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 176, p. 33. 47. Minutes no. 64 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), October 3, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 163, vol. 193, p. 8. 48. Minutes no. 68 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), October 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 216, p. 6.



Notes to pages 344–350 443

49. Lenin’s notes in the margins of minutes no. 68 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), October 15, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 163, vol. 199, p. 22. 50. Minutes no. 69 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), October 19, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 217, pp. 1–2. 51. Instructions from the CC RCP (B) for Azerbaijani workers, October 17, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 163, vol. 200, pp. 3–4. 52. Minutes no. 81 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), December 1, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 238, p. 2. 53. Minutes no. 92 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), January 26, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 257, p. 1. 54. Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde, 273. 55. Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to CC, August 1923, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 2, vol. 2, pp. 50–51. 56. Minutes of the meeting of the committee investigating the report and statement by ­Narimanov, June 13, 1923, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 2, vol. 176, pp. 62–63. 57. Letter from Stalin to Kirov, May 22, 1922, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 746, p. 1. 58. Minutes no. 94 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), February 9, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 163, vol. 244, p. 26. 59. Conversation of Abilov with Yusuf Kemal bey, January 26, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 68, p. 20. 60. Minutes no. 2 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), April 10, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 288, p. 6. 61. Kommunist, February 13, 1922. 62. Musayev, Azerbaycanın kharici siyaseti: İkinci hisse, 24. 63. Statement of Bekir Sami bey, May 3, 1921, APDPARA, f. 7, r. 1, vol. 59, p. 53. 64. Minutes no. 82 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), November 5, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 129, p. 2. 65. Minutes no. 87 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), November 16, 1921, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 134, p. 1. 66. Minutes no. 96 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), February 13, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 265, pp. 1–2. 67. Minutes no. 94 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), February 9, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 163, vol. 248, p. 4. 68. Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, 15. 69. Letter from Litvinov to the Politburo, March 1, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 163, vol. 261, p. 20. 70. RSFSR government contract with the governments of the Soviet republics of the South Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia), 1922, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 240. 71. Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b): Povestka dnia zasedanii, 100. 72. Program of activities given by the Azerbaijani government to Rabinovich, 1922, ­APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 25. 73. Letter from Abilov to Narimanov, March 3, 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 177. 74. Bakinskii Rabochii, March 22, 1922. 75. Letter from Karakhan to Tskhakaia, January 2, 1922, RSASPH, f. 157, r. 1/с, vol. 12, p. 3. 76. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 5, 58. 77. Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b): Povestka dnia zasedanii, 144–45. 78. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 5, 47. 79. Minutes no, 90 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), January 17, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 253, pp. 1–2.

444

Notes to pages 350–360

80. Telegram from Kalinin and Chicherin to Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Bukhara, Khiva, and the Far Eastern republics, January 17, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 46, p. 40. 81. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 5, 67–68. 82. Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b): Povestka dnia zasedanii, 152. 83. Mandate presented to Narimanov from the CEC, CPC, and PCFA of Azerbaijan, ­February 11, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, v.95, p. 159. 84. Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b): Povestka dnia zasedanii, 161. 85. Minutes no. 116 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), March 23, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 285, pp. 1–2. 86. Bakinskii Rabochii, March 22, 1922. 87. Letter from Narimanov to Stalin, March 27, 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 71, pp. 43–44, 46 (following Narimanov quotations also from this source). 88. Narimanov, “Our Current Attitude toward the Muslim East,” 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 31, p. 73. 89. Bakinskii Rabochii, June 2, 1922. 90. Trotskii’s proposal, April 9, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 288, pp. 13–14. 91. In the book by Social Revolutionary Vadim Chaikin, the execution of the twenty-­ six Baku commissars was not associated with the Social Revolutionaries controlling Turkestan but with the English. For this reason the Bolsheviks published the book in 1922 and used it in anti-­English propaganda. For more detailed information, see Vadim Chaikin, K istorii rossiiskoi revoliutsii: Kazn’ 26 Bakinskikh komissarov. 92. Minutes no. 2 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), April 10, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 288, p. 6. 93. Open letter from Narimanov to Topchibashov, Khatisov, and Tsereteli, 1922, ­APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 31, p. 81. 94. Ibid., 82. 95. Narimanov, “What Is Genoa?,” 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 31, pp. 29, 33. 96. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 5, 201. 97. Narimanov, “What Is Genoa?,” 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 31, p. 34. 98. Report from Narimanov at a meeting of the Baku City Council, June 1, 1922, ­APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 27, p. 59. 99. Corrierre della Sera, April 11, 1922. 100. Bakinskii Rabochii, June 2, 1922, 101. Narimanov, “What Is Genoa?,” 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 31, p. 36. 102. Ibid., 83. 103. Aleksandr Chubar’ian, XX vek: Vzgliad istorika, 267. 104. Rossiiskoe zarubezh’e vo Frantsii 1919–2000, 323. 105. Le Figaro, May 16, 1922. 106. Letter from Abilov to Narimanov, March 1, 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 178. 107. Mamoulia, Les combats independantistes des Caucasiens entre URSS et puissances ­cccidentales, 63–64. 108. Le Figaro, May 6, 1922. 109. Guardian Commercial, April 13, 1922. 110. Chapai Sultanov, Politicheskie i ékonomicheskie étiudy po Iuzhnomu Kavkazu, 93. 111. Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin, June 6, 1921, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 18, vol. 82, p. 7. 112. Informazioni, April 11, 1922. 113. Izvestiia, May 9, 1922. 114. Kommunist, July 8, 1989.

1 15. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123.

1 24. 125. 126. 1 27. 128. 129. 130. 131. 1 32. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 1 43. 144. 145. 146. 1 47. 148. 149. 1 50. 151. 152.

Notes to pages 360–368 445 Corriere d’Italia, April 12, 1922. Pravda Zakavkaz’ia, May 16, 1922. Musayev, Azerbaycanın kharici siyaseti: İkinci hisse, 43. Times, May 7, 1922. Qasımov, Kharici dövletler ve Azerbaycan, 272. The ambassador in Italy (Child) to the secretary of state, May 2, 1922, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2, 772. Memorandum by the economic adviser of the Department of State (Millspaugh), May 3, 1922, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2, 772. The ambassador in Italy (Child) to the secretary of state, May 3, 1922, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2, 774. The chairman of the Board of Directors of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Bedford) to the secretary of state, May 5, 1922, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2, 786. Karl Gofman, Neftianaia politika i anglo-­saksonskii imperializm, 135–36. Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, 16. The ambassador in Italy (Child) to the secretary of state, May 4, 1922, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2, 775. Kommunist, July 8, 1989. Sultanov, Politicheskie i ékonomicheskie étiudy po Iuzhnomu Kavkazu, 91. Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, 15. Le Figaro, May 19, 1922. “Les aspirations de l’Azerbaidjan: Notre entrevue avec Toptchibacheff,” May 18–19, 1922, Archives d’Ali Mardan-­bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 1, p. 292. Bakinskii Rabochii, June 2, 1922. Narimanov, “What Is Genoa?,” 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 31, pp. 37–38. Materialy Genuézkoi konferentsii, 167. Istoriia diplomatii, 177. Narimanov, “What Is Genoa?,” 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 31, pp. 39, 86. Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, 21–22. George Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, 218. Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde, 276. Richard Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe, 38. Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, 22. Minutes no. 3 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), April 20, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 289, p. 1. Sultanov, Politicheskie i ékonomicheskie étiudy po Iuzhnomu Kavkazu, 83. Materialy Genuézskoi konferentsii, 168. Chubar’ian, XX vek: Vzgliad istorika, 272. Mamoulia, Les combats independantistes des Caucasiens entre URSS et puissances ­occidentales, 66–67. Pravda Zakavkaz’ia, May 16, 1922. Cited in Narimanov, “What Is Genoa?,” 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 31, p. 49. The ambassador in Italy (Child) to the secretary of state, May 2, 1922, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2, 772. Narimanov, “What Is Genoa?,” 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 31, p. 52. The ambassador in Italy (Child) to the secretary of state, May 6, 1922, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2, 788. The Delegation of Soviet Russia at the Genoa Conference to the Delegations of Italy,

446

1 53. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 1 59. 160. 161. 1 62. 163. 164. 165. 166. 1 67. 168. 169.

1 70. 171. 1 72. 173. 1 74. 175. 176. 177. 1 78. 179. 1 80. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 1 87. 188.

Notes to pages 368–378 France, Great Britain, Japan, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, and Sweden, May 11, 1922, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2, 803. Materialy Genuézskoi konferentsii, 445. Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, 27–28. Le Figaro, May 16, 1922. Manuscript by Narimanov, March 24, 1924, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 31, p. 19. Pravda Zakavkaz’ia, May 16, 1922. The ambassador in Italy (Child) to the secretary of state, May 7, 1922, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2, 789–90. Trud, May 17, 1922. Izvestiia, May 14, 1922. Minutes no. 12 of the meeting of the Presidium, Regional Committee of South ­Caucasus–CC RCP (B), May 13, 1922, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 24, vol. 281, p. 3. Pravda Zakavkaz’ia, May 16, 1922. Kommunist, July 8, 1989. Bakinskii Rabochii, June 2, 1922. Report by Narimanov at a meeting of the Baku City Council, June 1, 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 27, pp. 61–62. Closing speech by Narimanov at a meeting of the Baku City Council, June 1, 1922, ­APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 27, p. 64. Bakinskii Rabochii, June 7, 1922. Baberovskii, Vrag est’ vezde, 276. Marx cited in Bakinskii Rabochii, June 15, 1922; Narimanov, Answer from several comrades, June 1922, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 74, vol. 128, pp. 18–21 (following Narimanov quotations also from this source). Altstadt, The Politics of Culture in Soviet Azerbaijan, xiii. Minutes no. 26 of the meeting of Presidium, CC CPA (B), June 19, 1922, APDPARA, f. 1, r.74, vol. 128, p. 13. Pravda Gruzii, July 6, 1922. Minutes no. 21 of the meeting of the Presidium of the Transcaucasus Regional Committee, CC RCP (B), July 24, 1922, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 24, vol. 281, p. 11. Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, 34. Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b): Povestka dnia zasedanii, 179. Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, 35. Raymond Poincaré, “About the Eastern Question,” June 1, 1922, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 3. Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, 33–34. Minutes no. 12 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B), June 15, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 298, p. 2. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 5, 474–78. Cited in Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, 35–36. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 5, 481–83. Gaagskaia konferentsiia iiun’–iiul’ 1922 g.: Polnyi stenograficheskii otchet, 73. Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, p. 38. Gaagskaia konferentsiia iiun’–iiul’ 1922 g.: Polnyi stenograficheskii otchet, 200. Minutes no, 18 of the meeting of the Politburo. CC RCP (B), July 20, 1922, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 304, p. 1. Mehdiyev, Beynelmilel siyasetde petrol, 49–50. Minutes no. 16 of the meeting of the Presidium of the CC CP of Azerbaijan (B), April 18, 1922, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 74, vol. 127, p. 114.



Notes to pages 378–383 447

1 89. Diplomatiya Alemi 23 (2009): 74. 190. Report on the activities of the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, November 9, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 96, p. 97. 191. Decree of the Presidium of the Union Council of the South Caucasus on united external politics, August 21, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 40, pp. 41–42. 192. The decision on Shirvani (Mustafabeyov), August 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 38, p. 134. 193. From the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs to the Department of Foreign Relations of the Soviet Union of the South Caucasus, August 26, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 40, p. 39. 194. Report on the activities of the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, November 9, 1922, SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 96, p. 98. 195. For additional information about the closure of foreign diplomatic representatives in the Azerbaijan SSR and Azerbaijani diplomatic representatives abroad, see Diplomatiya Alemi 23 (2009): 66–74. 196. Minutes no. 25 of the meeting of the Presidium of the Transcaucasus Regional Committee RCP (B), September 25, 1922, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 24, vol. 28, p. 21. 197. Minutes no. 34 of the meeting of the Presidium of the Transcaucasus Regional Committee RCP (B), September 25, 1922, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 24, vol. 28, p. 21. 198. Information about Ibrahim Abilov, published in the Peyami Sabah newspaper, May 24, 1922, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 6. 199. Aslan, Türkiye-­Azerbaycan İlişkileri, 266–67. 200. Minutes no. 26 of the meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPA (B), June 19, 1922, ­APDPARA, f. 1, r. 74, vol. 128, p. 12. 201. Letter from Abilov to Narimanov, February 3, 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, pp. 169–71. 202. Biographical information on Asker Askerov, October 4, 1922, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 746, p. 6. 203. Biographical information on Ibrahim Abilov, October 4, 1922, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 746, p. 6. 204. Top secret letter from Iagoda and Peters to Karakhan, October 5, 1922, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 746, p. 6. 205. Letter from Karakhan to Stalin, October 7, 1922, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 746, p. 5. 206. Stalin’s answer to the letter from Karakhan and Peters, October 11, 1922, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 746, p. 4. 207. Letter from Nazaretian to Kirov, October 12, 1922, RSASPH, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 746, p. 3. 208. Letter from Abilov to Narimanov, February 3, 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, pp. 164–72; letter from Abilov to Narimanov, March 1, 1922, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, pp. 173–79. 209. Letter from Pankratov to Narimanov, October 28, 1922, APDPARA, f. 1, r. 85, vol. 214, p. 349. 210. Credentials given to Abilov from the CPC and PCFA, 1922, APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 94. 211. Credentials given to Abilov from the PCFA of Georgia, November 10, 1922, ­APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 92. 212. Credentials given to Abilov from the PCFA of Armenia, November 10, 1922, ­APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 93. 213. Minutes no. 42 of the meeting of the Presidium of the South Caucasus Regional Committee, RCP (B), November 10, 1922, RSASPH, f. 85, r. 24, vol. 281, p. 27. 214. Aralov, “About Ibrahim Abilov,” APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 130. 215. Minutes of the meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPA (B), September 11, 1922, ­APDPARA, f. 1, r. 74, vol. 128, p. 175.

448

Notes to pages 383–387

216. Minutes of the meeting of the CC CP of Georgia, September 15, 1922, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, p. 256. 217. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. 45, 211–13. 218. Telegram from Stalin to the Caucasus Regional Committee of the RCP (B), October 6, 1922, RSASPH, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 1, pp. 258–59. 219. Pervyi zakavkazskii s”ezd, 129. 220. Letter from Narimanov to the Politburo, CC RCP (B), 1923, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 71, pp. 20–21. 221. Letter from Narimanov to Stalin, 1923, APDPARA, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 71, pp. 18–19. 222. Minutes no. 2 of the joint meeting of the Control Committee of the CC CPA and BC CPA and Control Committee of the CC RCP (B), July 10, 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 179, p. 35. 223. Minutes of the meeting of commission to review the report and written request of ­Narimanov, 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 179, pp. 1–101; vol. 178, pp. 1–153. 224. Minutes of the meeting of commission to review the report and written request of ­Narimanov, 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 176, pp. 76–77, 81. 225. Letter from Narimanov to Iacobson, June 16, 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 176, p. 129. 226. Resolution of the meeting of activists of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, July 12, 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 178, p. 143. 227. Resume of the Central Control Commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (B) on Narimanov, July 28, 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 178, pp. 142–43; proto­col of the meeting of the Central Control Commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (B), July 28, 1923, RSASPH, f. 5, r. 2, vol. 154, p. 43; secret telegram from ­Iaroslavskii and Shkiriatov to Petrovskii, July 28, 1923, RSASPH, f. 588, r. 2, vol. 177, p. 39. 228. Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (B) on the statements of Narimanov and Iaroslavskii, November 15, 1923, RSASPH, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 394, p. 22. 229. Izvestiia, March 24, 1925. 230. Pravda, March 24, 1925.

Abbreviations

AEC AMIAG AMNS APDPARA

All-­Russian Extraordinary Commission Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Tbilisi, Georgia Archive of the Ministry of National Security of the Azerbaijan Republic Archive of Political Documents of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee ARC AREC All-­Russian Extraordinary Commission Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic Armenian SSR ASALA Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia ASSR Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic All-­Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) AUCP(B) Azrevkom Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee Baku Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (Bolshevik) BC CPA (B) CB CC RCP (B) Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee CC Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan CC CPA CC RCP (B) Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union CC CPSU CDP Constitutional Democratic Party Central Executive Committee CEC Centre d’Études des Mondes Russe, Caucasien et Centre-­Européen CERCEC CP Communist Party Communist Party of Azerbaijan. CPA CPC Council of People’s Commissars CPG Communist Party of Georgia Communist Party of the Soviet Union CPSU CSADSPORA Central State Archive for Documents of Social-­Political Organizations of the Republic of Armenia DRA Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic of Georgia DRG DVP Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR Extraordinary Commission EC EHESS École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales Foreign Commissariat of the Russian Federation FCRF FPARF Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation Foreign Relations of the United States FRUS Glavkom Commander in Chief Grand National Assembly of Turkey GNAT State Commission for Electrification of Russia GOÉLRO

449

450

GSHA GSSR HSE ICP MAEF

Abbreviations

Georgian State History Archive Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic Higher Soviet of Economy Iranian Communist Party Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France, Archives Diplomatiques, Paris MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Military Revolutionary Council MRC Nakhchivan ASSR Nakhchivan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland NARA Narkom People’s Commissar People’s Commissar of Nationalities Narkomnats NKVD Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR and USSR National Security Archive, George Washington University, WashingNSA ton, D.C. Orgburo Organizational Bureau People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs PCFA Politburo Political Bureau Public Records Office, London PRO RCP (B) Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Record Group RG RNAMH Russian State Archive of Modern History Russian State Archive of Social-­Political History RSASPH RSFSR Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Russian State Military Historical Archive RSMHA RTA (ROSTA) Russian Telegraph Agency Revolutionary War Council RWC State Archive of the Azerbaijan Republic SAAR SARF State Archive of the Russian Federation Sovnarkom (SPC) Council of People’s Commissars Sovprof Council of Trade unions SPD State Political Department Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal SRT TCP Turkish Communist Party Turkish National Center TNC TPCP Turkish Popular Communist Party Transcaucasus Soviet Federative Socialist Republic TSFSR TsK RCP (B) Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) United Kingdom UK USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics All-­Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) VKP (B)

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Index

Page numbers followed by f and t indicate figures and tables repectively. Abilov, Ibrahim: and CC CPA, 329; and CC RCP, 330, 331; election of, 280–82; and GNAT, 382; and Huseinov, 282–83, 293, 315, 317; and Kars treaty, 321; and Kemal bey, 315–17, 319–22; and Narimanov, 281, 328–29, 380; and Orjonikidze, 325; and PCFA, 282; purges issue, 328, 329; rumors about, 379–82 Abukov, Batyrbek, 85–86, 88 Aghayev (Aghaoglu), Ahmed bey, 17, 20–21, 28 Aghayev, Hasan bey, 34, 42 Agharonian, Avetis, 117, 190, 249–50, 291 Akhundov, Mirza Fatali, 16 Akhundov, Ruhulla, 141–42, 281, 328, 337, 344–45, 385 Akstafa agreement, 59, 60 Alberts meeting, 364, 365 Alexandropol agreement, 204–19, 265 Ali and Nino (novel), 45 Ali Fuat: and Chicherin, 231, 242, 261, 264; and Kars conference, 306; and Kemal bey, 288; and PCFA, 286; and Russian-Turkish relations, 287; and Stalin, 287 Alikhanov, Mahammadgulu, 87–88 All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 7, 119, 147, 384 Alphand, Charles, 374 Altstadt, Audrey, 12, 17, 23, 68, 373 Amuoghlu, Heydar khan, 97, 100, 104–6, 114 Anatolia, 161, 172, 285 Andreev, Andrei, 115, 154, 317 Ankara government: and Azerbaijani Embassy, 315–331; delegation sent by, 167–68; and Kars conference, 306; and Russian-Turkish talks, 242. See also Turkey anti-Soviet movement, 1, 46, 231, 238, 265 anti-Soviet propaganda, 77, 354, 360 April Coup of 1920, 4, 54, 62–64, 71–72, 170 Armenia: anti-Soviet revolt in, 231, 238, 265; armistice terms, 196, 198; border issues, 254–55; CPC of, 139; and Dro government, 203; and eastern policy, 273; and Georgia, 62; giving Karabagh to, 5; and Gumru, 196; independence declaration of, 31–32; and Kars region, 191, 214; and Legrand, 188; and

Mdivani, 200; and Moscow conference, 249–50; and ­Nakhchivan issue, 167, 171, 173, 190, 192, 275–76, 294–95; peace treaty with, 177–78, 213–14; revolt against Azerbaijani government, 36; and Russian-Turkish relations, 166, 171; ­Soviet power in, 210–11; ­Soviet troops in, 196–97; and Treaty of Moscow, 266; and Turkish delegation, 168, 233, 235; and Turkish policy, 179–180; ultimatum by, 173–74; war with Turkey, 5, 181– 204, 271; and Zangezur issue, 190, 192, 200, 201. See also Soviet Armenia Armenian Dashnaks: about, 4, 5, 12, 14; and Anatolia residents, 172; and Chicherin, 289–290; and coalition government, 202; crimes by, 174; “Declaration of Cooperation” signed by, 290; demands of, 190–91; and Karabekir pasha, 219, 225; and Legrand, 191; plundering by, 62; and Shahtakhtinskii, 225–26; and slaughter of Muslims, 30–31, 53, 118, 168; talks with, 290 Armenian delegation: about, 117, 122; and Chicherin, 150–51, 275, 298–99; at Kars conference, 298; and Moscow conference, 231, 250, 265, 273–75; protest from, 275 Armenian-Muslim war, 19, 22, 24 Armenian-Russian treaty, 174 Asia Minor, 96, 161–63, 176–77, 185, 353 Atabekov, Mikhail, 220, 221, 294 Avalashvili (Avalov), Zurab, 251 Avanesov, Varlam, 223, 226 Azerbaijan: about, 1, 16–17; anti-Soviet uprisings in, 38–54; cabinet formation in, 34; delegates selection in, 34–35; foreign policy of, 4, 8, 41; historical-fiction chronicle of, 45– 46; independence issues, 28–37, 67–69, 71, 160, 252, 330; and land disputes, 4, 54, 58, 67, 126, 132; map of, 10f–11f, 18f; methods of Sovietizing, 43; National Council of, 31, 32, 34; ­national life of, 18–19; occupation regime in, 1–2; political functions transfer of, 378–387; recognition of, 33–34; Red Army in, 35, 37; and Russian revolution, 17–28;

461

462

Index

and Russia’s policy, 54–56; Russia’s stance toward, 36; seizure of, 48–49; taking control over, 51–52; and treaty with Turkey, 32 Azerbaijan Communist Party, 51, 129, 278, 385, 386 Azerbaijani delegation: about, 127; humiliation of, 129; at Kars conference, 301; and ­Nakhchivan issue, 307–8; and Narimanov, 260–61; new members for, 143 Azerbaijani Embassy, 315, 320, 328, 380 Azerbaijani troops, 43, 91, 109, 172 Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee (ARC), 5, 6, 71–72, 82–83, 140–41, 174–75, 211

plundering by, 49; and Sheikh Khiyabani, 101; and slaughter of Muslims, 30–31; terrorist activities by, 47–48. See also Red Army border issues: between Azerbaijan and ­Georgia, 57–58; and CC CPA, 144; ­internal, 340–41; between Nakhchivan and ­Armenia, 254–55; Turkey, 293–315 British military, 33, 34, 72 British officers. See foreign diplomats Bukharin, Nikolai, 85, 235 Bulygin, Aleksandr, 19–20 Bunyadzade, Dadash, 87-88, 118, 154, 156, 222, 294

Baberowski, Jörg, 13–14, 26, 136, 296, 344, 372 Baku: Armenian-Muslim war in, 22; arrest of diplomats in, 71–77; August events, 21; and “Baku comrades,” 120; as a center of conflicting interests, 32–33; and Central Caspian ­Dictatorship, 33; closing Turkish routes to, 204–19; congress of nations in, 95–97; disagreement between Moscow and, 100– 111; Duma elections in, 23; endangerment of, 198, 199; Enver pasha in, 185–86; and Gilan events discussion, 104–5; growth in population of, 17; “Iranian Bureau” in, 88; Muslim organizations meeting in, 28–29; Narimanov’s arrival in, 51–52; occupation of, 36; ­Stalin’s visit to, 68–71; Turkish delegation in, 222, 266–67; Turkish mission in, 317–18; and Zangezur, 198. See also Azerbaijan Baku commissars, execution of, 77, 354, 444n91 Baku oil: about, 3, 8; attitude toward, 360; concession for, 360–62; foreign capital in, 366; getting access to, 36; and Hague conference, 369, 374–77; importance of, 73; struggle for, 353–377; and Turkish delegation, 305 Barthou, Louis, 356–58, 364, 366, 374–75 Batum port issue, 308, 310 Batum question, 240, 241, 247, 248, 252, 268 Bedford, Alfred, 361 Bekir Sami bey, Kunduh, 168–69, 187, 226, 249, 251 Bekzadian, Alexander, 150–51, 256, 273–74 Berlin talks, 164 Berthelot, Filippe, 249–50 Black Sea coastline, 261, 285, 286, 317 Bodrero, Alexander, 96, 184–85, Bolsheviks/Bolshevism: about, 1–6, 14; aggression by, 42; and Dro government, 203; and Gilan adventure, 79–90; and Iranian experiment collapse, 111–16; and mediation services, 208; and Northern Azerbaijan, 102;

Cannes meeting, 349, 357 Caucasian Muslims, 20, 22, 29, 30 Caucasus Bureau: about, 5; and Genoa conference, 349–50; and Hague conference, 375; ICP’s letter to, 100; and Iranian revolution, 93–95; and Karabagh question, 150, 154–56; and Lenin, 383; and Orjonikidze, 335; plenum of, 142–43, 149–150, 152; and South ­Caucasus, 337, 339; and Sovietization of Georgia, 180; and Zangezur question, 137– 39, 141. See also Kars conference Caucasus republics. See South Caucasus ­republics CC ICP. See Iranian Communist Party CC of the Communist Party of Armenia, 138, 139, 142, 294, 295 CEC of the South Caucasus, 314, 342 Cebesoy, Ali Fuat, 178, 219, 222, 227–28, 231, 236, 241–42, 259, 261, 264–65, 285–89, 292, 295, 297, 299, 305–6, 326 Central Caspian Dictatorship, 33 Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (CC CPA): and Abilov, 329; and border issues, 144; and Gilan adventure, 88; Huseinov as a chair of, 40–41; joint session with CC RCP, 191–92; and Karabagh case, 154–55; and Nakhchivan issue, 170, 294; and Narimanov’s articles, 373, 374; and Stalin, 68–70; and Zangezur question, 141 Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (CC RCP): and Abilov, 330, 331; about, 3, 5; and alliance between Azerbaijan and Russia, 66–68; and Caucasus affairs, 106–7; and Chicherin, 62, 63; and Iranian revolution, 86, 92–94; and Karabagh question, 149; and PCFA, 216; and Stalin, 192 Chicherin, Georgii: about, 6; anti-Turkish stance of, 229; and Armenian Dashnaks, 289–290; and Armenian delegation, 150–51, 275, 298–99; and “Baku comrades,” 120–21; and Bekzadian, 256; and Caucasus



Index 463

­ olsheviks, 47; and Caucasus problems, 195; B and CC CPA, 62, 63; Chorokh mines issue, 304–5; and eastern policy, 131; and Eliava, 174, 218–19; and Entente’s policy, 194–95; and Fuat, 231, 242, 261, 264; and Ganetskii, 302–4; and Genoa conference, 349–350, 356; and GNAT, 253–54; and Huseinov, 266–67, 271; and Iranian revolution, 6, 92– 93; and Karakhan, 124; and Kars conference, 306; and Kemal bey, 233–34, 320; and Kemalists, 176, 218; and Kemal pasha, 167; and Kirov, 118; and Legrand, 125, 175–76, 182–83, 189, 196–97, 269–270; and Lenin, 36, 62, 127–28, 161–63, 176–77, 258, 326; and Mdivani, 229; and Mikhailov, 328; and Moscow conference, 222–24, 236–37, 252; and Nakhchivan issue, 166–67, 314; and Narimanov, 74, 75, 98, 115, 133, 390; and Ohanjanian, 185; and oil-related confrontations, 362–63; and Orjonikidze, 123, 256, 261; and peace talks, 205–7; pro-Armenian position of, 178–180; and Rotshtein, 107, 111–15; ­Russian ambassador issues, 242–43; and Russian-­Armenian treaty, 128–30; and Russian-­Turkish relations, 163, 241–42; and Soviet delegation, 366; and Stalin, 39, 256– 57, 286–87, 297; and Treaty of Moscow, 276; and Turkish-Armenian issue, 187, 223–24; and Turkish delegation, 231–32 Chakmak, Fevzi, 265, 319 Chermoyev, Abdul-Mejid, 251, 291 Chevalier, Abel, 42 Child, Richard, 365, 367 Chorokh mines issue, 304–5 Communist Party of Azerbaijan, 35, 40, 89, 329, 381 confiscated goods: and Hague conference, 376; return of, 91, 108–9, 306, 308, 375; and Soviet delegation, 368 Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), 22, 23, 24 Cossack detachment, 97, 102 Council of People’s Commissars (CPC), 67, 76, 139, 215, 224, 227, 277 counterrevolutionaries and counterrevolution, 43, 46, 49, 176–77, 228 Curzon, Lord George, 35, 73, 75–76, 94, 98, 181, 188, 210, 249–51 Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan (DRA), 43, 47, 52, 54, 60, 388 de Martel, Damien, 42, 73 Deterding, Henry, 361–62 Dilijan, 204, 209–13, 265 disarmament issue, 356–57, 370

Dro (Drastamat Kanaian) government, 203, 212, 215 Duma elections, 23, 24, 25, 26 eastern policy: about, 6, 15, 78–79; and Armenia, 273; and Chicherin, 131; displeasure with, 273, 351; and Gilan adventure, 79–90; and Iran, 78–116; and Iranian policy, 90– 100; and Iranian revolution, 100–116; and Karakhan, 39–40; Narimanov’s role in, 39, 131; and ­Orjonikidze, 279; and Soviet Russia, 78–116 Efendiyev, Soltan Mejid, 154, 334, 338 Ehsanullah khan government, 90, 99, 108, 109, 111 elections, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30 Eliava, Shalva: about, 68; and Caucasus republics federation, 334; and Chicherin, 174, 218–19; and Iranian revolution, 92, 94–95, 98–99; and Karakhan, 108; and Lenin, 182 England. See Great Britain Entente countries, 35, 264, 367, 371 Enverists, 323, 326, 327 Enver pasha: about, 159; arrival in Baku, 185– 86; joint actions of Soviet Russia and, 286; and Kemal pasha, 316, 327; Moscow trip, 163–64; and Muslim movement, 164; ­rumors about, 316; secret appearance of, 283–85; and Turanism concept, 164 Enzeli Operation, 79, 81–83, 87, 94 Erivan: about, 23–27; as Armenian territory, 212; diplomatic mission in, 137; isolation from, 121, 122; Legrand in, 190, 193; Mdivani in, 197, 200; Soviet power in, 212; takeover of, 210 Esendal, Memduh Shevket, 186–87, 208, 261, 271 European economy, 347–49, 356, 367 European imperialism, 162, 235 Extraordinary Commission (EC), 41, 52 Facta, Luigi, 356–57 federalization concept, 332, 335–36, 339 Federation of Transcaucasus Republics, 343, 383 foreign diplomats: arrest of, 71–75; release of, 75–77 foreign missions, 7, 8, 330, 331 foreign policy, 4, 8, 41, 277, 280, 388–393 foreign trade, 67, 271, 333, 337, 348 France, 323, 324 French delegation, 356, 357, 358, 364, 366 Fraser, Bruce, 72 friendship and brotherhood treaty, 232, 234, 259, 261, 276

464

Index

Ganetskii, Iakov, 295, 302–5, 308, 311 Ganja: about, 1, 2; Duma elections in, 23; uprising in, 43, 47–48, 52, 77; violent events ­related to, 43–45 Garayev, Aliheydar, 69, 143–44, 153–56, 334, 344 Gasymov, Mir Bashir, 87, 156 Gauk, Konstantin, 89 Gazakh uyezd, 340–41 Gegechkori, Evgenii, 30, 55–56, 58, 358, 366, 370 Genoa conference: and anti-Soviet propaganda, 354, 360; and Caucasus Federation, 345–53; and Chicherin, 349–50, 356; closing of, 368–69; disarmament issue, 356–57, 370; failure of, 369, 370; finalizing delegates for, 350; and Legrand, 350–51; and Narimanov, 350–51, 368–372; and oilfields, 346, 347; oil question as an important issue at, 359; opening of, 356, 358; preparation for, 349; result of, 371, 372; and Soviet delegation, 354, 357– 58; and Soviet Russia, 348–49. See also Baku oil Georgia: and Akstafa agreement, 60; and Armenia, 62; Batum port issue, 308, 310; border ­issues, 57–58, 310; and Caucasus Bureau, 180; disputed regions issue, 216; and federali­zation, 335–37, 339; and Party CC plenum, 152; and PCFA, 215–16; plenary meeting of, 367–68; and Soviet Russia, 54– 57; and Stokes, 187–88; and Treaty of Moscow, 282; treaty with Azerbaijan, 59–60; Turkey’s stance concerning, 216–17; and Turkish delegation, 187; Zakatala district transfer to, 46–47, 65 Georgian Mensheviks, 4, 30, 57, 131, 370 Gikalo, Nikolai, 107, 109 Gilan adventure/events: attitude to, 87; of the Bolsheviks, 79–90; and CC CPA, 88; discussion of, 95, 104; and Great Britain, 92; and Mdivani, 88; and Red Army, 84, 85, 86; and Soviet government, 92 Gilan republic, liquidation of, 111–12 Gogoberidze, Levan, 50, 103 Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT): and Abilov, 382; about, 160; and Chicherin, 253–54; closed meeting of, 299; congratulatory telegram to, 272; and Karabekir pasha, 160; and Kemal pasha, 160; and Russian-­ Turkish relations, 165; and “Turkish ­Armenia” ­issue, 168–69; two groups of, 279 “Great Armenia” concept, 178, 207, 250, 251, 311 Great Britain: about, 2; and Armenia, 126; and Baku congress, 98; and Georgia, 47; and ­Gilan events, 92; and Iranian revolution, 94,

116; and Musavat government, 193; and Soviet-­Iranian treaty, 110–11; and Soviet Russia, 75 great powers, 33, 35, 38, 289, 362 Greame, Lloyd, 374, 376 Gulkhandanian, Abraham, 204 Gumru: agreement, 204–19; and Armenia, 196; Mdivani in, 202; peace talks in, 204–7, 213–14; Soviet delegates in, 201–2; Soviet power in, 209–11; and Turkey, 196, 198, 264, 265 Gumru Treaty, 243, 250–51, 263, 264, 299 Hague conference, 369, 374–77 Hajibeyli, Islam, 296, 301, 304, 382 Hajibeyli, Jeyhun bey, 251 Hajinskii, Mahammad Hasan, 28–29, 34 Heydar khan, Amuoghlu, 97, 100, 104–6, 114 Higher Soviet of the Economy (HSE), 338, 341, 342, 347 Hovannisian, Richard, 12–14 Hughes, Charles Evans, 356, 361 Huseinov, Mirza Davud: and Abilov, 282–83, 293, 315, 317; as a chair of CC CPA, 40–41; and Chicherin, 266–67, 271; and Hajibeyli, 304; and Kars conference, 291–93, 301; and Legrand, 272; and Narimanov, 63, 143–45; and Orjonikidze, 271–72; political career of, 40–41; and Shahtakhtinskii, 255; and Shevket bey, 296, 297; and Turkish ­delegation, 269 Huseinzade, Ali bey, 17, 20–21, 28 Iaroslavskii, Emel’ian, 115, 385–86 Ildyrym, Chingiz, 36, 156 imperialism: European, 162, 235; struggle against, 160, 169, 177, 246, 289 independence: related to Armenia, 31–32; ­related to Azerbaijan, 28–37, 67–69, 71, 160, 252, 330; Transcaucasus Republics, 355 internation scandal over arrest of diplomats, 71–77 Iran: confiscated properties return to, 91, 108– 9; defeat in, 99–100, 104–5; and eastern policy, 78–116; establishing relations with, 105; and Gilan adventure, 79–90; liberation movements in, 80, 84, 115; political tension in, 102–3; socialist revolution in, 78–80, 87, 89, 99; and Soviet Azerbaijan, 391–92; ­Soviet Russia’s policy in, 90–100; Soviet troops in, 105–6; treaty with, 107–12, 115 Iranian Communist Party (ICP), 87, 88, 93, 99, 352 Iranian Red Army, 85–87, 92–93, 97, 109, 112 Iranian revolution: about, 6, 7; and Baku con-



Index 465

gress, 95–97; and CC RCP, 86, 92–94; and Chicherin, 6, 92–93; defeat of, 115–16; disagreement about, 100–111; and eastern policy, 100–116; and Eliava, 92, 94–95, 98–99; and Great Britain, 94, 116; and Karakhan, 93–94; and “leftist” group, 104; and Narimanov, 80–81; and Orjonikidze, 93; and RSFSR, 86, 87. See also Gilan adventure/ events Islamic army, 32, 33, 198 Israfilov, Muslim, 85–86 Italian government, 325, 356 Jabaguyev, Vassan Girey, 251 Jafarov, Mahammad Yusif, 26 Javadzade, Mir Jafar (Seyid Jafar Pishevari), 87 Jemal pasha, Ahmet, 178, 316, 327 Kalinin, Mikhail, 234, 289, 350, 384, 387 Kamenev, Lev, 85, 92, 184, 234–45, 289 Kaminskii, Grigorii, 137, 141–42, 210, 231 Kammerer, Charles, 249–50 Kapancı, Hamid bey, 204 Karabagh: about, 5; Armenian activity in, 118; ceding of, 137; committee for, 156; end of the struggle over, 157; Mountainous, 138– 40, 143–44, 146–57; and Musavat government, 119, 121, 125; offensive in, 62; and Orjonikidze, 151; uprising in, 46; and Zangezur, 117–27, 132–33, 136, 140, 146–57 Karabekir, Kazım: about, 159; and Armenian question, 219, 225; Chorokh mines issue, 304–5; congratulatory message by, 213; and GNAT, 160; and Kars conference, 301–4; and Kut, 172–73, 175; and Legrand, 202; and Mdivani, 202; and Moscow conference, 221, 224, 230; and Nakhchivan issue, 171, 174; and peace talks, 206; and Shahtakhtinskii, 217; and Shevket bey, 296; and South Caucasus, 207; and Suphi, 171–72; and Treaty of ­Alexandropol, 219; Turkeys citizenship issue, 306–7; and Turkish-­ Armenian war, 182–83, 197–98, 207 Karakhan, Levon: and Chicherin, 124; and eastern policy, 39–40; and Eliava, 108; and Iranian revolution, 93–94; and Sovietization of Armenia, 124, 127; and Sovietization of Iran, 84; and Turkey and Afghanistan ­issues, 166 Karakozov, Armenak, 118, 140–41, 156 Kargareteli, Vasilii (Shapur), 85, 107 Kars: Armenian crimes in, 27; liberation of, 190–​91; and Russian-Turkish talks, 244; transfer of, 214; treaty on, 7, 293–15, 320–24, 326, 330

Kars conference: and Ali Fuat, 306; and Ankara government, 306; Armenian delegation at, 298; Azerbaijani delegation at, 301; Chicherin’s displeasure with, 306; Georgia delegation at, 298; and Huseinov, 291–93, 301; invitation for, 291; and Karabekir ­pasha, 301–4; and Kemal bey, 291–93; and Nakhchivan issue, 307–8; opening of, 295, 301; plenum’s decision for, 297–98; preparation for, 278–93, 296; and Treaty of Moscow, 291; Turkish delegation at, 299 Kasian, Sarkis, 210, 213, 215, 219 Kemal, Mustafa: about, 159; and Anatolian movement, 161; Azerbaijani people welcomed by, 318–19; and Chicherin, 167; and diplomatic mission, 186; and Enver pasha, 316, 327; flag-raising ceremony by, 319–20; and GNAT, 160; greatest success of, 288; mistrust of, 318; and Moscow conference, 223; and Muslim congress, 297; report about, 279–80; and Russian-Turkish relations, 165–66; and TPCP, 285; and Treaty of Sèvres, 168; and Turkish-­Armenian war, 184–85, 188–89 Kemal bey, Yusuf (Tengirşenk): 205; and ­Abilov, 315–17, 319–22; and Ali Fuat, 288; and Baku congress, 240; and Chicherin, 233–34, 320; Chorokh mines issue, 304–5; instructions from, 300–301; and Kars conference, 291–93; love for Azerbaijani people, 299–300; as a member of delegation, 222; and Russian-Turkish relations, 287–88; and Shahtakhtinskii, 226–27; and South Caucasus delegation, 346; and Treaty of Alexandropol, 241; and Turkish delegation, 232–33, 247, 255–56 Kemalists: and Chicherin, 176, 218; and counter­revolution movement, 176–77; and Entente government, 183–84; exchanging British diplomats for, 73–74; and France, 323; Soviet Russia’s attitude toward, 193–94; and Turkish-Armenian war, 183, 192 Khalil pasha. See Kut, Khalil pasha Khanbudagov, Mahmud, 156 Khasmammadov, Khalil bey, 24–55, 32 Khatisian (Khatisov), Alexander, 204, 226, 354 Khiyabani, Sheikh Mahammad, 79, 100–103, 116, 392 Khoiskii, Fatali khan, 24, 30–32, 34, 43, 389 Kirov, Sergei: and Chicherin, 118; and ­Karakozov, 141; and Legrand, 125; and ­Lenin, 54; and Orjonikidze, 61, 62, 115, 147; and RCP CC, 114; and Stalin, 155–56 Korganian, Stepan, 204

466

Index

Korkmazov, Jelaleddin, 192–93, 196–97, 204, 236, 241, 247, 259 Krassin, Leonid, 109, 184, 325, 360 Krestinskii, Nikolai, 235, 241–42, 289, 295, 349, 374–75 Kuchek khan (Younes), Mirza, 83, 85–89, 106 Kurdistan, 140, 154, 165 Kurds, 245, 247, 253 Kut, Khalil pasha, 159, 161–63, 172–73, 175, 241, 283 land disputes, 4, 54, 58, 67, 126, 132 Legrand, Boris: and Armenia, 188; assignment of, 121; and Caucasus republics, 330–31; and Chicherin, 125, 175–76, 182–83, 189, 196–97, 269–270; and Dashnaks’ demands, 191; in Erivan, 190, 193; and Genoa conference, 350–51; and Huseinov, 272; instructions for, 189; and Karabekir pasha, 202; and Kirov, 125; and Lenin, 134; and Mdivani, 203–4; and Narimanov, 272; and Orjonikidze, 204; and peace talks, 209; and Russian-Armenian treaty, 126, 130; and Soviet mission, 194; and Turkish-Armenian war, 182, 183 Lenin, Vladimir: about, 2, 6, 7; and Baku occupation, 36; and Caucasus Bureau, 383; as a chair of Soviet delegation, 350; and Chicherin, 36, 62, 127–28, 161–63, 176–77, 258, 326; and Eliava, 182; and Kirov, 54; and Legrand, 134; and Narimanov, 40, 47–48, 50, 131–32, 339–40; and Shahtakhtinskii, 63–66, 103–4; and Stalin, 48, 70, 106, 179, 192–93, 200–201, 326 liberation movements: about, 7, 14; of the East, 83, 235, 305; in Iran, 80, 84, 115; in Turkey, 175 Litvinov, Maksim, 74, 243, 347–51 Lloyd George, David, 72–73, 349, 354–58, 361–69, 371 Lominadze, Vissarion, 50, 87–88, 100, 103–4, 127, 345 Long, Walter, 72 Lordkipanidze, Grigorii, 59, 141 Lorrain, Alsace, 356 Lukashin (Srapionian), Sarkis,139, 334, 341–42 Luke, Harry Charles, 74–75 Maharramov, Mahammad, 251, 358, 360 Makharadze, Filipp, 137–38, 147, 152–53, 333, 340, 342 Makintsian, Boghos, 139, 298, 311 Mdivani, Polikarp (Budu): and Armenia, 200; and Chicherin, 229; in Erivan, 197, 200; and

Gilan adventure, 88; in Gumru, 202; and “Karabagh track,” 153; and Karabekir pasha, 202; and Legrand, 203–4; mandate for, 197; and peace talks, 205–7, 209 Mdivani, Simon, 59, 371 Mehdiyev, Mir Yagub, 273, 347, 358, 361–62, 365, 368–69 Menshevist government, 54, 57 Miasnikov (Martuni), Alexandre, 137-38, 144– 47, 333-34, 336, 341–42, 381, 384 Mikhailov, Boris, 327, 328 Mikoian, Anastas, 50–51, 71–72, 75–76, 88–89, 91, 96, 100, 103, 120, 124, 127, 170 , 345, 385–86 Millerand, Alexandre, 73 Military Revolutionary Council (MRC), 85, 86 Millspaugh, Arthur, 356, 361 Mirzoian, Levon, 51, 154, 157, 342, 385 Mokhber ol-Saltaneh (Mehdi Qoli khan ­Hedayat), 102–3 Molotov, Viacheslav, 275, 283, 289–90, 333–34, 337, 339 Moscow conference: about, 220–21; and Armenian question, 249–50; and Chicherin, 222–24, 236–37, 252; conclusion of, 258–76; and Georgian comrade, 245; and Karabekir pasha, 221, 224, 230; and Kemal pasha, 223; and Narimanov, 222, 235–36; opening of, 236–58; ­political commission of, 247, 252, 253, 255, 257; preparation for, 221–36; and “Provision” clauses, 224–25; and Shahtakhtinskii, 237–38, 241, 244–46 Moscow Treaty, 7, 148, 279, 311, 328 Mosheer ed-Doule, 102 Moshaver ol-Momalek (Ali Qoli khan Ansari), 105 Mozzaffar ad-Din, shah, 24 Mravian, Askanaz, 136, 139, 142–44, 146, 221,271, 275, 295, 298–99, 302, 311 Mudros Armistice, 33, 34 Mukhtar, Ahmet, 208, 215–18, 220, 224, 279 Musabeyov, Gazanfar, 281–82, 342, 344–45 Musavat Party/government: and Great Britain, 193; and Karabagh, 119, 121, 125; and ­Nakhchivan issue, 170, 171; and Ohanjanian, 118; set up of, 26, 29 Muslim Communists, 71, 152, 328, 344, 389 Muslim East, 40, 41, 235, 352, 353 Muslims: and Azerbaijani lands, 132; crimes against, 27; first congress of, 21; mass emigration of, 246; needs and demands of, 20– 21; protests against disarmament of, 65; slaughter of, 30–31, 53, 118, 168 Muzaffarzade, Mir Saleh, 86, 89



Index 467

Nakhchivan: administrative changes in, 312– 13; and Armenia, 167, 171, 173, 190, 192, 275– 76, 294–95; autonomy issues, 313–15; and Azerbaijani delegation, 307–8; border issues, 254–55; capturing of, 166–67, 174; and CC CPA, 170, 294; international status of, 311–12; and Karabekir pasha, 171, 174; and Kars conference, 307–8; and Musavat government, 170, 171; Red Army in, 170; and Russian-Turkish talks, 239, 248, 259–60; and Shahtakhtinskii, 177; and Soviet Azerbaijan, 171, 393; struggle for, 167–81; transfer of, 134–36, 177, 195, 211, 213, 309; and Treaty of Kars, 309, 311–14; and Treaty of Moscow, 260–61, 268; and Zangezur, 134–36 Namitekov, Aytek, 251 Naneishvili, Victor, 87, 120, 170, 175 Narimanov, Nariman: and Abilov, 281, 328–29, 380; about, 5–7, 12–13; accusations against and by, 354–56, 385, 389; arrival in Baku, 51– 52; and Azerbaijani delegation, 260–61; and Azerbaijan’s borders, 153; and Baku congress, 96–98; and British memorandum, 363–64; burial day, 387; as chair of ARC, 210; and Chicherin, 74, 75, 98, 115, 133, 390; contradictory declaration by, 134–36; death of, 387, 390; desire to return to Baku, 384; and eastern policy, 39, 131; and EC, 41; and ­Genoa conference, 350–51, 368–72; grievances of, 131–32; harsh decision against, 386; as a head of new government, 38–39; and Huseinov, 63, 143–45; and Iranian revolution, 80–81; and Kuchek khan, 106; and Legrand, 272; and Lenin, 40, 47–48, 50, 131–32, 339–40; and Lloyd George, 357–58; loyalty issues, 131–32; and Moscow conference, 222, 235–36; newspaper articles by, 373, 374; and Orjonikidze, 50, 51, 145, 198–99, 344, 389; personal tragedy of, 384–85; promotion of, 343–44; and Red Army, 49–50; resignation of, 386–87; restricting authority of, 39–40; and Shahtakhtinskii, 50, 63, 103, 125, 345; and socialist revolution, 79, 80; and Soviet delegation, 358; and Soviet power victory, 142; and Stalin, 50–51, 115, 344, 351–53; “state wisdom” of, 270–71; and Turkish delegation, 269, 270; views about, 52, 54. See also Karabagh; South ­Caucasus republics national independence movements, 9, 12, 13, 160, 318 National Pact: acceptance of, 247, 311, 428n56; and Batum question, 240, 241; and Russian-­ Turkish talks, 241–43; territorial issues, 239; by Turkey, 231, 233

national republics, 32, 330, 332, 350, 358 Natsarenus, Sergei, 285, 289, 318, 323–24 Nazaretian, Amayak, 135–37, 147, 149, 151, 211, new economic policy, 349, 355, 356 Nikolai II, Tsar, 22, 23, 24, 236 Nobel Brothers Company, 361, 362 non-Muslim population, 248, 253 non-Slavic peoples, 8, 9, 28 North Caucasus, 35, 68, 195, 251, 376 Northern Azerbaijan, 101, 102 Northern Iran, 78, 79, 110, 111, 116 Nubar pasha, Boghos, 249–50 Nurijanian, Avis, 118, 210, 213 October Revolution, 30, 38, 78 Ohanjanian, Hamo, 118, 119, 185, 189, 196 oil companies, 359–62, 369, 375, 377 oil concessions, 346–48, 360–62, 365, 370 oilfields: fire in, 21, 360; and Genoa conference, 346, 347; leasing of, 360, 370, 376; ­return of, 362 Oil in International Policy (Mehdiyev), 347 oil policy, 348, 359, 361, 369 Orakhelashvili, Ivan, 137, 147, 261, 263, 265, 271, 341–42, 348, 370, 384 Orjonikidze, Sergo: about, 6; and CC RCP, 335; and Chicherin, 123, 256, 261; and congress of nations, 95–96; and defeat in Iran, 99–100, 104–5; and eastern policy, 279; and federalization, 337–38; and Huseinov, 271– 72; and Iranian revolution, 93; and Karabagh question, 151; and Kirov, 61, 62, 115, 147; and Legrand, 204; and Lenin, 46– 47, 127; and Mikhailov, 327–28; and Nakhchivan issue, 134–36, 166–67, 170; and Narimanov, 50, 51, 145, 198–99, 344, 389; and peace talks, 205–7; and Red Army, 112; and Russian-Armenian treaty, 130; and Russian-­Turkish treaty, 230; “On the Situation in Persia’ report by, 114; on Sovietizing Azerbaijan, 43, 122; and Stalin, 179–80, 201; and Tabriz revolt, 83; and Turkish-­ Armenian war, 183; views on Armenian government, 122–23; and Zangezur, 134–36 Ottoman Empire, 32–33, 168, 171, 177, 233 Öngören, Ibrahim Tali bey, 168, 187 Özgen, Osman bey, 168 Pahlavi, Reza khan, 109, 113 pan-Islamism, 25, 337, 353 Pankratov, Semen, 42, 52, 381 Paris declaration, 290, 291 Paris oil conference, 377 Paris Peace Conference, 34, 35, 75, 77, 358 Party organs, 333, 335, 336, 341–42, 374

468

Index

Pavlovich, Mikhail (Veltman), 98–99, 104 peace and friendship, 32, 59, 243 peace treaties, 59–60, 129 People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (PCFA): and Abilov, 282; about, 79–81; and CC RCP, 216, 375; and Georgia, 215–16; and independent action by republics, 262–63; liquidation of, 378; mandate to Mdivani, 197; and Mountainous Karabagh, 147, 148; ­Nakhchivan issues, 313–15; and prisoners of war, 257; and Rapallo treaty, 375; and Russian-­Turkish talks, 252; and Stalin, 381; and treaty with Iran, 107–9, 112–13, 115; and Turkish question, 215–16 Poincaré, Raymond, 354–55, 358; Poincaré ­government, 359, 366 prisoners of war, 257, 259, 325 Pylaev, Andrei, 86 Qavam os-Saltaneh, Mirza Ahmad, 113–15 Radek, Karl,15, 63, 96–97, 115, 235 Rafibeyli, Khudadat bey, 43–44 Rapallo treaty, 365–67, 375 Raskol’nikov, Fedor, 82–87, 91, 113 Rasulzade, Mahammad Emin: 2-3, 6, 26, 28– 32, 42–43, 54, 70–71, 77, 110, 385 Red Army: about, 1, 3; in Azerbaijan, 35, 37; and Gilan adventure, 84, 85, 86; Iranian, 92, 93, 112; in Nakhchivan, 170; and Narimanov, 49–50; and Orjonikidze, 112; plundering by, 42, 44–45; as a terrorist organization, 41; and Zakatala uprising, 46 Red Fleet, 82, 83, 86 refugees issue, 308, 310–11 Republic of Azerbaijan, The (Rasulzade), 54 Revolutionary Committee of Armenia, 134, 141–43, 208–10, 213, 221 Revolutionary War Council, 47, 125, 128, 163 Riga talks, 290 Rıza, Dr. Nur, 219, 226–27, 230, 233, 236, 240, 252, 259, 269–270, 299 Rotshtein, Fedor, 107, 111–15 Royal Dutch Shell, 359–62, 377 Russia. See Soviet Russia/Union Russian-Armenian treaty, 125–27, 130, 390 Russian Communist Party, 3, 5, 48, 158, 386, 387 Russian delegation, 151, 253–56, 274, 302 Russian Muslims, 21–24, 28, 245, 268 Russian question, 368, 374 Russian revolution, 17–28, 88, 206, 318, 319 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR): instructions from, 147, 148; and ­Iranian revolution, 86, 87; mandate to

Shahtakhtinskii, 197; and Russian-Turkish talks, 243–44; and Treaty of Kars, 311; and treaty with Iran, 110; and Turkish-French talks, 315 Russian Telegraph Agency (RTA), 161, 294 Russian-Turkish relations, 158–67, 171, 238, 287–88 Russian-Turkish talks: and Ankara government, 242; and Batum question, 240, 247, 248, 252, 268; crisis situation, 242; draft treaty related to, 246–47; frequent meetings for, 245–46; important agreements at, 246; and Kars, 244; and Nakhchivan issue, 239, 248, 259–60; and National Pact, 241– 43; and PCFA, 252; and RSFSR, 243–44; Russian ambassador issues, 242–43; and ­Sovietization of Georgia, 238; and Treaty of Sèvres, 236–37. See also Moscow conference Russian-Turkish treaty, 178, 230, 240, 256, 261, 263 Russian-Turkish war, 239, 260 Sabit, Fuad Dr.,161, 168 Sarkis, Ter-Danelian, 50–51, 91, 141–42, 210, 345, 385 Schanzer, Carlo, 364 Serebrovskii, Aleksandr, 3, 235 Shahtakhtinskii, Behbud bey: and ARC, 211; and Armenia, 224–26; and Azerbaijan situation, 228; common treaty issue, 304; and CPC, 227; and Huseinov, 255; and Karabekir ­pasha, 217; and Kars conference, 293– 94; and Kemal bey, 226–27; and Lenin, 63–66, 103–4; mandate to, 197; and Moscow conference, 237–38, 241, 244–46; and Nakhchivan issue, 177; and Narimanov, 50, 63, 103, 125, 345; and Red commanders, 48; and Russian-­Armenian treaty, 130; and Stalin, 270–71; and treaty with Russia, 227–28; and Turkish delegation, 228 Shahtakhtinskii, Mahammad agha, 24 Shatunovskaia, Ol’ga, 141 Shaumian, Stepan, 30–32, 50–51 Sheinman, Aron, 191, 192 Sheikhulislamov, Akber agha, 251 Shevket bey, Memduh, 272, 292, 296, 297, 311, 317 Shirvani (Mustafabeyov), Aliheydar, 132, 144, 328, 331, 379 socialist revolution, 54, 78–80, 87, 89, 99 Solov’ev, Nikolai, 53–54, 65, 129 South Caucasus Federation, 321–22, 339, 341, 345, 390 South Caucasus republics: about, 4, 7, 8; after 1921, 148f; Azerbaijan’s position in, 258–76;



Index 469

and balances of forces, 265; Bolshevist threat in, 35; border issues, 239, 293–315, 340–41; and Caucasus question, 354; CEC of, 314, 342; commitment regarding, 259; conference for, 341; draft treaty related to, 338; and Duma elections, 23, 24; foreign trade among, 333; and Karabekir, 207; and Kars conference, 278–93; and Legrand, 330–31; military conventions issue, 334–35; only ­salvation of, 188; and Orjonikidze, 148–49; preventing independent actions by, 262–63; representations of, 382–83; and Russian revolution, 28; sovereignty issues, 254; and Soviet Russia, 54–71, 330; and Turkey, 267–68, 302, 308–9; and Turkish-Armenian War, 181–204. See also Caucasus Bureau South Caucasus union, formation of, 333–45, 378, 379, 381, 383 Soviet Armenia: about, 12, 117; and Azerbaijani lands, 132; and Great Britain, 126; and ­Karakhan, 124, 127; and Ohanjanian, 118, 119; and Russian-Armenian treaty, 125–27, 130; territorial disputes, 132, 137. See also Karabagh Soviet Azerbaijan: about, 1–4; and Akstafa agreement, 60; and Armenia, 62; border ­issues, 57–58; and Caucasus republics, 7–8; consolidation of, 258–76; as a “contributor,” 133; counterrevolutionary coup in, 61; destructive actions against, 154; and dictatorship of bayonets, 388; embassy in Ankara, 315–31; and extermination of cadres, 47; and federalization, 335–37; foreign policy of, 4, 8, 41, 277, 388–93; and Gilan adventure, 79– 90; and Iran, 391–92; and Karabagh, 146– 57; and Moscow conference, 221–38; and Nakhchivan issue, 171, 393; and Orjonikidze, 43, 122; political interest issues, 58; preventing independent actions by, 262–63; and Russian-Turkish relations, 158–67; and Russia’s Iranian policy, 90–100; and Shahtakhtinskii, 228; and Soviet Russia, 62, 66–68, 128–29, 360; territorial disputes, 63– 65, 67, 127, 129, 130, 132, 390; treaty with Georgia and, 59–60. See also Azerbaijan; Turkey Soviet delegation: and British memorandum, 363–64; and Caucasus representatives, 346; and Chicherin’s proposals, 366; and confiscated goods, 368; and Genoa conference, 354, 357–58; in Gumru, 201–2; to Hague conference, 375; Lenin as a chair of, 350; and ­Nakhchivan issue, 307, 308; and National Pact, 247; sudden departure of, 369 Soviet-German treaty, 365

Soviet-Iranian treaty, 109, 110, 111, 392 Sovietization of Georgia: about, 180, 215; and counterrevolutionaries, 228; geopolitical situation caused by, 238; and Great Britain, 47 Soviet republics. See South Caucasus republics Soviet Russia/Union: about, 2–4, 7–8; and Azerbaijan, 36, 66–68; and Baku, 100–111; blockade against, 377; collapse of, 12; demands for credit, 368, 375–76; and eastern policy, 78–116; and Enver pasha, 286; establishing relations with, 105, 107; formation of, 332; and Genoa conference, 348–49; and Gilan adventure, 79–90; and Great Britain, 75; Iranian policy of, 90–100; and Kemalists, 193–94; lack of moral assistance from, 289; political ­crisis in, 28; regional policy of, 54–71; research works on, 9, 12; secret talks about, 124; treaties with, 56–57, 107–12, 115, 125–27, 227–28, 238, 249. See also Turkey Soviet troops, 82, 85, 105–6, 108, 110, 113, 196– 97 Soviet-Turkish treaty, 258–276 Stalin, Joseph: 5, 6; and CC CPA plenum, 68– 70; and CC RCP, 192; and Chicherin, 39, 256–57, 286–87, 297; and federalization, 339; and Fuat, 287; and Karabagh question, 147, 150–52; and Kirov, 155–56; and Lenin, 48, 70, 106, 179, 192–93, 200–201, 326; and Mdivani, 197; and Narimanov, 50–51, 115, 344, 351–53; and Orjonikidze, 179–80, 201; and PCFA, 381; and peace talks, 209; plan of autonomization, 383; report by, 69–70; and Shahtakhtinskii, 270–71; and Sheinman, 191–92 Standard Oil, 360–62, 377 Stark, Leonid, 184–85 State Duma, 19, 20, 22–28 Stokes, Col. Claude, 187–88, 210 Sultan-Galiyev, Mirsaid, 7, 385 Sultanov, Hamid, 132, 146, 154 Sultanov, Khosrov bey, 219, 317 Sultanzade, Mahammad Hasan (Mikaelian Avetis Sultanovich), 87–89, 97–98, 104–6 Suphi, Mustafa, 171, 172, 173 Svanidze, Aleksandr, 282–83, 298, 311, 341–42, 282–83, 298, 311, 341–43 Tabatabaee, Seyyed Zia’eddin, 109 Tabriz revolt, 83, 100–103 Taghiyev, Haji Zeynalabdin, 18, 20, 24 Talaat pasha, Mehmed, 164 Tchenkeli, Akaki, 251, 291, 359 Ter-Gabrielian, Saak, 122, 136, 151, 221, 275, 290, 294, 298, 348 Ter-Minasian, Ruben, 173

470

Index

Ter-Simonian, Drastamat, 138-140, 154 territorial autonomy, 29, 30 Terterian, Hambarsum, 202–3, 209 Theunis, Georges, 356, 364 Third Congress of the Comintern, 281 Topchibashov, Ali Mardan bey, 17–18, 20–25, 27, 30–31, 35, 75, 252, 273, 291, 354, 358, 363 trade agreements, 107, 232, 252, 324, 348 Transcaucasian states. See South Caucasus ­republics Transcaucasus regional committee, 156, 374, 379 Transcaucasus Soviet Federative Socialist ­Republic, 332, 383 Treaty of Alexandropol, 214–15, 219, 225, 241 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 164, 190 Treaty of Kars, 309–14 Treaty of Moscow: about, 5; and Armenia, 266; and Azerbaijani delegation, 273; and Batum question, 268; as a cause for celebration, 261; and Chicherin, 276; conclusion of, 258–76; displeasure with, 283; and Georgia, 282; and Kars conference, 291; and Nakhchivan issue, 260–61, 268; ratification of, 276; and Zakatala uprising, 46 Treaty of Sèvres, 126, 168, 236, 237 Treaty on Peace and Friendship, 32, 59, 243 Trotskii, Lev, 55, 84, 85 Tsereteli, Iraklii, 354 Turkey: about, 5–8, 15; “alliance” with, 232, 235; and Armenia, 5, 175, 181–204, 213–14, 271; and Azerbaijan, 32, 217–18; border issues, 254–56, 259, 274, 293–315; and Caucasus republics, 267–68, 302, 308–9; desire for separate treaties, 224; diplomatic talks with, 165; and France, 324; and Georgia, 216–17; and Gumru, 196, 198, 264, 265; intention for allied treaty, 297; and Italian government, 325; liberation movements in, 175; National Pact by, 231, 233; and Ohanjanian, 189; Orjonikidze’s plan about, 137; and prisoners of war, 257, 259; report about situation in, 279; Russians’ mediation rejected by, 203, 206, 208; Russia’s war against, 26–27; and South Caucasus, 308–9; transfer of arms to, 177; treaty with ­Soviet Russia, 148. See also Nakhchivan Turkish-Armenian War, 5, 181–90, 197–98, 207, 271 Turkish-Azerbaijani treaty, 379, 380 Turkish delegation: and Armenian question, 168, 233, 235; arrival in Baku, 222, 266–67; and Baku oil, 305; and Chicherin, 231–32; and Georgia, 187; and Huseinov, 269; initial

success of, 234; instructions for, 268, 300– 301; at Kars conference, 299; and Kemal bey, 232–33, 247, 255–56; lengthy delay in Rostov, 230; for Moscow conference, 221–36; and ­Narimanov, 269, 270; and National Pact, 242–43; official meeting with, 178; proposal of, 306; and Shahtakhtinskii, 228 Turkish-French talks, 287, 315 Turkish mission, 226, 317 Turkish nationalists, 163, 195, 328, 343 Turkish Popular Communist Party (TPCP), 285 Turkish revolutionary government, 161, 171 Turkish troops, 175, 182, 188, 200–201 Union of Russian Muslims, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): about, 1, 8; archival documents, 15; complex analysis of, 13–14; formation of, 332, 378–87. See also Soviet Russia/Union Union Soviet, 337–38, 340–45, 383 union treaty, 338, 339, 341, 342, 343 Upmal-Angarskii, Ian, 223, 226, 242, 285, 331 Uratadze, Grisha, 55–56 Urquhart, John Leslie, 374 Usubbeyov, Nasib bey, 43 Vansittart, Robert, 249 Versailles system, 38, 77, 311 Vesnik, Iakov, 120, 222 Villa Alberts talks, 364, 365 Vorontsov-Dashkov, Illarion, 20–21, 27 Vosug ed-Doule, 102 Vyborg Declaration, 23, 25 war debts, 366 Wardrop, Oliver, 35 White Guards, 61, 79, 82, 285, 381 Wilson, Woodrow, 13–14, 28, 33, 35, 250 world revolution, 80, 89, 90, 180, 223 World War I, 26–27, 33–34, 78, 79, 391–92 Zakatala, 1, 4, 46–47, 59–61, 65 Zangezur: about, 4, 5; and Armenia, 190, 192, 200, 201; and Caucasus Bureau, 137–39, 141; ceding of, 137; Dashnak revolt in, 153; and Karabagh, 117–27, 132–33, 136, 140, 146–57; and Nakhchivan, 134–36; as “top secret,” 138–39; transfer of, 192, 195, 198, 200, 201, 211 Zardabi (Melikov), Hasan bey, 16–17 Zhordaniia, Noe, 55–56, 58, 72 Zinov’ev, Grigorii, 95–96, 100, 104, 185, 235, 273, 289, 297