The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture: Surfing the Korean Wave 3030842959, 9783030842956

Table of contents :
Preface: BTS, Riding the Hallyu Crest
Bibliography
Acknowledgments
Contents
About the Authors
1: Introduction: Hallyu as an Alternative Aestheticized Global Pop Culture
1 Global Pop Culture
1.1 The P in Global Pop Culture
1.2 Creating a Common Landscape
2 The Korean Wave: From the Margins to the Mainstream
2.1 Hallyu 1.0: A Regional Success Story
2.2 Hallyu 2.0: From East to West
3 A Monographic Approach to Hallyu: Production, Circulation, and Consumption
3.1 Through the Lens of Hallyu: A Multiscalar Approach
3.2 Hallyu in France
3.3 Global Pop Culture and Pop Cosmopolitanism
3.4 Hallyu as an Aestheticized Pop Culture System
4 Conclusion
Bibliography
2: Is Entertainment Capitalism the Ultimate Stage of Aesthetic Capitalism?
1 A Critique of Aesthetic Capitalism
1.1 The Tenets of Aesthetic Capitalism
1.2 Addictive Aesthetics
1.3 Emotional Aesthetics
1.4 The Aesthetics of “Cool”
2 South Korean Capitalism
2.1 Accelerated and Internationally Oriented Economic Modernization
2.2 The Jurassic Park Syndrome
2.3 State Capitalism
2.4 The “Cultural Package” Industry: The Example of SM Entertainment
3 The Distinctive Traits of Entertainment Capitalism
3.1 Serialized Production
3.2 From the Artist to the Transmedia Idol
3.3 Fans as Co-producers
3.4 Promoting an Ideology of Well-Being
4 Conclusion
Bibliography
3: An Alternative Globalization of Pop Culture
1 The Global Pop-Cultural Arena
1.1 The Domination of the Big Three League
1.2 Toward a New Multipolar Cultural Order
2 The Dominance of the United States
2.1 The Pillars of US Pop Culture
2.2 Signs of Weakening
3 Developing an Alternative
3.1 The American Lesson
3.2 Three Lessons from Japan
3.3 Global Pop Culture, South Korean Style
4 Conclusion
Bibliography
4: From Soft Power to “Sweet Power”
1 Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Industries
1.1 Three Models of Cultural Diplomacy
1.2 “Cool Japan”
1.3 Imperialism and Cultural Resistance
2 South Korea as a Global Brand
2.1 Playing on the International Stage
2.2 The Segyehwa Strategy
2.3 Telling the Story of Resilience, Modernity, and Harmony
3 South Korean Sweet Power
3.1 The Sweet Image of an In-Between Nation
3.2 Sweet Power and Its Impact on Tourism
3.3 The Limits of Sweet Power in Terms of Regional Leadership
4 Conclusion
Bibliography
5: The Theory of Cosmopolitan Elective Affinities
1 The Hallyu Appeal in the Global Pop Landscape
1.1 The Appeal of the Familiar and the Exotic
1.2 The Poverty of Culturalism
2 The Work of the Cosmopolitan Amateur
2.1 Understanding Cosmopolitan Reception
2.2 Strange Familiarity and Reassuring Difference
3 Unknown and Mysterious South Korea
3.1 Historically Tenuous Ties with France
3.2 Recent Cultural Presence
3.3 An All-French Form of Cultural Openness
4 The Japanese Bridge
4.1 The Japanese Wave in France
4.2 A Cultural and Aesthetic Fault Line
4.3 Pan-Asian Cultural Contagion
5 Portrait of the Young Hallyu Fan
6 Conclusion
Bibliography
6: From One Wave to the Next: Aesthetics and Digital Intimacy
1 Giving Dominant Cultures the Cold Shoulder
1.1 A Desire for Something New
1.2 American Pop Culture on Trial
1.3 In Search of a New Form of Audience Reception
1.4 Toward a Cosmopolitan World
2 Growing Up with Manga and Anime
2.1 The Taste for “Japanness”
2.2 The Adolescent Mainstream
2.3 From Japan to South Korea
3 The Irresistible Aesthetic Canon of South Korea
3.1 High-Quality Difference
3.2 An Appreciation for Hybridity
3.3 A Celebration of Beauty
3.4 Perfection Through Asceticism
3.5 Beautiful and Virtuous
4 Resources for Digital Intimacy
4.1 Cultural Mobilization
4.2 Proximity Effects with the Idols
5 Conclusion
Bibliography
7: Looking in the Korean Mirror: Enchantment and Disenchantment with Elsewhere
1 Hallyu and South Korean Culture
1.1 The Mirror
1.2 The Façade
2 The Appeal of South Korean Society
2.1 The Siren Call of Tomorrow’s Technology
2.2 The Confucian Tradition and Respect for Others
2.3 Tempered Masculinity
2.4 Romance Regained
3 Behind the Scenes
3.1 The Tyranny of Appearances
3.2 Emotional Repression
3.3 Male Dominance and Heteronormativity
3.4 Fierce Competition
3.5 Of People and Pigeonholes
3.6 An Exclusionary Society
4 Conclusion
Bibliography
8: Using Hallyu to Stand Out
1 Growing Up with the Korean Wave
1.1 Hallyu and Adolescent Uniqueness
1.2 Hallyu and Adolescent Turmoil
1.3 Hallyu and Adolescent Stigma
2 Eschewing the Mainstream
2.1 Asserting Oneself at the Risk of Exclusion
2.2 Seeking Support
3 Hallyu as Cosmopolitan Empowerment
3.1 Empowerment Through Openness
3.2 Empowerment Through Reaffiliation
3.3 Empowerment Through Autodidactism
3.4 Empowerment Through Trend-Setting
4 Shaping the Future with Hallyu
4.1 The Color of Dreams
4.2 Betting on Social Mobility
4.3 Hallyu as a Supplemental Resource
4.4 Salvaging Skills
5 Conclusion
Bibliography
9: General Conclusion: Why Does the Global Success of Hallyu Matter?
1 The Two-Fold Nature of Hallyu
2 In Defense of Pop Cosmopolitanism
2.1 Rethinking Taste in a Global World
2.2 Rethinking Culture in a Global World
3 A New Cultural Hegemony or Multipolar Globalization?
4 Hallyu Beyond Pop Culture
Bibliography
Appendix: Presentation of the Interviewees
Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned in the Book
Index

Citation preview

The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture Surfing the Korean Wave Vincenzo Cicchelli · Sylvie Octobre

The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture “Closely examining the consumption of and negotiation with media cultures from South Korea by youth in France, this book gives a fresh insights into how transnational flows of East Asian media culture has been organized by various social actors and industries, generated alternative media globalization, engendered cross-border dialogues, and fostered cosmopolitan outlook. This book is essential reading to anyone interested in the study of “Korean Wave”, cultural globalization and mediated dialogue.” —Koichi Iwabuchi, Professor of Media and Cultural Studies, Monash University “This is an exceptional work about the Korean Wave (Hallyu) and multi-polar globalization of culture in general. While providing the context and appropriate source material surrounding the emergence, promotion, and global diffusion of Hallyu, the authors also address Hallyu in the theoretical arena, tackling such emerging concepts as aesthetic capitalism, sweet power, and the theory of cosmopolitan elective affinities. A must-read book for understanding the past, present, and future of Hallyu!” —Wonho Jang, Professor of Urban Sociology, University of Seoul

Vincenzo Cicchelli • Sylvie Octobre

The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture Surfing the Korean Wave

Vincenzo Cicchelli Centre Population et Développement Université de Paris/IRD Paris, France

Sylvie Octobre DEPS - Ministère de la Culture/Centre Max Weber (UMR 5283) Paris, France

Translated by Sarah-Louise Raillard

ISBN 978-3-030-84295-6    ISBN 978-3-030-84296-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84296-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch/shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

개천에서 용 난다 (A dragon rises up from a small stream) Korean proverb

This book is dedicated to Hipollène without whom we would never have thought to investigate on Hallyu

Preface: BTS, Riding the Hallyu Crest1

“I tried to jam myself into molds that other people made…. No matter who you are, where you’re from, your skin color, gender identity: speak yourself. Find your name, find your voice by speaking yourself.” It was with these words that, on 24 September 2018, the musical group Bangtan Sonyeondan (usually referred to by its short name, BTS*2) became the first K-pop band to ever speak at the United Nations. BTS took the floor during the 73rd session of the General Assembly in New  York on the occasion of Generation Unlimited,3 an international initiative launched by UNICEF to combat violence against children and promote youth education, with a view to having all young people in school or work by 2030. How did the members of a South Korean pop band (who moreover perform most of the time in their native language) come to have such significant international media coverage and thus be involved with this initiative? Composed of seven young men who resemble manhwa characters4–– RM and Suga the rappers; Jin the lead vocalist; J-Hope a rapper and  In Chinese, hallyu means “Korean Wave.” This term was coined at the end of the 1990s by the Chinese media to refer to the rapid rise in popularity and market penetration of Korean products. The epithet has since been translated into English as well as a variety of other languages, including Spanish (ola coreana) and French (vague coréenne). 2  The South Korean cultural products referred to in this book and marked with an asterisk are presented in the glossary at the end of the book. 3  https://www.generationunlimited.org 4  The name for Korean comics and print cartoons. 1

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dancer; Jimin, V, and Jungkook singers and dancers––this group leads the pack in record sales throughout the world, including in the United States (where it is rare for a non-American, and especially a non-English-­ speaking musician, to top the charts). “Bangtan Sonyeondan,” the group’s name, is a combination of 방탄, signifying “bulletproof,” and 소년단, meaning “boy scouts.” The group’s seven members can thus be seen as the defenders of youth. By blending together a variety of different musical styles (including rap, pop, R&B, and moombahton5), adopting international quality standards, employing tried-and-tested marketing strategies (such as adapting songs to the styles favored by targeted geographical regions), and putting on spectacular stage shows with complex choreography and special visual effects, BTS has become a major musical phenomenon––not entirely unlike the Beatles of yesteryear. The group’s popularity can be measured in commercial terms. In 2018, the album Love Yourself: Tear was at the top of the iTunes charts in over 60 countries. With that success, BTS became the most-watched South Korean boy band on YouTube, garnering more than 4 billion views (counting all of their videos combined). “Fake Love,” the single from Love Yourself: Tear, was released in May 2018; it was then ranked tenth on the Billboard Hot 100, making BTS the first Korean group to make the Top 10 and the first Korean artist to reach the Top 10 in the week immediately following a release. The video of their single “Dynamite,” released in August 2020, amassed more than 100 million views in 24 hours: BTS has become the first all-Korean group to reach the top of the US Billboard 100 (Cruz 2020). This shows the full extent of the BTS craze around the world. Everywhere in the world, BTS draws huge crowds to its over-the-top shows. At first, the concert venues that the band performed in held only a few thousand people; these have now been replaced by stadiums on all continents. BTS has attracted the largest crowds in Asia (especially Japan) and Latin America (in particular Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru). However, in the fall of 2018, BTS twice filled the Bercy Arena in Paris: the 20,000 seats in this concert venue sold out just a few hours after being announced, despite a complete lack of promotion and the fact that each ticket cost several hundred euros. The same  This is a fusion genre that combines house and reggaetón.

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excitement held for a return performance on 7 and 8 June 2019, this time in the Stade de France, which has more than 80,000 seats. Critical recognition and awards have also kept rolling in: since the beginning of its career, BTS has won more than 220 prizes and 339 nominations across the globe. It has been positively reviewed by Rolling Stone, which has devoted several articles and interviews to the band. The internet plays a central role in this success: K-pop is mostly disseminated through the internet, and BTS is very active on social media. One of their accounts, @BTS_twt, allows fans to enjoy their “personal” photos, while another, @bts_bighit, is used by their agency to make official announcements. There is also @BTS_trans, created by English-­ speaking fans to disseminate news worldwide. The group’s YouTube channel BANGTANTV,6 created in 2012, presents clips and videos, while the YouTube channel ibighit,7 which hosts their clips, had 61 million subscribers. BTS also streams videos on V-Life; some of the members even have their own shows. On Twitter, which created a special BTS emoji in 2016, Facebook (Bangtan.official), and Instagram (@bts.bighitofficial), BTS already has more than 20 million followers of its “Bangtan Bombs,” or short videos frequently posted by group members sharing their daily lives and making jokes. In 2017, BTS members were the most commented upon celebrities on Twitter. To that number, we can also add the individual accounts of each of the group’s members, which in some cases have more than 6 million followers. BTS members are also fashion influencers on the web (on Twitter, #KimDaily is run by RM and focuses on streetwear; Vogue US praised the account for its unique take on style). The boy band is even the subject of a webtoon8 called On: Be the Shield, which tells the story of seven young men who are tasked with saving the world, much like Marvel’s Avengers. The engagement of BTS fans, who go by the acronym ARMY (for “Adorable Representative MC of Youth”), plays a key role not just in the group’s commercial success, including sales of physical CDs, with many

 https://www.youtube.com/user/BANGTANT  https://www.youtube.com/user/ibighit 8  The name given to webcomics or manhwa published online in South Korea. 6 7

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of the group’s albums being marketed as collectors’ items,9 but also at concerts, where they sing along to lyrics they know by heart while wearing t-shirts of the band and wielding the “ARMY bombs,” or light sticks, that have become ubiquitous at BTS shows. Outside of the arena, BTS enthusiasts create fan chants10 in Korean, Wave banners, engage in flash mobs, and perform covers. In addition, fans lobby radio stations to play the group’s music; they are moreover at the source of various artistic collaborations, promoting commercial activities and distributing original content, including fan fiction, created on fan sites (Amino, Allkpop, and Bangtan Base). While it is true that musicians and bands have in the past given rise to similar cultural obsessions, the fans behind Beatlemania or Jacksonmania simply did not have the same digital tools at their disposal. Thanks to today’s social networks, young people across the world can connect to their idols with unprecedented speed, which gives them a hitherto unknown power to help disseminate musical acts and shape global success. This global success is tied to the messages contained in BTS songs, which are ones of self-love and the promotion of a peaceful relationship with others and with society more broadly. By and large, K-pop strives to be positive and modest, thus eschewing any references to politics, sex, alcohol, or drugs, as well as any criticisms of society or the government. BTS songs specifically focus on self-acceptance, which explains their success among young people. Their songs seek to comfort fans when the latter experience trouble, anxiety, and various forms of vulnerability.11 “Forget about the fear in your eyes––break it up! Break the glass ceiling that cages you,” the group sings in “Not Today,” a song dedicated to all minorities. Similarly, the key message in “Run” is that you should live life fully and not be afraid of falling––or of picking yourself back up again. It is therefore unsurprising that the speech given by BTS at the United Nations was chock-full of affirmations urging young people to express their individuality, to love themselves, and to share what they feel and  Several versions of the same album are often released in a box set, along with numerous goodies such as posters and cards signed by the singers. 10  Some of these can be seen on the K-pop channel Mnet. 11  These are issues that are particularly relevant to South Korean society, where social pressure leads to isolation for many, and where the suicide rate is the highest among OECD countries. 9

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think. “I have many faults and I have many fears, but I am going to embrace myself as hard as I can, and I’m starting to love myself, little by little.”12 After their win at the Billboard Music Awards in May 2018, the group spoke in almost evangelical tones: “This award belongs to all the people by the millions who shine their light and love on us and has made BTS so proud. Please remember what we say: love yourself!” While the symbol of the rainbow is generally used to defend a host of political causes, for BTS it primarily serves to promote the idea of love. Singer V thus invented the expression “I purple you” to mean “I will love you forever,” since purple is the last color in the rainbow; this expression has now trickled down into use by young people in South Korea. This is a far cry from the critical messages disseminated by youth Western counterculture in the 1960s. Indeed, they do not follow in the footsteps of the countless pop culture artists that have used their lyrics to speak for their generation and criticize the culture at large, including such topics as American imperialism, the Vietnam War, British colonialism, capitalism and the consumer society, academic indoctrination, racism, apartheid, and multiple forms of inequality. When BTS takes a position, it is to denounce school harassment and accompany young people in their adolescent ­transformations (as through the albums of the “school trilogy”—2 Cool 4 Skool (2013), O! RUL8, 2? (2013), and Skool Luv Affair (2014)), or advocate for a midler post-pandemic world (Life Goes On, 2020). The power of this message with BTS fans stems at least partially from its embodiment: like all boy bands, these seven young men present a varied palette of talents and personalities. Different BTS members fulfill different roles: the life of the party, the soulful and sad one, the dancer, the rapper, the singer, and so on. For instance, Jimin studied modern dance and was the valedictorian of his class at Busan Arts College; he was recruited during a private audition. As for Jin, he was a film student and tried out as an actor before becoming a singer. Before joining BTS, RM was already performing as an underground rapper named “Runch Randa” and had several tracks to his name. Suga was also an underground rapper in Daegu, going by the name “Gloss.” Finally, J-Hope was part of a street dance troop called “Neuron,” thanks to which he had already won several 12

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZhJ-LAQ6e_Y

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festival prizes in Gwangju before entering the Gwangju Dance Academy. As is the case for all K-pop groups, the members of BTS were scouted at a very young age and trained relentlessly for years to become performers with both singing and dancing skills. All of this work culminates in precise vocal performances and spectacular visual shows that play an important role in K-pop, whether it is concerts or television appearances (note that in South Korea, musical appearances on television are live, and do not use any lip-syncing). Due to its international success, BTS is a source of national pride. In October 2018, BTS received the medal of the prestigious Hwagwan Order of Cultural Merit from the acting Minister of Culture, Do Jong-­ hwan. Prime Minister Lee Nak-yeon justified the choice to confer this honor on its youngest recipients ever by referring to “their efforts at spreading South Korean culture and language throughout the world” (Herman 2018). According to the Korean Popular Culture and Arts Awards, BTS won this award for being “a global musician who has set a new milestone in the development of Hallyu. They have lifted the status of K-pop by becoming the first Korean artists to rank No. 1 on the Billboard 200 chart with two of their albums” (Koreaboo 2018). The band’s members were also ranked among the 25 most influential people on the internet by Time magazine, which had BTS on its cover in October 2018 with the title “Next Generation Leaders” (Bruner, 2018). This Korean influence is recognized throughout the world: in France, for example, BTS was used by the publisher Hatier in the 2019 Première d’Histoire et de Géopolitique (high school junior textbook for history and geopolitics) to illustrate the issue of soft power. In 2020, moreover, the IPO of their production company, Big Hit Entertainment (now HYBE), was boosted by their phenomenal success, bringing the full extent of South Korean soft power to the fore. Indeed, South Korea’s ambitions seem limitless: in 2021, HYBE bought Ithaca Holdings, which manages the rights to Ariana Grande, Justin Bieber, and Kanye West, among other Western pop and rap stars, to accelerate its penetration of the global market. BTS is therefore not an isolated phenomenon. Before them, there was Rain,* BoA,* Se7en,* Girls’ Generation,* Big Bang,* 2NE1,* and countless other groups on the global music scene. K-pop is not just a fluke: it is a tidal wave that exemplifies the mutations of global pop culture 2.0.

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Its economics is based on the idea of a participatory public, while its production incorporates the newest technological innovations. K-pop has developed an inclusive approach that multiples and hybridizes genres, including comics, television shows, and video games. K-pop is more concerned with being “cool” and well-liked––image is everything, after all–– than with being subversive or countercultural. The success of K-pop was boosted by the pandemic, and this music even took the lead in the “feel-good music” range. Its influence, as measured by the popularity of its online concerts, has tremendously grown: for instance, KCON:TACT 2020, a week-long online concert organized in June 2020, attracted over 4 million viewers. UNESCO even suggests that K-pop has helped young people to cope with the “corona blues,” an effect never observed for a crisis at this global scale (Jin 2021). K-pop itself is only the tip of the Korean iceberg: there is a vast ensemble of South Korean products that are popular abroad, including K-dramas whose actors have become famous around the world (like Bae Yong-Jun, the star of the television show Winter Sonata,* or Lee Min-ho, one of the main actors in the series Boys over Flowers*). In order to grasp the extent of this phenomenon, let us just recall that in 2004, the Japanese prime minister at the time, Junichiro Koizumi said that “Bae Yong-joon is more popular than I am in Japan” (Lee 2011). Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister from September 2006 to September 2007, likewise declared that he was a fan of the Korean show. As for Lee Min-ho, in a 2014 online poll in a Chinese tabloid, he was awarded the title of “Asian male god” (HIcap 2014), receiving more than 10 million votes; the same year, he became the first South Korean celebrity to have his wax figure at Madame Tussauds (Ji-Young 2014). He was also the guest of honor at the third conference of South Korea’s Presidential Committee for Cultural Enrichment in 2014, where he was invited to represent the entertainment industry and contribute to discussions on how to further expand the reach of Korean culture abroad. Last but not least, the famous Korean actor Park Seo Joon (starring in 8 movies, including Parasite*, and 14 TV shows among the most globally successful) will perform in the next Marvel movie that should be released in November 2022  in the United States.

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There are many indicators that K-pop music, K-dramas, K-films, manhwa, webtoons, and, to a lesser extent, Korean video games now play an important role in global cultural flows, in particular finding a place in the cultural repertoires of young people around the globe. What is known as Hallyu encompasses highly diverse products whose sole point in common, to a layperson, may seem to be that they were produced in South Korea and are popular internationally. However, the local reception of this global Korean pop culture highlights how fans handle the globalization of this formerly peripheral culture, and what they do with it. Indeed the whole popular Korean culture is not part of Hallyu: as in every national pop culture, only a part of it reaches global markets and even less a global success. With this distinction in mind, this book is devoted to the analysis of the Korean Wave—that is, the products elaborated by South Korean cultural industries that achieve global success—and the conditions of its possibilities, as well as how it comes to constitute a form of alternative pop culture globalization in the eyes of Western audiences. Paris, France 

Vincenzo Cicchelli Sylvie Octobre

Bibliography Bruner, Raisa. 2018. How BTS Is Taking Over the World. Time, October 10. Cruz, Lenika. 2020. BTS’s ‘Dynamite’ Could Upend the Music Industry. The Atlantic, September 2. Herman, Tamara. 2018. BTS Awarded Order of Cultural Merit by South Korean Government. Billboard, October 25. Hicap, Jonathan. 2014. Lee Min Ho Voted No. 1 ‘Asian male god’ in China. Korean Observer, April 10. Jin, Yu Yung. K-pop, a cure for the pandemic blues. The UNESCO Courier 2021–2. https://en.unesco.org/courier/2021–2/k-­pop-­cure-­ pandemic-­blues

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Ji-Young, Sohn. 2014. Lee Min Ho was Figure Goes on Display in H.K. KoreaHerald, January 14. Koreaboo. 2018. BTS Becomes Youngest Recipients of Order Of Cultural Merit At 2018 Korean Popular & Arts Awards. Koreaboo, October 24. Lee, Claire. 2011. Remembering “Winter Sonata”, the Start of Hallyu. KoreaHerald, December 30.

Acknowledgments

The survey upon which this book is based––entitled “La globalisation de la culture et la transformation de la réception: le cas de la Hallyu” (“Globalization of Culture and the Transformation of Reception: The Case of Hallyu”)––was financed by the Département des études, de la prospective et des statistiques (DEPS) of the French Ministry of Culture and Communication and was supported by the IdEx Université de Paris, anr-18-idex-000. This book is based on interviews conducted by students in Vincenzo Cicchelli’s classes who were enrolled in the courses Sociologie de l’adolescences et jeunesse (2019, Sociology of youth and adolescents, year L2) and Observations qualitatives (2019/2020, Qualitative observation, year L3) in the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences of the Université de Paris. The interviews were faithfully transcribed; the translation strives to respect the linguistic choices of the interviewees to the greatest extent possible. We thank the interviewers profusely for their work. The translation from the French manuscript was entrusted to Sarah-­ Louise Raillard, whom we warmly thank for her accurate and dedicated work.

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Contents

1 Introduction: Hallyu as an Alternative Aestheticized Global Pop Culture  1 1 Global Pop Culture   3 1.1 The P in Global Pop Culture   4 1.2 Creating a Common Landscape  10 2 The Korean Wave: From the Margins to the Mainstream  11 2.1 Hallyu 1.0: A Regional Success Story  12 2.2 Hallyu 2.0: From East to West  14 3 A Monographic Approach to Hallyu: Production, Circulation, and Consumption  17 3.1 Through the Lens of Hallyu: A Multiscalar Approach  17 3.2 Hallyu in France  19 3.3 Global Pop Culture and Pop Cosmopolitanism  20 3.4 Hallyu as an Aestheticized Pop Culture System  25 4 Conclusion  27 Bibliography 27

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2 Is Entertainment Capitalism the Ultimate Stage of Aesthetic Capitalism? 37 1 A Critique of Aesthetic Capitalism  39 1.1 The Tenets of Aesthetic Capitalism  39 1.2 Addictive Aesthetics  42 1.3 Emotional Aesthetics  43 1.4 The Aesthetics of “Cool”  44 2 South Korean Capitalism  46 2.1 Accelerated and Internationally Oriented Economic Modernization 46 2.2 The Jurassic Park Syndrome  48 2.3 State Capitalism  50 2.4 The “Cultural Package” Industry: The Example of SM Entertainment  55 3 The Distinctive Traits of Entertainment Capitalism  57 3.1 Serialized Production  58 3.2 From the Artist to the Transmedia Idol 60 3.3 Fans as Co-producers  62 3.4 Promoting an Ideology of Well-Being  65 4 Conclusion  66 Bibliography 67 3 An Alternative Globalization of Pop Culture 75 1 The Global Pop-Cultural Arena  76 1.1 The Domination of the Big Three League  76 1.2 Toward a New Multipolar Cultural Order  80 2 The Dominance of the United States  82 2.1 The Pillars of US Pop Culture  83 2.2 Signs of Weakening  88 3 Developing an Alternative  91 3.1 The American Lesson  91 3.2 Three Lessons from Japan  92 3.3 Global Pop Culture, South Korean Style  96 4 Conclusion 104 Bibliography105

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4 From Soft Power to “Sweet Power”111 1 Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Industries 112 1.1 Three Models of Cultural Diplomacy 113 1.2 “Cool Japan” 118 1.3 Imperialism and Cultural Resistance 120 2 South Korea as a Global Brand 123 2.1 Playing on the International Stage 124 2.2 The Segyehwa Strategy 125 2.3 Telling the Story of Resilience, Modernity, and Harmony127 3 South Korean Sweet Power 134 3.1 The Sweet Image of an In-Between Nation 134 3.2 Sweet Power and Its Impact on Tourism 137 3.3 The Limits of Sweet Power in Terms of Regional Leadership138 4 Conclusion 141 Bibliography142 5 The Theory of Cosmopolitan Elective Affinities149 1 The Hallyu Appeal in the Global Pop Landscape 150 1.1 The Appeal of the Familiar and the Exotic 151 1.2 The Poverty of Culturalism 154 2 The Work of the Cosmopolitan Amateur 158 2.1 Understanding Cosmopolitan Reception 159 2.2 Strange Familiarity and Reassuring Difference 162 3 Unknown and Mysterious South Korea 165 3.1 Historically Tenuous Ties with France 166 3.2 Recent Cultural Presence 168 3.3 An All-French Form of Cultural Openness 170 4 The Japanese Bridge 171 4.1 The Japanese Wave in France 172 4.2 A Cultural and Aesthetic Fault Line 175 4.3 Pan-Asian Cultural Contagion 177 5 Portrait of the Young Hallyu Fan 179 6 Conclusion 181 Bibliography182

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6 From One Wave to the Next: Aesthetics and Digital Intimacy191 1 Giving Dominant Cultures the Cold Shoulder 192 1.1 A Desire for Something New 192 1.2 American Pop Culture on Trial 194 1.3 In Search of a New Form of Audience Reception 198 1.4 Toward a Cosmopolitan World 201 2 Growing Up with Manga and Anime 203 2.1 The Taste for “Japanness” 203 2.2 The Adolescent Mainstream 205 2.3 From Japan to South Korea 207 3 The Irresistible Aesthetic Canon of South Korea 208 3.1 High-Quality Difference 209 3.2 An Appreciation for Hybridity 211 3.3 A Celebration of Beauty 214 3.4 Perfection Through Asceticism 216 3.5 Beautiful and Virtuous 219 4 Resources for Digital Intimacy 220 4.1 Cultural Mobilization 220 4.2 Proximity Effects with the Idols223 5 Conclusion 225 Bibliography226 7 Looking in the Korean Mirror: Enchantment and Disenchantment with Elsewhere229 1 Hallyu and South Korean Culture 231 1.1 The Mirror 231 1.2 The Façade 233 2 The Appeal of South Korean Society 235 2.1 The Siren Call of Tomorrow’s Technology 236 2.2 The Confucian Tradition and Respect for Others 238 2.3 Tempered Masculinity 241 2.4 Romance Regained 243 3 Behind the Scenes 246 3.1 The Tyranny of Appearances 246 3.2 Emotional Repression 249

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3.3 Male Dominance and Heteronormativity 251 3.4 Fierce Competition 255 3.5 Of People and Pigeonholes 257 3.6 An Exclusionary Society 258 4 Conclusion 263 Bibliography264 8 Using Hallyu to Stand Out267 1 Growing Up with the Korean Wave 269 1.1 Hallyu and Adolescent Uniqueness 269 1.2 Hallyu and Adolescent Turmoil 271 1.3 Hallyu and Adolescent Stigma 274 2 Eschewing the Mainstream 278 2.1 Asserting Oneself at the Risk of Exclusion 278 2.2 Seeking Support 281 3 Hallyu as Cosmopolitan Empowerment 283 3.1 Empowerment Through Openness 284 3.2 Empowerment Through Reaffiliation 285 3.3 Empowerment Through Autodidactism 288 3.4 Empowerment Through Trend-Setting 291 4 Shaping the Future with Hallyu293 4.1 The Color of Dreams 293 4.2 Betting on Social Mobility 296 4.3 Hallyu as a Supplemental Resource 299 4.4 Salvaging Skills 301 5 Conclusion 303 Bibliography304 9 General Conclusion: Why Does the Global Success of Hallyu Matter?307 1 The Two-Fold Nature of Hallyu307 2 In Defense of Pop Cosmopolitanism 309 2.1 Rethinking Taste in a Global World 310 2.2 Rethinking Culture in a Global World 312

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3 A New Cultural Hegemony or Multipolar Globalization? 314 4 Hallyu Beyond Pop Culture 316 Bibliography318 Appendix: Presentation of the Interviewees321  Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned in the Book331 Index345

About the Authors

Vincenzo Cicchelli  is an associate professor at Université de Paris and research fellow at Centre Population et Développement (UMR 196, Université de Paris/Institut de Recherche pour le Développement). He is the former General Secretary of the European Sociological Association (ESA); the former founder of the ESA research network “Global, Transnational and Cosmopolitan Sociology”; and the former director of the multidisciplinary program “Sociétés Plurielles” (Université Paris Sorbonne Paris Cité). He is the Director of International Relations at the Global Research Institute of Paris, Université de Paris. At Brill, he is the Editor-in-Chief (with Sylvie Octobre) of the “Global Youth Studies” suite: http://www2.brill.com/gys. He is the author of many books and articles, of which the latest are as follows: (with Sylvie Mesure, eds) Cosmopolitanism in Hard Times (2020); (with Sylvie Octobre and Viviane Riegel, eds.) Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism and Global Culture (2019); (with Sylvie Octobre) Aesthetico-Cultural Cosmopolitanism and French Youth: The Taste of the World (Palgrave 2018); Plural and Shared: The Sociology of a Cosmopolitan World (hardcover edition 2018; paperback edition 2020). Sylvie Octobre  is a researcher at Département des études, de la prospective et des statistiques, French Ministry of Culture, and research fellow at Centre Max Weber (UMR 5283, Université Lumière Lyon 2, ENS de Lyon, and CNRS). At Brill, she is the Editor-in-Chief (with Vincenzo xxvii

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About the Authors

Cicchelli) of the “Global Youth Studies” suite: http://www2.brill.com/ gys. She is the author of many articles and books, of which the latest are: Youth Technoculture. From Aesthetics to Politics (2020); (with Vincenzo Cicchelli and Viviane Riegel, eds.) Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism and Global Culture (2019); ¿Qiéne teme a las culturas juveniles? Las culturas juveniles en la era digital (Oceano Traverso 2019); (with Frédérique Patureau, eds.) Normes de genre dans les institutions culturelles (Presses de Sciences Po 2018); (with Vincenzo Cicchelli) Aesthetico-Cultural Cosmopolitanism and French Youth: The Taste of the World (Palgrave 2018); and Les techno-­ cultures juvéniles (L’Harmattan 2018).

1 Introduction: Hallyu as an Alternative Aestheticized Global Pop Culture

At a pace similar to South Korea’s rapid and dazzling modernization— emblematic of what has been called “compressed modernity” (Kyung-­ Sup 1999, 2010)—the Korean Wave has conquered the world in just 30 years. Before the rise of Hallyu, American hegemony over pop culture was virtually unchallenged, even if certain countries could claim success in specific realms (British pop, Franco-Belgian  bandes dessinées, Japanese animation and manga, Mexican and Brazilian telenovelas, Bollywood and Nollywood films, for instance). For the first time since its inception, the cultural industry of the United States has a formidable competitor: one that offers a wide variety of cultural products and has already conquered Asian markets, enjoying such expansion that it can be seen as a new form of global pop culture, intended here as a planetary cultural mosaic made of images and contents produced and distributed by global cultural industries, and consumed and appropriated by local consumers. To avoid any misunderstanding, in this volume, Hallyu strictly refers to the global popularity of South Korea’s cultural economy exporting pop culture (id est entertainment, music, TV dramas, and movies): (a) independently from how observers consider the Korean cultural system as a whole, with its own specificity and history and from how Korean life and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Cicchelli, S. Octobre, The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84296-3_1

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culture are seen, lived, and performed by Korean people itself; (b) linked to the process of aestheticization and branding of cultural artifacts marketed by Korean cultural industries and the artistic choice made by Korean artists and producers; and (c) as the result of the public policies promotion that works to maximize the overlapping success of its various products at a global scale and to export a certain image of Korea (Lie 2012; Choi 2013). One of the reasons that the Korean Wave has attracted a significant amount of attention in the academic realm is that South Korean cultural production seemed to become a competitive player on the global stage almost overnight. Research on Hallyu in fact resembles the Korean Wave itself; it is abundant, diverse, international, multilingual, and interdisciplinary. As of February 2020, more than 100 articles on the subject were published on Sage, 276 on JSTOR, and approximately 1600 on Academia. edu (MacDonald 2020). Since its start about 20 years ago, the field of Hallyu studies—which encompasses a large number of scholars and works from a wide variety of backgrounds and disciplines (Jin and Yoon 2014)1—has helped to foster debate on the globalization of culture, the transformations of capitalism, the geopolitical issues of a multipolar world, the pervasiveness of technoculture, and the cultural participation of amateurs from the greater public. Hallyu studies have innovated and created their own tools to understand the dynamics of global diffusion and consumption of cultural products, drawing upon its predecessors in the fields of global, cultural, pop culture, media, communications, post-­ colonial, and gender studies. Building on certain elements of this vast body of research, we shall argue that while global pop culture was necessary for its emergence, the Korean Wave has influenced the former enough to become a viable alternative imbued with a cosmopolitan aesthetic that is particularly appealing to educated, middle-class city dwellers (Kidd 2014; Cicchelli et al. 2019); we shall use the expression “alternative aestheticized global pop culture” to refer to this new phenomenon.

 There is even an international academic association devoted to promoting Hallyu studies: The World Association for Hallyu Studies (https://www.iwahs.org). 1

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In order to conduct our analysis, we shall consider Hallyu as a “cultural package” (Hong 2014) rather than focus on any one specific product, as many publications have previously done. In this package, several concentric circles can be distinguished, according to their network ties and their international popularity: K-pop and K-dramas are the “essential content” at the heart of the phenomenon, while a second circle includes “semi-­ essential content” such as films and video games. The products belonging to the two first circles mostly circulate thanks to digitalization. In the third circle, we find non-digital “para-Hallyu services and products” such as food, cosmetics, fashion, tourism, and language (Choi 2015a). Focusing on the products most frequently consumed by young fans in France (i.e., K-pop and K-drama), our study will primarily deal with the first circle of Hallyu products and will touch upon the second and third in less detail. In our considerations, we do not analyze Hallyu as the mirror of Korean history and culture—even though we cannot ignore that the latter provides the former with patterns, moral codes, and various sources of inspirations—but as the artifact of Korean cultural industries that create and recreate a new aestheticized and attractive imaginary of South Korea for audiences all around the world, even in very distant places with few (or no) historical links with South Korea.

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Global Pop Culture

While this volume does not adopt the triumphalist tone of Euny Hong (2014), it does nonetheless take seriously the rise of the Korean Wave as one of the major cultural phenomena of the twenty-first century. Hallyu has allowed for a large-scale renewal of pop culture analysis in terms of how the latter helps to create shared principles, ideals, norms, and values, as well as shared cultural models and imaginaries (Chua and Hong 2008; Kim 2013; Kuwahara 2014; Kim and Choe 2014; Jin and Kwak 2018).

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1.1

The P in Global Pop Culture

In order to describe the contribution of Hallyu to global pop culture, we must first outline the five major traits of the latter. While these traits are rooted in American pop culture, they can be considered as an ideal type of how pop culture functions nowadays at the global level. In other words, local pop cultures engage with the six distinctive elements discussed below to gain a global audience. As the birthplace of pop culture, the United States has also long represented its most widespread, diverse, and hegemonic form before being challenged by new powerful Asian players (such as Japan, India, South Korea, and more recently China). First of all, since its genesis as an artistic movement—christened as such by Hubert Artus (2017) on the occasion of “This Is Tomorrow” exposition, in August 1956, at the Whitechapel Art Gallery in London— global pop culture has brought together two elements that were otherwise distinct: art for art’s sake (characterized by a lack of instrumental purpose) and consumerism (which is linked to highly streamlined commercial reproducibility). “One year before his success at ‘This is Tomorrow,’ Richard Hamilton (1922–2011) had already defined the main traits of pop art. This was art that was popular, mass-produced, transitional, long-lasting, low-cost, young, spiritual, sexy, clever, glamour, and big business” (Artus 2017: 50–1).2 From the beginning, pop art entertained close ties with capitalism, as shown by the example of Andy Warhol’s Factory, while still proclaiming a strong artistic dimension that incorporated elements of underground and street art (think of Jean-­ Michel Basquiat, for instance). The pop movement later reached music and film, all the while advocating the primacy of visual media in all aspects of production, including music thanks to the advent of video clips, dedicated television stations (MTV at the fore), and YouTube (Prins and Zameczkowski 2019). In the pop movement, the artist’s image is a key to how works are received and interpreted, to the extent that the  Of course, pop culture has even older roots in European history (serial novels, operetta, vaudeville, and boulevard theater are just some examples). As we know it today, however, pop culture traces its origins back to American jazz in the 1920s for music, the emergence of comic strips for the graphic art form, the rise of detective and noir novels for literature, and B movies for cinema and is tied to the rise of cultural industries and mass media that occurred in the United States. 2

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artist’s life is part of their work. The staging of an artist’s life—a sophisticated form of storytelling—has become a significant phenomenon, becoming even more essential at the beginning of the twenty-first century thanks to the rise of digital tools and social networks. In addition, the linkages between art and industry have helped to ensure the standardization of products. In the music sector, for instance, whether we are referring to the limited recording time of 45  rpm records or the constraints of radio broadcasting, production has always followed industry standards while still attempting to attract the greatest number of listeners thanks to easily recognizable “hooks” and refrains. Second, global pop culture justifies its “popular” epithet every step of the way, from a work’s conception to its distribution and reception. In fact, the term pop culture alludes to three distinct registers. On one hand, the connotation of the adjective “popular” contained within “pop” emphasizes the fact that pop culture is construed as an alternative to high-brow culture (associated with universities, elites, legitimacy, and snobbery). On the other hand, “pop” makes us think of the expression “to pop up”—in other words, it signifies events and works that emerge on the streets and on the fringes of the established art world. Finally, the popularity of reception is implied, given that since its inception, pop culture has unabashedly sought to attract the largest number of people (see, for instance, the erstwhile success of “pulp magazines,” where the adjective “pulp” refers to the low quality of the paper on which the former were printed). If we consider all of these associations when examining global pop culture, it makes sense that it would be strongly rooted in technologies of mass publication and diffusion, of which social networks are of course only the most recent and powerful example. This characteristic has simply become more pronounced over time, as contemporary pop culture has, thanks to the internet, gradually freed itself from the strictures of television and radio. It has slowly converged with geek culture, itself a product of Japanese video game culture. While video games—which first found immense success in Asian countries, Japan first, followed by China, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan—were not present at the genesis of pop culture, their influence on mass culture has become indisputable during the last three decades. Significant convergence has

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occurred between the various genres and aesthetic languages of pop culture; today’s video games are like real movies, with highly sophisticated scripts, graphics, and soundtracks that often include famous actors (in Beyond: Two Souls, Ellen Page and Willem Dafoe play the main characters, for instance). The aesthetics of video games has in turn heavily influenced other audiovisual products, such as The Matrix Trilogy (1999, 2003). Global pop culture has also given rise to vast fan communities and, more broadly, participatory publics. Both types of groups have grown exponentially, thanks to the advent of networks and digital tools, as well as through convergence with geek and video game culture. Via the massification of distribution technologies and the emergence of participatory tools, contemporary pop culture has become an ideal vantage point from which to examine “a top-down corporate-driven process and a bottom­up consumer-driven process” (Jenkins 2006: 18). It has flourished in part, thanks to the shift from a world of official media to one of “spreadable media” (Jenkins et al. 2013), where consumers and amateurs interact with cultural industries and participate in the creation of economic and cultural value. Third, global pop culture is aesthetically inclusive. It seeks coexistence and hybridization between the products of dominant aesthetic models (in the second half of the twentieth century, these were mostly American and European) and local products (Barbero 1993; Dorfman 1984 [1972]; Martinez 1998; Craig 2000; Chua and Iwabuchi 2008); the resulting innovations of which are then reintegrated into mainstream production circuits. This was the case with techno, which was invented in West Germany under American influences (with the famous group Kraftwerk) and first became popular in Europe before flourishing in Chicago. Bringing together musicians, producers, and club kids (Daft Punk, Laurent Garnier, Air, and other emblems of the “French Touch”), electro quickly distanced itself from its American and British roots, before being welcomed back into the fold via a number of collaborations with mainstream artists such as Madonna (Artus 2017). A similar thing occurred with Cantonese kung-fu movies, which combined Western values, narratives, and aesthetic preferences with their Chinese counterparts and thus helped to revitalize the flagging film industry in Hong Kong (Ang 1990). These films later served as an inspiration for American productions: for

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instance, Hong Kong director John Woo directed Mission impossible 2 (2000) and Quentin Tarantino paid homage to this style of film making in Kill Bill (2003). Fourth, this capacity for inclusion is itself linked to another trait: a tendency toward parody, allusion, and self-referential. In fact, “layering and combining are in pop culture’s very DNA” (Artus 2017: 68). There are countless examples: the famous collage of 58 individuals (including pop culture icons) on the cover of the Beatles’ 1967 album, Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band (Draper 2019); the animated film Shrek (2001),3 which references no fewer than 22 other American films, and Steven Spielberg’s 2018 film Ready Player One, which makes at least 50 different allusions to pop culture references, including movies, television shows, songs, and video games (IMDb 2018). In global pop culture, it is common for creators to parody, adapt, and pastiche other works (from both high-brow and low-brow culture), especially via the medium of icons (real people or fictional characters, sometimes even objects) by using transmedia platforms (Cantor 2003; Ramet and Crnković 2003). This kind of creative work presupposes a broad and eclectic culture that is shared by both creators and consumers, as well as a knack for catching allusions and references. Some have even argued that “the wink” is a defining characteristic of global pop culture, which often operates at a meta level (Yano 2013). Fifth, by drawing inspiration from traditional stories, legends, and tales—or by creating new ones—pop culture crafts universal myths (Hatfield et al. 2013; Wolf 2018). From the very beginning, global pop culture has focused on the big questions: where do we come from; how was the world created (see 2001, A Space Odyssey); how can we avoid the end of the world (countless disaster movies portray world-saving heroes); how do we deal with free will and the crushing responsibility that comes with power (“With great power comes great responsibility,” the famous recurring phrase in the Spiderman comics) (Cronin 2015)? Pop culture is haunted by the possibility of other worlds, including cosmopolitan galactic utopias (Star Wars, The Foundation Cycle) and a post-human landscape 3  For a visual comparison of images of the original and how it is parodied in Shrek, see Engvalson 2018.

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of cooperation with machines, androids, or aliens (ET, Blade Runner, the augmented reality game Pokémon Go). It examines the wide variety of problems that humanity constantly faces. In short, “a fundamental trait of pop culture is that it does not shy away from the dark side of humanity, of the world, of the past and present—it suggests living without fatalism but with hedonism” (Artus 2017: 81). At the heart of American pop culture, the uniqueness of these myths is their ontological optimism, an attitude that is closely linked to the historical context in which this form of culture was developed (i.e., the United States in the middle of the twentieth century, following the defeat of Nazi-fascist and imperialist powers, with the country presenting itself as the world’s best hope in fighting the Communist threat and promoting faith in “good men” and their ability to triumph over adversity). Starting in the 1940s, countless heroes and protectors, unshakeable in their faith and infallible in their actions, became part of the mythical landscape, such as Captain America and Superman (Lawrence and Jewett 2002; Jewett and Lawrence 2003). In the 1960s—that is, after the golden age of the superhero (Kaplan 2008)—as new fictional worlds were explored and new frontiers were crossed (Star Trek, Battlestar Galactica), even the most self-destructive urges were ultimately redirected toward the common good (The Incredible Hulk). Even the darkest of characters had their Apollonian counterparts (Batman versus Superman, for instance). This heroic phase of pop culture found an ideal outlet in comics and Hollywood films portraying good and deeply honest protagonists ready to sacrifice themselves for the greater good (two roles played by James Stewart immediately come to mind: Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939) and It’s a Wonderful Life (1946), both films directed by Frank Capra). More recently, American production has led pop culture, especially in terms of movies, to explore darker fare, as seen in Christopher Nolan’s trilogy when Batman grapples with his uncertain status as a hero and the blurring of the lines between Good and Evil, the ontological nihilism of The Joker, or the unending thirst for power displayed in Game of Thrones and House of Cards. Other sectors of pop culture have likewise delved into antihero territory, in particular cyberpunk and post-apocalyptic Japanese

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films, manga, and anime such as Akira,4 Ghost in the Shell (which strongly inspired The Matrix),5 Tetsuo: The Iron Man,6 Gundam,7 and Fist of the North Star.8 Nevertheless, global pop culture continues to have a relentlessly optimistic undercurrent, which has recently taken the form of the hero’s return (Wonder Woman and Black Panther) and renewed interest in sunnier fare (romantic comedies, love songs, musicals, etc.). In this context, rising actors on the global scene (from Japan, India, China, and South Korea in particular, as we will see in this volume) are creating new forms that embrace pop culture’s lighthearted and positive underpinnings. Six, global pop culture does not overlap with the popular culture of a specific country, even if this country occupies a central position in the world cultural system. Even though the United States dominated the sphere of global pop culture, folk music—and related dances, both very popular in that country—struggled to be exported. Some of the jurors on American Idol, the world-known musical contest, for example, are virtually unknown to global audiences, even though they are stars in their own countries (such as country music singer Luke Bryan). Conversely, what reaches global success may sometimes appear stereotyped, even caricatured to national audiences. The 2021 Eurovision9 contest gives an example of this phenomenon: Barbara Pravi, the French contestant was placed second, playing on the imagery of Edith Piaf (singing alone under the spotlight, dressed in black and with a very emotional singing voice),

 Akira is a Japanese cyberpunk manga series written and illustrated by Katsuhiro Otomo (1982). The manga is also famous for spawning the seminal 1988 cyberpunk anime film adaptation of the same name. Akira was instrumental in the popularity surge of manga outside Japan. 5  Ghost in the Shell is a Japanese cyberpunk media franchise based on the manga series of the same name written and illustrated by Masamune Shirow (1989). Animation studio Production I.G has produced several anime adaptations of the series: these include the 1995 film of the same name. 6  Tetsuo: The Iron Man is a 1989 Japanese cyberpunk body horror film. It was written, produced, edited, and directed by Shinya Tsukamoto. 7  Gundam is a Japanese science-fiction anime, created by Yoshiyuki Tomino featuring giant robots, or mecha, with the name “Gundam.” The franchise was launched in 1979. 8  Fist of the North Star is a Japanese manga series written by Buronson and illustrated by Tetsuo Hara. The anime was first appeared in France in 1988. 9  The Eurovision Song Contest is an international song competition organized annually by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) which features participants representing primarily European countries, with competing countries then casting votes for the other countries’ songs to determine a winner. 4

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a style far from the contemporary national production as a whole.10 Therefore, we shall here focus on South Korean cultural products that reach global audiences with success and their reception (Chua 2004; Choe and Russell 2012), neglecting the effect of Hallyu on its national audiences or media, a topic investigated by other scholars (Kim 2007a). Indeed, only a selection of national popular cultural products and artists reaches the global flux and becomes part of the global pop culture. The reasons for this selection are uncertain, and the production of culture is a prototype economy (Cowen 2002), in the context of the global competition (Crane et al. 2002), where many conscripts will only give way to a few chosen ones. Hallyu refers to both a space of production (South Korea) and of reception abroad. Consequently, the expression Hallyu does not just signify Korean pop culture, but rather the global success of various sectors of Korean culture abroad. In other words, answering the question “what is the K in K-Wave” (Lie 2012) is a very tricky one, and the same applies to every kind of pop culture reaching global success, as pointed out by many Korean scholars, first, because the Hallyu does not reflect South Korean pop culture as a whole and, second, because its success comes from the use of many stereotypes that foreigners have (or have built through their consumption of cultural product) about what the “K” means.

1.2

Creating a Common Landscape

Given that many elements which help to unite the world are inherently cultural (Lechner and Boli 2005) and that capitalism uses culture as a sort of Trojan Horse to gain access to our everyday lives (Robertson and White 2007), pop culture—defined as the culture produced by cultural industries, distributed by networks and mass media, and consumed by global publics (Pickering 2010; Parker 2011; Williams 2018)—is an ideal perch from which to examine the inclusive dynamics of globalization. The latter is a phenomenon which operates through the production and consumption of cultural products whose circulation puts very distant cultures in contact with each other (Cicchelli and Octobre 2018a).  https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCtlN-Ff1AivzUjTNLf-_wqQ

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Pop culture is omnipresent in everyday life, offering individuals around the globe a vast panoply of choices as well as an important (and often interlinked) inventory of cultural touchstones to reference (Shim 2006; Ryoo 2009; Pickering 2010; Kidd 2014). As a powerful creator and vector of myriad images of the world, which spread through capillary action at unprecedented speed, thanks to digital and audiovisual technologies (During 1997; Song and Jang 2013; Jin and Yoon 2014; Lee and Nornes 2014; Octobre 2020), pop culture produced the global commons, which is fostered through the imagination of desirable “elsewheres” (Appadurai 1990,  1991, 1996) and affiliation with imagined transnational communities. A plethora of highly seductive images of modern life are conveyed by pop culture, which provokes both desire and frustration in its publics (Suarez-Orozco and Qin-Hilliard 2004; Regev 2019). To paraphrase Raymond Williams (1958: 4), pop culture is a “whole way of life—the common meanings.” It is after the 1960s that pop culture was finally able to become the most significant modality of cultural dissemination, thanks to the widespread adoption of radio and television and the emergence of youth culture. Starting in the 1980s, pop culture became worthy of sociological study (Bennett 1980). It should be noted that until the 1970s and 1980s, pop culture was largely a Western affair. After this period, however, Asian countries—with Japan in the lead—began to join the global landscape of pop culture, gradually understanding not only just economic but also symbolic stakes of exporting cultural products (Kim 2009a). Consequently, our contemporary context is characterized by unprecedented competition between cultural products made in the West and those “made in the East” (Kim 2009b).

2

 he Korean Wave: From the Margins T to the Mainstream

Hallyu, the Korean Wave, is a product of global pop culture, certain traits of which it has preserved while nonetheless offering new characteristics linked to the context in which it was born.

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Hallyu 1.0: A Regional Success Story

The Korean Wave looks like a global pop culture success story, experiencing in the space of three decades a transition from contents that were “made for Korea” in the 1990s to ones that were “made in Korea” in the 2000s, and now global products that are “made by Korea” (Jin 2012; Prins and Zameczkowski 2019). One may be surprised that until the middle of the 1990s, Korean products were seen by Asian and Western audiences as largely devoid of aesthetic interest (Shim 2006), as evidenced by this 1994 excerpt from World Music: The Rough Guide about Korean music: “The country has developed economically at a staggering pace, but in terms of popular music there is nothing to match the remarkable contemporary sounds of Indonesia, Okinawa, or Japan” (Kawakami and Fisher 1994: 12). Similarly, the Oxford History of World Cinema published in 1996, while seeking to provide an exhaustive overview of international cinema, did not mention a single Korean film, though it awarded many pages to films from China, Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (Nowell-Smith 1996). Korean cultural products were really only concerned with attracting a local public. This lack of interest, or even ignorance, in Korean culture on the part of the broad audience and on some critics only makes the advent of the Korean Wave and its successful story at the global level all the more remarkable and sheds light on the shifting of cultural flows. Hallyu was primarily the result of coordinated government action to emancipate the country from its colonial heritage. Starting in the 1990s, the South Korean government thus set its sights on creating its own pop culture industry by the end of the century, with a view to perhaps even influencing other cultures (Hong 2014). In the last decade of the twentieth century, amidst a backdrop of media liberalization in many Asian countries (Iwabuchi 2004), and after it had improved the quality of its products and started producing them more cheaply than its Japanese competitors, South Korea began to export its K-dramas and films to its neighbors, countries which were already used to receiving high-quality exports from Hong Kong and Japan. South Korean exports first found popularity in East Asia, with China becoming the first country where

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appreciation for Korean products was recorded, a few years after the two countries had resumed diplomatic relations (1992). K-pop and in particular dance music became increasingly popular amongst Chinese teenagers after it was introduced in 1997 by a radio program broadcast from Beijing called Seoul Music Room. The first goal was conquering the Japanese market, which was at the time the second-largest music industry market (after the United States). Increasingly, slick K-pop groups with diverse styles (pop, dance, R&B) such as BoA,*11 TVXQ,* Girls’ Generation,* SHINee,* and Kara* were gradually introduced to Japanese consumers. However, Japan was truly won over with the advent of the television show Winter Sonata,* rebroadcasted by the Japanese channel NHK. The series was an instant hit, transforming its lead actor Bae Yong-jun into an Idol for Japanese female fans (Lee, 2011). Tourism from Japan to South Korea began developing at this time, with many fans of the series going to visit where it had been shot (Korean Cultural Center, 2019). The Korean Wave also began to wash over other countries in the region: the K-dramas Autumn in My Heart* and Jewel in the Palace* were very popular in Thailand, Singapore, and Hong Kong between 2002 and 2006 (Jin and Yoon, 2014). During the same period, South Korean movies met with box office success across Asia: this was the case for My Sassy Girl,* a romantic comedy directed by Kwak Jae-yong which made 1.7 million USD at the box office in Hong Kong and 4.3 million USD in Japan. The film was also the subject of remakes in India, China, and even the United States (Jung-Kim 2014). The success of this first, regional Hallyu at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s can be attributed to the ability of South Korean producers to adapt the content and format of Western (and especially American) products to the tastes and expectations of Asian publics, while nonetheless respecting traditional Confucian values (a topic we shall discuss further) (Chua 2004; Yang 2012). Another decisive element in the Korean Wave’s early success was the low cost of Korean production (Kim 2007a; Yang, 2007). Prior to the 2000s, South Korean television shows  The South Korean cultural products referred to in this book and marked with an asterisk are presented in the glossary at the end of the book. 11

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cost about one-quarter of the price of their Japanese counterparts and one-tenth the price of Hong Kong-based productions (Shim 2006). The regional success of Korean products helped to transform the country’s image amongst its neighbors. The peninsula, which had been colonized and dominated by several different countries, was finally viewed—perhaps for the first time in centuries— as a modern economic powerhouse. South Korea was seen as culturally influential, including with regard to its former colonizers, and yet abstained from dabbling in military and territorial expansion itself. This was the era of products “made in Korea” that skillfully copied existing formats but were successful exports on account of their lower cost.

2.2

Hallyu 2.0: From East to West

In the 2010s, the Korean Wave went global (Choi and Maliangkay 2015a; Kuwahara 2014; Hong-Mercier 2013): every region of the world, even the most remote, was hit by the “Hallyu tsunami” of K-pop (Lansky 2012). This new phase was variously called the “new Korean Wave” (Jin 2014) or “Hallyu 2.0” (Lee and Nornes 2014). We prefer the latter term, as it more precisely describes this unprecedented phase in the globalization of pop culture enabled by digital and network technologies, as well as by the emergence of fan and amateur communities that are highly engaged in participatory forms of culture. This global expansion does not only mark vast commercial success but also highlights a number of structural shifts in how global pop culture functions. The Korean “brand” is now something worthy of exporting—this is the idea behind “made by Korea”—and has in fact become synonymous with quality, originality, and success. This brand relies heavily on a competitive industrial sector but also on an alternative vision of global pop culture (which competes with Japanese and American dominance), on national policies supporting industry and culture, and on vast networks of fans that are highly involved in promoting it throughout the world. In order to fully grasp the global reach of the new Korean Wave, we must first briefly outline the main characteristics of Hallyu 2.0 and what makes it unique among other global cultural flows.

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First of all, Hallyu 2.0 is an integrated and transversal pop culture phenomenon. Aesthetically, the cross-cutting Korean style can be identified in every product, as has been stated clearly by JungBong Choi and Roald Maliangkay (2015b) when analyzing music: Stylistically, K-pop is best described as an integrated popular culture sui generis—an entertainment of its own class. It is a mosaic that blends storytelling, music, group dance, body performance, and fashion show. In terms of musical and performative conventions, it draws on hip hop, Euro techno, grunge, pop, and rap, all the while incorporating contemporary choreographies, acrobatics, and runway acts. Linguistically, it routinely fuses Korean with English words, introduces neologisms and mobile device-based jargons, and occasionally interjects Japanese and Chinese onomatopoeia (4).

This integration is closely linked to the modes of production, as evidenced by the ubiquitous reference to “entertainment” in the names of South Korean labels. In addition to functioning as a kind of wink or meta-reference (common in pop culture more generally), the Korean Wave’s insistence on entertainment truly refers to a panoply of intricately linked products promoted using sophisticated marketing strategies with a view to conquering all sectors of the entertainment market. In fact, a vast number of diverse products were labeled as “Korean contents” at the 2020 MIPCOM, the world’s largest content market, where South Korea was the guest of honor.12 Album and film releases are accompanied by videos, actors become singers, manhwa characters become the protagonists of K-dramas, television and game shows employ pop stars as participants, and so on. Secondly, we argue the Korean Wave is first and foremost a global pop culture phenomenon: strictly speaking, it is not defined in terms of ethnic or national aesthetics (as may be the case for Chinese, Taiwanese, or Hong Kong cinema, for instance). A few numbers to get an idea of its scope: in 2018, there were 89 million self-proclaimed Hallyu fans in the world. In 2018, there were 1843 Korean Wave fan clubs (focusing on 12

 https://www.mipcom.com/en-gb/conferences-events/country-of-honour.html

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various actors, singers, cultural elements, etc.) outside of South Korea, in 113 different countries. Although the greatest number of K-pop fans live in Asia and Oceania (70.59 million members in 457 different fan clubs), they are also a sizeable presence in the Americas (11.8 million members in 712 clubs) and Europe (6.57 million members in 534 clubs). Africa and the Middle East (230,000 members in 140 clubs) are the regions with relatively fewer fans (Yeon-soo 2019). Finally, this new global pop culture is characterized by an intensive and extensive use of communications technologies and participative cultures. Unlike the Korean Wave 1.0, which was heavily reliant on radio channels and television stations, Hallyu 2.0 allows for the dissemination of South Korean culture on digital devices and social networks, which are themselves globalized. Any analysis of the second Korean Wave must therefore take note of transnational flows (Ono and Kwon 2013) and the specificity of media environments (Jung and Shim 2014) and of how individuals appropriate these for themselves. Korean movies, television shows, and music all circulate on networks and platforms such as YouTube, V-Life, Netflix, and Rakuten TV. In the past few years, streaming platforms, with Netflix leading the charge, have begun to invest in the production of K-dramas, which appeal to both Asian and Western audiences (e.g., Netflix has produced Kingdom,* Persona,* Love Alarm,* and My Holo Love,* among others). We have even seen new cultural forms appear, such as webtoons, and specific commercial venues pop up, such as manhwabangs,13 and the ability to purchase pages of manhwa online. This use of the internet and social media is accompanied by a shift in perspective, since fan communities now play a major role: “from user generated content web sites to peer-to-peer networks, these channels play a central role in global cultural circulation” (Jin 2012: 6). The Hallyu model does not use the media just to distribute cultural products but also to coproduce consumption experiences. This has been made easier by the fact that South Korea was an early proponent of a “user-oriented” digital society (O’Reilly, 2007). In fact, according to Statista (2016), in 2016 the average internet speed  Manhwabangs are private libraries and reading rooms devoted to manhwa. They allow patrons to rent manhwa 24 hours a day and to read them onsite for a low cost (about 20 cents per title). 13

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in the country was already 28.6 megabits per second and 95% of the population had access to it. A 4G wireless network already covered 95% of the country’s territory, with South Korea boasting the highest rate of smartphones connected to the Internet in the world (100% among 18- to 20-year-olds).

3

 Monographic Approach to Hallyu: A Production, Circulation, and Consumption

The Korean Wave is a unique product of global pop culture, but it has also transformed the latter. In order to fully account for the contribution of Korean pop culture, our analysis will look at both consumer agency and infrastructure, examining modes of production, methods of circulation, geopolitical uses, and the consumption of globalized Korean pop cultural products. In this theoretical framework, we methodologically separate Hallyu as a globally oriented product from Korean culture, as our analysis does not focus on the link between the contents conveyed by Korean industries and Korean culture but on their production, circulation, and reception abroad.

3.1

 hrough the Lens of Hallyu: T A Multiscalar Approach

In her study of Hello Kitty, the ubiquitous Japanese icon of what the author calls “Pink Globalization”—defined as “the transnational spread of goods and images labeled kawaii (glossed in English as ‘cute’) from Japan to other parts of the industrial world” (Yano 2013: 6), Christine Yano outlines a macro and a micro level of analysis. The first is based on the global political economy of “cuteness,” which rose to the fore in the 2000s and of which Hello Kitty was one of the major drivers. The second level is individual and pertains to everyday life. “These personal stories etch intimacy upon the pink, global encounter. Pink Globalization thus searches for the personal in the political as much as the political in the personal” (Yano 2013: 9).

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With an increased degree of complexity, we shall also adopt this scalar approach combining macro- and microanalyses, also used by Henry Jenkins and his coauthors (Jenkins et al. 2013). In this volume, we invite the reader to see Hallyu as a South Korean variation on global pop culture, first focusing on industrial systems of production, then on the advent of a non-hegemonic global pop culture alternative, and finally on the close relationship between cultural industry and diplomatic strategy embraced by “The Land of the Morning Calm.”14 These first three levels of analysis will allow us to understand the structural conditions undergirding the emergence of the Korean Wave. However, to fully comprehend Hallyu’s role as a new form of global pop culture and truly take advantage of our monographic focus, we shall also explore the reasons behind the public’s new appetite for Korean products, as well as their varying uses of these cultural products. In fact, the globalization of the Korean Wave is closely linked to its two-fold nature as the production of cultural contents, stricto sensu, and the production of culture more broadly. These two aspects operate independently of each other, at least in part: the first concerns the production of goods, while the second concerns a cultural phenomenon, the expression of the desires and practices of consumers who are scattered around the globe but linked together in participatory loops. Fans can therefore be seen as actors in the cultural process, even if they remain outside of where cultural products are manufactured. Fans take on roles as cocreators (staging flash mobs, creating covers, etc.), publicists (publicizing cultural contents), media commentators (by explaining and interpreting content with a view to creating more fans), and distributors (sharing contents). Our approach thus lies at the intersection between pop cultural studies—which investigate the close linkages between production, distribution, and consumption/reception but curiously tend to overlook the globalization of culture (Grazian 2010; Storey 2012; Danesi 2015)—and global studies, for which the globalization of culture has become a hobbyhorse, without nonetheless ever converting pop culture into a serious  The Korean toponym Choson was erroneously translated by nineteenth-century missionaries as “The Land of the Morning Calm.” Despite the initial mistake, this expression has made its way into common usage. 14

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subject of study (Featherstone 1990; Tomlinson 1991, 1999; Robertson 1992; Appadurai 1996; Curran and Park 2000; Crane 2002). Our approach is also intended as a dialogue between Western and Asian (mostly Korean and also Japanese) analysis of pop culture studies in order to shed light both on the distinctiveness and similitude of Hallyu, on its unique contribution to the global landscape of pop culture, and on its inspiration from American and Japanese pop culture.

3.2

Hallyu in France

In our examination of the Korean Wave, France stands out as a prime example. Contrary to expectations, the turning point of the global spread of Hallyu took place in France, rather than in the United States—a market that some K-pop groups had in vain tried to penetrate prior to the 2010s. Five K-pop groups represented by the Korean agency SM Entertainment (TVXQ,* Girls’ Generation,* Super Junior,* f(x),* and SHINee*) held their first concert in June 2011 at the Zénith in Paris: 6000 tickets were sold in under 15  minutes. Ultimately, more than 140,000 fans coming from all over Europe attended the concert (Oh 2011). Hundreds of young French and European fans protested their inability to get tickets by hosting a flash dance in front of the Louvre and posting it on social media (Cha and Kim 2011). SM Entertainment then added two more concerts to meet the demands of fans. This popularity was surprising, given that Asian pop was at that point only appreciated by a happy few in France. Entertainment agencies learned their lesson in France, however, and began to deploy the full range of possibilities offered by social networks and digital platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok (Oh and Park 2012; Jung and Shim 2014) to gain traction and take advantage of a growing fanbase. The latter are of course powerful tools to disseminate cultural products far and wide (by drawing on the desire of users to share what they love), but they also encourage consumers to discuss contents, which makes the latter more visible and thus more likely to be appropriated by a broad range of individuals (Song and Jang 2013). The stunning success of Psy’s “Gangnam Style,”* released in July 2012, helped K-pop transition into the realm of global fame,

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thanks to a tidal wave of one billion YouTube views in under six months, from which France was not immune. The extent of this craze may seem surprising if we compare it to the niche markets that are the remnants of previous cultural “waves,” such as the Bollywood wave that hit France at the start of the 2000s (Litaud 2013) and which was largely appreciated by young French persons of Northern African descent, in particular from Morocco.15 The scope of the Korean Wave is also stunning if we consider the weak migratory flows and low levels of tourism between France and South Korea, especially compared to other geographical regions such as Northern Africa.

3.3

Global Pop Culture and Pop Cosmopolitanism

The reason we are proposing a monographic approach to the Korean Wave is because we believe that this will be a more heuristic method to understand the global interest in South Korean cultural products, as it accounts for the transnational mechanisms of pop culture as well as the joint action of industrial infrastructures of production and distribution, policies of international promotion, and technologies of global diffusion and transnational consumption (Cicchelli and Octobre 2021). While we will not engage with the analysis of the aesthetics of the Korean products in this volume,16 we leave the fans the care of account of their taste for Korean culture. Our monograph-based approach devotes Chaps. 2, 3, and 4 to analyze the international scientific literature (to which South Korean researchers have notoriously contributed) as well as Korean official reports, with a view to investigating what David Wright (2015) calls “the infrastructure of tasting,” that is, the ecosystem created by producers, intermediaries, institutions, technologies, and the state. This analysis will allow us to understand how Korean products go beyond the borders of their country of origin and become accessible to international publics and specifically French publics in our case.  Every year, Morocco hosts the Marrakech International Film Festival (Basini 2012).  This analysis exceeds the scope of this book and will require another approach that we intend to develop in a forthcoming research.

15

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To do so, we will examine the specific modes of capitalist production that govern Hallyu (Chap. 2). Associated with the production of aesthetic goods, capitalism has become aesthetic or artistic (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006; Böhme 2017; Pharo 2018) and has marketed difference (Emontspool and Woodward 2018) as a strategy to maintain elevated demand. The desire of consuming the others (a sort of neo-exoticism stripped of its colonial and elitist underpinnings) has become a key driver of global growth. This desire is cleverly stoked by permanent emotional stimulation (Illouz 2019), which transforms consumption into an experience of self-construction. South Korean cultural industries have developed a highly specific model of production—which we term “entertainment capitalism”—that cuts across various cultural spheres and competitive markets and is based on a close partnership between the state and private enterprise. This sui generis variety of aesthetic capitalism relies on highly serialized production according to international norms and presents a new figure of the artist (the Idol ) which breeds great attachment amongst fans (Lie and Oh 2014; Kang 2015; Choi 2015b). It also exploits digital publics to ensure success and promote an ideology of well-­ being through its products, which is even more attractive given that consumers are invited to become cocreators of this ideology. While pop culture was born under the aegis of American culture, the Korean Wave offers a litmus test to identify the defining characteristics of an alternative globalization of pop culture (Chap. 3) in terms of counterflows (Shim 2006; Yang 2007; Chua and Iwabuchi 2008) stemming from a non-hegemonic player. In this vein, it displays the advent of a multipolar cultural order. Historically, cultural products produced in subaltern countries were subject to exoticism, while the cultural products of dominant world powers were consumed around the globe as symbols of modernity. Given that South Korea is a modern and highly attractive— but not dominant—country, this dichotomy no longer applies. While Korea is not the first example of the “Asian miracle” in the cultural sphere (Iwabuchi 2004), the country has now become the most credible alternative to its regional superpower Japan, as well as the global superpower of the United States, in terms of providing a coherent vision of the world that stems from its cultural products as crafted, aestheticized, and marketed by Korean cultural industries. Today, the Korean Wave has

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managed to obtain significant visibility well beyond the borders of its Asian homeland (Kofice 2018). Almost 20 years after the diagnostic pronounced by Koichi Iwabuchi (2002) on the role played by cultural flows from Japan with regard to “recentering globalisation,” we are witnessing a turning point in global pop culture, what has also been termed a “de-­ centralising multiplicity” (Kim 2007b). Cultural offerings have become diversified, and audiences can now be exposed to new models of cultural globalization. Both because it is a counterflow and it is an original creation stemmed from Western pop cultural standards, Hallyu reshuffles the cards of Western hegemony over pop culture in terms of norms, values, and ideals. Far from being a mere variation of the cultural globalization model invented by the United States, which has been disseminated far and wide, with local adaptations, since the end of the Second World War, Hallyu represents a globalization that is an alternative to the Western model of pop culture, even though the strength, pervasivity, and efficiency of American cultural globalization lead Hallyu to embrace and convey its modes of production and promotion, ideology, and credo to a certain extent. Hallyu can also be seen as a sui generis tool to promote the image of South Korea around the world (Chap. 4). Global competition, often seen from a military or economic perspective in terms of hard power, can also be symbolic and cultural, thus giving rise to the cultural diplomacy of soft power (Nye 1990; Chaubet 2013; Kim and Nye 2013; Ang et al. 2015). The soft power of the Korean Wave is unique in that it is not accompanied by any deployment of military might (as was the case with American hegemony, whose global brands burst onto European markets after the Second World War), and it does not reignite any painful feelings linked to an imperialist or colonial past (as was the case with Japanese cultural products in East Asia). Moreover, this soft power is greatly served by the content of K-pop and K-dramas which, unlike American products that often explicitly depict conflict (racial-based, gender-based, age-­ based, or class-based), choose to convey aesthetically pleasing messages that do not threaten the social order and reinforce ideas of a happy modernity and that does not aim at being hegemonic. Due to its harmless outward appearance, we shall refer to the Korean variant of soft power

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as “sweet power,” reflecting both the country’s reconstruction efforts after its socio-economic crisis in 1997 and the new image that South Korea seeks to project beyond its borders: one where it is no longer a nation of industrious manufacturers, but rather a global actor on the global scene, a nation of peaceful, modern, and creative individuals (Lee 2012). The massive use of pop culture led to the culturalization and aestheticization of Korea’s image abroad, and this aestheticization is inseparable from the country’s proud ownership of its past, its cultural and spiritual roots, and its modernity, which all contribute to a kind of positive storytelling that Japan seems to lack—and which also confirms the role that South Korea intends to play as a counterpower to the United States in the realm of pop culture. This success is in large part due to the Hallyu strategy of depicting South Korea as a “sweet” and non-threatening nation, whose culture lies at the convergence of regional and global influences and succeeds thanks to its ability to combine the latter with a carefully curated past free of any imperialist ambitions (which differentiates this sweet power from the soft power developed by former imperialist countries) and whose cultural products praise personal empowerment (this second trait being another originality of the sweet power). Thus defined, this “sweetness” is the main difference between South Korea and its main East Asian rival, Japan, in terms of pop culture dominance. Following our analysis of Hallyu’s infrastructure, we will look at the agency of young people in France, adopting a unique perspective that examines not just research on the various forms of learning that occur through the reception of Korean cultural products but also on how a Western audience use these products to develop an image of “a good society.” By using Korean products in this manner, young people elaborate a non-hegemonic vision of globalization and (re)imagine their place in the world. In exploring how Hallyu products are used, we seek to go beyond the statement made by Ingyu Oh (2009), according to which “Korean Wave fans in different regions are ‘transnational consumers and learners of popular culture for inter-ethnic cultural understanding’ based on their active consumption and participation in the Korean Wave” (426 in Jang and Song 2017: 187). In fact, we shall be more focused on the ideologies, imaginaries, and narratives developed by young French people using products of the Korean Wave, in short, on better

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understanding the contribution of “the consumption of difference” (Schroeder 2015) to self-development and self-construction as a human being in the world, what we have termed the cosmopolitan Bildung (Cicchelli 2012). When the peripheral and the faraway—from the point of view of Western audiences—become central and near, what are the effects of the internalization of this Korean “new other” in terms of aesthetic criteria, cultural knowledge, vision of the world, and biographical trajectories? This second level of analysis draws on a series of in-depth interviews conducted with young Hallyu fans living in the Paris region (the interviews were conducted in March/April 2019, December/January 2020, and April/May 2020 on 73 individuals).17 These interviews help us describe how the transnational flows of pop culture reach new publics among global generations, transform cultural engagement by forcing it to become more participatory, and, most importantly, create new cosmopolitan tastes, imaginaries, and worldviews stemmed from non-Western countries giving them new contents. This is where our analysis, inherently focused on the globalization of culture and transnational consumption patterns, links up with the main tenets of cosmopolitanism, seen as the openness to cultural alterity that is mobilized by social actors during the formative moments of their lives in a globalized society (Cicchelli 2018). As we have seen, pop culture is fertile terrain for the genesis of shared global commons and should therefore be exploited as one of the ideal vantage points from which to examine the cosmopolitanization of the world intended as the global inclusion of ancient peripheral cultural center. In fact, if the contemporary era is “founded on a dialogical imaginary of the internalized other” (Beck 2004: 79) in a context where “the global other is in our midst” (Beck and Grande 2010: 417), it is doubtless culture, and global pop culture more specifically, that plays a major role in providing individuals with the resources they need to experience emotions, form (self-)representations and live in the world. The acts of consumption of cosmopolitan amateurs can thus be viewed as mediated encounters which powerfully contribute to cosmopolitan socialization, especially for the younger generations who  The interviewees are presented in Appendix.

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are increasingly exposed to multipolar cultural flows (Cicchelli and Octobre 2018b). We shall look at how distances are measured and a global commons is created through the acts of reception of Western cosmopolitan amateurs (Chap. 5). Following Henry Jenkins (2004), we shall designate this kind of openness to the aesthetic and culture otherness of South Korean pop culture as “pop cosmopolitanism,” that is, “the ways that the transcultural flows of popular culture inspire new forms of global consciousness and cultural competency” (127). To understand the work undertaken by Western cosmopolitan amateurs, we shall investigate how South Korean products help to foster youth imaginaries and consider the “K” of the K-Wave as a floating signifier (Lie 2012), whose signified is determined by young fans and that can be distant from the Korean culture as lived and imagined by consumers and/or fans belonging to Korean country or diasporas. Given that it is aesthetically pleasing, this signifier allows these young individuals—who sometimes are not familiar with Korean culture—not to turn away from the mainstream and embrace the defining characteristics of the Korean Wave, in large part, thanks to the participatory culture of online networks (Chap. 6). Among young people, the representations that stem from the consumption of Hallyu products feed into a dialectic of affiliation and disaffiliation that relies on the comparison between what they perceive of South Korean society (as they appraise via the cultural products they consume) and the society in which they live, as well as sometimes their culture of origin when young people from immigrant backgrounds are concerned (Chap. 7). While the Korean Wave is often discovered as a new passion in middle and high school, offering distraction and support to teenagers as they face the trials and tribulations of adolescence, it sometimes leads fans to reorganize their lives, in particular, when it inspires professional projects or academic trajectories (Chap. 8).

3.4

Hallyu as an Aestheticized Pop Culture System

All of these different dimensions form a system: sweet power is inseparable from an alternative vision of globalization that is in turn encouraged by consumers who cultivate a sense of openness—a cosmopolitan virtue

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that entertainment companies have learned to manipulate to their advantage—and vice versa. This system is unique in that it is highly aestheticized, not just because the aesthetic quality of Korean products is high but also because its assessment of quality specifically places aesthetic considerations at the heart of developing one’s relationship with the world. The promotion of aesthetics does not just concern individual beauty (actors and singers, almost all of whom are also models) but also a cinematic, stage, choreographic, and musical aesthetic in which there is no place for dissonance, for harsh audio or visuals, or for sloppy dress or behavior. Many K-dramas are even recolorized to obtain images that at times resemble paintings. K-pop shows and videos are designed to be cinematic experiences that employ the most advanced techniques (3D, multiple visual effects, superimposition, chroma key compositing, colorizing, etc.) and mix genres (no K-pop show is complete without the insertion of videos shot like films, complex choreography, and impressive visual effects). Thanks to the aestheticization of this pop culture that individuals can enjoy products from a country whose cultural codes they do not know, in turn using these new cultural resources to enrich their biographical trajectories, transform their tastes and distastes, and support their socialization to alterity in order to decenter themselves form a Western point of view of the world (Yoon 2018). Previous comparative studies on young cultural consumers in Paris, Sao Paulo, and Seoul have shown that this aesthetic understanding is particularly well developed among young French individuals (Cicchelli et  al. 2018). This aesthetic dimension is likewise well-suited to inciting emotions and maximizing the spontaneous investment of publics, whereas a cultural approach, which is inherently more selective, requires a greater upfront cost. Last but not least, this aesthetic dimension does not promise any kind of cultural authenticity. In fact, Hallyu illustrates one of the key findings of global studies, the complex dynamics according to which global cultural processes are integrated into local contexts, appropriated, and reinvented: in short, “glocalized” (Robertson 1992). In a more formalized fashion, we also find this approach to the circulation of global cultural products in the work done by Wonho Jang and Byungmin Lee (2016). Applied to Korean pop culture, this analysis shows how globalization allows, following its

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adaptation to local contexts, for the emergence of new global flows from new centers of production, which promote an original aesthetic that can be identified simultaneously as both specific and universal. For all of these reasons, and particularly because aesthetics is always hybridized, we propose referring to this system of production and consumption as “aestheticized pop culture.”

4

Conclusion

In the ample body of literature devoted to the Korean Wave, this volume stands out thanks to its multi-level monographic approach. First, it prompts a long-neglected dialogue between the sociology of culture, the globalization of culture, and the study of cosmopolitanism (using the concepts of the cosmopolitan amateur and pop cosmopolitanism). Second, it considers South Korean production as an avatar of global pop culture, from which it borrows and reinvents certain indispensable elements, with the result that we can consider Hallyu as an alternative to American hegemony in this sphere. Finally, this work is unique in arguing that the Korean Wave is the outcome of significant changes in the modes of capitalist production and consumption, as well as in the rise of the diplomatic use of cultural goods by countries that have only recently entered the global cultural competition (the latter in turn helping to restructure the geopolitics of cultural flows) and in the development of highly participatory and cosmopolitan youth publics. Thanks to our monographic approach, youth cosmopolitanism can clearly be seen in the openness to alterity, the strength of attraction to the exotic, and the use of foreign cultures to “de-center” oneself and learn how to transcend or at least shift one’s ethnic and class-based affiliations.

Bibliography Ang, Ien. 1990. Culture and Communication: Towards an Ethnographic Critique of Media Consumption in the Transnational Media System. European Journal of Communication 5 (2): 239–260.

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Cicchelli, Vincenzo, Sylvie Octobre, and Viviane Riegel, eds. 2019. Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism and Global Culture. Leiden/Boston: Brill. Cowen, Tyler. 2002. Creative Destruction. How Globalization is Changing the Worlds Cultures. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Craig, Timothy J., ed. 2000. Japan Pop! Inside the World of Japanese Popular Culture. Armonk: Sharpe. Crane, Diana. 2002. Culture and Globalization: Theoretical Models and Emerging Trends. In Global Culture: Media, Arts, Policy, and Globalization, ed. Crane Diana, Kawashima Nobuko, and Kawasaki Ken’ichi, 1–25. London: Routledge. Crane, Diana, Kawashima Nobuko, and Kawasaki Ken’ichi, eds. 2002. Global Culture: Media, Arts, Policy, and Globalization. London: Routledge. Cronin, Bryan. 2015. When We First Met – When Did Uncle Ben First Say “With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility?”. CBR.com, July 15. https:// www.cbr.com/when-­we-­first-­met-­when-­did-­uncle-­ben-­first-­say-­with-­great-­ power-­comes-­great-­responsibility/. Accessed 30 May 2020. Curran, James, and Myung-Jin Park. 2000. Beyond Globalization Theory. In De-Westernizing Media Studies, ed. Curran James and Park Myung-Jin, 1–27. London: Routledge. Danesi, Marcel. 2015. Popular Culture: Introductory Perspectives. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Dorfman, Ariel. 1984 [1972]. How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic. New York: International General. Draper, Jason. 2019. Who’s Who on the Beatles’ ‘Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band’ Album Cover. Udiscovermusic, May 23. https://www.udiscovermusic.com/stories/whos-­who-­on-­the-­beatles-­sgt-­peppers-­lonely-­hearts-­club-­ band-­album-­cover/. Accessed 25 May 2020. During, Simon. 1997. Popular Culture on a Global Scale: A Challenge for Cultural Studies? Critical Inquiry 23 (4): 808–833. Emontspool, Julie, and Ian Woodward, eds. 2018. Cosmopolitanism, Markets, and Consumption. A Critical Global Perspective. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Engvalson, Audrey. 2018. 22 Pop Culture References You Definitely Missed in Shrek Movies. BuzzFeed, May 8. https://www.buzzfeed.com/audreyworboys/ shrek-­hidden-­pop-­culture-­references. Accessed 30 May 2020. Featherstone, Mike. 1990. Global Culture: An Introduction. Theory, Culture & Society 7 (2–3): 1–14. Grazian, David. 2010. Mix it Up: Popular Culture, Mass Media, and Society. New York: Norton.

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Hatfield, Charles, Jeet Heer, and Kent Worcester. 2013. The Superhero Reader. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. Hong, Euny. 2014. The Birth of Korean Cool: How One Nation is Conquering the World through Pop Culture. London: Picador. Hong-Mercier, Seok-Kyeong. 2013. Hallyu as a Digital Culture Phenomenon in the Process of Globalization: A Theoretical Investigation on the Global Consumption of Hallyu Seen in France. Journal of Communication Research 50 (1): 157–192. Illouz, Eva, ed. 2019. Les marchandises émotionnelles. Paris: Premier Parallèle. IMDb. 2018. Ready Player One. IMDb. https://www.imdb.com/title/ tt1677720/. Accessed 25 May 2020. Iwabuchi, Koichi. 2002. Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism. Durham: Duke University Press. ———, ed. 2004. Feeling Asian Modernities: Transnational Consumption of Japanese TV Dramas. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Jang, Wonho, and Byungmin Lee. 2016. The Glocalizing Dynamics of the Korean Wave. Korean Regional Sociology 17 (2): 5–19. Jang, Wonho, and Jung Eun Song. 2017. Webtoon as a New Korean Wave in the Process of Glocalization. Kritika Kultura 29: 168–187. Jenkins, Henry. 2004. Pop Cosmopolitanism: Mapping Cultural Flows in an Age of Media Convergence. In Globalization: Culture and Education in the New Millennium, ed. Suarez-Orozco Marcelo and B. Qin-Hilliard Desiree, 114–140. Berkeley: University of California Press. ———. 2006. Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide. New York: New York University Press. Jenkins, Henry, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green. 2013. Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture. New  York: New  York University Press. Jewett, Robert, and John Shelton Lawrence. 2003. Captain America and the Crusade against Evil: The Dilemma of Zealous Nationalism. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. Jin, Dal Yong. 2012. Hallyu 2.0: The New Korean Wave in the Creative Industry. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library. ———. 2014. The Power of the Nation-State amid Neoliberal Reform: Shifting Cultural Politics in the New Korean Wave. Pacific Affairs 87 (1): 71–92. Jin, Dal Yong, and Nojin Kwak, eds. 2018. Communication, Digital Media, and Popular Culture in Korea. Lanham: Lexington Books.

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Jin, Dal Yong, and Kyong Yoon. 2014. The Social Mediascape of Korean Pop Culture: Hallyu 2.0 as Spreadable Media Practice. New Media & Society 18 (7): 1277–1292. Jung, Sun, and Doobo Shim. 2014. Social Distribution: K-Pop Fan Practices in Indonesia and the ‘Gangnam Style’ Phenomenon. International Journal of Cultural Studies 17 (5): 485–501. Jung-Kim, Jennifer. 2014. My Sassy Girl Goes Around the World. In The Korean Wave. Korean Popular Culture in Global Context, ed. Yasue Kuwhara, 85–100. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kang, Hyungseok. 2015. Contemporary Cultural Diplomacy in South Korea: Explicit and Implicit Approaches. International Journal of Cultural Policy 21 (4): 433–447. Kaplan, Arie. 2008. From Krakow to Krypton. Jews and Comics Books. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society. Kawakami, Hideo, and Paul Fisher. 1994. Eastern Barbarians: The Ancient Sounds of Korea. In World Music: The Rough Guide, ed. Broughton Simon and Ellingham Mark, 468–472. London: Rough Guides. Kidd, Dustin. 2014. Pop Culture Freaks: Identity, Mass Media, and Society. Westview: Boulder. Kim, Jeongmi. 2007a. Why Does Hallyu Matter? The Significance of the Korean Wave in South Korea. Critical Studies in Television 2 (2): 47–105. Kim, Youna. 2007b. The Rising East Asian ‘Wave’. In Media on the Move: Global Flow and Contra-Flow, ed. Kishan Thussu Daya, 131–152. London: Routledge. ———. 2009a. Introduction: The Media and Asian Transformations. In Media Consumption and Everyday Life in Asia, ed. Youna Kim, 1–25. London: Routledge. ———, ed. 2009b. Media Consumption and Everyday Life in Asia. London: Routledge. ———, ed. 2013. The Korean Wave: Korean Media Go Global. London: Routledge. Kim, Kyung Hyun, and Youngmin Choe. 2014. The Korean Popular Culture Reader. Durham: Duke University Press. Kim, Youna, and Joseph Nye. 2013. Soft Power and the Korean Wave. In The Korean Wave: Korean Media Go Global, ed. Youna Kim, 31–42. London: Routledge.

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2 Is Entertainment Capitalism the Ultimate Stage of Aesthetic Capitalism?

According to UNESCO, over the course of ten years (2004–2013) the exchange of cultural goods and services has doubled in volume, accounting for almost 213 billion USD in 2013 (UNESCO 2014).1 Since 2010, the market for cultural products has experienced yearly growth of approximately 5%,2 whereas the global economy is experiencing a phase of relative stagnation (Korea Invest 2017). The markets for movies (+4.1%), video games (+5.7%), media (+7.4%), and animation (+8.3%) are growing at a much faster rate than those for traditional products such as music (+0.8%) and books (+0.4%), with the market for bandes dessinées even witnessing a certain decline (−1.7%). These data confirm that cultural industries are one of the key drivers of global economic growth and cultural globalization. This globalization is closely linked to the new form of capitalism that is the result of runaway consumerism since the 1960s. Moving away from the Weberian analysis of a capitalist spirit based on an ascetic  UNESCO divides cultural goods and services into the six following categories: cultural and natural heritage; performance and celebration; visual arts and crafts; books and press; audiovisual and interactive media; design and creative services. 2  Using the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) as a metric. This is an indicator used to measure the growth of a country’s economy from one year to the next. 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Cicchelli, S. Octobre, The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84296-3_2

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ethos (Weber 2010), scholars have variously described this new capitalism as “aesthetic” (Murphy and la Fuente 2014; Böhme 2017), “cultural,” or “artistic” (Martin 2009; Lipovetsky and Serroy 2013) in order to emphasize the aestheticization of everyday life, a process which is both the cause and the effect of contemporary capitalism (Featherstone 2007). Among these three expressions, sometimes used interchangeably, we prefer “aesthetic capitalism,” as we believe that it captures the essence of contemporary capitalism: that is, the production of aesthetic goods. It would appear as though the deepest desire of the artistic avant-garde––to have art invade everyday life––has come to pass thanks to the meteoric rise of creativity-oriented capitalism and, in particular, the development of cultural industries in constant search of innovations to seduce new segments of the population (targeted in terms of geography, age, sex, social class, ethnicity, and religious affiliation) and provoke new attachments and desires in the latter (Pharo 2018). Creativity and cultural diversity are subject to the Schumpeterian process of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 2003), which increases consumer choice and also echoes the current rhetoric of Silicon Valley in the realm of information and communications technology (Cowen 2004). This form of capitalism is characterized by three concomitant shifts: from the local to the global in terms of distribution; from the tangible to the intangible in terms of the materiality of goods; and from the market’s control over external behaviors to its control over private lives, in terms of symbolic. The industrial dimension of the Korean Wave is thus an integral part of this transformation of global capitalism. Hallyu shares some transnational traits with the latter, but also proposes its own unique version which is a reflection of its specific historical context. To characterize the singularity of aesthetic capitalism in South Korea, we will use the term “entertainment capitalism.” In this chapter, we shall analyze the latter with a view to better understanding South Korea’s stupendous rate of modernization, including the role played by cultural industries since the mid-1990s.

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1

A Critique of Aesthetic Capitalism

Without diving into the full genealogy of contemporary capitalism, we shall first present the ideal-type characteristics of its newest incarnation. These traits have often been put forth as the reason for capitalism’s omnipresence in everyday life and modes of socialization, especially among young people. Aesthetic capitalism is deeply embedded in the lifestyle of the educated and urban middle class. There are many adjectives used to describe the spirit of contemporary capitalism––in addition to “aesthetic,” “cultural,” and “artistic,” it has sometimes been termed “cool” (Frank 1998; McGuigan 2009), “emotional” (Illouz 2008, 2017), “addictive” (Pharo 2018), and “creative” (Florida 2002; Reckwitz 2017). All of these descriptors highlight shared elements of the post-Fordist industrial system. On the one hand, they emphasize the increased commodification of tastes and of artistic and cultural creation, which had hitherto been somewhat protected from capitalism, if not seen as entirely incompatible with the latter. On the other hand, these traits also emphasize the intense, pervasive, and individualized stimulation of desires and purchases.

1.1

The Tenets of Aesthetic Capitalism

Many studies have demonstrated that the contemporary period is characterized by the widespread application of aesthetic strategies to commercial ends in all sectors of mass consumption (Assouly 2011). Gilles Lipovetsky and Jean Serroy (2013) have identified four main tenets of aesthetic capitalism: the incorporation and generalization of style into consumer goods; the widespread development of an entrepreneurial dimension in cultural industries; the increased power of those involved in producing goods and services with an aesthetic dimension; and the emergence of a system in which traditional artistic and cultural hierarchies are scrambled alongside the intermingling of artistic, economic, and financial spheres. We can thus define aesthetic capitalism as the historical phase of the system of production, distribution, and consumption when the pursuit of economic growth is accomplished via the production of aesthetic values (Böhme 2017). As Peter Murphy (2014) has written, “it

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is the alliance of aesthetics and economics, design and industry, beauty and society that sets apart the capitalism of the last two centuries. It was achieved by the gradual permeation of art into everyday life” (52–3). For some, the essential elements of this spirit of capitalism were already present at the birth of industrial capitalism, as captured by Werner Sombart (1967) and Walter Benjamin (1969) in their respective analyses of the roles of luxury and extravagance, and the aestheticization of goods. For others, this spirit has a more recent birthplace in the United States, subsequently spreading to Western Europe and then Japan starting in the 1960s. Its emergence is seen as being tied to societal shifts resulting from postwar economic growth: the expansion of the educated urban middle class; increases in leisure time freed from the cycles of (re)production; the rise of mass culture and cultural industries (Galbraith 1958; Dumazedier 1974; Riesman et al. 2011). These elements arguably form the bedrock of the consumer society as embodied in the “American way of life,” an ideal that has been widely exported toward other countries embracing liberal and market democracies (whether voluntarily, or under duress following military defeat, as was the case for Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Imperial Japan) (Wagnleitner 1994). The industrialization of cultural products has been subject to criticism, especially with regard to its rejection of the humanist universalist tradition of Bildung, the reduced aesthetic quality of works, diminished creativity due to the serialization and standardization of products, the loss of artistic autonomy as well as the power to subvert, given the public’s outsized influence (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002). Moving beyond such elitist and backward-looking criticisms, we are inclined to think that we are witnessing a genuine reconfiguration of the relationship of individuals to culture. The hypertrophy of supply and the extreme precision of sales techniques thanks to targeted marketing go hand-in-hand with an important expansion of the aesthetic and sensitive dimension of experience, that is, the aestheticization of everyday life. Aesthetic capitalism should therefore be viewed as an entrepreneurial strategy that accompanies and bolsters this aestheticization. It draws on a relationship to consumption that is based on the compulsive desire to acquire things, and on the use of cultural goods as linchpins of self-­ identity in contemporary societies where work no longer suffices to define

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the good life (Sennett 1998), and where the regulating force of large institutions is on the wane. Revisiting one of Axel Honneth’s main ideas (1995, 2004), the “de-institutionalization” of contemporary societies promulgates a new ideal of personal fulfillment, which leads to the diversification of lifestyles based on consumerism as a means to shape one’s identity. In aesthetic capitalism, the consumption of goods does not solely serve to reproduce and preserve everyday life, but first and foremost to enrich it and allow for the staging of people’s idiosyncratic projects: every act of consumption must express and reaffirm an authentic choice that fits with the image we have of ourselves (Redden 2007). Commodities thus become powerful resources allowing individuals to create self-narratives, for better or for worse. An increasing number of spheres of human activity hitherto outside the scope of commodification such as education, health, and culture have now fallen under its sway, revealing the radical changes wrought by capitalism. Analyzing aesthetic capitalism therefore requires a distinctive theoretical framework. As Alfred Marschall (1890) was the first to argue, the demand for a certain kind of cultural good depends on its consumption: the more an individual has listened to a particular kind of music, for example, the more they will appreciate it and keep seeking it out. As a result, the law of diminishing marginal utility used in general economics (and according to which added satisfaction decreases with each supplemental unit of a good consumed) does not apply to cultural goods. More recently, the pioneers of cultural economics, William Baumol and William Bowen for the arts (1966) and Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy (1988) for “addictive goods,” demonstrated that the cultural sector can be distinguished from other economic sectors on account of several defining characteristics: the unpredictability of how experiential goods will be received; the wide variety of cultural goods that cannot be compared to each other, given that their aesthetic traits are subjective; the important concentration of sales on a small number of products (best-sellers or blockbusters); the very short life cycle of products and the significant fixed costs associated with an innovation economy. Some economists have even noted the existence of a “reverse flow” of cultural goods (Galbraith 1958): the ultimate difference between goods that enjoy commercial and critical success and those that do not is essentially a matter of

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unknown preferences, which cannot always be traced downward from demand to offer. In the context of economic analysis, taste preferences play an important role; they can be considered as an economic asset that can produce “rational” addictions (McCain 2006). This form of capitalism developed at the crossroads of three relatively independent historical movements: (1) the transformation of needs into desires; (2) the creation of a new commodity value (in additional to traditional use and exchange values), the “staging value”; and (3) the ultimate integration and neutralization of any and all subversive elements. To this core triumvirate, we can also add one more peripheral element that nonetheless bolsters aesthetic capitalism and makes it more challenging to find practical alternatives (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006): the force of contemporary alienation is inextricably linked to the fact that the system is constantly fed by subjective desires and practices, thus making the private space of individual lives the greatest ally of external commercial forces. By examining these foundational elements, we will elaborate a critique of the aesthetic economics of contemporary capitalism.

1.2

Addictive Aesthetics

The Marxist analysis of commodities was developed in an economic context where both goods and consumption existed in relative scarcity (Debord 1995). The latter especially was the purview of the well-off–– including those European aristocrats who escaped the various political revolutions and economic upheavals since the end of the eighteenth century unscathed, and the bourgeoisie that came to prominence throughout the following century (Hobsbawm 1975)––whereas workers, peasants, and the middle classes were largely excluded. In addition, consumption primarily concerned durable material goods. And yet, in a world dominated both by the expansion of commodification to all possible realms and the dematerialization of products for the benefit of producing knowledge and symbols, consumption is sustained by the transformation of needs into desires. Given that the latter can never be truly appeased, they are in fact only heightened with each attempt at satisfaction. In this regard, aesthetic capitalism is intrinsically addictive

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(Pharo 2018). Moreover, the extensive use of highly personalized sales strategies made possible thanks to the development of new technologies promotes this consumerist addiction via permanent stimulation: buyer profiling, personalized offers, targeted marketing, immediate gratification through online ordering and rapid home delivery, frequent sales, and price comparison tools. As a result, many different domains of everyday life are now ruled by the market, from what we eat to how we party, and including how we communicate, how we conduct our personal, romantic, and sexual lives, and how we develop professionally.

1.3

Emotional Aesthetics

What makes aesthetic capitalism singular is the fact that when a commodity is sold, it is not just an object that is sold, but also the whole imaginary made possible by the acquisition of this good (Veblen 1934; McGuigan 2009). In an attempt to extend the Marxist distinction between use value and exchange value in the context of the consumer society, Jean Baudrillard (1998) originally proposed a third value––symbolic value––that allowed individuals to mark their social status and differentiate themselves from other buyers. Going even further than Baudrillard, Gernot Böhme (2017) coined the term “staging value.” In order to increase their exchange value, commodities are now presented in a way that has little to do with their function or use: in a sense, they create a new type of use value that is derived from their exchange value, to the extent that their attractiveness, charm, or “atmosphere” are what is being exploited (Böhme 2018). In an aesthetic economy, the aesthetic dimension of a commodity becomes the primary driver of its design. A large part of social production thus becomes aesthetic production: that is, it no longer produces use values but staging values. When objects become increasingly part of our everyday lives, they start to play a central role in how we develop our individual identities. Consumption thus no longer forms a superficial layer of social life, but rather creates a sphere where individuals can elaborate and test out identities, emotions, and social relationships. In fact, emotions that are provoked as the result of consumption can become commodities themselves. As Eva Illouz wrote (2017):

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Consumer capitalism has increasingly transformed emotions into commodities and it is this historical process which explains the intensification of emotional life. This explains the intensification of emotional life in “Western” capitalist societies since the late nineteenth century and more clearly in the second half of the twentieth century. (10)

The compulsive and hedonistic consumption that goes hand-in-hand with this spirit of capitalism also gives us some clues as to its origins. Today’s variant of capitalism finds its avatars in Jordan Belfort, the stockbroker who penned The Wolf of Wall Street (2007) and the homonymous film directed by Martin Scorsese (2013), and in the protagonist of Don DeLillo’s novel Cosmopolis (2003). What do these compulsive consumers have in common with Benjamin Franklin, the founding father of American capitalism, or with any of a myriad of individuals whose economic behavior is shaped by asceticism, thrift, and hard work––in short, with the “delayed gratification, and restraint in gratification” (Bell 1972: 33) that formed the backbone of the bourgeois ethos at the birth of capitalism? While economic success was seen as a sign of divine election in Puritanical capitalism, according to Weber (2010), profit was not necessarily used for pleasure, and even less to ensure happiness. Neither hedonism nor eudemonism has a place in this ethical system. For Daniel Bell (1972), it is precisely the decline of Puritanical asceticism that ultimately eroded the ideological justifications of American capitalism, finally replacing it with an entirely antithetical way of life. According to this author, “the Protestant ethic as a social reality and a life-style for the middle class was replaced by a materialistic hedonism, and the Puritan Temper by a psychological eudaemonism” (32–3). And yet, more than 50 years after this observation, we are compelled to observe that American capitalism has not died as a result of this contradiction between Puritanism and hedonism as Bell feared, but has on the contrary used the latter to shape-shift.

1.4

The Aesthetics of “Cool”

If aesthetic capitalism has managed to penetrate the daily lives of so many individuals, it is also thanks to contemporary capitalism’s ability to act as a chameleon, absorbing traits that were initially hostile to its development and transform them into its essential components.

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Arguing that the highly expressive, rebel, and anti-conformist dimension of youth culture became quite attractive to American companies as early as the 1950s, Thomas Frank (1998) illustrated the new sensibility that arose as a result of the young generation’s rejection of the conformity of American society as embodied in the lifestyles, ambitions, and consumption choices of the White American middle class. According to this author, the business world managed to neutralize counterculture and replace it with a fake counterculture, “a commercial replica that seemed to ape its every move for the titillation of the TV-watching millions and the nation’s corporate sponsors” (7). By assimilating the joyous lifestyle and corrosive critique of materialism and routine associated with the counterculture movement, capitalism could become “cool” (McGuigan 2009). By helping to subvert the strict conventions of private life for the White American middle- and upper-classes, as well as the rigidity of the industrial order, once incorporated into capitalism, counterculture offered the latter the possibility of developing new, highly personalized forms of control and marketing that were seen as more “authentic” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006). Analyses of the countercultural origin of capitalist innovations converge in some ways with Frank’s theory of the co-optation of counterculture (1998). Today, bohemian lifestyles are far from being a sign of social marginality or of genuine desire for social change; on the contrary, the bohemian aesthetic is now a marker of the new creative economy. In 2004, UNESCO implemented the Creative Cities Network (UNESCO 2007), while the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon led to the publication by the European Commission of a Green Paper on “unlocking the potential of cultural and creative industries” (European Commission 2010). In any case, if creativity has become a fundamental pillar of innovation-based capitalism––especially in the field of high-tech––artistic creation has similarly become the inspirational model. As David Roberts (2012) explains, “the antagonism of capitalism and culture, art and technology, disappears in the creative economy, just as the antagonism of bourgeois society and bohemian subculture disappears in the new cultural class” (92). The pop-cultural turning point (Kidd 2014) is characteristic of this strategy to resolve the contradictions of capitalism using the new spirit of aesthetic capitalism. Andy Warhol’s artistic production perfectly illustrates this transformation, operated via four major substitutions (Roberts

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2012): a unique artwork is replaced by a mechanical reproduction (the paradigmatic example being the Campbell soup cans); the singular genius that is typical of bourgeois art is supplanted by instant but fleeting fame; the bohemian ideals of outsiders and rebels are swapped out for trendy popularity; and finally, the avant-garde dream of the reunion of art and life is transformed into the fusion of creativity and business––what Warhol called “business art business.”

2

South Korean Capitalism

Much as Toyotism became the Japanese form of a labor organization under industrial capitalism, once it had moved away from its Fordist and Taylorist predecessors, the industrial system of Hallyu is the Korean adaptation of capitalism’s evolution toward a new aesthetic spirit. In addition to the transnational elements described earlier, the economic system that created the Korean Wave has a number of specific traits which are important for us to consider when trying to understand how a country that was underdeveloped just 50 years ago (economists only began speaking of the “four Asian tigers” in the late 1980s) became a major player on the global pop culture scene. In our analysis, we shall first look at the lightning-fast shift from a heavy industry-based form of capitalism resolutely turned toward international markets, to a new system of aesthetic capitalism. We shall then investigate what makes Korean capitalism more specifically “entertainment capitalism.”

2.1

 ccelerated and Internationally Oriented A Economic Modernization

The socioeconomic transformation of South Korea was exceptional because of its speed: almost entirely destroyed during the Korean war (1950–1953), the country became one of the top 15 economies in the world in just 50 years of reconstruction, acquiring particular dominance in the automotive and telecommunications sectors thanks to the emergence of several large global conglomerates (chaebols) including the pioneers Hyundai, Samsung, and LG.

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A number of publications have focused on what has been termed “the Asian miracle” (Amsden 1992; World Bank 1993; Vogel 1993). Most of the time, they identify three factors to explain the particular success of South Korea. First is the knock-on effect of the country’s interactions with the United States and Japan. The American presence in South Korea as well as the latter’s strong cultural ties with Japan (given that Korea was first a Japanese protectorate and then a Japanese colony between 1905 and 1945) allowed the nation to reproduce certain industrial methods and modalities, in particular with regard to total quality control and respect for consumer demands, two founding principles of Toyotism (Ōno 1988). Second, the implementation of a highly unique economic system in which the government plays a major role, with regard to both launching and supporting specific industries and financial sectors. Finally, cultural factors are often seen as being very influential in cultural industries, in particular Confucianism, which has deep roots dating back to the fourteenth century and appears to play a particularly important role in terms of regional influence (Rozman 1991; Bidet 2005). As is the case for other Asian countries, “what makes something like the East Asian Confucian revival plausible is not its offer of alternative values to those of Euro-American origin, but its articulation of native culture into a capitalist narrative” (Dirlik 1996: 30). Paradoxically, while Korean politicians and intellectuals may have initially viewed the country’s legacy of Confucianism as an obstacle to economic development (as many Western observers did), some ultimately argued that Confucian ethics on the contrary provided the momentum behind South Korea’s meteoric rise (Choi 2010; Lew 2013). This heritage is particularly visible in the importance awarded to education, self-discipline, and hard work, all seen as powerful drivers of economic growth. The traditional Korean work ethic “has given rise to a special kind of capitalism in Korea and led to a new scientific term, ‘Confucian capitalism,’ used to define the cultural traits of East Asian industrial society” (Cha 2003: 486). One of the keys to Korea’s integration into the global economy was the country’s choice of prioritizing exports. Eric Bidet (2013) notes that at the end of the 1950s, South Korean imports were 20 times higher than its exports; in addition, Korea’s international trade (both imports and exports) accounted for less than 15% of its gross domestic product (GDP), with the latter reaching just over 80 USD per person in 1960.

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Confronted with the limits of its own domestic market, South Korea quickly turned toward international trade and developed a growth model built on exports, initially focused on raw commodities (metals, agriculture, fishing) at the beginning of the 1960s (raw commodities accounting for more than 80% of the country’s exports at that time), and then on manufactured goods at the beginning of the 1970s (accounting for almost 90% of contemporary exports). Since 2011, the Korean economy has become highly dependent on exports: with an export/GDP ratio of over 50%, the country’s trade balance is consistently operating with surplus funds. In 2012, Korea’s trade surplus surpassed a record-breaking 43 billion USD, marking also the first surpluses in the service sector, in large part thanks to culture and entertainment. In 2016, this surplus had more than doubled. Nevertheless, until the end of the 1970s, trade remained primarily centered on a small number of partners, especially those with historical ties to the country. In 1973, the United States and Japan thus accounted for 70% of Korean imports and exports. When South Korea joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996, these affiliations helped to expand its trading partners.

2.2

The Jurassic Park Syndrome

The 1997 financial crisis that rocked South Korea as well as its East and Southeast Asian neighbors (Goldstein 1998) led to a major national economic restructuring, including a sharp increase in the trade of cultural goods and services to meet the consumption demands of a growing global middle class. Prior to the crisis, the cultural economy of South Korea was relatively underdeveloped. Until the end of the 1980s––and in part due to certain restrictions on freedom of expression and creation––cultural policy largely focused on conservation rather than creation, with culture being seen as a form of heritage rather than industry. Korean cultural industries primarily benefited from measures designed to protect their products from Japanese and American rivals on the domestic market (e.g., thanks to the implementation of quotas for television shows and films). In the second half of the 1990s, however, these cultural industries began spearheading the country’s new export policy. At the same time as Samsung

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and Hyundai were expanding their international market shares, Jurassic Park (released in 1993) was heralded as the highest-grossing film ever made, thus attracting new eyes on the cultural sector. On 17 May 1994, the Presidential Advisory Council on Science and Technology, a government think tank, gave a briefing called “Strategic Plan for the Growth of the High-Tech Visual Arts Industry.” This document announced that “Jurassic Park, directed by bankable filmmaker Steve[n] Spielberg on a budget of US$65 million, has earned a total of US$850 million in one year. The revenue the movie has brought in is equivalent to the export sales of 1.5 million motor vehicles” (at this time, South Korea barely exported 700,000 cars per year) (Kang 2015: 51). From this date forward, both governments and the press began comparing the success of a given blockbuster film to the number of cars, semi-conductors, or video players sold. What we are calling “the Jurassic Park syndrome” thus highlights a watershed moment in cultural history: when culture was first viewed as a commodity, whose exchange value mattered more than its use value. This syndrome can be seen everywhere today. Just look at the reports regularly published in South Korea about BTS*3: the group’s success is measured in financial terms, using comparisons to the value of various other Korean industries without any reference to the artistic quality of their work. This perspective is illustrated in this press release made by the YONHAP news agency: The economic value generated by K-pop boy band BTS is estimated at around 4 trillion won (US$3.54 billion) annually, a local researcher said Tuesday, indicating that the global sensation plays a significant role in South Korea’s economy that stretches beyond the cultural sector. The Hyundai Research Institute (HRI) said the group’s so-called annual production inducement effect, a term that refers to the economic value generated among related industries, is estimated at 4.1 trillion won annually. As an average mid-sized South Korean firm posted annual sales of 160 billion won on average in 2016, the production inducement effect of BTS is equal to combined sales of 26 companies, the researcher said [….] South Korea exported $65.2 billion worth of consumer goods in 2017, and BTS is esti The South Korean cultural products referred to in this book and marked with an asterisk are presented in the glossary at the end of the book. 3

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mated to have been responsible for $1.1 billion, or 1.7 percent, the HRI said. BTS is anticipated to generate an economic value of 41.8 trillion won over the 2014–2023 period if the band continues to maintain its popularity, the HRI added.4

The cultural industries sector has expanded in large part thanks to funding by industry giants (Samsung, Daewoo, SKC, Hyundai, etc.) who saw a chance to diversify their portfolio, with significant opportunities for returns on investment with limited risk. In 1995, for instance, Samsung Entertainment was born, an organization that spans numerous cultural industries (Dream Box and Star Max for video and film, Q Channel and Catch-One for television).5 Even if some of these enterprises are short-lived (the Samsung Entertainment division was shuttered in 1999 after colossal investment), their participation helped to structure cultural industries in the country. The most significant transformation was the consolidation of the movie industry (Pacquet 2005). The latter entered the major leagues (with CJ Entertainment, Lotte Cinema, MediaPlex, and Cinema Service), using the “star system” and vertical integration to combine production, distribution, and projection in order to reduce risk and maximize profit.

2.3

State Capitalism

The Hallyu phenomenon must also be analyzed as the product of unique interactions between State policies and industrial changes in a country seeking to establish itself as a new international trading partner. The Korean Wave is in fact a constitutive element of a political strategy largely supported and funded by the South Korean government, operated with a view to triggering a new cultural shift in Korean society, previously traumatized by the 1997 financial crisis  (Kim and Ni 2011; Jang and Paik 2012).

 https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20181218003600320  Diversification well outside the original scope of industrial focus is characteristic of South Korean chaebols: Samsung has also dabbled in sugar refineries, Hyundai in rice production, and so forth. 4 5

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This form of State capitalism can be characterized by (a) the entanglement of the political and business sectors; (b) a trade policy that combines protectionist measures with support for exports in order to defend domestic markets and compensate for their small size; and (c) strong investment practices structured in five-year plans that successively bolstered heavy industry and the chemical industry (in the 1960s and 1970s), the automobile, naval and electronics industries (in the 1980s and 1990s), and finally new technologies and the information industry (since the 1990s). In 50 years, these investments have transformed South Korea into a major industrial player in terms of automobiles, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, steelmaking, nuclear energy, and mass electronics and communications technologies (with broadband internet and 4G then 5G smartphones at the fore). We must therefore abandon the “sandwich” theory (Bae 2016), which argued that South Korea was stuck between the Japanese high-technology and low-cost Chinese labor markets, as well as any theories that rely on American influence to understand this new phenomenon with regard to cultural products. In fact, following the crisis in the second half of the 1990s, both South Korean public agencies and the country’s major conglomerates (chaebols) began to invest massively in cultural products by means of public-private partnerships, in particular to support start-ups and mitigate the omnipotence of the United States at the international level, and the supremacy of Japan at the regional level, but also in an attempt to balance out an economy that had been crippled by its over-reliance on heavy industry (steel, electronic parts, cars, and ships primarily) and on the major conglomerates. The government also heavily invested in start-ups, fearing that the weight of the chaebols on the economy would prove dangerous––in 2012, the ten largest conglomerates accounted for 75% of the South Korean economy (Hong 2014). When the financial crisis hit the country, capital flight was estimated at 20 billion KRW (20 million USD) during 1997 alone and the won lost 50% against the dollar in November; Kia Motors declared bankruptcy and the First Bank of Korea was imperiled. While donations flowed in quickly as the currency continued to fall (individuals donated 200 tons of gold), only international aid could stem the tide: the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank loaned the country a total of 57 million USD. Unemployment skyrocketed from

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2.6% in 1997 to 7.6% in 1999. Given that employment plays a particularly important role vis-à-vis social status in South Korea, this shockwave prompted a rash of suicides, especially among individuals who were over 60 and felt like a burden on their families. South Korea experienced a 50% increase in the rate of suicide between 1996 and 1997 (Gazier and Herrera 2001; Paulet 2005). As for the younger generations, they were faced with high unemployment rates or precarious employment––underpaid or irregular employment, sometimes as little as 800,000 KRW per month (i.e., 650 USD) (Seo and Kim 2009) as well as an unprecedented rise in poverty and precarity. The unemployment rate, which quadrupled between October 1997 and October 1999, primarily represented young people and those with the lowest education levels; this led to an explosion of individuals living in poverty (17 million in 1998), with the poverty rate rising to 19.2% in 1998 (compared to 9.8% in 1996) (Gazier and Herrera 2001). Add to this the intergenerational anxiety caused by the spate of major political, economic, social, and technological shifts occurring in the space of two generations, leading to significant discrepancies between the values, references, lifestyles, and aspirations of the two generations (Hong 2014). Following the financial and economic crisis of the 1990s, the government decided to capitalize on the opportunities offered by globalization (Kim 2000), in particular in the cultural industry sector. South Korea turned toward the wider Asian market, after having largely ignored it since the 1960s. It was during this period that government measures were taken to support cultural industries. In 1995, a law on the promotion of films was passed that provided financial incentives for the large conglomerates to invest in the film sector. In 1999, similar legislation was passed to promote cultural industry more broadly. Close cooperation was rapidly established between the companies of the Korean Wave and the major industrial firms, in particular in the telecommunications sector; this cooperation was heavily supported by the State with a view to implementing the “Global Korea” strategy (Choi 2013, 2015), which now went far beyond heavy industry. Kim Joo-sung, the president of CJ Entertainment (the largest South Korean film production and distribution company) spoke very clearly on this point: “the ultimate goal of the media business in CJ Entertainment is to produce and supply the

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best-­quality contents in Asia, and grow to become ‘Asia’s number one total entertainment group’” (Lee 2015: 9). This strategy was accompanied by significant investment in internet infrastructure, seen as essential to disseminate cultural products. In the 2010s, the government invested in household broadband connection for every home (1 gigabit per second, which was 200 times faster than the average connection in the United States at the time). During this period, most of the institutional actors were established that would come to support the development of cultural industries, principally through exports: the Ministry of Culture was created in 1990 and, within it, the Office of Cultural Industry in 1994. President Kim Dae-­ jung, who declared himself the “culture president” during his investiture speech in 1998 and, in 1999, passed a law for the promotion of cultural industry and allocated a total budget of 148.5 million USD to culture. In addition, the South Korean government worked to encourage synergy between K-pop and other cultural and media industries, implementing a full set of measures to deregulate the creative industries (notably in terms of taxation). Hallyu thus took on a commercial facet linked to the need for exportation and techno-industrial excellence. Several government agencies were also created to target each segment of the cultural industrial landscape. As a result, when the music publishing sector faced an imminent crisis due to the rise of illegal downloading, the government invested 91 million USD to build a “K-pop center” with a 3000-seat concert venue; it likewise implemented stricter regulation of karaoke venues (noraebangs) to ensure that the latter paid the appropriate song royalties. In addition, the Korea Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE) reached an agreement with YouTube in late 2011, leading to the creation of a specific K-pop channel on the site (Thévenet 2013, 2017). South Korean government authorities thus amply guided and supported the development of cultural industries (see Sidebar 1), to the extent that the Korean Wave can be seen as the result of public policies (or Hallyu-hwa)6 that worked to maximize the overlapping success of its various products. The government thus became a promoter of “global Hallyu” (Lie 2012: 359): “helmed by a handful of entrepreneurs,  In Korean, “-hwa” is the equivalent of the English “-ize” and signifies the action of becoming.

6

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mainstream media, state bureaucrats, and professional consultants, mostly” (Choi 2013: 45), and via many different government agencies that strove to implement supportive policies. Sidebar 1: Three Examples of Government Support Provided to Cultural Industries –– Financial Investment Support Policies via the Korea Fund of Funds (KFoF). Managed by the Korea Venture Investment Corp, the Korea Fund of Funds was created by the government to offer financial investment for production funds, by reducing risk and facilitating greater autonomy thanks to indirect investment. In terms of mandatory measures to promote investment in content, special accounts for cultural content and films were created so they could operate as seed funding. In total, 66 cultural and film accounts were created between 2006 and 2015, reaching a total of 1.41 trillion KRW (or 1.18 million USD), 1.68 trillion KRW (1.4 million USD) of which were invested in 2500 different companies and projects. The KFoF accounts helped to finance the production of cultural content in performance arts, games, animation, music, television, 3D imagery, and other domains. –– Completion Bond System. This system allows financial institutions to guarantee the completion and delivery of products to distributors. The system permits a maximum loan of 3 billion KRW (or 2.5 million USD) to every company and up to 5 billion KRW (or 4.16 million USD) to high value-added content producers. In April 2014, a total of 197 loans (for a total value of 148.2 billion KRW or 123.5 million USD) were granted to 138 companies. –– Content value assessment. To help companies and cultural content projects receive financial aid, the government provides a number of services to assess the intangible value of cultural contents. These assessment and evaluation services were launched for films and video games in 2016 and expanded to include radio broadcasts and animation in 2017 and the performing arts in 2018. Similarly, in 2016 a 20 billion KRW fund for evaluating content value was created, with a fixed ratio of investment in content value evaluation.

We can thus see how K-pop stars came to be seen as national treasures, on the same level as Samsung cellphones: in addition to being the country’s best export, they are also responsible for generating a whole swath of knock-on successes. It has become commonplace for K-pop artists and bands to be invited to national and international events, including to promote public campaigns and business events like the G20 Summit in

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2010, the Expo 2012 Yeosu, and the 2014 Asian Games in Incheon. President Park Geun-hye thus met the members of two K-pop groups–– Girls’ Generation* and Super Junior*––during a concert held to celebrate Korean-Chinese friendship in June 2013. Countless examples of government support for the “third phase” of the Korean Wave, which focuses on food, illustrate this as well. In May 2009, the government created the Korean Cuisine Globalization Committee, which hired 36 experts (including ministers and CEOs from Korean agri-­ food companies) with the objective of not just increasing exports but also improving the international reputation of South Korean cuisine (Na 2009). The committee seeks to expand the number of Korean restaurants abroad (originally, its goal was 40,000 restaurants by 2017), by emphasizing the uniqueness and healthy nature of the food. In order to make Korean food one of the top five most popular cuisines in the world, the government also spent 50 billion KRW (42 million USD) to open Korean cooking classes in various prestigious schools and universities abroad. Countless crossovers with products from the earlier phases of Hallyu have been envisioned to increase the visibility of this third wave. For instance, during a 2011 food festival organized in New York’s Central Park, hanbok (traditional Korean dress) and K-pop were both on display. The expansion of the Korean Wave is therefore based on the fact that it presents itself as a “cultural package” that is greater than the sum of its parts (Hong 2014).

2.4

 he “Cultural Package” Industry: The Example T of SM Entertainment

Seoul alone boasts 18 different entertainment companies that all strive to be part of this “cultural package.” Created in 1995 by Lee Soo-man, SM Entertainment is the largest among them. Today, the company is the size of a large SME (it has fewer than 1000 employees), but its structure and organizational model clearly reveal its ambitions, pithily expressed by its slogan: “The Future of Technology.” This firm has experienced impressive growth: between 2015 and 2018, its sales revenue doubled, reaching 581 million USD. Publicly traded on the Korean stock exchange, the company’s founder retains 20% of its shares, with pension funds and large

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investors drawn to attractive financial prospects making up the rest of the shareholders. Low upfront investment was thus coupled with the possibility of important returns on investment, especially compared to the heavy industry sectors that still accounted for most of the Korean economy. SM Entertainment perfectly illustrates the various ways that capitalism has been deployed in South Korean cultural industries.7 The company first grew through consolidation, buying up various actors in the entertainment production chain to attain critical mass in its different market segments and better exploit the synergies made possible by these acquisitions. Concentration is particularly pronounced in the music production sector: SM bought the independent labels Woollim Entertainment and Mystic Entertainment in 2013 and 2017, respectively, and in 2015 acquired shares in Baljunso. Very early on, the company also began to expand internationally, launching a subsidiary in Japan in 2001 (SM Entertainment Japan). This international expansion also quickly became one of the main lines of attack of Hallyu-hwa: toward the end of 2002, SM received the Ministry of Culture and Tourism’s grand prize for cultural content with regard to music exports. In 2008, SM created a Mandarin-language subdivision of Super Junior* called Super Junior-M and announced its intention of launching BoA* on the American market under a new subsidiary level called SM Entertainment USA. Shortly thereafter, this company also created Dream Maker Entertainment Limited (a concert production agency based in Hong Kong but active throughout Asia) and then SM True (a joint venture with the True group, the largest radio broadcasting, telecommunications, and distribution company in Thailand). In short, in the musical domain, SM manages about 60 groups and 400 songwriters who produce about 3000 songs per year. This global strategy presupposes pooling together both resources and risks: in April 2011, SM Entertainment, YG Entertainment, JYP Entertainment, KeyEast, AMENT, and Star J Entertainment merged to form United Asia Management, an investment agency seeking to promote Asian music throughout the world.  https://www.smentertainment.com

7

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Since 2017, SM Entertainment has worked to diversify its holdings in the different markets composing the Hallyu phenomenon: audiovisual production (it bought Hoon Media), sports marketing (it linked up with IB Worldwide to create Galaxia SM, which manages the careers of golfer Park In-Bee, rhythmic gymnast Son Yeon-jae, and Texas Rangers baseballer Choo Shin-Soo), modeling (through affiliation with the modeling agency ESteem), and the food industry (launching the SMT Seoul restaurant and opening a chain of grocery stores called SUM Market). Finally, in December 2017, SM Entertainment merged with the advertising agency SK Group. The SM Entertainment universe is thus comprised of 15 specialized companies that crisscross the whole entertainment sector and its derived markets. This trajectory demonstrates that the goal of such Hallyu actors is to create an attractive, highly stylized, and modern lifestyle: “when people buy into K-pop, they buy into a lifestyle. K-pop is pop culture as a lifestyle brand” (Hong 2014: 199).

3

 he Distinctive Traits T of Entertainment Capitalism

South Korean entertainment capitalism also has several unique traits in terms of its production model, which establishes it as an alternative to American capitalism in the realm of cultural industries. Three elements come to define this model: (a) the significant serialization of production methods characterized by the de-individuation of artists and the hyper-­ commodification of production (what some critics might call the “McDonaldization” of the Korean music industry (Ritzer 1993)); (b) the transformation of artists into “Idols,” or transmedia emotional and aesthetic commodities; and (c) the emergence of participatory culture based on the constant solicitation of publics to assess the quality of products, whose contents can then be adjusted almost in real time.

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Serialized Production

The three major South Korean entertainment companies––SM Entertainment, YG Entertainment, and JYP Entertainment8––have elaborated an integrated system to produce “home-grown” stars (Lee 2011; Marx 2012; Lie and Oh 2014) that are highly serialized and adhere to international quality standards. SM Entertainment was the first to import this originally Japanese model, later perfecting it by creating countless male and female groups that became the standard-bearers of the South Korean music industry (Maliangkay 2015). K-pop is also an ideal vantage point from which to examine this serialized system of mass production, centered on the importance of a work ethic (rather than the value of raw and natural talent). The young individuals chosen to become K-pop stars are selected because of their personal traits––their character, their beauty––rather than their singing, dancing, or acting abilities, given that these skills can be taught to them during multiyear training periods. What matters is tenacity: for every 100,000 teenagers that audition, 1% will go into training and 0.1% will become professionals. Consequently, South Korea has as many pop artists as the United States, for a much smaller population (51 million compared to 328 million). Approximately 4% of the country’s population auditioned for Superstar K* in 2012, the largest singing competition on television (2.08 million contestants representing 4% of the whole population). In comparison, there are about 80,000 contestants on American Idol each year (representing roughly 0.03% of the American population). In this system, de-individuation reigns, from selection processes to career management if a given artist is successful. In fact, the young individuals chosen to be trained and then heavily promoted (as entirely replaceable entities) within groups are the product of the hyper-­ commodification of cultural production. Even if all K-pop stars are not identical, they are all created using the same formula: men and women of generally similar stature are selected while still quite young and are trained  The IPO of Big Hit, BTS’ label, changed the game in late 2020, since Big Hit obtained a market capitalization greater than that of the largest three South Korean channels. Big Hit is now worth some 8.7 trillion KRW (7.6 billion USD), and this is entirely thanks to the worldwide success of BTS, as the group accounted for 97% of Big Hit’s sales in 2019 (Hollingsworth and Kwon 2020). 8

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to have complementary skill sets (one will specialize in dancing while another will focus on singing, for instance). In other words, the members of a given group are crafted rather than discovered by talent scouts, as is the case in many other countries where the rhetoric is focused on finding natural talent. Since the 2000s, this has become especially true, as K-pop groups have tended to grow in size. For instance, After School* has 5 members; Girls’ Generation,* Nine Muses,* ZE:A* and Speed* all have 9; COED School* has 10; Super Junior* and EXO* have 12; and SEVENTEEN* has a whopping 13 members. The larger the group, the harder it is for its constitutive individuals to be truly unique and easily identifiable. This situation, which is relatively rare in Western cultural industries, has sometimes presented an obstacle to commercial success, as explained by John Seabrook (2012) when discussing the trajectory of various K-pop groups in the United States. We can also observe de-individuation in the relationship that group members have with their production companies. The latter exert complete control not just over the image of artists, but also over their private lives by means of draconian common law contracts that cover long periods of time9 and can include one-sided clauses concerning intimate matters.10 Artists in K-pop groups are supposed to live in shared houses paid for by their production companies, with each individual playing a specific role within the collective––without which they are nothing. South Korean production companies therefore entirely control the lives of these artists, whose every moment is covered by the media. The same phenomenon of serialization can also be seen with regard to the production of K-dramas, especially given their mode of distribution: each series only lasts for one season (compared to Western series, which may stretch out over many seasons when successful) but drops episodes frequently (once or even twice a week). As a result, series are structured to  For example, candidates sign a contract that covers the whole training period and their potential career afterward. For candidates who are not ultimately selected, however, such contracts prevent the former from seeking employment elsewhere in the sector. Moreover, if a group breaks up, certain clauses may prevent individual artists from pursuing solo careers. On this topic, see the case of the group JYJ Republic as discussed in Seung-Ah Lee (2005). 10  Such clauses may stipulate prohibit an artist from smoking, from drinking alcohol, from using a personal cell phone, from traveling, from taking vacation, or even from having romantic relationships. 9

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unfold over a few months of broadcast, reaching about 20 episodes total on average (even if some shows may expand to 50 episodes––Empress Ki* and Six Flying Dragons,* for instance). Even in the case of these longer runs, however, K-dramas rarely go beyond a single season. Given that there are only a small number of broadcast channels on the South Korean market,11 ferocious competition determines which shows will last after the pilot episode. When they are uncertain, producers cannot take the risk of producing more than two or three episodes ahead of time. This means that production companies are in intense competition with each other, which in turn creates a system of “just-in-time” shooting without pre-production and with minimal postproduction. As a result, a large number of shows are pitched by independent producers to South Korean distributors. The television shows that are successful give rise to a number of copycat series. All subjects are explored in a patchwork fashion all at once, which means that South Korean production is highly segmented and often combines disparate genres: for example, a show such as The King: Eternal Monarch* brings together elements from the fantasy, historical fiction, procedural, and romance genres.

3.2

From the Artist to the Transmedia Idol

Entertainment capitalism dreams of reaching the masses; it does so by relying heavily on icons and Idols. As Göran Therborn (2012) has argued, “hugely expanded audiences widen the visibility and attraction of stars, augment the remuneration pool, and increase profits. Entertainment capitalism and stardom need each other, symbiotically” (585). While this phenomenon is not new, the Korean Wave grants it remarkable intensity, given that this system has become the dominant production model, with Idols––and not stars––at the center (Dator and Seo 2004). Whereas Hollywood invented the star system in the movie business, the Idol model is Japanese in origin (Aoyagi 2005). South Korea has simply refined this model and applied it mostly to the fields of pop music and TV shows.  There are more than 100 production companies specializing in K-dramas, and only three public channels: KBS, MBC, and SBS. The fourth channel is EBS (Educational Broadcasting System), which is a purely educational channel that does not purchase any K-dramas. 11

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At the outset, an Idol is a manufactured product that does not hide the amount of hard work required12 and its integration into the production chain––whereas a star, even when molded from raw material, uses the values of individuality, originality, and excellence as the basis for praise and success. Unlike stars, Idols are not specialized but multi-talented artists: they must master a variety of different media spheres and artistic disciplines such as singing, dancing, comedy, television hosting, and modeling. In short, Idols are fully integrated transmedia products. In addition, they embody the promise that “anyone can make it,” a promise which is in line with the democratization of access to public space, reputational recognition, and celebrity ostensibly made possible by the advent of social media. This is why artists in K-pop groups regularly post videos on social media sites depicting their everyday rehearsals and training without makeup and performance attire, creating an illusion of closeness with their fans. The actors in K-dramas are sometimes employed to sing vocals on original soundtracks, while some K-pop musicians star in television shows. Given their beauty (more on this later), many Idols branch out into modeling, fashion, and/or cosmetics. Thanks to this increased media visibility, such individuals become almost ubiquitous: they constantly show up on magazine covers, in television shows, in concerts, commercials, and print advertisements. Stars, on the contrary, remain a bit more inaccessible, given that they conceal their backstage efforts. The de-individuation and massive visibility of Idols means that these are the nodal points for a wide variety of media, consumer, and economic activities. In this context, Idols can be seen as largely interchangeable “disposable commodities” (Galbraith and Karlin 2012). They are consumable products of the entertainment society, manufactured thanks to colossal efforts at advertisement, distribution, and promotion, and are always placed in the public eye thanks to the intensive exploitation of social media marketing (Shin 2009). The unique South Korean spin is that the country has established a system of serialized production for high-quality Idols, whereas most of the time, serialization tends to lower production quality standards.  Though present in Western countries, this trait is much more pronounced in South Korea (Menger 2003). 12

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Media saturation subjects these artists to frenzied schedules. For example, BTS* has released no fewer than 14 albums in Korean and 6 albums in Japanese since 2013; they have also gone on three Korean tours, one Japanese tour, and four international tours. To that list, we can also add their participation in five separate “Musters” (or BTS fan meet-ups organized by the group’s production company). In addition, BTS has appeared on about 60 different television shows and was the subject of a documentary (BTS: Burn the Stage). BTS also produced six “summer packages,” wherein the group’s members traveled to a different city each summer to film video and take pictures that later accompanied an album release. The members of BTS are also actors, making appearances in various K-dramas and participating in advertising campaigns abroad, including Mattel, Coca-Cola, Hyundai, and Puma.

3.3

Fans as Co-producers

The final trait that characterizes the unique Hallyu mode of production is the role played by amateur publics in the hypercompetitive music and television markets. To limit the uncertainty provoked by this competition, immediate public reactions (mainly on social networks) are scrutinized by producers all along the production timeline, in what Younjeong Oh (2015)  calls “discursive consumption.” The “just-in-time filming” system is likewise designed to grant significant importance to public feedback on the internet before proceeding with the writing and filming of a given show––not solely because this guarantees a broader audience, but also because it allows producers to increase the unit sales price of each episode, especially on international markets. In South Korea, it is customary for two episodes of the same series to air each week, meaning that several episodes (or about 140 minutes) are shot just in time each week. This situation creates pressure for everyone working on a show and leads to reusing footage when an episode is short, as well as a practice called “hasty scripts”: very small pieces of scripts are used, barely enough to cover the scenes that are on the docket for shooting, because both screenwriters and producers are waiting for public reactions to the previous episode to make changes to the story and potentially add scenes. Aside

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from the pilot episode of a series, shooting often takes place just a few days before an episode airs and changes are made to scripts until the last minute, with little time left for editing. The role of public feedback becomes even more urgently important as a television show is nearing its final episodes. In the case of the final episode of the series Sign* shooting wrapped up 15 minutes before the episode aired, with almost time allotted for postproduction. As a result, the show’s protagonist lost his voice due to sound issues for 20 minutes during the broadcast. This production system has given rise to heated debate in South Korea on the volatile nature of the public’s tastes, and the nefarious impact of catering to these tastes with regard to the exploitation of professionals. In fact, to reduce the risks associated with this system, employees in the production chain are generally paid per day, which leads to a drastic reduction in the number of days of filming and thus to the exploitation of workers in this sector of activity. Professionals are often forced to alternate underemployment with periods of intense overwork. Paradoxically, this exploitation relies on the free work spontaneously provided by the public: the interpretations, suggestions, reviews, criticisms, analyses, descriptions, theories, and even parodies of plot points, important scenes, and larger narrative arcs provided by fans are used to determine whether the right choices were made, and at times even to change the trajectory of a given story. Fan communities likewise play a crucial role in the world of K-pop (Kang 2015). This situation is very different from the one described by John Friske (1992) when he discussed the linkages between fans and industries in terms of opposition and even conflict. In the case of K-pop, there is more collaboration and negotiation than there is tension and conflict between the two ends of the equation. As commodities, Idols inherently depend on the existence of faithful and devoted consumers, which explains why management companies have developed fan systems that operate in tandem with Idol systems. These communities are regularly called upon for events (television shows, communication blasts, album releases): fans act as agents of content and event diffusion thanks to their use of covers, flash mobs, and so on. ARMY, the BTS* fan community, was created on 9 July 2013, or just a few short weeks after the group’s incarnation. ARMY is international in scope: the group’s YouTube

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channel, BANGTANTV, has hosted close to 800 videos and has more than 5 million subscribers, while the group’s entertainment label, ibighit (thanks to which additional videos are shared) has close to 10 million subscribers. Finally, there are more than 6.5 million users of the V-Life App who subscribe to the BTS streaming channel (AMINO 2017). Some numbers to illustrate the economic effectiveness of this system: the Hyundai Research Institute (Ego_Centrik 2018) estimates that BTS has had an economic impact greater than that of the 2018 Winter Olympics, with the group bringing in 52.6 billion KRW (50.6 million USD) over the 2014–2023 period, compared to 41.6 billion KRW (or 37.5 million USD) for the Games. All of this has been made possible by the immense participation of fan communities, as recognized by J Hope (a BTS singer) on ARMY’s French website: “To be honest, every day is hard and exhausting. But I believe that the sole reason why I can keep going is thanks to ARMY.”13 Each K-pop group grows and develops symbiotically with its fans. For instance, Girls’ Generation* gave rise to the fan club S♡NE (So-One), Super Junior* to the fan club E.L.F. (for “Ever Lasting Friend”), and to an official fan color, “pearl sapphire blue” used by fans to stand out at concerts. These fan communities are used in marketing strategies not just upstream to boost sales, but all throughout the creative process. The relationship that K-pop groups have with their fans is based on affection (love, friendship, and companionship are words that pop up all over fan club sites) and collaboration. The lyrics to BTS’ smash hit “Idol” are a powerful example of this,14 much like the fact that their last two tours were titled Love Yourself and Persona.

 https://btsarmyfrance.fr/le-fandom-army/  Excerpt from the song “Idol” by BTS, sung in English and Korean: “You can call me artist (artist) / You can call me idol (idol) /No matter what you call me / I don’t care / I’m proud of it (proud of it) / I’m free (free) / No more irony (irony) / Cuz I was always just me / [Refrain 1: Suga, RM] They point fingers at me / But I don’t care at all / Whatever the reason for your criticism is / I know what I am (I know what I am) / I know what I want (I know what I want) / I never gon’ change (I never gon’ change) / I never gon’ trade / (Trade off) / [Pre-Chorus: V, RM, Jimin] Keep on chit-chatting, saying this and that / I do what I do, so you do you / You can’t stop me lovin’ myself / […] do my thang (I do my thang) / I love myself (I love myself ) / love myself, I love my fans / Love my dance and my what / There are hundreds of me’s inside of me / I’m facing a new me again today / It’s all me anyway […].” 13 14

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3.4

Promoting an Ideology of Well-Being

While the pursuit of happiness has been a consistent element of the American dream, it is perhaps the entertainment capitalism of the “essential contents of the Korean Wave” (K-pop and K-dramas) (Choi 2015) that has most completely and effectively standardized the contribution of the cultural market to the neoliberal ideology of happiness and well-being (Davies 2013; Binkley 2014; Cederström and Spicer 2015)  even if the backstage is less cheerful as shown by the producers’ control over the Idols’ bodies (with an intensive use of cosmetic surgery) or private lives, that pushes some of them to terrible ends, committing suicides. Korean Idols are by their very nature the satisfying product of the happiness industry, as they promise fans beautiful emotional experiences in exchange for their closeness and participation. The primary emotions called on by K-pop groups are positive (love, passion, desire, optimism, coolness, happiness, self-confidence, and joy). K-pop groups and K-drama episodes are “emodities,” or emotional commodities (Illouz 2008) that operate within the context of an overarching ideology of happiness and wellbeing––which has also been promoted on the global stage by international agencies launching initiatives such as the United Nations’ World Happiness Report, the creation of the International Day of Happiness on 20 March, and the OECD’s Your Better Life Index and Better Life Initiative. The significance attributed to happiness stems from a conception of the individual responsibility for the pursuit (and attainment) of well-­ being as an essential dimension of humanity, a conception that justifies a certain level of emotional and aesthetic consumption. In this context, the feeling of “authenticity” (Gilmore and Pine 2007) is derived less from the inherent traits of a given product, than from the fact that the latter effectively elicit the emotions that they promise consumers and that they are forms of affiliation with repertoires of things that ultimately help individuals discover their own truth.15 This ideological argument provides the foundation for entertainment capitalism such as described above.  This is what Ann Friedberg (1993) means when she talks about “the commodity-experience” and what Joseph Pine and James Gilmore are referring when they look at the “experience economy” (1999). 15

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The products that compose Hallyu thus seem like they have successfully wagered on cultural consumption being the battlefield where the power struggles inherent to capitalism will play out. As Edgar Cabanas and Eva Illouz have argued (2019), “the meritocratic and individualistic values underlying happiness disguise the fundamental differences of class, and endorse competition in unequal systems rather than promoting the reduction of economic inequality” (70). Paradoxically, products from a non-Western country are those that seem to most ferociously promote and disseminate the values of Western neoliberalism, even in their most extreme developments for the very same Idols that bring it to life.

4

Conclusion

In a form of capitalism that has become aesthetic, addictive, and emotional and which encourages the growing aestheticization and commodification of everyday life, the Korean Wave presents a unique production model that borrows from global capitalism and builds upon close collaboration between the State and the private enterprise (chaebols, especially in the telecommunications sector) that are characteristic of the South Korean industrial landscape. In addition, this model has recentered economic focus on exports, which have become fundamental for a country with a limited domestic market. While it remained a minor phenomenon in the 1990s, entertainment capitalism burst onto the global scene in the 2010s. It helped to revitalize the South Korean economy after the 1997 financial crisis, transforming the country’s cultural industries into the symbol of Korean excellence in exports. This South Korean version of aesthetic capitalism promotes the horizontal integration of various products into a “cultural package” (Hong 2014). The latter has a number of specific traits, among which an important degree of serialization (leading to specific modes of productions), the rise of the transmedia Idol (rather than the earlier star), and the transformation of the relationship between artists/entertainers and their audiences. With regard to the last point, a great degree of closeness is fostered between Idols and their fans, especially given that fan communities play an essential role in the elaboration of cultural dynamics, in particular via

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extensive online activity. Entertainment capitalism promotes an ideology of well-being inspired by neoliberalism, of which is also the fruit, relying on the authenticity of the emotions elicited in consumers by the products they consume.

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Reckwitz, Andreas. 2017. The Invention of Creativity: Modern Society and the Culture of the New. Cambridge: Polity Press.  Redden, Guy. 2007. Makeover Morality and Consumer Culture. In Reading Makeover Television. Realities Remodeled, ed. Dana Heller, 150–164. London: I.B. Tauris. Riesman, David, Nathan Glazer, and Reule Denney. 2011 [1950]. The Lonely Crowd: The Study of American Changing Society. New Haven: Yale University Press. Ritzer, George. 1993. The McDonaldization of Society: an Investigation into the Changing Character of Contemporary Social Life. Newbury Park: Pine Forge Press. Roberts, David. 2012. From the Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism to the Creative Economy: Reflections on the New Spirit of Art and Capitalism. Thesis Eleven 110 (1): 83–97. Rozman, Gilbert, ed. 1991. The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 2003 [1942]. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Milton Park: Taylor and Francis. Seabrook, John. 2012. Factory Girls: Cultural Technology and the Making of K-pop. New Yorker, October 8. Sennett, Richard. 1998. The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism. New York: W.W. Norton. Seo, Eun-kyung, and Jonghyun Kim. 2009. Young South Koreans Become the ‘880,000 Won Generation’. Taipei Times, April 12. Shin, Hyunjoon. 2009. Have You Ever Seen the Rain? And Who’ll Stop the Rain? The Globalization Project of Korean Pop (K-Pop). Inter-Asia Global Studies 10 (4): 507–523. Sombart, Werner. 1967 [1913]. Luxury and Capitalism. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Therborn, Göran. 2012. The Killing Fields of Inequality. International Journal of Health Services 42 (4): 579–589. Thévenet, Stéphane. 2013. Les séries télévisées mondialisent la culture sud-­ coréenne. Le Monde Diplomatique, May. ———. 2017. Quand déferle la vague coréenne. Manière de voir 154: 6–7. UNESCO. 2007. Creative Cities Network. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ ark:/48223/pf0000156026. Accessed 15 Mar 2020.

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———. 2014. Globalization of Cultural Trade: A Shift in Consumption. https://en.unesco.org/creativity/files/globalisation-­c ultural-­t rade-­s hift-­ consumption. Accessed 15 Mar 2020. Veblen, Thorstein. 1934 [1899]. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions. New York: The Modern Library. Vogel, Ezra F. 1993. The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wagnleitner, Reinhold. 1994. Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Weber, Max. 2010 [1904–1905]. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. World Bank. 1993. The East Asian Miracle. Economic Growth and Public Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

3 An Alternative Globalization of Pop Culture

Entertainment capitalism can only be understood within the context of a twofold process: the globalization of culture and the culturalization of globalization, against a backdrop of interconnection accelerated by networks and mobility, by the elaboration of systems of shared norms and references (Leclerc 2000), and the shrinking of distances through the compression of space-time (Harvey 1990), which puts the planet’s inhabitants in more frequent contact with cultural diversity. In addition, the role of mass-market cultural industries has been growing since the 1950s (Hesmondhalgh 2019) through the exportation and confrontation of cultural, social, political, and even civilizational models, since the latter spread ideas and representations of different lifestyles. Further, entertainment capitalism can only be understood within the context of a truly pop culture, that is, one which is created for the masses rather than the elites, and which combines art with a consumerist aesthetic, glamour, and business (Artus 2017). From this standpoint, the rise of South Korea as a major player in pop culture, after long being considered a minor player on the global geopolitical playing field, shakes up the global competition for pop-cultural hegemony. Far from being a mere variation of the cultural globalization model invented by the United States, which has been

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disseminated and far and wide, with local adaptations, since the end of the Second World War, Hallyu represents a form of globalization that is an alternative to the Western model of pop culture. Its contours and specific characteristics will be described in this chapter and compared to its American, Japanese, and European rivals.

1

The Global Pop-Cultural Arena

Pop culture was born in the United States during the first decades of the twentieth century and arrived in Europe after the Second World War. For a long time, it remained a Western phenomenon, before undergoing an initial expansion in East Asia, initially in Japan and on the Indian subcontinent. Without recounting the lengthy history of competition in the cultural industries, we will recall some of the highlights thereof that are useful to understand the rise of Hallyu.

1.1

The Domination of the Big Three League

Cultural industries and pop culture were long dominated by a duopoly consisting of the United States and Western Europe, the leading cultural lights of the twentieth century. The entry of Japan onto the stage during the 1970s and 1980s––culminating with the purchase of Columbia Pictures by Sony in 1989––marked the formation of the “Big Three League,” a trio that has dominated global cultural exchanges ever since. This triopoly may be observed in the magnitude and direction of flows, in the asymmetry of the balance of power between producer countries and consumer countries, and in the division of markets. The United States remains the uncontested market leader with regard to the production of movies, TV series, and popular music, as well as in the “character industry” (franchises for comic and movie characters). Meanwhile, Western Europe has maintained its dominance over literary production and criticism, as well as arthouse and experimental films (i.e., the more highbrow sectors), while Japan has carved out the lion’s share of the market selling cultural industry products to adolescents, including manga,

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anime, video games, and also the “character industry”. Hence it is hardly surprising that, out of the world’s 25 most profitable media franchises of all time, not one has been created anywhere other than in the United States, Europe, or Japan, with the five most successful avatars of global pop culture being Pokémon, Hello Kitty, Winnie the Pooh, Mickey Mouse, and Star Wars (Jones 2019). The United States is also the world’s leader of cultural exchanges in terms of economic volume, particularly in the audiovisual sector. The revenue of the Walt Disney Studios, which has successively acquired Pixar, Marvel, Lucasfilm, and the Fox television network, reveals the magnitude of this domination: out of the ten most lucrative films of 2019, eight were produced by this American giant, which brought in more than 12 billion USD with titles such as Frozen II and Star Wars: The Rise of Skywalker. Broadly speaking, the U.S. media and entertainment (M&E) industry is the largest in the world. At $717 billion, it represents a third of the global M&E industry, and it includes motion pictures, television programs and commercials, streaming content, music and audio recordings, broadcast, radio, book publishing, video games, and ancillary services and products. The U.S. industry is expected to reach more than $825 billion by 2023. (SelectUSA 2020)

The supremacy of the audiovisual industry has extended to the digital realm. The top online platforms for the creation and distribution of audiovisual content are likewise American. Between 2008 and 2018, Netflix’s total sales (the company was founded in 1997) went from about 1.36 to 15.8 billion USD. In 2019, it had 150 million subscribers worldwide (an increase of 25 million from the preceding year) (Godoy Hilario 2019). That same year, Amazon Prime Video (launched in 2016) had 150 million subscribers to its Prime service worldwide (an increase of 50 million compared to the preceding year) and 55 million subscribers to its music streaming service (marking a 14% increase in international sales relative to the preceding year) (Duvert and Bertrand 2020; Louis 2020). Meanwhile, Apple is experiencing new growth thanks to its cultural product services launched in 2019, particularly Apple Arcade, Apple TV+, and also the Apple Card (all of which are successors to iTunes,

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created in 2001). This expanded product offering allowed it to bring in 12.5 billion USD during the fourth quarter of 2019 (Hiot 2019). On the other hand, Japan dominates the video game industry, which in 2018 had global sales of 180 billion USD (growing annually by 13%). More than 54 billion in profits were generated in Asia, while 15 billion came from North America and 11 billion from Europe (BPI France 2019). Most of the 13 highest-grossing video games of all time are Japanese. Since its creation, Mario Bros. has grossed 36 billion USD for Nintendo (all media combined), while Pokémon (also Nintendo) has brought in more than 20 billion USD. Wii (Nintendo again), Pac-Man (Bandai Namco Entertainment), and Space Invaders (Taito) have each generated 14 billion USD, and Street Fighter (Capcom) has brought in 12 billion USD. Among the top 13, only 3 games are American: Call of Duty (more than 19 billion USD; produced by Activision), FIFA (more than 12 billion USD; produced by Electronic Arts), and World of Warcraft (more than 12 billion USD; produced by Blizzard Entertainment). Just one is Chinese: League of Legends (11 billion USD; produced by Tencent via Riot Games of which it is a shareholder), and two are Chinese-Korean co-productions: CrossFire (which has grossed more than 12 billion USD for Tencent and Smilegate) and Dungeon Fighter Online (14 billion USD; produced by Nexon and Tencent).1 The most recent installment of Nintendo’s Animal Crossing series, entitled Animal Crossing: New Horizons, was released in the middle of March 2020. Within a mere six weeks, 13.4 million copies had already been sold (Le Monde 2020). Pac-Man, the first Japanese video game to enjoy international success, including in the United States, was released in 1980. “Revenue from the game Pac-Man alone was estimated to exceed that from the cinema box-office success Star Wars” (Bing 1982: 36). It was therefore not surprising that Japan hosted an exhibit with a title that evoked the worldwide distribution of video games. Held in Mito (the capital of Ibaraki Prefecture) in 2000–2001, the exhibit was called Bit Generation 2000 “TV Games” (AartTowerMito 2020).2  Wikipedia, “List of highest-grossing video game franchises,” consulted on 22 July 2020. https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_highest-grossing_video_game_franchises 2  In Japan, “TV games” refers to video games. 1

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The dominant position of the Big Three can also be seen in the animation industry. American companies have carved out the lion’s share of this 75 billion USD export market. These include major, long-established producers such as the Walt Disney Studios, DreamWorks Animation, Warner Bros, Animation, Pixar Animation Studios, Universal Pictures, and Fox Animation Studios. Japan comes in second place with Studio Ghibli. This oligopoly is rounded out by Europe, with a sizeable number of French studios3 (including Dargaud Media, Les Armateurs, La Fabrique Production, Folimage Studio, Mac Guff, and Europacorp). In all, out of 62 companies producing animation, only 6 are neither American, nor Japanese, nor European.4 In any event, American animated films attract the greatest number of viewers by far: out of the 100 top-grossing films, the first non-American movie comes in 25th place (it is Chinese) and the second non-American one is ranked number 73 (it is Japanese).5 The economic supremacy of the Big Three in the pop culture industry is coupled with a form of symbolic hegemony, given that the references produced by the cultural industries function as powerful social, and especially generational, integrators. Your Republic Is Calling You, a novel by Kim Young-ha (2006 [2010]), demonstrates this powerfully. Kyeong, the lead protagonist, is a North Korean spy who at the age of about 20 is sent by his superiors to South Korea to live under an assumed identity. Since he did not consume the cultural products characteristic of the global generations of the 1970s and 1980s during his childhood and adolescence, the primary difficulty Kyeong must overcome to fit in without attracting notice is developing emotional familiarity with references such as King Kong, UFO Robot Grendizer, Bruce Lee, Jackie Chan, Donald Duck, Woody Woodpecker, Superman, and Spiderman. This example attests to the profound asymmetry that marks the history of pop culture: while the Big Three––especially the United States––lead the way in setting global cultural trends, the Global South has primarily  France alone accounts for 40% of European production: https://www.lesmetiersdudessin.fr/ cinema-danimation/ 4  “List of animation studios,” consulted on 5 August 2020. http://www.filmsanimation.com/studio/ 5  https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Box-office_des_films_d%27animation_dans_le_monde 3

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remained a consumer. Given the configuration of this balance of power, there have been few opportunities for other countries to seize upon. Notwithstanding, there have been a few notable exceptions, including Turkish television series (Turkey is the world’s second-largest producer after the United States), as well as Latin American telenovelas, and the martial arts movie niche in Hong Kong. Bollywood in India and Nigeria’s Nollywood have also joined the competition, surpassing the United States, China, Japan, and France to become the top two countries in the world in terms of the number of films produced (but not in terms of audience), according to UNESCO data.6 Meanwhile, the “world music” category, an umbrella term for all non-Western music independent of genre, has met with some success since the 1960s.

1.2

Toward a New Multipolar Cultural Order

While a clear-cut distinction between exclusively consumer countries and major producer countries underpinned many analyses of cultural imperialism during the 1970s and 1980s, such an approach is significantly less relevant in the current context, given that cultural flows between the North and South have changed considerably. Since 2013, China has become the number one exporter of cultural goods and services (more than 60 billion USD in worth, which is more than double the value of exports from the United States (UNESCO 2016)). With an annualized growth rate in excess of 10%, China is on the way to becoming the world’s second-biggest market player in terms of value, although admittedly still far behind the United States, whose cultural industry has a monetary value that is nearly three times larger, and which for the time being dominates every cultural industry. We are therefore witnessing a reconfiguration of cultural flows: two regions of the world have divvied up exports––Southeast Asia (accounting for 45.5% of exports in 2013), and North America and Europe (representing 49% of exports)––whereas imports are more concentrated geographically, with 62% going to North America or Europe and no more than 5% going to  http://data.uis.unesco.org

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each of the other regions of the world (the Caribbean, the Middle East, Oceania, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa). Although Western countries remain the primary consumers, what they consume now comes from various regions of the world. This dramatic change is closely linked to the 2.0 era in which HBO, Disney, Netflix and GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon) are the major players. With the rise of new cultural powers that are both at a remove from Western nations in terms of their history, values, and national cultures and that are very modern both economically and technologically, a multipolar logic now prevails. It is in this context that analyzing Hallyu finds full relevance. We should consider Hallyu as characteristic of a new phase in the globalization of pop culture, wherein a new player––hitherto never a major power––has emerged with an influence that is just as regional as it is global, and which provides the world with new models of globalization and modernity thanks to its attractive cultural offering. Indeed, South Korea’s products have conquered the world, and the growth in its cultural content exports is undeniably impressive (UNESCO 2016). In fact, they grew by 250% between 2004 and 2013, an achievement unequaled by any of its competitors. Since 2017, the Hallyu share of total export revenue has increased by 9.1%, reaching 9.5 billion USD. South Korean audiovisual content was distributed worldwide by Netflix and Rakuten TV and sold via DramaFever (now closed), Viki, Amazon, and Hulu in the United States, and Iflix, Viu, and HOOQ in Asia. South Korea also exports franchises that are then adapted in countries around the world. Examples include television shows (like Good Doctor,*7 which has been adapted for Japanese television), as well as competition shows (such as The King of Mask Singer,* which has been sold in both the United States and France, among others, and I Can See Your Voice,* which has been sold in China, Thailand, Indonesia, Bulgaria, Malaysia, the Philippines, Romania, Cambodia, and Slovakia). South Korea exports its modernity, particularly in the video game industry. In 2017, exports in this sector reached almost 6 billion USD,  The South Korean cultural products referred to in this book and marked with an asterisk are presented in the glossary at the end of the book. 7

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with an increase in value of nearly 81% between 2017 and 2018 (PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds dominates the list of the world’s top-­ selling games). These products are exported primarily to China (60.5%), but are also sold in Japan (12.5%), Southeast Asia (12.5%), North America (6.5%), and Europe (6%). As for K-pop, sales have also increased dramatically between 2017 and 2018, not just in the regional markets of Southeast Asia (+38%), but also in North America (+94%), Western Europe (+25.4%), and the rest of the world (+18%). This is due to the turbocharging effect of BTS’* success (KOFICE 2018). In the film industry, exports are primarily to Asian countries (67%), but it is those toward Europe that are experiencing the strongest growth (+7%). Likewise, exports of manhwa increased by 11% between 2016 and 2017 (and by a yearly average of +14% since 2014), owing primarily to the success of webtoons broadcast on platforms such as Line Webtoon, KakaoPage, and Lezhin Comics. South Korea now accounts for more than 10% of the video game market worldwide (the 4th largest share in the world), more than 3% of the film market (9th place), nearly 3% of the publishing market (8th place), and 1.5% of the television market (13th place) (Korea Invest 2017). On the whole, the country is benefiting from the increasingly important role that networks play in the distribution of cultural content. The example of South Korea shows that the globalization of culture can offer some countries an opportunity to access the production market of the global cultural industry, on the condition that they invest in infrastructure and provide original cultural content, the quality of which is then recognized by international audiences.

2

The Dominance of the United States

Analyzing the way in which South Korea is on its way to becoming a credible alternative to the Big Three in the globalization of culture entails reassessing how cultural dominance is established, as well as the elements that form it and that grant those who wield it a hegemonic position. Henry Jenkins (2004) notes that there are four forms of media imperialism which are usually closely correlated in the dominant countries:

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economic (the ability to produce and circulate cultural goods), political (the ability to impose ideologies), cultural (the ability to produce and circulate meanings), and psychological (the ability to shape desires, imaginaries, and identities). Over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, the United States developed its hegemony by relying on these four mutually reinforcing forms of power, in addition to its military strength, the size of its territory, its natural resources, and its demographic weight.

2.1

The Pillars of US Pop Culture

Having succeeded the British Empire as the world’s preeminent military power on both land and sea, the United States found itself, following the Second World War, in a position of strength in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Pacific. One of the clearest characteristics of this hegemony was that during the Cold War it was at the “center of everything,” (Ikenberry 2007) from the creation of a multilateral liberal order founded on economic and military agreements, to international regulatory institutions––whether the UN, the Bretton Woods Agreements, the GATT, NATO, or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its dominance also applies to the manufacturing of imagination: five of the six biggest movie studios are American (Martel 2010), and Hollywood dominates the world of mainstream entertainment (Tardif and Farchy 2006) to such an extent that the places seen in American movies now exist “in our cultural imagination, our repertoire of ‘textual locations’ built up out of all the millions of images in films, TV programs, books and magazines that we have encountered” (Tomlinson 1999: 119). This model of pop-cultural hegemony has always benefited from lobbying and government aid, and the government has always been quick to threaten sanctions when obstacles to the expansion thereof have been raised (de Grazia 2005; Arndt 2006). This model relies on the four following elements: First, an ability to disseminate and to profit from production, thanks to a novel combination of creativity, aggressive marketing, and relatively limited risk-taking in which products are first amortized in the domestic

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market, which is exceptionally vast and integrated (Hartley 2005; Greffe 2006; Hesmondhalgh 2019). Associated with the permanent quest for high standards of quality and professionalism, this conception of cultural production has led to the creation of a pop-cultural canon in extremely varied registers, and this canon is recognized by both professional critics and international audiences. Even while American cultural output is intended to be mass-market, thanks to its diversity it manages to produce a complex and nuanced vision of the world. Whether we think of westerns (which have told the story of how the west was won both as an adventurous conquest and as a massacre perpetrated against American Indians) or of the films that have shown the heroism of the great wars of liberation from the Nazi/fascist and imperialist yokes in Europe and Asia, as well as the horrors produced by these conflicts, particularly in Vietnam, the ability of screenwriters, directors, and actors well versed in the most sophisticated cinematographic and acting techniques to tell the story of America has meant that American fiction cannot be reduced to mere storytelling about the clash between good and evil, a quest for truth and justice, or perseverance and success. In such cultural contents, we encounter individualism, heroism, consumerism, hedonism, and feminism, as well as a lust for power and wealth, and even nihilism. Second, this canon is born of the broadly inclusive nature of the American system of production. By inclusiveness, we mean the ability of American pop culture to import works and cultural content from elsewhere by adapting (and also Americanizing) them, while also adapting to them (by imitating them), and also its ability to attract a broad domestic (and international) audience due to its multicultural make-up. This concern for inclusivity manifests itself in creators’ tendency to imitate, parody, adapt, quote, twist, and transpose by using cultural references without any concern for whether the authenticity of a work, its historic context, or its creators’ sources of inspiration are respected. We know that the work of Walt Disney was strongly influenced by European culture, including the tales of Perrault (Snow White, Cinderella) and the Brothers Grimm, as well as Pinocchio, Alice in Wonderland, and Peter Pan (Mary 2006). Likewise, The Matrix (1999), a box-office smash that was also critically acclaimed, was very strongly influenced by Japanese animation, which even its producers have acknowledged. The intro to the track

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“Clubbed to Death,” composed by Rob Dougan, and best known as part of the soundtrack of The Matrix, accompanies key scenes from the film. It is in fact an homage to the first movement of the Enigma Variations, composed by Edgar Elgar (1898–1899). This in turn is explicitly referenced by its subtitle, “Kurayamino variation,” which in Japanese means “of the darkness”––a lovely mise en abyme. And then of course there is the “historical epic” genre: drawing from episodes of Greco-Roman history and mythology––as these are reimagined by Hollywood filmmakers and the American audience––this genre helped to shape the Golden Age of American cinema. The importation of cultural content is but a preamble to its appropriation and exportation, with a brand-new look, once it has been imbued with American values. The United States has been a recipient as much as an exporter of global culture […]. American culture has spread throughout the world because it has incorporated foreign styles and ideas. What Americans have done more brilliantly than their competitors overseas is repackage the cultural products we received from abroad and then retransmit them to the rest of the planet. (Pells 2002: 468)

By way of example, in the classic Chinese tale Mulan, the protagonist dies without achieving recognition of her right to define herself as an individual, while in the Disney film she manages to emancipate herself, in line with the Western model of female liberation. At the same time, all while promoting products with an aesthetic, content, and gender conventions that can claim to be universal––or that de facto become so thanks to their global success––American filmmakers have managed to create a shared foundation underpinning a contemporary imaginary. The narratives produced by the American cultural industry may have diverse origins and come from elsewhere; in the United States they are refashioned from an ancient substratum. Such is the case of the Marvel and DC Comics superheroes, many of whose creators were Ashkenazi Jews who fled Europe (Kaplan 2008). In other cases, these narratives are even more “authentically American,” like the myth of the

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frontier.8 Despite their great diversity, they may be integrated into a national narrative that poses as universal, even though it is but one form of American modernity, long conflated with modernity itself. In the words of Ulf Hannerz (2003), “By and large, Americans may not expect that the meanings and the cultural forms they invent are only for themselves; possibly because they have seen at home over the years that practically anybody can become an American” (223–4). Third is an ability to overcome the strongly rooted division that exists in Europe between highbrow and lowbrow culture. The values, norms, and worldviews of American society have been spread and appropriated all the more easily because the day-to-day consumption of the products that transmit them does not require extensive amounts of prior schooling. Hence, whether they are invented out of whole cloth or inspired by ancient narratives  (Campbell 2010; Witzel 2013; Cicchelli 2018), the mythologies produced by Marvel or DC Comics, Lucasfilm, and Disney––including complex universes such as those of the Star Wars and Avengers franchises––do not have as high a bar to entry as Norse sagas such as Snorri’s Edda, the Arthurian story cycles, the books of the Old Testament, or the tales of ancient Greco-Roman heroes, even though they are often inspired by the former. Nonetheless, these narratives create universes that are sometimes self-referential (as in the case of the above-­ referenced sagas) and that captivate faithful audiences while providing continuity in their references. And last, but not least, one could hardly overstate the ability of the American model to embody a form of modernity that is imbued with the values of hedonistic emancipation and freedom of expression. Evoking the attraction of American pop culture for postwar generations of Europeans, Austrian historian Reinhold Wagnleitner writes (1994): “To us pseudo-Americans, the United States signified an amalgam of freedom, fun, modernity, wealth, mobility, and youthful rebellion” (xiii). Peter Berger (2000) says the same thing about the attraction of rock music around the world: “Its attraction is not just due to a particular  One may recall the famous thesis of historian Frederick Jackson Turner (1861–1932), who in a now classic work declared: “American democracy was born of no theorist’s dream; it was not carried in the Susan Constant to Virginia, nor in the Mayflower to Plymouth. It came out of the American forest, and it gained new strength each time it touched a new frontier” (Turner 1920 [1893]: 293). 8

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preference for loud, rhythmic sound and dangerously athletic dancing. Rock music also symbolizes a whole cluster of cultural values––concerning self-expression, spontaneity, released sexuality, and, perhaps most importantly, defiance of the alleged stodginess of tradition” (423). This worship of freedom of expression is also found in the ability of American culture to fuel criticism, and even subversion. In fact, US pop culture stoked the youthful attitude of rebellion that, between the 1950s and 1970s, sparked a clash of generations in every Western country. This attitude was typified by such icons as James Dean (in Rebel Without a Cause, directed by Nicholas Ray, 1956), Marlon Brando (in The Wild One, directed by László Benedek, 1953), and Sal Paradise (the protagonist of Jack Kerouac’s On the Road, 1957, which became a manifesto for the Beat Generation). A few years later, American culture would be used by young people in Europe to protest against the war in Vietnam and to criticize their parents’ generation. To quote Reinhold Wagnleitner (1994) once again: “[W]e also sang in English, however badly and naively, as an act of protest against the older generation. When we sang Bob Dylan’s ‘Masters of War,’ those who understood the lyrics were not reminded of Vietnam but of the Second World War” (xiii). To this day, American pop culture references are used throughout the world to challenge the established order (Octobre 2020). From the Anonymous collective’s use of the Guy Fawkes mask, popularized by the comic book V for Vendetta (Leloup and Audureau 2016), to the three-fingered salute from The Hunger Games, used as a gesture of defiance by opponents of the regime in Thailand (Le Monde 2014), to the Joker’s makeup, worn by people protesting social inequality (Andraca 2019), the same symbols are used from New York to Hong Kong, and from Beirut to Santiago. There are even images of young protestors in Hong Kong in 2019 using all three symbols of resistance (Audureau 2019). In short, the American Dream and its model of modernity are composed by combining a consumerist lifestyle, values of emancipation achieved through work and personal merit, the headlong pursuit of happiness and love, and the primacy of individual rights over the constraints of the collective, together with a fierce attachment to freedom of expression along with the freedom to criticize, which can give rise to rebellion and underground movements.

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Signs of Weakening

Still, one can see signs that American pop-cultural dominance is weakening, and it is its very ability to be inclusive that seems to be waning. Of course, this inclusiveness has not always been above reproach. The process of whitewashing, primarily at the expense of the African American community, but also the Asian community, has had a lasting impact on US pop culture. One may recall that it was not until 1966 that Stan Lee and Jack Kirby, the two heavyweights of the Marvel universe, created the first Black superhero, Black Panther––and even this character did not initially have any obvious connections to the civil rights movements that were shaking the United States at the time.9 It was not until two years later, on 22 November 1968, that tens of millions of Americans saw an interracial kiss on the screen for the first time. The kiss, which happened during the second episode of Star Trek’s third season, was between Black actress Nichelle Nichols (Lieutenant Uhura) and white actor William Shatner (Captain Kirk). The show’s producers were strongly opposed to the idea, arguing that it had only been ten years since the miscegenation clause prohibiting suggestions of romantic relationships between whites and Blacks had been removed from the Hollywood Production Code. However, the two actors strongly supported the depiction and ended up getting their way by deliberately flubbing all the other takes of that scene (Mahoux 2020). Similarly, it was not until the third Star Wars trilogy (2015–2019) that non-white actors played lead characters: Finn, played by British-Nigerian actor and producer John Boyega; Poe Dameron, played by actor and singer Oscar Isaac, who is of Guatemalan origin; and Rose Tico, played by actress Kelly Marie Tran, who is of Vietnamese descent. Although Marvel-Disney is making much greater efforts than before in terms of “minority representation, even if it means calling upon woke and politicized representatives of these communities” (Croquet 2018), these efforts at inclusion are not always sufficient in the eyes of a segment of public opinion and the American star system. Proof of this is the recurring controversy for a number of years over the apparent  It was not until 2018 that this character had the leading role in a movie devoted to him (directed by Ryan Coogler). 9

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inability of the US movie industry to recognize and reward Black actors during the annual awards ceremonies, which gave rise to the #OscarsSoWhite movement (Ugwu 2020). The diminishing capacity of US pop culture to be inclusive is not only seen in such national controversies, which primarily have to do with questions of equality. It can also be seen in the habituation and even saturation of audiences when it comes to American products: after more than 80 years of domination, and despite their undeniable aesthetic development, these products no longer arouse the same desire, precisely because they appear too American. Most consumers see Disney as being typically American or Western in its values and cultural orientations (Wasko 2001). Some audiences, particularly in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, are reportedly turning away from American products––whether TV shows, movies, music videos, or video games––on the grounds that these are oversaturated with sex, violence, drugs, and other addictive elements. According to some authors (Jang and Paik 2012; Elaskary 2018; Yoon 2018), such audiences are said to be calling for alternatives based on values such as modesty, discretion, restraint, and respect––which can all be found, as we will explore at length, in South Korean cultural products.10 Moreover, the values promoted by American products have changed significantly, as can be demonstrated by comparing Gilligan’s Island, Star Trek, The Simpsons, and The X-Files (Cantor 2003: x). The first two, which came out in the 1960s, embodied a period during which “a fundamental faith in American liberal democracy” was not only prevalent, but went hand in hand with a universalist project. In contrast, The Simpsons and The X-Files, which became popular in the 1990s, reflect an America that is less self-centered and is beginning to criticize itself. Moreover, one can see how much distance separates certain contemporary American creations, dominated by the visage of “the bad guy” (Jost 2015), from those of the postwar years, which were dominated by the American Dream, as exalted by Walt Disney and others. After all, when Disney said: “If you can dream, you can do it. Always remember that this whole thing was started by a mouse,” was not it to demonstrate the extent to which his  Again, we do not claim by all means that these values are the mirror of South Korean culture but that they are presented as such by the cultural products. 10

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personal success embodied the self-made man, and the power of individual will? This headlong rush of cultural production toward a jaded, cynical, and even nihilistic view of American modernity can be seen in various recent works, particularly the film Joker (directed by Todd Phillips, 2019), the TV series House of Cards, and the Batman film trilogy (directed by Christopher Nolan and released in 2005, 2008, and 2012). These productions are radically different from the traditional image of America, from its traditional forms of storytelling in which the hero, even the most tormented and ambivalent one, manages to overcome adversity and remain a good guy. Some voices have been raised to criticize the axiological foundations of American pop culture, by refusing to allow that it is in any way innocent. Indeed, even though the American superhero can distinguish between good and evil, he intervenes where institutions seem to be absent. And it is precisely this function, of substituting democratic powers, that has led some to fear the autocratic message conveyed by this explosive combination of zealous nationalism and incitement to vigilantism––a combination that some consider to be American pop fascism (Lawrence and Jewett 2002; Jewett and Lawrence 2003). It would seem as though audiences are turning to alternatives that are better able to offer them dreams, and are fleeing American output guilty of being enchanted with its own disenchantment. However, it could also be that this saturation is due to the slow but inexorable dilution of American cultural traits through globalization, which would tend to lead consumers to turn to new, more culturally localized products. In the words of Jean Baudrillard (1988), “American power has entered a new stage of ‘hysteresis,’ which may be defined as the process whereby something continues to develop by inertia, whereby an effect persists even when its cause has disappeared” (115). American cultural traits may have become diluted through globalization, just as Protestantism has become diluted within modernity, which both helped forge and were very closely associated with it for a long time. So it is that we join Koichi Iwabuchi (2002) in wondering about the outcome: “it is an open question if this transformation of the nature of America’s global cultural influence is the pinnacle of Americanization or the demise of Americanization” (39).

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Developing an Alternative

The success of Hallyu should of course be understood against the backdrop of fading American glory, but the latter is not sufficient to explain the attractiveness of Hallyu products and their ability to capture the attention of international audiences and stimulate their desire for new products. What are the contours of the Hallyu cultural globalization model which has succeeded in seducing such varied audiences?

3.1

The American Lesson

The success of South Korea’s cultural industries cannot be analyzed without considering their longstanding and complex interactions with America’s output (Anderson 2014). As we know, South Korea has had close ties with the United States since 1945. The strong US military presence in South Korea––to this day, some 30,000 soldiers are still stationed there––has engendered a close familiarity with American pop culture. This has favored the replication of modes of production and quality standards, which have been guided by the mantra “learning from Hollywood.” Since the 1990s, South Korea’s major film companies have imported sophisticated marketing techniques, modeled on those of the major American studios, and every step of the film production process has become more rigorous and iterative. This led up to the release in 1999 of the surprise hit Shiri,* a South Korean action thriller that attracted an audience of 5.8 million (including 2.44 million in Seoul), surpassing the record set in local theaters by the Hollywood production Titanic upon its release in 1998. It has been reported that the screenplay of Friend,* a 2001 South Korean blockbuster, was revised 21 times. As we saw in the Chap. 2, test audiences are often invited to take part in the writing, revision, and editing of screenplays, so as to better analyze and leverage their tastes. As noted by one movie producer, the South Korean counterpart to the Hollywood industry spends a lot on marketing and research to ensure that their audience data is highly accurate (Chon 2001: 49). The music industry has also taken a few pages from the American playbook: SM Entertainment’s manual lays out in fine detail what needs to be done to create a hit group (Seabrook 2012).

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Three Lessons from Japan

Japan was a second source of inspiration in the invention of the South Korean model. It was the first non-Western power to make inroads into global pop culture, and it continues to be a serious rival to the United States, particularly in Asia and among young people. South Koreans, whose domestic market abounds with familiar Japanese products, have drawn three main lessons from the Japanese model. a) An imagined Asian community Japanese production has been able to leverage the demand for non-­ Western modernity which has arisen from the convergence of several trends in Asia: economic development, known as the “Asian miracle;” the expectations of a middle class that is undergoing a demographic boom and is increasingly accustomed to high-quality cultural products; and the development of information and communication technologies (which have been one of the mainstays of fast-tracked modernization in both Japan and South Korea). In this process of rapid modernization, Japan has also wagered on cultural industries, leveraging Japanese industrial know-how to grow the leading telecommunications and cultural facilities companies. These include Sony, Panasonic, Toshiba, Tepco, and Hitachi in electronics, and NTT and Softbank in telecommunications, all of which are among the top 20 Japanese corporations (Murphy et al. 2020), and which foster the development of cultural contents, particularly in the video game and animation industries. In this context, Japan has sought to offer products that embody an imagined Asian community. To aphoristically use an expression coined by Benedict Anderson (1983)––without anchoring it in the national context to which it originally referred––one may in fact consider that there are “imagined transnational communities” which are formed through affiliation by virtue of consumption that sparks recognition of shared historical memories. The famed Japanese television series Oshin11  Oshin is a serialized Japanese morning television drama, initially broadcast in 1983 and 1984. It has 297 episodes, each 15 minutes long, and is set over a period stretching from the early 1900s 11

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(1983) is a good example of this. The series narrates the story of Tanimura Shin (known as Oshin), born in 1907 to a poor Japanese family and who, by enduring numerous tribulations tied to her social condition and overcoming various misfortunes, ultimately meets with success and becomes very rich thanks to her perseverance. According to the analysis of Koichi Iwabuchi (2002), “Oshin cultivated among Asian viewers a sense of commonality between Japan and other Asian nations through the representation of common values such as perseverance, diligence, attachment to family and the common harsh experience of non-Western modernization” (76). Thus, according to this author (ibid.), the regional circulation of Japanese cultural products produces “a sense of living in the shared time and common experience of a certain (post-)modernity which cannot be represented well by American popular culture” (56). b) Improved exportation through despecification The second lesson from Japan comes from this desire to fashion commonalities, even though the country is a former colonizer in the region, bitterly criticized for its conduct during the Second World War. The rise of anti-Japanese sentiment in East Asia at the beginning of the 1970s led the Japanese government to grant new importance to the country’s cultural ties with its neighbors. This included the development of a cultural diplomacy policy, the “Fukuda Doctrine,” which allowed Japan to promote its economic interests through the expansion of its companies in the Asian region. One way in which it did this was by exporting industrial products that were marketed in such a way that their “Japaneseness” would be overlooked. The initial ambition of the Japanese strategy was regional. This meant that products, whether equipment and hardware (videocassette recorders, personal cassette players, and CD players) or media content (especially manga and video games), needed to have their cultural characteristics softened in order to neutralize the painful memories of Japan’s armed conflicts with its Asian neighbors and any negative reactions these might provoke. We can thank Koichi Iwabuchi (2002) for the most well-known descriptor of this characteristic, which he calls (during the Meiji era) to the early 1980s. It is one of the most famous series in Japan and has been rebroadcast in 68 countries (including in many English-speaking and Arabic-speaking countries).

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“odorlessness,” a process “in which a country’s bodily, racial, and ethnic characteristics are erased or softened” (28). The erasure of the Japanese phenotypical and cultural characteristics of these products is called mukokuseki, a word which means “something or someone lacking any nationality, but also implying the erasure of racial or ethnic characteristics or a context, which does not imprint a particular culture or country with these features” (ibid.). This strategy of despecification has not been applied to all cultural industries in the same way: although it has been particularly effective in the realm of video games (where Japanese excellence may even be considered an attractive feature), it has not been the same in the sphere of music. J-pop exports are low, mainly because of Japanese artists’ weak command of foreign languages, whether English or other Asian languages (Kim 2015). The Japanese strategy of cultural globalization is therefore quite different from the American one, mainly because Japanese cultural exports in no way seek to promote a “Japanese way of life.” This strategy of despecification entails taking into account the local contexts in which exports occur and a particular form of hybridization which analysts have dubbed “glocalization” (Robertson 1992, 1995; Jang and Lee 2016) (or dochakuka in Japanese). This is the adaptation of a product or service to the locations where it will be sold, and to the cultures for which it is intended, that is, a simultaneous juxtaposition of universalization and particularization, of localization and globalization––a phenomenon that has been facilitated by the explosion of digital social networks. c) Kawaii modernity The third lesson comes from the Japanese concept of kawaii (translated as “cute” in English). Astro Boy,12 Candy Candy,13 Captain Harlock,14

 Astro Boy, known in Japan as Atom is a fictional superhero and the protagonist of the eponymous franchise. Created by Osamu Tezuka, the character was introduced in the 1951 Captain Atom manga. In France, it first aired in 1986. 13  Candy Candy is a Japanese series created by Kyoko Mizuki. The main character, Candice “Candy” White Ardley is a blonde girl with freckles, large emerald-green eyes, and long hair worn in pigtails with bows. It first aired in France in 1978. 14  Captain Harlock, also known as “Captain Herlock” in the English release of Endless Odyssey and some Japanese materials, is a fictional character and the protagonist of the Space Pirate Captain 12

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Kiki’s Delivery Service,15 and Pokémon16 are just a few examples of countless fictional characters who are kawaii. Without a doubt, the best example of kawaii is Hello Kitty, who meets––and in turn fosters––growing audience demand worldwide (particularly among women) for strongly aestheticized objects, characters, and cultural content that have a positive emotional charge. This cat who is not a cat, whose highly stylized facial expression is reduced to a few essential lines (her mouth is missing, for example), and whose colors fall within a vivid palette of pinks, is representative of a product that has been offered in a variety of forms, from wallets to theme parks, from cartoons to backpacks, from colored pencils to clothes, from video games to toasters, and from credit cards to lingerie and even sex toys. Initially intended for little girls, the character has won the hearts of older female audiences by playing on what Lori Merish (1996) called “a structure of emotional response that assimilates consumption into the logic of adoption” (187). Indeed, as Christine Yano (2013) showed in her work with female consumers, Hello Kitty seems to elicit strong emotions of a return to childhood, of an emotional attachment that can even take on aspects of mothering. Hello Kitty is constructed entirely around an idea of empathetic consumption, for her talents are many: she is said to bake perfect cookies and collect cute trinkets. Her color palette popularized the kawaii aesthetic, and she has been a UNICEF “children’s ambassador” since 1983. The character’s cuteness fosters intense feelings of attachment: 3.3 million users connect via Sanriotown.com, the official online community for fans (Guiton 2015). It is therefore not surprising to hear Suri Fukunaga, the CEO of Burson-Marsteller (a consultant to major Japanese Harlock manga series created by Leiji Matsumoto. It was adapted into an anime television series and first aired in France in 1980. 15  Kiki’s Delivery Service is a 1989 Japanese animated film written, produced, and directed by Hayao Miyazaki, adapted from the 1985 novel by Eiko Kadono. It was animated by Studio Ghibli. The film tells the story of a young witch, Kiki, who moves to a new town and uses her flying ability to earn a living. 16  Pokémon, also known as Pocket Monsters in Japan, is a Japanese media franchise managed by The Pokémon Company, a company co-founded by Nintendo, Game Freak, and Creatures. The franchise was created by Satoshi Tajiri in 1995 and is centered on fictional creatures called “Pokémon,” which humans, known as Pokémon Trainers, catch and train to fight each other for sport. Games, television series (20 seasons, 1000 episodes in 169 countries), card games (30.4 billion cards sold), anime film series, books, comics, music, merchandising, and a theme park… all of these form the Pokémon universe, which has become the highest-grossing media franchise of all time.

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corporations), say: “Cute is a boom. This style has suddenly become a fashion element among youths around the world… Marketers in Japan are seeing this and are adept at churning out products that incorporate this style for overseas” (quoted in Yano 2013: 7). With “cute,” what is offered is content that pleases regardless of the country that produces or receives it. In short, it is about achieving a kind of cuteness that is as transcultural as possible, while retaining features that may be considered exotic and/or attractive (such as the use of very bright colors). Cuteness is then reflected back upon perceptions of the producer country. This type of strategy indicates that, unlike in the United States, in the Japanese case there is no association between consumed cultural products and a claim to hegemonic modernity (any such claim would in fact be contrary to cuteness). Christine Yano (2013) points out that “a Japanese product such as Hello Kitty remains more of a product, and less a bearer of lifestyle or national identity than Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, or Starbucks” (14).

3.3

Global Pop Culture, South Korean Style

Since the early 2000s, Hallyu has owed its success to the fact that its products are less expensive than those of their Western competitors (this ensured the success of K-dramas in Asia and Latin America, for instance) and that their quality is now proven. These products are a novel synthesis of the dominant formats’ best ingredients, both globally and regionally. By leveraging the lessons learned from America and Japan, South Korea is offering its own novel version of pop culture, which combines five different aspects. a) A form of modernity embodied by highly innovative cultural products While Sony invented the Walkman, the CD, and the DVD, South Korea perfected devices to broadcast digital content (Samsung), equipped itself with one of the best telecommunications infrastructures (4G, 5G), and adapted its output so that it could be consumed on every kind of screen. In other words, it developed an integrated offering of cultural products and content as well as the infrastructure needed to disseminate it as widely as possible.

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The example of webtoons is edifying. Created in South Korea as a new form of manhwa adapted to websites and smartphones, a webtoon is not a scanned version of a printed manhwa page, but rather an original cultural object that has created a specific submarket, supported by the spread of smartphone ownership (which has become the main access point for culture for young people in many countries of the world). Since 2003, South Korea has produced a wide variety of webtoons, which continue to change the way in which manhwa are produced and read. They place a strong emphasis on images relative to text (Jang and Song 2017). And even though Japan and France are the world’s top consumers of comics (manga/bandes dessinées), Korean webtoons have been so successful that they have forced Japanese and French producers to follow suit in order to remain attractive (Oh and Koo 2018). It is perhaps in the area of e-sports that the innovation so emblematic of Hallyu is most evident. In South Korea, online gaming culture is widespread, and Korean cities have what are called PC cafés, cybercafés devoted to video games and online games. As a central part of South Korean society––as of 2013 there were reportedly 17 million gamers in South Korea (Rousse-Marquet 2013)––video games are considered to be a national sport17 and enjoy worldwide recognition, whether through the success of individual games or, even more so, e-sport stars. The best of them, like Lee “Faker” Sang-hyeok, become professionals, sign promotional deals, have fan clubs, are funded by sponsors, and face off against other domestic and foreign players during competitions that are broadcast on television, such as the StarCraft II World Championship Series and the Global StarCraft II League. South Korea is at the forefront of the young e-sports industry and was a finalist in League of Legends and StarCraft II during the 2018 Asian Games. b) The choice of quality In addition, the output of South Korean cultural industries, most of which are no more than 30  years old, is characterized by a very fast  There are four television channels devoted to them, and the scores of e-sports competitions are reported on the mainstream channels’ news segments, along with those for soccer and basketball. 17

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upmarket transition. This transition has been particularly evident in the movie industry. Every year, more and more South Korean films are invited to compete at prestigious film festivals throughout the world and have won numerous awards since the early 2000s. In 2002, director Im Kwon-­ taek won the award for best director at the Cannes Film Festival for his film Chi-hwa-seon (2002),* and Lee Chang-dong won the award for best director at the Venice Film Festival for Oasis (2002).* In 2004, director Park Chan-wook won the Grand Prix (second prize) in Cannes for his film Oldboy.* Quentin Tarantino, who was the president of the jury, was lavish in his praise. Meanwhile, Kim Ki-duk won the best director award at the Berlin International Film Festival (for Samaritan Girl, 2004)* and in Venice (for 3-Iron, 2004).* The Guanajuato International Film Festival (in Mexico) named South Korea the guest of honor in July 2011 and showed a total of 76 Korean films, including Whispering Corridors (1998)* and Bedeviled (2010),* as part of a program devoted to Korean horror films and to two directors, Bong Joon-ho and Kim Dongwon. During the 2016 International Film Festival of India, held in Goa, South Korea was chosen for the first time to be the “Country of Focus,” and director Im Kwon-taek received a lifetime achievement award. The Throne (2015),* directed by Lee Joon-ik, was also screened in the International Competition category, while The Age of Shadows (2016),* from director Kim Jee-woon, was selected as the closing film (Korean Cultural Center 2020). The success in 2019 of the film Parasite,* from South Korean director Bong Joon-ho, was the crowning glory of this dazzling series of worldwide accolades: he received both the Palme d’Or18 and the Oscar for best film, a first for a film in a foreign (non-English) language. Joon-ho won the Oscar for best director and best international feature film, then the BAFTA Film Awards in 2020 (for best screenplay and best film not in English). Newspapers such as The Guardian, The Washington Post, and The New York Times have drawn attention to the fact that foreign films are rarely shown in American theaters and are most often relegated to the internet due to the habit of favoring films in English. In so doing, these  In France it attracted more than 1.67 million moviegoers, making it the most viewed Palme d’Or winner in 15 years. 18

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news sources have questioned whether audiences’ tastes are changing, with the box-office success of Parasite being the most obvious sign thereof. Adam Epstein (2020) reached the following terse conclusion: “Americans are willing to see these kinds of films in theaters if given the opportunity.” The same phenomenon can be observed with K-pop, judging by the international success of major K-pop groups in terms of awards and acclaim from professional critics (we need only cite the exemplary case of BTS)*. The same is true of K-dramas, especially since massive investments made by streaming platforms, with Netflix in the lead, have increased demand for quality products in the international sector. c) The art of glocalization and hybridization As we have already mentioned, Korea was occupied by China and then Japan, and the US military presence remains strong. It has consequently developed an aptitude for recycling and reinvention (Kim and Bae 2017). South Korea is therefore an accomplished master of the art of adapting to foreign markets in order promote broad distribution: “The Korean Wave can be considered an exemplary case of glocal culture. It skillfully blends Western and Asian values into cultural products, presenting a ‘vision of modernization’ and universal values such as pure love and familism in Korea-specific ways” (Jang and Song 2017). It is this ability to glocalize and hybridize that becomes the expression of Korean know-how in the cultural realm, and which has given rise to a flourishing sociological literature on Hallyu. These products adapt American and Western culture to Asian tastes by injecting Confucian values and ideologies into the narrative structures of films and series (Ryoo 2009), as well as music (Howard 2006), but also adding specific skills (subtle acting and highly polished singing and dancing) (Oh and Jang 2020). “Hallyu is neither a rejection nor a reaction to the US- and western- Europe-oriented culture, and it represents a new hybrid culture that has captured the influence of both the West and the East” (Kim and Ryoo 2007: 145-146). The adaptation of Western formats to conquer Asian markets is the rule when it comes to music, and such adaptations have become a new standard (as in the case of Seo Taiji and Boys,* and H.O.T.* in the 1990s) (Shim 2006). K-pop is actually based on a mixture of Western music and

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Korean music: it is not unusual to see some of the singers of Girls’ Generation* appear in Korean Air Force uniforms (thereby establishing a national connection) or dressed up as cheerleaders (thereby establishing an international connection, this time of the American variety). Likewise, K-pop does its own job of sexualizing female groups (an international trait), but in a softer way, particularly to penetrate the Japanese market, given that the bitter memory of “comfort women” is still raw.19 Additionally, the K-pop formations of the major production studios are (re)configured based on the market segments being targeted: they include Vietnamese or Thai performers to satisfy consumers in those countries, they sing in other languages, including in English, Japanese, Thai, and so on. For example, Girls’ Generation has two Korean-American members, which is a dual asset: they speak flawless English when interviewed outside of Korea, and their multiculturalism finds an echo in the diasporas present in the countries where they tour. This aspect is all the more important to emphasize given that there is a hierarchical view of the diasporas: those who come back from the United States are considered to be cosmopolitan and have an aura of modernity, whereas those who come back from China are fastidiously avoided during recruitments for pop groups (Epstein 2011). Glocalization is also done for high-profile collaborations, the choice of which leaves nothing to chance. Such was the case for a rap version of BTS’* song “Idol,” performed with Nicki Minaj, which came out in 2018. This transnational mode of production is also used by YS Entertainment, an Indonesian–Korean agency, which manages the Indonesian boy bands S4 (for “sweet, smart, sexy and sentimental”) and S.O.S. (which stands for Sensation of Stage) for the Indonesian market. Moreover, the entire chain of production calls upon foreign professionals. For example, even though the wealthiest K-pop labels work with their own singers, songwriters, and producers, they also often outsource the creative process, especially to Sweden, which produces many hits. When  During the Japanese occupation, Korean women were abducted and used as sexual slaves called “comfort women” by the Imperial Japanese Army (Epstein and Joo 2012). The Japanese sexual colonialism inflicted upon Korea has never been fully recognized by Japan and it continues to be remembered to this day, as demonstrated by the fact that references to it are commonly made in certain K-dramas. 19

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covering the BTS album Love Yourself: Tear (released in May 2018), Billboard magazine reported that the group incorporates musical styles far removed from the genres on which it built its success: the track “Airplane pt. 2” uses Latin American rhythms and incorporates instrumental passages from tango “to provide a backdrop for the members to relay their feelings about being able to travel the world as pop stars” (Herman 2018). It was thanks to this glocal and hybrid formula that BTS dethroned Taylor Swift for the music video having received the most views within 24 hours on YouTube, with their track “Idol.” d) Despecifying without diluting For Sun Jung (2011), the concept that best expresses Korean productions is mugukjeok, which “implies the transcultural hybridity of popular culture, which is not only influenced by odorless global elements, but also by traditional (national) elements” (3). In contrast with the Japanese principle of mukokuseki which inspired it, this Korean process of hybridization places an emphasis on harmony: the blending of despecified cultural elements (bibim) should not unbalance the whole, an important traditional value in South Korea. Korea has a long tradition of harmonious blending. In samul nori (a quartet of traditional Korean percussion instruments) the four popular percussion instruments are the drum, the janggu (an hourglass-shaped drum), the jing (gong), and the kkwaenggwari (small gong) and they are all played in harmony. Bibimbap (a colorful mixture of rice, vegetables, and meat) is another meaningful example of harmony. In this culture of blending, all of the component parts act together, all while preserving their individuality (Kim and Bae 2017). More broadly speaking, in South Korean productions authors have recourse to an element that is sometimes considered typical of their culture, haan, but which is also compatible with modernity. “For Koreans, haan evokes a sense of shared destiny and suffering that is considered vital to the building of a national identity. Haan has been one of the most significant themes of Korean national film over the past decades” (Jung 2011: 7). Haan can be found in webtoons, blockbusters, TV series, novels, and certain songs (Chi Kim 2017). It is precisely by highlighting this element that South Korean creators are able to fully showcase their ability

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to balance on the tightrope of mugukjeok. Researchers, artists, writers, and art critics often qualify haan as the “Korean ethos” insofar as they consider it the soul of the country’s art, literature, and cinema. It is said to belong uniquely to Koreans and be incomprehensible to Westerners. e) Promoting beauty In South Korean products, the kawaii aesthetic yields to beauty. This beauty is both physical and moral: the figure of the “bad boy” (or “bad girl”) does not exist among South Korean singers or actors. On the contrary, it is the figure of the chak han kid, a mixture of goodness and innocence,20 that is valued. Euny Hong defines this trait as follows: “It is a smaller scale than goodness and it refers more to conforming with traditional social values rather than spiritual or metaphysical goodness” (Hong 2014: 124). K-dramas highlight this dual dimension of beauty fairly consistently. For example, in Hwarang: The Poet Warrior Youth,* a militia of young aristocrats is formed to defend the kingdom: their beauty consists of graceful body movements, artistic talents (dancing and playing music), and, of course, military prowess. As it happens, one of the members of BTS* acts in the series. South Korean society is obsessed with beauty. In a highly competitive society, obsessed with standards of physical appearance that have a clear influence on people’s place in the social hierarchy, many job offers require candidates to have a clean-cut look and a photo attached to one’s résumé. In a country that has become very aware of the importance of physical beauty to succeed in romance, education, and work, it is not surprising that plastic surgery has become so prevalent. South Korea is third in the world, behind the United States and Brazil, for the number of cosmetic surgery procedures performed each year, although its population is less than half the size of all the other countries in the top five of this ranking. It has more than 1300 specialized clinics, more than half of which are in  This trait is also meant to be safeguarded by the youth protection laws that were passed in South Korea in the 1990s, and which enforce censorship. For example, the song “I’ve Got You Under My Skin” by TVXQ! had to be changed to “I’ve Got You Under My Sky” for the domestic market, otherwise it could not have been broadcast on the radio or on TV. Artists are required to respect a form of puritanism. 20

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Seoul, and they are attracting ever greater numbers of patients from abroad (Mesmer 2017). The South Korean Ministry of Health revealed that, in 2016, 100,000 foreigners, of whom 35% were Chinese, 13.4% were American, and 7.3% were Japanese, went to South Korea for cosmetic surgery procedures, on which they spent 221 billion KRW (about 191 million USD), as compared to 5.7 billion KRW (about 4.4 million USD) in 2009. Here the idea of a “cultural package” also comes into play: the resonance of beauty and the spread of cosmetic surgery have inspired numerous television series about this subject (e.g., Birth of a Beauty* and Gangnam Beauty)*. With an estimated turnover of 13 billion USD in 2019,21 the K-Beauty market is considered one of the best and most profitable in the world. For women, on whom social pressure is still very strong, appearance counts a lot in the collective imagination to find a husband, start a family. Thinness is also very important. It is quite rare to meet overweight people in the streets in Korean cities and Korean girls learn very quickly to assimilate that they must be thin to be pretty. Nowhere is this highlighting of beauty more apparent than in K-pop groups. The female members of the group Six Bomb* underwent cosmetic surgery prior to the release of their track “Becoming Prettier.” These operations were planned and paid for by their production company, and cost a total of 100 million KRW (about 90,000 USD). “They received almost every kind of surgery that could be done on a face, and breast implants,” said their manager, Kim Il-Woong (AFP 2017). They posted the videos of their operations, and of their rehearsals with bandages and black sunglasses leading up to their postoperative reveal, which coincided with the release of their song in which they sing “Everyone follows me, they know I’m pretty.” In such a competitive society, Idols embody a total model. All the more so as many small celebrities who have undergone surgery land overnight advertising contracts for make-up or soju (the traditional alcohol). Beauty is therefore a constant pressure that “Escape the Corset” denounces. Born in spring 2018 in the wake of #MeToo and after the resounding scandal of “molka” (pornography via hidden cameras in cities by voyeurs filming passers-by without their knowledge), this popular feminist movement 21

 https://www.letemps.ch/lifestyle/coree-sud-culte-beaute-conteste

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calls to rebel against the ultra-rigid beauty standards of a nation obsessed by appearance. Moreover, the Ministry of Gender Equality has tried to change things. Guidelines were issued in 2019 asking entertainment channels to stop emphasizing thinness and sexualizing women by imposing very short and sexy outfits. The guidelines denounce a serious problem of uniformity among singers and worry about the influence of K-pop stars on young people. This initiative could be seen as a step forward for the country, but it is without counting on the trauma caused by the totalitarian regimes of the years 1960–1980, still very present in the minds of Koreans. Accused of censorship attempt, the government finally withdrew this polemical guide. MP Ha Tae kyung called these recommendations “totalitarian and unconstitutional” on his Facebook account, drawing parallels with the dictatorship of Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1988): “What is the difference between controlling hair length under the military dictatorship and controlling skirt length?” he asked.

4

Conclusion

The domination of global pop culture has long been the sole purview of the Big Three (the United States, Europe, and Japan). Recently, however, new players have emerged, with South Korea in the lead, a country whose productions are fashioning a more multipolar world despite the persistence of power imbalances in many fields. Cultural offerings have become diversified: audiences far and wide can now be exposed to new models of cultural globalization. Taking advantage of lessons learned from the American and Japanese pop culture industries and the waning of US and Japanese dominance, Hallyu is a happy marriage of Western and Asian traits and is not reducible to an attempt to imitate or catch up with the West (Howard 2013). In fact, Hallyu can be considered as a form of alternative globalization (Ryoo 2008) which incorporates elements from both East and West into its cultural products (Jenkins 2004). As Jonghoe Yang (2012) states: “its flow clearly represents a case of alternative globalization, from the periphery to the center, signaling a new phase in the recent history of globalization” (139).

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By adopting the high-quality standards of the players dominating the cultural markets, and by showcasing innovation, the Korean Wave has mastered the art of hybridizing genres and sub-genres, as well as the process of glocalization, in order to win over audiences and build loyalty, first regionally and then globally. Cultural despecification, which is necessary to export cultural products to audiences that are at a cultural and geographical remove, is accomplished without dilution. It is also achieved with a distinctive aesthetic signature which may be summarized as a never-ending quest for beauty which is the result of “body work” (plastic surgery, the cosmetics industry) and which mobilizes all the techniques of image-making.

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4 From Soft Power to “Sweet Power”

The intense competition characterizing the globalization of culture does manifest not only at the economic or political levels, as discussed in Chaps. 2 and 3, but also at the symbolic level. The symbolic competition consists of exporting, and at times even imposing, a specific worldview to promote one’s own geopolitical interests (Isar 2010); this phenomenon has sometimes been termed cultural diplomacy, “soft power” (Courmont and Kim 2013; Kim and Nye 2013), or even “pop-culture diplomacy” (Iwabuchi 2015), all expressions which recognize the significance of the cultural dimension of globalization. Whether they occur in Jakarta, Mexico City, Macao, Los Angeles, Chicago, New  York, Vancouver, Melbourne, Sydney, Milan, London, Hamburg, Paris, São Paolo, Bangkok, Buenos Aires, or Dubai, K-pop flash mobs confirm what Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) seminal work already had stated a quarter of a century ago: The crucial point, however, is that the United States is no longer the puppeteer of a world system of images but is only one node of a complex transnational construction of imaginary landscapes. The world we live in today is characterized by a new role for the imagination in social life […] now mediated through the complex prism of modern media. (31)

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Cicchelli, S. Octobre, The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84296-3_4

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Given this perspective, the Korean Wave must be analyzed not just as an immensely successful Korean export, but first and foremost as a means to accumulate symbolic capital and thanks to which the country’s reputation is enhanced, allowing it to find its place in the global cultural competition. Some analysts have even argued that Hallyu may be an example of the subversive power of peripheral cultures with regard to the dominant Western forms of cultural expression (Ryoo 2009). A single example of this impact will suffice: in 2012, the first “Gangnam Style” flash mob took place in Bangladesh, giving young Bangladeshis a way to participate in a global youth movement. This was significant, especially because developing countries are often ignored or overlooked when it comes to cultural phenomena (Shim 2018). The success of the Korean Wave has thus provided new opportunities to countries that were hitherto absent from the globalized cultural scene. This chapter, therefore, analyzes how South Korea has managed to develop an alternative to American pop-cultural hegemony through the process of “nation branding” (Dinnie 2010), which has allowed the country to become a “global brand” and acquire “sweet power” of attraction. This form of power is heavily reliant on aesthetics and fully exploits the possibilities of the internet age, while benefiting from the absence of any problematic imperialist legacy.

1

Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Industries

Traditionally, there here are two different approaches to the analysis of cultural diplomacy. The first cultural approach is based on slow forms of media. It occurs at the scale of interpersonal exchange, the circulation of books and ideas. It is primarily concerned with the literate public (e.g., academic exchanges, linguistic programs, guest artists, and cultural events). The second informational approach looks at fast-paced forms of media (radio, the daily press, cinema, television, the internet) that are rapidly accessible to the public at large (Chaubet and Martin 2011). This difference is the marker of historical reality, as the shift from the first to

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the second approaches largely occurred during the twentieth-century interwar period, at the same time as intellectual centers of power began to move from Europe to the United States. It is, in fact, in the United States that the second approach began to be studied in the 1940s. In his famous volume, America’s Strategy in World Politics that was published during the Second World War, Nicholas J. Spykman (1942) was the first to elaborate a geopolitical study of the informational approach, arguing for the importance of the media in global strategies of power during both peace- and wartime. Today, “the central role played by cultural issues in discussions about the new world order illustrates […] the importance of networks and cultural industries in reconfiguring strategies of power” (Mattelart 2017: 4). The significant role played by media and the consumption of (especially audiovisual) fiction-based products in cultural repertoires around the world have led to an increasingly international offer and thus a certain reliance on large producers—in particular, the “Big Three” discussed in Chap. 3. Against this backdrop of dense and multidimensional media, which has only grown in speed and complexity with the advent of networks and the digital age, the different worldviews that mass cultural goods can help to develop depend more than ever before on the symbolic resources wielded by nations that are engaged in the global symbolic competition (Ang et  al. 2015). We shall quickly revisit the genesis of contemporary cultural diplomacy to highlight major actors on this scene, as well as the predecessors that proved to be an inspiration for the South Korean model.

1.1

Three Models of Cultural Diplomacy

According to François Chaubet (2013), only three States have translated their policies of global cultural influence into reality and successfully developed models of cultural diplomacy: France during the 1870s and 1880s, the USSR during the 1920s, and the United States after 1945. At a time when its power was in relative decline and it attempted to counter the industrial and military rise of Germany and the land-and-sea imperial hegemony of Great Britain, France invented the modern form of cultural

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action abroad at the end of the nineteenth century by elaborating a series of initiatives that were designed to promote trade. The following could be read on the first page of the Bulletin de l’Alliance française published in 1884: “The French language gives rise to French habits; French habits lead to buying French products. Whoever speaks French becomes a client of France” (cited in Kessler 2018: 267–268). This model is “characterized by the multiplicity of forms of action (the offering of books, conference attendees, theater and film companies), on the one hand, and the gradual consolidation of a tangible network of cultural schools, universities, and institutes on the other hand (the first created in Florence in 1908)” (Chaubet 2013). This model reached its peak in the 1970s. It is based on a conception that closely links together artistic culture (in the sense of works of art and cultural goods that a society produces) and anthropological culture (in the sense of a given society’s ways of thinking and doing); it obeys an aristocratic logic of diffusion amongst the educated and literate public. Despite several criticisms levied at this conception of cultural diplomacy—for instance, Nicholas J. Spykman (1942) noted the important cultural influence of France in Latin America, despite its relatively weak economic and military might compared to the United States—it has nonetheless remained effective, as attested to by the establishment of UNESCO in Paris after the Second World War. This success was doubtlessly tied to the symbolic power of France, rather than the country’s economic or military power. In other words, even though French is only the 11th most spoken language in the world, its geopolitical influence is much greater: in terms of use on the internet, the language of Molière comes in second, behind English but ahead of Spanish and German. The large number of countries that have French as an official language, as well as the number of international organizations that use French as a working and diplomatic language, means that France is a major international player, linguistically speaking. And finally, French is a key language with regard to cultural excellence, if we are to judge by the number of Nobel prizes in literature awarded to French speakers: second only to English speakers and ahead of German speakers  (Chaubet 2006; Calvet and Calvet 2009). This all goes to show the symbolic power linked to a certain image of France that has been exported throughout the world and

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that draws heavily on the legacy of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and human rights (Wilson 2002; Chaubet 2010). This image has allowed the country to preserve a significant cultural and political influence over the years. During the interwar period, the rise of cultural industries changed the game: “the universalism of mass culture overtook the cosmopolitan agenda of classical culture that was the legacy of the Enlightenment” (Mattelart 2017: 21). In the shift from one universalism to another, cultural relationships became a privileged geopolitical tool. A more circumscribed notion of culture became widely accepted and later embedded into modes of commercial production; this notion of culture was also closely tied to the rapid pace of new media. The film industry became emblematic of this shift, and consequently of the power struggles that would come to mark the internationalization of cultural production. Since its inception, the film has in fact embodied the utopian dream of bringing together people from the four corners of the globe. Armand Mattelart (2017) thus reminds us that Georges Méliès1 had the phrase “le monde à portée de main” [“the world at your fingertips”] emblazoned on his film company’s letterhead. Similarly, he observes that Marcel L’Herbier2 described the film as “what brings humanity together” and Jack London viewed cinema as a vector of “universal education” (27). This vision of cultural production thus grew to have an outsized influence on the imaginaries produced by the major cultural players. The transition from text to image went hand in hand with the dominance of the United States in the global cultural contest. At the end of the Second World War, Americans “are perhaps the first people in history to have a centrally organized mass-produced folk culture” (Boorstin 1989: 135) and to develop a foreign policy that granted an important role to the media as a driver of consumerist modernity. In accordance with the  Marie-Georges-Jean Méliès, known as Georges Méliès (1861–1938), was a French illusionist, actor, and film director who spearheaded many technical and narrative developments in the earliest days of cinema. 2  Marcel L’Herbier (1888–1979) was a French filmmaker who gained prominence as an avant-garde theorist and imaginative practitioner with a series of silent films in the 1920s. During the 1950s and 1960s, he worked on cultural programs for French television. He also occupied many administrative roles in the French film industry, and was the founder and the first president of the French Film School, the Institut des Hautes Etudes Cinématographiques (IDHEC). 1

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Truman Doctrine that resurrected a deep-seated belief in America’s “manifest destiny,” a term coined by John O’Sullivan in 1845, and that was designed to counteract the isolationist tendencies of its predecessor the Monroe Doctrine, cultural industries actively worked to disseminate the contemporary American imaginary, one that was both messianic and universal in nature (Stephanson 1995). For example, we can look at the Blum-Byrnes agreements signed in 1946 to renegotiate France’s debt to the United States: these agreements waived the said debt in exchange for import quotas regarding American films and looser protective measures for French cinema. Ultimately, only 4 out of every 13 weeks were reserved for French films; as a result, only 31% of screen time was devoted to national films (compared to 50% previously). Very early on, then, cultural industries were a tool for the United States to export its cultural, social, and political model. The strength of the United States lay in knowing how to create synergy between a myriad of private actors (under the Hollywood umbrella) and semi-private ones (museums, charitable foundations). In addition, the United States got engaged with both “high” culture (e.g., the New York school of painting at the end of the 1950s) and its “low” counterpart (jazz and then rock music, broadcast by the radio programs such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, to spread a progressive and liberal message to Europeans). Amid the Cold War, the goal was to prevent Europe’s potential fall to Communism after the totalitarian experiences that had led to the Second World War. This policy of exporting representations of the desirable American way of life (Berger 2002) was supported by the growing dominance of the English language in science, high technology, education, and culture, as well as the creation of a network of innovative companies with global influence. This policy reached its apex toward the end of the 1960s (Brzezinski 1970; Wallerstein 1997). The originality of this model was that it used “the essentially peaceful tactic of exporting its cultural and media products — films, television shows, music — to depict its values and way of life, thus winning over more hearts and minds than through gunboat diplomacy” (Chaubet and Martin 2011: 203). The USSR also wielded culture as an important diplomatic weapon, in particular through (a) the creation of the honorific title “People’s Artist of

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the USSR,” which was awarded to artists who made notable contributions to theater, film, or music, and (b) the development of a very strict censorship policy that would only be abolished in 1988 and was coordinated by a large number of State agencies, like the General Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press (Glavlit), as well as the triumvirate of the Goskomizdat, Goskino, and Gosteleradio councils that targeted writing, cinema, and radio, respectively. Soviet cultural diplomacy was the mirror image of its American counterpart, as evidenced clearly by the Zhdanov Doctrine, thus named after the third secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. In order to tackle the Truman Doctrine head-on, Zhdanov made the following speech in 1947: The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct become two major trends in post-war international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces operating in the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U.S.A. Allied with it are Great Britain and France... The imperialist camp is also supported by colony-­ owning countries […]. The anti-imperialist and anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies […]. The anti-imperialist camp is backed by the labor and democratic movement and by the fraternal Communist parties in all countries. (United States of America 1948: A1288)

The two giants of cultural diplomacy thus got locked into a ruthless campaign to ensure hegemony in their respective spheres. Structured around the Communist Party, the State, and a planned economy, the Soviet Union prioritized highbrow art, while the United States, with its emphasis on capitalism, the private sector, and market forces, focused on mass culture (Chaubet 2013). Ultimately, pop culture and mass cultural industries proved to be more effective at promoting ideology than the tools of Soviet cultural diplomacy when it came to European populations that had newly converted to democracy. The contribution of iconic pop culture icons such as Marilyn Monroe, Louis Armstrong, and Bob Dylan to the success of the American model is undeniable. Unquestionably, “the

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cultural Cold War (…) has been a total war of consumption. More than many other things, consumerism has defeated Communism” (Wagnleitner 1994: xiv).

1.2

“Cool Japan”

Japan’s entry into the fray marked the third phase in the global competition for cultural imaginaries. The country began to reach international markets in the 1970s and 1980s, but its ambitions were quite different than those of its Soviet and American competitors: the hope was to transform how the country was perceived abroad, including by glossing over its imperialist past and its military defeat at the hands of the new world powers during the Second World War. Instead, Japan was to be portrayed as a reliable ally and friendly neighbor. Forced into demilitarization, the country adopted a pacifist constitution and a democratic system (even if the imperial system was preserved as a national symbol). In between 1950 and the mid-1980s, Japan focused all of its energies on its economic development, exploiting its centralizing State apparatus and a strategy of rapid development based on imports and the appropriation of technologies and knowledge, given that a total ban on military research (which often leads to discoveries applicable to many other sectors) limited the country’s capacities in terms of fundamental research. In order to change its image abroad, Japan mobilized its mass pop culture and its technology. The use of manga, animation, and video games are all part and parcel of what has been called “pop-culture diplomacy” (Iwabuchi 2015), in this case, based on the Japanese kawaii aesthetic. Japan thus entered into the “global beauty contest” where all sorts of highly competitive cultural products fight each other for attention (Fan 2008). This policy was supported by multiple State initiatives: for example, in 2006, Japan launched its Japan Localization and Promotion (J-LOP) program to promote Japanese content throughout the world— and anime in particular—with support for the localization of products accounting for 50% of all costs.

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Manga  overwhelmingly accounts for the success of Japanese cultural goods in terms of export sales (e.g., 250 million copies of Dragon Ball Z3 have been sold worldwide, compared to 200 million copies of The Adventures of Tintin4). Japanese television dramas, animated films, and video games also draw inspiration from the manga genre, which provides them with imaginary universes, values systems, plotlines, and even capable illustrators. In addition, in 2007 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the Japan International MANGA Award to reward creators who contribute to the spread of manga culture overseas. Cosplay has also achieved significant international popularity as a result. Since 2007 as well, the Ministry has discerned a “best cosplayer” award during the World Cosplay Summit. In March 2008, the Foreign Minister at the time named the cat from Doraemon5 as the global ambassador for Japanese animation. On this occasion, the feature film Doraemon: Nobita’s Dinosaur 2006 was translated into five languages (Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish); the film has now been screened in 67 countries and regions (as of January 2017). Thanks to the model of cultural diplomacy that operates halfway between its largely State-dominated French and its private sector-led American counterparts, Japan has managed to massively change its international image, shedding its military past in favor of a new “cool Japan” brand that has become a sort of mantra for Japanese public officials. Since 2013, the Cool Japan Promotion Council (Iwabuchi 2008) has therefore worked to enhance mutual understanding and trust between different populations via the means of pop culture, in addition to traditional art forms. A public-private fund called “Cool Japan” was created in the same

 Since its release, Dragon Ball has become one of the most successful manga and anime series of all time: the manga has been sold in over 40 countries and the anime was broadcast in more than 80 countries. 4  The Adventures of Tintin is a series of 24 bandes dessinés albums created by Belgian cartoonist Georges Remi, who wrote under the pen name Hergé. The series was one of the most popular European comics of the twentieth century. It has been translated in more than 70 languages and adapted for radio, television, theater, and film. 5  Doraemon is a Japanese manga series created by Fujiko Fujio. It later became an anime and a vast media franchise. The main character is a robot-cat named Doraemon who travelled to the present time from the future. The manga originally appeared on the Japanese market in August 1969. 3

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year.6 Describing this evolution, the journalist Douglas McGray (2009) coined the term “gross national cool” to account for Japan’s rise as a superpower in terms of youth pop culture throughout the world. “Cool Japan” thus tried to capitalize on an imagined Asian community that exists in opposition to its Western rival (Godement 2008).

1.3

Imperialism and Cultural Resistance

In 1990 Joseph S. Nye (1990a, b) conceptualized soft power as a kind of power of attraction that had the capacity to shape the preferences of others through culture, values, and ideas rather than through military action, ultimately helping to influence ideological, political, and social agendas. Since then, “the frequent use of the English expression ‘soft power’ reveals the ‘Gramscian moment’ of international relations, wherein symbolic hegemony is just as important to the balance of powers as traditional and material factors (demographics, armies, economies)” (Chaubet 2013: 93–94). Cautioning against any reductive uses of this concept, Joseph S. Nye drew attention to the fact that cultural industries can only exert this power if they mirror their nation’s internal political values and universal ambitions in terms of foreign policy. America’s soft power was effective because of “the universal appeal of its popular culture, as embodied in cultural goods and services, as well as the international influence of what he (Joseph Nye) called the ‘ethnic openness’ of its way of life, or the political appeal of the American values of democracy and human rights” (Ang et  al. 2015: 367). This universalist vision would not be credible (Holden 2013) if it was merely a form of ideological propaganda or if it excluded the (often overlooked) fundamental capacity for self-criticism and did not consider counterculture and subversion as legitimate. These traits further helped Joseph S.  Nye to later coin the term “meta-soft power” (2002). The universalism touted by the United States has often been accused of concealing a form of cultural imperialism, defined as “the set of processes by which a society is inserted into the modern global system and the  https://www.cj-fund.co.jp/en/

6

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means by which its ruling class is convinced, through fascination, pressure, force, or corruption, to alter its social institutions so that they correspond to the values and structures of the system’s dominant player, and ultimately promote those values more widely” (Mattelart 2017: 49). Seen (rightly or wrongly) as embodying this kind of imperialism more than any other country (Tomlinson 1991), the United States and its cultural diplomacy have consequently been met with many forms of resistance (Dulphy et al. 2010). Immediately after the Second World War, (Kuisel 1993; Pells 1997; Alexander 2006) France became the spokesperson for those who rejected American hegemony. At the National Assembly on 28 February 1950, a Communist member of parliament asked the Minister of Public Health to ban the sale of Coca-Cola, arguing that behind the economic issue was a political one: “we must therefore know if, for the sake of politics, you will allow French men and women to be poisoned.” The very same day, the National Assembly finally voted to give the government the authority to ban Coca-Cola if it was determined that the beverage was harmful (Kuisel 1991). During the same period, the Catholic Church in Spain (then under Franco) had likewise begun to target American culture. In 1946, for example, the archbishop of Toledo addressed a conference of Spanish clerics and wondered aloud how they should handle “the growing demoralization of women,” caused in large part by the introduction of American customs to Spanish culture via cinema, and which promoted greater independence for young women. The exotic practices portrayed in American films were seen as having the potential to break up families, discredit future spouses and mothers, make women less feminine, and destabilize the home (Tomlinson 1997). Speaking more generally, European openness to American cultural production in the postwar period was always ambivalent. In fact, “Europeans have always been ambivalent about American culture … [and] … [t]hat ambivalence is... prompted by the suspicion that America may be charting the future for the rest of the world” (Ramet and Crnković 2003: 5). Toward the end of the 1960s, rejection of the US cultural agenda spread to new climes. In Latin America, the term “Americanization” became synonymous with “the hegemonic project of a new model of civilization, a new culture that sought to be universal, a new ‘Roman Magisterium’” (Mattelart 2017:

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17). The fight against the Americanization of culture took the form of protectionist measures declaring the exceptional status of certain products. During the 1990s and in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, France introduced the concept of the “cultural exception”—primarily concerning audiovisual products— which authorized State support for these sectors by means of protectionist measures. This legislation squeaked by in 1993 but would be replaced in 1999 by the term “cultural diversity,” a much vaguer notion, legally speaking. Unsurprisingly, the United States’ offensive strategy on the international cultural market is paired with strong protectionist measures back home. The country has a very defensive position with regard to Japanese animation, for instance: the latter was much later in arriving at American shores than European ones because it was a competitor for Disney, DC Comics, and Marvel—and also because it offered up a fictional universe with largely foreign aesthetic and cultural codes. The import of Japanimation did not go entirely smoothly. For example, the way the anime series Saint Seiya (translated as Knights of the Zodiac)7 was adapted to the American market demonstrated a lack of respect for the original work: the original soundtrack composed by Seiji Yokoyama was replaced by rock and techno music, different coloring choices were made (the red blood on fangs was swapped out for blue or green), certain sound effects were entirely redone (Précigout 2019). Similarly, Osamu Tezuka’s manga Jungle Emperor (published between 1950 and 1954) was adapted into a television series in 1965 and localized as Kimba the White Lion for the English-speaking market. Years later, many elements of this work would turn up in Disney’s The Lion King, released in 1994 and Disney would be accused of plagiarism (Denham 2019). More generally speaking, we can of course point to the American penchant for remakes rather than importing audiovisual foreign productions: there are countless examples of this tendency, such as the fact that the iconic song “My Way,” sung by both Paul Anka who wrote the English lyrics and his contemporary Frank  Saint Seiya is a Japanese manga series written and illustrated by Masami Kurumada. The manga was adapted into an anime television series by Toei Animation that ran from 1986 to 1989. Saint Seiya has been immensely successful, with over 35 million copies sold as of 2017. The series began to be known in the West after it became popular in France in 1988. 7

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Sinatra, in fact, reused the melody and musical arrangement of a Claude François song called “Comme d’habitude” with new lyrics. Criticism of imperialism also spread to Japan. No matter how “cool” the country might wish to appear, and despite its major successes in regional and global markets, Japan has struggled to assert its dominance internationally, even in Asia. This expansion has been hindered in part by insufficient coordination between different ministries whose objectives do not always converge on the promotion of “soft” or “pop” cultural nationalism; it has also been hampered by painful memories in many neighboring countries (Bouvard 2015). Nevertheless, Japan’s overall success can still be seen as proof of the relative decline of Western cultural hegemony, “in particular that of the United States; it should encourage those who analyze cultural globalization to move away from a Western-­ centric perspective” (Iwabuchi 2008: 38).

2

South Korea as a Global Brand

South Korea arrived on the scene of international cultural diplomacy when American imperialism was already being challenged and the “cool Japan” strategy was hitting its limit in the Asian region. South Korea adopted the concept of “nation branding,” which uses brand communication and marketing techniques to promote a country’s image and reputation overseas (Fan 2008), to attract tourists and investors, stimulate exports, restore its credibility, enhance its reputation globally, increase its political influence, build stronger international partnerships, combat negative stereotypes, and improve the nation’s confidence, pride, harmony, and determination (Dinnie 2010). From this perspective, sweet power is to soft power what entertainment capitalism is to aesthetic capitalism, namely a specific variant. As in the case of Japanese cultural diplomacy, sweet power is the result of collaboration—albeit closer in nature—between State agencies and cultural industries. Again like in Japan, the massive use of pop culture led to the culturalization and aestheticization of Korea’s image abroad. In the case of South Korea, however, this aestheticization is inseparable from the country’s proud ownership of its past, its cultural and spiritual roots, and

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its modernity, which all contribute to a kind of positive storytelling that Japan seems to lack—and which also confirms the role that South Korea intends to play as a counterpower to the United States in the realm of pop culture.

2.1

Playing on the International Stage

In order to understand Korea’s success, we need to examine some recent historical events. In 1988, the 24th Olympic Games were held in Seoul. This was a turning point in contemporary Korean history, and thanks to television broadcasts, the event helped to bring the country into the international spotlight. South Korea was now seen as a modern country capable of hosting the largest international sporting event in the world.8 In 2002, the FIFA World Cup was another opportunity for South Korea to enhance its image on the international stage. Finally, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ban Ki-moon’s election as Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2007 marked a great diplomatic success for South Korea. This country’s opening up to the world has been paired with its consolidation of the democratic process: in 1987, the first President of the Republic was elected by direct universal suffrage (for a single, five-­ year term). The country’s first and foremost goal was to restore national self-­ esteem, which had been bullied by the Japanese long occupation (1905–1945); to do so, it amped up its ideological battle with North Korea and encouraged domestic cultural nationalism. Park Chung-hee (1963–1972) pursued a cultural policy that sought to align Korea’s national culture with its traditional roots while promoting ethnic and cultural nationalism as a means to strengthen the country’s unity (Kang 2015). One of the best examples of this is doubtlessly the 1997 list of the “Top 10 symbols of Korean culture” established by the Ministry of Culture and Sports, on the basis of a report commission in 1996 called “Korean Cultural Identity Selection and Utilization Strategy.” Among these symbols, we find hanbok (traditional Korean dress), hangeol (the  Prior to South Korea hosting the Olympics, only two other non-Western countries had been hosts: Japan in 1964 and Mexico in 1968; China joined the ranks in 2008. 8

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Korean script), kimchi and bulgogi (traditional dishes), the Bulguksa and Seokguram Buddhist temples, and the martial art taekwondo. These symbols were used by public relations firms and government agencies in a wide variety of promotional materials for an international audience. The importance of national folklore is particularly evident in an animated series called Animentary Korean Folklore, broadcast on the public channel KBS for three years, starting in July 2000 and totaling 150 episodes. However, the Koreans quickly realized that this short list could present a somewhat limited and unchanging picture of their culture. South Korea thus turned toward international markets by offering contemporary products that were more rooted in pop culture (rather than highbrow culture). The country first had to cast off its American yoke; however, until the 1990s, the United States largely controlled the systems of production and distribution of cultural products, especially in terms of the film industry. From the end of the 1980s to the mid-1990s was an important turning point for South Korean media, due to growing liberalization in the sector. Until 1987, only national film societies were authorized to import and distribute foreign films in the country. Under pressure from the United States, in 1988 the Korean government authorized Hollywood studios to distribute movies directly to local movie theaters. By 1994, more than ten South Korean film importers had closed up their shops. As the Korean market was opened up to major Hollywood studios, this had a long-lasting impact on the vitality of the local film industry, with the number of films produced dropping from 121 in 1991 to 63 in 1994. By 1994, Hollywood’s market share reached 80%, compared to 53% in 1987. Ignored by a local public who found it to be low quality, boring, and often melodramatic, South Korean cinema seemed to be on its last legs.

2.2

The Segyehwa Strategy

After the 1997 financial crisis, and evenmore so after the turn of the millennium, the Korean government implemented a strategy to improve the country’s competitiveness on the global scene; this strategy banked on the promotion of Korean heritage, including monuments, landscapes, cities,

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traditional cuisines, and cultural goods (Kang 2015). The segyehwa strategy—the word that means “globalization” in Korean—was designed to increase the country’s symbolic capital in the international economy of cultural prestige. South Korea hoped to revamp its image as a backward nation (hujinguk) and become an advanced country (seonjinguk) by capitalizing on globalization. The desire to transform South Korea into a global player was achieved, at least partly, thanks to policies targeting cultural industries. The country’s increased exportation of cultural goods has become an important piece of its national identity. The implementation of policies that were resolutely focused on the rise of a “Global Korea” is thus not incompatible with a significant dose of national pride, perhaps even with a nationalistic streak (John 2015) that takes the guide of “pop nationalism” (Joo 2011). Under President Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008), in 2003 the South Korean government created an agency for the promotion of Hallyu and the Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange (KOFICE); the following year, it defined a cultural policy framework titled “Creative Korea,” which outlined a long-term plan to encourage the country’s creative capacity. Similarly, in 2005, Roh’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism published a report called “Culture Strong Nation,” which outlined the goal of reaching the top five cultural content nation status by 2010, alongside the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and France. The figures associated with this goal were ambitious: the report mentioned a domestic cultural market of 90,000 billion KRW (or 85 billion USD) compared to a 6 billion USD export market (Kang 2015). The same year, the Korean Language and National Culture Division was created, which funded classes in institutions and universities around the world and created a number of Korean cultural centers (such as the one in Paris which, though originally established in 1980, reopened in a spacious new building in 2019 and now offers an impressive roster of activities and events to an ever-demanding public). And yet, at the end of the 2000s, South Koreans still had a negative impression of their own country. In addition, Korea’s reputation abroad was still not proportional to its industrial capacity; this phenomenon was termed the “Korea discount” by government officials (Lee 2010). In 2008, South Korea was ranked 33rd on the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation

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Brands Index despite having grown into the 15th largest economy in the world. Public authorities were afraid that this low ranking in terms of national branding would devalue Korean products abroad, and the country’s competitiveness more broadly (Kang 2015). Consequently, the government worked with several major industrial groups to create the “Nation Brand Dual Octagon” indicator to measure the gaps between the objective performance of the nation brand (based on analysis of 125 statistical data points), and the latter’s subjective performance, evaluated via surveys conducted on 13,500 thought leaders in 26 countries (Lee 2010). The Presidential Council on Nation Branding (mentioned in Chap. 2) was created in 2009 with the mission of promoting the Korean national brand on the international scene in order to mitigate the impact of the “Korea discount.” Starting in 2013, the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning (a few years later, renamed the Ministry of Science and ICT) has spearheaded important synergies between the State and the major private sector conglomerates. “Global citizenship” and “the advanced country of the future” became the Ministry’s watchwords. Under Lee’s presidency, the South Korean government adopted “complex,” “value-based” diplomacy as the main goal of its cultural and public diplomatic efforts (Leveau 2002).

2.3

 elling the Story of Resilience, Modernity, T and Harmony

To support this form of value-based diplomacy, cultural industries engaged in three-dimensional storytelling to depict a South Korean identity that would be attractive to both national and international publics. The story told was one of South Korea’s resilience, its positive technological modernity, and its alternative perspective on individuality that (apparently) allowed for harmonious coexistence with the country’s natural environment and historical legacy. Before going into the details of this narrative, it is important to note that we do not seek to establish an instrumental relationship between cultural policy and the industrial production of cultural content, even if some authors have spoken of the “theater of national security” to refer to

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a kind of parallel between the ideological content of some American films and the geopolitical context such as it is perceived by the military-media complex (Valentin 2010). Although creators do have artistic autonomy— as can be observed in any number of highly sophisticated and diverse television show plotlines—it is nonetheless true that a certain number of tropes, due to their prominence and frequency, have become part of a shared national representation, even if the latter only occurs piecemeal and unintentionally. a) A long history of resilience Since the famous television series 500 Years of Joseon,*9 which told the sprawling story of the Joseon dynasty10 over 11 seasons from 1983 to 1991,11 the sageuk genre (historical fiction in television or film) has become one of the most well-known elements of Hallyu. The high quality of this series in large part explains its success: in addition to the fine acting on display, the show’s creators were careful to pepper the show with as many “reality effects” as possible, by incorporating older forms of speech and traditional proverbs, using period-appropriate costumes and set design, and shooting on historical landmarks. The sageuk genre is imbued with the Confucian values of filial piety and respect for one’s elders.12 This genre often focuses  on the Joseon period in particular, given that this dynasty’s extraordinary duration (approximately five centuries) is a point of pride for the Koreans. Throughout the shows’  historical meanderings, the true protagonist remains the Korean spirit of resilience. The stories extol the nobility and grandeur of a people who were long oppressed, while the set designs  The South Korean cultural products referred to in this book and marked with an asterisk are presented in the glossary. 10  The Joseon dynasty was a Korean dynastic kingdom that lasted from 1392 to 1897. 11  This series drew on elaborate historical research conducted using the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty, official documents penned between 1413 and 1865: these represent over 1893 volumes of Chinese text. 12  This echoes the important revival of Confucianism in Korea in recent years. A number of Confucian schools and centers have been reopened, while other education programs inspired by Confucianism have also been developed to teach children decorum and well-being. There has also been a return to traditional rituals in some places (Kaplan 2018). 9

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depict many facets of millennia-old folklore whose traditional elements come from shamanism, Cheondoism (a syncretic religion), Buddhism, and, more recently, Christianity. This is the case for the television series Mr. Sunshine,* a 26-episode K-drama that was the fourth most popular show on Korean television, receiving many awards and being rebroadcast around the world. It takes place at the turn of the twentieth century in Seoul, at the tail end of the Joseon dynasty and the very beginning of the Japanese occupation, and it follows a group of Korean resistance fighters. This series helps to rebuild national pride: opposite invading Japan and its cynical and instrumental ally the United States, the resistance and courage of the female protagonist come to embody the noble traits of Korea itself (Park 2018). The same emphasis was placed on resilience in The Bridal Mask,* a series that takes place in the 1930s when South Korea had already been occupied by Japan for about two decades. The Bridal Mask rejects simplistic depictions of colonial violence and highlights on the contrary—as in Mr. Sunshine*—both the reality of everyday collaboration and a number of larger-scale efforts that were undertaken with the full cooperation of the Korean government, such as the recruitment of “comfort women” for Japanese soldiers. In fact, the show’s title refers to the disguise worn by the masked protagonist who, while fighting against the invader and committing acts of sabotage, dons the traditional mask worn by young women on their wedding day as a mark of allegiance to their husband, in a subtle allusion to Korea’s submission to Japan. The people’s rebellion is embodied by the character of Lee Kang-to, who through great hardship transforms from a despicable police agent working for his colonizing overlords to a righteous vigilante. In episode 24, one character declares, “Our country may have been defeated, but not our hearts!” Historical K-dramas, which may at first seem to be designed with a solely domestic audience in mind, have been quite successful as exports abroad. Mr. Sunshine* was also appealing to Korea’s neighbors, who in many cases shared the country’s turbulent relationship with the regional superpowers of Japan, China, and Russia; the show was also purchased by television channels in the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand, before continuing to gain viewers through streaming and downloading

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platforms such as Netflix and Rakuten TV.  This is just one example among many of the seductive power of the fictional representation of symbolic victory over a former oppressor. b) A positive view of technological modernity The second characteristic trait of K-dramas is their positive depiction of technological modernity, especially when compared to Western and Japanese cultural productions, which often portray the future of technology in a bleak and troubling fashion. Human subservience to technology (including biotechnologies), natural disasters, and humanitarian crises have constituted the subject matter for many seminal American movies and television shows, including the Terminator franchise, The Day After Tomorrow, Jurassic Park, World War Z, the Matrix trilogy, 24, Black Mirror, and so on. The same can also be applied to various Japanese cyberpunk classics in the manga and anime realms, such as Akira13 and Ghost in the Shell.14 K-dramas are the radical opposite: in this worldview, technology serves humanity, and Artificial Intelligence is benevolent and helps its users to better understand themselves (as is the case in My Holo Love* or I’m Not a Robot*). Similarly, advances in modern medicine help protagonists to transform in a positive fashion (as in Birth of a Beauty*). Most non-­ historical K-dramas take place in Seoul and highlight the exciting, modern life of its inhabitants. Both the Namsan Tower, which is 236 meters tall, has a revolving floor, and is accessed by cable car, and the flashy Gangnam neighborhood,15 one of the hippest and most affluent areas in the city, are often used as emblematic reference points. The audience  Akira is a Japanese cyberpunk manga series written and illustrated by Katsuhiro Otomo (1982). The manga is also famous for spawning the seminal 1988 cyberpunk anime film adaptation of the same name. Akira was instrumental in the surge in popularity of manga outside Japan. 14  Ghost in the Shell is a Japanese cyberpunk media franchise based on the manga series of the same name written and illustrated by Masamune Shirow (1989). The animation studio Production I.  G. has produced several anime adaptations of the series. These include the 1995 film of the same name. 15  South Korea’s “Silicon Valley,” Teheran-ro, can be found in Seoul’s Gangnam neighborhood. Teheran-ro was transformed into a start-up incubator after the government bought a large number of buildings to house companies. It is now home to Google’s Seoul Campus, where the 500 Kimchi seed fund is located. 13

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either discovers (or is once again reminded) that Seoul is one of the most connected cities in the world, and that its residents are constantly using mobile applications throughout their days. This lifestyle is often depicted in the backdrop of K-dramas, where individuals compulsively use smartphones and applications that are “Made in Korea.” K-pop is no different: while most tracks are computer-assisted compositions, they sometimes include elements of traditional music (gugak). These musical allusions help to modernize South Korea’s musical heritage and can be seen in works by BTS,* Topp Dogg,* and Crayon Pop.* In addition, by using advanced digital imaging techniques, K-pop videos often depict Seoul and the Gangnam neighborhood in particular, as seen in Psy’s* “Gangnam Style.” South Korea also has four separate concert venues equipped for 3D K-pop shows (Ho 2016). In fact, projections are also used in live shows, which now permit 270-degree viewing, thanks to ScreenX technologies; this was the case for the BTS concert that was rebroadcast in two Parisian venues in January 2019 (Bajos 2019). K-pop concerts also make extensive use of pyrotechnics and video projection. This technological modernity is also showcased in a variety of commercial activities that K-pop stars engage in, especially in advertisements for audiovisual (AV) and telecommunications products and cosmetics, three important economic sectors for Korea. Girls’ Generation* appears in advertisements for LG products, while Blackpink* helps to sell Samsung’s Galaxy A and TXT* is the face of the skincare line It’s Skin. As we shall see in Chap. 5, this modernity is particularly evident in the highly developed use of social media platforms by K-pop groups and stars, with a view to creating ties with their fan communities around the world. In short, K-pop is inherently linked to South Korea’s brand of technological modernity. c) An individual in harmony with the world Technological modernity and resilience are the keywords used to integrate the individual within a form of reflexive consumerism that also allows for personal growth and development. This vision of the individual is the first cultural content conveyed by Hallyu, and it brings together two main values.

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First of all, the individual does not come first (as is in the case in Western culture) but is instead subordinate to the community, with which courteous relations must always be preserved. The importance of having close family ties, displaying filial piety, and believing in a kind of universal affection16 are often mentioned in South Korean television dramas. Accordingly, many of these shows follow the complex and painful emotional journeys of characters who evolve without hurting those around them—that is, while fully respecting the collective. The individual in South Korean culture is thus the antithesis of the rugged lone wolf depicted in American movies, a figure which has profoundly influenced Western cinema as a whole. Secondly, intuition and harmony are essential, interlinked concepts that hark back to various forms of shamanism found throughout the Asian world. In this perspective, the term “harmony” does not refer to peaceful interactions with others, but rather a state of equilibrium between opposing forces. In K-dramas, for instance, enemy forces balance out. This is the case for the three male protagonists of Mr. Sunshine*— the Korean-born American, the Korean-born Yakuza, and the Korean aristocrat breaking with tradition—who are all initially at odds with each other but end up working toward the same goal of Korea’s salvation without ever collaborating. These two traits stem from an alternative concept of individuality that inherently rejects violence and the  hyper-sexualization of male-female relationships (Hong 2014; Oh 2014). It likewise pays special attention to family commitments and dynamics (Chua and Iwabuchi 2008), whereas Western series tend to focus on highly charged sexual relations between the sexes and depict a model of unfettered, self-constructed individuality (in the United States, this takes the shape of the foundational myth of the “self-made man”). The same ideas apply to K-pop. Most groups and their fan communities have names that reference love and harmony: for example, the five-­ member boy band TXT,* which was created in 2019, stands for  The concept of Jeong is hard to translate. It encompasses a broad range of positive emotions such as love, affection, and sympathy but cannot be reduced to these. It can be defined as a type of deep-­ seated love which can be directed to all, living or not. 16

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“Tomorrow by Together” and its fan community is called Moments of Alwaysness (MOA). Similarly, the seven-piece female group Girls’ Generation,* formed in 2017, calls its fan club S♡NE (SO ONE); the 12-piece boy band EXO,* formed in 2015, got its name from a variation on the common youth expression “XOXO” that signifies “hugs and kisses.” Countless other band names make some kind of reference to love (Boyfriend,* GFriend,* Glam,* Hello Venus,* Kiss,* Lovelyz,* Oh My Girl,* U-Kiss,* etc.). Girls’ Generation embodies this image of harmony in its marketing and promotional materials, which all emphasize a loving relationship between different groups and generations (the girls often talk about their families during interviews, and their sister-like bond is always mentioned) (Epstein 2015). Although they are aesthetic hybrids, Korean cultural products convey a worldview that is specifically Korean. Geun Lee (2009) explains: “the Korean Wave can contribute to its soft power by providing opportunities for the manipulation of Korea’s images, extending a network effect of Korean popular culture, and also producing internationally influential heroes and celebrities” (123). The elements disseminated by cultural industries thus help to paint a particular picture of Korea, which as a country has shifted from a model based on development, risk, and suffering to a trifecta of resilience, positive technological modernity, and a concept of the individual that coexists in harmony with the world, while maintaining a highly developed aesthetic sense. From this point of view, Hallyu differs from “cool Japan” in that it is more focused on transmitting values; “cool Japan’s” lack of emphasis on values, according to Joseph S. Nye (1990a, b) and Koichi Iwabuchi (2002), was ultimately the downfall of Japanese attempts to dominate the global market, even if the country experienced undeniable commercial success.

3

South Korean Sweet Power

Hallyu has enhanced the South Korean national brand which, in today’s highly competitive context, is an unequivocal sign of the country’s soft power. In the struggle for symbolic hegemony, South Korea has adopted the unique strategy of sweet power, building on American attempts to

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exploit rapid broadcast media and Japanese success with the power of kawaii aesthetics. However, South Korea has pushed these elements to levels never before displayed by “new” players in the international competition for the symbolic dominance of imaginaries. As Youna Kim explains, “the success of Korean popular culture abroad has helped to shine a light on the culture of a formerly colonized nation that has long been eclipsed by those of more powerful nations” (Kim 2014: 332).

3.1

The Sweet Image of an In-Between Nation

This success is largely due to the Hallyu strategy of depicting South Korea as a “sweet” and non-threatening nation, whose culture lies at the convergence of regional and global influences and succeeds thanks to its ability to combine the latter with a carefully curated past free of any imperialist ambitions. This “sweetness” is the main difference between South Korea and its main East Asian rival, Japan, in terms of pop-culture dominance. Sweet power is not without its pitfalls, however, given that South Korea’s deployment of it has meant reviving symbolic competition in East Asia (Chua 2012) and the world at large. While it draws inspiration from the country’s very real history of mistreatment by its neighbors, the strategy of sweet power also relies on certain persuasive abilities that South Korea has gradually developed. The image of South Korea as a non-threatening country initially helped to encourage exports of its products throughout East and Southeast Asia, as well as to many so-called developing countries that were looking for alternative models to those offered by former colonial powers. This image was so powerful that it conceals a reality that does not immediately come to mind when we think of South Korea: the country is in fact the sixth-­ largest military power in the world (well ahead of North Korea, in 25th place, a country which the public nonetheless sees as much more dangerous) (GlobalFirePower 2020). In an interview from 2005, Kim Jae-won, the director of the Korean Culture Information Service (KOCIS, an agency within the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism) emphasized that in order for the country’s nation branding program to work, two principles were indispensable.

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The first was maintaining consistency between the country’s foreign policy and the story that it tells about itself: “establishing a national brand is like writing a cover letter for Korea. We can promote Korea through this self-introduction. More importantly, we should match our life to the slogan and brand to prevent mistrust that stems from the gap” (Kwon 2015). Here we can see the vast difference between South Korea and its neighbor, China. Joseph S. Nye (2012) also argues that China cannot reap the benefits of soft power, given its inconsistent track record abroad. For example, although the 2008 Olympics were a success, “shortly afterwards, China’s domestic crackdown in Tibet and Xinjiang, and on human rights activists, undercut its soft power gains.” The universal exposition that was held in Shanghai just two years later was followed by the arrests of Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and artist Ai Weiwei. In order for soft power to be effective, it must not be seen as propaganda; that is, it cannot visibly diverge from real behaviors in terms of foreign policy and the values displayed thereby—for Western nations, the concern often falls on human rights violations. The United States has similarly suffered setbacks in terms of the public image due to its foreign policy. More and more, the public abroad views American foreign policy as pursuing the country’s own interests, rather than respecting individual liberties; this perception contradicts the American democratic narrative. At the same time, American cultural exports have never been higher (Wike et al. 2018). As we can see, therefore, the commercial success of a country’s cultural industries and its symbolic gains in terms of soft power do not always go hand in hand. The second principle mentioned by Kim Jae-won involves finding a subtle balance between the universal and the specific, by betting on the reciprocity of cultural exchanges. He explains: “it is about cultural reciprocity. Promoting the Korean national brand does not come from imposing its culture, but can be completed by understanding and accepting other countries. It is more about sharing and exchanges than promotions or marketing” (Kwon 2015). This is a far cry from the US model of diffusion (which seems the maximum number of sales by forcing local markets to develop a taste for American products); it is also quite different from Japanese-style “glocalization,” which on the contrary, looks to

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maximize sales by adapting products to local markets. When describing the Japanese case, Koichi Iwabuchi (2015) observes the following: despite its emphasis on the promotion of international cultural exchange and dialogue, Japan’s pop-culture diplomacy goes no further than a one-­ way projection of Japanese culture. (…) Pop-culture diplomacy does not seriously engage with the promotion of cross-border dialogue over historically constituted issues in East Asia. (420)

It would have been naïve to assume that the export of kawaii products could single-handedly pacify tense relations between Japan and its Asian neighbors. “Kawaii as the cute, the infantile, the feminine, and the sexual trivializes historical enmity and controversial realities of the nation Japan” (Yano 2013: 266). In short, when it is reduced to its purely aesthetic dimension, soft power is ultimately ineffective. By trusting in its sweet power to export positive values and by emphasizing consistency across its public image and its respectful foreign policy, South Korea has come to play the role of cultural mediator between Asia and the West (Ryoo 2009), a role which Japan ultimately, and despite a promising start, failed to fulfill on account of its Japanese-centric view of Western pop culture and its past as an imperial power (Iwabuchi 2002). In addition, South Korea has not historically been a major military or cultural power in East Asia (or throughout the world), and can thus be considered—by some of its Asian neighbors like Taiwan, Vietnam, and Singapore—as a potential “arbiter” capable of mitigating American cultural domination, especially in terms of mass production, by encouraging mutual exchanges that favor the coexistence of inter-Asian cultures (Ching 2000). Given these elements, we should not be surprised at the penetration of South Korean products in other Asian markets, and their success at reviving pre-existing Confucian cultural traits, be they real or imagined. “The focus of South Korean TV dramas on family lives and their depiction of social relationships based largely on Confucian values and ideology supposedly contribute to their popularity in Asia” (Park 2006). Operating under the aegis of quality and modernity, Korean cultural products seem to be driven less by hegemonic desires than their

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American and Japanese counterparts; consequently, they seem more acceptable in regard to the values and emotions they disseminate (Leung 2008).

3.2

Sweet Power and Its Impact on Tourism

The success of sweet power has translated into massive growth for South Korea’s tourism industry, now explicitly tied to the Hallyu cultural package. Specialists have distinguished two different dynamics at play in Hallyu-based tourism. On the one hand, some interest is directly tied to cultural products and leads to tourism to sites where movies and K-dramas have been filmed, as well as fan conferences and K-pop performances. On the other hand, there is also broader interest in South Korea that was developed via the consumption of Hallyu products, but which has now expanded beyond those bounds (Mori 2008; Lin and Huang 2008). Yukie Hirata attributes the growth of 35.5% in Japanese tourism to South Korea between 2003 and 2004 to Hallyu, and more specifically to the rampant popularity of the television series Winter Sonata* (Hirata 2008). It has been estimated that 500,000 tourists came to South Korea on account of this K-drama. Similarly, the province of Ganwong, where the K-drama Autumn in My Heart* is set, saw a 15% increase in visitors when that show was aired. A longitudinal study (conducted on a panel of tourists from the United States, Japan, China, and Hong Kong between 2007 and 2014) showed that Hallyu had played a positive effect on their choices (Bae et al. 2017). K-pop has similarly had an important impact on tourism, according to the Yonhap press agency (Yonhap 2018). BTS* alone has made a significant contribution to the tourism industry since on average the group attracts about 800,000 tourists each year for its concerts (since 2013); this represents 7.6% of the total 10.4 million foreign tourists that visited South Korea in 2017. Of course, this type of tourism is not new. According to a market research firm based in London, one tourist out of every five who visited the United Kingdom was inspired to do so because of British television and film; 50% of those who visited Scotland chose their holiday destination on account of television programs or movies (MINTEL 2003). Similarly, the number of foreign tourists to New Zealand increased on

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average by 5.6% per year after the first Lord of the Rings movie was released in 2001; 9% of tourists stated that their trip had been influenced by this movie (ibid.). Thanks to strong governmental support, South Korea has been able to rapidly expand and adapt its tourism apparatus on the fly following the success of a film, K-drama, or K-pop group. It has also been more successful than any other country at making tourism a cross-cutting phenomenon. For example, tourism related to plastic surgery procedures, and more broadly to the beauty and fashion industries, is directly linked to the success of Hallyu cultural products, given that these products are worn, used, and advertised by the stars of K-pop groups, K-dramas, and films throughout Asia, in particular in China and Southeast Asia (Yun 2015; Witt 2017). The Hyundai Research Institute thus estimates that the international popularity of BTS* has had a significant impact on the exports of various consumer products, including clothing, cosmetics, and foodstuff, given that in 2017, 1.7% of the 65.2 million USD in consumer exports were tied to this group (Yonhap 2018).

3.3

 he Limits of Sweet Power in Terms T of Regional Leadership

With the development and global diffusion of technological and cultural products that are “made in Asia,” a regional sentiment has recently emerged throughout East and Southeast Asia, one with regard to which South Korea has placed an important role. The products of South Korean pop culture have helped transform relations in this geographical and civilizational space through the creation of shared imaginaries (Callahan 1999). While Hallyu has often been analyzed from the perspective of nationalism, just as Japanese anime (Iwabuchi 1998) and Chinese martial arts movies before it (Wu and Chan 2007), it nonetheless also constitutes a pillar of pan-Asian identity (Cho 2005). From this point of view, South Korea has supplanted Japan as the driver of “Asian consciousness” or “Asiatic imaginary” (Ching 2000). Some tensions seemed to have been appeased. For example, we can look at how far Japanese-Korean relations have come since the colonial period. Once a dominated country, South Korea initially sought to escape

4  From Soft Power to “Sweet Power” 139

Japanese influence and culture, with the government prohibiting the exchange of cultural products between the two countries until the 1990s (Mori 2008). Now, however, and thanks to the exceptional success of Winter Sonata,* the two countries have drawn closer together (Ryoo 2009). The Japanese market has likewise opened up to Korean music, with Korean pop stars helping to improve foreign relations by creating points of convergence with some of the country’s neighbors. For example, actor Jan Dong-gun and actress Kim Nam-ji are so popular in Vietnam that they are considered “national” stars there. More broadly, Hong Tien Vu and Tien-Tsung Lee (2013) have shown how K-dramas have helped to enhance South Korea’s image in Vietnam, with television having more influence in contexts where there are fewer sources of information. And yet, these shared imaginaries created thanks to cultural products cannot completely escape strong intraregional tensions, in particular South Korea’s grievances with regard to Japan and its collective memory of the colonial period; the territorial dispute concerning the so-called independent island (Dokdo in Korean, Takeshima in Japanese); disagreements concerning the fate of Hong Kong and China and their permanent struggle for autonomy and control; the Chinese-Taiwanese dispute over the Taiwan Strait; or the Russian-Japanese dispute over the four southernmost Kuril Islands (which Japan views as part of its northern territory). Similarly, the Vietnamese have not forgotten that South Korean soldiers fought against their liberation army during the Vietnam War. As for the Taiwanese, they felt betrayed by South Korea when Seoul severed diplomatic relations with Taipei in order to build new ties with Beijing in 1992. South Korean public opinion is, on the whole, rather negative toward China, which it views as a threat (Kim 2018). Different surveys have also described the reciprocal negative image that South Koreans and the Japanese have of each other (Kudo 2019). In addition, as the Korean Wave has gained steam, negative reactions have popped up in Asian countries, in particular those in the Chinese economic sphere, where some have seen the invasion of Korean products as challenging domestic markets. Consequently, China regularly refuses to diffuse certain South Korean products, be they movies, television shows, or video games. It is the only country that has not been affected

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by the Asia-wide box-office success of Along with the Gods.* In fact, on account of South Korea’s adoption of the American anti-ballistic missile system “Terminal High Altitude Area Defense” (THAAD), ostensibly to protect itself from potential North Korean attacks, China banned the official release of Korean movies in  local theaters between 2015 and 2018.17 Likewise in Japan, a very strong anti-Hallyu movement was born (called yuk-Hallyu in Japanese) (Hwang 2011) which was illustrated by the impressive success of a manga called Hyom-Hallyu (meaning “anti-­ Korean Wave”) published in 2005 and which has sold more than 300,000 copies, ultimately becoming a bestseller on Amazon Japan (Liscutin 2009). Hyom-Hallyu tells the story of a Japanese student who realizes the true and terrible nature of South Korea. Cultural powers outside of the region, the United States in particular, have also watched South Korea’s ascension with wariness. Case in point: President Trump condemned the Oscars for awarding the Best Picture award to Parasite,* arguing that given the economic tension between the United States and South Korea, the policy of “America first” should have applied to the film industry as well. During a campaign rally in Colorado on 20 February 2020, the President mentioned just “how bad the Academy Awards were [that] year” and added: “we got enough problems with South Korea, with trade. On top of it, they give them the best movie of the year?” Trump continued: “was it good? I don’t know […] Let’s get ‘Gone With the Wind’. Can we get ‘Gone With the Wind’ back please? ‘Sunset Boulevard?’.”18 The United States, formerly a hegemonic power, is frustrated with the artistic and commercial success of its former vassal state, in the cultural realm at least.

 South Korean films that were blocked in China managed to make it onto the market in Taiwan and Hong Kong, which are now (and for the first time since statistical data have been collected regarding South Korean film exports) the first and second export markets for Korean films abroad (Kofice 2018: 6). 18  See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lVd2vzDPhT4 17

4  From Soft Power to “Sweet Power” 141

4

Conclusion

The Korean Wave can be analyzed as a specific kind of soft power that we have termed sweet power and that is characterized by the fact that it stems from a nation that has never been hegemonic and that does not openly pretend to dominate, whereas lying at the convergence of regional and global influences. This “sweetness” is the main difference between South Korea and its main East Asian rivals, Japan and China, in terms of pop-culture dominance. Sweet power is not without its pitfalls, however, given that South Korea’s deployment of it has meant reviving symbolic competition in East Asia (Chua 2012) and the world at large. In fact, it is sweet power that is deployed using values-based diplomacy that encourages exchanges and hybridization and is disseminated in the form of the Korean “cultural package.” This sweet power has benefited from the rise of aesthetic capitalism and the emergence of a multipolar world in terms of cultural exchanges. South Korea has also developed its own brand of “pop nationalism” that appears innocuous and therefore much more palatable, given that it comes from a country with no stated hegemonic ambitions. This form of pop nationalism has also been adopted by other countries that were formerly under colonial control: the popularity of Hallyu in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and nations still under Chinese influence is often analyzed in these terms (Marinescu 2014). What about France, which has no specific ties to South Korea, but which has a long tradition of cultural production at home and of openness to other world cultures? The reception of Hallyu products by the younger generations illustrates the transformation of global imaginaries, and the shifting of boundaries between different categories (generations, social classes, genders, cultural origins, etc.) at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The following chapters in this book shall look at these topics more closely.

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5 The Theory of Cosmopolitan Elective Affinities

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this volume analyzed the structural and institutional contexts that led to the emergence, promotion, and global diffusion of the Korean Wave, looking at both the circulation of goods at the global level and the creation and production of such goods at the national level. Regardless of its heuristic value, this analysis is not sufficient to explain why Korean cultural products have seduced so many young people belonging to many different countries both in Asia (where Japan and China are economically and politically more powerful than South Korea) and in the West (where American pop culture has long captured the lion’s share of both attention and sales). In order to complete our analysis, we shall thus study the desires and passions provoked in young French men and women by Korean cultural products, which just a few years ago were largely ignored, and which are still snubbed or disdained by some. In this chapter, we shall further our investigation of the Hallyu production infrastructure by looking at the agency of consumers, arguing that it is important for an empirical analysis of the hybridization of cultural products to examine their contexts not only of production and circulation but also of their consumption and reception (Kraidy 2005).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Cicchelli, S. Octobre, The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84296-3_5

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Staying close to the monographic approach we presented in Chap. 1—that is, considering South Korean cultural production as a litmus test, both produced by and producing global pop culture itself, of which it is a variant—we argue that an analysis of the Hallyu cultural offer, shaped by the economic and political system we have examined above, should be expanded to include an analysis of Hallyu culture: the latter is created by pop cosmopolitan amateurs through their various forms of engagement and depending on their profiles (or capital), their expectations (or desires), and their trajectories as consumers. In other words: we must analyze the cosmopolitan reception of Hallyu products. This reception obeys the general mechanisms outlined in works on the consumption of global pop culture, while also displaying some points of divergence, given South Korea’s unique context of production (entertainment capitalism), circulation (an alternative globalization of pop culture), and promotion (sweet power) on the one hand, and the intersection of the sociology of cosmopolitan taste (Cicchelli and Octobre 2018a) with the rise of professional amateurs in the technocultural regime (Octobre 2020) on the other. This chapter shall therefore look at the foundations of a cosmopolitan relationship to others, nurtured through the consumption of foreign products, which remain solidly anchored in local contexts of reception, and which encourage cosmopolitan elective affinities between the French public and South Korean products.

1

The Hallyu Appeal in the Global Pop Landscape

The success of the Korean Wave has attracted the attention of researchers and scholars all over the world, who have endeavored to understand the mechanisms and driving force of Hallyu in the setting of global pop culture. Taking account of how amateurs are rooted in their local contexts of reception, two contrasting arguments have been ventured to explain the interest of audiences for South Korean products. Some authors have suggested that attraction is a function of pre-existing cultural proximity

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between the characteristics of the consumer’s cultural environment and those of the product’s original cultural environment (and, ostensibly, of the environment the product is designed to evoke). In this perspective, amateurs identify aesthetic codes and/or cultural contents that they consider to be familiar given a certain proximity to their own aesthetic and cultural references, which in turn allows them to recognize themselves within a cultural community. Others have argued, on the contrary, that attraction to cultural products is inseparable from the cultural and/or aesthetic distance (sometimes called “exoticism”) that exists between the country of production and the publics of reception. A thirst for the new and the undiscovered can explain why amateurs flock to what is unknown, strange, or just simply different. In fact, although these two explanations are often pitted against each other and seen as mutually exclusive, we believe that they are complementary rather than opposed in the context of pop cosmopolitanism; insisting on this nuance will better account for the different modalities of reception.

1.1

The Appeal of the Familiar and the Exotic

The argument of cultural proximity has most often been deployed to explain the success of Hallyu in East Asia or within Asian diasporas around the world. In literature on the international circulation of cultural goods (Straubhaar 1991), this notion has often been introduced to counter the theory of cultural imperialism, given that it highlights the alleged resistance of publics to products that they see as imposed on them by American cultural industrial giants. Joseph Straubhaar (2003) defines cultural proximity as “the tendency to prefer media products from one’s own culture or the most similar possible culture” (85). Much like the extensive concept of “culture” whose semantic floating it inherits, this form of proximity (or similarity) can be considered in multiple ways when elaborating an imagined transnational community. The main issue here is defining the criteria of proximity. One first explanation has relied on shared language use (Ksiazek and Webster

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2008). By hypothesizing that cultural exchanges generally follow “geo-­ linguistic regions,” John Sinclair (1996) was able to explain the success of American products throughout the English-speaking world. A British study confirmed this: interviewees who appreciated foreign cultural products overwhelmingly preferred products from the United States (Bennett et al. 2009). Despite this argument’s undeniable appeal when applied to products originating in countries whose language has become the dominant one at the international level, it nevertheless comes up short when we bring minority languages into the equation. Given that Korean is a relatively “rare” language outside of the Korean peninsula (there are only about 80 million speakers worldwide), the popularity of Korean products (such as the television show Jewel in the Palace*)1 has largely been the result of dubbing (e.g., into Mandarin for Taiwan, or Cantonese for Hong Kong), and even adaptations. For example, the Hong Kong-based television channel Television Broadcast Limited (TVB), which is the largest broadcaster of Chinese-language programs in the world, added voice-over explanations in Cantonese when airing Korean shows with a view to “domesticating and localizing practices” (Chua 2011: 229). Cultural proximity has also been seen from the broader angle of civilizational belonging (the argument being that all of East Asia shares a Confucian legacy and certain values such as modesty, familial piety, harmony, respect for hierarchy and community, etc.) and shared historical experiences (Korea was long under the political and military yoke of China and then Japan), or even from the perspective of widespread human and economic intraregional exchanges (chosen mobility, mixed marriages, colonization) (Chan and Ma 1996; Yoo and Chung 2000; Yoo and Lee 2001). From this point of view, audiences would favor contents that hark back to certain familiar cultural models or patterns (Hoskins and Mirus 1988), because even before engaging in acts of consumption, they share a frame of reference (Iwabuchi 2000, 2013). Antonio C. La Pastina and Joseph Straubhaar (2005) list a certain number of elements that can be shared: “there are other levels of similarity or proximity, based  The South Korean cultural products referred to in this book and marked with an asterisk are presented in the glossary at the end of the book. 1

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in cultural elements per se: dress, ethnic types, gestures, body language, definitions of humor, ideas about story pacing, music traditions, religious elements, etc.” (274). Building on this argument, some studies have shown that in the case of the Korean Wave, similarities can be found in clothing styles, forms of non-verbal communication, humor, music, and food throughout the region (Hanaki et al. 2007; Jung 2009). This concept of cultural proximity was later applied to more distant geographical regions that nonetheless allegedly belonged to the same civilizational space in order to explain the success of K-dramas in Muslim countries that appreciated modesty in relationships between men and women, as well as respect for one’s elders, a value that is often depicted in Korean television shows (Noh 2011; Elaskary 2018). Cultural proximity in fact describes two concentric circles: first, the circle of societies that have strong cultural (religious, historical, political, and sociological) ties; and second, the circle of societies that are more distant but nonetheless share a number of anthropological traits. Other explanations have relied, on the contrary, on the cultural distance between consumers and products, and the desire created by this distance. Henry Jenkins (2004) has explained the interest of young Americans in manga and anime on account of these products’ “Japaneseness:” that is, their foreignness compared to American aesthetic canons, and their identification with certain cultural and aesthetic traits that are clearly perceived as Japanese (reading direction, graphic design, cultural references to bushido, etc.). Jenkins also emphasizes that this attraction to the foreign has made young Americans more familiar with the cultural contents of a distant country without any pre-existing close cultural ties to the United States, than with other foreign (especially European) cultural contents which played more of an important role in the initial development of American culture. This argument has generally been used to explain popular reception in countries that are ostensibly quite distant from South Korea (in particular geographically), and/or in regions of the world where values and cultural traditions (including language) are significantly different, as in the United States (Jung 2018) or Latin America (Han 2017).

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The Poverty of Culturalism

One could argue that the success of Hallyu 1.0, which was primarily limited to East and Southeast Asia, can be explained by the cultural proximity argument, whereas the global unleashing of Hallyu 2.0 might be better explained by the exoticism argument. This would be a hasty conclusion, however: associating one explanation with a historical moment and using cultural and geographical distance as the variable that predicts success seems misguided on several accounts. First of all, the cultural proximity argument does not take into account the painful memories associated with the interregional past of wars and colonization which are nevertheless quite vivid in East and Southeast Asia. The commercial success of Hallyu in neighboring countries (Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, etc.) can thus be seen as a form of regional resistance to the economic dominance of Japan in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, this argument does not explain the significant variations in the socio-demographic profiles of publics in countries otherwise belonging to similar cultural and geographical spheres. The 2008 East Asian Social Survey revealed a certain social similarity in Hallyu publics across the region (members of the middle class who had benefited from the economic boom), but also highlighted several important differences. For instance, women were more drawn to Korean television shows than men; fans were particularly young in China and Taiwan, and relatively older in Japan (Yang 2012). The appeal of globalized products favored the expansion of Hallyu among Chinese and Taiwanese publics, but the same was not true for Japan: while the former exhibited a general taste for culturally familiar and politically neutral television programs (Leung 2008), for the same reasons Chinese and Taiwanese fans tended to avoid Western and Japanese shows, which they perceived as ideologically threatening and emotionally unacceptable. Other explanations have emphasized the converging trajectories of countries in the region striving to modernize, which would explain the fact that their publics were first interested in Japanese products, and subsequently began to express a preference for South Korean products. On account of their quality and the technological means of their creation and

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distribution, these products could be seen as embodying the great leap forward accomplished by these societies on the cultural and economic level. By consuming products from Japan and South Korea, Asian publics would be identifying with a shared destiny and expressing the feeling of “coevality” (Iwabuchi 2004), a feeling bolstered by a shared desire for consumerist modernity. And yet, still according to the results of the 2008 East Asian Social Survey, the modernity argument is also questionable, given that this term has given rise to a number of different local interpretations. Indeed, South Korean products are seen by regional publics as being more “Westernized” than products from China or Southeast Asia more broadly (Uhn 2005), and sometimes as more sophisticated and modern. However, publics also prefer these products to their Japanese or American counterparts because they do not come from an imperialist nation. There are nonetheless some important differences here, too. While the vision of modernity embodied by South Korea plays a major role in how Hallyu has been embraced throughout the region, it is sometimes also regarded with suspicion by neighboring countries such as Vietnam, where “South Korean TV dramas provide the tightly controlled communist country with an enticing glimpse of the outside world” (Visser 2002), or China, particularly in the realm of video games. In short, the cultural proximity argument quite often reduces shared values to a shared experience wherein attraction to Hallyu products is generally more hypothesized than demonstrated. As for the opposite theory that prioritizes the seductive appeal of cultural distance, it also exhibits the same culturalist flaw of focusing on authenticity, the idea according to which every product should be a mirror of the culture in which it was produced, thus representing the unique spirit of its national origins. This nearsightedness is isolationist in nature, as it does not account for the vast number of cultural products that are the result of hybridization. Borrowing, trading, and imitating have always been part of the history of cultural circulation; using cultural authenticity as an argument usually stems more from an attempt to justify defensive national policies than from a desire to describe cultural phenomena (Amselle 2001). In addition, as we outlined in Chap. 1, one of the main characteristics of pop culture is its penchant for creating a “global mélange” (Pieterse 2009). Without going into a history of cultural hybrid

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forms, we shall underscore the fact that affinities can be developed between far-flung cultural centers that are not linked by any kind of shared history. This is the case behind the initially puzzling existence of “Greek Japan,” a phenomenon which Michael Lucken (2019) has studied, arguing that since the Meiji era (1868–1912), Japanese intellectuals have repeatedly emphasized their filiation with the Greek tradition, using their philhellenism as a means to distance themselves from their Chinese rivals and the otherwise significant influence of Chinese culture on their own. The Greek tradition thus becomes a way to establish a different precedent for Japan’s cultural greatness that does not emphasize any Chinese legacy. This drive to find spiritual and intellectual ancestors was so powerful that it bled into artist imaginaries, as evidenced by the fact that Japanimation regularly pilfered the vast treasure trove of Greek mythology for its ends, adapting, subverting, and sometimes reinventing this source material. Via the consumption of Japanese products, this syncretism introduced many young Europeans to ancient themes, characters, and narratives that they would have otherwise ignored (Thomas 2019). The popularity of Ulysses 31,2 which adapts Homer’s Odyssey to the thirty-­ first century, is proof of such successful hybrids, which are particularly prevalent throughout the “space opera” genre of animation. In fact, Ulysses 31 met with great success in France (it first aired between 1981 and 1983 on FR3, and was subsequently rebroadcast on France 3, France 5, and Télétoon et Mangas, and released on video and DVD), but also in Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Some Japanese productions even operate as a kind of palimpsest: Astro Boy,3 for instance, started a whole genre—mecha—that relies heavily on robots, cyborgs, and androids. He was created at the beginning of the 1950s by Osamu Tezuka who claims to have been inspired by Disney’s Pinocchio (the most ambitious and also  Ulysses 31 is a French-Japanese animation series (with 26 episodes that are each 26 minutes long, at a rate of 12 images per second) based on Homer’s Odyssey, but set in a futuristic thirty-first century (hence the title). The show was new in terms of the partnerships it forged between Japanese and European creators, but also in terms of its aesthetic finish and production techniques. In particular, its extended color palette and attention to detail were unusual for a television show at the time (as was the use of composite images during the credits). It first aired in France in 1981. 3  Astro Boy, known in Japan as Atom is a fictional superhero and the protagonist of the eponymous franchise. Created by Osamu Tezuka, the character was introduced in the 1951 Captain Atom manga. In France, it first aired in 1986. 2

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most accessible illustration of the original Italian text). The importing of cultural material also went hand in hand with significant attempts at reappropriation. In fact, “the same type of reclaiming transforms Joan of Arc, Faustus, or Puss in Boots into the spokesperson of Japanese society and the myths that ensure its continuity” (Chappuis 2008: 31). Returning from Europe and naturally transformed by the addition of deeply Japanese and Shinto cultural traits—in particular concerning the relationship between the subject and the object, and good and evil—these cultural products offered consumers a number of resources to distance themselves from the national identity imposed on them by the educational system, in particular in literature and history curricula. To borrow the title of a work by Paul Ricœur (1990), it is through the detour of Japanese pop culture that we can sharpen our eyesight and see “oneself as another.” Although isolationist myopia applies to both of the arguments discussed above, the mirage of authenticity is particularly relevant when speaking about products from elsewhere, given that the thirst for exoticism is one of the most powerful drivers of aesthetic capitalism and consumption preferences (Illouz 2007; Nava 2007; Lipovetsky and Serroy 2013) among individuals who have become omnivores (Peterson 2005) in the context of cultural globalization (Cicchelli and Octobre 2017; Coulangeon 2017). This “consumption of difference” (Schroeder 2015) often takes place without any inherent consideration of the nature of said difference, especially as it is often sugarcoated and glossed over by global marketing strategies; the main point is that the public must be able to view such cultural products as “coming from elsewhere.” The mirage of exotic authenticity thus ignores the force of aesthetic capitalism driving youth publics in particular to pinpoint the recognition of the Other as a characteristic trait of contemporary consumption. Both of these stumbling blocks regarding the authenticity argument are particularly detrimental to any understanding of the hybrid nature of the Korean Wave. In the vast ocean of pop culture, any cultural wave that appears, swells, and ends up imposing its standards in terms of both aesthetic codes and contents is an integral part of this complex dynamic, according to which global cultural processes are embedded into local contexts, then appropriated and reinvented—which allows for both familiarity (preventing immediate rejection) and continued appeal (on

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account of novelty). While Korean products combine the traits of transnational cultural industries with certain characteristics that are seen as typically Korean (Jin 2018), their talent for hybridization has become a unique trait, as well as a guarantee of quality for international publics. Many authors (Shim 2006) have argued that the appeal of Hallyu products comes precisely from their hybrid nature. Instead of reflecting a well-­ defined national identity, the “Koreanness” of Hallyu (in other words, the K of K-pop and K-dramas) can be seen as a kaleidoscopic recycling of all the styles of global youth consumption: punk, goth, emo, street, gangsta, Hollywood sci-fi, Japanese manga and anime, video game aesthetics, and so on (Lie 2012; Fuhr 2015).

2

The Work of the Cosmopolitan Amateur

Both the argument for cultural proximity and that for exoticism overlook the work of cosmopolitan reception undertaken by amateurs to create distance or proximity with the cultural products they consume. This shared blind spot should encourage us to look beyond what Korean products “are” and instead focus on how their “Koreanness” is perceived by consumers, with these consumption-based representations naturally depending on their social and geographical positions. In fact, while the cultural proximity argument reduces difference by absorbing it under a shared belonging (which is often more proclaimed than demonstrated), the counterpoint of exoticism fails to even address the existence of ecumenical patterns (in iconography, narrative, artistic language, visual and musical codes, etc. (Cicchelli 2018)) which establish the transnational cultural backdrop against which new elements can emerge. In addition, the same cultural elements can be interpreted as foreign or familiar by the publics consuming them (Lee 2006; Russel 2008), given that the two registers are not in fact mutually exclusive. Consumers can be attracted by the novelty of the Korean Wave and simultaneously reassured by its manifest continuity with the canons of global pop culture. Keeping these considerations in mind, we shall therefore examine the registers used by cosmopolitan amateurs in a number of reception situations.

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159

Understanding Cosmopolitan Reception

To understand cosmopolitan reception, we need to connect the perception of difference with motives for consumption. In the existing literature, the relationship between these two realities is often alleged rather than proven. This is the case, for instance, when claims are made that a foreign product is consumed on account of its difference, when in fact this consumption may merely be a consequence of mainstream circulation flows and consumers may remain blissfully unaware of the product’s distinctive, exotic nature. First and foremost, then, our analysis of the cosmopolitan reception of Hallyu products must look at how products from elsewhere are categorized. The categories of reception depend on the aesthetic or cultural “signature” of each product (which can either highlight or downplay its exotic nature), but also on the ability of consumers to decipher “foreign” cultural and aesthetic traits. To return to the Japanese example, manga are immediately associated with foreignness in France, given that the reading direction runs contrary to what is normal there, whereas early Japanese animation that was very popular in France (Candy Candy,4 UFO Robot Grendizer5) did not highlight the element of alterity. In addition, the ability to identify otherness also depends on how long consumers have been exposed to global flows (Tobin 2002). An experienced consumer will be able to spot subtle references (such as colors, graphics, and secondary cultural elements) to a distant cultural context. A certain kind of expertise can also lead to familiarity with what was originally perceived as strange. In short, the more consumers consume, the more they can spot similarities everywhere—or, on the contrary, the more they can perceive cultural difference everywhere. These observations help to lay the groundwork for the discussion of two models often used to analyze the reception of global pop cultural products. The first model focuses on  Candy Candy is a Japanese series created by Kyoko Mizuki. The main character, Candice “Candy” White Ardley is a blonde girl with freckles, large emerald green eyes and long hair, worn in pigtails with bows. It first aired in France in 1978. 5  UFO Robot Grendizer, also known as Force Five: Grandizer in the United States, is a Japanese Super Robot anime television series and manga created by manga artist Go Nagai. It first aired in France in 1978.

4

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the dichotomy between cultural “fragrance” (the taste of products, which is linked to their authenticity and “purity”) and “odorlessness” (the absence of taste in industrial and mass consumption products) (Iwabuchi 1998, 2002, 2008). On the other hand, the second model discusses the “weak” cultural reception of exotic products. The opposition between “fragrance” and “odorlessness” is often used to criticize certain cultural products and/or their reception. The argument here is that some products are devoid of taste because they are not authentic, whereas other products, by virtue of their cultural rootedness, possess certain properties that will ensure their popularity and success. However, this dichotomy cannot account for the various forms of appropriation that publics exhibit. First of all, because what circulates the most successfully could well be products that are culturally “impure,” born at the crossroads of multiple influences that confer a particular taste; and second, because public taste criteria may vary widely and not correspond to the a priori legitimacy of authenticity, which is a largely normative category based on a representation of cultures operating as discrete, isolated entities (Jin and Yoon 2016). Here again, the example of the Japanese wave provides a pertinent point of comparison to understand the Hallyu phenomenon. In fact, a two-fold movement can be observed: on the one hand, the familiarization, and even re-traditionalization of exotic traits— or as Joseph J. Tobin explains, “what was marked as foreign and exotic yesterday can become familiar today and traditionally Japanese tomorrow” (Tobin 1992: 26)—and on the other, an increasingly greater appreciation of their difference, as observed by Henry Jenkins (2004): at the moment, Japanese style is marketed as a distinctive fragrance to niche or cult audiences and deodorized for broader publics, but this distinction is starting to break down as American consumers develop a preference for those qualities they associate with Japanese cultural productions. (123)

In the same vein, the “cultural discount” argument (Lee 2008) has often been used to explain the global circulation of cultural products, according to the idea that in order for products to be appreciated, they must be understood by their target publics. This argument suggests that

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publics which are distant at the outset can only consume products that are stripped of any overly distinctive cultural markers; in short, it is only through this “cultural discount” that the reception of a global product can truly occur (Hoskins and Mirus 1988; Hoskins et al. 1997). And yet, here again, we can observe foreign products that have been appreciated by large publics all around the world, including anime, manga, Hallyu products, and “world music” (an all-encompassing aesthetico-cultural category if ever such a thing existed). Such widespread reception contradicts this argument, which cannot account for the global dynamics of pop culture in recent decades: mainstream products with significant cultural connotations (Naruto,6 BTS,* etc.) or without (Captain Harlock,7 UFO Robot Grendizer8) exist side-by-side with niche products (Korean indie and hard rock music, Iranian art house cinema) and all of these have found audiences in various parts of the world. In addition, the cultural discount argument fails at its own attempt to qualify contents as culturally authentic: this qualification varies, given that what is authentic for a Korean living in South Korea may be different from what is authentic for a member of the Korean diaspora—and of course, what seems authentic to a French Hallyu fan who has never lived in Korea will be yet different. As we can see, both of these arguments fail to account for the appeal of Hallyu products that stems precisely from their “impure” nature, the result of both the global circulation and hybridization that occur in today’s technocultural ecosystem, on the one hand, and of the preponderance of certain mainstream narrative and aesthetic traits, on the other. The highly controversial issue of identifying the pertinent and selective traits of cultural authenticity when analyzing cultural goods becomes redundant in our perspective of a cosmopolitan reception, which is on the contrary entirely oriented toward highlighting the elements  Naruto is a Japanese manga series written and illustrated by Masashi Kishimoto. It was published in French between 2002 and 2016. The manga was adapted into an anime television series that first aired in France in 2006. 7  Captain Harlock, also known as “Captain Herlock” in the English release of Endless Odyssey and some Japanese materials, is a fictional character and protagonist of the Space Pirate Captain Harlock manga series created by Leiji Matsumoto. It was adapted into an anime television series that first aired in France in 1980. 8  See footnote 5. 6

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composing a space of intercultural exchange with high emotional and transnational value (Elfving-Hwang 2013). It is under this lens that we must look at what the K in K-Wave means for young French men and women, by analyzing how products ostensibly from a distant culture have become familiar or at least perceived as belonging to a non-foreign artistic language.

2.2

Strange Familiarity and Reassuring Difference

Thanks to an increase in mobility, growing diasporas, and the widespread circulation of cultural products and knowledge, contemporary generations are more familiar with distant cultures and regions. French youth are no exception to this contemporary condition of global existence (Cicchelli and Octobre 2018a). In today’s world, the power of the aesthetic dimension is so great that it can sometimes transcend the need for cultural comprehension (with regard to products from foreign cultures). This suggests that we should go beyond the ultimately sterile opposition between a taste for the familiar and a penchant for the exotic, and instead look at the dynamics of global pop culture while adopting this apparent paradox as our guiding principle: a feeling of déjà-vu can nonetheless give way to surprise and astonishment and the perpetual quest for novelty does not mean the adoption of a detached and blasé attitude. Without being unique to Hallyu, the appeal of aesthetic novelty has been fully exploited by this wave of global pop culture. Proof lies in the hordes of K-pop fans all over the world who flock to concert venues to sing, in unison and largely in Korean with the exception of some English hooks or refrains, songs by their favorite groups, even when only a minority of fans can correctly speak this language. In fact, international pop music, which mostly circulates in a sort of basic English, is progressively establishing a non-literal relationship to language, one that is allusive and leads to the aestheticized appreciation of the “musicality” of different languages (Noble 2002)—especially given that the diffusion of music via video clips limits the importance of lyrics (and literary comprehension) in favor of visual comprehension. Similarly, the massive use of subtitles when consuming television series in their language of origin has

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transformed linguistic appropriation, increasingly separating comprehension (through the reading of subtitles) from aesthetic appreciation (through listening to the original language that one does not understand). One study which looked at the aesthetico-cultural cosmopolitanism of French youth revealed that appropriation of original-language cultural products happens much more frequently than the presence (or lack) of language skills might suggest—and that these appropriations are valued for aesthetic reasons above all (Cicchelli and Octobre 2018a). More generally, it can be argued that the aestheticization of the world (Germann Molz 2011; Lipovetsky and Serroy 2013) that is the result of expanded visual marketing (design, publicity, etc.) has cultivated an aesthetic approach to cultural difference among young people, an approach that is based on shapes, sounds, colors, moods, and rhythms—which a recent comparative study found to be particularly dominant in France (Cicchelli et al. 2018). The primacy of aesthetics forces us to nuance the concepts of both cultural proximity and exoticism by incorporating the consumption of difference into pre-existing global aesthetic languages. Twisting the original definition of cultural proximity a bit, Antonio C. La Pastina and Joseph Straubhaar (2005) suggest that we should embrace a broader conception of the former which is not reduced to its objective and inherently culturalist characteristics, but which belongs instead to the realm of cultural shareability: a process that encompasses representations, desires, shared (or shareable) ambitions and allows individuals to discover similarities, to see themselves in the other, and to reflect upon themselves. Similarly, contemporary exoticism is necessarily selective on the global pop culture market. After decades of hegemony in terms of Western music, the global ear has been trained to appreciate a certain kind of music: a critical transformation was a shift in scale: from the traditional pentatonic to the Western—and by now global—diatonic. To be sure, it is not that music composed in pentatonic scale cannot become popular—consider only the Japonisme of some of Debussy’s compositions—but a sure way to alienate an audience is to play music in alien registers and scales. (Lie 2012)

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We can thus use these two explanatory models with regard to the work done by cosmopolitan amateurs, in order to identify how the latter establish a cartography of shared elements on a continuum between the close and the faraway (including elements from cultures that are ostensibly the closest, but also those which would initially seem the most distant). Consequently, our approach considers each of the two positions (close/ distant) less as objective pieces of data, for instance linked to place of birth or generational cohort, and more as attempts, by consumers, to negotiate and adjust distance using oppositions such as similar/different, familiar/exotic, known/unknown shaped by the consumption of global products (Noh 2011; Otmazgin and Lyan 2013; Schulze 2013). In fact, affiliation with the Korean Wave occurs via a process of distancing and identification (Chua 2008, 2012). Will Brooker (2007) suggests using the metaphor of the “symbolic pilgrimage” to describe how each fan exists in the tension between these two poles, being attracted to the exotic, but making it familiar by (re)localizing it to feel “at ease”; he also adds that this process is never totally resolved or completed. This “in-­ between” movement is particularly prevalent in global pop cultures. Since World War II, Western hegemony has shaped a certain vision of modernity based on the capitalist society of the United States. By imposing asymmetrical cultural exchanges, the dissemination of this view of modernity resulted in the discovery of many world cultures that simultaneously became similar (in this non-hegemonic position) and different (in terms of content). Asymmetrical cultural globalization has thus given rise to “familiar differences” and “strange similarities” that can be layered on top of each other to generate a complex understanding of what separates cultures, or brings them closer together. It is precisely this combination of differences and similarities that constitutes the bedrock of the globalization of culture, so long as audiences do not perceive such divergence as threatening. In Israel, for example, Irina Lyan and Alon Levkowitz (2015) have shown how fan communities have reterritorialized Hallyu by creating “in-between” spaces that combine respect for what they see as “Asian values,” a penchant for exotic landscapes and forms of behavior, appreciation for the aesthetic quality of Hallyu products, and attraction toward models of masculinity and femininity that are different from those prevalent in Israeli society. The creation of this “in-between” Hallyu

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space is largely due to the fact that it was developed in a young country, geopolitically speaking, one that was traditionally on the fringes of global politics and competition and which is now setting forth to conquer the world without any imperialist ambitions, having already integrated dominant cultural dynamics into its makeup. Quite a few studies have examined the symbolic tinkering undertaken by fans. In Latin America (Chan and Ma 1996; Jung 2009; Han 2017; Iadevito 2019) and Central Europe (Mazana 2014), audiences are attracted to the quality and originality of Hallyu products, to how they use networks in a modern way, but also to the aesthetic and cultural difference of products when compared to the American mainstream—to the fact that they propose alternative cultural models, for example in terms of romantic relationships and intergenerational ties. These elements are appealing to different audiences on account of local contexts and especially experiences with the cultural and geopolitical imperialism of the United States. The value of studying the avatar of the cosmopolitan amateur thus lies in the question it poses about consumption: when does the Other, to whom I draw closer through acts of cultural consumption, become my fellow human, and when does the Other remain shrouded in the distance?

3

Unknown and Mysterious South Korea

While this approach can be applied to any form of consumption of global pop cultural products, we have decided to focus on how young French people have received Hallyu products: in particular because this form of consumption resists any easy categorization according to pure and authentic aesthetic criteria, and but also because the global pop culture market, which has traditionally been open to international products, appears to be driven by the appeal for cultural novelty. Although many countries have been studied in the quest to understand why the Korean Wave has been so successful, the French passion for Hallyu has remained largely unexplored, with the exception of a handful of journal articles (Saint-Exupéry 2015; Lee 2016; Joinau 2018). However, France presents an exemplary case study to analyze the reception of Hallyu products. The country does not possess strong historic ties

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with South Korea—with the only remarkable event being the Korean War, in which a small number of French troops fought, and which has never been extensively studied by French historians (Cadeau 2016). There have been no historically decisive cultural exchanges between the two countries (e.g., South Korea is not even mentioned in an important study of global cultural relations conducted by Chaubet and Martin 2011). The South Korean diaspora in France is a tiny minority, especially compared to other foreign communities from Asia and North Africa, and Korean is only taught in a very limited number of schools and universities.9 In short, cultural proximity between France and South Korea is largely non-existent. Nevertheless, two particularly momentous K-pop concerts were held in France in 2011, meeting with great success. To understand this apparent paradox, we must highlight a number of elements pertaining to the national context, as they will allow us to understand how the appeal of Hallyu products for French youth stems from an affiliation without filiation.

3.1

Historically Tenuous Ties with France

Although France and South Korea have entertained diplomatic relations for over 130 years, their exchanges have historically been quite tenuous until recent decades. Before 1886, the year that the Treaty of Amity and Commerce was signed between France and Korea, contact between these two countries had been limited to a handful of missionaries and seafarers. In 1887, Victor Collin de Plancy, the first official French representative, and Maurice Courant, his interpreter at the time (and now considered as  The French website Coréen Actuel lists only 5 university programs in Korean (INALCO, Université Paris Diderot, Université de la Rochelle, Université du Havre, and Université Jean Moulin), plus 21 private institutions and associations located in Paris (including the Centre culturel coréen), Lyon, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Lille, Nantes, Grenoble, Strasbourg, Aix-en-Provence, Dijon, Montpellier, Clermont-Ferrand, Orléans, and Blois. See http://coreen-actuel.com/ apprendre-­le-coreen-en-france.php. At the high school level, there are very few establishments that offer Korean as an elective (the Lycée Victor Duruy in Paris, the Lycée François Magendie in Bordeaux); other high schools send “free candidates” to sit this examination at the baccalaureate. See: https://parisconsortium.hypotheses.org/257. Some middle schools have hosted workshops in Korean, primarily in Paris, Bordeaux, Lyons, Orléans, Rouen, and Chollet, but numbers remain very low compared to the school population as a whole. 9

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the father of Korean studies in France), set foot in Korea. Shortly after this date, we also find traces of the first Korean, Hong Jong-u, to travel to France. After communicating with Émile Guimet, a major collector of Asian art, Hong Jong-u arrived in Marseille in 1890; he worked for several years at the museum founded by the former with a view to inaugurating a Korean art gallery. Until World War II was over, the main people to communicate with Korea were explorers and scientists; in fact, the French embassy in Korea was only established in 1958. It was only following the 1987 democratic transition that relations between the countries grew closer, giving rise to presidential visits, economic cooperation, and increased cultural exchanges. Today, South Korea is the 11th largest economy in the world and the 5th largest exporter; it is also France’s 4th most important commercial partner in Asia (9.4 million USD of exchanges took place in 2017, and France has had a trade surplus since 2013). France became the 5th largest European investor in South Korea in 2017. Given that France and South Korea are major actors with regard to innovation and the creative economy, both countries work to enhance industrial cooperation via start-ups and investments in technologies of the future (France Diplomatie 2020). And yet familiarity with South Korea in France has long remained scant, even if the organization of the Année France-Corée (2015–2016) helped to deepen this relationship somewhat through the organization of over 200 events in France. Technological cooperation has also been promoted via the launch, in July 2018, of the France-Korea Joint Committee on Science and Technology (COMIX S&T); academic collaboration has likewise been bolstered by the opening of the “Korea House” on the campus of the Cité Internationale Universitaire in Paris in December 2018. There were thus limited historical ties between South Korea and France before the present day; similarly, the Korean community in France is very limited in size (Insee 2020) and French tourism accounts for a tiny percentage of tourism in South Korea—the latter attracted a little over 100,000 French tourists in 2018, out of 15 million tourists globally, or about 0.6% of the total number (Veille Info Tourisme 2019). In other words, there are weak ties between France and South Korea in general, and Korean culture is not a shared cultural touchstone between the two nations.

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Recent Cultural Presence

For the broader French public, it is only recently that South Korea has emerged as a cultural actor of note. The first major retrospective of Korean film, which followed on the heels of a few showings in film festivals such as the Festival des 3 Continents10 in Nantes, was organized in 1993 at the Centre Georges Pompidou (a major national cultural institution in Paris); numerous other festivals (Cannes, La Rochelle, Deauville) began to take an interest in Korean filmmakers after this date. It was likewise in the 1990s that various publishing houses (including Actes Sud, Philippe Picquier, Zulma, L’Harmattan, Autres Temps, Seuil, etc.) launched Korean literature collections; in 1995, Korean literature similarly dominated the Belles Étrangères11 literary festival. Around the same time, the French public discovered traditional Korean performance arts, the latter meeting with critical success at both the Festival d’Avignon12 in 1998 and the Festival d’automne13 in Paris in 2002. But it is nonetheless thanks to K-pop and K-dramas that the French public has truly discovered the depth and breadth of Korean cultural products, as evidenced by the increased offerings on mass media video services (Rakuten TV, Netflix, etc.), music streaming sites, and online radio stations. For French youth, the primary mode of access to South Korean products is obviously the internet, since the latter are not easily accessible on national radio and television programs. Things may be changing, however: Hallyu has begun to occupy a more important place in the television sector, with TF1, the major channel in France, broadcasting a reality television show called Mask Singer* (in November  The Festival des 3 Continents is an annual film festival held since 1979 in Nantes, France, and devoted to the cinemas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 11  Les Belles Étrangères is a festival, created in 1987 by the Centre national du Livre (CNL) under the aegis of the French Ministry of Culture. Each year, a group of writers, from the same country or working in the same language, are invited by the CNL to participate in meetings during November with readers all over France, or even in Belgium. This festival was last held in 2010. 12  The Festival d’Avignon is an annual arts festival held in the French city of Avignon every summer in July in the square in front of the Palais des Papes, as well as other locations throughout the city. Founded in 1947 by Jean Vilar, it is the oldest consistently running festival in France and one of the world’s greatest. 13  The Festival d’Automne is a contemporary multidisciplinary arts festival held annually in Paris, France, since 1972. 10

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and December 2019) based on an original Korean concept; the first episode enjoyed over 6 million viewers in France. In this show, celebrities are hidden behind costumes depicting various animals and objects; they then engage in a singing competition, while other celebrities attempt to guess who is behind each mask. The concept was adapted to many different local markets, with Mask Singer being purchased for diffusion in Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United Kingdom. In fact, the show originally made it to France via the United States, given that it was the American adaptation called The Masked Singer, which aired on Fox, that facilitated the concept’s introduction in the country. Buying this program was a notable success for TF1: while television channels were fighting for market shares in the wake of changes wrought by streaming and on-demand services, the sixth and final episode of Mask Singer drew in 26% of the television-viewing public, or more than 5 million viewers according to Médiamétrie14; this marked a 300,000 increase in viewers compared to the previous week (TV Mag 2019). A second season has been ordered by TF1. The success of this South Korean format is unique, given that most prime-time shows are imported from the United States or the Netherlands. This new interest in South Korean products has also translated into a greater number of Korean-specific performances in France. Since the first Festival KCON held in Paris in 2016 and focused on K-pop, the number of K-pop concerts in France has only increased, year after year: 162,000 tickets were sold for the two BTS concerts in France in 2019, as part of the group’s Speak Yourself tour. For 2020, 11 K-pop concerts were originally planned (BT21 2020). The Korean Wave has given birth to a whole new spate of fan sites, focusing variously on Hallyu in general,15 on specific artists or bands, or on broader elements of Korean culture. Several specialized webzines have been created, the foremost being KPop Life

 Médiamétrie, established in 1985, is a public limited company specializing in audience measurement and research into audiovisual and digital media usage in France. 15  For example: https://hallyufrance.com, https://korean%2D%2Daddiction.blogspot.com/ 14

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Magazine,16 and concept stores and boutiques specialized in South Korean products have also popped up, both online17 and in brick-and-­ mortar form.

3.3

An All-French Form of Cultural Openness

The recent interest of the French public in the Korean Wave must be contextualized with regard to France’s tradition of cultural openness, which is bolstered by a strong network of foreign cultural institutions. France is in fact the country with the greatest number of foreign cultural institutions (organized under the umbrella institution, the Forum des instituts culturels étrangers [FICEP]18 and financed by the Ministry of Culture). In addition, major public cultural and art institutions in France (including the Louvre, the Musée du Quai Branly, the Musée Guimet, the Centre Pompidou, the Centre national des arts plastiques, etc.) have long worked to promote cultures from around the world, in large part by organizing major exhibits and expositions of artists and art movements from abroad. Finally, in terms of performance art, there is a long-­standing tradition of inviting troupes and orchestras from around the world (see the Théâtre de l’Odéon, the Comédie Française, the Opéra National, the Cité de la Musique, etc.). Moreover, the French policy of cultural influence has always been based on the principle of reciprocity, which has become particularly important since the 1970s (Chaubet and Martin 2011). As a result, France is one of the largest markets for foreign films19 and for literary translation into French (Sapiro 2016); French remains the second-most popular language  https://www.kpoplife.fr  For example: YesAsia.com sells cultural products, Kimchi-Passion.fr sells fine foods, Miin-­ Cosmetique.fr, Ouyou-shop.fr, and Niasha.eu sell cosmetics, and Mapetitecorée.com is more general in scope. 18  The Forum of Foreign Cultural Institutes in Paris, abbreviated as Ficep, is a body bringing together 59 foreign cultural centers and institutes in Paris, as well as a number of associated partners. Ficep contributes to the development of cultural pluralism and the defense of cultural and linguistic diversity. Every year, it organizes the “Week of Foreign Cultures” (September–October), and since 2014, it has also hosted the “Week of Foreign Cinemas in Paris” every March. 19  For example, in the 72 years that the Cannes Film Festival has been held, a French film was awarded the Palme d’or fewer than a dozen times. 16 17

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for translation, accounting for 10% of all books translated (Mollier 2010). This openness relies on a veritable arsenal of multilateral agreements, many of which France has spearheaded at both the Francophone (International Organization of La Francophonie) and international (World Intellectual Property Organization, UNESCO, and the World Trade Organization) levels. These agreements seek to encourage and support cultural exchanges. In this regard, France has signed many international conventions on cultural matters, including the 1985 Granada Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe, the 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (signed by France in 1970), the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, its 1999 Second Protocol, and the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. This uniquely French tradition of openness supports our desire to transcend the false dichotomy between cultural proximity and exoticism when explaining recent Korea-mania. In fact, while cultural proximity does not apply in the French case (as outlined above), exoticism is equally inapplicable (and if applied, would be strongly tinged with essentialism, it should be noted). How can we talk about the quest for novelty in France while also stressing that the country has a long habit of turning toward other world cultures?

4

The Japanese Bridge

The Japanese wave, which preceded its Korean counterpart by a few decades, can help to dispel this paradox. France was in fact one of the first countries to welcome the first wave of Asian pop culture, from the 1970s until the “Cool Japan” era of the 2000s. The Japanese wave dramatically transformed aesthetic categories and how the French public perceived cultural distance (Bouissou 2014; MacLelland 2017), leading to increased familiarity with Asian cultural products, especially during childhood exposure; Hallyu has thus been able to capitalize on this early work of acculturation (Wescott 2002).

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The Japanese Wave in France

Although the Japanese cultural invasion may have taken France by surprise in the 1970s and 1980s, given that national pop culture and the American and English influence dominated at the time, it had established a firm presence in French culture by the 1990s. The Japanese influence helped to forge the taste of a whole new generation in terms of pop culture, be it through the animated series of their childhood, the manga of their adolescence, or the video games of their young adulthood. Animated series were the first Japanese products to arrive in France in the 1970s, at a time when the youth market was expanding—chafing against a lack of low-cost products. In order to attract loyal new viewers, Japanese and American animated series were bought in bulk (Baron-­ Hervé 2003), with a purchase price that was unbeatable: one episode of UFO Robot Grendizer20 cost 3000 USD a minute, compared to 4000 USD for an American product (Bouissou 2008). The presence of Japanese products was first observed in 1972 with the broadcasting of Le Roi Leo21 (on the Rue des Alouettes program on ORTF, the first TV channel created in France, known as Kimba the White Lion in English), then Prince Saphir (in the La Une est à vous program), known as Princess Knight22 in English, and then also in 1974 with the Anglo-Franco-Japanese coproduction of Barbapapa.23 But it was the arrival of the highly successful series UFO Robot Grendizer (Goldorak in French) in July of 1978 (on Antenne 2, the second TV channel, in the context of the Récré A2 children’s program, which aired from 3 July 1978 to 29 June 1988) that marked the “year zero” of Japanese animation in France (Romero 2016).  See footnote 5.  Osamu Tezuka’s manga Jungle Emperor (published between 1950 and 1954) was adapted into a television series in 1965. It was the first anime to be broadcast in France. 22  Princess Knight, also known as Ribon no Kishi, is a Japanese manga series written and illustrated by Osamu Tezuka. This manga follows the adventures of Sapphire, a girl who was born accidentally with a blue heart of a boy and a pink heart of a girl. She pretends to be a male prince to prevent the evil Duke Duralumin from inheriting the throne of Silverland. The anime first aired in France in 1974. 23  Barbapapa is an animated television series created by Annette Tison (French born) and Talus Taylor (American born) in 1974. With a total of 45 five-minute episodes, this series is adapted from the Barbapapa book collection, whose first volume was published in 1970. 20 21

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During the 1980s and 1990s, the success of animated series was proportional to the criticism they received. For example, the very popular Club Dorothée (a children program created in time for back to school in 1987 on TF1) rebroadcast some classics (Candy Candy and UFO Robot Grendizer) but also introduced the public to new combat-based series (such as Dragon Ball,24 Saint Seiya,25 and City Hunter26) and even more dramatic ones (such as Fist of the North Star27). At the same time, Channel 5, the first private and free television channel in France, invested in a number of sci-fi and romantic comedy series, including Robotech,28 Attacker you!,29 and Princess Sarah.30 Japanese animated programs were nevertheless roundly criticized for their allegedly poor quality and accused of having a bad influence on children, as evidenced by a number of commissioned studies (Lurçat 1981; Royal 1989) as well as the unfavorable opinion published in 1989 by the Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel,31 which accused Japanese products of containing “scenes of violence, representations of and allusion to nudity and sex, politically incorrect objects

 Since its release, Dragon Ball has become one of the most successful manga and anime series of all time: it has been sold in over 40 countries and the anime was broadcasted in more than 80 countries. 25  Saint Seiya is a Japanese manga series written and illustrated by Masami Kurumada. The manga was adapted into an anime television series by Toei Animation that ran from 1986 to 1989. Saint Seiya has been immensely successful, with over 35 million copies sold as of 2017. The series began to be known in the West after it became popular in France in 1988. 26  City Hunter is a Japanese manga series written and illustrated by Tsukasa Hojo. The anime was first aired in France in 1987. 27  Fist of the North Star is a Japanese manga series written by Buronson and illustrated by Tetsuo Hara. The anime was first aired in France in 1988. 28  Robotech is a science-fiction franchise that began with an 85-episode anime television series produced by Harmony Gold USA in association with Tatsunoko Production and first released in the United States in 1985 and aired in 1987 in France. 29  Attacker You! is a 1984 Japanese manga series by Jun Makimura and Shizuo Koizumi published by Kodansha. 30  Princess Sarah is a 1985 Japanese anime series produced by Nippon Animation and Aniplex, based on Frances Hodgson Burnett’s 1905 novel, A Little Princess. The series has also been selected as one of the best 100 Japanese anime series of all time by viewers of TV Asahi. It first aired in France in 1987. 31  The Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel, abbreviated as CSA, is a French institution created in 1989 whose role is to regulate the various audiovisual and electronic media in France, such as radio and television. 24

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and symbols, and material that is deemed violent, offensive or immoral” (Romero 2016: 33). During the 2000s, some elements of Japanese pop culture achieved cultural recognition and were accepted into the traditional categories of the art world in France as “art works,” “artists,” and “authors” (Becker 1982). While the most commercially successful manga are still disdained by some (Naruto and One Piece might be familiar as names of series, but their authors remain relatively unknown), there is growing recognition for so-called auteur manga, including at specialized events such as the Festival de la Bande dessinée d’Angoulême,32 where a Japanese manga won the grand prize in 2013, 2015, and 2019. In the anime sector, since the film Paprika33 (2006) came out, a similar phenomenon has occurred: there is growing legitimacy awarded to a subcategory of “prestige anime” that is now recognized by critics as a true form of cinema (Anderson 2016). At the beginning of the 2010s, France was leading the Western European pack in terms of the consumption of Japanese animated series (Pellitteri 2010). Similarly, the popularity of manga was quite notable at this time, given that by the mid-2000s, manga dominated the national market in terms of bandes dessinées and graphic novels (Ozouf 2019). Japanese products have also cornered the lion’s share of the video game market, thanks to major innovations in graphic design and 3D technology, as well as brand marketing that is highly successful with young people. For example, the Pokémon game franchise has accompanied today’s young people at every step of their journey as they have grown up, moving from the Gameboy to the Nintendo DS via 35 different incarnations, starting with Pokémon Green in 1996 and culminating (so far!) with Pokémon Sword and Shield in 2019.

 The Festival international de la bande dessinée d’Angoulême is the second largest comics festival in Europe after the Lucca Comics & Games in Italy, and the third biggest in the world after the latter and Japan’s Comiket. It has occurred every year in January since 1974 in Angoulême, France. 33  Paprika is a 2006 Japanese science-fiction psychological thriller anime film co-written and directed by Satoshi Kon, based on Yasutaka Tsutsui’s 1993 novel of the same name, about a research psychologist who uses a device that permits therapists to help patients by entering their dreams. 32

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175

A Cultural and Aesthetic Fault Line

The French youth public’s infatuation with Japanese animation arose in part due to the dominant model of television consumption (Sauvage and Veyrat-Masson 2012): children would every day and collectively at the same time watch programs that were designed for them,34 generally without their parents being around (women having increasingly joined the workforce), which means that the moments these children spent with their animated heroes were powerful experiences of reception at the individual level and served to establish strong generational bonds.35 The existence of these shared generational references was further strengthened by the advent of streaming and video on demand while freeing viewers from the constraints of programmed television. The power behind these acts of consumption is inherently linked to the cultural and aesthetic fault line engendered by these products. Before Japanese animation arrived on French shores, children’s programming included fairytales and educational stories often using puppetry and stop-­ motion animation. Shows were generally short, much like the American cartoons that usually ran between 5 and 10 minutes long (compared to the 22-, 24-, 25-, or 30-minute formats of Japanese animated series). The “limited animation” method used by Japanese programs, which operates at 8 frames per second (compared to the 12–18 fps average) and reuses common parts of frames rather than redrawing every time, was originally chosen because it was less costly; ultimately, however, its jerky appearance allowed for a more dynamic world-building, in which action scenes could unfold more naturally. As for manga, these also wrought an important number of changes (Pellitteri 2016) with regard to book format, reading direction, sequencing and serialization, the balance between text and image, the use of onomatopoeia, highly specific market segmentation in terms of gender and age, cultural references, and the creation of hybrid genres

 In Japan, animated series air on a weekly basis and are created in batches of 36 episodes, to be spread out over six months; in France, series generally air on a daily basis. 35  This is the phenomenon described by Éric Maigret (1995) with regard to the French magazine Strange. 34

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(which combine humor and tragedy, for instance). These are precisely the innovations that led to widespread success among the French public: the limited role played by the text, the important role played by the image in terms of constructing the narrative, and some prior familiarity thanks to anime all helped to break down a series of cultural barriers. (Collovald and Neveu 2004: 174)

In addition, the consumption of Japanese products has helped to blur the distinctions between different age groups, given that French television channels present certain animated series to children that are not targeted to children in Japan. For example, in the show Dragon Ball, Master Roshi, a martial arts guru, has a tendency to leer, ogle, and attempt to grope the opposite sex, even going so far as to ask the young Bulma if he could look at her underwear. Age-targeted marketing is even more porous in the world of video games, given that both children and adults now play many of the same games and develop long-standing loyalty to certain franchises. The blurring of boundaries is perhaps the most apparent with long-form animation, which has gradually convinced French audiences that “works of animation inherently contain everything that Western audiences have come to expect from live-action films (Napier 2001). The products of Japanese pop culture also transformed how Japanese culture was construed by the French public. In fact, they helped to move away from the refined image of Japanese culture embodied by tea ceremonies and ikebana36 (which had persisted in international exchanges since the Meiji era). Traditionally, the niche culture of the samurai elite had been depicted as the nation’s general culture in order to better export Japanese culture to the Western world—this is precisely what has been termed “the samuraization of society” (Pons 1988: 45). As a result, popular culture, which contains elements of violence, vulgarity, and crass humor, was long ignored (Bouissou 2014).

 Japanese art of floral arrangement.

36

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177

Pan-Asian Cultural Contagion

In short, Japanese products thus introduced young French men and women to a new form of curiosity and a new taste for items that “came from elsewhere.” The widespread diffusion of Japanese products gave rise to a “Japanese” aesthetic and cultural category (Pellitteri 2016). Producers and distributors banked on this consumer-created category, as shown by the popularity of Studio Ghibli films (Allamand and Morand 2016), whose distribution in France was characterized by the development of a self-referential and explicitly “Japanese” world. The various movies produced by Studio Ghibli, from Laputa: Castle in the Sky37 (1986, released in France in 2003) to Ponyo38 (2009, released in France the same year) followed a kind of serial logic and shared a number of important visual elements: the posters generally had a predominantly blue background depicting a starry sky and contained white typeface. Similarly, the films were marketed with a heavy emphasis on their Japanese origin (often, the original title was also mentioned) and their association with Hayao Miyazaki (even when the latter did not direct the movie in question). Finally, many of these movies mentioned their Studio Ghibli predecessors; starting with Kiki’s Delivery Service39 (1989, released in France in 2004), all releases would systematically include the figure of the Studio’s logo, Totoro,40 on their promotional marketing.

 Laputa: Castle in the Sky, known as simply Castle in the Sky in North America, is a 1986 Japanese animated fantasy-adventure film written and directed by Hayao Miyazaki. It was the first film animated by Studio Ghibli and was animated for Tokuma Shoten. It follows the adventures of a young boy and girl in the late nineteenth century attempting to keep a magic crystal from a group of military agents, while searching for a legendary floating castle. 38  Ponyo is a 2008 Japanese animated fantasy film written and directed by Hayao Miyazaki, animated by Studio Ghibli. It is the eighth film Miyazaki directed for Studio Ghibli, and his tenth overall. The film tells the story of Ponyo, a goldfish who escapes from the ocean and is rescued by a five-year-old human boy, Sōsuke after she is washed ashore while trapped in a glass jar. 39  Kiki’s Delivery Service is a 1989 Japanese animated film written, produced, and directed by Hayao Miyazaki, adapted from the 1985 novel by Eiko Kadono. It was animated by Studio Ghibli. The film tells the story of a young witch, Kiki, who moves to a new town and uses her flying ability to earn a living. 40  Totoro is a fictional character created in 1988 by Hayao Miyazaki of Studio Ghibli, for the film My Neighbor Totoro. The film was such a success that the character became the studio’s emblem. 37

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Familiarity with Japanese products was thus cultivated, which had two primary results. First, this familiarity helped to shift a taste for items produced by Japanese cultural industries toward curiosity about Japanese culture more generally, a phenomenon that JungBong Choi (2015) has called “loyalty transmission:” how one form of popular culture lays the groundwork for another, and how this concatenation amplifies into a greater cultural allegiance to the whole society from which these popular cultures derive. (98)

The concomitant rise in popularity of Japanese food and increased tourism to Japan are also proof of this phenomenon. In 2013, France became the largest consumer of sushi in Europe; 22% of French respondents reported that they ate sushi at least once a month, with the most frequent consumers being young people aged 20–34 years old (Goutard 2019). According to a tour operator website, French tourism to Japan increased almost three-fold between 2008 and 2019 (Kanpai 2020). Increased familiarity with distant Japanese culture has also opened the door to new cultural waves from Asia through a kind of Pan-Asian “technocultural contagion” that is largely supported by the massive diffusion of content on the internet. In his study of the Hallyu phenomenon in Argentina, JungBong Choi (2015) argues that Japanese popular culture acted as a powerful stepping stone for Argentina’s ultimate K-pop frenzy. Has the same phenomenon of Pan-Asian cultural contagion spread in France since 2010 among young boys and girls who grew up watching Japanese animation and reading Japanese manga (Détrez and Vanhée 2012)? It is certainly true that widespread network coverage and internet connections in France have facilitated access to cultural products as well as the creation of fan communities: in 2019, 98% of young people aged 15–29 years old reported having internet access at home, with 93% of them having high-speed broadband. In addition, 95% of those same young people used the internet outside of their homes (Rolland 2020).41  High-speed broadband access is defined as an internet connection whose speed is greater than that of a modem (56 kbps) or ISDN. In France, broadband internet operates between 256 kbps and 30 Mbps. The 30 Mbps threshold was set by the European Commission as the minimum level for “ultra-fast broadband” connections. 41

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179

Portrait of the Young Hallyu Fan

Earlier works have highlighted the important degree of cosmopolitan openness among French youth, which takes the form of significant curiosity regarding foreign cultural products, including the consumption of such products in their original language versions. Combined with a desire for various forms of mobility, this openness has become a new standard of “generational good taste” (Cicchelli and Octobre 2018b). While this openness is based on an omnivorous attitude, it gives a new dimension to omnivorism that can better account for the important circulation of cultural goods at the global level. This openness can refashion approaches to distinction, which have hitherto generally overlooked the issue of cultural globalization, as pointed out by Annick Prieur and Mark Savage (2013): we should look more closely at how “savvy forms of cultural appropriation” and “cosmopolitan taste” are liable to significantly influence cultural practices through new technologies, and to circulate within different forms of “popular” culture. (240)

Examining the concept of distinction within the context of the globalization of culture means looking at how boundaries are established between different social groups by means of consumption activities. Tobias Hübinette (2012) has shown, in his research on Swedish Hallyu fans, that the latter generally come either from the immigrant middle class—which has a particular interest in this alternative form of popular culture—from educated young Swedes living in urban areas—who, like the former, live in multicultural environments—or, finally, from young Swedes in mid-size cities who belong to the lower classes and use Korean Wave products as a form of escapism. This study underscores just to what extent an attraction to elsewhere can transcend social class and living conditions for young people, and how much their amateur trajectories are shaped by their agency and desire to free themselves from social constraints by crossing the cultural borders that separate different social groups. In addition, studies on Hallyu audiences throughout the world often highlight the important gendered dimension of fandom. According to

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the data provided by the Korea Foundation, 70% of the 30 million self-­ proclaimed Hallyu fans in the world are women (Oh 2016); this statistic is confirmed by all of the existing research on the subject (Noh 2011; Hübinette 2012, 2018; Yang 2012; Lyan and Levkowitz 2015; Jin and Yoon 2016; Han 2017; Jung 2018). This leads to more questions: what kind of models, media, and forms of digital participation attract female fans? But it also means we must look at socially situated empowerment strategies, which lead to the fact that girls are more likely than boys to appropriate “illegitimate” cultural products from exotic popular cultures in order to acquire new cultural, social, or pedagogical resources and accumulate more cultural capital. To examine why the Korean Wave has been so popular, but also to shed light on the resources that young fans develop and how they use the former, we interviewed 74 young men and women aged between 18 and 31 years old (see the presentation in Appendix). These young individuals were recruited via word-of-mouth, but also on forums and fan community sites, and shopping at specialized stores (especially in Paris). Interviewees were self-proclaimed fans (their love affair with Korean products lasts since 2 and 15 years); for them, Hallyu was not just a passing fad. These young people developed their passions within the context of Hallyu 2.0—some since the beginning of 2010, and some more recently. Much like what has been observed in other countries, French fans of the Korean Wave are predominantly women (only 8 men were interviewed in our corpus) and generally belong to the middle class (38, compared to 18 young individuals each from the lower and upper classes, respectively). Our sample includes 20 men and women from immigrant families (6 from lower-class families and 9 from middle-class families, with the rest from the upper classes), as well as 4 individuals from French overseas territories (2 each from the lower classes and the middle classes, respectively). Among the young people we interviewed, 19 of them had already traveled to South Korea, often in relation to their interests, and 6 were studying Korean in specialized language classes. Reflecting the demographic makeup of French universities and youth culture more broadly, our sample also included a majority of individuals with some degree of higher education and relatively omnivorous consumption habits in terms of cultural products.

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181

Conclusion

The existing literature that discusses Hallyu often tries to explain the phenomenon’s success by layering chronology onto geography. When investigating the Korean Wave’s popularity in East and Southeast Asia, the cultural proximity argument has often been used, even if this sometimes meant glossing over intraregional differences. When Hallyu’s spread to more distant countries is examined, however, the concept of exoticism is often employed to justify this success, consequently overlooking the growing familiarity of many publics with global pop culture, which is the result of the widespread circulation of cultural and aesthetic products. Although at first glance, it may seem like cultural distance is more relevant than cultural proximity when discussing the arrival of Hallyu on French shores, we must remember that the French public already had significant exposure to and familiarity with American and Japanese pop culture. This means that we must nuance our approach to exoticism: while we can still leave room for astonishment, we must eliminate any traces of the colonizer’s condescending curiosity. Understanding the balance between the familiar and the strange means accepting that not understanding everything does not necessarily prevent appropriation. Moreover, we must abandon a normative view of cultural products (based on the notion of authenticity) and of cultural reception (the critique of which drives the concept of “cultural discount”). This approach to cosmopolitan elective affinities will allow us to (a) understand why young French individuals are attracted to Hallyu products, which are objectively quite far removed from their normal cultural touchstones but nonetheless benefit from the prior familiarization of this public with Japanese cultural products, via a kind of Pan-Asian cultural contagion wherein aesthetics play a major role; (b) describe the various forms of learning and (self-)representations that are developed through the consumption of exotic products from a formerly peripheral nation, geopolitically speaking; and (c) comprehend the biographical use that young people make of these acquired resources to transcend boundaries between class, gender, and even race. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 will look at these issues in detail.

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6 From One Wave to the Next: Aesthetics and Digital Intimacy

In Chap. 5, we spurned culturalist explanations, arguing instead for an approach based on the work done by cosmopolitan amateurs to appropriate cultural products for themselves. It behooves us now to explore the mechanisms through which young fans turn to South Korean cultural products. What are the “hooks” thanks to which Hallyu catches their attention and fuels a lasting interest that, for some, becomes a veritable passion? In the landscape of youth culture, whether in France or numerous other countries, the Korean Wave has disrupted American and Western hegemony. Young French fans’ cultural repertoires have long been characterized by the strong presence of cultural products from the United States in particular, and from the Anglosphere in general, especially when it comes to music, television, and film. Additionally, young French people came of age during a period when the Japanese wave crested; they became avid consumers of anime, manga, and video games. In order for Hallyu to truly become a passion rather than a marginal trend, young fans must free themselves from the clutches of both the American and Japanese pop culture canons, given how formative the aesthetic of these products was with regard to cultural socialization during their childhood © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Cicchelli, S. Octobre, The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84296-3_6

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and adolescence. This phenomenon applies especially to the two flagship genres of Hallyu 2.0, namely K-pop and K-dramas, which correspond to South Korea’s offerings in the dominant areas of youth cultural consumption, that is, music, TV shows, and movies.

1

 iving Dominant Cultures G the Cold Shoulder

As young fans increasingly become interested in South Korean cultural products, they simultaneously distance themselves (at least in part) from the cultures they are already familiar with, that is, both domestic and mainstream cultural productions, and most especially American pop culture.

1.1

A Desire for Something New

Many of the young fans we interviewed expressed the wish to “broaden [their] horizons,” “to find something different,” to be “surprised” by “new” products that “[are] different from everyday ones”, and which stand out when compared to the dominant models offered by American cultural industries––the influence of which is still felt in other Western products, including French ones. In the words of Ana,1 it is therefore a question of “finding something different, you know: different from ourselves, from what we know, from what we were raised with and from what we are used to.” This distancing from domestic cultural products is hardly surprising given how open young French people are to the world, and how vast their international repertoires have become in recent years. American music, movies, and TV shows have long dominated in France, as have manga, which are now more popular than Franco-Belgian bandes dessinées. In general, anime and manga have largely supplanted their local French  22 years old, graduate student majoring in psychology, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for eight years. 1

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equivalents for young people (Cicchelli and Octobre 2018a). Aby,2 like many other interviewees, has categorical views on the subject: “French culture has become a run-of-the-mill thing for me, so I felt like a change, like looking elsewhere.” Interest in Hallyu is just as much a way to think outside the box of national culture as it is the expression of a desire for novelty, stimulated by the global cultural industries. Mathieu3 speaks to this when he says: “Generally speaking, there’s something kind of exotic about it, it’s a change […], it basically looks really different. It’s true that, when it comes to interests, I’m interested in Asia because it offers something I have a hard time finding in French entertainment.” Growing rejection of American pop culture, however, may seem much more surprising. The survey entitled Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism among French Youth (Cicchelli and Octobre 2018b), which was carried out using a representative sample at the national level, showed the dominant position held by American products across broad swathes of youth culture. In the words of Diane,4 American TV shows have become “universal, insofar as they convey images, values, lifestyles that the inhabitants of other countries can identify with.” Indeed, the vast catalog of American TV shows available in France depicts a veritable comédie humaine, with a vast panoply of characters, situations, and scenarios that enable identification, critique, and catharsis. For fans of Hallyu, it is this very omnipresence that justifies their indictment of American products, given how commonplace and generic the latter have become, to their eyes. Laura,5 recalling conversations among her peers about the consumption of American cultural products during her teen years, put it as follows: “Everyone was talking about New York, and eventually I was just over it.”

 20 years old, sales representative of Senegalese descent, middle-class upbringing, works in a ready-­ to-­wear clothing store; has been a fan for three years. 3  28 years old, management auditor of Moroccan descent, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for 12 years. 4  25 years old, born in France, Master’s degree in human resources, HR executive, working-class upbringing; has been a fan for 4 years. 5  22 years old, French film school student, working-class upbringing, of Romanian and Italian descent; has been a fan for eight years. 2

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Young Hallyu fans subsume these desires for novelty and distance with regard to the dominant and (overly) familiar pop cultures of France and America in a form of escapism. This dynamic is found among some young French fans with immigrant backgrounds, for whom seeking out a rival to the dominant players of cultural globalization can also be reassuring, insofar as emphasizing the difference of others makes their own alterity less singular. Laura, who is of Romanian and Italian descent, explains it this way: “I love France so much and I really love French culture and all that. But the templates that were being offered to me, as a teen/preteen, or a teen/young adult, didn’t interest me. I wasn’t into them. They didn’t suit me.” This dynamic is also present among young French people whose families have been in France for a longer time, and whose search for new horizons is a way to escape a future which, in France, seems unpromising in terms of both college studies and job prospects. Lina,6 a young woman with a working-class upbringing, who describes her university studies as “not encouraging,” says: “When I watch them [South Korean television shows] it’s not to be like them, it’s to escape and enter this universe which is simply a form of entertainment for me, actually.” For this interviewee, a combination of details from the settings of K-dramas and their characters’ daily lives is a way for her to get some distance from her surrounding culture, even though the plots of the series she watches, which often depict the tribulations of fierce classroom and workplace competition, may sometimes remind her of her own failures.

1.2

American Pop Culture on Trial

Since French pop culture is dismissed as being “out of the running” by our young interviewees in search of new horizons (according to one interviewee, said culture is incapable of “creating new perspectives”), their criticism largely targets American pop culture instead. However, the appeal of novelty––and the appearance of cultural models that break with mainstream aesthetics and open the door to cultural  21 years old, attending vocational school for tourism, working-class upbringing; has been a fan for two years. 6

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discovery––does not suffice to explain why French youth are increasingly rejecting a form of pop culture as widespread and valued as American pop culture, nor why they have developed a lasting affinity for the Korean Wave. Nevertheless, this novelty-based explanation is proffered by many, including some who have been fans for over a decade, including Amina, Candice, Caroline, Daphné, Delphine, Kira, Odalie, Ophélie, Marine, Mathieu, and Stéphanie. Hence, the reasons for the widespread rejection of American pop culture should be sought in the characteristics attributed to this culture. The starting point for this distancing has to do with the mainstream nature of American products, which have become a common generational denominator, and therefore banal: “Everybody knows Friends.” This generational touchstone is another kind of peer pressure, to which young people must conform in order to fit in. This “tyranny of the majority” (Pasquier 2005) is touched on by Étienne7 who, failing to understand why American products are so popular, speaks of a generational “trend”: American culture is everywhere, it’s hard to avoid, so… yes, I consume American products like McDonald’s and iPhones, but when it comes to TV shows or movies, not really. In fact, I tried to get into them at one point because they’re “in,” for example on Netflix, watching lots of American shows or watching the latest American movies to be up-to-date, but I don’t really understand this trend. I’ve watched a few series that people talk about a lot like The Walking Dead, Game of Thrones, Empire… basically the best-known ones, the trendiest ones, but I can’t get into them.

In this case, what young fans are looking for is the possibility of making an “original choice,” which can only happen by sidestepping the mainstream. Indeed, many young fans are proud of affirming tastes that set them apart. In their words, it is a matter of defining their own identity by finding what they “truly like” in order “to not be like everyone else,” by arriving at a “personal choice.”

 22 years old, supermarket cashier (taking a break from his undergraduate studies in economic and social administration), working-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years. 7

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A second, more radical, criticism is leveled against the imputed imperialism of American culture. Ania,8 for example, calls out the tendency of American cultural industries to undermine the integrity of certain products, which ultimately consigns the original works to oblivion. A fan of South Korean cinema, Ania is concerned about original films being replaced by inauthentic, standardized productions. By way of example, she mentions a film she particularly enjoyed, Train to Busan:*9 It’s maybe a rumor, but I don’t think so; Train to Busan, which actually won awards—the Americans want to buy it and do a remake. After appropriating films and all that… I don’t know, I’m afraid that in the end there will be people who know Parasite,* for example. Imagine if they made an American version. Well, young people will just know the American version without seeing the Korean version and maybe they’ll never even wonder what film it’s based on.

Meanwhile, Caroline10 suggests that American pop culture is drawing inspiration from South Korean products because it is lacking new ideas: There’s an American show, The Good Doctor, it’s an American series based on a Korean drama from six years ago, actually, and it’s cut-and-paste, word-for-word, it’s just been sloppily readapted a little into an Americanized version, you know, but it’s really word-for-word, and I actually think they must be starting to struggle with ideas and imagination in the United States, if they’re going looking for it in Korean dramas.

According to these young interviewees, then, although American pop culture has become a marker of generational belonging that transcends national boundaries, endowed with a powerful symbolic repertoire, it ultimately steamrolls cultural difference. Shared generational points of reference, including those based on imported content (Disney’s animated  22 years old, second-year undergraduate student majoring in English and Chinese, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 9  The South Korean cultural products referred to in this book and marked with an asterisk are presented in the glossary at the end of the book. 10  20 years old, third-year undergraduate student majoring in law and legal culture, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for two years. 8

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version of Mulan is given as one example), are Americanized. Moreover, this “Americanness” has become too familiar to provide any sense of otherness. Indeed, American culture is deemed incapable of bringing about an encounter with cultural alterity: in their eyes it is a sort of lexicon shared by the “children of globalization,” an expression used by young fans themselves, which does not provide opportunities to discover what is specific to a different culture. When put on trial, American pop culture is criticized for its hegemony and its tendency toward cultural appropriation (Young 2010). More surprisingly, however, the quality of its templates and contents is challenged. Our interviewees strongly criticized the power imbalance imposed by this dominant pop culture on its consumers. Lisa11 states that she hates the format of American TV shows which, according to her, are guilty of encouraging audience dependency by releasing too many seasons. She rejects the consumerist relationship that is imposed between American shows and their audiences, which make her appreciate Korean series all the more: “[With Korean series,] you know in advance that it’s going to end with a given episode, at a given time. There won’t be 15 seasons and at the end you can’t make heads or tails of it. For me, that’s what makes it successful.” This is due in large part to the fact that, in most cases, South Korean series become available in France only after they have finished production in their country of origin, which means that French audiences have access to all episodes at the same time. Our interviewees went on to firmly condemn American TV shows for their content. We lost count of the number of interviews denouncing the significant presence of sex and violence in these series, which stands in stark contrast to the perceived “grace,” “purity,” “innocence,” and “wholesomeness” of South Korean productions––to name only the words that came up the most often. This “freshness” is emphasized by Aude12: What actors and singers give off, in any case, is this feeling of innocence and that’s true in K-dramas in general, so there’s something about them that I find refreshingly wholesome compared to the overtly sexual celebrity 11 12

 23 years old, holds a bachelor’s degree, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for seven years.  26 years old, professional dancer, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years.

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culture we have, not just in France. I find [K-dramas] more wholesome or more in line with my type of sensibility in any case. Or, I don’t know, even when there are violent scenes, I find it easier to watch them because K-dramas have that whole martial arts thing going on. Easier than scenes from American series where it’s bang-bang every three seconds and the noise alone bother me, actually. But when I watch K-dramas, there’s a true beauty in them, you know, beauty in their movements, which appeals to me in any case.

Although American products come in for heavy criticism, they nonetheless represent the standards against which alternative products are judged. Thus, when it comes to praising the diversity of the Korean Wave, the comparison is always to American culture. In the words of Mathilde13: “We know American culture, it’s always the same style, the same genres over and over, whereas Korean culture is very diverse.” Likewise, comparisons between BTS* and Justin Bieber are legion when interviewees discuss the superior quality of K-pop.

1.3

In Search of a New Form of Audience Reception

We also noted that the young fans we interviewed are searching for an alternative to the audience approach preferred by American producers. More often than not, the American approach is based on realistic and intensely emotional elements driving scenes that young people describe as “shocking,” “violent,” and “frenetically paced,” with “very choppy” camerawork and editing. This search can take different directions. One has to do with the realism of productions and the plausibility of narratives. According to this principle, in American productions, fiction must have an internal logic in order to be deemed credible. In Korean products, however, a certain detachment from narrative plausibility is permitted. According to our young interviewees, this means that K-dramas prefer allusion and suggestiveness to the straight description and reproduction of reality. As a  21 years old, graduate student majoring in Korean, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years. 13

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result, realism and verisimilitude are not criteria used by fans to judge the quality of South Korean TV series. Émilie,14 for example, describes the plot of a TV series that she particularly enjoyed, Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo,* which tells the story of Go Ha-jin, a girl who, at a moment when she is deeply depressed and wishes to die, is transported, during a solar eclipse, to the Goryeo Era during the reign of Taejo, the first king of the Goryeo kingdom.15 In this new reality, she must live under the assumed identity of Hae So, cousin of the wife of the eighth prince, Wang Wook. Back in the twenty-first century, she realizes that everything she has lived has changed the past. However, the implausibility of this back-­ and-­forth jump through time does not bother Émilie: Well, actually, basically it’s… so, the main female character is… she jumps backward in time and she ends up in the Goryeo Era. And, actually, she wakes up in the twenty-first century. In fact, everything she’s been through was a dream for her, but in fact it really happened. She goes to an exhibit about that era she was in and she realizes while looking at a painting that it was the palace where she lived, and she cries in front of this painting, she says “I’m sorry,” and that’s it. That’s the end of the show.

Young Hallyu fans are therefore quite different from those we interviewed for the survey Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism among French Youth mentioned earlier, who shared negative judgments of products they deemed extravagant or that strained credibility. Accustomed to American products’ standards of realism, certain interviewees were quick to make fun of the fight scenes in Bollywood and Nollywood films (Cicchelli and Octobre 2018b), even if they stated that they enjoyed watching some of these. In this new corpus, negative judgments concerning the realism or believability of K-dramas and South Korean films are rare, on the contrary. Our young respondents instead highlighted the need to get used to a certain style of cinematography, which can be jarring at first. Such is the

 19 years old, student at France’s National Institute for Oriental Languages and Civilizations (INALCO), middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for seven years. 15  The Goryeo kingdom was founded in 918 and replaced by the new state of Joseon in 1392. 14

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case of Marie,16 initially more a fan of K-pop than K-dramas, and an avid consumer of American TV series, who states: The first time I saw a historical K-drama, I said to myself “What the heck is this?” and it, it intrigued me, there are some shots that are kind of weird that I’m not used to, it’s not like watching CSI or anything like that. No, it’s different, it’s not the American version, but it intrigued me so I started exploring.

Another direction taken in this search for a new form of reception has to do with the highlighting of beauty, praised by our young interviewees without exception, both that of singers and actors, but also of the scenery and décor, costumes, choreography, and even filming techniques. Hence, even though our interviewees do not deny that South Korean productions contain scenes of violence, they emphasize that the latter are never “crude,” “shocking,” or “unbearable,” and that they are acceptable on account of their aestheticization. A recurring example given during interviews was of martial art combat scenes, which feature in every historical K-drama. In many respects, these fights resemble colorful acrobatic dances, especially when the combatants wear period costumes. This insistent focus on the aesthetic register echoes the aforementioned break with realism. Hence, lauding the gestural beauty of hand-to-hand combat or sword fights also serves to parry any criticisms of non-realism that could be leveled against such battles when they feature, for example, the exploits of a swashbuckler of death-defying bravery who single-handedly defeats a bevy of adversaries, thanks to his lightning-fast spins and somersaults and his 10-yard leaps and bounds. This aesthetic is also associated with the “slower pace” of South Korean television productions. Our young interviewees praised their “static shots,” their “moments of silence,” and their focus on the “intimate emotions” that flicker across actors’ faces, rather than on “shocking scenes.” Hence, the success of South Korean TV series depends on the acceptance of a new form of reception, one that provides an alternative to the usual approach to audiences found in American fiction and is  26 years old, aesthetician, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for eight years.

16

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better-­suited to the Korean taste for a certain “sweetness,” “grace,” and “refinement”––a taste which generally excludes anything “gory,” “trashy,” or “shocking.”17 Lou explains this very clearly18: Korean series are super different from the American ones we have on Netflix. For example, these are stories that are truly relaxing, actually. Basically cute. Well, there are a lot of things that are scary, actually, but it’s really… It’s not always gory, actually, compared to the American movies and series that we see on Netflix, for example. In fact, South Korean productions are a lot mellower.

1.4

Toward a Cosmopolitan World

The final element explaining the rejection of the American mainstream–– and consequently the appeal of Hallyu––can be found in the awareness that younger generations have of globalization and of the power imbalances linked to the former. We should therefore not be surprised if “K-pop seems to facilitate a cosmopolitan imagination of globalization, as it allows the fans to challenge Western dominance in global media and cultural flows” (Yoon 2017: 6). Even though our young respondents consider Hallyu to be apolitical (the promotion of Hallyu by the South Korean government does not elicit any political commentary, for instance), the taste for South Korean products clearly has geopolitical significance for them. What these young fans are imagining is in fact a cosmopolis in which emerging nations, in terms of cultural output, are also recognized and respected in the political realm. Hence, in interviews, declaring one’s attachment to the Korean Wave means calling into question Western dominance and rebalancing cultural flows, in the name of a more humanistic and cosmopolitan vision of globalization. Indeed, criticizing the mainstream and recognizing Hallyu as an alternative dovetail in various positions that seek distance from a Western-centered

 Even so, the South Korean movie industry abounds in horror films that have gained popularity (see Chap. 3). 18  18 years old, high school student, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years. 17

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standpoint. Alex19 makes this clear: “[Consuming Hallyu] means getting used to the fact that there are other countries around us that have other cultures that are far from being identical to our own, but are just as interesting.” This argument against a one-way world (universum) in favor of a plural world (pluriversum) goes hand in hand with a particular focus on the countries overlooked in the initial drive toward globalization but which have recently become major players, such as South Korea over the course of the last 30 years or so. This historical reading of the balance of power between countries is particularly evident in statements made by Aude,20 who enthusiastically shares her admiration for the resilience of the Korean people in the face of the many adversities it has faced throughout its long history, and for the country’s meteoric development: In fact, they had to rebuild so quickly and they did it with such passion because they just wanted to keep their country from sinking. They were invaded a bunch of times by the Japanese and the Chinese, and what’s more there was the separation from North Korea. It’s as if it was an island, a little peninsula, actually, and they’re kind of alone in the middle of the sea. There’s a bit of that, you know, and on top of it they’re surrounded by enemies, they’re used by everyone all the time. But they actually have a true empire of their own, with Hallyu, and they’ve also won their gamble to really succeed at economic dominance. When you see where they were 50 years ago, it’s crazy.

To go from wishing for a rebalancing of the power dynamics in global cultural flows to positing a global swing in the direction of Asia––bearing promises of a future once embodied by the United States and the rest of the West––is not a huge leap. Like many others, Kira21 has already made this leap:

 22 years old, front office supervisor of a five-star hotel, upper-class family of American descent; has been a fan for five years. 20  26 years old, professional dancer, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 21  22 years old, unemployed after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in international trade, working-­class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for ten years. 19

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So really, when you see Asia, and Korea in particular, and/or Asia in general, it’s really what we’ll call the future. So I know that before it was “Yes, the United States is 10 years ahead,” but Asia, I think that we kind of closed our eyes about it for a long time, and when you look at Asia and at Korea you realize to what extent there’s space to create, to invent yourself, to reinvent yourself, etc., and I just find that fascinating, actually.

The promises of a pop culture renewal and a desirable alternative modernity go hand in hand for some fans. For them, it is a question of accessing quality products that can serve as a stepping stone between, on the one hand, the American pop culture they have bathed in from a very young age and, on the other hand, more distant cultures they have acquired a taste for, due to their heightened sensitivity to questions of globalization and diversity, all while upholding international quality standards, as evidenced by the recurring comparison with American products.

2

Growing Up with Manga and Anime

Quality standards and the quest for something new, which are highly valued by our young interviewees, also owe much to the latter’s familiarity with the Japanese products they consumed during childhood and adolescence. Indeed, the consumption of Japanese products laid the foundation for a subsequent understanding of Hallyu, by smoothing the way for their receptiveness to Asian cultural products, for their appreciation of novelty and foreignness, and for their recognition of an aesthetic that is sui generis.

2.1

The Taste for “Japanness”

Lili22 sees this positive bias toward Japanese culture as a generational trait:

 25 years old, enrolled in the second year of a Master’s program in management, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for two years. 22

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Like a lot of people, I had a bias in favor of Japan. When I was in middle school, I read manga like everybody and, uh yeah, I thought that universe was great, so anyway, Japanese culture was a huge, huge hit in France in the 2000s, we’ve been familiar with it for a long time. The French are big, big fans of Japan, and so kind of like everyone I already had just this idea, this positive bias towards Japan.

In this regard, our interviewees are practically identical to the young teenagers interviewed by Christine Détrez and Olivier Vanhée (2012) at the beginning of the 2010s and whose preferred reading material in middle school was manga, a trait still prevalent today. Practically, all young adults who are Hallyu fans state that they used to read manga, or still do. Indeed, our interviews seem to indicate that manga and anime are the preferred gateways for young people’s interest in Japanese culture, since they convey a set of socio-anthropological references on ways of being and their visual dimension gives access to a quicker understanding of the latter. Unlike the generational common ground formed by American pop culture, the knowledge to which these young people gain access by consuming Japanese products does indeed seem exotic to them. Although it appears plausible to postulate a certain ignorance among the young people who were the first generation of French consumers (i.e., during the 1970s and 1980s), insofar as these often only discovered the geographic origin of their favorite heroes once they reached adulthood, the situation in the 2000s was very different. It is different for manga readers, who read “backward,” for viewers of anime who watch the original versions with subtitles, on numerous dedicated digital platform, sor even for the general cartoon audience, given that animated series are increasingly incorporating “Japanese” elements to make their universes internally consistent (this includes franchises). They feature so many examples of real and imaginary places in Japan, along with Japanese cultural codes, historical references, and mythology, that it would be tedious to list them. Our young interviewees contradict the thesis of “odorlessness” insofar as they repeatedly mention that the Japanese cultural products they have consumed are “very Japanese,” “different,” “characteristic [of Japan],” “very Asian,” “not at all like French products,” and that they like them precisely

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because of their cultural specificity. Aude23 expresses this as follows: “Miyazaki and all that, it’s really Japanese, and very typically so.” This intense socialization from a young age via aesthetics that came from elsewhere, and that are identified as such, has had a major impact on the modes of reception of young French people––all the more so given that cross-media synergies have been at their apex, from cartoons to manga, then from anime to video games, with action figures, posters and other goodies to boot. Moreover, these forms of reception have been built upon the collective childhood dynamics of middle school. Kira speaks to this24: When I was in middle school, it was all about Japan, I mean, middle school and the entire 2000s were very manga, etc. It was super in fashion, Hello Kitty, etc., and so it was kind of unavoidable. So sometimes I watched manga [sic] on TV, uh, there was a boy I really liked in my class who liked that so a few times I bought a day planner with manga things written on it, stuff like that.

The popularity of Japanese products enabled “the inclusion of themes, concepts, and values tied to Japanese imagination in the margins of European fans of comics and animation from Japan” (Pellitteri 2010: 44–5) and fostered the diffusion of a taste for Japanese (pop) culture.25

2.2

The Adolescent Mainstream

While Japan rules the global market of products aimed at children, pre-­ teens, and teenagers, its output has been unable to impose itself in other areas of pop culture. For example, Japan has not assumed the rank that one would have expected in e-sports. This is primarily because the way in which video games are consumed in Japan––on smartphones and in video arcades—has long ceased to conform to how e-sports are played, that is,  26 years old, professional dancer, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years.  22 years old, unemployed after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in international trade, working-­class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for ten years. 25  This French partiality for Japanness explains why, even today, France plays the role of Japan’s beachhead in Europe. For example, the Japan Expo, which is held in Paris, is the largest event in Europe dedicated to Japanese culture, drawing an estimated 300,000 attendees per year. 23 24

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mainly on computers. Moreover, Japanese laws against betting games have long held back the professionalization of players. Nor has Japan achieved eminence in the music industry. The youth music industry in Japan is mostly limited to the domestic market. Its inability to penetrate international markets can be explained by its visual and stylistic choices and the poor command of English of Japanese singers and band members. Japan has also failed to be a competitive exporter of television shows, which are also a major component of children’s audiovisual diet. Thus, despite the predilection of young French people for “Japanness,” their cultural appetites for it have not been fully satisfied as they have advanced in age. Not surprisingly, young French people strongly associate Japanese products with an earlier phase of their lives, usually ranging from childhood to the beginning of adolescence. Thus, the distancing of these former consumers from Japanese products is the result of mechanisms governing the perceived symbolic ages at which cultural consumption occurs. Research has shown the extent to which cultural tastes are developed midway between the subjective construction of age and the establishment of autonomy vis-à-vis one’s peer group, which translates into the abandonment of certain practices once these seem like “kid stuff,” and a desire to define tastes perceived to be more personal (Octobre et al. 2010). This was the case for Pauline,26 for example: I must have been around 14… I had friends who, like me, were tired of Japan and wanted to explore something else. We kind of did it at the same time and we started to listen to pretty weird artists like Brave Girl,* Gummy,* Wassup*. Anyway, there’s too many to list them all, and I also tried out a TV show with some friends when we started high school, I think it was Boys Over Flowers.*

This late-adolescent desire to turn away from what had by then become the Japanese mainstream was also strongly experienced by Manon.27 In relating her loss of interest in manga at the end of middle school, she  19 years old, studying for a two-year degree in management, middle-class background; has been a fan for five years. 27  20 years old, student majoring in language and international communication, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 26

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expressed her desire to set herself apart from her peer group, accompanied by her wish to develop a more personal worldview: “Really, I wanted to do something else. Because if I’d started listening to the popular girl who says ‘Do this,’ I’d have felt like ‘Oh, I’m being like them [her friends] but I don’t want to be like them,’ anyway, yeah, I don’t know.” However, when explaining their loss of interest in Japanese pop culture, our interviewees’ criticisms were not as strong as when they explained their rejection of American pop culture. In France, unlike in Japan’s neighboring countries in Asia, Japanese pop culture is not associated with Japan’s imperialist and colonialist past. None of our interviewees shared any criticism concerning the quality or aesthetic of Japanese products themselves. On the contrary, they shared how grateful they were to Japanese pop culture for introducing them to Asia and helping them develop a taste for non-American and non-Western cultural products. Moreover, a good number of them continue to watch anime, read manga, and/or play Japanese video games. Such is the case of Stéphanie,28 who defines herself as a “longtime fan of Hallyu, a longtime fan of manga,” which she sometimes still reads.

2.3

From Japan to South Korea

The tastes of young French people have swung away from Japanese cultural products and toward South Korean ones. This is due to the conjunction of the development of a taste for quality exotic products providing an alternative to the mainstream on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the absence of Japanese offerings in certain core sectors of youth consumption. As teens age, they ultimately seek products less identified with their early adolescence––ones that allow them to more clearly affirm the uniqueness of their own tastes. This transition can be described as a “cultural transfer” (Choi 2015). It is built upon a Japanese inheritance, in a context where quality Asian alternatives are rare. With a few exceptions, Chinese productions have yet to reach international standards and have not penetrated global pop culture markets (Lemaître 2020). 28

 28 years old, nursing assistant at a hospital, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years.

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This mechanism of cultural transfer fosters curiosity toward what some young French fans refer to as “Asian cultures,” a label used by some French youth, and identified previously by Anne Garrigue (2004: 13). This category is based upon a curiosity fed by the similarities, real or supposed, among products from a given region. Émilie29 expresses this as follows: I think that the Japanese thing was a starting point, it triggered the Korean thing. And now, for example, I watch Thai shows, Chinese ones… So I think the fact that I got interested in K-pop or Korean culture, or the others, can’t be separated from the fact that Japan was the starting point for everything.

This indicates that a gradually constructed familiarity with Japanese products fosters an interest in other Asian aesthetics. Clémentine30 also discusses how, from the time she was a small child, Studio Ghibli introduced her to an animated universe greatly enjoyed by her entire family, which eased her transition to Hallyu and made her parents’ acceptance of her new interest more natural: My family is very interested in general Japanese culture because of Studio Ghibli, they really love Ghibli movies. So they’ve never said “What you’re doing is strange” or anything like that [when I took to Hallyu]. My mother loved the old Ghibli films, so she showed them to me all the time. I think I’ve watched more Ghibli than Disney, definitely.

3

 he Irresistible Aesthetic Canon T of South Korea

The appeal of Hallyu should be understood within a two-fold context: growing dissatisfaction with American products, which nonetheless remain the standard against which others are judged, and increasing distance from Japanese products, which still manage to foster a taste for  19 years old, student at INALCO, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for seven years.  22 years old, graduate student in Korean studies, working-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 29 30

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Asian exoticism among young people. Set against the backdrop of stiff competition, engendered by the mass circulation of products from diverse ethnic and national regions, aesthetics are the initial “hook” of Hallyu products. This is because many of its formal aspects (choreography, wardrobe, voices, sets, etc.) are immediately identifiable, independent of linguistic or anthropological comprehension. For our interviewees, this aesthetic appeal relies on four dimensions: the search for high-quality difference, the appreciation of hybridity, the showcasing of an association between beauty and goodness, and the celebration of hard work rather than talent.

3.1

High-Quality Difference

When consuming Hallyu, the perception of difference is immediate: the physical appearance of Korean actors or singers and the Korean language itself immediately signal that the products are ones that “come from afar,” well before more subtle elements such as the “color scheme,”31 the “editing,” or the “acting” might be identified. Moreover, the various media platforms used by consumers only serve to reinforce ethno-national identification, since products are often categorized “K-dramas” or “K-pop.” The perception of alterity is thus accentuated in the case of Hallyu, and is quite distinct from the mechanisms governing the consumption of American cultural products, which have a strong presence in domestic markets around the world and are not categorized in terms of their ethno-­ national origin. Young Hallyu fans resemble what we called “cosmopolitan fans” in the survey entitled Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism among French Youth: they seek aesthetic and cultural difference, in full awareness of this difference (even if this awareness is not always accompanied by any form of knowledge), and they value it as such (Cicchelli and Octobre 2018b). Hallyu fans say they see a “a high-quality difference,” “something different but good,” and a “new thing that’s well done.” This penchant for difference that is also a form of quality creates a cosmopolitan openness among young  The interviewees used this expression because K-dramas and K-pop videos are generally colorful and use a palette of color gradients and pastels rarely showcased in Western productions. 31

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fans. It is a difference that is valued in and of itself, as evidenced by what Pauline says32: “For me, Hallyu isn’t this generic thing, you know, it’s a cornerstone, it opens me up to other creative mentalities.” It’s a question of “opening up,” “discovering,” “stepping outside of oneself,” “thinking differently,” and “broadening one’s horizons” by consuming South Korean products. Hence, for these young fans, it is not a question of “discounted” appropriation, but rather a doorway to new aesthetic and cultural worlds. The ethno-national differences of these worlds are noted and appreciated on their own terms even if, in the absence of specific skills, they are not always analyzed in depth. In the interviews we conducted, this “high-quality difference” is associated with “creative freedom,” “originality,” and even “extravagance.” According to Kira,33 “I think that the starting point [of taste] for everyone is creativity. I think that was the starting point for everything, creative expression is tremendous.” This creative freedom operates in tandem with a mastery of world-class cinematic and musical techniques, as indicated by the fact that all of our young respondents insisted that South Korean products are “well made.” In the realm of TV shows, what attracts fans’ attention is the ability of South Korean screenwriters to check off many boxes thanks to scripts that are tight, consistent, and poignant, alternating between majestic natural settings and refined interiors, with action scenes that are enlivened by rousing music. This results in products that, in many ways, are unique, especially when compared to the various genres and subgenres of Western products. Moreover, young fans note South Korean directors’ consummate skill at letting audiences grasp the characters’ underlying motivations without relying on lengthy expository scenes or dialogue. Hence, K-dramas focus on characters’ internal struggles, and dramatic emotions are evinced through subtle facial expressions. Referring back to the series Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo,* Émilie dwells on the nuanced skills of its actors, for whom a gaze suffices to convey vivid emotions: “I really liked the male lead. He is just an actor who just… wow. I’ve watched many of his dramas and the way he  19 years old, studying for a two-year degree in management, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 33  22 years old, unemployed after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in international trade, working-­class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for ten years. 32

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conveys his emotions, all that, just through his eyes, I find that fantastic.” This emphasis on drama does not rule out the possibility of theatricality, comedy, or burlesque, which are nonetheless reserved for supporting characters. For young fans, this contiguity between drama and burlesque appears specific to South Korean products: they repeatedly noted that American products rarely blend these genres, a facet which they value as proof of originality and artistic mastery. This recognition of quality has also been noted in studies on the reception of Hallyu in the countries of East and Southeast Asia, whose increasingly educated populations have become informed consumers of cultural products (Yang 2012). This recognition results from the transformation of the audiovisual industries’ cultural products, the quality of which is increasing, and which have established musical, visual, narrative, and acting standards of a high caliber. These products also require more and more complex cognitive reception processes (Johnson 2005). Moreover, this recognition is closely linked, both in France and elsewhere in the world, to the massification of education at all levels, as well as the massification of cultural consumption. As it happens, the majority of our interviewees are college graduates and have omnivorous consumption repertoires.

3.2

An Appreciation for Hybridity

Among the specific qualities of Hallyu that young fans most appreciate, hybridity plays a central role. Christina Klein (2008) emphasizes that South Korean products (specifically movies) are enjoyable because they achieve a novel synthesis among the formats of the American cultural industries, which are hybrid themselves, and combines them with South Korean traits: thus, Hallyu is perceived by consumers and analyzed by researchers as the hybrid of a hybrid. This is confirmed by Mattéo34: What also characterizes South Korea is everything that it has received from abroad, particularly the United States, which means that it is a country that  20 years old, third-year undergraduate majoring in Korean at INALCO, working-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years. 34

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I want to call sort of hybrid, because actually they have maintained this Korean tradition, but on the other hand there is all this modernity and this Western culture which arrived all of a sudden.

Contrary to what has been advanced in some of the scientific literature, which associates hybridity with despecification, young fans consider hybridity to be a valued feature of Hallyu. For David,35 the hybrid nature of South Korean productions, as compared to the usual categories of American productions, is an innovative and attractive trademark. He cites the example of K-dramas: Like, “it’s a comedy but it’s not funny.” It’s a comedy where at one point there is a spurt of blood, or it’s a horror film but at one point they make jokes. These are directors and screenwriters who totally march to the beat of a different drum, that’s what [K-]dramas are, compared to the usual categories of American stuff.

Therefore, according to young French fans, Hallyu has beaten American pop culture at the game of hybridity. Aude36 affirms this as follows: “You see, K-pop is doing what the US usually does, times a hundred.” As we have seen, American pop culture’s borrowing from other cultures has been criticized as an insidious form of cultural appropriation. In Hallyu, however, borrowing has been praised as proof of its creativity, a sign of its ability to transcend the American model. Even though the word Hallyu is written in the singular, South Korean output is viewed as plural by its fans, who emphasize how its high diversity of genres has made it attractive to a wide variety of people. In the words of Léa37: “I think that it’s variety, diversity. So actually it’s really, it’s really just diversity that’s in everything that’s encompassed within Hallyu which is attractive. You can’t find that anywhere else.” The appreciation of Hallyu’s hybrid nature also has to do with the transmedia strategies of its producers. These strategies are considered to  24 years old, job hunting after graduating with a two-year degree, working-class upbringing, family is from Mayotte; has been a fan for eight years. 36  26 years old, professional dancer, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 37  20 years old, nursing school student, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 35

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be an original element compared to competing Western creations, insofar as they create links between diverse cultural elements via digital tools and foster cross-promotion. To quote Jasmine38: Actually, for example, on a cooking show like you’d see anywhere they might have K-pop stars on. And it’s super well done because in fact everything is a tie-in. They know how to get you to like something. So, for example, they’ll show you a plate of tteokbokki,39 but it’ll be your favorite singer who prepared it. And because of that you’ll want even more to buy stuff tied to that group, and on top of it you’ll want to taste what your Idol prepared.

For our young interviewees, these tie-ins between different products or media platforms exhibit one of Hallyu’s strengths. This cultural package, considered to be both “hybrid” and “very Korean,” defuses the dual criticism of cultural poverty and commercialism (often leveled against American products), while affirming a specific, high-quality aesthetic. Indeed, it is this hybridity that, for certain young fans, elevates South Korean productions to the level of an art form. Pauline,40 for example, explains that the innovative nature of K-pop is not just an aspect that distinguishes it from American pop, it is above all the proof of a unique ability to make very commercial products a form of art: It’s pop music that sets itself apart from the Americanized crap we have nowadays. Actually, pop is great, but not just any old kind, and K-pop is really a pop that I find colorful, innovative in the way it expresses things, the expressiveness of the movements. It’s maybe even a form of art pop, even though nowadays it’s ultra-commodified… but what art nowadays isn’t, you know? So I was struck by the different viewpoint brought to a pop style of music, it allowed me to discover a different side to Asia, too,  21 years old, works part-time at a Korean restaurant while preparing to enroll in a Master’s of Political Science program with a major in international relations, holds a bachelor’s degree in Korean from INALCO, middle-class upbringing, of Vietnamese descent; has been a fan for nine years. 39  A Korean side dish consisting of rice cakes, a spicy sauce, scallions, sesame seeds, hard-boiled eggs, meat, and assorted vegetables. 40  19 years old, studying for a two-year degree in management, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 38

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the Asian-style boy band concept if you will. It’s a whole way of making music, a hybrid syncretism.

Hence, being a fan of Hallyu can in some cases lead individuals to tout the artistic respectability of youth pop cultures, a facet which is often denied the latter.

3.3

A Celebration of Beauty

The third argument we encountered frequently in our interviews pertains to “beauty:” this word (or the adjective “beautiful”) is one of the most frequently occurring when young fans describe the objects of their fandom. Lou41 offers an enlightening example: “Koreans take much more care with everything aesthetic, and these forms of aesthetics and beauty are so different from what we’re used to seeing.” Here, it’s primarily Japanese pop culture that serves as a point of reference, since young Hallyu fans repurpose Japanese concepts to describe their attraction to South Korean products. As Léa42 puts it: “They’re super dialed into the whole cute thing, kawaii.” During our interviews, the beauty of Korean singers and actors was systematically highlighted. This beauty is considered to be natural (our interviewees describe Koreans as inherently beautiful, or handsome) as well as attained through certain efforts (e.g., by changing hair color; by wearing makeup, for both men and women; and by very frequent outfit changes between scenes during concerts). In a more general way, our young respondents noted that this concern with aesthetics informs Hallyu products overall, from the sets and landscapes, which shine in historical K-dramas, to the editing, acting, and colors. The Korean language is also included in this celebration of beauty: many of our interviewees state that they have been charmed by the sound

 18 years old, high school student, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years.  22 years old, unemployed after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in international trade, working-­class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for ten years. 41 42

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of it, even though the majority do not speak it. Alice43 expresses this as follows: “That’s what I like the most over there, it’s the way they express themselves, and I also find the language very beautiful.” Beyond any semantic comprehension, aesthetic appreciation is cited as an element that facilitates familiarization. This is exemplified by Carla,44 who doesn’t speak Korean: “The language, actually, I was just listening to some interviews in Korean and I said to myself: ‘Hey, this language is so beautiful!’ And then it became familiar to me.” Once again, the argument according to which a reception is “weak” seems to have been demolished: what could be more intense in aesthetic terms than an attachment to a language that one does not understand? The example of Jamila45 demonstrates the power of the aesthetic appeal of the language which attracted her to K-pop and K-dramas: The language itself interested me very, very much. Aesthetically I find it very pretty, and I also really love to listen to it. So it’s really the language that caught my interest, which spoke to me, and I started to listen to music. I was all “Oh, it’s so good!” And then later, when I saw [K-]dramas, etc., well, luckily it wasn’t dubbed! Because if I had only seen them dubbed in French, frankly, that would’ve ruined it for me!

She went on to evoke what the sounds of the Korean language inspire in her: The sound itself. I mean, the musicality in and of itself, because at that point I didn’t understand, so in any case the lyrics didn’t do much for me. Yeah, for example, “Miracles in December” by EXO,* that one truly touched me… Truly [she said, tearing up].

 20 years old, unemployed, middle-class upbringing, originally from Réunion; has been a fan for eight years. 44  20 years old, majoring in French literature and preparing to sit the entrance exams for the most prestigious French universities, upper-class upbringing, of Algerian descent; has been a fan for three years. 45  21 years old, activity leader at a recreation center, middle-class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for seven years. 43

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Perfection Through Asceticism

It should be noted that in our interviewees’ statements, this obsession with beauty coincides with a quest for perfection. The cult of perfection is considered to be the apex of beauty by young fans from a wide variety of backgrounds. This is expressed by Kira,46 who is unemployed and had a working-class immigrant background, and by Delphine,47 who had an upper-class upbringing and is currently preparing to sit the entrance exams for the most prestigious French universities. Kira says: “For example, you can search on YouTube for artists that you really like, that you’ve seen and that you really like, it’ll be perfect, you’ll see that he appears in magnificent shows, well dressed, etc.” Delphine adds: “Ultimately what I like a lot about the K-pop industry is this kind of cult of perfection.” Although the quest for perfection characterizes Hallyu’s aesthetic canon, perfection is not achieved through sheer talent, but through hard work. Surprisingly, the former was never mentioned by our interviewees, standing thus in stark contrast to Western perception of genius self-­ created artists (Heinich 2005; Menger 2018). Although most of our respondents expressed admiration for perfection, hard work was particularly praised by young fans with a working-class, middle-class, and/or immigrant background, who hope to achieve upward social mobility through their studies. Stéphanie,48 a nursing assistant, says: “They know what they want, and they know that you don’t get something from nothing.” Abby49 is a young woman of Comorian descent who began working in a store as a sales representative after dropping out of college and dreams of having another life abroad. She expresses her feelings this way: “[What I like is] maybe their particularly rigorous approach to work, which could maybe lead to this difference that they create between themselves and the rest of the world.” Hard work democratizes success, and the way in which  22 years old, unemployed after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in international trade, working-­class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for ten years. 47  24 years old, postgraduate student of political science, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 48  28 years old, nursing assistant at a hospital, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 49  20 years old, sales representative, middle-class upbringing, of Comorian descent; has been a fan for eight years. 46

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Idols themselves model the virtue of humility in their efforts corroborates values that some surveys have associated with the working and middle classes (Bréchon and Tchernia 2009; Vatin 2015). In the domain of K-pop, one of the points of excellence that is the most often mentioned is the high quality of its complex synchronized choreography, which elaborated connects song and dance. This excellence is highlighted especially in the case of music videos, particularly in the interview with Milann50: Because actually, when you compare an American video and a Korean video, the Korean video is a lot more colorful. There are lots more colors; they put much more of an emphasis on the choreography, on video production. And especially the dancing… In fact, when you compare a Korean video and an American one, you see that the Korean ones are a lot more polished, a lot more colorful. Even with the outfits, the production, and the dancing—because each song has its own choreography. Whereas with American artists that wouldn’t necessarily be the case. And every choreography is super synchronized.

Complex synchronized choreography (Choi and Maliangkay 2015) requires a huge amount of preparation and is achieved through intensive training sessions, which are shared with fans through videos posted online. These videos reveal the choreography’s difficulty and the long hours of labor required to master it. Fans watch them and share them on social networks, just like they do with the official music videos. This approach serves a dual function: showcasing the work of fans’ Idols (all while fanning the illusion that anyone could achieve what they do through training), and providing routines that fans can cover or reappropriate for themselves in various ways. The young people we interviewed are aware of how South Korean artists are selected and the training that they endure to become well-rounded performers. Many of them described the length of this training, the areas in which aspiring Idols have trained (singing and dancing, but also other performing arts, foreign languages and international cultural codes, etc.),  21 years old, third-year undergraduate student in sociology, middle-class upbringing, from Guadeloupe; has been a fan for seven years. 50

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and the constant demand for success that rules their lives. All this information is easily accessible on the websites of their favorite stars or via their fan communities, thanks to “making of ” videos, training sessions, and backstage footage, some of which are posted daily. David51 provides a detailed account: They work a huge amount! Especially beforehand, that’s the worst! Even before beginning, when they’re in training, I know that, I’ve seen a fair amount of reporting on this: they sleep very little, they have very strict diets, they have to do hours and hours of classes to be well trained, to be perfect. And then there’s also the physical side which counts a huge amount, it’s not all fun and games! Then, once they’ve made a name for themselves—well, at first it’s complicated, but over the years things settle down. But it’s true, you really have to know how to hang in there.

Hard work is equally praised when K-dramas are discussed, with respondents pointing out the quality of the scripts, described as very “structured” and “consistent,” or of the acting, which viewers attribute to the “expressive abilities” of the actors’ faces, and their “looks,” their “facial expressions and body language,” and “use of silence.” Indeed, since K-dramas avoid explicitly erotic scenes, the emotional relationships between individuals, which are a classic theme of television programs regardless of their country of production, take on a very psychological and allusive turn: lovers’ hands brush against one another where, in equivalent Western scenes, there would be kissing or even sex depicted. In the K-drama, the height of passion is most often represented by a chaste kiss after many hesitations and vicissitudes in the relationship. Close-ups of faces are plentiful; shots frame expressions, buried emotions, the unsaid, and form the basis of “a different kind of acting” that requires great mastery, according to our interviewees. In addition to facial expressions, body movements are also an exhibit in mastery, illustrated during martial arts combats, songs, and dances; it is not unusual for heroes to be called upon to fight or to sing and dance. Such is the case of The Bridal Mask* in which the hero, Lee Kang-to, a police officer and  24 years old, looking for work after graduating with a two-year degree, working-class upbringing, family is from Mayotte; has been a fan for eight years. 51

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vigilante, sings a few verses in a bar he frequents; it is also illustrated in Six Flying Dragons,* in which the righter of wrongs, known as the Viper, is disguised as an actor/storyteller/singer. We could give many more examples of our young interviewees extolling the merits of learning how to act “South Korean style,” that is, being “versatile” and “psychologically convincing,” which they say requires great “diligence.”

3.5

Beautiful and Virtuous

This worship of perfection achieved through hard work is better understood by taking into account the moral dimension of beauty associated with Hallyu. In point of fact, young fans use the descriptive categories of beauty and virtue in tandem, associating them with the terms “truth,” “justice,” “depth,” “authenticity,” and “honesty”—what recalls the Greek kalokagathia.52 The question of artists’ commitment quickly comes up when explaining young fans’ attraction to K-pop. Such is the case of Lou,53 who cites the group BTS,* declaring: I’ve started to love them. More than their music, it’s them I really like! It’s their personality, even if it’s a myth. And they’re much more honest about the messages they try to convey, because in K-pop, actually, there’s something really different from the industrially-produced music we hear. They’re much more open about what they do, they speak with real messages through their music, which talk about society, too. They also talk about how the process of creating music works, for example.

This moral dimension combines sentiments of truth and sincerity emanating from these Idols with the optimistic messages conveyed through products. These sentiments contribute to the enhancement of well-being, whether collectively (“doing things for others,” “devoting oneself to causes”) or individually (“feeling better about oneself,”  An expression that harkens back to an Ancient Greek concept that, over the long course of history, was transmitted from Herodotus to Aristotle. Strictly speaking, it is associated with beauty and virtue (albeit with some variations). On this point, see the masterly summary written by Félix Bourriot (1995). 53  18 years old, high school student, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years. 52

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“gaining self-confidence”). It is interesting to note that the most committed fans come from marginal populations that may have suffered unemployment and/or racism, in the case of young fans with a workingclass or immigrant background. Their identification with artists whose appearance and messages are beautiful and virtuous allows them to reconstruct a positive image of global dynamics (Jung 2015) through the rise of an alternative pop culture. However, this positive vision is developed lucidly, without naiveté: young fans identify the constraints tied to this South Korean kalokagathia––hard work, fierce competition among aspiring Idols, the power of beauty standards that lead certain contenders to undergo plastic surgery, and the paradox of a message of self-acceptance conveyed in an environment where everyone looks like a model.

4

Resources for Digital Intimacy

In the process of constructing a taste for Hallyu, the importance of digital social networks cannot be understated. Through these networks, audiences come into contact with products from a wide variety of sources, connect with people from around the world who share their interests, and form transnational forums, communities, and fandoms. Powerfully intertwined with information and communications technologies, Hallyu has become a techno-cultural system that enables a variety of experiences (listening, watching, playing, but also learning, doing, sharing, and socializing) and has found particular traction in France, where these participatory cultures have flourished (Flichy 2010).

4.1

Cultural Mobilization

Social networks are undoubtedly central to the lives of Hallyu fans in several ways. Firstly, these networks reduce barriers to accessing Hallyu products and information about them. In this respect, Japanese cultural

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products are very different. This is especially the case with Japanese music, which can sometimes be challenging to access. As Manon54 explains: As for the Japanese, 80% of their music is not on YouTube. For example, one Japanese singer I adore, Namie Amuro, is super famous in Japan, but on YouTube you can only find two or three of her songs, and only short ones at that. Because they really protect their songs, and on YouTube you can stream, and you can upload and all that. Though this may have changed, to my knowledge very few [Japanese] songs are on YouTube and you have to look... on other sites, and that’s not always easy. It took me a long time to find them.

By comparison, Hallyu has developed symbiotically with social networks. Stéphanie,55 an early fan of K-dramas, explained how difficult it was to access her favorite products before the 2010s. This shared struggle brought together a community of enthusiasts who helped one another find access: Back then, to simply access K-dramas you had to be on the forums of teams that translated them. You had no choice but to join a network. But that was back then. Now, there are still two or three teams that translate the dramas, but if you wait three weeks, they’re on Netflix, so it’s not really worth the effort. Looking back, I think that Hallyu is partly due to all of those teams. It did not emerge by chance; it’s here thanks to the work of all the international fans, because if there had been no translations, nobody would have been able to access the content. So thank you, internet, and thank you to the translator fans, thank you to all these communities!

In the time of Hallyu 2.0, K-pop in particular has afforded multiple venues for audience participation (Takacs 2014). Indeed, all social networks are mobilized: interviewees discuss YouTube channels as the primary source of accessing this material, but also mention Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, V-Life, and TikTok. These networks provide a wealth of  20 years old, student majoring in language and international communication, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 55  28 years old, nursing assistant at a hospital, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 54

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information and up-to-the-minute Hallyu-related content, which fosters ongoing mobilization by fans. As Corentin56 describes with regard to BTS:* For example, if I’m on Instagram. What day is it today? April 3rd. So, in nine days a new BTS album is coming out. And obviously the album has a teaser. So, on Instagram, over the course of, uh, a week they’ve posted twice in two days. On Twitter too. That’s where information is usually released first. There are obviously the official BTS accounts, and then also the fan accounts. There’s the BTS Bangtan France account, which I’m subscribed to, which is an account of the French ARMY that has almost 40,000 subscribers. And then there is the content I see because I’m subscribed on social networks to the official pages, to “your country’s fan page.”

Taking full advantage of the growing power of these cultures of participation, Hallyu 2.0 operates as a transnational cultural technology of consumer engagement (Lee and Kuwahara 2014; Hu 2015). Fans like being helping to disseminate the products they love; products circulate accompanied by fans’ comments, explanatory paratexts, and subtitles. These practices are central to Hallyu’s worldwide success (Jung 2011; Jung and Shim 2014). Communities of fans have even come to influence actual markets. As Coralie57 describes: “the French fanbase managed to negotiate that every international FNAC music store would sell BTS* albums, that is, all of their albums and goodies. Before that, there were none.” The efforts of fanbases are well known around the world. A classic case is that of JYJ (TVXQ*) fans who helped sway a legal dispute at the end of 2009 between three members of the group and their production company, SM Entertainment. The conflict led to a review of the legal framework and better protection for the artists. The aggregate of transnational practices by amateurs has been referred to by JungBong Choi (2015) as “cultural mobilization.” Fan networks foster a community of taste, in a process that frees them from a priori  19 years old, currently enlisted in France’s national civil service program after one year of journalism studies middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 57  19 years old, searching for employment after two years of journalism school (which she did not finish), middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 56

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cultural boundaries. As Berta Chin and Lori Hitchcock Morimoto remark (2013), “Fans become fans not (necessarily) because of any cultural or national differences or similarities, but because of a moment of affinity between the fan and transcultural object” (104–105). Fans are brought together through highly codified behaviors and ritual activities that showcase their dedication, rather than through their social position. These activities include modes of access to content, monitoring of events, contributions to collective discussions, shares and comments on social networks, and the like. As many interviewees mention, collecting objects provides one support for these ritual activities. These objects include physical albums (which are sometimes available in multiple versions that contain extras and goodies), light sticks, posters, postcards, and a variety of “merch.”58 Collecting these objects frequently involves transnational exchanges between fans.

4.2

Proximity Effects with the Idols

This cultural mobilization is based on a form of “digital intimacy” (Choi 2015) between fans, bound only by their mutual fandom. Nevertheless, they are led to share and collaborate, and to create personal bonds that have a strong emotional dimension. To return to what Mark Granovetter (1983) described as the strength of weak ties, we could say that in the 2.0 era, resources are no longer shared between friends of friends (which always entailed physical contact). Instead, resources are shared between friends that typically only meet virtually. In sharing their passion, these virtual friends strengthen their common expertise and reap narcissistic and psychological benefits from establishing cosmopolitan ties that are untethered from geographic, cultural, linguistic, and social proximity. Moreover, the fact that Hallyu started in a distant country that most fans will never have the chance to visit (though many would like to), intensifies the strength of their digital bonds. The need to bridge this geographic distance requires that fans invest in virtual friendships.

58

 The merchandise for K-pop groups and Idols ranges from phone cases to stationery to clothing.

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This transnational digital intimacy is evident among young fans who use terms like “family,” “community,” “relatives,” and “alter ego.” Such terms are invoked by Corentin, a member of BTS* and Blackpink* fan clubs (among others); Carla, a member of the GOT* fan club; Aya, a member of the ATEEZ* fan club; and Manon, a member of the Biscuit Family network that promotes Japanese and Korean culture. This digital intimacy is a form of mediation afforded by globalized social networks. On a large scale, it diversifies and strengthens connections and interactions within fandoms united by content and cultural rites. It promotes new forms of intersubjective proximity. This intimacy is constantly affirmed and sustained via a whole series of participatory practices that link fans to their Idols. The specific digital intimacy produced by Hallyu rests on the strong bonds that fans have with their Idols, and which fluctuate between public and private registers. Participatory cultures often unite fans and allow them to enrich and contribute to the very cultures that they idolize. Most of the time, the digital posts of celebrities (especially US celebrities) are oriented toward creating well-timed media buzz; those interviewed cite provocative tweets made by Miley Cyrus, declarations of love by Justin Bieber, and the digital presence of Kardashian family members as examples. By contrast, interviewees state that the media presence of Hallyu stars is more oriented to their cultural production. This is especially true of K-pop because Idols share releases, rehearsals, previews, and almost systematically link their private lives to their creative activity––for example, they film themselves in their shared dormitories, helping one another learn dances after rehearsal. K-pop group members live together by contractual obligation and they come to embody a certain communitarian model. Their life together is the subject of constant discussion. In this way, the community between fans echoes the community of the Idols. K-pop groups’ posts, like those of famous actors and actresses, often adopt an intimate register that creates an impression of dialogic, or even conversational, proximity. Ophélie59 describes this, explaining:

 27 years old, works in a ready-to-wear clothing store in Paris, family is from Guadeloupe; has been a fan for about ten years. 59

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They connect live with fans, because we can really talk with them there. This is the type of intimacy you won’t find in other musical genres. The stars even do broadcasts on this application; every time you log into the livestream, you’re seeing them in real time. They even ask questions for fans to answer. Because they want to know what we’re up to... sometimes they even tell us “Be careful going out, it’s cold, bundle up!” or “Don’t get sick!” You’d never get that with other bands. Sometimes they even talk about what they’re doing, or if they’re feeling down.

Daphné60 adds: “We’re invited into their private lives, and we come to feel like we know them, as if they were friends”! The impression of synchronous exchange through these daily digital connections makes distant content powerfully intimate. This content is made locally significant through fans’ interpretations, covers, and flash mobs, as well as their discussions on forums and within fandoms. Through these appropriations, fans can develop and experience an intense, if virtual, sense of familiarity. Alongside this imagined intimacy, the fact that certain aspects of global pop culture are embedded in Hallyu products ensures that they never seem entirely foreign to audiences.

5

Conclusion

The wave of Japanese pop culture that reached France in the 1990s, during the formative years of some of our respondents, undeniably set the stage for them to adopt Hallyu. The Japanese wave fostered their taste for exotic difference and for seeking high-quality alternatives to American, and more broadly Western, mainstream culture. Their familiarity with Japanese products laid the foundation for their reception of Hallyu. The latter also benefitted from a stronger aesthetic dimension than the Japanese products, a strategic understanding of how cultural globalization is broadly perceived, and the impression of intimacy afforded by digital technology. Hallyu is thus understood as an alternative global aesthetic. According to our interviewees, the inclusion of previously 60

 31 years old, schoolteacher, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years.

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overlooked countries in the Hallyu aesthetic offers a more humanized and equitable vision of globalization. If we abandon the normative concept of the “cultural truth” of products, we are forced to conclude that the consumption of perceived cultural difference (i.e., Koreanness) encourages a cosmopolitan openness among young French fans, the effects of which will be examined in Chap. 7.

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Garrigue, Anne. 2004. L’Asie en nous. Arles: Philippe Picquier. Granovetter, Mark. 1983. The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. Sociological Theory 1: 201–233. Heinich, Nathalie. 2005. L’Élite artiste. Excellence et singularité en régime démocratique. Paris: Gallimard. Hu, Brian. 2015. RIP Gangnam Style. In Korean Wave in the Age of Social Media, ed. Sangjoon Lee and Abé Markus Nornes, 229–243. Ann Abor: Michigan University Press. Johnson, Steven. 2005. Everything Bad is Good for You: How Today’s Popular Culture Is Actually Making us Smarter. New York: Riverhead Books. Jung, Sun. 2011. Korean Masculinities and Transcultural Consumption: Yonsama, Rain, Oldboy, K-Pop Idols. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Jung, Eun-Young. 2015. K-Pop Idols, Social Media, and the Remaking of the Korean Wave. In Korean Wave in the Age of Social Media, ed. Sangjoon Lee and Abé Markus Nornes, 73–89. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. Jung, Sun, and Doobo Shim. 2014. Social Distribution: K-Pop Fan Practices in Indonesia and the ‘Gangnam Style’ Phenomenon. International Journal of Cultural Studies 17 (5): 485–501. Klein, Christina. 2008. Why American Studies Needs to Think About the Korean Cinema or Transnational Genres in the Films of Bong Joon-Ho. American Quarterly 60 (4): 871–898. Lee, Claire Seungeun, and Yasue Kuwahara. 2014. ‘Gangnam Style’ as Format: When a Localized Korean Song Meets a Global Audience. In The Korean Wave: Korean Popular Culture in Global Context, ed. Yasue Kuwahara, 101–116. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Lemaître, Frédéric. 2020. Le soft-power chinois tenu en échec. Le Monde, May 13. Menger, Pierre-Michel. 2018. Le talent en débat. Paris: PUF. Octobre, Sylvie, Christine Détrez, Pierre Mercklé, and Nathalie Berthomier. 2010. L’enfance des Loisirs. Paris: MC. Pasquier, Dominique. 2005. Cultures lycéennes. La tyrannie de la majorité. Paris: Autrement. Pellitteri, Marco. 2010. The Dragon and the Dazzle: Models, Strategies and Identities of Japanese Imagination. A European Perspective. Latina: Tunué. Takacs, Stacy. 2014. Interrogating Popular Culture: Key Questions. New York: Routledge. Vatin, François. 2015. Le Travail et ses valeurs. Paris: Albin Michel.

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Yang, Jonghoe. 2012. The Korean Wave (Hallyu) in East Asia: A Comparison of Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese Audiences Who Watch Korean TV Dramas. Development and Society 41 (1): 103–147. Yoon, Kyong. 2017. Global Imagination of K-Pop: Pop Music Fans’ Lived Experiences of Cultural Hybridity. Popular Music and Society 41 (4): 373–389. Young, John O. 2010. Cultural Appropriation and the Arts. Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing.

7 Looking in the Korean Mirror: Enchantment and Disenchantment with Elsewhere

In Chap. 6, we identified what “hooked” fans on South Korean products, imbued with an aesthetic code that they deemed original and innovative. South Korean production was thus seen as an alternative to the dominant (American) stream of pop culture. In this chapter, we shall look at how consumers develop a representation of Korean society, whether idealized and/or critical, which allows them to trace the broad contours of a “good society” through a comparison with the French society. This reflexive work operates through the identification of both similarities and differences between the two societies, as uncovered via the consumption of cultural products. The Korean Wave’s products convey several cultural models that offer a mediated ethnography of South Korea. In this chapter, we shall distance ourselves from the most widespread research on reception, which tends to focus on the knowledge and skills that young people gain and develop, thanks to their consumption practices. However, like many studies have previously highlighted, various forms of “minuscule knowledge” (Pasquier 2002) are produced via the reception of Hallyu products—lessons that are subsequently mobilized in the lived experiences of individuals (Cicchelli and Octobre 2019). Thanks to their passion for Hallyu, young © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Cicchelli, S. Octobre, The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84296-3_7

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fans learn about Korean geography and landmarks and become familiar with the country’s history (especially the Joseon period,1 which is widely depicted in numerous historical K-dramas). They might learn the Korean alphabet (hangeul) or become curious about Korean cuisine (hansik). When watching historical K-dramas, young fans discover certain traditional customs, traditions, and cultural traits, including hanbok (traditional dress), hanok (traditional architecture), haindong gumdo (Korean swordsmanship), and hanji (Korean paper). Young fans also gain exposure to contemporary life in South Korea, thanks to K-dramas that take place in a contemporary setting, as well as YouTube shows and the social media presence of K-pop stars. Despite a total absence of pre-existing pedagogical intentions, the consumption of South Korean products thus helps to create a cultural toolkit (Swidler 1986) composed of linguistic, historical, social, and geopolitical knowledge (of varying depth and accuracy, it should be noted). As we shall see in Chap. 8, some young fans choose to pursue their Korean education and follow a more formal curriculum by attending specialized programs of study. What we shall focus on here is the axiological dimension of the amateur’s work, that is, how amateurs use their toolkits to develop a normative representation of what a “good society” is or should be (one that ensures a decent life for all its citizens, free from major forms of inequality, injustice, or discrimination). Comparing two very different societies (in terms of geography, history, and culture) side-by-side—that is, what they see represented of the Korean society in Hallyu products with what they experience in French society on a daily basis—young fans explore their enchantment and disenchantment with both options. According to their narratives, the passion for Hallyu seems a realistic and clear-headed one: it takes the form of a utopia, in the literal sense of a “nowhere place,” given that the “good society” only exists as an idealized third space, resulting from the combination of the respective advantages of both societies. In order to better highlight the power of this mediated socialization to alterity and its role in crafting a representation of a desirable society, we shall focus here on the fans who have never traveled to South Korea (representing the majority of our sample population). In so doing, we shall  The Joseon dynasty was a Korean dynastic kingdom that lasted from 1392 to 1897.

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avoid confusing the effects of a mediated socialization (through cultural consumption) with the effects of real encounters, which involve different mechanisms than those we are interested in here, as was discussed in an earlier study on educational trips taken by European youth (Cicchelli 2012). For Korean Wave fans who have never been to South Korea, cultural products are the only access to this society and the only source that can inform their reflections about identity and alterity.

1

Hallyu and South Korean Culture

Although never gullible or naïve regarding the crafty marketing strategies of the Korean Wave deployed to forge an appealing image of South Korea, the young fans we interviewed nonetheless engaged in a two-fold interpretation of Korean society, in which they perceive Korean cultural products as both a “mirror” and a “façade.”

1.1

The Mirror

Fans may use cultural products as a mirror of South Korean culture and society via a mechanism called “loyalty transmission” (Choi 2015), that is, the transfer of interest in a cultural product (in this case, usually K-pop or K-dramas) toward a broader spectrum of cultural elements, including mores and customs, societal norms, and historical, spiritual, or religious traditions. If this transfer occurs, fans tend to “read” the society through its cultural products via progressive impregnation; the repetition of certain features then passes for an image of reality. Lila2 perfectly illustrates this mechanism when she says that “what’s interesting is that it’s a truly different culture; it’s usually because of K-pop that teenagers are interested in Korea, but through K-dramas we can also learn a lot about Korean culture and the fact that it’s so different from ours.” For other fans, this transfer of interest becomes a much more active  25 years old, sustainable development consultant, upper-class upbringing, has been a fan for five years. 2

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endeavor—even if, most of the time, this endeavor is not driven by prior intentions and does not follow an established plan. This is what Coralie3 suggests: As soon as you join the Hallyu movement, you adopt Korean culture. Thanks to K-pop and K-dramas, I got interested in Korean culture, documentaries and books to see how things were over there. Korean culture means adopting everything that has to do with military service, spicy foods—they eat a lot of spicy things over there. Korean kimono culture is also different from Japanese kimono culture. It’s a culture of respect, especially for one’s elders. All of this is an endorsement that happens through K-pop and K-dramas, in fact. Because K-dramas are a depiction of everyday life, in reality.

Coralie thus proceeds by synecdoche, listing out the elements that compose the Korean culture which she views as a whole package. This access to information about everyday life, whether past or present, is derived from watching K-dramas, and also from following K-pop bands and artists, who regularly communicate on social media and to their fan communities about their daily life. According to Julie,4 all Hallyu cultural products can show fans new ways of thinking, doing, and creating: “Hallyu of course reflects the population of a group, or at least whatever that group identifies with or wants to identify with [….] Yeah, it’s a good mirror that allows us to get a little closer to Korean society.” A detailed description of South Korean culture and society thus emerges from the background. Like any good ethnographer worth their salt, Julie works to uncover “the social issues” at play in cultural products as a means to garner a holistic understanding of Korean society: the goal is to comprehend what Koreans “expect out of their lives, what they are focused on, what frustrates them too!” And this young woman goes on with a jumbled list of what she has noticed:

 19 years old, searching for employment after two years of journalism school (which she did not finish), middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 4  18 years old, first-year student in childcare studies, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for seven years. 3

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Upwards social mobility, class tensions, but also a certain mindset, how they organize their thoughts and ideas; the importance of family, a collectivist vision of the world, and the values that are emphasized: courage, justice, the struggle against oppression by the richest segment of the population.

While being aware that the cultural products they consume are the result of sophisticated aesthetic and narrative efforts, and not denying artistic language a certain autonomy, young fans believe in a culturalist determinism which gives them the impression of being able to “read” South Korean culture and society via Hallyu products. They consider that the cultural traits and historical context glimpsed through these products are resistant to fictionalization—or rather, that they give the fictional distortion a specific orientation that preserves access to an underlying “truth.” This is emphasized by Khadija:5 I think that the choices that are made in the plots of movies, or the themes addressed in clips and shows, this reflects a country’s values, at least some of them. Perhaps the strongest values, those that are already internalized. It’s maybe not even a conscious choice, it’s just that these values are so strong, so rooted in everyone’s mindset from birth, that individuals reflect them in their work without even realizing it.

In this perspective, accessing the cultural traits conveyed by cultural works necessarily entails identifying cultural codes.

1.2

The Façade

Some young people want to go through the looking glass, like a kind of “Alice in the Land of the Morning Calm.” Following a personal period of research, composed of watching documentaries, reading books and magazines, and consulting specialized websites, such fans come to the conclusion that Hallyu products are merely a “façade.” By lifting the veil of  20 years old, obtaining an undergraduate work/study degree in asset management, upper-class upbringing, of Tunisian descent; has been a fan for three years. 5

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illusion—alternatively described as “positive,” “dynamic,” “beautiful,” or “appealing”—some argue that the messages, images, and representations offered by cultural products should not be taken at face value. This is the viewpoint adopted by Marine:6 “I think that in fact everything I consume doesn’t really reflect what’s happening in Korea. We get this beautiful image of Korea thanks to K-pop, television shows, and everything, but in the end, the real picture isn’t necessarily perfect, it’s a lot darker.” Since Hallyu is a façade, stripping away the veil of illusion is the most important thing, according to Manon:7 In the drama Sky Castle,*8 for example, they all succeed, but at the same time there are a lot of suicides and everything. And I mean, Hallyu is a façade, it gives us a specific image of Korea, but there is a lot more nuance. They succeed, but they make a ton of sacrifices in order to succeed.

This critical perspective expands as fans go deeper into their passions, with those who have been fans, the longest being the most vocal on the subject, regardless of whether they have significant cultural capital or not, and regardless also of the depth and breadth of their intercultural experience. Thus, Kira,9 a young woman from an immigrant family who is currently unemployed, states: Everyone is free to dig deeper or not. So I mean, you can look up stuff on YouTube and find out more about an artist that you like, that you’ve seen and it will all seem perfect, you’ll see that he’s been on these spectacular TV shows, and always looks perfectly coiffed…You’ll think, “ok, so in Korea everyone is beautiful and well-dressed and perfectly styled.” Afterwards, you turn on the TV in France, you go to channel 6 and end up watching

 21 years old, sales consultant in children’s clothing (did not complete her vocational training certificate in cosmetology), working-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 7  20 years old, a third-year student in an international languages and communications bachelor program, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 8  The South Korean cultural products referred to in this book and marked with an asterisk are presented in the glossary at the end of the book. 9  22 years old, unemployed after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in international trade, working-­ class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for ten years. 6

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“Capital” or some other program discussing the crisis in Korea, poverty and then you go “Ah, ok…”. You can take it or leave, it’s your choice.

Delphine,10 a young well-off woman, and an old fan, also displays the same critical distance: “You have to put things into perspective, often in dramas the stories are fairy tales like Cinderella. Obviously, that’s not real life.” Even more recent fans share this viewpoint, as we can see in the statements made by Lou,11 a young woman who became a Hallyu fan four years ago: “At the same time, I know that everything that’s depicted isn’t real life. People don’t dance in the streets like you see in clips and stuff. You have to dig deeper.”

2

The Appeal of South Korean Society

This comparative process allows young people to develop a positive picture of South Korean society that emphasizes four main interconnected qualities. The power of the Korean Wave resides first and foremost in its ability to convey a positive vision of the future, itself based on the ideal of a harmonious blending together of tradition and modernity, innovation combined with respect for the past. Fearlessly oriented toward a future that is no longer seen as a threat, South Korean society is also seen as maintaining a certain level of respect in interpersonal relationships. It offers a softer version of masculinity that values traits often denigrated in Western societies, thus feeding into a new kind of romanticism. It is easy to see how these four traits come to dominate any societal interpretation of Hallyu products: they are at the heart of the issue of “how to live together” prevalent in Western societies, especially if we consider the conjunction of three separate trends. First of all, contemporary Western declinism cultivates desire for what have been called “rétrovolutions” (Amselle 2010) or “retrotopias” (Bauman 2017), and even certain forms of anti-humanism (Wolff 2017). These ideologies denote a shifting  24 years old, postgraduate student in political science, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 11  18 years old, high school student, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years. 10

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relationship to history; the appeal of the past, rather than faith in the future, now seems predominant. They are consequently at the root of all kinds of moral panics regarding the fraying of the social fabric, including the rise of antisocial behaviors, the fragmentation of society, unbridled individualism, and, more broadly, the rejection of universality (Wolff 2019). Secondly, the persistence of inequalities between men and women, despite years of feminist efforts, and the pervasiveness of virilistic masculinity—at the root of many forms of inequality and discrimination called out by international and national agencies alike—cast doubt on the ability of Western societies to transcend or resolve gender issues. Finally, as the global #MeToo movement has demonstrated, the hypersexualization of male/female relationships (based on masculine aggression and dominance) and the objectification of women continue to persist, despite targeted attempts at education and prevention. It is unsurprising if, when confronted with the challenge of juggling personal and professional lives, families and relationships, young women are increasingly attracted to “realistic love” rather than “romantic love” (Giraud 2017)—often favoring multiple partners over time rather than lifelong soul mates or extra-­ conjugal affairs to monogamous partnerships (Garcia 2016)—even if some continue to dream of this ideal.

2.1

The Siren Call of Tomorrow’s Technology

Older generations in South Korea experienced the Korean War, an immensely divisive event whose repercussions are still felt today. Korean cultural productions (and especially novels) often depict post-war poverty, the many years lived under a dictatorship, and eventually, the rapid technological and economic development that allowed the country to open up internationally. Young French fans admire South Korea’s stunning transformation and its emphasis on innovation, especially given the fact that the country’s historical and cultural legacy has also, according to them, been preserved. This is emphasized by Ludivine:12  21 years old, third-year undergraduate student in business development, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for two years. 12

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When you see the country’s economic development, well, I mean, it’s interesting that it’s tied to history as well. What’s interesting with Koreans, it’s that they exist in this in-between space. We also experienced this transitional moment between tradition and modernity. Korea is a country that recently opened up; it’s exploded over the last 50 years, and during the last 20 especially in terms of culture and economics.

This subtle blend of tradition and modernity has convinced many young fans that South Korea is an emblem of a peaceful and reassuring future. This vision of the future can be seen, in particular, through the country’s wholesale adoption of technological progress in support of a radiant modernity. Home automation, artificial intelligence and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), and towering skyscrapers are all signs of this modernity, abundantly depicted in K-dramas and K-pop videos. This technology is never (or rarely) portrayed as threatening or scary, unlike many Western movies or television shows that focus on grim scenarios, where technological advancements turn against their human creators. This positive vision of modernity is a source of pride for Hallyu fans: they see it as proof of South Korea’s success in terms of global competition. Alex explains:13 Korea is still a pioneer in a number of different sectors, like IT, aeronautics, automobiles, etc. It’s always interesting to see how a country that is a leader in different sectors views the world, and how it is different compared to other countries which don’t necessarily have this appeal, maybe this is the social impact that Korea has.

This form of modernity is especially interesting to fans because it is not entirely foreign to them—many young people, like Camille,14 have highlighted the elements that it borrows from its familiar Western c­ ounterpart: “It’s still a bit modern, it draws on Western [culture] a bit.” Here again,  22 years old, front office supervisor of a five-star hotel, upper-class family of American descent; has been a fan for five years. 14  20 years old, third-year undergraduate student in foreign and regional languages, cultures, and literature, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 13

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references to the United States are made, with the country being seen as the source of this modernity. Louise elaborates:15 What also characterizes South Korea, well, it’s that it got a bunch of stuff from abroad, from the US in particular, which means that it’s a country that is sort of I want to say a hybrid—like, they kept their Korean culture, but on the other hand there are elements of modernity and the West.

The modernization of South Korean society is thus admired both for its own sake and for its ability to offer a global alternative. This alternative is particularly appreciated by young people in France, who see few other options in their society. For example, Kira,16 a young immigrant stuck working odd jobs “without managing to find a stable position,” declares: “Koreans are very proud of their country, but they are also aware of the smaller size of their country, especially when speaking historically, so as a result the fact that their small country has been able to export so much and influence so many foreigners is really unique.” Like other interviewees, Kira demonstrates an awareness of the transition to forms of modernity that distance themselves with the American paradigm, as announced by Fareed Zakaria (2006). Such statements also echo issues raised in French public discourse and academic studies regarding a wide variety of deepening inequalities (economic, social, cultural, racial, gender-­ based, etc.).17

2.2

The Confucian Tradition and Respect for Others

Deeply rooted in Confucianism (Rozman 1991; Choi 2010), South Korean society has seen a renaissance of its spiritual heritage in recent years (Śleziak 2013; Kaplan 2018). Confucian elements are often described in a positive light by our interviewees, who see in them respect  20 years old, second-year undergraduate student in biology, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years. 16  22 years old, unemployed after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in international trade, working-­class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for ten years. 17  We can point to the success of erudite tomes such as Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014), or to Stéphane Hessel’s tract Indignez-vous [translated as Time for Outrage! (2011)]. 15

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for well-regulated interpersonal relationships. Confucianism provides a moral and ethical guide to navigating five different relationships (oryun): justice, virtue, and loyalty between a king and his subjects; affection (care and respect) between a father and his sons; etiquette, respect, and justice between a husband and wife, with a clear separation of roles and responsibilities; order and obedience from younger people with regard to their elders; and trust between friends. These five rules for living together help promote social cohesion, as well as the moral superiority of the collective over the individual. Anne18 says, “The respect that they have to show each other is very important. In the language, there are seven different registers to show respect, depending on the person you’re talking to.” Similarly, Louana19 asserts, “They are going to be much more respectful towards people than the French. I think that’s really obvious whenever you watch a show.” Respect for others can be seen in the widespread politeness that makes interactions seem “softer,” “calm,” “simple,” and “pleasant,” according to young fans. A “typically Asian” benevolence is highlighted by them, especially when talking about jeong, “a kind of benevolence that is not limited to feelings, but is also expressed through actions, even very discrete ones, a kind of kindness, affection, attachment, and mutual comprehension over time” (Daussy 2019: 186). Young fans find many traces of jeong in television shows, video clips, and interactions with K-pop Idols more broadly. As examples, they mention how South Korean boys always offer to carry their girlfriend’s purse, or how K-pop bands are constantly looking out for the well-being of their fans. They also highlight the important psychological dimension of Hallyu fictional products, where the action is always driven by interpretation and anticipation of the needs and emotions of others. How interpersonal relationships are managed in Korean culture is very different from what young French fans observe in their own society, and

 29 years old, childcare assistant, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years.  21 years old, third-year undergraduate student in English, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years.

18 19

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in the Western world more generally. Once again, American society offers a powerful counterpoint, as Khadija20 explains: They really have a culture of respect for others that well, you’re not going to find in France or in the United States. You can feel it, it’s very present in their attitude—I mean it’s just very spontaneous. It’s a thing that I appreciate, because when you watch American television shows and you know what goes on behind the scenes, everything is just so hypocritical, we know it.

Several young fans with immigrant backgrounds expressed appreciation for the respect and emotional modesty displayed in Korean culture. Mériem,21 a young woman of Tunisian descent, sees similarities between her culture and South Korean culture. “Modesty, it’s like for us, we don’t kiss in public, there’s not lots of emoting and sex everywhere,” she explains. Amina,22 a young woman with a Moroccan background, also appreciates the visual restraint exhibited in Korean video clips: “There’s lots of style, they really preserve themselves, in fact they don’t show a lot, like in American clips where you can see everything, I’ll spare you the details, but you see a lot more than in Korean clips. I identify with it.” Other young people criticize French society based on their personal experiences. Louna,23 who works as a waitress in a restaurant, says she deals with rudeness all the time: In terms of culture, well, politeness first of all! It’s the main thing. Here in France, we’ve lost this sense of politeness, I mean, there is still some respect but it’s not the same, there’s not a lot. Ultimately, I know that… no, actually, there’s no more politeness! And there hasn’t been for a long time, and I think we need a lot more in France. This is also what drew me [to Korean culture], because I think it’s important.  20 years old, obtaining an undergraduate work/study degree in asset management, upper-class upbringing, of Tunisian descent; has been a fan for three years. 21  29 years old, data scientist, upper-class upbringing, of Tunisian descent; has been a fan for ten years. 22  24 years old, nurse, middle-class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for 11 years. 23  18 years old, waitress in a restaurant (she has left school and is taking her baccalaureate exam as a free candidate), working-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 20

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2.3

241

Tempered Masculinity

The third facet of the Korean ideal is a variation of manhood that distances itself from traditional codes of Western hegemonic masculinity.24 South Korean masculinity, often described as “sweet” or “soft” (Jung 2011; Oh 2014), translates to intense preoccupation with one’s appearance among boys and young men, a trait which is often condemned as “effeminate” by detractors of the Korean aesthetic. Lou25 thus defines this aesthetic standard for men as the integration of practices (with regard to the body and clothing) that were traditionally limited to women: They take much more care with anything that has to do with their appearance, and these are such different forms of beauty and aesthetics than what we are used to seeing. For example, guys wearing earrings, without facial hair, whose skin is very delicate and soft, who really pay attention to their appearance and wear clothes that are very different from what we see normally, like V-neck shirts and stuff like that, whereas if you see that in America, the audience is going to say, “oh they’re gays”26 or something like that.

Amina27 also explains how this form of masculinity goes against the grain of how it is traditionally depicted in the West: “People often say this when I’m watching videos, because it’s true that Asians are rather effeminate, let’s not kid ourselves, we have to admit that many Asian men are super effeminate but we can clearly see that they are men.” As for Abby,28 she emphasizes the specific body-care activities Korean men engage in, as well as their hexis (how they hold and use their bodies) compared to French men:  This form of masculinity can be defined as “the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women” (Connell 2005: 77). 25  18 years old, high school student, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years. 26  The French word chosen by Lou is more derogatory. 27  24 years old, nurse, middle-class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for 11 years. 28  22 years old, sales representative, middle-class upbringing, of Comorian descent; has been a fan for eight years. 24

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Korean men really take care of their appearance. In France, you don’t really see men take care of themselves to treat their acne, their skin, their teeth. But over there, it’s totally normal. There are lots of products for men, they do peel-off masks, they really baby their skin. Here in France, everyone thinks that’s only for women, even though really it’s for everyone. A man has just as much right to wear foundation so he can cover up imperfections and blemishes. A guy who really takes care of himself, I think that’s cool, but a guy who neglects his appearance, no, no, no. And on top of that, I think Koreans dress better than French guys. In France, they all wear their pants so low you can see their boxers, no thanks. I also really don’t like how they walk, all tough and swaggering. They should stand straight up, walk confidently.

On this subject, all the young female fans agree, regardless of their social class, their immigrant backgrounds, their educational and professional trajectories, or even the amount of time they have been passionate about Hallyu. This new form of masculinity can be seen as a triumph for the female gaze (Goddard 2000; Benson-Allott 2017) and a sign of the female empowerment that some (female) fans have been calling for. Their goal is “defeating prejudice” and shifting norms toward what Charlotte Hooper (2001) has called a “feminine masculinity.” Many of our female interviewees also underscored the fact that Korean men are not “macho,” that they are “sweet” and “express their feelings,” unlike most of the men they encounter in their lives. By preferring an alternative form of masculinity, one that has often been marginalized in Western society and represented, in the collective mindset, by effeminate and/or gay men (Haywood and Johansson  2017), these young women are in fact rejecting hegemonic masculinity, traditionally defined by power, assertiveness, and emotional repression. Their passion for Hallyu flips their perspective: Hallyu offers a softer version of masculinity that is generally denigrated in the world of its Western fans, but then comes to occupy an important place in their symbolic universe. The exoticism of Korean products allows for a shifting of traditional norms, even though the reality on the ground in France demonstrates that alternative visions of masculinity are still quite

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marginalized.29 This is clearly explained by Madeleine,30 who works in construction and public works, a sector that she admits is notorious for its machismo: I think this is awesome. Particularly because nowadays, if you cross a gay man in the street, you know it’s probably not going to end well for him unfortunately. Whereas they [Korean men] don’t hesitate, they go full out. They go out dressed to the nines, they don’t get judged—on the contrary, they’re immensely successful. They live their lives, I’m not saying they’re gay or anything. But I mean, I’m certain they could go out wearing a skirt with high heels and it would go over just fine.

2.4

Romance Regained

South Korean pop culture explores different facets of the human condition; it is precisely this ability to narrativize and depict life (via text, music, or images) that explains why it has been able to give young fans several resources to facilitate and support their transition to adulthood. One topic in particular appears time and again in Korean television shows and pop songs: love. In fact, love is described as the beating heart of Hallyu by fans. Indeed, love stories are omnipresent in Korean cultural productions, regardless of the genre or subgenre, with the result that Hallyu is providing a new sentimental education whose cornerstone is romantic love. A number of different elements give these love stories their unique flavor, according to fans, a flavor which, much like the Proustian madeleine, evokes fragments of an old-fashioned romantic imaginary, now forgotten in the West. Young fans report that, contrary to what is depicted in fictional products in the West, Korean narratives of love unfold over long periods of

 For example, homophobic acts are on the rise in France, according to the organization SOS Homophobie and its Rapport sur l’homophobie 2018 (2018 report on homophobia), https://www. sos-homophobie.org/sites/default/files/rapport_annuel_2018.pdf 30  22 years old, works in the construction and public works sector, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 29

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time, which presents a significant advantage for viewers who need to assimilate the themes of romantic discourse. As Lou31 explains: It’s very often a love story, what I really like is that they take a lot of time to describe the characters. Relationships develop step-by-step, nothing moves super quickly like in other movies where it’s love at first sight, etc. It takes more time; it’s more realistic in a way.

Secondly, the combination of Asian modesty, a penchant for focusing on first loves and destiny, and an emphasis on the highly psychological and contemplative dimension of characters (in K-dramas and K-pop alike, relationships are often at the root of self-transformation) means that malefemale relationships are relatively de-sexualized, especially when compared to similar products in the West. This is even truer when the protagonists are young and as yet unable to fully understand their budding emotions. As Jamila32 says while purposefully exaggerating to illustrate her feeling of strangeness, “Well, so let’s say you’re watching a drama and for ten episodes, well, it’s going to take 30 years for them to sleep together, whereas well, they could have just cut to the chase [laughter].” The culmination of romantic love, a rare scene, usually takes the form of a chaste kiss that occurs generally behind closed doors and is only used to make the couple “official” in the eyes of viewers (occasionally, the kiss will be unwittingly witnessed by secret observers, but it rarely takes place in public). Lou33 explains thus: “The kisses, it’s really like kisses from the movies 45 years ago, it’s super cute, they don’t use tongue and every time when they stop kissing they are all surprised, as if they can’t believe what just happened.” The chaste kiss (a mere brushing of lips, or a kiss on the forehead) stands in sharp contrast to the “French kiss” that often takes center stage in Western productions: similarly, Korean productions emphasize affection, delicate gestures, and benevolent, all-­encompassing concern over grand gestures, dramatic proclamations of love, and surging desires when depicting romantic love. In most K-dramas, love is chaste; in the shows that do  18 years old, high school student, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years.  21 years old, activity leader at a recreation center, middle-class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for seven years. 33  18 years old, high school student, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years. 31 32

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deal with physical desire, emphasis is placed on the development and experience of budding desires, while remaining very allusive on its satisfaction (and without ever including explicit sex scenes). Some young fans who are originally from Northern Africa explained that they strongly prefer this representation of love, as it seems closer to what they expect from their own culture. Mériem,34 originally from Tunisia, explains: For me, it’s the ideal I was looking for. I really like love stories where there’s a lot of emotions and it’s kind of modest as well. Koreans are very modest and I appreciate that they don’t have to say “I love you” every five seconds, you can see it in how they act, how they behave. They say that, well, already love is very important to them, not like how it is here. It’s like, I love you, I do things for you, rather than I love you but I’m going to take care of myself first and then I’ll see if you need anything. That’s what I really like.

Céline,35 who was born in France but has a Turkish background, also explains her preference for “cute” stories, where the narrative pact is based on the long-term relationship of a couple: learning to decipher the various codes of love and relationships takes place without a change in romantic partners. “Their first love will always remain their first love, they will stay with this person for the rest of their lives,” she explains. Céline prefers South Korean television shows over their Turkish counterparts, which tend to have “couples who flirt a lot.” By constantly depicting the young love of couples who belong to different social worlds—for example, “secretary Kim falls in love with her boss,” as Carla36 explains, or “There’s a girl who doesn’t have much money who randomly meets a guy who is a superstar, or a rich doctor or lawyer,” as Ania37 elaborates—screenwriters transform sociological implausibility  29 years old, data scientist, upper-class upbringing, of Tunisian descent; has been a fan for ten years. 35  23 years old, assistant manager, middle-class upbringing, of Turkish and Lebanese descent; has been a fan for nine years. 36  20 years old, majoring in French literature and preparing to sit the entrance exams for the most prestigious French universities, upper-class upbringing, of Algerian descent; has been a fan for three years. 37  22 years old, second-year undergraduate student majoring in English and Chinese, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 34

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(especially in a society with such a strong social stratification, like South Korea) into narrative tools to powerfully depict the development of love. By multiplying the number of obstacles that a couple faces, in particular the tropes of parental objection, the jealousy of one’s peers, and the cruelty of rejected suitors, these stories update the classic (Western) theme of the battle between “sense and sensibility,” to borrow the title of Jane Austen’s masterpiece, while ultimately providing a happy ending.

3

Behind the Scenes

The charm that Hallyu wields, in terms of making South Korean society enticing to foreigners, does not mean that young fans are unable to train a critical eye on what happens “behind the scenes.” Fans are able to get a glimpse of the Hallyu underbelly through some cultural products, but also thanks to the information they gain digging up from other sources in the fan sphere. Among the criticisms many fans come to levy: in South Korea, beauty is a kind of tyrannical obsession, modesty belies repressed emotions, masculine tenderness and romance are the flipside of persistent patriarchy and condescension toward women, and modernity has entailed cutthroat competition between individuals and a plethora of discriminations and exclusions. These criticisms are the symmetrical counterpart to the praises sung of Hallyu: while the former insist on what is missing in French society, the latter stem precisely from what France can offer that may be missing in South Korea. Such critiques are made equally by long-­ term fans and newer ones, which confirm that new fans are nonetheless not naïve when consuming cultural products from abroad.

3.1

The Tyranny of Appearances

Based on compliance with strict standards, the tyranny of beauty and appearances more broadly is one of the elements most commonly condemned by our young interviewees. As Étienne38 explains, “In Korea,  22 years old, supermarket cashier (taking a gap year from his undergraduate degree in social and economic administration), working-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years. 38

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there is a cult of aesthetics, including pale skin, thinness, smooth skin without any pimples or imperfections, K-pop stars have to meet this standard of beauty.” This requirement to comply with a very stringent set of aesthetic demands stems, it is argued, from the desire of young South Koreans to resemble fictional characters. Aby39 emphasizes the power of fictional images with regard to developing these aesthetic standards: I think that there are a lot of similar characteristics with manga and webtoon characters and others. In terms of beauty for instance, for the guys, you usually see these V-shaped faces, with relatively large eyes and thin noses. The same traits as for girls, actually. But you can also see all the same traits in dramas and webtoons and in real life—in terms of celebrities, it’s like seeing a webtoon character in front of you!

The highly standardized canon of beauty conveyed by South Korean cultural industries reflects a very homogenous vision of the country’s population and excludes any kind of ethnic diversity, which stands in stark contrast to the current movement in the West, to increasingly include men and women of color as well as different body types and gender identities (Elan 2019; Owuku 2019). Young people condemn the repercussions of this obsession with appearance. They critique the emphasis on aesthetic capital and the effects of its unequal distribution, with the latter seeming particularly unfair given that success achieved, thanks to beauty stems, more from winning the biological or genetic lottery than from any kind of meritocratic value such as hard work or talent. Kira,40 a young immigrant who has personally struggled to find stable employment, underscores just how harshly those without aesthetic capital can be shut out of the labor force in Korea: If you’re really beautiful according to their standards, it’s like you’ve got this universal free pass, you’re free and you will always have people around you.  20 years old, sales representative of Senegalese descent, middle-class upbringing, works in a ready-to-wear clothing store; has been a fan for three years. 40  22 years old, unemployed after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in international trade, working-­class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for ten years. 39

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But if people think you’re ugly… you can just be stuck. You can really be stuck with regard to everything. Your job applications can be rejected, you might never marry, even if you have kids, your appearance will be judged above everything else. And your appearance defines how everything else will be judged.

Léa,41 a nursing student who describes her academic trajectory as one of grit and hard work, says: “If you’re not beautiful, if people don’t think you’re beautiful or handsome, you’re not going to have any breakthroughs. In the professional world, people aren’t going to hire you, they’re not going to even look at your qualities.” The astute observations of South Korean society made by Lee Hyeon-seo, the famous North Korean defector, also reflect this view. When this author talks about the various obstacles South Koreans face within their own society, she cannot help but notice that many of these failures are due to their physical defects or limitations. While lamenting their condition, many women exaggerate “minor flaws—being too plump, or too short” and perceive them as causes of failure (Lee 2015: 225). The importance of appearance explains the prevalence of plastic surgery in K-drama storylines (Pişcărac 2016). According to Lila,42 “Often they get plastic surgery to have a double eyelid fold, you can see the difference on the internet, but in reality you can barely see it: it’s the fold that your eyelid has when your eyes are open, and they don’t have that, so they have operations to get it.” It is primarily girls and women who get plastic surgery, in part because they are under more pressure, but interviewees were critical of the trend regardless of their gender. The young men and women interviewed pointed out the absurdity of this mad quest for fictional perfection (“it’s not based in reality”), as well as the very human costs (sometimes, operations are “botched,” and some individuals simply cannot afford plastic surgery). Most of all, young fans highlight the contradiction between this beauty imperative and the messages c­ onveyed by so many K-stars, which focus on self-acceptance and self-love. Louna43  20 years old, nursing school student, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years.  25 years old, sustainable development consultant, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 43  18 years old, waitress in a restaurant (she has left school and is taking her baccalaureate exam as a free candidate), working-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 41 42

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explains this clearly: “So ultimately, most girls in girl bands, they want to do it to be perfect. To have all the right beauty criteria… except that these same groups, they’re the first to say that it’s all useless… that you have to love yourself and accept yourself. It doesn’t make sense.” The beauty imperative is thus inconsistent with the messages offered by the various Idols. This paradox is especially jarring for young Hallyu fans, who are struggling with self-acceptance and the weight of social competition, especially those who may not have the same opportunities as their more privileged peers. By promoting a cosmetic image of South Korea (in the literal sense) designed to make the country seem highly appealing, the Korean Wave ultimately reveals this society’s internal contradictions to young French fans.

3.2

Emotional Repression

The tyranny of appearance goes hand in hand with a high level of emotional repression, which many young people see as the dark side of modesty and respect for others. Emotional repression is one of the consequences of the powerful collective framework prevalent in South Korea, and which many argue is the antithesis of the Western (and especially American) emphasis on individualism. Laura44 explains: In Korea, there’s always this idea that “we’re a society, so I have to fit in and conform, we’re a community,” and that’s very different from the European slash American model of individualism. It’s part of communitarianism I think, blending in, I believe. Because if you don’t do that, you’re excluded from society. So, they don’t really have a choice.

Modesty thus translates to difficulties expressing oneself in public and sharing one’s emotions especially. According to Alex,45 “There’s a huge amount of censorship going on, self-censorship even, with regard  22 years old, French film school student, working-class upbringing, parents are Romanian and Italian; has been a fan for eight years. 45  22 years old, front office supervisor of a five-star hotel, upper-class family of American descent; has been a fan for five years. 44

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to showing emotions, that’s viewed negatively. It’s really a question of respecting others to the point that you completely blend into the background and don’t show your feelings.” Similarly, beneath respect, our interviewees often saw a powerful conservative streak. Milann explains:46 “I think about culture and hyung, respect for one’s elders in particular. If you give advice to a friend, and you’re older than him, he’s going to consider you as an elder, not just like any other friend giving advice.” Young people see this emotional repression as the source of two societal issues: on the one hand, isolation (given that one does not have the right to talk about one’s innermost struggles), and on the other, jealousy (since silence leaves room for imagining the most envy-provoking scenarios). These two feelings appear to be in stark contradiction to the Confucian legacy, otherwise associated with Korean society. Here again, our young interviewees observed the paradoxes inherent in South Korean society. Caroline47 compares the isolation of individuals in a society that emphasizes the collective with the force of the collectivities created through elective relationships in French society: In Korea, I think there are a lot of people who are alone, actually, I mean I think that, well, obviously you make friends, but I think in the end you don’t have that feeling like we have in France where you feel like you can really rely on all your friends. I think over there it’s a very specific feeling, like you have very few people that you can really count on.

She then highlights the pervasiveness of jealousy in interpersonal relationships, which, according to her, explains why so many people feel alone. “In the shows that I watch, there’s a ton of jealousy, like in friendships there’s always the jealous girl who ends up backstabbing her friend, always this kind of thing. It’s a jealous society,” Caroline explains. The apparently sweet exterior of interpersonal relationships in South Korean society thus masks a darker side, a society of taboo topics and  21 years old, third-year undergraduate student in sociology, middle-class upbringing, from Guadeloupe; has been a fan for seven years. 47  20 years old, third-year undergraduate student majoring in law and legal culture, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for two years. 46

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concealed emotions, where many major problems, especially suicide and psychological conditions such as depression, are simply not discussed, despite their significant negative impact on society. Lou48 says: “It’s a society that’s calm, when someone has a problem, I get the sense that they don’t really talk about it, especially things like depression, it’s kind of a taboo, everyone has to fit into their little box in society.”

3.3

Male Dominance and Heteronormativity

Even if the Korean Wave offers a desirable model of masculinity, there are many young people who nonetheless point out that this ideal has not translated into any real challenge to the overwhelming dominance of men in South Korean society. Fans also note that K-pop groups are almost never co-ed (Lison49 was the only interviewee to mention a co-ed group in the survey, Kard*). They also highlight that the professional world of Korean show business is run by old men, moguls who perpetuate male sexual fantasies, in keeping with the false dichotomy of the child-like ingénue and the provocative and sexually dangerous femme fatale. On the flipside, male K-pop groups tend to have a flattering, dynamic, and not overtly sexualized image, running the gamut from the kkot minam (the sweet and romantic pretty boy stereotype) to the rarer pseudo-bad boy. On this topic, Lucie50 says: “So in terms of feminism, I would love to see a little bit more of that in the songs. The main subjects of K-pop songs are love, school, it’s always the same thing, or sometimes they’ll talk about happiness, sadness, death, things like that. It’s not very feminist.” Young people also highlight the male dominance on display in most K-dramas. Jeanne51 vehemently expresses her exasperation:

 18 years old, high school student, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years.  20 years old, first-year undergraduate student in foreign and regional languages and literature, with a specialization in Spanish, works part-time, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 50  20 years old, first-year undergraduate student in psychology, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 51  32 years old, head receptionist at a hotel, working-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 48 49

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It’s just not how we live, but it’s a very patriarchal society, the man is the head of the household, when young women are not married they don’t leave the house. It’s all about honor, all the time. It’s really a different lifestyle and sometimes, with our Western eyes, there are certain moments in shows when I’m like, “come on, do something! You can do it, you can assert yourself ”!

While certain female characters may appear to be “strong,” this in no way entails the reversal of gender roles, which remain firmly entrenched in South Korean society. While a handful of shows in a subgenre called yuga yenung (childcare reality entertainment) may present new forms of masculinity—such as Dad! Where Are We Going? which depicts six male celebrities going on a trip and spending a night away from home with their children (aged 4–11 years old), or Dad! Superman, which follows the everyday life of celebrities with their children52—these programs ultimately circle back to traditional expectations in terms of gender (Iryanti et al. 2017; Jung 2020). First of all, they derive entertainment and laughs from the fact that fathers are unexpectedly performing the childcare obligations generally performed by mothers (Kim 2014). Secondly, these shows target a female audience that expects to see a traditional division of domestic tasks along gender lines—this despite the fact that an increasing number of women in South Korea are attempting to reconcile work and domestic life, the professional and the personal (Swanson 2009; Park 2018). Young French fans thus question the models that are offered to them, especially when these present liberated women or stay-at-home dads, often arguing that South Korean society prevents women from having true autonomy and that social constraints regarding employment probably mean that very few Korean men actually aspire to a Western model of paternity, given their extremely heavy workloads.53

 These shows are in fact a hybrid between reality television and older “variety shows”; in Korean, yenung means “entertainment” and is used to refer to both of these types of shows. This hybrid of reality and variety is called kwanch’al yenung, which roughly translates to “observational entertainment.” 53  Just recently, a South Korean law went into effect to establish a maximum 52-hour work week (Moon and Shin 2018; Song 2018). 52

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The most expert of our interviewees observed the strict division of gender roles in Korean productions. Coralie,54 who taught herself Korean, explains that a married man is referred to as pakkat yangban, an “outside noble” (in the sense of existing in the public space), whereas a married woman is called a jip saram, “house person,” in keeping with the Confucian vision of gender roles. Sophie,55 who is studying Korean at college, emphasizes that South Korea is also ranked poorly in terms of gender equality. Indeed, in 2018, the country was ranked 115th (out of the 149 countries in the World Economic Forum) in terms of gender equality, in part due to a 37% gender pay gap and significant imbalances in the distribution of household tasks—which explains the country’s low birthrate, at least in part (Yoon 2016; Koo 2016; Lee 2018; Ying 2018). The most convincing proof of continued male dominance in South Korea is, as many young fans have pointed out, the plethora of sexual scandals that have recently come to light in the world of K-pop. Fans highlight the unequal treatment that men and women receive in this sector, as well as abuses of power and even rape. Coralie56 discusses this at length: There’s a huge scandal in Korea, absolutely gigantic, it’s getting a lot of media coverage because it involves the police and everything. There’s a couple of male K-pop singers and then guys whose fathers work in the conglomerate, their names don’t get revealed because they’re rich… anyways they have a discussion group where they were sharing videos, videos that showed them drugging and raping women. These videos were made by K-pop singers and in them, there were young women who were in training to become singers, and so there was a huge scandal with one of the female singers, one of the people in the group, and a super famous singer who is the manager of a night club and who is said to have organized meetings between trainees and guys from his nightclub. So often this involved minors and he was really abusing the fact that they were trainees. It’s made a huge splash. And it’s not an isolated case: the trainees receive tons of  19 years old, searching for employment after two years of journalism school (which she did not finish), middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 55  19 years old, first-year undergraduate student in foreign and regional languages and literature with a specialization in Korean, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 56  19 years old, searching for employment after two years of journalism school (which she did not finish), middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 54

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harassment because you know, those girls really want to succeed and so of course they respond well to a little bit of blackmail.

Talking about the same scandal, Marie57 laments: “They had everything that they wanted and they just destroyed it all, they destroyed the lives of these young girls, their own lives, the lives of their families and their real fans.” Note that in such statements, the very real violence inflicted on young women is compared to the symbolic violence inflicted on fans (the majority of whom are also women and thus feel betrayed). Coralie thus warns against the idealized version of gender relations conveyed by Hallyu and certain K-dramas in particular: So, yeah, the dramas that are all like “that guy is really sweet, he’s going to take care of you, he’s going to rush to come and pick you up at the airport,” well, in the end, no, that’s an idealized version because sure, there are some Korean guys who are sweet, but this is a very idealized view of relationships!

This critique of male dominance in South Korea occurs through comparison with French mores. The young fans we interviewed (a majority of whom are women) work or attend college, have mothers who work, some of whom are single mothers. All of them dream of a world, where being in a couple or having children is not an obstacle to achieving one’s personal and professional goals. Sophie58 speaks definitively on the subject, “I would not want to live in Korea, because it’s a very patriarchal society and even in terms of work, it’s super complicated for women,” and Louna59 shares the same opinion: That’s exactly why I couldn’t live there, women are discriminated against so much. I know there are tons of jobs where women are passed over in favor of men even though they might have more skills, that’s just not how it

 26 years old, aesthetician, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for eight years.  19 years old, first-year undergraduate student in foreign and regional languages and literature with a specialization in Korean, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 59  18 years old, waitress in a restaurant (she has left school and is taking her baccalaureate exam as a free candidate), working-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 57 58

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works over there, you’re a woman and you are “less than” you know, and I think that’s still a very prevalent attitude in Korea.

In our study, this critical interpretation is shared by long-standing fans and newer recruits to the Korean Wave equally.

3.4

Fierce Competition

The young fans we interviewed were also incredibly critical of the brutal interpersonal competition that is frequent in Korea, in particular in the university system. Numerous K-dramas depict this reality: in a country with few natural resources, human capital plays a key role, and total sacrifice is expected of young people and their parents (in particular their mothers), in order to ensure acceptance into one of the SKY universities (Seoul National University, Korea University, and Yonsei University), given that major and prestigious companies recruit from these elite universities. Ania60 elaborates: Over there, education, well school, already plays such a huge role, it’s very intense, with classes from 8 in the morning to 9 at night, and they’re all pushed to excel, in Japan like in Korea, and there are a ton of suicides because of work and studies. It’s very very elitist over there, you really have to be the best, they have classes at night and in the morning, like private lessons. So I mean, what we see in the K-dramas I imagine that’s what life is like for rich people, or at least people who are well-off and want to give everything to their kids.

Many young fans describe the hak-won system, which provides night courses for extra tutoring and the double-long day that South Korean students endure. They connect the dots between this rigorous schedule, and intense pressure, and the high rate of suicide in the country (suicide is the leading cause of death for teenagers in Korea). These aspects are well known by fans, regardless of whether they are familiar with the Asian  22 years old, second-year undergraduate student majoring in English and Chinese, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 60

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landscape or not (compare Ania, who is studying Chinese, with Milann,61 who is from Guadeloupe62 and studying sociology). Young fans also see how education is not just an individual student matter, but a family strategy; students must succeed to make their parents proud (and ensure their old age). Manon,63 who studied Korean in high school but did not continue those studies, describes how Samguk yusa (“The Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms,” a collection of traditional folktales from about 1280) based education on the philosophical concept of hongik ingan, which exhorts individuals to learn and strive to broadly benefit the human world. Education is viewed as a kind of competition that trains students and their families; many fans deem this frantic race “crazy,” “difficult,” or “unfair.” Perfectionism becomes a totalitarian regime, quite at odds with interpersonal relationships in the West, where personal freedom and growth are prized. According to Lila:64 Your parents can say, no you’re not going to wear makeup today, go back to your room. These are things that would be a bit complicated for me, plus in the long-term having a family over there means that your children have to go to school in Korea, the academic system is very challenging, and kids sleep like four hours a night, it’s so demanding. Everything has to be perfect.

Even though young French fans know that South Korean academic performance is excellent—some of them mention the results of PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) studies or the high rate of university attendance—and despite understanding that this system reflects the accelerated rate of change in South Korean society, they are unanimous in criticizing this system for its “pressure,” “human toll,” “exclusion,” and “consequences” (including suicide and alcoholism). The elements criticized are incompatible with the flattering image of Korea  21 years old, third-year undergraduate student in sociology, middle-class upbringing, from Guadeloupe; has been a fan for seven years. 62  Guadeloupe is a French overseas territory located in the Caribbean; it has a mixed-race population. 63  20 years old, third-year student in international languages and communication, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 64  25 years old, sustainable development consultant, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 61

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depicted in most of its television shows. Exceptions are quite rare—the aforementioned show Sky Castle* is one that focuses exclusively on these issues. Its storyline starts with the suicide of a mother, who was totally devoted to her children’s success and could not handle her son’s rejection of the system when he abandons his studies as a young man.

3.5

Of People and Pigeonholes

This critique of the academic system is closely linked to a broader critique of social structures in South Korea, which is seen as a society based on rank rather than merit—or, to use the classical dichotomy, as a society that functions according to ascribed status rather than achieved status (Linton 1936; Dubet 2010). In South Korea, professional obligations play a major role, but there are few opportunities for transcending one’s social origins. According to fans, the low rate of upward social mobility is rooted in a Confucian understanding of fate. Laura65 explains: “This fate thing, to us it seems really cheesy, a little childish and not realistic at all, in our culture I mean. But for them, I mean, destiny, unmyung, it’s part of their worldview. And they really think… yeah, there’s a lot of talk about fate.” Kira66 adds: Korea, for Koreans, it’s really different in the sense that social development is really limited. And you can’t have a career in Korea like you can have in the United States. For a lot of reasons, it’s almost impossible, so everything is very homogenous. They have just as many ideas in their head too, it’s not that they’re afraid of change, but in practice things are still really static.

As Lila explains,67 even though they are acquired at high cost, prestigious diplomas do not protect all Koreans from precarity and unemployment:  22 years old, French film school student, working-class upbringing, parents are Romanian and Italian; has been a fan for eight years. 66  22 years old, unemployed after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in international trade, working-­class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for ten years. 67  25 years old, sustainable development consultant, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 65

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The unemployment rate is super high among young people, especially qualified young people with college diplomas, they can’t find jobs. This is something that has been studied a lot in Korea, there’s something like 30% unemployment among young people graduating from college, they all work part-time jobs as waiters and stuff like that. Right now it’s super difficult for Koreans to find jobs, because there was a ton of growth in the 1980s and then afterwards there wasn’t really room for everyone, so it’s really hard today, a lot of people decide to work in the restaurant industry because Koreans don’t eat at home a lot.

The young fans we interviewed all condemn this falsely meritocratic but deeply unequal society, which continues to pigeonhole people as “gold spoons,” “silver spoons,” or “dirt spoons” according to a hierarchical ranking imposed at birth. These inequalities are on display in series like Boys over Flowers* or Inheritors,* which take place in elite high schools and narrativize class conflict, often taking the form of the violent harassment of (the quite few) scholarship students and attempts by students to free themselves from their parents’ clutches. Kira68 insists on this point: A lot of young Koreans call their country “Hell Korea,” they feel like they are at an impasse. So in fact their generation—our generation—is stuck between “we want to change things but our parents don’t really want us to change in that sense. And we don’t really know what kind of identity we can have.” You end up with a super educated youth population and not enough jobs. Or even if there are jobs, they ask for so much on your résumé that you end up unemployed again, or doing 3–4 part-time jobs on the side just to pay for your small apartment. These are things I think are pretty dangerous in terms of the future, because the chasm between the older generations and the new generation is just huge.

3.6

An Exclusionary Society

Unsurprisingly, young people also criticize South Korean society for the various forms of exclusion it produces. We have already mentioned how  22 years old, unemployed after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in international trade, working-­class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for ten years. 68

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individuals can be ostracized if they do not meet the high appearance standards of South Korean society: the men and women who reject these standards or fail to meet them are often confronted with daily harassment and discrimination (as seen in the K-drama Birth of a Beauty* mentioned by some of our interviewees). While the country appears highly modern technologically and economically speaking, Korea is described by interviewees as “lagging behind” in terms of fighting gender discrimination, racism, and homophobia. Young people are broadly unanimous in rejecting racism and homophobia (Galland 2000): the fight for equal treatment has translated into many global movements (LGBT Pride and Black Lives Matter, to cite just two) and has long been included in the action items of large international organizations.69 Given that these are hot-­ button issues in France,70 French Hallyu fans are already highly sensitive to the persistence of discrimination and inequality and thus comb through South Korean productions, often in vain, to find signs of inclusivity.71 To many young French fans, it seems that Korean society is still permeated by minjok thinking—the belief in a single Korean race that speaks one language and lives according to one set of customs. Korea is not a country of asylum or immigration, even if it is one of the few Asian nations to have signed the United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. There is relatively little awareness around ethno-­ racial discrimination in Korea, and multiculturalism does not play a major role. This was evidenced in recent months, when K-pop fans (who constitute an international and multiracial public) mobilized to support Black Lives Matter, well in advance of K-pop stars themselves, who largely remained quiet on the subject (Mayard 2020). This trait of South Korean society is particularly emphasized by young people of color. Aby,72  For example, the United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which was ratified in 1965 and entered into force in 1969, and the 2005 creation of an International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia. 70  In France, a survey called Trajectoires et origines works to document these kinds of discrimination (Beauchemin et al. 2016). 71  The World Values Survey ranks countries according to a number of indicators related to discrimination: it has ranked South Korea 51st out of 59 countries in terms of racial issues. http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp 72  20 years old, sales representative of Senegalese descent, middle-class upbringing, works in a ready-to-wear clothing store; has been a fan for three years. 69

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underscores the lack of multiculturalism in South Korea, especially compared to France: In terms of foreigners, it’s true that they treat them differently than other Koreans. Because Korea is a country that was relatively closed off until the end of the nineteenth century and tourism and such is still pretty new to them. So when they see a white person, they assume that that person is middle-class, or even rich. And when they see a Black person, they assume that person is ghetto, sort of not civilized, a hoodlum, or something like that. But there are tons of stereotypes over there that we don’t have any more [in our society]. Their view is biased because of the media, they don’t really see outside of their society. But that’s also why they don’t have like, an all-Black boy band or something like that.

Alice,73 who is from La Réunion,74 flat out declares that South Korean society is racist: The problem with South Korea is that they are really racist. Like, if you go over there and you’re white and blonde, they are going to have all sorts of assumptions about you, that you’re a slut or something like that. But if you’re Black, that’s really bad, already if you’re Asian but quite dark it’s considered unattractive, you’re a hick, so even to their own people they are racist, you see.

This broad and ordinary racism was also observed by Lison,75 who gives the following historical explanation: When they see a foreigner, they are always like “wow it’s a foreigner, crazy” and when they see a Black person, they’re just not used to it at all […]. There were some Brazilian soldiers in Korea and sometimes well, they had children with Koreans and so there were some mixed-race kids with darker  20 years old, unemployed, middle-class upbringing, originally from Réunion; has been a fan for eight years. 74  La Réunion is a French overseas territory located in the Indian Ocean; it has a mixed-race population. 75  20 years old, first-year undergraduate student in foreign and regional languages and literature, with a specialization in Spanish, works part-time, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 73

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skin, and Koreans would throw boiling water on their skin to try to lighten it. It’s really horrible, there’s always been this cult of pale skin.

Here, young people confront another Hallyu paradox: while this global cultural wave is unfurling over vast multicultural and multiethnic audiences and developing the latter’s openness to Korean alterity, Korean culture itself remains very reticent toward cosmopolitanism, in terms of its narrative templates and celebrity focus. Milann,76 describes his experience: Sometimes I watch Korean TV programming, because there’s the KBS YouTube channel, which is the national channel. And so for like an hour they will listen to what foreigners in South Korea have to say. It can be French people, Mexicans, South Africans, Ivorians, people from all over the world. And you can see how these individuals are struggling to integrate into South Korean society, even if it’s gotten a little more open thanks to globalization. You can see how they are the victims of discrimination and certain prejudices. I also watch some YouTube channels. For example, there are Black people who say that sometimes, people in the street just come up to them and take their picture, touch their hair, stuff that I would never be able to stand. I hate when people touch my hair. If you’re not a hairdresser, why are you putting your hand in my hair, I don’t understand, leave it alone [laughter].

The second kind of discrimination that young people highlighted was homophobia. This stems from the fact that the heterosexual couple with children is key to the equilibrium of Korean society, both in terms of its tradition and Confucian legacy, and in terms of modern demands, given the country’s very low birth rate (which has fallen to 0.98 children per woman in 2018, one of the lowest rates in the world (AFP 2019)). Marine77 exposes what she calls “the [heterosexual] norm of coupledom”: “Yeah, so couples are really this tool to get social recognition, there are tons of activities that are designed for couples. There are restaurants for  21 years old, third-year undergraduate student in sociology, middle-class upbringing, from Guadeloupe; has been a fan for seven years. 77  21 years old, sales consultant in children’s clothing (did not complete her vocational training certificate in cosmetology), working-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 76

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couples, outings for couples, it’s a whole thing and a lot of Koreans are in couples for the social recognition they get.” Jeanne78 continues this line of thinking by comparing with her experience in France: “Doing everything together, wearing the same shirts and the same shoes. It’s ultimately very important to be in a couple [in Korea]. K-dramas are all about couples.” Young people also note that homosexuality is rarely depicted in the Korean Wave. Milann79 says: “You don’t see a lot of gay people in Korean shows, whereas in Taiwanese shows, you see gay couples.” Emma80 thus deduces that “Koreans don’t really care for gay people yet, they don’t like it.” Young people are thus faced with yet another paradox: while Hallyu cultural products seem to offer new alternatives of masculinity and convey messages of self-acceptance, South Korean society continues to maintain strict gender roles and to exclude many people based on their sexual orientation or gender expression. Consequently, the passion that young fans may feel regarding the products of the Korean Wave does not necessarily translate into a deep commitment to South Korean society more broadly. In fact, while the latter may provoke curiosity and generate plans for travel and tourism, few of our interviewees actually envisioned living abroad in South Korea for any length of time. On the one hand, the cultural distance is often seen as too great to overcome, as Angèle81 explains: On the whole, I stay in my own French society, but I am interested in some things about that culture. Globally, there’s just a huge gap between us, how we live in France and how they live over there, even their way of thinking is totally different. How they think about work, love, friendship. It’s super different and I don’t really get the impression that I’m getting any closer to their way of thinking, we just don’t think the same.

 32 years old, head receptionist at a hotel, working-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years.  21 years old, third-year undergraduate student in sociology, middle-class upbringing, from Guadeloupe; has been a fan for seven years. 80  24 years old, third-year undergraduate student in music (flute performance), upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for two years. 81  22 years old, third-year undergraduate student (work-study) in public and social health management, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for two years. 78 79

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On the other hand, French society is also seen by many young people are a reassuring safe haven. South Korean society is appealing not because it proposes a wholesale substitution, a kind of cultural swap, but because it highlights ways to improve French society. Many young people, speaking about a wide variety of subjects, said something along the lines of “We could learn a lot from Korea”—but they do not wish to import the South Korean model of society as a whole. In this context, young Hallyu fans, who do wish to move to South Korea (despite never having been there, like Khadija82) are the exception that proves the rule.

4

Conclusion

The French reception of Hallyu has naturally been influenced by the culture and norms of the society of its consumers, as the latter look for similarities and differences with regard to their society of origin. This back-and-forth between the familiar and the exotic, the close and the faraway allows Hallyu fans to outline the principles of a good and fair society. The interest that they have in South Korean society is thus not driven by what seems universal about this society, anthropologically speaking, but rather what differentiates it from other cultures that they know. For many of the young fans we interviewed, South Korean society offers a different perspective on interpersonal relationships, thanks to its Confucian heritage, as well as “sweet” forms of masculinity, and a positive, optimistic vision of technological progress. All three of these elements paint South Korean modernity in a desirable light, in stark contrast to the individualism, hegemonic masculinity, and declinism of French society and Western societies, more broadly. South Korea can, however, shift from being an enviable model to a target of criticism when young fans examine how the country deals with what they glean the cultural products they consume in terms of personal liberties and discrimination, gender equality, and social mobility—elements which should be at the basis of any society that respects human dignity, according to our interviewees. Amongst our fans  20 years old, obtaining an undergraduate work/study degree in asset management, upper-class upbringing, of Tunisian descent; has been a fan for three years. 82

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of the Korean Wave, no trace of the koreaboos,83 or individuals who are so obsessed with Korean culture that they reject their own and pretend to be Korean themselves. Instead, our interviewees elaborate their own taste for Korean products, following their own hearts while negotiating the critical tension between fictional worlds and reality, as discovered via extra-fictional channels (documentaries, websites, magazines), and creating a dialogue between South Korea and their culture and society of origin.

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Elan, Priya. 2019. Race Shouldn’t Be Going In and Out of Fashion. We Need a Fully Diverse Industry. The Guardian, November 5. Galland, Olivier. 2000. L’évolution des valeurs des Français s’explique-t-elle par le renouvellement des générations ? In Les Valeurs des Français, ed. Pierre Bréchon, 202–216. Paris: Armand Colin. Garcia, Marie-Carmen. 2016. Amours clandestines. Sociologie de l’extraconjugalité durable. Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon. Giraud, Christophe. 2017. L’amour réaliste. La nouvelle expérience amoureuse des jeunes femmes. Paris: Armand Colin. Goddard, Kevin. 2000. ‘Looks Maketh the Man’: The Female Gaze and the Construction of Masculinity. The Journal of Men’s Studies 9 (1): 23–39. Haywood, Chris, and Thomas Johansson. 2017. Marginalized Masculinities. Contexts, Continuities and Change. London: Routledge. Hessel, Stéphane. 2011. Time for Outrage! New York: Twelve. Hooper, Charlotte. 2001. Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Iryanti, Muri, Aquarini Priyatna, and Raden Muhammad Mulyadi. 2017. The Construction of Fathers New Masculinity in South Korea Variety Show Superman Is Back. Humaniora 8 (4): 339–348. Jung, Sun. 2011. Korean Masculinities and Transcultural Consumption. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Jung, Grace. 2020. Aspirational Paternity and the Female Gaze on Korea, Reality-Variety TV. Media Culture & Society 42 (2): 191–206. Kaplan, Uri. 2018. Rebuilding the ‘Eastern Country of Ritual Propriety’: Decorum Camps, So˘wo˘n Stays, and the Confucian Revival in Contemporary Korea. Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies 18 (1): 59–84. Kim, Mira. 2014. New Types of Masculinity Represented in TV and Its Limitations: Focusing on Week-End Variety Programs. Journal of the Korean Contents Association 14 (1): 88–96. Koo, Se-Woong. 2016. South Korea’s Misogyny. The New York Times, June 13. Lee, Hyeon-seo. 2015. The Girl with Seven Names. A North Korean Defector’s Story. London: William Collins. Lee, Claire. 2018. Misogyny in Korean Online Communities a Serious Concern: Report. The Korea Herald, October 8. Linton, Ralph. 1936. The Study of Man: An Introduction. New York: D. Appleton-­ Century Co. Mayard, Aline. 2020. BlackLifeMatter: comment les fans de K-pop ont aidé la révolte ». ADN Innovation, June 11.

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Moon, Sue H., and Jongtae Shin. 2018. The Return of Superman? Individual and Organizational Predictors of Men’s Housework in South Korea. Journal of Family Issues 39 (1): 180–208. Oh, Chuyun. 2014. The Politics of the Dancing Body: Racialized and Gendered Femininity in Korean Pop. In The Korean Wave: Korean Popular Culture in Global Context, ed. Yasue Kuwahara, 53–81. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Owuku, Janelle. 2019. The 2010s Were a Turning Point for Diversity in Fashion. Vogue, July 18. Park, Sun-jin. 2018. One Out Seven Young Koreans Not Interested in Marriage. Hankyoreh, April 15. Pasquier, Dominique. 2002. ‘Les savoirs minuscules’. Le rôle des médias dans l’exploration des identités de sexe. Éducation et sociétés 10 (2): 35–44. Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the 21st Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pişcărac, Diana. 2016. Medial K-Dramas: A Cross-Section of South Korea’s Global Cultural Industry. Romanian Journal of Sociological Studies 1: 43–60. Rozman, Gilbert, ed. 1991. The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and its Modern Adaptation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Śleziak, Tomasz. 2013. The Role of Confucianism in Contemporary South Korean Society. Rocznik Orientalistyczny 66 (1): 27–46. Song, Jung-a. 2018. South Korea to Cap Working Week at 52 Hours. Financial Times, July 2. Swanson, Lisa. 2009. Complicating the ‘Soccer Mum’. The Cultural Politics of Forming Class-Based Identity, Distinction, and Necessity. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 80 (2): 345–354. Swidler, Ann. 1986. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. American Sociological Review 51 (2): 273–286. Wolff, Francis. 2017. Trois utopies contemporaines. Paris: Fayard. ———. 2019. Plaidoyer pour l’universel. Fonder l’humanisme. Paris: Fayard. Ying, Moxy. 2018. This Fund Manager Wants to Prove Gender Equality Is Good for Profits. Bloomberg, December 3. Yoon, Soo-Yeon. 2016. Is Gender Inequality a Barrier to Realizing Fertility Intentions? Fertility Aspirations and Realizations in South Korea. Asian Population Studies 12 (2): 203–219. Zakaria, Fareed. 2006. The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest. London: Penguin.

8 Using Hallyu to Stand Out

Many studies have shown just how powerful a tool cultural consumption can be for young adults leaving childhood behind (Gléravec 2010; Octobre et al. 2010), in particular, because it allows specific age groups to experiment with different tastes and discover those that make them “unique.” Young people are savvy consumers: they pick and choose from the plethora of options offered by global cultural industries to elaborate their preferences, their affiliations, and their forms of belonging within specific cultural universes (understood here as collective sets of representations of the world and oneself in the world). As young people discover new styles and change their tastes, their belonging to different groups and subgroups can change. Such diversity and mutability is one great advantage of the forms of affiliation and belonging that stem from cultural consumption, as opposed to social, professional, academic, or familial ties. The Korean Wave is thus an ideal vantage point from which to analyze the typical dynamics of adolescence and youth1: between free choice and peer pressure, between strong attachments and cultivating a secret garden, between discoveries and challenges, Hallyu cultural products  On the trials and tribulations of adolescence, see Hall 1904, often considered to be the foundational text for modern studies of adolescence. 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Cicchelli, S. Octobre, The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84296-3_8

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provide the resources that young people need as they transition to adulthood in our contemporary societies, marked by a high degree of individualization and increasingly varied (and fragmented or even “misled”) life paths.2 The Hallyu passion, which is far from being shared by all or even most members of France’s younger generation, has nonetheless left its mark on adolescence by highlighting the sui generis cosmopolitanism that is the result of the Korean Wave’s inherently globalized development. The global cultural offering has transformed difference into a marketing asset and an almost infinite source of possibilities for hybridization, thus supporting one of the cornerstones of cosmopolitan society: the omnipresence of alterity (Beck and Grande 2010; Rumford 2013). In this context, integrating an exotic culture into one’s everyday routine affects how individuals develop a reflexive self that is open to the world. It also has a significant impact on their forms of belonging and how they recognize others (who are no longer limited to close contacts such as friends and family). Given that they are the creations of an alternative, post-­American and post-Japanese hybrid pop culture, Hallyu products give young fans a specific set of tools for cosmopolitan empowerment. Loving Hallyu products rather than mainstream offerings means asserting one’s unique taste, compared to both one’s immediate environment and the larger youth market, but it also helps young fans develop a specific relationship to the world. Openness to Hallyu and the cosmopolitan skills that it entails (expanding one’s cultural and linguistic horizons, among other things) (Cicchelli and Octobre 2019) profoundly influences life choices for some young people, in particular with regard to academic and professional trajectories in the transition to adulthood. While, like any cultural phenomenon, the Hallyu doesn’t entirely escape the hierarchies inherent in cultural products and publics, attempts at various forms of empowerment take the form of (more or less conscious) socially situated strategies that revisit major questions related to social mobility, gender, and age.

 There are countless studies on this topic. See Evans and Furlong 2000; Walther 2002; Cicchelli 2013.

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Growing Up with the Korean Wave

When young people speak—largely positively—of the role that the consumption of South Korean cultural products has played in their lives, one expression keeps coming back: “growing up.” Many of our interviewees traced their taste for Hallyu products back to its inception and were able to identify a tipping point when they truly became fans; for most, this happened during adolescence, and specifically during middle school. These young people generally share the traditional vision of adolescence—bequeathed to us by literature as well as the social sciences—as a time of great turbulence (Cicchelli and Merico 2001), but underline how Hallyu helped them to get through this difficult period in their lives.

1.1

Hallyu and Adolescent Uniqueness

Many young people emphasized the importance of their passion in developing a unique identity, which is one of the main struggles of adolescence, one made even more difficult when the subject of one’s passion lies outside of the mainstream. Were we to judge by the broad national media coverage in France, the public only became aware of the Korean Wave around 2012, thanks to the astounding success of Psy’s “Gangnam Style,” as well as the massively attended BTS*3 concerts in Paris in 2019 and 2020 and K-pop fan mobilizations in favor of Black Lives Matter, or against online racism and Donald Trump (Poncet 2012; Chauffet 2019; Brandy 2020; Mayard 2020). But despite its planetary success, Hallyu is still not a mainstream taste, unlike Anglo-American music, movies, and television shows. In many ways, Hallyu remains a niche interest in France. This is precisely why it helps so many fans develop a unique identity and also why it is sometimes criticized as being incomprehensibly “other” by its detractors. This is what Jamila4 means when she says the following: “In the end I tell myself ‘it’s ok,’ because everyone has their own passions,  The South Korean cultural products referred to in this book and marked with an asterisk are presented in the glossary at the end of the book. 4  21 years old, activity leader at a recreation center, working-class Moroccan upbringing; has been a fan for seven years. 3

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their own thing, and if you feel alone at this moment, well, that’s what makes you unique.” A passion for Hallyu is thus seen as proof of a fan’s autonomy and distance from the peer pressure to conform and appreciate mainstream products. Speaking about her experience in a less privileged middle school, Kira5 offers a great example of the struggle to stand out by means of a unique taste preference: “So in my middle school, it’s about 50% Africans, 40% Arabs and the 10% left are ‘French from France’ or Asian, etc. As a result though, everyone followed the same trends, and as soon as someone asserted themselves and a slightly different taste, that was frowned upon.” Marie6 makes a broader claim about how fans use their Hallyu tastes to stand out: There’s a real need to be different among people who listen to K-pop. In fact, the majority of them are 15 years old, which is when, as a teenager, you want to stand out and be unique, and a lot of them have the impression that they can do this by listening to music that quote unquote no one else listens to, stuff from South Korea, whereas everyone else is talking about American stuff day in, day out.

All of the young people that we interviewed expressed both the pressure to conform and the desire to stand out, regardless of their cultural or social background. Without being the source of this desire for uniqueness, the Korean Wave certainly feeds into it, by giving young people a “bubble” in which to move around. Alix7 explains: “I think that when you’re a teenager, you have to find a kind of bubble. And here I’m talking about K-pop, not necessarily Korean TV shows, but I mean, that can be part of it too.” Under the auspices of Hallyu, and K-pop and K-dramas in particular, this “bubble” works like a protective shield for teenagers.

 22 years old, unemployed after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in international trade, working-­ class Moroccan upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 6  26 years old, esthetician, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for eight years. 7  24  years old, Master’s student in Asian studies, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for eight years. 5

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1.2

271

Hallyu and Adolescent Turmoil

When young fans talk about their journey through adolescence, they often mention physical, mental, and interpersonal transformations, some of which unfold amidst troubled family situations. To navigate these sometimes treacherous waters, teenager Hallyu fans use their passion as a kind of compass to orient and “find themselves,” as Marine8 explains: “In terms of family, well my parents just separated so I think that Hallyu has really helped me to find myself.” If an individual’s attachment to Korean Wave products grows, it is often because these products help to support them by conveying positive messages about the various challenges that they face as teenagers. Caroline9 describes the resonance that K-dramas can have for young people who are standing up to their parents, as was her case: There are a lot of dramas that focus on family conflict. You learn some stuff, it makes you think. There was one situation where the heroine was fighting with her father, they weren’t speaking. Then she went to talk to him and things were better afterwards, even if it was complicated. So I think, well, in cases of conflict, it’s better to talk it out. But at the same time, it’s just another piece of evidence, I already knew that’s what you were supposed to do.

In this young woman’s case, the interactions depicted in the show encouraged her to act in a similar fashion to resolve family conflict. In our sample, there were many other young people who explained how Korean television shows provided them with behavioral and emotional guidance in their everyday life. The message conveyed by K-pop really hits the mark when it echoes the trials and tribulations of adolescence, while also depicting values that can inspire desirable behaviors. Hallyu products do not just constitute a kind of repertoire of possible behaviors: by presenting inspirational Idols,  21  years old, sales consultant in children’s clothing (did not complete her vocational training certificate in cosmetology), working-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 9  20  years old, third-year undergraduate student majoring in law and legal culture, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for two years. 8

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they also help young people struggling with self-esteem. Mélanie,10 a young woman who says that she has never felt good about herself, explains how she gained confidence thanks to the successful role models offered by K-pop girl groups such as Girls’ Generation,* Blackpink,* Red Velvet,* and Twice*: I was never very comfortable in my own skin and thanks to my passion [for Hallyu] I rediscovered myself, I gained confidence and as a result now I feel much better about myself [nervous laughter]. So like, seeing these girls with so much self-assurance, ok I only see them in their public appearances of video clips, not when the cameras aren’t on, but anyways they made me want to get better and change.

For her part, Lou11 insists on the powerful messages of positivity conveyed by South Korean cultural products, and how these helped to counter certain depressive tendencies that she experienced during her teenage years: Because it’s a kind of music that has positive messages, in their videos they are always doing stuff together, it’s happy and joyful and positive. It’s had this effect on a lot of fans, I’ve seen discussions on the internet, like this woman who was taking care of former depressives and BTS’* music helped them in group therapy to relax and feel better. For me, it’s a kind of music that really helped me to grow up and to deal with some really difficult moments in middle school especially.

Similarly, Stéphanie,12 who used to suffer from an almost debilitating shyness, argues that her hard-won confidence is the result of her passion for Hallyu: “I think that it allowed me to have this kind of solid basis to rely on when dealing with some obstacles that I had, like my shyness.” In addition to these forms of support, cultural products can also play a therapeutic role, helping to heal the wounds caused by bullying or  22  years old, specialized receptionist working in a psychiatric medical center, working-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 11  18 years old, high-school student, upper-classing upbringing; has been a fan for four years. 12  28 years old, nursing assistant at a hospital, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 10

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harassment. Many of the young women that we interviewed said that they had suffered from bullying in middle and high school, while such grievances were not mentioned by our male interviewees. Perhaps not coincidentally, bullying is a major theme in K-dramas that take place in South Korean high-school settings (including Inheritors,* Boys over Flowers,* and Sky Castle* just to name a few); it is also frequently mentioned in many K-pop songs. BTS,* for instance, has many songs that deal with the problems of bullying and harassment. In partnership with UNICEF,13 BTS* put out a video called Answer: Love Myself to fight bullying on the International Day of Friendship on 30 July 2019. Coralie14 expounds at length on this topic, explaining how her painful high school experience, especially due to being relentlessly teased by her classmates, led her to find solace in Hallyu. “It’s actually what allowed me to get out of that mess. It’s what allowed me to find myself, and go beyond this little shell that I had created to protect myself from bullying.” Julia15 provides possibly the most clear-cut example of the therapeutic—almost magical—benefits of identification with cultural products. With regard to Hallyu, she says: It’s a world that really helped me when I wasn’t doing well. When you feel lonely and you listen to music, everything is different, you tell yourself, ok, well at least they understand me, it’s like a childish illusion. Especially because I was bullied in middle school, so I was already pretty unhappy in my own skin. This wasn’t what was good for me. And so when I came across BTS* and saw how they dressed, Korean webtoons, K-dramas, etc., I said to myself “that’s it! That’s what I need! That’s what fits me,” and I just stayed in this world.

The exotic aspect of Hallyu products allows young people such as Julia to distance themselves from the bullying that they experience in daily life,

 Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eo_mo5vA7twE  19 years old, searching for employment after two years of journalism school (which she did not finish), upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 15  23 years old, second-year undergraduate student in economic and social administration, upper-­ class upbringing; has been a fan for eight years. 13 14

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while also creating a strong attachment via cathartic identification.16 In order to further develop her confidence, Julia created a YouTube channel devoted to her passion for Korean beauty regimes, drawing on her personal experience traveling to South Korea: I started my YouTube channel, originally it was really to work on myself, I had a lot of hang-ups and so when I saw that people were so supportive on my blog I thought, ok let’s try this! It was really therapeutic, ultimately, I told myself that I was going to really see myself, it would help with my confidence, and I could talk about things that were interesting, like my experience when I went to Korea and stuff.

Once timid and closed off, now Julia has become a recognized expert, thanks to her passion for Hallyu cultural products.

1.3

Hallyu and Adolescent Stigma

As we already know, adolescence is a time when young people start to move away from the influence of their families and adopt the norms and values of youth culture more broadly (Octobre 2014), while simultaneously becoming more susceptible to peer pressure. In terms of the Korean Wave, this two-fold movement—emancipation from the parent-child relationship, and integration into elective social circles (Cicchelli 2013)— causes stigma associated with the social definition of age groups in three ways. First, the Korean Wave encounters the condescension of adults with regard to adolescent taste (adults generally judge products aimed at a teenage audience as tacky or of poor quality). Secondly, since the majority of Hallyu fans are girls, the products are often criticized for their naïve, immature sentimentality or “sappiness.” Finally, the fact that Hallyu cultural products offer an “effeminate” version of masculinity is targeted by adults who are critical of this allegedly “deviant” gender identity. These forms of stigma can be seen in intergenerational dynamics as well as in  For cathartic identification, see Jauss (1982: 177) who defines it as what allows the audience to “free” itself “from the real interests and entanglements of its world” and step into the shoes of the hero, who suffers or otherwise finds himself in a difficult situation, in order to provoke internal liberation through tragic emotion or laughter. 16

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the broader social discourse on youth as a sociological entity and a marketing segment. Teenage enthusiasm for the Korean Wave forms part of the struggle for autonomy that young people engage in as they grow up. This budding autonomy often takes the shape of distance from the likes and dislikes of one’s parents. Given that its products are exotic in terms of language, aesthetics, and culture, Hallyu appears inherently foreign to older generations in the West, which are more familiar with Anglo-American pop and rock (or in France, French variety). Without sharing in their children’s passion, some parents nonetheless see interest in South Korean cultural products as a sign of openness, a trait which they appreciate. This is the case for Clémentine’s17 parents: Yeah, my parents were very receptive, my mother more so than my father but they never said anything to me like “it’s weird that you’re listening to Asian music” or anything. They were very open-minded when I had them listen to stuff, they would say “that’s not bad, pretty cool.” They never said to me “you’re a weirdo, stop,” they never said anything to me like that or suggested it.

On the whole, however, most parents are somewhat critical of their children’s newfound enthusiasm for the Korean Wave, whether this takes the form of explicit critiques of Hallyu for its “foreignness” or “weirdness,” or implicit silence and rejection. When Laura18 went full throttle in Hallyu as a teenager, her parents strictly opposed it, criticizing the effeminate nature of the male singers and the poor quality of the products. “At the beginning, when I listened to what they were saying to me, I was shocked, it was really this kind of cultural conflict,” she explains. As for Marine’s19 parents, they were mostly just “waiting for it to pass,” banking on the fact that this was a fad linked to their daughter’s immaturity. Marine says: “My parents didn’t share my passion for Hallyu, not at all.  22 years old, graduate student in Korean studies, working-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 18  22 years old, French film school student, working-class upbringing, parents are Romanian and Italian; has been a fan for eight years. 19  21  years old, sales consultant in children’s clothing (did not complete her vocational training certificate in cosmetology), working-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 17

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They didn’t understand me at all, they said I would grow out of it.” In both of these cases, criticism of the cultural “illegitimacy” of certain products is ascribed to adolescent immaturity, thus denigrating Hallyu on the whole. Julie,20 a precocious fan who has been invested in the Korean Wave for over six years already, explains as follows: I was young, I was like 14 or so. Of course I had bad taste […]. Everyone treated me like a kid. But now, since I’m more mature, maybe it’s not really that shitty. In any case, I think they are much better at accepting now. Well, it’s not that they didn’t accept it before, but they judged it, and now they don’t judge anymore.

For girls, there is a gendered axis of cultural legitimacy that persists alongside critiques of immaturity. Stéphanie21 explains: “K-pop gets this reputation that it’s for teenagers and it’s super commercial.” When she began to be interested in K-pop, in seventh grade, Stéphanie came face-­ to-­face with gender stereotypes: “Everyone around you just treats you like a teenager in heat [laughter]… but I mean, in fact you’re interested in culture and a lot of other things.” It is true, of course, that many female fans report having initially been drawn to Korean products during their teenage years because of the love stories that many of these products depict. This was the case for Laura22: “When I was in middle school, and then in high school, I watched a lot of the shows that took place in high schools, cheesy little love stories like Boys Over Flowers,* and yeah, there was a lot of romantic stuff.” But this typical preoccupation with romance—a common rite of passage in adolescence—becomes a source of gendered stigma for some young women. Many fathers criticize Korean cultural products, calling the various male artists “effeminate,” “gay,” or “homos,” alleged deviants from the norms of heterosexual relationships and hegemonic masculinity. Julia23 states:  18 years old, first-year student in childcare studies, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 21  28 years old, nursing assistant at a hospital, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 22  22 years old, French film school student, working-class upbringing, parents are Romanian and Italian; has been a fan for eight years. 23  23 years old, second-year undergraduate student in economic and social administration, upper-­ class upbringing; has been a fan for eight years. 20

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It’s true that I got a lot of really unpleasant comments from my father, along the lines of “they look like they’re gay,” or “why do you like that, are you a lesbian?” He even said I was a lesbian because I was watching these guys who were effeminate, except I didn’t see them as being effeminate.

The attitude displayed by Julia’s father is what Raewyn Connell (2005) calls “complicit masculinity.” The rejection of alternative forms of masculinity by men like Julia’s father is also accompanied by a desire for dominance over women, given that the accusation of the artists’ homosexuality feeds into intimations that female fans are themselves gay. This reaction is not the purview of a specific social class: it can be witnessed in privileged families (such as Julia’s) just as often as in working-class households (this is the case for Kira, Abby, and Jeanne). In addition, when fathers disparage their daughters’ tastes, they combine critiques of deviant sexuality with claims that the products in question are of poor quality (often using adjectives like “dumb,” “bad,” or “cheesy”).24 In fact, these two lines of criticism reinforce each other, and the combination is often concealed under the umbrella of “generational differences.” This latter argument often relies on a broader criticism of where these “deviant” representations of masculinity are coming from—that is, a culture and a geographical location that stands outside of Europe. Odalie25 thus explains her father’s rebukes: “My father lives in the country, he’s kind of closed-off, I mean to get a positive reaction from him about this stuff is going to be very hard. He’s the kind of guy to be like ‘oh, the Chinese guys,’ that’s him.” The rare times that mothers come to their daughters’ defense are a reflection of matrilineal complicity, a fact that Julia26 observes. Julia was supported by her mother who, following a difficult divorce, lived for a while with a manga-lover: My mother, she was with this guy, and when he was younger he was also really into Japan, so you see, she accepted this, it didn’t bother her and  With regard to French fans, this explanation seems more fruitful than hypothesizing a “feminine universalism” as Oh and Jang propose doing for Asian publics (Oh and Jang 2011). 25  25 years old, banking advisor, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for eight years. 26  23 years old, second-year undergraduate student in economic and social administration, upper-­ class upbringing; has been a fan for eight years. 24

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according to her, everyone can like whatever they want. So I’m lucky that my mom is supportive in that regard. But my father is much less help, it was really difficult, well ok now we’re just butting heads, so that is a thing, but it was very, very challenging when I was a teenager.

In cases like these, Hallyu is not just a preference shared by mother and daughter,27 but also a way to reinforce ties in opposition to the paternal authority figure.

2

Eschewing the Mainstream

No matter how freely and lucidly fans choose to pursue their passion for Hallyu—and no matter how much pleasure it brings them—they will likely face challenges, less on account of the attachment itself (even if some interviewees emphasized their dependence on Korean products), and more because of the negative perception of these products in their social circles. Even if the rebukes made by parents (and especially fathers) can be hurtful, these are ultimately chalked up to a generational conflict that plays out on the contemporary stage of global cultural consumption. Many young women concluded their account of paternal rejection with these words: “It’s normal, their generation just doesn’t get it.” However, criticism from one’s peers can be truly challenging for young fans to confront and withstand.

2.1

Asserting Oneself at the Risk of Exclusion

The unconventional and exotic nature of the Korean Wave has prompted harsh criticism and hurtful jokes about both the products and their fans from peer groups that only rarely share their passion for Hallyu. As a result, young fans must use a number of subtle strategies to protect themselves. This runs counter to our expectation that fans would engage in a certain level of proselytism, or at least attempt to justify their taste to  This is a classic trait of cultural transmission, which occurs more frequently through women. See Octobre 2011. 27

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their peers. In fact, this rarely happens with Hallyu. When young fans describe how they became enamored with the Korean Wave, they first and foremost insist on the fact that this passion of theirs has placed them outside of the mainstream. Interviewees use words like “unique” or “fringe” when talking about their solitary Hallyu pursuits, shedding a light on the dark side of the aforementioned quest for uniqueness. In the case of a taste that is only shared by a minority of people outside of the mainstream (such as Hallyu), young fans do not openly shout their passion from the rooftops when asserting themselves. On the contrary, they tend to dissimulate their preferences, even from their friends. As a result, unlike most other youth interests, where peer pressure and validation play an important role (Pasquier 2005; Balleys 2015), devotion to Hallyu is generally kept in one’s “secret garden:” “it’s my little thing,” “it’s my secret pleasure,” and “it’s something that’s just mine” are all phrases used by interviewees when describing their trajectory as fans. Despite wildly different profiles, many young fans express the same desire to “keep [their passion] to themselves,” to “not share,” and to “not talk about” their dedication to the Korean Wave. Hippolyte,28 a fan of both K-dramas and the Korean language more generally, puts it this way: “No, it’s just me. I would say it’s just me and then I have a couple of friends who are sort of interested that I can talk to about it, but generally I do this alone.” Similarly, Lison29 explains that even today, when Korean Wave products are more well-known and she is steeped in cosmopolitanism, thanks to her university program in foreign languages, she is forced to hide her preferences out of fear of attracting stereotype-based criticism: I don’t really talk about it because I know that K-pop, uh, at the beginning, well the Korean name nobody knows, or likes really, they just have this stereotypical image in their mind. When I say that I listen to K-pop, people often say, “oh, BTS,*” whereas in fact I don’t listen to BTS at all. After that, people who are afraid of talking about their interests, it’s because they get  31 years old, attending rheumatologist in a hospital, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for nine years. 29  20 years old, first-year undergraduate student in foreign and regional languages and literature, with a specialization in Spanish, works part-time, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 28

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lots of comments like “that’s lame.” Whenever we talk about K-pop or Korea in general, people have the BTS stereotype, they just think about plastic surgery and all that jazz. So yeah, obviously you don’t want to always get the same sort of negative comments. For me, though, it’s water off my back, I don’t really care, you like it or you don’t like it, I won’t talk about it.

Keeping one’s passion to oneself certainly protects young fans from ridicule and mockery, but this strategy does not prevent a kind of persistent malaise from developing. Delphine,30 a graduate student in political science, explains: “When I meet people, I don’t really talk about it, ok well now it’s a bit better, I say it more as a joke.” She is self-deprecating when she talks about her love of Hallyu, to ward off the ridicule of her peers. Maëva,31 on the contrary, can’t seem to get over “the shame” that she feels about loving K-pop: I really don’t want to mix my love [for the Korean Wave] with my real life, let’s say, it’s kind of my secret garden. So I don’t particularly want people to see who I am online, what I post, yeah, I’m still a bit ashamed with regards to some people my age, but I think it’s better. At least this allows me to experience things differently, in a kind of bubble.

Even though it is a rarer phenomenon than the freely chosen solitude of the impassioned fan, the rejection of one’s peers and resulting isolation is a much more painful experience. Jasmine32 describes feeling left out, given that her interest in Hallyu came about at a time when South Korean products were still relatively unknown in France (circa 2010). “I felt really alone, because even if I liked some of the same things as other people, this is what I really preferred. Little by little I realized that as I was talking about it more, they all thought it was weird, so I stopped talking about it and kept my tastes to myself.” It is a small step from self-imposed  24 years old, postgraduate student in political science, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 31  23  years old, undergraduate student in mathematics and computer science, working-class upbringing; has been a fan for two years. 32  21 years old, works part-time at a Korean restaurant while preparing to enroll in a Master’s of Political Science with a focus on international relations; holds a bachelor’s degree in Korean from INALCO, middle-class upbringing, of Vietnamese descent; has been a fan for nine years. 30

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solitude to exclusion and isolation: quite a few young fans report taking this step, which transforms their love for Hallyu into one of the ordeals of adolescence.

2.2

Seeking Support

It should be noted that if young fans sometimes keep their love for Korean products to themselves, it is not that these fans are censoring themselves because they are less privileged, or live in less open environments, or are otherwise forced to cultivate their secret garden to avoid becoming the target of social opprobrium. In reality, we encountered this attitude among the most privileged of our interviewees in terms of cultural and academic capital—precisely the group from which we would expect a highly transparent display of cosmopolitan omnivorism (Coulangeon 2017), given that this is a trait which is prized by the elites. However, we also saw it among young people who live in an environment that is culturally open and who display this openness as a principle (Cicchelli and Octobre 2018). On the ground, however, almost all young fans develop their passion for Hallyu in the absence of any validation from their peer groups, albeit sometimes citing the rare individuals who initiated them into the cult of Hallyu. Ludivine33 thus mentions her best friend’s contribution to this journey: “I started with K-pop and at the end of 2017, my best friends said to me, ‘look, this is really good and everything,’ but my reaction was like, ‘I’ll never listen to this!’ But finally in November 2017, I started listening to K-pop and it became my passion.” What drove our young interviewees to take the plunge and convert to fandom, thus overcoming the social stigma associated with liking K-pop, was in many cases friendship. The secret garden of fandom is open to partners in crime, many of whom are or become the best of friends, but mostly on internet. Transnational social networks are often used by young fans to find support, given that their immediate surroundings (middle and high schools, universities, work environments) are generally lacking in individuals who  21 years old, third-year undergraduate student in business development, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for two years. 33

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share their passion. Lila34 explains: “Because these networks are like communities, I’ve met a lot of people that I can share these passions with, and I spend most of my time online when I’m not working.” Stéphanie35 emphasizes the fact that shared tastes help to form bonds: “When you know that everyone is there [on online fan sites] for the same reason, because they share the same passion, it’s easy to establish ties.” Young fans are particularly struck by the sheer number of possibilities opened up by Hallyu on the internet, which allows them to meet fans from all over the world. When describing the friendships she has made on online fan sites, Jeanne36 emphasizes this point: The funny thing is, we’re all crazy about Korea, but I meet people living in France who are from Tunisia, from Germany, from Spain, from lots of places. And even though we all live in France, we don’t live the same way, so how we look at Korea is going to be different, naturally. When we talk to each other, that comes up.

This intermingling of individuals with distinct, nationally inflected forms of socialization but identical patterns of cultural consumption translates into a powerful feeling of belonging to a transnational community (Min et al. 2019; Yoon 2019). Such virtual contact can sometimes lead to in-person encounters, as was the case for Jeanne, who attended an online fan meet-up in Paris, with individuals from all of the countries she cited above. Ophélie37 also recounts a similar experience: “We bonded over social networks, and then we ended up meeting in person and becoming friends.” Concerts are also occasions where fans can meet in person and make new friends. This is what happened to Camille38: “I’ve been to concerts  25  years old, sustainable development consultant, upper-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years. 35  28 years old, nursing assistant at a hospital, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 36  31 years old, head receptionist at a hotel, working-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 37  27  years old, sales representative in a ready-to-wear clothing store in Paris, family is from Guadeloupe; has been a fan for ten years. 38  20 years old, third-year undergraduate student in foreign and regional languages, cultures, and literature, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 34

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alone and while I was in line, I made friends with random people.” Julia39 particularly likes these kinds of encounters: “When you’re at a concert, you talk to the people who are near you, it’s cool.” Corentin,40 on the other hand, explains how having a shared interest can help to meet people in a wide variety of circumstances: So, it’s helped in the sense that, for example, in nightclubs, or during student activities, there are always foreign exchange programs. So in schools and all sorts of student activities there are going to be foreign students: from England, from America, from Colombia, from China, from Vietnam, from the DRC, and from Korea. So I would start to talk to them, in English of course. And we came to the subject of K-pop, pretty quickly actually, and I just simply found an ARMY.41

The products of the Korean Wave allow for spontaneous ties to be established between strangers, for immediate, circumstantial communion based on a singular passion. For young fans, their passion thus plays a therapeutic role, allowing them to overcome the challenges of adolescence and forge their own identity.

3

Hallyu as Cosmopolitan Empowerment

Products associated with Hallyu allow young fans to stand out from the crowd, but they also provide an open window onto the possibility of other worlds. Consequently, these products are powerful tools of empowerment. They also add a cosmopolitan dimension to this empowerment, which young fans are aware of, and attached to, in varying degrees.

 23 years old, second-year undergraduate student in economic and social administration, upper-­ class upbringing; has been a fan for eight years. 40  19 years old, currently enlisted in France’s national civil service program after one year of journalism studies, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 41  Name of the BTS fan club and thus by extension, of one of its members. 39

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Empowerment Through Openness

The young fans we interviewed emphasized the fact that their passion for South Korean products—easily identifiable on account of their ethno-­ national differences—has made them more open-minded and has contributed to their personal growth. Stéphanie42 formulates it as follows: “It allowed me to discover new things. I think that now, thanks to [Hallyu] I’ve become a lot more open to the world and to other people.” Abby43 adds that this open-mindedness has taught her the value of empathy: It’s let me become more open-minded, especially… when you’re interested in a new culture, it’s a kind of openness to the world. I think it’s mostly that… it’s like another point of view on everything. I think I’m more open-­ minded now. Since there are a lot of television shows that illustrate life lessons, it shows you things, like the good side of things. Always be empathic and well-intentioned. It’s sort of had an impact on how I act.

This openness leads to several different benefits, as it applies to all facets of youth life. Julie44 provides a sweeping overview of the impact Hallyu has had on her personal and social existence: In terms of the impact on my life, honestly it has changed so much, because I wouldn’t be the person I am now, I think, if I hadn’t come across K-pop, if I hadn’t started watching K-dramas, if I hadn’t had friends who were into this as well. Oh yeah, it would have been really different, I wouldn’t have grown up the same way, I wouldn’t have learned the same things. This country saw me grow up, I grew up with it, I got interested in stuff I would never have been into if I hadn’t been interested in [Korea]. I’ve already started looking at schools where I can learn Korean. For example, I would go on Google Street View to see what things looked like, what the cities were like. I mean, I just know it’s in my heart, I love it so much.

 28 years old, nursing assistant at a hospital, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years.  20 years old, sales representative, middle-class upbringing, of Comorian descent has been a fan for eight years. 44  18 years old, a first-year student in childcare studies, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for seven years. 42 43

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When it comes to their passion for Hallyu products, young fans mention several elements that are interwoven: personal transformation, peer pressure, the transition to adulthood, elective interpersonal affinities, and openness to other countries and cultures.

3.2

Empowerment Through Reaffiliation

When young French fans plunge into their passion for Hallyu, this can take the form of a kind of imagined reaffiliation, especially for fans with an immigrant background and/or who have the least cultural capital, both struggling to find their place in the French society.  Mériem,45 a young woman born in Tunisia, who came to France to pursue her studies, says the following: “It’s like back home, in our culture. Sometimes I think to myself that maybe I have some roots over there [laughter], because I feel things the same way that they do.” The foreign nature of Hallyu allows young fans to overcome their discomfort and to manage their own feelings of strangeness within French society. At the same time, the worldwide popularity and success of the Korean Wave lets them share in the newfound pride of a once-subjugated nation. This affinity with South Korea thus justifies—and adds value to—social and cultural differences that could otherwise be interpreted negatively by young fans’ social circles. The fact that Korean products are ethnically marked (though sometimes mistakenly described as “Chinese” or just “Asian” by their detractors) but endowed with a positive connotation in terms of modernity means that they come to palliate the—sometimes great—difficulties that young fans face when attempting to integrate into their society. This has been the case for Carla,46 who has an Algerian background; she stated that she has been the victim of racial discrimination and that she is struggling to find her place in France (even though she is already quite advanced in her studies and has thus overcome numerous challenges  29  years old, data scientist, upper-class upbringing, of Tunisian descent; has been a fan for eight years. 46  20 years old, majoring in French literature and preparing to sit the entrance exams for the most prestigious French universities, upper-class upbringing, of Algerian descent; has been a fan for three years. 45

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related to the French academic system). Turning to South Korea has allowed her to look at France with a fresh perspective. Carla counters the stigma she faces by drawing on South Korean culture, which is seen as inherently “Asian” and thus “different,” but also “a symbol of success.” She views Korean culture as a paragon of integrity, given that it lies outside American and more broadly Western hegemony—contrary to French culture, which Carla sees as a mere extension of the latter. For Carla, distancing herself from her culture of origin (Algerian) and falling in love with a foreign culture (Korean) means taking control and fighting against the racial and social discrimination she has suffered (in France). Other young fans have adopted the same stance as Carla, especially those who have struggled to join the workforce like Abby47 and Aby,48 or those who state they have been the victims of racial and ethnic discrimination, like Aïcha49 and Ophélie.50 This desire for reaffiliation with another culture culminates, at least for some young fans with an immigrant background, in the desire visit to South Korea—or even, in Khadija’s case,51 in the desire to move to South Korea, despite never having been there or speaking the language. Given the difficulties that such young fans face in the French society, and the limited degree of upwards social mobility that is available to them, it makes sense that these fans choose Hallyu to combat socially and racially motivated forms of discrimination, especially since the French assimilationist model, on the contrary, rejects cultures of origins with a view to achieving republican integration. In our interviews, we saw how young fans with an immigrant background (usually second-generation immigrants) combine their elective affinities in terms of South Korean cultural products with the French culture in which they grew up (including its more Americanized facets),  20 years old, sales representative, middle-class upbringing, of Comorian descent; has been a fan for eight years. 48  20  years old, sales representative of Senegalese descent, middle-class upbringing, works in a ready-to-wear clothing store; has been a fan for three years. 49  19 years old, second-year undergraduate student in law, working-class upbringing, of Comorian descent; has been a fan for three years. 50  27  years old, sales representative in a ready-to-wear clothing store in Paris, family is from Guadeloupe; has been a fan for ten years. 51  20 years old, obtaining an undergraduate work/study degree in asset management, upper-class upbringing, of Tunisian descent; has been a fan for three years. 47

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but tend to reject cultural products from their culture of origin. Many young women of Northern African descent emphasize the fact that they do not consume cultural products from their country of origin (or no longer do so, if they did before), such as the Turkish television series that are highly popular in the Maghreb, or popular Arabic music (Cicchelli et  al. 2019). This sets them apart from both their parents and certain friends of theirs. These young women rarely consider speaking Arabic to be an asset, unless they are discussing their ability to pick up a new language such as Korean more easily, given their existing ease with multiple languages. This form of cultural reaffiliation can also be seen among young, middle-­class fans without an immigrant background who nonetheless encounter challenges to social integration. Some fans mention dropping out of school or difficulties finding a job, and express their disappointment. They are sometimes forced to alter their hopes for the future, given that they see themselves as “stuck” in France’s economy right now. This situation can explain why young people might turn their gaze elsewhere for inspiration. The South Korean fantasy thus allows young fans to dream of a better future, even when they do not possess the resources that are needed, objectively, to get there. This is Anne’s case: she is a 29-year-­ old childcare assistant who says that she would love to work in South Korea someday, even though she has never visited that country and does not speak its language. While some young fans with an immigrant background use their identity as Hallyu aficionados to question their place in French society, it should be noted that this applies much more to women than men. Globally, it is true that pop music fandom is gendered (Monnot 2009); in addition, however, the French context also presents a racial and ethnic dimension to this fandom, as young girls with North African or African origins integrate better into society than boys, who are more frequently seen as rebellious or dangerous (Guénif-Souilamas and Macé 2004). Moreover, young women are more likely to exploit their academic and cultural capital to transcend their social situation, including via cultural consumption (Baudelot and Establet 2006).

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Empowerment Through Autodidactism

As they delve into their passion for Hallyu, young fans often acquire rare cultural and linguistic competencies related to South Korea; this generally takes place outside of formal schooling, in an autodidactic fashion. The majority of these new skills are developed through osmosis, by consuming shows, movies, soundtracks, and video clips. Aya,52 a K-pop fan who belongs to the ARMY, MOA, and Blackrose fan clubs (for BTS,* TXT,* and The Rose* fans, respectively), says the following: I wanted to start [learning Korean] this summer. At that point, I could introduce myself, but that’s about it. Now, I can recognize some symbols in Korean like for example this one [she writes on a piece of paper], this means “ha ha,” they use it all the time. And now when I’m watching a show or a movie, I’m starting to recognize some sounds and words. When I’m on the subway and I hear people speaking Korean, I’m still amazed when I understand some words!

Young fans are very proud of these forms of learning, especially when they concern hard-won language skills. This is the case for Corentin,53 who dropped out of a degree he was not invested in to enter civil service and is now very proud of the fact that he has taught himself a smattering of Korean: By listening, essentially. I learned a few words. Really, just a few words. So like I know how to introduce myself, “Hi my name is Corentin,” that’s about it. There’s this one BTS* track that’s called “I’m fine” and like “I’m fine” in the sense of “I feel good” in Korean is “gwaenchanha.” So I know some stuff like that. Sometimes the lyrics are really powerful. So there are certain words that pop out every time. And I know what it means then.

 19  years old, second-year undergraduate student in a bilingual English/Spanish program, working-­class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for two years. 53  19 years old, currently enlisted in France’s national civil service program after one year of journalism studies, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 52

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The same is true for Julie,54 who is a mediocre student but explains how her ability to teach herself Korean has led her to reevaluate her intelligence and gain greater self-esteem: So I started because I saw on this website, someone smart said that “an intelligent person can learn hangeul in two hours, a stupid person in two days.” And I was totally like, “wow I really want to learn it in two hours!” In the end, uh, I didn’t learn it in two hours, but I ended up really liking the experience because it encouraged me to at least think, “wow, ok, maybe I can really learn the Korean alphabet in two hours, who knows!”

For many young fans who are lacking in academic clout, teaching themselves Korean has helped them to validate their abilities, which their family, school, or professional environment may have otherwise caused them to doubt. Autodidactism becomes a kind of symbolic compensation for young fans who are relatively low on the social ladder and who may face difficulties in achieving economic autonomy through stable employment with their qualifications. In fact, as Aby55 observes, scattered and unintentional focus can gradually morph into structured efforts at learning and acquiring knowledge: I’ve been learning for two years now. Eventually, after listening to music and reading words in Korean, you start to learn stuff, you translate and then it’s easier. The more you hear certain words and phrases, the more you start to remember them. At the beginning, when I started to listen to K-pop, well I learned the Korean alphabet. Originally, it was just to be able to read the titles of songs, so I could recognize them, but then I started to like the language and want to learn a little more. I started working on grammar and then while watching Korean television shows, I started to pick up some vocabulary. You get used to it, a little bit.

 18 years old, first-year student in childcare studies, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 55  20  years old, sales representative of Senegalese descent, middle-class upbringing, works in a ready-to-wear clothing store; has been a fan for three years. 54

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This kind of learning can be facilitated by some specific tools, especially on the internet (song translations, ad hoc language learning resources, tutorials, etc.). As Léa56 explains, formal education in Korean is rare and costly: “I started to use some language-learning apps (for Korean) and then to learn the alphabet.” These varying attempts at self-education, ranging from just teaching oneself a few words of Korean to developing a deeper understanding of the language and culture, leads our young fans to express a number of strong aspirations such as “finding out what I’m capable of,” “being proud,” and “believing in myself.” Young fans emphasize their “satisfaction” and “pleasure” when they notice the full extent of what they have learned. These feelings are particularly pronounced among young fans with less academic capital, such as Alice (who only has a junior school certificate), Abby, Aby, Candice, and Marie (who completed short-cycle associate programs), Coralie, Etienne, and Corentin (who dropped out of college), and even Kira and David (who completed their college education but are struggling to find work). All of these young fans see their self-taught Korean skills as a motive to reevaluate their aptitudes. David,57 a young college graduate who is unemployed, says the following: “In 2020, today, as humans we should be proud of the fact that we can watch movies in all different languages.” This kind of cosmopolitan pride carries over onto family dynamics. K-pop fan Louna58 did not pursue her studies and is in constant conflict with her father; however, she admits that her father is starting to be somewhat proud of her when she watches Korean dramas and movies in the original version without subtitles. “For him, it’s a pretty amazing feat that I can even read Korean [laughter], the other day he saw me watching a movie without subtitles.” This kind of self-study thus takes different guises depending on the social position of the young fans in question, especially given that cultural products are on the lowbrow end of the spectrum of leisure activities  20 years old, nursing school student, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for five years.  24 years old, looking for work after graduating with a two-year degree, working-class upbringing, family is from Mayotte; has been a fan for eight years. 58  18 years old, waitress in a restaurant (she has left school and is taking her baccalaureate exam as a free candidate), working-class upbringing; has been a fan for three years. 56 57

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and are not generally even acknowledged by educational systems. For our young fans, the pride that they associate with “discovering” Hallyu compensates somewhat for the feelings of unworthiness that they often have in the cultural, social, economic, and familial realms. The claim to cosmopolitanism, usually the purview of the educated, multilingual, and well-traveled elites, intellectuals, and artists—and thus, according to its detractors, the prerogative of the privileged and the powerful—has been massively democratized, thus allowing young people who were previously excluded to appropriate cosmopolitanism as a major pillar of their (self-) education with a view to truly inhabiting the global world.

3.4

Empowerment Through Trend-Setting

A third kind of cosmopolitan empowerment stems from what fans, especially ones who have been invested in Hallyu for longer, call their “intuition” for trends: their ability to discover and appreciate the unique qualities of Korean Wave products well before the latter attract the attention of the mainstream public. This knack for identifying what will later become popular—to find diamonds in the rough—is here indexed to the capacity for openness and the ability to move beyond the traditional Western canon; this trait has positive knock-on effects for the individuals that possess it. Fan intuition, especially among those who have been aficionados since the beginning of the 2000s, is noted with pride by Amina,59 who has been a BTS* fan since the band formed and well before its international success at the end of the 2010s: At the beginning, they were relatively unknown, it’s only starting in 2016 that people started to know them and they became popular. We call ourselves the old fans, when the new fans come and say something like “oh yeah I’ve been fan for a month already,” we just retort “well, I’ve been a fan for five years so don’t come here and ask us if we know this or that. We’re all the same here, we know what we know and that’s that.” So yeah, I’m a member of the ARMY fan club, and since the beginning, before all of that. 59

 24 years old, nurse, middle-class upbringing, of Moroccan descent; has been a fan for 11 years.

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The subsequent success of K-pop and its broad recognition, alongside other products like K-dramas, eventually came to validate the “good taste” of early Hallyu fans, even though this taste continues to be mocked and marginalized in certain circles. Daphné60 underscores her perceptiveness when she quickly understood that this movement was destined to last and to become more diverse, despite the doubts of early fans and critics alike: “I understood it right away, I mean it’s a complex universe even if from the outside you might not see it. It’s a pretty rich and varied industry, in terms of appearance and artistic research, it’s really broad.” Daphné is one of our interviewees who places the most emphasis on the artistic quality of lesser-known musical groups, while also vehemently criticizing both BTS* and the band’s fans. The precocity of her attachment to Hallyu products allows her to assert a more refined taste than most young K-pop fans: “I don’t want to categorize stuff but it’s really a whole groupie thing, and that kind of attitude bothers me a bit. It’s not the same with K-rock, it’s not the same public, it’s an older, more settled crowd.” As for Alice,61 she is proud of her foresight with regard to the Hallyu trend. A fan since the beginning of her teenage years, Alice is pleased to see that now, K-pop can compete against American music— something that seemed impossible when she discovered the Korean Wave. She says: Especially since now, K-pop is becoming almost international, I think it’s going to be as popular as American [music]. I think that Korea, and Korean culture, are going to become as big of a deal as American culture, like before people dreamed of going to America and now there are people who dream of going to South Korea, for the same reasons too.

We can conclude with what Stéphanie62 said when responding to her skeptical friends, at the time when the Korean Wave had not yet crested:

 31 years old, schoolteacher, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years.  20  years old, unemployed (with low qualifications), middle-class upbringing, originally from Réunion; has been a fan for eight years. 62  28 years old, nursing assistant at a hospital, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 60 61

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I remember, with a friend we fell into it at the same time, and we used to tell people, you’ll see, right now you’re treating us like boy-crazy teenagers or whatever, but in ten years they’ll all be onTV. Well, we were right, ten years later, even before, we were able to turn to them and say “so you saw “Gangnam Style” in 2012 yeah?”

4

Shaping the Future with Hallyu

Despite the obstacles and various forms of stigma that young fans often face, their passion for Hallyu nonetheless grants them precious resources to trace their own path. Some, like Lila, Stéphanie, Anne, Caroline, Daphné, and Etienne, keep Hallyu as their secret garden, a source of solace and pleasure that enriches their free time. Others—more about them in the pages that follow—translate their passion for Korean cultural products into broader life choices, seeking for their newfound skills to be validated by academic institutions and thus transformed into social and cultural capital. From teaching oneself a language to developing skills that are ultimately recognized by accredited universities, there is a sizeable gap: one that some young people would like to address in order to fully live (off) their passion.

4.1

The Color of Dreams

While all of our young fans grew up with Hallyu and also thanks to it, some fans feel that they are particularly well poised to control their own destiny by drawing on the different skills they have acquired (and continue to acquire), in addition to or as replacements for the other resources they may have received from their families. In this light, Hallyu can be seen as a way for young fans to broaden their academic and professional horizons as they transition into adulthood, especially for those whose futures would otherwise be limited on account of their modest capital. As discussed above, language plays a fundamental role in recognizing new capabilities in oneself, capabilities which can be used as resources to imagine a new future. It is thus no accident that a sizeable percentage of

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our interviewees talked about their love of languages (including foreign languages spoken at home, learned at school, or self-taught), about the efforts they have made to learn Korean, and about the decisive role that the latter played in orienting their plans for the future. In our sample, few interviewees enrolled in highly selective academic programs; most students followed a curriculum that was not influenced by their passion for Hallyu, strictly speaking, but which nonetheless took the shape of a cosmopolitan Bildung, as we have seen. And yet, it would be false to assume that the inside world of passion and the outside world of academic trajectories are always separate and impermeable entities. While we cannot generalize that all interviewees experienced an overwhelming passion that translated linearly into an impact on their academic trajectory, it is common for young fans to describe the impact that Hallyu has had on their choices at school and in life more generally. Such fans emphasize the decisive role played by cultural consumption with regard to both their academic and professional future. As Laura63 explains, the all-­ encompassing nature of her passion for Hallyu was incredibly significant when it came to making major life decisions: “So of course when there’s something that takes up so much room in your life, obviously it invades every aspect of your life.” Needless to say, translating one’s passion into an academic project can take different forms depending on the social dynamics at play in a given fan’s life, including the understanding that individuals and their families have of the different types of academic paths they can follow and what outcomes these are associated with. From this point of view, while a taste for cultural products underpins interest in South Korea more broadly and constitutes the basis for different forms of knowledge and learning that feed into aspirations, there are nonetheless cases where these aspirations remain largely unattainable dreams, given the social constraints of one’s point of origin. Some fans question whether they will ever be able to realize their dreams, but still keep hope alive. This is the case for Aby,64 a young cashier in a Parisian department store, who hopes to change jobs  22 years old, French film school student, working-class upbringing, parents are Romanian and Italian; has been a fan for eight years. 64  20  years old, sales representative of Senegalese descent, middle-class upbringing, works in a ready-to-wear clothing store; has been a fan for three years. 63

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and someday “work in a field that has something to do with Korea” (she provides no further details) and also dreams of studying Korean language and history. Aby sketches out a potential future by combining her strengths in high school (“I loved languages, I had a humanities curriculum with a focus on English literature and language, I’ve always liked to learn languages: English, German, and even Dutch”) with her interest in Korea, the result of her heavy consumption of K-pop, K-dramas, and webtoons. “It’s really something that interests me for the future. I would love to go to school, well, go back to school, but to study Korean because I’m sick of working in a field I don’t like. I don’t like it anymore, it’s too mundane. Plus, Korean is my passion, and maybe I can make a career out of it.” By banking on her acceptance to a prestigious program like INALCO65 (she insists on the quality of classes there), Aby develops a plan to travel to South Korea as part of an undergraduate study abroad program. She even dreams of perhaps going to live in South Korea someday: “I would really like to do an exchange program in South Korea, like Erasmus. You know, like during three months or a semester I could go there and discover Korea for myself. I would love that so much! Not a super long trip, but just to see if I like it. And if I like it, I can go back.” Who knows if Aby will ever realize her seemingly unrealistic dream, which, despite its sheen of improbability, is nonetheless quite coherent and deeply anchored in the active mobilization of resources provided by Hallyu? Aby’s case is even more notable when we compare it to Abby’s66: the latter is an established Hallyu fan with a similar social profile, working in the same field (and experiencing the same frustrations), but who on the contrary expresses no interest in exploiting her cultural tastes to modify her biographical trajectory. When Abby insists on the “recreational” nature of her cultural consumption choices, she negates the possibility of Hallyu having an impact on her life that goes beyond personal enrichment. “Otherwise, no, having an impact on my professional life? I don’t think so, since I’m a cashier.”  L’Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales (INALCO) is a French research institution that teaches languages from Central Europe, Africa, Asia, America, and Oceania. It is very selective. 66  20  years old, sales representative, middle-class upbringing, of Comorian descent, practicing Muslim; has been a fan for eight years. 65

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Betting on Social Mobility

Some young fans with working-class backgrounds wish to convert their passion for Korean culture into an academic strategy. To do so, they pivot toward foreign language and cultural studies as their main course of study. Some of them attempted to complete the first year of a Korean curriculum before realizing that the associated expectations were too demanding. Others see more of a vocational path to achieve upwards social mobility: this is the case for Mattéo,67 who peppers his conversion narrative with expressions like “transformation,” “shock,” and “turning point.” By emphasizing the powerful impact of his passion on his personal development, Mattéo, who originally comes from a working-class background, wants to pursue a specialized Master’s degree and hopes to then enroll in a Ph.D. program and write a dissertation on North Korea: I intend to continue a Master’s degree in this vein, and then try to concentrate on the northern part of the peninsula. In North Korea, you have to know Korean and all the local customs and stuff, you can’t just show up in North Korea like you can in South Korea. So as a result, I had to do a lot of field work, I would never have been able to go to North Korea without studying Korean for three years. Without these three years behind me, I would never have been able to say, now I want to do a Master’s thesis on a specific topic. After the research Master’s, which seems indispensable to me, well there’s the Ph.D. route. That’s what I’ve got in mind right now, in any case I have to get the Master’s under my belt first. My professional goal would be to get my doctorate and then at the end of my program to teach at a research institution, to be a North Korean specialist. But if I don’t get accepted into a doctoral program I don’t really know what else I could do.

Given that he was not provided much social or cultural capital by his family, Mattéo is betting double or nothing on his passion for Hallyu to forge a path forward for himself.

 20 years old, third-year undergraduate majoring in Korean at INALCO, working-class upbringing; has been a fan for four years. 67

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Kira,68 who has a working-class Moroccan background, provides another powerful example of the aspirations engendered by multilingualism in general, and by Korean language learning in particular. Kira taught herself Korean during high school, and it was only thanks to a fortuitous exchange with one of her teachers that she realized that her passion could be beneficial for her academic performance: It’s thanks to my philosophy teacher, he’s the only one who really took the time to ask us what were our strengths, what we knew how to do, and so when it was my turn I told him that I speak Arabic, I speak English fluently, I speak Korean. He didn’t hesitate: as a result, I chose the bachelor’s degree I’m in now. I have a bachelor’s in Korean language and literature, and now I’ve added another year to professionalize my degree. It’s in the same institute because I would really like to continue my Korean classes.

By combining her multilingualism and her professional aspirations, Kira was able to rapidly find work in the luxury hotel industry: “I realized that it was one of the only sectors where speaking Korean and Arabic were really valued. And it’s the only sector, hospitality, where you can meet so many people from so many different places, learn so much and travel so much.” However, Kira’s disappointing experience working as a receptionist at an exclusive Parisian hotel—she used Korean a lot less than expected, as she interacted with relatively few South Korean clients—means that she has decided to try something new. Even though she was unemployed at the time of the interview, Kira expressed the continued desire to use her language skills to find a job that is somehow related to South Korea. When she discusses the impact that Hallyu has had on her personal life path, Kira concludes: “I think that my life would have been totally different [without it], it has really contributed to who I am, to what I’ve become, to the choices and plans I’ve made.” Other young fans with working-class upbringing who have not chosen to follow Korean studies, but who nonetheless already live multilingual lives, also manipulate their familiarity with South Korean culture and the  22  years old, unemployed after graduating with a bachelor’s degree in international trade, working-­class Moroccan upbringing; has been a fan for ten years. 68

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Korean language to different ends. Laura,69 whose father is Romanian and whose mother is Italian, speaks both of those languages in addition to French and English; she also started learning Korean on her own in middle school before adding the language as an elective as part of her language and literature-focused curriculum. “I had gotten to the A270 level I think, at least… all on my own,” she explains. After a three-year break, during which she attended a preparatory school and completed a bachelor’s degree in translation and interpretation, Laura resumed her studies in Korean in order to be better prepared for her travels to South Korea; she then continued with classes while taking a gap year in South Korea. Then Laura once again put her Korean ambitions on hold while she devoted herself to obtaining a degree, with a view to a Master’s in film studies. While her linguistic commitment, motivated by her love of languages and the musicality of Korean in particular, has come and gone in “waves,” with hindsight Laura recognizes the socializing function of linguistic escapism when it came to elaborating plans and making choices: “I wanted to travel, I wanted to get away, so I told myself ok I’ll learn the language, that way it will be possible. And in fact, it’s because I had this project that I continued to learn the language. If I didn’t have those plans, I wouldn’t have continued.” Emphasizing this continuity, Laura admits that she dreams of moving to South Korea to pursue professional opportunities: “If I could find a job, like with a company that is Franco-Korean, that would be super cool, or maybe even an American company that does stuff in Asia, and then slowly I could try to get closer to Korea. If I could make movies in Korea that would be awesome. Or even television shows, actually, I would be happy! [laughter].” In Laura’s case, learning Korean is an extension of her pre-existing linguistic skills, but also a deviation from the expectations of her family and friends that marks a generational shift.

 22 years old, French film school student, working-class upbringing, parents are Romanian and Italian; has been a fan for eight years. 70  Translator’s note: the European Framework of Reference for Languages (CECRL) is a classification that evaluates a student’s proficiency level in a foreign language. The levels range from A1 (beginner) to C2 (mastery and fluency). The A2 level corresponds to an advanced beginner who has some conversational skills in a foreign language and can communicate in simple and direct exchanges. 69

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For young fans with a middle-class upbringing who are uncertain of their academic future, a passion for Hallyu can also help to provide orientation. This was the case for Alix,71 who “searched for a long time” and “tried lots of things” before “finding her way.” At the time of her interview, she was enrolled in a research Master’s in Asian studies in a major Parisian university, after having completed two years of psychology and one year of sociology studies. Most notably, Alix is writing a thesis that is connected to her passion, given that it focuses on associations that work to promote Korean culture in France.

4.3

Hallyu as a Supplemental Resource

It is a different story for those who are endowed with a form of capital that complements the skills acquired via a passion for Hallyu, especially linguistic competencies, not as a primary academic or professional goal but rather as a gateway to more selective and highly profitable trajectories with regard to the labor market. Young fans with upper-class backgrounds are the most likely to use their mastery of the Korean language as an “added bonus” to their more traditional academic paths. It is clear that they take into account how a specific diploma will help them secure employment. Ania, one of the upper-class fans that speaks Korean in our sample, decided to pursue a Chinese/English double major, which should translate to many professional opportunities, given the intensity of economic exchanges between English- and Chinese-speaking sectors. Ludivine, who is in business school in a very selective university, and Delphine, who is working toward her Master’s in political science, both leverage their knowledge of Korean to gain advantage over other highly qualified candidates in their extremely competitive spheres. Young fans with an upper-class immigrant background who speak Korean are banking on the same results: Khadija is studying wealth management and believes that Korean will help her to find a job in the niche sector of Franco-Korean expatriation.  24  years old, Master’s student in Asian studies, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for eight years. 71

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Let’s look more closely at Camille,72 a young fan who was accepted to a Master’s program in international business in part due to her “Korean project” and the skills that she developed, thanks to her passion for Hallyu. Not only did Camille learn Korean, she also traveled to South Korea to “better understand the country.” She emphasizes the major role that Hallyu played in her teenage life: “It was omnipresent, it was really everywhere, and [pause], I listened to K-pop, I watched videos all the time, I watched [K-]dramas all the time, I learned a ton of stuff thanks to it.” Camille’s parents, who both completed university studies, support their daughter’s ambitions: My family thought it was great, especially in terms of my studies. For my Master’s, I took the entrance exam for business school and I was accepted. They think this is a better choice than doing a bachelor’s degree in Korean, because this way it really complements my Master’s, it brings a lot to the table. I’m going to do a Master’s in international business and ultimately I’d like to focus on Korea—especially since the school I am going to allows me to take classes in Korean.

Camille also explains that her goal of obtaining this prestigious diploma is more important than her desire to find work that is related to South Korea somehow: “In the end, if what I end up doing doesn’t have anything to do with Korea, well, too bad, but yeah I would prefer that.” In Camille’s case, she has reinvested her passion for Hallyu in an academic trajectory that ends up being the priority. She concludes her interview with the following words: Hallyu, in the end it’s just music. I went to concerts and that was super cool, I did stuff with my friends and that was cool, I went to Korea and that was cool but that’s it. It was a phase, it brought me here, but it’s not like there are elements that really transformed me and that I’ll remember my whole life.

 20 years old, third-year undergraduate student in foreign and regional languages, cultures, and literature, middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 72

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What distinguishes Camille (and the other upper-class fans in our sample) from Mathieu, Alix, Laura, and Kira is the fact that the latter seek to convert their resources in terms of cultural openness into ones that can help them gain access to academic programs and, by extension, develop a cosmopolitan manner of being in the world (which can even include expatriation), whereas fans like Camille translate their resources into degrees that primarily symbolize the ability to manage the economic complexity of globalization and secure employment on a highly competitive job market, rather than signaling an openness to alterity or a cosmopolitan worldview.

4.4

Salvaging Skills

When it seems like their academic or professional strategies are not going to pan out, young fans may try to salvage the situation so as to still benefit from the resources that they have acquired along the way. Sometimes, this involves the painful process of renegotiating one’s dreams. This is what happened to Coralie,73 who grew up in a middle-class but relatively less educated family (both her parents became police officers after finishing high school). She dropped out of journalism school after struggling to find her place. Subsequently, however, she started a blog about Hallyu and Asian culture more broadly; she hopes that this will lead to professional opportunities. Coralie explains that her passion is what allowed her to discover her interest in journalism: “It’s a change that was really life-affirming, and helped me to become who I am today. In a way, it’s what led me to become a journalist. Because it’s thanks to Hallyu that I was able to assert myself. This change, it’s my life.” She adopts an approach to the objects of her passion that is not solely aesthetic, but analytic as well, thus allowing her to take them seriously and decipher their ethnological dimension: There aren’t many journalists who can really understand what’s happening in the Asian universe. So today, I’ve got a website about K-pop, to show  19 years old, searching for employment after two years of journalism school (which she did not finish), middle-class upbringing; has been a fan for six years. 73

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people what it’s like and everything. But behind the scenes, I’m deciphering messages and subtexts and I’m trying to establish connections with Korean culture. I use my knowledge of Asian culture to shed light on the subject.

As a young girl, Julia74 also dreamed of becoming a “business woman” like the heroines of the K-dramas she used to watch: At the time, it seemed like Korea was going to play a big role in my life. It was really my obsession, and it was almost like I wasn’t thinking about school, I just thought “I’ll go over there and have an amazing career,” I already pictured myself as a business woman. It was really a dream, I would tell myself “just go over there, you’ll find a job in a big chaebol”—a chaebol is a major corporation in Korea, like Samsung—I was thinking, “I’ll be the only foreign woman there.” I was creating this whole fantasy and well, in the end, nothing really happened like I hoped it would.

Julia ultimately had to give up on her dream, having realized that it would require acceptance to university programs that were much more selective than her academic background warranted. After obtaining her professional baccalaureate and then dropping out of a bachelor’s in Korean, Julia took a gap year. She ended up enrolling in college to study economic and social administration. She explains how she was forced to question her Hallyu-driven academic choices: although Julia originally believed she had the skills necessary to get a degree in Korean, she was ultimately unable to keep up. This failure was painful for Julia—proof of the difficulty she had in transferring the skills she learned in her free time to an academic environment, and of the vast chasm between cultural consumption and academic learning: We were going to class kind of wide-eyed like kids, all naïve, and we ended up with profs who were super strict, who just barked a ton of stuff at us. And after, well on top of everything, you’re trying to grow, you’re only watching shows—I would just watch shows, K-dramas, and I listened only to K-pop. So ultimately, well, I just ended up getting so disgusted by it all.  23 years old, second-year undergraduate student in economic and social administration, upperclass upbringing; has been a fan for eight years. 74

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There was a time when I couldn’t watch K-dramas anymore, couldn’t listen to K-pop, I was just so buried in it, I just ended up getting so burnt out.

And yet, Julia’s new path does not stem from rejecting her former passion, but is on the contrary an attempt to salvage the knowledge related to South Korea that she developed, thanks to two personal trips as well as documentaries, blogs, and online research. Julia blogs and posts videos about K-beauty, as we discussed earlier, and she hopes to mobilize her knowledge about Asia more broadly in a future job: So now I’m studying economic and social administration, I’m studying everything that has to do with the economy. I still want to work in international business, but I’m dabbling in a lot more stuff, especially since now South Korea is no longer really an emerging economy. At the time, you know, it was a developing country and now I think it’s already proven itself on the global stage. So I think there’s lots of interesting stuff to do there now. There are a lot of foreigners in Korea, there are a lot of French people there now. As a result, I think it’s really an interesting country economically speaking, to work there or try to develop something over there.

Although these trajectories may be less linear than those of some other fans, they nonetheless follow the thread of enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment with Hallyu and South Korea more broadly. These attempts at salvaging allow fans to still reap the benefits of their hard-won skills, even when they are unable to transform the latter into socially recognized forms of capital.

5

Conclusion

Most of the young fans we interviewed discovered the Korean Wave in middle or high school. Their passion developed alongside the trials and tribulations of adolescence and, in many cases, allowed them to draw on a repertoire of behaviors and—perhaps most importantly—on a cosmopolitan vision of the world and the self. Their decision to stand out by expressing their passion for a niche culture was very often met with incomprehension or ridicule, and sometimes even reprimands from their

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immediate circle, which explains why many fans turned to transnational fan communities for camaraderie. And yet, growing up with Hallyu was not just an ordeal for our young fans, but also a source of support when facing the various challenges of adolescence. The positive messages associated with so many South Korean cultural products appear to have a therapeutic value and were used by many young fans to heal teenage wounds. Through their cultural consumption, these young fans developed new cosmopolitan forms of knowledge, especially linguistic skills, which led many to realize that they were in possession of unique resources that could help them stand out from their generational peers. Fans with an immigrant background and relatively little capital used their skills to develop cultural affiliations (the flipside of which is a relative disavowing of one’s culture of origin, as well as distancing from French culture) in order to counter the racism and prejudice they experience in their everyday lives. Some of these fans were quickly driven to have their cosmopolitan competencies recognized and turned to specialized programs of study: those who were less familiar with their academic options generally opted for Korean-related studies as a primary track, whereas savvier students opted for cumulating skills and using their passion for all things Korean as an added bonus to a well-rounded curriculum. While Hallyu started as a leisure activity for all young fans, it gave rise to many dreams and led some individuals to adapt their academic and professional trajectories in consequence.

Bibliography Balleys, Claire. 2015. Grandir entre adolescents. A l’école et sur Internet. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes. Baudelot, Christian, and Roger Establet. 2006. Allez les filles! Une révolution silencieuse. Paris: Seuil. Beck, Ulrich, and Edgar Grande. 2010. Varieties of Second Modernity: Extra-­ European and European Experiences and Perspectives. The British Journal of Sociology 61 (3): 409–443. Brandy, Grégor. 2020. Des fans de K-pop ont perturbé un meeting de Donald Trump: comment ont-ils atteint ce degré d’influence en ligne? Le Monde, June 24.

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Chauffet, Simon. 2019. La BTS ARMY n’est pas une communauté, c’est une famille: les fans de K-pop remplissent le Stade de France. Le Monde, June 8. Cicchelli, Vincenzo. 2013. L’autonomie des jeunes. Questions politiques et sociologiques sur les mondes étudiants. Paris: OVE/La documentation Française. Cicchelli, Vincenzo, and Maurizio Merico. 2001. Adolescence et jeunesse au XXe siècle. Une esquisse de comparaison entre la tradition sociologique américaine et sa réception en Europe. In Les jeunes de 1950 à 2000. Un bilan des évolutions, 207–230. Paris: Éditions Injep. Cicchelli, Vincenzo, and Sylvie Octobre. 2018. Aesthetico-Cultural Cosmopolitanism Among French Young People: Beyond Social Stratification, the Role of Aspirations and Competences. Cultural Sociology 11 (4): 416–437. ———. 2019. La Hallyu ou comment apprendre des petites choses: une éducation au cosmopolitisme par le bas. Éducation et sociétés 44 (2): 131–148. Cicchelli, Vincenzo, Sylvie Octobre, and Nadia Tarhouni. 2019. De Shakira à Naruto et Soliman. Cosmopolitisme esthético-culturel chez les jeunes Français et Tunisiens. In Cultures et jeunes adultes en région Méditerranée, Circulations, pratiques et soft power, ed. Abdelfettah Benchenna, Hélène Bourdeloie, and Zineb Majdouli, 241–258. Paris: L’Harmattan. Connell, Raewyn. 2005. Masculinities. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press. Coulangeon, Philippe. 2017. Cultural Openness as an Emerging Form of Cultural Capital in Contemporary France. Cultural Sociology 11 (2): 145–164. Evans, Karen, and Andy A.  Furlong. 2000. Metaphors of Youth Transitions: Niches, Pathways, Trajectories or Navigations. In Youth, Citizenship and Social Change in a European Context, ed. Bynner John, Lynne Chisholm, and Furlong Andy, 36–44. Farnham: Ashgate. Gléravec, Hervé. 2010. La culture de la chambre, Préadolescence et culture contemporaine dans l’espace familial. Paris: MC. Guénif-Souilamas, Nacira, and Eric Macé. 2004. Les féministes et le garçon arabe. La Tour d’Aigues: Édition de l’Aube. Hall, Graham Stanley. 1904. Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations in Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education. New  York: Appleton. Jauss, Hans Robert. 1982. Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Mayard, Aline. 2020. BlackLivesMatter: comment les fans de K-pop ont aidé la révolte. L’ADN, June 11. Min, Wonjung, Dal Yong Jin, and Benjamin Han. 2019. Transcultural Fandom of the Korean Wave in Latin America: Through the Lens of Cultural Intimacy and Affinity Space. Media, Culture & Society 41 (5): 604–619.

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Monnot, Catherine. 2009. Petites filles aujourd’hui: l’apprentissage de la féminité. Paris: Autrement. Octobre, Sylvie. 2011. Du féminin et du masculin: genre et trajectoires culturelles. Réseaux 168–169 (4-5): 23–57. ———. 2014. Deux pouces et des neurones. Paris: MC. Octobre, Sylvie, Christine Détrez, Pierre Mercklé, and Nathalie Berthomier. 2010. L’enfance des loisirs, Trajectoires communes et parcours individuels de la fin de l’enfance à la grande adolescence. Paris: MC. Oh, Ingyu, and Wonho Jang. 2011. From Globalization to Glocalization: Configuring Korean Pop Culture to Meet Glocal Demands. Culture & Empathy 31 (1–2): 23–42. Pasquier, Dominique. 2005. Cultures lycéennes, la tyrannie de la majorité. Paris: Autrement. Poncet, Emmanuel. 2012. Gangnam Style, alchimie d’un tube. Le Monde, December 21. Rumford, Chris. 2013. The Globalization of Strangeness. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Walther, Andreas, ed. 2002. Misleading Trajectories. Integration Policies for Young People in Europe? Opladen, Leske+Budrich: An EGRIS Publication. Yoon, Kyong. 2019. Transnational Fandom in the Making: K-Pop Fans in Vancouver. International Communication Gazette 81 (2): 176–192.

9 General Conclusion: Why Does the Global Success of Hallyu Matter?

The term Hallyu does not just refer to Korean popular culture but more specifically to a set of highly varied cultural products that enjoy international popularity. As we have seen, the entire Hallyu production system is designed to ensure global appeal.

1

The Two-Fold Nature of Hallyu

This is the perspective from which we must examine the intense efforts deployed by South Korea, efforts which are underpinned by strong State support, close collaboration between the public and private sectors, inspiration drawn from the strategies that ensured the earlier success of chaebols in the heavy industry and technology sectors, the integration of international standards (especially American and Japanese), and the promotion of hybrid but still culturally specific aesthetics. As a major phenomenon of contemporary cultural globalization, the Korean Wave can also be characterized by its entanglement of cultural, economic, and political elements. JungBong Choi (2015) thus speaks of the “biformity in Hallyu that materializes in two different manifestations: as a © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Cicchelli, S. Octobre, The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84296-3_9

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transnational cultural phenomenon and as a national-institutional campaign” (33). Research on Hallyu has gradually started to take this biformity into account. The earliest studies of Hallyu focused on trying to define the phenomenon and on analyzing how it became a driver of South Korean economic growth. During a second research phase, the Korean Wave was used to shift from an investigation of cultural imperialism (i.e., the Americanization of the world) toward an examination of how globalization was being recentered, perhaps even leading to a kind of inverted cultural imperialism. In the subsequent period, studies looked at the dynamics animating the circulation of Hallyu cultural products and their reception in Asian countries, especially from the perspective of a regional sub-empire (possibly giving rise to the sentiment of “Asian community”) as an alternative to American hegemony. The fourth and current phase of research, associated with Hallyu 2.0, has centered its analysis on the role of digital social networks with regard to the global expansion of the Korean Wave, as well as the development of a participatory culture that is highly visible through the rapid diffusion of K-pop and the proliferation of transnational media communities and the activities they sponsor (e.g., flash mob contests and cover dances all over the world, from New York and Chicago to Milan, London, Paris, Mexico, and Dubai). In this current perspective, Hallyu can be defined as “a complex trans-border cultural phenomenon and formation in the era of poly-centered cultural production” (Lee 2005: 15). Our analysis of the Korean Wave and its reception in France belongs to this fourth phase of research, although we integrate elements from the preceding three phases. By establishing connections between micro- and macro-analyses, between structure and agency, this volume argues that Hallyu is “an intriguing example of how both the industry and the consumers successfully transform themselves into equally important players in the global game of social networking” (Jung 2015: 85). Our monographical approach has demonstrated how Hallyu is a unique phenomenon in four different ways, on account of (a) its broad conception of art and culture, based on the notion of entertainment and multi-talented artists (Idols) whose skills stem from both the cultural realm and the commercial/media-based sphere; (b) its revitalization of creativity by betting

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on close interactions between entertainment agencies and participatory audiences; (c) its production infrastructure, which allows for the promotion of South Korean pop culture as an alternative to the American and Japanese mainstream and which relies heavily on globally oriented public policies; and (d) its promotion of an alternative form of cultural globalization that draws on the lessons provided by its American and Japanese predecessors and works to reshape representations of the world according to non-Western models. This volume has also shown how young people develop an interest in Hallyu cultural products independently of any pre-existing historical or diaspora-related ties. The exotic appeal of South Korea is derived more from a primarily aesthetic form of appropriation: given that the country is associated with a desirable image of positive modernity, it offers glimpses of what “a good society” could look like in the context of globalization. Moreover, this appeal encourages an affiliation with elsewhere that gives young fans—those with relatively little academic capital, those who are facing difficulties joining the workforce, and those who are experiencing tension between their multicultural origins and the republican assimilationist model that reigns in France—a new avenue for self-empowerment.

2

In Defense of Pop Cosmopolitanism

The biformity of Hallyu has encouraged researchers to reevaluate certain concepts in cultural sociology, such as “lowbrow” and “illegitimate” forms of cultural industrial production, now seeing them through the heuristic lens of cosmopolitanism. At the same time, in terms of the sociology of globalization, the Korean Wave has produced analyses on the elaboration of shared generational references embedded in cultural creations emanating not from the usual hegemonic suspects (the United States, Japan, or Europe) but rather from a former colonized nation. Hallyu is thus an ideal vantage point from which to observe shifts in the social uses of cultural products—for example, how young fans latch onto Hallyu to transcend the boundaries of gender, race, and social class—as well as the shift toward a more multipolar world. In this conclusion, we

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shall revisit what Jenkins has called “pop cosmopolitanism” (2004): we believe that this concept will help elucidate the global cultural dynamics, thanks to a new analytical framework.

2.1

Rethinking Taste in a Global World

If we take into account the cosmopolitan dimension of Hallyu, which is at the root of the (social, cultural, and gender-based) empowerment exhibited by young fans, this will naturally breathe new life into analyses of taste. For many years, the leading studies on taste have overlooked its ethno-national dimension, focusing instead on factors such as gender, social position, and age. In addition, the volume and diversity of tastes have been the most popular topics of study: a great number of quantitative studies have endeavored to highlight the unequal distribution of omnivorist tendencies. Omnivorism is thus seen as a mechanism of social classification that varies according to age and gender; many studies have converged on the idea that omnivorism is a trait that characterizes the elites and youth populations of many countries (Katz-Gerro and Sullivan 2010; Purhonen et al. 2010; Warde et al. 2007). A different branch of research has, on the contrary, moved away from looking at taste to focus instead on consumption modalities (Danekindt and Roose 2014)— something which Pierre Bourdieu had already signaled as worthy of study—or what might be called “a particular discriminating orientation towards tastes” (Warde et al. 2008: 149). This approach allows scholars to conduct a more granular analysis of the most omnivorous practices, common among young people who are faced with an increasingly abundant cultural offering. Such studies have expounded on the distance between luxury and necessity established by Bourdieu and discovered other mechanisms of distinction: the opposition between tradition and trend (Bellavance 2008; Taylor 2009), between modesty and opulence (Daloz 2010; Schimpfossl 2014), between cosmopolitanism and traditionalism (Cicchelli and Octobre 2017), and between voracious and omnivore appetites (Gershuny 2005; Cveticanin and Popescu 2011; Prieur and Savage 2013). These studies have also shown how possessing certain forms of knowledge and know-how can also play a decisive role in terms of empowerment, distinction, capitals, etc. (Holt 1997; Skeggs 2001).

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It is only recently that a new branch of research has begun looking at cultural tastes within the framework of globalization, migration flows, generational shifts, post-modernity, and cosmopolitanism. These studies have generally focused on young people who have benefited from the massification of education, increased voluntary mobility, the spread of multicultural environments (the most stunning indicators of which are the rise in “mixed” marriages and diasporas), and a substantial increase in cultural offerings (Turner and Edmunds 2002; Peterson 2005; Prieur and Savage 2013). Research has additionally looked at the growing heterogenization of cultural legitimacy under the influence of the rise to power of cultural and digital industries, the spread of consumerism, fashion and branding (which come to validate lowbrow genres that were previously lacking in legitimacy (Frank 1997; Wright 2015)), and the ascendance of pop culture more generally. As a result, the globalization of culture, which encourages more varied consumption in terms of the ethno-national source of products, has transformed cosmopolitan taste into a new generational standard of “good taste” (Cicchelli and Octobre 2018). Recently, a number of studies have looked at the effect of cultural globalization on how the boundaries between social groups are being reconfigured, on the role played by global cultural consumption with regard to the transformation of social hierarchies and the construction of identity (Cicchelli and Octobre 2017; Coulangeon 2017; Cicchelli et al. 2018; Lavie and Varriale 2019). Our analysis of Hallyu thus takes place within this framework, accounting for the full influence of globalization on cultural dynamics and the reshaping of social boundaries and cultural legitimacy. This is why we have turned our serious attention to the pop culture of a formerly overlooked nation, a country that was long a bit player on the stage of cultural production. It is also why we have eliminated the distinction between the products of cultural industries and works of art—a distinction that had a whiff of elitism about it and whose elimination allowed us to also overcome a number of related dichotomies: copy versus mass reproduction, original versus innovation, artisan versus artist, work versus talent, dominant country versus dominated country (in terms of cultural production), and so on. In this manner, we were also able to revisit the notion of soft power. From this perspective, the

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success of the Korean Wave is like the proverbial bull in the china shop, as it completely upended entrenched cultural hierarchies. The various modalities of consumption—especially the use of digital networks to access, disseminate, and share information but also Korean language learning as a tool to enhance understanding and aesthetic pleasure— thus become key elements in how individuals develop a close relationship with ostensibly exotic cultural products.

2.2

Rethinking Culture in a Global World

This is a particularly useful new vantage point from which to examine the globalization of culture. Today, in fact, Hallyu is a vehicle for dismantling scholarship on critical globalization studies, in collaboration with the reverse cultural imperialism school, reorienting/recentering globalization practicioners, and cultural pluralism theoreticians who are arguing that the predominant center-periphery perspective cannot explain global media relations today and that a new epoch of cultural pluralism has now arrived. (Lee 2015: 12)

The Korean Wave is thus an excellent perch from which to examine the three major (and partially overlapping) registers of cultural globalization. First of all, we looked at practices that promote participatory globalization, mostly on the side of reception. We emphasized the powerful influence of participatory fan culture and the coconstruction of success via the proliferation of entry points made available for fans to latch onto Hallyu (Lee and Kuwahara 2014; Takacs 2014), in particular, thanks to participatory logic of social networks (Oh and Lee 2013). In democratic societies, this participatory imaginary naturally leads to a number of questions regarding the inclusion of diverse publics, given that citizenship has become culturalized (Appadurai 2006); this leads us to the second register. Secondly, we analyzed the rise of a cosmopolitan form of globalization, whose form can be spotted in the statements of young fans when they mention a number of transnational generational touchstones related to their passion. This alternative globalization challenges the relative positions of nations in terms of cultural and political dominance and moves

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us toward a multipolar worldview. Fans thus use Hallyu to revise their perception of the global world they live in: by consuming K-pop and K-dramas—the two cultural genres mentioned most frequently—young fans clearly advocate for the inclusion of diverse cultures and populations, while rejecting racism, xenophobia, and other forms of exclusion related to gender or physical characteristics. This transformation can be seen as cosmopolitan globalization (Beck 2002), a phenomenon which appears to evade the requirement of cultural proximity: the young fans we interviewed overwhelmingly did not have any kind of heritage ties to South Korea or Asia more broadly. In addition, they grew up in cultural universes dominated by American and Japanese cultural products, and yet, they became fans of Hallyu cultural products precisely because of their uniqueness and, ultimately, their foreign character—even despite the reassuring presence of familiar aesthetic components common to global pop culture across the board. In fact, young fans with an immigrant background were most likely to allow their Korean passion to play a central role in their Bildung and the decisions they made with regard to their academic and professional trajectories. Thirdly, we talked about the imaginary of soft globalization (drawing on the concept of sweet power), which lacks hegemonic designs and operates primarily in the traditional spheres of soft power. When K-pop and K-drama “Idols” create intimate ties with certain fans (ties which may be supportive or even therapeutic in some cases); when they highlight modesty, hard work, and respect for one’s elders; when the mass-diffused cultural contents in which such stars appear largely eschew the sexualization and violence that are characteristics of Western media; when beauty is omnipresent and becomes synonymous with goodness (even if this “mandatory cuteness” (Oh 2014: 63) is ensured at great cost and artifice), they embody the new face of globalization. This new globalization is miles away from the traditional discourse about economic crises, intergenerational conflicts, political tensions, and environmental or public health crises—discourse that can easily lead to negative visions of the future for many young people. In fact, young fans can clearly identify with Hallyu products precisely because the latter subtly combine Western and Asian traits, presenting a highly desired but somewhat tamer version of exoticism. The Korean Wave thus appears as a “non-threatening, pleasant

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package” (Lie 2012: 356) that transforms the body and soul of Korean stars, as well as the emotions that their songs, shows, or movies elicit (Kim and Kim 2015) into commodities that help to promote Korean society as a whole. This does not mean that young fans are condescended to or remain apolitical over the course of their consumptions (Galbraith and Karlin 2012). On the contrary, while young fans cultivate a vision of “a good society” that is based on their passion for Hallyu products, they never lose sight of the dark side of South Korean cultural industries.

3

 New Cultural Hegemony or A Multipolar Globalization?

From this perspective, the Korean Wave is a symptom of geopolitical changes that are currently affecting power relations and cultural exchanges. It embodies the rise of industrial offerings in emerging economies, as well as the growing demand for new global pop cultures from publics that are looking for a better representation of their cultural preferences, the diversity of their ethno-national origins, their aesthetic tastes, or their ethical inclination toward diversity. If we consider the speed at which Hallyu cultural products conquered the global landscape of cultural consumption, we must conclude that geocultural hierarchies have been profoundly subverted. A once-colonized nation whose cultural contributions were long ignored and that remained economically dependent on its powerful neighbors for much of its existence has now come to the forefront as a major player: South Korea is taking on the Big Three on their own turf, mass cultural industries. What is the future of these alternative pop cultures among the younger generations? It has been suggested that young people, by becoming fans of exotic cultures, could lead to a reconfiguration of the geopolitical landscape, currently dominated by the West. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Kuan-Hsing Chen and Yiman Wang (2000) argued that the success of Hallyu was already great enough to presage a sub-empire anchored in Asia (the original zone entranced by the Korean Wave) that would offer a different cultural model than the United States and create a feeling of Asian-wide community (which had hitherto been lacking), while (re)

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placing Asia in the game of global cultural exchanges. The shift these researchers envisioned is no small feat, given that cultural forms have long been associated with States (Ching 2000) and that the peaceful regionalization of the world is a trajectory strewn with obstacles, judging from the history of the European project. For this reason, Hallyu fandom is an alternative in global pop culture that fosters the transformation of regional and global identities by promoting mechanisms of affiliation and disaffiliation that go well beyond the realm of history to capitalize instead on imaginaries and desires. Hallyu has thus sometimes been seen as a new cultural formation, an “in-between space” playing the role of an influential mediator between East and West—but also as the creator of a unique culture emerging amongst the current transformations of the globalization of culture (Bhabha 1994; Shim 2006). Unlike its hegemonic predecessors, the Korean Wave does not seek to subjugate others: it does not intend to Koreanize Asia or even less the world. However, the success of Hallyu in the West, and more especially in countries that were traditionally bastions of cultural production and major players in the elaboration of international standards (including France), has changed the game: the new phenomenon of cultural globalization embodied by Hallyu cannot be fully explained by the aforementioned theory of “in-betweenness.” Why have young fans, ostensibly quite removed from the South Korean area of influence, become so invested in Hallyu that they have altered their academic, professional, or romantic decisions to follow this passion? Answering this question means looking at the future of cultural globalization from a different angle—less as a reconfiguration of existing hegemonies and more as a disjunction between soft power and hard power as a truly multipolar world emerges (and this even if power relations remain strongly imbalanced). The global success of cultural products from the “small nation” of South Korea thus holds up a mirror to the global ambitions of “major countries” such as China, whose designs for economic dominance are evident in the country’s elaboration of new Silk Road over land and sea, its production of new geographical maps and a national GPS system, its rejoining of the United Nations Human Rights Council, its increasing control over Hong Kong, and its poorly hidden expansionist designs on Taiwan.

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More broadly, this multipolar variant of globalization presupposes youth publics that are simultaneously global and capable of engaging in local forms of appropriation. In France, the alternative (and positive) pop culture offered by Hallyu is used as a tool for empowerment by young fans with an immigrant background, against a French backdrop of increased ethno-racial tensions. The products of the Korean Wave give these fans skills that can be decisive in the global information market, as well as a way to imagine a desirable elsewhere that is more appealing than their country of origin. The consumption of this alternative pop culture does not, therefore, lead to the erasure of local differences, but rather to the reconfiguration of individual allegiances and affiliations. Global pop culture has become a cultural mosaic: it is a tool used by young fans in France (as elsewhere) to develop a rooted but hybrid identity which combines national and/or local elements with transnational ones, permitting ties all over the world that transcend the traditional boundaries of gender, race, and history in a variety of different ways.

4

Hallyu Beyond Pop Culture

As we write this conclusion, it is impossible to ignore the political and social impact of Hallyu and more generally of the participatory culture that is the result of alternative pop cultures (Octobre 2020). Alongside shifts in the social uses of cultural products, we cannot overlook recent examples of fan mobilizations that have occurred independently of input or action from the artists themselves: such events illustrate the empowerment of Hallyu fans. When we look at global causes like Black Lives Matter, examples abound. Shortly after the death of George Floyd, BTS fans started to organize in support of the US-wide protests against racist police violence. They drew on their initial experience in Dallas: when the Dallas police had called on residents to report photos and videos of illegal activity committed during the protests, Korean Wave fans, and especially K-pop ones, had flooded the reporting application with photos, videos,

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and GIFs of their favorite stars alongside anti-racist messages. Ultimately, they were able to block the application’s functionality entirely. K-pop fans from all over the world then organized a substantial fundraiser to donate money to Black Lives Matter (Mayard 2020). Nor should we forget fan intervention in the American presidential debate in 2020 (whose scope in reality extends far beyond the United States, given the global stakes of the election): K-pop fans disrupted a rally Donald Trump had planned in Oklahoma by reserving vast numbers of seats and allowing the candidate to believe in a sold-out event. The president was ultimately humiliated by a sparsely attended rally (Brandy 2020). Similarly, K-pop fans operated en masse on social networks to block white supremacists: as soon as a given hashtag was rising in popularity amongst such circles (#whitelivesmatter or #exposeantifa, for instance), BTS*1 and other K-pop fans started reappropriating it massively so that white supremacists could no longer use it. In all four cases, the community-based structures that were created for recreational purposes were subverted for political and social ends by fans themselves, in support of a shared vision of justice and a good society. Whereas in the past, celebrities were the ones to support causes, now fans are the ones leading the charge, deciding for themselves what are worthy objectives and motives. Thanks to their transnational passion (Tiffany 2020), fans have become masters of social networks (they know how to reach large numbers of people very quickly); they exploit this mastery in the service of humanist causes like reforestation, anti-racism, and to combat xenophobia and violence against children. The political dimension of pop culture and its fan communities is only growing: it is logical to wonder what the scope of this transformation will be, especially given that political and union-based participation (as well as traditional forms of societal and political engagement more broadly) has been declining among young people. Cultural consumption is thus becoming inherently more of a political and citizen act.  The South Korean cultural products referred to in this book and marked with an asterisk are presented in the glossary at the end the book. 1

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Appendix: Presentation of the Interviewees

First namea

Age Occupation

Abby

20

Aby

20

Aïcha

19

Alex

22

Alice

20

Alix

24

Amina

24

Ana

22

Sales representative Sales representative Second-year undergraduate student in law Front office supervisor of a five-star hotel Unemployed (with low qualifications) Master’s student in Asian studies Nurse

Ethno-­ Social national background background Middle class Comorian descent Middle class Senegalese descent Working Comorian class descent Upper class

American descent

Middle class Her family is from La Réunion Middle class

Middle class Moroccan descent Graduate student Upper class in psychology

How long have they Have they been a already visited fan? South Korea? 8 years 3 years 8 years

No, but wishes to visit No, but wishes to visit No, but wishes to visit

5 years

No, but wishes to visit

8 years

No

8 years

Yes, visited for 1 month Yes, visited for 1 month No

11 years 8 years

(continued)

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Cicchelli, S. Octobre, The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84296-3

321

322 

Appendix: Presentation of the Interviewees

(continued)

First namea

Age Occupation

Angèle

22

Ania

22

Anne

29

Aude

26

Awa

21

Aya

19

Camille

20

Candice

25

Ethno-­ Social national background background

How long have they Have they been a already visited fan? South Korea?

Third-year Middle class undergraduate student (work-study) in public and social health management Second-year Upper class undergraduate student in a dual foreign language Chinese-English program Childcare assistant Middle class

2 years

No, but wishes to visit

10 years

No

3 years

Professional dancer Professional musician Second-year undergraduate student in a bilingual English/Spanish program Third-year undergraduate student in foreign and regional languages, cultures, and literature Looking for a job. Holder of a CAP in early childhood education

Upper class

5 years

No, but wishes to visit No

Middle class

8 years

No

2 years

No, but wishes to visit

6 years

No

15 years

No

Working class

Moroccan descent

Upper class

Working class

Portuguese descent

(continued)

  Appendix: Presentation of the Interviewees 

323

(continued)

First namea

Age Occupation

Carla

20

Caroline

20

Céline

23

Charlène

27

Clémen tine

22

Constance 21

Coralie

19

Ethno-­ Social national background background

Majoring in Upper class Algerian French literature descent and preparing to sit the entrance exams for the most prestigious French universities Third-year Upper class undergraduate student majoring in law and legal culture Assistant manager Middle class Turkish and Lebanese descent Works with Working Togolese students with class descent disabilities in a secondary school Graduate student Working in Korean class studies

Student in biomedical degree Searching for employment after 2 years of journalism school (which she did not finish)

How long have they Have they been a already visited fan? South Korea? 3 years

No, but wishes to visit

2 years

No

9 years

No, but wishes to visit

5 years

Yes, visited for 2 weeks

10 years

Yes, spent 8 months in South Korea as part of her studies and plans to live there next year No, but wishes to visit

Middle class Polish descent 8 years

Upper class

6 years

No

(continued)

324 

Appendix: Presentation of the Interviewees

(continued)

First namea

Age Occupation

Corentin

19

Daphné

31

David

24

Delphine 24

Diane

25

Elisa

23

Elise

27

Émilie

19

Emma

24

Ethno-­ Social national background background

Currently enlisted Middle class in France’s national civil service program after 1 year of journalism studies Schoolteacher Middle class Looking for work after graduating with a 2-year degree Postgraduate student in political science HR executive with a Master’s degree in human resources First-year Master’s student in modern history + part-time job Work-study student in archival science

How long have they Have they been a already visited fan? South Korea? 3 years

No

10 years 8 years

Yes, visited for 2 weeks No

10 years

No

4 years

No

Middle class

10 years

No

Working class

8 years

Yes, lived in South Korea for 1 year and visits often No, but wishes to visit

Working class

His family is from Mayotte

Upper class

Working class

Student at Middle class France’s National Institute for Oriental Languages and Civilizations (INALCO), in Japanese Third-year Upper class undergraduate student in music (flute performance)

Portuguese descent

7 years

2 years

No

(continued)

  Appendix: Presentation of the Interviewees 

325

(continued)

First namea

Age Occupation

Étienne

22

Hippolyte 31

Jamila

21

Jasmine

21

Jeanne

31

Julia

23

Julie

18

Khadija

20

Supermarket cashier (taking a break from his undergraduate studies in economic and social administration) Attending rheumatologist in a hospital Activity leader at a recreation center Works part-­time at a Korean restaurant while preparing to enroll in a Master’s of Political Science with a focus on international relations; holds a bachelor’s degree in Korean from INALCO Head receptionist at a hotel Second-year undergraduate student in economic and social administration First-year student in childcare studies Obtaining an undergraduate work/study degree in asset management

Ethno-­ Social national background background

How long have they Have they been a already visited fan? South Korea?

Working class

4 years

No

Upper class

9 years

Yes, visited for 1 week

7 years

No, but wishes to visit

Middle class Vietnamese descent

9 years

Yes, lived 6 months in Seoul for a university program

Working class Upper class

3 years

No

8 years

No

Middle class

6 years

No, but wishes to visit

3 years

No, but hopes to live in South Korea someday

Working class

Upper class

Moroccan descent

Tunisian descent

(continued)

326 

Appendix: Presentation of the Interviewees

(continued)

First namea

Age Occupation

Kira

22

Lara

20

Laura

22

Léa

20

Léonie

20

Lila

25

Lili

25

Lina

21

Ethno-­ Social national background background

Unemployed after Working Moroccan graduating with class descent a bachelor’s degree in international trade Second year of a Middle class DUT in social careers with the option of social and sociocultural animation French film school Working Romanian student class and Italian descent Nursing-school Middle class student Second-year Middle class Irish and undergraduate Turkish student in descent foreign languages, literature, and civilization, specializing in Korean at INALCO + part-time job Sustainable Upper class development consultant with KPMG Enrolled in the Middle class second year of a Master’s program in management Attending vocational school for tourism

Working class

How long have they Have they been a already visited fan? South Korea? 10 years

No, but wishes to visit

3 years

No, but wishes to visit

8 years

No

5 years

No, but wishes to visit Yes, visited for 1 week

7 years

5 years

No

2 years

Yes, participated in a 4-month academic exchange in Seoul Yes, visited for 2 weeks

2 years

(continued)

  Appendix: Presentation of the Interviewees 

327

(continued) Ethno-­ Social national background background

How long have they Have they been a already visited fan? South Korea?

First namea

Age Occupation

Lisa

23

Holds a bachelor’s Middle class degree; pursuing a Master’s

7 years

Lison

20

Middle class

3 years

Lou

18

Upper class

4 years

No

Louana

21

Middle class

4 years

No

Louise

20

Middle class

4 years

Yes, visited for 1 month

Louna

18

Working class

3 years

No, but wishes to visit

Lucie

18

Middle class

5 years

No

Ludivine

21

First-year undergraduate student in foreign and regional languages and literature, with a specialization in Spanish, works part-time at the FNAC High-school student Third-year undergraduate student in English Second-year undergraduate student in biology Waitress in a restaurant (she has left school and is taking her baccalaureate exam as a free candidate) First-year undergraduate student in psychology Third-year undergraduate student in business development

Upper class

2 years

No

Yes, studied for 1 year in Seoul as part of her Master’s degree No, but wishes to visit

(continued)

328 

Appendix: Presentation of the Interviewees

(continued) How long have they Have they been a already visited fan? South Korea?

Age Occupation

Ethno-­ Social national background background

Made leine

22

Middle class

5 years

No

Maëva

23

Working class

2 years

No

Manon

20

Middle class

6 years

No

Mathieu

28

Works in the construction and public works sector Undergraduate student in mathematics and computer science Student majoring in language and international communication Management auditor

Middle class Moroccan descent

12 years

Mattéo

20

Third-year undergraduate majoring in Korean at INALCO

Working class

4 years

Marie

26

Esthetician

Middle class

8 years

Marine

21

Sales consultant in Working children’s class clothing (did not complete her vocational training certificate in cosmetology) Graduate student Middle class majoring in Korean (Master’s degree) Specialized Working receptionist class working in a psychiatric medical center

Yes, spent one semester in Seoul Yes, visited twice for 1 and 6 months, respectively, as part of his studies and as a tourist No, but has a trip planned for next summer No, but wishes to visit

First namea

Mathilde 21

Mélanie

22

10 years

4 years

Yes, visited once

3 years

No, but wishes to visit

(continued)

  Appendix: Presentation of the Interviewees 

329

(continued)

First namea

Age Occupation

Mélodie

20

Mériem

29

Milann

21

Nancy

31

Odalie Ophélie

25 27

Pauline

19

Sophie

19

Stépha nie

28

a

Ethno-­ Social national background background

How long have they Have they been a already visited fan? South Korea?

Third-year nursing Upper class student Data scientist Upper class

No, but wishes to visit No

Third-year undergraduate student in sociology Assistant Director at the Korean Cultural Centre in Paris Banking advisor Sales representative in a ready-towear clothing store in Paris Studying for a 2-year degree in management First-year undergraduate student in foreign and regional languages and literature with a specialization in Korean Nursing assistant at a hospital

Belarusian 3 years descent Tunisian 8 years descent Middle class His family is 7 years from Guadeloupe

No, but wishes to visit

Upper class

11 years

Yes, lived in South Korea for 5 years

Middle class 10 years Working Her family is 10 years class from Guadeloupe

No Yes, visited for 3 weeks

Middle class

5 years

No

Upper class

5 years

No

Middle class

10 years

Yes, has traveled several times to South Korea

All names have been modified to protect anonymity

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned in the Book

After School 

is a five-member female K-pop band launched in 2009 by Pledis Entertainment. Along with the Gods:  The Two Worlds is a South Korean fantasy action film directed by Kim Yong-hwa and released in 2017. It is an adaptation of the eponymous webtoon created by Joo Ho-Min (2010). In a world where the dead, escorted by angels, have 49 days to prove that they lived a good life and should be allowed to reincarnate, Kim Ja-hong, a fireman who died suddenly, is visited by three angels who accompany him on his journey to the great beyond. The film was sold to 12 different countries at the Busan Film Market: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, the United States, and Canada. Then, at the American Film Market in Santa Monica, it was sold to 90 other countries, for a total of more than 100 countries of distribution. ATEEZ  is a South Korean boy band formed by KQ Entertainment and consisting of eight members that debuted in 2018. As rookies, ATEEZ were recipients of the Next Generation Award at the 2019 Golden Disc Awards, as well as being named Worldwide Fans’ Choice at the 2019 Mnet Asian Music Awards (MAMA). The group was also named “4th Generation Leaders” by the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism and is now official global ambassador for Korean culture and tourism. Autumn in My Heart  is a 16-episode South Korean television drama that originally aired in 2000. It tells the story of two children who were switched at birth and cross paths again when one of them needs a blood transfusion fol© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Cicchelli, S. Octobre, The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84296-3

331

332 

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned…

lowing an accident. Upon discovering the real identity of their parents, the two children return to their birth families, which leads them to explore their personal and social identities (in particular, one of the two children is popular in school, whereas the other is not). This series was considered as a pioneer of the melodramatic style that would become part of the signature success of K-dramas more broadly. It was remade in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and China, and was broadcast in Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Mexico, and even Egypt. It attracted one of the top ten largest Asian audiences. In 2000 and 2001, the series obtained ten different awards (at the Baeksang Arts Awards and the KBS Drama Awards). It is available for streaming on Netflix. Bedeviled  is a 2010 South Korean film released directed by Jang Cheol-soo. It was first screened at the Cannes Film Festival, under the title Blood Island. Big Bang  is a South Korean group formed by YG Entertainment in 2000. Forbes Korea ranked them as one of the most powerful celebrities in Korea in 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016. They were the first Korean mainstream hip-­ hop idols and are credited for the genre spreading throughout Asia and the world. They were the first Korean artists to be included on the Forbes Celebrity 100 (in 2016) and 30 Under 30 list of the most influential musicians in the world (2017). Birth of a Beauty  is a 21-episode South Korean series, initially broadcast from 2014 to 2015, which tells the story of Sa Geum-ram, a young overweight woman who is left by her husband and exploited by her in-laws. Following a car accident, she lets people believe she died and, using plastic surgery to completely transform herself, she sets out to seek revenge but ultimately finds true love instead. The series received five awards in 2014 and 2015 (at the SBS Drama Awards and the 15th Hwajeong Awards). It was broadcast in seven other countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam) and is now available on Netflix. Biscuit Family  is a French Facebook community dedicated to Asia. Blackpink  is a four-member South Korean girl group, formed by YG Entertainment that debuted in 2016. Blackpink is the highest-charting female Korean act on the Billboard Hot 100. Their 2020 release The Album was the first-ever album by a Korean girl group to sell more than 1 million copies. Blackpink was also the first female Korean act to receive a certification from the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) thanks to their hit single “DDU-DU DDU-DU” (2018). They have the most top 40 hits in the United Kingdom among all Korean artists, and their 2018 song “Kiss and

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned… 333

Make Up” was the first by a Korean group to receive a certification from the British Phonographic Industry (BPI) and a platinum certification from the Australian Recording Industry Association (ARIA). Their fan club is named Blink. BoA  is a South Korean singer, songwriter, and actress, discovered by SM Entertainment and who debuted in 2000. She is multilingual (speaking Japanese, English, and even some Mandarin, in addition to Korean) and is recognized as one of the most influential Korean entertainers. She is often termed “the Queen of K-pop.” Since her debut, she has released 16 albums including some in Japanese and in English. Boyfriend  is a six-member male band launched in 2011 by Starship Entertainment. It is the first K-pop band to feature twins. Boys over Flowers  is a 25-episode South Korean television show broadcast in 2009 and based on the popular manga Hana yori dango by Yoko Kamio. It tells the story of four handsome male high-school students and their transformation into men following their encounter with a young, lower-class girl. The title alludes to the “flower boys,” thus called in deference to their beauty. It also prefigures the arc of this series, which follows the development of these characters from an initially superficial quartet of pretty boys to true individuals with feelings and emotional depth. This show won 11 awards (at the KBS Drama Awards in 2009, the Seoul International Drama Awards in 2009, the 45th PaekSang Arts Awards, and on Arirang TV). It was rebroadcast throughout the world and is now available on Netflix and Rakuten TV. Brave Girl  is a South Korean girl group formed in 2011. Initially a five-member group, Brave Girls has undergone multiple lineup changes and currently consists of Minyoung, Yujeong, Eunji, and Yuna, with no original members remaining. In 2021, the group gained a sudden surge in popularity after their song “Rollin’” unexpectedly went viral. Bridal Mask  is a 28-episode South Korean television show that was originally broadcast in 2012. It is based on the 1975 graphic novel Gaksital by Huh Young-man. It follows the adventures of Lee Kang-to, a young Korean police officer during the Japanese occupation who joins the fight for independence. The series won awards nine times in 2012 and 2013 (at the 20th Korean Culture and Entertainment Awards, the Premiers K-Drama Star Awards, the KBS Drama Awards, and the 13th Republic of Korea National Assembly Awards). This series was broadcast on television in Algeria (on DTV), the Philippines (on UNTV), and Thailand (on Work Point TV); it is now available on Netflix.

334  BTS 

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned…

is a male K-pop band composed of seven members launched in 2013 by Big Hit Entertainment. It is the best-known K-pop band in the world: in 2017, the band won “best artist on social networks” at the Billboard Music Awards, beating Justin Bieber. As of 2020, their title Dynamite surpasses all records for downloads. BTS has set records in the Guinness Book of Records: the most retweets on Twitter and the most views on YouTube in less than 24 hours, and so on. BTS has also received more than 220 awards and 339 nominations. Chi-hwa-seon  is a 2002 South Korean drama film directed by Im Kwon-taek about Jang Seung-eop, a nineteenth-century Korean painter who changed the trajectory of Korean art. COED School  was a mixed K-pop band launched in 2010 by MBK Entertainment, composed of six boys and four girls. The band disbanded in 2013 but the two subgroups it produced (F-ve Dolls created in 2011 with the four girls and Speed created in 2012 with the six boys) continue to produce music. Crayon Pop  is a South Korean girl group formed under Chrome Entertainment in 2012. The group consists of four members: Geummi, Ellin, Choa, and Way. Their fifth member, Soyul, left the group in 2017. Empress Ki  is a 50-episode South Korean television show that aired between 2013 and 2014 and which follows the story of Gi Seugnyang, a young woman who transcends her lowly class at birth and becomes the Empress of the Yuan dynasty. This series received 7 awards (at the MBC Drama Awards, the 50th Baeksang Arts Awards, and the 9th Seoul International Drama Awards). It was broadcast in 16 different countries (Armenia, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Lithuania, Myanmar, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam) and is now available to stream on Netflix and Rakuten TV. EXO  is a South Korean–Chinese group launched in 2010 by SM Entertainment, originally composed of 12 members (6 dedicated to promotion in South Korea and 6 to promotion in China). The group has only nine members today. The group received the title of best-selling album at the 2015 World Music Awards, and its next album was the world’s best-selling pre-sale album. This is one of the world’s best-selling bands and is considered a vocal powerhouse in the K-pop industry. 500 Years of Joseon Dynasty (or The King of Chudong Palace)  is a 1983 historical drama that depicts the fall of Goryeo and the founding of Joseon over 27 episodes.

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned… 335 f(x) 

is a female K-pop band launched in 2015 by SM Entertainment, initially consisting of five members, but now with only four. In 2015, the American trade magazine Spin declared the band to be “the greatest living pop band of the moment” and in 2017, Billboard ranked f(x) seventh in their Top 10 Women’s K-pop of the Decade. Two of their singles were included in Billboard’s 2010 Top 100 K-pop songs of the decade list. Friend  is a drama written and directed by Kwak Gyong-taek that tells the story of four friends whose paths diverge over time. It was a commercial success in South Korea’s domestic market, selling more than 8 million tickets. Gangnam Beauty  is a 16-episode South Korean series, initially broadcast in 2018, based on a webtoon of the same name from 2016. It relates the adventures of Kang Mi-rae, a young student who decides to get plastic surgery after being a victim of intimidation and harassment over her appearance. The series won six awards in 2018 and 2019 (at the 11th Korea Drama Awards, at the 26th Korea Culture and Entertainment Awards, at the 14th Annual Soompi Awards, and at the 1st iQiyi Entertainment Awards). The series was broadcast in three other countries (Mongolia, the Philippines, and Singapore) as well as in the Middle East (by MBC4). It is available on Netflix and on Rakuten TV. GFriend  is a six-member female group formed by Source Music and launched in 2015. The group is characterized by its energetic dances and particularly complex choreography. Girls’ Generation  is a female K-pop band composed of nine members launched by SM Entertainment in 2007. The group has sold more than 57 million records and is one of the most famous acts in Asia. In 2013, the video clip of their single “I Got a Boy” received the “Video of the Year” award at the YouTube Music Awards. Their success earned them the nickname “The Nation’s Girl Group” in South Korea. Glam  was a five-piece female band launched in 2012 by Big Hit Entertainment in partnership with Source Music. The group disbanded in 2015 after one of the members was found guilty of blackmailing another singer. GOT or Got7  is a South Korean boy band composed of seven members formed by JYP Entertainment in 2014. The group gained attention also for their live performances, which often includes elements of martial arts tricking and street dancing. The group departed from JYP Entertainment on 19 January 2021 following the expiration of their contract with the agency. Gummy  is a South Korean singer. She debuted in 2003 with her album Like Them and has since become known for her soundtrack appearances.

336  Hello Venus 

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned…

(2012–2019) was a six-member female band, formed by Pledis Entertainment and Fantagio. Hello Venus fans call themselves “Hello Cupid.” H.O.T.  (1996–2001) was a South Korean boy band. They are considered to be the first K-pop idol group and their successful formula became the model for many of the K-pop groups that followed them. Hwarang:  The Poet Warrior Youth is a 20-episode South Korean television series, initially broadcast from 2016 to 2017, which follows the transformation of Sam Maek Jong, the king’s young son who, after his father’s death, is hidden outside of the capital to keep him safe from enemies while his mother, Ji So, rules as regent. To break the power of the nobles, who have become accustomed to their privileges under the bone rank system, Ji So creates a new elite, the Hwarang, to supersede the existing power factions, and she has Sam Maek Jong join it without revealing his identity. The series was broadcast in Taiwan (Videoland Drama), in Malaysia (8TV), in the Philippines (ABS-­ CBN), in Romania (National TV), and in Thailand (Channel 8). It is available on Netflix and on Rakuten TV. I Can See Your Voice  is a South Korean television program, based on a singing contest, broadcast on Mnet since 26 February 2015. This show was adapted for the US public by Fox and started airing on American TV on 23 September 2020. I’m Not a Robot  is a 32-episode South Korean television show that originally aired in 2018. Its main protagonist, Kim Min-kyu, lives a very solitary life on account of a severe allergy to human contact, which translates into hives all over his body. When Jo Ji-ah, a young woman struggling to create her own business as an inventor, meets Kim, she pretends to be a robot called Aji3. This series was broadcast on television stations in seven other countries (China, Ecuador, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, and the United States), as well as more broadly throughout Latin America; it is now available on Netflix and Rakuten TV. Inheritors,  also known as The Heirs, is a 20-episode South Korean television series that originally aired in 2013 and which follows the adventures of a group of privileged high-school students who are the heirs to their families’ financial empires, once they meet a young girl from the other side of the tracks. The series won 22 prizes in 2013 and 2014 (at the Anhui TV Drama Awards, the Baidu Fei Dian Awards, the SBS Drama Awards, the 50th Baeksang Arts Awards, and the 2nd Asia Rainbow TV Awards). It was rebroadcast on ­television in more than 25 countries (in North America, Latin

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned… 337

America, the Middle East, and Asia; it is now available on Netflix and Rakuten TV). Jewel in the Palace  is a 54-episode South Korean series that originally aired from 2003 to 2004. It tells the story of an orphaned kitchen cook who becomes the King’s first female physician. In addition to highlighting its protagonist’s tenacity and perseverance, this series was also a means to present traditional South Korean forms of art and learning, including cuisine and medicine. Jewel in the Palace received seven awards (in 2003 at the MBC Drama Awards and in 2004 at the Baeksang Arts Awards). It was rebroadcast in 60 countries on 5 continents; the show is now available on Netflix and Rakuten TV. Kara  (2007–2016) was a South Korean pop girl group composed of four members and formed by DSP Media in 2007; the group was active until 2016. Kard  is a South Korean co-ed group formed by DSP Media in 2017. They are composed of four members J.Seph and BM (two boys) and Somin and Jiwoo (two girls). Kingdom  is a 2019 South Korean TV series. It is Netflix’s first original Korean series. The series is adapted from the webcomic series The Kingdom of the Gods. This series was positively reviewed and renewed for a second season which was released in 2020. Kiss  (2001–2016) was a female trio created by J-Entercom. The group disbanded following the revelation that one of its members was in a relationship. Lovelyz  is an eight-member female band launched in 2014 by Woollim Entertainment. Their fan club’s name is “Lovelinus.” Love alarm  is a 2019 South Korean TV series based on the webtoon of the same name by Chon Kye-young. Produced by Netflix, the series follows the life of a high school girl in a society greatly influenced by a mobile app that is capable of notifying whether someone within their vicinity has romantic feelings for them. It was ranked as one of Netflix’s top releases. Season 2 was released in 2021. Mask Singer  is a French reality television series that is based on the format of the South Korean television game show series King of Mask Singer by Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation. Run by TF1 Group, Mask Singer is a singing competition that consists of celebrities donning elaborate costumes and face coverings to conceal their identity from the audience, judges, and other contestants. It first aired in 2019. Moon Lovers: Scarlet Heart Ryeo  is a 2016 K-drama based on the Chinese novel Bu Bu Jing Xin by Tong Hua. Go Ha-jin is a young woman in the twenty-first

338 

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned…

century who, after a breakup with her boyfriend, goes to the seashore. While attempting to rescue a drowning child, an eclipse appears and she is transported back in time to the Goryeo Era, during the reign of Taejo, the first king of that dynasty. She must then live under the assumed identity of Hae Soo, a cousin of the wife of Wang Wook, the eighth prince, and finds herself caught up in conflicts among the Wang princes. This series received nine awards in 2016 (at the Korea Brand Awards, the SBS Drama Awards, and the First Asia Artist Awards). Mr. Sunshine  is a 24-episode South Korean television show that was originally broadcast in 2018. Its main protagonist is Eugene Choi, who was born a slave in Korea, sought asylum in the United States, and became an American naval officer. As an adult, Choi returns to Korea and joins the struggle for Korean independence from its Japanese colonizer. This series won awards at the 11th Korean Drama Awards, the 6th APAN Star Awards, and the 2nd Seoul Awards in 2019, as well as at the Baeksang Arts Awards in 2018. The show was broadcast on television stations in the Philippines and Malaysia and is now available on Netflix. My Holo Love  is a 12-episode South Korean television show that became available on Netflix in 2020. It tells the story of Han So-yeon, a young woman who suffers from face blindness and thus has a very limited social and romantic life, despite excelling at work. She accidentally becomes a beta tester for a new hologram (Holo) created by a tech genius named Go Nan-do, who is likewise lacking in a certain number of social skills. The hologram is designed to offer friendship to its owner. My Sassy Girl  is a romantic comedy from 2001, based on a true story originally published in a blog and then a novel by Kim Ho-sik. This movie was a box office smash in South Korea before being released in Asia more broadly, where it was comparable in success to Titanic and thus propelled Korean cinema to the international stage. The foreign movie rights were purchased in several countries, which proceeded to offer local remakes (the American version, also called My Sassy Girl, came out in 2008, the same year as a Japanese remake; a Sino-Korean remake was released in 2016). The film won 12 different awards (at the Blue Dragon Film Awards in 2001, the Baeksang Arts Awards in 2002, the Grand Bell Awards in 2002, the Golden Cinematography Awards in 2002, the Hong Kong Film Awards in 2003, the Hochi Film Awards in 2003, the Fant-Asia Film Festival in 2003, and at the Awards of the Japanese Academy in 2004).

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned… 339 Nine Muses 

, often stylized as 9Muse, was a female K-pop band launched in 2010 by Star Empire Entertainment and composed of four members. Their separation was announced in 2019. Oasis  is a 2002 South Korean movie. The film’s plot recounts the difficult romance between a mildly mentally disabled man who has just been released from jail after a sentence for involuntary manslaughter and a woman with severe cerebral palsy. Oh My Girl  is a seven-member female band launched by WM Entertainment in 2015. The name of their fan club is “Miracle.” Oldboy   is a 2003 South Korean neo-noir action thriller film co-written and directed by Park Chan-wook. It is based on the Japanese manga of the same name, written by Garon Tsuchiya and illustrated by Nobuaki Minegishi. The film won the Grand Prix at the 2004 Cannes Film Festival. Parasite  is a 2019 South Korean black comedy thriller film, directed by Bong Joon-ho, who co-wrote the screenplay with Han Jin-won. This film follows a poor family who schemes to become employed by a wealthy family and infiltrate their household by posing as unrelated, highly qualified individuals. Parasite is the first South Korean film to receive Academy Award recognition and one of three films to win both the Palme d’Or and the Academy Award for Best Picture. Persona  is a South Korean anthology television series produced by Netflix, where each story is directed by a different director. The first season was released in 2019. PSY  is a South Korean singer produced by YG Entertainment who became world-famous in 2012 thanks to the success of his single “Gangnam Style,” whose global success was compared to Michael Jackson’s “Thriller.” Rain  is a South Korean singer-songwriter, actor, and music-producer, who debuted in 1998 with the boy band Fanclub before launching his solo career. Among his seven albums, It’s Raining (2004) established him as an international star. He made his acting debut in 2003, when he starred in the Hollywood movies Speed Racer and Ninja Assassin. He was the first Korean to win an MTV award. Red Velvet  is a female K-pop group composed of five members launched by SM Entertainment in 2014. The group has been praised for its diverse discography and received many accolades throughout its career. Internationally, they were named one of the most popular K-pop formations by Time and Billboard. As of February 2020, they were the fifth-most streamed K-pop artist worldwide on Spotify.

340 

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned…

Samaritan Girl 

is a 2004 South Korean movie. Jae-Young is an amateur prostitute who sleeps with men while her best friend Yeo-Jin “manages” her by setting up dates, taking care of the money, and making sure the coast is clear. Seo Taiji and Boys  (1992–1996) was a male band. Its three members Seo Taiji, Yang Hyun-suk, and Lee Juno experimented with many different genres of popular Western music and are credited with pioneering the use of rap in K-pop. Se7en  is a South Korean singer and actor, who debuted in 2003 (after four years as a trainee under YG Entertainment) and entered the Japanese market in 2006 and the US market in 2007. He accepted the lead role for the Korean drama Goong S in 2007. SEVENTEEN  is a male K-pop band, launched in 2015 by Pledis Entertainment, and composed of 13 members, divided into three sub-units with distinct specializations (Hip Hop Unit, Vocal Unit, and Performance Unit). Its members are very involved in the writing of songs, choreographies, and the general life of the group. In addition to its numerous awards in South Korea, the group was recognized at the MTV Europe Music Awards in 2017. SHINee  is a male K-pop band launched in 2008 by SM Entertainment and originally composed of five members aged 14–18 (the lead singer committed suicide in 2017). They are the precursors of a new K-pop generation. The band distinguishes itself by its clothing style (high-top sneakers, skinny jeans, and colorful sweaters) which has become the “SHINee trend” among young people. The band has received numerous awards in Asia. Shiri  is a South-Korean thriller (1999) written and directed by Kang Je-gyu, which follows the adventures of Ryu, a South Korean secret service agent, as he investigates a terrorist conspiracy plotted by North Korean sleeper agents. Sign  is a 20-episode South Korean show that aired in 2011. It is about a pair of forensic doctors (one a young extrovert and the other a hardened veteran) that are tasked with solving criminal cases. In 2011, the show won an award at the 19th SBS Drama Awards. A Japanese version was created in 2019. Six Bomb  is a three-member girl group currently under World Event Agency. Originally a six-member outfit, they debuted on 27 January 2012. Six Flying Dragons  is a 50-episode South Korean television show that aired between 2015 and 2016 and which tells the story of the Joseon dynasty using both fictional and real historical characters, including the prince Lee Bang Won. This show won 16 different awards (in 2015, at the 23rd SBS Drama Awards, and in 2016, at the 52nd Baeksang Arts Awards, the 43rd Korean Broadcasting Grand Prize Awards, the 11th Seoul International Drama

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned… 341

Awards, the 5th APAN Star Awards, the 23rd Grimae Awards, and the 9th Tokyo Drama Awards). The series is now available to stream on Netflix. Sky Castle  is one of the most successful K-drama on South Korean television. Its 20 episodes were broadcast in 2018 and 2019. The story takes place in an affluent residential neighborhood and focuses on four housewives whose husbands have prestigious jobs. These women are obsessed with gaining admissions for their children in one of the three SKY universities (the most prestigious universities, admission to which ensures a high-paying job and career in one of the country’s major corporations): Seoul National University, Korea University, and Yonsei University. These women spend lots of money on special tutors and evening classes in hak-won (costly private schools) and ultimately betray each other in countless ways. The series won ten awards (at the 55th Baeksang Arts Awards, at the 12th Korea Drama Awards, at the 27th Korean Culture and Entertainment Awards, and at the 24th Asian Television Awards). It has been rebroadcast in eight other countries (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam) and is available on Netflix. Speed  , commonly stylized as SPEED, was a South Korean boy band formed by MBK Entertainment in 2012. The group was formerly COED School’s male unit until they became an independent group in 2013. In late 2015, it was reported that the group was disbanded. Super Junior  is a male K-pop band, launched by SM Entertainment in 2005 and composed of 11 members, which was then divided into subgroups to reach a wider audience. With diverse styles, Super Junior have recorded and participated in more than 20 albums. The group has received numerous awards in Asia and around the world. Superstar K  is a yearly South Korean TV talent show, first held in 2009, and now considered the biggest audition program in South Korea. Traditionally, the award winner of each season is given the chance to perform at the Mnet Asian Music Awards. 3-Iron  is a 2004 romantic drama film written, produced, and directed by Kim Ki-duk. The film tells the story of a young drifter who develops a relationship with an abused housewife. 2NE1  (2009–2016) was a South Korean composed of four girls formed by YG Entertainment which had a successful career in South Korea, Japan, and East Asia, as well as worldwide: they were one of the best-selling girl groups of all time, and Billboard magazine ranked them as one of the best K-pop girl groups of the past decade in 2017.

342 

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned…

The King: Eternal Monarch 

is a 16-episode South Korean drama which originally aired in 2020 and which tells the story of Lee Gon, the modern emperor of the Kingdom of Korea in an alternate reality. This emperor travels to our world to find South Korean detective Jung Tae-eul, whose ID he has had since the assassination of his father during his childhood. This show was also broadcast in the Philippines and is now available on Netflix. The Age of Shadows  is a 2016 South Korean thriller film directed by Kim Jee-­ woon. The film is set in Shanghai and Seoul in the 1920s. The Rose  is a four-member male K-pop band formed in 2015 by J&Star Company. The Throne  is a 2015 South Korean historical drama film directed by Lee Joon-ik. Set during the reign of King Yeongjo, the film is about the life of Crown Prince Sado, the heir to the throne who was deemed unfit to rule and, at age 27, was condemned to death by his own father by being locked in a rice chest for eight days. Tomorrow X Together  , commonly known as TXT, is a five-member male K-pop band formed by Big Hit Music that debuted in 2019. Topp Dogg  is a South Korean boy group now known as Xeno-T. At first a 13-member group created in 2013 under Stardom Entertainment, the group moved to Hunus Entertainment; following Stardom Entertainment’s merger with the company and multiple line-up changes, the remaining five members subsequently changed their name to Xeno-T in 2018. Train to Busan  is a 2016 action-horror film directed by Yeon Sang-ho, which takes place on a train while a deadly virus ravages the country and turns its inhabitants into zombies. The film, which was a huge commercial success, was screened out of competition at the Cannes Film Festival in 2016. TVXQ  (sometimes referred to as DBSK, an abbreviation of their Korean name Dong Bang Shin) is a male K-pop band launched in 2003 by SM Entertainment and initially composed of five members. It was one of the most prominent bands of the second generation of K-pop, until three of its members accused their producer of forcing them to sign abusive contracts. After a long legal battle, those three members were able to leave the band, leaving two members behind. Twice  is a female K-pop band composed of nine members formed by JYP Entertainment in 2015. This group has been successful in Japan, Canada, and the United States. U-Kiss  is a five-member male band created in 2008 by NH Media. The name of its fan club is “Kiss me” and the official color of the band is pearl pink.

Glossary: List of South Korean Cultural Products Mentioned… 343 Wassup 

(2013–2019) was a South Korean girl group that debuted with the single “Wassup.” Whispering Corridors  is a 1988 South Korean supernatural horror film. It was part of the explosion in Korean cinema following the liberalization of censorship at the end of the country’s military dictatorship, and offers strong social commentary on authoritarianism and conformity in the harsh South Korean education system. Winter Sonata  is a 20-episode South Korean television show broadcast in 2002. It recounts the love story between two high-school students, Jun-sang and Yoo-­jin. When Jun-sang dies in a car accident, this tragedy would appear to put an end to their story. Ten years later, however, Yoo-jin meets a man who looks exactly like her young lover, but she is engaged to Sang-hyuk. This drama was broadcast in the Philippines (on GMA Network), in Venezuela (on TVes), in Ecuador (on Ecuavisa), and in Peru (on TV Perú). This show was likely responsible for kicking off the popularity of Korean television shows abroad, and especially in Japan. An eight-volume manga was later created based on the show. And in 2009, a 26-episode animated series was adapted into Japanese. Finally, the show was also transformed into a musical. ZE:A  is a male K-pop band composed of nine members launched in 2010 by Star Empire Entertainment.

Index1

A

Abe, Shinzo, xv Activision, 78 Adorable Representative MC of Youth (ARMY), xi, xii, 63, 64, 288, 291 Aesthetic appeal, 209, 215 appreciation, 163, 215 canon, 208–220 capital, 247 code(s), 151, 157, 229 contents, 85 dimension, 26, 39, 43, 136, 162, 225 distance, 151 languages, 6, 163

mainstream, 194 novelty, 162 pleasure, 312 primacy of, 163 references, 151, 214 standards, 241, 247 Aestheticization of culture, 26 (everyday) life, 38, 40 goods, 40 world, the, 163 Affiliation, 11, 25, 27, 38, 48, 57, 65, 92, 164, 166, 267, 304, 309, 315, 316 Alcoholism, 256 Alterity, 24, 26, 27, 159, 194, 197, 209, 230, 231, 261, 268, 301

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 V. Cicchelli, S. Octobre, The Sociology of Hallyu Pop Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84296-3

345

346 Index

Amateur(s), 2, 6, 14, 24, 25, 27, 62, 150, 151, 158–165, 179, 191, 222, 230, 340 Amazon Prime Video, 77 American aesthetic canons, 153 cultural exports, 135 cultural industries, 85, 151, 192, 196, 211 dream, 87, 89 fiction, 84, 200 geopolitical imperialism, 165 hegemony, 1, 22, 27, 121, 308 imaginary, 116 mainstream, 165, 201 pop fascism, 90 producers, 198 way of life, 40, 44, 116 Americanization, 90, 121, 122, 308 Americanness, 197 Anime, 9, 9n4, 9n5, 77, 95n14, 95n16, 118, 119n3, 119n5, 122, 122n7, 130, 130n13, 130n14, 138, 153, 158, 161, 161n6, 161n7, 172n21, 172n22, 173n24, 173n25, 174, 174n33, 176, 191, 192, 203–208 Appearance importance of, 248 tyranny of, 246–249 Apple TV+, 77 ARMY, see Adorable Representative MC of Youth Asian aesthetics, 208 community, 88, 92–93, 120, 308 consciousness, 138

cultural products, 171, 203 cultures, 136, 208, 301, 302 exoticism, 209 miracle, 21, 47, 92 modesty, 244 values, 99, 164 Asiatic imaginary, 138 Authenticity cultural, 26, 155, 161 exotic, 157 mirage of, 157 Autodidactism, 288–291 Autonomy, 40, 54, 128, 139, 206, 233, 252, 270, 275, 289 B

Bandai Namco Entertainment, 78 Basquiat, Jean-Michel, 4 Beat Generation, 87 Beatles, x, 7 Beauty, 26, 40, 58, 61, 102–105, 138, 198, 200, 209, 214–216, 219, 219n52, 220, 241, 246–249, 274, 313, 333 Biformity, 307–309 Big Three League, 76–80 Bildung, 24, 40, 294, 313 Billboard Hot 100, x, 332 Black Lives Matter, 259, 269, 316, 317 Blizzard Entertainment, 78 Bollywood, 1, 20, 80, 199 Boundaries, 141, 176, 179, 181, 196, 223, 309, 311, 316 British pop, 1 Bullying, 272, 273

 Index  C

Capcom, 78 Capitalism addictive, 39, 66 aesthetic, 21, 37–67, 123, 141, 157 American, 44, 57 artistic, 4, 21, 38, 39, 45 consumer, 44 contemporary, 38, 39, 42, 44 cool, 39, 45 creative, 39 cultural, 2, 10, 39 emotional, 39, 66 entertainment, 21, 37–67, 75, 123, 150 puritanical, 44 State, 50–55 Capra, Frank, 8 Chaebols, 46, 50n5, 51, 66, 302 Character industry, 76, 77 Choreography, x, 26, 200, 209, 217, 335 Civilizational belonging, 152 CJ Entertainment, 50, 52 Coevality, 155 Cold War, 83, 116, 118 Comfort women, 100, 100n19, 129 Communism/communist Party, 116–118, 121 Compressed modernity, 1 Confucian capitalism, 47 cultural traits, 136 elements, 238 heritage, 263 influence, 47 legacy, 152, 250, 261

347

revival, 47 tradition, 238–240 understanding of fate, 257 values, 13, 99, 128, 136 vision of gender roles, 253 Confucianism, legacy of, 47 Consumer society, xiii, 40, 43 Cool Japan, 118–120, 123, 133, 171 Cosmetic, plastic surgery, 65, 102, 103, 105, 138, 220, 248, 280, 332, 335 Cosmopolis, 44, 201 Cosmopolitan amateur(s), pop, 24, 25, 27, 150, 158–165, 191 Bildung, 24, 294 competencies, 304 elective affinities, 149–181 empowerment, 268, 283–293 fan(s), 209 globalization, 313 imagination of globalization, 201 omnivorism, 281 openness, 179, 209, 226 pride, 290 reception, 150, 158–162 socialization, 24 society, 268 taste, 24, 150, 179, 311 ties, 223 virtue, 25 vision, 201, 303 world, 201–203 worldview, 301 Cosmopolitanism aesthetico-cultural, 163 pop, 20–25, 151, 309–314 Cosplay, 119

348 Index

Counterculture, xiii, 45, 120 Creative economy, 45, 167 Cultural appropriation, 179, 197, 212 borders, 179 boundaries, 223 capital, 180, 234, 285, 287, 293, 296 circulation, 16, 155 community, 151 comprehension, 162 consumption, 66, 165, 192, 206, 211, 231, 267, 278, 282, 287, 294, 295, 302, 304, 311, 314, 317 contents, 18, 54, 81, 82, 84, 85, 92, 95, 126, 127, 131, 151, 153, 313 diplomacy, 22, 93, 111–123 discount, 160, 161, 181 diversity, 38, 75, 122 economics, 41, 307 environment, 151, 179, 311 exchanges, flows, 76, 77, 135, 136, 141, 152, 164, 166, 167, 171, 201, 202, 314, 315 good(s), 27, 37, 37n1, 40, 41, 48, 80, 83, 113, 114, 119, 120, 126, 151, 161, 179 hegemony, Western, 123 illegitimacy, 276 imperialism, 80, 120, 151, 308, 312 legacy, 236 legitimacy, 276, 311 mediator, 136 mobilization, 220–223 nationalism, 123, 124

openness, 170–171, 301 package, 3, 55–57, 66, 103, 137, 141, 213 policy, 48, 124, 126, 127 poverty, 213 power(s), 81, 136, 140 production, product(s), ixn2, 1, 2, 10–12, 13n11, 16–23, 25, 26, 37, 40, 49n3, 51, 53, 58, 77, 79, 81n7, 84, 89, 89n10, 90, 92, 93, 96, 99, 104, 105, 115, 118, 121, 125, 130, 133, 136–139, 141, 149–152, 152n1, 155, 157–160, 162, 163, 165, 168, 171, 178–181, 191–193, 196n9, 203, 204, 207, 209, 211, 221, 224, 229, 231–234, 234n8, 236, 243, 246, 262, 263, 267–269, 269n3, 272–276, 286, 287, 290, 293, 294, 304, 307–309, 311–316, 317n1, 331–343 proximity, 150–155, 158, 163, 166, 171, 181, 313 references, 84, 151, 153, 175 repertoires, xvi, 113, 191 shareability, 163 signature, 159 socialization, 191 technology of consumer engagement, 222 ties, 47, 93, 153 toolkit, 230 transfer, 207, 208 universes, 267, 313 Cultural industry/industries, xvi, 1–3, 4n2, 6, 10, 18, 21, 37–40, 47, 48, 50, 52–54, 57,

 Index 

59, 66, 75, 76, 79, 80, 82, 85, 91, 92, 94, 97, 112–123, 127, 133, 135, 151, 158, 178, 192, 193, 196, 211, 247, 267, 309, 311, 314 Cuteness, 17, 95, 96 D

DC Comics, 85, 86, 122 De-centralising multiplicity, 22 Depressive tendencies, 272 Despecification, 93–94, 105, 212 Digital bonds, 223 connections, 225 intimacy, 191–226 platforms, 19 Discrimination ethnic, 286 racial, 285, 286 social, 286 Disposable commodities, 61 DreamWorks Animation, 79 E

East Asia, 12, 22, 76, 83, 93, 134, 136, 141, 151, 152, 341 Electronic Arts, 78 Elitism, 311 Emotional aesthetics, 43–44 commodities, 43, 44, 57, 65 consumption, 21, 43, 65, 95 experiences, 65 life, 44 repression, 242, 249–251

349

Empowerment autodidactic, 288 strategies, 180 Enlightenment, 115 Entertainment capitalism, 37–67, 75, 123, 150 Ethno-national difference(s), 210, 284 identification, 209 origin, 209, 314 Everyday life, 11, 17, 38–41, 43, 66, 232, 252, 271 Exclusion, 246, 256, 258, 278–281, 313 Exotic appeal, 151–153, 309 aspect, 273 culture, 268, 314 Exoticism, 21, 151, 154, 157, 158, 163, 171, 181, 209, 242, 313 Expansion of commodification, 42 F

Facebook, xi, 19, 81, 104, 332 Familiarity, 79, 91, 157, 159, 162–165, 167, 171, 176, 178, 181, 203, 208, 225, 297 Fan communities, 6, 16, 63, 64, 66, 131–133, 164, 178, 180, 218, 232, 304, 317 networks, 222 sphere, 246 Fanbase(s), 19, 222 Fandom, 179, 214, 220, 223–225, 281, 287, 315 Female gaze, 242

350 Index

Financial crisis, 1997, 48, 50, 51, 66, 125 Floating signifier, 25 Fox Animation Studios, 79 Fox television, 77 Fragrance, 160 Franco-Belgian bandes dessinées, 1, 192 French Touch, 6 Fukuda Doctrine, 93 G

GAFA, see Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon Geek culture, 5 Gender stereotypes, 276 Generational belonging, 196 common ground, 204 conflict, 278 denominator, 195 differences, 277 good taste, 179, 311 touchstone, 195, 312 trend, 195 Global actor, player, 23, 126 aesthetic, alternative, 163, 225, 238 ambassador, 119, 331 beauty contest, 118 brand, 22, 112, 123–133 capitalism, 38, 66 citizenship, 127 common, 11, 24, 25 competition, 10, 22, 75, 118, 237 conglomerates, 46 consciousness, 25

cultural contest, 115 cultural exchanges, flows, trends, 27, 76, 159, 315 cultural industries, 1, 82, 193, 267 cultural influence, 90, 113 economy, 37, 47 existence, 162 fame, diffusion, success, xii, xvi, 2, 9, 10, 19, 20, 85, 138, 149, 307–317, 339 generations, 24, 79 Hallyu, 53 imaginary, 141 influence, 23, 116, 134, 141 Korea strategy, 52 landscape, 11, 19, 314 marketing strategies, 157 markets, xiv, xvi, 123, 133, 205 middle class, 48 political economy, 17 products, illegitimate, 12, 161, 180, 309 publics, 10 scene, 9, 23, 66, 125 South, 79 swing, 202 symbolic competition, 113 system, 120 world, 291, 310–314 Globalization alternative, 21, 25, 75–105, 150, 312 asymmetrical cultural, 164 children of, 197 cultural, 22, 37, 75, 91, 94, 104, 123, 157, 164, 179, 194, 225, 307, 309, 311, 312, 315

 Index 

multipolar, 314–316 recentering, 22, 312 soft, 313 Glocalization, glocalized, glocal, 26, 94, 99–101, 105, 135 Good society, 23, 229, 230, 309, 314, 317 Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon (GAFA), 81 H

Haan, 101, 102 Hallyu 1.0, 12–14, 154 Hallyu 2.0, 14–17, 154, 180, 192, 221, 222, 308 Hallyu culture, 150 Hallyu-hwa, 53 Hamilton, Richard, 4 Happiness, 44, 65, 66, 87, 251 Harassment, xiii, 254, 258, 259, 273, 335 Harmony, 101, 123, 127–133, 152 HBO, 81 Highbrow culture, 125 Hollywood, 8, 60, 83, 85, 88, 91, 116, 125, 158, 339 Homophobia, 259, 259n69, 261 Honor, xiv, xv, 15, 98, 252 HOOQ, 81 Hulu, 81 Human rights, 115, 120, 135 Hybrid, hybridization, 6, 94, 99–101, 133, 141, 149, 155–158, 161, 175, 211–214, 238, 252n52, 268, 307, 316

351

I

Identity, ix, 41, 43, 79, 83, 96, 101, 126, 127, 138, 157, 158, 195, 199, 231, 247, 258, 269, 274, 283, 287, 311, 315, 316, 332, 336–338 Idol(s) inspirational, 271 system, 63 transmedia, 57, 60–62, 66 Iflix, 81 Imagined transnational communities, 11, 92, 151 Immaturity, 275, 276 Individualism, 84, 236, 249, 263 Inequality, xiii, 66, 87, 230, 236, 238, 258, 259 Instagram, xi, 221, 222 J

Jackson, Michael, 339 Japanese animation, Japanimation, 1, 84, 119, 122, 156, 159, 172, 175, 178 cultural codes, culture, 136, 176, 178, 203, 204, 205n25, 208 cultural productions, products, 92, 96, 130, 154, 156, 160, 172–174, 176–178, 203–208, 225 mainstream, 206, 309 pop culture, 104, 157, 174, 176, 181, 191, 207, 214, 225 Japaneseness, Japanness, 93, 153, 203–206 Japan wave, 160, 171–174, 191, 225

352 Index

Jeong, 132n16, 239 Joseon dynasty, 128, 128n10, 129, 230n1, 340 period, 128, 230 Jurassic Park syndrome, 48–50 JYP Entertainment, 56, 58, 335, 342

149, 150, 153, 157, 158, 164, 165, 169, 170, 179–181, 191, 195, 198, 201, 229, 231, 235, 249, 251, 255, 262, 264, 267–280, 283, 285, 291, 292, 303, 307–309, 312–316 Koreanness, 158, 226

K

L

KakaoPage, 82 Kawaii, 17, 94–96, 102, 118, 134, 136, 214 Kirby, Jack, 88 Koizumi, Junichiro, xv, 173n29 Koreaboos, 264 Korea discount, 126, 127 Korean cultural productions, products, ixn1, 14, 18, 20, 23, 26, 101, 127, 139, 152, 158, 180, 198, 236, 242–244, 253, 264, 276, 278, 281, 285 culture, xv, xvi, 10, 12, 17, 20, 25, 124, 167, 169, 198, 208, 224, 231, 232, 238–240, 261, 264, 286, 292, 296, 299, 302 diaspora, 161 education, 230 geography, 230 landmarks, 230 (national) brand, 127, 135 society, 50, 229–232, 250, 259, 261, 314 war, 46, 166, 236 Wave, ixn1, 1–3, 11–23, 25, 27, 38, 46, 50, 52, 53, 55, 60, 66, 99, 105, 112, 133, 139, 141,

Lee, Stan, 88 Lezhin Comics, 82 Line Webtoon, 82 Love, love story, xii, xiii, 19, 64, 65, 87, 99, 132, 132n16, 133, 180, 194, 208, 215, 219, 222, 224, 243–246, 249, 251, 262, 276, 280, 281, 284, 286, 287, 294, 295, 298, 332, 343 Lowbrow culture, 86 Loyalty transmission, 178, 231 LucasFilm, 77, 86 M

Male dominance, 251–255 Mandatory cuteness, 313 Manga(s), 1, 9, 9n4, 9n5, 9n8, 76, 93, 94n12, 95n14, 97, 118, 119, 119n3, 119n5, 122, 122n7, 130, 130n13, 130n14, 140, 153, 156, 156n3, 158, 159, 159n5, 161, 161n6, 161n7, 172, 172n21, 172n22, 173n24, 173n25, 173n26, 173n27, 173n29, 174, 175, 178, 191, 192, 203–208, 247, 333, 339, 343 Manhwabangs, 16, 16n13

 Index 

Marvel, xi, xv, 77, 85, 86, 88, 122 Masculine tenderness, 246 Masculinity alternative visions of, 242 complicit, 277 desirable model of, 251 effeminate, 274 feminine, 242 hegemonic, 241, 242, 263, 276 sweet forms of, 263 tempered, 241–243 virilistic, 236 Western hegemonic, 241 Minjok, 259 Minuscule knowledge, 229 Miyazaki, Hayao, 95n15, 177, 177n37, 177n38, 177n39, 177n40, 205 Modernity consumerist, 115, 155 technological, 127, 130–131, 133 Modernization, 1, 38, 46–48, 92, 93, 99, 238 Modest, modesty, xii, 89, 152, 153, 240, 244–246, 249, 293, 310, 313 Moombahton, x Mugukjeok, 101, 102 Mukokuseki, 101 Multiculturalism, multicultural, 84, 100, 179, 259–261, 309, 311 Multipolar world, 2, 104, 141, 309, 313, 315 N

National boundaries, 196 culture, 81, 124, 193

353

folklore, 125 identity, 96, 101, 126, 157, 158 pride, xiv, 126, 129 Nation branding, 112, 123, 127, 134 Neoliberalism, 66, 67 Netflix, 16, 77, 81, 99, 130, 168, 195, 201, 221, 332–339, 341, 342 Nintendo, 78, 95n16 Nolan, Christopher, 8, 90 Nollywood, 1, 80, 199 O

Odorless, odorlessness, 94, 101, 160, 204 Omnivore(s), 157, 310 Omnivorous consumption repertoires, 211 Otherness, 25, 159, 197 P

Pan-Asian cultural contagion, 177–178, 181 identity, 138 “technocultural contagion,” 178 Participatory audiences, 309 culture, 25, 57, 220, 224, 308, 316 globalization, 312 Patriarchy, patriarchal society, 241n24, 246, 252, 254 Perfection, perfectionism, 216–219, 248 Phillips, Todd, 90 Pixar Animation Studios, 79 Pluriversum, 202

354 Index

Pop culture alternative, xvi, 1–27, 75–105, 112, 150, 203, 220, 309, 314–316 American, 4, 8, 14, 21, 23, 76, 83, 88, 112, 124, 149, 192–198, 203, 204, 207, 212, 229 Asian, 171, 207 diplomacy, 111, 118, 136 dominance, dominant, 14, 23, 88, 104, 134, 141, 194, 197, 317 global, xiv, xvi, 1–27, 75–105, 150, 158, 162–165, 181, 207, 225, 313–316 Japanese, 14, 19, 23, 104, 157, 174, 176, 181, 191, 205, 207, 214, 225 Korean, xvi, 1, 10, 17, 25, 26, 123–133, 138, 243, 309 national, xvi, 14, 172 Pop nationalism, 126, 141 Pulp magazines, 5 R

Racism, xiii, 220, 259, 260, 269, 304, 313 Rakuten TV, 16, 81, 130, 168, 333–337 Rap, x, xiv, 15, 100, 340 Reaffiliation, 285–287 Realism, non-realism, 198–200 Republican assimilationist model, 286, 309 Reputation, 55, 112, 123, 126, 276 Resilience, 127–133, 202

Resistance, 87, 120–123, 129, 151, 154 Rolling Stone, xi Romance, 60, 102, 243–246, 276, 339 Romantic discourse, 244 imaginary, 243 partners, 245 S

Sageuk genre, 128 “Sandwich” theory, 51 Sappiness, 274 Scorsese, Martin, 44 Second World War, 22, 76, 83, 87, 93, 113–116, 118, 121 Secret garden, 267, 279–281, 293 Segyehwa strategy, 125–127 Self-education, 290 Self-made man, 90, 132 Serialization, 40, 57, 59, 61, 66, 175 Shyness, 272 Silk Road, 315 Skills, xiv, 58, 59, 99, 163, 210, 229, 254, 268, 288, 290, 293, 297–304, 298n70, 308, 316, 338 Small nation, 315 SM Entertainment, 19, 55–58, 91, 222, 333–335, 339–342 Social media, networks, xi, xii, 5, 16, 19, 61, 62, 94, 131, 217, 220–224, 230, 232, 281, 282, 308, 312, 317, 334 Soft Power, xiv, 22, 23, 111–141, 311, 313, 315

 Index 

Spielberg, Steven, 7, 49 Spreadable media, 6 Staging value, 42, 43 Stigma gendered, 276, 281 social, 281 Storytelling, 5, 15, 23, 84, 90, 124, 127 Studio Ghibli, 79, 95n15, 177, 177n37, 177n38, 177n39, 177n40, 208 Suicide, rate of, 52, 255 Sweet power, 23, 25, 111–141, 150, 313 Symbolic ages, 206 dominance of imaginaries, 134 hegemony, 79, 120, 133 pilgrimage, 164 repertoire, 196 T

Taito, 78 Tarantino, Quentin, 7, 98 Techno, 15, 122 Technoculture, 2 Telenovelas, 1, 80 Tencent, 78 Therapeutic benefits of identification, 273 role, 272, 283 value, 304 TikTok, 19, 221 Tourism, tourism industry, 3, 13, 20, 126, 134, 137–138, 167, 178, 194n6, 260, 262, 331

355

Transition to adulthood, 243, 268, 285 Truman Doctrine, 116, 117 Twitter, xi, 19, 222, 334 U

Unemployment, 51, 52, 220, 257, 258 United Nations (UN), ix, xii, 65, 83, 124, 259, 259n69, 315 Universalism, 115, 120 Universal Pictures, 79 Universum, 202 V

Verisimilitude, 199 Video games, xv, xvi, 3, 5–7, 37, 54, 77, 78, 81, 82, 89, 92–95, 97, 118, 119, 139, 155, 158, 172, 174, 176, 191, 205, 207 Viki, 81 Viu, 81 W

Walt Disney Studios, 77, 79 Warhol, Andy, 4, 45, 46 Warner Bros Animation, 79 Well-being, 21, 65, 67, 128n12, 219, 239 West, xiv, 6, 11, 14–17, 84, 99, 104, 122n7, 149, 173n25, 202, 238, 241, 243, 244, 247, 256, 275, 314, 315

356 Index

Western canon, 291 creation, 22, 213 dominance, 201 hegemony, 22, 164, 191, 241, 286 model of paternit, 252 production, products, 192, 209n31, 210, 244 scenes, 218 societies, 235, 236, 242, 263 world, 176, 240 Western-centered standpoint, 201 Western-centric perspective, 123 Whitechapel Art Gallery, 4 Woo, John, 7 World music, 12, 80, 161, 334

Y

YG Entertainment, 56, 58, 332, 339–341 Youth culture, 11, 45, 180, 191, 193, 274 life, 284 market, 172, 268 YouTube, x, xi, 4, 16, 19, 20, 53, 63, 101, 216, 221, 230, 234, 261, 274, 334, 335 Z

Zhdanov Doctrine, 117