The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics (Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, 33) 3031301595, 9783031301599

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Introduction
References
Contents
Part I: General Issues
Chapter 1: The Socio-Cognitive Approach as a Theoretical Framework
1.1 Introduction
1.2 The Idealized View of Communication
1.3 The Egocentrism View
1.4 The Socio-Cognitive Approach
1.5 Intention and Salience
1.5.1 Types of Intention
1.5.2 Salience Effect: Inter-Label Hierarchy and Intra-Label Hierarchy
1.6 Two Sides of Context
1.7 Common Ground
1.7.1 Common Ground in SCA
1.7.2 Nature and Dynamism of Common Ground
1.8 Summary, Ongoing and Future Research
References
Chapter 2: The Paradox of Communication: A Socio-Cognitive Approach to Pragmatics
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Three Problems with Current Theories
2.2.1 Hearer-Centered Pragmatics
2.2.2 Context-Dependency
2.2.3 Cooperation Versus Egocentrism
2.3 A Socio-Cognitive View: The Construal of Communication
2.3.1 Need for a Socio-Cognitive View
2.3.2 The Socio-Cognitive View
2.4 Intention and Attention
2.4.1 Intentions
2.4.2 Attention
2.5 SCA as Speaker-Hearer Pragmatics
2.6 Salience as Guiding Mechanism
2.6.1 Differences Between SCA and the Graded Salience Hypothesis
2.6.2 Salience in Language Production
2.7 Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: Intercultural Communication and our Understanding of Language
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Understanding Language
3.3 Role of Context
3.4 Creativity in Language Processing
3.4.1 The Idiom Principle and Economy Principle
3.4.2 An Alternative Way of Looking at Linguistic Creativity
3.4.3 Deliberate Creativity
3.5 Conclusion
References
4: Impoverished Pragmatics? The Semantics-Pragmatics Interface from an Intercultural Perspective
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Relationship of Semantics and Pragmatics
4.2.1 Semantic Underdeterminacy
4.2.2 Constancy and Conventions
4.3 Semantics Growing into Pragmatics in Intercultural Interactions
4.3.1 Diachronic and Synchronic Pragmatics
4.3.2 Prior Context and Actual Situational Context Revisited
4.3.3 How Can Speakers in IC Rely Mainly on What they Have Limited Access to?
4.4 Summary
References
Part II: Pragmatic Competence and Linguistic Creativity
Chapter 5: How Does Pragmatic Competence Develop in Bilinguals?
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Nature of Pragmatic Competence
5.3 Change of Pragmatic Competence Affected by another Language
5.4 Pragmatic Competence in Interlanguage Pragmatics
5.5 How Does Pragmatic Competence of Bilinguals Develop and Change?
5.5.1 Question for Bilingual Pragmatic Development
5.5.2 Differences Between Conceptual Socialization and Language Socialization
5.5.2.1 Partial Consciousness of the Process
5.5.2.2 Age and Attitude of Bilinguals
5.5.2.3 Direct or Indirect Access to the Target Culture and Environment
5.5.3 Dynamic Move on the Continuum of Conceptual Socialization in L2
5.6 How Is Pragmatic Competence Reflected in Language Use?
5.7 Conclusion
References
Chapter 6: Linguistic Creativity in English as a Lingua Franca
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Idiom Principle Versus Open Choice Principle
6.3 Linguistic Creativity in ELF
6.4 Deliberate Creativity
6.4.1 Deliberate Creativity in L1
6.4.2 Deliberate Creativity in ELF
6.5 Summary
References
Chapter 7: Why Do We Say What We Say the Way We Say It?
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Linguistic Salience and Perceptual Salience
7.1.2 Need for Research on How Salience Affects Production
7.2 Former Research
7.3 The Socio-Cognitive Framework
7.4 Utterance Generation in SCA
7.4.1 The Mechanism
7.4.2 Selection and Ordering
7.5 Conceptual Accessibility (CA) and Salience
7.5.1 Dimensions of Conceptual Accessibility
7.5.2 Salience in SCA
7.5.3 Competition Between Inherent and Emergent Situational Salience
7.6 Differences Between SCA and the Graded Salience Hypothesis
7.7 Salience as a Guiding Mechanism in Utterance Production
7.8 Conclusion
References
Part III: Context and Salience
Chapter 8: Dueling Contexts: A Dynamic Model of Meaning
8.1 The Cognitive View
8.2 Understanding Context
8.3 Dynamic Model of Meaning (DMM) and Context
8.4 Meaning Value of Words
8.4.1 Do Words Have Meanings?
8.4.2 Two Facets of Meaning Value of Words
8.4.2.1 Coresense
8.4.2.2 Culture-Specific Conceptual Properties
8.4.2.3 Word-Specific Semantic Properties
8.4.2.4 Consense
8.5 Application of the Dynamic Model of Meaning
8.5.1 How Can DMM Be Used to Explain Meaning Values of Words?
8.5.2 Situation-Bound Utterances in the DMM
8.6 The Dynamic Model of Meaning and Current Pragmatic Theories
8.6.1 Need for a Dialectic Model of Communication
8.6.2 Context and Processing
8.6.2.1 Differences in Private Contexts
8.6.2.2 Actual Situational Context
8.6.2.3 Speaker Processing Versus Hearer Processing
8.6.3 Salience and Situational Context
8.6.4 Linguistic Underspecification
8.7 Conclusion
References
Chapter 9: Context-Sensitivity in Intercultural Impoliteness
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Approaches to Impoliteness
9.3 Context-Dependency
9.4 Norms and Context in Intercultural Interactions
9.4.1 Norms and the Discursive Approach
9.4.2 Context and Semantic Analyzability
9.5 Anti-Normative Politeness or Mock Impoliteness
9.6 Conclusion
References
Chapter 10: The Role of Context in English as a Lingua Franca
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Approaches to Context
10.3 Contextual Effect and Semantics in ELF
10.4 Two Sides of Common Ground
10.5 Reliance on Semantic Analyzability
10.6 Conclusion
References
Chapter 11: The Interplay of Recipient Design and Salience in Shaping Speaker´s Utterance
11.1 Introduction
11.2 The Sociocognitive Approach
11.2.1 Main Tenets of the Sociocognitive Approach
11.2.2 Salience in the Sociocognitive Approach
11.3 How Is the Speaker´s Utterance Shaped?
11.4 Context and Speaker Meaning
11.5 The Semantics-Pragmatics Interface in L1 and Intercultural Communication
11.6 When and How Can Speakers Manipulate Speaker Meaning?
11.6.1 Salience Effect
11.6.2 Speaker Manipulates Speaker Meaning
11.6.2.1 Alerting Addressees to What they Mean
11.6.2.2 Manipulating Hearer´s Salience
11.7 Conclusion
References
Part IV: Common Ground and Background Knowledge
Chapter 12: Activating, Seeking and Creating Common Ground: A Socio-Cognitive Approach
12.1 Theoretical Background
12.2 Need for a Socio-Cognitive Perspective
12.3 Pragmatic and Cognitive Views
12.3.1 Pragmatic View
12.3.2 Cognitive View
12.4 A Socio-Cognitive View: The Construal of Communication
12.4.1 Intentions
12.4.2 Attention
12.5 Assumed Common Ground
12.5.1 Understanding Context
12.5.2 Assumed Common Ground in the DMM
12.5.2.1 Core Common Ground
12.5.2.2 Emergent Common Ground
12.5.3 Common Ground Is an Assumption
12.6 Conclusion
References
Chapter 13: On the Dynamic Relations Between Common Ground and Presupposition
13.1 Introduction
13.2 The Socio-Cognitive View of Communication
13.3 Assumed Common Ground
13.3.1 Core Common Ground and Emergent Common Ground
13.3.2 Dynamism of Common Ground
13.4 The Speaker-Assigned Presupposition
13.4.1 Categorization
13.4.2 The Mechanism
13.4.3 Dynamism of Presupposition
13.5 The Dialectic Relation Between Common Ground and Presupposition
13.6 The Accommodation Problem Revisited
13.7 Conclusion
References
Chapter 14: The Interplay of Linguistic, Conceptual and Encyclopedic Knowledge in Meaning Production and Comprehension
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Socio-Cultural Background Knowledge
14.3 The Relationship of Socio-Cultural Background Knowledge to Linguistic Knowledge and Conceptual Knowledge
14.3.1 Understanding the Three Knowledges
14.3.2 Approaches to Separating Linguistic Knowledge from Conceptual Knowledge
14.3.3 The Multilingual Perspective
14.4 A Possible Model of Knowledge Distribution
14.4.1 The Relationship of Three Knowledges in the Model
14.4.2 Words and Concepts (the Interplay of Linguistic Knowledge and Conceptual Knowledge)
14.4.3 Encyclopedic Knowledge
14.5 Socio-Cultural Background Knowledge in L2
14.6 Summary
References
Chapter 15: Processing Implicatures in English as a Lingua Franca Communication
15.1 Introduction
15.1.1 Objectives
15.1.2 Definition of Implicature from an ELF Perspective
15.2 The Need for a Modified Understanding of Implicature
15.3 Implicatures in Pragmatics
15.3.1 The Gricean Approach
15.3.2 Utterer Implicatures and Audience Implicatures
15.4 Processing Implicatures
15.4.1 A Possible Processing Model
15.4.2 Processing Problems
15.5 Salience and Implicatures
15.6 Conclusion
References
Chapter 16: Formulaic Language and its Place in Intercultural Pragmatics
16.1 Introduction
16.2 The Socio-Cognitive Approach (SCA)
16.3 Formulaic Language in L1
16.4 Psychological Saliency of Formulaic Sequences
16.5 How Does Intercultural Pragmatics Explain Formulaic Language Use?
16.6 Conclusions and Future Directions
References

Citation preview

Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33

Istvan Kecskes

The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics

Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology Volume 33

Series Editor Alessandro Capone, University of Messina, Messina, Italy Editorial Board Members Noel Burton-Roberts, Newcastle University, Newcastle, Australia Brian Butler, University of North Carolina Asheville, Asheville, NC, USA Marco Carapezza, Università degli Studi di Palermo, Palermo, Italy Felice Cimatti, University of Calabria, Cosenza, Italy Eros Corazza, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada Michael Devitt, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA Frans van Eemeren, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Neil Feit, SUNY Fredonia, Fredonia, NY, USA Alessandra Giorgi, University of Venice, Venice, Italy Larry Horn, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA Klaus von Heusinger, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany Kasia Jaszczolt, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK Robin Beth Jeshion, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA Kepa Korta, University of the Basque Country, Leioa, Spain Ernest Lepore, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA Stephen C. Levinson, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Francesca Piazza, Università degli Studi di Palermo, Palermo, Italy Mark Richard, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA Nathan Salmon, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, USA Stephen R. Schiffer, New York University, New York, NY, USA Michel Seymour, Université de Montréal, Montreal, Canada Mandy Simons, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA Timothy Williamson, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Anna Wierbizcka, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia Elizabeth C. Traugott, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA Advisory Editors Sanford Goldberg, Northwestern’s Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences, Evanston, IL, USA Roberto Graci, University of Messina, Messina, Italy Fabrizio Macagno, New University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal Yael Sharvit, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA Keith Allan, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia Louise Cummings, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Hong Kong Wayne A. Davis, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA Igor Douven, University of Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, France Istvan Kecskes, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, NY, USA Antonino Pennisi, University of Messina, Messina, Italy Francesca Santuli, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Venice, Italy

Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy and Psychology deals with theoretical pragmatics and pragmatics from a philosophical point of view. The connection between philosophy and pragmatics is double. On the one hand, philosophy contributes to creating a framework to be called the ‘pragmatics of language’ capable of dealing with interpretation phenomena that complement purely semantic processes; on the other hand, pragmatics is capable of coping with major philosophical problems, e.g. skepticism and Gettier’s problem. All volumes in the collection reserve a central place for the philosophical ideas in pragmatics, such as contributions to epistemology in which pragmatics plays a key role.

*** This series is indexed by Scopus The collection: Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy and Psychology publishes: • pragmatics applied to philosophical problems and in the area of pragmalinguistics • pragmatics applied to the understanding of propositional attitudes, including knowledge, belief, in dissolving paradoxes and puzzles relating to epistemology • pragmatics applied to psychology, especially on the topic of intentions and mindreading • philosophical treatments of dialogue analysis

Istvan Kecskes

The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics

Istvan Kecskes State University of New York Albany, NY, USA

ISSN 2214-3807 ISSN 2214-3815 (electronic) Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology ISBN 978-3-031-30159-9 ISBN 978-3-031-30160-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Acknowledgments

This book is the result of my two lecture series at the University of Messina, Italy, in 2019 and 2021. I am much obliged to Professor Alessandro Capone for the invitation and Professor Pietro Perconti, Chair of the Cognitive Science Department, for his support. I collected those pieces of my work in this volume that served as basis for my lectures at the University of Messina.

v

Introduction

The socio-cognitive approach (SCA) is an alternative to the two main lines of pragmatics research: linguistic-philosophical pragmatics and socioculturalinteractional pragmatics. What is common in these three lines of thinking is that they all originate from the Gricean pragmatics, but they represent three different perspectives on it (cf. Horn & Kecskes, 2013). Linguistic-philosophical pragmatics seeks to investigate speaker meaning within an utterance-based framework focusing mainly on linguistic constraints on language use. Socio-cultural interactional pragmatics maintains that pragmatics should include research into social and cultural constraints on language use as well. The socio-cognitive approach to pragmatics initiated by Kecskes (2008, 2010, 2014) integrates the pragmatic view of cooperation and the cognitive view of egocentrism and emphasizes that both cooperation and egocentrism are manifested in all phases of communication, albeit to varying extents. It is an important step to bring the two different views together in one theory because not only pragmatics but also humanities research in general overemphasizes the importance of either the individual cognitive side or the socio-cultural contextual side. There have been rare endeavors to accept that both sides are equally important to explain what happens around us in the world. The basic element of Gricean pragmatics is cooperation which represents the social side of communication. SCA claims that individually privatized social experience that, most of the time, subconsciously motivates intention and communicative action is as important as the effect of the socio-cultural environment and social factors in which the interaction takes place. SCA claims that while (social) cooperation is an intention-directed practice that is governed by relevance, (individual) egocentrism is an attention-oriented trait dominated by salience. SCA pulls together these seemingly antagonistic factors (cooperation and egocentrism) to explain production and comprehension in the communicative process. The socio-cognitive approach to pragmatics as a theoretical framework has its origin in the view summarized by Wold (1992). In the introduction to his edited book Wold (1992: pp. 1–2) described the approach in the following way: vii

viii

Introduction The dialogically based, social-cognitive approach reflects an insistence on the necessity to study language use, a conception of the world as multidimensional and always only partially understood, and Man as a social being in search of meaning with individual minds embedded in a cultural collectivity. Linguistic meaning is conceived as open and dynamic, and constituted in the dialogic process of communication. It is not to be seen as formal and static representations. Concepts like dialogue, intersubjectivity, intentionality, perspective taking, ‘attunement to the attunement of the other’, temporarily shared social realities, fixation of perspectives and meaning potentials are all frequently used . . . The tension between language as a conventionalized system and specific acts of real communication is a recurrent topic.

However, on certain issues there are significant differences between the view presented by Wold above and SCA. The socio-cognitive approach was developed to synthesize the positivist and social constructivist views into a coherent whole that acknowledges the equal importance of both societal and individual factors in meaning creation and comprehension as well as knowledge transfer. Both the positivists and the social constructivists are aware of the individual and collective factors affecting human relations and their interplay. But, while the positivists put more emphasis on the individual, social constructivists focus on the collective. How does all that individuation get integrated and leveled out in the collective? And how is the collective acquired, preserved, and passed on by individuals? These are crucial questions for research in humanities research. What is especially important for the SCA is the interplay of three types of knowledge in meaning construction and comprehension: collective prior knowledge, individual prior knowledge, and actual situationally co-created knowledge (e.g., Kecskes 2008, 2010, 2014). What is co-constructed and co-developed in practice contains prior social and material experience of the individual and the given speech community as well as situationally, socially constructed knowledge. Both sides are equally important. Practice can hardly work without the presence of relevant cultural mental models with which people process the observed practice, or which they use to actually create practice. Even when we pass along simple routines by sharing them in practice (e.g., how to use a vacuum or make coffee) we rely on the presence of a large amount of pre-existing knowledge. Social practices are conventionalized routines that may develop into expectations and norms that are shared in speech communities. The social character of communication and knowledge transfer should not put community-of-practice theory at odds with individualistic approaches to knowledge as it often happens nowadays. After all, social practices pass “through the heads of people, and it is such heads that do the feeling, perceiving, thinking, and the like” (Bunge, 1996: p. 303). While communities of practice exist, members of those communities may still interpret shared practices differently. This is a key issue to understand what communication is all about. Collective knowledge exists but it is interpreted, “privatized” (subjectivized) differently by each individual (see Kecskes, 2008, 2014). Collective cultural models are distributed to individuals in a privatized way. In order for members to share the meaning of a particular practice a huge amount of shared knowledge must already be present to assure common ground.

Introduction

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Pragmatic theories have tried to describe the relationship of the individual and social factors by putting specific emphasis on the idealized social side, and focusing on cooperation, rapport, and politeness. This is what SCA wants to change by adding the not-so-favorable side of communication to the picture, such as the trial-and-error nature of the interactional process, egocentrism of interlocutors, impoliteness, etc. In the following chapters of this book, I will present some of the important pieces of my theory development. The book does not follow a chronological order, rather the different chapters are organized thematically. Each chapter is based on a previously published paper that is either modified to some extent or not. I am much obliged to the publishers that have given their permission to use the previously published materials. State University of New York, Albany, NY, USA

Istvan Kecskes

References Bunge, M. (1996). Finding philosophy in social science. Yale University Press. Horn, L., & Kecskes, I. (2013). Pragmatics, discourse and cognition. In S. R. Anderson, J. Moeschler, & F. Reboul (Eds.), The language-cognition interface (pp. 353–375). Librairie Droz. Kecskes, I. (2008). Dueling contexts: A dynamic model of meaning. Journal of Pragmatics, 40(3), 385–406. Kecskes, I. (2010). The paradox of communication: A socio-cognitive approach. Pragmatics and Society, 1(1), 50–73. Kecskes, I. (2014). Intercultural pragmatics. Oxford University Press. Wold, A. H. (Ed.). (1992). The dialogical alternative: Towards a theory of language and mind. Scandinavian University Press.

Contents

Part I 1

2

General Issues

The Socio-Cognitive Approach as a Theoretical Framework . . . . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 The Idealized View of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 The Egocentrism View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 The Socio-Cognitive Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Intention and Salience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5.1 Types of Intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5.2 Salience Effect: Inter-Label Hierarchy and Intra-Label Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Two Sides of Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 Common Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7.1 Common Ground in SCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7.2 Nature and Dynamism of Common Ground . . . . . . . . . 1.8 Summary, Ongoing and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3 3 4 6 7 9 9 12 13 15 15 16 17 19

The Paradox of Communication: A Socio-Cognitive Approach to Pragmatics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Three Problems with Current Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Hearer-Centered Pragmatics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Context-Dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 Cooperation Versus Egocentrism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 A Socio-Cognitive View: The Construal of Communication . . . . 2.3.1 Need for a Socio-Cognitive View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 The Socio-Cognitive View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Intention and Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2 Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 SCA as Speaker-Hearer Pragmatics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23 23 25 25 26 28 30 30 30 31 32 33 35 xi

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Contents

2.6

Salience as Guiding Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1 Differences Between SCA and the Graded Salience Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2 Salience in Language Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

4

Intercultural Communication and our Understanding of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Understanding Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Role of Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Creativity in Language Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 The Idiom Principle and Economy Principle . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 An Alternative Way of Looking at Linguistic Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3 Deliberate Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Impoverished Pragmatics? The Semantics-Pragmatics Interface from an Intercultural Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Relationship of Semantics and Pragmatics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Semantic Underdeterminacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Constancy and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Semantics Growing into Pragmatics in Intercultural Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Diachronic and Synchronic Pragmatics . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Prior Context and Actual Situational Context Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 How Can Speakers in IC Rely Mainly on What they Have Limited Access to? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part II 5

37 37 39 41 42 45 45 49 53 56 56 57 58 60 61 65 66 69 69 71 74 74 77 81 84 85

Pragmatic Competence and Linguistic Creativity

How Does Pragmatic Competence Develop in Bilinguals? . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 The Nature of Pragmatic Competence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Change of Pragmatic Competence Affected by another Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Pragmatic Competence in Interlanguage Pragmatics . . . . . . . . . 5.5 How Does Pragmatic Competence of Bilinguals Develop and Change? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91 92 93 94 95 97

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5.5.1 5.5.2

Question for Bilingual Pragmatic Development . . . . . . Differences Between Conceptual Socialization and Language Socialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.3 Dynamic Move on the Continuum of Conceptual Socialization in L2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 How Is Pragmatic Competence Reflected in Language Use? . . . 5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

102 103 105 106

6

Linguistic Creativity in English as a Lingua Franca . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Idiom Principle Versus Open Choice Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Linguistic Creativity in ELF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Deliberate Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1 Deliberate Creativity in L1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2 Deliberate Creativity in ELF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

109 109 110 113 114 116 116 119 120

7

Why Do We Say What We Say the Way We Say It? . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1 Linguistic Salience and Perceptual Salience . . . . . . . . . 7.1.2 Need for Research on How Salience Affects Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Former Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 The Socio-Cognitive Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Utterance Generation in SCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.1 The Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.2 Selection and Ordering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Conceptual Accessibility (CA) and Salience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5.1 Dimensions of Conceptual Accessibility . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5.2 Salience in SCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5.3 Competition Between Inherent and Emergent Situational Salience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 Differences Between SCA and the Graded Salience Hypothesis . 7.7 Salience as a Guiding Mechanism in Utterance Production . . . . 7.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

123 124 124

Part III 8

98 99

125 125 129 131 131 132 134 134 135 136 138 140 141 142

Context and Salience

Dueling Contexts: A Dynamic Model of Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 The Cognitive View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Understanding Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Dynamic Model of Meaning (DMM) and Context . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

147 148 149 151

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Contents

8.4

Meaning Value of Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.1 Do Words Have Meanings? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.2 Two Facets of Meaning Value of Words . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 Application of the Dynamic Model of Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.1 How Can DMM Be Used to Explain Meaning Values of Words? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5.2 Situation-Bound Utterances in the DMM . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 The Dynamic Model of Meaning and Current Pragmatic Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6.1 Need for a Dialectic Model of Communication . . . . . . . 8.6.2 Context and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6.3 Salience and Situational Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6.4 Linguistic Underspecification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

153 153 156 160

162 162 163 165 168 169 170

9

Context-Sensitivity in Intercultural Impoliteness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 Approaches to Impoliteness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 Context-Dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4 Norms and Context in Intercultural Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.1 Norms and the Discursive Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4.2 Context and Semantic Analyzability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 Anti-Normative Politeness or Mock Impoliteness . . . . . . . . . . . 9.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

173 174 176 178 182 182 185 187 189 190

10

The Role of Context in English as a Lingua Franca . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 Approaches to Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3 Contextual Effect and Semantics in ELF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 Two Sides of Common Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5 Reliance on Semantic Analyzability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

195 195 196 198 201 203 206 206

11

The Interplay of Recipient Design and Salience in Shaping Speaker’s Utterance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 The Sociocognitive Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2.1 Main Tenets of the Sociocognitive Approach . . . . . . . . 11.2.2 Salience in the Sociocognitive Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 How Is the Speaker’s Utterance Shaped? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4 Context and Speaker Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5 The Semantics–Pragmatics Interface in L1 and Intercultural Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

160 161

209 209 210 210 213 214 217 220

Contents

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11.6

When and How Can Speakers Manipulate Speaker Meaning? . . 11.6.1 Salience Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.6.2 Speaker Manipulates Speaker Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part IV 12

13

14

222 222 223 225 226

Common Ground and Background Knowledge

Activating, Seeking and Creating Common Ground: A Socio-Cognitive Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1 Theoretical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2 Need for a Socio-Cognitive Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3 Pragmatic and Cognitive Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3.1 Pragmatic View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3.2 Cognitive View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4 A Socio-Cognitive View: The Construal of Communication . . . . 12.4.1 Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4.2 Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5 Assumed Common Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5.1 Understanding Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5.2 Assumed Common Ground in the DMM . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5.3 Common Ground Is an Assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the Dynamic Relations Between Common Ground and Presupposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2 The Socio-Cognitive View of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3 Assumed Common Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3.1 Core Common Ground and Emergent Common Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3.2 Dynamism of Common Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.4 The Speaker-Assigned Presupposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.4.1 Categorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.4.2 The Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.4.3 Dynamism of Presupposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.5 The Dialectic Relation Between Common Ground and Presupposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.6 The Accommodation Problem Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

231 232 233 234 234 235 237 239 241 243 244 244 248 250 251 255 256 258 259 259 260 262 263 265 266 268 271 273 273

The Interplay of Linguistic, Conceptual and Encyclopedic Knowledge in Meaning Production and Comprehension . . . . . . . . . 275 14.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

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14.2 14.3

Socio-Cultural Background Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Relationship of Socio-Cultural Background Knowledge to Linguistic Knowledge and Conceptual Knowledge . . . . . . . . 14.3.1 Understanding the Three Knowledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.3.2 Approaches to Separating Linguistic Knowledge from Conceptual Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.3.3 The Multilingual Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4 A Possible Model of Knowledge Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4.1 The Relationship of Three Knowledges in the Model . . 14.4.2 Words and Concepts (the Interplay of Linguistic Knowledge and Conceptual Knowledge) . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4.3 Encyclopedic Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5 Socio-Cultural Background Knowledge in L2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

16

Processing Implicatures in English as a Lingua Franca Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.1.1 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.1.2 Definition of Implicature from an ELF Perspective . . . . 15.2 The Need for a Modified Understanding of Implicature . . . . . . . 15.3 Implicatures in Pragmatics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.3.1 The Gricean Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.3.2 Utterer Implicatures and Audience Implicatures . . . . . . 15.4 Processing Implicatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.4.1 A Possible Processing Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.4.2 Processing Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.5 Salience and Implicatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Formulaic Language and its Place in Intercultural Pragmatics . . . . 16.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.2 The Socio-Cognitive Approach (SCA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.3 Formulaic Language in L1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.4 Psychological Saliency of Formulaic Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.5 How Does Intercultural Pragmatics Explain Formulaic Language Use? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.6 Conclusions and Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

277 278 278 280 283 284 284 286 287 288 291 292 295 295 295 296 298 300 300 302 303 303 305 307 311 312 315 315 317 319 321 324 328 329

Part I

General Issues

Chapter 1

The Socio-Cognitive Approach as a Theoretical Framework

1.1

Introduction

The socio-cognitive approach (SCA) was introduced by Kecskes (2010, 2014) as a theoretical framework for intercultural pragmatics. The new subfield of pragmatics needed a theoretical frame as an alternative to the existing monolingual Gricean approaches in order to explain what happens in intercultural interactions where the interlocutors represent different first languages (L1) and cultures and not a relatively coherent speech community that is ruled by norms and conventions of language use and usage. Also, the new theoretical framework was expected to account for the far from ideal, untidy, occasionally poorly-structured and full of wrong-word-choices language use of intercultural interactions. SCA does not intend to be cut off from the Gricean theory of pragmatics rather wants to add to it to help research both in intercultural pragmatics and L1-based pragmatics. The need for addition arises from the unbalanced explanatory power of existing theories. Although the field of pragmatics has a variety of approaches to language use, most pragmatic research can be related to two fairly broad traditions: linguistic-philosophical pragmatics (or so-called Anglo-American pragmatics), and sociocultural-interactional pragmatics (or so-called European-Continental pragmatics). Linguistic-philosophical pragmatics seeks to investigate speaker meaning within an utterance-based framework focusing mainly on linguistic constraints on language use. Socio-cultural interactional pragmatics includes research that focuses on the social and cultural constraints on language use as well. Intercultural pragmatics attempts to combine the two traditions into one explanatory system that pays special attention to the characteristics of intercultural interactions. Consequently, the socio-cognitive approach to pragmatics integrates the pragmatic view of cooperation and the cognitive view of egocentrism and emphasizes that both cooperation and egocentrism are manifested in all phases of communication, albeit to varying

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_1

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4

1 The Socio-Cognitive Approach as a Theoretical Framework

extents. This is important for the analysis of intercultural encounters where sociocultural factors interact with individual cognitive features. What is new in the SCA in comparison to other Gricean approaches is two important claims. First, SCA emphasizes that while (social) cooperation is an intention-directed practice that is governed by relevance, (individual) egocentrism is an attention-oriented trait dominated by salience which is a semiotic notion that refers to the relative importance or prominence of information and signs. SCA pulls together these seemingly antagonistic factors (cooperation and egocentrism) to explain production and comprehension in the communicative process. Second, SCA claims that pragmatic theories have tried to describe the relationship of the individual and social factors by putting special emphasis on idealized language use, and focusing on cooperation, rapport, and politeness while paying less attention to the untidy, messy, poorly-organized and impolite side of communication. SCA takes a more down-to-earth approach to communicative encounters than current theories, which may help not only our understanding of intercultural communication but also L1 communication. In the following sections the idealized view of communication is discussed. Then I will analyze how communication is understood in the socio-cognitive approach. Intention and salience are in the focus of Sect. 1.4. The final sections examine the effect of context and common ground.

1.2

The Idealized View of Communication

Current theories of pragmatics derive from the Gricean idealized view of communication. Grice did in pragmatics what Chomsky did in linguistics but, of course from a different perspective and with a different goal in mind. While Chomsky’s target was the linguistic system, Grice focused on language use. What is common in their approach is the idealization of a knowledge system (Chomsky) and the systematization of a usage system (Grice). Grice developed an idealized description of communication so that we can better understand what actually happens when human beings interact. That was an important step forward in the field of pragmatics. Science is based on idealizations. For example, physicists or chemists often work with ideal models of reality that they abstract from the existence of friction. Abstraction also occurs when we analyze the semantics-pragmatics division. Carnap (1942) was quite specific about the relationship of the two by saying: “If in an investigation explicit reference is made to the speaker, or, to put it in more general terms, to the user of a language, then we assign it to the field of pragmatics. [. . .] If we abstract from the user of the language and analyze only the expressions and their designata, we are in the field of semantics (Carnap, 1942, p. 9).” It is clear that Carnap treats semantics as an abstraction of pragmatics. Semantics is said to be abstracted away from the specific aspects of concrete discourse situations in which utterances are used. The theory of meaning, both in philosophy and linguistics, is not different. Approaches to the theory of meaning all presuppose an idealized model, which we

1.2

The Idealized View of Communication

5

can call the standard model. In that model various idealizations have been made to draw attention to the central aspects of linguistic communication. There is nothing wrong with idealization. But we should know that what happens in real life is not the idealized version of communication. The question is: what can we offer beyond just criticizing the ideal view? Can we propose an alternative approach or theory that can explain “messy” communication too? Well, there have been attempts to that extent. In a paper Kecskes (2010) argued that current research in pragmatics and related fields shows two dominant tendencies: an idealistic approach to communication and context-centeredness. According to views dominated by these tendencies (Relevance Theory and Neo-Gricean approaches), communication is supposed to be a smooth process that is constituted by recipient design and intention recognition (e.g. Clark, 1996; Grice, 1989; Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Capone, 2020). The speaker’s knowledge involves constructing a model of the hearer’s knowledge relevant to the given situational context; conversely, the hearer’s knowledge includes constructing a model of the speaker’s knowledge relevant to the given situational context. This line of research focuses on the “positive” features of communication: cooperation, rapport, politeness.1 Kecskes (2010, 2020) argued that the emphasis on the decisive role of context, socio-cultural factors and cooperation is overwhelming, while the role of the individual’s prior experience, existing knowledge and egocentrism is almost completely ignored, although these two sides are not mutually exclusive. The idealistic view on communication that usually goes together with an overemphasis on context-dependency gives a lopsided perspective on interactions by focusing mainly on the positive features of the process. But communication is more than just a trial-and-error, try-and-try-again, process that is co-constructed by interlocutors. It is said to be a non-summative and emergent interactional achievement (Arundale, 1999, 2008; Mey 2001; Kecskes & Mey, 2008). Therefore, pragmatic theories are expected to focus also on the less positive aspects of communication including breakdowns, misunderstandings, struggles and language-based aggression — features which are not unique, and appear to be as common in communication as are cooperation and politeness. It is not just SCA that calls attention to the idealized view of communication that governs pragmatics and linguistic research. Similar criticism has been expressed by Beaver and Stanley (2019, forthcoming) and Stanley (2018) but from the perspective of political speech. Beaver and Stanley isolated five idealizations (cooperativity, rationality, intentionality, alignment, propositionality) that are used in the vast majority of works in the theory of meaning and argued that these idealizations are scientifically problematic and politically flawed. They use the critique of the standard model of pragmatics to propose a new program for the theory of meaning. What they place at the center of inquiry is precisely the features of communication (such as impoliteness, hate speech, misunderstandings, etc.) that the idealized standard model seem to almost deliberately exclude.

1

Positive in a sense that ensures smooth communication and mutual understanding.

6

1

The Socio-Cognitive Approach as a Theoretical Framework

What is common in Beaver and Stanley’s and Kecskes’ approach described above is that they both underline that the idealized L1-based Gricean theory can hardly explain the messy and sometimes untruthful reality of communication. However, while Beaver and Stanley set out to change the Gricean approach and develop a new theory of “messy communication”, SCA acknowledges that there is also need for the idealistic approach that provides us with a basic understanding of communicative actions and processes. In the SCA the Gricean theory serves as a starting and reference point to describe and better understand what is expected to happen and what actually takes place in communicative encounters.

1.3

The Egocentrism View

SCA attempts to offer a theoretical frame that considers ideal and messy not like a dichotomy but a continuum with two hypothetical ends incorporating not only the basics of the Gricean theory but also what makes communication “messy”: speakerhearer’s egocentrism. This approach was generated by cognitive psychologists such as Barr and Keysar (2005), Giora (2003), Gibbs and Colston (2012), Keysar (2007) and others who argued that speakers and hearers commonly violate their mutual knowledge when they produce and comprehend language. Their behavior is called “egocentric” because it is rooted in the speakers’ or hearers’ own knowledge instead of their mutual knowledge and common ground. The term is not negative and has nothing to do with “egotistic” behavior. “Egocentric” here refers to the behavior of the interlocutor that is motivated by her/his individual prior knowledge and experience. Studies in cognitive psychology have demonstrated that speakers and hearers are egocentric to a surprising degree. The individual, egocentric endeavors of interlocutors play a much more decisive role, especially in the initial stages of production and comprehension than is envisioned by current pragmatic theories. This egocentric behavior is rooted in the interlocutors’ reliance on their own prior knowledge and experience rather than on mutual knowledge. Speaker-hearers appear to be poor estimators of what their partners know. Speakers usually underestimate the ambiguity and overestimate the effectiveness of their utterances (cf. Keysar & Henly, 2002). Referring to key concept of current pragmatic theories cognitive psychologists claim that cooperation, relevance, and reliance on possible mutual knowledge come into play only after the speaker’s egocentrism is satisfied and the hearer’s egocentric, most salient interpretation is processed. Barr and Keysar (2005) argued that mutual knowledge is most likely implemented as a mechanism for detecting and correcting errors, rather than as an intrinsic, routine process of the language processor. The egocentric approach is crucial for intercultural pragmatics because in intercultural encounters individual prior experience is even more decisive than in L1 where membership in a speech community provides a core common ground that helps interlocutors process not only literal but also figurative language. Findings by cognitive psychologists have been confirmed by Giora’s (1997, 2003)) graded

1.4

The Socio-Cognitive Approach

7

salience hypothesis and Kecskes’s (2003, 2008) dynamic model of meaning. They also underlined that interlocutors appear to consider their conversational experience more important than prevailing norms of informativeness. Giora’s (2003)) main argument is that knowledge of salient meanings plays a primary role in the process of using and comprehending language. She claimed that “. . .privileged meanings, meanings foremost on our mind, affect comprehension and production primarily, regardless of context or literality” (Giora, 2003, p. 103). Kecskes in his dynamic model of meaning (2008) pointed out that what the speaker says relies on prior conversational experience, as reflected in lexical choices in production. Conversely, how the hearer understands what is said in the actual situational context depends on her/his prior conversational experience with the lexical items used in the speaker’s utterances. If we compare the pragmatic ideal version and the cognitive coordination approach, we may discover that these two approaches are complementary rather than contradictory to each other. The ideal communication view adopts a top-down approach and produces a theoretical construct of pragmatic tenets that warrant successful communication in all cases. In contrast, the cognitive coordination view adopts a bottom-up approach which provides empirical evidence that supports a systematic interpretation of miscommunication, communication breakdowns and repair attempts. In the SCA framework cooperation and egocentrism are not conflicting, and the a priori mental state versus post facto emergence of common ground may converge to a set of integrated background knowledge for interlocutors to rely on in pursuit of relatively smooth communication. So far, no research has yet made an attempt to combine the two, at least to our knowledge. Therefore, the aim of SCA is to eliminate the ostensible conflicts between common ground notions as held by the two different views and propose an approach that integrates their considerations into a holistic concept that envisions a dialectical relationship between intention and attention in the construal of communication.

1.4

The Socio-Cognitive Approach

The socio-cognitive approach (Kecskes, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014; Kecskes & Zhang, 2009) highlights the complex role and interplay of socio-cultural and private mental models, explains how these are applied categorically and/or reflectively by individuals in response to socio-cultural environmental feedback and framing mechanisms, and describes how this leads to and explains different meaning outcomes and knowledge transfer. In meaning construction and comprehension interlocutors rely both on pre-existing conceptual and encyclopedic knowledge and knowledge co-constructed (emergent) in the process of interaction. SCA is based on two important claims. First, it treats speaker and hearer as equal participants in the communicative process. Each interlocutor is a speaker and a hearer in one body. They both produce and comprehend language while relying on their most accessible and salient knowledge. They are the same person with the same

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mind-set, knowledge and skills. However, when acting as a speaker or as a hearer their goals and functions are different. Interlocutors should be considered individuals with various cognitive states, with different prior experience, with different commitments, and with different interests and agenda. An important difference between current pragmatic theories and SCA is that there is no “impoverished” speaker meaning in SCA. The speaker utterance is a full proposition with pragmatic features reflecting the speaker’s intention and preferences and expressing the speaker’s commitment and egocentrism (in the cognitive sense). The proposition expressed may be “underspecified” only from the hearer’s perspective but not from the speaker’s perspective. This is especially important in intercultural pragmatics where the situational context cannot play selective role to the extent as it does in L1 because of the low level of collective salience and common ground between interlocutors. Second, SCA considers communication a dynamic process, in which individuals are not only constrained by societal conditions but they also shape them. As a consequence, communication is characterized by the interplay of two sets of traits that are inseparable, mutually supportive, and interactive: Individual traits: Prior experience Salience Egocentrism Attention

Social traits: Actual situational experience Relevance Cooperation Intention

Individual traits (prior experience ! salience ! egocentrism ! attention) interact with societal traits (actual situational experience ! relevance ! cooperation ! intention). Each trait is the consequence of the other. Prior experience results in salience which leads to egocentrism that drives attention. Intention is a cooperationdirected practice that is governed by relevance which (partly) depends on actual situational experience. In the SCA communication is considered the result of the interplay of intention and attention motivated by socio-cultural background that is privatized individually by interlocutors. The socio-cultural background incorporates the situational environment (actual situational context in which the communication occurs), the encyclopedic knowledge of interlocutors deriving from their prior experience tied to the linguistic expressions they use, and their current experience, in which those expressions are put to use. In communication people demonstrate the combination of their two sides. On the one hand they cooperate by generating and formulating intention that is relevant to the given actual situational context. In the meantime, their egocentrism (prior experience) activates the most salient information to their attention in the construction (speaker) and comprehension (hearer) of utterances. A crucial notion of SCA is privatalization (making something private, subjectivize something). Privatalization is the process through which the interlocutor “individualizes” the collective. S/he blends his/her prior experience with the actual situational (current) experience and makes an individual understanding of collective

1.5

Intention and Salience

9

experience. This approach is supported by the Durkheimian thought according to which cultural norms and models gain individual interpretation in concrete social actions and events (Durkheim, 1982). Before continuing our description of SCA we need to explain how SCA relates to van Dijk’s understanding of the socio-cognitive view in language use. A major difference is that SCA is an extended utterance-centered pragmatic view while Van Dijk’s approach is a discursive view on communication. Van Dijk (2008, p. X) said that in his theory it is not the social situation that influences (or is influenced by) discourse, but the way the participants define the situation. He goes further and claims that “contexts are not some kind of objective conditions or direct cause, but rather (inter)subjective constructs designed and ongoingly updated in interaction by participants as members of groups and communities (Van Dijk, 2008, p. X).” In van Dijk’s theory everything is co-constructed by interlocutors in the socio-cultural environment (context). There is strong emphasis on meaning construction in the communicative process, but what is somewhat neglected is the “baggage” that the participants bring into the process based on their prior experience. As mentioned above, SCA considers communication a dynamic process in which individuals are not only constrained by societal conditions, but they also shape them at the same time. Interlocutors rely not only on what they co-construct synchronically in the communicative process, but also on what is subconsciously motivated by their prior experience. It needs to be underlined that there are social conditions and constraints (contexts) which have some objectivity from the perspective of individuals. So, it is not that everything is always co-constructed in the actual situational context as claimed in Van Dijk’s approach. It is natural that there may always be slight differences in how individuals process those relatively objective societal factors based on their prior experience. Kecskes (2014, 2020) argued that blending is the main driving force of interactions that is more than just a process of co-construction. It is combining the interlocutors’ prior experience with the actual situational experience which creates a blend that is more than just a merger. In blending, the constituent parts are both distinguishable and indistinguishable from one another when needed. Blending incorporates the dynamic interplay of crossing (parts are distinguishable) and merging (parts are indistinguishable). Depending on the dynamic moves in the communicative process, either crossing or merging becomes dominant to some extent. In the following the main tenets of SCA will be discussed.

1.5 1.5.1

Intention and Salience Types of Intention

SCA considers the interplay of cooperation directed intention and egocentrism governed attention the main driving force in meaning production and

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comprehension. Cooperation means that attention is paid to communicative partners’ intention. Attention is driven by individual egocentrism that is the result of salience. As mentioned above, the pragmatic view is concerned about intention while the cognitive view is more about attention. But in current pragmatic theories there is no explicit explanation of the relations between these two entities. Relevance Theory defines relevance with respect to the effects of both attention and intention but does not distinguish these two effects and never clarifies their relations explicitly. RT theoreticians claim that “an input (a sight, a sound, an utterance, a memory) is relevant to an individual when it connects with background information, he has available to yield conclusions that matter to him” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 3). SCA accepts the centrality of intention in conversation, but it also takes into account the dynamic process in which intention can be an emergent effect of the conversation. Consequently, intention, on the one hand can be private, individual, pre-planned and a precursor to action, as current pragmatic theories state, or it can be abruptly planned or unplanned, or emergent, ad-hoc generated in the course of communication. It should be emphasized, however that there is not a trichotomy here. Rather, a priori intention, salience-charged intention and emergent intention are three sides of the same phenomenon that may receive different emphasis at different points in the communicative process. When a conversation is started, the private and pre-planned nature of intention may be dominant, or a subconscious, salience-charged intention may occur. However, in the course of the interaction the emergent and social nature of intention may come to the fore. These three sides of intention are always present in the interaction; the question is only to what extent they are present at any given moment of the process. Emergent intention is co-constructed by interlocutors in the dynamic flow of conversation. This dynamism is reflected in emerging utterances: they may be interrupted, unfinished, cut and/or started again. It is not only the actual situational context, but also the dynamism of the conversational flow and the process of formulating an utterance that may affect and change the intention. Kecskes (2021) demonstrated that with the following example (1) HKM: Hong Kong Male, CZM: Chinese Male, TYF: Turkish Female; GMF: German Female; BIF: Bolivian Female. HKM: Do you think it’s. . .it’s kind of difficult for you to make friends here with Americans? CZM: Hmm. HKM: . . . generally, you know. . . BSF: Yeah. HKM: . . .or it’s more directly than it is in China. . . TYF: Yeah. HKM: . . .in Singapore or that. . . it’s more difficult. . .what do you think so? Why it’s more difficult? GMF: I am maybe, thinking, it’s because. . . I don’t know. . . CZM: I would say the culture issue is the most thing. Because, you know, the background is different and errh. . .even the value is maybe different. BIF: Yeah. But we have a lot of friends from other countries. (continued)

1.5

Intention and Salience

11

CZM: Aha. BIF: And we. . .we really met with each other. . . BNF: Yeah. BIF: . . .we aren’t from Americans, I don’t know why. CZM: Oh. BSF: The Americans all the times2 I guess would know how are you but they don’t really want to know how you are. CZM: Yeah. BIF: Yeah. Yeah.

HKM starts the conversation with a pre-planned intention to talk about how to make friends here with Americans. When he sees that the exchange takes off with difficulties a salience-triggered intention leads to an utterance “. . . .or it’s more directly than it is in China..” with the goal to provoke responses. CZM’s intention is to explain the issue with cultural differences. BIF’s emergent intention is triggered by CZM’s utterance. She wants to say that they (the international students) have many friends who are not Americans. In the course of this short encounter each of the three types of intentions are represented. SCA introduced a third type of intention in between a priori intention and emergent intention: salience-charged intention. It was pointed out earlier that salience leads to egocentrism that drives attention which refers to those cognitive resources available to interlocutors that make communication a conscious action. When intention is formed, expressed, and interpreted in the process of communication, attention contributes to the various stages of the process in varying degrees. There are three factors that affect the salience of knowledge and ease of attentional processing in all stages: (a) interlocutors’ knowledge based on their prior experience; (b) frequency, familiarity, or conventionality of knowledge tied to the situation; and (c) the interlocutors’ mental state and/or the availability of attentional resources. Considering the effect of these three factors, the knowledge most salient to the interlocutors in a particular interaction is the information that is included in their knowledge base, is pertinent to the current situation, and is processed by the necessary attentional resources. A priori intention and emergent intention are controlled by the interlocutor to some extent. However, salience-charged intention is not necessarily. This intention is mostly subconscious and automatic and can take the place of either of the other two intentions as we saw in example (1) where HKM referred to a direct friendmaking attempt that was triggered by actual situational relevance and relied on prior pertinent information. Salience-charged intention means that interlocutors act under the influence of the most salient information that comes to their mind in the given actual situational context.

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1.5.2

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The Socio-Cognitive Approach as a Theoretical Framework

Salience Effect: Inter-Label Hierarchy and Intra-Label Hierarchy

although SCA considers interlocutors speaker-hearers it acknowledges that cognitive mechanisms may work differently when an interlocutor is a speaker or hearer. Salience effect is a good example for this (cf. Kecskes (2008, p. 401). When a lexical item (labeled for private context) is used by a speaker to produce an utterance, private contexts (prior experience of the speaker) attached to this lexical expression are activated top-down in a hierarchical order by salience. For the speaker, there is primarily an inter-label hierarchy (which item to select out of all possible), while for the hearer intra-label hierarchy (which out of all possible interpretations of the particular lexical item) comes in first. The inter-label hierarchy operates in the first phase of production, when a speaker looks for words to express her/his intention. As a first step, s/he has to select words or expressions from a group of possibilities to express communicative intention. This selection may happen consciously or subconsciously. Words and/or expressions constitute a hierarchy from the best fit to those less suited to the idea the speaker tries to express. To explain how this works we will analyze an excerpt from a movie (see Kecskes 2020). (2) This is an excerpt from the film “Coogan’s bluff.” A man and a young woman are sitting in a restaurant after meal. The woman stands up and with a short move reaches for her purse. W: - I have to be going. M: - (seeing that she reaches for her purse) what are you doing? W: - Dutch. M: - You are a girl, aren’t you? W: - There have been rumors to that effect. M: - Sit back and act like one. W: Oh, is that the way girls act in Arizona?

When the girl wants to leave the restaurant, she says “I have to be going”. She has had several choices (inter-label hierarchy) to express the same meaning: “I must go now”, “it’s time to go”, “I have got to go”, etc. There is no particular reason for her to use “I have to be going”. This expression is that has come to her mind first out of all possible choices. When the girl attempts to pay the man expresses his objection with asking “what are you doing?”. This hardly looks like salience effect. The man knew exactly what he wanted to say and how he wanted to say it. The girl perfectly understands what the man is referring to, so she tells him “Dutch”, which means she wants to pay for her share of the bill. This does not look like salience effect rather a well-planned expression. The man understands what the girl means although “Dutch” can mean a number of different things (language, people of the Netherlands). “To split the expense” is not very high on the intra-label hierarchy list. Still, that is the most salient meaning, given the situational context. This is why it is important that

1.6

Two Sides of Context

13

salience effect and contextual effect run parallel as the Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 1997) says. A less salient meaning gets the intended interpretation because of the contextual force in L1. The man expresses his disapproval in a very indirect but still expressive way: “You are a girl, aren’t you?” The inter-label hierarchy is governed in this case by a well-planned recipient design. The girl’s response shows that she knows what the man is driving at. Then the man hints at what he expects the girl to do “Sit back and act like one”. The intra-label hierarchy helps the girl identify the figurative meaning of “sit back” which means that the man does not want her to pay her share. This inductively developed sequence in the segment is a good example for elaborated recipient design where nothing is said directly, still there is no misunderstanding because the speaker alerts the hearer to what he means.

1.6

Two Sides of Context

In the SCA context has two sides: prior context and actual situational context. This approach differs from the traditional view on context. What is common in the definitions of context is that they generally refer to the actual situational context of the linguistic sign(s) or utterance. Goodwin and Duranti (1992, p. 2) argued that context is “a frame that surrounds the event and provides resources for its appropriate interpretation”. “Resources” here refer to any factor – linguistic, epistemic, physical, social, etc. – that affects the actual interpretation of signs and expressions. According to George Yule (1996, p. 128), ‘context’ is “the physical environment in which a word is used”. Most of the definitions stick to framing context as the actual situational background. Leech (1983, p. 13) claimed that context refers to “any background knowledge assumed to be shared by speaker and hearer and which contributes to his interpretation of what speaker means by a given utterance.” However, this is just one side of context that is referred to as “actual situational context” by Kecskes (2008, 2010, 2014) and there is no mention about “prior context”, which is an important notion in SCA. In the SCA context is a dynamic construct that appears in different forms in language use both as a repository and/or a trigger of knowledge. This means that it plays both a selective and a constitutive role. Contextualist theories such as Relevance Theory and Neo-Gricean approaches argue that meaning construction is primarily dependent on situational context. Carston claimed that” ... linguistically encoded meaning never fully determines the intended proposition expressed” (Carston 2002: 49). Consequently, linguistic data must be completed by non-linguistic, contextual interpretation processes. SCA, however, points out that the meaning values of linguistic expressions, encapsulating prior contexts of experience, play as important a role in meaning construction and comprehension as actual situational context. What SCA attempts to do is to bring together individual cognition with situated cognition. This view recognizes the importance of an individual’s background and biases (often prompted

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by prior contexts, prior experience) in information processing (cf. Finkelstein et al., 2008; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988), but at the same time it also suggests that the context in which individuals are situated is strong enough to direct attention and shape interpretation (Elsbach et al., 2005; Ocasio, 1997). Based on this view SCA emphasizes that there are two sides of context: prior context and actual situational context. Prior context is a repository of prior contextual experiences of individuals. Prior context makes things/information salient in a communicative encounter and actual situational context makes things/information relevant. Our experience is developed through the regularity of recurrent and similar situations which we tend to identify with given contexts and frames. The standard (prior recurring) context can be defined as a regular situation that we have repeated experience with, and about which we have expectations as to what will or will not happen, and on which we rely to understand and predict how the world around us works. Gumperz (1982, p. 138) said that utterances carry with them their own context or project a particular context. Confirming Gumperz’s stance, Levinson (2003) claimed that the message versus context opposition may be misleading because the message can carry with it or forecast the context. Prior, reoccurring context may cancel the selective role of actual situational context. This can be demonstrated through an example taken from Culpeper (2009). (3) Culpeper: Example 3: Creative deviation from the default context (cf. “mock impoliteness”) [Lawrence Dallaglio, former England Rugby captain, describing the very close family he grew up in]

“As Francesca and John left the house, she came back to give Mum a kiss and they said goodbye in the way they often did. “Bye, you bitch,” Francesca said. “Get out of here, go on, you bitch,” replied Mum. (It’s in the Blood: My life, 2007)”. Culpeper explained that the reason why the conversation between the mother and daughter does not hurt either of them is due to the context (“mock impoliteness”), meaning “actual situational context.” However, a closer look at the example reveals that actual situational context plays hardly any role here. The real defining factor is the strong effect of prior context, prior experience that overrides actual situational context: “. . .they said goodbye in the way they often did.” Reoccurring context, frequent use may neutralize the impolite conceptual load attached to expressions. This is exactly what happens here. Context represents two sides of world knowledge: one that is already “encoded” with different strength in our mind (prior context) as declarative knowledge and the other (actual situational context) that is out there in the world occurring in situated conversational events (see Kecskes, 2008). These two sides of world knowledge are interwoven and inseparable. Actual situational context is viewed through prior context, and vice versa, prior context is viewed through actual situational context in interactions. Their encounter creates a unique blend of knowledge that supports interpretation of linguistic signs and utterances. According to SCA, meaning is the result of the interplay of prior experience and actual situational experience. Prior

1.7

Common Ground

15

experience becomes declarative knowledge that is tied to the meaning values of lexical units constituting utterances produced by interlocutors. Current experience is represented in the actual situational context (procedural knowledge) in which communication takes place, and which is interpreted (often differently) by interlocutors. Meaning formally expressed in the utterance is co-constructed in the course of communication as a result of the interaction and mutual influence of the private contexts represented in the language of interlocutors and the actual situational context interpreted by interlocutors. In the next section we will discuss common ground that basically unites salience with contextual relevance.

1.7 1.7.1

Common Ground Common Ground in SCA

Common ground refers to the ‘sum of all the information that people assume they share’ (Clark, 2009, p. 116) that may include world views, shared values, beliefs, and situational context. Much of the success of natural language interaction depends on the participants’ mutual understanding of the circumstances in which communication occurs. Common ground and collective salience are based on prior experience (prior context) of members in a particular speech community. Clark et al. (1983, p. 246) defined common ground as follows: “The speaker designs his utterance in such a way that he has good reason to believe that the addressees can readily and uniquely compute what he meant on the basis of the utterance along with the rest of their common ground.” This means that the speaker assumes or estimates the common ground between speaker and hearer with respect to the utterance. Assumed common ground from the speaker’s perspective is based on an assessment of the hearer’s competence to understand the utterance. Common ground makes it possible for speakers to be economical in wording utterances in a given speech community. This traditional approach to common ground, which can be considered core common ground is clearly based on prior experience. However, common ground has another side. SCA brings a new element into the understanding of common ground: emergent common ground. In the SCA common ground is directly related to prior context (core common ground) and actual situational context (emergent common ground). The question is how much of common ground is the result of prior experience (core) and how much of it is emergent, growing out of actual situational experience. In the SCA we distinguish between three components of the common ground: information that the participants share, their understanding the situational context, and relationships between the participants – knowledge about each other and trust and their mutual experience of the interaction. Similar prior contexts, prior experience and similar understanding of the actual situational context will build common ground. It is important to note that we should not equate prior context with core common ground. Prior context is a privatized understanding, privatized knowledge

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of the individual based on his/her prior experience. Common ground is assumed shared knowledge. Individual prior context is a part of core common ground that is assumed to be shared by interlocutors. The same way emergent common ground is that part of actual situational context that is assumed to be understood similarly by interlocutors in a given situation. Present research in intercultural pragmatics (e.g. Kecskes, 2014, 2019; Liu & You, 2019; García-Gómez, 2020), and the application of Kecskes’ socio-cognitive approach (e.g. Mildorf, 2013; Macagno & Capone, 2017; Macagno, 2018) with its emphasis on emergent common ground, calls attention to the fact that current pragmatic theories (e.g. Stalnaker, 2002; Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark, 1996) may not be able to describe common ground in all its complexity because they usually consider much of common ground as the result of prior experience and pay less attention to the emergent side of common ground. In the meantime, current cognitive research (e.g. Barr & Keysar, 2005; Colston & Katz, 2005) may have overestimated egocentric (prior experience-based) behavior of the interlocutors and argued for the dynamic emergent property of common ground while devaluing cooperation in the process of verbal communication and the prior experiencebased side of common ground. The SCA has attempted to eliminate this conflict and proposes to combine the two views into an integrated concept of common ground, in which both core common ground (assumed shared knowledge, a priori mental representation) and emergent common ground (emergent participant resource, post facto emergence through use) converge to construct a socio-cultural background for communication. Based on this view, in the SCA common ground is perceived as an effort to merge the mental representation of shared knowledge that is present as declarative memory that we can activate, shared knowledge that we can seek, and rapport, as well as knowledge that we can create and co-construct in the communicative process. The core components and emergent components join in the construction of common ground in all stages, although they may contribute to the interaction in different ways, in various degree, and in different phases of the communicative process as demonstrated by studies based on the application of SCA (e.g. Mildorf, 2013; Macagno & Capone, 2017; Macagno, 2018; La Mantia, 2018).

1.7.2

Nature and Dynamism of Common Ground

Core common ground is a repertoire of knowledge that can be assumed to be shared among individuals of a speech community independent of the situational circumstances, such as when and where the conversation occurs, between whom it occurs, etc. In contrast, emergent common ground is knowledge that emerges, is co-constructed and/or involved as shared enterprises in the particular situational context that pertains to the interlocutors. Core common ground is a general assumption in two ways. First, although core common ground is relatively static and shared among people, it usually changes diachronically. During a certain period, say a

1.8

Summary, Ongoing and Future Research

17

couple of years, we may safely assume that interlocutors have access to relatively similar common knowledge because components of core common ground in a speech community won’t change dramatically. However, in the long run it will definitely change. People’s social life, both material and spiritual, will experience some changes over a long period of time, and as a consequence, their core common ground will also be changed. For instance: (4) At the check-out desk in a department store: the customer is about to pay. Sales associate: - Credit or debit? Customer: - Debit.

It is part of core common ground what the terms “credit” and “debit” refer to. No more words are need. However, forty years ago that conversation would not have made much sense since credit and debit cards did not exist as a part of core common ground. Second, core common ground may also vary among different groups of individuals within a speech community. Types of shared knowledge may be determined by different factors such as geography, life-style, educational, financial and racial factors. This fact may restrain the accessibility of certain elements of core common ground to particular groups only within that speech community. Emergent common ground is assumptive in that it is contingent on the actual situational context, which reflects a synchronic change between common grounds in different situations. However, emergent common ground is not only new shared knowledge co-constructed in the course of interaction but also the modification of shared prior knowledge or experience. There is a dialectical relationship between core common ground and emergent common ground. The core part may affect the formation of the emergent part in that it partly restricts the way the latter occurs. In many cases the emergent part may partly originate in instances of information that are predictable in the core part. On the other hand, the emergent part may contribute to the core part in that the contingent emergent part in a frequent ritual occurrence potentially becomes public disposition that belongs to the core part. In other words, core common ground and emergent common ground are two different components of assumed common ground, which are interconnected and inseparable.

1.8

Summary, Ongoing and Future Research

SCA offers an alternative approach to communication. Unlike most current pragmatic theories, it does not idealize the communicative process, rather makes an attempt to describe it with its ups and downs, organized and messy sides and polite and impolite features. SCA claims that individual egocentrism is just as part of human rationality as socially-based cooperation is. It takes into account both the societal and individual factors in communication and considers interlocutors social

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beings searching for meaning with individual minds embedded in a socio-cultural collectivity. As Kecskes (2020) pointed out the central idea of SCA is that there is a dialectical relationship between prior experience and actual situational experience that affect how meaning is created and interpreted. Prior experience results in salience which leads to egocentrism that drives attention. Intention is a cooperation-directed practice that is governed by relevance which (partly) depends on actual situational context.2 As a result relatively static elements blend with ad hoc generated elements in meaning production and comprehension. Collective salience – emergent situational salience, a priori intention – emergent intention, and core common ground and emergent common ground are all essential elements of the dynamism of communication. But they function not as dichotomies. Rather they operate like continuums with constant movements between the two hypothetical ends of those continuums resulting in both positive and negative effects in dynamic communication such as cooperation – egocentrism, politeness – impoliteness, understanding – non-understanding, rapport – disaffection, etc. One of the major projects of SCA should be the experimental and corpus-based investigation of the interplay of dynamic elements of communication such as collective salience and emergent situational salience or prior intention and emergent intention. There have been attempts in this direction as some of the chapters in this handbook demonstrate. SCA considers assumed common ground a central factor of communication that pulls together the other crucial factors such as intention, salience and context. In the dynamic creation and constant updating of CG speakers are considered as “complete” individuals with different possible cognitive status, evaluating the emerging interaction through their own perspective. Co-constructing CG occurs within the interplay of intention and attention, and in turn the interplay of the two concepts is enacted on the socio-cultural background constructed by common ground. In this sense CG plays not only a regulative but also a constitutive role in communication. The approach of SCA to common ground has been in the center of several studies in health communication (e.g. Bigi, 2016; Rossi, 2016), dialogue research (e.g. Mildorf, 2013; Macagno & Bigi, 2017), and internet and computational research (e.g. Diedrichsen, 2019, 2020; Nolan, 2017). SCA as a theoretical frame has been playing a growing role in different branches of pragmatics research in general and socio-pragmatics and intercultural pragmatics in particular. Researchers apply SCA not only as a theoretical framework for their work but also develop it further by modifying or clarifying some of its tenets or claims. Several studies have focused on the interpretation of context and the dynamic model of meaning in the SCA (e.g. Romero-Trillo & Maguire, 2011; Mildorf, 2013; Moss, 2013; Wojtaszek, 2016), and intercultural communication (e.g. Kecskes, 2014; Liu & You, 2019). Khatib and Shakouri (2013) used SCA to explain certain processes in language acquisition. Some theoretical papers on issues like meaning argumentation, presupposition, and miscommunication also relied on SCA as

2

Actual situational context makes things, events, pieces of knowledge, information, etc. relevant.

References

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theoretical support (e.g. Gil, 2019; La Mantia, 2018; Macagno & Capone, 2017; Macagno, 2018; Rossi, 2016; Capone, 2020; Martin de la Rosa & Romero, 2019). These studies all underline the potential of SCA to explain important phenomena and processes in communication and pragmatics. However, the theory is still under development and needs further improvement as the chapters of this handbook demonstrate.3

References Arundale, R. B. (1999). An alternative model and ideology of communication for an alternative to politeness theory. Pragmatics, 9, 119–154. Arundale, R. B. (2008). Against (Gricean) intentions at the heart of human interaction. Intercultural Pragmatics, 5(2), 231–256. Barr, D. J., & Keysar, B. (2005). Making sense of how we make sense: The paradox of egocentrism in language use. In H. L. Colston & N. K. Albert (Eds.), Figurative language comprehension (pp. 21–43). Lawrence Erlbaum. Beaver, D., & Stanley, J. (Forthcoming). Hustle: The politics of language. Princeton University Press. Beaver, D., & Stanley, J. (2019). Toward a non-ideal philosophy of language. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 39(2), 501–545. Bigi, S. (2016). Communicating (with) care. A linguistic approach to the study of doctor-patient interactions. IOS Press. Capone, A. (2020). Presuppositions as pragmemes: The case of exemplification acts. Intercultural Pragmatics, 17(1), 53–77. Carnap, R. (1942). Introduction to semantics. Harvard University Press. Carston, R. (2002). Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication. Blackwell. Clark, H. H. (1996). Using Language. Cambridge University Press. Clark, H. H. (2009). Context and common ground. In L. Mey Jacob (Ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of pragmatics (pp. 116–119). Elsevier. Clark, H. H., & Brennan, S. E. (1991). Grounding in communication. In L. B. Resnick, J. M. Levine, & S. D. Teasley (Eds.), Perspectives on socially shared cognition (pp. 127–149). American Psychological Association. Clark, H. H., Schreuder, R., & Buttrick, S. (1983). Common ground and the understanding of demonstrative reference. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 22, 245–258. Colston, H. L., & Katz, A. N. (Eds.). (2005). Figurative language comprehension: Social and cultural influences. Erlbaum. Culpeper J. (2009). Impoliteness: Using and understanding the language of offence, ESRC project. Retrieved from http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/projects/impoliteness/. Diedrichsen, E. (2019). Challenges for knowledge representation: Emergence in linguistic expressions and internet memes. In B. Nolan & E. Diedrichsen (Eds.), Perspectives on the construction of meaning and knowledge: The linguistic, pragmatic, ontological and computational dimensions (pp. 22–54). Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Diedrichsen, E. (2020). On the interaction of core and emergent common ground in internet memes. Internet Pragmatics., 3(2), 223–259.

3 The chapter was first published in Kecskes, I. (ed.) Cambridge Handbook of Intercultural Pragmatics. Cambridge: CUP. Thanks to CUP for the permission to reuse a part of the text.

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The Socio-Cognitive Approach as a Theoretical Framework

Durkheim, E. (1982). The rules of sociological method. Simon and Schuster. Elsbach, K. D., Barr, P. S., & Hargadon, A. B. (2005). Identifying situated cognition in organizations. Organization Science, 16(4), 422. Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, B. (2008). Strategic leadership: Theory and research on executives, top management teams, and boards. Oxford University Press. García-Gómez, A. (2020). Intercultural and interpersonal communication failures: Analyzing hostile interactions among British and Spanish university students on WhatsApp. Intercultural Pragmatics, 17(1), 27–53. Gibbs, R., & Colston, H. (2012). Interpreting figurative meaning. Cambridge University Press. Gil, J. M. (2019). A relational account of communication on the basis of slips of the tongue. Intercultural Pragmatics, 16(2), 153–185. Giora, R. (1997). Understanding figurative and literal language. The graded salience hypothesis. Cognitive Linguistics, 7, 183–206. Giora, R. (2003). On our mind: Salience, context and figurative language. OUP. Goodwin, C., & Duranti, A. (1992). Rethinking context: An introduction. In Rethinking context: Language as an interactive phenomenon (pp. 1–42). CUP. Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Harvard University Press. Gumperz, J. J. (1982). Discourse strategies. Cambridge University Press. Kecskes, I. (2003). Situation-bound utterances in L1 and L2. Mouton de Gruyter. Kecskes, I. (2008). Dueling contexts: A dynamic model of meaning. Journal of Pragmatics, 40(3), 385–406. Kecskes, I. (2010). The paradox of communication: A socio-cognitive approach. Pragmatics and Society, 1(1), 50–73. Kecskes, I. (2012). Is there anyone out there who really is interested in the speaker? Language and Dialogue, 2, 283–297. Kecskes, I. (2014). Intercultural Pragmatics. Oxford University Press. Kecskes, I. (2019). Impoverished pragmatics? The semantics-pragmatics interface from an intercultural perspective. Intercultural Pragmatics, 16(5), 489–517. Kecskes, I. (2020). The interplay of prior experience and actual situational context in intercultural first encounters. Pragmatics and Cognition, 26(1), 112–135. Kecskes, I. (2021). Processing implicatures in English as a Lingua Franca communication. LINGUA, 256. Kecskes, I., & Mey, J. (2008). Intention, common ground and the egocentric speaker-hearer. Mouton de Gruyter. Kecskes, I., & Zhang, F. (2009). Activating, seeking and creating common ground: A sociocognitive approach. Pragmatics & Cognition., 17(2), 331–355. Keysar, B. (2007). Communication and miscommunication: The role of egocentric processes. Intercultural Pragmatics, 4(1), 71–84. Keysar, B., & Henly, A. S. (2002). Speakers’ overestimation of their effectiveness. Psychological Science, 13, 207–212. Khatib, M., & Shakouri, N. (2013). On situating the stance of socio-cognitive approach to language acquisition. Theory and Practice in Language Studies, 3(9), 1590–1595. La Mantia, F. (2018). “Where is meaning going?” semantic potentials and enactive grammars. Acta Structuralica, 1, 89–113. Leech, G. (1983). Principles of pragmatics. Longman. Levinson, S. C. (2003). Language and mind: Let’s get the issues straight! In G. Dedre & S. GoldinMeadow (Eds.), Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and cognition (pp. 25–46). MIT Press. Liu, P., & You, X. (2019). Metapragmatic comments in web-based intercultural peer evaluation. Intercultural Pragmatics, 16(1), 57–85. Macagno, F. (2018). A dialectical approach to presuppositions. Intercultural Pragmatics, 15(2), 291–313.

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Macagno, F., & Bigi, S. (2017). Analyzing the pragmatic structure of dialogues. Discourse Studies, 19(2), 148–168. Macagno, F., & Capone, A. (2017). Presuppositions as cancellable inferences. In K. Allan, A. Capone, & I. Kecskes (Eds.), Pragmemes and theories of language use (pp. 45–68). Spinger. Martin de la Rosa, M. V., & Romero, E. D. (2019). A modality-based approach to the United Nations security Council’s ambiguous positioning in the resolutions on the Syrian armed conflict. Intercultural Pragmatics, 16(4), 363–389. Mey, J. (2001). Pragmatics. Blackwell. Mildorf, J. (2013). Reading fictional dialogue: Reflections on a cognitive-pragmatic reception theory. Anglistik: International Journal of English Studies, 24.2(September 2013), 105–116. Moss, M. (2013). Rhetoric and time: Cognition, culture and interaction. Doctoral Thesis. Chase Western University. Nolan, B. (2017). Computing the meaning of the assertive speech act by a software agent. Journal of Computer-Assisted Linguistic Research, 1, 20–39. Ocasio, W. (1997). Towards an attention-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 18, 187–206. Romero-Trillo, J., & Maguire, L. (2011). Adaptive context: The fourth element of meaning. International Review of Pragmatics, 3, 228–241. Rossi, M. G. (2016). Metaphors for patient education: A pragmatic-argumentative approach applying to the case of diabetes care. Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, 10(2), 34–48. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance: Communication and cognition. Blackwell Publishing. Stalnaker, R. C. (2002). Common ground. Linguistics and Philosophy, 25, 701–721. Stanley, J. (2018). Precis of how propaganda works. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(2), 470–474. Starbuck, W. H., & Milliken, F. J. (1988). Executive’s perceptual filters: What they notice and how they make sense. In D. C. Hambrick (Ed.), The executive effect: Concepts and methods for studying top managers (pp. 35–65). JAI Press. Van Dijk, T. A. (2008). Discourse and context: A sociocognitive approach. Cambridge University Press. Wojtaszek, A. (2016). Multimodel integration in the perception of press advertisements within the dynamic model of meaning. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics., 12(1), 77–101. Yule, G. (1996). Pragmatics. Oxford University Press.

Chapter 2

The Paradox of Communication: A Socio-Cognitive Approach to Pragmatics

Abstract Communication is not as smooth a process as current pragmatic theories depict it. In Rapaport’s words “We almost always fail [. . .]. Yet we almost always nearly succeed: This is the paradox of communication (Rapaport, 2003)”. This paper claims that there is a need for an approach that is able to explain this “bumpy road” by analyzing both the positive and negative features of the communicative process. The paper presents a socio-cognitive approach (SCA) to pragmatics that takes into account both the societal and individual factors including cooperation and egocentrism that, as claimed here, are not antagonistic phenomena in interaction. This approach is considered an alternative to current theories of pragmatics that do not give an adequate account of what really happens in the communicative process. They consider communication an idealistic, cooperation-based, context-dependent process in which speakers are supposed to carefully construct their utterances for the hearer taking into account all contextual factors and hearers do their best to figure out the intentions of the speakers. This approach relies mainly on the positive features of communication including cooperation, rapport and politeness while almost completely ignores the untidy, trial-and-error nature of communication and the importance of prior contexts captured in the individual use of linguistic units. The overemphasis on cooperative, societal, contextual factors has led to disregard individual factors such as egocentrism and salience that are as important contributors to the communicative process as cooperation, context and rapport. The socio-cognitive approach is presented as a theoretical framework to incorporate and reconcile two seemingly antagonistic sides of the communicative process and explain the dynamic interplay of prior and actual situational contexts.

2.1

Introduction

Recent research in pragmatics and related fields shows two dominant tendencies: an idealistic approach to communication and context-centeredness. According to views dominated by these tendencies, communication is supposed to be a smooth process © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_2

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that is constituted by recipient design and intention recognition. The speaker’s knowledge involves constructing a model of the hearer’s knowledge relevant to the given situational context; conversely, the hearer’s knowledge includes constructing a model of the speaker’s knowledge relevant to the given situational context. Focus in this research is on the positive features of communication: cooperation, rapport, politeness. The emphasis on the decisive role of context, sociocultural factors and cooperation is overwhelming, while the role of the individual’s prior experience, existing knowledge and egocentrism is almost completely ignored although these two sides are not mutually exclusive as we will see later. In current theories it is widely accepted that meaning is socially constructed, context-dependent and is the result of cooperation in the course of communication. Communication is unproblematic if the speaker’s intentions are recognized by the hearer through pragmatic inferences. Consequently, the main task of pragmatics is to explain how exactly the hearer makes these inferences, and determine what is considered the speaker’s meaning. In a recent study, Levinson (2006) confirmed that (Gricean) intention lies at the heart of communication, and proposes an “interaction engine” that drives human interaction. Although several attempts have been made by both neo-Griceans (e.g. Levinson, 2000; Horn, 2007) and relevance theoreticians (e.g. Carston, 2002; Moeschler, 2004) to “revise and correct” the Gricean speaker meaning concept based on truth condition semantics, most theories are still hearer-centered because they place too much emphasis on the common aspects of communication and disregard individual aspects. In SCA, speaker and hearer are equal participants of the communicative process but they are different individuals. They both produce and comprehend language while relying on their most accessible and salient knowledge expressed in their private contexts. Consequently, only a holistic interpretation of utterances, from both the perspective of the speaker and hearer, can give us an adequate account of language communication. Interlocutors should be considered as “complete” individuals with different possible cognitive statuses, with possible different interpretations of the same core common ground information, all of which has a profound effect on what the same linguistic structure may mean for any of them. The other strong tendency in current pragmatic theories is emphasis on contextdependency. According to the dominant view, context-sensitivity (in various forms) is a pervasive feature of natural language. Nowadays, everybody seems to be a contextualist. Literalism according to which (many or most) sentences express propositions independent of context has been extinct for some time; compare Carston’s claim that”...linguistically encoded meaning never fully determines the intended proposition expressed” (Carston, 2002, p. 49). Consequently, linguistic data must be completed by non-linguistic, contextual interpretation processes. The present paper argues that the idealistic view on communication and the over-emphasis placed on context-dependency give a lopsided perspective on communication by focusing only on the positive features of the process. In fact, communication is more like a trial-and-error, try-and-try-again, process that is co-constructed by the participants. It appears to be a non-summative and emergent interactional achievement (Arundale, 1999, 2008; Mey, 2001; Kecskes & Mey,

2.2

Three Problems with Current Theories

25

2008). Consequently, due attention should be paid to the less positive aspects of communication including breakdowns, misunderstandings, struggles and languagebased aggression — features which are not unique, but seem to be as common of communication as are cooperation and politeness. Similarly, dependency on actual situational context is only one side of the matter, while individuals’ prior experience of recurring contexts expressed as content in the interlocutors’ utterances likewise play important roles in meaning construction and comprehension.

2.2

Three Problems with Current Theories

The dominance of the societal and contextual factors over the individual cognitive factors can be demonstrated through the way current theories handle three major issues: speaker-hearer relations, context-dependency, and cooperation versus egocentrism.

2.2.1

Hearer-Centered Pragmatics

Kecskes (2008, p. 404) argued that in order to give an adequate explanation of the communicative processes, we need a dialectical model of pragmatics that combines the perspective of both the speaker and hearer. This change is needed because current pragmatic theories, both those that have grown out of Grice’s theory, such as the various neo-Gricean approaches and the approach proposed by Relevance Theory are all hearer-centered; they base themselves on the Gricean modular view that divides the interpretation process to two stages: what is said and what is implicated. Although Gricean theory, with its cooperative principle and maxims, was supposed to embrace conversation as a whole, basically its further development has remained hearer-centered, with less emphasis on and interest in the speaker’s position — a rather paradoxical turn, as Grice himself always emphasized speaker’s meaning. Even so, the Gricean divide of truth-conditional semantics and pragmatics has led to an impoverished speaker’s meaning, without regard for the pragmatic features of speaker’s meaning. The division between what is said and what is implicated was made for the sake of utterance interpretation. However, a theory that is concerned about speaker’s meaning should focus not only on the truth values of the speaker’s utterance, but also on its pragmatic elements and on speakers’ egocentrism. Most attempts to revise/correct the problems of the modular view and recognize pragmatic features of the speaker’s meaning (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Carston, 2002; Moeschler, 2004: explicature/implicature; Capone, 2008: what-is-A-said/what-is-B-said; Bach, 2001: what is said/ impliciture/ implicature) have not gone far enough because they still were interested primarily in utterance interpretation, without paying due attention to

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private knowledge, prior experience, and the emergent, rather than the a priori only intentions of the speaker. Although the neo-Griceans’ main concern is speaker’s meaning, they still view communication as designed with a view towards the recipient and his/her recognition of speaker’s intention. In this view, the speaker designs his/her utterance for the hearer and the hearer’s task is to recognize the speaker’s intention. But what is recovered is not always what was intended because of the interlocutors’ differences in private cognitive contexts and prior experience. So an adequate account of interaction should consider interlocutors not only as common-ground seekers, but as individuals with their own agendas, with their specific mechanisms of saliency (based on prior experiences), and their individual language production systems. Unlike the neo-Griceans, who attempt to give an account of the speaker’s meaning, relevance theorists focus on developing a cognitive psychological model of utterance interpretation, which does not address the question of how and why the speaker, given what he wants to communicate, utters what he utters. Saul (2002) said that the main difference between the neo-Gricean theory and Relevance Theory lies in ‘whose meaning’ they model. While the neo-Griceans follow the original perspective and consider utterance meaning, including implicature, to be the speaker’s intended meaning, relevance theorists discuss intentional communication from the perspective of the addressee’s reconstruction of the speaker’s assumptions. For the socio-cognitive approach which will be presented here, the main problem with the hearer-centered views is that they want to recover speaker meaning from a hearer perspective. The proposition the speaker produces will not be exactly the same as that which will be recovered by the hearer: interlocutors are individuals with different cognitive predispositions, prior experiences, and different histories of use of the same words and expressions. In SCA, by contrast, equal attention is paid to the processes of utterance production and utterance interpretation.

2.2.2

Context-Dependency

In linguistics, context usually refers to any factor – linguistic, epistemic, physical, social – that affects the actual interpretation of signs and expressions. The notion that meanings are context-dependent has informed some of the most powerful views in current linguistic and philosophical theory, all the way from Frege to Wittgenstein and beyond. Frege’s Context Principle (Frege, 1884/1980) asserts that a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence. Wittgenstein (1921/1922) basically formulated the same idea, saying that an expression has meaning only in a proposition; every variable can be conceived as a propositional variable. Such external perspectives on context hold that context modifies and/or specifies word meanings in one way or another. Context is seen as a selector of lexical features because it activates some of those features while leaving others in the background. Some versions of this ‘externalist’ contextualism take this line of thinking to the extreme and claim that meanings are specified entirely by their contexts, and that there is no

2.2

Three Problems with Current Theories

27

semantic systematicity underlying them at all (e.g. Barsalou, 1993, 1999; Evans, 2006). According to this view, the mind works primarily by storing experiences and finding patterns in those experiences. These patterns shape how people engage with their subsequent experiences, and store these in their minds. According to Sperber & Wilson’s original formulation of Relevance Theory, relevance is something that is not determined by context, but constrained by context. A context-driven pragmatic process is generally top-down. It is usually not triggered by an expression in the sentence but emerges for purely pragmatic reasons: in order to make sense of what the speaker says. Such processes are also referred to as “free” pragmatic processes. They are considered ‘free’, because they are not mandated by the linguistic expressions but respond to pragmatic considerations only. For example, the pragmatic process through which an expression is given a non-literal (e.g. a metaphorical or figurative) interpretation is context-driven: we interpret the expression non-literally in order to make sense of the given speech act, not because this is required by linguistic expressions. Opposite to the externalist view on context is the internalist perspective. It considers lexical units as creators of context (e.g. Gee, 1999; Violi, 2000). Violi (2000) claimed that our experience is developed through a regularity of recurrent and similar situations that we tend to identify with given contexts. Standard (prior recurring) context can be defined as a regular situation that we have repeatedly experienced, about which we have expectations as to what will or will not happen, and on which we rely to understand and predict how the world around us works. It is exactly these standard contexts that linguistic meanings tied to lexical units refer to. For instance: (1) License and registration, please. Let me tell you something. What can I do for you? How is it going?

These and similar expressions create their own context. Kecskes called them ‘situation-bound utterances’ (Kecskes, 2000, 2002) since they are tied to standard recurring contexts which they are able to (re) create. Thus, Gumperz (1982) said that utterances somehow carry with them their own context or project that context. Similarly, Levinson (2003), referring to Gumperz’s work, claimed that the messageversus-context opposition is misleading, because the message can carry with it, or forecast its context. In the socio-cognitive approach this refers to what is called the ‘double-sidedness’ of context. In the semantics–pragmatics interface debate, contextualists are committed to deriving rich pragmatic effects from what is said by a sentence, or from the proposition expressed, or from the semantic content. Contextualism has its origin in speech act theories of meaning, as I have argued above. Moderate contextualists will claim that only some expressions outside the basic set are context-sensitive and/or semantically incomplete, while radical contextualists claim that every

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expression or construction outside the basic set is context sensitive. Radical contextualists include Searle and Recanati as well as the relevance theorists such as Carlston, Sperber, and Wilson; among the moderate contextualists, we find those who argue for the context sensitivity of quantified phrases (e.g., Stanley and Szabo), of belief statements (e.g., Richard and Perry), and of epistemic claims (e.g., DeRose). From the perspective of SCA, the main problem with both the externalist and internalist views of context is that they are one-sided inasmuch as they emphasize either the selective or the constitutive role of context. However, the dynamic nature of human speech communication requires a model that recognizes both regularity and variability in meaning construction and comprehension, and takes into account both the selective and constitutive roles of context at the same time. Millikan (1998) claimed that the conventional sign (the lexical unit) is reproduced (or ‘copied’ as he said), not discovered or invented anew by each producer–processor pair. This can only happen if the linguistic unit has some kind of regular reference to certain contexts in which it has been used. Already Leibniz (1976 [1679]) said: “. . . si nihil per se concipitur, nihil omnino concipietur” (‘. . . if nothing is understood by itself, nothing at all will ever be understood’). Consequently, we need an approach to communication that recognizes both the selective and constitutive role of context. This is exactly what the SCA does.

2.2.3

Cooperation Versus Egocentrism

Current pragmatic theories attach great importance to cooperation in the process of communication. Communication is considered an intention-directed practice, during which the interlocutors mutually recognize their intentions and goals, and make joint efforts to achieve them (Clark, 1996). Grice’s (1975) four maxims formulate the overall rules regulating the speaker’s production of an utterance, and it is on the basis of a mutual agreement on these maxims that cooperation is recognized and comprehension is warranted. Grice’s is an ideal abstraction of verbal communication, in which cooperation and effect of intention are greatly valued. In this communication-as-transfer-betweenminds, construal of common ground takes a central place. However, common ground is also idealized in this approach as an a priori mental state of interlocutors that facilitates cooperation and successful communication (e.g. Stalnaker, 1978; Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark, 1996). The mental representations of (assumed) shared knowledge exist in the speaker prior to conversation; they relate to, and facilitate comprehension of, the intentions and goals, and thereby direct the conversation in the desired way. Such theories favoring an ideal abstraction of verbal communication have met with several challenges. Cooperation was questioned by Relevance Theory (RT) when it referred to counter-cases of cooperation, with interlocutors being unwilling to build relevance because of their preferences for certain interests, as

2.2

Three Problems with Current Theories

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opposed to cases when they are unable to be relevant because of lack of the needed information or mental resources. In RT, the interlocutors are free to be cooperative or uncooperative, and their preferences for cooperation or the reverse are driven by their own interests. The most robust evidence against cooperation and common ground as an a priori mental state derives from empirical cognitive research, which reported the egocentrism of speaker-hearers in mental processing of communication and postulated the emergent property of common ground. Barr and Keysar (2005) claimed that speakers and hearers commonly ignore their mutual knowledge when they produce and understand language. Their behavior is called ‘egocentric’ because it is rooted in the speakers’ or hearers’ own knowledge instead of in their mutual knowledge. Other studies in cognitive psychology (e.g., Keysar and Bly 1995; Giora, 2003; Keysar, 2007), have shown that speakers and hearers are egocentric to a surprising degree, and that individual, egocentric endeavors of interlocutors play a much more decisive role, especially in the initial stages of production and comprehension, than is envisioned by current pragmatic theories. This egocentric behavior is rooted in speakers’ and hearers’ relying more on their own knowledge than on mutual knowledge. People turn out to be poor estimators of what others know. Speakers usually underestimate the ambiguity and overestimate the effectiveness of their utterances (Keysar & Henly, 2002). These findings about the egocentric approach of interlocutors to communication are also confirmed by Giora’s (1997, 2003) graded salience hypothesis and Kecskes’ (2002, 2008) dynamic model of meaning. Interlocutors seem to consider their conversational experience more important than prevailing norms of informativeness. Giora’s (Giora, 2003) main argument is that knowledge of salient meanings plays a primary role in the process of using and comprehending language. She claims that “...privileged meanings, meanings foremost on our mind, affect comprehension and production primarily, regardless of context or literality” (Giora, 2003, p. 103). Kecskes’ dynamic model of meaning (Kecskes, 2008) also emphasizes that what the speaker says, relies on prior conversational experience, as reflected in lexical choices in production. Conversely, how the hearer understands what is said in the actual situational context depends partly on his/her prior conversational experience with the lexical items used in the speaker’s utterances. Smooth communication depends primarily on the extent of the match between the two. Cooperation, relevance, and reliance on possible mutual knowledge come into play only after the speaker’s ego is satisfied and the hearer’s egocentric, most salient interpretation is processed. Barr and Keysar (2005) argued that mutual knowledge is most likely implemented as a mechanism for detecting and correcting errors, rather than as an intrinsic, routine process of the language processor. Kecskes and Zhang (2009) proposed an integrated concept of common ground, in which both core common ground (as assumed shared knowledge, or a priori mental representations) and emergent common ground (as emergent participant resources, in post factum emergence through use) converge to construct a dialectical socio-cultural background for communication.

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2.3 2.3.1

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The Paradox of Communication: A Socio-Cognitive Approach to Pragmatics

A Socio-Cognitive View: The Construal of Communication Need for a Socio-Cognitive View

The studies mentioned above, as well as many others (Giora, 2003; Arnseth & Ivar Solheim, 2002; Koschmann & LeBaron, 2003; Heritage, 1990; Arundale 1999, 2008; Kecskes, 2004a, 2008; Kecskes & Zhang, 2009), warrant some revision of traditional pragmatic theories of cooperation and common ground. However, as they also point out, the cooperative principle does not suffice for such a revision, as it has been proven vulnerable to fluctuations in the mental resources that prefer egocentric interpretations (Strayer & Johnston, 2001). However, a call for revision of the idealized view of communication does not imply its absolute denial. If we compare the pragmatic ideal version and the cognitive coordination approach, we can see that the two approaches are not contradictory, but rather complement each other. The ideal abstraction adopts a top-down approach. It works well for a theoretical construct of pragmatics that warrants successful communication in all cases. In contrast, the cognitive coordination view adopts a bottom-up approach. It provides empirical evidence supporting a systematic interpretation of miscommunication; it can be applied in general as well. From a dialectical perspective, cooperation and egocentrism are not conflicting, such that the a priori mental state supporting intention and common ground versus the post factum emergence of intention and common ground may converge to a body of integrated background knowledge for the interlocutors to rely on in pursuit of a relatively smooth communication. However, so far no attempt has been made to combine the two. Therefore, the aim of the socio-cognitive approach is to eliminate the ostensible conflicts between the two views, and propose an approach that integrates their considerations into a holistic concept of communication.

2.3.2

The Socio-Cognitive View

The socio-cognitive approach that I am proposing is based on two important claims. First, speaker and hearer are equal participants in the communicative process. They both produce and comprehend, while relying on their most accessible and salient knowledge as expressed in their private contexts in production and comprehension. Consequently, only a holistic interpretation of the utterance, from both the perspective of the speaker and the perspective of the hearer, can give us an adequate account of language communication. Interlocutors should be considered as “complete” individuals with different possible cognitive statuses, and with possible different interpretations of the same core common ground information and actual communicative situation —all of which has a profound effect on what the same linguistic structure may mean for any of them. Second, communication is a dynamic process,

2.4

Intention and Attention

31

in which individuals are not only constrained by societal conditions but they also shape them at the same time. As a consequence, communication is characterized by the interplay of two traits that are inseparable, mutually supportive, and interactive: Individual trait: Attention Private experience Egocentrism Salience

Social trait: Intention Actual situational experience Cooperation Relevance

Communication is the result of the interplay of intention and attention, as this interplay is motivated by the individuals’ private socio-cultural backgrounds. This approach integrates the pragmatic view of cooperation and the cognitive view of egocentrism and emphasizes that both cooperation and egocentrism are manifested in all phases of communication, albeit to varying extents. While cooperation is an intention-directed practice which may be measured by relevance, egocentrism is an attention-oriented trait which is measured by salience. Intention and attention are identified as two measurable forces that affect communication in a systematic way.

2.4

Intention and Attention

The proposal to measure intention and attention by means of relevance and salience is distinct from earlier explanations (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2004; Giora, 1997, 2003; Kecskes, 2001, 2004b). Unlike Wilson and Sperber’s (2004) account of relevance as a unified constraint with both cognitive and pragmatic concerns, relevance in SCA is considered exclusively a pragmatic effect, caused by relations to intention. Only information that relates to intention is considered relevant in communication, according to SCA. The notion of salience also carries different interests. While salience by Giora (2003) mainly concerns the storage of knowledge as a function of degree of familiarity, frequency, and conventionality, salience in SCA refers to the contingent effect of salient knowledge as a result of the attentional processing of communication in a particular situation which facilitates or hampers the expression of intention and the subsequent achievement of communicative effects. SCA claims that salience plays as important a role in language production as it does in comprehension; in contrast, most of the research on salience investigates only comprehension (see, e.g., Giora, 1997, 2003). SCA demonstrates how salience of an entity can be interpreted as a measure of how well an entity stands out from other entities, and how it influences the preference of the individual in selecting words, expressions and complex constructs in the process of communication. SCA also differs from current research by positing a dialectical relationship between intention and attention. As previously argued, the pragmatic view and the cognitive view are concerned about intention and attention in an isolated way. There

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is no explicit explanation of the relations between the two. Relevance Theory defines relevance by effects of both attention and intention, but does not distinguish the two effects and never clarifies their relations explicitly, as revealed by their claim that “an input (a sight, a sound, an utterance, a memory) is relevant to an individual when it connects with background information he has available to yield conclusions that matter to him” (Wilson and Sperber 2004, p. 3). In SCA, intention and attention are identified as two measurable forces that affect communication in a systematic way, and whose interplay is clarified by appealing to the interlocutors’ socio-cultural background.

2.4.1

Intentions

With regard to intention, the socio-cognitive view on the one hand incorporates the Searlean understanding of the term (Searle, 1983); on the other, it extends the notion to emphasize the dynamism of intention and its non-summative, emergent nature. SCA not only considers the centrality of intention in conversation, just as the cognitive-philosophical approach has done, but also takes into account the dynamic process in which the intention can be an emergent effect of the conversation. In SCA, intention is considered a dynamically changing phenomenon that is the main organizing force in the communicative process. Intention is not only private, individual, pre-planned and a precursor to action; it is also emerging and social. Here, it should be underlined that we are not talking about a dichotomy: rather, a priori intention and emergent intention are two sides of the same phenomenon that may receive different emphasis at different points in the communicative process. When a conversation is started, the private and pre-planned nature of intention may be dominant. However, in the course of conversation the emergent and social nature of the phenomenon may come to the fore. These two sides of intention are always present; the question is only to what extent they are present at any given moment of the communicative process. This view does not contradict Searle’s claim that intentionality is directedness; intending to do something is just one kind of intentionality among others (Searle, 1983, p. 3); it is also in line with Joas’ claim that intentionality consists in a self-reflective control which we exercise over our current behavior (Joas, 1996, p. 158). The basic property that renders intention a central element of communication is its functionality. There is always a reason and/or a goal behind a conversation; without intention, there would be no need to initiate communication, and we could hardly make any sense of this social action. Searle (1983, 2007) considered intention, along with other mental acts such as perception, desire, and belief, as prerequisites to communication. However, this is just one side of intention. The emergent side is co-constructed by the participants in the dynamic flow of conversation. Consider the following (source: internet) conversation:

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Intention and Attention

33

(2) John: - want to talk about your trip? Peter: - I don’t know. If you have questions. . . John: - OK, but you should tell me . . . Peter: - wait, you want to hear about Irene? John: - well, what about her? Peter: - she is fine. She has. . .well. . . put on some weight, though.

John’s utterance gives the impression that his intention is to give a chance to his friend to talk about his trip. However, Peter does not seem to have much of an intention to do so. John’s second utterance appears to be very determined, but it is not completed, so we will never know what his real intention was. But that utterance triggers an interesting turn by Peter, who thinks John wants to know about his former girlfriend, Irene. Maybe this is the case, but it was not John’s original intention. It was the conversational flow that led to this point, at which there appears a kind of emergent, co-constructed intention. Communication is a process in which intention is formed, expressed, and interpreted. From the speaker’s perspective, intention is something that s/he bears in mind prior to the utterance; alternatively, it is generated in the course of conversation and expressed in the form of utterances. From the hearer’s or analyst’s perspective, intention is something that is processed by the hearer simultaneously with the utterance, or after it has been completed. The primary intention expressed in a particular situation serves the function of guiding the conversation. Knowledge or information explicated in linguistic forms, implied connotation, along with inferable background, all get united to achieve comprehension and communication under the driving force of intention. Notice there that in SCA there is significant room for such a dynamism, which means that intention is not necessarily an a priori phenomenon; it can also be generated and changed during the communicative process. This dynamism is reflected in emerging utterances: they may be interrupted and started again. It is not only the context, but also the dynamism of the conversational flow and the process of formulating an utterance that likewise affect and change the intention.

2.4.2

Attention

Attention refers to those cognitive resources available to interlocutors that make communication a conscious action. When intention is formed, expressed, and interpreted in the process of communication, attention contributes to the various stages of the process with different strength. Three factors will affect salience of knowledge and ease of attentional processing in all stages: (a) interlocutors’ knowledge based on prior experience; (b) frequency, familiarity, or conventionality of knowledge tied to the situation; and (c) the interlocutors’ mental state and/or the availability of attentional resourcesi. Based on these three factors, the knowledge

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most salient to the interlocutors in a particular situation is the information that both are included in their knowledge base, is pertinent to the current situation, and is processed by the necessary attentional resources. No matter what mental state the interlocutors are in, and at which stage of the communication they are operating, the most salient knowledge will be available as a result of the interplay of these three factors. All stages in the communicative process require the commitment of attention in order for successful communication to occur. As stated above, cognitive research has documented the interlocutors’ egocentric behavior in the process of communication. Egocentrism means that interlocutors activate and bring up the most salient information to the needed attentional level in the construction (by the speaker) and comprehension (by the hearer) of the communication. Consequently, the speaker will use the linguistic resources (e.g., the lexical units) which s/he thinks are most salient for expressing his/her communicative intentions and/or goals; similarly, the hearer will cooperate by capturing those salient units and assigning them a proper place in the communicational process. Because of their different knowledge bases, the frequency/rituality of their knowledge in the situation, and the attendant attentional resources available to them for processing the salient items, the interlocutors’ knowledge has different levels of salience; as a result, they conduct the attentional processing of communication in an egocentric manner. There are specific ways in which attention contributes to different stages of communication as characterized by the processes of intention. When intention is formed, attention plays a crucial role. Consider the following (construed) example: (3) Sally is speaking to bill. Sally: - Don’t move! There is a snake over there!

Without Sally noticing the existence of a snake nearby, her intention of warning Bill wouldn’t come into being. When expressing intention in an utterance, the speaker also needs the necessary attention, so as to formulate the utterance in a comprehensible way. The frequency or familiarity of the intention and especially of the linguistic expression in question determines the extent of attentional processing. Greetings require less attentional resources and appear more automatic than do snake warnings, the latter being less frequent and also easier to process. When intention is interpreted by the hearer, the amount of attentional resources needed is similarly proportional to the resources required in the formulation of intention. The person being greeted can easily comprehend the speaker’s intention and respond to it in an effortless way. However, in example 3, Bill, when warned of the snake, may need to undertake some effort in order to read the intention and deploy the relevant reaction. Intention directs attention to relevant information resources so that the intention can be realized, and communication be conducted in a coherent and comprehensible way. By selecting those resources, intention becomes central to the processing of communication. The socio-cultural background has an overall influence on the interplay of intention and attention. The interlocutors’ prior knowledge directs their attention

2.5

SCA as Speaker-Hearer Pragmatics

35

to becoming aware of different features, or different parts, of the same phenomenon. For example, an architect, an engineer, and a dustman may form different views when looking at the same building. Also as a consequence of this, different intentions may be formed, and the effect of interplay is also affected by the accessibility of the knowledge. As a result, communication is achieved with intentional action guaranteed by attentional processing; both are motivated by the common sociocultural background. In this process, interlocutors are both cooperative (in terms of intention) and egocentric (in terms of attention). The part of knowledge that is relevant to intention, salient to attention, and available in the socio-cultural background will contribute to successful communication.

2.5

SCA as Speaker-Hearer Pragmatics

The speaker-hearer perspective of the socio-cognitive approach requires a revision of the recipient design and intention recognition views espoused by current pragmatics theories. In SCA, the speaker’s utterance is the result of an interpreting commitment that is a private reaction to a communicative situation, as it is expressed in lexical items that are affected by the mechanism of salience. This interpretation is different from explicature,the latter being a proposition explicitly expressed by the speaker; it differs in several aspects (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1995; Carston, 2002; Carston, 2004a, 2004b). Explicature is distinguished from ‘what is said’, in that it involves a considerable component of pragmatically derived meaning, which is added to linguistically encoded meaning. In SCA, the speaker’s utterance is more than that. According to Carston (2004a, 2004b), the derivation of an explicature may require ‘free’ enrichment, that is, the incorporation of conceptual material that is wholly pragmatically inferred, on the basis of considerations of rational communicative behavior. In SCA, this enrichment of the uttered sentence is the result of the speaker’s private and subjective treatment of the utterance in an actual situational context. How the hearer will infer this speaker-subjectivized commitment is another issue. While admitting that an explicature is defined as committed and endorsed by the speaker, SCA stresses that the enriched proposition is actually owned by the speaker; it is not something recovered by the hearer as result of the latter’s inference, as it is the case in RT. The speaker’s utterance is the speaker’s product, his private reaction to an actual communicative situation, it is based on the speaker’s prior and emergent knowledge and intention. In current pragmatic theories, the main issue is to figure out how the hearer recognizes and recovers what the speaker said. Less attention is paid to the question of why exactly the speaker said what s/he said in the way s/he said it. SCA differs from the Gricean and relevance theoretical approaches in its attempt to give equal attention to speaker production and hearer interpretation. In SCA, speaker’s utterance is a full proposition constructed by the speaker; in contrast, explicature is a full proposition of the hearer’s reconstruction.

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In the Gricean paradigm, speakers are committed to offer linguistic forms, while the rest is left to the hearers: what is said is an inference trigger. The neo-Griceans have gone further, by saying that speaker’s commitment includes not only the truthvalue in the Gricean sense but also some automatic pragmatic enrichment. Thus, what is said is revised from being limited to sentence meaning to comprise utterance meaning. Since the neo-Griceans’ main concern is speaker’s meaning, the familiar divide between speaker’s meaning and utterance interpretation is still in existence, and intention is restricted to the hearer’s recovering process. In SCA, speaker’s utterance is a full proposition in its own right, operating with speaker-centered pragmatic enhancement and speaker’s intention in order to satisfy primarily the speaker’s agenda. The full proposition the speaker puts out in this scenario will not necessarily mean the same as that which is recovered by the hearer: interlocutors have different privatized background knowledge and experience, they may perceive the actual situational contexts differently, use lexical items in different sense and in general, differ greatly as to what is salient for them and to what extent. So the speaker’s production is not a recipient design. What is recovered by the hearer cannot replace what the speaker produces on his/her own. As to the RT concept of ‘explicature’, as we have seen, this includes not only the truth-conditional semantic meaning, but also some contextual pragmatic enrichment. There have been attempts to enlarge the pragmatic scope of explicature towards “full propositions” (e.g. Carston, 2002; Burton-Roberts, 2005; Jaszczolt, 2005), but the RT approach remains hearer-oriented. Explicature is something that is recovered by the hearer, and as such it is not necessary equal to what the speaker has explicated. In fact, in the hearer’s perspective of RT, what the hearer can recover by automatic and default pragmatic inference is what the speaker was supposed to have explicitly offered; any additional inference goes to implicatures. In SCA, on the other hand, speaker’s utterance is a ‘pragmatized’ full proposition that involves speaker intention, personal attitude, and privatized actual contextual elements. This approach shares some features with what Jaszczolt has called “merger representation” (Jaszczolt, 2005); her notion of representation is comprehensive and integrative. But unlike Jaszczolt’s proposal, the scope of speaker’s utterance in SCA is wider because it contains not only the automatic pragmatic inference part recovered by the hearer, but also the part new to the hearer, which comes from the speaker’s private knowledge and privatized actual situational context. The main concern of SCA is how the speaker’s public knowledge and private knowledge are integrated into a speaker’s utterance. Kecskes (2008) makes a distinction between private context and actual situational context. Private contexts develop through individuals’ situational experience. Some of these experiences get tied to lexical items in the minds of speakers of a particular speech community. These private contexts incorporate core knowledge (tied to prior experience), which is the public part of the private context, and individual-specific knowledge that may not be shared by other members of the speech community, because it is the individualized reflection of prior socio-cultural contexts. The public context, that is to say, the public part of the private context, however, is available to each speaker of that speech community because it refers to relatively similar,

2.6

Salience as Guiding Mechanism

37

conventionalized conceptual content. In utterance production, speaker’s intention gets privatized in accordance with the actual situational context; it is formulated in words uttered ‘out there’ in the world by the speaker in a situation (actual situational context), and is matched (‘internalized’) to the private cognitive contexts (prior and actualized knowledge) ‘inside’ the head of the hearer. Meaning is the result of interplay between the speaker’s private context and the hearer’s private context in the actual situational context as understood by the interlocutors.

2.6

Salience as Guiding Mechanism

In SCA, both speaker production and hearer interpretation are governed by the mechanism of salience. As a semiotic notion, salience refers to the relative importance or prominence of signs. The relative salience of a particular sign when considered in the context of others helps an individual to quickly rank large amounts of information by importance and thus give attention to that which is the most important. Linguistic salience describes the accessibility of entities in a speaker’s or hearer’s memory and how this accessibility affects the production and interpretation of language. Several theories of linguistic salience have been developed, to explain how the salience of entities affects the form of referring expressions, as in the Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel et al., 1993), or how it affects the local coherence of discourse, as in Centering Theory (Grosz et al., 1995), or in Giora’s Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 1997, 2003). I would also include Jaszczolt (2005) concepts of ‘primary meaning’ and ‘pragmatic default’ in this list, because the latter also deals with salience, albeit from a somewhat different perspective.

2.6.1

Differences Between SCA and the Graded Salience Hypothesis

SCA relies mainly on the Graded Salience Hypothesis (GSH), but it does not accept all of its tenets. GSH is hearer-centered, while SCA focuses on production and comprehension equally. GSH deals with lexical processing, whereas SCA’s concern is both lexical unit meaning and utterance meaning; in contrast, SCA distinguishes individual salience, collective salience, and situational salience. While GSH uses ‘context’ in the sense of actual situational context, SCA emphasizes the interplay between prior contexts, encapsulated in the utterance formulation, and actual situational context. The main claim of the GSH is that stored information is superior to unstored information, such as novel information or information inferable from context (Giora, 2003, p. 15). As a consequence, salient meanings of lexical units (e.g., conventional, frequent, familiar, or prototypical meanings) are processed automatically,

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irrespective of contextual information and strength of bias. Although context effects may be fast, they run in parallel with lexical processes and initially do not interact with them (Giora, 2003, p. 24). According to the GSH hypothesis, in language processing both salient information and contextual knowledge run in parallel, and salient information may not be filtered out even when it is contextually inappropriate. This claim basically questions context-dependency as we have described it earlier. While salience, according to the GSH, mainly concerns the storage of knowledge as a function of degree of familiarity, frequency, and conventionality, salience in SCA refers to the contingent effect of salient knowledge as a result of the attentional processing of communication in a particular situation, which facilitates or hampers the expression of intention and the subsequent achievement of communicative effects. A significant difference between GSH and SCA is that the GSH emphasizes the importance of stored information, while SCA considers salience to be both a stored and an emergent entity. According to the GSH (Giora, 2003, p. 15), for information to be salient – to be foremost on a person’s mind – it needs to undergo consolidation, that is, to be stored or coded in the mental lexicon. Stored information is superior to unstored information, such as novel information or information inferable from the context: while salient information is highly accessible, non-salient information requires strongly supportive contextual information to become as accessible as is salient information. Giora seems to equate salient information with consolidated/ stored information and nonsalient information with unstored information. This, to me, is somewhat questionable because it considers salience as a relatively static entity. In contrast, SCA emphasizes that salience is in a continual state of change both diachronically and synchronically. What is ranked ‘most salient meaning’ at the present moment may die off after only a few decades. An example of such diachronical change is the word ‘gay’, whose most salient meaning in the 50 s of the past century was ‘joyful’; nowadays, this meaning would rank below that of ‘homosexual’. Salient information can be ‘disconsolidated’ when its salience dies off and the information in question ends up as less salient or non-salient. For analytic purposes three theoretically significant categories are distinguished in SCA: individual salience, collective salience, and situational salience. Individual salience is characterized as a natural preference built into the general conceptual- and linguistic knowledge of the speaker; it has developed as a result of prior experience with lexical items, and changes both diachronically and synchronically. Individual salience is affected by the two other types. Collective salience is shared with the other members of the speech community, and changes diachronically. Situational salience changes synchronically, and refers to the salience of specific objects in the context of language production; it may accrue through such determinants as vividness, speaker motivation, and recency of mention. In an actual situational context, individual salience is affected and shaped both by collective and situational salience. The following (source: British sitcom) example serves to show the role of salience both in production and comprehension:

2.6

Salience as Guiding Mechanism

39

(4) Jill: - I met someone today. Jane: - Good for you. Jill: - He is a police officer. Jane: - Are you in trouble? Jill: - Oh, no. . . ..

Jill met someone who was a policeman. Conform with our society’s collective salience, the concept of ‘policeman’ is identified with some kind of trouble. However, this understanding of the concept is privatized in Jill’s case and acquires a positive overtone, as the result of her positive (maybe even romantic) encounter with the policeman. Jane did not have this experience, so she processed the word in accordance with its collective salience, as privatized by her in the given situation. What the speaker meant differed from what the hearer inferred from the same utterance. The difference is the result of the concept’s different privatization, based on prior experience. By Situational salience refers to the salience of situational constraints that can derive from factors such as obviousness, recency of mention, and others. The cashier’s “how are you doing today?” question in a supermarket requires only a short “fine, thank you”. The salience of the situation makes the function of the expression obvious. However, situational salience can be overridden by both collective salience and individual salience. In the following example, situational salience is overridden by a collective salience, individualized similarly by hearerreaders. (5) (sign on the door of a department store) “Girls wanted for different positions.”

Not even the actual situational context and environment can subdue the sexual connotation of the sentence. As Giora (2003) claimed, both salient information and contextual knowledge run in parallel, and salient, but contextually inappropriate information may not be discarded. A similar example comes from one of Robin Williams’ films, where the hero says: “I had to sleep with the dogs. Platonically, of course. . .” The speaker thinks that the sexual connotation of ‘“sleep with’” is so strong that a clarification is necessary.

2.6.2

Salience in Language Production

The role of salience in language production involves a ranking relation of prominence of entities, as well as a preferred choice among alternatives. When the speaker is faced with having to choose a word or an expression, a ranking of the available choices is obtained on the basis of the degree of salience of entities in the context of generation. The word or phrase then is selected for utterance on the basis of

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maximum salience. Once a speaker has either an a priori or an emergent, co-constructed intention to communicate, s/he should find an appropriate linguistic representation to transfer this message to the hearer. The message of the preverbal thought is made up by combining the concepts that the speaker intends to explicate. Concepts are attached to several possible frames. When a preverbal thought is formulated, the related schemas will be activated. Jackendoff (2002) claimed that concepts have no direct, one-to-one connection with lexical items. A concept may be associated with several lexical expressions, and conversely. The process of transforming preverbal thought into linguistic expressions varies among different speakers because they have several options to explicate their intentions. For Kecskes (2008, p. 401) argued that there is a difference between speaker processing and hearer processing. When a lexical unit (labeled for private context) is used by a speaker, private contexts attached to this lexical expression are activated top–down in a hierarchical order based on salience. This hierarchical order works differently for the speaker and the hearer. For the speaker, there is primarily an interlabel hierarchy, while for the hearer the intra-label hierarchy comes first. The interlabel hierarchy operates in the first phase of production, when a speaker looks for words to express her/his intention. First, s/he has to select words or expressions from a group of possibilities in order to express his/her communicative intention. These words or expressions constitute a hierarchy from the best fit to those less suited to the idea s/he is trying to express. The hearer, however, has to cope with a different type of hierarchy from her/his perspective. Thus, an intra-label hierarchy is in force, when the hearer processes (a) lexical unit(s) in an utterance (or even an entire utterance). The label (word) uttered by the speaker hierarchically triggers the history of that particular label as used by the hearer (but not by the speaker). This may also be a reason for misunderstanding in the communicative process. Compare the following (source: American sitcom) interchange: (6) Bob: - Are you OK? Mary: - I am fine. Bob: - I know you are fine, but are you OK? Bob had several options to ask about Mary’s well-being: “Are you OK?”, “Are you fine?”, ”Is everything all right?”, etc. His selection of “Are you OK?” caused a slight misunderstanding between the two.

The mechanism of putting preverbal thought into linguistic expressions is a process of privatization of the actual situational context. In fact, this process contradicts Grice’s notion of “what is said”. For how can a truth-conditional semantic meaning be transferred from speaker to hearer without any change? Both processes, the speaker’s utterance production and the hearer’s interpretation, are highly personalized and based on an individual salience that is the result of privatizing collective and actual situational salience. Both speaker’s production and hearer’s inference comprise lexical processes and contextual processes that run parallel and are governed by salience. Speaker’s utterances often undergo corrections showing

2.7

Conclusion

41

speaker’ attempts to adjust to the context en-route. Similar processes occur in comprehension. Utterance interpretation hardly consists of just those two modules, as the Griceans maintain. Inferencing is a trial-and-error process on the part of the hearer who tries to make sense of speaker intention.

2.7

Conclusion

This paper has presented a socio-cognitive approach to pragmatics as an alternative to current pragmatic theories. SCA is based on two assumptions. First, the process of communication is shaped by the interplay of societal and individual factors. In this process interlocutors act as individuals on their own right. Their different prior experiences, their different evaluations of the actual situational context, their dynamically changing intentions and individual degrees of salience result in a personalized process of production and comprehension; as a result, there may be no single point in the recovery process at which speaker’s utterances exactly matches hearer’s implicatures. This is because both speaker’s production and hearer’s interpretation are ‘contaminated’ by individualized pragmatic elements. For this reason, a pragmatic theory should be both speaker- and hearer-centered to be able to explain both production and comprehension. Second, as a consequence of the differences in speaker and hearer processing, the communicative process is rough, rather than smooth. Communication is a trial-anderror process that is co-constructed by the participants. It is an emergent interactional achievement that requires researchers to pay equal attention to both the positive and negative aspects of communication. An idealized description of the communicative process that focuses only on cooperation, politeness, and rapport building can be misleading if it does not also focus on break-downs, misunderstandings, struggles, and linguistic aggression as properties which are in no way unique, but rather represent common features of communication. SCA proposes four traits that function like continuums, connecting individual features with societal features, namely: attention – intention; private experience actual situational experience; egocentrism – cooperation; salience – relevance. All these traits are present in every phase of the communicative process, albeit to different extent. A systematic analysis of their relationships may help us better understand the nature of human communication. The present article is an attempt in that direction.1

First published in “Pragmatics & Society” 2010. Vol. 1. No. 1: 50–73 Thanks to John Benjamins for permission to reuse a part of the text.

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Kecskes, I., & Zhang, F. (2009). Activating, seeking and creating common ground: A sociocognitive approach. Pragmatics & Cognition., 17(2), 331–355. Kecskes, I. (2000). A cognitive-pragmatic approach to situation-bound utterances. Journal of Pragmatics, 32(6), 605–625. Kecskes, I. (2001). The “graded salience hypothesis” in second language acquisition. In S. Niemeier & M. Puetz (Eds.), Applied cognitive linguistics (pp. 249–271). Mouton de Gruyter. Kecskes, I. (2002). Situation-bound utterances in L1 and L2. Mouton de Gruyter. Kecskes, I. (2004a). Lexical merging, conceptual blending and cultural crossing. Intercultural Pragmatics, 1(1), 1–21. Kecskes, I. (2004b). The role of salience in processing pragmatic units. Acta Linguistica Hungarica, 51(3–4), 309–324. Kecskes, I. (2008). Dueling context: A dynamic model of meaning. Journal of Pragmatics, 40(3), 385–406. Kecskes, I., & Mey, J. (2008). Intention, common ground and the egocentric speaker-hear. Mouton de Gruyter. Keysar, B. (2007). Communication and miscommunication: The role of egocentric processes. Intercultural Pragmatics, 4(1), 71–84. Keysar, B., & Bly, B. M. (1995). Intuitions of the transparency of idioms: Can one keep a secret by spilling the beans? Journal of Memory and Language, 34(1), 89–109. Keysar, B., & Henly, A. S. (2002). Speakers’ overestimation of their effectiveness. Psychological Science, 13, 207–212. Koschmann, T., & LeBaron, C. D. (2003). Reconsidering common ground: Examining Clark’s contribution theory in the OR. In K. Kari, E. H. Karsten, G. Fitzpatrick, P. Dourish, & K. Schmidt (Eds.), (pp. 81–98). Kluwer. Leibniz, G. W. (1976 [1679]). Philosophical papers and letters. In Selection translated and edited with an introduction by Leroy E. Loemker (2nd ed.). D. Reidel. Levinson, S. (2006). On the human ‘interaction engine’. In N. Enfield & S. Levinson (Eds.), Roots of human sociality. Culture, cognition and interaction (pp. 39–69). Berg. Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature. MIT Press. Levinson, S. C. (2003). Language and mind: Let’s get the issues straight! In G. Dedre & G.-M. Susan (Eds.), Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and cognition (pp. 25–46). MIT Press. Mey, J. (2001). Pragmatics: An introduction (2nd ed.). Blackwell. Millikan, R. G. (1998). A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More mama, more milk, and more mouse. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9(1), 55–100. Moeschler, J. (2004). Intercultural pragmatics: a cognitive approach. Intercultural Pragmatics, 1(1), 49–70. Rapaport, W. J. (2003). What did you mean by that? Misunderstanding, negotiation, and syntactic semantics. Minds and Machines, 13(3), 397–427. Saul, J. (2002). What is said and psychological reality: Grice’s project and relevance theorists’ criticisms. Linguistics and Philosophy, 25, 347–372. Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press. Searle, J. (2007). What is language? In I. Kecskes & L. Horn (Eds.), Explorations in pragmatics: Linguistic, cognitive and intercultural aspects. Mouton de Gruyter. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance: Communication and cognition. Blackwell. Stalnaker, R. C. (1978). Assertion. Syntax and Semantics, 9, 315–332. Strayer, D. L., & Johnston, W. A. (2001). Driven to distraction: Dual-task studies of simulated driving and conversing on a cellular phone. Psychological Science, 12, 462–466.

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Violi, P. (2000). Prototypicality, typicality and context. In L. Albertazzi (Ed.), Meaning and cognition (pp. 103–123). John Benjamins. Wilson, D., & Sperber, D. (2004). Relevance theory. In L. R. Horn & G. Ward (Eds.), The handbook of pragmatics (pp. 607–632). Blackwell. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1921/1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. C. K. Ogden. : Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Chapter 3

Intercultural Communication and our Understanding of Language

Abstract This paper argues that research in intercultural communication should be taken into account when we want to define what language is, what its nature is like, and how it functions. Standard linguistic and pragmatic theories based on L1 analysis assume that language use depends on there being commonalities, conventions, standards and norms between language users. These conventions of language and conventions of usage create a core common ground on which intention and cooperation-based communication is built. When, however, this core common ground is limited as is the case in intercultural communication interlocutors cannot take them for granted, there is reason to take up the question of how people go about formulating utterances and interpreting them when they have limited access to those conventions and frames, and in a sense, they are expected to create, co-construct them (at least a part of them) in the communicative process. The paper examines three important aspects of this issue: (1) definition of language, (2) changing role of context, and (3) a modified understanding of linguistic creativity. Keywords Narrow language faculty · Broad language faculty · Actual situational context · Linguistic creativity · Prefabricated language

3.1

Introduction

We should start with looking at how language is understood from different linguistic perspectives. There certainly is a basic difference in understanding what language is, and how it functions between formal linguists and applied linguists, mainly scholars whose focus is second language acquisition and use. For formal linguists there exists the assumption that language is a relatively stable though still constantly changing abstraction of signs that has a logical and describable structure with its consistencies and rules. These are the results of commonalities, conventions, norms, standards, common beliefs, shared knowledge and the like that all create a core common ground, a kind of collective salience on which the understanding and use of the system of signs are built one. All this presupposes a relative, long-term homogeneity of the linguistic system that changes both diachronically and synchronically. Most © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_3

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Fig. 3.1 Recent linguistic theory of language

formal linguists agree that what we call “language” is an abstraction that they can describe for different purposes. This abstract language exists, i.e. is substantiated in its varieties and dialects. Communication between users of a language is made easier if there is a relatively standard and describable dialect that most speakers know and use besides having their own dialect that varies depending on several factors such as geography, economic status, register, social relations, etc. Because of this, bi- and tri-dialectalism is quite natural and widespread within speakers of a given language. For instance, Mandarin is the main dialect of Chinese but there are other important dialects such as Yue, Wu, Minbei, etc. Yue (Cantonese) speakers usually speak Mandarin as well because it functions like lingua franca in the country. The broader understanding of language including not only the system of signs, but also socio-cultural factors has been with us for many decades. However, although formal linguists have always acknowledged the this “other”, hardly formalizable part of language, they have always tried to keep that part out of language description arguing that it is “not stringent enough”. Recent linguistic research (e.g. Hauser et al., 2002; Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005) differentiates between aspects of language that are special to language code (‘Narrow Language Faculty’, NLF) and the faculty of language in its entirety, including parts that are shared with other psychological abilities (memory, recognition, etc.) found elsewhere in cognition (‘Broad Language Faculty’, BLF). The lexicon can be considered an interface that ties NLF to the other elements of the BLF. See Fig. 3.1 below: Scholars interested in applied linguistics, second language acquisition, and sociopragmatics have always been focusing on the Broad Language Faculty but still keeping an understanding of language as an abstract phenomenon that can be considered the Narrow Language Faculty. There has usually been a peaceful coexistence between the formal and more social sides although formal linguists have rarely “interfered” in what has been going on the other side. However, since Firth and Wagner (1997) questioned some key dichotomies dominating second language acquisition research in their article, there has been quite a strong tendency in SLA, applied linguistics and partly in socio-pragmatics research to dismantle the concept

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Introduction

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of language (as it is traditionally understood, and described above). This endeavor is based on the Haugenian approach, according to which “the concept of language as a rigid, monolithic structure is false, even if it has proved to be a useful fiction in the development of linguistics. It is the kind of simplification that is necessary at a certain stage of a science, but which can now be replaced by more sophisticated models (Haugen, 1972, p. 325)”. I can respond to this Haugenian approach with a quote from Leibniz (1976/1679): “. . . si nihil per se concipitur, nihil omnino concipietur” meaning if ‘nothing is understood by itself, nothing at all will ever be understood.” Why is this Leibniz quote important? In order for us to do research we need definable categories and abstractions to have a grasp of how the world including language works around us. It is true that what we call “language” is a scientific abstraction, and what we actually have is the instantiation of this abstraction in different dialects and varieties. This does not mean, however, that we do not have to have a “core”, a basic abstraction to which we relate the “concrete” occurrences and substantiations of language. For instance, English as a Lingua Franca is not a language, it is not a normative phenomenon, it is a temporary “community of practice”— a “language use mode” (Istvan 2007, Kecskes, 2019a)— that may develop into a variety if, and only if it is used for a longer period of time in a relatively definable speech community. There is hope for that in the European Union. This basically explains why ELF research appears to be the most intensive and extensive in Europe. Even if we are in a temporary speech community like English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) we do comparatively the same or similar things with language as in a relatively stable language-like speech community. The same human rationality leads us, the same principles of human interaction governs our speech behavior, and we rely on the same unwritten rules of engagement and are under the effect of the framing power of actual situational context. So the real question is not really about what we do with language but about how we do what we do when we are in a relatively stable (language-like) speech community, and when we are, in contrast, in a temporary speech community (intercultural interaction, lingua franca). How much do we rely on the code system and how much do we rely on extralinguistic factors such as situational frame, encyclopedic knowledge, common ground, shared knowledge, etc. Of course, the first question is whether it makes sense to use this dichotomy: relatively stable (language-like) speech community versus temporary speech community. This dichotomy resembles us of what is called intracultural or L1 communication and intercultural communication. I have argued several times that it would be a mistake to handle this difference as a dichotomy. The socio-cognitive approach (SCA) to communication (see Kecskes, 2010, 2014a) treats this relationship as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. The hypothetical left end of the continuum is intracultural communication (L1) and the right end is intercultural communication. Neither exists in pure form. Intracultural (L1) Intercultural

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Movement on the continuum between the two ends, and differences between the two phenomena are affected by different factors such as situational context, L1 of interlocutors, language proficiency, register, etc. The question is to which end a given communicative situation is closer and what characteristics it is dominated by. While moving on toward the right end (intercultural) communication becomes less dependent on standards, norms, frames, core common ground and formulaic language as is the case in L1 communication and is characterized more by emergent common ground, ad hoc generated expressions (rather than prefabricated language), norm creating attempts and individual creativity in solving communication problems. In what we call “intercultural communication” speakers have different L1s, communicate in a common language, and, usually, represent different cultures. But why should intercultural communication be an issue for linguistics? Why should we examine if research in intercultural communication brings in any change, any “fresh air” in how we think about language? We need to do this inquiry because language use has been changing significantly in the last decades. The Broad Language Faculty has become even broader and include a variety of language use that was not with us, say, 30 years ago: multilingual discourse, computer-mediated communication, technology/media supported interaction, just to mention a few. So we cannot avoid revisiting the fundamental assumption in linguistics according to which, as said above, languages are governed by rules and conventions, which basically constitutes them. We have conventions of the linguistic system and conventions of usage. The former is connected with the Narrow Language Faculty while the latter is more like the reflection of Broad Language Faculty. Morgan said the following about this distinction: “In sum, then, I am proposing that there are at least two distinct kinds of convention involved in speech acts: conventions of language . . .and conventions in a culture of usage of language in certain cases. . .The former, conventions of language, are what make up the language, at least in part. The latter, conventions of usage, are a matter of culture (manners, religion, law. . . .). (Morgan, 1978, p. 269).” We are very familiar with the conventions of language system that are basically grammatical rules. Conventions of usage are reoccurring phenomena lexicalized in languages for different purposes. These lexicalized units usually reflect cultural values, manners and way of thinking of people belonging to that speech community. Here are some examples from different languages. (1) Încântat de cunoştinţă Enjoy your meal Have a nice day

Nice to meet you (Romanian) Mànman chī 慢慢吃 (Chinese) Szép napot kivánok (Hungarian)

The crucial difference between the two hypothetical ends of the communication continuum described above lies mainly in usage conventions that are quite systematic within L1 but less systematic toward the intercultural end of the continuum. The question is: how does this relatively systematic usage convention change when the

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Understanding Language

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language (Narrow Language Faculty) is used by nonnative speakers? What rules and conventions govern intercultural interactions when the common language is not the L1 of any of the interlocutors, or when native and nonnative speakers communicate, and how does that relate to our understanding of language? The next parts of this paper try to answer these questions first by discussing what language is, and then examining the role of context in different types of interactions. Finally, the issue of linguistic creativity will be addressed.

3.2

Understanding Language

The definition of language in current linguistic theory was given above. However, a more detailed definition is needed if we want to explain what happens on the intrainter continuum. I defined language as follows: Language is a system of signs operated by a conceptual base that is the reflection of the socio-cultural background in which the system of signs is put to use (Kecskes, 2014a, 2019a). This definition has three important elements: system of linguistic signs, conceptual base of users and situational context. Individuals use the system of signs in different contexts (sociocultural background) to convey meanings that are reflections of their mindset (conceptual base) (Fig. 3.2). The interplay of these three components that making up the Broad Language Faculty is the basis of any language use and development. Conventionalization, development of standards and rules all depend on the interplay of these three components. As a result of the interplay, each human language has preferred ways of saying things and preferred ways of organizing thoughts (Wray, 2002; Istvan 2007; Kecskes, 2014a; Idemaru et al., 2019). As stated above L1 communication is close to the hypothetical end of intracultural communication on the continuum which is dominated by preferred ways of saying things and preferred ways of organizing thoughts within a speech community (see Kecskes, 2008, 2014a). This is not the case in intercultural communication, because the development of “preferred ways” requires time and conventionalization within a speech community. “Preferred ways” are expressed in a well-balanced blend of prefabricated language

Fig. 3.2 Definition of language (Kecskes, 2014a, 2019a)

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with ad hoc generated language in language production. Selecting the right words and expressions in communication is more important than syntax. Americans “shoot a film”, “run a business”, “make love”, “do the dishes” and “put out the fire”. The word selection of nonnative speakers may be (and usually is) different: “make a film”, “have a business”, “do love”, “extinguish the fire”. The TV anchor asks you to “stick around” (stay with the program), and the shop assistant tells you at the end of the transaction that “you’re all set”. Language socialization and socialization through language (see Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986), to a great extent, depends on the acquisition of what is expected to be said in particular situations, and what kind of language behavior is considered appropriate in the given speech community. For instance: (2) If you have no money left you say: I am broke; I cannot afford this If you are angry at your friend you say: Leave me alone; get out of here

Now we should look at the two signs below and explain the difference relying on the interplay of the three constituents of language (system of signs, conceptual base, socio-cultural background). The two signs demonstrate how language works as an L1 and how it works when it is an L2. If we compare the US construction sign and the sign at the Shanghai TV tower below we will see why it is important what conceptual base and socio-cultural background motivate and dominate the use of the language system for communicative purposes. The two signs demonstrate how preferred ways of saying things and organizing thought work in practice. The “Site Safety” sign shows the typical characteristic features of this type of signs in the US: careful selection of words (safety helmet, high visibility jacket, etc.) and the use of passive constructions (parents are advised, entry to this site is strictly forbidden, etc.). All these are reflecting the way American speakers think about these issues. It is how their conceptual base selects the preferred words and preferred grammatical structures to reflect the socio-cultural context in which the linguistic signs are used.

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Understanding Language

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The Chinese sign shows the opposite. It is a sign at the entrance to the Shanghai TV Tower. The sentences on the sign are written in English but they reflect Chinese way of thinking. No native speaker of any native variety of English would say something like “prohibit carrying animals and the articles which disturb common sanitation including unusual smell” or “Prohibit carrying the articles which can destroy or pollute the environment of the Tower”. This is Chinese English at its best. The person who wrote the text has knowledge of the use of the English language system. However, s/he is not familiar with preferred ways of saying things and preferred ways of organizing thoughts in English. Word selection and structural preference are partly dominated by his/her Chinese conceptual system rather than English.

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Fig. 3.3 Use of English. CB conceptual base, SCB socio-cultural background

Figure 3.3 below shows how English as a Native Language (in the middle) relates to English as a Nonnative language (right) and English as a Lingua Franca (left). The figures demonstrate why output through the same system of signs (English) can be so different in English as a Foreign/Second language and in English as a Lingua Franca. While in the former the CB and SCB is relatively the same, in English as a Lingua Franca we have different varieties of English at work.

3.3

Role of Context

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Why are these differences in English language use important for linguistics and our understanding of language? Because all linguistic theories, let them be generative, cognitive or functional rely on the assumption that in language there are conventions, norms, common beliefs, shared knowledge between speakers and hearers. As we said above, these factors create a core common ground, a kind of collective salience on which interaction or any language use is built. However, when this target language-based core common ground appears to be limited as is the case in intercultural communication interlocutors must temporarily build up a shared understanding of actual situational context, socio-cultural frames and a mutual way of understanding of the linguistic signs. So the question is: will the conventions of target language and conventions of usage still hold? My answer is “yes”, but in order to understand how this works we will first discuss the changing role of context in meaning production and comprehension.

3.3

Role of Context

In the Broad Language Faculty we have the system of signs plus everything else that makes that system meaningful. That “everything else” is added through mostly what we call “context”. The majority of scholars are radical contextualists in linguistics, pragmatics, second language acquisition, language education, etc. Contextdependency is one of the most powerful views in current linguistic and philosophical theory which goes back to Frege (1884/1980), Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1921/ 1922) and others. The Context Principle of Frege (1884/1980) asserts that a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence. Wittgenstein (1921/1922) basically formulated the same idea saying that an expression has meaning only in a proposition. I think the overemphasis on context-dependency gives a lopsided perspective to linguistic analysis and our understanding of language. Intercultural communication seems to confirm this claim. It is a crucial issue in any kind of communication that how much context is needed to make the linguistic signs meaningful (e.g. Gil, 2019; Warner, 2019). This is what the semantics-pragmatics interface debate is all about. Current research (e.g. Cieslicka, 2006; House, 2003; Istvan 2007) shows that semantic analyzability and literal meaning are very important factors in intercultural interactions. This is basically what intercultural interlocutors have as their core common ground: the linguistic system itself. Even if someone does not quite understand an expression but that expression is used in its literal sense, usually no misunderstanding occurs. If anybody including nonnative speakers hears the expression “the doctor will see you in a few minutes”, everybody knows that this will not happen: “a few minutes” could be half an hour or more. The function of the expression is to indicate to the patient that his/her presence is acknowledged, and s/he will be taken care of soon. The reason why no misunderstanding occurs is because the utterance is semantically analyzable, and basically what we have is just meaning extension based on the actual situational context and preferred ways of saying things.

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When talking about context researchers and educators usually mean “actual situational context” (see Kecskes, 2008). But dependency on actual situational context is only one side of the matter. This is especially clear in intercultural interactions that teach us to look at the other side of context, i.e. prior context as well. Prior experience of individuals with recurring contexts expressed as content in their utterances also plays an important role in meaning construction and comprehension. We can assume that both the traditional semantic view (literalism) and the novel pragmatic view (contextualism) go wrong when they leave prior context out of the picture. According to the traditional view we must distinguish between the proposition literally expressed by an utterance (‘what is said’ by the utterance, its literal truth conditions) and the implicit meaning of the utterance (‘what is communicated’ by a speaker producing the utterance): the former level is the object of semantics, the latter of pragmatics. Followers of the pragmatic view underline the importance of semantic underdetermination. The encoded meaning of the linguistic expressions used by a speaker underdetermines the proposition explicitly expressed by the utterance. According to Bianchi (2010) this means that every utterance expresses a proposition only when it is completed and enriched with pragmatic constituents that do not correspond to any syntactic element of the sentence (neither an explicit constituent, as in cases of syntactic ellipsis, nor a hidden indexical present at the level of the logical form of the sentence) and yet are part of the semantic interpretation of the utterance. For instance: (3) Bob and Jane are engaged (to each other)1 Some (not all) girls like singing You need to change (clothes)

According to the traditional view truth conditions may be ascribed to a sentence (of an idealized language), independently of any contextual considerations. The opposing pragmatic view says that a sentence has complete truth conditions only in context. The semantic interpretation of utterances, in other words the propositions they express, their truth conditions, is the result of pragmatic processes of expansion and contextual enrichment. The followers of the semantic view may not be right when they think that any linguistic sign can be independent of any contextual considerations. No linguistic sign or expression can be independent of context because they carry context (prior context), they encode the history of their prior use (prior context) in a speech community. The supporters of the pragmatic view may go wrong when they do not emphasize that expansion and contextual enrichment are the results of the individual’s prior experience. Suffice it to say both sides appear to be mistaken to some extent because they talk about context without making a distinction between its two sides: prior context and actual situational context. The proposition literally expressed (sentence meaning) is the result of collective prior experience of speakers in a given speech community. This is expanded and/or

1

What is in brackets is taken for granted. It is not needed to express explicitly.

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Role of Context

55

enriched by prior experience, present situational experience and/or need of a concrete speaker when s/he uses that utterance (speaker’s meaning). The speaker privatizes the collective experience by enhancing/enriching the content with his private experience. Inferred meaning (implicature) is the reflection of the interplay between prior experience of the speaker and prior experience of the hearer in an actual situational context. Prior context as understood in the socio-cognitive paradigm is declarative knowledge while actual situational context represents procedural knowledge (e.g. Bezuidenhout, 2004; Kecskes, 2014a). Lexical conceptual knowledge is the basis for prior context that is encapsulated in the lexical items while procedural knowledge, which is pragmatic, is triggered by the actual situational context. So going back to the sentences in example (3) the socio-cognitive approach says that all of those sentences are complete without the parentheticals, and express a truth conditional, actual situational context-independent, proposition. I want to emphasize actual situational context-independent because what those sentences are not independent of is prior context. Prior context, reoccurring use (without the elements in parenthesis in example 3) makes their meaning clear even without actual situational context. Suffice it to say the speaker can say Bob and Jane are engaged true or false without concern for “to whom”. The speaker can say some girls like singing true or false without concern for whether all do, and can say she needs to change true or false without considering in what way (clothes? diet? priorities? career?) The parentheticals add what that speaker was talking about specifically, an added propositional element based on actual situational context. But that is a new proposition. The one it supplants is still adequate in itself as the expression of a proposition. Therefore, I argue that it is a mistake to claim that no sentence is complete without context. It is more the case that speakers can mean more than the sentence itself means, because actual situational context may supply the rest. But the sentence does say something, completely, and sometimes it is exactly what the speaker means. And this is because of prior experience and reoccurring prior contexts. In sum, context plays both a selective (actual situational context) and a constitutive role (prior context). Actual situational context is viewed through prior context. Meaning in the socio-cognitive approach is the outcome of the interplay of prior and current experience. Prior context Actual situational context

Prior context (prior experience with lexical items, expressions, utterances) is present in salience while actual situational context is present as relevance effect in communication. Prior, reoccurring context may create actual situational context or cancel the selective role of actual situational context. When someone starts the conversation with “let me tell you something” the conversation partner knows that something important, bad or not so pleasant is coming. The collective salience effect of the expression “it’s not my cup of tea” is so strong that its literal equivalent is less salient, at least in L1. But most of the time the opposite is true. Collective salience is usually tied to semantics rather than actual pragmatic meaning.

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What we see today is that semantics (which basically represents prior context) is gaining space over pragmatics, not only in intercultural interactions but also in L1 communication. More attention is paid to semantic content (collective salience) than actual pragmatic meaning. The result is that political correctness prevails in presentday life. It does not matter what expression or utterance is used in what actual situational context. What really matters is the traditional (prior context-based) interpretation of linguistic units. We cannot see signs “men at work” at construction sites any longer. Those signs have given place to “crew at work”, which is considered not sexist. We cannot say any more “limited English proficiency students” because the traditional (prior context) meaning of “limited” may hurt students. We are expected to talk about “English as a New Language” rather than “English as a Second Language” because “new” is neutral but “second” is not. Language users do not wait for language to follow social changes. They rush the process and select those lexical items and expressions that best suit their present way of thinking. With their picks they create context rather than expect the actual situational context to specify the meaning of lexical units and utterances. This may certainly be a challenge for both linguists and pragmaticians when analyzing and theorizing about present-day language use. The interplay of the two sides of context leads us to another important issue where we can rely on research in intercultural communication: creativity in language processing.

3.4 3.4.1

Creativity in Language Processing The Idiom Principle and Economy Principle

Sinclair (1991) argued that language production alternates between word-for-word combinations and preconstructed multi-word combinations. He made a difference between idiom principle and open choice principle. The idiom principle claims that language users have available a large number of memorized semi-preconstructed phrases that constitute single choices, even though they might appear to be analyzable into segments. The open choice principle refers to the opposite: freely generated utterances using word-for-word combinations. According to psychologists and linguists the default processing strategy is the formulaic option which is expected to be most salient in language production (Sinclair, 1991; Wray, 2002; Miller & Weinert, 1998). The idiom principle is tied to the economy principle according to which human beings want to achieve as much as possible with the least possible effort both in production and comprehension. (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). There is psycholinguistic evidence that fixed expressions and formulas have an important economizing role in speech production (cf. Miller & Weinert, 1998; Wray, 2002). Sinclair’s idiom principle says that the use of prefabricated chunks may illustrate a natural tendency to economy of effort (Sinclair, 1991:110). It is a well-known fact that salient meanings of formulaic expressions are easily accessible in production and

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Creativity in Language Processing

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processing in L1 (e.g. Giora, 2003; Istvan 2007, Kecskes, 2014a; Wray, 2002). The question is how this alternation of prefabricated and freely generated units affects language production and comprehension, i.e. creative use of language on the intrainter continuum.

3.4.2

An Alternative Way of Looking at Linguistic Creativity

Linguistic creativity is a part of general human creativity which is always in some sense a response to a regulating order. Creativity and variation are impossible without reference to “existing patterns”. The sociologist Csikszentmihalyi (1999) talked about this issue as follows:” ‘New’ is meaningful only in reference to the ‘old’. Without rules there cannot be exceptions, and without tradition there cannot be novelty (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999:314–315).” This is true for human languages as well. Chomsky (1965) interpreted creativity as an inherent feature of normal language use rooted in the specific ability of the human mind to produce an infinite number of novel sentences appropriate to a particular context guided but not determined by internal state and external conditions. Basically, he talked about the open-choice principle without even mentioning the idiom principle. That is why generativists have successfully ignored formulaic language use for decades. With corpus linguistics, cognitive linguistics and intercultural pragmatics being engaged in researching prefabricated language and actual language use we would be shortsighted if we continued focusing on the ad hoc generated side of language only. We should explain how formulaic language fits into our understanding of language. Examining large corpora linguists spoke about the fact that “language users are adept at shifting in and out of the analytic mode and move between the systems quite naturally” (Skehan, 1998:54). The two types of processing (analytic – holistic) could be viewed as forming a continuum (cf. Skehan, 1998; Wray, 2002; Carter, 2004). From the perspective of the language user we can say that formulaic expressions emerge as ‘islands’ of temporary stability in the course of interaction and show varying degrees of variation and possibilities for further evolution in tune with the dynamics of discourse. All this calls for a change in our understanding of linguistic creativity. Without excluding the combinatorial element we can define linguistic creativity as follows: Linguistic creativity refers to the ability of combining prefabricated units with novel items (ad hoc generated items) in a syntax-and discourse-affecting way to express communicative intention and goals, and create new meaning (Kecskes, 2014a, 2016). In this approach the proper use of formulaic language is one of the conditions for linguistic creativity which is a discourse level rather than just a sentence level phenomenon. The following humorous exchange demonstrates this point well.

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(3) Sitcom: “Two and a half man”. Evelyn, Charlie’s mother is speaking to his new girlfriend. Lidia: - Hi, Evelyn. Nice to meet you. Charlie has talked so much about you. Evelyn: - So Lidia, tell me what do you do? I mean besides doing my son. . .. . . In this short exchange there are several prefabricated units such as “nice to meet you”, what do you do?”. And the word “do” is used both in its literal and figurative sense.

Linguistic creativity relies on existing knowledge and the actual situational need and intention of the speaker. It is a graded phenomenon ranging from the more conventional and predictable to the less conventional and unpredictable. CONVENTIONAL-PREDICTABLE UNCONVENTIONAL-UNPREDICTABLE

In any language production and comprehension interlocutors constantly move on this continuum. To which hypothetical edge they are closer always depends on several factors such as the relative coherence of speech community (short term/ long term), actual situational contexts, background of interlocutors, use of L1 or L2, common ground, topic, etc. The important thing is that both the idiom principle and open choice principle are present in any language production and comprehension (see Kecskes, 2015). The only question is to what extent these principles are present, which basically depends on the variables, some of which were listed above. When we talk about first languages their users are most of the time closer to the CONVENTIONAL-PREDICTABLE end of the continuum. Lingua franca speakers are usually closer to the other end. But any concrete language production keeps moving up and down on the continuum.

3.4.3

Deliberate Creativity

According to traditional, monolingual linguistics formulaic language is the result of a diachronic process in which reoccurring language use patterns are conventionalized and become prefabricated units. However, the analysis of intercultural interactions demonstrates that formulaicity is tied not only to diachronic processes but also synchronic ones. This means that formulas can be created ad hoc even in a temporary speech community, and the idiom principle is present all the time in any language production. However, at this point we must explain a seemingly contradictory phenomenon: While in L1 the use of formulaic language is rather high (28–40% see references below), in L2 use it is usually under 10%. How can we prove then that the idiom principle is present in any kind of language production? Examining English as an L1 use Fillmore found that “an enormously large amount of natural language is formulaic, automatic and rehearsed, rather than propositional, creative or freely generated (Fillmore, 1976, p. 24).” Altenberg (1998), a computational linguist claimed that “80% of our language production can be considered formulaic.” Of course, this sounds like a bit of an exaggeration but there is no doubt about the fact that in L1 there is much more reliance on

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prefabricated language than in L2 or English as a Lingua Franca where even advanced L2 users have difficulty with formulaic language use (e.g. Ellis et al., 2008; Prodromou, 2008; Warga, 2005). The use of formulaic expressions is much higher in L1 (Biber et al. (1999) 28%; Howarth (1998) 40%) than in L2 (under 10%: Edmondson & House, 1991; Istvan 2007). So is this natural preference for formulaic language in L1 is something that is missing in L2 and ELF use? Why is it that we have a low rate of formulaic language in intercultural interactions? We have to be careful and not to draw abrupt conclusion from what we find in studies on L2 use and ELF use. It is one thing that we do not find as many formulaic expressions in L2 and ELF use as in L1, and it is another if the idiom principle is on or not in L2 and ELF use as well. The real question should be whether the idiom principle works the same way in L2 and ELF as it does in L1. Based on the results of a couple of studies I argued that the idiom principle is on, no matter what language production we talk about, but the output is different in L1, L2 and ELF (see Kecskes, 2015, 2016). In L2 and ELF language users produce less target language formulas for two main reasons: (a) The development of psychological saliency of formulaic expressions is a matter of not only frequency and exposure to language but also immersion in the culture, and the preference and wish of the nonnative speaker whether s/he wants to use those formulaic expressions or not (see Ortactepe, 2012; Kecskes, 2014a, 2014b). Frequent encounters with these expressions for nonnative speakers help but are not enough to develop psychological saliency. (b) It is not so easy for L2 speakers to remember a whole formulaic sequence especially if it consists of more than two words since those expressions do not operate as functional units for them like it happens in the L1. They usually do not know how flexible formulas are linguistically, i.e., what structural changes they allow without losing their original function and/or meaning. Linguistic form is a semantic scaffold; if it is defective, the meaning will inevitably fall apart as in the examples below: (4) Are you pulling my leg? (idiom) -------- Are you pulling my legs? (freely generated expression) Piece of cake (idiom) --------- A piece of cake (freely generated expression)

As a consequence of these two facts L2 and ELF speakers use much less formulas of the target language than L1 speakers. But the idiom principle is still present, and this results in the production of synchronic, ad hoc formulas that do not exist in the target language but help smooth communication in a temporary speech community. This kind of deliberate creativity works like a compensation for limited access to prefabricated units in the target language (see Kecskes, 2016, 2019a). The idiom principle is on because interlocutors create their own formulas, but these formulas do not develop over time as is the case in L1. They are the results of deliberate creativity in three different ways:

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A) by analogy “Let sleeping dogs lie” ----------------! “we should not wake up any dogs” The language user does not remember the idiomatic expression, so s/he creates one with similar metaphoric meaning. B) Changing one or two elements of a target language formula “draw the limits” (cf. ‘draw the line’), “preserve their face” (cf. ‘save [sb’s] face’), “turn a blank eye” (cf. ‘turn a blind eye’), “keep in the head” (cf. ‘bear/ keep [sb/sth] in mind’), C) L2 speakers generate new formulas that are the results of cooperation and co-construction. The more time members of a speech community spend together the more norms of conduct they develop for themselves. (5) Examples from Istvan’s studies (2007 and Kecskes, 2015): “it is almost skips from my thoughts” “you are not very rich in communication” “take a school” “we connect each other very often” “native American” (in the sense of native speaker of American English) The use of target language formulas coined by interlocutors in their temporary speech community was considered like a “joint venture” and created a special feeling of camaraderie in the group.

3.5

Conclusion

It was argued that analysis of intercultural communication should change the way we think about language. With globalization the traditional view of language based on shared common ground, conventions, norms, common beliefs and cultural frames within relatively homogenous speech communities cannot be maintained any more. We need to adjust our understanding of language and accept that the forces (conventions of language system and conventions of usage) that keep a language together are loosen up and are more flexible and rapidly changing. There are two factors in which this change is especially visible: role of context and the alternative use of ad hoc and prefabricated units of language in oral and written production. Intercultural communication where semantic analyzability prevails in meaning construction and comprehension directs our attention to the changing role of context and the reinterpretation of the semantics-pragmatics interface (see Kecskes, 2019b). Context has both selective (actual situational context) and constitutive role (prior context). Meaning is the outcome of the interplay of prior and current experience (context). However, both linguists and pragmaticians have been giving much more attention and power to actual situational context than it deserves. They have overemphasized the selective role of context. But present climate is changing because actual language use shows a significant strengthening of the importance of semantics over pragmatics in any kind of language use. We cannot, of course, say

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that this is a good tendency. But it certainly calls for the reinterpretation of the semantics-pragmatics interface that has been a leading topic of pragmatic debates for decades (e.g. Bach, 2004; Macagno & Capone, 2016; Kecskes, 2019b) and will be in decades to come. In intercultural communication there is less reliance on the socio-cultural frames and prefabricated units of the target language because interlocutors have limited access to those factors. So they function as core common ground creators rather than just common ground seekers and activators as is usually the case in L1. They need to pay more attention to what language they use and how they use it. There is more reliance on language created ad hoc by individuals in the course of interaction than on prefabricated language and pre-existing frames of the target language. So it is the individual speaker with his/her creative language use that comes to the forth rather than the linguistic and socio-cultural frames that guide production and comprehension in the target language. This leads to a need for change in how we understand linguistic creativity. We cannot ignore formulaic language any more as has been the case in generative linguistics. It should be included in the definition of linguistic creativity which refers to the ability of combining prefabricated units with novel items (ad hoc generated items) in a syntax-and discourse-affecting way to express communicative intention and goals and create new meaning. Linguistic creativity relies on existing knowledge and the actual situational need and intention of the speaker. It is a graded phenomenon ranging from the more conventional and predictable to the less conventional and unpredictable. Language users move on the continuum in any concrete situation. The process of blending ad hoc generated items with prefabricated units should be in the center of linguistic research. Acknowledgement The paper was first published in 2021 in LANGAGES. 222. Pp. 25-42. Thanks to the publisher Armand Colin for permission to reuse a significant part of the text.

References Altenberg, B. (1998). On the phraseology of spoken English: The evidence of recurrent wordcombinations. In A. P. Cowie (Ed.), Phraseology: Theory, analysis, and applications (pp. 101–122). Clarendon Press. Bach, K. (2004). Minding the gap. In C. Bianchi (Ed.), The semantics/pragmatics distinction. CSLI Publications. Bezuidenhout, A. (2004). Procedural meaning and the semantics/pragmatics interface. In B. Claudia (Ed.), The semantics - pragmatics distinction (pp. 101–131). CSLI Publications. Bianchi, C. (2010). Contextualism. In Jan-Ola Östman and Jef Verschueren. Handbook of pragmatics. John Benjamins. Biber, D., Johansson, S., Leech, G., & CONRAD, S., & FINEGAN, E. (1999). Longman grammar of spoken and written English. Pearson Education. Carter, R. (2004). Language and creativity. The art of common talk. Routledge. Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. MIT Press.

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Cieslicka, A. (2006). Literal salience in on-line processing of idiomatic expressions by second language learners. Second Language Research, 22(2), 115–144. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1999). Implications of a systems perspective for the study of creativity. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of creativity (pp. 313–335). Cambridge University Press. Edmondson, W., & House, J. (1991). Do learners talk too much? The waffle phenomenon in interlanguage pragmatics. In R. Phillipson, E. Kellerman, L. Selinker, M. S. Smith, & M. Swain (Eds.), Foreign/second language pedagogy research: A commemorative volume for Claus Farch. Multilingual Matters. Pp.273–287. Ellis, N. C., Simpson-Vlach, R., & Carson, M. (2008). Formulaic language in native and second language speakers: Psycholinguistics, corpus linguistics, and TESOL. TESOL Quarterly, 42, 375–396. Fillmore, C. J. (1976). The need for a frame semantics within linguistics. Statistical Methods in Linguistics, 12, 5–29. Firth, A., & Wagner, J. (1997). On discourse, communication and (some) fundamental concepts in SLA research. The Modern Language Journal, 81, 285–300. Frege, G. (1884/1980). The foundations of arithmetic. (Austin John, L. Trans.) (2nd Rev. ed.). Northwestern University Press. Gil, J. M. (2019). A relational account of communication on the basis of slips of the tongue. Intercultural Pragmatics, 16(2), 53–185. Giora, R. (2003). On our mind: Salience, context and figurative language. University Press. Haugen, E. (1972). The ecology of language. In A. S. Dil (Ed.), The ecology of language: Essays by Einar Haugen. Stanford University Press. Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. T. (2002). The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science, 298, 1569–1579. House, J. (2003). Misunderstanding in intercultural university encounters. In J. House, G. Kasper, & S. Ross (Eds.), Misunderstanding in social life: Discourse approaches to problematic talk (pp. 22–56). Longman. Howarth, P. (1998). Phraseology and second language proficiency. Applied Linguistics, 19, 24–44. Idemaru, K., Winter, B., & Brown, L. (2019). Cross-cultural multimodal politeness: The phonetics of Japanese deferential speech in comparison to Korean. Intercultural Pragmatics, 16(5), 517–557. Istvan, K. (2007). Formulaic language in English lingua franca. In K. Istvan & L. R. Horn (Eds.), Explorations in pragmatics: Linguistic, cognitive and intercultural aspects (pp. 191–219). Mouton de Gruyter. Kecskes, I. (2008). Dueling context: A dynamic model of meaning. Journal of Pragmatics, 40(3), 385–406. Kecskes, I. (2010). The paradox of communication: A socio-cognitive approach. Pragmatics and Society, 1(1), 50–73. Kecskes, I. (2014a). Intercultural Pragmatics. Oxford University Press. Kecskes, I. (2014b). A response to the paper “metaphor interpretation and motivation in relevance theory”. Journal of Pragmatics, 60(1), 274–279. Kecskes, I. (2015). “Is the idiom principle blocked in bilingual L2 production?” chapter 2. In R. Heredia & A. Cieslicka (Eds.), Bilingual figurative language processing (pp. 28–53). Cambridge University Press. Kecskes, I. (2016). Deliberate creativity and formulaic language use. In K. Allan, A. Capone, & I. Kecskes (Eds.), Pragmemes and theories of language use, perspectives in pragmatics, philosophy & psychology 9 (pp. 3–20). Springer. Kecskes, I. (2019a). English as a lingua Franca: The pragmatic perspective. Cambridge University Press. Kecskes, I. (2019b). Impoverished pragmatics? The semantics-pragmatics interface from an intercultural perspective. Intercultural Pragmatics, 16(5), 489–517. Leibniz, G. W. (1976/1679). Philosophical papers and letters. A selection translated and edited, with an introduction by Leroy E. In Loemker (2nd ed.). D. Reidel.

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Macagno, F., & Capone, A. (2016). Uncommon ground. Intercultural Pragmatics, 13(2), 151–180. Miller, J., & Weinert, R. (1998). Spontaneous spoken language: Syntax and discourse. Clarendon Press. Morgan, J. L. (1978). Two types of convention in indirect speech acts. In C. Peter (Ed.), Pragmatics (syntax and semantics 9) (pp. 261–280). Academic. Ortactepe, D. (2012). The development of conceptual socialization in international students: A language socialization perspective on conceptual fluency and social identity (advances in pragmatics and discourse analysis). Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Pinker, S., & Jackendoff, R. (2005). The faculty of language: What’s so special about it? Cognition, 95, 201–236. Prodromou, L. (2008). English as a lingua franca: A corpus based analysis. Continuum. Schieffelin, B. B., & Ochs, E. (Eds.). (1986). Language socialization across cultures. Cambridge University Press. Sinclair, J. (1991). Corpus, concordance, collocation. Oxford University Press. Skehan, P. (1998). A cognitive approach to language learning. Oxford University Press. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance: Communication and cognition (2nd ed.). Blackwell. Warga, M. (2005). ‘Je serais très merciable’: Formulaic vs. creatively produced speech in learners' request closings. Canadian Journal of Applied Linguistics, 8, 67–94. Warner, R. (2019). Meaning, reasoning, and common knowledge. Intercultural Pragmatics, 16(3), 289–305. Wittgenstein, L. 1921/1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (Ogden Charles, K., Trans.). : Routledge and Kegan Paul. Wray, A. (2002). Formulaic language and the lexicon. Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 4

Impoverished Pragmatics? The Semantics-Pragmatics Interface from an Intercultural Perspective

Abstract The semantic-pragmatic interface debate is about how much actual situational context the linguistic signs need in order for them to be meaningful in the communicative process. There is evidence (e.g. House. Misunderstanding in social Life: Discourse approaches to problematic talk. Longman, 2003; Kecskes. Explorations in pragmatics: Linguistic, cognitive and intercultural aspects. Mouton de Gruyter, 2007; Trbojevic. Journal of Pragmatics. 151:118–127, 2019; Gabbatore et al., Intercultural Pragmatics, 16(1):27–57, 2019) that interlocutors in intercultural interactions rely more on the compositional meaning of linguistic signs (semantics) than contextually supported meaning (pragmatics) because actual situational context cannot help pragmatic implication and interpretation the way it does in L1 communication. At the same time in pragmatic theory there seems to be an agreement between the neo-Gricean account (Chierchia, 2013; Horn. The Handbook of Pragmatics) and the post-Gricean account on the fact that the process of implicature retrieval is context-dependent. But will this L1-based contextualism work in intercultural interactions? Is pragmatics impoverished if interlocutors can only partly rely on pragmatic enrichment coming from context and the target language? The paper argues that in fact pragmatics is invigorated rather than impoverished in intercultural communication. A new type of synchronic events-based pragmatics is co-constructed by interlocutors. Instead of relying on the existing conventions, norms and frames of the target language interlocutors create their own temporary frames, formulas and norms. There is pragmaticization of semantics which is a synchronic, (usually) one-off phenomenon in which coded meaning, sometimes without any specific pragmatic enrichment coming from the target language, obtains temporary pragmatic status. This pragmatic enrichment happens as a result of interlocutors’ blending their dictionary knowledge of the linguistic code (semantics) with their basic interpersonal communicative skills and sometimes unusual, not necessarily target language-based pragmatic strategies that suit them very well in their attempt to achieve their communicative goals. Keywords Impoverished pragmatics · Pragmatic enrichment · Intercultural interactions · Actual situational context · Co-construction · Conventions

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_4

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4.1

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Impoverished Pragmatics? The Semantics-Pragmatics Interface from. . .

Introduction

A historical view on the semantics-pragmatics interface debate shows that in the beginning, there was recognition of the code alone. Then, Grice taught us that the linguistic code is routinely accompanied by pragmatic inference. Maximalists, such as Relevance theoreticians, tipped the balance in favor of inference over code, and previous research on intercultural communication (IC) “reasonably” assumed that in the absence of a full command of a common code and with limited core common ground lingua franca users would rely on pragmatics of the target language even more heavily. So everything has pointed to the mighty power of context both in L1 pragmatics and intercultural communication. But the thesis offered in this paper changes the balance of power described above between semantics and pragmatics, at least for intercultural interactions and shows an opposite tendency. We must be careful with the L1-based contextualism because it is based on assumed core common ground, common beliefs and collective salience that speakers of a speech community share. They understand linguistic signs similarly based on existing cultural frames, norms, and usage conventions they live with. No native speaker of American English will misunderstand the meaning of “tell me about it” in the following example: (1) John: - Sally is driving me crazy with her silly questions. Bob: - Tell me about it.

However, we cannot be sure that in a lingua franca situation each interlocutor with a different L1 background will be familiar with the right interpretation of the expression which is “do not tell me about it because I have had the same experience, I feel the same way”. So in order for the broad non-linguistic context to be supportive in interpretation the interlocutors need common ground and a kind of collective salience that leads them to a relatively similar interpretation of actual contextual factors. The question is whether interlocutors in intercultural interactions have all that to a similar extent as L1 speakers do. Interestingly enough one of the most significant criticisms against contextualism comes from semanticists (and not intercultural pragmatists!) like Cappelen and Lepore (2005), p. x) who have nothing to do with intercultural communication. They gave a strong argument against contextualism that could have been formulated even by an intercultural pragmaticist: “The common thread that runs throughout our criticism of contextualism is that it fails to account for how we communicate across contexts. People with different background beliefs, goals, audiences, perceptual inputs, etc. can understand each other. They can agree or disagree. They can say, assert, claim, state, investigate, or make fun of the very same claim. No theory of communication is adequate unless it explains how this is possible. Contextualists cannot provide such an explanation.” That is absolutely true. But if that is so true then the linguistic signs must have some strongly encoded meaning that is relatively

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the same for most speakers of a language with different background beliefs, goals, let them be native or nonnative speakers (e.g. Warner 2019). I argued that the difference between L1 communication and intercultural communication can be demonstrated on a continuum with two hypothetical ends (Kecskes, 2015, 2018). There is nothing like “pure” intracultural communication (L1) or intercultural communication. Every kind of communication is in-between the two hypothetical ends. Commonalities, conventions, common beliefs, shared knowledge and the like all create a core common ground, a kind of collective salience on which L1 communication is based on. We simply have less of those in intercultural interactions that take place in temporary speech communities. However, the more time people spend together the more they create norms, conventions, commonalities to make their communication smoother and economize the speech process. As a result the linguistic signs come to have something that can be called presumptive meaning (see Levinson, 2000). This is a sub-category of meaning that is neither semantic nor pragmatic. These are presumed, default interpretations, arrived at by virtue of the repeated scenarios from the past, knowledge of language and the world, and other salient information, processed with the aid of some general principles of human reasoning. This meaning is neither exactly what we have in the dictionary nor what we have in a contextualized utterance. Presumptive meaning is about utterance-type meaning (abstracted), not the utterance-token meaning (substantiated in context) that is usually the focus of pragmatics. But it has direct relevance to intercultural interactions because the utterance-token meaning generated and arrived at in those interactions may not be fully compatible with what the common language – based (English) contextual understanding projects. This is mainly because presumptive meaning may be attached to different conceptual contents for different English language users. A typical example can be the use of “patronize” in the following interaction (Example 2): (2) Korean: - Jill, do you want me to help you with your essay? American: - Don’t patronize me, please. Korean: - You say, you don’t want support? American: - Please just don’t..... Okay? Korean: - Tell me please what I did wrong.

The misunderstanding comes from the differences in presumptive meaning. In Korean the closest lexical equivalent to “patronize” is “huwonhada” that conceptually always refers to something positive. However, in English the conceptual load is different depending on the collocating phrase expressed by the direct object. If one patronizes an institution, a restaurant, or a university that has a positive connotation. However, if the direct object refers to human beings the sense of the expression is usually negative. The example may explain why interlocutors in intercultural interactions attempt to stick to words and expressions whose literal meaning is based on universal encyclopedic knowledge rather than conceptually culture – specific knowledge.

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4 Impoverished Pragmatics? The Semantics-Pragmatics Interface from. . .

This is one of the main reasons why semantics somehow overshadows pragmatics dictated by the common language in intercultural communication. In intercultural interactions there is more reliance on the common code than on the broad language faculty provided by context as interpreted in the target language (English). But again, this does not necessarily mean that pragmatics is impoverished. It rather means that since interlocutors can only partly rely on English pragmatics they need to co-construct a new type of pragmatics that is prompted by the actual situational need and relies on the blend of following factors: basic interactional skills, pragmatics knowledge of the common language, pragmatic knowledge of the L1 and ad hoc created pragmatic knowledge and strategies. In intercultural interactions speakers can hardly put vague expressions or utterances out there and expect the actual situational context to specify their meaning as it usually happens in L1. Interlocutors in intercultural encounters should be quite specific as far as semantics is concerned because that is what they share with their partners. Pragmatic enrichment based on the target language and contextual mechanisms can hardly help the production and interpretation process in this type of interactions, rather they may even lead to misunderstandings. So this seemingly leads us again to a phenomenon that I called “impoverished” pragmatics. Let me try to explain what is going on here. It is relative constancy, which is the result of conventionalization and normativization, what keeps language together, and what makes it meaningful. Of course, this relative constancy refers not only to the denotational meaning and function of linguistic signs but also the way they are used by interlocutors. Language users frequently make critical efforts to find, create, shape and keep up constancy within language use even where only little of that exists like in temporary intercultural interactions. They generate new formulas and metaphors that do not exist in the target language, they co-construct emergent common ground, and they work out common strategies that help them make the communicative process meaningful. But what their safest bet is for relative constancy in their language use, is the linguistic code itself that all interlocutors share (at different proficiency level) and use for communication. The linguistic code gives them more constancy than anything else including conceptual knowledge and/or encyclopedic knowledge. If in intercultural interactions interlocutors rely on what is encoded in the linguistic signs rather than on language specific conceptual knowledge and/or encyclopedic knowledge (cf. House, 2003; Kecskes, 2007, 2015; Philip, 2005) they can usually have less bumps in their communication because literal meanings are usually quiet similar for any language users no matter what variety of English they represent. If we accept that semantics defines sentence meaning while pragmatics governs utterance meaning, can we then claim that these findings go against what we know about the semantics-pragmatics interface based on L1 research? In other words, does it mean that interlocutors in intercultural interactions rely more on semantics than on pragmatics in their language use? If so, what does intercultural communication reveal about the semantics-pragmatics interface? These and some similar questions will be in the focus of this paper. We shall start with the review of the issues concerning the semantics – pragmatics distinction in L1 research.

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The Relationship of Semantics and Pragmatics

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The Relationship of Semantics and Pragmatics Semantic Underdeterminacy

Semantics and pragmatics as separate fields of inquiry are both about meaning so they have both developed sophisticated methods of analysis of meaning. As a consequence their separation into different disciplines has caused a lot of discussions and debates in linguistics, language philosophy as well as theoretical pragmatics. But this is the first time, at least to my knowledge, that the issue is raised in relation to intercultural communication. The need for revisiting this issue is warranted by the nature of intercultural communication where, as argued above there seems to be a dominance of semantics rather than pragmatics. The Gricean modular view divides the interpretation process into two stages: what is said and what is implicated. It is, however, overlooked that the division between what is said and what is implicated was made for the sake of utterance interpretation, and for the sake of distinguishing the semantic meaning from the pragmatic meaning of an utterance. Traditionally, semantics has been responsible for compositionally construed sentence meaning, in which the meanings of lexical items and the structures in which they occur are combined. Pragmatics has been regarded as a study of utterance meaning, and hence meaning in context, and is therefore an enterprise with a different object of study. However, the boundary between them has never been clear, especially after the so-called semantic underdeterminacy view was introduced (see Bach, 2004; Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2005). Semantic underdeterminacy describes the linguistic semantics of the utterance, that is, the meaning encoded in the linguistic expressions used. Semantics refers to the relatively stable meanings of lexical units in a linguistic system, meanings which are widely shared across a speech community using that particular linguistic system, no matter whether they are native speakers or nonnative speakers of that language. These meanings are encapsulated in lexical items as a result of their reoccurring use. They underdetermine the proposition expressed (what is said) and need contextual support to recover the actual sense to which they refer to. So the hearer has to undertake processes of pragmatic inference in order to work out not only what the speaker is implicating but also what proposition she is directly expressing (see Carston, 2002). Here, when starting discussing underdeterminacy of sentence meaning as well as speaker implication and utterance interpretation, without any detailed explanation, we need to introduce two terms that will be important for us in this paper. Saul (2002) made a distinction between ‘utterer-implicature’ and ‘audience-implicature’. Utterer-implicatures are claims that the speaker attempts to conversationally implicate (intended by the speaker, but not necessarily recognized by the addressee). Audience-implicatures are claims that the audience takes to be conversationally implicated (recognized by the addressee but not necessarily intended by the speaker). This distinction will help us understand the behavior of both L1 and intercultural speaker-hearers.

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Now let us illustrate what underdeterminacy means through a couple of examples: (3) A. John should know better (better than what or whom?) B. Mary is too old (for what?) C. The girls left early (left what? left for?)

As you can see, these are full sentential utterances whose encoded meaning does not seem to determine a fully propositional representation, that is, one which, in principle at least, could be assigned a truth value. As the bracketed questions indicate, these examples require completion by context before they can be judged as true or false of a state of affairs. This completion usually requires encyclopedic knowledge and includes pragmatic enrichment, both given by contextual effects. Also, example (4) reveals semantic underdetermincy when a hearer-implicature is needed to figure out the meaning of speaker-implicature: (4) Andy to Sally: Andy: - Did you enjoy the party at the Browns’ yesterday? Sally: - Well, I got a bit drunk, and forgot to dance with Bill. Andy: - Hope, you still had a good time.

Although it is not explicitly formulated, it is quite clear that Sally implied that she did not have a good time. Andy managed to infer this from the utterance that did not directly and/or literally contain that information. Although the utterance was semantically underdetermined, still Andy seems to have managed to recover what the speaker wanted to say with uttering that sentence. So the utterer-implicature matches the hearer-implication (inference). In intercultural communication, the first type of underdeterminacy does not seem to cause any serious problem. If interlocutors know the literal meaning of those words they can pragmatically enrich the utterances just like native speakers do on the basis of encyclopedic knowledge. However, the second type of underdeterminacy, where a relative match between utterer-implicature and hearer-implicature is required, may raise some serious problems because it requires not only encyclopedic but oftentimes conceptual knowledge tied to the target language. If only encyclopedic knowledge is required to make the match that might not be an issue as we have seen. If, however, conceptual knowledge attached to a frozen metaphor, a situationbound utterance or an idiom (all specific elements of the target language) is required to process the utterer’s implication that may cause mismatch between utterer-implicature and hearer-implicature or misunderstanding, as is the case, in the example (5): (5) Jiang is talking to Monika (German student) about a survey: Jiang: - Monika, do you know what is wrong with this answer? Monika: - I think you missed the boat here. You did not understand the question. (continued)

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Jiang: - What boat are you talking about? There was nothing about a boat in the question.

In this example, Monika used an idiomatic expression (‘miss the boat’) to say that Jiang did not seem to have understood a question in the survey. However, Jiang did not know the expression. She was confused because the literal meaning of ‘boat’ did not fit into the actual situational context. This example reveals that underdeterminacy in cases like this may be a real problem in intercultural interaction because the actual situational context cannot help if the interlocutor does not know the figurative meaning of an expression. But, we have to be careful because there seems to be a contradiction here between what I said at the beginning of the paper and what semantic underdeterminacy means. I claimed that semantic analyzability plays a central role in intercultural communication, for what interlocutors share mostly is the linguistic code, the relatively stable dictionary meaning of lexical items. However, semantic underdeterminacy in L1 means that the encoded meaning is vague, and is in need of contextual support and/or pragmatic enrichment. How can interlocutors in intercultural interactions rely on semantically vague expressions? Are those expressions really semantically vague for them the way they are for L1 users? To answer these questions we should discuss constancy and conventions.

4.2.2

Constancy and Conventions

Let us quote Morris (1938, p. 6) who was quite straightforward about the semanticspragmatics divide: “One may study the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable. [. . .] [T]he study of this dimension will be called semantics. Or the subject of study may be the relation of signs to interpreters. [. . .] [T]he study of this dimension will be named pragmatics.” This basically means that pragmatics deals with concrete utterance tokens made by speakers in concrete discourse situations that are located in time and space, while semantics abstracts away from those concrete contextual factors and studies the decontextualized expression types that underlie those utterances (see Gutzmann, 2014 for more discussion). From this perspective, the relation between semantics and pragmatics parallels (to some extent) the broader distinction between Chomsky’s competence and performance or Saussure’s langue and parole. Additionally, Carnap was even more specific about the relationship of the two by saying: “If in an investigation explicit reference is made to the speaker, or, to put it in more general terms, to the user of a language, then we assign it to the field of pragmatics. [. . .] If we abstract from the user of the language and analyze only the expressions and their designata, we are in the field of semantics (Carnap, 1942, p. 9).” This approach clearly handles semantics as an abstraction of pragmatics because it is said to abstract away from the specific aspects of concrete discourse situations in which utterances are used. So what we have so far is that, semantics deals with abstract sentences while pragmatics studies ‘real utterances’. This makes sense, however, this is not what happens in linguistics/

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theoretical pragmatics where nobody is interested in ‘real utterances’ although they all say they are. Researchers rely on introspective data and data resulting from thought experiments, and create their own utterances to make their points when studying logical structures and relations instead of ‘real utterances’. So they do pragmatics with semantic units. It is also crucial to note that contexts given to those examples are hypothetical and not real. Recently several researchers have questioned the reliability of data heavily dependent on the linguist’s own linguistic intuition in L1 (e.g. Dąbrowska, 2010; Kecskes, 2015; Kertész & Rákosi, 2012). But intercultural communication is about real utterances, and research in that paradigm focuses on real utterances in the Carnapian sense. So we will need to look at the semantics-pragmatics division from two perspectives: First, we need to relate the theoretical pragmatics perspective to real utterances produced in intercultural interactions and try to explain with their help what exactly happens in those encounters. Second, we need to investigate if what we learn from the analysis of intercultural interactions can help us add some new knowledge to the discussion about the semantics-pragmatics interface. In order to execute our plan we should further discuss the differences between semantics and pragmatics. As it has been overtly argued, we can all agree that semantics studies the literal meaning of an expression, and the subject of pragmatics is what and how speakers communicate by using that expression. In other words, semantics is more tied to the conventional aspects and relative constancy of linguistic meaning as encoded in the lexicon, while pragmatics deals with the conversational aspects of speaker meaning in concrete discourse contexts. The difference between conventional and conversational meaning is demonstrated clearly in the use of the underlined expression in example (6). (6) Sam is talking to his friend Archie. Sam: - Archie, I took your girlfriend to the movies yesterday. Archie: - Oh, what a good guy you are! Sam: - I am sorry if you think I did something wrong.

What we have here is that Archie’s response can be interpreted in two different ways. First, if we take “Oh, what a good guy you are!” literally, it means that Archie is actually obliged to his friend that he was kind enough to take his girlfriend to the movies either because he did not have time to go, or because he just wanted to get rid of her. Second, we can interpret Archie’s utterance as ironic meaning that he is actually very unhappy with Sam’s action. Here the utterance means the opposite of what it says. Both interpretations are possible, however, encyclopedic knowledge— knowledge of the world—as well as Sam’s response suggests the second, nonliteral interpretation is the most probable one even without knowing what Sam’s response is. So if semantics is based on an abstraction of pragmatics, which goes without any aspect of actual situational context, then pragmatics should study those aspects of meaning that are actual situational context dependent. Semantics is restricted to what could be called (relatively) constant, that is, actual situational context-independent

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meaning.1 In example (6) the first reading seems to be independent of the actual situational context in a sense that actual situational context does not help the hearer as expected (as it usually happens in L1). It is that reading that comes to anybody’s mind if no actual situational context is given, say, the sentence is written on a board, and we ask students to interpret it. This is the literal interpretation of the sentence that is based on its compositionality. The second reading can be made possible by the actual situational context. If we bring in salience, the whole thing becomes even more interesting. If we take the actual situational context-free interpretation, the most salient meaning will be the literal meaning of the expression. If we add the actual situational context (see example 6) the most salient interpretation will be the figurative (ironic) one for both native speakers of English and nonnative speakers of English. But why will they not differ? The answer lies in encyclopedic knowledge that is universal in this case. If someone takes his/her friend’s girlfriend to the movies without a prior agreement with the friend, that friend might not be very happy about it. This interpretation is the result of general common sense that is not biased by any language or culture-specific factor. Besides the two criteria, namely conventionality and constancy, there is also the traditional criterion of truth-conditionality which represents the core for the truthconditional semantics in the Fregean tradition. According to this view, semantics concerns those aspects of meaning that are truth-conditional, which means that they are relevant for determining the truth-conditions of a sentence. Truth conditions are conditions under which a sentence is true. For example, ‘Mr. Brown lives in a new house.’ is true precisely when there is a Mr. Brown who has a house which is new. Truth conditions of a sentence do not necessarily reflect current reality. They are merely the conditions under which the statement would be true. Gutzmann (2014) argued that conventionality, constancy, and truth-conditionality go hand-in-hand. If we take them together we can use them as a means to distinguish semantics and pragmatics. According to this approach, semantics concerns the conventional, constant, and truth-conditional content, while pragmatics deals with conversational, context dependent, non-truth-conditional meaning; this is summarized below: Semantics vs. Pragmatics Semantics Conventional Constant (prior context-dependent) Truth-conditional

Pragmatics Conversational Actual situational context-dependent Non-truth-conditional

But there is a problem with this interpretation from our perspective. Pragmatics is also about conventions: the conventions of usage and norms of conversational encounters. Pragmatics of a language represents a repertoire of expected conversational behavior in the culture or sub-cultures that are tied to that language. So we have conventions of language and conventions of usage as Morgan said: “In sum, then, I am proposing that there are at least two distinct kinds of convention involved in speech acts: conventions of language . . .and conventions in a culture of usage of

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language in certain cases. . .The former, conventions of language, are what make up the language, at least in part. The latter, conventions of usage, are a matter of culture (manners, religion, law. . . .).” (Morgan, 1978, p. 269). L1 pragmatics constraints our actual situational behavior to some extent with expectations, prefabricated language and cultural frames that all kick in subconsciously and automatically when we use our L1. Of course, it is another question whether we follow those or not. But they are there and help us make sense of our communicative encounters and the world around us. Well, this is where the problem is for intercultural interactions. This kind of pragmatic repertoire that is taken for granted in L1 is there in IC only in a limited extent and at different levels for interlocutors. In L1 that kind of background knowledge helps us make the right implicatures and detect situational relevance. This is like a frame (cf. Fillmore, 1982; Goffman, 1974) that affects us top-down. So in L1 pragmatics there are conventions and norms that are available to all members of that speech community. Again, it is another issue whether they use that and to what extent. However, in intercultural communication each interlocutor has different access to and familiarity with this pragmatic repertoire, and this difference as we saw in a couple of examples above (2 and 5) can cause misunderstanding. So reliance on this target language pragmatics is relatively limited. Instead interlocutors rely on universal pragmatic features and also co-construct their ‘online’ actual situational pragmatics. In the following section, we shall summarize what we have discussed so far, and then further look into the semantics-pragmatics interface based on what we have learned about intercultural communication.

4.3 4.3.1

Semantics Growing into Pragmatics in Intercultural Interactions Diachronic and Synchronic Pragmatics

While reviewing issues concerning contextual effect above we made several important notes about how those issues relate to intercultural communication. It was pointed out that speakers in IC prefer semantic analyzability to figurative and formulaic language. Also, semantic underdeterminacy does not seem to affect their speech activities to the extent as it does in L, for they cannot count on actual situational contextual support in the same way as that works in L1. Furthermore, it was claimed that constancy and conventionality built in the lexical items for L1 users do work for IC as far as literal meanings are concerned because interlocutors in IC share the coded literal meaning among themselves depending on their proficiency. As far as the standard pragmatic model is concerned, it appears to work better for lingua franca users than for L1 users because ELF users seem to first process literal meaning, and they may stick to that sometimes even if there is a mismatch with the actual situational context. Now we must summarize the differences between L1 and

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intercultural communication from the perspective of the semantics-pragmatics divide. – Semantic content and compositionality dominates both expressing intention and interpreting it. The standard pragmatic model works (literal meaning processed first). – Linguistic code seems to play the role of core common ground. – Actual contextual support (based on English socio-cultural background) for comprehension is not significant. Pragmatic enrichment deriving from target language is minimal: it mainly represents general world knowledge rather than language specific features. – What is said is usually equals or close to what is communicated. – Framing power and effect of actual situational context is not based on target language. Rather it is co-constructed bottom-up. – The more target language-specific utterances are the less the speaker can be sure that they will be interpreted as meant. All the above reveals the dominance of semantics over pragmatics in intercultural interactions, at least seemingly. But is that really true? How does pragmatics work for IC? Does not, in fact, semantics grow into pragmatics in intercultural communication taking over some functions of pragmatics? Or rather, are semantic features pragmatisized in IC? It is essential that pragmatics for IC speakers cannot be just something “they communicate over and above the semantic content of the sentence,” as King and Stanley (2005, p. 117) assumed for L1. For IC speakers, the semantic content is usually the conveyed content, or at least it is close to the conveyed content. If this is not clear from their utterance, they try to reinforce it through some pragmatic strategies such as repetition, paraphrase, or other procedures. Here is a brief exchange between a student with African French as L1 (AF) and a Korean student (K). (10) AF: - ah . . . so you have good neighbors . . . it’s quiet . . . good . . . so everybody has difficulties where they live so since you came from Korea what kind of difficulties you . . . what are the problems that you have to live in Albany? K: - Ah I came . . . when I came here . . . the first time about . . . I applied the driver’s license and you go to there. AF: - Yeah. K: - DMV . . . yeah, yeah . . . driver station. AF: - Yeah. K: - And then they require so many documents. AF: - I see. K: - So I had to go another office. AF: - To apply to school. K: - Yeah social number or . . . officer . . . anybody . . . anyway I had to go there and then . . . receive the document I gave them . . . so long time I . . . take a long time. (continued)

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AF: - Yeah so the difficulty for you is to get a driver’s license here in the US.

In this excerpt we can see that the Korean student is talking about her difficulties to obtain a driver’s license in Albany. There is no figurative or formulaic language use in the excerpt. The Korean student makes special efforts to make sure that the AF student can follow her. For instance, she pays attention to the backchanneling of her partner by saying “DMV”, and wants to make sure that the AF student understands her properly so adds “driver station”, which is an odd, ad hoc created semantic unit but makes perfect sense in the given context (about “odd structures” see Kecskes & Kirner-Ludwig, 2019). For non-native speakers—especially speakers with lower language proficiency— who participate in intercultural interactions there is little “above semantics”, at least what pragmatics of target language is concerned. In L1 communication, ‘what is said’ rarely coincides with ‘what is communicated’. This is why Gricean pragmatics gives such importance to implicatures. “Speakers implicate, hearers infer” (Horn, 2004, p. 6). In L1 it rarely happens that nothing is implied beyond semantics of the sentence. However, in intercultural communication what the speaker says is what s/he usually (not always though) means. In most cases utterance meaning is what the corresponding sentence means literally. This fact gives a strong support to Bach’s claim: “[I]t is a mistake to suppose that “pragmatic content is what the speaker communicates over and above the semantic content of the sentence” (King & Stanley, 2005, p. 117). Pragmatics doesn’t just fill the gap between semantic and conveyed content. It operates even when there is no gap. So it is misleading to speak of the border or the so-called “interface” between semantics and pragmatics. This mistakenly suggests that pragmatics somehow takes over when semantics leaves off. It is one thing for a sentence to have the content that it has, and another thing for a speech act of uttering the sentence to have the content it has. Even when the content of the speech act is the same as that of the sentence, that is a pragmatic fact, something that the speaker has to intend and the hearer has to figure out (Bach, 2007, p. 5).” Bach’s claim is true not just for L1 communication but for any communication including intercultural communication as well. In fact, intercultural communication confirms Bach’s claim. Pragmatics does not take over when semantics leaves off; in fact, pragmatics is always there. In fact, pragmatics is there even when the utterance means what the sentence says. The semantics of the sentence is pragmatisized in intercultural interactions. In other words, semantics and pragmatics are intertwined and almost inseparable, at least in IC. A part of pragmatics is encoded in the lexical items and utterances, and another part of pragmatics requires actual situational support in the target language (English, in the case of ELF communication). The latter is often referred to as pragmatic enrichment as described by contextualists. The problem, however, is that the diachronically semantisized part of pragmatics (semantics) does not work without the other, that is, the synchronic part of pragmatics, which comes into effect in actual situational contexts. Basically all that we call semantics is the result of pragmatic actions and processes attaching reoccurring conceptual load to lexical items and utterances in a diachronic process.

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Pragmatic features, actual situational experiences being standardized, conventionalized and normativized overtime grow into somewhat stabilized, relatively easily recallable semantic features. This is how word-specific semantic properties (Cruse, 1992; Kecskes, 2003, 2010) of expressions such as ‘chicken out’, ‘pass away’, ‘blackmail’, ‘kidnap’, etc. develop. Actual situational context cannot cancel the conceptual load that is attached to “chicken out” or “blackmail”. This “semantization” process makes language development dynamic and ever-changing. In short, semantics originates from pragmatics. The former is a summary of prior reoccurring contexts, a repository of the history of use of lexical items. It is nothing else but diachronic pragmatics as opposed to synchronic pragmatics. However, the semantisized part of pragmatics (or diachronic pragmatics) affects synchronic pragmatics (and vice versa), and occasionally overrides the selective power of actual situational context. The problem for non-native speakers (both EFL and ESL) is that this diachronic pragmatics, that represents a built-in conceptual load in lexical items, is not usually part of the language learning process that they go through. They learn the pure literal meaning, core meaning of the lexical items, but not the conceptual load (originator of different senses of a word) that is tied to them, and is an essential part of actual use of those lexical items.

4.3.2

Prior Context and Actual Situational Context Revisited

When discussing the semantics-pragmatics divide, we need to explore the relationship and interplay of prior context and actual situational context in order to explain the semantically biased behavior of IC speakers. As stated earlier, prior context is tied to semantics or what I called “diachronic pragmatics”. And actual situational context is tied to pragmatics, more specifically to “synchronic pragmatics”. It seems to me that the traditional semantic view (literalism) and the novel pragmatic view (contextualism) may go wrong in their way of handling the role of prior context and prior experience. As a reminder, according to the traditional view, we must distinguish between the proposition literally expressed by an utterance (‘what is said’ by the utterance, i.e. its literal truth conditions) and the implicit meaning of the utterance (‘what is communicated’ by a speaker producing the utterance). The former level is the object of semantics, the latter level is the object of pragmatics. In addition, followers of the pragmatic view emphasize the importance of semantic underdeterminacy according to which the encoded meaning of the linguistic expressions used by a speaker underdetermines the proposition explicitly expressed by the utterance. As for the traditional view, truth conditions may be ascribed to a sentence (of an idealized language system), independently of any contextual considerations. The opposing pragmatic view says that a sentence has complete truth conditions only in context. The semantic interpretation of utterances, in other words the propositions they express, their truth conditions, is the result of pragmatic processes of expansion and contextual enrichment. The followers of the semantic view may not be right

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when they think that any linguistic sign can be independent of any contextual considerations. No linguistic sign or expression can be independent of context because they, in fact, carry context (reoccurring prior context), they encode the history of their prior use (reoccurring prior context) in a speech community. The supporters of the pragmatic view may go wrong when they do not emphasize that expansion and contextual enrichment are the results of the individual’s prior experience. Suffice it to say, both sides appear to be mistaken to some extent because they talk about context without making a distinction between its two sides: prior context and actual situational context. The proposition literally expressed (sentence meaning) is the result of collective prior experience of speaker-hearers of a given speech community. This is expanded and/or enriched by prior experience, current situational experience and/or the communicative need of a concrete speaker when s/he uses that utterance (speaker’s meaning) in an actual situational context. The speaker privatizes the collective experience by enhancing/enriching the content with his/her private experience. Inferred meaning (hearer-implicature) is the reflection of the interplay between prior experience of the speaker and prior experience of the hearer in an actual situational context. Prior context as understood in the socio-cognitive paradigm is declarative knowledge while actual situational context represents procedural knowledge (see Kecskes, 2014). Moreover, Bezuidenhout (2004) claimed that parallels exist between the declarative – procedural divide, the semantics/ pragmatics interface and the competence/performance distinction. She proposed that a clear-cut distinction must be made between procedural knowledge, which belongs to the performance system and is pragmatic, on the one hand, and the lexical conceptual knowledge, which belongs to the competence system and is semantic, on the other. This is in line with what the socio-cognitive approach claims: lexical conceptual knowledge is the basis for prior context that is encoded in the lexical items while procedural knowledge, which is pragmatic, is triggered by the actual situational context. To make our point clear, let us look at the sentences in example (11). (11) Stan and Sally are engaged (to each other). Some (not all) boys like baseball. I need to change (clothes).

According to the socio-cognitive approach, all of the sentences above are complete without the parentheticals, and express a truth conditional, actual situational context-independent proposition. I want to emphasize actual situational contextindependent proposition because what those sentences are not independent of, is prior context. Prior context, reoccurring use (without the elements in parenthesis in example 11) makes their meaning clear even without the actual situational context. The speaker can say Stan and Sally are engaged true or false without concern for ‘to whom’. The speaker can say some boys like baseball true or false without concern for whether all do, and can say she needs to change true or false without considering in what way (clothes? diet? priorities? career?). The parentheticals add what that

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speaker was talking about, specifically, an added propositional element based on the actual situational context. But that is a new proposition. The one it supplants is still adequate in itself as the expression of a proposition. So I argue that it is a mistake to claim that no sentence is complete without (actual situational) context. It is more the case that speakers can mean more than the sentence itself means, because actual situational context may supply the rest. Nevertheless the sentence does say something completely, and sometimes it is exactly what the speaker means (uttererimplicatures). In the socio-cognitive approach underdeterminacy of sentence meaning may exist only from the perspective of the hearer. The speaker’s utterance is not underdetermined in any way unless the speaker deliberately wants it to be. The speaker expects that his/her utterance fits into the actual situational context, or creates an actual situational context. Let us look at this issue in L1 communication first, and then in intercultural communication. The following conversations (12A and 12B) will support this point (example 12 A and B are from Kecskes, 2014). (12A) Sam is talking to his friend, Andy. Sam: - Coming for a drink? Andy: - Sorry, I can’t. My doctor won’t let me. Sam: - What’s wrong with you? (12B) The same situation with one change. Sam: - Coming for a drink? Andy: - Sorry, I can’t. My mother-in-law won’t let me. Sam: - What’s wrong with you?

In example (12A), we can see that Andy says that he cannot go to have a drink with Sam because his doctor does not let him drink. Sam’s question, which is “what’s wrong with you?”, can definitely be interpreted as an inquiry about Andy’s health. Andy’s use of “my doctor” gives prior context support to that interpretation. Traditionally doctors can prohibit people drinking for health reasons. However, in example (12B), when Andy says that his mother-in-law does not permit him to go and have a drink with his friend, we can see that the whole actual situational context is changed. Based on traditional collective saliency (prior context) no one would think that Andy listens to his mother-in-law. So the question “what’s wrong with you?” may mean something like ‘are you out of your mind?’ or ‘are you in trouble?’ Now let us take an example and see how this works in intercultural communication. (13) A Japanese student (J) and a Korean student (K) are talking. J: - OK it’s been three or. . . 3 months so far right? Do you like living in Albany? Living in America? K: - Yes I like. J: - What makes you like this life? What is your . . . like .. What you like about living in Albany? (continued)

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K: - I stay here only 4 month in this semester so I have no time. I go to many place. . . I went to Boston, Washington DC, of course New York City. J: - That’s a lot wow. K: - Next month I will go to San Francisco. J: - San Francisco wow. West coast. K: - Grand Canyon, Niagara. J: - Oh. So many plans are coming wow. K: - I like traveling. J: - I can see that. K: - I like nature. The US has many nature.

In this example, the Japanese student wants to know if the Korean likes Albany, and starts with a direct question, which creates the frame of the conversation. He does not get a direct answer because the Korean begins to talk about his travel with which he changes the topic of the conversation. Here no prior context breaks the dominance of actual situational context. The same goes for the rest of the discourse segment. So the examples from L1 and IC discourse demonstrate that context plays both a selective (actual situational context) and a constitutive role (prior context). Actual situational context is viewed through prior context. Thus, meaning is the outcome of the interplay of prior and current experience (actual situational context). We can imagine the relationship of prior context and actual situational context during interaction as a continuum. Prior context Actual situational context.

What I want to emphasize, here is that there is a constant movement on the continuum. Depending on how speaker intention is expressed either or neither side can be dominant (see examples 12 A, B and 13). Also, prior context tied to salience is as important as actual situational context connected to relevance. Our experience develops through the regular recurrence of similar situations that we tend to identify with given contexts. Additionally, the standard (prior, recurring) context can be defined as a regular situation of which we have repeated experience, about which we have expectations as to what will or will not happen (Kecskes, 2014), and on which we rely for understanding and predicting how the world around us works. Gumperz (1982, p. 138) claimed that utterances somehow carry with them their own context or project a context. Referring to Gumperz’s work, Levinson (2003) argued that the message versus context opposition is misleading because the message can carry with it or forecast the context. All of this shows that semantics (diachronical pragmatics) is as important as synchronic pragmatics in language production and comprehension. But how does this work for IC speakers? I have argued several times that IC speakers heavily rely on semantics. But semantics is about historically encoded meaning, reoccurring contexts, frequent encounters and built-in collective salience. And I also said that IC speakers do have only limited access to all these things in the target language. So is there, in fact, a contradiction between these two claims?

4.3

Semantics Growing into Pragmatics in Intercultural Interactions

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How Can Speakers in IC Rely Mainly on What they Have Limited Access to?

This issue is not as complicated as it looks. What we call ‘dictionary knowledge’ and what constitutes a significant part of semantic knowledge is learnable for IC speakers. Learnability and learning is a key concern here. IC speakers who represent a particular variety of English (Chinese English, Russian English, German English, Korean English, etc.) have studied and/or experienced the target language system and vocabulary, at least to some extent (See footnote 1). Their variety of English is an approximation to what is considered a native-like variety. The process of approximation is usually characterized by learning rather than learning by using in EFL environment where the target language socio-cultural background is not directly present. This changes in an ESL environment such as immigrants acquiring English in the US where the target culture is present, and learning usually takes place through using the language in everyday situations (See footnote 1). But no matter whether the route towards English leads through classroom learning or learning by usage, what is common for everyone, no matter which variety of English they speak is the core knowledge of the system of signs that makes them “English speakers”. This core knowledge consists of a basic system of signs and semantic core (vocabulary). English language learners are exposed to these two core linguistic entities in classroom circumstances and in a target language environment as well. We can agree with Swan (2012, p. 388) that, in a sense, EFL leads to English as a Lingua Franca use. However, we should add that not only EFL but ESL and any other kinds of learning of English will lead to English as a LF use when users of any variety of English engage in interaction with representatives of other varieties of English. In addition, Swan (2017, p. 513) argued that many of the world’s English learners merely seek an effective working knowledge of the language, without wanting or needing a high level of accuracy. This has nothing to do with the recent growth in the lingua franca use of English or the implied existence of a new class of ELF users. So ELF users do not constitute a new class/group of English language users because, in fact, they use their own varieties of English without creating a new variety or developing some kind of normativity because there is little reoccurrence in temporary ELF speech communities. This makes standardization and conventionalization possible only to a limited extent. As a consequence, ELF users’ prior context background is more tied to their varieties of English than to some kind of ELF core, or norm as some ELF researchers claim (e.g. Archibald et al., 2011; Bowles & Cogo, 2015). Further, Swan (2012, p. 381) explained the situation of many ELF users, where they disregard the native speaker norms in terms of correctness as follows: “However, many lingua franca English speakers are certainly unconcerned about emulating NS norms of correctness except in so far as these are likely to serve their communicative purposes, and are perfectly satisfied with approximations that are transparent and effective. For such speakers it seems quite reasonable to say that the forms they use have their own validity, and should not in principle be judged by NS norms or labeled ‘mistakes’.”

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When ELF researchers speak about “native speaker norms” and “correctness” they usually refer to semantics and grammar. As far as my definition of English as a Lingua Franca goes, I think we can talk about ELF when different varieties of English are put to use in communicative encounters (Kecskes 2019). It was argued above that those varieties are usually based mainly on EFL and partly on ESL. EFL classroom learning is more about structure and semantics while ESL is more about use (practice) and pragmatics. Consequently EFL learners need more usage-practice while ESL learners may need firmly established semantics, more core knowledge of the language to clarify for themselves why people say what they say the way the say it in English as a native language. This may give them the necessary awareness and confidence in using English for communicative purposes. So English as a Lingua Franca seems to pull together these two things. No matter what the source of knowledge of English (EFL or ESL), in ELF interaction, ELF speakers put to use that knowledge. So it would be unwise to talk about a switch between EFL and ELF or ESL and ELF. Rather, what we see here is the use of different varieties that are biased either for semantics or pragmatics. The best way to put it would be just to say that both sides (semantics and pragmatics) are present all the time among both types of speakers (EFL or ESL). The only question is to what extent this bias exists? The paradox is that when learned semantics (diachronic pragmatics) is put to use in intercultural encounters, it is expected to function as synchronic pragmatics. But we should not forget about an important claim of Bach according to which “sentences have the properties they have independently of anybody’s act of uttering them. Speakers’ intentions do not endow them with new semantic properties...” (Bach, 2004, p. 27). So there are no new semantic properties added when an utterance is made but those that are encoded should continue functioning pragmatically as well. So a continuum between these two hypothetical parts is justified. Diachronic pragmatics (semantics) L2 influence but presupposes bidirectionality and includes not only structure and form transfer but knowledge and skill transfer.

5.2

The Nature of Pragmatic Competence

There is no doubt about the fact that human beings have pragmatic competence. It allows us to use language appropriately in concrete situations, utter relevant arguments, act properly and be considered a competent communicator. Pragmatic competence is something like what Descartes (1637, p. 6) called `le Bon Sens’: “Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed”. Yes, this sense is equally distributed but differently manifested in different languages. Gumperz and Cook-Gumperz (2005) confirmed this with saying that monolingual people and multilingual people do not differ in what they do with language, but in how they do what they do. Discussing the nature of pragmatic competence we should start with communicative competence, a term coined by Dell Hymes in 1966 in reaction to Noam Chomsky (1978) notion of “linguistic competence”. For Hymes communicative competence included intuitive functional knowledge (linguistic competence) and control of the principles of language usage (pragmatic competence). Hymes (1972, p. 281) argued that a person who acquires communicative competence acquires knowledge and ability for language use with respect to whether (and to what degree) something is formally possible; feasible in virtue of the means of implementation available; appropriate (adequate, happy, successful) in relation to a context in which it is used and evaluated; and is in fact done, actually performed, and what its doing entails. Grammatical competence is about correctness while pragmatic competence is more about appropriateness. Grammar contains facts and rules about the given language system that must be followed (at least to some extent) otherwise the language is unrecognizable. This is something that can systematically be acquired by the language learner. Pragmatic rules (language use rules), however, are different: not following them may cause misinterpretation of linguistic behavior and many different reactions from the hearers. If grammar is bad, the utterance may not convey the right message or any message while if pragmatics is bad, the utterance will usually convey the wrong message. This is how Crystal (1997, p. 240) defined pragmatic ability: “The study of language from the point of view of users, especially of the choices they make, the constraints they encounter in using language in social interaction and the effects their use of language has on other participants in the act of communication.” Yorio’s (1980) example of a North-American shop-attendant’s saying “What can I do for you” versus “What do you want,” the former being a routine formula while the latter is a grammatically and semantically accurate question, highlights how the latter could be inappropriate and even impolite at the

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pragmatic and sociolinguistic levels due to the preferences of the given speech community. Pragmatic rules of language use function like suggestions and/or recommendations by the members of a speech community, which are based on norms, behavioral patterns, conventions and standards of that community. So the language user has more leverage there than in the case of grammatical rules.

5.3

Change of Pragmatic Competence Affected by another Language

Pragmatic competence in the L1 is the result of language socialization. As said above language and social development in the L1 go hand in hand, and are inseparable. However, this is not exactly the case in L2 and subsequent languages. Pragmatic skills in L2 appear like modifications, adjustments and additions to the existing L1-based pragmatic competence. Socio-pragmatic norms and conventions concerning appropriateness developed through L1 are very influential and difficult to change. Exposure to and immerging into the new language and culture are not enough to change them. Sometimes L2 norms and patterns need conscious acts by the language learner to accept and/or acquire them. Bilinguals may see things in L2 through their L1 socio-cultural mind set. Thomas (1983) indicated that if we should try to force nonnative speakers (NNS) to conform to a native speaker (NS) norm, it would be nearly the same as NS’s ideological control over NNSs or cultural imposition on NNSs by NSs’ socially hegemonic strata. Some recent studies have pointed out that NNSs may have some kind of resistance toward the use of NS norms and speech conventions to maintain their own identity, and so they may commit pragmatic negative transfer “on purpose” (e.g. Al-Issa, 2003; Siegal, 1996). Siegal (1996) discussed the case of a female western learner of Japanese who felt affective resistance to a Japanese norm, because Japanese female language appeared too humble to her. According to Siegal (1996) these findings mean real difficulty for researchers because frequently it is impossible to establish whether some inappropriate or misleading language use results from the NNS affective resistance to the NS practice or it is just a lack of nativelike pragmatic competence. Willingness, motivation and ability of adult bilinguals to assume L2 (or subsequent language) socio-cultural beliefs, conventions and norms seem to play a decisive role in bi- and multilingual development and language use. An advanced L2 speaker cannot be expected “simply to abandon his/her own cultural world” (Barro et al., 1993, p. 56). Adamson (1988) pointed out that non-native speakers are often reluctant to accept and share the values, beliefs and presuppositions of an L2 community even if they have been living there for a long period of time and can speak the language quite well. The influence of culture on communication patterns is so strong that even if the conceptual socialization process in L2 is very advanced and the individual has high proficiency and excellent skills in the L2 her/his interaction with native speakers is severely blocked by the limits imposed by

5.4

Pragmatic Competence in Interlanguage Pragmatics

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cultural factors. According to Lu (2001) the influence of the traditional Chinese culture is so far-reaching a persistent that even second- or third-generation Americans of Chinese descendants are unable to fully ignore it although their English proficiency is on a par with that of native English speakers. Many of these people do not speak Chinese and totally depend on English as the tool of thinking and communication. “Nevertheless, their speech acts are still in the shadow of culturally governed modes of thinking, talking and behaving (Lu, 2001, p. 216).” The literature discussed above all shows the decisive role of individual willingness and motivation in modifying existing L1-base pragmatic norms and conventions and making room for the pragmatic requirements of the new language.

5.4

Pragmatic Competence in Interlanguage Pragmatics

As mentioned in the introduction research in pragmatic competence has been a very important part of interlanguage pragmatics. Although I do not quite agree with how interlanguage pragmatics handles pragmatic competence it is important to review some of their major tenets in order to demonstrate where the differences are between the interlanguage pragmatics approach and the socio-cognitive approach proposed here. In interlanguage pragmatics pragmatic competence is usually defined as the ability to produce and comprehend utterances (discourse) that is adequate to the socio-cultural context in which interaction takes place (e.g. Rose & Kasper, 2001; Soler, 2012; Thomas, 1983). According to Barron’s definition (Barron, 2003, p.12), who has researched study abroad programs in L2, “[P]ragmatic competence . . . . . . is understood as the knowledge of the linguistic resources available in a given language for realising particular illocutions, knowledge of the sequential aspects of speech acts, and finally, knowledge of the appropriate contextual use of the particular language’s linguistic resources.” Based on the research of Leech (1983) and Thomas (1983) two aspects of pragmatic competence have been distinguished. The pragmalinguistic aspect refers to the resources for conveying communicative acts and relational or interpersonal meanings. These resources include pragmatic strategies such as directness and indirectness, routines, and a great variety of linguistic forms which can intensify or soften communicative acts. For one example, compare these two versions of request: (1) (2)

Waiter to the customer; – Come with me, please. I’ll show you your table. Mary to her husband: – Why don’t you come with me? I’ll show you something.

In both cases, the speaker chooses from among a great variety of available pragmalinguistic resources of the English language which can function as a request.

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However, each of these two expressions indexes a very different attitude and social relationship. This is where the sociopragmatic aspect comes in and becomes important in bilingual speech analysis. It is not enough, for instance, to know that “you bet” can be a response to “thank you”. The speaker also needs to know when it is an appropriate response. For instance: (3) At the end of the plenary talk the chair of the session turns to the plenary speaker and says: – Professor Green, thank you for this thought-provoking presentation. – You bet/ no problem / thanks / my pleasure / not at all. Definitely “you bet” is not the right response in this situation. Neither is “no problem”.

Leech (1983, p.10) defined sociopragmatics as “the sociological interface of pragmatics.” He referred to the social perceptions underlying participants’ interpretation and performance of their communicative action. Speech communities differ in their assessment of speakers’ and hearers’ social distance and social power, their rights and obligations, and the degree of imposition involved in particular communicative acts (Rose & Kasper, 2001). According to Thomas (1983), while pragmalinguistics is, in a sense, akin to grammar in that it consists of linguistic forms and their respective functions, sociopragmatics is about appropriate social behavior. In many cases adult bilinguals with at least an intermediate proficiency in their L2 appear to have less problems with pragmalinguistics than with sociopragmatics. For instance, Barron (2003) examined the development of Irish learners of German in producing the three speech acts of request, refusal, and offer. It was found that the learners achieved great improvement in their pragmalinguistic competence, but little sociopragmatic development. There may be two reasons for this. First, classroom instruction usually focuses more on pragmalinguistics (see, for instance, Jeon & Kaya, 2006) than on sociopragmatics. Second, pragmalinguistics is about linguistic means expressing social functions. In a study abroad situation learners are exposed to those social situations all the time. So they can pick up the expressions relatively easily. What they have trouble with is sociopragmatics: which of the available form(s) is/are appropriate in a given situation? (see example 3). Bilingual speakers need to be aware of the consequences of making pragmatic choices. Using an expression like “Why don’t we have lunch some time?” may mean different things for an American and a Russian L2 learner. An American will take it as a casual utterance meaning almost nothing except expressing that the speaker wants to be nice. A Russian hearing this utterance in English may take it at face value and ask: “When? When do you want to have lunch with me?” Bialystok (1993, p. 54) argued that bilingual “adults make pragmatic errors, not only because they do not understand forms and structures, or because they do not have sufficient vocabulary to express their intentions, but because they choose incorrectly”. Although Bialystok identified the cause of “incorrect choices” in adult learners’ lacking ability to control attentional resources, another explanation may be that learners’ sociopragmatic knowledge is not yet developed enough for them to make contextually appropriate choices of strategies and linguistic forms.

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Another important issue that L2 pragmatics has raised is about how pragmatic competence correlates with grammatical competence. The studies that focused on this issue have often presented different findings (Bardovi-Harlig, 1999; Maeshiba et al., 1996). It has been argued that learners of high grammatical proficiency will not necessarily show concomitant pragmatic skills. Bardovi-Harlig (1999) argued that grammatical competence and pragmatic competence are independent of one another though a lack of grammatical competence in a particular area may cause a particular utterance to be less effective. According to another view (e.g. Barron, 2003) grammatical competence is the pre-requisite of pragmatic competence, but Barron argued that these two aspects are interrelated, and the way they correlate with each other is not linear, but rather complex. More research is needed to investigate this complicated issue because the impact of low level pragmatic competence modified by L2 may lead to serious consequences especially in native speaker – nonnative speaker communication. Platt (1989) pointed out that when somebody speaks very little of the target language, s/he is usually considered to be an ‘outsider’, so pragmatic mistakes do not generate any problem. However, when a nonnative speaker speaks English fluently, native speakers tend to consider the person to be part of the speech community and interpret his/her behavior according to the sociocultural rules of that community. So the tendency is to consider an inappropriately used utterance to have been deliberate rather than just an error. In lingua franca communication this issue is even more complex as we will see later.

5.5

How Does Pragmatic Competence of Bilinguals Develop and Change?

In the pragma-linguistic versus socio-pragmatic debate there is one issue missed. It is not enough to ask “does the English language learner have the linguistic means/ resources to act properly?” (pragma-linguistics) and “does the English language learner have the socio-cultural knowledge tied to L2 to act appropriately?” (sociopragmatics). We should also ask the question: if the English language learner (or learner of any other language) has the linguistic means and the socio-cultural knowledge to act in a way that is considered appropriate by the norms of the given speech community, why is it that s/he still does not do so? This question opens up for us the real nature and uniqueness of bilingual pragmatics competence. The key is what House’s (House, 1996) German subjects said about small talk in English. They considered it “superficial” and “typically American”. So even if bilingual adults knew the required expressions and were aware of when those are appropriate to be used they still rejected them. Pragmatic awareness is the conscious, reflective, explicit knowledge about pragmatics. But that is not enough. In order for us to understand this we need to return to a more detailed discussion about the differences in how pragmatic development happens in L1 and L2.

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In L1 linguistic and socio-cultural knowledge are constructed through each other. This interplay between language acquisition and socialization was described by Ochs (1986, p. 407) as follows: “. . . .the acquisition of language and the acquisition of social and cultural competence are not developmentally independent processes, nor is one process a developmental prerequisite of the other. Rather, the two processes are intertwined from the moment a human being enters society”. Leung (2001, p. 2) emphasized that language socialization basically deals with how novices “become competent members of their community by taking on the appropriate beliefs, feelings and behaviors, and the role of language in this process”. Language socialization relies on two processes: a) socialization through the use of language, referring to “interactional sequences in which novices are directed to use language in specific ways”; and, b) socialization to use the language, referring to “the use of language to encode and create cultural meaning” (Poole, 1994, p. 594). This view emphasizes the importance of language use to develop socio-cultural behavior (appropriateness), and on the other hand it underlines the role of social processes in developing individual language skills (correctness). The appropriate use of language within a speech community depends on conventions, norms, beliefs, expectations, and knowing the preferred ways of saying things and preferred ways of organizing thoughts (cf. Kecskes, 2007). People are able to learn all these only if they go through the socialization process with the other members of the speech community. This is a life-long process (e.g. Duff, 2003; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986) as people enter new socio-cultural contexts and take up new roles in society. How does this relate to bilingual pragmatic development?

5.5.1

Question for Bilingual Pragmatic Development

The language socialization paradigm built mainly on the works of Ochs and Schieffelin has had a strong ethnographic orientation, and paid close attention to contextual dynamics of language behavior and human agency in L1. Following the traditions of language socialization research interlanguage pragmatics has aimed to identify deviations from native speakers’ norms (Kasper, 2001) and emphasized the dynamism and ever-lasting change of pragmatics competence. This paper attempts to take into account the results of language socialization research both in L1 and L2. However, its concerns are slightly different from those of interlanguage pragmatics. The main issue concerning bilingual pragmatic socialization can be summarized as follows: How will the existing, L1-based pragmatic competence change under the influence of the newly emerging language, and how will the new strategies, behavior patterns and socio-cultural knowledge blend and/or interact with the existing ones? These questions presuppose that (a) the change primarily means the modification of an existing system, (b) the process is dynamic with its ups and downs, (c) there is a bidirectional influence between languages and cultures,

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(d) subjectivity plays a leading role in what new elements are accepted and incorporated into the existing system. In order to describe how language socialization takes place in L2 and subsequent languages Kecskes and Papp (2000) and Kecskes (2002) proposed the term “conceptual socialization”, which was defined as “the transformation of the conceptual system which undergoes characteristic changes to fit the functional needs of the new language and culture”. During the process of conceptual socialization the L1-dominated conceptual base of a bilingual is being gradually restructured, making space for and engaging with the new knowledge and information coming through the second language channel (e.g. Kecskes, 2002; Ortactepe, 2012). This leads to the development of a conscious awareness of how another culture is different from one’s own culture, the ability to reflect upon this difference in language production, and the development of an identity that is the reflection of the dual culture.

5.5.2

Differences Between Conceptual Socialization and Language Socialization

The term “conceptual socialization” has been used to distinguish the process of socialization in L2 or Lx from “language socialization” (c.f. Ochs, 1988; Willett, 1995; Mitchell & Myles, 1998) which has its roots in anthropological linguistics. With the term I wanted to underline that changes in pragmatic competence are primarily conceptual rather than linguistic that are reflected in the functioning of the dual language system. Ochs’ and Schieffelin’ work has focused on L1 development. They did not pay much attention to L2 socialization. There are only a restricted number of studies that extend their paradigm to second language acquisition (e.g. Cook, 2008; BlumKulka, 1997; Willett, 1995; Platt, 1989) and focused on a long-term development of socialization in L2. Willett (1995), for instance, conducted a longitudinal study with young classroom learners of ESL in an elementary school with an international intake. Based on her results she argued that language socialization is a complex process in which participants construct and evaluate shared understandings through negotiation. This process leads to changes not only in their identity but also in social practices. Ortactepe (2012) conducted a longitudinal, mixed-method study that relied on the assumption that international students as newcomers to the American culture experience bilingual development through conceptual socialization which enables them to gain pragmatic competence in the target language through exposure to the target language and culture. By collecting qualitative and quantitative data three times over a year, the study examined the linguistic and social development of Turkish bilingual students as a result of their conceptual socialization in the U.S. Socio-cultural and linguistic features of the language socialization process were analyzed together to emphasize the interplay between them in shaping the social and

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linguistic behavior of the subjects. Ortaztepe provided evidence that L2 learners’ conceptual socialization relies predominantly – contrary to what previous research says – on learners’ investment in language rather than only on extended social networks. Conceptual socialization broadens the scope of the paradigm of language socialization which has its main focus on language developmental issues. Conceptual socialization has a multilingual perspective and differs from language socialization in that it emphasizes the primacy of mental processes in the symbiosis of language and culture, and aims at explaining the bidirectional influence of the two or more languages. The process of conceptual socialization is strongly tied to the emergence of the common underlying conceptual base that is responsible for the operation of two or more language channels (see in Kecskes & Papp, 2000; Kecskes, 2010). The child acquiring his/her first language lives in the culture that is responsible for the development of the encyclopedic knowledge base, social skills, image system, and concepts which give meaning to all linguistic signs that are used in the given language. This is not exactly the case if the target language is acquired as a second or foreign language. The main differences between L1 language socialization and conceptual socialization can be summarized as follows (Kecskes, 2013):

5.5.2.1

Partial Consciousness of the Process

L1 language socialization is basically a subconscious, and partly automatic process through which the child gradually integrates into her/his environment and speech community both linguistically and socially. In the L2, however, much more consciousness is involved in the process in which age is a decisive factor (see below). Several researchers have noted that bilinguals make deliberate, conscious choices about pragmatic strategies and/or features of the target language. Taguchi (2011, p. 303) claimed that when learners’ L1 and L2 cultures do not operate under the same values and norms, or when learners do not agree with L2 norms, linguistic forms that encode target norms are not easily acquired. As discussed above, research has indicated that not all language learners wish to behave pragmatically just like native speakers of the target language (e.g. Li 1998; Siegal, 1996). Li (1998) reported that Chinese immigrant women sometimes resisted more expert peers’ pragmatic socialization based on their personal values and cultural beliefs. The important thing here is that bilinguals may know target language norms and expectations but do not wish to act accordingly. For instance, the frequent use of “thank you”, “I am sorry”, “have a nice day” type of expressions may be annoying for nonnative speakers of different cultural background.

5.5.2.2

Age and Attitude of Bilinguals

The later the L2 is introduced the more bilinguals rely on their L1-dominated conceptual system, and the more they are resistant to any pragmatic change that is

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not in line with their L1-related value system, conventions and norms. Ochs (1988, p. 14) claimed about L1 socialization that “not only are language practices organized by the world views, they also create world views for the language users carrying out these practices”. For second/foreign language users the crucial question is whether those existing world views will be modified to any extent under the influence of the new language and culture, and how this new blend (if any) will affect language production in both languages. Gee (1999, p. 63) argued that the situated and local nature of meaning is largely invisible to us. It is easy for us to miss the specificity and localness of our own practices and think that we have general, abstract, even universal meanings. We come to think, when we have learned no other languages, that ‘standing’ is just standing, ‘eating’ is just eating, ‘over there’ is just over there. In fact, the situated, social and cultural nature of meaning often becomes visible to us only when we confront language-at-work in languages and cultures far distant from our own. This “confrontation” often occurs at the level of fixed expressions as it will be discussed below.

5.5.2.3

Direct or Indirect Access to the Target Culture and Environment

In L1 language and social development go intertwined because people have direct access to the socio-cultural environment that shapes their norms, values, conventions and beliefs. This is not exactly the case in L2. Bilinguals have usually limited and/or indirect access to the L2 culture and environment. Even if they live in the target language environment it is not for sure that they have full access to it because of personal or external reasons. In the second language, pragmatic socialization is more about discourse practices as related to linguistic expressions than how these practices relate to cultural patterns, norms and beliefs. Language learners may have direct access to the L2 linguistic materials they need but not always to the sociocultural background knowledge that gives sense to the particular linguistic expressions in the L2. The following conversation between a Japanese student and an American student illustrates this point. (4) Emiko: - Melody, I have received the travel grant. M: - Nooou, get out of here! E: - You should not be rude. I did get it. M: - OK, I was not rude, just happy for you.

It is clear that the expression ‘get out of here’ does not mean the same thing to the two speakers. The Japanese student processes it literally. However, that meaning does not match the actual situational context.

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5.5.3

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How Does Pragmatic Competence Develop in Bilinguals?

Dynamic Move on the Continuum of Conceptual Socialization in L2

Conceptual socialization is presented here as a continuum in which there are moves up and down depending on several variables including exposure, environment and individual will. From the perspective of conceptual socialization it is important to mention Lave and Wenger’s (Lave & Wenger, 1991) legitimate peripheral participation. Their approach is based on the assumption that cognition is built from experience through social interaction in communities of practice. It is a process of “incorporation of learners into the activities of communities of practice, beginning as a legitimated (recognized) participant on the edges (periphery) of the activity, and moving through a series of increasingly expert roles as learners’ skills develop” (Watson-Gegeo, 2004, p. 341). In activities in the language community while bilinguals adopt various communicative and social roles in temporarily and spatially situated activities/practices, they also develop grammatical, discourse, sociocultural and general cognitive structures of knowledge. This is how the skill-side and content-side of conceptual socialization are ideally intertwined. Bilinguals, who begin peripherally in a new language, should be exposed to mutual engagement with the members of the community till they are granted enough legitimacy to be a potential member (Wenger, 1998). Moving through this dynamic continuum with its ups and downs second language users can get from the status of a beginner to advanced roles through gaining and/or being allowed access to social interaction in the dominant language community. However, as discussed above, dynamic move on this continuum depends both on individual and social factors. The socio-cognitive approach (cf. Kecskes, 2013) emphasizes that exposure, quality and quantity of input can be effective only as much as the individual learner allows them to be. As mentioned above, there can be much control here from the perspective of the bilingual individual. In her longitudinal study Ortactepe (2012) examined both the skill-side and content-side of conceptual socialization. In the qualitative analysis of the contentside that she connected to the dynamic changes of social identity she found evidence against the language myth according to which students learn by osmosis when in the target speech community. Learning through osmosis is the natural way to learn a language. To learn through osmosis means to learn by immersing oneself in a language and culture. Most of the literature in second language acquisition takes for granted that this is the best and most efficient way of acquiring another language. This way of thinking does not seem to take into account the decisive role of the individual learner in the process. An important element of Ortactepe’s work is that analyzing the conceptual socialization process of her subjects one by one in her longitudinal study she provided evidence that L2 learners’ conceptual socialization relies predominantly – contrary to previous research – on learners’ investment in language rather than on extended social networks. Her finding demonstrated that not only in language use but also in language development and socialization the role of

5.6

How Is Pragmatic Competence Reflected in Language Use?

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individual cognition is as important as the role of the socio-cultural environment and social networking.

5.6

How Is Pragmatic Competence Reflected in Language Use?

Pragmatic competence can be manifested in language use in different ways such as lexical selection, small talk, formulaic language, just to mention a few. In this paper I will focus on formulaic language use only because that can be considered one of the main reflections of pragmatic competence. (I have no space here to focus on the other manifestations.) Kecskes (2007) argued that using a particular language and belonging to a particular speech community means having preferred ways of saying things and preferred ways of organizing thoughts. Preferred ways of saying things are generally reflected in the use of formulaic language and figurative language. Selecting the right words and expressions in communication is more important than syntax. Language socialization, to a great extent, depends on the acquisition of what is expected to be said in particular situations, and what kind of language behavior is considered appropriate in the given speech community. Formulaic language is the heart and soul of native-like language use. In fact, formulaic language use makes language use native-like. Hymes, 1972, pp. 126–127) said that “a vast proportion of verbal behaviour consists of recurrent patterns, . . . [including] the full range of utterances that acquire conventional significance for an individual, group or whole culture”. Coulmas (1981, pp. 1–3) argued that much of what is actually said in everyday conversation is by no means unique. Rather, a great deal of communicative activity consists of enacting routines making use of prefabricated linguistic units in a well-known and generally accepted manner. Successful coordination of social interactions heavily depends on standardized ways of organizing interpersonal encounters because conventional ways of doing things with words and expressions are familiar to everyone in the speech community so speakers can be expected to be understood according to their communicative intentions and goals. Pragmatic competence is directly connected to and to some extent, develops through the use of formulaic expressions, mainly because use of formulas is group identifying. They reflect a community’s shared language practices, and so they discriminate those who belong to the group from those who do not (Yorio, 1980). This is so because, as Wray and Namba (2003, p. 36) claimed “. . .speech communities develop and retain common ways of expressing key messages”. Language socialization studies highlighted the importance of prefabricated chunks in the socialization process both in L1 and L2 development. Schieffelin and Ochs, (1986) pointed out that there is much direct teaching of the interactional routines (“elema”) among the Kaluli in Western Samoa. Willett (1995) argued that in the first months ESL students relied heavily on prefabricated chunks which they

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picked up from their fluent English-speaking peers or from adults during routine events. Coulmas (1981), pp. 256–260) gave a summary of difficulties L2 learners have when using routine formulae. He categorized pragmatic interferences according to the respective process or structural phenomenon giving rise to the mistake in question. From the perspective of conceptual socialization and change in pragmatic competence of bilinguals, the development and use of situation-bound utterances (SBU) are especially important because they are reflections of socio-cultural patterns, cultural models and behavioral expectations in a speech community. I do not have space here to focus on other categories of formulaic language such as idioms, speech formulas, semantic units, etc. so I will restrict the discussion to SBUs. Situation-bound utterances (Kecskes, 2000, 2003) are highly conventionalized, prefabricated pragmatic units whose occurrences are tied to standardized communicative situations (e.g. Coulmas, 1981; Kiefer, 1995; Kecskes, 2000). Many bilingual speakers have an excellent command of the language systems. Besides pronunciation there are only two things that can reveal that they are not native speakers: word choice and use of SBUs. SBUs are direct reflections of what is considered appropriate language use in a speech community. Here is an example that was given to me by Roberts Sanders (personal communication). (5) He was ordering a pizza on the phone. The woman who answered was fluent in English but had an accent. Sanders: - I’d like to order a medium pizza. Woman: - Is that pickup or delivery. Sanders: - Pickup. Woman: - Is that it? Sanders: - What? Woman: - Is that it? Sanders: - Is that what? Woman: (No response. Silence) Sanders: - We want three toppings: pepperoni, mushroom, cheese Woman: - OK, you want pepperoni, mushroom and cheese Sanders: - Right. Woman: - Okay, about 20 mins.

Although the woman at Pizza Hut was fluent in English, her inappropriate use of the SBU “is that it” caused a slight breakdown in the interaction. Normally, “is that it?” is a formula used to close this part of the transaction and move on to something new or closing. But for Sanders, the transaction shouldn’t have been moving on, because they were still in the middle of the ordering process. He hadn’t yet told the assistant what toppings he wanted. The woman repeated, “is that it?”, and Sanders said “is that what?”. This followed by silence from the woman who must have been confused. Then Sanders told her what toppings he wanted, she

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understood perfectly, and they closed the transaction properly. The confusion was caused by the bilingual speaker’s inappropriate use of SBU. The use of SBUs is directly connected to small talk that reveals a lot about how bilinguals communicate in their L2. Small talk is a non-referential use of language to share feelings and sympathy, or establish social rapport rather than to communicate information. Malinowski defined phatic communication as “[. . .] language used in free, aimless, social intercourse” (Malinowski, 1923, p. 476). Phatic communication is characterized by the use of routinized and ritualized formulas, mainly situationbound utterances. This term refers to all kinds of acts including greetings, welcomes, questions about work, health, well-being, family and other aspects of live, leavetakes, wish-wells, farewells, compliments about obvious achievements or personal traits of the interlocutors, complaints about things or events with which they are familiar, or those narrations or chit-chat about trivial facts or comments about topics that may seem obvious (Malinowski, 1923, pp. 476–479). Why is small talk important for bilingual pragmatic competence? Because it is part of what we referred to as preferred ways of saying things and preferred ways of organizing thoughts in a language. Bilinguals are supposed to have two sets of small talk: one for each of their language. However, as we discussed earlier they actually do not have two sets rather they have one that blends small talk from both languages. But in this blend a bilingual might be more comfortable with norms and conventions of one of his/her languages than with the other. Mugford (2011) demonstrated that his Mexican learners of English transferred local norms and practices and did not adhere to those of the L2 when engaging in phatic exchanges. For instance, unaware of the role of status and distance in the target community, on some occasions Mexican learners made overly personal comments to their instructors, as if assuming they were talking to very close subjects. On other occasions, their small talk displayed local practices, such as lack of expected greetings when entering classrooms, very extended greetings with a profusion of self-disclosure or the transfer of L1 idiomatic phatic expressions –e.g. ‘fresh as a salad’ instead of ‘fresh as a daisy’ as a reply to a how-are-you question. An effective management of small talk in any language requires an awareness of subtle issues such as when and with whom to engage in it, the underlying reasons and purposes to do so, the topics that can be addressed or the effects achievable by means of it.

5.7

Conclusion

Discussing the pragmatic competence of adult sequential bilinguals the paper argued that these bilinguals already have an L1-governed pragmatic competence at place, which is adjusted to accommodate the socio-cultural requirements of the new language as much as the bilinguals allow that to happen. So no separate pragmatic competence develops for the L2. One pragmatic system handles all interactions. A unique feature of this kind of bilingual pragmatic competence is that bilinguals may control what they find acceptable from the norms and conventions of the L2 and

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occasionally L1. Having a system of pragmatic norms already at place adult sequential bilinguals may have some kind of resistance toward the use of certain pragmatic norms and speech conventions of (mainly) their L2. Consequently, the language socialization process in subsequent languages may not take place only through osmosis. Contrary to previous research bilingual conceptual socialization appears to rely predominantly on learners’ investment in language rather than just on extended social networks. This partial individual control of pragmatic socialization in L2 is most clearly demonstrated in the use of situation-bound utterances because these formulaic expressions represent cultural models and ways of thinking of members of a particular speech community. Pragmatic competence is directly tied to and develops through the use of formulaic expressions, mainly because use of formulas is group identifying. These expressions reflect a speech community’s shared language practices, and so they discriminate those who belong to the group from those who do not. This is so because speech communities develop and retain common ways of expressing key messages. It was argued that bilingual pragmatic competence shows a unique symbiosis of pragmatic rules and expectations of both languages. Bilingual language use is the reflection of this symbiosis. Bilinguals may have preferences in the pragmatic rule systems of both languages and act accordingly in communicative encounters. Acknowledgement The chapter was first published in Kecskes, I. 2016. How does pragmatic competence develop in bilinguals? In Ruiz de Zarobe, Yolanda and Leyre Ruiz de Zarobe (eds.). 2016. ‘Multilingualism and L2 Acquisition: New Perspectives on Current Research’. London: Routledge. Thanks to Routledge for permission to reuse the text.

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Chapter 6

Linguistic Creativity in English as a Lingua Franca

Abstract The paper argues that linguistic creativity is about the alternation of prefabricated lexical and grammatical units and ad hoc generated chunks and sentences that are amalgamated into simple and/or more complex utterances in speech production. This alternation is crucial for English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) because this is where the main difference between English as a Native Language (ENL) use and ELF use can be identified. Since ELF users cannot rely on norms, standards and conventions of ENL to the extent as native speakers do, they need to co-construct, co-create those in their temporary speech communities. Consequently, ELF users produce more ad hoc generated language than rely on prefabricated units of the target language when creating utterances than their ENL counterparts. The paper sets to explain this difference in linguistic creativity. Keywords Linguistic creativity · Norms · Prefabricated units · Temporary speech community · Temporary extensions

6.1

Introduction

Jespersen (1904, pp. 16–17) described phraseology as an ‘indispensable’ dimension of language competence. But the rise of the Chomskian generative approach (Chomsky, 1965) changed the landscape in linguistics, and formulaic language was pushed to the periphery because it did not fit in generative syntax. Recently, however, the linguistic landscape has been changing again. There has been more discussion on the essence of linguistic creativity and the role of prefabricated language in language production in general, and its relationship to linguistic creativity in particular. Kecskes (2016, 2019a) argued that linguistic creativity is about the alternation of prefabricated lexical and grammatical units and ad hoc generated chunks and sentences that are amalgamated into simple and/or more complex utterances in speech production. This alternation is crucial for English as a Lingua Franca because this can explain the main difference between English as a Native Language use and ELF use. Representing different levels of English proficiency ELF users cannot rely on norms, standards and conventions of ENL to the extent as native speakers do, so © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_6

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they need to co-construct, co-create those in their temporary speech communities. As a result, ELF users usually produce more ad hoc generated language and less rely on norms and prefabricated units of the target language when creating utterances than their ENL counterparts. The two types of processing (analytic – holistic) could be viewed as forming a continuum in any language production. Speakers of any language in their actual language use move up and down on a continuum with two hypothetical ends: “prefabricated language” and “ad hoc generated language”: Prefabricated languageAd hoc generated language

Both in ENL and ELF, speakers move up and down on the continuum when they use English in actual situational contexts. They are always in between the two hypothetical ends. This means that in actual language production people use more or less prefabricated and ad hoc generated language depending on several factors such as communicative need, intention, topic, actual situational context, speech partners, etc. In a study Kecskes (2015) claimed that the “idiom principle” (Sinclair, 1987) is the most salient guiding mechanism not only in L1 but in any language production. However, the principle generates less formulaic language in L2 use than L1 because there are several factors that are not present in L1 but exist in L2, affecting the functioning of the idiom principle in a different degree. Such factors include limited core common ground, language proficiency, willingness to use certain formulas, language proficiency of other participants, and others (e.g. Pang, 2020: TimpeLaughlin and Dombi). These factors affect movement on the language use continuum and determine the combination of prefabricated units with ad hoc generated units. As a result, the actual production of target language formulaic expressions in the L2 will be likely to be lower than in L1 most of the time. This, however, does not mean that people in their L2 use are more creative linguistically than in their L1 or vice versa. The ‘idiom principle’ always has priority over the “open choice principle” in any language use. Speakers always prefer ready-made expressions to ad hoc generated ones if they are available and/or appropriate in most communicative situations. The question is how this priority can be demonstrated and what effect it has on production.

6.2

Idiom Principle Versus Open Choice Principle

If we want to understand the alternation and interplay of prefabricated and ad hoc generated language use, we should start with the economy principle. Leopold (1930) discovered that there are two contradictory tendencies in any linguistic systems: Linguistic development follows two opposing tendencies, that is, towards

6.2

Idiom Principle Versus Open Choice Principle

111

distinctness on the one hand, and economy on the other. Either of these poles prevails, but both are present and alternately preponderant (Leopold, 1930, p. 102). The tendency to distinctness originates from the fact that any speaker has, at any time, the predominant intention of being understood. The tendency to economy is “the innate tendency of man, wisely given him by nature, not to spend more energy on any effort than necessary” (Leopold, 1930, p. 102). Consequently, in communicative acts, one of the two factors usually prevails on the other, generating different balances depending on the social or professional level. In the Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), economy has been used with two functions: first to explain how cognitive processes are linked to utterance interpretation (processing efforts must be balanced by cognitive effects), second to explain how communication may be successful (inferences complete the underspecified content of the utterance to obtain its intended meaning). In other words, economy is a property of the cognitive system devoted to both utterance production and interpretation (and not just interpretation as RT theorists like to say), and is also required in order to ensure successful communication, by the computational devices, which are combined with linguistic decoding to yield the intended meaning of an utterance. There is psycholinguistic evidence that fixed expressions and formulas have an important economizing role in speech production (cf. Miller & Weinert, 1998; Wray, 2002). Sinclair’s (1991) idiom principle says that the use of prefabricated chunks may . . . illustrate a natural tendency to economy of effort (Sinclair, 1991, p. 110). This can be interpreted as: in communication we want to achieve more cognitive effects with less processing effort. So formulaic expressions ease the processing overload not only because they are ready-made and do not require of the speaker/ hearer any putting together, but also because their salient meanings are easily accessible in online production and processing. Wray (2002) maintained that by favoring formulaic units, speakers can reduce both their own processing – the larger the units, the fewer the operations needed to construct the message – and also the processing load of the hearer. On that account, she argued that there are major benefits to the speaker in ensuring that the hearer does not have to engage in too much processing. Wray also proposed that both parties are to some extent obliged to find ways of minimizing their processing, because the grammar of human languages is too complex for human memory to cope with all the time (Wray, 2002, p. 15). Thus, Wray converged with Sinclair’s proposal (Sinclair, 1991) that the formulaic option, which he calls the idiom principle, is the default processing strategy. Analytic processing, the open choice principle in Sinclair’s terminology, is invoked only when the idiom principle fails. As highlighted earlier this is a crucial point for English as a Lingua Franca research because being the default processing strategy the formulaic option (i.e., idiom principle) is expected to be most salient in language production in general including ELF. It means that the speaker is expected to come up primarily with utterances that contain ready-made, formulaic expression(s) if possible, appropriate and plausible. If it is not, the open choice principle steps in. This looks like a logical mechanism in L1 production where participants can rely on the mutual understanding of formulaic expressions that are motivated by

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common ground, conventions, commonalities, norms, common beliefs and mutual knowledge. Besides, the use of formulas will give them the tranquility of mind that they will be understood since formulaic expressions are usually not polysemic. But is this also the case in ELF speakers when they use their L2? Does their mind pre-wired for the idiom principle? In order for us to answer these questions, we first need to look at how the idiom principle works in L1 language production and then in L2. Let me make this clear that in L1 production there is hardly any doubt about the salience of the idiom principle. Coulmas (1981pp. 1–3) argued that much of what is actually said in everyday conversation is by no means unique. Rather, a great deal of communicative activity consists of enacting routines making use of prefabricated linguistic units in a well-known and generally accepted manner. He continued claiming that successful co-ordination of social intercourse heavily depends on standardized ways of organizing interpersonal encounters. Howarth (1998) and Pang (2020) also talked about the fact that native speaker linguistic competence has a large and significant phraseological component. This, in fact, has a profound effect on how we explain ELF interaction. In L1 both figurative and formulaic language are the result of conventionalization and standardization, which is supported by regular use of certain prefabricated lexical units in a speech community. However, ELF represents a temporary speech community with limited access to idiomaticity of the target/common language. People using a particular language— who belong to a particular speech community— have preferred ways of saying things (cf. Wray, 2002; Kecskes, 2007) and preferred ways of organizing thoughts (Kecskes, 2007, 2014). Preferred ways of saying things are generally reflected in the use of formulaic language and metaphorical/figurative language, while preferred ways of organizing thoughts can be detected through analyzing, for instance: the use of subordinate conjunctions, clauses, discourse markers and sequential structure of discourse segments. Selecting the right words and expressions and formulating utterances in ways preferred by the native speakers of that language (nativelike selection) is more important than syntax. The following example from a sign in an Austrian hotel catering to skiers (source: Octopus, October 1995, Champaign, IL, p.144) demonstrates this clearly. As we can see, the sentence shows wrong word choices but correct syntax. (1) Not to perambulate the corridors in the hours of repose in the boots of descension.

Correct form: Don’t walk in the halls in ski boots at night. It is clear that the author of this sign compiled this sentence by using a dictionary verbatim to convey the meaning needed for the warning sign. The result is understandable, but a native speaker would never say anything even close to this sentence.

6.3

Linguistic Creativity in ELF

6.3

113

Linguistic Creativity in ELF

Now that we have discussed the role of formulaic elements in language use in general, we shall turn to the issue of linguistic creativity in ELF. Relatively small number of studies (e.g. Langlotz, 2006; Holmes, 2007; Prodromou, 2007; Pitzl, 2011, 2012; Wang, 2013) have addressed this problem. As an example, Pitzl’s study (Pitzl, 2012) discussed this topic in depth. She proposed a working definition of linguistic creativity which, in her words is “. . .the creation of new (i.e. non-codified) linguistic forms and expressions in ongoing interaction/discourse or the use of existing forms and expressions in a non-conventional way (Pitzl, 2012, p. 38).” This can be considered both a product-oriented and a process-oriented definition although Pitzl’s main goal is to accommodate the linguistic forms and expressions created by ELF speakers in interactions which do not represent the ‘preferred ways of saying things’ by ENL speakers. Furthermore, relying on Widdowson’s and Pope’s research, Pitzl (2012) emphasized the importance of the idea of “potentialities already available” put forward by Pope who used that with regard to creativity in general: “ ‘[i]nvention’, then, is hardly ever a making-up entirely from scratch. It is the ‘coming-in’ and in effect the ‘coming-together’ of potentialities already available” (Pope, 2005, p. 64). Similarly, Widdowson talked about his concept of virtual language, which refers to a speaker exploit[ing] linguistic resources to produce a novel combination, not allowable by the conventional code, but nevertheless a latent possibility which is virtual in the language though not actually encoded (Widdowson, 1997, p. 137).

I think we must be careful with the idea of ‘potentialities already available’ and ‘virtual language’ in ELF production. There are no concrete examples in Pitzl (2012) to illustrate what this really means in practice. In my view, ‘potentialities already available’ may take us back to Chomsky who speaks about a potential of speakers to create infinite number of sentences within the potentials of a coded system (conventions of language: grammar). If the potential of creating a given form derives from the system itself, we must consider that as a possible product of the system although it is not coded yet. Here are some examples: (2) ELF: The crualism of those people was not understandable. The basical fact remains that the members misused the system.

These are all ‘potentialities already available’ that were created by stretching the system, creating something that is not encoded in the system yet. This usually happens on the morphological and lexical level. However, this creativity may work differently on the semantic and discourse level. The problem with ELF speakers is that when they use English, they rely not only on their existing limited English language system but also their L1 system. So their ‘creations’ can often be considered as the result of a hybrid or synergic system which

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is neither English nor Russian, German or whatever the L2 of the ELF speaker is, but a blend of the two systems (see Kecskes 2020).1 This is especially true for the semantic and discourse level. That dual language system can create utterances like below. (3) They started the meeting off on a bad foot. You are not very rich in communication.

This type of linguistic creativity can go beyond established norms, and bypass existing rules and break current conventions. It is important to underline that this activity or production should make sense within the confines of the actual situational context. The question is where to draw the dividing line between the products and creations that can still be considered the output of the existing system or a temporary communicative extension of the system (TCE hereafter). By TCE I mean expressions and utterances that violate the existing norms and conventions but still make sense in a given actual situational context and can be considered a possible output of the English language system. These are word-choices and word-combinations and utterances that are conceptually “foreign” for the target language system (English). Here are some examples: (4) Let’s rest the sleeping lion. We connect with them. Can you illuminate my cigarette?

As we can see, these expressions make sense in English. But they are not preferred ways of saying things at all, and unlikely to be used by other speakers. What I am trying to call attention to here is that TCEs play a crucial role in ELF, for they are the results of what I call “deliberate creativity” (see Kecskes, 2016). These TCEs may reflect L1-motivated word selection, unusual syntactic formulations, ad hoc-created metaphors, etc.

6.4

Deliberate Creativity

In ELF both the idiom principle and the economy principle are present just like in L1. But in ELF the functioning of these two principles cannot produce formulaic language the way it does in L1. But because of the priority of the idiom principle in any language production there is a pressure on the hybrid, synergistic system that ELF users rely on to produce more formulaic language. But what type of formulaic language is that? To answer this question, we need to recall the Bolingerian view. Bolinger (1976) referred to prefabricated expressions as “remembering and putting together” which cannot work the way it does in L1 because for “remembering” ELF 1

The example is from Kecskes (2019a) as some of the other ones in this paper.

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Deliberate Creativity

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speakers would need to have access to the same psychological saliency of formulas as L1 speakers do have access to. But this is hardly possible in ELF. However, this problem may be solved by what I called ‘deliberate creativity’ (Kecskes, 2016, pp. 11–12). Deliberate creativity is a process that is used by ELF speakers to create and/or co-construct formulas which either resemble those of L2 (English) or L1 (speaker’s L1) or are just the result of temporary communicative extension of the system (TCE). In order for us to understand this type of ELF processing we need to examine the nature of this ‘deliberate creativity’. First, we need to discuss how idiomatic/formulaic language use fits into creative language processing. Our point of departure should be the hypothesis that prefabricated language does not preclude linguistic creativity. In fact, there is quite a bit of evidence for this in corpus linguistics. Skehan (1998) talked about the fact that “language users are adept at shifting in and out of the analytic mode and move between the systems quite naturally (Skehan, 1998, p. 54).” Some researchers even mentioned that the two types of processing (analytic – holistic) could be viewed as forming a continuum (cf. Skehan, 1998; Wray, 2002; Carter, 2004). In the course of interaction, prefabricated expressions may mean islands of temporary stability demonstrating varying degrees of variation and possibilities for further development in sync with the dynamics of discourse. In this sense, “linguistic creativity refers to the ability of combining prefabricated units with novel items (ad hoc generated items) in a syntax-and discourse-affecting way to express communicative intention and goals and create new meaning” (Kecskes, 2016, p. 12). This ability is an essential part of a person’s language competence that is deployed mainly subconsciously and automatically based on the existing knowledge of the speaker and his/her actual situational communicative needs. As a result, linguistic creativity is a graded phenomenon ranging from the more conventional and predictable to the less conventional and unpredictable. The more conventional and predictable side is operated by the idiom principle while the less conventional and more unpredictable side of the continuum is governed by the open choice principle. Of course, these are just hypothetical ends of the continuum on which there are constant alterations in any communicative process. CONVENTIONAL and PREDICTABLE UNCONVENTIONAL and UNPREDICTABLE

More reliance on the right end of the continuum (open choice principle) can be called deliberate creativity (Kecskes, 2016). It is ‘deliberate’ because it is mostly a conscious process in which language users prefer to generate their own utterances rather than resorting to prefabricated units or the combination of ad hoc generated units and ready-made expressions. The process exists in both L1 and ELF, however, its nature may differ significantly depending on which language the speaker (L1 or L2) uses. In L1, deliberate creativity is reflected mainly in the ways in which the speaker tries to manipulate speaker meaning, while in L2 or ELF it can be

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demonstrated through the significant overuse of ad hoc generated utterances and less reliance on L2 (English, target language) formulaic expressions.

6.4.1

Deliberate Creativity in L1

The speaker can fully control what s/he wants the audience to believe/understand but s/he cannot control what the audience will actually believe and/or understand. The two aspects of speaker meaning (individual and conversational) and recipient design give the chance to the speaker to manipulate speaker meaning according to his/her needs; that is to leave meaning conversationally open for interpretation or signal his/her intention with cues, and markers. In the abovementioned cases, the speaker aims to promote his/her own agenda by trying to manipulate the interpretation process. There are several instances of this case. However, here, as an example we will focus only on one of them: manipulating hearer’s salience. Sometimes the speaker attempts to manipulate the saliency of certain linguistic expressions for the hearer. This manipulation is usually based on collective salience. We can demonstrate this manipulation the following example: (5) In one of his films survivors, Robin Williams says the following line: - I had to sleep with the dogs. Platonically, of course. . .” The speaker thinks that the sexual connotation of ‘sleep with’ (collective salience) is too strong so a clarification is indispensable. He tries to cancel this effect with the adverb ‘platonically’.

6.4.2

Deliberate Creativity in ELF

Deliberate creativity works differently in ELF. Since ELF interlocutors are all nonnative speakers of English, we will need to look first at how the default idiom principle affects their L2 use at different levels of proficiency. Recent research in L2 (relevant to ELF) has demonstrated that there is a difference in formulaic language use between less and more proficient non-native speakers. Based on the longitudinal studies both Howarth (1998) and Ortaçtepe (2012) came to the conclusion that less proficient learners pick up formulaic expressions and overuse them, while more advanced learners prefer to generate their own sentences rather than resorting to prefabricated units. Wray and Perkins (2000, p. 23) argued that formulaic expressions provide non-native speakers with survival phrases that achieve basic socio-interactional functions. They have automatic access to prefabricated chunks, and this eases communication especially in the early stages of language learning (cf. Nattinger & DeCarrico, 1992; Wray, 2002). However, there is a problem with this practice for a

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couple of reasons. Firstly, L2 or ELF users may pick up formulas easily, but this may happen without their clear knowledge of the conceptual load attached to those expressions with psychological saliency in the given speech community. It may take them quite a long time through a trial and error process to actually acquire the appropriate use of those expressions. Secondly, their selection of formulas may be subjective (e.g. Kecskes, 2007; Dynel, 2020; Ortaçtepe, 2012). L2 users/learners pick up expressions that they like for some reasons, and may overuse them such as ‘you know’; ‘you bet’; ‘I’ll talk to you later’; ‘let me tell you something’, etc. Also, according to Segalowitz and Freed (2004, p. 403), at later stages of language development, formulaic expressions function as a database from which language learners abstract recurrent patterns, leading to the mastery of grammatical regularities. Wray (2002, p. 147) considers this creative tendency of advanced learners as a major problem resulting from the production of perfectly grammatical utterances that are simply not used by native speakers. This claim is in line with my finding about the language use of lingua franca speakers (see report in Kecskes, 2007). Further, Pawley and Syder (1983) referred to this kind of ‘deliberate creativity’ of relatively advanced L2 learners as a process of over-generating and producing grammatical, non-idiomatic utterances due to not having accumulated the native repertoire of formulaic expressions as nativelike competence and fluency demand such idiomaticity (see in Ellis 2003, p. 12). The danger for lingua franca speakers in the use of formulaic language, as mentioned above, is that they often pick up these expressions without comprehending the sociocultural load attached to the expressions. This is especially true for situation-bound utterances in which, it is usually the figurative meaning that is dominant rather than the literal meaning. In ELF communication, if one of the interactants does not know this figurative meaning and processes the utterance literally, misunderstanding or confusion may occur, such as in the following conversation. (6) Conversation between a Chinese student and a Turkish student: T: - You look worried. Why don’t you tell me what bothers you? Ch: - I have no reason not to tell you. T: - Ok, then go ahead.

Here the Turkish student used the expression ‘why don’t you tell me. . .’ in a figurative sense as a formula, but the Chinese student seems to have processed it literally. At least this is what his response shows. He assured the Turkish student that there was no reason for him not to tell his friend what bothered him. I would not call this case a complete misunderstanding, but certainly there was some kind of confusion between the two ELF speakers. In order to avoid cases like this, ELF speakers usually stick to literal meanings of expressions rather than figurative ones. The use of semantically transparent language resulted in fewer misunderstandings and communication breakdowns than was expected in my studies (Kecskes, 2007, 2015). This finding corresponds with House’s observation about the same phenomena (House, 2003).

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The most important and unique role of deliberate creativity in ELF is the endeavor of ELF speakers to create their own temporary formulas. This phenomenon fully confirms the general priority of the idiom principle as most salient in any language production. Speakers —monolinguals or multilinguals alike — make an effort to use formulas, no matter which language of theirs they use. In my former studies, the formulas our international interlocutors created can be split into two categories (Kecskes, 2007, 2015). In the first category, we can find expressions that are used only once and demonstrate an effort to sound metaphorical and/or idiomatic. This endeavor is usually driven either by the L1 of the speaker in which there may be an equivalent expression for the given idea, or by not remembering the exact words within the sequence. For instance: (7) Formulas that demonstrate an effort to sound metaphorical. – It is almost skips from my thoughts. – You are not very rich in communication. – Take a school. (8) Not remembering the exact words within the sequence Draw the limits (cf. ‘draw the line’), Preserve their face (cf. ‘save [sb’s] face’), Turn a blank eye (cf. ‘turn a blind eye’), (These examples are from the VOICE database)

These expressions are created on the spot during a conversation and are also picked up by the other members of the temporary speech community. One of the participants creates or coins an expression that is needed in the discussion of a given topic. However, this is just a temporary formula that may be entirely forgotten when the conversation is over. The avoidance of genuine formulaic language, the creation of temporary formulas and preference for semantically transparent expressions can be explained by another factor. The analysis of the database and the ‘think aloud’ sessions in two studies (see Kecskes, 2007, 2015) shed light on something that is hardly discussed in the literature. It seems that multiword chunks might not help L2 language use and ELF use in the same way as they help L1 processing. ELF speakers usually do not know how flexible formulas are linguistically, namely, what structural changes they allow without losing their original function and/or meaning. Linguistic form is a semantic scaffold; if it is defective, the meaning will inevitably fall apart. This is one of the things that lingua franca speakers worry about as was revealed in the ‘think aloud’ sessions of my studies (Kecskes, 2007, 2015). Lingua franca speakers may not be able to continue the expression if they break down somewhere in the middle of its use. Let us look at and example. (9) A Korean and a Turkish student are talking: T: - I like but . . . they like but they haven’t time. I see in Albany too many people like sport. And they run and fitness. K: -Yeah. (continued)

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Summary

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T: - They fitness. Too many people play tennis. So I think they sport. They, they keep yourselves healthy. ..They keep healthy yourselves. . . K: - Healthy. T: - Yes. K: - I agree with you.

As we can see, the Turkish student tried to use the formula ‘keep oneself healthy’. However, he had a problem with the use of the appropriate pronoun. Instead of using ‘themselves’, he inserted ‘yourselves’ into the formula. However, he did not realize that the problem is not with the place of the pronoun in the sequence but with the selection of the pronoun.

6.5

Summary

It was argued that language use is a well-balanced alternation between more conventional and novel, ad hoc generated units and a blend of the two. It does not matter whether the speaker uses his/her L1 or L2, this creative blending of prefabricated units with ad hoc generated ones prevails. The only question is which side of the alternation can be considered dominant in a particular moment in an interaction, and this always depends on the speaker’s communicative intention and needs. What makes language a language is the presence of norms, standards and conventions, both in the linguistic system and in its practical use (e.g. Kecskes, 2019b; Mao, 2020). Commonalities, conventions, common beliefs, shared knowledge and the like all create a core common ground, a kind of collective salience on which L1 communication is based on. This inherent endeavor of human beings to create mutual understanding in any speech community results in an everlasting process of reoccurring attempts for normativization and conventionalization in the language system through its use. The result is prefabricated language that functions as core common ground. This endeavor for normativization is present in ELF as well. However, when this, often prefabricated language-dependent, core common ground of the English language appears to be missing or limited, ELF interlocutors cannot take them for granted, rather they need to co-construct them, at least temporarily. So, there appears to be a shift in emphasis from the communal to the individual, from the more conventional to the less conventional, from the more formulaic to the less formulaic as we claimed in the introduction. Consequently, the importance of deliberate creativity increases in L2 language use in general, and ELF in particular because speaker rely more on the “open choice principle”. However, in ELF this principle is used not only for generating language ad hoc but also generating new temporary formulas that can be considered temporary extensions of the target language system. This is how ELF speakers try to compensate for the limited access

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to the idiomaticity of the target language, and this is why deliberate creativity is a driving force in ELF interactions. Acknowledgement The paper was first published in 2020 in Studies in Pragmatics (The Pragmatics Society of Japan), Vol. 22, 1-13. Thanks to the Pragmatics Society of Japan for permission to reuse the text.

References Bolinger, D. (1976). Meaning and memory. Forum Linguisticum, 1, 1–14. Carter, R. (2004). Language and creativity: The art of common talk. Routledge. Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. MIT Press. Coulmas, F. (Ed.). (1981). Conversational routine: Explorations in standardized communication situations and prepatterned speech. Mouton. Dynel, M. (2020). Laughter through tears: Unprofessional review comments as humor on the ShitMyReviewersSay twitter account. Intercultural Pragmatics, 17(5), 513–544. Ellis, R. (2003). Task-based language learning and teaching. Oxford University Press. Holmes, J. (2007). Making humour work: Creativity on the job. Applied Linguistics, 28(4), 518–537. House, J. (2003). Misunderstanding in intercultural university encounters. In J. House, G. Kasper, & S. Ross (Eds.), Misunderstanding in social life: Discourse approaches to problematic talk (pp. 22–56). Longman. Howarth, P. (1998). Phraseology and second language proficiency. Applied Linguistics, 19(1), 24–44. Jespersen, O. (1904). How to teach a foreign language? S. Sonnenschein & Co. Kecskes, I. (2007). Formulaic language in English lingua franca. In I. Kecskes & L. R. Horn (Eds.), Explorations in pragmatics: Linguistic, cognitive and intercultural aspects (pp. 191–219). Mouton de Gruyter. Kecskes, I. (2014). Intercultural pragmatics. Oxford University Press. Kecskes, I. (2015). “Is the idiom principle blocked in bilingual L2 production?” chapter 2. In R. Heredia & A. Cieslicka (Eds.), Bilingual figurative language processing (pp. 28–53). Cambridge University Press. Kecskes, I. (2016). Deliberate creativity and formulaic language use. In A. Keith, C. Alessandro, & K. Istvan (Eds.), Pragmemes and theories of language use (Perspectives in pragmatics, philosophy & psychology) (Vol. 9, pp. 3–20). Kecskes, I. (2019a). English as a lingua Franca: The pragmatic perspective. Cambridge University Press. Kecskes, I. (2019b). Impoverished pragmatics? The semantics-pragmatics interface from an intercultural perspective. Intercultural Pragmatics, 16(5), 489–517. Kecskes, I. (2020). Situation-bound utterances as pragmatic acts. Journal of Pragmatics, 42(11), 2889–2897. Langlotz, A. (2006). Idiomatic creativity: A cognitive-linguistic model of idiom-representation and idiom-variation in English. Benjamins. Leopold, W. (1930). Polarity in language. Curme volume of linguistics studies, 6(4), 102–109. Mao, T. (2020). Redefining pragmatic competence among modular interactions and beyond. Intercultural Pragmatics, 17(5), 605–631. Miller, J., & Weinert, R. (1998). Spontaneous spoken language: Syntax and discourse. Clarendon Press. Nattinger, J. R., & DeCarrico, J. S. (1992). Lexical phrases and language teaching. Oxford University Press.

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Ortaçtepe, D. (2012). The development of conceptual socialization in international students: A language socialization perspective on conceptual fluency and social identity. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Pawley, A., & Syder, F. H. (1983). Two puzzles for linguistic theory: Nativelike selection and nativelike fluency. Language and Communication, 5, 191–226. Pitzl, M. L. (2012). Creativity meets convention: Idiom variation and remetaphorization in ELF. Journal of English as a Lingua Franca, 1(1). Pitzl, M. L. (2011). Creativity in English as a lingua franca: Idiom and metaphor. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. University of Vienna. Pope, R. (2005). Creativity: Theory, history, practice. Routledge. Prodromou, L. (2007). Bumping into creative idiomaticity. English Today, 23(1), 14–25. Segalowitz, N., & Freed, B. F. (2004). Context, contact, and cognition in oral fluency acquisition: Learning Spanish in at home and study abroad contexts. Studies in Second Language Acquisition, 26, 173–199. Sinclair, J. (1987). Collocation: A progress report. In R. Steele & T. Treadgold (Eds.), Language topics: Essays in honour of Michael Halliday (pp. 319–331). John Benjamins. Sinclair, J. (1991). Corpus, concordance, collocation. Oxford University Press. Skehan, P. (1998). A cognitive approach to language learning. Oxford University Press. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance: Communication and cognition (2nd ed.). Blackwell. Pang, Y. (2020). The cognitive saliency of word associations of verbs of speech in English as a lingua Franca interactions. Intercultural Pragmatics, 17(4), 417–443. Wang, Y. (2013). Non-conformity to ENL norms: A perspective from Chinese English users. Journal of English Lingua Franca, 2(2), 255–282. Widdowson, H. G. (1997). EIL, ESL, EFL: Global issues and local interests. World Englishes, 16(1), 146–153. Wray, A. (2002). Formulaic language and the lexicon. Cambridge University Press. Wray, A., & Perkins, M. R. (2000). The functions of formulaic language: An integrated model. Language & Communication, 20(1), 1–28.

Chapter 7

Why Do We Say What We Say the Way We Say It?

Abstract This paper seeks answer to the question why exactly we say what we say the way we say it. Although Giora argued that cognitively prominent salient meanings, rather than literal meanings, play the most important role both in production and comprehension of language, most attention in pragmatics research has been focused on comprehension rather than production. This paper claims that salience plays as important a role in language production as in comprehension and discusses how salience of an entity can be interpreted as a measure of how well an entity stands out from other entities and biases the preference of the individual in selecting words, expressions, and complex constructs in the process of communication. It is argued that there is a unique interplay between linguistic salience and perceptual salience both in production and comprehension. The role of perceptual and linguistic salience involves a relation between prominence of entities in a ranking, and preference of a choice among alternatives. From the perspective of interlocutors, three theoretically significant categories are distinguished: inherent salience, collective salience, and emergent situational salience. Inherent salience is largely equivalent to cognitive status. It is characterized as a natural built-in preference in the general conceptual and linguistic knowledge of the speaker, which has developed as a result of prior experience with the use of lexical items and situations, and changes both diachronically and synchronically. Inherent salience is affected by collective salience and emergent situational salience. Collective salience is shared with the members of a speech community, and changes diachronically. Emergent situational salience that changes synchronically refers to the salience of specific objects or linguistic elements in the context of language production and comprehension, and may accrue through such determinants as vividness, speaker motivation and recency of mention. In an actual situational context inherent, individual salience is affected and shaped both by collective and situational salience. When the speaker is faced with the choice of a word or an expression, a ranking of the available choices is obtained on the basis of the degree of salience of entities in the generation context. The word or phrase then is selected for utterance on the basis of maximum salience. This paper argues that inherent salience is dominated by linguistic salience, while emergent situational salience is usually governed by perceptual salience. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_7

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As stated above salience is equally important both in production and comprehension. However, the focus of this paper will mainly be on speaker production because this issue has received less attention so far. Keywords Socio-cognitive approach · Linguistic salience · Perceptual salience · Cooperation · Egocentrism · Accessibility

7.1

Introduction

As a semiotic notion, salience refers to the relative importance or prominence of signs. The relative salience of a particular sign when considered in the context of others helps an individual to quickly rank large amounts of information by importance and thus give attention to that which is most important. We tend to overestimate the causal role (salience) of information we have available to us both perceptually and linguistically.

7.1.1

Linguistic Salience and Perceptual Salience

Linguistic salience describes the accessibility of entities in a speaker’s or hearer’s memory and how this accessibility affects the production and interpretation of language. Several theories of linguistic salience have been developed to explain how the salience of entities affects the form of referring expressions, as in the Givenness Hierarchy (Chafe, 1976; Givon, 1992; Gundel et al., 1993), or how it affects the local coherence of discourse, as in Centering Theory (Grosz & Sidner, 1986; Grosz et al., 1995), which was further developed into a Meta-informative Centering by Wlodarczyk and Wlodarczyk (2006) or in Giora’s Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora 1997, 2003) just to mention a few. I also include Jaszczolt’s (2005) concepts of “primary meaning” and “pragmatic default” in this list, because the latter also deals with salience, albeit from a somewhat different perspective. Perceptual salience refers to information that is the focus of people’s attention. Perceptual salience is about how the state or quality of information stands out relative to neighboring items. This paper argues that there is a bidirectional influence between linguistic salience and perceptual salience. This claim differs from the traditional view. There are two approaches to the issue of how language interacts with perceptual processing. According to the traditional view, language is “merely the formal and expressive medium that is [used] to describe mental representations” (Li & Gleitman, 2002, p. 290). Language is just a tool for reporting perceptual or conceptual representations, rather than shaping and modulating them (Bloom & Keil, 2001; Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005; Pinker, 1994). According to this view, linguistic-perceptual interactions are seen in terms of recoding perceptual experiences into verbal ones (e.g., Dessalegn & Landau, 2008; Munnich & Landau, 2003). Lupyan and Spivey (2010) represents an opposing view, which argues that language

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dynamically modulates visual processing. Although they focused only on one aspect of this interaction—the degree to which processing spoken labels facilitates the visual processing of the named items—I agree with their claim and speculate further that there is a bidirectional influence between linguistic salience and perceptual salience, which will be discussed later.

7.1.2

Need for Research on How Salience Affects Production

Giora (1997, 2003) claimed that cognitively prominent salient meanings, rather than literal meanings, play the most important role both in production and comprehension of language. There are numerous works analyzing how salience affects comprehension, but only a little number of studies have focused on production. The main reason is that production is simply inherently more difficult to study. It is quite hard to design appropriate tests for the effects of salience on language production because we have access only to what is actually produced, not all the options that were left out. Despite this difficulty, some studies have made efforts to investigate the subject. For instance, the paper of Givoni, Giora and Bergerbest (see in this special issue) explores how speakers use linguistic markers to explicitly cue addressees to multiple meanings of concepts.

7.2

Former Research

Clark Hull (1943, p. 229) was likely to be the first to have tackled salience in production with his principles of behavior. He argued that in both comprehension and production, more salient meanings would be processed first. In their studies Osgood and Bock (1977) and MacWhinney (1977) entertained the idea that the attentional processing of the cognized world may somehow be reflected in how people organize their production and comprehension of sentences. Osgood and Bock (1977) explicitly suggested that the referents’ salience status acting as an exogenous determinant of the distribution of a speaker’s attention should promote the referents currently in focus to the prominent positions in a spoken sentence. MacWhinney (1977) presented the “Starting Point” hypothesis. Although it is not specifically geared toward sentence production, the hypothesis predicts that one of the main factors determining the assignment of the prominent positions in a sentence is the interlocutor’s perspective or attentional focus. Osgood and Bock (1977) distinguished three principles of salience: naturalness, vividness, and motivation of the speaker. All three principles are based on the assumption that more prominent or more salient items appear earlier in a sentence. Osgood and Bock argued that naturalness is exhibited in the fact that subjects almost always come before objects in languages around the world because the subject is more prominent than the object. This prominence often arises naturally from a series

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of relations. It should be noted here that there are subject-prominent and topic-prominent languages. Li (1976) distinguished topic-prominent languages, like Chinese and Japanese, from subject-prominent languages, like English. Topicprominent languages have morphology or syntax that highlights the distinction between the topic and the comment (what is said about the topic). Topic-comment structure may be independent of the syntactic ordering of subject, verb and object like in Chinese. See for instance (1): (1) Yuàn zi lǐ ting zhe yí liàng chē. In the courtyard is parked a car.

The topic of the sentence (defined as “old” information) takes precedence in the sentence. The sentence does not follow normal subject-first word order, but adheres perfectly to the topic-comment structure. Vividness refers to the affective features of a particular element. The more emotional intensity a unit carries, the more likely it will appear earlier in the sentence. Emotional intensity naturally raises the level of prominence for the speaker, making it only natural that such a movement should occur. See for instance (2) and (3): (2) Never have I got such a slap in the face. (3) To grandma’s house we go.

Motivation relates to the prominence a speaker gives to a particular unit that otherwise may carry no special significance. This principle has been thought to carry the largest effect of the three principles. However, Osgood and Bock’s study claimed otherwise. Naturalness was found to be highly regulatory in terms of ordering. The earlier occurring elements of an utterance will be more salient because they have more prominence in the mind of both the speaker and the hearer. Ordering is influenced by the salience prominence of the agent (for active relations) or figure (for stative relations). Orderings occurred as predicted in the various test situations. The basic hypothesis was that speakers around the world promote the more salient elements of an utterance to the beginning of that utterance. According to Osgood and Bock this phenomenon derives originally from the unconscious forward movement of items that have inherent salience. Their study showed that the effects of inherent salience consistently trumped those that would need to gain salience from speaker motivation. Speakers naturally fronted items that occur in a number of situations that inherently comprise an element of increased salience. These situations included cases of actors and instruments, which were found to be more active or potent (increasing their salience); animateness, for which living elements were always evaluated as more active and more meaningful than non-living ones; and for mobility, where mobile pieces were more salient than non-mobile ones (tongue vs. tooth, animal vs. vegetable, etc.). Palpability did not hold the same effect, as the more palpable elements were not found to be significantly more salient

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than their impalpable partners (cube vs. square, ball vs. smoke, etc.). Subordinates (September as compared to month, baby as compared to human, tarantula as compared to spider, etc.), however, were found to be considerably more salient. Since inherently salient items naturally move to the beginning of utterances, it makes sense that this trend would not be continued when the salience of the element in question is not inherent. Human speech production is expected to follow a principle that is already naturally in place. The claim made by this principle has effects that reach well beyond these observations. The analysis of the experimental data in Osgood and Bock (1977) revealed several important things. First, speakers tended to use naturalness as the main determinant of the order of mentioning in the sentence (in other words, they relied heavily on the natural event causality and the canonical grammar of English). Second, Agents were more likely to be mentioned before Patients. Third, referents of a higher vividness status were more likely to be mentioned before the ones of a lower vividness status. Osgood and Bock (1977) contrasted their findings to the well-known tendency of the old discourse information to appear before the novel material. They claimed that control of the ordering through givenness is not as powerful as the same process driven by the factors related to “naturalness” and “vividness.” They, however, acknowledged that the problem with this interpretation is that the “perceptual” properties of the referents, such as vividness, were derived solely from the lexical ratings. Whether such vividness reflects a tendency for a preferential perceptual treatment of corresponding world referents is not at all clear. Later I will argue that in the symbiosis of perceptual and linguistic salience the former may play the leading role. Languages around the world further demonstrate the fronting of salience-high elements through topicalization (see example 1), which very frequently is manifest through forward movement. This means that the element intended to have the greatest salience or importance is placed at the beginning of the sentence, regardless of its grammatical category. In configurational languages, a syntactic change accompanies this movement; in non-configurational languages, such a change is unnecessary as the relevant morphemes still clarify the meaning of the sentence. (4) English (configurational) Peter likes dogs. It is Peter who likes dogs. (structural change) (5) Russian (non-configurational) Petr ljubit sobak. Ljubit Petr sobak. Sobak ljubit Petr. (word order change)

This movement appears to follow the theory of naturalness primarily through generative effect. Speakers consider whatever they have topicalized to be most salient in their utterance, and therefore simply follow the standard rules of the principle of naturalness and promote that item to position prominence. Although this explanation makes some sense, Osgood and Bock (1977) made an interesting distinction. They claimed that elements whose high salience is the result of speaker cognition rather than inherent attribution are categorized differently. Osgood and Bock proposed a theory concerning motivation of the speaker, which includes a host

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of salience effects that closely mirror those of the principle of naturalness in many aspects, but were shown to differ in some key ways. Their study showed that differences might exist between the processes that apply to inherently or motivationally salient items. (This finding will be very important in some further discussion.) Osgood and Bock (1977) found that elements of inherent salience have a stronger effect on ordering than elements of motivated salience. This claim basically coincides with what Giora said in her graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997, 2003). Of course, she spoke about linguistic salience and comprehension. However, further research is needed, especially in production, because a speaker’s emergent motivation (that I call “emergent situational salience”) could easily overcome the effects of inherent salience in ordering in the process of communication. We can topicalize any element of a sentence that we feel is most important, so shouldn’t what we feel is important trump whatever effect naturalness has? I will return to this question later. Continuing on the work of Osgood and Bock, Rosemary Stevenson (2002) studied referent generation from the perspective of salience. Her findings were rather clear in demonstrating that salience does affect the choice of whether someone will refer to an entity in an utterance, though they went into further detail in a number of areas. Osgood and Bock’s principles of vividness and naturalness are again confirmed in this study, though Stevenson adds to the idea some relatively new elements. Animacy was found to be a deciding factor in salience—verb-evoked salience (from implicit causality verbs and the like) and proximity salience are only applicable when the subject is animate. Inanimate subjects failed to carry the salience required to properly trigger the naturalness or vividness principles. Stevenson (2002) also proposed a theory of salience effects blended with the Centering Theory (Grosz & Sidner, 1986). Her work dealt primarily with the generation of pronouns. Centering Theory posits two local discourse centers: Cf (which is forward-looking) and Cb (which is backward looking). The Cf is used to introduce entities, whereas the Cb is used to refer back to previously mentioned entities. Since multiple Cfs can occur in a single utterance, the most salient of these is also identified. This is labeled as the Cp, or “preferred center.” Several methods have been proposed for ranking Cfs, but current research is trending toward structure being the main factor, with ranking determined by order of occurrence—that which comes first is ranked highest. This fits very well with Osgood and Bock’s (1977) theory of naturalness. So what do Cfs and Cbs have to do with salience and production? Stevenson (2002) claims that the Cb will be present in the choice of what referent a pronoun takes. Whatever realized Cf in the previous utterance (Un-1) is the highest ranked element, so this will be the referent for the Cb in the current utterance (Un). Gordon et al. (1993) made the claim that the pronominalization of the Cb actually increased the coherence of the discourse as it forced relational cohesion in the mind of the listener, because using a pronoun naturally makes the listener go back and relate the previous utterance to the current one. If the pronoun is left out in favor of an actual name, it may suggest to the listener that the sentences are somehow not meant to correlate, as the interpretation can be that this is a Cf instead of a Cb. In a study by

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The Socio-Cognitive Framework

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Stevenson et al. (1994), it was found that the salience of the antecedent in Un-1 affected the choice of entity referred to in Un, but not how it was referred to, which was chosen instead by the grammatical role of the entity. Stevenson also claimed that, “the choice of who to refer to in an utterance depends on the salience of the entity in the speaker’s mental model of the preceding utterance” (Stevenson, 2002, p. 188).

7.3

The Socio-Cognitive Framework

Salience in this paper is discussed in a socio-cognitive approach (SCA), which was proposed by Kecskes (2008, 2010). This approach unites the societal and individual features of communication, and considers communication a dynamic process in which individuals are not only constrained by societal conditions but they also shape them at the same time. SCA emphasizes not only the role of co-construction, but also the importance of individual prior knowledge as basis of salience in the interaction. It points out the complex role and interplay of social and cultural models and private individual mental models, and how these are applied categorically and/or reflectively by individuals in response to socio-cultural environmental feedback mechanisms, and how this leads to and explains different meaning outcomes and knowledge transfer. In meaning construction and comprehension, individuals rely both on pre-existing encyclopedic knowledge based on their prior experience and current knowledge co-constructed by interlocutors in the process of interaction. In the SCA interlocutors are considered as social beings searching for meaning with individual minds embedded in a socio-cultural collectivity (2010; 2012). Individual traits (prior experience --!salience --!egocentrism --!attention) interact with societal traits (actual situational experience --! relevance --!cooperation --!intention). Each trait is the consequence of the other. Prior experience results in salience which leads to egocentrism that drives attention. Intention is a cooperationdirected practice that is governed by relevance which (partly) depends on actual situational experience (Table 7.1). In the socio-cognitive paradigm, communication is driven by the interplay of cooperation required by societal conditions and egocentrism rooted in prior experience of the individual and triggered by salience. Consequently, egocentrism and cooperation are not mutually exclusive phenomena. They are both present in all

Table 7.1 Individual vs. social traits

Individual trait Attention Egocentrism Salience Prior experience

Social trait Intention Cooperation Relevance Actual situational experience

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stages of communication to a different extent because they represent the individual and societal traits of the dynamic process of communication (Kecskes, 2010). We need to make a distinction between a conscious type of egocentrism that is driven by the preferences of the speaker as discussed in the relevance theory (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1995), and a subconscious, automatic speech behavior of the interlocutor that cognitive psychologists talk about (e.g., Keysar & Bly, 1995; Barr & Keysar, 2005). Cooperation was questioned by Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) when it referred to counter-cases of cooperation, with interlocutors being unwilling to build relevance because of their preferences for certain interests, as opposed to cases when they are unable to be relevant because of the lack of the needed information or mental resources. In the RT, the interlocutors are free to be cooperative or uncooperative, and their preferences for cooperation or the reverse are driven by their own interests. Cognitive psychologists, however, talk about a different type of egocentrism. Several researchers (e.g., Keysar & Bly, 1995; Barr & Keysar, 2005; Giora, 2003) have indicated that speakers and hearers are egocentric to a surprising degree, and individual, egocentric endeavors of interlocutors play a much more decisive role in the initial stages of production and comprehension than current pragmatic theories envision. Their egocentric behavior is rooted in the interlocutors’ greater reliance on their own knowledge instead of mutual knowledge. Egocentrism means that interlocutors activate and bring up the most salient information to the needed attentional level in the construction (by the speaker) and comprehension (by the hearer) of communication. Consequently, the speaker will use the linguistic resources (e.g., lexical units, syntactic structures) which s/he thinks are most salient for expressing his/her communicative intentions and/or goals; similarly, the hearer will cooperate by capturing those salient units and assigning them a proper place in the communicational process. Because of their different knowledge bases, the frequency/rituality of their knowledge in the situation, and the attendant attentional resources available to them for processing the salient items, the interlocutors’ knowledge has different levels of salience; as a result, they conduct the attentional processing of communication in an egocentric manner, as for instance in (6): (6)

Chris’s friend Peter arrived by plane and Chris met him at the airport. Chris: Are you hungry? Peter: I had something to eat on the plane. I am OK. Chris: All right. Let’s go to a Wendy’s.

In this conversation, Peter’s utterance, “I had something to eat on the plane” can be interpreted in three different ways: kind of hungry, not hungry, and don’t really know. However, his adding, “I am OK,” points to implying “not hungry.” Chris either misses this interpretation or thinks that his friend needs encouragement. Or, maybe, he is hungry himself. In any case, his suggestion to go to a Wendy’s does not quite match Peter’s intention.

7.4

Utterance Generation in SCA

7.4

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Utterance Generation in SCA

SCA demonstrates a functional and cognitive view of utterance production, according to which utterance structures reveal the cognitive processes involved in the preparation and production of sentences. Basic cognitive operations, such as memory retrieval and attentional tracking of entities, therefore become important phenomena underlying aspects of utterance production. By producing an utterance, the speaker makes a commitment to some information or action s/he can be held accountable for. However, the degree of the speaker’s commitment and accountability varies between saying and implying. Haugh (2010) argued that where two (or more) interlocutors co-construct what is said, the speaker generally holds him/herself accountable for that interpreting, while in the case of implying, where two (or more) interlocutors co-construct an implicature, the degree to which the speaker should hold him/herself accountable for that interpreting is often more open to discussion. This is what happens in example (6). Haugh added that he did not want to suggest that speakers are always held less accountable for meanings achieved through implying, because implicatures cannot always be legitimately cancelled (Burton-Roberts, 2006; Jaszczolt, 2009). Instead, he proposed that a richer understanding of speaker meanings may be derived through greater exploration of the ways in which interlocutors create meanings in interaction.

7.4.1

The Mechanism

In order to explain sentence production, SCA adopts Levelt’s modular approach to explain perceptual, conceptual, and linguistic processes during production of sentences in different languages (Levelt, 1989; Bock & Levelt, 1994). The model includes three levels or stages of sentence generation distinguished as (1) MESSAGE component, (2) GRAMMATICAL component, and (3) PHONOLOGICAL component or ARTICULATOR (see Fig. 7.1, adopted from Bock & Levelt, 1994). Accordingly, the production stages are as follows: PERCEPTUAL (from perceptual analysis to rapid apprehension) ! CONCEPTUAL (from lemma selection to lexical access) ! LINGUISTIC (from lexical retrieval to phonological encoding).

Each of the processing stages receives input from the preceding level. At the first step of producing an utterance, a communicative intention is created. This intention is called a message (cf. Garrett, 1975). At the message stage, pre-verbal thought (intention) is processed, and organized into a conceptual scheme of the event before any linguistic processing occurs. It is at this message level that salience comes in as an important factor. The perceptual effects are supposed to be the most active here, biasing conceptualization of the event according to the event’s salience map. The message captures features of the speaker’s intended meaning and provides the raw material for grammatical encoding. The grammatical component has two sub-stages:

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Fig. 7.1 Levelt’s modular approach

functional processing level and positional processing level. The functional level is responsible for word selection: selecting lemmas. Lemmas are “amalgams” of an individual lexical concept’s properties, including its semantic representation and its morpho-syntactic features (cf. Myachykov, 2007). However, lemmas are not yet lexical forms. This is also the level in which grammatical functions, like Subject and Object are assigned. Lemmas and grammatical function information are fed into the positional sub-component. At this sub-level representations of words are sequentially inserted into a sentence structure that later becomes fixed as the order of the elements in an utterance. This ordering may not be imposed during functional processing. Evidence for this comes from different types of errors. For instance, according to Garrett (1982) quoted by Myachykov, 2007, when sounds are exchanged, they originate in the same phrase 87% of the time as opposed to whole word exchanges that occur within the same phrases only 19% of the time. Finally, at the phonological level, the phonological forms for the words are retrieved and an overt utterance is produced.

7.4.2

Selection and Ordering

What determines the selection of words into which the preverbal thoughts are placed? Past and current research has focused mainly on the formal and structural issues of selection and ordering asking the question, What facilitates the choice of a

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structure and the ordering of the sentence constituents during the production of utterances? However, according to SCA conceptualization and the concept/word (lemma), interface plays a crucial role in shaping structures. Selected words require/ facilitate particular structures and not vice versa. Structural variability depends on the selected words. Before this is explained, we need to review findings on the formal and structural selection and ordering. Evidence from some previous studies points to the role of salience and the distribution of attention in planning and formulation of sentences (e.g., Myachykov, 2007; Tomlin, 1997; Stevenson, 2002). Speakers seem to actively take into account the attentional status of the referents in the scene when they decide what to say first and, depending on that, what structure to use to organize the sentence (Myachykov & Posner, 2005; Myachykov, 2007; Garrod & Pickering, 1999; Sanford, 2001). But several other factors have also been found to influence the accessibility of words and, therefore, their ordering in sentences. Those factors comprise the ones that are related to the referent’s conceptual status: novelty in discourse, animacy, concreteness, definiteness, imageability, and prototypicality. The role of salience and distribution of attention as primary factors affecting selection and ordering somewhat contradicts the traditional view commonly shared in linguistics: “The [sentence] constituents move to certain positions because of their discourse function interpretation” (King, 1995, p. 63). This approach is based on the assumption that the assignment of the syntactic positions in a clause is based on the functional opposition between clause-level theme and rheme, topic and comment, and/or the referents’ semantic roles, like agent and patient. Traditionally, starting from the Prague school of linguistics (e.g., Mathesisus, 1929; Firbas, 1965; Daneš, 1970) and continuing with Halliday (1985), the notion of theme is associated with the element “what one is talking about, the topic,” while the rheme is “what one says about it, the comment” (Daneš, 1970). In this framework, the subject of a sentence frequently acts as the syntactic counterpart of the theme or topic of the utterance. But there may be other structures that highlight the theme through means such as clefts and dislocations. Functional interaction between discourse elements is generally realized as the hierarchy of semantic roles. Fillmore (1968) used the term “agent” to denote a doer of the action while the term “patient” referred to an experiencer of the agent’s action. According to this view, the semantic agent is the most likely candidate to take the position of syntactic subject of a sentence. This is usually so in configurational language, such as English, as for example in (7): (7)

Because of the rain, the driver could hardly see the road.

However, this is not necessarily the case in non-configurational languages such as Russian, Turkish, Hungarian, etc. Example (8) comes from Russian: (8)

Mne nravits’a Masa. (‘I like Mary’)

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In order to understand what makes one referent more prominent than another, why some referents (or, more broadly, concepts) receive preferential treatment by the processor, we need to attend to the notion of conceptual accessibility (Bock & Warren, 1985), which is related to “codeability,” “imageability,” “retrievability,” etc. Bock and Warren said that, “Conceptual accessibility is the ease with which the mental representation of some potential referent can be activated in or retrieved from memory” (Bock & Warren, 1985, p. 50). Sanford and Garrod (1981) developed a similar approach. They claimed that one important function of maintaining coherence in discourse is to constantly perform a successful search for discourse-relevant referents in the memory of the interlocutors. They called such referential situation a scenario. They argued that referents that form part of the current portion of the discourse, and, therefore, are actively maintained in the memory, are more easily (or quickly) accessible than the referents that do not correspond to the current topic of discussion (see Myachykov, 2007). Levelt (1989) also expressed a similar idea. He related the production of referring expressions to the level of the accessibility in terms of the addressee’s mental state. As mentioned above, the information flow in discourse can be divided into old or given information and new information. The term givenness represents the knowledge shared between the interlocutors. Consequently, the given information is that which the speaker believes to be known by the hearer. In contrast, the new information is the information with which the hearer is unfamiliar (cf. Clark & Haviland, 1977; Halliday, 1967/1968; Haviland et al., 1974). A quasi-psychological view on givenness suggests that given versus new distinction correlates with the notion of cognitive activation of the concept. Chafe (1976, p. 30) said that, “Given (or old) information is that knowledge that the speaker assumes to be in the consciousness of the addressee at the time of the utterance. The so-called new information is what the speaker assumes he is introducing into the addressee’s consciousness by what he says.” In fact, here, Chafe implicitly referred to the issue of salience and memorial activation. Explaining what makes the referent given or new, he argued that the new information is “newly activated” at a given point in conversation, while the old information is the one that does not require such activation (Chafe 1994, p. 72). Such activation status, among other things, depends on the speaker’s perspective affected by the salience of the processed material.

7.5 7.5.1

Conceptual Accessibility (CA) and Salience Dimensions of Conceptual Accessibility

Prat-Sala and Branigan (2000) distinguished two dimensions of conceptual accessibility: inherent and derived accessibility dimensions. Inherent accessibility is based upon the intrinsic properties of the concept, such as word frequency status, familiarity, animacy, concreteness, and prototypicality. These are the features the concepts possess, regardless of the interlocutors’ intentions and the current discourse

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status of the corresponding referents. The derived accessibility is a temporary property of the concept that is dependent on the referent’s current activation status in both linguistic and non-linguistic terms. The derived accessibility is driven by various means of priming such as vividness, speaker motivation, and recency of mention. These two CA dimensions can overlap at any given time in discourse if the inherent prominence status is supported by the current, derived prominence status. On the other hand, the contributions of the inherent and derived accessibility forces can be contradictory if the prominence promoted by priming is not supported by the inherent prominence status of a referent. This approach introduces both the global and the local levels for the CA effects to appear. Inherent and derived accessibility looks similar to what Pattabhiraman (1993) called canonical salience and instantial salience. The former is a natural, built-in preference that is inherent in the general conceptual knowledge and linguistic knowledge of the speaker. Canonical salience is rooted in prelinguistic perceptual experience and has resemblance to Osgood’s naturalness. Instantial salience arises in the generation context because of a number of factors, such as vividness, speaker’s motivation, and recency of mention. Pattabhiraman also mentions that the interaction between canonical salience and instantial salience (between built-in factors and situationally arising factors) is a crucial issue of language production.

7.5.2

Salience in SCA

In SCA both linguistic salience and perceptual salience can take three forms: inherent salience, collective salience, and emergent situational salience. The notion of inherent salience is close to what Prat-Sala and Branigan (2000) called “inherent accessibility” and Pattabhiraman (1993) referred to as “canonical salience.” Inherent salience is characterized as a natural preference built into the general conceptual and linguistic knowledge of the speaker; it has developed as a result of prior experience with lexical items, and changes both diachronically and synchronically. Inherent salience is affected by the two other types of salience. Collective salience is shared with the other members of the speech community, and changes diachronically. Emergent situational salience is similar to “derived accessibility” of Prat-Sala and Branigan (2000) and instantial salience of Pattabhiraman (1993). It changes synchronically, and refers to the salience of specific objects and linguistic elements in the context of language production. Situational salience may accrue through such determinants as vividness, speaker motivation, and recency of mention. In an actual situational context, inherent salience is affected and shaped both by collective and situational salience. The following (source: British sitcom) example serves to show the role of salience both in production and comprehension: (9)

Jill: I met with someone today. Jane: Good for you. (continued)

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Why Do We Say What We Say the Way We Say It? Jill: He is a police officer. Jane: Are you in trouble? Jill: Oh, no. . . .

Jill met someone who was a policeman. Conforming with our society’s collective salience, the concept of “policeman” is identified with some kind of trouble. However, this understanding of the concept is privatized in Jill’s case and acquires a positive overtone, as the result of her positive (maybe even romantic) encounter with the policeman. Jane did not have this experience, so she processed the word in accordance with its collective salience, as privatized by her in the given situation. What the speaker meant differed from what the hearer inferred from the same utterance. The difference is the result of the concept’s different privatization, based on prior experience. Emergent situational salience refers to the salience of situational constraints that can derive from factors such as obviousness, vivideness, recency of mention, and others. The cashier’s “How are you doing today?” question in a supermarket requires only a short “Fine, thank you.” The salience of the situation makes the function of the expression obvious. However, actual situational salience can be overridden by both collective salience and inherent salience. In the following example, situational salience is overridden by collective salience, individualized similarly by hearerreaders. (10)

(sign on the door of a department store) “Girls wanted for different positions.”

Not even the actual situational context and environment can subdue the sexual connotation of the sentence. As Giora (2003) claimed, both salient information and contextual knowledge run in parallel, and salient, but contextually inappropriate information may not be discarded. A similar example comes from one of Robin Williams’ films (The Survivors), where the hero says, “I had to sleep with the dogs. Platonically, of course. . . .” The speaker thinks that the sexual connotation of “sleep with” is so strong that a clarification is necessary.

7.5.3

Competition Between Inherent and Emergent Situational Salience

From a theoretical perspective, it is also difficult to reconcile the attended first (instantial salience, situational salience) with the given-before-new (canonical salience, inherent salience) hypothesis. Bock et al. (2004) provided a comprehensive account of this theoretical controversy. They claimed that “the focused first” and “the old first” proposals are contradictory because the information that attracts the focus of attention is typically the new elements of the scene, whereas givenness promotes the already established background. The lexical-semantic factors (e.g.,

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Fig. 7.2 Salience in advertisement

old-before-new) and the perceptual factors (e.g., focused/attended first) should, therefore, produce competing effects. However, this is not necessarily so in the socio-cognitive paradigm. Prior experience also plays some role in attention-getting; i.e., it may determine what the focus of attention becomes. Inherent salience (old-before-new) and emergent situational salience (focused-first) are intertwined and affect each other continuously in the communicative process. The strongest communicative effect is reached when there is no competition between the two, like in the advertisement in Fig. 7.2 below. (11)

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Not only actual situational salience but also perceptual inherent salience direct (especially males’) attention to the girl in the advertisement. However, this is just perceptual salience. Linguistic salience is another matter. The text “Wherever your destination we deliver” has nothing to do with the girl in the picture. The note “girl not included” aims to decrease the powerful perceptual saliency, and solve the discrepancy between perceptual salience and linguistic salience. The interdependence of inherent salience (old-before-new) and emergent situational salience (focused-first) and their bidirectional influence is based on the assumption that inherent salience is dominated by linguistic salience, while emergent situational salience is usually governed by perceptual salience. The following example (12) demonstrates how the two different types of salience operate. (12)

Allen and Sherry (of sitcom two and a half men) are sitting in a restaurant. Allan’s right eye is covered with a bandage so he does not see Sherry very well. Allen:- You know, Sherry, I would really like to see more of you. Sherry:- Maybe, we should wait and see how the night goes. Allen:- Oh, no. I mean I have only got one good eye. Can we change places? Sherry:- Sure.

The conversation demonstrates that Sherry completely misunderstood Allan’s utterance “. . . I would really like to see more of you.” This may be due to the fact that she relied exclusively on linguistic salience and ignored perceptual salience in processing the utterance. Some studies referred to the fact that inherent linguistic salience seems to override perceptual salience in most cases. Osgood and Bock (1977) also showed that the effects of inherent salience consistently trumped those that would need to gain salience from speaker motivation. Lupyan and Spivey (2010) also came to a somewhat similar conclusion when they argued that language dynamically modulates visual processing.

7.6

Differences Between SCA and the Graded Salience Hypothesis

SCA relies on the Graded Salience Hypothesis (GSH) of Giora (1997, 2003) to a significant instant, but it does not accept all of its tenets. GSH basically is hearercentered, while SCA focuses on both production and comprehension. The focus of GSH is on linguistic salience, specifically meaning salience. GSH deals with lexical processing, whereas SCA’s concern is both linguistic salience and perceptual salience. While GSH uses “context” in the sense of actual situational context, SCA emphasizes the difference and interplay between prior context and actual situational context. The main claim of the GSH is that salient information is superior to less salient information and often (Giora, 2003, p. 15), though not always, to unstored

7.6

Differences Between SCA and the Graded Salience Hypothesis

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information, such as novel information or information inferable from context (see Giora, 2003, pp. 10–11; Peleg et al., 2001). As a consequence, salient meanings of lexical units (e.g., conventional, frequent, familiar, or prototypical meanings) are processed automatically, irrespective of contextual information and strength of bias. Although context (“actual situational context”) effects may be fast, they run in parallel with lexical processes and initially do not interact with them (Giora, 2003p. 24). According to the GSH, in language processing, both salient information and contextual knowledge run in parallel, and salient information may not be filtered out even when it is contextually inappropriate. This claim basically questions context-dependency, which is one of the main tenets of current pragmatic theories. While salience, according to the GSH, mainly concerns the storage of knowledge as a function of degree of familiarity, frequency, prototypicality, and conventionality, salience in SCA refers to the contingent effect of salient knowledge as a result of the attentional processing of communication in a particular situation, which facilitates or hampers the expression of intention and the subsequent achievement of communicative effects. Another significant difference between GSH and SCA is that the GSH emphasizes mainly the importance of stored information, while SCA considers salience to be both a stored (inherent salience) and an emergent entity (actual situational salience). According to the GSH (Giora, 2003, p. 15), for information to be salient— to be foremost on a person’s mind—it needs to undergo consolidation, that is, to be stored or coded in the mental lexicon. Stored information is superior to unstored information, such as novel information or information inferable from the context: While salient information is highly accessible, non-salient information requires strongly supportive contextual information to become as accessible as is salient information. Giora seems to equate salient information with consolidated/stored information and nonsalient information with unstored information. This, to me, is somewhat questionable because it considers salience as a relatively static entity that changes only diachronically. According to Giora, in order for something to be salient, it should be stored in the memory. What is ranked “most salient meaning” at the present moment may die off after only a few decades. An example of such diachronical change is the word “gay,” whose most salient meaning in the ‘50 s of the past century was “joyful”; nowadays, this meaning would rank below that of “homosexual.” Salient information can be “disconsolidated” when its salience dies off and the information in question ends up as less salient or non-salient. In contrast, SCA emphasizes that salience is in a continual state of change not only diachronically but synchronically as well (emergent situational salience).

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Why Do We Say What We Say the Way We Say It?

Salience as a Guiding Mechanism in Utterance Production

The role of salience in language production involves a ranking relation of prominence of entities, as well as a preferred choice among alternatives. When the speaker is faced with having to choose a word or an expression, a ranking of the available choices is obtained on the basis of the degree of salience of entities in the context of generation. The word or phrase then is selected for utterance on the basis of maximum salience. Once a speaker has either an a priori or an emergent, co-constructed intention to communicate, s/he should find an appropriate linguistic representation to transfer this message to the hearer. The message of the preverbal thought is made up by combining the concepts that the speaker intends to explicate. Concepts are attached to several possible frames. When a preverbal thought is formulated, the related schemas will be activated. Jackendoff (2002) claimed that concepts have no direct, one-to-one connection with lexical items. A concept may be associated with several lexical expressions, and conversely the process of transforming preverbal thought into linguistic expressions varies among different speakers because they have several options to explicate their intentions. Kecskes (2008, p. 401) argued that there is some difference between speaker processing and hearer processing. When a lexical unit is used by a speaker, private/ subjective contexts attached to this lexical expression are activated top-down in a hierarchical order based on salience. This hierarchical order works differently for the speaker and the hearer. For the speaker, there is primarily an inter-label hierarchy, while for the hearer the intra-label hierarchy comes first. The inter-label hierarchy operates in the first phase of production, when a speaker looks for words to express her/his intention. First, s/he has to select words or expressions from a group of possibilities in order to express his/her communicative intention. These words or expressions constitute a hierarchy from the best fit to those less suited to the idea s/he is trying to express. The hearer, however, has to cope with a different type of hierarchy from her/his perspective. Thus, an intra-label hierarchy is in force when the hearer processes (a) lexical unit(s) in an utterance (or even an entire utterance). The label (word) uttered by the speaker hierarchically triggers the history of that particular label as used by the hearer (but not by the speaker). This may also be a reason for misunderstanding in the communicative process. Compare the following (source: American sitcom) interchange in (13): (13)

Bob: Are you OK? Mary: I am fine. Bob: I know you are fine, but are you OK?

Bob had several options to ask about Mary’s well-being: “Are you OK?”, “Are you fine?”, “Is everything all right?”, etc. His selection of “Are you OK?” caused a slight misunderstanding between the two because they interpreted “OK” differently.

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Conclusion

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The mechanism of putting preverbal thought into linguistic expressions is a process of privatization of the actual situational context by the speaker . In fact, this process contradicts Grice’s notion of “what is said.” For how can a truthconditional semantic meaning be transferred from speaker to hearer without any change? Both processes, the speaker’s utterance production and the hearer’s interpretation, are highly personalized/privatized, and are the results of the interplay of inherent salience and emergent situational salience. Both speaker’s production and hearer’s inference comprise lexical processes and contextual processes that run parallel and are governed by salience. A speaker’s utterances often undergo corrections showing the speaker’ attempts to adjust to the context en-route. Similar processes occur in comprehension. Utterance interpretation hardly consists of just those two modules, as the Gricean pragmatics maintains. Inferencing/interpreting is a trial-and-error process on the part of the hearer, who tries to make sense of the speaker’s intention. In fact, implicature is one of the possible interpretations of speaker intention (cf. Bach, 2001).

7.8

Conclusion

This paper has presented a socio-cognitive approach to speaker’s utterance production that is based on salience as a guiding mechanism. It was argued that salience is both an individual and a societal phenomenon. Prior and actual situational experience is privatized/subjectivized and prioritized in the mind of interlocutors. Their different prior experiences, their different evaluations of the actual situational context, their dynamically changing intentions and individual degrees of salience result in a personalized process of production and comprehension. As a result, there may be no single point in the recovery process at which a speaker’s utterance fully matches a hearer’s interpretation. This is because both a speaker’s production and a hearer’s interpretation are “contaminated” by individualized pragmatic elements. Pragmatic enrichment processes work differently for both speaker and hearer. Consequently, the match between the two sides keeps varying in the communicative process. This is why we think that, “we almost always fail. [. . .] Yet we almost always nearly succeed” (Rapaport, 2003, p. 402). And this is why a pragmatic theory should be both speaker- and hearer-centered. Speaker’s utterance production should be analyzed in its own right as a full proposition that does not need any enrichment and/or saturation from the speaker’s perspective. Acknowledgement The paper was first published in 2013 in the Journal of Pragmatics. March 2013. 48(1):71–83. Thanks to Elsevier for permission to reuse the text.

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Halliday, M. A. K. (1985). Dimensions of discourse analysis: Grammar. In The handbook of discourse analysis (Vol. 2, pp. 29–56). Dimensions of Discourse. Academic Press. Haugh, M. 2010. Doing speaker meaning in interaction. Abstract submitted to the Conference of the International Pragmatics Association. Haviland, S. B. E., Clark, H. H., & H.H. (1974). What’s new? Acquiring new information as a process in comprehension. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13, 512–521. Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts. Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations of language. Oxford University Press. Jaszczolt, K. M. (2005). Default semantics: Foundations of a compositional theory of acts of communication. Oxford University Press. Jaszczolt, K. M. (2009). Cancellability and the primary/secondary meaning distinction. Intercultural Pragmatics, 6, 259–289. Kecskes, I. (2008). Dueling context: A dynamic model of meaning. Journal of Pragmatics, 40(3), 385–406. Kecskes, I. (2010). The paradox of communication: A socio-cognitive approach. Pragmatics and Society, 1(1), 50–73. Keysar, B., & Bly, B. (1995). Intuitions of the transparency of idioms: Can one keep a secret by spilling the beans? Journal of Memory and Language, 34, 89–109. King, T. H. (1995). Configuring topic and focus in Russian. CSLI Publications. Levelt, W. J. M. (1989). Speaking: From intention to articulation. M.I.T. Press. Li, C. N. (1976). Subject and topic: A new typology of language. In C. N. Li (Ed.), Subject and topic, 475. Academic. Li, P., & Gleitman, L. (2002). Turning the tables: Language and spatial reasoning. Cognition, 83(3), 265–294. Lupyan, G., & Spivey, M. J. (2010). Redundant spoken labels facilitate perception of multiple items. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 72, 2236–2253. MacWhinney, B. (1977). Starting points. Language, 53, 152–168. Mathesisus, V. (1929). Functional linguistics. In J. Vachek (Ed.), Praguiana (pp. 121–142). John Benjamins. Munnich, E., & Landau, B. (2003). The effects of spatial language on spatial representation: Setting some boundaries. In Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and thought (pp. 113–155). MIT Press. Myachykov, A. (2007). Integrating perceptual, semantic and syntactic information in sentence production. In Submitted for the degree of Ph.D. to the higher degree Committee of the Faculty of social sciences. University of Glasgow. Myachykov, A., & Posner, M. I. (2005). Attention in language. In L. Itti, G. Rees, & J. Tsotsos (Eds.), Neurobiology of attention (pp. 324–329). Academic. Osgood, C. E., & Bock, J. K. (1977). Salience and sentencing: Some production principles. In S. Rosenberg (Ed.), Sentence Production (pp. 89–140). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Pattabhiraman, T. (1993). Aspects of salience in natural language generation. PhD Dissertation. Simon Fraser University. Peleg, O., Giora, R., & Fein, O. (2001). Salience and context effects: Two are better than one. Metaphor and Symbol, 16, 173–192. Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct. Harper Collins. Prat-Sala, M., & Branigan, H. P. (2000). Discourse constraints on syntactic processing in language production: A cross-linguistic study in English and Spanish. Journal of Memoryand Language, 42, 168–182. Rapaport, W. J. (2003). What did you mean by that? Misunderstanding, negotiation, and syntactic semantics. Minds and Machines, 13(3), 397–427. Sanford, A. J. (2001). Context, attention, and depth of processing during interpretation. Mind and Language, 17(1), 188–206. Sanford, A. J., & Garrod, S. C. (1981). Understanding written language: Explorations beyond the sentence. John Willey and Sons.

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Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance: Communication and cognition (2nd ed.). Blackwell. Stevenson, R. (2002). The role of salience in the production of referring expressions: A psycholinguistic perspective. In K. van Deemter & R. Kibble (Eds.), Information sharing: Reference and presupposition in language generation and interpretation (pp. 167–192). CSLI. Stevenson, R. L., Schmitz, B. E., & Delp, E. J. (1994). Discontinuity preserving regularization of inverse visual problems. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 24(3), 455–469. Tomlin, R. S. (1997). Mapping conceptual representations into linguistic representations: The role of attention in grammar. In J. Nuyts & E. Pederson (Eds.), Language and conceptualization (pp. 162–189). Cambridge University Press. Wlodarczyk, A., & Wlodarczyk, H. (2006). Focus in the meta-informative Centering theory. La focalisation dans les langues. L’Harmattan.

Part III

Context and Salience

Chapter 8

Dueling Contexts: A Dynamic Model of Meaning

Abstract This paper focuses on the role of context in meaning construction. My starting point is the assumption that context is a dynamic construct that appears in different formats in language use both as a repository and/or trigger of knowledge. Consequently, context has both a selective and a constitutive role. Unlike several current theories of meaning (e.g. Barsalou. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 577–609, 1993; Coulson. Semantic leaps: Frame-shifting and conceptual blending in meaning-construction. CUP, 2000; Croft. Explaining language change: An evolutionary approach. Longman, 2000; Evans Cognitive Linguistics. 17(4):491–534, 2006) claiming that meaning construction is mostly dependent on situational context, I will argue that meaning values of words encoding prior contexts of experience play as important a role in meaning construction as situational context. These two sides of world knowledge (encoded and current) exist dialectically and relationally. Actual situation context is viewed through prior context, and their encounter creates a third space. According to this approach meaning is the result of the interplay of prior experience and current experience, which are both socio-cultural in nature. Prior experience is encapsulated in the meaning values of lexical items that make up the utterances used by the interlocutors, and current experience is represented in the actual situation context in which communication takes place, and which is interpreted (often differently) by the interlocutors. Meaning formally expressed in the linguistic interactional context is created on-the-spot, and is the result of the interaction and mutual influence of the private contexts represented in the language of the interlocutors and the actual situational context interpreted by the interlocutors. In speech communication people attempt to fit their language to a situational context that their language, in turn, helped to create in the first place. This reciprocity means that language both creates context and is created by it (cf. Durant and Goodwin 1992; Gee. An introduction to discourse analysis. Routledge, 1999). The dynamic model of meaning (DMM) is put forward as an attempt to give equal importance to message and actual situational context in meaning construction as described above, and blend the external and internal approaches to context. The model considers the communicative process as a structured whole, as something viewed from different perspectives. It applies Sciabarra’s understanding of dialectics to context according to which dialectics is “the ‘art of context-keeping,’ because it © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_8

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counsels us to grasp the full context of any object through techniques of abstraction and integration. By examining an object from different vantage points and on different levels of generality, we achieve a more comprehensive grasp of its antecedent conditions, interrelationships, and tendencies (Sciabarra. The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 3:381–399, 2002)”. The paper starts with a brief introduction to the cognitive approach followed by a discussion of different ways of understanding context. Then the dynamic model of meaning (DMM) is presented, and it is demonstrated how the model can be used to explain the dialectics of context, word meaning, and utterance meaning. The paper ends with a section that discusses how the application of the DMM may affect our understanding of some major issues in pragmatics. Keywords Context · Dialectics · Interaction · World knowledge · Meaning construction · Dynamic model of meaning · Salience

8.1

The Cognitive View

According to the cognitive approach human communication relies on two important components of the cognitive network: the meaning construction system and the meaning prompting system. Linguistic forms prompt for the construction of meanings. The problem is that they do not have a one-to-one relationship. Meaning is incomparably richer than the form of language because “grammar reflects only a small number of general frames and space builders which can apply to organize the very large number of situations that we encounter and imagine” (Fauconnier 1997, p. 190). A limited number of mergeable linguistic forms can cover a very large number of meaningful situations. Fauconnier and Turner (2002, p. 360) argued that the general view that conceptual structure is encoded by the speaker into a linguistic structure, which then is decoded by the hearer back into a conceptual structure, is false because an expression provides only sparse and inefficient prompts for constructing a conceptual structure. The problem is described by Fauconnier and Turner (2002, p. 277) as follows: Conceptual systems are vast and rich and open-ended, but linguistic systems, however impressive, are relatively quite thin. How can a linguistic system be used to convey the products of conceptual systems, and how can these products find expression in language, given the stark mismatch in their respective infinities?

The answer to this question is that when forms prompt for the construction of meanings that go far beyond anything like the forms themselves, a well-developed inference and implicature system starts to operate to ensure the right interpretation of forms in language use. As a result of this explanation, recent research tends to consider meaning to be a fluid, flexible, and on-the-spot phenomenon, with the human mind as a pattern recognizer and builder rather than a rule-following logical calculator (cf. Barsalou 1993, 1999; Croft 2000; Evans 2006) This paper, however, argues that the mind is neither exclusively one nor the other but a combination of the

8.2

Understanding Context

149

two. The mind is both a pattern recognizer/builder and a rule-following calculator. Pattern building and recognition need to rely on formal elements that have a certain regularity of occurrence at least for a period of time. The meaning prompting system that represents this regularity is the result of the dynamic and flexible operation of the ever-evolving meaning construction system. Linguistic expressions can prompt for meanings because they represent prior encounters and experience. Lexical units encode the contexts of their prior use. Through processes of blending, mapping, framing, and other cognitive operations, a great variety of meanings can be constructed from symbolic structures (grammar) that contain the required prompts for such constructions. This way, language allows a limited number of linguistically mergeable forms to cover an enormous range of meaningful situations. The inference system is dynamic, fluid, and constantly changes while grammar is conservative, relatively stable, and changes slowly. What makes it possible for these two seemingly different systems to work together smoothly in producing and comprehending meaning? The key to understanding the relationship between the meaning construction system and the meaning prompting system is context that appears in different forms and functions in the course of communication, and the lexicon that, on the one hand, is a thesaurus of contexts and on the other, functions as an interface between the conceptual level and the relatively independent linguistic level.

8.2

Understanding Context

In linguistics context usually refers to any factor — linguistic, epistemic, physical, social — that affects the actual interpretation of signs and expressions. The traditional, external perspective on context holds that context modifies and/or specifies word meanings in one way or another. Context is seen as a selector of lexical features because it activates some of these features while leaving others in the background. Some versions of externalist contextualism take this line of thinking to the extreme and claim that meanings are specified entirely by their contexts, and that there is no semantic systematicity underlying them at all (e.g. Barsalou 1993, 1999; Evans 2006). According to this view, the mind works primarily by storing experiences and finding patterns in those experiences. These patterns shape how people engage with, and store in their minds, their subsequent experiences. The internalist perspective on context considers lexical units as creators of context (e.g. Gee 1999; Violi 2000). Violi (2000) claimed that our experience is developed through a regularity of recurrent and similar situations that we tend to identify with given contexts. Standard (prior recurring) context can be defined as a regular situation that we have repeated experience with, and about which we have expectations as to what will or will not happen, and on which we rely to understand and predict how the world around us works. It is exactly these standard contexts that linguistic meanings tied to lexical units refer to. This argument leads us back to Gumperz (1982), who said that utterances somehow carry with them their own

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context or project the context. Referring to Gumperz’s work, Levinson (2003) claimed that the message-versus-context opposition is misleading because the message can carry with it or forecast the context. In the semantics-pragmatics interface debate, contextualists are committed to rich pragmatic effects throughout what is said by a sentence, or throughout the proposition expressed, or throughout semantic content. Contextualism derives from speech act theories of meaning, which is a school of thought that includes Austin, the later Wittgenstein, and others. There are moderate contextualists who claim that only some expressions outside the basic set are context-sensitive and/or semantically incomplete, while radical contextualists claim that every expression or construction outside the basic set is context sensitive. Radical contextualists include Searle, Recanati and the relevance theorists (e.g., Carlston, Sperber, Wilson), while moderate contextualists include those who argue for the context sensitivity of quantified phrases (e.g., Stanley and Szabo), belief statements (e.g., Richard and Perry) and epistemic claims (e.g., DeRose). The problem with the externalist and internalist views of context is that they are both one-sided because they emphasize either the selective or the constitutive role of context. However, the dynamic nature of human speech communication requires the development of a model that recognizes both regularity and variability in meaning construction and comprehension, and takes into account both the selective and constitutive roles of context at the same time. Millikan (1998) claimed that the conventional sign (lexical unit) is reproduced or “copied,” not discovered or invented anew by each producer-processor pair. This is only possible if the linguistic unit has some kind of regular reference to certain contexts in which it has been used. This is more than just the “semantic potential” that Evans (2006) speaks about. To some extent I agree with Evans and others (e.g., Langacker 2000; Fauconnier and Turner 2002) that words serve as points of access to larger-scale encyclopedic (world) knowledge structures, and in meaning construction not all aspects of this repertoire are activated. However, the core of the knowledge a particular lexical item refers to is always activated because this knowledge in the mind has been created partially through the repeated use of the given lexical unit in relatively similar actual situational contexts. So we not only recognize patterns but actually can reproduce and create patterns. Since both the points of reference and points of access keep changing, the lexicon is in a constant state of movement; that is, words and expressions keep changing their meaning values (cognitive contexts) based on their use. This dynamic change results in a kind of vagueness that may apply not only to content words but also to figures of speech, implicatures, and other extensions of usage that slowly move from being entirely innovative, to being somewhat familiar, to being handled automatically without parsing or derivation of meaning from compositional structure. This is why external contextualists claim that word meaning is protean and “the meaning associated with a word in any given utterance appears to be, in part, a function of the particular linguistic context in which it is embedded.” (Evans 2006:492). However, as we will see later, this issue is more complex than the external contextualists claim.

8.3

8.3

Dynamic Model of Meaning (DMM) and Context

151

Dynamic Model of Meaning (DMM) and Context

The DMM argues for a broad understanding of context that includes both prior and present experience with the outside world. According to the dialectics of context both sides of world knowledge (encoded private context and actual situational context) participate in meaning construction. The extent of their respective contributions keeps changing, depending on which phase of a concrete speech situation the interlocutors happen to be in. The DMM serves to demonstrate this dynamism. It is built on two assertions: 1. The dynamic behavior of human speech implies a reciprocal process between language (message) and actual situational context as demonstrated in Fig. 8.1.

Lexical Level

S1 P R I V A T E

Actual on-line

C O N T E X T

produced utterances

E N C O D E D

Actual contextual

ACTUAL SIT. CONTEXT

meaning

S2 P R I V A T E C O N T E X T E N C O D E D

I N

I N

W O R D S

W O R D S

Fig. 8.1 Understanding context

Conceptual Level

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Dueling Contexts: A Dynamic Model of Meaning

Language encodes prior contexts and is used to make sense of actual situational contexts, so language is never context-free. There are no meanings that are context-free because each lexical item is a repository of context (contexts) itself; that is to say, it is always implicitly indexed to a prior recurring context(s) of reference. Even when an explicit context (actual situational context) is not available, one is constructed from stored knowledge originating in prior experience during the process of comprehension (cf. Katz 2005). Suppose we hear or read the sentence “I am bored with you, I’d rather sleep with you” without any actual situational context. With no difficulty at all can we create a context based on the meaning of the words in the sentence. The interesting thing is that we all will probably make up the same context that is based on the figurative rather than the literal meaning of “sleep”. This is how powerful salience encoded in lexical units is. Dynamism of context means that when people speak or write they craft what they need to express to fit the actual situational context in which they are communicating. But, at the same time, the way people speak or write, including the words, expressions, and utterances they use, create that very situation or context in which the given communication occurs. Consequently, as Gee (1999) claimed, two things seem to happen simultaneously: people attempt to fit their language to a situation or context that their language, in turn, helped to create in the first place. These co-constructive aspects of speech communication, in particular the co-construction of meanings and identities in and through discourse have also been explored in recent discourse studies, especially in ones focusing on intercultural communication (e.g., Scollon and Scollon, 2001; Shi-xu 2004). 2. The fact that communication is increasingly intercultural (cf. Rampton 1995; Blommaert 1998; Kecskes 2004a) requires the development of a theory of meaning that can explain not only unilingual processing but also bi- and multilingual meaning construction and comprehension. Fauconnier (1997:188) wrote that when we deal with a single language the complexities of modeling meaning do not necessarily stand out. However, when we compare two or more languages, or translate something from one language to the other, we realize that different languages have developed different ways of prompting the required cognitive constructions. Furthermore, different cultures organize their background knowledge differently. So both the meaning construction systems and the meaning prompting systems differ in languages because both are culturespecific. Translating from one language to another requires a reconstruction of cognitive and cultural configurations that were prompted by one language and a determination of how another language would set up similar configurations with an entirely different meaning prompting system and pre-structured background. Processing contexts and establishing repositories of contexts in the mind have both individual-specific elements and common elements. That is why communication is full of misunderstandings. In Rapaport’s words “We almost always fail [. . .]. Yet we

8.4

Meaning Value of Words

153

almost always nearly succeed: This is the paradox of communication (Rapaport 2003:402).” Why do we both fail and succeed? We have difficulties in speech communication because individual socio-cultural experience with lexical items and actual situational contexts may be different in a given speech community. Prior experience creates private context that gets encapsulated in lexical items in the mind of speakers of a particular speech community. This private context incorporates core knowledge (tied to the prior experience), which is the public part of the private context, and individual-specific knowledge that may not be shared by the other members of the speech community because it is the individualized reflection of the socio-cultural context. The public context, that is to say, the public part of the private context, however, is available to each speaker of that speech community because it refers to relatively similar conceptual content that is conventionalized. The important point here is that the meaning value of a lexical unit refers to both relatively static and dynamic elements that are the results of actual use of the given lexical unit in different actual situational contexts. Fig. 8.1 demonstrates the different ways context is understood in the DMM. Speaker’s private context encapsulated in lexical units and formulated in an utterance (actual linguistic context) is uttered (or written) “out there” in the world by a speaker in a situation (actual situational context), and is matched (“internalized”) to the private cognitive contexts “inside” the head of the hearer (prior knowledge). Meaning is the result of interplay between the speaker’s private context and the hearer’s private context in the actual situational context as understood by the interlocutors.

8.4

Meaning Value of Words

The DMM serves to explain not only relations between contexts encoded in lexical units and actual situational contexts, but also the meaning values of words and bigger lexical units such as situation-bound utterances (Kecskes 2003), speech formulas, and fixed expressions. This paper focuses mainly on the meaning values of words and emphasizes that the word functions as an interface that links the phonological, syntactic, lexical and conceptual structures in working memory in the course of perceiving or producing an utterance (cf. Culicover and Jackendoff 2005).

8.4.1

Do Words Have Meanings?

In fact, they do, although Evans (2006) and others argue that they do not. This is what Evans (2006: 496) says:

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I argue that meaning is not a property of language per se, but rather is a function of language use, and thus, a characteristic of a process of meaning construction, rather than relating to mental entities/units stored in memory. Meaning construction is not an unpacking of stored information, as assumed in more traditional accounts. Rather, it is a constructive process, in which integration of lexical units involves differential access to the conceptual knowledge which lexical entities potentially afford access.

I agree with Evans that meaning construction is a constructive process. The question is, however, what situational meaning is constructed from if “meaning is not a property of language per se.” The DMM claims that language is meaningful, and we need to make a difference between the meaning values of lexical units on the one hand, and situational meaning on the other. The process of situational meaning construction includes both “unpacking” (stored private contexts expressed in meaning values of lexical units) and “constructing” (interplay of private contexts of interlocutors with the actual situational context). Current work in cognitive psychology appears to support this view (e.g., Swinney 1979; Gibbs 1996; Giora 1997, 2003). Gibbs (1996, p. 33) argued that “context becomes operative only at a postaccess stage, guiding the selection of the contextually relevant meaning of the ambiguous words.” The main claim of the graded salience hypothesis of Giora is that salient meanings are processed automatically (though not necessarily solely), irrespective of contextual information and strength of bias in the first phase of comprehension when lexical processing and contextual processing run parallel (Giora 2003, p. 24). This assumes that while situational context can be predictive of certain meanings, it is deemed ineffective in obstructing initial access of salient context encoded in lexical units based on prior experience. According to Evans, words are purely linguistic units that make access to conceptual knowledge structures. These structures represent only “semantic potentials” that are realized in language use. He acknowledges that words have some kind of “meaning,” whatever it may be called. Evans (2006, p. 493) says the following: “What a word ‘means,’ which is to say, which part of its encyclopaedic knowledge potential is activated will always be a function of how it is being used in any given context.” I have several problems with this approach. Evans ignores that words encapsulate prior contexts of their use, so when he uses the term “context,” he means actual situational context only. Evans’ claim is that words do not mean anything without situational context. There are two ways to demonstrate that this is not quite so, and that words happen to have more than just “semantic potential”: (1) When a word is uttered or written down without any actual situational context (this is what Evans means by “context”) it can actually create its own context based on prior experience encapsulated in it. Kecskes (2001) gave a list of words and expressions to a group of native speakers of English and a group of non-native speakers, and asked them to write down what came to their mind first when they saw or heard the given lexical unit. None of the subjects asked for actual situational context to execute the task. The native speakers’ responses showed a remarkable similarity in most of the words and expressions such as “break;” “welcome;” piece of cake;” “get out of here,” etc. As the lexical units were polysemic in some cases, however, there were deviations in subjects’ responses, or they gave two or three “stored contexts” in a

8.4

Meaning Value of Words

155

hierarchical order. Certain deviations in subjects’ responses were essential because their first response was the most salient context that came into their mind based on their prior individual experience with the use of that word. The “context-free” exercise has pointed to the fact that words have meaning values without actual situational context. Uttered or written without any situational context, words create a context in the mind of the hearer/reader. These meaning values, however fuzzy they may be, are the results of prior experience with, and prior use of, the given lexical unit. (2) Research in second language acquisition (e.g.,Kroll and Stewart 1994; Nan Jiang 2000; Kecskes and Cuenca 2005) demonstrated that in the first phase of L2 development, when encountering a new word in L2, the learner tries to reach into the conceptual base to find the concept that the word in the L2 stands for. Since the conceptual system of the learner is L1-based, the closest concept can be reached through an L1 word that denotes the concept in the L1. The problem, however, is that concepts are culture-specific. Consequently, there can hardly be any direct route between the L2 word and the L2 concept at this stage of development. The obvious way for the L2 learner to reach the concept is through the L1 translation equivalent. This is called the “word association model” by Kroll and Stewart (1994), and most recently “the first language (L1) lemma mediation stage” by Nan Jiang (2000, p. 47). For instance: (1)

L2 (Spanish) word almuerzo escuela

L1 translation equivalent “lunch” (English) “school” (English)

L1 concept [LUNCH] [SCHOOL]

The higher the fluency in L2, the less the learner has to rely on L1 word association because the growth of L2 proficiency brings about changes in the conceptual system, which starts to accommodate socio-cultural knowledge and concepts gained through L2 use and experience. This makes it possible for the learner to reach the appropriate conceptual structures directly without associating them with L1 translation equivalents. Second language learning and bilingual experience show that in the first phase of development there is an interaction of L2 and L1 lexical equivalents on the linguistic level. This interaction relies on linguistic rather than conceptual knowledge. This points to the fact that what Evans calls “linguistic knowledge” comprises not only an abstract network of grammatical rules but also lexico-semantic information that derives from conceptual information. A wrong word choice by L2 learners often occurs because they believe that (relative) lexical equivalency means also conceptual equivalency, which is not the case, as we can see in the following example: In a Bucharest hotel lobby: “The lift is being fixed for the next day. During that time, we regret that you will be unbearable.” (The Octopus. Oct. 1995.) Evans is right when he makes a distinction between “linguistic knowledge” and “encyclopaedic knowledge” (the semantic potential). The problem is, however, that he considers linguistic knowledge an abstract network of grammatical rules only: “. . .lexical concepts constitute the semantic units conventionally associated with linguistic forms, and form an integral part of a language user’s individual mental

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grammar” (Evans 2006, p. 496). Linguistic knowledge in the DMM is the result of not only grammaticalization but also lexicalization, a process of language change broadly defined as the adoption of concepts into the lexicon, as the “development of concrete meanings” (Brinton and Traugott 2005). As a result of lexicalization words may have “word-specific semantic properties” (Cruse 1992), which are the results of recurring use of words in particular contexts. Some part of the “encyclopaedic knowledge” may become lexicalized and developed into a part of linguistic knowledge. The meaning properties that differentiate cognitive synonyms like ‘GIVE UP;’ ‘CAPITULATE;’ ‘SURRENDER;’ ‘CHICKEN OUT’ can be viewed as properties of the individual lexical units, as distinct from properties of the common concept. Word-specific semantic properties will include such things as emotive coloring, stylistic value, and various kinds of contextual affinities (see Cruse 1990, for a more detailed discussion of word-specific semantic properties).

8.4.2

Two Facets of Meaning Value of Words

According to the DMM (see Fig. 8.2) there are two facets of the meaning value of a word (lexical unit): coresense and consense (actual contextual sense). Coresense is a denotational, diachronic, relatively constant, and objective feature that reflects changes in the given speech community, while consense is actual, subjective, referential, and connotational, and changed by actual situational context (cf. Kecskes 2004a). In the DMM, a lexical item represents world knowledge based on prior contextual experience. Fig. 8.2 shows how “privatized” world knowledge may be represented in a lexical unit as a blend of coresense (general world knowledge tied to the given concept), word-specific semantic properties1 (lexicalized part of world knowledge), and culture-specific conceptual properties (culture-specific part of world knowledge). The dynamism of language use may result in changes in the relationship of these constituents of the blend.

8.4.2.1

Coresense

Coresense is abstracted from prior contextual occurrences of a word. It is neither conceptual nor lexical, but the interface between the two linguistic and conceptual levels. Coresense is not the sum of the most essential properties of the given category, but a summary of the most familiar, regular, typical, and (generally, but not always) frequent uses of a word. It is the common core information that was called public context above, and is usually shared by members of a speech community. Coresense is not a pure linguistic phenomenon because it depends on extralinguistic factors such as familiarity, conventionality, and frequency. It is an essential feature of the word that pulls together conceptual semantic and lexical semantic information when a word is uttered.

8.4

Meaning Value of Words

157

Lexical Level Word-Specific Semantic Properties (WSSPs)

A C T.

Consense [1]

C O R E S E N S E

Consense [2]

Consense [x]

S I T U A T I O N A L

C O N T E X T

Conceptual Level

Culture-Specific Conceptual Properties (CSCPs) Fig. 8.2 The Dynamic Model of Meaning

Coresense grows as a generalization from the most common conceptual features of contexts the word has been used in through various interactions. This set of core conceptual features is abstracted from speakers’ usage of the given lexical item. It changes in time by losing some features and/or adding new ones. Just think about the historical change in the coresense of words such as “candy,” “kidnap,” “school,” “snack,” etc. Coresense has a unique relationship with the word-specific semantic properties (WSSP) and culture-specific conceptual properties (CSCP). Word-specific semantic properties link the coresense to the lexical level while culture-specific conceptual properties tie it to the conceptual level. Culture-specific conceptual properties belong to conceptual pragmatics, while word-specific semantic properties are features of the word itself, hence are a matter of lexico-semantics. It is within these two types of

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properties where individual differences occur, where individual speakers’ private contexts tied to a particular word may differ.

8.4.2.2

Culture-Specific Conceptual Properties

As noted above, culture-specific conceptual properties tie coresense to the conceptual level. They are the basis for figurative, metaphorical meaning and the development of word specific semantic properties. Culture-specific conceptual properties can be revealed relatively easily if we compare words from different languages that show lexical equivalency but differ as to their CSCPs. For instance, let us take the concept denoted by the word “lunch” in English and “almuerzo” in Spanish. “Lunch” for a native speaker of American-English refers to a light meal consisting of a sandwich, soup and salad, or something else that is consumed in a 30 to 60 minute break around noon. “Almuerzo,” for a Spaniard, denotes the main meal of the day (usually consisting of three courses) that s/he consumes between 1 and 4 o’clock (no Spanish restaurant will serve “almuerzo” before 1 p.m.). The coresense of the two words is relatively the same; there is no word-specific semantic property attached to either, however, they differ in culture-specific conceptual properties. Bilingual people will have the same coresense for each word with different culturespecific conceptual properties, which will result in a synergic concept whose content may change depending on the extent of exposure to the two language and cultures (about this issue see Kecskes 2007). Not all concepts have culture-specific conceptual properties. For instance, the concept denoted by the English word “salt” has hardly any culture-specific conceptual property, nor does its lexical equivalents in other languages. The word “pumpkin,” however, is different. It has a culture-specific conceptual property that usually has a positive value in American culture: a pumpkin is a popular symbol of autumn and Halloween, and parents often use the word as a nickname for their children: (2)

Father: Margie:

Listen Pumpkin, how about going for ice cream? Cool, let’s go.

As seen also in the English-Spanish example (“lunch” versus “almuerzo”), these CSCPs do not apply across cultures. A conversation like the one in (2) could hardly take place in Hungarian, where the lexical equivalent of the English word “pumpkin” is “tök,” which carries a CSCP with a negative value. Hungarian children would not be happy if addressed by the word “tök,” which has the connotation of “stupid.” Culture-specific conceptual properties are very dynamic features of words and keep changing all the time. They are sensitive to socio-cultural changes in the given language community. CSCPs represent the cognitive base for word meaning value, and are responsible for changes in the coresense of a word and its word specific semantic properties. When culture-specific conceptual properties get fully lexicalized they turn into word specific semantic properties. This is why native

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speakers of English do not have to check with the conceptual system when they use words such as “chicken out,” “kidnap,” “blackmail,” etc.

8.4.2.3

Word-Specific Semantic Properties

The term “word-specific semantic properties” (WSSP) was coined by Cruse (1992) to denote specific semantic properties that belong to the lexical rather than the conceptual level. WSSPs make it possible for speakers to have alternative lexical access routes to a single concept: for instance, “run,” “dash,” and “rush;” or “sleep,” “doze,” and “nap.” Cruse (1992, p. 291) argued that cognitive synonyms map onto identical concepts. The meaning properties that differentiate such cognitive synonyms as “die,” or “pass away,” can be viewed as properties of the individual lexical units, as distinct from properties of the common concept. Word-specific semantic properties are the result of the recurrent use of words in particular contexts. Originally WSSPs derive from the interplay of the given lexical unit and actual situational contexts, and they are the best evidence for category stability and variability. They usually develop from metaphors or other figures of speech, and over time they become lexicalized and conventionalized. Cruse (1992) argued that words with word-specific semantic properties can create a more emotive, more “colorful” context than words without WSSPs. Compare the following sentences: (3)

Peter ate the steak. ------------–>Peter devoured the steak. John repaired the car. ---------------->John overhauled the car.

It should be emphasized that word-specific semantic properties (that is, “semantic loads”), just like culture-specific conceptual properties, are not mandatory features that are attached to each lexical unit in use. There are lexical units that have neither word-specific semantic properties, nor culture-specific conceptual properties (such as “division,” “example, “depart,” etc.) no matter what actual situation context they are used in. Actual situational context can suppress culture-specific conceptual properties. This is, however, hardly the case with word-specific semantic properties encoded in the word, such as “pass away,” “chicken out,” “dash,” and so forth.

8.4.2.4

Consense

Coresense should be distinguished from consense, which is the situated, contextual meaning value of a lexical unit in an actual situational context. Coresense is the invariant while consense represents the possible variants. Consense realizes a particular aspect or aspects of the coresense by uniting it with the appropriate wordspecific semantic property and/or culture-specific conceptual property when the word is actually uttered in a particular situation. Consense is based on private contexts encoded in the given lexical unit. It is a mental representation consisting

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of a variable set of conceptual features compositionally related to the syntactic structure of the lexical unit. This set may vary with every use of the given expression in actual situational contexts. There is a dialectical relationship between coresense and consense. Coresense changes diachronically while consense changes synchronically. Systematic, repeated changes in consenses (actual uses) will result in changes of coresense. Change in the coresense of the following words overtime clearly supports this point: “gay”, “google”, “anchor.” Fig. 8.2 demonstrates how coresense and consense fit within the dynamic model of meaning. As the diagram shows, coresense is the interface between the conceptual and lexical level. Word-specific semantic properties are links to the lexical level, while culture-specific conceptual properties are ties to the conceptual level. Consenses are the variations of coresense in context. The actual contextual interpretation of coresense is expressed in a consense connected to other consenses of lexical units to form an utterance.

8.5 8.5.1

Application of the Dynamic Model of Meaning How Can DMM Be Used to Explain Meaning Values of Words?

The DMM can be used to explain how the word form pulls together cognitive information (both linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge) when it is uttered in actual situational contexts. It demonstrates the different aspects of the meaning value structure of lexical units, and how these different aspects of the meaning value structure may change (strengthen, weaken or get canceled) depending on the actual situational context, and how prior experience encapsulated in the meaning values of lexical units interacts with current experience in actual situational meaning construction. For example: (4) (A) The player kicked off the ball. (B) They kicked Imus off the air forever. (C) The president kicked off the school year with an excellent speech.

The verb “kick off” is used in three different senses in these sentences. The coresense in each use is the same: “initiate proceedings.” The culture-specific conceptual property that represents the cognitive base for the meaning value of the word comes from football as sentence A demonstrates. In sentences B the culturespecific conceptual property receives a metaphorical sense while in sentence C the word has a word-specific semantic property that turned the word into a lexicalized metaphor. It is important to underline that these senses of the word “kick off” are not necessarily the results of contextual enhancement as the followers of the Relevance Theory would say. Rather, these particular senses in those particular sentences are

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the results of word selection, and the interplay of the verb with its argumentations. The words “kick off; Imus, air” in sentence, B and “kick off, president, school year” in sentence C were selected by the speaker because their conceptual domains make it possible to join them in a sentence to express what the speaker intended to say. The created utterance meaning would be different if different argumentations were selected by the speaker.

8.5.2

Situation-Bound Utterances in the DMM

The DMM can be used to explain the behavior of any pragmatic units including situation-bound utterances. These are highly conventionalized, prefabricated pragmatic units whose occurrences are tied to standardized communicative situations (Kecskes 2001, 2003). Kecskes (2001) claimed that if, according to their obligatoriness and predictability in social situations, formulaic expressions are placed on a continuum where obligatoriness increases to the right, situation-bound utterances will take the rightmost place because their use is highly predetermined by the actual situational context. Lexical idioms (“kick the bucket;” “eat one’s words;” “pull one’s leg,” etc.) and pragmatic idioms (“I’ll talk to you later;” “Welcome aboard;” “Howdy”) typically differ in predictability. The likelihood of occurrence of lexical idioms is usually unpredictable while the use of situation-bound utterances (SBU) is generally tied to particular social contexts. In the DMM situation-bound utterances also have coresense, culture-specific conceptual property and formula-specific pragmatic property. The following example shows how the DMM can be applied to the use of situation-bound utterances. (5) Policeman: - [(1)What’s going on here?] [(2)What seems to be the problem?], [(3) What’s up?] David: - He hit my car. Bob: - He stopped short for no reason. Policeman: (To Bob, the driver of the other car): - How fast were you going? Bob: - I don’t know. Maybe forty.

The dialog happens after a traffic accident. The policeman is talking to the two drivers. He has to address the participants and may choose from several situationbound utterances which can substantiate this pragmatic function. Each of the three SBUs has a formula-specific pragmatic property that distinguishes it from the others. “What’s going on here?” and “What seems to be the problem?” are likely to open up the same frame while “What’s up?” appears to create a different contextual frame which is not appropriate in this situation. The culture-specific conceptual property that is attached to “What’s up?” makes the use of the SBU appropriate between close friends, but not necessarily between a policeman and a participant of a traffic accident. So while the three situation-bound utterances have the same coresense and

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can express a similar situated meaning, their formula-specific pragmatic properties and culture-specific conceptual properties are different. The difference of formulaspecific pragmatic properties allows substitution like in (1) and (2); if, however, the culture-specific conceptual properties are different, the two situation-bound utterances are not interchangeable.

8.6

The Dynamic Model of Meaning and Current Pragmatic Theories

Being a model that attempts to pull together speaker and hearer perspectives the DMM directs attention to some problematic issues in current pragmatic theories and confirms some of the latest findings in language processing research.

8.6.1

Need for a Dialectic Model of Communication

The DMM builds on reciprocity between cognitive context expressed in language and actual situational context in meaning construction and emphasizes the dynamism of speech communication in which interlocutors attempt to fit their language to a situation or context that their language, in turn, helped to create in the first place. This approach calls for the development of a dialectic model of communication that considers the process as a structured whole and can explain it from both the speaker’s and the hearer’s perspective. However, two of the current leading theories in pragmatics (Neo-Gricean approach; Relevance Theory) rely on a modular view, and start from the assumption that an essential feature of human communication is the expression and recognition of intentions (Grice 1957; 1969). In pragmatic interpretation the hearer infers the speaker’s intended meaning from the utterance (s) the speaker has produced. The hearer must recognize the speaker’s communicative intention and identify what the speaker means. An utterance is a linguisticallycoded unit, so verbal comprehension should involve an element of decoding. However, the decoded linguistic meaning is only the starting point for an inferential process that results in the attribution of a speaker’s meaning. This process is explained from either predominantly from the speaker’s perspective (Neo-Gricean approach) or the hearer’s perspective (Relevance Theory); consequently neither theory in its present form supports a dialectic model. Clark’s contribution theory (Clark and Brennan 1991; Clark 1996) can be considered a dialectic model of communication because it extended the traditional sender/receiver model of communication by enlarging the frame of analysis from the single message unit (utterance) to an interactionally - developed “contribution.” The construct of common ground is a mechanism by which joint understanding is

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achieved. It can be described as the mutual knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions of the participants in a conversation. Grounding is the process in which common ground is updated in an orderly way, by each interlocutor attempting to establish that the others have understood their utterances well enough for the current purposes. Clark and Brennan (1991) claimed that “contributions” to common ground have two phases: the presentation phase and the acceptance phase. They argued that interlocutors not only signal a lack of comprehension in instances of miscommunication, but in principle, they try to ground every utterance and seek negative or positive evidence of understanding for every utterance. The difference between Clark’s contribution theory (Clark 1996) and the DMM is that while the former considers communication as a constant search for common ground following a contribution by contribution sequence, the latter puts the main emphasis on the “ego” of interlocutors just like current theories in cognitive psychology (e.g., Keysar and Henly 2002, Barr and Keysar 2005, Giora 2003), and underscores the “untidy,” chaotic nature of communication which is not just recipient design and intention recognition as most theories that have grown out of Grice’s approach claim. The DMM approach reveals several problems in the communication process, which may lead to misunderstandings and require negotiation of meaning. Unlike Clark’s contribution theory, the DMM recognizes meaning as the result of the “clash” of two or more private contexts (speaker’s context and hearer’s context) in an actual situational context that is usually processed differently from the perspective of the speaker and hearer. This leads to a unique dynamism of communication that is full of ups and downs, silence, unfinished and unacknowledged utterances, and breakdowns. Within ongoing streams of interaction, the distinction between “presentation and acceptance” (Clark 1996) may be complicated, as an utterance may connect forward or backward to various other utterances. Contributions, therefore, may rarely occur in tidy, recognizable packages. Complications associated with multi-party interaction (e.g., overlapping utterances, no response) may make the relationship between presentations and acceptances ambiguous for participants and analysts alike (cf. Koschmann and LeBaron 2003). The DMM also recognizes the “egocentrism” of contributors (see Keysar and Henly 2002; Barr and Keysar 2005) especially in the first phase of the communication sequence, and gives an account of how participants in conversation routinely and relatively with little problem coordinate their understandings of matters at hand.

8.6.2

Context and Processing

8.6.2.1

Differences in Private Contexts

Although both the speaker and the hearer work with lexical units from the same meaning prompting system (language) their meaning construction system may give

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different interpretations to the same items. Differences can be significant depending on the interlocutors’ prior experience (frequency, familiarity, motivation, etc.) with the same words, expressions, and utterances. This is especially visible in intercultural communication where because of cultural differences not only speakers’ private contexts can differ significantly but also their public contexts tied to the same lexical item. The following is a conversation between a South Korean student and an American student who took the same linguistics class. The South Korean student was very good at linguistics while her American friend could barely pass the course. (6) Korean: - Jill, do you want me to help you with your essay? American: - Don’t patronize me, please. Korean: - You say, you don’t want support? American: - Please just don’t..... Okay?

There is a difference in how the American student uses the word “patronize”. and how the South Korean student understands it. The coresense of “patronize” can be described as follows: [to act as a patron to someone or something]. This is the sense both interlocutors are supposed to have because in conversation it is usually the coresense of a lexical unit that constitutes the minimum set of features that we can assume to be shared by interlocutors. However, especially in intercultural communication, the same word may have different culture-specific conceptual property for the native speaker and the nonnative speaker. This is what may have happened here. In American culture the word “patronize” usually has quite a negative culture-specific conceptual property while in South Korean L2 speakers this English word is tied to some positive cultural load. This is because the Korean word “huwonhada”, which is the lexical equivalent of English “patronize” has a positive culture-specific conceptual property. For Koreans if they are patronized, it means that they receive a favor. This positive cultural load is transferred to the English word. This is why the South Korean student does not seem to understand the negative attitude of the American speaker. The application of the DMM can especially be helpful to explain intercultural communicative situations like this.

8.6.2.2

Actual Situational Context

Something functions as an actual situational context for an interlocutor only insofar as he or she has conceptualized it as such. So we have to be concerned with what things in the environment are understood by language users to be relevant context, which brings us to a deeply mentalist position. Bach (2006) argued that context does not literally determine, in the sense of constituting, what the speaker means. It must be so, because the actual situational context may be evaluated differently by the speaker and the hearer. When communication succeeds, actual situational context provides the hearer with the basis for determining, in the sense of ascertaining, what

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the speaker means. But what the speaker really means is a matter of his communicative intention, not context, although what he could reasonably mean depends on what information is mutually salient. The following conversation between a Chinese waitress and an Australian traveler at a Chinese airport illustrates this point: (7) Waitress: - Can I get you some more coffee, sir? Traveler: - Who is stopping you? Waitress: - You want to stop me? Traveler: - Oh no, just bring the damned coffee.

The waitress was confused because she did not recognize the expression ‘Who is stopping you?’ as relevant in the actual situational context, having processed it literally. She did not realize how rude the expression was either. The negative intention of the Australian traveler had very little to do with the actual situational context.

8.6.2.3

Speaker Processing Versus Hearer Processing

When a lexical unit (a label for private context) is used by a speaker, private contexts attached to it are activated top-down in a hierarchical order that is based on salience. This hierarchical order works differently for the speaker and the hearer. For the speaker there is an inter-label hierarchy first, while for the hearer there is an intralabel hierarchy. Inter-label hierarchy works in the first phase of production when a speaker looks for words to express her/his intention. First s/he has to select a word (words) from a group of possible words to express his/her communicative intention. These words constitute a hierarchy from the best fit to those less suited to the idea s/he is trying to express. The hearer, however, has to cope with a different type of hierarchy from her/his perspective. Intra-label hierarchy occurs when the hearer processes a lexical unit(s) in an utterance. The label (word) uttered by the speaker triggers the history of the use of that particular label by the hearer and not by the speaker in a hierarchical order. This may also be a reason for misunderstanding in the communicative process.

8.6.3

Salience and Situational Context

Most pragmatic theories support the modular view according to which utterance interpretation falls into two phases, decoding and inference. Actual situational context affects comprehension after the initial literal interpretation of the sentence has been accomplished. From the perspective of the dynamic model of meaning there are two problems with this assumption. First, literal meanings that are expected

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to be decoded first are not inevitably present in comprehension. Second, semantic and pragmatic factors may come to play in the earliest stages of comprehension. The DMM confirms the results of the latest research in cognitive psychology on language processing according to which both speaker and hearer rely on their most accessible and salient knowledge expressed in their private contexts in production and comprehension. The critical variable is saliency and not the literalness of the lexical unit (e.g., Giora 2003; Katz 2005; Kecskes 2004b). Explaining her graded salience hypothesis, Giora suggested that the literal priority model (“the lexicon proposes and context disposes”) should be revised. Instead of postulating the priority of literal meaning, the priority of salient (e.g., conventional, familiar, frequent, predictable) meaning should be assumed (Giora 1997, 2003). The most salient meaning is the most probable meaning out of all possible meanings. Words and expressions usually have multiple meaning values, and some of these meanings are more accessible than others because we ascribe greater cognitive priority in our mental lexicon to some meanings over the rest. According to the graded salience hypothesis in the initial phase of comprehension contextual and lexical processes do not interact but run parallel, and this stage is dominated by lexical access (Giora 2003). Salient meanings of lexical units are first accessed automatically, and are then revised in the case of a misfit with context. Salient meaning overrides literal meaning in production and comprehension. Giora’s theory, however, does not make a difference between private context and public context, which the DMM does. In it salience is tied to private context while literalness relates to public context. According to the DMM it is essential that salience overrides literalness because, given the fact that the lexical unit encapsulates the history of its prior use, those usages will get priority in the meaning hierarchy that represents the most familiar and frequent encounters. As a consequence, what is salient for the speaker may not be equally salient for the hearer, and what is relevant for the speaker may not be equally relevant for the hearer. The following conversation that took place between a professor and one of his Japanese students in the professor’s office illustrates this difference. (8) Noritaka: - Hi Professor X. Professor: - Hi Noritaka. How are you? Why don’t you sit down? Noritaka: - Because you did not tell me to. Professor: - OK, I am telling you now.

The speaker’s intention and hearer’s interpretation were different because the student did not have enough prior experience with the expression ‘Why don’t you sit down?’ to develop a non-literal understanding of the pragmatic unit whose most salient meaning for most native speakers is its non-literal rather than literal meaning. It is important to note that there is some difference in the understanding of context dependency between the graded salience hypothesis and the DMM. The graded salience hypothesis talks about actual situational context dependency in the first phase of processing. The DMM, however, adopts a different approach. When

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someone is asked to interpret the lexical unit “hot” without context, according to the DMM we have to bear in mind the following: When we say “without context” we actually mean “without actual situational context.” Context is created merely by uttering the word or the expression. When someone is asked to interpret the meaning of a lexical unit “without actual situational context,” in fact s/he is expected to create, (or think of) a situational context into which the given lexical unit fits best in his/her mind. If someone says that “hot” refers to “spicy food” it usually means that this is the context that has priority in his/her mind. The DMM approach distinguishes between collective salience and individual salience, a distinction that does not exist in Giora’s theory. Collective salience belongs to public context represented in the coresense of a lexical unit while individual salience is a matter of private context tied to consense. What appears in actual situational context is individual salience represented in consense. This is why most misunderstandings happen in the first phase of processing. The same lexical item is processed differently by the speaker and hearer as in example 8. Collective salience is a more complicated matter. A typical example can be what may be called “patronizing syndrome” in American-English native speaker nonnative speaker communication. This was demonstrated in example 6 above. “Patronizing” is a unique feature of American culture. It has to do with the expectation and trust of doing a good job. Americans do not like to be told either directly or indirectly how to do their job. Sometimes they may misinterpret good-willed suggestions and recommendations because they think they are being patronized. This culture-specific conceptual property is usually attached to the coresense whenever the word “patronize” is used. Differences in collective salience attached to the concept (denoted by the word “patronize”) in different cultures led to a misunderstanding in example 6 above. The predominance of salience over literalness is supported by the “egocentrism” approach described by cognitive psychologists (e.g., Keysar and Henly 2002; Barr and Keysar 2005; Keysar 2007) who argued that language users egocentrically anchor their judgments in available information regardless of whether this information is actually useful for solving the given problem, and fail to fully adjust to the perspectives of others. The most salient information is usually the most accessible information. Barr and Keysar (2005, p. 30) claimed that “. . .language processing is anchored in the assumption that what is salient or accessible to oneself will also be accessible to one’s interlocutor.” The dynamic model of meaning, the graded salience hypothesis and the egocentrism approach have something in common. They all question the priority of literal meaning in language processing and advocate the priority of salient meaning instead. At the same time they all underline the equally important role of prior experience encapsulated in lexical units and current experience represented in the actual situational context in meaning construction.

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Linguistic Underspecification

Linguistic underspecification of utterance content is widely accepted across different frameworks including the neo-Gricean approaches (cf. Horn 2005; Levinson 2000), relevance theory (Carston 2002, 2005; Sperber and Wilson 1986), Bierwisch’s (1996, 1997) two-level conceptual semantics, and Pustejovsky’s (1995) theory of the generative lexicon. These approaches claim that the meaning of the lexical units is underspecified and gets conceptual specification in context. It is argued that the specification of word meaning in context is accomplished by conceptual shift, which “shifts” the core meaning into various conceptual fields, and by conceptual differentiation, which only “differentiates” the core meaning within one and the same conceptual domain, thereby yielding literal meanings. There is also an agreement that if linguistic underdeterminacy is given, pragmatic inference is required if a hearer is to recover a speaker’s meaning successfully. However, in pragmatics there is much less consensus on the nature of principles in the pragmatic inferential process, and whether pragmatic additions are strictly guided by the underlying structure of the uttered sentence, or are relatively free of linguistic constraints. The underspecification approach relies on the assumption that the linguistically encoded element of an utterance is not generally geared toward achieving as high a degree of explicitness as possible, but rather toward keeping processing effort down. As a consequence, information that is clearly already highly activated in the addressee’s mind is often not given linguistic expression (cf. Carston 2002). In recent pragmatic theories there is a tendency to distinguish three levels of interpretation instead of the Gricean two: the proposition literally expressed (compositional meaning), explicitly communicated content (“explicature” or “impliciture”) and implicitly communicated content (implicature). There is no consensus on the explicit nature of pragmatically enriched content. The debate is about whether the pragmatically enriched content is explicitly communicated or not. The relevance theorists argue that the pragmatically enriched content is explicitly communicated so they use the term “explicature.” However, most neo-Griceans (e.g., Bach 1994; Horn 2005) resist the term “explicature” because they do not consider the pragmatically enriched content explicitly communicated. Therefore they prefer to use the term “impliciture” for these cases. For Bach, the impliciture is an implicit component of what is said, and it is not explicitly communicated. Recanati (2001) speaks about “what is saidmax” in these cases. The pragmatically enriched content is a partially pragmatically-determined proposition which may accommodate different degrees of explicitness and implicitness. It appears be necessary to distinguish this level because in most cases the proposition literally expressed is not something the speaker could possibly mean. For instance: (9) At a gas station - I am the black Mercedes over there. Could you fill me up with diesel, please? - Sure.

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Conclusion

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The recognition of linguistic underspecification by both the neo-Griceans and the relevance theoreticians shows that they consider context (what is called “actual situational context” in the DMM) as the most decisive factor in the process of meaning construction. The dynamic model of meaning follows a somewhat different path. According to the DMM private cognitive contexts represented in the speaker’s utterances have a dynamic interplay with the actual situational context in which they are uttered. As described above, both private context and actual situational context have a decisive role in the communication process, but at different stages. In the DMM there is no underdeterminacy of lexical units in the first phase of speaker production because the lexical units selected by the speaker are supposed to be the most salient representations of the speaker’s intention. Actually the rather firm determinacy of salient meaning in the first phase of processing suppresses actual situational context. Bach (2006) was right when he said that (actual situational) context does not literally determine, in the sense of constituting, what the speaker means. The DMM emphasizes that what the speaker really means is a matter of his communicative intention expressed in private contexts encoded in the lexical units the utterance consists of. So speaker meaning is not underdetermined from this perspective. Based on the egocentric view (cf. Barr and Keysar 2005; Keysar 2007), the graded salience hypothesis (Giora 2003) and the DMM, we can argue that in the first phase of processing speaker meaning is not underdetermined from the hearer’s perspective either. In this phase the hearer matches the private context of the speaker to his/her private context. If the two do not match, actual situation context will serve as a basis for determining, in the sense of ascertaining, what the speaker means.

8.7

Conclusion

The DMM represents an approach with new elements to meaning construction and context from a multilingual rather than a unilingual perspective. It is built on the assumption that the key to understanding the process of meaning construction is world knowledge that is represented in the head of interlocutors (private contexts), and outside in the world (actual situational context) as interpreted by the interlocutors. The different aspects of world knowledge expressed in actual communication bring together prior and present experience of interlocutors. Aspects of world knowledge built on prior experience are encapsulated in lexical units while aspects of world knowledge originating in current experience are expressed in the actual situational context. The prior experience based aspects of world knowledge tied to lexical items are as follows: A general aspect of world knowledge is expressed in the coresense of a lexical unit, culture-specific aspects are given as culture-specific conceptual properties, and language-specific aspects are represented in the word-specific semantic properties. This approach allows us to understand the dialectics of meaning construction as reflected in the interplay of two sides of world experience as well as the dynamism and synergism of the process of meaning creation and comprehension.

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Dueling Contexts: A Dynamic Model of Meaning

The advantage of the application of the DMM is that it puts into new perspective some of the key issues in language use and language processing such as salience, literalness, relevance, common ground and cooperativeness. The dynamic model of meaning calls attention to the relatively disorderly and chaotic nature of communication, which has a unique dynamism full of ups and downs, silence, unfinished and unacknowledged utterances, and breakdowns. The claim that in this process speakers strive to be maximally informative and relevant in lexical selection does not seem to fit what they actually do. Cooperativeness and reliance on possible mutual knowledge usually come in only after the speaker’s ego is satisfied and the listener’s egocentric, most salient interpretation is processed. In order to give adequate explanation to these processes we need a dialectic model of pragmatics that combines the perspective of both the speaker and hearer. The development of the dynamic model of meaning may be considered an attempt toward this goal. Acknowledgement The paper was first published in the Journal of Pragmatics in 2008. Vol. 40. Issue 3: 385-406. Thanks to Elsevier for permission to reuse the text.

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Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature. MIT Press. Levinson, S. C. (2003). Language and mind: Let’s get the issues straight! In D. Gentner & S. Goldin-Meadow (Eds.), Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and cognition (pp. 25–46). MIT Press. Millikan, R. G. (1998). A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More mama, more milk, and more mouse. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9(1), 55–100. Pustejovsky, J. (1995). The generative lexicon. MIT Press. Rampton, B. (1995). Crossing: Language and ethnicity among adolescents. Longman. Rapaport, W. J. (2003). What did you mean by that? Misunderstanding, negotiation, and syntactic semantics. Minds and Machines, 13(3), 397–427. Recanati, F. (2001). What is said. Synthese, 128, 75–91. Sciabarra, C. M. (2002). Reply to Roderick long: Dialectical libertarianism: All benefits, no hazards. The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, 3(2 (Spring 2002)), 381–399. Scollon, R., & Scollon, S. W. (2001). Intercultural communication: A discourse approach (2nd ed.). Blackwell. Shi – Xu. (2004). A cultural approach to discourse. Palgrave Macmillan. Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). 1995. Reprint. Relevance. Oxford: Blackwell. Original edition. Blackwell. Swinney, D. (1979). Lexical access during sentence comprehension: (re)consideration of context effects. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior., 18, 645–659. Violi, P. (2000). Prototypicality, typicality and context. In L. Albertazzi (Ed.), Meaning and cognition (pp. 103–123). John Benjamins.

Chapter 9

Context-Sensitivity in Intercultural Impoliteness

Abstract There has been a great deal of research on impoliteness focusing on one particular language or cross-cultural differences between languages (e.g., Bousfield. Impoliteness in Interaction. John Benjamins 2008, Bousfield & Locher. Impoliteness in Language: Studies on its interplay with power in theory and practice. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, 2008; Culpeper. Journal of Politeness Research 1:35–72, 2005); Culpeper 2009, http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/projects/impoliteness/; Haugh. Journal of Politeness Research 3:295–317, 2007; Haugh. Situated Politeness. Continuum, London, 2011; Kienpointner. Functions of Language 4:251–287, 1997). However, much less attention has been paid to impoliteness in intercultural communication in which all or some speakers communicate in a language other than their native tongue. On the basis of research on L1s and cross-cultural analysis of impoliteness, most of the researchers (e.g. Culpeper. Journal of Politeness Research 1:35–72, 2005; Culpeper. http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/projects/impoliteness/ 2009, Haugh. Situated politeness. Continuum, London, 2011; Watts. Politeness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003)) in the field seem to agree that no act is inherently impolite, and that such an interpretation depends on the context or speech situation that affects interpretation (see Culpeper. http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/projects/impoliteness/ 2009). The paper will examine this context-dependency in intercultural communication where interlocutors cannot always rely on much existing common ground, shared knowledge and conventionalized context but need to co-construct most of those in the communicative process. It will be argued that limited shared knowledge and common ground may restrict the interpretation process to the propositional content of utterances, which may result in an increase in the actual situational context-creating power of utterances. Recent research (e.g. Abel. Second Language Research 19:329–358, 2003; Bortfeld. Bilingual sentence processing. Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2002; Bortfeld. Experimental Psychology 50:1–14, 2003; Cieślicka. On processing figurative language: Towards a model of idiom comprehension in foreign language learners. Motivex, Poznań, 2004; Cieślicka. Second Language Research 22:114–144, 2006; House. Lingua Franca Communication. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 2002; House. Misunderstanding in social life: Discourse approaches to problematic talk. Longman, London, 2003; © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_9

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Kecskes. Explorations in pragmatics: Linguistic, cognitive and intercultural aspects. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, 2007) demonstrated that in intercultural communication the most salient interpretation for non-native speakers is usually the propositional meaning of an utterance. So interpretation generally depends on what the utterance says rather than on what it actually communicates. As a consequence of their taking propositional meaning for the actual meaning of an utterance, interlocutors are sometimes unaware of impoliteness conveyed implicitly or through paralinguistic means. Keywords Context-dependency · Prior context · Actual situational context · Salience · Common ground

9.1

Introduction

Research in politeness and impoliteness in intercultural communication is almost uncharted territory. This is not necessarily surprising because politeness and impoliteness are considered universal categories by several researchers (cf. Brown & Levinson, 1987; Lakoff, 1973) that are expressed lexically in a variety of different ways in languages. So researchers have been occupied with investigating how these categories are expressed in different languages and how they compare to each other. As a result, there is much research on politeness/impoliteness focusing on one particular language or cross-cultural comparisons between languages but much less about how politeness/impoliteness theories can be applied to explain intercultural interactions. Writing about intercultural (im)politeness, Haugh (2010) found that no specific theory of intercultural politeness had yet been developed. The main reason for this situation may be that politeness and impoliteness are essential parts of cultural models, conventions and norms in languages that bring about different expectations about what is polite or impolite in a given language. For instance, Culpeper (2005: p. 38) suggested we should use Tracy and Tracy’s (1998: p. 227) definition of impoliteness: “communicative acts perceived by members of a social community (and often intended by speakers) to be purposefully offensive”. Then further referring to the role of the speaker and hearer Culpeper (2005: p. 38) defined impoliteness as those occasions when “(1) the speaker communicates faceattack intentionally, or (2) the hearer perceives and/or constructs behavior as intentionally face-attacking, or a combination of (1) and (2)”. It is crucial how we understand the role of a speech community and the role of individuals in the impolite speech act because as Holmes and Schnurr noted: “We can never be totally confident about the ascription of politeness or impoliteness to particular utterances, even for members of our own communities of practice” (Holmes & Schnurr, 2005: p. 122). Tracy and Tracy’s (1998) definition clearly referred to the “members of a social community”. Other researchers such as Eelen (2001), Mills (2003), and Watts (2003) used the term ‘communities of practice’. Kádár and Haugh (2013) used ‘relational network’ (which is different from ‘communities of practice’). The important thing for us in this paper is that all these categories refer to some kind of

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relatively constant language communities. However, interlocutors in intercultural interactions hardly make up a “social community” or “community of practice” in the traditional sense of the expressions. The “social community” in which the lingua franca is used as a means of communication is usually just temporary. Interlocutors can rely on factors such as common beliefs, common cultural models, community norms, etc. only to a limited extent in these temporary speech communities. But there is some evidence that even in these kinds of communities there is a strong tendency for interlocutors to co-construct some kind of norms of their own, however short a time their members spend together (e.g. Canagarajah, 2014; Kecskes, 2007; Kecskes, 2013, 2015b). Those temporary norms are quite loose and vague in comparison to norms in traditional language communities (or whatever other term we use). However, it is expected that the more time members of a speech community spend together the more norms of conduct they develop for themselves. This is true for lingua franca use as well, which explains why lingua franca research is considered very important within the European Union where English is considered as a lingua franca. Talking about intercultural interactions the question we need to ask is as follows: Will a person, with, let us say, a French L1, sound polite enough or impolite to a, for instance, Japanese speaker when they use English as a lingua franca? Will the Japanese speaker of English consider the utterance of the French speaker impolite or polite enough in English? Will the actual situational context help the interlocutors process the utterance appropriately as polite or impolite? Will they have a common context that they can rely on while processing the given utterance? What does it mean for those international speakers to process the utterance “appropriately”? To illustrate what I mean, here is an example from a dialogue I noted down at Fuzhou Airport between a Chinese waitress and an Australian traveler who was sitting at a table talking to two other fellow travelers drinking beer and coffee and eating something (see also in Kecskes, 2013): (1)

Chinese: Australian: Chinese: Australian:

Can I get you some more coffee, sir? Who is stopping you? You want to stop me? Oh no, just bring me the damned coffee.

The example clearly shows what problems nonnative speakers may face when they produce and process impolite or polite utterances in intercultural interactions. The expression “who is stopping you?” used by the Australian in this situation sounded very rude according to the norms of most varieties of the English language, however, the Chinese waitress did not seem to have felt that way. She might have been misled by the literal meaning of the expression, which, however, hardly fitted into the actual situational context. If she really relied on the literal meaning of the expression she may not have found the utterance rude according to her limited L2 (English) cultural models and expectations. The actual situational context did not appear to have helped the Chinese waitress to process the utterance properly. Actually, I asked her later if she had realized how rude the Australian tourist was.

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She smiled and said she did not think so. The example demonstrates how the impoliteness of the utterance was lost because the waitress understood what the expression said rather than what it implicated. The actual situational context did not help her recover the communicative meaning of the utterance. Why? This is what this paper is all about.

9.2

Approaches to Impoliteness

This paper does not aim to go into the details of the very complex debates about politeness and impoliteness theories that appear to have a monolingual focus as will be explained below. That would take another paper. This study attempts to explain what happens to impoliteness when none of the interlocutors communicate in their L1 in the course of interaction. But still a basic understanding of the notions and leading current theories in im/politeness is necessary for us to explore what is going on in intercultural communication with the politeness and impoliteness phenomena, and how those theories of politeness/impoliteness should or could be modified (if needed) to accommodate intercultural interactions. When I say that the theories appear to be monolingual in nature I mean that they mainly analyze and discuss how im/politeness works in different languages and across cultures such as English, German, French, Chinese, Japanese, etc. So they focus on one language at a time or the comparison of two or more languages rather than on intercultural interactions where the language of communication is not the L1 of any or some of the participants. Still those studies are all very important because they have paved the way for intercultural interaction studies. There are few papers (see for instance Chang, 2008; Chang & Haugh, 2011 as exceptions) that actually focus on and analyze intercultural (not cross-cultural!) data in which the interlocutors use a common language and represent different L1s such as in lingua franca communication or native speaker and nonnative speaker interaction. Several authors (e.g. Garcés-Conejos Blitvich, 2010; Wierzbicka, 2001) emphasized that most models and theories of politeness and impoliteness are Anglocentered. At the same time there are some studies that show a certain awareness regarding cultural and linguistic variation when theorizing about politeness/impoliteness related concepts (e.g. Bargiela-Chiappini & Haugh, 2009; Holmes et al., 2008). This is mainly true for the field of politeness studies where, as I mentioned above, there are a number of studies that focus on cross-cultural variations. However, impoliteness has just started to be explored in the last decade. Culpeper et al. (2010: p. 598) claimed that “it makes sense to put notions that may assist in understanding how impoliteness works to the cross-cultural test as a matter of priority, the objective being to let the mechanisms of variation help define impoliteness, rather than let a definition of impoliteness obscure variation.” Another issue that we need to take into consideration when we examine intercultural impoliteness is the discursive turn in politeness/impoliteness research (Eelen, 2001; Haugh, 2007; Locher, 2004; Locher, 2012; Watts, 2003). Criticizing

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theories of politeness Eelen (2001) and Watts (2003) argued that a theory of politeness cannot develop without a radical re-conceptualization of politeness that involves a shift away from politeness as an abstract theoretical concept towards members’ evaluative practices as found in their natural environment in everyday discourse. Eelen (2001: pp. 247–248) said that politeness research should focus on the processes of constructing social reality and evaluations of politeness as particular representations of reality. In line with this argument Watts (2003: pp. 19–20) redefined the goal of politeness research as follows: “What a theory of politeness should be able to do is to locate possible realizations of polite and impolite behavior and offer a way of assessing of how the members themselves may have evaluated that behavior.” As Haugh (2007) puts it, this requires the researcher to examine more carefully how (im)politeness is interactionally achieved through the evaluations of self and other (or their respective groups) that emerge in the sequential unfolding of interaction. So the analyst should look for “evidence in the interaction that such (im)politeness evaluations have been made by the participants, either through explicit comments made by participants in the course of the interaction (less commonly), or through the reciprocation of concern evident in the adjacent placement of expressions of concern relevant to the norms invoked in that particular interaction (more commonly)” (Haugh, 2007: p. 301). The aim of the discursive approach is not to describe and explain what linguistic expressions are going to sound (im)polite, or (in)appropriate, and why, but how the interlocutors arrive at their evaluations of their partners’ behavior, and why. This means that the focus is on individual evaluation, and on how people react to their conversational partners’ behavior. As we saw in example (1), the expression “who is stopping you” is theoretically rude, but practically, for the Chinese waitress in that particular context, the expression did not sound impolite. This highlights the importance of individual evaluation beside context-dependency. Both of them are crucial in intercultural interactions. In the discursive approach, analysis happens on the discourse level, and one of the main arguments is that it is the speaker rather than the utterance that is impolite or polite. This claim puts emphasis on the individual. However, the discursive approach also relies on the notion of communities of practice (cf. Wenger, 1998) (and several similar notions mentioned above such as ‘social community”, “relational network”, etc.) that has been very popular lately in several linguistic fields including sociolinguistics, second language acquisition and bi- and multilingualism. This notion focuses on language practices and styles developed by groups of people as they engage in a common task. By analyzing these practices the researcher is expected to identify the norms of appropriateness for a given community of practice and then assess a given utterance as polite or impolite against those norms. However, the analyst’s interpretation as an outsider might not always coincide with that of participants’ themselves (see example 1 above). So the analyst has to look for cues such as explicit comments made by interlocutors in the course of the interaction, or the reciprocation of concern that is evident in the adjacent placement of expressions of concern relevant to the norms invoked in that particular interaction. Intercultural interactions with participants representing different L1s can be considered

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temporary communities of practice or temporary social communities or whatever other terms we use (the emphasis here is on “temporary”.) In these temporary speech communities we cannot speak about well-established prior norms, expectations, frames, and familiar contexts because members of the temporary community have not had time to establish them yet. But they need to rely on some common ground when producing or interpreting utterances. In the co-construction of core common ground the following factors are relied on: L1-based norms, conventions, their limited L2-based knowledge about norms and conventions in L2 and common understanding of elements and factors in the given actual situational context. Out of all these factors interlocutors must co-construct their own micro-context. This is why more “burden” seems to be on the individual than on the socio-cultural, normative, frame-based factors. This shift from the communal to the individual evaluation is the most important phenomenon for intercultural impoliteness. This is where we should look for cues that help us understand the differences between L1 communication and intercultural communication regarding impoliteness. Since there are very few conventions and norms that actually characterize a temporary speech community or ad hoc intercultural interaction, individual participants need mainly to rely on their own knowledge and prior experience in L1 as reference rather than shared common ground, conventions, norms in a long-term speech community. The question is how this shift from the communal evaluation (what is considered impolite in a given speech community) to the individual evaluation affects the role of context. Before answering the question we will need to discuss the nature of context.

9.3

Context-Dependency

In L1 communication research and pragmatics context is everything. Contextualism in pragmatics is one of the dominant approaches according to which contextsensitivity is a pervasive feature of natural language. Literalism, according to which (many or most) sentences express propositions independent of context (declarative knowledge), has been almost completely extinct for some time. According to contextualists, linguistic data must be supplemented by non-linguistic, contextual interpretation processes. There is no meaning without context. As Carston claims, “... linguistically encoded meaning never fully determines the intended proposition expressed” (Carston, 2002: p. 49). As said above, in politeness/impoliteness research almost all researchers seem to agree that no act is inherently polite or impolite, but such a condition depends on the context or speech situation. Culpeper (2009: p. 13) claimed: “Impoliteness involves (a) an attitude comprised of negative evaluative beliefs about particular behaviors in particular social contexts, and (b) the activation of that attitude by those particular in context-behaviors”. This may be true for L1 communication. However, the issue of context-dependency should be revisited in intercultural interaction because context may play a more complex role than just being a selector/activator. This complexity

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can be understood better if we analyze the interplay of prior context and actual situational context in meaning construction and comprehension. So we need to review briefly how context is understood in linguistics research and im/politeness research. In linguistics, context usually refers to any factor—linguistic, epistemic, physical, social—that affects the actual interpretation of signs and expressions. Contextdependency is one of the most powerful views in current linguistic and philosophical theory going back to Frege (1884), Wittgenstein (1921) and others. The Context Principle of Frege (1884) asserts that a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence. Wittgenstein (1921) basically formulated the same idea saying that an expression has meaning only in a proposition. Every variable can be conceived as a propositional variable. This external perspective on context holds that context modifies and/or specifies word meanings in one way or another. Context is seen as a selector of lexical features because it activates some of these features while leaving others in the background. According to Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory (1986), relevance is something that is not determined by context but constrained by context. A context-driven pragmatic process is generally top-down. It is usually not triggered by an expression in the sentence, but occurs for purely pragmatic reasons: that is, in order to make sense of what the speaker says. Such processes are also referred to as “free” pragmatic processes. They are considered free because they are not mandated by the linguistic expressions but respond to pragmatic considerations only. For example, the pragmatic process through which an expression is given a non-literal (e.g. a metaphorical or figurative) interpretation is context-driven because we interpret the expression non-literally in order to make sense of a given speech act, not because this is required by linguistic expressions. This is demonstrated in example (2) in the interpretation of the word “shoot”. (2)

Bob: Jim:

Jim, I need to tell you something. OK, shoot.

The opposite view on context is the internalist perspective. This perspective considers lexical units as creators of context (e.g. Gee, 1999; Violi, 2000). Violi (2000: p. 117) claimed that our experience is developed through the regularity of recurrent and similar situations which we tend to identify with given contexts. The standard (prior recurring) context can be defined as a regular situation that we have repeated experience with, and about which we have expectations as to what will or will not happen, and on which we rely to understand and predict how the world around us works. It is exactly these standard contexts that linguistic meanings tied to lexical units refer to. For instance: (3)

Help yourself. You are all set. Have a nice day.

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These situation-bound utterances (SBU) can actually create their own contexts (See Kecskes, 2003; Kecskes, 2010b). Gumperz (1982: p. 138) said that utterances somehow carry with them their own context or project a context. Referring to Gumperz’s work, Levinson (2003) argued that the message versus context opposition is misleading because the message can carry with it or forecast the context. The main problem with the externalist and internalist views of context is that they are both one-sided because they emphasize either the selective or the constitutive role of context. However, the dynamic nature of human speech communication requires that we recognize both regularity and variability in meaning construction and comprehension, and take into account both the selective and constitutive roles of context at the same time. World knowledge is available to interlocutors in two ways: (1) as tied to lexical items and images based on prior encounters and experience, and (2) as provided by the actual situational context framed by the given situation (Kecskes, 2008, 2010a). According to the socio-cognitive approach to pragmatics (Kecskes, 2010a, 2013), context represents two sides of world knowledge: prior context and actual situational context, which are intertwined and inseparable. Actual situational context is viewed through prior context, and this combination creates, as it were, a third space. Meaning is, in this view, seen as the outcome of the interrelation and interaction of prior and current experience. This has a profound effect on the evaluative function of language because prior, reoccurring context may cancel the selective role of actual situational context. We can demonstrate this through an example taken from Culpeper (2009). (4)

Creative deviation from the default context (cf. “mock impoliteness”) [Lawrence Dallaglio, former England Rugby captain, describing the very close family he grew up in]

As Francesca and John left the house, she came back to give Mum a kiss and they said goodbye in the way they often did. “Bye, you bitch,” Francesca said. “Get out of here, go on, you bitch,” replied Mum. (Dallaglio, 2008). Culpeper explained that the reason why the conversation between the mother and daughter does not hurt either of them is due to the context (“mock impoliteness”). However, a closer look at the example reveals that actual situational context hardly plays any role here. Rather what we have here is the strong effect of prior context, prior experience that overrides the actual situational context: “. . .they said goodbye in the way they often did”. Reoccurring context and frequent use may neutralize the impolite conceptual load attached to expressions. This is exactly what seems to be the case in this interaction. When I talk about “prior context” I mean two things that are intertwined. Prior context that those two participants themselves share (i.e. prior context emerging from their prior interactions with each other) in the example above, and prior context that can also be “sourced” from similar interactions with other speakers. In politeness research Terkourafi’s approach to context appears to be quite influential. Terkourafi (cf. 2005, 2009) proposed a frame-based approach according to which specific linguistic expressions should be analyzed in their particular contexts of use

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(i.e., frames). She said that it is “the regular co-occurrence of particular types of context and particular linguistic expressions as the unchallenged realizations of particular acts that create the perception of politeness” (Terkourafi, 2005: p. 248). Terkourafi (2009: p. 23) emphasized the constitutive role of the (actual situational) context that creates a frame for the participants to evaluate what is polite. As her focus is on politeness, she concentrates on statistical regularities of usage: “politeness is not a matter of rational calculation, but of habits” (Terkourafi, 2005: p. 250). She also argued that “Empirically, frames take the form of observable regularities of usage” (Terkourafi 2001: p. 185). Analyzing Terkourafi’s approach, Culpeper et al. (2010) asked the questions: “Could conventionalised impoliteness formulae have the same basis as that argued for politeness formulae? Are they conventionalised frequency correlations between forms and particular contexts?” (Culpeper, 2010: p. 3232). His argument was that impoliteness cannot be adequately treated that way. I agree with Culpeper’s assessment. Impoliteness formulae should be handled differently from politeness formulae. Referring to Leech, Culpeper argued that impoliteness formulae are much less frequent than politeness formulae. Leech (1983: p. 105) stated that “conflictive illocutions tend, thankfully, to be rather marginal to human linguistic behaviour in normal circumstances”. Another important difference between politeness and impoliteness expressions was pointed out by Watts: “Behaviours and expressions considered impolite are more noticed and discussed than politeness” (Watts, 2003: p. 5). People know about impoliteness, they are familiar with impolite expressions and understand when they face impoliteness in their L1 but do not necessarily exercise impoliteness. It is one thing to know how to be impolite or when someone is impolite, and it is another thing to actually be impolite or “practice” impoliteness. Culpeper (2010: p. 3238) confirms this line of thinking: “. . .there is an interesting point of difference with politeness formulae is that people acquire a knowledge of impoliteness formulae that far exceeds their own direct experience of usage of formulae associated with impolite effects in such contexts. This, I argue, is because they also draw upon indirect experience, and in particular metadiscourse.” As we see, impoliteness research has also pointed out that context plays a different role in impoliteness than in politeness. Something can be conventionalized not only through frequent usage. There are other factors that may play an important role in conventionalization of any formulas or expressions in a language. These factors include (but not restricted to) familiarity, functional importance, psychological salience and something that I call “resonance” which refers to affecting someone in a personal or emotional way. What I mean by this is that some linguistic signs, expressions and occasionally whole utterances may evoke or suggest images, memories, and emotions for a language user. These expressions may carry a negative or positive load for a language user for particular, usually individual reasons. People know negative expressions like “get lost”, “you are an idiot”, “drop dead”, etc. but most of them very rarely use those. Or on the other hand, some people may overuse certain expressions with a positive load, like myself who uses “would you mind . . . .” too often although it is quite rare in American English.

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Consequently, to be familiar with an impoliteness formulae does not necessarily require frequent and direct prior contextual experience. One can get to know the “norm” not only through direct prior experience but also indirectly, through hearsay, observation, etc. This is an important factor for intercultural interactants because there is no easy answer to the question: Whose im/politeness norms should be followed when participating in an intercultural interaction? For instance, when a French person is speaking with a Japanese person in English, whose norms will define what is considered im/polite? The obvious answer would be English norms but in fact this is hardly what happens as we will see in some of the examples below. Besides, there is the additional issue that Culpepper raised in connection with impoliteness formulae: no direct prior experience is needed to be familiar with what is considered impolite in a given speech community. Living in that community, members can get to know what is impolite through indirect means as well.

9.4

Norms and Context in Intercultural Interactions

People generally think that when using a second or third or X language interlocutors are impolite or rude not according to the norms of the target language but according to the norms and rules of their L1. This is not surprising, because even very fluent speakers of L2 may fall back on their L1 norms and conventions when they are emotional: very happy, or very angry, or rude, and when they are tired (see Dewaele, 2006; Gawinkowska et al., 2013). In order to clarify this issue we need to discuss how the relationship of norms and the process of co-construction are handled in the discursive approach and the socio-cognitive approach.

9.4.1

Norms and the Discursive Approach

As far as the role of norms and conventions in interaction is concerned there is significant difference between the discursive approach (Eelen, 2001; Haugh, 2007; Locher, 2004, 2012; Watts, 2003) and the socio-cognitive approach (e.g. Kecskes, 2010a, Kecskes 2013; Zufferey, 2015). Norms and conventions are results of prior experience and repeated prior contexts. As mentioned above norms, conventions and their sharedness have become a key issue in politeness/impoliteness research in the discursive view. However, the discursive view does not consider norms straightforward and pre-existing entities, but versatile argumentative tools, which are not necessarily shared across the board by individuals in the language community. Norms are seen as being relative to the practice to which they are part of, rather than informing it in an objective way (Eelen, 2001: pp. 229–236). They are maintained through interactions and discourses on im/politeness, but they may also be challenged or disputed by speakers. Researchers should accordingly focus on how norms are discursively co-constructed and how they may be resisted or

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contested. It is very important to note that there is no formal distinction made between pre-existing and co-constructed norms in most discursive approaches. As a consequence, the discursive approach relies on the minute by minute description of specific occurrences of politeness and impoliteness in individual encounters. The socio-cognitive approach does not accept this approach to politeness/impoliteness research. It maintains that interlocutors rely both on pre-existing norms and conventions and co-constructed elements in both production and comprehension. So the effect of prior experience substantiated in norms, conventions and expectations cannot be ignored as is done in the discursive view. In the socio-cognitive approach, politeness/impoliteness is both constituted in the communicative process through on-the-spot evaluations and decisions, and constitutive of the communicative process through expectations and norms. So what we have is a process that blends what the interlocutors already have, based on their prior experience (dominated by L1 experience) and what they co-construct in the course of interaction. Prior experience with politeness and impoliteness expressions is especially important for nonnative speakers in intercultural communication. For instance: (5)

I’ll talk to you later, Be my guest, Get out of here Knock it off, will you?

If these expressions are used according to the norms of the target language (English) and interlocutors are familiar with them, no problem is expected to occur in the interaction. They will know the socio-cultural load attached to these expressions. However, if they are not familiar with them the use of these expressions may cause conflict or tension. The following conversation between a Turkish student and a Russian student illustrates this point. (Source: Albany ELF dataset). (6)

Ali: Sasha: Ali: Sasha: Ali:

Sasha, come with me to the library. Sorry, I cannot. I need to finish this essay. You really need to come. Peg will also be there. Knock it off, will you? Don’t you see that I am kind of busy Okay, okay, just chill.

Knock it off, will you? used by the Russian student is quite rude by American English norms, and this is how the Turkish student processed it. Both students were familiar with the impolite load of the expression in American English, so there was no escalation of conflict. Although Sasha’s expression does seem to carry a possible “escalatory” or even “aggressive” attitude, Ali attempts to deescalate the conflict by asking Sasha to “chill”. In other words, Ali recognizes the possible emotional/ aggressive load of Sasha’s prior utterance and responds by attempting to calm him down. Both are familiar with the socio-cultural load of the expression and act accordingly: no escalation of conflict occurs because of the Ali’s appropriate response.

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Situation-bound utterances (like the ones in example 5) whose use is tied to particular speech scenarios may cause trouble in intercultural interaction because interlocutors cannot be sure that their communicative partners know that particular formulation of a norm that they used in the interaction. Although a number of SBUs usually express a polite approach if they are processed literally, they may be easily misinterpreted and considered impolite. (7)

Don’t you look pretty Not that I do not believe you, but. . . Tell me about it Get out of here

The problem with the discursive view in im/politeness research not recognizing the importance of pre-existing norms and expectations is that interlocutors involved in interactions usually make predictions (based on their prior experience both in L1 and L2) regarding appropriateness and what might be expected therein. Therefore, the norms underlying expectations of politeness/impoliteness go back to generic constraints, and those generic norms are the ones the analyst needs to assess vis-à-vis assessments of politeness/impoliteness. Hong (2008) described an interesting example for this generic norm to illustrate how it may work in a speech community (example used in Ardington, 2011 and Kecskes, 2013). “Where the bloody hell are you?” has been used as a catch phrase of Tourism Australia’s marketing campaign encouraging tourists to visit Australia.1 The advertisement features images of Australians preparing for visitors to their country. It begins in an outback pub— the bar keeper says that he’s poured a beer; moves on to a young boy on the beach— he says he’s got the sharks out of the swimming pool; and then to partygoers watching Sydney harbor fireworks, who say that they’ve turned on the lights. The commercial ends with a girl stepping out of the ocean asking “So where the bloody hell are you?” There was quite a controversy about this phrase all over Australia. Some thought that the catch phrase demonstrated light-hearted play on stereotypical characteristics of Australia such as “informality”, “casualness” and “friendliness”. Others said that, since the ad represents Australia, it should show more politeness and courtesy in standing for the country. Hong (2008) relying on Wierzbicka (2001) and her own survey argued that “bloody” is generally considered to be a very mild expletive, unlikely to cause offence in most circles. Close to 80% of her respondents said that the expression “bloody hell” is acceptable and not impolite. This would not necessarily be the case if nonnative speakers were asked about the polite/impolite load of the expression because if lacking the conceptual support they would probably process the expression literally in spite of the fact that actual situational context does not support that interpretation. Of course this is just speculation based on existing research in other similar cases (see, for instance, research of Cieślicka,

1 “So where the bloody hell are you?” is a A$180 million advertising campaign launched in 2006 by Tourism Australia created by the Sydney office of the London advertising agency M&C Saatchi.

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2006; House, 2002, 2003; Kecskes, 2007). No survey was done with non-native speakers only in the Australian case.

9.4.2

Context and Semantic Analyzability

In intercultural communication actual situational context may affect the processing of politeness and impoliteness differently from what actually happens in L1 communication. The main reason of this is the priority of semantic analyzability of an utterance for nonnative speakers in L2 language processing. Current research has shown that in intercultural communication non-native speakers very often prioritize the compositional meaning of an utterance (Abel, 2003; Bortfeld, 2002; Bortfeld, 2003; Cieślicka, 2004; Cieślicka, 2006; House, 2002, 2003; Kecskes, 2007; Kecskes, 2015a). The following example from the Albany dataset demonstrates this quite well: (8)

A Japanese student enters into the room of Professor Brown. Noritaka: Hi Professor Brown. Professor: Hi Noritaka. How are you? Why don’t you sit down? Noritaka: Because you did not tell me to. Professor: OK, I am telling you now.

“Why don’t you sit down?” is a formulaic expression that is used to invite someone to sit down. However, if processed literally/compositionally the expression asks about the reason why someone does not take a seat. Not knowing the figurative meaning of the expression the Japanese student relied on the compositional meaning of the expression that also fitted into the actual situational context. The problem with formulas is that they usually carry a conceptual load that is culture-specific. Nonnative speakers may require several encounters (direct) or observed cases (indirect) to acquire the appropriate use of this kind of expressions. The priority and saliency of literal meaning for nonnative speakers in meaning processing may have a profound effect on how politeness/impoliteness is processed. As a result, the polite or impolite load of the expressions and utterances may be lost or an evaluative polite/impolite function may emerge where it should not. We saw an example in the first case at the beginning of the chapter (see example 1). The Chinese waitress did not recognize the rudeness of the Australian traveler when he asked ‘Who is stopping you?’ as the waitress offered him more coffee. The waitress processed the utterance literally but she seemed to be confused because it did not make sense for her in that actual situational context. So the actual situational context caused confusion rather than clarification because the rudeness of the expression was lost as the waitress could not process it properly (see footnote 1). Another case is when a polite or impolite function emerges for the nonnative speaker where it should not. This is what is happening in example (9) in which a Japanese student, Akiko is talking to an American student, Melody (Albany dataset).

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Melody, I have received the travel grant. Nooou, get out of here! You should not be rude. I did get it. OK, I was not rude, just happy for you.

The Japanese student processed the situation-bound utterance ‘get out of here’ literally although it is clear that if processed that way, the literal sense of the expression does not match the actual situational context. The interesting thing is that not even the intonation and enthusiasm of Melody helped the Japanese student process the expression properly. In sum, in this short interaction all actual situational contextual factors were overridden by the student’s prior experience with the use of ‘get out of here’ (which was probably literal) and the strong semantic analyzability of the expression. The actual situational context did not really seem to allow the nonnative speaker to catch the impolite load of an expression as is usually the case in L1 communication. This issue is worth attention because, as mentioned above, in L1 communication the main tenet is that context is everything: meaning is dependent on context because the linguistic sign is underdetermined (see Carston, 2002 above). This, however, is not quite so in intercultural communication where the semantic analyzability of expressions often creates its own context as we saw in example (9). As said at the beginning of this paper, when talking about L1 communication, all researchers (e.g. Culpeper, 2009; Haugh, 2007; Terkourafi, 2005) seem to agree that no act is inherently polite or impolite, but such a condition depends on the context or speech situation. This may be so for L1 communication. However, in intercultural interactions the actual situational context does not always work as a collective frame that helps interlocutors make similar sense of the linguistic signs. Occasionally the actual situational context is interpreted differently by the interlocutors because their prior experience is rooted in different cultures and in different experiences with different speech communities. I argued that the issue of context-dependency should be revisited in intercultural communication because prior context appears to be as powerful (and often even more powerful) as actual situational context in shaping meaning in language processing. When processing politeness or impoliteness functions of utterances, interlocutors in intercultural interactions may rely primarily on (mainly L1-based) prior context in meaning construction and comprehension rather than on actual situational context. This does not help the interpretation process as it does in L1. If context does not help, interpretation generally depends on what the utterance says rather than on what it actually communicates. As a consequence, interlocutors focusing on literal meanings may sometimes be unaware of politeness or impoliteness because it is conveyed implicitly or through paralinguistic means. Here we should refer to the issue of common ground. Common ground refers to the ‘sum of all the information that people assume they share’ (Clark, 2009: p. 116) that may include world views, shared values, beliefs, and situational context.

9.5

Anti-Normative Politeness or Mock Impoliteness

187

Kecskes and Zhang (2009) argued that core common ground should be distinguished from emergent common ground. Core common ground is constituted by knowledge, expectations and beliefs that members of a speech community have in common based on their prior experience while emergent common ground is mutual knowledge that emerges in the process of communication, and is co-constructed by the participants. Core common ground is usually attached to prior experience and prior context, while emergent common ground is immediately related to actual situational context. Limited core common ground may restrict the interpretation process to the propositional content of an utterance, and may also decrease context-sensitivity. The proper processing of impoliteness requires strong share of core common ground. In intercultural communication, however, interlocutors usually rely more on emergent common ground than core common ground, which may result in the loss of impoliteness effect as was demonstrated above. The next section will discuss a phenomenon that confirms the somewhat weaker role of actual situational context in intercultural impoliteness.

9.5

Anti-Normative Politeness or Mock Impoliteness

From the perspective of context-sensitivity we should discuss a unique occurrence of impoliteness that is called “mock impoliteness” or “anti-normative politeness” (Zimmerman, 2003) in the literature (see Mugford, 2012). Anti-normative politeness has been described as “mock impoliteness” (Culpeper, 1996) “banter” (Leech, 1983), “sociable rudeness” (Kienpointner, 1997: p. 268) and “ritual abuse” (Parkin, 1980: p. 45). Mock impoliteness is often contrasted with impoliteness. Culpeper (1996: p. 352) defined mock impoliteness as “impoliteness that stays on the surface, since it is understood that it is not intended to cause offence”. Mock impoliteness makes it possible for interlocutors to establish their own interactional patterns without having to conform to conventional patterns of use. They use rude, aggressive and/or impolite expressions in order to express solidarity, friendship, and group-inclusion. This type of impoliteness allows a subgroup of given speech community to express positive politeness in its own creative and unique way. It is often used cross-culturally as the following example shows. (10)

English: What’s up, dudes? Russian: Kak dela, muziki?

Both the English and Russian expressions are used for addressing and/or greeting friends who belong to the close circle of the speaker. Literally they may sound rude but in fact they are not. They refer to group-inclusiveness in a funny way. Functionally the Russian word “muziki’ (meaning “peasants”) is the close conceptual (not semantic!) equivalent of American English “dudes”. Relating anti-normative politeness (see footnote 1) to foreign-language use and participation, Mugford (2012) argued that foreign language users must be aware not

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only of linguistic features of expressions but also how they are used socially to achieve interpersonal goals and group understandings. Nonnative speakers, based on their L1, understand that mock impoliteness reflects phatic communion, mutual trust, group affiliation and enhanced individual image of a given speech community subgroup. However, mock impoliteness in L2 is still very difficult for them to process because their prior experience with mock impoliteness, and prior contexts with mock impoliteness, is attached to L1 rather than L2. So it is hard for them to recognize when exactly mock impoliteness is used, and actual situational context does not always help them in processing cases of mock impoliteness. However, we must be careful how we evaluate the role of actual situational context in anti-normative impoliteness. Culpeper argued that the role of (actual situational) context is neutralized in these cases. Analyzing example (4) above I already claimed that it is not quite so. What neutralizes the actual situational context is in fact prior context, which can also be the way the involved individuals are accustomed to speaking to each other. From this perspective we should look at another example of Culpeper (2009). He talks about a party to which he was late. He turned up at 7:00 p.m., only to discover the party had started at 5:00 p.m. and had almost finished. Upon telling the host, a friend of his, the reason for his mistake, the friend replied “You silly bugger”. He used a conventionally impolite insult. But of course Culpeper did not take offence. For him this was a friendly banter. Banter involves mock or non-genuine impoliteness, as does some types of teasing and humor. The important thing in language processing is to recognize that the impolite expression is indeed non-genuine. Culpeper (2009) argued that the recognition of this mock impoliteness relies on some degree of mismatch between the conventionally impolite formulae used and the context (e.g. “you silly bugger” vs. friendly relations), along with additional signals (e.g. laughter, smiling) that the impoliteness is not genuine. In fact, I would argue that the additional nonverbal signals paired with the speakers’ prior experience (not the actual situational context!) cancel the impoliteness effect. It is important to note that mock impoliteness is not about the frequency of use of the given expression in similar contexts. It is about the relationship between the people who use the expression and about the relationship two people (sometimes strangers) want to establish. Mock impoliteness can arise in interactions amongst speakers who are meeting for the first time (see Haugh, 2011) with the aim to establish an in-group relationship. A speaker can try to use mock impoliteness with a person that he has never met before, based on his positive prior experience with other people when his goal was similar: establish camaraderie or a friendly relationship. When I talk about prior context I also include prior experience with other speakers not featured in the actual situational context. Elsewhere Culpeper (2009) acknowledged that “the neutralisation of impoliteness by any context is difficult to achieve.” Then he continued: The main reason for this is that the context in many cases is likely to be overwhelmed by the salience of impoliteness behaviors. Research in social cognition would suggest that, people do not careful attend to contextual reasons why they should not take offence; they are more likely to focus on the impolite language or action and, with little thought, take offence. (Culpeper, 2009).

9.6

Conclusion

189

We can agree with this statement that fits how the socio-cognitive approach handles these cases. The semantic content of expressions that encodes prior contexts is so powerful that the actual situational context cannot cancel that. But how would that work for a foreign language user who did not have enough encounters with the group of native speakers to establish this camaraderie? Probably not that well, as the following exchange demonstrates (see footnote 1): (11)

Jerry and Bob are going to the movies. They want their Chinese friend, Zhang to go with them. Jerry (smiling): Hey, douchebag, wanna come with us? Zhang: What did you just call me? Jerry: Forget it. Do you want to come with us or not?

The Chinese person was embarrassed to be called “douchebag”. He may not have known what the word exactly means but seemed to have interpreted it as offensive in spite of the fact that Jerry used the expression as banter. He wanted to sound funny and express a kind of camaraderie. When he saw it did not work, he just let it go. This is where the problem is for the nonnative speaker. Although he may be aware of the mock impoliteness value of the expression, still he finds it offensive because his prior L1-based experience may override what the actual situational context presents.

9.6

Conclusion

It was argued that impoliteness research is dominated by intracultural and crosscultural views and emphasis on context-dependency with only a small number of works focusing on intercultural interactions. This paper has attempted to examine how existing theories of politeness/impoliteness can be applied to explain intercultural interaction where, according to existing research, there is dominance of propositional meaning, and only minimal core common ground is available for interlocutors. So they need to co-construct and develop emergent common ground. It was hypothesized that context may affect these interactions differently than it is the case in L1 communication. When participating in intercultural interactions, interlocutors have the knowledge to recognize impoliteness based on their L1. However, this recognition in L1 is supported by contextual factors that may not work in L2 the way they do in L1, and reliance on L1 experience only can be misleading. The issue of context-dependency was revisited in intercultural interaction because context appeared to play a more complex role than just being a selector/activator. Examples demonstrated that there is a need for distinguishing prior context and actual situational context as two sides of context whose interplay strongly affects how meaning is shaped and interpreted. The main reason of this is the priority of semantic analyzability of an utterance for nonnative speakers rather than the priority of meaning most supported by the actual situational context. The behavior of nonnative speakers seems to support what Cruse said about L1 politeness which,

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in his opinion is “first and foremost, a matter of what is said, and not a matter of what is thought or believed” (Cruse, 2000: p. 362). This statement is not widely accepted in politeness and impoliteness research focusing on L1s. However, it appears to be supported, at least to some extent, by what nonnative speakers do. The priority of “what is said” for nonnative speakers and their L1-based prior experience and context awareness in meaning processing has a profound effect on how politeness/ impoliteness is processed in L2. As a result, the polite or impolite load of expressions and utterances may be lost or an evaluative polite/impolite function may emerge where it should not. For nonnative speakers, prior context may have a stronger effect on meaning construction and comprehension in intercultural interactions than actual situational context when processing polite or impolite value of utterances. Interpretation generally depends on what the utterance says rather than on what it actually communicates. As a consequence, relying on compositional (literal) meanings interlocutors may sometimes be unaware of impoliteness because it is conveyed implicitly or through paralinguistic means. Research in intercultural impoliteness is a relatively new area of inquiry. We need large datasets (which we do not have yet) to analyze the real nature of this phenomenon. Right now we are still in the process of asking questions, mainly relying on existing research whose focus is on cross-cultural rather than intercultural data analysis. This paper has attempted to contribute to this growing field of research with pointing out areas that further research should address. Acknowledgements The paper was first published in 2017 as Context-sensitivity in intercultural impoliteness. Journal of Politeness Research. Vol. 13. No. 1: 7–33. Thanks to DeGruyter for permission to reuse the text.

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Kecskes, I. (2003). Situation-bound utterances in L1 and L2. Mouton de Gruyter. Kecskes, I. (2007). Formulaic language in English lingua franca. In I. Kecskés & L. R. Horn (Eds.), Explorations in pragmatics: Linguistic, cognitive and intercultural aspects (pp. 191–219). Mouton de Gruyter. Kecskes, I. (2008). Dueling contexts: A dynamic model of meaning. Journal of Pragmatics, 40(3), 385–406. Kecskes, I. (2010a). The paradox of communication: A socio-cognitive approach. Pragmatics and Society, 1(1), 50–73. Kecskes, I. (2010b). Situation-bound utterances as pragmatic acts. Journal of Pragmatics, 42(11), 2889–2897. Kecskes, I. (2013). Intercultural pragmatics. Oxford University Press. Kecskes, I. (2015a). Is the idiom principle blocked in bilingual L2 production? Chapter 2. In R. Heredia & A. Cieślicka (Eds.), Bilingual figurative language processing (pp. 28–53). Cambridge University Press. Kecskes, I. (2015b). Intracultural communication and intercultural communication: Are they different? International Review of Pragmatics, 7(2), 171–194. Kecskes, I., & Zhang, F. (2009). Activating, seeking and creating common ground: A sociocognitive approach. Pragmatics and Cognition, 17(2), 331–355. Kienpointner, M. (1997). Varieties of rudeness: Types and functions of impolite utterances. Functions of Language, 4(2), 251–287. Lakoff, R. (1973). The logic of politeness; or, minding your P’s and Q’s. In C. Corum, T. C. SmithStark, & A. Weiser (Eds.), Papers from the ninth regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistics Society (pp. 292–305). Department of Linguistics, University of Chicago. Leech, G. (1983). Principles of pragmatics. Longman. Levinson, S. C. (2003). Language and mind: Let’s get the issues straight! In D. Gentner & S. Goldin-Meadow (Eds.), Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and cognition (pp. 25–46). MIT Press. Locher, M. (2004). Power and politeness in action: Disagreement in oral communication. Mouton de Gruyter. Locher, M. A. (2012). Politeness research from past to future, with a special focus on the discursive approach. In: New perspectives on (im)politeness and interpersonal communication. 1–22. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Mills, S. (2003). Gender and politeness. Cambridge University Press. Mugford, G. (2012). I wouldn’t say that if were you: Fact-to-face with foreign-language impoliteness. Journal of Politeness Research, 8(3), 195–221. Parkin, D. (1980). The creativity of abuse. Man (N.S.), 15, 45–64. Sperber, D. & Wilson D. (1986/1995). Relevance: Communication and cognition (2nd edn.). Oxford: Blackwell. Terkourafi, M. (2001). Politeness in Cypriot Greek: A frame-based approach. In Politeness in Cypriot Greek: A framebased approach. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge. Terkourafi, M. (2005). Beyond the micro-level in politeness research. Journal of Politeness Research, 1(2), 237–262. Terkourafi, M. (2009). On de-limiting context. In A. Bergs & G. Diewald (Eds.), Contexts and constructions. CAL9 (pp. 17–42). John Benjamins. Tracy, K., & Tracy, S. J. (1998). Rudeness at 911: Reconceptualizing face and face attack. Human Communication Research, 25(2), 225–251. Violi, P. (2000). Prototypicality, typicality, and context. In L. Albertazzi (Ed.), Meaning and cognition: A multidisciplinary approach (pp. 103–123). John Benjamins. Watts, R. J. (2003). Politeness. Cambridge University Press. Wenger, E. C. (1998). Communities of practice: Learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge University Press.

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Wierzbicka, A. (2001). Cross-cultural pragmatics: The semantics of human interaction. Mouton de Gruyter. Wittgenstein, L. (1921/1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Ogden Charles Kay (trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Zimmerman, K. (2003). Constitución de la identidad y anticortesía verbal ente jóvenes masculinos hablantes de español. In D. Bravo (Ed.), Estudios del Discurso de Cortesía en Español (pp. 47–59). EDICE. Zufferey, S. (2015). Acquiring pragmatics: Social and cognitive perspective. Routledge.

Chapter 10

The Role of Context in English as a Lingua Franca

Abstract This chapter argues that context is a dynamic construct that appears in different formats in language use both as a repository and/or trigger of knowledge. It has both a selective and a constitutive role. Mainstream theories of meaning (e.g. Coulson. Semantic leaps: Frame-shifting and conceptual blending in meaning-construction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000; Croft. Explaining language change: An evolutionary approach. Longman, London, 2000; Evans. Cognitive linguistics 17:491–534, 2006) claim that meaning construction is mostly dependent on actual situational context. This chapter, however, argues that meaning values of linguistics expressions that encapsulate prior contexts of experience play as important a role in meaning construction and comprehension as actual situational context. This is especially true in ELF interactions where actual situational context cannot help pragmatic implication and interpretation the way it does in L1 communication because of the different L1 background of interlocutors and uneven sociocultural experience with the target language. Keywords Actual situational context · Prior context · Common ground · Semantic analyzability · Socio-cognitive approach

10.1

Introduction

Goodwin and Duranti (1992: p. 2) argued that context is “a frame that surrounds the event and provides resources for its appropriate interpretation”. “Resources” here refer to any factor—linguistic, epistemic, physical, social, etc.—that affects the actual interpretation of signs and expressions. The question is how and why these resources support meaning construction and interpretation. The answer is quite simple. Members of a speech community share common ground, beliefs, cultural models, social frames, and have preferred ways of saying things and preferred ways of organizing thoughts. All these factors together create what we call “context”, which makes it possible for interlocutors in that speech community to have relatively smooth communication. There is no need to explain in that L1 community that “tell me about it” means the opposite in the following encounter: © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_10

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(1) Bob: - I think Sally is an excellent debater. Eve: - Tell me about it. She really knows how to make an argument.

However, in ELF encounters it is important whether interlocutors are familiar with the use of that formulaic expression. Contextual effect cannot help ELF speakers here because they have different L1 backgrounds and different experience with their common L2. A significant part of contextual effect is language and culture specific. In L1 language develops through socialization and socialization takes place through language (e.g. Ochs & Schieffelin, 1984; Ortaçtepe, 2012; Kecskes, 2013). As a result, members of a speech community develop a relatively similar understanding of their environment, cultural modals and social frames that all feed in our understanding of umbrella notion “context”. It is important that this shaping of the contextual effect is a never ending, dynamic and diachronic process in each language. This is why members of a speech community have preferred ways of saying things and preferred ways of organizing thoughts (e.g. Wray, 2002; Kecskes, 2007). Contextual effect helps them understand figures of speech, metaphors, idioms, formulaic expressions in their L1 that all serve relatively smooth communication. This contextual effect makes clear the meaning of “shoot” in the following exchange: (2) Jim: - Mary, I have a question. Mary: OK, shoot.

If, however, this encounter happened between two ELF speakers it is for sure that the actual situational context would not help the interpretation. In order for the broad non-linguistic context to be supportive in interpretation the interlocutors need common ground and a kind of collective salience that leads them to a relatively similar interpretation of actual contextual factors. The question is whether interlocutors in intercultural interactions have all that to a similar extent as L1 speakers do. Of course, they do not. Still, they can communicate quite smoothly. So how is this possible? What do ELF interlocutors rely on when they communicate? How is it possible that although they cannot rely on the target language provided contextual effect, they still can have rather smooth communication? These are the questions that are to be addressed in this chapter. But first, we need to discuss approaches to context in current L1-based linguistics.

10.2

Approaches to Context

Contextualism is one of the dominant approaches according to which contextsensitivity (in various forms) is a pervasive feature of natural language. The opposite view is literalism, according to which (many or most) sentences express propositions

10.2

Approaches to Context

197

independent of context (declarative knowledge), has been almost completely extinct for some time in current linguistics. Carston claims that”... linguistically encoded meaning never fully determines the intended proposition expressed” (Carston, 2002: p. 49). Consequently, linguistic data must be completed by non-linguistic, contextual interpretation processes. This view goes back to the Context Principle of Frege (1884) that asserts that a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence. Wittgenstein (1921) basically formulated the same idea saying that an expression has meaning only in a proposition. Every variable can be conceived as a propositional variable. This external perspective on context holds that context modifies and/or specifies word meanings in one way or another. Context is seen as a selector of lexical features because it activates some of these features while leaving others in the background. However, overemphasis on context-dependency gives a lopsided perspective. Dependency on actual situational context is only one side of the matter. We assume that both the traditional semantic view (literalism) and the novel pragmatic view go wrong when they leave prior context out of the picture. The followers of the semantic view may not be right when they think that any linguistic sign can be independent of any contextual considerations. No linguistic sign or expression can be independent of context because they actually carry prior context, i.e., they encode the history of their prior use that create collective saliency in a speech community. The supporters of the pragmatic view may go wrong when they do not emphasize that pragmatic expansion and contextual enrichment are the results of the individual’s prior experience. Suffice it to say both sides appear to be mistaken to some extent because they talk about context without making a distinction between its two sides: prior context and actual situational context as distinguished by the socio-cognitive approach (SCA, proposed by Kecskes, 2008, 2010, 2013). SCA claims that the proposition literally expressed (sentence meaning) is the result of collective prior experience of speakers of a given speech community. This is expanded and/or enriched by prior individual experience, present situational experience and/or need of a concrete speaker when s/he uses that utterance (speaker’s meaning). The speaker privatizes the collective experience by enhancing/enriching the content with his private experience. Inferred meaning is the reflection of the interplay between prior experience of the speaker and prior experience of the hearer in an actual situational context. Prior context as understood in the socio-cognitive paradigm is declarative knowledge while actual situational context represents procedural knowledge. Bezuidenhout (2004) claimed that parallels exist between the declarative/procedural divide, the semantics/pragmatics interface and the competence/performance distinction. She proposed that a clear-cut distinction must be made between procedural knowledge, which belongs to the performance system and is pragmatic, on one hand, and lexical conceptual knowledge, which belongs to the competence system and is semantic, on the other. This is in line with what the socio-cognitive approach (SCA) claims: lexical conceptual knowledge derives from prior context that is encapsulated in the lexical items while procedural knowledge, which is pragmatic, is triggered by the actual situational context.

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This distinction between the two sides of context and the role of prior experience are especially important from the perspective of ELF. While L1 interlocutors have common ground and collective salience based on their prior experience (prior context) in a particular speech community, ELF interlocutors’ prior experience is rooted in different speech communities. So, we need to look at what may not be right about L1-based contextualism and how contextual effect varies on the intraintercultural continuum (cf. Kecskes, 2015).

10.3

Contextual Effect and Semantics in ELF

However strange it may sound, one of the most significant criticisms against contextualism comes from semanticists like Cappelen and Lepore (2005: p. x) whose works have not been on/dealt with intercultural communication. They gave a strong argument against contextualism that could have been formulated even by an expert in ELF: “The common thread that runs throughout our criticism of contextualism is that it fails to account for how we communicate across contexts. People with different background beliefs, goals, audiences, perceptual inputs, etc. can understand each other. They can agree or disagree. They can say, assert, claim, state, investigate, or make fun of the very same claim. No theory of communication is adequate unless it explains how this is possible. Contextualists cannot provide such an explanation.” The authors are absolutely right. But if that is so true, then there must be something that makes communication across contexts possible. This “something” is semantics. The linguistic signs must have some strongly encoded meaning that is relatively the same for most speakers of a language with different background beliefs, goals, let them be native or nonnative speakers. For instance, the word “heat” literally means “a condition of being hot” for everybody who uses the English language. The real problem for nonnative speakers lies in the metaphorical domain that is attached to this concept: 1. heated conversation 2. turn the heat on the interviewee 3. answer with considerable heat This is where ELF speakers may get into trouble. When they communicate with other ELF speakers and use words in metaphorical sense (e.g. Werkman Horvat et al., 2021), they cannot be sure that their partners will understand what they mean, for instance, when they say something like “the director turned on the heat on the interviewee with some personal questions”. The actual situational context may not help the interpretation as it does in L1. The speaker either knows the metaphorical meaning or not. This is where the role of prior context, prior experience with lexical items in the target language comes in. It could take over in ELF the role of core common ground that contextual effect in L1 is based on. So, is that code-related common ground the key to relatively smooth ELF communication? Let us take a closer look at this issue.

10.3

Contextual Effect and Semantics in ELF

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Kecskes (2015) argued that the difference between L1 communication and intercultural communication can be demonstrated on a continuum with two hypothetical ends. There is nothing like “pure” intracultural communication (L1) or intercultural communication. Every kind of communication is in-between the two hypothetical ends. Commonalities, conventions, common beliefs, shared knowledge and the like all create a core common ground, a kind of collective salience on which L1 communication is based on. We simply have less of those in intercultural interactions that take place in temporary speech communities. However, the more time people spend together, the more they create norms, conventions, commonalities to make their communication smoother and economize the speech process. This process can be well-demonstrated in transient speech communities such as doctoral students with different L1s studying together for several years, or multilingual classroom where students spend one or two semesters together. As a result, the linguistic signs come to have something that can be called presumptive meaning (see Levinson, 2000). This is a sub-category of meaning that is neither semantic nor pragmatic. These are presumed, default interpretations, arrived at by virtue of the repeated scenarios from the past, knowledge of language and the world, and other salient information, processed with the aid of some general principles of human reasoning. This meaning is neither exactly what we have in the dictionary nor what we have in a contextualized utterance. Presumptive meaning is about utterance-type meaning (abstracted), not the utterance-token meaning (substantiated in context) that is usually the focus of pragmatics. But it has direct relevance to intercultural interactions because the utterance-token meaning generated and arrived at in those interactions may not be fully compatible with what the common language – based (English) contextual understanding projects. This is mainly because presumptive meaning may be attached to different conceptual contents for different English language users. A typical example can be the use of “patronize” in the following interaction (Example 3): (3) Korean: - Jill, do you want me to help you with your essay? American: - Don’t patronize me, please. Korean: - You say, you don’t want support? American: - Please just don’t..... Okay? Korean: - Tell me please what I did wrong.

The misunderstanding comes from the difference in presumptive meaning. In Korean the closest lexical equivalent to “patronize” is “huwonhada” that conceptually always refers to something positive. However, in English the conceptual load is different depending on the collocating phrase expressed by the direct object. If one patronizes an institution, a restaurant, or a university the lexical item has a positive connotation. However, if the direct object refers to human beings, the sense of the expression is usually negative. The example may explain why interlocutors in intercultural interactions including ELF attempt to stick to words and expressions whose literal meaning is based on

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universal encyclopedic knowledge rather than conceptually culture – specific knowledge (e.g. House, 2002; Howarth, 1998: Kecskes, 2007). This reliance on literal (compositional) meaning is one of the main reasons why semantics somehow overshadows the pragmatics of the common language in intercultural communication. In intercultural interactions there is more reliance on the common code, the linguistic context than on the broad language faculty (see Hauser et al., 2002) provided by context as interpreted in the target language (English). But this does not necessarily mean that pragmatics is impoverished in ELF. What is in fact may be impoverished is English-based pragmatics. It means that since interlocutors can only partly rely on English pragmatics, they need to co-construct a new type of pragmatics that is prompted by the actual situational need of speakers and relies on the blend of following factors: basic interactional skills, pragmatics knowledge of the common language, pragmatic knowledge of the L1 and ad hoc created pragmatic knowledge and strategies. Basically, what happens in ELF is that the nature of actual situational context changes. In L1, actual contextual effect is based on some kind of relatively common community-based experience of interlocutors that leads to relatively similar interpretation of linguistic signs. In ELF encounters, this contextual effect is emergent and is partly the result of general encyclopedic knowledge and partly co-constructed by the participants. While in L1 interlocutors subconsciously can count on the support of contextual effect, and somehow it is taken for granted, in ELF encounters there is mutual context building and context interpretation. The following example (#4) demonstrates how this process takes place. (4) AF: K: AF: K: AF: K: AF: K: AF: K: AF: -

A student with African French as L1 (AF) and a Korean student (K) are talking. ah . . . so you have good neighbors . . . it’s quiet . . . good . . . so everybody has difficulties where they live so since you came from Korea what kind of difficulties you . . . what are the problems that you have to live in Albany? Ah I came . . . when I came here . . . the first time about . . . I applied the driver’s license and you go to there. Yeah. DMV . . . yeah, yeah . . . driver station. Yeah. And then they require so many documents. I see. So I had to go another office. To apply to school. Yeah social number or . . . officer . . . anybody . . . anyway I had to go there and then . . . receive the document I gave them . . . so long time I . . . take a long time. Yeah so the difficulty for you is to get a driver’s license here in the US.

10.4

Two Sides of Common Ground

201

In this excerpt the Korean student is talking about her difficulties to obtain a driver’s license in Albany. Interlocutors do not use figurative or formulaic language in the excerpt, they mainly stick to the literal senses of the words. The Korean student makes special efforts to make sure that the AF student can follow her. For instance, she pays attention to the backchanneling of her partner by saying “DMV”, and wants to make sure that the AF student understands her properly so adds “driver station”, which is an odd, ad hoc created semantic unit but makes perfect sense in the given context (about “odd structures” see Kecskes & Kirner-Ludwig, 2019). In ELF interactions, speakers can hardly use semantically vague expressions or utterances and expect the actual situational context to specify their meaning as it usually happens in L1. Interlocutors in intercultural encounters should be quite specific as far as semantics is concerned because that is what they share with their partners. Pragmatic enrichment based on the target language and contextual mechanisms can rarely help the production and interpretation process in this type of interactions, rather they may even lead to misunderstandings. So, this leads us again to a phenomenon that was called “impoverished pragmatics” by Kecskes (2019). How does target language pragmatics get impoverished in ELF interactions? It is relative constancy, which is the result of conventionalization and normativization, that keeps language together, and what makes it meaningful. Of course, this relative constancy refers not only to the denotational meaning and function of linguistic signs but also the way they are used by interlocutors. Language users frequently make critical efforts to find, create, shape and keep up constancy within language use even where only little of that exists like in temporary ELF interactions. They generate new formulas and metaphors that do not exist in the target language (cf. Pitzl, 2012, 2018; Kecskes, 2013, 2019) they co-construct emergent common ground, and they work out common strategies that help them make the communicative process meaningful (cf. Ortaçtepe & Okkalı, 2019; Kecskes, 2019; Sampietro et al., 2022). But what their safest bet is for relative constancy in their ELF language use, is the linguistic code itself that all interlocutors share (at different proficiency level) and use for communication. The linguistic code gives them more constancy than anything else including conceptual knowledge and/or encyclopedic knowledge. If in intercultural interactions interlocutors rely on what is encoded in the linguistic signs rather than on language specific conceptual knowledge and/or encyclopedic knowledge (cf. House 2002; Kecskes, 2007, 2015; Philip, 2005) they can usually have less bumps in their communication because literal meanings are usually similar for any language users no matter what variety of English they represent.

10.4

Two Sides of Common Ground

The notion of context is directly tied to the notion of common ground. In order for us to understand the real nature of contextual effect in ELF, we must examine the interplay of these two theoretical constructs in both L1 and ELF communication.

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Common ground is thought to provide the basic context for language (Clark, 1996). It refers to the ‘sum of all the information that people assume they share’ (Clark 2006: p. 106) that may include world views, shared values, beliefs, and situational context. People usually infer this “common ground” from their past conversations, their immediate surroundings, and their shared cultural background and experience. Traditionally we can distinguish between three components of the common ground: information that the participants share, understanding the situational context, and relationships between the participants—knowledge about each other and trust and their mutual experience of the interaction. Communication conventions are usually acquired through a long-lasting history of socialization and usage in the first language. They are generally processed unconsciously during interaction, thus, not easily subject to repair procedures. However, the participants of intercultural communication do not share much of that type of common ground, which has led to a “problem approach” in second language and intercultural communication research. Gass and Varonis (1985: p. 340) summed up the various issues associated with “shared background” and described in their study what can be termed a problem approach to the study of cross-cultural, cross-linguistic communication: “...NSs [native speakers] and NNSs [nonnative speakers] are multiply handicapped in conversations with one another. Often, they may not share a world view or cultural assumptions, one or both of which may lead to misunderstanding. In addition, they may not share common background... that would permit them to converse with shared beliefs about what Gumperz and Tannen (1979) call the “semantic content” of the conversation referring to the encapsulated prior experience in lexical items. Furthermore, they may have difficulty with speaking and interpreting an interlocutor’s discourse as a result of a linguistic deficit.” So, the main problem in intercultural interactions is that interlocutors do not and cannot have that type of common ground that L1 speakers have because of lack of common prior experience. Consequently, since they have little shared knowledge to activate and seek, rather they have to create common ground in the course of conversation. In ELF, focus is not necessarily on what interlocutors already have but what they co-construct. So, core common ground that most part is language-specific can’t help their communication much. Instead, they need to create an actual situationspecific common ground in the course of interaction that was called “emergent common ground” by Kecskes and Zhang (2009). This is important not only for intercultural interactions but also for L1 communication because common ground theories (e.g. Stalnaker, 1978; Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark, 1996) usually consider much of common ground as the result of prior experience and pay less attention to the emergent side of common ground. In the meantime, current cognitive research on common ground (e.g. Arnseth & Solheim, 2002; Barr & Keysar, 2005; Colston & Katz, 2005; Koschmann & LeBaron, 2003) may have overestimated the egocentric behavior of interlocutors and argued for the dynamic emergent property of common ground while devaluing the overall significance of cooperation in the process of verbal communication and the prior experience-based common ground. Intercultural pragmatics research (cf. Kecskes, 2013; Macagno & Bigi, 2017; Ortaçtepe & Okkalı, 2019; Van Olmen & Tantucci, 2022) attempts to eliminate this conflict and proposes

10.5

Reliance on Semantic Analyzability

203

to combine the two views into an integrated concept of common ground, in which both core common ground (assumed shared knowledge, a priori mental representation) and emergent common ground (emergent participant resource, a post facto emergence through use) converge to construct a socio-cultural background for communication. Both cognitive and pragmatic considerations are central to the understanding of common ground. While attention (through salience, which is the cause for interlocutors’ egocentrism) explains why emergent property unfolds, intention (through relevance, which is expressed in cooperation) explains why presumed shared knowledge is needed. Based on this, common ground is perceived as an effort to merge the mental representation of shared knowledge that is present as memory that we can activate, shared knowledge that we can seek, and rapport, as well as knowledge that we can create in the communicative process. The core component (shared based on the knowledge of target language, let it be either L1 or ELF) and emergent components join in the construction of common ground in all stages, although they may contribute to the construction process in different ways, in various degree, and in different phases of the communicative process. There appears to be a basic difference between L1 communication and ELF communication from the perspective of common ground. While the former usually builds on exiting core common ground that is the result of relatively similar prior experience of interlocutors and less on emergent common ground, intercultural communication relies more on the emergent side of common ground because of the limited availability of core common ground resulting from the little or no mutual prior experience.

10.5

Reliance on Semantic Analyzability

If we want to demonstrate the relationship between our understanding of context and common ground in interaction, the best bet for that is a continuum. This will help us understand why ELF speakers prefer to rely on semantic analyzability that may function for them as core common ground. Prior context Actual situational context Core common ground Emergent common ground

There is a constant movement on the continuum in any interaction. Depending on how speaker intention is expressed, either or neither side can be dominant. Our core common ground develops through the regular recurrence of similar situations that we tend to identify with given contexts. Additionally, the standard (prior, recurring) context can be defined as a regular situation of which we have repeated experience, about which we have expectations as to what will or will not happen (Kecskes, 2013), and on which we rely for understanding and predicting how the world around us works. Gumperz (1982: p. 138) claimed that utterances somehow carry with them

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their own context or project a context. Referring to Gumperz’s work, Levinson (2003) argued that the message versus context opposition is misleading because the message can carry with it or forecast the context. But how does this work for ELF speakers? It was argued in this entry that ELF speakers heavily rely on semantics that is about historically encoded meaning, reoccurring contexts, frequent encounters and built-in collective salience. And I also said that ELF speakers do have only limited access to all these things in the target language. So, is there, in fact, a contradiction between these two claims? How can speakers in ELF rely mainly on what they have limited access to? This issue is not as complicated as it looks. What we call ‘dictionary knowledge’ and what constitutes a significant part of semantic knowledge is learnable for ELF speakers. It is learnable but usually not through direct experience. ELF speakers representing a particular variety of English (Russian English, French English, Chinese English, German English, Korean English, etc.) have studied and/or experienced the target language system and vocabulary, at least to some extent. Their variety of English can be considered an approximation to what is considered a native-like variety. The process of approximation is usually characterized by learning rather than learning by using in English as a Foreign Language (EFL) environment where the target language socio-cultural background is not directly present. This changes in an English as a Second Language (ESL) environment such as immigrants acquiring English in the US where the target culture is present and learning usually takes place through using the language in everyday situations. But no matter whether the route towards knowledge of English leads through classroom learning or learning by usage, what is common for every learner, no matter which variety of English they speak is the core knowledge of the system of signs that makes them “English speakers”. This core knowledge consists of a basic system of signs and semantic core (vocabulary). It serves as a core common ground. English language learners are exposed to these two core linguistic entities in classroom circumstances and/or in a target language environment. Swan (2012: p. 388) is right when says that, in a sense, EFL leads to English as a Lingua Franca use. However, we should add that not only EFL but ESL and any other kind of learning of English will lead to English as a Lingua Franca use when users of any variety of English engage in interaction with representatives of other varieties of English. In addition, Swan (2017: p. 513) argued that many of the world’s English learners merely seek an effective working knowledge of the language, without wanting or needing a high level of accuracy. This has nothing to do with the recent growth in the lingua franca use of English or the implied existence of a new class of people who use ELF. So, those who use ELF in temporary or transient speech communities do not constitute a new class/group of English language users because, in fact, they use their own varieties of English without creating a new variety because there is little reoccurrence in temporary ELF speech communities (of course, this depends on time they spend together). This makes standardization and conventionalization possible only to a limited extent. As a consequence, ELF users’ prior context background is more tied to their varieties of English than to some kind of ELF core, or norm as some ELF researchers claim (e.g. Archibald et al., 2011; Bowles & Cogo, 2015).

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Further, Swan (2012: p. 381) explained the situation of many ELF users, where they disregard the native speaker norms in terms of correctness as follows: “However, many lingua franca English speakers are certainly unconcerned about emulating NS norms of correctness except in so far as these are likely to serve their communicative purposes and are perfectly satisfied with approximations that are transparent and effective. For such speakers it seems quite reasonable to say that the forms they use have their own validity and should not in principle be judged by NS norms or labeled ‘mistakes’.” When ELF researchers speak about “native speaker norms” and “correctness” they usually refer to grammar. What ELF users do not disregard is the compositional meanings of lexical units, that is to say semantic analyzability. That is common for them, this is their core common ground whichever variety of English they represent. What is beyond this core common ground should be co-constructed in the interaction and should be made as part of common ground. Let us consider an ELF encounter to demonstrate how contextual effect and semantic analyzability work together. (5)

A Turkish student is talking to a Korean student in front of their apartment house. KS: - Do you know where Arnold is? TS: - There is a Humvee outside. KS: - What do you mean? TS: - His girlfriend is in the military. KS: - Okay..? TS: - Humvees are usually used by military personal.

Turkish student’s utterances included two challenges for the Korean student. First, he was expected to know what “Humvee” is. [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV; colloquial: Humvee). It is a family of light, four-wheel drive, military trucks and utility vehicles produced by AM General. This is the short name for that type of vehicle in American culture, which is culture-specific knowledge that native speakers of American English are familiar with. However, the Korean student did not know, and the actual situation context could not help the interpretation. The second challenge was more like a common ground issue. The Korean should also know that Arnold’s girlfriend is in the military. However, this piece of knowledge was not a part of their common ground and it could not be inferred or guessed without knowing what Humvee is. The point is that the communication was not smooth because the Turkish student relied on a culture-specific concept that the Korean student did not have prior experience with. The actual situational context did not help the Korean understand what the other speaker meant so the Turkish student had to give explanation in the end.

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10.6

10 The Role of Context in English as a Lingua Franca

Conclusion

Based on the socio-cognitive approach the chapter presented context with its two sides: prior context and actual situational context that are interwoven and inseparable because they represent two sides of our world knowledge. Prior context is partly encapsulated in the lexical items we use in our L1, L2 or Lx. The other part of reoccurring prior contexts creates frames and cultural models for our encounters in actual situational context. As a result, actual situational context is not only viewed through the prior context, but also can trigger prior context effect. Meaning formally expressed in utterances is co-constructed online as a result of the interaction and mutual influence of the private contexts represented in the language of interlocutors and the actual situational context interpreted by interlocutors. This dialectical relation of two sides of context explains why ELF users rely on semantic analyzability as their core common ground, and instead of relying on target language pragmatics they co-construct a situation-appropriate pragmatics that helps them have communication with less misunderstanding and non-understanding than most scholars would expect. Note The text was originally prepared for K. Bolton (Ed.), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of World Englishes. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

References Archibald, A., Cogo, A., & Jenkins, J. (2011). Latest trends in ELF research. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Arnseth, H. C., & Solheim, I. (2002). Making sense of shared knowledge. In G. Stahl (Ed.), Proceedings of CSCL 2002 on computer support for collaborative learning: Foundations for a CSCL community (pp. 102–110). Lawrence Erlbaum. Barr, D. J., & Keysar, B. (2005). Making sense of how we make sense: The paradox of egocentrism in language use. In L. Colston Herbert & A. N. Katz (Eds.), Figurative language comprehension: Social and cultural influences (pp. 21–43). Lawrence Erlbaum. Bezuidenhout, A. (2004). Procedural meaning and the semantics/pragmatics interface. In B. Claudia (Ed.), The semantics/pragmatics distinction (pp. 101–131). CSLI Publications. Bowles, H., & Cogo, A. (Eds.). (2015). International perspectives on English as a Lingua Franca: Pedagogical insights. Palgrave. Cappelen, H., & Lepore, E. (2005). Insensitive semantics. Blackwell Press. Carston, R. (2002). Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication. Blackwell. Clark, H. H. (1996). Using language. Cambridge University Press. Clark, H. H. (2006). Context and common ground. In K. Brown (Editor-in-Chief), Encyclopedia of language & linguistics (Vol. 3, 2nd ed., pp. 105–108). Elsevier. Clark, H. H., & Brennan, S. E. (1991). Grounding in communication. In L. B. Resnick, J. M. Levine, & S. D. Teasley (Eds.), Perspectives on socially shared cognition (pp. 127–149). American Psychological Association.

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Colston, H. L., & Katz, A. N. (Eds.). (2005). Figurative language comprehension: Social and cultural influences. Erlbaum. Frege, Gottlob. (1884/1980). The foundations of arithmetic. Austin John Langshaw (trans.) (2nd Rev. edn.). Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. Gass, S. M., & Varonis, E. M. (1985). Miscommunication in native/nonnative conversation. Language in Society, 14(3), 327–343. Goodwin, Charles and Alessandro Duranti, (eds.) (1992). Rethinking context: An introduction. Rethinking context: Language as an interactive phenomenon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1–42. Gumperz, J. J. (1982). Discourse strategies. Cambridge University Press. Gumperz, J. J., & Tannen, D. (1979). Individual and social differences in language use. In C. J. Fillmore, K. Daniel, & W. S.-Y. Wang (Eds.), Individual differences in language ability and language behavior (pp. 305–325). Academic. Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. T. (2002). The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science, 298, 1569–1579. House, J. (2002). Developing pragmatic competence in English as a lingua franca. In K. Karlfried & C. Meierkord (Eds.), Lingua Franca Communication (pp. 245–267). Peter Lang. Howarth, P. (1998). Phraseology and second language proficiency. Applied Linguistics, 19(1), 24–44. Kecskes, I. (2007). Formulaic language in English lingua franca. In I. Kecskes & L. R. Horn (Eds.), Explorations in pragmatics: Linguistic, cognitive and intercultural aspects (pp. 191–219). Mouton de Gruyter. Kecskes, I. (2008). Dueling contexts: A dynamic model of meaning. Journal of Pragmatics, 40(3), 385–406. Kecskes, I. (2010). The paradox of communication: A socio-cognitive approach. Pragmatics and Society, 1(1), 50–73. Kecskes, I. (2013). Intercultural pragmatics. Oxford University Press. Kecskes, I. (2015). Intracultural communication and intercultural communication: Are they different? International Review of Pragmatics, 7, 171–194. Kecskes, I., & Zhang, F. (2009). Activating, seeking and creating common ground: A sociocognitive approach. Pragmatics and Cognition, 17(2), 331–355. Kecskes, I. (2019). Impoverished pragmatics? The semantics-pragmatics interface from an intercultural perspective. Intercultural Pragmatics, 16(5), 489–517. Kecskes, I., & Kirner-Ludwig, M. (2019). Odd structures in English as a Lingua Franca discourse. Journal of Pragmatics, 151(October 2019), 76–90. Koschmann, T., & LeBaron, C. D. (2003). Reconsidering common ground: Examining Clark’s contribution theory in the OR. In K. Kari, K. E. Helena, F. Geraldine, D. Paul, & K. Schmidt (Eds.), Proceedings of the Eight European Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (pp. 81–98). Kluwer. Levinson, S. (2000). Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature. MIT Press. Levinson, S. C. (2003). Language and mind: Let’s get the issues straight! In G. Dedre & S. GoldinMeadow (Eds.), Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and cognition (pp. 25–46). MIT Press. Macagno, F., & Bigi, S. (2017). Understanding misunderstandings. Presuppositions and presumptions in doctor-patient chronic care consultations. Intercultural Pragmatics, 14(1), 49–75. Ochs, E., & Schieffelin, B. B. (1984). Language acquisition and socialization: Three developmental stories and their implications. In R. A. Shweder & R. A. LeVine (Eds.), Culture theory: Essays on mind, self, and emotion (pp. 276–320). CUP. Ortaçtepe, D. (2012). The development of conceptual socialization in international students: A language socialization perspective on conceptual fluency and social identity. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

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Chapter 11

The Interplay of Recipient Design and Salience in Shaping Speaker’s Utterance

11.1

Introduction

According to current pragmatic theories, communication involves recipient design and intention recognition. The speaker constructs a model of the hearer’s knowledge relevant to the given situational context, and vice versa. On the basis of the speaker’s utterance, the hearer constructs a model of the speaker’s knowledge relevant to the given situational context. Recipient design, as a term, derives from conversational analysis, where it denotes the adaptation of communicative behavior to a particular addressee (Garfinkel, 1967). This is one instance of audience design (Clark & Carlson, 1982), in which utterances are constructed according to what others in the communicative exchange know and believe (Clark, 1996). Audience design has been investigated in speech and actions, in both naturalistic and experimental settings (Ozyurek, 2002; O’Neill et al., 2005; Holler & Stevens, 2007; Jacobs & Garnham, 2007), but, according to Newman-Norlund et al. (2009), there is still considerable debate over when, how, and why it is used. An undecided issue is whether audience design is structurally linked to initial attempts to communicate or is used parsimoniously, to repair erroneous attempts. Some researchers support a sociocentric approach, in which communicative behavior is designed by taking into account the knowledge and characteristics of the addressee that are assumed to be part of common ground (Isaacs & Clark, 1987; Clark, 1996; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). Others claim that the initial planning of utterances ignores common ground (this is an egocentric approach) and that messages are adapted to addressees only when adjustments are required (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar et al., 1998). The sociocognitive approach (SCA) proposed by Kecskes (2008, 2010, 2013a) attempts to blend the two views and argues that both cooperation and egocentrism are present in the communication process all the time to varying degrees and that the interplay of conscious recipient design (a result of cooperation) and subconscious salience (the driving force behind egocentrism) is what shapes speaker’s production. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_11

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As a semiotic notion, salience refers to the relative importance or prominence of signs. The relative salience of a particular sign when considered in the context of others helps an individual quickly rank large amounts of information by importance and thus give attention to what is most important. We tend to overestimate the causal role (salience) of the information available to us both perceptually and linguistically. In pragmatics, on the basis of Giora’s graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997, 2003), when we speak about salient information, we usually mean given information that the speaker assumes to occupy a central place in the hearer’s consciousness when the speaker produces the utterance. It is the most probable out of all possible options (Kecskes, 2013b). The chapter first reviews the main tenets of the SCA. Then it discusses how the speaker’s utterance is shaped by the interplay between recipient design and salience. The third part focuses on the two sides of context. It explains how salience is tied to the prior context, how relevance dominates the actual situational context, and how the two interact in meaning construction. The next section looks at the semantics– pragmatics interface in L1 and intercultural communication from the perspective of the interplay between recipient design and salience. The chapter concludes with a section on when and how speakers manipulate their message to the hearer.

11.2 11.2.1

The Sociocognitive Approach Main Tenets of the Sociocognitive Approach

The theoretical framework of this chapter is based on the SCA proposed by Kecskes (2008, 2010, 2013a). The main goal of the SCA is to bring together the two seemingly antagonistic lines of research in pragmatics: the individualistic, intention-based cognitive–philosophical line; and the societal, context-based sociocultural–interactional line. This looks like a necessary attempt because we human beings have a double nature: we are both individuals and social beings at the same time. This fact is reflected in our communicative behavior. Recent neurological experiments on mirror neurons can be interpreted as confirming human beings’ double nature as well as the interaction of their abilities (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Arbib et al., 2005). One of the main differences between the cognitive–philosophical approach and the sociocultural interactional approach is that the former considers intention to be a prior mental state of speakers1 that underpins communication, while the latter regards intention as a post factum construct that is achieved jointly, through the 1

The notion of prior intention was initially proposed by Searle (1983: pp. 165–166). Searle’s work on intentionality introduced a distinction between prior intention and intention in action, the latter referring to “the proximal cause of the physiological chain leading to overt behavior” (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007: p. 3106). In my understanding, “intention in action” also refers to some kind of prior cause.

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dynamic emergence of meaning in a conversation in which sociocultural factors play the leading role. Since the two approaches represent two different perspectives, it would be difficult to reject either of them entirely. According to the SCA, the complexity of the issue requires that we consider both the a priori and co-constructed, emergent sides of intention when analyzing communicative processes. The SCA was proposed by Kecskes (2008, 2010, 2013a, b) and by Kecskes and Zhang (2009) as an attempt to unite the two perspectives. It emphasizes that there is a dialectical relationship between a prior intention (which is based on an individual’s prior experience) and an emergent intention (which is based on the actual social– situational experience), as well as between egocentrism (which is individual) and cooperation (which is social). In this approach interlocutors are considered social beings who search for meaning with individual minds embedded in a sociocultural collectivity. The SCA argues that Grice was right when he tied cooperation to the speaker-hearer’s rationality. However, egocentrism must be added to the speaker-hearer’s rationality. We human beings are just as egocentric as individuals as we are cooperative as social beings. Several studies (e.g. Barr & Keysar, 2005; Giora, 2003; Keysar 2007) claimed that speakers and hearers commonly ignore their knowledge of each other when they produce and understand language. Their behavior is called “egocentric” because it is rooted in their own knowledge instead of being rooted in their knowledge of each other. If this claim is accepted, then a speaker’s utterance cannot be just recipient design, as it is affected by that individual prior experience. “Egocentrism” in the SCA refers to attention bias, which is the result of an individual’s prior experience. This concept indicates that interlocutors activate and bring up the most salient information to the attentional level required for the speaker’s construction and the hearer’s comprehension of what is communicated. So there is nothing negative about egocentrism, if the term is used in this sense. It should not be confused with “egoism,” the property of a self-centered person, focused only on his/her agenda, or with “egotism,” the habit of talking excessively about oneself. Communication is a dynamic process, in which individuals not only are constrained by societal conditions but also shape them in their turn. As a consequence, the process is characterized by the interplay of two sets of traits that are inseparable, mutually supportive, and interactive: Individual traits: prior experience salience egocentrism attention

Social traits: actual situational experience relevance cooperation intention

Individual traits (prior experience ! salience ! egocentrism ! attention) interact with societal traits (actual situational experience ! relevance ! cooperation ! intention). Each trait is the consequence of the other. Prior experience results in

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salience, which leads to egocentrism, which drives attention. Intention is a cooperation-directed practice governed by relevance, which (partly) depends on actual situational experience. Integrating the pragmatic view of cooperation and the cognitive view of egocentrism, the SCA emphasizes that both cooperation and egocentrism are manifested in all phases of communication, albeit to varying degrees. Communication is the result of the interplay of intention and attention motivated by sociocultural background, which is privatized individually, by interlocutors. The sociocultural background is composed of the environment, that is, the actual situational context in which the communication occurs; the encyclopedic knowledge of interlocutors, which derives from their “prior experience” tied to the linguistic expressions they use; and their “current experience,” in which those expressions create and convey meaning. So language is considered both individual (as part of prior experience and knowledge) and social (as part of the actual situation). In communication we show our two sides. We cooperate by generating and formulating intentions that are relevant to the given actual situational context (see footnote 1). At the same time our egocentrism means that we activate the most salient information to our attention in the construction of utterances, as speakers, and in the comprehension of utterances, as hearers. A crucial element of the SCA is privatization—the act of making something private or of subjectivizing it. This is a process through which the individual blends his/her prior experience with the actual situational (current) experience and that yields an individual understanding of a collective experience. The following example from the film Angel Eyes illustrates this process. Mother and son are talking while the mother is examining the groceries that the son has brought. She knows that her son had a fight with a man that morning. (1) Son: I met someone today. Mother: Good. Oh, you got the broccolini? Thank you. Son: She is a woman. Mother: You did not have to tackle her too, did you? Son: She is a police officer. Mother: Are you in trouble? Son: I don’t think so.

The utterance “I met someone today” sets the scene; it partly creates the actual situational context. The son wants to talk about his recent past experience. However, the mother’s attention focuses on the groceries. She starts to get interested when the son says that the person he met was a woman. However, even then she does not pay full attention, rather she jokes about a previous event the son talked about. When the mother finds out that the woman her son met was a police officer, the son gets her full attention. She wants to know whether he was in trouble. It is clear that they have a different understanding of “police officer,” which, in terms of collective salience, usually has a highly conventionalized negative connotation attached to it. The actual

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situational context cannot override this stigma for the mother, as her question (“Are you in trouble?”) demonstrates. However, the son’s public context (collective salience) is changed (privatized) as a consequence of his positive experience with a police officer. As a result, the term “police officer” appears to have lost its negative connotation for him. As we said above, privatization is a process through which the interlocutor “individualizes” the collective. This individualization is prompted by the actual situational context and results in a dynamic process of meaning construction. The two sides (prior and current) constantly change and affect each other. Meaning construction relies both on relatively definable cultural models and norms and on situationally evolving features. In this process prior experience is represented through relatively definable cultural models and norms, which blend with actual situational experience or are related to it in some other way. This approach is supported by the Durkheimian approach, according to which cultural norms and models gain individual interpretation in concrete social actions and events (see Durkheim, 1982).

11.2.2

Salience in the Sociocognitive Approach

The SCA incorporates the graded salience hypothesis (GSH) to a significant extent, but it does not accept all of its tenets. The GSH is basically hearer-centered, while the SCA focuses on both production and comprehension. The focus of the GSH is on linguistic salience, specifically meaning salience. The GSH deals with lexical processing, whereas SCA’s concern is both lexical (linguistic) salience and perceptual salience. While the GSH uses “context” in the sense of actual situational context, the SCA emphasizes the difference and interplay between prior context encoded in lexical items and actual situational context. The main claim of the GSH is that salient information is superior to less salient information and often (Giora, 2003: p. 15), though not always, to unstored information, such as novel information or information inferable from context (see Giora, 2003: pp. 10–11; Peleg et al., 2001). As a consequence of this superiority, salient meanings of lexical units (e.g., conventional, frequent, familiar, or prototypical meanings) are processed automatically, regardless of contextual information and strength of bias. Although context (actual situational context) effects may be fast, they run in parallel with lexical processes and initially do not interact with them (Giora, 2003: p. 24). According to the GSH hypothesis, in language processing both salient information and contextual knowledge run in parallel, and salient information may not be filtered out even when it is contextually inappropriate. This claim basically questions context dependency, which is one of the main tenets of current pragmatic theories (see footnote 1). While salience, according to the GSH, mainly concerns the storage of knowledge as a function of degree of familiarity, frequency, prototypicality, and conventionality, salience in the SCA refers to the contingent effect of salient

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knowledge as a result of the attentional processing of communication in a particular situation, which facilitates or hampers the expression of intention and the subsequent achievement of communicative effects. Another significant difference between the GSH and the SCA is that the GSH emphasizes the importance of stored information, while the SCA considers salience to be both a stored (inherent salience and collective salience) and an emergent entity (actual situational salience). According to the GSH (Giora, 2003: p. 15), for information to be salient—to be foremost in a person’s mind—it needs to undergo consolidation, that is, to be stored or coded in the mental lexicon, which usually happens by way of conventionalization. Stored information is superior to unstored information, such as novel information or information inferable from the context. While salient information is highly accessible, nonsalient information requires strongly supportive contextual information to achieve an equal level of accessibility. At this point Giora seems to equate salient information with consolidated or stored information and nonsalient information with unstored information. This is somewhat questionable, because such equations consider salience as a relatively static property that changes mainly diachronically. According to Giora, in order for something to be salient, it should be stored in the memory. What is ranked as “most salient meaning” at the present moment may die off after only a few decades. An example of such diachronic change is the word “gay,” whose most salient meaning in the 1950s was “joyful”; nowadays this meaning would rank below that of “homosexual.” Salient information can be “disconsolidated” when the salience dies off and the information in question ends up as less salient or nonsalient. Giora’s approach acknowledges diachronic change and does not talk about synchronic change. In contrast, the SCA emphasizes that salience is in a continual state of change, not only diachronically but synchronically as well (emergent situational salience), as a result of the interplay of linguistic salience and perceptual salience.

11.3

How Is the Speaker’s Utterance Shaped?

SCA considers recipient design—according to which the speaker constructs a model of the hearer’s knowledge that is relevant to the given situational context—to be too idealistic. This is not exactly what happens in everyday communication, which appears to be a mixture of consciously designed and subconsciously, automatically, and ad hoc generated utterances. The cognitive approach is not quite right when it claims that the initial planning of utterances ignores common ground and that messages are adapted to addressees only when adjustments are required (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar et al., 1998). What really takes place is both conscious planning and subconscious formulating. While fitting words into actual situational contexts, speakers are driven not only by the conscious intention of making the hearer recognize what is meant as intended by the speaker (cooperation), but also by salience to the individual speaker, which affects the production subconsciously (egocentrism). However, the two factors affect the communicative process to

11.3

How Is the Speaker’s Utterance Shaped?

215

varying degrees. The interplay of these social and individual factors—recipient design and salience respectively—shapes the communicative process. This can be demonstrated through the excerpts in examples (2) and (3). (2) Excerpt from Sacks (1992, 2: p. 147): 1 Ann: I’m reading one of uh Harold Sherman’s books. 2 Bea: Mm hm, 3 Ann: I think we read one, one time, about life after death’s 4 something. 5 Bea: Mm hm, 6 Ann: And uh, this is How Tuh Make uh ESP Work For You. 7 Bea: Mm hm, 8 Ann: And it’s excellent. 9 Bea: Well, when you get through [with it 10 Ann: [And he talks about-

According to the recipient design view, in order to succeed, speakers must correctly express intended illocutionary acts by using appropriate words and must make their attempt in an adequate context. In this process they relate propositional contents to the world—that is, to the actual situational context and to the audience— with the intention of establishing a correspondence between words and things from a certain direction of fit. This is what happens in example (2). Pomerantz and Heritage (2012: p. 211) explain the sequence as follows: Ann was sharing information with Bea about a book that she was reading. Instead of initially identifying the book by its title, she first identified it by the author (line 1), then mentioned a book by that author that they both had read (lines 3–4), and then gave the title of the book (line 6).

Sacks (1992, 2: p. 149) commented the interaction in the following way: That she goes through that kind of work to find a way to refer to the book is a most elegant sort of evidence that one does work at finding a description for something, and does have a preference, if one can use it, for building such a description as will permit the other to see that you know that they know what you are talking about.

Both explanations—that f Pomerantz and Heritage and that of Sacks—refer to a careful recipient design in which subconscious salience does not intrude. The description is a well-built inductive sequence by Ann. (3) Excerpt from the movie Angel Eyes: Situation: A policewoman in uniform is driving the car, and the man sitting beside her is starring at her. PW: What? M: I was trying to picture you without your clothes on. PW: Excuse me? M: Oh no, I did not mean like that. I am trying to picture your without your uniform. PW: Okaay? M: I mean, on your day off, you know, in regular clothes.

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Excerpt (3) demonstrates a different process, which is a deductively built-up sequence. Salience usually affects deductive sequences where the speaker has something on his/her mind, and this intention is formulated abruptly, rather carelessly, without specific planning, as seems to be the case in example (3). This excerpt appears to support the claim of cognitive psychologists, according to which the initial planning of utterances ignores common ground (egocentric approach) and messages are adapted to addressees only when adjustments are required (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar et al., 1998). It looks like recipient design usually requires an inductive process that is carefully planned, while salience effect generally appears in the form of a deductive process that may contain repairs and adjustments. Why were the man’s attempts unsuccessful in the conversation in (3)? Because on the one hand we have the speaker with an intention to tell the woman why he was looking at her the way he did, and on the other hand there is subconscious salience that affected how he formulated his intention. So the utterance was not designed by the speaker to fit his words into the actual situational context, taking into account his partner. As a result, word selection was wrong. Why was word selection wrong? Because it was not directed by recipient design but was prompted by salience. As argued above, salience (motivated by prior experience), which operates subconsciously and automatically, may affect word selection and utterance formation. “I was trying to picture you without your clothes on.” Is this what the speaker wanted to say and mean? Yes, this is exactly what he wanted to mean but not necessarily what he wanted to say. I agree with Bach (2005) that a speaker can always mean something distinct from the semantic content of the sentence s/he is uttering. But even if s/he speaks literally and means precisely what his/her words mean, even that fact depends on his/her communicative intention (Bach, 2005: p. 27). Wording—expressing intention in words—is a tricky thing. Conceptualization is one thing, wording is another, and meaning is a third one. There is no one-toone relationship between any two of the three. Let us look at the difference between the three formulations of one and the same intention: (A) I was trying to picture you without your clothes on. (B) I am trying to picture your without your uniform. (C) I mean, on your day off, you know, in regular clothes. A and B are very similar because they both use the preposition “without,” and the only difference is that B narrows down the concept of “clothes” to “uniform.” The impact is the same: the hearer is upset. The collective salience is in effect: woman— without clothes. C, however, shows careful recipient design through well-selected words and utterance formulation. C is a repair for two unsuccessful attempts. It’s not using “without” but rather “in” clothes, and it’s further specified by the expression “on your day off,” so there is no misunderstanding here. In sum, we can say that A and B appear to have been affected by salience while C is the result of careful recipient design. What was wrong with A and B? Why did wording create the effect it did? Because the subconscious, automatic formulation of intention may have prompted

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expressions that were unwanted, uncontrolled, and unfit for the actual situational context. This, of course, does not mean that the salience effect always results in problematic utterances. Most of the time subconscious, automatic reactions prompt perfectly fine utterances. However, this was not the case in example (3). I could compare this phenomenon to what has been happening nowadays with language use in general. People may get into trouble because what is on their mind subconsciously may result in selecting semantically too powerful, socioculturally loaded words, expressions, or utterances that create their own context, and therefore the actual situational context cannot cancel them. Mitt Romney’s case during the 2012 presidential elections can demonstrate this issue very well. Romney was speaking to a group of investors as presidential candidate, and uttered the following sentence: “I am not concerned about the very poor.” In that actual situational context he wanted to say that he wasn’t worried: the poor are usually taken care of in the United States because a great variety of programs are helping them. However, the utterance was semantically so powerful and had such a strong sociocultural load that it generated its own situational context. As a result, prior context and collective salience overrode the effect of the actual situational context. The wording of the utterance reflected what might have been on Romney’s mind while he was talking to the investors— namely that the poor were not a priority for him. This issue is connected with the understanding of two sides of context: prior context and actual situational context.

11.4

Context and Speaker Meaning

The term “context” is used in many different ways. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines it in the following way: • the circumstances that form the setting for an event, statement, or idea, • the parts that immediately precede and follow a word or passage and clarify its meaning The first part of the definition refers to what we can call scenario or extralinguistic contextwhile the second refers to the linguistic context, that is, to elements of language that either precede or follow a word, an expression, or a larger lexical unit. However, this is only one aspect of context. I usually refer to it as the “actual situational context” (Kecskes, 2008, 2013a, b), which combines linguistic and extralinguistic factors. This is basically similar to the definition used in linguistics: context usually refers to any factor—linguistic, epistemic, physical, social, and so on—that affects the actual interpretation of signs and expressions. My problem with this definition is that it refers only to the “actual situational context”; and there is no mention of the “prior context” encoded in the lexical items that we use in communication. The SCA (Kecskes, 2008, 2010, 2013a) claims that context is a dynamic construct that appears in different forms in language use, both as a repository and as a trigger of knowledge. Consequently, it plays both a selective and a constitutive role.

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Several current theories of meaning (e.g. Coulson, 2000; Croft, 2000; Evans, 2006) argue that meaning construction is primarily dependent on actual situational contexts. The SCA, however, claims that the meaning values of linguistic expressions, encapsulating as they do prior contexts of experience, play as important a role in meaning construction and comprehension as the actual situational context. What the SCA attempts to do is bring together individual cognition with situated cognition. It recognizes the importance of an individual’s background and biases, often prompted by the prior context, in information processing (Finkelstein et al., 2008; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988), but at the same time it suggests that the context in which individuals are situated is strong enough to direct attention and shape interpretation (Elsbach et al., 2005; Ocasio, 1997). In other words, the context in which individuals are located has a major effect on what they notice and interpret, as well as on the actions they take. The prior context tied to salience is as important as the actual situational context connected to relevance. Our experience develops through the regular recurrence of similar situations that we tend to identify with given contexts. The standard (prior, recurring) context can be defined as a regular situation of which we have repeated experience, about which we have expectations as to what will or will not happen, and on which we rely for understanding and predicting how the world around us works. Gumperz (1982: p. 138) says that utterances somehow carry with them their own context or project a context. Referring to Gumperz’s work, Levinson (2003) claimed that the message versus context opposition is misleading because the message can carry with it or forecast the context. Prior, reoccurring context may cancel the selective role of the actual situational context. We can demonstrate this through an example taken from Culpeper (2009). (4) Example (3) from Culpeper: Creative deviation from the default context (cf. “mock impoliteness”): Lawrence Dallaglio, former England Rugby captain, describing the very close family he grew up in: “As Francesca and John left the house, she came back to give Mum a kiss and they said goodbye in the way they often did. ‘Bye, you bitch,’ Francesca said. ‘Get out of here, go on, you bitch,’ replied Mum. (It’s in the Blood: My life, 2007).”

Culpeper explained that the reason why the conversation between the mother and daughter does not hurt either of them is due to the context (“mock impoliteness”). However, a closer look at the example reveals that the actual situational context hardly plays any role. What we have here is the strong effect of prior context, prior experience that overrides the actual situational context: “they said goodbye in the way they often did.” Frequently recurring use may neutralize the impolite conceptual load attached to expressions. This is exactly what happens here. As we have seen, the context represents two sides of world knowledge: one—the prior context—is in our mind, the other—the actual situational context—is out there in the world (see Kecskes, 2008). These two sides are interwoven and inseparable. When communication occurs, the actual situational context is viewed through the prior context, and vice versa: the prior context is viewed through the actual situational context. Their encounter creates a third space. According to this

11.4

Context and Speaker Meaning

219

approach, meaning is the result of the interplay of prior experience and current, actual situational experience. Prior experience that becomes declarative knowledge is tied to the meaning values of the lexical units that constitute the utterances produced by interlocutors, while current experience is represented in the actual situational context (procedural knowledge) in which the communication takes place, and which is interpreted (often differently) by interlocutors. Meaning formally expressed in the utterance is co-constructed as a result of the interaction and mutual influence of the private contexts represented in the language of interlocutors and the actual situational context interpreted by them. From the perspective this chapter takes, salience that drives egocentrism is the result of prior contexts, prior experience. Recipient design is tied to the actual situational context and is the result of a cooperation governed by relevance. Basically this is how the prior context and the actual situational context are connected through the interplay of recipient design and salience. According to the traditional perspective in semantics (see Bianchi, 2010), truth conditions may be ascribed to a sentence (in an ideal language) independently of any contextual considerations. The opposing pragmatic view says that a sentence has complete truth conditions only in a context. The semantic interpretation of utterances—in other words the propositions they express, their truth conditions— is the result of pragmatic processes of expansion and contextual enrichment. The followers of the semantic view may not be right when they think that any linguistic sign can be independent of any contextual considerations. According to the SCA, no linguistic sign or expression can be independent of a context because they carry context, they encode the history of their prior use (prior context) within a given speech community. The supporters of the pragmatic view may be wrong when they do not emphasize that expansion and contextual enrichment are results of the individual’s prior experience. Suffice it to say that both sides appear to be mistaken to some extent, because they talk about context without making a distinction between its two sides: prior context and actual situational context. The proposition literally expressed (the sentence meaning) is the result of speakers’ collective prior experience in a given speech community. This is expanded and enriched by the present situational experience or by the communicative needs of an individual speaker when s/he uses that utterance (the speaker’s meaning). The speaker privatizes the collective experience by enhancing (or enriching) its content with his understanding of the actual situational experience. Inferred meaning (implicature) is the reflection of the interplay between the speaker’s and the hearer’s prior experience in an actual situational context. The prior context, as understood in the sociocognitive paradigm, is declarative knowledge, while the actual situational context represents procedural knowledge. Bezuidenhout (2004) claimed that parallels exist between the declarative–procedural divide, the semantics–pragmatics interface, and the competence–performance distinction. She proposed that a clear-cut distinction must be made between procedural knowledge, which belongs in the performance system and is pragmatic, and lexical conceptual knowledge, which belongs in the competence system and is semantic. This is in line with what the SCA claims: lexical conceptual knowledge

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is the basis for prior context that is encapsulated in the lexical items, while procedural knowledge, which is pragmatic, is triggered by the actual situational context. The sentences in example (5) demonstrate how context (in the traditional sense of the term) makes up for the missing elements of the proposition. (5) Bob and Mary are engaged (to each other). Some (not all) girls like dancing. I need to change (clothes).

Against the traditional view, the SCA claims that all of these sentences are complete without the parentheticals and express a truth-conditional, actual, situational, and context-independent proposition. I want to emphasize actual, situational, and context-independent because what these sentences are not independent of is prior context. Prior context or recurrent use without the elements in parenthesis makes their meaning clear even without an actual, situational context. The speaker can say whether “Bob and Mary are engaged” is true or false without any concern for “to whom.” The speaker can say whether “some girls like dancing” is true or false without any concern for what all of them do, and can say whether “she needs to change” is true or false without considering other ways of changing or things to change (diet? priorities? career?). The parentheticals add what the speaker was talking about specifically: a propositional element based on the actual situational context. But this is a new proposition. The one it supplants is still adequate, by itself, as the expression of a proposition. Hence I argue that it is a mistake to claim that no sentence is complete without an actual situational context. It is rather the case that speakers can mean more than the sentence itself means, because the context supplies the rest. But the sentence does say something completely, and sometimes that is exactly what the speaker means.

11.5

The Semantics–Pragmatics Interface in L1 and Intercultural Communication

Bach (2007: 5) said that the (actual situational) context does not literally determine, in the sense of constituting, what the speaker means. What the speaker really means is a matter of communicative intention, although what s/he could reasonably mean depends on what information is mutually salient for him/her and the hearer. Bach further argued that taking mutually salient information into account goes beyond semantics, for what a speaker means need not be the same as what the uttered sentence means. This claim raises an important issue from the perspective of lingua franca speakers. What is the “mutually salient information” for lingua franca speakers, people participating in intercultural interactions? They have different first languages, use a second (or Lx) language to communicate with each other, and share very little common ground (Kecskes, 2007, 2013a). Salience is based on

11.5

The Semantics–Pragmatics Interface in L1 and Intercultural Communication

221

familiarity, frequency, and common prior experience (Giora, 1997, 2003). Mutually salient information (unless it is connected with the ongoing speech situation where English lingua franca (ELF) speakers created their own temporary formulae) is something ELF speakers lack, because they speak several different first languages and represent different cultures. For them mutually salient information should be directly connected to the actual situational context, tied to some universal knowledge, and encoded in the common linguistic code (lingua franca), so that it may be “extracted” by the hearer without any particular inference that relies on common prior experience—which does not exist. Inferencing for the lingua franca hearer in intercultural interaction usually means something close to decoding. This can be demonstrated through the following example: (6)

A clerk and a Korean student interacting in an office of human resources: Lee: Could you sign this document for me, please? Clerk: Come again. . . Lee: Why should I come again? I am here now.

The Korean student misunderstands the expression “come again.” He processes it literally, although the actual situational context is completely unsupportive to this interpretation. It is essential therefore that pragmatics for lingua franca interlocutors cannot be something “they communicate over and above the semantic content of the sentence,” as King and Stanley (2005: p. 117) assumed. For lingua franca speakers, the semantic content is usually the conveyed content. If this is not clear from their utterance, they try to reinforce it through repetition, paraphrase, or other procedures. So, for non-native speakers (especially speakers with lower language proficiency) who participate in intercultural interactions, pragmatics is very close to semantics. In L1 communication, “what is said” rarely coincides with “what is communicated.” This is why Gricean pragmatics gives such an importance to implicatures. “Speakers implicate, hearers infer” (Horn, 2004: p. 6). However, in intercultural communication what the speaker says is what s/he usually means. In most cases utterance meaning is what the corresponding sentence means literally. This fact gives a strong support to Bach’s claim: [I]t is a mistake to suppose that “pragmatic content is what the speaker communicates over and above the semantic content of the sentence” (King & Stanley, 2005: p. 117). Pragmatics doesn’t just fill the gap between semantic and conveyed content. It operates even when there is no gap. So it is misleading to speak of the border or the so-called “interface” between semantics and pragmatics. This mistakenly suggests that pragmatics somehow takes over when semantics leaves off. It is one thing for a sentence to have the content that it has and another thing for a speech act of uttering the sentence to have the content it has. Even when the content of the speech act is the same as that of the sentence, that is a pragmatic fact, something that the speaker has to intend and the hearer has to figure out (Bach, 2007: 5).

In intercultural communication the content of the speech act is usually the same as that of the sentence. This is a pragmatic act, as Bach says, something that the speaker intends to say and the hearer has to figure out. In L1 communication, on which

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current pragmatic theories are built, there is much more of a gap between what is said and what is meant than in lingua franca communication. This is because in those interactions it is very important that the speaker should mean close to what s/he says, otherwise the hearer may have difficulty figuring out the speaker’s intention as a result of limited common ground, shared knowledge, and mutual norms.

11.6

When and How Can Speakers Manipulate Speaker Meaning?

As discussed above, word selection is affected both by conscious and by subconscious processes. This leads to the fact that there is always an intuitive possibility of a distinction between what a speaker says and what s/he actually implicates.

11.6.1

Salience Effect

The likelihood of this distinction is especially high when the communicative process is affected by salience and takes place deductively, as shown in example (3). This gives the speaker less chance to manipulate meaning according to his/her needs and to unfold his/her agenda, since repair is generally dictated by the hearer’s needs, which the speaker tries to meet, as in (3). The following short interaction also demonstrates what happens when both speakers’ production is dominated by salience rather than by recipient design. (7)

Excerpt from the TV comedy Two and a Half Men: Charlie: Morning. Alan: What’s so good about it? Charlie: I ain’t say “good.”

Neither Charlie nor Alan did much recipient design in this interaction. Charlie said “morning,” which may be considered an elliptical form of “good morning,” automatically on noticing Alan. Although the utterance was produced subconsciously, it was relevant in the actual situational context. However, Alan did not pay close attention to what exactly Charlie had said. He was in a bad mood and may have been affected by some negative prior experience the previous evening. He assumed that Charlie had uttered the usual formula “good morning.” It can be claimed that, when salience dominates word selection, it may result in two things. One of them is unwanted ways of expressing intention, as demonstrated in examples (3) and (7)—and also in the following excerpt from the 2010 election campaign in Australia, in which Tony Abbott, the opposition leader, asked about the fact that Julia Gillard, the prime minister, had changed her mind about whether to participate in a live televised debate with him, responded as follows:

11.6

When and How Can Speakers Manipulate Speaker Meaning?

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“Are you suggesting to me that when it comes from Julia, no doesn’t mean no? She said ‘no’ repeatedly. And when she said ‘no,’ I thought she meant ‘no.’” (Example from Daily Telegraph. 2010. August 3. „Abbott's no means no gaffe“ by Alison Rehn.)

The use of the expression “no means no” by a man (Abbott) with reference to a woman’s (Gillard) accepting or not accepting an invitation (televised debate) generated controversy. Tanya Plibersek (then minister for the status of women) held Abbott to account for the meaning routinely associated with the phrase “no means no,” namely issues of non-consensual sex. What happened here was that Abbott was not careful enough when wording his response to the anchor. The expression “no means no,” whose meaning is collectively salient because of its sexual connotation, is very powerful and can create its own context. The actual situational context cannot override the negative sociocultural load attached to that expression. This rarely happens when recipient design governs speaker production. The other result, when salience dominates selection, is misunderstandings. Salience is based on individual experience and drives egocentrism, which usually differs from individual to individual, as the following example demonstrates. (8)

From the sitcom Two and a Half Men: Allen and Sherry are sitting in a restaurant. Allan’s right eye is covered with a bandage, so he does not see Sherry very well. Allen: You know, Sherry, I would really like to see more of you. Sherry: Maybe, we should wait and see how the night goes. Allen: Oh, no. I mean I have only got one good eye. Can we change places? Sherry: Sure.

The conversation demonstrates that Sherry completely misunderstood Allan’s utterance “I would really like to see more of you.” This may be due to the fact that she relied exclusively on linguistic salience and ignored perceptual salience in processing the utterance. Some studies refer to the fact that inherent linguistic salience seems to override perceptual salience in most cases. Osgood and Bock’s study (1977) showed that the effects of inherent salience consistently trumped effects that would need to gain salience from speaker motivation. Lupyan and Spivey (2010) also came to a somewhat similar conclusion when they argued that language dynamically modulates visual processing.

11.6.2

Speaker Manipulates Speaker Meaning

The two aspects of speaker meaning (individual and conversational) and recipient design give the possibility for the speaker to manipulate speaker meaning according to his/her needs: leave meaning conversationally open for interpretation or signal his/her intention with cues and markers. In these cases the speaker aims to promote his/her own agenda by trying to manipulate the interpretation process. There are

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several types of this phenomenon. However, here we will focus only on two of them: alerting addresses to what they mean; and manipulating hearer’s salience.

11.6.2.1

Alerting Addressees to What they Mean

(9) Roy: Is there something wrong, Susie? Susie: I am fine, Roy. Roy: I would have believed you if you hadn’t said “Roy.” Susie: OK, OK, just stop.. .

In example (9) Roy notices that there is something wrong with Susie and asks about it. Susie uses a relatively neutral formulaic expression: “I am fine.” However, she wants to call Roy’s attention that in fact not everything is fine. She is doing this by adding the conversational partner’s name, “Roy,” to the expression. This produces an entirely different communicative effect, because “I am fine” is a formulaic expression. But if something else is added to it, formulaicity is lost—just as in “you are pulling my leg” or “you are pulling my legs.” Roy understands this alert, as his response demonstrates: “I would have believed you if you hadn’t said ‘Roy.’” However, the speaker’s attempt to alert an addressee to what s/he means can be unsuccessful, because the hearer can still process the utterance as s/he wishes. This is what we see in the following excerpt. (10)

Excerpt from the film Coogan’s Bluff: A man and a young woman are sitting in a restaurant after meal. The woman stands up and with a short move reaches for her purse. W: I have to be going. M (seeing that she reaches for her purse): What are you doing? W: Dutch. M: You are a girl, aren’t you? W: There have been rumors to that effect. M: Sit back and act like one. W: Oh, is that the way girls act in Arizona?

When the girl wants to pay, the man expresses his objection by asking: “What are you doing?” The girl understands perfectly what the man means, so she tells him “Dutch”: in other words she wishes to pay for her share of the bill. The man indicates his dislike in a very indirect but still expressive way: “You are a girl, aren’t you?” The girl’s response shows that she follows where the man is getting to. Then the man hints at what he expects the girl to do: “Sit back and act like one.” This means that he does not want her to pay the bill. This inductively developed sequence is a good example of elaborated recipient design where nothing is said directly, still there is no misunderstanding because the speaker adequately alerts the hearer to what he means.

11.7

Conclusion

11.6.2.2

225

Manipulating Hearer’s Salience

There are cases where the speaker tries to manipulate what s/he thinks will be highly salient to the hearer. This assumption is usually based on collective salience. We can demonstrate this manipulation with the help of two examples. The first (11) is one of canceling or degrading highly salient meaning. Robin Williams in the film Survivors: “I had to sleep with the dogs. Platonically, of course...”

(11)

The speaker thinks that the sexual connotation of “sleep with” (collective salience) is so strong that a clarification is necessary. So he tries to cancel this effect with the adverb “platonically.” As Giora (2003) claimed, both salient information and contextual knowledge run in parallel, and are salient, but contextually inappropriate information may not be discarded. The second example (12) is one of practicing explicitly cueing low-salience meanings. Givoni, Giora, and Bergerbest (2013: p. 30) argued: “Where multiple meanings of a stimulus differ in terms of degree of salience, there seems to be a need for a procedure that will prompt the activation of senses low on salience, in case they make up part of the intended meaning.” Given that salient meanings are activated initially, cues may be required to alert the processor to the possibility that initial outputs of the automatic process of decoding should undergo “recoding.” This procedure can be referred to as the practice of explicitly cueing low-salience meanings. Givoni et al. (2013: p. 29) gave the following example: (12) “The variety of secondhand goods available at no cost to the consumer was astonishing at the Really Really Free Market, held at Anisq’Oyo’ park this past Saturday. This market was ‘free’ in all senses of the word. (McEniry, 2011)” The phrase “in all senses of the word” draws attention to less salient meanings of “free.” In addition to the salient meaning “without cost”/“free of charge,” the less salient meanings “liberty/ freedom (to exchange)” and “without regulation” are also activated.

11.7

Conclusion

This chapter argued that speaker production is not just recipient design. While fitting words into actual situational contexts, speakers are driven not only by the conscious intention of making the hearer recognize what is meant as having been intended by the speaker (cooperation), but also by salience to the individual speaker, which affects production subconsciously (egocentrism). Therefore, it was proposed that speaker-hearer rationality should include not only cooperation but egocentrism as well.

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Through some examples it was pointed out that recipient design usually requires an inductive process that is carefully planned, while salience effect generally appears in the form of a deductive process that may contain repairs and adjustments. The speaker has something on his/her mind, and this intention is formulated abruptly, rather carelessly, without specific planning. The salience effect can lead to unwanted ways of expressing intention and occasionally to misunderstanding, which requires the speaker to make repairs and adjustments in the communicative process. It was also argued and demonstrated that speaker meaning can usually be underdetermined from the speaker’s perspective only if the speaker leaves it underdetermined deliberately, or as a result of the salience effect. Recipient design gives the speaker the chance to manipulate speaker meaning according to his/her needs: leave meaning conversationally open for interpretation or signal his/her intention with cues and markers. Here the goal of the speaker is to promote his/her own agenda by trying to manipulate the interpretation process. This chapter has focused on two particular cases: the case of speakers who alert addresses to what they mean, and the case of speakers who manipulate hearer’s salience. It has been known that there is always an intuitive possibility of a distinction between what a speaker says and what s/he actually implicates. The chapter has attempted to contribute to research that aims to investigate when and why the likelihood of this distinction is especially high. Acknowledgement The chapter was first published as Kecskes, I. 2017. The interplay of recipient design and salience in shaping speaker’s utterance. In María de Ponte and Kepa Korta (eds.) Reference and Representation in Thought and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 238-273. Thanks to OUP for permission to reuse the text.

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Part IV

Common Ground and Background Knowledge

Chapter 12

Activating, Seeking and Creating Common Ground: A Socio-Cognitive Approach

Abstract This paper argues that current pragmatic theories fail to describe common ground in its complexity because they usually retain a communication-as-transferbetween-minds view of language and disregard the fact that disagreement and egocentrism of speaker-hearers are as fundamental parts of communication as agreement and cooperation. On the other hand, current cognitive research has overestimated the egocentric behavior of the dyads and argued for the dynamic emergent property of common ground while devaluing the overall significance of cooperation in the process of verbal communication. The paper attempts to eliminate this conflict and proposes to combine the two views into an integrated concept of common ground, in which both core common ground (assumed shared knowledge, a priori mental representation) and emergent common ground (emergent participant resource, a post facto emergence through use) converge to construct a dialectical socio-cultural background for communication. Both cognitive and pragmatic considerations are central to this issue. While attention (through salience, which is the cause for interlocutors’ egocentrism) explains why emergent property unfolds, intention (through relevance, which is expressed in cooperation) explains why presumed shared knowledge is needed. Based on this, common ground is perceived as an effort to converge the mental representation of shared knowledge present as memory that we can activate, shared knowledge that we can seek, and rapport, as well as knowledge that we can create in the communicative process. The socio-cognitive approach emphasizes that common ground is a dynamic construct that is mutually constructed by interlocutors throughout the communicative process. The core and emergent components join in the construction of common ground in all stages, although they may contribute to the construction process in different ways, to different extents, and in different phases of the communicative process. Keywords Socio-cognitive approach · Assumed common ground · Core common ground · Emergent common ground · Socio-cultural background · Intention · Attention · Cooperation · Egocentrism

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_12

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Activating, Seeking and Creating Common Ground: A Socio-Cognitive Approach

Theoretical Background

Current pragmatic theories emphasize the importance of intention, cooperation, common ground, mutual knowledge, relevance, and commitment in executing communicative acts. Cooperation and common ground are considered particularly important for successful communication. Presently there are two main approaches to common ground. The dominant view (e.g. Stalnaker, 1978; Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark, 1996) considers common ground a category of specialized mental representations that exists in the mind a priori to the actual communication process. Arnseth and Solheim (2002) pointed out that Clark and Brennan’s joint action model (1991) and Clark’s contribution theory (1996) retain a communication-as-transfer-betweenminds view of language, and treat intentions and goals as pre-existing psychological entities that are later somehow formulated in language. In these theories, common ground is considered as a distributed form of mental representation and adopted as a basis on which successful communication is warranted. The other approach to common ground has emerged as a result of recent research in cognitive psychology, linguistic pragmatics, and intercultural communication. Investigating how the mind works in the process of communication, cognitive researchers (Barr, 2004; Barr & Keysar, 2005; Colston & Katz, 2005) revealed that a priori mental representation of common knowledge is not as significantly involved in the process of communication as pragmatic theories have claimed; instead, they formed a more dynamic, emergence-through-use view of common ground which conceptualizes it as an emergent property of ordinary memory processes (also see Arnseth & Solheim, 2002; Koschmann & Le Baron, 2003). This dynamism is also emphasized in other studies (e.g. Heritage, 1984; Arundale, 1999) which report that real everyday communication is not conducted as a relatively static practice of recipient design and intention recognition, which current pragmatic theories tend to claim. In fact, communication is more like a trial-and-error, try-again process that is co-constructed by the participants. It appears to be a non-summative and emergent interactional achievement (Arundale, 1999, 2008). With this dynamic revision of common ground, the role of cooperation has also been challenged. Several researchers (e.g. Keysar & Bly, 1995; Barr & Keysar, 2005; Giora, 2003) have indicated that speakers and hearers are egocentric to a surprising degree, and individual, egocentric endeavors of interlocutors play a much more decisive role in the initial stages of production and comprehension than current pragmatic theories envision. Their egocentric behavior is rooted in the speakers’ or hearers’ more reliance on their own knowledge instead of mutual knowledge. Recent research in intercultural communication also affiliates with cognitive dynamism. Kecskes (2007) argued that especially in the first phase of the communicative process, instead of looking for common ground, which is absent to a great extent, lingua franca speakers articulated their own thoughts with linguistic means that they could easily use. We assume that cooperation and egocentrism are not mutually exclusive phenomena. They are both present in all stages of communication to a different extent.

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Need for a Socio-Cognitive Perspective

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These two approaches to common ground, weighing cooperation and egocentrism respectively, have nonetheless the same weakness; neither resides in a sociocognitive perspective. Therefore, we consider the socio-cognitive concern a necessity in revising the notion of common ground with a view that pays equal attention to cooperation and egocentrism.

12.2

Need for a Socio-Cognitive Perspective

This paper is an attempt to eliminate the conflict between the communication-astransfer-between-minds pragmatic view and the dynamic cognitive view of common ground, and proposes instead a dialectical approach with an overall socio-cognitive concern that combines the current views into an integrated concept of assumed common ground. This attempt is made by applying a socio-cognitive view to common ground within the framework of the dynamic model of meaning (DMM) presented in Kecskes (2008). According to the DMM, communication is the result of interplay of intention and attention on a socio-cultural background. Not only is communication an intention-directed practice, as the pragmatic approach posits, but it also displays an attention-oriented traits. The interplay of intention and attention is formed on the basis of mutual knowledge of the interlocutors, and in turn affects the construction of mutual knowledge in the processing of communication. The socio-cultural background, according to the DMM, is composed of dynamic knowledge of interlocutors deriving from their prior experience and current experience that are both socio-cultural in nature. We argue that the reason why neither the pragmatic view nor the cognitive view has been able to capture the real nature of common ground is that they have ignored the fact that both intention and attention are motivated by socio-cultural factors. According to the DMM, two components of common ground are identified: core common ground, which is composed of common sense, cultural sense and formal sense, and mainly derives from the interlocutors’ shared knowledge of prior experience, and emergent common ground, which is composed of shared sense and current sense, and mainly derives from the interlocutors’ individual knowledge of prior and/or current experience that is pertinent to the current situation. The construction of common ground is a dynamic process; it is the convergence of the mental representation of shared knowledge that we activate, shared knowledge that we seek, and rapport as well as knowledge that we create in the communicative process. Socio-cognitive factors motivate the interplay of intention and attention in this process and decide at which stage and to what extent intention and attention dominate the process and what their relationship is like. In the first part of this paper we will give a critical review of both pragmatic theories and cognitive research findings. Then we will discuss the socio-cognitive approach that integrates both sides into a holistic view. In the following section we will account for the assumed common ground.

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Activating, Seeking and Creating Common Ground: A Socio-Cognitive Approach

Pragmatic and Cognitive Views Pragmatic View

Current pragmatic theories attach great importance to cooperation in the process of communication. Communication is considered an intention-directed practice, during which the interlocutors mutually recognize the intentions and goals, and make joint effort to achieve them (Clark, 1996). Grice’s (1975) four maxims formulate the overall rules to regulate the speaker’s production of an utterance, and it is on the basis of a mutual agreement of these maxims that cooperation is recognized and comprehension is warranted. This is an ideal abstraction of verbal communication, in which cooperation and effect of intention are greatly valued. Under such a communication-as-transferbetween-minds construal common ground is also idealized as an a priori mental state of interlocutors that facilitates cooperation and successful communication (e.g. Stalnaker, 1978; Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark, 1996). The mental representations of (assumed) shared knowledge exist in the speaker prior to a conversation, and contribute to it as they relate to and facilitate comprehension of the intentions and goals which direct the conversation in a desired way. These theories in favor of ideal abstraction of verbal communication have met with several challenges. Cooperation was questioned by the Relevance Theory (RT) which refers to counter cases of cooperation when the interlocutors are unwilling to build relevance because of their preferences for certain interests as opposed to cases when they are unable to be relevant because of lack of the needed information or mental resources. In RT, the interlocutors are free to be cooperative or uncooperative, and their preferences for cooperation or the reverse are driven by their own interests. On the other hand, the role of intention was also considered equivocal. While Gricean, neo-Gricean, and post-Gricean theories consider intention as central to communication (cf. Wilson & Sperber, 2004; Levinson, 2006a), other pragmatists emphasized the decisive function of society in communication and rejected the central role of intention (cf. Verschueren, 1999; Mey, 2001), or challenged Gricean intention from cognitive perspectives (cf. Jaszczolt, 2005, 2006; Keysar, 2007). Conflicting views on intention were formed, “ranging from ‘believers’ through to ‘skeptics’ (with perhaps not a few ‘agnostics’ in-between)” (Haugh, 2008: p. 106). Recent studies (e.g., Verschueren, 1999; Gibbs, 2001; Arundale, 2008; Haugh, 2008) have pointed out that the role intention plays in communication may be more complex than proponents of current pragmatic theories have claimed. In particular, there is substantial recent evidence that works against the continued placement of Gricean intentions at the center of pragmatic theories. While this evidence mainly comes from the socio-cultural, interactional line of research in pragmatics, the cognitive-philosophical line (represented by neo-Gricean Pragmatics, Relevance Theory, and Speech Act Theory) still maintains the centrality of intentions in communication. According to this view, communication is constituted by recipient design and intention recognition. The speaker’s knowledge involves

12.3

Pragmatic and Cognitive Views

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constructing a model of the hearer’s knowledge relevant to the given situational context; conversely, the hearer’s knowledge includes constructing a model of the speaker’s knowledge relevant to the given situational context. Communication is supposed to be smooth if the speaker’s intentions are recognized by the hearer through pragmatic inferences. Consequently, the main task of pragmatics is to explain how exactly the hearer makes these inferences, and determine what is considered the speaker’s meaning. In a recent study, Levinson (2006b) confirms that (Gricean) intention lies at the heart of communication, and proposes an “interaction engine” that underlines human interaction. In contrast, the sociocultural-interactional paradigm does not consider intention as central to communication, rather it underlines its equivocality. According to this view, communication is not always dependent on speaker intentions in the Gricean sense (e.g., Verschueren, 1999; Nuyts, 2000; Mey, 2001; Haugh, 2008). The field of Conversational Analysis (CA) is also very critical about intention. According to conversation analysts the role of intention (or goal/plan), together with other mental resources such as awareness and mutual knowledge (e.g. Schiffer, 1972), is considered equivocal and peripheral to the study of communication. What really matters is the situated action observable in the objective physical and social world and accountable by the inferred mental world of participants (e.g., Suchman, 1987). CA analysts resist addressing mental representations of the participants and keep agnostic about how intention is inferred, how the state/level of awareness and mutual knowledge are involved in and affect social interaction, and how distinct facets of the mental world converge to make an influence on communication (e.g., Mandelbaum & Pomerantz, 1990). Rather, communication is action-oriented, and intention is not central or indispensable to communication as pre-existing artifact but only invoked as a possible account for social actions (e.g., Edwards, 2006; Haugh, 2008). In fact, one of the main differences between the cognitive-philosophical approach and the socio-cultural interactional approach is that the former considers intention an a priori mental state of speakers that underpins communication, while the latter regards intention as a post factum construct that is achieved jointly through the dynamic emergence of meaning in conversation. Since the two approaches represent two different perspectives, it would be difficult to reject either of them in toto. The complexity of the issue requires that we consider both the encoded and co-constructed sides of intention when analyzing the communicative process. Haugh (2008) proposed that the notion of intention need only be invoked in particular instances where it emerges as a post factum construct, salient to the interactional achievement of implicatures.

12.3.2

Cognitive View

The most robust evidence against cooperation and common ground as an a priori mental state derives from empirical cognitive research, which reported the

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egocentrism of speaker-hearers in mental processing of communication and postulated the emergent property of common ground. Barr and Keysar (2005) claimed that speakers and hearers commonly violate their mutual knowledge when they produce and understand language. Their behavior is called “egocentric” because it is rooted in the speakers’ or hearers’ own knowledge instead of in mutual knowledge. Other studies in cognitive psychology (e.g., Keysar & Bly, 1995; Giora, 2003; Keysar, 2007), have shown that speakers and hearers are egocentric to a surprising degree, and that individual, egocentric endeavors of interlocutors play a much more decisive role, especially in the initial stages of production and comprehension than is envisioned by current pragmatic theories. This egocentric behavior is rooted in speakers’ and hearers’ relying more on their own knowledge than on mutual knowledge. People turn out to be poor estimators of what others know. Speakers usually underestimate the ambiguity and overestimate the effectiveness of their utterances (Keysar & Henly, 2002). Findings about the egocentric approach of interlocutors to communication are also confirmed by Giora’s (1997, 2003) graded salience hypothesis and Kecskes’ (2003, 2008) dynamic model of meaning. Interlocutors seem to consider their conversational experience more important than prevailing norms of informativeness. Giora’s (2003) main argument is that knowledge of salient meanings plays a primary role in the process of using and comprehending language. She claimed that “... privileged meanings, meanings foremost on our mind, affect comprehension and production primarily, regardless of context or literality” (Giora, 2003: p. 103). Kecskes’ dynamic model of meaning (2008) also emphasizes that what the speaker says relies on prior conversational experience, as reflected in lexical choices in production. Conversely, how the hearer understands what is said in the actual situational context depends on his/her prior conversational experience with the lexical items used in the speaker’s utterances. Smooth communication depends primarily on the match between the two. Cooperation, relevance, and reliance on possible mutual knowledge come into play only after the speaker’s ego is satisfied and the hearer’s egocentric, most salient interpretation is processed. Barr and Keysar (2005) argued that mutual knowledge is most likely implemented as a mechanism for detecting and correcting errors, rather than as an intrinsic, routine process of the language processor. Example (1) taken from Norton (2008: p. 189) illustrates this point. The excerpt is from the Call Home Corpus, which is a collection of telephone conversations between friends and family members collected by the Linguistic Data Consortium (Kingsbury et al., 1997): (1) A: And one of her students showed her how to get into the X-500 directories. B: Which are? A: Hm? B: What are the X-500 directories? A: Oh um where you put- your um- How c- How can you not know?

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The excerpt contains an infelicitous referring expression. Speaker “A” seems to attribute too much knowledge to his addressee, referring to the “X-500 directories” without further identifying information. This prompts “B” to seek clarification about what is meant. The studies mentioned above and many others (Giora, 2003; Arnseth & Solheim, 2002; Koschmann & Le Baron, 2003; Heritage, 1984; Arundale, 1997, 2004) warrant some revision of traditional pragmatic theories on cooperation and common ground. Communication in general is not an ideal transfer of information; instead, it is more like a trial-and-error process that is co-constructed by the participants. It is a non-summative and emergent interactional achievement (e.g., Arundale, 2008). Consequently, the cooperative principle does not suffice for such revision of communication, and is proved vulnerable to fluctuations of mental resources that prefer egocentric interpretations (Strayer & Johnston, 2001). However, a call for revision of the ideal abstraction does not mean the absolute denial of it. If we compare the pragmatic ideal version and the cognitive coordination approach, we may discover that these two approaches are not contradictory but complementary to each other. The ideal abstraction adopts a top-down approach. It works for a theoretical construct of pragmatic tenets that warrant successful communication in all cases. In contrast, the cognitive coordination view adopts a bottomup approach. It provides empirical evidence that supports a systematic interpretation of miscommunication, and further is applied to all cases in general. From a dialectical perspective cooperation and egocentrism are not conflicting, and the a prior mental state versus post facto emergence of common ground may converge to a set of integrated background knowledge for the interlocutors to rely on in pursuit of relatively smooth communication. So far no research has yet made an attempt to combine the two. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to eliminate the ostensible conflicts between common ground notions as held by the two different views, and to propose an approach that integrates their considerations into a holistic concept of assumed common ground. We substantiate this approach to common ground by adopting a socio-cognitive view that envisions a dialectical relationship between intention and attention in the construal of communication.

12.4

A Socio-Cognitive View: The Construal of Communication

As discussed above the pragmatic view posits cooperation as the main driving force of communication, while the cognitive view considers egocentrism as central in communication. In the socio-cognitive view adopted in this paper, communication is the result of the interplay of intention and attention motivated by the socio-cultural background. This view emphasizes that both cooperation and egocentrism are manifested in all phases of communication. While cooperation is an intentiondirected practice and measured by relevance, egocentrism is an attention-oriented

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trait and measured by salience. More importantly, a socio-cultural background is assumed to underlie the process of communication and interact with intention and attention in a systematic way. The measurement of intention and attention by means of relevance and salience is distinct from earlier explanations (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Wilson & Sperber, 2004; Giora, 2003; Kecskes, 2006). Unlike Wilson and Sperber’s (2004) account of relevance as a unified constraint with both cognitive and pragmatic concerns, relevance in our model is exclusively a pragmatic effect caused by relations to intention; only information that relates to intention is considered relevant in communication according to our approach. The notion of salience also carries different interests. While salience by Giora (2003) mainly concerns the storage of knowledge as a function of degree of familiarity, frequency and conventionality, salience in our view refers to the contingent effect of salient knowledge as a result of attentional processing of communication in a particular situation, which facilitates or hampers the expression of intention and the subsequent achievement of communicative effects. Our view posits a dialectical relationship between intention and attention, which also differs from current research. The pragmatic view and the cognitive view as previously reviewed concern about intention and attention in an isolated way; there is no explicit explanation of relations between them. Relevance Theory defines relevance by both effects of attention and intention but doesn’t distinguish the two effects or clarify explicitly their relations. This is revealed in their claim “an input (a sight, a sound, an utterance, a memory) is relevant to an individual when it connects with background information he has available to yield conclusions that matter to him” (Wilson & Sperber, 2004: p. 3). In conversation analysis (e.g., Mandelbaum & Pomerantz, 1990; Edwards, 2006) social actions are pivotal structures of communication and fully explored. In contrast, no special efforts are ever made in analytic approach to intention and attention and their relations. However, this may change in the future as a recent study by Kidwell and Zimmerman (2007) suggests. In our approach we identify intention and attention as two measurable forces that affect communication in a systematic way. We attempt to clarify the traits and interplay of intention and attention based on the socio-cultural background. The background, according to the Dynamic Model of Meaning by Kecskes (2008), is composed of knowledge of interlocutors deriving from their prior experience and current situational experience that are both socio-cultural in nature. This background knowledge is the basis for assumed common ground that we will expound in the next section. However, before that we need to clarify our understanding of intention and attention.

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A Socio-Cognitive View: The Construal of Communication

12.4.1

239

Intentions

Our socio-cognitive view of intention incorporates the Searlean understanding of the term (Searle, 1983) and extends it to emphasize the dynamism of intention and its non-summative and emergent nature. We not only consider the centrality of intention in conversation, as the cognitive-philosophical approach has adhered to, but also take into account the dynamic process in which the intention can be an emergent effect of the conversation. In our view intention is considered a dynamically changing phenomenon that is the main organizing force in the communicative process. Intention is not only private, individual, pre-planned and a precursor to action but also emerging and social. It should be underlined that we are not talking about a dichotomy. Rather priori intention and emergent intention are two sides of the same phenomenon that may receive different emphasis at different points in the communicative process. When a conversation is started the private and pre-planned nature of intention may be dominant. However, in the course of conversation the emergent and social nature of the phenomenon may come to the forth. These two sides of intention are always present, and the question is only to what extent they are present at any given moment of the communicative process. This view does not contradict to Searle’s claim that intentionality is directedness; intending to do something is just one kind of intentionality among others (Searle, 1983: p. 3), and it is also in line with Joas’ claim that intentionality consists in a self-reflective control, which we exercise over our current behavior (Joas, 1996: p. 158). The basic property that renders intention as a central element of communication is its functionality. There is always a reason and/or a goal behind a conversation; without intention there would be no need to initiate communication, and we could hardly make any sense of this social action. Searle (1983, 2007) considered intention and also other tenets, such as perception, desire and belief, as prerequisites of communication. However, this is just one side of intention. The emergent side is co-constructed by participants in the dynamic flow of conversation. Let us take the following conversation: (2) John: - Want to talk about your trip? Peter: - I don’t know. If you have questions. . . John: - OK, but you should tell me . . . Peter: - Wait, you want to hear about Irene? John: - Well, what about her? Peter: - She is fine. She has. . .well. . . put on some weight, though.

John’s utterance gives the impression that his intention is to give a chance to his friend to talk about his trip. However, Peter does not seem to have much intention to do so. John’s second utterance looks to be very determined but it is not completed so we will never know what his real intention was. But that utterance triggers an interesting turn in Peter who thinks John wants to know about his former girlfriend,

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Irene. Maybe, this was not John’s intention but the flow of conversation led to this point, which appears to be a kind of co-constructed intention. We propose to distinguish three types of intentions and two levels of expressions of those intentions. The three types of intentions, namely informative, performative, and emotive, are expressed in the utterance at the primary (functional) and secondary (constructional) level. It is important to note that all three types of intentions carry a so called “performative” effect, intention to ‘do things by saying’ or achieve certain effects, which entails a certain reaction on the hearer’s side. However, our classification of intentions uses ‘performative’ in a narrow sense; performative intention is through which a certain act is initiated, such as proposing to a loved one or initiating a trip. This is supposed to be different from the other two types of intentions as described below. Informative intentions indicate that the speaker intends to inform the hearer about something new; story telling, lecture delivering and news reporting are typical cases of this intention. Performative intentions indicate that the speaker intends to perform an action that often produces a certain effect, such as a change of state or a reaction from the hearer; the president’s declaring a war and a friend’s inviting you to a dinner are such cases. Emotive intentions indicate that the speaker intends to express her feelings or evaluations about a state, an event or an object; complaining, blaming, or showing gratitude are such cases. It is the type of intention expressed in the primary level in a particular conversation that is most critical. The primary intention is functional—it guides a conversation (i.e., the goal) and decides the relevance of utterances to the conversation in a particular situation (and therefore it is coherent to its context, both verbal and non-verbal). The secondary intention is constructional. It represents the most ready interpretation of the encoded information of a sentence (and therefore it is semantically encoded and free from context). In real situations it is sometimes the case that an utterance expresses one type of primary intention that is distinct from the secondary one. This explains why the same utterance may carry different intentions when its context changes. We illustrate this point by the examples below: (3)

The conversation takes place at Bud’s house that Ann visits at the weekend: Ann: - That doll looks cool! Bud: - Thank you.

(4)

This conversation happens at a shop-window that Ann passes with her mother. Ann: That doll looks cool! Mom: Oh yes dear, but we must hurry to meet your father.

In both cases Ann’s utterance is exclamatory and expresses emotive intention. However, this is only the secondary level of intention. The primary level, which is connected with the context, is expressed differently in the two situations. While in conversation (3) Ann’s primary intention is emotive (praise a doll on Bud’s sofa)— so it coincides with the secondary level intention, in (4) she enacts a performative

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A Socio-Cognitive View: The Construal of Communication

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intention (which is emotive on the secondary level)—to plead with her mother to stop and look at or purchase the doll. In sum, communication is a process in which intention is formed, expressed and interpreted. From the speaker’s perspective intention is something that s/he bears in mind prior to the utterance or is generated in the course of conversation and expressed in the form of utterances. From the hearer’ or an analyst’s perspective intention is something that is processed by the hearer while or after the utterance is (being) made. The primary intention expressed in a particular situation serves the function of guiding the conversation. Knowledge or information explicated in linguistic forms, implied connotation and also background that can be inferred, all get united for comprehension and achievement of communication under the driving force of intention. Cooperation is therefore a consistent effort of interlocutors to build up relevance to intentions in their communication. This sense of cooperation is close to Grice’s cooperative principles (Grice, 1957) and Simons’ brief reinterpretations (Simons, 2006, 2007). However, in our approach there is significant room for dynamism, which means that intention is not necessarily a priori but it can also be generated and changed during the communicative process. This dynamism is reflected in emerging utterances that may be interrupted and started again. It is not only the context but also the dynamism of the flow of the conversation and the process of formulating an utterance that may also affect and change intention.

12.4.2

Attention

Attention refers to the cognitive resources available to interlocutors that make communication a conscious action. In the process of communication when intention is formed, expressed and interpreted, attention contributes to the stages of the process with different strengths. According to our approach attention can be classified as follows: mindful, mindless, and mind-paralyzed . The mindful state refers to situations when a lot of attentional resources are evoked in a more strenuous and focused way, the mindless state refers to situations when relatively fewer resources are evoked and more automatic actions take place, and the mind-paralyzed state (e.g., Strayer & Johnston, 2001) refers to scenarios when the amount and extent of attentional resources involved in communication are impaired by unnatural or abnormal conditions, such as distraction, mental illnesses, getting drunk or shocked which make the interlocutors’ effort of attentional processing ineffective. Three factors will affect salience of knowledge and ease of attentional processing in all stages: interlocutors’ knowledge based on prior experience, frequency, familiarity, or conventionality of knowledge tied to the situation, and the interlocutors’ mental state or availability of attentional resources. The knowledge most salient to the interlocutors at a particular situation is information that is included in their knowledge base, pertinent to the current situation, and processed by necessary attentional resources. No matter what mental state they are in, and what stage of communication they work for, there is most salient knowledge stored in the

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interlocutors as a result of interplay of the three factors. To illustrate this, let us look at two situations: situation (a) when Ann saw Bud, her classmate, on campus, versus situation (b) when Ann saw a cobra in a nearby bush in the forest. Given that both Bud and cobras are present in Ann’s knowledge base, Ann will pay attention to them when seeing them. If Ann doesn’t know Bud and cobras, the sight of them may trigger attentions that work differently, or even they fail to draw her attention at all. In addition, as the sight of Bud is conventional and non-urgent to the situation, the attentional resources needed for processing are relatively fewer compared with the occasion when the sight of a cobra is rather unusual or alarming. The attentional resources available at the given situation also affect how knowledge is processed. Usually processing is effective as long as the needed attentional resources are satisfied in that situation except when Ann fails to summon her attention as a result of distraction or other mental interference. The analysis above explains attention and the effect of salience in the first stage of communication when intention is formed. All other stages in the communicative process also require the commitment of attention so that successful communication occurs as an outcome of conscious effort. As stated above, cognitive research observed egocentric behavior of interlocutors in the process of communication. Egocentrism means that interlocutors activate the most salient information to their attention in the construction (speaker) and comprehension (hearer) of communication. This claim demonstrates that there is a major difference between Giora’s understanding salience and our understanding salience. While Giora focuses on the hearer only, we emphasize that salience is present in both production and comprehension. The speaker will use those linguist resources (lexical units) which s/he thinks are most salient to express his/her communicative intentions or/and goals. Because of differences in their knowledge base, the frequency/rituality of the knowledge in the situation, and the attentional resources available for processing, interlocutors enjoy different salience of knowledge, and therefore conduct attentional processing of communication in an egocentric manner. The following example demonstrates how differences in salience of knowledge may result in misunderstanding. (5) Anchor: - Do you believe in clubs for young people? Priest: - Only when kindness fails. (Giora, 2003)

It is obvious that the most salient meaning of “club” is different for the anchor and priest. Even the actual situational context fails to create common ground. There are specific ways attention contributes to different stages of communication as characterized by the processes of intention. When intention is formed, attention plays a crucial role. Take conversation (6) as an example. (6)

Ann is speaking to Bud. Ann: - Don’t move! Cobra!

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Assumed Common Ground

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Without noticing the existence of a cobra nearby, Ann’s intention of warning wouldn’t come into being. Greetings, for instance, are also relevant only when the speaker catches sight of another person who is known to her; such consciousness of a certain state necessitates a functional response. When intention is expressed in an utterance, the speaker also needs necessary attention to formulate the utterance in a comprehensible way. The frequency or familiarity of the intention and especially of the linguistic expression in that situation determines the extent of attentional processing. Greetings require less attentional resources and appear more automatic than the warning of a cobra, which is not frequent or easily accessible in processing. When intention is interpreted by the hearer, the amount of attentional resources is similarly proportional to when intention is formulated. The person being greeted can easily comprehend the speaker’s intention and responds to it in an effortless way. However, for Bud (example 6) who is warned of the cobra, it may not be easy, but instead he needs strenuous efforts to read the intention and make relevant reaction. On the other hand, intention directs attention to relevant information resources so that intention can be realized, and communication be conducted in a coherent and comprehensible way. Intention has a selective function of those resources, and is central to the processing of communication. The socio-cultural background has an overall influence on the interplay of intention and attention. The interlocutors’ knowledge directs their attention to awareness of different features or parts of the same presence; for example, an architect, an engineer, and a dustman may form different views at the sight of the same building. Also as a consequence of this, different intentions may be formed, and the effect of interplay is also affected by the accessibility of the knowledge. As a result, communication is achieved with intentional action guaranteed by attentional processing, both motivated by the socio-cultural background. Interlocutors are both cooperative (in terms of intention) and egocentric (in terms of attention) in the process. The part of knowledge that is relevant to intention, salient to the attention, and available in the socio-cultural background will contribute to successful communication.

12.5

Assumed Common Ground

The notion of assumed common ground is proposed under the socio-cognitive view of communication and discussed within the theoretical framework of the dynamic model of meaning (Kecskes, 2008). In this section, we briefly review the model and then propound the revised concept of common ground that attempts to eliminate the conflicts between pragmatic and cognitive approaches and integrates them into a holistic view of common ground.

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Activating, Seeking and Creating Common Ground: A Socio-Cognitive Approach

Understanding Context

According to the dynamic model of meaning, “. . . meaning formally expressed in the linguistic interactional context is created on-the-spot, and is the result of the interaction and mutual influence of the private contexts represented in the language of the interlocutors and the actual situational context interpreted by the interlocutors” (Kecskes, 2008: p. 385). Thus meaning is the result of interplay of prior experience and current experience that are both socio-cultural in nature. This claim puts the understanding of context into a new perspective because it approaches context from multiple dimensions: context is formed in different time phases (from prior experience and current experience), by different agents (private or individual interlocutors, and public or collective communities), and in different forms (linguistic form and situational form). This approach is formalized in the following figure. Figure 12.1 demonstrates the different ways context is understood in the process of communication. Speaker’s private context generated by intention is encoded in lexical units and formulated in an utterance (actual linguistic context) that is uttered (or written) “out there” in the world by a speaker in a situation (actual situational context), and is matched (“internalized”) to the private cognitive contexts “inside” the head of the hearer (prior knowledge). Meaning is the result of interplay between the speaker’s private context and the hearer’s private context in the actual situational context as understood by the interlocutors.

12.5.2

Assumed Common Ground in the DMM

Common ground is a cooperatively constructed mental abstraction. It is assumed by interlocutors in a sense that none will know for sure that it exists. The multidimensional concern of DMM facilitates the construction of common ground in communication. From the time dimension, common ground derives from the interlocutors’ information gained from prior communicative experience and current communicative experience (actual situational context). From the range dimension, common ground derives from the interlocutors’ shared information that belongs to a community (a macro concern), and that pertains to their individual experiences (a micro concern). The distinction between macro-concern and micro-concern resembles Clark’s (1996: p. 100) distinction between communal and personal common ground. However, there are some differences. According to Kecskes (2008: p. 390) prior experience of speakers creates private contexts that get encoded in lexical items in the mind of speakers of a particular speech community. These private contexts incorporate core knowledge (tied to prior experience), which is the public part of the private context, and individual-specific knowledge that may not be shared by the other members of the speech community because it is the individualized reflection of the socio-cultural context. The public context, that is to say, the public part of the private context, however, is available to each speaker of that

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245

Fig. 12.1 Understanding context (Kecskes, 2008: p. 389)

speech community because it refers to relatively similar conceptual content that is conventionalized. Common ground is inevitable in communication. The more common ground we activate, share and create, the better we are supposed to understand each other, and the more efficiently we achieve our desired effect. However, common ground is not something that is already there as a reliable repertoire for interlocutors, nor is it something that comes about as a loose contingent subsequence of the conversation. Neither the pragmatic nor the cognitive approach of common ground suffices to offer us a complete picture of common ground although certain dynamism of common ground is emphasized by the pragmatic approach. Clark (1996: p. 116) said that “common ground isn’t just there, ready to be exploited. We have to establish it with each person we interact with.” Similar thoughts are formulated by Stalnaker (2002).

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The difference between Clark’s contribution theory (Clark, 1996) and the DMM is that while the former considers communication as a constant search for common ground following a contribution by contribution sequence in an idealized way, the latter underscores the “untidy,” chaotic nature of communication which is not just recipient design and intention recognition as most theories that have grown out of Grice’s approach claim. The DMM emphasizes that speakers not always seek for common ground, and they are both egocentric and cooperative in the communicative process. Based on the DMM we propose a socio-cognitive approach that considers both the pragmatic and cognitive aspects within a socio-cultural frame. By integrating the pragmatic and cognitive approaches and incorporating varying sources, we postulate that there are two sides of common ground: core common ground and emergent common ground. Core common ground refers to the relatively static, generalized, common knowledge that belongs to a certain speech community as a result of prior interaction and experience, whereas emergent common ground refers to the relatively dynamic, particularized, private knowledge created in the course of communication that belongs to the individual(s). The former is a repertoire of knowledge that can be assumed to be shared among individuals of a speech community independent of the actual situational circumstances, such as when and where the conversation occurs, between whom it occurs, etc. This can be split into three subsets: common sense, cultural sense, and formal sense. In contrast, the actual contextual part is knowledge that is aroused or involved as shared enterprises in the particular situational context that pertains to the interlocutors exclusively. This contingent circumstance draws attention of the interlocutors to the same entities or states and, with the formation of particular intentions therein, activates some of their prior individual experiences that join in this intention-directed action. This actual contextual part can be split into two subsets: shared sense and current sense, which will be explained in Sect. 12.5.2.2.

12.5.2.1

Core Common Ground

As mentioned above, there are three subcategories that compose core common ground: common sense, culture sense, and formal sense. Common sense (of generality of the world) entails the generalized knowledge about the world. This is based on our observation of the objective world and our cognitive reasoning of it; the knowledge of natural science that is most available and accessible to us in our daily life contributes to this sense. Culture sense (of society, community, nation, etc) entails the generalized knowledge about cultural norms, beliefs and values of the human society, a community, a nation, etc. People form and observe certain norms in social life, such as customs and ethics; the knowledge of social science that is available and accessible to us in our daily life contributes to this sense. Formal sense (of linguistic system) entails the generalized knowledge about the language system that we use in our social interaction. We rely on a common language system, sometimes more than one system (i.e. bilingual or multilingual), to put through our

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meaning to each other and achieve certain desired effects, such as informing others, performing an action, or expressing our emotions. The knowledge of linguistic system that is available and accessible to us in our daily life contributes to this sense. Core common ground is a general assumption in two ways. First, although core common ground is relatively static and shared among people, it can change diachronically. During a certain period, say a couple of years, we may safely assume that the interlocutors have access to relatively similar common knowledge as components of core common ground won’t change dramatically. However, in the long run it definitely will change; people’s social life, both material and spiritual, will experience some changes over a long period, and as a consequence their common ground will also be changed. Contents of lexical items demonstrate this diachronic change. The most salient meaning of the following expressions has gone through significant changes in the last 20–30 years. (7)

gay; piece of cake; awesome; patronize

Second, core common ground may also vary among different individuals. Type of knowledge and scope of a community determined by different factors such as geography, life style, and educational, financial and racial factors restrain the accessibility of common ground to a community that is characterized in a particular way.

12.5.2.2

Emergent Common Ground

Emergent common ground is the part that is more private and sensitive to contingent situational context. There are two subcategories that compose emergent common ground: shared sense, and current sense. Shared sense entails the particularized knowledge about personal (not of community) experiences that interlocutors share. Current sense entails the emergent perception of the current situation. This is more private a part of common ground; interlocutors perceive and evaluate the current situation, such as sight of a cobra nearby and subsequent awareness of danger, and contribute such knowledge to their conversation. Emergent common ground is assumptive in that it is contingent on the actual situation, which reflects a synchronic change between common grounds in different situations. Shared sense varies according to the relationships of the interlocutors, and their mutual knowledge based on their personal experiences. For example, the shared sense Ann enjoys when talking to her colleague is not the same that she has when talking to her husband. Still, even for a shared experience, such as a recent excursion, the two people involved may enjoy memories of different segments of the same happening. There is no perfect match between them, and shared sense is better achieved only after their joint effort to construct it. Current sense also enjoys this dynamic assumptive feature. Interlocutors may share this sense since they are involved in the same actual situation, but it may often be the case that they need to co-construct this sense when they perceive the current situation differently which is

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caused by their different angles of perception, available attentional resources, and other factors. For example, Ann saw the cobra, but Bud didn’t because it was behind him. In brief, both shared sense and current sense can vary from case to case according to the identification of relations or roles of interlocutors, their memory of prior experiences, and their cognitive perception of the actual situational context available to them.

12.5.3

Common Ground Is an Assumption

Common ground is an assumption that we make in the course of actual communication. Both core common ground and emergent common ground are integrated parts of this assumed common ground. While core common ground is generalized from prior experience of a certain community, emergent common ground derives from individuals’ prior personal experiences and perceptions of the current situation. There is a dialectical relationship between core common ground and emergent common ground. First, the core part derives from macro socio-cultural information of a community (or any groups of people divided by nations, regions, etc.) that is accessible to all individuals in that community, whereas the actual part derives from micro socio-cultural information that pertains to individuals solely. Second, the core part changes diachronically, whereas the actual part changes synchronically. Third, the core part may affect the formation of the actual part in that it partly restricts the way the actual part occurs. In most cases the actual part is instances of information that are predictable in the core part. On the other hand, the actual part may contribute to the core part in that the contingent actual part in a frequent ritual occurrence potentially becomes public disposition that belongs to the core part. In other words, they are different components of assumed common ground, which have internal connections. In the socio-cognitive view assumed common ground works as a background on which the interplay of intention and attention occurs and communication takes place. There are three different ways the two components (intention and attention) contribute to common ground in the process of communication. One is that the interlocutors activate mental representations of shared information that they already have. For example, Ann talks to her husband: (8) Ann: - Please check why the baby is crying.

The common ground of “the baby”, which is represented in the form of presupposition, is the shared part from their experience and activated in this utterance. This belongs to the actual part of common ground. Besides, other components of common ground including the core part are also activated, such as a baby’s physiological needs (common sense), the parents’ social roles and responsibilities (cultural sense), and their competence of language use (formal sense). Upon her utterance, Ann is

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fully confident that her husband has a good knowledge of the above and thus they share the same common ground that facilitates the achievement of the goal of the conversation. A second way of constructing common ground is that interlocutors seek information that potentially facilitates communication as mutual knowledge. Before the speaker makes the seeking effort, the piece of information is not salient in the hearer as background underlying the upcoming conversation. Because the piece of information may or may not be accessible to the hearer, the speaker pronounces it explicitly so that this information becomes salient and joins in the conversation as a relevant part. For example, when walking on campus Ann talks to Bud, and a woman with blonde hair passes them: (9) Ann: - See the woman with blonde hair? She’s our new English teacher. She’s pretty, isn’t she?

Ann seeks their mutual perception of the woman because her seeing the woman passing by doesn’t necessarily guarantee a mutual perception, and/or that she aims at building up the same salient knowledge in Bud so as to start a relevant conversation. In other cases, a piece of information is mutually known to the interlocutors, but doesn’t appear as most salient in the particular moment when the conversation takes place. This occurs when the speaker attempts to talk about past experience or information that she shared with the hearer earlier. In order to involve the information as salient, the speaker will state it explicitly in the conversation. The instance of a teacher’s utterance illustrates this situation: (10) Teacher: - As you well know, I am leaving soon, . . . (Giora, 1997: 24)

Before he proposes a make-up-lecture timetable, the teacher starts with the statement of information that is publicly known to the students. We won’t comment on whether Giora’s coherence or Wilson and Sperber’s relevance works best for the above situation; rather, we argue that the assumed common ground is superior to both of them in that it identifies common ground as a set of knowledge that is salient and pertinent to the current situation. The information that is commonly known to the interlocutors doesn’t necessarily become a part of common ground in the current conversation if it is neither salient nor relevant to the social action involved. The third contribution to common ground is when the speaker brings in her private knowledge and makes it a part of common ground. The speaker has some private information that she knows is non-accessible to the hearer, and she adopts it as common ground in the belief that it facilitates the conversation and that the hearer will accept it willingly. For example, Ann responds to Bud’s invitation to dinner: (11) Bud: - Ann, would you like to have dinner with me tonight? Ann: - I’d love to, but I’ll have to pick up my sister at the airport.

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The knowledge that Ann has a sister and that she plans to pick her up wouldn’t have become publicly known to the interlocutors if Bud hadn’t made such an invitation. It was not necessary for Ann to tell Bud this piece of information except when the current situation requires so. Ann had to discuss her sister because her sister was Ann’s excuse for not having dinner with Bud. In other words, the relevance of this piece of knowledge to the intention of the conversation makes it available as a part of common ground. Assumed common ground is an integral part of the socio-cognitive view of communication. The three ways of constructing common ground occur within the interplay of intention and attention, and in turn the interplay of the two concepts is enacted on the socio-cultural background constructed by common ground. The processes in which we activate, seek, and create shared information are driven by relevance to the intention and realized with salience to attention. On the other hand, shared knowledge that we enjoy affects the formation of intention as well as the interplay of intention and attention as has been explained in the sociocognitive view.

12.6

Conclusion

This paper offers an alternative to existing approaches to common ground. It has made an attempt to integrate the pragmatic and cognitive view into a dialectical approach that emphasizes the decisive role of socio-cognitive factors in communication. In this socio-cognitive view, communication is considered the interplay of intention and attention motivated by the socio-cultural background. These tenets are interconnected; they affect and are affected by each other. Generally speaking, communication is an intentional action that is usually attended by adequate and sufficient attentional resources on the basis of common socio-cultural background. The socio-cognitive view on assumed common ground within the confines of the DMM offers a more transparent description of sources and components of common ground, and the specific manners in which they join to influence the process of communication. This approach makes it possible to explain why interlocutors are egocentric and cooperative at the same time. In the dynamic creation and constant updating of common ground speakers are considered as “complete” individuals with different possible cognitive status, evaluating the emerging communication through their own perspective. Constructing common ground occurs within the interplay of intention and attention, and in turn the interplay of the two concepts is enacted on the socio-cultural background constructed by common ground. In this sense common ground plays not only a regulative but also a constitutive role in communication. The processes in which we activate, seek, and create shared information are driven by relevance to the intention and realized with salience to attention. On the other hand, shared

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knowledge that we enjoy affects the formation of intention, the attraction of attention, and the interplay of intention and attention. One of the main advantages of the socio-cognitive approach is that it eliminates the conflicts between the pragmatic and cognitive approach of common ground by integrating them into a holistic picture that offers an emergence-through-use view of common ground. Further research, especially empirical research, is needed to clarify the nature and consequences of the interplay of intention and attention as related to relevance and salience. Acknowledgement The paper was first published as Kecskes, I. & F. Zhang. 2009. Activating, seeking and creating common ground: A socio-cognitive approach. Pragmatics & Cognition. Vol. 17. No. 2: 331-355. Thanks to John Benjamins for permission to reuse the text.

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Chapter 13

On the Dynamic Relations Between Common Ground and Presupposition

Abstract The common ground theory of presupposition has been dominant since the seventies (Stalnaker. Semantics and philosophy. New York: New York University Press. 197–214, 1974; Stalnaker. Syntax and Semantics, 9: 315–332, 1978; Stalnaker. Linguistics and Philosophy, 25:701–721, 2002). This theory has resulted from a view of communication as transfer between minds. In this view interlocutors presume that speakers speak cooperatively, they infer that they have intentions and beliefs that are necessary to make sense of their speech acts, and treat such entities as pre-existing psychological ones that are later somehow formulated in language. Common ground is considered as a distributed form of mental representation and adopted as a basis on which successful communication is warranted (Arnseth & Solheim. Proceedings of CSCL 2002, Computer support for collaborative learning: Foundations for a CSCL community, 102–110. Boulder, Colorado, 2002; Kecskes & Zhang. Pragmatics and Cognition. 17:331–355, 2009)). However, the theory has not gone without objection and criticism (e.g., Abbott. Linguistics and Philosophy 21: 523–538, 2008; Beaver & Zeevat. Accommodation. MS. 2004; Von Fintel. Ken Hale: A life in language. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001; Von Fintel. Draft paper for Workshop on Presupposition Accommodation at The Ohio State University. 2006; Simons. Philosophical Studies 112:251–278, 2003) because it is based on “an oversimplified picture of conversation” (Abbott. Linguistics and Philosophy 21:523–538, 2008), and as a consequence the relationship between common ground and presupposition has also been oversimplified. In this approach presupposition is often considered as a conventional or conversational constraint of common ground, or requirement on common ground that must be satisfied in order to make an appropriate utterance. The problem of accommodation is a critical issue that has been raised against this view, and caused great challenge to the theory by stimulating diverse alternatives. The goal of this paper is to redefine the relationship between common ground and presupposition within the confines of the socio-cognitive approach (SCA). SCA (Kecskes. Journal of Pragmatics 40:385–406, 2008; Kecskes & Zhang. Pragmatics and Cognition. 17:331–355, 2009; Kecskes. Pragmatics & Society 1:50–73, 2010) adopted in this paper offers an alternative view on communication, which claims that communication is not an ideal transfer of information, and cooperation and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_13

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egocentrism are both present in the process of communication to a varying extent. The SCA emphasizes the dynamics of common ground creation and updating in the actual process of interaction, in which interlocutors are considered as “complete” individuals with different possible cognitive status being less or more cooperative at different stages of the communicative process. Presupposition is a proposal of common ground, and there is a vibrant interaction between the two. They enjoy a cross relation in terms of content and manners in which they are formed, and their dynamism is inherently related and explanatory to each other. This claim has important implications to the solution to presupposition accommodation. After the introduction Sect. 13.2 describes the socio-cognitive approach. Section 13.3 reviews the assumed common ground, and Sect. 13.4 introduces the speaker-assigned presupposition. Section 13.5 discusses the dynamism of presuppositions and common ground, and claims that their dynamic observations are coherent and explanatory to each other. Section 13.6 readdresses the accommodation problem with redefinition of the relations. Keywords Presupposition · Common ground · Socio-cognitive · Egocentrism · Cooperation

13.1

Introduction

The common ground theory of presupposition started to be formulated in the seventies. It was first proposed by Stalnaker (1974, 1978) and adopted by several formal pragmatists (e.g. Heim, 1983; Beaver, 1997; Von Fintel, 2006). In this theory propositions that a sentence presupposes are just those that must be entailed by the common ground of any context that is to admit that sentence. This notion of presupposition relies on a concept of “common ground” according to which the common ground of a context of utterance is the conjunction of all those propositions that interlocutors take for granted in that context either because they are permanently shared beliefs in their community, or because they have been established in the course of the preceding conversation (cf. Heim, 1990). Stalnaker proposed a version of information-gathering discourse, in which assertion is intended to update common ground, and presupposition is intended to shape or narrow down common ground. Presupposition is interpreted as the speaker’s belief in the common ground status of the proposition: “A proposition P is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context just in case the speaker assumes or believes that P, assumes or believes that his addressee assumes or believes that P, and assumes or believes that his addressee recognizes that he is making these assumptions, or has these beliefs” (Stalnaker, 1974: p. 573). The formula below describes the speaker’s cognitive state in presupposing: (1)

K1p, K1K2p, K1K2K1p, . . .

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In this formula number 1 denotes the speaker, number 2 denotes the hearer or the addressee, and the letter K denotes the state of having belief or assumption in a weak sense or knowledge in a strong sense. Formal pragmatists (cf. Beaver & Zeevat, 2007; Simons, 2003; Von Fintel, 2001) adopted Stalnaker’s common ground theory and adapted it to their own needs. They have aimed at formal description of presupposition projection which takes place in an unfolding context. The sentence requires that the presupposed proposition be taken for granted and not subject to (further) discussion and the utterance of it requires that the speaker assume that its requirements are satisfied. The main problem with this approach is that it takes into account only the collective core part of common ground that is encapsulated in the utterance and means relatively the same for all speakers of that language community. At the same time this approach ignores the privatized knowledge and beliefs of interlocutors. It does not actually consider what is on the speaker’s mind in that particular situational context. Instead, it formalizes what’s going on with the sentence and its linguistic context. The formula below describes the minimal requirements of presupposition on the interlocutors’ cognitive states: (2)

K1p, K2p

It might be difficult to clarify what exactly “taken-for-grantedness” means, but the formula may suffice to indicate that the proposition is noncontroversial and requires no further discussion. Researchers studying pragmatic presuppositions from socio-cultural or other perspectives (e.g. Soames, 1982; Yule, 1996) have shown concerns about the interlocutors’ cognitive states. However, in whatever directions the common ground theory of pragmatic presupposition has been developed, it still has drawn criticism. The critical issue is accommodation. A special type of informative presupposition raises this issue which has become a problem that no one could get by without handling it first. The following conversation shows this problem: (3)

Bob (who met Alice for the first time): - Are you going to lunch? Alice: - No, I’ve got to pick up my sister.

This is a problematic case of presupposition concerning its common ground status. We can see this problem more clearly by the formula below: (4)

K1p, ~K2p, K1 ~ K2p, . . .

Obviously this description of cognitive states does not go with either (1) or (2). Because this special case of presupposition violates the common ground theory, many researchers adopted the “common ground + accommodation” view (e.g. Karttunen, 1974; Lewis, 1979; Stalnaker, 1974, 2002, 2008; Soames, 1982; Von Fintel, 2000, 2006). Although in different forms of interpretation, this view generally follows the rule depicted by Lewis (1979: p. 417): “If at time t something is

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said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t, then—ceteris paribus and within certain limits—presupposition P comes into existence at t”. Although several attempts have been made to explain accommodation, none has managed to clarify properly why the speaker presupposes as such when s/he is fully aware of the presupposed not being part of common ground knowledge, and how accommodation is achieved in the time gap after the utterance event has taken place and before it has been accepted or rejected (Zhang, 2009). This case of informative presupposition and the approach of accommodation have called the common ground theory of presupposition into question. Several researchers have proposed alternative ways which greatly challenged the extant theory. Burton-Roberts (1989) regarded accommodation as a fatal problem to the theory and insisted on a semantic version of presupposition instead. Abbott (2000, 2006, 2008) approached the issue from the angle of information structure and proposed to give up the theory altogether. Simons (2001, 2003, 2004) argued that accommodation, as construed on the common ground view, requires one to posit a conventional constraint on sentences, and therefore she was forced to abandon the common ground view of presupposition and investigated conversational constraints on utterances by analyzing the assumptions of relevance and cooperativeness. From the above we can see that not only is the “common ground + accommodation” view problematic but objections to and criticisms of it also vary greatly. What makes things more complicated is that Stalnaker (2002, 2008) appears to have obscured the dividing line between common ground and presupposition, and occasionally tends to use them as alternative terms. This may cause even more confusion to the problems at issue. It is therefore crucial how one views the relationship between common ground and presupposition. The socio-cognitive approach with its notions of assumed common ground and speaker-assigned presupposition gives us the chance to reexamine the dynamism of these two entities and redefine their relationship.

13.2

The Socio-Cognitive View of Communication

We think that the main problem with the common ground theory of presupposition is that it considers common ground an a priori concept, partly ignores its dynamism and relies on the assumption that cooperation is always present to the same extent in the communicative process. The Alice’s sister (3) issue may be solved within the confines of the socio-cognitive approach (SCA) to communication proposed by Kecskes (2008, 2010) and (Kecskes & Zhang, 2009). This approach is based on two claims. First, speaker and hearer are equal participants of the communicative process. They both produce and comprehend relying on their most accessible and salient knowledge expressed in their private contexts in production and comprehension. Consequently, only a holistic interpretation of utterance from both the perspective of the speaker and the perspective of the hearer can give us an adequate account

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Assumed Common Ground

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of language communication. Interlocutors should be considered as “complete” individuals with different possible cognitive status, with possible different interpretation of the same core common ground information, which has a profound effect on what the same linguistic structure may mean for any of them. Second, communication is a dynamic process in which individuals are not only constrained by societal conditions but they also shape them at the same time. As a consequence, communication is characterized by the interplay of two traits that are inseparable, mutually supportive and interactive: Individual trait: Prior experience Salience Egocentrism Attention

Social trait: Actual situational experience Relevance Cooperation Intention

In the socio-cognitive approach interlocutors are considered as social beings searching for meaning with individual minds embedded in a socio-cultural collectivity. Individual traits (prior experience -! salience -!egocentrism -! attention) interact with societal traits (actual situational experience -!relevance -! cooperation -! intention). Each trait is the consequence of the other. Prior experience results in salience which leads to egocentrism that drives attention. Intention is a cooperation-directed practice that is governed by relevance which (partly) depends on actual situational experience. Kecskes (2010, 2012) argued that SCA integrates the pragmatic view of cooperation and the cognitive view of egocentrism and emphasizes that both cooperation and egocentrism are manifested in all phases of communication, albeit to varying extents. Communication is the result of interplay of intention and attention motivated by socio-cultural background that is privatized/ subjectivized by the individuals in their linguistic behavior. The background is composed of knowledge of interlocutors deriving from their private prior experience and current situational experience that are both socio-cultural in nature (Kecskes, 2008).

13.3 13.3.1

Assumed Common Ground Core Common Ground and Emergent Common Ground

Kecskes and Zhang (2009) postulated that there are two sides of assumed common ground: core common ground and emergent common ground. Core common ground refers to the relatively static, generalized, common knowledge that belongs to a certain speech community as a result of prior interaction and experience, whereas emergent common ground refers to the relatively dynamic, actualized and particularized knowledge co-constructed in the course of communication that belongs to

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and is privatized by the individual(s). The former is a repertoire of knowledge that can be assumed to be shared among individuals of a speech community independent of the situational circumstances, such as when and where the conversation occurs, between whom it occurs, etc. In contrast, the actual contextual part (emergent common ground) is knowledge that is aroused, co-constructed and/or involved as shared enterprises in the particular situational context that pertains to the interlocutors exclusively. This contingent circumstance draws attention of the interlocutors to the same entities or states and, with the formation of particular intentions therein, activates some of their prior individual experiences that join in this intention-directed action. When critiquing the common ground view of presupposition Abbott (2000) underlined that the driving idea behind this theory is that presuppositions are identified with “old” information, or information that the speaker is treating as “old.” This is not the case in the socio-cognitive approach in which common ground is perceived as an effort to converge the mental representation of shared knowledge present as memory (“old” information) that we can activate, shared knowledge that we can seek, and rapport as well as knowledge that we can create in the communicative process (“new” information). According to this approach common ground is present throughout the whole communicative process. The core and actual (emergent) components join in the construction of common ground in all stages and motivate the interplay of intention and attention in this process, although they may contribute to the construction process in different ways, to different extent, and in different phases of the communicative process.

13.3.2

Dynamism of Common Ground

Common ground is an assumption that we make in the course of actual communication. Both core common ground and emergent common ground are integrated parts of this assumed common ground. Core common ground is a general assumption in two ways. First, although core common ground is relatively static and shared among people, it can change diachronically. During a certain period, say a couple of years, we may safely assume that interlocutors have access to relatively similar common knowledge because components of core common ground won’t change dramatically. However, in the long run it definitely will change; people’s social life, both material and spiritual, will experience some changes over a long period of time, and as a consequence their core common ground will also be changed. For instance: (5) Jill: - I need some money. Jack: - There is an ATM over there.

13.3

Assumed Common Ground

261

It is part of core common ground what “ATM” refers to. However, 30 years ago that conversation would not have made much sense since “ATM” did not exist as a part of core common ground. Second, core common ground may also vary among different groups of individuals within a speech community. Type of shared knowledge may be determined by different factors such as geography, life style, and educational, financial and racial factors. This fact may restrain the accessibility of certain core common ground to particular groups only within that speech community. Emergent common ground is assumptive in that it is contingent on the actual situation, which reflects a synchronic change between common grounds in different situations. However, emergent common ground is not only new shared knowledge created in the course of communication but also the use and modification of shared prior knowledge or experience. There is a dialectical relationship between core common ground and emergent common ground. The core part may affect the formation of the emergent part in that it partly restricts the way the latter occurs. In many cases the emergent part may partly originate in instances of information that are predictable in the core part. On the other hand, the emergent part may contribute to the core part in that the contingent emergent part in a frequent ritual occurrence potentially becomes public disposition that belongs to the core part. In other words, they are different components of assumed common ground, which are interconnected and inseparable. The dialectical relationship between the two sides of common ground (core and emergent) can be illustrated by the following conversation. (6) Jill: - I met someone today. Jane: - Good for you. Jill: - He is a police officer. Jane: - Are you in trouble? Jill: - Oh, no. . .

Jill met someone who was a policeman. Conforming with our society’s collective salience, the concept of ‘policeman’ is identified with some kind of trouble. This knowledge is part of core common ground. However, this understanding of the concept is privatized in Jill’s case and acquires a positive overtone, as the result of her positive (maybe even romantic) encounter with the policeman. Jane did not have this experience, so she processed the word in accordance with core common ground. What the speaker meant differed from what the hearer inferred from the same utterance. Emergent common ground was created as a modification of core common ground as required by the given situation. In brief, both shared sense and current sense can vary from case to case according to the identification of relations or roles of interlocutors, their memory of prior experiences, and their cognitive perception of the actual situational context available to them. In the socio-cognitive view assumed common ground works as a background on which the interplay of intention and attention occurs and communication takes

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place. There are three different ways intention and attention affect the construction of common ground in the process of communication (Kecskes & Zhang, 2009). One is that the interlocutors activate mental representations of shared information that they already have. A second way of constructing common ground is that interlocutors seek information that potentially facilitates communication as mutual knowledge. Before the speaker makes the seeking effort, the piece of information is not salient in the hearer as background underlying the upcoming conversation. The third contribution to common ground is when the speaker brings in her private knowledge and makes it a part of common ground. The speaker has some private information that she knows is non-accessible to the hearer, and she adopts it as common ground in the belief that it facilitates the conversation and that the hearer will accept it willingly. Example # 6 demonstrates this case.

13.4

The Speaker-Assigned Presupposition

In this section we intend to relate presupposition to the understanding of common ground in the socio-cognitive approach. The most commonly accepted view is that presupposition is taken for granted in the sense that its assumed truth is a precondition for felicitous utterance of the sentence and places a kind of constraint on discourse contexts that admit the sentence for interpretation (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginnet, 1990: p. 283). For a sentence to be appropriate in a given context its pragmatic presuppositions should already be part of the conversational background or common ground, though it may also be easy for the hearer to accommodate them. According to the SCA this is a restricted view on common ground that relies mainly on what we called “core common ground” that the interlocutors take for granted in that context either because they are permanently shared beliefs in their community. In the SCA presupposition is always related to the speaker’s and hearer’s state of mind that works with both prior and current experience. Presupposition is a joint business, in which the speaker and the hearer play different roles. An analogy to an oral contract can be made. The first party (the speaker) draws a draft of this contract by uttering a sentence, and once it is agreed on by the second party (the hearer) giving a positive response to it, the contract becomes valid between them. Similarly, presupposing by the speaker is to common ground as what draft is to a contract. The speaker proposes a background of the conversation in his/her presupposition, and this action will receive a response from the hearer, who either agrees with it and a mutual background is formed, or has no idea about it and (or) feels doubt about it, and then the common ground is at stake. This analogy illustrates the dynamic nature of presupposition. Aiming to shape out a systematic vision of dynamic presupposition, Zhang (2009) proposed the definition of speakerassigned presupposition, which can be formalized as follows: The speaker presupposes that p in her/his utterance, iff:

13.4

The Speaker-Assigned Presupposition

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1. s/he proposes that p be common ground; 2. s/he assigns propositional attitudes and communicative interests about p to the proposal; and 3. s/he observes truthfulness principles and intention principles in the proposal. This definition emphasizes the dynamic nature of presupposition, and reveals the effect of attention (substantiated by the speaker’s propositional attitudes) and intention (by form of communicative interests) on the formation of presupposition. The three points of the definition offer us answers to the basic questions concerning the nature of presupposition: what is presupposition, where does it come from, and how is it made. According to the SCA it is not the truth value of the proposition or its common ground status as triggered by linguistic expressions or means that must be satisfied as a precondition for the utterance of the sentence; instead, it is the propositional attitudes and the communicative interests concerned as assigned by the speaker that make the utterance appropriate and comprehensible.

13.4.1

Categorization

The formal analysis of the speaker’s knowledge set (or belief set)1 enables us to investigate specific ways the speaker relies on her propositional attitudes and communicative interests and makes his/her proposal through presupposition. Presupposition can be categorized into three groups according to values of the speaker’s belief set: truthful presuppositions, assumptive presuppositions, and fake presuppositions (see footnote 1). The table below is a summary. As we can see from the Ep value in the table, the speaker commits herself/himself to the truth value of the proposition for the group of truthful presuppositions, suspends it for assumptive ones, and forges a fake value for fake ones. This indicates that the speaker doesn’t necessarily commit himself/herself to the truth value of presupposition. In addition, Cp-1 and Cp-2 indicate that the speaker assumes the truth value of presupposition to be shared knowledge for canonical presupposition, but not for the rest groups or subtypes. That is to say, the speaker doesn’t always hold a common ground belief of presupposition. We have no space here to explain each sub-categories so we will give only one example for each category. The most often addressed case is informative presupposition. It deviates from the speaker’s common ground belief and reveals her communicative interests. Previous

1 According to epistemic logic, we assume that the agent’s knowledge that p is a strong version of her belief that p. As presupposition usually reflects the speaker’s beliefs about p and its common ground status, we use the logic operator K to denote the agent’s strong belief; i.e., if the speaker who utters “John regrets beating his dog” presupposes that p (“John has beaten his dog before”) the way she believes that p is common ground, then the formal analysis of the speaker’s knowledge set about p is: K1p, K1K2p, K1K2K1p, …

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research, however, did not establish a systematic view of it. By defining presupposition as the speaker’s assignment of both propositional attitudes and communicative interests, we are able to examine informative presupposition in a more reliable way. Let us turn to Alice’s case. (7)

(adopted from 3) Bob (who met Alice for the first time): - Are you going to lunch? Alice: - No, I’ve got to pick up my sister. >>p: Alice has a sister.

The presupposition is proposed when Alice is aware of Bob’s ignorance of it, as she intends to speak in an economic way. (8) A daughter to her dad who has no idea about her engagement: - Oh Dad, I forgot to tell you that my fiancé and I are moving to Seattle next week. (Simons, 2004: p. 14) >>p: The speaker is engaged.

In this example the speaker intends to achieve certain rhetoric effects via indirect conveyance of new information that p (see footnote 1). Assumptive presuppositions Subtype: Partial presupposition The speaker does not have common ground beliefs about p; however, s/he believes that p will be common ground if the hearer contributes that p. (9) Mary does not know if Jill is married or not. However, she wants to find it out indirectly. Mary: - Why do you want to take a bus to the meeting? Can’t your husband drive you? Jill: - No, he cannot. He is too busy. >>p: Jill has a husband (Jill is married).

Fake prepositions Deceptive presuppositions: The speaker does not have common ground beliefs about p, the utterance does not have truth-value. Some presupposition acts are designed only to facilitate certain communicative interests and the truth-conditional commitment is falsely made. For example: (10) Washington to the neighbor who has stolen his horse (the fact is that the horse is not blind): Which of the horse’s eyes is blind? >>p: One of the horse’s eyes is blind.

13.4

The Speaker-Assigned Presupposition

265

When interrogating the neighbor who had stolen his horse, Washington deliberately offers a false presupposition, for which he made a false commitment for its truth value so as to mislead the neighbor. In such presuppositions the speaker violates, rather than just exploits the common ground status in order to realize certain communicative effects. In brief, the categorization of speaker-assigned presupposition describes the dynamism of various presuppositional phenomena in an exhaustive and systematic way. Presupposition is a proposal of common ground, and during the process of communication the speaker’s attentional resources and intentional state affect the ways presupposition is proposed and common ground is updated. The mechanism below formalizes the process.

13.4.2

The Mechanism

We propose the following mechanism to regulate the dynamic processing of presupposition by the interlocutors. Figure 13.1 describes that two agents (Agent1 and Agent2), with their cognitive states (consisting of knowledge set K and intention set I), make speech acts (S) and listen to (L) the utterance set (U1 and U2 by two agents) by observing the rules set (R). The presupposition act as component of the speech act may result in the update of the common ground set (C) of the utterance. In this mechanism the presupposed proposition p, which is proposed to be common ground, may be added to the common ground set (C) but not necessarily so (see footnote 1). There are altogether the following components involved in the mechanism: two agents (Agent1 and Agent2), four elements that interact with each other (K, I, U, C), two components of speech act (S, L), and one set that regulates all connections (R). So we get the Cartesian products below: R = {RK, RI, RU, RC} RK: C × U × I = > K RI : C × U × K = > I RU: C × K × I = > U RC : U × K × I = > C

Fig. 13.1 Mechanism for presupposition processing

S1 K1

I1

Agent1

R1

L2 U1

L1

U2

C

Agent2

K2 S2

R2

I2

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These products reveal that each of the four elements (K, I, U, C) are functions of the other three by the relation R. Each time an utterance is made (update of U), all the other three elements (K, I, C) will be updated accordingly. The question is about the nature of the information encoded in the presupposed proposition of U and the way the relation R is specified. Does the proposition refer to/activate/seek prior knowledge and/or information, or does it create new knowledge and/or information that can be considered emergent common ground? As the categorization shows, presupposition may contribute to common ground of the conversation in many different ways, but sometimes it does not contribute to it at all. The mechanism connecting the four elements and regulating the update of common ground information by presupposition is based on truthfulness principles and intention principles formulated by Zhang (2009). By observing the principles or ‘exploiting’ them, the speaker shapes presupposition in different ways, and the update of common ground also varies accordingly.

13.4.3

Dynamism of Presupposition

The dynamic nature of presupposition has been explored in the definition of speakerassigned presupposition and the subsequent categorization and processing mechanism. In the SCA dynamism reveals itself in two dimensions, namely synchronic variation and diachronic change. Synchronic dynamism is reflected by the variety of participants’ common ground belief at the utterance time, whereas diachronic dynamism by the change of such belief during the course of communication. Synchronic dynamism means that the speaker’s common ground beliefs about p and p’s common ground status at the utterance time vary in different types of presuppositions. The speaker’s belief in common ground should be: K1 = fp : K1 p, K1 K2 p, K1 K2 K1 pg As we can see in Table 13.1, the speaker holds different beliefs about p in different types of presuppositions, each related to common ground in different ways. The speaker’s belief about p varies from case to case, and many do not go with the expected common ground status. Informative presupposition, for instance, is a case where the speaker deviates from his/her common ground belief as we illustrated in example (3). Also see the example below: (11) Joe: - Look at that poster. Bill: - Which one? Joe: - The green one about car insurance. Just over there, on the wall. Bill: - Wow, it’s huge! Joe: - Soon I will need to renew my insurance.

13.4

The Speaker-Assigned Presupposition

267

Table 13.1 Categorization of presuppositions (ps)a Group Truthful ps

Subtype Canonical Informative

Ep K1p K1p

Assumptive ps

Partial

~K1p

Temporary Figurative

~K1p K1 Øp K1 Øp

Fake ps

Deceptive

Cp-1 K1K2p K1 ~ K2p; K1^K2p; ~K1? K2p K1K2p!

Cp-2 K1K2K1p K1K+2K1p

K1 ~ K2p K1K2 Øp

K1 ~ K2 ~ K1p; K1K2 ~ K1p K1K2 ~ K1p K1K2K1 Øp

K1 ~ K2p

K1 ~ K2K1 Øp

a The formal system goes in this way: “1” denotes the speaker. “Ep” (“everyone knows that p”) here denotes the status of p in the speaker’s knowledge; “K1p” denotes that the speaker knows that p, “~K1p” the speaker does not know that p (which entails that the speaker believes that ⋄p), and “K1Øp” the speaker knows that p is false. “Cp” (“it is common knowledge among the agents that p”) here denotes the speaker’s belief about status of p in the agent’s knowledge, which consists of two parts (Cp-1 and Cp-2). In Cp-1: “K1K2p” denotes that the speaker believes that the hearer knows that p, “K1 ~ K2p” denotes that the speaker believes that the hearer does not know that p, “K1^K2p” denotes that the speaker believes that the hearer has a false belief about p, “~K1?K2p” denotes that the speaker does not know whether the hearer knows that p, “K1K2p!” denotes that the speaker believes that the hearer knows that p or not p, “K1K2Øp” denotes that the speaker believes that the hearer knows that p is false. In Cp-2: “K1K2K1p” denotes that the speaker believes that the hearer believes that the speaker knows that p, “K1K+2K1p” denotes that the speaker believes that the hearer will believe (upon hearing the utterance) that the speaker knows that p, “K1K2K1Øp” denotes that the speaker believes that the hearer believes that the speaker knows that p is false, and so forth

In this conversation, Joe makes the two presuppositions of insurance in different ways. These are different cases of informative type (see Table 13.1 for formal analysis). Whereas the first one is seeking shared information in that current situation which may add to current sense of emergent common ground, the latter also contributes to current sense, but by way of creating it with the speaker’s individual knowledge. Diachronic dynamism means that p’s common ground status changes at different times of the conversation. After the presupposition is made, it goes through a process in which the participants’ knowledge adapts to each other’s, and p’s common ground status may experience some change. The proposition p that is not common ground at the utterance time may be added to common ground set later. The addition of p to C is a joint effort of the interlocutors. A proposition p that is eligible for common ground should be: C = fp : K1 p, K2 p, K1 K2 p, K2 K1 p, K1 K2 K1 p, K2 K1 K2 p, . . .g In example (11) after the hearer accommodates his knowledge the propositions will then be added to the common ground of the actual conversation. Also see example (12) illustrating a partial presupposition:

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(12) Sally: - Sorry, I must go now. Mary: - So you are going to meet your boy-friend tonight? Sally: - Yes, he will come to pick me up.

In this example interlocutors make joint effort to add partial p to common ground. Sally’s contribution to common ground can be dubbed as compensation. Both accommodation and compensation are instances of dynamic change of common ground belief (and status) of p in an unfolding conversation. The projection problem also can be perceived as disclosure of diachronic dynamism. Let us explain this by the example below. (13) Student: The prime minister of Tahiti is a woman. Teacher: Tahiti’s prime minister is not a woman because there is no prime minister in Tahiti. (see footnote 1) #> > There exists a prime minister of Tahiti.

The speaker’s (teacher) belief is that not p remains unaltered, but the hearer (student) will experience an update of her belief, and this is done diachronically: she may not change her belief that p when hearing the first clause of the utterance but change it soon when hearing the second clause. The utterance can be interpreted in two steps: the first is that the speaker claims that the student’s assertion does not hold, and the second is that she justifies her claim by arguing that the presupposition (precondition) of the false assertion does not hold. It is after the second step is made that the hearer detects the negation of presupposition and updates her knowledge accordingly.

13.5

The Dialectic Relation Between Common Ground and Presupposition

In this section we will analyze the dialectic relations between the two phenomena and argue that they enjoy a cross relation in respect of their content and the particular ways they are formed. Dynamism of common ground in terms of its components (core common ground and emergent common ground) explains why dynamic processes of presupposition formation should occur. As there is no perfect match between the interlocutors’ common ground in a particular situation, for the benefit of smooth communication a variety of methods to build up and develop common ground becomes necessary. Presupposition is to propose common ground based on which the present utterance can be made and comprehended. Different types of presupposition are required by different mental representations of shared knowledge the speaker has obtained, and this variety also enables her/him to aim for particular communicative interests.

13.5

The Dialectic Relation Between Common Ground and Presupposition

269

Presupposition is among the various ways common ground can be formed and updated. Assertion and implicature may also contribute to common ground in different ways. All these sources converge to build up common ground and facilitate smooth communication. In the socio-cognitive approach we proposed it is not the quantity but the quality of common ground that counts. Efficiency of common ground constructions depends on their attention-raising quality that must be adjusted to the actual situational context. Hearers sometimes may ignore common ground that is activated by a presupposition, or they may also miss the information updated by an assertion and so forth. This may occur because of lack of attention, or there exist other cognitive obstacles, such as amnesia or other mental disorders. In such cases more strenuous efforts are called for to achieve common ground for the participants. The following dialogue (see footnote 1) demonstrates this point. (14) Mother: - Josh, your grandma’ called (Assertion 1). Josh (working on the computer): - What?.. Mother: - She is having a birthday party on Sunday (Assertion 2). Josh: - Who is having a party?.. Mother: - You never listen.. Your grandma’ does (Assertion 3).

Josh’s mother made three assertions, among which the first two were not easily received by Josh or added to common ground of the conversation because of attention and quality problems. The core common ground (“grandma’s called’) in Assertion 1 was not activated because Josh did not pay close attention to what was said, and as a remedy it was restated by Assertion 3 in an explicit way. On the other hand, dynamism of presupposition, revealed in its variety of types and change in the communication, affects the dynamic process of common ground construction. As we have explained earlier, different types of presupposition may contribute to common ground in different ways. They enjoy different belief representations at the utterance time and add to common ground after the joint effort of the interlocutors. Not all presuppositions will invariably contribute to common ground successfully. Sometimes they fail. The failure may be caused by undesirable complexity of the interlocutors’ cognitive state. They may have a store of different set of core common ground knowledge because of age as illustrated by (15), or they lack facilities to achieve the core common ground as illustrated by (14) or the same emergent one as in (16). For different components of knowledge or belief about/in a proposition their sharedness varies according to situational factors, such as absentmindedness in (14), cultural gap in (15), and loss of deictic tracking in (16). When these occur, the presupposed part has to be readdressed so that it can be added to common ground. In (14) ‘grandma’s called’ is asserted, in (15) ‘ATM’ is brought under discussion, and in (14 below) no remedy can be made, as ‘blonde hair’ is not longer within sight.

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(15) Jiang: - I need some money. Jack: - There is an ATM over there. Jiang: - I beg your pardon? What is that, uh, ‘ATM’?

(16) Bob: - Look at that girl. Her blonde hair looks so nice. Tom: - Where is she?. Bob: - Oh forget it, she’s gone.

Still there are cases when it is the speaker’s intention not to take presupposed propositions as common ground. S/he ‘exploits’ their common ground status. Temporary presuppositions and fake ones are such cases. These presuppositions are designed for the speaker’s intention to achieve certain communicative interests and as a consequence their truth conditions are rated lower in value. The exploited presuppositions are distinct from common ground, or they are ‘contaminated’ by communicative intentions. They don’t contribute to common ground in a traditional way, but enjoy some similar temperaments of implicature with intentions joined in (see footnote 1). Some of them may be added to common ground later after the truth values are mutually recognized, as (12) illustrates, and others may not, as (17) goes (see also 10). (17) Washington to the neighbor who has stolen his horse (the fact is that the horse is not blind): Which of the horse’s eyes is blind? >>p: One of the horse’s eyes is blind.

From the above analysis, we can see that there is a vibrant interaction between presupposition and common ground. Their dynamism is inherently related and explanatory to each other. Both of them can be explained within the confines of the socio-cognitive approach that we have proposed. The individual factors of attention and societal factors of intention affect the dynamic processes in which presupposition is proposed and common ground is formed. As a result, they enjoy a cross relation in terms of content and manners in which they are formed. In terms of content, presupposition partly contributes to the formation of common ground, as it is just one source of common ground. It is added to common ground selectively, and there are cases when it fails. Presupposition and common ground also overlap in terms of manners they are formed. Different types of presupposition serve to activate, seek shared knowledge present as memory in both/all interlocutors, and create new knowledge to enrich their common ground. While canonical presupposition is a process in which old information is activated, informative one is a typical example when common ground is actually created on the spot. Common ground can be sought, and created by other

13.6

The Accommodation Problem Revisited

271

forms, such as Assertion 3 in (14). The ways through which common ground can derive from assertion and implicature are still generally ignored.

13.6

The Accommodation Problem Revisited

As said above the accommodation problem has brought great challenge to the common ground theory of presupposition. Not only supporters of this theory vary in their arguments, but its opponents hold different views as well. Zhang (2009) pointed out that the attempts to justify accommodation did not clarify properly why the speaker presupposes as such when s/he is fully aware of the presupposed not being part of common ground knowledge, and how accommodation is achieved in the time gap after the utterance event has taken place, and before it has been accepted or rejected. The main problem with those attempts is that they take into account only the collective core part of common ground that is encoded in the utterance, and means relatively the same for all speakers of that language community. In other words, a relatively static view of presupposition and common ground and their relations has hampered the development of a proper theory. Accommodation is an inherent problem for the common ground theory which might not be solved properly within its confines. SCA offers an alternative approach to this problem. We argue that accommodation is normal occurrence, not a problem or exception to presupposition theory. The case of informative presupposition is one form of speaker-assigned presuppositions, and its accommodation process can be well explained by the dynamism in two dimensions (synchronic and diachronic). As shown in the categorization (4.1), informative presupposition is one type of truthful presuppositions to which the speaker assigns a truth value commitment, but differs from canonical one in that its common-groundness is an outcome of co-constructing by both/all participants. The speaker creates new information to become part of common ground, and only after the hearer accommodates her belief to it can this common ground be achieved. The two unsolved issues concerning accommodation can be explained through the analysis of the dynamic and dialectical relationship between presupposition and common ground. Why should (or can) the speaker presuppose as such when s/he lacks common ground belief? This is answered by the synchronic dynamism. As the speaker holds different propositional attitudes and targets for different communicative interests, presuppositions she makes are also of different types. Informative presupposition is proposed for economic effect, saving energy by packing new information in the form of presupposition and making space for more new information coming up in the form of assertion. This may also achieve an effect of coherence, as the information most closely related to communicative intentions is asserted and made focus of the participants’ attention. Then the second issue is: how is accommodation achieved? Accommodation is the process through which presupposition gets added to common ground; the participants’ common ground beliefs for

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the proposition are co-constructed. There is a problem, however, about how accommodation is fulfilled. From the formal analysis below, it is unknown why the speaker should assume that the hearer will accommodate (K1K+2p?), and why the hearer should accommodate as expected by the speaker (K+2p?) and even believe that the latter should believe so (K2K1K+2p?). (18) a. at t (utterance time): K1p, ~K2p, K1 ~ K2p, K1K+2p; b. at t + 1 (after t): K+2p, K2K1K+2p; c. at t + 2 (after added to CG): K1p, K2p, K1K2p, K2K1p, K1K2K1p, K2K1K2p, . . .

According to diachronic dynamism of speaker-assigned presupposition, accommodation is one of the dynamic processes through which presupposition gets added to common ground. The addition of p to common ground is a joint effort of the interlocutors, and in this joint effort of accommodation, they abide by related truthfulness principles (see footnote 1). The formal analysis below describes the process. (19) a. at t0 (before t): K1p, ~K2p, K1 ~ K2p; b. at t: ~K2K1p, K1K+2K1p, K1K+2p; c. at t + 1 (after t): K+2k1p, K+2p, K2K1K+2p; d. at t + 2 (after added to common ground): K1p, K2p, K1K2p, K2K1p, K1K2K1p, K2K1K2p, . . .

At time t, the speaker infers according to truthfulness principles that the hearer will infer her truth value commitment (K1K+2K1p) and therefore assumes that the latter will accommodate (K1K+2p). At time t + 1, the hearer, also based on truthfulness principles, infers that the speaker knows p (K+2k1p), accommodates her belief (K+2p), and also infer that the speaker believes so (K2K1K+2p?). In this process the interlocutors ‘take for granted’ that each part should abide by the truthfulness principles and therefore truth values are derived. In addition, informative presupposition and its accommodation are indispensable processes for the formation of common ground. SCA distinguishes core common ground from emergent common ground. In the course of communication there is always a chance (or necessity) to bring in some new information as emergent common ground, as the current situation adapts to changes of various elements and the same with the interlocutors’ perceptions of them. Informative presupposition plays an important role in creating emergent common ground. It is a reliable source for common ground, as the speaker assigns a true proposition to it and the hearer will safely adopt it and update their common ground information. The exception, which is rare, is that the speaker’s knowledge turns out to be false.

References

13.7

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Conclusion

In this paper we examined the dynamism of presupposition-common ground relation within the confines of SCA and redefined deictic relations between them. The SCA emphasizes the dynamics of common ground creation and updating in the actual process of interaction, in which interlocutors are considered as “complete” individuals with different possible cognitive status, being less or more cooperative at different stages of the communicative process. Presupposition is a proposal of common ground, and there is a vibrant interaction between the two. They enjoy a cross relation in terms of content and manners in which they are formed, and their dynamism is inherently related and explanatory to each other. Presupposition and common ground share similarities and differ from each other. When we agree on their close correlations, we should also pay respect for their separateness. While presupposition is an important subject of linguistic pragmatics which relies on formal analysis, common ground embraces a broader area with rich resources of information that do not always derive from verbal cues. Presupposition is significant in its linguistic neatness (see footnote 1), truth-conditional concern and recent conversational incorporation. In contrast, common ground outstands for its psychological, philosophical reflection and recent experimental observation. SCA offers an alternative to explain their complex relationship.

References Abbott, B. (2000). Presuppositions as nonassertions. Journal of Pragmatics, 32, 1419–1437. Abbott, B. (2006). Unaccommodating presuppositions: A NeoGricean view. http://www. pragmatics.osu.edu/links/events/BarbaraAbbott_Unaccompresupps.pdf (31 August 2008). Draft paper for Workshop on Presupposition Accommodation at The Ohio State University. Abbott, B. (2008). Presupposition and common ground. Linguistics and Philosophy, 21, 523–538. Beaver, D. I. (1997). Presupposition. In J. van Benthem & A. ter Meulen (Eds.), Handbook of logic and language (pp. 939–1008). Elsevier. Beaver, D., & Zeevat, H. (2007). Accommodation. In G. Ramchand & C. Reiss (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of linguistic interfaces (2007) (Online ed.). OUP. Burton-Roberts, N. (1989). The limits to debate: A revised theory of semantic presupposition. Cambridge University Press. Chierchia, G., & McConnell-Ginnet, S. (1990). Meaning and grammar. The MIT Press. Heim, I. (1983). On the projection problem for presuppositions. West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics: 114–125. Republished in 1991 Davis, S (ed). Pragmatics: A Reader. New York: Oxford University Press. 397–405. Heim, I. (1990). E-type pronouns and donkey anaphora. Linguistics and Philosophy, 13(2), 137–177. Karttunen, L. (1974). Presupposition and linguistic context. Theoretical Linguistics, 1, 181–193. Kecskes, I. (2008). Dueling contexts: A dynamic model of meaning. Journal of Pragmatics, 40, 385–406. Kecskes, I. (2010). The paradox of communication: A socio-cognitive approach. Pragmatics & Society, 1(1), 50–73.

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Kecskes, I. (2012). Is there anyone out there who really is interested in the speaker? Language and Dialogue, 2(2), 285–299. Kecskes, I., & Zhang, F. (2009). Activating, seeking and creating common ground: A sociocognitive approach. Pragmatics and Cognition, 17(2), 331–355. Lewis, D. (1979). Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8, 339–359. Republished in 1991 Davis, S (ed). Pragmatics: A Reader. New York: Oxford University Press. 416 – 427. Simons, M. (2001). On the conversational basis of some presuppositions. Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory 11. Simons, M. (2003). Presupposition and accommodation: Understanding the Stalnakerian picture. Philosophical Studies, 112, 251–278. Simons, M. (2004). Presupposition and relevance. In Z. G. Szabo (Ed.), Semantics vs. pragmatics. Oxford University Press. Soames, S. (1982). How presuppositions are inherited: A solution to the projection problem. Linguistic Inquiry, 13, 483–545. Stalnaker, R. C. (1974). Pragmatic presuppositions. In M. K. Munitz & P. K. Unger (Eds.), Semantics and philosophy (pp. 197–214). New York University Press. Stalnaker, R. C. (1978). Assertion. Syntax and Semantics, 9, 315–332. Stalnaker, R. C. (2002). Common ground. Linguistics and Philosophy, 25(5–6), 701–721. Stalnaker, R. C. (2008). A response to Abbott on presupposition and common ground. Linguistics and Philosophy, 31, 539–544. Von Fintel, K. (2000). What is presupposition accommodation? http://web.mit.edu/fintel/www/ accomm.pdf. Ms., MIT. Von Fintel, K. (2001). Counterfactuals in a dynamic context. In M. Kenstowicz (Ed.), Ken Hale: A life in language. MIT Press. Von Fintel, K. (2006). What is presupposition accommodation, again? Draft paper for Workshop on Presupposition Accommodation at The Ohio State University. Yule, G. (1996). Pragmatics. Oxford University Press. Zhang, F. 2009. Speaker-assigned presupposition: A cognitive-pragmatic approach. Proceedings for The 2nd International Conference on English, Discourse and Intercultural Communication. Macao: University of Macao.

Chapter 14

The Interplay of Linguistic, Conceptual and Encyclopedic Knowledge in Meaning Production and Comprehension

Abstract One of the most complicated issues of present-day linguistics is the relationship of three types of knowledge: linguistic knowledge, conceptual knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge. After discussing the complexity of their interplay from different perspectives the chapter presents a model to explain their relationship. The model has linguistic knowledge on one side, and the socio-cultural background knowledge (world knowledge) on the other side. There is constant interaction between the two sides in language use. For analytic reasons, within the sociocultural background knowledge there a distinction is made between conceptual knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge. According to this model, meaning is constructed in the dynamic interplay of actual situational context and lexical items, with the context representing the actual, present, situational, ever-changing side of socio-cultural background and the lexical item(s) embodying previous experiences and relations in the socio-cultural background. The lexical items with their semantic properties (linguistic knowledge) represent prior reoccurring experience (conceptual knowledge), and the actual situational context triggers the other part of world knowledge that we previously called encyclopedic knowledge. The difference between the two types of socio-cultural background knowledge is that the conceptual knowledge part is immediately tied to linguistic knowledge while the other type of socio-cultural background knowledge (encyclopedic knowledge) is called upon as needed in language use. Keywords Linguistic knowledge · Conceptual knowledge · Encyclopedic knowledge · Socio-cultural background · Context

14.1

Introduction

Linguistics research has always been characterized by separatist and synergistic endeavors. The debate is about the basic question of whether language is a relatively independent cognitive faculty or an essential part of overall cognitive development. Recent events point to the fact that synergetic endeavors are receiving more attention than ever before. Current debate has been not about the legitimacy of meaning and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_14

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Fig. 14.1 Recent linguistic theory of language

performance research (usage), but about the extent to which grammar-research and usage-research can be combined, and what role communication plays in shaping grammar. In other words, whether one can and/or needs to support the other, or they should not interact at all. Linguists have never denied that there is a link between structure and usage. Chomsky (1975: p. 56) wrote that “surely there are significant connections between structure and function”: so this has never been in doubt. Searle (1979) argued that “it is reasonable to suppose the needs of communication influenced [language] structure”. “I agree” said Chomsky (1975: pp. 56–58). Newmeyer (2003) claimed that mental grammar contributes to language use, but usage is not represented in the grammar itself. Knowledge of grammatical structure is only one of many systems that underlie usage. Recent linguistic research (e.g. Hauser et al., 2002; Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005) differentiates between aspects of language that are special to language code (‘Narrow Language Faculty’, NLF hereafter) and the faculty of language in its entirety, including parts that are shared with other psychological abilities found elsewhere in cognition (‘Broad Language Faculty’, BLF hereafter). The lexicon can be considered as an interface that ties NLF to the other elements of the BLF. Please look at Fig. 14.1. below. Kecskes’ definition (2013) of language attempts to pull the two sides together as follows: “Language is a system of signs operated by a conceptual base that is the reflection of the socio-cultural background in which the system of signs is put to use.” This definition emphasizes the unique relationship of the socio-cultural background (BLF) with the system of signs (NLF) through the conceptual base (See Fig. 14.2). So, the question is how these three factors: system of sign, socio-cultural background and conceptual base interact with one another.

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Socio-Cultural Background Knowledge

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Fig. 14.2 Kecskes’ definition of language

14.2

Socio-Cultural Background Knowledge

Language can never be all-inclusive to convey every aspect of meaning. Gumperz argued that as a consequence some combination of ‘practical reasoning’ and ‘unstated, taken-for-granted background knowledge’ is needed to fill in what is left unsaid (Gumperz, 2001: p. 216). So, but what is this ‘unstated, taken-for-granted background knowledge’? It is socio-cultural background knowledge that comprises socio-cultural practices and experiences that a member of a speech community (temporary or relatively stable) is and has been exposed to and uses to make sense of the world around him/her. All this is reflected in core common ground, collective salience and beliefs for individuals in a given speech community, which has a profound effect on language behavior of speech community members. The more homogeneous and stable (relatively) a speech community is, the more significant the effect of the core common ground and collective salience is. Conversely, the more diverse a speech community is, the more limited the reliance on core common ground and collective salience is, the more is there a need for co-construction of common ground. In other words, smooth communication is hardly possible without some, at least, minimal common ground. Speech community members gain socio-cultural knowledge from having been and being acculturated in their speech community. This is the basis for core common ground and collective salience that help speech community members to behave as an insider in the community. If this is lacking, or limited, interlocutors may feel like outsiders as is in the case of intercultural communication where interlocutors do not feel and, most of the time, do not want to feel as insiders of an English L1 speaking community. The following conversation between a Korean student and a Chinese student demonstrates this very clearly. (1) K: - And then language problem. Sometimes I obviously look like a foleign .. foreign person . . . foreigner here. . . so they assume I don’t speak English so they sometimes . . . I don’t know . . . they sometimes don’t understand what I’m saying . . . even though I’m speaking English. It hurts me a lot . . . I don’t know. CH: - Could you follow them?

(continued)

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K: - Of course. CH: - But they find it hard to follow you? K: - Mhmm I don’t know why. I think it’s because of my . . . how I look like you know. I don’t know it hurts me a lot. CH: - I don’t think it matters very much because just for your physical appearance. Did you try slowing down your space? K: - Yes eventually they understand I can speak English but still in their mind they have strong strategy . . . I mean . . . I’m sorry . . . stereotypes prejudice like . . . you look foreign. CH: - Foreigner. K: - And you probably don’t speak English so they don’t even bother themselves to speak to me.

Both the Korean student and Chinese student express their frustration about not feeling as members of the Albany speech community in which they have been living. They talk about their physical appearance, their language use and prejudice of some members of the speech community. What frustrates them most is what the Korean student says as: “they sometimes don’t understand what I’m saying . . . even though I’m speaking English.” Although he uses the same code system as native speakers do, something is still missing. This “something” is the other side of the language use: the socio-cultural background knowledge that would help him use the right intonation, select the preferred words in a given context, use the appropriate situationbound utterances and understand implications and contextualization cues, including both verbal and non-verbal and the like. Broadly speaking, everything that goes with a language minus the code system can be considered socio-cultural background knowledge. Nevertheless, the nature and functioning of this knowledge—what exactly it includes and how people access and activate the appropriate knowledge— in a given conversational moment is still not clear and is under investigation.

14.3

14.3.1

The Relationship of Socio-Cultural Background Knowledge to Linguistic Knowledge and Conceptual Knowledge Understanding the Three Knowledges

One of the most complicated issues of present-day linguistics is the relationship of three knowledges: linguistic knowledge, conceptual knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge. Language philosophy, theoretical linguistics, cognitive linguistics, computational linguistics and pragmatics have been addressing this issue from different perspectives. Kecskes’ definition of language (see above) is based on the relationship of these three knowledges. There are three important factors in that definition: system of signs, conceptual base and socio-cultural background. It would be logical to assign linguistic knowledge to the system of signs, conceptual knowledge to the conceptual base and encyclopedic knowledge to the socio-cultural background. This, however,

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is not that simple. Goddard is probably right when he said: “.....knowledge of all kinds is integrated in the mind to such an extent that it does not make any sense to partition it into two distinct realms” (Goddard, 1998: p. 15). But we still need to partition knowledge if we want to understand how language works. Also, this may help us understand better what happens in intercultural interactions when not all these knowledges are equally available. Some works in theoretical linguistics (e.g. Bierwisch & Schreuder, 1992; Gruber, 1985; Kiefer, 1990) talked about the need to distinguish between three types of knowledge: linguistic knowledge, which, roughly speaking, concerns the core meaning (mostly literal meaning) of lexical items, conceptual knowledge, which has to do with the possible modifications, conceptualizations of the core meaning in various actual situational contexts, and encyclopedic knowledge, which comprises the rest, i.e. world knowledge that is associated with a word, but which is not immediately relevant to linguistic structure. Take for instance, the lexical item ‘plate’ that has its core meaning something like ‘a flat dish’. The fact that this lexical item can be used also as a non-physical entity as in the sentences: “I have too much on my plate” or “dinner is twenty dollars a plate” belongs to our conceptual knowledge. Actually, conceptual knowledge comprises the different possible senses of the lexical item. Everything beyond that, like the knowledge that plate is used to eat food from, that it is usually made of porcelain, metal or some artificial material, and it is usually oval or round belong to our encyclopedic knowledge. Another example can be the verb ‘shoot’. Its core meaning is ‘kill or wound (a person or animal) with a bullet or arrow’. Our conceptual knowledge comprises different other possible senses of the label ‘shoot’ such as ‘to shoot questions at someone’, or fling (The volcano shot lava into the air) or to direct suddenly or swiftly as in ‘He shot a smile at his girlfriend’. At the same time, there are some things that we know about ‘shoot’ which, however, do not play any role (at least most of the time) in its semantic interpretation. Beyond what was said above, we know that we need an instrument or tool to execute the action ‘shoot’ like a weapon or a volcano or metaphorically a laugh. We also know that ‘shoot’ presupposes a swift and rapid move. This approach to three different knowledges makes sense, but how does this relate to what we call ‘socio-cultural background knowledge’? Can socio-cultural background knowledge be equated with encyclopedic knowledge as is usually done in some of the existing literature (e.g. Croft & Cruse, 2004; Evans, 2006; Fillmore, 1982)? One can argue that socio-cultural background knowledge comprises everything we know about the world. So, should we distinguish conceptual knowledge from encyclopedic knowledge, or we should handle them as one entity? The answer to this question is not straightforward, but we can look at intercultural rather than L1 communication for an answer. We know that linguistic knowledge is relatively easy to define: that is coded, and (relatively) standardized. Languages do not differ that much with respect to core meanings of lexical items denoting basic objects and actions in the world, but they may exhibit essential differences as to conceptual knowledge and, to some extent, encyclopedic knowledge. What the core meaning of the verb ‘cut’ denotes ‘make an opening, incision, or wound in something with a sharp-edged tool or object’ exists in many languages. However, the various

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conceptualizations of that action are at odds in different languages. Take for instance, ‘cut to the chase’ which indeed is a very American way to mean ‘make your point’. Likewise, there is no English translation for Hungarian ‘megvágtam egy kis pénzzel’, which means ‘I squeezed some money out of him’ in which the literal equivalent of cut (vág) is used.

14.3.2

Approaches to Separating Linguistic Knowledge from Conceptual Knowledge

Linguistic theories (e.g., generative linguistics and lexical semantics) usually focus on and discuss linguistic knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge. Linguistic knowledge (dictionary knowledge) is supposed to cover the idiosyncrasies of particular words, whereas encyclopedic knowledge covers everything regarding the underlying concepts. In cognitive linguistics, however, semantic representations which constitute the semantic pole of a linguistic sign are equated with “conventionalized conceptualizations” (Langacker, 1988: p. 94). This view integrates encyclopedic knowledge into the lexicon. So, there is no separate linguistic knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge. In cognitive linguistics, meaning emerging from language use is a function of the activation of conceptual knowledge structures as guided by context. Consequently, there is no principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics (e.g. Fauconnier, 1997; Evans, 2006; Paolucci, 2021). Thus, language is seen as a repository of world knowledge and a structured collection of meaningful categories which help us deal with new experiences and store information about old ones (Geeraerts, 1997). It can be deduced that our linguistic knowledge is rooted in our experience with the world; this is what language in use expresses. So, if language is a system for categorization of the world, one can argue that there does not seem to be any need to postulate a systemic and structural level of meaning that differs from the level where world knowledge is associated with linguistic forms. However, each language categorizes the same world out there differently (see Van Olmen & Tantucci, 2022). Americans make money, Hungarians search for money (“pénzt keres”), and Russians work for money (зарабатывать). What is more, Slobin (1997) argued that language is a transmitter of real-world experiences, and that these experiences are filtered through language into verbalized events. If that were not the case, second language speakers/learners would not face the constant problem of linguistic and conceptual differences in Chinese English, Bulgarian English, Indian English, German English, etc. The differences between languages are most significant at the conceptual level. There is no one-to-one relationship between a word and a concept in languages, and especially not across languages. This is where the different world views of different speech communities are conventionalized and developed into a relatively standardized code system (cf. He, 2021: Hopkinson, 2021). That is the main reason why intercultural communicators consider linguistic knowledge as relatively similar in each variety of

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English, no matter what their L1 is. This is why they treat the code system as their core common ground. In a way everybody who speaks English uses the same code system. For instance English L2 users all know at a particular level of proficiency the semantics of the word ‘patronize’— to act as a patron of; support—such as in the sentence ‘they patronized the local stores’. However, what not all L2 speakers may know is the conceptual load that is attached to this word depending on its direct object. If the direct object is inanimate—take for instance the sentence above—there is no problem: the meaning is neutral or positive. But if the direct object is animate the meaning becomes negative. It refers to a condescending treatment, some kind of superiority like in the following encounter: (2) Kelly: - I am sure you did your best. The accident was not your fault. Bill: - Please do not patronize me. I will take the responsibility. Bill does not like Kelly’s patronizing tone. He is fully aware that he was wrong and is ready to take the responsibility.

In most cases, linguistic knowledge in English is available for the L2 speakers (depending on their proficiency) while conceptual knowledge may or may not be accessible. This is where the major difference lies between L1 use and L2 use. While speakers in L1 seek and establish common ground on the conceptual level, L2 speakers usually do that on the linguistic level. The separation of linguistic knowledge and conceptual knowledge is quite clear in L2 (e.g. Kecskes, 2003; Baker, 2015). Of course, this does not mean that common ground cannot be established at the conceptual level in L2 communication. In fact, what happens is that the more time a temporary speech community spends together the more common ground is created at the conceptual level, just like in L1. Cognitive linguists have attempted to keep linguistic knowledge separate from conceptual knowledge. Bierwisch (1981) argued that there is a clear distinction between a word’s purely linguistic meaning and the interpretation that a word may have relative to conceptual knowledge (cf. Bierwisch, 1981; Bierwisch & Schreuder, 1992; Taylor, 2000). This two-level model distinguishes between a linguisticsemantic level of meaning and an essentially non-linguistic, conceptual level of interpretation. Encyclopedic knowledge is provided only in the act of interpreting the word in its context, while the word meaning itself is underdetermined with respect to its possible interpretations in different kinds of context. This position seriously constrains polysemy in the mental lexicon and relegates it to the conceptual level. So, words have a number of meanings because of their various possible conceptual interpretations. It could be argued that the goal of dictionary knowledge (linguistic knowledge) is only to collect all possible interpretations under a unitary semantic entry. This corroborates with what Taylor pointed out as “on the two-level model, interpretation of an expression emerges through the interaction of the unitary semantic representation with conceptual information, relative to a context (Taylor, 2000: p. 130).” Consequently, the dictionary knowledge (linguistic knowledge)— encyclopedic knowledge controversy opposes two extreme conceptions of word

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definitions. According to the dictionary approach, a word is described in terms of linguistic elements only, without recourse to world knowledge, whereas an encyclopedic definition includes “an indication of the different species or different stages of the object or process denoted by the word, the main types of behavior of this object or process,.....” (Mel'cuk & Zholkovsky, 1984: p. 88). Let me highlight that the debate on the separation of the conceptual and linguisticlexical level does not necessarily go on between generativists and cognitivists, although it concerns the basic difference between the two perspectives. Rather, it involves linguists from both sides. For instance, Bierwisch is a generativist, and Wierzbicka is a cognitivist, still they are on the same side although their reasons are unalike. Also, several researchers, who are considered as cognitive linguists, argued for keeping lexical semantics separate from conceptual semantics. Take for instance Haiman who claimed that while theoretically untenable, the distinction between dictionaries and encyclopedias has “the happy property of working very well in practice (Haiman, 1980: p. 355)”. Similarly, Gibbs (1996) claimed that cognitive linguists would not argue against the idea that there is a mental lexicon that might be independently accessed during sentence processing. In his view, part of the confusion about the role of cognitive structure in language use and processing results from the failure to distinguish between different levels at which cognition and language interact. Moreover, Wierzbicka (1996) strongly believes that word meaning can and has to be defined at the linguistic (lexical) level. She argued that the acquisition of another language demonstrates very well how important lexical semantics is. She said that “for anyone seriously trying to learn another language and understand another culture, the proposition that words cannot be defined can hardly be anything but bad news (Wierzbicka, 1996: p. 256). Also, she said that the “belief that a dictionary definition represents nothing other than a selection from a (real or imaginary) encyclopedic entry, with the choice being determined by practical considerations and having no theoretical justification, leads to stagnation in lexical semantics (Wierzbicka, 1996: p. 336).” Wierzbicka clearly makes the distinction between linguistic knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge for she thinks that linguistic knowledge is essentially shared between all speakers of a particular language, while encyclopedic (real-world) knowledge is not. She pointed out that there is linguistic evidence that the human mind itself draws a distinction between a mental dictionary and a mental encyclopedia (Wierzbicka, 1996: p. 344). On that account, the nature of available linguistic evidence is summarized by Taylor (2000: p. 16) who argued that acquisition is not a process of building up a concept from its constituent parts, but it consists in the gradual elaboration of a knowledge network. Another important observation comes from Harnad (1990) who said that “once one has the grounded set of elementary symbols provided by a taxonomy of names (and the iconic and categorical representations that give content to the names and allow them to pick out the objects they identify), the rest of the symbol strings of a natural language can be generated by symbol composition alone, and they will all inherit the intrinsic grounding of the elementary set (Harnad, 1990: pp. 343–344).” This implies that higher order symbols can be interpreted without direct acquaintance with reality. We should not think, however, that these higher order symbols are not grounded in

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experience at all. They, together with their underlying symbolic representations, are derived from the sensory representations and thus indirectly grounded in experience. Actually, the real issue here is not whether the content of lexical units is grounded in experience or not, because in most cases they are grounded in experience either directly or indirectly. What is important for us is that linguistic symbols can entirely be cut off from their original source and live the life of their own, which is independent from the conceptual system to a particular extent and from a particular perspective. Just think about this issue from a second language perspective. L2 users have access to the symbols (words) in English but they have limited direct experience with the target language reality in which those symbols are grounded for the native speakers. Consequently, ELF speakers may have linguistic knowledge but lack or have access to limited conceptual knowledge. Based on the instances of mono- and multilingual development, it would be far-reaching to claim that linguistic units (words) reflect specific, autonomous linguistic knowledge that is separate from various types of conceptual knowledge. However, it might very well be that some linguistic knowledge that is attached to the word form is partly autonomous from the rest of our conceptual system (see Gibbs, 1996; Kecskes, 2003: Kecskes, 2019b, 2021). We can take the expression ‘chicken out’ as an example. The basic meaning of the expression can be defined as ‘to decide not to do something because you are too frightened’. No actual situational context can cancel the negative conceptual load attached to the word “chicken out”. Take for instance, the utterance ‘in the last minute Sally chickened out of the race.’ No contextual support is needed for the expression to call upon the negative conceptual load. Consequently, we can say that the conceptual load is already tied to the semantics of the lexical unit. In other words, the conceptual load becomes its word-specific semantic property. In that regards, Croft and Wood argued that “it is not the case that any time we think we must conceptualize our experience the way that our language requires us to. But it is the case that any time we express our thoughts in language, we must conceptualize our experience in the way that our language requires us to. Cognition may be linguistically neutral, but language is not semantically neutral (Croft & Wood, 2000: p. 55)”. Slobin (1991) also made a similar point when he described “thinking for speaking” as the appropriate domain for the influence of language on thought. The issue here is not necessarily whether language influences thought or not, but to what extent. The world is always given to us under some construal for our purposes. Thus, the remaining question is: how much of this construal is provided by the language we speak?

14.3.3

The Multilingual Perspective

To answer this question, we must go back to Wierzbicka’s thought which reflects a second language perspective. She argued that basically the process of second language learning is the proof that the proposition that words cannot be defined is wrong. She rejects the belief that a dictionary definition represents nothing other than

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a selection from a (real or imaginary) encyclopedic entry, with the choice being determined by practical considerations and having no theoretical justification. Wierzbicka makes the distinction between linguistic knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge because she is convinced that linguistic knowledge is essentially shared between all speakers of a particular language, while encyclopedic (real-world) knowledge is not. So far, she is right, but she does not clarify the nature of what she calls “encyclopedic knowledge” because she equates it with what I have called socio-cultural background knowledge. So, the problem is not solved yet. But we are on the right track because we are using a multilingual view, the perspective of L2 or Lx speakers. When bringing a multilingual view into the debate we should say that the relationship between the three knowledge types is way more complex than just a simple trichotomy. The main problem is that world knowledge is available for human beings in two ways: (1) A part of world knowledge is encapsulated in the lexical items that we use in a language. That is why cognitive linguists argue that it does not make sense to separate linguistic knowledge from encyclopedic knowledge. In a way they are right because when we use a word that triggers both what they call linguistic knowledge (grammatical information about the word, its relations to other words, synonymy-antonym, etc.) and encyclopedic knowledge that comprises what Mel'cuk and Zholkovsky (1984) called an indication of the different species or different stages of the object or process denoted by the word, the main types of behavior of this object or process. This kind of encyclopedic knowledge sounds like something encoded in the word which we called ‘conceptual knowledge’. But, then, where is the other part of world knowledge that is not encoded in the lexical items? (2) It looks like that ‘second’ type of world knowledge is not directly connected with our language system, rather, it comprises behavior practices, models and social frames that are called upon when we use a language. We will take a closer look at these two sides of socio-cultural background knowledge which are conceptual knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge in the following section.

14.4 14.4.1

A Possible Model of Knowledge Distribution The Relationship of Three Knowledges in the Model

I propose a model in which we have the linguistic knowledge on one side, and the socio-cultural background knowledge (world knowledge) on the other side. There is constant interaction between the two sides in any language use. For analytic reasons, within the socio-cultural background knowledge we should distinguish between conceptual knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge. Linguistic knowledge Socio-cultural background knowledge Conceptual knowledge ---- encyclopedic knowledge

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According to this model, meaning is constructed in the dynamic interplay of actual situational context and lexical items, with the context representing the actual, present, situational, ever-changing side of socio-cultural background and the lexical item(s) embodying previous experiences and relations in the socio-cultural background (see Kecskes, 2003, 2013). This is how the three knowledges are intertwined and function together. The lexical items with their semantic properties (linguistic knowledge) represent prior reoccurring experience (conceptual knowledge), and the actual situational context triggers the other part of world knowledge that we previously called encyclopedic knowledge. The difference between the two types of socio-cultural background knowledge is that the conceptual knowledge part is immediately tied to linguistic knowledge while the other type of socio-cultural background knowledge (encyclopedic knowledge) is called upon as needed in the actual language use. L2 users have the least problem with linguistic knowledge that is mainly reflected in their language proficiency. Linguistic knowledge is learnable both systematically (schools, institutions) or asystematically (natural environment). It represents core knowledge that L2 interlocutors share and rely on, no matter which variety of English (Chinese, German, French, Russian, etc.) they speak. This linguistic core knowledge gives some core common ground for the interlocutors to rely on. However, conceptual knowledge is different. The problem is that conceptual knowledge that is tied to the semantics of a lexical item is quite conservative and occasionally seems to be old-fashioned or obsolete because it may be rooted in the past experience of the given speech community (cf. Kecskes, 2019a; Werkmann Horvat et al., 2021). Language only partly reflects the actual social world around us because of this delay in conceptual coding. It will take a while for some neologisms such as ‘sharrow’ (road marking), ‘procott’ (intentionally buy things) or ‘placemaking’ to be fully part of common conceptual knowledge. Words with their semantics are needed not only to symbolize concepts but also to stabilize them, keep them tidy and make them definable. This, however, can only be done if a word or formula has some elements in its meaning that are relatively constant, i.e., part of the language system and not totally dependent on actual use and context. So I need to quote Leibniz’s argument: “Si nihil per se concipitur, nihil omnino concipietur”, that is ‘if nothing can be understood by itself nothing at all can ever be understood (Leibniz 1903: 430).” Human communication would hardly be possible if words did not have any relatively permanent elements in their meaning and meaning formation would only be the matter of online, in-process production. If, however, these relatively constant elements of meaning really exist, it becomes questionable (at least to some extent) what cognitive linguists claim that word meanings may not apply at all without the supporting cognitive structures and mechanisms.

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14.4.2

The Interplay of Linguistic, Conceptual and Encyclopedic Knowledge. . .

Words and Concepts (the Interplay of Linguistic Knowledge and Conceptual Knowledge)

The central element of lexical pragmatics is the way we understand the relationship of word and concept, i.e. linguistic knowledge and conceptual knowledge. This issue needs a deeper analysis because this is where languages differ from each other and it is the key to understanding difficulties in L2 and Lx use. The conceptual system and linguistic system are related through the interdependence of concepts and words. Most of the controversy centers around the question of how concepts and words are related to one another. A natural language possesses an inventory of lexical forms, and these are mapped onto the concept network (Cruse, 1992: 290). The question is: how does this mapping take place? It is true that concepts are represented by words, but this representation is rather contradictory. The contradiction is caused by two facts. First, there is no oneto-one relationship between the concept and the word: the overall concept usually extends beyond the sections labeled with a word. Second, the semantic domain of a word also contains specific properties which are not present in the concept. As a result, sometimes there are several different lexical routes to one and the same concept. While discussing the relationship between concept and word, a distinction need to be made between two approaches. Kurt Baldinger described this distinction in the following way: “Semasiology [...] considers the isolated word and the way its meanings are manifested, while onomasiology looks at the designations of a particular concept, that is, at a multiplicity of expressions which form a whole (Baldinger, 1980: p. 278).” The semasiological perspective focuses on the word and explores how concepts (conceptual meanings) are associated with that word. So, semasiology targets polysemy and the multiple applicability of a lexical item. In contrast, the onomasiological approach takes the concept as its starting-point and investigates what words can express a particular concept. The subject of onomasiology is synonymy, name-giving, and the selection of an expression from among a number of possible alternatives (cf. Geeraerts, 1997). It is clear from this distinction that semasiology refers to processes of meaning while onomasiology involves naming. As a result of the thought-word interaction in language production, thought usually undergoes several changes as it turns into speech. During this process conceptual categories (concepts) are mapped on linguistic categories (words). Here is an example of how this happens when English as an L2 is used. (3)

A male native speaker of English is having a conversation with a Thai female student. He wants to know whether she likes sports or not. The Thai student initially says she likes ‘football’ and then immediately replaces that with ‘soccer’. Non-Native Speaker (Thai woman)-Native Speaker (American man) NS: -. . . .So do you like sports? NNS: - I love sports. NS: - What sports do you love? (continued)

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A Possible Model of Knowledge Distribution

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NNS: - I love football.. Ops- in here we call soccer. NS: - Oh okay.

When replacing football with soccer, the NNS probably wanted to provide the NS with an accurate identification of the sport she liked. According to collective salience of her culture, the Thai woman used the right label ‘soccer’. However, she realized that that label for the concept might not work in the actual situation context for the American man. In addition, she likely anticipated that if NS understood her to be identifying American football, he could ask follow-up questions that NNS would be unable to answer. In the NNS’s mind ‘football’ is the label that has priority based on her L1-experience. However, she realized that for the American the word has another most salient meaning. To avoid misunderstanding the Thai student changed the word for ‘soccer’ that matched the actual situational context.

14.4.3

Encyclopedic Knowledge

Now we need to examine how the uncoded part of socio-cultural background knowledge affects language production. In our understanding, encyclopedic knowledge refers not only to extralinguistic information about the world but also to a structured system of knowledge, organized as a network. Rosch’s (1977) schema theory is a theoretical framework which has been developed in the cognitive sciences over the last several decades. The central concept, ‘schema’, has gone by a number of other names, including ‘cultural model’ (Holland & Quinn, 1987; D’Andrade, 1992), ‘frame’ (Minsky, 1975; Fillmore, 1982), ‘mental model’ (Johnson-Laird, 1983), ‘idealized cognitive model’ (Lakoff, 1987), ‘folk model’ (D'Andrade, 1987) and ‘script’ (Schank & Abelson, 1977). According to most of these theories encyclopedic knowledge is mostly represented in cultural models and schemas that provide scenarios or action plans for individuals of how to interpret speech situations and behave in a particular situation or how to interpret the behavior of others in one or another situation. Cultural schemas for social interaction are cognitive structures that contain knowledge for face-to-face interactions in a person’s socio-cultural environment. The following encounter between a Hungarian man and three Chinese women illustrates how these cultural models work. (4)

The four people are going into a restaurant in Albany, NY. The Hungarian stops at the desk of the receptionist while the three Chinese women are walking into the restaurant looking for an empty table. H: - Where are you going? CH1: - There is a vacant table over there. H: - Please wait till we are seated.

According to US customs when someone walks into a restaurant s/he has to wait till the hostess/waitress walks him/her/party to a table. In China there is a different

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model: usually (not always though) you are free to occupy whichever table is available. Not knowing the US cultural model, the three Chinese women acted according to their own. I argued before that cultural models provide a kind of reference library for possible plans of action for oneself or possible interpretation of actions of others (see Kecskes, 2013). These models are not learned directly as models but are inferred by each of us from what we see and experience with those other people in our speech community. But what we experience are never the models themselves. What we infer from experience is pieces of information, images, features that keep a model together. What we infer depends directly on what parts of the given scenario are saliently and repetitively present in the messages we experience for us to pull out the regularities on which we will base our construction of the model behind them. Thus, systematic and repeated changes in speech or cultural behavior in one generation will be learned by the next generation as part of the givens of language or culture. The core of cultural models that people in the same speech community share changes diachronically through systematic and repeated shifts that can come from socio-political changes, technological changes, environmental changes and the like. For instance, currently gender specific expressions such as ‘policeman’, ‘chairman’, and ‘freshman’ are replaced by gender neural expressions such as ‘police officer’, ‘chairperson’, ‘first-year student’, etc. Of course, usually there is trouble if people try to force the linguistic system to accept something that is conceptually unfounded. An example can be Justin Trudeau’s attempt1 to change ‘mankind’ for ‘peoplekind’. These attempts are the result of a socio-political practice that prefers the use of gender-neutral terms in language. Those socio-political practices may prevail if the given speech community will find them important to keep and use them repeatedly.

14.5

Socio-Cultural Background Knowledge in L2

To justify the proposed model, we need to see how it works for L2 and English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) users. Baker (2009) argued that linguistic and cultural forms expressed through ELF are likely to be hybrid, dynamic, and continuously adapting to local needs, global influences, and the demands of communicating across cultures. He lamented that apart from Meierkord’s (2002) study, there is little empirical evidence from ELF settings, and none from expanding circle environments (see footnote 1), that is specifically concerned with understanding how cultural frames of reference and communicative practices operate in such a liminal manner in intercultural communication through English. The situation has not changed much as we can see in Baker’s new book (2015). It is worth looking at House’s argument (2014) who said that when English is used as a lingua franca for communication, it is in principle neutral with regard to the different socio-cultural backgrounds of its

1

Canadian Prime Minister.

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users. Kecskes (2019a) argued that House may not be right. Risager (2006) took House’s argument even further. She spoke not about neutrality of the socio-cultural background but also about separation of language and culture. Building on the understanding of dynamism in critical theory, or as Risager views it, the complex and global flow of language and culture, she claimed that from the perspective of users of English as a second or foreign language, languages and cultures can be separated. In order to explain what she means by this she makes a distinction between cultures and languages in the generic sense and in the differential sense (Risager, 2006: pp. 4–5). In the generic or universal sense, language and culture are intertwined the way some theories such as linguistic relativity proposed (e.g. Gumperz & Levinson, 1996; Whorf, 1939). Language is always an enactment and embodiment of culture, so the two cannot be separated. However, Risager believes that when examining specific languages and cultures such as English, in the differential sense, language and culture can be separated. Her main argument is that all languages, and especially international languages such as English or Spanish, can in practice (i.e., during actual instances of use) take on new cultural meanings. She refers to those as languacultures (Risager, 2006: p. 110), which depend on users and context. In this sense “the link between language and culture is created in every new communicative event” (Risager, 2006: p. 185). As a result, a language such as English will have as many languacultures as there are speakers of the language, and in this sense, there is no identifiable culture to which a language is inseparably tied. She goes even further than that. She believes that at the individual psychological level, i.e. at the level of an individual’s linguistic competence or resources, language and culture are again inseparable, and develop in tandem based on the individual’s life experiences. She believes that this individual perspective may have led to confusion over the relationship between specific languages and cultures, and consequent claims that languages such as English are in some way directly tied to British or U.S. culture as in strong forms of linguistic relativity (Whorf, 1939). What is important for us here is that while maintaining that languages are never culturally neutral for their users, Risager’s approach to the relationship between languages and cultures allows English use in ELF to be separated from the cultures of the inner circle countries. However, this is not quite so if we accept what I suggested earlier: a significant part of inner circle culture (let it be Australian English, American or British English) is encapsulated in the lexical items in English. So Chinese, German, Russian, Korean, etc. learners/users of English have this conceptual knowledge available to them to a certain extent depending on their proficiency level. So, it is a mistake to suggest that target language culture is separated from the use of English as a lingua franca. The problem is that the ELF interlocutors cannot rely on that conceptual knowledge as the inner circle interlocutors can because it is unknown how much of this conceptual knowledge of inner circle English the outer and expanding circle interlocutors share. This is especially true for formulaic language as the example below demonstrates this point quite clearly.

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(5)

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The Interplay of Linguistic, Conceptual and Encyclopedic Knowledge. . . Jianwei, Mary, Andy, and Liya are sitting at a table and eating. Jianwei: - Can I eat that last piece of sandwich? Liya: - Be my guest. Jianwei: - But it’s not yours.

This example shows quite well why we cannot separate inner circle culture from L2 and ELF. There are three non-native speakers and one native speaker at the table. The Chinese student asks for permission to eat the last piece of sandwich. The Russian student uses a formulaic expression to respond, which is a situation-bound utterance, encouraging or allowing someone else to take action like in the following encounter: A: Do you mind if I order another glass of beer? B: Not at all—be my guest.

The possessive pronoun ‘my’ in the set phrase ‘be my guest’ does not necessarily refer to possession. However, the Chinese student in example (5) processes the utterance based on its literal meaning because he may not know the conceptual load of the situation-bound utterance in this figurative use ‘be my guest’. So, a slight misunderstanding occurs. This issue was discussed by Kramsch from a second language acquisition perspective. Kramsch (1993: p. 233) viewed second language communication as operating in a ‘third place” between the users’ first language and culture (L1/C1) and the target language and culture (L2/C2) but being part of neither. She claimed that second languages operate along a “cultural faultline” (p. 205) in which communicative practices are freed from the norms of both L1/C1 and L2/C2, which opens up new perspectives on languages and cultures. Baker (2015) suggested that the notion of liminality, as proposed by Rampton (1995), shares many features with Kramsch’s third places. Rampton studied communication between different ethnic groups within the United Kingdom. He identified “liminal moments” or “crossings” (Rampton, 1995: p. 167) when language users who are not part of a given language community adopt that language for their own purposes or needs at least temporarily. This results in a code-alteration (Rampton, 1995: p. 280) of the L2 by minority or outside users. Rampton argued that such crossings are quite common in the L2 classroom and are a part of L2 teaching and learning practice. Relying on Rampton’s approach, Brumfit (2006) proposed that L2 learning and use can be considered a liminal process that leads users into new areas, in which languages and their cultural codes are unique to each individual and communicative encounter. Baker (2015) emphasized the importance of these approaches and noted that although none of these authors had talked specifically about ELF communication, the notion of third places and liminality have much to offer in highlighting the fluid, dynamic, and novel communicative practices and language–culture connections that might be expected in such contexts. Definitely, both the third space approach and liminality are relevant to our discussion about the interplay of linguistic, conceptual and encyclopedic knowledge in meaning production and comprehension in ELF. However, the question is whether ELF users do something different from what L1 users do. Seemingly, the answer is ‘yes’. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. What

14.6

Summary

291

is beneath is more complex. L1 users rely on the relative, synchronically available ‘end-product’ of language development (see footnote 1): a relatively coherent system of signs and a relatively coherent socio-cultural background knowledge that serves as a support system. This is what LaPolla claims about language development: “Language is the cumulative result of the actions of many individual humans, but their actions are not with the intention to create language; language is the unintended byproduct of their attempts to communicate effectively (constrain the addressee’s inferential process effectively) on an individual level. It forms as if guided by some invisible hand, much the way economies and paths in fields develop (LaPolla, 2010: p. 13)”. But, how is that related to ELF? We should think about the following: ELF users enter into a communicative encounter with their full knowledge of L1, different levels of linguistic, conceptual and encyclopedic knowledge of L2 and an individual understanding of the actual situational context. From there, they start the cumulative process which is usually very short: to put together what they have so as to create core common ground that they can rely on while communicating with each other. Although this is a short process (ELF speech communities are only temporary), people generally try to do similar things that they do in L1 but some of those things are more articulated than in L1. So, ELF users also try to primarily rely on prefabricated language (the idiom principle works), and if they do not have enough of it, they produce new ones. They seek common ground, and if they do not have enough of it, they create some. They try to make sense of the actual situation context, and if that does not fit in their existing repertoire, they co-construct one, and so on and so forth. So, one could argue that they create their own variety of ELF for the time they spend together. And in this endeavor, it is linguistic knowledge that helps them most, since that is that they all share to some extent. Conceptual knowledge is mostly co-constructed on the basis of this shared linguistic knowledge.

14.6

Summary

In this chapter we discussed the relationship and interplay of tree knowledges: linguistic knowledge, conceptual knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge. A model was proposed in which there is linguistic knowledge on one side, and socio-cultural background knowledge (world knowledge) on the other side with constant interaction between the two sides. For analytic reasons, within the sociocultural background knowledge there was a distinction made between conceptual knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge. According to this model, meaning is constructed in the dynamic interplay of actual situational context and prior context encapsulated in lexical items. The context represents the actual, present, situational, ever-changing side of socio-cultural background and the lexical item(s) used in the interaction encapsulate previous experiences and relations in the socio-cultural background. It was claimed that differences between the three types of knowledges are most visible in L2 or ELF use. Access to the three knowledges represented by the target

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language is a graded phenomenon for L2 and ELF users with the most accessible knowledge being the linguistics code, followed by encyclopedic knowledge. L2 interlocutors have the least access to conceptual knowledge tied to the target language. The problem is not just that they do not have enough experience in the target language to develop enough of that type of knowledge, but also that when interlocutors use L2 and ELF they cannot be sure how much of that conceptual knowledge they share with their partners. The interplay of three knowledges requires more research both in L1 and L2 communication not only to further clarify their interrelations but also to analyze the outcome of their interplay in different types of speech communities. Acknowledgement The chapter originally was written for Romero-Trillo Jesus (ed.) Cambridge Handbook of Language and Context. Cambridge: CUP. Thanks to CUP for permission to reuse the text.

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Chapter 15

Processing Implicatures in English as a Lingua Franca Communication

Abstract The paper argues that cognitive mechanisms responsible for implicatures are the same no matter what language someone uses. However, linguistic knowledge, conceptual knowledge, encyclopedic knowledge and contextual effect that are all needed for producing and comprehending implicatures vary significantly in ELF users. They cannot be expected to act in accordance with the conventions and norms of the societal culture of native English-speaking communities. It is claimed that in ELF discourse participants must create their own temporary norms and conventions with implicatures among them. Consequently, it seems mistaken to test L2 users or ELF speakers on the use of L1-based conversational and/or frozen implicatures (functioning as idioms) as many studies have done. The paper offers a modified understanding of implicatures with the notion of “simplicature”, and a model to explain the relationship and interplay between factors that affect implicature processing: linguistic knowledge, conceptual knowledge, encyclopedic knowledge and contextual effect. Keywords Implicature · Norm · Convention · Common ground · Actual situational context · Salience · Simplicature

15.1 15.1.1

Introduction Objectives

The starting point of the paper is that cognitive mechanisms responsible for implicatures are the same no matter what language someone uses. These mechanisms rely on conventionalization, stereotyped expectations, norms, idiomaticity and core common ground of the language in use. But how those mechanisms affect the actual language use depends on the specific language and the availability to those factors that operate the mechanism in the target language by the language users. From this perspective ELF users represent a unique case because of their individual differences in availability to core common ground, stereotyped expectations, norms and idiomaticity of the target language. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_15

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In order to explain how implicatures work in ELF and find out what elements of ELF implicature processing may help us better understand implicature processing in L1 as well, first we will discuss what problems a general, monolingual definition of implicatures raises for ELF communication. Then we will explain why a modified understanding of implicature is needed, which will be related to the interpretation of the notion in Gricean pragmatics. This will lead us to a discussion on processing problems and offering a model that explains differences between L1 and ELF in implicature production and comprehension. In the rest of the paper we examine how salience affects implicature use in general and in ELF in particular.

15.1.2

Definition of Implicature from an ELF Perspective

The issue of implicatures takes a central place in Gricean pragmatics. It is the basis for the Gricean modular view that divides the interpretation process into two stages: what is said and what is implicated. The division between what is said and what is implicated was made for the sake of utterance interpretation and for the sake of distinguishing the semantic meaning from the pragmatic meaning of an utterance. Our present understanding of implicature is fully based on monolingual pragmatics: language use of speakers in a relatively definable and coherent speech community. The definition in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) confirms this claim: “Implicature” denotes either (i) the act of meaning or implying one thing by saying something else, or (ii) the object of that act. Implicatures can be determined by sentence meaning or by conversational context and can be conventional (in different senses) or unconventional. Figures of speech such as metaphor and irony provide familiar examples, as do loose use and damning with faint praise. Implicature serves a variety of goals: communication, maintaining good social relations, misleading without lying, style, and verbal efficiency. Knowledge of common forms of implicature is acquired along with one’s native language (Davis, 2005).”

This definition is a good starting point for several reasons. First, it preserves the gist of original Gricean definition (meaning beyond what is said). Second, it refers to the connection between implicatures and figures of speech where idioms belong to. Finally, the definition underlines of the importance of implicatures as knowledge of common forms at an early age in L1 that is the result of gradually developing ability of speakers to process idiomatic and formulaic language based on growing conceptual and encyclopedic knowledge. Davis’ definition helps us identify the main problems of implicature production and comprehension in English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) communication and revise the notion of implicature from an intercultural perspective. The definition states that implicatures are acquired at early age along with one’s native language in a speech community. If that is so, English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) speakers are in trouble because they might not necessarily have access to implicatures in English (their target language and not L1) at an early age in a developmental sense as they do in L1. The development of

15.1

Introduction

297

understanding non-literal, indirect, figurative speech that partly serves as basis for implicatures starts to shape at a relatively early stage in L1 when children enter into the period of formal operations around ages 10–11 (see Piaget, 1977). In addition, some existing literature (e.g. Antoniou & Katsos, 2017; Barac et al., 2014) with the focus on implicature processing in L2 learners and young multilinguals, confirmed the claim that implicature processing depends on variables such as age and language proficiency. The definition in the SEP also claims that implicatures are dependent on ‘conversational context’. This, however, may not be so if we accept that actual situational context does not help ELF speakers the way it does in L1 (see Kecskes, 2014; Kecskes, 2019a, b; Widdowson, 2017). This is an important fact because implicatures are context dependent in L1. Actual situational context triggers the right (expected) interpretation of implicature for interlocutors. The same utterance might give rise to different conversational implicatures in various contexts. Allan (2001) argued that implicatures are based on stereotyped expectations of what would, more often than not, be the case. If we accept Allan’s claim, then we can understand why ELF implicature processing differs from L1 implicature processing. “Stereotyped expectations” what belong to “core common ground” greatly differ in L1 and ELF use where interlocutors represent different L1s. ELF speakers usually co-create their own actual situational context and build common ground and situational frames in that particular context rather than rely on the existing features, stereotypical expectations and frames of the target language. What they rely on is emergent common ground rather than core common ground as it will be discussed later. The third problem with the definition is the assertion that implicatures are the basis for figures of speech such as metaphor, irony, sarcasm and many times formulaic language and idioms. They usually imply a meaning beyond the literal sense of what is explicitly stated. But in order to understand figures of speech, idioms and nonliteral language interlocutors should have a relatively good command of the target language1 and share core common ground, which is usually not the case in ELF. Kecskes and Zhang (2009) made a difference between “core common ground” and “emergent common ground”. The former refers to knowledge, beliefs, frames and conventions that members of a speech community share. The latter emerges and is co-constructed in the process of interaction by interlocutors. In intercultural communication including ELF interlocutors rely mainly on emergent common ground as it is usually unknown for them how much core common ground of the English language they share with other participants (cf. Björkman, 2014; Kecskes, 2014, 2019a). All these problems point to the fact that there must be some difference in how implicatures work in L1 and ELF. This is the main issue that this paper attempts to unfold.

1

I am aware of the vagueness of this expression. It may refer to an intermediate level of proficiency.

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15.2

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Processing Implicatures in English as a Lingua Franca Communication

The Need for a Modified Understanding of Implicature

Implicatures are a phenomenon that affects any speakers of any language in a similar way: top-down. Therefore, they are heavily influenced by prior experiencebiased salience both in comprehension and production (e.g. Peleg et al., 2001; Liu & You, 2019; Kecskes, 2006). This saliency derives from two main factors mentioned above: “stereotyped expectations” or core common ground, and context-dependency. The two are intertwined because situational contexts in L1 are understood relatively similarly due to shared core common ground. What is communicated beyond what is said can be produced and inferred as a result of this unique symbiosis of these two factors. But ELF users may have a problem with this central part of definition of implicatures that says that “implying one thing by saying something else”, for three reasons. The first one is that semantic analyzability is a crucial feature of language production and comprehension in intercultural communication (e.g. Cieślicka, 2006; García-Gómez, 2020; Kecskes, 2007; Heredia & Cieślicka, 2015). Nonnative speakers consider the linguistic code as core common ground. “Implying one thing by saying something else” is not a good strategy in ELF because it can easily lead to misunderstandings. ELF users usually try to “implicate” only what they say explicitly, i.e. they generally do not implicate anything beyond the bare linguistic meaning of expressions or utterances. This is the best way not to be misunderstood. Secondly, as stated above target language implicatures, especially the ones based on idiomatic and figurative language use require good command of language and core common ground between interlocutors. Let us take two examples (see footnote 1) to illustrate this point: (1)

A Korean and a German student. Kim: - We will need to decide how to proceed with this project. Jorg: - The ball is in your court. Kim: - I know. I will make a decision by tomorrow.

(2)

A Russian and a Chinese student. Kolia: - Why are you beating around the bush? Spit it out. Yuqi: - What do you mean? Kolia: - Just say what you think.

In example (1) there is no misunderstanding because what the idiom implies (“the ball is in your court”) can be understood compositionally even if an ELF speaker is not familiar with it. However, in example (2) the Chinese speaker’s reaction shows that he is not familiar with the idiom “beat around the bush”. This kind of misunderstanding of figurative language almost never happens in L1 because of shared core common ground and collective salience. However, it is very common in ELF (e.g. Deterding, 2013; Kaur, 2011) because ELF speakers cannot be sure what figures of speech of the target language their interlocutors are familiar with.

15.2

The Need for a Modified Understanding of Implicature

299

The third problem is that in ELF contexts, the understanding of implicatures in the Gricean sense (i.e. that implicatures imply one thing by saying something else) is less likely to apply. Consequently, the question for ELF can be formulated as follows: Can implicatures imply what is said and nothing beyond or if not, can they still be considered implicatures? This sounds strange because ‘imply’ means that something is not directly said. But in ELF the Gricean modularity is not always present. In fact, usually it is not present. As a result, most of the time there is little or no difference between what is said and what is communicated in ELF interactions. ELF speakers usually try to avoid vague language and implicating something that is not directly said. They generally remain as direct as possible in their language use (e.g. House, 2003, 2009; Kecskes, 2007; Kaur, 2010; Martin de la Rosa & Romero, 2019). But it is still fair to ask ‘what did the speaker imply?’, and the short answer is: ‘s/he implied/meant what s/he said’. This is somewhat different from the Gricean understanding of implicature that always refers to something that is implied beyond what is said. But that assumption is based on L1 use without any consideration of L2 use. The example below from L1 demonstrates what I have claimed about implicating. (3)

L1 situation: Peter: - Your furniture has been delivered into your room. I saw it. Jon: - OK, thank you. I’ll look at it later.

In the utterance “your furniture has been delivered into your room”, the message is exactly what the utterance says. And, Jon comprehends it that way. Is this an implicature? Not necessarily in the Gricean sense. But should we extend the understanding of implicatures to cases like this, where what is said explicitly is what is meant or find some new term to cover these cases? This is a complicated issue not only in ELF but also in L1. We need to deal with it because of the ever-pending difference between the speaker’s communicative intention and its interpretation by the hearer. I agree with Bach (2005) that a speaker can always mean something distinct from the semantic content of the sentence s/he is uttering. But even if s/he speaks literally, and means precisely what his/her words mean, that also depends on his/her communicative intention (Bach, 2005:27). That is to say, it is the speaker, not the sentence that does the implicating. And the hearer still must infer properly that what the speaker said was what s/he actually meant. Bach further argued that what a speaker could, in a given situation, plausibly be taken to implicate will be constrained by the semantic content of the sentence—certainly it matters what the sentence means—but this does not make implicature a property of the sentence itself. The point of the matter is that both implicating and inferring are pragmatic acts. Therefore, we need to clarify our approach to this crucial notion in pragmatic theories before diving into the analysis of ELF implicatures.

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15.3 15.3.1

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Processing Implicatures in English as a Lingua Franca Communication

Implicatures in Pragmatics The Gricean Approach

In Gricean pragmatics, ‘utterance’ is the product of a verbal act, a communicative unit which may consist of single words, phrases, clauses and clause combinations uttered in an actual situational context with/without intonation and/or gesture selected by the utterer. By saying something the speaker intends to convey some meaning that either coincides with what is said or communicates some literally unsaid information. Thus, ‘implicature’ usually refers to this literally unsaid information that can be conveyed by intonation and/or gesture (or other extra-linguistic factors) or by actual contextual support. But sometimes the speaker means what s/he says, as we saw in example (3). In those cases, there is basically no difference between what is said and what is implicated as far as the speaker’s intention is concerned. As discussed above in ELF the main problems of implicature production and interpretation is limited access to core common ground of the target language and non-target language-based interpretation of situational context or frame. The latter is especially important in what Grice calls “conversational implicatures”, and what he defines as follows: “Conversational implicature is a nonconventional implicature based on an addressee’s assumption that the speaker is following the conversational maxims or at least the cooperative principle.” It is triggered by “certain general features of discourse” rather than by the conventional meaning of specific words (Grice, 1975: p. 26). Limited access to core common ground of the target language in L2 especially comes into play in idiomatic expressions that can be considered “frozen implicatures” (e.g. Arseneault, 2013; Boisset, 1978; Hockett, 1956; Traugott, 2004). In an often-cited comment Grice (1989: p. 39) said: “it may not be impossible for what starts life, so to speak, as a conversational implicature to become conventionalized”. Some early work in the Neo-Gricean tradition sought to establish how conversational implicatures may become attached to an expression and subsequently become part of its meaning (Brown & Levinson, 1987: p. 261). Basically, this refers to the diachronic process of possible idiomatization of conversational implicatures. For instance, the implicature has been conventionalized as literal meaning in the expression “go to the bathroom”, which is now an idiom with the meaning “to excrete”. Thus, we can say non-metaphorically, “the dog went to the bathroom on the living room rug”. The point is that this kind of expressions are a part of core common ground in the given speech community, to which non-L1 speaker may have limited access, which will have a serious effect on their ability to process this type of implicatures in the target language unless what is implied can be inferred based on the compositional meaning like in this example. Implicatures are not generated only through breaking the maxims. The Cooperative Principle and the modular view have been criticized from several perspectives and alternative interpretations were offered (e.g. Bach 1999; Carston, 2002; Horn, 2004; Levinson, 2000; Zufferey et al., 2019). Most attempts to revise/correct the

15.3

Implicatures in Pragmatics

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problems of the modular view and recognize pragmatic features of the speaker’s meaning (e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Carston, 2002; Moeschler, 2004: explicature/implicature; Capone, 2008: what-is-A-said/what-is-B-said; Bach, 1994: what is said/impliciture/implicature) have not gone far enough because they still were interested primarily in utterance interpretation, without paying due attention to private knowledge, prior experience, and the emergent, rather than the a priori only intentions of the speaker. Having mentioned these attempts to correct the modular view and relate them to our main issue, we must return to our question above: should we extend the understanding of implicatures to cases where what is said explicitly is what is meant or find some new term to cover these cases? The explicature-implicature separation offered by the Relevance Theory is not the best solution for us if we want to understand what is going on in ELF because explicature also includes some pragmatic features of speaker’s meaning. And these pragmatic features are based on target language norms and conventions that might not be known and/or recognized by ELF speaker/hearers. In ELF what speaker’s meaning implies is very often the bare linguistic meaning of the utterance in which the linguistic units do not have any pragmatic enrichment of the target language. This bare linguistic meaning is a linguistic artifact in L1 but not in ELF where literal meaning is often not blended with any existing conceptual knowledge rather this temporary conceptual knowledge is co-constructed in the course of interaction. So, I recommend that to denote these cases we should use the term “simplicature”: the speaker simply means what the words in her utterance mean without any particular pragmatic enrichment of the target language or her L1. The conceptual load is worked out in the interaction as is the case in example (4) (see footnote 1): (4)

Brazilian au pair girls talking to a man from Hong Kong on living circumstances: HKM: Ah. . .so you people are here au pair, hmm? BNF/BSF/BIF: Yeah/Hmm. HKM: Tell me something about. . .so you live together with the families, yeah? BNF/BSF/BIF: Yeah. BNF: Ah. . . I am here the nanny. HKM: Hmm. BNF: And we take care of the kids. They give you. . .food and they host us for home a year. . . HKM: Do they give you some stipends? Some money? BNF/ BSF/BIF: Yeah. BNF: We, we, we, we are paid. HKM: Aha. BNF: And they pay. . .our studies. And. . . HKM: How about living circumstances? Do you have your separate room, or. . .? BNF/ BSF: Yeah. Yes HKM: Tell me something about it. BSF: Ah. . .we have to have our own room.

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The exchange demonstrates how the conceptual load for the simplicature “Ah. . .so you people are here au pair, hmm?” is being co-constructed by the speakers. They both have the bare linguistic meaning of the word “au pair” but want to make sure that it means the same thing for both of them. This type of simplicature that exits also in L1 (although to less extent) requires to revisit the speaker’s and hearer’s role in meaning construction not only in L2 but L1 as well.

15.3.2

Utterer Implicatures and Audience Implicatures

In any kind of language use conversational meaning is created by the interplay of linguistic signs and actual situational context (e.g. Kecskes, 2014; Kampf et al., 2019). So, the question is: how much context is needed to be added to the linguistic meaning of a sentence so that it should make sense when uttered in a given situation? If we take L1 communication and ELF communication this interplay between linguistic units and context can be demonstrated on a continuum: linguistic units actual situational context The more coherent a speech community is, the more core common ground its members share, and the more they attend to existing cultural frames and norms, the more they can rely on the selective and meaning-determining role of actual situational context. This is usually the case in L1 speech communities. However, in ELF interlocutors have limited access to target language-based common ground, shared beliefs, norms and conventions so they need to co-construct them temporarily in the conversational exchanges (see Kecskes, 2014, 2019a, b). Consequently, the actual situational context appears to play a constitutive rather than selective role. Also, there appears to be a shift in emphasis from the communal to the individual. It is not that the individual becomes more important than the societal. Rather, since there is limited common ground, it should be created in the interactional context in which interlocutors function as co-creators of core common ground rather than just common ground seekers and activators as is mostly the case in L1 communication (see footnote 1). So, the nature of intersubjectivity seems to be being changed. There is more reliance on language created ad hoc by individuals in the course of interaction than on prefabricated language and pre-existing frames. In the case of ELF speakers who need to rely on limited target language-based common ground, and whose L1s differ, the lack of full control over language skills (L2) and full knowledge of conventions, beliefs and norms in the target language (L2) may lead to a more conscious approach to what is said and how it is said. What is really important in ELF interactions is not exactly what interlocutors already have in common (because they may know quite little about that) but what they can and do co-construct in the course of interaction. As a result, speakers have more authority not only over what they utterer-implicate, but also what they conversationally implicate, which is not exactly the case in L1. Let me explain this further.

15.4

Processing Implicatures

303

In order to better understand what happens in ELF interaction we should rely on Saul’s (Saul, 2002) distinction between ‘utterer-implicatures’ and ‘audienceimplicatures’ that was based on L1 communication. Utterer-implicatures are claims that the speaker attempts to conversationally implicate (intended by the speaker, but not necessarily recognized by the addressee/audience). Audience-implicatures are claims that the audience takes to be conversationally implicated (recognized by the addressee/audience but not necessarily intended by the speaker). This dichotomy is needed because it helps us explain the possible gap between speaker’s utterance and its interpretation by the hearer. This gap, however, can be minimal in ELF because of the endeavor of speakers to rely on semantic analyzability. So, by analogy we can talk about “utterer-simplicature” and “audience-simplicature” when the “utterersimplicature’ does not implicate anything more than what is said, as often happens in ELF. This is mainly due to the fact that ELF users are on the semantics side of the semantics-pragmatics interface because they cannot count on actual contextual support to that extent as they can in L1 as we discussed above. So Humpty Dumpty’s maxim (Lewis Caroll 1871, Through the Looking-Glass) is truer than ever before: “When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less”. When a lingua franca speaker produces an utterance it usually signifies more or less what its compositional meaning is, and the speaker can expect that partners “audience-simplicate” the utterance. Semantic analyzability helps perfect match between utterer-simplicature and audience-simplicature in any language use. But what does this mean for implicature processing in ELF? How can simplicatures be further explained, what justifies their presence especially in ELF?

15.4 15.4.1

Processing Implicatures A Possible Processing Model

One might ask: how do people understand implicatures? What makes us capable of correctly processing something that is not said directly in the Gricean sense? To answer these questions, we should create a model to explain the relationship between three factors: linguistic knowledge, conceptual knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge (see Kecskes, 2019a). In this model we have linguistic knowledge on one side of a continuum and socio-cultural background knowledge (world knowledge) on the other side. There is a constant interaction between the two sides. For analytic reasons, within the socio-cultural background knowledge we should distinguish between conceptual knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge. Linguistic knowledge Socio-cultural background knowledge Conceptual knowledge ---- encyclopedic knowledge

In this model, meaning is constructed in the dynamic interplay of actual situational context and semantic content of lexical items, with context representing the

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actual, present, situational, ever-changing locus of socio-cultural background and the lexical item(s) encapsulating previous experiences, contexts and relations in the socio-cultural background. The lexical items with their semantic properties (linguistic knowledge) represent prior reoccurring experience (conceptual knowledge) and the actual situational context triggers the other part of world knowledge that has been called encyclopedic knowledge. So the difference between the two types of sociocultural background knowledge (world knowledge) is that the conceptual knowledge part is immediately tied to linguistic knowledge (semantics) while the other type of socio-cultural background knowledge (encyclopedic knowledge) is called upon as needed in the actual situational context. But, how does that model work for implicatures? First, we will examine two cases (A and B) when ELF speakerhearers have little or no problem with target language-based implicatures: (A) If what is said equals what is meant, compositional meaning prevails. The only problem in this case can be the proficiency of ELF speakers: The hearer may not understand a word or expression because s/he is not familiar with it. Here are a couple of examples: in one of them (5) there is a full compositional match, while in the other (6) unfamiliarity with the idiomatic expression inhibits comprehension. (5)

Full match: Arabic student and French student French: - How long was your flight? Arabic: - Thirteen hours. French: - It is a long way to go.

There is a match between utterer-implicature and hearer-implicature. Not like in the next example: (6)

No match because of unfamiliarity with expression. ELF speakers: a Hungarian student (Sandor) and a German student (Manfred) are talking. Sandor: - I think Sue’s argument was incorrect. Manfred: - You may have missed the boat there. I guess she was right. Sandor: - It was not about a boat. Manfred: - Sorry, you may not have understood her point.

As you can see, the Hungarian student, Sandor did not seem to have understood the idiomatic expression ‘missed the boat’ used by Manfred, the German student. The point is that this is not an implicature problem, rather it appears to be a language proficiency problem: Sandor does not know the idiom. But is this really the case? Later we will return to this issue. Now we should look at case “B”. (B) No problem is expected to occur in either L1 or ELF if the implicature can be processed on the basis of general encyclopedic knowledge that most people with any linguistic and/or cultural background are familiar with.

15.4

Processing Implicatures

(7)

305

Oksana (Russian) and Franziska (German) are talking: Oksana: People usually listen to me. Franziska: You’re lucky because you’re pretty. Oksana: -What does prettiness have to do with attention? Franziska: - A lot.

As we can see, the utterer-implicature is that pretty people are usually listened to. This is supposed to be quite a well-known stereotypical way of thinking no matter what language someone speaks (knowledge of the world) (see footnote 1). Oksana’s reaction shows she understands it but does not agree with it. The point is that basic general encyclopedic knowledge is not language specific. Consequently, implicatures based on this general encyclopedic knowledge are not difficult for any interlocutors to understand.

15.4.2

Processing Problems

The real problem in producing implicatures (utterer-implicatures) and processing implicatures (audience implicatures) occurs when speaker-hearers, especially ELF ones must rely on either (a) conceptual knowledge that is culture-specific or (b) linguistic knowledge where semantics prevails, because speaker/hearers are faced with a lexical item or expression that encodes some culture-specific conceptual property (e.g. ‘chicken out’, ‘patronize’, ‘cakewalk’, ‘kick the bucket’, etc.) (see footnote 1). Let us see examples for both cases: (8)

A Turkish student (TS) is talking to a Korean student (KS). KS: - Do you know where Arnold is? TS: - There is a Humvee outside. KS: - What do you mean? TS: - His girlfriend is in the military. KS: - Okay..? TS: - That Humvee is used by military personnel.

There are two problems here: First, the Turkish student’s utterer-implicature did not take into account the possible limitations of the hearer’s background knowledge. There was no recipient design at all. For the Korean student to understand the uttererimplicature he needs to know what a ‘Humvee’ is. [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV; colloquial: Humvee) is a family of light, four-wheel drive, military trucks and utility vehicles produced by AM General]. Humvee is the short name for that type of vehicle in American culture, which is culture-specific knowledge. Second, the Korean student would also need to know that Arnold’s girlfriend is in the military. This information could not be inferred without knowing what a Humvee is. That would have been the actual contextual trigger for the

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implicature. As the Korean’s nonplussed response shows, neither of the uttererimplicatures went through. The Turkish student had to give an explanation. Continuing our discussion on conceptual knowledge we need to turn some former research on L2 implicatures. One of the most typical examples for the crucial role of conceptual knowledge in processing implicature is the so-called ‘Pope Q’ implicature. This is a type of relevance-based implicature which Bouton labelled ‘pope’ questions, (Pope-Q) after the prototypical example ‘Is the Pope a Catholic?’ (cf. Bouton, 1988, 1994). A seemingly unrelated response is applied to indicate (usually in a good-natured way) that a question has been asked to which the answer is very obvious, like in (9). (9) Kate: - Do you think it will rain tomorrow? Bob: - Is the Pope catholic?

We can lexicalize this pragmatic function in different ways such as ‘do bears fly?’; ‘does the sun come up in the east?’, etc. All these expressions convey equivalent implication: “I think the answer is obvious?” However, there is an important issue here for ELF users. Most of the lexicalizations of this pragmatic function are language- and culture-specific. The more culture-specific they are, the more difficulty ELF users may face in inferring their correct meaning. In one of the previous studies (Kecskes, 2001:258), the following example was used: (10) Amy: - Don’t you think Jim drinks a bit too much? Billy: - Is the Pope catholic?

The nonnative speaker subjects gave a range of interpretations: Russian student (2 years in the US, female, age 23): “Catholics drink too much”. Spanish student (6 months in the US, female, age 27): “Billy thinks that catholic people drink too much”. Spanish student (8 months in the US, male, age 22): “Billy confused catholic with alcoholic”. All interpretations were inaccurate and showed that the utterer-implicature did not match the audience-implicatures. This discrepancy occurred because the compositional meaning of the utterance did not make sense in the given situation. Consequently, the inaccurate interpretations were inevitable considering the unshared socio-cultural knowledge around the phrase “is the Pope catholic”. We should be careful when analyzing this type of implicature because some of the lexicalizations of the pragmatics function (“something is obvious”) are widely used and conventionalized (e.g. ‘is the Pope catholic’ or ‘do bears fly’) while others are spontaneously created in the course of conversation like in example (12) below. It seems that what both conventionalized expressions and ad-hoc generated

15.5

Salience and Implicatures

307

expressions have in common is only their communicative function: “express something that is obvious”. (11)

Example from Bouton (1988: 191). Two roommates are talking about what they are going to do during the summer. Fran: My mother wants me to stay home and entertain the relatives when they come to visit us at the beach. Joan: Do you have a lot of relatives? Fran: Does a dog have fleas?

In this brief exchange the expression Fran used is not very common or may have been generated in the course of conversation (see footnote 1), and may not only perform the usual communicative function of such conventionalized utterances (“I think it obvious”) but also convey annoyance about the relatives. In interpreting expressions such as this, prior experience of the speaker-hearer plays a very important role. Since prior experience contributes to salience effect, we need to examine how salience affects implicature use in general and in ELF in particular.

15.5

Salience and Implicatures

In producing and processing implicatures, figurativity and formulaicity play a decisive role because most of the time figurative and formulaic expressions communicate something beyond what they say. The way they are processed may create a major difference between L1 and non-L1 users including ELF speaker-hearers. Both figurativity and formulaicity are connected with salience. Kecskes (2006, 2014) defined salience as a semiotic notion that refers to the relative importance or prominence of signs: it is the most probable out of all possible construals. Peleg et al. (2001) argued that context may affect comprehension immediately, but it is ineffective in blocking (contextually incompatible) salient meanings, since contextual effect does not interact with lexical processes but runs in parallel. This is true for L1, because salience effect cancels the decisive role of the literal-figurative dichotomy in production and comprehension and puts the most salient meaning at the center. Therefore, the Gricean modularity (linguistic meaning first, then contextual effect) is not always applicable in L1 processing. As a consequence, the most salient meaning of a word, expression or utterance prevails both in production and comprehension, and that meaning can be figurative, literal or both. In top-down processing (comprehension) and production, what matters in L1 is the most salient meaning that is based on prior experience, familiarity, frequency, prominence, etc., and the effect of those combined factors will override any contextual effect. If that is the case, then we can say that both utterer-implicature and audience-implicature may work differently for an L1 speaker-hearer than for an ELF speaker-hearer because of the latter’s potentially limited access to target language-based prior experience, familiarity and frequency. More processing effort is needed on the ELF side. This

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is basically what some experimental studies on implicature processing of L2 speakers demonstrated (cf. Antoniou & Katsos, 2017; Antoniou et al., 2019). In example (6) we already highlighted this problem and promised to come back to it with more explanation. Here are two more examples to illustrate this point (see footnote 1): (12)

L1 speakers Tom: - Are you coming to the Quincy Jones concert? Sally: - It’s not my cup of tea. Tom: - OK, I understand. Not everyone likes his music.

(13)

ELF speakers (Russian and Chinese) Sasha: - Are you coming to the Quincy Jones’ concert? Xiao: - It’s not my cup of tea. Sasha: - What does tea have to do with the concert? Xiao: - OK, I just do not like Quincy’s music.

In both cases the utterance ‘it’s not my cup of tea’ implies the same thing indirectly: I do not like QJ and/or his music, so I won’t go to the concert. What is implicated is almost like what is said for the L1 speakers because of the formulaic feature of the expression. No special processing effort is needed. Based on their L1 prior experience and language socialization, a particular familiarity develops with these figurative and formulaic expressions. Tannen and Öztek (1981: p. 54) argued that “cultures that have set formulas afford their members the tranquility of knowing that what they say will be interpreted by the addressee in the same way that it is intended, and that, after all, is the ultimate purpose of communication.” Therefore, formulaic expressions and figurative language usually do not complicate L1 production and use, rather they simplify them. Utterer-implicature more often than not matches audience-implicature when formulaic expressions are used among L1 users. They function like simplicatures do. What counts is what message that particular wording (formula) usually conveys to the speakers of that language community. It is important to note that formulaic and idiomatic expressions are usually not polysemic. They mean, and usually imply, the same thing for most members of the L1 speech community. They appear to function like frozen implicatures. What happens in L1 can be described as follows: A particular communicative act and/or repeated speech event gets worded in a particular way, usually in a metaphoric way (but not always) that may convey some meaning above compositional/ literal meanings of words in the expression, such as ‘it’s not my cup of tea’ (not my fancy), ‘help yourself’ (take whatever you want), ‘stick around’ (don’t go away), ‘be my guest’ (allowing, permitting), etc. (e.g. Guan & Forceville, 2020; Macagno, 2020). But it can also happen that the compositional meaning of an expression gets similar privileged formulaic status such as ‘what can I do for you?’, ‘this way, please’, ‘I have nothing to wear’. Because of repeated use and recurrence, the expression may become privileged to denote a particular communicative act or

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Salience and Implicatures

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speech event, and it does not matter that the wording may be not the literal way to describe that act or event. What counts is the communicative function that the expression conveys. The functional meaning of the expression can override the compositional meaning of the words that make up the expression. This is how the functional meaning becomes the most salient meaning of the expression in a given speech community (L1) as the expressions above demonstrate. If these expressions are used in the given speech community, there is no modular effect. No literal meaning is processed first. The most salient meaning prevails, whether it is the literal/compositional meaning or the figurative meaning of the expression. Note that the implications in such expressions are not ‘dead’ in the sense of having lost their original meaning and imaginative force through frequent use or outdated terminology. Rather they are “frozen” (as I said above) in a sense that they stopped denoting anything else but the functional meaning that is attached to them. They are unlikely to be misinterpreted by/for L1 speakers. What can be better for smooth communication than a perfect match between an utterer-implicature and an audience implicature? Continuing this line of thinking we need to look at what Widdowson said about figurative language in L1 and ELF. Widdowson (2017:277-278) argued that if familiar, jointly understood idiomatic phrases are used in L1 there is no violation of maxims so there is no implicature. No special inference is needed for the hearer to process them. It is clear that for Widdowson, ‘implicature’ means something that departs from the familiar and ‘customary patterns of use’, like in the Gricean paradigm. He further argued that there is no implicature without bilateral condition of mutual norm recognition. Consequently, the criteria for implicature are twofold for him: maxim violation (“When a maxim is violated, the effect is what Grice refers to as an “implicature”), and bilateral condition of mutual norm recognition. I agree with Widdowson that in L1 talk formulaicity restricts the possible interpretations of what is implied to one option only, which leads to a full match between the uttererimplicature and audience-implicature. So “bilateral condition of mutual norm recognition” works in L1. Let us see now how this works for formulaic language use in ELF. Widdowson connected implicature use in ELF with creativity. He argued that much of ELF use can be described as creative. He considers ELF creativity as acts of intended non-conformity, deliberate departures from an expected norm (Widdowson, 2017: p. 277) (see footnote 1). He claimed that these departures are intended to have a particular perlocutionary effect—to make an utterance emphatic, ironic, amusing, and so on. Also, he emphasized that to be a non-conformist in this way is to act against what Grice (1975) called the Cooperative Principle. According to Widdowson, the maxim that is of particular relevance to creativity is the so-called ‘maxim of manner’, which calls for perspicuity of expression. When people communicate, they would normally be expected to conform to this clarity condition, avoid obscurity and ambiguity and make their meanings as transparent as possible. Thus, creative uses of language go against this maxim since they are of their nature non-conformist and unexpected, and so they quite naturally give rise to implicatures. So far so good! But then Widdowson (2017: pp. 278–279) said the following:

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But this bilateral condition of mutual norm recognition typically does not apply in contexts of interaction between ELF users. If one or more than one of them is a non-native speaker, as is frequently the case, they exploit whatever linguistic resources they have at their disposal to get their meaning across and whatever non-conformities they produce are not usually intended to be noticed as such, and even if they are, the recipient may well not be able to ratify the intention. If the condition of mutual norm familiarity is not met, there is no implicature. In what sense, then, can ELF usage be considered creative?

I do not agree with Widdowson’s argument that implicature occurs only if the “bilateral condition of mutual norm recognition” is met. If that were true, there would be almost no implicatures in ELF communication. Furthermore, Widdowson (2017:279) continues arguing like this: According to the co-operative principle, an implicature comes about when a departure from the default norm is intended and recognized as such. The usual assumption is that this norm is preconceived a schematic construct already known by the participants as a basis for their co-operation. But when ELF users co-operate in their communication—since they come from different linguacultural backgrounds—they cannot rely on such shared preconceptions. How do ELF users from Lecce and Leicester, for example, or from Bangkok and Barcelona manage to communicate? The answer, I suggest, is that they negotiate pro-tem norms online in the adaptive, emergent process of their very interaction. The co-operative principle still applies, as it must apply to all communication, but it is acted upon in ways that do not require conformity to conventional native speaker ways in which the principle is put into practice.

I agree with Widdowson that ELF users lack core common ground that would enable them to use and process implicatures the way L1 users do since they come from different linguacultural backgrounds and cannot rely on shared preconceptions. Yet we cannot conclude from this that ELF users do not use implicatures, but simply that they rarely use target language-based implicatures. And when they use implicatures they do not expect them to be inferred based on target language (English) conceptual knowledge. This is because ELF speakers usually lack what Widdowson called “bilateral condition of mutual norm recognition” in the target language due to their limited exposure to English socio-cultural background as discussed above. But that does not mean that they do not use or recognize implicatures. So, we need to modify the requirement to “bilateral condition of mutual function recognition” rather than norm recognition. Here are two examples from VOICE (Seidlhofer, 2011): (14) “The point of the whole things about quota it’s a very good idea but in the same time it’s like knife with double blade” “I feel that many times I am pulling the brakes and I’m really and I’m consciously doing it because I know time is needed”

There are no norms either in the English language or in any other language according to which the highlighted expressions have been created. But they make sense and are recognized by ELF users because of mutual recognition of function they perform. A significant part of human communication is built on implicature production and comprehension. The cognitive mechanisms for implicatures are the same no matter

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Conclusion

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what language someone uses. However, the linguistic knowledge, conceptual knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge that are all needed for implicatures vary significantly in ELF users, especially conceptual knowledge that is the key for implicatures as we saw in some of the examples above. Consequently, ELF users cannot be expected to act in accordance with the conventions of the societal culture of native English-speaking communities. They must create their own temporary norms and conventions with implicatures among them. That is why it seems mistaken to test L2 users or ELF speakers on the use of L1-based frozen conventional implicatures as many studies have done (e.g. Bouton, 1994; Taguchi, 2005; Köylü, 2018; Antoniou & Katsos, 2017).

15.6

Conclusion

It was argued that there is no fundamental difference between L1, L2 and ELF users as far as mechanisms responsible for implicature processing are concerned. However, the way interlocutors produce and interpret implicatures may differ significantly in L1 and ELF. First, the modular view does not seem to work in ELF because semantic analyzability is the ruling principle in both production and comprehension. Actual situational context cannot help the interpretation process the way it does in L1 because speaker-hearers in temporary speech communities do not share similar cultural models, frames and collective salience. Vague language and indirect speech do not help the communicative process in any way in ELF, so interlocutors try to avoid them. Findings of implicature-processing studies in L2 (e.g. Bouton, 1994; Taguchi, 2005; Köylü, 2018; Antoniou & Katsos, 2017) revealed that implicatures that relied on formulaic and figurative language (e.g. novel metaphors, irony, and idiomatic expressions) where specific conceptual knowledge was required for correct processing were especially hard for L2 subjects to comprehend. This makes perfect sense because ELF users often have only limited access to core common ground and the collective salience of the target language, and the “bilateral condition of mutual (target language) norm recognition” does not support their implicature production and inferencing. However, this does not mean that ELF speakers do not use implicatures or they use them more rarely than L1 speakers. They do, but not necessarily target language-based implicatures. Instead of depending on mutual conceptual knowledge that drives implicature use in L1, ELF users rely on co-constructed and temporarily shared knowledge-bases and emergent common ground. That helps them produce and comprehend ad hoc created implicatures. What works for them is a bilateral condition of mutual function recognition rather than a “bilateral condition of mutual norm recognition” (Widdowson, 2017:277). Preference for semantic analyzability in ELF creates “utterer-implicatures” that usually do not implicate anything else beyond what is said. We have called them “simplicatures” to distinguish them from explicatures that include target

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language-based pragmatic enrichment. They usually create perfect match between what the speaker intends to say and how it is interpreted by the hearer. What we can observe in ELF interactions is a kind of pragmaticalization of semantics which is a synchronic, one-off phenomenon in which coded meaning, sometimes without any specific pragmatic enrichment based on the target language, obtains temporary pragmatic status. ELF speakers need this in situ- and ad hoc-generated pragmaticalization process because they cannot rely on target language-based pragmatic effects as happens in L1. Target language norms and frames do not work well in ELF, so interlocutors usually need to jointly build up their own frames in the course of interaction. Actual situational context does not help much because it may be understood differently by interlocutors. Therefore ELF users will produce and interpret a pragmatic act—including implicatures—mainly based on its semantic content that is pragmaticalized not by the actual contextual effect or core common ground as usually is the case in L1 but by prior context and knowledge and co-constructed emergent common ground. Consequently, there is no impoverished pragmatics here (see Kecskes, 2019b). What we have is pragmatics with some different emphasis than we experience in L1. Pragmatics in ELF relies not necessarily on existing norms, standards and conventions as in L1 but rather on emergent intention, innovation, emergent common ground, online frame building and one-off strategies. This ELF-type of pragmatics is a unique feature of ELF users whose nature we should continue investigating. Acknowledgement The paper was first published in 2021 in Lingua. Vol. 254. Thanks to Elsevier for permission to reuse the text.

References Allan, K. (2001). Natural language semantics. Wiley-Blackwell. Antoniou, K., & Katsos, N. (2017). The effect of childhood multilingualism and bilectalism on implicature understanding. Applied PsychoLinguistics, 38, 787–833. Antoniou, K., Veenstra, A., Kissine, M., & Katsos, N. (2019). How does childhood bilingualism and bi-dialectalism affect the interpretation and processing of pragmatic meanings? Bilingualism: Language and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1366728918001189 Arseneault, M. (2013). An Implicature account of idioms. International Review of Pragmatics, 6(1), 59–77. Bach, K. (1994). Conversational Impliciture. Mind and Language., 9(2), 124–162. Bach, K. (1999). The myth of conventional implicature. Linguistics and Philosophy, 22(4), 327– 366. Bach, K. (2005). Context ex Machina. In S. Zoltán (Ed.), Semantics vs. pragmatics (pp. 15–45). Oxford University Press. Barac, R., Bialystok, E., Castro, D. C., & Sanchez, M. (2014). The cognitive development of young dual language learners: A critical review. Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 29(4), 765–785. 4th Quarter 2014. Björkman, B. (2014). An analysis of polyadic English as a lingua franca (ELF) speech: A communicative strategies framework. Journal of Pragmatics, 66, 122–138. Boisset, J.-H. (1978). Idioms as linguistic conventions. University of Florida.

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Chapter 16

Formulaic Language and its Place in Intercultural Pragmatics

Abstract This chapter discusses the use of formulaic language in a second language (L2) from the perspective of intercultural pragmatics introducing the socio-cognitive approach as a theoretical frame. It argues that the low rate of formulaic language in L2 does not mean that the idiom principle and economy principle do not affect L2 use. Rather the low rate is due to two factors. First, besides frequency of exposure there are several factors such as acceptance, preference and willingness to use, which are not present in L1 to the extent as in L2. Second, as a compensation for limited use of L2 formulas L2 learners create new formulaic units, which is the result of individual endeavours or co-construction. Keywords Idiom principle · Economy principle · Prefabricated unit · Nativelikeness · Formulas

16.1

Introduction

In spite of the fact that many studies report low rate of use of formulaic expressions in L2 (e.g., Ellis et al., 2008; Kecskes, 2007; Prodromou, 2008; Warga, 2005) formulaic language (FL) use is as important in a second language (L2) as in a first language (L1). Several scholars called our attention to how important prefabricated units are in L1 and L2 production and comprehension. This work started in L1 research (see Hymes, 1962; Fillmore, 1976) and L2 scholars followed suit (e.g., Hakuta, 1974; Krashen & Scarcella, 1978; Weinert, 1995). Hymes (1962) pointed out that an immense portion of verbal behaviour consists of linguistic routines. Bolinger (1976) suggested that speakers do at least as much remembering as they do putting together. Fillmore (1976) also found that an enormously large amount of natural language is formulaic, automatic and rehearsed, rather than propositional, creative or freely generated. Sinclair (1991) argued that language production alternates between word-for-word combinations and prefabricated multi-word combinations. This is so because all languages have particular ways of putting words together which is eloquently represented in the domain of phraseology and is supposed to be a major mechanism contributing to the formation and reinforcement of a person’s © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Kecskes, The Socio-Cognitive Approach to Communication and Pragmatics, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology 33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30160-5_16

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language use and cultural identity (Cowie, 1998). Kecskes (2007, 2013) claimed that preferred ways of saying things and preferred ways of organizing thoughts in a language are best reflected in the use of FL that has received particular attention over the last four decades, especially idioms, speech formulas and metaphors. As far as L1s are concerned, the development of formulaicity and idiomaticity is a natural consequence of language socialization and socialization through language. There is psycholinguistic evidence that fixed expressions and formulas have an important economizing role in speech production (cf. Miller & Weinert, 1998; Wray, 2002) (see Chap. 2 in this volume). Sinclair’s (Sinclair, 1991) idiom principle says that the use of prefabricated chunks may illustrate a natural tendency to economy of effort. This means that in communication we want to achieve more cognitive effects with less processing effort. Formulaic expressions ease the processing overload not only because they are ready-made but also because their salient meanings are easily accessible in online production and processing. There is no doubt about this in L1 (e.g., Ellis et al., 2008; Giora, 2003; Kecskes, 2002). But how about intercultural communication in which interlocutors do not share core common ground or lingua franca communication where the medium of interaction is not the L1 of any of the participants? Will formulaic expressions play the same role in L2 use as they do in L1? Is FL the essential part of language use when L2 is put to use in intercultural interactions? These are some of the important questions that intercultural pragmatics seeks answers for. In fact, the use of FL is one of the central issues of research in intercultural pragmatics (e.g., Kecskes, 2007, 2013; Osuka, 2017). Intercultural Pragmatics is concerned with the way the language system is put to use in social encounters between human beings who have different L1s, communicate in a common language, and, usually, represent different cultures (Kecskes, 2010, 2013). What is common in interlocutors in intercultural interactions is that they use their L2 or Lx for communication. The communicative process in these encounters is synergistic in the sense that in them existing pragmatic norms and emerging, co-constructed features are present to a varying degree. An important reason for the emergence of Intercultural Pragmatics as a new field of inquiry at the beginning of the 2000s was to distinguish research on intercultural interaction and discourse from interlanguage and cross-cultural pragmatics, as well as to emphasize the importance of developing a subfield of pragmatics with a multilingual angle. Interlanguage pragmatics focuses on the acquisition and use of pragmatic norms in L2: how L2 learners produce and comprehend speech acts, and how their pragmatic competence develops over time (e.g., Kasper & Shoshana 1993; Kasper, 1998). Cross-cultural pragmatics (e.g., Boxer, 2002; Wierzbicka, 2001) is comparative in nature. It focuses on cross-cultural similarities and differences in the linguistic realization and sociopragmatic judgment in context. By now, it has become clear that each of these three disciplines has its own legitimacy. However, it is almost unavoidable that these three fields have some overlap, which is a natural consequence of some of the issues that each addresses from its own perspective. Intercultural Pragmatics represents a socio-cognitive perspective in which individual prior experience and actual social situational experience are equally important

16.2

The Socio-Cognitive Approach (SCA)

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in meaning construction and comprehension. If we want to answer the questions raised above about FL use in L2, first we will need to give a brief overview of the main tenets of the socio-cognitive approach (SCA) that constitutes the theoretical basis of research in Intercultural Pragmatics. In SCA there is emphasis on the interplay of cooperation (actual situational experience) and egocentrism (prior experience) in language production and comprehension, which help us better understand the differences between L1 and L2 in the use of FL.

16.2

The Socio-Cognitive Approach (SCA)

The main goal of SCA is to bring together the two seemingly antagonistic lines of research in pragmatics: the “individualistic” intention-based cognitive-philosophical line and the “societal”, context-based sociocultural-interactional line to better explain intercultural interactions. This looks like a necessary attempt because we human beings have a double nature: we are both individuals and social beings at the same time. This fact is reflected in our communicative behaviour and is very important if we want to understand the differences in FL use in L1 and L2. Recently SCA has been used in several studies focusing on a variety of issues both in L1 and L2 including FL (e.g., Macagno & Bigi, 2017; Schenck & Choi, 2015). One of the main differences between the cognitive-philosophical approach and the socio-cultural interactional approach is that the former considers intention a prior mental state of speakers that underpins communication, while the latter regards intention as a post factum construct that is achieved jointly through the dynamic emergence of meaning in conversation in which socio-cultural factors play the leading role. Since the two approaches represent two different perspectives, it would be difficult to reject either of them entirely. According to SCA, the complexity of the issue requires that we consider both the a priori and co-constructed, emergent sides of intention when analysing communicative processes. SCA was proposed by Kecskes (2008, 2010, 2013) and Kecskes and Zhang (2009) as an attempt to unite the two perspectives, and emphasize that there is a dialectical relationship between a priori intention (based on individual prior experience) and emergent intention (based on actual social situational experience), as well as egocentrism (individual) and cooperation (social). In this approach interlocutors are considered social beings searching for meaning with individual minds embedded in a socio-cultural collectivity. SCA argues that Grice was right when he tied cooperation to the speaker-hearer’s rationality. However, egocentrism must be added to speaker-hearer’s rationality. We human beings are just as egocentric (as individuals) as cooperative (as social beings). Several studies (e.g., Barr & Keysar, 2005; Giora, 2003; Keysar, 2007) claimed that speakers and hearers commonly ignore their mutual knowledge when they produce and understand language. Their behaviour is called ‘egocentric’ because it is rooted in the speakers-hearers’ own knowledge instead of their mutual knowledge. If this

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claim is accepted then speaker’s utterance cannot be just recipient design because it is also affected by individual prior experience. ‘Egocentrism’ in the SCA refers to attention-bias that is the result of prior experience of an individual. It means that interlocutors activate and bring up the most salient information to the needed attentional level in the construction (by the speaker) and comprehension (by the hearer) of the communication. This issue is especially important when interlocutors use their L2 or Lx. What is most salient for an L2 user is usually motivated by her/his L1 prior experience or limited L2 experience. There is nothing negative about egocentrism if the term is used in this sense. It should not be confused with ‘egotistic’ that refers to a person who is selfcentered and focuses only on his/her agenda. Communication is a dynamic process, in which individuals are not only constrained by societal conditions but they also shape them at the same time. As a consequence, the process is characterized by the interplay of two sets of traits that are inseparable, mutually supportive, and interactive: Individual traits: prior experience salience egocentrism attention

Social traits: actual situational experience relevance cooperation intention

Individual traits (prior experience ! salience ! egocentrism !attention) interact with societal traits (actual situational experience ! relevance ! cooperation ! intention). Each trait is the consequence of the other. Prior experience results in salience which leads to egocentrism that drives attention. Intention is a cooperationdirected practice that is governed by relevance which (partly) depends on actual situational experience. Integrating the pragmatic view of cooperation and the cognitive view of egocentrism and SCA emphasizes that both cooperation and egocentrism are manifested in all phases of communication, albeit in a varying degree. Communication is the result of the interplay of intention and attention motivated by the socio-cultural background that is privatized individually by interlocutors. The socio-cultural background is composed of the environment (actual situational context in which the communication occurs), the encyclopaedic knowledge of interlocutors deriving from their ‘prior experience’, tied to the linguistic expressions they use, and their ‘current experience’, in which those expressions create and convey meaning. So, language is considered both individual (as part of prior experience knowledge) and social (part of the actual situation). In communication, we show our two sides. We cooperate by generating and formulating intention(s) that is/are relevant to the given actual situational context. At the same time, our egocentrism means that we activate the most salient information to our attention in the construction (speaker) and comprehension (hearer) of utterances. The interplay of cooperation (social) and egocentrism (individual) has a profound effect on language processing. This is where we should look for the origin of FL use. Cooperation and common prior experience within a speech community result in the

16.3

Formulaic Language in L1

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development of prefabricated linguistic units that mean the same thing for the members of that community and make interaction smooth. At the same time, individual differences in prior experience and different communicative goals are reflected in freely generated language. The two types of language processing (analytic – holistic) could be viewed as forming a continuum. Speakers of any language in their actual language use move up and down on a continuum whose hypothetical ends are “prefabricated language” and “ad hoc generated language” like below: Prefabricated language Ad hoc generated language

Language users, no matter whether they use the given language as L1, L2 or Lx, are always in between the two poles. This means that they use more or less prefabricated and ad hoc generated language depending on several factors such as communicative need, intention, topic, actual situational context, speech partners, etc. If we want to understand why FL is as important in L2 as in L1 first we should review the most important issues in L1 use that have relevance in L2 as well.

16.3

Formulaic Language in L1

By FL we usually mean multi-word collocations which are stored and retrieved holistically rather than being generated de novo with each use. Collocations, fixed semantic units, frozen metaphors, phrasal verbs, speech formulas, idioms and situation-bound utterances can all be considered as examples of FL (Howarth, 1998; Kecskes, 2000; Wray, 2002, 2005). These word strings occurring together tend to convey holistic meanings that are either more than the sum of the individual parts, or else diverge significantly from a literal, or word-for-word meaning and operate as a single semantic unit (Gairns & Redman, 1986). However, with the appearance of huge corpora, understanding FL has become more complicated. Working with large corpora, Altenberg (1998) went so far as to claim that almost 80% of our language production can be considered formulaic. Whatever the proportion actually is, one thing is for sure: speakers in conventional speech situations tend to do more remembering than putting together. Our everyday conversations are often restricted to short routinized interchanges where we act as the given situational ‘frame’ requires. So, a typical conversation between a customer and a store assistant may look like this: (1)

Conversation between store assistant (A) and Customer (B). A: - What can I do for you? C: - Thank you, I am just looking. A: - Are you looking for something particular? C: - No, not really. (continued)

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Formulaic Language and its Place in Intercultural Pragmatics A: - If you need help, just let me know.

The expressions that the speakers used do not look freely generated. Each of them can be considered a formula that is tied to this particular kind of situation. A great deal of linguistic performance, both speech and writing, does not involve improvising phrases and sentences ex nihilo from a vocabulary of several thousand words or lexical items and a basic stock of internalized grammatical patterns or rules, as the generative syntacticians believed (see, for instance Chomsky, 1981). Pawley and Syder (1983) claimed that although few people are able to encode, either in advance or while speaking, anything longer than a single clause of eight to ten words, they all regularly produce far longer fluent, pause-free, multi-clause utterances in spontaneous speech, mainly because they employ many prefabricated units and utterances. What we seem to do is to retain language in chunks, and this way much of our mental lexicon is stored in lexical expressions. This is basically what we do, no matter whether we use or L1, L2 or Lx. Kecskes (2016) argued that real linguistic creativity appears to be a discourse phenomenon rather than a sentence phenomenon as generative syntacticians have claimed. The economizing role of memorized lexical phrases allows addressees to pay attention to the larger structure of the discourse rather than to individual lexical items. What Pawley and Syder (1983) said about the size of the postulated stock of familiar usages is very interesting. Whereas “the number of single morpheme lexical items known to the average mature English speaker is relatively small; a few thousand”, they suggest that “the number of sentence-length expressions familiar to the ordinary mature English speaker probably amounts, at least, to several hundreds of thousands” (p. 194). What about L2 users? It is essential that this number will be much less for them because of lack of or limited exposure and other factors that will be discussed below. The huge stock of prefabricated units in the mind that are ready to be called upon when need occurs is mainly the result of normativization, standardization, emergence of shared expectations and core common ground development of native speakers in a particular language or speech community. There is evidence (e.g., Eckert, 1992; Gumperz, 1968; Kecskes, 2015) that when people are together even only for a short time they create a speech community that starts to develop their language use norms from scratch. Kecskes (2015, 2016) claimed that the endeavour of creating normative use by developing formulas in a speech community is part of human rationality just like Gricean cooperation. He demonstrated through two research projects that the idiom principle is on in L2 as well, but it generates less FL that it is the case in L1. However, as a compensation L2 learners produce their own formulas in the course of interaction even if they spend only a short time together. Gumperz (1968) defined a speech community as any human aggregate characterized by regular and frequent interaction by means of a shared body of verbal signs and set off from similar aggregates by significant differences in language usage. Based on all this we may say that the more time a group or community of people spend together the more we can expect that they start to give special meaning to certain strings of linguistic signs and units. As a result, their language use

16.4

Psychological Saliency of Formulaic Sequences

321

will be more and more characterized by the use of formulaic expressions that will be combined by ad hoc generated linguistic units. Kecskes (2016) argued that in SCA creativity in language use is considered a dynamic process in which formulaic units are combined with ad hoc generated elements in a syntax and discourse affecting way. Research in L2 confirms that (see Ellis, 2003; Ellis et al., 2008; Howarth, 1998).

16.4

Psychological Saliency of Formulaic Sequences

People use accessible categories to make sense of their social and linguistic context and environment. For a social or linguistic category to affect behaviour it must be psychologically salient as the basis for perception and self-conception. From the perspective of L2 use it is important to discuss the psychological salience of formulaic units. That will help us better understand why FL use differs in L1 and L2. Examining the role of psychological saliency in the use of formulaic units highlights that psychologically salient formulas behave like coherent, synergistic lexico-functional units and not as multi-word chunks whose meaning can be calculated on the basis of its composition. The question for L2 users is as follows: Can they develop this psychological saliency in L2? What factors affect that process? Simpson-Vlach and Ellis (2010) argued that psycholinguistically salient sequences like on the other hand, suffice it to say, welcome abroad, you are all set, cohere much more than would be expected by chance. Thus, measures of association, rather than raw frequency keep them glued together. If we want to understand how formulas and idiomatic units function we will need to answer the following questions: Do native language users perceive particular word sequences as formulaic-functional units, and other word sequences only as loose collocations that are often used together? What is the difference, for instance, between the ‘glued together’ word sequences such as suffice it to say, as a matter of fact, and ad hoc frequent word sequences such as if they were. . . or I have been...? What is needed for considering a word sequence a formulaic-functional unit? How does psychological saliency work in L2 use? With the emergence of corpus linguistics, the interest in multi-word sequences has increased to a great extent. Corpus linguists go beyond the Bolingerian ‘remembering and putting together’ dynamism of language use and mostly side with Altenberg (1998) who claimed that 80% of our language production can be considered formulaic. (see above). This appears to be so if we accept Wray’s definition of formulaic sequences: “a formulaic sequence [is] a sequence, continuous or discontinuous, of words or other elements, which is, or appears to be, prefabricated: that is, stored and retrieved whole from memory at the time of use, rather than being subject to generation or analysis by the language grammar” (Wray, 2002: p. 9). Based on this definition there is hardly anything in language production that cannot be considered formulaic.

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There is no doubt about the fact that an immense portion of verbal behaviour consists of linguistic routines. But what is the nature of these linguistic routines? Why do they exist in the language? Are they the results of the functioning of the linguistic system or are they the results of socio-cultural needs? The right answer to this question is both. Multi-word sequences clearly demonstrate the distinction between conventions of language and conventions of usage. This division has been made by several researchers including Searle (1979) and Morgan (1978). Searle said: “It is, by now, I hope, uncontroversial that there is a distinction to be made between meaning and use, but what is less generally recognized is that there can be conventions of usage that are not meaning conventions” (1979, p. 49). This distinction is expressed even more clearly by Morgan: In sum, then, I am proposing that there are at least two distinct kinds of convention involved in speech acts: conventions of language . . .and conventions in a culture of usage of language in certain cases. . .The former, conventions of language, are what make up the language, at least in part. The latter, conventions of usage, are a matter of culture (manners, religion, law. . . .) (Morgan, 1978, p. 269).

To demonstrate the difference between the two types of conventions, let us look at the following examples: (2)

Renting a car Clerk: - Can I help you, sir. Customer: - Yes. I have a reservation. Clerk: - Your name, please. Customer: - James Cunning. Clerk: - May I see your driver’s license, Mr. Cunning?

None of the expressions used by the interlocutors look freely generated. Each of them can be considered a formula. However, if we consider the following conversation, we may see something different. (3)

Bill and David are talking. Bill: - If we want to be on time we will need to take a taxi. B: - OK, my friend.

Can the expressions in bold be considered formulas? Are they in any way different from the ones in example (2)? There is no doubt that the expressions in bold consist of words that are frequently used together. But are they formulas here? Do they have some kind of psychological saliency as formulas for the speakers? We must be careful with the answer because frequency of occurrence of word sequences is only one of the criteria based on which we can identify formulaic expressions. The problem is that the role of frequency seems to be overemphasized in present day linguistics, especially in corpus linguistics. Recent research analysing written and spoken discourse has established that highly frequent, recurrent sequences of words, variously called lexical bundles, chunks, and multiword expressions, are not only salient but also functionally significant (e.g., Biber et al., 1999; Ellis et al., 2008).

16.4

Psychological Saliency of Formulaic Sequences

323

Cognitive research demonstrated that knowledge of these ready-made expressions is crucial for fluent processing. The recurrent nature of these units is discussed in the relevant literature (Biber et al., 1999; McEnery & Wilson, 1996). Simpson-Vlach and Ellis (2010) confirmed that large stretches of language are adequately described as collocational streams where patterns flow into each other. However, Sinclair (1991)‘s idiom principle is based primarily not on frequency that results in long lists of recurrent word sequences (Biber et al., 2004, 1999). The problem with list of reoccurring word sequences is that they can hardly give us any chance to distinguish where we have conventionalized formulas or where we have just frequently occurring word chunks that lack psychological saliency. We need a criterium other than frequency to distinguish between frequently occurring collocations and formulaic expressions. Corpus linguistics does not help us much with that distinction. Biber et al. (1999, p. 990), in their study of lexical bundles, defined FL as sequences of word forms that commonly go together in natural discourse, irrespective of their structural make-up or idiomaticity, and argued that conversation has a larger amount of lexical bundle types than academic prose. However, there seems to be a clear difference from the perspective of psychological saliency between sequences such as to tell the truth, as a matter of fact, on the one hand, and if they could, we will need to, huge suitcase, or that is probably what. . . although all these expressions are high on any frequency-based list. This is why we need to distinguish between groups of prefabricated expressions that have psychological saliency for speakers of a particular language community and loosely-tied, frequently occurring word sequences such as if they want, to do with it, tell them to, etc. L2 studies that are relevant for intercultural pragmatics show something different. They also emphasize the importance of frequency in processing FL. Ellis et al. (2008) argued that formula processing by non-natives, despite their many years of English as a second language (ESL) instruction, was a result of the frequency of the string rather than its coherence. For learners at that stage of development, it is the number of times the string appears in the input that determines fluency. Ellis et al. argued that tuning the system according to frequency of occurrence alone is not enough for nativelike accuracy and efficiency. According to those authors, what is additionally required is tuning the system for coherence–for co-occurrence greater than chance. Ellis et al. (2008) claimed that this is what solves the two puzzles for linguistic theory posed by Pawley and Syder (1983), nativelike selection and nativelike fluency. Native speakers have extracted the underlying co-occurrence information, often implicitly from usage. Non-native speakers, even advanced ESL learners with more than 10 years of English instruction, still have a long way to go in their sampling of language. These learners are starting to recognize and become attuned to more frequent word sequences, but they need help to recognize distinctive formulas. Based on the socio-cognitive approach intercultural pragmatics gives a different explanation for this phenomenon. It argues that the development of psychological validity/saliency of these expressions in L2 is a matter of not only frequency and exposure to language use but also immersion in the culture, acceptance and wish of the non-native speaker whether s/he wants to use those formulaic expressions or not

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(see details of Ortaçtepe, 2012 and Kecskes, 2015 studies below). Frequent encounters with these expressions for non-native speakers help but are not enough to develop psychological saliency, as the following encounter between a Korean student and a clerk at the Registrar’s office demonstrates: (4)

Korean student (Lee) and Registrar (Clerk) encounter. Lee: - Could you sign this document for me, please? Clerk: - Come again...? Lee: - Why should I come again? I am here now.

In spite of the distinctive intonation used by the clerk when uttering come again, the Korean student processed the expression not as a formula but as a freely generated expression with literal meaning. So, what really counts is the type of association between the lexical units in a sequence, rather than raw frequency. What creates psychological saliency is the discursive function in a particular context of that expression. As mentioned at the beginning of this section the formula behaves like one coherent synergistic lexico-functional unit and not as a multi-word chunk whose meaning can be calculated on the basis of its composition. This functional aspect is what makes immersion in the target culture important for non-native speakers, because that is where those functions come from. But as we will see later that may not be enough.

16.5

How Does Intercultural Pragmatics Explain Formulaic Language Use?

There have been several studies within the confines of intercultural pragmatics that have aimed to look at how formulas are used in intercultural interaction or by bilingual speakers (e.g., Çakır, 2008; Minakova & Gural, 2015; Ortaçtepe, 2012; Taguchi et al., 2013; Zhou, 2012). They all mention that non-native speakers struggle with the use of FL for several reasons including lack of knowledge of conceptual load attached to formulas, no fit into synergistic communicative style, unwillingness to use certain expressions, preference for ad hoc generated expressions, etc. When we examine intercultural interactions two more problems occur. One of them is that interlocutors in intercultural interactions cannot be sure that their partners understand the given formula the same way they do because they may lack the core common ground that native speakers share. Let us take the following example: (5)

Jianwei, Mary, Andy, Liya are sitting at a table and eating. Jianwei: - Can I eat that last piece of sandwich? Liya: - Be my guest. Jianwei: - But it’s not yours.

16.5

How Does Intercultural Pragmatics Explain Formulaic Language Use?

325

This example shows the problem very well. There are three non-native speakers and one native speaker at the table. The Chinese student asks for permission to eat the last piece of sandwich. The Russian student uses a formula to respond, which is a situation-bound utterance, encouraging or allowing someone else to take action like in the following encounter: A: Do you mind if I order another glass of beer? B: Not at all—be my guest. The possessive pronoun my in the set phrase be my guest does not necessarily refer to possession. However, the Chinese student processes the utterance based on its literal meaning because he may not know the functional meaning of the situationbound utterance be my guest. So, a slight misunderstanding occurs. The socio-cognitive approach emphasizes the importance of prior experience and actual situational experience. When formulas are used in L1, native speakers almost never misunderstand each other because they have the necessary prior experience with the use of formulas and the actual situational frame makes their use smooth and clear. In intercultural interactions, the interlocutors’ prior experience with target language (L2) formulas significantly differs because of the factors mentioned above such as acceptance, preference, willingness to use, etc. that are not present in L1 to the same extent. Besides, the situational frame does not play the same triggering and/or clarifying role as it does in L1 because interactants may not be equally familiar with it. The other problem that intercultural pragmatics research highlights is the contradiction that exists between the default processing principles (idiom principle and economy principle) and the low rate of target language formulas in intercultural communication. Being the default processing strategy the formulaic option is expected to be most salient in language production in L1 (Sinclair, 1991; Miller & Weinert, 1998; Wray, 2002). The open choice principle is invoked in L1 only when the idiom principle fails or is blocked for some reason. This looks like a logical mechanism in L1 production where participants can rely on mutual understanding of formulaic expressions that are motivated by common ground, conventions, commonalities, norms, common beliefs and mutual knowledge. This explains why we find much ‘remembering’, i.e. FL use in L1. However, this is not the case in L2 where the idiom principle generates much less FL. But why? Does it mean that L2 users’ mind is not prewired for the idiom principle the way L1 users’ mind is? And what about the economy principle? Are these two principles blocked in L2, or they function in a different way in L2? Based on the socio-cognitive approach we can argue that neither of the principles is blocked in L2 production and intercultural interactions (see Kecskes, 2015). What we have is a shift of emphasis from the communal to the individual, and that move causes changes in how the two principles operate. The key issue here is the extent to which interlocutors have access to core common ground. If societal circumstances in the speech community provide broad core common ground, speakers in that community may rely on a wide range of FL provided by presumed background information shared by participants in interactions. However, if this core common ground is not present to the extent it is in L1, L2 users must co-construct it, which is not an easy task given the different socio-cultural background the participants represent in

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intercultural interactions. So, it is not that the individual becomes more important than the societal. Rather, since there is limited core common ground, it should be created in the interactional context in which the interlocutors function as core common ground creators rather than just common ground seekers and activators as is mostly the case in L1. As a consequence, there is more reliance on language created ad hoc by individuals in the course of interaction than on prefabricated language and pre-existing frames in the target language. But the idiom principle and economy principle are on: L2 users’ primary choice is formulaic units if they have access to any in the target language. And the natural tendency to the economy of effort also works. L2 users want to achieve as much as possible with the least possible effort both in production and comprehension. But how can they do that? They use the open choice principle to create formulas. There is more new formula creation than use of existing formulas in L2. We can find evidence in corpora to prove this (Kecskes, 2007, 2015): (A) L2 speakers use formulas where their proficiency and preference allow that. Ortaçtepe (2012) conducted a longitudinal, mixed-method study that relied on the assumption that international students as newcomers to the American culture, experience bilingual development through conceptual socialization which enables them to gain competency in the target language through exposure to the target language and culture. By collecting qualitative and quantitative data three times over a year, the study examined the linguistic and social development of Turkish bilingual students as a result of their conceptual socialization in the U.S. Ortactepe provided evidence that L2 learners’ conceptual socialization relies predominantly—contrary to what previous research says—on learners’ investment in language rather than only on extended social networks. Examining FL use she found that in case of advanced language learners the use of FL depends not on proficiency but on acceptance, preference and willingness of use. (B) Kecskes (2015) conducted a corpus-based study to examine if the idiom principle is blocked in L2 production or not. Data collection was based on seven conversations that lasted 30-min recording spontaneous speech on topics such as health, sports, living in Albany. The participants were as follows: C1 Japanese and Korean, C2 Korean and Turkish, C3 Korean and Chinese, C4 Japanese and Chinese, C5 Chinese and Korean, C6 Korean and Burmese, C7 African-French and Korean. Two types of production sequences were selected within each 30-minute session: (1) how do participants introduce themselves (closed social situation) and (2) how do participants introduce a new topic (open social situation)? Introduction is a closed social situation that requires formulaicity in most languages. The subjects (6 out of 7 pairs) relied on well-known situation-bound utterances rather than freely generated expressions: • Let me introduce myself first. • So glad to meet you. Let me ask you how long you have been here? • Can I ask your name?

16.5

How Does Intercultural Pragmatics Explain Formulaic Language Use?

327

• Nice to meet you. Introducing a new topic is an open social situation. Although the frame is well known, language use associated with this frame is much less formalized than in close social situations. Focus of analysis was on the first attempt to change the topic of the conversation. Results showed that subjects used mainly freely generated expressions to introduce a new topic. For instance: (6) C1B: - Ok it’s been three or. . . three months so far right? Do you like living in Albany? Living in America? C4B: - So can you please tell me the difficulties in life here. C6B: - And what about . . . do you care more about . . . food?

The examples above demonstrate that the idiom principle must be on because the ad hoc generated utterance chunks are combined with some formulaic expressions (see in bold) that are relevant to the matter the participants attempted to talk about. (C) L2 speakers generate new formulas that are the results of cooperation and co-construction. The more time members of a speech community spend together the more norms of conduct they develop for themselves. There is evidence (e.g., Canagarajah, 2014; Eckert, 1992; Gumperz, 1968; Kecskes, 2015) that when people are together even only for a short time they create a speech community that starts to develop its language use norms from scratch. They create formulas that do not exist in the target language or are modifications of existing formulaic expressions such as it is almost skips from my thoughts, you are not very rich in communication, take a school, etc. Kecskes (2015) demonstrated that English lingua franca (ELF) speakers frequently coin or create their own ways of expressing themselves effectively, and the mistakes they may make will carry on in their speech, even though the correct form is there for them to imitate. For instance, he reported that several participants in a spontaneous conversation adopted the phrase native Americans to refer to native speakers of American English. Although in the ‘think aloud’ conversation session, the correct expression (native speaker of American English) was repeated several times by one of the researchers, the erroneous formula native Americans kept being used by the lingua franca speakers. They even joked about it and said that the use of target language formulas coined by them in their temporary speech community was considered like a ‘joint venture’ and created a special feeling of camaraderie in the group. Several studies in ELF (e.g., Firth, 2009; Mauranen, 2009; Pitzl, 2012; Seidlhofer, 2009) reported this ‘creative’ attitude of L2 users to idiomatic expressions. However, we have to be careful with what we actually consider creative language use and what constitutes an error in ELF. Cogo and Dewey (2012) claimed that “deciding what

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constitutes an error is [. . .] not a particularly ELF-compatible way of thinking about language” (p. 78). Pitzl et al. (2008) talked about ‘creative innovations’. To be creative in a language first of all means drawing on experiences and knowledge in that language, and then diverge in ways which may be unexpected but still processible by other language users.

16.6

Conclusions and Future Directions

The chapter emphasized that from the perspective of intercultural pragmatics only those linguistic units should be considered formulaic that have some psychological saliency for the language users. These expressions are glued together and cohere much more than would be expected by chance or in collocations where the measure of association is only raw frequency. This approach partly explains the low level of FL use in L2 or Lx. The lack of or limited psychological saliency for L2 users bring forth factors such as acceptance, preference and willingness to use that may be present in L1 use to a lesser extent. It was argued that the idiom principle and economy principle are the main driving forces of any language use. They are inherent and affect the use of any language production, the question only is to what extent. Human beings want to achieve as much as possible with the least possible effort. The best way to do that is to use as many prefabricated chunks of language and possible and combine them with ad hoc generated utterances in a creative way. As it was argued above there is little use of L2 FL in intercultural interactions but at the same time there is quite a bit of new formula creation that is the result of individual endeavours or co-construction. So, the open choice principle is used not only for generating expressions ad hoc but also as a compensation for limited access to prefabricated units in the target language. Future research should focus on the investigation of the nature of this compensation process. Several attempts have already been made in this direction (see Kecskes, 2016; Pitzl, 2012; Taguchi et al., 2013). These studies have focused on the creative language use of ELF speakers and sought answer to the question: where is the limit to ELF interlocutors’ ‘creative use of language’? There is also need to study further the psychological factors such as preference and willingness to use that affect the selection and use of target language formulas. This should be connected with the investigation of what types of formulaic expressions L2 users create ad hoc in temporary speech communities. Acknowledgement The chapter was first published in Siyanova-Chanturia, Anan and Ana Pellicer-Sánchez (eds.) Understanding formulaic language. New York: Routledge. Pp. 170-188. Thanks to Routledge for permission to reuse the text.

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